Gilgit-Baltistan: Under Pakistan's Occupation 9383445521, 9789383445523

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Gilgit-Baltistan under

Pakistan’s Occupation

Sapru House Soundings on Area Studies

Gilgit-Baltistan under

Pakistan’s Occupation Edited by

Ashish Shukla

KNOWLEDGE WORLD

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Indian Council of World Affairs New Delhi

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ISBN 978-93-83445-52-3 Hardback Published in India by Kalpana Shukla

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Contents Forewordvii Contributorsix Introductionxi 1. Gilgit in 1947-48



Raghvendra Singh

1

2. Gilgit-Baltistan: An Unfortunate History

19

3. Developments in Gilgit-Baltistan: Interpreting Local Angst

32

4. Chinese Involvement in Gilgit-Baltistan

39

5. Indian Concerns in Gilgit-Baltistan

47



Satinder Lambah

Ashok K. Behuria

Ashish Shukla

K. Warikoo

6. Exploitation of Water and Mineral Resources

of Gilgit-Baltistan

Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharjee

67

7. “India-Pakistan Cross-LoC Connectivity”:

Bridging the Gap between Ladakh and Baltistan by



Invoking the “Balti Culture” Zainab Akhter

Index

82 94

Foreword

Contributors

Raghvendra Singh is a retired senior civil servant and author of the book, India’s Lost Frontier: The Story of the North-West Frontier Province.

Satinder Lambah is Chairman, Ananta Aspen Centre, New Delhi and

former special envoy of the Prime Minister of India and former High Commissioner to Pakistan.

Ashok K. Behuria is a Fellow and Coordinator of the South Asia Centre

at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Ashish Shukla is Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.

K. Warikoo is a retired Professor of School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Presently, he is Secretary General of Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, New Delhi.

Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharjee is Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.

Zainab Akhter is a Research Analyst at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Introduction

Ever since 1947, Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), a part of erstwhile Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir ( J&K), has remained in Pakistan’s illegal occupation. Its geostrategic importance could be understood with the fact that the territory not only borders three nuclear powers—China, India

and Pakistan—it is also situated at the convergence of Afghanistan and Tajikistan. It contains a number of traditional passes that were historically used by several invaders as a gateway to enter India. These passes also played an important role in socio-economic and religious-cultural interactions between India and the world at large. It is through these passes that

ancient Indian culture and Buddhism travelled to different parts of the world including Central Asia, East Asia and Southeast Asia. It has also

been an important element in the famous ancient Silk Route. Besides, the region has also been termed as an ethnic boiling pot or melting pot due to

the presence of diverse cultural patterns, religious practices and languages.

One can find three distinct religious traditions coexisting—Buddhism, Islam and Zoroastrianism—in the region.

The Karakoram Highway, which General Pervez Musharraf used to

refer to as the Eighth Wonder of the World, and China’s flagship project

under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) known as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through the area. The CPEC, roughly a 2,700-kilometre-long route, connects Pakistan’s port city Gwadar in

Balochistan province and China’s Kashgar in Xinjiang province. Touted

as an economic project by both China and Pakistan, the CPEC has deep geopolitical and geostrategic implications for the world in general and

xii | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

the region in particular. Despite inhabiting such an important territory, the indigenous people do not enjoy basic human rights. The nature of Pakistani occupation is such that the people of GB have no representation

in the highest legislative body of the country. There is no reference of the

territory in any of the three constitutions adopted by Pakistan in 1956, 1962 and 1973. The interim constitution of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir

(POK), referred by Pakistan as Azad Kashmir, too fails to mention the territory as part of it.

The politico-security establishment of Pakistan has not only

disenfranchised the indigenous people of GB, but also failed to justify

its undefined and ambiguous status in the body politic of Pakistan. This, over the years, has given rise to unrest and resentment among the natives

against the Pakistani government and its representatives. The people are also opposing the presence of a number of dangerous terror outfits in their area such as Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Hizb-ul-

Mujhahideen, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Al-Badr, Harkat-ul-Ansar, etc. Most of these terror outfits operate under the protection of the security

establishment and receive all sorts of support to remain active. Apart from this there has been a deliberate attempt on the part of the politico-security elite to change the demographic profile of the GB by settling more and

more people from other parts of Pakistan. There are also allegations of

infusing extremist ideologies in the area with the help of some of the most

dreaded extremist outfits. There are certain nationalistic groups within

GB that oppose Pakistan’s high-handedness. The discontent among the

people has grown each day and they have demanded redressal of their genuine concerns. Their demands range from autonomy, a POK-like status, provincial recognition as well as secession from Pakistan. Instead

of addressing some of these genuine concerns, the politico-security elite of the country appear to be busy using the strategic territory for proxy wars in the region.

It is against this backdrop that the present volume pursues an in-

depth analysis of Pakistan Occupied J&K with special reference to Gilgit-Baltistan. Besides the Introduction, it consists of seven distinct

Introduction | xiii

chapters that deal with various aspects of Pakistan’s illegal occupation of the strategic territory in the Himalayan region. Raghvendra Singh in

his article, “Gilgit in 1947-48”, provides a historical account, based on

primary sources, of the region. He categorically argues that advancing of the date of India’s partition and phased withdrawal of the British administration and its forces cost India dearly and later culminated in a

dispute over J&K. He raises certain pertinent questions such as: why was

North West Frontier Province, which had a Congress majority in 1946, lost to Pakistan? Why was Kalat allowed to be forcibly taken by Pakistan?

Why does everyone ignore the basic flaw in the map of erstwhile J&K? The approved map does not include Chitral which was very much part of

it. He argues that everyone talks about GB, Shaksgam Valley, Aksai Chin and POK, but does not mention Chitral. He goes on to suggest that most

of the territories of Chitral were directly ruled by Kashmir. It might have been a British conspiracy to ensure that the area goes to Pakistan.

Satinder Lambah in his article, “Gilgit-Baltistan: An Unfortunate

History”, underlines the tragic and unfortunate history of Gilgit-Baltistan, which led to the sufferings of the original inhabitants of the land. He

categorically claims that both Gilgit Agency and Gilgit Wazarat were

part of the state of J&K. Gilgit Agency was administered by the British, whereas Gilgit Wazarat was administered by Maharaja Hari Singh despite

leasing the area to the British in 1935. When the lease ended, both parts were returned to the Maharaja who in turn deputed Brigadier Ghansara

Singh as the Governor to take care of the administration. However, Major Brown, who commanded the Gilgit Scouts then, intervened on behalf of

Pakistan and arrested Ghansara Singh on November 1, 1947. After this

Major Brown invited Pakistan to take control over the area which in turn sent a Tehsildar in NWFP as its Governor. This was the beginning of the tragic history of GB which continues till date.

Ashok K. Behuria in his article, “Developments in Gilgit Baltistan:

Interpreting Local Angst”, argues that historically GB was regarded as

an important frontier and the great games by the powers were played out at its door. In present circumstances, the territory is viewed by

xiv | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

many countries as a strategic locale, which apart from India, China and

Pakistan also includes other Central Asian countries. The Maharaja of

Jammu rightly understood the strategic importance of the region and so, soon after getting back the domain, he embarked on a visit to Gilgit and

conquered the connecting routes. The route was part of the ancient Silk Route that connected India with the rest of the world. He also underlines

the fact that Pakistan never made any genuine attempt to address the

issues of the people of GB, who initially wanted to have an autonomous

status and carve out a confederal space in the body politic of Pakistan. However, Pakistani rulers had their own plans of swallowing it completely. The angst seen in the people of GB is the result of non-fulfilment of their aspirations. He goes on to suggest that if India is interested in building

bridges with the people of GB, it should focus as much on the people as

it focuses on the territory. It should build contacts, grant scholarships, encourage their visits to India, etc. It is through these ways that India can reach out to the people. He also warns that India’s episodic reactions and calls would not be helpful.

Ashish Shukla in his article, “Chinese Involvement in Gilgit-

Baltistan”, argues that the very nature of Pakistan-China relationship

in recent times has transformed from “All-Weather Friendship” to “AllWeather Strategic Partnership”. This happened due to increased Chinese

presence and activities in Pakistan under the China-Pakistan Economic

Corridor (CPEC). The strategically important GB has always been an important factor in the bilateral relations between the two countries. After having acquired 2,500 square miles from Pakistan in 1963, China pushed

Pakistan for the Karakoram Highway project so that it could address its territorial vulnerabilities in the Western flank. The project connected Chinese Kashgar with GB and strengthened Pakistan’s hold over the

illegally occupied Indian territory. Under the ongoing CPEC, Pakistan further intends to tighten its grip over GB and push the indigenous people

into subservience. Several activists of GB have accused both China and Pakistan of increasing their presence for exploiting vast natural resources

present in the area. The land is now being forcibly occupied and those

Introduction | xv

questioning it are being tortured and killed. There is a draconian rule in place to silence the people.

K. Warikoo in his article, “Indian Concerns in Gilgit-Baltistan”

underlines the importance of the territory for India from an Indian point of view. He presents historical evidence as well as contemporary records to assert that Skardu, Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Chilas, Astor, Gupis, Kuh-

Ghizar, Punial, Ishkoman, Yasin, Darel and Tangir all were part of the erstwhile state of J&K at the time of partition in 1947. The Kashmir government exercised its writ over Gilgit, Bunji and Astore, while the

chiefships of Hunza, Nagar and Governorship of Punial, Yasin, Chilas,

Khu-Ghizar, Ishkoman and the tribal territories of Darel, Tangir, Thor, Kandia, Jalkot, Shtian, Harban were feudatories of the Kashmir Durbar which received tribute from them but allowed internal autonomy in their local administration.

He argues that given the importance of the territory, Lord Curzon

travelled extensively in the area up to Pamir and was of the view that in order to protect the British colonial state in India, dominance of the

strategic Himalayan neighbourhood was necessary. Thus came the idea of having ‘buffer states’ in the Himalayan region, which later became an integral part of the strategic philosophy. It was Lord Curzon who wanted to extend the idea of having ‘buffer zones’ to India’s strategic Himalayan

neighbourhood in a proactive manner. Indian leaders, especially Prime

Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, were conscious of the fact, and that was the reason on August 20, 1948 he wrote a letter to United Nations

Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) Mission and asserted the authority of J&K over the ‘northern areas’.

Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharjee in his article, “Exploitation of Water and

Mineral Resources of Gilgit-Baltistan”, focuses on how GB’s precious

natural resources are being exploited by Pakistan and China. The

mountainous region has numerous mineral deposits, inter alia metallic, non-metallic, energy, minerals, stones and rocks of industrial value. Minerals and metals found in these mountains are exported to the world

by Pakistan. These minerals and metals include marble, China clay, topaz,

xvi | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

peridot, emerald, morganite, tourmaline, gold, gypsum, chalcopyrite, uranium, etc. The region is also quite rich in terms of hydropower

potential. Pakistan is exploiting these at the cost of the development of

the local people. The indigenous people are not given their due share in the resource cake. Those demanding the due share in the resource cake are

often silenced with threats of torture and killings. Extrajudicial killings are the norm in many of such cases.

Zainab Akhter in her article, “‘India-Pakistan Cross-LoC

Connectivity’: Bridging the Gap between Ladakh and Baltistan by

Invoking the ‘Balti Culture’” makes an attempt to analyse Balti culture prevalent in both sides of the India-Pakistan Line of Control (LoC). She

underlines the fact that Balti connect is often lost due to the dominance

of literature on Punjab and Kashmir with respect to the partition. It is Punjabiyat and Kashmiriyat that makes the noise, not the Balti identity

and culture. Her perspective on the subject is enriched by her field trip in 2017 during which she could get first-hand experience of Balti culture on

the other side of LoC. She argues that the ancestors of Baltis migrated long before partition from Baltistan to Kargil and Leh or Kargil/Leh to

Baltistan. Though the people at both sides of LoC have been separated for several decades, one finds the existence of a common culture across

the LoC. People on both sides believe in Balti-adab making them distinct from the rest of the population. They also have a common language—

Balti. Kargil and Turtuk both have the highest number of Balti-speaking population and also the highest number of divided family in comparison

to the rest of Ladakh. Balti music strongly connects people from both the sides and people like Abbas Anand are quite popular in Ladakh.

1. Gilgit in 1947-48 Raghvendra Singh

Advancing the date of India’s partition and dispensing with the phased

withdrawal of the British administration and its forces cost India dearly. The communal conflagration that ensued and the festering Kashmir

dispute were no unintended consequences of this decision. Why the Indian freedom struggle leaders were so anxious to advance the partition date is strictly not my brief here to explain, but one thing is certain, there has not been much debate on this issue, for it never suited the political

dispensation of those days to pry into this question. Why was NWFP lost

to Pakistan when it had a comfortable Congress majority in the 1946 state elections? Why was Kalat (80 per cent of Balochistan) and 40 per cent of current Pakistan forcibly taken by Pakistan in April 1948? And why does

no one talk about a flaw in the map of Jammu and Kashmir ( J&K)? In

the approved map we only claim Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), Shaksgam Valley, Aksai Chin and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). No one makes any mention of Chitral which is shown conveniently by Pakistan as part of NWFP.

In fact Chitral was a suzerain and many of its territories were directly

ruled by Kashmir. The British, however, continuously endeavoured to complicate the situation for the Maharaja since the 1880s, and then

deliberately restored the status quo ante on August 1, 1947. Whether their

action of early 1947 to retrocede the entire Gilgit Agency to Kashmir was a ploy to ensure that it eventually landed in the lap of Pakistan is clearly

a moot point. To better serve their areas of strategic importance in Asia, they needed to maintain influence over Pakistan. And that is what they

did. In my forthcoming book on the NWFP, titled India’s Lost Frontier,

2 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

I have discussed this point at length—that of the strategic imperative of partitioning India in the manner the British so chose to do.

I have structured this article around the issue of retrocession of

Gilgit as dealt by the British Indian Government and later by the

Indian Government; the interventions Nehru made on this subject, first as Member External Affairs and later as Prime Minister of India. I particularly mention a note prepared by the Assistant Political Agent of

Gilgit, a British officer, purely from the viewpoint of its analysis in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). The relationship of the northern

districts with the Kashmir Darbar that included the Chitral territory is also analysed in this paper. And finally, the letter which Nehru as Prime

Minister wrote in August 1948 to Joseph Korbel, the Chairman of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP).

I tried locating direct references made by Nehru on GB, for he

wrote prodigiously in 1947-48 on the subject of Kashmir. Perhaps some administrative records may contain observations made by him, which we are not privy to, but there is no hint of lost territories in his letters made

public. The ordeal that the people of GB had to go through in 1947-48

is all well documented. But these issues were never leveraged effectively with the Pakistan authorities. Why was that so?

Through a Lease Agreement signed in 1935, the Maharaja of

Kashmir had relinquished his rights to govern Gilgit for 60 years. But on the lapse of British paramountcy in 1947, the agreement would terminate

and control of the civil and military administration of Gilgit was to revert to the Kashmir Darbar. September 1, 1947 was the proposed date for this

to happen. In late March 1947, the External Affairs Department (EAD) raised the issue of the shape of the Indian Constitution and its relationship

with Kashmir. If Kashmir elected to remain outside the Constitution or

linked itself to a government not acceptable to Muslims, it was likely to prejudice Indian interests.

The EAD note stated that the population of Gilgit was 100 per cent

Muslim and the Mirs, Governors and people had made their dislike of direct Kashmir rule amply clear. It would therefore be unwise to presume

Gilgit in 1947-48 | 3

that the Chiefs of the people of Gilgit Agency would agree to be handed

over to the direct administration of the Kashmir government unless

Kashmir was associated with an Indian government acceptable to Muslim sentiments. Failing such an association, the field would be open to forces

which caused the British intervention in the 1890s. In the “free for all” struggle that would ensue, Hunza might renew its old association with China or the Soviets; Chitral might seek to recover its lost dominion and

bring them under Pakistan’s fold. Similarly, the Raja of Punial might also

choose Pakistan. EAD inferred that in such a scenario, Russia, China and Afghanistan might not be disinterested spectators. The note reflecting

these apprehensions was prepared by a Joint Secretary in the EAD, Major Crichton, on March 27, 1947. The Secretary noted that any foreign relations problem was unlikely to surface.

Joint Secretary Crichton felt October 1, 1947 to be a better date

for terminating the lease. Member, External Affairs Jawaharlal Nehru, however, differed. In his noting of April 10, 1947 he emphatically stated

that the proper time for the retrocession of Gilgit should be the spring of

1948. By then the picture of the Constitution of the Indian Union was to be much clearer as also Kashmir’s association with it. It would be far easier then to consider the problem in all its aspects. This in no way would

prejudice the claim of Kashmir. The argument based on the winter climate

was not strong and offered no real difficulty. Nehru therefore urged that

this question be reconsidered later. The External Affairs Department and Viceroy Mountbatten did not concur with Nehru.

On April 27, 1947, Mountbatten wrote to Nehru that he had been

looking into the question of the retrocession of Gilgit to Kashmir. He also

made a reference to Nehru’s observations of April 10, about extending the time for retrocession to March-April of 1948 and that Nehru had not been impressed with the arguments based on the winter climate

and accordingly urged that the whole question be reconsidered later. Mountbatten said that he had come into the question personally with

great care and was sure that there were practical reasons why the decision about Gilgit must be made as soon as possible. Mountbatten observed

4 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

that the passes to Gilgit were officially closed from October 15 to June

15 each year. These dates were fixed on the basis of long experience of weather conditions and it would be most unwise to prepare plans on the assumption that the passes would be open before June 15, in any particular

year. Individual travellers, travelling light, often crossed the passes a week or two before the official opening date; but heavily laden pack animals could not do this. (The journey from Gilgit to Srinagar normally took 15 to 17 days.)

If personnel of the Crown Representative serving in Gilgit were not

withdrawn in the summer of 1947, they could not reach Srinagar with

their families, baggage, etc., before June 30, 1948 at the earliest. But before that date the Kashmir Residency would have been closed. Mountbatten reiterated that a decision had to be taken in the near future on this matter and he was therefore sending a telegram to the Secretary of State proposing to terminate the agreement not later than October 1, 1947.

Member Defence, Baldev Singh, was also privy to the file on this

subject. On July 14, 1947 he noted that sufficient information was not

available in the file to enable him to come to a decision. He sought further details on this question, in particular whether the Lease Agreement dated March 26, 1935 was with the British Government or with the Crown

Representative. He wanted to see the agreement, if it was available. He observed that Secretary, Defence had mentioned that the Defence

Ministry had already agreed in principle to the retrocession of Gilgit to Kashmir. Baldev Singh wanted to know where and how this decision was taken. He went on further to note on the file on July 18, 1947 that:

I see that H. M., E. A. D. (Nehru) has not so noted on the file although it is stated that External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations Departments have agreed to the retrocession. The situation has changed considerably in the last few weeks. The final decision should, therefore, be taken after ascertaining the view of Nehru once again. This may be done and then the file put up for my orders as regards the withdrawal from the defence point of view.

Gilgit in 1947-48 | 5

He had clearly reflected his reluctance to go along with the decision

on this file. But did it matter?

On July 19, 1947 Nehru made another noting on this issue stating that

the question of the retrocession of Gilgit had come up before him during April last. He had then expressed the opinion that the proper time to consider this would be early next year when the picture of the Constitution

of the Indian Union as also Kashmir’s association with it would be much clearer and the problem could be considered in all its aspects. As he had

pointed out then, this in no way prejudiced the claims of Kashmir. The only

argument that was advanced against this was based on the severity of the winter climate and the difficulty of taking any steps. The proposal then was that retrocession should take place in September 1947.

The Crown Representative responded that it would be better and

more in consonance with the policy of achieving the greatest possible

devolution of paramountcy by the end of 1947 to terminate the agreement

about Gilgit in September 1947. Nehru had been informed of this and he

had said that in view of this decision he would raise no further objection. But since then, further developments had taken place and it had now

been proposed to terminate the agreement about Gilgit immediately and to hand over that subdivision to the Kashmir government. The matter

had come up before the Defence Department indirectly in connection with the future of the Scouts and the Wireless Equipment. So far as these two minor matters are concerned, he had nothing to say and it was for

the Defence Department to decide. But regarding the major matter of handing over Gilgit, he still suggested that no immediate steps should

be taken. This did not involve any real delay and in any event the date previously fixed, i.e., September 1947, was still far (Nehru was unaware that the dates had been advanced to August 1, instead).

It was true that in view of the Indian Independence Act, certain other

consequences would follow. But plans were being made for Standstill Agreements and other arrangements with the states and any premature

steps taken then could have consequences, which may not have fitted with the future arrangements. It was probable that some decision would

6 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

be made by the Kashmir Government regarding the future association with the Dominion in the course of the next two or three weeks. It

seemed to Nehru that it was obviously desirable to wait till this decision

was made and then to take such steps as might flow from the decision or the standstill arrangements. This applied not only to Gilgit but to

other states where cantonments and Government of India troops were

stationed. Nehru wanted the troops to continue where they were for the present. He wanted the States Department to see the file and consider the matter.

The States Department’s response on July 28, 1947 to Nehru’s notings

was as under:

This file was made over to us by the Political Department who want it back urgently as they have to issue the notification regarding the retrocession of the Gilgit. Retrocession with effect from the August 1 has been sanctioned and communicated to the Government of Jammu & Kashmir vide telegram. In any case, it could not be delayed beyond the August 15 when the foreign jurisdiction ceases with the lapse of paramountcy. The standstill clause in the Indian Independence Act or any standstill agreement which may be reached between the Kashmir government and the Indian Dominion government cannot be of any help in delaying the retrocession which flows inevitably from the Indian Independence Act. In these circumstances, the States Department do not see any objection to the issue of the draft notification on August 1, 1947.

Before Nehru could reiterate his objection, on July 19, the

Secretary of State had approved the retrocession of Gilgit in advance

of the lapse of paramountcy of July 18 itself and arrangements were to be made to retrocede Gilgit on August 1, 1947. The Political Agent and his staff were to be withdrawn by that date and detailed orders

were to be issued for the transfer of the Gilgit Scouts, disbursement of pay, pension and the handing over to Kashmir of administrative details, revenue records, etc.

Gilgit in 1947-48 | 7

Interestingly on July 9, 1947, IG Frontier Corps NWF wrote to

Secretary, External Affairs that if the Kashmir Darbar required British

officers to serve in the Gilgit Scouts, he could perhaps arrange it, particularly for one applicant who had come in on a contract. He was a

competent officer with past experience in Gilgit Scouts and was currently serving in Chitral. In response, Secretary External Affairs noted on July 11, 1947 that it was possible that the Kashmir Darbar could make such a request, and therefore the best thing was to forward the name of this

officer privately to the Resident in Srinagar, Lt. Col. W. F. Webb. Who was that officer? Could he be Major Brown?

The Prime Minister of Kashmir State, R. C. Kak, in his letter to the

Resident of Kashmir of June 12, 1947, mentioned that the terms of the lease made it clear that the sovereign rights of the State in this area had

never been ceded as the Agreement guaranteed the continuance of the Maharaja’s sovereign rights over the ceded territory, including ceremonial honours and salutes.

Kashmir had always considered the political districts comprising the

Gilgit Agency as an integral part of the State. The Prime Minister recognised that the change contemplated would create a vacuum, which the Maharaja’s

government considered desirable to avoid. He was therefore anxious to initiate action in consultation with the Political Agent, Gilgit, to re-establish their old relationship with the Mirs and the Chiefs of these districts.

On the issue of the political relationship with Hunza, Nagir, Punial,

Kuh-Ghizar, Yasin, Ishkoman, Chilas, Darel and Tangir, Resident

Kashmir reported on June 16 to Delhi that the Prime Minister of Kashmir

had told him that the Kashmir government was prepared to treat the

Mirs of Hunza and Nagir exactly as they had been treated by the British government and that the Maharaja would grant them similar Sanads like the ones they already had except that any reference to the British government would be omitted.

If this proposal was approved, the officers of the Political and External

Affairs Department could come to Srinagar to conclude the negotiations with the Kashmir government. On the subject of concluding agreements

8 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

between the Mirs of Hunza and Nagir and the Kashmir government, the

only possible course seemed to be for an accredited Representative of the

Kashmir government and Resident Kashmir to fly to Gilgit as neither of the Mirs was prepared to risk coming in an aircraft, and getting them down by road would have caused considerable delay.

The Political Department wrote to the Resident Kashmir on June

27, 1947 that as far as Hunza and Nagir were concerned, it was for the

Kashmir government to make their own arrangements with Mirs but if

the former desired the Resident’s good offices, there was no objection to his flying to Gilgit for this purpose. The Resident responded saying that

the Mirs of Hunza and Nagir had been recently invited by the Maharaja of Kashmir to visit Srinagar and that they proposed to leave Gilgit by road in the first week of July and return by the end of the month.

The Political Department formally informed the Resident Kashmir

on July 20 that the termination of lease and retrocession of jurisdiction

over Gilgit from August 1, 1947 had been sanctioned. The Gilgit Scouts also stood transferred to the Kashmir government. The Resident was to

arrange prompt withdrawal of the Political Agent and urgently forward

the draft retrocession notification. The notification came out on July 28, 1947.

Captain Mainprice, a former Assistant Political Agent of Gilgit,

submitted a note dated October 10, 1947 to the Department of External

Affairs, Government of India and also shared it with the Government of Pakistan. He stressed the following points in this note: •

Though theoretically the 60 years lease was to terminate prematurely, the reasons which had caused the Government of India to take over its administration in 1935 still held good. The people of Gilgit Agency

strongly opposed putting the clock back and restoring the alien regime of those whose inefficiency and neglect were only equalled

by their contempt for the local people and their aspirations. Nor did reversion of State administration necessarily mean reversion to the pre-1935 position, for the old state regime largely depended on the guidance of the British political agent.

Gilgit in 1947-48 | 9

•

Following the treatment of Hyderabad and Kalat claims to Berar and Quetta respectively, a very strong case existed for the retention of

•

central government administration in Gilgit.

In the area of Chilas, Darel and Tangir, the Wali of Swat had extended his control and was infinitely preferred to the alternate Kashmir State

regime in Gilgit. The Wali’s propaganda work throughout Yaghistan

had a positive impact. It was expected that he would take control of these territories as soon as there was a change in administration in •

Gilgit.

The Mirs of Hunza and Nagar and the four Governors undoubtedly

wanted to link up with Pakistan. It was suggested that one of the British officers in the Pakistan service should be sent to Gilgit after consultation with the Maharaja of Kashmir to administer the Central •

Government Political Agency.

Reference was made to Major Crichton’s note of March 27, 1947 which observed that failing satisfactory arrangements it would

result in a ‘free-for-all’ situation leading to foreign intrigues and intervention. Crichton’s note was overlooked by others not personally

familiar with the Gilgit Agency. The best solution was to make the Gilgit Agency a responsibility of the central government concerned •

with the North West Frontier of Pakistan.

The fate of the whole Gilgit Agency had been decided before the

Political Agent flew to Srinagar in early June 1947 and met the

Resident. The Mirs, Governors and local people were not consulted. When the two Mirs were on the road down to see the Maharaja on

July 17, 1947, the orders to hand over the Gilgit Agency on August 1, •

to the Kashmir Darbar was received.

Kashmir’s unpopularity had grown. Swat and Chitral had already

joined Pakistan. Hunza was expected to renew its connection with •

China, only recently broken.

In November, when crops were harvested and the Gilgit Agency

was completely cut off from Kashmir, there was every possibility of trouble.

10 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

•

Neither in Baluchistan nor in the NWFP had the Frontier Agencies been withdrawn. Gilgit was as much a Frontier Agency as Khyber or the Malakand and not a Political Agency in Indian States such as

Bhopal or Simla. The Gilgit Agency was under the External Affairs •

Department and not under the Political Department.

Kashmir, a Hindu state was in varying degrees repugnant to all chiefs and people of the Gilgit Agency who were all Muslims. Kashmir could

not hold sectors of the former Frontier of India, now of Pakistan with Afghanistan, China and Russia. It could also not hold other parts

of the Gilgit Agency against Swat and Chitral. It was not possible for Kashmir to maintain internal peace, efficient administration or supplies to the troops beyond the Valley of Kashmir. Kashmir could

also not control or replace rulers of the Agency or the Scouts. The Darbar was unable to bear the cost of Frontier Administration and •

the defence.

In this situation fraught with internal and external danger and with

both Pakistan and India having the same vital interest, Captain Mainprice preferred the rule of Pakistan. If something was not done

promptly, Gilgit could be the first breach in the former Frontier of India and could become a thin end of the Soviet wedge.

Captain Mainprice’s note was examined in the MEA, which

considered it as a good piece of subtle propaganda to aid Pakistan. But

some of the notings in this particular file were positively strange unless

there is a specific context to it of which we are all unaware. Sample the notings and draw your own inference: •

I have served as A.P.A., Gilgit for 1¼ years and therefore I am in

a good position to comment on Mr. Mainprice’s note which does

require contradictions on various points. I had as A.P.A., an added advantage of being an Indian as I could mix freely with the masses and also with Mirs and Governors of the States of the Gilgit Agency

thereby gaining information which reflected the true sentiments, wishes and aspirations of the people of that Agency.

Gilgit in 1947-48 | 11

•

Because of the march of events in Kashmir, there does not seem any immediate hurry to deliberate on the internal problems of the

Gilgit Agency and also because of the pressure of other urgent work, I propose to postpone my comments, and hope in due course, when

I have some leisure, to write an elaborate note on the subject. In the meanwhile, I am always available if the Ministry of States require any

firsthand knowledge about Gilgit (and also about Kashmir). D.S. (X) •

may like to see the F.R. ( J. N. Dhamija dated November 5, 1947.)

I glanced through this note when Mr. Mainprice showed me a copy

last month and have only now had time to read through the whole of it. I should like to discuss this with US (FEA). (A. Dayal dated • • •

November 8, 1947.)

Three months elapsed. No action at present. Have discussed with DS(X). (Dated February 10, 1948.)

May be filed. ( J. N. Dhamija dated March 31, 1948.)

Ministry of States—Ref. pre-page. Seen and returned with thanks. (Dated June 5, 1948.)

On the important question of Kashmir acceding to the Federation

under the 1935 Government of India Act, the External Affairs Department

in January 1938 was not against the idea of Gilgit subdivision’s co-option and declaration u/s 294(1) of the Government of India Act 1935. But

the department was not sure about the remaining part of the agency. Any declaration made would be tantamount to acknowledging those areas as part of the Kashmir State.

An Indian State could include any territory under the suzerainty

of the ruler, u/s 311 (1), which was not part of British India. It was, therefore, perfectly clear that for the purpose of the Government of

India Act 1935, Kashmir could include Hunza, Nagir, Chilas, Kuh-

Ghizar, Yasin and Ishkoman, which were under Kashmir’s suzerainty. Punial would also come within this ambit for it was a jagir granted by

the Kashmir Darbar. But the External Affairs Department decided to exclude federal authority from these areas despite the fact that the Census

12 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

Records shown against Kashmir took into account the population of all these eight frontier areas.

Could Chitral be regarded, for the purposes of the Government of

India Act 1935, as a part of Kashmir? Chitral was under the suzerainty of Kashmir as per the Aitchison Treaties (Vol. XI, p. 428), a definitive

acknowledgement of the suzerainty in the Agreement of 1914, attested by the Assistant Political Agent of Chitral. As per the definition of Indian States under Section 311 (1), Chitral should have been regarded, for the purpose of the Government of India Act 1935, as part of Kashmir State.

The British Indian Government, however, decided to introduce an

amendment to the Government of India Act 1935 to circumvent issues arising from the definition of an Indian State. The amendment stated that the “territory which was under the suzerainty of, but did not belong, to

the Ruler of the Indian State shall, for the purpose of the Government of India Act of 1935, be deemed not to form a part of the State”.

There took place a dispute over the Indus waters in the middle of

1953. The Pakistan Government produced maps in which the territories of the erstwhile Gilgit Agency were marked as part of Pakistan. A reference

was made by the then Ministry of Irrigation and Power on May 21, 1953 to the Ministry of States seeking clarification on the territorial locus standi

of these areas. Strangely, after a lapse of more than a month, on June 30, 1953 the Ministry of States wrote to the Chief Secretary, Government

of J&K for providing the details. Finally, on July 29, 1953 the requested

note was sent by the Chief Secretary to Mr. Viswanathan, Joint Secretary, Ministry of States. The facts alluded to in that note are as follows: • • • •

The Gilgit Agency comprised of the Gilgit Wazarat which included the Tehsil of Gilgit and the Niabat of Astor. The States of Hunza and Nagar. The Republic of Chilas.

The Governorships of Punial/Yasin/Kuh-Ghizar/Ishkoman. The Gilgit Wazarat was administered by Kashmir State officials. The

remaining districts were subject to the control of the Political Agent. They

Gilgit in 1947-48 | 13

all acknowledged the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir as their suzerain and they all paid him some form of tribute.

At the time of the Treaty of Amritsar in 1846, Gilgit was under the

occupation of the Sikhs who maintained a military force there. As per the

terms of this Treaty, the British Government transferred and made over

the hilly and mountainous country within its dependencies eastward of the river Indus and westward of river Ravi. During the drawing up of this

Treaty, the British government itself was not aware of the character and

extent of territories transferred since the demarcation of the boundary

was to be done separately after survey. But the areas transferred by the

Treaty of Amritsar included the territories which came to be known as Political Agency ilaqas (areas). The Administration Report of the State

in 1874 expressly mentions that during the regime of the Sikhs, Gilgit, Nagar, Hunza and Nomal came under the control of the Government of Kashmir in 1842 and at the time of the transfer of Kashmir to Maharaja

Gulab Singh in 1846, these ilaqas (areas) came into possession along with

Kashmir.

There was constant strife in the Northern Territories. Attempts were

made by both, Gulab Singh and Ranbir Singh to establish control, which

were largely successful. From late 1850 onwards, we find the Raja of

Nagar paying tribute to Kashmir and receiving subsidy as a feudatory. He also provided for keeping hostages at Gilgit as a guarantee for good

conduct. In 1870, the Raja of Hunza also gave a similar undertaking and was granted a subsidy of Rs. 2,000 a year.

The relationship with Chilas began early during the rule of Maharaja

Gulab Singh who sent a punitive expedition there in 1851-52. From

that time, Chilas not only undertook to pay tribute to the Maharaja, but also sent hostages to ensure the good conduct of Chilasi tribesmen. The

Chilasis regularly approached the J&K government for redressing wrongs as ordinary subjects of the state.

Around 1870, the State extended its effective authority over all these

territories. A close relationship existed between the principalities and the

state of J&K. In 1886, when a part of the Afghan Boundary Commission

14 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

was returning to India via Gilgit, the Government of India requested the Maharaja to issue orders to the Mehtar of Chitral to arrange transport and make other arrangements for the Commission while in Chitral. The map prepared and published in 1874 shows Hunza, Nagar, Chilas and Chitral

within the territory of J&K. The Mehtar of Chitral in 1870 was earnest

in his desire to conciliate the Kashmir Government lest the Darbar went beyond its (Chitral’s) borders and annexed Yasin.

The Maharaja received support from the British Indian Government

in his expansionist activities. The British were perturbed by the Russian

menace. However, they found it expedient to appoint an Officer on Special Duty at Gilgit in 1877. While doing so, the Viceroy requested the Maharaja to notify the appointment in a manner the Maharaja so

chose to do. The officer was also instructed to march with the state forces

and to help and guide the Commandant of the forces with his advice and experience. The business of the Officer on Special Duty was that

of an ordinary intelligence officer and as far as the administration was concerned, he had no locus standi in the movement of troops. His function was not that of an officer commanding the troops or dictating policy.

It was during 1877-81 that Chitral accepted the suzerainty of the

Maharaja and Yasin, Kuh-Ghizar and Ishkoman came directly under

the Maharaja’s rule after these districts were severed from Chitral. Subsequently, the British Indian Government also thought it wiser to withdraw the Officer on Special Duty in 1881. This position continued till the death of Raja Ranbir Singh in 1885.

The situation changed when Maharaja Pratap Singh took over. On

his accession, the designation of the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir

was changed to that of Resident in Kashmir. The Maharaja was removed from his position of effective rulership, and his powers were transferred

to a Council under the presidentship of his brother Raja Amar Singh. The Resident was given wide powers to conduct the administration of

the State. The Gilgit Agency was re-established in 1889. The British

reorganised the State under the scheme of Imperial Service Rules. The British officers took command of the State forces though the State had

Gilgit in 1947-48 | 15

to bear the expenditure. The de facto administration of the Gilgit frontier

passed into the hands of the British officers and thus came into being the Gilgit Agency ilaqas.

In 1891 there was an organised attempt on the part of Hunza and

Nagar to rise in rebellion. The state bore the brunt of the fighting as well

as the expenditure. The British officers commanding the Imperial Service

Troops acted on behalf of the Maharaja. Even as late as 1891, by which time the British had secured complete control of the state and the Gilgit

Agency ilaqas (areas), they still regarded these territories as belonging to the state. The occupation of Hunza and Nagar was left to the state forces after victory. The Sanads restoring Nagar and Hunza to the Chiefs was

granted by the Maharaja. Among various issues, the Sanad stated that they should fulfil orders given by the J&K government and that so long as they were loyal to J&K, they would enjoy their favour and protection.

The state while issuing these Sanads reserved for itself the right to

control external relations of Hunza and Nagar and also for exercising

complete supervision in details of administration. But in actual practice, the control of the state gradually diminished on account of the increasing

influence and power of the British Resident in Kashmir. The greater part of expenditure of the Agency and administration of these districts was borne

by J&K state, which included maintenance of the Agency, maintenance

of state troops at Gilgit, cost of making roads, dispensaries, schools and

normal functions of administration. The total expenditure of the Gilgit

Agency including Gilgit Wazarat from 1889 till 1935 came to Rs. 3 crore. In 1927, the subsidies of the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar were increased from Rs. 4,000 to Rs. 5,000 each, the increase being borne equally by the Government of India and the Kashmir government.

After Maharaja Pratap Singh was restored with full powers in 1922

and with the accession of Hari Singh to the throne in 1925, the issue of

the equation with Gilgit was raised by Kashmir with the Government of India. A long correspondence ensued. Ultimately a proposal was mooted of which the main features were: •

Abolition of the Political Agency.

16 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

• • •

Bringing unsettled districts under full administrative control of the state.

Cementing relations between the Maharaja and Frontier Chiefs.

Maintaining the prestige of the Government of India on the frontier without detriment to the rightful authority of the state.

On March 29, 1935 the Government of India assumed civil and

military administration of the Wazarat of Gilgit. In this agreement, there was no mention of the political districts for the reason that this agreement was made to enable the Viceroy to assume civil and military administration over the territory over which he exercised no such jurisdiction, namely, the trans-Indus portion of the Wazarat.

Chitral In the 1870s the Second Afghan War was in the offing and the British were anxious to isolate Afghanistan. The Afghan Government exerted

pressure on the Mehtar, threatening him with an invasion. The British encouraged the Maharaja of Kashmir to accept the position of a suzerain

over Chitral. On May 14, 1874, Lord Lytton wrote to the Maharaja on the subject stating that “the Ruler of Chitral should promptly be informed

that having accepted the suzerainty of the Maharaja of Kashmir, he was not at liberty to change it for the suzerainty of Kabul, that your Highness

would doubtless take such measures as you may deem suitable for the protection of your feudatory and that the British Government would afford, if need be material aid.”

On August 2, 1877 the Viceroy reiterated similar sentiments.

Eventually a treaty was signed between the Ruler of Chitral and the Maharaja of Kashmir, wherein the Mehtar executed a deed stating that he would obey and execute the order of the Maharaja, consider the Maharaja’s enemy as his enemy and would pay an annual Nazarana to

Kashmir; also that he would receive a subsidy from Kashmir state. While

this arrangement was being made, no mention of the Government of India was made in it.

Gilgit in 1947-48 | 17

For a very long time a Vakil of the Maharaja resided in Chitral sending

regular information to the Maharaja. On Maharaja Ranbir Singh’s death, Chitral affairs also underwent a drastic change. In 1891, a supporting political agency was established at Chitral for effective watch and control

by the Government of India. The situation in Chitral got precipitated by the British in 1895, when the British agency was besieged in Chitral Fort

and a relief expedition became necessary. That the Kashmir troops played a major part in the Chitral campaign is well known. Ultimately in 1895, the boundary between Chitral and Gilgit was severed. Yasin, Kuh-Ghizar and

Ishkoman were administrated by Governors. Chitral was partitioned into two. The Katur country (Chitral proper with the neighbouring country) and the Khushwaqt country (Mastuj, Laspur, Ghizar, Kuh and Yasin).

The control of Mehtar was to extend through Katur, while for

Khushwaqt it was to be administered by the British at Gilgit on behalf of

the Kashmir Darbar. The British Agent in Gilgit, on behalf of the Kashmir

State was to attend and pay the Governors and Chiefs of Khushwaqt country except in the case of Mastuj and Laspur. This arrangement was

continued till 1896, when the Chitral Agency was transferred from Gilgit to the Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral. As a consequence, Mastuj

and Laspur were transferred with Chitral, whereas Yasin remained with Gilgit. This arrangement continued till 1914. Even after the Mehtar

of Chitral continued to pay Nazarana to the Maharaja and the state continued to pay annual subsidy to the Mehtar till 1947.

The Government of India formally obtained the concurrence of the

Kashmir Darbar whenever there was a change in policy contemplated in the administration of Chitral. Till 1939, the Mehtar of Chitral was interested in negotiating a direct agreement with the Kashmir Darbar on the lines of the 1878 Treaty wherein the British Government was not a party. Since the Gilgit Wazarat was already leased out to the Government

of India in 1935, the then Prime Minister of Kashmir could not entertain

such a proposal and ultimately the idea of a fresh agreement was given up. Further negotiations were kept in abeyance owing to the outbreak

of war in September 1939. At the time of partition in 1947, the Treaty

18 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

of 1878 between Kashmir and Chitral and the agreement of 1914 stood unmodified.

On December 28, 1947 Lord Ismay, the Chief of Staff of Lord

Mountbatten, made a mention of a meeting between Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan:

The two Prime Ministers have agreed that the legal position of Hanza, Nagar and Chitral should be examined. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan explained that Hanza and Nagar had applied to accede to Pakistan, but their accession had not been accepted pending a clarification of the legal position. Meanwhile, he had heard that a telegram had been received from Hanza to the effect that if they were not allowed to accede to Pakistan they would accede to Russia. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan gave a description of the position in Gilgit. The Dogra troops had been disarmed and had left the country: a provisional government had been set up: and the Gilgit Scouts were in charge and functioning. He suggested that the forcible occupation of Gilgit would be a task beyond the powers of the Indian armed forces.

On August 20, 1948 Nehru wrote to Joseph Korbel, Chairman of

UNCIP wherein for all practical purposes he relinquished India’s claims to Gilgit. This is what he wrote:

We desire that, after Pakistan troops and irregulars have withdrawn from the territory the responsibility for the administration of the evacuated areas should revert to the Government of Jammu & Kashmir and that for defence to us. (The only exception that we should be prepared to accept would be Gilgit.)

2. Gilgit-Baltistan: An Unfortunate History Satinder Lambah

During the British regime, Gilgit was divided in two parts: Gilgit Agency, administered by the British and Gilgit Wazarat, administered by the Maharaja Hari Singh despite leasing it to the British in 1935. They were both part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir ( J&K) and were returned to

the Maharaja on August 1, 1947. The Maharaja then deputed Ghansara

Singh as the Governor. However, Major Brown, the commander of the Gilgit Scouts, an armed force that the British had raised in 1930, decided

to intervene on behalf of Pakistan. The Muslim Scouts assisted and guided by Brown arrested Governor Ghansara Singh on November 1, 1947 and

raised the Pakistan flag. In a secret message to Pakistan, Brown asked them to take over the administration of the area. Immediately Pakistan sent

Sardar Mohammad Alam, previously a tehsildar in the North West Frontier

Province (NWFP) as the Governor. Brown supported Pakistan to prevent Soviet penetration into the area. Though the British denied any role against India, it is interesting that Brown got both a Pakistani award and Officer

of the Order of the British Empire (OBE) simultaneously. Thus started the tragic story of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) which continues till now.

GB is a part of the Indian state of J&K but, under Pakistan’s illegal

occupation since 1947, has had an unfortunate and tragic history as a

region. After 1947, Northern Areas is the name given by Pakistan

to the area comprising GB. This area has been neglected, isolated and

disenfranchised; its status has been kept deliberately ambiguous and undefined. None of the constitutions of Pakistan: 1956, 1962, 1972 and

20 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

1973 recognised the Northern Areas as a part of Pakistan. Likewise, the

1974 interim constitution of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) also did not include GB as its part.

To begin with, it would be prudent to have a brief idea of the location,

geography, and the people of the Northern Areas. The total geographical area of the state of J&K is 222,236 sq. km. Of this, at present, 101,437

sq. km is under India’s administrative control. Parts of the territory of the J&K are under illegal Pakistani/Chinese occupation. The POK, which consists of the so-called Azad Kashmir (hereinafter referred to as Azad

Kashmir, only to differentiate it from the rest of POK) and GB, covers an

area of 78,114 sq. km. Of this, the territory of GB (Northern Areas), is five times the area of so-called Azad Kashmir. This apart, the area under Chinese control is 42,685 sq. km, which includes 5,180 sq. km illegally

ceded to China by Pakistan in 1963. Gilgit is the capital of GB. It has

nine districts. The districts of Baltistan region include Ghanche, Skardu, Kharmanu and Shigar.

The religious groups in the GB region include the Shia (Twelvers),

Nurbakhshi, Ismaili and Sunni (Ahle-hadith). The languages spoken are Shina, Balti, Wakhi, Khowar, Gujjari, Burushaski, Puriki, Kashmiri and

Pashto.1 GB, a multilingual region with sociocultural and ethnic diversity,

is surrounded by the Hindu Kush and the Karakoram mountains. According to the Pakistani census of 2017, the population of GB is 1.8 million against 870,347 recorded in the previous census of 1998. The Shias constitute 39.85 per cent, Sunnis 30.05 per cent, Ismailis 24 per cent, and

Nurbakshis 6.1 per cent of the total population. According to the same census, the population of Azad Kashmir was 4.45 million against 2.97 million in the 1998 census. In terms of natural resources, GB is rich in

hydroelectric and minerals, and has several tourist attractions. Polo is the popular game of the area. However, owing to many reasons, the benefit of these has not accrued to the local population.

In 1947, GB formed a part of the state of J&K, under Maharaja Hari

Singh’s rule. After 1947, Pakistan has made a few piecemeal changes in respect of GB, which even when taken together have not made any material change

Gilgit-Baltistan: An Unfortunate History | 21

in the lives of the people. In November 1947, Pakistan sent Muhammad

Alam as its representative to Gilgit to run the local administration. Two years later by virtue of the Karachi Agreement of 1949, the Azad Kashmir

government, on the pretext of geographical and administrative reasons, was

asked to surrender administrative and legal control of GB to the federal government of Pakistan. Thereafter, the political and administrative affairs

of GB were managed through the Frontier Tribal Regulation (FTR). Accordingly Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas became two distinct

entities, without having any formal official relationship between them. The Karachi Agreement also gave the Pakistan government the responsibility for defence and foreign affairs of Azad Kashmir.

In 1969, the Northern Areas Advisory Council (NAAC) was set up; but

it did not give any decision-making power to the local authorities. In 1970,

Hunza and Nagar, parts of Azad Kashmir, were amalgamated with GB. This did not go down well with the local population who started protesting

against the federal government. In 1974-75, on account of protests by the

local population, Prime Minister (PM) Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto abolished the

FTR and introduced the Northern Areas Council Legal Framework Order. It brought in some administrative and judicial reforms but did not in any

way empower the people of GB. In 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq came to power by unseating Bhutto in a military coup. He thought of making the Northern Areas a part of Pakistan. In 1982, Zia-ul-Haq proclaimed that

the people of the Northern Areas were not part of the state of J&K and

extended his martial law to the Northern Areas but not to Azad Kashmir. With this act, he drew a clear distinction between the Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir. In an exclusive interview to the Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayar (on April 1, 1982), he said Gilgit, Hunza, and Skardu of the Northern Areas were not part of the disputed area.2

General Zia’s Announcement and India’s Protest While addressing the Majlis-e-Shoora (Pakistani Parliament) on April 3, 1982, General Zia announced that three observers from Northern Areas would be appointed to the Federal Council or the Majlis-e-Shoora. Three

22 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

hours later the Indian Chargé d’affaires in Pakistan, who was present at the Majlis-e-Shoora session, along with other Foreign Heads of Diplomatic

Missions in Islamabad, lodged a protest at General Zia’s announcement

to the Pakistan Foreign Office. Twelve days later on April 15, 1982, the Minister of External Affairs, P. V. Narasimha Rao, informed the Lok

Sabha (Lower House of the Indian Parliament) that Northern Areas are “Juridically and constitutionally part of the Indian state of J&K. Our Chargé d’affaires has already lodged a protest over the matter with the

Pakistan Foreign Office” and the government was awaiting the response of the Pakistan Government. There was no official reply to this but Pakistan

did not appoint any observer from Northern Areas to the Majlis-e-Shoora. Benazir Bhutto during her first tenure as the Prime Minister of

Pakistan (1988-90), appointed a local Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) leader, Qurban Ali, as advisor to the PM for Northern Areas. In her second tenure in 1994, her government introduced the Northern Areas

Legal Framework Order (LFO). According to this order, all executive

powers were vested with the federal minister of Kashmir Affairs

and Northern Areas. He also doubled up as the chief executive of the

Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC). His authority was absolute, and no legislation could be passed unless it had his prior approval. In 1999, the Supreme Court of Pakistan directed Islamabad to extend fundamental freedom to the Northern Areas following which General

Pervez Musharraf ’s regime delegated administrative and financial powers

to NALC. This was done by introducing minor amendments to the 1994 LFO. These were, however, insignificant.

In 2007, the NALC was upgraded to a Legislative Assembly. The

Pakistan Minister of Kashmir Affairs continued to function as the exofficio chairman of the Legislative Assembly. In August 2009, the PPP-

led federal government introduced the GB Empowerment and SelfGovernance Order. It changed the name of the region from the Northern

Areas to GB, and created the new offices of Governor and Chief Minister.

Now, GB was also entitled to have its own Public Service Commission,

Gilgit-Baltistan: An Unfortunate History | 23

Election Commission, and an Auditor General. It also established an

Upper House in the GB Council that comprised 15 members, with the PM of Pakistan as its ex-officio Chairperson. The elected Legislative Assembly was functional only in name as all decisions were effectively taken by the federal government in Islamabad. Indeed, the order of

2009 was on the lines of the Azad Kashmir Interim Constitution Act of 1974, and both the orders offered the two respective territories much less

autonomy than what has been granted to the four provinces of Pakistan.3

In February 2018, Pakistan brought GB Executive Order that transferred the powers of GB Council to GB Assembly. With GB Assembly acquiring the powers to legislate, now there is no role of the Kashmir

Affairs Ministry. The order also made Prime Minister of Pakistan quite

powerful, as he/she will now be entitled to levy taxes. This order could not be challenged or its validity be questioned. Article 41 of the order states: The executive authority of the government shall extend to the matters with respect to which the assembly has the power to make laws, provided that in any matter with respect to which both Prime Minister and the assembly have the power to make laws, the executive authority of the government shall be subject to and limited by the executive authority expressly conferred and this order by law made by the Prime Minister.

Besides, Article 60 (4) states: Any law which the Prime Minister is competent to enact then the law made by the Prime Minister, whether passed before or after the act of the assembly shall prevail and the act of the assembly shall to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.

The opposition parties in GB protested against the order and termed

it PM-centric. The leaders of opposition parties argued that before this

order, the GB Council enjoyed powers to legislate on 54 subjects as per the

Schedule 3, and 61 subjects as per the Schedule 4 of the 2009 ordinance. The new system in place has mixed the Schedules 3 and 4 and restricted to 62 subjects only and that too under the PM’s authority.

24 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

India also objected to these developments. It summoned Pakistan’s

Deputy High Commissioner to protest against the attempts by Islamabad

to integrate GB into the federal structure of Pakistan. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) press release stated that:

It was clearly conveyed that the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir which also includes the so-called “Gilgit-Baltistan” areas is an integral part of India by virtue of its accession in 1947. Any action to alter the status of any part of the territory under forcible and illegal occupation of Pakistan has no legal basis whatsoever, and is completely unacceptable.

There had been widespread criticism by the local population for

depriving GB of any political or economic benefits. There were also reports

that China wanted greater federal control of the area. The choices before

the Pakistan government were either to merge the Northern Areas with Azad Kashmir, to which there was local resistance, or declare the area as the fifth province of Pakistan, which was considered inappropriate as it would have adversely affected Pakistan’s position on J&K. Therefore, in

June 2018, Pakistan’s outgoing Abbasi government decided to make only

some changes through the GB Reform Order 2018, which replaced the earlier self-governance order of 2009. Under this new order, all powers

earlier exercised by the GB Council, including passing legislation regarding

minerals, hydropower and tourism sectors, were shifted to the GB Assembly. This order [Article 41 and Article 60(4)] vests huge powers in

Pakistan’s Prime Minister, who in fact is far stronger than the Assembly. Opposition parties in GB protested against this order as they felt that

the new order enhanced the role of the federal government rather than resulting in any substantive devolution. They dubbed the order as PMcentric. The Government of India also protested. The MEA statement

mentioned that “the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir which also

includes the so-called ‘Gilgit-Baltistan’ areas is an integral part of India” and “any action to alter the status of any part of the territory under forcible

and illegal occupation of Pakistan has no legal basis whatsoever, and is completely unacceptable.”

Gilgit-Baltistan: An Unfortunate History | 25

It is interesting to note that most of the administrative changes

made in 1974, 1988, 1994 and 2009 happened when there was a PPP government in Islamabad. It may, however, be mentioned that the changes in 2009 were under consideration since 2006-7. The changes made in June 2018 were made under the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government.

There are at least four major issues with respect to the GB. These

include inter alia the way India responded to the changes introduced by Pakistan periodically, growing sectarian tensions in the region, and Chinese role, especially under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) framework.

Response of the Government of India The views of the Government of India have been clear in terms of the status of GB. Whether it was the protest made by the Chargé d’affaires immediately after General Zia’s speech in Islamabad on April 3, 1982, the

statement of External Affairs Minister in the Lok Sabha on April 15, 1982

or the comment of the MEA after the latest order of the government of

Pakistan in June 2018, the stand of the Government of India with respect to GB has been unequivocal. Ever since 1963, India has challenged the

legitimacy of the Sino-Pak agreement by which Pakistan ceded territory to China. It is noteworthy that India’s position has also been clearly

conveyed. Former Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri

in his recently published book, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove (2015), wrote that during back-channel discussions on Kashmir (during the tenure of

Dr. Manmohan Singh), Pakistan accepted GB as a part of J&K. He added: Before Independence, the Northern Areas including inter alia Gilgit and Baltistan, were part of the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir ... During the back channel negotiations also, the Indians made it abundantly clear that they could only accept an agreement regarding Jammu & Kashmir if the Northern Areas were also included in the entire scheme. We confronted a dilemma … We therefore reached an agreement after many arguments and negotiations that there would be

26 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

two units for the purposes of the agreement ... comprising the areas respectively controlled by India and Pakistan.4

Separation of GB from Azad Kashmir

From the beginning, Pakistan separated GB from Azad Kashmir so as to

maintain greater control over it. This has been a great concern to people of the area. A writ petition challenging the position of Pakistan on the status

of Northern Areas was filed in the High Court of Azad Kashmir in the 1990s in what came to be known as the Muskeen case.5 The High Court of Azad Kashmir decided that the Northern Areas were a part of Azad

Kashmir and its administrative control should be with the government of Azad Kashmir (POK) and not the Government of Pakistan. Pakistan did

not implement that decision and had it vacated by its Supreme Court, which maintained that the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue any such order in the matter. It described the matter as political rather than a legal issue.

Growing Sectarianism in GB The three main communities in GB—Shias, Ismailis and Sunnis—lived

peacefully in communal harmony till the 1970s till the time the Kashmiri

tradition of pre-1947 was prevalent there. Differences started to emerge

from 1975 onwards. Skardu has a predominantly Shia population. The Sunnis have lived mostly in Diamir, and the Ismailis in Hunza. The first sectarian clash occurred in 1975 when a Shia Muharram procession was

fired at from a Sunni mosque in Gilgit. The next major clash was in 1998

over the sighting of the moon to mark the end of Ramzan. By this time, sectarian violence had become a common occurrence, and manifested itself even more after the killing of foreign mountaineers in 2014. On

August 3, 2019, 12 schools were burnt down in Diamir. Similar attacks, according to Pakistan News Agencies, in the past, have been blamed on militant organisations. The fact that Shias and Sunnis live in separate areas has adversely affected cohesion.

The Karakoram Highway (KKH) linking Pakistan with GB has

resulted in the influx of weapons and drugs, and attacks by religious

Gilgit-Baltistan: An Unfortunate History | 27

militia into the region, leading to a change in demography. The nonviolent Ismaili community also became targets of attack. The Agha Khan

Foundation has been active in developmental work in the area, and there were reports that even their workers had been targeted. The decision

to abolish SSR (State Subject Rule)6 was an attempt at upsetting the demography of the region. This paved the way for settling outsiders—

mostly Sunni ethnic Pathans and Punjabis—in GB. General Musharraf

(then Brigadier), in 1988, under President Zia’s rule, played a role in crushing the Shia revolt.7

Chinese Role in GB One of the important reasons for separation of GB from Azad Kashmir

and its direct supervision and control by Pakistan was the China factor. The area that was ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963, south of the Mintaka Pass, belonged to Hunza. The Border Agreement of March 2, 1963 changed the alignment of the boundary line between the

Sinkiang province of China and the contiguous area under the actual control of Pakistan. India protested to both Pakistan and China about this agreement. Ceding territory to China was not even discussed in

GB as it did not have any elected assembly of its own. Articles I, II and VI of the 1963 Sino-Pakistan Agreement accepted that the area

covered by the Agreement was disputed. Article VI of the Agreement stated that:

The two parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations with the government of the People’s Republic of China on the boundary as described in Article II of the present Agreement of Kashmir so as to sign a boundary treaty to replace the present agreement...

Article I of the Agreement accepts that the India-Pakistan boundary

in this area is not delimited or defined. It states that:

28 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

In view of the fact that the boundary between China’s Sinkiang and the contiguous areas, the defence of which is under the control of Pakistan, has never been formally delimited, the two parties agree to delimit it on the basis of the traditional customary boundary.

Here, China concedes that the area is not under the sovereign control

of Pakistan, a fact that becomes important when seen in the context of

the CPEC. In respect of the South China Sea, China has based its claims of sovereignty on the historical context. But these seem to have become

secondary and extraneous to China in the context of the CPEC projects in POK. Both history and sovereignty issues do not favour Chinese

arguments here. They are, therefore, using commercial arguments for their political and strategic investments in Pakistan for transiting through POK.8

CPEC and GB The CPEC passes through POK, which is a part of the Indian state of

J&K. The shortest route from Gwadar to Kashgar runs through Panjgur, Quetta, Zhob, Dera Ismail Khan, and then into Punjab through Mianwali, onto Islamabad, and then the KKH to Xinjiang/Sinkiang. There were reports that China was not comfortable about the route passing through Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on account of protests against

CPEC and the security situation prevalent in these areas.9 It was decided

by the Pakistan government on account of these considerations and

because of reservations expressed by the governments of Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh to change the alignment of the route

of CPEC, so that it could pass mainly through Punjab. As a result, the CPEC is being dubbed as the China-Punjab Economic Corridor.

Additionally, there have been reports in the Pakistani media that

China was equally concerned about regular protests in GB about CPEC as 600 km of the proposed 2,000-km Kasghar-Gwadar corridor pass

through the region. Consequently, there has been apprehension that

the pace of progress of implementation of the project could get affected. Pakistan, therefore favoured greater federal control over GB on Chinese

Gilgit-Baltistan: An Unfortunate History | 29

insistence.10 Some other media reports revealed that there are more than

5,000 Chinese troops across the Middle East and Asia to protect China’s

economic corridor. The largest number (1,800) in this list is deployed on the China-Pakistan corridor. Many of them could be stationed in the POK, and be a cause for concern for India.11

Imran Khan on CPEC Pakistan’s new Prime Minister Imran Khan, had in the past been critical

of the CPEC. However, he later changed his viewpoint to avoid offending China, and in a meeting with the Chinese Ambassador, explained that he was concerned about the transparency of the project and did not want it to pass only through Punjab but also through Khyber Pakthunkhwa.12

After the elections in July 2018 he stated, “We want to work towards

success of CPEC.”13 Commenting on Imran Khan’s change of attitude,

Fakir Aijazuddin, a Pakistani scholar mentioned that “Imran Khan (once as anti-CPEC as Theresa May was once anti-Brexit) referred in his victory speech to China offering a huge opportunity through CPEC, to use it and drive investment into Pakistan.”14

Conclusion The location of GB is unique. In addition to India and Pakistan, it has borders with Afghanistan and China. India’s stand about GB being a part

of the Indian state J&K has been consistent. Pakistan has shown greater concern for the territory of J&K it occupied than for the people living

there. It is quite evident the way Pakistani governments have handled the issue. None of the governments at the helm have ever shown any genuine interest to address the issues pertaining to the economic and

political interests of the people of the area. Instead, these have been neglected throughout. The demography of the area has been changed by settling of outsiders. In 1948, Shias and Ismailis constituted 85 per cent of the population of the area. Today it is around 50 per cent. This is also

evident from a comparison between the last two censuses in 1998 and

2017. Whereas the population of Pakistan increased by 56 per cent, from

30 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

1998 to 2017, that of GB doubled during the same period. The desire of the people of GB to be connected with India has always been prevented

and suppressed by Pakistan. Two land routes—Kargil and Leh on the

Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) connect with Skardu and Khaplu (POK side), but Pakistan has not permitted interaction on these routes.15 The Northern Areas were separated from the rest of POK to ensure greater federal control.

There has been pandering to China’s concerns. China, since 1962 and

after the Sino-Pak agreement of 1963, is occupying nearly 19 per cent of

the territory of J&K which includes some vital territory of Northern Areas. China and Pakistan have been using the territory of the area as a deterrent to Indian interests. There has also been criticism within Pakistan about

the treatment meted out to the people of GB. Right from the beginning, Pakistani rule has been identified with the story of deprivation of the

people of the Northern Areas. The Pakistani magazine Herald termed the

Northern Areas as “the last colony”. As far back as August 14, 1964, the

Outlook, Karachi wrote, “the uncomfortable truth is that the Ministry of

Kashmir Affairs has acquired a vested interest of its own. It treats Azad Kashmir territory and GB areas as its own domain … The Ministry likes to deal with puppets not with the presidents who take their position too literally.”16

Despite the passage of time, there has not been any material change.

The people of GB have been denied basic rights and privileges. K-2, the leading newspaper of the region, has always carried on its masthead

the phrase Sarzamin-Be-Ain Ki Awaz (Voice of the Constitution-less Land). This in itself explains the misery of the people. It is time that the

international community took note of the sufferings faced by the people of GB.

Notes 1.

Indian Foreign Affair Journal, Vol. II, No. 3, July 3, 2016. Article on this subject by the author. Some contents have been used in the speech after updating.

2. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/no-war-pact-between-indian-and-pakistanpushed-out-of-reach-as-leaders-spar/1/391667.html

Gilgit-Baltistan: An Unfortunate History | 31

3. S. M. Gillani (2011). “Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), Islamabad”, at http://www.pildat.org/publications/ publication/constitution/ProposedConstitutionalAmendments-AJK-GBDiscussionPaperMay2011.pdf 4. Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri (2015). Neither a Hawk nor a Dove. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 90, 339-41. 5. Nilima Lambah (2008). A Life across Three Continents. Delhi: Roli Books, p. 139.

6. SSR (State Subject Rule) was a law passed by the erstwhile Maharaja of Kashmir defining a hereditary state subject, and forbidding employment of non-state subjects in public services. Also, non-state residents were not allowed to purchase land in the state of J&K. This rule is still applicable in J&K. Technically, it is perhaps prevalent in the so-called Azad Kashmir. A change was effected in respect of GB where non-residents can now purchase property, settle there, and also change the demographic composition of the region.

7. Devasher, Tilak (2018). Pakistan at the Helm. Noida: HarperCollins Publishers, p. 252. 8. Rumel Dahiya and Jagannath Panda (2015). “A Tale of Two Disputes: China’s Irrationality and India’s Stakes”. IDSA Policy Brief, June 29, 2015, at http://www. idsa.in/policybrief/ATaleofTwoDisputesChinasIrrationalityandIndiasStakes_ rdahiya_290615 9. Sushant Sareen (2016). Corridor Calculus. Monograph, Vivekananda International Foundation, at http://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/corridor-calculuschina-pakistan-economic-corridor-and-china-s-comprador-investment-modelin-pakistan.pdf 10. “Pakistan Mulls Elevating Status of Gilgit-Baltistan on Chinese Insistence”. Dawn, January 8, 2016. 11. New Delhi Times, Vol. 25, No. 52, pp. 1−7, February 2016.

12. Nirupama Subramanian (2018). Name of the news article? Indian Express, July 27, 2018. 13. Jeffrey Gettleman (2018). New York Times, July 29, 2018 quoting from Imran Khan’s party (PTI). Twitter in Chinese.

14. Fakir Aijazuddin (2018). “The Unkingly Crown”. The Tribune, Chandigarh, August 5, 2018. 15. Syed Waqas Ali and Taqi Akhunzada (2015). “Unheard Voices: Engaging Youth of Gilgit-Baltistan”, Conciliation Resources, UK, at https://rc-services-assets. s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/CR%20Unheard%20voices%20 from%20Himalayas.pdf 16. Quoted in http://www.kashmirlibrary.org/kashmir_timeline/kashmir_files/ india_pok.htm

3. Developments in Gilgit-Baltistan: Interpreting Local Angst Ashok K. Behuria

During the imperial times, Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) was regarded as an

important frontier and that is how the concept of the great game came about. The British started talking about it around the 1840s and it became

clearer during and after the 1870s. It is interesting to note the British

nervousness about the possible Soviet and Chinese intrusion in this region. The geostrategic importance of GB can be understood just by looking

at the political map. The area is surrounded by four different countries. Legally, it is part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir ( J&K) and

shares the borders with Afghanistan, China and Pakistan. The territory is viewed by China, India, Pakistan and other Central Asian countries as a

strategic locale. The history of the region presents an interesting account. When the Maharaja of Jammu was given back his domain, the first thing

he did was to visit Gilgit and conquer the connecting routes. It was a part of the historical Silk Route that connected the world with the rest of India. The commercial route was acquired as it could bring the muchneeded revenue to sustain the regime and trading system.

Given the presence of diverse ethnic groups and languages, the area

could also be termed as an ethnic boiling pot or melting pot. Basically, there are three divisions—Diamer, Gilgit and Baltistan. Historically, Diamer consisted of about 12 to 13 principalities at one point of time. So

were the other areas. The fight between Hunza and Nagar and the conflict

they had with the British at one point of time in history is well-known. Even at the height of their empire, the British could never completely

Developments in Gilgit-Baltistan | 33

control the area. Their hold over this terrain remained quite tenuous. It was only between 1935 and 1947 that they had some kind of control over

it. With the lapse of paramountcy, Major Brown deprived the Maharaja

of J&K of any authority over the territory. After Major Brown’s revolt, Pakistan took control over the territory. In April 1949, with the Karachi

Agreement in place, Pakistan sliced off GB from the illegally occupied J&K and converted it into a stateless entity. Neither then, nor today, is it

declared part and parcel of Pakistan. None of the Pakistani constitutions mention it.

From the very beginning, there was a class of perception between

Brown’s people and the rulers of Pakistan. It was natural for the indigenous people to have an autonomous status and carve a confederal

space in the Pakistani political set-up. This was not something Pakistanis would accept, as they wanted to swallow it. Karachi then sent a tehsildar

to take care of the region. Later, it was managed through a political agent

and the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. From the 1980s till the 1990s, one finds some sort of rudimentary representative system put in place. In 2009, the then Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) government introduced the

GB Empowerment and Self-Governance Order. The indigenous people, ever since 1947, remained dissatisfied with the way Pakistan handled the

issues. They always compared themselves with the people of “Azad Jammu

& Kashmir” (AJK) as it is known in Pakistan. The people of the so-called AJK enjoy many more rights than the people of GB because earlier they could secure a better bargain with Pakistan.

From 1974 onwards, an interim constitution was put in place that gave

AJK a semi-provincial status. But GB was deprived of any such scheme. Since 2009, after the PPP introduced the GB Empowerment and SelfGovernance Order, people have been looking for a better bargain from

the Pakistani State. If one sees the statistics, especially the socio-economic

data, it gives a sense of how the people of GB were governed and deprived of many rights. There is no uniformity in the data from several Pakistani

sources on GB. The Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) has come up with figures on literacy. According to this, 14 per cent of men in the

34 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

area were literate, compared to only 3.5 per cent women being literate. However, the Government of GB data puts it very differently. As per their data, about 37.85 per cent of people were literate out of which 52.6 per cent were male and 21.65 per cent female. The federal government’s data suggests that the literacy rate is 59.75 per cent. This is something one cannot understand. Therefore, in the three sets of data there is no similarity.

The official data about GB is misleading. If one looks at the condition

of the public schools in the area, he/she feels disgusted. The condition

on the ground is pathetic. Girls’ education is discouraged and with the infiltration of radical elements in society, it has become even more difficult

for girls to have access to education. According to the World Bank data, there were about 33 hospitals across GB with only 986 beds. The total population of the terrain is about two million. It means there is one doctor

for every six thousand people. However, the federal government’s data

claim to have one doctor for every 3,814 people in GB. It is far below the

national average in Pakistan. As per the World Bank statistics, 85 per cent of the people live on subsistence farming. The Pakistani data highlights

that only 23 per cent of people live below the poverty line. But the people of GB tell a very different story.

The unemployment rate is also very high and it is certainly larger than

the Pakistani average. That means there are rules that the people of GB

have vis-à-vis Pakistan. Soon after introducing the 2009 Order, the PPP

government found a way of imposing taxes on the people. Earlier there were no direct taxes. Now direct taxes were levied on the people of GB and

that is what has led to some sort of movement against the government. The local activists talk about the blatant discrimination against the people of GB. The people of GB get 25 per cent less salary than the officials

who come to GB from other provinces. Almost 90 per cent of indigenous people are engaged in agricultural activities.

There are ecological issues as well. In 1998, about 640,000 hectares of

land were under forest cover. Presently, it is estimated to be about 285,000

hectares. There is an unrepentant exploitation of natural resources and

Developments in Gilgit-Baltistan | 35

the benefits of it are not accruing to the people in the region. Most of the people from GB would argue that it is colonialism at work, and nothing

else. So, there is a genuine sense of grievance about it. There is a political

aspect to the issues. On May 28, 1999, the Supreme Court of Pakistan came out with a verdict and acknowledged that the Northern Areas constituted

part of the state of J&K. This changed the whole dynamics about it. Now, the Pakistanis started saying that the proper administrative and legislative

steps would be taken by the government to ensure that the people of the

Northern Areas enjoy their rights under the Pakistani Constitution. After this, President Musharraf came out with the Northern Area Legislative Council Act and the representative system was introduced. With PPP’s

2009 Order, the name was changed from Northern Areas to GB. It also

established an Upper House in the GB Council consisting of 15 members with the Prime Minister of Pakistan as its ex-officio chairperson. Out

of these 15 members, 9 were to be from Pakistan and 6 from GB itself. So, instead of giving the GB people self-governance, federal government strengthened its position.

After 2012, when the taxes were imposed, the locals revolted. The

GB Legislative Assembly passed a resolution demanding provincial status

within Pakistan. The latest round of demonstrations that one notices is because of this very fact. Most of the people want provincial status, so that they have more allocations and would be better cared for by the central

government. This initiated a debate after the resolution came about in

the GB Legislative Assembly. In April 2014, the Standing Committee of the Senate on Human Rights took notice of the human rights violations

in GB. It evidenced the sectarian violence and made a special reference to the constitutional deprivation of the people of GB. The reactions from different quarters were converging to the point that the Pakistani

Parliament should take note of the people’s distress. Basically, the local people have argued that Pakistan had left them “high and dry”. They are asking to be mainstreamed into Pakistan’s existing national system.

In 2012, a retired colonel named Imtiaz-ul-Haque, whose father had

once served in the Gilgit Scouts and had rebelled against the Maharaja in

36 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

1947, came out with a dissertation. The dissertation was titled, Determining

the Political Status of Gilgit-Baltistan: Future Perspective. Later, Colonel Imtiaz was made one of the members of the committee which was set up

by the GB government to make recommendations on the constitutional status of GB. His recommendations were really revealing and very interesting. After the battle for absorbing GB into the Pakistani state, he

observed that it might not be possible for the Government of Pakistan to take a U-turn on its principal stand on the subject and integrate GB in its

constitutionally defined territories because of its commitments with the

people of J&K, United Nations, India, and the international community. However, the provision of interim provincial status could be considered.

If granted an interim provincial status, the people of GB would enjoy

the right to vote and would have due representation in the constituent assemblies of Pakistan. This is considered the best viable option to address

the issue of the identity crisis amongst the people of GB. The GB Bar

Council took this issue and laid several demonstrations to argue that GB had been made a sacrificial goat in the name of J&K. They accused

the government of having a malafide intention to keep the area and

the people under the clutches of the Pakistani bureaucratic system and deprive the people of their fundamental rights. The GB Bar Council said

that the J&K is often compared to us! In reality, that part has an act based governing system at work since 1969 and 1974 even if they do not

have a constitutional status and this would be granted to us as well. They also made other interesting statements. They said the pattern of political

government system in the “Indian-occupied J&K,” as they refer to it, beginning from 1948 and 1957 was the most suitable and viable in this

regard as it not only catered to the strategic interests of Pakistan in this region, but also redressed the prolonged sense of deprivation amongst the people of GB.

There is a grudging recognition of the rights granted to people in

J&K. So, in 2015 the GB Chief Secretary headed a committee and they also prepared a document in this regard. The committee recommended an

interim provincial status to GB with the right of vote and representation

Developments in Gilgit-Baltistan | 37

in the Parliament of Pakistan as the best option. These developments

created a pressure on the Government of Pakistan, which set up the Sartaj Aziz Committee to look into the possibility of granting provincial

status to GB. The committee presented its report in November-December 2017. As it was going on, Yasin Malik wrote a letter to Nawaz Sharif

enquiring how he could do it when the resolution of Kashmir issue was still pending. He urged him not to grant provincial status to GB. In his

reply, Nawaz Sharif assured him of taking his concerns into account while framing policies. The final report that came out later did allude to interim provincial status but without explicitly mentioning it.

In May 2018, when Nawaz Sharif demitted office, the Khaqan

Abbasi government came out with GB Order 2018. It was promulgated on May 21, 2018. Soon after, there was a new PTI government headed by Imran Khan. The new government informed the Supreme Court that

the GB Order 2018 could not be implemented, and the apex court took it up from November 16, 2018 and deliberated upon the issue. At that time, there was an activist Chief Justice who was emotionally involved with the Kashmir issue to the extent that he went begging for funds to

build the Diamer-Bhasa dam. He was the one who categorically stated

that people should not be stopped from enjoying their rights. The January 2019 Supreme Court orders are quite interesting. The Court stated that

the May 2018 GB Order should not be amended after due promulgation, except in terms of the procedure provided in Article 124 of the Order. The Court also made it clear that the government should ensure that whatever reservations it had on the May 2018 Order, it should bring about changes

in such a manner that this would not be amended again. So, now the

Pakistani Supreme Court has a stake in the order and the order can only be amended if the Court is convinced.

Now, the Supreme Court has taken a stand that the Pakistan

Government, even if it recognises the problem of the Pakistani Government in granting provincial status to GB, it will find a way of

ensuring that the people of GB enjoy the rights as per the Constitution of Pakistan. Now, the situation has become complicated as the people of

38 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

GB still do not feel that the Order can satisfy their demands. In all the

demonstrations, they are chanting “no taxation without representation”. Either Pakistan will have to find a way of not taxing them, not imposing direct taxes on them, or granting them some kind of a representation.

Given the kind of emotional outbursts that are often witnessed from

Pakistan on the Kashmir issue now, suggests that Pakistan will not be able to give them full provincial status. They will try to introduce certain changes that would be between a provincial status and the GB Order

and this will keep the pot boiling at the popular level. India has left its hold on the terrain from 1947 onwards. It has only taken an episodic interest in the terrain depending on its relationship with Pakistan and issues that come to the fore. For everything else, GB has been left to

Pakistan. This is something that India must recognise. Apart from issuing some ritualistic statements from the Ministry of External Affairs, India has not done anything significant that could attract the people of the

terrain. If one looks at the population in GB, they are demanding national

recognition—recognition based on nationalism. Most of the people want to be a part of Pakistan and they want Pakistan to recognise GB as its fifth province.

The dissatisfaction that is seen within the people of GB emanates

from non-fulfilment of this demand. If India wants to build bridges with

people in that terrain, it should try to look at GB not as a territory alone, but as a territory with people in it. The next step would be to build contacts with the people there, grant them scholarships, encourage their visits to

India, etc. These are some of the ways in which India can reach out to the people to build bridges there. Otherwise, one can only episodically wake

up to this reality and put something out on the table, which does not have any basis.

4. Chinese Involvement in Gilgit-Baltistan Ashish Shukla

The Illegal Occupation of Gilgit-Baltistan

The present-day Gilgit Baltistan (GB) is a territory illegally occupied

by Pakistan since 1947. It has a unique geostrategic location where the boundaries of three nuclear powers—China, India and Pakistan—as well

as Afghanistan and Tajikistan converge. The numerous traditional passes

present in the region have been used by numerous invaders in the past as a gateway to enter India. These passes were also instrumental in socio-

economic and religious-cultural transactions between India and the rest of the world.

There is documentary evidence that establishes that GB was

historically a part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Given the geostrategic importance of this region, the Sikhs of Punjab, the Dogras of Jammu and the British developed an interest to bring the area under their direct control. The first Anglo-Sikh War (1845-46), between the Sikh

Empire and British East India Company resulted in the Sikh Kingdom surrendering the Jullundur Doab, a valuable region between the Beas and

Sutlej rivers. The British were also to be paid Rs. 15 million as indemnity

failing which the Sikh Kingdom had to cede Kashmir and Hazara. Soon after this, the British entered into a separate agreement with Maharaja Gulab Singh of Jammu. Under the Treaty of Amritsar (1846), Gulab Singh acquired Kashmir from the British and thus came to be known

as Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. Later, in 1899, Ladakh, Gilgit and Baltistan were merged into one frontier district and placed under

40 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

Wazir-e-Wazarat (Governor). In 1935, the British persuaded Maharaja Hari Singh, the then ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, to lease the Gilgit

Agency for the next 60 years. The lease agreement of March 26, 1935 clearly underlined that the Viceroy and Governor General of India would take over only the civil and military administration, whereas the territory

along with the mining rights would continue to be under the Maharaja’s dominion.

In 1947, with the end of the Raj, the lease was terminated in July

and the Gilgit Agency reverted to its original ruler. Maharaja Hari Singh appointed Brigadier Ghansara Singh as the new Wazir-e-Wazarat.

However, Major William Brown, the British Commander of Gilgit Scouts, not only organised a revolt/coup d’état and arrested Ghansara Singh, he also handed over the area to Pakistan, which appointed Sardar

Muhammad Alam as its political agent. These steps were accompanied by

Pakistan sending tribal raiders and regular forces, also disguised as raiders, into other parts of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. It was under these circumstances that Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession making the princely state an inalienable part of India. The

Indian armed forces pushed the Pakistani regular forces as well as tribal

raiders back. At the time of the declaration of ceasefire in January 1949, Pakistan however remained in possession of a large territory of Jammu

and Kashmir, including Mirpur, Muzaffarabad and GB. India considers the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, including GB, as an integral part of the country.

Initially, GB was treated by Pakistan as a part of the occupied

territory—which Pakistan refers to as “Azad Jammu & Kashmir” and India terms as Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (POJK). Later in April 1949, under the Karachi Agreement between the governments of

Pakistan and “Azad Kashmir”, Pakistan assumed direct control over GB

and imposed the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) on it. Ever since, its indigenous people have been deprived of basic human and political rights.

Chinese Involvement in Gilgit-Baltistan | 41

An Ambiguous Political Status

The people of GB have no representation in Pakistan’s parliament. The territory has not figured in any of the three Constitutions adopted by

Pakistan in 1956, 1962 and 1973. Even POK’s Interim Constitution (1974) did not refer to the area of GB as part of it. Pakistan has not

only neglected, isolated and disenfranchised the people of GB, it has

never been able to justify or clarify GB’s undefined and ambiguous status. Instead of addressing the concerns of the people, the politico-security

elites of Pakistan have decided to use the strategically located territory for provoking proxy wars in the region. A number of terrorist training

camps—belonging to Lashkar-e-Toiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-eMuhammad, Hizbul Mujahideen, Al-Badr and Harkat-ul-Ansar—exist

and operate in the area under the protection of security institutions and intelligence agencies of Pakistan. There have also been moves to infect

the area with extremist ideologies. Pakistan has also tried to change the demography of the region by bringing people from other areas and settling them in GB.

The ambiguities in its legal status and lack of basic human and

political rights over the years have given rise to political unrest and deep-

seated resentment among the people against the Government of Pakistan. This led to the emergence of certain political/nationalist groups opposing Pakistan’s high-handedness. Their demands range from autonomy, a

POK-like structure, provincial status, to complete freedom from Pakistan. Some such prominent groups include the Balwaristan National Front

(BNF), the Gilgit Baltistan United Movement (GBUM), the Balwaristan

Student National Organisation (BSNO), the United Kashmir People’s National Party (UKPNP), the GB Democratic Alliance (GBDA), the

GB National Movement (GBNM), the GB National Alliance (GBNA), the Karakoram National Movement (KNM), the GB Thinkers’ Forum (GBTF), and the Bolor Thinkers’ Forum (BTF).

Although political unrest has been endemic in GB for the past

several decades, protests have largely been peaceful, and focused on a

legal-constitutional battle and launching political movements to get

42 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

grievances addressed. Pakistan’s politico-security establishment continues

to be inattentive to these genuine demands. The politico-legal changes, which Pakistan has introduced periodically, have failed to assuage the

concerns on the ground and its legally ambiguous status seeks to cloak the fundamental fact that this is a territory under illegal occupation. The

GB Empowerment and Self-Governance Order of 2009 renamed the

area from Federally Administered Northern Areas to GB, it introduced an improved set-up of legislative system that included a Legislative

Assembly, GB Council, and offices of Governor and Chief Minister. It is

important to note that the order ensured that the real power remains with the Governor and the GB Council—the Governor was to be appointed by the President of Pakistan on the advice of the Prime Minister and

all the members of the GB Council were to be appointed by the federal

government with the Prime Minister as the Chairman of the Council. The recent GB Order 2018 abolished the GB Council and transferred all its powers to the GB Legislative Assembly. It made the Prime Minister of

Pakistan even more intrusive in GB affairs by vesting extraordinary powers in his office. The Prime Minister now has the final say on all legislation and policies, which actually strips the GB Legislative Assembly of all authority and credibility.

Chinese Engagement in Pakistan Pakistan and China refer to each other as “Iron-brothers” and “AllWeather Friends”. Till recently they used to define this friendship as

“Deeper than the deepest ocean, higher than the highest mountain, and sweeter than the sweetest honey”. Owing to the increasing Chinese

presence and activities in Pakistan, especially after the launch of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the nature of Sino-

Pakistan relations is undergoing a change. This is reflected in the way the

two countries refer to each other in the public domain. In October 2018, when Prime Minister Imran Khan was preparing for his China visit, Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi emphasised that “The two

countries are close friends, good neighbours and development partners.

Chinese Involvement in Gilgit-Baltistan | 43

The bilateral relationship has withstood the test of time. Regardless of domestic or international changes, this close friendship has served as a

model of state-to-state relations for other countries.”1 He further added

that the two countries were “all-weather strategic cooperative partners” and the CPEC strengthened the ties in the economic field.2 Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou, who in the backdrop of the Pulwama

terror attack and Balakot strike visited Pakistan on March 6, stressed that

Pakistan and China were “All-Weather Strategic Partners”.3 In less than

a decade from “All-Weather Friends” they became “All-Weather Strategic Partners”.

The GB Factor It is worth noting that during the growing Sino-Indian tussle over the border, General Ayub Khan came up with a demarcation proposal which

culminated in a border agreement under which Pakistan surrendered about 2,500 square miles of Indian territory to China. Given the territorial

vulnerability of its Western flank—which includes Shaanxi, Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Tibet and Chongqing—China pushed Pakistan for the Karakoram

Highway project. The project commenced in 1964 and was completed

in 1978. It is one of the highest paved international roads in the world connecting Kashgar (Xinjiang Uighur region of China) with GB. The

highway strengthened Pakistan’s hold over the illegally occupied territory. General Pervez Musharraf, in his political autobiography, refers to the

Karakoram Highway as the eighth wonder of the world. His advent to power as the President of Pakistan coincided with China’s “Open up the

West” or “Go West” strategy, which was primarily aimed at reducing the fast-growing socio-economic development gap between the weak western flank and well-off but distant coastal provinces.4 During Musharraf ’s

tenure as the President of Pakistan, agreements and MoUs were signed to rebuild and upgrade the Karakoram Highway so that its potential could be fully utilised.

44 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

The Advent of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

In 2013, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Chinese Premier Li

Keqiang in principle agreed to enhance mutual connectivity. In April 2015, during his visit to Pakistan, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the

construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The proposed corridor, roughly a 2,700-km route, aims to connect the Pakistani

port city Gwadar in Balochistan province to China’s Kashgar in Xinjiang

province. The common narrative propagated by both Pakistan and China

emphasises the benefits of connectivity and other related projects for the people of the region. On the surface, it appears to be an economic

project. However, it has deep geopolitical and geostrategic implications. The CPEC also connects at least three information black holes of the region—Balochistan, GB, and Xinjiang. The world community, by and

large, is not aware of the rapidly-changing ground situation in these areas. In the wake of an increasing Chinese presence, Islamabad seeks

to further tighten its grip on the region and push the people into

subservience. From Gwadar (the entry point) to GB (the exit point), the security establishment has not only increased its presence, but has

adopted an iron-hand approach to deal with any dissent. In January 2017, the Pakistan Army raised a 13,700 strong Special Security Division

(SSD), comprising nine army battalions and six civil wings, to protect the CPEC.5 Besides Pakistani forces, there are reports suggesting a

significant presence of Chinese troops in the area. The New York Times

(2010) estimated around 7-11,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

soldiers on the ground.6 Later, in 2015, Chinese troops were spotted by

Indian armed forces at the Line of Control (LoC). Abdul Hamid Khan, Chairman of the Balawaristan National Front (BNF) argues that “They have to build many cantonments in GB and both China and Pakistan will

station their huge army divisions.”7 In 2018, the Indian Army reportedly

spotted the presence of senior PLA officials in Nowgam sector in North Kashmir. Then there were reports about Chinese plans to establish three

divisions, under a local name, in POK.8 Three divisions roughly translates into 30,000 troops, which is a significant number.

Chinese Involvement in Gilgit-Baltistan | 45

Exploitation of Natural Resources

In order to achieve CPEC objectives, Pakistan and China have been

crushing the legitimate concerns of the local populace. If there is no

transparency regarding the CPEC projects in Pakistan as a whole, this is particularly so for GB. People feel that under the garb of developmental projects under CPEC, Pakistan and China have been exploiting the

precious natural resources of the region. It is no secret that Islamabad is forcibly acquiring land and displacing people. Most of the lands were forcibly acquired by the Pakistani Army and those opposing were

either killed, silenced, or incarcerated without any trial. Wazahat Hasan, the Chairman of the GB Thinkers’ Forum (GBTF), is of the view that “Thousands had their land snatched and occupied by the military

authorities and their agencies. Under this black draconian rule, nobody can raise their voices against the CPEC.”9 Those who dare raise their

voices, often end up being tortured and booked under the Anti-Terrorism Act.

There is also an ecological angle in respect to various CPEC projects

in GB. No studies are known to have been undertaken about the possible ecological impact of these projects. Many fear that the manner

of implementation is in violation of environmental safety norms. Those

raising their voices are being arrested, tortured and imprisoned on false charges of terrorism.

Notes

1. The Economic Times (2018). “Islamabad, China Relations a ‘Model of Stateto-State Ties’, says Pakistan Foreign Minister”. October 31, at https:// economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/islamabadchina-relations-a-model-of-state-to-state-ties-says-pakistan-foreign-minister/ articleshow/66445048.cms 2. Ibid.

3. Sowmiya Ashok (2019). “China: ‘All-Weather’ Partner Pakistan Appreciates ‘Unbiased Attitude’”. The Indian Express, March 8, 2019, at https://indianexpress. com/article/world/pakistan-is-our-all-weather-strategic-partner-china/ 4. Mathias Hartpence (2011). “The Economic Dimension of Sino-Pakistani Relations: An Overview”. Journal of Contemporary China, 20 (71): 581-99.

46 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

5. The Express Tribune (2017). “Special Security Division Established to Secure CPEC”. January 22, at https://tribune.com.pk/story/1303428/special-securitydivision-established-secure-cpec/

6. Selig S. Harrison (2010). “China’s Discreet Hold on Pakistan’s Northern Borderlands”. The New York Times, August 26, at https://www.nytimes. com/2010/08/27/opinion/27iht-edharrison.html?mtrref=www.dailyo.in& asset Type=opinion

7. The Firstpost (2017). “Beijing to Fund Dam Project in Gilgit-Baltistan: Increasing Presence of Chinese Troops Should Worry India”, July 22, at https:// www.firstpost.com/world/beijing-to-fund-dam-project-in-gilgit-baltistanincreasing-presence-of-chinese-troops-should-worry-india-3734075.html 8. The Economic Times (2018). “Chinese Army Troops Spotted along Line of Control in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir”. July 12, at https://economictimes.indiatimes. com/news/defence/chinese-army-troops-spotted-along-line-of-control-inpakistan-occupied-kashmir/articleshow/51380320.cms

9. The Firstpost (2017). “Beijing to Fund Dam Project in Gilgit-Baltistan: Increasing Presence of Chinese Troops Should Worry India”. July 22, at https:// www.firstpost.com/world/beijing-to-fund-dam-project-in-gilgit-baltistanincreasing-presence-of-chinese-troops-should-worry-india-3734075.html

5. Indian Concerns in Gilgit-Baltistan K. Warikoo

The Pakistan occupied territory of Jammu and Kashmir (POK) includes the highly strategic areas of Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Chilas, Astor, Darel/

Tangir, Gupis, Ghizar, Punial, Ishkoman, Yasin and Baltistan (Skardu, Shigar, Kharmang and Ghanche). These are all situated at the trijunction of the Hindu Kush, Karakoram and Pamir mountains, where the frontiers of India, China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia meet. The very fact

that the boundaries of China, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and Tajikistan converge at Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), lends a unique geostrategic importance to this region. It is through this area that the Karakoram Highway and the

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) pass, providing Pakistan

direct land access to Central Asia. It has been an important constituent of India’s trans-Himalayan communication network in the continent and beyond. As such this frontier region is most important for the security and defence of the north and northwestern frontiers of India.

This region is the cradle from where ancient Indian culture including

Buddhism spread to different directions in Central Asia, East Asia and Southeast Asia. Gilgit, Hunza, Chitral, Skardu, Kargil, Leh and other

frontier areas have been important mileposts on the famous Silk Route. The region displays a diversity of cultural patterns, languages, ethnic

identities and religious practices. The entire region has been a melting

pot of different cultures and faiths: Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Islam. The region is referred to as Daraddesa (corresponding to present

Gilgit and adjoining areas) and Polulo (corresponding to the present

Baltistan area) in several ancient sources. The entire region is also referred to as Bolor, Baloristan or Balawaristan. Whereas Gilgit was under the

48 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

reign of Palola or Patola Shahis, who practised Buddhism during the

sixth to eighth centuries, Baltistan remained Buddhist up to the fifteenth

century. That this frontier area has been part of the Indian political and

cultural system in ancient times is corroborated by historical evidence. Thousands of rock carvings, inscriptions, petroglyphs, etc., spanning the

Karakoram-Himalayas provide evidence of the prevalence of Hindu and

Buddhist faith and rule since ancient times. Fourteen rock edicts of the

Mauryan emperor Ashoka dating to mid-3rd century BC in Kharoshthi script and detailing both the moral teachings and administrative orders inscribed on huge boulders, have been found along the Karakoram

Highway.1 Ashoka is referred here by his titles of Devanampriya Priyadarshi Raja (The King, beloved of gods, of noble appearance).2 A

number of inscriptions in Brahmi, Kharoshthi and Hindu temples with

engravings of Swastika, Trishula (trident) and Buddhist figures found at

Shatial, Thor, Hodur and Chilas point to the existence of Hindu faith and rule in the region in ancient times.3 A Kharoshthi inscription near Chilas

mentions Uvimadasakesa (a name referring to the second emperor Vima Kadphises).4 Kharoshthi inscriptions belonging to the Kushana period are

concentrated at Alam Bridge, 25 miles west of Gilgit.5 The Sacred Rock at

Hunza also has Kushana inscriptions and carvings.6

It is thus established that Dardistan was a constituent unit of

Kanishka’s empire. Kalhana’s Rajatarangini refers to the military exploits of

King Lalitaditya of Kashmir (6th-7th century) in Gilgit region. Similarly, GB formed a part of the medieval Kashmir Sultanate of Shahbuddin and

Zain-ul-Abidin. Whenever the local chiefs asserted their independence, they continued to be influenced by Indian culture and way of life. Even in modern times, they have been known by their titles like Raja and

Mehtar, which is the corrupt form of the Sanskrit title Mehattar. Life-size

images of Buddha carved out of rock, abundance of Buddhist inscriptions

throughout this region, discovery of famous Gilgit MSS there (in the early 1930s), etc., are living testimony of the Indian cultural influence

in this frontier area. Even as late as in the 19th century, the Muslims of Gilgit were found to be lax in their practice of Islam.

Indian Concerns in Gilgit-Baltistan | 49

Major J. Biddulph, who joined as the Political Officer in Gilgit in 1877

was emphatic that “Buddhism was no doubt the religion of the country at the time of the Shin invasion. There seem good grounds for supposing

that the religion of the Shins was of the Brahminical type.”7 According to him, “till a very recent period burning the dead was practised. The ashes

were carefully collected and buried in rude wooden boxes, sometime carved out of a solid block, or in round earthen jars. The bones are neatly

packed in the boxes, which have previously been lined with birch bark.”8

However, Biddulph found that “the burning of the dead ceased to be practised more than sixty years ago”9 (i.e., around AD 1810). Biddulph

ascribed the “names of many of the rulers and of a number of places, not

only in the Indus and Gilgit valleys, but also in the Chitral Valley”, to a Brahminical origin.10 It was actually the Sikh Commander, Nathu Shah who was Muslim by religion and Syed by caste and was functioning as

Kashmir’s Governor at Gilgit for several years, who made his subjects follow Islam more strictly. According to Frederic Drew, who for several

years was the British Joint Commissioner in Ladakh, the people of Astor

used to cremate their dead which was changed to that of burial after the

arrival of Nathu Shah in AD 1842.11 Yet, they continued to light a fire near the grave.12

In ancient times Baltistan was under the sway of the Kushanas who

introduced Buddhism here. However, in the 7th century AD, the Tibetans expanded their authority to this region, only to be expelled in early eighth

century by Lalitaditya Muktapida of Kashmir. The presence of Buddhist

inscriptions and rock carvings in Baltistan and the survival of Tibetan/ Buddhist names, dialect and script to this day points to the prevalence of

Buddhism and the existence of active socio-economic contacts between Baltistan and Ladakh. In the thirteenth century, a Muslim adventurer

Ibrahim Shah is reported to have come to Baltistan, married a local princess, assumed power and founded the Makpon dynasty.13 A Muslim

missionary, Mir Shamsuddin Iraqi who came to Baltistan in the fifteenth

century, spread Islam and established the Nurbakhshiya order there. Many

people in Baltistan continue to follow the Nurbakhshiya sect of Islam.

50 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

Ali Sher Khan, who ruled Baltistan from AD 1595 to 1633, established

matrimonial and friendly relations with the Mughal rulers.14 However, following Ali Sher’s death the internecine feuds among his sons and

successors led the Mughal rulers Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb to extend their authority over Baltistan.15 During the decline of the Mughals, the Balti chiefs regained their authority, which lapsed again when the Afghan

Governor of Kashmir Haji Karim Dad Khan sent a large force to Skardu in AD 1779 and brought Baltistan under Kashmir’s control.16

Whereas the Afghans were defeated in Kashmir by the Sikhs in AD

1819, Baltistan witnessed internecine feuds amongst its chiefs. Ahmad

Shah, the powerful chief of Skardu sought the assistance of the Sikh rulers

of Kashmir (AD 1832-1834) in his fight against the chief of Khaplu.17

The internal feuds among the local chiefs facilitated the Dogra general

Zorawar Singh’s military campaign in the region bringing Baltistan under the control of the Sikh/Dogra rulers of Kashmir. Zorawar Singh established a military post at Skardu in a newly built fort and appointed a thanedar (commander) to supervise the garrison.

Before Gulab Singh became the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir

under the Treaty of Amritsar (1846), he as the Raja of Jammu under the

Sikhs had conquered the whole of Ladakh including Skardu (Baltistan), thanks to his trusted and dynamic military commanders Zorawar Singh

and Diwan Hari Chand. Maharaja Ranjit Singh—the Sikh potentate, who had long coveted Ladakh (because it was the transit route for shawl

wool and a big revenue earner), recognised Gulab Singh’s conquest of this frontier region. The area was thus brought under the full administrative

control of Jammu and Kashmir state. When the Treaty of Amritsar was signed in 1846, the British not only recognised Gulab Singh as the

Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir but also of Ladakh and Baltistan. In 1899, Baltistan, Ladakh and Gilgit were merged into one ‘frontier district’ and placed under the Wazir-e-Wazarat.18 Two years later in 1901, the separate

district of Ladakh was established, which incorporated Skardu, Kargil and Ladakh tehsils.19 The areas of Gultari and from Pari to Kharol were

included in Kargil tehsil.20 From now onwards, Skardu became the winter

Indian Concerns in Gilgit-Baltistan | 51

headquarters of the Ladakh district. Amar Nath Pragal of Jammu was the last Wazir of Skardu, before he was brutally killed by Pakistan raiders when they occupied Skardu in August 1948.

The historical evidence and contemporary records, as discussed show

that Skardu, Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Chilas, Astor, Gupis, Kuh-Ghizar, Punial, Ishkoman, Yasin, Darel, Tangir, etc., were part of the territories of Jammu and Kashmir till 1947. Whereas the Kashmir government

exercised direct authority over Gilgit, Bunji and Astor, which were part

of Gilgit Wazarat till 1947, Skardu, Rondu, Shigar, Tolti, Khaplu, etc., were part of a tehsil in the Ladakh district. However, the chiefships of

Hunza, Nagar and Governorships of Punial, Yasin, Chilas, Kuh-Ghizar,

Ishkoman and the tribal territories of Darel, Tangir, Thor, Kandia, Jalkot, Shatian, Harban, etc., were feudatories of the Kashmir Durbar. The Durbar received tribute from them but they were allowed internal autonomy in their local administration.

When the British left the subcontinent in August 1947, the area

of Gilgit Agency reverted to the Maharaja’s control. Maharaja Hari

Singh appointed Brigadier Ghansara Singh as the new Wazir-e-Wazarat

(Governor) of Gilgit, who assumed charge on July 31, 1947. On August

1, 1947, the illumination was done in the entire Jammu and Kashmir State to celebrate the resumption of the civil and military administration

of Gilgit. However, Major Brown, the British Commander of Gilgit

Scouts organised and led a revolt of Gilgit Scouts and arrested Brigadier Ghansara Singh, the Kashmir Durbar’s Wazir-e-Wazarat at Gilgit. On

November 4, 1947 Brown hoisted the Pakistani flag at Gilgit and handed over the area to Pakistan, which appointed its Political Agent.

Covering an area of about 28,000 sq. miles (about 73,000 sq. km),

GB has ten districts—Ghizer, Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar (in Gilgit Division), Ghanche, Skardu, Shigar and Kharmang (in Baltistan Division) and Astor and Diamer (in Diamer Division), with a total population of

about 2 million. Whereas the entire population of Hunza, Punial, Yasin, Ishkoman and Gupis are Ismailis (followers of Agha Khan), the people

of Nagar and Baltistan (Skardu, Ghanche) are Shia Muslims. Gilgit has

52 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

60 per cent Shias and 40 per cent Sunnis (mainly Punjabi and Pakhtoon

settlers from Pakistan). Chilas, Astore and Darel/Tangir have Sunni Muslim majority. Pakistan secured direct administrative control of Gilgit-

Baltistan by the Karachi Agreement with Presidents of “Azad Kashmir” and Muslim Conference on April 28, 1949 by detaching this area from

POK and terming it as “Northern Areas”. Since then, this region has been directly governed by the Ministry of Kashmir and Northern Affairs

(KANA) from Islamabad. Obviously, this arrangement has come in handy

for Pakistan in its military colonisation of the area and in its dealings with China including the ceding of about 2,100 sq. miles21 territory in

Shaksgam and Muztagh valleys of GB. On the other hand, “Azad Jammu and Kashmir” (AJK) has had a modicum of democratically elected

governments and assembly. AJK has an area of 5,134 sq. miles (13,297 sq. km) and a population of about 4 million. For administrative purposes, it has been divided into 10 districts—Muzaffarabad, Hattian Bala, Neelum

Valley, Mirpur, Bhimber, Kotli, Poonch, Bagh, Haveli and Sudhnoti. The

people of AJK who are Sunni Muslims speaking Punjabi, Pothowari, Mirpuri, Pahari/Gojri languages, have not much in common with those of

the GB region. Pakistan, besides maintaining regular army detachments and Northern Light Infantry (NLI) formation, has been operating scores

of training camps for terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba, Harkat-ulMujahideen, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Hizbul Mujahideen, Al-Badr, Harkat-

ul-Ansar, etc., at Marol, Baghicha, Dou, Dhappa, Skardu, Daral, Aztor, Bunji, Damiyor, Gilgit (in GB) and at Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Kotli, New Mirpur, Tain, Kahuta, Rawalakot, Manshera, Palandri, Bhimber (in AJK) for carrying out proxy wars against India.22 China has consistently

provided diplomatic, military, logistics, physical and financial support to Pakistan to enable it to consolidate its grip over the strategic frontier area of GB.

Shadow of the “Great Game” During the period of the “Great Game”, the importance of the Hindu Kush-Karakoram-Pamir region had become clear to the British as it was

Indian Concerns in Gilgit-Baltistan | 53

the meeting point of the Kashmir frontiers in Gilgit, Hunza and Chitral, the Afghan provinces of Badakhshan and Wakhan, the Russian territory of Kokand and the Sarikol area of Chinese Turkestan.23 The British strategy was to create a barrier between the Russian and British empires

right on the Pamirs, simultaneously extending their effective control

over the frontier areas in Gilgit, Hunza, Chitral and Yasin through the

Maharaja of Kashmir. The British used Ladakh and adjoining areas in Gilgit, Skardu, Hunza and Chitral as ‘frontier listening posts’ to monitor the developments in Central Asia and Xinjiang throughout the Dogra

period. With these strategic considerations, the British encouraged the Maharaja of Kashmir to bring the warlike and unruly Dardic tribal

chiefs inhabiting the obscure mountainous valleys of the Hindu Kush and Karakoram under his effective control.24 The Maharaja was given the

freedom to choose any means from conciliation to military expeditions or both and was provided with the necessary arms and ammunition too.

The idea behind several military expeditions carried out jointly by the

Kashmir forces and the British officers against Hunza, Nagar, Chitral and

Yasin was to put the defence of the north and northwestern frontiers on a firm footing.25 Once these unruly tribes were coerced into subjugation to Kashmir, a strong military garrison was established at Gilgit, thus making

it the nucleus of the whole defence arrangements.26 The importance of

Gilgit as a convenient base for extending the British influence up to the territories lying south of the Hindu Kush had now been fully realised. To

quote Alder, it was a “natural choice” being situated at the “hub of routes leading off to all parts of Dardistan”.27 According to E. F. Knight, the

celebrated author of Where Three Empires Meet,

the value of Gilgit to the Kashmir State, commanding as it does the Indus Valley and the mouth of the Hunza River, and so holding in check the unruly tribes on either side. Gilgit, the northernmost outpost of the Indian Empire covers all the passes over the Hindu Kush, from the easternmost one—the Shimshal, to those at the head of the Yasin River. Possession of the Gilgit valley affords a direct communication through Kashmir territory to the protected state of Chitral.28

54 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

By 1876, the British Indian government was convinced about the

necessity of extending Kashmir’s control over Chitral and Yasin right

up to the south of Ishkoman and Baroghil passes. The incorporation

of Kokand by Russia, which pushed the Russian frontier beyond Osh, only catalysed the British forward policy in this region. It is against this

background that Lord Lytton enunciated the future course of action to be taken in this frontier belt, which he finally conveyed to Maharaja Ranbir Singh personally at Madhopore on November 17-18, 1876.29 Lytton

impressed upon the Kashmir ruler the need to strengthen Indian frontiers

by assuming control over the territory that lay between the Hindu Kush and Kashmir frontier, in order to secure command of such passes as were thought to be practicable for the passage of Russian forces.30

To the British, it was now of vital importance that states like Chitral

and Yasin “should come under the control of a friend and ally” like the Maharaja of Kashmir, “rather than be absorbed by powers inimical to

Kashmir”.31 But while encouraging Ranbir Singh to obtain “an effective

but peaceful control over the countries lying between those passes and the Kashmir frontier, namely Chitral, Mastuj, Yasin and their dependencies”,32

the British secured the right to station an agent at Gilgit “to collect

information regarding the frontier and the progress of events beyond it”.33

The Kashmir ruler, however, relented to this measure only after obtaining written assurance from Lytton that the Gilgit Agent would in no case interfere in his internal administration. The Maharaja also volunteered

to connect Gilgit, Srinagar and Jammu with the British Indian telegraph

system. Maharaja Ranbir Singh stuck to his stand that the frontier territories in Ladakh, Baltistan, Gilgit, Yasin, Punial, Hunza and Nagar

formed a part of Gulab Singh’s territory even before the Amritsar Treaty was signed in 1846. After

having

obtained

Kashmir’s

concurrence, the

formal

announcement for the appointment of Captain J. Biddulph as Officer on Special Duty in Gilgit was made on September 22, 1877. He was assigned

the task of collecting information about the topography and resources of

the territory beyond the Kashmir frontier and to extend British influence

Indian Concerns in Gilgit-Baltistan | 55

among the tribal people by cultivating cordial relations with them.34

Though Biddulph succeeded in keeping track of the Russian movements in Badakhshan, Afghan Turkestan and Kokand, he could not win the

support of the Kashmir Durbar officials posted in Gilgit. Obviously, the Kashmir Durbar disparaged the foisting of a British Agent on its territorial jurisdiction. The assault by Hunza and Yasin on Gakuch and

Sher Kila on October 28, 1880 proved to be the proverbial last straw for the Gilgit Agent. And finally, it was decided in July 1881 to withdraw the Gilgit Agent, only to be re-established in 1888.

The British Indian government developed Gilgit as the defensive

nucleus of Dardistan and establish a garrison of locally raised troops

under a British commandant carrying out both the political and civil

functions.35 The Secretary in the Foreign Department (GOI) H. M. Durand recommended the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency with a garrison of Kashmir troops and local levies, Durand wanted the British

Indian government to adopt a more active policy towards this northern frontier so that in the event of any difficulties with Russia, Kashmir would

not be “more or less shaky and inclined to hedge”.36 It was in October 1887 that more clear directives reached the Resident in Kashmir regarding the

revised policy of the Indian government about the frontier defence. He was informed:

The time has come for establishing on the north-west frontier of Kashmir an effective political control, which will enable us to watch the passes of the Hindu Kush and the country beyond, and a military organization sufficient both to control the Chiefships over the border and also to check, in the event of war with Russia, any demonstration towards the passes not backed by a respectable force.37

The need to strengthen Kashmir’s hold over its frontier tributaries

assumed urgency in view of a joint attack by Hunza and Nagar on the Kashmir posts at Chaprot and Chalt in early 1888, and due to the Chinese links with Hunza. It was against this backdrop that Dufferin decided to depute Captain A. G. A. Durand (younger brother of the

56 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

Foreign Department Secretary, H. M. Durand) on a mission to Gilgit. He was required to “report on the military position at Gilgit with reference to the recent tribal disturbances and to future possible complications with

Russia, and to work out a scheme for rendering Gilgit secure without

the aid of British troops and for dominating from Gilgit, through the Kashmir forces, the country up to the Hindu Kush; thus, rendering Kashmir territory thoroughly secure against attack …”38

On his return in late 1888, Captain Durand proposed the re-

establishment of a political agency at Gilgit and stationing of about 2,000 Kashmir troops there to function under four British officers.39 He also

recommended the improvement of the Kashmir-Gilgit-Chitral road and the early completion of the telegraph line to Gilgit.40 The local chiefs of

Chitral, Punjab, Hunza and Nagar were proposed to be encouraged by grant of increased subsidies to them.41 Lord Lansdowne, who succeeded

to the Viceroyalty in December 1888, accepted Captain Durand’s

recommendations. He had high hopes of success this time, “we shall have the upper Hindu Kush well watched, and the countries to the south of it closed against interference from China, Russia and Afghanistan, and

we shall get some useful information from the districts beyond. We shall

be protected against any coup de main from the northward and we may eventually succeed in establishing our influence in Kafiristan also. We

shall thereby have provided for a really important part of our scheme of frontier defence, and at small cost to ourselves.”42 Accordingly Captain

Algernon Durand along with two British officers, Dr. Robertson and Lt. Manners Smith, arrived in Kashmir in April 1889 to prepare for their journey to Gilgit.43

Durand, who left Srinagar for Gilgit in mid-June 1889, was

formally appointed as the British Agent at Gilgit in July 1889. Durand’s

position was quite different from that of his predecessor Biddulph, as a British Resident had already been appointed in Kashmir in 1885. Now

the virtual administration of Dardistan (Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Astor, Yasin, Chitral, Gor, Chilas, Darel, Tangir and Kohistan) passed into

British hands through their Agent, though the Kashmir Governor

Indian Concerns in Gilgit-Baltistan | 57

at Gilgit continued to exercise civil authority over this territory.44

Lord Curzon, who before assuming the Viceroyalty of India (1899-

1905) travelled extensively in this frontier even up to the Pamir, was

also convinced that protection of the British colonial state in India required dominance of the strategic Himalayan neighbourhood

to stem any incursions by other interested regional state actors like Russia and China. The idea of developing ‘buffer states’ formed an integral part of this strategic philosophy and formed the crux of efforts

to develop an integrated external policy paradigm during his term in India. Curzon sought to “extend the idea of ‘buffer zones’—whether notionally independent like Afghanistan or under British control like

the North West Frontier Province—to India’s strategic Himalayan neighbourhood in a proactive but composite manner.”45

Post-independent India and particularly the then Prime Minister

Jawaharlal Nehru was conscious of the importance of the frontier areas

of GB as India’s only overland corridor to Central Asia. That explains why Nehru as the first Prime Minister of India wrote a letter on August

20, 1948 to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan

(UNCIP) Mission which was finalising the ceasefire agreement, asserting

the authority of Jammu and Kashmir over the ‘Northern Areas’. He wrote: The authority of the Government of J&K over the sparsely populated and mountainous region of the J&K State has not been challenged or disturbed, except by roving bands of hostiles or in some places like Skardu. The Commission resolution, as you agreed in the course of our interview on the 18th, does not deal with the problem of administration or defence in this large area. We desire that, after Pakistan troops and irregulars have withdrawn from the territory, the responsibility for the administration of the evacuated areas should revert to the Government of Jammu & Kashmir and that for defence to us. We must be free to maintain garrisons at selected points in this area for the dual purpose of preventing the incursion of tribesmen, who obey no authority and to guard the main trade routes from the state into Central Asia. 46

58 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

Responding to the Prime Minister’s letter, the Chairman of the

UNCIP, Joseph Korbel in his letter of August 25, 1948 to Jawaharlal Nehru assured him that the matter of defence administration of the Northern

Areas “could be considered in the implementation of the August 13, 1948 resolution”.47 But the Commission later resorted to subterfuge declaring

that it would study the situation in those areas. Bringing this fact to the

notice of the Security Council, one of the Commission members, Dr. Chyle submitted a minority report on December 1, 1948 giving some interesting insights on the inner workings of the UNCIP, which in his

view was “heavily influenced in its decisions and judgements by Western strategic considerations and designs.”48

When the UNCIP asked the UN Secretary General to send to Kashmir

40 military observers and a military adviser, the then Security Council Chairman, M. Jacob Malik (of USSR) called a meeting of the Council

and proposed to draw these military observers from all the five countries

represented on the Commission—Argentina, Belgium, Colombia, the USA and Czechoslovakia. Malik’s suggestion was brushed aside and foreign

military observers drawn from the armies of the USA, Canada, Australia, Belgium and Norway were dispatched to Kashmir.49 The US member

on the UNCIP mission had brought with himself military and political experts and a large staff of field workers to make on the spot survey of this

strategically important area to assess its value for military and air bases. It may be recalled that at the height of the Cold War era, the USA and Britain

were obsessed with the rise of Communist China and the Soviet Union, near the borders of Pakistan and India, and were desperately looking for a foothold in this strategic frontier of Gilgit to monitor the developments in Xinjiang, Tibet, Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Dr. Oldrich Chyle, the Czechoslovak member of the UNCIP, in his

minority report50 blamed the Commission for the failure of its efforts

for reaching a “positive solution of the whole problem”.51 He pointed

out that the “cancellation of the joint Indo-Pakistan political conference; the unauthorised proposal for arbitration; the disclosure of the secret memorandum on arbitration to the Governments of the United States

Indian Concerns in Gilgit-Baltistan | 59

of America and Britain”,52 were the principal factors responsible for

undermining the mediatory role of the Commission. Dr. Chyle while

referring to the problem of the ‘Northern Areas’ stated that “in both the

resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, the Commission did not refer to the situation in the strategically very important territory to the

north of Kashmir.”53 And by the time the Commission decided to study

the situation, Pakistan’s army, contrary to the provisions of the August 13, 1948 resolution, had occupied these strategic regions and presented the Commission with a fait accompli. Dr. Chyle in his report to the Security

Council explained that: “The Commission facing later on the materially changed situation in the Northern Areas is bound to admit that while the

reservation of the Government of India of August 20, 1948 may be legally

valid, it is physically impossible to implement it.”54 And the Government

of India did not pursue the matter to its logical conclusion.

It is pertinent to point out that the British Embassy in Moscow

wrote to the Commonwealth Relations Office, London on January 6, 1948 informing them that Novikov of the Soviet Foreign Ministry (and later Soviet Ambassador in India) had told Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the

then Indian Ambassador in Moscow, that “the Soviet Union and India

had a common frontier of 16 miles” at Gilgit.55 Around the same time, The Times,56 London also reported the speech of Gopalaswami Ayyangar

at the UN Security Council in which he had explained that “Kashmir

and Jammu matched with Chinese Turkestan in the north, Tibet to

the northeast and the Soviet Union to the northwest, so that it was of

vital importance to the security and international contacts of India”. The

British Government taking an urgent view of the matter concluded that

“it is a somewhat unreal to speak of anything but a ‘presumptive frontier’ in an area as mountainous as this”.57

Strategic Advantages of Pakistan Whereas after 1947, Ladakh including Kargil has been a province of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, a sizeable portion of the Ladakh

territory (Baltistan, Raskam, Shimshal and Muztagh valley and Aksai

60 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

Chin) besides the Gilgit region have been under the occupation of

Pakistan and China after 1947-48. Out of a total area of 222,236 sq. km, only about 45.6 per cent, i.e., 101,387 sq. km, remains in the Indian

State of Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmir valley covers only 7.2 per cent, i.e., 15,948 sq. km. Ladakh covers 59,146 sq. km constituting 26.6 per cent

and Jammu region spans about 26,293 sq. km, i.e., about 11.8 per cent. Pakistan occupied territory of Jammu and Kashmir covers 35.1 per cent, i.e., 86,000 sq. km of the total territory (13,297 sq. km in AJK and 73,000 sq. km in Gilgit-Baltistan). China is in occupation of an area of about

37,555 sq. km (16.9 per cent) in Aksai Chin and 5,180 sq. km (2.3 per cent) which was ceded by Pakistan in Shimshal, Muztagh and Raskam area to China in 1963.

Even though Kashmir has been the focus of national and international

attention during the past 72 years, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and GB have eluded attention. This is mainly because this frontier area has

been put under the iron curtain by the successive Pakistani governments. Pakistan took over the administration of this area enforcing Frontier

Crimes Regulations (FCR). The Muslim Conference which assumed power in POK in 1947 with Muzaffarabad as the capital of AJK was not

even allowed to open its branch in the GB region. Pakistan’s policy was

to segregate this strategic area from POK both in name and governance. And by the Karachi Agreement of April 28, 1949, signed between the

Pakistan Government, ‘Azad Kashmir Government’ and the Muslim Conference, Pakistan assumed full control over the GB region. There was no representative from this region.

Pakistan’s Federal Ministry of Kashmir Affairs directly administered

the ‘Northern Areas’. Even though the 1949 agreement became defunct

after the promulgation of the 1974 Interim Constitution of POK by Z. A.

Bhutto, Pakistan did not let the ‘Northern Areas’ be part of ‘Azad Kashmir’. And when in July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq promulgated martial law in Pakistan, he declared the ‘Northern Areas’ as the Martial Law Zone E. In

early 1982, the late General Zia-ul-Haq, the then President of Pakistan, publicly announced that this area was never a part of Jammu and Kashmir

Indian Concerns in Gilgit-Baltistan | 61

State before 1947, evoking protests in Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the LoC. In fact, the late Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the then Chief Minister of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, while addressing a

huge May Day rally at Iqbal Park in Srinagar in May 1982, reiterated that

“the whole of POK including Gilgit constitutes the territory of the State”. Subsequently, the state government issued a White Paper detailing the historical evidence of the GB area being part of Jammu and Kashmir.58

The draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation was replaced by the

Northern Areas Governance Order of 1994 by the late Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, which with some amendments was later renamed the Legal Framework Order by President Musharraf in 2007.59 And in

2009, the Zardari government taking cognisance of the local demands

for restoration of the original name, issued the GB Empowerment and

Self-Governance Order, in a bid to deflect criticism over human rights violations in the region.

Ambivalence in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy is best reflected in its

political and constitutional relationship with the region. While insisting

that Jammu and Kashmir is disputed territory, GB is neither included in the definition of territories of Pakistan as per its constitution of 1973

(Article 1), nor does the AJK Interim Constitution of 1974 define this area as under its administrative control.60

Sino-Pak Axis: Implications for India Soon after the 1962 Sino-India war, China and Pakistan signed a border agreement in March 1963 following which Xinjiang’s border with POK was delineated and demarcated with Pakistan ceding about 5,180 sq. km

area in Shaksgam and Muztagh valleys of POK to China. Though the Sino-Pak agreement of 1963 accepted and recognised that “it did not

affect the status of the territory of Jammu & Kashmir”, both China and

Pakistan went ahead with the building of the 1,330-km long Karakoram Highway. Now this highway has been expanded and rebuilt to make it

an all-weather highway and an expressway, railways, oil/gas pipeline61 are planned through it thereby giving immense strategic advantage to China

62 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

in terms of speedy transport of its armaments and military forces, securing

easy access to the sea, resources of Central Asian Republics, energy supplies from West Asia, etc. China has been constructing several tunnels in GB,62

besides helping Pakistan in the expansion of its network of feeder roads

and bridges in this area. China has already built feeder roads through

Shaksgam, Raskam and Shimshal valley (ceded by Pakistan to China in

1963), linking Gilgit to Khotan, which is connected to Qinghai province of China through the Qinghai-Golmud Highway.63 Over 10,000 Chinese

personnel are reported to be working in POK and GB.64 There have also

been reports of China establishing its Consulate in Gilgit.

The Sino-Pak CPEC project which passes through POK along the

Karakoram Highway poses serious security challenge to India in Kashmir

and Ladakh. That China opened a new high altitude airport at Ngari in Tibet (4,300 m), claimed to be the highest airport in the world facing Ladakh, demonstrates China’s determination to consolidate its physical presence in the outlying provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet, by building quick

and efficient means of air communication. This not only facilitates direct

flights between Ngari, Lhasa, Southern Xinjiang and mainland China, but also poses a direct threat to the Indian positions in Ladakh. For the

past few years, China has been making incursions in the Ladakh sector, particularly in Demchok, Chushul, Spanggur, Hot Springs, Depsang and the Pangong Lake areas. The prevailing geopolitical situation and

rapidly expanding physical reach of China even within Central Asia, Pakistan, POK and GB, are all going to work to the advantage of China. This situation calls for a bold and out-of-the-box solution to the vexed problem.

India needs to safeguard its interests in this strategic frontier by

securing direct overland access to Afghanistan, Tajikistan and other

Central Asian countries, and to ensure that it has a peaceful, tranquil and

benign neighbourhood. Considering the concept of strategic frontiers, India needs to determine the area within which no hostile or potentially hostile force is to be allowed to exist or develop, so that national security is not threatened.

Indian Concerns in Gilgit-Baltistan | 63

On February 22, 1994 both the houses of the Indian Parliament

unanimously passed a resolution expressing deep concern over “Pakistan’s role in imparting training to the terrorists in camps located in Pakistan

and occupied Kashmir, the supply of weapons and funds, assistance in

infiltration of trained militants including foreign mercenaries into Jammu & Kashmir with the avowed purpose of creating disharmony and subversion.” The resolution firmly declared that: •

The State of Jammu and Kashmir has been, is and shall be an integral

part of India and any attempts to separate it from the rest of the • •

country will be resisted by all necessary means.

India has the will and capacity to firmly counter all designs against its unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Pakistan must vacate the areas of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, which they have occupied through aggression.

The Parliament of India has thus laid the policy framework in terms

of retrieving its lost territory in Jammu and Kashmir. The time has come

for India to take the necessary steps to reverse its adversarial situation and free itself of the strategic bottleneck it has been facing due to the continued illegal occupation of POK and GB by Pakistan. This will enhance the

prestige and stature of India among the neighbouring countries of Central

Asia and Afghanistan, which are eagerly looking forward to seeing India

play a balancing role vis-à-vis China in the region. It will, once and for all,

resolve the vexed Kashmir problem, which has been sapping the energy, resources, morale and profile of the Indian nation state both within and outside the country. By doing so, India will secure its appropriate international position proportionate to its size, population, geopolitical position, economy and status of a rising power.

Notes 1. 2. 3.

Ahmad Hasan Dani (1995), Human Record on Karakorum Highway, Islamabad: Sang-e-Meel Publications, p. 18. Ibid. (For full text of these rock edits), see pp. 20-22. Ibid., pp. 30-34.

64 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

4.

Ibid., p. 35.

6.

Ibid., p. 122.

8.

Ibid., p. 113.

5. Ahmad Hasan Dani (1989), History of Northern Areas of Pakistan, Islamabad: Sang-e-Meel Publications. 7.

9.

J. Biddulph (2001), Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh. Delhi: Bhavana Books (reprinted), pp. 112-13. Ibid., p. 114.

10. Ibid., p. 115.

11. Frederic Drew (1971), The Jummoo and Kashmir Territories: A Geographical Account, London, 1875. Delhi: Oriental Publishers (reprinted), p. 429. 12. Ibid.

13. Ahmad Hasan Dani, n. 5, p. 215. 14. Ibid., p. 222. 15. Ibid., p. 223. 16. Ibid., p. 224. 17. Ibid., p. 225. 18. Ibid., p. 320. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid.

21. P. Stobdan (2007), “Gilgit and Baltistan: The Historical Dimension”, in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: The Untold Story, Virendra Gupta and Alok Bansal (eds). New Delhi: Manas Publications, p. 48. 22. See Maloy Krishna Dhar, “An Itinerant’s Journey through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir”. In Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: The Untold Story, Virendra Gupta and Alok Bansal (eds). New Delhi: Manas Publications, pp. 134-36.

23. For further details see, K. Warikoo (ed.), Himalayan Frontiers of India, pp. 1435. 24. Ibid., p. 16. 25. Ibid., p. 17. 26. Ibid.

27. G. J. Alder (1963), British India’s Northern Frontier, 1865-95. London: Longmans, p. 11. 28. E. F. Knight (1905), Where Three Empires Meet. London: Longmans, Green & Co., pp. 288, 290-91. 29. K. Warikoo (ed.), n. 23, p. 19.

30. See Memo of conversation held at Madhopore on November 17-18, 1876 between the Viceroy and Maharaja of Kashmir. Foreign Secret. July 1877, 34-60B. 31. Ibid.

Indian Concerns in Gilgit-Baltistan | 65

32. Lytton to Salisbury (Secretary of State), June 11, 1877, cited in Foreign Secret, n. 30. 33. Ibid.

34. T. H. Thomson, Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India to J. Biddulph, September 22, 1877. Foreign. Pol. A. February 1878, pp. 117-37. 35. Ibid.

36. Cited in D. K. Ghosh (1975), Kashmir in Transition, 1885-93. Calcutta: World Press, p. 166.

37. H. M. Durand to the Resident in Kashmir, October 18, 1887, Foreign Sec. F., January 1888, op. cit. 38. H. M. Durand to Capt. A. G. A. Durand, June 22, 1888.

39. A. G. A. Durand, Report on the Present Military Situation in Gilgit. Simla, December 5, 1888, p. 14. 40. Ibid., p. 45. 41. Ibid., p. 14.

42. Cited in G. J. Alder, British India’s Northern Frontier, pp. 163-64. 43. A. G. A. Durand, Making of a Frontier. London, 1899, p. 120. 44. Ibid., p. 198.

45. Vijay Kapur (2009), “India’s Himalayan Frontiers”. In K. Warikoo (ed.), Himalayan Frontiers of India. London and New York: Routledge, p. 49. 46. Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Reports of United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (June 1948 to December 1948). New Delhi, pp. 17-18. 47. Ibid.

48. P. N. Jalali, “The Gilgit Dimension of the Kashmir Frontier”, in Himalayan Frontiers of India, K. Warikoo (ed.), p. 45. 49. Vijay Kumar, Anglo-American Plot against Kashmir. Bombay, PPH, 1954, p. 95. 50. S/1430/Add.3, December 9, 1949.

51. Vijay Kumar, Anglo-American Plot against Kashmir, p. 116. 52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., p. 117. 54. Ibid.

55. L/BS/12/3303. Coll.24/21 (India Office Records, London). 56. The Times, London, January 16, 1948.

57. J. Ross of Commonwealth Relations Office, London to B. R. Curzon, UK Delegation to UN Assembly, New York, January 29, 1948.

58. See J & K Government, Statement of Facts on Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Yasin, Punial, Chitral and Skardu. Srinagar, p. 16. 59. Senge H. Sering, “Constitutional Impasse in Gilgit-Baltistan ( Jammu and Kashmir): The Fallout”. Strategic Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 3, May 2010, p. 354.

66 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

60. M. A. Niazi, “Northern Areas’ Status: Forty-Five Years of Ambiguity”, Nation, March 12-13, 1993, pp. 1, 4. 61. For further details see Senge H. Sering, Expansion of the Karakoram Corridor. New Delhi, IDSA, 2012, p. 64. 62. Ibid., p. 24.

63. Ibid., p. 10. 64. Ibid., p. 27.

6. Exploitation of Water and Mineral Resources of Gilgit-Baltistan Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharjee

Introduction Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) comprises approximately 72,000 km of territory, bordering Afghanistan to the north, the Xinjiang province of China to the northeast, the Pakistan-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK) to

the south and Jammu and Kashmir to the southeast. With an estimated

population of 2 million, GB’s legal identity and constitutional status has been disputed ever since the partition of India in 1947. For over 70 years

now, the area of GB has lacked a proper constitutional status, a working

legal system and political autonomy. The lack of this democratic set-up

has resulted in constant human rights violations, poverty, slow economic

development, exploitation of natural resources and growing sectarian

turbulence. While Islamabad earns billions in revenue from GB annually from trade and transit, water resource exploitation, trophy hunting, ecotourism, mineral exploration and direct and indirect federal taxes, a

significant majority of these earnings are not allocated for the development

of the region. This chapter tries to identify how the federal government has been exploiting the water and mineral resources of this autonomous

region. It shows the presence of dubious Chinese companies and army in this region, which has created an atmosphere of doubts and discontent among the locals for the alienation they have been experiencing by the Government of Pakistan.

68 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

GB is one of the most underdeveloped regions in South Asia. This

autonomous region has not been constitutionally recognised by the

Pakistani government as a province of the country. This has had farreaching consequences for the people of the region, who have an undefined relationship with Pakistan and have an unclear legal status. As they are not

constitutionally part of the state of Pakistan, people have limited rights

and nearly no political representation. This has meant that they have very limited space or legal recourse to object to the federal government’s bids

to exploit the region’s natural resource wealth. The autonomous region

finds rare mention in both, mainstream Pakistani or Indian media, but is gaining significance since the territory of GB determines an essential part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multimillion

dollar development project heralded as a ‘game changer’ for Pakistan and the whole region.1 Yet, even bearing such prospects of development, the

current patterns of natural resource exploitation have been environmentally

destructive; socially inequitable; which contributes to human insecurity, political instability, and social conflict.2

The Wealth of GB The region of GB has remained an anomaly in the political system of

Pakistan. There are several factors that have contributed to its constitutional

limbo. It has been kept as a region by the Pakistani government without a constitutional status, exploiting the resources of the region without giving any due credit. The presence of natural resources is a testament of progress

and prosperity of any region but ironically, the case is quite the opposite

with GB. GB is a resource-rich region. The chapter will have three key areas of interest, namely, water, minerals and energy resources.

Mineral Resources To understand the nature of exploitation of resources from GB, there is a need to assess the resource wealth of GB. Its mountainous topography is characterised by numerous mineral deposits, including metallic, nonmetallic, energy minerals, precious and dimension stones, and rocks of

Exploitation of Water and Mineral Resources of Gilgit-Baltistan | 69

differing industrial value. In these mountains several minerals have been

found, which Pakistan currently offers to the world markets, including topaz, peridot, emerald, morganite, and tourmaline. Surveys carried out

by governmental and non-governmental agencies have stated that there

is an abundance of precious metals such as gold, gypsum, chalcopyrite, uranium, etc.3 Industrial minerals like marble, China clay, feldspars and

serpentinite are also found in GB in abundance. The state sees this wealth as an opportunity that can allow it to pursue economic growth through expansion of its mining industry. Mining in Pakistan is dominated by

the public sector through federal and regional development corporations, mainly from China. While mineral exploitation contributes only about 1

per cent of the country’s GDP (International Alert 2015), development planners see it as the key to good governance and inclusive growth.4

Provincial governments have the right to develop their own economic

infrastructure as well as exploit their mineral resources by enforcing

legislation in tandem with the existing federal regulatory regime. However, as per the Constitution of Pakistan, the federal government has overall authority over the country’s oil, gas and nuclear minerals. The Mineral

Investment Facilitation Authority has been established in all the provinces

along with offices in special areas. For the issuance of licences and leases, collection of fees and royalties, and monitoring of the mining activities, the federal government has also established offices functioning under the Department of Mines and Minerals. As there was no government

department responsible for monitoring the welfare of artisanal miners, the government introduced special provisions in the mining legislation to legalise informal mining. The 2013 National Mineral Policy, formulated by the federal government of Pakistan, in cooperation with provincial

governments, articulates mining policy and legal regulatory aspects, and with it the government aims to incorporate artisanal mining into the formal economy in an organised and sustainable way. According to Pakistan Minerals Working Group (2013), the National Mineral Policy-2

(NMP-2) was formulated based on the following themes: first, increasing the contribution of the mining sector to Pakistan’s economy by attracting

70 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

more private investment; second, being competitive for scarce and mobile international capital for investment in the mining sector through a

stable and enabling environment; third, ensuring smooth operation and effective coordination between federal and provincial institutions in the

implementation of the regulatory and legislative regime for the mining sector; fourth, ensuring that the exploration for, and development and

production of, Pakistan’s mineral resources is environmentally sustainable; and finally, encouraging small-scale mining and local private participation

in the development of the sector. So, the NMP-2 is focused mostly on private and international investment, which is consistent with the

recommendations of the World Bank in their GB Economic Report

(World Bank 2011) addressing large-scale mining and managing the mineral sector in Pakistan.5

According to the Mine and Minerals Department of GB, “different

aspects of NMP have been implemented in the provinces to a varying

degree but till now no major breakthrough has been achieved in the

sector primarily due to lack of infrastructure facilities in the mineral bearing areas and high risk nature of investment in the sector. Under the constitutional framework, the government of Pakistan is responsible

for policy formulation, generation of geological data and exploration targets.”6 The GB region has minerals worth billions of dollars. At the

beginning of the decade, around Rs. 500 million worth gemstones were extracted annually from GB and efforts are underway to explore other precious minerals. It has been confirmed that nearly all valleys in GB have

reserves of gold and base metals but lack of investment and oversight has meant that the region or its people have not benefited.7

Owing to the lack of oversight, it is alleged that several foreign

companies with the support of corrupt officials have exploited more resources than permitted, to the detriment of the local economy.8 Apart

from over-mining, the region also faces the problem of illegal mining, which has a long history in Pakistan and has played an increasing role

as a source of rural employment and revenue. The absence of an effective regulatory state, as well as failure to develop a long-term strategy to harness

Exploitation of Water and Mineral Resources of Gilgit-Baltistan | 71

labour force potential, has led to its growth. The fact that this region has

uranium deposits and the possibility of illegal smuggling of this mineral is

worrisome, due to the fear of its wrong usage, the role of Chinese mining companies extracting uranium without any restriction or regulation of the federal or local government has been accused by the locals.9

GB has a long history of mining and the mineral wealth has not

been unknown to the local community. This was common knowledge long before the state became aware of it, and has been exploited in a way local communities organise the mining and distribute the proceeds.

Apart from these problems, the minerals department of the region

has also been accused of patronising non-local companies for mining

licences. This not only deprives the people of the region from access to their own resources, it also has a detrimental effect on employment

generation in the region. The lack of communication with the region and the federal government is also expressed through miscommunication

which widens the gap in information and perpetuates further confusion. For example, according to some people, the federal government secretly

awards licences, while others state that it operates “ghost companies” to extract resources without the permission of the local communities and

without providing them with any royalty.10 While the rumours have not been verified, these sentiments highlight the frustration and lack of basic

communication between the communities and the different levels of government.11 Pakistan is also strengthening its occupation by illegally

awarding more than 2,000 leases of these mighty mountains, which are

replete with precious and industrial mines including gold, uranium and

molybdenum (which are used in space technology) to China and for its own national use by entirely violating State Subject Rule and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) Resolutions.12

Presently, Chinese miners and mining organisations from China can be found mostly in all the resource belts in GB, having a significant presence

in the Hunza-Nagar district. This district has uranium mines and is also rich in heavy minerals extremely important for space technology. The local

people are barred from visiting areas in the district, like the Chapursan

72 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

valley, where the Chinese are directly involved in mineral exploration

and other construction activities. These areas have been handed over to the Chinese for tunnel building and mineral exploration. Land has also been leased to the Chinese for extracting high quality copper. Shahzad

International, a large lease owning company, is coordinating with Chinese investors for mining gold and uranium in GB and have been behind the exploitation of minerals from the district.13

It must also be noted that crude methods with indiscriminate blasting

techniques are being used for the excavation of minerals including

gemstones, which not only destroys this natural resource but, according to official sources, also result in the wastage of more than 75 per cent of the total yield.14

Energy and Water Resources The GB region lies at the confluence of the Karakoram, the Hindu Kush

and the Himalayan mountain ranges. It consists of about 27 per cent glaciers and snow deposits. The Indus river and its tributaries such as the

Gilgit, the Hunza and the Nagar make the region rich in hydro resources with the potential to generate over 30,000 MW of electricity. There are

several dam projects underway in GB. Significant among these are the Diamer Bhasha project, the Satpara dam and the Bunji dam.

The construction of the Diamer-Bhasha dam on the River Indus

commenced on October 18, 2011. On completion, this will be the highest Roller Compacted Concrete (RCC) dam in the world and is slated to

produce 4,500 MW of electricity, store 8,500,000 acre feet (10.5 km) of

water for Pakistan that would then be used for irrigation and drinking. The estimated cost of the project is more than US$ 11 billion with an estimated completion time of 12 years. Its location in a highly seismic zone is a source of great concern to the local population, who will face all the adverse consequences of construction, while all the benefits will flow to

the people living in Punjab and Sindh. The people have not been taken into confidence regarding the effects of the dam, neither has the government

proposed to pay any compensation to the people who will be losing their

Exploitation of Water and Mineral Resources of Gilgit-Baltistan | 73

land and livelihood. The most daunting challenge has been the shortage of funds to support the construction cost, conservatively estimated at US$ 14 billion in 2017.15 Since its genesis, this project on River Indus as part of

the Water and Power Development Authority’s (WAPDA) Water Vision

2025, has witnessed unprecedented delays owing to numerous logistical hurdles. Moreover, there are geopolitical implications considering that the site of the project is in a region claimed by India.

It needs to be noted that the two dams, Diamer-Bhasha and

Bunji are part of Pakistan’s North Indus River Cascade, which involves

construction of five big water reservoirs with an estimated cost of US$ 50 billion. With the construction of these dams, Pakistan will be able to generate approximately 40,000 MW of hydroelectricity. Under the

MoU signed in 2017 between Pakistan and China, the National Energy

Administration of China would oversee the financing and funding of these projects. However, in November 2017, reports surfaced that talks

between Pakistan and China on the Diamer-Bhasha hit a rough patch owing to China issuing a precondition that it will “construct, operate

and maintain” the dam. During the last few months of the former Chief Justice (CJ) of the Pakistan Supreme Court, Saqib Nisar, began a people’s

movement of collecting donations for building the Diamer-Bhasha dam, which saw domestic and international donations pouring in. Pakistani

Prime Minister Imran Khan till September 2018 had requested the people

to openly donate for the dam. But with time, the momentum of such donations has died down, and has lost the media glare that was created by the former CJ of the Supreme Court.

During the construction of the Diamer-Bhasha dam, and after its

completion, 110 km of the Karakoram Highway will get submerged, and

initially 80,000 people will get displaced. After further extension of this dam, about 300,000 local indigenous people will be displaced and about

a 200-km area up to Gilgit town will be submerged. Pakistan has also built a mega dam in Skardu. With a depth of 650 ft, Skardu dam, which

commenced in April 2003, is slated to produce 17.6 MW of power when

completed. This dam is opposed by local journalists and activists due to

74 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

its faulty design and material use, which could lead to a major accident

affecting the inhabitants of Skardu Valley.16 Pakistan is building another dam in Bunji  on the river Indus. It should be noted that not only will

there will be an indelible impact on the environment if these proposed dams are built, there will be inundation of major land masses, which

includes towns like Skardu, loss of livelihood, and significant population displacement. WAPDA has stated that there was not sufficient land

where such displaced population can be reinstated.17 Though the Pakistan

Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government has announced to provide GB the

status of an interim province, it still awaits to gain the status of a full province.18 The caveat is that although the Prime Minister has mentioned

that royalty of all dams would go to the provinces, it needs to be clarified

that despite the Prime Minister’s proposal to provide partial provincial status to GB, as per the Constitution, only a province enjoys the right to

receive royalty, an autonomous region or partial province does not. So, hypothetically, if the dam gets built, GB would remain bereft of receiving any royalty.

Grievances of the People of GB To date, dozens of locals in GB face sedition charges, arrest and torture

for resisting Chinese mining projects for gems, uranium, gold, copper and heavy metals. There are complaints against Chinese firms for denying jobs and financial compensation and for damaging farmlands

and infrastructure. The China Roads and Bridges Corporation, currently

active in projects, is a blacklisted firm in Turkey and Malaysia, as they

have been involved in using devastating environmental practices in its

expansion of the Karakoram Highway in GB.19 The local newspaper, Daily Baadeshimal, has reported that the company along with other

Chinese companies working in the region have no regard for local laws and customs and are involved in the systematic destruction of flora

and fauna.20 However, Huang Xilian, Deputy Director General of the Asian Affairs of the Foreign Ministry of China has maintained that

these “projects are not political projects. They are all for the livelihood

Exploitation of Water and Mineral Resources of Gilgit-Baltistan | 75

of people. There is no commercial action by China in that part of the

region.” These remarks seem to overlook the plight of the common people of GB.21

Reputed journalist Selig Harrison stated that Pakistan has literally

handed over GB to China. “Many of the [Chinese People’s Liberation Army]

PLA soldiers entering GB are expected to work on the railroad. Some are

extending the Karakoram Highway, built to link China’s Sinkiang Province

with Pakistan. Others are working on dams, expressways and other projects.” He added that “mystery surrounds the construction of 22 tunnels in secret

locations where Pakistanis are barred. Tunnels would be necessary for a projected gas pipeline from Iran to China that would cross the Himalayas

through Gilgit. But they could also be used as missile storage sites ... Till

recently, the PLA construction crew lived in temporary encampments and

went home after completing their assignments. Now they are building big residential enclaves, clearly designed for a long-term presence.”22

The People’s Liberation Army, while building the highway, had

created a general negative perception within the minds of the people of

GB. The purpose of the highway generated apprehension in the minds of

foreign analysts. The presence of the PLA in GB was known to most of them. “China deployed an infantry battalion of the PLA at the 15,397ft Khunjerab Pass on the Karakoram Highway ... for the security of its workers engaged in building a railroad. This railroad will eventually connect Xinjiang to the port of Gwadar in Balochistan, Pakistan”,23 which has been turned into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor of today.

As the elected government of GB is not part of the dialogue process

between Pakistani and Chinese leaderships regarding CPEC, an alliance

of political groups from GB, the Awami Action Committee (AAC) has demanded that since GB is a disputed territory, the CPEC agreement be

amended to include the territory as a third party as GB remains a nonstakeholder to the entire project.24

In a recent report published, it has been shown that most of the

proposed projects by the federal government from 2015 have not been

completed. In 2015-16, Pakistan had approved 103 schemes, and in

76 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

2016-17 had approved 152 schemes and none of the projects have been completed.25

In this same report, it has been stated that GB Order 2018 was

promulgated by the former Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi on May 21, 2018, which replaced the GB Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009, having the objective of providing the “same rights enjoyed by

the other citizens of Pakistan to the people of GB.” The August 8, 2018, order made it clear that political, administrative, financial and judicial

powers will be enjoyed by the people of the region. In fact, however, the order shifted powers from the GB Council—including those related

to passing laws regarding minerals and tourism—to the GB Assembly. A comparative analysis of the 2009 and 2018 Orders indicates that the

‘special rights’ the people of GB had enjoyed have been curtailed further. For instance, the Legislative Power, according to the 2009 Order, was vested

in the GB Council (though this was led by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, but also had representatives from GB) and the GB Assembly. As per the 2018 Order, this power lies with the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the

GB Assembly, which comprises 33 members of which 24 members were elected through direct election. The Prime Minister seems to hold final authority in terms of legislative powers, as the GB Order 2018 reads,

If any provision of an Act of Assembly is repugnant to any provision of any law which the Prime Minister is competent to enact, then the law made by the Prime Minister, whether passed before or after the Act of the Assembly, shall prevail and the Act of the Assembly shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.26

In a media interview, Farman Ali, a political activist from Upper

Hunza in GB said, “Over 70,000 trucks will pass through this region daily, emitting a large amount of carbon. The government will also lay railway tracks in this mountainous area by building a number of tunnels. This will likely cause landslides and disturb the region’s ecological balance.”27

Amir Hussain, a political analyst from Lower Hunza part of the region

stated that, “The Chinese bring their own manpower wherever they go.

Exploitation of Water and Mineral Resources of Gilgit-Baltistan | 77

For CPEC they are likely to bring 7 million workers to Pakistan. Around 400,000 of them will be working in GB. How will the local [population] get jobs?”28 He further stated on the question of 500-acre land allocated

to create a special economic zone in the Maqpoon Das area in GB that, “These lands have been taken over in the name of CPEC projects. In addition, the Army is planning to build checkpoints to provide security to

CPEC projects. For that reason, they are planning to relocate people from

Hunza and Nagar districts, which are located on the Chinese border … CPEC has become a holy cow in Pakistan. The locals are not allowed to protest against CPEC projects. Those who do so are booked under antiterrorism laws and dubbed anti-state elements.”29

In view of the forced alteration of the demography of the indigenous

populace, the spokesman for the GB local government, Faizullah Faraq stated that, “Most of the hotels, shops, markets and businesses are already

owned by non-locals from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or Punjab. Now CPEC projects will attract more migrants. This will ultimately turn the locals into a minority.”30

Conclusion GB can be seen as “occupy[ing] a problematic, minimal position in the national order of things.”31 The region has an ambiguous place within

both Pakistan and the wider international sphere. Its in-between status stems from a complex web of colonialism, post-colonialism, globalisation

of resources, as well as international security that makes the status of the

region uncertain and geopolitically, economically, and militaristically strategic.32 Pakistan is considering to elevate the constitutional status of the northern GB region in a bid to provide legal cover to the multibillion-

dollar Chinese investment plan. Though the federal court has requested the federal government to look at the region with a sense of urgency, the government has not yet decided to provide any constitutional status to

the mountainous region, which would have brought it one step closer to being fully absorbed as an additional province. If the proposal had been passed, for the first time, GB would have sent two lawmakers to sit in the

78 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

federal parliament—though they would be given observer status only.33

Considering the geostrategic importance of GB for Pakistan and now for China, it is unlikely that Islamabad and Beijing will allow the province more autonomy. This may mean a more controlled governance combined

with extraordinarily repressive measures, and in the long run could turn

the people against the CPEC. The fear is that it would be a means for China to entrench its security forces in the region.

It is also clear that the communities feel vulnerable, excluded and

denied access to the much-needed sources of revenue. They are unable to lobby or express their interests and they have an uncertain position

in negotiations. Attempts at mining in Chipursan expose the challenges facing the communities. Besides limiting potential investment, the constitutional uncertainty also inhibits the ability of communities to lobby for greater control of the development of these industries. Weak politically

elected bodies may not be able to defend the rights and interests of the people in the region.34 The region will continue to experience exploitation till the federal government makes an earnest attempt to listen to the woes of the people living in GB.

Notes

1. Siegfried O. Wolf, “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its Impact on Gilgit-Baltistan”, SADF Focus, South Asia Democratic Forum, No. 25, November 11, 2016, at https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/83630277.pdf. Accessed on March 14, 2019. 2. Richard Cronin and Amit Pandya (eds.), “Exploiting Natural Resources: Growth, Instability, and Conflict in the Middle East and Asia”, The Henry L. Stimson Centre, 2009, p. xi, at https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/fileattachments/Exploiting_Natural_Resources-Full_0.pdf. Accessed on March 14, 2019. 3. “Judicious Utilization of Gilgit-Baltistan’s Resources”, Pamir Times, February 25, 2014, at https://pamirtimes.net/2014/02/25/judicious-utilization-gilgitbaltistans-resources/. Accessed on March 14, 2019.

4. Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt and Hugh Brown, “Governing the Ungovernable? Reflections on Informal Gemstone Mining in High-Altitude Borderlands of Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan”, The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability, Vol. 22, 2017, Issue 11, p. 6, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2017.13576 8. Accessed on March 14, 2019.

Exploitation of Water and Mineral Resources of Gilgit-Baltistan | 79

5. Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt and Hugh Brown, “Governing the Ungovernable? Reflections on Informal Gemstone Mining in High-Altitude Borderlands of Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan”, The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability, Vol. 22, 2017, Issue 11, p. 11, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2017.1357 688. Accessed on March 14, 2019. 6.

“Gilgit Baltistan, Mines and Minerals Department, Government of Pakistan”, at http://www.mineralsgb.gov.pk/. Accessed on March 1, 2019.

7. Raees Kamil, “Real Threat to Mineral Industry in Gilgit-Baltistan”, Gilgit Baltistan Times, July 20, 2011, at https://gbtimes.wordpress.com/2011/07/20/ opinion-real-threat-to-mineral-industry-in-gilgit-baltistan/. Accessed on March 14, 2019. 8. Senge Hasnan Sering, “Chinese Mining Companies Make Inroads into Gilgit’s Mineral-Rich Region”, The Economic Times, June 30, 2011, at https:// economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/indl-goods/svs/metals-mining/ chinese-mining-companies-make-inroads-into-gilgits-mineral-rich-region/ articleshow/9032343.cms. Accessed on March 14, 2019. 9. Ibid.

10. “Natural Resources of Gilgit Baltistan, Skardu Baltistan”, November 6, 2019, at https://skarducity.com/2019/11/06/natural-resources-of-gilgit-baltistan/. Accessed on February 25, 2020. 11. Caylee Hong, “Liminality and Resistance in Gilgit-Baltistan”, Legal Working Paper Series on Legal Empowerment for Sustainable Development, Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, 2012, p. 12, at http://cisdl. org/public/docs/Hong_Liminality_and_Resistance_in_Gilgit-Baltistan.pdf. Accessed on March 14, 2019.

12. Abdul Hamid Khan, “Natural Resource Management, Human Rights and Environmental Security in Central Asia Gilgit-Baltistan: A Case Study, Keynote Address”, Foundation for Democracy and Law for Regions in Conflict (DLRC), July 6, 2013, at https://www.facebook.com/notes/491438914265127/. Accessed on March 14, 2019. 13. Senge Hasnan Sering, “Chinese Mining Companies Make Inroads into Gilgit’s Mineral-Rich Region”, n. 8.

14. Syed Akhtar Hussain Shah, “Strategy for Mineral Sector Development in Pakistan”, Planning Commission of Pakistan, Government of Pakistan, 2018, p. 11. 15. “PAC Told: Construction of Diamer-Bhasha Dam to Begin with Local Resources”, Business Recorder, November 15, 2017, at https://fp.brecorder. com/2017/11/20171115235070/. Accessed on February 25, 2020.

16. “Energy and Water Resources of Gilgit Baltistan”, Skardu Baltistan, November 11, 2019, at https://skarducity.com/2019/11/11/energy-and-water-resources-ofgilgit-baltistan/. Accessed on February 25, 2020.

80 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

17. “15,000 MW Dam Project Shelved by Wapda”, Dawn, September 11, 2011, at https://www.dawn.com/news/660997. Accessed on February 25, 2020.

18. PM Approves Interim Province Status for G-B, The Express Tribune, November 28, 2018, at https://tribune.com.pk/story/1855919/1-pm-imran-approvesinterim-province-status-g-b/. Accessed on March 15, 2019. 19. Senge Sering, “China at a Crossroads in Gilgit-Baltistan”, Institute for Gilgit Baltistan Studies, Sharnoff ’s Global Views, September 15, 2014, at http://www. sharnoffsglobalviews.com/china-crossroads-baltistan-391/. Accessed on March 15, 2019. 20. Ibid.

21. “China Rejects India’s Proposal on LAC Clarity”, The Pioneer, June 5, 2015, at http://www.dailypioneer.com/todays-newspaper/china-rejects-indias-proposalon-lac-clarity.html. Accessed on March 15, 2019.

22. Selig S. Harrison, “China’s Discreet Hold on Pakistan’s Northern Borderlands”, The New York Times, August 26, 2010, at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/ opinion/27iht-edharrison.html?_r=0. Accessed on March 15, 2019. 23. “Re: NYT Story about Chinese Troops in Pakistan’s Northern Gilgit-Baltistan Region”, The Global Intelligence Files, WikiLeaks, November 2013, at https:// wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/12/1221974_re-nyt-story-about-chinesetroops-inpakistan-snorthern.html. Accessed on March 15, 2019.

24. Kunwar Khuldune Shahid, “Gilgit-Baltistan: Pakistan’s Geopolitical Loophole”, The Diplomat, February 16, 2019, at https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/gilgitbaltistan-pakistans-geopolitical-loophole/. Accessed on February 25, 2020.

25. Ajit Kumar Singh, “Pakistan: Brutal Assimilation in Gilgit Baltistan—Analysis”, Eurasia Review, March 12, 2019, at https://www.eurasiareview.com/12032019pakistan-brutal-assimilation-in-gilgit-baltistan-analysis/. Accessed on March 15, 2019. 26. Ibid.

27. “CPEC, a Game Changer for Pakistan, But Disastrous for Gilgit-Baltistan”, ANI, January 9, 2019, at https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/cpec-a-gamechanger-for-pakistan-but-disastrous-for-gilgit-baltistan201801091413540001/. Accessed on March 15, 2019.

28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid.

31. Prabhash K. Dutta, “Beyond Kashmir: Status of Gilgit-Baltistan is a Case in Contrast”, India Today, August 13, 2019, at https://www.indiatoday.in/ news-analysis/story/beyond-kashmir-status-of-gilgit-baltistan-is-a-case-incontrast-1580373-2019-08-13. Accessed on February 25, 2020.

32. Caylee Hong, “Liminality and Resistance in Gilgit-Baltistan,” Legal Working Paper Series on Legal Empowerment for Sustainable Development, Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, 2012, p. 22, at http://cisdl.

Exploitation of Water and Mineral Resources of Gilgit-Baltistan | 81

org/public/docs/Hong_Liminality_and_Resistance_in_Gilgit-Baltistan.pdf. Accessed on March 14, 2019.

33. “Pakistan Mulls Elevating Status of Gilgit-Baltistan on Chinese Insistence”, Dawn, January 7, 2016, at https://www.dawn.com/news/1231394. Accessed on March 14, 2019.

34. Caylee Hong, “Liminality and Resistance in Gilgit-Baltistan”, Legal Working Paper Series on Legal Empowerment for Sustainable Development, Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, 2012, p. 16, at http://cisdl. org/public/docs/Hong_Liminality_and_Resistance_in_Gilgit-Baltistan.pdf. Accessed on March 14, 2019.

7. “India-Pakistan Cross-LoC Connectivity”: Bridging the Gap between Ladakh and Baltistan by Invoking the “Balti Culture” Zainab Akhter

Since partition, India and Pakistan have been involved in various conflicts

ranging from water sharing to border demarcation, and were embroiled

in three full wars, 1947 and 1965, the first and second Kashmir wars; 1971 Bangladesh liberation war; and 1999 a half war in Kargil. However

each war was followed by a major peace declaration and numerous

back-door diplomacy to improve the bilateral relationship between the two countries. The biggest breakthrough came with the revival of the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP)1 in 2004 which is based on the idea

of a structured dialogue process between India and Pakistan formed on a compromised approach. Although the CDP has gone through highs and

lows, to a great degree it was instrumental in transforming the bilateral relations from more state-centric to people-friendly, thus opening the

possibility of a cross-LoC engagement/connectivity between India and Pakistan. As a part of the Confidence Building Measure (CBM), border routes were opened to trade and people’s movement in the state of Jammu

and Kashmir, which also facilitated the union of divided families across the LoC. Nonetheless the cross-LoC connectivity and the opening of border routes, like Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalakot remained more Kashmir-centric.

Ladakh in the northernmost part of the state bordering Pakistan in

the west and China in the east, and Baltistan also known as Balti Yul,

“India-Pakistan Cross-LoC Connectivity” | 83

the northernmost territory in Pakistan, are completely left out from

the narrative of the India-Pakistan cross-border connectivity and the economic and emotional benefits of the cross-border openings. Most of the literature on the history of partition centres around stories of the

people of Punjab and Kashmir region while there is hardly any literature on the partition stories from Ladakh and Baltistan. This chapter tries to

bridge this knowledge gap and makes a case for the need to open border routes between Ladakh and Baltistan. It further argues that the Balti-

culture is the key to connecting the people and has the potential to open the door for people-to-people diplomacy between these two remote Himalayan regions of India and Pakistan.

After remaining an independent kingdom for a long time, mostly

under Tibetan influence, Ladakh was invaded and annexed to the

Sikh Empire by Zorawar Singh, a general of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1834. The Ladakhi people were unhappy with the foreign invasion and planned a rebellion against the Sikhs in 1842. The movement was

crushed and due to proximity to Kashmir and to simplify its rule, the Dogras incorporated Ladakh (including Baltistan) into the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Ladakh and Baltistan became part of the Ladakh Wazarat  (Ladakh Ministry) with three tehsils based in Leh, Kargil

and Skardu under the Dogra rule, with a governor each to administer known as the Wazir-e-Wazarat (Governor). However, post-partition the region got divided between India and Pakistan. Kargil and Leh

were retained on the Indian side while Baltistan was incorporated into Pakistan on the other side of the Line of Control (LoC). During the

1971 war, India managed to take back Turtuk village from Pakistan, but many families were displaced, divided and relocated on either side of

the border. The people of Baltistan and Ladakh are considered peace-

loving. But due to the overall tense relationship between India and Pakistan, the Governments of India and Pakistan have not considered

opening up these border regions, thus building a permanent wall of separation between the Baltis of the mountainous region.

84 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

The Balti Connect

The Baltis are a distinct community whose ancestors migrated from Baltistan to Kargil and Leh or Kargil/Leh to Baltistan before

partition. Even after many years of separation and isolation, what has not

changed is the common culture across both sides of the border. People in Kargil and Baltistan adhere strongly to the  Balti-adab  (mannerism) which makes them distinct from the rest of the population. The language

is spoken by the people in Kargil and Baltistan, and is also known as the Balti dialogue. Compared to the other language Purig-pa2 used by Muslims in Ladakh, the Balti-speaking population is larger and therefore Balti as a language has found its place in the eight schedules of the constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. Radhika Gupta in her article, Poetics and Politics of

Borderland Dwelling: Baltis in Kargil noted that Balti has been accorded

official recognition as one of the eight regional languages through its

inclusion in the eighth schedule of the Jammu and Kashmir constitution. This is based on the pre-colonial 1941 census linguistic enumeration, based

on population numbers.    She further added that considering Baltistan

and Kargil, there were a greater number of Balti speakers compared to

Purgi, which has not been included in the eighth schedule. Despite the Baltis being a minority in numerical terms today, their language has

constitutional status (Gupta 2014). Kargil and Turtuk have the highest

number of Balti-speaking population, and the highest number of divided family ratio compared to the rest of Ladakh.

During my travel to Baltistan in 2017, I had a first-hand experience of

this Balti culture on the other side of the border. Skardu, the main town, looks like Kargil and the Balti-Bazaar in Skardu is a replica of the BaltiBazaar in Kargil, both of which date back to the time of the Silk Route

trade. The language, culture and food habits are like the Kargilis in India

that helped me mingle easily with my relatives and the people of Baltistan. It was found that an important aspect that keeps the Baltis on both sides of the border connected is Balti music. Abbas Anand, a famous Balti singer in Sermikisso is popular in Ladakh for his songs and style of singing. My

cousins in India had requested me to meet him and record his songs on the

“India-Pakistan Cross-LoC Connectivity” | 85

cellphone, which I did. Abbas is a big fan of Dev Anand, the Indian actor

of yesteryear, that’s why he added Anand as his second name. The Balti

singers of Ladakh, like Faizal Ashoor and Shrien Fatima of Turtuk, are

very popular in Baltistan, especially among the youth. Although there is no official channel to access each other’s music, with the advent of the Internet

these Balti songs and ghazals (poetry) are viewed and shared widely on YouTube and other social media forums on both sides of the border.

Despite the influence of Urdu in Baltistan, the Baltis take pride in

their past and have tried to preserve the old Balti culture, which also has traces of Buddhist influence. For example, they are reviving the original Balti written in Tibetan script and are educating the youth about various

cultures from the past shared in common with Ladakh. One of the traditions still prevalent is the celebration of Losar (New Year) along with

Ladakh and Tibet. But it is interesting to note that during the celebrations which are called Jashn-e-Mephang3 in Baltistan they still use fire as part

of the celebrations and perform a special dance with sticks lighted with

fire. This tradition has slowly died down in Ladakh but is still prevalent in Baltistan, indicating their will to hold on to the shared past.

Cross-Border Connectivity between Ladakh and Baltistan The opening of the Uri-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalakot routes

in Kashmir and Jammu, respectively have proved to a great extent

that the cross-border routes have the potential to alleviate emotional

alienation, especially between families divided by borders.  However, in the larger narrative of cross-LoC connectivity, the Ladakh region is

totally neglected. India looks at Kashmir more through the prism of

security and defends the region from outside threats through the prism of its massive security structure. However, despite the volatility of the situation in Kashmir, its borders are open for trade and humanitarian exchange. On the other hand, Ladakh, which is portrayed as the most peaceful region of the state, having amicable relations between army and people, has not been brought into the map of the cross-LoC connectivity.

86 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

Historically, the all-weather Kargil-Skardu (connecting Kargil in

India and Skardu in Pakistan) and Turtuk-Khaplu Road (connecting

Turtuk in India and Khaplu in Baltistan) was a jugular of intra-regional trade on which the local economy was heavily dependent. The IndiaPakistan war of 1948 resulted in the closure of this historic route dividing

the ‘Balti-land’ into Kargil (India) and Baltistan (Pakistan). The people

of Kargil and Turtuk have been demanding the opening of the KargilSkardu and the Turtuk-Khaplu roads based on the larger cross-LoC connectivity project between India and Pakistan. This route has the

potential to become an important trade and tourism link which can also bring respite to the divided families of this mountainous region.

Moreover, it is argued that if Kashmir, being a conflict zone, can have

routes open for trade with Pakistan, why should the same parameter not

apply to Ladakh, which is otherwise considered to be a peaceful place. Also,  the link to Kashmir is snowed in for half of the year. This route delinks what is otherwise an all-weather tourist destination to the climatic

undesirables of weather patterns in Kashmir. As a result, the seasonal

unemployment that Kashmir suffers from is unwittingly imposed on the

Kargil region, which need not be the case. The routes in Ladakh connecting Pakistan can be an alternative all-weather road, which can keep the region

accessible through the long winter months and strategically provide India with rapid access to Central Asia. 

As trade between India and Pakistan is carried out in a third country,

significant revenues are lost, profit margins are reduced, and costs go

up.  Also, several studies indicate the existence of a large smuggling-based black market in the region. Formalisation of direct trade by eliminating

these undesirable aspects can bring an immediate improvement to the quality of life in the region.  These studies also aim to underline that

formalising this trade carries the potential of  increasing governmental income, which can strengthen the local economy by providing the impetus for further growth, independent of what happens in the Kashmir valley. 

The origin of the cross-LoC connectivity can be traced to the

ceasefire between India and Pakistan in 2003. In the following year, a

“India-Pakistan Cross-LoC Connectivity” | 87

series of negotiations between the two countries coupled with a meeting between the then Prime Minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and then President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf took place at the sidelines of

the 2004 SAARC Summit in Pakistan. This had set the stage for the commencement of the cross-LoC interactions. It needs to be stressed here that the demand for the opening of the cross-LoC routes from both

sides were based overtly on humanitarian grounds citing the plight of

the people on both sides of the LoC. The following years 2005 and 2006 witnessed the opening of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad Road (connecting the people of Kashmir to Pakistan) and Poonch-Rawalakot Road (linking Jammu to Pakistan). “In 2006 the understanding was reached between

India and Pakistan to start cross-LoC trade in selected primary products of Kashmiri origin. The Foreign Ministers of both countries met on May 21, 2008, to discuss new and existing Kashmir-specific Confidence

Building Measures (CBMs), and agreed to increase the frequency of Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalakot Bus services and allow intra-Kashmir trade and truck services” (Padder 2014: 4).

The opening of the routes was well received by people, especially by the

business community across the LoC and looked at it as the beginning of the trans-LoC trade. There was a common understanding that the opening of these routes would bring economic prosperity. Most importantly, it was proposed to bridge the gap between the people of India and Pakistan

that would help reduce tension by strengthening the peace process. “The  Karvan-e-Aman,  which brings together families from both sides of Kashmir is momentous for the divided families and enables families

separated since 1947 to unite. The cross-LoC connectivity has opened up

immense possibilities for cooperation between the two sides of Kashmir” (Pattanaik and Anant 2003: 9). Similarly, the Rah-e-Aman facilitates the

meeting of divided families and cross-LoC trade in the Jammu sector. However, it needs to be underlined here that there is one more region in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, i.e., Ladakh that has roots in the IndiaPakistan partition and thus needs attention from the government. As

Haider Ali Askary (2015) rightly points out this disparity when he writes,

88 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

“A lot has been said and written about the divided families in the Kashmir

and Jammu regions. As a result of which the two governments initiated the Uri-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalakot bus services. However, the

thousands of divided families in Ladakh region (particularly Kargil) and Gilgit-Baltistan remained unnoticed.”

Despite the  potential of cross-LoC routes (Kargil-Skardu, Turtuk-

Skardu) and the repeated demand by locals to open these routes, there have been no efforts by the government to connect this region to the larger

cross-LoC narrative. Ravina Agarwal in her book, Beyond Lines of Control: Performance and Politics on the Disputed Border of Ladakh,  eloquently

brought out the reason why the state is only seen through the prism of Kashmir while sidelining the Ladakh region. She wrote, “Kashmir was the popular abbreviation for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The name of

Ladakh, the state’s largest region, did not feature anywhere on our maps” (Agarwal 2004: 2). This can be one reason why the partition and divided

families are only considered as an issue of the Kashmir valley, and there is hardly any knowledge among the masses about the divided families of this mountainous region.

Historically, the all-weather Kargil-Skardu route was a jugular

of intra-regional trade on which the local economy was heavily

dependent.  “This route was one of the most important routes through which many traders and artists travelled all the way from Tibet to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Being on the way at almost a junction point, this region

served as the important purpose of trade and stay” (Nitesh 2015).  The events following partition, specifically the India-Pakistan War of 194748, resulted in the closure of this historic route isolating Baltistan from its

natural linkages to the outside world. Ladakh has many families divided

across the border, most of them concentrated in various border villages of Kargil, Zanskar and Turtuk in Leh. But unlike the divided families in Kashmir and Jammu, they do not have immediate access to their relatives across the LoC. For a person from Kargil, to visit Gilgit-Baltistan, they

must travel from Kargil to Delhi for a visa and to Amritsar/Wagah and to Islamabad and Skardu. “The distance between Kargil district and Gilgit-

“India-Pakistan Cross-LoC Connectivity” | 89

Baltistan is less than 200 km and it takes approximately five hours while the distance they need to travel to meet each other is approximately 3,000 kilometres” (Askary 2015).

Kargil is historically, geographically and culturally more connected

and similar to Baltistan than the Kashmir valley. The deep-rooted Balti

culture keeps the people of Kargil and Baltistan emotionally connected even after so many years of partition. “Haji Abdul Hamid, a native of

Zanskar symbolises this. In 1948 the retreating Pakistan Army, which had occupied the Zanskar heights took many locals and settled them

in Skardu. As a result of tight travel restrictions, they can only meet in Saudi Arabia or Iran during pilgrimages. Since the Baltis do not identify

with the Kashmiri culture, the alleviation of Balti concerns significantly

reduces the scope of what is referred to as the ‘Kashmir Issues’ taking the further wind away from the sails of this monolith construction” (Akhter 2012).

The road from Skardu to Kargil via Srinagar is almost a stretch of

1,700 km, while, at the same time, Skardu is a 173-km or a five to sixhours’ drive from Kargil. The entire route is, at present, suitable for fourwheeled vehicles and may need some widening for a small stretch of

about half a kilometre near the Line of Control (Akhter 2012). The utility

of the Kargil-Skardu Road also lies in its durability in winter months. At present, there is only one pass Zoji-La (NH1), which connects the Ladakh region on the Indian side with the rest of the world. But this

lifeline is cut off for more than six months in winter due to heavy snowfall

and people spend their lives in isolation, especially in Kargil (Leh has aerial connectivity from Srinagar, Jammu and Delhi). 

The opening of the Kargil-Skardu link has the potential of increasing

the inflow of tourists manifold. “At a time when the government sector is shrinking and unemployment is rampant, tourism could possess muchunemployed youth in its fold on both sides. It would also revive the

traditional route for movement of trade and commerce, connecting many neighbouring regions, which was the case till 1947” (Askary 2015).  In addition, the reopening of the road would also give direct access to the

90 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

numerous shrines and religious monuments for the Muslim, Buddhist and Hindu pilgrims who consider them to be sacred. 

Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) and Kargil have extensive tourism potential,

especially adventure tourism, like trekking, mountain biking and river

rafting among others. In addition, there are several routes suitable for

high-altitude jeep safaris. The exploitation of these depends on open circuits with several contingencies and shorter access routes, which are

cut off by the border as of now.  A section of leaders in Kargil have

been demanding a Greater Ladakh that includes Baltistan. Now with the bifurcation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two union

territories, Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir, the pacification between

Baltis on both sides of the border may become possible in the near

future. This card if played right can be the first step towards winning

the hearts of the people of Baltistan, thus giving a chance to India to reconnect with an isolated population with no fundamental rights under the constitution of Pakistan.

Additionally, consolidating a road that intercepts the Karakoram

Highway (KKH) is critically important in times of war, for rapidly

severing this link has been deeply detrimental to India’s security. Moreover, such a road can provide rapid access to Central Asia, should either of

two extremities eventuate—the collapse of Pakistan or rapid warming of India-Pakistan ties.

Conclusion Baltistan is the most ignored part in Pakistan where development has taken a long time to reach the people. It is only after the Karakoram Highway

that people of Baltistan have been able to physically connect to the rest of Pakistan. Compared to Ladakh, the development is at a snail’s pace and

from what I have seen I can say that Ladakh is way ahead in all sectors including education, health and connectivity. On top of this, the invasion of the outsiders (basically Urdu-speaking Punjabis) is a great threat to the

local customs and cultures of the Baltis. Under such circumstances, the Baltis of Baltistan look with great hope towards Ladakh and wish that the

“India-Pakistan Cross-LoC Connectivity” | 91

border routes like Kargil-Skardu and Turtuk-Khaplu should open, which they hope will serve a multifold purpose. First, it will help the reunion of divided families, second, it will bring prosperity to their region through

trade and, most importantly, it will reduce the distance and cost of travel between Ladakh and Baltistan. It is ironical that even though Kargil is just three hours’ drive from Karmang, people from Kargil have to travel all

the way round from Delhi to Amritsar-Lahore-Islamabad-KP, crossing

the Babusar top into Baltistan, which takes many days. This journey is not only long and horrendous but also very costly which most of the people

in Baltistan and Ladakh cannot afford. On top of it, the visa regime is really strict and it is almost impossible to get a visa as an Indian to travel to Baltistan or a Balti from Baltistan to travel to Leh or Kargil.

While, for the divided families of Kashmir, the rules are not that strict

and they can cross the LoC with minimum documents to meet relatives or

conduct trade on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad route. On some occasions, India and Pakistan have not raised any voice against the crossing of

Hurriyat Conference leaders through these routes. It is such an irony that

the only place the divided families from this Himalayan region can meet or send letters to their relatives are during Haj, the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. I have seen many cases, even in my family, when letters from

our relatives in Sermik, Baltistan were brought to us by the Hajis of our native place.

Ladakh is considered a peaceful place and tourists throng the place

in search of Buddha and peace. On the other hand, Kashmir is a declared conflict zone but still its border is open to Pakistan for trade and people’s

movement. However the Indian government’s decision to abrogate Article 370 from the state of Jammu and Kashmir and bifurcate into two union

territories, Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh, has instilled hope among the people of Ladakh. They now believe that their voices will be heard by

the centre and will no more remain hostage to the Kashmir issue. With this the hope of the Baltis in Ladakh with divided families has gone up

that one day the border routes will be opened and that they will be able

to reconnect with their relatives on the other side, Baltistan. The Baltis

92 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

in Baltistan have more hope from these border routes than the China-

Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that will pass through their land. They think that it will not benefit them and the whole game is to provide benefits to mainland Pakistan, especially the Punjab region.

At a time when Gilgit-Baltistan is fighting for their rights, for

representation in the national assembly and when they deeply appreciate the Hill Council system provided to the Kargil and Leh districts, the

Government of India, instead of claiming GB as part of India, should

take small steps towards the welfare of the Baltis in Baltistan by opening

the border routes and making travel between Ladakh and Baltistan easier and relaxed. The UT status granted to Ladakh is also seen favourably

in Baltistan and as a step towards better integration into India. On the other hand, the Baltis in Pakistan have never been able to enjoy their

democratic rights as the region is still clubbed with Kashmir under the Kashmir Affairs Ministry. It is the Kashmir Affairs Ministry in Islamabad which handles all the affairs related to travel to Baltistan, especially for someone from India.

There is a need to organise more conferences in Ladakh and invite the

Balti people from Baltistan and make them feel part of the Baltis in India. Also, the Baltis in Dehradun who are originally from Baltistan must be

brought into the common Balti fold in Ladakh and should be granted the

right to land. Instead of focusing on overall India-Pakistan dialogue over

Kashmir, there is a need to bring Ladakh into the picture by highlighting the issue of Baltis on both sides of the border. Connectivity along this

Himalayan region can be a great confidence building measure between

India and Pakistan, especially at a time when the diplomatic relations are

at a new low post the revocation of Article 370 from the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Notes 1.

The roots of the Composite Dialogue Process date back to May 1997, when at Male, the capital of Maldives, the then Indian Prime Minister, Inder Kumar Gujral, and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, mooted the idea of a structured dialogue or the Composite Dialogue Process.

“India-Pakistan Cross-LoC Connectivity” | 93

2. The language spoken by the Muslims (mainly Sunni) in the Suru valley in Ladakh. 3. Literally translated as a celebration of fire, it is the New Year celebration in Baltistan according to the Tibetan calendar. 

References

Askary, A. Haider (2015). “Kargil-Skardu Road: Only Connect”, Greater Kashmir. May 23, 2015. Aggarwal, Ravina (2004). Beyond Lines of Control: Performance and Politics on the Disputed Borders of Ladakh. Seagull Books.

Akhter, Zainab (2012). “The Kargil-Skardu Route: Implications of its Opening”, Institute of Peace and Conflict, at http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/the-kargilskardu-route-implications-of-its-opening-3614.html Gupta, Radhika, “Poetics and Politics of Borderland Dwelling: Baltis in Kargil”, South Asia Multidisplinary Academic Journal. Samaj Publications, 2014.

Nitesh, Ravi (2017). “Prioritizing Kargil-Skardu Route to Build Line of Confidence”, Rising Kashmir. August 23, at http://www.ravinitesh.com/2017/09/prioritizingkargil-skardu-route-to.html Padder, Sajad (2014). “Cross-LoC Trade: Peace and Process”, Social Science Review of Pakistan, 1(2): 4.

Pattanaik, Smruti S. and Arpita Anant (2010), “Cross-LoC Confidence Building Measures Between India and Pakistan: A Giant Leap or a Small Step towards Peace”, Issue Brief, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Index

Abbasi, Shahid Khaqan 37, 76 Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad 61 Afghan Boundary Commission 13–14 Afghan War (Second) 15 Agha Khan Foundation 27 Aijazuddin, Fakir 29 Aitchison Treaties 12 Aksai Chin xiii, 1, 60 Alam, Muhammad 21 Alam, Sardar Muhammad 40 Al-Badr xii, 41, 52 Ali, Farman 76 Ali, Qurban 22 Anand, Abbas xvi, 84–5 Anand, Dev 85 ancient Indian culture framework in GB 47–8 Anglo-Sikh War first (1845-46) 39 Ashoka, referred by titles of Devanampriya Priyadarshi Raja 48 Ashoor, Faizal 85 Askary, Haider Ali 87–8 Aurangzeb 50 Awami Action Committee (AAC) 75 Ayyangar, Gopalaswami 59 Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) 33, 40, 52 Azad Kashmir xii, 20–1, 26–7, 31n6, 40, 52, 60 Azad Kashmir Interim Constitution Act of 1974 23 Balakot strike 43 Balawaristan National Front (BNF) 44

Balochistan xi, 1, 28, 44, 75 Baloristan (or Balawaristan) 47 Balti-adab xvi Baltis community xvi, 84–5, 90–2 Balti Yul 82 Balwaristan National Front (BNF) 41 Balwaristan Student National Organisation (BSNO) 41 Bangladesh liberation war of 1971 82 below poverty line 34 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) xi. See also China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Beyond Lines of Control: Performance and Politics on the Disputed Border of Ladakh (Ravina Agarwal) 88 Bhutto, Benazir 22, 61 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali 21, 60 Biddulph, Captain J. 54–5 Biddulph, Major J. 49 Bolor 47 Bolor Thinkers’ Forum (BTF) 41 Brown, Major William xiii, 40, 51 Buddhism xi, 47–9 buffer zones xv, 57 Bunji dam 72 Captain Mainprice, note to Indian government 8–11 Chand, Diwan Hari 50 China/Chinese relations with Pakistan 42–3 All-Weather Strategic Partnership xiv, 42–3

Index | 95

and its implications for India 61–3 role in Gilgit-Baltistan and support to Pakistan 52, 78 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) xi, xiv, 25, 42–5, 47, 68, 75, 77–8, 92 and Gilgit-Baltistan 28–9 Imran Khan support for 29 China Roads and Bridges Corporation 74 Chitral territory xiii, 3, 12, 47, 49, 54 British agency besieged in Chitral Fort 17 changes in affairs after death of Maharaja Ranbir Singh 17 Mehtar of Chitral desire to conciliate Kashmir Government 14 ruled by Kashmir 1 Chyle, Oldrich 58–9 Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) between India and Pakistan 82, 92n1 Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) 82, 87 Constitution of India 2, 5 Constitution of Pakistan 37 Daily Baadeshimal 74 Daraddesa 47 Dardistan 48, 53, 55–7 Dayal, A. 11 Dhamija, J. N. 11 Diamer-Bhasa dam project 37, 72–3 Drew, Frederic 49 Durand, Captain A. G. A. 55–6 Durand, H. M. 55 Fatima, Shrien 85 Federally Administered Northern Areas 42 Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) 40, 60–1 Frontier Tribal Regulation (FTR) 21 GB Bar Council 36 GB Democratic Alliance (GBDA) 41

GB National Alliance (GBNA) 41 GB National Movement (GBNM) 41 GB Thinkers’ Forum (GBTF) 41, 45 General Zia-ul-Haq 27, 60 announcement on observers appointment to Federal Council (or Majlis-e-Shoora) and protest by India 21–5 on Northern Areas 21 Gilgit Agency xiii, 1, 3, 7–8, 11–12, 19 administered by British xiii order to hand over (1 August 1947) 9, 51 political agency ilaqas (areas) 13, 15 re-established in 1889 14 total expenditure from 1835 till 1935 15 Gilgit Agent 54–5 Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) 1, 19, 47 administrative changes during PPP government 25 ecological issues in 34–5 Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 22, 33, 42 entitlements granted to 22–3 Executive Order (2018) 23–4, 37, 42, 76 geographical area of 67 geostrategic importance of xiv, 32 growing sectarianism in 26–7 history of 39, 48–51 Hunza and Nagar parts amalgamation with 21 illegally occupied by Pakistan since 1947 39 during imperial times 32 in-between status 77 Islamabad earnings from resources of 67 Jawaharlal Nehru on 2 Karachi Agreement of 1949 (see Karachi Agreement of 1949) languages spoken in 2 Lease Agreement of 1935 2, 4, 40

96 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

legal identity and constitutional status 67 Legislative Assembly demand from Pakistan for provincial status 35–6 local population deprived of benefits 24 multilingual region 20 nationalistic groups opposition of Pakistan high-handedness xii no representation in Pakistan parliament 41–2 part of J&K state 19–21 PIPS study on literacy rate among men and women 33–4 population as per Pakistani census of 2017 20, 29–30 Reform Order 2018 24 religious groups in 20 response of Government of India on situation in 25–6 revolt by Major Brown 33 separation from Azad Kashmir 26 States Department’s reply to Nehru’s notings on 6 ten districts in 51–2 underdeveloped regions in South Asia 68 unemployment rate in 34 Upper House, establishment of 23 Viceroy Mountbatten observation on 3–4 Gilgit Baltistan United Movement (GBUM) 41 Gilgit MSS 48 Gilgit Scouts xiii, 7–8, 35 Gilgit Wazarat xiii, 12–13 administered by Maharaja Hari Singh xiii, 12 Government of India assumed civil and military administration of 16–17 part of J&K state xiii Government of India Act 1935 11–12 Great Game 52–9 Gujral, Inder Kumar 92n1

Gupta, Radhika 84 Gwadar port city xi, 44 Harkat-ul-Ansar xii, 41, 52 Harkat-ul-Mujahideen xii, 41, 52 Harrison, Selig 75 Hasan, Wazahat 45 Hill Council system 92 Hindu Kush-Karakoram-Pamir region 52–3, 56 Hizbul Mujahideen xii, 41, 52 Hunza and Nagar, conflict between 32 Hurriyat Conference 91 Hussain, Amir 76 Imtiaz-ul-Haque 35–6 Indian Independence Act 5 Iraqi, Mir Shamsuddin 49 Islam xi, 47–9 Jahan, Shah 50 Jaish-e-Muhammad xii, 41, 52 Jammu and Kashmir ( J&K) 1, 13–14, 19, 25–6, 29, 31n6, 32–3, 61, 63, 67, 84, 90 conflict zone 91 geographical area of 20 recognition of rights granted to people 36 Jashn-e-Mephang 85 Jinping, Xi 44 Jullundur Doab 39 Kak, R. C. 7 Kalat xiii, 1, 9 Karachi Agreement of 1949 21, 33, 52, 60 Karakoram Highway (KKH) xi, xiv, 26–7, 47–8, 61–2, 73–5, 90 Karakoram National Movement (KNM) 41 Kargil xvi, 30, 47, 50, 59, 82–4, 86, 88–90, 92 Karvan-e-Aman 87 Kasghar-Gwadar corridor pass 28

Index | 97

Kashmir Darbar 7, 9, 17, 51, 55 Kashmiriyat xvi Katur country 17 Keqiang, Li 44 Khan, Abdul Hamid 44 Khan, Ali Sher 50 Khan, General Ayub 43 Khan, Haji Karim Dad 50 Khan, Imran 29, 37, 42, 73 Khan, Liaquat Ali 18 Kharoshthi inscription 48 Khunjerab Pass 75 Khushwaqt country 17 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 28–9 Korbel, Joseph 2, 18, 58 Ladakh xvi, 39, 49, 59, 91–2 and Baltistan, cross-Border connectivity between 85–90 Chinese incursions in 62 established in 1991 50 geographical area of 60 geographical location of 82 invaded and annexed to Sikh Empire by Zorawar Singh 83 used by British as frontier listening posts 53 Ladakh Wazarat (Ladakh Ministry) 83 Lashkar-e-Toiba xii, 41, 52 Line of Control (LoC) (India and Pakistan) xvi, 30, 44, 61, 83 Lok Sabha (Lower House of the Indian Parliament) 22 Lord Curzon xv, 57 Lord Ismay 18 Lord Lytton 16, 54 Losar (New Year) 85, 93n3 magazine Herald 30 Outlook 30 Maharaja of Kashmir 2, 8–9, 16 Majlis-e-Shoora (Pakistani Parliament or Federal Council) 21–5

Makpon dynasty 49 Malik, M. Jacob 58 Malik, Yasin 37 May, Theresa 29 Ministry of External Affairs, India 38 Ministry of Kashmir Affairs 23, 30, 33, 60, 92 Ministry of Kashmir and Northern Affairs (KANA) 52 Musharraf, General Pervez xi, 27, 35, 43, 61, 87 Muslim Conference 60 nationalism 38 National Mineral Policy (2013) 69 National Mineral Policy-2 (NMP-2) 69–70 natural resources, exploitation by China and Pakistan 45 Nayar, Kuldip 21 Nazarana 16–17 Nehru, Jawaharlal xv, 2–6, 18 letter to UNCIP Mission 57–8 Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove (Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri) 25 Nisar, Saqib 73 Northern Area Legislative Council Act 35 Northern Areas Advisory Council (NAAC) 21 Northern Areas Council Legal Framework Order 21, 61 Northern Areas Governance Order of 1994 61 Northern Areas Legal Framework Order (LFO) 22 Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC) 22 Northern Light Infantry (NLI) 52 Northern Territories/Areas 13, 19–25, 30, 35, 52, 57–60 North West Frontier of Pakistan (NWFP) xiii, 1, 9–10, 19, 57 Nurbakhshiya sect of Islam 49

98 | Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan’s Occupation

Open up the West (or Go West) strategy 43 Order of the British Empire (OBE) 19 Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) 33–4 Pakistan Minerals Working Group (2013) 69 Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) 25 Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (POJK) xii, 40, 67 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) xii, 1, 20, 26, 28–30, 44, 60–1 Indian Parliament resolution in 1994 on terrorist training camps in 63 occupied areas under 47 Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 22, 25, 33 Pakistan’s North Indus River Cascade 73 Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) 74 Palola (or Patola) Shahis 48 partition of India and Pakistan 1, 87 conflicts post 82–3, 88 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China 44 presence and activities in GB region 75 political relationship 7–8 Polulo 47 Pragal, Amar Nath 51 Pulwama terror attack 43 Punjabiyat xvi Purig-pa 84 Qureshi, Shah Mahmood 42 Rah-e-Aman 87 Rajatarangini (Kalhana) 48 Rao, P. V. Narasimha 22 river Indus 13 River 13 SAARC Summit (2004), Pakistan 87 Sartaj Aziz Committee 37

Satpara dam 72 Shah, Ahmad 50 Shah, Nathu 49 Shaksgam Valley xiii, 1, 52, 61–2 Sharif, Nawaz 37, 92n1 Silk Route 32, 47 Singh, Baldev 4 Singh, Brigadier Ghansara xiii, 40 Singh, Ghansara 19 Singh, Maharaja Gulab 13, 39, 50 Singh, Maharaja Hari xiii, 15, 19, 40, 51 Singh, Maharaja Pratap 14–15 Singh, Maharaja Ranjit 50 Singh, Manmohan 25 Singh, Raja Ranbir 13–14, 17, 54 Singh, Zorawar 50, 83 Sino-India war of 1962 61 Sino-Pakistan Agreement of 1963 27, 30 South China Sea 28 State Subject Rule (SSR) 27, 31n6 strategic advantages of Pakistan, in GB region 59–61 subsistence farming 34 Supreme Court of Pakistan 22, 35, 37 Treaty of Amritsar (1846) 13, 39, 50 United Kashmir People’s National Party (UKPNP) 41 United Nations 36 United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) xv, 2, 18, 57–9, 71 UN Security Council 58–9 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari 87 Viceroy Mountbatten 3–4 Water and Power Development Authority’s (WAPDA) Water Vision 2025 73–4 Wazir-e-Wazarat (Governor) 40, 50–1, 83 wealth of GB, exploitation of natural

Index | 99

resources by China and Pakistan energy and water resources 72–4 and grievances of people 74–7 mineral resources 68–72 Webb, W. F. 7 Where Three Empires Meet (E. F. Knight) 53 World Bank, GB Economic Report of 70

Xilian, Huang 74 Xuanyou, Kong 43 YouTube 85 Zardari, Asif Ali 44 Zoroastrianism xi, 47