Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39: Local, National and International Perspectives 9781472533128, 9781474235662, 9781472531087

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Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39 Local, National and International Perspectives Julio Ponce Alberca Translated by Irene Sánchez González

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

LON DON • OX F O R D • N E W YO R K • N E W D E L H I • SY DN EY

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

1385 Broadway New York NY 10018 USA

www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2009 by Universidad De Sevilla as Gibraltar y la Guerra Civil española: una neutralidad singular Paperback edition first published 2016 © Julio Ponce Alberca, 2009, 2015 English language translation © Irene Sánchez González, 2015 Julio Ponce Alberca has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: 978-1-4725-3312-8 PB: 978-1-4742-8643-5 ePDF: 978-1-4725-3108-7 ePub: 978-1-4725-2528-4 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ponce Alberca, Julio. [Gibraltar y la Guerra Civil española. English] Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39 : local, national and international perspectives / Julio Ponce Alberca ; translated by Irene Sánchez González. pages cm Originally published as: Gibraltar y la Guerra Civil española : una neutralidad singular. Sevilla : Universidad de Sevilla, Secretariado de Publicaciones, Vicerrectorado de Investigación, 2009. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4725-3312-8 (hardback) — ISBN 978-1-4725-2528-4 (epub) — ISBN 978-1-4725-3108-7 (epdf) 1. Gibraltar—History—20th century. 2. Neutrality— Gibraltar—History—20th century. 3. Spain—History—Civil War, 1936–1939. 4. Spain— Foreign relations—Great Britain. 5. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Spain. I. Sánchez González, Irene, Translator. II. Title. DP302.G4P6613 2014 946.081’34689—dc23 2014020198 Typeset by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk Printed and bound in Great Britain

To my son Julio

Contents Acknowledgements

ix

Introduction

1

1

9

2

3

4

5

6

Britain, Spain and Gibraltar: An Historical Triangle Spanish foreign policy towards Gibraltar in the opening decades of the century Is Gibraltar worth keeping? A special economy The Spanish Republic and British Diplomacy Republic in Spain, alarm in Whitehall The victory of the Popular Front: unease and reaction The Initial Impact of the Civil War in Gibraltar Air and sea combat around the Rock Governor Harington and the British fleet: humanitarian aid and national interest Desperation at the border: the flood of refugees Diplomats, Journalists and Spies at the Rock War and the diplomatic game The role of opinion Espionage from the Rock Gibraltar in the Midst of a Steady War The nationalist ‘consulate’ The evacuation of refugees Economic warfare Tensions with Nationalist Spain The Queipo incident and other political collisions Rumours, threats and relieved tensions

9 15 18 25 25 32 39 39 46 52 61 61 72 78 85 85 90 97 107 107 111

Contents

viii

7

One War Ends, Another Looms A new British goal: strengthening the fortress Strains in a relationship: the Spanish claim to Gibraltar Keeping an eye on Franco

121 121 124 133

Closing Thoughts

137

Illustrations Notes References Index

145 153 175 186

Acknowledgements A book such as this owes a great deal to the many people and institutions that have made it possible. In the first place, I would like to express my gratitude to the Instituto de Estudios Campogibraltareños, the institution that provided the original funding for the research underpinning this work, and more specifically to Mr Rafael de las Cuevas. I am also grateful to the Gibraltar Government Archives and the Garrison Library, both of whom gave me every facility. I am particularly indebted to Mr Finlayson, Dennis Beiso and William Serfaty, always friendly and helpful during my visits to the Rock. Mr Marcarenhas was kind enough to allow me to consult his photographic archive. Mr Manuel Galliano of the Gibraltar government was always most attentive to me. The Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce – diligent and efficient in sending me documents – and Jonathan Jeffries – who has conducted research on Alberto Fava and the trade union movement in Gibraltar – also deserve my acknowledgment. I owe a debt of gratitude to professor Gareth J. Stockey, who had the generosity of allowing me to consult some of his original work prior to its publication. Across the border, I would like to express my gratitude to the staff of the Spanish National Library for their attention and efficacy; to the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco. In the most collegial manner, Professor Sepúlveda had the kindness of sending me several of his articles. I am also indebted to Professor Moradiellos, whose contributions and ideas have enriched this book. I would like to thank the University of Seville for awarding this work the FAMA Prize and publishing the Spanish version of this book in 2009. The University’s Secretariat of Publications, directed by professor Antonio Caballos, was generous enough to release the rights for the publication of this work in English. Last but not least, I would like to thank the graduate researcher Irene Sánchez González, future PhD in History, for her brilliant work as a translator and her insightful suggestions toward the improvement, qualification and rounding-­off of the original Spanish version for its publication by Bloomsbury Publishing. I am of course indebted to this publishing house and to commissioning editor Rhodri Mogford, who has decidedly supported this project from the start. Naturally, I take all responsibility for any errors, inaccuracies or shortcomings.

Introduction Gibraltar represents a great many things. Above all it is a strategic enclave and the peculiar outcome of an historical evolution that has determined most of its unique qualities. Geographically, it shares the features of many other geostrategic points around the world. Indeed the British Empire – based on a dominion of the seas ensured by its powerful fleet – has controlled a number of similar enclaves throughout the last three centuries. Most were abandoned as international politics evolved and the decolonization process took off – such was the case with Aqaba, Aden or Hong Kong. The West Indies also boasted a ‘Gibraltar’ of sorts, known as Brimstone Hill and located in the Lesser Antilles, specifically in Saint Kitts and Nevis. Even the Citadelle of Quebec has been dubbed ‘the Gibraltar of America’.1 There is no shortage of possible comparisons, yet the Rock is different from the rest. In the first place, Gibraltar is a dense combination of sensations, outlooks, religions, traditions and peoples. It hosts a fortress, a military base and a swarm of races. The crag constitutes a geographic peculiarity in the area and is populated with peoples who arrived from abroad after expelling the local population. The British transformed its society, economy and mentality; they re-­organized political power basing it on the all-­ powerful colonial governor. They also introduced physical changes, as the British armed forces moved the border north on several occasions to occupy the isthmus and build an airport, extended the naval base while improving its capabilities and dug tunnels into the milky mass of rock. In keeping with traditional – perhaps superstitious – beliefs, they have also been careful to preserve the Rock’s unique macaque population, for their presence is said to guarantee that the British flag will continue to fly over Gibraltar. These monkeys even had a place in the governor’s official correspondence as late as the 1960s.2 Gibraltar can seduce and surprise; it can upset and attract; it can cause aversion and amaze. For one reason or another, for or against, it hardly ever leaves the visitor indifferent. It comes as no surprise that Gibraltar inspired the last chapter of Joyce’s Ulysses, in which Molly Bloom, in a sleepless stream of consciousness, recalls her childhood on the Rock, including her erotic adventures with Lieutenant Mulvey.3 More recently, Juan José Téllez has portrayed Gibraltar in his Main Street: from the memory of Nelson to that of the labour unionist José Netto (who was highly influenced by the Spanish anarchists that sought refuge in the colony during the Civil War); from its value as a cradle of history to its role as a crossroads for ships, people, goods or services.4 Even the anti-Masonic literature of the late nineteenth century featured Gibraltar, represented as a sinister cave in which Freemasons plotted their conspiracies. There was no limit to the imagination when it came to discrediting the enclave, where the much-­despised Union Jack watched over the Strait:

2

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39 Through this cave of Gibraltar, every impious religion, every false god has passed. A pious hymn has never been heard there. It is the English, the hateful protestant, the hypocritical heretic that has established his dominion there . . . On the floor of the cave there are deformed objects, twisted sheets of iron and steel, red copper plates, tin bars . . . No gold or silver are used in crafting the instruments for high magic . . . The ceremonial objects of this infernal cult are provided in white boxes with red stripes and they have a large inverted L on a green star, in the centre of a triangle . . . Yes, Gibraltar, patch of damned ground, skylight of the infernal kingdom, you were destined to become the anteroom of Satan . . .5

Such passages probably delighted an audience seeking to confirm their belief in the boundless capacity for evil of the British, particularly when it came to inflicting damage on France or Spain. Additionally, these delusions were encouraged by Great Britain’s skilful use of the enclave to protect its Mediterranean empire. Gibraltar played an important role in Great Britain’s espionage networks; in turn, its enemies infiltrated agents into the colony at every opportunity. During the Napoleonic Wars, Gibraltar (like Malta) served as a route for secret couriers crossing the Mediterranean. Aside from being an important base for the naval blockade on France, the Rock also allowed the British to maintain communications with their Eastern European allies (e.g. Austria).6 Spanish and British perceptions aside, foreign travellers visiting Andalusia and Gibraltar stood in awe at the striking contrast between the colony and its surroundings. Their judgement rarely favoured the Spanish, particularly if the visitor came from Northern Europe. Count Moltke wrote: The first step on shore led us into a new world – a wonderful combination of Spain and England. The brilliancy and luxury of a southern sky are here allied with the energy and activity of the North. The red-­coated un-­breeched Highlanders stand like giants among the small brown Spaniards, wrapped in their cloaks, and the slender Arabs . . .7

To be sure, these other descriptions must have been equally satisfying to read – for a completely different audience. The British may have been evil incarnate in the eyes of the Spanish, but the latter were perceived as the poor devils of Europe. At the start of the twentieth century, the Spanish were weak and backward enough for Anglo-Saxon observers to look upon them almost with sympathy. One way or another, the colony’s presence in southern Spain has been a source of conflict in Spanish-British relations. The persistent Spanish claim to the Rock has been met with British indifference or rejection, based on the Treaty of Utrecht and later agreements. As the balance of power has always been unfavourable to Spain, the status quo has not changed. There has generally been brazenness and condescension on one side, a sterile show of pride on the other. Gibraltarians have often found themselves caught in the crossfire, though the ‘Llanitos’ – as they sometimes call themselves – have known to keep in with the right crowd. In this controversy, both sides toss about legal arguments with the added difficulty that certain de facto situations were not contemplated in Utrecht (e.g. the territorial waters or the extension of the airport). It

Introduction

3

may thus appear a paradox that the two powers have traditionally maintained close mutual relations, but several factors account for this. On the one hand, the British had significant investments in Spain that were necessary for the country’s development. On the other, the security of the naval base was dependent upon a healthy relationship with the Spanish, especially given technical advances in artillery and aviation that made Gibraltar vulnerable to an attack from the bay. In fact, not everyone in Great Britain has always defended the preservation of the colony. The first chapter of this book deals with some of the views put forward by prominent British individuals regarding possible alternatives (e.g. exchanging Gibraltar for Ceuta, returning it to Spain, etc.). To be sure, such positions were not widespread, but they are nonetheless interesting. As a curious anecdote, it is worth noting that Adam Smith – the author of The Wealth of Nations – blamed Gibraltar for the rapprochement between France and Spain. In a letter to John St Clair (son of Henry, 10th Lord Sinclair), Smith wrote the following: ‘. . . to the possession of [the barren rock of Gibraltar] we owe the union of France and Spain, contrary to the natural interests and inveterate prejudices of both countries [Spain and Great Britain], the important enmity of Spain and the futile and expensive friendship of Portugal . . .’8 In a discussion of this nature it is always possible to find opposing arguments, even to the point of refuting Adam Smith himself. It is worth recalling, for instance, that the presence of the British fleet in the Strait did Great Britain more good than whatever harm could come from a French-Spanish alliance. Indeed, not long after Smith’s letter was written, the Battle of Trafalgar (1805) marked the start of British supremacy at sea. Gibraltar has celebrated three centuries as a British possession, having rendered invaluable services to the British Empire throughout its history. Its presence has also determined the historical evolution of Spain in the past 300 years. From the humiliation of Utrecht to the sieges of the Rock organized by Carlos III; from the course of the Spanish War of Independence in the south of Spain to the intense smuggling activity; from its role as a refuge for Spanish liberals throughout the nineteenth century to the unilateral extensions of the enclave by moving the border north. Gibraltar played a significant part in the two world wars of the twentieth century, but the Rock had also had a key role in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39). It aided and was witness to the rapid control of the seas by the insurgents. The fortress was also a hotbed of spies, a crossroads for goods, a communications exchange, a naval base for the Non-Intervention Committee and a shelter for refugees. In sum, Gibraltar rendered valuable services during the war, though these were conveniently forgotten in the ensuing decades. Starting in 1954, the relationship between the colony and Spain deteriorated after a rather ill-­timed royal visit and the signature of the bilateral pacts between Spain and the United States, which made Spain feel stronger in its centuries-­old claim.9 Relations progressively worsened culminating in the closing of the border in 1969. After this break, Gibraltar survived by receiving supplies from Great Britain and other countries while continuing to engage in other economic activities (from financial assistance to smuggling). Thus the colony proved that it could survive without Spain; in the 1980s, the latter gave in and reopened the gates in exchange for negotiations which to this day have led nowhere (except for the interesting discussions of a possible co-­sovereignty around the years 2000 and 2001).

4

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

History does not repeat itself and there is no reason to suppose that Great Britain will embrace the same attitude it had in 1969 or to believe that Spain will decide to harass the border decisively in an era of globalization. Moreover, relations between Gibraltar and Spain were not always marked by the hostility felt between 1954 and 1969. On the contrary, co-­existence and fluid relations were the norm in the Campo de Gibraltar throughout the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth. Indeed the border has generally proven quite permeable – and the Spanish Civil War is a case in point. * Despite the existence of a considerable amount of literature on Gibraltar and its history, there is a surprising dearth of research regarding the history of the colony during the Civil War. Likewise, references to the Rock are scarce in the extremely large body of publications devoted to the Spanish conflict. It is striking that even those who experienced the war first-­hand do not grant Gibraltar a significant role in its development.10 In general, it is hardly mentioned except in the context of the early days of maritime war in the Strait. What emerges is the impression that the Strait of Gibraltar was no more than a war theatre during the first few weeks of the war, to be later forgotten once the nationalists established the airlift to the Peninsula and pushed the republican fleet away to the Cantabrian Sea. Hardly anything is said about the role played by the British colony in the fighting that took place in the Strait, the delivery of war supplies, the evolution of the war itself, the movement of merchant ships, the implementation of the plans devised by the Non-Intervention Committee or the relationship between the Peninsula and the Moroccan Protectorate. Even in areas as intriguing as espionage, references to the Rock are scarce or non-­existent, which is odd as Gibraltar was a privileged platform for intelligence activities. A case in point for the dearth of references to the colony is the work of Armando Paz on espionage during the Civil War.11 Fortunately, an increasing amount of literature has recently begun to transform this landscape. Particularly worth mentioning are the works of E. Moradiellos on British policy toward the Civil War, Tom Buchanan’s different approach to the same subject or the research published by Michael Alpert regarding the naval aspects of the war. We cannot forget the work done by Neila on the foreign policy of the Second Republic, the contribution of Avilés to our understanding of French and British attitudes toward the conflict, Isidro Sepúlveda’s research on the nationalist exploitation of Gibraltar or the analyses of asylum policy during the war (Rubio, Moral). Local studies add an important dimension to our knowledge of the subject; particularly worth mentioning are the contributions of Benady, Tornay, Finlayson, Grocott, Jeffries, Beiso, Stockey, Davies, Morales, Algarbani or Escuadra, regarding a variety of specific aspects of the history of Gibraltar and its hinterland in the 1930s. These advances are part of a larger trend initiated by authors such as Preston (on international attitudes toward the Republic), Tusell, Avilés and Pardo (on Spanish foreign policy in the twentieth century), Hugh Thomas (in his ambitious classic on the civil war), Á. Viñas (in his analysis of the international dimension of the war, recently enriched by Sánchez Asiaín) or Michael Seidman (in his study of the causes of the nationalist victory). Naturally, any analysis of Gibraltar’s role during the years of the Civil War relies on a previous understanding of its history throughout other periods. In this respect, we

Introduction

5

must mention the works of Sánchez Mantero for nineteenth-­century Gibraltar, García Sanz for the First World War or the abundant books published by contemporaries of the events throughout the twentieth century. This book draws especially on works written in the 1930s, which have allowed us to track the evolution of Spanish views of the controversy surrounding the Rock. Whereas their tone remained rather moderate during the Republic (despite maintaining that Gibraltar was Spanish), the intensity of the Spanish claim to the Rock increased once the nationalists began to emerge as victors. In this regard, it is worth noting that most of what was published in Spain on this topic in the late 1930s and early 1940s aimed to defend the Spanish right to Gibraltar, with little or no space devoted to the role played by the colony during the Civil War. A noteworthy example is a book published by the Marquis of Mulhacén, Carlos Ibáñez de Ibero, which only mentions Gibraltar directly to refer to eighteenth-­ century negotiations and campaigns to recover the enclave – the work, however, bears the title El Mediterráneo y la cuestión de Gibraltar (The Mediterranean and the issue of Gibraltar). Years later, in the 1960s context of renewed Spanish claims, the abundant literature generated by the controversy used the worldwide process of decolonization as an argument in favour of Spain’s rights. Again, little was said about the period of the Civil War in the succinct historical summaries of the history of Gibraltar written solely to drive home the Spanish point. In Great Britain, a similar phenomenon took hold – with opposing arguments – as seen in Andrews’ Proud Fortress: The fighting story of Gibraltar.12 Writers and their thinking were at the service of politics. Interestingly, later works aiming to break the stalemate also neglected to mention the period of the Civil War. Good examples can be found in Gibraltar: historia de una usurpación (Gibraltar: the history of a usurpation), published by the Spanish Information Service in 1968; or La descolonización de Gibraltar (The decolonization of Gibraltar), published in 1981 by the Spanish International Affairs Institute (Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales) and reflecting a seminar held in 1979. In recent years, a number of studies in other fields have broached the subject of Gibraltar. Among the most comprehensive works is one coordinated by Jesús Salgado and titled Estudios sobre Gibraltar (Studies on Gibraltar, 1999). It includes works by José Uxó Palasí (on Gibraltarian identity), Fernando Olivié (on Gibraltar in Spanish foreign policy), Andrés Fernández and Jorge Uxó (on the economic aspects of the issue), Ángel Liberal Lucini (on the military aspects), Salustiano del Campo (on the contemporary situation in Gibraltar and its hinterland) and the book’s coordinator (offering thoughts on possible solutions to the issue).13 Yet even in works of such broad scope, references to the Civil War are scarce. The multidisciplinary approach taken in The Strait of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, by Scott C. Truver, is also attractive. The book constitutes the fourth volume in a series of studies organized by the Center for Marine Policy at the University of Delaware, focusing on international straits around the world. It is a comprehensive work covering topics such as pollution in the Strait, the dynamics of the sea in the area, naval power in the region, the Strait’s history or the legal regulation of the use of its waters. Needless to say, this work also has little to contribute on the Civil War.14 Given the lack of publications analysing the history of Gibraltar during the Civil War, it has been indispensable to consult archival material. Among them, five archives

6

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

have proven fundamental. Two are British: the Gibraltar Government Archives and the British National Archives (formerly known as the Public Record Office). The remaining three are Spanish: the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (now extinct and in the process of transferring its holdings to other national archives), the Archivo General de la Administración (one of several Spanish national archives) and the holdings of the Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco. The first group offer valuable information on the attitude of the British government and the Gibraltarian authorities before the Civil War. As for the two Spanish public archives, their holdings include the documents produced by the two consulates existing in Gibraltar during the Civil War: the official republican consulate and the unofficial nationalist one (which became official in 1939). The Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco is home to valuable documents about Gibraltar kept among the former Head of State’s personal documents. Nevertheless, the information that can be retrieved from these archives is not all of the same quality. Two examples may illustrate this. The documents held in the Fundación Francisco Franco are very limited in number and largely include information that can be found in other archives as well. The Gibraltar Blue Books held at Kew, for their part, are only relatively interesting as they provide the official account – they certainly offer valuable data, but the result is a strictly official (perhaps too official) view of the colony. There are significant omissions in the Blue Books, such as neglecting to mention exports and imports in the section devoted to commercial traffic (as Gibraltar is a free port). Fortunately, the above are exceptions. Most of the archival material we have accessed has helped us reconstruct – solidly, we feel – the period analysed in this book. The tapestry has been enriched with other available sources that are reflected in the final outcome, including historical press accessed either online (e.g. The Times online) or on-­site (at the newspaper libraries of Madrid and Seville). We have also located a number of individual documents in a diverse set of archives (for instance, the correspondence of Diego Martínez Barrio at the Spanish National Archive in Madrid). Additionally, we have investigated Freemasonry at the General Archive of the Spanish Civil War (Salamanca). To an extent, we have sought to complement the above with potential audiovisual sources, though these offer very limited possibilities. An internet search allows us to verify the existence of a number of films, documentaries or isolated sequences having to do with Gibraltar, but they are extremely diverse in the topics they cover.15 In general, they offer little or no information on what happened on the Rock during the Spanish Civil War, at least in the few works we have had the opportunity to view, as access tends to be extremely complicated in most cases.16 In contrast, there are abundant photographic sources that help illustrate the history of Gibraltar during this period. * Other sources would probably be useful in complementing the conclusions of this work. In this respect, we would like to point out the advisability of making certain archives available to researchers, such as those of the Masonic Institute. There may well be company archives worth exploring, as well as other collections belonging to private individuals, which should perhaps be added to the holdings of the Gibraltar Government Archives or other public institutions with sufficient means to look after

Introduction

7

these documents. A fellowship granted by the government of Canada in 2005 afforded us the opportunity to consult several sources at the library of McGill University (Montreal), the research centre of the Canadian War Museum and the National Library of Canada (both in Ottawa). We are thus aware that there remain potential new sources to explore. Nonetheless, and despite the unfinished nature of historical research, we feel that the overall results put forward in this book accurately reflect the events that took place during the Civil War in Gibraltar. In this regard, we can anticipate that Gibraltar clearly exemplified the calculated non-­intervention policy promoted by Great Britain. It remained formally neutral, though the authorities and businesses present on the Rock favoured a nationalist victory in more ways than one. The British colony played a strategic role in the development of the Spanish Civil War, and the insurgents were wise to secure control of the Strait in the early weeks of the conflict. Soon, Gibraltar’s relations with its immediate hinterland were re-­established and a mutually beneficial commercial relationship began. In the meantime, the Republic’s presence at sea was divided into two areas that had been cut off from each other, as communications between the republican fleet in the Cantabrian Sea and its Mediterranean bases (Cartagena, Menorca) passed through the Strait. While this was the position of the British government, that of British public opinion also deserves to be explored. In general, it is difficult to say with any certainty how the British public felt about the appeasement policy of Baldwin and Chamberlain and its effects in Spain. After 1937 Great Britain held no elections until 1945, after the end of the Second World War. We are no better equipped to know how the inhabitants of Gibraltar felt, particularly as they had no truly democratic rights under the colonial administration. Nevertheless, we know that the Gibraltarian authorities – particularly governor Harington and those responsible for the Royal Navy – hardly bothered to conceal their sympathy for the nationalists. Nor did Gibraltarian businessmen, who saw the peace imposed in the nationalist zone as a better guarantee for business than the Republic’s socialist tendencies. Yet these attitudes coexisted with the generous aid provided by many Gibraltarian citizens to Spanish republicans. Ultimately, British conservatives did not wish to drag Europe into a war caused by the situation in Spain, especially as long as they had the security that communism would be contained in the Iberian Peninsula. Labourists were no more willing to endanger the stability of Great Britain for the sake of Spain. They sympathized with the republican cause and equated it with the cause of freedom against the fascist threat, but were not keen to defend the social paradise promised by communism. The communist threat – real or perceived – determined the attitudes of many. In the end, what was most important was preserving British investments in Spain, the possession of Gibraltar and the presence of Spain under the Union Jack’s sphere of influence. These were the goals of every British cabinet, and Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain did as was expected of them. The theatre of politics worked its magic, to the surprise only of idealists or individuals lacking insight into the situation. As always, the war and its outcome were the result of a play of interests.

1

Britain, Spain and Gibraltar: An Historical Triangle Spanish foreign policy towards Gibraltar in the opening decades of the century Spain limped into the twentieth century licking its wounds after the humiliating defeat of the Spanish-American War. The loss of its last remaining colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific had shed a blinding light on the country’s weakness and illuminated its less than secondary role. Internationally, it was a minor power of rather meagre significance, dependent on true world powers like France or Great Britain. Nor could it have been very active, with its ever-­dwindling fleet, its lack of natural resources and a domestic crisis in which a longing for regeneration was not enough to erase a national sentiment of impotent desperation. In the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico, the Spanish flag had been lowered: the United States had consolidated its uncontested hegemony in the Caribbean and Southeast Asia. The year was 1898. On 4 May, British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury delivered a famous speech at the Albert Hall, declaring that there two types of nations in the world: the dying and the living.1 In this bluntly expressed synthesis of international Darwinism, Spain clearly had one foot in the grave. Having been defeated by Philippine revolutionaries in the Battle of Binakayan, it was yet to face the worst of its fate in Cuba. From a British perspective, the Spanish had no possible role other than that of an extra, subjected to the biddings of great powers and, more specifically, of Great Britain itself, who had vested interests in the Iberian Peninsula. The most important of these, needless to say, was the strategic base of Gibraltar. Spain was thus a likely pawn in the struggles between dominant nations. This was true not only of the Peninsula, but also of the country’s islands (Canary and Balearic) and North African possessions (Ceuta and Melilla), all coveted by the great colonial powers. During the disastrous Spanish-American War, the United States had even made plans to take over the Canary Islands. That they did not materialize was the result of French insistence on expediting the peace agreements, thus avoiding an uncomfortable American presence near French Morocco.2 In the early decades of the twentieth century, Spain would find little room for manoeuvre. Against the backdrop of acute political instability, loss of credibility of the two main parties and a precarious economic and social atmosphere, there was little the nation could do to pursue a strong or truly independent foreign policy. The Spanish

10

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

fleet was barely capable of defending its closest, most vital interests. Nor was the country’s strategic location very helpful – Spain’s nominal sovereignty over the axis linking the Canary Islands, the Strait of Gibraltar and the Balearic Islands placed the country at the centre of great power interests. For Great Britain, passage of the Strait was fundamental in accessing its Mediterranean enclaves (Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Alexandria) and the route to its possessions in the Indian Ocean (Suez, Aden). The Strait was equally important to France, since it connected its Mediterranean and Atlantic ports; additionally, the Balearic islands were on the route from Marseilles to North Africa. Under such circumstances, there were two available options. One was to rearm in order to acquire certain autonomy as a neutral power; the other was to find shelter under the security umbrella provided by the great powers. The latter was chosen mainly because Spain lacked the strength to build up the military capabilities needed to resist a strong attack. This resignation to the reality of its international standing was combined with an attempt to maintain a certain status quo through alliances with France and, especially, Great Britain. Having good rapport with the British required accepting their colonial presence in Gibraltar, respecting their investments in Spain and embracing the protection provided by the Royal Navy’s surface vessels. There was no Atlantic ambition left to speak of in Spanish foreign policy – a telling symptom of the country’s weakness. At most, the Spanish hoped to maintain their international position by guaranteeing the security of the south through an expansion into northern Morocco. In this regard, they were perfectly aligned with the interests of the British, who rejected the presence near Gibraltar of any foreign fleet, be it the French naval force or – even worse – the emerging German Kriegsmarine. For the above reasons, the foreign policy implemented during the reign of Alfonso XIII was defined by three basic tendencies: (1) good relations with France and Great Britain; (2) an emphasis on the south (Morocco); and (3) neutrality in conflicts among great powers.3 As far as Gibraltar was concerned, this could only mean that it would remain undisputedly British. Spain was in no shape to lay claim to it – and the British were by no means willing to give it up. In the short term, the situation was clearly not going to change and the only rational position for both sides was to pursue cordial relations. The long time gone by since the British flag had been raised on the Rock (in 1704), the relative permeability of the border and the amicable relations between Gibraltar and its hinterland made it relatively simple to push the problem aside. Nonetheless, British demands on such a weak and dependent country occasionally led to friction. In 1898, the British became concerned with the potential threat posed by the installation of hostile artillery near Gibraltar. Relations were tense between Great Britain and France as a result of colonial competition over Egypt, and the possibility of a joint French-Russian attack on the naval base was disquieting. To keep Spain from establishing an alliance with the enemies of Great Britain, an agreement was negotiated whereby the Spanish government relinquished the right to build defences less than seven nautical miles from the Rock.4 This was yet another humiliation for the Spanish, who received no guarantees regarding the strengthening of the defence of Gibraltar or the expansion of the colony’s limits towards the isthmus. Yet there was little the Spanish could do given the significance of British investments in the Peninsula,

Britain, Spain and Gibraltar: an historical triangle

11

the primacy of the Royal Navy and the power of the British Empire. In fact, Great Britain actually increased both the protection and the size of its enclave over the following years. The colony’s defences were modernized and the Gibraltar-Spain border was moved further into the isthmus, taking over part of the neutral zone in the interest of acquiring space for future landing strips. Advances in aviation made such a move advisable and Spanish weakness made it possible. The British seized the occasion. Significant construction work was undertaken in Gibraltar from 1895 to 1905. A protected port was built, whose docks were designed to accommodate the largest units in the British fleet. In a time of armed peace and colonial competition, the modernization of Gibraltar’s infrastructure was meant to reinforce the colony’s standing as a combined fort and naval base. The axis going from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea played a pivotal role in the preservation of the British Empire. In this regard, the Rock was the key to a British-­dominated Mare Nostrum and its guardians were aware that its only vulnerability was the possibility of artillery or infantry attacks by land. Great Britain obviously understood that maintaining good relations with Spain was the best way to ensure the preservation of Gibraltar, but it nonetheless strengthened its artillery and port to prepare for possible conflicts. Luckily for the British, Spain did not have the military capabilities to represent a serious threat to the enclave, and the Foreign Office was aware that the best guarantee was Spanish weakness and lack of strong international alliances. In other words, Spanish neutrality and its severe limitations as an international power were more important to the defence of Gibraltar than the quality of the colony’s infrastructure. In fact, British MP Thomas Gibson Bowles highlighted the shortcomings of Gibraltar’s defences in case of a Spanish alliance with Britain’s enemies,5 yet Spain’s feebleness made this scenario unlikely. If anything, Gibraltar could fear an attack on its shores from another country and it was thus more important to focus on the naval aspects, controlling the Strait and preparing for a possible sea attack, than on defending the colony from an attack by land. Construction work continued as planned and the naval base was considerably improved. Even if Spanish neutrality provided a sense of safety, it was convenient to adapt Gibraltar’s military installations for their use by large surface units. In 1908, the British continued to expand their control of the isthmus, moving the fence north and effectively taking over part of the so-­called neutral zone. According to the Treaty of Utrecht, no installations were allowed on that area, but the Spanish had authorized the British to expand toward the area during a yellow fever epidemic in 1815; in 1854, there was another advance due to a cholera epidemic. Afterwards, Great Britain had failed to retreat to the previous border. Now, half a century later, they moved the fence to the middle of the neutral zone, a fait accompli that Spain could do nothing to stop.6 The Spanish had agreed to the Pact of Cartagena, which tied them to Great Britain and France in opposing German ambitions in Morocco, and lacked the means to cut ties and decrease their dependence. The British move was defensive and basically sought to increase Gibraltar’s capacity in preparation for expected advances in combat aviation, but it was nonetheless an encroachment on neutral ground.7 The action also seems to have been carefully planned. In fact, the 1st Battalion of the Border Regiment was deployed in Gibraltar from 1906 to 1908.8 The enhancement of the base’s capabilities ran parallel to an expansion onto the isthmus designed to make room for

12

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

more units, whether naval, aerial or terrestrial. In this respect, Bowles was right in his insightful quip that Gibraltar was not so much a key to the Mediterranean as the hook on which the key hung9 – the fundamental instrument was not the Rock itself, but rather the military forces that it was home to. Additionally, it was important to count on Spanish acquiescence, a tacit approval that was guaranteed as long as Spain lacked the strength to recover a colony located on its territory. Fortunately for the British, this had been the case since 1704. With these goals accomplished, Great Britain could be satisfied. Spanish foreign policy remained mired in Moroccan affairs and was soon to face the struggle of staying neutral during the First World War (1914–18). In Spain, Morocco was seen as a chance to compensate for the colonial losses endured in 1898 and a way to recover international prestige. Both France and Great Britain were willing to grant Spain an area of expansion in Northern Morocco (1904 French-British agreements, initiating the Entente Cordiale). After negotiations regarding this redistribution of Moroccan territory and several other episodes (Algeciras Conference, Second Melillan campaign, expansion towards Asilah – Larache – Ksar el Kebir), the Hispano-French Treaty of 191210 established the limits of the Spanish protectorate in Morocco, only a few months after the Treaty of Fez between France and the Moroccan Sultanate. Securing the territory was yet to require years of fighting, the loss of many lives and considerable military expenditures. Spanish weakness as a colonial power was highlighted by its struggle to control the Rif (Battle of Annual, 1921). In the end, Spain relied on French aid in a 1925 landing at Alhucemas Bay. The country remained under the French and, especially, British spheres of influence. Spanish neutrality during the Great War was constrained by this situation and its policy was indeed much more favourable to the Allies. Spain respected the newly expanded British presence in Gibraltar; more significantly, it allowed Great Britain to make extensive use of the naval base and its surrounding waters, aside from maintaining an intense commercial relationship with the Rock, where water and food were needed. The Spanish also cooperated in law enforcement tasks against German spies and acts of sabotage carried out from the Campo area.11 Spanish Cabinets were too concerned with the defence of Morocco to risk endangering cordial relations with Great Britain over Gibraltar. Thus, the British were free to carry on with the war and use the enclave as they saw fit, knowing that Spain would represent no obstacle. Throughout the Great War, the Rock served as a secure naval base where maritime traffic could find shelter from German submarines, as well as being a gathering place for diplomats and spies. British military units occasionally made brief stops at the Rock before being deployed elsewhere, as in the case of part of the Middlesex Regiment, en route to Egypt in 1915. The British had originally doubted that German submarines would be able to operate in the Mediterranean, but they realized their error upon verifying that they had made their way there using two different routes. The first was through the Adriatic Sea, after transporting components by land and assembling them on the Adriatic coasts, controlled by Austria-Hungary. The second route was directly through the Strait of Gibraltar, where they had passed undetected right in front of the British enclave (at the time, submarine detection instruments were still primitive and it was relatively simple to discreetly cross the Strait

Britain, Spain and Gibraltar: an historical triangle

13

while submerged). The subs began operating in 1915 and managed to stage attacks near the Rock,12 the intense submarine warfare turning the triangle formed by the Balearic Islands, the Costa Brava and Malaga into an extremely dangerous route. Espionage and intelligence activities also had important consequences. The Allies sent frigate Captain Filippo Camperio to Gibraltar and later to Madrid, tasked with the creation of an intelligence service.13 Involved in these affairs was the peculiar Juan March, a well-­known bootlegger for whom Gibraltar was a key instrument. Aside from smuggling, March dabbled in other dubious activities, including selling information to the Germans and cashing in on insurance policies for boats sent deliberately to meet the German submarines. He was also in touch with the chief of the Gibraltarian secret service (Colonel Charles Julian Thoroton). The writer A.E.W. Mason, a British secret service agent operating between Spain, Gibraltar and Morocco during the Great War, had persuaded Thoroton to establish a broad intelligence service in Gibraltar and make it permanent after the end of the conflict. And so it was done: the governor, General Noel Mason MacFarlane, personally headed the Gibraltar secret service during the Second World War (from May 1942 to February 1944), while Colonel W.F. Ellis was in charge of the organization in Tangier.14 The Rock was also the site of conversations in search of a separate peace agreement with Turkey, in the context of the earliest attempts to provide Jews with a homeland in Palestine.15 But the Great War, despite bringing material benefits to Spain, had political consequences that crystallized in the nationwide crisis of 1917, when the country’s leadership was faced with the creation of military juntas challenging civilian power, with the Parliamentary Assembly held that year, with growing tensions in Catalonia and with the increased belligerence of the Spanish labour movement. Few periods in Spain’s history have been as critical as the years between 1917 and 1923. The military grew stronger as civilian politicians lost credibility, and the road to dictatorship was paved. In September 1923, General Miguel Primo de Rivera led the coup d’état that gave way to a new regime. Yet this regime change did not bring about a Copernican shift in Spanish foreign policy. The country remained weak and at the mercy of the continent’s great powers. Primo de Rivera’s regime, like those before him and those that would follow, was strongly dependent on trade with the British. The latter owned financial institutions, extractive firms (Rio Tinto) and water supply companies (in Seville, for example). These businesses exerted great pressure and maintained a strong flow of imports and exports between Great Britain and Spain.16 British names were also prominent in the wine industry (Sandemann, Byass, Williams & Humbert, etc.). Primo de Rivera contemplated a closer partnership with Mussolini’s Italy, but it was necessary for Spain to be on good terms with France in order to put an end to its Moroccan troubles and defeat the insurgents led by Abd-­el-Krim. For this and other reasons, the Spanish dictator’s trip to Italy in November 1923 was of little practical consequence, whereas two years later an agreement would be sealed with France to complete the conquest of Morocco (Madrid Conference of 1925). The result was a joint landing at Alhucemas. Spain asserted control over the hinterland of its protectorate, though Primo de Rivera advanced the idea of abandoning it (by trading in Ceuta for Gibraltar), taking the city of Tangier (in order to control the Tangier-Ceuta-Melilla strip), or slightly expanding

14

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

the perimeters of Ceuta and Melilla. Neither France nor Great Britain was amenable to these ambitions. Having failed to control Tangier or recover Gibraltar, Spain felt compelled to withdraw from the League of Nations in protest. The 1926 Treaty between Spain and Italy (7 August) was also of little substance. Ultimately, Spain was forced to accept its prostration and follow the guidelines set by France and Great Britain, re-­ joining the League of Nations in 1928 without the permanent position it had insistently demanded.17 Spain’s precarious international standing did not give Primo de Rivera much of an opportunity to openly lay claim to Gibraltar. Indeed, the dictator focused on Tangier and the Rock went on being a piece of land unsuccessfully claimed by Spain. Whereas Gibraltar was a key piece in the foreign policy of Great Britain, it was little more than a matter of national pride for the Spanish. With such differing views and faced with a highly unfavourable balance of forces, Spain was in no position to recover the Rock and the British well knew it. Perhaps the most interesting phenomenon of this period was Spain’s insistence on raising the possibility of exchanging Gibraltar for another territory. Though the idea was not new, it became salient during Primo’s dictatorship. In the critical year of 1917, the dictator delivered a speech at the Royal Spanish-American Academy (Real Academia Hispano-Americana) in Cadiz, titled ‘The recovery of Gibraltar’. In his talk, he proposed recovering Gibraltar in exchange for Ceuta. Other military figures made similar proposals. Colonel Jenevois suggested exchanging the Rock for the Chafarinas Islands, and even Admiral Grey considered that swapping Gibraltar for Ceuta would be advantageous to Great Britain. Gibraltar’s former assistant chief of naval staff (Joseph Kenworthy, Lord Strabolgi) echoed these views. Their positions were backed by solid arguments, including the Rock’s vulnerability in the event of a ground attack combined with artillery fire, which could potentially ravage both the city of Gibraltar and its naval base. The implication was that preserving the Rock required a good-­ neighbour policy designed to keep Spain from ever forging an alliance with the enemies of Great Britain – a rather irksome necessity that would cease to exist with the possession of Ceuta or strategic islands such as Menorca or the Chafarinas.18 Yet no such exchange would ever take place, as several obstacles stood in the way. On the one hand, giving up part of Spain’s sovereign territory (whether insular or North African) in exchange for Gibraltar would have been deemed an intolerable act of spinelessness by certain sectors of the Spanish public. On the other, the British continued to regard Gibraltar as a secure possession in view of the Spanish inability to pose a serious threat. It was this sense of security that determined Eduardo Dato’s failure to reap any rewards for Spanish neutrality during the Great War. It would hardly have been sensible to abandon Gibraltar for Ceuta, as the latter would have demanded a larger garrison and could have been interpreted by the French as a threat. Spain’s feebleness was Gibraltar’s guarantee, as well as serving as a powerful argument against Spanish claims – a minor power was not fit to assume responsibility for such a strategic stronghold.19 For the British, the costs associated with maintaining Gibraltar were significantly smaller than in the hypothetical case of Ceuta; for the Spanish, the idea of a swap lost its appeal as the country continued to strengthen its position in northern Morocco and Ceuta emerged as a key base for the control of its African territories.

Britain, Spain and Gibraltar: an historical triangle

15

Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship gradually abandoned the notion as Spain managed to pacify the Moroccan Protectorate. In fact, the British had never been seriously interested in such a swap. Gibraltar was more than a military and naval base – it was a jewel of the Empire and a showcase of Britain’s unabashed pride. The Rock guarded the entrance to a sea under British dominion in a world where Great Britain’s naval prowess remained undisputed. At the start of the century, Bowles had already foreseen that the British would never relinquish their Rock in exchange for Ceuta or Menorca, no matter how many military analysts declared the former as valuable as Gibraltar and the latter superior.20 He was not mistaken. Throughout the century, Gibraltar was to face myriad difficulties. Yet the Rock always managed to weather the storm, standing the test of time.

Is Gibraltar worth keeping? Views favouring the exchange of Gibraltar for other possessions were neither new nor born in the twentieth century. To the contrary, during the nineteenth century British voices had questioned the convenience of holding on to the Rock as a strategic naval base. Salvador de Madariaga and a number of other authors later compiled a number of these British arguments. Among them were those laid out in Captain Warren’s 1882 leaflet entitled ‘Gibraltar: Is it Worth Holding? And Morocco’, which argued that it would be best to let the Rock go and gain control of a more secure port such as Ceuta.21 In 1917, Frederick Harrison went further in a letter to the Manchester Guardian: ‘For the two hundred years that we have held this town we have made it a resort of smugglers, gipsies, vagabonds, African rogues, Spanish rebels – a sentina gentium. As a systematic emporium for the smuggling of Spanish products into Britain, of British goods into Spain, for generations Gibraltar was notorious.’ Harrison also noted that advances in artillery had made the base more vulnerable and that holding on to it as a colony cast a long shadow of doubt on the sincerity of Great Britain’s respect for nationalities and abhorrence of imperialist domination22 – a rather curious argument for the world’s leading colonial empire, to be sure. In any event, whatever arguments the critics may have made against continued possession of Gibraltar were unappreciated by the majority of British opinion. More in tune with the latter were the guidelines drawn up by the Foreign Office secretary in 1782. The document had put forward the idea that the Rock was one of the most important British possessions – it was a source of prestige, guaranteed British supremacy and was an instrument giving Great Britain great leverage as it could make life difficult for other nations from such a strategic enclave. Should Gibraltar be returned to Spain, the Mediterranean would become no more than a lake where anyone and everyone would be able to navigate. Europe’s Mediterranean nations would no longer consider the British the ultimate guarantors of the freedom of the seas, and hence Great Britain would lose its most important asset in any alliance.23 Only a few years later, Gibraltar was to play a key role in the decisive British victory at Trafalgar. There was no question that the Rock was a key to the Royal Navy’s control

16

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

of the Mediterranean. In the 1920s, the British fleet was reduced by virtue of the FivePower Treaty (1922), and the 1930 Treaty of London further diminished its forces. Even so, the Mediterranean fleet remained an impressive force composed of six Iron Duke-­class battleships, six cruisers, sixteen destroyers and a flotilla of submarines. Its supporting bases were Malta and, to a lesser extent, Gibraltar. In 1922, it was decided that the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets would conduct joint operations every spring, performing tactical exercises. Though these were mostly convoy escort operations, in the early 1930s the fleets also practised operations involving attacks on Gibraltar and the defence of the garrison. After finishing the exercises, the dark-­grey vessels of the Atlantic fleet and the lighter ones of the Mediterranean fleet would meet at the port and the crew disembarked at the Rock.24 These were the symbols guaranteeing freedom of navigation, and it was Britain’s prerogative to grant such a right. At the end of the Roaring Twenties, nobody foresaw any changes to the status quo. After the Great War, the British remained in control of the Empire and strengthened their ties with the US. Meanwhile, continental Europe was calm owing to a combination of prosperity, revived liberal regimes and a set of authoritarian dictatorships including Primo de Rivera’s in Spain. The most severe threat lay to the east, where the Soviet Union embodied an alternative economic and political system. There was no reason to hand back Gibraltar, and little reason to believe that there could be no future scenario in which it would again prove essential to British interests. In 1928, Sir Alexander John Godley became the new Governor, a post in which he was to remain until 1933. Godley did not consider the Rock vulnerable: Bombing the town would produce no tangible effect on the military defence of the fortress. The harbour is a very small target, and to hit these targets with any certainty, or even probability, airplanes would have to fly extremely low. This they cannot do, in close proximity to the Rock. Not only would they have to encounter the well-­known Levanter, an easterly wind which is both tricky and dangerous (as I know from my own experience in sailing in the harbour), but there are innumerable air-­pockets which cause airplanes to give the Rock a wide berth . . . Even in the unlikely event of an attack from land the danger to Gibraltar seems remote. To do any conceivable damage guns would have to be of a calibre at least approximating to that of our old friend Big Bertha. Such guns might cause a lot of annoyance and uneasiness, and a few casualties, but, in my judgment, they would have no more effect on Gibraltar’s security than Big Bertha had on that of Paris in 1918. [The population would be] immune from danger, either from the air or from long-­range guns, thanks to the galleries, tunnels, and caves in the Rock which are available for shelter . . . Gibraltar is secure. With His Majesty’s ships controlling the harbour we may rest assured that this important jewel of the Crown is in safe hands.25

Britain, Spain and Gibraltar: an historical triangle

17

From London’s vantage point, advances in artillery and aviation did not endanger Gibraltar and the exchange of the Rock for another enclave represented too high a risk. In general, the population of Gibraltar was not a serious threat to the power of the colonial authorities and the inhabitants of the enclave accepted their subordinate position as colonized peoples, a principle which could not be taken for granted in the case of an enclave such as Ceuta. Furthermore, the motherland was hardly eager to grant the Rock true self-­government capabilities, despite certain decentralizing measures taken for effect – for example, the creation of the City Council in 1921. After the traumatic experience of the First World War, it was a time of change and uncertainty for colonial empires.26 In a letter sent by Lord Moyne to Mr Amery about the organization of the Empire, the former expressed very strong feelings against granting enclaves self-­government. In his own words: ‘Some colonies are so small, or strategically so important, that complete self-­government seems out of the question . . .’ .27 After the Great War, the level of activity at the Rock’s naval base diminished. Post-­ war economic woes and a policy of budget cuts in defence caused a reduction in the demand for labour, prompting workers who visited the enclave daily to search for jobs elsewhere. This affected the demography of Gibraltar and its neighbouring areas, to the point that La Linea lost 44.06 per cent of its population over the course of the 1920s and the rest of the region witnessed a 20.56 per cent decline. Only Algeciras, Los Barrios and Tarifa saw a slight increase in population. Gone were the days of the port’s expansion and the economic prosperity made possible by the world war. The Rock remained the economic engine of the Campo de Gibraltar, but it did not regain buoyancy until the late 1930s, following rearmament activities and the enhancement of its military facilities.28 Gibraltar was also home to a diverse society in constant contact with Spain. Political emigrants continued to approach the border in order to flee repression or plot conspiracies, just as they had done during the previous century. In the final years of Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship and during the Second Republic, political dissidents provisionally found refuge in Gibraltar before continuing their journeys to other destinations. Yet the Rock’s limitations meant it was ill-­suited to permanent stays and the British always sought to avoid sheltering a large number of exiles and thus risking conflict with Spain. Gibraltar was meant to be a military base, not a safe haven for the Spanish opposition. Nor was it supposed to be a warehouse for smuggled goods – but on this point the military authorities were willing to look the other way and tolerate the illegal distribution to Spain of certain products, especially tobacco.29 To be sure, this would have been unacceptable in other parts of the Empire, but the British were well aware of Gibraltar’s peculiarities, including the fact that it lacked agricultural or industrial potential and that the Spanish authorities were incapable of putting an end to such trafficking. Beyond maintaining cordial relations, the British did not hold their neighbours in particularly high esteem. Their feelings towards the peculiar group of British subjects known as Gibraltarians were no warmer. They had no political rights, the military governor held all power and many Britons appeared to deem themselves superior to Gibraltarian civilians. Known as ‘rock scorpions’ in the military jargon,30 they were necessary as workers in Gibraltar’s military facilities – so was Spanish labour and the supply of fresh produce from the

18

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

Campo de Gibraltar area. This hardly meant they would be granted rights capable of interfering with the power of British military authorities. And the fact remained that Gibraltarians, despite their attempts to secure some degree of self-­governance since the late nineteenth century, had to wait until 1921 to have a scarcely representative city council. By and large, they proved to be a fairly docile population. So long as the status quo was not threatened, the British took every opportunity to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate, especially with the Spanish. A case in point were the events of the summer of 1929, when Ramón Franco, Gallarza and Ruiz de Alda attempted the feat of flying to the United States on a Dornier Jo. The aviators had become famous three years earlier for piloting the Plus Ultra on a trans-Atlantic flight. This time, however, they found themselves running out of fuel and crashing the plane in the sea. The news of their disappearance led several nations to send rescue units, and the British ordered the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle to modify its route (it was headed for Gibraltar) and search for the crew. After several failed attempts, the flying boat was located by the Eagle on 29 June and transported to the Rock along with the aviators. Popular acclaim in Spain led the Rock’s authorities to prepare a mass welcome. The Governor declared them honoured guests and Spanish aviation paid tribute to the Royal Navy by dropping a bouquet of flowers in the colours of the British and Spanish flags onto the deck of the Eagle. After crossing the border at La Linea, the aviators travelled to Madrid with the officers of the Eagle. Captain Laurence was awarded the Cross of Naval Merit, first class. Meanwhile, a reception was organized in Seville for the crew.31 These events embodied one of the warmest moments in relations between Spain and Great Britain. For once, Gibraltar was not a source of conflict – quite the opposite. If the Spanish aviators were safe, it was because the Rock was a key base for the Royal Navy, enabling its constant presence both in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Yet such warm spirits were a flash in the pan. The controversial Ramón Franco was made responsible for the failure of the trans-Atlantic flight, while the political climate of Spain took a turn for the worse with the fall of Primo’s dictatorship months later. The monarchy of Alfonso XIII found itself in a very difficult position – so much so that the proclamation of a republic could not be stopped. This sudden upheaval in Spanish politics would prove to be a source of alarm for Great Britain.

A special economy In the 1930s, Gibraltar combined its strategic function as a military base with the trade activity derived from the influence of the British and of the other populations that had settled in the colony. Travellers on short stays mingled with residents of diverse origins (Genovese, Spanish, Portuguese, Moroccan; Jews, Muslims, Hindus, etc.), and being part of the world’s largest empire made the colony a centre of commercial activity whose livelihood was guaranteed by the needs created by the naval base. In a broad sense, the range of business activity included smuggling and the transit of capital. The former was tempting despite being outlawed by the Treaty of Utrecht (which had also established that Gibraltar was to have no open communication with Spain, another clause that was never respected). Given the geographic proximity, a high demand for

Britain, Spain and Gibraltar: an historical triangle

19

better prices and a set of suppliers in search of lucrative business, there was every incentive to load a boat with products to smuggle onto Spanish or North African shores. Something similar could be said for the mobility of capital, as Gibraltar offered an enclave where it could reproduce at attractive rates, sheltered from fiscal intervention and instability. We are relatively familiar with the general economic characteristics of Gibraltar in the 1930s thanks to the reports sent by the Spanish consul to the Ministry of State.32 The first thing to stand out about daily life on the Rock was the large number of Spanish employees who crossed the border every day in order to earn a salary in British currency which was low for the colony but quite generous by Spanish standards. They worked forty-­eight to fifty hours a week with salaries ranging from 45 to 75 pesetas weekly. These figures were quite enticing when compared to the earnings of the average Andalusian day labourer, and were often supplemented by petty smuggling, especially since workers were obliged to spend a certain portion of their earnings on products bought inside the colony. There were two distinct groups of Spanish workers. On one hand, the colony employed Spaniards at the arsenal, port, repair shops and other sites of manual work. On the other, there were the shop assistants and waiters, along with all those performing similar jobs in hotels, cafes, restaurants, laundries, shops or domestic service. Around 4,000 men and 100 women belonged to the first group, whereas the second consisted of approximately 120 men and 2,400 women. In total, some 7,000 workers entered the colony every morning through the land border or on a ferry from Algeciras. In the evening, they were forced to leave as they were shut out of the military enclave unless they had a special permit. This daily flow of workers could be seen as a humiliation for Spain, which watched as its subjects tried to make a living in a British colony in the middle of its own territory; nonetheless, it was also a sign of the fortress’s dependence on Spanish labour, and hence a sign that the Rock too had its weak points. A more detached analysis simply revealed the workings of a labour market based on supply and demand. As so often happens, national pride and political convictions paled before economic imperatives. Officially, cross-­border trade was quite unremarkable. The colony exported small amounts of sugar, coffee, soap, bread and potatoes, while a modest stream of fruit, vegetables, rice, poultry, oil, preserves, Spanish wine, perfume and charcoal entered the colony. This was enough, as the bulk of Gibraltar’s needs were covered by sea. In fact, the true engine of the Gibraltarian economy was its role as a provider of coal, fuel oils, essential supplies and drinking water for merchant ships. Coaling was a key activity and the supply facilities were improved in 1932 so that ships no longer had to enter the port to procure coal. In fact, ships visiting Gibraltar for the sole purpose of acquiring coal were exempt from paying port fees. Ships procuring provisions on the docks or unloading passengers, on the other hand, were obligated to purchase a minimum amount of coal (10 tons for small vessels of 10–50 displacement tons; 30 tons for medium-­sized vessels of 50–500 displacement tons; and 50 tons of coal for vessels of over 500 displacement tons). In the thirties, economic depression had severe effects on the Rock’s naval traffic in spite of Gibraltar’s fiscally privileged low prices. Revealingly, there was no official record of imports and exports aside from

20

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

the very low taxes imposed on a limited range of products including liquor and tobacco. Capital flows and smuggling also merit particular attention. It would be impossible to fully comprehend the intricacies of the Gibraltarian economy without taking into account the capital and contraband movements (often irregular) that took place at the Rock. In the early 1930s the colony had two main banks: Barclays and Credit Foncier d’Algerie et de Tunisie. Alongside them were three further financial institutions controlled by the Mosley, Galliano and Rugeroni families. The Spanish Consul in Gibraltar was well aware that capital flowed through diverse mechanisms from Spain to the Rock, where it was converted into movable or immovable assets. Indeed, a number of Spanish citizens were willing to go to any lengths to safeguard their wealth from the instability of a politically volatile Spain. After the proclamation of the Republic, capital flight became so intense that the Spanish Consul alerted the Carabineros, though little could be done to force repatriation once the money had left Spain.33 A number of aristocrats, conservatives and businessmen who were not keen on the Republic got their money out of the country through Gibraltar. They probably all disapproved of the presence of the British colony on Spanish soil, but that hardly precluded the use of the Rock to keep their capital safe and, should the situation require it, seek refuge for themselves and their families. Smuggling too was a fairly clear-­cut matter of supply and demand, especially in the case of the very intense flow of tobacco. This was not new, as the Rock had been receiving massive amounts of tobacco since the nineteenth century that could not be accounted for by local consumption. A 1934 report by the Spanish consulate shows that they were perfectly informed of the details of this lucrative business. According to this source, cigarettes arrived from the US and Great Britain, whereas leaf tobacco was brought to the Rock from Cuba, Puerto Rico, Brazil, the US, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and the Canary Islands. Also included in this smuggling were cigars. The products arrived on ships flying flags of convenience (Italian, German, English, French or Dutch) and operated with a series of consignees, including but not limited to Jorge Russo, Alfredo J. Vázquez, Ricardo Povedano, Menahem Serruya, M.S. Serruya and Saccone & Speed. The consulate had very detailed information on this traffic, for which the ultimate destination was to be re-­exported: The shipping companies that regularly carry tobacco shipments are: Transports Maritimes de Vapeur, French, from Brazil, consignee Cueret Imossi; Koninkle Netherlands Line, Dutch, shipping from Hamburg and Belgium, consignees Turner & Co; Oldemburg Danpfsshiffs Rhederei, German, shipping from Hamburg, the Netherlands and Belgium, consignees A. Mateos & Sons; Mac Andre & Co, English, shipping from England and France, consignees M. H. Bland & Co; Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company, English, shipping from England and France, consignees Smith Imossi & Co; Henderson Line, English, shipping from England and France, consignees Smith Imossi & Co.34

Part of the merchandise shipped by these suppliers was destined for the four tobacco factories based in Gibraltar, belonging to Vázquez, Russo, Povedano and

Britain, Spain and Gibraltar: an historical triangle

21

Serruya. They employed around 200 workers and manufactured fine-­cut tobacco and cigarettes, especially from the cheaper Dutch tobacco. But most of the tobacco was stored in warehouses for subsequent export. Only a small part entered Gibraltar, where it paid a very lenient tariff of 1s 3d per pound of cigarettes, plus an additional 5d per 100 cigarettes. Storing the tobacco for re-­export was even cheaper, as the duties paid amounted only to 1d per 10lb of cigars or cigarettes. Under such a taxing scheme, it was little wonder that tobacco was much cheaper in the colony than it was in Spain. Gibraltar, after all, relied mostly on the colonial administration for funding and did not depend on local taxes for most of its needs. The last stage was re-­export. The tobacco was shipped legally to several destinations, but in the case of Spain and other nations with a state monopoly on tobacco, it was necessary to smuggle the merchandise on shore or through land borders. This activity took place on two different levels. Petty smuggling operations were frequently conducted using small vessels (under 10 tons) that were not required to record their entry and exit or carry any type of documents. These small ships sometimes came and went in the daytime, but they were more active at night, when they stayed in the bay just long enough to load the merchandise and navigate to nearby beaches on the shores of Malaga or North Africa. A wide range of characters participated in these activities and received their cut of the ample profit margins. Gibraltarian smugglers and their counterparts across the border were only the most visible part of a network including a number of ostensibly respectable businessmen, storekeepers on both sides of the border and the many policemen and guards who chose to look the other way. A second level of activity involved larger vessels operating in the triangle between Gibraltar, the Balearic islands and Algeria. Falucho boats such as the San Bartolomé, Carmencita Ferrer, San Isidro or Lighter or yachts such as the Sudalce, Rolling Rock, Rower, Nitsichin and Agustina V, to name only a few, participated in such activities. These vessels flew a British flag and were registered in Gibraltar to Ricardo Povedano, Alfredo Vázquez, Mosés S. Serruya, Sebastián Carlos Luque and Juan Gabriel. But the true centre of operations was not at the Rock. In the words of the Consul: ‘It is suspected that the true owners are Spanish residents of the Balearic Islands dedicated to large-­scale tobacco smuggling, with the main points of action being Palma de Mallorca and Algeria’.35 He was probably referring to the network at whose centre lay Juan March. These facts help to explain why March went straight to Gibraltar upon his escape from prison in 1933. As we will see, he found enough support there to cross the border undisturbed in the middle of the night and take a room at the Rock Hotel. He arrived in the company of his secretary Raimundo Burguesa and two prison officers, cleared the border with ease in his Rolls Royce and later moved on to Paris.36 The implications of the smuggling taking place in Gibraltar in the years leading to the Spanish Civil War were not minor. There was a great deal of money at stake in the illegal trafficking of tobacco, often leading to friction between the Spanish Republic and the colony. The contraband yacht Rower, for instance, was sunk 50 miles from Barcelona by a vessel belonging to the state tobacco monopoly Tabacalera. Given such incidents, it is hardly surprising that a man like March had more friends in Gibraltar

22

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

than the republican government. More broadly, these facts help explain the sympathies of many Gibraltarian businessmen when the war broke out. Most were staunch anti-­ communists wary of much of what the Republic stood for, and soon found themselves doing business with the insurgents. It was in fact an Imossi who prevented the sale of fuel to the republican fleet in the early days of the conflict, whereas the Gibraltarian M.H. Bland & Co swiftly offered to supply the rebels, whose vessels became well known in the ports of Ceuta, Melilla, Cadiz or Seville. Winning the war demanded financial facilities for the acquisition of materiel and fuel, and the nationalists had the upper hand in this respect from the start. In any event, life in Gibraltar remained prosperous and calm despite the economic recession brought on by the 1929 stock market crash. Gibraltarians were interested in events across the border and kept up with the news in the Spanish press from Malaga, Seville and Madrid, as well as keeping abreast of developments in Great Britain. Additionally, the Rock had its own press. The Gibraltar Chronicle, founded in 1801, was the oldest local newspaper and generally showed pro-­government tendencies. During the years of the Spanish Civil War, it was to become an official gazette of sorts for the British authorities at Gibraltar, and was a source for informative journalism. In Spanish, Gibraltarian citizens could also read El Calpense and El Anunciador (founded in 1868 and 1885 respectively), the other two main newspapers. These two had a more political bent, with more space devoted to opinion and clear political commitments. Whereas El Calpense espoused liberal-­democratic ideas, El Anunciador proved to be more conservative. During the war, El Calpense experienced an extreme growth in its circulation, from 3,000 to 20,000 copies. According to official figures, El Calpense had had a circulation of 900 copies at the start of the decade (El Anunciador had had around 1,000).37 This sudden growth in readership was probably one result of the arrival of many Spanish refugees in Gibraltar, as well as the many Spanish citizens secretly reading the paper across the border. On the other hand, El Anunciador was discontinued in the early 1940s, in the middle of the Second World War. There were also some other newspapers in Gibraltar, but in the 1930s they remained minor publications.38 Most of the population was Catholic, and Gibraltar had its own cathedral, two churches and a chapel. But religious diversity was ingrained in the colony’s lifestyle, in the tradition of the Anglo-Saxon world. The Anglican Church, the Presbyterians and the Methodists all had their places of worship, as did the Jewish community with its four synagogues and some other creeds with smaller followings. Life in Gibraltar was placid, but could offer little in the way of recreational areas due to geographical constraints. A prolonged stay at the Rock could eventually feel stifling, and so the colony’s residents often sought leisure at sea or by touring nearby Andalusian cities. In fact, the National Tourism Board created by Primo de Rivera had a Gibraltarian office, subsidized by the colonial authorities. It publicized the attractions of southern Spain, directing its message at everyone arriving at the Rock. At the time, communications with Spain were open by post, phone and telegraph. It was simple to clear the land border in the daytime, and additionally the steamship operator La Punta de Europa performed four daily journeys carrying employees between Algeciras and Gibraltar. Mixed marriages between British subjects and Spanish citizens from nearby towns were

Britain, Spain and Gibraltar: an historical triangle

23

not rare, making the Llanitos an even more unique population. These marriages were grounds for a change in nationality, though cases of dual citizenship remained extremely rare. In sum, there was intense and frequent contact between the two sides of the border, and the inhabitants of the Rock were interested in developments in Spain and remained vigilant of political changes such as those that would take place from 1929 to 1931.

2

The Spanish Republic and British Diplomacy Republic in Spain, alarm in Whitehall In late January 1930, General Primo de Rivera took the risk of asking the Spanish captain generals for their thoughts regarding the continuation of the dictatorship. The dictator, who was at that point already ill, understood their lukewarm responses to mean that the time had come to put an end to a regime that had lasted over six years. With Primo gone, the King faced a conundrum of his own – how to restore some semblance of normality to Spanish political life. His solution was an attempt to return to the constitutional regime and go back to a situation similar to that of 1923, though somewhat freer of corruption and clientelist networks. To carry out the process, Alfonso XIII appointed General Dámaso Berenguer (February 1930 to February 1931) and later Admiral Juan Bautista Aznar (February to April 1931). The latter’s decision to organize an election led to the proclamation of the Second Republic as the unwitting result of a unique local election – one that had somehow turned into a plebiscite on the monarchy. Spanish citizens went to the polls on Sunday, 12 April 1931. By Tuesday, Spain was a republic. Republicans and monarchists alike were dumbfounded. Nonetheless, this domestic transformation did not lead to substantive changes in Spanish foreign policy. As we have seen, the latter had for years been toothless, constrained and severely uncoordinated. Since the disaster of 1898, the high costs entailed by diplomatic isolation and a lack of international alliances had become clear. Spain had had nobody to turn to for support during the Cuban War of Independence, let alone after the intervention of the United States. Internationally, it remained dependent on Great Britain and France and subordinate to these two countries, which had strong investments in Spain and physical borders with Spanish territories (the Pyrenees, Gibraltar or the French border in the Moroccan Protectorate). The minor role of the Spanish in world affairs had been highlighted by events such as those regarding the Moroccan problem, the fruitless attempts to recover Tangier or the sterile claim to Gibraltar. Aware of Spain’s weakness, the Ministry of State saw no choice but to opt for a combination of resignation and impotence regarding important affairs. There was only room for gesture politics (such as filing complaints before the League of Nations regarding Tangier), negotiations on minor issues or attempts to profit from tensions among the great powers. Given the meagre returns that Spanish cabinets expected from international relations, it is hardly surprising that they chose to consider them

26

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

secondary. These views were inherited by the new republican leaders. Upon the establishment of the new regime, the most pressing concern of the provisional government was securing its international recognition by reassuring the great powers (mainly France and Great Britain) that the political transformation had been both peaceful and legitimate, and that Spain’s international commitments would be honoured. Beyond this, the Republic found itself too engrossed in its many domestic problems to pay much attention to foreign policy. Alejandro Lerroux himself, as Minister of State in the provisional government, was aware of the low significance his fellow Cabinet members accorded to his portfolio. It was more urgent to deal with domestic issues, especially since these too had international repercussions, given the attention paid from abroad to the proclamation of the new regime and the controversial evolution of the Republic. Lerroux acknowledged this in preparing his first visit to the League of Nations in representation of Spain: ‘Domestic affairs absorbed the intention and activity of the ministers and they all seemed as distant and absent from foreign issues as if Spain had been located on the moon’.1 His fellow ministers all insisted on knowing the details of his upcoming trip to Geneva, yet upon his return he did not even have the opportunity to present the results of his efforts. Nor did President Niceto Alcalá-Zamora attach much importance to early signs of political strife (such as the burning of religious buildings) or seem particularly aware of the need to consolidate the newborn regime. ‘International politics was the least of our worries’, as Lerroux concluded after experiencing his first few cabinet meetings.2 The head of that first republican government, Alcalá-Zamora, had had ample government experience before Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship. A few months later, he would become the Republican Head of State. He understood the importance of foreign policy, but lacked the opportunity to grant this area the necessary attention both as head of the provisional government and as President of the Republic. His memoirs reflect on the Achilles heel that was republican foreign policy, given the ‘frequent succession of governments that were enemies of one another’. Amid the continuous string of political leaders, Spanish foreign policy was devoid of assertiveness because ‘it [could] not be affirmed by permanent diplomats, advisers and servants of an inspiration, who advise and support but cannot devise’. Spain’s international activity was constrained by the country’s difficult situation as well as by the actions of several ministers, who often failed to rise to the occasion in a context of governmental instability. The various political parties also lacked clarity of vision regarding international affairs, and Alcalá-Zamora’s idea of establishing a permanent board for foreign affairs proved unsuccessful.3 Regarding relations with Great Britain, Alcalá-Zamora acknowledged that they were smooth and cordial. In his view, this was largely thanks to the attitude of the British ambassador, Sir George Grahame, whom he considered a ‘true friend of Spain’.4 The appraisal may have been somewhat ingenuous in view of the ambassador’s confidential reports and the distrusting British attitude toward the Spanish Republic, which we shall explore in detail. In any event, the republican president’s positive assessment of Spain’s relations with Great Britain did not preclude his disgust at their presence in Gibraltar:

The Spanish Republic and British Diplomacy

27

Regarding the problem of Gibraltar my attitude was to consider it the inalienable right of Spain, which could be exercised by peaceful means, to the benefit of the British Empire and the security of its communications. In this regard there was general agreement in Spain. In one cabinet meeting Fernando de los Ríos mentioned that English Labour Party members acknowledged our rights as indisputable, but with the dishonest ability of asserting that only a Conservative British government could settle the issue.5

Alcalá-Zamora’s opinion reflected two things. In the first place, the intent to recover Gibraltar while still respecting the strategic interests of the British fleet – though how this was to be accomplished remained unspecified. In the second, the conviction that the British would not accept an effective negotiation, as the ‘dishonesty’ of British Labour made clear. Conservatives were no more honest. Gibraltar was too important to be turned over to a Spanish Republic that was proving incapable of guaranteeing effective control of the Strait and certainly lacked the strength to ward off interference by other powers. Taken together, Alcalá-Zamora’s views on the British attitude, the instability of the republican regime, and the lack of attention paid to the problem of Gibraltar all help account for the failure to file an official claim to Gibraltar, despite the fact that the War Minister, Azaña, apparently toyed with the idea of recovering the Rock.6 Spain was ill-­ equipped to lay claim to the Rock, given its difficult domestic situation and the severe limitations of its foreign policy. Further, Gibraltar was far from being at the top of Spaniards’ list of concerns, despite the centuries-­old conviction that it was rightfully Spanish. In this regard, Salvador de Madariaga quite aptly quoted the words of Ramiro de Maeztu’s Idearium: Gibraltar is a permanent offence, one we are partially deserving of for our lack of good government; but it does not hinder the normal development of our nation nor is it cause enough to sacrifice other more valuable interests in order to slightly accelerate, in the best possible scenario, an event whose logical outcome is already marked as the restoration of our nationality.7

It is worth noting that Great Britain had been unwilling to negotiate the status of Gibraltar under all previous regimes and it was even less likely to do so under the Second Republic. The British had felt wary of the new regime ever since the day of 14 April 1931, when they were taken aback by the sudden fall of Alfonso XIII and the unexpected proclamation of a republic after what should merely have been a local election. In his extraordinary work on the British government and the Spanish Civil War, E. Moradiellos has highlighted the early anti-­republicanism of the Foreign Office. British analysts were persuaded that the Republic had been born with a marked centre-­ left imprint that could easily take on a revolutionary character. This perception was based on the Russian experience of 1917, when Alexander Kerensky’s moderate cabinet had been overwhelmed by Bolshevik pressure, leading to the October Revolution that very year. Further, the Foreign Office was convinced that the Soviet Union and the Comintern were poised to launch a campaign to take over Spain at any moment. The

28

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

still miniscule Spanish Communist Party (PCE) could soon become the engine of a revolution.8 Needless to say, a leftist revolution in Spain would represent a severe threat to British interests in the Peninsula, from business and investments to the potential loss of Gibraltar’s naval base if it fell under the influence of another power. Not for nothing had the British established MI6 agents in Gibraltar to keep a close watch on developments in the western Mediterranean in the 1930s. Espionage stations had also been established in Vienna and Prague to monitor the East.9 Ultimately, the Foreign Office was above all concerned with a possible Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean Sea. The chairman of the Rio Tinto Company, Sir Auckland Geddes, shared his government’s unease at the political changes that had taken place in Spain since 14 April. A few weeks after the proclamation of the Republic, Geddes told his management team that there was a high probability that Spain would soon experience a communist phase that would most likely be both preceded and succeeded by a socialist one. The company was thus at risk of experiencing many inconveniences regarding the property and management of the mines, and could potentially be forced to give up their control. He conjectured that the Spanish government might order the sale of the mines to a Spanish company or, even worse, their expropriation and nationalization.10 Such a negative perception of the Spanish Republic was shared by other powers. Mussolini’s Italy was a case in point. Though the fascist dictatorship had little in common with the United Kingdom’s parliamentary monarchy, Mussolini clearly related to the fears of the Foreign Office. In May 1931, shortly after the birth of the republican regime, the Italian dictator wrote down some observations on the new situation in Spain, in which he noted that Kerensky had set the stage for Lenin.11 With regard to British alarm, it is worth noting that its intensity fluctuated in the years between 1931 and 1936. The Foreign Office was initially taken aback by the turn of events, and British perceptions of the Spanish Republic were largely determined by its proximity to Gibraltar, where establishments such as the Rock Hotel were flooded in the spring of 1931 by members of the Spanish upper classes seeking refuge and providing clearly unsympathetic accounts of the Republic. The number of refugees increased with the burning of convents and religious buildings, and the British conservative press added drama to the already tragic events and reported on the arrival of priests and nuns at the Rock.12 Masses and acts of reparation with high attendance rates were held. To have Spaniards seeking asylum in Gibraltar was hardly a new occurrence. For years, the Gibraltarian border had seen refugees come and go in response to political developments in Spain. Shortly before the proclamation of the Republic, in early February 1931, republican personality Diego Martínez Barrio had sought asylum in Gibraltar for a week before departing for Paris. On 10 February, a gathering of republicans and Freemasons saw him off as he boarded the steamship Mooltan covering the London-Australia route.13 Several months later, the tables had turned and well-­ known monarchists travelled to Gibraltar in search of refuge – including Infant Carlos de Borbon. On 16 April, two days after the proclamation of the new regime, the Infant and his family left Seville on board the Cabo Razo (belonging to the Ybarra shipping

The Spanish Republic and British Diplomacy

29

company). He was destined for Gibraltar, where he stayed briefly before departing for France and Italy.14 His was no isolated experience. Juan de Borbón, then a student at the San Fernando Naval Academy, boarded a torpedo boat to Gibraltar and stayed at the Bristol Hotel, later moving to the governor’s residence (The Convent) to protect himself from possible attacks against members of the Spanish Royal Family by groups of Spaniards. During his stay, he had the chance to see some of his relations, including his future wife María de las Mercedes, the daughter of Infant Carlos. He left Gibraltar quickly, boarding the ocean liner Roma to Italy.15 Governor Godley’s leniency knew no limits, allowing the entrance of political figures such as General Jordana and former ministers of the dictatorship such as Estrada or the Count of los Andes. The Marquis of Larios also found refuge in Gibraltar after his home in Malaga was attacked. Gradually, the situation improved and some refugees, including Jordana, eventually returned to Spain. Nevertheless, as late as May 1931 the governor continued to complain that the number of Spanish conservatives occupying the Rock’s hotels was excessive.16 It was one thing to allow for ample hospitality in the extraordinary circumstances of April and quite another to accept the permanent presence of prominent anti-­republicans in the colony once the political transformation had taken hold in Spain. In any case, the accounts offered by these monarchist refugees seemed to confirm that Spain was indeed in the hands of a Kerensky-­like government. The British secret service and naval intelligence were very active at the Rock and gathered as much information as they could. Governor Godley remained suspicious of developments beyond the border and took completely unwarranted precautions to ward off communist activity. Likewise, he was careful to prevent any type of anti-­religious demonstrations, such as the burning of churches, that were taking place in Spain.17 Yet several months into the new regime, the British ambassador to Madrid, George Grahame, helped reassure his government of the Republic’s firm hand in stifling anarchist insurgence and stopping the attempted coup by General Sanjurjo (10 August 1932). It was perhaps for this reason that Alcalá-Zamora had such fond memories of the British diplomat. Even more soothing for Ramsay MacDonald’s government was the centre-­right victory in 1933. It seemed unlikely that a revolution would triumph under CEDA-influenced cabinets, as the events of October 1934 highlighted. Further, British economic interests were preserved when the Spanish government put a stop to agrarian reform, weakened labour rights and abandoned protectionism. Spanish politics seemed to be stabilizing and the British status quo appeared secure. In such circumstances, it was advisable to maintain friendly relations with Spain, as urged by Ambassador Grahame in 1933. The diplomat had made it clear to the Foreign Office that he deemed it desirable to keep on friendly terms with Spain and foster ‘the goodwill which . . . the new regime seems prepared to offer us’. Though Spain was no great power, whether politically or economically, it still benefited from certain historical stature and the country’s strategic geographic location was of great interest both to Great Britain and to France. The ambassador saw no sign that British political interests ran against those of Spain, so long as the latter did not question the former’s presence in Gibraltar, and the commercial interests of the two seemed quite aligned. He added that it would be of some value to have Spain on Britain’s side in international conferences and warned of the risks of

30

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

‘a Franco-Spanish Entente, or quasi alliance’ if the British failed to show a friendly attitude to Spain.18 This would indeed be the gist of British policy towards Spain for some time thereafter: maintaining friendly relations, curbing the influence of other countries and sustaining the veto over Gibraltar. The British remained firmly convinced that Spain was in no condition to lay claim to the Rock. It lacked the necessary military capabilities to hold on to the fortress and had no shortage of domestic problems to face before plunging into the dangerous adventure of trying to take on the world’s largest empire. Republican Cabinets did not consider Gibraltar a primary objective, regardless of how they felt about it. Nor did the Spanish parliament ever pay much attention to the issue. Under the governments of the left republicans and socialists, the colony was hardly ever discussed, though some attention was paid to the project for a tunnel to Morocco. Only in one session did Adolfo Chacón de la Mata, a Radical member of parliament from Cadiz, request enhanced surveillance of the border with Gibraltar, which lay neglected. This carelessness was taking its toll in the shape of increased smuggling and the escape of Spanish fugitives. On 10 August 1932, after General José Sanjurjo led a failed attempt to take over government, several conspirators involved in the operation managed to flee to the Rock. Chacón de la Mata recounted the events in the Spanish Cortes: At the border between Gibraltar and La Linea, where many people pass, there are no police in charge of inspecting passports, to the point that, after the last attempted coup, the City Hall of La Linea had to resort to appointing authorized delegates in order to prevent the escape of those involved in the events of 10 August.19

Among those who cleared the border undisturbed was José María Ybarra Gómez-Rull, meeting family members who had previously travelled to Gibraltar. His brother, Jesús Ybarra, also made it to the Rock with his wife and six children.20 Prominent right-­wing individuals who had been involved in the attempted coup arrived at the colony from nearby Andalusian cities. In Jerez, for instance, those who were not arrested tried to escape to a number of destinations, among which Gibraltar was a favourite. Some succeeded (e.g. José Barroso or Manuel Delgado), while others were arrested in Algeciras when they were about to board the ship to Gibraltar. Included in the latter group were Diego Zuleta, Francisco Mier Terán, Ángel García Riquelme and Juan Manuel Jurado.21 The new refugees joined those who had arrived in 1931, when renowned monarchist aristocrats, landowners, politicians and businessmen had opted for exile upon the proclamation of the Republican regime (e.g. the Marquis of Villapanés and his wife; José Estrada; the Count of los Andes and his family; General Jordana; the Marquis of Larios; Cristóbal and Antonio de la Puerta; Carlos Benjumea; etc.). This initial wave had mostly sought personal safety, rather than a platform from which to plot against the government. By 1931–32 the Republic appeared to be a hard and fast reality and for a majority of these exiles the foremost concern was to continue to manage their business interests from the shelter provided by the Rock. This is not to say that the refugees concealed their desire to put an end to the Republic, but that hardly meant that the Sanjurjada was prepared from Gibraltar or that the colony was home to a

The Spanish Republic and British Diplomacy

31

broad network of conspirators. Nonetheless, the nuance escaped the left republican and socialist governments, who had always been apprehensive about what certain individuals might be planning in Gibraltar. After the events of 10 August, they concluded that the Rock had been one of the centres of the attempted coup. Even the Spanish consul in Gibraltar (Antonio Suqué y Sucona) was suspected, as he was shocked to discover upon reading what El Calpense had to say about his involvement in the conspiracy. He sent a long letter to the Minister of State in which he refuted allegations for which there was no hard evidence. He was accused not only of having concealed the conspiracy from the government, but also of having done nothing to prevent capital flight. In late September, he was replaced with an acting consul, Manuel Martín González, who was to take his place until the arrival of the newly appointed Antonio Cánovas Ortega.22 The flow of people fleeing the Republic for whatever reason never quite stopped. In November 1933, a few weeks before the following general election, financier Juan March escaped from prison at Alcalá de Henares and left Spain through Gibraltar. We have already described March’s connection to the British secret service during the First World War – indeed, the British were involved in his escape operation. It is also worth noting that March was close friends with Gómez-Beare, who had been posted to Gibraltar by the British Naval Intelligence Division. The British guaranteed March’s safety on his journey to the colony, facilitated an easy border crossing involving little paperwork and a quick passport inspection, and allowed him to deliver a press conference from the sunny comfort of the Rock Hotel terrace. He later departed for Marseilles and went on to meet José Calvo Sotelo in Paris. The operation enabled the British to achieve the liberation of Juan March without the need to pressure the Spanish government into granting the tycoon’s extradition.23 Gibraltar, as always, proved a thoroughfare, a place for provisional but satisfactory solutions, an enclave and pathway at the service of British foreign policy. Amid the complex political upheavals of the Republic, Gibraltar continued to host a diverse range of refugees after every severe episode in Spanish political life. Upon the revolutionary events of October 1934, a group of socialist Freemasons fled to the Rock, where they received aid thanks to fundraising efforts such as those organized by the lodge Autonomía from La Linea.24 Other political individuals who were not connected to Freemasonry also found temporary shelter in Gibraltar, as in the case of the socialist Alberto Fernández Ballesteros, who had been city councillor in Seville since 1931 and would later be elected to the Cortes in 1936.25 In the opposing political camp, high-­ ranking Spanish military officers frequently visited Gibraltar between 1934 and 1936. General Sanjurjo was there in April 1934 and March 1935; General Franco himself was also present at the Rock a few days before Sanjurjo’s second visit, in the company of General Pinillos (the Military Governor of Cadiz). Senior officers in the Protectorate also remained very much in touch with Gibraltar and the Campo area.26 Yet the British remained relatively calm in Gibraltar, despite the instability at the other side of the border. Even the 1935 tensions between Great Britain and Italy on occasion of the Ethiopian crisis and the intensified claim to the Rock by Spanish monarchists failed to truly alarm the British, who remained sure that the status quo was not at risk. To be sure, the Spanish government did not decidedly back Great

32

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

Britain in the 1935 crisis, and indeed certain sectors of Spanish opinion were clearly pro-Italian. The British request that the Spanish allow them the use of strategic bases in the event of a war against Italy was denied. This served only to strengthen the conviction that Gibraltar had to remain British in order to guarantee the Royal Navy control over the Mediterranean.27 Under the circumstances, the Spanish and the British each followed their own path. Great Britain increased its naval and air presence in Gibraltar as well as in Malta.28 For its part, Spain viewed Anglo-Italian tension as an excuse to intensify its claim to the Rock. In December 1935, Manuel Portela Valladares’s cabinet, whose Minister of State was José Martínez de Velasco, discussed pressuring the British into returning Gibraltar in exchange for Spanish cooperation against Italy. According to the cabinet minutes of 26 December: The time seems right to raise the problem of Gibraltar internationally. Three points can be made here: the first is that the opportunity has presented itself to clarify what is and what is not war-­related regarding the fortification of the Strait, presenting as cooperation with Geneva any preparations that the Spanish government may deem necessary to strengthen Spanish sovereignty over the Strait of Gibraltar; the second is that we could point out the need to appeal to Article 19 for the revision of the problem of Gibraltar, where Great Britain has customarily abused its rights asserting its sovereignty far beyond the allowances of the treaty; the third is that the problem itself of Great Britain’s departure from the Rock could be seen as a goal to be achieved through the first and second stages, which have been precisely defined above . . . It would thus be necessary to carefully make future preparations in case of a continental war, so that we would be able to raise the matter in the future, not through abstention, which would lead to nothing other than a dishonourable status quo, but rather through cooperation, which could allow us to effectively succeed in a demand that remains unachievable at present, as we have nothing to offer our neighbours in return.29

The renewed Spanish intentions did not amount to much, partly because the British government thought the best way to deal with fascist powers was through appeasement, avoiding direct confrontation. Mussolini’s colonial adventure in distant Ethiopia was not enough to warrant a war between Italy and Great Britain, though it raised some alarm. Ultimately, nothing changed, least of all the valuable colony of Gibraltar, where in fact the exiled emperor Haile Selassie spent a night on his way to England.30 The Mediterranean balance of power was safe – for the time being.

The victory of the Popular Front: unease and reaction British wariness and vigilance regarding the Spanish Republic did not preclude cordial relations between the two countries. There were far too many interests at stake and Great Britain would never resort to explicit measures against Spain’s new regime. For its part, the Republic could not afford to cut off relations with the British. Indeed, its calculations rested on the assumption that the British might begin to feel at ease and

The Spanish Republic and British Diplomacy

33

perhaps come to accept the new regime as long as the government managed to show signs of strength and moderation by keeping revolutionary impulses in check. British feelings of unease, however, were renewed in late 1935 in view of the likely future evolution of the republican regime. Spain’s lukewarm support regarding a potential war with Italy was alarming enough, and British concern only grew as corruption scandals (i.e. the Nombela and estraperlo cases) eroded Lerroux’s standing. In the meantime, leftists and progressive republicans formed a Popular Front with communist participation. The collapse of the centre-­right and a new call for elections heightened the alarm of the Foreign Office. Henry Chilton, the new British ambassador appointed in October 1935, had unsettling news regarding the rise of the Popular Front. The Foreign Office surmised that a coup was not unlikely should this broad left-­wing coalition triumph in the general election. Their analyses concluded that such a coup would most likely be successful, as the army was loyal to the right. There was no way of knowing, however, whether there would be a strong enough resistance to lead to a civil war. The only thing left to do was wait and see.31 This ‘wait and see’ strategy was the only possibility before the election, but the Popular Front victory soon made the situation very clear for those fearing revolutionary events. Above all, they were convinced that the Spanish Communist Party was in close contact with the Comintern in order to devise a revolutionary strategy with the ultimate goal of making Spain a Soviet stronghold. The merits of this vision are certainly worth debating, but the fact remains that the Foreign Office firmly believed it to be true, determining its stance towards the Popular Front. The United States did not feel much more warmly about the triumph of the Popular Front, although the Roosevelt administration was not quite as anti-­republican as the British Cabinet and American Ambassador Bowers was a staunch defender of the Spanish regime. Nonetheless, the US allowed themselves to be advised by Great Britain on European affairs, and a number of American businessmen with interests in Spain and the Mediterranean probably squirmed at the thought of a strong Popular Front. On this point, it is worth noting that between 1932 and 1935 the United States was Spain’s largest import partner and fourth largest export market, behind Great Britain, France and Germany.32 This must be taken into account in order to understand the future behaviour of Roosevelt’s administration toward the Spanish Civil War: the US formally remained neutral (Neutrality Act of 1937), but did nothing to stop the massive exports of supplies to the insurgents by American companies. The Republic, on the other hand, found no support in the US except for the purpose and determination of a handful of Americans who joined the International Brigades full of romantic idealism but lacking advanced military training. Many were to spill their blood in the Jarama valley. Spain seemed headed down a dangerous path of instability, with the communists gaining street power and the republican government incapable of counteracting the appeal of revolutionary slogans. Even part of the socialists had joined together with the communists, and Francisco Largo Caballero was known as the ‘Spanish Lenin’. From this perspective, the British had a clear diagnostic in which Azaña was equated with Kerensky and, like the latter, would eventually be the victim of a revolutionary uprising.33

34

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

For firms such as the Rio Tinto Company, the prospects were bleak. Its chairman, Geddes, had witnessed the deterioration of labour relations at the mines while pyrite exports drastically declined. Frequent strikes were followed by government orders to re-­hire workers that had been let go. From his position, the idea of a coup against the Republic was a hope to cling to. The mines’ English management did not bother to conceal their sympathy for an anti-­republican conspiracy, though they remained discreet and only made such views known in private conversation.34 The British authorities in Gibraltar felt likewise. Their perceptions may have been distorted, but they were reinforced by the testimonies of those seeking refuge at the Rock after the election of 16 February. Among these exiles were prominent conservatives, but also a number of republicans who felt threatened by the Popular Front. A case in point was Eloy Vaquero, who had been mayor of Cordoba in 1931 and Minister of the Interior in 1934, when the revolutionary events of October were stifled. Vaquero was a renowned figure in republican circles in Cordoba, but he had become a target of leftist hatred and was despised by many trade union members who were not willing to forget his actions as minister in a cabinet including members of Gil-Robles’s CEDA. On the very night of the vote count and once the Popular Front emerged as a clear victor, Vaquero decided to leave Cordoba for Montalbán, where he picked up his family and travelled with them to Gibraltar. After the outbreak of the war, he left the Rock for London.35 His was just one story among many others highlighting the nature of developments in Spain: even republican figures were fleeing the country, fearing the actions of the Popular Front. After February 1936, these testimonies created a hostile environment. They were an addition to the already negative view of the Republic provided by other prominent conservatives who had sought refuge in Gibraltar for themselves or their families at an earlier time (the families of the Count of Mejorada, Santiago Mendaro, Gaitán de Ayala, the Ybarras, Carlos Piñar, etc.). Now, after the triumph of the Popular Front, it was a primary objective to find shelter from the uncertain turn events might take in Spain.36 According to Cambó, Gibraltar became a hotbed of refugees during 17 and 18 February, when a Popular Front victory seemed imminent. The tabulation of election results confirmed these fears, causing an immediate increase in the flow of refugees to the Rock. Their number must have been high, judging by the fact that American Ambassador Bowers was unable to find lodging at the Rock Hotel when he visited Gibraltar in March, thus being forced to take a room at the María Cristina Hotel in Algeciras. As a progressive liberal, Bowers deemed the fear of the Spanish noblemen and aristocrats who had escaped to Gibraltar unwarranted, but the fact remains that their panic was visible.37 Who were these refugees? Most were businessmen and landowners from nearby Andalusian cities, who sought ‘protection under the English flag, a guarantee that was not to be found in their own country, where authority was absent’.38 The social significance of these refugees contributed to the anti-­republicanism of the British authorities at Gibraltar. They listened to what the exiles had to say, which was altogether aligned with the perceptions of the Foreign Office. Worth stressing is the fact that these exiles found perfectly comfortable lodging in Gibraltar, whereas the Rock’s Spanish workers were all forced to cross the border back into Spain at the end of each workday.

The Spanish Republic and British Diplomacy

35

On 7 February 1936, the Petit Parisien reported that between 7,000 and 8,000 Spanish workers entered the Rock every day from La Linea, being forced to return in the evenings so that they would not become a nuisance.39 Regardless of their usefulness as labour, they could not be allowed to take up permanent residence in Gibraltar given their sheer number. In contrast, the Gibraltarian authorities made exceptions to the colony’s residency rules in favour of nationalist sympathizers. In any event, as a military enclave Gibraltar had more urgent affairs to tend to. One was the possible vulnerability of the Rock given advances in artillery and air power, which led the Royal Navy to devise an anti-­aircraft umbrella revolving around the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal. In February 1936, joint naval and air exercises were conducted with the Royal Air Force, who participated in surveillance and defence tasks.40 Obviously, aircraft could also serve to neutralize enemy artillery in the vicinity of Gibraltar. In other words, the Rock needed air power both for its defence and for its offensive capabilities. The decks of aircraft carriers might suffice for the time being, but it seemed clear that an airport would soon have to be built. Engineers started work on the isthmus in the 1930s, and the airport’s construction finished during the Second World War. Had the construction of a landing strip in Gibraltar been unfeasible, it is likely that Great Britain would have seriously considered trading it for Ceuta, as recommended by Vice-Admiral C. V. Usborne in December 1936.41 Enhancing the Rock’s defences was a necessary step in an increasingly tense international environment, for it was vital that Gibraltar retain its autonomy to act in any conceivable scenario. Secret studies regarding British defence were concerned with a potential ground invasion from Spain and, even more so, with the possibility of air attacks from French Morocco, should Spain or France become enemies of the British. An attack by distant Germany or Italy was considered less likely in view of their fleets’ relative weakness and the limited autonomy of aircraft at the time, aside from political factors that would later change.42 Gibraltarian business sectors were also concerned with developments in Spain, albeit for slightly different reasons. As businessmen and traders, they were mainly worried about the socialist tint the Second Republic was acquiring. The colony was extremely dependent on its hinterland, and the Popular Front’s policies could decisively impact their economic interests. Some problems were not new, but became more severe under the Popular Front. Two days after the election, the manager of Barclays Bank in Gibraltar visited the British embassy in Madrid carrying a letter of introduction from Governor Harington. His objective was to prevent Spanish regulatory organs for currency dealings from hindering the free circulation of foreign currencies.43 A few weeks later, in March 1936, the Chamber of Commerce met to examine a decree by the Spanish Ministry of Finance restricting the circulation of Spanish currency outside the country’s borders. Designed to prevent capital flight, the measure was a blow to Gibraltarian trade interests because it established a thirty-­day period for the reintroduction of pesetas in Spain, hampering the fluency of trade and currency exchanges. Such regulations were yet another reason to look askance at the Spanish government and long for the fall of the Republic.44 It did not help matters that the government also decided to prohibit non-Spaniards from purchasing properties near the Rock, meaning that Gibraltarians were excluded from such dealings.45

36

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

For other Gibraltarians, the Republic was a legitimate and progressive regime that guaranteed freedom. This group included most of the working class, who sympathized with the Spanish workers who travelled to the Rock every day to work in the colony’s military facilities. Their support for the Republic was connected to class solidarity, despite the fact that harmony was not always the rule between the two groups, given their differing wage levels and rights. Nonetheless, Gibraltarian workers clearly saw the gap between themselves and the British authorities as being much wider than whatever differences set them apart from workers from Algeciras or La Linea – places where the Popular Front had incidentally obtained high electoral support (as much as 90 per cent of the votes cast in the case of La Linea).46 Blood ties and family also affected relations between the two groups. Gibraltarian and Spanish workers were all part of the region’s ‘proletariat’, they were neighbours and some of them were also family. The Republic, thus, had a significant number of supporters in Gibraltar. It was worth analysing whether Spanish workers in Republican Spain did not perhaps have more social rights than those working in Gibraltar under the rule of the colony’s authorities, but the economic advantages of being Gibraltarian and the higher living standards warranted a certain sense of pride, especially when compared to the bleak economic prospects on the other side of the border, where underdevelopment and extremely concentrated land ownership were the norm.47 It would be mistaken to think of Gibraltarian society as a monolithic group of anti-­ republicans that would end up supporting the insurgents during the Civil War. A more nuanced and accurate account should view the war as a series of events that deepened a rift that already existed among the population of Gibraltar. The authorities were indeed aware of this and did everything in their power to ensure peace and maintain a certain balance inside the colony, all the while employing pro-­nationalist strategies and safeguarding the enclave’s outward security. Ultimately, this meant that during the war sympathy toward the Republic was deemed less tolerable than the presence of nationalist agents in Gibraltar. Given the social differences on the Rock, religious factors played a key role in Gibraltarians’ views of the Republic. For the colony’s Catholics (accustomed to freedom of religion, but also to a scrupulous respect toward all creeds), the attacks on churches and convents, the secularism of the Spanish government and the complaints of Spanish Church members were reason enough to become anti-­republican and support any alternative capable of guaranteeing law and order. From this perspective, D. Beiso has stressed the importance of Catholicism in Gibraltar’s sympathy toward the Francoist cause. Nonetheless, it seems prudent not to consider this the only possible explanation, particularly in view of the complexity and diversity of Gibraltarian society. As Stockey has pointed out, it was mostly class that determined differences of opinion regarding the Republic, first, and later the Civil War. A local working-­class leader, such as Augustine Huart, accused the British authorities, army and navy, the local Catholic Church and the middle classes and businessmen of fostering an environment sympathetic to the rebels. Other sources would appear to confirm this view: ‘In the beginning the sympathies of the moneyed classes in Gibraltar were largely to the side of General Franco, but the working classes were almost to a man in favour of the Government side . . .’ .48 In the end, the key issue lay not in the existence of such a social

The Spanish Republic and British Diplomacy

37

and political rift, but rather in its practical consequences. The Rock’s leading social groups (members of the military and businessmen) firmly opposed the Spanish Republic and hoped for its fall. Whether or not many working-­class Gibraltarians disagreed with them was ultimately of little importance in a territory administered by colonial authorities, in which the military had extraordinary influence. Political passions had to be kept in check and leftist sympathizers were to remain under control. Above all, Gibraltar had to remain orderly and devoted to its military functions; additionally, it could serve the interests of the British government by favouring the fall of the Spanish Republic. Collaboration with the rebels was a reality from the start, when the conspirators against the Republic found suppliers of smuggled weapons in Gibraltar. Before 18 July, the Marquis of Tamarón purchased handguns and shotguns from a Gibraltarian trafficker in Jerez for Falange. After the war broke out, as we will see, Gibraltarian traders like Benyunes sent donations to Seville, and a fruitful bilateral trade between the Rock and it hinterland flourished.49 Gibraltarian cooperation with conspirators, the lodging offered to conservative families and the undisguised anti-­republican sentiment of significant sectors were a prelude to the colony’s behaviour during the Civil War. Gibraltar may have been ostensibly neutral, in accordance with the official British policy of non-­intervention, but the Rock ultimately functioned by aligning local perceptions of Spain with the instructions of the British government. The latter was aware that a coup against the Republic was in the pipeline and that it would be conservative in nature. Those involved were careful to let London know that the coup did not intend to establish a fascist dictatorship in Spain that might threaten British interests through potential alliances with Italy or Germany. As early as May 1936, the Marquis of Carvajal travelled to London to make this clear: ‘The organizers would like His Majesty’s Government to know that this is NOT a Fascist movement and hope that it will not be thought connected to Italian propaganda or interests. It is designed to restore order and place a civilian right-­wing government in power’.50 The last part obviously turned out to be untrue, but the military dictatorship born on 18 July was indeed no threat to British interests. It was in fact quite the opposite. And while the outcome of the war was being decided, the primary objective of the British government would be to ensure that the Spanish war remained limited to a purely national conflict. This was essential in order to guarantee a certain degree of international harmony, which remained vital for the preservation of an empire whose military superiority was no longer as undisputed as it had once been.51 The fervent anti-­communism of a significant part of the British media only made Gibraltarian feelings toward the Republic stronger. Some Spanish journals, such as ABC, frequently reprinted anti-Bolshevik opinions previously published by The Daily Telegraph or The Times. On 18 July, coinciding with the military uprising, a letter appeared that had originally been published by The Daily Telegraph, in which a British lieutenant defended the need for Great Britain to align with Italy and Germany, champions of western civilization against the Soviet Union.52

3

The Initial Impact of the Civil War in Gibraltar Air and sea combat around the Rock The Spanish Civil War took on an international dimension from the start. Although both camps patriotically claimed to reject foreign intervention, they were in dire need of arms and munitions given the shortcomings of Spanish defence capabilities. Thus, the rebels and the republican government alike soon turned abroad for help, finding justification in the aid being received by the enemy. The countless mutual accusations of treason and foreign domination did little to mask the fact that both sides required at least two imports: fuel and armaments. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Samuel Hoare (future ambassador to Spain during the Second World War) declared British neutrality in August 1936, in accordance with his government’s position and against the opinion of the Labour Party. This was the natural outcome of the government’s non-­intervention policy, which we will be examining in more detail; for the moment, suffice it to say that the British position was all but neutral, for the official stance was carefully combined with measures designed to harm the republican effort. A case in point was the influence exerted to hinder the arrival of fuel, sent to the republicans from places ranging from Tangier to Romania. Great Britain also declined to recognize the right of the Spanish fleet to blockade its own coasts; consequently, the Royal Navy refused to allow the inspection of British merchant ships. Neutrality and non-­intervention were to be rather vague concepts.1 Crossing the Strait of Gibraltar became crucial from the onset of the war. The rebels were aware of the vital importance of transporting troops and supplies from northern Morocco to the southern Peninsula; the republicans, on the other hand, risked seeing the naval connection between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean blocked if they failed to secure maritime control of the area. In fact, the government had already taken precautionary measures to cut off the two shores of the Strait, acting on rumours regarding a possible conspiracy in the Moroccan Protectorate. Shortly before the uprising, on the nights of 16 and 17 July, the destroyers Almirante Churruca, Lepanto, Sánchez Barcáiztegui, Almirante Valdés and Alsedo had been deployed to the area around Gibraltar. Together with other units and the flotilla of submarines based in Cartagena, they formed a sizeable naval force. Nonetheless, two companies of regulares from Ceuta managed to land in Cadiz and Algeciras in the midst of the confusion initially created by the uprising.2 Most naval units declared their loyalty to the Republic early on, when the crews mutinied against the officers who sympathized with the nationalists. The destroyer

40

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

Churruca, after having escorted rebel troops, went on to serve the republican government. So did most of the destroyers in the Strait, the flotilla of submarines and the units from northern Morocco, which soon sailed into the vicinity of Gibraltar.3 The chief of operations of the fleet was Lieutenant Pedro Prado Mendizábal; from Malaga, he ordered the blockade of the Strait, made possible by the unquestionable naval superiority of the Republic. Yet three factors would soon enable the nationalists to dodge the blockade on troop transportation. One was the establishment of an airlift, initiated on 20 July and reinforced by the arrival of German and Italian aircraft. A second were the strategic and tactical shortcomings of the republican fleet, which was under the command of revolutionary committees rather than experienced officers. Last but certainly not least, the neutral stance embraced by certain countries benefited the nationalists when it was implemented in enclaves such as Tangier and Gibraltar: the republican fleet was kept from provisioning with fuel and denied authorization to dock in the bases of the Strait, forcing the units to make frequent trips to the port of Malaga. The events of 21 July and the following days, involving the loyalist fleet, highlighted the distrust of governments such as the British and American towards the Spanish Republic. On that day, the chief of the republican fleet, Fernando Navarro Capdevila, directed his ships to the port of Tangier in search of fuel supplies. He had asked the president of the Republican government, José Giral, to negotiate the corresponding authorization. The cruiser Cervantes arrived first and was soon joined by other units, accounting for most of the republican fleet in the Strait.4 They were in urgent need of fuel, food and water. With Ceuta, Algeciras and Cadiz under the control of the nationalists, the closest alternative for acquiring these goods was the international city of Tangier. Yet the peculiar fleet, with its mutinied crews and no officers, was not met with a warm welcome. The powers ensuring the neutrality of Tangier sent out warships to meet the fleet, and British officers attempted to verify the state of affairs by visiting the Tofiño. The officer of the Whitehall was taken aback by what he saw: ships lacking fuel or water, dirty and scruffy crews, and discipline light-­years away from the standards of the Royal Navy. He reported this information to the Foreign Office, thus ratifying the pre-­existing British perception of the republican camp. The conclusion was clear: the republican fleet was led by soviets controlled by revolutionary petty officers. The verdict was strikingly similar to the contents of General Franco’s complaint before the Tangier Control Committee, demanding the immediate departure of ‘pirate’ troops with no right to refuel at an international port.5 Met with such pressures, the major ships in the republican fleet left Tangier for Gibraltar, though – according to Martínez Bande – the submarines and several minor ships remained in Tangier a few more weeks, stocking up on supplies. This provisioning must have been very minor, for Michael Alpert has shown that Shell denied fuel to the republican fleet and the United States Consul in Tangier advised American companies to do the same. The loyalist fleet offered no guarantees in the eyes of British and American representatives, who embraced the principle of neutrality before the Spanish government while gradually opening the door to a discreet tactical cooperation with the rebels. The events of Tangier were an initial symptom, but what happened in

The Initial Impact of the Civil War in Gibraltar

41

Gibraltar in the following days removed any remaining doubts about the attitude of the major democratic powers towards the Spanish Republic. On the surface, refuelling at Gibraltar was a mere commercial transaction. But the implications were much deeper. To those responsible for the Rock and to His Majesty’s Government, it was convenient to quickly get rid of the republican fleet, denying it any aid and expelling it from the Strait altogether if possible. A fleet could not be refused anchorage at a neutral port, nor had the two factions been recognized as belligerents; in fact, they never would be. Thus, there was officially no war, but rather a rebel uprising against an internationally legitimate government. In this context, British policy guidelines were precise: the Spanish war should remain a domestic affair, preserving British interests in Spain and the base of Gibraltar. The protection of the enclave would run parallel to its conversion into a valuable instrument for the policy of the British government. As for the authorities of the colony, they harboured no sympathy for the Spanish Republic. The governor acknowledged receipt of Franco’s complaints regarding the presence in the Bay of Gibraltar of the Jaime I, the Liberty, the Cervantes, the Sánchez Barcáiztegui and other loyalist ships. Again, a Royal Navy officer visited one of the republican ships (the Jaime I) and was shocked by the appearance of the lieutenant commander in charge (probably Fernando Navarro Capdevila), who ‘had forgotten to put on socks’.6 Chaos, filth and a lack of discipline foreign to the standards of British sailors seemed to be the norm.7 The report that reached London dealt a further blow to the republican cause, and the British authorities denied official supplies to the ships. In essence, British official opinion was in line with the words of Franco himself in a telegram to the governor of Gibraltar: The state of the crew is one of open Communism, the chiefs and officers have been made prisoners, if not killed or wounded . . . As it would not serve Spanish interests that these ships be supplied with fuel or allowed to refuel in British waters, I request that you bring these circumstances to the attention of H.M. Government, so as to put an end as soon as possible to the state of anarchy that the presence of these ships promotes in the Mediterranean.8

On 22 July the Gibraltar Chronicle echoed these feelings, carrying news that the crews of the Spanish ships arriving from Tangier had imprisoned their officers and created revolutionary soviets. The fleet reeked of Bolshevism to the point that colonial authorities refused to attend their requests: if the republicans needed fuel, they would have to negotiate with local companies. With this, the authorities declined responsibility and left the matter in the hands of local businessmen, who in turn applied stalling tactics, protected by the government’s silence. On the same day, Second Lieutenant José Paz landed in Gibraltar in the company of the acting Spanish vice-­consul on the Rock, intending to purchase fuel from local companies. He needed between 1,500 and 2,000 tons of coal, as well as 6,000 tons of petroleum. The Oil Fuel Depot Ltd was in a position to match the demand, but the company’s London headquarters (the Asiatic Petroleum Company) decided to paralyse the transaction until the British government expressed its opinion. The delay was well

42

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

attuned to the views of the rear-­admiral of Gibraltar, who opposed giving fuel to a fleet that could potentially risk the lives of British citizens if it bombed Ceuta, Melilla or Algeciras. Further, on the night of 21 July, Governor Harington had already informed the Foreign Office that the republican ships were communist and revolutionary, while prominent businessman Lionel Imossi (a consummate right-­winger and member of the board of directors of the Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce) demanded the release of the nationalist officers imprisoned on the ships in exchange for selling fuel supplies to the republican fleet. To Imossi’s full satisfaction, no one was released and not one drop of fuel was sold. The businessman would later cooperate with Francoist intelligence, intercepting republican telegrams as commandant of the Gibraltar Special Constabulary. A fellow Imossi (George) was, interestingly enough, the German consul on the Rock.9 In sum, the general atmosphere could hardly have been more hostile to the republican cause. The prospect of the ‘practically communist’ governmental forces winning the war was widely feared.10 Fortunately, the republican oil tanker Ophir arrived near Gibraltar with 500 tons of fuel and the fleet was finally able to depart from the Bay of Gibraltar after facing harassment from nationalist aircraft. The airborne attack, coming from Ceuta, targeted the cruisers Cervantes and Libertad and the battleship Jaime I. Some bombs, however, fell near the British ocean liner Chitral and the destroyer Shamrock, which was carrying British refugees from Malaga to Gibraltar. Additionally, shrapnel landed on Gibraltar (inside the fortress, near the Rock Hotel; and even in Sandy Bay and Catalan Bay, on the other side of the Rock) and there were explosions over the RAF headquarters and the Royal Naval Cinema. The following day, Brigadier Brooks (acting Governor and commander-­in-chief of Gibraltar) lodged a strong protest with the republican authorities, blaming their ships for putting Gibraltar at risk by launching anti-­aircraft missiles towards the skies over the Rock. The nationalists also received a complaint from the British consul in Tetouan, who informed General Franco. The Foreign Office issued warnings to both sides – albeit in different tones – that it would tolerate neither Spanish ships in the port of Gibraltar nor aircraft overflying the colony.11 General Alfredo Kindelán, however, was warmly welcomed when he arrived to present excuses on behalf of Franco and discuss the incident.12 Further, he was given permission to use the Gibraltar telephone exchange – the most important British communications exchange in continental Europe – to communicate with Lisbon, Berlin and Rome and coordinate the arrival of German and Italian aircraft.13 The incident is revealing, especially in view of the general’s testimony that he was received as ‘Franco’s official representative’ and allowed to dial Mussolini, Hitler and Alfonso XIII before embarking for Ceuta on a nationalist seaplane. There could be no clearer sign of cooperation than enabling the rebels to communicate through a telephone network under government control. Two years later, in striking contrast, the British authorities would arrest members of the crew of the republican destroyer José Luis Díez for attempting radio communications from Punta Europa.14 Having endured such vicissitudes, a battered and demoralized republican fleet reached Malaga on 23 July. The ships had been unwelcome visitors in Tangier and Gibraltar, while the rebels in the Strait were already starting to profit from the first signs of the Republic’s international isolation. Judging by the attitude of Gibraltar’s

The Initial Impact of the Civil War in Gibraltar

43

authorities, nationalist aviation posed no threat to the colony, nor was it unsettling to see the surroundings of the Rock under insurgent control. The real risk, according to the enclave’s authorities, was the presence of the loyalist fleet in Gibraltar Bay. In a twist of irony, the nationalists’ air attacks on republican vessels were Gibraltar’s excuse for expelling the ships from these waters. The Republic was alone. Though the Strait should have been under its control, the enemy had already achieved air presence and was well installed on both shores. In fact, the rebels managed to transport more troops throughout the remaining days of July. In the meantime, loyalist ships proved incapable of effectively blocking the Strait, lost as they were between Tangier and Gibraltar and having to make frequent trips to their base in Malaga. And despite having more aircraft than the nationalists during the first few months of the war (around 400 against the nationalists’ 109, according to the figures of Martínez Bande), they were no more effective in controlling the airspace. The chief of the naval forces, Prado Mendizábal, constantly insisted on a combined land and sea operation to take Algeciras. He understood the strategic importance of the area for the control of Andalusia; yet the military commander of Malaga, Colonel José Asensio, persuaded him to abandon this idea in favour of taking Cordoba and Granada.15 Asensio must not have realized that securing the inland cities ultimately depended on maritime control of the south, especially of the Strait of Gibraltar. In many ways, achieving victory required the conquest of the seas; the republicans, however, failed to grasp its significance. By contrast, the nationalists considered the Strait vital and were more fortunate in their efforts to control it. Well aware of their naval inferiority (they only had the striker Dato, the coastguard vessel Uad-Quert and the torpedo boat T-19), the insurgents knew that aerial cover was essential. Franco and Kindelán thus did everything in their power to have operational aircraft in the area, based in airports such as Larache and Tetouan, as well as the connection with the Peninsula (Seville). This allowed them to guarantee the airlift, protect their convoys and harass republican ships. In this context, the so-­called ‘convoy of Victory’ crossed from Ceuta to Algeciras on 5 August. The convoy itself carried little more than 1,500 men, but its success was an important propaganda coup for the nationalists. The republicans suffered the humiliation of being unable to intercept a weakly escorted convoy – the republican Lepanto, after being attacked and momentarily seeking refuge in Gibraltar, left for Malaga. Without it, the destroyer Alcalá-Galiano proved incapable of impeding the passage of the convoy. Demoralized, the republican fleet retaliated with the naval bombardment of Algeciras, Cadiz, Asilah and Larache between 7 and 9 August. The small nationalist striker Dato was rendered useless by the powerful artillery of the battleship Jaime I. But this was a punitive action that only managed to inflict some material damage, while the nationalists continued their airlift and remained in control of both shores: on the very days of the attack, they transported over 3,000 men to the Peninsula.16 Despite these raids, life in Cadiz (bombarded several times by the Cervantes, the Almirante Valdés and others) slowly returned to normal throughout the month of August.17 In retrospect, it seems striking that the republicans failed to concentrate their air force over the vicinity of the Strait, establish an effective permanent watch to enforce the blockade or take a city as strategic as Algeciras. Prado Mendizábal always thought

44

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

such measures necessary, but even after 5 August he had no luck getting the Republic to outline a concrete and coherent plan for securing control of the Strait.18 There were only a few feeble attempts at recapturing the Campo de Gibraltar, launched without the necessary naval and aerial cover. On 27 August, a column from Malaga took San Roque, except for the headquarters of the infantry and the Guardia Civil, which resisted until regulares arriving from Algeciras took back the town for the nationalists. In early September, an attempt to land troops at Atunara beach was also repelled, on this occasion by local forces.19 Republican plans to enforce an effective naval blockade (decrees of 24 July and 7 August) were also unsuccessful.20 Internationally, the war was not acknowledged and the two sides were not considered belligerents, so the republican navy had no legal basis for detaining and searching neutral merchant ships at sea. Nor were the British authorities willing to allow a blockade by a fleet they considered mutinous and revolutionary. To prevent any problems, Great Britain stepped up its naval presence in the Strait with the arrival of the battle cruiser HMS Repulse and the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, deployed from Malta.21 Tension hung thick in the sea air. A sign of the unease was the incident that took place on 23 August, when the British merchant ship Gibel Zerjon was intercepted en route from Gibraltar to Melilla by the republican cruiser Miguel de Cervantes. The HMS Repulse immediately left Gibraltar, along with the swift destroyer Codrington, in order to intervene and free the merchant ship. The Gibel Zerjon was in fact transporting fuel, but there was no inquiry regarding the final destination of such supplies. The British simply would not have it: a unilateral blockade of their merchant ships by the Spanish Republic was unacceptable. Faced with a shortage of ships and fuel, a lack of international cooperation and harassment from nationalist aviation, the republican naval blockade was doomed to failure.22 In September, the Minister of the Navy (Indalecio Prieto) decided to deploy most of the republican fleet in the Cantabrian Sea to defend the Peninsula’s northern maritime front. There were reasons for this choice, for throughout August the nationalists had established a partial blockade of this coast by harassing republican merchant ships such as the Arriluce, sunk under fire from the Almirante Cervera en route from Valencia to Gijon, where it was transporting war supplies.23 But Prieto’s decision was nonetheless a strategic mistake, because the nationalists gave the exact opposite order and deployed the cruisers Cervera and Canarias from El Ferrol to the Strait of Gibraltar. Once there, they rid the area of the presence of republican destroyers and submarines (the destroyer Almirante Ferrándiz was sunk by the Canarias in September). With this, the Strait came under complete control of the nationalists. The republicans should probably have set off in pursuit of the Canarias and the Cervera, the two most important units in the rebel fleet, instead of taking a defensive stance when they still held naval superiority.24 After the insurgents’ success, the two republican zones (Cantabrian and Mediterranean) were cut off from each other. The area around Gibraltar stayed under nationalist control for the remainder of the war. Further, by 30 September 1936 the insurgents had received around seventy German and sixty-­eight Italian airplanes, giving them considerable aerial advantage. The Republic would also receive foreign aid, but it was more expensive, less organized and more technically problematic. The number of airplanes or artillery units was definitely not the only key to winning the war – strategy,

The Initial Impact of the Civil War in Gibraltar

45

tactics, supplies, technical training and discipline had all helped establish the nationalists’ early military superiority. All in all, the British authorities at the Rock could consider themselves satisfied with the initial results of the conflict. After the first few weeks of war, on 19 November 1936, Labour MP Josiah Wedgwood informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies what he had learnt from a British officer of aid dispensed by the Admiralty to the insurgents. Among other services, the Admiralty had provided the rebels with intelligence regarding the republican fleet.25 This may have been a decisive element in the defeat of loyalist ships and the control of the Strait by Franco. The British, from the base of Gibraltar, helped consolidate the rebels’ position through gestures as obvious as authorizing Kindelán to communicate from the Rock to avoid governmental interception, placing HMS Queen Elizabeth across Gibraltar Bay to impede possible naval attacks by the republican fleet, or leaking information to the insurgents about the help being received by the Republic. Not to mention, of course, the supplies (especially fuel) made available to the rebels in the British colony. Taken together, such actions made it rather difficult to see the British attitude as one of non-­intervention, no matter how loudly this principle was proclaimed. Hans Voelckers, German chargé d’affaires, was among those to notice: ‘As for England we have made the interesting observation that she is supplying the Whites with ammunition via Gibraltar, and that the British cruiser commander here has recently been supplying us with information on Russian arms deliveries to the Red Government, which he certainly would not do without instructions’.26 The flow of supplies and information was discreet, but very real. Recent research has shown that, on 11 August 1936, the military governor of Algeciras requested permission from the British authorities to send a couple of boats to Gibraltar to purchase provisions for the troops. The authorization was granted, under the condition that those in charge of transportation wore civilian clothes. More conspicuously, a report preserved in the Public Record Office acknowledged that ‘. . . armed boats of the Spanish Tobacco Monopoly are constantly travelling from Gibraltar to Algeciras with provisions under protection of Rebel Army officers . . . Provisions are also brought on board the Algeciras mail boat and the tank boat which carries wood . . . Ammunition is carried in a fishing boat painted white which is armed with machine guns and officers of the Foreign Legion’.27 The insurgents also found backing among Gibraltar’s most influential figures. Businessmen like the Imossis, high-­ranking civil servants, and members of the Catholic and Anglican Churches all heartily supported the rebels. For the first group, the military coup was a business opportunity that also carried the promise of ridding Spain of leftist influence; for civil servants, supporting the insurgents was a matter of applying the real – or hidden – instructions associated with the policy of non-­ intervention; and for religious sectors, what was at stake was no less than the cause of God and Christian civilization itself.28 For all of them, the Republic had to be finished off, discreetly and firmly. Governor Harington’s attitude clearly reflected the position of the colonial administration, which throughout the Civil War remained the perfect instrument for carrying out the wishes of His Majesty’s Government. While the republican fleet was denied any type of aid,

46

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

German planes – according to journalist Henry Buckley – were allowed to refuel in Gibraltar’s small aviation field during the first few days of the war, in order to help the rebellion in Seville. And suspicious fishing boats, painted white but carrying Spanish Foreign Legion officers, were allowed to approach the Rock to acquire ammunition.29

Governor Harington and the British fleet: humanitarian aid and national interest If Stanley Baldwin’s government barely bothered to disguise its coldness toward the Spanish Republic, the governor of Gibraltar was even more obvious in his sympathy for the insurgents. He felt a deep aversion toward the government in Madrid. For the profoundly conservative Charles Harington, the leftist positions of the Popular Front, the growing communist influence and the progressive collapse of law and order were reason enough to long for General Franco’s victory. Born in Chichester on 31 May 1872, Charles ‘Tim’ Harington was an experienced and distinguished British officer. He had been educated at Cheltenham and Sandhurst, where he started a long military career. In 1899, he was deployed to South Africa for a short-­lived participation in the war against the Dutch Boers; he was also a First World War veteran (an experience which he described in Plumer at Messines). Harington was considered a man of sharp political judgement and clarity of vision. It was probably these two qualities that got him commissioned to negotiate the Greco-Turkish peace treaty with Turkish nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal. After several years devoted to teaching and training in the Army (he developed the Army Education Corps), he was sent to India. In 1933, he was named governor of Gibraltar, a post he would occupy until 1938. Hence, he was the Rock’s highest authority for most of the Spanish Civil War. In the year of his death (1940), he published his memoirs in London under the title Tim Harington Looks Back. His account is rich in details, albeit discreet: the audience must often read between the lines to infer his views regarding the Spanish Civil War. Indeed, the book was published when Great Britain was at war with Germany, forcing him to moderate his pro-Franco enthusiasm. By his own acknowledgement, however, it seems beyond doubt that 18 July marked a before-­and-after in his time in Gibraltar. If the British colony had been calm as a millpond before the outbreak of the war (despite unsettling news from republican Spain or the Abyssinia Crisis), this peace was quickly shattered when the Rock became a place brimming with refugees and surrounded by naval battles.30 Harington was also a devout Christian and an old-­fashioned military man. With his love of discipline and of all things orderly, he could hardly understand the anticlerical incidents taking place in the hinterland of the Rock before July 1936. In fact, Harington was a distinguished member of TOC H. Though virtually unknown in Spain, this was a peculiar society bringing Christians together for purposes of mutual aid and solidarity with the needy, among other goals. It had been founded during the First World War within the Second Army, and it was Lord Plumer who put Harington in charge of

The Initial Impact of the Civil War in Gibraltar

47

further development of the organization inside the armed forces. He never abandoned this task, on which he focused even more intensely after leaving his post in Gibraltar toward the end of his life (1938–40).31 Given his ideological and religious profile, Harington’s appraisal of the events beyond the Rock’s border comes as no surprise. Once the war began, he rejected the style and behaviour of the republican militias in favour of the discipline he saw in the insurgents. He was particularly outraged when the crews of the republican fleet mutinied against their officers. If Franco had labelled the republican ships a ‘pirate’ fleet, Harington’s view was no better. He soon came to expect the victory of the insurgents, considering that the apparent superiority of the republican forces would be easily undermined by their lack of organization. The republican fleet may have been larger in numbers, but the nationalists were in possession of El Ferrol, where the construction of two new cruisers (the Canarias and the Baleares) was nearing completion. They also had most of the officer corps on their side: the Republic could only count on 2 admirals (out of 19), 2 captains (out of 31), 7 frigate captains (out of 65) and 13 corvette captains (out of 128). The loyalists could fit out the ports of Bilbao and Barcelona, and they also controlled most of the merchant fleet and the base of Cartagena, but they never developed the necessary organizational capabilities to achieve victory. Harington clearly envisioned what was bound to happen after the nationalists gained control of the Strait throughout the first few months of war. But the rebels had some discreet help in their efforts. Harington never regretted taking on responsibility for Gibraltar. After his arrival on board the Narkunda on 20 October 1933, one of the first problems he had to face was the Royal Calpe Hunt conflict. Disagreements between the Larios family and the previous governor of Gibraltar had led the Marquis to interrupt a long-­standing tradition of inviting British officers to hunt on family lands. Upon arriving at his post, Harington had the Marquis and Marchioness over for lunch and quickly orchestrated a solution allowing British officers to resume their fox hunting on the lands of the Marquis. Aside from that affair and the relative turmoil caused by the Italian intervention in Abyssinia (as noted, Emperor Haile Selassie stopped in Gibraltar on his way to exile), his life as the Rock’s governor was fairly manageable until 1936. The outbreak of the war changed everything. He would have to put to use the experience acquired in Constantinople – where there had been many Russian, Turkish and Afghan refugees – to deal with the delicate problem of the refugees arriving at the Rock during the Spanish conflict. In 1938, shortly before being relieved of his post, he implemented a firm evacuation policy, assuming responsibility for the potential deaths of refugees after they crossed the gate.32 The Sudeten Crisis and the Munich Agreement were a likely prelude to war with Germany, and the British could not afford to turn the base of Gibraltar into a permanent residence for exiles. The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War disrupted the calm that had characterized the early years of Harington’s term. He was in Great Britain when the news of the uprising reached him. Immediately, he departed for Gibraltar and, on the ship, ran into José Larios, the son of the Marquis of Marzales. Larios knew the Governor and asked him for news regarding the coup, but Harington had no more information than what had been published in the British press. José Larios would reach Gibraltar, where he

48

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

found his family unharmed (despite rumours that his sister Talía and brother-­in-law Fernando, Marquis and Marchioness of Povar, had been murdered). After crossing the border, he joined the nationalist forces as a fighter pilot. As for Harington, he came face to face with the difficult task of governing the Rock under new circumstances.33 The governor dutifully adjusted his behaviour to the instructions from Whitehall and his attitude to what he considered just and reasonable. His views were not rare in Gibraltar – his anti-­communist convictions were shared by most of the British elite, both inside and outside the enclave. A case in point was the attitude of Sir Auckland Geddes, president of the Rio Tinto Company, who did not even summon his company’s board of directors after 18 July. Three weeks passed before he met with the directors in London and explained that Spain was on the verge of a revolution: the bothersome protests instigated by trade unions and the demands of the republican government were history. The rebellion came as a relief, for the insurgents embodied law and order and that was precisely what the exploitation of the mines required. The territories that fell to the nationalists (including the port of Huelva) quickly returned to a much-­ longed-for normalcy. In Geddes’s view, the desirable outcome was a quick military victory to put an end to the revolutionary events of the republican zone.34 Pro-­nationalist sentiment prevailed among British diplomats in Spain, businessmen and members of the armed forces. Though many in Gibraltar sympathized with the Republic, they were not the people making the crucial decisions in the colony and military base. The leftist Garratt offered a vivid description of the support the insurgents found among the British authorities: A more important cause of misunderstanding was due to our local representatives, senior officers at Gibraltar, consuls in Spain; all of these had their contacts with the class supporting General Franco, the landed aristocracy who hunted with the Calpe hounds, the Spanish Foreign Office officials, the prosperous business men, and the military caste. The official Gibraltar gazette always referred to the Government as the ‘Reds’. In England itself the campaign in favour of the rebellion had been organized in advance.35

All of this neatly matched the guidelines laid out by the British government, and it is likely that Harington himself would have been swiftly replaced had he failed to comply with them. London had such clear notions regarding Spain that, once war broke out and the Non-Intervention Committee was set up, the British turned their attention to predicting what the future would be and devising plans for the protection of British interests. The official in charge of Spanish affairs in the Foreign Office, Montagu-Pollock, drew up a minute on 9 October 1936, shortly after Francisco Franco was named nationalist ‘Head of State’. He offered a lucid analysis of the post-­war period: I suggest that our chances of regaining our influence in Spain during this period [the post-­war] are considerable, owing to the fact that the Spanish revolution, unlike the Fascist and Nazi revolutions, will have been won primarily by the military, who traditionally look to the United Kingdom and France rather than

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49

Germany and Italy . . . It is therefore a British interest that a liberal military rather than a fascist dictatorship should emerge (1) in order to counteract Italian and German influence, (2) in order to stabilize the internal situation.36

Every aspect had been analysed and there were reasonable prospects that the situation would have the desired outcome. Yet the British government did more than sit back and wait. Germany and Italy were openly helping Franco while the international landscape grew increasingly tense. It was well and fine to help the nationalists defeat the Republic, but Great Britain certainly could not let its guard down in Gibraltar and its other Mediterranean enclaves, which guaranteed navigation routes to Suez and the Asian colonies. Containing communist influence in Spain, however advisable, could not come at the expense of weakening British control of the Mediterranean. In September 1936, Samuel Hoare performed inspection visits to the Mediterranean enclaves, arriving at the conclusion that their protection should be enhanced given the likelihood of imminent conflict in the area. In the case of the Rock, the envoy was taken aback by the lack of anti-­aircraft artillery and the fact that there was not a single gun aimed at Spain.37 The ensuing measures for bolstering the defence of the Rock would make up a substantial part of the duties of Harington and his successors. At the outbreak of the war, however, the most pressing concerns were managing the urgent evacuation of British nationals from Spain and dealing with the influx of Spanish refugees. The cooperation of the British Navy was crucial to both tasks, with its units carrying British citizens to the safety of the Rock and transporting republican refugees to loyalist ports in the Mediterranean (Malaga, Valencia, Barcelona). Such difficult moments again highlighted the importance of controlling the seas. Gibraltar was not the key to the Mediterranean, but the hook from which dangled the true key – the Royal Navy. The British Navy indeed played a pivotal role at the beginning of the war. Its mobility allowed for a first-­hand assessment of the situation on both sides, with information rapidly gathered and transmitted to London. It was no less instrumental in humanitarian tasks (such as the evacuation of British nationals) or in the protection of British interests in Spain. Naturally, safeguarding the lives and integrity of British citizens in Spanish territory was a priority, and they were deported to destinations such as Marseilles, Tangier and, of course, Gibraltar.38 Precisely during the first weeks of July, the 1st Flotilla of Destroyers was in the Mediterranean, heading home after two years of operations. It arrived at Gibraltar, where the crews enjoyed several days of rest prior to taking off toward the Atlantic on 10 July. The admiral of Gibraltar (Rear Admiral J. Pipon) decided to keep back two of the destroyers (the Wild Swan and the Whitehall) in order to increase the Rock’s naval defences. The rest of the flotilla was navigating along Portuguese shores on 20 July when it received orders to assist British citizens in Galicia. The HMS Whitshed, the Wren and the Witch set course for Vigo, La Coruña and El Ferrol, respectively. While carrying out their tasks, members of the British Navy gathered very different impressions regarding each of the sides at war. From the start, the rebels were associated with law and order. The commanding officer of the Wren witnessed harsh combat in La Coruña, but considered evacuation of

50

Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

British citizens unnecessary once the nationalists had taken control of the city. In his eyes, it was the insurgents who offered guarantees of security for British citizens.39 These perceptions did not imply the Royal Navy’s fully-­fledged allegiance to the nationalists, despite frequent accusations in that vein. There is little doubt, however, that neither officers nor rank-­and-file sailors sympathized with the Marxist slogans flung about in the republican zone. In contrast, from the start of the war, there was excellent rapport with the Basques and the Basque government, by virtue of the region’s traditionally good relations with Great Britain and the moderate ideology of the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV).40 Rear Admiral Pipon had certainly been right to add two destroyers to the local defensive ship Shamrock and the other minor defensive units protecting Gibraltar. The Rock’s port did not have a large naval presence at the time and many units were being frantically used to meet the needs created by the war. A small ship (the Sir Nigel Birch) had to be sent to Malaga to pick up British citizens, while the tugboat Energetic travelled to and from Algeciras, bringing in British refugees and then returning evacuees once the area came under nationalist control on 21 July. On 24 July, the HMS Boreas reached Gibraltar carrying British women and children from the Rio Tinto mines. Throughout these early days, the HMS Wild Swan patrolled the Strait and the HMS Whitehall set course for Tangier. Between 18 and 24 July the hustle and bustle was constant. An avalanche of refugees stacked up at the gates trying to gain access to the Rock; there were few units at sea, calling for a hasty reinforcement; and the information received was often contradictory. The Wild Swan, for instance, was bombed when a nationalist plane mistook it for a republican destroyer. Fortunately, this and other incidents did not cause human losses. As a territory of an officially neutral power, Gibraltar initially kept a scrupulous distance from both sides, while carrying out humanitarian relief tasks (assistance to the wounded, reception of war materiel that would be kept on the Rock) and attempting to promote a prompt return to normalcy in the area. Among other reasons, Spanish workers were a necessary labour force. The goal was gradually attained: by 5 August, the ferry from Algeciras to Gibraltar was again operational, transporting workers needed in the docks and arsenal. The Rock regained its comfortable isolation from its surroundings despite its geographic proximity to the war. From the enclave, the battles could be watched almost as a show, and it was customary to find crowds in locations affording an unobstructed view of the fighting. One such spectacle was provided on 29 July, when aircraft from Ceuta repeatedly attacked the republican submarine C-3. After several emergency immersions, the sub was hit. According to The Times, it had to be tugged to Malaga.41 Once the area was relatively stable, the port became a key piece in the international system of surveillance patrols set up by the Non-Intervention Committee, which began operating in the spring of 1937. Great Britain was responsible for the shores of Andalusia – from the border with Portugal to Cabo de Gata – and for the area from Cape Busto to the French border on the northern facade. There were other fleets (French, German, Italian) and Gibraltar also served as a docking base for these foreign naval units. Repairs of non-­intervention ships usually took place in Gibraltar, which was the neutral base best equipped for such purposes. As early as August 1936 the

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German pocket battleship Admiral Scheer and the Italian cruiser Gorizia arrived at the Rock for repairs.42 Meanwhile, the neutrality of the port of Tangier (vital to British interests) was reinforced with the presence of an international fleet including British, French, Italian and Portuguese ships. Despite the relative calm that was achieved, it was not possible to prevent some incidents at sea. On 17 August, a rebel plane mistakenly bombed the British ship Blance near Melilla, prompting the apologies of the military governor of Algeciras to the Gibraltarian authorities. Shortly afterward, on 23 August, came the incident with the merchant ship Gibel Zerjon, intercepted by the republican cruiser Miguel de Cervantes and liberated in the presence of the destroyer HMS Codrington and the powerful HMS Repulse, both of which arrived at the scene from Gibraltar. Nearly one month later, the same merchant ship was again intercepted by the republicans and freed under similar circumstances by the HMS Arrow. And the Royal Navy continued to protect its citizens as well as its commercial traffic: as late as the end of September, the HMS Arham was sent to Tangier and a torpedo-­boat destroyer to Alicante to evacuate British nationals.43 With both shores of the Strait under rebel control, there were no significant disturbances after the autumn of 1936. British Navy and merchant ships continued to perform humanitarian tasks, transporting refugees from Almeria or mediating in prisoner swaps. The tension at sea eventually dissipated, except for a few isolated incidents. In May 1937, for instance, the destroyer HMS Hunter hit a nationalist mine near Almeria; the HMS Hardy had to come to its aid from Gibraltar at full speed, covering 150 miles in five hours. In August, the Italian submarine Iride torpedoed the destroyer HMS Havoc; the incident did not cause great harm, but it precipitated the signature of the Nyon Agreement.44 Thereafter, the situation remained mostly calm until 1938, when the republican destroyer José Luis Díez sought refuge in Gibraltar. As we will see, its presence created an awkward situation for the Rock’s authorities.45 The Royal Navy did what was expected of it. So did the consuls who cooperated in the task of protecting British citizens, accommodating many of them in consulates before their evacuation via land or sea. In cities such as Barcelona, Valencia or Cartagena, citizens were evacuated in ships assigned exclusively to this task. Whether for humanitarian reasons or out of sheer opportunism, the consuls also extended protection to some non-British nationals. Not all of these people were Spaniards: for instance, the consul in Barcelona (Norman King) requested authorization to protect members of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. He was told that they were not listed among those whom the British consulate had to protect, but that he could provide them with whatever semi-­official assistance he deemed desirable.46 Evacuating British citizens was a simple task compared to the problems posed by Spanish refugees on the Rock. People with British passports had only to await their evacuation; they otherwise had little to fear from a war that was not their own, other than some isolated incidents. Spaniards were a completely different matter. They were at war, killing each other with the brutality inherent to civil strife, and the rocky silhouette of Gibraltar offered the promise of a lifeline. The main problem was that there were far too many of them. The Rock was a small territory lacking enough housing, and the presence of Spanish citizens sympathetic to different sides created

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Table 3.1  Evacuation of refugees to Malaga (31 October 1936–13 January 1937) Date

Ship

Number evacuated

31 October 1936 7 November 1936 22 November 1936

HMS Gipsy HMS Gallant HMS Griffin

112 256 157

10 December 1936 27 December 1936

HMS Acasta HMS Gipsy

168 185

3 January1937

HMS Gallant

252

13 January 1937

HMS Achates

212

Observations

21 men, 54 women, 82 children 143 men, 16 women, 26 children 136 men, 67 women, 49 children 154 men, 36 women, 22 children

Source: GGA, 427/1936, pp. 1–57.

tensions in the enclave. They had to be evacuated, but many were unwilling to return to the front lines. It took a long time to solve the difficult situation, despite the constant efforts of the British Navy to evacuate refugees. Between the start of the war and the end of October, around 2,000 refugees were transported to Estepona, Malaga and other republican ports. The trend continued in the following months, as reflected in the figures for transportation of republican refugees to Malaga between October 1936 and January 1937 (see Table 3.1). In two and a half months, over 1,300 people were evacuated. Yet the problem was not solved, as new refugees continued to arrive.

Desperation at the border: the flood of refugees Gibraltar’s peculiar geography had long made it a shelter for targets of political persecution and a major thoroughfare for those seeking safety in other lands. We have already mentioned the arrival at the Rock of nineteenth-­century Spanish liberals and the many Spaniards who sought refuge in Gibraltar or abroad during the twentieth century (be it during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera or as a result of the upheavals of the Second Republic). The flow of refugees, to be sure, also included criminals, smugglers and defectors. And occasionally, it went in the opposite direction, when British soldiers unhappy with their deployment at the Rock chose defection over the discipline of a stifling and faraway garrison, particularly in times of war. Spanish and British nationals, as well as men and women of other origins, were part of a bi-­ directional – though by no means symmetrical – flow of human beings seeking shelter or evacuation. During the Second World War, refugees from Nazi-­occupied territories reached Spain and were confined in the concentration camp of Miranda de Ebro. From there, these people (French, British, Polish, Belgian, etc.) were swiftly evacuated to Portugal and Gibraltar, where they joined the Allied forces. Between 1940 and 1944, over 60,000 foreign refugees passed through Spain fleeing the Nazis; among them were

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Jews.47 The British and American embassies were very active in organizing their evacuation with the cooperation of the Franco government. Lorries carried food supplies from Gibraltar to Miranda de Ebro and returned transporting men to join the Allied forces.48 During the Civil War, Gibraltar was flooded with a motley throng of people living and sleeping in the most unlikely places. Such scenes had never been seen in the colony. The arrival of British nationals was fully expected; in fact, one of the first decisions the British government took was to send HMS Devonshire to the port of Valencia to evacuate British citizens to several destinations, including Gibraltar.49 What was not anticipated was the flow of refugees through the land border. Among the arrivals were a number of Gibraltarians who had taken up residence in Spain. According to Gumersindo Rico, they were people of modest means: ‘Many of the poorest citizens lived in Spain until the Civil War forced them to return to the Rock. Many of them are really Spanish. They are as much a product of Spain as the members of the upper class are of England’.50 Assessing the exact number of Spaniards who fled the unwonted violence is no simple task,51 especially since many crossed the border only to continue onwards to other destinations or to return to Spain once the situation was more stable. In the initial days of the conflict, it was virtually impossible to enforce strict control of the overcrowded border. Bureaucratic admission requirements meant little under circumstances so exceptional that some people even swam to Gibraltar. Reasonable estimates find no fewer than 4,000 refugees;52 according to most studies, the figure was most likely somewhere between 5,000 and 9,000.53 It is worth noting, however, that these figures include a substantial part of the thousands that crossed the border daily to go to their jobs in the British colony. In any event, the refugees accounted for no less than 20 per cent of the population of Gibraltar – around 18,000 residents at the time.54 Desperate, people sought any possible way to get into Gibraltar and find cover within. By Harington’s account, hundreds of refugees filled the poorer quarters, crammed into pontoons at the docks or found shelter in the Rock’s caves.55 The flow of refugees became so overwhelming that the Gibraltar police had to step up border controls and turn away people lacking the required documents. But these measures were implemented late, when too many refugees had already made their way in. Additionally, people continued to swim to Gibraltar or land at the beaches on the east side in small boats.56 Some businessmen and individual citizens generously provided initial humanitarian aid to those who arrived – Judah Benzimra, a baker, offered food to the refugees wandering about the market square.57 One group of refugees was made up of Spaniards who sympathized with the rebels. During the early days of the war, they arrived at Gibraltar in search of their own safety and that of their families, waiting for the situation to clear up in Algeciras and La Linea. These profoundly anti-­republican monarchists, right-­wingers and landowners, joined similar-­minded Spanish citizens who had already taken up residence at the Rock after the electoral victory of the Popular Front. The size of this group declined after a few days, as Gibraltar’s hinterland fell to the nationalist troops. Yet some were still reluctant to return to Spain. Many feared a possible loyalist counter-­offensive, while a few others – not many – were not enthusiastic enough to directly contribute to the insurgents’ effort, whether economically or in battle. Whatever their sympathies, it

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was easier to keep up with events across the border from the safety of a civilized and developed enclave than to be part of a cruel civil war in an impoverished Spain. The insurgents frowned upon this attitude. This was a moment for patriotic fervour and war zeal, with no room for half-­hearted endorsements. One was either a republican enemy or a fellow nationalist fighter. Neutral or lukewarm positions were regarded as suspicious. As General Queipo de Llano put it, Spanish refugees in Portugal or Gibraltar were either cowards or traitors. In his radio broadcasts, he urged them to return to their homeland and contribute to the war effort. On 27 July he called on them: If you do not come back and defend the fatherland, I, as a man of my word, promise to have your properties seized in the territories under my control, in which lists are already being drawn up of landowners who have fled the country. Since you were willing to abandon them [your properties] to the hands of the Marxists, I am sure you will be happy to know that they will serve as a contribution to the future greatness of Spain.

To add to his argument, Queipo then turned the microphone over to Gibraltarian resident Ángel Gómez, who described the calm situation he had encountered on his business trips to several Spanish towns and cities (La Linea, Algeciras, Tarifa, San Roque, Los Barrios, Jerez, Seville, Chiclana, San Fernando). The next day, the general continued to attack Spaniards watching the war from a distance, urging them to ‘return to Spain to defend the fatherland instead of patronizing bars and looking at the legs of dancers [!]’.58 Yet even as the nationalist-­controlled radio was broadcasting these diatribes, the republican media published their own news; for instance, that loyalist troops had taken La Linea and that Queipo himself had sought refuge in Gibraltar, from where he was to travel to Portugal.59 Only when the course of the war started to become clear did landowners return to Spain, motivated both by the pressure placed on them and by a certain guarantee of safety. To be sure, they must also have felt reassured by Queipo’s loss of influence after 1 October 1936. The Franco government in Burgos seemed more reliable than boastful, hot-­headed Queipo. Despite the latter’s threats, the properties of the refugees were never seized. The Larios were perhaps the most distinguished landowners to find shelter in Gibraltar. Several members of the family show up in historical accounts in connection with the Rock, some involved in espionage or cooperating with the Francoist cause. A case in point is Lorenza Talía Larios y Fernández de Villavicencio. Born in 1907, Talía Larios was the daughter of the Marquis of Marzales. In 1931, she married the Marquis of Povar, Fernando Fernández de Córdoba. Both husband and wife had interests in the Campo de Gibraltar area and were fervent anti-­republicans. When war broke out, the married couple immediately picked sides. The Marquis participated in the initial fighting, sustaining injuries (at first, he was thought dead). Under such circumstances, they sought refuge in the Rock, where they had a few properties. On 21 July the Gibraltar Chronicle revealed that the Marquis of Povar had been admitted to the Colonial Hospital with injuries, at a time when communications were practically closed and the border guard had been reinforced. This happened while thousands of

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republican refugees were forced to spend the night anywhere from modest private homes or garages to the Victoria Gardens or the small beaches of Catalan Bay or Eastern Bay. Some people were arriving aboard improvised boats. In Gibraltar, nationalist and republican sympathizers lived side by side, creating a constant threat of violent outbursts; indeed, an incident had already been recorded between a member of a trade union and a monarchist. The authorities took drastic measures to keep the violence outside the border from being repeated at the Rock. On 4 August, the Gibraltar Chronicle published a regulation banning illegal possession of arms; all in all, the efforts to keep the peace were reasonably successful. Life as a refugee in Gibraltar was certainly very different for the well-­off, who were not subjected to the circumstances endured by left-­wing loyalists. The Marquis of Povar was evacuated and admitted to hospital while his wife the Marchioness became an agent for Francoist intelligence. The death of her young husband in March 1938 on board the Baleares would increase her zeal in performing her tasks.60 A relative of hers, Carlos Crooke Larios, also worked for the nationalist secret service from Gibraltar. Compared to these nationalist refugees, republicans and leftists were more numerous, their lodgings more precarious and their service to the cause less effective. The violent repression unleashed on certain groups explains why waves of people fled the country. Cities like Algeciras or La Linea became the macabre setting for acts of unspeakable brutality.61 The best way to survive was to escape, and the most obvious way to do so was to seek protection under the shadow of the Rock. One case among thousands was that of writer Ángel María de Lera, a member of Ángel Pestaña’s Syndicalist Party, who managed to get to Gibraltar on a rowboat after hiding out in Sierra Carbonera for several days.62 Republicans, socialists, communists, Freemasons and liberals of every shade were seen by the nationalists as moving targets or as malignant tumours calling for removal. By extension, all things heterodox or foreign to the principles of the insurgents were ‘the anti-Spain’ and should be eliminated. People with no political affiliation were considered enemies for not adhering to the Movimiento. By the same token, others in the republican zone suffered at the hands of popular militias for not showing enough enthusiasm for the revolution of the proletariat. A significant share of the nationalists’ rage was directed against Freemasonry, an organization deemed all the more terrible for being shrouded in mystery and secrecy. The Campo de Gibraltar was home to a number of Masonic lodges, given the British colony’s age-­old influence in the area. There were fourteen operational lodges in the Rock’s hinterland in 1936 (eight in La Linea, three in San Roque, one in Algeciras, one in Jimena and one in Los Barrios). During the war, the premises of the lodges Fiat-Lux and Resurrección in La Linea were stormed. In October 1936, the directors of Resurrección informed the Grand Federal Symbolic Council of the Grand Spanish Orient (GSE): ‘The temple was attacked and the furniture thrown out on the street by the rebels; in the most grotesque manner, they tried to ridicule the Order by exposing its objects to the laypeople and allowing them to be mocked by the poor people’.63 This report (together with one by the Fiat-Lux lodge) offers a valuable means of tracing the vicissitudes that most members endured after 18 July. It can be established that most Freemasons were either punished or forced into hiding or escape, in most cases seeking safety in Gibraltar. Repression took different shapes, ranging from physical elimination

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to imprisonment and including the seizure or destruction of properties. Only a very small number of Freemasons stayed safely in the nationalist zone, thanks to their adherence to the Movimiento or to well-­connected relatives or friends. There are individual stories for every taste. Francisco Cascales Lozano, a salesman from La Linea, was arrested and killed after his properties had been seized and his business confiscated. His brother José, who was also a salesman, managed to escape to Gibraltar. The businessman Francisco Montes, the doctor Fermín Martínez López (director of the local clinic) and the hospital employee Antonio Flores Álvarez were all killed. Another doctor at the same hospital in La Linea, Juan García Rodríguez, had his death sentence commuted to imprisonment thanks to the mediation of foreign colleagues. Other Spanish Freemasons were lucky enough to be employed in Gibraltar, a circumstance that saved their lives and made it easier for them to find refuge. Such were the cases of José Caballero (a waiter at the Rock Hotel), Francisco Lozada (an employee of the arsenal), Juan Bueno (a barber), Juan Medina (an employee of the colonial government), José Romero and José González (carpenters), and Miguel Julia Tornos and Cristóbal Mota (tobacconists), among others. Still others managed to save their lives, but found themselves in precarious financial circumstances after losing their jobs in Spain: the teacher Francisco Limón García or the city hall employee Rafael Vallejo López, of La Linea, were two such cases. For those who made it to Gibraltar, a quick transfer to another destination was common practice. Some left for Tangier or Casablanca, while others travelled to cities under republican control (Alicante, Malaga). A few exceptions to the general trend were Roberto Fernández (a surgeon who became a member of Falange and a zealous nationalist), Federico Porral (who was employed in Gibraltar but nonetheless stayed in La Linea) or the city councilmen Luis Repullo Cejudo and Francisco Chacón Martorell, who were arrested and released within a few weeks (they were publicly acknowledged Freemasons and members, respectively, of the parties Izquierda Republicana and Unión Republicana).64 The Freemasons of the Fiat-Lux lodge were less fortunate. Though over 60 per cent found refuge in Gibraltar, most lacked the means to make a living there. Some had relatives killed and others paid with their own lives for being Freemasons or sympathizing with the republicans. In contrast with the Resurrección lodge, there were no Falangists or pro-­nationalists in Fiat Lux, which had a more working-­class and leftist profile. The Fiat-Lux report provides a clear account of the events: Once the rebel forces had occupied the city after facing the resistance of local citizens, among which were most of the brothers living there, they began a tenacious persecution of leftist elements, and particularly of Freemasons. One consequence of this conduct of the clerical-­fascist hordes was the need to find shelter from their repression, which made the brothers seek refuge, some in Gibraltar, others in houses, others crossing the countryside to Estepona and others wandering without aim around the outskirts of the city. The arrest of numerous brothers and their relatives was carried out swiftly, and they were subjected to the inhuman procedures typical of the rebels, so that many members of our Order lost their lives. The four temples of the Lodges of La Linea were destroyed and mocking parades were conducted using the ritual objects that we employ in our ceremonies.

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In short, so many atrocities and cruelties have been directed at us, that it has been proven that our August Order is the main target of the wrath of the fascist criminals.65

For these Freemasons, the Rock’s silhouette became a symbol of protection and liberty. Some found enough solidarity there to enable them to stay for years. As late as 1938, around 45 per cent of the members of the lodge Autonomía were still sheltered in Gibraltar. In general, Freemasons encountered better conditions for their stay than others, or else found better destinations for their evacuation. It is likely that they received help from Gibraltarian lodges, but further research would be required to confirm this hypothesis. It can nonetheless be established that whatever salvation the Rock provided at first waned as the weeks passed. This has been and remains the norm for political refugees: the relief of finding shelter is followed by the countless problems associated with the temporary nature of their situation. To be sure, many Gibraltarians – including Freemasons – showed their solidarity and hospitality to the refugees, brothers or otherwise. This attitude seems more intense in the case of the Freemasons because there were pre-­existing relations between Gibraltarian lodges (which had Spanish members) and Spanish lodges (with Gibraltarian members). The British citizen Arturo Pitto Caballero, for instance, lodged Spanish brothers in his own home.66 Some important lodges in Gibraltar also offered support, as in the case of the Continental or the Internacional (the latter under the direction of master Carlos Aspery), located respectively at 25 Calle Real and 44 Turnbull’s Lane. Many refugees concentrated on the premises of the lodge Al Mogreb number 670.67 The real problems arose over time, given the excessive number of Freemasons who had sought shelter in precarious circumstances. Many lacked the means to survive on their own in the colony, and they could not be helped indefinitely. For them, evacuation was the next step. Yet the main problems for Spanish Freemasons in Gibraltar were their own internal differences and the scarce aid provided by Spanish governing bodies, which could do little to help in the midst of the war. The provisional venerable master of the Fiat-Lux lodge expressed the brothers’ disappointment at the lack of assistance from the Grand Symbolic Council of the GSE, especially considering that years back they had sent funds to help those who ‘roamed about these valleys [Gibraltar], persecuted during the several periods of repression that our Republic has endured’. Neglected, the brothers became painfully disunited and many sought individual solutions, even including negotiating with the enemy for a possible return to Spain.68 Although sheltered Freemasons initially attempted to keep their lodges alive in Gibraltar, the groups eventually dissolved among growing difficulties, internal dissension and the unfavourable course of the war. Some Spanish Freemasons became members of local lodges. It should be noted, in any event, that the mere existence of the British colony saved many lives. Almost 50 per cent of the members of the main lodges in La Linea survived only because they had had the opportunity to cross a border as peculiar and artificial as that of Gibraltar. If we count the British Freemasons that were members of Spanish lodges and managed to flee, the percentage rises to almost 60 per cent. The rest were killed or arrested or else went into hiding or disappeared.69

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Surely, there must be no stranger feeling for a refugee than that of looking upon the land where death would await them from the safety provided by a mere border gate. Many Spaniards took shelter in tents on the North Front, only a few yards away from Spain – only a few yards away from a certain death. Though the sanitary and living conditions left much to be desired, they were alive, and nothing in the world could make them go back. But the refugees had become a problem for the Gibraltarian authorities. Their overcrowding was a likely source of insalubrity, and then there was the threat of ideological contagion: the authorities had no intention of allowing Gibraltar’s society to be contaminated by the tensions of the Civil War. Additionally, it was obvious that the provisional tents that had been set up could not remain on the North Front under the rain, cold and wind of the approaching autumn and winter. For these reasons, the refugee camp was shut down on 13 September. Many were evacuated, but others found ways to stay in Gibraltar with the help of residents and relatives. The measure enraged the Rock’s working classes, who decried the lack of solidarity shown by the authorities. The next day, around 200 people gathered before the Irish Town police station, shouting and jeering at officers and banging on the doors of the building. The disturbances were so severe that the Gibraltar trade union decided to distance itself from those involved, while Governor Harington blamed local leftists for the incidents, banned future protests and declared that many refugees would return to Spain. The governmental Gibraltar Chronicle had already pointed out on 1 September that there were more than 3,000 British nationals living in La Linea, implying that there was no repression across the border.70 Yet only a few days later, on 8 September, Queipo had boasted on the radio that three relatives of the sailors of the coastguard vessel responsible for the bombardment of La Linea had been executed.71 The closing of the refugee camp did not solve the problem. Most of the refugees refused to return to nationalist Spain. Some were willing to accept evacuation to loyalist ports, but most wished to remain in Gibraltar, sheltered from the war and with the opportunity to perhaps find a job in the colony. And there would always be new refugees: even as some were being evacuated in British destroyers, others were arriving. Their presence fostered a social divide, bringing the war to the heart of Gibraltarian daily life and giving rise to disturbances. The sympathizers of each side had different bars and meeting spots. While those supporting the rebels gathered around Market Lane, the more numerous loyalists favoured El Martillo or the Petit Bar on Main Street.72 Right until the end of the war, there were occasional outbreaks of violence, only kept from escalating through swift police action and, on occasion, with the aid of the army. Carlos Crooke Larios, for instance, was attacked on 15 November. A demonstration on 3 December resulted in the death of a leftist refugee. And yet another incident was caused on 12 December when three Gibraltarian taxi drivers, in the middle of Calle Real, shouted out slogans against Franco and in support of communism and the Republic.73 Emotions were certainly running high. Though important sectors supported the rebels, many Gibraltarians sympathized with the cause of the Republic and some simply disapproved of the escalating repression across the border. To a Gibraltarian such as Abraham Bensusan, it was inconceivable that the British authorities were on good terms with Algeciras or La Linea, considering the executions and violence that

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were taking place in those cities. In this regard, he wrote two letters to London (on 16 and 20 November 1936) in which he described the executions of British citizens, such as a clothes salesman (a Jewish Pole), or of Spaniards, such as a woman who had been carrying a pair of shoes wrapped in a communist newspaper or a man who had celebrated the resistance of Madrid with a few friends in Gibraltar. Bensusan blamed most of these actions on Emilio Griffith, a Gibraltarian who was the head of Falange Española in La Linea and who apparently controlled a network of spies in the colony. According to Bensusan’s report, among his informants were policemen such as Benedetto Benyunes or Mr Gulloch, as well as auctioneer Foffi Montgriffo. From Gibraltar, files were opened on people who could be punished if they crossed the border into Spain. Among the targets (according to the author of these reports) were trade union leader Huart and communist Judah Benzimra. Reading an anti-­fascist newspaper could be reason enough for Griffith’s spies to take down a name. Bensusan reported complicity with Spanish fascists: businessmen, civil servants, policemen and part of the Gibraltarian population were not only pro-­fascist, they were also more pro-Spanish than they were loyal to England. The only exception was the British military, in whom the author placed his trust in case of a future war with Spain. For some of these people, such as the businessmen, it was quite lucrative to sell supplies to the nationalists; in fact, sales provisions experienced an extraordinary growth in Gibraltar during the years of the Civil War. There was a double benefit to be reaped: the economic profit from the transactions and the destruction of the business-­unfriendly Spanish Republic. These were the complaints of an impassioned man who had been deeply hurt by the war. Bensusan hated Griffith enough to recommend his execution and volunteer to help bring it about. Yet, despite its profoundly subjective nature, his account reflected certain realities of the time. It was indeed true that supplies were being sold to the nationalists – but denied to the Republicans – and that the Rock’s authorities were remarkably lenient towards anything that might contribute to a Francoist victory.74 It seems beyond doubt that Griffith was the type of despicable character that thrives in the midst of a war. The Marquis of Tamarón, in a book about Falange in Cadiz, paints a sinister portrait of him. He had apparently been a trusted police officer for Casares Quiroga and Diego Martínez Barrio and a go-­between with the Gibraltarian lodges, though he had worked in the royal stables during the reign of Alfonso XIII and been a soldier in the Spanish army in the mid-1920s. He was also a long-­time friend of Queipo de Llano, who appointed him civil delegate in the Campo de Gibraltar; in this capacity, he began to work for the nationalists, committing the aforementioned excesses. According to La Cierva, Griffith was actually a cunning spy for the British intelligence services, and his behaviour was so outrageous that even the insurgents began to suspect him. His downfall came when the Marquis of Tamarón, the commander of the Campo de Gibraltar (the Duke of Seville) and the Civil Governor of Cadiz (Eduardo Valera Valverde) managed to unmask the delegate-­turned-spy in the eyes of Queipo, who subsequently locked him up in Seville. He would die in captivity, reportedly after a fall from the prison rooftop.75 The presence of the refugees in Gibraltar also had cultural consequences, intensifying the use of Spanish in the colony. This was historically a common

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occurrence whenever there were smooth relations with Spain. As Harry W. Howes had already pointed out, the English language often had to fight for its life outside official circles, particularly in times of improved relations with Spain.76 The Civil War simply strengthened the trend toward the use of Spanish. The tendency would be partially reversed during the years of the Second World War, when the civilian population was evacuated to other locations (Jamaica, England); and also decades later, during the years that the gates remained closed (1969–82). By then, the memory of the Civil War and of the role played by Gibraltar in saving Spanish lives was long forgotten.

4

Diplomats, Journalists and Spies at the Rock War and the diplomatic game The outcome of any conflict depends largely on what happens at diplomatic negotiating tables, and the Spanish Civil War was no exception to this rule, especially considering its international dimension. The warring parties both sought foreign recognition and aid. The nationalists longed for international legitimacy to counteract their status as rebels against a legally established government. The republican government, in turn, strove to maintain the recognition of its rights as sole legal representative of Spain. Yet the Republic gradually lost legitimacy on the international stage as the insurgents managed to establish informal bureaus abroad. The shift in balance was brought about by the attitude of the great powers, and particularly of Great Britain. To begin with, the British blocked the recognition of the right of belligerency for both sides, a measure with diplomatic, political, legal and military consequences – effectively, this meant placing the legitimate republican government on an equal footing with the rebels and giving both the same international status. Great Britain also kept the Spanish war domestic, avoiding its expansion to the rest of Europe, though it could not impede foreign aid from reaching both sides. Substantial effort went into preventing the confrontation between fascism and communism from altering the status quo and into protecting British interests through the Non-Intervention Committee, a peculiar diplomatic mechanism that had the effect of undermining the Republic’s chances of success. The feigned neutrality of the non-­intervention policy was a diplomatic masquerade bathed in blood, where some field-­tested their weapons and others sent idealists to fight a romantic war in an exotic land. Ultimately, beyond the aid provided by Germany, Italy or the USSR, the outcome of the war was largely determined by the attitude of Great Britain and the United States. As Douglas Little has shown, the two countries were the main pillars of the non-­intervention policy, with the British as direct sponsors and the Americans following at a distance. Further, this was not only the result of so-­called US isolationism or of a purported British pacifism aimed at maintaining the status quo. Rather, according to Little, AngloAmerican policy toward the Spanish conflict was determined by three guidelines underlying the two powers’ worldwide strategy since the end of the Great War:

1. Containment of any outbreak of left-­wing nationalism inspired by the Comintern. 2. Worldwide reconstruction efforts after the war through a policy of British and American investments.

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3. Defence of free trade schemes favouring the interests of Great Britain and the United States (as opposed to the emergence of protectionist policies).1

Woven together, these principles created a tapestry that helps understand events such as the constant interventions of the United States in countries south of the Rio Grande, the Dawes Plan or the promotion of the Commonwealth. The ultimate goal in all cases was to contain communism within the Soviet borders and, if possible, wipe it from the face of the earth. This worldview was consistent with the perception of the Spanish Republic as a Trojan horse for communism placed in a dangerously strategic location, an appraisal shared by British conservatives and the American administration. The two nations’ decisive contribution to the victory of the insurgents took the shape of a cautious neutral stance designed to be detrimental to the Republic and favourable to the rebels. As Lord Strabolgi so aptly put it in the Daily Herald on 10 August 1936, what was pursued was a policy of ‘malevolent neutrality’.2 In November 1936, there were pervasive rumours that the United Kingdom might formally recognize the Francoist government. Indeed, conservatives in both countries longed for such a measure, but the war defied the expectation – and the hope – of a quick victory, and formal recognition was delayed until 1939. In contrast, Italy and Germany did grant recognition to the nationalists from the start, providing an added value in terms of legitimacy that was not altogether insignificant. The two countries were, after all, prominent international powers.3 In the general British strategy of careful neutrality, the most distinctive tactic was the creation of the so-­called London Committee. Though tacitly promoted by Great Britain, it was ostensibly the fruit of a French proposal for a committee to oversee the implementation of the non-­intervention policy. It was instituted on 9 September 1936 with the participation of almost every European country (including Italy, Germany and the USSR) and with Englishmen Lord Plymouth and Francis Hemming, respectively, as president and secretary. Though the United States never officially joined, it nonetheless embraced neutrality and deeply damaged the prospects for a loyalist victory, as Republican Senator Gerald Nye rightly pointed out.4 Among the makers of this policy was Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British Permanent UnderSecretary for Foreign Affairs; his memoirs show that its design reflected the anti-­ communist strategy of many British Conservatives, more worried about Stalin and the expansion of Soviet influence than about National Socialism – a movement with which many still sympathized around 1937. Additionally, Great Britain was careful to avoid commitments to either side, leaving the door open to good relations with whatever government emerged from the Spanish war. Rather than classic neutrality toward belligerents, this was an approach created ad hoc to protect British interests.5 The purported goal of the Committee was to impede foreign aid to either side, but its implementation made the acquisition of foreign supplies much more difficult for the Republic than it ever was for the insurgents, who received men and materiel through several channels.6 One was the Portuguese border, controlled by the nationalists early on.7 The Non-Intervention Committee could watch Spanish ports, but not Portuguese ones, and the patrols were never very effective in any case. The first plan for maritime control (November 1936) was quickly replaced by a second (March 1937);

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neither served its purpose too well, except in creating problems for the republican government, which was never recognized as a belligerent due to the opposition of Great Britain. The second plan had four main points:

1. The creation of a Board for Non-Intervention in charge of overseeing the plan’s

implementation, with representatives from eight countries (Germany, Great Britain, France, Greece, Italy, Norway, Poland and the USSR). 2. The establishment of controls on Spanish land borders with France, Gibraltar and Portugal. The latter initially refused to allow surveillance of its borders, though it eventually granted permission under the condition that only British observers be allowed. These areas were controlled by administrators, with the support of subordinate staff and a certain number of observers: 130 for the French border, around 150 for the Portuguese border (all British), and 5 for the very short Gibraltarian border. 3. The establishment of a mechanism for maritime control requiring every ship under the flag of a London Committee country to dock at selected ‘observation ports’: Gibraltar, Dover, Downs, Cherbourg, Brest, Le Verdon, Palermo, Marseilles, Sète, Oran, Madeira and Lisbon. 4. The establishment of a system of naval patrols by the German, Italian, French and British fleets around the Spanish coasts.8 The plan presented several loopholes that would be exploited in violation of the principle of non-­intervention, particularly in ways favourable to the nationalists. Revealingly, the Soviet fleet was not responsible for surveying any zones, whereas Germany and Italy – favourable to Franco – were in charge precisely of the Mediterranean coasts, vital to the Republic because Cartagena, Alicante, Valencia and Barcelona were landing ports for Soviet aid.9 On the other hand, maritime patrols could not be effective because irregularities were simply reported to the NonIntervention Committee and ships sent on their way to their destination ports, where they unloaded men and supplies. In other words, the surveillance flotillas had no real powers of interception, despite isolated events such as the detention near Malta by HMS Greyhound of the British merchant ship African Mariner, carrying munitions for the republicans;10 nothing of the sort happened to the nationalists, who attempted to intercept enemy ships and occasionally managed to sink some ‘red’ merchant vessels.11 Last but not least, there were reasons to cast doubt on the surveillance of the Gibraltarian and Portuguese borders (the latter exclusively in British hands). In fact, the insurgents continued to receive supplies through both these frontiers, discreetly but in sizeable quantities. Even more sterile was the surveillance of the Canary Islands, controlled only by a boat anchored fifty miles from the coast with Committee observers on board. The blockade could not have been simpler to violate, given the ease with which supplies could be unloaded at the nationalist-­controlled island ports and packed into Spanish ships destined for the Iberian Peninsula. At the Gibraltarian border, the implementation of the second plan was problematic. The coordination between the Gibraltarian border police and the Committee observers was anything but smooth. Suspicious Italians and Germans were allowed to cross the border and, when such events were reported, Governor Harington often took up to two

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months to reply. On other occasions, the local agents did not recognize the right of the observers to request the passports of citizens waiting to cross the border. Some Englishmen refused to identify themselves to non-British authorities. One incident took place when a Dutch observer denied exit from the Rock to the writer Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson, despite her valid British passport. Her father, Mr Grice-Hutchinson, an Englishman living in Malaga, reported the events, stressing that he had never had any trouble with the Spanish authorities – always most courteous – whereas the Committee observers had gravely offended a British citizen on British territory. Further, he failed to understand how such events were taking place at the land border when he had encountered no obstacles in sailing his yacht from Gibraltar to Malaga. He threatened to take the matter before Parliament or to court.12 The British government, by virtue of its fleet and its influence on the NonIntervention Committee, was able to exploit the second control plan for its own purposes, modulating the arrival of supplies for one side or the other. It also kept two critical surveillance areas for itself: the northern coast, from the French border to Cape Busto (controlling the Basque ports, with which Britain had intense commercial traffic) and the entirety of the coast of Andalusia (both Atlantic and Mediterranean), surrounding Gibraltar. The colony’s naval base hence became a point through which the British surveillance flotilla had to pass, aside from being a neutral port for the fleets of the other Committee countries. As is well known, the German pocket battleship Deutschland docked at Gibraltar to unload its wounded and repair the damage inflicted by a republican bombing in Ibiza. The Committee took no measures when the Germans unilaterally retaliated by bombarding Almeria. Ultimately, the Non-Intervention Committee was a British device to erect a wall of neutrality around Spain that would make it difficult for the Republic to receive foreign aid while leaving loopholes through which the insurgents could easily acquire supplies. Naturally, the participation of British citizens in the International Brigades was also impeded to the extent that the law allowed.13 As early as August 1936, the First Lord of the Admiralty (Samuel Hoare) defined neutrality as an anti-­communist instrument: enforcing non-­intervention meant preventing the Soviets from helping the Republic. It was vital to keep communism from taking hold in Spain and possibly spreading to Portugal, where it would pose a severe threat to the British Empire.14 By May 1937, even the republican President Manuel Azaña understood that the British government had done nothing but favour the insurgents from the start. As he pithily observed in his diary: ‘Our greatest enemy until now has been the British government’.15 Non-­intervention may have been a good mechanism for keeping the Spanish conflict within the country’s borders, but it was contributing to the collapse of the Republic. One had to be blind to the nature of international relations not to see where Great Britain stood. As Baldwin put it, Great Britain would certainly not be on the same side as the Russians in the Spanish war. This position was ratified on countless occasions by the behaviour not only of the Foreign Office, but also of the Governor of Gibraltar. Under the guise of neutrality, both favoured the cause of the rebels. In October 1936, the republican government complained to the Foreign Office that fascists with passports issued by a so-­called Spanish consulate in Genoa had been allowed into Spain through the Gibraltarian

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border. Since Spain’s sole legitimate consulate in Italy was in Naples, it appeared that the passports were either forged or issued by unofficial nationalist bureaus. The government thus requested that such documents not be accepted in Gibraltar. Ten days later, the Foreign Office sent a code cable explaining that it would not risk disturbing its relations with the insurgents to satisfy this request. In the un-­coded part of the reply and in more diplomatic terms, a simple pretext was offered: the border officers had no way of knowing which passports were not valid. Besides – the republican government was told – Spaniards holding irregular passports had no need to pass through Gibraltar to reach the nationalist zone. In a previous show of British neutrality, the governor of Gibraltar had waited until 3 September before publishing an ordinance prohibiting the exportation and re-­exportation of armament, war materiel, ammunition, aircraft or aircraft motors from the colony to Spain.16 Without the assistance of the democratic powers, the Spanish Republic could only count on the Soviet Union. Ironically, this further enhanced the sympathies of British (and European) conservatives for the authoritarian alternative that Franco embodied. The Non-Intervention Committee carried on with its task, despite the complaints of British Labour and the European left. The conservative British Cabinet and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had to weather the storm in Parliament. Attlee, Noel-Baker, Lloyd George and the Duchess of Atholl did not mask their disgust at the events in Spain or at the government’s appeasement policy toward fascism, which they saw as weak and dangerously tolerant. In November 1937, the Duchess asked Eden a key question in Parliament regarding the early days of the Civil War: ‘The Right Honourable Gentleman referred to the insurgent forces being now the strongest at sea. May I ask him whether, if what he calls a normal form of neutrality had been adopted at the beginning, it would have inured to the advantage of the insurgents? Were they then stronger at sea?’17 The tacit aid to the rebels in the first few weeks of the war helped the consolidation and, in time, the legitimation of nationalist Spain. Eden knew that victory itself was a large part of a contender’s legitimacy; in November 1937, he was justifying the government’s diplomatic rapprochement with the insurgents on the basis of their superiority. The rebels – the argument ran – were stronger at sea and had to be reckoned with in the interest of British sea dominance. The Duchess of Atholl, herself no stranger to the subtleties of politics, gave scant credibility to Eden’s feigned naiveté. The Foreign Secretary was playing an obvious and rather old card in British foreign policy: the Spanish Republic was not a suitable regime for the defence of British interests in Spain and the Mediterranean, a change was necessary, and Franco posed no threat of fascism. In the same parliamentary session, Eden summed up his point of view in the following terms: ‘There are those who are convinced that, supposing the insurgent forces are victorious, the result will be a Spain in active alliance with a foreign policy directed against this country. I do not accept that’.18 According to the analysis of the British government, a victorious Franco would not forge an alliance with Hitler or Mussolini against Great Britain. There were too many interests binding Spain to Great Britain (as well as the United States and France) for the country to fall into the hands of fascism. And in the unlikely event that the Spanish military would follow the path of Nazi totalitarianism, there remained the monarchist alternative. Ultimately, the Foreign

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Office knew that the Spanish right was conservative, even authoritarian, but not fascist. In this regard, Eden’s views were in line with the appraisal of an internationally renowned Spaniard such as Salvador de Madariaga, who had told The Times the following: Spain will never be either Communist or Fascist. Her foreign policy, determined by geo-­political and economic laws, will never vary fundamentally – whoever wins – and foreign help, known to have been given for something more than its own sake, is sure to call forth deep resentment after the war in Spain, in all Spain. Here again, the best policy, and the one most in harmony with the interests of all the nations concerned, is to agree to bring about a speedy end of the war through reconciliation.19

Madariaga’s analysis provided yet another reason to prevent arms from being sent to the warring parties – especially the republicans – as well as support for the conviction that Spain would not become a fascist dictatorship. If international diplomacy played a key role in the outcome of the war, many members of the Spanish diplomatic corps also contributed to the nationalist victory, as Marina Casanova has shown in her study of Spanish diplomats during the war. When the conflict broke out, both the republican government and the rebels immediately called for the support of the authorities and civil servants of the Spanish Foreign Service. The contenders were well aware of how crucial their adherence could be for the war effort. The insurgent National Defence Junta ordered the dismissal of republican ambassadors and that the offices be handed over to the diplomat of immediately inferior rank. The cable, signed by Miguel Cabanellas as president of the Junta, highlighted the insurgents’ mistrust of the ambassadors appointed by the republican government. Time soon proved these suspicions misguided, for their support for the nationalist cause was actually very high. The republican government, for its part, issued a circular on 24 July requesting the support of the heads of mission and legation personnel. Two days earlier, the Republic had published a decree dismissing all civil servants who had taken part in the events of 18 July. According to Casanova, 128 of the 187 response cables expressed support for the Republic; there were fifty-­nine resignations.20 Yet many cables were lukewarm, seeking to avoid commitment while confusion still reigned. This raised the suspicions of the republican government, which decided several weeks later (on 21 August 1936) to dismiss the diplomatic corps as a whole and undertake its reorganization. Gradually, many diplomats decided to side with the National Defence Junta, especially after Largo Caballero entered the government on 4 September 1936: around seventy-­eight diplomats resigned when the trade union leader became premier of the republican government. Among the reasons they gave were the following: Due to government’s Communist character; True to a national ideal absent in the present regime, I resign from my post in order not to serve its current political orientation;

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I promised to loyally serve the Republic, but after the President’s declaration to Parliament, the regime that was about to be implemented was a proletarian republic; In disagreement with the government’s policy, increasingly dominated by Communists and revolutionary Socialists whom I consider enemies of Religion, Fatherland and Liberty, I prefer to lose my post than betray my conscience; Although on July 31 I swore allegiance to the Republican regime, I will never serve a Soviet regime, but I do not renounce my Foreign Service career or my acquired rights.21

More resignations followed. Ultimately, only sixty-­two diplomats stayed loyal to the Republic for the duration of the war. The government filled the vacancies with prominent academics and intellectuals (Fernando de los Ríos, Pablo de Azcárate, Manuel Pedroso, Luis Jiménez de Asúa, Antonio Jaén, Luis Araquistáin, Américo Castro, etc.). All were men of extraordinary worth in their respective fields, but they lacked the experience and training to face the international scene of the time, particularly hostile to everything they stood for. The overall result of their efforts left much to be desired.22 By contrast, the nationalists could rely on professional diplomats and on more than a few sympathies in western ministries of Foreign Affairs. Gradually and determinedly, the rebels overcame their precarious and provisional situation and organized their own Foreign Service. This required establishing diplomatic bureaus and having them accepted abroad, whether officially or informally. The main obstacle, of course, was the insurgents’ lack of international legitimacy. But the rebels’ diplomatic services were established fairly quickly. On 30 July 1936, a diplomatic Cabinet was created in the National Defence Junta, followed by a Secretariat of Foreign Relations on 1 October and the organization of the diplomatic corps through the Decree-Law of 11 January 1937; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was set up later on. These were the changes experienced by the Spanish diplomatic corps at the start of the war; as for the Spanish consulate in Gibraltar, the situation was one of absolute chaos at least until the end of 1936. Everything seemed relatively normal at first, with Consul Antonio Cánovas Ortega at the head of the consulate addressing the issues that arose from the sudden instability. This was at any rate how Madrid saw it, as cables coded and signed by the consul continued to reach the capital until early August. The truth was, however, that Cánovas had left Gibraltar on 10 July, according to his successor Díaz Pache – it was the civil servants in the consulate that kept things running. This was actually common practice, for Cánovas had the habit of spending a great deal of time in Madrid and Barcelona. As late as the beginning of August, the Ministry received a cable pledging the consul’s ‘unconditional loyalty’ to the Republic. There is no way of knowing who signed it, but it was certainly not Cánovas, who had not shown his face in Gibraltar for weeks. The farce could not be kept up much longer, for the government had been informed by the ‘popular block’ in La Linea and the CNT that there were ‘fascists’ in the consulate who were failing to provide ‘the necessary protection to hundreds of leftist political refugees’.23 Around mid-August, Madrid

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decided to put the diplomat Alfonso Díaz Pache (embassy secretary) in charge of the consulate. In the few days that he remained in his post, Díaz Pache partially restored consular activity to normal, though affairs were mostly left in the hands of the Gibraltarian Juan Bautista Arias, who acted as vice-­consul according to John Bosano. Among the first tasks he undertook were the organization of prisoner exchanges and the evacuation of refugees.24 The consulate also reported on the movements of republican and enemy ships, the presence in Gibraltar of members of the Italian and German militaries, and the troop movements and battles in the strip between Algeciras and Estepona. On 15 August, for instance, a cable recounted that ships from Gibraltar were carrying 16,000 litres of petrol and food supplies to Ceuta and Melilla, while two ships belonging to the state tobacco monopoly were transporting supplies from the British colony to Algeciras. But the refugees and their return to republican zones were the most pervasive problem. Here, Díaz Pache ran into subtle attempts to block his efforts. The British delayed his diplomatic recognition, while delegates of the Spanish National Bank in Gibraltar did everything to thwart the arrival of funds for the consulate’s expenses, creating a severe situation in which the employees’ salaries could not be paid. Such were the circumstances encountered by the new consul, Ramón Peña, when he arrived at the end of August. Needless to say, the Rock’s authorities looked askance at the constant parade of consuls, some of whom showed little enthusiasm for the Republic.25 In the early weeks of the war, the British authorities gave the first signs of their uncooperative attitude. When Madrid requested the recognition of Díaz Pache, the issue was repeatedly dodged. Lord Halifax was disinclined to trust the consul and, especially, the vice-­consul accompanying him: Ramón Peña Orellana. Governor Harington informed London that Díaz Pache was a leftist in contact with the trade union leader Huart in Gibraltar. Despite this, the British government eventually recognized Díaz Pache on 22 August, as he was a professional diplomat and no excuse could be found for refusing to admit a valid representative. Harington, however, hesitated – he felt no sympathy toward the republican representatives, and the behaviour of Díaz Pache made things worse. When the latter left for Tangier without announcing whether he would be back, the governor turned the situation to his advantage, refusing to recognize him on the grounds that he did not wish to hurt his relations with Queipo de Llano, who had described the consul as a communist. The governor was not altogether unjustified considering the spectacle the consul was providing in his lukewarm support for the Republic. When Díaz Pache was asked about his allegiance, he took his time before sending a reply – indeed, he did not do so until 14 August. At that point, the government had already decided to name a new consul: the consul-­general in London and third-­class minister plenipotentiary Vicente Álvarez Buylla (named on 11 August). Although Álvarez Buylla did not immediately show up in Gibraltar, Díaz Pache understood that his days as consul were numbered. His reaction under pressure was to abandon Gibraltar, creating a chaotic and unseemly situation that left Ramón Peña in charge of the consulate and created the need to request recognition once again. As late as mid-September 1936, he had not yet been recognized, rendering him unable to pay the employees’ salaries, meet the consulate’s regular expenses or provide aid to the many refugees gathered at the Rock. Peña was

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soon taken for a frivolous leftist who would meet his death should he dare show his face across the border. Harington, for one, could not stand his presence or the spectacle that the republican consulate on Scud Hill was making of itself. Deep down, the British yearned for a quick outcome to the war that would put an end to all these problems. Only when it became obvious that the war would last did the British authorities accept that they would have to admit a republican consul capable of serving as a valid representative in the colony. After weeks of no contact with Ramón Peña, the decision was made to recognize yet another new consul, Plácido Álvarez Buylla. The Foreign Office informed Madrid on 16 December 1936 that he would be admitted as soon as he arrived at the colony.26 His designation was the outcome of the efforts of Vicente Álvarez Buylla: despite having been named consul in August, he had never left his many occupations in London. Ramón Peña, however, was too much of a nuisance for the governor’s taste; hence Vicente Álvarez Buylla’s suggestion that his brother Plácido be the new consul. This finally put an end to the situation, but the republican consulate in Gibraltar had shown itself weak and chaotic for five months of war. Vicente Álvarez Buylla could have made a very effective consul in Gibraltar. Yet he was second in rank in the Spanish embassy in London, immediately under Ambassador Julio López Oliván (an intelligent and honest monarchist, according to Madariaga). When López Oliván resigned from his post toward the end of August (like many other diplomats), Álvarez Buylla was left in charge of the embassy until the arrival of his replacement, Pablo de Azcárate. López Oliván had been a loyal servant to the Republic until 18 July, but he could not stand the news of the chaos and massacres taking place in the republican zone. He soon began to unofficially serve the insurgents, delaying any weapons exports to Spain until the embargo on war materiel came into force on 19 August. In proximity to the British government, several other Spaniards cooperated with him in these strategies, such as Juan de la Cierva, Alfonso de Olano or Ricardo Goizueta. The latter was an engineer who owned Tarik Petroleum (based in Gibraltar) and a go-­between between General Mola and López Oliván.27 Of the many resignations tendered by Spanish diplomats, none hurt the Republic as much as Julio López Oliván’s. His successor, Pablo de Azcárate, arrived in London with the mission of improving the British Cabinet’s perception of the republican government. Hostility to the Republic was palpable among the conservatives, as Winston Churchill himself made clear when he refused to shake Azcárate’s hand while mumbling ‘blood, blood . . . ’ .28 In November 1936, Churchill gave a speech in the House of Commons blaming the USSR for the war in Spain. Though he was no sympathizer of Hitler or Mussolini, Churchill’s position was representative of most British Conservatives, who gave more credibility to news of atrocities in the republican zone than of crimes committed by the nationalists.29 Further, the frequent changes in the Republic’s diplomatic representatives were not to the taste of the British government, and Sydney Clive, marshal of the Diplomatic Corps, went as far as to suggest to Azcárate that he was expected to remain at his post when Franco marched on Madrid and London recognized the new Spanish government.30 The British government had apparently not ruled out a quick nationalist victory, and the republican ambassador was received with uncustomary coldness and discourtesy. Relations were certainly not at their best between the Republic and the British authorities, and this was to be a determining factor in the role played by Gibraltar

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during the Spanish Civil War. The instability of the Spanish consulate was not making things any better in the eyes of the governor, and Vicente Álvarez Buylla could do little but leave the affairs of the consulate in Gibraltar in the hands of Juan Bautista Arias. He had enough work in London and was also busy attempting to guarantee that republican consulates in the Mediterranean remain open (he would later be consul in Marseilles in 1937 and in Nice in 1938). He made efforts to secure the recognition of Ramón Peña, but eventually suggested the appointment of his brother Plácido when it became clear that Peña was a source of disgust in Gibraltar.31 Finally, as the year 1937 began, the Spanish consulate recovered some semblance of normality. Plácido Álvarez Buylla was a man with experience in politics. He had been Minister of Industry and Commerce in Giral’s Cabinet from July to September 1936. He had also been director general in Morocco; undersecretary of the Council of Ministers; ambassador to Montevideo; and consul-­general in Tangier and Berlin, among other positions. When he was appointed, he still had many occupations outside Gibraltar, forcing him to delegate much of the consulate’s business to Vice-­consul Ramón Peña and Chancellor Juan Bautista. The two relied on the support of Carlos Delgado Bianchi (private secretary), Leopoldo del Río Pérez (main office worker), Manuel Cañas Trujillo (chief accountant), Francisco Limón García (in charge of correspondence), Antonio Alonso Vital (unofficial commercial attaché), Juan Peinado (chauffeur), José María Fernández Colmeiro (attention to refugees), Petra Rodríguez Muñoz (cook) and Julia Fernández Gómez (assistant). Some of these employees were actually refugees who had found a means of sustenance in the consulate – such were the cases of Leopoldo del Río or Francisco Limón. Consular jobs must have been coveted and advantageous, to the point that one of the employees, Antonio Alonso, turned down an offer to be exchanged and return to the republican zone, opting to remain in Gibraltar as a self-­appointed commercial attaché.32 The activity of the republican consulate was mostly steeped in bureaucratic routine, and its service to the cause was less effective than that of the unofficial agents working for the nationalists. Rather than to lack of ability, this was due to the hostility that the loyalists encountered. There was little assistance to be found in an enclave in the middle of the nationalist zone and in a colony whose elites sympathized with the enemy.33 Among the activities most useful to the republican cause was espionage, partially funded by the consulate. Intelligence was gathered on the traffic of enemy ships (especially Italian vessels) and on the deployment of artillery in the Punta Canero batteries that exchanged fire with Ceuta. Refugees, including some enemies, were recruited to the cause. The tasks conducted also included the surveillance of enemy agents, such as the antiques merchant Guillermo Glower – a suspected friend of Queipo de Llano – or Roy Winston, ostensibly a ‘friend of the Republic’ but probably a nationalist spy. The information gathered must have been valuable, for the Ministry of State demanded more. In September 1938, the then consul, Leopoldo del Río, was asked to send a secret agent (codename Leder) to provide information about the installation of batteries in Ceuta, the suspected closure of the border with Morocco, the enemy’s troop movements, and even the record and situation of Manuel Díaz Criado, an ‘agent under Queipo’s orders’.34 To be sure, the intelligence received from the consulate in Gibraltar was often more precise and detailed than that of the Ministry of State itself. One year into the war, the

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Ministry sent the republican consul a rather peculiar piece of intelligence about the rise of Queipo to the presidency of the Council of Ministers, ‘as per Germany’s suggestion’ (!). The scoop was supposed to explain the no less shocking news that a plot against Franco and Queipo had recently been dismantled in Seville, resulting in the execution of over fifty members of Falange. Purportedly, the reaction of the enraged Falangists was to be found in their local press organ FE, in which they threatened to ‘brandish the “very hot gun” once again’.35 These were merely rumours, easy to spread amidst the confusion, misinformation and psychological warfare associated with the conflict; the truth was that the nationalists were much more united than the loyalists. Rather than of ideological cohesion, this was the result of a firm, unquestioned line of command that had been copied from the Africanist army. The insurgents’ international support did the rest: in Gibraltar, the rebels were served by an unofficial network which proved much more effective than the official republican consulate. On the Rock, the nationalists’ valuable contacts provided essential goods and aid during the first few weeks of the war. Their sympathizers moved comfortably inside the fortress, counting on the friendship of the Gibraltarian elite. The pilot José Larios regularly visited Gibraltar when he was on leave – his sister Talía Larios continued to work for the nationalist intelligence service – and celebrated the rapid Francoist advance in the company of British officers.36 After Franco was named Head of State in nationalist Spain, it seemed convenient to send a representative to Gibraltar. So long as Franco Spain could have an intermediary with the colony’s authorities, there was no need for official standing (the same was true of the aristocrats and monarchists acting as go-­betweens with Great Britain, such as the seventeenth Duke of Alba). The man performing this function since the autumn of 1936 was Ricardo Goizueta, an engineer who had been directing the Tarik Petroleum Company since 1934. Well known by the British authorities at the Rock, he was an essential contact for Mola and had played an important role in the uprising. His intervention had lowered the price of petrol in the colony and he had excellent relations with the Colonial Secretariat and the governor; naturally under such circumstances, petrol supplies in Gibraltar wound up in the welcoming arms of the nationalists. In October 1936, Goizueta presented a letter with Franco’s request that he be authorized as the Francoist representative in Gibraltar. The authorities explained that they could not grant a petition that would have implied the official recognition of the nationalist government, but this posed no obstacle to his services as a de facto agent. He served as a key cross-­border liaison, ensuring that fresh food supplies and labour reached Gibraltar and that the insurgents received raw materials and fuel. He also transmitted requests from the British to Franco personally, to the full satisfaction of all parties involved. Goizueta kept a close watch on the republican refugees, oversaw evacuations and prisoner exchanges and, all in all, performed the part of an extremely effective, albeit unofficial, consul. The situation remained unchanged until the summer of 1937. Despite his valuable services, the precarious diplomatic standing of Goizueta had to be dealt with. Given the insurgents’ lack of international recognition, his was a wholly unofficial agency that could not strictly speaking be considered a consulate or even a business bureau – despite the rather amazing fact that it issued passports and exchanged currencies. The

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republican consul exerted constant pressure to put an end to Goizueta’s activities, but the latter had the backing and support of the British authorities. It was not until the middle of August 1937 that the unofficial nationalist bureau was closed and moved to La Linea, ostensibly as a result of republican pressures.37 But the truth was rather more complex: Goizueta was no longer as essential as he had been to the Burgos government, Franco was in search of an unquestionably loyal agent in Gibraltar, and Great Britain was preparing for a more complete semi-­recognition of the insurgents. In this context, Goizueta’s downfall came in September 1937. He had prepared a prisoner swap and managed the situation just as on all previous occasions, but his arrangements this time did not please the Burgos government. Certain women of the Larios family were to be liberated and the agent conceded to add Queipo de Llano’s sister to the list, allowing the general’s interference without informing the government. He paid for this error with his dismissal. For a short time thereafter, he continued to serve as a communication channel between Gibraltar and the British consuls in Seville, Cadiz and Malaga, but his replacement was a done deal. Within a few weeks, a new representative arrived; he had more recognition, a consulate, and above all a powerful sense of obedience to the orders of Franco and his emissaries – Queipo, to be sure, was not part of this ‘inner circle’.38 Coincidentally, Goizueta’s Tarik Petroleum Co. Ltd. went into liquidation in October.39 Franco’s new man in Gibraltar was Luciano López Ferrer. On his watch, the nationalist ‘consulate’ opened in the context of a broader exchange of agents between Burgos and London that nearly amounted to official British recognition. The key men in this new scenario were the Duke of Alba (the Spanish representative in London) and Robert Hodgson (his counterpart in Burgos); we shall be dealing with them in subsequent chapters.

The role of opinion Any human endeavour requires support, and war is no exception. Throughout the past century, states and governments preparing for war were not content to build up their armed forces – they made every effort to boost civilian morale and generate a spirit of mobilization essential for sending people off to war. The task included promoting blind enthusiasm for certain symbols and winning the hearts and minds of the people. In this process of shaping public opinion, the press was a key instrument, spreading ideas, perceptions and myths from the home front to the battlefields. Newspapers, rallies and parliamentary speeches played a vital role in the outbreak and course of war. William R. Hearst and the Spanish-American War of 1898 had provided an early case in point, with the First World War making the role of the media even more conspicuous. The lesson reaped was clear: the flame of violence had to be lit and kept alive as long as arms remained the only language. The Spanish Civil War was no different. Propaganda posters, pamphlets and newspapers turned fellow countrymen and neighbours into cruel enemies under the command of foreign ideologies (fascism or communism), who had to be annihilated in a relentless battle. Additionally, the conflict’s international dimension led to a relatively

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novel approach to the war of information. The goal was no longer to persuade the Spanish population – rather, the world at large had to be taught the ‘truth’. The twofold goal was to garner support abroad while promoting the ostracism of the enemy, and the key was to influence opinion in countries that were formally neutral but could in any way favour one of the contenders. For these purposes, printing presses were simply insufficient; it was vital to oversee and direct the visits of foreign correspondents. Both sides made serious efforts in this area, but it was perhaps the nationalists who proved more effective. At the beginning of the war, Luis Bolín proposed and created a press office in Seville, which he would direct until his transfer to Salamanca as press officer of the Francoist headquarters. The main objective of the office was to persuade foreign opinion of the legitimate reasons for the uprising; the methods included information filtering and, whenever possible, the censoring of unfriendly opinions. Bolín hosted a committee of British MPs on an organized tour of nationalist-­controlled Andalusia, a fairly successful initiative that gave the rebels positive press coverage in the conservative media of the English-­speaking world. This may help explain why he was later appointed director general for tourism in the middle of the Civil War: tourism and information, to be sure, were the two pillars of Spain’s image abroad. And the Francoist regime would continue to yearn for international legitimacy well after the war – in the 1950s, a Ministry of Information and Tourism was created.40 Much time and effort were devoted to organizing tours for foreign individuals who could help paint a positive picture of the nationalist zone. Some visits were quite specific, such as that of a group of members of the British Women’s Auxiliary Service, a voluntary women’s police force devoted to the feminist cause and the defence of women’s suffrage. Among the visitors was Commander Mary Allen, pleasantly impressed with the nationalist zone and Seville, where she found ‘peace, order and happiness’ rather than war. She also declared that the republican government represented nobody and that the real Spain was that of General Franco.41 Unsurprisingly, the controversial Allen was a supporter of Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists. During the first few months of the war, foreign correspondents in Spain were given ample freedom of movement. It was Bolín who came to realize the inherent risks and attempted to curtail their liberties, but the journalists soon discovered that they could send home uncensored articles from safe havens such as Gibraltar and Tangier. Many sent reports under false names and then returned to Spain to continue gathering information, and unmasking these correspondents proved no easy task. Bolín attempted to uncover the true identities of the authors of unfriendly articles in order to deny them accreditation. As he was particularly suspicious of those writing for progressive publications (the News Chronicle or the Daily Express), quite a few of these outlets’ journalists were expelled from the nationalist zone. Among them was the Daily Express correspondent Noel Monks, thrown out in 1937; on 4 April, he explained the reasons in a message sent from Gibraltar: “‘We have nothing against you, Señor Monks,” I was told at Salamanca. “If we had we would have shot you. But your paper is ‘red’ and the generalissimo says you have to go.”’42 Arthur Koestler’s experience was more severe. As a communist agent at the time, he visited Spain on three occasions. On the first, he travelled to the nationalist zone with the endorsement of Nicolás Franco and managed to interview Queipo de Llano. Upon

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being discovered by the insurgents, he was sent to Gibraltar. The other two visits were to the republican zone as a Comintern envoy. In 1937, he found himself trapped in Malaga and the nationalists locked him up in Seville. His life was spared thanks to his British passport, his country’s diplomatic pressure and Franco’s desire to avoid problems with foreign nations – especially with the power leading the Non-Intervention Committee. Koestler was eventually part of a prisoner exchange arranged in Gibraltar.43 The Rock played many roles throughout the Civil War years – it was a gathering place for Spanish refugees; for Englishmen and other foreigners undergoing evacuation; for spies, informants and journalists; and for wartime supply seekers. And it was also a perfect location for swapping prisoners through the isthmus’ border. Another instance of this was the departure of French-­speaking journalist Jean Alloucherie, who left via Gibraltar after giving his account of the war in his Noches de Sevilla.44 The writer and Manchester Guardian correspondent Gerald Brenan vividly described the diversity and crowded atmosphere of the Rock’s five square kilometres. In September 1936, he arrived from Malaga on board an American destroyer, meeting countless Spanish refugees from both sides. Among the nationalists, he recognized Carlos Crooke Larios, an acquaintance from Malaga who was there in the company of his wife and children. By Brenan’s account, Crooke Larios was working for the rebels’ secret service, and his task must not have been very difficult in the colony, where sympathy for the insurgents was the norm. Brenan’s personal record recounts people’s morbid interest in the atrocities committed by the ‘reds’. Governor Harington himself did not hesitate to give full credibility to ludicrous rumours from Malaga that loyalists in a steamroller had trampled over naked nuns in the middle of the street.45 Unlike correspondents in nationalist Spain, Brenan was a journalist in the republican zone and did not have to travel to Gibraltar to bypass censorship. But he was extremely upset that the colony’s authorities seemed so eager to justify the uprising and discredit the Republic, and he tried to refute the rumours that had spread among his colleagues. Gibraltar was full of foreign correspondents; among them was an old acquaintance of Brenan’s, the American Jay Allen, who had apparently been threatened by the Requetés (Carlist militias) and sought refuge in Gibraltar after several investigative incursions into nationalist-­controlled Spain. As a writer for the progressive News Chronicle, he was persona non grata despite the equanimity of his reports.46 Gibraltar was a main source of information for the British during the first few days of the war. London was very interested in whatever news came in from the strategic enclave regarding the events in Spain. According to Stockey, between 18 and 24 July, Gibraltar was the sole source of news for the Baldwin government.47 Though it seems somewhat unlikely that there were no other sources, the Rock was indeed a primary location for obtaining information, as the arrival of correspondents from several media outlets suggests. As is well known, the Spanish Civil War was a prominent issue in the international press, with news about Spain growing exponentially during the war years. References to Gibraltar also experienced a noteworthy rise. An analysis of The Times’ coverage highlights this trend for the case of the British press: the yearly frequency of news regarding Gibraltar grew considerably during the war. And though it had been unusual before the war to read the term Gibraltar in a headline or lead-­in, this changed in 193648 (see Figure 4.1).

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Figure 4.1  Instances of headlines mentioning Gibraltar (per year) Source: The Times (1931–40).

To be sure, writers were as caught up in the passions of war as anybody else, and their preconceived notions were reflected in their pieces. Journalists, intellectuals, novelists, poets, essayists and thinkers all inevitably wound up showing some form of bias. From abroad, the war was seen from a romantic angle – whether as a fight for the future of freedom or as a crusade – and it exerted a strong magnetism over opinion-­ leaders of every stripe. The conflict’s strong ideological underpinnings prompted journalists to pick sides, and pressure from editors and from the warring parties did the rest. The end result was hardly surprising: many news pieces were written to discredit the enemy. The printing presses of the world drew trenches in ink and paper. In Spain or abroad, writing about the war was no easy task. The British media were divided, with some outlets in favour and others opposed to the government’s policy of appeasement and non-­intervention. Papers such as the Manchester Guardian, the News Chronicle or the Daily Herald bemoaned the weakness of British Cabinets (both Baldwin’s and Chamberlain’s) and the masquerade of the Committee of London, whose permissive attitude worked to the benefit of Italy and Germany. In the opposite camp, the Daily Telegraph or The Times (despite the noteworthy objectivity of the latter) approved of what they deemed a neutral and cautious approach.49 Tensions between journals ran high and reflected differences in opinion among the British population as well as a bitter dispute in political circles. The various newspapers sought to exploit information regarding Spain for their own purposes, attempting to defend their interests and persuade the public that their favoured course of action was the best way to protect Great Britain’s international standing. The belligerents, in turn, tried to exploit the contents of foreign media. Nationalists and republicans alike looked abroad for arguments that would strengthen their position. The conservative Spanish paper ABC, for instance, echoed the information carried by certain British journals, selecting excerpts suited to its purposes. It reported that the Daily Mail thought Great Britain should remain friends with Franco instead of betting on a bad horse as it had done in Ethiopia; that the Morning Post considered the republicans more barbaric than the Muslim enemy ever was; and that according to The

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Times the insurgents controlled the lion’s share of the country’s resources and were in better shape to finance the war effort.50 Part of the British media was indeed very supportive of the insurgents. In 1937, the Daily Mail published an article by Harold G. Cardozo titled ‘The March of a Nation’. Its author echoed Franco’s argument that the republican Cabinet had lost the right to be considered Spain’s legitimate government, by virtue of its anti-­constitutional measures, its leniency toward crime and its wilful blindness to the threat of a Marxist revolution. He contended that the country’s future happiness rested on the possibility that General Franco would win the war and remain the country’s dictator long enough for civil strife to be forgotten and for a new generation to rise, facilitating the harmonization of different political ideals.51 For journalists, Gibraltar provided a privileged observation point. It was an enclave in the country at war and in just a few hours one could travel to the front lines by land or sea. But the media in the colony was just as divided as in Great Britain. The local papers El Calpense and El Anunciador picked sides, the former in support of the Republic and the latter favouring the insurgents. Local reporters made the acquaintance of the many foreign correspondents who arrived in Gibraltar, an experience that only the Civil War could provide. They too were a source of information, but their working conditions were very diverse. Those writing for conservative journals could count on the sympathy of the Gibraltarian elite and on the support of the Rock’s authorities, whereas unambiguously pro-­republican journalists were deemed suspicious and encountered numerous obstacles in their path. The official opinion of the Rock was to be found in the Gibraltar Chronicle, controlled by the governor. And in the battle of information as elsewhere, Gibraltar did everything in its hands to favour a nationalist victory. In fact, conflict between foreign correspondents and the Gibraltarian authorities grew more likely whenever there was an increase in news reports casting the nationalists in a negative light. The Daily Herald’s Stephen Wall was called to account by colonial secretary Alexander Beattie and accused of publishing false news after describing the crimes taking place across the border.52 His brother Harold, also a journalist, made it into the nationalist zone but was eventually expelled for sympathizing with the Republic. Both siblings were apparently quite leftist and could often be seen at the republican consulate in Gibraltar. To someone like Harington, interested in maintaining good relations with nationalist Spain, the pair were a nuisance. The most significant episode involving the Wall brothers took place in February 1938, when they informed pro-­labour journals that Queipo de Llano had claimed Gibraltar for Spain in a speech at La Linea;53 we shall return to this later. Naturally, the governor always preserved an outward appearance of neutrality. Freedom of the press was never openly denied in a colony priding itself on British ways, neutrality in war and modern democratic principles. Yet everyone knew that the Rock’s highest authority had the power to expel certain people or forbid them from taking up residence in what was ultimately a military enclave. This sword of Damocles hung permanently over journalists’ heads. By the spring of 1937, those following the war could foresee its outcome. The Republic had been unable to quell the uprising and seemed to be tilting to the left

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irreversibly, while Franco’s troops continued their slow but steady advance. In the spring, Admiral Backhouse conducted his yearly visit to the Mediterranean (Palma de Mallorca, Barcelona, Valencia and Gibraltar). He met with Francisco Largo Caballero and Indalecio Prieto, as well as with the British chargé d’affaires in Valencia, OgilvieForbes, and the consul in Barcelona, Norman King. Despite his good relations with the republicans, Backhouse witnessed the divisions within the government and the fall of Largo Caballero after the events of Barcelona – he emerged convinced that Franco would win the war. Consequently, Great Britain should strengthen its ties with the authorities of the ‘new’ Spain if it wanted to protect British interests in the country.54 Having accepted that the nationalists would win, pragmatism ensued: it was best to be on good terms with the victor, whoever this happened to be. A few weeks after Admiral Backhouse’s visit, in a note dated 10 June 1937, Admiral Lord Chatfield pondered the need to preserve friendly relations with Spain, guaranteeing the security of Gibraltar and avoiding the installation of enemy batteries on nearby shores. At stake was not just the Rock but the entire Mediterranean – Great Britain could not risk letting Spain ally with another power.55 The closer Franco inched to victory, the less the British would be willing to let anything cloud their relations. To be sure, the Burgos government also sought to avoid any misunderstanding with Great Britain. Maintaining such cordial relations required both parties to control the flow of information. Some news nonetheless leaked through Gibraltar, as in the case of the execution of Primo de Rivera, made public despite wishes to the contrary: the American journalist Edward Knoblaugh, author of Correspondent in Spain (1937), was a witness. Yet, for the most part, Gibraltar strove to keep journalists in check and avoid harming the cause of the rebels. In return, the nationalists gave every assurance that British interests in the Peninsula would be protected. In January 1937, the British and French press picked up rumours that there were German troops in the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco. To France and Great Britain alike, this was an alarming bit of news: it was one thing to have Germans in Spain but quite another for them to be installed across the Strait of Gibraltar. Tensions rose to the point that the high commissioner (the highest Spanish authority in Morocco) invited Harington to send a group of British officers to verify the absence of any foreign military units. So it was done: the mission visited Melilla, Ceuta and part of the Protectorate.56 Franco would spare no effort to keep those providing him with advantages happy. A few days later, the military government of the Campo de Gibraltar was re-­established (after having been supressed during the Second Republic) to strengthen intelligence services and remain in close contact with the British.57 In a largely Catholic colony, Church figures also held sway. The colony’s bishop left no room for doubt regarding his position: Franco’s Spain was tantamount to order and religion, whereas the republican zone was full of hordes of people ravaging churches and attacking the clergy. On one occasion, he expressed his outrage at the publication of an article, in La Bandera Roja (Alicante), about a trip he had taken to Salamanca. The piece claimed that the bishop was saddened by the anti-Catholic mood that dominated the city as a result of German interference. He reacted strongly and swiftly, publishing a retort in the Catholic nationalist press in which he railed against the ‘reds’ and ‘Spanish-Muscovites’. His response was tinged with sarcasm:

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Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39 Even though the red newspaper is too modest to say, I presume that I must be as charmed by the flourishing of Catholic Religion in Soviet Spain as I am devastated by the anti-Catholic mood of Nationalist Spain . . . I think the paper ‘La Bandera Roja’ of Alicante should eschew its fears and remain calm regarding the future of religion in Nationalist Spain. It will not be based, even remotely, on the model of the country of the Soviets . . . The most basic essences of Civilization are at stake. The future of Religion, of order, of the welfare and progress of peoples not only in Spain but in many parts of the world, is at risk. The outcome of this epic battle will be felt for centuries. What shall we choose: European civilization or the Soviet jungle?58

In the war of information, Gibraltar made a significant contribution to the nationalist cause. The bold propaganda of the insurgents, their support abroad and fear of communists all harmed the republican cause. The difficulty the republicans had in obtaining external aid was epitomized by the experience of Marcelino Domingo in Europe and America. Except for organizing a few mass events and securing several proclamations of solidarity, the envoy failed to produce serious results.59 Wherever a book was published in defence of the cause of freedom (such as the Duchess of Atholl’s Searchlight on Spain), a response soon hit the printing presses in the form of nationalist propaganda (i.e. Daylight on Spain, by Charles Sarolea).60 Faced with such gloomy prospects, republican embassies intensified their efforts to explain what was happening in Spain, while foreign political and labour organizations attempted to do the same in their respective countries. The Spanish embassy in London, for instance, published a pamphlet about Italian prisoners captured after the battle of Guadalajara, while leading figures from the United States Communist Party (Browder and Lawrence) strove to keep hope and anti-­fascist unity alive.61 The American communists noted three factors vital to the republican war effort: the cohesion of progressive forces, the aid of the international working class to the Spanish people and the support of democratic powers. None of the three can truly be said to have existed.

Espionage from the Rock Propaganda was important for the morale of civilians and soldiers, but accurate and timely information was essential to victory. Obtaining such intelligence required a network of spies and, naturally, the war saw a surge in espionage in Spain and its surroundings (Portugal, France, Gibraltar and the borders of the Protectorate). But there is evidence that intelligence activities had increased even before the outbreak of the conflict. As early as August 1935, the Italian consulate in Tangier reported to Rome that Spain was full of British, German, French, Russian and Japanese agents, in numbers not seen since the end of the First World War.62 If true, the above would explain how so many foreign affairs ministries were well informed of Spain’s political evolution, monitoring a potential outbreak of war with likely international repercussions. The military uprising and the bloodshed that ensued may not have come as much of a surprise. It is reasonable to assume that certain

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powers, vigilant of events in Spain, must have drafted contingency plans in case of war. After 18 July, both the number of spies and the number of their missions increased. Accurate intelligence became an invaluable asset and agents infiltrated the highest spheres in both zones. According to the Manchester Guardian, General Franco’s main headquarters was full of spies, causing more than one setback during the war.63 Gibraltar provided a privileged vantage point for the observation of ship movements, shipments from the Protectorate or the traffic of the Bay of Algeciras, and the diverse population of the Rock made it easy for agents to blend in and remain inconspicuous. Surrounded by refugees and people passing through, and by Hindus, Arabs, Jews, Englishmen and foreign consuls, it was relatively easy to call little attention to oneself. Spies were also present in the hinterland – the Germans, for instance, had instructors infiltrate the Non-Commissioned Officers Academy at the Diego de Salinas infantry quarters in San Roque. They remained there until 1937, when the front line had moved away from the area.64 Spies came in every shape. Some were actual secret agents with government-­paid salaries, but alongside this category flourished an array of impromptu informers, diplomats, civil servants, occasional collaborators, idealists and mercenaries. They could be anywhere, from the shabbiest environments to the most luxurious salons; some were extremely clever, others unbelievably naïve. There were, to be sure, double agents and counterespionage. Germans and Italians routinely helped the insurgents, while the Republic counted on the services of figures such as the able professionals Harold Philby, Herbert Greene or Arthur Koestler. British diplomats and consular officers were generally pro-Franco, yet the republicans could also count on the vice-­ consul in San Sebastián, Arthur Goodman. This was no doubt a complex world, full of intricacies and no small share of danger.65 Spies worked either for their countries or for their ideals. In this regard, honest idealism was more frequent in Spanish spies, who were generally fighting for a cause that was dear to them and for the land where they had been born; this is not to imply, of course, that the lure of money was always absent in the case of Spaniards. Comparing the intelligence services of the two camps, the insurgents appear to have been more effective for several reasons. First of all, they had greater freedom of movement in democratic nations (France or Great Britain) than the republicans found under the dictatorial regimes of Portugal, Italy or Germany. Secondly, they could rely on aristocrats and military men with connections abroad and solid funding. Last, but definitely not least, the support garnered abroad by each side was very different: in Gibraltar, for instance, nationalist spies operated more freely than their closely monitored republican counterparts. Good organization also contributed to the effectiveness of these services. In 1937, the nationalists created the SIPM (Servicio de Información y Policía Militar, or Information and Military Police Service). Until then, a large share of the rebels’ espionage activities had been in the hands of the SIM (Servicio de Información Militar, or Military Information Service) – whose acronym was identical to that of the republican SIM (Servicio de Investigación Militar, or Military Investigation Service). The director of the SIPM was Colonel José Ungría, a prominent officer who had sought refuge in the French embassy in Madrid and been evacuated by the French Navy in

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April 1937. From France, he made his way to the nationalist zone and undertook the management of the insurgents’ intelligence services, which proved particularly important at the beginning and in the last few months of the conflict – we have already mentioned the Admiralty’s good relations with the insurgents and the efforts to keep the republican fleet away from the Strait at the start of the war. Also important was SIFNE (Servicio de Información del Nordeste de España, or Northeast Spain Information Service), commanded by José Bertrán y Musitu and in charge of espionage activities in France – especially in the port of Marseilles – and in the republican rear-­guard. Military men such as Manuel Espinosa cooperated decisively, but what proved crucial was the help of aristocrats like Francisco Moreno Zuleta, Count of los Andes, who was very well connected abroad and had excellent relations in Gibraltar (close to his birthplace of Jerez).66 Throughout the war, the information arriving from Gibraltar was considered of the utmost importance. Certain aspects were under constant surveillance, with the nationalists closely monitoring (1) fortifications on both sides of the border; (2) the military situation in Gibraltar and trends in Gibraltarian public opinion; (3) the construction of the Rock’s aviation camp; (4) traffic at the border and its control; (5) British espionage in Gibraltar; and (6) republican espionage based at the Rock.67 These services relied on a fairly broad network with ramifications inside Gibraltar. In fact, one of the most important agents was a well-­known jeweller under the code name Otero. Coded intelligence was received at the General Headquarters in Burgos, though the source was not always the SIMP. Along with the information sent by this service, reports were received from the military governor of the Campo de Gibraltar, the Spanish consul general, the maritime authorities, the government delegate for public order and borders, etc. The secret information was channelled through many authorities in different spheres (Ministries of the Interior, of Foreign Affairs, etc.). In 1939, which saw the end of the Civil War and the outbreak of the Second World War, espionage activities gained in intensity.68 According to Ricardo de la Cierva, the insurgents’ intelligence service in Gibraltar had a broader network and was more effective than that of the republicans. The latter was basically limited to the consulate, which used a clandestine radio station to transmit relevant information (especially regarding nationalist shipping traffic in the Strait). The police, however, dismantled the station in 1937; thereafter, the loyalists had trouble getting news quickly to the government in Valencia. By contrast, nationalist operations were more tolerated, at least on Harington’s watch (well into 1938). Further, they relied on a triple network of spies. Firstly, there was a web of spies in contact with Queipo de Llano and the southern army through Colonel Francisco Borbón y de la Torre, the military commander of the Campo area. This network conducted surveillance of the enemy rear-­guard and undertook the negotiations leading to prisoner swaps; they counted on the cooperation of the British authorities of Gibraltar. In February 1937, the British consul in Barcelona sent a coded message to his ambassador in Hendaye, informing him of the movements of three gunmen who had made their way across the French border and into the nationalist zone with the mission of assassinating Franco. The information quickly reached the Rock and was immediately reported to the Duke of Seville.69

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The second network was led by Ricardo Goizueta, the unofficial representative of the nationalists during the first year of the war. He tracked the traffic of the republican fleet through the Strait and the activity of the Spanish consulate. He was a key link between Burgos and London, until his star waned shortly before the establishment of the nationalist consulate. The third and last network was perhaps the most powerful, directed from the High Commission in Morocco by Colonel Juan Beigbeder Atienza. After several foiled attempts, he managed to introduce a spy (codename V-3) who operated from Tangier and had his contact residence in the Victoria Hotel in Gibraltar. This agent’s activity must have been very intense, to the point that he gained the trust of the republican consulate, including the consul himself. His work spanned the period from the spring of 1937 to January 1939, when his cover was blown by British counterespionage and he was expelled to Tangier. By then, with a world war likely to begin at any moment, His Majesty’s Government could not afford to harbour Spanish spies in Gibraltar.70 This complex and diverse web included many informants working for the nationalists. Establishing a profile of these agents is no simple task – they included Gibraltarian merchants, sympathizers of Falange or the Carlists, aristocrats and adventurers. Despite the triple network, all the intelligence was ultimately centralized in Burgos through several channels, including coded messages. Some prominent figures tried to push for a more unified control of the nationalist espionage services. Colonel Sotomayor y Patiño, for instance, wanted a centralized coordination of the services operating in the Campo de Gibraltar, but nothing of the sort was ever implemented.71 The triple network had its advantages, as it made it possible to contrast information from different sources and a non-­centralized web was more difficult to dismantle. Information was essential for both sides, especially in an area as vital as the Strait. The republicans had their own web of spies, eventually dismantled by Francoist counterespionage and the unfavourable course of the war. The Francoist Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent frequent reports to the nationalist representative in Gibraltar regarding the dismantling of republican espionage networks by parallel counterespionage services. In December 1938, the insurgents uncovered a network of loyalist spies based in Gibraltar and Algeciras and with ramifications in Cadiz, Seville, Cordoba and Malaga. Its leader was Enrique Moreno Chicano, who was in possession of information about the movements of nationalist troops, the location and number of foreign officers, the German and Italian troops who landed in the port of Cadiz, Francoists in the republican zone, ship traffic in the Strait and even the identity of republican soldiers who had defected to the nationalist zone when they saw that the war was lost. Nearly twenty people were arrested during the dismantling, including two women.72 Gibraltarians also took part in intelligence activities. The police officer Griffith, whom we have already mentioned, was a member of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and a close collaborator of the nationalists. Others extended their activity as informants to other fields, such as Samuel M. Benady, who worked as legal counsel for General Franco during the war. By his own account, he often saw Norberto Goizueta at the Spanish embassy in London and he witnessed the comings and goings of

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many figures before 18 July, though he was not aware that a coup was being prepared. As we have mentioned, Norberto’s brother Ricardo wound up being the unofficial rep­ resentative of the Francoists in Gibraltar and also undertook intelligence work.73 Other Gibraltarians cooperated with the republicans for ideological reasons. Such was the case of Esteban Bellarque, who had been a member of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and Spanish Communist Party (PCE). When the war started, he was incarcerated in Algeciras, but subsequently released by virtue of his British citizenship, though he was prohibited from entering Gibraltar. He managed to cross the border through Eastern Beach, however, and later made his way from the Rock to Estepona, where he fought at the front in Malaga. He then enrolled in the International Brigades. After months of fighting on several fronts, he returned to Gibraltar in December 1938, after the dissolution of the International Brigades. He left his account of what happened in Gibraltar during the war. Supplies reached Franco, but not the Republic: The Republic lost the war because in the end only Russia was supporting us . . . The League of Nations decided on a stance of non-­intervention which gravely damaged the Republicans. France, England and America, who were prominent members of the League, feared the rapid spread of Communism in Europe. So trains loaded with armaments and supplies were left stranded at many European railway stations. Interestingly enough lorries loaded with arms for General Franco were smuggled through France, Portugal and Gibraltar’s frontier into Spain.74

Bellarque was not alone. Others, such as Alberto Fava, also contributed to the republican cause. In different ways (unrelated to espionage), Archbishop Buxton devoted himself to charitable contributions to both camps. He visited areas in the nationalist zone, but also landed in Valencia.75 Last but not least, there was a group of spies controlled by intelligence authorities sent to Gibraltar. To them, what was essential was to ensure the military safety of the Rock in the midst of the Spanish storm. They had a chance to see for themselves what was happening in nationalist and republican ports, as the British Navy moved quite freely in Spanish waters. The ship captain Blackman, for instance, provided one eyewitness account of supplies for the insurgents being unloaded from the Canarias at the port of Cadiz in November 1936; the British, of course, were also well informed of shipments for the Republic arriving from the Soviet Union.76 In this context, the governor of Gibraltar had to maintain an appearance of neutrality: his diplomatic skills were put to the test and he clearly rose to the challenge. Harington’s memoirs include two letters from 1937 that showcase the strong support for his performance in high circles. On 5 February, the commander-­in-chief of the naval forces, Admiral Fisher, wrote him: My Dear Tim: Bless you for the kindest of letters – just like you. Everyone tells me what I already know, that Gibraltar is Utopia, and that it is to you both – your consideration for all, your accessibility, your sympathy and understanding that this has come about. Gibraltar is lucky. You have smoothed away all discord and every man and woman,

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English and Spanish is entirely devoted to you. Yours ever.

Lord Baldwin also showed his affection on 5 June, shortly after his third term as prime minister: My Dear Harington: Your kind telegram gave me great pleasure for you are a judge of an innings and of the straightness of the bat! I may add that I have stood up to a bit of body-­line bowling too! It would be a great pleasure to me if we happened to meet at Lord’s next month.77

Ultimately, Harington was content with the mission he had been given. The outcome of the war had already been decided.

5

Gibraltar in the Midst of a Steady War The nationalist ‘consulate’ After the summer of 1937, the understanding between the British and Francoist governments called for closer relations. The war had stabilized and time was on Franco’s side. The British had myriad interests to protect, many of them in the nationalist zone. Further, it was necessary to ensure that Franco did not become captive to Germany and Italy, an endeavour that required strengthening the relationship with him. Such a rapprochement would come in the shape of an exchange of representatives, though still avoiding formal diplomatic recognition: a difficult balance requiring that the term ‘ambassador’ be replaced with ‘representative’ or ‘agent’; that ‘consuls’ become ‘subagents’; and that ‘consulates’ be known as ‘sub-agencies’ or ‘delegations’ – a mere subterfuge to disguise what were in fact true diplomatic relations. Ultimately, the change in relations mostly consisted of making public what had been a de facto reality for some time. Even so, both parties were extremely cautious – especially the British, as recognizing the Burgos government could have serious domestic consequences. The Francoists, who were extremely interested in exchanging representatives, wanted them to have the highest possible standing. Hence, General Sangróniz explained to the British that the insurgents wanted reciprocity between their agents and their British counterparts and that both should have the capabilities of de facto consuls, particularly in matters of trade and navigation. Further, the people selected as British representatives should be to the liking of the Francoist government. The British accepted these conditions, but insisted that the exchange of representatives did not amount to diplomatic recognition even though Spanish agents were to be granted official protection, access to the Foreign Office and the right to confidential communications. The authorities at Gibraltar found this to be an excellent arrangement, as it improved relations with the surrounding area without allowing London to appear too sympathetic to the nationalists.1 The negotiations were kept secret and nothing was made public until an agreement had been reached to the full satisfaction of both parties. Finally, in the autumn of 1937, the Duke of Alba (whom Salvador de Madariaga had considered a gentleman of exquisite intelligence) was appointed Francoist agent in Great Britain, along with sub-agents the Marquis of Los Arcos (London), Eduardo Danís (Cardiff), Ignacio de Muguiro (Liverpool), Emilio Núñez (Newcastle), the Count of Artaza (Southampton) and Luciano López Ferrer (Gibraltar).2 The appointment of López Ferrer was the outcome of consultations between Alba, Franco, Robert Hodgson (the British representative in Salamanca), the Foreign

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Office, the Colonial Office and the governor of Gibraltar. The latter communicated his approval of López Ferrer in mid-January 1938. The Spanish appointee had the necessary experience, as he had been the Spanish consul in Gibraltar (1923–31) as well as high commissioner of the Moroccan Protectorate and ambassador to Cuba during the Republic. In addition, he had the friendship and trust of the British authorities.3 Like most Spanish diplomats, he was a monarchist and an unenthusiastic supporter of conservative authoritarianism. He was certainly not one of Falange’s men, nor was he a far-rightist; in fact, Falange’s External Service had branded him ‘perfectly undesirable’.4 López Ferrer’s biography seems to indicate that his role as a diplomat was always more important to him than political convictions, the latter proving to be quite mutable through the changes experienced by Spain. During Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship, he was the Spanish representative in Gibraltar, where he maintained friendly and cordial relations. When the Republic was established, he became high commissioner in Morocco. Many doubted his sudden republicanism, but it was nonetheless enough to assure him the new post. In his two years as high commissioner, he was criticized for his performance, for his difficult personality and for his feigned support for the regime born on 14 April. According to a contemporary testimony, he fell out with General Cabanellas (head of the military forces), dismissed Colonel Capaz (head of the Service of Military Interventions), and was the victim of a campaign led by conservative republicans and Freemasons, including parliamentarian Pérez Madrigal and diplomat Vicente Álvarez Buylla. In early 1933, he left Morocco in response to mounting pressure and took on a faraway post as ambassador in Cuba. His bitterness over the experience of the Republic probably caused him to grow increasingly sympathetic to the views of the 1936 rebels. In fact, Franco himself backed his appointment as the nationalist representative in Gibraltar.5 From the republican perspective, this made López Ferrer a turncoat who had happily held government posts under the Republic and now felt no qualms about pledging his allegiance to Franco.6 Renowned journalist Adelardo Fernández Arias was no fonder of him. After meeting the high commissioner on a tour of Morocco, he described him as: an old and grouchy consul. His head is somewhat stiff, like a scuba diver’s helmet; unmovable and forward-jutting, like those dog heads on the tops of walking canes. He laughs solemnly. He tries to be solemn at all times, but he completely lacks solemnity. One can see from afar that the role of High Commissioner is beyond his capabilities, and he puts his best foot forward to fulfil it well; but he can’t.7

In those days López Ferrer was involved in a number of incidents, including the inappropriate appointment of a khalifa. He was authoritarian and rather tactless in his leadership, and his feigned republicanism certainly was not enough to disguise his monarchist leanings. Toward the end of his term, a rather embarrassing episode further diminished his credit. The Spanish consul general in Tangier, Plácido Álvarez Buylla, had organized a reception to honour his brother Adolfo’s appointment as chief

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of staff of the Ministry of State. Among the guests were the consuls in Asilah, Larache and Ksar el-Kebir. The high commissioner was not invited, but he nonetheless turned up at the banquet, prompting a bitter scene in which he was accused of being a false republican, a ‘phoney’, a ‘caveman’ and ‘disloyal’. Álvarez Buylla intervened, attempting to persuade him to leave. After the incident López Ferrer was transferred to Cuba. In an ironic twist of fate, he and Álvarez Buylla were to find themselves in opposing camps years later, each representing the interests of one of the two sides in the Spanish Civil War.8 The unofficial exchange of agents between Franco Spain and Great Britain in November of 1937 was motivated, among other reasons, by the significant economic relationship between the two and by the important sums of British capital invested in the territory under Francoist control. As Á. Viñas has shown, for months British exports to Spain had been almost entirely destined for the nationalist area. In return, Great Britain imported large quantities of iron, pyrites and copper precipitate, as well as foodstuffs from the Canary Islands. The British were so important to the Spanish economy that Franco resisted German attempts to control firms in key sectors such as mining.9 Regardless of the military aid being sent by Hitler, Francoist Spain’s strong economic ties with Great Britain were to be a decisive factor in the outcome of the war, in the smooth understanding between the Conservative British government and the rebels, in the role of Gibraltar and in the nationalists’ access to loans through British banks. Just as Franco had unofficial agents in Great Britain, the British had sent Robert Hodgson to Burgos as ‘observer’ well before granting official recognition to nationalist Spain. Also in Burgos, a representative of Standard Oil ensured a regular supply of fuel to the nationalist army.10 Juan March was among the guarantors of payment. Robert Hodgson, the ‘commercial agent’, was actually an experienced diplomat. Born in 1874, he had graduated from Trinity College, Oxford, and gone on to hold consular and diplomatic posts in Algeria, Marseilles, Albania and Russia (where he remained from 1906 to 1927). Married to a ‘white’ Russian, Hodgson was a staunch anti-communist. He retired in 1936, but was called on shortly thereafter for his special mission in Spain. His first public statement, picked up by the Spanish press, made his intentions clear: We sincerely hope that this personal contact shall allow us to eliminate any possible confusion or divergence, or at least to be able to manage them should they arise. It goes without saying that I and all my staff alike deeply desire to establish a direct relationship allowing us to accomplish the goals we have been assigned, and that all our efforts shall be put into fulfilling them.11

Hodgson’s appointment paved the way for a firm albeit unofficial relationship. Indeed, Franco granted the agent full diplomatic privileges in an attempt to ingratiate himself with the British government, which was proving immensely helpful to the nationalist cause: after establishing the Non-Intervention Committee, the British were now deepening their ties with the nationalists through their de facto recognition. Revealingly, German and Italian representatives had been sent to San Sebastián after

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Franco explained that there was no appropriate place to lodge diplomats in Burgos. By contrast, Hodgson and his staff were accommodated in the heart of the city, where they were provided with offices overlooking the Cathedral Square. Hodgson was thus in constant contact with the Francoist government and with British sympathizers of the nationalists.12 The British emissary astutely chose to surround himself with an effective network of Francoist supporters such as Major Desmond Mahony, who served as military attaché and was married to a niece of Admiral Cervera, commander in chief of the nationalist fleet.13 On balance, his performance as British representative before the Burgos government was extremely satisfactory until March 1939, when the British officially recognized Franco and his mission concluded. Hodgson’s views aligned with those of the British diplomatic corps in the republican zone. In general, British representatives supported the insurgents’ cause, beginning with Ambassador Henry Chilton, who had been living in San Juan de Luz since the beginning of the war. Consuls Oxley (Vigo), Coultas (Seville) and Clissold (Malaga) were also pro-Franco. Arthur Pack, the British commercial secretary, was moved to Warsaw in April 1937 because his fervent endorsement of the rebels had become a source of embarrassment.14 This warmth in Great Britain’s relations with the insurgents was also connected to a British willingness to satisfy the economic needs of the rebels, accepting the harsh commercial terms imposed by the nationalists. A basic priority of the latter was to ensure a continuous flow of war materiel, fuel and industrial products. As these goods had to be paid for in foreign currencies, the Francoists established strict monetary control mechanisms and seized exportable resources such as the copper from the Rio Tinto mines. Those exporting sherry or copper pyrites to Great Britain were required to deposit the value of their sales in pounds sterling before being allowed to conduct operations.15 In nationalist Spain, the exchange rate fluctuated between 42 and 42.45 pesetas to the pound (for purchases) and between 52.50 and 53.05 pesetas to the pound (for sales), meaning that the insurgents always had pounds with which to finance their imports of arms and fuel.16 After the Germans entered the Spanish trade market, Germany and Britain competed for Spanish exports (especially of minerals), but Franco never abandoned the British completely. In fact, Great Britain was a significant provider of supplies for nationalist Spain, in quantities that nearly equalled the exports sent to the country as a whole before the war. In the early months of the conflict, Great Britain supplied the rebels with coal (in value of £436,000), tin sheets (£270,000), manufactured goods (£180,000), petrol (£80,000) and jute (£80,000).17 What is more, in March 1937 the commercial attaché to the British Embassy in Hendaye met with an official in the nationalist Ministry of Economy in order to improve the clearing agreement between Spain and Great Britain.18 Technically speaking, such a negotiation should have been conducted with the republican government, yet the British chose to pursue it with an unrecognized government, fruit of an armed uprising. Under such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Great Britain sought to forge closer diplomatic ties with the nationalists, a need the British had been discussing since March 1937. In contrast, they completely disregarded the proposals of Julián Besteiro and other prominent republican leaders when the latter requested international

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mediation to put an end to the Spanish conflict in May 1937.19 The British government considered it wiser to let the war follow its expected course and conclude in a Francoist victory. Hodgson’s arrival in November was a result of the two parties’ economic relations, but the de facto recognition given to the nationalists was also a significant sign of international support. Indeed, as the Francoist position in the war improved and the insurgents gained control over more territory and resources, the international community proved increasingly interested in normalizing relations with nationalist Spain. The British were not even concerned about the growing influence of Italy and Germany in Spain. Mussolini’s and Hitler’s aircraft flew in Spanish skies and trade with both countries intensified, but Great Britain was confident that it would continue to play a key role. According to a report by the British military intelligence service dated 2 April 1937, pound sterling diplomacy would keep Spain predictable and dependent in the future. The author asserted that it was unlikely for the bulk of Spanish trade to end up in the hands of Germany and Italy after the end of the war. Rather, the victors would be forced to request a very large loan in order for Spain to get back on its feet, and the only European nation capable of providing such financing was Great Britain.20 The Royal Navy’s high-ranking officers were also clear supporters of the insurgents, heightening British convictions that Franco would remain dependable in the future. In December 1937 the officer J.J.B. Waldrom, an interpreter who was very familiar with the Spanish situation, drew up a confidential report sent to British senior officers in the Mediterranean, to the general headquarters at the Gibraltar fortress and to the governor of the Rock. The text analysed the various political parties and prominent individuals taking part in the Spanish war, a ‘Who’s Who’ of sorts containing thorough and generally accurate information, despite some errors and omissions. It is striking to contrast the style and tone used to portray different characters. Among those analysed were Indalecio Prieto, Diego Martínez Barrio, Juan Negrín, José Giral, Manuel Azaña, Luis Companys, ‘La Pasionaria’, Alejandro Lerroux, Margarita Nelken, Victoria Kent and Julián Besteiro, along with the main parties. Dolores Ibárruri was deemed a ‘firebrand’ and Marcelino Domingo a ‘sinister’ character. Almost all these individuals and parties were considered to be under Soviet influence, with the exception of centrist republicans and moderate socialists such as Prieto, who was ‘socialist though anti-communist’. Another significant exception was possibly Jaime Miravitlles, the Catalan FAI leader, whose organizational skills and intelligence were acknowledged. The author’s main concern was Soviet influence in Spain; in general, the nationalists were described in more benevolent terms, particularly in the case of Franco himself. Also of interest was the report’s assignment of blame to the Catholic Church: There is little doubt that the conduct of the Roman Catholic Church in Spain has been directly responsible for much of the present trouble. Its actuation cannot be compared with the same body in other countries, more especially the Northern ones, in that there always has been a direct Crown, or Government interference, and even a veto used in the appointment of the Bishops.21

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With the establishment of the nationalist ‘sub-agency’, there were now two consulates in Gibraltar: the authentic republican one and the newly-created nationalist delegation. From its inception, the latter was more active than the republican consulate, not least because it did not lack the means to meet its costs, as Minister Gómez Jordana assigned allocations paid in a timely fashion through cheques from the Banca Commerciale Italiana in New York.22 Further, the nationalist agents had significant support in the colony, allowing them to carry out their activities publicly and openly – behaviour that led to incidents with Spanish refugees. In contrast, the republican consulate was quickly running out of resources and enthusiasm despite certain attempts at self-delusion – as late as 18 July 1938, the republican consul, Monguió, sent a telegram to the government expressing his ‘unswerving faith in the victory of the people in arms, who are fighting for their freedom and for the independence of the motherland’.23 In truth, the morale and fighting spirit of anti-fascist Spaniards was almost the only thing the Republic had left.24

The evacuation of refugees From the start of the war, Gibraltar was a stop on the road to evacuation, thanks to the help of the British fleet. During the conflict, the Rock was witness to a constant coming and going of people. Thousands of republican refugees had arrived at the colony and resisted departing, though some of them were sent on to other destinations. The nationalist refugees were taken by the Royal Navy or by merchant ships to Marseilles or Gibraltar; from there, they travelled to the area controlled by the insurgents. Along with these groups, there were also British residents of the Campo de Gibraltar area who had sought temporary refuge in the colony. British nationals also arrived from the republican zone, as did conservatives who had found shelter in the British Embassy. Prominent right-wing individuals requested diplomatic asylum in foreign embassies and managed to reach the nationalist zone thanks to the humanitarian services of foreign powers. In his book Spain: The Vital Years, Luis Bolín recalls the effort made by a number of foreign diplomats to save the lives of asylum-seekers by placing them on British or French ships to be transferred to Gibraltar, Oran, Marseilles or Genoa.25 Massive evacuation required a network of discrete collaborators with friends in the right places. Captain Edward Christopher Lance established one such network, saving the lives of numerous anti-republicans. Lance was a military man and an experienced engineer who had fought in the First World War and in support of the Whites in the Russian Civil War. After spending several years in Latin America on engineering projects, he and his wife travelled to Madrid, where he had taken a job with the firm Ginés Navarro. He was in the Spanish capital on 18 July and witnessed the killing that ensued and the persecution of a variety of people ranging from businessmen to Church members. His anti-communism and the spectacle he saw in Madrid led Lance to conduct humanitarian tasks with his wife in favour of the nationalists. He began by evacuating over 600 people from the British Embassy to Valencia and from there to Gibraltar. The success of this operation encouraged him

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to organize other evacuations through republican ports (Valencia and Alicance), sending people to Gibraltar on board British ships (sometimes, warships were used because merchant ships were often searched). He returned to England, but soon thereafter came back to Spain to continue his work; he was responsible for saving the life of a son of the Francoist General Francisco Martín Moreno. Not long after his return, he was arrested by the republicans and imprisoned for over a year. Towards the end of the war, British diplomatic efforts saved him from the Segorbe prison and from a possible execution. Thus ended the adventures of the so-called ‘Spanish Pimpernel’.26 The Rock did not only provide asylum and a road to evacuation. It also served as an intermediary for information sent by post and cable, ensuring the success of many operations. Through Gibraltar, information could be sent from one zone to another (a mechanism taken advantage of by spies) and international communications could bypass Spanish control. A case in point were Captain Lance’s operations, which used Gibraltar to communicate with Great Britain, keeping republicans in the dark about his aid to right-wingers.27 Occasionally, these humanitarian activities concealed espionage, as Gibraltar was a hotbed of spies in these times (it is worth remembering that it was at the Rock that the renowned Kim Philby unsuccessfully conspired against Franco).28 As there were supporters of both camps in the colony, and since Gibraltar had the capacity to organize massive evacuation operations thanks to the British fleet, the Rock also became an ideal spot for exchanges. On 22 September 1937, nationalist ‘consul’ Ricardo Goizueta wrote to the chairman of the Spanish Red Cross, the Count of Vallellano. He wished to arrange the exchange of right-wing prisoners for a number of relations and acquaintances of renowned republican figures.29 Both the nationalists and the republicans used the family members of prominent personalities for leverage. In Seville, the insurgents arrested the families of communist leader José Díaz and republicans Martínez Barrio and González Sicilia, as well as the son of Largo Caballero.30 Three Larios sisters were exchanged through Gibraltar after being held for months and enduring the political prisons known as ‘chekas’.31 Goizueta had to intervene to free members of the Primo de Rivera family and the son of General Kindelán,32 and Manuel Clavero was also exchanged through Gibraltar.33 Exchanges, evacuations and refugees were commonplace during the war. A veritable human river passed through Gibraltar and managed to save their lives thanks to the colony. A number of refugees, however, created a difficult situation by choosing to remain on the Rock. Many of the refugees were gradually evacuated, but between mid1936 and mid-1937 they were constantly replaced by new arrivals. In the autumn of 1937 alone the Gibel Zerjon evacuated 4,000 people from Mediterranean ports; though many travelled to the nationalist zone, others stayed in Gibraltar.34 Nationalist evacuees were more numerous than republican ones, as they arrived in a constant stream throughout the war, to be immediately transferred to La Linea or Algeciras. This group were not a problem, as they were not seeking refuge in Gibraltar, unlike the thousands of republicans who arrived between 1936 and 1937. As late as 1938 the Rock remained overpopulated – the refugees continued to pose a problem, and many wondered why they were not permanently evacuated.

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Though refugees had been transferred in several stages since 1936, drastic measures were never taken to put an end to their presence. There were a number of reasons for this. One the one hand, refugees arrived in a continuous fashion and in sizeable numbers at least until the conquest of Malaga. On the other, Great Britain could not afford to disregard the right to asylum and appear unsupportive toward the victims of the war. Further, the refugees were an important source of labour and they had good relations with Gibraltarian workers. A massive evacuation could have led to conflict between the Rock’s population and the British authorities. For these reasons, a number of refugees were allowed to remain in the colony. Only after 1938, with the outcome of the war appearing inevitable against the background of a bleak international landscape, did the Gibraltarian authorities decide on a firm policy to resolve the issue. In the following pages we analyse the vicissitudes endured by the refugees throughout the war. By early 1937 the war was relatively on track and the Rock’s authorities trusted that the front line would move away as soon as the nationalists gained control over Malaga. Relations with the Spanish hinterland were smooth, with trade flows benefiting both the colony and the insurgents. Yet the refugees remained a problem, despite the evacuations carried out by the Royal Navy. Moreover, around 4,000 British nationals living across the border in La Linea could potentially claim their right to take up residence in Gibraltar should a new crisis arise, just as they had done in July 1936. These considerations worried Governor Harington, prompting him in January 1937 to consult with his government on what measures to take regarding British nationals living outside the Rock. Though he was aware that those holding a British passport were entitled to reside in any part of the British Empire, he also knew that Gibraltar would face severe limitations if it had to add 4,000 British nationals to its population, which already included the garrison’s military personnel and the Spanish refugees. Overpopulation might endanger the security of the enclave, especially given Harington’s negative perception of many of the British nationals living in the Rock’s hinterland. The governor considered most of them undesirables from the lower walks of life and communists opposing the British government. In his own words: I may remark that a number of people in question are of low type and mentality, probably born in some of the many houses of ill-fame which exist there . . . It is my duty to report that in Gibraltar, as elsewhere, there are members of the community, who tainted by the active propaganda of Soviet Russia and connected organisations, are definitely anti-Government.35

The right of residence was extensively regulated, but the governor was ultimately responsible for granting or denying the right to live on the Rock, as it remained an essentially military enclave. He had the prerogative to expel any people found inconvenient or dangerous. Beginning in May 1937, when the conquest of Malaga caused more refugees to arrive, evacuations were organized.36 Those expelled would be sent to other Spanish or North African ports (in the case of Spanish nationals) or to Great Britain and other parts of the Empire (for British nationals). There was a chance

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that British liberals or socialists might be arrested in the nationalist zone, but in general such repression was not widespread and thus Gibraltar never had to face an avalanche of British nationals. Hence, Spanish citizens remained the main problem throughout the following months. As many of them had entered Gibraltar by rather unconventional means, Harington requested a credit in August 1937 in order to finance the construction of security gates to keep illegal immigrants away. A limited range of entryways was established as the only possible entrance to the Rock, including the gates at the land border and the port’s facilities. All other accesses, such as the east coast, were cut off and protected against irregular refugees. This was a key issue, as many refugees entered the colony clandestinely and managed to stay hidden, adding to the problems faced by the Gibraltarian police. Some republican refugees had no interest in returning to the battlefields and sought to remain in Gibraltar at all costs. In accordance with British law, they could request political asylum to escape nationalist retribution for political offences, though the Gibraltarian authorities were well aware that this could be exploited: ‘The exact meaning of the word “political offences” is at present not clear.’37 Harington’s measures gave way to rumours regarding an imminent expulsion of the refugees.38 Although the rumours soon died out, it was clear that the colony was overpopulated and a solution to the issue would eventually have to be found. In the meantime, the refugees survived as best they could. Some had found jobs at the Rock, whereas others continued to live in the shadows. In any event, they were all reluctant to return to the violence and reprisals of the poor, backward country that was Spain. Part of Gibraltar’s population (especially those with more progressive views) was sympathetic to their plight, and the governor hesitated to take a heavyhanded approach to the issue until the autumn of 1938. By then, Harington was about to be relieved of his duties and the outcome of the war had been decided. Further, many republican refugees were tired of the war and a number of them seemed to disapprove of the evolution experienced by the republican regime. Though they did not subscribe to the insurgents’ ideas, they were wary of the Republic’s transformation into a pro-communist regime. Such refugees were deemed traitors by the ‘reds’ and considered suspicious by the nationalists – despised by all, they had little choice but to go into exile and await the end of the conflict. A number of them were senior officials or highly qualified professionals; one example was Remigio Moreno González, who was a civil servant at the Ministry of Finance and district judge in Santo Domingo (Malaga). Moreno had been a member of Acción Republicana until 1934. In September 1936, he was appointed public prosecutor in the Special People’s Court established in Malaga. Though he kept his thoughts to himself, he never accepted the legitimacy of these people’s courts, the pressure of the militias, the crisis of authority experienced after 18 July or the subsequent public disorder. He never openly acknowledged it, but he sympathized with the nationalists. He avoided referring to the repression that had been unleashed in the Francoist zone, but was taken aback by the killings in republican Spain. He certainly was not comfortable in Malaga; he soon chose to send his family to Oran, where they would be safe from what he considered ‘red’ barbarism. He requested sick leave to prepare his escape and discovered that the vice president of Malaga’s

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Provincial Council – Baltasar Peña – had found shelter in a consulate and was planning to flee on board a sailboat. Rather than join this operation, Moreno chose to exploit his British friendships and the contacts he had in Gibraltar. In the end, he swam from a beach in Torremolinos until he reached a British destroyer. The authorities in Malaga realized he had fled and pressured the British consulate to return him, but the British helped him elude republican surveillance by having him change ships twice. He finally reached Gibraltar, where he received the ‘affection and noble hospitality’ of the Rock. He did not leave the colony until 1938, when he departed for Tangier. Some time later, the civil governor of Granada helped him return to Francoist Spain by vouching for his impeccable behaviour.39 As time went by and the war moved further away from the Rock, republican refugees began to lose hope. Conversely, nationalist victories fuelled Francoist enthusiasm and a growing faith in the fall of the Republic. The admiral superintendent at Gibraltar outlined such developments in a report to the Admiralty: ‘Whilst the Government resistance continued within measurable distance of Gibraltar the activities of the “red” sympathizers in the Colony were much more prominent than those of the other side . . . After the fall of Malaga . . . “red” activities became less marked, but gradually the number of Nationalist sympathizers increased and their activities became noticeable.’40 Allegiance to the Republic gradually weakened, whether opportunistically or out of sincere disapproval of developments in the ‘red’ zone. One of the many Freemason refugees, Antonio Lima Chacón, renounced his former allegiances in writing in order to return to Spain in November 1938.41 A more interesting case was that of José Centeno González, a moderate republican and former parliamentarian, first as a member of Derecha Liberal Republicana (1931) and later as a progressive republican (1933). In 1933 he was also appointed to the republican court of audit, a position he still held on 18 July. He moved to Valencia with the government, but his disapproval of the growing leftist influence continued to increase. Eventually, he travelled to Marseilles and never came back. There, a nephew of his persuaded him to join him in going to Gibraltar and abandoning the republican zone. Centeno acquiesced, despite the fact that his wife was ill in Paris and his daughter, writing from Valencia, begged him to return and serve the republican government. From Gibraltar he travelled to Tangier, arriving in 1937. Having settled in the North African city, he felt the need to write to Diego Martínez Barrio and Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, providing them with an explanation for his actions. In his letter to Martínez Barrio, he recounted his experience upon arriving at the Spanish consulate in Gibraltar: When I arrived I went with him [his nephew] to our consulate. Álvarez Buylla greeted me cordially and amiably. We exchanged some views. He told me he was confined to his offices and felt very isolated from the population. I saw some people from Seville that I hardly knew wandering about the consulate offices. They were young people whom I never saw exposed to any dangers or risking anything when we conspired against the Dictatorship, or in the revolutionary juntas, or even in elections. They did not seem willing to go and exchange shots, despite their youth, but were probably keen to fire from the back in exchange for a good state salary.

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When I have later learned of their comings and goings and they have been to see me in Tangier I have treated them as disdainfully as they deserve. In Gibraltar, the ‘white’ consul Mr Goizueta, whom I’d met in the past, was totally in control. I was never fond of him. I realized that I could not remain there.42

Despite the assurances given by nationalist Spain, the British authorities hesitated to evacuate the refugees through the land border. There had been so many atrocities and the repression had been so harsh that it proved quite delicate to forcefully return people to Spain knowing that they would most likely wind up imprisoned or dead. The international media often published news of nationalist massacres, which made it politically costly to attempt to deport refugees to Spain. On 27 May 1937, for instance, La Prensa of Buenos Aires reported on the deaths of forty-five prisoners who had been killed after being forced to work on the fortification of the road from Algeciras to Tarifa.43 In addition, there were plenty of republican sympathizers inside Gibraltar, as well as a growing unease about the future attitude of Francoist Spain in case of a European war. Freemasons were among the most difficult cases to deal with, as Francoist Spain intensely rejected them. Confidential nationalist documents show that Freemason refugees were continuously monitored and spied on. The nationalist ‘consulate’ in Gibraltar was used for such purposes, as were informants who managed to infiltrate Gibraltarian lodges in order to find out which Spanish citizens had joined them. The records reveal that around half the members of the lodge Autonomía were still sheltered in Gibraltar in 1938. They had been more fortunate than other Freemasons, such as the doctor Juan García Rodríguez or the city guard Rafael Carrasco Téllez, both of whom were victims of the Francoist regime. The informants provided detailed information regarding which Freemasons were in the ‘red’ zone, which were British nationals (which virtually guaranteed they would not be killed) and which were in La Linea, leading their lives in nationalist Spain (such as the merchant Antonio Ahumada Mateo).44 This obsessive investigation of the lives of Freemasons continued well after the war. As late as March 1940 an informant reported to the military chiefs of staff that most of the Freemasons’ archives were held in the Al Mogreb lodge or in the hands of Spanish nationals who were among the lodge’s 984 members.45 The spring of 1938 changed everything for many republican refugees.46 The insurgents were winning the war and they had been virtually recognized by Great Britain, who had accepted nationalist ‘sub-agencies’ and the unofficial embassy led by the Duke of Alba. Portugal, the centuries-old ally of the British, officially recognized the Francoist government in May 1938. Given the positive relations with Franco and the more than likely European war that loomed ahead, it was necessary to rid the Rock of leftist refugees. The situation had become untenable, with civilian and military employees arriving from Great Britain and finding that it was impossible to find housing due to overpopulation. Hence, Harington decided in May to inspect the residence permits of foreign nationals.47 In the same month, the Gibraltar Chronicle published a press release by the nationalist representative in Gibraltar (López Ferrer), in which refugees were encouraged to cross the border and assurances were given to those who had not committed crimes in the early days of the war.48 Gradually, refugees

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with no legal right to remain on the Rock were found and sent to Barcelona or Valencia on hospital boats. In early September 1938, an official report was published with data regarding the overpopulation of the Rock in 1936 (around 5,000 extra inhabitants for a normal population of 17,000, yielding a total of 22,000 people on the Rock). The report also gave figures for the evacuations that had taken place during 1937 and the refugees whose deportation was still pending in 1938. Estimates for the latter were around 3,000 people (1,700 British and 1,400 non-British). Consequently, massive evacuation began in October. In only six days, over 700 refugees left the colony. Revealingly, many refused to return to the republican zone and chose Tangier instead. Those lacking their own means were sent to Valencia and Barcelona, their expenses covered by the republican consulate.49 In the end, this was the solution taken to put an end to the problems posed by the refugees, including the frequent tensions among them. Indeed, the employees of the nationalist sub-agency in Gibraltar regularly endured hissing and booing from Spanish nationals at the port when they set off for a trip or left their offices. In late 1938 the Count of Vallellano (chairman of the Spanish Red Cross) was greeted by the raised fists of a group of republicans who placed International Red Aid stickers on the back of his car. Such spectacles led López Ferrer to lodge frequent complaints with the colonial secretary and were a source of distress for Governor Harington. The Francoist ‘consul’ insisted on the importance of good neighbourly relations for the good of Gibraltar: ‘If such elements cannot be reduced to orderly and disciplined conduct by the British authorities, the time may come when we shall request their expulsion from the enclave provided the British truly wish to maintain correct and normal relations with the Spanish authorities.’50 After Governor Harington’s succession by William Edmund Ironside, evacuations were undertaken that practically resolved the issue of the Rock’s overpopulation. Fortunately, there were hardly any new arrivals. In late 1938 the new governor reported that only twenty-three refugees had arrived in the previous twelve months, having made their way to the colony by swimming or on small boats.51 Some may have been defectors wishing to stay away from Spain rather than serve in either of the two camps. Either way, the flow of refugees had drastically diminished and those who had been there since 1936 were gradually being shipped to various destinations (including Tangier and republican ports). By 1939, the republican refugees had been reduced to a handful of people employed in Gibraltar who had good relations with the colony’s working class. Except for some isolated incidents, they were no longer a source of trouble. Moreover, the circumstances had changed and Ironside considered some of the anti-Franco refugees more trustworthy employees for the military facilities than the workers who crossed the border daily and who could potentially be spies. Such Spanish refugees thus became stable employees who were to remain in Gibraltar through the difficult times of the Second World War. By 1946, when the British government allowed the civilians that had been evacuated during the war to return to Gibraltar, there were 350 Spanish nationals on the Rock. Although Venezuela offered them asylum and jobs, those Spaniards ultimately chose to stay in the enclave, where they had put down roots and formed bonds of solidarity throughout the years of the Second World War.52

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Economic warfare By the summer of 1937, Gibraltar had once again become a safe and comfortable shelter from which to observe events in Spain. The front line was moving away and the course of the war was turning in favour of the Francoist camp. Such an assessment was based not only on the nationalists’ territorial advances (the north, Malaga) but also on the differing political evolution within each camp (Francoist unity versus internal conflict in republican Spain). Even more important was the evolution of the economic war. From the start of the conflict, the two sides had decided on radically different economic policies. Whereas the republican government gradually lost control over significant political and economic areas to workers’ organizations that attempted to forge a revolution, the insurgents imposed nationalist economic policies combining protectionism and state intervention. The ultimate goal was to ensure that the means and resources that would make victory possible were firmly under control. From the beginning, the National Defence Junta established its firm grip over industry and drew up the institutional framework for so-called ‘National Services’ such as the National Wheat Service (Servicio Nacional del Trigo). It also seized exportable raw materials such as those of the Rio Tinto mines (decree of 28 August 1936). The Technical State Junta (Junta Técnica del Estado) was created on 1 October 1936 under similar guidelines, prepared to wage an all-out economic war against the Republic.53 The nationalists acted swiftly and shrewdly. The Burgos government soon undertook negotiations with western nations in order to impede the sale of wheat exports to republican Spain. The nationalists also made efforts to destroy the value of republican currency both domestically and internationally, as well as attempting to hurt the enemy by influencing business decisions in the republican zone. The Republic, by contrast, was severely uncoordinated and only achieved some degree of reorganization under Juan Negrín – but at that point, there was little to be done. Lost in the ideological rhetoric of the war, the Republic failed to see the importance of its economic aspects until it was too late. Gradually left aside and lacking resources from western nations, the republican government made a desperate attempt to secure aid from France and Great Britain by hinting at the possibility of giving up certain parts of the Moroccan Protectorate.54 The strategy failed, not least of all because the Republic had no real control over the Protectorate. The French and British flatly rejected the proposal and lightly admonished the Republic for making it. The nationalists received financing through international loans (partly covered by their exports of raw materials). The Republic, on the other hand, had to pay for most of its imports and military aid up front and in cash (as evidenced by the famous ‘Moscow gold’ operation). Its most significant partner by far was the Soviet Union (followed by France and Mexico), which meant that trade operations had to cross the increasingly hostile Mediterranean. By contrast, the nationalists received aid by sea (despite the theory of non-intervention) as well as through the Portuguese and Gibraltarian borders. As a result, the insurgents were considered more trustworthy and received more international backing, while many looked askance at the Republic given its close ties with the Soviet Union.

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International markets clearly reflected this set of circumstances: whereas the republican peseta lost 99.3 per cent of its value throughout the course of the war, the nationalist currency only registered a comparatively low 27.7 per cent devaluation. This inflation differential was the result of the strong appreciation of the nationalist peseta to the republican peseta. In January 1937, 100 nationalist pesetas were worth 130.21 francs; one year later, they were worth 165.91 francs. Conversely, 100 republican pesetas went from being worth 86.35 francs six months into the war to only 32.3 francs by January 1938. In June of that year, a pound sterling was equivalent to 72–76 republican pesetas (in Madrid; in Barcelona, the figure rose to 85–100 pesetas), as opposed to 52–57 nationalist pesetas. Both camps obviously experienced inflation, but the Republic’s monetary chaos made its effects much stronger in the loyalist camp. In September 1937, a pound sterling could buy 285 republican pesetas, as compared to only 80 nationalist pesetas. The value of the republican currency continued to decline until April 1939.55 The evolution of the economy during the war was felt in Gibraltar. Firstly, few Gibraltarians were willing to hold on to Spanish currency given its high inflation rate. On 20 November 1936 the superintendent of the Rock’s market reported to the colonial secretary that the butchers had requested that trade be conducted exclusively in British currency.56 Months later, on 1 July 1937, Gibraltar decided that Spanish currency would no longer be accepted.57 Only silver coins were kept, given their intrinsic value. In early 1938, the colony was still home to several million silver pesetas that republicans and nationalists alike longed to recover. In fact, the nationalist consul requested the Burgos authorities to delay banning the entrance of silver coins into national territory. Quite reasonably, he proposed allowing a period of fifteen to twenty days for silver coins to be placed in bank accounts in La Linea or exchanged for paper bills.58 The Gibraltarian authorities viewed the nationalist advance favourably, as did the colony’s businessmen, who were supportive of anyone capable of ensuring an orderly environment and a disciplined workforce. The war had a negative impact on retail, but the increase in the demand for fuel made up for it.59 On the other hand, the Gibraltarian working class and labour sympathizers harboured rather different feelings. The conservatives’ appeasement policy seemed to them a complete error that would lead to the victory of Franco thanks to the explicit support of Hitler and Mussolini. They were concerned about the rise of fascism and sincerely convinced that the Soviet Union embodied the defence of a true people’s democracy. In any event, the governor controlled the colony and followed the instructions of the British government. As applied to Gibraltar, the non-intervention policy was essentially a charade aimed at favouring one camp and hurting the other. Gibraltar was included in the non-intervention mechanisms and a group of observers were sent to the border and authorized to inspect the ships departing from Gibraltar toward Spanish ports. On 15 January 1937, Secretary of State Anthony Eden informed Harington that observers were to be sent to Gibraltar; however, they did not arrive until 19 April. During that period, the principles of the non-intervention policy were repeatedly violated, as denounced by the republican embassy in London. Italian army officers arrived at Gibraltar and were allowed to cross the border into Spain and

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an Italian steamship was allowed to enter the port despite carrying troops to Mallorca. Italian aviation officers also landed aboard the steamship Rex in the middle of the night and were allowed to leave through the land border without their luggage being inspected. Across the border, cars were waiting to take them to Seville immediately.60 This was quite uncustomary, as the land border was closed each night and did not reopen until morning – and such notorious exceptions always seemed to favour the nationalists. Whenever such events were denounced, the phlegmatic Governor Harington either denied the charges or remarked that the non-intervention observation system certainly could be improved.61 In the meantime, the discreet and diverse traffic in Gibraltar Bay never ceased. Just as neutrality was violated with the passage of certain individuals, it was constantly undermined in business and trade. Gibraltar received enormous quantities of fuel that were clearly not meant for British merchant ships or for the Navy’s fleet. The technology used to quickly supply ships with fuel had improved throughout the 1930s, and by 1937 the GOBAC coal suppliers’ cartel had reached the impressive record of 80,000 tons supplied per month.62 Evidently, such an amount surpassed the combined needs of the Royal Navy and the usual supplies for merchant ships. The Rock had become a fuel storage and redistribution hub for merchant ships (British and foreign), supplying Spain – and especially nationalist Spain – with coal and other goods. Seville was one of the main destination ports, as it was the most important city in the nationalist rear-guard for a long time. Further, Seville’s was a well-protected river port that allowed goods and fuel to reach interior Spain. According to the available data, the port witnessed a continuous flow of merchant ships, starting in September 1936. González Dorado provides figures for the loading and unloading of cargo (in millions of tons per year: see Table 5.1).63 As seen in the table, the increase in traffic was spectacular, with a significant take-off after 1936. The most recent similar figures for Seville went back over half a decade, when the city had been getting ready for the Ibero-American Exposition of 1929. Loading and unloading of ships alike increased continuously throughout the war – only at the end of the conflict did the loading of cargo lose some ground to its unloading, as one would expect from an economy that had little to offer and many needs given its severe domestic difficulties. In any event, the tons of cargo and the number of ships arriving at the port (which peaked in the spring and summer of 1937)

Table 5.1  Loading and unloading cargo in Seville harbour (1936–39), millions of tons per year Year

Loading

Unloading

Total

1936 1937 1938 1939

319.9 558.9 663.3 571.7

266.5 431.3 483.4 497.8

586.4 990.2 1,146.8 1,069.5

Source: González Dorado, A.: Sevilla: Centralidad regional y organización interna de su espacio urbano (Sevilla: Ayuntamiento, 2001), 2nd edn, p. 159.

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are not as significant as the names and nationalities of the merchants engaging in trade with Gibraltar.64 The port of Seville welcomed vessels of various origins from mid-1936. Italian and German ships were particularly numerous and easy to recognize. The Italians even named a merchant ship Sivigliano and the Germans did not hesitate to send destroyers (the Leopard or the Ludhs) and submarines (U-28, U-29, U-30, U-33 or U-34) to protect its merchant ships. There was also a discreet Portuguese presence. Yet perhaps the most noteworthy part of this traffic was the continuous flow of British and American merchant ships. The names of the American vessels all started with ‘Ex’ (Exermont, Executive, Exchester, Exmoor, etc.), with a couple of exceptions such as the Chester Valley. The most prominent British ships were the Gibel Dris, Gibel Zerjon and Gibel Kebir (all belonging to the Gibraltarian Bland company), along with the Wild Eagle and the Blackbird. They all regularly visited the port of Seville and normally remained there for several days – enough to unload and load cargo – and departed, only to return a few days later: evidently, they were not going too far. They operated mainly in the Strait, especially in Gibraltar and North Africa. Though there are no data regarding their cargo, it seems safe to assume that they were most likely transporting fuel and supplies. According to the Gibraltarian trade unionist Huart, they carried goods ranging from soup and cereal to fuel, though the weight of their cargo was sometimes suspiciously high for mere foodstuffs.65 In theory, the Non-Intervention Committee had banned them from carrying weapons, but it was clear that the coal they were selling the nationalists would also help win the war. It is worth noting that a very limited number of companies owned a significant portion of the vessels involved in such trade. The American ships arriving in Seville, of around 5,000 tons, belonged to American Export Lines.66 Founded in 1919 as the Export Steamship Corporation, it had been created for commercial traffic between New York and the Mediterranean; it became American Export Lines in 1936. Aside from merchant ships, in 1931 they started deploying four vessels of nearly 10,000 tons for passenger transport. In their journeys, this company’s vessels frequently called at the port of Gibraltar; this traffic remained constant throughout the Civil War, although passengers were not allowed to disembark at the colony.67 Many of the American merchant ships arriving in Seville also called at Gibraltar. The British Gibel vessels belonged to the Bland group. Marcus Henry Bland, a Liverpool merchant, had founded the company in Gibraltar in 1810. It was originally a small shipping agency, but later expanded into carrying supplies for the Rock’s garrison. In 1891 the company was sold to Joseph and Emmanuel Gaggero, who transformed it into a firm specializing in coal transportation and ship repair. It operated mainly in the Strait, though it opened a few routes to France and Great Britain. In the 1920s the company’s fleet expanded through the purchase of vessels from the Dutch firm Batavier. The Gibel Zerjon, for instance, was acquired in 1928; it had formerly been known as the Batavier VI, covering the Rotterdam-London route. By 1932, the company had offices in Tangier and decided to enter the airline industry by becoming the main shareholder of Gibraltar Airways, one of the first companies to use the Rock’s airport facilities. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the Bland Group continued to consolidate and diversify into other areas of land, sea and air transportation. The

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Spanish Civil War provided the company with a golden opportunity it immediately seized, supplying fuel, especially to the nationalists.68 An interesting document held in the Spanish National Archives confirms the key role played by the Bland group. The chairman of the company, Gaggero, did not hesitate to remind the Spanish director general of maritime traffic of the services rendered to the nationalist cause: while the action of the red warships in the Strait lasted and until the presence of the Nationalist vessels forced them to withdraw, this Company’s steamships were the only ones maintaining service between the ports of Seville/Gibraltar and Ceuta/Melilla, despite the constant danger such traffic represented to our vessels due to the red blockade, as evidenced by the many occasions on which they were bothered by the ships patrolling those waters. Our steamships never stopped supplying the aforementioned Moroccan ports with the food and provisions they so needed in those days. It is for us a source of great satisfaction to have been able in this way to indirectly help the Spanish National Cause.69

In those days – October 1937 – Bland merchants were trading in large shipments of jute that travelled from India to Gibraltar, where Bland undertook their transport to Seville. In order to keep its vessels from making a return journey with no cargo, the company sought to find goods in Seville that they could transport to North African ports. In fact, the letter quoted above was written to request an unlimited permit to navigate the coasts and ports of Spanish Morocco, particularly that of Tetouan.70 The Bland and American Export Lines vessels were not the only ones calling at Gibraltar as part of their trade schemes with the nationalists. In fact, the Rock was part of a much larger commercial network. It is well-known that the Spanish CAMPSA sent one of its employees (Juan Antonio Álvarez Alonso) to negotiate with the director of Texaco in France, W.M. Brewster. The chairman of Texaco, Thorkild Rieber, also took part in the negotiations, quickly closing a deal for the supply of fuel to the nationalists. Texaco vessels soon began to arrive in Tenerife, from where the fuel was redistributed to nationalist ports. Between 1936 and 1939, Texaco sold the insurgents increasing quantities of fuel on unsecured long-term credit – a gift explained by Rieber’s pro-fascist sympathies. Standard Oil also supplied the nationalists with fuel, its first convoy – consisting of three oil tankers – leaving Philadelphia on 13 August destined for Algeciras. In total, G. Howson estimates that the nationalists received fuel in value of $20 million (US) from companies such as the aforementioned, along with Shell, Socony and the Atlantic Refining Company. Texaco alone sent 1,866,000 tons to Francoist Spain. The republicans had no such luck with their fuel imports from Eastern Europe.71 It is worth mentioning two examples of important petroleum supplies that reached the nationalists through Gibraltar. One took place on 19 September 1936, when the German vessel Palos unloaded 500 barrels of benzole at Gibraltar, from where they were reshipped to the nationalist forces. Another German vessel taking part in this commerce was the Tangier, which on one occasion unloaded 100 barrels of benzole

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while inspectors looked the other way. These are only two examples of a series of commercial activities that were as widespread as they were discreet.72 These fuel supplies were vital, but it was not only coal or fuel that Gibraltar provided. In fact, the colony received shipments of all sorts from London and Liverpool, as well as from German or Dutch ports. There are data regarding some of the goods being shipped from Gibraltar to cities in the nationalist zone. The Provincial Council of Seville, for instance, acquired reasonably priced medication and medical supplies with the required import permits through the customs office in La Linea. Among the imports were cotton, gauze and ampoules transported in the Council’s own lorries. This flow remained constant until 1939.73 Gibraltarian trade unionists also denounced British companies for shipping surgical instruments to the insurgents from Liverpool – on 22 September 1936, the British merchant vessel Assyrian arrived at Gibraltar carrying one such shipment, which was then transported to Spanish territory on the boat Miu, belonging to Lionel Imossi.74 In sum, Gibraltar was very much a part of the economic side of the Spanish Civil War. Neutrality did not preclude good business opportunities stemming from a rigid demand, although there were risks involved and the arbitrary exchange rates imposed by the insurgents had to be endured. Ultimately, this was not important. The profit margin was more than sufficient and then there was the added advantage of favouring a Francoist victory. For the colony’s businessmen, an authoritarian regime in Spain was more appealing than a socialist-leaning Republic with ties to the Soviet Union. Certain guarantees were needed to ensure that business flowed smoothly, and nationalist Spain was better suited to provide them. What is more, Gibraltarian merchants did not merely sell goods or fuel to the nationalists. Some of them, members of the Jewish community and well connected in Tangier, Melilla and Tetouan, made generous donations to the insurgents. Such was the case of the Gibraltarians Benholta and Bentotila, as well as Shell’s representative in Melilla, Jacobo J. Salama. These individuals all provided economic aid to the rebels and established commercial relations with Spanish authorities and members of the military, including García Valiño, Muñoz Grandes, Millán Astray, Juan Vigón and even Serrano Súñer.75 Gibraltarian Jews were not the only ones to help the insurgents. As the course of the war turned in favour of Franco, the Jewish community in Spain began to support the rebels’ cause. After all, many of them had fled the republican zone fearing revolutionary excesses. Once outside the country, some decided to lend their support to the nationalists. They were Sephardic businessmen who had taken up residence in Eastern Europe; in exchange for their cooperation, the Francoist government granted them certain privileges in 1938, including exemption from military service without losing their Spanish citizenship. A few years later, the Spanish government saved the lives of many of those Jews living in Nazi-invaded Romania.76 Juan March probably played a role in Gibraltar’s commerce with the nationalists, though we have been unable to establish his direct participation in this traffic. The financier’s support of the rebels is well-known, including the 1,000-million-peseta loan granted to Franco and Mola for the purpose of purchasing foreign arms through Claiworth Bank. Moreover, March was also instrumental in transporting men and war supplies from North Africa to the Iberian Peninsula. The communist newspaper

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L’Humanité published an article on 15 October 1936 recounting the exploits of the tycoon. Its title was ‘The Last Pirate of the Mediterranean’: Most of the moors that arrived in the Peninsula were transported by Juan March’s band of pirates, which transported them in small ships, the same ones used by Juan March to smuggle tobacco on the Moroccan shores. Each of the aforementioned boats transported men and weapons, making one trip per night between certain spots that it is unnecessary to publicly name. Juan March’s pirate fleet, with more than thirty years’ experience in contraband, transported moors and weapons daily to the rebels in the Peninsula. His activity increased continuously, until he had filled the rebel zone in the South with weapons and moors. Then, Juan March, who is an ultra-dynamic man, went on to conquer new horizons, using foreign ships to transport war materiel from the Fascist nations. Aircraft, guns, munitions and all sorts of foreign materiel in the rebels’ hands have been transported by Juan March.77

Despite certain inaccuracies and exaggerations, the article was highlighting something that was essentially true: not all the rebel forces had been transported via airlift or in organized convoys. Many Moroccan soldiers (though probably not a majority) were transported in small boats used for smuggling ‘. . . between certain spots that it is unnecessary to publicly name’. It is not unlikely for some of these transports to have arrived at Gibraltar from Spanish ports in North Africa, Algerian enclaves or even Tangier. Whether or not this was the case, it is certainly true that March would have been in a position to organize such transports through the Rock, given the attitude of Governor Harington and the lack of effectiveness of the British non-intervention policy. None of the above implies a perfect understanding between the British authorities in Gibraltar and their nationalist counterparts in the Campo area. There were on occasion minor conflicts, generally resolved thanks to Harington’s agreeable attitude, which sought to preserve friendly relations. One such problem arose regarding the surveillance of the Strait to neutralize vessels carrying weapons for the ‘reds’. In March 1937, the Dato intercepted the SS Stanholme and sent it to Gibraltar to be inspected by the international observers on the grounds that it was suspected of transporting weapons for the opposing camp.78 To be sure, the nationalists had an effective intelligence service in Gibraltar, but their accusations were not always well founded. There was, however, evidence of some commercial traffic with the republican zone, which was kept under strict surveillance to impede shipments of war materiel. Some of the British merchant ships that dared to engage in trade with the Republic were attacked or even destroyed. One was the steamship Endymion, sunk in the Mediterranean a few days after leaving Gibraltar. It was not the only vessel to be attacked: the Alcira encountered a similar fate. The incidents were discussed in the Commons, where Eden issued a serious warning. These attacks had come after the Nyon Agreement and British patience was not infinite. The first measure taken was the enhancement of the non-intervention fleet: of seventy deployed ships, forty would be British.79 Months later, the British themselves were to intercept the Stancroft

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when it was on its way from Barcelona to Valencia carrying lorry chassis which could be used for military purpose.80 Regardless of any conflicts with the nationalists, the British were not willing to make things easier for the Republic. When Franco achieved air supremacy, Great Britain made it clear to its ship operators that they would enter republican ports at their own risk. Chamberlain himself established this doctrine in the House of Commons when it became known that between mid-April and mid-June 1938 twenty-two British merchant ships had been attacked, mostly by nationalist aviation.81 Overall, Gibraltar had become a handy instrument for the insurgents. The Republic’s diplomats in Europe could do little to impede exports to nationalist-controlled ports. It was impossible, for instance, to cut off traffic from Gibraltar Bay. These circumstances caused a sense of unease, powerlessness and resignation in republican diplomats. A case in point of the Republic’s impotence was experienced by the Spanish vice-consul in Bombay, who requested instructions regarding whether or not to issue visas to merchant ships destined for Spanish ports (including those under nationalist control). Despite raising this question with the republican authorities, the consulate was well aware that any merchant ship could travel from Bombay to Gibraltar and then reship its goods to the insurgents. Moreover, it was suspected that the Italian or German consuls in Bombay might issue such visas upon Franco’s request. Consequently, any attempt at establishing restrictions would serve only to diminish the consulate’s economic resources – it was preferable to at least charge for the visas.82 As for the fighting around Gibraltar, it diminished drastically in 1937 as the front line moved north. Naval and air activity in the Strait area were controlled by the nationalists, and the republican flag could not be flown between the Atlantic and Mediterranean without encountering grave danger. Among the most noteworthy incidents were the sinking of the torpedo-armed motorboat Javier Quiroga on 7 May 1937 and the arrival of the Deutschland at Gibraltar for repairs. The Italians had ceded the Javier Quiroga in early 1937, along with the Cándido Pérez. Built in 1931, the motorboats had originally been known as MAS 436 and 435; they were fast vessels, albeit with low capacity and quality. They barely had the capability for air defence and the crew had to crowd on the stern to leave room for the torpedoes and other armament (mines). They only proved useful for mining enemy ports in good weather. The slightest sign of unfavourable weather was enough to make them nearly impossible to manoeuvre and in fact the Javier Quiroga sunk upon colliding with the Cándido Pérez. This was a minor loss without any significant consequences other than highlighting the low quality of much of the armament sent by Italy.83 The Deutschland affair was far more important. The events are well known and we shall not dwell on them except to bring attention to certain details. In sum, the incident took place when Soviet-built republican aircraft attacked the German pocket battleship Deutschland on 29 May 1937. Dozens of people were wounded or killed. The incident was serious because the ship was part of the non-intervention surveillance fleet and, as such, neutral. It had already been attacked in Palma de Mallorca, albeit unsuccessfully. The new attack, which took place in Ibiza, had tragic consequences and created a difficult situation for the Republic. The Germans retaliated almost immediately by bombarding Almeria, which was technically an outbreak of hostilities between

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Germany and the Spanish Republic that could lead to an expansion of the Civil War. This was not to be, and the Deutschland called at the port of Gibraltar for repairs and to bury its dead. The British authorities treated the crew impeccably, welcoming them with full honours. This was not to be the vessel’s last day at the Rock: in 1938, it paid a courtesy visit to Gibraltar. The Deutschland incident blew the lid off the charade of non-intervention. Tasking Germans and Italians with the surveillance of Mediterranean ports was an invitation to trouble, as they were the ones helping Franco. The German retaliation was appalling for a member of the London Committee. In the end, all the parties involved knew who their enemies were and it made little sense to be engaging in battle with German aircraft while being told that a German ship was ‘neutral’ and could not be attacked at sea. In the middle of this theatrical performance, the nationalists understood the peculiar rules of the war and stayed away from trouble with any foreign nation (with the exception of the Soviet Union). The impression left in Gibraltar by the funerals of the German sailors only served to exacerbate the anti-republicanism of the colony’s elites. The sea was coming increasingly under nationalist control, which for the British government meant one more reason to further the pseudo-recognition of Francoist Spain. The insurgents had not only managed to control the Strait in the early weeks of the war; in 1937, they also secured the northern facade and increased their fleet, adding new minelayers, destroyers and auxiliary ships. The Cervera, the Galerna and the Jupiter captured the oil tanker Gobeo in June 1937 off the coast of Santoña. It had been transporting refugees, who were imprisoned by the Francoist forces. The ship was then used to supply nationalist units with fuel, increasing their autonomy and their presence at sea.84 In sum, the Spanish Civil War was well advanced and its outcome seemed close and reasonably certain. It was only a matter of waiting and keeping maritime traffic under control in order to impede a change in the balance of forces. The British government received daily reports of the International Board for Non-Intervention in Spain regarding ship movements. The London Committee had had its desired effects.85 Eden’s unblushing definition of non-intervention said it all: ‘A clear distinction must be made between non-intervention in what is purely a Spanish affair and non-intervention where British interests are at stake’.86 From Gibraltar, there was little left to do except wait for the outcome of the war, enhance the defence of the fortress and naval base, and continue to pursue commercial activities. Life had essentially gone back to the calm and quiet that the Rock had been familiar with before 18 July 1936. In October 1937, the American USS Raleigh arrived for the formal inauguration of the American War Memorial’s triumphal arch, in Orange Bastion. The monument had actually been built four years earlier by the American Battle Monuments Commission to honour British-American cooperation in the Strait during the First World War.87 The time was not far away when the two fleets would cooperate once more.

6

Tensions with Nationalist Spain The Queipo incident and other political collisions On 27 February 1938, an incident occurred which would serve to highlight the attitude of the Chamberlain Cabinet toward the Spanish Civil War as well as the nationalist strategy regarding its foreign image. That day, General Queipo de Llano gave a speech in La Linea in which he referred to Gibraltar as a Spanish territory bound to rejoin the motherland, and announced that the Rock would soon return to the hands of ‘true Spaniards’, its rightful owners. The journalist Harold Wall published his remarks in the British Labour press. The news created a storm in Great Britain. The commotion reached the House of Commons, where Labour MPs asked the government for explanations regarding the contents of Queipo’s speech and the potential threat his words represented to the colony, demanding that the garrison be strengthened if need be. On 2 March, at 2.20 in the afternoon, the colonial secretary telegraphed the governor of Gibraltar requesting information. Prominent Gibraltarian personalities were reported to have been present, and the British government wanted to know the full extent of the nationalists’ true intentions. A few hours later, Harington sent back a report in which he played down the incident based on what he had been told by those who had witnessed Queipo’s speech. Among the latter was the British vice-­consul in La Linea, who informed the governor that there had been no claims worth taking seriously. Gibraltarian civilians who had not heard the speech had similar views; according to them, officials speaking for the general had ‘emphatically denied’ the claims, blaming the entire affair on a ‘dastardly plot by the reds living in Gibraltar’.1 The same day, the journal ABC branded the alleged misrepresentation of Queipo’s words a ‘crude and despicable ploy by foreign Marxists’ and reported the indignant reaction to the rumours of Britons who had been in attendance. The incident came at a delicate moment for nationalist Spain, as three sub-­agents had just been appointed to represent the insurgents in Glasgow (Rafael Mendicuti), Southampton (Luis Olivares) and Newcastle (Emilio Núñez del Río).2 Fortunately for the Burgos government, the Gibraltarian authorities chose to take the heat out of the issue and reassure London. Harington’s subdued report was followed by a series of telegrams confirming that Queipo had not made any hostile statements. The notary public of Gibraltar, Cecil Prescott, reported that he had attended the event and had heard nothing that was offensive. More vigorously, Marie Louise Maxwell Scott asserted that the questions raised in the House of Commons were outrageous, as the entire affair was a fabrication of red propagandists that had infiltrated Gibraltar and had to be stopped. According to her, ‘General Queipo de Llano praised the tenacity

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of the British regarding the preservation of their colonies, by contrast with the old Spanish politicians who had lost the Spanish colonial Empire and especially with the Popular Front government, who was willing to turn Spain into a Russian colony’. A few days later, the nationalist agency in London delivered a conciliatory message to the British government from General Jordana. According to the latter, Queipo had claimed that ‘Spain should always be strong’ because it had lost Gibraltar in a moment of weakness as a result of the War of Succession, just as it was now in danger due to the ‘Bolsheviks’ plans to take control of Spain’.3 For their part, the intelligence services of the nationalist consulate in Gibraltar sent a confidential and reserved report in which the journalist Harold Wall was characterized as a ‘crook’ who had twisted the General’s words – Queipo had merely referred to Gibraltar ‘in passing . . . citing its loss as well as that of other Spanish colonies as a result of a disunited Spain lacking domestic potential and a foreign policy capable of defending its interests’.4 For one reason or another, everyone was interested in drawing a veil over the events. The Gibraltarian authorities had no desire to fall out with the nationalists, and the Burgos Cabinet needed to maintain its good relations with the British. Though the left was accused of manipulating Queipo’s speech, the truth is that they were caught unprepared by his words and hardly had the time to launch a disinformation campaign. It seems likely that the nationalists knew that the republicans had had little to do with Queipo’s recklessness, though they could not afford to acknowledge it. Ultimately, the general was to blame for mentioning the issue at all, whether or not he had vindicated the recovery of the Rock. The affair caused such a stir that Franco himself had to intervene, denying the accusations and granting The Times an interview in which he announced that the nationalists had practically won the war.5 For his part, the Duke of Alba offered his apologies as the Spanish representative in London, blaming the incident on communist propaganda. G.T. Garratt assessed the situation as follows: An official disclaimer was issued by the duke of Alba, a denial as conventional as the speech, but the matter was treated in most of the English press as if it was an example of Communist propaganda aimed at discrediting General Franco. It would be far wiser to recognize that the recovery of Gibraltar remains a part of the Phalangist programme, and that this would have enthusiastic support of nearly all the elements which make up General Franco’s Spanish supporters.6

Bowers, the American ambassador, also offered his account of the events: Whether he actually made the speech at La Linea, with huge amplifiers to carry the words into Gibraltar, announcing that in due time Spain would take the Rock back, I do not personally know. It was naturally denied by Franco, and the Chamberlain government accepted the denial, though Englishmen in Gibraltar who heard the speech were less surprised by the denial than by its ready public acceptance. Whatever the facts, immediately after the incident it was made the subject of a sharp interrogation in the House of Commons and soon thereafter Queipo’s retirement from the radio was announced.7

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Thus ended Queipo’s radio broadcasts. The rough and uncertain war of the early years had given way to a conflict that was soon to be won by the nationalists, who aspired to recognition. The time was ripe for moderation and soundness, by contrast with the republicans’ desperation. There was no room in this new environment for fiery speeches and rash behaviour: Queipo had become expendable. His style differed radically from that of Franco, from whom he had been growing apart for some time. The British were to keep abreast of the increasingly complicated relationship between the two; indeed, the Gibraltarian archives preserve a translation of Queipo’s 1939 speech, in which he demanded the Laureate Cross of Saint Ferdinand for his war merits. As is well known, Queipo was removed from Seville immediately thereafter.8 The republican propaganda machine was slow to react to the Queipo incident and hardly managed to benefit from it. It proved somewhat shrewder a few weeks later, when the government press organs spread the rumour that German technicians were preparing to attack Gibraltar from Algeciras and Sierra Carbonera. The idea was to circulate the notion that Franco had dark intentions to recover the Rock and alter the Mediterranean balance of power. But the Gibraltarian authorities paid little heed to these claims, perfectly distinguishing fact from propaganda.9 The British had their own observers to rely on and were kept informed of any suspicious movement around the Rock. Weeks later, in April, the conservative ABC published an article by former minister Eduardo Aunós in which he praised Neville Chamberlain for his appeasement policy.10 It was not easy to cause a rift in the special relationship between Franco and the Foreign Office. Their bond was too tight to be undone by republican fabrications or by the words of a reckless general. Months later, in June 1938, another incident took place. This time, it happened inside Gibraltar and its scope was purely local. The events were simple – an individual tore down the nameplate of the Francoist consulate. Such were the consequences of the tensions created by the establishment of a nationalist delegation in Gibraltar. From the start of the year, the republican refugees and the loyalist consulate had felt outraged at the presence of the Francoist agency. There was a deep animosity between the two consulates; in fact, Fernando Arnao (the representative of the republican consulate) had lodged a complaint regarding the use of the term ‘delegation’, as López Ferrer was merely a sub-­agent. The atmosphere had been heating up since May, when the nationalist flag was first raised at the consulate, and incidents were expected to erupt sooner or later.11 The British wanted López Ferrer to keep a low profile, as they thought the importance of the sub-­agency lay in its activity rather than its public visibility. The Francoist ‘consul’ was free to raise the flag and display nationalist symbols at the sub-­ agency, in his office or on his official vehicle, but he would be advised to remove them should they cause any trouble.12 Unfortunately for the Gibraltarian authorities, López Ferrer was given to flaunting his position and this came at a cost in Gibraltar, where there were still many refugees. Tension heightened when Valentín Llanos, a Spanish sailor of the Stancroft (the vessel that was intercepted on the grounds that it might be carrying war materiel to the republicans), took a taxi to the nationalist consulate and tore the nameplate off the door while chanting anti-Franco slogans. He was arrested and found guilty, being sentenced to a small two-­pound fine paid by the republican consulate. After his

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release, Llanos went on to insult Franco in the Café Universal, from which he was expelled. He then caused a further incident at the tobacconist’s shop Nueva Tabaquería Real, where nationalist sympathizers usually shopped.13 These events prompted a complaint by López Ferrer, who wrote to the colonial secretary to express his outrage at the meagre fine that had been imposed and at the way the sailor had been treated throughout the process. He also took the occasion to denounce other actions, such as Llanos’s insults of Spanish nationals a few days later. It was clear that the situation of the Spanish refugees could not be tolerated any longer. From his point of view, it was inadmissible for Gibraltar to allow the presence in the colony of a numerous group of anti-Francoist refugees and still seek to maintain good relations with the nationalist authorities. These events took place shortly before Harington’s replacement by Ironside and served as a warning call to the British that the freedom of movement of the republican refugees should be curtailed, and that it would be wise to arrange their evacuation.14 The pressure exerted by López Ferrer regarding the refugees turned out to be effective. In the autumn of 1938, the evacuation process intensified. Nonetheless, the decision had not been due merely to his insistence. In fact, Harington’s departure and the arrival of Ironside were part of larger changes in Gibraltar’s role in response to an increasingly sombre international landscape. The change of direction called for a new management style. Harington had been the ideal governor for the inter-­war period, an officer capable of ruling Gibraltar in accordance with the British non-­intervention policy, a man who understood and supported the appeasement of fascism as a means to defeat communism. Ironside, on the other hand, was tasked with preparing the fortress for a likely world war in which the enemy was not communism, but rather the fascist powers. This meant that he would be in charge of strengthening Gibraltar’s naval base, land defence and airport. Harington was replaced in the autumn of 1938. The change had been under discussion since the spring of the previous year and the decision had become official in August, but he remained in Gibraltar as acting governor until October. Though the circumstances made them act differently, the fundamental beliefs of the two governors were quite similar. Ironside had led a multinational force against the Red Army in Russia and he favoured a politics of order over revolutionary whims. His résumé was outstanding: a spy during the Boer War, he had been stationed in France during the First World War. He had gone on to serve in the anti-Bolshevik ‘white army’ and in the 1920s he had commanded a British force in Persia and then returned to the United Kingdom as commandant of the Staff College, Camberley. His tenure at Gibraltar was brief (approximately one year), and relatively simple as far as the Spanish war was concerned. The conflict seemed settled in favour of General Franco and all he had to do was wait for it to end. Shortly after returning from Gibraltar, he was appointed chief of the Imperial General Staff. Before he arrived, the Burgos Cabinet had taken the time to learn all it could about William Edmund Ironside through British news clippings.15 The nationalists were interested to know whether Harington’s successor would have a similar attitude, and to an extent Ironside delivered everything that Franco could hope for. But ultimately, the new governor concerned himself less with maintaining close relations with the nationalists

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and more with preparing the Rock for the scenario of a world war; this attitude caused some friction, ultimately leading to his replacement in the summer of 1939. It is easy to track the transformations experienced by Gibraltar through the orders issued by the new governor. Before the autumn of 1938, most orders involved issues such as the activities of non-British merchants, forgeries, the ban on selling weapons to Spain or the manipulation of currency. The focus shifted under Ironside. The governor issued orders to keep foreigners from arriving in Gibraltar in order to join the war in Spain (a decision made in November 1938, with the outcome of the war already decided) and to prepare for the imminent world war. The latter included protecting goods and people from land, air and sea attacks; controlling supplies in case of emergency; or maintaining a permanent defence force.16 Matters such as the construction of the airport (taking over waters that were not mentioned in any agreement) or the proto-­fascism of the Francoist regime created friction between the Gibraltarian authorities and the nationalists. But one way or another, the basic understanding between Spain and Great Britain would remain unaltered in the following years: despite appearances to the contrary, Franco proved to be different from Hitler and Mussolini, just as the Foreign Office had expected since 1936.

Rumours, threats and relieved tensions The supremacy of the nationalist forces was not merely territorial. The Francoists had managed to control the Strait in 1936, and one year later they took over the northern maritime facade while acquiring new vessels for their navy (minelayers, destroyers and auxiliary vessels, along with some other minor units). As of mid-1937, the Republic’s presence at sea was limited to the Mediterranean, a fact that was vital to the outcome of the war – perhaps even more so than the more famous conquest of Madrid after the city’s heroic resistance with the slogan no pasarán (‘they shall not pass’). The Republic could only receive supplies through Mediterranean ports, where they usually arrived from the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. But the German and Italian non-­intervention vessels were bent on interrupting that traffic. The Republic was practically drowning. Its only lifeline consisted of whatever supplies it could receive through the French border or via the maritime route through the Strait. It was for this reason that the nationalists installed heavy artillery on both shores of the Strait, aiming to cut off this route to enemy vessels. This artillery was a source of unease in certain Gibraltarian and British circles. The guns were aimed towards the sea, but they could easily turn against Gibraltar. The ones in Ceuta were certainly a potential threat, but those installed near Algeciras would prove even more lethal if directed against the colony, which was a sitting duck for an attack from the opposite side of the bay. The city of Gibraltar and its naval base extended west and could be razed to the ground if sufficient force was applied. The issue had been the subject of rumours and speculation for some time. As early as 2 August 1937 the Daily Telegraph had published a letter by former governor Alexander Godley, in which he set out his thoughts on the matter. He admitted the risk of a land-­based artillery attack, provided Spain launched a combined attack against

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Gibraltar (staging a ground invasion backed by massive artillery fire capable of destroying the naval base). Yet Godley saw this as a remote possibility. He was convinced that Franco had no intention of attacking Gibraltar, but sought rather to ensure the security of Gibraltar Bay. Franco’s concern was winning the Civil War and he had no desire to make things difficult for himself by attacking a colony that was contributing directly to a nationalist victory. In fact, such a move would be reckless, considering that Algeciras and La Linea were easy targets for the Royal Navy and would also be exposed to artillery fire from Gibraltar itself. An attack on Gibraltar would be too risky given Great Britain’s air and naval supremacy. Thus, concluded Godley, Spanish artillery did not represent a serious threat to the British enclave. To the contrary, it had to be accepted as the nationalists’ only means of defending the bay. After all, the Royal Navy could not assume responsibility for protecting the area if Great Britain wished to keep out of the war.17 Not everyone agreed with Godley. Labour and opponents of appeasement expressed their outrage in Parliament and in the press at the Conservatives’ poor vision. Prime Ministers Baldwin and Chamberlain both came under heavy criticism for appearing weak and making dangerous concessions that could endanger British presence in the Mediterranean. Progressives saw the covert support given to Franco as a defence of fascism against democratic values and freedom. The presence of German and Italian forces in Spain reaffirmed their conviction that the insurgents posed a serious threat to democracy and to British interests. As if this were not enough, the nationalists dared to intercept suspicious merchant ships that departed Gibraltar bound for republican ports. Franco appeared to be an ally of Hitler, capable in the future of crushing British interests in the Peninsula. The conservatives sought to counter these views with the arguments of reputable experts such as Godley or Governor Harington himself. The issue had become a matter for continuous questions in the House of Commons and the government had no choice but to request that Gibraltar send reports regarding the interception of British vessels and Spanish artillery installations. Harington denied the existence of a threat and played down the interceptions, which had taken place in waters not belonging to Gibraltar.18 Invoking the first-­hand information provided by the governor, the British Cabinet continued to weather the attacks of the Opposition. The fact was, despite all appearances, that there was little substance to the rumours spread by Labour and amplified in the republican press. British vessels were detained under suspicion of carrying supplies for the Republic only because there were people in Gibraltar keeping an eye out for anything the nationalists might need to know – and this flow of information was tolerated (perhaps encouraged) by the colonial authorities. Though Britain appeared neutral and Franco appeared pseudo-­fascist, the truth was that London and Burgos had deep ties that could not be so easily broken. Franco reassured the British that they had nothing to fear from nationalist artillery, and indeed Spanish guns did not once open fire on Gibraltar – neither during nor after the war.19 Great Britain and the nationalists continued to maintain an ostensibly tense yet mutually beneficial relationship that resulted in the acceptance of faits accomplis. The British tolerated the installation of nationalist artillery and Franco continued to wage his war. However, keeping up appearances became more difficult after 1938, when

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tensions between Germany and Great Britain added complexity to the situation. With Germans and Italians disembarking in Cadiz and given the fascist style of Franco’s regime, caution was advisable. Regardless of the reassurances given by the Spanish dictator, a plan B was needed in case the nationalists succumbed to the temptation of forging an unconditional alliance with Hitler. Whitehall never lost sight of Gibraltar’s vulnerability to a potential German attack from the Campo area. Indeed, Governor Ironside’s attitude toward the two camps in the Spanish Civil War soon proved different from that of his predecessor. He introduced nuances in his relations with the insurgents, chose to ignore Spanish republicans and above all focused on strengthening Gibraltar. He was much more concerned about a potential German or Italian attack than he was about Spanish coastal batteries. The likelihood of a new world war made it vital to concentrate on the colony’s airport, tunnels and naval facilities. The goal was not to make Gibraltar invulnerable – something it could never be unless Spain remained neutral – but rather to ensure that it was as solid as possible, capable of playing a key role in a defensive network that encompassed Portugal as well. A report by the Ministry for Co-­ordination of Defence made it clear that British air power could use Portugal as a base from which to neutralize enemy air activity against Gibraltar or the Strait. Moreover, in the summer of 1938 the chiefs of staff concluded that the threat from Spanish artillery was non-­existent and a report on the issue was sent to the Committee of Defence. According to its authors, the coastal artillery represented only a minor threat to Gibraltar, though it could prove more dangerous for merchant traffic in the Strait. However, the risks could be avoided by sailing at night or under the protection of naval forces. Ultimately, the crux of the matter was to preserve friendly relations, as the British had always known that a hostile Spain could easily open fire on Gibraltar from its territory.20 In the end, the scenario of an unfriendly Spain never presented itself and Franco followed the script expected of him. There were abundant reasons to trust the nationalists, at least as long as the Civil War lasted. The threat detected by some never materialized, and relations continued without reaching breaking point. In such circumstances, life in Gibraltar remained reasonably calm, to the point that in 1938 the film Gibraltar was shot on location by Fedor Ozep. It was the first time the Rock was at the centre of a film’s plot, but the story it told had more to do with British colonial interests than with the war being waged on the other side of the border. In fact, the film revolved around a British officer posing as a traitor in order to uncover a terrorist plot to introduce arms in Palestine.21 Meanwhile, the Spanish conflict had entered its terminal stage and it was only a matter of time before the nationalists secured their victory. Commercial activity in the colony continued in the midst of the war, while the garrison underwent preparation for future scenarios. The year 1938 was a watershed in the international dimension of the Spanish conflict, and the developments affected Gibraltar. The Munich Agreement, the governor’s replacement and the measures taken to accelerate the end of the war were all signs of change. In June, Great Britain convinced France to close its border with Spain, cutting off the delivery of arms through the Pyrenees and choking the Republic.22 Throughout the summer, there was discussion about the possibility of using Gibraltar as an evacuation port for foreign volunteers who had fought in Spain. Specifically, the

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proposed plan was to allow Italian volunteers to depart from the Rock to their home country. The idea was viewed with unease by the authorities, as the operation would have made Gibraltar a breeding ground for intelligence services and espionage. The British had already had conflicts with the Germans on the Non-Intervention Committee, who had been closely monitored at least since the summer of 1937. It hardly seemed advisable now to allow Italian soldiers and officers into the colony – not even with precautions such as special uniforms for these volunteers or restrictions on their freedom of movement. In the end, it was decided that the Italian volunteers should board the ship at the port of Malaga and depart directly for Italy.23 One year later, between May and June 1939, the remaining Italian legionnaires gathered in Cadiz to be put on ocean liners. Escorted by destroyers and by the cruiser Duque de Aosta, they returned to Italy through the strategic Strait, leaving the Rock’s silhouette behind.24 Their departure was a satisfaction for Great Britain. Many had feared that Germans and Italians might remain in Spain after Franco’s victory, a possibility that had been of particular concern among Labour and others wary of the rise of fascism. Additionally, some studies had suggested – rather misguidedly – that this was likely. Indeed, the researcher Elizabeth Monroe had spent fifteen months touring the Mediterranean under the auspices of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Her resulting analysis included an insightful portrayal of the social climate of Gibraltar and Malta. However, she also concluded that Germans and Italians would remain in Spain, altering the Mediterranean equilibrium – an assessment of affairs proved wrong by time.25 Yet even if Spain was not a serious source of concern, the international landscape continued to deteriorate, bringing the British and French closer together against a growing German threat. Great Britain and France had accepted Spanish coastal artillery in the Strait – but the mere sight of a German periscope cutting across those waters was enough to make them lose sleep. The Strait was vital to the interests of both countries, which explains why the authorities of French Morocco extended an invitation to the governor of Gibraltar to visit the area. It was the autumn of 1938 and the proposal was well received by the Foreign Office, though extensive measures would be taken to ensure that the Burgos government did not interpret the visit as a move against the Spanish Protectorate. Indeed, Franco was informed in advance by the British agents in Burgos.26 The French-British rapprochement was part of a much broader scheme. Around the same time, on 24 November 1938, the Quai d’Orsay hosted a FrenchBritish conference between Edouard Daladier, Neville Chamberlain and their respective foreign ministers (Georges Bonnet and the Viscount Halifax). The great international issues of the moment were on the table – most of the discussions revolved around joint defensive measures against Germany, the Jewish question, French-Italian relations, Czechoslovakia and Central Europe, Romania and several colonial matters. The Spanish Civil War was dealt with only marginally at the beginning of the second session, immediately after lunch and as part of the discussion of French-Italian relations. Bonnet pointed out that the situation in Spain was making French relations with Italy more difficult and enquired what the British point of view was regarding the Civil War. A possible withdrawal of all foreign volunteers in exchange for the

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recognition of the right of belligerency was discussed, but the British avoided committing to anything (despite the fact that British figures such as Winston Churchill supported such recognition). At that point, the British were merely awaiting a Francoist victory and analysing when and how to recognize the new government. They did, however, advise the French to seek a rapprochement in their relations with Franco, just as the British had done in 1937 by sending commercial representatives to Burgos. Chamberlain underscored the improvement in British-Spanish relations made possible by Hodgson’s presence and intimated that France might take similar action. Bonnet resisted the suggestion and even put forward the option of requesting a temporary armistice – a clear sign of the differences between the French and British approaches. Chamberlain and Halifax let the matter stand, as they knew that in time France would come into line.27 Nothing could have been more ingenuous than proposing a temporary armistice at a time when Franco was approaching total and unconditional victory. It was important, however, for the Civil War to come to an end as soon as possible. There was great interest in terminating the conflict, given the high risk of a European war. Diplomats, leaders and business all sought for one reason or another to bring the war to a full stop. Fearing possible measures by the Francoist government, Sir Auckland Geddes sent a memo to the Foreign Office from Rio Tinto. He proposed accelerating the end of the war by offering Franco a million pounds sterling in exchange for facilitating the restoration of the monarchy in the person of Don Juan.28 Though the British cabinet paid no heed to Geddes’s suggestion, it too attempted to devise a formula for putting an end to the war and keeping Franco away from a potential alliance with the Axis nations. Chamberlain had no particular interest in the pyrites business as he had a broader view of things and knew that Cyprus could offer a sufficient supply should Franco choose to nationalize the Rio Tinto mines. Besides, it was anything but clear that restoration of the monarchy would ensure stability in Spain. Franco was a bastion of anti-­communism and, as such, acceptable to the British so long as he did not join forces with Hitler or Mussolini. Other peace initiatives originated in Spain itself and were brought to the attention of the British government by prominent personalities seeking international mediation. Like Geddes’s suggestions, these proposals fell on deaf ears. Many of them were received between November and December 1938, coinciding with the Daladier-Chamberlain conference. One of the peace plans was proposed by a prominent Francoist personality, whose name remains unknown and who suggested establishing a broad assembly with moderate delegates from each camp. The assembly would elect a five-­member directorate tasked with ruling Spain for five years, laying the foundation for the nation’s political future. Its implementation would have brushed aside Falange and General Franco himself. The Foreign Office branded it pure fantasy. Another project was proposed to the British embassy in Paris, its author being another ‘very well known’ personality. This proposal aimed to promote an agreement between the United Kingdom, France and Italy for the restoration of the monarchy in Spain: a constitutional – albeit not parliamentarian – monarchy, halfway between a liberal model and the principles of the Movimiento Nacional. The British dismissed it. The republicans also attempted to secure international mediation in order to reach a negotiated settlement before the war came to a natural end. The Catalans and the

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Basques were particularly active in putting forward proposals, as they had traditionally good relations with Great Britain. The London delegations of the Basque and Catalan governments presented peace plans and met with high-­ranking officials in the British Foreign Ministry, hoping to secure an armistice through international pressure. They sought to preserve what was left of the Republic and, above all, to ensure the integrity of the Basque Country and Catalonia, which according to their proposals would have become demilitarized areas under international control. During their exchange of views with the British, these envoys went as far as to defend a Spanish federation consisting of four large regions, namely (1) the Francoist-­controlled territories, (2) the areas under the authority of the Republic, (3) Catalonia and (4) the Basque Country.29 Naturally, such goals seemed rather far-­fetched. In truth the British had a very different view of the situation. They were unimpressed by republican arguments that the war was now at a stalemate and by the peace plans they received, all of which appeared too complex and unpredictable in the mid and long term. Deep down, they had wagered that Franco would win the war, as they told the Duke of Alba in October 1938. This served to further ratify an alignment of interests that was not news. Through Jordana, the Francoist cabinet wasted no time in reassuring Chamberlain that Spain would remain neutral in case of conflict with Germany, a guarantee that was good news for Chamberlain’s much criticized appeasement policy. Lord Hailsham told Alba that his cabinet would be very pleased to see Franco triumph soon and that this would be a culmination to European peace.30 The British had no intention of fragmenting Spain, as this would have been a potential source of instability and, in any event, the plans they had been made aware of were highly unrealistic. The fantasies of the Basques and Catalans may have been acceptable in republican circles, but they were viewed as delirious from abroad. The British may have had to suppress a smile when Catalans and Basques suggested keeping their regions independent, demilitarized and under international control. It is worth posing the question of whether Hitler would have stopped at the Pyrenees in 1939 in such a scenario. Would he have respected the integrity of two demilitarized regions, internationally controlled or not? Would fragmenting Spain have promoted the neutrality of the Iberian Peninsula in case of a world war? Franco represented a much greater guarantee than the haphazard behaviour of a withering Republic. Spain would remain united and in all likelihood neutral. Rather than raise the hopes of Franco’s enemies or waste time on sterile proposals, Chamberlain’s cabinet instructed that Gibraltar be strengthened. The government was kept abreast of the situation on the Rock through multiple channels, including annual reports on its social and economic development. The latter offer a unique insight into the state of the colony in non-­military terms. The 1938 report reflects the life of a prosperous and peculiar enclave tied to military facilities and with some weaknesses. At the end of that year Gibraltar had around 17,300 inhabitants, and over 20,000 when counting the 3,000 workers that commuted daily into the colony. A significant number of refugees (around 3,000) remained there despite the fact that many had already been evacuated. The local government remained under the control of the governor and in the hands of a scarcely representative Executive Council, just as it had been since 1922. There were a variety of commercial activities (including smuggling), among which the

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supply of coal, petroleum, water and supplies for vessels was particularly important. Recent advances in the provisioning of ships and Gibraltar’s status as a port of call meant that the ships could be rapidly serviced without anchoring at the port. Postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications connected the colony to Great Britain and to several countries with which it maintained close relations (the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States, Canada, Egypt and India, among others). Gibraltar’s high standard of living was also reflected in the good state of its few roads, the quality of its health care establishments and its advanced educational system (with compulsory education until age 14, free textbooks and the possibility of attending British universities). There were important financial institutions (such as Barclays), indicating a level of prosperity in sharp contrast to the Rock’s surroundings. Building on such limited lands made it necessary to continuously renew and reconstruct. When compared to San Roque, Algeciras and La Linea, the differences were striking.31 The war was coming to an end and Great Britain would one day recognize Franco. In the interim, nationalist Spain received signs of recognition from Gibraltar. On the festivity of 12 October, a Spanish flag was raised in the Assembly Rooms, with Gibraltar’s elite and authorities in attendance (though Governor Ironside was careful not to attend). The flag had been embroidered in Seville, and the local secretary of FET-JONS, Manuel Mergelina, presented it in representation of the civil governor Pedro Gamero del Castillo.32 The warmth of these relations was also visible in the attention Mrs Mackintosh gave to members of the Junta de Damas de Frentes y Hospitales, including the Countess of Maza. The British hostess was also the president of the Junta in Algeciras. The Bishop of Gibraltar, consul López Ferrer and other sympathizers were usually in attendance at such ceremonies. The goal of the association was to channel as much sanitary aid as possible to the nationalist army and organize fundraisers. In the meantime, the conservative Spanish press called attention to The Times’ editorials in defence of the recognition of the right of belligerency for nationalist Spain.33 Such long-­awaited recognition was finally granted in February 1939. The following month, in March, contacts between nationalist sympathizers in Gibraltar, consul López Ferrer and other authorities in the Campo area became even more explicit. Victory was near and the ensuing enthusiasm led to a series of tributes, appreciation ceremonies and other social events. A case in point was the tea offered by López Ferrer at the Rock Hotel to Spanish friends and ‘to the countless Gibraltarian personalities who have been lending their collaboration and invaluable services to the Holy National Cause since the beginning of the war’. The ceremony was graced by the likes of the Duke and Duchess of Montellano, the Duke of Arion, the Count of Revertera, the Marchioness of Povar, Colonial Secretary Beattie and the Russos, Mackintoshs, Smiths, Turmos, Carraras, Imossis, Sanguinetis and Gaggeros, as well as the consuls of Portugal, Italy and Germany. A few days earlier, John Mackintosh and William G. Thomson had organized the delivery of 6,000 kilogrammes of foodstuffs to a recently liberated Madrid.34 This was merely the culmination of a long series of services – in January 1938, John Mackintosh had gone beyond making donations and offered up a villa in Algeciras for the Hogar Azul.35 Everything had been perfectly calculated to maximize support for the nationalists. Throughout the war’s penultimate year, the nationalists gave signs of being skilled

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propagandists and information managers. Censorship tightened with the 1938 press law, under which any unfriendly foreign reporter could be treated as a spy. Under this pressure, very few of those setting foot in the Francoist zone dared to report on the presence of German and Italian forces, the execution of prisoners or the repression taking place in the rear-­guard. Rather, they emphasized the defensive nature of the uprising (meant to prevent a Marxist revolution) and the joy of the population at having been liberated from the communist yoke. Meanwhile, the nationalists also organized touristic/informational tours for sympathetic foreign correspondents. The routes were planned to the last detail, taking place in the North (San Sebastian, Bilbao, Oviedo) and South (Cadiz, Malaga, Granada, Seville). The participants were normally impressed by what they saw (which, of course, was only what the nationalists wanted them to see). These initiatives strengthened the nationalist cause, which kept receiving aid from firms (the British accounted for 20 per cent of foreign capital in Spain), the support of associations such as the Friends of Spain and the backing of Catholic circles (including the Archbishop of Westminster, Arthur Hinsley, who had a photograph of Franco in his office). According to the British Institute of Public Opinion, the British public still considered the republican government the only legitimate one (71 per cent of the population held this view in January 1937).36 But popular perceptions had no significant role to play. The above helps explain one of the last Civil War episodes to take place in Gibraltar – the events involving the republican destroyer José Luis Díez, which helped to reignite the tensions of a war that had long seemed a distant affair. The vessel had had rather bad fortune since the beginning of the war. It had been damaged several times in the Atlantic and set course for foreign ports after the northern maritime facade fell to Franco. It was repaired at Falmouth (Great Britain) and at Le Havre (France) on a different occasion. On route back to Spain, it decided to disguise itself as the British HMS Grenville in order to avoid interception by nationalist units. The José Luis Díez faced the same problem encountered by the entire republican fleet at that point in the war – to reach a loyalist port from the Atlantic Ocean it had no choice but to pass the Strait of Gibraltar. The nationalists knew this and were waiting for the vessel, hoping to keep it from reaching Cartagena. In late August 1938, the Canarias and several destroyers opened fire on the José Luis Díez. The resulting damage forced it to set course for Gibraltar and seek refuge there. The affair became a problem for everyone involved. The nationalists chose to stand guard immediately beyond Gibraltarian waters, waiting for the José Luis Díez to take to sea again. The governor saw the presence of the ship as a source of conflict, wishing neither to intern the ship nor to expel it from the base. The nationalists had requested its internment in Gibraltar until the end of the war (which seemed near), but they did not trust that their request would be met, hence the constant surveillance of the naval base.37 If the José Luis Díez had been repaired in Falmouth and Le Havre, no one was to say that it would not be repaired for a third time. The Gibraltarian working class, who sympathized with the Republic, pressured to have the vessel repaired and returned to sea (which was actually not in line with the right of asylum for warships). Nor were the Rock’s authorities impressed with the manners of the ship’s crew, who were scorned and humiliated during their stay. The episode went on for four long

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months (from August until December of 1938), which was more than enough time for tensions to erupt. Throughout the duration of the ship’s stay there were negotiations, pressure, espionage, mediation, attempts to take the vessel to the republican zone and projects to neutralize it through its internment, capture or sinking. The nationalists kept a close watch day and night through a permanent naval guard near the Rock and a network of spies in the colony. In the meantime, agents of Falange Española in London tried to garner support for an operation to capture the enemy vessel.38 On the other hand, the Rock’s workers met with the republican consul and offered to repair the destroyer free of charge. This was on 10 September, but the British authorities blocked the reparation, arguing that it could be interpreted as a violation of neutrality. In those days, the republican consulate was on Prince Edwards Road and its head was Francisco Barnés y Salinas, though most affairs were managed by the adjunct consul Jesús de Miguel y Lancho. Both the captain of the destroyer and the consul encountered the opposition of the British and they were hardly able to obtain permits for the sailors to disembark – they would only be allowed to do so in groups, at certain times of day and providing they did not discuss political issues with the local population. Nationalist spies remained alert throughout this time, tracking the crew’s and the consul’s movements as well as the state of the destroyer and the moment when it would be ready to take to sea. The republicans, however, managed to get the José Luis Díez repaired discreetly and kept tabs on the nationalist surveillance flotilla in order to calculate the best moment to leave the port of Gibraltar. The destroyer became such a familiar sight that the Gibraltarian population dubbed it Pepe, el del puerto (‘Pepe the port guy’). The British authorities did not find the affair as amusing, nor were they keen on the presence of the ship’s crew in Gibraltar. On one occasion, several of the officers were arrested for attempting to use a transmission radio from the Rock. Relations between the disciplined British military and the crew of the destroyer were no better. The shabbiness of its members, the lack of a clear hierarchy and the egalitarian and casual style of the ship’s crew were probably attractive to many republicans in Spain, but the British were utterly unimpressed. Time went slowly by until the last day of December 1938, when the destroyer left the port at night after having been repaired in secret. It took advantage of the relative relaxation of the surveillance flotilla, convinced that New Year’s Eve would draw attention away from the vessel. They were wrong. As soon as the ship began manoeuvring to exit the port, flares were fired to alert the nationalist fleet. According to Algarbani, the flares originated from the rooftop terrace of Leopoldo J. Yome, the head of the nationalist consulate;39 other sources point to the Royal Gibraltar Yacht Club. One way or another, the alert was obviously sent by nationalist sympathizers or spies, and it proved effective. The minelayer Vulcano immediately set course toward the destroyer’s path. In theory, a destroyer should have had little to fear from a modest minelayer, but the crew of the José Luis Díez were slow to react and the minelayer’s crew succeeded in boarding the ship. The two ships were kept side by side until the destroyer was again anchored in Gibraltar, this time on the east side, in Catalan Bay.40 Thus ended the life of the republican destroyer. The crew were arrested and the ship remained in Gibraltar until the end of the war. The republican consul, Francisco Barnés,

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wrote to Ironside to request the release of the sailors,41 but the British were not inclined to do the republicans any favour at that point. Nonetheless, Great Britain did not neglect to call certain facts to the attention of the nationalists. On 7 January 1939, the British government lodged a formal complaint with the nationalist minister of foreign affairs, claiming that the hostilities had taken place in Gibraltarian waters. The Francoist government replied that the José Luis Díez had attacked nationalist ships from inside ‘Gibraltarian’ waters – which, incidentally, were not even contemplated in the Treaty of Utrecht. If through custom there had arisen the recognition of territorial waters for the Rock, British vessels should have escorted the José Luis Díez to international waters.42 Like the British, the nationalists were aware of the value of a policy of faits accomplis. As usual, the complaints amounted to nothing. A few months later and shortly before the end of the war, on 25 March 1939, Gibraltar presented the José Luis Díez to the nationalists, who towed it to Algeciras, escorted by the gunboat Calvo Sotelo. The ceremony was full of national-Catholic symbolism, with a benediction bestowed upon the vessel. According to the conservative press, the ship was purified with ‘our flag and the unimpeachable honour of our sailors’.43 But the war was not yet over and the consequences of the defeat of the José Luis Díez were soon felt in Gibraltar. Spanish and Gibraltarian leftists alike voiced their outrage and directed their anger at nationalist sympathizers. The colony’s authorities hardly reacted, except to temporarily expel prominent nationalists such as the Marquis of Viana (a seconded officer of the Spanish navy), the Marchioness of Povar or the nationalist consulate’s surveillance agent, Mr Soler. Ironside thought such action might help soothe the anger of the republicans, which had reached significant heights in the context of an impending defeat. This was a miscalculation, though. In fact, on the afternoon of 27 January 1939, a resounding incident took place while the nationalist consulate was celebrating the fall of Barcelona. It had not been a month since the departure of Pepe, el del puerto.

7

One War Ends, Another Looms A new British goal: strengthening the fortress A report written in the early 1940s gave the demographic data available for Gibraltar in 1939, which can be seen in Table 7.1.1 These figures appear to indicate that the colony had nearly reverted to the pre-Civil War demographic distribution. Among the British, the majority were Gibraltarians and the rest was largely made up of English nationals. Aside from the small number listed as living ‘in the Bay’, there were around 2,000 foreigners, including the last remaining Spanish refugees, who accounted for fewer than a thousand people. This was the result of the mass evacuation of refugees in 1938. In truth, the drastic decline in the number of Spanish refugees was also partly due to the rejection of any new refugees during the last stages of the conflict. As early as March 1938, the British had discussed the possibility of using their fleet to evacuate people from republican ports threatened with an impending Francoist takeover. From a humanitarian perspective this would have seemed logical, particularly given the role the British fleet had played in the early months of the conflict. Yet the circumstances had now changed and Chamberlain’s Cabinet was not willing to give the slightest help to the Republic by evacuating thousands of people who could easily end up in British enclaves such as Gibraltar. Rather, the goal was to eliminate the agonizing Republic as soon as possible; besides, there was no way to evacuate refugees from Almeria, Cartagena or Valencia without the consent of the Burgos government. The only possible transfers would be conducted for humanitarian reasons and only with the consent of both camps. The 1936 evacuations could not be repeated because both conditions and interests had changed. When questioned in Parliament by MP Benn as to whether His Majesty’s fleet would play a similar role to the one it had had at the start of the war (evacuating many an enemy of the Republic from the ‘red’ zone), Chamberlain replied that the British should not interfere in the Spanish war.2 Table 7.1  Population in Gibraltar (1939) British

Gibraltarian Other In the bay

16,469 1,578 78

Foreign

In the colony In the bay

2,098 217

Source: PRO. ADM 116/4994. Report on Labour Conditions in Gibraltar.

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Nonetheless, it was necessary to strike a balance. Great Britain would take no action to save the lives of the last remaining resistance fighters, but nor would it simply extradite the Spanish nationals who had been sheltered in Gibraltar for a long time, protected by the Union Jack. The British could hardly offer up the refugees to Francoist repression, as that would have implied creating a storm both in the colony and in Great Britain. The refugees who did not wish to return to Francoist Spain would be evacuated by sea to safe destinations. But they could not remain in Gibraltar indefinitely with the war drawing to an end. Spain did not want a large population of republicans on the other side of the border, and Great Britain could not afford the luxury of keeping them there. The pseudo-­recognition of nationalist Spain granted in 1937 was finally expanded to full and official recognition in February 1939. The British Catholic press glowed with satisfaction at the news, with journals such as The New Catholic Herald and The Universe enthusiastically welcoming nationalist Spain to the international landscape while continuing to carry out humanitarian tasks (hospitals, surgical supplies, etc.) destined for the Francoist zone. This type of press, which staunchly supported the British Cabinet’s policy, published paragraphs such as the following: ‘The recognition of Spain victorious over the disruptive forces of Communism once more brings the Western nations into line and restores the unity of Europe. On re-­entering the concert of Nations, Spain brings a spiritual rather than a material conception into twentieth century civilisation’.3 This decision was the culmination of the British policy of neutrality and leniency towards the insurgents. The Royal Navy rescued the survivors of the nationalist cruiser Baleares using the destroyers HMS Boreas and HMS Kempenfelt. It was aboard another British warship, the HMS Devonshire, that republicans and nationalists negotiated the surrender of Menorca (in a meeting between the head of the naval base, González Ubieta, and the Francoist envoy, the Count of San Luis). This avoided the possibility of an uncontrolled surrender, which could have resulted in the installation of an Italian naval base on the strategic island. Neither Germany nor Italy was informed of these negotiations, as agreed to by Franco and the British. The nationalists accepted the conditions imposed by the British, whereby the nationalists would not allow foreign forces on the island for the following two years in exchange for British aid in securing the surrender of Menorca.4 Slowly, Great Britain focused on securing commitments from Franco, given the deteriorating international landscape of 1939. Meanwhile, it was vital to prepare Gibraltar for the coming storm. After the First World War, the British had somewhat neglected the capabilities of the naval base. Throughout the 1920s, hardly any construction took place. Whereas thousands of men had been hired before 1914 to improve the port and the naval repair shops, in 1923 the workforce consisted of no more than 1,200 men (around one-­third of the number hired in the previous period). It was a time of tight budgets and even the Admiralty considered Malta more important than the Rock. The docks were rather obsolete, insufficient for the British fleet’s most advanced ships by the end of the 1920s. The first alarms went off when Italy attacked Ethiopia. Mussolini’s fleet could pose a threat in the Mediterranean and it was necessary to be prepared for any scenario. Governors Harington and Ironside were well aware of

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this. Indeed, in 1938 work was finished on the expansion of the docks and the improvement of the shipyard.5 The fleet needed a port with adequate capabilities and every detail was carefully planned, including the labour conditions and salaries of the shipyard workers, in an attempt to dissuade unions from organizing strikes or protests in times of crisis.6 Nonetheless, the defence of the Rock in a context of modern warfare also called for a larger number of men in the garrison and sufficient aerial cover. Gibraltar was no longer as far away from its enemies as it had been during the Great War, and it could be attacked in several ways. This meant that it needed above all space in which to lodge more air and land troops, once the dock facilities had been improved. Anti-­aircraft and anti-­submarine defences were necessary, but by no means sufficient. Hence the decision to dig several kilometres of tunnels in the Rock itself, in order to increase the space in which to store materiel and lodge troops. Additionally, the controversial construction of the colony’s airport began. The speed at which the landing strip was built was perhaps the clearest sign of the impending war. However, its construction was full of difficulties, as the neutral zone in the isthmus could not be unilaterally occupied. The idea had been in discussion since the 1920s, coinciding with the growing importance of aerial warfare. Gibraltar and London consulted on the issue, but even the Foreign Office warned of the risks involved in building a landing strip in an area not contemplated in the Treaty of Utrecht. The British could occupy the isthmus, and had indeed done so by unilaterally moving the border north, but this had no legal backing in terms of British sovereignty. Nonetheless, British Cabinets knew that there was some leeway to violate the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht given Spain’s undeniable weakness (indeed, there was never any discussion regarding British jurisdiction over the Rock’s waters, yet today these waters are de facto recognized as British). And the Spanish inability to react was even larger given the difficult context of a civil war. History was presenting Great Britain with a golden opportunity and the British would not hesitate to make the most of it. To be sure, the British government had no desire to give rise to disputes with Spain, as it wished for the country to remain in the British sphere of influence. Construction of the strip was thus postponed as much as possible. Meanwhile, the British analysed possible locations for the airport. After much discussion of the possibility of expanding the east side or building around the port, the conclusion was reached that the only feasible location for the air strip was the North Front, as the Committee of Imperial Defence had concluded as early as 1932. While the strip was being built, the base could use aircraft carriers or a squadron of hydroplanes, but this was only a temporary solution. Aircraft carriers were vulnerable and they were needed on the high seas. Hydroplanes were scarcely armed and they stood little chance against fast and flexible fighters. The airport was thus indispensable. Construction finally began during Governor Godley’s tenure. Great caution was taken and the republican government was reassured that the racetrack located on the isthmus was being torn down only to allow for ‘emergency landings’. By March 1936, with Harington as governor, the isthmus was already operational for occasional landings on a strip no longer than the width of the isthmus. Months later, in October 1936, the British took advantage of Spanish preoccupation with the war and began

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construction to reclaim land from the Bay of Gibraltar, extending the landing strip over waters not under British sovereignty. There was not much the loyalist government could do from Valencia, and the nationalists for their part chose to remain silent. The pace of work accelerated in 1938, when Ironside arrived with the basic mission of strengthening the war-­making capabilities of the Rock. Franco had not yet been recognized and the Republic was on the verge of disappearing completely. There were thus no official negotiators with whom to discuss the matter, giving the British liberty to extend the strip as far as they deemed convenient. The Treaty of Utrecht, once again invoked in defence of British sovereignty over Gibraltar, was suddenly argued to be a mere historical artefact with no bearing on the issue of the airport. By April 1939 the airport had been finished, pending only a few details and adjustments that would be completed during the Second World War. Nonetheless, the Spanish ambassador in London was told that the facilities would only be used in case of emergency. There is no way of knowing if the Duke of Alba was satisfied with this explanation, but the Second World War soon broke out and that certainly appeared to be enough of an emergency. Once again, the British successfully applied a policy of fait accompli – to this day, the state of ‘emergency’ has been permanent and the strip has even been further extended.7 It is worth asking, nowadays, whether daily British Airways flights from London are ‘emergencies’.

Strains in a relationship: the Spanish claim to Gibraltar Preparing Gibraltar for the upcoming war also meant guaranteeing that the Rock’s surroundings would not prove hostile or serve as a base for the installation of artillery. Additionally, there were both Spanish and British spies among Gibraltar’s workers, as well as double agents.8 Throughout 1938 and 1939, relations between the nationalist authorities in the Campo de Gibraltar and their British counterparts on the Rock began to deteriorate, though the tension never amounted to a complete break. The freedom of movement of Gibraltarians and British nationals was restricted in the Rock’s surroundings with the goal of impeding espionage in Spain, but the Royal Air Force had already taken aerial photographs of the artillery installations in the area in order to have detailed information about their location and be able to destroy them should the situation require it. Relations between Great Britain and Franco became a game of sorts, in which formal friendship was intertwined with veiled threats. Yet Franco never saw the need to attack Gibraltar, nor did the British put excessive pressure on the dictator. To be sure, strains in Spanish-British relations after the Civil War were to be expected, given the profound nationalism of the victors. It is hardly a secret that Gibraltar, originally a British enclave in the Kingdom of Seville, has been a source of conflict between the two nations since the day the Union Jack was first raised on the Rock. After the end of the war, Falange took up the Spanish claim to Gibraltar again as a fundamental patriotic point of reference. Feelings of hostility regarding British sovereignty over the Rock were both centuries old and sincere on both sides of the Spanish political spectrum. Hodgson cites the views of two ideologically opposed

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personalities who nonetheless saw eye to eye on the issue of Gibraltar. For Salvador de Madariaga, there was no doubt that the Rock was rightfully Spanish: ‘I know some Spaniards say that Spain does not want Gibraltar. They do so under their own responsibility. The problem of Gibraltar cannot be defined by Spaniards; it defines itself. That Spain wants Gibraltar admits no discussion. Spain cannot in any way cease to want it’. For his part, Franco told The Daily Telegraph the following: ‘Gibraltar has always been like a shadow standing between our two countries. It is a part of the Spanish territory that one of our thinkers has described as a thorn lodged in the heart of a man’.9 For Spaniards of every political hue, the Rock has always been part of the national territory and a portion of the province of Cadiz. It is regarded as an anomaly which can be considered more or less tolerable, but which is the object of an eternal claim. In the national-­Catholic atmosphere of the early 1940s, with its patriotic fervour and nationalist pride, it is no wonder that the claim was renewed. In the official image of Spain, with its imperialist ambitions, the motherland was incomplete without Gibraltar. This was not to change in the following decades, whether in the views of the regime (Areilza, Castiella) or in those of republicans in exile. British views of the Gibraltarian conflict have always been more divided, both before and after the Civil War. In 1950, in a radio broadcast entitled ‘The useless key’, the Duke of Edinburgh claimed that the Rock was at that point merely a sitting duck for Spanish and African guns, and that Great Britain should stop looking for the ‘key’ of Gibraltar and worry about securing the friendship of Spain. But the value of the Rock was not only strategic – it was also symbolic, especially for those who looked with longing at Great Britain’s past imperial splendour. According to Hodgson, Great Britain’s man in Burgos, the Rock had a profound influence on British minds throughout the Commonwealth.10 The issue had always been controversial, and it became even more so at the end of the Civil War. The international landscape of 1939 heightened the mutual suspicions between Great Britain and Spain. The British government more or less trusted Franco, but never let its guard down; the dictator, for his part, occasionally added fuel to the fire, but always managed to avoid all-­out confrontation. This strategy may have been a way to pander to Falange while capitalizing on nationalist sentiments. It is also likely that Franco wished to threaten Great Britain ever so slightly just to make the point that Spain’s dependence came at a cost. In 1939, the British Cabinet had neither the inclination to change the status quo of Gibraltar nor the desire to push Spain into Germany’s loving arms. Consequently, the main task was to strengthen the Rock for its role in a future European war without damaging relations with Franco. Swapping Gibraltar for another enclave, returning it to Spain or granting Gibraltarians a degree of self-­government were all out of the question for the time being. There could be a world war around the corner and it was no time to experiment. The only things that mattered were strengthening the Rock and fostering good relations with Spain. Whatever the fortress’s strengths, its Achilles heel remained Spain and whatever Spaniards chose to do from their shores. The key with regards to Gibraltar was to secure Spanish neutrality in the scenario of a world war, as

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there would be no way to defend the colony if Franco became an ally of Hitler. Just the thought of the Wehrmacht advancing through the isthmus was enough to make it clear that Gibraltar’s tunnels were not enough. Indeed, what was arguably a Gibraltarian strength could just as easily become a death trap for the British forces at the Rock if Spain entered the war on Hitler’s side. The British Cabinet was well aware of this and took pains to ensure that Franco would remain neutral – if the dictator decided to enter the war, Great Britain would not hesitate to attack other strategic areas such as the Canary or Balearic islands. The Foreign Office kept abreast of developments in Spain, constantly analysing Franco’s possible intentions. To be sure, there was no shortage of signs that the Spanish dictator had very friendly relations with both Italy and Germany. As far as appearances went, there seemed to be close ties between the three and the possibility that Spain might join the Axis in a future war. It was vital to remain alert, and the British government did not hesitate to officially recognize the Francoist government in February 1939, appointing Sir Maurice Petersen as ambassador. France soon followed suit, sending Marshall Pétain as its ambassador to Madrid. These measures were an attempt to guarantee good relations with Spain as a means to counter fascist influence in the country. In the meantime, rumours regarding Franco’s possible attitude in the event of a war spread like wildfire. On 7 February 1939, the British embassy in Belgrade reported that a high-­ranking Yugoslav officer had suggested that Italy might attack Gibraltar with the discreet aid of the Spanish.11 The rumours persisted through the ensuing weeks and in early April, just days after the end of the Civil War, the British came to fear an impending Spanish-Italian attack on the Rock. What raised the alarm was a series of Italian troop movements in Cadiz that seemed to indicate the intention to deliver a deadly blow to Gibraltar in a surprise attack. Such a development would have deprived Great Britain of a vital base in the upcoming war. The Viscount Halifax, Secretary of State, received worrisome reports from the British embassy in Paris starting on 7 April. According to Paris, the Italians had been concentrating reinforcements in the Strait for two weeks and the colony should prepare to repel an imminent attack. However, the British ambassador in Rome, Lord Perth, sent more appeasing reports that the Italian government had no intention of attacking vital British possessions. In the midst of the contradicting news, the British Cabinet chose to focus on the defence of the Rock while embracing a patient attitude and waiting to see if Italy would truly be capable of launching an offensive in the Mediterranean. It was obvious that Franco’s Spain could not afford to conquer and maintain Gibraltar without paying a high price for it and risking the loss of other possessions. It seems Chamberlain lost no sleep over this, as he diverted part of the British fleet from a relatively secure Mediterranean to the Far East. For its part, the French government did not feel quite as confident and thought the Mediterranean would be vital in the future war, which they considered would be won in Europe. Indeed, French forces were sent to Gibraltar – with a British permit – to help guarantee the survival of the base should the situation require it.12 This was one of the consequences of Ironside’s improved relations with the authorities in French Morocco, following his government’s instructions. In fact, the governor had crossed the Spanish Protectorate to visit the French zone in February

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1939, and the French fleet had become quite a familiar sight at the docks of Gibraltar, where it performed joint manoeuvres with the Home Fleet.13 In the midst of a thick calm, the relationship between Governor Ironside and López Ferrer deteriorated. The two men had quite different temperaments, increasing the likelihood of conflicts: whereas the Spanish consul was rather finicky, Ironside was quite an impulsive man, with a strong military character befitting his surname. At least in theory, they represented very different interests – those of German-­influenced Francoist Spain versus those of Great Britain, no longer willing to make concessions to Hitler. The issue of the Rock’s remaining Spanish refugees and their anti-Francoist activities was still a source of friction. As late as September 1939 there were nearly 1,000 refugees on the Rock, with another 700 having chosen to return to Spain with the guarantee that they would not face severe repression. The Spanish consul complained about the continuous subversive activity of the exiled ‘reds’ while the British authorities insisted that they would return to Spain as long as they were given assurances that they would not be executed. By then, the number of refugees had ceased to be a problem and the Rock’s authorities were willing to accept the presence of a small group which represented a significant labour force and had strong ties in Gibraltar. Ironside protected the rights of the refugees; the latter, for their part, took advantage of this protection to harass the Francoist consulate as much as they could. Ironside’s attitude deeply irritated López Ferrer. In February 1939, the consul lamented the governor’s decision to revive the tradition of Sortie Day (a nearly forgotten celebration commemorating the British garrison’s seizure of several cannons in San Roque). He also accused Ironside of being obsessed with presumed Francoist espionage in favour of Germany, though López Ferrer himself routinely sent reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the construction of the airport, the unloading of war materiel at night, its typology and quality, etc. Ironside probably did not wish for these reports to be too detailed, as the sensitive information contained in them could perhaps end up in German hands. The governor, in fact, was wary of having certain Spaniards employed in the arsenal, the docks or the communications system. To be sure, he was no less reluctant to trust the Spanish consul. In less than a year there had been great changes. Ironside’s views were considerably different from Harington’s, irrespective of the friendship between the two men. Indeed, just as Ironside was making efforts to improve relations with France in order to strengthen the defence of the Mediterranean, Harington was delivering a lecture at the Royal Empire Society in which he claimed that Franco posed no threat to British interests: It was after the Republican battleship Jaime I had bombarded the undefended Algeciras from a range of one mile that General Franco installed guns on the Straits of Gibraltar . . . He put six guns near Algeciras and at Ceuta . . . Later, he installed four 12-inch howitzers at Pelayo, between Algeciras and Tarifa. To my certain knowledge, there were never more than four of these great howitzers, and General Franco removed them last September – two to the Ebro front and two to Cadiz . . . I hold no brief for General Franco, but I affirm that all the territory administered by him that I have seen is better administered than it was two years

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ago. Before the September crisis I asked for gas masks and was told that none would be available before 1939. I learned that General Franco wished to be neutral if war broke out in September.14

Not everyone felt this confident, and tension continued to run high. The final straw in the relationship between López Ferrer and the governor came on 27 January 1939, when the celebration of the fall of Barcelona in the Spanish sub-­agency was met with riots on the street. The event was attended by Gibraltar’s elite and by a majority of British nationals. The Spanish national anthem was played, patriotic songs were sung, and there were cheers for Franco, Spain, Great Britain and Chamberlain. As the celebration was taking place, a group of pro-­republican workers approached the building and hissed at the participants in the event. They were joined by members of the Worker’s Union who carried a British flag and chanted against Chamberlain and for Russia. Disturbances and fighting ensued and the police did too little too late.15 Leopoldo Yome wrote a report giving full details of the events: The aggressions were repeated, not only against the office, throwing stones, one of which injured the arm of the undersigned – in response to a ‘long live Spain and Franco’ proffered from one of the building’s windows, but also against the people leaving the party, such as Miss Patron, Secretary of Fronts and Hospitals, and from one of the most distinguished families in Gibraltar, who was thrown to the ground and mistreated; the wife of Mr John Mackintosh, who has supported Spain and every charitable activity in Gibraltar, was insulted; Mr Thomson, like the others, was attacked and his wife injured only because he is a friend of Spain and a close friend of General Queipo de Llano. Others who sympathize with our Cause were injured, such as the barbaric and cowardly aggression against a brother of this National Delegation’s officer, Mr Bonifacio, severely injured, taken unconscious to the Police Headquarters, where he remained for an hour without receiving medical attention, then transferred to the Hospital, he did not recover consciousness until five hours later. Another, Mr Prescott, who cried ‘long live Christ the King’ in the street, was beaten. The aggressions were also directed against the church, for the savage hordes, passing across the Cathedral where a novena was being held, insulted the believers and the doors had to be closed . . . All of this, all of it, with the authorities present.

He went on to denounce the passivity of the colonial authorities: The Governor of Gibraltar, advised by his RED Police, by his RED Colonial Secretary, and influenced by the RED Admiral (who backed the pirate ship José Luis Díez), and coerced by the Workers Union, has ordered measures such as the following: expulsion from their jobs at the Arsenal of many heads of families from Gibraltar, only because they sympathize with Spain and CAME TO THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED PARTY. These men are now coming to us

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demanding the protection or help that their own authorities deny them; in fact, they are the ones to attack them.16

The nationalist press, for its part, amplified the events. ABC gave the following account: Starting at six o’clock in the evening, there gathered around our Consulate, an assorted group of riff-­raff in the midst of which stood out the affected suits and flashy ties of those proletarian leaders who seek to look bourgeois as soon as they access the mandatory contribution funds, as well as the big-­bellied figures of many members of the bourgeoisie, bent in their hatred and their silhouette, who hide their spiritual misery under a theatrical display of Marxism in packs. The presence of the plebs, intermingled with celluloid dickeys, which surprised our Consulate’s guests, wound up causing them great unease when they raised their fists casting fierce looks and there emerged the red flag and, amidst howls and obscenities, the hisses and insults. The Gibraltarian police observed the riots undaunted, despite being insistently requested to impose order; and fearing that the situation could escalate, the ceremony was terminated and the sympathizers of our cause began to go out to the street, where they were greeted with screams and insults. And the riff-­raff got worked up and they attacked the English subject Mr William Thompson, who was strongly bruised; but the men defending themselves with force, they found it more practicable to attack the women, striking and kicking Miss Mackintosh and Miss Patrón, among others. This repugnant scene unfolded before the ironic stiffness of the policemen. Later . . . they organized a thick demonstration, with raised fists and deafening howls, with their hisses directed against our highest delegation, in front of which, stretched tautly between two broomsticks, they hung the British flag. Down Enginner’s Lane and calle Real they reached the governor’s palace in this fashion, where we presume they disbanded. Demonstrations of this type were apparently uneventful matters in poor popular-­front Spain, but in Gibraltar . . .?

The author of the piece went on: ‘We cannot erase from our memories the British flag, stretched between two broomsticks, at the forefront of an uncouth, uncultured and provocative horde which, with no possible excuse, violates and insults the dignity of Spain while stiff British policemen look on in passive irony’.17 López Ferrer sent a personal letter to Minister Gómez Jordana in which he explained the events from a similar perspective. By his account, the incident had been a consequence of the following: ‘The incessant activity in Gibraltar of its red elements, with the assistance of Spanish refugees in the enclave, and protected more or less sneakily by the police, makes life truly unpleasant for the nationalists living there’. He informed of the insults hurled by leftists on several occasions, the numerous fundraisers for the International Red Aid and the ‘red’ celebration of the sinking of the nationalist cruiser Baleares. To counteract these activities, López Ferrer explained that he organized

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events in the Assembly Rooms and the Rock Hotel in support of the Aid to Fronts and Hospitals. He added: The British authorities did not complain about or object to any of these events. Only when they saw that almost all of Gibraltar showed up at the Sub-Agency to express their joy at the fall of Barcelona was the demonstration of the 27th, with its hisses to Franco and its cheers for Russia, organized in agreement with the police or counting with their passivity.

The letter was written ‘foreseeing that the events may be distorted to appear as offended when we were the ones who were truly violated’.18 Deep down, this was a sensitive issue because the Burgos government did not wish to have bad relations with Gibraltar or the British government, no matter how bitter López Ferrer’s outrage. Recognition by Great Britain could arrive at any moment (indeed it did in February). Perhaps for this reason, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gathered reports not only from the consulate, but also from its information services, which provided a more nuanced account of the situation. The SIPM underscored that ‘the new Governor as well as the other authorities are all, albeit sometimes appearing to be nationalists, actually steadfast enemies of our Crusade’ – hence the attitude of the Gibraltarian police. However, these reports also had something to say about the nationalist consul: Unfavourable comments are being made regarding our Representative, who should have prevented such a scandal against our Holy Cause by presenting it energetically to the English authorities, and should they not have been willing to impose their authority and with it our prestige, he should not have held any ceremony for the citizens of Gibraltar, who as a general rule do not really deserve it anyway.19

In other words, the consul should have gauged the prevailing atmosphere in Gibraltar and been more prudent. The SIPM was well informed not only of Ironside’s views, but also of the (sometimes economic) interest some Gibraltarian merchants had in supporting the nationalist cause. Given the contradicting information, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs chose to act cautiously. It remained aloof from the conflict between López Ferrer and Ironside while putting calculated pressure on Gibraltar by suspending the entrance of Spanish workers in the colony ‘until Spain has received compensation for the violations it has suffered’.20 The expulsion of Spanish workers for having attended the sub-­agency’s party was unacceptable, especially as several of those workers were also sources of information for the nationalists. Additionally, Spain knew that the Rock needed Spanish workers and that blocking the daily entrance of thousands of them meant dealing the colony a hard blow, especially at a time when significant construction work was being done. As late as the summer of 1939, in the midst of Ironside’s replacement with Sir Clive Gerard Liddell (11 July), the tension had not dissipated. It was quite visible in the correspondence between the consul and the colony’s authorities. The conflicts continued in the same vein as the incident that had developed during the celebration

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of the fall of Barcelona, and the list of confrontations is not short. After the firing of Gibraltarian workers (British subjects) who sympathized with the nationalists, López Ferrer intervened with Colonial Secretary Beattie to seek their re-­admission to their posts in the arsenal, the service corps and the military telephone service. Given the consul’s interest in seeing these British subjects reinstated to such sensitive posts, it seems likely that they were informants. Some of them, in fact, had attended the celebration of the fall of Barcelona, but others had not. According to the consul, this was ‘an incalculable harm to the National Cause as on the one hand all the red elements consider themselves helped by it, eliminating and persecuting people who have always showed their sympathy and collaboration’.21 The problem of the refugees and the guarantees they would have to be offered to return to Spain certainly persisted. There was no shortage of fights between the ‘reds’ and ‘blues’ in the colony (Spanish or Gibraltarian); these had been common since 1938, and their echo eventually reached London. In March 1939, the Duchess of Santoña – the sister of the Spanish ambassador in London – was forced to remove the Spanish flag from her automobile, whereas there was still a republican flag hanging from a rooftop terrace behind the American consulate. In June, the consul intervened to persuade the authorities to allow one Spanish national to continue living in Gibraltar; the following month, he discussed the permanence of a high-­ranking consulate official. López Ferrer himself lived outside Gibraltar, ostensibly due to the lack of lodging inside the colony. By contrast, the staff of the old republican consulate continued to live on the Rock.22 While López Ferrer persisted in his confrontation with the Gibraltarian authorities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs persevered with its strategy of limited hostility. Having suspended the entrance of Spanish workers, it then decided to refuse to return British defectors who crossed the border into Spain. Normally, defectors were arrested and handed over to the Rock, but in June four British soldiers in an advanced state of inebriation jumped the fence to Spain. Despite stating that they wished to return to Gibraltar, they were detained, adding to the six British soldiers already being held at La Linea until the Gibraltarian authorities showed a more positive attitude. Later, in December 1940, in the midst of the Second World War, an 1838 agreement for the handover of defectors and conscripts was suspended. Spain refused to return defectors to a belligerent country, as this would have entailed a form of ‘indirect belligerency’.23 Evidently, the number of runaways was so insignificant that this was clearly a case of gesture politics. The confrontation continued through the summer of 1939, when López Ferrer was relieved of his post and replaced by Pedro A. Satorras de Dameto, the Marquis of Bellpuig.24 In August, there were also changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when Juan Luis Beigbeder Atienza was appointed to head the department. Around this time, there was a resounding incident involving the wife of a British officer, Mrs Malley, who attended a bullfight in Algeciras and had no better idea than to raise her fist twice while the national anthem was being played. She was immediately arrested and a 10,000-peseta fine was imposed. At eleven o’clock that night she was released, to appear before the authorities the following day (14 August) at ten in the morning. After providing a rather unconvincing explanation, the fine was reduced to 1,260 pesetas, which she paid at the Public Order Delegation before crossing the border into Gibraltar. The case

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seemed closed, but the day after her definitive release the British governor filed a complaint with the consul and established an indefinite ban on the entrance of British officers in Spain (a prohibition that was later extended to civil servants). The press picked up the story and a nationalist sympathizer even published an article criticizing the arrest of Mrs Malley.25 Despite such commotion, the Malley affair was not the only incident. Sparks had flown in June 1939 when the British installed surveillance posts in the neutral zone. They had been built in 1937 without causing a stir, but with the war over Franco requested that the British remove them or, at least, not allow British guards to be armed in the neutral zone. What is more, Spain began to build fortifications around the Rock, not hesitating to seize lands whose owners could have been British. In the meantime, the republican consul (Jesús de Miguel Lancho) remained in Gibraltar, despite the protests of the Francoist government and its London representative. By then, the nationalists had impounded even the republican consulate’s documents and it made little sense for the consul to stay there any longer.26 He and his family were eventually evacuated to Casablanca. Mutual suspicion ran so high that it was not rare to see insults being exchanged across the border. The French consul in Gibraltar was clearly anti-Franco, and the Spanish government knew through its informants that British war materiel was entering the colony. The only possible outcome was the closing (or semi-­closing) of the gate. However, Spain exported workers and isolating the fortress could significantly damage the economy of the Campo area. The Francoist government was aware of this, and the Campo’s delegate for public order drew up a report in August 1939 in which he provided a detailed analysis of the border’s most peculiar qualities. There was one conclusion to take home: if it is decided that within a certain period of time we have to cancel the export of workers, we need to seriously consider not only the way to absorb the workforce living in La Linea today, but also what the fate will be of this town if its ties to Gibraltar are severed, evacuating the population or turning it into a free trade zone (dreadful solution), which can only be justified by the determination to preserve its existence.27

In other words: the incidents and the unease that they generated could make relations with the Rock and with Great Britain difficult, but they were not sufficient motive to lead to a break. Post-­war Spain could not afford one, as it required foreign supplies and had to balance the enormous influence of the Germans; nor could the impoverished Campo de Gibraltar area afford the luxury. This was not to say, however, that Spain would not harass the colony through espionage or allow the Italians to direct attacks against the port with guided torpedoes during the Second World War. In the same vein, the Francoist authorities strove to limit freedom of information. Gibraltarian radio became a low-­coverage anti-­fascist medium, and there were tragic anecdotes such as the one referred to by Tornay de Cózar involving a Spanish servant arrested for crossing the border with a pair of shoes wrapped in a copy of El Calpense. She died in jail.28

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Keeping an eye on Franco The imminence of a European war softened the attitude of western powers toward Franco. Almost everything went as long as Spain did not fall into the arms of Germany. The Civil War had culminated with the establishment of an ill-­defined new regime, which many foreign ministries hoped would keep Spain stable, neutral and anti-­ communist. The major losers were Spanish exiles, sentenced to a life as stateless outcasts. They were welcome neither in the United States nor in Great Britain (at least not in significant numbers); and even France rid itself of many as soon as it could. International solidarity was reduced to mere rhetoric. Only a handful of SouthAmerican republics, and especially Mexico under Lázaro Cárdenas (with a combination of public humanitarianism and discreet interest) welcomed a group of people that could potentially modernize the country with their knowledge, skills and initiative.29 The pressure of the world war also affected Gibraltar. Only a few Spanish workers had managed to remain in the colony indefinitely and their presence brought to mind the memory of the many thousands who had saved their lives through Gibraltar. It was convenient and necessary to improve relations with the Spanish authorities, especially after the Second World War broke out in early September 1939. That month, the ban was lifted on British officers visiting Spain – a measure taken following the Malley incident, for which both parties now presented excuses as though nothing had ever happened.30 Hitler had invaded Poland and Gibraltar could not afford Spanish hostility on account of the lady’s recklessness, no matter how British she was. Even so, maintaining a good relationship with Spain did not preclude keeping a close eye on Franco’s true intentions regarding Gibraltar. It was no coincidence that Spaniards and Britons both massed troops on the Rock and its surroundings, seeking to impede any potential aggression through the border. The risk of a Spanish attack by air or sea was considered so small that only a ground invasion was feared. For this reason, as well as due to the world war, thousands of men were deployed at the strategic fortress. Their number was so large that the Spanish feared the British might cross the border and attempt to extend their territory – hence the deployment of a permanent Spanish force charged with defending the Campo de Gibraltar region. The idea that the British wished to control the Bay of Algeciras to military ends was no figment of the Spanish imagination; indeed, the construction of the airport was happening while Spain looked on with resignation. All parties had been made aware of the officially sanctioned explanation that it was merely a strip for emergency landings: ‘The improvements being carried out would, it was stated, not affect the general uses of the landing ground, which would remain essentially of an emergency nature, and instructions had been issued to all British aircraft to respect Spanish territory and territorial waters’.31 Once the Second World War broke out in September 1939, and especially after the invasion of France in June 1940, the main British concern regarding Spain was to ensure its neutrality. The country’s many kilometres of shoreline were vital to the control of the Western Mediterranean, the entrance to the Atlantic and the Bay of Biscay, as were the two Spanish archipelagos (Balearic and Canary islands), its North African Protectorate and the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Spain also had an

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abundance of important raw materials (i.e. wolfram), not to mention the presence of Gibraltar. The latter was difficult for Germany and Italy to attack given its distance from their bases, but the rocky fortress (in many ways more fictitious than real) was very vulnerable to a land-­based attack. It could easily be invaded from Spain without massive movements of troops or materiel, and it was equally exposed to the use of heavy artillery from the shores of the Bay of Algeciras. Advances in weapons technology (artillery, aviation) had drastically altered the Rock’s capability to defend itself in case of war. In sum, the British knew that the key to the preservation of Gibraltar was Spanish neutrality. If Franco decided to join the Axis powers and Gibraltar was invaded by German troops, the British obviously had the option of taking other Spanish enclaves. They had contemplated several scenarios should they lose control of the colony, including taking over the strategic Vigo Ria or the Canary or Balearic islands, or attacking the Spanish Protectorate. Nevertheless, it was more advisable to ensure Spanish neutrality than to risk opening new fronts that might endanger maritime routes. Consequently, it was worth every effort to keep Franco away from Mussolini and Hitler. Among the measures taken was the appointment of the shrewd Samuel Hoare as ambassador in Madrid. Perhaps even more importantly, the British bought off high-­ranking Spanish officers, using Juan March as an intermediary to promise them 10 million dollars. The British secret service coordinated their strategy with the Americans: the goal was to keep an eye on the dictator, promote a monarchist regime and, above all, show Franco that the Allies would be willing to support a military conspiracy against him should he choose to enter the war.32 Franco probably knew what was going on around him, and hence must have been aware of the many disadvantages he would face should he decide to join Hitler in an uncertain and costly war adventure. One way or another, he never went beyond a few friendly gestures toward the Axis powers and the use of fascist-­style rhetoric. London had done too much to help Franco win the war to now allow him to join Hitler. Even the end of the Civil War had been accelerated by the British. Among the strategies they applied to help terminate the war was their decision to recognize Franco (27 February 1939), their promotion of the coup led by Colonel Casado, and their support for Besteiro and Prieto in their plans to open Madrid to the advance of Franco’s troops.33 Part of the very diverse set of attitudes embraced by Franco between 1939 and 1945 was no doubt connected to these ties with the Allies, regardless of the politics of gesture he employed in his dealings with Hitler (all the while remaining staunchly anti-­ communist). Indeed, the Spanish government exported large amounts of wolfram to the British, who sought through these purchases to keep the Germans from accessing these supplies. The operation was carried out through Spanish intermediaries in Seville, and the British loaded the material and shipped it to Gibraltar, where they maintained facilities for the construction of armaments. The amounts supplied were so large that Italy attempted to use its secret service to sabotage this traffic. It was the summer of 1943.34 Throughout the Second World War, Gibraltar received the supplies it requested, just as it had been the greatest supplier for the nationalists during the Civil War. These commercial ties helped keep Spain neutral despite any tensions and incidents between

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the colony and its neighbouring country. To be sure, there were a few acts of sabotage directed against British facilities and Allied vessels (since 1938 and throughout the world war) by Spanish sympathizers of the Axis. Everybody was aware that this happened, and the governor of Gibraltar filed complaints about such events. In July 1943, the Spanish consul reported that the British had protested and reminded the Spanish authorities of the need to maintain good relations with the Rock. This was not made easy by such acts of sabotage: ‘. . . it is rather difficult to show the English Government that we wish to maintain strict neutrality when Italians or perhaps Spaniards are allowed to act in ways very different from what we seek to prove’. He proposed removing all possible saboteurs from the Campo de Gibraltar area. And some measures were indeed taken, though British complaints about attempts to sabotage their facilities persisted until 1945.35 One way or another, the British did not sit back and wait for further attacks. Rather, they took the initiative and arrested every suspicious-­looking ship they saw (including Spanish fishing boats) and sent Allied vessels to Spanish territorial waters to impede hostile movements. More discreetly – but just as effectively – they also kept a close watch on Spanish businesses and individuals conducting trade with Germany and drew up corresponding blacklists.36 Occasionally, there were also terrorist attacks staged from Gibraltar by Spanish refugees, such as the murder of a Spanish coastguard on 10 July 1944 after the perpetrators used a boat to approach Algeciras.37 For the most part, though, the British were not willing to tolerate guerrilla activity near the Rock. For his part, General Franco tried to keep abreast of international developments and of events in Gibraltar through the chiefs of staff of the Spanish army and navy. Franco bided his time and embraced an attitude designed to avoid raising British suspicions and to ward off an attempt at a land invasion by the Wehrmacht.38 One way or another, Franco’s goal was to remain in power and guarantee the survival of his regime. He most likely planned to remain neutral given the massive exports of Spanish supplies to Gibraltar. Saboteurs, incidents or imperial claims could do little to alter his policy. Having been a source of aid throughout the Spanish conflict, during the Second World War Gibraltar became a gateway to the Allies.

Closing Thoughts After 1945, the Francoist regime took every opportunity to compile foreign testimonies in support of its neutrality throughout the Second World War. The strategy was designed to align Spain with the western allies, projecting the image of a country that had been generous to the victors and should be backed in the context of a growing confrontation with the new Soviet enemy. The pro-Francoist work 25 años de relaciones internacionales (Twenty-five years of foreign relations) included the testimonies of personalities such as Carlton Hayes and the Conservative MP Quintin Hogg. The former had written the following: To have joined the Axis in 1940 would sooner or later have brought it into the war. To have shown any partiality for the Allies prior to the end of 1942 would have brought the Germans into Spain, and consequently Spain into the war. To have flouted reasonable requests of the Allies from 1943 onwards might well have led to hostile action on their part and thus brought Spain into the war. In any of these cases, Spain would have lacked foresight and failed to serve its own greatest interest.

Hogg had been even more eloquent: ‘I am no friend to General Franco. He is, I firmly believe, no friend of my country’, he wrote. Yet had Malta and Gibraltar fallen to the enemy during the Second World War, it would have been impossible to stop Rommel from taking over North Africa.1 What none of these compilation works ever mentioned was the role Gibraltar had played during the Spanish Civil War. For a variety of reasons, nobody wished to draw attention to the British contribution to Franco’s victory. On the one hand, British democracy did not want to be linked to the establishment of a dictatorship; on the other, the Francoist regime had revived the Spanish claim to the Rock in the 1950s and had no interest in admitting that the disputed enclave had rendered valuable services in the past. Yet Gibraltar continued to play a significant part in Spain immediately after the Second World War. In an interesting book about Nazi refugees in Spain, C. Collado Seidel has shown that the British attempted to convert the Rock into a control port for Spanish vessels suspected of transporting German exiles to other destinations. In truth, Gibraltar’s port was too crowded to be able to perform such a task effectively. In 1944, the colony’s postal inspection services were unable even to keep up with the thousands upon thousands of bags of correspondence arriving at Gibraltar.2 The possible flight of

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Nazis was less important than the defeat of Hitler and, later, than the containment of Soviet expansionism. The substantive fact remained that Francoist Spain had not attacked the enclave, despite any gestures to the contrary or any signs of a chill in the relationship between the two countries. Indeed, the apparent distance between the two countries is attributable to a number of factors, including the fact that British tolerance of fascism had run out, the aggressive attitude displayed by Hitler, the incorporation of Spain to the anti-Comintern pact (in February 1939, though it was not made public until the end of the Spanish Civil War) and a growing closeness between Italy and Spain. After the conclusion of the Pact of Steel between Hitler and Mussolini (May 1939), Franco sent troops to the surroundings of the British colony.3 Everything pointed to Spanish alignment with the Axis powers that could lead to Franco’s participation in the imminent war and hence to a potential ground invasion of Gibraltar, which would be difficult to stop if the Wehrmacht helped Spanish troops conquer the enclave. Yet beneath the surface were a series of considerations that provided a more nuanced view of Franco’s proximity to the Axis powers. The dictator was well aware of the diverse origins of the foreign aid he had received during the Spanish conflict. He also had the support of the Vatican4 as well as the most powerful asset of all: his fervent anti-communism. Given the above factors, he probably concluded that the best approach to the upcoming war was to bide his time and remain ambiguous until the outcome of the war became clear. Ultimately, the goal was to ensure Spain’s alignment with the victors, whoever these may have turned out to be. The conclusion of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in late August 1939 further consolidated the ambiguity of Franco’s foreign policy, especially as he had a good understanding with Mussolini but was not entirely devoted to Hitler’s views. As a staunch anti-communist, the dictator considered the Soviet Union the most dangerous threat to Western civilization. In this regard, Franco’s views were not too distant from those of Britain’s most conservative individuals. In fact, Great Britain took no measures in response to Spanish troop movements around the Rock in late May 1939. This is not to say, of course, that the British were not permanently informed of any possible threats from other powers. In this regard, the information they received ranged from the most ludicrous rumours to authentic and verified facts. An informant in Bern, for instance, warned that the Italians were supposedly planning to instal a cable to damage British naval units docked at the Rock.5 In the meantime, the work to continue strengthening the colony continued, focusing on the naval base and airport in order to be better equipped for a potential – at this point, almost inevitable – war against Germany and perhaps Italy. The Francoist regime may not have been an ideal ally for Great Britain, but it was nonetheless a worthy asset under the circumstances, as Spain’s neutrality would allow Gibraltar to remain operational as the key to the Mediterranean and a platform from which to launch attacks in North Africa. This play of interests moulded an ambivalent relationship between Spain and Great Britain, marked by a combination of calculated mutual respect, occasional gestures of firmness, a no less calculated distancing and a few isolated signs of tacit agreement. This context helps explain attitudes such as the caution exhibited by the British in

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dealing with republican refugees towards the end of the Spanish war, or the reopening of official commercial negotiations once the Francoist government had been recognized. Regarding the latter, the British had hesitated to extradite people to Spain because it was not clear what constituted a ‘political offence’ and it seemed more than likely that those extradited might end up imprisoned or executed; but nor was Great Britain willing to grant the request of the last republican ambassador, who had asked for a period of truce before the final surrender, hoping to use this time to evacuate the last defenders of the Republic.6 As for commercial relations between Spain and Great Britain, the Bank of England and the British Chamber of Commerce in Spain had begun in late 1938 to discuss the idea of renegotiating the commercial agreements they had with Spain once Franco emerged as the winner. They were particularly sensitive to German competition and very interested in a future lending policy that would prove indispensable in the ‘new’ Spain given the massive destruction of infrastructures caused by the war (e.g. the country’s railways). It seemed relatively safe to assume that Franco would remain within the British sphere of influence, as no other power was in any condition to supply such lines of credit and few could offer clearing agreements of that nature. The final rapprochement that took place after the end of the war had had many informal precedents between 1936 and 1939, as we have seen throughout this book. In June 1938, the British representative in San Sebastian was instructed to contact the Francoist Minister for Foreign Affairs and initiate conversations for the re-establishment of cordial economic relations with Spain. It was obvious that Great Britain would recognize Franco as soon as the circumstances advised doing so, thus hoping to limit the influence of Germany and Italy.7 Yet still many months passed before British aid materialized. In the meantime, Franco played a complicated game, straddling the distance between the Axis and the Allies while vocally defending an autarchic economic policy as the cornerstone of true national independence. The British government, for its part, also combined gesture politics with a careful calculation of each bit of financial aid granted to Franco, hoping to use such aid to defend British interests and counter the influence of Germans and Italians.8 On the issue of Gibraltar, the early Francoist regime spouted nationalist rhetoric, embracing an imperialist worldview. Yet the fact was that Gibraltar welcomed many Spanish workers who were paid miserably for their labour (but still more generously than they would have been in Spain). The Campo de Gibraltar Delegation of Public Order reported the following in August 1939: Our workers work regular days on different day and night shift[s], without any increase in salary for the latter. The average weekly pay for an unqualified worker is 26 shillings, women usually earning 4 shillings per week. In comparison with the general trend of our daily salaries, these are acceptable; but when compared to British salaries they are too low and as indisputable proof of my assertion one can see that the Portuguese [who] have been brought here hired to do the same work are paid double, that is to say 3 pounds per week, but there is something even more unheard of in the work regime, namely that in case of accident they only receive half their salaries if they are capable of returning to work, and no compensation

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pay at all in case of disability, the situation being such that several workers killed in job accidents have left behind families who have been unable to claim anything. The dominant spirit here is akin to that of Transvaal or India.9

Simultaneously tending to the tacit (and necessary) understanding with Great Britain and to the pressure of the most radical members of Falange, Franco sought to strike a balance between the two. Hence, he preserved the fascist salute and sent the Blue Division to help Germany one day, only to allow the Allies to be supplied with raw materials the next. One way or another, the regime’s propaganda endeavoured to hide any type of alignment between the 1936 coup and Gibraltar. This led to a distorted portrayal of historical events, as seen in José Carlos de Luna’s rather unblushing account of the history of Gibraltar: ‘During the first few months of action of the red fleet in the Strait waters, its bases and shelters were Tangier and Gibraltar; there they refuelled and gathered their sinister secrets’.10 This was far removed from historical fact, but it was simply another accusation, a further piece of slander against the geopolitical anomaly known as Gibraltar. The Spanish claim to the Rock was always justified with a long list of grievances: smuggling, the presence of Freemasons, or the promotion of poverty or prostitution. The Rock had plunged the Campo de Gibraltar into destitution and it was a symbol of all the harm Great Britain had inflicted on Spain. This biased view of things naturally led to a convenient reinterpretation of the role Gibraltar had played during the war. Hispanus summed up the official version, providing a rather idiosyncratic account of Spanish history and of the Civil War: Freemasonry, for instance, was no stranger to the machinations that led to the independence of the American colonies; nor to the treacherous acts of Riego and Torrijos; nor to the misadventures that led to the loss of the colonies and, more specifically, to the establishment of the two republics which we have endured; nor to the disintegration of the monarchist political parties; to the outbreak of Barcelona’s tragic week; the ‘No to Maura’ campaign . . . to the subversive Defence Juntas; to the 1917 strike; to the revolution of September 68 or that of October 1934; nor to the republican machinations that led Spain down the road of demagoguery to the red revolution between 1931 and 1936. The Freemasons controlled the political organizations of this period. From abroad Freemasonry constantly helped the cause of the Spanish reds; throughout the war of liberation and after the war of liberation. Freemasonry, Spain’s number-one enemy, has always had an active base in Gibraltar for its ruthless offences. Thus the Rock has also served this purpose. This should not be forgotten.

Given such a peculiar interpretation of the Spanish past, it is no wonder that Gibraltar was considered an enemy at any time and under any circumstances. The behaviour the Rock had actually exhibited during the conflict was forgotten: Providence, always looking after Spain, wished that, when our War of Liberation broke out on 18 July 1936, in the strange initial political division of the Spanish soil

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during the early days of the war, Cadiz and with it the surroundings of the Rock should fall into nationalist hands. This was undoubtedly great fortune. In the hands of the reds, is it too much to suppose that Great Britain would have found the opportunity it had so long desired and awaited?11

These propagandists gave rise to an entire genre of literature focusing on a renewed claim to Gibraltar. Two works are worth mentioning. The first, titled Gibraltar Español: reseña gráfica de una parte de nuestro territorio nacional (Spanish Gibraltar: a graphic profile of part of our national territory) is a defence of the claim to Gibraltar inspired by a speech Franco gave on 18 July 1940. Despite its patriotic fervour, the author maintained a neutral attitude regarding the world war and saw the future of the Rock as depending on the outcome of the conflict.12 Likewise and on the same occasion, the book Gibraltar: Antología de crónicas en torno a esta jornada de emoción nacional (Gibraltar: an anthology of articles on occasion of this day of national emotion) was published. All such works exploited the myth of ‘perfidious Albion’ and its sinister anti-Spanish machinations. They all renewed the claim to the Rock. Yet they all took pains not to defend an alliance with Hitler in order to recover Gibraltar. In 1940, Vázquez Sans wrote a book called España ante Inglaterra (Spain versus England) in which he compiled all the acts of ‘perfidy’ committed by Great Britain and its many personalities (Freemasons, conspirators, aggressive merchants, Anglo-Dutch pirates, etc.). His position was straightforward: ‘The time has come for Gibraltar to return to Spain. Friendly voices are heard from abroad: “Gibraltar is Spanish” says the Italian Gayda; and the Berliner Boersen Zeitung writes: “Gibraltar will be Spanish once again”. Many are concerned about when and where this shall happen.’13 In this scheme of things, Great Britain had of course played a sinister role against the Francoist crusade: ‘Let us remember the sensational discovery of a military operations plan, found in San Sebastian, in the bag of the English representative before the Government of Generalissimo Franco; a scandalous event that took place shortly before the beginning of the Nationalist offensive that put an end to the campaign in Catalonia.’14 This animosity against Great Britain materialized in demonstrations in favour of the Spanish claim to Gibraltar in front of the British Embassy in Madrid. Falange organized them with the acquiescence of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs (Serrano Súñer), as they befitted a strategy of rapprochement to the Axis.15 The historical truth about what had happened during the Civil War remained untold. The collaboration Gibraltar had lent the nationalists until 1939 was forgotten and replaced by a more convenient image that suited the interests of the new Francoist regime. After all, the word ‘Gibraltar’ had always been a thorn in Spanish souls of every ideological inclination. As Antonio Cánovas had put it: ‘So long as the English flag flies over Europa Point we shall always have to expect the renewal of such fatal mistakes in our history.’16 The pain exhibited by Donoso Cortés had run even deeper: It turns out England is even closer to us than France. If France is at our border, England is inside our territory; if France is at our door, England is inside our house . . . what England is doing, if it can be put this way, is breaking up our territorial

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unity, and territorial unity is the first and most essential form of unity; political unity, moral unity, religious unity; without territorial unity, they all amount to little or disappear completely.

In an interview with The New York Times, Franco said: The Spanish claim to this stronghold – Gibraltar – is so alive in the hearts of the nation that it need not renew it; it has been alive for two centuries; its return has repeatedly been promised and demanded whenever it is spoken of. If in the past it could even have justified a war, its military value is lost nowadays, not to mention in a few years’ time. In the future it may constitute one of Great Britain’s greatest mistakes. Spain has said on this matter all it can say. Our position is to wait, as time will not work against us.17

Luis Bolín underscored the same notion in his book Spain: The Vital Years: ‘There is a piece of Spanish rock occupied by the British from a time when the nationality of our motherland had all but disappeared, and there is not a single Spaniard who does not every night dream of Gibraltar.’18 Even republicans in exile such as Mariano Granados or Claudio Sánchez Albornoz did not forget that Gibraltar was Spanish soil over which a foreign flag was flown. Yet neither nationalists nor republicans ever acknowledged the Rock as a key instrument in British ‘neutrality’ during the Civil War. The nationalists endeavoured to forget it and the republicans did not succeed in denouncing it. The British government, on the other hand, was quite aware of what had happened, though it kept cautiously silent even when the Spanish claim seemed too virulent – the aggressiveness never amounting to more than words. Great Britain did not lose any sleep over Falangist demonstrations and witty slogans claiming that Gibraltar was Spanish. It was much more concerned with ensuring that Franco remained neutral and managed to channel the country’s patriotic fervour into the Blue Division – sent away to the distant Soviet Union – rather than into an attack on the strategic colony and military base. The British Cabinet was kept abreast of any developments and had plans to invade the Rock’s surroundings if German pressure called for it or Franco gave in to temptation. José Carlos de Luna went as far as stating that the British had prepared a force of 15,000 to 20,000 men to deploy to the hinterland in defence of the Rock.19 Despite labourist accusations and criticism of the government’s appeasement policy, Great Britain had actually kept a close eye on the Germans since shortly after Hitler’s rise to power. This can be verified in a small but interesting pamphlet titled ‘Axis Plans in the Mediterranean’. With a preface by Captain Liddell Hart, it attempted to respond to the threats of General Karl Haushofer, professor at the University of Munich.20 The gist of it was that the Germans were contemplating the possibility of attacking French possessions in North Africa once they had completed the invasion of France. With the cooperation of Spain they would control the eastern coast of the Peninsula, the Balearic islands and Gibraltar, dealing a deadly blow to the Mediterranean communications of the British fleet. The pamphlet also warned that the Italians could pose a threat, as they controlled a valuable route to Libya and were lying in wait to take over the Balearics (including the strategic Mahon) as well as Gibraltar.

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Naturally, Franco had also charted out plans should a valuable occasion present itself. In the summer of 1939, the Francoist government had drawn up a plan to attack Gibraltar. The initiative was exclusively Spanish and it presented a sound and coherent tactical scheme based on blockading the enclave and hitting it with massive artillery fire. This pre-dated the famous Felix plan devised by the Germans in November 1940,21 but there is room for reasonable doubt regarding the objectives of the plan (an attack without German participation), the likelihood of its success, its political costs in terms of international relations and whether or not it responded to an actual willingness to execute it in any context. In any event, Franco received reports from the Spanish navy advising against its implementation and thus chose to discard it in favour of a patient yet attentive attitude. In the end, the plan was never implemented; to the contrary, the ideas it contained were used to establish a defensive mechanism in the Campo de Gibraltar area in case of an Anglo-American invasion. The British, to be sure, had their own alternative plans should they lose the enclave, but they were never forced to execute them. In this context, intelligence activities persisted. Between 1942 and 1944 Gibraltar served as a base of operations for troop landings in North Africa and Sicily. The Rock became a hotbed of espionage and counterespionage, false leaks of information, conspiracies and smokescreens – take, for instance, the plot of The Man Who Never Was. What is interesting is that Spain leaked the false information it received to the Germans, yet somehow the real invasion plans never reached German spies, even though they had fallen into Spanish hands after an Allied airplane was shot down.22 Unquestionably, such forms of tacit understanding proved incredibly useful in the preparation of the Allied landings. Ultimately, the common ground between previously irreconcilable interests was probably none other than anti-communism. After the Second World War, the offensive against the communist threat inside Gibraltar led the local authorities to arrest, deport or at least keep a close watch on leftist elements. After deporting Alberto Fava in October 1948, the British authorities conducted secret surveillance operations on thirteen communist refugees of Spanish nationality who were considered a threat. It was advised that they be sent to England, far from clandestine communist networks or any contacts they might have across the border.23 For his part, Franco continued his repressive crusade, though in a more moderate vein given the disappearance of Europe’s fascist regimes. It was a time of isolation and international sanctions. Yet Franco still had something to offer foreign powers. Anti-communism had led Franco to victory with the direct involvement of the fascist powers and the indirect aid of European democracies. The last Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic, Julio Álvarez del Vayo, considered that the nonintervention and appeasement policies had determined the defeat of the Republic in the Civil War and contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War. His words were explicit: ‘Today no one should be able to deny that the collapse of the Spanish Republic was due to Non-Intervention’.24 Republican Cabinets had paid insufficient attention to foreign policy, engrossed as they were in their domestic troubles. Their lack of international vision dragged the Republic to its grave, and Gibraltar attended the funeral.

Illustrations

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Figure 1  Spanish Civil Guard and Gibraltarian police officers watch the British Army’s changing of the guard. It was a time of pacific coexistence (1934). Source: Luis Mascarenhas (Gibraltar).

Figure 2  The border gates were closed in July 1936 to prevent a flood of refugees into the colony of Gibraltar. The security of the British territory was reinforced with a barbed-­wire fence. Source: Luis Mascarenhas (Gibraltar).

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Illustration Captions and credits

Figures 3 and 4  The Gordon Highlanders were deployed along the border to guarantee the security of Gibraltar at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Beside them, several firemen hold water nozzles prepared to disperse the crowd beyond the gates. Desperation, fear and tension were present at the gates of Gibraltar during those days of July 1936. Source: Luis Mascarenhas (Gibraltar).

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Figure 5  Thousands of republican Spaniards got into British territory during the early days of the war. They were provisionally lodged in tents installed on the neck of land between the Rock and the borderline. Source: Luis Mascarenhas (Gibraltar).

Figure 6  Spanish refugees exercising under the supervision of a Gibraltarian officer. Source: International Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (Amsterdam, the Netherlands).

Figure 7  Sir Charles Harington, governor of Gibraltar (1936–38). Source: Luis Mascarenhas (Gibraltar).

Illustration Captions and credits

Figure 8  The runway of Gibraltar, under construction in the late 1930s (1938). Source: Luis Mascarenhas (Gibraltar).

Figure 9  Spitfire fighters under the shadow of the Rock (1939). Source: Luis Mascarenhas (Gibraltar).

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Notes Introduction 1. For instance, the interesting photographic pamphlet Québec, the Gibraltar of América (Grand Rapids: The James Bayne Company, 1895?), probably dated some time between the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first one of the twentieth. Also, Quebec, Gibraltar of America: a series of views (Quebec: Ant. Langlois, 1910). 2. As verified by the documents preserved at the National Archives (Public Record Office, PRO: FCO 73–146). These include sardonic poems about the issue of the monkeys written by the governor himself. 3. Joyce, James: Ulysses (Barcelona: Lumen-Tusquets, 1998), pp. 743ff. 4. Téllez, Juan José: Main Street (Cádiz: Fundación Municipal de Cultura del Ayuntamiento de Cádiz-Algaida, 2002). 5. Ferrer Benimeli, José Antonio: El contubernio judeo masónico-­comunista (Madrid: Istmo, 1982), pp. 59–60. He quotes Dr Bataille (pseudonym for Léo Taxil) in his Le Diable au XIXe siècle ou les mystères du Spiritisme. La Francmaçonnerie luciférienne (París: Delhomme et Briquet, 1896, 2nd edn). 6. Deacon, Richard: Historia del servicio secreto británico (Barcelona: Ediciones Picazo, 1973), p. 112. It is unbelievable that Napoleon failed to see the urgency of delivering a mortal blow to Gibraltar. 7. Notes of Travel (extracts from the Journals of Count Moltke) (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), p. 114. 8. Rae, John: Life of Adam Smith (London: Macmillan, 1895), chapter XXVI. Available online at: www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Rae/raeLS26.html (accessed 15 December 2013). Ramón Tamames pointed us in the direction of this letter in Tamemes, Ramón: ‘Cuando Adam Smith visitó Gibraltar’, El Mundo, 10 December 2001. 9. The regime’s official press spared no efforts in voicing the Spanish claim to Gibraltar. See the contents of the magazine Mandos. Revista General del Frente de Juventudes between July and December 1954 (issues 151 to 155). Another example is the book 25 años de relaciones internacionales, published in 1961 by the National Delegation of Organizations of the Movimiento, in which the issue of Gibraltar is constantly present (pp. 42; 56–59; 61–62 and 91–92). 10. See, for instance, Bill Alexander’s British Volunteers for Liberty: Spain, 1936–1939, published by Lawrence & Wishart Ltd in 1982 and available at The National Archives. 11. Paz, Armando: Los servicios de espionaje en la guerra civil española (Madrid: Editorial San Martín, 1976). 12. The epilogue suffices for a sample of the book’s omissions and idiosyncrasies as well as its militant anti-Francoist and anti-Spanish position (pp. 206–12). Andrews, Allen: Proud Fortress: The fighting story of Gibraltar (London: Evans Brothers Ltd., 1958). 13. Salgado, Jesús (ed.): Estudios sobre Gibraltar (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa-INCIPE, 1999).

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14. Truver, Scott C.: The Strait of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sjthoff & Noordhoff, 1980). 15. A few titles: It Happened in Gibraltar (1943); Les Requins de Gibraltar (1947); Gibraltar Adventure (1953); The Silent Enemy (1958); Operation Snatch (1962); Torpedo Bay (1962); Misión en el Estrecho (1964); Proceso de Gibraltar (1967); The Sailor from Gibraltar (1967); Historia de Gibraltar (1971); Souvenir of Gibraltar (1975); The Crash off Gibraltar (1984); Rocket Gibraltar (1988); Goodbye Gibraltar (1993); Les Audacieux (1993); Au-­delá de Gibraltar (2001); O la película francesa Gibraltar (2013). There are also some curious films such as Admiral Dewey Landing at Gibraltar (1899), which briefly covers the visit to the Rock of American Admiral George Dewey, protagonist of the previous year’s Spanish-American War. Some authors have considered John Glen’s more recent The Living Daylights a film about Gibraltar, but it includes only a few spectacular sequences shot on location at Gibraltar and lacks substantive interest. See CLÍO, no. 4 (February 2002), p. 65. The most interesting film is perhaps the first one mentioned (It Happened in Gibraltar, based on Jacques Companéez’s 1938 script titled Gibraltar). Unfortunately, we have been unable to watch this film. 16. On the interesting issue of cinema, see Fernández Sánchez, Manuel Carlos: Historia del cine en el Campo de Gibraltar (1895–2000) (Sevilla: Bahía, 2002).

Chapter 1 1. Niño, Antonio: ‘Política de alianzas y compromisos coloniales para la “regeneración” internacional de España, 1898–1914’, in Tusell, Javier, Avilés, Juan and Pardo, Rosa (eds): La política exterior de España en el siglo XX (Madrid: UNED-Biblioteca Nueva, 2000), p. 36. 2. Ibid., p. 37. 3. Ibid., pp. 45–46. 4. Ibid., p. 47. 5. Bowles, Thomas Gibson: Gibraltar, un peligro nacional (Madrid: 1901). 6. Granados, Mariano: Los republicanos españoles y Gibraltar (México: Finisterre, 1970), p. 57. 7. Salgado, Jesús (ed.): Estudios sobre Gibraltar (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa-INCIPE, 1999), p. 81. 8. Gibraltar. Regiments in Garrison, 1759–1912 (typewritten copy, Public Record Office library). The battalion remained in Gibraltar from September 1906 to October 1908. 9. Ibid., p. 12. 10. Signed on 27 November. 11. This has been highlighted in an interesting work on Spanish neutrality and Gibraltar between 1914 and 1918. García Sanz, Carolina: La Primera Guerra Mundial en el Estrecho de Gibraltar: economía, política y relaciones internacionales (Madrid: CSICUniversidad de Sevilla, 2011). 12. Regarding naval warfare in this period, see: Benady, Tito: The Royal Navy at Gibraltar (Gibraltar: Gibraltar Book Ltd, 2000), pp. 118–31. 13. Espadas Burgos, Manuel: ‘España y la Primera Guerra Mundial’ in Tusell, Javier, Avilés, Juan and Pardo, Rosa (eds): La política exterior de España en el siglo XX, p. 115. 14. Dixon, Arturo: Señor monopolio. La asombrosa vida de Juan March (Barcelona: Planeta, 1985), especially Chapters 2 and 3; Deacon, Richard: Historia del servicio

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secreto británico (Barcelona: Ediciones Picazo, 1973), p. 226. While Dixon identifies Thoroton as a commander, Deacon – in his book on the British secret service – says he was a Royal Marine colonel. We have chosen the latter reference. 15. Reinharz, Jehuda: ‘His Majesty’s Emissary: Chaim Weizmann’s Mission to Gibraltar in 1917’, Journal of Contemporary History, 27, 2 (April 1992). 16. A case in point was the attitude of British pressure groups toward the economic policy of Primo de Rivera. Yet another relevant fact is that Great Britain led the ranking in both exports and imports to the port of Seville between 1922 and 1935. Polo Sánchez, M. Teresa: ‘Los grupos de presión ante las relaciones comerciales hispano-­británicas y la prensa inglesa, 1926–1932’ in Documentos de trabajo de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales (Universidad Complutense de Madrid). Document number 9001. Additionally, see: Rodríguez Bernal, Eduardo: ‘El tráfico del puerto de Sevilla desde 1900 a 1935’, Archivo Hispalense, 219 (1989). 17. Sueiro Seoane, Susana: ‘La política exterior de España en los años 20: una política mediterránea con proyección africana’ in Tusell, Javier, Avilés, Juan and Pardo, Rosa (eds): La política exterior de España en el siglo XX, pp. 135–57. 18. On these attempts at a swap, see: Lowry, B.: ‘El indefendible Peñón, Inglaterra y la permuta de Gibraltar por Ceuta, 1917–1919’, Revista de Política Internacional, 153, (1977); Arribas Martín, J.T.: ‘El Estrecho de Gibraltar, los archipiélagos españoles y los intereses británicos, 1898–1918’, II Aula Canarias y el Noroeste de Africa (Gran Canaria, 1988); and Pereira, J.C.: ‘La cuestión de Gibraltar (cambios, ofensivas y proyectos de búsqueda de un acuerdo hispano-­británico en el primer tercio del siglo XX)’ in Vilar, J.B. (ed.): Las relaciones internacionales en la España contemporánea (Murcia: Universidad, 1989); Hills, George: El Peñón de la discordia. Historia de Gibraltar (Madrid: Editorial San Martín, 1974), pp. 489–90. Colonel Pedro Jenevois Labernade, who had studied the possibility of a tunnel under the Strait, joined the insurgents in 1936. 19. Luna y Sánchez, José Carlos de: Historia de Gibraltar (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1944), pp. 496ff. 20. Bowles, Thomas Gibson: Gibraltar, un peligro nacional, p. 11. 21. Warren, Fred P.: ‘Gibraltar, Is it Worth Holding? And Morocco’ (London: Edward Stanford, 1882). 22. Madariaga, Salvador de: España. Ensayo de historia contemporánea (Madrid: Aguilar, 1934), pp. 341–42 (footnote). Also quoted by Garratt, G.T.: Gibraltar and the Mediterranean (New York: Coward-McCann, 1939), p. 124. 23. Cited in: Pereira, J.C.: ‘La cuestión de Gibraltar (cambios, ofensivas y proyectos de búsqueda de un acuerdo hispano-­británico en el primer tercio del siglo XX)’, p. 248. 24. Benady, Tito: The Royal Navy at Gibraltar (Gibraltar: Gibraltar Book Ltd, 2000), pp. 132 and 136. 25. Quoted in Garratt, G.T.: Gibraltar and the Mediterranean (New York: CowardMcCann, 1939), pp. 247–50. 26. Kiernan, V.G.: European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, 1815–1960 (Suffolk: Fontana, 1982), pp. 191ff. 27. British Documents on the End of the Empire. Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice, 1925–1945 (S.R. Ashton and S.E. Stockwell, eds.) (London: HMSO, 1996) vol. 1, p. 169. 28. Torremocha, Antonio and Humanes, Francisco: Historia Económica del Campo de Gibraltar. Vol. III. Edad Contemporánea (Algeciras: Tip. Mazuelos, 1989), p. 255. 29. Sánchez Mantero, Rafael: Estudios sobre Gibraltar. Política, diplomacia y contrabando en el siglo XIX (Cádiz: Diputación, 1989), pp. 33–46.

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30. The 1933 Oxford English Dictionary included this term. Salgado, Jesús (ed.): Estudios sobre Gibraltar, p. 21. 31. Garriga, Ramón: Ramón Franco, el hermano maldito (Barcelona: Planeta, 1979), pp. 137–40. Also see: Vallejo, Tito: ‘The Eagle and the Whale’ in The Gibraltar Heritage Trust (2001). 32. All this data is contained in AGA. Asuntos Exteriores. Box 3847. Reports on Gibraltar issued by the Spanish consulate. They lack specific dates, but were written in the early 1930s. There is also a report on tobacco smuggling dated 17 April 1934. 33. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores. Box 3847. Indirect reference to the Consul’s report, requested by the sub-­director of the Carabineros, 22 September 1931. 34. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores. Box 3847. Report by the Consul regarding smuggling activity. 17 April 1934. 35. Ibid. 36. Cabanellas, Guillermo: La guerra de los mil días. Nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II república española (Buenos Aires: Heliasta, 1975), Vol. I, p. 244. 37. Gibraltar Blue Book for the Year 1928 and Gibraltar Blue Book for the Year 1932 (copies held at the Public Record Office). Both journals were sold at 15p. 38. On the Gibraltarian press, see: Tornay De Cozar, Francisco: Gibraltar y su prensa (Cádiz: Diputación, 1997), especially pp. 33–55. It would be desirable for Gibraltar to have a press library or for the Garrison Library to compile copies of newspapers other than the Gibraltar Chronicle, increasing its holdings. There are apparently collections of El Calpense and El Anunciador in private hands.

Chapter 2 1. Lerroux, Alejandro: La pequeña historia, 1930–1936 (Buenos Aires: Ed. Cimera, 1945), p. 95. 2. Ibid., p. 105. 3. Alcalá-Zamora, Niceto: Memorias (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977), pp. 318–20. 4. Ibid., p. 326. 5. Ibid., p. 326. 6. Granados, Mariano: Los republicanos españoles y Gibraltar (México: Finisterre, 1970), p. 113. He quotes Azaña’s memoirs. 7. In an early precedent of the Francoist notion of the ‘ripe fruit’, Maeztu thought Gibraltar would return to the Spanish when Spain recovered its strength: ‘Gibraltar is an asset for England as long as Spain remains weak; but if Spain were strong, it would become a weak spot and lose its raison d’être’. Both quotes can be found in: Madariaga, Salvador de: España. Ensayo de historia contemporánea (Madrid: Aguilar, 1934), pp. 257–58. 8. Moradiellos, Enrique: La perfidia de Albión. El Gobierno británico y la guerra civil española (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1996), pp. 26–27. 9. Deacon, Richard: Historia del servicio secreto británico (Barcelona: Ediciones Picazo, 1973), p. 269. The investments in Spain of private British citizens alone amounted to over $194 million (US) of the time. Whealey, Robert H.: ‘La intervención extranjera en la guerra civil española’, in Carr, Raymond: Estudios sobre la República y la guerra civil española (Madrid: Sarpe, 1985), p. 314. 10. Quoted by Gómez Mendoza, Antonio: El ‘Gibraltar económico’: Franco y Riotinto, 1936–1954 (Madrid: Fundación Rio Tinto-Civitas, 1994), p. 34.

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11. Quoted by Heiberg, Morten: Emperadores del Mediterráneo. Franco, Mussolini y la guerra civil española (Barcelona: Crítica, 2004), p. 36. Mussolini also criticized the peculiar process by which the Republic had been proclaimed, claiming that the response of the ballot boxes had been crushed and the cities had subjugated the rural areas (p. 37). 12. The Times, 14 and 18 May 1931, p. 14 and p. 12 respectively. 13. Mola Vidal, Emilio: Memorias (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977), p. 293. 14. Ybarra Hidalgo, Eduardo: Apuntes sobre una familia sevillana durante la Dictadura, la República y la Guerra Civil. 1923–1939 (Sevilla: Ybarra y Compañía, 1987), p. 102. 15. Cierva, Ricardo de la: Franco Don Juan. Los reyes son corona (Madrid: DINPE-Época, 1992), p. 34. 16. Information regarding these refugees during the left republican-­socialist period can be found in Grocott, Chris A.: ‘The Day the Right Arrived – Gibraltar and the Spanish revolution of 1931’, (accessed 10 March 2008). The author takes his data from PRO. WO 31/2404. Also cited by Téllez, Juan José: Gibraltar en tiempos de los espías (Sevilla: Andalucía abierta, 2005), p. 110. The list of refugees since 1931 was long, including: Jorge Parladé, Carlos Benjumea, Jesús Ibarra, José María Ibarra, Antonio Puertas, Miguel de Giles, Cristóbal Puertas, the Marquis of Villapanés, José Benjumea Zayas, Miguel Benjumea Zayas, Pablo Benjumea, etc. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, Box 3847. 17. Ibid. 18. PRO. FO 371/17426. Sir George Grahame, 5 May 1933. Cited by Pertierra De Rojas, José Fernando: Las relaciones hispano-­británicas durante la Segunda República española (1931–1936) (Madrid: Fundación Juan March, 1984), p. 14; and Stone, Glyn: ‘Sir Robert Vansittart and Spain, 1931–1941’, in Otte, T.T. and Pagedas, C. A. (eds): Personalities, War and Diplomacy: Essays in International History (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 129. 19. Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Españolas, 5 October 1932, number 236, p. 8780. 20. Ybarra Hidalgo, Eduardo: Apuntes sobre una familia sevillana durante la Dictadura, la República y la Guerra Civil. 1923–1939, pp. 106–7. 21. Caro Cancela, Diego: Violencia política y luchas sociales: la Segunda República en Jerez de la Frontera (1931–1936) (Jerez: Ayuntamiento, 2001), p. 221. 22. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores. Box 3847. 23. Dixon, Arturo: Señor monopolio. La asombrosa vida de Juan March (Barcelona: Planeta, 1985), pp. 129–30; Deacon, Richard: Historia del servicio secreto británico, p. 272. 24. Morales Benítez, Antonio and Sigler Silvera, Fernando: ‘Gibraltar y la masonería de obediencia española’, in Ferrer Benimeli, José Antonio (ed.): La Masonería en la España del siglo XX, Vol. 2 (Toledo: CEHME-Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha y Cortes de Castilla-La Mancha, 1996), p. 924. 25. Fernández Ballesteros taught French at the San Francisco de Paula School in Seville. We would like to thank this institution for providing this information. He was a member of the leftist sector of the local PSOE. Ponce Alberca, Julio: Andalucismo, República, Socialismo. Hermenegildo Casas Jiménez (1892–1967) (Sevilla: DiputaciónAyuntamiento, 2002). 26. Sepúlveda, Isidro: Gibraltar. La razón y la fuerza (Madrid: Alianza, 2004), p. 232. 27. Moradiellos, Enrique: La perfidia de Albión, p. 29.

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28. As reported by El Correo de Andalucía, 19 September and 5 November 1935. The British government sent the powerful HMS Hood and HMS Renown. Jenkins, Roy: Churchill (Madrid: Ediciones Folio, 2003), p. 546. 29. AMAE: R 257 (bis)-9. Italian-Abyssinian conflict. Cabinet meeting. 26 December 1936. Cited in Pertierra De Rojas, José Fernando: Las relaciones hispano-­británicas durante la Segunda República española (1931–1936), pp. 44–45. 30. Benady, Tito: The Royal Navy at Gibraltar (Gibraltar: Gibraltar Books Ltd, 2000), p. 138. 31. Report cited in Moradiellos, Enrique: La perfidia de Albión, p. 31. 32. AA.VV: Política comercial exterior en España (1931–1975), Vol. 1 (Madrid: Banco Exterior de España, 1979), p. 134. These data are taken from: París Eguilaz, Higinio: España en la economía mundial (Madrid: Diana, 1947), p. 189. 33. Ibid., pp. 32ff. 34. Gómez Mendoza, Antonio: El ‘Gibraltar económico’: Franco y Riotinto, 1936–1954, pp. 35–36. 35. Vaquero, Eloy: Del drama de Andalucía. Recuerdos de luchas rurales y ciudadanas (Córdoba: Ediciones La Posada, 1987). Notes and biographical appendix by Juan Ortiz Villalba, p. 226. 36. Archivo Manuel Giménez Fernández (Hemeroteca Municipal de Sevilla). B-X/15. Relación de familias que se han marchado al extranjero, han enviado a sus familias o ya han regresado (Abril 1936). 37. Bowers, Claude G.: Misión en España (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1977), p. 212. 38. Cfr.: The Daily Telegraph, 28 December 1936. Article by Francesc Cambó cited in De Riquer i Permanyer, Borja: El último Cambó 1936–1947. La tentación autoritaria (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1997), p. 289. 39. Rico, Gumersindo: La población de Gibraltar (sus orígenes, naturaleza y sentido) (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1967), p. 134. 40. The Times, 22 February 1936. 41. Ibid., 22 December 1936, p. 14. In a talk delivered at the Near and Middle East Association, Usborne supported this possibility because Ceuta was large enough to comfortably support an airport. 42. Gibraltar Defence Scheme 1936 en PRO: CAB 11–195. 43. PRO: FO 160–851. 44. The Times, 20 March 1936. 45. Granados, Mariano: Los republicanos españoles y Gibraltar, pp. 68–69. 46. Sepúlveda, Isidro: Gibraltar. La razón y la fuerza, p. 231. 47. A single estate, property of the Duke of Medinaceli, accounted for over 96 per cent of the town of Castellar de la Frontera. Ibid., p. 231. 48. Beiso, D.: ‘The social impact of the Spanish Civil War’, Gibraltar Heritage Journal, 7 (2001); Stockey, Gareth J.: Gibraltar during the Years of the Spanish Second Republic and Civil War (University of Lancaster, 2003), p. 57. 49. Mora-Figueroa, José de (marqués de Tamarón): Datos para la historia de la Falange gaditana (1934–1939) (Jerez de la Frontera: Graf. del Exportador, 1974), pp. 46–49; Cierva, Ricardo de la: ‘La Roca de los espías. Gibraltar en los años treinta’, Historia y Vida, no. 2 (1968), especially p. 104. 50. Cfr.: Moradiellos, Enrique: La perfidia de Albión, pp. 34–35. 51. Smyth, Denis: Diplomacy and Strategy of Survival. British Policy and Franco’s Spain, 1940–41 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 1–19. 52. ABC, 18 July 1936, p. 29.

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Chapter 3 1. ABC, 6, 20, 22 and 23 August 1936. 2. One company was transported to Cadiz on board the motorship Ciudad de Algeciras, escorted by the destroyer Churruca; the merchant ship Cabo Espartel and the striker Dato took the other company to Algeciras. 3. They were the battleship Jaime I, the cruisers Libertad and Miguel de Cervantes and the destroyer Almirante Antequera, among other smaller units. 4. It was joined by the battleship Jaime I, the cruiser Libertad, the destroyers Churruca, Sánchez Barcáiztegui and Almirante Ferrándiz, the auxiliary ship Tofiño, the coastguard vessels Uad-Lucus and Uad-Martin, the striker Laya and the torpedo boat T-14. 5. Alpert, Michael: La guerra civil en el mar (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1987), p. 80. 6. Alpert, Michael: La guerra civil en el mar, p. 83. 7. By some accounts, the officers of the Royal Navy sympathized with the nationalists. Considering British standards of naval discipline, it was inconceivable for sailors to rebel against their officers, execute them and take control of the ships. Hodgson, Robert: Franco frente a Hitler (Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1954), p. 94. 8. Ponce Alberca, Julio: ‘La guerra civil española y Gibraltar. Los refugiados españoles en el Peñón’, Almoraima, 25 (2001), p. 392. 9. Escuadra Sánchez, Alfonso: ‘Gibraltar 1937: encuentros germano-­británicos durante la guerra civil española’, Serga, 4 (March–April 2000), p. 54. 10. Moradiellos, Enrique: El reñidero de Europa. Las dimensiones internacionales de la guerra civil española (Barcelona: Península, 2001), p. 80. 11. Urgent cable from the Foreign Office (7 August 1936), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Volume XVII, p. 70. Regarding the damage to Gibraltar: Gibraltar Chronicle, 23 July 1936. 12. The Times, 23 and 24 July 1936. In the latter, esp. ‘Protest against firing at Gibraltar’, p. 14. 13. Alpert, Michael: La guerra civil en el mar, p. 97. The American ITT also established special lines for the insurgents; see Beevor, Anthony: The Spanish Civil War (London: Cassell, 2000), p. 48. 14. Kindelán, Alfredo: Mis cuadernos de guerra (Barcelona: Planeta, 1982), pp. 83–84. 15. Martínez Bande, José Manuel: La campaña de Andalucía (Madrid: Editorial San Martín, 1986), p. 50. 16. Ibid. On the ‘convoy of Victory’ and the subsequent republican retaliation, see pp. 55ff. 17. Guilloto y González, Fernando: Cinco años de la historia de Cádiz (Ayuntamiento de Cádiz: Cuadernos de la Cátedra Adolfo de Castro, 1988), pp. 22–23. It is worth noting that the ‘normalization’ of daily life did not imply the end of persecution, repression, executions, etc. 18. After the war was over, Kindelán himself expressed his disbelief in the republicans’ inability to block the Strait. With a dozen fighter planes in Malaga and the republican fleet, the government could have kept the convoys from crossing from Ceuta. Kindelán, Alfredo: Mis cuadernos de guerra, p. 190. 19. Martínez Bande: José Manuel: La campaña de Andalucía, p. 124. 20. Velarde Fuertes, Juan: ‘El capítulo marítimo de la economía de la Guerra de España’, Razón Española, 113 (May–June 2002). 21. Benady, Tito: The Royal Navy at Gibraltar (Gibraltar: Gibraltar Books Ltd, 2000), pp. 139 and 141. 22. Alpert, Michael: La guerra civil en el mar, pp. 99–100.

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23. Velarde Fuertes, Juan: ‘El capítulo marítimo de la economía de la Guerra de España’. 24. This was Kindelán’s critique of the defensive stance taken by the republican fleet, which gradually wound up seeking shelter in safe ports after having squandered its initial naval superiority. See: Kindelán, Alfredo: Mis cuadernos de guerra, p. 198. 25. Algarbani Rodríguez, José Manuel: ‘El SIPM. El Servicio de Información del Ejército nacional en el Campo de Gibraltar’, Almoraima, 29 (2003), p. 499. 26. Beevor, Antony: The Spanish Civil War (London: Orbis Publishing Ltd., 1982), p. 112. This note references the 1982 edition, though we normally refer to the 2000 edition. 27. PRO, CO 91/500/2. Cited by Stockey, Gareth J.: Gibraltar during the years of the Spanish Second Republic and Civil War (c. 1931–1939), University of Lancaster, (manuscript not published), p. 64. We thank to the author for allowing us to consult his manuscript. 28. Ibid., p. 65. 29. Téllez, Juan José: Gibraltar en tiempos de los espías (Sevilla: Andalucía abierta, 2005), pp. 78 and 114. He cites Henry Buckley’s account in his Life and Death of the Spanish Republic. 30. For a biography of Harington, see Annual Register Online (1940), pp. 439–40. The book Tim Harington Looks Back was first published in November 1940, and reprinted shortly thereafter (January 1941). 31. Harington, Charles: Tim Harington Looks Back (London: John Murray, 1941), pp. 228ff. 32. Ibid., p. 193. 33. Larios, José: Combate sobre España. Memorias de un piloto de caza (Madrid: San Martín, 1982), pp. 45–47. 34. Gómez Mendoza, Antonio: El ‘Gibraltar económico’: Franco y Ríotinto, 1936–1954 (Madrid: Ed. Civitas-Fundación Ríotinto, 1994), p. 38. 35. Garratt, Geoffrey Theodore: Gibraltar and the Mediterranean (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939), p. 281. 36. Quoted by Moradiellos, Enrique: ‘The Gentle General: The Official British Perception of General Franco during the Spanish Civil War’, in Preston, Paul and Mackenzie, Ann L. (eds.): The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain, 1936–1939 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), p. 9. 37. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Volume XVII, p. 311. 38. Having lost their businesses and means of sustenance in Spain, many found themselves in precarious economic circumstances, leading to organized efforts to request aid from the British government. The Times, 10 August 1936, p. 15. Regarding these humanitarian efforts, see Ribelles, Silvia: ‘La Marina real británica en las costas de Asturias durante la guerra civil (1936–1937): su olvidada labor humanitaria’, Cuadernos Republicanos, 61 (2006). 39. Gretton, Peter: El factor olvidado. La Marina británica y la Guerra Civil española (Madrid: Editorial San Martín, 1984), p. 94. 40. Ibid., pp. 98–99. 41. The Times, 30 July 1936 42. Benady, Tito: The Royal Navy at Gibraltar, p. 141. It was this incident that made the British aware that the Italians had violated the conditions set out in the Washington Treaty: the Gorizia was over 10,000 tons. 43. ABC, 25 September 1936.

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44. See: AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, box 3850, ‘Llegada de refugiados procedentes de Almería a bordo de los vapores Arethusa, Rutland y Dover (10 de agosto, 18 de septiembre y 7 de octubre de 1937), además de transporte de canjeados a bordo del HMS Galatea’. 45. Gretton, Peter: El factor olvidado, pp. 108–12; 255–56 and 314–15. There were other curious incidents: in August 1936, the Italian cruiser Gorizia suffered a petrol explosion and was tugged to Gibraltar for repairs. There, the British realized that it was over the 10,000-ton limit established in the Washington Treaty: this was yet another violation of the naval limitation agreements, with which Italians and Germans failed to comply. 46. PRO: CO 91-500-3. Cables of 29 September 1936. 47. Blaye, Edouard de: Franco, ou la monarchie sans roi (Vienne: Stock, 1974), p. 157. 48. Avni, Haim: España, Franco y los judíos (Madrid: Altalena, 1982), pp. 97–98. 49. Phillips, E.C.L.: El pimpinela en la guerra de España, 1936–39 (Barcelona: Juventud, 1965), p. 36. 50. Rico, Gumersindo: La población de Gibraltar (sus orígenes, naturaleza y sentido) (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1967), p. 94 (he takes information from the book by Stewart, p. 70). 51. On the refugees, see: Ponce Alberca, Julio: ‘La guerra civil española y Gibraltar. Los refugiados españoles en el Peñón’. The archives of the Gibraltar government have abundant holdings regarding this issue. GGA: 89/1938; 273/1936; 458/1936; 271/1936; 255/1936; 89/1938; 89/1938. 52. Portero, Florentino: ‘El contencioso gibraltareño, 1936–1991’, Historia, 16, 186 (November 1991). A similar figure is given in Hills, George: El Peñón de la discordia. Historia de Gibraltar (Madrid: Editorial San Martín, 1974), p. 495. 53. Stockey, Gareth J.: Gibraltar during the Years of the Second Republic and Civil War, p. 59. 54. Gibraltar had a population of around 18,400 in 1921. In 1948, the figure was 18,544. See: Rico, Gumersindo: La población de Gibraltar, p. 38. 55. Hills, George: El Peñón de la discordia, p. 495. 56. Regarding the controls, there is a police report, 30 November 1936; GGA. 427/1936. Another report, from 1939, takes note of the number of ships that had arrived at the colony from Algeciras and Puente Mayorga; GGA, 392/1936. 57. Benyunes, Isaac: ‘Gibraltar during the Spanish Civil War’, Gibraltar Heritage Journal, 2 (1994), p. 51. 58. Gibson, Ian: Queipo de Llano. Sevilla, verano de 1936 (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1986), p. 220; Gibraltar Chronicle, 28 July 1936. 59. Radio broadcast of 17 August 1936; ibid., p. 365. 60. The Marquis of Povar, Fernando Fernández de Córdoba (son of the Duke of Arión) married Talía Larios (daughter of the Marquis of Marzales, Gibraltar and Algeciras) in July 1931. An officer on the Baleares, he died when the ship sank in March 1938; The Times, 11 March 1938, p. 13; Gibraltar Chronicle, 21 July 1936; Stockey, Gareth J.: Gibraltar during the years of the Second Republic and Civil War, p. 60. 61. On repression in Algeciras, Ocaña, Mario: Historia de Algeciras, Volume II (Cádiz: Diputación Provincial, 2001), pp. 359ff. 62. See: Téllez, Juan José: Gibraltar en tiempos de los espías, pp. 78ff. 63. Morales Benítez, Antonio and Sigler Silvera, Fernando: ‘Gibraltar y la masonería de obediencia española’ in Ferrer Benimeli, José Antonio (ed.): La Masonería en la España

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del siglo XX, tomo II (Toledo: CEHME-Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha y Cortes de Castilla-La Mancha, 1996), p. 926. 64. AGGC: masonería A, box 743, file 8. 65. Ibid. 66. Morales Benítez, Antonio: ‘Gibraltareños en la masonería española (1911–1936)’, Almoraima, 29 (2003), p. 464. 67. On these lodges, AGGC: masonería A, box 758, files 16 and 17. Relations between the two sides of the border were intense. Further, the lodge Continental, for instance, ordered masonic books from the Barcelona-­based publisher Mainade. Gibraltarian Freemasons had similar relations with lodges in North Africa, especially in Tangier (for instance, the Serruyas). The economic relationship between the colony and the free port of Tangier was significant. 68. Morales Benítez, Antonio and Sigler Silvera, Fernando: ‘Gibraltar y la masonería de obediencia española’, pp. 927–28. 69. Ibid., p. 929. Table with data for five lodges in the Campo de Gibraltar. 70. Stockey, Gareth J.: Gibraltar during the years of the Second Republic and Civil War, pp. 69ff. 71. Cabanellas, Guillermo: La Guerra de los mil días. Nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II República española (México: Grijalbo, 1973), vol. I, p. 400. 72. Benyunes, Isaac: ‘Gibraltar during the Spanish Civil War’, Gibraltar Heritage Journal, no. 2 (1994), p. 53. 73. Stockey, Gareth J.: Gibraltar during the Years of the Second Republic and Civil War, pp. 70–72. 74. PRO: CO 91-500-3. Letters from Abraham Bensusan, 16 and 20 November 1936. 75. Mora-Figueroa, José de (marqués de Tamarón): Datos para la historia de la Falange gaditana (1934–1939) (Jerez de la Frontera: Graf. del Exportador, 1974), pp. 46–49. Also, Cierva, Ricardo de la: ‘La Roca de los espías. Gibraltar en los años treinta’, Historia y Vida, no. 2 (May 1968), esp. pp. 108–9. 76. Rico, Gumersindo: La población de Gibraltar, p. 80.

Chapter 4 1. Little, Douglas: Malevolent Neutrality. The United States, Great Britain and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War (London: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 17–18. 2. Ibid., p. 33. The article provoked the immediate reaction of the Foreign Office in a letter by Halifax the following day. It was certainly warranted: Lord Strabolgi had hit home. 3. ABC, 10 and 20 November 1936. 4. Rey García, Marta: Stars for Spain. La guerra civil española en los Estados Unidos (A Coruña: Edicios do Castro, 1997), esp. pp. 27–34. 5. Note by the Foreign Office (1 September 1936) regarding British interest in the outcome of the Spanish conflict, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Volume XVII, p. 209. 6. In the eyes of some diplomats, such as the American Ambassador Bowers, the Non-Intervention Committee was a farce that hurt the republican cause. See: Bowers, Claude G.: Misión en España. En el umbral de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, 1933–1939 (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1977), Chapter XXII.

Notes

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7. In the summer of 1936, the aid received by the nationalists through Portugal proved vital: ammunition and fuel were supplied at key moments thanks to the direct intervention of Salazar. Garriga, Ramón: Nicolás Franco, el hermano brujo (Barcelona: Planeta, 1980), p. 59. 8. Azcárate, Pablo de: Mi embajada en Londres durante la guerra civil española (Barcelona: Ariel, 1976), pp. 145ff. 9. ABC, 23 October 1936. It cites information from the Morning Post regarding the unloading of war materiel from the Soviet ships Konsomol and Stari Bolchevite. 10. ABC, 21 November 1937. 11. ABC, 11 December 1936, reporting on interceptions by the cruiser Canarias. 12. PRO: CO 91-502-12. 13. ABC, 16 December 1936. The government contemplated enforcing a law approved in 1870, prohibiting British nationals from participating in wars in which the country was not directly involved. 14. Howson, Gerald: Armas para España. La historia no contada de la Guerra Civil española (Barcelona: Península, 2000), p. 61. 15. Quoted by Smyth, Denys: Diplomacy and Strategy of Survival. British Policy and Franco’s Spain, 1940–41 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 11 and 21. 16. See both in PRO: CO 91-500-3. 17. Eden, Anthony: Foreign Affairs (London: Faber and Faber, 1939), p. 241. 18. Ibid., p. 245. 19. Ibid., p. 205. The Times, 19 July 1937. 20. Casanova, Marina: La diplomacia española durante la guerra civil (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1996), pp. 27–29. 21. Ibid., pp. 27–29. 22. Ibid., pp. 31–32. 23. MAE. Archivo Barcelona, RE 34, Report #1. 24. Arias remained loyal to the Republic, just as he had been loyal to previous political regimes. After the end of the war, he sold all his properties and never returned to Spain. Bosano, John: ‘A Tale of Two Consuls’, Insight Magazine (November 1999). 25. MAE: Archivo Barcelona, RE 156, folder 15, sheet 17. 26. PRO: CO 323-1383-9. Peña Orellana was the brother-­in-law of Vicente Álvarez Buylla, Plácido’s brother and a diplomat himself. 27. Sepúlveda Muñoz, Isidro: Gibraltar: la razón y la fuerza (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2004), p. 236. 28. Azcárate, Pablo de: Mi embajada en Londres durante la guerra civil española, p. 27. 29. Jenkins, Roy: Churchill (Madrid: Ediciones Folio, 2003), p. 555. 30. Casanova, Marina: La diplomacia española durante la guerra civil, p. 60. 31. GGA. 268/1939. The request for recognition of Ramón Peña Orellana as chargé of the consulate is dated 4 September (f. 16). Recognition of Plácido Álvarez Buylla was granted on 3 October (f. 19). A document dated 14 January 1937, by Consul Plácido Álvarez Buylla, recognized Juan Bautista Arias as ‘canciller’ (f. 26). 32. GGA. 268/1936. 33. MAE. Archivo Barcelona, box RE 117, folder 5, sheet 7. 34. MAE. Archivo Barcelona, RE 34, reports # 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15 and folders # 32, 33, 34. The request by the Ministry of State, in RE 101, folder 7. 35. MAE. Archivo Barcelona, box RE 133, folder 1, sheet 5.

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36. Larios, José: Combate sobre España. Memorias de un piloto de caza (Madrid: Editorial San Martín, 1982), p. 131. 37. PRO: CO 323-1483-18. 38. On Goizueta’s dismissal and the designation of López Ferrer, see: PRO: CO 91-504-11. 39. PRO: CO 91-501-16. 40. An autobiography of Luis Bolín, in Bolín, Luis: España. Los años vitales (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1967). Regarding the press office, see pp. 197–98. Also: Moradiellos, Enrique: ‘Una guerra civil de tinta: la propaganda republicana y nacionalista en Gran Bretaña durante el conflicto español’, Sistema. Revista de Ciencias Sociales, 164 (2001), pp. 69–97; García, Hugo: The Truth About Spain!: Mobilizing British Public Opinion, 1936–1939 (Sussex: Sussex Academic Press, 2010); Holguín, Sandie: “‘National Spain Invites You”: Battlefield tourism during the Spanish Civil War’, The American Historical Review, 110, 5 (2005), pp. 1399–426; Pack, Sasha D.: Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe’s Peaceful Invasion of Franco’s Spain (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 41. ABC, 20 January 1937. 42. Southworth, Herbert Rutledge: Guernica! Guernica! A Study of Journalism, Diplomacy, Propaganda, and History (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1977), p. 49. Also quoted (in Spanish) in Armero, José Mario: ‘Corresponsales extranjeros en el bando nacional’, AA.VV.: Periodistas y periodismo en la Guerra Civil (Madrid: Fundación Banco Exterior, 1987), p. 53. 43. Keene, Judith: Fighting for Franco. International Volunteers in Nationalist Spain during the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (London: Leicester Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 78–79. 44. A recent re-­edition, in Bahamonde, Antonio: Un año con Queipo de Llano (memorias de un nacionalista) (Sevilla: Espuela de Plata, 2005), pp. 302–3. 45. Brenan, Gerald: Memoria personal 1920–1975 (Madrid: Alianza, 1980), pp. 446–47. 46. Ibid., p. 447. 47. Stockey, Gareth J.: Gibraltar during the years of the Spanish Second Republic and Civil War (c. 1931–1939), University of Lancaster (manuscript not published), p. 44. Based on the Documents on British Foreign Policy. 48. Data taken from the digital archive of The Times. We have calculated frequency based on instances of the term Gibraltar in headlines only. References to the Rock were much more numerous in the full text of the newspaper. 49. Gretton, Peter: El factor olvidado: la marina británica y la guerra civil española (Madrid: San Martín, 1984), p. 157. 50. ABC, 23 July 1937, p. 9. 51. Larios, José: Combate sobre España, pp. 151–52. That year, Cardozo published a book also titled The March of a Nation. 52. The debate between Wall and Beattie, in Téllez, Juan José: Gibraltar en tiempos de los espías (Sevilla: Andalucía abierta, 2005), pp. 88ff. 53. AGA, Asuntos Exteriores, box 3851, ‘Informes sobre el incidente y la actitud de los hermanos Wall’. 54. Gretton, Peter: El factor olvidado, pp. 205–6. 55. Ibid., p. 288. 56. ABC, 14 January 1937. 57. ABC, 31 January 1937. 58. ABC, 2 July 1937, p. 11. 59. Domingo, Marcelino: España ante el mundo (México: Editorial México Nuevo, 1937). 60. Atholl, Katharine M.S.M.: Searchlight on Spain (Harmondswoth: Penguin, 1938); Sarolea, Charles: Daylight on Spain (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1938).

Notes

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61. Italian Prisoners in Spain (New York: Universal Distributions, 1937); Browder, Earl and Lawrence, Bill: Next Steps to Win the War in Spain (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1938). 62. Heiberg, Morten: Emperadores del Mediterráneo. Franco, Mussolini y la guerra civil española (Barcelona: Crítica, 2004), p. 171. 63. Ibid., pp. 175–76. 64. Téllez, Juan José: Gibraltar en tiempos de los espías, p. 66. 65. Pastor Petit, Domingo: Espionaje, España. 1936–1939 (Barcelona: Bruguera, 1977), pp. 51–107 passim. By the same author, Los dossiers secretos de la guerra civil (Barcelona: Argos Vergara, 1978), p. 65. Herbert Greene was very active in service of Great Britain in the republican rear-­guard. He completed his work in 1937, before seeing the end of the war. He had proposed dividing Catalonia from the rest of the Spain and leaving this region under the protection of Great Britan and France, as well as fully dismantling fortifications in the islands of Menorca and Mallorca, under international supervision. He sympathized with the Republic, but his allegiance lay with the interests of his country (Pastor Petit, Domingo: Los dossiers secretos de la Guerra civil, pp. 266–67). 66. Moreno Zuleta was the author of the prologue to the book published by Bertrán in 1940, Experiencias de los Servicios de Información del Nordeste de España (Madrid: Espasa Calpe). 67. Algarbani Rodríguez, José Manuel: ‘El SIPM. El Servicio de Información del Ejército nacional en el Campo de Gibraltar (1936–1939)’, Almoraima, no. 29 (2003), p. 499. 68. Ibid., pp. 502ff. 69. GGA: 117/1937. 70. Cierva, Ricardo de la: ‘La Roca de los espías. Gibraltar en los años treinta’, in Historia y Vida, no. 2 (May 1968), pp. 107–8. 71. Téllez, Juan José: Gibraltar en tiempos de los espías, p. 100. 72. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, box 3847. Along with Moreno Chicano, the arrested were: Manuel López Fernández; Francisco Muñoz Avilés; Dolores García Pérez; Luis Regen Cambino; José Serrano Pérez; Juan Melero Wilson; Sebastián León López; José Chico Lozano; Francisco Hera Martín; Antonio González García; Francisco Cabello Mesa; Juan Rubio Benítez; Enrique Melero Wilson; Manuel Prados López; Carmen Sánchez Maresco; and Pedro Gallardo González. 73. Benady, Samuel M.: Memoirs of a Gibraltarian (1905–1993) (Gibraltar: Gibraltar Books Ltd, 1993). 74. Berllaque, Esteban: ‘A Gibraltarian At War in Spain’, Insight (April 1998), pp. 23–24. He mistakenly includes the United States in the League of Nations. 75. Buxton, H.J.: A Mediterranean Window (Guilford: Biddles Ltd, 1954), pp. 9–13. 76. Gretton, Peter: El factor olvidado, pp. 146–47. 77. Both letters in: Harington, Charles: Tim Harington Looks Back (London: John Murray, 1940), p. 282.

Chapter 5 1. On how the exchange of diplomatic agents was prepared, see: GGA: 600/1937.s 2. Moradiellos, Enrique: La perfidia de Albión. El Gobierno británico y la guerra civil española (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1996), pp. 214–15.

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3. Governor Harington nonetheless requested detailed instructions on how to welcome the sub-agent (consular courtesies, the right to fly the flag in the consulate and official vehicle, etc.). PRO. CO 91-504-11. The British too were extremely cautious in the issue of recognition. The Duke of Seville, for instance, was denied an official visit to Gibraltar, as it could have been seen as a violation of neutrality because he was Francisco de Borbón y de la Torre, the military commander of the Campo de Gibraltar and a member of the Spanish royal family. 4. Falange disliked Consul Muguiro as well and considered him ‘inept’. Tension ran high between Falange’s External Service and traditional Spanish diplomacy. Information taken from www.rumbos.net/rastroria/rastroria06/FE%20Exterior%201.htm (accessed 22 April 2006). 5. Castelló, J.: Marruecos. Recuerdos y comentarios (unpublished manuscript), Chapter 13, 11ff. 6. Cabanellas, Guillermo: La Guerra de los mil días. Nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II República española (México: Grijalbo, 1973), Vol. 1, p. 194 and Vol. 2, p. 902. This author was the son of General Miguel Cabanellas and did not have friendly relations with High Commissioner López Ferrer. He considered the nationalist consul a ‘shady’ character who ‘boasted about having crushed the African Army, trampling over it with his civilian boots’. 7. Fernández Arias, Adelardo: Vísperas de sangre en Marruecos (Madrid: Imprenta de Galo Sáez, 1933), p. 45. 8. Ibid., pp. 146–48. 9. Viñas, Angel: Guerra, dinero, dictadura. Ayuda fascista y autarquía en la España de Franco (Barcelona: Crítica, 1984), p. 163. 10. Serrano Súñer, Ramón: Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar (Madrid: Publicaciones Españolas, 1947), p. 79. 11. ABC, 23 November 1937, p. 9; and 18 December 1937, p. 8. Translator’s note: the quote is translated from the words in Spanish published in ABC; we do not know which language the ‘commercial agent’ used on this occasion. 12. Hodgson, Robert: Franco frente a Hitler (Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1954), pp. 112–14. 13. Ibid., p. 99. 14. Keene, Judith: Fighting for Franco. International Volunteers in Nationalist Spain during the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (London: Leicester University Press, 2001), p. 47, footnote 10. 15. AA.VV.: Política comercial exterior en España (1931–1975) (Madrid: Banco Exterior de España, 1979), 2 vols, p. 143 and p. 153. 16. Ibid., p. 192. 17. Ibid., p. 155. 18. ABC, 10 March 1937. 19. Cabanellas, Guillermo: La Guerra de los mil días, p. 743 and p. 1081. 20. Quoted in: Moradiellos, Enrique: El reñidero de Europa. Las dimensiones internacionales de la guerra civil española (Barcelona: Península, 2001), p. 135. 21. GGA. 621/1937. 22. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, Box 3844. The allocation for December 1938 was $911.05 (US). 23. MAE. Archivo Barcelona, RE 165 leg. 2, carpeta 6. 24. Fernando González-Arnao had been consul shortly before Monguió (since March 1938) – there was a revealingly high rate of turnover at the republican consulate. GGA. 268/1936.

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25. Bolín, Luis: España. Los años vitales (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1967), p. 245. 26. Phillips, Cecil Ernest Lucas: The Spanish Pimpernel (London: Heinemann, 1960), Spanish Edition: El pimpinela de la guerra española, 1936–39 (Barcelona: Juventud, 1965), p. 115. Reynolds, Reg: Gibraltar Connections (Gibraltar: Guide Line, 1999), pp. 219–24. 27. Ibid., p. 149. Let us recall that Pablo Merry del Val personally handed Lance a list of people to be evacuated from the republican zone (p. 79). 28. Reynolds, Reg: Gibraltar Connections (Gibraltar: Guide Line Promotions, 1999), pp. 85–87. The author takes his information from the book The Philby Files, by the Soviet General Borovik, though Philby himself does not mention this episode in his book The Silent War. 29. The republican prisoners were José María Aguilar Calvo (brother of a Popular Front MP), Francisco Martín Tejada (former secretary of Martínez Barrio), Manuel León Álvarez Fernández (Unión Republicana’s leader in Seville), a son of the socialist Manuel Cañete and a sister and three children of Saturnino Barneto. 30. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, Box 3850. 31. Larios, José: Combate sobre España. Memorias de un piloto de caza (Madrid: Editorial San Martín, 1982), p. 179. 32. GGA. 160/1937 33. Téllez, Juan José: Gibraltar en tiempos de los espías (Sevilla: Andalucía abierta, 2005), p. 78. 34. Rubio, Javier: Asilos y canjes durante la guerra civil española (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1979), pp. 304, 309–10. The nationalist ‘consulate’ requested Great Britain to send the refugees to Gibraltar rather than Marseilles, as this would make it easier for them to return to the nationalist zone. 35. PRO. CO 91-503-8. Confidential report by the governor of Gibraltar, f. 3. Also, PRO. HO 213–283. 36. ABC, 20 and 26 May 1937. Four hundred and fifty people were shipped to Valencia on the hospital boat Maine. Two days later, a further 439 were transferred. 37. PRO. CO 91-504-2. 38. PRO. CO 91-501-4. 39. Moreno González, Remigio: Yo acuso . . . (Ciento treinta y tres días al servicio del Gobierno de Madrid) (Tánger: Imprenta F. Erola, 1939), especially 325ff. Report by the civil governor in AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, Box 3851. 40. Stockey, Gareth J.: Gibraltar during the years of the Spanish Second Republic and Civil War (c. 1931–1939), University of Lancaster (unpublished manuscript), p. 57. 41. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, Box 3851. 42. AHN. Diversos. Fondo Diego Martínez Barrio, leg. 2, carp. 7. 43. Cabanellas, Guillermo: La Guerra de los mil días, p. 861, footnote 96. The news was received in a United Press cable, probably sent from Gibraltar. 44. AGGC. Masonería, Box 743, exp. 8. 45. AGGC. Masonería, Box 758, exp. 13 A. 46. As late as 1938, a considerable number of refugees remained at the Rock. A detailed list of their names can be found in GGA. 89/1938. 47. ABC, 6 May 1938, p. 15. 48. Rubio, Javier: Asilos y canjes surante la guerra civil española, p. 351. 49. ABC, 6 October 1938. The report, in Gibraltar Chronicle, 6 September 1938. 50. MAE. Archivo Burgos, leg. 1057.

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51. PRO: CO 91-506-9. The governor’s report was brought on by a question raised in the British Parliament by George Strauss. 52. Rubio, Javier: Asilos y canjes durante la guerra civil española, p. 351. 53. Sánchez Asiaín, José Angel: Economía y finanzas en la Guerra Civil española (1936–1939) (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1999), pp. 52–68 passim. 54. ABC, 17 and 19 March 1937. 55. Ibid., p. 90. 56. GGA. 452/1936. 57. ABC, 8 April 1937. On a relatively regular basis, the Gibraltar Chronicle laconically reported the exchange rate to 2 pesetas. 58. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, Box 3851. 59. The Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce acknowledged this. Report of the Board of Directors of the Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce for the Year 1937. We are grateful to the chamber for providing this information. 60. Cited in Téllez, Juan José: Gibraltar en tiempos de los espías, p. 97. The republican chiefs of staff informed the Ministry of State that twelve Italian pilots had disembarked from the steamship Reza and that, ‘against the rules of the stronghold’, they had departed for Seville in military vehicles. The previous day, the steamship Gerano had unloaded 250 tons of fuel in Gibraltar, to be shipped to Algeciras. MAE. Archivo Barcelona, leg. RE Caja 99, carpeta 7, pliego 3 (16 October 1936). 61. Stockey, Gareth J.: Gibraltar during the years of the Second Republic and Civil War, pp. 75ff. 62. Benady, Tito: The Royal Navy at Gibraltar (Gibraltar: Gibraltar Books Ltd, 2000), pp. 134–35. 63. González Dorado, A.: Sevilla: Centralidad regional y organización interna de su espacio urbano (Sevilla: Ayuntamiento, 2001), 2nd edn, p. 159. 64. The data regarding traffic at the port of Seville are taken from the information compiled by Francisco Javier Hernández Navarro (Archivo del Puerto de Sevilla, books number 69–72, 1936 and 1937). We thank him for his kindness in making this information available to us. 65. Téllez, Juan José: Gibraltar en tiempos de los espías, p. 94. 66. A list of the company’s vessels and their tonnage can be found at www.usmm.org/ ships1939.html (accessed 15 January 2014). 67. www.simplonpc.co.uk/AmericanExport.html (accessed 20 January 2014). 68. www.blandgroup.gi (accessed 20 January 2014). 69. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, Box 3853. David Benaim was yet another merchant who requested favours in return for his aid to the insurgents (Box 3844). 70. Ibid. 71. Howson, Gerald: Armas para España. La historia no contada de la Guerra Civil española (Barcelona: Península, 2000), pp. 111–12. (English version: Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War, John Murray, 1998). 72. Téllez, Juan José: Gibraltar en tiempos de los espías, pp. 93–94. 73. Díaz Arriaza, José: La Diputación de Sevilla al inicio de la guerra civil (julio-diciembre 1936) (Universidad de Sevilla, 2003, unpublished thesis). 74. Téllez, Juan José: Gibraltar en tiempos de los espías, p. 93. 75. Torres Robles, Alfonso: El Lobby judío (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2002), p. 69. 76. Avni, Haim: España, Franco y los judíos (Madrid: Altalena, 1982), pp. 77–78. 77. Cited in Sánchez Soler, Mariano: Ricos por la patria (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 2001), p. 43.

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78. Stockey, Gareth J.: Gibraltar during the years of the Second Republic and Civil War, p. 76 and 77. 79. ABC, 2 and 8 February 1938. 80. ABC, 14 May 1938. 81. ABC, 15 June 1938. 82. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, box 7212. 83. The torpedo-armed motorboats sent by the Soviet Union were not very successful either, as they were also of low quality. The names Javier Quiroga and Cándido Pérez were a tribute to the commander and engineer of the Francoist armed bou trawler Virgen del Carmen. They had been arrested by the ship’s crew and tried in Bilbao. They were executed on 11 January 1937. We are grateful to Mr Xoán Porto, coordinator of revistanaval.com, for providing this information (June 2003). 84. The Gobeo had been built in Great Britain in 1921 and belonged to the Cantábrica de Navegación. Begoña Valera was among the refugees on board the ship when it was captured. Her eyewitness account in Elordi, Carlos (ed.): Los años difíciles. El testimonio de los protagonistas anónimos de la guerra civil y la posguerra (Madrid: Aguilar, 2002), pp. 119–24. 85. A case in point is the movement of merchant ships in 1938, which can be found in PRO. FO 371/22663. 86. Eden, Anthony: Foreign Affairs (London: Faber & Faber, 1939), p. 220. 87. Benady, Tito: The Royal Navy at Gibraltar, p. 134.

Chapter 6 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

PRO. FO 371/22662. ABC, 2 March 1938. Ibid.; for Marie Louise Maxwell Scott’s words, see AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, box 3851. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, box 3851. ABC, 6 March 1938. Garratt, Geoffrey Theodore: Gibraltar and the Mediterranean (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939), pp. 299–300. 7. Bowers, Claude G.: Misión en España. En el umbral de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, 1933–1939 (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1977), p. 344. Translator’s note: the quote has been retrieved from the original English version: Bowers, Claude G.: My Mission to Spain: Watching the Rehearsal for World War II (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1954). 8. GGA. 116/1938. A transcript of the speech had been published in Spanish by ABC, 19 July 1939. 9. Press clippings in GGA. 116/1938. 10. ABC, 26 April 1938. 11. ABC, 25 May 1938. Coincidentally, the same consul (López Ferrer) who had witnessed how the flag was changed in 1931 now saw the two-­coloured flag raised again. 12. Foreign Office letter on the acceptance of López Ferrer and containing instructions regarding how he was to be treated, vid. GGA. 600/1937. 13. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, box 3853. Also, MAE. Archivo Burgos, leg. 1057. 14. PRO. FO 371-22663. Also see López Ferrer’s complaints regarding the nameplate incident, GGA 600/1937. 15. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, box 3852. 16. PRO. CO 93-8.

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17. ABC, 11 August 1937, p. 14. It quotes Godley’s letter, omitting several paragraphs. 18. Stockey, Gareth J.: Gibraltar during the years of the Spanish Second Republic and Civil War (c. 1931–1939), University of Lancaster (unpublished manuscript), pp. 77ff. 19. Moreno Juliá provides an indirect reference to an occasion on which Spanish artillery opened fire on a British aircraft over Algeciras, apparently resulting in a brief exchange of fire. However, this information is difficult to verify as it is based solely on the account of the German ambassador in Madrid and it was probably no more than a mere skirmish. In any event, it seems safe to say that no key British installations were attacked. Moreno Juliá, X.: La División Azul (Barcelona: Crítica, 2004), p. 78. 20. PRO. CAB 2/7, quoted by Moradiellos, Enrique: La perfidia de Albión. El Gobierno británico y la guerra civil española (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1996), p. 301. 21. Fernández Sánchez, Manuel Carlos: Historia del cine en el Campo de Gibraltar (1895–2000) (Sevilla: Grupo de Investigación Evaluación y Tecnología EducativaBahía, 2002), p. 139. 22. Smyth, Denys: Diplomacy and Strategy of Survival. British Policy and Franco’s Spain, 1940–41 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 12. 23. This problem in PRO. CO 323-1612-17. 24. Guilloto y González, Fernando: Cinco años de la historia de Cádiz, 1936–1940 (Ayuntamiento de Cádiz: Cuadernos de la Cátedra Adolfo de Castro, 1988), pp. 38–39. 25. Monroe, Elizabeth: The Mediterranean in Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), especially pp. 221–31. 26. PRO. FO 371-22588. 27. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939. Vol. 3, pp. 285–311. 28. Gómez Mendoza, Antonio: El ‘Gibraltar económico’: Franco y Ríotinto, 1936–1954 (Madrid: Ed. Civitas-Fundación Ríotinto, 1994), pp. 67–68. The lack of understanding between the company and the British government had been obvious since the summer of 1938. 29. Peace initiatives in PRO. FO 371/22662. 30. Moradiellos, Enrique: La perfidia de Albión, p. 323. 31. Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Gibraltar, 1938 (London: 1939), PRO. CO 1045-171. 32. ABC, 14 October 1938. 33. ABC, 25 November 1938 and 15 December 1938. 34. ABC, 8 and 10 March 1939. 35. ABC, 15 January 1938. 36. Keene, Judith: Fighting for Franco. International Volunteers in Nationalist Spain during the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (London: Leicester University Press, 2001), pp. 46–48, 51, 69. 37. The arguments in defence of the internment of the ship were put forward by a professor of international law, Camilo Barcia Trelles. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, box 3847. 38. On 20 June 1939, after the war had ended, the newspaper Solidaridad Nacional published an article titled ‘When the London Falange tried to capture the José Luis Díez’. This information has been retrieved from: www.rumbos.net/rastroria/ rastroria06/FE%20Exterior%201.htm (accessed 20 April 2006). 39. Téllez, Juan José: Gibraltar en tiempos de los espías (Sevilla: Andalucía abierta, 2005), p. 127.

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40. A more subjective account of these events can be found in Alonso, Bruno: La flota republicana y la guerra civil de España (Sevilla: Ediciones Espuela de Plata, 2006), pp. 129–37. 41. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, box 3845. 42. Ibid, pp. 512–25. 43. A detailed account of the events can be found in Romero Bartomeus, Luis: ‘La estancia del destructor republicano José Luis Díez en Gibraltar (agosto-­diciembre 1938)’, Almoraima, 29 (2003), pp. 509–25. ABC, 26 March 1939.

Chapter 7 1. PRO. ADM 116/4994. Report on Labour Conditions in Gibraltar. Information from the Gibraltarian police. 2. PRO: FO 371-24153. One of these documents claimed that the British government would not evacuate ‘criminals’. 3. Press clippings in AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, box 6931. 4. Hodgson, Robert: Franco frente a Hitler (Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1954), pp. 106–7. 5. Benady, Tito: The Royal Navy at Gibraltar (Gibraltar: Gibraltar Books Ltd, 2000), pp. 135–36. 6. PRO: ADM 116-4994. Report on local workers in the shipyard of Gibraltar. 7. Benady, Tito: ‘El aeródromo de Gibraltar’, Almoraima, 29 (2003), p. 530. 8. Téllez, Juan José: Gibraltar en tiempos de los espías (Sevilla: Andalucía abierta, 2005), pp. 102–3. 9. Hodgson, Robert: Franco frente a Hitler, pp. 314–15. 10. Ibid. 11. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, vol. IV, pp. 103–4. 12. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, vol. V, pp. 54–57; 70-71; 118–19; 142–45; 152–53; 160–61; 170–71 and 222–23. 13. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, box 3844. 14. The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 February 1939, p. 12. Also quoted by Hills, George: El Peñón de la discordia. Historia de Gibraltar (Madrid: Editorial San Martín, 1974), pp. 503–4. 15. Documents referring to these incidents are available in several archives (MAE, AGA, PRO). In Gibraltar, see: GGA 68/1939. The pro-­republican demonstrators claimed that they had heard the Marchioness of Povar cry ‘death to England!’ from the nationalist consulate. 16. MAE. Archivo Burgos, leg. 1057. 17. ABC, 9 February 1939. Cited by Luna y Sánchez, José Carlos de: Historia de Gibraltar (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1944), p. 501. 18. Ibid. 19. MAE. Archivo Burgos, leg. 1057. 20. MAE. Archivo Burgos, leg. 1057. 21. MAE. Archivo Burgos, leg. 1057. 22. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, box 3851. 23. MAE. Archivo Burgos, leg. 1188, exp. 78. 24. The Marquis of Bellpuig was consul in Gibraltar until June 1941, when he was sent to the consulate in Yokohama. Leopoldo J. Yome Pizarro stayed on as vice-­consul. In

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those days, the Spanish consulate took care of Italian affairs on the Rock. See Bellpuig’s farewell letter, GGA. 285/1939. 25. ‘Consideraciones a un incidente en Algeciras. Lo cortés y lo valiente’ in El Anunciador, 16 August 1939. The Spanish perspective on the incident in MAE: Archivo Burgos, leg. R. 1065. 26. Bolín, Luis: España. Los años vitales (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1967), p. 314. According to Luis Bolín the consulate had information regarding attempts to sabotage the nationalists’ tourist routes toward the north and in the Seville-Jerez-Cadiz-AlgecirasMalaga-Granada-Cordoba area. 27. MAE. Archivo Burgos, leg. R. 1065. 28. Tornay, Francisco et al.: Gibraltar y su prensa (Cádiz: Diputación Provincial, 1997), p. 52. 29. Cabanellas, Guillermo: La Guerra de los mil días. Nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II República española (México: Grijalbo, 1973), p. 1121. 30. Gibraltar Chronicle, 1 September 1939. Press clipping in MAE. Archivo Burgos, leg. 1057. 31. GGA. 192/1940. Political Review of Events in Spain during the Year 1939, p. 8. 32. Garcés, Joan E.: Soberanos e intervenidos. Estrategias globales, americanos y españoles (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2000, 2nd edn), pp. 5ff. 33. Ibid., pp. 367–68. 34. Heiberg, Morten: Emperadores del Mediterráneo. Franco, Mussolini y la guerra civil española (Barcelona: Crítica, 2004), p. 209. The author claims to know the names of the Spanish businessmen in Seville. 35. MAE. Archivo Burgos, leg. R 2270, exp. 15. 36. MAE. Archivo Burgos, leg. R 1190, exp. 1 and leg. R 1065, exp. 23. 37. AGA. Asuntos Exteriores, box 3848. 38. These reports can be found in FNFF, document numbers 24019, 24024, 24025, 24046, 24047 and 24049.

Closing thoughts 1. 25 años de relaciones internacionales (Madrid: Delegación Nacional de Organizaciones del Movimiento, 1961), p. 26. The original quotes in: Hayes, Carlton J.H.: Wartime Mission in Spain, 1942–1945 (New York: Macmillan, 1945), and Hogg, Quintin: The Left Was Never rRight (London: Faber and Faber, 1965). 2. Collado Seidel, Carlos: España, refugio nazi (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2005), pp. 31–53. 3. Preston, Paul: La política de la venganza. El fascismo y el militarismo en la España del siglo XX (Barcelona: Península, 1999), p. 108. 4. Despite the traditionally cautious manner of Vatican diplomacy, Pope Pius XII was quite expressive in his messages to ‘Catholic Spain’, which had ‘just given the converts to materialist atheism of our century the most sublime proof that the eternal values of religion and spirit stand above all else’. Quoted by Preston, Paul: La política de la venganza, p. 87. 5. Plot to destroy the British naval units at Gibraltar, in PRO. FO 371-24006. 6. PRO. FO 372-3320. The events took place in March 1939. 7. PRO. TO 160-851. Resumption of Clearing Negotiations following Recognition of Franco Government. It is worth noting that this file was not made available to researchers until 1990.

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8. Smyth, Denys: Diplomacy and Strategy of Survival. British Policy and Franco’s Spain, 1940–41 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 24. 9. Rico, Gumersindo: La población de Gibraltar (sus orígenes, naturaleza y sentido) (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1967), p. 140. 10. Luna y Sánchez, José Carlos de: Historia de Gibraltar (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1944), p. 500. 11. Hispanus (pseudonym of José Díaz de Villegas): El Estrecho de Gibraltar. Su función en la geopolítica nacional (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1953), pp. 147, 370. 12. Literally: ‘The fate of Gibraltar is thus dependent on the events of the war, of this war declared by England and France and Germany and on which the fate of the world and of civilization also depend’. Gibraltar Español: Reseña gráfica de una parte de nuestro territorio nacional (Barcelona: Edic. Patria, 1940), unpaginated. 13. Vázquez Sans, Juan: España ante Inglaterra, (Madrid: 1940), p. 108. 14. Ibid., p. 169. 15. Cabanellas, Guillermo: La Guerra de los mil días. Nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II República española (México: Grijalbo, 1973), p. 1132. 16. Cfr.: Hispanus: El Estrecho de Gibraltar, p. 402. 17. Ibid., pp. 401–2. 18. Bolín, Luis: España. Los años vitales (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1967), p. 229. 19. Luna, José Carlos de: Historia de Gibraltar, p. 488. 20. Haushofer was the director of a seminar in which possibilities of attacks on Gibraltar were discussed. His ideas were similar to those of Professor Ewald Banse, who in 1933 published a book titled Raum und Volk im Weltkriege and translated into English as Germany, Prepared for War! (London: Lovat Dickson, 1934). Germany was obviously preparing for an imminent conflict. 21. Ros Agudo, Manuel: ‘Preparativos secretos de Franco para atacar Gibraltar (1939– 1941)’, Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, no. 23 (2001), pp. 299–313. 22. Deacon, Richard: Historia del servicio secreto británico (Barcelona: Ediciones Picazo, 1973), pp. 371–79, especially p. 373. 23. PRO. CO 537/4059. We would like to thank Jonathan Jeffries for sending us these and other documents. 24. Álvarez del Vayo, Julio: Freedom’s Battle (New York: 1940), p. 70, quoted by Little, Douglas: Malevolent neutrality. United States, Great Britain and the origins of the Spanish Civil War (New York: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 17.

References The following list includes most of the primary and secondary sources used in this book. Nevertheless, the reader will find some additional references mentioned in each chapter’s notes. It is worth mentioning that the bibliography includes books used to establish the general context, as well as others focusing on the Second World War (which include information on the years between 1936 and 1939), as well as personal testimonies (such as that of Carlos Castilla del Pino).

Archives Archivo General de la Guerra Civil (AGGC). Salamanca. Archivo General de la Administración (AGA). Alcalá de Henares (Madrid). Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN). Madrid. Archivo Manuel Giménez Fernández (AMGF). Hemeroteca Municipal de Sevilla. Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco (FNFF). Madrid. Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce. Gibraltar. Gibraltar Government Archives (GGA). Gibraltar. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (MAE). Madrid. The National Archives. Public Record Office (PRO). Kew, London.

Press ABC El Anunciador El Calpense El Correo de Andalucía (Sevilla) Gibraltar Chronicle Gibraltar Post Social Action The Times Vox

Bibliography Articles and chapters Algarbani Rodríguez, José Manuel and Torres Barranco, Francisco: ‘Apuntes sobre la Guerra Civil en el Campo de Gibraltar’, Almoraima, 21 (1999).

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Algarbani Rodríguez, José Manuel: ‘Gibraltar y la política británica en la guerra civil española’, Almoraima, 25 (2001). Algarbani Rodríguez, José Manuel: ‘El SIPM. El Servicio de Información del Ejército nacional en el Campo de Gibraltar (1936–1939)’, Almoraima, 29 (2003). Arribas Martín, J.T.: ‘El Estrecho de Gibraltar, los archipiélagos españoles y los intereses británicos, 1898–1918’, II Aula Canarias y el Noroeste de Africa (Gran Canaria, 1988). Beiso, Denis: ‘Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil War’, Gibraltar Heritage Journal, 7 (2000). Beiso, Denis: ‘The social impact of the Spanish Civil War on Gibraltar’, Gibraltar Heritage Journal, 7 (2001). Benady, Tito: ‘El aeródromo de Gibraltar’, Almoraima, 25 (2003). Benyunes, Isaac: ‘Gibraltar during the Spanish Civil War’, Gibraltar Heritage Journal, 2 (1994). Berllaque, Esteban: ‘A Gibraltarian at War in Spain’, Insight Magazine (April 1998). Bosano, John: ‘A Tale of Two Consuls’, Insight Magazine (November 1999). Bywater, Hector C.: ‘The Changing Balance of Powers in the Mediterranean’, International Affairs, 16, 3 (May–June 1937). Carlton, David: ‘Eden, Blum and the Origins of Non-Intervention’, Journal of Contemporary History, 6, 3 (1971). Cierva, Ricardo de la: ‘La Roca de los espías. Gibraltar en los años treinta’, Historia y Vida, 2 (May 1968). Clarence-Smith, Gervase: ‘The Impact of the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War on Portuguese and Spanish Africa’, The Journal of African History, 26, 4 (1985). Corbin, John: ‘Truth and Myth in History: An Example from the Spanish Civil War’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 25, 4 (1995). Davies, Viv: ‘Gibraltar during the Spanish Civil War’, Discover Gibraltar, 6 (September 1989). East, Gordon: ‘The Mediterranean Problem’, Geographical Review, 28, 1 (January 1938). España Guerrero, José: ‘La política británica en el peñón entre julio y septiembre de 1936. Gibraltar al empezar la Guerra Civil’, Historia 16, 318 (2002). Fleming, Shannon E.: ‘Spanish Morocco and the Alzamiento Nacional, 1936–1939: The Military, Economic and Political Mobilization of a Protectorate’, Journal of Contemporary History, 18 (January 1983). Goda, Norman J. W.: ‘The Riddle of the Rock: A Reassessment of German Motives for the Capture of Gibraltar in the Second World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, 28 (April 1993). Holguín, Sandie: ‘ “National Spain Invites You”: Battlefield Tourism during the Spanish Civil War’, The American Historical Review, 110, 5 (2005). Hubbard, John R.: ‘How Franco Financed His War’, The Journal of Modern History, 25 (December 1953). Jeffries, Jonathan: ‘Los refugiados republicanos entre la espada y la pared, franquismo, el Imperio británico y solidaridad obrera en Gibraltar’, Cuadernos Republicanos, 63 (2007). Little, Douglas: ‘Red Scare, 1936: Anti-Bolshevism and the Origins of British NonIntervention in the Spanish Civil War’, Journal of Contemporary History, 23, 2 (April 1988). Lowry, B.: ‘El indefendible Peñón, Inglaterra y la permuta de Gibraltar por Ceuta, 1917–1919’, Revista de Política Internacional, 153 (1977). Moradiellos, Enrique: ‘Una guerra civil de tinta: la propaganda republicana y nacionalista en Gran Bretaña durante el conflicto español’, Sistema. Revista de Ciencias Sociales, 164 (2001).

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Morales Benítez, Antonio: ‘Gibraltareños en la masonería española (1911–1936)’, Almoraima, 29 (2003). Morales Benítez, Antonio and Sigler Silvera, Fernando: ‘Gibraltar y la masonería de obediencia española’, in Ferrer Benimeli, José Antonio (ed.): La Masonería en la España del siglo XX, Vol. II, Toledo: CEHME-Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha y Cortes de Castilla-La Mancha (1996). O’Rourke, Vernon A.: ‘Recognition of Belligerency and the Spanish War’, The American Journal of International Law, 31, 3 (July 1937). Padelford, Norman J.: ‘The International Non-Intervention Agreement and the Spanish Civil War’, The American Journal of International Law, 31, 4 (October 1937). Padelford, Norman J.: ‘Foreign Shipping During the Spanish Civil War’, The American Journal of International Law, 32, 2 (April 1938). Polo Sánchez, Ma Teresa: ‘Los grupos de presión ante las relaciones comerciales hispano-­ británicas y la prensa inglesa, 1926–1932’, in Documentos de trabajo de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Document number 9001. Ponce Alberca, Julio: ‘La guerra civil española y Gibraltar. Los refugiados españoles en el Peñón’, Almoraima, 25 (2001). Ponce Alberca, Julio: ‘La Guerra Civil y el Peñón de Gibraltar’, Historia Contemporánea, 41 (2010). Portero, Florentino: ‘El contencioso gibraltareño, 1936–1991’, Historia 16, 186 (November 1991). Reinharz, Jehuda: ‘His Majesty’s Emissary: Chaim Weizmann’s Mission to Gibraltar in 1917’, Journal of Contemporary History, 27, 2 (April 1992). Romero Bartomeus, Luis: ‘La estancia del destructor republicano José Luis Díez en Gibraltar (agosto-­diciembre, 1938)’, Almoraima, 29 (2003). Ros Agudo, Manuel: ‘Preparativos secretos de Franco para atacar Gibraltar (1939–1941)’, Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, 23 (2001). Sáez Rodríguez, Ángel J.: ‘España ante la II Guerra Mundial. El sistema defensivo contemporáneo del Campo de Gibraltar’, Historia Actual Online, 24 (2011). Sánchez Mantero, Rafael: ‘Difícil convivencia en el siglo XIX’, Historia 16, 186 (November 1991). Sepúlveda Muñoz, Isidro: ‘Instrumentalización nacionalista del irredentismo: Gibraltar y el nacionalismo español’, Spagna Contemporanea, 9 (1996). Stone, Glyn: ‘Sir Robert Vansittart and Spain, 1931–1941’, in Otte, T.T. and Pagedas, C.A. (eds): Personalities, War and Diplomacy: Essays in International History, London: Frank Cass (1997). Vallejo, Tito: ‘The Eagle and the Whale’, The Gibraltar Heritage Trust (2001). Velarde Fuertes, Juan: ‘El capítulo marítimo de la economía de la Guerra de España’, Razón Española, 113 (May–June 2002). Whealey, Robert H.: ‘How Franco Financed his War–Reconsidered’, Journal of Contemporary History, 12 (January 1977). Whealey, Robert H.: ‘La intervención extranjera en la guerra civil española’, in Carr, Raymond: Estudios sobre la República y la guerra civil española, Madrid: Sarpe,1985. Wheeler, Douglas L.: ‘In the Service of Order: The Portuguese Political Police and the British, German and Spanish Intelligence, 1932–1945’, Journal of Contemporary History, 18, 1 (January, 1983). Wright, Quincy: ‘The Present Status of Neutrality’, The American Journal of International Law, 34, 3 (July 1940).

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Index

ABC 37, 75, 107, 109 Acción Republicana 93 Aguilar Calvo, José María 167n. 29 air defences 35, 42–3, 44, 104, 111, 113, 123 airlifts 40, 43 airport airport expansion 11 construction of 35, 111, 123–4, 133, 138 Gibraltar Airways 100 need for 35 strategic importance in Second World War 113 Alba, Duque de (Jacobo Fitz-James Stuart y Falcó) 72, 85, 95, 108, 116, 124 Alcalá Zamora, Niceto 26–7, 29, 94 Alcira (ship) 103 Alexandria 10 Alfonso XIII 18, 25, 27, 42 Algarbani Rodríguez, José Manuel 4, 119 Algeciras coastal artillery 127 and the ‘convoy of Victory’ 43 evacuees taken to 91 under nationalist control 40 population of 17 risk of attack 42, 112 as source of workers 22, 36 taking of 43 violence in 55, 58–9 weaponry installed in 111 Algeria 21 Alhucemas 13 Alicante 51, 56, 63, 91 Allen, Jay 74 Allen, Mary 73 Alloucherie, Jean 74 Almeria 104

Alonso, Bruno 171n. 40 Alonso Vital, Antonio 70 Alpert, Michael 4, 40 Álvarez Alonso, Juan Antonio 101 Álvarez Buylla, Plácido 69, 70, 86–7, 94 Álvarez Buylla, Vicente 68, 69, 70, 86 Álvarez del Vayo, Julio 143 Álvarez Fernández, Manuel León 167n. 29 American Export Lines 100, 101 American War Memorial 105 Andes, Conde de los (Francisco Moreno Zuleta) 30, 80 Andrews, Allen 5 Anglo-American policies towards Spanish conflict 61–2 anti-aircraft umbrella 35, 42, 49, 111, 123 anti-communism 22, 48, 92–3, 115, 122, 138, 143 anti-republicanism 27, 33, 34, 36–7, 39 anti-submarine defences 123 Anunciador, El 22, 76 appeasement policy 7, 32, 65, 75, 98, 109, 112, 116, 142, 143 see also non-intervention policy Araquistáin, Luis 67 archives used for research 5–6 Arcos, Marqués de los (Luis Martínez de Irujo y Caro) 85 Arias, Juan Bautista 68, 70 aristocracy and noblemen 20, 30, 34, 48, 55, 71, 80, 81, 85, 117 Ark Royal, HMS 35 Armero, José Mario 164n. 42 armistice, proposed 115–16 arms trading see weapons Arnao, Fernando 109 Artaza, Conde de 85 artillery attack, risk of 111–12, 124

Index Asensio, José 43 Aspery, Carlos 57 asylum, Gibraltar providing see refugees Atholl, Katharine 65, 78 Attlee, Clement 65 Atunara beach 44 Aunós, Eduardo 109 Autonomía (masonic lodge) 31, 57, 95 Avni, Haim 161n. 48, 168n. 76 Azaña, Manuel 27, 33, 89 Azcárate, Pablo 67, 69 Backhouse, Almirante 77 Bahamonde, Antonio 164n. 44 Baldwin, Stanley 7, 46, 64, 74, 75, 83, 112 Baleares (ship) 47, 55, 122, 129 Balearic Islands 9, 10, 14, 21, 126, 133, 134 banks 20, 117 Barcelona, fall of 128–30 Barcia Trelles, Camilo 170n. 37 Barclays bank 20, 35, 117 Barnés y Salinas, Francisco 119 Barneto, Saturnino 167n. 29 Barroso, José 30 Basques 50, 116 Batavier 100 Battle of Annual (1921) 12 Battle of Binakayan 9 Battle of Trafalgar 15–16 Bautista Arias, Juan 68, 70 Beattie, Alexander 76, 117, 131 Beevor, Anthony 159n. 13 Beigbeder Atienza, Juan 81, 131 Beiso, D. 36 Bellarque, Esteban 82 Benady, Samuel M 81 Benady, Tito 4 Benaim, David 168n. 69 Benholta 102 Bensusan, Abraham 58, 59 Bentotila 102 Benyunes, Benedetto 59 Benyunes, Isaac 37 Benzimra, Judah 53, 59 Berllaque, Esteban 165n. 74 Bertrán y Musitu, José 80 Besteiro, Julián 88, 89, 134 Blance (ship) 51 Bland, Marcus Henry 22, 100

187

Bland Group 100–1 blockades, naval 39, 40, 44, 63 Bolín, Luis 73, 90, 142 Bolshevism 41, 108 Bonnet, Georges 114 Borbon, Carlos de 28 Borbón, Juan de 29 Borbón y de la Torre, Francisco 80 border (Spain-Gibraltar) construction of gates 92 exceptions to the rules 99 gates 92, 132 implementation of non-intervention plan 63–4 letting through facists 64–5 neglected in early 1930s 30 in Non-Intervention Committee plan 63 permeability of (early twentieth century) 10 refugees through land border 53, 95 shifting of 11, 123 border controls 30, 53, 63 borders with other countries 63, 113 Bosano, John 68 Bowers, Claude G. 33, 34, 108 Bowles, Thomas Gibson 11, 12, 15 Brenan, Gerald 74 Brewster, W. M. 101 Bristol Hotel 29 Brooks, Brigadier 42 Browder, Earl 78 Buchanan, Tom 4 Buckley, Henry 46 Bueno, Juan 56 business and commerce see also supplies; trade British businesses in Spain 13 businessmen and espionage 59 businessmen and pro-nationalism 48 businessmen in support of rebels 45 commercial relations in Second World War 139 German trading with Spain in Second World War 135 Gibraltar as commercial centre 18–19 refuelling and reprovisioning 40–1 supplying the nationalists 59 and violation of Gibraltar’s neutrality 99–105 Buxton, H. I. 82

188

Index

Caballero, José 56 Cabanellas, Guillermo 156n. 36, 162n. 71, 166n. 6, 166n. 19, 167n. 43, 172n. 29, 173n. 15 Cabanellas, Miguel 65, 66, 86 Cadiz 40, 43, 125 Cadogan, Alexander 62 Calpe Hunt conflict 47 Calpense, El 22, 31, 76, 132 Calvo Sotelo, José 31 Camperio, Fillippo (frigate captain) 13 Campo area 12, 17, 18, 44, 54–6, 77, 80, 90, 92, 117, 124, 132, 133, 135, 139, 140, 143 CAMPSA 101 Canadian sources of information 7 Canarias (ship) 44, 47, 82 Canary Islands 9, 63, 126, 133, 134 Cañas Trujillo, Leopoldo 70 Cánovas Ortega, Antonio 31, 67, 141 Capaz, Osvaldo 86 capital transit/capital flight 18–19, 20, 35, 87 Cardozo, Harold G. 75 cargo increases in Seville 99–100 Caro Cancela, Diego 157n. 21 Carrasco Téllez, Rafael 95 Carvajal, Marquis de 37 Casanova, Marina 65 Casares Quiroga, Santiago 59 Cascales Lozano, Francisco 56 Cascales Lozano, José 56 Castro, Américo 67 Catalans 116 Catholic church 22, 36, 45, 77, 89, 118, 120, 122, 138 censorship 118 Centeno González, José 94 Cervantes (battleship) 41, 42, 43 Cervera 44, 105 Ceuta 9, 13–14, 35, 40, 42, 68, 70, 133 coastal artillery 127 and the ‘convoy of Victory’ 43 possible exchange of Gibraltar for 13, 14, 15 weaponry installed in 111 Chacón de la Mata, Adolfo 30 Chacón Martorell, Francisco 56 Chafarinas 14

Chamberlain, Neville 7, 75, 104, 107, 109, 112, 114, 116, 121, 126, 128 Chatfield, Lord 77 ‘chekas’ (political prisons) 91 Chilton, Henry 33, 88 cholera epidemic 11 churches 22 see also religion Churchill, Winston 69, 115 Churruca (Spanish naval destroyer) 39–40 Cierva, Juan de la 69 Cierva, Ricardo de la 59, 80 cigarette smuggling 20 City Council of Gibraltar 17, 18 civil servants, and support of rebels 45, 65 class-based opinions of the Republic 36 Clavero, Manuel 91 Clive, Sydney 69 coaling 19, 99 coastal artillery 111–13 coastguard murder 135 Collado Seidel, C 137 Comintern 27, 33, 61, 138 communism 27–8, 29, 33, 37, 41–2, 46, 49 anti-communism 22, 48, 92–3, 115, 122, 138, 143 Juan March as anti-communist 87 non-intervention as anti-communism 61, 62, 64, 82 and the Quiepo incident 108 US communists 78 Companys, Luis 89 conservatives British 27, 28, 62, 65, 69, 87, 112 Spanish 29, 33, 34, 65 conspiracy theories 30–1 consuls chaos at Spanish consulate in Gibraltar 67–70 nameplate vandalism incident 109 nationalist ‘consulate’ 85–90 protection of evacuees 51 Spanish consuls in Italy 64–5 unofficial consuls 71–2, 85–90, 109 contraband see smuggling convents, burning of 28 ‘convoy of Victory’ 43 Cordoba 34, 43 corruption scandals 33 coups d’état 13, 29, 30–1, 37

Index Credit Foncier D’Algerie et de Tunisie (bank) 20 Crooke Larios, Carlos 55, 58, 74 cross-border trade 19–20 Cuba 9, 25 cultural consequences of refugees in Gibraltar 59–60 currency circulation 35 currency exchange 88, 98 Cyprus 10 Daily Express 73 Daily Herald 76 Daily Mail 74, 75 Daladier, Edouard 114 Danís, Eduardo 85 Dato (striker) 43, 103 Dawes Plan 62 Deacon, Richard 153n. 6, 154n. 14, 156n. 9, 157n. 23, 173n. 22 defectors (British) 52, 131 defence strategies 49, 123, 125–6, 134 Delgado, Manuel 30 Delgado Bianchi, Carlos 70 depression, economic 19–20, 22–3 Deutschland (German battleship) 64, 104 Devonshire, HMS 53 Díaz, José 91 Díaz Criado, Manuel 70 Díaz Pache, Alfonso 67–8 diplomacy 61–72, 85–90, 134 disease epidemics 11 Domingo, Marcelino 78, 89 Donoso Cortés 141 duty 20, 21 Eagle, HMS 18 economics see also trade British importance to Spanish economy 87 capital transit/capital flight 18–19, 20, 35, 87 economic relations between Spain and Britain post-civil war 139 economic warfare 97–106 recession 22–3 special economic situation in 1930s 18–24 Eden, Anthony 65, 98, 103, 105 education and schools 117

189

El Ferrol 47, 49 El Martillo 58 elections 25 Elordi, Carlos 169n. 84 ‘emergency,’ state of 124 emigrant populations in Gibraltar 17 see also refugees Endyimion (ship) 103 English language 60 Entente Cordiale 12 epidemics, disease 11 Escuadra Sánchez, Alfonso 4 Espadas Burgos, Manuel 154n. 13 Espinosa, Manuel 80 espionage in 1930s 28 and anti-communist efforts 29 creation of Allied (First World War) 13 and Emilio Griffith 59 and Freemasonry 95 Gibraltar as hub for information communication 2, 4, 91 and the José Luis Díez 119 and Juan March 13, 31 and the Larios family 54, 55, 74 Lionel Imossi 42 and the Quiepo incident 108 in the Spanish Civil War 78–84 and the Spanish consulate 70–1 in First World War 12, 13 in Second World War 124, 127, 130–1, 134, 143 Estepona 52, 56, 68, 82 Ethiopia 31, 32, 47, 122 evacuation of British citizens from Spain 49–52 evacuation of refugees 52–9, 68, 90–7, 110 evacuation policy 47, 51, 68 exchange rates 88, 98 exchanges for Gibraltar for another territory 14, 35 for Spanish cooperation against Italy 32, 125 exchanges of prisoners 51, 68, 71, 72, 74, 91, 131 executions 59, 77 exiles, Spanish 17, 30, 34, 47, 133 exports from Britain to Spain 87 cross-border trade with Spain 19–20

190

Index

from Spain to Britain 88 from USA to Spain 33 factories, tobacco 20–1 Falange 37, 56, 59, 71, 86, 119, 124, 125, 140 fall of Barcelona 128–30 fascism 28, 37, 61, 65, 73, 98, 110, 112–13, 114, 138 Fava, Alberto 82 Fernández, Roberto 56 Fernández Arias, Adelardo 86 Fernández Ballesteros, Alberto 31 Fernández Colmeiro, José María 70 Fernández de Córdoba, Fernando 48, 54 Fernández Gómez, Julia 70 Fernández Sánchez, Manuel Carlos 154n. 16, 170n. 21 Ferrer Benimeli, José Antonio 153n. 5, 157n. 24, 161n. 63 ferries 22, 50 Ferrol, El 47, 49 Fiat-Lux masonic lodge 55–6, 57 First World War 12, 72 fishing boats 46, 135 Five Power Treaty (1922) 16 flag raising ceremonies 117 Flores Álvarez, Antonio 56 foreign aid 44, 61, 62, 97, 138, 139 foreign correspondents 73–4 fort, Gibraltar as 11, 134 France and Britain in Second World War 126 closure of border with Spain 113 espionage 79, 80 and Great Britain 35, 114–15 and non-intervention 62–3 and Spanish exiles 133 Spanish relationship with 10, 12, 13–14, 25, 29–30 and the Strait of Gibraltar 10 trade with 97 Franco, Francisco 31, 40, 41, 43, 65, 71, 85, 86, 87, 108, 109, 112, 113, 125, 126, 133, 134, 135, 141 on who Gibraltar belongs to 138, 139, 141, 143 Franco, Nicolás 73 Franco, Ramón 18 free port status 6

free trade schemes 62, 132 freedom of the press 76 Freemasonry 1, 6, 31, 55–7, 86, 94, 95, 140 Friends of Spain 118 fuel supplies 19, 39, 40–2, 45, 87, 88, 98, 99–105 Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco 6 Gaggero, Joseph 100, 117 Gaggero, Manuel 100, 101, 117 Galliano family 20 Gamero del Castillo, Pedro 117 García Riquelme, Angel 30 García Rodríguez, Juan 56, 95 García Valiño, Rafael 102 Garrat, Geoffrey Theodore 48, 108 Garriga, Ramón 156n. 31, 163n. 7 gates, construction of 92, 132 Geddes, Auckland 28, 34, 48, 115 Germany and airplanes 44, 46 bombing of the Deutschland 64, 104 diplomacy 87 espionage 79 and Franco 49, 85, 126 German ships 51, 64, 104 German troops in Morocco 77 Germans remaining in Spain 114 and the non-intervention plan 63, 105, 111, 114 recognition of Franco’s government 62 relationship with Spain 10, 11, 35, 37, 42, 89 rumours of attack on Gibraltar 109 sinking of the Deutschland 64, 104–5 tensions with Britain mounting 113 and trade 100 trading with Spain 87, 88–9, 135 in First World War 12–13 and Second World War 114, 133, 142, 143 gesture politics 25, 131, 139 Gibel Zerjon (merchant ship) 44, 51, 91, 100 Gibraltar (film) 113 Gibraltar Airways 100 Gibraltar: Antología de crónicas en torno a esta jornada de emoción nacional 141 Gibraltar Blue Books 6

Index Gibraltar Chronicle 22, 41, 54–5, 76, 95 Gibraltar Español: reseña gráfica de una parte de nuestro territorio nacional 140–1 Gibson, Ian 161n. 58 Gil-Robles, José María 34 Giral, José 40, 89 Glower, Guillermo 70 GOBAC coal cartel 99 Gobeo (oil tanker) 105 Godley, Alexander 16, 29, 111, 112, 123 Goizueta, Norberto 81 Goizueta, Ricardo 69, 71–2, 81–2, 91, 95 Gómez Jordana, Francisco 90, 108, 116, 129 González, José 56 González Dorado, Antonio 99 González Sicilia, Ramón 91 González Ubieta, Luis 122 González-Arnao, Fernando 166n. 24 González-Gallarza, Eduardo 18 Goodman, Arthur 79 good-neighbour policies 14 governor’s residence (The Convent) 29 Grahame, George 26, 29 Granada 43 Granados, Mariano 142 Great Britain-Spain relationship anti-British opinions 141 British attitude to Quiepo’s speech 107 closer relationship with Francoist government 85–90, 109, 111–19 diplomacy in Civil War 61 merchant ships in Seville 100 role in outcome of war 61 Spanish alliance with (early twentieth century) 10 strained relationship during Second World War 124–33, 138–9 trade with 97 Greene, Herbert 79 Grenville, HMS 118 Gretton, Peter 160n. 39, 161n. 45, 164n. 49, 164n. 54, 165n. 76 Grice-Hutchinson, Marjorie 64 Griffith, Emilio 59, 81 ground attacks, Gibraltar’s vulnerability to 11, 14, 35, 111–12 guerrilla activity 135

191

Guilloto y González, Fernando 159n. 17, 170n. 24 Halifax, Lord 68, 114, 126 Harington, Charles, ‘Tim’ 7, 35, 42, 45, 46–52, 53, 58, 63–5, 68, 69, 74, 76, 80, 82, 92–3, 95, 96, 99, 103, 107, 110, 112, 122, 127 Haushofer, Karl 142 Hayes, Carlton 137 health care 117 Heiberg, Morten 157n. 11, 165n. 62, 172n. 34 Hemming, Francis 62 Hills, George 155n. 18, 161n. 52, 161n. 55, 171n. 14 Hinsley, Arthur 118 Hispano-French Treaty (1912) 12 Hitler, Adolf 42, 65, 69, 87, 89, 98, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 126, 127, 134, 138 Hoare, Samuel M. 39, 49, 64, 134 Hodgson, Robert 72, 85–6, 87–8, 89, 115, 124–5 Hogg, Quentin 137 Howes, Harry W. 60 Howson, Gerald 101 Huart, Augustine 36, 59, 100 Huelva 48 humanitarian tasks 49, 51, 90–1, 121 see also refugees hydroplanes 123 Ibárruri, Dolores 89 Imossi, George 42 Imossi, Lionel 22, 42, 102 Imossi family 22, 45, 117 Infant Carlos de Borbon 28–9 inflation 98 information censorship 118 Gibraltar as hub for information communication 22, 91, 112, 117, 132 information leakage 44, 77, 143 press and ‘official’ information 72–8 secret intelligence see espionage intermarriages, British-Spanish 22–3 International Brigades 33, 64, 82 Ironside, William Edmund 96, 110–11, 113, 117, 120, 122, 124, 126, 127, 130

192 isolationism 61 Italy diplomacy 87 espionage 79 and Ethiopia 31, 32, 47, 122 and Franco 49, 85, 126 Gibraltar proposed for Italian volunteers’ evacuation 114 Italian ships 51 and the non-intervention plan 63, 98–9, 105, 111 provision of airplanes 44 recognition of Franco’s government 62 risk of attack on Gibraltar 126 and Second World War 142 ships 104 and Spain 13, 14, 28, 31–2, 35, 37, 42, 89, 138 tensions with Britain mounting 113 and trade 100, 134 Jaén, Antonio 67 Jaime I (battleship) 41, 42, 43, 127 Javier Quiroga (ship) 104 Jewish community 22, 51, 102 Jiménez de Asúa, Luis 67 José Luis Díez (ship) 51, 118–20, 128 journalism 72–8 Julia Tornos, Miguel 56 18 July 1936 37, 46 Junta de Damas de Frentes y Hospitales 117, 128 juntas, military (1917) 13 Jurado, Juan Manuel 30 Keene, Judith 164n. 43, 166n. 14, 170n. 36 Kent, Victoria 89 Kindelán, Alfredo 42, 43, 45, 91 King, Norman (British consul in Barcelona) 51, 77, 80 Knoblaugh, Edward 77 Koestler, Arthur 73–4, 79 La Coruña 49 La Linea and border controls 30 British nationals living in 58–9, 92 and the closure of the border 132 easy target for Navy 112

Index and Freemasonry 95 home of many workers in Gibraltar 17, 35, 36 population of 17 Quiepo’s speech 76, 107 violence in 55 labour force blocked following fall of Barcelona riots 130 refugees as labour force 92, 96, 127 Spanish labourers crossing border daily 19, 34–5, 36, 96, 132, 139 Spanish workers necessary to Gibraltar in Civil War 50 labour movement, Spanish 13 Lance, Edward Christopher 90 land-based attacks, Gibraltar’s vulnerability to 11, 14, 35, 111–12 landowners, fleeing Spain 53–4 see also aristocracy and noblemen language 59–60 Larache 43, 87 Largo Caballero, Francisco 33, 65, 77, 91 Larios, José 47, 71 Larios, Talía 48, 54, 71 Larios family 29, 30, 47, 54, 72, 91 Lawrence, Bill 78 League of Nations 14, 26, 82 leisure facilities 22 Lera, Ángel María de 55 Lerroux, Alejandro 26, 89 Levanter 16 liberalism 34, 52 Liberty (battleship) 41, 42 Liddell, Clive Gerard 130 Lima Chacón, Antonio 94 Limón García, Francisco 56, 70 Little, Douglas 61 Llanos, Valentín 109–10 Lloyd George, David 65 loans, international 97 local government in Gibraltar 17, 18, 116–17 London Committee 62, 75, 105 López Ferrer, Luciano 72, 85–7, 95, 96, 109, 110, 117, 127–31 López Oliván, Julio 69 Los Barrios 17 Lozada, Francisco 56 Luna, José Carlos de 140, 142

Index macaque monkeys 1 MacFarlane, Noel Mason 13 Mackintosh, John 117, 128, 129 Madariaga, Salvador de 15, 27, 65, 69, 85, 125 Madrid Conference (1925) 13 Maeztu, Ramiro de 27 Mahony, Desmond 88 Main Street 58 Malaga 40, 42–3, 49, 52, 60, 92, 93, 114 Malley affair 131–2, 133 Malta 10, 16, 32, 122, 137 Manchester Guardian 74, 79 March, Juan 13, 21, 31, 87, 102–3, 134 Mare Nostrum 11 Market Lane 58 marriages between British and Spanish 22–3 Martín González, Manuel 31 Martín Moreno, Francisco 91 Martín Tejada, Francisco 167n. 29 Martínez Bande, José Manuel 40, 43 Martínez Barrio, Diego 6, 28, 59, 89, 91, 94 Martínez de Velasco, José 32 Martínez López, Fermín 56 Mason, A. E. W. 13 Masons see Freemasonry Maxwell Scott, Marie Louise 107 Maza, Condesa de la 117 media 54, 72–8, 95 medical supplies 102 Medina, Juan 56 Mediterranean seaway, strategic control of 15–16, 32, 111 see also Strait of Gibraltar Melilla 42, 68, 102, 133 Mendicuti, Rafael 107 Menorca 14, 15, 122 Mercedes, Maria de las 28–9 Mergelina, Manuel 117 Mexico 133 Mier Terán, Francisco 30 Miguel y Lancho, Jesús de 119, 132 military enclave, Gibraltar as 35, 92 Millán Astray, José 102 mining 13, 28, 34 Ministry of Information and Tourism 73 Miranda de Ebro (concentration camp) 52 Miratvilles, Jaime 89 Mola, Emilio 69, 71, 102–3

193

Moltke, Count 2 monarchy, restoration of 65, 115 Monks, Noel 73 Monroe, Elizabeth 114 Montagu-Pollock, W. 48 Montes, Francisco 56 Montgriffo, Foffi 59 Moradiellos, Enrique 4, 27 Moreno Chicano, Enrique 81 Moreno González, Remigio 93–4 Morocco 10, 12, 13, 25, 30, 35, 39, 81, 97, 101, 126, 134 see also Ceuta; Melilla ‘Moscow Gold’ operation 97 Mosley family 20 Mota, Cristóbal 56 Muguiro, Ignacio de 85 Munich Agreement 113 Muñoz Grandes, Agustín 102 Mussolini, Benito 13, 28, 32, 42, 65, 69, 89, 98, 111, 115, 134, 138 mutinies 47 National Defence Junta 65, 67, 97 ‘National Services’ 97 National Socialism (Nazis) 48, 52, 62 see also Hitler, Adolf National Tourism Board 22 naval base construction of 11 in First World War 12, 13 and Gibraltar as commercial centre 18 as point surveillance flotilla must pass 64 at risk from coastal artillery 111 in Second World War 113, 122 Navarro Capdevila, Fernando 40, 41 Navy (British) see Royal Navy Navy (Spanish) 10, 39–40, 47 Negrín, Juan 89, 97 Nelken, Margarita 89 Netto, José 1 neutral zone 11, 123, 132 neutrality of British in Spanish Civil War 39, 40–1, 61–2, 122 in First World War 12, 14 of Gibraltar 7, 37, 50, 82, 98–9, 102, 119 of merchant ships 44 and the sinking of the Deutschland 104–5

194

Index

of Spain in early twentieth century 10, 11 of Spain in Second World War 116, 125–6, 133–5, 137–8 of USA in Spanish Civil War 33 news reports 72–8 Noel-Baker, Phillip 65 Non-Intervention Committee 48, 50, 61, 62–6, 87, 100, 105, 114 non-intervention policy 7, 37, 39, 45, 61–6, 75, 82, 97, 98, 104–5, 110, 143 North Africa see Morocco Nueva Tabaquería Real 110 Núñez del Río, Emilio 85, 107 Nye, Gerald 62 Nyon Agreement 51, 103 observers, international 63–4, 98, 103 Ocaña, Mario 161n. 61 Ogilvie-Forbes, George 77 Oil Fuel Depot Ltd 41–2 Olano, Alfonso de 69 Olivares, Luis 107 Otero (spy) 80 overcrowding (with refugees) 52–60, 91–7 Ozep, Fedor 113 Pack, Arthur 88 Pact of Cartagena 11 Pact of Steel 138 Palestine 13, 51 Pastor Petit, Domingo 165n. 65 patriotism 54 Paz, José 41 PCE (Spanish Communist Party) 28, 82 peace initiatives 115–16 Pedroso, Manuel 67 Peinado, Juan 70 Peña, Baltasar 94 Peña Orellana, Ramón 68, 69, 70 people’s courts 93 Pereira Castañares, Juan Carlos 155n. 18, 155n. 23 Pérez Madrigal, Joaquín 86 peseta, value of 88, 98 Pestaña, Ángel 55 Pétain, Marshall 126 Petersen, Maurice 126 Petit Bar 58 petrol supplies 71 see also fuel supplies

Philby, Harold ‘Kim’ 79, 91 Phillips, E. C. L. 161n. 49, 167n. 26 Pinillos, General 31 Pipon, Rear Admiral 49–50 ‘pirate’ fleets 40, 103 Pitto Caballero, Arturo 57 Plymouth, Lord 62 ‘political offences’ 93, 139 Popular Front 32–7, 108 population of Gibraltar in 1938 116 British views towards 17 as colonized people 17 demographics in 1939 121 diversity of 18, 22, 79 intermarriages, British-Spanish 22–3 Spanish labourers crossing border daily 19, 34–5, 36, 96, 132, 139 sympathy towards Republic 36 Porral, Federico 56 port construction of 11 reconstruction of 123 Portela Valladares, Manuel 32 Portero, Florentino 161n. 52 Portugal 62, 63, 95, 97, 100, 113 postal communication 22, 91, 117, 137–8 Povar, Marqués de (Fernando Fernández de Córdoba) 48, 54, 55 Povar, Marquesa de (Lorenza Talía Larios y Fernández de Villavicencio) 48, 54, 71, 117, 120 Prado Mendizábal, Pedro 40, 43–4 Prescott, Cecil 107, 128 press censorship 118 on Gibraltar 22 reports of riots after fall of Barcelona 129 as source of information 6 on Spanish Civil War 72–8 prestige and Britain’s control of the Rock 15 Preston, Paul 4 Prieto, Indalecio 44, 77, 89, 134 Primo de Rivera, Miguel 13–14, 16, 25, 77, 86, 91 prisoner exchanges 51, 68, 71, 72, 74, 91, 131 progressives 33, 34, 73, 78, 94, 112 ‘proletariat’ 36

Index propaganda 72, 78, 108, 109, 140–1 property purchase 35 protectionism 29, 62, 97 provisioning and refuelling 19, 40–2, 45, 46 see also fuel supplies PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) 82 Punta Canero 70 pyrites 34, 87, 88, 115 Queen Elizabeth, HMS 45 Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo 54, 58, 59, 68, 70–1, 72, 73, 76, 80, 107–11, 128 radio communication 42, 54, 80, 109, 119, 132 Raleigh, USS 105 recession, economic 22–3 re-export of goods 21 refugees arrival of Spanish refugees in Civil War 49–60 British nationals 42 British soldiers defecting to Spain 52, 131 businessmen and landowners as 17, 31, 34 in early twentieth century 22 evacuation of refugees 90–7, 121–2 overcrowding (with refugees) 52–60, 91–7 problems with anti-Francoist refugees 110 recruited to espionage 70 refugee camp 58 rejection of new refugees 121 and the Second Republic 28–9, 30–1 in Second World War some stayed on Gibraltar 91–2, 116, 121, 127, 131 regime change (1917) 13 religion anti-religious acts after fall of Barcelona 128 burning of religious buildings in Spain 26, 28, 29, 36 Catholic church 22, 36, 45, 77, 89, 118, 120, 122, 138 Governor Harington’s 46–7 influence of church figures 77

195

key to views of Republic in Gibraltar 36 religious diversity in Gibraltar population 22 and support of rebels 45 Repullo Cejudo, Luis 56 Repulse, HMS 44 residency rules 35, 47, 92, 95–6 resignations of Spanish diplomats 65–6 Resurrección masonic lodge 55–6 revolution 27–8, 29, 31, 33, 97 Rey García, Marta 162n. 4 Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact 138 Rico, Gumersindo 53 Rieber, Thorkild 101 right of belligerency 61, 115, 117 Río Pérez, Leopoldo de 70 Rio Tinto 13, 28, 34, 48, 88, 115 Ríos, Fernando de los 27 rioting 128–9 roads 117 Rock Hotel 21, 28, 31, 34, 117, 130 Rodríguez Muñoz, Petra 70 Romeo Bartomeus, Luis 171n. 43 Romero, José 56 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 33 Ros Agudo, Manuel 173n. 21 Royal Air Force 35, 124 Royal Calpe Hunt conflict 47 royal family (Spanish) 28–9 Royal Navy (British) HMS Eagle rescues pilots 18 in mid-1930s 35 pivotal role in Civil War 49 protection of enclave 112 support of insurgents 89 surveillance patrols (naval) 50, 63, 64, 103, 104, 132 transporting refugees and British evacuees 49, 51, 121 Royal Spanish-American Academy 14 Rubio, Javier 4, 167n. 34, 167n. 48, 168n. 52 Rugeroni family 20 Ruiz de Alda, Julio, 18 sabotage 135 Salama, Jacobo J. 102 Salgado, Jesús 5 San Luis, Conde de 122 San Roque 44, 79, 127

196

Index

Sánchez Albornoz, Claudio 142 Sánchez Asiaín, José Ángel 4 Sánchez Mantero, Rafael 5 Sangróniz, General 85 Sanjurjo, José 29, 30, 31 Sarolea, Charles 78 Satorres de Dameto, Pedro A. 131 school and education 117 sea mines 51 Second Republic 17, 18, 25–38 Second World War 13, 52, 60, 96, 111, 113, 121–35 secret service see espionage security gates, construction of 92, 132 security umbrella 10, 111 Selassie, Haile 32, 47 self-governance 17, 18 Sepúlveda, Isidro 4 Serrano Súñer, Ramón 102, 141 Seville 13, 22, 37, 43, 72, 73, 74, 81, 91, 99–100 Shamrock (ship) 42, 50 Shell 40, 101, 102 SIFNE (Servicio de Información del Nordeste de España, or Northeast Spain Information Service) 80 SIM (Servicio de Información Militar) 79 SIPM (Servicio de Información y Policía Militar) 79, 130 SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) 81 Smith, Adam 3 smuggling and Britain’s non-intervention policy 45 in early twentieth century 13, 15, 17, 18–19 implications of 21–2 as means to supplement incomes 19 and neglect of the border 30 as part of Gibraltar’s economy 116–17 tobacco 20–1 of troops 102–3 of weapons 37, 82 Smyth, Denis 158n. 51, 163n. 15, 170n. 22, 173n. 8 socialism 30, 31, 33, 35, 82, 89 Sorty Day 127 Sotomayor y Patiño, Colonel, 81 sovereignty of Gibraltar, disputed 124–33, 137, 140–3 Soviet Union blamed for war in Spain 69

in early 20th century 16, 27, 33, 37 influence on key Spanish personalities 89 in the Non-Intervention Committee 63 relationship with Spain 65, 82, 105 threat to Spain from 92, 138 as trading partner of Republic 97 Spanish language 59–60 Spanish National Bank 68 ‘Spanish Pimpernel’ 91 Spanish-American war 9 Stancroft (ship) 109–10 standard of living 117 Standard Oil 87, 101 stock market crash (1929) 22 Stockey, Gareth 4, 36, 74 Strabolgi, Lord 14, 62 Strait of Gibraltar, strategic importance of in Civil War 39, 43–4, 47, 49 in early twentieth century 11, 15–16, 32 Francoist control of 111 in Second World War 10, 133–4 as trade route 97, 100–1 strikes 34, 123 submarines 12–13, 39, 40, 50, 100 supplies British importance to Spanish economy 87, 88 fuel supplies 19, 39, 40–2, 45, 87, 88, 98, 99–105 as key part of Gibraltarian economy 117 and the non-intervention plan 63–4 reaching Franco but not Republic 82 and Ricardo Goizueta 71 in Second World War 134–5 Suqué y Sucona, Antonio 31 surveillance patrols (naval) 50, 63, 64, 103, 104, 132 Tamarón, Marqués de (José de MoraFigueroa) 37, 59 Tangier 13–14, 25, 40, 48, 51, 73, 81, 86, 96 Tarifa 17 Tarik Petroleum 69, 71, 72 taxes 20, 21 telegraphy 22, 91, 117 telephony 22, 42, 117 Téllez, Juan José 1

Index territorial exchanges 14–15 terrorist attacks 135 Tetouan 43, 101 Texaco 101 Thomson, William G. 117, 128, 129 Thoroton, Charles Julian 13 Times, The 74, 75, 108, 117 tobacco smuggling 17, 20–1 tobacconists shop 110 TOC H 46–7 Tornay de Cózar, Francisco 4, 132 totalitarianism 65 tourism 22, 73 trade cross-border trade 19–20 currency circulation 35 economic warfare 97–106 free trade schemes 62, 132 Gibraltarian business in mid-1930s 35 in Second World War 134 Spain dependent on trade with British 13 special economic situation in 1930s 18–24 with the USA 33 and violation of Gibraltar’s neutrality 99–105 in weapons 37 weapons trading 37, 45, 88, 100, 102, 113 trade unions 34, 48, 58–9, 123 trans-Atlantic flight 18 Treaty between Spain and Italy (1926) 14 Treaty of Fez 12 Treaty of London (1930) 16 Treaty of Utrecht 2, 11, 18, 123, 124 troop transportation 40, 102 Truver, Scott C. 5 tunnels 30, 113, 123, 126 Ulysses (Joyce) 1 Ungría, José 79–80 USA American War Memorial 105 in early twentieth century 16, 33, 40 merchant ships in Seville 100 and the Quiepo incident 108 role in outcome of war 61–2 trans-Atlantic flight 18

197

Valencia 49, 51, 53, 63, 82, 90–1 Valera, Eduardo 59 Vallejo López, Rafael 56 Vallellano, Conde de (Fernando Suárez de Tangil) 91, 96 Vaquero, Eloy 34 Vázquez Sans 141 Victoria Hotel 81 Vigo Ria 134 Vigón, Juan 102 Vilar, Juan Bautista 155n. 18 Viñas, Ángel 4, 87 visa restrictions on trade ships 104 Voelckers, Hans 45 vulnerability of Gibraltar 14, 16, 35, 111–12 Waldron, J. J. B. 89 Wall, Harold 76, 107, 108 Wall, Stephen 76 waters, Gibraltar’s, British jurisdiction over 123 weakness, Spanish 9–15 weapons ban on exportation of 65 ban on illegal possession 55 coastal artillery 111–13 strategic importance in Civil War 39 weapons construction 134 weapons trading 37, 45, 88, 100, 102, 113 Wedgwood, Josiah 45 Whealey, Robert H. 156n. 9 Whitehall, HMS 49, 50 Wild Swan, HMS 49, 50 wine industry 13 Winston, Roy 70 wolfram 134 workers blocked following fall of Barcelona riots 130 Spanish labourers crossing border daily 19, 34–5, 36, 96, 132, 139 Spanish workers necessary to Gibraltar in Civil War 50 workers’ organizations 97 Worker’s Union 128

198 working classes enraged by action over refugees 58 and the Republic 36–7, 98, 118 World War I see First World War World War II see Second World War

Index Ybarra, Jesús 30, 34 Ybarra Gómez-Rull, José María 30, 34 yellow fever epidemic 11 Yome, Leopoldo J 119, 128 Zuleta, Diego 30