Global Jihad in Muslim and non-Muslim Contexts [1st ed.] 9783030470432, 9783030470449

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Global Jihad in Muslim and non-Muslim Contexts Jonathan Matusitz

Global Jihad in Muslim and non-Muslim Contexts

Jonathan Matusitz

Global Jihad in Muslim and non-Muslim Contexts

Jonathan Matusitz University of Central Florida Orlando, FL, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-47043-2 ISBN 978-3-030-47044-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47044-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

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Introduction Global Appeal to Jihad Quest for the Caliphate Objectives of This Book Importance of Understanding Global Jihad Quick Facts on Jihad in Europe Today Why Focusing on Ten Reasons for Global Jihad? No Single Explanation for Jihad Scholarship Sometimes Too Narrow Case Study: 2019 Sri Lanka Easter Bombings Reason 1: Political Motivations Reason 2: Religious Motivations Reason 3: Economic Conditions? Comparison with Other Books Summary of All Chapters References

1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 13 13 14 15 16 17 24

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Jihad: A Description Interpretation Within the Scope of This Book The Ummah Jihad for the Ummah Jihad in History Reasons for Early Jihad

29 30 30 31 32 33 v

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Crusades and European Colonies Greater vs. Lesser Jihad Spiritual and Political Interpretation Further Contradictions Defensive vs. Offensive Jihad Defensive Jihad Offensive Jihad Who Are the Jihadists Today? The Increase in the Number of Jihadist Groups Jihadist Ideologues and Leaders Thoughts on Global Jihad Today Landscapes of Jihad Indirect Jihadist Players Inside Western Lands References

34 35 36 36 37 37 38 39 40 42 44 44 45 46 53

Radicalization The “Slippery Slope” Radical Milieu Radical Ideologies Islamic Radicalization Four Stages of Islamic Radicalization Jihadization Who Is Susceptible to Islamic Radicalization? Gender Considerations Case Study I: Jihadization in French Prisons Case Study II: Jihadization in U.S. Military Detention Centers References

59 60 61 62 62 63 64 65 65 67

Group Dynamics and Socialization Group Grievance Individual Psychology, Group Psychology, and Terrorism Groupthink Jihadist Group Polarization Social Identity Theory (SIT) Social Identity and Group Membership In-Group vs. Out-Group

79 79 80 81 82 82 83 83

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Out-Group Threat to the Ummah Threat to Muslim Identity Grooming the In-Group Mentality Dehumanization Psychosocial Resilience Psychosocial Resilience Through Group Interaction Case Study: Palestinian Youths Communal Routines References 5

Social Alienation Durkheimian Perspectives Terrorism and the Failed Integration Model Social Closure Theory The Elite Structural Discrimination Social Alienation of Muslims in the West From Estrangement to Radicalization Radicalization Within No-Go Zones From Estranged to Foreign Fighters Social Alienation and Jihadism: Outsider and Insiders The Outsiders The Insiders First- vs. Second- and Third-Generation Muslims Illegitimacy of Authorities Case Studies Case Study I: Muslim Youths in Belgium Case Study II: Muslim Youths in France Case Study III: Muslim Youths in Great Britain Case Study IV: Palestinians in Israel Problems of Social Integration? Insufficient Evidence to Support “Lack of Social Integration” European Efforts on Integration Successful Multiculturalism? References

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84 85 85 86 87 87 88 89 96 103 103 104 105 105 106 106 107 108 109 110 110 111 111 112 113 113 114 115 116 117 117 119 120 127

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Religious Motivations Social Construction of Religion Truth for the Devout or Suffering Sacralization of Conflict and Religious Outbidding Quran-Driven Jihad Violence Against Unbelievers in the Quran Case Study: Hamas Principle of Abrogation Hadith-Driven Jihad Origins of Jihad in the Hadith Prophetic Methodology Dawah The Shahid as a Hero Martyrdom Suicide Terrorism, Not Suicide Jannah or Eternal Paradise Jannah for Martyrs Karbala Case Studies Case Study I: Belgian and Dutch Muslims Case Study II: Ajmal Kasab References

135 136 136 137 137 138 140 140 142 143 144 145 145 146 146 147 148 150 150 150 151 157

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Legal Motivations Ulama Differences in Islamic Legal Training Sharia Sharia as a Universalist Body of Law Sharia-Driven Jihad Case Study I: Saudi Arabia Case Study II: Pakistan Case Study III: Situation in 13 Countries Fiqh Jihad as Legal “Just War” Islamic Military Jurisprudence Dar al-Islam vs. Dar al-Harb Fard Ayn vs. Fard Kifaya Legal Persuasion for Jihad: Additional Perspectives References

163 164 164 165 165 166 166 167 168 168 169 170 171 172 173 177

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Political Motivations “Decadence” of Muslim Societies Case Study: The Iranian Revolution The Muslim Brotherhood: A Description Political Jihadism Alliance with Nazi Germany The Muslim Brotherhood: Sayyid Qutb Jahiliyyah Traveling to the United States Sayyid Qutb’s Legacy The Global Caliphate Perspectives from the Past Islamic State No Possible Negotiation Violating International Borders Emirates: The Precursor to the Caliphate Reactions Against Foreign Policy Blowback Theory Collective Emotional Orientation References

181 182 183 184 185 185 186 186 187 188 189 189 190 191 191 192 193 193 195 200

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A Clash of Civilizations Five Significant Factors Cultures vs. Civilizations Jihad Against the Rest Identity Issues Territorial Issues Jihad vs. McWorld McWorld: A Description Dangers of “Excessive” Modernity The Lexus and the Olive Tree Clash with Human Rights and Western-Based Laws On the Universal Declaration on Human Rights On the Treatment of Non-Muslim Minorities Clash of Unprovable Universalisms Western Lawmakers as “Crusaders” Culture Wars Democracy References

207 207 209 210 210 211 212 212 213 214 216 216 217 219 220 221 221 228

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Economic Conditions Economic Conditions and Jihadism Demographic Factors Poverty State Failure Suicide Bombers Palestinian Terrorists World Risk Society Modernity and Risk Global Financial Risks as Causes of Terrorism Risk Communities and Imagined Communities Risk Communities Imagined Communities Radical Ummah as Imagined Community Jihad Always a Result of Economic Conditions? Studies Rejecting the Jihad-Poverty Link The Taliban, Osama Bin Laden, and “Poverty” References

233 234 234 235 235 237 238 240 240 240 242 242 242 243 244 244 245 251

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Transformative Learning Taking Action vs. Instructional Learning Perspective Transformation Meaning-Making Transformation Frames of Reference Paradigm Shift Jihadist Radicalization Through Self-Learning Precursors to Jihadist Radicalization Paradigm Shift Transformative Learning Through Jihadist Sermons Legitimation of Jihad Through Discourse Sermons Offering New Frames of Reference Jihadist Sermons: Case Studies Case Study I: Anwar al-Awlaki’s Sermons Case Study II: Aboud Rogo’s Sermons Case Study III: Abu Hamza al-Masri’s Sermons Case Study IV: Mustafa Graf’s Sermons Final Notes References

255 256 256 257 257 258 259 260 261 261 262 263 265 265 267 269 270 271 278

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Outbidding and Internal Rifts Destructive Competition vs. Escalating Competition Internal Rifts Internal Rifts Increasing Support Outbidding and Internal Rifts in Jihad Increasing Jihadist Attacks Fratricidal Jihadists 2014 Peshawar School Massacre Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) First Internal Rifts in 2006 Aggressive Claims to Leadership From AQI to ISI to ISIS The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) In Competition with Al-Qaeda In Competition with Al-Nusra Front Jihadist Outbidding in the Syrian Civil War A Staggering Death Toll The Syrian Government Hafez al-Assad’s Régime Outbidding in Palestinian Suicide Terrorism Domestic Competition Palestinian Suicide Bombers Competition Hypothesis: Two Opposing Views Outbidding Within the Caucasus Emirate Evolution of Internal Tensions Terrorism to Outbid Other Factions References

283 284 285 286 287 287 288 289 290 290 291 291 292 293 295 296 296 296 297 298 298 299 301 301 302 302 309

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Conclusion A Global War Against Both Muslims and Non-Muslims Diverse Forces of Convergence Salafism as Fascism Reformation in Islam: Two Opposing Directions Global Divergence Theory (GDT) More Than Just a “Clash of Civilizations” A Paradigm Shift Democracy vs. Salafist Islam

315 316 317 319 321 322 323 324 325

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Global Divergence within the Ummah Final Thoughts References Index

326 327 331 337

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This book examines global jihad by describing ten reasons that have fueled one of the most threatening crises that humankind has ever faced. We cannot begin to deal with the problem until we acquire a better understanding of its roots. Journalists, essayists, and academics alike have facilely presented global jihad as rooted in the Muslim religion and its holy scriptures, as originating in a Clash of Civilizations, as embedded in the long-established memory of the Crusades and postcolonial politics, or as driven by the Wahhabi hatred of the Infidels. It is actually all these combined reasons—in addition to many other reasons—that contribute to the problem. Consequently, this book fills this gap by describing, in detail, ten reasons for global jihad today. Specifically, these reasons are (1) radicalization, (2) group dynamics and socialization, (3) social alienation, (4) religious motivations, (5) legal motivations, (6) political motivations, (7) a Clash of Civilizations, (8) economic conditions, (9) transformative learning, and (10) outbidding and internal rifts. There is no more contentious and disquieting topic with respect to Islam than that of jihad. For a multitude of reasons, studies of jihad have been a sensitive matter.1 Muslim history is replete with occurrences of violence, terrorism, and negation of human rights that were conducted presumably to advance Islam, sharia (Islamic law), and the jihadist doctrine. Significant portions of the Muslim world continue to witness lawlessness, extreme violence, and jihadist activities.2 Until the September 11, 2001 attacks, the discipline of jihadism studies held a negligible position within mainstream academic circles. Only a few renowned scholars3 © The Author(s) 2020 J. Matusitz, Global Jihad in Muslim and non-Muslim Contexts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47044-9_1

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devoted their time to develop social scientific or meaningful explanations to jihadist wars across time and space. Such intellectual endeavors were mostly concerned with past events, whereby scholars were trying hard to interpret evolving trends and predict the types of jihadist waves that would appear in the future.

Global Appeal to Jihad According to a study of extremism conducted in 2019 by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP),4 terrorist attacks have increased by 500% since September 11, 2001. Although terrorism has been in the media limelight for several decades, since 9/11 world order has been shaken by the colossal, unpredictable movement of global jihad. Sometimes referred to as “jihadism,” “Islamist terrorism,” or “contemporary jihadist violence,” global jihad denotes a widespread militant movement rooted in Islam and existentially threatening the present-day world order, both in the Western and non-Western worlds.5 Global jihad is particularly troubling because of its scattered popular support within civil societies. It is a multifaceted conflict symbolized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, between fighters and civilians, and between modern terror strategies and methods of conflict customary in pre-modern times. As a militant movement, global jihad has had unprecedented global reach and appeal.6 From bombings, mass shootings, and vehicle-ramming attacks in Western European cities like Barcelona, Berlin, Brussels, London, and Paris, to attacks in the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, Africa, and North America, global jihad has not only spread with great speed; it has also attracted widespread infamy, especially because the movement has been co-opted by worldwide non-state factions fighting in numerous conflicts. In Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, among other nations, socalled mujahedin (or Soldiers of Allah) hail from all corners of the earth under the umbrella of jihad. “Mujahedin” refers to Islamist guerrilla fighters. Today, they are portrayed as the perfect example of the modern enemy—as mentioned by the United States and Coalition Forces—in this global war on terror.7

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Quest for the Caliphate It is crucial not to engage in reductionism and not to essentialize all jihadist groups into organizations or factions that all have the same tactics and meanings. Chapter 12, for example, explains how ISIS and Al-Qaeda differed, in the same way that jihadist groups grew dissimilar during the Syrian Civil War. And though the Muslim Brotherhood was created in 1928 to revive the dream of the Caliphate through jihadism, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood officially abandoned jihadist violence in the 1970s8 and participated in politics (until Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi and a large segment of the Egyptian population banned them as a dangerous organization).9 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad actually broke off from the Muslim Brotherhood because it was not violent enough. Nevertheless, the main purpose of jihad is the achievement of world domination—through any means, including violent means—by the Muslim community and in the name of Islam. Inherent in jihad is the act of hijrah, or emigration, because Muslims must leave their country to take part in the global conflict for the Caliphate.10 The Caliphate is a Muslim system of world government that seeks to establish a new world order by overthrowing the current order. It is an all-encompassing Islamic state headed by a grand religious and political leader called the Caliph, the leader of the ummah (the worldwide Muslim community). The Caliph will be considered the successor of the Prophet Muhammad. Jihadists want the Caliphate to become an emerging culture that will magnetize a large array of fanatics and supporters across the globe.11 Contemporary jihadists blame both non-Muslim and Muslim governments for Islam’s current state of affairs, which has said to contribute to the deviation of many Muslims from true Islam. This departure from the true principles of Islam is what Sayyid Qutb—a scholar and a supreme leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood—termed jahiliyyah (i.e., the Age of Ignorance).12 In line with this vision is a global jihad scheme that must be carried out to the fullest until the entire humankind either converts or submits to Islam. For fundamentalists like Sayyid Qutb (in the past) and Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi (the late leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, or ISIS, who was killed on October 27, 2019)—among myriad others—peace will not exist until Allah’s order and law have been categorically implemented across the world. From this vantage point, the cosmic conflict between Good and Evil lingers on.13

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Muslim governments are perceived as complicit to jahiliyyah and, thus, traitors to the faith. Whereas non-Muslims are the Infidels, Muslim “traitors” are the Apostates. The ultimate target—though not often the direct target (as most victims of jihad are innocent civilians)—of a multitude of modern-day jihadists is generally the ruling government, which they believe should be toppled in support of an “Islamic State” (Quran 24:55), one in which sharia will be the law of the land. Consistent with this interpretation, it is only by instituting the Caliphate that Muslims can truly live out their faith and be awarded their rightful position of power. Consequently, jihad is meant to be as much offensive as defensive. For the Muslim fundamentalists, no truces or treaties can happen; peace will only exist when the entire world submits to Islam.14 The jihadist mission is the ummah’s best opportunity to redeem itself.

Objectives of This Book The most important aspect of this work is the ten reasons for jihadism and how they have increasingly contributed, in complex and diverse ways, to the unprecedented global jihad threat today. Hence, the author deems it important to look at the jihadist patterns and evolutions occurring at the micro, meso, and macro levels. This implies exploring the local, regional, and global trends and incidents of jihad. To achieve this objective, all chapters include historical backgrounds, specific case studies (both past and current), statistics, and theoretical approaches to the subject of global jihad. The scope and rationale of this book do not include (1) personal opinions, (2) conducted interviews with jihad scholars, (3) conducted interviews with jihadists themselves, and (4) predictions as to what global jihad will look like in the future (rather, it is up to the readers to derive such conclusions after reading all 13 chapters). This book is also an attempt at understanding global jihad in both Muslim-governed lands (dar al-Islam) and non-Muslim lands (dar al-harb) from a multi-dimensional, historically contextual perspective. Taking into consideration one of the most complex conflicts of our time, with real possibilities for an indeterminate continuation into the future, another important objective of this book is to argue that the scholarly need of the moment is to recognize that global jihad is a common problem not just facing non-Muslims, but also Muslims themselves. In fact, according to the National Counterterrorism Center (2011),15 between 82 and 97% of jihadism-related victims (from 2006 to 2011)

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were Muslims themselves. A case in point is the 2017 Sinai mosque attack, whereby 305 Muslims were killed on November 24, 2017 after ISIS bombed a Sufi mosque in al-Rawdah (a village in the Egyptian Sinai) and opened fire on the terrified crowd.16 On April 28, 2019, Welt am Sonntag —a German Sunday newspaper—published an article titled “18 Jahre Terror” (i.e., “18 Years of Terror”), citing over 31,000 jihadist attacks since September 11, 2001 with a death toll of almost 150,000 people—most of whom were Muslims.17 This book integrates all ten reasons into a unified framework that can help us better understand the principal forces and undercurrents behind the spread of jihadism, especially by considering it into a longerterm perspective. While this book surely cannot answer every question on the matter, the objective is to open new lines of examination and attempt to grasp the immeasurable complexity of present-day jihadist violence. The goal is to answer essential questions such as “What is the mission of jihad?” “Against whom is it to be waged?” “What lies behind this obsession with killing non-Muslims and fellow Muslims alike?” and “Under what circumstances is it implored?” The book is structured in the following manner: this introductory chapter lays out the objectives of this book, explains why ten reasons were selected to address the global jihad problem, describes competitive works on the subject, provides definitions of terrorism, and summarizes all the other 12 chapters. Each reason (among ten) is described within its own chapter (i.e., Chapters 2–12). The last chapter of this book is the conclusion of this conceptual analysis. Importance of Understanding Global Jihad Jihad is the most pervasive and threatening form of international terrorism today. Therefore, discussing its underlying reasons is of utmost importance. Of all jihadist attacks since the 1980s, the most destructive—and mediatized—ones have been the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001. The motivations behind the 9/11 attacks are similar but not identical to the jihadist strikes in Bali, Casablanca, and Madrid.18 The increasing visibility of jihad in the public domain is an important topic within the available research on transnational terrorism. Though terrorism is not confined to any religion in particular, the prevalence of terrorism perpetrated in the name of Islam and the volume and magnitude of militant uprisings involving Muslim groups are quite disconcerting. They range from terrorist raids executed by

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transnational organizations such as Al-Qaeda—also responsible for 7/7 suicide bombings in London—to the insurgencies organized by Muslim factions in India, Russia, the Philippines, and Thailand.19 It can also be demonstrated that the degree of the Muslim radicalization problem, in comparison with that of other religions, indicates the subsistence of causal processes that can be rapidly absorbed and acted upon by individuals—sometimes even entire communities.20 The loss of ISIS’s territories in the Middle East in March 2019 and the dismantlement of its organizational structures may decrease the impact or the aura of the organization. However, this has not reduced the threat of jihadist terrorism, as ISIS leaders, fighters, and sympathizers— including those residing in Western European nations—have already committed terrorist attacks abroad, recruited new members, and joined forces with other groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, Abu Sayyaf and the Maute Group in the Philippines,21 and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid in Indonesia.22 Eight ISIS branches and a deluge of ISIS networks are already operating the world over, not to mention the inexplicable number of sleeper cells.23 Aside from ISIS, Al-Qaeda remains a powerful actor and actively encourages terrorist attacks against both dar al-Islam and dar al-harb. Near-future jihadist activities in Western European countries remain an existential threat. A list of 85 jihadist organizations is provided in Chapter 2; all of them were designated as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and/or the United nations. Quick Facts on Jihad in Europe Today The “Black and White Book of Terrorism in Europe,” released in 2019, revealed that jihadists have been responsible for the deaths of over 90% of all terrorist victims since the year 2000. The book is the brainchild of Maité Pagazaurtundua, a member of the Spanish Parliament and president of the Foundation for Victims of Terrorism. Le Figaro (2019)24 reports that the book listed the 753 people killed as a result of terrorism in the European Union between 2000 and 2018. Le Figaro report also looked at European victims of terrorism globally, revealing that an additional 1115 people—including tourists and military personnel—also perished during the same period. In total, 91% of the European victims lost their lives

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because of jihadists, 20% of whom were killed by suicide bombers. Casualties of political terror were much lower, with far-left and far-right terrorists each killing 13 Europeans. According to the European Union’s Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018, published by Europol (2018),25 in 2017, no fewer than 205 foiled, failed, and successfully completed terrorist attacks were reported by nine countries of the E.U. The United Kingdom (UK) experienced the highest number of attacks (107), followed by France (54), Spain (16), Italy (14), and Greece (8). Belgium and Germany only reported two attacks; Finland and Sweden only one. Spain, Finland, and Sweden reported one jihadist attack after a long absence of jihadist occurrence. In 2017, 68 people died of jihadist attacks and 844 people were wounded. Comparably to 2016, virtually all reported fatalities and casualties were caused by jihadist attacks. The total number of attacks (205) is a departure of the downward spiral that began in 2014, because of a 45% rise in the number of attacks in 2017 in comparison with 2016 (142). Most arrests (705 out of 791) were in connection with jihadist terrorism. Data comes from media reports and contributions of countries of the E.U. Statistics do not account for casualties of Northern Ireland terrorism-related incidents. Whereas the Europol report reveals a constant increase in the frequency of jihadist attacks, it also highlights a decline in the complexity of their preparation and execution. In spite of the increasingly simple nature of jihadism (e.g., like vehicle-ramming attacks), jihadist assaults create more deaths and casualties than any other form of terrorism. Contemporary attacks by jihadists have followed three models: indiscriminate massacres (e.g., London, March and June 2017; and Barcelona, August 2017); attacks on representations of Western lifestyle (e.g., Manchester, May 2017); and attacks on representations of authority (e.g., Paris, February, June, and August 2017). More jihadist attacks in the E.U. that will follow one of these models—or a combination thereof—are expected. Many jihadist attacks have been perpetrated by homegrown Muslims, who were radicalized in their native E.U. countries without having migrated to a jihad-prone zone at some point. The demographic of homegrown jihadists is vastly diverse, consisting of Muslims (1) born in the E.U., (2) who have lived there most of their lives, (3) who may have been on the “terrorist suspect” list by the police (or not), and (4) who usually do not have direct contact to ISIS or other jihadist groups.26

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Why Focusing on Ten Reasons for Global Jihad? Undeniably, it could be easily argued that more than ten reasons, or even fewer than ten reasons, have contributed to global jihad today. In this book, however, the number “10” in “ten reasons” was not chosen randomly or deliberately, but it is the overarching conclusion that the author has reached vis-à-vis the global jihad threat. These ten reasons are not to be treated separately as exclusive variables that appear irreconcilable. Rather, they integrate themselves into a unified framework to help readers understand the key forces and undercurrents behind the spread of global jihad. The ten reasons emerged from an in-depth, conceptual analysis and interpretation of the literature on the subject—i.e., books, academic journal articles, newspaper exposés and editorials, testimonies from U.S. governmental hearings, foreign government reports, and even speech excerpts from the jihadists themselves. All these sources were produced by the hard work of a range of scholars, reporters, and policymakers who addressed the issue. These sources and voices embody a wide assortment of disciplines, methodologies, and data. The ten “reasons” themselves could be conceptualized as “themes;” central topics that each summarized a specific aspect of jihad. Jihadist violence has multiple simultaneous aims—though not always ten aims at a time. A jihadist attack may have ten reasons or only one reason; what determines the number of reasons is to be found across the aforementioned sources and voices. Because these ten reasons have demonstrated that global jihad remains a very complex and multifaceted threat, four general conclusions have been derived from all combined reasons for global jihad: (1) A global war against both Muslims and non-Muslims; (2) diverse forces of convergence, (3) Salafism as Fascism, and (4) reformation in Islam: two opposing directions. The detailed explanation of these conclusions is in Chapter 13. The present wave of global jihad does not have a single answer. For example, as we will soon discover in the case study of the 2019 Sri Lanka Easter bombings, one could easily identify three main reasons for the killing of 259 innocent civilians: political motivations, religious motivations, and—possibly—economic conditions. Other reasons, not mentioned in this case study, could be aggressive Islamic revival or globalization (i.e., the masterminds behind the attacks had a fan base on the internet). By extension, some of the ten reasons overlap to a great extent. Although religious motivation was attributed its own chapter (Chapter 6),

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the author is keenly aware that some of the other reasons stem from uses and abuses of the Islamic religion. For example, the two subsequent chapters on legal and political motivations for global jihad are rooted in Islam as a religion. Nevertheless, “Religious Motivations” was given its own chapter because it is a predominant reason in and of itself, in the same way that the other two motivations are predominant reasons too. This book cannot certainly ask or answer all the burning questions about global jihad today, but the author deems it important to offer as many explanations and alternative perspectives as possible, in an effort to rise above microscopic views of the global jihad problem. This is exactly what this monograph brings to bear on. Today’s jihadist violence is a multifarious and convoluted phenomenon—one that cannot be understood in a monolithic way. With different organizations, splinter groups, and motivations in Islam, and different methods and degrees of jihadism, some instances of jihad are designed to suit a particular purpose and interest.27 Other instances are designed to suit a more overarching purpose and interest, such as the establishment of the Caliphate and the Muslim domination of the world. No Single Explanation for Jihad To date, no clear consensus exists on the root causes of jihadism (or extremism involving Muslim communities). Instead, research in that domain has suggested a variety of reasons, including poverty, ethnocultural hostilities, and even some aspects of the Muslim religion itself. This lack of consensus is of critical importance and the primary reason why the author wrote this book. Academics have attempted to understand global jihad in other ways, acknowledging that there is no single explanation. This is a crucial first step in addressing the bigger questions at hand: a simplistic cause-and-effect account of global jihad will only generate a wholly inaccurate and incomplete picture of the problem. No scholar can claim that, one day, a set-in-motion factor suddenly inspired Muslims of the ummah to become mujahedin, and attempting to pinpoint the exact “trigger” for global jihad is a hopeless action that cannot succeed. Instead, a wholly organic framework which encompasses many reasons— each that is treated separately in this book, but also accounted as part of the whole—gives readers a more comprehensive, nuanced, balanced, and correct explanation for today’s jihadist violence.28

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The broad concept of “jihadist conflict” is used extensively in academic, government, and media circles to denote a range of political and religious conflicts. Although such conflicts are waged by Muslim groups that consider, at some level, their struggle as jihad, the reasons and interpretations of jihad vary greatly from one conflict to another. Nevertheless, the labeling of movements as “jihadist” is continually employed by critics, lawmakers, and journalists on the one hand and by radical Islamic organizations with a global agenda on the other. While this labeling is, indeed, adopted by individuals and groups in the name of Islam—be they militants implicated in transnational conflicts or lone-wolf terrorists executing suicide missions—the “jihadist” label, in and of itself, does not contribute much to our understanding of the underlying dynamics of global jihad.29 As opposed to ethnic or spiritual Muslim communities that feel connected through a worldwide diaspora, jihadists and jihad supporters have more choices in regard to (1) the types of “jihad” that they would like to advance and (2) the places where they can migrate as foreign fighters. In some instances, a jihadist insurgent faction that is not totally dedicated to the implementation of sharia, and whose commitment to jihad has been “warped” by negotiations for peace with the enemy, will not attract mujahedin who are ideologically obsessed with jihad. In other instances, it has often been shown that the radical program of global jihadist groups frequently takes precedence over local preferences.30 Scholarship Sometimes Too Narrow Why is global jihad so widespread in the present day? To address this question, academics and practitioners alike have suggested a scope of reasons: the attempt of jihadist groups at attracting more media and public attention in an information-saturated era31 ; the greater availability of lethal weapons and sophistication of attacks thanks to the trialand-error method;32 the growth of state-supported jihadism;33 better recruitment methods for jihadist training (e.g., martyrdom missions);34 competition and outbidding between terrorist organizations35 ; the revival of the Caliphate;36 and so forth. Terrorist attacks, in which the assailant embraces his or her demise as a certainty, defy our conception of human rationality to the core. Given this enigma, certain scholars have attempted to interpret this fanatical behavior by examining the psychological profiles of suicide jihadists, environmental conditions of poverty or

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other economic afflictions, or radical religious and ideological discourses. Such research has often engendered contradictory results.37 Likewise, a large volume of the literature on the subject takes an excessively narrow approach by focusing on only one or two reasons for global jihad. For example, essays on jihad are often presented in anachronistic terms that compare age-old jurisprudence with contemporary rationalities of liberalism in a nation-state perspective. The nuance of these debates frequently centers on whether modern jihad is solely a reflection of some ancient religious or cultural fundamentalism. Notwithstanding many significant contributions, scholars have a propensity to focus on either the historical roots of the problem or the contemporary side of the issue. The tendency of other scholars to focus singularly on the political and institutional characters of global jihad overlooks other important facets, such as religious, legal, and financial motives. Jihadist organizations are operating in many parts of the globe. Consequently, examining them through the same lens would be misrepresentative of the phenomenon. Muslim insurgents in Southern Thailand and Taliban soldiers murdering local citizens and Allied forces in Afghanistan both have recourse to jihad, but their intentions to do so are profoundly, perchance even entirely, different.38 Some observers chalk up the jihadist threat to one that is rooted in political Islam. To reduce the global jihad threat to political Islam is “only to pick up no more than a piece, perhaps a major piece, of a broken mirror.”39 For example, while recognizing that the motivations for global jihad are complex, Moghadam (2009),40 Benjamin and Simon (2005),41 and Sageman (2004)42 have mostly advanced the political angle, maintaining that the political dogma of jihad is the massive motivator behind the proliferation of suicide bombing attacks. By the same token, Pape and Feldman (2010)43 identify deployments of U.S. forces in Muslim territories as the “heart of the problem,” construing jihadist terrorism as political revenge against Western nations (the “Infidels”) and their Muslim allies (the “Apostates”). Nevertheless, Assaf Moghadam (2009)44 also acknowledges that “these attacks increasingly occur in countries where there is no discernible occupation.” Generally, when framing jihad as a byproduct of political violence, the concepts of fear and terror are included. It is a good start but only piecemeal. It is insufficient to focus uniquely on the psychological scars of fear provoked by political violence, mainly because all political violence causes

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fear in both the victims who experience it directly and in the indirect audiences who witness it. As such, militant and insurgent revolts always drive up the number of terrified refugees or displaced persons; even riots can be distressing for those trapped in or witnessing them. Put another way, we have to look beyond jihad as caused by the fear-inducing side of political violence; there are many other reasons for jihadist violence causing fear within the hearts of communities.45 Other scholars, such as Monica Toft (2007),46 blame the religion of Islam as being the principal driver of global jihad. Specifically, Toft has proposed a religion-based principle called “religious outbidding,” whereby jihadist organizations outbid (i.e., compete with) each other for various purposes: to please Allah, to establish the Caliphate in the most ideal fashion, and so forth. It is important to note that, because of their overwhelming dependence on Muslim-specific data, the abovementioned approaches contribute to an academic trend of insufficiently examining the external influences of cultural, legal, societal, socioeconomic, mass media, and globalizing factors on Muslim communities. Lastly, it has been proven time and time again that a certain number of global jihad wannabes are neither religious scholars nor individuals with a deep-rooted religious upbringing. This is not to say that all such violent misfits should have their religious labels removed. What this book suggests is that, although Islam is an important factor in jihadist radicalization, it is not a sufficient variable per se. There are other reasons at work. For example, Olivier Roy (2004)47 argues that one major reason is globalization. For the French scholar, the forces of rapid communications, innovation, urbanization, secularism, and freedom of movement—inter alia—create a dissonance for Muslim youths who find themselves ensnared between the time-honored socioreligious beliefs within their societies or neighborhoods and the globalizing, non-religious world in which they live. Let us take a brief look at Pakistan: although violent religious extremism has been a major problem in Pakistan for the past few decades, to the point of affecting the country’s relations with the outside world, a voluminous body of research has ignored the question of whether the Muslim-majority society may have accelerated radicalization processes and instances of jihadism for reasons other than religion. This point was confirmed in the work of Ganguly and Kapur (2010),48 which accords limited regard to the role of religion in Pakistan. Rather, jihadist radicalism correlates with other problems in that Central Asian nation.

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This book fills all the gaps addressed in the above sections, in addition to many other questions and issues that will be examined comprehensively across 13 chapters.

Case Study: 2019 Sri Lanka Easter Bombings On Easter Sunday, April 21, 2019, four hotels, three churches, and one housing complex were attacked by nine suicide bombers (including a woman) in Sri Lanka, causing the death of 259 people and wounding another 500. The National Thowheedh Jamaath (NTJ) was believed to be behind the attacks.49 The South Asian island has 21 million inhabitants and is dominated by Sinhalese Buddhists; there is also a significant Tamil minority, most of whom are Hindu, Muslim, or Christian.50 To a certain degree, the massive suicide attacks could have been prevented because of a warning (i.e., an intelligence report) given to the Sri Lankan government at least a week earlier. In fact, according to an Indian official, the Indian government resent the warning a few hours before the bombings, cautioning the Sri Lankans that an attack was looming.51 What is interesting in this case study are the reasons given by media outlets across the world, and by Sri Lankan politicians in particular, to determine the motivations for the worst terrorist attack in the country since the end of Sri Lankan Civil War in May 2009. Reason 1: Political Motivations The reason provided by Ruwan Wijewardene, the State Minister of Defense, was political motivation. As such, Wijewardene, who was addressing the Sri Lankan Parliament, expressed the following: “Investigations have revealed that the attacks were carried out by Islamic extremists in retaliation for the mosque attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand.” On March 15, 2019, an Australian white supremacist murdered 50 Muslims in two mosques in Christchurch. However, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe acted more prudently in a news conference two days after the Sri Lanka bombings. As he said, “it is possible [that Sunday’s attacks] could have been because of the Christchurch attacks,” but “we cannot say yet.”52 Now, it is up to scholarly experts to determine whether or not these attacks were committed in retaliation for the anti-Muslim terrorist attack in Christchurch one month prior. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the late ISIS leader, claimed in a late April 2019 video that the Sri Lanka

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bombings were revenge for ISIS’s loss of the Caliphate in Syria and Iraq53 —another political motive. To conceive jihadism as a political force that has ravaged the world since the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is important to investigate the Western world’s actions that extremist Muslims regard as a symbolic attack on Islamic values overall. The terrorist attack in Christchurch was committed by Brenton Tarrant, a 28-year-old Australian who extolled the virtues of White supremacism in his manifesto.54 For many—not just jihadists and jihad sympathizers (also called “cojihadists”)—it was a symbolic attack on the Muslim world. The theory that illustrates jihad as a form of retaliation is blowback theory.55 In the case of the Sri Lanka attacks, the blowback on four Western-style, posh hotels—namely, the Shangri-La Hotel, Colombo, the Cinnamon Grand Hotel, the Kingsbury, and the Tropical Inn56 —was symbolic retaliation against Western values and to avenge White supremacist attacks on the Muslim world. Reason 2: Religious Motivations Religion was not a driving force in Sri Lanka’s 26-year civil war (1983– 2009), in which ethnic hostilities between the dominant Sinhalese society and the minority Tamils nearly lacerated the country. Contrary to what might be expected, during the civil war years, many Muslim men advanced through the ranks of intelligence services because they were fluent in Sri Lanka’s three main languages—Sinhala, Tamil, and English. Until the Easter bombings on April 21, 2019, jihadist terrorism had hardly been committed in Sri Lanka.57 These circumstances shifted completely when we learned that the nine suicide bombers—along with their collaborators—had religious motivations to target three Christian churches—namely, St. Anthony’s Shrine in Colombo, St. Sebastian’s Church in Negombo and Zion Church in Batticaloa, on the Eastern side of the country.58 Days later, most people in Sri Lanka were still avoiding places of worship because of the potential danger of jihad.59 To begin, Sri Lankan intelligence identified an important individual behind the Easter Sunday attacks. His name was Moulvi Zahran Hashim, a radical local preacher who inflamed his followers with incendiary sermons via online social media. Since 2016, Hashim acquired thousands of followers and the attention of terrorism experts for his intense sermons of violence—which were disseminated on a pro-ISIS Sri Lankan Facebook

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account, known as “Al-Ghuraba” media, and on YouTube.60 Hashim began publishing videos online in 2016 calling for the “idolaters” (i.e., non-Muslims) to be “slaughtered.” The radical cleric also used diatribes against Sufi Muslims—who, according to Muslim tradition, are considered rebels in the religion. He even orated about the Sri Lankan national flag as being a meaningless piece of cloth and that the country should be governed by sharia. Taken as a whole, his vile tones were intended to lure a new wave of militants.61 These videos were already posted three years before the anti-Muslim terrorist attack in Christchurch. A few days after the 2019 Sri Lanka Easter bombings, ISIS released a video showing Moulvi Zahran Hashim as leading black-clad disciples with ski masks as they pledged allegiance to the terrorist organization.62 Reason 3: Economic Conditions? An oft-cited argument is that economic conditions like poverty are a key contributor to jihad. Is it true in this case? The aforementioned State Minister of Defense, Ruwan Wijewardene, confirmed that most of the nine suicide bombers were highly educated or came from affluent families. Before executing their suicide missions, they were certainly financially autonomous.63 Inshaf Ahamed Ibrahim, 33, was one of the suicide bombers and also a mastermind of the massacre. He exploded himself at the breakfast buffet of the Shangri-La Hotel right before 9 a.m. on the third floor. The hotel was brimming with tourists including British victims. Ibrahim’s younger brother, Ilham, also detonated a bomb at a breakfast buffet—but at another hotel, the Cinnamon Grand Hotel— when he blasted a suicide bomb five minutes later. Both attacks took place in the capital Colombo. Inshaf Ibrahim, their father, is an authority figure and wealthy businessman in Sri Lanka; he owned a successful spice trading company. In addition, he also ran a copper factory where it is believed the bombs were assembled.64 The entire family lived in a charming white villa and used a chauffeured BMW as their mode of transport. The rich father—who amassed his wealth by selling black pepper, white pepper, nutmeg, cloves, and vanilla—was praised by Sri Lanka’s former president for his “outstanding service” to the nation.65 Another suicide bomber held a law degree and a fourth one studied in Great Britain and Australia. Regarding the latter, Abdul Lathief Jameel Mohamed studied in Southeastern England between 2006 and 2007 and later enrolled in a postgraduate course in

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Australia (after which he returned to Sri Lanka).66 Given these circumstances, one must wonder why the argument of poor economic conditions is even brought up. In this case, the correlation between jihad and poverty is difficult to ascertain.

Comparison with Other Books In his book titled Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World, Mohammed Hafez (2003)67 develops the argument that jihadist uprisings are popular when stemming from a combination of politics, ideological structures, and organizational means and capitals. They are also reactionary to the tyrannical political milieus in which most Muslims live. However, his work insufficiently identifies which aspects of politics or ideological structures cause jihadist insurgencies to emerge. More importantly, Hafez concentrates distinctively on armed Islamist revolts and not on jihadism at large. His approach misses the big picture of the threat posed by the global jihad movement. In Why the West Fear Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies, Jocelyne Cesari (2013)68 mostly blames the West for the tensions that have escalated between Islam and Western civilization. More specifically, she stereotypes the West as an entity that treats Muslims as aliens or the “other”69 by fashioning a binary vision of Islam versus the West. For example, she points the finger at Westerners’ tendencies to create “national communities,” in which minority groups like Muslims do not belong (in spite of benefiting from full citizenship rights). Members of national communities have no desire to incorporate, protect, or grant rights to such Muslim minority groups, because they allegedly regard them as undeserving, amoral, and even “uncivilized.”70 Cesari also misunderstands the threat of global jihad when she claims that such a threat will likely disappear when the West quits believing in Samuel Huntington’s (1993)71 Clash of Civilization thesis—the one between Islam and the West. The problem with Cesari’s argument is twofold: (1) Most western intellectuals actually do not essentialize Islam (nor do they believe in the Clash of Civilization thesis) and (2) the problem with global jihad stems from many reasons (not just one). Not surprisingly, she fails to mention them—if she ever understands them. In Defeating Jihad: The Winnable War, Sebastian Gorka (2016)72 likens the fight against global jihad with the one against the Cold War. For Gorka, Americans can win the global war on terror in a sharp and

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convincing way by discrediting jihadists within their own supporters and sympathizers. This approach, Gorka believes, will be efficient because this is how Americans operated against the Soviets in the Cold War. The fight against global jihad is winnable, then. The problem with Gorka’s argument is that America triumphed over the Cold War with less difficulty because it was predominantly political and territorial. We did not have to deal with tens of millions of religious fanatics who were willing to sacrifice their lives for Allah, the holy war, or the Caliphate—among other reasons. We can surely admire Gorka’s effort at employing a universal framework of Judeo-Christian values in the quest against jihad, but it cannot be vanquished permanently as he declares in his book.

Summary of All Chapters Chapter 2 provides a detailed description of jihad. Particularly discussed are historical perspectives of jihad, greater versus lesser jihad, defensive versus offensive jihad, and lone-wolf jihad. In addition, a list of jihadist organizations and a list of jihadist ideologues and leaders are also offered. The chapter ends with thoughts on global jihad today, including indirect jihadist players. Chapter 3 defines radicalization in detail, particularly Islamic radicalization (and its four stages, culminating with jihadization). Part of the definition entails an understanding of radical milieus and ideologies. Of equal relevance is the focus on who the most susceptible people are to Islamic radicalization. To this point, discussions of gender differences and jihadization in French prisons and in U.S. military detention centers are deemed important by the author. Chapter 4 discusses group dynamics and social alienation as reasons for global jihad. Key concepts such as culture and groupthink add fresh insights to the emergence of phenomena of social identity (i.e., “in-groups” vs. “out-groups”). Other related concepts such as group grievance, and psychosocial resilience are explained. This chapter ends with case studies on Palestinian youths and their communal routines. Chapter 5 focuses on social alienation as a source of jihad. The notions of no-go zones, the failed integration model, and social closure theory explain how youths come to join the global jihad movement. The distinction between “outsiders” and “insiders” among Muslim immigrants in Western countries plays a large role here. Four case studies are examined in this chapter: (1) Muslim youths in Belgium, (2) Muslim youths in France, (3) Muslim youths in Great Britain, and (4) Palestinians in Israel.

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Chapter 6 describes the religious motivations for jihad. A key premise is that jihad propagandists use the Muslim religion as a rallying cry, which gives rise to phenomena such as sacralization of conflict and religious outbidding. A large section is devoted to Quran-driven jihad, including specific Quranic verses and a related segment on the Principle of Abrogation. What comes subsequently is a section on hadith-driven jihad. Fundamental terms such as martyrdom and Jannah (Eternal Paradise) are also important here. Chapter 7 describes the legal motivations for jihad. The first major section deals with jihad inspired by sharia (a body of Islamic law), supplemented by an analysis of several Muslim countries. Another important section covers the concept of fiqh (jurisprudence). Chapter 8 describes the political motivations for jihad. An important point is the jihadists’ belief that the so-called “decadence” of Islamic societies has led to the predicament of the Muslim world today. This is why a section is devoted to the Iranian Revolution in 1979. An entire section is devoted to the Muslim Brotherhood and Sayyid Qutb (i.e., Qutbism) as well. The following piece describes the global Caliphate in detail. The last piece pertains to reactions against foreign policy and blowback theory. Chapter 9 is predicated upon the idea that Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis can explain why global jihad is prominent today. The Clash of Civilizations is a theoretical concept postulating that, since the end of the Cold War, individuals’ cultural and religious identities have been the main reasons for conflict and divisions between civilizations. Related concepts in this chapter are Benjamin Barber’s “Jihad vs. McWorld” and Thomas Friedman’s “The Lexus and the Olive Tree.” The chapter ends with a description of jihadists’ clash with human rights and Western-based laws. Chapter 10 makes the point that economic conditions can occasion global jihadist wars. Two important notions in this context are poverty and state failure. Ulrich Beck’s world risk society hypothesizes that newer problems and conflicts (associated with the distribution of risks) often become more prevalent than older problems and conflicts (associated with the distribution of welfare). At the end of chapter, the point is also made that economic conditions are not always the root cause of jihadism. Chapter 11 explains how transformative learning motivates would-be recruits to jump on the global jihad bandwagon. Transformative learning is a theory positing that constant behavioral change can take place when critical reflection and the nurturing of new personal belief systems are caused by certain triggering factors. The best facilitator of transformative

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learning in jihad is the jihadist sermon. To this effect, multiple case studies on radical Islamic preachers are provided at the end of the chapter. Chapter 12 presents two occasional causes for global jihad: outbidding and internal rifts. Outbidding is a concept that explains how competition among groups with shared religion, ideology, politics, and/or ethnicity can impress their existing or potential constituency and motivate them to fight for global jihad. Internal splits within jihadist organizations can occur because of disagreements over leadership or the direction that these groups are taking. Case studies about Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), ISIS, the Syrian Civil War, Palestinian terrorist groups, and the Caucasus Emirate are included in the second half of the chapter. Chapter 13 is the conclusion of this book. Overall, four general conclusions can be derived from all examined reasons for global jihad: (1) A global war against both Muslims and non-Muslims; (2) diverse forces of convergence, (3) Salafism as Fascism, and (4) reformation in Islam: two opposing directions. This conclusion also engendered a new theory created by the author of this book: Global Divergence Theory (GDT). GDT emphasizes the ever-increasing demarcation and polarization that a global movement like jihadism is creating vis-à-vis the rest of the world. A confrontation between irreconcilable outlooks gives rise to increasing polarization which, in turn, foreshadows utter violence.

Notes 1. Asim Roy, Islam in History and Politics: Perspectives from South Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 2. Javaid Rehman, “Islam, ‘War on Terror’ and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the United Kingdom: Dilemmas of Multiculturalism,” Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2007): 831–78. 3. For example, see John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998); Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 4. United States Institute of Peace, Preventing Extremism in Fragile States: A New Approach: Final Report of the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2019). 5. John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); and Farhad Khosrokhavar, Inside Jihadism: Understanding Jihadi Movements Worldwide (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2009).

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6. Kabir Sethi, “The Allure of the Radical: Understanding Jihadist Violence in the West,” Macalester International 22 (2009): 201–25. 7. Darryl Li, “Jihad in a World of Sovereigns: Law, Violence, and Islam in the Bosnia Crisis,” Law & Social Inquiry 41, no. 2 (2016): 371–401, https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12152. 8. Charles McDaniel, “The Role of Human Security in the Contest between the Egyptian Government and the Muslim Brotherhood, 1980–2010,” in Religion and Human Security: A Global Perspective, ed. James K. Wellman Jr., and Clark B. Lombardi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 48–66. 9. Nicola Pratt and Dina Rezk, “Securitizing the Muslim Brotherhood: State Violence and Authoritarianism in Egypt after the Arab Spring,” Security Dialogue 50, no. 3 (2019): 239–56, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0967010619830043. 10. Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 11. Jonathan Matusitz, Andrea Madrazo, and Catalina Udani, Online Jihadist Magazines to Promote the Caliphate: Communicative Perspectives (New York: Peter Lang, 2019). 12. Mark A. Menaldo, “Sayyid Qutb’s Political and Religious Thought: The Transformation of Jahiliyyah and the Implications for Egyptian Democracy,” Leadership and the Humanities 2, no. 1 (2014): 64–80. 13. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 265. 14. Ibid., 242. 15. National Counterterrorism Center, 2011 Report on Terrorism (Washington, DC: National Counterterrorism Center, 2011). 16. Shaul M. Gabbay, “Socio-Political Conditions for Christians in Egypt,” European Scientific Journal 14, no. 20 (2018): 144–64, http://dx.doi. org/10.19044/esj.2018.v14n20p144. 17. Retrieved on April 29, 2019 from http://www.pi-news.net/2019/04/ wams-veroeffentlicht-terrorliste-seit-9-11-mit-150-000-toten/. 18. Joseph F. Pilat, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Journal of Organisational Transformation & Social Change 6, no. 2 (2009): 171–82, https://doi. org/10.1386/jots.6.2.171_1. 19. Arie Kruglanski and Shira Fishman, “Psychological Factors in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Individual, Group, and Organizational Levels of Analysis,” Social Issues and Policy Review 3, no. 1 (2009): 1–44, https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-2409.2009.01009.x. 20. Bruce Hoffman, “Outlook: Al-Qaeda’s Grand New Strategy,” The Washington Post, January 11, 2010, A1. 21. Truls Hallberg Tønnessen, “The Islamic State after the Caliphate,” Perspectives on Terrorism 13, no. 1 (2019): 2–11.

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22. Muh Taufiqurrohman, “The Road to ISIS: How Indonesian Jihadists Travel to Iraq and Syria,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 7, no. 4 (2015): 17–25. 23. Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019). 24. Le Figaro, “Publication d’un ‘livre blanc et noir du terrorisme en Europe’,” Le Figaro, March 5, 2019, A1, retrieved on March 8, 2019 from http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2019/03/05/97001-201903 05FILWWW00190-publication-d-un-livre-blanc-et-noir-du-terrorismeen-europe.php?redirect_premium. 25. Europol, European Union’s Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2018 (The Hague: Europol, 2018). 26. Ibid. 27. Roy, Islam in History and Politics, 7. 28. Sethi, “The Allure of the Radical,” 201–25. 29. Marte Nilsen and Shintaro Hara, “Religious Motivation in Political Struggles: The Case of Thailand’s Patani Conflict,” Journal of Religion and Violence 5, no. 3 (2017): 291–311, https://doi.org/10.5840/jrv 20184546. 30. Brynjar Lia, “Understanding Jihadi Proto-States,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (2015): 31–41. 31. Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, and Marion R. Just, Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government, and the Public (New York: Routledge, 2003). 32. Shabana Fayyaz, “Child Militancy in Pakistan: A Human Security Challenge,” Journal of Political Studies 24, no. 2 (2017): 601–15. 33. Julian Droogan, “The Perennial Problem of Terrorism and Political Violence in Pakistan,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 13, no. 2 (2018): 202–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/183 35330.2018.1473631. 34. Joshua D. Freilich, William S. Parkin, Jeff Gruenewald, and Steven M. Chermak, “Comparing Extremist Perpetrators of Suicide and Non-Suicide Attacks in the United States,” Terrorism and Political Violence 31, no. 5 (2019): 943–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1297708. 35. Mohammed Hafez, “Fratricidal Jihadists: Why Islamists Keep Losing Their Civil Wars,” Middle East Policy 25, no. 2 (2018): 86–99, https:// doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12344. 36. James A. Piazza, “Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous? An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal Structure,” Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 1 (2009): 62–88, https://doi.org/10. 1080/09546550802544698.

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37. Dipak K. Gupta and Kusum Mundra, “Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 4 (2005): 573–98, https://doi. org/10.1080/09546550500189895. 38. Sethi, “The Allure of the Radical,” 210–15. 39. Roy, Islam in History and Politics, 13. 40. Assaf Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom: Al Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks,” International Security 33, no. 3 (2009): 46–78. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.33.3.46. 41. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and the Strategy for Getting It Right (New York: Times Books, 2005). 42. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 43. Robert Pape and James Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). 44. Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom,” 54. 45. Richard Jackson, “In Defence of ‘Terrorism:’ Finding a Way through a Forest of Misconceptions,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 3, no. 2 (2011): 116–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/194 34472.2010.512148. 46. Monica Duffy Toft, “Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War,” International Security 31, no. 4 (2017): 97–131, 103, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.31.4.97. 47. Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst, 2004). 48. Sumit Ganguly and Paul Kapur, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Islamist Militancy in South Asia,” The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 1 (2010): 47–59, https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600903418686 49. Ranga Sirilal and Shihar Aneez, “Sri Lankan President Bans Islamist Groups,” The Canberra Times, April 28, 2019, A1. 50. Ruwan Ranasinghe, “Strategic Myopia of Tourism Development in Sri Lanka: A Critique,” International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development 2, no. 2 (2015): 604–9. 51. Kai Schultz, “Sri Lanka Calls Bombers ‘Well Educated’ and Warns of Ongoing Threat,” The New York Times, April 24, 2019, A1. 52. Joanna Slater, Amantha Perera, and Shibani Mahtani, “Sri Lanka Easter Bombings Were Retaliation for Christchurch Mosque Shootings, Official Says,” The Washington Post, April 23, 2019, A1. 53. Patrick Goodenough, “ISIS Leader Baghdadi Calls for Terror Attacks to Avenge Loss of ‘Caliphate’,” CBS News, April 30, 2019, retrieved on

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55. 56.

57.

58.

59. 60. 61.

62.

63. 64.

65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

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May 1, 2019 from https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goo denough/isis-leader-baghdadi-calls-terror-attacks-avenge-loss-caliphate. Laura King, “‘Not a White Supremacist,’ Aide Says of Trump, Who Defends Fox News Host Accused of Anti-Muslim Bias,” Los Angeles Times, April 17, 2019, A1. Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2000). Allison Mccann, Julie Shaver, Jin Wu, and K. K. Rebecca Lai, “Sri Lanka Bombing Maps: What We Know about the Attack Sites,” The New York Times, April 21, 2019, A1. Jeffrey Gettleman and Dharisha Bastians, “Sri Lanka’s Muslims Face an Angry Backlash after Easter Sunday Attacks,” The New York Times, April 24, 2019, A11. Dharisha Bastians, Jeffrey Gettleman, and Kai Schultz, “Blasts Targeting Christians Kill Hundreds in Sri Lanka,” The New York Times, April 21, 2019, A1. Pamela Constable, “Officials in Sri Lanka Warn of More Attacks as Death Toll Is Lowered to around 250,” The Washington Post April 25, 2019, A1. Ben Farmer and Nicola Smith, “Sri Lanka ‘Bombing Mastermind’ Named as Moulvi Zahran Hashim,” The Telegraph, April 23, 2019, A1. Hannah Beech, “Sri Lankan Accused of Leading Attacks Preached Slaughter: Many Dismissed Him,” The New York Times, April 25, 2019, A1. Jeffrey Gettleman, Dharisha Bastians, and Kai Schultz, “Suicide Bombers Included Two Sons of Sri Lanka Spice Tycoon,” The New York Times, April 24, 2019, A1. Doug Stanglin, “Sri Lankan President Shakes Up Defense Forces, Says Attack Warnings Went Unheeded,” USA Today, April 24, 2019, A1. Robert Mendick, “First Picture of ‘Mastermind’ behind Sri Lanka Suicide Bomb Attacks as Identity of UK Student Is Revealed,” The Telegraph, April 24, 2019, A1. Gettleman, Bastians, and Schultz, “Suicide Bombers Included Two Sons,” A1. Mendick, “First Picture of ‘Mastermind’,” A1. Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fear Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Ibid., 4. Jeffrey C. Alexander and Philip Smith, “The Discourse of American Civil Society: A New Proposal for Cultural Studies,” Theory and Society 22, no. 2 (1993): 151–207.

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71. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49. 72. Sebastian Gorka, Defeating Jihad: The Winnable War (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2016).

References Alexander, Jeffrey C., and Philip Smith. “The Discourse of American Civil Society: A New Proposal for Cultural Studies.” Theory and Society 22, no. 2 (1993): 151–207. Bastians, Dharisha, Jeffrey Gettleman, and Kai Schultz. “Blasts Targeting Christians Kill Hundreds in Sri Lanka.” The New York Times, April 21, 2019, A1. Beech, Hannah. “Sri Lankan Accused of Leading Attacks Preached Slaughter. Many Dismissed Him.” The New York Times, April 25, 2019, A1. Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and the Strategy for Getting It Right. New York: Times Books, 2005. Cesari, Jocelyne. Why the West Fear Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Coats, Daniel R. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community. Washington, DC: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019. Constable, Pamela. “Officials in Sri Lanka Warn of More Attacks as Death Toll Is Lowered to around 250.” The Washington Post, April 25, 2019, A1. Delong-Bas, Natana J. Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Droogan, Julian. “The Perennial Problem of Terrorism and Political Violence in Pakistan.” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 13, no. 2 (2018): 202–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2018.1473631. Esposito, John L. Islam and Politics. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998. ———. Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Europol. European Union’s Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2018. The Hague: Europol, 2018. Farmer, Ben, and Nicola Smith. “Sri Lanka ‘Bombing Mastermind’ Named as Moulvi Zahran Hashim.” The Telegraph, April 23, 2019, A1. Fayyaz, Shabana. “Child Militancy in Pakistan: A Human Security Challenge.” Journal of Political Studies 24, no. 2 (2017): 601–15. Freilich, Joshua D., William S. Parkin, Jeff Gruenewald, and Steven M. Chermak. “Comparing Extremist Perpetrators of Suicide and Non-Suicide Attacks in the United States.” Terrorism and Political Violence 31, no. 5 (2019): 943–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1297708.

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Gabbay, Shaul M. “Socio-Political Conditions for Christians in Egypt.” European Scientific Journal 14, no. 20 (2018): 144–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/ esj.2018.v14n20p144. Ganguly, Sumit, and Paul Kapur. “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Islamist Militancy in South Asia.” The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 1 (2010): 47–59. https:// doi.org/10.1080/01636600903418686. Gettleman, Jeffrey, and Dharisha Bastians. “Sri Lanka’s Muslims Face an Angry Backlash after Easter Sunday Attacks.” The New York Times, April 24, 2019, A11. Gettleman, Jeffrey, Dharisha Bastians, and Kai Schultz. “Suicide Bombers Included Two Sons of Sri Lanka Spice Tycoon.” The New York Times, April 24, 2019, A1. Goodenough, Patrick. “ISIS Leader Baghdadi Calls for Terror Attacks to Avenge Loss of ‘Caliphate’.” CBS News, April 30, 2019. Retrieved on May 1, 2019 from https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-gooden ough/isis-leader-baghdadi-calls-terror-attacks-avenge-loss-caliphate. Gorka, Sebastian. Defeating Jihad: The Winnable War. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2016. Gupta, Dipak K., and Kusum Mundra. “Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 4 (2005): 573–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/095465 50500189895. Hafez, Mohammed. “Fratricidal Jihadists: Why Islamists Keep Losing Their Civil Wars.” Middle East Policy 25, no. 2 (2018): 86–99. https://doi.org/10. 1111/mepo.12344. ———. Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. Hoffman, Bruce. “Outlook: Al-Qaeda’s Grand New Strategy.” The Washington Post, January 11, 2010, A1. Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49. Jackson, Richard. “In Defence of ‘Terrorism:’ Finding a Way through a Forest of Misconceptions.” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 3, no. 2 (2011): 116–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2010.512148. Johnson, Chalmers. Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2000. Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002. Khosrokhavar, Farhad. Inside Jihadism: Understanding Jihadi Movements Worldwide. Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2009.

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King, Laura. “‘Not a White Supremacist,’ Aide Says of Trump, Who Defends Fox News Host Accused of Anti-Muslim Bias.” Los Angeles Times, April 17, 2019, A1. Kruglanski, Arie, and Shira Fishman. “Psychological Factors in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Individual, Group, and Organizational Levels of Analysis.” Social Issues and Policy Review 3, no. 1 (2009): 1–44. https://doi.org/10. 1111/j.1751-2409.2009.01009.x. Le Figaro. “Publication d’un ‘livre blanc et noir du terrorisme en Europe’,” Le Figaro, March 5, 2019, A1. Retrieved on March 8, 2019 from http:// www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2019/03/05/97001-20190305FILWWW00190publication-d-un-livre-blanc-et-noir-du-terrorisme-en-europe.php?redirect_ premium. Lewis, Bernard. The Political Language of Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Li, Darryl. “Jihad in a World of Sovereigns: Law, Violence, and Islam in the Bosnia Crisis.” Law & Social Inquiry 41, no. 2 (2016): 371–401. https:// doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12152. Lia, Brynjar. “Understanding Jihadi Proto-States.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (2015): 31–41. Matusitz, Jonathan, Andrea Madrazo, and Catalina Udani. Online Jihadist Magazines to Promote the Caliphate: Communicative Perspectives. New York: Peter Lang, 2019. Mccann, Allison, Julie Shaver, Jin Wu, and K. K. Rebecca Lai. “Sri Lanka Bombing Maps: What We Know about the Attack Sites.” The New York Times, April 21, 2019, A1. McDaniel, Charles. “The Role of Human Security in the Contest between the Egyptian Government and the Muslim Brotherhood, 1980–2010.” In Religion and Human Security: A Global Perspective, edited by James K. Wellman Jr., and Clark B. Lombardi, 48–66. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Menaldo, Mark A. “Sayyid Qutb’s Political and Religious Thought: The Transformation of Jahiliyyah and the Implications for Egyptian Democracy.” Leadership and the Humanities 2, no. 1 (2014): 64–80. Mendick, Robert. “First Picture of ‘Mastermind’ behind Sri Lanka Suicide Bomb Attacks as Identity of UK Student Is Revealed.” The Telegraph, April 24, 2019, A1. Moghadam, Assaf. “Motives for Martyrdom: Al Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks.” International Security 33, no. 3 (2009): 46–78. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.33.3.46. National Counterterrorism Center. 2011 Report on Terrorism. Washington, DC: National Counterterrorism Center, 2011.

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Nilsen, Marte, and Shintaro Hara. “Religious Motivation in Political Struggles: The Case of Thailand’s Patani Conflict.” Journal of Religion and Violence 5, no. 3 (2017): 291–311. https://doi.org/10.5840/jrv20184546. Norris, Pippa, Montague Kern, Marion R. Just. Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government, and the Public. New York: Routledge, 2003. Pape, Robert, and James Feldman. Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. Piazza, James A. “Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous? An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal Structure.” Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 1 (2009): 62–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/095465508025 44698. Pilat, Joseph F. “The Causes of Terrorism.” Journal of Organisational Transformation & Social Change 6, no. 2 (2009): 171–82. https://doi.org/10. 1386/jots.6.2.171_1. Pratt, Nicola, and Dina Rezk. “Securitizing the Muslim Brotherhood: State Violence and Authoritarianism in Egypt after the Arab Spring.” Security Dialogue 50, no. 3 (2019): 239–56. https://doi.org/10.1177/096701061 9830043. Ranasinghe, Ruwan. “Strategic Myopia of Tourism Development in Sri Lanka: A Critique.” International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development 2, no. 2 (2015): 604–9. Rehman, Javaid. “Islam, ‘War on Terror’ and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the United Kingdom: Dilemmas of Multiculturalism.” Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 4 (2007): 831–78. Roy, Asim. Islam in History and Politics: Perspectives from South Asia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Roy, Olivier. Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. London: Hurst, 2004. Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Schultz, Kai. “Sri Lanka Calls Bombers ‘Well Educated’ and Warns of Ongoing Threat.” The New York Times, April 24, 2019, A1. Sethi, Kabir. “The Allure of the Radical: Understanding Jihadist Violence in the West.” Macalester International 22 (2009): 201–25. Sirilal, Ranga, and Shihar Aneez. “Sri Lankan President Bans Islamist Groups.” The Canberra Times, April 28, 2019, A1. Slater, Joanna, Amantha Perera, and Shibani Mahtani. “Sri Lanka Easter Bombings Were Retaliation for Christchurch Mosque Shootings, Official Says.” The Washington Post, April 23, 2019, A1. Stanglin, Doug. “Sri Lankan President Shakes Up Defense Forces, Says Attack Warnings Went Unheeded.” USA Today, April 24, 2019, A1.

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Taufiqurrohman, Muh. “The Road to ISIS: How Indonesian Jihadists Travel to Iraq and Syria.” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 7, no. 4 (2015): 17–25. Toft, Monica Duffy. “Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War.” International Security 31, no. 4 (2017): 97–131. https://doi.org/10. 1162/isec.2007.31.4.97. Tønnessen, Truls Hallberg. “The Islamic State after the Caliphate.” Perspectives on Terrorism 13, no. 1 (2019): 2–11. United States Institute of Peace. Preventing Extremism in Fragile States: A New Approach: Final Report of the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2019.

CHAPTER 2

Jihad: A Description

As an Arabic term, the root of jihad indicates exertion or struggle, although it still has more than one contested meaning today. In Islamic tradition, jihad is often interpreted as religiously authorized warfare against non-Muslims and Muslims who are not considered true adherents to the faith. It is important to observe that the term is also used to signify nonviolent and thoroughly internal struggles, such as soul-searching, personal improvement, spiritual betterment, and social activism. In the same way that jihad is not just about violence, not all categories of political violence documented in Islamic law should be called jihad.1 Abu Sulayman (1987)2 has assumed a pacifist and defensive position vis-à-vis jihad, though he mentions combat on the battlefield as one crucial aspect of jihad. He writes that, Jihad is the Muslim’s striving to fulfill his every responsibility and to serve the Islamic cause and principles in a manner consistent with the Islamic framework. It is not to be taken to mean warfare alone. Jihad in this sense is the active expression of the Islamic commitment, responsibility, and sense of duty whenever it is required in practical life.

In Modern Standard Arabic, which is the standardized and literary form of Arabic in writing,3 “jihad” is applied in reference to struggle for causes (both religious and non-religious). In daily life, it is generally used in the religious sense and its beginnings go back to the Quran and the Prophet’s

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words and deeds.4 In the Quran itself, jihad is usually followed by the expression fi sabil illah (i.e., “in the path of God”).5

Interpretation Within the Scope of This Book Jihad is based on jahdu or jahada, which literally means “to strive” or “to labor”—i.e., working energetically, tirelessly, laboriously, industriously, studiously, sedulously, and seriously.6 As we have seen, in Islamic contexts, jihad is imbued with many nuances of meaning, such as a fight against our own evil proclivities, an effort to convert unbelievers, or a struggle towards the overall betterment of society,7 though it is most often related to war.8 Within the scope of this book, jihad is to be interpreted as the violent struggle for Islam. It is a key concept in Islamism and Salafism. Salafism is a literalist doctrine of Islam that has a militant and political desire to return to the Golden Age of Muhammadian lifestyles and conquests (see descriptions in subsequent chapters). Even though “jihad” emerges regularly in the Quran with and without military overtones, even through idioms,9 most Muslim jurists and ulema (experts on the religious interpretation of Islam) of the classical school of thought interpreted the obligation of jihad with a military frame.10 The Quran does not consider the military activities of non-Muslims as “jihad.” Rather, it employs concepts such as harb (war) or qital (fighting/war). This difference lies in the principle that Muslims wage wars for a nonmaterial and noble purpose of achieving social equality and the sovereignty of Allah’s rule, whereas non-Muslims wage wars to oppose Allah’s rule.11 Of the 200 references to jihad within the most standard volume of hadith—by the Muslim scholar Muhammad al-Bukhari in the ninth century—all conceive of jihad as warfare.12 The reported proverbs and dicta of the Prophet Muhammad on jihad included the two following: “The best Jihad is the word of Justice in front of the oppressive sultan” and “The Messenger of Allah was asked about the best jihad. He said: ‘The best jihad is the one in which your horse is slain and your blood is spilled’.”13 The Ummah In Arabic, ummah means “community.” Within the context of Islam, it refers to the global community of Muslims with a shared history.14 As Huntington (1993)15 astutely explained, the phrase “‘world community’

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has become the euphemistic collective noun (replacing ‘the Free World’) to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers.” The term “ummah” is mentioned in the Quran over 60 times and written frequently in the hadith as well—i.e., the hadith is the recorded words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad. The conceptualization of the ummah as a distinct religious community emanates from the early days of Islam when the ummah was the nascent Muslim circle consisting of both Arabs (dispersed across tribes) and nonArabs.16 In the Quran itself, the ummah is alluded to as a group whose members share common religious beliefs, particularly those related to divine salvation. From an etymological standpoint, the word is to be interpreted as “community of people” and is believed to be a kindred of the Hebrew am and Aramaic ummetha. In today’s parlance, ummah is better translated as “nation” and is often used in Arabic to symbolize the Western idea of “nation” (as in al-Umam al-Muttahida, or the United Nations).17 However, according to Judy (2004),18 “it would be an error to translate ummah as ‘nation,’ because the term means ‘the collecting of people’ as a function of heritage, convention, or faith, or even a way of life.” From a geopolitical standpoint, the ummah can only be cohesive through the leadership of a Caliph and a grand Muslim state (i.e., the global Caliphate). Jihad for the Ummah Many jihadists see themselves as part of the ummah, the international community united by not only transnationalism, but also victimization and oppression from both non-Muslim and Muslim governments. For the past few decades, jihads carried out by foreign fighters have conjured up a sentiment of global Muslim solidarity that can be understood as attempts to create a rivalry to the involvement of the international Muslim community into global peace processes. Before the September 11, 2001 attacks, the idea of volunteers mobilizing for jihad from all over the Muslim world was inconceivable. Today, the jihad for the ummah arouses a sense of collective duty among the worldwide community of Muslims to participate in the holy struggle for the Caliphate, even if their own governments disallow it.19 One of the tasks of jihadists is to build for a new identity for millions of adherents. Several scholars have put forward the notion that Muslims

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and converts to Islam adopt jihadist principles when they experience a crisis of identity.20 In particular, to people who are unsettled or saddened by the invasions of modernity into their lives, jihad gives those lives new meaning and a new sense of belonging (i.e., like a type of supranational family). As a whole, it is an attempt to inculcate into Muslims the belief that the only identity that is significant is their new membership of the ummah, because it is a global kinship unit that provides solace, dignity, safety, and honor to the oppressed Muslims.21

Jihad in History From the birth of Islam to the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD, Islam experienced two critical stages: (1) the Prophet’s journey through the hostile environments in Mecca and (2) the period that followed; that is, a more peaceful time (called post-hijrah) in Medina. Thus, the higher emphasis placed on moral battle and self-improvement during the first stage is attributed to the Meccan phase. Training and participation for jihad as a defensive measure against an army or as a reaction to foreign aggression are known as Qitaal or Jihad-e-Asghar. Commands for Qitaal or Jihad-e-Asghar are mostly associated with the post-hijrah period of the Medina phase.22 In the early days of classical Islam (particularly during the Rashidun Caliphate, from 632 to 661 AD), jihadist aspirations to conquer the world were designed to involve millions of followers; a territory extending “from the borders of India and China to the Pyrenees and the Atlantic.”23 In fact, the empire spread from the edges of China and the Indian subcontinent, passing through Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, to the southern parts of Europe (Sicily, the Iberian Peninsula, and the Pyrenees).24 In The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon (1867)25 wrote that, The Arabian empire extended two hundred days journey from east to west, from the confines of Tartary and India to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. We should vainly seek the indissoluble union and easy obedience that pervaded the government of Augustus and the Antonines; but the progress of Islam diffused over this ample space a general resemblance of manners and opinions. The language and laws of the Quran were studied with equal devotion at Samarcand and Seville: the Moor and the Indian embraced as countrymen and brothers in the pilgrimage of Mecca; and the

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Arabian language was adopted as the popular idiom in all the provinces to the westward of the Tigris.

The only two empires obstructing the expansion of Islam were the Persian Sassanid Empire and the Byzantine Empire. By 657 AD, the Persian Empire was defeated and, by 661 AD, the Byzantine Empire was severely shrunk.26 Reasons for Early Jihad During the first waves of Islamic conquests, Muslims were informed that their ultimate mission was to disseminate Islam to every territory and that they had the obligation to wage war on those who resisted their mission. As we all know, global war was not invented by Muslims; it was actually a common practice used by various empires for various purposes. Moreover, the aggressive propagation of Islam was not authorized unilaterally, but was a major reaction to the declaration of war or armed resistance by the nations of dar al-harb (see Chapter 7). Put another way, the Muslim territories regarded the non-Muslim territories as prospective threats to Islam, which made Muslims look at the latter as the perpetual enemy.27 An important event was the Quraysh’s opposition to Muhammad and his followers at the beginning of the seventh century. The Quraysh were a mercantile Arab tribe in Mecca. After the oppressive actions of the Quraysh, jihad was infused with a military component. Jihad was now the fight for Allah to be pursued by the Muslim community against the oppressors (commonly referred to as the “classical” doctrine of jihad). Other similar waves of jihad occurred until the end of the eighth century. They focused on “jihad of the sword” (jihad bil-saif ) rather than “jihad of the heart” (spreading the good news through the Muslim gospel). Jihad was already differentiated in respect to the rules and duties within Muslim-governed lands (dar al-Islam) and non-Muslim lands (dar al-harb).28 However, jihad was still limited by many legal decrees which arose from interpretations of the Quran and the hadith. Examples were meticulous rules about “the initiation, the conduct, the termination” of jihad, conduct in relation to prisoners of war, and the sharing of booty. Commands relating to jihad could be both personal and collective duties of the Muslim community. Therefore, the nature of jihad was essential to the interpretation thereof. If the image of the entire ummah was under

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attack, then jihad became mandatory for all Muslims.29 Unless a sudden assault was inflicted on the Muslim community, jihad was not an individual obligation (fard ayn), but a collective one (fard al-kifaya).30 Fard al-kifaya had to be executed “in the way of Allah” (fi sabil Allah) and could only be ordered by the Caliph, “whose discretion over its conduct was all but absolute.”31 Crusades and European Colonies At that time, Jerusalem fell to the Crusaders in 1099, with its carnage and displays of Western Christian zeal, which stirred widespread indignation. During the seven Crusades for the Holy Land (1095–1291), Muslim forces eventually repelled the European Christians who had invaded the Eastern Mediterranean holy sites on numerous occasions.32 This fueled a series of jihadist revivals over the following centuries. New radical Islamic movements sprung up, all with slightly different interpretations of Islam, but all of which put strong primacy on jihad. The Wahhabi movement, for example, reached across the Arabian Peninsula in the eighteenth century and unambiguously stressed that jihad had to be waged as an armed struggle.33 In more contemporary times, particularly at the beginning of the nineteenth century, European powers joined forces to settle in the Middle East. By the time the Armistice of November 11, 1918 was signed to end WWI, they pulled the Ottoman Empire to pieces—a great Muslim empire that lasted for six centuries—and controlled its territories among themselves. Britain announced the support of Israel through the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and the European nations, as a collective, selected local collaborators to be the ones administering their new “colonies.” After WWII, the United States acceded to the interests of the European powers, and the Soviet Union extended its empire by engulfing Islamic communities of Eurasia. Worried that the Muslim peoples might, in turn, join forces against their invaders, the colonial masters supported the establishment of nationalist movements in their colonies. This illusion of independence, designed to keep Muslim peoples divided and weak, was inducing them to place loyalty to their country above loyalty to Islam and the ummah.34 Insurgencies against Western powers ultimately emerged and were framed as jihad. For example, the Senussi religious order (a Muslim political-religious clan) declared holy war on the Italian rulers in Libya

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(1912) and the “Mahdi” declared holy war against both the British and the Egyptians in the Sudan (1881).35 A few decades later, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt to fight for physical struggle and martyrdom. The group implored Muslims to jump on the jihad bandwagon against the newly founded State of Israel in 1948. Subsequent to the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, many more jihadist groups appeared.36 According to Ab¯u ‘Amr (1994),37 for the Muslim Brotherhood society, The jihad for Palestine will start after the completion of the Islamic transformation of Palestinian society, the completion of the process of Islamic revival, and the return to Islam in the region. Only then can the call for jihad be meaningful, because the Palestinians cannot along liberate Palestine without the help of other Muslims.

Earth-shattering events such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), the defeat of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (1989), the fall of communism, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War (all in 1991) facilitated the development of an unprecedented number of jihadist movements in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, the Caucasus, and the Balkans—arguably more than one hundred of them.38

Greater vs. Lesser Jihad When jihad is under consideration, the Quran makes conflicting proclamations, generally in two forms. The first is the peaceful version of the “struggle” against our own base impulses, also called the “greater jihad.”39 The second is the more violent version of jihad: “jihad of the sword” or the “lesser jihad.” The belief that is customary among many Muslims—particularly Sufis—is that the “greater” jihad against our own evil proclivities is worth pursuing because it is “greater” than the “lesser” jihad of the sword. This view is grounded in a statement by the Prophet Muhammad in hadiths compiled in a non-canonical volume (including the sunan of Ahmad ibn Al-Husseyn Al-Bayhaqi in the eleventh century). According to that philosophy, Muhammad allegedly told Muslim warriors upon arrival that they had evolved from the lesser jihad of the struggle against the Infidels to the greater jihad of the struggle against one’s sins. Still and all, some intellectuals have cast the reliability of this hadith into doubt.40

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Put in layperson’s terms, when jihad is placed into the “greater” category, it is “inner” jihad because it involves a struggle against one’s own evil nature of his or her soul. This carries with it the notion of a moral plight towards self-improvement or self-elevation on moral grounds. Alternatively, the “lesser” category is “external” jihad, which is subdivided even more into jihad of the pen or tongue (as in “war waged through deception”) and jihad of the sword. Whereas many Western critics believe that external jihad is more important than inner jihad to Muslims, the majority of the contemporary Muslim world believes in the opposite.41 Spiritual and Political Interpretation Because jihad is a highly meaningful concept in Islam, it has stimulated much attention in the Islamic socio-legal system.42 No matter how “greater” or “lesser” jihad is to Muslims, it remains central to the universal mission of Muslim individuals as well as entire communities.43 Hence, on the one hand, it has a spiritual meaning for the individual and, on the other hand, it has a more political meaning for the community.44 The spiritual message of jihad is conveyed by the phrase jihad kabir (which actually means “greater jihad”), for it is an individual Muslim’s constant struggle against his or her own evil tendencies. The political message of jihad is communicated through the phrase jihad sagir (meaning “smaller jihad”), for it is the Muslim world’s military struggle against others for a multitude of reasons. This is a smaller jihad because it is temporary, triggered by particular reasons, and it will stop when victory over the entire world is achieved. Taken as a whole, irrespective of how greater or smaller jihad is, it will always remain the core of the universal mission of both individual Muslims and political communities.45 Further Contradictions Further contradictions have surfaced regarding the “lesser jihad vs. greater jihad” dichotomy. For example, in his book, The History of Baghdad, Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, an Islamic erudite writer in the eleventh century, quoted a hadith by Jabir ibn Abd-Allah (one of the Prophet’s companions) that is similar to the one included in the previous section. Here was his alleged statement: “We have returned from the lesser jihad (al-jihad al-asghar) to the greater jihad (al-jihad al-akbar).” When asked, “What is the greater jihad?,” he riposted by saying, “It is the struggle against

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oneself.”46 However, Abdullah Azzam—a Muslim Brotherhood cleric who was Osama bin Laden’s mentor and one of Al-Qaeda’s founders— condemned the statement as a “contradiction” to the true teachings of Islam and as “a false, fabricated hadith which has no basis. It is only a saying of Ibrahim Ibn Abi ‘Abalah, one of the successors, and it contradicts textual evidence and reality.”47 More importantly, that specific hadith is not included in any of the authoritative volumes.

Defensive vs. Offensive Jihad Before examining the jihadist radicalization process of the Muslim world and its long-term impact (see Chapter 3), the rise in jihadist terror that has worried the security bureaus of virtually every nation on the planet can also be explained through the “defensive vs. offensive jihad” spectrum. It is a phenomenon that kicks in rapid geographico-political changes occurring in places doomed by jihadist activities. Consider the following examples: the 2016 Brussels bombings (March 2016), ISIS, and Al-Shabaab (just to cite a few). Although their contexts are different and physically remote from each other, they find a common denominator in the long-established notion that jihad is to be carried out in the defense of the religion from external threats—today, this position remains highly inherent in the concept of militant Islam. From the standpoint of Western logic, terrorism is an offensive tactic, but in jihad it can be both offensive and defensive. The Brussels bombings and the expansion of ISIS and Al-Shabaab appear to meet the criteria of Western logic: offensive terrorism. However, upon examining the Brussels case succinctly, it can be deduced that the three bombings were executed in defense of the faith from external threats. More precisely, the external threats were (1) the Belgian government’s active fight against jihad and (2) the arrest of Salah Abdeslam (one of the masterminds of the November 13, 2015 attacks in Paris) exactly four days before the bombings at the Brussels airport and the Maalbeek metro station.48 Defensive Jihad Defensive jihad follows an enemy’s attack on Muslims, pushing them into a defensive position. In fact, it is a responsibility incumbent on all Muslims.49 In Arabic, it is called jihad al-dafaa, a widely embraced notion akin to international norms of self-defense and the Judeo-Christian

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“Just War” thesis.50 For most Islamic intellectuals, when an outside force illegitimately enters a Muslim territory, all Muslims are obligated to fight a holy war to guarantee the protection of the faith and the faithful. Thus, protecting one’s brothers and sisters is a religious obligation to make sure that the mission of the global Islamic state is not derailed. The underpinnings of defensive jihad are a theological emphasis on justice, as embodied in Quran 6:151: “Do not slay the soul sanctified by Allah except for just cause.” Defending the ummah against external threats is a quintessential “just cause.”51 On the other hand, defensive jihad does not allow the departure of any believer from the faith, as he or she would be called an apostate (which is a capital sin). When declared, a defensive jihad can rarely be overturned by a ruling authority in Islam. It can dispose of fasting obligations during Ramadan and with subservience to a ruler in opposition. What matters the most is the survival of the ummah.52 According to some schools of thought on sharia, when the enemy invades a Muslim territory, jihad becomes the collective obligation of every male and female Muslim. Indeed, all Muslims—men, women, and even adolescents and slaves— must leave their homes and responsibilities behind to fight for their people and their religion.53 In the late twentieth century, this widely embraced interpretation of defensive jihad was implemented in the Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989). When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan to buttress the dwindling communist government, Muslim academics, clerics, and jurists across the world called for jihad. Thousands of Muslim fighters—including Osama bin Laden—migrated to Afghanistan to meet their religious obligation. They were funded by Islamic aid agencies, wealthy donors, and the Muslim régimes of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Pakistan (among others). State leaders and Muslim fundamentalists alike agreed that defensive jihad was more than appropriate and encouraged the ummah to fight, support soldiers financially, and perform humanitarian work—contingent on their abilities and resources.54 Offensive Jihad Offensive jihad is an offensive attack on the Kuffar (unbelievers) who have previously received the jihadists’ message to convert to their faith and abandon any obstruction to the global Muslim expansion, but who

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have not complied with their demands.55 In Arabic, Islam means submission.56 If the Kuffar refuse to submit to Islam, then Muslims must fight them. In Islamic jurisprudence, offensive jihad is analogous to Muslim conquest and aspires to propagate Islam to the dar al-harb (the House of War).57 It also falls under the political authority of jurists and imams. Any Muslim can take part in it, including soldiers and volunteers enthused by a devout zeal or driven by the expectation of justifiable killing of the enemy.58 Offensive jihad is intrinsically linked to the fight for the Caliphate. It is aimed at overreaching the territory of Islam to the entire world until all opponents are extirpated.59 In Arabic, offensive jihad is jihad-e-asghar. It is the duty of the ummah to carry it against four categories of enemies: the Infidels, the Apostates, the insurgents within the faith, and the bandits. In the eyes of many Muslim scholars, only the first two are legitimate forms of jihad in the vein of a holy war against the enemies of the faith. The aggressive push to turn non-Muslim territories into Muslim ones must be led by a Caliph and requires specific pre-conditions and circumstances, which would be difficult to implement in twenty-first-century contexts. Strictly speaking, offensive jihad would only happen if the ummah is led by a supreme Muslim ruler.60 However, as most of us know, there are so many interpretations of jihad that “pre-conditions” and “circumstances” tend to vary from one group to another, and also from one historical period to another. A case in point was the expansion of the meaning of jihad in the aftermath of the Prophet’s death in 632 AD and the designation of his successor, Abu Bakr, as Caliph. During Abu Bakr’s reign, most treaties to which the Prophet and the tribes had agreed were annulled (as many tribes launched rebellions against the new leader). Abu Bakr responded by launching wars against riddah (apostasy). The Apostates were now traitors to the faith and included in the enemy target of offensive jihad. Under Abu Bakr’s reign, offensive jihad was even extended to include fighting any Muslim rebellion against a Caliph.61

Who Are the Jihadists Today? The following list includes about 85 jihadist organizations that are active today and that have been designated as terrorist organizations by various governments and institutions, including the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations.62 These

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jihadist organizations are: the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, the Abu Nidal Organization, Abu Sayyaf, the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, Ajnad Misr, Akhil Bharat Nepali Ekta Samaj, the Al-Aqsa Foundation, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Al-Badr, Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, Al Ghurabaa, the Al-Haramain Foundation, Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, Al-Mourabitoun, AlNusra Front, Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Al-Qassam Brigades, Al-Shabaab, Ansar al-Sharia (Libya), Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia), Ansar al-Islam, Jamaat Ansar alSunna, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, Ansar Dine, Ansarul Islam, Ansaru, the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, the Army of Islam, the Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Osbat al-Ansar, Boko Haram, the Caucasus Emirate, the East Turkestan Islamic Party, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, the Haqqani network, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harakat Sham al-Islam, Hasm Movement, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, Hezbollah, Hizbul Mujahideen, the Islamic Jihad Union, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), Jaish-e-Mohammed, Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, Jamaat al Dawa al Quran, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, Jamaat Ul-Furquan, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Jamaat-ulMujahideen Bangladesh, Jemaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, Jund al-Aqsa, Jund al-Khilafah, Jund al-Khilafah, Kach and Kahane Chai, Katibat al-Imam al-Bukhari, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Khuddam ul-Islam, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem, the Palestine Liberation Front, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Al-Quds Force, Saraya al-Ashtar, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Tahrir al-Sham, Tehreek-e-Nafaze-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade. The Increase in the Number of Jihadist Groups In parallel with the increase of lone-wolf jihadist incidents, there is also an increase in the number of jihadist groups. The sharp increase of such groups was noticed in the 1980s and 1990s, which has considerably raised

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the level of lethality as a result of terrorism. There is empirical evidence that jihadist organizations are, indeed, more lethal than their non-jihadist counterparts. From the 1980s to 2005, jihadist organizations accounted for 93.6% of all terrorist attacks by religiously oriented terrorist organizations and accounted for 86.9% of all casualties among all those religiously oriented groups. On average, non-jihadist attacks produced 8.7 victims per incident, as opposed to 20.7 victims per jihadist attack.63 The vast majority of the aforementioned 85 jihadist organizations consider violent jihad a sixth pillar of Islam. A significant percentage of these organizations are direct offshoots of Al-Qaeda, which supports them financially, technologically, and ideologically. As proclaimed by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Al-Qaeda leader today, the main mission of a jihadist organization should (1) establish a global Caliphate; (2) get rid of invaders from Muslim holy lands; and (3) eradicate pro-Western Muslim governments—particularly referring to Saudi Arabia.64 Another reason that explains the significant increase of jihadist organizations today lies in the methods and strategies involved. Jihadists operate differently than non-jihadists. In jihad, the use of any weapon is justifiable, and the use of any target is justifiable. The enemy encompasses any man, woman, and child who does not share the jihadist ideology; in fact, there should be no discrimination among targets. Jihadism is bellum omnium contra omnes —the war of all against all.65 It is a Culture of Terror that yearns for the breakdown of America, the West, and the rest of the world through large-scale exterminations of the Infidels and Apostates.66 The disproportionate violence and terror committed by groups like ISIS have taken the lives of countless innocent people—in fact, the vast majority of their victims have been Muslims themselves. The repeated strategy of terrorizing entire communities through decapitations and mass killings on a high scale has become the norm for groups like ISIS. They are fighting to transform political régimes. Some, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, have been active since the 1920s and have managed to inculcate the jihadist doctrine through multiple conduits, but only have a small track record of violence.67 In fact, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood officially abandoned jihadist violence in the 1970s68 and participated in politics (until Egyptian president Abdel Fatah al-Sisi and a large segment of the Egyptian population banned them as a dangerous organization).69

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Jihadist Ideologues and Leaders Many jihadist ideologues and leaders are cultured and well informed, often with modern secular educations under their belts. Raised in middleclass and upper-class families, they are among the intellectual and technocratic élite in their own countries. Osama bin Laden, for instance, was a civil engineering student in Saudi Arabia. Both Ayman al-Zawahiri and Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (another founding member of Al-Qaeda) earned a medical degree. Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (a key architect of modern jihadism) and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (a major mastermind of the 9/11 attacks) graduated with a mechanical engineering diploma. Muhammad ‘Atif (AlQaeda’s former military chief) had an agricultural engineer degree and became a policeman later.70 Abu-Mus’ab al-Suri (2004)71 was another architect in global jihad. He was a military instructor in the Afghan-Arab training camps, participated in several jihadist missions, and was an officer in several terrorist organizations in Europe and the Middle East. In the 1980s, Abdullah Azzam, a leading Salafist figure of the Muslim Brotherhood, was also one of the fathers of modern global jihad. A Palestinian scholar and chief proponent of the Arab-Afghan jihad against the Soviets, he inspired millions of would-be jihadists against the unbelievers across space and time. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Azzam issued a fatwa calling for defensive jihad and pronounced it as an individual obligation—i.e., from now on, all able-bodied Muslims had to migrate to Afghanistan to fight the invaders.72 His fatwa was sanctioned by many Muslim clerics. Azzam claimed that “anyone who looks into the state of Muslims today will find that their great misfortune is their abandonment of Jihad,” and he also warned that “without Jihad, shirk (joining partners with Allah) will spread and become dominant.”73 Jihad was so essential that “repelling” the unbelievers was “the most important obligation after Iman [faith].”74 Azzam also pushed for a broader inclusion of enemy targets in jihad, a move that inspired many of his disciples, including Osama bin Laden. As Azzam continued in his proclamations, Muslims may abide by the Prophet Muhammad’s dictum to his companions that they should “not to kill any women or children” but, Azzam warned, “very few know that there are exceptions to this case. In summary, Muslims do not have to stop an attack on mushrikeen [idolaters], if non-fighting women and children are present.”75 After Abdullah Azzam’s death in 1989, Osama bin Laden slowly became a jihadist leader and ideologue. Osama bin Laden identified

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Salafist thinkers such as Azzam, Ahmed Yasin (Hamas’s founder), Omar Abdel Rahman (conspirator of the World Trade Center bombing in 1993), Salman al Awdah and Safar al Hawali (two Saudi clerics), and Ibn Taymiyah (a thirteenth-century Islamic scholar) as his main ideological mentors.76 Osama bin Laden gained experience as a logistics and finance operator for the Arab-Afghan resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It is during this time that his beliefs that Muslims should engage in jihad against the enemy materialized. His interest in the teachings of Salafist scholars in Saudi Arabia and his work with Arab-Afghan leaders in Afghanistan provided the theological and ideological groundwork for (1) radical Islamic reform in the Muslim world and (2) militant resistance against perceived aggression. These became the mission of AlQaeda, which Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam founded in 1988.77 When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, bin Laden vehemently opposed the passing of Western military troops through Saudi Arabia. After the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the Al-Qaeda leader regarded the presence of these troops in the Holy Land—which, historically speaking, was the birthplace of Islam—as a legitimate reason for Muslims’ renewed obligation to defensive jihad and the endorsement of violence against the Saudi government and the Crusader Alliance.78 Another jihadist leader and ideologue is the late ISIS leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. Born Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali Al-Badri, Al-Baghdadi grew up as a quiet, shy boy who mostly spoke when reciting verses from the Quran. He became an exemplary, overachieving student who graduated with a doctorate in Islamic studies from the University of Baghdad.79 Later in his life, he took on the nom de guerre “Al-Baghdadi” (the actual successor of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century) and self-identified as Caliph.80 For leaders of ISIS, Baghdad is a symbolic site within the context of the Caliphate. In addition to Mosul, Raqqa, and other Middle-Eastern cities, governing Baghdad would portend the beginning of the Caliphate era. Baghdad is in Iraq and all jihadist leaders unequivocally support Iraq and resist the Western-backed régimes of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Al-Baghdadi praised jihad as the perfect method to enforce the virtuous purification of Islam on the world. In other words, by ascertaining himself as the world’s Caliph, Al-Baghdadi attempted to enable Islam to reach global domination through extreme violence.81

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Thoughts on Global Jihad Today Global jihad today is a reflection of a devastating crisis in a significant number of Muslim societies and throughout the ummah. The ideological resolve to enact violence on a massive scale is a modern articulation of Salafist thinking, which sees the “contamination” of Islam as a deep malaise at the micro, meso, and macro levels. Salafism is the desire to return to the Golden Age of Islam.82 Global Salafists seek to change not only the entire ummah but—to put it plainly—the entire world. This book describes Salafism in ample detail. For Salafists, jihad is the idyllic means to transform the apparatus of the world into a global Caliphate. They promote the narrative that the Muslim world has endured a longstanding, aggressive onslaught by the West, led by America the Great Satan, along with Israel the Little Satan, in what Salafists have called the Crusader Alliance.83 The global jihad movement is to be viewed as a global insurgency against the forces of evil—those that threaten Islam. Insurgency is generally defined as a popular movement that wants to bring down the status quo through insurrection, political action, armed combat, and terrorism.84 Insurgent movements often start at the grassroots level, as shaking the foundations of a society is the best method to overthrow the established order.85 Jihadist insurgencies have used surprise attacks, guerrilla tactics, and other violent methods against the established government, military forces, and most of all, civilians themselves. Many jihadist insurgencies attract their active fighters from disaffected socioeconomic backgrounds and their leaders from well-educated, malcontent élites. Al-Qaeda and related organizations exploit local grievances, mix them with broader ideologies, and integrate various conflicts through a global framework of propaganda channels, recruitment methods, training camps, finances, and technology—all in the name of jihad.86 Landscapes of Jihad Jihad is no longer confined to the regions of the historical Caliphate (when it began in the seventh century) and the much larger pan-Islamic Caliphate (i.e., the Ottoman Empire). One of the most obvious consequences of the emergence of global jihadist organizations is their attempt at abolishing current Muslim authority structures. It is the destruction of these structures that will enable global jihad to pave the way for the

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“landscapes of jihad.”87 In 2014, we could witness this phenomenon with ISIS’s claim of the Caliphate (i.e., the “Islamic State”) in Iraq and Syria. There, ISIS fighters destroyed a large part of authority structures. Of course, ISIS’s momentum in Iraq and Syria waned in 2016 when U.S.backed local militias expelled ISIS from much of the territory they had under control.88 In March 2019, ISIS lost total control of its territory in the Near East. The landscapes of jihad transcend Muslim authority structures; it is also a global landscape. With 9/11, “jihad ceased to be a foreign or alien subject to become the very stuff of American popular or political culture.”89 9/11 was a strike into the heart of the global sphere, which proves that jihadists are “as familiar with the infidel West as with any other place. These men are already inside the world of their enemies and can no longer be described as an outside threat in any sense.”90 According to the aforementioned Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda fights for the establishment of a global Islamic State ruled exclusively by sharia. Secular governments only apply man-made laws that fly in the face of Allah-ordained laws. When the global Muslim government is finally set up, only then will Earth enjoy a true “liberation of the human being.” This was Al-Zawahiri’s vision of the landscapes of jihad. For him, jihad will eventually get the world to follow sharia-compliant principles and rules.91 Indirect Jihadist Players In contrast to a monolithic organization like the Provisional Irish Republican Army in the 1970s and 1980s, the global jihad movement is a multifaceted phenomenon that is omnipresent both horizontally and vertically. On occasion, the literature overlooks the danger posed by indirect jihadist players.92 It is a situation in which jihadist networks operate through regional theaters of warfare, using unaffiliated operatives in neighboring countries. Data suggests that regional jihadist fighters within those regions apply similar ideological dogmas of the global jihad movement, and share a common strategic approach. It is not always clear whether a supranational network like ISIS or Al-Qaeda oversees jihad in each theater. In regard to Al-Qaeda, nine major jihadist theaters have been identified, including the Americas; Western Europe; Australasia; the Iberian Peninsula and Maghreb (Muslim Northwest Africa); the Greater

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Middle East; East Africa; South and Central Asia; the Caucasus and European Russia; and Southeast Asia.93 In line with such contentions, jihadism in Western Europe has also been characterized by internationally functioning, ad hoc terrorist cells— generally consisting of five to ten core members who may have never received any training or direct contact from groups like ISIS or Al-Qaeda. The cell members can be first- or second-generation Muslim youths, most of whom come from the Maghreb.94 Global actors sometimes connect local actors together or use their skills and motivations through regional affiliates. They seldomly communicate one-on-one with local actors, but support them through liaisons and agents. Operational players are found in each jihadist theater, tapping into global jihad. These theaters are linked through an aggregated network of global jihadist actors and organizations. Links include shared ideologies, languages, cultures, and Islamic faith principles. As we will see in Chapter 5, although these groups come from multiple walks of life and subsets of Islam, they still identify with a universal sense of social alienation from mainstream society.95 The “indirect jihadist players” variable presents a huge obstacle to entities fighting terrorism. Global jihad leaders hiding in the ridges and highlands of western Pakistan can use a multitude of channels (e.g., the internet or human couriers) to recruit unknown Soldiers of Allah across the world. They may even be supported by jihadist thinkers and religious authorities in Europe and the Middle East. The global jihad entity is decentralized and landless; it wields so much power and influence, and owns so many resources, that its force and specter are equivalent to a global state. To cite a specific example, this “global state” was able to exert its power and influence in Somalia in June 2006 when it indirectly created the Islamic Courts Union—a pro-jihad group of sharia courts. The Union could not be removed when Ethiopian-led troops overthrew the Somali government six months later.96 Inside Western Lands A Nixon Center study of 373 jihadists in Western Europe and North America between 1993 and 2004 reported that twice as many French people as Saudis and a higher percentage of British people than Sudanese, Yemenites, Emiratis, Lebanese, and Libyans were mujahedin. A whopping 25% of those jihadists were Western European citizens who could legally travel to the United States without a visa.97 A case in point is

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Mohammed Bouyeri, the murderer of Theo van Gogh. Bouyeri was on the unemployment benefits roll when he killed the Dutch filmmaker. The tragedy rocked the Netherlands and adjacent countries not only because of who the victim was—a filmmaker from the same lineage as the painter Vincent van Gogh, the Dutch’s most famous person—but also because Mohammed Bouyeri was “an average second-generation immigrant,” said Stef Blok, the chairman of the parliamentary commission supervising Bouyeri’s immigration documents. European counterterrorism agencies considered the killing a new phase in the jihadist threat. It raised the likely occurrence of Middle-Eastern-style surprise attacks as part of the terrorist arsenal in Europe and it exposed another type of specter: mysterious killers with no troublesome criminal record among Europe’s Muslims.98

Notes 1. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 2. Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman, The Islamic Theory of International Relations: New Directions for Islamic Methodology and Thought (Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1987), 136. 3. Adrian Gully, Mike Carter, and Elsaid Badawi, Modern Written Arabic: A Comprehensive Grammar, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2015). 4. Jonathan Berkey, The Formation of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 5. Hanna E. Kassis, A Concordance of the Qur’an (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 6. Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1996); S. Abdullah Schleifer, “Jihad: Sacred Struggle in Islam,” Islamic Quarterly 28, no. 3 (1984): 135–49. 7. Rudolph Peters and David Cook, The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 8. Roy Jackson, What Is Islamic Philosophy? (New York: Routledge, 2014). 9. Ahmed Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Josef W. Meri, Medieval Islamic Civilization: An Encyclopedia (New York: Routledge, 2005). 10. Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 11. Monir Moniruzzaman, “Jihad and Terrorism: An Alternative Explanation,” Journal of Religion & Society 10, no. 1 (2008): 1–13. 12. Cited in Douglas E. Streusand, “What Does Jihad Mean?” Middle East Quarterly 4, no. 3 (1997): 9–17.

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13. Cited in Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Shari’ah Law: An Introduction (London: Oneworld Publications, 2008), 204. 14. Robert A. Saunders, “The Ummah as Nation: A Reappraisal in the Wake of the ‘Cartoons Affair’,” Nations and Nationalism 14, no. 2 (2008): 303–21, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2008.00322.x. 15. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49, 39. 16. James Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 17. Ibid., 206. 18. Ronald Judy, “Sayyid Qutb’s fiqh al-waqi’i, or New Realist Science,” Boundary 2 31, no. 2 (2004): 113–48, https://doi.org/10.1215/019 03659-31-2-113. 19. Darryl Li, “Jihad in a World of Sovereigns: Law, Violence, and Islam in the Bosnia Crisis,” Law & Social Inquiry 41, no. 2 (2016): 371–401, https://doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12152. 20. Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs (London: Pluto Press, 2005). 21. Assaf Moghadam, “The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 3 (2008): 1–3. 22. Manzar Zaidi, “A Taxonomy of Jihad,” Arab Studies Quarterly 31, no. 3 (2009): 21–34. 23. Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 4. 24. Robert G. Hoyland, In God’s Path: The Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Hugh Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2007). 25. Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (London: Bell & Daldy, 1867), 112. 26. John Joseph Saunders, A History of Medieval Islam (New York: Routledge, 2002). 27. Moniruzzaman, “Jihad and Terrorism,” 5. 28. Roxanne L. Euben, “Killing (for) Politics: Jihad, Martyrdom, and Political Action,” Political Theory 30, no. 1 (2002): 4–35, 12, https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0090591702030001002. 29. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, Islamic Rulings on Warfare (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004). 30. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), 60. 31. Sadakat Kadri, Heaven on Earth: A Journey through Shari’a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 150.

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32. Conor Kostick, The Siege of Jerusalem: Crusade and Conquest in 1099 (New York: Continuum, 2011); Carole Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2017). 33. Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 34. Lisa Anderson, “Antiquated before They Can Ossify: States That Fail before They Form,” Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 1 (2004): 1–16; Arnon Golan, “European Imperialism and the Development of Modern Palestine: Was Zionism a Form of Colonialism?” Space and Polity 5, no. 2 (2001): 127–43, https://doi.org/10.1080/135625701 20104445; and Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789–1923 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 35. David Coates, The Oxford Companion to American Politics, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 36. Pippi Van Slooten, “Dispelling Myths about Islam and Jihad,” Peace Review 17, no. 2 (2005): 289–90, https://doi.org/10.1080/146313705 00333013. 37. Ziy¯ad Ab¯ u ‘Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 23. 38. Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Ideology,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 1 (2005): 59–83. 39. Mustansir Mir, “Jihad in Islam,” in The Jihad and its Times, ed. Hadia Dajani, Shakeel, and Ronald A. Messier (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies, 1991), 113–26, 113. 40. Moghadam, “Mayhem, Myths, and Martyrdom,” 126. 41. Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 42. Reed M. Donner, “The Sources of Islamic Conception of War,” in Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, ed. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (New York: Greenwood, 1991), 31–71. 43. Jamilah Kolokotronis, Islamic Jihad: An Historical Perspective (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1990); Andulaziz A. Sachedina, “The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History,” in Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Traditions, ed. James Turner Johnson (New York: Greenwood, 1990), 167–76. 44. S. Abdullah Schleifer, “Understanding Jihad: Definition and Methodology,” Islamic Quarterly 27, no. 3 (1983): 117–31. 45. Moniruzzaman, “Jihad and Terrorism,” 8–12. 46. Streusand, “What Does Jihad Mean?” 12.

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47. Cited in Robert Spencer, Onward Muslim Soldiers: How Jihad Still Threatens America and the West (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003), 247. 48. Elke Devroe and Paul Ponsaers, “The Power Context of Police Reform in Belgium—The Brussels Case: A Shift in the Style of Policing after the Terrorist Attacks,” Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, https://doi. org/10.1093/police/pay038. 49. Sherman Jackson, “Jihad and the Modern World,” Journal of Islamic Law and Culture 7, no. 1 (2002): 1–26. 50. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991). 51. James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). 52. Gilles Kepel, “The Origins and Development of the Jihadist Movement: From Anti-Communism to Terrorism,” Asian Affairs 34, no. 2 (2003): 91–108, https://doi.org/10.1080/0306837032000118198 53. Nelly Lahoud, “The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis’ Exclusion of Women from Jihad,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 5 (2014): 780–802, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.772511. 54. Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, “Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda’s Justification for September 11,” Middle East Policy 10, no. 2 (2003): 76–92, https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4967.00107. 55. Ibid., 85–7. 56. Nelly Lahoud, Political Thought in Islam: A Study in Intellectual Boundaries (London: Routledge, 2013). 57. Wiktorowicz and Kaltner, “Killing in the Name of Islam,” 85–7. 58. Kepel, “The Origins and Development of the Jihadist Movement,” 93. 59. Shmuel Bar, “The Implications of the Caliphate,” Comparative Strategy 35, no. 1 (2016): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2016.113 3994. 60. Zaidi, “A Taxonomy of Jihad,” 24–5. 61. Lutz Wiederhold, “Blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad and His Companions (Sabb Al-Ras¯ ul, Sabb Al-Sah¯ abah): The Introduction of the Topic into Sh¯afi’¯ı Legal Literature and Its Relevance for Legal Practice under Mamluk Rule,” Journal of Semitic Studies XLII, no. 1 (1997): 39–70, https://doi.org/10.1093/jss/XLII.1.39. 62. The sources proving that the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and/or the United nations have designated these jihadist organizations as terrorist organizations can be found on https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_designated_terrorist_groups. 63. Cited in James A. Piazza, “Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous? An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal Structure,”

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64. 65.

66. 67.

68.

69.

70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

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Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 1 (2009): 62–88, https://doi. org/10.1080/09546550802544698. Kabir Sethi, “The Allure of the Radical: Understanding Jihadist Violence in the West,” Macalester International 22 (2009): 201–25. Martin Wight, “An Anatomy of International Thought,” Review of International Studies 13, no. 3 (1987): 221–27, https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0260210500113610 Maximiliano E. Korstanje, Terrorism, Tourism and the End of Hospitality in the “West ” (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). Yosef Jabareen, “The Emerging Islamic State: Terror, Territoriality, and the Agenda of Social Transformation,” Geoforum 58 (2015): 51–5, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.10.009. Charles McDaniel, “The Role of Human Security in the Contest between the Egyptian Government and the Muslim Brotherhood, 1980–2010,” in Religion and Human Security: A Global Perspective, ed. James K. Wellman Jr., and Clark B. Lombardi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 48–66. Nicola Pratt and Dina Rezk, “Securitizing the Muslim Brotherhood: State Violence and Authoritarianism in Egypt after the Arab Spring,” Security Dialogue 50, no. 3 (2019): 239–56, https://doi.org/10.1177/096701 0619830043. Akil N. Awan, “Success of the Meta-Narrative: How Jihadists Maintain Legitimacy,” CTC Sentinel 2, no. 11 (2009): 6–8. Abu-Mus’ab al-Suri, The Call to Global Islamic Resistance. DCIA Counterterrorism Center (Langley, VA: Office of Terrorism Analysis, 2004). Bruce Riedel, What We Won: America’s Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979– 89 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017). Dore Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003), 95. Ibid. Ibid., 99. Christopher M. Blanchard, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007). James Turner Johnson, “Jihad and Just War,” First Things 124 (2002): 12–14. Richard Miniter, Losing Bin Laden: How Bill Clinton’s Failures Unleashed Global Terror (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003). Peter Beaumont, “Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi: The ISIS Chief with the Ambition to Overtake al Qaida,” The Guardian, June 12, 2014, A1. Massimo Calabresi, “Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi: The Head of ISIS Exports Extreme Violence and Radical Beliefs around the Globe,” TIME 154 (2015): 102–3. James L. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Nicolas Pelham, “ISIS and the Shia Revival in Iraq,” The New York Times, June 24, 2015, A1.

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82. Madawi Al-Rasheed, “The Quest to Understand Global Jihad: The Terrorism Industry and Its Discontents,” Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 2 (2009): 329–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200802699445. 83. Farhana Ali and Jerrold Post, “The History and Evolution of Martyrdom in the Service of Defensive Jihad: An Analysis of Suicide Bombers in Current Conflicts,” Social Research: An International Quarterly 75, no. 2 (2008): 615–54. 84. Elisabeth Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 85. Florian Weigand, “Afghanistan’s Taliban: Legitimate Jihadists or Coercive Extremists?” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 11, no. 3 (2017): 359–81, https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2017.1353755. 86. David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 597–617, https://doi.org/10.1080/014023 90500300956. 87. Faisal Devji, Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity (London: Hurst, 2005), xii. 88. Zachary Laub, The Islamic State (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2016). 89. Faisal Devji, Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity (London: Hurst, 2005), xii. 90. Devji, Landscapes of the Jihad, xiv. 91. Blanchard, Al Qaeda, 11. 92. Cristian E. Guerrero-Castro, “Strategic Communication for Security & National Defense: Proposal for an Interdisciplinary Approach,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal XII, no. 2 (2013): 27–52. 93. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” 598. 94. Petter Nesser, “Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 4 (2006): 323–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100600641899. 95. Michael Vlahos, Terror’s Mask: Insurgency within Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2002). 96. Segun Joshua and Felix Chidozie, “Al-Shabaab: An Emerging Terrorist Group in Somalia,” African Renaissance 12, no. 1 (2015): 81–105. 97. Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 4 (2005): 120–35. 98. Ibid., 125–28.

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References Aboul-Enein, Youssef H., and Sherifa Zuhur. Islamic Rulings on Warfare. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004. Ab¯ u ‘Amr, Ziy¯ad. Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. Abu Sulayman, Abdul Hamid. The Islamic Theory of International Relations: New Directions for Islamic Methodology and Thought. Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1987. Al-Dawoody, Ahmed. The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Ali, Farhana, and Jerrold Post. “The History and Evolution of Martyrdom in the Service of Defensive Jihad: An Analysis of Suicide Bombers in Current Conflicts.” Social Research: An International Quarterly 75, no. 2 (2008): 615–54. Al-Rasheed, Madawi. “The Quest to Understand Global Jihad: The Terrorism Industry and Its Discontents.” Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 2 (2009): 329– 38. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200802699445. al-Suri, Abu-Mus’ab. The Call to Global Islamic Resistance. DCIA Counterterrorism Center. Langley, VA: Office of Terrorism Analysis, 2004. Anderson, Lisa. “Antiquated before They Can Ossify: States That Fail before They Form.” Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 1 (2004): 1–16. Awan, Akil N. “Success of the Meta-Narrative: How Jihadists Maintain Legitimacy.” CTC Sentinel 2, no. 11 (2009): 6–8. Bar, Shmuel. “The Implications of the Caliphate.” Comparative Strategy 35, no. 1 (2016): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2016.1133994. Beaumont, Peter. “Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi: The ISIS Chief with the Ambition to Overtake al Qaida.” The Guardian, June 12, 2014, A1. Berkey, Jonathan. The Formation of Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Blanchard, Christopher M. Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007. Bonner, Michael. Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. Calabresi, Massimo. “Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi: The Head of ISIS Exports Extreme Violence and Radical Beliefs around the Globe.” TIME 154 (2015): 102–3. Coates, David. The Oxford Companion to American Politics. Vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Delong-Bas, Natana J. Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Devji, Faisal. Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. London: Hurst, 2005.

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Devroe, Elke, and Paul Ponsaers. “The Power Context of Police Reform in Belgium—The Brussels Case: A Shift in the Style of Policing after the Terrorist Attacks.” Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice. https://doi.org/10. 1093/police/pay038. Donner, Reed M. “The Sources of Islamic Conception of War.” In Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, edited by John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, 31–71. New York: Greenwood, 1991. El Fadl, Khaled Abou. Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Euben, Roxanne L. “Killing (for) Politics: Jihad, Martyrdom, and Political Action.” Political Theory 30, no. 1 (2002): 4–35. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0090591702030001002. Gelvin, James L. The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. Gibbon, Edward. The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. London: Bell & Daldy, 1867. Golan, Arnon. “European Imperialism and the Development of Modern Palestine: Was Zionism a Form of Colonialism?” Space and Polity 5, no. 2 (2001): 127–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/13562570120104445. Gold, Dore. Hatred’s Kingdom. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003. Guerrero-Castro, Cristian E. “Strategic Communication for Security & National Defense: Proposal for an Interdisciplinary Approach.” Connections: The Quarterly Journal XII, no. 2 (2013): 27–52. Gully, Adrian, Mike Carter, and Elsaid Badawi. Modern Written Arabic: A Comprehensive Grammar. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2015. Gunaratna, Rohan. “Al Qaeda’s Ideology.” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 1 (2005): 59–83. Hashim Kamali, Mohammad. Shari’ah Law: An Introduction. London: Oneworld Publications, 2008. Hillenbrand, Carole. The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 2017. Hoyland, Robert G. In God’s Path: The Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic Empire. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49. Jabareen, Yosef. “The Emerging Islamic State: Terror, Territoriality, and the Agenda of Social Transformation.” Geoforum 58 (2015): 51–5. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.10.009. Jackson, Roy. What Is Islamic Philosophy? New York: Routledge, 2014. Jackson, Sherman. “Jihad and the Modern World.” Journal of Islamic Law and Culture 7, no. 1 (2002): 1–26.

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Johnson, James Turner. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. ———. “Jihad and Just War.” First Things 124 (2002): 12–14. Joshua, Segun, and Felix Chidozie. “Al-Shabaab: An Emerging Terrorist Group in Somalia.” African Renaissance 12, no. 1 (2015): 81–105. Judy, Ronald. “Sayyid Qutb’s fiqh al-waqi’i, or New Realist Science.” Boundary 2 31, no. 2 (2004): 113–48. https://doi.org/10.1215/01903659-31-2-113. Kadri, Sadakat. Heaven on Earth: A Journey through Shari’a Law from the Deserts of Ancient Arabia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Karsh, Efraim, and Inari Karsh. Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789–1923. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. Kassis, Hanna E. A Concordance of the Qur’an. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Kelsay, John, and James Turner Johnson. Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991. Kennedy, Hugh. The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2007. Kepel, Gilles. “The Origins and Development of the Jihadist Movement: From Anti-Communism to Terrorism.” Asian Affairs 34, no. 2 (2003): 91–108. https://doi.org/10.1080/0306837032000118198. Khadduri, Majid. War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955. Khosrokhavar, Farhad. Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs. London: Pluto Press, 2005. Kilcullen, David J. “Countering Global Insurgency.” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 597–617. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390500300956 Kolokotronis, Jamilah. Islamic Jihad: An Historical Perspective. Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1990. Korstanje, Maximiliano E. Terrorism, Tourism and the End of Hospitality in the “West.” New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Kostick, Conor. The Siege of Jerusalem: Crusade and Conquest in 1099. New York: Continuum, 2011. Lahoud, Nelly. “The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis’ Exclusion of Women from Jihad.” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 5 (2014): 780–802. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.772511. ———. Political Thought in Islam: A Study in Intellectual Boundaries. London: Routledge, 2013. Laub, Zachary. The Islamic State. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2016. Leiken, Robert S. “Europe’s Angry Muslims.” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 4 (2005): 120–35.

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Lewis, Bernard. Islam and the West. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. ———. The Political Language of Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Li, Darryl. “Jihad in a World of Sovereigns: Law, Violence, and Islam in the Bosnia Crisis.” Law & Social Inquiry 41, no. 2 (2016): 371–401. https:// doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12152. McDaniel, Charles. “The Role of Human Security in the Contest between the Egyptian Government and the Muslim Brotherhood, 1980–2010.” In Religion and Human Security: A Global Perspective, edited by James K. Wellman Jr., and Clark B. Lombardi, 48–66. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Meri, Josef W. Medieval Islamic Civilization: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge, 2005. Miniter, Richard. Losing Bin Laden: How Bill Clinton’s Failures Unleashed Global Terror. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003. Mir, Mustansir. “Jihad in Islam.” In The Jihad and Its Times, edited by Hadia Dajani, Shakeel, and Ronald A. Messier, 113–26. Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies, 1991. Moghadam, Assaf. “The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology.” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 3 (2008): 1–3. Moniruzzaman, Monir. “Jihad and Terrorism: An Alternative Explanation.” Journal of Religion & Society 10, no. 1 (2008): 1–13. Nesser, Petter. “Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 4 (2006): 323–42. https:// doi.org/10.1080/10576100600641899. Pelham, Nicolas. “ISIS and the Shia Revival in Iraq.” The New York Times, June 24, 2015, A1. Peters, Rudolph. Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1996. Peters, Rudolph, and David Cook. The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Piazza, James A. “Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous? An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal Structure.” Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 1 (2009): 62–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/095465508025 44698. Piscatori, James. Islam in a World of Nation-States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Pratt, Nicola, and Dina Rezk. “Securitizing the Muslim Brotherhood: State Violence and Authoritarianism in Egypt after the Arab Spring.” Security Dialogue 50, no. 3 (2019): 239–56. https://doi.org/10.1177/096701061 9830043.

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Riedel, Bruce. What We Won: America’s Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–89. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017. Sachedina, Andulaziz A. “The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History.” In Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Traditions, edited by James Turner Johnson, 167–76. New York: Greenwood, 1990. Saunders, Robert A. A History of Medieval Islam. New York: Routledge, 2002. ———. “The Ummah as Nation: A Reappraisal in the Wake of the ‘Cartoons Affair’.” Nations and Nationalism 14, no. 2 (2008): 303–21. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2008.00322.x. Schleifer, S. Abdullah. “Jihad: Sacred Struggle in Islam.” Islamic Quarterly 28, no. 3 (1984): 135–49. ———. “Understanding Jihad: Definition and Methodology.” Islamic Quarterly 27, no. 3 (1983): 117–31. Sethi, Kabir. “The Allure of the Radical: Understanding Jihadist Violence in the West.” Macalester International 22 (2009): 201–25. Spencer, Robert. Onward Muslim Soldiers: How Jihad Still Threatens America and the West. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003. Streusand, Douglas E. “What Does Jihad Mean?” Middle East Quarterly 4, no. 3 (1997): 9–17. Van Slooten, Pippi. “Dispelling Myths about Islam and Jihad.” Peace Review 17, no. 2 (2005): 289–90. https://doi.org/10.1080/14631370500333013. Vlahos, Michael. Terror’s Mask: Insurgency within Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2002. Weigand, Florian. “Afghanistan’s Taliban: Legitimate Jihadists or Coercive Extremists?” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 11, no. 3 (2017): 359–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2017.1353755. Wiederhold, Lutz. “Blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad and His Companions (Sabb Al-Ras¯ ul, Sabb Al-Sah¯ abah): The Introduction of the Topic into Sh¯afi’¯ı Legal Literature and Its Relevance for Legal Practice under Mamluk Rule.” Journal of Semitic Studies XLII, no. 1 (1997): 39–70. https://doi.org/10.1093/jss/XLII.1.39. Wight, Martin. “An Anatomy of International Thought.” Review of International Studies 13, no. 3 (1987): 221–27. https://doi.org/10.1017/S02602105001 13610. Wiktorowicz, Quintan, and John Kaltner. “Killing in the Name of Islam: AlQaeda’s Justification for September 11.” Middle East Policy 10, no. 2 (2003): 76–92. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4967.00107. Wood, Elisabeth. Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Zaidi, Manzar. “A Taxonomy of Jihad.” Arab Studies Quarterly 31, no. 3 (2009): 21–34.

CHAPTER 3

Radicalization

Radicalization remains an enigmatic concept because individuals can be radicalized for different reasons and in different ways. It would be useful to start this discussion by defining the term. First, radicalization, like terrorism, remains a controversial concept in the literature.1 To date, no universally agreed-upon definition of radicalization exists within academic or government circles. Thus, in this chapter, although we can begin with a comprehensive definition, more than one particular definition will have to be presented. One of the challenges appears to be the significance of the context to determine what is to be framed as radicalization.2 Several case studies on jihadist radicalization, particularly regarding radicalization in prisons and detention centers, are offered at the end of the chapter. By and large, radicalization is the process of adopting extremist ideologies and beliefs. It is a series of steps whereby an individual or group embraces revolutionary political, social, or religious ideals and ambitions that weaken or eliminate the status quo—i.e., within a society, status quo refers to the general ideas and expressions of the day.3 The outcomes of radicalization can be determined by a large community, a smaller group, or even one single individual. In some cases, radicalization can be initiated through a social consensus against progressive changes in a society or from a general desire for change in that society.4 Although radicalization does not necessarily lead to violence, most academic works interpret it as violent extremism.5

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There are a multitude of additional definitions. As such, for Sedgwick (2010),6 radicalization is “what goes on before the bomb goes off.” McCauley and Moskalenko (2008)7 describe as the “change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the ingroup.” For other scholars, it is a “personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations that justifies the use of indiscriminate violence. It is both a mental and emotional process that prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent behavior”8 or “the process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergo a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes.”9 And others frame it as a “pathway” (e.g., Horgan 2008)10 or “staircase” (e.g., Moghaddam 2005)11 to terrorism. As one can see, multiple pathways to radicalization exist, leading to diverse outcomes. Radicalization can also develop through either real or perceived grievances, or even real or imaginary threats from the outside world.12 Within the context of this book, the objective of the jihad propagandist is to nurture or inculcate dangerous ideas so that people participate in violent action—not just upset the status quo.

The “Slippery Slope” The “slippery slope” model explains how radicalization develops through activities that gradually narrow the person’s social life, their thinking and attitudes, and their approach toward violence (i.e., by desensitizing him or her to it). This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the “True Believer” syndrome, whereby one also follows a gradual process of identity change. In this case, one becomes more and more serious about one’s political, social, and religious beliefs, as in “taking the next step.” How does this happen? The answer is rather simple. One begins with small and seemingly innocuous steps; for example, by participating in peaceful activities such as attending fundraisers, mutual aid events, or even protests (not actively, but passively). This step, in and of itself, demonstrates one’s seriousness and commitment to the cause. It is also a good way to earn the respect and appreciation of one’s in-group or social status. Little by little, commitment turns into perseverance, and simple curiosity turns into passion. It will reach such a point that the difference between “ideological” and “criminal” will not be clear to the individual. The process of

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radicalization will co-mingle the two such that criminal acts are now legitimated for good reasons; put another way, radical purposes are sufficient to justify what are ultimately criminal actions in society.13

Radical Milieu A radical milieu is an immediate social environment from which individuals emerge as violent and with which they remain ideologically or symbolically associated. It is through such social environment that people develop experiences, narratives, and structures of interpretation of the world. Milieu, in this context, denotes a social formation, a social organization of interactants who nurture common perspectives and ideas of collective identity.14 A radical milieu is social; it is linked to a social environment on which terrorist groups draw because it can shape a particular type of formative character within each individual.15 Such milieu is particularly suitable to a terrorist movement for recruitment or fundraising. Two categories of sub-communities can emerge from a radical milieu. The first are radical communities: small, spatially dense communities with a regional focus. The second are radical networks: individuals who are loosely connected to each other around the world and who share a common ideology.16 The beginning of a radicalization campaign is critical. The jihad propagandist has to find the best strategy to convince would-be radicals to undergo intense training and eventually commit violence. It is the leader’s task to explain why the ideology implanted in the minds of would-be radicals is superior to the one they were accustomed to. Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009)17 argue that people’s theological understanding is a rather strong variable in their radicalization; in their sample, almost 50% of them attributed their violent behavior to a radical milieu. The word “radical” denotes a person who entertains “a deep felt desire for sociopolitical changes.”18 There is a growing body of knowledge on the antecedents of radicalization that examines the sociopolitical reasons for ultra-violent behavior. Violence is inherently linked to a radical milieu; it is its hardwired and ingrained feature. Radical milieus can form out of the context of militant confrontations, as it is the case with the Palestinians in their fight against the Israelis.19 In this event, the radical milieu is the result of the perception of hatred or betrayal by an enemy

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group. Thus, it is not based on abstract beliefs, but on experiences, militant ambitions, and relationships between violent actors who share the same fundamental dogmas.20

Radical Ideologies Within radical milieus, radical ideologies come into being. Ideologies combine thoughts, beliefs, and agendas on the one hand, and action on the other hand. They can be tools of protection in the sense that they can help a group maintain its power or status quo. When ideologies become radical, they are often exploited as mechanisms of competition and conflict, not simply opposition and contestation. Once a person internalizes the ideology, that ideology guides him or her as a “cognitive map” that frames how the social world is perceived by emphasizing certain aspects of the world while ignoring others—a process also known as filtering.21 Filtering makes the new “reality” easier to understand and more meaningful, even though it could be devoid of truth. Ideologies offer some level of comfort and relief in the face of uncertainty—especially in times of crisis or under threat.22 Radical ideologies create or widen existing rifts between adherents and non-adherents. They tend to polarize people, aggravating tensions with the so-called enemies, who could be the world at large. Individuals who have been swayed by an ideology can exhibit “a remarkable ability to ignore, deny, or reinterpret information which is incompatible with tenets of their belief system.”23 Ideologues themselves “tend to be explicit in their cognitive claims, exclusionary in their membership, authoritarian in their leadership, rigorous in their ethical mandates, and insistent on the rightness of their causes.”24 Terrorist attacks are often the consequence of a long and intense process of radicalization by such ideologues,25 although in a handful of cases terrorists have killed people “overnight,” without any sign of deep radicalization. In most cases, propagandists of terror use a type of sociological trap that gives recruits no other alternative to fulfill their material or spiritual needs.26 Islamic Radicalization Islamic extremism is an ultraconservative doctrine of violence and fundamentalism that has developed through various interpretations of the

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Quran, prophetic traditions (hadith), as well as classical and modern writings of Islamic scholars.27 An essential requirement of radicalization for Muslims is re-Islamization—that is, the return of Muslims of the ummah to purely traditional beliefs.28 Based on the tenets of radicalization theory, the effective accomplishment of re-Islamization is contingent upon proper “framing,” whereby ideology is set up to meet the needs of target audiences.29 Radical Islamic ideology, then, gains ground when it can be successfully aligned with the widespread beliefs and values of the masses.30

Four Stages of Islamic Radicalization Mulcahy et al. (2013)31 have presented four stages of Islamic radicalization: (1) pre-radicalization, (2) self-identification, (3) indoctrination, and (4) jihadization. At the pre-radicalization stage, people find themselves in an environment that exposed them to extremism. There are two reasons for them to be receptive to extremism: intrinsic and extrinsic. With intrinsic radicalization, the individual is driven by a personal crisis, discrimination, or disaffection. His or her religion can also be a key factor if he or she feels dissatisfied. With extrinsic motivation, it can be any negative factor that impacts the person’s attitudes and beliefs. Examples include financial and social deprivation, and racial discrimination. That person, then, may feel that espousing a new ideology or belief is the remedy to their existential perception of deprivation and discrimination. At the self-identification stage, people identify with a particular extremist event. It is at this point that the change of ideology or belief occurs. A new temperament begins to form based on that change. Once the temperament is formed, more interactions with like-minded others in the radical milieu and more exposure to that ideology or belief strengthen their penchant for extremism. At the indoctrination stage, the individual becomes even more willing to take action, although he or she may still be unclear as to how to take part in it. This is where training comes into play (either in groups or individually). Crucial elements of jihadist training are the knowledge, proficiencies, and leadership from the mentors. This stage can be hot-blooded and emotional for the trainees. In the course of time, the trainees gain confidence and their minds are choked with the ideology. Jihad propagandists are trained to identify, assess, and recruit potential jihadists. Their strategies rely on networking through a combination of online and offline support. Their messages are diffused through online and offline communities (including mosques, religious centers, and even

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educational institutions). They employ intimidation and manipulative tactics as a way to reinforce their position and prevent dissention,32 a theoretical concept called groupthink (see next chapter). Jihad radicalizers convey the message that the Muslim religion has been withering. It is in a precarious state of religious, political, military, financial, and cultural decline. For this reason, radicalizers differentiate between true Muslim adherents and those who are not.33 The narrative of “us” defending against “them” consolidates the bond among the trainees, while isolating them from both the Infidels (e.g., non-Muslims in the West) and the Apostates (those “fake” Muslims). Radicalizers stress the fact that the only hope is jihad, that the tide has turned, and that Islam can regain its past glory—the one that the Prophet and his companions enjoyed in the seventh century.34

Jihadization Jihadization is the final stage. Now, the indoctrinated recruits’ ideology or belief is the main reason they want to fight for, and violence is the only path. At this stage, the degree of radicalization has reached such a point that the jihadists execute missions to wreak havoc on the enemy. Often, there is no “going back;” they lose connections with their old selves. The previous stages of Islamic radicalization were so effective that they do not seem capable of doing something else to save the ummah—which would entail leaving the jihad movement.35 Jihadization is efficient because it uses various methods of destruction, some of which barely cost anything. For instance, jihadists can use guns, homemade bombs, knives, as well as acid-throwing and vehicle-ramming attacks from rented trucks. These are the most affordable and effective weapons to kill as many pedestrians on streets and in markets. In 2017 alone, five of such low-tech jihadist attacks took place in Great Britain, including the Manchester bombing at the Ariana Grande concert.36 Fundamentally, jihadization is a program of action; it is jihad in military terms. Jihadist leaders assure the new soldiers that the tide of history will be reversed and that jihad will redeem them from their misery. Dying for the cause (martyrdom) is hailed as the greatest way to wage holy war—because of this, the excess of suicide attacks among jihadists is something to behold.37 The four stages usually occur chronologically, although recruits evolve at different rates throughout the radicalization process.

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It would also be interesting to briefly examine how modern technologies like the internet can play a role in Mulcahy, Merrington, and Bell’s four stages of Islamic radicalization. During the first two stages of preradicalization and self-identification, where people are curious about the new ideology and want to learn about it, websites direct them to the group’s mission thanks to information about core beliefs and dogmas. In the third stage of indoctrination, when individuals have absorbed these beliefs and dogmas, websites can offer guidelines as to how to participate in jihad. In the fourth stage of jihadization, websites allow them to connect with freshly trained jihadists and other jihad mentors in order to execute jihadist attacks in the most efficient manner.38 Who Is Susceptible to Islamic Radicalization? Jihad radicalizers devote considerable time and energy to establish grassroots legitimacy among the masses, muster public support for their maneuvers, and maintain their current constituencies.39 In the words of Jones and Wright (2017),40 jihadists apply a “tried and tested model” of networking with diverse extremist individuals and susceptible converts through online social media, and then quickly sway them into partaking in violent activities. The manner by which terrorists brand themselves is essential. Their public relations skills, allowing them to boast their military prowess and digital media know-how, gives them an aura of credibility— an ideal method to recruit disenfranchised Muslims from all over the world. The internet is a valuable platform for public relations, particularly through the use of online jihadist magazines.41

Gender Considerations On average, the jihadist fighter is a man who is 18–29-years old, although exceptions do exist in terms of age and gender. Beyond these two variables, there is no solid profile as to who the jihadist is, particularly foreign fighters. In spite of 40 years of research on radicalization, no universal socioeconomic or religious pathway toward terrorist violence can be established.42 Let us consider the gender variable for a moment. Fighting for global jihad is not limited to men. ISIS is now using women to be their most outspoken supporters online. Aqsa Mahmood is an example of a woman working to recruit foreigners to join the jihadist organization. She decided to renounce her ostensibly contented teenage life in Glasgow,

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Scotland. She publicized her jihadization journey on Tumblr and then migrated to Syria, where she continued using Tumblr (and Twitter) as a platform to inspire others. The same public relations techniques to attract male foreign fighters can be used for female audiences. The persuasive principles are the same: extolling the virtues of the “Muslim” plight, the Islamic State, and mujahedin who are willing to sacrifice their lives for Allah. A certain number of women also romanticize the idea of becoming the wife of a soldier fighting for the Caliphate, and many foreign girls do not hesitate to marry such soldiers upon their arrival.43 In a study by Meleagrou-Hitchens et al. (2018),44 it was reported that 11% of U.S. foreign fighters in ISIS-controlled territories were women. The importance of noncombatant migrants who still support jihadist organizations should also be considered, particularly when it comes to female travelers who willingly assume auxiliary positions in such organizations. They work in logistical and financial operations, in addition to more communal, day-to-day activities. Traditionally, groups like ISIS expect men to assume roles as combatants and martyrs, whereas women should take on domestic roles as wives and procreators of the next generation of mujahedin. However, women’s increased skills—such as social networking and their abilities to assume traditionally male roles—along with the difficulty in seeing them as perpetrators, make them a significant, if not a greater, threat to both domestic and international security.45 In June 2019, in a Europol report titled Women in Islamic State Propaganda, it was stated that jihadist females have the same levels of ideological motivations as their male counterparts and they are willing to contribute as much to the creation of an Islamic state.46 Today, the increasing number of female jihadists heralds a shift in ISIS’s approach to radicalization and recruitment, in spite of being known for its immutable gender roles and misogyny.47 Since 2015 or so, ISIS’s propagandists began to lay the foundations for this change; in October 2017, the organization’s newspaper urged women to train for holy war.48 By early 2018, ISIS was openly eulogizing its female fighters in a video that featured a woman brandishing an AK-47, the text describing “the chaste mujahed woman journeying to her Lord with the garments of purity and faith, seeking revenge for her religion and for the honor of her sisters.”49 An important conclusion to derive from all this is that jihadism can inspire a wide range of individuals to fight the enemies of Islam, to institute the global Caliphate, and to unite the ummah across all continents.

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Case Study I: Jihadization in French Prisons The authorities of multiple Western nations are concerned that prisons are a fertile ground for conversions to Islam. Under France’s laicity regulations—called laïcité or secularism (the separation of between religion and government)50 —it is illegal to include the country’s inmates based on religious affiliation. However, experts generally rely on a statistical report published in 2015: of the 67,500 prisoners in France during that year, approximately 70% were Muslim, notwithstanding the fact that Muslims only account for 8% of the total French population. The experts also observed that in prisons of the Paris and Marseille areas, the percentage of Muslim prisoners is even higher.51 The method and level of Islamist radicalization in French prisons have been examined for several decades.52 The empirical study of Khosrokhavar (2014)53 reveals that the prison system in France is a breeding place for all sorts of Islamic radicalization. According to French officials, most of the terrorist communication in French prisons hovers around Muslim fundamentalist views. French prisons are an abode where felons look for some type of redemption in religion and are more likely to lean toward a brand of Islamic fundamentalism, said Thomas Renard, a terrorism expert and researcher from Belgium (at the Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations).54 Since prisons are a location where people are forced to co-exist, the living conditions, the types of relations developed with the outside world, the relationships between different units of the prison (including the level of proximity from one another), and the manner by which prisoners socialize (including the amount of liberty they have to move from one cell to another) are essential to better understand the radicalization process.55 Neumann (2010)56 adds that, Over-crowding and under-staffing amplify the conditions that lend themselves to radicalisation. Badly run prisons make the detection of radicalisation difficult, and they also create the physical and ideological space in which extremist recruiters can operate at free will and monopolise the discourse about religion and politics.

In France, the term banlieue is used regularly. It is a suburb of a large city with low-income housing projects. Banlieues are separated into autonomous administrative districts and are not part of the city proper.

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For example, 80% of the residents in the Paris metropolitan area (l’aire urbaine de Paris ) live outside the city.57 The high crime and delinquency rates that typify the banlieues mean that youths who come from there are disproportionately represented in the prison population—particularly those of Muslim heritage. Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, the two brothers who stormed the Charlie Hebdo office in Paris in January 2015 and killed 12 people, came from the banlieues and were subsequently radicalized in a French prison.58 Part of the issue is that, within Muslim communities in France (along with other Western European countries), rigid Salafist interpretations of Islam share many similarities with radical views in prisons.59

Case Study II: Jihadization in U.S. Military Detention Centers In a report from the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, more than 15% of the terrorist suspects released from Guantánamo Bay have resorted to terrorism again.60 Military detention centers such as Guantánamo Bay have radicalized a certain number of Muslim prisoners, who ultimately seek revenge upon their release. This was the case with Abdullah Mehsud who, after his release from Guantánamo Bay in 2004, joined the Taliban and committed terrorist attacks.61 More precisely, he became a Pashtun militant commander leading a force of possibly 5000 Taliban fighters. He also led attacks on Coalition soldiers in Afghanistan.62 According to Hamm (2012),63 Mehsud had been radicalized by Guantánamo. Having never committed an act of terrorism before, he set about making jihadist videos and organized a Taliban division to fight U.S. troops. Mehsud then planned and carried out a bold attack on Pakistan’s interior minister, killing 31 people. And finally, in 2007, Mehsud blew himself up in a suicide attack against the Pakistani Army. His martyrdom was hailed in an audio message by Osama bin Laden.

Consider Camp Bucca, named after Ronald Bucca, a New York City firefighter who perished in the September 11, 2001 attacks.64 Camp Bucca was the largest U.S. military prison in Iraq. After the Abu Ghraib prison scandal (regarding the torture and abuse of Iraqi prisoners), many prisoners from Abu Ghraib were moved to Camp Bucca.65 According to a

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senior leader from Al-Qaeda, the ideological underpinnings of ISIS were founded in Camp Bucca. As a terrorist organization, ISIS turned out to be an offshoot of Al-Qaeda that became even more radical and dangerous. Because of the lengthy periods of time that prisoners spent at the Camp and the high number of insurgents detained there, it became a breeding ground for radicalization of Muslims. In fact, Islamists were able to organize meetings and mentorship sessions on a regular basis. They even managed to design future plans after prison.66 About 26,000 Iraqis were held at Camp Bucca and Camp Cropper (Camp Bucca was shut down in 2009, after six years).67 One notorious ex-Camp Bucca prisoner who became an ISIS leader is Abu Mohammed Al-Adnani, who was detained for several years during the Iraq War. In 2014, Al-Adnani encouraged lone-wolf attacks throughout the world and instigated multiple terrorist attacks in France. He was killed in an airstrike in Aleppo in the summer of 2016.68 Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi (a jihadist leader and the architect of ISIS’s capture of Mosul),69 Abu Ayman al-Iraqi (another senior jihadist leader),70 and Abu Mohammad al-Julani (founder of Al-Nusra Front, the Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate) were all prisoners at Camp Bucca before their release.71

Notes 1. Peter R. Neumann, “The Trouble with Radicalization,” International Affairs 89, no. 4 (2013): 873–93, https://doi.org/10.1111/14682346.12049. 2. Alex P. Schmid, Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, CounterRadicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review (The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013). 3. Kim Cragin, “Resisting Violent Extremism: A Conceptual Model for NonRadicalization,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 2 (2014): 337– 53, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.714820; Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 4. Arun Kundnani, “Radicalization: The Journey of a Concept,” Race & Class 54, no. 2 (2012): 3–25. https://doi.org/10.1177/030639681245 4984; Derek Silva, “Radicalization: The Journey of a Concept, Revisited,” Race & Class 59, no. 4 (2018): 34–53, https://doi.org/10.1177/030 6396817750778.

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5. Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 7–36, 8, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.1. 6. Mark Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 4 (2010): 479–94, 479, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.491009. 7. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–33, 416, https://doi.org/10.1080/095465508 02073367. 8. Alex S. Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Radicalization,” Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 1 (2010): 33–51, 38, https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150903487956. 9. Chuck Crosset and Jason Spitaletta, Radicalization: Relevant Psychological and Sociological Concepts (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 2010), 10. 10. John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism,” The ANNALS of American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2008): 80–94, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716208317539. 11. Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Explanation,” American Psychologist 60, no. 2 (2005): 161–69, http:// dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.161. 12. Farhad Khosrokhavar and Jane Marie Todd, Radicalization: Why Some People Choose the Path of Violence (New York: The New Press, 2017). 13. Jerrold M. Post, “Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior,” Terrorism 7, no. 2 (1984): 241–56, https://doi.org/10. 1080/10576108408435577. 14. Stefan Malthaner and Peter Waldmann, “The Radical Milieu: Conceptualizing the Supportive Social Environment of Terrorist Groups,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 12 (2014): 979–98, https://doi.org/10. 1080/1057610X.2014.962441. 15. Kadri Semm, “Neighborhood Milieu in the Cultural Economy of City Development: Berlin’s Helmholtzplatz and Soldiner in the German ‘Social City’ Program,” Cities 28, no. 1 (2011): 95–106, https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.cities.2010.10.004. 16. David Jones, “ISIS’ Embrace of Violence Strategic Rationale and LongRun Implications,” Political Science Undergraduate Review 2 (2016): Article 16. 17. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process (Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2009).

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18. Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 9 (2010): 797–814, 798, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X. 2010.501423. 19. Klaus Weinhauer, “Terrorism between Social Movements, the State and Media Societies,” in The History of Social Movements in Global Perspective, ed. Stefan Berger and Holger Nehring (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 543–77. 20. Ibid., 800–3. 21. Norman Fairclough, “Semiosis, Ideology, and Mediation: A Dialectical View,” in Mediating Ideology in Text and Image: Ten Critical Studies, ed. Inger Lassen, Jeanne Strunck, and Torben Vestergaard (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2006), 19–36. 22. Assaf Moghadam, “The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 3 (2008): 1–3. 23. Christopher G. Flood, Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction (New York: Garland, 1996), 20. 24. Bruce B. Lawrence, Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt against the Modern Age (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), 77. 25. Michael King and Donald M. Taylor, “The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A Review of Theoretical Models and Social Psychological Evidence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 4 (2011): 602–22, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.587064. 26. Anat Berko, The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and Their Dispatchers (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2009). 27. Halim Rane, “Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Islamist Extremism,” in Violent Extremism Online: New Perspectives on Terrorism and the Internet, ed. Anne Aly, Stuart Macdonald, Lee Jarvis, and Thomas Chen (New York: Routledge, 2016), 167–85. 28. Olivier Roy, “EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?” The National Interest 71 (2003): 63–73. 29. Neil J. Smelser, The Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 30. Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005). 31. Elizabeth Mulcahy, Shannon Merrington, and Peter Bell, “The Radicalisation of Prison Inmates: Exploring Recruitment, Religion and Prisoner Vulnerability,” Journal of Human Security 9, no. 2 (2013): 4–14, https://doi.org/10.12924/johs2013.09010004. 32. Meir Litvak, “‘Martyrdom Is Life’: Jihad and Martyrdom in the Ideology of Hamas,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 8 (2010): 716–4, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.494170.

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33. Shabbir Akhtar, Islam as Political Religion: The Future of an Imperial Faith (London: Routledge, 2010). 34. Daniel H. Heinke and Mareike Persson, “Youth Specific Factors in Radicalization,” Defence Against Terrorism Review 8 (2016): 53–66. 35. Ibid., 5–7. 36. Jonathan Matusitz, Andrea Madrazo, and Catalina Udani, Online Jihadist Magazines to Promote the Caliphate: Communicative Perspectives (New York: Peter Lang, 2019). 37. Moghadam, “The Salafi-Jihad,” 1–3. 38. Joseph Lieberman and Susan Collins, Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat (Washington, DC: United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2008). 39. Awan, “Success of the Meta-Narrative,” 6–8. 40. Sam Jones and Robert Wright, “Police Probe How Family Man Khalid Masood Became a Violent Zealot,” Financial Times, March 23, 2017, A1. 41. Jad Melki and May Jabado, “Mediated Public Diplomacy of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: The Synergistic Use of Terrorism, Social Media and Branding,” Media and Communication 4, no. 2 (2016): 92–103, https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v4i2.432. 42. Anne Aly, Stuart Macdonald, Lee Jarvis, and Thomas M. Chen, “Introduction to the Special Issue: Terrorist Online Propaganda and Radicalization,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 1 (2017): 1–9, https:// doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157402. 43. Ibid., 5. 44. Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Seamus Hughes, and Bennett Clifford, The Travelers: American Jihadists in Syria and Iraq (Washington, DC: George Washington University Press, 2018). 45. Audrey Alexander, Cruel Intentions: Female Jihadists in America (Washington, DC: George Washington University Press, 2016). 46. Retrieved on June 14, 2019 from https://www.europol.europa.eu/activi ties-services/europol-specialist-reporting/women-in-islamic-state-propag anda. 47. Vera Mironova, “Is the Future of ISIS Female?” The New York Times, February 20, 2019, A1. 48. Lizzie Dearden, “Isis Calls on Women to Fight and Launch Terror Attacks for First Time,” The Independent, October 6, 2017, A1. 49. Cited in Mironova, “Is the Future of ISIS Female?” A1. 50. Murat Akan, “Laïcité and Multiculturalism: The Stasi Report in Context,” The British Journal of Sociology 60, no. 2 (2009): 237–56, https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2009.01229.x.

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51. Cited in Harriet Alexander, “What Is Going Wrong in France’s Prisons?” The Telegraph, January 17, 2015, A1. 52. Farhad Khosrokhavar, “Radicalization in Prison: The French Case,” Politics, Religion and Ideology 14, no. 2 (2013): 284–306, https://doi.org/ 10.1080/21567689.2013.792654. 53. Farhad Khosrokhavar, Radicalisation (Paris: Editions de la maison des sciences de l’homme, 2014). 54. Cited in Cindy Pom, “France Faces the Daunting Task of Curbing Prison Radicalization to Prevent ‘ISIS 2.0’,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 10, 2018, A1. 55. Khosrokhavar, “Radicalization in Prison,” 289. 56. Peter R. Neumann, ICSR Report on Prison Radicalisation to Be Launched at Peace and Security Summit (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2010). 57. Laurent Bonelli, “The Control of the Enemy Within? Police Intelligence in the French Suburbs (Banlieues ) and Its Relevance for Globalization,” in Controlling Frontiers Free Movement into and Within Europe, ed. Elspeth Guild (London: Routledge, 2017), 193–208; Raphaël Canet, Laurent Pech, and Maura Stewart, “France’s Burning Issue: Understanding the Urban Riots of November 2005,” in Crowd Actions in Britain and France from the Middle Ages to the Modern World, ed. Michael T. Davis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 270–92. 58. Matthew Moran, “Terrorism and the Banlieues: The Charlie Hebdo Attacks in Context,” Modern & Contemporary France 25, no. 3 (2017): 315–32, https://doi.org/10.1080/09639489.2017.1323199. 59. Rik Coolsaet, Radicalisation and Europe’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations, 2005). 60. Boaz Ganor and Ophir Falk, “De-Radicalization in Israel’s Prison System,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 2 (2013): 116–31, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.747071. 61. Imran Awan, “Muslim Prisoners, Radicalization and Rehabilitation in British Prisons,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 33, no. 3 (2013): 371–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2013.853979. 62. Shehzad H. Qazi, “Rebels of the Frontier: Origins, Organization, and Recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 22, no. 4 (2011): 574–602, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2011.601865. 63. Mark Hamm, “Prisoner Radicalisation in the United States,” Prison Service Journal 203 (2012): 1–11, 5. 64. Ido Levy, Radicalization in Australia’s Goulburn Correctional Centre: A Reassessment of NSW Corrections Policy in Light of the Returnee Threat (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2018).

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65. John Bateson, The Last and Greatest Battle: Finding the Will, Commitment, and Strategy to End Military Suicides (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 66. Martin Chulov, “ISIS: The Inside Story,” The Guardian, December 11, 2014, A1. 67. Jessica Stern. “Mind over Martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (2010): 95–108. 68. Syed Huzaifah Alkaff and Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani. “The Death of IS Top Strategist: Reflections on Counter-Terrorism Efforts,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 8, no. 9 (2016): 4–9. 69. Craig Whiteside, “A Pedigree of Terror: The Myth of the Ba’athist Influence in the Islamic State Movement,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 3 (2017): 1–17. 70. Truls Hallberg Tønnessen, “Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam? The Relationship between Al-Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic State,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (2015): 48–60. 71. Burak Kadercan, “What the ISIS Crisis Means for the Future of the Middle East,” in Non-State Armed Actors in the Middle East, ed. Murat Ye¸silta¸s and Tuncay Karda¸s (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 237–60.

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Malthaner, Stefan, and Peter Waldmann. “The Radical Milieu: Conceptualizing the Supportive Social Environment of Terrorist Groups.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 12 (2014): 979–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/105 7610X.2014.962441. Matusitz, Jonathan, Andrea Madrazo, and Catalina Udani. Online Jihadist Magazines to Promote the Caliphate: Communicative Perspectives. New York: Peter Lang, 2019. McCauley, Clark, and Sophia Moskalenko. “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550802073367. Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander, Seamus Hughes, and Bennett Clifford. The Travelers: American Jihadists in Syria and Iraq. Washington, DC: George Washington University Press, 2018. Melki, Jad, and May Jabado. “Mediated Public Diplomacy of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: The Synergistic Use of Terrorism, Social Media and Branding.” Media and Communication 4, no. 2 (2016): 92–103. https://doi.org/10. 17645/mac.v4i2.432. Mironova, Vera. “Is the Future of ISIS Female?” The New York Times, February 20, 2019, A1. Moghadam, Assaf. “The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology.” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 3 (2008): 1–3. Moghaddam, Fathali M. “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Explanation.” American Psychologist 60, no. 2 (2005): 161–69. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.161. Moran, Matthew. “Terrorism and the Banlieues: The Charlie Hebdo Attacks in Context.” Modern & Contemporary France 25, no. 3 (2017): 315–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/09639489.2017.1323199. Mulcahy, Elizabeth, Shannon Merrington, and Peter Bell. “The Radicalisation of Prison Inmates: Exploring Recruitment, Religion and Prisoner Vulnerability.” Journal of Human Security 9, no. 2 (2013): 4–14. https://doi.org/ 10.12924/johs2013.09010004. Neumann, Peter R. ICSR Report on Prison Radicalisation to Be Launched at Peace and Security Summit. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2010. ———. “The Trouble with Radicalization.” International Affairs 89, no. 4 (2013): 873–93. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12049. Pom, Cindy. “France Faces the Daunting Task of Curbing Prison Radicalization to Prevent ‘ISIS 2.0’.” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 10, 2018, A1. Post, Jerrold M. “Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior.” Terrorism 7, no. 2 (1984): 241–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/105761084 08435577.

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Qazi, Shehzad H. “Rebels of the Frontier: Origins, Organization, and Recruitment of the Pakistani Taliban.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 22, no. 4 (2011): 574–602. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2011.601865. Rane, Halim. “Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Islamist Extremism.” In Violent Extremism Online: New Perspectives on Terrorism and the Internet, edited by Anne Aly, Stuart Macdonald, Lee Jarvis, and Thomas Chen, 167–85. New York: Routledge, 2016. Roy, Olivier. “EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?” The National Interest 71 (2003): 63–73. Schmid, Alex P. Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review. The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. Sedgwick, Mark. “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion.” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 4 (2010): 479–94. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/09546553.2010.491009. Semm, Kadri. “Neighborhood Milieu in the Cultural Economy of City Development: Berlin’s Helmholtzplatz and Soldiner in the German ‘Social City’ Program.” Cities 28, no. 1 (2011): 95–106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cit ies.2010.10.004. Silva, Derek. “Radicalization: The Journey of a Concept, Revisited.” Race & Class 59, no. 4 (2018): 34–53. https://doi.org/10.1177/030639681775 0778. Smelser, Neil J. The Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Stern, Jessica. “Mind over Martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists.” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (2010): 95–108. Tønnessen, Truls Hallberg. “Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam? The Relationship between Al-Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic State.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (2015): 48–60. Weinhauer, Klaus. “Terrorism between Social Movements, the State and Media Societies.” In The History of Social Movements in Global Perspective, edited by Stefan Berger and Holger Nehring, 543–77. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Whiteside, Craig. “A Pedigree of Terror: The Myth of the Ba’athist Influence in the Islamic State Movement.” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 3 (2017): 1–17. Wilner, Alex S., and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz. “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Radicalization.” Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 1 (2010): 33–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150903487956.

CHAPTER 4

Group Dynamics and Socialization

Group dynamics refers to interactional and psychological behaviors within a group of people. It sheds light on the fundamental processes that generate norms, roles, relations, objectives, or ideologies within social groups.1 For members of such groups, there is a sense of interdependence, through which the behaviors and attitudes are collectively guided by the other group members.2 Gordon Allport (1954)3 defines group dynamics as “an attempt to understand and explain how the thought, feeling, and behavior of individuals is influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others.” Socialization is the process of internalizing the aforementioned norms, roles, relations, objectives, or ideologies of a group. As humans need social experiences to communicate and survive in society, socialization is highly correlated to developmental psychology.4 Both group dynamics and socialization symbolize a process of lifelong learning and is an essential motivator for the beliefs and attitudes of both children and adults. The views of most individuals are shaped by their group’s consensus and are usually in line with the group’s.5 An extensive case study on Palestinian youth is provided at the end of the chapter.

Group Grievance Group grievance refers to a person’s identification with a group of victims—e.g., victims of racism, prejudice, discrimination, or persecution (among others). The group can radicalize that person even if he or she © The Author(s) 2020 J. Matusitz, Global Jihad in Muslim and non-Muslim Contexts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47044-9_4

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has not suffered any grievance personally. This is sometimes the case for lone-wolf terrorists and those struck by the “sudden jihad syndrome.”6 Examples include Mohammed Rea Taheri-azar and Momin Khawaja. In March 2006, Taheri-azar intentionally rammed nine students with his vehicle at the University of North Carolina as an act of revenge for the deaths of Muslims worldwide and for punishment against the U.S. government.7 Momin Khawaja is a Canadian Muslim sentenced to life imprisonment for plotting to plant fertilizer bombs in the United Kingdom. His motive was group grievance as well.8 Group grievances are similar to personal grievances; the difference is that the individual does not necessarily suffers harm him- or herself, but feels it when a group with which he or she identifies has been inflicted with harm. This pathway arguably represents the greatest motive for extreme political, religious, or ethnic violence, in which terrorism or mass killing is perpetrated in support of the group at large (rather than a personal vendetta). Radicalization out of support for an allied group was confirmed in the Weather Underground’s coalition with the Black Panthers and Viet Cong. The link between radicalization into violent extremism and suicide bombings has also been validated as a measure of group grievance; perceived threats to group identity—such as the invasion of foreign troops—constitutes the majority of suicide bombings.9 Individual Psychology, Group Psychology, and Terrorism A conceptual analysis of terrorism should take both the wider group and the individual into consideration, by making individual psychology and group psychology intersect.10 The terrorist’s core individual identity is inherently linked to an overarching group identity—whether or not that terrorist has actually made contact with that group. Group identity is often built upon shared mental representations of that group’s mission and past accomplishments. This identity also includes historical traumas— i.e., collective grief and shame that can hardly be erased—that have been absorbed and ritualized by the group to reinforce group cohesion and distinguish the group from the enemy. For terrorist groups driven by a feeling of injustice vis-à-vis their national, ethnic, or religious identity, interventions may only work if they are designed to remedy large group issues, rather than individual ones. Some individuals will even join a terrorist group because they experienced unrelated traumas in childhood or have a weak sense of core individual identity. Hence, their

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psychopathology dictates that they need to embrace the identity of a terrorist group to be able to function.11 When terrorism operates as a tool to re-enact a historical trauma, it accentuates another crucial psychoanalytic principle: that past influences permeate the present. If historical traumas remain unsettled, they will remain alive and kicking until the enemy goes away.12 This is what Freud (1914)13 called “repetition compulsion.” Psychoanalytic scholars on terrorism stress the importance of understanding the devastating effects of historical trauma on group identity. A case in point is the escalation of terrorism among the Palestinians in the 1980s and again the early 2000s. This was caused by their perception of injustice from the State of Israel, which “bruised” the Palestinians’ identity—e.g., calamitous seizures of land, losses of other property, and experiences of dishonor and subjugation.14 Understanding terrorist violence may become more obvious when understanding the collective traumatic history of a group. In this case, terrorism becomes legitimate; it is justifiable retribution for social and cultural abuses that may be traced to several generations, if not centuries. Among lone wolves, although personal experience of trauma may not have happened, they can still indirectly identify with it.15

Groupthink Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, there has been a methodical strategy by jihadist leaders to apply principles of groupthink to shape the minds of would-be jihadists. Groupthink is a psychological technique whereby a group coerces its members into a false sense of coherence or security, which can result in unsound or dangerous decision-making outcomes. Group members are taught to suppress conflict and reach an agreement without consideration of alternative viewpoints. This is achieved by actively stifling dissent and isolating oneself from external influences.16 In groupthink, members develop close-knit emotional strands. These emotional units have internal regulations for behavior, with implicit and explicit expectations for what members are allowed to say and how they should interact with others. The ultimate objective is simple: to get members to conform. When groups are more unified, more isolated, and more agreeable to their ideologies, group conformity is the strongest.17

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Jihadist Group Polarization Groupthink leads to group polarization, the tendency of members of a like-minded group to create a more pronounced binary opposition with the enemy group. The majority of arguments follows the group-favored direction.18 Groupthink, then, cultivates extreme mindsets within individual group members who would otherwise not be as violent or hold such opinions and attitudes—a phenomenon known as collective effervescence.19 The danger of jihadist group polarization is the normalization to an “us vs. them” philosophy against the rest of the world. The repetition of the “humiliation” and “oppression” of Muslims hardens the “us vs. them” position.20 Close-mindedness is manifest in the way the ummah is framed as “victimized” and “demonized” by the Infidels and Apostates. Such victimization was particularly boosted by media accounts of U.S. military soldiers torturing Muslim prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.21 The role of hate preachers and extremist clerics is another point to consider. Would-be jihadists are recruited and radicalized by hate clerics on a regular basis. The latter manipulate young recruits into believing that it is impossible to fail when fighting for Allah and that their actions are the ultimate act for Allah. In due course, group members who have internalized such brainwashing tactics will overestimate the group’s “invulnerability.” It should come to no surprise that group members hold no second thoughts about participating in extremity shift, or risky shift, whereby extreme decisions are taken as a group.22 Under these circumstances, radical Islamic leaders can effortlessly rationalize attacking innocent civilians—including bombing nursery schools—because jihad is against all, not just the enemy government or military.23 The abundance of jihadist training camps in many parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia points to the fact that group polarization has turned countless youths into killing machines.

Social Identity Theory (SIT) Research on group and social interaction has made substantial contributions to understanding social decisions and behavior in group contexts.24 One theory that explains this phenomenon well is Social Identity Theory (SIT). Introduced by Henri Tajfel (1982),25 SIT rests on the premise that (1) social identification with a group is based on a perception of oneness

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with that group; (2) social identification comes from the categorization of people, the uniqueness and standing of the group, the existence of outgroups, and the factors that lead to group formation; and (3) social identification is reinforced by activities that are in line with the identity of the group and that support the institutions for a better group identity. Social Identity and Group Membership Tajfel (1972)26 developed the idea of social identity to explain how individuals perceive themselves in intergroup contexts, how an organism of social categorizations “creates and defines an individual’s own place in society.” He defined social identity as “the individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership.” The individual’s perception of who he or she is, then, is contingent on the groups to which he or she belongs. Because groups only develop meaning in relation to other groups, they build their descriptive and evaluative character (and, consequently, their social value) in relation to these groups. People interpret their group membership through positive or negative connotations. Generally, they see themselves and their group more positively. Not surprisingly, they tend to see in-groups in a more positive light than out-groups. Once a positive self-image is anchored on people’s minds, it has to be upheld. As a result, people will distinguish in-groups from out-groups by making out elements in which they rate their own group as superior.27 Such positive evaluation of group membership comes with a great sense of pride, confidence, and belonging in a social world. The outcome is that shared beliefs and values that represent the group become accepted as normal and part of the everyday life of the self. It is like groupthink; individuals begin to think, feel, and behave in the way that the group does. These social interpretations can actually last a long time but, as we will see, people as a group can also react to social events in a threatening or violent way.28 In-Group vs. Out-Group The search for identity creates divisions with others, because every “us” finds itself in contrast to a “them.”29 When an individual perceives himor herself as part of a group, it becomes an in-group for them. A comparable group with which he or she does not identify becomes an out-group.

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Ultimately, the individual develops an “us” vs. “them” mentality.30 The aspiration to see one’s self positively is projected onto the in-group, which creates a propensity to see one’s own group with a positive image, and by comparison, the out-group(s) with a negative image.31 To achieve this, members of the in-group will, for example, (1) maximize the differences between the in-group and the out-group, (2) minimize the real or imaginary differences between in-group members (so as to enhance in-group cohesion), and (3) remember the real or imaginary achievements of the in-group in a positive fashion and the out-group’s in a negative fashion (or not remember it at all).32 In-group members can also augment the value of cognitive resources. Cognitive resources refer to the collective skills of group members and the leader’s experience and decision-making abilities. They can be highly beneficial during a highly complex terrorist undertaking.33 An important corollary of all this is that people only need one reason, whether important or insignificant, to defend their in-groups or demonstrate that they are better than out-groups.

Out-Group Threat to the Ummah The biases that people harbor, even those that would otherwise not hold as individuals outside their groups, can lead them to be aggressive toward out-group members.34 In most situations of radicalism or indoctrination, the new recruits learn that an external threat to the wellbeing of the in-group is present. This real or imaginary threat may appear in several forms. Let us take a brief look at Stephan et al.’s (2002)35 description of three types of threat: symbolic threats, realistic threats, and intergroup anxiety. Symbolic threats are threats to the group’s beliefs and values— as in the threat to the Muslim way of life overall. Realistic threats are threats to the socioeconomic side of one’s group. Intergroup anxiety denotes the fear that people experience when they have to interact with people from another group. Past studies have established a link between group threats and negative out-group attitudes.36 To prove this point, Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, and Orehek (2009)37 found that people support violence and enact violent actions more often when they believe that they have to restore threatened significance.

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Threat to Muslim Identity Group membership gives a person a heightened feeling of pride, selfesteem, and place in a social world. This is especially true for the jihadist radicalization of individuals and the larger global jihad movement. The impact of contemporary values and principles on the way Muslims perceive themselves (e.g., like those living in Western nations) is an issue to be addressed. For example, in the West, the accent is placed on the separation of church and government; religion should remain a private matter. This can make a significant minority of Muslims, like those who display their religiosity through their outward appearance (e.g., the headscarf, veil, or full body covering), feel highly self-conscious. These feelings can lead them to be “excluded” or “inferiorized” as the Other, which may be exacerbated by real-life experiences of discrimination. By extension, their different belief system can complicate their situation in mainstream society, where they have to balance their values with those of the secular world.38 Second, the perception of being the Other in the West is a justification for insulating themselves into ethno-religious micro-communities that are both socially and geographically at odds with the secular world. This inevitably strengthens their Muslim identity as a group vis-à-vis mainstream society. Because their identity is rooted in both their ethnicity and religion, a certain number of Muslims are more likely to segregate themselves in sub-worlds at a level not observed with other migrant communities. As perceptions of threats toward the in-group develop, ingroup members pull back further and further into the in-group to protect it from external forces.39 This self-segregation attitude was labeled “isolationist” by Peter Hain, a member of the British Parliament (Labour Party) in 2011, and “concerning” by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2010. Merkel was concerned that Germany did not successfully achieve its integration program for Muslim immigrants, particularly Turks and Arabs, because they hung onto their own religion, languages, and traditions—enclaves built within the larger German context.40 Grooming the In-Group Mentality Jihadists and jihadist groups do not exist in a vacuum. They may find themselves within a hierarchical structure (but not always). They can be at the apex of a larger pyramid. Right below are active supporters,

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below whom are passive supporters, and below whom is the larger base of sympathizers. This is exactly here that jihadists enjoy their base of support and their opportunity to manipulate them into joining or supporting the in-group.41 A period of soul-searching and meaning-searching can open a window of opportunity, whereby the jihadist ideology can penetrate their mind. The most vulnerable individuals will hear the jihadist’s side of the story, what the world is really like, and get exposed to alternative ideas for redemption and world peace. This new worldview stresses the tribulations and persecution of fellow Muslims around the world, the decadence of the West, and the requirement for all true Muslims to return to pure, traditional Islam. More importantly, the jihadist will convince the listener that there is a large community of Muslims out there who feel the same way. In this sense, the susceptible individual is made to believe that joining the global jihad movement would be joining a large in-group. This is the practice of grooming the in-group mentality, but it works. As this newfound feeling of belonging grows, so too does his or her commitment to jihadist violence.42 In times of crisis, leaders or group manipulators present ideological explanations for their predicament—again, real or imaginary. Radical ideologies can be enticing when they place blame on the out-group. The out-group is assigned all sorts of evil traits that, according to the radical narrative, undermine the welfare and safety of the in-group.43 At the same time that the out-group is made responsible for the alleged quandary of the in-group, the radical ideology is gradually absorbed by the members and spreads like wildfire. The remedy that the ideology provides is generally a straightforward plan of action to redeem the in-group of its plight and train the new recruits to sacrifice their lives for the “group” at large.44 Dehumanization For jihadist organizations, as is also the case with street gangs and cults, the in-group is idealized, whereas others (and their ways of life) are denigrated. Primitive sentiments, particularly abhorrence, contempt, disgust, shame, and disgrace, direct and motivate violent action. Terrorist violence can easily inhibit the mind, regardless of the devastating traumatic impact it can cause. Rationality is either lacking, resisted, or not in line with the Western sense of it [rationality]. Rather, revenge and instant gratification predominate.45 This is a powerful group dynamics that leads to severe regression in human relations and to a level of dehumanization in

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which victims are treated as subhuman to be killed indiscriminately. Dehumanization flies in the face of human nature, with its tendency to show empathy, regret, or self-concern. In terrorism, the recruits themselves are trained to accept self-dehumanization, particularly when they are told that life on Earth is miserable—in contrast to eternal life in Paradise. This type of indoctrination is used as an ego-building strategy whereby suicide bombers create a dehumanized self so they can be the most lethal weapon in terrorism.46 Dehumanization also needs to be examined within the framework of a Manichaean struggle of Good vs. Evil. Global jihad will not relent until all members of the eternal enemy group submit or are killed. Any human being who is not a fighter, follower, or supporter of global jihad— and many Muslims do not agree with such extreme ideology—is “evil” and becomes fair game. Indiscriminate attacks are not unique to Islamic terrorists but, since the September 11, 2001 attacks, they have reportedly dehumanized and killed more people internationally than most other religious-driven terrorists.47

Psychosocial Resilience Another important concept of group dynamics and socialization in jihadism is psychosocial resilience.48 Psychosocial resilience is the individual’s ability to conquer stress and misfortune by taking particular actions (both short- and long-term) to enhance their self-esteem. Stress and misfortune can be personal problems (e.g., mental, health-related, etc.), family or relationship tensions, and professional hardships, and financial stressors.49 The resilient person can successfully adapt to the social world and escape crises through various coping methods.50 Resilience should be framed as a coping mechanism, not a natural personality trait.51 Stressful events can impact not only the developmental process of youths, but the wellbeing of adults as well.52 Psychosocial Resilience Through Group Interaction Psychosocial resilience can be driven by a larger social dynamic, such as the interaction between the individual, the immediate social environment, and the external context. On the other hand, the inspiration of only one senior mentor can produce an immense impact on one’s resilience.53 Friends and kinfolks can be highly influential in helping us comprehend,

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process, and surmount difficult times. Even peer-to-peer mentorship can serve as a template for problem-solving, encouragement, and other coping methods.54 Dyer and McGuinness (1996)55 refer to this general idea as “prosocial attitude,” a convivial, benevolent attitude of interpersonal attachment with those in need of developing resilience. The value of our close relationships, the episodes we experience in life, and the type of attachments we form are essential in our upbringing. This structuralist frame postulates transactional stimuli between people and their environments. Our peers, relatives, and educators, among many, communicate with us on a daily basis, which reciprocally makes who we are.56 Studies that examine resilient youths reveal that their abilities to dominate stressful life events and turn over a new leaf are directly tied to competence and practice.57 These two variables are grounded in emotional attachment to like-minded people; numerous relationships with caregivers and mentors; self-control (i.e., by modulating emotion); and self-efficacy (truly believing in oneself to accomplish the goals required in specific circumstances).58 All these characteristics imply that those resilient youths learned how to “work against” difficult situations through strategies that avoided giving up on life—i.e., a simple coping mechanism for “survival.” In both the Western and non-Western contexts, non-profit institutions and community-based groups have been known to improve disaffected individuals’ self-esteem by offering them a supportive milieu. When both localities and the government act as the “caregiver,” people are more likely to develop psychosocial resilience. In essence, helping others through a sequence of interventions, including food and housing programs, communal insurance, and institutions of childhood (e.g., daycare and play centers) can be a great alternative to conventional family support. If truth be told, in difficult times, they would be a good replacement for family altogether. In case localities or the government do not intervene to help disaffected individuals, the latter can develop their resilience through other group-based means.59 Case Study: Palestinian Youths This matter is of significance because a robust minority of Palestinian suicide terrorists are still teenagers.60 The volume of developmental and behavioral changes taking place in teenage years is extraordinarily high, in comparison with that of other age brackets. Adolescence is often saturated

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with unexpected psychological, social, emotional, and physical changes.61 In the Palestinian territories, the philosophy is that there is Palestinian child “left behind.” He or she benefits from social safety, like the abovereferenced “prosocial attitude.” This occurs by welcoming, cherishing, and looking after the child until he or she is sufficiently mature to establish his or her own family.62 This looks rosy and promising, but the problem is that seemingly innocuous community programs can be set up to transform disaffected children into suicide killers. In this event, the martyr-to-be learns that he or she can surmount difficult times by becoming a hero for the cause—i.e., sacrificing oneself for Allah, a status symbol that motivates a great many youths. For them, martyrdom is istishhad, the supreme performance that would erase all their problems on Earth. By killing the Infidels, the martyr (shahid) participates in a group-based ritual to raise his or her status and grow unconquerable over his or her targets.63 During such “holier-than-thou” rituals, their Palestinian peers and mentors glorify and socialize with them. When cross-examined on their last mission (before blowing up their bodies for the cause), martyrs-to-be often wish their immediate family members to follow the same path. Beyond everything, martyrdom is a form of group-based healing that promises rewards in Paradise. For this reason, it is a great honor for his or her family to have been chosen by the group to carry out the ultimate mission.64 Communal Routines Communal routines can help Muslim youths vanquish the negative effects of stress. Such communal routines can be simple: eating meals as a group, sharing stories, and playing sports. They can help youths attain a sense of order and structure.65 They can maintain or regain predictability in their lives. Predictability is fundamental to martyrdom training; the young recruit must give undivided attention and energy to the suicide mission. Psychological resilience will help recruits reach a balanced mental state and behavior, which enables jihadist leaders to “manage” these recruits and channel their efforts in the most efficient way.66 Frequent celebrations and observances are of great symbolic significance that can help youths stay focused on the mission. According to Sandler, Miller, Short, and Wolchik (1989),67 such commemorations “have symbolic significance in that they signify collective identity and continuity.”

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Communal routines are important when analyzing the motives of Palestinian martyrs-to-be.68 When a recruit obeys the rules of a cult-like group, it is called “positive cult.” The positive cult lays out the rules for collective and normative behavior. This can happen through a sequence of rituals that glue group members around hallowed things. In Islam, one of those hallowed rites is the “last night,” a mystical rite. The “last night” is a poem arranged through a collection of verses. Martyrs-to-be recite the poem before executing their suicide attack. From a metaphorical standpoint, the “last night” refers to the decisive moment whereby devout Muslims sacrifice their lives against the enemy—in contrast, the coward ones hide in shame in the dark or on the back rows.69 The positive cult is a routine through which people “have always believed that they upheld positive and bilateral relations with religious forces.”70 It serves two purposes: to support youths’ commitment to the group’s values and to arouse the power of religious/cultural symbols over their consciousness.71 Communal routines work through interpersonal communication. For youths, these interactions represent opportunities to develop particular skills and attitudes, and to learn to nurture one another. At the same time, in certain circles of Palestinian society, even those jihadist groups that favor peer-to-peer support may intentionally sequester young recruits to isolated social environments. The objective here is to show tough love and make the young one “grow” quickly. In due course, they will be more likely to renounce their prior associations with groups. This is akin to a replacement of relationships. Such “milieu control” may contribute immensely to his or her psychosocial resilience. To be more precise, by creating a “milieu control,” former group identities will not hamper the absolute commitment required to be a top martyr.72 These circumstances also bring up the notion of herd behavior, whereby humans dispose of their old self, become engulfed into a larger group dynamic, and are no longer constrained by scruples or civility. All in all, this group-based strategy of psychological resilience demonstrates how a person’s identity can surrender to a collective identity. At this stage, what benefits the group’s agenda is the only thing that counts.73

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Notes 1. Donelson R. Forsyth, Group Dynamics, 7th ed. (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2018). 2. Ruth Wageman, “Interdependence and Group Effectiveness,” Administrative Science Quarterly 4, no. 1 (1995): 145–80, https://doi.org/10. 2307/2393703. 3. Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1954), 5. 4. E. E. Maccoby, “Socialization and Developmental Change,” Child Development 55, no. 2 (1984): 317–28, https://doi.org/10.2307/1129945. 5. Kai Alderson, “Making Sense of State Socialization,” Review of International Studies 27, no. 3 (2001): 415–33, https://doi.org/10.1017/S02 60210501004156. 6. Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley, Sophia Moskalenko, and Clark Mccauley, “Containing the Narrative: Strategy and Tactics in Countering the Storyline of Global Jihad,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 5, no. 1 (2010): 42–57, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 18335300.2010.9686940. 7. Kimberly A. Powell, “Framing Islam: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Terrorism since 9/11,” Communication Studies 62, no. 1 (2006): 90– 112, https://doi.org/10.1080/10510974.2011.533599. 8. Ashley Carver and Conor Harrie, “Framing Terrorists in Canada: A Comparative Analysis of Two Shootings,” International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences 12, no. 1 (2017): 98–110, https://doi.org/110. 5281/zenodo.345718. 9. Robert Pape and James Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). 10. Reid Meloy and Jessica Yakeley, “The Violent True Believer as a ‘Lone Wolf’—Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Terrorism,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 32 (2014): 347–65, https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2109. 11. Vamik Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1988). 12. Meloy and Yakeley, “The Violent True Believer,” 350. 13. Sigmund Freud, “Remembering, Repeating and Working Through,” in Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1914), 145–56. 14. Susan S. Elmendorf and Ronald Ruskin, “Trauma, Terrorism: Man’s Inhumanity to Man,” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 85, no. 4 (2004): 983–86, https://doi.org/10.1516/m5ra-vbw2-pgjb-qhym. 15. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

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16. Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of ForeignPolicy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). 17. Clark McCauley and Mary Segal, “Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups,” in Group Processes and Intergroup Relations: Review of Personality and Social Psychology, ed. Clyde Hendrick (Newbury Park: Sage, 1987): 231– 56. 18. Leuprecht, Hataley, Moskalenko, and Mccauley, “Containing the Narrative,” 49. 19. William B. Swann, Jr., Jolanda Jetten, Ángel Gómez, Harvey Whitehouse, and Brock Bastian, “When Group Membership Gets Personal: A Theory of Identity Fusion,” Psychological Review 119, no. 3 (2012): 441–56, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0028589. 20. Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins, “The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 11 (2015): 958–975, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1051375. 21. Gerald-Mark Breen and Jonathan Matusitz, “Excitation Transfer Theory: An Analysis of the Abu Ghraib Prison Abuse Scandal,” Journal of Applied Security Research 4, no. 3 (2009): 309–21, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 19361610902930097. 22. Clark R. McCauley, “Extremity Shifts, Risk Shifts and Attitude Shifts after Group Discussion,” European Journal of Social Psychology 2, no. 4 (1972): 417–36, https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420020406. 23. Michael W. Kramer and Debbie S. Dougherty, “Groupthink as Communication Process, Not Outcome,” Communication & Social Change 1, no. 1 (2013): 44–62, http://dx.doi.org/10.4471/csc.2013.03. 24. See Jaihyun Park, Karla Felix, and Grace Lee, “Implicit Attitudes toward Arab-Muslims and the Moderating Effects of Social Information,” Basic and Applied Social Psychology 29, no. 1 (2007): 35–45, https://doi.org/ 10.1080/01973530701330942. 25. Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 26. Henri Tajfel, “La catégorisation sociale,” in Introduction à la psychologie sociale, ed. Serge Moscovici (Paris: Larousse, 1972), 272–302, 292, 293. 27. Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Henri Tajfel and John Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin (Monterey, CA: Brooks-Cole, 1979), 33–47; Maykel Verkuyten, “Ethnic Group Identification and Group Evaluation among Minority and Majority Groups: Testing the Multiculturalism Hypothesis,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88, no. 1 (2005): 121–38, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.88.1.121; and

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Maykel Verkuyten and Arjan Reijerse, “Intergroup Structure and Identity Management among Ethnic Minority and Majority Groups: The Interactive Effects of Perceived Stability, Legitimacy, and Permeability,” European Journal of Social Psychology 38, no. 1 (2008): 106–27, https://doi.org/ 10.1002/ejsp.395. Henri Tajfel and John Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,” in Psychology of Intergroup relations, ed. Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986): 7–24. Jonathan Sacks, “The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations,” Orbis 46, no. 4 (2002): 601–9, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 15570274.2009.9523391. Henri Tajfel, “Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour,” Social Science Information 13, no. 2 (1974): 65–93, https://doi.org/10.1177/053901 847401300204. Charles Efferson, Rafael Lalive, and Ernst Fehr, “The Coevolution of Cultural Groups and Ingroup Favoritism,” Science 321, no. 5897 (2008): 1844–49, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1155805. Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory,” Social Psychology Quarterly 63, no. 3 (2000): 224–37, https:// doi.org/10.2307/2695870. Kayla Keller and Jonathan Matusitz, “Examining U.S. Navy SEALs through Cognitive Resources Theory (CRT),” Journal of Applied Security Research 10, no. 3 (2015): 317–29, https://doi.org/10.1080/193 61610.2015.1038764; Mary Kathryn Jackson and Jonathan Matusitz, “Understanding Somali Piracy through Cognitive Resources Theory,” Africa Review 9, no. 1 (2017): 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1080/097 44053.2016.1239931. Karen Gonsalkorale, William von Hippel, Jeffrey W. Sherman, and Karl Christoph Klauer, “Bias and Regulation of Bias in Intergroup Interactions: Implicit Attitudes toward Muslims and Interaction Quality,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45, no. 1 (2009): 161–66, https://doi. org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.07.022. Walter G. Stephan, Kurt A. Boniecki, Oscar Ybarra, Ann Bettencourt, Kelly S. Ervin, Linda A. Jackson, Penny S. McNatt, and C. Lausanne Renfro, “The Role of Threats in the Racial Attitudes of Blacks and Whites,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28, no. 9 (2002): 1242–54, https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672022812009. For example, see Blake M. Riek, Eric W. Mania, and Samuel L. Gaertner, “Intergroup Threat and Outgroup Attitudes: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 10, no. 4 (2006): 336–53, https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1004_4. Arie Kruglanski, Xiaoyan Chen, Mark Dechesne, Shira Fishman, and Edward Orehek, “Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and

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the Quest for Personal Significance,” Political Psychology 30, no. 3 (2009): 331–57, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00698.x. Dina Al Raffie, “Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora,” Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 4 (2013): 67–91, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.4.4. Samina Yasmeen and Nina Markovi´c, Muslim Citizens in the West: Spaces and Agents of Inclusion and Exclusion (New York: Routledge, 2014). Cited in Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fear Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 7. Lewis Herrington, “British Islamic Extremist Terrorism: The Declining Significance of Al-Qaeda and Pakistan,” International Affairs 91, no. 1 (2015): 17–35, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12184. Al Raffie, “Social Identity Theory,” 74. Assaf Moghadam, “The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 3 (2008): 1–3. Terence Ball and Richard Dagger, Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal (New York: Longman, 1999). Meloy and Yakeley, “The Violent True Believer,” 350. George Hough, “Does Psychoanalysis Have Anything to Offer an Understanding of Terrorism?” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 52, no. 3 (2004): 813–28, https://doi.org/10.1177/000306510405200 31101. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” International Security 27, no. 3 (2003): 30–58, https://doi.org/10.1162/01622880260553624. Jonathan Matusitz, “Martyrdom as a Result of Psychosocial Resilience: The Case of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists,” in The Routledge International Handbook of Psychosocial Resilience, ed. Updesh Kumar (New York: Routledge, 2016), 285–95. Michael Rutter, “Resilience in the Face of Adversity: Protective Factors and Resistance to Psychiatric Disorder,” British Journal of Psychiatry 147, no. 6 (1985): 598–611, https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.147.6.598; Michael Rutter, “Psychosocial Resilience and Protective Mechanisms,” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 57, no. 3 (1987): 316–31, https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-0025.1987.tb03541.x. Emmy Werner and Ruth S. Smith, Overcoming the Odds: High Risk Children from Birth to Adulthood (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992). Ann S. Masten, Karin M. Best, and Norman Garmezy, “Resilience and Development: Contributions from the Study of Children Who Overcome Adversity,” Development and Psychopathology 2, no. 4 (1990): 425–44, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0954579400005812.

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52. Bruce E. Compas, “Stress and Life Events during Childhood and Adolescence,” Clinical Psychology Review 7, no. 3 (1987): 275–302, https:// doi.org/10.1016/0272-7358(87)90037-7; Eric Dubow and John Tisak, “The Relation between Stressful Life Events and Adjustment in Elementary School Children: The Role of Social Support and Social ProblemSolving Skills,” Child Development 60, no. 6 (1989): 1412–23, https:// doi.org/10.2307/1130931. 53. Emmy Werner and Jeannette L. Johnson, “Can We Apply Resilience?” in Resilience and Development: Positive Life Adaptations, ed. Meyer D. Glantz and Jeannette L. Johnson (New York: Academic/Plenum Publishers, 1999), 259–68. 54. Raija-Leena Punamaki, “Content of and Factors Affecting Coping Modes among Palestinian Children,” Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives 6, no. 1 (1987): 86–98. 55. Janyce G. Dyer and Teena Minton McGuinness, “Resilience: Analysis of the Concept,” Archives of Psychiatric Nursing 10, no. 5 (1996): 276–82, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0883-9417(96)80036-7. 56. Richard Williams and John Drury, “Psychosocial Resilience and Its Influence on Managing Mass Emergencies and Disasters,” Psychiatry 8, no. 8 (2009): 293–96, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mppsy.2009.04.019. 57. Ann S. Masten and J. Douglas Coatsworth, “The Development of Competence in Favorable and Unfavorable Environments,” American Psychologist 53, no. 2 (1998): 205–20, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/ 0003-066X.53.2.205. 58. Saundra Murray Nettles and Michael J. Mason, “Zones of Narrative Safety: Promoting Psychosocial Resilience in Young People,” Journal of Primary Prevention 25, no. 3 (2004): 359–73, https://doi.org/10. 1023/B%3AJOPP.0000048026.99223.3b. 59. Jo Boyden and Gillian Mann, “Children’s Risk, Resilience and Coping in Extreme Situations,” in Handbook for Working with Children and Youth: Pathways to Resilience across Cultures and Contexts, ed. Michael Ungar (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005), 3–25. 60. Child Soldiers International, Global Report 2004 (London: Child Soldiers International, 2004); Greg Myre, “Israeli Soldiers Thwart a Boy’s Suicide Bombing Attempt,” The New York Times, March 25, 2004, A1. 61. S. G. Forman, Coping Skills Intervention during Childhood and Adolescence (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993). 62. Brian Burgoon, “On Welfare and Terror: Social Welfare Policies and Political-Economic Roots of Terrorism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 2 (2006): 176–203, https://doi.org/10.1177/002200270528 4829. 63. Jonathan Matusitz, Symbolism in Terrorism: Motivation, Communication, and Behavior (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015).

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64. Alouph Hareven, “Victimization: Some Comments by an Israeli,” Political Psychology 4, no. 1 (1983): 145–55, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/379 1179. 65. Robbie Gilligan, “Adversity, Resilience and Young People: The Protective Value of Positive School and Spare Time Experiences,” Children & Society 14, no. 1 (2000): 37–47, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1099-0860.2000. tb00149.x. 66. Anat Berko, The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and Their Dispatchers (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2009). 67. Irwin N. Sandler, Paul Miller, Jerome Short, and Sharlene A. Wolchik, “Social Support as a Protective Factor for Children in Stress,” in Children’s Social Networks and Social Supports, ed. Deborah Belle (New York: Wiley, 1989), 277–307, 279. 68. Jonathan Matusitz, Terrorism & Communication: A Critical Introduction (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2013). 69. David Cook, “Suicide Attacks or Martyrdom Operations in Contemporary Jihad Literature,” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 6, no. 1 (2002): 7–44, https://doi.org/10.1525/nr.2002. 6.1.7. 70. Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: Free Press, 1915), 326. 71. James Brow, “Class Formation and Ideological Practice: A Case from Sri Lanka,” The Journal of Asian Studies 40, no. 4 (1981): 703–18, https:// doi.org/10.2307/2055677. 72. Margaret Thaler Singer and Janja Lalich, Cults in Our Midst: The Hidden Menace in Our Everyday Lives (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995). 73. André Orléan, “Bayesian Interactions and Collective Dynamics of Opinion: Herd Behavior and Mimetic Contagion,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 28, no. 2 (1995): 257–74, https://doi.org/ 10.1016/0167-2681(95)00035-6; Jerrold M. Post, “‘When Hatred Is Bred in the Bone:’ The Social Psychology of Terrorism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 1208 (2010): 15–23, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05694.x.

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Janis, Irving L. Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972. Keller, Kayla, and Jonathan Matusitz. “Examining U.S. Navy SEALs through Cognitive Resources Theory (CRT).” Journal of Applied Security Research 10, no. 3 (2015): 317–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2015.103 8764. Kramer, Michael W., and Debbie S. Dougherty. “Groupthink as Communication Process, Not Outcome.” Communication & Social Change 1, no. 1 (2013): 44–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.4471/csc.2013.03. Kruglanski, Arie, Xiaoyan Chen, Mark Dechesne, Shira Fishman, and Edward Orehek. “Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and the Quest for Personal Significance.” Political Psychology 30, no. 3 (2009): 331–57. https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00698.x. Leuprecht, Christian, Todd Hataley, Sophia Moskalenko, and Clark Mccauley. “Containing the Narrative: Strategy and Tactics in Countering the Storyline of Global Jihad.” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 5, no. 1 (2010): 42–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335300.2010.9686940. Maccoby, E. E. “Socialization and Developmental Change.” Child Development 55, no. 2 (1984): 317–28. https://doi.org/10.2307/1129945. Masten, Ann S., Karin M. Best, and Norman Garmezy. “Resilience and Development: Contributions from the Study of Children Who Overcome Adversity.” Development and Psychopathology 2, no. 4 (1990): 425–44. http://dx.doi. org/10.1017/S0954579400005812. Masten, Ann S., and J. Douglas Coatsworth. “The Development of Competence in Favorable and Unfavorable Environments.” American Psychologist 53, no. 2 (1998): 205–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.53.2.205. Matusitz, Jonathan. Terrorism & Communication: A Critical Introduction. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2013. ———. Symbolism in Terrorism: Motivation, Communication, and Behavior. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015. ———. “Martyrdom as a Result of Psychosocial Resilience: The Case of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists.” In The Routledge International Handbook of Psychosocial Resilience, edited by Updesh Kumar, 285–95. New York: Routledge, 2016. McCauley, Clark. “Extremity Shifts, Risk Shifts and Attitude Shifts after Group Discussion.” European Journal of Social Psychology 2, no. 4 (1972): 417–36. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420020406. McCauley, Clark, and Mary Segal. “Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups.” In Group Processes and Intergroup Relations: Review of Personality and Social Psychology, edited by Clyde Hendrick, 231–56. Newbury Park: Sage, 1987.

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Meloy, Reid, and Jessica Yakeley. “The Violent True Believer as a ‘Lone Wolf’— Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Terrorism.” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 32 (2014): 347–65. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2109. Moghadam, Assaf. “The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology.” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 3 (2008): 1–3. Nettles, Saundra Murray, and Michael J. Mason. “Zones of Narrative Safety: Promoting Psychosocial Resilience in Young People.” Journal of Primary Prevention 25, no. 3 (2004): 359–73. https://doi.org/10.1023/B%3AJOPP. 0000048026.99223.3b. Orléan, André. “Bayesian Interactions and Collective Dynamics of Opinion: Herd Behavior and Mimetic Contagion.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 28, no. 2 (1995): 257–74. https://doi.org/10.1016/01672681(95)00035-6. Pape, Robert, and James Feldman. Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. Park, Jaihyun, Karla Felix, and Grace Lee. “Implicit Attitudes toward ArabMuslims and the Moderating Effects of Social Information.” Basic and Applied Social Psychology 29, no. 1 (2007): 35–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 01973530701330942. Post, Jerrold M. “‘When Hatred Is Bred in the Bone:’ The Social Psychology of Terrorism.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 1208 (2010): 15–23. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05694.x. Powell, Kimberly A. “Framing Islam: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Terrorism since 9/11.” Communication Studies 62, no. 1 (2006): 90–112. https://doi.org/10.1080/10510974.2011.533599. Punamaki, Raija-Leena. “Content of and Factors Affecting Coping Modes among Palestinian Children.” Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives 6, no. 1 (1987): 86–98. Riek, Blake M., Eric W. Mania, and Samuel L. Gaertner. “Intergroup Threat and Outgroup Attitudes: A Meta-Analytic Review.” Personality and Social Psychology Review 10, no. 4 (2006): 336–53. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15 327957pspr1004_4. Rutter, Michael. “Resilience in the Face of Adversity: Protective Factors and Resistance to Psychiatric Disorder.” British Journal of Psychiatry 147, no. 6 (1985): 598–611. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.147.6.598. ———. “Psychosocial Resilience and Protective Mechanisms.” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 57, no. 3 (1987): 316–31. https://doi.org/10.1111/j. 1939-0025.1987.tb03541.x. Sacks, Jonathan. “The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations.” Orbis 46, no. 4 (2002): 601–9. https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274. 2009.9523391.

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CHAPTER 5

Social Alienation

Unlike group-based processes such as group grievance discussed in the previous chapter, social alienation occurs more at the societal level. By and large, social alienation is a form of social exclusion or marginalization whereby minority groups experience social difficulties and feel downgraded to the fringe of society.1 It is “a condition in social relationships reflected by a low degree of integration or common values and a high degree of distance or isolation between individuals”2 in a community or culture. Social alienation is a sentiment that people experience when they perceive that they, as individuals or group members, receive less than they deserve.3 As Wright-Neville and Smith (2009)4 suggest, “alienation is replaced by identification with the group, powerlessness is replaced by potency derived from being involved in group operations, while humiliation is mitigated by participation in actions.”

Durkheimian Perspectives The idea of alienation is a highly influential concept in sociology. The feeling of alienation, along with substandard social support, can have a detrimental effect on people’s perception of the dominant society. Consequently, these people will come to the conclusion that they are denied fair access to specific rights, opportunities, and resources that should be available to all citizens of society.5 For Durkheim,6 social alienation is manifested through anomie, which emerges from a disconnect between © The Author(s) 2020 J. Matusitz, Global Jihad in Muslim and non-Muslim Contexts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47044-9_5

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group standards and larger social standards, and which creates a lack of legitimate ambitions or goals. Anomie is a “condition in which society provides little moral guidance to individuals.”7 It may come from a clash of belief systems and trigger a failure of social bonds between people and the community. Durkheim described it as a cause of suicide; it has also been associated with growing susceptibility to radical ideologies. An absence of social connection can expose a person to new ideas and a new sense of self that is infused with political radicalization. Separated from friends, relatives, and even basic needs, people may begin joining unlike groups led by political, religious, or cultural extremists. Hoffer (1951)8 asserts that, after a lengthy phase of alienation, individuals become “true believers” in that “their innermost craving is for a new life—a rebirth—or, failing this, a chance to acquire new elements of pride, confidence, hope, a sense of purpose and worth by an identification with a holy cause.” Terrorism and the Failed Integration Model The “failed integration” model is a long-established argument for explaining away the root causes of jihadism in Western nations—from laypersons and experts alike. The opinion that less integration causes more radicalization has been articulated in a variety of media outlets, academic works, and official government documents.9 With respect to Muslim radicalization and political violence, the “failed integration” model is attributed to economic conditions, social deprivation, social alienation, and exclusion.10 For Beutel (2007),11 “successful integration is an important part of the fight against terrorism by ensuring that radicals do not have the political and moral ammunition to spread their ideologies.” As explained later in this chapter, perceived failure to achieve adequate levels of integration among second- and third-generation Muslims in Western countries has often been a general explanation for radicalization.12 The result of “failed integration” can be repeated: (1) Seclusion—politically, socially, and ideologically—from the larger society and (2) rejection of the national identity (and related value systems) shared by the other members of society. Anti-democratic action and violence have been observed outcomes.13 People who eventually become terrorists may have been unemployed, secluded, and vulnerable youths, but they could have also been issued from cultivated, middle-class backgrounds, and even well-off, upper-class ones. Extremism emerges in both closed societies and open, democratic ones.14 The issue at hand is that terrorism

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can be the byproduct of a new identity and a corresponding narrative that justify ultra-violence against its own society. Where and when the network of relationships—both real and perceived—that nurture violence-inclined identity materialize cannot be answered or addressed with mathematical certainty. Rather, a conceptual examination of the milieus in which such identity develops must be conducted.15 Four specific case studies—on Muslim youths in Belgium, France, and Great Britain, and on Palestinians in Israel—are offered at the end of the chapter to explain the potential danger of such milieus.

Social Closure Theory Developed by Coleman et al. (1966),16 social closure theory rests on the premise that mainstream society tends to prevent historically marginalized groups from fully enjoying certain resources in order to uphold its power. Social closure theory considers exclusionary mechanisms of alienation as a means to an end. The larger group excludes others to safeguard a privileged position or control access to resources.17 Social closure, in and of itself, is a phenomenon by which the dominant group defends its resources by excluding others from their élite circle based on multiple criteria. Closure is universal within any society, regardless of its shape or size.18 The Elite Social closure theory argues that people of higher status have more advantages (e.g., access to positions and resources) than lower status individuals. This can be achieved through a social segregation process. People keep valued resources for like-minded others or people of the same religious, racial, political, or ideological stock.19 The élites, then, control “access to resources and rewards” by closing off opportunities to less-advantaged groups.20 Social exclusion is immensely embedded within social stratification.21 The best possibilities come from close-knit circles of members who are bound by trust and loyalty.22 Elite-driven social closure reflects the concept of essentialism, which is based on stereotypical attributes and which stresses that the Other is immutable—unless that Other converts to a new religious, political, or ideological stock.23

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Structural Discrimination Social closure theory fits this framework for examining structural discrimination because power and conflict frequently go hand in hand vis-à-vis social exclusion. Structural discrimination is a type of institutional discrimination against members of a particular religious, racial, or gender group who are denied access to certain opportunities. It is often more intentional than unintentional, and it may stem from both public and private policies. Such discrimination is obvious when these policies bear excessively negative effects on the morale of the rejected group.24 One such example of structural discrimination was the typical Jim Crow law in the Southern United States, enacted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Jim Crow laws were designed to curtail the rights of African-Americans in education, employment, and other areas of life.25 The argument of a certain number of scholars and lawmakers is that, without greater efforts to address the structural discrimination imposed on Muslim minorities, and without greater respect of Muslims in Western society (on the part of the non-Muslim majority), the existential threat of Salafism and jihadism will continue to linger in both the short- and long-term future. Put another way, how Muslims in Western society enjoy a genuinely multicultural and multireligious society is contingent upon structural improvements made at the local and national levels.26 On the other hand, what is the percentage of Muslims who want to remain radical, no matter what the circumstances? Do such extremists want a multicultural and multireligious society in the West?

Social Alienation of Muslims in the West The September 11, 2001, attacks in New York City and Washington, DC, as well as the bombings in Madrid and London, have caused much of the public discourse on national security to concentrate on issues of alienation and anger among Muslims—particularly youth—living in the West. The discourse often centers on whether Muslim and American or European identities are harmonious with each other. Essential questions in both lay and expert circles derive from debates about the apparent Clash of Civilizations between Muslims and Westerners. Questions about whether this clash is at the origin of the lack of Muslim integration are raised frequently.27 An important question is to understand how Muslim transnational youths develop subcultures through new forms of identity

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and belonging. These Muslim subcultures can make us reconsider our outlook on the situation. This is why it is vital to take a look at the mechanisms through which a significant minority of youths nurture passions and commitments to ostensibly radical communities.28 From Estrangement to Radicalization In a radical milieu, people generally start by feeling disconnected from society. This dynamic captures the essence of the idea that one does not belong.29 Radicalization is one process for marginalized Western Muslim youths to reaffirm their religious identity within non-Muslim environments. According to Roy (2004),30 “in radical Islam,” individuals find “a way to recast and rationalize their sense of exclusion,” substituting the lack of interpersonal ties with a newfound sense of identity and belonging. As Roy (2003) continues, the most common form of radicalization is ideological and, in this context, it is an Islamic revival of the ummah, a type of transnational Islam that should be divorced from its host country. Ideological radicalization is common in French banlieues (see Chapter 3)—a microcosm for miserable or socially marginal urban areas (almost analogous to favelas in Brazil). Less attached to traditional Islam, second- and third-generation unemployed males are the ideal target for recruitment to jihadism.31 Isolation cultivates radical thinking by allowing experienced or charismatic leaders of a group to define that group’s agenda. When a new member is exposed to mainly one in-group milieu, that group monopolizes the thinking pattern and aspirations of the individual. Conversely, disagreement with the group could be met with ostracism (social exclusion), threats, and even capital punishment. Nevertheless, radical Islamic groups “compensate.” They have been shown to provide access to basic services and resources that the general community is less likely to fulfill. As isolated subcultures, radical Islamic groups in the West take advantage of this type of weakness. On occasion, Muslim youths may be struggling in society because of language barriers, cultural differences, in addition to discriminatory treatment. Such vulnerabilities are also pathways of Islamic radicalization.32 Huntington (1996)33 writes that “people rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language, values, and institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones.” Muslim youths may be inspired by a dogma that outright challenges Western integration, advocating

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instead incessant hostility toward the Infidels and even their extermination. Remember the bombings in Madrid and London, just to name a few. More importantly, the mere fact of identifying terrorism with Islam has widened the rift of mistrust between Muslim and non-Muslim communities, which could arguably become justification for a divided society. This was exemplified by the events in the Netherlands in the aftermath of the assassination of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004.34 Radicalization Within No-Go Zones A no-go zone is an area known for its higher levels of insecurity, violence, and crime, causing people to be hesitant about going there. It is also an area with a subculture that desires to apply its own laws, traditions, or lifestyles (often at variance with mainstream society), and which is overshadowed by aggressive individuals.35 Following the November 13, 2015 Paris attacks, which caused the death of 130 innocent people,36 Molenbeek, one of the 19 municipalities of Brussels, was depicted in many news reports as a no-go zone, where radical Islam had contributed a great deal to Molenbeek’s marginalization, desolation, and embittering resentment of the state.37 In France, no-go zones are called “sensitive urban zones.”38 A significant minority of Muslims in countries like Belgium, France, and Germany have formed such large subcultures that they simply become states within states, like subsets of the European population. These Muslim migrants live in common, underprivileged localities and seek to follow the religion and social norms of their countries of origin, thereby neglecting to share the values of the host country and, at the same time, falling prey for extreme propaganda.39 These marginalized subcultures are replete with Muslim youths who are of “drafting age”; i.e., ideal for recruitment by jihadists. What is more alarming is that they remain the most vulnerable recruits. As traditional or converted Muslims, they are at a point in their life with multiple unanswered questions regarding their identity. Joining the global jihad movement can be a way to meet approval and validation. They are given propaganda-driven explanations that are religiously and culturally justified, that gives them a new identity, and that makes it clear that it is their call for action.40

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From Estranged to Foreign Fighters The wave of foreign fighters is attributed to a Muslim youth subculture that has formed in the backdrop of their environment. The point was made earlier, on several occasions, that these youth see their current environment as unbearable, unfair, and lacking prospects for a better society. Being a foreign fighter for global jihad can also be an opportunity to escape their social alienation and the authorities of their host country.41 The protracted conflicts in the Near East have enthused a record surge of foreign fighters with family roots in the Arab and Central Asian regions. When traveling to Syria, they join ISIS to fight the government led by President Bashar al-Assad, hoping to replace it with an Islamic State. This trend is a growing concern for nation-states and serious attempts are being made to track and even reject the entry of returning fighters.42 Across the whole world, most of the foreign fighters hail from countries in the Greater Middle East (e.g., Tunisia, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia), but an astoundingly large number were also born on the European continent, in the United Kingdom, in Canada, in Australia, and in the United States. Approximately 25,000–30,000 foreign fighters have been counted, including 4000–5000 from the West. A significant number of Western foreign fighters come from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in particular, and disproportionately—in proportion to their overall populations—come from Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden. By late 2015, a great many of them were also coming from Russia and ex-Soviet countries in Central Asia.43 The ostensible polarization of society into various religious and cultural subsets erodes the glue that binds national identity, patriotism, and the willingness to perform civil duties together. As time passes, the larger environment in which the radicalizing person resides becomes, in his or her eyes, as the enemy and a major reason for migrating to war zones like Syria in order to experience jihadist training. As Granatstein (2007)44 argues, the problem “in Western Europe is that the second and third generation of Muslim citizens are more fiercely Islamist than their parents. Their sense of themselves as Dutch or British or French is much less strong than their identity as Muslims.”

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Social Alienation and Jihadism: Outsider and Insiders The sentiment of social alienation among Muslims in Western nations has proven to be a reason for self-retreat into ethnic enclaves which become detached both socially and culturally. This, in turn, strengthens their Muslim identity as a “Muslim collective” apart from mainstream society. Muslims have self-segregated into sub-communities at a level that is less observed within other recent immigrant groups. These Muslims’ in-group identity is important to them not only for their ethnicity, but also for their religion. As perceptions of hostility or threats to “Muslim collective” arise, the next step is to retreat further into a larger in-group in order to protect it from the external environment. From this perspective, there are two categories of jihadists in Western Europe: “outsiders” and “insiders.”45 The Outsiders The outsiders are aliens, like refugees or foreign students, who secured entry in Western Europe—often to move there permanently or to escape crackdowns from Salafists in their homelands. Included among outsiders are radical preachers, often on financial allowances from countries like Saudi Arabia, who open their doors to jihad recruiters or serve as a mouthpiece for global jihad. The percentage of such dangerous outsiders in the West is yet to be known. Once these outsiders gain entry into a Western nation, they can start the chain migration process and recruit more family members. Many of these are first-generation migrants (especially to Europe) and some of whom are deliberately there to perpetrate jihadist attacks. In Islamist history, migration was intrinsically associated with conquest.46 After many years of persecution in “sinful” Mecca, in 622 AD, the Prophet Muhammad cursed the city’s leaders and left with his followers to Medina. In Medina, he gathered troops who conquered Mecca in 630 AD, instituting Muslim rule.47 In the present day, in the minds of Soldiers of Allah from Europe, the Middle East has also become sinful like Mecca was—especially after several Muslim governments suppressed Islamist takeovers, first in the 1990s and then in 2010–2011 during the Arab Spring. It would not be unreasonable to say that Europe is being used as a type of Medina, where would-be jihadists are being trained for the recapture of the holy land, starting with Syria and Iraq.48

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The Insiders The insiders refer to Muslim European citizens, often second- or thirdgeneration children of immigrants, like Bouyeri (the murderer of Theo van Gogh), who feel socially alienated—despite being born in Europe and raised speaking English, French, German, Dutch, and so forth. Some are jobless youth from dismal banlieues of Marseilles, Lyon, and Paris or mill towns like Bradford and Leicester. They embody an equally dangerous strand of would-be jihadists, just like the “outsider” immigration wave. As mentioned multiple times in this very chapter, they regard their own country as representative of “adversarial culture.” Their antiWestern attitude is being aggravated by self-radicalization through the internet. The typical second-generation Muslim recruit is a technologyastute young adult, such as the college-educated Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called twentieth hijacker (for the September 11, 2001 attacks) who was eventually removed from the final list by Osama bin Laden.49 First- vs. Second- and Third-Generation Muslims Second- and third-generation Muslims in the West sometimes clash with their own parents, who were first-generation Muslims when they migrated. These often stick to a more conventional or “folk” Islam and have higher levels of tolerance of the broader secular environment. In their minds, the multiple advantages that the West offers counterbalance their willingness to join global jihad. Put simply, being a jihadist is not “worth it.” Conversely, second- and third-generation Muslims are not only more versed in the language and culture of the host country; they are also more highly educated and more intellectually motivated to study Islam in depth, which makes them more likely to challenge their secular environment. This has been known to breed intergenerational conflict, resulting in a double sense or lack of belonging. An internal conflict can emerge for these types of individuals because they are neither fully Western nor fully Middle-Eastern—which motivates them to engage in soul-searching and find a new identity.50 It comes to no surprise, then, that these second- and third-generations of Muslims socialize only with like-minded people, ultimately forging an in-group that, in turn, becomes a self-isolated community. The prevalence of such Muslim subculture and value system can contribute to a willingness to forge a global like-mindedness of Muslims through jihadism.51

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In line with these contentions, the children of Muslim immigrants to Europe do not possess the same memory bank as their parents’, some of whom experienced grave adversities in their countries of origin. Secondand third-generations often experience these adversities second hand and do not know their parents’ national roots too well. More importantly, although their parents migrated to nations that had jobs ready for them, second- and third-generations experience higher unemployment, inadequate living conditions, and prospects for better living that are lower than that of their non-Muslim European counterparts. As Ganor (2011)52 says it, “these young Muslims were not grateful that the gates of host nations had been opened for their parents; in fact, quite the opposite was true. Many younger Muslims reject the minority status to which their parents acquiesced.” This phase of soul-searching and meaning-searching can open horizons for jihadist ideologies to make their way in. Jihad propagandists look at vulnerable Muslim youths as the ideal target for recruitment. The notion of social alienation gets conflated with notions of suffering by their Muslim brothers and sisters around the world, Western moral decadence, and the need for the entire ummah to go back to pure, traditional Islam.53 It is in the very cities of Brussels, London, Lyon, Marseilles, and Paris that second- and third-generations of Muslims encounter larger communities of like-minded adherents. As this feeling of belonging grows, so too does their commitment to jihadist violence. Illegitimacy of Authorities When people begin to defend and feed a radical belief system, they also actively work against the authorities as they see them as illegitimate.54 This is due to perceived social alienation, which leads to suspicion and wariness of such authorities. From a radical Muslim person’s standpoint, there is a strong obligation and desire to only obey the Quran and the commands of Allah. Secular laws are man-made and should not be respected but, if they ought to be, then they are respected (but begrudgingly so). Let us take a brief look at the “mistrusted” authorities in the Netherlands. In a series of interviews conducted by Buijs, Demant, and Hamdy (2006), one radical Islamic Dutch individual stated the following: “I do not know the Dutch laws. I consider them as nothing. I do not acknowledge the Dutch laws.”55 Similarly, Bouyeri (the Theo van Gogh murderer) said that “you cannot expect anything from the government. I

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have had enough of the institutions.”56 To disrespect, and even conquer, non-Muslim institutions is a staple of the global jihad worldview. Jihad must be taken as a pathway to religious and social redemption, even if it means fighting Muslim governments that are depraved and steeped in jahiliyyah. Those two interviews reflect a general dissatisfaction and estrangement from modern society—i.e., a great justification for taking up jihadist actions. “Jihad” is to be regarded as a battle cry and liberation tool for all Muslims. It has to be waged in on multiple fronts. When such individuals espouse a jihad-prone belief system, they also develop a feeling of great distance toward citizens who do not share that belief system, or who simply live differently. Going back to the case about the Netherlands, some Muslims living in that nation may experience an invisible barrier because they encounter major obstacles in their attempt to go up the social ladder (like the one leading up to high leadership positions). As they tend to see their culture as fairly different from the mainstream culture, their collective norms and values clash with the larger cultural belief system.57 In Moghaddam’s (2005)58 staircase model of radicalization, the argument is made that perceived injustice is a critical determinant on the “ground floor” and, therefore, it is a major factor in jihadization.

Case Studies Obvious cases for radicalization can be observed throughout Western Europe, where a significant percentage of second- and third-generation immigrant Muslims fail to integrate into mainstream society. Multiple experts say that these very European Muslim youths feel alienated in a society that is not willing to value them for who they are. They join fundamental Islamic circles to form and maintain a new form of identity.59 Let us briefly examine four case studies: (1) Muslim youths in Belgium, (2) Muslim youths in France, (3) Muslim youths in Great Britain, and (4) Palestinians in Israel. Case Study I: Muslim Youths in Belgium In a monarchy populated by more than 11 million people, Islam claims to have nearly one million adherents, most of whom come from either Morocco or Turkey. The majority of Belgium’s 300-plus mosques are Turkish or Moroccan, and Muslim preachers who lead them usually come

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from those countries. In Brussels, both the country’s capital and the nexus of Europe’s main institutions, Muslims comprise approximately 25% of the population. Even prior to the jihadist attacks in Brussels in March 2016, that killed 32 innocent people, Belgium had the appalling reputation for producing the highest number (per capita) of fanatic youths (among all European countries) to fight in Syria. The aforementioned district of Molenbeek earned the nickname of “Jihadi Central” because it became a launching pad of jihadism for the people responsible for the November 13, 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris.60 The major financial crisis that started in 2008 has exacerbated overall sentiments about Belgium’s future. In 2012, more than two-thirds of those Belgians who were polled said that the nation’s future looked dim, which was an increase of almost 15% in six years. In 2013, only 20% were optimistic about the new year, whereas 40% said it would be even grimmer. This level of Belgian pessimism is comparatively high; the European average is 26%.61 The firm decision of Belgian Muslims to migrate to Syria is striking among youngsters—with the exception of the first Belgian wave in 2012, particularly the core of Sharia4Belgium (a Salafist group in the Northern part of the country).62 Group dynamics plays an important part, since these youths nurture each other’s ideas at school, sports clubs, or on the street. Their willingness to fight in global jihad is not just rooted in political radicalization (as it was believed by academics in the past decade) or their religious and political knowledge (whether deep or superficial)— geopolitics may be just as important to them as their predecessors, who were inspired by the fight against global superpowers. Their willingness also stems from their personal experience of social estrangement. A feeling of social injustice is a starting point in their journey toward jihadization and jihadism.63 Case Study II: Muslim Youths in France Islam is the second most followed religion in France behind Catholicism (based on the sheer number of worshippers). France has the highest number of Muslims among all Western nations—primarily due to the massive flux of migrants from North-African and Middle-Eastern countries.64 For François Héran, former Head of the Population Surveys Branch at INSEE and Director of INED (French National Institute for Demographic Research) between 1999 and 2009, approximately oneeighth of the French population was Muslim in 2017 (which would

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be 8–9 million people).65 The U.S. Department of State considers the number of Muslims in France to be one-tenth of the French population, which would be 6–7 million people. Conversely, a Pew Forum study, published in January 2011, estimated that nearly five million Muslims lived in France in 2010 (and predicted that seven million of them would live there in 2030).66 Many of these Muslims see themselves as true French citizens. Other members of this religious group, however, do not consider themselves French, but Muslim (in a religious and/or cultural sense). These people treasure their Muslim identity because, on the one hand, their efforts to assimilate and to attain social success have failed and, therefore, they have not been able to vanquish the “alien image” labeled on them by the majority society. On the other hand, to transfer their national consciousness to their Muslim identity allows them to manifest their bitterness in a cohesive manner, not the least because the host country has ascribed this marker to them since the beginning.67 These Muslims are not only “alienated” from French society; they are also unwilling to assimilate to it. Their mosque attendance is not always regular. So is their probability to observe other Muslim traditions, such as abstaining during Ramadan and avoiding the consumption of liquor. Instead, for this small group of Muslims, Islam symbolizes both a cultural and religious concept, one that allows them to interpret their socioeconomic disadvantages as an emblem of their moral superiority. Many in this group cannot conceive of the idea of being both Muslim and French. To a large extent, this conflict of identities is rooted in the social conflict between the customs of the French Republic and the harsh reality in the banlieues of French cities.68 Case Study III: Muslim Youths in Great Britain Since WWII, Great Britain has experienced a wave of immigration that has profoundly transformed its nature. The population has evolved from an overwhelmingly white one (i.e., ethnically British and Anglican) to one established by faiths, cultures, and communities hailing from all over the world.69 Such British multiculturalism has allowed for many diasporas to develop on the island. Yet, closely knit racial and religious communities have not always mixed with each other.70 Indeed, the “multiculturalism” policies—or, put simply, the “multicultural approach”— have boomeranged on counterterrorism in Great Britain, since numerous minority communities are still not integrating well with fellow Britons

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and, even more, do not offer sufficient assistance or information to law enforcement about possible radicalization among its people.71 A major reason for the 7/7 bombings in London (or the July 7, 2005 bombings) is attributed to social alienation. The perpetrators were British-born Muslims from educated backgrounds who nonetheless felt socially alienated or inadequately integrated. Their background and behavior were never seen as alarming by the authorities or friends, even when they appeared to be ready to commit violence in the months preceding the attacks.72 Case Study IV: Palestinians in Israel One of the outcomes of the Oslo Agreements (in Washington, DC in 1993 and Egypt in 1995) was the intensification of activities by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinians’ perception of it as its sole true representative. This situation posed a danger to its ideological rivals. As a reaction, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad increased their violent campaign against the State of Israel. They discovered the destruction potential of suicide bombings. These quickly wreaked unprecedented damage not only on Israeli citizens but, also, on the country’s infrastructures. The brutal equation of relative losses backfired on the Israelis.73 In view of the resentment expressed by young Palestinian Muslims, jihadist groups emerged as entities with two professed solutions: (1) The removal of Jews from their sacred land and (2) a return to pure, traditional Islam. As stated by Hani al-Hassan, a leader of the Fatah organization and a member of the Palestinian Authority (PA), “We reached a very dramatic conclusion. We discovered that the silent majority of people in the occupied territories supported radical Islam, if not in their actions then by their hearts.”74 Many jihadist organizations, generally funded by other countries and institutions, want to exploit these grievances. As such, they represent the legitimating inspiration to execute terrorist activities. To accomplish this, they recruit from schools and universities in the Palestinian territories. Such youths are often wealthier than their own parents and they know the customs and language of Western nations.75 Given the extraordinary level of Palestinian violence, Israel has responded with ruthless methods of collective punishment, which has further alienated and radicalized a certain number of Palestinians. To them, any peaceful harmony with the Jews in Israel is inconceivable. These

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times of bitterness were aggravated by the PA’s inability to constitute an effective government and fulfill the promises it had made to the Palestinian population. Believing that suicide bombings give them a renewed sense of meaning, those Palestinian youths will not follow another line of argument, like an alternative to such a deadly strategy. The conversation, within certain Islamic circles, about the legitimacy of the suicide terrorist tactic is high and running. For several decades now, the main voice for alienated youths in the Palestinian territories (like Gaza) has been the voice of Islamic fundamentalists, which has extolled the virtues of martyrdom.76

Problems of Social Integration? Nearly all, if not all, homegrown jihadists in the West have been, at some point in their lives, Western in both appearance and behavior. Awan (2008)77 further argues that the most surprising fact about Western jihadism is “the degree to which its proponents are ensconced with the majority culture prior to radicalization.” This points to the idea that people might in fact develop more than one identity: (1) A majority cultural identity that mirrors the daily sociopolitical life of the national community, and (2) a minority cultural identity that expresses traditional aspects of religious practice and creed. At various intervals, either the majority cultural identity or the minority cultural identity plays a more pivotal role in shaping a person’s association with like-minded others and in influencing their behavior.78 Insufficient Evidence to Support “Lack of Social Integration” Since the end of the twentieth century, Islamic radicalization in Europe has primarily taken the path of the minority cultural identity, in support of a supranational community, the ummah. It is either a physical or a virtual community (a possible world much developed thanks to the internet and its related subcultures). Paradoxically, Islamic radicalization goes in tandem with Westernization of Muslims in Western European countries. Many radicalized Muslims in these countries benefit from a Western education, often in STEM fields (i.e., science, technology, engineering, and mathematics). Only a handful of them receive their formative years at traditional Islamic schools. Most enjoy a phase of fully Westernized life, including binge drinking and sexual promiscuity, before converting to

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more fundamental versions of Islam in European mosques or prisons. At the same time, conservative Muslims, who adhere to traditional versions of Islam or who develop cultural and linguistic bonds with non-European cultures, can still display strong attachment to a host European country. Therefore, radicalization is not always associated with integration or the lack thereof.79 A 2005 study on the integration of minority groups in the Netherlands revealed that non-Western immigrants and their offspring were living a lower socioeconomic lifestyle in comparison with the host population. As such, they possessed inferior educational qualifications, had higher levels of unemployment, earned less money, did not do as well in school, and had disproportionally higher levels of criminal records. Another study revealed that Dutch Muslims encountered more discrimination in the labor force. From these reports, one could easily conclude that relative deprivation is a plausible reason for domestic jihadism like the Hofstad Network (a Dutch jihadist group at the dawn of the twenty-first century).80 However, there is little solid evidence that income inequality, lower educational opportunities, lower levels of political representation, and a lack of social integration drive Muslims to jihadization or jihadism. As one individual admitted, his commitment to Islamic terrorism began when he was denied an internship through what he thought was discrimination based on his Moroccan lineage. However, this person also stressed that his prejudicial experience did not motivate his participation in terrorism but facilitated it. In the absence of an internship to pursue, this Moroccan individual had more time to spend on other activities, one of which was actually his growing passion for militant Islam—which eventually led to his involvement in the Hofstad Network.81 In like fashion, in their examination of British Muslim youths, Lewis (2008) and Mondal (2008) rebuffed the conventional narrative that Muslim youths suffer from social alienation in Great Britain, which would increase their probability of becoming jihadists.82 Both studies demonstrate that, in most cases, intensifying one’s religious affiliation is not necessarily an indicator of social alienation from British society. On the contrary, many British Muslim youths are deepening their commitments to Islam to combat, as an in-group, the social and economic disadvantages that their communities have experienced and to restore their full participation as members of British society. Kibria’s (2008)83 study of Bangladeshi youths offers a slightly different approach. Although she

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agrees that youths are strengthening their connection to the ummah in order to reject social, economic, and political exclusion, she also admits that they are strengthening their religious identity to challenge what they think are the moral decay of mainstream British culture. In spite of these differences, her study reported that religious identification is one route through which second- and third-generation Muslims can attain social, political, and economic empowerment against the discriminatory social and economic situations that have engulfed them.84 Mondal (2008)85 contests mainstream constructions of social integration that are assimilationist in nature and believes that young Muslims’ commitment to and identification with British society are not based on abandonment of their religious and ethnic affiliations. Drawing a parallel, Mondal finds that Muslim youths’ increasing commitments to the ummah do not clash with their commitments to the Western nation; rather, youths today are actively involved in local, national, and global contexts at once. European Efforts on Integration Integration is a contested term, but it can be best understood as an interactional process between a host country and immigrants that is affected by institutional decisions and social mindsets on the one hand, and migration dynamics like human capital and collective social capital on the other.86 In recent programs on integration, social solidarity has been a regular concept and there seems to be quasi-unanimous support for the notion that radicalization can be reduced by increasing social solidarity and the integration of Muslims.87 In Belgium, many occupations in Brussels require fluency in French and/or Dutch, and now even English too, whereas most Muslim immigrants speak mostly Arabic, Urdu, Turkish, and some French. That is an obstacle to integration. In contrast, Flanders offers immigrants language classes and workshops on Belgian values.88 In the Netherlands, Muslim culture and religion are sometimes portrayed as a direct threat to the Dutch way of life, like the separation of church and state, acceptance of same-sex marriage, gender equality, and freedom of expression. Under these circumstances, efforts on integration have included mandatory integration courses, language tests that have to be passed successfully before immigration, the pledging of national allegiance, the compulsory watching of cultural films about Western values, “homework support cafés” for marginalized youths, and more state

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recruitment programs within minority communities. If domestic jihadism is a result of social alienation and lack of integration, providing more efforts on embracing Muslim immigrants should help suppress its development. The burning issue, however, is that many domestic jihadists were raised as well-integrated citizens in the very nations that they target.89 Let us re-examine the previously mentioned 7/7 attacks in London. Shortly after the tragedy that killed 52 innocent civilians, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in accord with the Home Office, launched a partnership program with the Muslim community that would assist the government in creating “better integration of those parts of the community inadequately integrated,” while staying “consistent with their own religion and culture.”90 That very assumption, that “inadequate integration” was the main culprit for the suicide bombings, also triggered the creation of the Preventing Extremism Together (PET) Project, which established multiple social integration incentives, including engagement with Muslim youths, training of Muslim preachers, and community– police relations, among many others.91 Regardless of whether they had suffered from such acts of “homegrown terror,” most other Western European countries adopted the same integration policies, questioned their own immigration and integration policies, and set up security and counterterrorism measures with a strong emphasis on integration. All this was driven by the same narrative: the assumption that failed integration was the reason for jihadization and jihadism.92 Successful Multiculturalism? Many European nations have concluded that, since the 1990s, the mainstream model of multiculturalism has not succeeded in decreasing racism and Islamophobia. In fact, it has led to the growth of subcultures and the social alienation of minority groups like Muslims.93 As a result, Western politicians across the entire political spectrum, like former French President Nicholas Sarkozy, former British Prime Minister David Cameron, and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, have openly stated that multiculturalism is a failed policy. The refusal to integrate into Western culture is a good fit for Islamic neo-fundamentalism (i.e., Salafism). Fundamentalism refers to a return to the “true” principles of religion. It is almost as old as the birth of Islam. The modern-day trend is rightly called neo-fundamentalism

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because it combines Salafism with technological modernism and the rejection of both modern Western cultures and globalization (as illustrated by websites like umma.net). Neo-fundamentalism has been shown to attract alienated youths because it transforms their social alienation into a valid reason for identifying with a transnational Islam bent on dominating all societies. This dogma does not require countless hours of study that conventional Islamic studies require from imams or mullahs. It dismisses Westernized Islamic cultures as un-Islamic and warped by delusions and syncretism with non-Islamic myths. Consequently, as opposed to what casual observers have expressed, multiculturalism is not necessarily successful.94

Notes 1. Hilary Silver, “Social Exclusion and Social Solidarity: Three Paradigms,” International Labour Review 133, no. 5 (1994): 531–78. 2. Robert C. Ankony, “The Impact of Perceived Alienation on Police Officers’ Sense of Mastery and Subsequent Motivation for Proactive Enforcement,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management 22, no. 2 (1999): 120–32, 120. 3. Bertjan Doosje, Annemarie Loseman, and Kees van den Bos, “Determinants of Radicalization of Islamic Youth in the Netherlands: Personal Uncertainty, Perceived Injustice, and Perceived Group Threat,” Journal of Social Issues 69, no. 3 (2013): 586–604, https://doi.org/10.1111/ josi.12030. 4. David Wright-Neville and Debra Smith, “Political Rage: Terrorism and the Politics of Emotion,” Global Change, Peace & Security 21, no. 1 (2009): 85–98, 95, https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150802659390. 5. Tamara Walsh, “A Right to Inclusion? Homelessness, Human Rights and Social Exclusion,” Australian Journal of Human Rights 12, no. 1 (2006): 185–204. 6. Émile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (New York: Free Press, 1997). 7. John J. Gerber and Linda M. Macionis, Sociology, 7th ed. (Toronto: Pearson Canada, 2010), 97. 8. Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: HarperCollins, 1951), 51. 9. Robert S. Leiken, Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security after 9/11 (Washington, DC: The Nixon Centre, 2004); Tomas Precht, Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalization in Europe: From Conversion to Terrorism (Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Defense,

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12. 13.

14. 15.

16.

17.

18. 19.

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2007); and Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe,” The Middles East Review of International Affairs 10, no. 3 (2006): 1–10. Johnathan Githens-Mazer, “Causes of Jihadi Terrorism: Beyond Paintballing and Social Exclusion,” Criminal Justice Matters 73, no. 1 (2008): 26–8, https://doi.org/10.1080/09627250802276944; Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleˇcková, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 (2003): 119–44, https://doi.org/10.1257/089533003772034925; and Nicholas Sambanis, “Poverty and the Organization of Political Violence,” Brookings Trade Forum 11 (2004): 165–211. Alejandro J. Beutel, Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism in Western Muslim Communities: Lessons Learned for America (Bethesda, MD: Minaret of Freedom Institute, 2007), 8. Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The HomeGrown Threat (New York: New York City Police Department, 2007). Alex S. Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Radicalization,” Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 1 (2010): 33–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150903487956. Tore Bjørgo, The Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward (London: Routledge, 2005). Cristina Archetti, “Terrorism, Communication and New Media: Explaining Radicalization in the Digital Age,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 1 (2015): 49–58. James S. Coleman, Ernest Q. Campbell, Carol J. Hobson, James M. McPartland, Alexander M. Mood, Frederic D. Weinfeld, and Robert L. York, Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, 1966). Jeremy E. Fiel, “Decomposing School Resegregation: Social Closure, Racial Imbalance, and Racial Isolation,” American Sociological Review 78, no. 5 (2013): 828–48, https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122413496252. Frank Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). Steve McDonald, “What’s in the ‘Old Boys’ Network? Accessing Social Capital in Gendered and Racialized Networks,” Social Networks 33, no. 4 (2011): 317–30, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2011.10.002. Herman G. van de Werfhorst, “Skills, Positional Good or Social Closure? The Role of Education across Structural–Institutional Labour Market Settings,” Journal of Education and Work 24, no. 5 (2011): 521–48, https://doi.org/10.1080/13639080.2011.586994.

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21. Mary Daly and Hilary Silver, “Social Exclusion and Social Capital: A Comparison and Critique,” Theory and Society 37, no. 6 (2008): 537–66, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-008-9062-4. 22. Vincent J. Roscigno, Sherry Mong, Reginald Byron, and Griff Tester, “Age Discrimination, Social Closure and Employment,” Social Forces 86, no. 1 (2007): 313–34. 23. Fenna Van Marle and Shadd Maruna, “‘Ontological Insecurity’ and ‘Terror Management’,” Punishment & Society 12, no. 1 (2010): 7–26, https://doi.org/10.1177/1462474509349084. 24. Matthias C. Angermeyer, Herbert Matschinger, Bruce G. Link, and Georg Schomerus, “Public Attitudes Regarding Individual and Structural Discrimination: Two Sides of the Same Coin?” Social Science & Medicine 103 (2014): 60–6, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.11.014. 25. Leslie V. Tischauser, Jim Crow Laws (Oxford: Greenwood, 2012). 26. Tahir Abbas, “Muslim Minorities in Britain: Integration, Multiculturalism and Radicalism in the Post-7/7 Period,” Journal of Intercultural Studies 28, no. 3 (2007): 287–300, https://doi.org/10.1080/072568607014 29717. 27. Thea Renda Abu El-Haj and Sally Wesley Bonet, “Education, Citizenship, and the Politics of Belonging: Youth from Muslim Transnational Communities and the ‘War on Terror’,” Review of Research in Education 35, no. 1 (2011): 29–59, https://doi.org/10.3102/0091732X10383209. 28. Ibid., 30–4. 29. Michael J. Mazarr, “The Psychological Sources of Islamic Terrorism: Alienation and Identity in the Arab World,” Policy Review 125 (2004): 39–60. 30. Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst, 2004): 324. 31. Olivier Roy, “EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?” The National Interest 71 (2003): 63–73. 32. Lorenzo Vidino, Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010). 33. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Free Press, 1996), 126. 34. Fidel Sendagorta, “Jihad in Europe: The Wider Context,” Survival 47, no. 3 (2005): 63–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330500248029. 35. David Wadley, “The Garden of Peace,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 98, no. 3 (2008): 650–85, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 00045600802099162. 36. Jonathan Matusitz and David Ochoa, “Agenda-Setting Theory in the U.S. Media: A Comparative Analysis of Terrorist Attacks in France and Nigeria,” Global Media Journal 16, no. 31 (2018): 10–21.

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37. Leo Cendrowicz, “Paris Attacks: Visiting Molenbeek, the Police NoGo Zone That Was Home to Two of the Gunmen,” The Independent, November 15, 2015, A1. 38. Z. Fareen Parvez, Politicizing Islam: The Islamic Revival in France and India (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). 39. Raheem Kassam, No Go Zones: How Sharia Law Is Coming to a Neighborhood Near You (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2017); Robert Leiken, Europe’s Angry Muslims: The Revolt of The Second Generation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); and DeMond Miller and Sotiris Chtouris, “The Differing Perceptions of Zones of Exclusion: The Redefinition of the Modern European Protectionist State in an Era of Unprecedented Irregular Migration,” in Migration and the Crisis of the Modern Nation State? ed. Frank Jacob and Adam Luedtke (Wilmington, DE: Vernon Press, 2018), 211–34. 40. Barbara Franz, “Europe’s Muslim Youth: An Inquiry into the Politics of Discrimination, Relative Deprivation, and Identity Formation,” Mediterranean Quarterly 18, no. 1 (2007): 89–112. 41. Anne Speckhard, Ardian Shajkovci, and Ahmet S. Yayla, “Following a Military Defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq: What Happens Next after the Military Victory and the Return of Foreign Fighters?” Contemporary Voices: St Andrews Journal of International Relations 8, no. 1 (2017): 81–9, http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1341. 42. Lorne L. Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam, “Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights into the Motivations for Hijrah to Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 3 (2017): 191–210, https:// doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1274216. 43. Ibid., 191. 44. Jack Granatstein, Whose War Is It? How Canada Can Survive in the Post9/11 World (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2007): 179. 45. Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 4 (2005): 120–35. 46. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” 120–22. 47. Fred McGraw Donner, Muhammad and the Believers: At the Origins of Islam (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2012). 48. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” 121–22. 49. Ibid. 50. Dina Al Raffie, “Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora,” Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 4 (2013): 67–91, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.4.4. 51. Boaz Ganor, “An Intifada in Europe? A Comparative Analysis of Radicalization Process among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza versus Muslim Immigrants in Europe,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 8 (2011): 587–99, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.582629.

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52. Ibid., 592. 53. Raffie, “Social Identity Theory,” 70–4. 54. Wagdy Loza, “The Psychology of Extremism and Terrorism: A MiddleEastern Perspective,” Aggression & Violent Behavior 12, no. 2 (2007): 141–55, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2006.09.001. 55. Frank J. Buijs, Froukje Demant, and Atef Hamdy, Warriors from Own Soil: Radical and Democratic Muslims in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 83. 56. Ibid., 35. 57. Doosje, Loseman, and van den Bos, “Determinants of Radicalization,” 590–93. 58. Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Explanation,” American Psychologist 60, no. 2 (2005): 161–69, http:// dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.161. 59. See Margarita Bizina and David H. Gray, “Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern for Counter-Terrorism Policy,” Global Security Studies 5, no. 1 (2014): 10–21; Ruud Koopmans, “Religious Fundamentalism and Hostility against Out-Groups: A Comparison of Muslims and Christians in Western Europe,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41, no. 1 (2015): 33–57, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X. 2014.935307; and Robert J. Pauly, Jr., Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization? (London: Routledge, 2016). 60. Erasmus, “In Belgium, Arguments about Islam Grow Louder,” The Economist, October 15, 2017, A1. 61. Dirk Tirry, Ten-Year European Social Survey (Leuven, Belgium: Catholic University of Leuven, 2014). 62. David Domingo and Florence Le Cam, “Journalism in Dispersion,” Digital Journalism 2, no. 3 (2014): 310–21, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 21670811.2014.897832. 63. Rik Coolsaet, What Drives Europeans to Syria, and to IS? Insights from the Belgian Case (Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations, 2015). 64. Ethan B. Katz, The Burdens of Brotherhood: Jews and Muslims from North Africa to France (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015). 65. François Héran, Avec l’immigration. Mesure, débattre, agir (Paris: La Découverte, 2017). 66. Pew Research Center, The Future of the Global Muslim Population (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2011). 67. Franz, “Europe’s Muslim Youth,” 100. 68. Ibid. 69. Richard T. Ashcroft and Mark Bevir, “Multiculturalism in Contemporary Britain: Policy, Law and Theory,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 21, no. 1 (2018): 1–21, https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13698230.2017.1398443.

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70. Gilles Kepel, “French Lessons in Londonistan,” National Interest 106 (2010): 42–52. 71. Bizina and Gray, “Radicalization of Youth,” 12–14. 72. Shane Brighton, “British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy: ‘Integration’ and ‘Cohesion’ in and Beyond the State,” International Affairs 83, no. 1 (2007): 1–17, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14682346.2007.00600.x. 73. Dipak K. Gupta and Kusum Mundra, “Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 4 (2005): 573–98, https://doi. org/10.1080/09546550500189895. 74. Cited in Ganor, “An Intifada in Europe?” 594. 75. Beverley Milton-Edwards, “The ‘Warriors Break;’ Hamas and the Limits of Ceasefire Beyond Tactical Pause,” International Peacekeeping 24, no. 2 (2017): 212–35, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2017.1290528. 76. Jerrold M. Post, “Reframing of Martyrdom and Jihad and the Socialization of Suicide Terrorists,” Political Psychology 30, no. 3 (2009): 381–85, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00702.x. 77. Akil N. Awan, “Antecedents of Islamic Political Radicalism among Muslim Communities in Europe,” PS: Political Science and Politics 41, no. 1 (2008): 13–17, 15, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096508080013. 78. Wilner and Dubouloz, “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning,” 40. 79. Roy, “EuroIslam,” 67–9. 80. Bart Schuurman, Edwin Bakker, and Quirine Eijkman, “Structural Influences on Involvement in European Homegrown Jihadism: A Case Study,” Terrorism and Political Violence 30, no. 1 (2018): 97–115, 105–6, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1158165. 81. Ibid., 106. 82. Philip Lewis, Young, British and Muslim (London: Continuum International, 2008); Anshuman A. Mondal, Young British Muslim Voices (Oxford: Greenwood World, 2008). 83. Nazli Kibria, “The ‘New Islam’ and Bangladeshi Youth in Britain and the US,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 31, no. 2 (2008): 243–66, https://doi. org/10.1080/01419870701337593. 84. El-Haj and Bonet, “Education, Citizenship, and the Politics of Belonging,” 34–8. 85. Mondal, Young British Muslim Voices, 95. 86. James Frideres, “Creating an Inclusive Society: Promoting Social Integration in Canada,” in Immigration and Integration in Canada in the Twenty-First Century, ed. John Biles, Meyer Burstein, and James Frideres (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), 77–101.

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87. Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Ghez, and Christopher Boucek, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010). 88. Steven Mufson, “The Belgian Neighborhood Indelibly Linked to Jihad,” The Washington Post, November 15, 2015, A1. 89. Wilner and Dubouloz, “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning,” 39. 90. Sadeq Rahimi and Raissa Graumans, “Reconsidering the Relationship between Integration and Radicalization,” Journal for Deradicalization 15, no. 5 (2015): 28–62, 33. 91. Brighton, “British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy,” 10–14. 92. Aleksandra Lewicki, Social Justice through Citizenship? The Politics of Muslim Integration in Germany and Great Britain (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 93. Kristin Archik, John Rollins, and Steven Woehrel, Islamist Extremism in Europe (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005); Daniel Fried, Islamic Extremism in Europe. Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. 109th Congress, Second Session, U.S. Congress, April 5, 2006. Retrieved on January 15, 2019 from http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fri edTestimony060405.pdf. 94. Roy, “EuroIslam,” 70–3.

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Loza, Wagdy. “The Psychology of Extremism and Terrorism: A Middle-Eastern Perspective.” Aggression & Violent Behavior 12, no. 2 (2007): 141–55. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2006.09.001. Matusitz, Jonathan, and David Ochoa. “Agenda-Setting Theory in the U.S. Media: A Comparative Analysis of Terrorist Attacks in France and Nigeria.” Global Media Journal 16, no. 31 (2018): 10–21. Mazarr, Michael J. “The Psychological Sources of Islamic Terrorism: Alienation and Identity in the Arab World.” Policy Review 125 (2004): 39–60. McDonald, Steve, “What’s in the ‘Old Boys’ Network? Accessing Social Capital in Gendered and Racialized Networks,” Social Networks 33, no. 4 (2011): 317–30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2011.10.002. Miller, DeMond, and Sotiris Chtouris. “The Differing Perceptions of Zones of Exclusion: The Redefinition of the Modern European Protectionist State in an Era of Unprecedented Irregular Migration.” In Migration and the Crisis of the Modern Nation State? edited by Frank Jacob and Adam Luedtke, 211–34. Wilmington, DE: Vernon Press, 2018. Milton-Edwards, Beverley. “The ‘Warriors Break;’ Hamas and the Limits of Ceasefire Beyond Tactical Pause.” International Peacekeeping 24, no. 2 (2017): 212–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2017.1290528. Moghaddam, Fathali M. “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Explanation.” American Psychologist 60, no. 2 (2005): 161–69. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.161. Mondal, Anshuman A. Young British Muslim Voices. Oxford: Greenwood World, 2008. Mufson, Steven. “The Belgian Neighborhood Indelibly Linked to Jihad.” The Washington Post, November 15, 2015, A1. Parkin, Frank. Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. Pauly, Robert J., Jr. Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization? London: Routledge, 2016. Pew Research Center. The Future of the Global Muslim Population. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2011. Post, Jerrold M. “Reframing of Martyrdom and Jihad and the Socialization of Suicide Terrorists.” Political Psychology 30, no. 3 (2009): 381–85. https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00702.x. Precht, Tomas. Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalization in Europe: From Conversion to Terrorism. Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Defense, 2007. Rabasa, Angel, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Ghez, and Christopher Boucek. Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010.

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Rahimi, Sadeq, and Raissa Graumans. “Reconsidering the Relationship between Integration and Radicalization.” Journal for Deradicalization 15, no. 5 (2015): 28–62. Roscigno, Vincent J., Sherry Mong, Reginald Byron, and Griff Tester. “Age Discrimination, Social Closure and Employment.” Social Forces 86, no. 1 (2007): 313–34. Roy, Olivier. “EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?” The National Interest 71 (2003): 63–73. ———. Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. London: Hurst, 2004. Sambanis, Nicholas, “Poverty and the Organization of Political Violence,” Brookings Trade Forum 11 (2004): 165–211. Schuurman, Bart, Edwin Bakker, and Quirine Eijkman. “Structural Influences on Involvement in European Homegrown Jihadism: A Case Study.” Terrorism and Political Violence 30, no. 1 (2018): 97–115. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09546553.2016.1158165. Sendagorta, Fidel. “Jihad in Europe: The Wider Context.” Survival 47, no. 3 (2005): 63–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330500248029. Silber, Mitchell D., and Arvin Bhatt. Radicalization in the West: The HomeGrown Threat. New York: New York City Police Department, 2007. Silver, Hilary. “Social Exclusion and Social Solidarity: Three Paradigms.” International Labour Review 133, no. 5 (1994): 531–78. Speckhard, Anne, Ardian Shajkovci, and Ahmet S. Yayla. “Following a Military Defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq: What Happens Next after the Military Victory and the Return of Foreign Fighters?” Contemporary Voices: St. Andrews Journal of International Relations 8, no. 1 (2017): 81–9. http:// doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1341. Stemmann, Juan Jose Escobar. “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe.” The Middles East Review of International Affairs 10, no. 3 (2006): 1–10. Tirry, Dirk. Ten-Year European Social Survey. Leuven, Belgium: Catholic University of Leuven, 2014. Tischauser, Leslie V. Jim Crow Laws. Oxford: Greenwood, 2012. van de Werfhorst, Herman G. “Skills, Positional Good or Social Closure? The Role of Education across Structural–Institutional Labour Market Settings.” Journal of Education and Work 24, no. 5 (2011): 521–48. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13639080.2011.586994. Van Marle, Fenna, and Shadd Maruna. “‘Ontological Insecurity’ and ‘Terror Management’.” Punishment & Society 12, no. 1 (2010): 7–26. https://doi. org/10.1177/1462474509349084. Vidino, Lorenzo. Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010.

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Wadley, David. “The Garden of Peace.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 98, no. 3 (2008): 650–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/000456 00802099162. Walsh, Tamara. “A Right to Inclusion? Homelessness, Human Rights and Social Exclusion.” Australian Journal of Human Rights 12, no. 1 (2006): 185–204. Wilner, Alex S., and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz. “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Radicalization.” Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 1 (2010): 33–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150903487956. Wright-Neville, David, and Debra Smith. “Political Rage: Terrorism and the Politics of Emotion.” Global Change, Peace & Security 21, no. 1 (2009): 85–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150802659390.

CHAPTER 6

Religious Motivations

Religion is also a contested term. One definition presents it as a social system of particular behaviors, values, worldviews, scriptures, sacred places, predictions, morals, or groups; such social system connects all these human practices to supernatural, transcendental, or spiritual elements.1 Religions have sanctified histories and narratives preserved in sacred texts, symbols, and holy places, all of which are designed to bestow meaning to life. By tradition, faith is the main source of religious beliefs.2 Clifford Geertz (1973)3 defined religion as, A system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and longlasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.

Because religion includes an “order of existence,” it has a societal basis and an organized structure; a general living tradition sustained by learned and lay actors alike. The social aspect of a religion determines what constitutes devotion or membership.4 A related term is religiosity, the relationship of a person with his or her religion and the religion’s impact on the decision made by that person.5

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Social Construction of Religion Social constructionism is a conceptual framework that analyzes interpretations of reality (or the universe in which we live) and how concepts and meanings are created.6 Adherence to and perception of religion are expressed in several ways, over the course of an individual’s lifetime, and in different environments. Because social constructionism is not fixed or monolithic, the idea of religion is fluid as well. It must be looked at from a group’s or individual’s perspective—what it signifies to people in certain contexts—not from the perspective of its content or practices. Examining the relativity of religion and religiosity is important because people can interpret their own faith or belief system, can evolve into new organized religious movements, and can create radical networks with porous boundaries. Put another way, interpretation of religion is molded—for good purposes or “contamination” purposes—by subjective experiences,7 cultural understandings,8 perceptions of religious authority figures, and discourses within which multiple approaches to religiosity develop.9 Truth for the Devout or Suffering Religion can offer consolation to the devoted or suffering ones—although “suffering” in radical Islam is only temporary, as martyrdom and redemptive suffering quickly lead to Paradise. Religion can stabilize social foundations and be a focal point for the development of community with shared interests, concerns, and enemies to target with violence. Religion can build solid notions of identity and contribute to the definition of enemy entities at the local and global level, sometimes rationalizing the method of terrorism against the Other.10 Like nationalism, religion provides existential answers to people’s questions about security, about the future. It does so by essentializing the in-group and the out-group(s), and by painting a picture of totality, unity, and perfection in another world. The fact that a Supreme Being has established guidelines and made them impossible to dispute is psychological solace to the person and exemption from his or her responsibility to choose.11 By furnishing an order of existence, religion establishes a structure out of chaos and uncertainty in the world. Like nationalism, religion gives answers to questions about existence itself, the secular world, and human life, the relationships with the Other, and what self-consciousness actually means. In presenting answers to such questions, they also authenticate

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a notion of “truth,” denoting a methodical exclusion of those who do not obey such “truth.” Thus, religion, particularly under a monotheistic structure, justifies principles of intolerance against those who are not adherents to these beliefs.12 Sacralization of Conflict and Religious Outbidding Global jihadists today are sometimes depicted as representative of a new cycle of religious terrorists, but authors such as Glazzard, Jesperson, Maguire, and Winterbotham (2017)13 say that this argument presents problems: religiously motivated terrorism is an age-old concept, and some groups allegedly fighting for religious purposes are actually protecting or reclaiming territory or resources. Across space and time, religious rhetoric has been exploited for political purposes. Islam, like any religion, can be manipulated as a conduit for political and military galvanization. For example, in 1858, Chechen leader Imam Shamil (the Third Imam of Dagestan) and his soldiers wanted to have an Islamic state. They started using Islam as a mobilization force—a call to a massive esprit de corps against the Other (i.e., outsiders and oppressors).14 Jihadist leaders (and those Muslim clerics who support them) construct the global conflict between Muslims and the Infidels (and Apostates) as a sacralized one. Sacralization of conflict is the method by which an extreme version of religion is transformed from an irrelevant or secondary faith system—especially at the beginning of the conflict—to an existential faith system for the key actors.15 A similar concept is religious outbidding. Religious outbidding is the method by which players in a conflict exploit religion in order to advance their position against competing factions within the faith. Although their religious passions and missions might be genuine, the radical decision to fight their own kind is caused by the desire to increase support and resources.16 As Toft (2007)17 explains, “the more religious outbidding that occurs, the more likely religion is to move from a peripheral to a central issue in a conflict.”

Quran-Driven Jihad For jihadists, the Quran is to be regarded as the perfect Word of Allah revealed to the Prophet Muhammad (570–632 AD), His last messenger and the founder of Islam. The Quran is Allah’s revelation to all humans. Whereas the Quran declares that Allah contacted prophets recognized by

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Jews and Christians (or “People of the Book”), the Quran remains Allah’s ultimate, unchallengeable revelation, and therefore, the primary source for sharia-compliant laws.18 The Quran contains all the revelations from Allah given to the Prophet over the years 610 to approximately 623 AD.19 Islam’s holy book commands Muslims to observe the five pillars of faith: Faith and bearing witness, Prayers, Fasting, Charity, and Pilgrimage.20 Some Islamic jurists consider jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam.21 Translated as “recitation” in Arabic, the Quran is deemed the verbatim word of Allah, which jihadists regard as the main miracle of Muhammad, who was given the revelation word-for-word by the angel Gabriel.22 Because the Quran makes numerous declarations that it is divinely ordained, a certain percentage of Muslims believe that it is categorically impossible for humans to produce a text like the Quran. In fact, it is the most self-referential holy text. For instance, in Quran 25:33, the text is “the clear truth and the best explanation”; and in Quran 16:89, it the revelation was done “to make everything clear.”23 The Quran is read and memorized by many jihadists in the original Arabic. Meticulous Islamic instruction worldwide is done in Arabic. Dialect-based or colloquial translations of the Quran are not regarded as genuine copies of the Book. As a result, the Arabic language is essential in the jihadist worldview.24 Violence Against Unbelievers in the Quran Classical jihad theory is predicated on an amalgamation of Quranic verses, hadiths (traditions attributed to the Prophet), legal discussions of the hadith literature, and esteemed essays on jihad. The Quranic verses are accounts of Muhammad’s (and the first Muslim community’s) experiences. After the migration to Medina (the hijrah, in 622 AD), they needed to settle in the oasis town. Most of the key battles that Muhammad and his companions fought during the eight years following the hijrah are mentioned directly or indirectly in the Quran. This is complemented by a thorough discussion of tactics, the theological implication of these battles, and the promise to martyrs and other heroes.25 The word “jihad” is written 41 times in the Quran.26 Most references to it indicate violence against non-Muslims. Below are just a few examples: • Quran 9:5: “When the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush.”

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• Quran 9:29: “Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture; fight until they give the jizyah [poll tax] willingly while they are humbled.” • Quran 4:76: “Those who believe, fight in the cause of Allah, and those who disbelieve, fight in the cause of Satan. So fight you against the friends of Satan. Ever feeble indeed is the plot of Satan.” • Quran 4:89: “Do not take from among them allies until they emigrate for the cause of Allah. But if they turn away, then seize them and kill them wherever you find them and take not from among them any ally or helper.” The first two verses above are called Sword Verses.27 Quran 9:5 is the classic Sword Verse and is rooted in the phrase “Islam or the sword.”28 It is a license for an absolute religious war against all unbelievers, including civilians. Seeing themselves as holier than all others, the more radical jihadists view all other faiths as idolatrous. The words for “idolater” and “unbeliever” are actually used interchangeably in the Quran. Other enemies of Islam include Scriptuaries, i.e., “People of the Book” (i.e., Quran 2:109) until they pay the jizya (poll tax); “hypocrites” (i.e., Quran 9:73), those that give the appearance of “believing, but who actually disagree with Muhammad and the community; and those Muslims who persecute other Muslims.29 “People of the Book” is a Quranic concept referring to Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians. Ishay (2008)30 claims that “the Quran justifies wars for self-defense to protect Islamic communities against internal or external aggression by non-Islamic populations, and wars waged against those who ‘violate their oaths’ by breaking a treaty.” In like fashion, in an examination of Quranic verses on warfare, Aboul-Enein and Zuhur (2004)31 remark that “specific verses that sanction fighting against persecution are called the Sword Verses.” This resonates with Quran 4:75: “Why should ye not fight in the cause of Allah and of those who, being weak, are illtreated (and oppressed)? Men, women, and children who cry: ‘Our Lord! Rescue us from this locality, whose people are oppressors’.” John Esposito (2003)32 corroborates the argument that the self-styled verses that champion violence against non-Muslims have been selectively used (or abused) by jihadists and purist Salafists to construct an ideology of hate and intolerance and, thereby, warrant total warfare.

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Peters (1996)33 notes that the Quran does not include an indisputable or absolute statement on whether Muslims must fight non-Muslims only as a defense measure against aggression or at all times (regardless of the reason). Supporting Peters’s argument are a number of verses like the following: “And fight in the way of God with those who fight you, but aggress not: Allah loves not the aggressors” (Quran 2:190). Explained differently, though no academic agreement can be attained in regards to how violent verses should be interpreted, one can look at the statistics on jihadist terrorism across the world (mentioned previously). Case Study: Hamas A brief case study on a terrorist group claiming to be inspired by the Quran is Hamas, founded in 1987. Although Hamas is a comparatively new Palestinian Islamist movement, it has provided considerable effort to rest its foundations of combat in the teachings of age-old scholars of traditional Islam. Hamas’s goal is to obtain higher religious legitimacy and respectability. In the view of the Palestinian organization, the utmost importance of jihad is manifested in the wide number of clear verses in the Quran (as well as the hadith), which mention jihad and prove “beyond any doubt” that it is a responsibility incumbent on all Muslims; it is not merely a permissible principle but an actual duty. Negligence in the practice of jihad should be considered disgraceful. Hamas also affirms the consensus among Muslim jurists that not a single verse on jihad has been abrogated by subsequent passages, meaning that they are legally and religiously binding until the Day of Judgment. Those who forsake the doctrine of jihad are considered deviants and should be blamed for the increase in the number of Infidels and Apostates.34 Principle of Abrogation The Quran comprises 114 chapters (suras) of varying lengths. Suras are classified as Meccan or Medinan, depending on when the verses were revealed to the Prophet. The early Quran was revealed in Mecca and is more passive, nonviolent, and poetic. The later Quran was revealed in Medina and is more violent and political. This discrepancy is rooted in the fact that, in Mecca, Muhammad was only a religious frontrunner. In Medina, his leadership became more political and military. Between the Meccan and Medinan verses, a sharp difference exists in tone,

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content, and word choice.35 Not only are there two Qurans, Meccan and Medinan, that are so different, but the Quran also contains numerous verses that disagree with each other. Below are two examples: • Quran 8:61: “If your enemy inclines toward peace, then you too should seek peace and put your trust in Allah” vs. Quran 47:35: “Do not weaken and call for peace.” • Quran 109:6: “To you your religion, and to me my religion” vs. Quran 2:191: “Slay them wherever you find People of the Book [i.e., mostly Jews and Christians].” For additional examples of peaceful Meccan verses, one can look at Quran 13:22 and 41:34–35. For additional violent Medinan verses, see Quran 4:75, 22:39, 2:216, and 2:217. It would be useful to know which verse displays true Islam. Instead of listing inconsistencies between verses regarding the Muslim community, many legal scholars accept the differences but also admit that the latter verses supersede earlier verses.36 This legal procedure is called the Principle of Abrogation—called naskh in Arabic. It is a principle in the Quran to put an end to the contradictions between Meccan and Medinan verses. Based on that principle, with respect to any contentious topic (e.g., slaying, treatment of non-Muslims, ethics, etc.), a later, Medinan verse abrogates—i.e., supersedes—an earlier, Meccan verse. In other words, because the more violent Medinan verses were thought out after the Meccan times, they abrogate the more peaceful verses.37 The handful verses of tolerance and peace are to be repealed by the many that require Muslims to combat and slay unbelievers until they agree to one of three options: undergo humiliation, submit to Islam, or be killed.38 This is exemplified in Quran 9:29: “Fight those who believe not in Allah… the People of the Book, until they pay the jizya (‘tax’ for non-Muslims) with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.” Taken as a whole, the Quran is distinct from other sacred scriptures in that it lays out a doctrine of abrogation in which later declarations of the Prophet make his earlier declarations null and void.39 Four Quranic verses acknowledge or justify abrogation: • Quran 2:106: “When we cancel a message, or throw it into oblivion, we replace it with one better or one similar. Do you not know that Allah has power over all things?”

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• Quran 16:101: “When we replace a message with another, and Allah knows best what he reveals, they say: You have made it up. Yet, most of them do not know.” • Quran 13:39: “Allah abrogates or confirms whatsoever he will, for he has with him the Book of the Books.” • Quran 17:86: “If we pleased, we could take away what we have revealed to you. Then you will not find anyone to plead for it with us.” Brief, additional reflections on the evolution of jihad in the Quran should be presented. Jihad has continually been a highly energetic and adaptive concept. During its infancy, Islam was led by a politically weak Muhammad. The message of jihad was aimed at propagating Islam against the dominant forms of idolatry and paganism. More peaceful descriptions of jihad stressed the passive endurance of persecution of Muslims.40 After the migration (hijrah) of Muhammad and his companions to Medina in 622 AD, the Muslim community of adherents was more united and more focused on safeguarding its religious practices. During the Medinan period, the idea prevailed that the compulsory prevention of religious practice is a direct declaration of war. That is why the Medinan verses of the Quran accentuate a type of jihad that is more aggressive.41 Historical circumstances marked a clear distinction between the first cycle, when the Muslim religion was in its formative years and growing out of its infancy, and the second cycle, when it established a solid religious, political, and military foundation in Medina.42

Hadith-Driven Jihad In Islam, the hadith is a volume of traditions and sayings by the Prophet Muhammad which tells of his daily life (the Sunna). After the Quran, it remains the second most important source of guidance for Muslims.43 The accounts of events of the Prophet’s life are also described in detail by his close companions. They include, in large part, a record of wars and conquests during Islam’s early period.44 The hadiths cover a wide range of topics, in some cases adding to accounts in the Quran, in others addressing issues not mentioned in the holy text. For Sunni Muslims, the hadith is of utmost importance in determining how to lead one’s life.45 Strictly speaking, the content of the hadith is not sufficient for a complete understanding of Islam, but the volume can provide enough information

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on legal precedents and jurisprudents who organized them. The hadiths were first compiled in the mid-eighth century and new material is still being included today.46 Origins of Jihad in the Hadith From the mid-700s onwards, the hadith collections were treated as a sophisticated and annotated volume of texts. The literature on jihad expanded with the advent of the hadith. The Kitab al-Jihad of Ibn alMubarak (d. 797) is a well-known example of this literature, when the use of the word “jihad” outside the Quran was first recorded. The Kitab al-Jihad of Ibn al-Mubarak incorporates hundreds of proverbs, tactical recommendations, descriptions of martyrs’ heroic deeds that were very handy in holy war. None of the Kitab’s hadiths is particularly long. Rather, most are short and clear. Ibn al-Mubarak began as a volunteer soldier; he exploited the spiritual and political respect that he earned after combating the Byzantines (almost single-handedly) to humiliate the Abbasid government into following him. In essence, Ibn al-Mubarak was one of the first Muslims to use the designation of “defender of Islam” to confront the establishment—a model emulated by militant Muslims today. During the first Crusades, jihad literature flourished again, with several famous authors like al-Sulami (d. 1261) and Ibn al-Nahhas al-Dumyati (d. 1411), who were inspired by Ibn al-Mubarak’s writings.47 The hadith today is a great source of inspiration for jihadists. Sayings related to jihad are included right after the sections on the “five pillars of Islam.” The hadith literature is enormous, but most primary collections (i.e., the “canonical” collections) have a section on jihad. These collections are composed of sayings attributed to the Prophet, who was instructing on warfare and what its parameters were. Also included are short segments about his battles or battlefield injunctions; these are abundantly blended with verses from the Quran pertaining to that subject.48 Without jihadist conquests, Islam would not have propagated the way it did; nor would the hadith have gained so much popularity. Although the Quran lays the foundations for the doctrine of jihad, it is actually the traditional hadith that tells how Muslims interpreted it as they executed battlefield missions. Put simply, the successful Islamic conquests would not have happened if they had not been support by the Islamic tradition of the hadith.49

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In The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period, scholars Mourad and Lindsay (2013)50 described the “Forty Hadiths for Inciting Jihad.” These were compiled shortly after the Second Crusade by Ibn Asakir, “one of the most celebrated scholars of medieval Islam, both in his own time and in subsequent centuries.” The Second Crusade occurred between 1147 and 1149. The original text on the forty hadiths was written in both Arabic and English, giving readers the opportunity to know firsthand what types of sayings on jihad were ascribed directly to the Prophet, all of which are considered by Sunnis as sahih (“authentic”). Prophetic Methodology A terrorist group like ISIS follows the so-called “Prophetic Methodology.” This means that the group attempts to copy the example of Muhammad with painstaking detail and in every aspect of life. This includes the routine of slavery, beheading offenders, Infidels, and Apostates, and fighting any entity that does not share their worldview. Without a doubt, this is all cruel, but it is also based on a strong theological foundation. For example, in September 2014, Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, ISIS’s most important mouthpiece, implored fellow Muslims in Western nations “to find an Infidel and ‘smash his head with a rock,’ poison him, run over him with a car, or ‘destroy his crops’.”51 This type of rhetoric can seem to be quite antediluvian and absurd to Westerners until one understands Adnani’s motive. His speech was loaded with theological and legal matters. His urge to target crops “directly echoed orders from Muhammad to leave well water and crops alone—unless the armies of Islam were in a defensive position, in which case Muslims in the lands of kuffar (infidels), should be unmerciful, and poison away.”52 Jihadists want to model themselves on the Prophet Muhammad. The legitimacy of global jihadism is largely based on the predominance of actions over words. Most jihadists have tried to commandeer traditional authority from imams and similar leaders in this manner.53 Mohammed Siddique Khan, the mastermind of the 7/7 bombings in London, did not use flattering words about Muslim scholars in Great Britain. Rather, he said that “real men” such as himself, whose actions and sacrifices were abundantly clear, were deserving of the Prophet’s legacy:

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Our so-called scholars today are content with their Toyotas and their semidetached houses. If they fear the British government more than they fear Allah then they must desist in giving talks, lectures and passing fatwas and they need to stay at home—they’re useless—and leave the job to the real men, the true inheritors of the Prophet.54

Just like the hadith, the Quran both directly and indirectly claims religious infallibility, which provides jihadists with the assumption to be exempt from criticism for their deeds. Therefore, there is no need for them to exculpate themselves from accusations and criticism.55 Dawah Dawah refers to the proliferation or preaching of Islam.56 Salafists who focus on dawah stress personal responsibility and commitment for each Muslim, praising the tradition of the hadith, and spreading pure Islam. For Salafists, Muslims must prioritize their knowledge and practice of Islam. This includes not only proselytization of the religion, but also an agenda to remove any weak or false hadiths to guarantee that every Muslim emulates the true “Prophetic Methodology.”57 Such strategic thinking was also evident when Al-Zawahiri and Al-Zarqawi made the following statement from 2005 through 2007 (which is actually a summary of their statements): “Jihadist action must have a clear ‘thought or idea that outlines its means and objectives’.” Al-Zarqawi declared that the strategic goal is to re-establish the Muslim way of life based on the hadith “by means of establishing the state of Islam that will solve the entire problems of the nation.” This agenda should be endorsed ideologically by “a circle of judicious men and scholars” and diffused through “a special dawah (Islamic outreach) authority.” The objective is to facilitate the global jihad movement to use “the [Islamic] nation’s potentials, including human and financial resources” by attracting more recruits and sympathizers.58

The Shahid as a Hero A shahid is a suicide terrorist dying for his or her cause. Shahid comes from the Arabic word “witness” (in the Quran) and refers to a “martyr.”59 In the context of jihadism, a martyr is an individual who sacrifices his or her life for Islam by fighting in holy war. Initially applied

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to people who experienced death for their religious beliefs, the term has acquired a militant connotation to denote warriors sacrificing themselves for a religious, ideological, or political reason.60 Through his or her lethal bravery for the cause of truth, the shahid—upon accomplishing the ultimate mission successfully—turns into a hero, a model for others to emulate.61 Martyrdom The concept of martyrdom (shahada) in Islam is to be framed from the perspective of jihad. In fact, the concept of martyrdom is to be understood within the entire religion of Islam. The process of becoming a martyr cannot be understood without understanding Islam as well. Here is the explanation: deriving from the Arabic root salama (“surrender” or “submission”), Islam means the absolute submission to the will and command of Allah62 ; that is, being prepared to die (martyrdom) as a way to express this submission. The notion of martyrdom, like other Islamic notions, can only be comprehended within the context of the doctrine of tawhid (i.e., the complete unity of Allah and submission to His will). Martyrdom cannot be fully grasped in a vacuum.63 Both martyrdom and jihad are frequently mentioned in the Quran. In fact, no martyrdom exists if it is not a struggle in the cause of Allah and for the sake of the truth.64 Martyrdom is a type of terrorism motivated by “messianic fervor.”65 It is an attack on the enemy with no fear for one’s own safety, and it is considered the highest form of heroism by jihadists and sympathizers.66 Drawing on contemporary interpretations of Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, Ruhollah Khomeini, Al-Qaeda, and others, it can easily be concluded that the vast majority of self-identified jihadists believe that martyrdom is a personal obligation. Thus, no Caliph or Islamic head of state needs to decree it. Killing oneself in the process of killing the Infidels is an act of heroism that earns one a guaranteed place in Heaven. Collateral damage (i.e., the killing of Muslim bystanders not intended to be a target) should not hinder jihad in any way, shape, or form.67 Suicide Terrorism, Not Suicide Killing oneself other than martyrdom is forbidden in the Quran or under sharia. Plain suicide is referred to as intihar in the Quran.68 A sharp distinction needs to be drawn between martyrdom and suicide. Suicide is

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killing oneself intentionally out of hopelessness, guilt, or another personal reason. Here, the person takes his or her own life because there was no outlet except ending one’s life. In contrast, martyrdom is a heroic deed of intentionally suffering death in support of Allah; a great many Muslim scholars regard it as one of the greatest achievements in jihad. When jihad is a personal duty, especially after a territorial invasion, women are urged to become martyrs alongside men.69 Jurists insist that when the enemy invades or attacks a given Muslim territory, it is the responsibility of all true adherents of the faith to fight them (even without the consent of the woman’s husband). In particular, pious, devout Palestinian Muslim women are often encouraged to take part in martyrdom. A son or daughter can do it too (without the parents’ permission), a slave without the consent of his master, and the employee without the approval of his employer. This is a situation where one should not confuse disobedience with duty. Disobedience, here, does not apply because martyrdom always pleases Allah.70 Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (born in 1926) is an Egyptian Islamic theologian and a prominent figure in online terrorist fatwas to legitimate jihadism. In a standard online Question and Answer form of fatwa, Al-Qaradawi declared the following: “The martyr operation is the greatest of all sorts of jihad in the cause of Allah.” As he continues, “a martyr operation is carried out by a person who sacrifices himself, deeming his life [of] less value than striving in the cause of Allah, in the cause of restoring the land and preserving the dignity.” As he finishes, “to such a valorous attitude applies the following Quranic verse: ‘And of mankind is he who would sell himself, seeking the pleasure of Allah; and Allah hath compassion on (His) bondmen’” (Quran, 2: 207).71

Jannah or Eternal Paradise Jannah refers to Eternal Paradise.72 Meaning “garden” in Arabic, it is the eternal place of righteous and devout Muslim believers.73 Since the advent of Islam in the seventh century, heavenly gardens have been used as a metaphor for Jannah.74 The Quran mentions gardens 166 times, 147 of which use the term Jannah.75 In Islam’s holy text, Jannah is illustrated through material delights, such as beautiful virgins, precious stones, tasty foods, and constantly running water. The latter was appealing to Arabs living in the desert, who spend a large part of their lives in dry lands. The Quran describes life for its immortal adherents as a happy life without

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suffering, grief, fear, or shame, and where all wishes are fulfilled.76 Often, when “heaven” comes up in the Quran, it is accompanied by depictions of flowing water and fruit-bearing trees, which speaks volume about the importance of that concept to Muslims. The reward for heroic deeds comes with a special place under shaded trees and flowing water, and in gardens with sweet fruits (bostan) and aromatic flowers (gulistan).77 The Quranic verse below describes what Allah has promised to the faithful followers: Allah has promised to the believing men and the believing women gardens, beneath which rivers flow, to abide in them, and goodly dwellings in gardens of perpetual abode; and best of all is Allah’s goodly pleasure; that is the grand achievement. (Quran 9:72)

As opposed to Jannah, the word Jahannam refers to Hell. In the Arabic language, many words exist for both Heaven and Hell. These words are also mentioned in the Quran and one of the hadiths. Most of them are now part of Islam’s traditions.78 Jannah for Martyrs Jannah is the symbol of success, eternal bliss, the greatest of all rewards, and the supreme achievement. It is a place that no one has ever seen before. The idea of Paradise as a reward for true, devout Muslims was actually propagandized by the Prophet Muhammad.79 Only martyrs became the ones getting to enjoy all the benefits of Jannah—which confirms the elevated rank of those who fought unbelievers in holy war.80 The hadiths, and the ideologies they have engendered, are unequivocal about this: “Lining up for battle in the path of God [jihad] is worthier than 60 years of worship” and “If he dies or is killed, all his sins are forgiven, He will be wedded to the virgins of Paradise, and the crown of dignity will be placed on his head.”81 According to the hadith tradition, the sword attests to the determined intention of the fighter and cleanses the believer’s sins. In modern terms, martyrdom equals to redemption. Hence, there is a redemptive part to jihad that is important to understand.82 According to the Quran, the shahid has a special place in Jannah, as demonstrated in the following verses:

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• Quran 3:169: “Think not of those who are slain in Allah’s way as dead. Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the presence of their Lord; They rejoice in the bounty provided by Allah. And with regard to those left behind, who have not yet joined them (in their bliss), the (Martyrs) glory in the fact that on them is no fear, nor have they (cause to) grieve.” • Quran 9:111: “For theirs (in return) is the garden (of Paradise): they fight in His cause, and slay and are slain: a promise binding on Him in truth, through the Law, the Gospel, and the Quran: and who is more faithful to his covenant than Allah? Then rejoice in the bargain which ye have concluded: that is the achievement supreme.” • Quran 22:8: “Those who leave their homes in the cause of Allah, and are then slain or die. On them will Allah bestow verily a goodly Provision: Truly Allah is He Who bestows the best provision. Verily He will admit them to a place with which they shall be well pleased: for Allah is All-Knowing, Most Forbearing.” In present-day jihadism, it is common for Muslim militants to not only describe themselves as martyrs, but also take these Quranic verses as a guarantee to Jannah. Such belief in the absolute reward to Paradise is readily embraced by both jihadists and purist Salafists. More importantly, in the Quran, soldiers for Allah (i.e., mujahedin) and Muslim believers who do not fight for Him are not considered the same by Allah Himself. As such, Quran 4:95 states that Allah prefers mujahedin over nonviolent Muslims. In like fashion, Quran 49:15 expresses the same idea: “The believers are only the ones who have believed in Allah and His Messenger and then doubt not but strive with their properties and their lives in the cause of Allah. It is those who are the truthful.” In March 2019, in spite of knowing their imminent defeat in the town of Baghuz (eastern Syria), ISIS released a propaganda video asking the few remaining residents of its besieged compound to keep praying, fight, and earn a place in Jannah. In the two-minute video, an ISIS fighter (purportedly called Abu Abd al-Azeem) said, “Tomorrow, God willing, we will be in Paradise and they will be burning in hell.” His declaration was replete with Quranic verses. Although ISIS’s proclaimed caliphate (in June 2014) was completely destroyed, the video shows that ISIS is not giving up. It still adheres to the belief that its leaders are the heirs to the Prophet Muhammad, ruler of all Muslim lands and people.83

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Karbala Karbala is the supreme commitment to submit to the will of Allah, to the point of dying for Him, which corroborates the previously mentioned idea that rewards will be abundant in Jannah.84 As a result, martyrs fight to their deaths, exploding in bodily pieces, expecting to finally see the Prophet Muhammad and sit by Allah’s throne. They are taught that the first drop of blood that is shed after a successful martyrdom operation instantly wipes away their sins. In other words, on the Day of Judgment, there will be no reckoning and no punishment of the tomb for them.85 They will move to the afterlife with the other shahids .86 They will have the privilege of traveling with prophets, saints, and righteous Muslims; they will be able to intercede for their unsaved family members on the Day of Resurrection; they will live an eternal life and enjoy rivers of wine and sweet honey; they will also enjoy the presence of 72 huris (black-eyed virgins).87

Case Studies Based on all descriptions related to martyrdom so far, it can be deduced that jihadists are difficult to dissuade because they are not afraid of trading their last days in life for ultimate rewards in Paradise. Their reactions to traditional methods of deterrence or prevention are, as one would expect, actions intended to defend their religion or deity. Any attempt by the federal government or people who seek to defend against martyrdom operations are generally ineffective or futile.88 Below are two brief case studies of extremists’ determination to die for the cause and, ultimately, to reach their place in Paradise. Case Study I: Belgian and Dutch Muslims In her work titled “Striving in the Way of God: Justifying Jihad by Young Belgian and Dutch Muslims,” Marion Van San (2015)89 conducted interviews with a high number of Belgian and Dutch Muslim youths. When she confronted her participants about their willingness to defend acts of ultra-violence for their religion, she was given several reasons. For instance, the participants suggested that the ultimate decision is not theirs. “If God wants it,” they will die for it, but it is “God who chooses his martyrs.” So, in due course, the choice is not up to them. Other reasons

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were that they are not yet ready to abandon their current life; that they are willing to be martyrs but they are afraid to die; or that they want to wait to have children first. To sum up what these participants were saying, although martyrdom is the highest act of heroism in Islam, and something that they hope to strive for one day, the opportunity has not been presented to them (at least not now). The Belgian and Dutch Muslim youths also liberated themselves from the obligation to join the global jihad movement by claiming that they are already involved in a form of jihad: by encouraging others to join Islam (as a form of dawah). They hope to enter Jannah by practicing dawah. Muslim youths uploaded pictures of fallen martyrs, praised and promoted violence, and romanticized about dying as martyrs to secure their place in Jannah. One of the participants was Ahmed, who told Van San the following statements: It’s not this life that really matters. It’s Paradise that counts. When the time is right and Allah bestows this favour on me, then it will happen, insha’ Allah. Allah looks at someone’s intentions and when he sees that they are pure and you want to fight for his sake and become a martyr, then Allah will give you his blessing.

One year after their last interview session, Ahmed was still living in the Netherlands as a fanatical supporter of global jihad on Facebook. Case Study II: Ajmal Kasab Also referred to as 26/11, the 2008 Mumbai attacks were a series of jihadist attacks that occurred in November 2008, when ten members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a jihadist terror group from Pakistan, perpetrated no fewer than twelve coordinated shooting and bombing attacks for four days in a row in Mumbai. The attacks attracted profound condemnation from leaders and critics around the globe. They began on November 26, 2008 and lasted until November 29, 2008. At least 174 people were killed, including nine of the 10 Lashkar-e-Taiba attackers, and over 300 others were wounded.90 The only jihadist survivor of the Mumbai attacks was Ajmal Kasab, a Muslim boy who was radicalized by the hate-India propaganda. Pakistan generals trained him to believe that his actions would secure him the highest place in Jannah (see the previous Quranic verse 9:111). Reports

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by the Government of India said that Kasab was indoctrinated into believing that Allah wanted him to execute the Mumbai mission so he could be with Him for eternity. On his deathbed, Kasab expressed no regret about the attacks and affirmed that they were not un-Islamic. During the interrogations, he never lost his equanimity or self-control. Kasab was even persuaded that his Pakistani trainers were chosen by Allah to help all 10 heroes fulfill His will.91 In less than one year, Islamist leaders turned a simple boy into a killing machine who believed that his deeds were moral and honorable.92

Notes 1. Brent Nongbri, Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013). 2. Anna L. Peterson, “Religious Narratives and Political Protest,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 64, no. 1 (1996): 27–44. 3. Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Basic, 1973), 87–125, 90. 4. Charles Kurzman, “Organizational Opportunity and Social Movement Mobilization: A Comparative Analysis of Four Religious Movements,” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 3, no. 1 (1998): 23–49, https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.3.1.m5612124613760j2. 5. Kabir Sethi, “The Allure of the Radical: Understanding Jihadist Violence in the West,” Macalester International 22 (2009): 201–25. 6. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor, 1967). 7. Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society (London: Macmillan, 1967). 8. Stuart Hall, Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices (London: Sage, 1997). 9. Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Jenny Bourne, “Cheerleaders and Ombudsmen: The Sociology of Race Relations in Britain,” Race and Class 1, no. 4 (1980): 331–52, https://doi.org/10.1177/030639688002100401; Timothy Fitzgerald, Discourse on Civility and Barbarity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); and Daniel Martin Varisco, Islam Obscured: The Rhetoric of Anthropological Representation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 10. Jeffry Halverson and Amy Way, “The Curious Case of Colleen LaRose: Social Margins, New Media, and Online Radicalization,” Media, War & Conflict 5, no. 2 (2012): 139–53, https://doi.org/10.1177/175063521 2440917.

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11. Hans Mol, Identity and the Sacred: A Sketch for a New Social-Scientific Theory of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 1976). 12. Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security,” Political Psychology 25, no. 5 (2004): 741–67, 742, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.003 96.x. 13. Andrew Glazzard, Sasha Jesperson, Thomas Maguire, and Emily Winterbotham, Conflict, Violent Extremism, and Development: New Challenges, New Responses (New York: Springer, 2017). 14. Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, “The New Chechen Jihad: Militant Wahhabism as a Radical Movement and a Source of Suicide Terrorism in Post-War Chechen Society,” Democracy and Security 2, no. 1 (2006): 103–55, https://doi.org/10.1080/17419160600625116. 15. Lorenzo Vidino, Raffaello Pantucci, and Evan Kohlmann, “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: Al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict,” African Security 3, no. 4 (2010): 216–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2010.533071. 16. Monica Duffy Toft, “Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War,” International Security 31, no. 4 (2017): 97–131, https:// doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.31.4.97. 17. Ibid., 105. 18. John Renard, Responses to 101 Questions on Islam (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1998). 19. Syed Arshad Husain, “Religion and Mental Health from the Muslim Perspective,” in Handbook of Religion and Mental Health, ed. Harold G. Koenig (San Diego: Academic Press, 1998), 279–90. 20. Azra Kidwai, Islam (New Delhi: Roli Books, 1998); Ruqaiyyah W. Maqsood, World Faiths Islam (Lincolnwood, IL: NTC Publishing Group, 1994). 21. Andrew Campbell, “‘Taqiyya:’ How Islamic Extremists Deceive the West,” National Observer 65 (2005): 11–23. 22. Kristina Nelson, The Art of Reciting the Quran (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985). 23. Jonathan Matusitz, Symbolism in Terrorism: Motivation, Communication, and Behavior (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015). 24. David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 597–617, https://doi.org/10.1080/014023 90500300956. 25. David Cook, “Islamism and Jihadism: The Transformation of Classical Notions of Jihad into an Ideology of Terrorism,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 10, no. 2 (2009): 177–187, https://doi.org/10. 1080/14690760903119100. 26. Mohammed Hiddas, “A Higher-Order Functional View of Translation,” Arab World English Journal 21, no. 10 (2014): 212–24.

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27. Dipak K. Gupta, Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence: The Life Cycle of Birth, Growth, Transformation, and Demise (New York: Routledge, 2008). 28. Reuven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 62. 29. Ibid., 63. 30. Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights (Berkeley: University of California, 2008), 45. 31. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, Islamic Rulings on Warfare (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 7. 32. John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 33. Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1996). 34. Meir Litvak, “‘Martyrdom Is Life:’ Jihad and Martyrdom in the Ideology of Hamas,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 8 (2010): 716–34, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.494170. 35. William Federer, What Every American Needs to Know about the Qur’an: A History of Islam & the United States (Saint Louis, MO: Amerisearch, 2007). 36. David Bukay, “Peace or Jihad? Abrogation in Islam,” Middle East Quarterly XIV, no. 4 (2007): 3–11. 37. Louay Fatoohi, Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law: A Critical Study of the Concept of “Naskh” and Its Impact (New York: Routledge, 2013). 38. Matusitz, Symbolism in Terrorism, 167. 39. Richard Bell, Introduction to the Qur’an (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1953). 40. Noor Mohammad, “The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction,” Journal of Law and Religion 3, no. 2 (1985): 384–88, https://doi.org/10.2307/ 1051182. 41. Assaf Moghadam, “Mayhem, Myths, and Martyrdom: The Shi’a Conception of Jihad,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 1 (2007): 125–43, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550601079656. 42. Manzar Zaidi, “A Taxonomy of Jihad,” Arab Studies Quarterly 31, no. 3 (2009): 21–34. 43. Recep Senturk, Narrative Social Structure: Anatomy of the Hadith Transmission Network, 610–1505 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 44. Muhammad Abdullah, Mohamad Abdalla, and Robyn Jorgensen, “Towards the Formulation of a Pedagogical Framework for Islamic Schools in Australia,” Islam and Civilisational Renewal 6, no. 4 (2015): 509–32, https://doi.org/10.12816/0019218.

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45. Jennifer Boutz, Claudia Brugman, and Alia Lancaster, “Quoting the Prophet Online: Communicative Functions of Hadith Quotations in Webbased Arabic Discourse,” Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research 10, no. 1 (2017): 3–23, https://doi.org/10.1386/jammr.10.1.3_1. 46. Samiul Hasan, “Islamic Jurisprudence: Sources and Traditions Creating Diversity in Human Relationships,” in The Muslim World in the 21st Century, ed. Samiul Hasan (New York: Springer, 2012): 23–42. 47. Cook, “Islamism and Jihadism,” 178. 48. Ibid., 177. 49. David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015). 50. Suleiman A. Mourad and James E. Lindsay, Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period (Leiden: Brill, 2013): 12. 51. Cited in Graeme Wood, “What the Islamic State Really Wants,” The Atlantic 15 (2015): 80–1, 80. 52. Ibid., 81. 53. Akil N. Awan, “Success of the Meta-Narrative: How Jihadists Maintain Legitimacy,” CTC Sentinel 2, no. 11 (2009): 6–8. 54. Ibid., 7. 55. Eli Alshech, The Emergence of the “Infallible Jihad Fighter:” The Salafi Jihadists’ Quest for Religious Legitimacy (Washington, DC: Middle East Media Research Institute, 2008). 56. Larry Poston, Islamic Dàwah in the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the Dynamics of Conversion to Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 57. Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, “Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda’s Justification for September 11,” Middle East Policy 10, no. 2 (2003): 76–92, https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4967.00107. 58. Cited in Christopher M. Blanchard, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007). 59. Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008). 60. Ibid., 21. 61. Wayne R. Husted, “Karbal¯a’ Made Immediate: The Martyr as Model in Im¯ami Shi’ism,” The Muslim World 83, no. 3 (1993): 263–78, https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-1913.1993.tb03579.x. 62. Abul-Fazl Ezzati, An Introduction to the History of the Spread of Islam (Cambridge, MA: Academic Press, 1979). 63. Ibid., 39–42. 64. Abul-Fazl Ezzati, “The Concept of Martyrdom in Islam,” Al-Serat XII (1986): 10–21.

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65. David C. Rapoport, “Messianic Sanctions for Terror,” Comparative Politics 20, no. 2 (1998): 195–213, https://doi.org/10.2307/421666. 66. Bernard Lewis, The Assassins, a Radical Sect in Islam (New York: Basic Books, 1967). 67. Sebastian Gorka, Defeating Jihad: The Winnable War (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2016). 68. Jim Winkates, “Suicide Terrorism: Martyrdom for Organizational Objectives,” Journal of Third World Studies 23, no. 1 (2006): 87–115. 69. Gabriel Weimann, “Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 10 (2011): 765–81, https://doi.org/10.1080/105 7610X.2011.604831. 70. Ibid., 773. 71. Ibid. 72. Soumaya Pernilla Ouis, “Islamic Ecotheology Based on the Qur’¯an,” Islamic Studies 37, no. 2 (1998): 151–81. 73. Mohammad Hassan Khalil, Islam and the Fate of Others: The Salvation Question (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 74. Safwa Mohamed Kamil and Mohd Yazid Mohd Yunos, “Examination of the Ideology of the Calmness Concept Based on Quranic Paradise Imagery towards Establishing an Environmental Islamic Garden in Malaysia,” Advances in Environmental Biology 9, no. 23 (2015): 120–23. 75. Hanna E. Kassis, A Concordance of the Qur’an (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 76. James L. Westcoat, Jr., “From the Gardens of the Qur’an to the ‘Gardens’ of Lahore,” Landscape Research 20, no. 1 (1995): 19–29, https://doi. org/10.1080/01426399508706451. 77. Kamil and Yunos, “Examination of the Ideology of the Calmness,” 120. 78. Maria Olisaemeka Rosemary Okwara, Sr., “The Renewal and Reform of the Catholic Church’s Relationship with the Religious Others: Prospects and Challenges for a Theological Humanistic Turn in Christian–Muslim Dialogue,” New Blackfriars 99, no. 1080 (2018): 206–18, https://doi. org/10.1111/nbfr.12348. 79. Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History (New York: Mouton Publishers, 1979). 80. Elisabeth Kendall and Ewan Stein, Twenty-First Century Jihad: Law, Society and Military Action (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015). 81. Cited in Raymond Ibrahim, “The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period,” Middle East Quarterly 23, no. 2 (2016): E3–4. 82. Cook, Understanding Jihad, 15. 83. Martin Chulov, “ISIS Releases Video of Fighters in Baghuz as Kurdish Forces Advance,” The Guardian, March 12, 2019, A1.

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84. Kamran Scot Aghaie, The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi’i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004). 85. Hugh Dellios, “His Father’s Son: The Making of a Bomber,” Chicago Tribune, August 27, 2001, A1. 86. Harvey Kushner, Terrorism in America: A Structured Approach to Understanding the Terrorist Threat (Springfield, IL: C.C. Thomas, 1998). 87. Assaf Moghadam, “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26, no. 2 (2003): 65–92, https://doi.org/10.1080/105761003901 45215. 88. Lee E. Dutter and Ofira Seliktar, “To Martyr or Not to Martyr: Jihad Is the Question, What Policy Is the Answer?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 5 (2007): 429–43, https://doi.org/10.1080/105761 00701258601. 89. Marion Van San, “Striving in the Way of God: Justifying Jihad by Young Belgian and Dutch Muslims,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 5 (2015): 328–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1013776. 90. V. S. Subrahmanian, Aaron Mannes, Amy Sliva, Jana Shakarian, and John P. Dickerson, Computational Analysis of Terrorist Groups: Lashkar-e-Taiba (New York: Springer, 2013). 91. C. Unnikrishnan, “Kasab Thought He Was on Mission Kashmir,” The Times of India, January 5, 2009, A1. 92. Peter Wonacott and Geeta Anand, “Sole Captured Suspect Offers Grim Insights into Massacre,” The Wall Street Journal, December 4, 2008, A1.

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Geertz, Clifford. “Religion as a Cultural System.” In The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, edited by Clifford Geertz, 87–125. New York: Basic, 1973. Glazzard, Andrew, Sasha Jesperson, Thomas Maguire, and Emily Winterbotham. Conflict, Violent Extremism and Development: New Challenges, New Responses. New York: Springer, 2017. Gorka, Sebastian. Defeating Jihad: The Winnable War. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2016. Gupta, Dipak K. Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence: The Life Cycle of Birth, Growth, Transformation, and Demise. New York: Routledge, 2008. Hall, Stuart. Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. London: Sage, 1997. Halverson, Jeffry, and Amy Way. “The Curious Case of Colleen LaRose: Social Margins, New Media, and Online Radicalization.” Media, War & Conflict 5, no. 2 (2012): 139–53. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635212440917. Hasan, Samiul. “Islamic Jurisprudence: Sources and Traditions Creating Diversity in Human Relationships.” In The Muslim World in the 21st Century, edited by Samiul Hasan, 23–42. New York: Springer, 2012. Hiddas, Mohammed. “A Higher-Order Functional View of Translation.” Arab World English Journal 21, no. 10 (2014): 212–24. Husain, Syed Arshad. “Religion and Mental Health from the Muslim Perspective.” In Handbook of Religion and Mental Health, edited by Harold G. Koenig, 279–90. San Diego: Academic Press, 1998. Husted, Wayne R. “Karbal¯a’ Made Immediate: The Martyr as Model in Im¯ami Shi’ism.” The Muslim World 83, no. 3 (1993): 263–78. https://doi.org/10. 1111/j.1478-1913.1993.tb03579.x. Ibrahim, Raymond. “The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period.” Middle East Quarterly 23, no. 2 (2016): E3–4. Ishay, Micheline. The History of Human Rights. Berkeley: University of California, 2008. Kamil, Safwa Mohamed, and Mohd Yazid Mohd Yunos. “Examination of the Ideology of the Calmness Concept Based on Quranic Paradise Imagery towards Establishing an Environmental Islamic Garden in Malaysia.” Advances in Environmental Biology 9, no. 23 (2015): 120–23. Kassis, Hanna E. A Concordance of the Qur’an. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Kendall, Elisabeth, and Ewan Stein. Twenty-First Century Jihad: Law, Society and Military Action. London: I.B. Tauris, 2015. Khalil, Mohammad Hassan. Islam and the Fate of Others: The Salvation Question. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Kidwai, Azra. Islam. New Delhi: Roli Books, 1998.

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Kilcullen, David J. “Countering Global Insurgency.” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 597–617. https://doi.org/10.1080/014023905 00300956. Kinnvall, Catarina. “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security.” Political Psychology 25, no. 5 (2004): 741–67, 742. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00396.x. Kurzman, Charles. “Organizational Opportunity and Social Movement Mobilization: A Comparative Analysis of Four Religious Movements.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 3, no. 1 (1998): 23–49. https://doi.org/10. 17813/maiq.3.1.m5612124613760j2. Kushner, Harvey. Terrorism in America: A Structured Approach to Understanding the Terrorist Threat. Springfield, IL: C.C. Thomas, 1998. Lewis, Bernard. The Assassins, a Radical Sect in Islam. New York: Basic Books, 1967. Litvak, Meir. “‘Martyrdom Is Life:’ Jihad and Martyrdom in the Ideology of Hamas.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 8 (2010): 716–34. https:// doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.494170. Luckmann, Thomas. The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society. London: Macmillan, 1967. Matusitz, Jonathan. Symbolism in Terrorism: Motivation, Communication, and Behavior. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015. Moghadam, Assaf. “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26, no. 2 (2003): 65–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100390145215. ———. “Mayhem, Myths, and Martyrdom: The Shi’a Conception of Jihad.” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 1 (2007): 125–43. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/09546550601079656. ———. The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008. Mohammad, Noor. “The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction.” Journal of Law and Religion 3, no. 2 (1985): 384–88. https://doi.org/10.2307/1051182. Mol, Hans. Identity and the Sacred: A Sketch for a New Social-Scientific Theory of Religion. Oxford: Blackwell, 1976. Mourad, Suleiman A., and James E. Lindsay. Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period. Leiden: Brill, 2013. Nelson, Kristina. The Art of Reciting the Quran. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985. Nongbri, Brent. Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013. Okwara, Maria Olisaemeka Rosemary, Sr. “The Renewal and Reform of the Catholic Church’s Relationship with the Religious Others: Prospects and Challenges for a Theological Humanistic Turn in Christian–Muslim

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Dialogue.” New Blackfriars 99, no. 1080 (2018): 206–18. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/nbfr.12348. Ouis, Soumaya Pernilla. “Islamic Ecotheology Based on the Qur’¯an.” Islamic Studies 37, no. 2 (1998): 151–81. Peters, Rudolph. Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History. New York: Mouton Publishers, 1979. ———. Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1996. Peterson, Anna L. “Religious Narratives and Political Protest.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 64, no. 1 (1996): 27–44. Poston, Larry. Islamic Dàwah in the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the Dynamics of Conversion to Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Rapoport, David C. “Messianic Sanctions for Terror.” Comparative Politics 20, no. 2 (1998): 195–213. https://doi.org/10.2307/421666. Renard, John. Responses to 101 Questions on Islam. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1998. Senturk, Recep. Narrative Social Structure: Anatomy of the Hadith Transmission Network, 610–1505. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005. Sethi, Kabir. “The Allure of the Radical: Understanding Jihadist Violence in the West.” Macalester International 22 (2009): 201–25. Speckhard, Anne, and Khapta Akhmedova, “The New Chechen Jihad: Militant Wahhabism as a Radical Movement and a Source of Suicide Terrorism in PostWar Chechen Society.” Democracy and Security 2, no. 1 (2006): 103–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419160600625116. Subrahmanian, V. S., Aaron Mannes, Amy Sliva, Jana Shakarian, and John P. Dickerson. Computational Analysis of Terrorist Groups: Lashkar-e-Taiba. New York: Springer, 2013. Toft, Monica Duffy. “Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War.” International Security 31, no. 4 (2017): 97–131. https://doi.org/10. 1162/isec.2007.31.4.97. Unnikrishnan, C. “Kasab Thought He Was on Mission Kashmir.” The Times of India, January 5, 2009, A1. Van San, Marion. “Striving in the Way of God: Justifying Jihad by Young Belgian and Dutch Muslims.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 5 (2015): 328– 42. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1013776. Varisco, Daniel Martin. Islam Obscured: The Rhetoric of Anthropological Representation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Vidino, Lorenzo, Raffaello Pantucci, and Evan Kohlmann. “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: Al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict.” African Security 3, no. 4 (2010): 216–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2010.533071.

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Weimann, Gabriel. “Cyber-Fatwas and Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 10 (2011): 765–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X. 2011.604831. Westcoat, James L., Jr. “From the Gardens of the Qur’an to the ‘Gardens’ of Lahore.” Landscape Research 20, no. 1 (1995): 19–29. https://doi.org/10. 1080/01426399508706451. Wiktorowicz, Quintan, and John Kaltner. “Killing in the Name of Islam: AlQaeda’s Justification for September 11.” Middle East Policy 10, no. 2 (2003): 76–92. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4967.00107. Winkates, Jim. “Suicide Terrorism: Martyrdom for Organizational Objectives,” Journal of Third World Studies 23, no. 1 (2006): 87–115. Wonacott, Peter, and Geeta Anand. “Sole Captured Suspect Offers Grim Insights into Massacre.” The Wall Street Journal, December 4, 2008, A1. Wood, Graeme. “What the Islamic State Really Wants.” The Atlantic 15 (2015): 80–1. Zaidi, Manzar. “A Taxonomy of Jihad.” Arab Studies Quarterly 31, no. 3 (2009): 21–34.

CHAPTER 7

Legal Motivations

For non-jihadist Muslims, particularly those who care about their religion, legal scholars of Islam play an essential role as mediators between the holy scriptures and daily religious rituals and practices. They are regarded as being specifically chosen to explain and diffuse the prophetic message, as the most qualified ones to interpret the absolute truth of Islam in the backdrop of a constantly changing secular world. On the other hand, for jihadist Muslims, legal scholars are essential nodes in a global network of Islam. They are regarded as being specifically selected to guide and teach students and disciples so that they follow the straight path of Islam to the Heavenly Garden in the hereafter. They offer religious interpretations and lessons for those seeking eternal life. For such radicals, legal scholars are of utmost importance, because they are spreaders of knowledge who can shed light on a perfect understanding of Islam based upon the example of Muhammad and his companions.1 Global jihadists today are influenced by centuries of theological pieces and a variety of bodies of law that they see as ideologically pure. According to many interpretations of Islamic law, treaties are re-evaluated every 10 years; revisions can be added based on changing conditions, requirements, or strategies. In fact, only the treaties that comply with the stipulations of Muslim legal theory are legally binding, and they must be revised every ten years. If such conditions are not met, the treaties are null and void. Standing against the diffusion of Islam in the lands of truce would be like opposing a casus belli (an act that warrants war), © The Author(s) 2020 J. Matusitz, Global Jihad in Muslim and non-Muslim Contexts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47044-9_7

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and jihad is to be waged again.2 These factors have strengthened a philosophical framework within which they must be preserved in order to be faithful to their ideology. In order to prove that internal legitimacy is highly significant to them, works on global jihad are replete with legal justifications for their actions. This philosophical framework also requires that Arab emirates and the global Caliphate be established.3 Case studies on the legality of Islam in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and (though briefly) 13 other countries serve to illustrate how legal motivations can accelerate motivations to commit extremism.

Ulama In the world of Sunni Islam, ulama are the protectors, purveyors, and interpreters of religious knowledge, Islamic dogmas, and law.4 Ulama are trained in religious institutions like madrassas (it is a time-honored tradition). The Quran and Sunna, among other traditions, are the foundations of Islamic law.5 In the course of time, the intellectual debate and instructions of the ulama have added fresh insights to the discourses in the Muslim public sphere, and continue to do so today. Traditional scholars of Islam have increasingly become major players in present-day Islamic societies and politics.6 It is the law that each Muslim, out of fear of mortal sin, must participate in jihad as appropriately as possible: according to his or her means, with weapons (or even funds), or at a minimum, through acts of charity or prayer. Jihad is the ultimate virtue and controls the galvanization of all energies. All means are allowed because the end is to protect the ummah. Nevertheless, this supreme aspect of Islam can be a two-edged sword. The ulama have provided considerable effort to limit jihad in time and space. If jihad gets out of their control, it can jeopardize the global order. It can trigger violence that causes chaos and sedition, thereby opening opportunities for Islam’s enemies to target the community of believers with violence.7

Differences in Islamic Legal Training Not all Muslim legal scholars are equally qualified. There are disparities in training, intellectual abilities, and communicative skills or power. All of these impact the status and charisma of scholars. Those with a good name can build a solid base of followers and emit decrees and other legal

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decisions to wield substantial influence. The term “scholar,” in and of itself, does not represent objective principles of learning. Rather, their recognition of a person as “scholar” is based on both subjective interpretation and the reputation of that person. Whether that person is seen as a Muslim scholar in good status establishes the probability that his or her interpretation will be acknowledged.8 As compared to the traditionalist ulama, who irrefutably come across as possessors of an impressive heritage of learnedness, the jihadists or Salafists do not always have such Islamic intellectual depth.9 Sharia Sharia is a body of laws embedded within the Muslim tradition. It is enshrined in the religious teachings of Islam, particularly the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet (hadith and Sunna). The Muslim holy book does not bring up the concept sharia directly. On the contrary, it is a legal doctrine based upon an interpretation of the religion. The extent of sharia varies across Islamic societies because of different interpretations and adaptations of centuries-old texts.10 The method by which it should be implemented in modern states is a matter of dispute between modernists and Islamic fundamentalists.11 Sharia is interpreted by the latter as coming directly from Allah. From this point of view, sharia is Allah-ordained—as opposed to man-made laws like the U.S. Constitution.12

Sharia as a Universalist Body of Law Islam is a universalist faith. Its teachings are made for all humans, at all places, and at all times. In contrast to the Catholic Church until Vatican II (1962–1965), Islam makes no separation between religion and political institutions. In the traditional Quranic sense, religious recommendations and requirements naturally include everyday political administration. The purpose is to establish and apply sharia decrees on moral and ethical behaviors of Muslims. Across the world, including Europe and the United States, a multitude of Muslim leaders are insisting that the separation of church and state should not be made.13 Critics of sharia are loud and determined. They believe that sharia represses the rights of women and non-Muslim minorities, forbids Muslims from changing or abandoning their religion, opposes modernization in many ways (including lending money), applies cruel punishment, requires the application of laws that were created centuries ago, and advocates jihad against the Infidels and Apostates.14

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Sharia-Driven Jihad Of particular danger are jihadist leaders who embrace violence under the banner of sharia to promote their global agenda. Their decrees vary, from widespread calls for holy war to the leadership proclamations of jihadist organizations.15 Under sharia-driven prescriptions for war, an Islamic community must wage a “lawful war,” in which case Muslims fight for a just cause so they can subjugate the enemy. In many situations, jihad— not just warfare—is interpreted as “lawful war.”16 In truth, jihad reserves the right to rebel against a Muslim head of state if he or she does not follow sharia.17 Jihad is used as a vehicle to accomplish a goal (in this case, seeking to apply sharia). Based on this perspective, Muslim rules must be enforced by all means. This corresponds to Kruglanski and Fishman’s (2006)18 argument that, when terrorism turns to religious violence, it ought to be seen as a “tool,” not a “syndrome.” Whether jihad is to be regarded as a tool or syndrome, extremists think that if Muslims abide by Allah-ordained sharia principles, no bad luck will happen to them. If bad things happen, it is because of spiritual failure that needs to be addressed. This type of thinking immensely motivates jihad and recruitment of would-be jihadists around the world.19 Jihad also means war against the unbelievers (kuffar) until they accept sharia as the law of the land. By sheer virtue of not being Muslims, these automatically become the enemies.20 Under traditional sharia edicts, all men who are mentally sound and able-bodied, and have reached puberty, are obligated to fight for global jihad. Today, a certain number of jihadist leaders implore women to be involved in the holy war as well.21

Case Study I: Saudi Arabia The House of Saud is the official name for the royal family of Saudi Arabia. It consists of the issues of Muhammad bin Saud, founder of the Emirate of Diriyah—when the First Saudi state was established (1744– 1818)—and his brothers. Today, the ruling circle of the House of Saud is primarily led by the heirs of Ibn Saud, the modern founder of Saudi Arabia (when he became King of Saudi Arabia from 1932 to 1953).22 He had many children, including 45 sons, and all of the following kings of Saudi Arabia. The most powerful ruler of the royal family remains the King of Saudi Arabia.23

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Resting upon strict Wahhabism, the official religion of the House of Saud, the royal family implements the Islamic religious codes to the letter. Enshrined in sharia, they send the religious police to enforce extremist Islamic religious laws in the land. In Saudi Arabia (and even in neighboring nations), the Saudis support and fund religious foundations, radical mullahs and mosques, madrassas, social programs, and charitable organizations. On top of fulfilling legitimate religious and social purposes, these sharia-based bodies are used as a religious foundation for jihad and religiously motivated killers—of which the targets will eventually be the Saudis themselves.24 Muthuswamy (2014)25 remarks that a significant subcategory of the local clerics in Saudi Arabia are also promoting jihadist violence. Nevertheless, such clerics play another major role in Islamic communities of that country: they are respected for their knowledge and authority on sharia. Unsurprisingly, this brings to mind the very fact that sharia is a massive contributor to the clerics’ agenda.

Case Study II: Pakistan A 2009 survey conducted in Pakistan pondered the question of sharia’s role in jihad. The survey revealed that comparable degrees of public support for jihadist groups were present among those who pushed for a bigger role of sharia in the Pakistani legal system (versus those who wished sharia were less important).26 Furthermore, many self-identified Islamist parties in Pakistan openly advocate policies of political violence. For example, the ulama political parties linked to two of the most important sharia traditions in Pakistan (Jamaat-e-Islami and Deobandism) have collaborated (directly or indirectly) with many jihadist groups. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) is the most recognized for its militant activities as a political party. It has had a track record of jihadist activities since 1971 (during the Bangladesh Liberation War).27 Likewise, the Deobandi ulema party has a wide array of members belonging to militant groups in Afghanistan and India, and that oppress religious minorities in Pakistan (e.g., the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistan Taliban, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi).28 In addition to supporting jihad, Islamist parties in Pakistan believe that an austere application of sharia should use even harsher physical punishments for crimes such as theft and adultery.29 This is a hallmark of Hudood ordinances. The Hudood Ordinances were laws in Pakistan enacted in 1979 when then-military ruler Zia-ul-Haq passed official

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sharia-based legislation regarding all aspects of life. By replacing a large section of the British-era Pakistan Penal Code, it added new criminal offenses to the list, like adultery and fornication, and new punishments as well, like public flogging, cutting off hands for theft, and stoning to death.30

Case Study III: Situation in 13 Countries In 13 Muslim nations, anyone can receive capital punishment for not having a religion (for being an atheist): Afghanistan, Iran, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.31 In a detailed study published in 2013, it was reported that in those 13 countries, anyone who openly embraces atheism or rejects the religion of Islam faces the official death penalty.32 Muslim-majority nations are empowering the political élite (who generally cooperate with religious clerics). The enforcement of these severe policies has provided legitimation for the purging of political opponents or moderate activists. Blasphemy laws are also something to behold. A blasphemy law is a law forbidding the act of insulting or expressing disdain—like an insult or a similar lack of respect—to a deity, or sacred things.33 Blasphemy laws have been maneuvered to exclude religious minorities and other defenseless communities out of the legal process. In 1984, Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, a religious thinker and political challenger to President Jaafar Nimeiry in the Republic of the Sudan, was put to death on fabricated charges of apostasy. The lack of legal and procedural measures confirmed the political ploy of the proceedings. Under Islamic blasphemy laws, blasphemy includes the verbal offense against Allah or the Prophet Mohammad (and other illustrious people in Islam), which can be committed by Muslims and non-Muslims alike.34 Fiqh Fiqh is Islamic jurisprudence. It is generally presented as the human reasoning and engagement with sharia. Fiqh applies or modifies sharia through interpretation (ijtihad) of the Quran and Sunna by Muslim jurists (ulama) and is carried out through the rulings (fatwa) of jurists on matters presented to them.35 Put another way, although sharia is

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perceived as absolute, fiqh embodies the multifaceted body of legal opinions; it is the result of human understanding of the foundational sources of authority (the Quran and the Sunna). The Quran is the foremost source of authority in Islamic jurisprudence; most Muslims see it as the word of Allah revealed to the Prophet in the seventh century. The Sunna is the model of behavior set by the Prophet through his actions and sayings, as reported through numerous accounts, or hadith. The Sunna comprises the second foremost source of authority in Islamic jurisprudence.36 In this discussion, Allah is considered flawless, whereas humankind’s efforts at understanding Allah’s actions are flawed. Islamic jurisprudence has it that humans can and should do their best to understand Allah’s actions. At the same time, humans’ abilities cannot provide answers to certain questions; the most they can achieve are reasoned conclusions of Allah’s will. This difference between Allah’s perfection and the imperfection of human understanding is of utmost importance because the use of human agency to interpret classical Islamic jurisprudence serves as a strong basis for commitment to jihad.37 One of the distinct characteristics of Islam is that it does not have a “church;” that is, Islam has no headquartered authority that prescribes a universal doctrine in the way the Catholic Church operates. To receive guidance, Muslims must consult the highest sources of authority in Islam: the Quran and the Sunna.38

Jihad as Legal “Just War” The doctrine of jihad is fundamental to the Muslim worldview of international law. The jihadist ideology has retained its prominence in contemporary conflicts and is often equated with the Islamic notion of “Just War.”39 Roda Mushkat (1987)40 corroborates the concept of jihad as legal “Just War” when he claims the following: Islamic law enjoins Moslems to maintain a State of permanent belligerence with all non-believers, collectively encompassed in the dar al-harb, the domain of war (…). The Muslims are, therefore, under a legal obligation to reduce non-Muslim communities to Islamic rule in order to achieve Islam’s ultimate objective, namely the enforcement of God’s law (the Sharia) over the entire world. The instrument by which the Islamic state is to carry out that objective is called the jihad (popularly known as the “holy war”) and is always just, if waged against the infidels and the enemies of the faith.

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Within Islamic jurisprudence, jihad is a means of military exertion against the Infidels, Apostates, and anyone insulting Islam. The basic purpose of jihad continues to be debated both within and outside Muslim communities. Salafists and Wahhabis consider it to be the only form of warfare allowed by sharia and Islamic jurisprudence. It may also be pronounced against illegal works, terrorists, criminal organizations, and leaders or states that oppress Muslims.41 A certain number of Muslims today see jihad as only a defensive form of war. For many in the ummah, jihad happens only in the event of a global mobilization. The more fundamental ones like Salafists and Wahhabis believe that the state of hostility and conflict for Muslims is perpetual and omnipresent.42 In explaining this position further, Busuttil (1991)43 makes the point that: A primary concern of Islam, given its impetus to conversion by the sword, is the conduct of war. Indeed, the study of the law of war, the siyar, so encompasses the attitude of Islam to the non-Muslim world that it has taken on the connotation of Islamic international law in general.

Islamic international law is called siyar. It differs from its Western counterpart in several ways. First, siyar is acknowledged as a central part of sharia and Islamic jurisprudence. Second, siyar evolved into a fully operated body of sharia several centuries before any legal system in the Western world was put in place. Islamic scholars argue that siyar is divinely ordained and, consequently, immutable. In Islamic jurisprudence, the implication of this for jihad is far-reaching.44

Islamic Military Jurisprudence Theological in both its form and implementation, Islamic military jurisprudence is not inflexible in its approach. Quranic texts reveal that it is divine and thus invariable in essence, but evolutionary and adaptable in application. Jihad allows for conceptual maneuvering in order to reach the most optimal outcomes. Theological and divinely directed, Islamic military jurisprudence looks at warfighting principles through a much different lens than Western strategic leaders are accustomed to. The reason is that it is not a military doctrine of war derived by humans, but by Allah. This is Allah’s warfighting theories and commandments at

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work.45 However, on account of fiqh principles, Islamic military jurisprudence still allows ample space for creativity and development. Therefore, jihadist theorists urge mujahedin to study military science in depth.46

Dar al-Islam vs. Dar al-Harb Islamic international law looks at the world as one divided into dar alIslam and dar al-harb. Virtually every Muslim legal scholar has concurred with these divisions. Dar al-Islam is a territory under Islamic rule. Its populations are Muslims by birth or conversion and the People of the Book (i.e., Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians), who choose to remain non-Muslims but who have the jizya (a poll tax). The dar al-harb is comprised of all the states and communities outside dar al-Islam. Its populations are called harbis (people belonging to territories of war).47 In principle, dar al-Islam is at perpetual war with dar al-harb. Muslims are under a legal obligation to crumble dar al-harb into ashes, establish Muslim rule, and impose Allah’s law over the whole world.48 Jihadists fight powerful leaders in dar al-harb and Muslim “traitors” in dar al-Islam. They target their victims based on long-established characteristics attributed to the enemy (e.g., religion, ethnicity, etc.), not because of unlawful actions by specific individuals. They perceive today’s Western-inspired régimes in the Muslim world as collaborators in the corruption of Islam; they refuse to be involved with these régimes and identify jihad as the best pathway to attain political power. This “logic of collective liability” implies that a large group is to be considered a legitimate target and, consequently, an obligation to fight it.49 When Osama bin Laden declared that “the world is divided into two camps, the camp of the faithful and the camp of the infidels,”50 this statement would strike any rational individual (from a Western standpoint) as antiquated and barbaric. Jihadism makes a sharp distinction between its devotees and those who are not. To the worst extremists, Muslims who deny the canons of jihad are tantamount to infidels, thus meriting capital punishment.51 The entire universe is divided “into what is permitted and what is forbidden. That is a worldview which is dished out to the pupils from the first school year onwards, a worldview which divides life as a whole into permissible and forbidden acts.”52

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Fard Ayn vs. Fard Kifaya In the Salafist school of thought, a supreme objective of Islam is to secure the supremacy of Allah’s word and purge any challenge to it. The classical doctrine takes jihad as the means to reach this objective. This is why it is mandatory for all Muslims to oust the Infidels from their land. Fard ayn (individual obligation) is mandatory for all. The believers do not even need approval from high authorities; children should do it without their parents’ consent, the wife without her husband’s, and the debtor without the creditor’s. If the Muslims in their invaded home country cannot expel the Infidels, for reasons of insufficient force or fear, then the fard ayn should spread between other believers to form a circle. The circles grow to the point of becoming fard ayn among the entire ummah.53 The individual obligation is to be included as part of a global war whereby every able person should enlist in the military. Fard ayn is particularly recommended in the event of a foreign attack on the state (Ibn Qudamah).54 An example is Osama bin Laden’s plea to the ummah— through is 1996 and 1998 fatwas—to fight the Crusaders. It was a call for defensive jihad against the Apostates and the Great Satan (i.e., the United States) which were said to tear up the very foundations of Islam. All Muslims, then, are beholden to join forces for this struggle to defend Islam in order to prevent its disappearance. Fard ayn is less binding or rigorous, but an essential precondition is that Muslims or the religion of Islam must be assailed first.55 Against this background, offensive jihad is to be applied when the Infidels are in a weak position; e.g., when they are not organized as a force against Muslims. In this case, the war is not fard ayn (individual obligation), but fard kifaya (collective obligation). The minimum requirements of a true, devout Muslim are surveillance of borders and the deployment of armed groups to terrify their enemies at least once a year. It is the responsibility of the religious authority to galvanize people into creating armed forces and fighting wars once a year. Additionally, the Muslim community is obligated to remind the religious authority that it is his or her duty to do so—otherwise, it is considered a sin. As one can see, fard kifaya is the implementation of the routine duties of jihad by trained Muslims for the “benefit” of the ummah.56

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Legal Persuasion for Jihad: Additional Perspectives As scholarship on persuasion has remarked, the effect of an argument is governed not only by its importance to the target audience, but also by the believability and authority of the rhetor.57 Influence largely depends on the credibility and reputation of the legal scholar. Placing jihad within the international legal structure of sovereign nations is an essential step toward making this phenomenon comprehensible and enlightening the types of dilemmas and strategic considerations inherent to it. Jihad propagandists attempt to persuade adherents to join the global fight to validate self-defense, assist their Muslim brothers and sisters, and react to an alleged violation.58 The Islamic legal jurisprudence surrounding the concept of jihad can be warped as one that promotes a “Just War,” which instructs Muslims to uphold a state of permanent aggression toward the unbelievers, collectively included in the dar al-harb. Under many circumstances, Muslims are obliged to subdue non-Muslim populations to Islam’s rule to accomplish Islam’s supreme objectives: (1) The enforcement of Allah’s will over the entire world and (2) to establish the global Caliphate. The instrument by which jihadists are to fulfill these objectives is called the “holy war,” and it is always just when fought against the enemies of the faith.59

Notes 1. Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, “Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda’s Justification for September 11,” Middle East Policy 10, no. 2 (2003): 76–92, https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4967.00107. 2. Bat Ye’or, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005). 3. Shmuel Bar, Warrant for Terror: The Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty to Jihad (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). 4. Joseph A. Kechichian, “The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 18, no. 1 (1986): 53–71, https://doi.org/10.1017/S00 2074380003021X. 5. Jonathan Berkey, The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo: A Social History of Islamic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 6. Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

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7. Gilles Kepel, “The Origins and Development of the Jihadist Movement: From Anti-Communism to Terrorism,” Asian Affairs 34, no. 2 (2003): 91–108, https://doi.org/10.1080/0306837032000118198. 8. Wiktorowicz and Kaltner, “Killing in the Name of Islam,” 81. 9. Wilna A. J. Meijer, “Fanaticism, Fundamentalism and the Promotion of Reflexivity in Religious Education,” in International Handbook of Inter-Religious Education, ed. Kath Engebretson, Marian de Souza, Gloria Durka, and Liam Gearon (New York: Springer, 2010), 729–41. 10. Moorthy S. Muthuswamy, “Sharia as a Platform for Espousing Violence and as a Cause for Waging Armed Jihad,” Albany Government Law Review 7, no. 2 (2014): 347–78. 11. Wael B. Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 12. Ali Khan, “Jurodynamics of Islamic Law,” Rutgers Law Review 61, no. 2 (2009): 231–93. 13. Carolyn M. Warner and Manfred W. Wenner, “Religion and the Political Organization of Muslims in Europe,” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 3 (2006): 457–79, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592706060300. 14. Khan, “Jurodynamics of Islamic Law,” 234. 15. Muthuswamy, “Sharia as a Platform for Espousing Violence,” 349. 16. Bassam Tibi, “John Kelsay and ‘Sharia Reasoning’ in Just War in Islam: An Appreciation and a Few Propositions,” Journal of Church & State 53, no. 1 (2011): 4–26, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcs/csq147. 17. Noor Mohammad, “The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction,” Journal of Law and Religion 3, no. 2 (1985): 384–88, https://doi.org/10.2307/ 1051182. 18. Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman, “The Psychology of Terrorism: ‘Syndrome’ Versus ‘Tool’ Perspectives,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 2 (2006): 193–215, https://doi.org/10.1080/095465506005 70119. 19. Hamdi Muluk, Nathanael G. Sumaktoyo, and Dhyah Madya Ruth, “Jihad as Justification: National Survey Evidence of Belief in Violent Jihad as a Mediating Factor for Sacred Violence among Muslims in Indonesia,” Asian Journal of Social Psychology 16, no. 2 (2013): 101–11, https:// doi.org/10.1111/ajsp.12002. 20. Bill Warner, Sharia Law for Non-Muslims (Nashville, TN: Center for the Study of Political Islam, 2010). 21. Karla Cunningham, “The Evolving Participation of Muslim Women in Palestine, Chechnya, and the Global Jihadi Movement,” in Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility, and Organization, ed. Cindy D. Ness (New York: Routledge, 2008), 84–99. 22. Afshin Shahi, The Politics of Truth Management in Saudi Arabia (London: Routledge, 2013).

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23. Barbara Bray and Michael Darlow, Ibn Saud: The Desert Warrior Who Created the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (New York: Skyhorse, 2015). 24. Anthony Oberschall, “Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory,” Sociological Theory 22, no. 1 (2004): 26–37, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00202.x. 25. Muthuswamy, “Sharia as a Platform for Espousing Violence,” 349. 26. C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Faith or Doctrine? Religion and Support for Political Violence in Pakistan,” Public Opinion Quarterly 76, no. 4 (2012): 688–720, https://doi.org/10. 1093/poq/nfs053. 27. Husain Haqqani, “The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 1 (2005): 112–26; Vali Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (2000): 139–80. 28. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). 29. Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, “Faith or Doctrine?,” 697–99. 30. Charles H. Kennedy, “Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979– 1989,” Pacific Affairs 63, no. 1 (1990): 62–77, https://doi.org/10. 2307/2759814. 31. Siobhan Fenton, “The 13 Countries Where Being an Atheist Is Punishable by Death,” The Independent, March 30, 2016, A1. 32. Cited in Abby Ohlheiser, “There Are 13 Countries Where Atheism Is Punishable by Death,” The Atlantic, December 10, 2013, A1. 33. Leonard Williams Levy, Blasphemy: Verbal Offense against the Sacred, from Moses to Salman Rushdie (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995). 34. Javaid Rehman, “Freedom of Expression, Apostasy, and Blasphemy within Islam: Sharia, Criminal Justice Systems, and Modern Islamic State Practices,” Criminal Justice Matters 79, no. 1 (2010): 4–5, https://doi. org/10.1080/09627250903569841. 35. Adis Duderija, The Imperatives of Progressive Islam (New York: Routledge, 2018). 36. Tamir Moustafa, “Islamic Law, Women’s Rights, and Popular Legal Consciousness in Malaysia,” Law & Social Inquiry 38, no. 1 (2013): 168–88, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2012.01298.x. 37. Ibid., 170. 38. Ibid., 171. 39. Hilmi Zawati, Is Jihad a Just War? War, Peace, and Human Rights under Islamic and Public International Law (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002).

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40. Roda Mushkat, “Is War Ever Justifiable? A Comparative Survey,” Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 9, no. 2 (1987): 227–317, 302. 41. Reuven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 42. Shaheen Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman, “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 10, no. 3 (2005): 321–43, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/kri017. 43. James Busuttil, “‘Slay Them Wherever You Find Them’: Humanitarian Law in Islam,” Revue de droit militaire et de droit de la guerre 30 (1991): 111–45, 113. 44. Ali and Rehman, “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law,” 323. 45. S. K. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War (Lahore, Pakistan: Associated Printers and Publishers, 1979). 46. Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through Which Umma Will Pass, trans. William McCants (Cambridge, MA: The John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006). 47. Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966). 48. Ali and Rehman, “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law,” 329. 49. Peter Mascini, “Can the Violent Jihad Do without Sympathizers?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 4 (2006): 343–57, https://doi.org/10. 1080/10576100600641832. 50. Cited in The New York Times, October 8, 2001, A8. 51. Assaf Moghadam, “The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 3 (2008): 1–3. 52. Nasr H. Abu Zayd, My Life with Islam (Haarlem: Becht, 2002), 126. 53. Juan José Miralles Canals, “Fourth-Generation Warfare: Jihadist Networks and Percolation,” Mathematical and Computer Modelling 50 (2009): 896–909, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mcm.2009.05.018. 54. Moniruzzaman, “Jihad and Terrorism,” 4. 55. Zaidi, “A Taxonomy of Jihad,” 25. 56. Canals, “Fourth-Generation Warfare,” 897. 57. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Reviews in Sociology 26 (2000): 611–39, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611. 58. Micheline R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 59. Mushkat, “Is War Ever Justifiable?” 302.

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References Abu Zayd, Nasr H. My Life with Islam. Haarlem: Becht, 2002. Ali, Shaheen Sardar, and Javaid Rehman. “The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law.” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 10, no. 3 (2005): 321–43. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/kri017. Bar, Shmuel. Warrant for Terror: The Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty to Jihad. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008. Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment.” Annual Reviews in Sociology 26 (2000): 611–39. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611. Berkey, Jonathan. The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo: A Social History of Islamic Education. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. Bray, Barbara, and Michael Darlow. Ibn Saud: The Desert Warrior Who Created the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. New York: Skyhorse, 2015. Busuttil, James. “‘Slay Them Wherever You Find Them’: Humanitarian Law in Islam.” Revue de droit militaire et de droit de la guerre 30 (1991): 111–45. Canals, Juan José Miralles. “Fourth-Generation Warfare: Jihadist Networks and Percolation.” Mathematical and Computer Modelling 50 (2009): 896–909. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mcm.2009.05.018. Cunningham, Karla. “The Evolving Participation of Muslim Women in Palestine, Chechnya, and the Global Jihadi Movement.” In Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility, and Organization, edited by Cindy D. Ness, 84–99. New York: Routledge, 2008. Duderija, Adis. The Imperatives of Progressive Islam. New York: Routledge, 2018. Fair, C. Christine, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro. “Faith or Doctrine? Religion and Support for Political Violence in Pakistan.” Public Opinion Quarterly 76, no. 4 (2012): 688–720. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfs053. Fenton, Siobhan. “The 13 Countries Where Being an Atheist Is Punishable by Death.” The Independent, March 30, 2016, A1. Firestone, Reuven. Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Hallaq, Wael B. An Introduction to Islamic Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Haqqani, Husain. Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. Washington, DC.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005. ———. “The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups.” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 1 (2005): 112–26. Ishay, Micheline. The History of Human Rights. Berkeley: University of California, 2008. Kechichian, Joseph A. “The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 18, no. 1 (1986): 53–71. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002074380003021X.

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Kennedy, Charles H. “Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979–1989.” Pacific Affairs 63, no. 1 (1990): 62–77. https://doi.org/10.2307/2759814. Kepel, Gilles. “The Origins and Development of the Jihadist Movement: From Anti-Communism to Terrorism.” Asian Affairs 34, no. 2 (2003): 91–108. https://doi.org/10.1080/0306837032000118198. Khadduri, Majid. The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966. Khan, Ali. “Jurodynamics of Islamic Law.” Rutgers Law Review 61, no. 2 (2009): 231–93. Kruglanski, Arie W., and Shira Fishman. “The Psychology of Terrorism: ‘Syndrome’ Versus ‘Tool’ Perspectives.” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 2 (2006): 193–215. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550600570119. Malik, S. K. The Quranic Concept of War. Lahore, Pakistan: Associated Printers and Publishers, 1979. Mascini, Peter. “Can the Violent Jihad Do without Sympathizers?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 4 (2006): 343–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10576100600641832. Meijer, Wilna A. J. “Fanaticism, Fundamentalism and the Promotion of Reflexivity in Religious Education.” In International Handbook of Inter-Religious Education, edited by Kath Engebretson, Marian de Souza, Gloria Durka, and Liam Gearon, 729–41. New York: Springer, 2010. Moghadam, Assaf. “The Salafi-Jihad as a Religious Ideology.” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 3 (2008): 1–3. Mohammad, Noor. “The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction.” Journal of Law and Religion 3, no. 2 (1985): 384–88. https://doi.org/10.2307/1051182. Moustafa, Tamir. “Islamic Law, Women’s Rights, and Popular Legal Consciousness in Malaysia.” Law & Social Inquiry 38, no. 1 (2013): 168–88. https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2012.01298.x. Muluk, Hamdi, Nathanael G. Sumaktoyo, and Dhyah Madya Ruth. “Jihad as Justification: National Survey Evidence of Belief in Violent Jihad as a Mediating Factor for Sacred Violence among Muslims in Indonesia.” Asian Journal of Social Psychology 16, no. 2 (2013): 101–11. https://doi.org/10. 1111/ajsp.12002. Mushkat, Roda. “Is War Ever Justifiable? A Comparative Survey.” Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 9, no. 2 (1987): 227–317. Muthuswamy, Moorthy S. “Sharia as a Platform for Espousing Violence and as a Cause for Waging Armed Jihad.” Albany Government Law Review 7, no. 2 (2014): 347–78. Naji, Abu Bakr. The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through Which Umma Will Pass. Translated by William McCants. Cambridge, MA: The John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006.

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Nasr, Vali. “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics.” Modern Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (2000): 139–80. Oberschall, Anthony. “Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory.” Sociological Theory 22, no. 1 (2004): 26–37. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00202.x. Ohlheiser, Abby. “There Are 13 Countries Where Atheism Is Punishable by Death.” The Atlantic, December 10, 2013, A1. Rehman, Javaid. “Freedom of Expression, Apostasy, and Blasphemy within Islam: Sharia, Criminal Justice Systems, and Modern Islamic State Practices.” Criminal Justice Matters 79, no. 1 (2010): 4–5. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09627250903569841. Shahi, Afshin. The Politics of Truth Management in Saudi Arabia. London: Routledge, 2013. Tibi, Bassam. “John Kelsay and ‘Sharia Reasoning’ in Just War in Islam: An Appreciation and a Few Propositions.” Journal of Church & State 53, no. 1 (2011): 4–26. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcs/csq147. Warner, Bill. Sharia Law for Non-Muslims. Nashville, TN: Center for the Study of Political Islam, 2010. Warner, Carolyn M., and Manfred W. Wenner. “Religion and the Political Organization of Muslims in Europe.” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 3 (2006): 457–79. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592706060300. Wiktorowicz, Quintan, and John Kaltner. “Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda’s Justification for September 11.” Middle East Policy 10, no. 2 (2003): 76–92. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4967.00107. Williams Levy, Leonard. Blasphemy: Verbal Offense against the Sacred, from Moses to Salman Rushdie. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995. Ye’or, Bat. Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis. Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005. Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Zawati, Hilmi. Is Jihad a Just War? War, Peace, and Human Rights under Islamic and Public International Law. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002.

CHAPTER 8

Political Motivations

Violence for political purposes is ubiquitous. Governments, militias, citizen collectives, as well as domestic and international terrorist groups embark on it and rationalize it as self-defense—a precious cause that cannot be attained by peaceful means. In most cases, violence is a pretext used against totalitarian, oppressive, fraudulent rulers; against economic mistreatment and social injustice; for sovereignty or autonomy; and in support of humanitarian intervention to protect a group from genocide— just to name a few. Terrorism, and its full mechanism of radicalization, is generally based on the desire to induce political change.1 Nasra Hassan (2001)2 interviewed close to 250 people involved in important Palestinian terrorist organizations: “None of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed. Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs.” More than 50% were refugees, and many aspired to fight a holy war for political reasons—principally out of reasons of humiliation, disgrace, dispossession, and emotional suffering caused by the State of Israel. Krueger (2007)3 postulates that terrorism is similar to voting. When one has a high-paying job, time is money, so it should dissuade one from voting. However, it is precisely these wealthy people who go out to vote because, first, they want to sway political outcomes and, second, they see themselves as sufficiently knowledgeable to express their opinions. In like fashion, terrorists want to influence political outcomes: they are so passionate about a cause that they are willing to sacrifice their lives for it. © The Author(s) 2020 J. Matusitz, Global Jihad in Muslim and non-Muslim Contexts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47044-9_8

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Terrorists are reacting to local or global political events. Understanding this fact can help discourage governments from undertaking counterproductive courses of action. Wiktorowicz (2004)4 argues that “since political movements are banned under most authoritarian régimes, Islamic activism becomes a natural vehicle for political discontent. Contention through Islam represents one of the few remaining effective options for confronting a sense of political exclusion.” In many regions, jihadism resonates with the masses because it seems like the best pathway against authoritarian rule, especially after pan-Arabism (which sought to unify the nations of North Africa and Western Asia in the 1950s and 1960s) has been dismissed as a failure.

“Decadence” of Muslim Societies For purist Salafists, the deterioration of Muslim societies is grounded in the betrayal of the true Quranic message, but it is also an outcome of secular conspiracy. In addition to abandoning traditional Islamic practices, the Muslim world, purist Salafists say, has colluded with Western-based leaders to form a conspiracy: to weaken the influence of Islam in the world. Behind this “plot” are the Crusaders and the Jews—remember Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa—who have devised a scheme to dominate Muslims and thwart Islam from flourishing. Political issues are framed as a package of ideas and rhetoric that come together internally (but are externally distinct).5 In this ideological structure, jihad is the only route to replace secular politics with sharia. This will be accomplished by defeating Western imperialism and dominance manipulated by darker powers that have been gradually supported by the Jewish-Crusader alliance.6 In this context, jihadism is a form of political resistance to “unjust rule,” particularly in Muslim territories, where many local Muslims (mostly Sunnis) are victims of terrorism themselves. ISIS, for example, exterminated many of its Sunni adherents in Syria and Iraq. The jihadist group believes that Muslim leaders have bowed to the West. The inhumane methods of ISIS are actually perceived as the least acceptable by many Muslims around the world—not its political model, which has gained more support in the Muslim arena.7 ISIS’s political model is to establish a global Islamic state. In contrast to political Salafism, whose development occurred within Muslim universities thanks to the classic texts of Salafism, “jihadists have received their political training on the battlefields.”8 Osama bin Laden himself made direct references to the

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decadence of the Muslim world, and this has remained a universal perception among purist Salafists.9 What comes next is a case study on the Iranian Revolution that serves to illustrate this concern about “Muslim decadence.” The main case study of this chapter, however, is the one on the Muslim Brotherhood. Case Study: The Iranian Revolution Sometimes called the Islamic Revolution or the 1979 Revolution, the Iranian Revolution was a sequence of violent actions to depose the monarch of Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and supersede his government by an Islamic republic (led by the Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was instrumental in the Iranian Revolution).10 The Revolution took place for various political reasons: (1) Pahlavi’s hard-wearing policies of Westernization and strong identification with Western powers (particularly the United States),11 (2) Pahlavi’s unpopular dismissal of Islamic tradition in his 1976 switch from the Islamic calendar to the Imperial calendar (which usually begins around March 21 of the Gregorian calendar),12 (3) his constant government surveillance and persecution of the People’s Mujahedin of Iran, the communist Tudeh Party of Iran, and other Marxist groups,13 (4) his rejection of previously apolitical Iranians, especially wholesalers of the bazaars, with the formation of a single party political cartel (the Rastakhiz Party),14 and (5) his authoritarian rule that violated the Iran Constitution of 1906, including suppression of dissent by security agencies like the SAVAK (Iran’s secret police).15 From 1979 onwards, the Iranian Revolution occasioned Islamist militancy and insurgency throughout the Muslim world, especially among the Shi’ites. Ayatollah Khomeini labeled the United States the “Great Satan” (blamed for the tribulations of Muslims) and proclaimed a holy war against the Jewish-Crusader alliance and Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia (that allegedly were pandering to the West). For Khomeini and other Muslim extremists, the misfortunes of the Muslim world were plentiful: (1) Underdevelopment and impoverishment, (2) military curtailment and embarrassing defeats of Arab armies by Israel, (3) despots supported by the West (as Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi had been), (4) too much dependence on the West, and (5) reckless waste of oil wealth to benefit the élite.16 Heartened by Khomeini and sponsored by the resources of Iranian revolutionary cadres, spiritual leaders,

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worship centers, educational institutions, and the media establishment, the political ideology of Islamic awakening proliferated across the Muslim world with special reverberation among minority Shi’ites. As Ayatollah Khomeini declared, “Islam and the teaching of the Koran will prevail all over the world. Weapons in our hands are used to realize divine and Islamic aspirations.”17 The Iranian youths who seized the U.S. embassy and triggered the 1979 hostage crisis—public disgrace for the Great Satan—led the way, in the early 1980s, for covert operational structures that became the template of many nascent jihadist groups and networks like Al-Qaeda. Sheltered by the Association of Militant Clerics in Teheran, the Council for the Islamic Revolution, and the Revolutionary Guard Corps, the call for a global Islamic revolution went out throughout Muslim and Arab nations for young men to migrate to Iran and train to be mujahedin. People who answered the call hailed from Libya, the Palestinian territories, Egypt, Lebanon, the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, among other places. The new recruits went to educational centers and training camps for religious indoctrination, weapons training, and studies of the enemy. The leading cadre—the jihadist élite—would eventually made the cut and embark on martyrdom operations. They backbit the leaders of their home countries and launched local revolutionary cells and networks. Others joined the Iran-Iraq war as foreign fighters.18

The Muslim Brotherhood: A Description Designated as a terrorist organization by the governments of Bahrain, Egypt, Russia, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates,19 the Muslim Brotherhood is an international Sunni jihadist organization founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna (a Muslim scholar and schoolteacher).20 The organization was created four years after the Ottoman Empire was abolished in Turkey (when the last Caliph was deposed in 1924). Al-Banna thought that the Quran and Sunna were the perfect guide for life and for social and political organization that Allah created for humankind. Muslim nations must abide by this mindset and eventually join forces for the Caliphate. The early mission of the Muslim Brotherhood was to expel British colonial and other Western powers, and redeem Islam’s sphere of influence—when it was an empire that stretched from Spain to Indonesia.21 In the nineteenth century, Western powers wielded political control over the Muslim regions. Because of European

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colonialism, Muslims experienced both foreign control and decadence in religiosity. The “impact of the West,” as Bernard Lewis (1993)22 elegantly called, could be heartily felt after the arrival of Western powers in the Middle East. This motivated religious reformists to launch transnational movements like the Muslim Brotherhood. Political Jihadism Political jihadism ensures that Islam grows and the world submits to Allah, a political doctrine inherent to the Muslim Brotherhood. Political and social action are necessary, and they have to suit an Islamic perspective based on a literalist interpretation of the politically laden Quranic texts—those that concern the administration of power, authority, and the Caliphate. The Muslim Brotherhood discourse is strongly opposed to any indication of commitment to or cooperation with Muslim or Western societies. Even in the West, local chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood employ a type of discourse that advocates resistance to the state and the fight for the global Caliphate.23 In 1928, Hassan Al-Banna’s objective was to introduce an Islamic system of world government that would be deny any association with Western values and institutions. This is reflected in its motto: “Allah is our objective; the Quran is our constitution; the Prophet is our leader; Jihad is our way; and Death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations.” This stands out against the leitmotiv of a great many Muslims, who have assimilated to Western values and institutions by voting and participating in the social and economic aspects of their host societies. Encouraged by the religious views of Ibn Taymiyya, a thirteenth-century Damascene divinity scholar who justified the use of jihad against the Mongols (whom he denied their membership to the ummah), the Muslim Brotherhood defended direct violence to fulfill the reign of Allah on earth.24 Alliance with Nazi Germany During WWII, and the period preceding it, a segment of the Muslim joined forces with Nazi Germany. Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem appointed by the British government, began currying favor with Nazi leaders in 1933, when Chancellor Adolf Hitler was elected. Agreeing with the anti-Semitic sentiment held by the Nazis, and aspiring to see the end of British rule in Palestine, al-Husseini quickly admired

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Adolph Hitler and Heinrich Himmler. Though mostly seen as a symbolic figure in the Near East, he volunteered his services to the Third Reich and became influential in the inclusion of Bosnian Muslims to the Bosnian SS Division. When the Third Reich fell in 1945, Husseini’s dream of an alliance between Nazism and Pan-Islamism was only short-lived.25 At present, the Muslim Brotherhood has chapters in almost all European nations where Muslim immigration has a significant presence. The organization continues to restore the declining Muslim communities and nations by championing an Islamic state ruled by sharia. To fulfill this dream, it urges all segments of society to contribute to the Islamization of society. In principle, this would consist of mingling an ultra-conservative approach to values and traditions with an openness to successful economic and scientific programs. In political terms, the Muslim Brotherhood’s recent ambiguous attitude towards democracy has moved in a more democratic direction. Now the question is, “Is this move being made out of belief or opportunism?”26

The Muslim Brotherhood: Sayyid Qutb It is important to describe some of the quintessential events and thinkers that played a major role in political jihadism and the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood. Few intellectuals were as critical for the popularity of modern jihadism as the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb—an Egyptian scholar who authored 24 books, a jihadist ideologue, and a supreme leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood until his death by hanging in 1966.27 Qutb urged righteous Muslims to join the global jihad movement to create a genuine Muslim state that would dominate their own country’s régimes. This, nevertheless, introduced the problem of fitna— internal war within Islam—which put Qutb in a position to defend the use of violence against other Muslims. To circumvent the problem of fitna, Qutb articulated the idea that true, devout Muslims were fighting not fellow Muslims but heretical Muslims.28 Qutb’s keen support of the jihadist doctrine and diffusion of offensive jihad to promote Islam is also referred to as Qutbism.29 Jahiliyyah On many occasions, Qutb included the Islamic concept of Jahiliyyah in his writings. Jahiliyyah refers to the era and state of affairs in Arabia before

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the birth of Islam. Translated as the “Age of Ignorance,” it is described as fervent resistance to the Prophet Muhammad’s monotheism.30 All religions or non-Islamic ways of life, whether coming from the West or the-then Marxist East, are corrupt and set up for failure. Only a return to pure, traditional Islam will avoid chaos.31 Qutb’s redefinition of jahiliyyah became one of his main philosophical staples to persuade Muslim groups to fight against the perceived encroachment of Western political and moral values on Islam. The circumstance of jahiliyyah, in which Allah is not considered the supreme deity, is a state of takfir (disbelief). In Islam, faith alone, or absolute obedience alone, is not sufficient for salvation. In Qutbism, there is a universal obligation for righteous Muslims to wage holy war until the global Caliphate emerges.32 Sayyid Qutb believed that his own country of Egypt, led by an illicit and oppressive régime under Gamal Abdel Nasser, had hindered the success of the peaceful propagation of Islam (dawah). Such a régime, he thought, prevented its Muslim citizens from freely practicing Islam and was, therefore, an apostate régime. The Nasserite régime—like virtually all other governments—was a jahiliyyah-troubled régime, a morally depraved entity. Dawah, in and of itself, could not support Allah’s will on earth because the jahiliyyah-afflicted régimes were too powerful. To eliminate this hurdle, Qutb said that the Muslim Brotherhood was the best Muslim vanguard movement to engage in global jihad.33 Traveling to the United States From 1948 to 1950, Sayyid Qutb lived in the United States on a scholarship to better understand its educational system. He spent a few months at Colorado State College of Education (now the University of Northern Colorado) in Greeley.34 Qutb condemned the United States as wicked and materialistic. He was infuriated by the American endorsement of the newly formed State of Israel in 1948. He also disparaged Western religions as a type of commerce, and commerce as a type of religion. He was shocked at the sexual tones of the church dance, of the “tapping feet, enticing legs, arms wrapped around waist, lips pressed to lips, and chests pressed to chests. The atmosphere was full of desire.”35 Upon his return to Egypt, Qutb proclaimed Western civilization to be a foe of Islam. He condemned leaders of Muslim countries as heretical for not observing the principles of Islam closely enough. He advocated that defensive jihad be waged not only to defend Islam, but also to

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cleanse it of all non-Islamic belief.36 As a result of his experience in the United States, he wrote his most seminal book in Arabic, Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Milestones in English), in which he declared that jihad “is not a temporary phase but a permanent war. Jihad for freedom cannot cease until the Satanic forces are put to an end and the religion is purified for God in toto [completely].”37 Qutb placed heavy emphasis on martyrdom and jihad, but he also underscored the problem of Christian and Jewish treachery and enmity vis-à-vis Islam. If non-Muslims were fighting a “war against Islam,” reactionary jihad was not offensive but defensive. He also stressed that Christians and Jews were mushrikeen (not monotheists) because priests and rabbis had the “authority to make laws, obeying laws which were made by them [and] not permitted by God” and “obedience to laws and judgments is a sort of worship.”38 Sayyid Qutb’s Legacy Considered a threat to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s régime, Qutb was sentenced and executed in 1966. After his death, he was lionized as a martyr by a large nucleus of followers and his philosophy kept its momentum. During the 1970s and 1980s, many Muslim extremist movements were created to occasion the downfall of their local governments. However, many were actually deposed by the state’s security apparatus.39 By the mid-1980s, a global jihad movement had entertained the philosophy that jihadist organizations had failed in the Muslim world because the corrupt régimes were continuously backed by the imperial West. One of the results of this school of thought was the expulsion of the Soviets from Afghanistan and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union. The disorder and immediate Taliban annexation of Afghanistan gave the global jihad movement a first great model of the modern Islamic state. It was also conducive to a permissive atmosphere to develop the caliphate philosophy and train a core of militants.40 In this twenty-first century, Sayyid Qutb remains an intellectual force of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the global jihad movement. Presentday fundamentalists are still influenced by Sayyid Qutb’s ideas regarding jihad. His distinguishing themes include (1) the advocacy of overthrowing a ruler when he or she is an apostate (due to failure to follow Islamic law), (2) the unconditional division of the world into dar al-harb and dar alIslam, (3) the labeling of any person not following the true tenets of Islam as an unbeliever, and (4) the call for global jihad against the Infidels and

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Apostates.41 A few years after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Qutb was portrayed in the U.S. media as Al-Qaeda’s “philosopher of terror.”42

The Global Caliphate For global jihadists, political jihadism is paramount, and they devote much time and energy toward the creation of a new state: the global Caliphate. It is an Islamic system of world government organized as the Prophet Muhammad did the first Muslim territories. The Caliph is a global Islamic ruler and the successor to the Prophet. He will make sure that the people of Earth live in agreement with Allah’s laws in all aspects of life: political, economic, social, and religious. The Caliphate is the physical and political system of government controlling the lands and populations under the global Islamic ruler. Already in the seventh century, it was a single political entity led by the Prophet Muhammad and his successors (i.e., the Righteous Caliphs).43 Perspectives from the Past The colonial and postcolonial phases that arose after the ending of the last Caliphate (i.e., the Ottoman Empire) are regarded by Muslim scholars and clerics as an epoch of desolation and humiliation. For this reason, since the commencement of the colonial period in the early twentieth century, Islamist movements have pushed for a rebirth of the transnational ummah, the return of the Caliphate, and sharia-compliant rules as their main geopolitical goals on their agenda. Such movements have included the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (established in 1928), in Syria (in the 1930s), in Jordan (in 1942), in the Sudan (in the 1940s), and in Algeria (in the 1950s). Other movements have included the Islamist Movement in Israel and Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (since the late 1980s), the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (since 1979); and the Taliban in Afghanistan (since the mid-1990s).44 Hassan Al-Banna, the aforementioned founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, championed the following ideas: “Rebuilding the international prominence of the Islamic Umma by liberating its lands, reviving its glorious past, bringing closer the cultures of its regions and rallying under one word.” As he continued, the world will not be at peace until it submits entirely to Islam and until the “long-awaited unity and the lost Khilafah is returned.”45 Another intellectual of the twentieth

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century, Abul A’la Maududi (1903–1979), proposed his plan for the global Caliphate in popular writing. A’la Maududi was a Muslim thinker living in India, and later Pakistan, who exerted enormous influence over contemporary Islamic political groups with his publication of The Islamic Law and Constitution in 1941.46 In his plan, the global Caliphate would implement sharia on all human beings. It would cover all their affairs and all functions of society at large, including régime administration, the rights and responsibilities of citizens, the legal system, laws regarding war and peace, and international relations.47 Islamic State As we have seen many times so far, the ultimate mission of global jihad is to create a global Islamic State. The idea of the Islamic State conjures up an impressive utopian imagination of the revival of the Ottoman Empire. It opposes the secular nation-state and all states established during the colonial and postcolonial phases. Rather, it calls for the restoration of the Caliphate ruled by the ummah, which goes beyond nationalism and race. For this reason, millions of jihadists from all over the globe have joined— or are willing to join—the fight for the Islamic State. ISIS is the driving force of the “Islamic State” concept today—hence, the term “Islamic State” as the first two letters of its acronym. ISIS views the phase of the first Caliphate in Muslim history (i.e., the Rashidun Caliphate, meaning “rightly guided” in Arabic) as the perfect political régime conducive to a perfect environment for Islam. The Rashidun Caliphate came to light after the Prophet Muhammad’s death and lasted until 661 AD.48 This regional Islamic State was succeeded continuously by many others, the last of which was the Ottoman Empire (1452–1924).49 For thirteen hundred years, “Islamic governments ruled states that ranged from fortified towns to transcontinental empires,” and that, “separated in time, space, and size, were so Islamic that they did not need the adjective to describe themselves.”50 In current Muslim-majority countries, Muslim Brotherhood circles are still calling for the return of a global Islamic State. They favor a unification of state and society into an absolute monolith that they call an “Islamic” state. They are adamant that such monolith would be the best way to impose the true foundations of Muslim morality and to make the boundaries between public and private, and between church and state,

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disappear. This would allow the disciplinary forces of the state to regulate both spheres.51 This militant doctrine exploits the sensibilities of the susceptible ones by a two-pronged scheme: On the one hand, jihad is framed as a method to protect the tenets of Islam (which sometimes is the only form of survival for those suffering abject misery and other types of insecurity). On the other hand, jihad is framed as the chance to bring back the lost glory of the Golden Age acts (which can rope many volunteers in, especially if they are promised many rewards in Paradise).52 No Possible Negotiation Jihadists and Salafists advocate the unification of religion and politics because a separation of these would be impossible as Islam controls all aspects of life.53 They believe they have been selected by Allah as a knowledgeable élite whose mission is to form and maintain a “top culture” aimed to fight for the rights of all Muslims. As such, they represent the avant-garde and role models for anyone. They want to be seen as the followed ones, not the followers.54 This also means that no negotiation with the Islamic State is possible; Islam would never be satisfied through negotiation with other states. Such extremist interpretation is predicated on the belief that Islam has precedence and authority above all other religions and ways of life—which, therefore, forbids righteous Muslims to participate in a non-Islamic political system. To participate in this system would imply that Muslims acknowledge equality between Islam and other religions and ways of life. Inferiorizing adversaries is a must. Recently, this philosophical approach towards European nations was confirmed by the fatwas issued by Saudi theologians, who make migration (hijrah) to Muslim countries a religious duty for all practicing Muslims living in Europe.55 Violating International Borders A key attribute of the “global Caliphate” syndrome is the jihadists’ aggressive attitude towards neighboring nations and the international community at large. Ultra-supporters of the global Caliphate have occasioned such severe international security concerns that they would be very difficult to be contained. Jihadism is adamant on changing the current world order, and true to their mission, jihadists will violate international

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borders, particularly those delineated by the colonial powers. ISIS maintains that it only believes in “frontlines,” not borders. As such, it prides itself on dismantling the “Sykes-Picot” system.56 The Sykes-Picot Agreement was a secret entente between Great Britain and France in 1916. This agreement determined the spheres of influence and monopoly in the Middle East and, thereby, redefined the borders between countries such as Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. The Sykes-Picot Agreement is considered a decisive moment in Western-Arab relations.57 For ISIS supporters, global jihad is a valid method to seek retribution for such unfair imperialism and for securing future territorial expansion of Islam. More importantly, it should serve as a lesson to the Western world; global jihad should be used as a deterrent force against attempts at such imperialism in the future.58 Violent conflicts between neighboring states are expected to become increasingly violent as borders become less rigid and governmental control—along with its power to deter and defend—fades. By extension, if non-state terrorist actors attribute external meddling to their nations’ political problems, then terrorism is an unsurprising result. It is improbable that it will be foiled where no effective government control exists. For instance, the Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab has committed terrorist attacks in the borderlands of Uganda and Kenya and against Ethiopians for interfering in Somalia’s affairs. Islamic terrorism in that region has flourished through the exacerbation of the Somali Civil War by Al-Shabaab.59 Emirates: The Precursor to the Caliphate Part of the success of the global Caliphate depends on electing a Caliph who meets certain conditions: He must be a member of the Prophet Muhammad’s lineage, from the Quraysh tribe, a righteous Muslim, and in excellent mental and physical condition (including sight in both eyes). Because of these requirements, the creation of the global Caliphate is considered a possible but distant goal. As soon as the network of like-minded emirates is set up, development from that entity into a transnational caliphate will only need internal changes.60 Indeed, the precursor to the global Caliphate is the formation of ruling emirates on all continents. An emirate is a political region governed by a dynastic Arab or Islamic king-styled emir. In fact, “emirate” is often synonymous with “kingdom.”61

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This network of emirates does not necessarily need centralized authority; i.e., it is not always structured hierarchically under one ruler or administration. On the contrary, each emirate collaborates with the others to offer some level of political, logistical, financial, military, and/or intellectual backing and to help create other emirates. This decentralized system of like-minded emirates lays the foundations for the true Islamic State in the future: the global Caliphate.62 As real emirates have already appeared in the world, they wittingly or unwittingly join an already-existing global jihad network. To this point, since the late 1980s, jihadist organizations have constantly sponsored the creation of “Islamic states” or “emirates” in many areas of the world (in such countries as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen).63 Escaping repression and injustice in their own lands, many global jihadists seek refuge in other—friendlier—nations throughout the world. There, they have already created informal emirate. Assisted by the new media technologies like the internet and social media, they have established a networked organization that arranges, raises funds, diffuses ideas, and activates its target audiences.64

Reactions Against Foreign Policy Another antecedent to jihadist radicalization is the anger caused by foreign policies taken by Western countries, where many Muslim migrants live. Indeed, jihad is driven not only by national issues, but also by foreign issues, which jihadists incorporate under a general war against Islam.65 The hypothesis is that “intrusive” foreign policies by Western governments dishonor and aggravate some Western Muslims to the point that they want to take revenge against people from states that tolerate or partake in such alleged injustices. Violence is seen as a natural reaction.66 The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks changed the trajectory of history. Like a wounded predator, the United States vowed to show the world that the Middle East could be used an example where democracy could be imposed one day. Thus, it decided to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. Blowback Theory Developed by Johnson (2000),67 blowback theory speculates that the global domination of Western states has occasioned terrorist violence onto

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lands and symbols of those states. To understand global jihad as a political force that has plagued the Muslim world since the late twentieth century, it is necessary to comprehend the emotional, social, financial, and political impact of European colonialism on many Muslim-majority states. European colonial rule triggered unparalleled anti-Western sentiments because of its purported disintegration of sharia codes, internecine conflict between ethnic or religious groups, impoverishment and underdevelopment, and tyrannical policies.68 The desire to reassert a unified Islamic identity against these darker powers buttressed political Islam and the concept of the global Caliphate. Muslims’ perpetual conception of European colonial rule in the Muslim world was its intent to weaken Islam by supplanting Islamic identity with Western traditions and values.69 More recently, a recurrent argument in the academic literature on global jihad is that jihadist leaders and thinkers see the Western invasion of Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Iraq; its support for Israel; and the attacks on Bosnia, Somalia, and Chechnya as valid reasons to get back at the West. These grievances are what Osama bin Laden emphasized as justification for targeting America and the West with terrorism. In his 1996 fatwa (i.e., his “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places”), Osama bin Laden stated that “the latest and greatest of these aggressions is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places [Saudi Arabia] by the armies of the American Crusaders and their allies.” In his 1998 fatwa, bin Laden urged the murder of American and its allies because “the United States had been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places [Saudi Arabia],” as well as destroying Iraq and supporting Israel.70 Pape (2005)71 believes that the deployment of “tens of thousands of American combat troops on the Arabian peninsula from 1990 to 2001 most likely made Al-Qaeda suicide attacks against Americans, including the atrocities committed on September 11, 2001, from ten to twenty times more likely.” Sethi (2009)72 observes that other reasons for such blowback include (1) the creation of the State of Israel and its long-term partnership with the United States, (2) defeats of Arab states and alliances (e.g., the SixDay War), (3) the occupation of sacred territories (e.g., Palestine), (4) non-Muslim rule in Jerusalem, (5) the popularity of the secular, democratic, and modern nation of Turkey (which was raised from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire), (6) the collapse of political Islam in many

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regions, and (7) the Western presence in Saudi Arabia (i.e., the birthplace of Islam). All these factors have led the ummah to feel humiliated and angry. Collective Emotional Orientation Collective emotional orientation denotes the manner in which a culture shares a particular emotion. It is a type of emotional atmosphere that people feel as a result of a culture’s sociopolitical predicament.73 Within the context of jihadism, collective emotional orientation can involve entire Muslim communities who feel immiserated—whether based on facts or perception—by the historical or present-day Western foreign policies in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Jihadists are still agitated by the diminished status of the Arab and Muslim world after what they believe were successive Western occupations of holy territories. Global jihad can also be a way to “get together” against a common enemy.74 Many Salafist youth, irrespective of gender, dream about fighting in Syria and Iraq. For them, it would be a journey that is both life-changing and morally inspiring. Some cling to photos of dead or wounded children in Syria and Iraq, and deeply identify with them. Repeatedly staring at these photos strengthens their determination to fight injustice with their Muslim brothers and sisters. Jihad, here, can take many forms: (1) Distributing Salafist readings, (2) proselytizing others through their clothing, (3) organizing rallies against religious offenses, and (4) eventually training and fighting against perceived aggressors.75 Justice is a key component. It signals a specific event or action as inequitable and elicits feelings such as moral outrage, hatred, dissatisfaction, and anger. The injustice frame motivates actors to express or make sense of their grievances.76 It constructs a political consciousness in which an entire community’s processes of identification, reasoning, and sentiments form a “motivational constellation preparing people for action.”77

Notes 1. Anthony Oberschall, “Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory,” Sociological Theory 22, no. 1 (2004): 26–37, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00202.x. 2. Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers,” The New Yorker, November 19, 2001, A1.

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3. Alan B. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist? Economics and the Roots of Terrorism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 4. Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory,” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 6–19, 8. 5. Nicholas Pedriana and Robin Stryker, “Political Culture Wars 1960s Style: Equal Opportunity Employment-Affirmative Action and the Philadelphia Plan,” American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 3 (1997): 633–91, https:// doi.org/10.1086/231252. 6. Barry Rubin, The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 7. Yosef Jabareen, “The Emerging Islamic State: Terror, Territoriality, and the Agenda of Social Transformation,” Geoforum 58 (2015): 51–5, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.10.009. 8. Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 3 (2006): 207–39, 225, https://doi.org/ 10.1080/10576100500497004. 9. Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001). 10. Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 11. Ervand Abrahamian, “Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution,” MERIP Reports 87 (1980): 21–6, https://doi.org/10.2307/3011417. 12. Ahmad Ashraf, “Iranian Identity,” in Encyclopaedia Iranica, vol. XIII (New York: The Encyclopaedia Iranica Foundation, 2006), 522–30. 13. Charles Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 14. Jerrold D. Green, “Pseudoparticipation and Countermobilization: Roots of the Iranian Revolution,” Iranian Studies 13, no. 1 (1980): 31–53, https://doi.org/10.1080/00210868008701564. 15. Jill Diane Swenson, “Martyrdom: Mytho-Cathexis and the Mobilization of the Masses in the Iranian Revolution,” Ethos 13, no. 2 (1985): 121–49, https://doi.org/10.1525/eth.1985.13.2.02a00030. 16. Bernard Lewis, “The Revolt of Islam,” The New Yorker, November 19, 2001, 50–63. 17. Cited in Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 27. 18. Oberschall, “Explaining Terrorism,” 32. 19. Stig Jarle Hansen, “O Brotherhood, What Art Thou? How to Classify the Islamist Group,” Foreign Affairs, March 24, 2017, A1.

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20. Rupe Simms, “‘Islam Is Our Politics:’ A Gramscian Analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood (1928–1953),” Social Compass 49, no. 4 (2002): 563–82, https://doi.org/10.1177/0037768602049004007. 21. Dan V. Segre and Joseph S. Szyliowicz, “The Islamic Revival,” The Washington Quarterly 4, no. 2 (1981): 126–37, https://doi.org/10. 1080/01636608109451772. 22. Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 23. Gilles Kepel, Jihad, expansion et déclin de l’islamisme (Paris: Gallimard, 2003). 24. Samir Amghar, “Salafism and Radicalisation of Young European Muslims,” in European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society, ed. Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur, and Michael Emerson (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007), 38–51. 25. Borris Havel, “Hajj Amin Husseini’s Anti-Semitic Legacy,” Middle East Quarterly 22, no. 3 (2015): 1–11. 26. Fidel Sendagorta, “Jihad in Europe: The Wider Context,” Survival 47, no. 3 (2005): 63–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330500248029. 27. John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998). 28. Danny Orbach, “Tyrannicide in Radical Islam: The Case of Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Salam Faraj,” Middle Eastern Studies 48, no. 6 (2012): 961–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.723629. 29. John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism (London: Hurst, 2010). 30. Mark A. Menaldo, “Sayyid Qutb’s Political and Religious Thought: The Transformation of Jahiliyyah and the Implications for Egyptian Democracy,” Leadership and the Humanities 2, no. 1 (2014): 64–80. 31. David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015). 32. Menaldo, “Sayyid Qutb’s Political and Religious Thought,” 65. 33. Mbaye Lo, Political Islam, Justice and Governance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). 34. Sayed Khatab, The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: The Theory of Jahiliyyah (London: Routledge, 2006). 35. Cited in Ellen McLarney, “American Freedom and Islamic Fascism: Ideology in the Hall of Mirrors,” Theory & Event 14, no. 3 (2011): 1–17, https://doi.org/10.1353/tae.2011.0031. 36. Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Ideology,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 1 (2005): 59–83. 37. Cited in Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 264.

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38. Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1996), 48. 39. Adnan Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005). 40. Benjamin E. Schwartz, “America’s Struggle against the Wahhabi/NeoSalafi Movement,” Orbis 51, no. 1 (2007): 107–28, https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.orbis.2006.10.012; Galina M. Yemelianova, “Islamic Radicalisation: A Post-Soviet, or a Global Phenomenon?,” in Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union, ed. Galina M. Yemelianova (New York: Routledge, 2010), 11–30. 41. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, 264–68. 42. Menaldo, “Sayyid Qutb’s Political and Religious Thought,” 65. 43. Thomas W. Arnold, The Caliphate (New York: Routledge, 2018). 44. Tamim Barghuthi, The Umma and the Dawla: The Nation State and the Arab Middle East (London: Pluto Press, 2008); Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966); Andrea Mura, “A Genealogical Inquiry into Early Islamism: The Discourse of Hasan al-Banna,” Journal of Political Ideologies 17, no. 1 (2012): 61–85, https://doi.org/10.1080/135 69317.2012.644986; and Andrea Mura, “The Inclusive Dynamics of Islamic Universalism: From the Vantage Point of Sayyid Qutb’s Critical Philosophy,” Comparative Philosophy 5, no. 1 (2014): 29–54, https:// doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2014).050106. 45. Jabareen, “The Emerging Islamic State,” 51–5. 46. Philip Jenkins, “The Roots of Jihad in India,” The New Republic, December 24, 2008, A1. 47. Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). 48. Tayeb El-Hibri, Parable and Politics in Early Islamic History: The Rashidun Caliphs (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 49. Philip Khuri Hitti, A History of the Arabs (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1961). 50. Noah Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 1. 51. Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 52. Manzar Zaidi, “A Taxonomy of Jihad,” Arab Studies Quarterly 31, no. 3 (2009): 21–34. 53. Sarah Glynn, “Bengali Muslims: The New East End Radicals?,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 25, no. 6 (2002): 969–88, https://doi.org/10. 1080/0141987022000009395. 54. Mohamed Ali Adraoui, “Purist Salafism in France,” ISIM Review 21, no. 1 (2008): 12–13.

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55. Ha Hellyer, “Engaging British Muslim Communities in CounterTerrorism Strategies,” The RUSI Journal 153, no. 2 (2008): 8–13, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840802103165; Zoltan Pall, “Between Ideology and International Politics: The Dynamics and Transformation of a Transnational Islamic Charity,” in Religion and the Politics of Development: Critical Perspectives on Asia, ed. Philip Fountain, Robin Bush, and R. Michael Feener (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 177–200. 56. Brynjar Lia, “Understanding Jihadi Proto-States,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (2015): 31–41. 57. Michael D. Berdine, Redrawing the Middle East: Sir Mark Sykes, Imperialism and the Sykes-Picot Agreement (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2018). 58. Lia, “Understanding Jihadi Proto-States,” 36. 59. Bridget L. Coggins, “Does State Failure Cause Terrorism? An Empirical Analysis (1999–2008),” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 3 (2015): 455–83, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713515403. 60. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. and Ibrahim Al-Marashi, A Concise History of the Middle East (New York: Routledge, 2018). 61. Johannes Harnischfeger, “Sharia and Control over Territory: Conflicts between ‘Settlers’ and ‘Indigenes’ in Nigeria,” African Affairs 103, no. 412 (2004): 431–52, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adh038. 62. W. R. Clement, Reforming the Prophet: The Dawn of the Islamic Reformation (Toronto: Insomniac Press, 2002); Kamran Hashemi, “Muslim States, Regional Human Rights Systems and the Organization of the Islamic Conference,” German Yearbook of International Law 52 (2009): 76–107. 63. Lia, “Understanding Jihadi Proto-States,” 31. 64. Deven Parekh, Amarnath Amarasingam, Lorne Dawson, and Derek Ruths, “Studying Jihadists on Social Media: A Critique of Data Collection Methodologies,” Perspectives on Terrorism 12, no. 3 (2018): 5–23. 65. Alex S. Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Radicalization,” Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 1 (2010): 33–51, 38, https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150903487956. 66. Edward Newman, “Exploring the ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 8 (2006): 749–72, https://doi.org/10. 1080/10576100600704069. 67. Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2000). 68. Halim Rane, “Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Islamist Extremism,” in Violent Extremism Online: New Perspectives on Terrorism and the Internet, ed. Anne Aly, Stuart Macdonald, Lee Jarvis, and Thomas Chen (New York: Routledge, 2016), 167–85.

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69. Halim Rane, Islam and Contemporary Civilisation: Evolving Ideas, Transforming Relations (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2010). 70. Cited in Michael Freeman, “Democracy, Al Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Policy,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 1 (2008): 40–59, 45, https://doi.org/10.1080/105 76100701759996. 71. Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), 114. 72. Kabir Sethi, “The Allure of the Radical: Understanding Jihadist Violence in the West,” Macalester International 22 (2009): 201–25. 73. Dominique Moïsi, “The Clash of Emotions: Fear, Humiliation, Hope, and the New World Order,” Foreign Affairs 86 (2007): 8–12; Joseph de Rivera, “Emotional Climate: Social Structure and Emotional Dynamics,” in International Review of Studies on Emotion, ed. Kenneth T. Strongman (New York: John Wiley, 1992), 199–218. 74. Monica Marks, “Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current,” Mediterranean Politics 18, no. 1 (2013): 104–11, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2013.764657. 75. Ibid., 111. 76. William A. Gamson, Talking Politics (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 77. Jacquelien Van Stekelenburg and Bert Klandermans, “Individuals in Movements: A Social Psychology of Contention,” in Handbook of Social Movements across Disciplines, ed. Bert Klandermans and Conny Roggeband (New York: Springer, 2007), 157–204, 177.

References Abrahamian, Ervand. “Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution.” MERIP Reports 87 (1980): 21–6. https://doi.org/10.2307/3011417. Adraoui, Mohamed Ali. “Purist Salafism in France.” ISIM Review 21, no. 1 (2008): 12–13. Afary, Janet, and Kevin B. Anderson. Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. Amghar, Samir. “Salafism and Radicalisation of Young European Muslims.” In European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society, edited by Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur, and Michael Emerson, 38–51. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007. Arnold, Thomas W. The Caliphate. New York: Routledge, 2018. Ashraf, Ahmad. “Iranian Identity.” In Encyclopaedia Iranica, vol. XIII, 522–30. New York: The Encyclopaedia Iranica Foundation, 2006.

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Barghuthi, Tamim. The Umma and the Dawla: The Nation State and the Arab Middle East. London: Pluto Press, 2008. Berdine, Michael D. Redrawing the Middle East: Sir Mark Sykes, Imperialism and the Sykes-Picot Agreement. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2018. Bergen, Peter. Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001. Calvert, John. Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism. London: Hurst, 2010. Clement, W. R. Reforming the Prophet: The Dawn of the Islamic Reformation. Toronto: Insomniac Press, 2002. Coggins, Bridget L. “Does State Failure Cause Terrorism? An Empirical Analysis (1999–2008).” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 3 (2015): 455–83. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713515403. Cook, David. Understanding Jihad. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015. Delong-Bas, Natana J. Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. El-Hibri, Tayeb. Parable and Politics in Early Islamic History: The Rashidun Caliphs. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Esposito, John L. Islam and Politics. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998. Feldman, Noah. The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. Freeman, Michael. “Democracy, Al Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Policy.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 1 (2008): 40–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100701759996. Gamson, William A. Talking Politics. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Glynn, Sarah. “Bengali Muslims: The New East End Radicals?” Ethnic and Racial Studies 25, no. 6 (2002): 969–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/014198 7022000009395. Goldschmidt, Arthur, Jr., and Ibrahim Al-Marashi. A Concise History of the Middle East. New York: Routledge, 2018. Green, Jerrold D. “Pseudoparticipation and Countermobilization: Roots of the Iranian Revolution.” Iranian Studies 13, no. 1 (1980): 31–53. https://doi. org/10.1080/00210868008701564. Gunaratna, Rohan, “Al Qaeda’s Ideology.” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 1 (2005): 59–83. Hansen, Stig Jarle. “O Brotherhood, What Art Thou? How to Classify the Islamist Group.” Foreign Affairs, March 24, 2017, A1. Harnischfeger, Johannes. “Sharia and Control over Territory: Conflicts between ‘Settlers’ and ‘Indigenes’ in Nigeria.” African Affairs 103, no. 412 (2004): 431–52. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adh038.

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Hashemi, Kamran. “Muslim States, Regional Human Rights Systems and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.” German Yearbook of International Law 52 (2009): 76–107. Hassan, Nasra. “An Arsenal of Believers.” The New Yorker, November 19, 2001, A1. Havel, Borris. “Hajj Amin Husseini’s Anti-Semitic Legacy.” Middle East Quarterly 22, no. 3 (2015): 1–11. Hefner, Robert W. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. Hellyer, Ha. “Engaging British Muslim Communities in Counter-Terrorism Strategies.” The RUSI Journal 153, no. 2 (2008): 8–13. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/03071840802103165. Hitti, Philip Khuri. A History of the Arabs. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1961. Jabareen, Yosef. “The Emerging Islamic State: Terror, Territoriality, and the Agenda of Social Transformation.” Geoforum 58 (2015): 51–5. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.10.009. Jenkins, Philip. “The Roots of Jihad in India.” The New Republic, December 24, 2008, A1. Johnson, Chalmers. Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2000. Kepel, Gilles. Jihad, expansion et déclin de l’islamisme. Paris: Gallimard, 2003. Khadduri, Majid. The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966. Khatab, Sayed. The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: The Theory of Jahiliyyah. London: Routledge, 2006. Krueger, Alan B. What Makes a Terrorist? Economics and the Roots of Terrorism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. Kurzman, Charles. The Unthinkable Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. Lewis, Bernard. Islam and the West. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. ———. “The Revolt of Islam.” The New Yorker, November 19, 2001, 50–63. Lia, Brynjar. “Understanding Jihadi Proto-States.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (2015): 31–41. Lo, Mbaye. Political Islam, Justice and Governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Marks, Monica. “Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current.” Mediterranean Politics 18, no. 1 (2013): 104–11. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13629395.2013.764657. McLarney, Ellen. “American Freedom and Islamic Fascism: Ideology in the Hall of Mirrors.” Theory & Event 14, no. 3 (2011): 1–17. https://doi.org/10. 1353/tae.2011.0031.

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Menaldo, Mark A. “Sayyid Qutb’s Political and Religious Thought: The Transformation of Jahiliyyah and the Implications for Egyptian Democracy.” Leadership and the Humanities 2, no. 1 (2014): 64–80. Minault, Gail. The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. Moïsi, Dominique. “The Clash of Emotions: Fear, Humiliation, Hope, and the New World Order.” Foreign Affairs 86 (2007): 8–12. Mura, Andrea. “A Genealogical Inquiry into Early Islamism: The Discourse of Hasan al-Banna.” Journal of Political Ideologies 17, no. 1 (2012): 61–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2012.644986. ———. “The Inclusive Dynamics of Islamic Universalism: From the Vantage Point of Sayyid Qutb’s Critical Philosophy.” Comparative Philosophy 5, no. 1 (2014): 29–54. https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2014).050106. Musallam, Adnan. From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005. Newman, Edward. “Exploring the ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 8 (2006): 749–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10576100600704069. Oberschall, Anthony. “Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory.” Sociological Theory 22, no. 1 (2004): 26–37. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00202.x. Orbach, Danny. “Tyrannicide in Radical Islam: The Case of Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Salam Faraj.” Middle Eastern Studies 48, no. 6 (2012): 961–72. https:// doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.723629. Pall, Zoltan. “Between Ideology and International Politics: The Dynamics and Transformation of a Transnational Islamic Charity.” In Religion and the Politics of Development: Critical Perspectives on Asia, edited by Philip Fountain, Robin Bush, and R. Michael Feener, 177–200. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Pape, Robert. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random House, 2005. Parekh, Deven, Amarnath Amarasingam, Lorne Dawson, and Derek Ruths. “Studying Jihadists on Social Media: A Critique of Data Collection Methodologies.” Perspectives on Terrorism 12, no. 3 (2018): 5–23. Pedriana, Nicholas, and Robin Stryker. “Political Culture Wars 1960s Style: Equal Opportunity Employment-Affirmative Action and the Philadelphia Plan.” American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 3 (1997): 633–91. https:// doi.org/10.1086/231252. Peters, Rudolph. Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1996. Rane, Halim. Islam and Contemporary Civilisation: Evolving Ideas, Transforming Relations. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2010.

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———. “Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Islamist Extremism.” In Violent Extremism Online: New Perspectives on Terrorism and the Internet, edited by Anne Aly, Stuart Macdonald, Lee Jarvis, and Thomas Chen, 167–85. New York: Routledge, 2016. de Rivera, Joseph. “Emotional Climate: Social Structure and Emotional Dynamics.” In International Review of Studies on Emotion, edited by Kenneth T. Strongman, 199–218. New York: John Wiley, 1992. Rubin, Barry. The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Schwartz, Benjamin E. “America’s Struggle Against the Wahhabi/Neo-Salafi Movement.” Orbis 51, no. 1 (2007): 107–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. orbis.2006.10.012. Segre, Dan V., and Joseph S. Szyliowicz. “The Islamic Revival.” The Washington Quarterly 4, no. 2 (1981): 126–37. https://doi.org/10.1080/016366081 09451772. Sendagorta, Fidel. “Jihad in Europe: The Wider Context.” Survival 47, no. 3 (2005): 63–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330500248029. Sethi, Kabir. “The Allure of the Radical: Understanding Jihadist Violence in the West.” Macalester International 22 (2009): 201–25. Simms, Rupe. “‘Islam Is Our Politics:’ A Gramscian Analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood (1928–1953).” Social Compass 49, no. 4 (2002): 563–82. https://doi.org/10.1177/0037768602049004007. Swenson, Jill Diane. “Martyrdom: Mytho-Cathexis and the Mobilization of the Masses in the Iranian Revolution.” Ethos 13, no. 2 (1985): 121–49. https:// doi.org/10.1525/eth.1985.13.2.02a00030. Van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien, and Bert Klandermans. “Individuals in Movements: A Social Psychology of Contention.” In Handbook of Social Movements across Disciplines, edited by Bert Klandermans and Conny Roggeband, 157–204. New York: Springer, 2007. Wiktorowicz, Quintan. “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 3 (2006): 207–39, 225. https://doi.org/10.1080/105 76100500497004. ———. “Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory.” In Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Approach, edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz, 6–19. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004. Wilner, Alex S., and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz. “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Radicalization.” Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 1 (2010): 33–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150903487956 Wright, Robin. Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985.

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Yemelianova, Galina M. “Islamic Radicalisation: A Post-Soviet, or a Global Phenomenon?” In Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union, edited by Galina M. Yemelianova, 11–30. New York: Routledge, 2010. Zaidi, Manzar. “A Taxonomy of Jihad.” Arab Studies Quarterly 31, no. 3 (2009): 21–34.

CHAPTER 9

A Clash of Civilizations

The Clash of Civilizations is a theoretical concept postulating that, since the end of the Cold War, individuals’ cultural and religious identities have been the main reasons for conflict and divisions between civilizations. These reasons for conflict and divisions occur across the world and will intensify in the future. Even though Samuel Huntington (1993)1 popularized that hypothesis in his article published in Foreign Affairs, it was actually described earlier by Bernard Lewis (1990)2 in The Atlantic Monthly, in an article titled “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” The phrase had already appeared much earlier in a book on the Middle East written by Basil Mathews (1926)3 : Young Islam on Trek: A Study in the Clash of Civilizations.

Five Significant Factors The most explicit conclusion that one can reach from the presentday Clash of Civilizations is that, in this post-Cold War age, the most widespread type of global conflict will be rooted in disagreements between major civilizations. According to Huntington (1996),4 the Clash of Civilizations has emerged as a result of five significant factors: 1. The growing interaction among groups of different civilizations. Owing to globalization, the world is now a smaller place. Hence, interactions from all corners of the planet are increasing. They © The Author(s) 2020 J. Matusitz, Global Jihad in Muslim and non-Muslim Contexts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47044-9_9

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deepen civilization consciousness and awareness of dissimilarities between civilizations (as well as commonalities within them). Distinctions between “us” and “them,” and the danger “they” pose, are framed in terms of cultural and religious attributes believed to be conflicting with “our” culture/nation. 2. In regard to the differences between civilizations themselves, they are too fundamental in that civilizations differ from one other based on history, language, values, customs, and religions. These fundamental differences have developed for centuries. So, they will not evaporate any time soon; 3. Growing economic regionalization, which intensifies civilization consciousness. More precisely, as economic regionalism attains more and more success, it also bolsters civilization consciousness. In fact, economic regionalism generally succeeds when it is grounded in shared consciousness; 4. The de-Westernization and indigenization of migrants in nonWestern nations. The development of civilization consciousness is attributed, in part, to the dual role played by the West. On the one hand, the West exerts a considerable degree of power and hegemony. On the one hand, a return-to-the-roots syndrome has been observed within non-Western civilizations. A West with a high degree of power now clashes with non-Western nations that have expressed their aspirations to transform the world in non-Western ways; and 5. A universal renaissance of religious identity, slowly replacing waning local and state-based identities. As a result of economic modernization and social change, a certain number of people are estranged from their local identities. This is where religion comes into play: by filling this gap, which lays the foundations for identity and commitment to transcend national borders and unite civilizations. Huntington (1996)5 asserts that “identity at any level—personal, tribal, racial, civilizational—can only be defined in relation to an ‘other,’ a different person, tribe, race, or civilization.” The sociological interpretation of this perspective is often paired with Simmel’s view (1898),6 which was elucidated and expanded later by Coser (1956).7

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Everything considered, the ideological wars that have influenced the postCold War have opened pathways to civilizational wars today. Huntington calls these wars “fault-line wars.” Based on these five key indicators, the Clash of Civilizations thesis has become the lynchpin of the academic discourse about the effects of ideological factors on global conflict. In fact, it has become so central in the political landscape that Roman Herzog (1999),8 the former president of the Federal Republic of Germany, published a seminal work titled Preventing the Clash of Civilizations. His volume designs strategies to prevent the Clash of Civilizations from becoming a reality. Huntington (1996)9 made it clear that “the interaction between Islam and the West is seen,” on both sides, “as a Clash of Civilizations.” As he continued, “the West’s next confrontation is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin.” Huntington (1996)10 added that, if Islam remains Islam, “and the West remains the West, this fundamental conflict between two great civilizations and ways of life will continue to define their relations in the future even as it has defined them for the past fourteen centuries.”

Cultures vs. Civilizations Cultures and civilizations have many elements in common, including religion, language, traditions, history, and institutions.11 However, “civilization” is a centerpiece to international conflict because it is “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have.”12 For Huntington (1996),13 a civilization is “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species.” He insists that a civilization “is a culture writ large” and is “the biggest ‘we’ within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other ‘thems’ out there.” Civilizations come in many sizes, shapes, and forms. They may “involve a large number of people, such as Chinese civilization, or a very small number of people such as the Anglophone Caribbean.” The “central defining characteristic” of a civilization is its religion. Therefore, “the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world’s great religions.”14

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Jihad Against the Rest As Bernard Lewis (1990)15 puts it, “this hatred becomes a rejection of Western civilization as such, not only what it does but what it is, and the principles and values that it practices and professes.” This conception of a community under threat is not unique to Islam. Even in democratic nations like America and Israel, radical Christians and Jews, respectively, have repeatedly claimed that their identities are constantly under threat by secular and liberal organizations and values. For this reason, some of these Christian and Jewish extremists have turned to violence and terrorism.16 As stated by Cohen (2015),17 To call this movement, whose most potent recent manifestation is the Islamic State, a “dark ideology” is like calling Nazism a reaction to German humiliation in World War I: true but wholly inadequate. There is little point in Western politicians rehearsing lines about there being no battle between Islam and the West, when tens of millions of Muslims, with much carnage as evidence, believe the contrary.

The roots of the protracted conflict between the Muslim and Western civilizations, Huntington (1996)18 explains, “lie not in transitory phenomena such as twelfth-century Christian passion or twentiethcentury Muslim fundamentalism,” but rather, “they flow from the nature of the two religions and the civilizations based on them.”

Identity Issues The assumption behind global divergence is simple: if differences in cultural identity are conflict-loaded, and identity is mostly monolithic, then one’s identity in conflict is more important than one’s status in conflict. From this vantage point, conflicts centered on identity are less likely to be open to compromise or negotiation. Since many civilizations today are predominantly ingrained in religious identity, this further reduces prospects for compromise, and, in fact, will exacerbate the propensity toward a Clash of Civilizations.19 Huntington (1996)20 adds that “people rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language, values, and institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones,” aggravating the discrepancies in identities between groups. In the twentyfirst century, as it was already in the nineteenth century, some groups are, in the words of Anderson (1991),21 “imagined communities.” They are

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invented constructs where identities are produced to achieve particular purposes. Huntington stresses that identity conflicts will happen between groups or movements, not so much nations: “Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations.”22 Although one can learn to speak multiple languages and still identify with one culture, this is not the case with religion. The uniqueness of religion makes it more complex than language, or even race and ethnicity. That is, “a person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries;” however, “it is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.”23 The exceptionality of religious-based differences stems from the fact that they represent conflicting views on basic issues of human existence. Examples are the nature of life and the essential ordering principles of self, family, and society, as well as matters related to the “end times” philosophy and redemption. The doctrine of global jihad is appealing, in part, because current and future generations perceive that their Muslim identity is under threat from Westernization. Islam, like most world religions, can be conceived as an overlapping and connected set of ideas (faith) and practices, as well as a purveyor of a certain identity. For would-be jihadists, their identity as righteous Muslims derives both from their faith in the interpretations of truths (as stipulated by their religion) and their ability—and others’—to practice this faith in order to live a just life.24 For Soroush (2000),25 this importance of Islam as identity, not just Islam as faith, for a significant percentage of Muslim adherents is driving global jihadist violence today. As he contends, “some people are saying, We’re neither Americans, nor Iranians, nor Arabs; we’re Muslims and this is our identity and we’re at war with the United States in the name of our Islamic identity.”

Territorial Issues When ideological factors become increasingly apparent in disputes, physical stakes such as territory become replete with universal values of global divergence against the enemy. This mindset tends to make territorial issues inseparable and not amenable to compromise. Generally, the successful outcome of a territorial dispute may be determined by dividing the disputed territory. However, it would be impossible to happen if Jerusalem—which Muslims call “Al-Quds”—were to be partitioned to

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the satisfaction of the warring parties.26 Huntington (1996)27 echoes this view: Differences in material interest can be negotiated and often settled by compromise in a way cultural issues cannot. Hindus and Muslims are unlikely to resolve the issue of whether a temple or a mosque should be built at Ayodhya by building both, or neither, or a syncretic building that is both a mosque and a temple.

Inherent to Huntington’s statement is the belief that conflicts between groups from different civilizations are more likely to forge an in-group identity and become culture-laden—so much so that it will intensify intercivilizational conflict levels. This is an example of primordialism, a concept arguing that nations or peoples are ancient natural phenomena and their descendants today want to maintain their identities28 (especially in today’s globalized circumstances). Jihad vs. McWorld Developed by Benjamin Barber (1995),29 in his book titled Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World, “Jihad vs. McWorld” is a theory that describes the struggle between “McWorld” (i.e., globalization, concentration of media ownership, and corporate regulations of the political process) and jihad (i.e., an extreme form of theocracy and religious orthodoxy). There are many academic works that point to the Islamic world’s antipathy towards the Western world. Books and articles attribute such antipathy to the overall cultural incompatibility between Western consumerism and religious fundamentalism. For Benjamin Barber, a global commercial culture poses a threat to local, traditional communities that want to preserve their identity in the backdrop of the commercialization of culture. Jihadist leaders are attempting to galvanize their local, traditional Muslim communities to fight the rest of the world.

McWorld: A Description The homogenizing promotion of U.S. goods and values as American “style” underprops McWorld. This holds true about U.S. media conglomerates. Barber defines information as the “black gold” of McWorld.30

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Whatever entity regulates the “pipes” for presenting information has tremendous power. This explains the recent trend of mergers and acquisitions between media conglomerates.31 McWorld can also be conflated with the theoretical concepts of McDonaldization, Disneyfication, and Wal-Martization, three phenomena of Western imperialism that have had an astronomical effect on the global market and consumer choices.32 Consider Mohammed Atta, one of the leaders of the 9/11 attacks, who was 33 years old when he flew the first airliner into WTC 1 (the North Tower) at 8:46 a.m. For Atta, to face down the McWorld threat to the ummah, the Muslim world had no choice but implement a jihadist strategy in order to sustain life. Mohammed Atta is a prime example of a dangerous byproduct of the McWorld phenomenon. When studying in Egypt and Syria, he became enraged by the sight of construction projects, one of which was a planned “Islamic Disneyland” for tourists in Cairo, an attraction with actors and restored buildings.33 This led to “the humiliation of what he felt to be his own culture, society, and religion.”34 In Syria, “one of the things that so angered him was the way taller, newer buildings in Western style overlooked, and thus invaded, the courtyards of older, traditional dwellings,”35 which disregarded the value of an “Islamicized space.” Atta condemned not only the Egyptian régime, but also the West and America in particular for debasing his country. Although Atta became a jihadist for many other reasons, the Western menace to the ummah and his Muslim identity was, without a doubt, one key factor.36

Dangers of “Excessive” Modernity Modernity and the nation-state have elicited a vehement reaction from groups, long embedded in their culture, location, habits, and community, that dread a loss of identity. Excessive modernity, they say, produces “imagined communities”37 of identity because face-to-face communication with all members of the community is impractical. As the relationships that glue imagined communities together decline, long-existing communities may rebuild themselves and materialize more strongly at a global level. Barber recognizes that violent identity-based movements like jihadism are emerging in particular places to resist modernity and shield traditional identities from the blitzkrieg of Western values. As Lewis (2001)38 affirms,

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Muslim fundamentalists are those who believe the troubles of the Muslim world are the result not of insufficient modernization but excessive modernization i.e. imposing and importing infidel ways on Muslim peoples. The task is to remove [modernizing] rulers and expel their foreign patrons and protectors, and return to purely Islamic ways of life in accord with the principles of Islam.

Ajami (2001)39 has argued that “Islam didn’t produce Mohamed Atta. He was born of his country’s struggle to reconcile modernity with tradition.” Similarly, Barber (2003)40 has described the “collision between the forces of disintegral tribalism and reactionary fundamentalism” with “the forces of integrative modernization and aggressive economic and cultural globalization brutally exacerbated by the dialectical interdependence of these two seemingly oppositional sets of forces.” As he continues, jihadists are in fact “people who detest modernity—the secular, scientific, rational, and commercial civilization created by the Enlightenment as it is defined by both its virtues (freedom, democracy, tolerance, and diversity) and its vices (inequality, hegemony, cultural imperialism, and materialism).” Hence, “globalization’s current architecture breeds anarchy, nihilism, and violence.” The Lexus and the Olive Tree Just like Benjamin Barber’s Jihad vs. McWorld, Thomas Friedman’s (1999)41 The Lexus and the Olive Tree postulates that the fast-tracking rate of globalization and cultural homogenization has occasioned a fundamentalist backlash. Unlike Jihad vs. McWorld, however, Friedman believes that the world is experiencing two struggles: the ambition to achieve wealth and development, embodied by the Lexus, and the ambition to maintain identity and traditions, embodied by the olive tree. The Lexus symbolizes a new global order. Built through computer-assisted robots and sold worldwide, the Lexus exemplifies the “global markets, financial institutions and computer technologies with which (people) pursue higher living standards today.”42 Conversely, the olive tree characterizes local affiliations with particular places. Olive trees “represent everything that roots us, anchors us, identifies us and locates us in the world – whether it be belonging to a family, a community, a tribe, a nation, a religion or, most of all, a place called home.”43

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Understanding world events entails understanding what is as new as social media sites and what is as old as olive trees in the Near East. Put another way, Friedman covers a realm much broader than geopolitics because it includes the whole world. It is a thesis about the world that has replaced the Cold War thesis; a framework that unifies the fates of populations all over the world—from Central American Indians to Asian bankers to multinational corporation executives. The issue at hand is the globalization of information, technology, and finance, and how it has reduced the world into a highly connected community where millions of people can easily travel thanks to new technologies and where billions of dollars are easily transferred from one place to another with a few mouse clicks away.44 Friedman also discusses the “disconnect” between the commercial methods of globalization (i.e., the Lexus) and humankind’s historical emphasis on relationship, tribe, and local community (i.e., the olive tree). The Great Disconnect means that the Lexus is displacing the olive tree; that is, globalization has upset traditional cultures and caused frictions and clashes between the new global philosophy and traditional cultures across the globe. The Lexus is a perfect example of a symbol of unrivaled material success, whose leading values have been placed on prestige and funding. It has been a chief sponsor of globalization. Many countries—including rich Muslim nations like the Arab states of the Persian Gulf—have appropriated its attributes with the hope that domestic economic growth and prosperity would ensue.45 How do globalization and the free market displace traditional cultures in a negative way? Globalization entails, The spread of free-market capitalism to virtually every country in the world. Therefore, globalization also has its own set of economic rules— rules that revolve around opening, deregulating and privatizing your economy, in order to make it more competitive and attractive to foreign investment.46

In brief, the free-market economy’s own rules can have a significantly detrimental effect on traditional cultures, to the point of wearing down the basic institutions of those cultures. This is happening because some of those cultures have a difficult time surviving or catching up. The fast pace of change is overpowering them. Their religious tenets are not

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helping, as they have imposed stiff limitations on embracing globalization. To this point, although technological innovations can be observed in most Muslim countries, the actual acceptance thereof does not necessarily match the progress of globalization in those places. Thus, a great disconnect exists, upon which jihad propagandists capitalize in order to gain followers. Clash with Human Rights and Western-Based Laws While most Western societies promote individual rights, most MiddleEastern ones promote community rights. Hoping that human rights become an international and intercultural exigence is delusional as it would be difficult to integrate these rights into the current normative framework of Muslim extremism. It is important to recognize that there are irreconcilable differences between basic sharia norms and the requirements of human rights. What is lacking, in the minds of global peace activists, is a comprehensive understanding of sharia and its fundamental principles.47 As columnist Polly Toynbee (2002)48 explains, “what binds together a globalized force of some extremists from many continents is a united hatred of Western values that seems to them to spring from Judeo-Christianity.”

On the Universal Declaration on Human Rights Although it is clear that Western-style democracy does not have a preponderantly positive image across the world, it would be interesting to look at the most important bill of rights in the twentieth century. In 1948, when the General Assembly of the United Nations had to make a determination on the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the ambassador from Saudi Arabia vehemently took exception to religious liberty, especially the right to abandon one’s religion—which is mentioned in Article 18 of the U.N. Declaration. Saudi Arabia ultimately abstained from voting, but it did not oppose the Declaration altogether. This anecdote demonstrates the unwillingness of a traditionalist Islamic régime to support the emancipatory model of human rights, a model that remains antithetical to the Muslim tradition.49 Consider the recent human rights proposals by Salafists as replacements of the U.N. Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The position of traditionalist-purist Muslims is to be differentiated from that of Muslims

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who advocate international human rights principles as harmonious with Islam. There is evidence that the stipulations of Islamic human rights proposals water down or outright abolish the rights secured by international law, particularly women’s rights. The political implications of Islamic rights proposals should be understood through the lens of rights abuses in Muslim nations in the Maghreb, the Middle East, and Central Asia, and through the governmental policies to support Islamization (like those in the Sudan).50 It is clear by now that the emancipatory model of human rights poses a challenge to the Muslim tradition, especially because that emancipatory model has been championed only since the twentieth century. In contrast, sharia is much older. It is enshrined in the Quran (its primary source).51 After the Quran, the most important source is the Sunna (i.e., the alleged patterns of behavior and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad). Exemplifying a perfect model for Muslims, the Prophet’s sayings and practice have been collected in the published tradition (i.e., the hadith). Along with the Quran and Sunna, other normative sources include (1) intersubjective agreement among Muslim scholars, (2) conclusions based on precedent cases (which are now seen as valid and can be used as customary law), (3) codified law, and (4) the long-accepted attitude toward common welfare. By relying on this assortment of sources, sharia developed from the seventh to the tenth centuries, considered the most important in Islamic history.52 When sharia is codified into law, it applies forms of corporal punishment that, per human rights standards, are considered barbaric, humiliating, and Middle-Age-like.53

On the Treatment of Non-Muslim Minorities In traditional Islam, religious issues are entangled with most issues of daily life and cannot be integrated within a rationalist framework of human rights. Because of the timing of its development, it should come to no surprise that classical sharia stands in sharp contrast to the modern concept of human rights. Sharia may clearly emphasize equality of all loyal adherents before Allah, but it also upholds unequal rights between men and women, as well as between Muslims and members of non-Muslim communities. For this reason, bias against women and religious minorities will not relent.54 A traditional Islamic nation designates different ranks and rights to members of different belief groups. Only righteous Muslims can be

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treated as true members of the political community. In the Middle Ages, followers of the non-Muslim monotheistic religions, the People of the Book (Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians), enjoyed independence in self-administration, religious law, and family law. Today is a different story. These previously protected minorities are considered dhimmis in some countries—i.e., they live in an Islamic nation with legal protection (but often experience all kinds of discrimination)55 —and unlawful in other countries (like in Saudi Arabia). As dhimmis, they cannot join the military and have to pay a special tax. Their places of worship cannot surpass mosques (in terms of size and splendor). Limitations on interfaith marriage are imposed to guarantee Islamic dominance. Even in a modern and wealthy country like United Arab Emirates, a Muslim man is allowed to marry a non-Muslim woman, but Jewish or Christian men cannot marry Muslim women.56 The Muslim husband is the head of the household, which guarantees that children of interfaith parentage are raised as Muslims. Marriages between Muslims and polytheists are prohibited in the majority of Muslim countries, regardless of gender.57 The Middle East and North Africa region is sometimes referred to as the MINA region. In view of the confirmed abuses of human rights in MINA countries, it is not shocking that their human rights violations range from a prohibition of religious rights, infringements on basic human needs (often as a result of state neglect and maladministration), to flagrant human rights violations like torture, forced disappearances, extrajudicial murders, and support of jihadism. It is customary for these tyrannical states to regulate most aspects of religious life—from everyday religious rituals to conventional traditions and commemorations. Violations of personal rights are often perpetrated by the military or state police. A strong military in many of these countries is deemed necessary. As such, in times of turmoil, some of the MINA states do not hesitate to declare martial law and deploy troops to restore order.58 In the Sudan, the War in Darfur has been a widespread operation of ethnic cleansing led by Sudanese Muslim militias against non-Arab groups living in Darfur (a southwestern province of the Sudan that is the size of France). On one side of the conflict are the Sudanese military, the police, and the Janjaweed (a Sudanese terrorist faction whose members come from Arabized indigenous African clans and Bedouin tribes).59 In 2007, the U.S. government designated the Janjaweed as a terrorist group and their murders in Darfur to be genocide. At that time, they had already decimated between 200,000 and 400,000 civilians in just three years.60

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The U.N. Security Council summoned the Janjaweed to disarm themselves. In July 2008, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court formally charged Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir with genocide. His accusation was engineering attempts to annihilate African tribes in Darfur through arbitrary killings, rape, and deportation with the assistance of the Janjaweed.61 Almost five years earlier, in September 2003, President alBashir ordered the Janjaweed to “eliminate the rebellion.”62 Translated from Arabic, “janjaweed” means “devils on horseback.”63

Clash of Unprovable Universalisms The tensions between Muslim laws and international human rights laws are called “unprovable universalisms” by Neville Cox (2013).64 Muslims who convert to other religions frequently run into strict social and legal sanctions in their own countries. Although capital punishment for apostasy is not included in the criminal codes of most contemporary Islamic states—with the exception of Mauritania and the Sudan65 —instances of incarceration and even execution based on accusations of apostasy have been plentiful in recent years. A perfect example of the clash of unprovable universalisms can be seen through the jihadist practices of iconoclasm— the public demolition of non-Muslim shrines, tombs, and other emblems of profane life. This is arguably the most obvious symbol of jihadism by pro-Caliphate builders. Jihadist iconoclasm has occurred in Bamyan (Afghanistan), Nimrod (Iraq), Palmyra (Syria), and Timbuktu (Mali). The purpose, of course, was to express hatred toward the “wickedness” of the Infidels and signal the emergence of the jihadist proto-state.66 Another example of unprovable universalism is the opposing stances on missionary work. Missionary work to convert Muslims is unequivocally haram (i.e., forbidden) in most Muslim countries and punishable by fines, incarceration, and even death.67 Any non-Muslim missionary work is a threat to Allah-ordained laws and the ummah as a whole. When contemporary jihadists materialize the divine dream of the Islamic state, they implement sharia to the core. Sharia is divine in its foundations, and because Allah does not need human approval of his creation, jihadists are adamant about imposing sharia without any institutional consent. The Muslim legal tradition seems archaic and incapable of change. It appears to be stuck in the Middle Ages. The “Islamic state” is an institution that enforces a system of laws derived from sources created several centuries ago.68

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The tensions between fundamental Islamic law and international human rights law lie in the fact that many followers of the latter believe human rights to be universal in nature. Hence, Islamic law and international human rights law naturally conflict, and the former must automatically be wrong. Only fanatics of cultural relativism would tolerate, to some degree, fundamental Islamic law. Followers of Allah-ordained laws also claim that they are natural and, therefore, have universal validity. The clash between Western and Islamist orthodoxy is of two “universalisms,” neither of which can persuasively and empirically verify its own truth. Either, then, may be “true” in their own right. A cultural relativist approach to this fact, and of the normative foundations of Islamist universalism, can help Westerners better comprehend those elements of Islamic law that conflict with Western notions of human rights.69

Western Lawmakers as “Crusaders” It is crucial to understand that Salafists and jihadists categorically reject any link between traditional religious standards in Islam and Western legal norms. This explains why most of those extremists value the authority of traditional sharia in principle, and why they do not want to engage in political and legal reforms. Any effort to apply human rights is seen as part of a new Western Crusade. Salafists and jihadists fear that human rights lawmakers are contemporary Crusaders infringing on local cultures. Western-style laws embody an overarching ideology or lifestyle that will, in due course, replace Islamic faith and practice.70 For jihadists, human rights are a manifestation of Judeo-Christian values, which are often likened to the Crusades in the Middle Ages. From this point of view, the universality of human rights is analogous to the universal canons of Judaism and Christianity. Two other prevalent attitudes will likely make any effort to reconcile human rights principles with the Islamist doctrine futile. The first attitude discards human rights as an outlandish concept that is fundamentally hostile to traditional nonWestern cultures. The second attitude blindly accepts human rights as an exclusive achievement of Western cultures. What Muslim extremists do not see (or refuse to see) is that human rights are not meant to liberate all aspects of human life; nor do they seek to engulf or replace all traditions. Rather, human rights do not necessarily challenge cultural and religious norms directly; what they ask are deep political and legal changes in human coexistence. In addition, human rights are not solely

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based on the notion of human dignity (which can also be present in different cultures and religions). In a nutshell, although human rights do not originate directly from religious traditions, they are not antithetical to those traditions that support the concept of human dignity.71 Culture Wars A culture war is a clash between two or more categories of conflicting cultural principles. The phrase “culture war” was heavily inspired by the German Kulturkampf , which means “culture struggle,” the struggle between cultural and religious factions during Bismarck’s campaign against the influence of the Roman Catholic Church. The campaign lasted from 1871 to 1878 when Bismarck was Chancellor of the German Empire.72 Culture wars are typified by conflicts over issues grounded in immutable notions of cultural and moral order.73 From this perspective, two competing worldviews transcend social groups that dictate moral value attitudes. Eventually, a drastic realignment and polarization reshapes international politics, culture, and human relations.74 The heart of the culture wars hypothesis is the premise that the social divisions emerge as a result of extreme opposition between two divergent religio-moral worldviews: the orthodox (i.e., old-school or conservative) and the progressive. The situation of the opposition is such that it is not open to compromise or negotiation, leading to more polarization and conflict.75

Democracy In the jihadist doctrine, only Allah is supreme, and his sharia-determined laws are not to be superseded. Allah’s infallible sovereignty is a widespread belief in Islam called hakimiyya. In this view, human governments are set up to guarantee that Allah’s law is followed, not to exercise dominion and control in their own right.76 Such view threatens democracy from below. On the other hand, for jihadists, democracy is an abomination to Islam because the establishment of democracy would entail the Western notions of individualism, individual liberty, lenience, secularism, and culturedeprived materialism, which often stand in opposition to Islamic values of social justice, religiousness, and communalism. As Simons (2006)77 writes, “what threatens Islam’s vector—the primacy of the group over the individual—is individuation, which is Westernization’s vector.” Worse still, for jihadists, democracy is not only a Western, non-Islamic concept

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that would be imposed on the ummah; it would also be an institution that is not driven by selfless ideological reasons. When a clash of values is connected to ideological or religious terrorism, it is often believed to be a source of certain types of terrorism. Owing to globalization, value systems encounter each other (for good or for ill), creating positive or negative perceptions. For example, Westernstyle democracy has been likened to imperialism and hegemony.78 Democracy is generally attributed to the endeavors of the nation-state, not so much individuals—except for a few notable figures such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson Mandela. The nation-state became popularized during the Enlightenment period, with anthropocentric ideals such as scientific rationality, individual freedom, and political progress. As a form of political revolution, the nation-state is the full embodiment of Enlightenment principles.79 Yet, as Scruton (2002)80 explains it, jihadism is the perfect example of an ideology that goes up against the modern state and secularism. For jihadists, democracy is a form of polytheism because the authority of a popularly elected leader will inevitably infringe on divinely ordained law. Democracy, then, is not only a dangerous model of government; it also constitutes a sin on the individual level and an assault on Islam on the collective level.81 In the eyes of the global jihadists, Western liberal values contaminate Islam by promoting habits and traditions that go above or contradict sharia, such as freedom of speech (including the right to insult what is sacred) and equal rights between men and women, and between people of different races and ethnicities. In this interpretation, democracy is “wicked” because it puts unbelievers on the same pedestal as believers, sinners on the same pedestal as righteous ones, and women on the same pedestal as men (regardless of the role that Allah wants them to fulfill).82 By making their own laws, legislators in non-sharia-compliant countries assume divine attributes, and anyone who obeys their laws is recognizing the divinity of the lawmakers.83 Abu-Mus’ab al-Suri (2004),84 one of the key jihadist masterminds in the global jihad movement today, put it elegantly: “There is very clear evidence, in the Quran and the Sunna, of the faithlessness of those who have given themselves the right to legislate laws in what is forbidden and permissible.” As he continues, “to change the laws, and to confront the sovereignty of God, thus becoming worshiped gods” is haram (forbidden). The “indication from the verse and from the Hadith is absolutely clear. It indicates that whoever creates laws, to permit and to forbid, has made himself a god; and whoever obeys

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him, is then considered a worshipper.” To this point, Yusef Al-Ayeri, an Al-Qaeda fanatic killed in a gun battle, wrote that democracy is arguably the worst form of secularism because it is a system that abolishes “the authority of sharia over society and opposes it in form and content. The Most High said ‘the command is for none but Allah.’ Democracy says that the command is for none but the majority of the people.”85

Notes 1. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49. 2. Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic Monthly 266, no. 3 (1990): 47–60. 3. Basil Mathews, Young Islam on Trek: A Study in the Clash of Civilizations (New York: Friendship Press, 1926). 4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Free Press, 1996). 5. Ibid., 129. 6. Georg Simmel, “The Persistence of Social Groups,” American Journal of Sociology 4 (1898): 829–36. 7. Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956). 8. Roman Herzog, Preventing the Clash of Civilizations: A Peace Strategy for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999). 9. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” 213. 10. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 232. 11. Bruce M. Russett, John R. O’Neal, and Michaelene Cox, “Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence,” Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 5 (2000): 583–608, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0022343300037005003. 12. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 43. 13. These three quotes are from the same sources as above: pages 41 and 43, respectively. 14. Ibid., 42, 43, 47. 15. Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” 48. 16. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise in Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 17. Roger Cohen, “Islam and the West at War,” The New York Times, February 16, 2015, A23.

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18. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 210, 212. 19. Errol A. Henderson and Richard Tucker, “Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 2 (2001): 317–38, https://doi.org/10.1111/ 0020-8833.00193. 20. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 126. 21. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991). 22. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 22. 23. Henderson and Tucker, “Clear and Present Strangers,” 27. 24. Michael Freeman, “Democracy, Al Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Policy,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 1 (2008): 40–59, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100701759996. 25. Abdolkarim Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 12. 26. Errol A. Henderson, “The Democratic Peace through the Lens of Culture, 1820–1989,” International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 3 (1998): 461–84, https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00092. 27. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 129. 28. Errol A. Henderson, “Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820–1989,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 5 (1997): 649–68, https://doi.org/10.1177/002200 2797041005003. 29. Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995). 30. Ibid., 90. 31. Christopher D. Merrett, “Understanding Local Responses to Globalisation: The Production of Geographical Scale and Political Identity,” National Identities 3, no. 1 (2001): 69–87, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 14608940020028501. 32. See Jonathan Matusitz, “Disney’s Successful Adaptation in Hong Kong: A Glocalization Perspective,” Asia Pacific Journal of Management 28, no. 4 (2011): 667–81, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-009-9179-7; Jonathan Matusitz and Kristin Leanza, “Wal-Mart: An Analysis of the Glocalization of the Cathedral of Consumption in China,” Globalizations 6, no. 2 (2009): 187–205, https://doi.org/10.1080/147477309028 54158; Jonathan Matusitz, “Disneyland Paris: A Case Analysis Demonstrating How Glocalization Works,” Journal of Strategic Marketing 18, no. 3 (2010): 219–33, https://doi.org/10.1080/09652540903537014;

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33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52.

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Jonathan Matusitz and Lauren Palermo, “The Disneyfication of the World: A Grobalisation Perspective,” Journal of Organizational Transformation & Social Change 11, no. 2 (2014): 91–107, https://doi.org/10. 1179/1477963313Z.00000000014; Jonathan Matusitz and Laura Lord, “Dialectical Tensions in the Wal-Martization of the United States,” Journal of Transnational Management 20, no. 3 (2015): 172–89, https://doi.org/10.1080/15475778.2015.1058691. Freeman, “Democracy, Al Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism,” 48. Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 239. Ibid., 240. Jason Burke, “Al-Qaeda,” Foreign Policy 142 (2004): 18–26, https://doi. org/10.2307/4147572. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 2. Bernard Lewis, “The Revolt of Islam,” The New Yorker, November 19, 2001, 50–63, 60. Fouad Ajami, “Nowhere Man,” The New York Times, October 7, 2001, A1. Benjamin Barber, Fear’s Empire: War, Terrorism and Democracy in an Age of Interdependence (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), xii, xvi. Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999). Ibid., 33. Ibid., 27. Ibid., 3. William Adrian, “Globalization and the Christian Idea of a University (Or, the Lexus, the Olive Tree, and Higher Education),” Christian Higher Education 6, no. 4 (2007): 299–320, https://doi.org/10.1080/153637 50701268137. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 9. Heiner Bielefeldt, “Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate,” Human Rights Quarterly 17, no. 4 (1995): 587–617. Polly Toynbee, “Was It Worth It?” The Guardian, November 12, 2002, A1. Donna E. Arzt, “The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States,” Human Rights Quarterly 12, no. 2 (1990): 202–30, https://doi.org/10.2307/762377. Abdullah Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam (New York: Routledge, 2017). Noel James Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964). Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964).

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53. Nonie Darwish, Cruel and Usual Punishment: The Terrifying Global Implications of Islamic Law (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2009). 54. Ibid., 10–18. 55. Ovamir Anjum, “Dhimmi Citizens: Non-Muslims in the New Islamist Discourse,” ReOrient 2, no. 1 (2016): 31–50, https://doi.org/10. 13169/reorient.2.1.0031. 56. “Prohibition of Interfaith Marriage,” available at https://www.loc.gov/ law/help/marriage/interfaith-prohibition.php. 57. Guilian Denoeux, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,” Middle East Policy 9, no. 2 (2002): 56–81, https://doi.org/10.1111/ 1475-4967.00057; Bat Ye’or, The Dhimmi: Jews & Christians under Islam (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985). 58. Julie Harrelson-Stephens and Rhonda L. Callaway, “You Say You Want a Revolution: The Arab Spring, Norm Diffusion, and the Human Rights Regime,” Human Rights Review 15, no. 4 (2014): 413–31, https://doi. org/10.1007/s12142-014-0315-5. 59. Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 1 (2005): 27–47, https:// doi.org/10.1177/0967010605051922. 60. Gwen Thompkins, Sudan’s Darfur Is Home to Tragedy, Optimism, National Public Radio, April 27, 2007, retrieved on January 29, 2019 from https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 9870455. 61. Andrew T. Cayley, “The Prosecutor’s Strategy in Seeking the Arrest of Sudanese President Al Bashir on Charges of Genocide,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 6, no. 45 (2008): 829–40, https://doi.org/ 10.1093/jicj/mqn071. 62. Scott Straus, “Darfur and the Genocide Debate,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (2005): 123–33, 126. 63. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and Richard A. Lobban, “Applied Anthropology and Human Rights: Expert Witnesses in Asylum Cases,” General Anthropology 25, no. 1 (2018): 1–11, https://doi.org/10.1111/gena.12037. 64. Neville Cox, “The Clash of Unprovable Universalisms: International Human Rights and Islamic Law,” Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 2, no. 2 (2013): 307–29, https://doi.org/10.1093/ojlr/rwt013. 65. Abdullah Saeed, “Muslim Debates on Human Rights and Freedom of Religion,” in Human Rights in Asia, ed. Thomas W. D. Davis and Brian Galligan (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2011); S. Iftikhar Murshed, “Islam and Apostasy,” Criterion 4, no. 3 (2009): 56–82. 66. Brynjar Lia, “Understanding Jihadi Proto-States,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (2015): 31–41.

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67. Melissa Crouch, Law and Religion in Indonesia: Conflict and the Courts in West Java (London: Routledge, 2013); Hanna Josua, “The Middle East: A Region without a Christian Future,” in Freedom of Belief and Christian Mission, ed. Hans Aage Gravaas, Christof Sauer, Tormod Engelsviken, Maqsood Kamil, and Knud Jørgensen (Edinburgh: Regnum Edinburgh Centenary Series, 2010), 190–213. 68. Heather J. Sharkey, “Arabic Antimissionary Treatises: A Select Annotated Bibliography,” International Bulletin of Missionary Research 28, no. 3 (2004): 104–6, https://doi.org/10.1177/239693930402800302. 69. Cox, “The Clash of Unprovable Universalisms,” 310–19. 70. Bielefeldt, “Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate,” 599–602. 71. Ibid., 600–3. 72. David Darts, “The Art of Culture War: (Un)Popular Culture, Freedom of Expression, and Art Education,” Studies in Art Education 49, no. 2 (2008): 103–21, https://doi.org/10.2307/25475862. 73. James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Control the Family, Art, Education, Law, and Politics in America (New York: Basic Books, 1992); James Davison Hunter, Before the Shooting Begins (New York: Free Press, 1994); Robert Wuthnow, Christianity and Civil Society (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996). 74. John H. Evans, “Worldviews or Social Groups as the Source of Moral Value Attitudes: Implications for the Culture Wars Thesis,” Sociological Forum 12, no. 3 (1997): 371–404, https://doi.org/10.1023/A:102462 5210910. 75. Dennis J. Downey, “Situating Social Attitudes toward Cultural Pluralism: Between Culture Wars and Contemporary Racism,” Social Problems 47, no. 1 (2000): 90–111, https://doi.org/10.2307/3097153. 76. Jonathan Matusitz, Terrorism & Communication: A Critical Introduction (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2013). 77. Anna Simons, “Making Enemies: An Anthropology of Islamist Terror, Part II,” The American Interest 4 (2006): 10–21. 78. Edward Newman, “Exploring the ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 8 (2006): 749–72, https://doi.org/10. 1080/10576100600704069. 79. Robert A. Dahl, “A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation,” Political Science Quarterly 109, no. 1 (1994): 23– 34, https://doi.org/10.2307/2151659. 80. Roger Scruton, The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute Books, 2002). 81. Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2 (2007): 107–21. 82. Mark Sedgwick, “Jihadist Ideology, Western Counter-Ideology, and the ABC Model,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 5, no. 3 (2012): 359–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2012.723520.

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83. Noah Feldman, After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003). 84. Abu-Mus’ab al-Suri, The Call to Global Islamic Resistance (DCIA Counterterrorism Center. Langley, VA: Office of Terrorism Analysis, 2004), 957. 85. Cited in Open Source Center, Future of Iraq, Arabian Peninsula after the Fall of Baghdad (Reston, VA: Open Source Center, 2003), retrieved on January 28, 2019 from www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gat eway/PTARGS_0_0_200_989_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov% 3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP200309290 00003?action=advancedSearch.

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Cohen, Roger. “Islam and the West at War.” The New York Times, February 16, 2015, A23. Coser, Lewis. The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: Free Press, 1956. Coulson, Noel James. A History of Islamic Law. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964. Cox, Neville. “The Clash of Unprovable Universalisms: International Human Rights and Islamic Law.” Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 2, no. 2 (2013): 307–29. https://doi.org/10.1093/ojlr/rwt013. Crouch, Melissa. Law and Religion in Indonesia: Conflict and the Courts in West Java. London: Routledge, 2013. Dahl, Robert A. “A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation.” Political Science Quarterly 109, no. 1 (1994): 23–34. https:// doi.org/10.2307/2151659. Darts, David. “The Art of Culture War: (Un)Popular Culture, Freedom of Expression, and Art Education.” Studies in Art Education 49, no. 2 (2008): 103–21. https://doi.org/10.2307/25475862. Darwish, Nonie. Cruel and Usual Punishment: The Terrifying Global Implications of Islamic Law. Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2009. Denoeux, Guilian. “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam.” Middle East Policy 9, no. 2 (2002): 56–81. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4967. 00057. Downey, Dennis J. “Situating Social Attitudes toward Cultural Pluralism: Between Culture Wars and Contemporary Racism.” Social Problems 47, no. 1 (2000): 90–111. https://doi.org/10.2307/3097153. Evans, John H. “Worldviews or Social Groups as the Source of Moral Value Attitudes: Implications for the Culture Wars Thesis.” Sociological Forum 12, no. 3 (1997): 371–404. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024625210910. Feldman, Noah. After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003. Fluehr-Lobban, Carolyn, and Richard A. Lobban. “Applied Anthropology and Human Rights: Expert Witnesses in Asylum Cases.” General Anthropology 25, no. 1 (2018): 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1111/gena.12037. Freeman, Michael. “Democracy, Al Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Policy.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 1 (2008): 40–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100701759996. Friedman, Thomas L. The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999. Harrelson-Stephens, Julie, and Rhonda L. Callaway. “You Say You Want a Revolution: The Arab Spring, Norm Diffusion, and the Human Rights Régime.” Human Rights Review 15, no. 4 (2014): 413–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s12142-014-0315-5.

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Henderson, Errol A. “Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820–1989.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 5 (1997): 649–68. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002797041005003. ———. “The Democratic Peace through the Lens of Culture, 1820–1989.” International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 3 (1998): 461–84. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/0020-8833.00092. Henderson, Errol A., and Richard Tucker. “Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict.” International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 2 (2001): 317–38. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833. 00193. Herzog, Roman. Preventing the Clash of Civilizations: A Peace Strategy for the Twenty-First Century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999. Hunter, James Davison. Before the Shooting Begins. New York: Free Press, 1994. ———. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Control the Family, Art, Education, Law, and Politics in America. New York: Basic Books, 1992. Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49. ———. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Free Press, 1996. Josua, Hanna. “The Middle East: A Region without a Christian Future.” In Freedom of Belief and Christian Mission, edited by Hans Aage Gravaas, Christof Sauer, Tormod Engelsviken, Maqsood Kamil, and Knud Jørgensen, 190–213. Edinburgh: Regnum Edinburgh Centenary Series, 2010. Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise in Religious Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Leiken, Robert S., and Steven Brooke. “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood.” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2 (2007): 107–21. Lewis, Bernard. “The Revolt of Islam.” The New Yorker, November 19, 2001, 50–63. ———. “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” The Atlantic Monthly 266, no. 3 (1990): 47–60. Lia, Brynjar. “Understanding Jihadi Proto-States.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (2015): 31–41. Mathews, Basil. Young Islam on Trek: A Study in the Clash of Civilizations. New York: Friendship Press, 1926. Matusitz, Jonathan. “Disneyland Paris: A Case Analysis Demonstrating How Glocalization Works.” Journal of Strategic Marketing 18, no. 3 (2010): 219–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/09652540903537014. ———. “Disney’s Successful Adaptation in Hong Kong: A Glocalization Perspective.” Asia Pacific Journal of Management 28, no. 4 (2011): 667–81. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-009-9179-7.

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———. Terrorism & Communication: A Critical Introduction. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2013. Matusitz, Jonathan, and Kristin Leanza. “Wal-Mart: An Analysis of the Glocalization of the Cathedral of Consumption in China.” Globalizations 6, no. 2 (2009): 187–205. https://doi.org/10.1080/14747730902854158. Matusitz, Jonathan, and Laura Lord. “Dialectical Tensions in the WalMartization of the United States.” Journal of Transnational Management 20, no. 3 (2015): 172–89. https://doi.org/10.1080/15475778.2015.1058691. Matusitz, Jonathan, and Lauren Palermo. “The Disneyfication of the World: A Grobalisation Perspective.” Journal of Organizational Transformation & Social Change 11, no. 2 (2014): 91–107. https://doi.org/10.1179/147796 3313Z.00000000014. Merrett, Christopher D. “Understanding Local Responses to Globalisation: The Production of Geographical Scale and Political Identity.” National Identities 3, no. 1 (2001): 69–87. https://doi.org/10.1080/14608940020028501. Murshed, S. Iftikhar. “Islam and Apostasy.” Criterion 4, no. 3 (2009): 56–82. Newman, Edward. “Exploring the ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 8 (2006): 749–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10576100600704069. Open Source Center. Future of Iraq, Arabian Peninsula after the Fall of Baghdad. Reston, VA: Open Source Center, 2003. Retrieved on September 28, 2019 from www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_ 0_0_200_989_51_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource. gov/content/Display/PRINCE/GMP20030929000003?action=advancedS earch. Russett, Bruce M., John R. O’Neal, and Michaelene Cox. “Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence.” Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 5 (2000): 583–608. https://doi.org/10.1177/002234330 0037005003. Saeed, Abdullah. Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam. New York: Routledge, 2017. ———. “Muslim Debates on Human Rights and Freedom of Religion.” In Human Rights in Asia, edited by Thomas W. D. Davis and Brian Galligan, 56–82. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2011. Schacht, Joseph. An Introduction to Islamic Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964. Scruton, Roger. The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat. Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute Books, 2002. Sedgwick, Mark. “Jihadist Ideology, Western Counter-Ideology, and the ABC Model.” Critical Studies on Terrorism 5, no. 3 (2012): 359–72. https://doi. org/10.1080/17539153.2012.723520.

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Sharkey, Heather J. “Arabic Antimissionary Treatises: A Select Annotated Bibliography.” International Bulletin of Missionary Research 28, no. 3 (2004): 104–6. https://doi.org/10.1177/239693930402800302. Simmel, Georg. “The Persistence of Social Groups.” American Journal of Sociology 4 (1898): 829–36. Simons, Anna. “Making Enemies: An Anthropology of Islamist Terror, Part II.” The American Interest 4 (2006): 10–21. Soroush, Abdolkarim. Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Straus, Scott. “Darfur and the Genocide Debate.” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (2005): 123–33. Thompkins, Gwen. Sudan’s Darfur Is Home to Tragedy, Optimism. National Public Radio, April 27, 2007. Retrieved on October 29, 2019 from https:// www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9870455. Toynbee, Polly. “Was It Worth It?” The Guardian, November 12, 2002, A1. Williams, Paul D., and Alex J. Bellamy. “The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur.” Security Dialogue 36, no. 1 (2005): 27–47. https://doi. org/10.1177/0967010605051922. Wuthnow, Robert. Christianity and Civil Society. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996. Ye’or, Bat. The Dhimmi: Jews & Christians under Islam. Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985.

CHAPTER 10

Economic Conditions

An oft-cited academic consensus ties precarious economic conditions to both domestic and international terrorism. The Darwinian philosophy of progress, predicated on the condition that the world’s problems are best solved through science and rationality, is questioned by those who point to the perpetualism of poverty and hardship in many regions of the world. Concrete examples of this include the deteriorating situation in many Sub-Saharan African nations, the inability of postcolonial countries to industrialize or grow out of underdevelopment, and the protraction of war and violence globally.1 The internationalization of economics and politics is affecting virtually all ordinary citizens as their space-time orientation is being compressed—at the same time, events elsewhere (real or perceived) are becoming more and more localized. A globalized world is, in the eyes of many, a world lacking certainty. For them, it is hard to know what tomorrow holds. It is a world where insecurity levels are intensified; the life they used to lead is being challenged or changed. Globalization challenges the very identity of who these people are and where they come from. A number of issues related to globalization seem to widen the gaps between the haves and the have-nots. Democratizing forces are endangering the traditional structures of many societies, making some feel troubled about the value of these forces.2

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Economic Conditions and Jihadism Economic depressions occasion greater frustration for both the downtrodden and the more educated and well-to-do. The latter are actually more likely to have higher hopes for economic opportunity than the less wealthy ones. To this very point, terrorist organizations have often drawn highly educated and wealthier recruits as they possess the finances and the resources (other means needed for a terrorist mission). By the same token, states sometimes avoid applying sanctions against states that have many terrorists. The reason is that the former fear weakening target states disproportionately, thereby indirectly bolstering terrorist organizations.3 In particular, U.S. policy toward Pakistan includes poverty reduction as a means to tackle terrorist recruitment.4 Under circumstances of weak governance, unbridled corruption, and human rights violations, terrorism will blossom. This is a recurring theme. It is widely believed that a major source of terrorism resides in the politics of exclusion and the rise of triangular problem (dispossession, empowerment, and a philosophy that legitimates violence). Impoverished societies are prone to becoming weak states, whose capacity to prevent terrorism becomes even weaker. They are also much less likely to develop education programs to reduce support of terrorism. Thus, states that are devoid of legitimacy and control over the economy (and other traditional forms of power) provide the ideal vacuum for terrorist groups to thrive. It is in such environments as Afghanistan, Algeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen (among many others)—that local or global terrorist groups establish their bases of operations.5 Demographic Factors Demographic factors can also be factors associated with economic conditions. Important demographic conditions include rampant population growth—especially a mushrooming of young males—and unequal population shifts among different ethnic groups.6 In many regions of the world, a demographic explosion has created a massive bubble of urbanized, unemployed young males. A similar demographic condition that is linked to terrorism involves migration and changes in the racial, religious, and social fabric of society. As such, Stern (2003)7 explains how population shifts and migration in Indonesia have played a role in the rise of terrorist violence. A great many boys are still under 15, many of whom

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are developing a passionate hatred for America and the West. They will enter the high-crime years; and the impacts of a youthful age demographic will continue. By 2050, almost 25% of men in developing nations will be between the ages of 20 and 34, while less than 17% of men in developed nations will be in that age group.8 Poverty In this context, “poor” means devoid of access to resources which are necessary to do well in the socioeconomic aspect of society.9 Sen (2000)10 describes poverty as deprivation of opportunity. In regards to poverty itself, demographic reports on global wealth, published in 2019, indicate that (1) the global distribution of wealth has become more equitable since the very early nineteenth century, when most humans earned less than $2 a day; (2) over the past 20 years, the percentage of humans living in abject poverty has been cut by 50%; and (3) every day, about 200,000 people worldwide rise above the $2-a-day poverty line. In like fashion, each day, over 300,000 people gain access to electricity and running water for the first time.11 To too great a degree, such reports do not mention that poverty is not just about numbers; it also needs to be understood within demographic or cultural contexts. For example, most demographic reports on global wealth do not take cultural or community-based perceptions of globalization overall. Put differently, economic conditions may look better in a specific region, but people’s perceptions of the world may actually get worse. This mindset reflects the concept of “imagined community;” in this case, it is an imagined community of impoverished people (even though new global statistics may prove otherwise). The concept of “imagined community” will be explained in detail in this chapter. State Failure A state that is incapable of handling its economic conditions properly and exercising control over violence, taxation, and financial regulation is called a “failed” state. Failed states are (1) dangerous, plagued by conflicts, disintegrated, and insecure; (2) more prone to being safe havens for terrorists and terrorist groups; and (3) pose a great danger to the current world order. Indeed, failed states experience a massive presence of terrorist networks. Economic opportunities for such networks are based

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on a cheap or “free” demographic that would do anything to survive or be better off financially.12 Under such circumstances, the United States and many other Western nations believe that intervention in these states is essential to global security.13 Failed states present security threats to their own inhabitants, to bordering states, and to the international system. Consider Somalia and Yemen. Both countries are the archetypes of failed states that have some of the worst economic environments on the planet today. Both nations have a significant track record of jihadist attacks and associations with global jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda. The resulting immiseration of local populations opens horizons for jihadism that are far better than most opportunities of counterinsurgency at both national and international levels.14 In September 2010, the director-general of Britain’s security service, Jonathan Evans, stated that terrorist plots devised in Somalia and Yemen could have repercussions in countries as far as Great Britain.15 Bridget Coggins (2015)16 analyzed the comprehensive relationship between state failure and terrorism by collecting data from 153 countries (1999–2008). In her study, Coggins argued that quantitative works tend to ignore the political context of terrorism and that terrorism is inherent in many conditions of state failure. In line with these expectations, the author realized that, though not all failing and failed states are inclined toward terrorism, failed states that are in perpetual conflict (or drowned in political collapse) are much more likely to face and create terrorism. These results stress the relationship between failure and external forces, and the importance of the political context of terrorism at the macro-level. Previous academic works on poverty posited that people’s participation in jihadism was motivated by their reaction against overwhelming economic injustice or, in regards to suicide terrorism (where participants’ relatives received financial rewards), out of economic need.17 Although it was mentioned earlier that, at the individual level, terrorist groups also draw recruits who are relatively better off and educated, studies supporting this view often fail to analyze macro-level patterns—e.g., by determining whether these recruits disproportionately come from countries that are poor or whose populations live in misery. If a state is incapable or unwilling to secure macroeconomic stability, if its population can barely survive, then this becomes justification—even in the eyes of the rich ones—for grievance-based violence against those held responsible.18

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Suicide Bombers In a seminal study that compared global incidents of terrorism with the proportion of the global population under the poverty line (1981–2006), James Piazza reported that the number of international terrorist incidents have vacillated over these years, whereas the global poverty rate has remained predominantly constant, with actually a slight decline toward the end—see Fig. 10.1 (cited in Cantin 2018).19 The lack of solid relation between these two trends is a sign that there is no significant correlation between the percentage of the world’s population below the poverty line and the occurrence of terrorism. Now, what Fig. 10.1 does notmention is that (1) there are many methods of terrorism and (2) poverty is more likely to trigger certain methods of terrorism than others. This is often the case for suicide bombings. Are poor people more likely to be suicide bombers? Not necessarily, but an impoverished environment is more conducive to it. Substandard economic conditions (e.g., morbidly high unemployment) can be an incentive for groups to use suicide bombing.20 Suicide bombing is a usual tactic used against hard targets or in higher-impact missions where complicated maneuvers are

Fig. 10.1 2006

Trends of transnational terrorism and global poverty from 1981 to

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essential to guarantee success. Terrorist organizations, when choosing the best candidates for suicide bombings from a large pool of candidates, often pick those who are highly educated, because they are believed to be more likely to carry out a complex mission. Nevertheless, despite the fact that suicide terrorists are more likely to be educated and from higher classes, they will sacrifice their lives for their “oppressed,” “impoverished” brothers and sisters of their own volition.21 The relationship between terrorism and economic conditions is a complex one. Modern terrorist groups have need of the management and technological skills of the upper and middle classes. At the same time, they also need foot soldiers who disproportionately originate from the lower classes.22 As societal hardship increases, the success to recruit more qualified (e.g., more educated, and from a better socioeconomic status) suicide bombers increases. These more qualified terrorists have a lower propensity to fail at their missions.23 To this point, Gambetta and Hertog (2009)24 report that, in the pool of suicide bombers, the overwhelming percentage of engineers and those possessing impressive degrees stems from the weak economic opportunities in those career fields in Middle-Eastern countries. This, in turn, increases their own perception of deprivation (as they feel sorry for their own communities) and makes jihadization more likely. In cases of high unemployment or the inability of relatives to find work, the benefit of earning potential death for a shahid (i.e., martyr or suicide bomber) generally increases. Just as a country’s level of poverty may motivate more people to embrace villainy, a family’s economic conditions may also motivate a “chosen one” to execute a dangerous mission on order to save it. If a child is not saving the household from economic calamity, families may be more prone to supporting the child’s decision to join a jihadist group. In India, for example, unemployment has been shown to have a significant impact on certain types of terrorism (1980–2005). In those situations, terrorism is a pathway out of unemployment. A household member’s participation in jihad may bring benefits that would not be otherwise granted. In many cases, participation in jihad earns more money than a son’s regular job-related contribution to the household.25 Palestinian Terrorists According to a World Bank (2001)26 report, more than 33% of Palestinians (roughly one million people) earn a little over than $2-a-day. Correspondingly, the number of Palestinian suicide terrorists at the dawn

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of the twenty-first century was remarkably high. It is not uncommon for Palestinians to earn a monthly salary of barely NIS 1700 ($475). In April 2018, the Palestinian Authority did not remunerate its 60,000 employees in Gaza for an entire month; this decision could have jeopardized an already-failing agreement with its jihadist rival, Hamas.27 In the poverty-afflicted Palestinian migrant camps in Lebanon, an appeal to jihadism has surfaced, an occurrence that is less frequent within better-assimilated Palestinian communities outside the camps. The refugees at those camps do not contribute to most aspects of Lebanese life. They have to endure a “poverty of opportunity” in which they have little motivation or ability to succeed at economic, social, and educational levels. The Lebanese camps are also no-go zones, which Lebanese authorities and the PLO tend to avoid. Jihadists use no-go zones as a safe haven from the country’s security forces.28 This “poverty of opportunity” will probably lead some youths to restore their dignity in radical ways; data on underemployment in the region provides evidence that this might facilitate radicalization. The stress and feelings of culpability and anger that one derives from joblessness often cause a negative effect on one’s mental health.29 In a similar vein, based on a collection of data reports from the Israeli Intelligence Agency (ISA), Benmelech et al. (2012)30 examined the biographies of all Palestinian suicide bombers who executed—or planned to execute—attacks against Israelis in Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel from September 2000 to December 2006. The list included the names of 157 suicide bombers, as well as their membership in terror groups, age, their cities of residence, their matriculation in institutions of higher education, and their (possible) previous inclusion by the ISA on the most-wanted terrorists list, their (possible) previous incarceration, or their (possible) previous detention by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The three researchers reported that, on the basis of their preferred specification, a 1% increase in the unemployment rate considerably raised the probability that the next quarter’s suicide bomber (1) would have some academic education (by 1.3%); (2) that the terrorist is older than 20 years (by 0.62%); and (3) that the terrorist was already involved in terrorism beforehand (by 0.81%). And the higher the quality of the terrorist, the higher the probability of a successful attack against higher value targets. Lastly, this would lead to many more attacks against more largely populated areas and symbolic targets, like regional capitals and highly populated zones.

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World Risk Society Developed by Ulrich Beck’s (1992),31 world risk society hypothesizes that newer problems and conflicts (associated with the distribution of risks) often become more prevalent than older problems and conflicts (associated with the distribution of welfare). The term “world risk” alludes to the possible consequences of “industrial, that is, techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility.”32 These decisions are rooted in contemporary institutions and basic contemporary principles. World risk society also postulates that, in earlier times, risks stemmed from nature, while today they stem from ourselves. As Beck (1997)33 continues, modern risks are the outcome of industrial modernization; they are the inadvertent results of the precipitous development of science and technology in twenty-first-century society. Modernity and Risk In a world risk society, modernity increasingly faces the backlash of its own negative consequences. As late modern society gradually abandons traditionalization, a growing trend of individualization occurs, as long as people are freed (Freigesetzt ) from traditional institutions and communities like the church, social classes, the family, participation in political parties, and so forth.34 Risks should no longer be trivialized as side effects because they are posing an internal threat through their self-enclosed social systems. There are risk conflicts in which a massive difference exists between the decision-makers who could eventually avoid the risks and the consumers who are more vulnerable to dangers and who cannot participate in these decisions. The dangers for those consumers are oversimplified as “unintentional, unseen side effects.” Overall, the reality of risks is reduced to these two antagonistic and incommensurable worlds: those who run and determine the risks (but who get protected from them) versus those on whom these risks are placed.35 Global Financial Risks as Causes of Terrorism Global financial risks have key attributes that make risks terrorism-prone. Sometimes, they go past rational logic to enter the realm of unpredictable turbulence. They symbolize the struggle over the allocation of “goods” and “bads,” of positive and negative corollaries of risky decisions.

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More than anything else, they share the commonalty of deterritorialization. This, in particular, is what makes them terrorism-prone because it unleashes the formation of global risk communities—and, hence, world risk society. The economy is a backbone of modern society; because all communities depend on it, a massive economic failure would be devastating. There are undeniable reasons to look at the world economy as a principal trigger of world risk society.36 Global financial risks can trickle down to certain countries or regions, subjecting them to national risks. This phenomenon could be explained through systems theory. Systems theory posits that the whole is more than the sum of its parts; as a cohesive assembly of interdependent parts, one major failure in the system affects all the other parts.37 Since all communities within modern society rely on major parts thereof, a colossal malfunction of the financial system would have ripple effects. As a functional system, the economy plays the most important role in the modern world. Consequently, the world economy is the most prominent source of man-made ambiguities and risks in world risk society.38 Assisted by the information revolution, financial currents define the winners and the losers. Global financial risks are not limited to risks in economic subsystems. They also escalate into social disorders and, ultimately, into political threats.39 Consider the Asian crisis, a financial crisis that absorbed much of East and Southeast Asia in 1997.40 During the Asian Crisis, a chain reaction disrupted entire countries and, at the same time, sparked epidemics of violence against minority groups who were scapegoated for it. This anecdote illustrates how easy it is for terrorists to target residual risks. The highly developed but interdependent regions of East Asia and Southeast Asia experienced levels of violence that crippled modern financial flows and occasioned movements of panic.41 Lastly, when urbanization is juxtaposed to unemployment and poverty, it can make a great many people malcontent, a facilitator for terrorist recruitment and organization. According to Massey (1996),42 “urbanization, rising income inequality, and increasing class segregation have produced a geographic concentration of affluence and poverty throughout the world, creating a radical change in the geographic basis of human society.” In addition, “as the density of poverty rises in the environment of the world’s poor so will their exposure to crime, disease, violence, and family disruption.”43

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Risk Communities and Imagined Communities A community is a self-aware conglomeration of people who have their own norms of integration, types of conflict (internal and external), and consensus-driven mechanism among its members.44 Global problems create transnational communities, as their members believe that it is better than playing the national card. Interdependence is not a curse of humanity but the best pathway for its survival. Cooperation is no longer seen as an option, but a necessity. Global unity is performative in nature.45 Risk Communities Risk communities solve problems of insecurity in their own manner. The concept of risk community is predicated on the idea that, because risk is subjective (in which the future is uncertain), members of the community must have similar understandings of how the system works and similar objectives on how to improve it. Yet, this is more likely to happen because communities tend to have mutual norms and values—much more than society at large. Different communities within a system will share values in different fashions. A community is a better venue for risk management because risk perception hinges on highly similar interpretations—again, interpretations based on shared values and norms.46 From this vantage point, risk communities are not “beings” but “becomings.”47 We understand who they are mostly through their performative effects.48 They are a sort of “glue” for diversity. Indeed, one of the most salient but least recognized features of global risks is how they produce some form of “compulsory cosmopolitanism;” that is, a “glue” for diversity and plurality in an environment whose boundaries are very permeable, at least in regards to communication and economics. Put simply, global risks possess the answer to the question of how risk communities (whether formed through common ancestry or proximity between people) can progress and establish themselves in the discordance of a globalized world.49 Imagined Communities Developed by Benedict Anderson (1991)50 in his treatment of nationalism, imagined communities are borne out of “politics of identification.” Risk communities come from the advent of nation-states as “imagined

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communities.” As Anderson explained in his discussion of nationalism, imagined communities are not created through face-to-face encounters, but through the conscious awareness that people experience and are influenced by similar events as distant others. This is how national identity is constructed, through a community beyond physical proximity, beyond national boundaries. As Calhoun (1991)51 explains, “people without direct interpersonal relations with each other are led by the mediation of the world of political symbols to imagine themselves as members of communities defined by common ascriptive characteristics, personal tastes, habits, concerns.” They are “imagined” because they are based on “categorical identities.” In this vein, there can be imagined communities of interest like those instituted by militant Islam. People identify with groups and movements because of perceived benefits or rewards; these are dynamic and vary from individual to individual. Whereas some people are primarily motivated by social affiliation or the development of a personal sense of meaning, others are looking for excitement or a way to survive (i.e., by seeking food, shelter, and meet their basic human needs).52 Radical Ummah as Imagined Community Forging bonds and affinities with an international ummah can be based on purely religious identification. In Western Europe, this often happens with Muslims of middle-class backgrounds. Within embittered and alienated youths, in particular, such bonds and affinities can lead to jihadization. This process fluctuates from area to area, and from one migrant community to another, but there seems to be a clear trend for this. When Muslim migrants live in openly diverse and multicultural societies, especially those with high levels of economic dynamism and social mobility, attempts by “tribal” elders to keep them separated from mainstream society generally fail (although in different degrees and speeds). As the original culture is gradually replaced by the host culture, such adaptable Muslim migrants absorb new cultural norms—either fully or partly.53 However, on some occasions, a mechanism of identity reconstruction emerges. Such process tries to maintain the essence of difference. Without the sufficient presence of a physical, diasporic community around, Muslim migrants—though previously assimilated or integrated—will identify or even create an imagined community. In Western Europe, this constructivist community rises from local networks of Muslim religious identities.

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Oddly enough, it is actually the liberal Western European laws regarding freedom and openness that allow Muslim migrants to promote the cause of a transnational identity—one that transcends both Muslim states and local European nationalisms. In Antwerp, Belgium, this was illustrated through the creation of a contested organization, the Arab European League, which fights hard for the rights of minority Muslims across the old continent.54

Jihad Always a Result of Economic Conditions? Baylouni (2015)55 investigated the link between terrorism and poverty and concluded claims that it was a falsehood. Many terrorists originate from middle-class families or have become financially independent on their own. They possess university-level degrees, particularly in the STEM fields. Likewise, Krueger and Maleˇcková (2003)56 reject any correlation between poverty, education, and terrorism in the countries of Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Lebanon. They interpret terrorism as a political occurrence instead of an economic one (taking into account civil liberties as well). They regard poverty as an indirect driving force behind civil conflicts in poor states. Others scholars57 insist that too many Western academics are obsessed with poverty and social injustice. They are too fixated on financial exploitation as a way to explain the discontent and grievance of Third-World terrorists. These Western academics are said to be perplexed and bemused by religious crusaders who devote their lives to fulfilling God’s will on earth, by any means possible. No such fanatical wave has existed in the Western world since the trials and killings of religious heretics and the global religious wars. Studies Rejecting the Jihad-Poverty Link In his study titled “Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages,” Piazza (2006)58 evaluated the common assumption that poverty, inequality, and poor economic conditions are the sources of terrorism. Using multiple regression analyses on terrorist attacks and deaths in 96 countries (1986–2002), Piazza factored in the variables of poverty, undernourishment, inequality, joblessness, inflation, and substandard economic growth as forerunners to terrorism, in addition to various political and demographic control variables. His results were that, counter to popular opinion, no meaningful link between any

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of the metrics on economic development and terrorism can be established. On the contrary, variables such as demographics, ethno-religious diversity, rampant state persecution and, most importantly, the mechanism of party politics are more significant predictors of terrorism. In their study on reasons for migrating to Syria and Iraq, Dawson and Amarasingam (2017)59 did not find enough evidence of poor economic conditions in influencing the choice to migrate. Conversely, they believe that more attention should be paid to current world events and the role of religiosity. In like fashion, a 2015 study of Muslims in Western Europe casts doubts on the relationship between jihadization, radical religious beliefs, and low socioeconomic status. Delia Deckard and Jacobson (2015)60 found that, On average, respondents from more prosperous families are more likely to practice Islam in a way closely associated with fundamentalism—they are more conservative regarding gender roles, seek the universal application of Islamic law, and embrace attitudes associated with a more politicized Islam. Additionally, respondents espousing this belief set are more supportive of the use of violence to “defend their faith”. (p. 412)

Studies on foreign jihadists have demonstrated that simple socioeconomic profiles are not sufficient reasons for resorting to jihadism. A certain number of jihadist foreign fighters have a college education and, in a nation like Belgium, not all foreign fighters come from poor backgrounds or experience a substandard socioeconomic and professional situation.61 Since the July 7, 2005 bombings in London, more and more evidence is provided as to the recruitment of wealthy middle-class Muslims in British universities to join the global jihad movement. A case in point is Salman Ramadan Abedi, the Manchester arena bomber in May 2017. Salman came from a middle-class family in England. He attended a renowned educational institution for boys, and studied business management at Salford University in 2014 (but he never graduated).62 The Taliban, Osama Bin Laden, and “Poverty” Consider the actions that the Taliban took (and the motivations for them). Prohibiting women from work and girls from earning an education has little to do with improving economic conditions, with achieving social justice, or with combating imperialism.63 Quite the opposite, these

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measures keep women and children immiserated, many of whom are already widows and orphans of war. Stoning women to death for adultery does not further an antipoverty agenda. A religious police that impounds videocassettes, punishes children for kite-flying, imposes a strict dress code, and fines Muslims for playing music is driven by religious—not secular—reasons.64 When the Taliban destroyed opulent Buddha rock statues—in the face of universal pleas not to do so, in a country where Buddhism died many centuries ago, and where the Buddha was not venerated by anyone—it was because their motivations were sacrilegious.65 Lastly, let us briefly discuss Osama bin Laden and his associates. No matter how much poverty and social injustice existed at that time, they began to openly criticize both Muslim régimes and the United States for politico-religious reasons (not for others). Because their mission was to impose unprecedented theocracy in the Middle East, their focus was on the invasive character of the U.S. military (and their economic presence in the region), which they saw as a major insult to both Allah and the ummah. Because the United States fought the First Gulf War to keep Iraq out of Kuwait, it surely would go to do the same in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states if they were in danger of destruction by other rogue nations.66

Notes 1. Christian Schubert, “The Pitfalls of Darwinian ‘Progress’: A Comment on ‘Evolvability and Progress in Evolutionary Economics’ by Tim Cochrane and James Maclaurin,” Journal of Bioeconomics 15, no. 3 (2013): 325–28, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-012-9146-0. 2. Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security,” Political Psychology 25, no. 5 (2004): 741–67, 742, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.003 96.x. 3. Elena V. McLean, Kaisa H. Hinkkainen, Luis De la Calle, and Navin A. Bapat, “Economic Sanctions and the Dynamics of Terrorist Campaigns,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 35, no. 4 (2018): 378–401, https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894216635023. 4. Victor Asal, C. Christine Fair, and Stephen Shellman, “Consenting to a Child’s Decision to Join a Jihad: Insights from a Survey of Militant Families in Pakistan,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 11 (2008): 973–94, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100802400201.

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5. Edward Newman, “Exploring the ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 8 (2006): 749–72, https://doi.org/10. 1080/10576100600704069. 6. Jeffrey Ian Ross, “Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model,” Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 3 (1993): 317–29, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343393030003006; Victor W. Sidel and Barry S. Levy, “War, Terrorism, and Public Health,” The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 31, no. 4 (2003): 516–23, https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1748-720X.2003.tb00119.x; Steven Simon, “The New Terrorism,” The Brookings Review 21, no. 1 (2003): 18–24. 7. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: HarperCollins, 2003). 8. Cited in Paul R. Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu, “Some Roots of Terrorism,” Population and Environment 24, no. 2 (2002); 183–92, https://doi.org/ 10.1023/A:1020700221602. 9. Saddam Ilyas, Bilal Mehmood, Raees Aslam, “Terrorism and Poverty: Double Trouble for Macroeconomic Performance in African Countries,” African Journal of Economic Review 5, no. 1 (2017): 1–13. 10. Amartya Sen, Freedom, Rationality, and Social Choice: The Arrow Lectures and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 11. Cited in Valerie Bauman, “Exposed: The Myth That the World Is Going to Hell! Seven Incredible Charts That Prove the World IS Becoming a Better Place—Despite All the Doom and Gloom,” Daily Mail, January 16, 2019, A1. 12. Terrance Ruth, Jonathan Matusitz, and Thomas T. H. Wan, “Understanding Predatory Organised Crime through Network Governance Theory,” Social Change 45, no. 5 (2015): 587–604, https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0049085715602790. 13. Toby Dodge, “Iraq: The Contradictions of Exogenous State-Building in Historical Perspective,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 187– 200; Francis Fukuyama, “Liberalism Versus State-Building,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 3 (2007): 10–13. 14. Susan L. Woodward, The Ideology of Failed States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 15. Ioannis Mantzikos, “Somalia and Yemen: The Links between Terrorism and State Failure,” DOMES: Digest of Middle East Studies 20, no. 2 (2011): 242–60, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1949-3606.2011.00098.x. 16. Bridget L. Coggins, “Does State Failure Cause Terrorism? An Empirical Analysis (1999–2008),” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 3 (2015): 455–83, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713515403. 17. Karin von Hippel, “The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths,” The Political Quarterly 73, no. 1 (2002): 25–39, https://doi.org/10.1111/ 1467-923X.73.s1.4.

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18. Coggins, “Does State Failure Cause Terrorism?” 459. 19. Marc-Olivier Cantin, “Reexamining the Terrorism-Poverty Nexus,” Journal of International Affairs 72, no. 2 (2018): 10–21. 20. Charlinda Santifort-Jordan and Todd Sandler, “An Empirical Study of Suicide Terrorism: A Global Analysis,” Southern Economic Journal 80, no. 4 (2014): 981–1001, https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-2013.114. 21. Michael C. Horowitz, “The Rise and Spread of Suicide Bombing,” Annual Review of Political Science 18 (2015): 69–84, https://doi.org/ 10.1146/annurev-polisci-062813-051049. 22. Newman, “Exploring the ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism,” 749–53. 23. Efraim Benmelech and Claude Berrebi, “Human Capital and the Productivity of Suicide Bombers,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, no. 3 (2007): 223–38, https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.21.3.223. 24. Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, “Why Are There So Many Engineers among Islamic Radicals?” European Journal of Sociology 50, no. 2 (2009): 201–30, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975609990129. 25. Asal, Fair, and Shellman, “Consenting to a Child’s Decision to Join a Jihad,” 80–4. 26. World Bank, Poverty in the West Bank and Gaza (Washington, DC: West Bank, 2001). 27. Adel Zaanoun, “In Gaza, Unpaid Palestinian Authority Salaries Dampen Eid Joy,” The Times of Israel, June 14, 2018, A1. 28. Royce Hutson, Taylor Long, and Michael Page, “Pathways to Violent Radicalisation in the Middle East: A Model for Future Studies of Transnational Jihad,” The RUSI Journal 154, no. 2 (2009): 18–26, https://doi. org/10.1080/03071840902965570. 29. Oksana Yakushko, Megan Watson, and Sarah Thompson, “Stress and Coping in the Lives of Recent Immigrants and Refugees: Considerations for Counseling,” International Journal for the Advancement of Counseling 30, no. 3 (2008): 167–78, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10447-0089054-0. 30. Efraim Benmelech, Claude Berrebi, and Esteban F. Klor, “Economic Conditions and the Quality of Suicide Terrorism,” The Journal of Politics 74, no. 1 (2012): 113–28, https://doi.org/10.1017/s00223816110 01101. 31. Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). 32. Ibid., 98. 33. Ulrich Beck, The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997). 34. Klaus Rasborg, “‘(World) Risk Society’ or ‘New Rationalities of Risk’? A Critical Discussion of Ulrich Beck’s Theory of Reflexive Modernity,” Thesis Eleven 108, no. 1 (2012): 3–25, https://doi.org/10.1177/072 5513611421479.

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35. Ulrich Beck, “Critical Theory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan Vision,” Constellations 16, no. 1 (2009): 3–22, https://doi.org/10. 1111/j.1467-8675.2009.00534.x. 36. Ulrich Beck, “The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited,” Theory, Culture & Society 19, no. 4 (2002): 39–55, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0263276402019004003. 37. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications (New York: George Braziller, 1968). 38. Beck, “The Terrorist Threat,” 40–4. 39. Ibid., 39–42. 40. Philippe F. Delhaise, Asia in Crisis: The Implosion of the Banking and Finance Systems (New York: Wiley, 1998). 41. Beck, “The Terrorist Threat,” 39–42. 42. Douglas S. Massey, “The Age of Extremes: Concentrated Affluence and Poverty in the Twenty-First Century,” Demography 33, no. 4 (1995): 395–412, 395, https://doi.org//10.2307/2061773. 43. Ibid., 395. 44. Benjamin Hanckel and Alan Morris, “Finding Community and Contesting Heteronormativity: Queer Young People’s Engagement in an Australian Online Community,” Journal of Youth Studies 17, no. 7 (2014): 872–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2013.878792. 45. Martin Albrow, The Global Age: The Global Age State and Society beyond Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). 46. M. J. Williams, “(In)Security Studies, Reflexive Modernization and the Risk Society,” Cooperation and Conflict 43, no. 1 (2008): 57–79, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836707086737. 47. Joy Y. Zhang, “Cosmopolitan Risk Community in a Bowl: A Case Study of China’s Good Food Movement,” Journal of Risk Research 21, no. 1 (2018): 68–82, https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2017.1351473. 48. Hans-Herbert Kogler, “Constructing a Cosmopolitan Public Sphere: Hermeneutic Capabilities and Universal Values,” European Journal of Social Theory 8, no. 3 (2005): 297–320, https://doi.org/10.1177/136 8431005054796. 49. Ulrich Beck, World at Risk (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2013). 50. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991). 51. Craig Calhoun, “Indirect Relationships and Imagined Communities: Large Scale Social Integration and the Transformation of Everyday Life,” in Social Theory for a Changing Society, ed. Pierre Bourdieu and James S. Coleman (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), 95–120, 108.

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52. Clark McCauley and Mary Segal, “Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups,” in Group Processes and Intergroup Relations: Review of Personality and Social Psychology, ed. Clyde Hendrick (Newbury Park: Sage, 1987), 231–56. 53. Olivier Roy, “EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?” The National Interest 71 (2003): 63–73. 54. Ibid., 68–9. 55. A. M. Baylouni, “Emotion, Poverty, or Politics? Misconceptions about Radical Islamist Movements,” Connections III 1, no. 4 (2015): 41–7. 56. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleˇcková, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 (2003): 119–44, https://doi.org/10.1257/089533003772034925. 57. See Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Anthony Oberschall, “Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory,” Sociological Theory 22, no. 1 (2004): 26–37, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00202.x. 58. James A. Piazza, “Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1 (2006): 159–77, https://doi.org/10.1080/095465590944578. 59. Lorne L. Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam, “Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights into the Motivations for Hijrah to Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 3 (2017): 191–210, https://doi. org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1274216. 60. Natalie Delia Deckard and David Jacobson, “The Prosperous Hardliner: Affluence, Fundamentalism, and Radicalization in Western European Muslim Communities,” Social Compass 62, no. 3 (2015): 412–33, https://doi.org/10.1177/0037768615587827. 61. Rik Coolsaet, What Drives Europeans to Syria, and to IS? Insights from the Belgian Case (Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations, 2015). 62. Martin Evans, Victoria Ward, and Robert Mendick, “Everything We Know about Manchester Suicide Bomber Salman Abedi,” The Telegraph, May 26, 2017, A1. 63. Kim Barker, The Taliban Shuffle: Strange Days in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Anchor, 2011). 64. John Baily, “Music Censorship in Afghanistan before and after the Taliban,” in Shoot the Singer!: Music Censorship Today, ed. Marie Korpe (New York: Zed Books, 2004), 19–28. 65. Anthony Oberschall, Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic Violence (New York: Routledge, 2007). 66. Ibid., 90–5.

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References Albrow, Martin. The Global Age: The Global Age State and Society beyond Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1991. Asal, Victor, C. Christine Fair, and Stephen Shellman. “Consenting to a Child’s Decision to Join a Jihad: Insights from a Survey of Militant Families in Pakistan.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 11 (2008): 973–94. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100802400201. Baily, John. “Music Censorship in Afghanistan before and after the Taliban.” In Shoot the Singer!: Music Censorship Today, edited by Marie Korpe, 19–28. New York: Zed Books, 2004. Barker, Kim. The Taliban Shuffle: Strange Days in Afghanistan and Pakistan. New York: Anchor, 2011. Bauman, Valerie. “Exposed: The Myth That the World Is Going to Hell! Seven Incredible Charts That Prove the World IS Becoming a Better Place—Despite All the Doom and Gloom.” Daily Mail, January 16, 2019, A1. Baylouni, A. M. “Emotion, Poverty, or Politics? Misconceptions about Radical Islamist Movements.” Connections III 1, no. 4 (2015): 41–7. Beck, Ulrich. “Critical Theory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan Vision.” Constellations 16, no. 1 (2009): 3–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14678675.2009.00534.x. ———. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. ———. The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997. ———. “The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited,” Theory, Culture & Society 19, no. 4 (2002): 39–55. https://doi.org/10.1177/026327640201 9004003. ———. World at Risk. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2013. Benmelech, Efraim, and Claude Berrebi. “Human Capital and the Productivity of Suicide Bombers.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, no. 3 (2007): 223–38. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.21.3.223. Benmelech, Efraim, Claude Berrebi, and Esteban F. Klor. “Economic Conditions and the Quality of Suicide Terrorism.” The Journal of Politics 74, no. 1 (2012): 113–28. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381611001101. Calhoun, Craig. “Indirect Relationships and Imagined Communities: Large Scale Social Integration and the Transformation of Everyday Life.” In Social Theory for a Changing Society, edited by Pierre Bourdieu and James S. Coleman, 95–120. Oxford: Westview Press, 1991. Cantin, Marc-Olivier. “Reexamining the Terrorism-Poverty Nexus.” Journal of International Affairs 72, no. 2 (2018): 10–21.

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Coggins, Bridget L. “Does State Failure Cause Terrorism? An Empirical Analysis (1999–2008).” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 3 (2015): 455–83. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713515403. Coolsaet, Rik. What Drives Europeans to Syria, and to IS? Insights from the Belgian Case. Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations, 2015. Dawson, Lorne L., and Amarnath Amarasingam. “Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights into the Motivations for Hijrah to Syria and Iraq.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 3 (2017): 191–210. https://doi.org/10.1080/105 7610X.2016.1274216. Delhaise, Philippe F. Asia in Crisis: The Implosion of the Banking and Finance Systems. New York: Wiley, 1998. Delia Deckard, Natalie, and David Jacobson. “The Prosperous Hardliner: Affluence, Fundamentalism, and Radicalization in Western European Muslim Communities.” Social Compass 62, no. 3 (2015): 412–33. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0037768615587827. Dodge, Toby. “Iraq: The Contradictions of Exogenous State-Building in Historical Perspective.” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 187–200. Ehrlich, Paul R., and Jianguo Liu. “Some Roots of Terrorism.” Population and Environment 24, no. 2 (2002); 183–92. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:102 0700221602. Evans, Martin, Victoria Ward, and Robert Mendick. “Everything We Know about Manchester Suicide Bomber Salman Abedi.” The Telegraph, May 26, 2017, A1. Fukuyama, Francis. “Liberalism Versus State-Building.” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 3 (2007): 10–13. Gambetta, Diego, and Steffen Hertog. “Why Are There So Many Engineers among Islamic Radicals?” European Journal of Sociology 50, no. 2 (2009): 201–30. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975609990129. Hanckel, Benjamin, and Alan Morris. “Finding Community and Contesting Heteronormativity: Queer Young People’s Engagement in an Australian Online Community.” Journal of Youth Studies 17, no. 7 (2014): 872–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2013.878792. Horowitz, Michael C. “The Rise and Spread of Suicide Bombing.” Annual Review of Political Science 18 (2015): 69–84. https://doi.org/10.1146/ann urev-polisci-062813-051049. Hutson, Royce, Taylor Long, and Michael Page. “Pathways to Violent Radicalisation in the Middle East: A Model for Future Studies of Transnational Jihad.” The RUSI Journal 154, no. 2 (2009): 18–26. https://doi.org/10. 1080/03071840902965570. Ilyas, Saddam, Bilal Mehmood, and Raees Aslam. “Terrorism and Poverty: Double Trouble for Macroeconomic Performance in African Countries.” African Journal of Economic Review 5, no. 1 (2017): 1–13.

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Kinnvall, Catarina. “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security.” Political Psychology 25, no. 5 (2004): 741–67, 742. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00396.x. Kogler, Hans-Herbert. “Constructing a Cosmopolitan Public Sphere: Hermeneutic Capabilities and Universal Values.” European Journal of Social Theory 8, no. 3 (2005): 297–320. https://doi.org/10.1177/136843 1005054796. Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Maleˇcková. “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 (2003): 119–44. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533003772034925. Lewis, Bernard. Islam and the West. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Mantzikos, Ioannis. “Somalia and Yemen: The Links between Terrorism and State Failure.” DOMES: Digest of Middle East Studies 20, no. 2 (2011): 242– 60. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1949-3606.2011.00098.x. Massey, Douglas S. “The Age of Extremes: Concentrated Affluence and Poverty in the Twenty-First Century.” Demography 33, no. 4 (1995): 395–412. https://doi.org//10.2307/2061773. McCauley, Clark, and Mary Segal. “Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups.” In Group Processes and Intergroup Relations: Review of Personality and Social Psychology, edited by Clyde Hendrick, 231–56. Newbury Park: Sage, 1987. McLean, Elena V., Kaisa H. Hinkkainen, Luis De la Calle, and Navin A. Bapat. “Economic Sanctions and the Dynamics of Terrorist Campaigns.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 35, no. 4 (2018): 378–401. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0738894216635023. Newman, Edward. “Exploring the ‘Root Causes’ of Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 8 (2006): 749–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10576100600704069. Oberschall, Anthony. Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic Violence. New York: Routledge, 2007. ———. “Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory.” Sociological Theory 22, no. 1 (2004): 26–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/j. 1467-9558.2004.00202.x. Piazza, James A. “Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages.” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1 (2006): 159–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/095465590944578. Rasborg, Klaus. “‘(World) Risk Society’ or ‘New Rationalities of Risk’? A Critical Discussion of Ulrich Beck’s Theory of Reflexive Modernity.” Thesis Eleven 108, no. 1 (2012): 3–25. https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513611421479. Ross, Jeffrey Ian. “Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model.” Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 3 (1993): 317–29. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343393030003006.

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Roy, Olivier. “EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?” The National Interest 71 (2003): 63–73. Ruth, Terrance, Jonathan Matusitz, and Thomas T. H. Wan. “Understanding Predatory Organised Crime through Network Governance Theory.” Social Change 45, no. 5 (2015): 587–604. https://doi.org/10.1177/004908571 5602790. Santifort-Jordan, Charlinda, and Todd Sandler. “An Empirical Study of Suicide Terrorism: A Global Analysis.” Southern Economic Journal 80, no. 4 (2014): 981–1001. https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-2013.114. Schubert, Christian. “The Pitfalls of Darwinian ‘Progress’: A Comment on ‘Evolvability and Progress in Evolutionary Economics’ by Tim Cochrane and James Maclaurin.” Journal of Bioeconomics 15, no. 3 (2013): 325–28. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-012-9146-0. Sen, Amartya. Freedom, Rationality, and Social Choice: The Arrow Lectures and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Sidel, Victor W., and Barry S. Levy. “War, Terrorism, and Public Health.” The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 31, no. 4 (2003): 516–23. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1748-720X.2003.tb00119.x. Simon, Steven. “The New Terrorism.” The Brookings Review 21, no. 1 (2003): 18–24. Stern, Jessica. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. New York: HarperCollins, 2003. von Bertalanffy, Ludwig. General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications. New York: George Braziller, 1968. von Hippel, Karin. “The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths.” The Political Quarterly 73, no. 1 (2002): 25–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X. 73.s1.4. Williams, M. J. “(In)Security Studies, Reflexive Modernization and the Risk Society.” Cooperation and Conflict 43, no. 1 (2008): 57–79. https://doi. org/10.1177/0010836707086737. Woodward, Susan L. The Ideology of Failed States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. World Bank. Poverty in the West Bank and Gaza. Washington, DC: West Bank, 2001. Yakushko, Oksana, Megan Watson, and Sarah Thompson. “Stress and Coping in the Lives of Recent Immigrants and Refugees: Considerations for Counseling.” International Journal for the Advancement of Counseling 30, no. 3 (2008): 167–78. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10447-008-9054-0. Zaanoun, Adel. “In Gaza, Unpaid Palestinian Authority Salaries Dampen Eid Joy.” The Times of Israel, June 14, 2018, A1. Zhang, Joy Y. “Cosmopolitan Risk Community in a Bowl: A Case Study of China’s Good Food Movement.” Journal of Risk Research 21, no. 1 (2018): 68–82.

CHAPTER 11

Transformative Learning

Counter to the conventional wisdom that terrorists are mindless, many terrorist players are symptomatically thoughtful and mindful. They dedicate much time and energy to cultivate new belief systems or new thought patterns to validate their ultra-violence as legitimate and ideologically imperative. Regardless of the motive that drives people to terrorism, the intention to murder or mutilate for the purpose of a cause is often the result of a transformation process; the decision itself is “valid” because it is grounded in moral arguments and reasons. The act of killing, hurting, and terrorizing the enemy can be explained through a theoretical framework called “transformative learning.” Developed by Mezirow (1991)1 from a large body of literature in the disciplines of education, health, and rehabilitation, transformative learning is a theory that offers an unconventional and interdisciplinary model to fathom the self-radicalization process. The theory posits that constant behavioral change can take place when critical reflection and the nurturing of new personal belief systems are caused by certain triggering factors. By applying transformative learning theory to jihadist terrorism, this chapter helps explain how previously nonviolent people come to support, legitimate, and undertake jihadist violence. The main case study, at the end of the chapter, is on the power of jihadist sermons to drive Muslim audiences to commit jihad (as will be demonstrated through four specific cases).

© The Author(s) 2020 J. Matusitz, Global Jihad in Muslim and non-Muslim Contexts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47044-9_11

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Taking Action vs. Instructional Learning A central thesis of transformative learning theory acknowledges the validity of Mezirow’s difference between instrumental and communicative learning,2 which was inspired by Habermas’s (1984)3 distinction between instrumental and communicative rationality. Instrumental learning seeks to regulate and manipulate the environment by enhancing prediction and performance. Instrumental learning seeks to evaluate truth claims (hypotheses that need to be verified by experience). In transformative learning, one’s personal change comes from these mental and cognitive mechanisms of transformation. After a period of personal crisis (the trigger), a person tries to interpret the event by taking action. Specifically, he or she can explore new thought patterns (critical reflection), a process that entails a transformation in meaning perspectives through the achievement of fresh knowledge and skills.4 A person’s “readiness for change” (i.e., “taking action”) enables him or her to actively begin the transformation process, which will gradually replace his or her previous ways of thinking (i.e., previous meaning schemes). During the transformative process, we come to realize that habitual ways of thinking are not ideal tools to manage a crisis (i.e., distortions). Therefore, we secure a competence and self-confidence in our new roles, which is manifest in our new pattern of behavior driven by our changed perspective. Of particular significance in the transformative learning process is “taking action.” This consists of (1) empowering our sense of self, (2) deeply understanding how our social environment and culture have shaped our beliefs and feelings, and (3) creating strategies for our new behavior. In the end, our transformed meaning perspective enables us to grow out of a past crisis, to cope with new environmental restraints, and adapt to an advancing daily routine.5

Perspective Transformation Perspective transformation is the person’s involvement in the building of personal knowledge. Learning per se becomes an interactive mechanism of meaning-making, integration, and alteration of experiences.6 Transformative learning is the enlargement of consciousness through the transformation of fundamental worldviews and certain capacities of the self. Transformative learning is smoothed by consciousness-driven processes such as the formation of symbolic concepts in our minds.7 An

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example of the latter, in jihad, is the symbolic concept of the perennial enemy Infidel and everything that he or she stands for. Such practice of perspective transformation has three aspects: Psychological (adapting our understanding of the self), convictional (change of belief systems), and behavioral (modifications in our lifestyle).8 Mezirow (1995)9 insists that it is usually the product of a “disorienting dilemma” (sparked by a major life crisis or life transition). However, it may also be the outcome of an increasing number of transformations in meaning frameworks over time. Less important matters, such as those exposed by a mentor or teacher, can still trigger transformation.

Meaning-Making Transformation There is an instinctive motivation along most earthlings to assign meaning to their everyday lives. Because no permanent or ahistorical truth exists, and change in the world is constant, no one can be absolutely sure of what to know or believe. As we evolve, we find methods to better understand our universe. Transformative learning theory can explain this learning process by creating and assuming new and reviewed interpretations of the meaning of our existence or daily life.10 Of particular significance is our re-evaluation or rebuilding of meaning perspectives. Meaning perspectives are formulated through principles, dogmas, values, sentiments, and knowledge about self, identity, and approaches to everyday activities. During the transformation stage, meaning perspectives are rearranged, redefined, or created anew. The transformation process is completed when people actively enter the next stage where they proceed to fully embrace and live out their new lifestyle. In this outcome stage, individuals acquire novel perspectives on life and abide by new behavioral routines.11

Frames of Reference Transformative learning is also the mechanism of stimulating change within a frame of reference. As times passes, adults amass a volume of experience that frames their worldview and defines their life world. An essential element of transformative learning is to critically reflect on one’s perspectives and beliefs and make conscious decisions that result in new ways of defining one’s world. This process is, in its essence, rational and analytical.12 Frames of reference are the structures of criteria and values through which we interpret our experiences. They subjectively

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mold and determine one’s prospects, perceptions, reasoning, and feelings. They delineate our “line of action.” Once defined, we automatically switch from one decision to another. It is human nature to oppose ideas that do not meet our preconceptions, thereby designating those ideas as undeserving of attention; we call them erroneous, irrelevant, bizarre, or mistaken. Under apposite circumstances, transformative learners evolve toward a frame of reference that is more discriminating, in line with their thinking, and integrative of experience.13 A frame of reference encapsulates mental, psychological, and conative components, and consists of two aspects: habits of mind and a point of view. Habits of mind are comprehensive, abstract, orienting, repetitive ways of thinking, sensing, and acting drive by assumptions that form a set of codes. These codes may be rooted in culture, society, education, economic situations, politics, or personal feelings. Habits of mind are expressed in a particular point of view. A point of view is a collection of beliefs, value judgments, mindsets, and sentiments that influence a certain interpretation. By and large, assumed frames of reference include firm interpersonal relationships, political leanings, cultural bias, ideologies, thought patterns, typecast attitudes and practices, occupational habits of mind, religious beliefs, moral-ethical principles, and psychological behaviors. From a more academic standpoint, assumed frames of reference include paradigms in science and math, approaches to linguistics and social sciences, and aesthetic ideals and standards.14 Frames of reference are also predominantly influenced by cultural adaptation and the attention and treatment provided by primary caregivers. Habits of mind last longer than points of view. Points of view tend to change continuously as we cogitate the substance or method by which we find solutions to problems and identify the need to change our suppositions or beliefs. This is the case when we attempt to understand actions that do not fit our habits of mind. We can follow another individual’s point of view and adapt to it, but it would be more difficult to do this with a habit of mind. Points of view are more subject to consciousness and responses from others.15

Paradigm Shift A concept very similar to the frame of reference is the paradigm shift. A paradigm shift is a shift in the way we think; a change in fundamental assumptions within the leading framework of science. A paradigm shift is a

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revolutionary transformation of one’s worldview. In this context, we come to acknowledge that the old paradigm is essentially flawed and cannot be applied to further use. Entirely new ideas—or old and abandoned ideas that have been left in oblivion—are considered, most of which will fail the test of time. However, during this time, a new paradigm is generated, and after a certain period of “paradigm shift,” the new paradigm becomes the norm according to each individual.16 In the beginning, Kuhn’s concept was mostly related to the hard sciences, but later it was applied to the social sciences as well. For example, Veilleux-Lepage (2016)17 explains how jihadist groups have created a paradigm shift by exploiting the internet to recruit would-be mujahedin. From the Chechen conflict to the more recent exploitation of social media by ISIS, a significant minority of Muslim youths have radically transformed their worldviews by interacting with jihad propagandists on platforms like Twitter. With respect to transformative learning, a paradigm shift is a theoretical concept of perspective transformation—the social circumstances which occasion such a change. Consider how that change impacts social institutions, like the institution of religion. Rational choice theory can be supplanted as the main paradigm in political science by perspective theory, which argues that the way people see themselves in relation to others determines the variety of options that are available to them.18 Transformative learning involves experiencing a profound, structural change in the basic principles of cognition, feelings, and actions. It is a transformation of consciousness that drastically and perpetually changes our experience of the world. Such a transformation deals with our understanding of ourselves and where we stand in life; our relationships in the social and natural environment; our relationships with people within diverse power structures (in relation to class, race, and gender); our bodily awarenesses; our worldviews on daily life; and our perception of possibilities for social equity, peace, and personal happiness.19 Jihadist Radicalization Through Self-Learning There is always more than one path to terrorism. There are individual paths which can change for the person over time. This is why radicalization to terrorism is a process.20 Let us examine the transformation of meaning perspective—the person’s psycho-cognitive development of new definitions of self—that is ineludibly linked to jihadist radicalization and changes in behavior.21 Jihadist self-radicalization is a process.

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A process is a series of events, involving stages or actions, that are generally ordered and/or codependent.22 As John Horgan (2009)23 asserts, “terrorists do not just appear ‘fully fledged;’ they have to learn and be trained, make sense of what they learn and express that learning in various ways.” While terrorist recruits may participate in “technical learning” (acquiring the skills necessary to participate in violent activities), what is most relevant to understand the course of radicalization is the person’s involvement in “ideological learning” (internalizing the justifications for violent behavior). Jihadist radicalization through self-learning operates on the same principle as transformative learning: previously held principles, beliefs, and identities—along with their corresponding behaviors—are progressively redefined and replaced. At some point, the creation of a new broad understanding occurs where multiple accomplishments in dealing with dilemmas accrue, enabling the person to build new meaning perspectives. Behavior changes accordingly. Cumulative transformation is the most probable route to jihadization. As McCauley and Moskalenko (2008)24 note, individual processes of identifying with a terrorist movement are “typically slow and gradual,” the result of “gradual radicalization” that can include “step-by-step self-persuasion.” Horgan (2009)25 agrees: “There is no available evidence to suggest that violent radicalization is anything but a gradual process.” Explained differently, while radicalization may be based on specific sociopolitical contexts, “setting events,” and personal idiosyncrasies, individual radicalization occurs during the transformation phase, where an amalgamation of thinking, knowledge gaining, and identity reassessment emerges.26

Precursors to Jihadist Radicalization From a transformative learning perspective, the antecedents to radicalization—like sociopolitical exclusion, discontent with foreign policy, or other reasons—should be regarded as factors that influence a person’s life circumstances. Other forerunners to radicalization—like religion, ideology, or other reasons—are the factors that determine a person’s immediate environment. They can be sensed and interpreted in ways that smooth the progress of the transformative learning process. Instead of simply inducing an individual to partake in violence, forerunners influence the person’s context of living in ways that make him or her subject to new experiences, worldviews, and beliefs.27

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With jihadist radicalization, information grounded in religious dogmas, responsibilities, and traditions motivates a person to (1) reframe current states of affairs in the world (e.g., international politics and events), (2) re-examine the difference between justice, defense, and violence, and (3) re-evaluate the person’s relationship with their immediate and global environment. Recently discovered or established religious creeds offer some of the knowledge that may contribute to a redefinition of meaning perspectives. For this reason, the information introduced by a formerly radicalized person, a recruiter, or Salafist ideologue could occasion a quest for a new meaning perspective from a conspicuously biased standpoint.28

Paradigm Shift Decisions made by people are meaningful for those making those decisions. As the individual becomes implicated in his or her specific route to terrorism, the focus is now on the individual in context and on the individual’s experiences as the processes affect him or her.29 Change through transformative learning can entail unexpected critical points, but may also pertain to more convoluted, long-term mechanisms of change. There is ample debate as to whether or not pathways to terrorism can be detected in early life—by particularly looking at how predisposed a person is to cultivate a penchant for violent behavior. Nevertheless, resolution to this matter does not automatically determine the importance of the concept itself.30 Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009)31 report that a large percentage of Muslim American and British terrorists consider “Islam and the West as existentially incompatible.” As those people critically analyze their Western identities and begin cultivating new meaning perspectives, the contrast between “Islam” and “West” builds a lens through which they dedicate their energies toward developing a goal of destroying the West. Symbols of hostilities and war that claim to show global injustices perpetrated against Muslims worldwide—from the Abu Ghraib prison to the bloodshed in Grozny (Chechnya)—are widely available on the internet and can be processed as accurate information. Transformative Learning Through Jihadist Sermons Jihadist sermons are verbal seminars or presentations delivered in person and/or pre-recorded by a jihadist or radical Islamic preacher (who is not

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necessarily a member of a particular institution or school of thought in Islam). Jihadist sermons are ambassadors of jihadism that tackle theological, religious, ethical, and political issues—both past and present—to champion a purist Salafist-like set of beliefs, attitudes, or laws that the ummah must follow or mimic. In practical terms, jihadist sermons often conclude with appeals to take direct actions against the Infidels and Apostates.32 Examinations of posted sermons of religious leaders (for their discourse) have been published before.33 Jihadist sermons address what Atran and Axelrod (2008)34 call the “sacred values” and what Edmund Burke (1958)35 called “the sublime”; a search for significance, magnitude, glory, and immortal meaning in a desperately chaotic world. Sacred principles differ from material or instrumental principles in the sense that they include moral beliefs that motivate extreme actions in ways that are far inconsistent with everyday deviant actions. Worldwide, a certain number of people believe that dedication to deep-seated values are—and ought to be— supreme, sacrosanct, and untouchable.

Legitimation of Jihad Through Discourse Discourse refers to back-and-forth communication. It incorporates topics approached from the point of view of a specific frame of reference. Justification of a plan or statement must be evaluated with respect to the frame of reference applied. To adopt and apply another person’s perspective involves an intrapersonal process, relying on the information that one has about the message sender or orator to create a model of the other.36 Transformation learning hypothesizes that moral values can be validated through discourse. Beliefs can be internalized when the pro-jihad speaker makes convincing appeals to tradition, appeals to authority, or appeals to the majority. Also called argumentum ad populum, an appeal to the majority operates on the principle that you should do it because many people do it.37 When knowledge, philosophies, values, and judgments are built through critical or dialectical discourse, it is reasonable to claim that, in light of evidence or knowledge, some judgments or interpretations will be perceived as having more validity than others. It may also be reasonably argued that a perspective, evidence, or argument can be tentatively accepted until a new one appears and is confirmed through critical or dialectical discourse.38

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Accepting such knowledge, philosophies, values, and judgments as universally true is like a doing cost–benefit analysis (a systematic method to estimate the strengths and weaknesses of several options).39 It is predicated upon the argument that they are better than their alternatives. In other words, discourse is a dialogue that can be used to provide arguments in support of competing interpretations—not always by objectively assessing facts, arguments, and alternate points of view. The more interpretations are presented, the greater the probability of identifying a more acceptable interpretation or synthesis. By relating to the experiences of others, group dynamics can influence how an individual adopts a worldview or set of actions (until new evidence or a new interpretation is offered).40 Jihadist sermons are produced and supported in both large cultures and subcultures in which (would-be) jihadists are present. Without jihadist sermons, the number of potential recruits would certainly be lower. This is not to underestimate or repudiate the causal centrality of motives and the danger inherent to terrorist activity. However, the point being made here is that, more often than not, terrorists are encouraged by some sort of discourse or narrative presented to them. Jihadist sermons have reportedly heightened their motive or desire to execute brutal attacks. In acting upon such motive or desire, they first need to neutralize the moral restraints about doing wicked or inhumane deeds. Owing to jihadist discourse, the listeners are now “trying new roles,” eventually mutating from regular citizens to active jihadists. Apropos transformative learning, new roles lead the person to rearrange his or her current value and belief systems. Rather than indifference, nonparticipation, egalitarianism, and collaboration (values often paired with the role of “citizen”), other values associated with the role of “militant” (e.g., insubordination, disobedience, noncompliance, and violence) become internalized.41

Sermons Offering New Frames of Reference As Stuart Hall (1985)42 remarks, frames of references are “the framework of thinking and calculations about the world—the ‘ideas’ that people use to figure out how the social world works, what their place is in it and what they ought to do.” Through jihadist sermons, critical information completely enshrined in religious and political ideals will make a listener reframe global politics and history, reassess his or her own relationship with both his or her direct and indirect milieu, and develop a

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new perception of the value of the Caliphate. Jihadist sermons provide the individual with new knowledge or old knowledge from a new angle. A jihad-prone cleric leader or ideologue will incentivize a search for a new meaning perspective that takes a peculiarly slanted position. Through videos uploaded on social media, the effects of globalization prove that many people can access those sermons. In many cases, jihadist sermons extoll the virtues of Islamic religious identity by integrating it into the perspective of current global affairs and by seizing the occasion to create a deep-seated gulf between the Muslim world and the non-Muslim world.43 For a certain number of jihadist sermons’ listeners, what follows is a hyped level of confidence and perception of Islamic religious identity itself. In due course, a decisive moment is reached whereby the radicalized person comes to believe that the old reality is no longer true or relevant and a new one is coming near. This realization accelerates identification with the newly internalized reality and stimulates a search for new roles. Rather than seeing him- or herself as a “Western citizen” or “member of society,” the newly transformed individual comes to identify as a “Muslim” first and, possibly, as a “jihadist” afterwards. New roles lead to reinforcement of the person’s new value systems.44 From the context of transformative learning theory, the symbols and texts in jihadist sermons help listeners dispose of previously learned and embraced knowledge from which self-identification and a range of behaviors had been formed. The outcome is self-doubt about one’s place and worth in Western society, confusion over Western identity, and intense reflection and contemplation (to the degree of identity deconstruction). At this stage, the majority cultural identity is gradually replaced by the minority one. This engenders meditations and self-deliberations regarding identity reassessment as well as new roles and relationships. Of additional interest is the notion that this reconceptualization process occasions a sudden eagerness for change. It is a critical moment in which the radicalizing listener comes to the realization that the past reality should be supplanted by one focused on (1) the near future (i.e., the personal accomplishment of eternal life through a martyrdom operation) and (2) the distant future (i.e., the collaborative accomplishment of the global Caliphate by joining the jihad movement).45 Violent activities belong to the final phase—the outcome phase—after consolidation and affirmation of the person’s new identity and belief system are in place.46

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Jihadist Sermons: Case Studies A jihadist sermon functions as a narrative, a coherent structure of interconnected and sequentially organized accounts. These rhetorical acts express the desire to achieve the global Caliphate by addressing specific goals for the audience. Violent jihadist preachers provide enthralling lines of reasoning to persuade their listeners of the value of abandoning everything to join the global jihad fight. Their sermons are master narratives that unite these listeners to impressive, ideologically imbued outlooks on both contemporary and historical events in Islam. It is a rhetorical practice that gradually gets Muslim audiences to understand, appreciate, and identity with jihadism.47 A master narrative is “a transhistorical narrative that is deeply embedded in a particular culture.”48 As we will see in the four case studies on jihadist sermons, to secure such a meaningful understanding of their new reality and identity, people susceptible to jihadist radicalization will—among other things—listen to various discourses posted online. Mesmerizing sermons through podcasts make online users develop some degree of emotional attachment with a cause and, eventually, experience a process of transformation. The transformation of meaning perspective is strengthened and a new identity surfaces with added value and strength. In his or her new role, the listener develops self-confidence and commences his or her life based on this new perspective. In this context, jihadist behavior is the outcome of a person’s newly adopted value system, where revenge and active combat against the Infidels and Apostates are not only warranted, but also expected.

Case Study I: Anwar al-Awlaki’s Sermons Anwar al-Awlaki was a dual Yemeni-American citizen who promoted jihad as a radical preacher in Yemen. Thanks to his captivating sermons, he quickly became a prominent English-speaking advocate of jihad, including unequivocal calls for the total extermination of Americans.49 He was labeled a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” by the U.S. government for his membership in Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and for delivering financial, physical, and technological assistance for terrorist activities.50 Up to now, al-Awlaki’s violent ideology has remained highly instrumental because it can act as an important recruitment method for Westerners. As a native English speaker and a U.S. citizen, al-Awlaki spoke with a soft voice, but his preaching skills drew the attention of thousands

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of online users who treasured his proclamations on the religious validation for terrorism. al-Awlaki resonated with a great many people because of his upbringing as an American, his apparent piousness and religious expertise, and his proficient use of the internet as a conduit for recruitment.51 al-Awlaki’s jihadist sermons made listeners (1) gain knowledge of a new set of beliefs in interpreting events (by amassing new information) and (2) espouse a new frame of reference, a paradigm shift in thinking, thereby legitimating ultra-violence and directing action toward a future objective (i.e., defeating the enemy to implement the global Caliphate). In his sermons, al-Awlaki denounced the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq or Afghanistan as an invasion designed to launch war on Islam. The calamity and destruction inflicted by U.S. forces seek to vanquish Muslims and erode Islam in order to enforce Western ideas, foundations, and infrastructure. The invaders must be resisted and fended off by any means, and the fight for the supreme Islamic state worldwide must be sustained. Muslim brothers and sisters who disagree with al-Awlaki’s vision are Apostates and should be killed too.52 In both the short- and the long-term, al-Awlaki has been accountable for inciting jihadist operations and plots, including Major Nidal Hasan’s mass shooting at Fort Hood in 2009, Faisal Shahzad’s attempted Times Square car bombing in 2010, and the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013. In regards to this one, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev confessed that he and his brother were fans of al-Awlaki’s online sermons.53 Nidal Hasan and Faisal Shahzad—both of whom had zero records of terrorism-related behavior—had corresponded online with al-Awlaki prior to their attacks. For many professionals, like policymakers and security experts, such cases exemplify the violent radicalizing features of jihadist sermons. Dzhokhar’s arraignment reports that he downloaded Salafist jihadist sermons and declarations made by al-Awlaki that urged the defense of “Muslim lands” from the unbelievers. This is consistent with the declaration that Dzhokhar wrote in the boat in which he was caught: “The US government is killing our innocent civilians,” ostensibly referring to the ummah. Anwar al-Awlaki not only exploited religious grandiloquence, but also embraced political objectives to connect with a particular constituency.54 Still today, al-Awlaki’s sermons are accessible on mainstream Muslim websites. When U.S. authorities got ahold of the radical preacher’s activities in 2008, his popular lesson titled “Constants on the Path of Jihad” was available on Ummah.com, a popular site that, according to U.S. authorities, was visited by about 48,300 users a month in the United States alone.55

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Case Study II: Aboud Rogo’s Sermons Sometimes called Shaykh Aboud, Aboud Rogo Mohammed (1968–2012) was another radical Islamic cleric. He was a Muslim extremist from Kenya accused of funding the Al-Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia. He was killed by gunfire in his native country, which sparked massive protests and violence.56 Rogo had the rhetorical aptitude of Hassan Nasrallah (the current Hezbollah leader) and the intellect of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (the Egyptian ideologue).57 He was also allegedly connected to Al-Qaeda’s East African leader, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, whom he helped execute the United States Embassy Bombings in Tanzania and Kenya in August 1998. He organized a meeting between Fazul and Kubwa Mohammed Seif, who assisted Fazul in the preparation of the suicide attack on the Paradise Mombasa Hotel (Kenya) in 2002. Aboud was gunned down by unidentified assailants when he was driving his wife to a hospital in August 2012.58 Beginning in 2007, Shaykh Aboud led weekly sermons from Masjid Musa in Mombasa, supporting Al-Shabaab’s war in Somalia as the pathway to martyrdom and swearing that working for the Kenyan administration was sinful. He opposed all formal education and inter-religious debate, and considered it an obligation to wage holy war.59 Mombasa was the first city where Aboud’s sermons resonated with his audience, particularly the youth. The city had a high rate of joblessness; the tourism sector was mostly benefiting local élites and outside investors from inland Kenya and overseas. The dire economic situation inflamed feelings of hatred among the youth and others toward the Infidels and those working for the government.60 Until his sudden death, Shaykh Aboud wasted no time expressing his loathing for his detractors and enemies of Islam. His inflammatory sermons were pointed at the government, law enforcement, and a faction of Muslims whom he regarded as traitors for supporting the war on terror against jihadists. Among Aboud’s incendiary sermons was the one he gave in July 2012 at Masjid Saada, openly supporting the church attack in Garissa. The attack was among many attacks executed by Al-Shabaab in Kenya (in response to the country’s military campaign against the terrorist group in Somalia in October 2011). Kenya’s military intrusion into Somalia to fight Al-Shabaab gave the group an opportunity to create a pretext for instigating attacks on churches in Kenya.61

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Shaykh Aboud insisted that it is every Muslim’s duty to slay Christians. For the jihadist preacher, the existence of Christian churches in Muslim lands was a dangerous symbol of Islam’s gradual decay. Therefore, jihad was a natural phenomenon as an obligation for true Muslims. During his sermons, Aboud instructed his audience not to show piety for the slayed ones, depicting a jihadist massacre as a magnificent event and a revelation of the continuation of jihad against enemies.62 Aboud exhorted his audience to join their brothers and sisters in Somalia and die as heroes in holy war. Aboud’s appeal for supporting Al-Shabaab was a clear and present danger whose purpose was to campaign for the restoration of the global Muslim dominion. It was an exhortation to free Muslim territories from oppression.63 Any Muslim who did not agree with this position was labeled an apostate. As a vehicle of intimidation “against other Muslims in matters of jurisprudence,” apostasy was already proclaimed as capital punishment by the early members of the ulama. Progressively, Shaykh Aboud’s sermons became not only divisive, inciting war on Christians and Muslims traitors; they also condemned the Western style of education because it was “warping” Muslim minds. It is not unusual for jihadists to aggressively push for “authentic” behavior in all domains in life—especially by comparing them with characteristics that are “foreign” origin.64 The centerpiece of Shaykh Aboud’s sermons was a type of transformative learning of Islam that included obligatory jihadist activities for all Muslims. This is what Lentini (2013)65 refers to as neojihadism. Peculiar to the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, neojihadism consists of a universal Muslim war grounded in a victimization narrative. In his sermons, Aboud described Muslims as an oppressed and pilloried group; for him, violence was the only route to end it. His messages were awash with dreams to transform oneself into new souls. The stage of meaning-making transformation is the changing stage where perspectives are rearranged, reframed, or rebuilt.66 Consequently, the rather new jihadist campaign in Kenya and Somalia became increasingly popular within militant youths who adhered to literal readings of the Quran to rationalize their violence against Christians and Apostates.

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Case Study III: Abu Hamza al-Masri’s Sermons Also known as the North London Central Mosque, the Finsbury Park Mosque is a five-story mosque located next to Finsbury Park station in the London Borough of Islington. The station is near Arsenal Football Club’s Emirates Stadium. The Finsbury Park mosque served as a major gathering venue for extremists until 2003. Many militant recruiters and preachers continued their activities outside the mosque and without obstruction until 2004 and, in some cases, until 2007.67 In 2003, the mosque was shut down by its board after an anti-terrorist police raid. It was re-established in 2005 under new management.68 Already in 2002, The Guardian reported that weapons training had occurred inside the edifice.69 After an anti-terrorist night raid unearthed illegal objects such as militant handbooks, handguns, combat fatigues, hundreds of embezzled and counterfeit documents, and even three CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) protection suits in the basement, authorities decided to close it.70 The Finsbury Park Mosque gained particular infamy when Abu Hamza al-Masri, a radical preacher, was appointed its imam in 1997. al-Masri, a one-eyed militant, considered democracy “the call of self-divinity loud and clear, in which the rights of one group of people, who have put their idea to vote, have put their ideas and their decisions over the decisions of Allah.”71 His jihadist sermons summoned to kill the Infidels. The mosque became a central information hub for Al-Qaeda and its operations. Al-Qaeda operatives like Richard Reid (the Shoe Bomber) and Zacarias Moussaoui (a French citizen found guilty for conspiring to kill citizens on 9/11) were attendees at the mosque. Some of the 7/7 suicide terrorists also listened to al-Masri’s sermons. Men faithful to the Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev regularly went there, as well as the Wood Green ricin plotters (who planned to attack the London Underground with ricin poison).72 On September 11, 2002, a symposium was organized at the mosque. Titled “A Towering Day in History,” it served to glorify the September 11, 2001 terrorists on the anniversary of the attack. Anjem Choudary, Abu Hamza, Omar Bakri Mohammed, and Mohammad al-Massari were among the participants.73 It should be observed that, in this case study, ideology—more than religion in and of itself—was essential to the Salafist and jihadist movement promulgated at the Finsbury Park Mosque. The radical sermons delivered by Imam Abu Hamza al-Masri reflected a consolidation of beliefs

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to disseminate a particular political vision. Master narratives fulfill central ideological functions which “exist in Muslim societies and cultures,” but have been “exploited and employed specifically by Islamic extremists.”74 By classifying democracy a set of “ideas and their decisions over the decisions of Allah,” al-Masri offered a theoretical replacement of a modern world based on selfish Western ideals and institutions.

Case Study IV: Mustafa Graf’s Sermons Mustafa Graf was a jihadist sermon guru at the Didsbury Mosque in Manchester. He championed holy war and applauded foreign Islamist fighters. In fact, the radical preacher “called for jihad” exactly ten days before Salman Abedi—the Manchester arena bomber who was responsible for the death of 22 innocent people—purchased his ticket to go into the arena and execute his suicide mission at the Ariana Grande concert in May 2017.75 A previously recorded sermon with devastating effects and delivered by the same radical imam was heard by Salman Abedi and continues to alarm British authorities to this day. The sermon, unmistakably given at the Didsbury Mosque, was recorded on December 16, 2016, six months before the suicide attack at the arena. Salman Abedi and his family were regular attendees; his father occasionally officiated the call to prayer.76 Imam Mustafa Graf called for militant jihad when the bombing of Aleppo was at its peak. As he continued in his speech: “We ask Allah to grant the mujahedin, our brothers and sisters right now in Aleppo and Syria and Iraq, to grant them victory” and “Lots of brothers stay behind unfortunately—they love Islam and Muslims but they do nothing about the support of their brothers and sisters.”77 Another excerpt of the sermon said the following: “Jihad for the sake of Allah is the source of pride and dignity for this nation.” An assistant imam at the Didsbury Mosque, Mohammed Saeed, confirmed that Salman Abedi was a regular mosque-goer and once looked at him “with hate” as he was delivering a sermon criticizing ISIS in Libya.78 The frame of reference used in Mustafa Graf’s sermons centers on the Muslim obligation to wage jihad, to the point of shaming the “brothers” who “stay behind unfortunately.” Although “they love Islam and Muslims,” “they do nothing about the support of their brothers and sisters.” The imam employed a social construct as a method to induce change in his followers. The clear and convincing purpose was to redefine

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the meaning of “Muslim;” now, it had to be one who fights as a jihadist. A social construct refers to the manner by which people perceive reality. Societies build a reality around a concept, defining many dimensions of their lives through the meanings they ascribe to the construct. In this case, jihad is a social construct; it is framed by manifold people within social and political realities.79 There are habitual communication patterns that ascertain a coherent frame of reference, which people use to interpret the world and support action and mobilization.80 Rather than using their “habitual ways” of thinking (i.e., previous meaning schemes), Muslim worshippers like Salman Abedi create their own reality based on the content and impetus provided by jihadist sermons. This reality becomes their new cultural worldview, what Hofstede (2011)81 calls “software of the mind”; our thinking pattern becomes our new mental program. In this case, Imam Mustafa Graf produced a social milieu conducive to a jihadist mentality. In the long term, this jihadist mentality consolidates a set of beliefs about the nature of the universe and offers convincing answers to basic questions about life. This is transformative learning at play. When the jihadists-tobe encounter the threat posed by the so-called Infidels (a threat to their cultural worldview), they do not simply count on their cultural sensibilities to interpret the “experience”; they also heartily cling to their new world or reality, reacting aggressively against those who violate it, or in support of those who bolster it.82

Final Notes Taken as a whole, what the four case studies on jihadist sermons demonstrate, based on the theory of transformative learning, is that master narratives can engender a transformation in a person’s vision of the world. This is reflected through his or her altered patterns of social relationships, cultivation of a renewed identity, individual narrative, and behavior—all of which happens in a continuing cycle. At times because of our actions, at other times because of simultaneous actions by all participants in the social environment, our creation of meaning constantly changes. Our identity, then, is in constant flux too. All this explains the way we interpret the universe in which we live and act. Such transformation of our interpretation also entails a continuous reinterpretation of the past and of future actions.83

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Jihadist sermons occupy an important place on the social map. They facilitate the gaining of new information (through conversation, internet surfing, newspaper reading, and television watching). It is at this very stage that a person evolves into a new stage (i.e., when he or she develops a new paradigm shift). As a category of narrative transportation, jihadist sermons encourage profound mobilization efforts, just like social movements and terrorist campaigns. Narrative transportation rests on the premise that individuals’ mindsets and intentions evolve when they have profound participation in a story, or when placing themselves “in the product.” The psychological aspect of narrative transportation can account for the persuasive effect of stories on individuals.84 As Ranstorp (2007)85 states, “in this virtual battlefield, it is clear the militants have mastery of mechanisms to project this ‘single narrative’ in a way that carries enduring resonance and with a logic that thousands of Muslims finds absolutely compelling.” According to Schmid (2014),86 the “single narrative plays a key role in preparing the path for Muslim recruits toward terrorism: a path that has been called radicalization.”

Notes 1. Jack Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991). 2. Jack Mezirow, “Transformative Learning Theory,” in Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning Theorists … In Their Own Words, ed. Knud Illeris (New York: Routledge, 2018): Chapter 8. 3. Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. 1, Reason and Rationalization in Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984). 4. Alex S. Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Radicalization,” Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 1 (2010): 33–51, 38, https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150903487956. 5. Alex S. Wilner and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, “Transformative Radicalization: Applying Learning Theory to Islamist Radicalization,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 5 (2011): 418–38, https://doi.org/10. 1080/1057610X.2011.561472. 6. Jack Mezirow, “A Critical Theory of Self-Directed Learning,” New Directions for Adult & Continuing Education 1985, no. 25 (1985): 17–30, https://doi.org/10.1002/ace.36719852504. 7. Dean Elias, “It’s Time to Change Our Minds: An Introduction to Transformative Learning,” ReVision 20, no. 1 (1997): 1–3.

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8. Valerie Grabove, “The Many Facets of Transformative Learning Theory and Practice,” in Transformative Learning in Action: Insights from Practice: New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education, ed. Patricia Cranton (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997): 89–96. 9. Jack Mezirow, “Transformation Theory of Adult Learning,” in Defense of the Lifeworld: Critical Perspectives on Adult Learning, ed. Michael Welton (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995), 45–52. 10. Edward Taylor, “Transformative Learning Theory,” in Third Update on Adult Learning Theory: New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education, ed. Sharan B. Merriam (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2008), 5–16. 11. Wilner and Dubouloz, “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning,” 47. 12. Jack Mezirow, “Contemporary Paradigms of Learning,” Adult Education Quarterly 46, no. 3 (1996): 158–72, https://doi.org/10.1177/074171 369604600303. 13. Patricia Cranton, Understanding and Promoting Transformative Learning: A Guide for Educators of Adults (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994); Patricia Cranton, Professional Development as Transformative Learning: New Perspectives for Teachers of Adults (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996). 14. Jack Mezirow, “Transformative Learning as Discourse,” Journal of Transformative Education 1, no. 1 (2003): 58–63, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1541344603252172. 15. Jack Mezirow, “Transformative Learning: Theory to Practice,” New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education 197, no. 74 (1997): 5–12, https://doi.org/10.1002/ace.7401. 16. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). 17. Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, “Paradigmatic Shifts in Jihadism in Cyberspace: The Emerging Role of Unaffiliated Sympathizers in Islamic State’s Social Media Strategy,” Contemporary Voices: St Andrews Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2016): 36–51, http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr. 1183. 18. Janet Moore, “Is Higher Education Ready for Transformative Learning? A Question Explored in the Study of Sustainability,” Journal of Transformative Education 3, no. 1 (2005): 76–91, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1541344604270862. 19. Edmund O’Sullivan, Amish Morrell, and Mary Ann O’Connor, Expanding the Boundaries of Transformative Learning: Essays on Theory and Praxis (New York: Springer, 2009). 20. Max Taylor and John Horgan, “A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist,” Terrorism

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21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32.

33.

34.

35. 36.

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and Political Violence 18, no. 4 (2006), 585–601, https://doi.org/10. 1080/09546550600897413. Wilner and Dubouloz, “Transformative Radicalization,” 419. Ibid., 585–89. John Horgan, Walking away from Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2009), 145. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–33, 419, https://doi.org/10.1080/095465508 02073367. Horgan, Walking away from Terrorism, 10. Taylor and Horgan, “A Conceptual Framework,” 588–92. Wilner and Dubouloz, “Transformative Radicalization,” 423. Ibid. Taylor and Horgan, “A Conceptual Framework,” 593. Ibid., 589. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process (Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2009), 45. See Petter Nesser, “Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 4 (2006): 323–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100600641899; Bosmat Yefet, “Authoritarianism, Jihadist Ideology, and Renewal of the Religious Discourse in Egypt,” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 8, no. 2 (2017): 211–32, https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2017.130 7671. See Peter S. Henne, “Government Interference in Religious Institutions and Terrorism,” Religion, State & Society 47, no. 1 (2019): 67–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2018.1533691; James O. Olufowote and Jonathan Matusitz, “‘How Dark a World It Is… Where Mental Health Is Poorly Treated’: Mental Illness Frames in Sermons Given after the Sandy Hook Shootings,” Health Communication 31, no. 12 (2016): 1539–547, https://doi.org/10.1080/10410236.2015. 1089458. Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod, “Reframing Sacred Values,” Negotiation Journal 24, no. 3 (2008): 221–46, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15719979.2008.00182.x. Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (London: Simon & Brown, 1958). Allen L. Edwards, “Political Frames of Reference as a Factor Influencing Recognition,” The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 36, no. 1 (1941): 34–50, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0058167.

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37. Corina Andone, “Argumentative Patterns in the Political Domain: The Case of European Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry,” Argumentation 30, no. 1 (2016): 45–60, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-015-9372-4. 38. Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter, Mapping the Language of Racism: Discourse and the Legitimation of Exploitation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). 39. Anthony E. Boardman, David H. Greenberg, Aidan R. Vining, and David L. Weimer, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice, 5th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 40. Mezirow, “Transformative Learning: Theory to Practice,” 6. 41. Simon Cottee, “Mind Slaughter: The Neutralizations of Jihadi Salafism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 4 (2010): 330–52, https://doi. org/10.1080/10576101003587176. 42. Stuart Hall, “Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 2 (1985): 91–114, 99, https://doi.org/10.1080/15295038509360070. 43. Wilner and Dubouloz, “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning,” 49. 44. Wilner and Dubouloz, “Transformative Radicalization,” 423. 45. Wilner and Dubouloz, “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning,” 49. 46. Ibid., 48. 47. Jeffry Halverson, H. Loyd Goodall, and Steven Corman, Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 48. Ibid., 14. 49. Robert Chesney, “Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force,” Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 13 (2010): 3–60, https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-90-6704-811-8_1. 50. Michael Ramsden, “Targeted Killings and International Human Rights Law: The Case of Anwar Al-Awlaki,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 16, no. 2 (2011): 385–406, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krr015. 51. Thérèse Postel, “The Young and the Normless: Al Qaeda’s Ideological Recruitment of Western Extremists,” Connections 12, no. 4 (2013): 99– 118. 52. Jytte Klausen, Eliane Tschaen Barbieri, Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, and Aaron Y. Zelin, “The YouTube Jihadists: A Social Network Analysis of Al-Muhajiroun’s Propaganda Campaign,” Perspectives on Terrorism 6, no. 1 (2012): 10–21; Scott Shane, “The Enduring Influence of Anwar alAwlaki in the Age of the Islamic State,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 7 (2016): 14–28. 53. Ibid., 112.

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54. Denise Lavoie and Tom Hays “Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Boston Bombing Suspect, Was Influenced by Internet: Indictment,” The Huffington Post, June 28, 2013, A1. 55. Maura Conway, “From al-Zarqawi to al-Awlaki: The Emergence of the Internet as a New Form of Violent Radical Milieu,” Combating Terrorism Exchange 2, no. 4 (2012): 12–22. 56. Mike Pfanz, “Riots in Kenya after ‘Al-Shabaab Backer’ Shot Dead,” The Telegraph, August 27, 2012, A1. 57. Bosire Boniface, “Rogo Death Seen as Setback to Radicalism in Kenya,” Sabahi, September 14, 2012, A1. 58. Ioannis Gatsiounis, “After Al-Shabaab,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 14 (2014): 74–89. 59. David Ochami, “How Fiery Cleric Rogo Developed, Propagated Extremism,” The Standard, September 2, 2012, A1. 60. Gatsiounis, “After Al-Shabaab,” 79. 61. Hassan Juma Ndzovu, “The Prospects of Islamism in Kenya as Epitomized by Shaykh Aboud Rogo’s Sermons,” The Annual Review of Islam in Africa 12, no. 2 (2013): 7–12. 62. Ibid., 8. 63. Mehdi Mozaffari, “What Is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 8, no. 1 (2007): 17–33, https://doi.org/10.1080/14690760601121622. 64. Ndzovu, “The Prospects of Islamism in Kenya, 9. 65. Pete Lentini, Neojihadism: Towards a New Understanding of Terrorism and Extremism? (Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013). 66. Mezirow, “Contemporary Paradigms of Learning,” 159–62. 67. Frank Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 68. Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010). 69. Jason Burke, “AK-47 Training Held at London Mosque,” The Guardian, February 17, 2002, A1. 70. Lorenzo Vidino, “Europe’s New Security Dilemma,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2009): 61–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/016366 00903224100. 71. Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2 (2011): 107–21. 72. Clive Bloom, Violent London: 2000 Years of Riots, Rebels and Revolts (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Aidan Kirby, “The London Bombers as ‘Self-Starters’: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 5 (2007): 415–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100701258619.

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73. Robert S. Lambert, “Ignoring the Lessons of the Past,” Criminal Justice Matters 73, no. 1 (2008): 22–3, https://doi.org/10.1080/096272508 02276910. 74. Halverson, Goodall, and Corman, Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism, 1. 75. Helen Pidd, “Manchester Police Investigate Arena Bomber’s Links to Imam,” The Guardian, August 16, 2018, A1. 76. Patrick Sawer and Jamie Johnson, “‘Jihad’ Imam Linked to Manchester Bomber Denies His Sermon Was a Call to Arms as Police Investigate Him,” The Telegraph, August 17, 2018, A1. 77. Lizzie Dearden, “Manchester Imam Praised ‘Jihad’ at Mosque Where Arena Bomber Salman Abedi Prayed, Recording Reveals,” The Independent, August 17, 2018, A1. 78. Pidd, “Manchester Police Investigate,” A1. 79. Nigel Mackay, “Psychotherapy and the Idea of Meaning,” Theory & Psychology 13, no. 3 (2003): 359–86, https://doi.org/10.1177/095935 4303013003004. 80. Matteo Vergani, “Neo-Jihadist Prosumers and Al Qaeda Single Narrative: The Case Study of Giuliano Delnevo,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 7 (2014): 604–17, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014. 913122. 81. Geert Hofstede, “Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context,” Online Readings in Psychology and Culture 2, no. 1 (2011): 10–21, https://doi.org/10.9707/2307-0919.1014. 82. Jonathan Matusitz, Terrorism & Communication: A Critical Introduction (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2013). 83. Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische, “What Is Agency?” The American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 4 (1998): 962–1023, https://doi.org/10. 1086/231294. 84. Jennifer Edson Escalas, “Imagine Yourself in the Product: Mental Simulation, Narrative Transportation, and Persuasion,” Journal of Advertising 33, no. 2 (2004): 37–48, 37, https://doi.org/10.1080/00913367.2004. 10639163. 85. Magnus Ranstorp, “The Virtual Sanctuary of Al-Qaeda and Terrorism in the Age of Globalization,” in International Relations and Security in the Digital Age, ed. Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello (New York: Routledge, 2007), 31–56, 31. 86. Alex P. Schmid, Al-Qaeda’s “Single Narrative” and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: The State of Knowledge (The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2014), 48.

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Emirbayer, Mustafa, and Ann Mische. “What Is Agency?” The American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 4 (1998): 962–1023. https://doi.org/10.1086/ 231294. Escalas, Jennifer Edson. “Imagine Yourself in the Product: Mental Simulation, Narrative Transportation, and Persuasion.” Journal of Advertising 33, no. 2 (2004): 37–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/00913367.2004.10639163. Foley, Frank. Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, and Laura Grossman. Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process. Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2009. Gatsiounis, Ioannis. “After Al-Shabaab.” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 14 (2014): 74–89. Grabove, Valerie. “The Many Facets of Transformative Learning Theory and Practice.” In Transformative Learning in Action: Insights from Practice: New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education, edited by Patricia Cranton, 89–96. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997. Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. 1, Reason and Rationalization in Society. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984. Hall, Stuart. “Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the PostStructuralist Debates.” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 2 (1985): 91–114. https://doi.org/10.1080/15295038509360070. Halverson, Jeffry, H. Loyd Goodall, and Steven Corman. Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Henne, Peter S. “Government Interference in Religious Institutions and Terrorism.” Religion, State & Society 47, no. 1 (2019): 67–86. https://doi. org/10.1080/09637494.2018.1533691. Hofstede, Geert. “Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context.” Online Readings in Psychology and Culture 2, no. 1 (2011): 10–21. https:// doi.org/10.9707/2307-0919.1014. Horgan, John. Walking away from Terrorism. London: Routledge, 2009. Kirby, Aidan. “The London Bombers as ‘Self-Starters’: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 5 (2007): 415–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10576100701258619. Klausen, Jytte, Eliane Tschaen Barbieri, Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, and Aaron Y. Zelin. “The YouTube Jihadists: A Social Network Analysis of Al-Muhajiroun’s Propaganda Campaign.” Perspectives on Terrorism 6, no. 1 (2012): 10–21. Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Lambert, Robert S. “Ignoring the Lessons of the Past.” Criminal Justice Matters 73, no. 1 (2008): 22–3. https://doi.org/10.1080/09627250802276910.

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Lavoie, Denise, and Tom Hays. “Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Boston Bombing Suspect, Was Influenced by Internet: Indictment.” The Huffington Post, June 28, 2013, A1. Leiken, Robert S., and Steven Brooke. “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood.” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2 (2007): 107–21. Lentini, Pete. Neojihadism: Towards a New Understanding of Terrorism and Extremism? Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013. Mackay, Nigel. “Psychotherapy and the Idea of Meaning.” Theory & Psychology 13, no. 3 (2003): 359–86. https://doi.org/10.1177/095935430301300 3004. Matusitz, Jonathan. Terrorism & Communication: A Critical Introduction. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2013. McCauley, Clark, and Sophia Moskalenko. “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550802073367. Mezirow, Jack. “A Critical Theory of Self-Directed Learning.” New Directions for Adult & Continuing Education 1985, no. 25 (1985): 17–30. https:// doi.org/10.1002/ace.36719852504. ———. “Contemporary Paradigms of Learning.” Adult Education Quarterly 46, no. 3 (1996): 158–72. https://doi.org/10.1177/074171369604600303. ———. “Transformation Theory of Adult Learning.” In Defense of the Lifeworld: Critical Perspectives on Adult Learning, edited by Michael Welton, 45–52. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995. ———. Transformative Dimensions of Adult Learning. San Francisco: JosseyBass, 1991. ———. “Transformative Learning as Discourse.” Journal of Transformative Education 1, no. 1 (2003): 58–63. https://doi.org/10.1177/154134460 3252172. ———. “Transformative Learning Theory.” In Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning Theorists … In Their Own Words, edited by Knud Illeris, Chapter 8. New York: Routledge, 2018. ———. “Transformative Learning: Theory to Practice.” New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education 197, no. 74 (1997): 5–12. https://doi.org/10. 1002/ace.7401. Moore, Janet. “Is Higher Education Ready for Transformative Learning? A Question Explored in the Study of Sustainability.” Journal of Transformative Education 3, no. 1 (2005): 76–91. https://doi.org/10.1177/154134 4604270862. Mozaffari, Mehdi. “What Is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept.” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 8, no. 1 (2007): 17–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/14690760601121622.

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Ndzovu, Hassan Juma. “The Prospects of Islamism in Kenya as Epitomized by Shaykh Aboud Rogo’s Sermons.” The Annual Review of Islam in Africa 12, no. 2 (2013): 7–12. Nesser, Petter. “Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 4 (2006): 323–42. https:// doi.org/10.1080/10576100600641899. Ochami, David. “How Fiery Cleric Rogo Developed, Propagated Extremism.” The Standard, September 2, 2012, A1. Olufowote, James O., and Jonathan Matusitz. “‘How Dark a World It Is… Where Mental Health Is Poorly Treated’: Mental Illness Frames in Sermons Given after the Sandy Hook Shootings.” Health Communication 31, no. 12 (2016): 1539–547. https://doi.org/10.1080/10410236.2015.1089458. O’Neill, Sean, and Daniel McGrory. The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque. New York: Harper Perennial, 2010. O’Sullivan, Edmund, Amish Morrell, and Mary Ann O’Connor. Expanding the Boundaries of Transformative Learning: Essays on Theory and Praxis. New York: Springer, 2009. Pfanz, Mike. “Riots in Kenya after ‘Al-Shabaab Backer’ Shot Dead.” The Telegraph, August 27, 2012, A1. Pidd, Helen. “Manchester Police Investigate Arena Bomber’s Links to Imam.” The Guardian, August 16, 2018, A1. Postel, Thérèse. “The Young and the Normless: Al Qaeda’s Ideological Recruitment of Western Extremists.” Connections 12, no. 4 (2013): 99–118. Ramsden, Michael. “Targeted Killings and International Human Rights Law: The Case of Anwar Al-Awlaki.” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 16, no. 2 (2011): 385–406. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krr015. Ranstorp, Magnus. “The Virtual Sanctuary of Al-Qaeda and Terrorism in the Age of Globalization.” In International Relations and Security in the Digital Age, edited by Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello, 31–56. New York: Routledge, 2007. Sawer, Patrick, and Jamie Johnson. “‘Jihad’ Imam Linked to Manchester Bomber Denies His Sermon Was a Call to Arms as Police Investigate Him.” The Telegraph, August 17, 2018, A1. Schmid, Alex P. Al-Qaeda’s “Single Narrative” and Attempts to Develop CounterNarratives: The State of Knowledge. The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2014. Shane, Scott. “The Enduring Influence of Anwar al-Awlaki in the Age of the Islamic State.” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 7 (2016): 14–28. Taylor, Edward. “Transformative Learning Theory.” In Third Update on Adult Learning Theory: New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education, edited by Sharan B. Merriam, 5–16. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2008.

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Taylor, Max, and John Horgan. “A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist.” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 4 (2006), 588–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/095 46550600897413. Veilleux-Lepage, Yannick. “Paradigmatic Shifts in Jihadism in Cyberspace: The Emerging Role of Unaffiliated Sympathizers in Islamic State’s Social Media Strategy.” Contemporary Voices: St Andrews Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2016): 36–51. http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1183. Vergani, Matteo. “Neo-Jihadist Prosumers and Al Qaeda Single Narrative: The Case Study of Giuliano Delnevo.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 7 (2014): 604–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.913122. Vidino, Lorenzo. “Europe’s New Security Dilemma.” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2009): 61–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600903224100. Wetherell, Margaret, and Jonathan Potter. Mapping the Language of Racism: Discourse and the Legitimation of Exploitation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. Wilner, Alex S., and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz. “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Radicalization.” Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 1 (2010): 33–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/14781150903487956. Wilner, Alex S., and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz. “Transformative Radicalization: Applying Learning Theory to Islamist Radicalization.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34, no. 5 (2011): 418–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X. 2011.561472. Yefet, Bosmat. “Authoritarianism, Jihadist Ideology, and Renewal of the Religious Discourse in Egypt.” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 8, no. 2 (2017): 211–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2017.1307671.

CHAPTER 12

Outbidding and Internal Rifts

In circumstances of extremism, outbidding is a concept that explains competition among groups with shared religion, ideology, politics, and/or ethnicity in order to impress their existing or potential constituency.1 In circumstances of terrorism, outbidding is a rational strategy used by a terrorist group to maximize its potential by competing with other terrorist groups. Academics and practitioners alike have long accepted the argument that competition among terrorist groups increases the degree of violence used by the participants.2 If truth be told, terrorism can be an instrument to outbid others to draw attention of the masses. It can function as the main feature of a group or an offshoot of a resistance movement. Leaders opt for terrorist strategies to distinguish themselves from similar others by resorting to extremely competitive methods, especially when they are in a power race.3 In some cases, disagreements emerge in regard to the targets of jihad. Whereas most jihadist groups attack civilians to retaliate against the state, a select few resent the idea of killing innocent people to merely send a message to the enemy. Factually speaking, by April 2019, more than 31,000 jihadist attacks had been executed since 9/11. With a death toll of close to 150,000 people, most victims were unarmed Muslim civilians.4 Outbidding is also observed between secular and religious groups to gain political control. As Horowitz (1985)5 puts it, “conflict is a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals.” The more competitive the group, © The Author(s) 2020 J. Matusitz, Global Jihad in Muslim and non-Muslim Contexts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47044-9_12

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the more likely it will create instances of factional fighting with other groups of the same movement in order to acquire political relevance. Because outbidding is not a universal phenomenon, an important question arises as to what circumstances lead to its occurrence. If outbidding regulates interactions among extremely committed groups, then conflict escalation is probable. The notion of outbidding bears a resemblance to Della Porta’s (2013)6 notion of competitive escalation (when competition emerges in situations prone to escalation of commitment). Today, outbidding remains the principal theoretical concept that explains the impact of competition between terrorist organizations on participants’ decisions. The logic of outbidding is to prove a group’s capabilities, dedication, and purposes vis-à-vis other groups. The outbidding theory has also been described by Rogers (2013)7 as a habitual practice undertaken by terrorist organizations that are largely political actors. At the micro level, as terrorist organizations fight with each other over a similar base of supporters and recruits, they will raise their levels of violence to show their commitment and capabilities against the other organizations. Consequently, even moderate organizations are compelled to increase their violence. At the macro level, entire nations or regions will endure rising levels of violence because ultra-violence has become the routine behavior for terrorist organizations, which will cultivate ever-increasing degrees of violence.8 In this chapter, several kinds of outbidding are relevant, including the following two: (1) A non-state jihadist organization may compete against another similar one and/or (2) that non-state jihadist organization may face competition among factions within their own network—like the fracture within the IRA and the subsequent formation of two IRA splinter groups.9 Multiple case studies of outbidding and internal rifts are provided throughout this chapter, such as the ones between Al-Qaeda and ISIS, jihadist groups within the Syrian Civil War, and jihadist groups within the Caucasus Emirate.

Destructive Competition vs. Escalating Competition Splits between terrorist groups have heralded eras of both destructive competition and escalating competition. Destructive competition occurs when terrorist organizations attack each other; it often emerges from internal fractures when terrorist factions want to control the same terrain.

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It can be aggravated by extremist youths aspiring to a more violent trajectory and hoping that older members abandon their nonviolent tendencies. It can also be triggered by waves of foreign fighters with divergent interests and by the presence of terrorist “Praetorian Guards” who do not have a stake in a post-conflict resolution. The Praetorian Guard was an élite squad of the Imperial Roman army who acted as a small escort force for leading officials (e.g., senators, provincial governors, procurators, etc.) and as bodyguards for high-profile officers within the Roman legions.10 On the other hand, escalating competition occurs when terrorist organizations try to outperform each other through sprawling competition. This is sometimes the case when competing terrorist groups part ways geographically and subsequently execute successful attacks that acquire them notoriety and increases in resources.11

Internal Rifts Throughout history, terrorist organizations and their ideologies have gone through many phases of destructive competition, primarily internal splits. Internal splits are splits over leadership and strategic direction that results in “irreconcilable differences” between factions. Generational discrepancies are a recurrent feature of internal fracturing.12 Also called “fissioning,” an internal rift within a terrorist organization is a group dynamic whereby dissent creates tensions that develop into “natural” splinter groups within ideologically based movements. These internal rifters compete or fight with one another in an escalating conflict.13 When victories are abundant, local participants and foreign fighters have a tendency to get along, as observed with ISIS’s strong unity during its late 2014 and early 2015 development. However, owing to disagreements among high-ranking players, but also group failure, territorial loss, lack of political options, lack of wages, and lack of resources, internal rifts can easily surface. Internal rifts are like outbidding between determined players, which makes a terror group that is already dangerous even more so. Internal rifts are always associated with leadership disagreements, which motivated the often more cruel younger generation of militants to ascertain their devotion to the cause—which could be called “vertical outbidding.” Through extraordinary acts of violence, groups maintain visibility and dominance, which may increase the incidence and lethality of ultra-violence among

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rival groups.14 Now, the escalation of internal competition is not necessarily a winning option for groups that want to attract public support. “Outbidding in extremism” could turn people away and work to the detriment of the organization.15

Internal Rifts Increasing Support Outside the realm of terrorism, Horowitz (1985)16 and Kaufman (1996)17 explained how political entrepreneurs or emergent parties within a movement can divide the ideological field to gain popular support. By espousing a more radical stance toward certain issues, political leaders want to attract new followers and challenge the status quo inside their respective groups. The audience at large is regarded as a channel to outbid the political enemy. A certain number of jihadist organizations operate on the same principle: groups that are more extreme will position themselves as more committed or devoted, which may increase their popularity in the eyes of potential members and supporters. Put simply, groups that participate in outbidding employ violence to persuade the public that their players have greater determination and skill than their rivals.18 As Kalyvas (2006)19 observes, belligerent parties compete to redefine their conflict in favorable terms so as to “mobilize the population around the cleavage dimension they represent, because they know that the population is divided in a multitude of contradictory ways.” According to Kydd and Walter (2002),20 the escalating violence that exemplifies outbidding tends to pursue objectives that might be of lower value to the attacking group. Attacks are increasingly aimed at demonstrating determination and power, which also sheds light on why terrorist attacks sometimes occur in places where they are not likely to engender significant results. Rampant terrorist competition can surface when terrorists have working space, freedom to operate, and a necessity to garner resources. When these groups are running out of human and financial resources or are not granted such assistance from higher headquarters, they will feel compelled to perpetrate greater attacks to widen their support base and attract media attention in order to garner personnel and money.21

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Outbidding and Internal Rifts in Jihad Why do jihadists kill each other? Since the 1980s, Islamist insurgents entangled in civil wars have devolved into internecine conflicts that have polarized their ranks, estranged their supporters, and made their bid for power more difficult. From the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, to AlQaeda in Iraq (AQI), to ISIS, each of these organizations has great opportunities to overthrow their governments. However, at the core of civil wars, they have begun to fight against fellow rebels, opting for hegemonic leadership over collaboration or harmony. What explains this divide-and-conquer attitude and self-defeating behavior?22 Internal rifts happen for many reasons, but they often arise during transformational phases occasioned by jihadist accomplishments or failures. The possible collapse of ISIS in Syria and Iraq points to another transformation, and fractures soon follow. Wrangling about strategic direction, future goals, and what exact methods to adopt becomes the bone of contention and justification for the formation of splinter groups. With each new wave of mujahedin serving as a unit on holy battles, from the Afghan fighters to Al-Qaeda to ISIS, the tendency is that ideologies change by integrating new goals and validating the increase in violence.23

Increasing Jihadist Attacks Jihadist organizations can become radicalized vis-à-vis other groups as they compete for legitimacy and respect within the population at large. This route underscores increased radicalization in order to outpace other organizations, thereby causing a rise in jihadist violence, economic deterioration, and even physical hardship. Salafist movements and the violent dimensions that contribute to global jihad display this characteristic. Although, in some cases, there may be dogmatic or ethnic disparities that engender this type of competition, its greatest outward indication is a growing request by the group for dedication to radical actions.24 Outbidding is inherent to a power struggle between factions; it involves more profound ideological radicalization and can expand the range of violent actions or targets in a conflict.25 Bloom (2004)26 remarks that, when monopoly over force is lacking, jihadist organizations compete and outperform each other with more impressive terrorist acts. On some occasions, groups will even compete over claiming responsibility for these acts. By extension, when jihadist organizations are subjected to

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internal rifts, they probably suffer from “management deficit,” which can motivate lower level soldiers to ascend the leadership ladder.27 The problem that has been observed is that these foot soldiers will be more motivated than their senior counterparts to perpetrate massacres against unarmed combatants to parade their superior commitment to the cause. As Shapiro (2013)28 indicates, lower level members “often clamor for more violence than is useful from the leader’s perspective,” and this intensifies the “terrorist’s dilemma” of regulating violence efficiently while staying covert. Boyle (2014)29 explains that internal rifts between insurgent groups increase the probability of strategic violence because of the “multiple and overlapping bargaining games between new and emergent claimants for power and resources.” Acts of ultra-violence are an organization’s tactic to show greater commitment to the cause and, therefore, attract the sympathy of those who are on the fence as to which group is more likely to fulfill its promises. Factions within a jihadist network have also applied extremely violent tactics to earn internal credibility from within the group. The process of outbidding works not only horizontally but also vertically.30 Lastly, as Nemeth (2004)31 argues, in an environment with limited resources to commit extreme violence, like suicide attacks, competition can essentially escalate. Groups that abstain from employing extreme violence, to secure support, will attempt to free ride on the endeavors of other groups. This further complicates the collective action issue that most jihadist organizations face.

Fratricidal Jihadists Fratricide is a conflict within a single family or organization. The term is used in relation to internal strife within sects, cults, clans, and criminal groups (like the mafia) as well.32 Fighting over leadership within sects or cults has been reported to encourage outbidding because radical sectarian entrepreneurs want to exclude moderates, a practice that can be efficient but highly divisive. In power struggles at the micro level, rival group leaders copy each other in some type of tit-for-tat sectarianism. This happens when one side presents the struggle in sectarian terms; when it succeeds, its rivals respond in a similar fashion.33 Fratricidal jihadists have three distinct features in common, which makes them predisposed to waging internecine wars. First, they frame their civil conflicts in black-and-white terms, simplifying the complexity

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of enemy relations into “us versus them,” “good versus evil,” and “Islam versus Infidels” categories. In this manner, they lump all their enemies into a single basket. Second, fratricidal jihadists often pursue revolutionary objectives that are too large-scale for rebels with political ambitions at the local level. The fratricidal jihadists’ highly dogmatic positions extinguish all ideas of political realism because they are skeptical of kindred groups that might digress the trajectory for the sake of pragmatism. They find it more beneficial to eliminate their rivals than challenging them through political strategies. Third, and in relation to the previous one, fratricidal jihadists begin by systematically killing unarmed combatants in their holy war against a régime. Their ideological approach engenders a moral code that justifies the slaying of their own brothers and sisters in arms. After all, to evolve from indiscriminately killing innocent people to indiscriminately killing fellow insurgents is not difficult because the latter are perceived as infringing on their notions of ideological purity.34

2014 Peshawar School Massacre A brief, but interesting case study is that of the Peshawar school massacre. On December 16, 2014, six militia killers associated with the Tehrik-iTaliban Pakistan (TTP) executed a terrorist attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar (in the northwestern part of Pakistan). All six militants were foreign nationals: three Arabs, two Afghans, and one Chechen. As soon as they arrived within the premises of the school, they opened fire on school personnel and children, killing 149 individuals (including 132 children). Most victims were between eight and eighteen years of age.35 By the time the tragedy happened, it became the world’s fourth deadliest school massacre.36 The Peshawar school massacre illustrates what can unfold when an already ultra-violent jihadist group simultaneously practices horizontal and vertical outbidding in consequence of internal rifts. The TTP quickly became the deadliest and most powerful insurgent organization in Pakistan since the start of the war in the northwestern part of the country (also called the insurgency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).37 The fragile organizational structure of the TTP led to major in-fighting and, ultimately, to horizontal (or interfactional) outbidding. The TTP is a loose network of close to 30 jihadist groups. Whereas some have hundreds of members, others have several thousand. It is an aggregate of numerous Pashtun tribes with their central seat located in Wana, South Waziristan; they are

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active in seven districts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).38 Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Also called Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, AQI is a Sunni jihadist network that formed after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It is made up of Iraqi and foreign fighters against Iraqi Shi’ites, the Shia-dominated Iraqi government, and U.S. and Coalition forces. AQI came to light in 2004 when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the aforementioned Jordanian-born militant, was leading terrorist operations in Iraq. He joined forces with Al-Qaeda, pledging his group’s allegiance to Osama bin Laden in return for the latter’s endorsement as AQI leader.39 AQI quickly rose to prominence as one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations in Iraq. Its operatives launched a wave of attacks, mostly suicide bombings, that targeted military forces, government establishments, and Iraqi noncombatants. Determined to exacerbate the sectarian conflict at the center of the Iraq War, AQI targeted Shia Iraqis the most, sometimes during religious parades or at Shia religious institutions and centers.40

First Internal Rifts in 2006 Beginning in 2006, AQI created an overarching body called the Mujahidin Shura Council. Later that year, it introduced the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and exhorted all other comparable groups to join forces with it. AQI began supporting other factions with arms so they would submit to AQI’s leadership. This proved to be a colossal mistake that was already made by the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) in Algeria and would be replicated by the Islamic State in Syria less than 10 years later. When other jihadist groups rejected AQI’s call, it began fighting with them and murdering their commanders. The Islamic Army of Iraq, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, the Mujahidin Army of Iraq, and Ansar al-Sunna have all condemned AQI for slaying a multitude of their militants.41 During that same year [2006], competition between AQI and rival offshoots of the same organization worsened when al-Zarqawi openly invited women to fight alongside men.42

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Aggressive Claims to Leadership AQI also infuriated groups that initially agreed to collaborate because of al-Zarqawi’s overly ambitious claims to leadership. al-Zarqawi misjudged his influence and ability to persuade others to join AQI. Owing to this, he made enemies out of former partners and caused the Sunni population to reject the AQI movement. U.S. military forces and the Iraqi régime exploited AQI’s mistakes by asking insurgents and tribes to join in a new strategy of Sunni engagement—the objective was to widen the distance between jihadist insurgents and their Sunni constituents. AQI’s pathway to extremism and strategic mistakes resulted in its quasi-destruction by the late 2000s, largely thanks to Iraqi fighters who were initially on AQI’s side. Such quasi-destruction sparked a civil war that, in turn, occasioned retaliatory violence against Sunni civilians (those that it could not defend). Those Iraqi fighters also coveted domination over the insurgent movement’s leadership.43 Upon facing criticism and rejection, this whole situation caused unprecedented fratricidal violence against AQI’s host communities and former Sunni partners, determining its destiny in the process. To secure a foundation of support within the Sunni population, AQI intensified sectarianism by framing the civil war as a holy war against Shiism. Sectarian polarization made AQI look like the ideal defender of the Sunnis. This plan climaxed with the destruction of the golden-domed Askari shrine in Samarra in February 2006. This well-coordinated attack on a sacred Shia shrine in Iraq chipped away at Shia identity. It led to retaliatory sectarian murders against Sunni communities in Baghdad (and its vicinity) and other cities that both Sunni and Shia populations.44

From AQI to ISI to ISIS “We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is in the battlefield of the media.” This statement was uttered by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current Al-Qaeda leader, to reprimand al-Zarqawi and AQI, which in 2006 had already differentiated itself through its supreme cruelty.45 At its peak, AQI had approximately 5000–10,000 members, a large proportion of whom came from outside the country.46 The Sons of Iraq (trained and funded by U.S. forces), along with the U.S. troop “surge” 2007 and other efficient counterterrorism activities, severely debilitated the jihadist group. However, AQI—now rebranding itself as the Islamic State in Iraq

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(ISI)—was able to garner sources and personnel. The Syrian Civil War facilitated the revival of the group, which found itself a new name again: the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS).47 Apropos Al-Qaeda Central, the ideological battle used to be mostly between Al-Qaeda and the West. Today, a struggle for hegemony in the global jihad movement is currently taking place between Al-Qaeda and its former affiliate: ISIS. As Al-Qaeda and ISIS compete for domination, policymakers have a difficult time to make a distinction between the two groups and uncovering the dissimilar threats they pose.48 AlQaeda, which long advocated patience in establishing the Caliphate, has insistently turned to governance after witnessing ISIS effectively earn international jihadist respect through its leadership and management for several years in Syria and Iraq. After Osama bin Laden’s death, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) contemplated the idea of governance during its ascension in Yemen in 2012.49 The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Outbidding intensifies when multiple groups vie for the support of a similar population. Ethnic, cultural, and religious differences between the vying groups escalate the violence even more. Hostilities between ISIS and other jihadist organizations culminated into factional conflicts in the fall of 2013 (about eight months before ISIS established its caliphate). For instance, in January 2014, ISIS apprehended, tortured, and murdered Dr. Hussein Suleiman (Abu Rayan), a Salafist leader in Tel Abiyad in Raqqa (Syria). This triggered wide-scale warfare, with countless fighters killed on both sides.50 Occasionally, ISIS included soft power in its outbidding endeavors, demonstrating its ability to offer resources to its population and, thereby, attract outsiders to its Caliphate. Soft power is the aptitude to persuade, rather than coerce (hard power).51 ISIS’s main focus on outbidding, however, was drawn upon hard power. It was reflected through its constant competition for recruits with other insurgent factions, including Al-Shabaab. To further defections from Al-Shabaab and invite new Somali recruits, ISIS’s multitiered media apparatus released many propaganda videos directed at Somali audiences. The first propaganda film was disseminated online in late May 2015. It showcased four Somali foreign soldiers and one Ethiopian foreign soldier in Iraq who implored Somalis to join the “caliphate upon the Prophet [Muhammad’s] methodology,” referring to leaders of ISIS, which they

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claim was the only group “truly” caring for them and determined to take revenge for their humiliation and oppression by the “Ethiopian Christians.” This initial indoctrination jab at Al-Shabaab led to additional releases between early October 2015 and January 2016. The videos also “starred” ISIS fighters who were both Somali and non-Somali, and who are deployed in different locations, including Syria, Libya, and Yemen.52

In Competition with Al-Qaeda The split between ISIS and Al-Qaeda emerged in a context where multiple factions were vying for popular support. To this point, Representative Adam B. Schiff of California, a chief Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, said the following: “ISIS is all about the quantity of attacks. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, is focused on the quality of the attack.”53 Michael E. Leiter, a former director of the National Counterterrorism Center, made this statement: “Al-Qaeda tried to be a movement and capture a more global imagination, and it largely failed; regional groups joined the A.Q. banner, but it never truly became a wholly decentralized movement.” As he continued: “ISIS has been more successful on this front, and this is why it is more dangerous, more difficult to identify adherents, and more challenging to combat.”54 Al-Qaeda’s and ISIS’s competition quickly became destructive. However, when ISIS declared its caliphate in June 2014, competition between the two organizations went from destructive to escalating with both organizations’ franchises aggressively engaging in attacks to outpace each other. As the number of attacks intensified, the ruling groups protected themselves economically and militarily by expanding their resources. In due course, they were forced to choose their battles more discriminately. In doing so, they trained their best fighters so they could protect their best assets. On the other hand, peripheral areas were covered by the weakest troops. Under threat and with their deaths forthcoming, those troops often retreated under competitive jihadist attack or defected to the other side. As government control is split between regions, when a jihadist group loses control, the whole region dives into chaos. As a result, counterterrorists today face more detriments because the competition between Al-Qaeda and ISIS has caused chaos in many regions. Counterterrorists have a difficult time measuring up with the scale and pace of jihadist attacks in Syria and Iraq.55 The internal competition between Al-Qaeda and ISIS facilitated Al-Qaeda’s change of strategy.

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This possibly motivated Al-Qaeda to reduce its global terrorist planning and shift its focus on Middle-Eastern regions.56 In June 2014, when ISIS captured Mosul and proclaimed its caliphate, it publicly called itself the Islamic State. Within months, major parts of the once-hyped Al-Qaeda global jihadist network disintegrated and turned into a more venomous form. Partners worldwide broke away from Al-Qaeda and reinvented themselves and ISIS-inspired insurgents. Such dissatisfied Al-Qaeda affiliates could be found in Algeria, Pakistan, and Yemen. They established new Islamic State wilayat —administrative branches, like states or provinces.57 Formerly Al-Qaeda-pledged associates Boko Haram and Ansar Beit al Maqdisi switched allegiances. The attractiveness of “ISIS branding” galvanized allegiance or support from over three dozen affiliates and nascent terrorist groups from Morocco to Indonesia.58 When Issue 1 of Inspire was released, Al-Qaeda’s monopoly over other jihadist groups was set in stone but the organization did not abandon its effort to promote and differentiate itself further. The article “Do the mujahedin and Christian terrorists have similar goals” was published to describe the jihadists as noble fighters with a lofty moral code and cause for their actions. In “Why did I choose Al-Qaeda,” a sequence of articles in Inspire, Abu Musab Al-Awlaqi depicted Al-Qaeda as a tightly knit circle that despises nonbelievers the most, an image that ISIS struggled to obtain a few years later. As the outbidding conflict between Al-Qaeda and ISIS heightened, Al-Qaeda sought to distinguish itself from its rival through its propaganda materials, although not as aggressively as ISIS’s own efforts. Inspire’s outbidding against ISIS includes the glorification of lone-wolf jihadism over hijrah: “If you join the ranks of the Muhajireen and Mujahideen, you will be a Soldier of Allah. But if you carry out a lone Jihad operation amidst the kuffar, you will be an Army of Allah.”59 In order to outperform Al-Qaeda’s Inspire, ISIS published Dabiq from July 2014 to 2016. Many articles in Dabiq were meant to disrepute rival jihadist groups, such as Al-Nusra Front (see next subsection) for conspiring with secularists. To ascertain its preeminence in the global jihad movement, Dabiq contributors often underscored the defection of soldiers from rival groups. They also emphasized other jihadist groups’ pledging of fidelity to ISIS; such groups include insurgent mujahedin groups from the Caucasus region.60

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In Competition with Al-Nusra Front Also called Jabhat al-Nusra, Fatah al-Sham, Al-Qaeda in Syria, or AlQaeda in the Levant, Al-Nusra Front was a jihadist organization fighting against the Syrian régime during the Syrian Civil War. Its mission was to secure an Islamic state in the country.61 Active from January 2012 to January 2017, Al-Nusra Front had between 6000 and 10,000 fighters at the most, which represented 7.5–9% of the total force of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).62 In just one year (from November 2011 to November 2012), Al-Nusra Front was responsible for no fewer than 600 terrorist attacks—including more than 40 suicide missions and a multitude of improvised explosive device (IED) operations—in large cities like Damascus, Aleppo, Hamah, Dara, Homs, Idlib, and Dayr al-Zawr. During these attacks, a great many innocent Syrians were killed.63 On January 28, 2017, after ferocious clashes with multiple rebel groups, Al-Nusra Front merged with four other factions to form Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a Salafist jihadist organization involved in the Syrian Civil War.64 The most bewildering enemy among Al-Nusra Front’s enemies was ISIS. The main difference between the two was Al-Nusra Front’s shortterm hope of monopolizing the Syrian jihad as opposed to the longer term dream of establishing the global Caliphate. Al-Nusra Front was also willing to ignore ideological goals to arrange operations with other factions. Al-Nusra Front was an offshoot of ISI. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent his military chief officer, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, to create a fighting unit in Syria as the Arab Spring spiraled into an intractable civil war. At first sight, one can attribute the split between the two leaders to al-Jolani. However, this is not the case; both men answered to Ayman alZawahiri (Al-Qaeda’s leader). The latter decided to keep Al-Nusra Front as its favorite affiliate in Syria and assigned al-Baghdadi’s organization in Iraq, a choice that was eventually disallowed by the future Caliph.65 Like its AQI predecessors, ISIS redefined the conflict in dividing terms and left no opportunity for neutrality. Participants in the conflict had to take sides, either with ISIS or against it. It presented all Shia and Alawites as perennial enemies, along with other adversaries. Essentially, both ISIS and Al-Nusra Front were jihadist organizations vying for the same objective: the waging of holy war for the sake of Islam. However, only one of them had to come out as the winner. For both groups, the Kurds were equally regarded as a menace to the Caliphate dream. Also branded in the same “threat” category were secular rebels associated with the FSA,

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Islamists linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, and Salafists who championed Syria’s territorial integrity, such as Jaysh al-Islam and the Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement (ASIM).66 Jihadist Outbidding in the Syrian Civil War Since March 2011, the Syrian Civil War has been a continuing armed conflict in Syria between the régime led by President Bashar al-Assad— with the help of domestic and foreign allies—and manifold homegrown and international forces against both the government and each other in varying combinations. The Syrian régime and insurgent groups fight for hearts and minds and for strategic territory. Winning the conflict would change power, credibility, popular support, and physical resources to the compassionately framed side.67 Since the beginning, the fundamental reasons for the fighting are not quite known (both by the government and opposition forces). A recurrent argument, however, is that the conflict has become gradually communal over time—a régime governed by an “alliance of minorities” against a large Sunni majority in the nation.68

A Staggering Death Toll The Syrian Civil War is one of the most lethal wars in modern times. Various organizations have applied the tactic of suicide bombings after Al-Nusra Front carried out over 40 of these attacks in Syria. The concept of outbidding can shed light on why competition between groups such as the Islamic Front, the Guardians of Religion Organization (i.e., Tandhim Hurras al-Deen), the FSA, and ISIS—among others—have compelled them to use deadlier and more extreme tactics to uphold group cohesion and show determination to aspiring recruits.69 The death toll as a result of jihadist outbidding in the Syrian Civil War has been staggering. According to the Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR), an independent NGO and think tank in Syria, the civil war has caused the deaths of almost 500,000 people—including many women and children—either directly or indirectly.70

The Syrian Government Of equal relevance is the fact that the Syrian government has taken advantage of the factor of fear, from which all minority groups in Syria may suffer. The government vowed to protect minorities from extremist

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actions. The opposition, however, were caught in a cycle of an outbidding syndrome, by including manipulated religious terms into their message in order to mobilize populations and frame the image of the régime. In the short term, this tactic proved to be highly beneficial to the opposition because they could rapidly gather moral, financial, and physical support from homegrown and outside forces. Nevertheless, in the long term, the same strategy turned out to be more beneficial to the Syrian government. It led to the disintegration of the opposition forces, giving them more opportunities for the development of radical battalions. More importantly, it changed the global perception of the civil war and caused the international community to be hesitant about supporting insurgent forces with heavy artillery so they could better resist the régime.71 From March to June 2011, during the Arab Spring, the Syrian government redefined the demonstrations as sectarian and proclaimed that the purpose was to safeguard the correct version of Islam. No matter what, a precarious outbidding mechanism can be initiated, thereby producing a sequence of episodes of action and reaction that may spiral into a politically vicious situation. Ultimately, this would deepen a wedge and alter the trajectory toward the original objectives. At the beginning of the Arab Spring, virtually all campaign messages underscored the importance of equality, liberty, nonviolence, dignity, unity of all Syrian minorities, and the replacement of President Bashar al-Assad, considered a tyrannical leader.72 Opposition groups criticized al-Assad’s régime for “playing the invalid card of sectarianism.” They employed slogans such as “freedom is my sect” and emphasized their demands for “freedom and democracy” with “no room for sectarianism or discrimination.” The rhetoric got harsher and harsher as the al-Assad cracked down on them. The opposition’s slogans were the alleged product of government provocateurs and appeared at protests, such as the notorious “Christians to Beirut, Alawites to the grave.”73 The influx of outside forces, predominantly Sunnis in support of the opposition and Shiites in support of the government, added to the verve of the sectarian narrative.74

Hafez al-Assad’s Régime As early as 1966, Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, then Syria’s Minister of Defense and Member of the Regional Command of the Syrian Regional Branch, was already suppressing opposition forces by creating a

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wedge between them. He kindled rivalry among various religious minorities by inducing the religious élite to collaborate with the ruling régime. In so doing, he instituted the purported “official Islam” of the state.75 The élites fought to define public definitions of problems and persuade populations to contemplate some issues more heavily than others.76 Hafez al-Assad’s régime, whose tyrannical apparatus was frequently challenged, instrumentalized the official religion because it was deemed advantageous. Based on the engagement of religious minorities in political opposition, capitalizing on Islam proved to be useful for the government to outbid its opponents. In due course, this incited intergroup rivalry and carnages, the most infamous of which was the Hama massacre in 1982.77 Outbidding in Palestinian Suicide Terrorism Suicide bombing is one of the most efficient instruments of contemporary terrorism. As a type of social noise, suicide bombing can increase visibility in the media and within the population (where directly or indirectly affected by suicide attacks).78 Suicide terrorist attacks are “directed toward the domestic population who sponsor, join, support, or ‘vote’ for these organizations. The objectives of suicide bombing are thus multiple and may reinforce or undercut each other depending on specific conditions endogenous to each case.”79

Domestic Competition Suicide attacks can be the product of internal competition between rival organizations to seek to influence the same constituency.80 Jihadist organizations that use suicide attacks in the same region compete by upsetting peace negotiations with enemy forces. Reminiscent of the coercion perspective, the competition model interprets the dissemination of suicide attacks as a rational, or strategic, learning method.81 As Bloom (2005)82 argues, “this kind of diffusion takes various forms: a spillover of violence to neighboring areas within the same country or to other countries.” As she continues, “in some instances, insurgent factions have been physically trained by other organizations. On other occasions, factions observe the successful operations of groups from afar.” Such jihadist groups want to prove that they have been selected by Allah to fight for their cause and their community. When a community at large supports

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the employment of suicide missions against another group or government, organizations will include a great deal of political advertising in the process.83 Internal rifts among Palestinian terrorists—like the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, or Fatah— reveal a continuous trend of youths seceding from the older generations. In the vast majority of cases, younger terrorists—criticizing the passive, moderate stance of the older generation—think that a new strategic direction of utmost violence will be the key to victory.84 By intensifying the level of their attacks, Palestinian jihadist groups come to be perceived as winners and, therefore, become agenda-setters as well. The more aggressive perpetrators of suicide bombings not only acquire more volunteers and money; they also shape the future for their own constituents. Hamas’s suicide violence during the Second Intifada (2000–2005) persuaded the PLO to adopt more extremist rhetoric. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s hastened violence pushed Hamas to turning away from peaceful activism.85

Palestinian Suicide Bombers In March 2019, a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) revealed that over 40% of Palestinians want Hamas to preside over the Palestinian territories.86 Hamas continues to train Palestinian suicide bombers. Under such conditions of public support, it should come to no surprise that suicide terrorism has been a facilitator of recruitment for the jihadist organization within the Palestinian community. Another significant percentage of Palestinians support other jihadist organizations. For example, in a poll conducted by the Washington Institute in July 2015, over 85% of Palestinians living in Gaza favored the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (which broke off from the Muslim Brotherhood so they could focus more on suicide bombing missions). Most people surveyed in that poll favored the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to Hamas.87 Competing Palestinian jihadist organizations benefit from varying levels of support, but they all serve the same purposes: to attack the common nemesis (the State of Israel) and to provide legitimacy to less influential militant groups that still oppose the Palestinian Authority for leadership of the Palestinian people.88 Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Fatah are encouraging more suicide attacks in the midst of

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the competition they created for each other and, later, other organizations in the region. From Japanese Kamikazes to Iraqi rebels, militants resort to suicide terrorism “to gain credibility and win the public relations competition.”89 To provide empirical evidence, Bloom (2005)90 brings up two additional circumstances. First, she claims that, over time, other groups, such as Marxist DFLP, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and An-Nathir, acknowledged that suicide bombings could attract more political votes. These groups have occasioned much fewer suicide attacks, but their increasing number is symptomatic of a craving for more support within Palestinian communities. The involvement of these organizations into the political fight has been characterized by their profuse employment of suicide attacks. Secondly, Bloom analyzes several cases of suicide attacks for which several groups have claimed responsibility. The decision of claiming a terrorist attack can come with the ostensible retaliation from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Based on Bloom’s argument, one can easily deduce that this advantage is insufficiently incentivizing, regardless of the IDF’s retaliation for attacks that such organizations may not even have conducted. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade was not created to erode the peace process because, by September 2000, the peace negotiations with President Clinton and the State of Israel (among others) were already unsuccessful. In addition, the Second Intifada was not triggered by a wave of suicide bombings but by militia operations ordered by Fatah and Fatahlinked groups. After the negotiations at Camp David failed in the summer of 2000, the absence of territorial concessions along with the rejection of the Palestinian state (a plan that was expected for September 13, 2000, only two weeks before the Second Intifada), gravely emasculated the prestige of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority.91 On the other hand, because of the failure of the peace process at Camp David, the prestige and authority of Palestinian jihadist organizations were ascending. In fact, there was no necessity to advertise for “martyrdom operations” to get a booster. The first obstacle that the PLO encountered was the ability to recover authority over the Palestinians who, after September 13, 2000, were discouraged and did not see their anticipated proclamation of the State of Palestine. The Second Intifada, not desired or created by Yasser Arafat (then leader of the PLO), gave the latter an opportunity to regain support. Owing to this, the secular factions, not the jihadist ones, were the first to pour gasoline on the Intifada fire.

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By way of comparison, at the beginning of the Second Intifada, suicide missions were few and far between. Their numbers grew rapidly as the Palestinian people reacted negatively when the secular factions wanted to gain full authority over them. The Palestinians’ negative reaction even compelled the secular factions to become martyrs themselves, giving rise to the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.92

Competition Hypothesis: Two Opposing Views The competition hypothesis is to be approached from two different perspectives. On the one hand, one can look at the competition hypothesis as a type of overbidding game between rival organizations that are really fighting each other. Occurrences of Palestinian suicide attacks do not follow a straightforward timeline that can be interpreted as a direct reaction to the IDF’s military actions. This is Mia Bloom’s interpretation: Palestinian suicide attacks are sporadic, regardless of the IDF. On the other hand, one can look at the competition hypothesis as a type of collaboration at the local level. It is analogous to competition in the industrial world when two corporations have the same fundamental research goals in spite of their market competition. This theory has been validated by ethnographic data. For example, we know that collaborations between rival terrorist cells occur frequently at the local level, especially regarding defense and policing responsibilities.93 Competitive collaboration could happen out of a need to join forces both against the IDF and the moderate leaders of the Palestinian Authority. After the Jenin battle (or Operation Defensive Shield, as the IDF called it), the main reason for the competition between West Bank and Gaza groups was the survival of the Second Intifada itself.94 Operation Defensive Shield was a wide-ranging military operation conducted by the IDF in 2002.95 Outbidding Within the Caucasus Emirate The Caucasus Emirate (or Caucasian Emirate) was a jihadist organization active in the southwestern part of the Russian Federation. Its mission was to oust the Russians from the North Caucasus and establish an autonomous Islamic state in the region.96 The North Caucasus comprises Russia, Syria, Iraq, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Starting as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in 2000 (at the end of the Second Chechen War),

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the Caucasus Emirate reached its peak in 2007, suffered from a leadership crisis in 2010, and ceased its activities in 2016.97

Evolution of Internal Tensions As conflict in the North Caucasian republics intensified, insurgent leaders outside Chechnya became more active in redefining the conflict in religious terms, contributing to a steady, but inadequate, vertical scale shift. Nevertheless, since the mid-2000s, the tendency has been reversed; the impact of Salafist preachers is being felt outside Chechnya, while the Chechen rebellion has reverted back to its traditional nationalistic views. After the death of Basayev and Sadulayev (two Chechen Islamist commanders) in 2006 and the triumphs of Chechenization, the Chechen insurrection tried to reshape its leadership around nationalistic spearheads like Dokka Umarov, a Chechen Islamist militant (also killed).98 At the same time, non-Chechen organizations aggressively promoted their own agendas. The establishment of the Caucasus Emirate could be interpreted as the product of the intersection of several social mechanisms. First, the Caucasus Emirate maintained its existence thanks to the outbidding that occurred between the nationalists within the Chechen movement, who wanted independence, and the Salafists, who wanted the global Caliphate in the North Caucasus. Second, non-Chechen Salafist ideologues, like Yasin Rasulov, Anzor Astemirov, and Said Burtiaskii, regarded Salafism as a doctrine that could solve major social problems and contest the hegemony of the political and religious élites.99

Terrorism to Outbid Other Factions Like other jihadist organizations involved in the conflict, North Caucasian jihadists faced internal splits that became bloody infighting. The restoration of suicide attacks as a method created a solid bond between the North Caucasus conflicts and the global jihad movement in the Muslim world. It also underscored the insurgents’ dedication to Salafism, eventually outbidding other groups across the region. At the same time, such circumstances gave leaders like Said Buriatskii—a symbol of the global Islamist resistance in the North Caucasus100 —a chance to directly confront the leadership of the likes of Anzor Astemirov—a leader of a rival jihadist group in the same region.101 Both Buriatskii and Astemirov were killed in battle in 2010. In 2011, at the beginning of the Syrian Civil

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War, outside fighters from all corners of the globe were drawn to the conflict. Since 2012, volunteers of the North Caucasus region, including Chechens, Dagestanis, and Ingush have been among the most active mujahedin. They represent a constellation of true jihadists of varying backgrounds who have joined the conflict to further the true cause of Islam. When rumors about North Caucasians’ participation began to circulate, some glorified their involvement, while others condemned their unwarranted use of violence against civilians, a practice that has infuriated thousands of noncombatant Syrians.102 Because of continual internal rifts, inter alia, by 2014 the Caucasus Emirate represented the second-largest unit of foreign fighters in the Syrian Civil War, after non-Syrian Arabs—an excessively high proportion in comparison with their demographics.103 Today, notwithstanding the disbanding of the Caucasus Emirate in 2016, what these mujahedin do and what they seek to achieve in Syria continues to pose a major security threat. If allowed to return to the North Caucasus region, they would pose a colossal threat to the Russia Confederation’s national security because these fighters are now committed, experienced, and acquainted with other jihadists worldwide.104

Notes 1. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 2. Stephen Nemeth, “The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 2 (2014): 336–62, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712468717. 3. Brandon M. Boylan, “Sponsoring Violence: A Typology of Constituent Support for Terrorist Organizations,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38, no. 8 (2015): 652–70, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015. 1030190. 4. Retrieved on April 29, 2019 from http://www.pi-news.net/2019/04/ wams-veroeffentlicht-terrorliste-seit-9-11-mit-150-000-toten/. 5. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Pres, 1985), 95. 6. Donatella Della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 7. Paul Rogers, “Terrorism,” in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams (New York: Routledge, 2013), 223–24.

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8. Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plümper, “International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations,” British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 4 (2009): 711–34, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123409000751. 9. Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley, Sophia Moskalenko, and Clark Mccauley, “Winning the Battle but Losing the War? Narrative and Counter-Narratives Strategy,” Perspectives on Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2009): 25–35. 10. Guy de la Bédoyère, Praetorian: The Rise and Fall of Rome’s Imperial Bodyguard (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017). 11. Clint Watts, “Deciphering Competition between al-Qa‘ida and the Islamic State,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 7 (2016): 1–6. 12. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2004). 13. Clark McCauley and Mary Segal, “Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups,” in Group Processes and Intergroup Relations: Review of Personality and Social Psychology, ed. Clyde Hendrick (Newbury Park: Sage, 1987), 231–56. 14. Yelena Biberman and Farhan Zahid, “Why Terrorists Target Children: Outbidding, Desperation, and Extremism in the Peshawar and Beslan School Massacres,” Terrorism and Political Violence 31, no. 2 (2019): 169–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1135425. 15. Martha Crenshaw, “Terrorism Research: The Record,” International Interactions 40, no. 4 (2014): 556–67, https://doi.org/10.1080/030 50629.2014.902817. 16. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 90–5. 17. Stuart J. Kaufman, “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War,” International Security 21, no. 2 (1986): 108– 38, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539072. 18. Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 7–36, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.1. 19. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 78. 20. Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence,” International Organization 56, no. 2 (2002): 263–96. 21. Watts, “Deciphering Competition,” 2. 22. Mohammed Hafez, “Fratricidal Jihadists: Why Islamists Keep Losing Their Civil Wars,” Middle East Policy 25, no. 2 (2018): 86–99, https:// doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12344. 23. Watts, “Deciphering Competition,” 3.

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24. Tore Refslund Hamming, “Jihadi Competition and Political Preferences,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 6 (2017): 10–21. 25. Aurélie Campana and Jean-François Ratelle, “A Political Sociology Approach to the Diffusion of Conflict from Chechnya to Dagestan and Ingushetia,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2014): 115–34, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.862901. 26. Mia Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 1 (2004): 61–88, https://doi.org/10.2307/20202305. 27. Max Abrahms and Philip B. K. Potter, “Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics,” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 311–42, https://doi.org/10.1017/S00208183140 00411. 28. Jacob N. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 5. 29. Michael J. Boyle, Violence after War: Explaining Instability in PostConflict States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 12. 30. Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 49–90, https://doi.org/10. 1162/isec.2006.31.1.49. 31. Nemeth, “The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations,” 338. 32. James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). 33. Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Sectarianization of the Middle East: Transnational Identity Wars and Competitive Interference,” Middle East Political Science 15, no. 4 (2016): 71–5. 34. Hafez, “Fratricidal Jihadists,” 86. 35. Umbreen Javaid, “Operation Zarb-e-Azb: A Successful Initiative to Curtail Terrorism,” South Asian Studies 30, no. 2 (2015): 43–58; Sara Mahmood, “Decapitating the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan: An Effective Counter-Terrorism Strategy?” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 7, no. 6 (2015): 24–9. 36. Jon Boone and Ewen MacAskill, “More Than 100 Children Killed in Taliban Attack on Pakistan School.” The Guardian, December 16, 2014, A1. 37. Naseer Ahmad Khan and Manzoor Khan Afridi, “South Asian Security and Stability and Regional Rivalries: Post 9/11 Indo-Pak Proxy War in Afghanistan,” FWU Journal of Social Sciences 1 (2015): 86–95. 38. Biberman and Zahid, “Why Terrorists Target Children.”

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39. Guido Steinberg and Isabelle Werenfels, “Between the ‘Near’ and the ‘Far’ Enemy: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Mediterranean Politics 12, no. 3 (2007): 407–13, https://doi.org/10.1080/136293907016 22473; Andrew Phillips, “How al Qaeda Lost Iraq,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 (2009): 64–84, https://doi.org/10. 1080/10357710802649840. 40. Anthony H. Cordesman and Sam Khazai, Iraq in Crisis (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). 41. Karin Brulliard, “Dozens Die in 2 Truck Bombings in the North,” The Washington Post, March 28, 2007, A1. 42. Jennifer Philippa Eggert, “Women Fighters in the ‘Islamic State’ and AlQaida in Iraq: A Comparative Analysis,” Journal of International Peace and Organization 90, no. 3 (2015): 363–80. 43. Hafez, “Fratricidal Jihadists,” 93. 44. Mohammed Hafez, “The Origins of Sectarian Terrorism in Iraq,” in The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat, ed. Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares (Columbia University Press, 2014), 436–60. 45. Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2015). 46. Kenneth Katzman, Al-Qaeda in Iraq: Assessment and Outside Links (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), retrieved on February 2, 2019 from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32217.pdf. 47. Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate,” Middle East Policy 21, no. 4 (2014): 69–83, https://doi. org/10.1111/mepo.12096. 48. Eric Schmitt, “ISIS or Al Qaeda? American Officials Split Over Top Terror Threat,” The New York Times, August 4, 2015, A1. 49. Watts, “Deciphering Competition,” 3. 50. Hafez, “Fratricidal Jihadists,” 94. 51. Giulio Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations: A Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism, and Constructivism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 52. Christopher Anzalone, “The Resilience of al-Shabaab,” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 10 (2016): 13–20. 53. Cited in Schmitt, “ISIS or Al Qaeda?” A1. 54. Ibid., A1. 55. Watts, “Deciphering Competition,” 3. 56. Hamming, “Jihadi Competition and Political Preferences,” 12–15. 57. Haroro J. Ingram, “The Strategic Logic of Islamic State Information Operations,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 69, no. 6 (2015): 729–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2015.1059799. 58. Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

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59. Celine Marie I. Novenario, “Differentiating Al Qaeda and the Islamic State through Strategies Publicized in Jihadist Magazines,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 11 (2016): 953–67, https://doi.org/10. 1080/1057610X.2016.1151679. 60. Ibid., 954–56. 61. Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 62. David Ignatius, “Al-Qaeda Affiliate Playing Larger Role in Syria Rebellion,” The Washington Post, November 30, 2012, A1. 63. U.S. Department of State, Terrorist Designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an Alias for al-Qa’ida in Iraq (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2012). 64. Regine Schwab, “Insurgent Courts in Civil Wars: The Three Pathways of (Trans)Formation in Today’s Syria (2012–2017),” Small Wars & Insurgencies 29, no. 4 (2018): 801–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/095 92318.2018.1497290. 65. Hafez, “Fratricidal Jihadists,” 94. 66. Ibid. 67. Daniel Corstange and Erin A. York, “Sectarian Framing in the Syrian Civil War,” American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 2 (2018): 441– 55, https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12348. 68. Ibid., 443. 69. Colin P. Clarke and Assaf Moghadam, “Mapping Today’s Jihadi Landscape and Threat,” Orbis 62, no. 3 (2018): 347–71, https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.orbis.2018.05.006; Zana Khasraw Gulmohamad, “The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (Levant) ISIS,” Global Security Studies 5, no. 2 (2014): 1–11. 70. Cited in Priyanka Boghani, “A Staggering New Death Toll for Syria’s War—470,000,” PBS, February 11, 2016, retrieved on February 2, 2019 from https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-staggeringnew-death-toll-for-syrias-war-470000/. 71. Hakim Khatib, “Political Instrumentalization of Islam in a Violent State Crisis: The Case of Syria,” Journal of Applied Security Research 10, no. 3 (2015): 341–61, https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2015.1038769. 72. Ibid., 344. 73. Corstange and York, “Sectarian Framing in the Syrian Civil War,” 44. 74. Marc Lynch, The New Arab Wars (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016). 75. Ibrahim Abu Rabi’, Contemporary Islamic Thought (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 10. 76. James N. Druckman and Arthur Lupia, “Preference Change in Competitive Political Environments,” Annual Review of Political Science 19 (2016): 13–31, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-020614095051; William G. Jacoby, “I ssue Framing and Public Opinion on

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Government Spending,” American Journal of Political Science 44, no. 4 (2000): 750–67, https://doi.org/10.2307/2669279. Dara Conduit, “The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the Spectacle of Hama,” The Middle East Journal 2 (2016): 211–26, https://doi.org/ 10.3751/70.2.12. Jonathan Matusitz, “Suicide Terrorism as Social Noise: A Communicative Perspective,” in Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Psychosocial Dynamics, ed. Updesh Kumar and Manas K. Mandal (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2014), 60–75; Jonathan Matusitz, “The Communication of Suicide Terrorism,” in Handbook of Suicidal Behavior, ed. Updesh Kumar (New York: Springer, 2017), 159–77. Bloom, Dying to Kill, 96. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Dipak K. Gupta and Kusum Mundra, “Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 4 (2005): 573–98, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550500189895. Benjamin Acosta and Steven J. Childs, “Illuminating the Global SuicideAttack Network,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 1 (2013): 49–76, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.739079. Bloom, Dying to Kill, 122. Nick Ayers, “Ghost Martyrs in Iraq: An Assessment of the Applicability of Rationalist Models to Explain Suicide Attacks in Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 9 (2008): 856–82, https://doi.org/10. 1080/10576100802291550. Marty and Appleby, Accounting for Fundamentalisms, 419. Della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence, 105–7. Adam Rasgon, “Poll Indicates 41% of Palestinians Would Vote for Hamas Leader for President,” Times of Israel, March 20, 2019, A1. Retrieved on June 20, 2019 from https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ palestinians-attitudes-about-terrorism. Daphne Burdman, “Education, Indoctrination, and Incitement: Palestinian Children on Their Way to Martyrdom,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 1 (2003): 96–123, https://doi.org/10.1080/095465 50312331292977. Bloom, Dying to Kill, 95. Ibid., 33. Luca Ricolfi, “Palestinians, 1981–2003,” in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, ed. Diego Gambetta (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 77–129. Ibid., 100–5. J. Bennet, “Armed Weapons and a Will, Palestinians Factions Plot Revenge,” The New York Times, February 21, 2003, A1.

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94. Ricolfi, “Palestinians, 1981–2003,” 110–4. 95. Edward H. Kaplan, Alex Mintz, Shaul Mishal, and Claudio Samban, “What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock Model,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 3 (2005): 225– 35, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100590928115. 96. Gordon M. Hahn, The Caucasus Emirate Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia’s North Caucasus and Beyond (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2014). 97. Edward C. Holland, Frank D. W. Witmer, and John O’Loughlin, “The Decline and Shifting Geography of Violence in Russia’s North Caucasus, 2010–2016,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 58, no. (2017): 613– 41. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2018.1438905. 98. Gordon M. Hahn, “The Jihadi Insurgency and the Russian Counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus,” Post-Soviet Affairs 24, no. 1 (2008): 1–39, https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586X.24.1.1. 99. Jean-François Ratelle, “The North Caucasus Insurgency: Understanding the Chechen Rebels in the Context of the Caucasus Emirate,” in Chechnya at War and Beyond, ed. Anne Le Huérou, Aude Merlin, Amandine Regamey, and Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski (New York: Routledge, 2014), 176–98. 100. Danis Garaev, “Jihad as Passionarity: Said Buriatskii and Lev Gumilev,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 28, no. 2 (2017): 203–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2017.1288460. 101. Campana and Ratelle, “A Political Sociology Approach,” 126. 102. Emil A. Souleimanov, “Globalizing Jihad? North Caucasians in the Syrian Civil War,” Middle East Policy 11, no. 3 (2014): 154–62, https:// doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12090. 103. Ibid., 154. 104. Daniel Byman, “How States Exploit Jihadist Foreign Fighters,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 41, no. 12 (2018): 931–45, https://doi.org/ 10.1080/1057610X.2017.1361281.

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Campana, Aurélie, and Jean-François Ratelle. “A Political Sociology Approach to the Diffusion of Conflict from Chechnya to Dagestan and Ingushetia.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2014): 115–34. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/1057610X.2014.862901. Clarke, Colin P., and Assaf Moghadam. “Mapping Today’s Jihadi Landscape and Threat.” Orbis 62, no. 3 (2018): 347–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis. 2018.05.006. Conduit, Dara. “The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the Spectacle of Hama.” The Middle East Journal 2 (2016): 211–26. https://doi.org/10.3751/70. 2.12. Cordesman, Anthony H., and Sam Khazai. Iraq in Crisis. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. Corstange, Daniel, and Erin A. York. “Sectarian Framing in the Syrian Civil War.” American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 2 (2018): 441–55. https://doi. org/10.1111/ajps.12348. Crenshaw, Martha. “Terrorism Research: The Record.” International Interactions 40, no. 4 (2014): 556–67. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014. 902817. de la Bédoyère, Guy. Praetorian: The Rise and Fall of Rome’s Imperial Bodyguard. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017. Della Porta, Donatella. Clandestine Political Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Druckman, James N., and Arthur Lupia. “Preference Change in Competitive Political Environments.” Annual Review of Political Science 19 (2016): 13– 31. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-020614-095051. Eggert, Jennifer Philippa. “Women Fighters in the ‘Islamic State’ and AlQaida in Iraq: A Comparative Analysis.” Journal of International Peace and Organization 90, no. 3 (2015): 363–80. Gallarotti, Giulio. Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations: A Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism, and Constructivism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Garaev, Danis. “Jihad as Passionarity: Said Buriatskii and Lev Gumilev.” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 28, no. 2 (2017): 203–18. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/09596410.2017.1288460. Gulmohamad, Zana Khasraw. “The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (Levant) ISIS.” Global Security Studies 5, no. 2 (2014): 1–11. Gupta, Dipak K., and Kusum Mundra. “Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 4 (2005): 573–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/095465 50500189895.

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Hafez, Mohammed. “Fratricidal Jihadists: Why Islamists Keep Losing Their Civil Wars.” Middle East Policy 25, no. 2 (2018): 86–99. https://doi.org/10. 1111/mepo.12344. ———. “The Origins of Sectarian Terrorism in Iraq.” In The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat, edited by Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares, 436–60. Columbia University Press, 2014. Hahn, Gordon M. The Caucasus Emirate Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia’s North Caucasus and Beyond. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2014. ———. “The Jihadi Insurgency and the Russian Counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus.” Post-Soviet Affairs 24, no. 1 (2008): 1–39. https://doi.org/10. 2747/1060-586X.24.1.1. Hamming, Tore Refslund. “Jihadi Competition and Political Preferences.” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 6 (2017): 10–21. Hashim, Ahmed S. “The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate.” Middle East Policy 21, no. 4 (2014): 69–83. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo. 12096. Hinnebusch, Raymond. “The Sectarianization of the Middle East: Transnational Identity Wars and Competitive Interference.” Middle East Political Science 15, no. 4 (2016): 71–5. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. Holland, Edward C., Frank D. W. Witmer, and John O’Loughlin. “The Decline and Shifting Geography of Violence in Russia’s North Caucasus, 2010–2016.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 58, no. 6 (2017): 613–41. https://doi. org/10.1080/15387216.2018.1438905. Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Pres, 1985. Ignatius, David. “Al-Qaeda Affiliate Playing Larger Role in Syria Rebellion.” The Washington Post, November 30, 2012, A1. Ingram, Haroro J. “The Strategic Logic of Islamic State Information Operations.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 69, no. 6 (2015): 729–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2015.1059799. Jacoby, William G. “I ssue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending.” American Journal of Political Science 44, no. 4 (2000): 750–67. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669279. Javaid, Umbreen. “Operation Zarb-e-Azb: A Successful Initiative to Curtail Terrorism.” South Asian Studies 30, no. 2 (2015): 43–58. Johnson, James Turner. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Kalyvas, Stathis N. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Kaplan, Edward H., Alex Mintz, Shaul Mishal, and Claudio Samban. “What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock

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Model.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 3 (2005): 225–35. https:// doi.org/10.1080/10576100590928115. Katzman, Kenneth. Al-Qaeda in Iraq: Assessment and Outside Links. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008. Retrieved on November 2, 2019 from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32217.pdf. Kaufman, Stuart J. “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War.” International Security 21, no. 2 (1986): 108–38. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539072. Khan, Naseer Ahmad, and Manzoor Khan Afridi. “South Asian Security and Stability and Regional Rivalries: Post 9/11 Indo-Pak Proxy War in Afghanistan.” FWU Journal of Social Sciences 1 (2015): 86–95. Khatib, Hakim. “Political Instrumentalization of Islam in a Violent State Crisis: The Case of Syria.” Journal of Applied Security Research 10, no. 3 (2015): 341–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2015.1038769. Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter. “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence.” International Organization 56, no. 2 (2002): 263–96. ———. “The Strategies of Terrorism.” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 49–90. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.49. Leuprecht, Christian, Todd Hataley, Sophia Moskalenko, and Clark Mccauley. “Winning the Battle but Losing the War? Narrative and Counter-Narratives Strategy.” Perspectives on Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2009): 25–35. Lister, Charles R. The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Lynch, Marc. The New Arab Wars. New York: PublicAffairs, 2016. Mahmood, Sara. “Decapitating the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan: An Effective Counter-Terrorism Strategy?” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 7, no. 6 (2015): 24–9. Marty, Martin E., and R. Scott Appleby. Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2004. Matusitz, Jonathan. “Suicide Terrorism as Social Noise: A Communicative Perspective.” In Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Psychosocial Dynamics, edited by Updesh Kumar and Manas K. Mandal, 60–75. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2014. ———. “The Communication of Suicide Terrorism.” In Handbook of Suicidal Behavior, edited by Updesh Kumar, 159–77. New York: Springer, 2017. McCauley, Clark, and Mary Segal. “Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups.” In Group Processes and Intergroup Relations: Review of Personality and Social Psychology, edited by Clyde Hendrick, 231–56. Newbury Park: Sage, 1987. Nemeth, Stephen. “The Effect of Competition on Terrorist Group Operations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 2 (2014): 336–62. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0022002712468717.

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Neumayer, Eric, and Thomas Plümper. “International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations.” British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 4 (2009): 711–34. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123409000751. Novenario, Celine Marie I. “Differentiating Al Qaeda and the Islamic State through Strategies Publicized in Jihadist Magazines.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 11 (2016): 953–67. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X. 2016.1151679. Phillips, Andrew. “How al Qaeda Lost Iraq.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 (2009): 64–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/103577108026 49840. Rasgon, Adam. “Poll Indicates 41% of Palestinians Would Vote for Hamas Leader for President.” Times of Israel, March 20, 2019, A1. Ratelle, Jean-François. “The North Caucasus Insurgency: Understanding the Chechen Rebels in the Context of the Caucasus Emirate.” In Chechnya at War and Beyond, edited by Anne Le Huérou, Aude Merlin, Amandine Regamey, and Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski, 176–98. New York: Routledge, 2014. Ricolfi, Luca. “Palestinians, 1981–2003.” In Making Sense of Suicide Missions, edited by Diego Gambetta, 77–129. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Rogers, Paul. “Terrorism.” In Security Studies: An Introduction, edited by Paul D. Williams, 223–24. New York: Routledge, 2013. Schmitt, Eric. “ISIS or Al Qaeda? American Officials Split Over Top Terror Threat.” The New York Times, August 4, 2015, A1. Schwab, Regine. “Insurgent Courts in Civil Wars: The Three Pathways of (Trans)Formation in Today’s Syria (2012–2017).” Small Wars & Insurgencies 29, no. 4 (2018): 801–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2018. 1497290. Shapiro, Jacob N. The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. Souleimanov, Emil A. “Globalizing Jihad? North Caucasians in the Syrian Civil War.” Middle East Policy 11, no. 3 (2014): 154–62. https://doi.org/10. 1111/mepo.12090. Steinberg, Guido, and Isabelle Werenfels. “Between the ‘Near’ and the ‘Far’ Enemy: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.” Mediterranean Politics 12, no. 3 (2007): 407–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629390701622473. Stern, Jessica, and J. M. Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror. New York: HarperCollins, 2015. U.S. Department of State. Terrorist Designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an Alias for al-Qa’ida in Iraq. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2012. Watts, Clint. “Deciphering Competition between al-Qa‘ida and the Islamic State.” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 7 (2016): 1–6.

CHAPTER 13

Conclusion

This book was an attempt to unveil the ten reasons for global jihad today. What these ten reasons have demonstrated is that global jihad is a highly complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Its existence continues to be a clear and present danger that troubles the global landscape. The conditions contributing to the rise of jihad in terms of both collective actions (e.g., through networks and organizations) and individual actions (e.g., through lone-wolf operations) do not seem to improve national security. So long as jihad is present, international affairs will remain the fierce competition for power it has always been. For jihadists, Islam is not only about asking for action, but taking action—the violent action of insurgency situated within the framework of ten different reasons for committing jihad. Any Muslim opposing jihadism is no longer a “true” Muslim and becomes a victim of it.1 The effects of the global war on terror are twofold: (1) On the one hand, it has attained some degree of success by exposing global jihad as one of the worst enemy entities today, but (2) on the other hand, it has enthused a multitude of Muslims to train as jihadists and fight the holy war. The ascendancy of jihadism is a troubling one as many so-called alienated and disillusioned Muslim youths, not all of whom even understand the phenomenon, have joined ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and many similar jihadist organizations.2 Another crucial observation is that jihadist methods are evolving—generally, to the detriment of both the targets of jihadism and law enforcement agencies that have to fight or stop jihadism. © The Author(s) 2020 J. Matusitz, Global Jihad in Muslim and non-Muslim Contexts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47044-9_13

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Novel jihadist methods pertain to new methods of warfare, new media channels or conduits for diffusing extremist ideas, and new approaches to terrorist recruitment. This is an attestation to the jihadists’ unfettered resolve, adaptation, and verve. There is no question that the Western world has to confront a daunting, capable, and obdurate enemy. Through jihadist networks, lone-wolf operations, and anonymous online recruitment, terrorism is now more diffuse and unstructured; it can operate without a central command and control relationships. The conventional manner by which we can understand terrorism and examine players based on organizational descriptions and attributes—considering the transformation and development of groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS—no longer matters. This requires changes in how this advancing form of terrorism is to be investigated and fought. Jihadists’ destructive behavior is inherent to the ideological codes of their global or regional movement, making it very difficult to deter. They operate from the standpoint of religious or ideological purity, grounded in the conviction that only their version of Islam is the correct one. The morality of an absolutely puritanical Islamic order simplifies their outlook on the world by offering an unambiguous narrative of “us versus them,” “right versus wrong,” “good versus evil,” and “permitted and prohibited.” This vision is appealing to tens of millions of potential recruits—often youths—from all corners of the globe and creates unity by advocating a single incorruptible goal. Overall, four general conclusions can be derived from all examined reasons for global jihad in this book: (1) A global war against both Muslims and non-Muslims, (2) diverse forces of convergence, (3) Salafism as Fascism, and (4) reformation in Islam: two opposing directions.

A Global War Against Both Muslims and Non-Muslims The first conclusion is that global jihadists believe that a violent theocracy is the only remedy to manifold problems that have plagued both Muslim and non-Muslim countries today. Across many territories—e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen—the world is at war, or on the brink of war, with global jihad.3 In order to bring back national magnificence and past glories, and to tackle problems of immorality, poverty, social inequality, inter alia, jihadists will not relent in promoting their ideology and institutions of violence against both the Infidels and

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the Apostates. This global war against both Muslims and non-Muslims is a long war. The concept of “long war” was employed by the George W. Bush administration to allude to the intricacy and determination of the world’s constant fight with self-identified global jihadists. Although some similarities exist between this phrase and the phrase “Cold War,” the distinct feature of the long war is the complication that it presents when it comes to developing effective winning strategies.4 Global jihad today is as much a sectarian conflict among Muslims as it is an East-West clash; the great divide runs along political, religious, and societal lines. After devastating attacks in the West—like the ones in Paris, Brussels, Nice, Berlin, Manchester, Stockholm, London, and Barcelona— one must always keep in mind that present-day jihadism is part of “a larger confrontation, not between civilizations, no, but between civilization itself and those who are opposed to a civilized world.”5 Now, an important question looms large: According to jihadists, who or what is at fault? There are two lines of reasoning. First, they blame non-Muslims for their open support of Israel (e.g., the failed Oslo Accords, endorsement of Benjamin Netanyahu, etc.); their wars in the Middle East (Iraq and Afghanistan); their alleged torture (Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib); their slaying of noncombatants (drones); their oil-driven deals (e.g., with Saudi Arabia). Second, Muslims are to blame because they are said to have failed the Muslim world. They are pro-West or support dictators against political Islam; they create secular institutions; they champion participatory citizenship (for women too); they do not provide employment or hope for youths; more importantly, they veer away from the true principles of Islam.6

Diverse Forces of Convergence The third conclusion is that, when allegedly threatened by external or homogenization forces, some groups—no matter how ethnically or culturally different—will join forces under the umbrella of a common identity and react violently against darker powers (e.g., forces of imperialism, etc.). As Julia Kristeva (1993)7 remarks, the quest for profits is a “holy war” in the United States, just as the quest for spiritual objectives is called a “holy war” in other regions of the world. Jihad offers a strong potential feeling of identity.8 Jihad is the combination of three powerful entities into one integrated doctrine: the global Caliphate, which is fundamentally a convergence of

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Islamic religion, law, and politics. The Caliphate is intrinsically a force of convergence that integrates Islam with sharia and politics. As an Islamic system of world government, the Caliphate will dominate and govern all nations by applying its own Muslim-based legal system and dictate its own political administration to both Muslim and non-Muslim groups. The Caliphate dogma is rekindling passions for Salafism, the desire to return to the Golden Age of Islam. For the global Caliphate to succeed, a collective identity has to succeed too. Because of the flexible and adaptable character of the internet (and its anonymous factor), the idea of joining the global jihad fight for the Caliphate is a given; it is accessible to hundreds of millions of Muslim users. Identity can be effortlessly warped through radicalization or self-radicalization to fulfill that specific agenda. To use Benjamin Barber’s (1995)9 words, in the context of global jihad, we seem to experience “retribalization” instead of “McWorld.” Today, what we are witnessing is not a series of isolated communities, but a global community of activists brainwashed through the internet. It is a giant community whose leaders have the resolve to impose Islam’s ideological hegemony worldwide. Put another way, it is a wide-scale insurgency that manipulates religion to serve a political purpose based on confrontation with the rest of the world. It is not a political scheme in religious garbs; rather, it is a fulfilling prophecy in which politics and religion are one. At the core of this vision lies a supreme ambition: the reinstatement of the Caliphate. In no way does it come short of political objectives and of men and women ready to die for it.10 Ultimately, for jihadists to dominate the world, there must be a convergence of all members of the ummah, the global community of believers. Thanks to rampant globalization, the age-old concept of the ummah is born again. Today, recruitment for global jihad is ummah-focused. Upon reading online jihadist magazines, one becomes quickly aware that jihad propagandists seek to not only unite Muslim brothers and sisters but, also, to make the global Muslim holy war a true jihad of the ummah. The concept of national pride or citizenship does not matter as much. Their reference group is now the global community of Muslims.11 Under these circumstances, groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS vehemently insist that both men’s and women’s duty is to fight in holy war (even for adolescents now). It is an imperative for the entire ummah. Already in the 1980s, Abdullah Azzam stressed that the pursuit of jihadist violence was required for all Muslims.12

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Salafism as Fascism The fourth conclusion is that Salafism shares many similarities with fascism. Fascism is a radical authoritarian doctrine symbolized by dictatorial power, violent suppression of dissent, and domination over everyday life.13 Fascists view liberal democracy as archaic and consider the total mobilization of the masses under a tyrannical one-party state necessary. From the fascist perspective, “no democracy + totalitarian one-party state” is an ideal situation for armed conflict and for responding effectually to socioeconomic difficulties. Such a government is run by a ruthless leader. It is led by a dictator who wields martial law through the members of the fascist party. The ultimate objectives are to secure national unity and uphold a stable and orderly society. Fascism repudiates claims that violence is innately negative; rather, it regards political violence, war, and hegemony as means to attain national rejuvenation.14 A substantial number of scholars15 have come to an agreement that a “fascist régime” is primarily an authoritarian model of government, though not all authoritarian governments are fascist. Umberto Eco (1995)16 outlined general properties of fascist ideology, including the following: • A one-state system led by a totalitarian leader: both the Caliph, on the one hand, and the fascist dictator, on the other, are hegemons in nature. • The cult of tradition and the rejection of modernism: this principle considers the rationalistic expansion of Western culture since the Enlightenment as decadence. As Huntington (1993) argues, “the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation-state as a source of identity.”17 • The cult of action for action’s sake: this principle dictates that action, in and of itself, is of value. It should be undertaken without critical thinking or self-criticism. This philosophy is a perfect example of anti-intellectualism and irrationalism; it is often obvious in assaults on modern culture and science. • Appeal to a frustrated middle class: afraid of socioeconomic forces that may erode local cultures, religions, and values, the masses will join forces with a one-party movement.

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• Obsession with a plot: it is the exaggeration of an enemy threat. This is where the concept of xenophobia becomes appealing, with a fear of betrayal and damage from marginalized groups within society. • Pacifism is trafficking with the enemy: life is perpetual warfare; there is always an enemy to combat. Totalitarian leaders stress the depravity of those élites as evidence of their ultimate weakness in the backdrop of an overpowering popular will. • Everybody can become a hero: this facilitates the espousal of a cult of death. All these traits are major pillars of the Caliphate, for which jihadists would fight and sacrifice their lives. Let us examine four of the seven pillars further. For example, in regard to the second pillar, “the cult of tradition and the rejection of modernism,” Salafism is extremism in that it promotes the notion that religion should discriminate severely and exclusively among people. Although someone can be half-White and half-Arab and even a citizen of two nations, Salafism does not allow anyone to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim. This worldview leaves no opportunity for peace, harmony, or bridge-building prospects. The idea of Qutbism was discussed in Chapter 8. Egyptian scholar Sayyid Qutb played a major part in the formulation of modern jihad theory. As a mastermind of global jihad and a nonpareil intellectual of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (until his death by execution in 1966),18 Qutb called upon Salafist-fascist principles by exhorting righteous Muslims to embark on violent jihad in order to create an Islamic state, including one opposing their own régimes. This, however, engenders an issue of fitna—internal conflict within Islam—which required Qutb to explain the use of jihad against fellow Muslims. To circumvent the issue of fitna, Qutb made the point that true, pious Muslims were not fighting fellow Muslims, but apostates.19 In his interpretation of modern jihadism, Qutb also stressed the concept of jahiliyyah, which refers to era and circumstances in Arabia before the birth of Islam. It has regularly been translated as the “Age of Ignorance.”20 This point ties directly to the fifth pillar: “obsession with a plot.” Sayyid Qutb believed that pro-Western Muslim régimes were conniving with the West to chip away at the true principles of Islam. For this very reason, he was openly advocating for Salafism, the belief that Muslims have veered away from righteous Islam and must return to “pure Islam” (as originally practiced when the Prophet Muhammad was alive). The sixth pillar,

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“pacifism is trafficking with the enemy,” reverberates with the Qutbist interpretation of Islam: jihad is a longstanding war against both the Infidels and Apostates. Global peace will not be real until the whole world submits to or embraces Islam. Lastly, in jihad, every Muslim “can become a hero” (the seventh pillar). Whereas we refer to suicide jihadists as suicide bombers or Islamic kamikazes, they call themselves martyrs or heroes who die in holy war.21

Reformation in Islam: Two Opposing Directions The last conclusion is that the so-called reformation in Islam is actually happening in two opposing directions. On the one hand, liberalism and progressivism in Islam are professed by Muslims who espouse and have published a substantial body of liberal thought on the redefinition and reframing of Islam’s understanding and practice.22 Certain liberal Muslims aspire to return to the tenets of the early ummah and to a purported ethical and pluralistic meaning of the Quran. They see themselves as different from conventional and less liberal views of Islamic law, which they consider culture-based and without comprehensive applicability. The reform movement relies on monotheism (tawhid) as an organizing code for human society and the foundation of religious education, wisdom, history, metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics, as well as socioeconomic and global order.23 Reform-driven leaders in the Muslim world launched modernization programs to keep up with the political challenge of the West. The massive scope of Western colonization also prompted Muslim reformed leaders outside the state to request that the possibility for religious interpretation be reopened. “New Muslim intellectuals” with a secular education contest the domination of religious power. They reject the authority of a monolithic “Islamic” state and, rather, encourage egalitarianism, voluntarism, and a balance of powers in both government and among the masses. They outright challenge the necessity of an Islamic state. However, they emphasize that society includes more than self-governing individuals and that democracy means more than the marketplace. As they continue, democracy requires a free, unregimented culture that inspires citizens to respect the rights of everybody as well as to treasure their own. This public culture needs to have mediating institutions in which citizens cultivate traditions of free speech, participation, and open-mindedness.24

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On the other hand, with the expansion of jihad and Salafism all over the globe, fundamentalist Islam is also a reformation movement that is appealing to a great many (would-be) disciples. This radical view of Islam is vehicled through a multitude of social movements that scholars and experts alike call “Islamic revival.”25 This Islamic revival charges itself with the mission of promoting jihad to the mostly complacent ummah and inflaming the passions of millions of Muslims to upset the sociopolitical status quo and turn it into a massive holy war.26 As we now know, the internet has added fresh insights to the diffusion of extreme voices: the greater influence of charismatic agents and authority figures whose online audiences go far beyond those in the three-dimensional space. The globalization of religious voices can be likened to neo-pan-Islamism. Although multiple versions of modern-day Islamism exist, Salafism has gained the most followers.27 One of the symbols of contemporary Islamic revival was the Arab Spring that started in December 2010. Although the Arab Spring started as a sequence of anti-government demonstrations, revolts, and armed revolutions across North Africa and the Middle East,28 it rapidly evolved into a movement of Islamic revival that pushed for jihadist violence in order to establish a new Islamic world order, like the one promulgated by the Muslim Brotherhood (and its dream of the global Caliphate).29 The Arab Spring has considerably reshuffled the jihadist landscape in the Middle East. After decades of tyranny and marginalization, Islamist parties have seized power in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. Nevertheless, the impressive ascendancy of Salafism is still the most visible hallmark of the new Islamist landscape in the region.30 One of the most lethal foreign policy impacts rooted in the Arab Spring has been the magnification of violence in North Africa by a large number of VNSAs. These VNSAs have been insurgent organizations, terrorist groups, and foreign fighters.31

Global Divergence Theory (GDT) An overarching conclusion of the entire book is that the growing threat that jihadists pose to humankind indicates the ever-increasing demarcation and polarization that the global jihad movement is creating vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Hence, I want to seize this opportunity to develop a new theoretical framework and add it to the current literature on international terrorism: Global Divergence Theory (GDT). My theory is inspired by Pomeranz’s (2000)32 “Great Divergence” concept, when Europe’s

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cultural and political changes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries began to digress from those of the previous traditions. Divergence is the process or state of diverging; it is a drawing apart. Here, GDT alludes to cultural divergence, when a movement deviates from the norm or goes in a different direction. More precisely, it is the tendency for a group or movement to disassociate from the rest of the world in order to defend or preserve its own from outside factors or any unacceptable interference.33 The actions of such group or movement become more and more antagonizing to actions of other groups or movements over time. This stands in sharp contrast to cultural convergence, which is the tendency for a culture to grow more and more similar with the rest of the world.34

More Than Just a “Clash of Civilizations” GDT unquestionably shares similarities with the Clash of Civilizations thesis. To begin, both frameworks agree that, since worldviews are non-negotiable in nature, the world will always experience global ideological conflicts. Through his theoretical concept of Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington (1996)35 anticipated a counter-movement: the renaissance of older and deeper allegiances and practices, akin to a new tribalism. Civilizational and religious disparities are dividing us ever more than before. That is the byproduct of tribalism.36 Second, GDT concurs with Huntington that shared ideology is a huge precursor to a global social movement. When people join forces on the basis of ideology and religious or cultural identity, they can easily advocate for a social movement (for good or ill purposes) that distinguishes them from other others. Local reactions within one group to the threats posed by globalization are also ideological in nature. The main premise of GDT does not rest on a definition of the fault lines along which international conflict is prone to taking place. It is not about intertribal or interstate fighting (or the fundamental reasons for it). The theory seeks to provide a more meaningful and useful framework through which to understand global developments than any alternative model. One of the main premises of Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis is that states from different civilizations are more prone to combating each other, while those from the same civilization are less likely to do so. It is not one of GDT’s objectives. Part of the problem inherent to global jihad is that, besides the longstanding conflicts over ideology, politics, and religion, the twenty-first century is gradually governed by

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conflicts over identity, centered on existential questions like “Who am I?” and “What is my purpose in this world?” The quest for identity inexorably creates divisions, because every “us” is defined as a counterbalance to a “them.”37 More importantly, the search for identity can contribute more passion and energy to a radical movement because the social construction of an identity narrative can radicalize the very movement it was designed to safeguard and sustain. Unlike the Clash of Civilizations thesis, GDT is not only about an East-West confrontation, or even a Muslim–Christian conflict. It is not a treatise on the West’s superior values, how “we” have Western-style democracy and thought patterns but “they” do not. Huntington declares that civilizational conflicts over culture will be the last cycle in the evolution of conflict in the future. This approach seems plausible on paper but, as the global jihad threat has demonstrated for the past few decades, jihad-driven global conflict is not merely cultural. It is also deeply religious, ideological, political, and legalistic. One of the hallmarks of purist Salafism is its obsession with the “us vs. them” dichotomy. Its fixation is on issues such as “Which side are you on?” Put in layperson’s terms, truly devout, sharia-compliant Muslims are not at liberty to switch sides between “us” and “them,” as it would be equivalent to switching sides between dar al-Islam (the House of Islam) and dar al-harb (the House of War)—see Chapter 7 on the legal motivations of jihad.

A Paradigm Shift The global jihad movement represents a paradigm shift in our interpretation of social, political, and religious monotheism. We can witness the progress of jihadism in a manner that most people from previous generations did not, mostly because jihadists have taken advantage of globalization and modernity (and, therefore, gained more visibility in the world). Of equal relevance is the fact that many studies38 have exposed the gap between the West and Islam, which is even wider among youths. This pattern indicates that, although younger age groups (more than their elders) in the West have embraced many of the benefits that globalization and modernity offer, they have nevertheless expressed the desire to support Salafism and traditional views of Islam (again, more so than their parents and grandparents in regard to ideology and perception of the Other).

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A confrontation between irreconcilable outlooks gives rise to increasing polarization which, in turn, foreshadows utter violence. The multiplicity of clashing worldviews that have been observed between Western civilization and the Muslim world have engendered a set of principles and belief systems that are strikingly at variance with each other. The corollary is that such circumstances foist an entirely new domain of politics or culture war issues onto the international political order. Globalization is a groundbreaking change, but it is also a perpetuation of past conflicts. In some respects, it evens up the playing field and constitutes a force for human progress. All the same, it is fueling nationalist and religious fervencies and sparking disputes over natural resources.39

Democracy vs. Salafist Islam Most Europeans admit to not being religious, to not belonging to religious organizations, and to not considering God as important in their lives.40 U.S. adults—both Christian and from other religions—are significantly more religious than their European peers by various other metrics, as reported through an analysis of data by the Pew Research Center’s (2014)41 U.S. Religious Landscape Study in the United States and a 2017 survey of Western Europeans.42 For example, about two-thirds of Christians in the United States pray every day (68%), in contrast to a mere 18% of Christians across 15 nations in Europe—including 6% in Britain, 9% in Germany, 12% in Denmark, and 38% in the Netherlands.43 An important inference from these statistics is that Westerners, Europeans in particular, care more and more about human rights—with respect to putting more emphasis on individual rights than religious or Godestablished laws. As both young and older groups in the West have increasingly become more tolerant on social issues, a certain number of Muslim nations remain some of the most traditional nations on the planet today. Salafism is dominant not only because it is one of the massive motivators for global jihad but, also, because it feeds the diametrical opposition between Islam and the West.44 The clash between democracy and Salafism is one between ideologies which, notwithstanding their major dissimilarities, arguably share a supreme goal of freedom: full individual freedom as opposed to freedom from Western influences. As long as Salafism supporters are capable, but refuse, to embrace liberal democracy, the clash between human rights and submission will never disappear or relent.

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Certainly, the disagreement between Western and Islamist interpretations of human rights does not encompass the whole range of the debate. Regardless of the extent to which Western civilizations and others are influencing the modern era, many parts of the world are following sharply different paths and chronologies.45 Because the importance of human dignity in an era of globalization and modernity needs to become acknowledged with respect to emancipatory political and legal prerogatives, human rights pose a threat to authoritarian conventions and rules in non-democratic cultures and religions. This remains a gigantic obstacle in nations or regions devoid of even the most rudimentary protocol of police ethics, and where the highest courts are still Allah-ordained or entirely controlled by the ruler or government. The Danish cartoons controversy is a textbook case study for reflecting on some of our timehonored assumptions about liberal democracy and its ability to become accustomed to cultural difference. Cesari (2013)46 mentioned a clash between two opposite paradigms that is even more acute. One paradigm, supported by a significant minority of Westerners, seeks to conceive of Islam—rather than Salafism or jihadism—as the enemy to Western civilization because of its backward and incompatible character vis-à-vis the Western principles of modernity, equity, and liberty. The other paradigm is the Salafist model, in which the entire West is considered the enemy of Islam because Western developments have perverted the Muslim faith and present a danger to Islamic purity. These two diametrically opposed tropes are ideologies that operate concurrently within Western societies and tend to widen the wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims. This clash between two opposite paradigms leaves no opportunity for compromise or negotiation. Both mindsets purvey an intolerant and elitist image of the public sphere that nurtures and reinforces each other, enlarging the chasm between Islam and the West.

Global Divergence within the Ummah This widening cleavage positions those Muslims unswerving to orthodox religious beliefs against those Muslims who are rejecting traditional orthodoxy in support of more liberal views. These social, political, and religious oppositions have rocketed into a widespread “culture war” in which religious “conservatives” clash with religious “liberals” (and secularists) to frame and determine cultural norms across the world. In actual fact,

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the “war” is pursued between two categories of individuals who have essentially varying and opposed perceptions of current affairs, ideas about moral authority, or understandings of the world.47 One group for such polarized perceptions of reality (or “worldviews”) is defined as “orthodox” or “theistic.” The opposite worldview is defined as “progressive” or “enlightened.”48 The long-term destiny of Islam (and Muslims as a global religious community) is contingent upon the balance between these divergent trends. It is a simple, though underrepresented, reality that most victims of jihad are members of the ummah themselves. If truth be told, they are killed and wounded by far greater measures than non-Muslims. Salafist jihadists openly defend the slaying of fellow Muslims under the reasoning of the ends justifying the means. Of equal significance is the fact that leaders of jihadist groups unambiguously preach about the values of martyrdom, but hardly ever execute suicidal missions themselves, or send their closest relatives on such missions. Al-Qaeda and related organizations provide no alternatives to permanent jihad.49 Because group identity often supersedes individual identity (see Chapter 4), it exacerbates differences and contributes to a hyped-up sense of identity that tends to give a false notion of togetherness.

Final Thoughts There is a common denominator across jihadist attacks worldwide: they are increasing in numbers and, therefore, exacerbating our fight against them. The question that instinctively follows is “What are the solutions against jihad?” The first important element to realize is that no “quick fix” solution is available. Present-day jihadist violence is not only a result of our historical epoch; it will also be one of the world’s greatest challenges in the future. Even in the eyes of idealists, no matter how much bloody hunting and slaying of jihadists occurs, how much forcible régime change occurs, or how many democratic principles are adopted by Muslims, our efforts to stop the spread of Salafism, suicide bombings, or jihadism overall will likely bear little fruit. How realistic is it to implement the final solution of killing jihadists who are ready to sacrifice their lives anyway? Alternative solutions must be offered.50 In what struggle should we participate, and how is it related to our understanding of causes? Politicians need experts and intellectual aides in order to make sound decisions that have higher chances of moving

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the world in the right direction than wrong decisions. Power to create terrorist networks or execute attacks is difficult to impede, particularly in democracies that follow the rule of law. The main reason is that terrorist groups are entrenched in a cultural or religious environment that is lawful by existence, that insulates its members from external forces, and that opposes interference from agents of social control.51 The significance of addressing the global jihad threat—let alone understanding it—should be based on a comprehensive strategy. Apropos legal instruments, some developments were made after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but it is unfortunate that critical improvements have not yet materialized, especially at the global level.

Notes 1. Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 2. Kenneth Christie, “Terrorism and Jihad,” Politics, Religion & Ideology 19, no. 2 (2018): 250–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2018. 1437702. 3. Roger Cohen, “Islam and the West at War,” The New York Times (2015, February 16): A23. 4. Ehsan M. Ahrari, “Why the Long War Can and Cannot Be Compared to the Cold War,” Comparative Strategy 26, no. 4 (2007): 275–84, https:// doi.org/10.1080/01495930701598581. 5. Remarks delivered by Secretary of State John Kerry, at the State Department, immediately after the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015. 6. Cohen, “Islam and the West at War,” A23. 7. Julia Kristeva, Nations without Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 8. David A. Deese, Globalization: Causes and Effects (New York: Routledge, 2012). 9. Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995). 10. Fidel Sendagorta, “Jihad in Europe: The Wider Context,” Survival 47, no. 3 (2005): 63–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330500248029. 11. Manuel R. Torres, Javier Jordán, and Nicola Horsburgh, “Analysis and Evolution of the Global Jihadist Movement Propaganda,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 3 (2006): 399–421, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09546550600751990. 12. Andrew McGregor, “‘Jihad and the Rifle Alone:’ Abdullah Azzam and the Islamist Revolution,” The Journal of Conflict Studies 23, no. 2 (2003): 10–21.

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13. Zeev Sternhell, Mario Sznajder, and Maia Ashéri, The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 14. Aristotle A. Kallis, The Fascism Reader (New York: Routledge, 2003); Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust, Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). 15. See Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991); Walter Laqueur, Fascism: Past, Present, Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966); Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1970). 16. Umberto Eco, “Ur-Fascism,” The New York Review of Books (1995, June 22): A1. 17. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49, 93. 18. John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998). 19. Danny Orbach, “Tyrannicide in Radical Islam: The Case of Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Salam Faraj,” Middle Eastern Studies 48, no. 6 (2012): 961– 72, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.723629. 20. Mark A. Menaldo, “Sayyid Qutb’s Political and Religious Thought: The Transformation of Jahiliyyah and the Implications for Egyptian Democracy,” Leadership and the Humanities 2, no. 1 (2014): 64–80. 21. Mohammed Hafez, “Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 1 (2007): 95–115, https://doi.org/10.1080/095465 50601054873. 22. Nabeel Qureshi, Answering Jihad: A Better Way Forward (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2016). 23. Ira M. Lapidus, “The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, no. 4 (1975): 363–85, https://doi.org/10.1017/S00207438 00025344. 24. Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 25. For example, see Jerome Drevon, “Embracing Salafi Jihadism in Egypt and Mobilizing in the Syrian Jihad,” Middle East Critique 25, no. 4 (2016): 321–39, https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2016.1206272; Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 26. Martin Kramer, Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival: The Politics of Ideas in the Middle East (New York: Routledge, 2017).

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27. Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fear Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 129. 28. Habibul Haque Khondker, “Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring,” Globalizations 8, no. 5 (2011): 675–79, https://doi.org/10.1080/147 47731.2011.621287. 29. Olivier Roy, “The Transformation of the Arab World,” Journal of Democracy 23, no. 3 (2012): 5–18, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2012. 0056. 30. Khalil al-Anani and Maszlee Malik, “Pious Way to Politics: The Rise of Political Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt,” DOMES: Digest of Middle East Studies 22, no. 1 (2013): 57–73. 31. Geoffrey Macdonald and Luke Waggoner, “Dashed Hopes and Extremism in Tunisia,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 1 (2018): 126–40. 32. Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 33. Paul Heelas, “Emotions across Cultures: Objectivity and Cultural Divergence,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 17 (1984): 21–42. 34. Robert Arthur Burchell, The End of Anglo-America: Historical Essays in the Study of Cultural Divergence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991). 35. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Free Press, 1996). 36. Jonathan Sacks, “The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations,” Orbis 46, no. 4 (2002): 601–9, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 15570274.2009.9523391. 37. Sacks, “The Dignity of Difference,” 601–9. 38. See Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “The True Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Policy 135 (2003): 62–70. 39. John Gray, “The World Is Round,” The New York Review of Books 52, no. 13 (2005): 1–10. 40. Cesari, Why the West Fear Islam, 120. 41. Available at https://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/. 42. Available at https://www.pewforum.org/2018/05/29/being-christianin-western-europe/. 43. Available at https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/05/u-sadults-are-more-religious-than-western-europeans/. 44. Cesari, Why the West Fear Islam, 129. 45. David Northrup, “Globalization and the Great Convergence: Rethinking World History in the Long Term,” Journal of World History 16, no. 3 (2005): 249–67. 46. Cesari, Why the West Fear Islam, 137. 47. Os Guinness, The American Hour (New York: Free Press, 1993).

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48. Richard John Neuhaus, America against Itself: Moral Vision and the Public Order (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1992). 49. Assaf Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom: Al Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks,” International Security 33, no. 3 (2009): 46–78, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.33.3.46. 50. Asim Roy, Islam in History and Politics: Perspectives from South Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 51. Anthony Oberschall, “Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory,” Sociological Theory 22, no. 1 (2004): 26–37, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00202.x.

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Index

A Abrogation, Principle of, 18, 140–143 Mecca, 140, 141 Medina, 140, 141 verses, 18, 140, 141 al-Assad, Hafez, 297, 298 al-Awlaki, Anwar, 265, 266, 275 Al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr, 3, 13, 43, 295 Allah, 2, 3, 12, 17, 30, 33, 34, 38, 42, 45, 46, 66, 82, 89, 110, 112, 137–142, 145–152, 165, 166, 168–173, 184, 185, 187, 189, 191, 217, 219–223, 246, 269, 270, 294, 298, 326 Al-Nusra Front, 40, 69, 294–296 Al-Qaeda, 3, 6, 37, 40–46, 69, 146, 184, 189, 194, 223, 236, 265, 267, 269, 284, 287, 290–295, 315, 316, 318, 327 Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), 19, 287, 290, 291, 295 al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 145, 290, 291

Al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 41, 42, 45, 145, 291, 295 Azzam, Abdullah, 37, 40, 42, 43, 146, 318, 328

B bin Laden, Osama, 37, 38, 42, 43, 68, 111, 171, 172, 182, 194, 246, 290, 292

C Caliphate, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 17, 18, 31, 32, 39, 41, 43–45, 66, 149, 173, 184, 185, 187–192, 194, 264–266, 292–295, 302, 317, 318, 320 Caliph, 3, 31, 43, 184, 189, 192, 295 emirates, 192, 193 Ottoman Empire, 44, 184, 189, 190 World order, 3, 191, 322 Clash of Civilizations

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 J. Matusitz, Global Jihad in Muslim and non-Muslim Contexts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47044-9

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338

INDEX

Barber, Benjamin, 18 civilizations, 18, 207, 209, 210, 323 culture wars, 221, 325, 326 Friedman, Thomas, 18 Huntington, Samuel, 16, 18, 24, 207, 209, 210, 323, 324 identity issues, 210–211 Jihad vs. McWorld, 18 Lexus and the Olive Tree, 18, 214–216 territorial issues, 211–212 unprovable universalisms, 219–220 Communication, 12, 67, 213, 242, 271 discourse, 262 interpersonal communication, 90 sermons, 271 Crusades, 1, 34, 143, 144, 220 D Dar al-harb, 4, 6, 33, 39, 169, 171, 173, 188, 324 Dar al-Islam, 4, 6, 33, 171, 188, 324 Democracy free speech, 321 human rights, 216, 325, 326 liberty, 216, 221, 297, 324 multiculturalism, 115, 120, 121 Western-based laws, 18, 216 E Economic conditions Beck, Ulrich, 18, 240 demographic factors, 234 failed states, 235, 236 financial risks, 240, 241 modernity, 214, 240, 326 poverty, 10, 15, 16, 18, 233–235, 238, 244 risk communities, 241, 242

world risk society, 18, 240, 241 Enemy Apostates, 38, 39, 41, 82, 266, 321 dehumanization, 86, 87 hatred, 61 infidels, 39, 41, 45, 82, 146, 169, 172, 257, 289, 321 Kuffar, 39, 166 persecution, 139 takfir, 187 unbelievers, 38, 42, 139, 166, 173 Europol, 7, 21, 66 F Fear, 11, 12, 84, 145, 146, 148, 149, 164, 172, 220, 234, 296, 320 G Gender, 17, 65, 66, 106, 119, 195, 218, 245, 259 female jihadists, 66 women, 65, 66, 218 Global Divergence Theory (GDT), 19, 322–324 Globalization, 8, 12, 121, 207, 212, 214–216, 222, 233, 235, 264, 318, 322–326 Group dynamics collective emotional orientation, 195 communal routines, 17, 89, 90 group grievance, 17, 79, 80 group identity, 80, 81, 83, 90 group polarization, 82 group psychology, 80 groupthink, 17, 81–83 In-group vs. Out-group, 83–84 psychosocial resilience, 17, 87, 88, 90 Social Identity Theory (SIT), 82 socialization, 1, 79, 87

INDEX

US vs. them, 82

H Hadith, 30, 31, 33, 35–37, 63, 138, 140, 142–145, 148, 165, 169, 217, 222 hadith-driven jihad, 18, 142 Kitab al-Jihad, 143 Hamas, 40, 43, 116, 140, 189, 239, 299

I Internet, 8, 46, 65, 111, 117, 193, 259, 261, 266, 272, 318, 322 social networks, 66 YouTube, 15 Iranian Revolution, 18, 183 Islam dawah, 145, 151, 187 hijrah, 3, 138, 142, 191, 294 Islamic revival, 8, 35, 107, 322 reformation in Islam, 8, 19, 316, 321–323 Treatment of non-Muslim minorities, 217–219 Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), 3, 5–7, 13, 15, 19, 37, 40, 41, 43, 45, 46, 65, 66, 69, 109, 144, 149, 182, 190, 192, 259, 270, 284, 285, 287, 292–296, 315, 316, 318 Islamic State, 4, 45, 66, 109, 137, 169, 182, 190, 294

J Jihad defensive jihad, 37, 38, 42, 43, 172, 187 fard al-kifaya, 34 fard ayn, 34, 172

339

Finsbury Park Mosque, 269 foreign fighters, 10, 31, 66, 109, 184, 245, 290, 303, 322 greater jihad, 35, 36 harb, 30 holy war, 17, 34, 38, 39, 64, 66, 143, 145, 148, 166, 169, 173, 187, 268, 270, 289, 295, 315, 317, 318, 321, 322 homegrown jihadists, 7, 117 indirect jihadist players, 17, 45, 46 Islamic conquests, 33, 143 jihadist ideologues, 17, 41, 42, 86, 112, 169, 186 jihadist leaders, 42, 43, 64, 69, 81, 89, 137, 166, 194, 212 jihadist sermons, 19, 255, 261–266, 269–272 lesser jihad, 17, 35, 36 mujahedin, 2, 9, 10, 46, 66, 149, 171, 184, 259, 270, 287, 294, 303 offensive jihad, 17, 37–39, 172, 186 Prophetic Methodology, 144, 145 qital , 30 struggle, 10, 29–31, 34–36, 87, 146, 172, 212, 214, 287, 288, 292, 294, 327 war, 2, 3, 8, 14, 16–19, 30, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 64, 66, 69, 109, 139, 142, 143, 145, 148, 163, 166, 167, 169–173, 186, 188, 190, 193, 211, 266–268, 270, 284, 289, 291, 295, 296, 315–317, 321

L Lashkar-e-Taiba, 40, 151

340

INDEX

M Martyrdom Jannah, 18, 147–151 karbala, 150 Kasab, Ajmal, 151, 152 martyr, 89, 145–147, 151 shahid, 89, 145, 146, 148, 150, 238 suicide terrorism, 146–148 Muhammad (Prophet), 3, 30–32, 35, 42, 43, 110, 137, 142, 144, 148–150, 187, 189, 190, 192, 217, 292, 320 Muslim Brotherhood, 3, 18, 35, 37, 41, 42, 183–190, 296, 299, 320, 322 Al-Banna, Hassan, 184, 185, 189 al-Husseini, Amin, 185 Alliance with Nazi Germany, 185–186 Muslims Belgium, 17, 67, 105, 108, 113, 114, 119, 244, 245 first-, second- and third-generation Muslims, 46, 104, 107, 109–113, 119 France, 17, 67, 68, 105, 108, 113–115 Great Britain, 17, 105, 113, 115, 118, 144 Israel, 17, 34, 35, 105, 113, 116, 183, 189, 194, 317 Netherlands, 47, 108, 112, 113, 118, 119 Palestine, 35, 185

N National Counterterrorism Center, 4, 20, 293

O Outbidding Caucasus Emirate, 19, 284, 301, 302 competition hypothesis, 301 fratricidal jihadists, 288, 289 internal rifts, 1, 19, 284, 285, 287 Peshawar school massacre (2014), 289

P Pakistan, 2, 12, 38, 46, 68, 151, 164, 167, 168, 190, 193, 209, 234, 289, 294, 316 Politics blowback theory, 14, 18, 193–195 foreign policy, 18, 193, 195, 260 political Islam, 11, 194, 317 political jihadism, 185, 186, 189 Propaganda, 44, 108, 149, 151, 292, 294

Q Quran People of the Book, 138, 139, 141 Quran-driven jihad, 18, 137–138 Sunna, 142, 164, 165, 168, 169, 184, 217, 222 Sword verses, 139 violence in the Quran, 138, 139, 268 Qutb, Sayyid decadence, 18 fitna, 186, 320 jahiliyyah, 3, 186, 187, 320 Qutbism, 18, 186, 187, 320

R Radicalization Camp Bucca, 69

INDEX

341

fundamentalism, 62, 67 Guantánamo Bay, 68, 317 Islamic radicalization, 17, 62–64, 64, 65, 67, 107, 117 jihadization, 17, 63–68, 113, 114, 260 military detention centers (radicalization in), 17, 68 no-go zones, 108, 239 pathways to radicalization, 60, 107 prisons (radicalization in), 17, 59, 67, 68, 118 radical ideology, 62, 104 radicalization through self-learning, 259–260 radical milieu, 17, 61, 63, 107 revolutionary, 59 slippery slope (model), 60–61 social environment, 61 True Believer (syndrome), 60 Religion devout, 90, 136, 172, 324 laïcité (laicity), 67 sacralization of conflict, 18, 137–138 scriptures, 1, 135, 139, 163 secularism, 12, 67, 221 social construction of religion, 136 Rogo, Aboud, 267, 268

September 11, 2001, 1, 2, 5, 31, 68, 81, 87, 106, 111, 189, 193, 194, 269, 328 Sharia fiqh, 18, 168, 169, 171 Islamic military jurisprudence, 170, 171 Just War, 38, 169 law, 1, 4, 18, 45, 138, 165–167, 169, 170, 190, 217, 219, 221, 222, 318 sharia-driven jihad, 166 siyar, 170 ulema, 30, 167 Social alienation anomie, 103, 104 durkheim, 103 estrangement, 113, 114 failed integration (model), 17, 104 insiders vs. outsiders, 17, 110 isolation, 103 marginalization, 103 social closure theory, 17, 105, 106 social exclusion, 103, 105, 106 social integration (lack of), 118 structural discrimination, 106 Sri Lanka Easter bombings (2019), 8, 13, 15 Syrian Civil War, 3, 19, 284, 292, 295, 296, 303

S Salafism, 30, 106, 120, 182, 302, 318–320, 322, 324–327 Golden Age of Islam, 44, 318 Salafism as Fascism, 8, 19, 316, 319–321 totalitarianism, 319 Saudi Arabia, 38, 41–43, 109, 110, 164, 166–168, 183, 184, 194, 195, 216, 218, 246, 317

T Taliban, 11, 68, 167, 188, 189, 245, 246 Terrorism bombings, 6, 11, 14, 37, 80, 108, 238, 266, 298, 299 extremism, 2, 80, 104, 283 insurgency, 6, 44 lone-wolf terror, 10, 80 mass shootings, 2, 266

342

INDEX

militancy, 2, 5, 68, 118, 300 vehicle-ramming attacks, 2, 7, 64 violence, 1, 2, 14, 60, 80, 81, 86, 104, 136, 166, 181, 210, 234, 236, 255, 283 Terrorism Situation and Trend Report , 7, 21 Transformative learning communicative learning, 256 frame of reference, 257, 258, 271 instrumental learning, 256 meaning-making processes, 256, 257, 268 paradigm shift, 259, 261, 272 perspective transformation, 256, 257, 259

taking action, 256

U Ummah, 3, 4, 9, 30–34, 38, 39, 44, 63, 64, 66, 82, 107, 112, 117, 119, 164, 170, 172, 185, 190, 195, 213, 219, 222, 243, 246, 262, 266, 318, 321, 322, 327 imagined communities, 213, 243–244 transnationalism, 31, 107, 189

W Wahhabism, 167