Germany: Key to Peace [Reprint 2014 ed.] 9780674865563, 9780674862791

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GERMANY KEY TO PEACE

by James P. Warburg

H A R V A R D UNIVERSITY PRESS . CAMBRIDGE • 1953

Copyright, 1953, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College Library of Congress Catalog Card/Number: 53-11516 Printed in the United States of America

For Joan, Jimmy & Jennifer Joan

CONTENTS PREFACE A Matter of Credentials 1 Why Germany Is the Key to Peace

1

2 Four-Power Fiasco

8

/. Germany under Potsdam in 1946 2. Reasons for Failure Pre-surrender Planning: "just peace," unconditional surrender, the Morgenthau plan, JCS 1061, Yalta. Post-surrender Policy: Potsdam, two major blunders, three fallacies, the lost initiative. A Suggested Policy Revision (August, 1946) Frontiers, unification, termination of occupation, revision of industry limitation and control, a European coal authority. 4. Secretary Byrnes's Attempt at Revision 5. Anglo-American

Difficulties

3 Deadlock and Cold War (1947) 1. Change in U.S. 2. The Truman 3. The Moscow

39

Management Doctrine Conference

4. Return to Reason (The Marshall Plan) 5. Firsthand

Reappraisal

6. The Notion of a Separate Peace 7. The London

Conference

8. Forecast and

Review

4 Partition and the Berlin Crisis (1948) /. East-West

Deployment

2. The "Devil Theory"

Adopted

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CONTENTS

Vili 5. Crisis in Qermany

4. The L7 JV. 'and the Berlin Crisis $. The Ruhr

Agreement

6. Year-end Evaluation

5

Lost Chance for Change (First half 1949) ;. Unsuccessful

77

Warning

2. The North Atlantic Security Program State Department Release of April 26 4. The Treaty before the Senate 5. Council of Foreign Ministers

Conference

6. The Military Aid Bill

6 Two Germany s Are Born (Second half 1949)

116

1. West Germany Elects a Government 2. East Germany Votes "Ja!" 3. The Petersberg

Agreement

4. The Rearmament Cat Let Out of the Bag 5. Year-end Evaluation

7 Military Cart before Political Horse (1950) 1. How to Defend

West

129

Germany?

2. The Schuman Plan Lets in Light 5. Washington Wrecks the Hope 4. Soviet Warning and Counter-proposal Elections in West 6. "Reexamination" 7. The Brussels

Germany Declined

Conference

5. Appraisal of 1950

8 Slow Motion (1951) z. Eisenhower Calls a Halt 2. "Troops for Europe" 5. The Schuman Plan Compromised

152

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CONTENTS 4. Dealings with Russia 5. The Deputies at Paris 6. The "European Army'''' 7. An "Iffy"

Proposal

8. West German

"Democracy"

9. Appeal to the United

9

Nations

The Power of Decision Is Lost (First half 1952) 1. Crisis within

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NATO

2. London and Lisbon 3. New Soviet Approach 4. The Mutual Security

to an All-German

Settlement

Act

5. The Die Is Cast 6. Pig in a Poke 7. The Truman-Acheson

Books Are

Closed

10 Europe Revolts While the U.S. Elects (Second half 1952) /. The Presidential

215

Campaign

2. The Revolt in Europe Events in Britain, the European community, stalling with Russia, events in Germany and France, slow-down strike. j. The

Interregnum

11 Retrospect anil a Look into the Future

245

/. Landmarks of Failure 2. A Program

Submitted

3. Reactions to the Proposal 4. Events and Indications of 1953 5. A Word about Over-all

Policy

Ribliography

327

Index

333

Preface

A Matter of Credentials This book presents a critical analysis of United States post-war policy in Europe and, especially, with regard to Germany. It has been written in the belief that, unless this policy is revised while a revision is still possible, the United States and, with it, most of the Western world will be headed for almost certain disaster. I am all too well aware that our European policy has had the almost unanimous support of the American people and that it has carried over from two successive Democratic administrations into a Republican administration, without having been seriously challenged or discussed in a campaign which left few past policies unchallenged. I am aware that there rests upon anyone, who ventures to present a dissenting opinion in such circumstances, the obligation to authenticate himself — to provide at least a sketch of the background and experience out of which his dissenting opinion has been formed. This is all the more true when the dissenter offers not only criticism of the past but also what he believes to be a constructive and viable alternative for the future. As briefly as possible, I shall, therefore, attempt to answer the perfectly legitimate questions: "Who are you anyway? What do you know about Europe? What has been your experience in European affairs?" And, particularly, "What makes you think you know anything about Germany?" Much of my life has been concerned with the relationship between Europe and the United States. Much of it has been lived abroad. Like most men of my generation, I have served in two wars against Germany; but, for me, these two interruptions of a career were not — as they were for most Americans — isolated periods in which one became acutely conscious of the existence of a German problem child in the European family of nations. My father's family

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had lived in Hamburg, Germany, ever since it had moved there, in the sixteenth century, from the little Westphalian town of Warburg, where, in April, 1945, two American armies joined to complete the encirclement of the Ruhr. My mother was American-born, but of German descent. Her father was the founder of Kuhn Loeb & Co. in New York, of which my father became a partner at about the turn of the century. Prior to that time, my parents spent the first five years of their married life in Hamburg. I was born there in 1896. From the time my parents moved to New York until my father was appointed to the first Federal Reserve Board by President Wilson, in 1914, we spent every summer in Europe. During these years my father, though primarily engaged in the business of American finance, retained his partnership in the family banking firm of M. M. Warburg & Co., Hamburg, in which he and his brothers were the sixth generation. Because of this, we visited not only Germany but most of the European countries each summer. My transatlantic boyhood — going to school in the United States and spending the long vacations abroad — interfered with some of the normal summer activities, but it had its advantages. By the time I graduated from preparatory school in N e w England, the languages and even the dialects of a large part of Europe were as familiar to me as its geography. Equally familiar was much of the terminology of banking and international commerce. My father's Washington appointment was the result of a sevenyear effort to introduce here some of the central banking practices of Western Europe, in the hope that they would do away with the frequently recurring financial panics then characteristic of the American scene. As one of the earliest pioneers of currency reform, my father was invited by President Wilson to help put into operation the new system which he had helped to devise. This necessitated the severing of all his business connections here and abroad. M y father took the sacrifice cheerfully for granted, but I remember his w r y amusement when I wrote him that the kindly Irish maid who looked after my freshman year room at Harvard had congratulated me on the fine salary my old man would now be making. World War I broke out in August, 1914, just after my father had entered the public service. Its savage brutality — quite apart from anxiety for his relatives in Germany — filled him with sadness and

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dismay. He hoped that the United States would remain neutral and eventually act as a peacemaker. Consequently, when I became an editor of the Harvard Crimson, he disapproved of my supporting the belligerent pro-Ally line of Theodore Roosevelt (my boyhood hero), instead of the cautious neutrality of his hero, President Wilson. While as a mature man my father was quite naturally torn between loyalty to the United States and concern for his native land, I merely resented what seemed to me the unfortunate accident of my German birth. It was not until years later that I understood the anguish I must have caused my father by enlisting as a cadet naval aviator before the United States had declared war. Once we were in the war, what little I saw of my father led me to believe that his inner conflict had been as simply resolved — or buried — as mine. The marketing of Liberty Loans and the procurement of capital for our infant war industries seemed his only concern. It took me some years to realize what a difficult period in his life this must have been. At the time, I was just one of many young eager-beavers, impatient to help "make the world safe for democracy." I felt no ties of any sort to the nation that had sunk the Lusitania, violated Belgian neutrality and ravaged northern France. Germany was, quite simply, "the Enemy." As for my own German origin, if someone reminded me of it, my favorite answer was: "If a cat happens to have its kittens in an oven, does that make them biscuits?" It was not until I revisited Germany for the first time after the War, as a budding international banker, that I discovered what every mature person knows; namely, that there are no "good" and "bad" nations — that, in the case of all peoples, it is only a question of whether the fraternal or the fratricidal impulses are, for the time being, dominant. Moreover, in seeing my relatives and revisiting the places where I had spent so much of my childhood, I discovered another platitude: that the place where you were born somehow, and often quite illogically, evokes a nostalgic tenderness — for the land, the language, the rivers, and even the somewhat different sky — a feeling of affectionate familiarity quite separate from any rational attitude toward a nation, or a people, or its government. I emphasize this because I am writing a book about Germany and because I do not believe that anyone can be wholly objective with regard to a country in which he was born and had a childhood

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home. F o r all I know, some of m y judgments concerning American policy in G e r m a n y may, therefore, be influenced b y unconscious emotional remnants. These would not necessarily prejudice me f o r or against Germany, but they may well have exaggerated to some extent both m y sympathy f o r the German people and m y disgust at some of the things they have done. Caveat lector! So much f o r personal background. A s to direct experience: from 1921 to 1933, as an executive of a N e w Y o r k bank, I worked with British, French, German, Swiss, and Scandinavian bankers toward European reconstruction and a revival of world trade. This w o r k took me at least once a year, sometimes oftener, to most of the European countries. I saw at first hand the slow shattering of the Wilsonian dream f o r a peaceful Europe and the emergence of new political and economic nationalisms. I witnessed the maneuvering of the W e i m a r Republic between East and West, the slow decay of the new German democracy, and the sinking into impotence of the W e i m a r Republic under the impact of the Great Depression. I knew personally practically all the great industrialists, the coal and steel barons of the R u h r and Upper Silesia, the German bankers and merchants, as well as a considerable number of political leaders. I cannot say that these years of working with the Germans in an effort to help them rebuild their country filled me with either fondness or admiration of them. With f e w exceptions, I found the leading bankers and industrialists arrogant, greedy, and often more than a little unreliable. W i t h even f e w e r exceptions, the political leaders and the top bureaucrats seemed an undistinguished lot, with those w h o meant well lacking force, and those w h o possessed force lacking good intentions. One of those w h o m I knew best and most cordially disliked was Dr. Hjalmar Schacht who, throughout most of this period, was head of the German Reichsbank. Looking back at this time, I am amazed and a little ashamed that I made no better use of m y opportunities to study and get to k n o w the German people — the farmers, trade unionists and white collar workers, whose sentiments at that time might well have deserved careful study. W i t h m y time preempted b y business appointments, I was unaware of the dangerous undercurrents of popular sentiment until I witnessed the enthusiastic reaction of a German audience to a speech of what seemed to me gibberish b y a man called Adolf Hitler. This was in the late twenties. In 1930, I was in Berlin during

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the Reichstag elections in which the National Socialists won their first substantial representation. The Nazi gains, the indecisive impotence of the Hindenburg-Bruening regime, and, above all, the complacent indifference of intelligent German leaders toward the rising threat sent me home to New York convinced that the handwriting was on the wall not only for Germany but for all of Europe. I told my banking associates — who thought I was a little unhinged — that Adolf Hitler would not only come to power in Germany, but that he would then either seek to conquer Europe by force or win control of it without encountering armed resistance. Where I was wrong — and where I have frequently been wrong since that time — was in thinking that the events I foresaw would happen almost immediately. After the spectacular failure of the Kreditmstalt in Vienna which shook confidence throughout Europe, I returned to Germany to make one more effort toward helping to arrest the tide. On behalf of an American banking syndicate, I went to Chancellor Bruening with an offer of very substantial help in shoring up at least one of the tottering German banks, hoping thereby to restore confidence in the structure as a whole. The Chancellor, a man of great culture and ascetic charm, welcomed the offer as the most useful thing that could be done both to arrest the panic and to ward off the National Socialist menace. Nevertheless, he was unable to come to a decision and, after several weeks, the offer had to be withdrawn. It was now more than ever clear to me that Hitler's accession to power was only a matter of time.1 Shortly after this Bruening was overthrown 1 A garbled report of this unpublicized effort may have served as the foundation for a strange fabrication perpetrated in 1933 by a certain J. G . Schoup of Amsterdam. In a book, Het Geldbronnen van Hitler, Schoup published the alleged confession of a "Sidney Warburg," in which this non-existent character "revealed" that he, on behalf of an American banking group, had provided financial backing for Hitler and the National Socialist movement. The book was withdrawn by the publishers when they realized that it was a fabrication but several years later the story was retold, with embellishments, by a Swiss writer — René Sonderegger — using the assumed name of Severin Reinhard. Sonderegger's book, Spanischer Sommer, proceeded to "prove" that the Schoup story had not only been true but that I was, in fact, "Sidney Warburg." This yarn was, in turn, retold by another Swiss writer, Werner Zimmermann, in a book called Liebet Eure Feinde. Meanwhile Schoup had died, but his son admitted in writing that his father's work had been a forgery. Zimmermann, discovering that he had been hoaxed by both Schoup and Sonderegger, pub-

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by the Schleicher-von Papen cabal. I had one interview with General von Schleicher shortly before he ousted the bumbling von Papen and became, to all intents and purposes, a dictator. This meeting was enough to convince me that von Schleicher was not the man to stave off the National Socialist revolution. That was my last visit to Germany until after the end of World W a r II. For a brief time in early 1933, even though Hitler had recently come to power, I believed that there was still a chance to avert war or the cold conquest of Europe by Nazi Germany. This was while I was working for President Roosevelt in preparing the ground for the World Economic Conference to be held at London. That hope vanished on the day, during the conference, when it was my unhappy duty 2 to transmit to the conference chairman, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, President Roosevelt's fateful message of July 3, 1933. It was clear to me then that, if the United States was about to indulge in a period of economic nationalism, Europe was doomed. After the shameful appeasement period had culminated in the betrayal of Czechoslovakia, I became convinced that there was still one w a y in which Hitler might be stopped from launching a war of conquest. In a speech delivered, in March, 1939, at the Economic Club of N e w York, under the chairmanship of Wendell Willkie, I advocated a declaration by the United States of its solidarity with Western Europe, very similar to the North Atlantic Treaty declaration which we were to make, in rather different circumstances, ten years later. M y contention was that this was the only way in which an otherwise inevitable W o r l d W a r II might still be averted. One of my opponents on that occasion was the leading isolationist, Burton K. Wheeler, then a United States Senator from Montana. The other, supposedly middle-of-the-road, speaker that evening was the Hon.

lished a full retraction. Sonderegger has found a refuge in Franco's Spain. M y own rather full affidavit denouncing these forgeries was deposited with the Swiss and United States Governments in 1949 and has since been published in the Memoirs of Franz von Papen. (Albert Deutsch, London, 1952.) Some interesting research concerning financial support given to Hitler from sources outside of Germany has been done b y Mr. Herman Lutz of Palo Alto, California. His work, so far as I know, has not yet been published. " A s Financial Adviser to the United States Delegation and as American liaison officer with the central bureau of the conference.

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John Foster Dulles who, somewhat surprisingly, lined up with Senator Wheeler in opposing any kind of American intervention. 3 When war did break out in Europe six months later, I became an active interventionist, working with both the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies and the Fight for Freedom group. (It is perhaps interesting to recall that, in those days, two men, both destined to become Secretaries of State, were on opposite sides of the "great debate"; in contrast to John Foster Dulles, Dean Acheson, then in private life, was one of the most effective members of these interventionist groups.) Several months before Pearl Harbor, I went to work for Colonel (later Major General) William J . Donovan, helping to set up the organization which later subdivided into the Office of W a r Information and the Office of Strategic Services. During the war, my work as Deputy Director of O W I Overseas Branch had to do with the shaping and coordination of Allied propaganda policy in the European Theater, and particularly with psychological warfare against Germany. This work necessitated a continuous intensive study of every sort of intelligence coming from behind the enemy lines. In the spring of 1944, I was for a brief time involved in the shaping of our post-surrender plans for Germany. When consulted by John J . McCloy, then Assistant Secretary of W a r and later United States High Commissioner in Germany, I opposed — as I would now if I had the decision to make over again — the whole concept of a victor's peace, or of a peace based upon the vengeful application of retributive justice. I believed in and argued for the broad principles of a just peace which had been enunciated in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and had later been endorsed by all the major members of the anti-Axis coalition. Holding these views, I took issue with the then popular theory that the "German race" had evil in its blood stream; this seemed to me neither more nor less than Nazi racialism in reverse. I argued against the Morgenthau Plan for the forcible "deindustrialization" of Germany. This proposal had been accepted by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the Quebec 3 T h e full text of this debate may be found in the author's Our War and Our Peace. A m o n g other things, Mr. Dulles maintained that "only hysteria would suppose that any of the dynamic have-not powers" (Germany, Italy, or Japan) "would ever dream of attacking the United States."

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Conference of September, 1943, in what I thought must have been a moment of absent-mindedness. M y opposition was based not only upon the conviction that this was not the w a y to make the Germans a "peace-loving people," but even more upon the definite knowledge that this plan for permanently closing and flooding the Ruhr coal mines would punish not only Germany but all of Europe. Finally, in these 1944 discussions I opposed all the various plans for partitioning Germany, feeling that partition would merely sow the seeds of future irredentism and renewed aggression. N o matter how much the Germans might deserve these various forms of punishment — as, indeed, I thought they did — I contended that the path to lasting peace lay, not in the application of punitive justice, but in the creation of a climate in which the German people might, one day, achieve their own regeneration. I argued that, once Germany had been defeated and rendered militarily impotent, the German people should be given a chance to carry out their own long-delayed revolution — to shake off the shackles of authoritarian habits and military tradition, and to free themselves from the yoke of the Junker-militarist-industrialist clique which had twice led them to disaster. I pointed out that the Allies, after W o r l d W a r I, had aborted an incipient democratic revolution in Germany and urged that a repetition of this mistake be avoided. M y recommendation was that we do everything possible to bring home the reality of military defeat to every German; but that, having disarmed Germany and destroyed the whole machinery of Nazi power, we retire to the German borders and let the inevitable revolution in Germany run its course. This approach found little favor at the time. The idea of permitting, if not actually stimulating a revolution was horrifying to minds concerned with what military governors refer to as "law and order." Moreover, as in 1918, the fear of communism overshadowed the desire for a democratic development in Germany. Some of my associates denounced my point of view as the advocacy of "a soft peace." M y reply to this was that, in my opinion, whatever we did about Germany should be determined by what we considered would most effectively further world peace, and not by either pity for "the poor, misguided Germans" or hate of the "Teutonic barbarians." In 1944,4 I stated my conviction in these terms: 1

Foreign Policy Begins at Home, pp. 280-290.

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"If, in our German policy, we are motivated by hate, we shall be unjust; and, if we commit injustice at the beginning, we shall overcompensate for that injustice in the end." As things turned out, we committed both injustice and folly at the beginning and are now, as I see it, in the last stages of a frighteningly dangerous reversal. This, then, is the background of involvement and experience against which the reader may evaluate the opinions expressed in this book. In it, I have tried to chronicle the development of our policy in Germany, to state where and why, in my opinion, that policy has gone wrong and, finally, to suggest a remedy. Since this work is not the result of a recent analysis made after the event but, rather, the product of a persistent and outspoken dissent expressed as the events occurred, I have had to deal as best I might with a rather difficult editorial problem. Interlarding the history of great events with references to one's own unsuccessful efforts to alter their course is, no doubt, immodest. Yet, since these past efforts build the case for the alternative program of action which I now venture to suggest, I know of no other way to proceed. Had I been less of a lone dissenter, the problem could have been solved at least in part by quoting others who contemporaneously expressed similar views. Unfortunately, with rare exceptions, there were no others to quote. The method I have been forced to adopt has at least one virtue to compensate for its immodesty: it permits the reader to distinguish between hindsight and foresight and to judge the final conclusions by whatever merit or defect may be found in the suggestions put forward publicly in the past. Whatever may be the reader's judgment of these past proposals, it will be found, I think, that they were at least based upon forecasts which have, for the most part, proved unhappily accurate. I would rejoice to see the somber forecast with which this preface began prove to be an exception. I fear that this is unlikely, but I hope that an awakening of public opinion will bring about a revision of our policy before it is too late. I am enough of an optimist to believe in this possibility. James P. Warburg

GERMANY KEY TO PEACE

1 W h y Germany Is the Key to Peace M a n y people would say that the Far East, with its major hot spots in Korea and Indo-China, and the Near East, with its turbulent Arab revolt against European domination, are the primary areas in which a solution to the world crisis must be sought. By contrast, the state of Western Europe and the stalemate over Germany seem, at first glance, considerably less urgent. It may well be — in fact, it probably is true that the decisive struggle of the future will be for the allegiance of Islam and the vast, uncommitted masses of India and Southeast Asia, and that the outcome of this struggle will greatly influence what is perhaps the ultimate question; namely, whether the present alliance between Soviet Russia and Red China will endure or disintegrate. Why, then, is a revision of our European policy — particularly our policy as to Germany — the first and most urgent order of business? Because our policy in the Near East and Asia, which few would characterize as eminently successful, has derived very largely from a wrong policy in Europe and cannot be reoriented unless the European parent policy is revised. The key to that revision lies in a reexamination of what we have been trying to do in and with Germany. The world crisis which developed after World War II began in Europe. In one sense it was strictly a European crisis, occasioned by the radically changed distribution of power within that area which lies between the Ural Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean. In another and more important sense, the crisis which began in Europe was a world crisis, precipitating revolutionary changes and upheavals long brewing in other parts of the world. Although Japan had long been tuning up for major conquest, it was the outbreak of war in Europe which provided the long-sought

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opportunity. The defeat of European power in Asia by Japan and the subsequent elimination of Japan as a power factor left the peoples of Asia more on their own than they had been at any time since the early days of European colonization. From Asia, the realization that the end of European colonialism was at hand spread to Africa and the Middle East. With the dawn of freedom on two vast continents came the inevitable pains and problems of emergence into independence, the inevitable appearance of power vacuums and the strains and tensions created by the conflict between new and old power factors. The crisis of the peoples suddenly freed from European domination was a thing in itself, even though it had been precipitated by the crisis in Europe. Insofar as the Asian and Near Eastern crises could be affected at all by American help or intervention, they demanded an American policy based upon wholly different and, in part, antithetical considerations from those arising out of the crisis in Europe. The fruitful and, in many ways, the natural role of the United States would have been that of the Occidental friend and counsellor of the colored peoples emerging into freedom — the Occidental friend who had not been involved in the hated colonial past — the great nation which had itself attained independence and prosperity through revolt against European colonialism. Had we been able to fulfill that role, we might have been able, to some extent at least, to guide the Asian and Near Eastern revolutions. Washington instead of Moscow might have become the magnet of attraction or, if not that, at least a powerful counter-force to the attraction of communism. T w o factors unhappily stood in the way of our fulfilling this mission: our arrested development with respect to race relations, and the nature of our involvement in the affairs of Europe. The first expressed itself, not only in our Old South but throughout our nation, in the treatment of Negroes as second-class citizens. It showed as well in our arrogant assumption of white supremacy, wherever we came into contact, throughout the world, with peoples of black, brown, or yellow pigmentation. The second factor — the nature of our involvement in the affairs of Europe — came about largely as the result of our misunderstanding and mishandling of the post-war crisis in Europe itself. The mistakes we made in Europe were largely responsible for those actions and, above all, for those failures to act in Asia, Africa, the Middle

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East, and Latin America which have made us appear to the emerging peoples as the friend and supporter of the old order, rather than as the guide to the new. Thus, to a very large extent, the failure of our global post-war foreign policy centers in our relationship to that relatively small peninsula, stretching westward from the Eurasian land mass, whose child we once were and whose protector we have now become. The question of establishing and preserving world peace is no longer merely a matter of straightening out that relationship and of solving the present European crisis, but the beginning must be made there. It is there that we first went wrong. It is there that we must regain our lost liberty of action. The bulk of the constructive work to be done in the world lies elsewhere than in Europe; but the great, creative tasks waiting to be undertaken in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America — and even the vast unfinished business awaiting us here at home — cannot be effectively tackled, so long as a costly and self-defeating negative effort in Europe preempts our energies and our resources. W e have allowed ourselves to become bogged down in a morass of mistaken policy in Europe because we failed, at the end of World War II, to understand a number of essential facts about Europe. The first such fact was that two great European wars had permanently destroyed Western Europe as the world's power-center, leaving it not only temporarily prostrate from exhaustion but stripped, to a very large extent, of its recuperative power. What appeared to us as a problem of restoration was actually a problem of survival in permanently altered circumstances. The second fact which eluded us was that Eastern Europe had been permanently cut loose from Western Europe by a process which began with the attempted Anglo-French appeasement of Nazi Germany and which culminated in the betrayal of Czechoslovakia, in 1938. The defeat of Germany might have been expected to restore the integrity of the European community of free nations, if the West had reconquered and liberated those Eastern countries which it had sacrificed in its attempt to avoid conflict. Had Britain and France been able to do this, with or without our assistance, it might have been reasonable to expect something like a restoration of the conditions existing before the Axis aggressions.

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The mistake we made was to assume that a similar restoration could be expected by agreement with Russia, after Eastern Europe had been reconquered by Russian arms and German defeat encompassed only by reason of Russian sacrifice far greater than that of the Western Allies. The naive assumption we made at Teheran and Yalta was that Russia, having first profited from a deal with the Nazis and then having beaten off the menace of Nazi conquest, would be content to retire behind its own borders, with only a few bits of Baltic, Polish, and Rumanian territory as the reward for its efforts. This assumption would have been dubious even if the nature of the Soviet regime had been shaped by the same history and tradition which had molded the regimes of Western Europe. It was wholly unrealistic to expect a ruthless Soviet dictatorship to give up anything which it possessed the power to hold, unless it could gain something else by relinquishment. It is just barely possible that we missed an opportunity to provide the one quid pro quo which might have turned the Soviet regime's attention inward and caused it to pursue a less aggressive and expansionist foreign policy. In the fall of 1945, Russia applied to us for a loan of several billion dollars. This request was ignored for six months and eventually turned down. In the light of subsequent developments, it seems unlikely that even a generous extension of peace-time Lend-Lease would, for long, have affected the attitude of the Soviet rulers. Moreover, it is highly doubtful whether any such proposal would have been accepted by Congress, even before relations with Russia had become strained. In any case, the idea seems never to have been seriously considered. Mr. Roosevelt thought he could induce the Kremlin to set Eastern Europe free by granting Russia territorial "concessions" in both Europe and Asia; actually, he "conceded" only what the Russians already held or had the unquestioned power to take. President Truman's first act after the end of hostilities was to terminate Lend-Lease assistance to all of our recent allies — an action which he later forthrightly admitted to have been a mistake. Irrespective of whether it would have been wise or foolish, possible or impossible, to attempt a policy which might have turned the Soviet regime's attention inward upon its own vast problems, the fact remains that it was utterly foolish to expect the policy we

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did pursue to result in freeing Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. That is where most of our troubles in Europe began. Once it became apparent that the Kremlin had no intention of carrying out what we conceived to be the Yalta Agreement, the question became one of deciding just where the line of Soviet influence was to be drawn. With the exception of Greece, temporarily conceded by Russia as a sphere of British influence, it soon became clear that the line would follow almost precisely that upon which the Soviet armies had stood when Germany surrendered. Everything east of Germany, Austria, and Italy — except Greece — lay under Soviet control. Germany, Austria, and the disputed area of Trieste were the bones of contention. Whichever side gained control of Germany and Austria would gain control of Europe. Thus Germany and Austria, but primarily Germany, became the central problem of the European peace settlement. In the opinion of this observer, we have made a series of disastrous mistakes in our German policy. It is true that Russian intransigence has driven us further and further into the wilderness, but we were headed for that wilderness long before the wartime honeymoon with Russia had ended. Instead of building, in Germany and Austria, a bridge between East and West — a neutral halfway house, where at least the two halves of a divided Europe might meet and exchange their products — we first permitted these two countries to become a no man's land; then we allowed them to become partitioned, with one-third of Germany locked into the Soviet orbit and two-thirds loosely and precariously attached to Western Europe. In our ignorance of Europe and our fear of Russia, we have created or helped to create a new, truncated German nation of 48,000,000 restless inhabitants — an unnatural state which threatens the future of the German people no less than it jeopardizes the peace of Europe and, ultimately, the security of the United States. T o contain Russia, we have brought into being a new, unpredictable Germany which may prove to be more difficult to contain than Russia itself. This new Germany has been shaped exclusively by the West under our leadership. It is not the "new," peaceful, democratic Germany which we talked about creating years ago. It is the old Germany — not the Germany of Hitler — but the Germany which

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produced Hitler — the Germany of industrial magnates and political bureaucrats who somehow survive all political change, of hardworking, peaceable people too apathetic or too immature to govern themselves, and of well-meaning but essentially undemocratic leadership. It is a Germany very like that of Gustav Stresemann and General von Seeckt which, in the early twenties, worked its way back to power by playing off Russia against the West. Once more, as in 1918, fear of communism has caused us to abort a democratic, anti-communist revolution and to turn over control of the country to a political Center which, because it is too weak to govern alone, is drifting steadily toward the unregenerate, nationalistic Right. In our fear of Russia and our ignorance of Europe, we have pushed and strained to create a so-called "United Europe" as a bulwark of democracy and freedom — a half-Europe which cannot live except on subsidy and which is "united" only through the shotgun marriage of governments subservient to the Washington paymaster but without firm roots in popular support. This weak and fundamentally disunited Little Europe will soon, if we continue to have our way, be dominated by the "new" Germany, which we shall have brought into being, supported, and rearmed. The one purpose of this "new" Germany will be to regain the lost German East. It will seek to accomplish this purpose by any and all means. It may sell out the West and make a deal with Moscow. It may drag or maneuver the West into war with Russia, if no deal can be made. There is still a chance that we shall be saved from the consequences of our folly by the revolt of the European peoples against the policy which we have imposed. This revolt has already forced a pause in the headlong rush toward disaster, but, unless we make use of that pause to reconsider, the stage will be set for another world conflict, arising, as other wars have arisen, from that troubled and troublesome area which lies between the Pripet Marshes and the Rhine. It may be that war will come in any case, either because the Kremlin actually intends to conquer the world by the sword, or because Russia will strike one of these days to anticipate what the Kremlin conceives to be a Western plan of attack. These are great risks in the immediate future. But these dangers are less ominous

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than the prospect of what will almost certainly happen in the slightly longer-range future, if no overt move is made by Russia and our present policy is continued. What if the Bonn Republic were to sell out the West in order to regain, through a Russo-German alliance, all or part of the territories which we so ill-advisedly permitted Russia and Poland to amputate? This would not be the first Russo-German deal at the expense of Poland. A new Russo-German entente would be far more serious than the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which heralded the beginning of World War II. This time, the entire European Continent, the Near East and, very likely, North Africa would fall under Moscow-Berlin domination. It is even possible that much of this might happen without a shot being fired, but it takes no soothsayer to predict that it would make World War III ultimately inevitable. The conditions in which that war of survival would have to be fought by the United States and whatever might remain of the British Commonwealth are terrifying to contemplate. Not a foothold would remain on the European Continent. The productive power of almost the entire Eastern Hemisphere would be in hostile hands. The seven seas would be infested with hostile submarines operating from safe sally-ports from Norway to Gibraltar and from Vladivostok to Canton. This is the morass into which we have been stumbling. This is the end toward which our diplomatic "triumphs" of London, Lisbon, Bonn, and Paris are leading us . . . How did we get into this perilous position? And, above all, how can we extricate ourselves from it?

2 Four-Power Fiasco Six months after the four-power occupation of Germany had begun, anyone who followed closely the day-by-day reporting of post-surrender developments could see that the experiment was headed for serious trouble. This was disturbing, not only because of the probable consequences as to the future role of Germany in a peaceful world, but because four-power failure in Germany would strike a serious blow at the whole structure of a world peace based upon the assumption of reasonably successful great-power cooperation. Having spent the war years studying not only the means by which the morale of Nazi Germany might be destroyed but also the political, economic, and psychological factors by which a peaceful, new Germany might be brought into existence, I was anxious to see for myself how the post-surrender plans, which I deeply distrusted, were working out in practice. Civilians were not at this time permitted to enter Germany, unless on official business or accredited as "war correspondents." After discussing the matter with friends in the War and State Departments 1 who were likewise troubled by the course of events in Germany, I obtained an assignment from the Chicago Sun Syndicate to make an on-the-spot study and write a series of background articles for a number of newspapers across the country. This type of assignment presented an unusual opportunity for access to the different zones and for careful and unhurried reporting. 1 Assistant Secretary of W a r , John J . M c C l o y , with w h o m I had discussed post-surrender policy in 1944, and Assistant Secretary of State, Dean G . Acheson. Both expressed the opinion that an independent survey might be useful.

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Through the generous cooperation of the occupation authorities2 and a stroke of luck, so far as the Soviet zone was concerned, I was able to travel extensively through all four zones of occupation and to make a rather thorough study of four-power relations in Berlin. This was in the summer of 1946. It was difficult, at first, to form any clear picture of the state of mind of the German people. The same questions, asked in daylight by a reporter wearing the uniform of an American war correspondent, and at night by a shabbily dressed civilian who could usually pass as German, often elicited wholly different answers. What was more, each of the four conquerors seemed to evoke a different attitude on the part of the conquered. Surprisingly enough, there appeared to be more open resentment in the French zone than in the Russian. Whatever the Russians did was apparently not quite as bad as what the guilty conscience of the Germans had led them to expect. On the other hand, their feeling was bitter against "these French conquerors, whom we knocked over in less than thirty days." As for the British and Americans, nothing that either of them did apparently came up to the rather peculiar expectations of a population which considered them liberators, rather than conquerors. The Germans remembered and resented the Allied "terror raids," but seemed to have forgotten the Luftwaffe's bombing of Warsaw, Rotterdam, and London. Few admitted to any sense of responsibility for the acts of Hitler's Third Reich; indeed, few admitted having had any sympathy whatever for National Socialism. "Aber ich war ja nur ein kleiner Mann. Was konnte ich da machen?" (But I was only a little man. What could I do?) Hunger — the scrounging and scrabbling for food, fuel, and bits of clothing — preoccupied most Germans, and most of them were, in fact, on the verge of starvation. In these circumstances it was not surprising to find apathy and sullen resentment, mingled with both crawling subservience and unregenerate arrogance. 2 Both General Lucius D. Clay, the American Military Governor, and Lieutenant General Sir Brian Robertson, head of the British Military Government, welcomed the proposed background study and placed every facility at m y disposal, in addition to being most generous of their own time. T h e French authorities were less accessible but equally courteous. A s for the Soviet zone, I had the good fortune to be permitted to join one of the very few groups of correspondents taken on "conducted tours" and then to acquire permission to wander off on m y own. T h e Soviet officials w h o made this possible would probably prefer not to have their names mentioned.

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In order to understand the more recent development of American policy and the disastrous position into which it has taken us, it is necessary to begin with a look at this earlier period. W h a t has happened is difficult enough to understand, even with some knowledge of the background; it would be wholly incomprehensible without a picture of what Germany was like immediately after the war and of the major factors which combined to frustrate the plans of the four occupying powers. 3 i. Germany

under Potsdam in 1946

Here is the picture of Germany as it appeared a little over a year after surrender. W h a t had once been the German nation, before Hitler's annexations, was now partitioned into six parts. T h e Koenigsberg area of East Prussia had been annexed by Russia. T h e rest of East Prussia, Pomerania, Upper and Lower Silesia, and the eastern part of Brandenburg had been annexed by Poland. T h e remaining rump, lying roughly between the Oder and the old western frontier, had been cut up into four separate zones of occupation. As the result of this partition, the political and economic life of Germany was paralyzed. T h e parts annexed by Russia and Poland, as well as the Soviet zone of occupation, were working for their Eastern masters. T h e French zone, in southwest Germany, was being milked by France, though on a smaller scale. T h e British zone in the northwest and the American zone in the south were living on subsidy to the extent of half a billion dollars a year, paid out of the pockets of British and American taxpayers. Between the Anglo-American area and the French zone there was little or no exchange of food, raw material, or manufactured products. Between East Germany and the W e s t there was no natural commerce at all, no legal movement of people, no exchange of information. It had become more difficult for a German, living in Leipzig under Russian rule, to visit his family in British-controlled Hamburg or American-controlled Munich, than for a British subject to travel from Montreal to Bombay. 3 For a fuller discussion than can be given in this chapter see the author's earlier work: Germany — Bridge or Battleground, published in 1947 by Harcourt, Brace & Co., N.Y., and Heinemann, London; and (in German) by Franz Mittelbach Verlag, Stuttgart, at the instance of United States Military Government.

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T h e East German granary, which formerly supplied food f o r itself and f o r a large part of W e s t G e r m a n y as well, was now exporting all its produce to the East, except f o r a bare subsistence ration retained at home. T h e East German industries were working f o r Russia or Poland. Those in the Soviet zone of occupation were gradually running down because of war damage, plant removals, lack of effective manpower, and the absence of parts and materials formerly obtained f r o m the West. W e s t G e r m a n y was in even worse condition. N e v e r self-sufficient in foodstuffs and n o w deprived of its normal supplies f r o m the East, it was living on French leavings and Anglo-American charity. Disease, death from malnutrition, and hunger edema were prevalent; infant mortality was high. Industry was at a low level of production, with some plants at a total standstill and f e w working at more than a fraction of capacity. In part this was due to w a r damage and in part to shortage of manpower and the low productivity of the available skilled labor. Most of all, it was due to the shortage of coal. T h e great R u h r coal fields, capable of producing 130,000,000 tons per annum, were turning out less than half of that amount. Most of this was needed to run the railroads and public utilities, to supply the armies of occupation, and to satisfy at least in part the demands of the coal-hungry countries of Western Europe. Only a trickle of coal was reaching German industry — not enough to make steel f o r even the most urgently needed reconstruction and repair. Throughout all of Germany, consumer goods were practically unobtainable. Foodstuffs (apart from rationed items), clothing, household utensils, furniture, or even the simplest hand tools were not to be found anywhere except in limited quantities and at fantastic prices on the black market. T h e r e was no incentive to earn, because there was nothing wages could buy. Those w h o had goods refused to sell them f o r currency, because even the most simpleminded citizen knew that the German currency was worthless. Cigarettes, at a dollar per cigarette, had become the accepted medium of exchange. Farmers were hoarding their produce and bands of hungry gleaners invaded their fields. Wage-earners often found that even the scant allowance of f o o d called f o r b y their ration-cards was unavailable. T h e average German's diet was less than half of that to which he had been accustomed.

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Millions were homeless. Yet scarcely a new house had been built in Germany in the fifteen months since surrender. Window glass was practically unobtainable. Families were crowded together, with frequently four or five persons in a single room. Many were still living in cellars. Here and there a window box with blooming geraniums indicated where some family was living in the still habitable portions of an apparent ruin. To make matters worse, over ten million Germans were in the process of being expelled from the lands annexed by Russia and Poland, from the Czech Sudetenland and from parts of Hungary. These refugees — predominantly old men, women and children — had no place to go except into the already overcrowded rump of Western Germany. Finally, to put the finishing touch to German misery, more and more of the better housing facilities were being taken over by the families and dependents of occupation troops and officials. Often as many as five German families were evicted to make room for one Allied household. Germany was an economic desert and a moral morass. In these circumstances it was not surprising that little, if anything, had been accomplished in reeducating the German people toward democracy. Not only had the denazification program proved itself a farce, but the Allies were learning that an army of occupation cannot very well teach democracy — least of all to a population struggling and scrounging for a bare existence. Furthermore, the Germans were becoming aware that there was no agreement among their four conquerors as to the nature of the democracy they were trying to teach. German apathy was increased by the fact that neither political parties nor labor unions were permitted to organize on a national basis. The political vacuum was almost as complete as the economic paralysis. As for cooperation among the four occupying powers, the Allied Control Council in Berlin was gradually changing from an organ of four-power government of Germany into a meeting place for the four independent rulers of the four parts of a partitioned Germany. Relations between the four pro-consuls were still quite cordial — far more so than the relations between Foreign Ministers Byrnes, Bevin, Bidault, and Molotov — but, to all intents and purposes, the Potsdam Plan was dead as a dodo. It required no protracted study or special insight to see the dis-

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astrous effect upon all of Europe of the four-power fiasco in Germany. The German nation had been a chronic troublemaker in Europe; but Germany had also been the hub of the whole European economy. Geography, geology, and technology had combined to make it so. German rivers, railways, and canals had been the natural gateways to the heart of the Continent. German coal fields had been the sole source of surplus coal for many countries without coal deposits of their own, or with coal production insufficient to cover their requirements. This had become even more important when Britain ceased, after World War I, to provide an overseas source of fuel for the Continent. German technology and industriousness provided the largest, single, compact mass of skilled labor in Europe. These elements combined to make Germany a major factor in European production as well as a major market place for the production of other nations. Even before Dr. Schacht's forced-draft expansion of Germany's economic orbit in the days of Hitler's Third Reich, Germany had ranked third among the nations in total world trade, with a volume surpassed only by the United States and Great Britain. It was clearly undesirable that Germany should ever regain the position of preponderant economic power acquired through the deliberate overexpansion of her productive capacity in the Hitler period. Yet it was equally obvious that unless Germany did regain a large measure of economic health there could be no European recovery. This had been recognized by Anthony Eden, then Britain's Foreign Minister, in 1941, at a time when Nazi bombs were raining upon the British Isles and victory seemed a remote dream. "Our conditions for peace with Germany," Mr. Eden had said, "will be designed to prevent a repetition of Germany's misdeeds . . . but it is not part of our purpose to cause Germany to collapse economically. I say that, not out of any love for Germany, but because a starving and bankrupt Germany in the midst of Europe would poison all of us who are her neighbors. That is not sentiment; it is common sense." Yet now — five years later — Germany was both starving and bankrupt, with her neighbors on all sides frightened and demanding a voice in what should be done. They were frightened of a strong, resurgent Germany; but, right now, they were far more alarmed

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at having to Jive next door to a moral and economic plague-center. Not only that, the entire Continent suffered from the absence of German coal, German potash, German machines and machine parts — as well as from the total disappearance of a market which had formerly absorbed much of its production. Dutch and Belgian transshipment ports lay idle. Scandinavia and Italy shivered for lack of fuel. In all the countries of Europe reconstruction was delayed and impeded. The economic collapse of Germany was proving itself to be the worst physical disaster that had befallen Europe since the war itself had ended. Not only was misery protracted and revolutionary discontent created throughout the Continent, but confidence was being undermined in the whole concept of a peace based upon the successfull cooperation of the great powers. Nowhere else in the world had great-power cooperation been placed on trial so explicitly as in Germany. Nowhere else had its failure been so conclusively demonstrated. 2. Reasons for

Failure

How had this failure come about? Innumerable interviews and the study of much documentary material led to the broad conclusion that the reasons for the disaster were to be found in the historical development of coalition policy toward Germany and in certain major blunders made at the Potsdam Conference of August, 1945. The trouble lay not so much in faulty execution of policy, as in policy itself. The first definition of coalition policy as to the post-surrender treatment of the defeated Axis powers was issued by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in August, 1941, several months before the United States became a participant in the war. The Atlantic Charter Declaration, issued at the famous shipboard conference off Argenta, was at first no more than a statement of Anglo-American policy, but shortly after Pearl Harbor the principles of this declaration were embodied in a formal pronouncement signed by all the major participants in the coalition. This "United Nations Declaration" was never thereafter revoked or modified. The signatories set forth, in eight major points, the broad principles of a just peace, renouncing both vengeance and the traditional

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spoils of the victor. In particular, they renounced any claims upon "territorial or other aggrandizement" and expressed the determination that there should be "no territorial changes that do not correspond to the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." They promised equal access for victor and vanquished alike, to the world's markets and raw materials. This became the basic document of coalition policy and of Allied propaganda. Apart from announcing their determination to bring about the "unconditional surrender" of the Axis Powers, the Allied leaders made no further pronouncements of policy toward Germany until the Yalta Conference of February, 1945. The "unconditional surrender" declaration, made in the flush of victory at Casablanca in January, 1943, was not a revocation of the Atlantic Charter. If anything, it meant that the coalition would impose, rather than negotiate, the just peace which it had promised. Nevertheless, from the point of view of its effect upon enemy morale, which was my job at the time, I considered the declaration a mistake and submitted a memorandum to President Roosevelt, pointing out that, unless clarified, it would be used by the Nazi regime to promote last-ditch resistance. A clarifying statement was, in fact, considered by the President but vetoed by Mr. Churchill.4 In September, 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill held one of their periodic joint staff conferences at Quebec. Henry Morgenthau, then Secretary of the Treasury, placed before this meeting a plan developed in his department for the post-surrender treatment of Germany. Although this fact did not become known until years later, both President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill initialed this plan at Quebec and gave it their apparent approval, an action which seems almost incredible in view of the nature of the proposal. 5 The plan was an extremely drastic proposal for what later became called "de-industrialization." It demanded the destruction or removal from Germany of all industrial plants or equipment capable of being used for war production, thus making Germany into an agricultural nation with only consumer goods industries permitted to operate. The plan even went so far as to propose specifi* F o r a fuller account, see Germany 265. 5 F o r text, ibid., pp. 273-278.

— Bridge

or Battleground,

pp. 16, 259-

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cally that all equipment should be removed from the Ruhr coal mines "and the mines closed." Both the War and State Departments had been working on quite different plans for the treatment of Germany, based upon the conviction that what makes a nation a threat to peace is not primarily the possession of a war potential, but the will to use it. The Secretaries of War and State took sharp issue with the Morgenthau proposal, pointing out among other things that — as shown by our own remarkable conversion from peace to war production — almost any industry is potentially a war industry. The experts of the Foreign Economic Administration chimed in with the assertion that the Morgenthau Plan was based upon erroneous assumptions of fact, particularly as to the availability in Germany of sufficient arable land to make Mr. Morgenthau's "pastoralization" practicable. The verbal battle raged behind the scenes in Washington throughout the winter of 1944-1945.® The job of resolving the conflict was left largely in the hands of Assistant Secretary of War, John J . McCloy and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. The resulting compromise directive (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1067) endeavored to find middle ground between Mr. Morgenthau's wish to remove or destroy all heavy industry and the State-War contention that German industry should be strictly controlled but that destruction of productive capacity, other than that for direct armament, would seriously impede the rehabilitation of Europe as a whole. Unfortunately, the fact that the President and the British Prime Minister had given offhand approval to the Morgenthau proposal made it inevitable that many remnants of this monstrosity should creep into the Joint Chiefs' compromise.7 When the document was presented by General Eisenhower to the European Advisory Commission at London,8 it was opposed before this body by the 9 T w o authoritative works present an interesting, if at times conflicting, account of this battle: Secretary of W a r Stimson's On Active Service, and Secretary of State Hull's Memoirs. ' F o r full text of J C S 1067, see Germany — Bridge or Battleground, pp. 277-302. " A t the Moscow Conference of October, 1943, it had been decided that U . S . - U . K . - U . S . S . R . planning for Germany should be handled b y a European Advisory Commission at London. T h e Commission consisted of U.S. Ambassador John G . Winant, Soviet Ambassador Fedor Gusev, and Sir William Strang of the British Foreign Office.

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representatives of the State Department and the Foreign Economic Administration. Thus, instead of taking a constructive lead in the shaping of coalition policy, the United States merely provided its allies with a spectacle of internal dissension and an excuse for postponing long overdue decisions. This was the background of planning against which the Big Three met at Yalta three months before the German surrender. T h e communiqué issued by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin showed clearly, by what it did not say, that the three leaders were far from seeing eye-to-eye concerning the post-surrender treatment of Germany. 9 T h e y did, however, announce four important decisions: 1. T h e y fixed the Russo-Polish boundary approximately along the so-called Curzon Line and promised that Poland should be "compensated by substantial accessions of territory in the North and West" f o r the loss of the Polish Ukraine. This meant that Roosevelt and Churchill had allowed Stalin to persuade them to abandon the Atlantic Charter pledges against annexations or "territorial changes that do not conform to the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." 2. T h e y confirmed their decision 10 — because Roosevelt sup9 For full text of communiqué on Germany see Germany — Bridge or Battleground, pp. 303-304. "President Roosevelt apparently went to Yalta with a plan for partitioning Germany into several states, probably derived from the plan submitted by Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles. (See Welles's The Time for Decision (Harper, 1944, pp. 336-361 ) ; and, for a brief outline and map, Germany — Bridge or Battleground, pp. 271-273). Mr. Churchill strongly objected to any such plan and Mr. Roosevelt dropped it. Churchill was not, however, able to win the President's support for a four-power occupation of all of Germany, which might well have prevented the unplanned partition resulting from the creation of separate zones of occupation. From Stalin's point of view, it was probably a matter of indifference which way Eastern Germany came under Soviet control — by partition or allocation to Soviet occupation. The exact history of the determination of the boundaries of the United States, British, and Russian zones is still somewhat obscure. In the August 2, 1952, issue of the Saturday Evening Post, Albert G . Warner attempted to reconcile the conflicting claims and recollections of the various interested parties. A previous account of the work of the European Advisory Commission had been rendered in an article by Professor Philip E. Mosely of Columbia University, former political advisor to Ambassador Winant; this article was published in the July, 1950 issue of Foreign Affairs. The most important facts seem to be these: 1. The three-zone arrangement finally adopted was proposed in late 1943 or

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ported Stalin against Churchill in this respect — to divide Germany into separate zones of occupation, coordinated and controlled through an Allied Control Council in Berlin. (Churchill fought for the joint occupation of Germany as a whole, which might well have prevented much of the subsequent disaster.) early 1944 by Sir William Strang and accepted by Ambassadors Winant and Gusev. N o provision was at this time made for a French zone. When Stalin agreed that the French should have a zone (at Yalta) he did so on condition that the French zone should be carved out of the Anglo-American area. (This was later done, resulting in the splitting of Wuerttemberg and Baden into two parts — northern and southern — with an artificial North Wuerttemberg-Baden state in the U.S. zone and a South Wuerttemberg-Baden state in the French area.) 2. There seems to have been surprisingly little discussion of the extent of the Russian zone — no attempt by Winant or Strang to have its western boundary run through Berlin, instead of 100 miles west of the capital. Although the division of Berlin into sectors was envisaged from the start, it never seems to have occurred to the British and American representatives that the Western zones should be contiguous to the Western sectors of Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington apparently did make a proposal in February, 1944, for a line roughly following the Elbe and running through Berlin, but, according to Mr. Warner, this was turned down by the State Department. By the time the proposal reached London, without State Department endorsement, the Russians had already accepted the Strang proposal. 3. N o provision was made for a corridor of communication between the Western zones and the Western sectors of Berlin. Dr. Mosely says that he suggested it and that Winant took the matter up in Washington. Warner says no other evidence supports the claim that Winant made any such effort. iMosely says that the W a r Department took the position throughout that this was a purely military matter with which the E.A.C. should not concern itself. All accounts seem to agree that the American authorities did not want to raise the matter for fear lest it "offend the Russians." (Later on, General Clay, acting as General Eisenhower's Deputy, likewise refrained from obtaining a clear agreement at the time when it might have been obtained by holding up the withdrawal of the American forces from that part of the Russian zone which they had liberated. See Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 26-27.) 4. Although very little timely attention seems to have been paid by any of the U.S. authorities to the definition of the Soviet zone, President Roosevelt took a lively interest in the Anglo-American arrangements, objecting strongly — though in vain — to British occupation of the industrial Northwest with its two great ports, while the United States was awarded the South "with its scenery." Fearing that American lines of communication through France might prove unsafe, because of the unpredictable developments in that country, the President demanded and got an agreement to make the port of Bremen an American enclave in the British zone, with a corridor connecting it to the American area. Former Secretary of W a r Henry L. Stimson records in his memoirs that he feared Roosevelt's insistence would "get us into a head-on collision with the British." Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy argued, according to Warner, that the corridor was unnecessary. Nevertheless, the Bremen cor-

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3. T h e y agreed — because Roosevelt here supported Churchill against Stalin — that France should be invited to take over a zone of occupation and to participate as a fourth member of the Allied Control Council. (Stalin considered France u n w o r t h y of this position and agreed only with some reluctance.) 4. T h e y determined the broad principles of denazification, demilitarization and disarmament. T h e i r decision as to German industry followed the Joint Chiefs' watered-down version of the Morgenthau Plan, providing for the elimination or control of "all German indust r y that could be used for military production." Finally, the Big T h r e e expressed the determination to bring all war criminals to justice and to "exact reparations in kind f o r the destruction w r o u g h t b y the Germans." This vague language clearly indicated that no real agreement had been possible. T h e Russians apparently demanded ten billion dollars in reparations from G e r many, while Roosevelt and Churchill merely took note of their demand. T h e Russians considered this tantamount to agreement. T h e one thing that was perfectly clear after Yalta was the whole concept of a "just" peace had been abandoned — in as well as in Europe (though the Asian provisions were not lished until later) — in favor of an old-fashioned victor's peace, all the trimmings of spoils and annexations.

that Asia pubwith

Meanwhile, as the coalition forces pressed on into Germany, there was still no joint directive to govern the four commanders. T h e Joint Chiefs' directive 1067 was issued to General Eisenhower in A p r i l and became binding upon the United States forces under his command, but not upon the British or French forces. (This was not generally k n o w n at the time, because J C S 1067 remained classified as "top secret" until several months after it had been superseded b y the Potsdam Agreement.) O n June 5, 1945, the four governments issued a declaration at ridor was obtained and, in this instance, nailed d o w n b y A d m i r a l Stark in a hard and fast written agreement with the British. T h e w h o l e story, insofar as it is k n o w n , reveals a shocking lack of coordination between W a s h i n g t o n and the L o n d o n Embassy as well as, within W a s h ington, between the W h i t e House, the State Department and the A m e r i c a n military authorities. It also reveals the curious absence of planning — one might even say the reluctance to consider — anything b e y o n d winning the w a r . T h e w h o l e purpose f o r w h i c h the w a r was being f o u g h t seems to have been secondary t o winning it.

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Berlin, announcing the defeat and unconditional surrender of the Third Reich, the assumption by the four powers of governmental authority down to the local level, the formation of an Allied Control Council and the administration of Berlin by four Commandants sitting as a Kommandatura. Each of the four Commandersin-Chief was given supreme authority in his own zone. T h e four, sitting together in the Allied Control Council, were to act jointly by unanimous decision on questions affecting Germany as a whole, and these decisions were to insure uniformity of action b y the individual Commanders in their respective zones. T h e absence of any common directive to govern the converging armies and the absence of any agreed policy during the first three months after surrender complicated the later problems of quadripartite government by permitting divergent trends and policies to become firmly established in the various zones. Within this framework of predetermined decisions and lack of over-all policy, the conferees at Potsdam sought to produce a practical operating directive. Only Stalin remained of the original Big Three; Roosevelt was dead, and Churchill was supplanted b y a new Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, in the midst of the deliberations. France was not represented. Given the purposeful determination of the Russian leader, the political overturn in Britain, and the uncertainties and contradictions in American policy, as expressed in the still unpublished Joint Chiefs' directive, the new leaders of Britain and the United States faced a difficult task. So far as producing an operating directive was concerned, the conferees did a reasonably good job, defining the procedures f o r disarmament, demilitarization, and denazification. But, in dealing with the broader and more important aspects of European and German policy, they made two very serious and far-reaching blunders. 11 T h e first major blunder made by the British and American delegations was that they allowed themselves to become parties to a Russo-Polish land-grab in eastern Germany, which went far beyond any reasonable interpretation of the Yalta Agreement. Under the formula of "compensating" Poland f o r the loss of lands held never to have been rightfully hers, one might have expected a proposal 11

For full text of the Potsdam Agreement, see Germany — Bridge or Battleground, appendix, pp. 305-321.

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to permit Poland to annex the strategically provocative German enclave of East Prussia. One might also, perhaps, have expected a proposal to give Poland the province of Upper Silesia, with its rich mineral deposits, well developed industries and partly Polish population. But Messrs. Truman and Attlee agreed to establish the Polish-German frontier at the line of the Oder and Western Neisse rivers, amputating from Germany not only East Prussia and Upper Silesia, but Pomerania, Lower Silesia, and the eastern part of Brandenburg as well. All these territories, containing some nine million Germans and producing food for about seventeen millions — in other words, for one quarter of the total German population — were awarded to Poland, except for the northern half of East Prussia, which was awarded to Russia for no better reason that that Stalin demanded it. It is true that these awards were made subject to the final determination of the peace treaty, but this did not deter the Russians and Poles from proceeding immediately to drive out the German populations, thus greatly prejudicing any chance of later rectification. Modern history records no more brutal mass expulsion on the part of supposedly civilized Western authorities, except the mass expulsions and exterminations undertaken by Hitler's Third Reich. T h e second great blunder committed by the American and British conferees was that, while they insisted upon the inclusion of France, as provided by the Yalta Declaration, they neglected to obtain French signature of the Potsdam Agreement. Thus, France was given a zone of occupation, a seat on the Allied Control Council, and veto power over any Council decision, without being made a party to the agreement which governed the quadripartite government of Germany. In spite of diligent research, I have never been able to discover how this essential step came to be omitted. Since the Potsdam conferees reached no decision as to the western frontier of Germany, the result of these two blunders was to fortify that section of French opinion which demanded the annexation of all German territory west of the Rhine and the political and economic separation from Germany of the Ruhr industrial area east of the Rhine. There were two perfectly logical reasons for this attitude: first, if the pledges against annexation were to be jettisoned, and if Poland and Russia were going to grab German territory in the East, why should not France take her pickings in

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the West? Second, the amputation of the eastern provinces and the expulsion of their populations into the overcrowded rump of West Germany would create resentments and population pressures which might easily lead to another German attack upon France; therefore, France must be permitted to protect herself by establishing the Rhine as a frontier and by denying Germany the use of the Ruhr arsenal. In order to enforce these demands, the French proceeded to veto in the Allied Control Council every action which might lead to the treatment of Germany as a political or economic entity and thus lead to the reestablishment of a German nation. They refused to permit free interzonal trade and economic unification. They obstructed the formation of political parties on a national basis. They refused permission for the interzonal organization of trade unions. They even vetoed a proposal to permit the issue of uniform postage stamps in the four zones. The result of these obstructive French tactics was the frustration of the whole Potsdam design for the four-power government of Germany and the consequent division of Germany into four, separate, hermetically sealed compartments. This not only caused a rapid deterioration of the German economy but imposed the first great strains upon the four-power coalition. The British and American authorities became exasperated with French obstructionism, but made no effort to deal with the very real problem of French security. The Russians, forming their opinions on the basis of their own treatment of satellites, could not understand why Britain and the United States did not make France come to heel. When the writer was in Berlin, in the summer of 1946, a high Russian authority said to him: "After six months of French obstruction, we began to suspect that this was a put-up job — that you did not like the bargain you had made at Potsdam, and that you were letting the French get you out of it." In addition to the Potsdam blunders, three fallacious assumptions contributed to the four-power fiasco: 1. The first was the assumption that it would be the proper function of the victors to remake Germany, to reeducate the German people, and to fit the new Germany into a world organized for peace. Actually, the regeneration of the German people could be expected to come about only as the result of their own repentance

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and resurgent will toward decency and freedom under law; it could not be imposed from without. The most that the victors could realistically hope to do would be to create a climate in which that regeneration could take place, meanwhile making renewed aggression impossible. Even if this were not true — even if it were possible for a victorious nation to impose regeneration — it would still be impossible for a coalition of four nations to carry out any such program, particularly when there existed so wide a divergence of views as was evident among the four Potsdam powers. 2. Given a coalition purpose not merely to render the vanquished harmless but to impose a social, economic, and moral reorientation, the creation of four separate zones of occupation had been a wellnigh fatal mistake. A four-power occupation of all of Germany might at least have forced the four powers to attempt a reconciliation of their aims and methods. Handing each of the four powers a separate piece of Germany to administer meant that each would try to remake its piece in its own image. 3. The third fallacy, inherited from the Morgenthau Plan via the Joint Chiefs' directive, was the thesis that a nation can be made peaceful and law-abiding merely by seeing to it that no weapons ever come within its reach, even though this may also involve turning back the clock by several centuries and reducing the living standards of a whole continent. The attempt to make Germany safe by deindustrialization, though not carried to the absurd extremes suggested by Mr. Morgenthau, nevertheless put the Potsdam Agreement at cross-purposes with European recovery. The outstanding fact about the four-power experiment, as the writer saw it in August, 1946, was that the initiative as to Germany's future had been left to France and Russia during the entire first year of occupation. The French knew what they did not want, and obstructed it. After six months of this, the Russians knew what they wanted, and proceeded to take it. Neither Britain nor the United States had a policy to supplant the broken-down quadripartite contract. In April, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes had put forward a proposal for a long-term, four-power treaty of mutual assistance as a guarantee against future German aggression. But neither this, nor Mr. Byrnes's patient labors throughout his incumbency, in concluding peace treaties with the former Axis satellites and attempting

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to settle the difficult question of Trieste, constituted an attack upon the central problem of what to do with Germany. Once it became clear that French obstruction was going to continue and that neither Britain nor the United States seemed to know how to put a stop to it, the Russians drastically changed their original policy of insistence upon carrying out the Potsdam contract. Accepting the compartmentalization of Germany, they shifted to a policy of getting the maximum advantage for themselves out of their zone of occupation. Instead of removing plant and equipment for reparations account, as agreed at Potsdam, they now switched to leaving plants in Germany and — contrary to the Potsdam Agreement — taking out a large part of their current production. In effect, they said to Britain and the United States: "If you are going to let the French sabotage the Potsdam Agreement, we can get along very nicely without it. W e have the only zone which produces more than it needs and we can make excellent use of the surplus. You can make up deficits in your zones just as long as you like." As a matter of fact, this was painfully true. Continuation of the zonal barriers meant that, while Russia was taking out millions of dollars at one end of Germany, and France was making a slight profit out of its zone, Britain and the United States were compelled to pour in their own money at the other end — to the tune of some five hundred million dollars a year. N o t content with this advantageous economic situation, the Soviet Union had also seized the political initiative. On J u l y 10, 1946, Mr. Molotov went on record as opposing any French annexations of German territory and proposed the early creation of an anti-fascist central German Government. In taking this stand, the Soviet Foreign Minister antagonized French opinion and embarrassed the powerful French Communist Party; but he also struck a shrewd blow on behalf of Soviet prestige in Germany. In the eyes of the German people, Russia had now become the champion of German unity and the defender of German soil against French annexation. In the same month, Mr. Byrnes made one more attempt to achieve economic unification of the four zones, but without facing the basic issues. H e offered an economic merger of the American zone — without political merger — to any or all of the other three

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powers. Britain alone accepted the proposal. T h e Soviet Union ignored it, and France made a counter-proposal which amounted to polite rejection. T h e need f o r a wholly new American approach to the problem was clearly evident. A Suggested Policy

Revision

T h e series of articles published in August, 1946, concluded with a tentative proposal f o r the revision of American policy in G e r many, drafted after much discussion with American and British officials in Germany, with German leaders, and with journalists of many nationalities. A copy of this proposal was sent to Assistant Secretary of W a r John J . M c C l o y and to Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson. 1 2 T h e latter invited me to discuss these suggestions with a group of five or six State Department officials and advisers w h o were then responsible f o r planning our German policy. Since the outcome of these discussions was a recommendation cabled b y the Department to Secretary Byrnes, then in Paris, and since this recommendation had rather curious and unforeseen consequences, the proposal itself may be of interest. It concerned only the following four elements in the German problem: frontiers, unification, termination of the occupation, and revision of limitations placed upon German industry. Proposal of August,

1946

T h e key difficulty at present lies in French insistence that before any steps are taken to reconstitute a German nation, the FrancoGerman frontier must be revised. In m y opinion, the United States should take a definite position on this matter, one of unequivocal opposition to any revision of the Franco-German border. " T h e writer has for over twenty years enjoyed a warm personal friendship with Dean Acheson. Although this friendship was based originally upon a common admiration f o r President Roosevelt and a common dissent from his monetary policies — and, later, upon a common conviction as to the necessity of supporting the anti-Axis coalition — the writer has dissented from some of Mr. Acheson's policies and judgments as Secretary of State. This dissent, concerning for the most part our policy in Europe, has had nothing in common with the hue and c r y raised against Mr. Acheson b y those who have unjustly blamed him for "the loss of China" and w h o have irresponsibly impugned the loyalty of a great and devoted public servant. This personal relationship will explain the temerity and persistence with which a private citizen has ventured to make occasional suggestions to an official in high public office.

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Reasons: (a) the transfer of large numbers of Germans to French sovereignty would create a dangerous irredentism; (b) the French have themselves repudiated the only alternative, which would be mass expulsions similar to those undertaken by Russia and Poland in the East; and (c) a Germany deprived of the Ruhr and Saar, as well as of its Eastern industrial districts and its breadbasket, simply could not live. The most reasonable French argument for annexation is based upon what has already been allowed to happen in the East. The Russo-Polish annexations have repudiated the Atlantic Charter principles; and the mass expulsion and overcrowding of the rump of Germany have created pressures and resentments likely to provoke renewed German aggression. Therefore — so runs the French argument — the Big Three, having created these conditions, must now complete the job of stripping the German people of any possible means of waging a future war in which France is likely to be the first victim. There is only one effective answer to this argument: The United States must insist upon a reopening of the question of Germany's Eastern frontier. Under the Potsdam Agreement the ultimate Polish-German frontier is to be determined by the peace settlement. The fact that millions of Germans have already been expelled from the territory East of the Oder-Neisse Line should not be allowed to prejudice the final decision. Nor should it be forgotten that any annexation of German territory by Poland or the Soviet Union is contrary to the United Nations Declaration, which was signed by Poland as well as by all four of the occupying powers. On the other hand, the United States has committed itself to support some "compensation" to Poland at the expense of Germany for the territory East of the Curzon Line ceded to Russia; and it is probably in the interests of permanent peace that Poland should have Upper Silesia and that East Prussia should not be left again as a German island in a Polish sea. This means a frank repudiation — or at least modification — of the first two principles of the United Nations Declaration. Either is greatly to be preferred to a legalistic "interpretation" of that document, such as has been attempted by some authorities. Nor is such a modification without moral justification.

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Upper Silesia has at various times been Polish. It has a mixed population. It contains valuable coal and other mineral deposits, w h i c h are probably more essential to the well-being of an independent Poland than to the well-being of a peaceful, democratic G e r m a n y — provided that such a G e r m a n y retains possession of the coal deposits in her Western provinces. East Prussia, though historically and ethnically German, is not only a strategic provocation, but has been the traditional stronghold of the Junker clique and of Prussian militarism. F o r this reason its cession is probably in the interests of European peace. But that is as far as the United States should go in countenancing territorial changes. All the rest of the territory East of the OderNeisse Line should be returned by Poland to Germany. Pomerania, Brandenburg, and L o w e r Silesia are historically and ethnically preponderantly German. T h e y are valuable chiefly because of their agricultural productivity. Poland already has an excess of agricultural land; she apparently lacks farmers to settle much new territory, and she will, in any case, receive a substantial accession of such territory in her half of East Prussia. Germany, on the other hand, cannot afford to lose farm territory w h i c h formerly provided the f o o d for more than a quarter of her total population. T o lose it would mean that the over-crowded rump of Germany would have to import about one half of its requirements of food and fertilizer. This, in turn, would mean that the rump of Germany would either become a permanent charity patient, or else have to build up a v e r y much larger industry w o r k i n g for exports than seems desirable in the interests of lasting peace. T h e r e w o u l d be no other w a y to prevent some 30 to 35 million Germans from starving to death. T o maintain this position with regard to Germany's physical frontiers will not be easy, either as against France or as against Russia and Poland. It is, however, very much less difficult since Mr. Molotov has gone on record as opposing any French annexation in the West, and as championing the cause of German unification. Having thus far defined its position with regard to the question of territorial settlements, the United States should move for the immediate carrying out of the various provisions of the Potsdam Agreement for treating Germany as an economic and political whole, and for the elimination of interzonal barriers to the move-

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ment of persons and to the free exchange of goods, services, and information. The United States should further propose the earliest possible adoption of a national constitution and the formation of a national German government to operate under such Allied control and supervision as may be necessary. Next, in order to rectify as much as possible the fallacious assumptions of the past, the United States should propose to the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France, that, at a date to be agreed in the near future, not later than January i, 1948, the four occupying powers shall formally terminate the Period of Occupation and enter upon a Period of Observation and Control. During this Period of Observation and Control the Allies would: 1. Maintain a strict control at the German frontiers over the movement of German citizens and over the nature and volume of imports and exports. Since Germany lacks many important raw materials as well as a large part of her food supply, such border controls would provide an important safeguard against any attempted German rearmament. 2. Maintain the Allied Control Council in Germany to see that no military or para-military organizations come into being; that no prohibited industrial or scientific activities take place; and that there be no interference with the freedom of the individual as guaranteed by the constitutional law and an independent judiciary. 3. Maintain such control machinery as may be necessary to see that all aspects of the Potsdam Agreement are carried out. 4. Maintain at strategic points in Germany units of an Air Force and of a highly mobile Ground Force, able to reach any part of Germany within a few hours upon being summoned by the Allied Control Council. By thus establishing a truly international police force, the four powers would be taking an important step in eliminating the last vestiges of separatism, and would be giving to the German people the best possible evidence of their impregnable solidarity. The United States should further propose that Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, and Poland be invited to participate in the border control, the Control Council, and the Police Force. The Period of Observation and Control would terminate when-

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ever the Big Four and the nations associated with them might decide that the German people had made themselves eligible for acceptance on terms of full equality into the family of peaceful and law-abiding nations. A t this time — and not until then — the final peace treaty would be signed. In all probability, so far as can be foreseen at the present time, the Period of Observation and Control would last for the better part of a generation. It might last considerably longer. T h e essence of this proposal is that it places upon the German people the responsibility for its own future, while at the same time making certain that the German nation shall not again disturb the peace. Finally, for the remainder of the Period of Occupation and the subsequent Period of Observation and Control, the United States should propose a revised and simplified Level-of-lndustry Plan. T h e Plan of March 28, 1946, should be restudied with a view toward reaching a definite understanding concerning the nature and amount of reparations and the period of time within which they are to be completed. This will require a difficult but necessary reconciliation of understandable but nevertheless excessive Russian claims with the interests of the other occupying powers, and with the interests of Europe as a whole, in preventing Germany from becoming either a festering sore or a continuing drain upon the resources of other nations. Furthermore, the Level-of-lndustry Plan must be revised in such a w a y as to avoid the present implication that unborn generations of Germans are to be committed — without chance of redemption — to an artificially limited standard of living and a sort of secondclass European citizenship. T h e limitations and controls of German industry during the Period of Occupation and the subsequent Period of Observation and Control must be such as to provide an absolute guarantee against renewed German aggression. But it must be clearly stated that they will terminate when the treaty of peace is signed. N o r must the treaty be signed so long as there remains the slightest doubt that a complete cure of the German people has been effected. This is the program of action respectfully submitted to those officials of the United States Government, who are now preparing

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for the October conference. It is put forward publicly in the hope that it may help to create a firm foundation for United States policy in an informed public opinion. A fifth recommendation was developed orally in the conferences with the Department of State and subsequently published.13 This concerned the establishment of a Ruhr Coal Authority, modeled on the broad principle of the Tennessee Valley Authority, which would control the allocation of Ruhr coal among the European countries, including Germany, and would thus automatically control German steel production and the German war potential. It was suggested that such an organization might be the first step toward the creation of an All-European Coal Authority, through which all European war potentials might be limited and controlled. The Department was, of course, well aware of the need for abolishing the zonal barriers and for revising and simplifying the restrictions upon German industry. Considerable interest was expressed in the suggestion that the German war potential might best be controlled through the allocation of coal by a supranational authority, which would automatically control the production of steel and synthetics.14 However, the most timely contribution seemed to be the suggestion to propose eastern frontier revision, while at the same time taking an unequivocal stand against any western annexations of German territory. This particular proposal found favor with the majority of the planning group and was cabled to Secretary of State Byrnes at Paris, where he was attending a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The result of this episode was the opposite of what might have been hoped or expected. As to procedure, it had been suggested that Mr. Byrnes should privately sound out Mr. Molotov, before Germany — Bridge or Battleground, pp. 231-233. The author lays no claim to originality in putting forward this idea, which, four years later, took shape in the French Schuman Plan. He was merely one of many who believed from the outset that recovery and demilitarization through direct control of German industry were incompatible; and that indirect control of the German war potential, through allocation of coal, provided a better solution. This method also had the advantage of being applicable to the coal production of other European nations, thus providing the means for eventually releasing Germany from the status of second-class membership in the European family of nations. 14

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raising the question at the Council meeting. Not only did this seem the most likely w a y to reach an agreement — if agreement could be reached at all — but also, an approach made in this manner might serve to convince the Russian minister that the United States was quite willing to co-sponsor a proposal with Russia and not, as he thought, predisposed to gang up against Russia with the other Western powers on every occasion. If this seems naive in retrospect, it must be remembered that, at this time, most of our own people in Berlin thought that an agreement with Russia as to the German future was still quite possible. General Clay found the Russians difficult, but, as he himself has said, he often found them less difficult than the French at this stage of the development. In fact, referring to a broadcast heard in Berlin, the General wrote me, on September 21, 1946: " I have seen a recent poll at home which indicates that only a fraction of the American people place any blame on France for our failure to reach a working agreement in Germany. The discussion of this point in your talk should prove most helpful in bringing the facts before the people." The purpose of mentioning this is not to cast unfair blame upon the French; indeed, the real fault lay in the failure of the British and American Governments to develop a common policy with the French. The significance of General Clay's remark is that it recalls the context of 1946, in which an agreement with Russia did not seem at all impossible. The difficulties between the United States and Russia did not, at this time, focus in Berlin. The relationships between General Clay and Marshal Sokolovsky, the Russian commander, were far better than the relationships between Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Molotov. The procedure suggested to Mr. Byrnes was based upon this background. Secretary Byrnes's Attempt at Revision Instead of taking up the frontier question with Mr. Molotov, or even with the Council of Foreign Ministers, Mr. Byrnes left the Paris session in order to make a one-day visit to Struttgart, in the American zone of Germany. There he made an address to the German people, redefining American policy. In this wholly inappropriate setting, the Secretary attempted to deal with the question of

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Germany's frontiers, as well as with other questions of high policy, affecting not only Germany but the interests of the three colleagues, whom Mr. Byrnes had left sitting in Paris. With regard to frontiers, Mr. Byrnes fumbled both the Eastern and Western parts of the problem. Concerning the Eastern border, the Secretary announced that, while the United States recognized the Russian annexation of the Koenigsberg area of East Prussia as permanent, it would insist upon a revision of the Polish-German frontier. Unhappily, he did not specify what sort of a revision. This pleased the Germans, as Mr. Byrnes no doubt intended that it should, but infuriated the Poles, evoking the not unreasonable charge that the United States was proposing to give back to Germany its "eastern war arsenal" (Upper Silesia), which the Secretary almost certainly had not intended to imply. The result was a flat statement by Mr. Molotov to the effect that the Oder-Neisse frontier must be considered an accomplished fact. That, as it turned out, was to be the last word on the subject for a long time to come. Mr. Byrnes then proceeded to discuss the Franco-German border and, in so doing, made an almost equally disastrous mistake. Recognizing that, without the Ruhr and the Rhineland, Germany could not become a reasonably prosperous and, therefore, peaceful nation, the Secretary insisted that there should be no French annexation or political separation of this important area from Germany. This stand might have been made acceptable to France, if it had been contingent upon eastern frontier revision and relief of the population pressures within Germany. With no such revision in sight, Mr. Byrnes's pronouncement left the French more than ever worried and dissatisfied. T o offset this anticipated French reaction, Mr. Byrnes proceeded to make a concession, which failed completely to solve the French problem but which was destined to cause no end of trouble in the years to come: the Secretary expressed the opinion that France should be permitted to annex the Saar. This stultified the position of the Western powers with regard to annexations, infuriated the Germans, failed to satisfy the French, and gave the Russians another opportunity to curry German favor by voicing opposition to the proposal. Even though the coal-rich little basin of the Saar was relatively unimportant in itself, the "Saar Question," created by Mr. Byrnes's Stuttgart speech, was to be-

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come one of the major obstacles to a peaceful settlement of the age-old Franco-German quarrel. In the political sphere, Mr. Byrnes insisted that the Potsdam provisions f o r treating Germany as an entity be put into effect forthwith. He seconded the motion made by Mr. Molotov in J u l y f o r the creation of an All-German central government and the drafting of a constitution. T h e language in this section of his speech was regrettably vague. It was not clear whether Mr. Byrnes was talking about a strong central government or a weak federation. (This was cleared up by a later statement made at Paris, in which Mr. Byrnes attempted to take a middle-ground position.) Finally, some rather ambiguous allusions to the withdrawal of occupation forces gave rise to the probably unjust interpretation that Mr. Byrnes thought the time had come when complete political power could safely be turned over to the Germans. In defining American economic policy, Mr. Byrnes was more precise, reaffirming four Potsdam principles: ( 1 ) that Germany should be treated as an economic whole; (2) that Germany should be permanently demilitarized through removal of plants or limitation and control of war-potential industry; (3) that reparations should be taken only through the removal of designated plants and not out of current production; and (4) that demilitarization and reparations should be so calculated as to leave a peaceful German nation able to live on at least an average West European standard of life. T h e net result of the Byrnes speech was to leave the German tangle unchanged. Without a revision of the eastern frontier, the whole proposal could neither be logically sustained nor made acceptable to France; and the question of the eastern frontier had been fatally fumbled. Without agreement with France, it was hopeless to try to deal with the Soviet Union. In an otherwise rather disastrous and badly stage-managed attempt to break the German deadlock, Mr. Byrnes made one statement noteworthy f o r its vision and wisdom. "It is not in the interest of the German people or in the interest of world peace," the Secretary said, "that Germany should become a pawn or partner in a military struggle for power between the East and West." N o wise injunction was ever more completely disregarded. T h e final meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, in the

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year 1946, once more failed to settle any basic issues. So far as Germany was concerned, it merely fixed the date for a conference to be held at Moscow March of the succeeding year. j. Anglo-American Difficulties The immediate post-war period was not a happy one in AngloAmerican relations. This had much to do with the failure of AngloAmerican policy in Germany. The reasons for the deterioration of the intimate and effective wartime partnership were both economic and political. For some time after V E day, neither the British nor we recognized that the United Kingdom's economic position had drastically changed. Both of us shared the illusion that it would be only a matter of time before Britain would resume her traditional place in the world. The economic facts denied the validity of this assumption. The pre-war United Kingdom had been a wealthy nation. It had purchased its large imports of food, raw materials, and foreign manufactures partly out of its own exports, partly through shipping and other services, and partly out of income from its substantial foreign investments. In the period before American Lend-Lease went into effect, Britain had been forced to sell most of its foreign investments in order to sustain its solitary war effort. From that moment, Britain's economic status had permanently altered. From that moment the United Kingdom had no appreciable income from invested capital and had to pay for essential imports and reconstruction by what it could currently produce. The realization of this utterly changed status was delayed and obscured by Lend-Lease during the next four and half years. Almost immediately after V J day, President Truman summarily shut off Lend-Lease, without consultation with our former Allies and without explaining to the American people that some method would have to be devised to help carry our friends over the difficult period of reconversion. While we were gaily flinging off our mild wartime rationing, Britain was faced with the necessity for imposing even more severe austerity measures, while at the same time reorganizing the entire British economy. T o meet this emergency, the British applied to us for a loan of about seven billion dollars.

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On the theory that the American people would not stand for any such amount, our negotiators cut the figures in half, without ever spelling out the problem in its true dimensions to the American people or to Congress. Thus they built one of the many half-bridges across rivers which became a distinguishing feature of our post-war policy. Thus also began the disastrous policy of assuming that the American people could not take the truth, unless it were half-concealed and half-sugarcoated. In addition to attempting a bargain basement solution of the British problem, our negotiators attached conditions to the loan, which very nearly wrecked the British economy altogether. T h e y insisted upon a promise to make the pound Sterling freely convertible into other currencies not later than J u l y 15, 1947, and upon certain anti-discrimination clauses which fitted into the pattern of multilateral free trade which they were trying to promote throughout the world. T h e trouble with these conditions was, very simply, that they were unfulfillable. T h e British knew this and said so, but unwisely agreed to our unwise demands out of sheer necessity. Unfortunately, this was not all. T h e loan was granted in the spring of 1946. B y the end of that year, Britain already showed great progress. But then two things happened: Britain was hit by the worst winter in modern history, and price control ended in the United States, causing a rapid rise in prices which cut down the purchasing power of Britain's borrowed dollars by more than 25%. T h e slim margin by which it had been hoped to overcome the reconversion problem disappeared overnight. This caused resentment and recrimination on both sides of the Atlantic. From the political point of view, President Roosevelt's death and the dismissal of Mr. Churchill from office broke up the wartime team. Beyond this, however, the coming into power of a socialist Government in Britain alienated conservative American sentiment. There was a widespread feeling, especially in business circles, that the United States should not extend help to any socialist governments. On the other hand, American liberal sentiment was alienated by the apparent continuation, under a Labour Government, of Mr. Churchill's determination to preserve the British Empire. It took some time f o r the new Government to effect the transition from Mr. Churchill's " I did not become the King's first minister in order to

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preside over the liquidation of His Majesty's Empire" to a policy of gradually converting the Empire into an expanding Commonwealth of free nations. Where Britain and the United States tried to cooperate in world affairs during this period, they were both hampered by a psychological factor which might be characterized as an Anglo-American conspiracy in self-deception. Both we and the British clung to an illusion created by the war — the illusion of equal partnership. This concept had not always been an illusion. The "fifty-fifty" relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill had been based upon a perfectly correct moral evaluation of the earlier and more dangerous deployment of relatively small British power in relation to the later and safer deployment of far greater American power. The difficulty arose after victory had been won. Because they were slow to realize that, with their diminished resources they could not sustain a position purchased at an enormous wartime sacrifice, the British resented the changed relationship. And, because we were reluctant to assume responsibility commensurate with our vastly increased power, we continued to expect Britain to carry commitments beyond her means, which we desired to see maintained. It was a curious phenomenon of this early post-war period that Winston Churchill, ousted from power and no longer able to speak for his own country, should yet have been able to exercize a decisive influence upon American and, later, Anglo-American policy. At Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, Mr. Churchill called for the mobilization of Anglo-American power against the Soviet Union. With President Truman sitting beside him and applauding his utterances, Churchill condemned "the police governments" of Eastern Europe and demanded "the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries." While he said that it was "not our duty at this time, when difficulties are so numerous, to interfere forcibly in that region" (italics mine), he clearly implied that he had such intervention in mind when sufficient Anglo-American force had been created. Meanwhile, he said that "no quivering, precarious balance of power" must be allowed "to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure." This was the nuclear idea of the containment doctrine which President Truman was to adopt exactly one year later. It was also the first expression

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of the idea of a "policy of liberation," to be adopted six years later by a Republican Secretary of State. So far as the development of German policy was concerned, the Anglo-American conspiracy in self-deception prevented the evolution of a firm, common policy at a time when Britain and the United States found themselves saddled with an extremely difficult problem. They controlled and were responsible for Germany's most important industrial area which also happened to be nonself-supporting in terms of food production. Rehabilitation would require long years of effort and heavy investment. Meanwhile, the mere feeding of the population and the maintenance of armies of occupation ran into something like half a billion dollars a year. Because we and the British had marched into Germany as "fifty-fifty" victors, we maintained that basis in post-surrender management. Britain was long unwilling to face the fact that the commitment exceeded her resources and to recede from a position of equality. We, on the other hand, were unwilling to face the fact that Britain's diminished power placed an additional burden upon us, which would mean that we should have to assume more than half of the cost of our joint occupation. It was over a year before this situation was realistically adjusted. During that year we missed our great opportunity to reach a solid Anglo-American understanding either with respect to Germany or — and this was even more important — with respect to France. (The same thing was true as to Anglo-American policy in Asia and the Middle East.) Churchill, in or out of office, consistently worked for an Anglo-American policy in which American power would have supplemented waning British power to carry out traditional British policy in all parts of the world. The British Labour Government, however, did not subscribe wholly to Churchill's restorationist policy, and the United States Government had as yet no world policy of its own. Here is an example of how this worked out in Germany, with disastrous results: One of the most important aspects of the German problem was the question of what should be done with the coal and steel monopolies of the Ruhr. The British Labour Government wished to nationalize the German coal mines and, eventually, the German steel industry; but its policy in Germany was carried out by old-line officials many of whom were far from sympathetic toward these

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aims. On the other hand, our Government's policy was to foster "free enterprise capitalism" in Germany, and to break up and deconcentrate the German monopolies. Yet many of the American officials charged with this task of trust-busting — or "decartelization," as it came to be called in the jargon of the occupation — were congenitally hostile to any such idea, considering that it ran counter to technological development and, therefore, to "getting things going again." Thus, because of the contradictions between the official British and American policies and because of the inconsistencies within each, the two countries failed to develop a common front in a matter of decisive importance in determining the future nature of the German nation. Similar examples could be cited to show a similar failure to reach basic agreement in many parts of the world. This failure of Britain and the United States quickly to unite in a common policy as to any of the world's problems, except that posed by Russia, has had much to do with what is perhaps the greatest misfortune of the post-war period; namely, the rise of Germany as the possessor of the decisive balance of power in Europe, and the rather similar though less rapid rise of Japan to an analogous position in the Far East.

3 Deadlock and Cold War (1947) /. Change in U.S. Management The beginning of 1947 marked a turning point in American foreign policy as well as a change in its top management. After his one personal experience with four-power conferences, at Potsdam, President Truman had apparently decided to leave such matters to his Secretary of State. However, Mr. Byrnes had developed a tendency to carry the State Department around the world in his brief case to such an extent that neither the White House nor the Secretary's own staff in Washington were kept in sufficiently close touch with developments. This was one factor making for a change in top management. Another reason was that Secretary Byrnes's peripheral approach to the European problem — his failure to come to grips with the central problem of Germany — had contributed to a dangerously deteriorating situation. Finally, the Congressional elections of 1946 had brought defeat for the Truman Administration and the election of a Republicancontrolled (80th) Congress. This necessitated a much closer working with the Republican leadership in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. T o obtain such cooperation, the President needed a Secretary of State commanding bipartisan respect and support, as well as one in whom he himself might repose implicit confidence. N o other man fulfilled these requirements as admirably as General of the Army George Catlett Marshall. At the time of his appointment in January, 1947, General Marshall had just returned from his protracted and unsuccessful mission to China. T w o European problems demanded his immedi-

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ate attention: the explosive state of affairs at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, and the impending Moscow Conference on the future of Germany. 2. The Truman

Doctrine

T h e Greek crisis and the American decision to intervene, resulting in the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, lie outside of the frame of reference of this book. T h e y have been discussed by the author elsewhere 1 in connection with the development of American foreign policy as a whole. Yet the impact upon our German policy of this major shift in direction necessitates at least a brief comment. After having received a thorough briefing on the state of European affairs — and particularly on Germany — Secretary Marshall came to the conclusion that, before he went to Moscow, he wished the United States to have assumed what he described as "a military posture." T h e State Department had no difficulty in finding a means of accomplishing this purpose, since Britain had for months been advising Washington that it was no longer capable of maintaining its position of military policeman at the eastern end of the Mediterranean and had recently threatened to withdraw from Greece, whether or not the United States should decide to take over. Consequently, the proposal was developed to assume the British commitments in Greece and Turkey and to extend some $400,000,000 of military aid to these two countries. However, at a conference of Congressional leaders with the President, the late Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was reported to have advised the President that: "If that's what you want, there's only one way you can get it. That is, to make a personal appearance before Congress and scare the hell out of the country." That is precisely what Mr. Truman proceeded to do on March 12, 1947, in a speech strongly reminiscent of Mr. Churchill, declaring that all nations must choose between "alternative ways of life," and that "it must be the policy of the United States to support peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." 1 F o r full text of President Truman's Message to Congress of March 12, 1947, see Put Yourself in Marshall's Place, ch. 2, and pp. 47-54.

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Painting a thoroughly alarming picture, the President proposed his program of Greco-Turkish aid, maintaining that the position in those countries was so urgent that we dared not wait for the United Nations to handle it, even though the United Nations had successfully handled a rather similar threat to Iran in the preceding year. A careful reading of this message left the impression that a step much more far-reaching than the program of Greco-Turkish aid was being taken. The message was, in fact, a declaration of ideological war — though it was far from clear against whom that war was being declared. Ostensibly the crusade was to be conducted against "totalitarian regimes, whether imposed from within or without." Yet, obviously, the President was not talking about the totalitarian regime of Chiang Kai-shek, nor that of General Franco. It was not clear whether the President was declaring a holy war against communism, or appointing the United States as a global policeman to protect the entire world against Russian imperialism. The only thing that was clear — apart from the specific Greco-Turkish proposal — was that the United States had assumed a wholly new attitude toward the world in general and toward the Soviet Union in particular.2 The Moscow

Conference

The pronouncement of this new doctrine was made just as the American Delegation headed by Secretary Marshall reached Moscow for the conference on Germany. Whatever beneficent result Secretary Marshall may have expected from this assumption of a "military posture," its effect was in the opposite direction. If the Russians had been willing to reach a compromise before Mr. Truman's pronouncement, they were certainly not willing now. The net result of six weeks of negotiation was utter and complete failure. There was, however, one important achievement; whereas previous four-power conferences on Germany had merely skirted or evaded the issues to such an extent that none of the participants had ever clearly and precisely defined its position, this conference did produce a much more definite understanding of what the major dis2 Senator Claude Pepper (D) of Florida delivered a noteworthy attack upon the Truman Doctrine in the United States Senate. See Congressional Record of Alarch 25, 1947.

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agreements were. This was in large measure due to Secretary Marshall's own clarity in presenting the American point of view and his tenacious insistence upon similar precision on the part of the other three Foreign Ministers. The unresolved differences were reported to the American people by Mr. Marshall upon his return.3 After explaining the over-all importance of German coal in the European recovery effort, with particular emphasis upon French needs, the Secretary listed the major points at issue with respect to Germany and Austria. The obstacles to agreement on Germany had arisen from differences as to: ( i ) the nature and powers of an All-German Government; (2) the nature and limits of a unified German economy; (3) reparations; (4) boundaries; and (5) which nations should be permitted to participate in making a German settlement. In most of these matters the Secretary reported that there had been substantial agreement between Britain and the United States. The French position had differed in that France continued to demand decentralization amounting to partition, with particular emphasis upon the separation of the Ruhr from Germany. The French had also demanded special priority in the allocation of Ruhr coal. Whereas Britain and the United States had backed the French demand for annexation of the Saar, Russia had rejected it. The Soviet representatives had demanded: ( 1 ) a more highly centralized German Government than that contemplated by Britain and the United States, with greater participation by labor organizations and political organizations as such; (2) the nullification of the Anglo-American zonal merger of 1946; (3) agreement as to continuing reparations out of current production after unification; (4) the permanent recognition of the German frontiers fixed at Potsdam; (5) total reparations for the Soviet Union in the amount of $10,000,000,000; and (6) the exclusion from the peace negotiations of countries which did not actually participate in the fighting against Germany. Failing to reach agreement on these issues, Mr. Marshall reported that he had tried to secure at least the adoption of Mr. Byrnes's fourpower treaty to guarantee the continued demilitarization of Germany. However, the Russians had attached to this treaty a series of 8 Germany — Bridge or Battleground, appendix, p. 40 for full text of Secretary Marshall's report.

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amendments, which would have settled in their f a v o r practically all the major matters of contention. T h e report on Austria was equally discouraging. T h e chief difficulties had arisen over reparations and the question of what former German assets in Austria were properly subject to seizure b y Russia under the Potsdam Agreement. T h e Western powers had sought to exclude Austrian assets seized b y the Germans under duress; the Russians insisted upon including them, which would have given Russia permanent control over the economic life of Austria. In concluding his report, Secretary Marshall expressed the view that " w e must not compromise with great principles in order to achieve agreement f o r agreement's sake. Also w e must sincerely try to understand the point of view of those with w h o m w e differ." H e revealed that in his private talk with Premier Stalin, the latter had expressed the view that "these were only the first skirmishes and brushes of reconnaissance f o r c e s " and that "after people had exhausted themselves in dispute they then recognized the necessity of compromise . . . that compromises were possible on all the main questions . . . that it was necessary to have patience and not become pessimistic." T o this report, Mr. Marshall added his o w n reaction: " I sincerely hope that the Generalissimo is correct in the view he expressed and that it implies a greater spirit of cooperation by the Soviet delegation at future conferences. But w e cannot ignore the factor of time involved here. T h e recovery of Europe had been far slower than expected. Disintegrating forces are becoming evident. T h e patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate. So I believe that action cannot await compromise through exhaustion. N e w issues arise daily. Whatever action is necessary to meet these pressing problems must be taken without delay." T h e Secretary showed little effect of the prolonged and trying acrimony which had pervaded the M o s c o w discussions. Only once did he refer to the tactics of his chief adversary: " A t Moscow propaganda appeals to passion and prejudice appeared to take the place of reason and understanding. Charges were made b y the Soviet delegation and interpretation given to Potsdam and other agreements, which varied completely from the facts as factually known by the American delegation. T h e r e was naturally much uncertainty regarding the real intention or motives of the

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various proposals submitted, or of the objections taken to the proposals. This," he philosophically concluded, "is inevitable in any international negotiation." Were the Russian motives and intentions really so obscure? From the Soviet point of view, Mr. Truman had, on March 12, declared ideological war. Whatever may have been the Kremlin's intentions with respect to Germany on March 10 when the Moscow Conference opened, two days later Germany had become merely one of many battle fronts upon which this ideological war would have to be fought. Undoubtedly, the Russians figured that time was on their side and that, if European recovery could be sufficiently delayed, the confidently expected collapse of the whole Western system would solve their problem. The Russians had been difficult precisely because they wanted to be difficult and to delay a solution. Secretary Marshall had done exactly what Mr. Byrnes should have done and failed to do in 1946 — he tried to grapple directly with the central problem of the European peace. In this effort he was hampered by the fact that he had to speak for a three-power coalition which had no coalition policy. Beyond that, because of the Truman Doctrine, a German settlement had now become dependent upon a clarification of just what sort of over-all East-West struggle lay ahead. 4. Return

to Reason

Perhaps the most important fruit of Secretary Marshall's first postwar visit to Europe was his clear realization of what would happen, if — with or without a German settlement — European recovery should be much longer delayed. This led to the most farsighted and constructive action ever undertaken in foreign lands by the United States. The first indications of a new policy orientation in Washington were revealed in a speech by Dean Acheson, then Undersecretary of State, delivered at Cleveland, Mississippi, on May 8, 1947. The burden of this address was an explanation of the necessity for American aid to European recovery, based upon the realization that the existing conditions created not only misery but revolutionary discontent. Although little noticed in this country, Mr. Acheson's speech was at once widely acclaimed in Europe as a welcome de-

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parture from the little-understood and deeply-feared belligerence of the Truman Doctrine. 4 T h e promise of Mr. Acheson's speech was fulfilled on June 5, when Secretary Marshall delivered his now famous address at Harvard University. T h e Secretary of State held forth the definite assurance that the United States would extend economic assistance to any and all of the nations of Europe who would work out together a recovery program based upon mutual aid and self-help. T h e Soviet Union was not excluded. In tones which unmistakably indicated a new approach, the Secretary said: "Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos." 5 Britain and France lost no time in preparing to take up Mr. Marshall's offer. Foreign Ministers Bevin and Bidault met in Paris and invited Mr. Molotov to join them. Before his reply was received, the British Foreign Secretary made an extremely tactless speech in the House of Commons, bluntly declaring that Britain would go ahead with the Marshall Plan with or without Russia — and, if necessary, against Russia. Referring to the recent Moscow Conference, he said that he would "not be a party to holding up the economic recovery of Europe by a mess of procedure, terms of reference, or all the paraphernalia which may go with it." Then he added belligerently: "If there is to be a conflict of ideologies, I shall regret it, but if it is forced upon us we must face it." This was not an auspicious beginning. When Mr. Molotov nevertheless arrived on June 26, with 89 experts and assistants, he was met by a take-it-or-leave-it attitude on the part of Mr. Bevin. M. Bidault was anxious and nervous, fearing trouble from the powerful French Communist Party in the event that no agreement should be reached with Russia. Six days later, Mr. Molotov departed in anger, having rejected the Anglo-French plans and procedures prepared in advance of his arrival, and leaving a stunned world to realize that it was now actually split into two openly hostile camps. Britain and France now issued an invitation to twenty-two European nations, omitting only Spain and the Soviet Union. For a short 4

Ibid., appendix p. 52 for full text of Mr. Acheson's speech. lbid., appendix p. 55 for full text of Marshall Address.

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time it looked as if some of the Soviet satellites (some of them prematurely so designated) might attend the conference. On July 8, Foreign Minister Masaryk of Czechoslovakia announced that' his country would be represented. This was tactlessly hailed by the Western press as a break with the Soviet Union. T w o days later the Czech Government reversed its position. On July 12, the Paris conference convened with sixteen nations participating: Britain, France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Eire, Switzerland, Austria, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The nations which had declined were: Russia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Albania. The line had been drawn, but the cleavage was not yet frozen. Conceived as a plan to promote the recovery of all of Europe, the Marshall Plan now became a program to promote the recovery of only the Western half of a divided Europe. So ended the short chapter in our post-war policy, which one might call "Return to Reason," with the Soviet Union walking out and slamming the door behind it. What would have happened if, instead of walking out, Mr. Molotov had joined the project? Would the American Congress have appropriated the funds for a plan in which the Soviet Union would have been one of the beneficiaries? Would it have been possible for President Truman to extinguish the anti-Soviet fire which he had kindled? And, if not, how would Secretary Marshall have dealt with the resulting highly embarrassing situation? Thanks to Mr. Molotov, these questions did not have to be answered. j. Firsthand

Reappraisal

A few weeks spent in Western Europe studying the effects of these developments led to the inescapable conclusion that something would have to be done — and done fast — to prevent complete economic collapse and serious political upheaval. In France and Italy powerful communist fifth columns were thriving upon the protraction of the post-war paralysis and the inability of governments to deal with it. An unusually harsh winter, followed by a devastating drought in most of Europe, made starvation in the coming winter a very real possibility since none of the European countries possessed

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the means for purchasing food overseas. In Great Britain, which had made such heroic efforts at readjustment, the paralysis of the severe winter and the uncontrolled rise of the American price level had all but exhausted the proceeds of the American loan. When the British Treasury complied, on July 15, 1947, with its promise to make the pound sterling freely convertible, a run started on sterling balances which drained away the last of its resources. Although Washington had been given repeated, explicit warnings by Ambassador Lewis W . Douglas, it was not until August 20 that the United States finally agreed to the reestablishment of British exchange controls. By this time a severe shock had been administered to the entire West European economy. Living among Englishmen at this time and seeing the quiet fortitude with which they faced complete economic disaster much as they had faced death and destruction during the war, one was reminded of Ralph Waldo Emerson's words, spoken to an English audience at the time of the Corn Law crisis a century earlier: "In prosperity, you are dull and uninspiring. But, in adversity, you are grand — with a pulse like a cannon." It was both difficult and embarrassing for an American visiting Britain in the summer of 1947, to explain that it was not lack of sympathy but lack of understanding which caused the unbelievable slow-motion performance in Washington at that time. One reason for American failure to recognize the need for immediate interim aid to Western Europe until the ponderous Marshall Plan could be brought into being, was the fact that Congress was in recess, and the President and Secretary of State were attending the Western Hemisphere Conference in Brazil. Mr. Marshall arrived back in Washington by plane on September 3, and, on the same day, Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett finally told the American people, "It is later than you think." Yet President Truman, boarding the battleship Missouri a week later for a leisurely trip home, announced that, in his judgment, there was "nothing on the horizon to require a quick return to the United States." On September 29, the President finally announced that he was writing — not telegraphing — the chairmen of the various Congressional committees, asking them to call their groups into session in October to consider the matter of interim aid to Western Europe. The New York Herald Tribune observed that Mr. Truman had

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"apparently elected to sit tight and hope for a miracle which would relieve him of the necessity for making a decision that might prove politically unpopular."-It was not until October 23 that the President finally made up his mind to call an extraordinary session of Congress for November 17. In contrast to the calamitous state of Western Europe in the summer of 1947, conditions seemed to be rapidly improving in the Soviet orbit. Such reliable observers as John Scott, of Time magazine, reported spectacular progress toward recovery in Poland and Finland. A stay of several weeks in Czechoslovakia left this observer impressed with the improvement there — in spite of a bad drought —• and far from convinced that Czechoslovakia should be written off as a Soviet satellite. Contrary to the widespread belief in the United States, there was no evidence of any Iron Curtain being drawn across the borders of the country and no sign of Russian interference in its internal affairs. There were no restrictions upon entering or traveling freely about the country. Western anti-communist newspapers were openly on sale at newsstands. The Czech press itself was apparently uncensored. True enough, the Russians did exercize a strong influence upon the republic's foreign policy, but this could scarcely surprise anyone who remembered the Western betrayal of 1938 and the fact that the Red Army had been permitted to liberate Czechoslovakia in 1945. It would have been overstating the case to say that the Czechs had no troubles and no anxieties, but the atmosphere in Prague was certainly far more confident and purposeful than that of Paris, Rome, or Berlin. The rather alarming conclusion was that, for the time being, at least some of the so-called Soviet satellites were making better progress toward economic recovery than the free countries of the West. If this were true, and if the fact became generally known, it would tend to strengthen the prestige of the communist fifth columns in the West and thus increase the already great danger. The sense of urgency was heightened by the activity of Russian diplomacy during the period when the sixteen nations of Western Europe were feverishly engaged in preparing their recovery plan for Washington approval. On October 5, Moscow announced the organization of the Cominform. This was to be a permanent coordinating committee of the communist parties of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and

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Yugoslavia, plus the communist parties of Italy and France. These parties were already all too well "coordinated." Clearly, more was intended than the announcement revealed. T h e true purpose was revealed when the 18,000 word report of Andrei Zhdanov to the assembled communist leaders was published. Zhdanov, one of the leading figures in the Soviet Politburo, told the gathering, when speaking of the Marshall Plan, that "the Soviet Union will make every effort to see that this plan is not realized." He then presented Mr. Molotov's alternative: "Through bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union," he said, "any European country can obtain what it needs without recourse to American dollar loans. Treaties with the Soviet Union constitute agreements of reciprocal advantage. T h e y never contain anything which could injure the sovereignty of the contracting parties. Thus, the U.S.S.R. clearly shows the way in which Europe can find a way out of its difficult economic situation." In one respect this "Molotov Plan" was pure bluff. Russia could not possibly supply the nations of Europe with the machines, equipment, and other capital goods which they needed. T h e Marshall Plan could, and that was precisely what the Kremlin was afraid of. On the other hand, the Russian proposal was more realistic than the American approach in two important respects. T h e first was that, in spite of the competition between the two plans, the Russians recognized the need for East-West trade — a conclusion to which Washington had to be pushed with great reluctance by the West European countries. Second, whereas Washington's desire to help Europe was strongly qualified by a prejudice against "helping anyone to socialize a n y t h i n g " — i n other words, whereas Washington did not at this time recognize the Social Democrats of Western Europe as its friends — the Soviet Union clearly recognized them as its enemies. T h e Cominform denounced such British, French, and German socialist leaders as Messrs. Attlee, Blum, and Schumacher, more violently than it denounced the "capitalist imperialists" in the United States. These two Washington blind spots were to be important factors in delaying the completion of the Marshall Plan. A relatively short visit to Germany sufficed to confirm the belief that the state of affairs was even worse than that observed in the preceding year. Germany was still an economic desert. T h e fourpower snarl remained more hopelessly tangled than ever. T h e four doctors still disagreed as to both diagnosis and cure. T h e patient

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was still g r o w i n g weaker and had become considerably less able and less willing to cooperate in bringing about his o w n recuperation. M u c h of the rubble had been cleared from the streets of the German cities, but little, if any of the rubble had been cleared from the German mind and spirit. In 1946, the Allied Control Council had been fighting against the frustration imposed b y the failure of the Foreign Ministers to reach an agreement, while the Berlin Kommandatura had been functioning as a miniature model of what the Control Council might some day become with respect to all of Germany. In 1947, the Control Council had sunk into purely formal existence, and even the K o m mandatura had lapsed into apathy and inaction. General Clay continued to face his impossible task with indomitable courage and even with a certain amount of w r y optimism. But no amount of hard w o r k b y the men on the spot could arrest the slow wasting away of the physical and moral strength of a people without vision of a future and without incentive to w o r k . N o r could courage and determination fully counteract the attrition of morale among the conquerors themselves, nor the loss of prestige resulting from their failure. A year ago, Allied officials had expressed the hope that before too long Paris, London, M o s c o w , and Washington would iron out their differences. N o w the prevailing mood was one of pessimism, at least as to the immediate future. So far as the longerrange prospects were concerned, there were t w o schools of thought: T h e more pessimistic were inclined to accept the East-West partition of Germany as permanent. Holding this view, these officials were impatient to get on with the job of making W e s t Germany capable of self-support. T h e more optimistic group believed that the eventual unification of Germany was still possible; that while agreement was unlikely to be reached at the next Foreign Ministers' meeting in November, it would eventually come about as the result of Russia's desire to have a voice in the future control of the Ruhr. This group was equally anxious to get on with the rehabilitation of the Western zones — but for a different reason: it argued that, "the sooner w e have a going concern, the sooner the Russians will want to come in." T h e first group, w h i c h regarded East-West partition as permanent, was anxious to unite the French zone with Bizonia as quickly as possible and, therefore, more inclined to listen to French claims

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and demands. The second group, which still aimed at unification, tended to pay less attention to the French, believing that they, like the Russians, would be easier to deal with, once Bizonia had been put on a profitable basis. T h e French demands at this time related chiefly to the question of what restrictions were to be maintained upon German steel production. Cutting through the mass of technical detail related to the argument over revision of the so-called Level-of-Industry Plan, it appeared that what the French really sought was a guarantee that German steel production would never be permitted to exceed French production. Actually, this did not merely mean holding back Germany until French production should reach its capacity, but holding down German production until French steel capacity could be increased by about 50%. T o effect such an increase would have required the building of new French plants, which, in turn, would require great quantities of steel and a considerable length of time. Meeting the wishes of France, therefore, meant nothing less than delaying the whole of European recovery. This was w h y the British and American authorities decided, in spite of French and Russian objections, to raise the permitted level of German steel production from 5,800,000 tons per annum to 10,700,000 tons. This action took place while I was in Germany; chance enabled me to obtain a frank reaction from an excellent Soviet source on the very night when the announcement of the decision was made. " Y o u are closing the door on the unification of Germany," this Russian said. " W h y couldn't you wait until November?" It was pointed out that we had been waiting for two years and paying out half a billion dollars a year for the privilege, while Russia continued to drain off German resources from the Soviet zone. " Y o u don't have to build up industry to make your Bizonia selfsupporting," the Russian said. " A l l you have to do is to make your Germans grow and deliver more food." He knew some facts too. Citing the exact percentage of arable land not under cultivation in the Western zones, he suggested that we make the Germans plow up pastures and cut down forests. T h e next day I tried out the Russian suggestion on the American officer in charge of such matters. "It could be done," he said. "But it would take years and a lot of expensive machinery. Even then, nothing short of force would make the Germans do it and — s o long

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as w e are trying to teach these people democracy — w e can't very well order them around like coolie labor." T h e last sentence indicated the key to much of our difficulty. It seemed clear that, having shifted to a policy of exploiting the Soviet zone, the Russians were not ready to shift again toward unification, much as they might raise a clamor about our obstructing it. T h e reason was simple: the Soviet zone had not yet been milked dry. If East G e r m a n y should become a deficit zone, while W e s t G e r m a n y became self-supporting, the Russian attitude might change. T h e danger at this time was that our attitude might change as well. This seemed more likely to happen as the result of general anti-Soviet exasperation at home than because of bad judgment on the part of our hard-working officials in Germany. 6. The Notion

of a Separate Peace

In M a y , 1947, former President Herbert H o o v e r paid a visit to Germany. U p o n his return, he advocated the creation of a separate W e s t German state and the making of peace between that state and the Western powers. His views were set forth in a widely publicized letter to Congressman John Taber, of N e w York.® B y the autumn of 1947 public sentiment had begun to turn toward this dubious suggestion. Both the late Senator Vandenberg, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and former Secretary of State Byrnes had given the proposal qualified endorsement. It seemed evident that, if Mr. Hoover's proposal were adopted, both the political and the economic future of G e r m a n y would be out of our hands. A n y negotiations between the t w o parts of a divided G e r m a n y would — once W e s t G e r m a n y had been given sovereignty — lie between W e s t G e r m a n y and the Soviet Union. F r o m the economic point of view, this would mean that w e should be committed to support a W e s t German state whose economic condition would depend v e r y largely upon how much or how little business it could do with the East; this would be out of our control. F r o m the political point of view, once w e had made a separate peace with W e s t Germany, only the Soviet Union would be able to hold out the hope of unification; and this hope was clearly the one p o w 6 For text of Mr. Hoover's letter of May 26, 1947, Germany — Bridge or Battleground, pp. 54-55.

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erful magnet of political attraction for all Germans, whether in the East or the West. Finally, it seemed reasonably clear that a separate peace with a West German state would mean the undermining, if not the total abandonment of the Western position in Berlin. A separate peace with West Germany would not only freeze the unhappy state of affairs which already existed. It would create a far worse condition and then freeze it. An expression of these views at this time usually encountered one of two arguments. The first ran like this: "Western Germany is gradually becoming self-supporting and may soon become a profitable investment instead of a drain upon our resources. East Germany is being reduced from a surplus producer into a deficit area. W h y merge an enterprise which is gradually approaching the dividendpaying stage with a concern that is headed toward bankruptcy?" The second and more powerful argument for a separate peace was the growing conviction that the success of our West European Recovery Plan was heavily dependent upon the Ruhr and that, therefore, the great workshop of Western Germany should be firmly integrated in "our half" of a divided Europe. Both arguments were logical, but they rested upon the fallacious assumption that there could be peace in a permanently divided Europe. 7. The London Conference The auspices for the November 25, 1947 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, at London, could scarcely have been less favorable. Both sides were engaged in a deployment of their respective resources for the power struggle now clearly recognized to have set in. In these circumstances, a settlement of the German question was most unlikely, even though the reasons for it were stronger than ever. But both sides were unwilling at this time to make the slightest concession — the Russians because they wished further to exploit the situation as it existed in Germany — and the United States because it foresaw that the Ruhr would be a key element in the recovery of Western Europe and did not want to risk letting the Russians have a voice in its management. Before leaving for London, Secretary Marshall made an important pronouncement of American policy. In a speech at Chicago, on November 18, he explained once more the deepening economic

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crisis in Europe and the American interest in helping to overcome it. He sought to dispel any idea that the American program rested upon imperial design, aggressive purpose, or desire to provoke conflict. He reaffirmed that "this Government is willing to cooperate with every nation that pledges a generous effort to the common cause of European recovery." Speaking of Russia, he attributed the existing disagreements to a "divergence of purpose concerning the future of Europe," holding that this divergence was not due to any direct clash of national interest. "It is my belief," he said, "that if Europe is restored as a solvent and vigorous community, this issue will have been decided and the disturbing conflict between the Soviets and ourselves, insofar as Europe is concerned, will lessen." This analysis seemed to rest upon the belief that the United States favored, while Russia opposed, European recovery. It would have seemed more in accordance with fact to recognize that we were in a struggle with Russia — not for and against recovery — but to determine which of us could more rapidly promote recovery in our respective halves of a divided Europe. The distinction seemed important, because one of the errors we were making at this time was to assume that the Russians wanted chaos in all of Europe, whereas they were actually seeking to demonstrate to Europe that it would recover faster by accepting communism. The London Conference was merely a dreary repetition of the earlier failure at Moscow. Mr. Molotov used it, as he had used previous conferences, as a sounding board for Soviet propaganda. He told the peoples of Western Europe that the heart of the Marshall Plan was the rebuilding of Western Germany as an arsenal (a statement which turned out to be unhappily prophetic). The same old arguments over the same old disagreements led to the same dead end as before. The Secretary flew home and, on the very night of his arrival, broadcast his report to the American people. Outlining once more the major points of disagreement, he concluded with a number of significant statements. He said that he himself had moved for adjournment because "there was no apparent wish to reach a settlement." His estimate was that "no real ground was gained or lost at this meeting" except'that "the outlines of the problems and obstacles are much clearer." And then he concluded with this statement: " W e

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cannot look forward to a united Germany at this time. W e must do the best we can in the area where our influence can be felt." 7

8. Forecast and Review Summing up the picture as it appeared after this report by the Secretary of State, the following conclusions were stated at a yearend public lecture. 8 It is now certain that the United States and Great Britain will proceed to organize "Bizonia" as an integral part of that Western Europe in which the Marshall Plan is going to operate. This raises the following questions to be answered in 1948: 1. Will France join her zone to Bizonia, or hold off because she fears even a partly united Germany? 2. What are the Anglo-American intentions with regard to the Ruhr? If the Ruhr is to be separated from Germany, the French will join Bizonia, but political separation of the Ruhr involves a number of extremely dangerous pitfalls, which Britain and the United States will wish to avoid. If the Ruhr is to be German, are its industries to be socialized or returned to private German ownership? Neither will please the French. 3. H o w are Britain and the United States going to effect the economic merger of their zones without creating so much of a political entity as to block the road to unification of Germany? Even if they do not commit the ultimate folly of creating a West German state and making a separate peace, they face the danger of playing into Russian hands b y making it appear that they, rather than the Russians, are responsible for keeping Germany partitioned. 4. Will the Soviet Union try to oust the Western powers from Berlin, on the grounds that their action in West Germany has nullified the Potsdam Agreement and rendered the Allied Control Council in Berlin obsolete and useless? And, if the Russians do undertake such action, will they, in the face of Allied refusal to leave, try to force matters by such sanctions as shutting off power and light from the Western sectors? It took no second sight to foresee these problems in December, * Germany — Bridge or Battleground, p. 81-83 for text of Secretary Marshall's speech of November 18; pp. 84-85 for his report on the London Conference. 8 At the New School for Social Research in New York.

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1947. T h e amazing and rather terrifying fact was that the British and American Governments seemed blithely unaware of the crisis into which they were blundering. Perhaps one reason f o r the curious somnambulism of AngloAmerican policy in G e r m a n y was that so many things were going on in so many parts of the world. Great Britain had embarked upon the great adventure of freeing India, Burma, and Ceylon. T h e Netherlands were engaged in a losing rear-guard action, trying to hold on to their colonial empire in Indonesia. France was engaged in a similar struggle in Indo-China. T h e Palestine pot was coming to a boil. T h e American adventure in Greece was going worse than badly, with the communist guerrilla forces growing steadily, in spite of suffering one defeat after another. It was all v e r y well f o r Secretary Marshall to say that "the place to begin is in Europe." T h e fact was that Europe, being deeply involved in A f r i c a , the Middle East, and Asia, could not be treated as a problem disconnected f r o m the rest of the world. This was one of the basic misconceptions underlying the Marshall Plan, which was soon to develop into the slogan that "Europe must integrate itself to survive." T h e trouble with this approach was that various essential parts of Western Europe were much more closely integrated with parts of A f r i c a , Asia, and the Middle East than they were with each other. Our preoccupation with Western Europe — as if it were a world in itself — led us into t w o disastrous courses of action: it caused us to stake far too much on uniting a group of nations which, even if united, could not alone f o r m a healthy, selfsupporting community; and it led us into the fatal mistake of permitting our policy in Asia, A f r i c a , and the Middle East to be shaped b y the needs and interests of Western Europe. A p p l y i n g this to Germany, w e were rapidly drifting into a policy which had no foundation in considerations relating to the interests of the German people, and which was based almost entirely upon the concept of creating a strong and united Western Europe as a bulwark against communism. T h e great unanswered and probably unanswerable question as to the year 1947 is whether the Truman Administration had actually changed its mind between March 12 and June 5, or merely its method of procedure. W a s the Marshall Plan a repudiation of the T r u m a n Doctrine, or just a more subtle version of the same policy?

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On the face of it, the Marshall Plan represented a reversal of the anti-Soviet crusade. This reversal seemed explicit in Secretary Marshall's already quoted: "Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine." It seemed fully demonstrated by the subsequent offer of participation to Russia and the countries in the Soviet orbit. On the other hand, could one really assume that President T r u man believed that the Congress, which he himself had indoctrinated with the spirit of an anti-Soviet crusade, would consent to a plan which made American dollars available to the Soviet Union and its satellites?

4 Partition and the Berlin Crisis (1948) i. East-West

Deployment

On January 22, 1948, British Foreign Minister Bevin declared in Parliament that four-power cooperation had definitely broken down and that "the free nations of Western Europe must now draw together." He revealed that conversations were already under way between Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, looking toward the organization of some sort of "Western Union." This announcement was welcomed in Washington and in the British overseas Dominions. According to the subsequent yearend review of The Times (London), "it also provoked the Soviet Union to hurry forward its own plans to consolidate the countries of Eastern Europe in a solid communist bloc." The first six months of the year were, in fact, noteworthy as a period of provocation and counter-provocation, as cold-war preparation and deployment took place on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The announcement, on February 9, of the Anglo-American Bizonal Charter served notice that Britain and the United States were going to proceed as rapidly as possible with their plans for West Germany, even though no agreement had yet been reached with France. As a matter of fact, Anglo-American relations with France were somewhat strained at this time by a unilateral French declaration making the Saar an autonomous territory, independent of Germany. This was the first step toward the annexation, which Mr. Byrnes had sanctioned in 1946, but about which nothing had been done up to this moment. While Western negotiations for a mutual defense treaty were going on and Western plans for a West German state were mov-

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ing forward, a whole series of treaties and trade agreements were negotiated by Moscow with the Soviet satellites. These were obviously designed to batten down the hatches for the power struggle and to create a monolithic, Moscow-directed Eastern bloc. T h e storm broke on February 25, when the Czechoslovak Communist Party suddenly seized power from the Benes Government. So swift was the unexpected collapse of the democratic coalition and so ruthless the betrayal of that coalition by Zdenek Fierlinger, fellow-traveling leader of the Social Democratic Party, that the world was confronted with an accomplished fact before any counter-measures could be taken. Until that moment, Czechoslovakia had occupied the precarious position of a halfway house between East and West — a laboratory in which it appeared that the possibility of peaceful cooperation between democracy and communism might be demonstrated. Overnight that hope vanished. Nothing could more vividly have expressed its doom than Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk's leap to death from the window of his apartment in the Czernin Palace. A passionate patriot and at the same time a greatly beloved citizen of the world, Masaryk had been the one man who personified Czechoslovak determination to maintain friendship with both East and West. Six months earlier, just after Czechoslovakia had been reluctantly forced to stav out of the Marshall Plan, Jan Masaryk had still cherished the hope and the determination to maintain the independence of the republic which his father had founded. He had asserted with pride that the Czech communists, much as he disliked them, were first of all patriotic citizens of Czechoslovakia, who would never allow their country to become a Soviet satellite. One night, in the course of a long talk, he said prophetically: "If this hope is ever betrayed, there will be nothing left for which to live." 1 I believed then, and I still believe that the precarious independence of Czechoslovakia might have been preserved if Washington had not prematurely written off that country as a Soviet satellite in J u l y , 1947. Be that as it may, the coup of February 25, 1948, demonstrated the ruthlessness of Moscow policy to an extent hitherto only suspected. Once the West recovered from its shock, its reaction was 1 "Report on Czechoslovakia," August, 1947, reprinted in the author's Last Call for Common Sense, pp. 238-260.

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swift and decisive. Within a month, Britain, France, and the Low Countries signed the Treaty of Brussels, pledging each other the closest economic cooperation and military assistance in the event that any signatory "should be the object of armed attack in Europe." On the same day, March 25, 1948, President Truman delivered a message to Congress which opened a new phase in American policy. 2. The "Devil Theory"

Adopted

Although, in enunciating the Truman Doctrine of 1947, Mr. Truman had been vague as to the nature of the crusade he desired to launch, there was nothing ambiguous about his pronouncement of 1948. His analysis of the world crisis was contained in four brief statements: 1. The situation in the world today is not primarily the result of the natural difficulties which follow a great war. It is chiefly due to the fact that one nation has not only refused to cooperate in the establishment of a just and honorable peace, but — even worse — has actively sought to prevent it. 2. The agreements we did obtain, imperfect though they were, could have furnished the basis for a just peace — if they had been kept. But they were not kept. They were consistently ignored and violated by one nation. 3. One nation has persistently obstructed the work of the United Nations. 4. The Soviet Union and its agents have destroyed the independence and democratic character of a whole series of nations in eastern and central Europe. It is this ruthless course of action and the clear design to extend it to the remaining free nations of Europe that have brought about the critical situation of Europe today. The President set the aim of American foreign policy as the aim of stopping Russia, demanding for this purpose the prompt passage of the European Recovery Program, more funds for Greece and Turkey, an additional half billion dollars of aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and the enactment of Universal Military Training and Selective Service here at home. Mr. Truman went out of his way to welcome the signing of the Brussels Treaty and assured the signatories of American support. The demand for prompt passage of the European Recovery Plan,

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involving about seventeen billion dollars over a four year period, was a sound and necessary recommendation. (Half a billion dollars had finally been voted by Congress in the preceding year, as muchneeded interim aid to keep Western Europe alive until the E.R.P. could be whipped into shape and enacted.) More money for Greece and T u r k e y was likewise obviously needed if our adventure in this area was to be rescued from failure. Whether or not the request for more funds to aid Chiang Kai-shek in his fight with the Chinese communists was wise depended upon whether one believed that such aid could be used to induce the Kuomintang Government to reform itself and thus recapture the allegiance of the Chinese people. Selective Service was certainly a necessity, in view of the commitments already undertaken and now proposed. Whether a simultaneous enactment of Universal Military Training made sense seemed highly doubtful. On the whole, then, the President's recommendations to Congress were not unreasonable. Some of them were long overdue. T h e thing which made this particular message a milestone on the road to disaster was not what it proposed, but the argument presented to justify the proposals. T h e message of March 25 marked the official adoption of what one might call a "devil theory of the world crisis"; that is to say, the theory that all would have been well in the world, if only there were no Soviet Union in it — or, if only the Soviet regime would "behave with common decency." T h e truly disastrous consequence of adopting this over-simplified and only partially correct explanation of a complex phenomenon has been the formulation of an essentially negative policy — a policy aimed, not at the accomplishment of creative, affirmative purposes, but merely at frustrating the destructive purposes of another nation. T h e consequences of such a policy have been: the surrender of initiative to the opposing nation; the preemption of resources which might otherwise be available for constructive effort; the selection of friends or allies on the simple test of their anti-Sovietism; and the gradual adoption by us of the methods and weapons of the enemy. 2 These factors have been chiefly responsible f o r the s F o r a critical, contemporary analysis of this "devil theory," presented to the American Academy of Political and Social Science, see Last Call for Common Sense, pp. 17-36, or the June, 1948 issue of the Annals of the Academy.

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incredibly rapid diminution of our prestige and influence abroad and for our increasing state of hysterical anxiety at home. In due course, Congress enacted the European Recovery Program and Selective Service. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation was established and the Marshall Plan began to function. A little later, the Senate, by a vote of 64 to 4, adopted a resolution which laid the foundation for giving the support to the Brussels Treaty powers, which the President had promised. This "Vandenberg Resolution" — so-called because of its author — provided for "the strongest encouragement to the development, under the United Nations Charter, of regional and other collective arrangements for self-defense," and further affirmed the determination of the United States "to resist, alone or in concert with others, any armed attack affecting its national security." It recommended American aid, "by Constitutional process" to "blocs based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." This was the foundation for the North Atlantic Treaty, the Western Hemisphere Defense Pact, and the Pacific treaties to be negotiated in the future. .j. Crisis in Germany The Russian reaction to the Anglo-American announcement of the Bizonal Charter was just what might have been expected. On March 20, General Sokolovsky and his staff walked out of the Allied Control Council in Berlin, with the declaration that, since the Western powers had abandoned the attempt at four-power government of Germany, the Council no longer had any usefulness. Five days after President Truman's address to Congress, the Kremlin made another move which should have alerted the Western Governments to what lay ahead if they pursued further the course upon which they had embarked: without explanation, certain minor restrictions were imposed by the Russians upon communications between the Western zones and the Western sectors of Berlin. As if reacting to these Russian moves, General Bedell Smith, then United States Ambassador to Moscow, made an approach to the Kremlin, suggesting a full discussion of the German problem. Although he apparently received a reply indicating willingness to enter such discussions, the approach was never followed up. This

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was in early May. A month later, the reason for the Western withdrawal became apparent. On June 7, the State Department released an announcement of the decisions which had been reached at London in what were termed "informal discussions" on Germany between representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The decisions of this group were described as "recommendations," to be fully considered as a whole by the participating governments. The first recommendation provided for close association of the three Benelux countries with the Western Military Governments in future dealings with Germany. The rest of the agreement provided a set of arrangements for the coordinated administration of the Western zones. The AngloAmerican Bizonal area and the French zone were to be coordinated and eventually merged. The Western zones were to participate fully in the European Recovery Program. An International Authority was to be created to control the allocation of Ruhr coal, coke, and steel between German consumption and export to other countries, and to safeguard against "remilitarization of the Ruhr industry." (A lengthy annex to the release set forth the details of the latter proposal. This will be discussed presently in connection with the release, on December 28, 1948, of the final text.) The West Germans were authorized to establish a provisional government, democratic and federal in character, based upon a constitution to be drafted by a constituent assembly of delegates from the Laender (states) composing the three Western zones. This government would be subject to supervision by the three occupying powers, in accordance with the terms of an occupation statute to be drafted. The agreement provided for consultation among the three occupying powers in the event of any threat of German military resurgence. It stated that the armed occupation forces were to remain in Germany until the peace of Europe was secure. It recommended the creation of a Joint Military Board with powers of inspection to insure against both military and industrial rearmament. It provided that existing disarmament and demilitarization measures should remain in force and that long-term

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measures should be developed and agreed upon prior to the end of the occupation. On June 9, Secretary of State Marshall issued a statement expressing complete approval of these recommendations, declaring: "I wish to announce that the U.S. Government approves and accepts the recommendations of the London Conference of the Western powers respecting Germany." The London Agreement represented a long retreat by Foreign Minister Bidault from the position he had represented under De Gaulle, until the latter's resignation in January, 1946, and even from the less intransigent position he had adopted as Foreign Minister under a number of successive governments. He was violently attacked in the French Assembly, and the London Agreement was ratified only with explicit reservations and by the narrow vote of 300 to 286. The Assembly held that the Agreement "did not take into account French claims in many important respects," and ratified only because "a refusal of the London proposals would dangerously weaken the good relations between friendly countries whose cooperation is today the safest guarantee of peace." The Assembly explicitly recommended against "any risk of reconstituting an authoritarian and centralized Reich." General de Gaulle gloomily forecast that Russia would, as a result of the Agreement, create an Eastern Germany, "totalitarian and entirely dependent" and held that the question of which of the two Germanys would achieve German unity constituted the main problem. "France cannot and should not," the General said, "admit the recommendations included in this queer London report." When, after the resignation of the Schuman Government, André Marie formed a new cabinet, Georges Bidault resigned and Robert Schuman became the French Foreign Minister. From the French point of view, Bidault had, in the course of his long retreat under Anglo-American pressure, achieved only one success — the annexation of the Saar — an achievement which was later to turn into a serious obstacle to the wholly different policy -of his successor. In spite of the unresolved differences between the Western powers, the London Agreement clearly foreshadowed the creation of a West German state and the making of some sort of peace treaty between that state and the three Western occupiers. From here on,

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events moved rapidly toward the clearly predictable crisis over Berlin. T h e immediate Russian response to the publication of the L o n don Agreement was another walkout — this time, f r o m the fourp o w e r Kommandatura of Berlin. On June 18, the Western powers put through in their zones the long-overdue reform of the German currency. This step, an absolute essential f o r the restoration of trade and incentive to w o r k , should have been one of the first acts of the occupation authorities. It had been delayed until now b y inter-Allied bickering and French obstructionism. Recognizing that currency reform in the W e s t would place the Soviet zone at a disadvantage, the Russians not only proceeded to prepare a similar move in the East, but cut off all land communications westward f r o m Berlin on the pretext of "technical difficulties." T h e real reason was probably fear that, if the Allies introduced the new, sound currency in the Western sectors of Berlin before the East zone currency reform had gone into effect, the entire economy of the Soviet zone would be adversely affected. T h e Western powers made the mistake of justifying this fear by making the wholly unnecessary move of immediately introducing the new currency in their sectors of the capital city. T h e fat was now in the fire. T h e Allies began to supply their sectors b y a well-organized and gallantly executed airlift soon to become famous. Denouncing the introduction of the new currency as an intervention in the economic affairs of the Soviet zone, the Russians now clamped down a complete blockade on the communications of the Western sectors of Berlin. T h e pretense of "technical difficulties" was abandoned. This was reprisal, pure and simple. Fortunately, the reprisal took a form which could be met b y the Airlift. If, in addition to shutting off land communications, the Russians had cut off light and power from the Western sectors, they would have created a far more difficult problem. It now came to light f o r the first time that, when the arrangements f o r dividing Berlin into four sectors had been made in 1945, no agreement had been signed as to the rights of the Western powers to maintain communications with the Western sectors. T h e Russians claimed that the Western powers had forfeited their

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rights in Berlin because they had broken the Potsdam A g r e e m e n t . A c t u a l l y , the W e s t e r n rights in Berlin — such as t h e y w e r e — had been acquired long before, w h e n the zonal arrangements w e r e established, as related in a previous chapter. W h i l e the Berlin imbroglio was rising to its climax, important events w e r e transpiring behind the Iron Curtain. T h e Kremlin's efforts to establish unquestioned authority over the Soviet satellites ran into unexpected resistance in Yugoslavia, w h e r e Marshal T i t o , though an ardent communist, refused to subject his c o u n t r y to M o s c o w orders. O n June 28, 1948, it was announced that Y u g o slavia had been expelled f r o m the C o m i n f o r m — an event w h i c h aroused both jubilation and puzzlement in the W e s t e r n w o r l d . T h e jubilation was, obviously, over the appearance of the first crack in the Soviet monolith; the puzzlement arose over the f a c t that — whereas communism had been declared the archenemy of W e s t e r n civilization — there w o u l d n o w be " g o o d " communists as w e l l as "bad," since any c o u n t r y , no matter w h a t its political structure, w o u l d have to be considered on the side of the angels, if o n l y it defied the Kremlin. Prior to the M o s c o w announcement of Yugoslavia's excommunication, but after the T i t o heresy had become an accomplished fact, the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet orbit held a t w o day meeting at W a r s a w . T h e communiqué issued at the end of this conference, on June 24, marked an important departure f r o m previous Soviet p o l i c y w i t h regard to G e r m a n y . T h e Soviet g r o u p denounced the L o n d o n A g r e e m e n t , accused the W e s t of w a n t i n g to split G e r m a n y , and demanded a return to Potsdam principles. It suggested an immediate f o u r - p o w e r conference, not o n l y to restore f o u r - p o w e r government of G e r m a n y but — and this was the departure f r o m previous Soviet p o l i c y —• to consider the earliest possible w i t h drawal f r o m G e r m a n y of all occupation forces. T h e W e s t e r n p o w e r s ignored this interesting overture, partly because the defection of Yugoslavia suggested that further w e a k ness might develop within the Soviet system, and partly because t h e y w e r e quite properly unwilling to discuss anything under duress. T h e vicious circle was n o w established. T h e Russians w o u l d not lift the blockade unless the c u r r e n c y problem w e r e settled. T h e Allies w o u l d not discuss the c u r r e n c y problem so long as the blockade of Berlin continued in effect. Underneath this surface

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dispute lay the Russian desire to force the Allies to give up their plans for the creation of a West German state. It would have seemed that this moment in the summer of 1948 called for a reappraisal of the deadlocked position and the display of a little ingenuity on the part of Western diplomacy. T h e Russian indication that the Kremlin would even consider a withdrawal of any part of the Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe introduced a new and potentially important element into the picture. Rather than continue to wrestle with the deadlock itself, w h y not outflank it by a new approach dealing with the causes out of which the deadlock had arisen? Such an approach might, for example, have taken the form of proposing a wholly new type of agreement as to Europe between the non-European powers — Russia, Britain, and the United States; an agreement under which the three powers would guarantee the neutrality of the entire Continent west of the Soviet frontier and withdraw their armed forces from the area so neutralized. Such a treaty would not have prevented the United States from maintaining powerful forces in the British Isles or in North Africa. It might even have provided for the maintenance of certain AngloAmerican bridgeheads on the Continent, to facilitate a quick return in the event of Soviet encroachment from the East. Except for such bridgeheads, however, such a treaty would have provided that not a single British or American soldier would have remained in Europe, nor a Russian soldier West of the Soviet Union's own frontier. 3 Some such broader attack upon the whole problem of Europe might or might not have borne fruit. It might even have failed and yet resulted in relaxing the pressures at the point of deadlock to a degree sufficient to make possible at least the discussion of an AllGerman settlement. A t the very least, the broadening of the discussion would have tended to put an end to the idiotic competition for the favor of the Germans by their quarreling conquerors. Yet no such move was undertaken. T h e door opened by the Warsaw communiqué was not entered. T h e Western statesmen were so preoccupied with winning a relatively minor victory that they gave no thought to anything else. T h e y acted like a general 3 For contemporary discussion of such a proposal, see Last Call for Sense, pp. 83-104.

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w h o is so busy hurling his troops against an obstinately held redoubt in the center that he fails to notice the sudden uncovering of one of the enemy's flanks.

4. The U.N. and the Berlin Crisis During August, 1948, the three Western Ambassadors to Mosc o w carried on negotiations with the Kremlin in which it appeared f o r a time that Premier Stalin was actually seeking a w a y to break the Berlin deadlock. B y this time the Allied counter-blockade was beginning to make itself felt in the Soviet zone and the success of the Allied A i r l i f t had been demonstrated. A t the end of these negotiations, on August 23, instructions were issued to the commanders of the four Berlin sectors to w o r k out a solution of the currency problem. T h e Soviet commander, however, showed little disposition to carry out these apparently amiable intentions. W h e n nothing came of the Berlin conversations, the Western powers decided, on September 26, to refer the whole matter to the Security Council of the United Nations, then in session at Paris. B y this time it was perfectly evident that a solution to the currency problem could be found, if both sides desired to find it. T h e real difficulty lay beyond the terms of reference given to the military commanders in Berlin. T h e real difficulty was that the Russians wanted to force the W e s t to discuss the abandonment of its plans f o r W e s t Germany, while the W e s t desired to avoid any such discussions. One factor in the Western reluctance to negotiate was that the Government of the United States had fallen in love with its coldw a r plan. A second factor was that the Western powers had no plan f o r German unification, because French fears of a united G e r m a n y had not been met. This problem of devising a plan f o r unifying G e r m a n y without creating a threat to French security was rendered more difficult by the fact that during the critical period France was, once more, without a government, four successive ministries having resigned within three weeks. T h e appeal to the Security Council was frustrated b y Russia's refusal to admit the competence of that body. W h e n a group of "neutral" nations put f o r w a r d a proposal, it was promptly vetoed b y Mr. Vishinsky.

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A n y careful observer visiting Western Europe at this time could not help but be impressed with the rising impatience of Europeans at what seemed to most of them a pig-headed inflexibility on the part of both Russia and the United States. There was already much speculation concerning the projected N o r t h Atlantic T r e a t y . T h e attitude of the various European peoples toward the proposed alliance could be summed up in one sentence: " W e are not interested in liberation after another war; what w e want is the prevention of a war in which w e shall be destroyed, no matter w h o wins it." A b o v e all, the Europeans were at this time extremely skeptical concerning the continuity of American policy. Almost everyone expected Governor D e w e y to win the impending presidential election. T h e almost universal question asked of an American visitor was: " W h a t will D e w e y ' s policy be?" A t the United Nations session in Paris, the American Delegation itself was in a peculiar position. Both Secretary of State Marshall and his presumable successor, Mr. J o h n Foster Dulles, were prepared f o r what Mr. Dulles later described as an "interregnum period," during which a lameduck Administration would have to w o r k closely with its successor. It was not a happy time to choose f o r an appeal to the United Nations. T h e outcome of our N o v e m b e r elections, with its return to Administration control of both Houses of Congress and its strong personal vindication of the President, created an entirely new situation. Assured of a second term and of a presumably friendly Congress, Mr. T r u m a n was n o w in a position to take a firm hand in extricating Europe f r o m the crisis which had arisen. T h e real crisis was not in Berlin but in Washington. American policy in Europe was drifting rapidly into a dilemma composed of these t w o alternatives: either the program f o r rearming Western Europe would involve the remilitarization of Western Germany, or else it would turn out to be the most cruel hoax ever perpetrated. If Western Europe was to be placed in a position to defend itself against Russian military attack, there was only one arsenal and one source of manpower which could be employed to bolster France, the L o w Countries, Scandinavia, and Italy. Unless w e remilitarized the Ruhr and drew upon the 48,000,000 people in the Western zones of Germany, w e should be rearming Western Europe merely to fight a delaying action, to be once more overrun and

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occupied, and, perhaps eventually, to be once more liberated. On the other hand, if we did rearm the West Germans, what would be the result? Would the Russians sit idly by and watch this operation? And, even if such action did not provoke attack, what would be the effect upon Western Europe itself? How good would be the morale of West European troops when asked to fight side by side with Germans? How reliable would German troops be in a war fought on German soil or on the wrong side of the Rhine? 4 These were the questions to be faced and which the Administration now had the power to face. All through the latter months of 1948 a curious air of unreality seemed to pervade the United Nations scene at Paris, as if the chief actors were reading their lines without quite knowing or caring what they were saying. The uncertainties caused by the impending American elections were not enough to account for this phenomenon. Only a hardened cynic could have suspected the answer, which was — quite simply — that the United States Delegation at Paris had not wanted to find a solution to the Berlin deadlock, preferring to let it continue for the time being — Airlift and all! This incredible fact was revealed in a confidential report to a private group of citizens by an individual who unquestionably knew the facts. Even at this late date, it would be a breach of confidence to reveal his identity, but my notes, jotted down in December, 1948, immediately after the meeting, leave no room for doubt as to what he said. They read as follows: "During the discussions at Paris it would have been perfectly possible for the Western powers to settle the currency dispute in Berlin and enough of the other matters involved to get the blockade lifted. But, if the Western powers did settle the Berlin affair, it was clear that they would have to agree to reconvene the Council of Foreign Ministers for the purpose of discussing the whole problem of the German peace settlement. This was considered dangerous and undesirable! "Reason: The Russians would propose the unification of Germany, as agreed to under the Potsdam Plan, along with the with4 T h e author first attempted to stimulate public discussion of these matters in December, 1948, before the W o r l d Affairs Council of Providence, Rhode Island. Last Call for Common Sense, pp. 142-159.

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drawal of the armies of occupation. If we allowed ourselves to be placed in the position of opposing this, we should give the Russians a tremendous advantage in the competition for German allegiance, because they would be proposing, while we opposed, what the majority of Germans wanted. If, on the other hand, we agreed to the Soviet proposal, we should frighten and upset all our friends in Western Europe. (The latter phrase seemed a polite circumlocution for saying that we would upset our plans for retaining Western control of the Ruhr, as an essential part of our West European recovery program.) "Therefore, the speaker stated quite frankly, our policy at Paris had been to avoid settling the Berlin crisis, thus protracting the favorable position created by the Airlift, and to keep away from any discussion of a German settlement until we had progressed further with our plans." Given the premise of a cold-war policy, this was not an illogical position. The amazing thing was that it should be stated so frankly and without apology or regret. Here was the proof that the cold war had ceased to be a means of seeking a peace settlement and had become, instead, an end in itself. The information obtained on this occasion served also to provide a possible explanation for another puzzling episode which had occurred in the latter part of 1948. It will be recalled that, in September, President Truman rather suddenly proposed to send Chief Justice Vinson on a mission to Moscow, and that this project was abandoned at the urgent request of Secretary Marshall, then in Paris. One can only speculate as to the considerations which motivated the President's proposal. T h e defection of Yugoslavia, the death of Zhdanov and the apparent change in Soviet policy indicated by the Warsaw Communique may well have led Mr. T r u man to believe that the Kremlin had shifted from an implacable Cominform policy to something more like traditional power politics, in which case some sort of understanding over Germany might have become possible. Whatever the President's motivation or reasoning, the revelation just cited made it clear that neither Secretary Marshall nor Mr. Dulles shared his desire to explore the situation. Both were by this time firmly committed to the creation of a West German state.

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Agreement

If any further evidence as to the trend of American policy had been needed, it was supplied on December 28, 1948, by the publication of full text of the Ruhr Agreement, drawn up in accordance with the London Agreement of the preceding June. This document had clearly been drafted on the assumption that Germany was now permanently divided into an eastern part, integrated with the Soviet Union, and a western part closely linked to noncommunist Western Europe. 5 A careful study of the text led to four positive and five negative conclusions. On the positive side, the agreement avoided the fatal mistake of attempting a political separation of the Ruhr from Germany; it put the final quietus upon the Morgenthau idea of flooding and closing the great coal mines; it attempted at least some integration of German production with the needs of Europe; and it seemed to preclude the inclusion of West Germany in a program of West European rearmament. On the other hand, the agreement imposed upon Germany the duty to accept the permanent regulation of its production in accordance with the needs of Europe and to work for the best interests of Europe, without imposing a similar obligation upon any other European country. In the long run, this would produce resistance and revisionism. By perpetuating the emphasis upon economic rather than psychological demilitarization — that is, the emphasis upon possession of the means of aggression rather than the will to aggression — the agreement perpetuated one of the fundamental errors of past occupation policy. By its failure to determine the ownership of the Ruhr mines and industries, the agreement barred the way to socialization and opened the door to recapture of control over the German social structure by elements which had, in the past, made Germany into a warrior nation. By its acceptance of a permanently partitioned Germany, the agreement had become an instrument in the cold-war struggle, 5

For full text, Last Call for Common Sense, pp. 272-288.

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rather than an instrument by which Europe might be brought nearer to reunification. Finally, the agreement made it likely that one of two things would happen: either, in spite of the assurances to the contrary, West Germany would become involved in a West European defense alliance; or, if West Germany should be kept demilitarized according to promise while the rest of Western Europe turned to rearmament, West Germany would be given an intolerable advantage in living standards and in the development of its export trade. In other words, the agreement would either lead to making West Germany a cold-war arsenal, or else it would create the very conditions which would open the way to the reestablishment of German-dominated restrictive cartels. These were the main points in a memorandum, prepared upon release of the text for possible submission to our Government. The memorandum concluded with the following paragraphs concerning a possible revision which, as the reader will see, reverted back to the idea of a European Coal Authority suggested in 1946: "The answer lies in the direction which the writer has advocated for some years — namely, the creation of a European Coal Authority rather than an Anglo-Saxon dominated Ruhr Authority. "Granted that it may be a long time before Germany can be accepted into the family of nations on terms of full equality, the fact remains that at some time she will have to be so accepted, or else be kept permanently in subjugation by force. It is a contradiction in terms to expect the Germans to accept the Ruhr Agreement as it now stands and at the same time expect them to become 'a peaceful, democratic nation.' "The situation would be very different, if the Ruhr Authority were set up as the avowed precursor of a European Coal Authority. It would be different if the European countries said to the Germans: 'You will have to accept a second-class status until you have demonstrated your moral regeneration; but, in the end, we are all going to impose upon ourselves the same obligations toward each other and toward the European community which we are now imposing upon you.' "It would be better yet if, instead of promising to do this at some future date, the countries of Western Europe would forthwith

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establish an Authority to handle the allocation of all West European coal, stating as they did so that the door would always remain open to the nations of Eastern Europe as well. "This much could be done, in the w a y of improving the present Agreement, even within the framework of a cold war policy. In fact, it would appear to be a more effective move if judged on the criterion of cold war policy. Instead of playing into Russian hands by proposing to create an unjust and intolerable permanent status for the German people, we should be frustrating the Russian appeal to German nationalism by marking out clearly the road by which a regenerate Germany might once again find its w a y back into the family of nations. "Furthermore, if the suggested procedure were followed, we should be making a move toward ending the cold war as well as a move toward winning it. Instead of confronting the Russians with a closed door, shutting them forever out of any voice in the disposition of the Ruhr area, we should be pointing out the only way in which they might some day be admitted as a member of an allEuropean, instead of merely a West European Authority."

6. Year-end. Evaluation Looking backward at the year 1948, several major factors stand out in sharp relief against the mass of events which took place in various parts of the world. 1. The increasingly sharp division of Europe was evidenced by the developments described in this chapter. 2. The focal point of the struggle for Europe was, more and more, centered in Germany. 3. T h e weakness of the Soviet bloc was revealed in the defection of Yugoslavia, which, incidentally, saved American intervention in Greece from disastrous failure, by closing the Greek-Yugoslav frontier. A further weakness of the Soviet Union lay in its inability to supply the goods needed to make the Molotov Plan more than an empty bluff. 4. T h e weakness of the West was disclosed in the instability of France, as shown by recurring cabinet crises, and the inability of the Western powers to reach any real agreement among each other with regard to the German future. In this respect the West came

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perilously close to fulfilling a prediction of the late Andrei Zhdanov that the Western powers would inevitably fall out over the Ruhr. 5. Outside of Europe there were even more distressing signs of cleavage within the non-communist world. In the Near East, Britain and the United States were split wide apart over policy toward the newly born state of Israel. In Africa, the abortive attempt to settle the future of Italy's former African colonies produced an unedifying spectacle of disagreement between France, Britain, and Italy. In the Far East, the fall of Mukden to the Chinese Communists, on October 30, followed by disastrous defeats and wholesale desertions from the Nationalist forces, presaged an ominous future. In Indonesia, the Netherlands, having been for the second time persuaded to seek a peaceful settlement, broke away from a solemn U.N.-sponsored agreement to start another attempt at reconquest of its former East Indian empire. France continued to fight her colonial war in Indo-China. A n d even Britain, having taken the great, constructive move of liberating India, Burma, and Ceylon, was having colonial troubles in Malaya. 6. In our own Hemisphere, while nominal solidarity had been obtained at the Bogotá Conference, the history of 1948 showed an alarming epidemic of military or para-military seizures of power among the Latin American republics. On the whole, 1948 was a year in which the anti-communist position grew somewhat stronger in Europe and weaker in Asia. West European recovery got well under w a y , thanks to the Marshall Plan. West German recovery set in with a spectacular rush after the currency was reformed and stabilized. T h e Italian elections had, with help from the Vatican and Washington, beaten off the threat of a communist seizure of power. T h e Greek communists — thanks to the closing of the Yugoslav border, were finally on the w a y to defeat. On the other hand, China down to the Yangtze river was lost and the total collapse of the Nationalist regime was threatened. N o one could foretell what the consequences of this disaster would be. T h e great questions, which overhung the year-end scene were: 1. What were the true Soviet intentions? Especially, what would be the relationship between Moscow and,Peiping?

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2. T o what extent would the Truman Administration wish to shift the emphasis in American foreign policy away from military containment and toward the creative approach symbolized b y the Marshall Plan?

5 Lost Chance for Change (First half 1 9 4 9 ) The drastic change in the domestic political scene, General Marshall's serious illness, and the consequent appointment of Dean G. Acheson as his successor in early January 1949, made the turn of the year a potentially decisive point in the development of American foreign policy. The change in top leadership coincided with what appeared to be the psychological moment for a shift from militarydominated bipartisanship to the assumption of full responsibility by the party in power, with a corresponding assumption by the minority party of its traditional function of loyal opposition. The selection of Mr. Acheson — an experienced veteran in government service and a strong believer in the Constitutional processes — seemed to indicate the end of that period in which Mr. Truman had left the making of foreign policy largely in the hands of his Secretary of State. Both the President's personal vindication at the polls and Mr. Acheson's temperament suggested a return to the traditional relationship between the White House and the Department of State. These factors combined to create an opportunity for the careful reexamination of the predominantly negative policy of physical containment and for the development of a broader, more positive, and more creative approach to the problems of world affairs. They provided an opportunity not only to clarify the nation's aims but to reconsider the means by which these aims should be pursued and, finally, to bring commitments into balance with power. The specific area in which a reexamination of our policy seemed most urgently required was Germany, even though when Mr. Acheson took office, the Far East presented a much more immedi-

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ately ominous picture. T h e fact was — though f e w American realized it at the time — that the Asian revolution had already passed beyond the control of American intervention. T h e position in the Far East which Mr. Acheson inherited presented little more than an opportunity for skilful rear-guard actions. These were important. But the position which Mr. Acheson inherited in Europe was still balanced upon the knife-edge of decision. T h e crucial element in this decision was Germany. The question remaining to be decided was: Whether to seek a European peace settlement through a determined and patient effort to reunite Germany and to eliminate it both as a bone of contention and as a threat to peace — or, whether to accept as more or less permanent the partition of Germany and the division of Europe, seeking security through a balance of power achieved by including the western two-thirds of Germany in a West European defense bloc. The drift, during 1947 and 1948, had been steadily in the latter direction, but the ultimate decisions were yet to be made. 1. Unsuccessful Warning The day after Acheson was appointed, the writer dropped in at his law office to wish him luck. Acheson remarked ruefully that he needed plenty of it and would find it difficult, after his "sabbatical year" in private practice, to pick up the threads of the tangled skein of foreign policy. In response to a casual comment that this simile seemed particularly apt as to our European, and especially our German policy, Acheson asked a number of shrewd questions which provided an opportunity to express misgivings and to outline briefly the events which had recently combined to cause an accelerating drive toward the creation of a West German state and the inclusion of that state in a West European defense bloc. The implications of the just-published Ruhr Agreement were spelled out in some detail, as were the unresolved basic differences within the Western coalition as to the German future. The necessity for providing a real guarantee of French security vis-à-vis Germany and the need for a realistic approach to the problem of West European defense against Soviet aggression were emphasized as were also the dangers inherent in the proposed North Atlantic Treaty, the terms and membership of which were then still unrevealed, although both had been

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fairly well indicated. It was suggested that a unilateral declaration by the United States, to the effect that it would consider any aggression against Western Europe as an act of war upon itself, might well serve as a useful deterrent; but that any treaty attempting to guarantee some European countries and not others — above all, any treaty committing the United States to the defense of any specific territory or frontier in Europe — would not only arouse false hopes but, very likely, create confusion and thereby actually invite aggression. T h e European attitudes recently encountered at first hand were reported in some detail. Mr. Acheson asked for an analysis of the Ruhr Agreement and for a written statement of the misgivings expressed with regard to our German policy and the treaty negotiations. T h e alreadyprepared paper on the Ruhr Agreement was forwarded to him immediately; his other requests were fulfilled within the week. By this time Mr. Acheson was being cross-examined for confirmation by a none-too-friendly Senate Committee. This was at the time when the first accusations had been brought against Alger Hiss and suspicions of a pro-communist conspiracy in the State Department had been aroused. T h e atmosphere was not one in which it would be easy to shift from negative anti-communism to a more positive and constructive policy. Whether for this reason or because the Administration had no intention of revising its policy, the hope that 1949 might bring a creative change was short-lived. The State Department's press release of January 14 revealed the advanced state of the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations. T h e President's Inaugural Address of January 20 made it quite clear that there would be no major change in the direction and emphasis of our foreign policy. Except for Mr. Truman's announcement of a "bold new program" of technical aid to the "under-developed areas" of the w o r l d 1 (which soon turned out to be neither bold nor new), it was evident that the Adminis1 W h e n the wholly inadequate legislative proposals for the carrying out of this program were submitted b y the Administration, and when even these inadequate recommendations encountered Congressional opposition, a number of private groups and citizens endeavored to arouse public support for a broader and more generous program. See "Bold New Program" Series of pamphlets published b y the Public Affairs Institute of Washington; Stringfellow Barr's Let's Join the Human Race; and the author's Point Four — Our Chance to Achieve Freedom from Fear.

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tration's major preoccupation would continue to be the negative effort to stop Soviet communism b y a policy of military containment. It followed f r o m this that our German policy would remain unaltered and that the drive to establish a West German state would continue unabated. It was now clear that the N o r t h Atlantic T r e a t y was being pushed hard precisely in order to induce France to fall in with these plans f o r W e s t Germany. It became apparent that not only would the Administration's basic policy remain unchanged, but that its tactics also would continue unaltered: each step along the w a y would continue to be presented as an accomplished fact, submitted f o r ratification and approval — but not f o r discussion; each step would be pictured as critically essential to save the world f r o m communism; each step, once accepted, would make the next step inevitable.

2. The North Atlantic Security Program Realizing that there was no time to be lost with regard to the N o r t h Atlantic T r e a t y , this dissenter now submitted a number of critical memoranda not only to the Secretary of State but to the leading members of the Senate and House of Representatives. 2 So far as the State Department was concerned, these documents were acknowledged in a most friendly manner b y M r . Acheson and turned over to the Department's planning group f o r study. T h e attitude of the planning group was reflected b y the following excerpt f r o m a letter written b y its chief, Mr. G e o r g e F . Kennan: 3 " I have read with great interest the memorandum about the proposed Atlantic Pact. W h i l e I agree with many of the points y o u raise in this memorandum, I think that in certain instances, they rest on an incorrect conception of what the pact is and purports to do. I think it will be easier to find the answers to some of these questions when the text of the Pact is published." 2

Later published in Last Call for Common Sense, pp. 202-229. Later United States Ambassador to Moscow. Mr. Kennan was at this time known as the "Mr. X , " who had authored a much discussed article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in the July, 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs. Because of this article, Mr. Kennan became widely regarded as the originator of the containment policy, though he has since been critical of that policy's execution. Whatever Mr. Kennan's responsibility for United States policy toward Russia, the writer believes that he exerted a strong influence upon our European policy in the direction of relying upon Germany, rather than upon France, as the core of a strong anti-Soviet coalition. 3

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The five points which had been raised were these: 1. The Geographical Loophole. The proposed treaty will apparently include some but not all of the free nations of Western Europe. This implies that the United States and Canada will not protect the non-signatories. Thus the treaty, in effect, may invite aggression against the non-signatories. This may endanger the signatories themselves. If, for example, Norway and Denmark participate, while Sweden does not, and if Sweden should be attacked and overrun, the defense of Norway and Denmark would become almost impossible. Similarly, if Iran is left exposed, Turkey will be endangered; if Turkey is left unprotected, Greece will be imperiled; if Greece is not included, Italy becomes vulnerable; and, if Italy is lost, the southern flank of France becomes exposed. 2. The Constitutional Loophole. Presumably Congress will preserve its right to declare war, to pass upon the various means of carrying out our treaty obligations, and to appropriate or withold the necessary funds. This means that there would be no certainty in advance whether, when, and in precisely what circumstances the United States would actually throw its full weight behind the defense of a victim of aggression. Such uncertainty may invite miscalculation by a potential aggressor and lull the nations to be protected into a false sense of security. 3. The Defense Dilemma. If the treaty is intended not merely to prevent aggression but also to provide a defense for the signatories in the event of aggression, it is difficult to see how this can be accomplished. No feasible amount of rearmament of the European signatories will provide them with a defense against Russian invasion because of their insufficient manpower, inadequate industrial capacity, economic weakness and political instability. Thus, the defense force will merely be a dangerous illusion, unless rearmament includes Western Germany, or unless the United States intends to station in Europe, prior to the outbreak of any war, a much larger combat force than it at present possesses. The remilitarization of West Germany is contrary to a sound and established American policy and would alienate the peoples of Western Europe; it would also be highly provocative. The providing of a substantial American garrison would necessitate a drastic increase in our defense establishment and Congressional sanction for stationing most of it in Europe; this, too, would almost certainly provoke Russian counter-measures.

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4. Defense Against What? The primary threat to the free nations of Europe is political, rather than military. T h e danger of communist subversion or penetration on the Czechoslovak formula is a greater risk than physical invasion. If Russia gained control of Western Europe by political means, then its war potential would be dangerously increased to a point where Russian leadership might consider that a military challenge to the free world offered a good chance of success. Therefore, the United States should create a deterrent by declaring its interest in the continued independence and freedom of Western Europe, while at the same time assisting Western Europe in every w a y possible to rebuild its economic health, strengthen its political stability, and, thereby, make itself immune to subversion or penetration. This has been the basic assumption of the Marshall Plan. T o the extent that Western Europe turns from recovery to rearmament, its political defenses will be weakened. T o the extent that American resources will be diverted to the rearming of Western Europe, American aid to economic recovery will be diminished. 5. The Dunkirk Danger. From the point of view of our own national security, the proposed treaty would appear to commit us in the event of war to a strategy which might mean the reenactment of the perilous evacuation of Dunkirk on a gigantic scale, unless we had taken measures prior to the outbreak of hostilities which would insure our being able to hold Western Europe — o r at least a substantial bridgehead. Are we prepared to take such measures? Could we complete them without provoking attack? Unless both these questions can be answered in the affirmative by our military men, we should be committing our armed forces to the certainty of a disastrous initial defeat. W h e n the text of the treaty was released, it varied in no important respects from what had been anticipated.4 The five questions raised remained unanswered, largely because the treaty itself constituted only one part of the proposed Atlantic Security Program. The nature and extent of European rearmament, the nature and extent of the proposed American commitment to aid that rearmament, and the American commitment to specific action in the event of war were all left hanging in the air, because they resided in the as yet 1 T h e text of the North Atlantic Treaty may be obtained from the Government Printing Office.

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undisclosed companion-piece to the treaty — the Military Assistance Bill. T h e tactics of the State Department were to insist upon the adoption of the T r e a t y before permitting any discussion of the program as a whole. This "one thing at a time" argument seemed certain to result in presenting the American people with an accomplished fact, without any opportunity f o r prior discussion or debate, and to the eventful adoption of a policy rooted in officially fostered emotional attitudes, rather than in public understanding and rational support. It was evident that mere negative criticism would not suffice to halt the rapid completion of this process. T h e following is the essence of a plan f o r modification of the N o r t h Atlantic T r e a t y and f o r the initiation of negotiations leading to a broader security system, submitted to the Secretary of State on February 26, 1949, and sent, one week later, to members of both Houses of Congress. I. Modification

of North Atlantic Pact

1. Limit the pact signatories to the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Suspend negotiations with all other countries. 2. Abandon the attempt to force, promote or assist the rearmament of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, except to the extent necessary f o r internal security. 3. Propose, instead: a) that these four Continental signatories, while maintaining adequate forces to maintain internal security, cease wasting their resources in rearmament against possible Soviet attack, and devote their entire energies to the achievement of full economic recovery and political stability. b) that France and the Netherlands agree to accept United Nations meditation of their current colonial wars in IndoChina and Indonesia, respectively. c ) that Great Britain, Canada, and the United States coordinate their military establishments in such a w a y as to enable the maximum p o w e r of these three nations to be brought to bear instantly against any nation attacking any or all of the four Continental signatories.

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These modifications were designed to accomplish three purposes: a) T o avoid the creation of a defense community which, while reaching right up to the Soviet frontier in some areas, would leave other countries contiguous with the Soviet orbit unprotected. (An alternative to the limitation of membership would be a new Monroe Doctrine applying to all of Europe west of the Iron Curtain.) b) T o relieve the Continental signatories of the burden of rebuilding and maintaining armaments, thus enabling them to devote their full energies and resources to the perfection of their social and economic defenses against communist subversion or penetration. c) T o make it clear that the United States, Britain, and Canada would instantly go to war with any nation attacking any or all of the Continental signatories, without implying that they would necessarily fight an aggressor on the European Continent. II. Germany As to German policy, it was suggested that the United States should: 1. Suspend temporarily the effort to create a West German state, the writing of an Occupation Statute and the drafting of a West German Constitution. 2. Demand the lifting of the Russian blockade of Berlin as a precondition for a four-power discussion of the entire problem of Germany. 3. Propose a date within the next three months for a four-power meeting in Berlin. 4. Declare that the United States would attend this meeting with the avowed purpose of bringing about: a) Four-power agreement to permit Germany to function as an economic entity. b) The removal of the zonal barriers to trade, travel, and information. c) The creation of those conditions in which the German Laender (state) governments might work toward the establish-

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ment of a federal government for all of Germany, meanwhile operating under four-power supervision on a basis similar to that existing in Austria. d) T h e withdrawal of occupation forces other than the minimum contingents required to maintain internal order and prevent any form of German rearmament. It was suggested that the Council of Foreign Ministers should not be expected at this time to write a German peace treaty. On the other hand, it was urged that the United States unequivocally clarify its ambiguous position with regard to German unification, which enabled the Russians to appear as the champions of unification while the Western powers seemed to favor a continuation of partition. It was pointed out that the two major obstacles to a German settlement were control of the Ruhr and reparations. T h e first would automatically be solved as soon as Germany would begin to function as an economic whole under four-power supervision. It was suggested that a compromise might be reached on the question of reparations by agreeing that reparations out of current German production might be considered after Germany had become selfsupporting and had repaid the funds which Britain and the United States had been forced to invest in their zones of occupation. Given agreement on these two major points, a partial revision of the PolishGerman frontier might become possible. III. A Treaty

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Europe

It was suggested that the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union negotiate a Treaty which would extend to all of Europe the disarmament proposal contained in the modified Atlantic Security Pact. Such a treaty should: 1. Guarantee the permanent demilitarization of Germany and the control of Ruhr coal for the benefit of all of Europe, including G e r many, with an agreement that the same principle of allocation for the benefit of all European countries should apply to all European coal-producing countries. Russia, Great Britain, and the United States to have no voice in determining coal allocation, except perhaps as arbiters. 2. Provide for the withdrawal from all of Europe west of the Soviet Union's frontier, of American, British, and Russian troops,

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except that Russia on the one hand, and Great Britain and the United States jointly, on the other, should have the right to maintain not over two divisions in Germany and Austria. This would not prevent the United States from stationing forces in the British Isles under agreement with Great Britain. 3. Guarantee all the nations of Europe between the Soviet frontier and the Atlantic Ocean (including the Mediterranean) against aggression (as defined by the United Nations), on condition that these European nations would agree to maintain only such military forces as might be necessary to maintain internal order, and that they would agree to permit continuing inspection by the United Nations of all military establishments and facilities capable of producing offensive weapons. In presenting this alternative to the Secretary of State and to Congress, the following argument was presented: 1. The proposal would make clear to the Soviet Union and to the world that we do not consider the cold war an end in itself and that we seek and are willing to reach a settlement. 2. The proposal would provide a realistically strong deterrent to Soviet aggression, without creating dangerous ambiguities or provocation. 3. It would get the Russian army out of Europe (except for a token force in Germany and Austria), while still leaving a similar Anglo-American force which would have to be engaged, if the Russians moved westward. 4. It would accelerate the attainment of West European self-support and political stability, thereby frustrating the Soviet design of political conquest. 5. It would save the United States the cost of aiding West European rearmament, as well as the cost of an indefinitely protracted program of economic aid and subsidy. 6. It would free the United States to apply its surplus economic resources at the points of maximum leverage throughout the world, instead of concentrating them primarily in Western Europe. 7. It would enable the United States, Britain, and members of the British Commonwealth of Nations to preserve their freedom of action and to build up their military power where it would count as a deterrent — or, in the last analysis, where it would count in war

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— instead of committing in advance a large part of their military resources to the dubious defense of Western Europe. 8. Once the Continent of Europe were neutralized by the proposed treaty, it would become possible for the Western powers and the Soviet Union to discuss realistically the reduction of their own armaments and the transformation of the United Nations into an organization under which universal enforceable disarmament would become realistically possible. It soon became evident that the Administration's program had already passed beyond the point of no return. Before there could be any public discussion of the full implications of the proposed commitments— let alone any discussion of possible alternatives — the Treaty was signed at a full dress ceremony, held at Washington on April 4. Immediately thereafter it was sent to the Senate for ratification. On April 5, the United States Chief of Staff, General Omar Bradley, made an address in New York City, containing the following highly significant passage: "It must be perfectly apparent to the American people that we cannot count on friends in Western Europe, if our strategy in the event of war dictates that we shall first abandon them to the enemy with a promise of later liberation . . . It is a strategy that would produce nothing better than impotent and disillusioned allies . . ." According to this interpretation by one of our highest responsible authorities, the United States was about to undertake far more than the declaration of solidarity expressed in the North Atlantic Treaty. It was going to undertake vastly more than merely to go to war against an aggressor. It was going to assure the European signatories that, in the event of war, our strategy would be to prevent them from being overrun — in other words, that our strategy would be to defend the frontiers of Western Europe from invasion. By what means was this promise to be fulfilled? General Bradley did not say. Those who asked this question at press conferences in the Pentagon and State Department were told to wait and see what the Military Aid Bill would provide. Meanwhile, the Senate was urged to ratify the Treaty without troubling itself over the contents of its undisclosed companion-piece. Nevertheless, as we shall see

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presently, the Senators did wish to k n o w at least the major provisions of this second part of the proposed program. State Department Release of April

26

W i t h the T r e a t y before the Senate, there n o w occurred a rather peculiar episode. On April 26, the Department of State released t w o important and curiously contradictory announcements. T h e first release revealed that negotiations with Russia, leading toward the lifting of the Berlin blockade, had been going on secretly through United Nations channels since February 15. These talks between United States Ambassador Philip Jessup and the Soviet Chief Delegate, J a c o b Malik, were now reported to have reached a point at which "the w a y appeared clear" f o r a solution of the Berlin deadlock and the convocation of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss an All-German settlement. T h e second release announced that an agreement had been reached, on April 8, between France, Great Britain, and the United States, on the basic principles f o r the merger of the three Western zones of Germany. T h e purpose of the agreement, the release said, had been "to define the organization and procedures through which the powers of the occupying governments will be exercised after the establishment of a provisional German Government." T h e agreement provided f o r a High Commission, composed of three Commissioners representing the occupying powers, and outlined the manner in which the H i g h Commission would vote and reach its decisions. T h e powers to be retained by the three occupying nations over the German Government were set forth in the Occupation Statute of April 8. (This draft was eventually superseded b y the formal Charter of the High Commission, adopted by the three p o w ers on June 29, 1949.) T h e contradictory nature of these two announcements raised t w o puzzling questions: 1. If our Government had been negotiating f o r over two months f o r a re-opening of discussions leading to an All-German settlement, w h y had it pressed f o r w a r d with such frantic haste toward the completion of its plans to create a separate West German state? 2. If the Kremlin's objective was to block the creation of a W e s t German state, w h y had it delayed its agreement to lift the blockade

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until the moment when the Western powers had finally reached agreement as to the formation of that state? T h e answer to the first question was not immediately clear but became clear within a short time. T h e Western powers — more accurately, the Washington planners — had not wanted to discuss an All-German settlement until they were in a position to say to Russia: " Y o u now want unification? Certainly. All you have to do is to let your zone come in under the West German constitution." This could not be said, until there was a West German constitution. T h e second question was more difficult. Distance between Moscow and Lake Success may have had something to do with the slowness of Mr. Malik's replies to Dr. Jessup's questions. Disagreement within the Politburo may have been another factor. But almost certainly the Kremlin had underestimated the speed at which Western plans were maturing and, particularly, the effect of the Atlantic Treaty upon French willingness to go along with the Anglo-American plan for a West German state. On April 28, Mr. Acheson made his first major public pronouncement as to German policy in an address delivered at N e w York. Recapitulating the post-surrender history, the Secretary outlined the origin and nature of the West German plans. He reviewed and reaffirmed the London Agreement of June 8, 1948, as well as the Ruhr Agreement of December 28, 1948. Then he proceeded to attempt a reconciliation of the State Department's two announcements of April 26. T h e following is a full quotation of that part of his address: " I know that this thought must be arising in your minds, at this stage. H o w long must we be satisfied with interim measures when the people of all countries desperately desire a genuine and lasting peace? Will the moves we are making in Western Germany contribute to a permanent settlement of the German problem? What are the possibilities of renewed four-power talks on Germany? Has the possibility of such talks or the success of their outcome been prejudiced? "In the communique announcing the London agreements, released June 6, 1948, it was emphasized that the agreed recommendations in no w a y precluded, and on the contrary would facilitate, eventual four-power agreement on the German problem. T h e y

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were designed, it was stated, to solve the urgent political and economic problems arising out of the present situation in Germany. "When this government embarked, together with its Western Allies, on the discussion of new arrangements for Western Germany, it did not mean that we had abandoned hope of a solution which would be applicable to Germany as a whole or that we were barring a resumption of discussions looking toward such a solution whenever it might appear that there was any chance of success. It did mean that this government was not prepared to wait indefinitely for four-power agreement before endeavoring to restore healthy and hopeful conditions in those areas of Germany in which its influence could be exerted. "Should it prove possible to arrange for renewed four-power discussions, this government will do its utmost, as it has in the past, to arrive at a settlement of what is plainly one of the most crucial problems in world affairs. "There are certain principles, however, the observance of which is essential, in our view, to any satisfactory solution of the German problem and which we shall have to keep firmly in mind in whatever the future may bring. "The people of Western Germany may rest assured that this government will agree to no general solution for Germany into which the basic safeguards and benefits of the existing Western German arrangements would not be absorbed. They may rest assured that until such a solution can be achieved, this government will continue to lend vigorous support to the development of the Western German program." It now appeared certain that the battle against the creation of a West German state had been lost. This was bad enough; but what would make it infinitely worse would be a decision not only to use that state as a cold arsenal in the cold war, but to remilitarize it and use it as a military ally in West European defense. The decision as to this matter would depend very largely upon the nature of the commitments to be undertaken in connection with the North Atlantic Security program. 4. The Treaty before the Senate During the latter part of April an impressive array of Administration witnesses appeared before the Senate Committee on Foreign

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Relations urging it to report promptly in favor of ratifying the North Atlantic Treaty. N o opposition witnesses were heard until the close of the hearings in May, but a considerable amount of opposition was expressed during the hearings by some Of the more conservative Republican Senators. This opposition was directed against the program as a whole. The testimony of the Administration witnesses revealed a number of interesting facts concerning the still undisclosed Military Aid Bill and developed a number of contradictions and ambiguities concerning the nature and extent of the commitments to be undertaken by the United States. The following examples illustrate the confusion which apparently existed not only in the minds of the Senators but in the minds of the Administration's chief witnesses. These examples are quoted from the Congressional Record of April 27-May 3. The following two statements by Secretary Acheson indicated that the United States would be committed to defend the frontiers of Western Europe in the event of war: 1. "It is understandable that the free nations of Western Europe cannot look forward with equanimity to invasion and occupation in the event of war, even if we guarantee subsequently to liberate them. Nor is it in our interest to permit them to be occupied with the consequent necessity of the costly liberation of those areas." 2. In response to a question by Senator Wiley of Wisconsin, Mr. Acheson spoke in words which almost exactly paraphrased remarks made some weeks earlier by Premier Queuille of France. He said: "They (the Europeans) say that if there were a really serious all-out attack, we know that in the long run, probably, the great strength of the United States would, in the end, defeat the aggressor. But in the meantime, they say, we would be overrun. Most of us, they say, would be dead, our countries would be destroyed, our civilization would be pretty well destroyed. The final outcome would be that the United States would be liberating a corpse." 3. Testifying along the same lines and in conformity with his speech of April 5, General Bradley told the Committee: "Geographically, many of these member nations are already in a position where any aggression into Western Europe would be a conquest of their homelands. I assure you that our frontiers of collective defense lie, in common with theirs, in the heart of Europe."

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The following statements by Secretary Acheson seemed to indicate that the North Atlantic program would not guarantee the defense of Western Europe's frontiers: 1. Senator Connally of Texas: "The proposed arms agreement does not necessarily envisage the increase in the armed forces of the signatories, but rather the furnishing of supplies and equipment to bring up to date their armed forces?" Mr. Acheson: "Correct." (Author's note: the existing armed forces in Western Europe were at this time less than 12 full-strength divisions.) 2. Mr. Acheson, replying to a question by Senator Hickenlooper of Iowa, as to whether the program could be considered aggressive: "The nations of Western Europe have small military forces. The action which is contemplated and outlined in what I have told you about the President's proposed recommendation on a military assistance plan could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be regarded as aggressive. There is nothing to aggress with under that program. What would be done is to take the existing small forces and make their equipment more modern and better rounded, so that, to the best of their ability, they can defend themselves, if they are attacked." 3. Mr. Acheson, in reply to a question from Senator Donnell of Missouri, as to whether the program was expected to provide "effective" collective capacity to resist armed attack: "No. It cannot mean that because, probably, the provision of sufficient forces is impossible for everybody. Otherwise, if you were trying to get sufficient forces, you would have to maintain military establishments which would be quite impossible for Europe and for us." Having testified that the West European nations would not, themselves, be expected to produce forces adequate to defend their frontiers against Russian invasion, Mr. Acheson unequivocally denied that West German manpower or productive resources would be drawn upon. Replying to a question from Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, as to whether it was contemplated to "bring back the Ruhr as a source of arms production," the Secretary said: "No, sir. It is not. We are very clear that the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany must be complete and absolute." This left only the possibility that American troops would be used

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to fill the gap. However, this method, too, was repudiated by Mr. Acheson in the following colloquy: Senator Hickenlooper: "Are we going to be expected to send substantial numbers of troops over there as a more or less permanent contribution to the development of these countries' capacity to resist?" Mr. Acheson: "The answer to that question, Senator, is a clear and absolute 'No.' " These conflicting statements showed that a dangerous ambiguity existed as to the fundamental nature and extent of the commitments which the country .was being asked to undertake. An invitation from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee provided an opportunity to present the following statement on May 10, 1949. Author's

Testimony

The Atlantic Security Pact and the program to rearm Western Europe must, I think, be considered together. The forthright testimony of the Secretary of State has made it clear the Treaty is the consequence rather than the cause of the rearmament program launched by the Brussels Treaty Powers on March 14, 1948, and endorsed on the same day by President Truman. I should like first to say a word about the context of this twofold proposal. It springs from a policy which should, in my opinion, go down in history as the Churchill Doctrine, instead of being associated with the name of our President. This policy rests upon the theory, advanced by Mr. Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, in March, 1946, that the Soviet Union alone is responsible for the world crisis and that the Soviet threat to peace is essentially a threat of physical conquest. From this theory derives the policy of seeking to contain the Soviet threat within a physical frontier manned by physical force. This essentially negative approach to peace has become one of the two major trends in our present foreign policy. The other, positive trend is the plan developed by President Truman and Secretary Marshall to attack the causes of mass discontent which invite communist exploitation. My own belief has been that the present world crisis derives from a number of factors, some of which are the products of the time in which we live and have nothing whatever to do with the nature of intentions of the Soviet Union; that, in addition to these

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non-Russian factors, there has been, and is, a very definite Soviet threat to peace; but that this Soviet threat has been, and still is, primarily a threat of communist penetration or subversion and only secondarily a threat of military conquest. Holding this belief, I have been an enthusiastic supporter of the Marshall Plan and a persistent critic of the doctrine of physical containment. For the past two years, I have viewed with increasing misgivings the ever greater preemption of our energies and resources by the negative and not very successful policy of strategic containment and the consequent slow strangulation of our positive program. In terms of dollars the ratio now stands at about three and a half to one. W e are now spending less than six billion dollars a year on our constructive program for peace. At the same time we are insuring ourselves against the failure of that program to the tune of more than eighteen billion dollars. This anomaly results, I think, from two basic misconceptions: first, the oversimplified scapegoat analysis of the world crisis; and, second, the widespread acceptance of a very dubious analogy to the Nazi design of military conquest. Our obsession with these two misconceptions blinds us to those aspects of the world crisis which have nothing to do with Russia or communism, and, at the same time, prevents us from seeing the true nature of the Russian or communist menace. If we could shake off this obsession, I believe that two things might happen. First, we might recognize that the way to stop Russia is to stop letting Russia make our foreign policy; in other words, we might see that Soviet expansionism can best be halted as the by-product of a constructive American policy for peace. Second, we might change our attitude about the United Nations. Instead of sadly shaking our heads over an impotent "debating society" and consoling ourselves with the easy notion that the United Nations would work, if only the Russians would let it work, we might set out to make the United Nations into an organization capable of enacting and enforcing world law. Were we to set out to do this, we should, of course, encounter Soviet opposition. But it would be Soviet opposition to a constructive program of peacefully uniting a divided world, in which we should enjoy far greater and more effective support from the peoples of the world than we can

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ever hope to muster in the present sterile and highly dangerous power struggle. So much for the context of the Atlantic Security Program. I am prepared to amplify these few remarks, if time permits and the Committee so desires. Given this context, which cannot be changed overnight, it seems to me that the twofold North Atlantic Security Program must be examined from the point of view of its efficacy as an instrument in our present policy. I shall now state my position from this narrower point of view as quickly and as precisely as I can. So long as we live in a world of international anarchy dominated by a power struggle between the two halves of a divided world, I am in favor of any declaration which makes it clear to ourselves and to others that a physical attack upon Western Europe is an attack upon us, and will be so regarded by us. I have spent most of my adult life fighting the isolationist illusion. I supported our entrance into the League of Nations and opposed the Neutrality Acts. When Western Europe was faced by the threat of Nazi conquest, I was horrified by our connivance in the so-called Peace of Munich and, shortly thereafter, publicly advocated an open military alliance with Britain, France, and the Low Countries as the only hope of preventing the outbreak of World War II. I do not object to such an alliance now, provided that it does not take our eyes off the real danger — which is now not military but political — and provided that we do not fool either ourselves or our friends about what we are doing. We are fooling ourselves, I think, when we try to clothe this Treaty in moral garments. To say that all the signatories are united by a common heritage of ethical belief and democratic conviction seems to me a dubious statement about large segments of the French, Dutch, Belgian, and Italian populations which willingly collaborated with and lived quite contentedly under fascism. It seems a dubious statement about any country in which 25% of the people are today communists, or about any country whose government seeks to deny democratic freedom to colonial peoples. This moral pretense becomes a complete mockery when Portugal is one of the signatories and when flirtatious eyes are cast at Franco Spain. Likewise I think we are fooling ourselves when we maintain that we are undertaking this program in order to strengthen the United

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Nations, when it is clear that we are trying to find a means of filling the gap left by the failure of the United Nations. These two polite hypocrisies seem to me to weaken our undertaking. I do not think they are vitally important because I do not believe that the American people take either pretense very seriously. There is, however, one respect in which I am afraid that some one is being seriously and dangerously led astray. In what is perhaps the most important aspect of the twofold proposal, I believe that either the American people do not realize what is afoot, or else our friends abroad are under a most regrettable misapprehension. From what I myself heard in Europe recently and from the published utterances of foreign officials, it seems clear that our friends abroad expect the new program to secure the frontiers of Western Europe against invasion by the Soviet Union. They are not interested in the promise of another liberation from enemy occupation. "Next time," said Premier Queuille of France, "you would be liberating a corpse." T o secure the frontiers of Western Europe means to hold an invading Russian army at the Oder, or the Elbe, or — at the very worst — at the Rhine. Being no military expert, I have tried to find out what military experts think this undertaking would require. The impression I have gathered, here and abroad, is that there would have to be created in Western Europe a ground force of at least forty fully equipped and highly mobile divisions and that such a ground army would have to be supported by great tactical and strategic airpower, fully functioning services of supply and adequately protected sea communications with the Western hemisphere. T o say that it would take at least ten billion dollars and a million men under arms to secure the frontiers of Western Europe against invasion is probably a gross understatement. Assuming that we were to supply all the money and equipment — assuming that, in the event of war, we undertook to provide much of the needed airpower and the protection of the sea-lanes — there would still remain the question of trained and mobilized manpower to secure the West European frontier. So far as I know, there are only three sources from which this manpower can be drawn: Western Europe itself, Western Germany, or the United States. Western Europe as a whole is suffering from a shortage of manpower, which at present is one of the chief obstacles to recovery.

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Italy is the only country which has a manpower surplus, but Italy cannot be rearmed without violating the Italian Peace Treaty. If a million men are withdrawn for military service from the farms and factories of France and the other European signatories, the recovery effort will come to a standstill and the door will be opened wide to communist subversion or penetration. If military manpower were to be recruited in Western Germany, it is clear, I think, that two things would happen: Russian retaliation would be provoked, and the already dubious morale of any potential French army would be destroyed. I say "the already dubious morale" because w e cannot ignore the fact that, with 25% of France voting communist, the Russians have a far more dangerous fifth column in France today than the Nazis had in 1940. That leaves the United States, and perhaps Canada, as a source of the necessary manpower. A former French Prime Minister has been making speeches in this country urging that w e send a large American force to Europe now to stand guard over its frontier. However, even if we were prepared to do that, it is necessary to bear in mind that, in spite of our huge military budget of fifteen billion dollars a year, we have at present a combat force of only about ten divisions. It would seem clear, then, that if the Atlantic Security Program means what our European friends think it means, either Western European recovery will have to be halted in its tracks, or else the United States will have to undertake a vastly greater commitment than the American people realize today. Halting the European Recovery Program means that we shall have to face the necessity of increased and indefinitely prolonged Alarshall Plan assistance, or else throw open the door to communist penetration at the very moment when it has been almost locked by patient and costly effort. If the Atlantic Security Program is intended to mean that we are to secure the frontiers of Western Europe against invasion, then the presently proposed $1,130,000,000 is merely the first bite at a very much larger commitment. It costs something like $250,000,000 to equip one armored division. I do not know what it would cost to create a force of forty divisions — either European or American — in Europe. But, whatever it costs, this would again be only the beginning, because we could hardly assume that the Russians would sit still on their side of the Iron Curtain while w e proceeded in a leisurely manner to build up a defense capable of holding their pres-

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ently available striking force. Actually, all the Russians would have to do to double their present immediate striking power would be to bring up another fifty existing divisions from wherever they are at present stationed in the Soviet Union. If they did that, our defense force would again have to be proportionately strengthened. And even this sort of calculation would only work out satisfactorily, if the Russians did not hit upon the bright idea that maybe they had better get the whole thing over with before we had built up any defense at all. These seem to me the facts to be faced, if we are talking about securing the West European frontier against invasion. If, on the other hand, we are not undertaking to do what our friends think we are doing, what is the point of diverting European manpower and resources from recovery to rearmament? What good will it do to build half a defense force? Twenty divisions are no better than the ten or twelve which exist in Western Europe today, if it takes forty to do the job. Surely, it is folly to think that the French, or the Dutch, or the Belgians would fight a delaying action for the benefit of Britain and the United States, if they knew in advance that their countries would be overrun and occupied. Surely, it is folly to weaken our own military strength by putting some of our stock of weapons in the hands of troops who — in the event of war — would be forced to surrender them to the invader. Before the Treaty is ratified, Mr. Chairman, I think the American people have a right to know what it means. I think our friends abroad have a right to know what it means. Either we are, or we are not, undertaking to defend Western Europe against invasion. If we are, let us not deceive ourselves about the costs or the risks involved. If we are not — if we are merely undertaking to deter invasion — let us not permit our friends to be deceived. Let us make clear to them what it is that we are promising to do. Shortly after the Treaty was signed, our Chief of Staff, General Bradley, made a speech, which I understand was cleared with the State Department, and in which I thought he clearly implied that our European friends were right in assuming that the frontiers of Western Europe are now to be secured against invasion in the event of war. On April 27, the Secretary of State himself said to this Committee: "It is understandable that the free nations of Western Europe can-

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not look f o r w a r d w i t h equanimity to invasion and occupation in the event of w a r , even if w e guarantee subsequently to liberate them. N o r is it to our o w n interest to permit them to be occupied w i t h the consequent necessity of the costly liberation of these areas." O n the same day, according to the New York Times, the Secretary of State told this Committee in response to a question that "there was absolutely no intention to send substantial numbers of A m e r i c a n troops to E u r o p e in any eventuality short of w a r . " In response to another question he is reported to have said that "there was no t h o u g h t of bringing W e s t e r n G e r m a n y into the alliance." A n d finally, speaking of the proposed A m e r i c a n subsidy of $1,130,000,000 to W e s t European rearmament, M r . A c h e s o n is reported to have stated that "the countries to be aided w o u l d themselves put up f r o m six to seven times w h a t the United States provided." I submit that these statements add up to the conclusion that the W e s t e r n European signatories are to provide all the m a n p o w e r and r o u g h l y 8 5 % of the material resources required to secure the frontier of W e s t e r n E u r o p e against invasion. I am unable t o reconcile this conclusion w i t h the repeated assurance given b y the State Department that rearmament is not to take precedence over or interfere w i t h W e s t European r e c o v e r y . I fear that the Secretary of State, f o r w h o s e integrity, wisdom, skill, and courage I have the greatest respect and admiration, has fallen heir to an unclear position not of his o w n making and is, to a certain extent, its prisoner. In these circumstances it seems to me that precisely the sort of occasion has arisen w h e n the Senate, in the fulfillment of its Constitutional duties and prerogatives, is in a position to help the President and the Secretary of State in their patient pursuit of peace, b y bringing about a clarification of the proposal. T w o kinds of clarification are possible. T h e first w o u l d establish that the t w o f o l d p r o g r a m means our participation in a determined e f f o r t to defend W e s t e r n Europe's frontiers in the event of w a r . T h e second w o u l d establish that w e are undertaking to make our utmost e f f o r t to deter a w o u l d - b e aggressor f r o m attacking W e s t e r n E u r o p e , but that, if this e f f o r t should fail, w e are committed to avenge and liberate, but not necessarily to prevent invasion.

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In the event of the first alternative, I w o u l d feel compelled — if I had a vote — to cast it against the ratification of the T r e a t y . I w o u l d do so most reluctantly, k n o w i n g that, in the present circumstances, our failure to r a t i f y w o u l d involve grave risks. Y e t I w o u l d feel that these risks w e r e not as serious as those involved in the attempt to erect a dubious defense against w h a t I conceive to be the secondary danger of military attack, at the price of w e a k e n ing W e s t e r n Europe's defenses against w h a t I conceive to be the primary danger — namely, the threat of communist penetration through exploitation of economic distress and political instability. I hope that the w i s d o m of the Senate will lead to a clarification of the t w o f o l d program in the opposite sense. Such a clarification would rest upon the recognition that the only effective way to protect Western Europe against military invasion is to prevent the outbreak of war. W e r e this premise accepted, a c l a r i f y i n g statement m i g h t take approximately the f o l l o w i n g f o r m : 1. T h e T r e a t y means that the United States recognizes that it has a vital interest in the security of W e s t e r n E u r o p e and that it will fight, if necessary, to maintain that security. 2. T h e T r e a t y means that the United States serves notice upon any potential aggressor that military attack upon W e s t e r n E u r o p e means w a r w i t h the United States. 3. T h e T r e a t y implies that, so long as no effective, supranational peace-enforcement machinery is established, the United States will do its utmost to maintain sufficient military p o w e r to make it apparent to a potential aggressor that any attempt at military conquest of W e s t e r n E u r o p e is f o r e d o o m e d to failure. 4. If, in spite of the f o r e g o i n g deterrents to aggression provided b y the United States, an aggressor should nevertheless embark upon military adventure, the U n i t e d States preserves full f r e e d o m of action to fight the aggressor in w h a t e v e r manner, b y w h a t e v e r means, and in w h a t e v e r theater or theaters of action it m a y deem expedient, in order to restore as rapidly as possible the security and f r e e d o m of the N o r t h Atlantic A r e a . If the T r e a t y w e r e thus clarified, I should be in f a v o r of its ratification. I should even be in f a v o r of a limited amount of military aid, designed primarily to enable the freely elected governments in W e s t e r n E u r o p e to deal e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h possible internal threats of violence, and to promote a greater feeling of self-respect and secu-

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rity. But I should stipulate that such military aid must not be given to governments which are not freely elected, and that it must not assume dimensions which would divert any of the nations of Western Europe from their primary task of achieving economic health and political stability. In voting for a program thus clarified, I should be well aware of certain defects in the Treaty which, I am afraid, it is now too late to remedy. By including Norway, the Treaty pushes the declared area of our vital interest right up against the Soviet frontier at its northern extremity. At the same time, the Treaty limits our commitment to certain countries of Western Europe, leaving others — notably Finland, Sweden, Turkey, and Iran — unprotected. This seems to me inconsistent and unwise. In spite of these now probably irremediable defects, I would consider that the Treaty has two offsetting virtues, provided that the whole program is clarified as suggested. These virtues are: first, that the Treaty makes explicit to every American citizen a commitment which has long been implicit in our whole foreign policy; and, second, that it makes this commitment unequivocally clear as a warning to any would-be aggressor and as an encouragement to our friends. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that my recommendation is at least precise and clear. I am grateful for the opportunity to present it for the consideration of your Committee. Should you find merit in the suggestion I have ventured to place before you, you will, I believe, have cured the Atlantic Security Program of its most dangerous defect. This program may then well become a most useful stopgap device to buy the time in which a positive, constructive American program for peace may be developed. Its ultimate effectiveness as such a device will then be determined by what we do with the time gained, in Europe and in Asia — more specifically, in Germany and in the southeastern rim of the Asiatic continent. The avowed purpose of this presentation had been to elicit a specific clarifying statement from the Committee as such; this effort failed; but, in explaining why a clarification was, in its judgment unnecessary, the Committee did actually repudiate the commitment to defend any particular territory in the event of war. The essential features of an extremely interesting discussion, which took place

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after the foregoing presentation, are accurately set forth in the following front page article in the New York Times of May 1 i , 1949. P A C T G I V E S E U R O P E N O INVASION B A R , V A N D E N B E R G

SAYS

Warburg Asks Senate to Issue Clarification of Our Aims — "Polite Hypocrisy" Fought By William S. White Washington, May 10 — A warning to this country's European associates in the North Atlantic treaty against any assumption that American military aid could give them any absolute guarantee of safety from invasion was issued today by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg. The Michigan Senator delivered his admonition from the table of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which he is senior Republican member, after James P. Warburg had appealed for public "clarification" of American intentions under the covenant. Mr. Warburg, a former N e w York banker, asserted that some of the statements of American leaders had led to a feeling among Western Europeans that the United States was prepared not simply to avenge any Soviet attack on them but to meet such an attack instantly and at its source. He specifically mentioned remarks by Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, and Gen. Omar N . Bradley, Army Chief of Staff. Senator Vandenberg said that he thought it not logical that the Europeans should expect the raising of any modern-day "Maginot Line," in view of the fact that the Administration's proposed military aid program under the treaty would involve only $1,130,000,000 for its first year. Nevertheless, he agreed that there had been interpretations in Europe that this country was about to extend a kind and scope of immediate security to which, in his view, it was not and could not be pledged. He emphasized that he, as the Republican foreign policy leader, had given "no commitment whatever" to any kind of military assistance program. He asserted that any program that was provided must be valued for the "potential force it implied and not for any "force in being." Discussing Mr. Warburg's proposal that the Senate, in ratifying

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the treaty, issue declarations making it clear that the United States was not necessarily committed to stopping any Soviet invasion at the outset, Senator Vandenberg said: "There is a great deal to be said for the importance of eliminating any possible ambiguity. It would be the last possible crime we could commit to let our friends be deceived. They should know that there is to be no Maginot Line." Senator Tom Connally, Democrat, of Texas, committee chairman, strongly rejected Mr. Warburg's argument that treaty ratification ought to be accompanied by American explanations. The French and other European statesmen who signed the covenant, Mr. Connally asserted, "know what it's all about already" and were quite aware that the obligation of this country, like that of all the others, was simply to respond to an attack when and how it thought fit. Mr. Warburg replied that ordinarily he believed this would have been clear enough, but he argued that the Acheson and Bradley statements had made it imperative to spell out what the United States would and would not do. Mr. Warburg, who held official posts during the Roosevelt Administration, testified that without "clarification" the treaty would be so "highly dangerous" a venture that it ought not to be ratified at all. Supporting a policy only of deterring aggression, Mr. Warburg asked the Senate to adopt a pronouncement that to this country the treaty meant the following: That the United States was prepared to fight, if necessary, to maintain European security; was now serving notice to that effect, and would do its utmost to make it clear that any attempt at European conquest was "foredoomed to failure." That, "if, in spite of the foregoing deterrents to aggression provided by the United States, an aggressor should nevertheless embark upon military adventure, the United States preserves full freedom of action to fight the aggressor in whatever manner, by whatever means, and in whatever theatre or theatres of action it may seem expedient, in order to restore as rapidly as possible the security and freedom of the North Atlantic area." Mr. Warburg supported the treaty, assuming such a "clarification." It was opposed before the committee during the day by

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several other witnesses, including James Imbrie, chairman of the Progressive (Wallace) party of N e w Jersey, and the Rev. Dudley H. Burr, representing the People's party of Connecticut. T w o days later, on May 13, 1949, the New York Times ran a lead editorial commenting upon the May 10 hearings. It is quoted here, along with my reply, published a day later in the Times letter column, because it illustrates the almost incredible confusion existing at the time. Perhaps the reader will be able to discover why the distinction between the two wholly different commitments should have been so difficult to explain and why its importance was not more apparent. I do not know to this day how the case might have been better presented in order to create greater public awareness of the nature and extent of the undertakings into which we were being led at this crucial juncture. ARMS

AND T H E

PACT

The hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have already demonstrated that the North Atlantic Treaty commands the support of a great variety of representatives of American public opinion, ranging from conservative Republicans to Socialists. In fact, the only outright opposition to the Treaty appears to be confined to a strange medley of die-hard isolationists, well-meaning but politically innocent pacifists, and the pro-Soviet factions of the Communists and their fellow-travelers. But the hearings are also beginning to shift emphasis away from the Treaty itself to a controversy over its military and strategic implications which threatens to impair the value of the Pact at a moment when it can register its first triumph in the lifting of the Berlin blockade, and when it has become the key to the success of the forthcoming Four-Power conference. This controversy is all the more hazardous because of the stand taken in it by Senator Vandenberg, one of the architects of the bipartisan foreign policy and author of the resolution out of which the Pact was born. Mr. Vandenberg remains a stanch advocate of the Pact itself, but he seems to hold that the Pact is sufficient unto itself as a deterrent to aggression, and that the military-aid program supplementing it is at best a secondary and perhaps unnecessary business on which he will not commit himself. Indeed, he warns

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our European allies that there will be no modern-day "iMaginot Line" resting on American aid to protect them against invasion, and insists that the Pact must be valued for the "potential" force implied, not for the "force in being" to be created by it. Senator Connally seconds this view by stating that there is no thought of sending an American army abroad in advance of invasion and "stringing it out along the Rhine." In some respects the Senators are playing with words and are setting up straw men to knock them down. The fact is that American troops are already strung out, not along the Rhine, but along the Elbe and in Berlin, and they are expected to stay there for some time. Are the Senators proposing to make them "expendables"? Moreover, there is no thought of erecting another futile Maginot Line; on the contrary, as General Bradley indicated, in case of newaggression the American strategy is based on carrying the war to the aggressor and ultimately subjugating the sources of his military and industrial power. But in a more fundamental sense the views of the two Senators are opposed to the strategic concepts of General Bradley and others, in particular our continental European allies, and involve the question whether we shall try to defend Western Europe or sacrifice it and then liberate it by another Normandy invasion. General Bradley and those of like views hold that our common defense frontiers lie in the heart of Europe, that to defend these frontiers we must aid our European allies to mobilize their tremendous resources in manpower and materials and integrate these in a common defense system, and that without such aid they will not only be unable to defend themselves but for want of means will even lack the will to do so. Any new occupation of Western Europe would not only put the industrial resources we are helping to build up at an enemy's disposal, but, left undefended, these very resources would in themselves be a powerful temptation to any aggressor able to seize them. In other words, while the Senators appear to think that the Pact alone is a sufficient deterrent to aggression, the military men hold that this deterrent will not deter unless it is backed by military strength. The history of military pacts without military integration, as in the cases of France and the Little Entente and the British guarantee to Poland, would seem to support the latter. No doubt the extent of American aid is limited, and, as General Bradley

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pointed out, Western Europe can be saved only by the Western Europeans themselves. If the stand of the two Senators helps to impress this on the Western Europeans, it will have performed a service of its own. But, in the final reckoning, all military power must be related to that of the possible opponent. On that score we must recognize the fact that Soviet Russia confronts us as a Power which has not only made the destruction of Western democracy the fundamental dogma of its policy but a Power which is arming to the hilt. W e cannot ignore that situation without courting possible disaster. T o THE EDITOR OF T H E N E W YORK T I M E S :

Y o u r editorial of M a y 13, "Arms and the Pact," goes to the root of the major problem inherent in the twofold Atlantic Security Program. It raises the one outstanding issue which must be clarified and understood here and abroad before a final commitment is undertaken. That issue is whether w e are undertaking to prevent military attack upon Western Europe by making it clear in advance that such an attack means immediate war with us, or whether we are undertaking to defend Western Europe against invasion, if, in spite of the deterrents provided by our declaration, an aggressor should attempt military conquest. These are two entirely different commitments. T h e one means that we must maintain sufficient military power to make it apparent that an attack upon our friends means a war with us in which the aggressor will face the certainty of ultimate defeat. T h e other means that we must create, or help create, sufficient military power in Western Europe before any war starts to make it impossible f o r an aggressor to break into West European territory. This is not, as your editorial implies, a question of "potential force" versus "force in being." Both alternatives require "force in being." But, in one case, w e should be committed to maintain a force in being wherever, in the judgment of our military leaders, that force would most effectively act as a deterrent to aggression and wherever it could most effectively be brought to bear upon an aggressor in the event of war. In the other case, w e should be committed to maintain the force in being in a specific area — West-

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ern Europe. W e should be committed to fighting the aggressor in a specific theatre of action. Our offensive capabilities would be limited by a specific commitment to defend the Oder, or the Elbe, or — at worst — the Rhine. Extent of Commitment In testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 1 o, I raised precisely this question, pointing out the existing ambiguity and urging its clarification. Senators Vandenberg and Connally, as well as other members of the committee, made it clear in the course of the subsequent discussion that they did not consider that our commitment involved an undertaking to defend the frontiers of Western Europe against invasion in the event of war. I cannot agree that "the Senators are playing with words and setting up straw men to knock them down." There is, I submit, a very real difference between having two American divisions "strung out along the Elbe and in Berlin" and facing the fact that, in the event of war, they are unfortunately "expendable," or building up along the Elbe two full American Armies of, let us say, half a million men. There is a real discrepancy between General Bradley's statement, reaffirmed by Secretary Acheson, that Western Europe must be spared another occupation and liberation, and the proposed arms program of $1,130,000,000 designed merely to re-equip some ten or twelve existing European divisions. Undertaking to defend the frontiers of Western Europe in the event of war means building up in Western Europe a force capable of holding an invader, as General Bradley said, "in the heart of Europe." This involves one of two things: ( 1 ) sending at least twenty American divisions to Europe before any war starts (we have at present about ten combat divisions), in order to supplement the re-equipped West European divisions; or (2), helping Western Europe to recruit, train and equip its own manpower to provide an adequate defense force. Size of Armed

Forces

Secretary Acheson has said that we definitely do not intend to send substantial American forces to Europe "in any eventuality short of war," which rules out the first alternative. T h e Secretary has

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testified that the proposed arms agreement does not envisage increasing the armed forces of the European signatories and that the size of these forces "is limited by the primary necessity for recovery." This disposes of the second alternative. W h y , then, is the ventilation of this subject a "hazardous controversy"? W h y is it not a useful service to the American people and to our friends abroad to clear up this ambiguity? Granted that it would be most desirable to be able to guarantee Western Europe against invasion in the event of war, the facts are that such a guarantee lies beyond the limit of our power. W e cannot make it effective b y helping Europe to mobilize and arm its own manpower without halting recovery, thereby opening the door wide to the primary danger of Communist penetration. W e cannot make such a guarantee effective by the use of our own manpower abroad, even if w e were willing to do so, because building up an American A r m y on the Elbe would almost certainly provoke the very attack w e seek to prevent. T h e fact is that the only w a y to guarantee Western Europe against invasion is to prevent the outbreak of war. T h e sooner w e realize this, and the sooner our friends realize it, the better. JAMES P. WARBURG.

N e w York, M a y 13, 1949. T h e Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the Treaty without any clarifying interpretation but clearly under the impression that the informal Vandenberg-Connally interpretation was correct. In J u l y , the full Senate ratified, undoubtedly under the same impression. In the course of the debate two Senators — T a f t ( R ) of Ohio, and Gillette ( D ) of Iowa — issued strong warnings, yet neither drew any distinction between the explicit and implicit commitments involved. T a f t opposed the Treaty as a whole. Gillette ended b y giving it his reluctant approval. Both Senators stressed their belief that the primary threat to Western Europe was political rather than military. T a f t ' s forceful argument on this aspect of the matter contrasted strangely with his reliance upon military containment in Asia. 5 5 See Congressional Record f o r Committee report, also the volume of its published hearings. T h e T a f t speech was on J u l y 9, 1949; Gillette spoke 011 J u l y 24, 1949.

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j. Council of Foreign Ministers

IO9

Conference

On May 20, Secretary Acheson flew to Paris to attend the eagerly awaited meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The day before his departure he spent several hours in secret conference with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and afterwards expressed the hope that the Committee would report favorably on the North Atlantic Treaty before the opening of the Paris Conference. In a statement to the press, the Secretary expressed restrained optimism as to the outcome of the talks on Germany. There seemed to be "more hope in the air," he said, largely because of the success of the European Recovery program, particularly in West Germany, and because of the North Atlantic Treaty. The following passages in the statement were significant: "It is not our intention, no matter how much we may desire agreement, to accept anything that would tend to undo what has been accomplished or impede future progress along the course we have charted . . . We shall neglect no real opportunity for increasing the area of solution and tranquillity in the world. At the same time we shall not barter away successes for the sake of promises which might again prove to be illusory, as they have too often in the past. "It remains to be seen whether the present favorable developments have brought about a situation in which workable and effective agreements can be reached with the Soviet Union on the central problem of Germany. I think perhaps we have a better opportunity to do so than we have had before. We most certainly are now in a better position to deal with the consequences of failure." Although it began under such apparently favorable auspices, the Big Four meeting ended in another fiasco, accomplishing little if anything other than some small progress toward an Austrian Treaty. There was still no single Anglo-French-American point of view. The mood in which Mr. Acheson went to the Conference has already been indicated. He was willing to discuss German unfication only on a basis that amounted to "unconditional surrender" by the Kremlin. Mr. Bevin went in a more truculent but somewhat similar state of mind, although for a different reason; he was acutely aware of the threat of German competition to British export industry, once

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any kind of a Germany should get back upon its feet; he did not like the prospects of partition, yet a unified Germany would be a more dangerous competitor than a Western state. M. Schuman's mood was that of a man torn between two fears: The fear that the American plan for a West German state would provoke war with Russia; and the contradictory fear that agreement with Russia on German unification would create a strong Germany which would again threaten the security of France. These three divergent attitudes had survived in spite of the recently reached "agreement." They made it all but impossible for the Western powers to take the initiative at the Paris Conference. The meeting began with the usual procedural sparring, each side waiting for the other to take the initiative. Since it was Russia that had demanded the conference, it was expected that Mr. Vishinsky would move for German unification. This he finally did, but with a proposal much easier to reject than that which the Western Foreign Ministers had expected. Instead of once more suggesting the election of an All-German Government, a peace treaty, and the withdrawal of occupation forces, Mr. Vishinsky merely proposed that the creation of a West German state be halted and that all of Germany be returned to four-power control as envisaged by the Potsdam Agreement. There was no difficulty about rejecting this suggestion, since it was not only impractical but thoroughly obnoxious to German sentiment. It is easy to imagine Mr. Acheson's relief at being spared the embarrassment of having to find a way to reject a more reasonable proposal and one which might have had great appeal to the German people. It is much less easy to understand why the Russians made this radical and unexpected shift in policy. U p to the time of the conference, it had seemed clear that the Kremlin had made up its mind to give up the attempt to acquire control of Germany through Cominform tactics — that is to say, by infiltration and subversion of West Germany, using the Soviet zone as a controlled base of operations. It had seemed that Moscow had reached the point of relinquishing this objective and of giving up its absolute control over East Germany, for the sake of a long-range policy of power politics designed to win over a reunited Germany as an ally, rather than a satellite. Such a shift would have appealed to all classes of

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German people and would have presented the West with a very real challenge. It would have forced the West either to accept the challenge, or else to admit openly that it preferred the permanent partition of Germany to unification. It was precisely this sort of proposal that Mr. Acheson had feared and against which he had sought to solidify Western opinion. What caused the Kremlin to forego the opportunity f o r which it had been working? One reason may have been the result of the recent elections in the Soviet zone, in which a surprising protest of about 33% had been registered against the communist regime. It is also probable that, having under-estimated the speed of Western policy development and over-estimated the stubbornness of French obstructionism, the Kremlin had now come to the conclusion that the moment had been missed. T h e Western counter-proposal said, in so many words, that, if Russia wanted German unification, she could easily obtain it by permitting the Soviet zone to come in under the Bonn Constitution and by accepting the terms of the Western merger. Like the Russian proposal, this counter-offer was clearly made without the slightest hope or expectation that it would be accepted. Both sides had, for reasons of their own, decided that they did not really want to discuss an All-German settlement at this time. This much was clear at the end of the first week of the conference. Another three weeks were consumed in fruitless wrangling over the administration of a divided Berlin. Then this matter, too, was dropped. It was decided to do what could be done in the existing circumstances to promote economic cooperation. Some apparent progress was made with regard to an Austrian Treaty, but this was rendered doubtful by a comic-opera finish. While Mr. Acheson and Mr. Bevin were packing their bags for the journey homeward, after the Council had agreed on a communiqué and adjourned, Mr. Vishinsky suddenly summoned his colleagues back in order to seek certain "clarifications" concerning Austrian property, which had been demanded by Moscow; and so the Austrian Treaty was, once more, consigned to the long-suffering Deputy Foreign Ministers " f o r study." It was significant that upon his return Mr. Acheson did not, like his predecessors, make a report to the American people. Instead, he reported to the President, who, on June 21, issued a statement

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praising Mr. Acheson, reporting "no progress" as to Germany in spite of the "forward-looking program sponsored by the Western powers," and hailing with some over-optimism the "genuine progress" made on Austria. The one definite accomplishment was the confirmation of the lifting of the Berlin blockade. Thus ended the chapter of negotiation so hopefully begun in February. The Allied Airlift had successfully met the challenge of the Soviet blockade. For almost eleven months, it had supplied the West Berliners with food, fuel and other essentials, bringing in as much as 8,000 tons a day during the height of the operation and a total of almost 2,500,000 tons carried by 277,000 flights. At a cost estimated at $200,000,000 the Western powers succeeded in maintaining their precarious position in Berlin, without giving up or modifying their plans for the creation of a West German state. What was more, the West had made a demonstration of loyalty to the sturdy West Berliners and of courage and firmness in the face of a physical challenge, which greatly enhanced its prestige. But the Airlift did not solve the problems which had brought on the Berlin blockade. It had merely served to postpone a solution. The Berlin crisis had one other important consequence. As a result of the operation, the United States established its first major air bases in the British Isles, later to be used for bombing groups and to be augmented by similar bases in French North Africa.

6. The Military Aid Bill On July 25, after the North Atlantic Treaty had been ratified by the Senate, the Administration submitted its long withheld companion-piece for ratification. The Military Assistance Bill provided, as expected, $1,130,000,000 of military aid (enough to equip about four armored divisions) to the European signatories of the Atlantic Treaty. In transmitting this legislation to Congress, the President said (italics mine): "The military assistance which we propose for these countries will be limited to that which is necessary to help them create mobile defensive forces. Our objective is to see to it that these nations are equipped, in the shortest possible time, with complete

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and effectively trained forces capable of maintaining internal order and resisting the initial phases of external aggression. "At the present time, the military power which is the greatest deterrent to aggression is centered in the United States, 3,000 miles away from Europe. It must be made clear that the United States has no intention, in the event of aggression, of allowing the peoples of Europe to be overrun before its own power can be brought to bear. The program of military assistance now proposed is a tangible assurance of our purpose in this regard." Contrary to the expectations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as expressed on May 10, the President himself now explicitly declared that the European interpretation of the Atlantic Security program had been correct. Thus, the Senate was now told that the program as a whole meant the undertaking by the United States of the precise commitment which the Senators had assumed to be out of the question when they ratified the Treaty. The explosion one might have expected to take place on Capitol Hill failed to materialize. Objection to the newly revealed commitment was voiced, but only by those few Senators who had opposed the whole program. Not one of the majority, who had supported the Treaty upon the understanding expressed by Senators Vandenberg and Connally on May 10, now raised any objection to the expanded commitment. Not one of these Senators took the floor to say that, if this were to be the American commitment, then both our own rearmament and our assistance to our European friends would have to be drastically increased. Not one of these Senators asked how the Administration proposed to carry out its solemn commitment to prevent Western Europe from being overrun. There is a limit to the action a private citizen can take in matters of this sort without overstepping the bounds of propriety. Nevertheless, these proceedings seemed so extraordinary and so fraught with danger as to warrant one more effort. The following is an abbreviated text of a memorandum, sent on August 1, to members of the Foreign Relations Committee and subsequently released to the press. "The President, the Secretary of State, and the Chief of Staff have stated — this time in unequivocal terms — that the purpose of this Bill is to prevent Western Europe from being overrun in the

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event of war and to place it in a position to hold off an invasion 'at least until our own power can be brought to bear.' Thus our highest executive authorities have confirmed the European interpretation of the Atlantic Security Program, which I called to your attention last May and which you then held to be incorrect. "This raises again the questions which I ventured to put before you as to whether we could carry out such a commitment. It raises the question of how long the West European nations can be expected to hold off a Russian invasion, if their existing defense establishments, augmented by the limited assistance provided for in this Bill, are to produce the forces for a delaying action . . . It raises the question of what combat forces we should be in a position to land on the European Continent during the period gained by the delaying action. "Last May, these questions were considered irrelevant, since it was held that we were not contemplating a commitment to defend Western Europe against invasion, in the event of war. They will now become crucially relevant, if the Senate and the House should approve of that commitment being taken . . . "From the point of view of a bystander, it would seem that we are in great danger of reversing the well-known maxim of Theodore Roosevelt: 'Speak softly and carry a Big Stick.' Contrasted with our loudly proclaimed intention to defend West European territory, the proposed Military Aid Bill, combined with our declared intention not to send our own troops abroad, would seem to provide merely an expensive photograph of a Big Stick. "Lest this be considered a plea for increasing the size and scope of our military aid, permit me to restate bluntly my belief that war is not inevitable and that we stand our best chance of preventing Russian military aggression by the declaration contained in the Atlantic Treaty, combined with the maintenance of adequate military power uncommitted to any pre-announced strategy of defense." T h e answers received in reply to this memorandum expressed in varying degrees the anxieties of conscientious men, deeply concerned over the dilemma in which they had been placed, but unable to see how they might meet the issue. In due course, the Military Aid Bill was passed without the basic questions ever being asked or answered. One reason for the extraordinary apathy of Congress, of the press

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and the public toward this issue may have been that attention at this time was increasingly focused on the Far East. T h e spotlight had shifted from Europe to China, where the regime of Chiang Kai-shek was entering the last stages of disintegration and defeat. Another difficulty arose from the fact that the distinction between the two wholly different commitments involved had been subtly obscured by the Administration's tactics. There is one other possible explanation for the attitude of the Treaty supporters in the Senate. One of the leading members of the Foreign Relations Committee wrote in reply to my memorandum of August 1: " T h e Russians won't go until they have the Bomb; and they won't have the Bomb until 1952." If this was the assumption underlying the Administration's program, it was rudely shattered a month later, when the President announced that an atomic explosion had occurred in the Soviet Union. Yet this momentous announcement was accompanied by the official statement that it entailed no change in American policy!

6 Two Germanys Are Born (Second half 1 9 4 9 ) The effect upon Germany of the diplomatic developments described in the preceding chapter was, of course, direct and immediate. The completion of the Occupation Statute and the Agreement, signed on April 6, 1949, by the United States, Britain, and France, defining the powers and procedures of the High Commission enabled the West Germans to complete the drafting of their constitution. This document was submitted for ratification to a Parliamentary Council, composed of sixty-five delegates from the Laender which were to form the new Federal Republic. On May 8, the Parliamentary Council ratified the "Basic Law" by a vote of 53 to 12, the most serious objections arising from Bavarian separatism and over the exclusion from the Federal Republic of the Western sectors of Berlin. Two days later the West Germans chose the little university town of Bonn as their capital. The selection of a small town, illequipped with housing and other facilities needed by a government, seemed to indicate that the Germans considered the new Western state as a temporary affair — in other words, as a step along the road to unification, rather than as a substitute. It was announced in Washington that General Clay would soon return home and that former Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, would in all probability become the first United States High Commissioner. On May 10, with the formal lifting of the Berlin blockade, normal relations were resumed with the Western sectors of Berlin. The definitive Charter of the High Commission was finally completed and published on June 29. This was to be the basic document

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governing the organization and operation of the West German Government, until such time as there would be either an AllGerman settlement or a separate peace contract between the Bonn Republic and the Western powers. 1 The High Commission Charter provided the mechanism by which the three Western powers were to exercise the powers reserved to themselves under the Occupation Stature. In addition to the Allied Council, composed of the three High Commissioners, the Charter set up six major committees and a number of sub-committees, of which the most important were those empowered to deal with Political Affairs, Foreign Trade and Exchange, Economics, Finance, Law, and Military Security. The Charter provided for "Land Commissioners," to represent the Council at the level of Laender government. It defined the individual responsibilities of the Commissioners and set up operating procedures. It specifically instructed the Commissioners "to take all necessary steps to give effect to Article X X I I of the agreement establishing the International Authority for the Ruhr." 1. West Germany

Elects a

Government

During July and August, 1949, the West Germans engaged in the first free political campaign held on German soil since the days of the Third Reich. The spectrum of the political parties contending for power in the first West German Government was differently weighted than it would have been in the case of All-German elections. West Germany was traditionally conservative and predominantly Catholic. East Germany had been predominantly Protestant and — especially in the Berlin area — strongly Socialist.2 The three largest and most important political parties in West Germany at this time were: the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), closely allied with the Christian Socialists of Bavaria; the Social Democrats; and the Free Democratic Party. The CDU, led by the mayor of Cologne, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, was a predominantly Catholic party which resembled the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP) in France and the Christian Democrats of Alcide de ' T h e full texts of the Bonn Constitution and the High Commission Charter may be obtained from the U.S. Government Printing Office. ' For a brief discussion of the development of the political parties in post-war Germany, see Germany — Bridge or Battleground, ch, jo, also the chapters dealing with each of the four zones.

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Gasperi in Italy. The Social Democratic Party, led by Dr. Kurt Schumacher, was essentially an anti-clerical workers' party, strongly anti-communist, and resembling the British Labour Party and the Socialist Party of Leon Blum in France. The Free Democrats, led by Theodor Heuss, were a middle-class party dedicated to the preservation of free enterprise. In addition to these three major parties, three other important political organizations participated in the campaign: the Communists, the Bavarian Peoples Party, and the German Party. The Communists had their chief strength in the industrial areas among the workers. The Bavarian Party was a separatist and reactionary local affair. The German Party comprised the extreme nationalists as well as the rag, tag, and bobtail of dissatisfied refugees and neoNazis, some of whom were later to split off into various splinter parties. The campaign was waged mostly upon nationalist appeal by all the parties and did not present an edifying spectacle — particularly for those optimists in Washington who had not hesitated to assert that the West Germans had been successfully "reeducated for democracy." The usually restrained London Economist commented as follows: "All the most unpleasant aspects of a not very attractive people came to the surface . . . History began in 1945 and everything was the fault of the occupying powers. All parties outdid each other in abuse of the Allies and at times the voices of Dr. Adenauer, Dr. Schumacher and General Remer (German Party), who helped Hitler crush the 1944 revolt, were indistinguishable. If this is the mood behind German politics, can it be wise to transfer more power to a German Government?" The elections were held on August 14 and showed the following results in votes and numbers of seats gained in the new Bundestag: Christian Democrats Social Democrats Free Democrats Bavarian Party German Party Communist Party

7,357,579 votes and 139 seats 6,932,272 " " 131 " 2,788,653 " " 52 " 986,606 " " 17 " 940,088 " " 17 " 1,360,443 " " 15 "

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The relatively small number of seats gained by the Communist Party was due to the heavy concentration of its vote in the industrial areas. T w o facts emerged clearly from these results: first, the Communist Party had suffered a resounding defeat; and second, the victorious Christian Democrats would have to form a coalition, either with the Social Democrats, or with the parties of the Right. A Christian Democrat-Social Democrat coalition would have followed in the tradition of the old Zentrum-Socialist coalition of the Weimar days; it would also have created the strongest government, provided that the two big parties could find a real basis of cooperation. This, however, was clearly unlikely — in part because of the very real differences in doctrine and policy, and perhaps even more because of the personalities of the two leaders. Both Konrad Adenauer and Kurt Schumacher were powerful and rather autocratic figures; neither of them was inclined to play second fiddle. The Social Democrats, while coming within a narrow margin of victory, even without their traditional stronghold of Berlin, could not form a coalition, because there was no party of the Left, except the Communists, with which to organize. Cooperation with the Communists was out of the question. It was obvious, therefore, that Dr. Schumacher's role would be that of opposition leader, while Dr. Adenauer would lead a Government forced to rely upon the parties of the Right to form its majority. This meant that the Government of the Federal Republic would be more Rightist than middle-of-the-road. These results were received with mixed feelings in Western Europe. The British Labour Government seemed disturbed, except for Mr. Bevin, whose Churchillian foreign policy tended to obscure his socialist convictions. French feelings were divided. Washington and Vatican City hailed the results joyfully as a "great victory for democracy." So did most of the American press. Percy Winner, Paris correspondent of the New Republic, put his finger on the heart of the matter when he wrote: "The question is not about the defeat but about the victory. Was this the kind of communist defeat — a defeat in which the Social Democrats vied with the Right in the most extreme form of nationalist propaganda — in which the enemy often seemed to be

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the Western occupying powers rather than the communists — was this also a victory for the hopes and possibilities of democracy in either Western Germany or Western Europe as a whole?" Theodor Heuss, leader of the Free Democratic Party was elected as the first President of the Bonn Republic and promptly nominated Dr. Konrad Adenauer, leader of the Christian Democrats, as the first Chancellor. Adenauer was the hand-picked candidate of the American Government. On September 14, 1949, he was elected Chancellor by the narrow margin of one vote. W h o was this man, and how did he come to be chosen by the American authorities? Throughout the election campaign he had been making statements like "England is our real enemy" — or " A nation like Germany has a claim to feel along nationalistic lines . . . The foreigners must understand that the period of collapse and unrestricted domination by the Allies is finished." 3 Shortly after World W a r I, Dr. Adenauer became mayor of the city of Cologne, a post he continued to hold until removed by Hitler. For many years he was also President of the Prussian State Council and a leading figure in the Catholic 2.entmm — an essentially conservative party which cooperated in an uneasy coalition with the Social Democrats throughout most of the Weimar period. As an intimate friend of the late Gustav Stresemann, Adenauer had a thorough schooling in the art of playing off Russia against the West. 4 T h e Rathenau-Stresemann policy of the early "See New York Times of August 14, 1949. 4 For an excellent analysis of the Stresemann policy and also of Stresemann's character, see Professor E. H. Carr's German-Soviet Relations between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939 (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951). The following two quotations from this work give the key to Germany's East-West policy during this period: "It was a topsy-turvy world, in which the German Right toyed with Bolshevism and world revolution, and German Social Democrats looked for salvation to American capitalism." Describing Dr. Stresemann's negotiations with the West, through which (Treaty of Locarno) Germany gained an opportunity to rehabilitate herself through Western loans, and Stresemann's subsequent Treaty of Berlin with the Soviet Union, Professor Carr writes: " T h e reality behind Locarno was German's financial dependence upon the West, and especially upon the United States; the reality behind the Berlin Treaty was Germany's military dependence on Soviet Russia, expressed in the secret agreements for the manufacture of munitions for Germany and the training of German officers in prohibited weapons, on German soil." Dr. Stresemann himself is quoted as follows:

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twenties had been one of keeping the threat of German-Russian cooperation openly in evidence as an alternative to better FrancoGerman relations. The Russo-German treaties of Rapallo (1922) and Berlin (1926) provided Germany, among other things, with the facilities for secret rearmament of the Black Reichswehr, during the very time when Stresemann was endeavoring to obtain a relaxation of the Versailles Treaty. During this early Weimar period, Adenauer also displayed strong separatist tendencies, favoring an independent Rheinland republic even while he was an important member of the Prussian Government. Both his experience in EastWest maneuvering and his local West Germanism are important bits of background to Konrad Adenauer's later career. When I first knew him as mayor of Cologne, Dr. Adenauer was — as he is now — on terms of intimate personal friendship with the Ruhr magnates and their bankers. He impressed me as a highly cultured, suave man-of-the-world, contrasting in his decisive, authoritarian manner with the ascetic and indecisive Bruening, who was then Chancellor of the German Reich. It is not clear just what role Adenauer played during the ill-fated Bruening administration. Though fellow-members of the Xentrum, the personalities of these two men were so different that it is difficult to picture Adenauer as being in sympathy with the strangely Fabian policy of the Chancellor toward the rise of the National Socialist party. Yet he was part and parcel of that rather small group of political leaders under whom the Weimar Republic died a slow death "I would not care to conclude a treaty with Russia so long as our political situation in other directions (the West) was not cleared up, as I wanted to be able to answer the question whether we had a treaty with Russia in the negative." "Few statesmen," remarks Professor Carr, "fail in an emergency to recognize a duty to lie for their country." This was the school in which Konrad Adenauer grew up as a German leader. T o say that he is pursuing the same sort of policy today would be untrue. For the time being, the Bonn Republic is in a different position from that of the Weimar Republic; it is, like Weimar, dependent upon the West for financial assistance, but, unlike Weimar, it is dependent upon the West — not upon Russia — f o r its chance to rearm. Once rearmed, and with recovery still further advanced, the Bonn Republic will be in a position far more favorable for playing the Stresemann game than that which existed in Stresemann's own time. It is even truer than it was in the 1919-1939 period that, while German industry must look westward f o r its capital, it must look eastward for its markets, and — more important — it must look eastward for the reunification of the German nation.

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through factional disputes, inability to force the parties of the extreme Right either into responsible opposition or responsible leadership, and through an ever greater recourse to government by decree. When, after the intrigues of General Kurt von Schleicher and the bumbling monarcho-clericalist efforts of Franz von Papen, Hitler finally came to power, Dr. Adenauer was dismissed from his offices and treated as an enemy of the Third Reich. Moral repugnance at the atheistic lawlessness and brutality of the Hitler regime was doubtless the chief reason for Dr. Adenauer's hostility, but, so far as political doctrine was concerned, it is probably safe to assume that it was the socialism, rather than the nationalism, in National Socialist policy toward which he found himself unsympathetic. There were, indeed, few leading Germans who did not at first welcome Hitler's "strong" foreign policy, no matter how much they might oppose his domestic doctrines. If there is any record of Dr. Adenauer's having opposed the Nazi decision to rearm, or the move into the Rhineland, I have been unable to discover it. Immediately after the liberation of Cologne, the United States Military Government reinstated Dr. Adenauer as Lord Mayor of the city. Shortly thereafter, when the British took over Cologne as part of their zone of occupation, Dr. Adenauer was dismissed by the British authorities, who apparently did not share the high American estimate of his democratic qualifications. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Adenauer was one of the first Germans to be given permission to visit the United States. His intimate friend, Professor Walter Hallstein — later to become Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the Bonn Republic — did actually come to Washington to lecture at Georgetown University. Both men seem to have made a deep impression upon our officials. This may have been partly because the Christian Democratic party, to which both men belonged, conformed to American political and economic predilections. Even more, it was due to the fact that Dr. Adenauer appeared as a "good European" rather than as a German nationalist. He was, in fact, one of the first among the European leaders to realize that European survival depended upon ending the centuries-old intraEuropean quarrels, especially the quarrel between Germany and France; but there was also another possible motivation which does not seem to have occurred to the Pentagon or State Department.

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Germany's quickest way back to power lay through its admission to and later domination of some sort of a Western Union. It is no reflection upon Dr. Adenauer to credit him with both motivations. The coalition government, which Chancellor Adenauer formed, was economically disposed toward laissez-faire policies; this was symbolized by the appointment of Dr. Ludwig Erhard as Minister for Economics. The Chancellor retained in his own hands the direction of foreign affairs, with Dr. Hallstein as his deputy. Because the coalition depended upon support of the Right, its general complexion became considerably more nationalistic than the Chancellor himself. This had the effect of causing Dr. Adenauer, himself a conservative of long standing, to adopt an increasingly progressive attitude in domestic affairs — so much so, that the Social Democrats found it difficult to quarrel with him over domestic policy. 2. East Germany

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On October 1, 1949, the Soviet Government handed identical notes of protest to the three Western ambassadors, declaring that it considered the West German state a violation of both the Potsdam Agreement and of the understandings reached by the Foreign Ministers in June 1949. The Soviet note denounced the Federal Republic as a "puppet state" and derided its constitution as an imposed statute. Six days later, on October 7, the Russians took the long-indicated step of formally creating an East German state. Ann O'Hare McCormick of the New York Times described the event in the following account: "On a stage hung with red, black and gold flags flanking an enormous white dove of peace, the Soviet-sponsored 'Peoples Council' met yesterday in Hermann Goering's Air Ministry in Berlin and proclaimed the long-heralded 'All-German Government.' Proclaimed is the word, for in a simple sleight-of-hand performance, the Council turned itself into a parliament, or 'Volkskammer,' and drew out of the hat a complete set of ministers, including a Minister of Foreign Affairs, all chosen in advance and all communists except the figure-heads. "The first act of the self-appointed parliament was to issue a manifesto of twenty demands for such measures as German unity,

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abolition of the Ruhr and Occupation Statutes, a peace treaty, withdrawal of occupation forces, end of rationing, restoration of German sovereignty, a single currency, free traffic within the whole country, establishment of Berlin as the capital, protection of the German economy. "Everything all Germans want is crammed into the manifesto, including the end of dismantling and of all trade restrictions, though the first is qualified by the saving clause of 'peace industries' and the second is limited to those 'imposed by the Western powers.' The demand for the abolition of the Atlantic Pact and the European Union — Marshall aid is significantly omitted — will not appeal to West Germans. Still less will the call for a fight against 'German traitors who serve American imperialism.' But, on the whole, it is a campaign platform on which any German could run — on which indeed one German did run very far, for, while the manifesto was obviously written in Moscow, it is closely modelled on the list of grievances with which Hitler shouted his way to power." Otto Grotewohl, the leading Social Democratic collaborator with communists, was named Chancellor of the Peoples Democratic Republic. On October 11, Wilhelm Pieck, the veteran German communist leader, was "elected" President. Premier Stalin's message of congratulation to these two leaders contained this interesting passage: "The experience of the last war has shown that the German and Soviet peoples made the largest sacrifices in that war, that both these peoples have the largest potentialities in Europe to complete great actions of world significance. If both these peoples will show the same determination to fight for peace with which they waged war, then peace in Europe can be regarded as secure." The Petersberg

Agreement

The Eastern manifesto was not without effect in West Germany, since it rather skilfully articulated existing resentments against the Allies. In particular, it aggravated one already troublesome grievance— namely, the continued dismantling of industrial plants. In the face of heavy unemployment, German workmen were being forced to tear down industrial establishments whose continued operation would have meant thousands of jobs. The solution of this difficulty had, so far, been obstructed by the fact that France was

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once more in the throes of a protracted political crisis, during which no French Government had thought itself able to risk a modification of the "deindustrialization" policy. On November 9-10, Secretary Acheson met in Paris with the British and French Foreign Ministers for another attempt at concerting Western policy in Germany. He failed to persuade the French to permit the Western sectors of Berlin to be incorporated in the Federal Republic, but succeeded in obtaining agreement to a number of modifications of the occupation policy. These were to be disclosed presently. At the end of this conference, the three Ministers issued a communiqué which The Times (London) accurately described as "cryptic and barely intelligible." Mr. Acheson then proceeded to Berlin, where the first post-Potsdam appearance of an American Secretary of State was hailed as marking the dawn of a new era for Germany. This visit was probably prompted by the desire to offset Allied refusal to permit West Berlin to become a part of the Bonn Republic. From Berlin, Mr. Acheson proceeded to Bonn for a meeting with Dr. Adenauer and the three High Commissioners. The results of this meeting were not made known until after Mr. Acheson's return to the United States. On November 24, the State Department released the text of the agreement, signed at Petersberg near Bonn, by the three High Commissioners and the Chancellor.5 Under this Petersberg Agreement, the High Commissioners conceded the Bonn Republic the right to resume certain types of ship construction, to cease dismantling a number of specified important industries, and to maintain consular offices abroad. In return, the Chancellor pledged the Federal Republic to maintain strict demilitarization and to prevent the recreation of armed forces of any kind. The Chancellor also undertook to eradicate Nazism, to prevent the revival of any sort of totalitarianism and to exclude all forms of authoritarian doctrine or practice from the life of the Republic. 4. The Rearmament Cat Let Out of the Bag The announcement of the renewed German renunciation of rearmament had a soothing effect in Paris, where acute apprehension 5 The full text of the Petersburg Agreement was printed in the New York Times of Nov. 25, 1949. It is also available at the U.S. Government Printing Office.

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had been aroused by the recent statements of two American generals and a United States Senator.6 General Bradley, the United States Chief of Staff, was quoted by a French newspaper as having said, during a recent visit to the French capital, that "once Germany is economically restored, we can consider her military attitude." General Clay, until recently the United States Military Governor in Germany, was reported to have told a Boston press conference that he favored "a composite military force of West European nations to which Germany could contribute with limited forces of a special type." Finally, Senator Thomas of Oklahoma, was reported to have said in Paris that he considered Germany necessary to the defense of Western Europe and that "several divisions of German troops should be armed by the United States, without Germany being permitted herself to manufacture arms." Even after the Petersberg Agreement, rumors continued current in Europe to the effect that German rearmament was only a matter of time. T o allay these suspicions, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, visiting Germany in company with General Bradley, made the following statement at Frankfurt, in General Bradley's presence: "President Truman has said that the United States had no intention to rearm Germany. That is official United States policy, with no hedging and no dodging." This was on November 27. A week earlier the magazine, United States News and World Report had published the following item: "George Kennan, the number one brain-truster in the State Department, has a new idea that the United States had better put its faith in Germany, rather than in France, as the bulwark against Russia. Mr. Kennan's view is that France will never regain her old position of leadership in Western Europe." Whatever the contradictions between the official pronouncements and the behind-the-scenes planning in Washington, the influential London Economist openly committed itself in a lead editorial to the use of German manpower in a West European defense force, holding that no other means of creating that force existed. The same view was expressed even more forcibly by Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery during an autumn visit to the United States. 6 Dispatches of Harold Callender to the New York Times and Marguerite Higgins to the New York Herald Tribune of November 22, 1949.

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Chancellor Adenauer was quick to react to the spate of rumors and, in particular, to the specific proposal of the London Economist. He began to talk about the "conditions of equality" which would have to be created, if the Bonn Republic were to be asked to make a contribution to Western defense. What was more, sensing the direction in which the wind was now blowing, the Chancellor began to hint that he would seek revision of the justsigned Petersberg Agreement — revisions which would presumably ease the remaining restrictions upon German industry and give the Federal Government a still greater measure of sovereign independence. It was now clear that, all official assurances to the contrary, our Government was proceeding along a course which would lead inevitably to German rearmament. It seemed high time to provoke public discussion of this fateful undertaking before another accomplished fact would be served up to the American people. This was the purpose of a very bluntly worded paper presented at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association and subsequently published as a pamphlet.7 The warning that we should wake up some morning to find that German rearmament had been agreed to by our Government was repeated many times during the next few months before a variety of audiences in different parts of the country. It fell, for the most part, upon unbelieving ears, because most Americans were willing to accept at face value the continuing official assurances that the United States would in no circumstances promote or acquiesce in any form of German remilitarization. j. Year-end.

Evaluation

Far from bringing about a change in the direction and emphasis of our European policy, Mr. Acheson's first year as Secretary of State carried the policy which he had inherited past the point of no return. Two Germanys had been created, and their unification postponed indefinitely. The Atlantic Security Program had crystallized into the far-reaching commitment to defend Western Europe at the line which divided these two Germanys, making inevitable two actions which Mr. Acheson had promised not to undertake: one was the rearming of Western Germany; the other was the stationing in Germany of additional American forces. 7

Rearming Germany — Hoiv Stupid Can We Be?

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The future nature of the West German Republic had likewise been determined. The control of its Government had been placed in the hands of a shrewdly calculating conservative leader of the Stresemann school. This was not the Germany that the majority of the German people wanted, nor the Germany desired by the British people or the French people; but it was the Germany which Washington had wanted and which it hoped to use to good advantage. Given the premises of American policy, things were going rather well as to Europe. The Marshall Plan was bringing about an even more rapid recovery than anyone had dared to hope. Rearmament had not yet reached sufficient dimensions to interfere with further progress. On the contrary, it served for a time to obscure the dollargap. Here at home, rearmament had, so far, imposed little sacrifice and had stimulated a boom atmosphere. N o such happy prospect existed in Asia. Chiang Kai-shek had fled to Formosa. All of China was in communist hands. While "waiting for the dust to settle," the State Department prepared a White Paper, showing how this disaster had come about. The China Lobby angrily repudiated the conclusion that the Nationalist regime had fallen of its own weight, through corruption and incompetence. The great witch-hunt in Washington was about to begin.

7 Military Cart before Political Horse (1950) /. How to Defend

West

Germany?

As it became clear that, sooner or later, both Britain and the United States would seek some form of military contribution from Germany, Dr. Adenauer became emboldened. Early in 1950 he took up conversations with the Bruederschaft, a group of German generals organized under the leadership of General Kurt von Manteuffel, who openly demanded the creation of a West German army. Their plans — in January, 1950 — were for one infantry division to be organized by June and an armored corps in 1951. Moreover, the Bruederschaft frankly demanded the recapture of the German East. Dr. Adenauer himself began to voice anxiety concerning the defense of the West German Republic. Quite naturally, this sort of talk aroused French apprehensions. On January 16, Foreign Minister Schuman proposed that the Western powers should guarantee the defense of West German territory, hoping by this proposal to allay the rising German demand for armed forces. On the same day, the Bonn Government laid official claim to the ownership of the Saar mines, declaring, a few days later, that it would refuse the proffered membership in the Council of Europe, so long as the French persisted in treating the Saar as an autonomous state. This was only the first of many occasions on which the Saar question reared its head just when Franco-German relations seemed about to take a turn for the better. January, 1950, also brought the first reports out of East Germany describing the communist plan to organize some thirty-five "alertgroups" (Bereitschaften) among the East German "Peoples' Police."

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It was reported from various sources that about 45,000 men were to be trained and organized into cadres, easily expandable into an East German army of 200,000 or 300,000 men. These rather alarming developments in both East and W e s t G e r many led Mr. M c C l o y , the American H i g h Commissioner, to make a trip to Washington in order to discuss the German problems fully with the State Department and with Congressional leaders, and also to make a report to the American people. T h e visit resulted in the issuance of a new directive to Mr. M c C l o y , making it explicit that the policy of the United States demanded that Germany be kept "deprived of the means of waging w a r " and that strict disarmament controls and inspection be maintained. O n February 6, immediately after his return to Germany, Mr. M c C l o y made a speech at Stuttgart, telling the German people that they would have to "do some very straight thinking regarding their position in the world." In particular, the American H i g h Commissioner frankly told the Germans that, while no one was charging all Germans with responsibility for Hitler's crimes, he did expect "an end to the arguments of those Germans w h o would not only deny their o w n guilt but also seek to place the responsibility for the consequences of that guilt exclusively upon the shortcomings of other peoples." T h e full text of this speech gives a clear picture of both the G e r man state of mind at this time and the official American attitude toward it. A s to rearmament, Mr. M c C l o y left no doubt of the American position. " G e r m a n y , " he said, "cannot be allowed to develop political conditions or a military status w h i c h would threaten other nations or the peace of the world. T h a t means there will be no German army or air force. German security will best be protected b y German participation in a closely knit Western European community." 1 T h e last sentence must have left the German people somewhat mystified, knowing, as they did, that no "closely knit W e s t European community" existed, and that the as y e t loosely knit community which did exist, possessed practically no effective military power. T h e question of defense against Russian aggression was, h o w ever, b y no means the only problem w o r r y i n g the Germans. T h e rapid economic recovery, w h i c h had come about as the result of 1

T h e texts of both speeches can be obtained at the Department of State.

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currency reform and Marshall Plan aid, showed marked signs of having run its course, as evidenced by over a million unemployed. A certain amount of continued dismantling, the presence in West Germany of nine million homeless refugees from the East, and the almost total absence of East-West trade exacerbated this condition. Moreover, the laissez-faire economic principles of Dr. Erhard, firmly supported by the American Government, made for an uneven distribution of the benefits of economic recovery. Shops were plentifully stocked once more with all sorts of necessities and luxuries. Food was plentiful. But these supplies were available only to those who had the money to buy. This "great improvement" only increased the discontent of the vast majority of Germans whose meager earnings and wretched housing conditions remained unchanged although they have improved considerably since that time. These were the conditions which led to the general state of mind which Mr. McCloy deplored. The well-to-do industrial leaders were also dissatisfied because of the ban on East-West trade. Nor was this pressure confined to Germany. The whole Marshall Plan had been predicated upon a resumption of East-West trade, yet American-sponsored cold-war policy now tended more and more to forbid such trade altogether. Over and above all these considerations, the German Government and all shades of German public opinion from extreme Left to extreme Right opposed a policy of "participation in a closely knit West European community," if that policy meant the permanent partition of Germany. The less and less convincing American avowals of seeking reunification of the two Germanys created a growing German determination to "play along" with Washington to the extent necessary in order to get a share of Marshall Plan aid, but to proceed very slowly in formalizing a state of affairs which promised neither reunification nor adequate protection for the Bonn Republic. On March 16, Winston Churchill, leader of the Conservative Opposition, made a speech in Commons criticizing the Government's foreign policy. In moving for a secret session, Mr. Churchill declared that in his opinion, there could be no defense of European frontiers without a German contribution. The British Foreign Office promptly repudiated this statement; the Bonn Government, with equal promptitude, "expressed interest." On March

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28, Mr. Churchill again took up the cudgels. Holding a packed House of Commons spellbound f o r an hour, the wartime leader urged "a supreme effort" to reach world agreement with the Soviet Union. Holding that war was not "imminent or inevitable," because "there never was a time when the deterrents against war were so strong," Mr. Churchill proposed that Britain join with France in raising Germany "to equal rank and lasting association," including a share in the defense of Western Europe. This he termed the "key problem" of Europe. Mr. Bevin brushed aside the suggestion for an attempt to reach a settlement with Russia. As to Germany, he said that any thought of "arming Germany" was "frightful," and that Britain, France, and the United States had "set their faces against it." Mr. Churchill denied that he had said anything about rearming Germany or re-creating a German army; "but," he said, "I see no reason w h y the Germans should not aid in the defense of their own country and of Western Europe, nor w h y British, American, French, and German soldiiers should not stand in line together on honorable terms of comradeship, as part of a combined system of defense." A week after this debate in Parliament, Mr. M c C l o y paid a visit to London and made a speech urging Britain to help "develop a United Europe of which Germany must be a part." Commenting somewhat sardonically upon this exhortation, Walter Lippmann aptly pointed out that the High Commissioner seemed to be unaware of the difference between including Germany in a United Europe and including half of Germany in half of Europe. It was now announced that Mr. Acheson would go to London in May for a meeting with Foreign Ministers Bevin and Schuman. On April .9, Chancellor Adenauer demanded a Western guarantee of German security. This reflected the growing feeling in Germany that if there was to be German rearmament of any sort, it could be undertaken only if the West provided what Dr. Schumacher called "a shield of Western force behind which w e can rearm." On April 1 1 , Walter Lippmann put forward a proposal which resembled rather closely my own suggestion of the previous year. He proposed that Germany be reunified and that a treaty be negotiated under which the Russians would agree to withdraw their armies to the Soviet frontier, while the Allies would withdraw

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their forces from Germany. There was no indication that Washington gave any consideration to this proposal. Another warning that the United States would have to change its policy in Germany, "if it wished to avoid defeat in a third world war" was issued by Senator Guy M. Gillette of Iowa, who demanded the appointment of a commission of inquiry into our German policy. Meanwhile, relations between France and Germany had once more become strained over the Saar question. On March 3, 1950, the French Government signed an agreement with the "autonomous" Saar Government, under which the Saar coal mines were leased to France for a period of fifty years, but without prejudice to the provisions of an eventual German peace treaty. The same reservation applied to a group of twelve "economic conventions" signed by M. Schuman and Saar Premier Hoffmann. On May 5, Bonn addressed a formal protest against this action to the Allied High Commission, proposing that an International Authority for the Saar be created. 2. The Schuman Plan Lets in Light A surprise was in store for Mr. Acheson and Mr. Bevin when they met on May 10, with the French Foreign Minister. Before coming to London, M. Schuman announced a dramatic French proposal for solving the ancient problem of Franco-German relations. The plan, developed primarily by Jean Monnet — a brilliant businessman-economist who habitually operated behind the scenes — had been a carefully guarded secret. It was a proposal for pooling, under a supranational authority, the coal and steel production of France and Germany and any other European nations willing to participate. Such a plan, it was pointed out, would make any future war between France and Germany impossible, since the military potential of each would be placed under the control of an authority superior to the national governments. The original rather general announcement was made in the form of a French offer to Germany, although the plan was designed to include as many as possible of the European nations. Explaining a few days later why this proposal had been "sprung" on the British and Americans without prior discussion, M. Schuman pointed out that it had seemed essential for the plan's success that it should be under-

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stood by the Germans as a French offer of lasting amity, and not as a scheme devised and imposed by the three Western occupying powers. The British Labour Government viewed the French proposal with reservations, suspecting that it might conceal a revival of the traditional steel cartel. Mr. Acheson, while hailing the plan as "furthering the objectives of Franco-German rapproachement and European integration" and welcoming the French initiative, noted that "the proposals must await the availability of details." The significance of the latter phrase was perhaps explained by a Washington dispatch to the New York Times by its diplomatic correspondent, James Reston. This unusually well-informed and reliable reporter stated that "Washington had some misgivings" when the text of the French proposal was received, because the proposed organization would be "open to all countries who wished to participate in it," and because the proposal set out to furnish coal and steel "to all countries" on "equal terms." "This at first raised one or two questions here," Mr. Reston reported. "Secretary Acheson had gone to Europe convinced that the cold war was here to stay and that the Western nations must organize together to fight that war. But did M. Schuman agree? Was he trying to organize the West to fight the cold war, or was he making some kind of general offer designed to liquidate the cold war?" Mr. Reston went on to report that these questions were answered in "various official telegrams to the State Department and the French Embassy." The upshot of these answers, as reported by Mr. Reston, was that M. Schuman shared Mr. Acheson's desire to unify the Western nations, that his first aim was to bring together Germany and France, but that he meant what he had said about the new supranational organization being "open to all who wished to participate." On the other hand, the French explained that it appeared extremely unlikely that any of the communist nations would wish to give an international authority the power to direct their coal and steel''production. What better illustration could there have been of the extent to which Washington had become the prisoner of its own past errors? The French proposal, before M. Schuman was forced to give this explanation, would have put the Kremlin on the spot. If

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any of the East European countries such as Poland or Czechoslovakia had expressed a desire to join in the merger, they would either have been admitted, or prevented from joining by the Kremlin. If they joined, a great step would have been taken toward liquidating the cold war. If Russia prevented their joining, the Western position in the cold war would have been vastly strengthened by a clear placing of the responsibility for a continued cold war upon the shoulders of the Russian regime. In effect, the Schuman Plan created a position very similar to that of June, 1947, when the Marshall Plan was first proposed by the United States. But the cold-war warriors in the State Department were unable to recognize the subtle virtue of the French proposal. They had to be assured that M. Schuman was "trying to organize the West to fight the cold war" and not making "some kind of a general offer to liquidate it." 2 The three Foreign Ministers at London took no official cognizance of the Schuman Plan at their conference. Three successive communiqués were issued on May 12, 13, and 14: the first affirming the Western determination to stay in Berlin, the second repeating the intention to hasten the emergence of an independent West German state, and the third promising the Bonn Republic a further relaxation of controls if it cooperated fully with the West. The final communiqué declared, however, that the occupation of West Germany must continue until unification of the two Germanys and blamed the Soviet Union for making unification impossible. Although the general German reaction to the Schuman Plan was somewhat mixed, the Bonn Government greeted the proposal with frank enthusiasm. Here, at last, was a clear indication of the road by which Germany could find its way back into the European family of nations, not as a second-class member on probation, but as a full-fledged equal. It was not until May 18 that President Truman made any sort of statement concerning this dramatic European development. Then, at a press conference, he praised the plan as an act of "constructive statesmanship," saying that it offered not only a new relationship between France and Germany but that it opened "a new outlook for Europe." In contrast with this rather belated pat on the back, " F o r the author's contemporary comment, see Germany and the Future of Europe, a symposium of opinion published by the Harris Foundation (Univ. of Chicago, 1950), pp. 160-161.

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Walter Lippmann had pointed out three days earlier what the French action really meant. Mr. Lippmann had written: "Mr. Acheson came to Europe in a state of mind and with a policy, if it can be called a policy, which was dreary and grimly discouraging. Every window seemed to be shut. All the shades had been pulled down. All the doors were bolted. And inside that dark and stuffy room the three Foreign Ministers were to feel their way around in circles . . . "The French Government has suddenly opened the door to the real world outside. Through the door there is coming a breeze which is blowing about and messing up the neat files of bureaucratic papers, and there is coming light which is startling and dazzling to the inmates of the room. " T h e problems of the Atlantic Community, as they were posed before the French action, were insoluble. The growing knowledge that they were insoluble was producing, all over Western Europe, a mood of defeatism and escapism . . . "The problems of the Atlantic Community had become insoluble because the three Western Governments had no view of Germany which the Germans, apart from a few time-serving place hunters, could possibly share. Western policy for Germany consisted of proposing to admit the Western part of Germany to second-class membership in the Atlantic Community. The Germans were to accept partition. They were to accept inferior status in the councils of the West. They were to accept total insecurity in that the front defenses of the West were to be located between the Elbe and the Rhine. And they were to be offered a choice between disarmament on the one hand and, on the other, rearmament of the German infantry under the command of British, French and American generals. "This absurd conception of Germany was an attempt to contain the Soviet Union by using Germany, and then to contain Germany by the occupation and the statutes and the controls. The main container both of Russia and of Germany was to be the French army which, unfortunately for the planners of this caricature of a policy, was unable to be both in Indo-China and in Europe at the same time. " T h e French decision to offer Germany not only peace and equality but an intimate partnership does not solve the insoluble

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problems with which the Foreign Ministers were struggling. It transcends those problems. It passes over and beyond them by creating a wholly new European situation . . . The Franco-German partnership, if it is consummated, will strengthen, not replace, the German movement to end the partition of Germany and the European movement to end the partition of Europe." The British Foreign Office seemed unaware of the new situation which had been created; it appeared to be solely concerned with the question of whether or not Britain should participate. The American State Department seemed confused; Mr. McCloy spoke at Hanover about the need for a long occupation to assure the development of a democratic Germany; simultaneously, an American note to Russia demanded the disbanding of the East German "army" on the grounds that its creation violated the Potsdam Agreement, thus implying that the United States wished to return to four-power management. The Russians, on the other hand, showed that they were well aware that the French proposal had radically changed the European picture and changed it, so far as they were concerned, for the worse. On June 7, the Kremlin ordered Walter Ulbricht, Vice Chancellor of the East German Republic, to go to Warsaw and sign a peace treaty with the Polish Government, confirming as permanent the Oder-Neisse frontier temporarily set at Potsdam. Thus the German communists were ruthlessly made to become the actual agents of German dismemberment, an invidious role certain to lose them prestige in Germany. But the Kremlin had reached the decision that its advocacy of German reunification under four-power control could no longer compete for German favor with the new French offer of equal partnership. Moscow therefore apparently considered it more important, for the time being, to solidify its hold over Poland than to go on dangling the bait of frontier revision before the Germans. The American Government denounced the East German-Polish accord as illegal, questioning the sovereign right of the East German Government to enter into any treaties. There was no indication that the State Department had grasped the connection between this Russian move and the new situation created by the Schuman Plan. The Bonn Government also denounced the East German-Polish Treaty, but chose to direct its wrath at the United States and Brit-

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ain on the grounds that they had originally sanctioned the Polish annexations. On June 12, after a month of deliberation, the British Labour Party Executive issued a foreign policy statement flatly rejecting British participation in the Schuman Plan. The party in power openly stated its opposition to any commitments which might impair British Commonwealth relations or jeopardize the planning and controls deemed essential for the maintenance of full employment in Britain. The Schuman Plan, said the Labour Party, would be acceptable only if all the participating governments controlled the pooled mines and industries. It declared that, while "international planning" was the key to economic unity, "planning for private profit" would be "worse than useless." The British rejection came as an unpleasant surprise to M. Schuman who had confidently predicted British participation. It also gave support to German nationalist opposition to the proposal. Most important of all, it raised the ugly possibility that, without British participation, Germany might easily become the dominant partner in the enterprise. As a matter of fact, it was probably the shrewd realization of precisely this possibility which led Chancellor Adenauer to maintain his enthusiasm for the French proposal in the face of objections voiced not only by the Social Democratic opposition but also by some of his friends among the big industrialists. A critical corner had now been reached. If the British maintained their refusal to participate, the plan might never be realized or else be perverted into a German-dominated cartel. It seemed of the greatest importance that the United States should intervene with a proposal for modification which would build a bridge over which the British might retreat with dignity. The Schuman Plan, according to the first rather general announcement, provided for the pooling of not only coal but also steel production under a supranational authority. This seemed not only unnecessary but unwise — at least in the initial stages. It seemed unnecessary, because the control of coal automatically provided for a control of steel production. It seemed unwise because, while coal mining is a relatively simple industry, the manufacture of steel is a highly complex and ramified business, running all the way from the simple making of ingots to the manufacture of rails, structural forms, and an infinite number of other products. Any country considering

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participation — and especially Britain, with a highly complex and integrated steel industry — could be expected to find participation more attractive if the plan involved only the pooling and allocation of coal production. The second stumbling-block to British participation could easily be assumed to arise from the fact that the British Labour Government, having nationalized its basic industries, could not picture a merger with the privately owned industries in other countries. There was no difficulty here as far as France was concerned, if the merger were restricted to coal, because the French, too, had nationalized their coal mines. But Germany, the largest coal producer by far, had not nationalized, largely because American insistence upon private ownership had overridden British desire for socialization. The German people, had the matter been put to a vote, would probably have favored nationalization, but the Adenauer Government and the industrialists were only too glad to have the Americans insist that the question be deferred. T w o points of modification now suggested themselves as a possible basis for an attempt to persuade the British to alter their attitude: That we propose eliminating steel, for the time being, from the direct control of the European Authority. This would not close the door to its later inclusion, should the simpler merger work out well and seem capable of expansion. That we reverse our past position with regard to the nationalization of the German coal mines. The purpose of these modifications would be to make British participation possible and thus to insure against German domination, and also to make the plan more attractive to all European nations with the idea not only of watering down the German position but of creating the broadest possible economic community. 3 The outbreak of the Korean war probably prevented our Government from making any attempt to bring about British participation in the Schuman plan and, for the next two months, both countries were preoccupied with the Far East, rather than with Europe. Nevertheless, France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries, having taken the unprecedented step of agreeing to merge their economic sovereignties, made considerable technical "Suggested to Secretary Acheson in a letter dated June 23, 1950.

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progress. It was characteristic that these Continental countries were, from the outset, primarily aware of the political significance of the merger, while the British and American Governments seemed to view it more from the point of view of its technical economic aspects. During this period two Americans, Commissioner McCloy and Ambassador David Bruce in Paris, worked most effectively behind the scenes in bringing the Germans and the French together. Meanwhile the British Conservative opposition party gave the distinct impression that, if it were in power, Britain's attitude would be more cooperative. This impression was soon to be dispelled by later developments. T h e driving force behind the Schuman Plan, personified in its author, Jean Monnet, was the realistic French feeling: "If you can't lick 'em, join 'em." T h e danger was that, unless Britain came into the picture, the joining might be on unequal terms and that the whole nobly conceived enterprise might turn into the old, cynical, restrictive cartel arrangement which the Germans knew so well how to manage. Washington

Wrecks

the

Hope

The impact upon Europe and upon European policy development of the Korean W a r was essentially that of accelerating, rather than changing, the course of events. T h e North Korean adventure, generally assumed to have been instigated by Moscow, provided the first evidence that the communist powers would resort to overt armed force in a case where they believed quick success to be attainable. On the other hand, the frustration of this particular adventure by the unexpectedly firm and prompt action of the United Nations, under American leadership, inspired a renewed feeling of confidence. This, however, was somewhat shaken by the North Korean victories in the early stages of the war. At this point Chancellor Adenauer began playing a very shrewd game. Sensing that there would now be a frantic search for ways and means to hasten the build-up of West European defenses, he began dropping hints that West Germany might, on certain conditions, be willing to contribute to that defense. Other hints suggested that the Germans were no longer as impressed with American military prowess as they had been before Korea. Openly, the Chancellor went no further than to demand a West German police force

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capable of offsetting the East German Bereitschaften — a demand which now encountered much less opposition in France, in view of the events in Korea. Where Dr. Adenauer was purposely vague as to the conditions on which Germany might be willing to become a partner in West European defense, the leader of the Socialist opposition was much more precise. Dr. Schumacher put the case the other way around. He declared that West Germany should not consider contributing to Western defense unless: ( 1 ) at least twenty American divisions were stationed in Germany as a shield behind which rearmament could be undertaken; (2) Germany were to have its own national army under German command; and (3) the purpose of rearmament were clearly understood to be "to defend all of Germany—not just that part of Germany which is under the control of the Western powers." (In other words, "If you want Germany to help you fight Russia, then you will have to fight Russia to recapture the lost German East.") Unacceptable as these conditions might be to the West, and especially to France, they probably reflected quite accurately the sentiments of the majority of those Germans who were at this time willing to consider rearmament on any terms whatever. This should have served as a warning to our Government against making Germany the central bastion of West European defense. Our Government, however, was past seeing danger signals or listening to warnings. On September 5, 1950, the last pretense was cast aside. Emerging from a conference with President Truman, High Commissioner John J . McCloy told the press: "In some manner, in some form, the Germans should be enabled, if they want to, to defend their own country. It seems so difficult to say to these people that you can't share in the defense of your own country if you're attacked. If that sounds like rearmament, then it's rearmament." The next day Secretary Acheson supported Mr. McCloy's argument and — so well had the way been cleared by the usual "next inevitable step" propaganda — that comparatively little surprise was expressed at this dramatic repudiation of past pledges and principles. At a secret session with the Senate and House leaders, Mr. Ache-

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son discussed his program for the impending N e w York meetings of the three Western Foreign Ministers and the North Atlantic Council. Apparently he encountered no serious opposition. On September 12, the Secretary proposed to Messrs. Bevin and Schuman: ( 1 ) a drastic increase in the pace of British and French rearmament; (2) the inclusion of German contingents in the North Atlantic defense force; and (3) the promise of more American troops in Germany with — perhaps — the assumption of the supreme command of the North Atlantic defense forces by an American commander. Mr. Acheson also proposed the further relaxation of the economic controls still remaining under the Petersberg Agreement. Both the British and French Foreign Ministers were considerably shocked by these proposals, especially M. Schuman. They were willing to relax controls and to allow an increase in the internal German police force, but that was as far as they would go. They welcomed the promise of additional American troops but insisted that they would have to consult their cabinets concerning the American proposal for German contingents in a Western defense force, demanding that they be authorized to do so on three conditions:4 1. "The rearmament of the Western Allies must have priority over German rearmament." 2. "Western contingents must be under command of a supreme North Atlantic commander and no German general should command a unit larger than a division — if that large." 3. "The Bonn Republic must show that, despite the criticisms of the rearmament proposal by some elements of the opposition, Western Germans really want to participate in the defense of Western Europe and are prepared to play their part in other ways than by providing soldiers." The Ministers then recessed for three days in order to attend the meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Here Mr. Acheson again put forward his proposal and encountered a strong protest, especially from M. Schuman, who said that insufficient notice had been given of such a drastic reversal of policy. After considerable discussion, the North Atlantic Council and the Big Three came to a 4

As reported by Thomas Hamilton in the New York Times, September 15,

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"compromise" solution. T h e y agreed on the creation of an integrated North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( N A T O ) force under a Supreme Commander, this force to be built up as rapidly as possible. T h e y agreed to guarantee the defense of Western Germany; and they agreed to discuss how German contingents might possibly be permitted to participate in the N A T O force, provided that the Germans themselves wished to participate. In essence the result as to Germany was this: German participation in N A T O had been accepted in principle. H o w this result was to be achieved remained open to discussion and, as we shall see, was to remain open for more than a year. What the American planners had really wanted was a German army placed, along with the other allied armies, under a supreme Allied command. This was also what Mr. Churchill had seemed to want; the Attlee-Bevin position was unclear. As for the French, they were reluctantly willing to permit West Germany to raise an internal police force of sufficient strength to offset the East German Peoples' Police; further than that they did not wish to go. The majority of the North Atlantic Council seemed to be in favor of using the West Germans in some sort of an integrated, multi-national defense force, with the Germans excluded from sharing in the command. This desire was understandable but wholly unrealistic. 4. Soviet Warning and Counter-proposal On October 18, the Soviet Government dispatched a note to the three Western powers declaring that it would "not tolerate such measures of the United States, British and French Governments aimed at reviving the German regular army in West Germany." This was strong language, even for the Kremlin. Three days after this note, the Kremlin released a communiqué, issued at the conclusion of a conference, held at Prague, by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet bloc. This declaration called for: 1. Proclamation by the four occupying powers "that they will not allow remilitarization of Germany and her being dragged into any aggressive plans," as well as a reaffirmation of the Potsdam Agreement. 2. "Removal of all hindrances to the development of a peaceful German economy."

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3. "The undelayed conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, the creation of a unified German state, and the withdrawal of all occupation forces a year after signature of the treaty." 4. "Creation of an All-German constitutional council on the basis of a balanced representation of Western and Eastern Germany which should prepare for establishment of an interim democratic, peace-loving All-German sovereign government." In connection with this Soviet proposal, it is worth noting that, four months earlier, on May 26, the three High Commissioners had given General Chuikov, the Soviet zone commander, the followingterms, upon which they said that the Western powers would agree to unification: 1. A freely elected All-German Government. 2. Individual freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of speech, press, and radio throughout Germany. 3. Freedom of action throughout Germany for all democratic political parties. 4. Independence of the Judiciary. 5. Prohibition throughout Germany of political secret police and police formations constituting a military force. 6. Assurance of German economic unity through action by a German Government on matters such as unified currency and customs, and through quadripartite agreement on matters such as cessation of reparations out of current production and prohibited or limited industries. 7. Surrender and disposal, in accordance with appropriate German legislation, of any industrial enterprise in Germany whose ownership or control was acquired after May 8, 1946 by or on behalf of any foreign power, unless such acquisition has quadripartite approval and the interest so approved is subjected to German law. 8. Establishment of quadripartite supervision through a fourpower commission, exercising the reserve powers in such a way as to permit the German Government to function effectively. Except for the ambiguous provision for "balanced representation" of the two Germanys, the Prague proposal, objectively viewed, might well have been considered an approach in somewhat general terms to the Allied basis for unification. Certainly the economic clauses of the Allied proposal could be construed as falling within

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"the removal of all hindrances to the development of a peaceful German economy." T o be sure, this needed exploration and the political conditions needed clear redefinition. But there was nothing in the Prague proposal which contradicted the terms laid down by the High Commissioners. Secretary Acheson lost no time in denouncing the Soviet note of protest as a piece of "effrontery." Chancellor Adenauer echoed the denunciation, declaring that any four-power talks would be "fruitless" until the Western powers were militarily as strong as the Soviet Union. As to the specific Prague proposals, the Secretary of State issued a press release, stating that he could find "nothing n e w " in these suggestions. He could see no reason for a reaffirmation of the intention to keep Germany demilitarized, since we had "solemnly agreed" to this at Potsdam and "the only militarization in Germany has occurred in the Soviet zone, where factories are producing armament for East European use and where 50,000 soldiers have been organized, trained and equipped with tanks and artillery." This argument had a somewhat hollow ring, in view of Mr. Acheson's own recent proposal for rearming West Germany. Instead of seeking to explore the meaning of the curious Soviet phrase providing f o r the removal of economic "hindrances," the Secretary merely denounced past Soviet exploitation of East Germany, contrasting it with Western efforts to aid reconstruction. Pointing out the obvious fact that a peace treaty could not be signed until there was a German Government with which to sign it, Mr. Acheson then put the worst construction on the proposal for "balanced representation," assuming that it meant giving 18,000,000 East Germans the same vote as that accorded to 48,000,000 West Germans. This was a legitimate interpretation of an ambiguous phrase and a good debating point, but it was by no means certain that this is what the Russians had intended to propose. It was also possible that the point had been left purposely ambiguous in order to create a bargaining position. T h e Secretary concluded by reaffirming that the United States had always sought German unification and still sought it, if the w a y could be opened through the free, democratic election of a constitutional assembly. This, too, would have been more convincing, if the Secretary's statement as a whole had conveyed the impression of

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willingness to abandon the West German plans, provided that a satisfactory All-German settlement could be obtained. Instead of this, the statement clearly implied the determination to disregard the Russian overture and to proceed full-speed-ahead with the incorporation of a rearmed West Germany in the N A T O alliance. 5. Elections in West

Germany

Throughout his first year in office, Chancellor Adenauer had acted more like an old-fashioned, absolute monarch than like the responsible head of a democratic republic. He not only failed to inform or consult the Bundestag as to his various maneuvers and undertakings; he also often neglected to consult even his own cabinet. Thus, while his maneuvering had been extremely effective in gaining concessions from the Western powers, particularly from the United States, his methods did not enhance his popularity at home. In November, 1950, parliamentary elections were held in Hesse, Wuerttenberg-Baden, and Bavaria, the three most important states in the American zone. In the first two Laender Dr. Kurt Schumacher's Social Democrats defeated the Adenauer coalition. In Bavaria, the coalition retained a majority but suffered a considerable loss in seats. The issue in these elections was not rearmament as such but the rearmament policy and the procedure of the Adenauer Government. Dr. Schumacher's victories resulted from popular endorsement of his insistence that there should be no German rearmamdnt of any sort without a general mandate from the people; and from support for his demand that, if there was to be German rearmament, it should be undertaken on conditions much more favorable to Germany than those contemplated by the Federal Chancellor. Essentially, the conditions put forward by the Social Democrats were the same as those previously demanded by Dr. Schumacher: a shield of Anglo-American divisions behind which to rearm, full equality in command, and the understanding that Germany was to be defended — not at the Elbe or the Rhine — but at its 1937 frontiers. This expression of popular sentiment in the Adenauer strongholds provided a clear demonstration of the futility of expecting French rearmament and German rearmament to complement one another. It supplied the first concrete evidence for this observer's long-held belief that the only conditions upon which an effective German

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military force could be created were precisely those conditions which would make France unwilling to fight. 6. "Reexamination"

Declined

During the latter part of 1950, Secretary Acheson was subjected to a crescendo of attack and abuse. This had little or nothing to do with his policies in Europe. Mr. Acheson was being blamed — unjustly, for the most part — for the fall of Chiang Kai-shek, for the war in Korea, and for being "soft toward communism." Above all, he was being crucified for the statement that he would not "turn his back upon Alger Hiss," after the latter had been convicted and sentenced for perjury. 5 In addition to the clamor for his resignation, led by Senators McCarthy of Wisconsin and Taft of Ohio, the Secretary of State was also subjected at this time to a barrage of less personal criticism of his foreign policy. Former President Herbert Hoover had come forward with a major foreign policy pronouncement, advocating the abandonment of Europe and the erecting of "an American Gibraltar of Freedom," unless Europe should prove itself more willing and able to defend itself. Senator Taft joined in with a demand that all of Mr. Acheson's policies be reexamined. Responding to these critics, the Secretary made an extemporaneous speech in which he said somewhat testily that a "reexaminationist" was like a farmer who kept pulling up his crop by the roots to see how it was growing. Rejecting the need of any reexamination whatever, Mr. Acheson conveyed the impression that anyone who suggested such a thing was, in his judgment, either a conscious or an unconscious isolationist. Returning from a trip to Europe at about this time, Walter Lippmann expressed this view of Mr. Acheson's European policy: "What has happened is that a great decision was made hurriedly last summer and — one might say — absent-mindedly. The decision has miscarried. Whether this will lead to a resounding American political defeat, if not to the absolute catastrophe of a total war, will — so far as we can still direct the course of events — depend upon whether we re-examine our German policy and revise it. " T h e author's view, that these charges were irresponsible and — except to a limited extent as to Korea — unjustified, was expressed in How to Co-exist, Without Playing the Kremlin's Game, pp. 68-80.

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"The first thing that re-examination will show is that it was absurd to make a military ally out of Germany before we had made peace with Germany. More concretely, it was vain to think that the French and German infantry — the bulk of the ground forces of the proposed Western army — could be "integrated" or would fight loyally side by side, unless France and Germany had first ended their historic quarrel and had become, in law and in fact, partners in Europe. "Awareness of this elementary fact and self-evident truth would have led us not to raise the question of German rearmament until the great enterprise of the Schuman Plan had been consummated. For then the question of Continental armies to defend the Continent would have been recognized as primarily a Franco-German problem to which only France and Germany can find a workable solution." Unhappily, the one thing which Mr. Acheson was least willing to do was to reëxamine his German policy. 7. The Brussels

Conference

Meanwhile, the somber year of 1950 ended on a note of triumph for the Secretary of State. Mr. Acheson's position at home had become so precarious that President Truman felt the need of resorting to the unusual expedient of sending his Secretary of State on his way to Brussels with a public statement expressing his full confidence. Contrary to general expectation, Mr. Acheson succeeded at the North Atlantic Council meeting in obtaining an apparent agreement with the French as to German rearmament. The communiqué, issued at Brussels on December 19, announced complete harmony and the appointment of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as the Supreme N A T O Commander. An additional threepower communiqué announced that instructions had been given to the three High Commissioners in Germany to explore with Dr. Adenauer's Government the possibilities of a German contribution to Western defense "as well as any changes in the present occupation arrangements which might logically attend German defense contributions." Although the N A T O Council's statement said that the Council had "reached unanimous agreement regarding the part which Germany might assume in the common defense," this was, in fact, a

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considerable over-statement. What the Council had agreed upon was a plan, devised in desperation by the French Government, for the integration of German " g r o u p e m e n t s o f not over 6,000 men each, in a "European Army." It was all very well to agree unanimously upon this "Pleven Plan," so named after René Pleven, its author. But it was obvious that such a plan would be completely unacceptable to the Germans. Moreover, in the unlikely event that "changes in the present occupation arrangements" might induce the Germans to accept the proposal, most military men recognized that such a plan was utterly impracticable. 8. Appraisal of 1950 1949 had been the year in which the Truman Administration lost its great opportunity to change its European policy of its own free will. 1950 was the year in which French ingenuity and statesmanship provided the American Government with a second chance to shift from negative military containment to a creative building of the European peace. This opportunity, too, was lost. By placing the military cart before the political and economic horses — by trying to weld West Germany into a military alliance before it had become politically and economically integrated in the West European community— our Government all but killed the brilliantly conceived Schuman Plan. For the brief period between May 9 and September 5, the Germans had been offered and had seized upon the Schuman Plan as their one way back into the European family of nations. From the moment when Mr. Acheson demanded a German military contribution, the Schuman Plan was side-tracked. The Germans now had not one but two ways back into a position of equality. If the West needed them as a military ally, there was no reason to sacrifice economic or political sovereignty. Overnight, the German negotiators stopped asking or suggesting and demanded, instead, secure in the knowledge that they had something which the West needed. In terms of his own objectives, Mr. Acheson might be said to have enjoyed a rather successful year in Europe — but not in Asia. Not content with a successful police action in Korea which would have restored the previously existing conditions, the United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel in an attempt to abolish the North Korean Republic and to create, by force, a unified, democratic

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Korean nation — in other words, to set up an outpost of Western democracy on the mainland of Asia and on the most sensitive frontier of both Russia and China. This brought Red China into the conflict, with the result that the United Nations forces, whose total victory by Christmas had been prematurely announced by General MacArthur, now found themselves in headlong retreat back across the 38th parallel. A t the year's end, a wholly new situation had developed in Asia — a situation fraught with danger and demanding far greater resources than the original, Russian-supplied, North Korean adventure. Whereas our European friends had approved and welcomed our action in taking a firm stand against the original aggression in June, they were outspokenly critical of General MacArthur's adventure into North Korea and, particularly, of his carrying his offensive right up to the Yalu River. Here at home, the hunt for "subversives" was now in full cry. T h e President himself had, in March, 1947, adopted the un-American guilt-by-association doctrine of House Committee on UnAmerican Activities, in a sweeping Executive Order calling for loyalty investigations of the entire Government personnel. N o sensible person could have doubted the need for security measures to protect all sensitive areas of Government planning and operation, but the President's order had gone far beyond this. It had, in effect, repudiated the American principle that a public servant—or, for that matter, any citizen — is presumed to be innocent of disloyalty, unless proved guilty. It had placed the burden of proving innocence upon any public servant against whom the merest whisper of denunciation had been raised. Granted that previous laxity had to be corrected, the remedy chosen by Mr. Truman opened the door to a flood of irresponsible denunciation by amateur and professional vigilantes. T h e disgraceful spectacle, in which the careers of innocent men were damaged or destroyed by unsupported slander, in which self-confessed perjurers and communist renegades became star witnesses, and in which what Mr. Justice William O. Douglas called "The Black Silence of Fear" descended upon the United States — this spectacle was not created by Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin. It was created by an Administration which had first been careless of security and then sought to remedy this mistake by being careless of freedom. Unscrupulous politicians — and not all of them

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Republicans — began, in 1950, to exploit the existing state of affairs to their own personal advantage. In so doing, they acquired the power of intimidation over the Administration which had itself started the process. The effect of this intimidation was, first of all, to make the Administration anxious at all costs to show that it was just as "tough" against communism as its critics. This led to an almost complete adoption of the Asian policy of its critics. In Europe, the effect was less obvious but no less important. Our increasingly inflexible and belligerent Far Eastern policy alarmed our European allies and made them distrustful of American leadership. Beyond that, the fear of being criticized as "soft" toward communism augmented the already negative attitude of the Administration toward any attempt to negotiate a European settlement.

8 Slow Motion (1951) T h e outstanding feature of 1951 was its slow tempo. In the Far East, once the Korean front was re-stabilized, the battle settled down into a stalemate, which became something like a partial armistice when the Kaesong truce talks began in midsummer. The great debate over General MacArthur's recall preempted the attention of Congress and the American people. Later in the year, the fluctuating hopes and disappointments of the armistice negotiations made daily headlines. But, except for conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, 1951, so far as Asia was concerned, was a year of much talk and little action — talk about the rights and wrongs of past policy, of General MacArthur's qualities and defects, of Russia's insistence that Red China be seated in the United Nations, and about the conditions upon which a Korean peace settlement should or should not be made. Indonesian independence had finally been established, but the French war against the Viet Minh dragged on inconclusively. The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan defied all efforts at settlement. Only the Japanese Peace Treaty denoted some degree of forward motion — whether or not it denoted actual progress toward peace remained to be seen. In the Near East, an uneasy truce continued between Israel and the Arab nations, but the relative quiet of that area was disturbed by the onset of a serious crisis, beginning with the anti-British revolt in Iran and then spreading into Egypt and North Africa. Washington seemed to be caught unaware and without anything resembling a Near East policy. In Washington itself, McCarthyism was rampant. Two supposedly liberal Senators voted against the confirmation of Ambassa-

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dor Philip Jessup because "his usefulness had been destroyed" by accusations which these Senators considered wholly without foundation. Forced by this state of affairs to devote much of its time and effort to the defense of its past policies, uncertain as to its next moves in Asia and the explosive Near East, and with an election year ahead, the Administration was harassed and overburdened with problems. Tempers were short, and little distinction was drawn between friendly criticism and partisan attack. With no recent successes or hopes of immediate successes to offset past failures, except perhaps in Europe, Secretary Acheson's European policy became something like a sacrosanct fetish. T h e European policy was right because it had to be right. Anyone who criticized it was considered either a knave or a fool. This attitude of stubborn intolerance not only tended to smother constructive criticism at home, but also produced a more and more dictatorial attitude toward our friends and allies abroad. Whatever the merits of the European policy as such, its success now became endangered through the methods used to carry it through. As peremptory insistence tended to take the place of persuasion, cooperation became mere acquiescence on the part of our European partners. T h e decisions of the previous year had left three specific tasks to be carried out. T h e President's promise of additional American troops for Europe had to be fulfilled. T h e method by which West Germany was to contribute to the N A T O defense force had to be worked out. T h e Schuman Plan, upon which depended the creation of a European community — essential to the formation of a "European A r m y " — had to be rescued from oblivion and brought to fruition. In addition, there remained the job of determining the contributions of the individual member nations to the contemplated "European A r m y " and to the N A T O force. This involved a careful reconciliation of military needs and economic potentials. Finally, there remained the question of dealing with the firm Russian protest against the N A T O - G e r m a n plan and the decision whether to abandon West German rearmament, if a satisfactory AllGerman settlement could be obtained. Stated in Washington terms,

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this was largely a matter of going through whatever motions might be necessary to prove that no satisfactory All-German settlement could be obtained through negotiation. i. Eisenhower

Calls a Halt

Early in January, General Eisenhower flew to Europe to make a preliminary survey of the problems he was about to take over as the Supreme N A T O Commander, and to report to Washington. His findings were eagerly awaited by the Administration for two reasons: first, it was hoped that the General's report would provide decisive support for the Administration's plan to send additional troops to Germany; and, second, it was hoped that his report would supply a convincing endorsement of the State Department-Pentagon plan for West German rearmament and remilitarization. General Eisenhower visited each of the North Atlantic Treaty nations, gathering his first, quick impressions of the strengths and weaknesses of each member of the alliance and of the coalition as a whole. In addition, he went to Germany, where he made a tactfully conciliatory speech to the people whom he had helped to conquer. At Paris and Bonn, he learned of the wide divergence which existed between France and Germany as to the nature and conditions of German rearmament. He also gained an impression of the complicated and unclear state of German public opinion. The Germans were at this time putting forward the outlines of a rearmament plan of their own, which had not been submitted by Dr. Adenauer to public discussion, nor even to the Bundestag. In secret conversations with High Commissioner McCloy's representatives at Petersberg, the German ideas were put forward by two former Wehrmacht generals, Hans Speidel and Adolf von Heusinger, accompanied by Herr Theodor Blank — a former German trade union official, now acting as the Chancellor's chief adviser on matters of security. Their plan provided for far greater German ground and air forces than had previously been considered, and for much greater autonomy of command than contemplated by the N A T O Council at its Brussels meeting. The French "Pleven Plan" had provided for 20 German brigades (groupements), not exceeding 6,000 men each, to be integrated into mixed divisions under non-German command. The plan of the German generals contemplated 12 Ger-

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man divisions of 12,000 men each at peacetime strength, organized in 6 army corps under German command, and equipped with their own tactical air force of 2,000 planes. General Eisenhower also learned that Dr. Adenauer was shrewdly making the most of opposition to rearmament on the part of the German people, by attaching to the demands of his generals what political conditions he thought the traffic would bear. T h e more he demanded "full equality" and a further revision of the Occupation Statute, the more French willingness to enter into any kind of Franco-German partnership diminished. This was not an encouraging prospect for the new N A T O commander. On January 30, 1951, while General Eisenhower was on his w a y home, the British High Commissioner in Germany, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, delivered a significant speech at Frankfurt, Germany. He declared that a German military contribution to Western defense was actually a secondary matter and that its consideration might well be delayed. Anyone who knew this cautious and experienced British diplomat would instantly realize that he would not have made any such statement unless it expressed the views of the newly appointed N A T O commander. That being the case, the General's forthcoming recommendations could be expected to provide a last opportunity for the State Department and the Pentagon to retreat gracefully from their ill-timed and ill-advised demand f o r German military contingents. This occasioned my last direct plea to Secretary Acheson, in the form of a letter urging him to identify himself with General Eisenhower's recommendations as soon as these should be made known, rather than to treat them as an unexpected and unwelcome obstacle. A f e w days later, General Eisenhower did in fact recommend a postponement of German rearmament, declaring that he wanted no mercenaries in any army under his command and that the only basis upon which a German military contribution could safely be accepted would be a basis of "earned equality." T h e implication was clearly that the Germans had yet to earn the right to demand acceptance as an ally on terms of full equality. T h e State Department and the Pentagon maintained a strict and obviously displeased silence as to the General's recommendation. T h e impression was created that the State Department-Pentagon

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plans had received a severe setback. Premier Pleven of France visited the White House and received assurances f r o m the President that French and W e s t European rearmament would have priority over Germany. On February 5, the State Department released a letter f r o m Secretary Acheson to French Foreign Minister Schuman, announcing that the United States would support the Pleven Plan f o r a "European A r m y " and welcoming M. Schuman's initiative in calling a conference to discuss the project. This was a definite retreat, but, as time would show, it was somewhat of a tonguein-cheek maneuver, since practically no one in official Washington believed the French plan to be practically possible. Nevertheless, General Eisenhower's report had brought about an important change in the concept of the N A T O force to be created. Instead of an army, the hard core of which would be formed b y German and American troops, the plans now contemplated a "European A r m y " composed of W e s t European contingents, with a stiffening of British and American divisions in N A T O and no G e r man contingents f o r some time to come. 2. "Troops

for

Europe"

Although General Eisenhower did not supply the hoped-for argument to sustain the plan f o r German rearmament, he did provide the decisive testimony in support of the promised strengthening of the American garrison in Germany. T h e debate over the fulfillment of this promise had been going on in Congress all through January. Although it eventually continued f o r another t w o months, General Eisenhower's report of February 2, and his later testimony made the outcome a foregone conclusion. T h e President's promise of "American reinforcements," made in September 1950, had raised the question of how large a force he intended to station in Europe. This, in turn, involved the question of the size and speed of our whole mobilization, as well as the question of priorities as between Europe and the Far East. In the January debate, some of the President's opponents, notably Senator T a f t , raised the question of the Chief Executive's Constitutional powers to undertake the proposed action without the specific consent of Congress. General Eisenhower's testimony served to put all these questions into proper perspective; he made clear our vital interest in the de-

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fense of Western Europe, while at the same time limiting and defining the nature of the American support which he thought that defense would require. Perhaps the most decisive statement made by the General was this: "While the transfer to Europe of American military units is essential, our major and special contribution should be in the field of munitions and equipment." Eventually, the N A T O commander's request for four additional American divisions received the almost unanimous approval of the country. 5. The Schuman Plan Compromised The clarification of the North Atlantic defense plans brought about a temporary easing of the strains within the alliance, but placed new obstacles in the path of the economic merger, upon which depended the creation of a European community capable of forming a European Army. There could be no European Army unless Western Europe were first politically and economically united to the point where there could be the common Defense Minister and the common defense budget posited by the Pleven Plan. The key to political and economic unification lay in the creation of the supranational authority envisaged by the Schuman Plan. By putting off the question of German rearmament, the political and economic horses had once more been placed where they belonged — in front of, rather than behind, the military cart. This, however, did not suit the Germans at all. Having learned that a German contribution was indispensable to the military defense of the West, even though its consideration might be temporarily postponed, the Ruhr coal and steel magnates now staged a rebellion against the Schuman Plan. Their objections, voiced through Dr. Walter Hallstein, were directed against two provisions in the draft Schuman Plan treaty which were essential to the proper functioning of the project. The original French proposal, which had been accepted in principle by Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, provided for the establishment of a single, free, competitive market, wherein all consumers would have access to coal and steel on equal terms, subject only to differentials in transportation costs. The draft of a complicated treaty, providing for the pooling of production and the creation of this free market, had been completed in January, except for two important articles

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dealing with the elimination of monopolistic practices and discrimination. One of these two articles dealt with "decartelization" — that is, the abolition of the traditional European practice of allowing monopolies to restrict production in order to maintain high prices. The second article provided for the "deconcentration" of ownership and control of the coal and steel industries — which meant the abolition of those vertical and horizontal trusts which had formed the characteristic structure of the Ruhr industries. It was against these two articles that the Ruhr magnates, speaking through the voice of Dr. Hallstein, now rebelled, thus jeopardizing the whole project. As might be expected, this revolt of the German monopolists received support from the French, Belgian, and Luxembourg monopolists. It was hardly to be expected, however, that support should also be forthcoming from the United States. Yet a whole battery of American corporation lawyers took up the cudgels for the Ruhr magnates, with the former Secretary of War — the late Robert P. Patterson — going to Germany to argue the case before his one-time assistant, the Hon. John J . McCloy. Mr. McCloy made short shrift of this attempted intervention, but the episode cast considerable doubt upon the sincerity of American support for the Schuman Plan and served to strengthen the hands of the German nationalists. After two months of bargaining, a compromise was reached which satisfied the German industrialists — for the time being — but which seriously endangered the accomplishment of the Schuman Plan's ultimate purposes. Under American pressure, the High Commissioners modified Law 24 of the Occupation Statute so as to lift the u,ooo,ooo ton per annum restriction on German steel production and the ban on manufacturing synthetic oil and rubber. Likewise they modified Law 27 so as to permit the German steel companies to retain ownership of coal mines producing up to 75% of their requirements. Taken together, these two concessions made the future of the free market somewhat doubtful and enhanced the probability of eventual German domination of the whole enterprise. On March 19, the delegates of the six participating countries finally initialed a fifty-year treaty giving effect to the coal and steel merger. This treaty now had to be ratified by the six parliaments. It remained open to any other European state wishing to participate,

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provided that the unanimous consent of the six charter members would be given. The treaty set up a highly complex machinery for operating the plan. A six-man, supranational board, called the High Authority, was given supreme power, with four other bodies acting as checks and balances. These were: 1. A Consultative Committee of thirty, chosen by the Council of Ministers, to represent workers, employers, and consumers. 2. An Assembly, composed of members of the parliaments of the participating countries, to review the work of the Authority and with power to compel resignation by a two-thirds vote. 3. A Council, composed of one cabinet member from each of the participating nations, whose function it would be to harmonize the work of the Authority with the economic policies of each of the participating nations. 4. A Court of Justice of seven judges to which appeals from the Authority's decisions could be taken and which would decide whether the Authority's actions were within the limits of its powers. Scarcely had this difficult step been accomplished, when the question of the Saar once more raised its head. On March 30, the "autonomous" Saar Government demanded an independent voice in the Schuman Plan. The French and German Governments agreed to deny this request. However, Dr. Schumacher denounced the Adenauer Government's procedure and demanded, on behalf of the Socialist opposition, that the Saar issue be debated and settled before the Bundestag would be asked to ratify the Schuman Plan Treaty. On April 18, the six Governments formally signed the Treaty, subject to ratification, with Dr. Adenauer making the reservation that French representation of the Saar in this matter should in no way prejudice the ultimate disposition of that territory. Simultaneously, the Chancellor voiced a demand that Britain and the United States reverse their Saar policy and deny the French claim to its annexation. Although the Schuman Treaty passed its first reading with a large majority in the Bundestag the Saar issue remained unsettled. 4. Dealings with Russia W e come now to a consideration of the long and complicated story of negotiations between the three Western powers and the

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Soviet Union which began on January 2 and continued throughout the year. It is not an edifying story. On December 22, 1950, the Western powers had replied to the Soviet notes of October 18 and November 3, expressing a willingness to have the Foreign Ministers discuss Germany, but only if they were also to discuss all the major causes of tension between the Soviet Union and the West. On December 30, 1950, the Kremlin replied in a note which continued to insist that Germany must be discussed "first and foremost," but which also seemed to leave the door open for the discussion of other matters. The Kremlin, however, forcefully restated its contention that the Western actions with regard to Germany were the primary cause of tension and violated existing agreements. This was denied by the British and French Governments in parallel notes, dispatched on January 8, 1951. On January 20, Moscow replied in an even more strongly worded message, insisting that the proposed remilitarization of West Germany constituted the most serious threat to peace and asserting, in addition, that France and Britain were violating their treaties of friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union. The Soviet note denied categorically that Russia had increased its own armed strength or rearmed the satellites beyond the limits imposed by the peace treaties, and claimed that the West actually possessed greater armed forces than the Soviet bloc. This presented the West with an opportunity either to question the truth of these allegations or — accepting them at face value — to ask for an arms census leading to the establishment of some sort of parity of force in Europe. The Western powers did not take up this interesting challenge in their reply of January 24. Instead, they merely reiterated their previous contentions and asked for "clarification" as to Russia's willingness to discuss matters other than Germany. The Soviet Government replied on February 5, with another long message containing much vituperative repetition but agreeing, finally, to discuss matters other than Germany. Ten days later, the British Government sent a carefully prepared note to Moscow, refuting the charge of treaty violation and rehearsing once more the history of Russian obstructionism and intransigence. The British note concluded with a reaffirmation of Britain's intentions to "work together in friendly and close collaboration," as provided for by the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance.

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The long exchange of diplomatic notes finally came to an end with Soviet acceptance of a United States proposal to have the Deputy Foreign Ministers meet at Paris on March 5 — but not before the Kremlin had one last word to say to the British Government, in reply to its note of February 15. This final Soviet communication, dated February 25, topped all previous Soviet performances in presenting an upside-down picture of the world situation. It made a strange overture f o r a conference which the Kremlin had been trying for almost six months to arrange. During these diplomatic maneuvers in the first two months of 1951, the attention of the American people was concentrated upon Korea and the debate over sending additional troops to Europe. Consequently, there was almost no awareness of the deeply disturbing fact that our Government was moving with ill-concealed reluctance, and without a positive plan of its own, toward a conference which might well decide the future not only of Europe but of Western civilization. T h e question of sending American troops to Europe should have been debated in 1949, when our Government was permitted to take a commitment which could not be fulfilled, unless we did station a substantial garrison in Europe. In 1951, the question was no longer debatable, except in terms of whether or not the United States should repudiate a solemnly given promise. T h e real issue, which should have been debated in the early months of 1951, was whether we considered the inclusion of a rearmed West Germany in N A T O more important than the achievement of a just and honorable All-German peace settlement. This issue could not be decided in conversations with Russia. It had to be decided before any conversations with Russia were undertaken. There would be little point in going to a conference without an affirmative plan of our own. T o go merely in order to defeat whatever plan might be proposed by the Kremlin would simply mean continuing along the road to disaster. T h e number one item in the President's instructions to Mr. Acheson should have read: " Y o u are authorized to make it clear that, if a settlement of the German question can be reached, under which a freely elected All-German Government will be enabled to guarantee the political freedoms to all German citizens, under which a just and honorable peace treaty may be negotiated, demilitarization assured and occu-

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pation forces gradually withdrawn, then the United States will gladly abandon its proposal for the inclusion of German forces in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." 1 j. The Deputies at Paris From March 5 to June 21, the Deputy Foreign Ministers held seventy-three completely futile sessions at Paris. Dr. Philip Jessup represented the United States in these talks with Messrs. Gromyko, Davies, and Parodi. It is not worth recording here the long drawnout word game played at the Palais Rose. The outcome of this abortive conference could have been foretold after the first few meetings made it apparent that the Soviet Union no longer wanted the conference on a German peace treaty which it had been seeking since October, 1950. Inasmuch as the United States had never wanted this conference, while France and Britain had wavered between wanting and not wanting it, the Russian change of front settled the matter. It was clear that the deputies were laboring to agree upon an agenda for a conference that would never take place. The only reason for continuing the sparring for another three months was that neither Russia nor the Western powers were willing to assume the responsibility for failure. Ostensibly, the conference broke up over Russian insistence that the Atlantic Treaty and the question of American overseas military bases be put on the agenda. This Russian demand could not very well have been made at all, if the Western powers had been willing to confer primarily on Germany. Instead they insisted for months that the agenda must include a discussion of all the causes of tension — such as the level of armaments, satellite remilitarization, the Austrian treaty and so forth —making it logical for the Russians to drag in the Atlantic Treaty, American bases, and the thorny question of Trieste. All this, however, was actually beside the point. The essential fact was that neither side wanted at this time to discuss German reunification. The reasons for the sudden switch in Russian policy were fairly evident. From the Kremlin's point of view, reunification of Germany meant giving up its absolute control over East Germany in exchange for a long-range gamble on ultimately getting control of all of Germany. This gamble became attractive only when the 1

Suggested in the author's pamphlet, Let's Talk about the Real

Issue.

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rearmament of Western Germany and its inclusion in N A T O appeared imminent. From the moment when German rearmament was pushed into the background by General Eisenhower's report, Russia's enthusiasm for the four-power conference cooled off. Where the Western powers made their mistake was in failing to take the determined initiative with a concrete proposal for German unification and a peace settlement, once the Russians had committed themselves to a four-power conference designed to bring about these results. Had they done so, they would either have achieved a German settlement or placed the onus for a continued partition of Germany squarely upon the Kremlin. T w o factors probably caused this Western failure: the stubborn adherence of the American Government to its pet project of including West Germany in N A T O ; and the vocal opposition to a four-power conference expressed at this time by the West German Government. The apparent contradiction between the German desire for unification and German opposition to a four-power conference to discuss unification was not too difficult to understand. Chancellor Adenauer's policy of exerting constant pressure upon the Western powers for more and more concessions had proved itself highly profitable. On May 2, when the Council of Europe offered full membership to the Bonn Republic, Dr. Adenauer had not hesitated to say, in accepting the invitation, that he considered it "a 90% recognition of full German sovereignty." Given his remarkable progress in working Germany back into a position of power, it was not surprising that the Chancellor bitterly opposed at this time any interruption of his game by a four-power conference looking toward German reunification. West Germany was rapidly becoming a co-maker of Western coalition policy. Dr. Adenauer was not yet quite strong enough to be certain that he could exercise a dominant voice in a negotiation for an All-German settlement. A four-power conference — even if its results should prove to be inconclusive— would make Germany once more the object of negotiation, instead of being one of the major participants. Thus, the stubbornness of Mr. Acheson and the calculating ambition of the German Chancellor combined to bring about a repetition of the failure of May, 1949. Then, at least, the adversaries had met face to face. N o w — two years later — they had conducted their battle by proxy. In the two intervening years the status of Ger-

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many had changed from that of a passive object, the bone of contention between Moscow and Washington, to that of an active though as yet tacit participant. The repetitiveness of the pattern of East-West negotiations will not have escaped the reader. The London Agreement of June, 1948, to create a West German state evoked the Warsaw demand for fourpower discussions. By the time these discussions took place in May, 1949, Russia no longer wanted to talk. In September, 1950, the decision to rearm West Germany evoked the Prague demand for four-power discussions; and, again, by the time the West had agreed to talk, Russia no longer wanted the conversations. 6. The "European

Army"

Having played his game with considerable skill as to the political and economic partnership with the West, Chancellor Adenauer now used much the same tactics with regard to the terms of military partnership. It was not difficult for him to play the part of the reluctant bride in view of the strong anti-rearmament sentiments of the German people. This feeling was, in fact, so widespread that Commissioner McCloy found it necessary, in April, to warn the German people against "neutralism," stating flatly that the protection of the Federal Republic in the event of war would depend very largely upon its own efforts. Nevertheless, two months later, Drew Middleton reported to the New York Times (June 25) that a public opinion poll in the Bonn Republic still showed 48% of the German people as being opposed to any form of German rearmament, with 14% unable to form an opinion. The state of mind, which Mr. McCloy had characterized as "neutralism," was at this time by no means confined to Germany. The term actually had its origin in France, where a considerable group of French intellectuals — led by the Paris Monde's editor, Hubert Beuve-Mery — favored a policy of neutrality in the East-West power struggle. The French neutralists were in no sense friendly toward communism, but they objected to having France drawn into what seemed to them a sterile struggle for power between Russia and the United States. They were not anti-American, but they felt that the United States was pursuing a policy which might easily bungle Europe into a war, in which France would be destroyed, no matter what the final outcome of the struggle. This neutralist posi-

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tion was somewhat different from the earlier, widely held European view that Europe should make itself into a "third force" between the two giants. Neutralism had no illusions as to Europe's strength. The German version of neutralism was at this time expressed in the phrase, "Ohne mich" (literally, "without me"'—meaning: "If you people are going to have another war, leave me out of it" — or, to use Sam Goldwyn's famous expression, "Include me out"). One reason for this state of mind was the obvious reaction to recent defeat. In addition, however, the anti-rearmament sentiment was in part due to the fact that the German people had been told next to nothing by their Government, either about the reasons for rearming or about the methods and means to be employed. This had the effect of causing those who feared and objected to conscription, but who might have favored an army of volunteers, to vote against rearmament; at the same time, it produced a negative reaction on the part of those who might have been willing to accept selective service but feared that a volunteer force would be composed of dangerous Neo-Nazis and Wehrmacht remnants. While it was true that Chancellor Adenauer's autocratic methods diminished his popularity and influence upon popular sentiment, the resistance and resentment, created by being kept in the dark, became useful assets for the Chancellor in driving a bargain with the Western powers. Dr. Adenauer could use not only the Schumacher opposition but popular sentiment in general as a reason for demanding one concession after another. The Petersberg talks between the representatives of the High Commissioners and the German generals had, as we have noted, received a setback in February as the result of the shift in Western policy occasioned by General Eisenhower's preliminary report. In late April or May, the go-ahead signal was apparently hoisted once more. Since this second change of direction has never been officially explained, one can only conjecture as to what transpired behind the scenes. Although the Pleven Plan for a "European Army" had received the official blessing of the State Department, almost all the professional military men — and, especially, those in the Pentagon — viewed this project with considerable skepticism. I recall in particular one conversation with an American general who scoffed at the

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idea of mixed divisions and multi-national, multi-lingual support. "I k n o w , " he said, "that I would certainly hate to command a mixed division and have to call for air support in one language. and artillery support in another. H o w do y o u think a German brigade commander would like to have his flank covered b y Belgians, his artillery support supplied b y the French, and his air b y the Americans?" W h e n General Eisenhower returned to Europe in order to translate the Pleven Plan into reality, he undoubtedly realized that, with German rearmament postponed according to his own recommendation, the French army and French leadership would have to supply the hard core of W e s t European defense. T h e French army, however, was being drained off into a stalemated war in IndoChina. T h e prestige of French military leadership was low. N o French government seemed to be able to govern with any degree of stability. Since Britain refused to participate in the European A r m y and could provide, at best, only some five divisions as an independent contribution to N A T O , where was the defense force to be found? T h e N A T O commander found himself in the same old mental merry-go-round which had existed ever since the American G o v ernment had undertaken the commitment to defend Western Europe somewhere in central Germany. There were only t w o possible sources of the needed manpower: Germany and the United States. T h e American contribution had been limited, in accordance with General Eisenhower's o w n recommendation, to six divisions — four in addition to the original garrison of two. Moreover, Congress expected that these American troops would remain in Germany only until Europe could be placed in a position to defend itself. Thus, one may surmise that the N A T O commander found himself driven to the very conclusion which he had repudiated in Febr u a r y — the conclusion that N A T O would remain a command structure without an army, unless and until there was a substantial W e s t German contribution. T h a t General Eisenhower was aware of the danger in asking for German contingents before Germany had become firmly integrated in a politically and economically united Western Europe, was clearly shown b y the address which he delivered in London on July 3. Stepping out of his role as a military

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commander, the General made an urgent and eloquent appeal for the immediate political and economic union of the West European countries. On the same day, and certainly not through mere coincidence, High Commissioner McCloy rejected the rearmament proposal of the German generals, saying that it would have to be integrated with the Pleven Plan for a European Army. This turn of events did not altogether fit into the German book. On July 6, Theodor Blank went to Paris to attend the negotiations for the creation of the Pleven Plan army. He demanded, so far as Germany's role was concerned, the acceptance of the Speidel-von Heusinger plan. This demand was promptly rebuffed. On July 9 — the same day on which President Truman asked Congress to pass a resolution formally ending the state of war with Germany — Chancellor Adenauer made a noteworthy speech at Essen. "Germany," he said, was emerging "not only as a member of the Western coalition but as a leader of it." Then he proceeded to define what German "leadership" had in mind. "The build-up of Western power is most desirable," the Chancellor said, "because only in this way can we get back the German East." Dr. Adenauer made it clear that this referred not only to the Soviet zone but also to the "lost provinces." Declaring that "the Russians understand only power," the Chancellor said: "Germany must be strong again, if she is to negotiate with the Soviet Union for the return of these lands." (In other words, German reunification was not to be achieved through four-power negotiation, but by Russo-German negotiations, once Germany had acquired sufficient power!) Meanwhile, however, Germany could grow strong only through agreement with the West. Knowing this, the Chancellor argued for close alliance with the West, but he did not hesitate to state bluntly two German conditions for any such alliance: "Germany will march with the West only with full equality." "Nobody will succeed in separating the Saar from Germany. The people of the Saar should know that we will not let them down." One might have thought that this deliberate unveiling of the German Chancellor's far-reaching ambitions would bring about at least a frank exchange of views as to the nature of the partnership between Bonn and the West and the ultimate purposes of the Western powers. The only visible Western reaction was that Mr.

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McCloy, after a hurried trip to Washington to explain the demands of the German generals, issued a statement urging the German and French negotiators at Paris to reach a compromise. On July 17, Mr. McCloy prodded the Germans once more, telling them that the United States had done about all it could do for Germany, until the Germans were prepared to take acceptable action on rearmament. On July 24, the French chairman of the Paris conference, Hervé Alphand, announced the signature of an "interim report" on the creation of a European A r m y by the representatives of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg. (The Netherlands, which had agreed to participate in the Schuman Plan, at this time followed Britain and the Scandinavian countries in opposing a supranational authority for defense but changed its mind a little later.) T h e interim report recommended that the signatories pool their military establishments and armaments programs under a supranational authority, similar to that contemplated b y the Schuman Plan. These arrangements would include a common defense commissioner, a cabinet, a parliament, and a court of justice. M. Alphand said that the outstanding points of disagreement concerned the size of the basic national units and the level at which the command should be integrated. He listed, among the items on which agreement had been reached: 1. T h e pooling of all defense forces, excluding police and overseas forces. 2. T h e creation of a joint defense fund. 3. A single system of supply and standardization of armaments. 4. A transitional period during which the new supranational authorities will "assume their responsibilities as fast as they are physically able to do so." 5. Units comprising the European force to depend on "integrated echelons for command, equipment, and supply, with an integrated general staff and an integrated air force." T h e next day, the conference proposed that 20 divisions be raised for the European A r m y by 1953. Germany was accorded full equality, but the main point of difference remained unsettled: Equality at what level of command? Judging from the general trend of events, it seemed perfectly certain that in the end the Germans would have the backing of the

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United States in getting 90% of their own way. Were this to happen, it seemed almost sure that Germany would sooner or later become the dominant element not only in the Schuman Plan but also in the European Army. There was still one possible w a y out of this unpleasant and dangerous prospect — provided that the recently inaugurated Far Eastern truce negotiations should bring about a Korean settlement. 7. An " I f f y " Proposal Shortly after the Korean truce talks began at Kaesong in J u l y , 1951, Secretary Acheson made a speech warning the country against relaxing its efforts, in the event that the Korean conflict should be settled. Emphasizing the world-wide nature of the communist threat, he declared that to relax, in the event of a Korean settlement, would be as dangerous as "falling asleep in a blizzard." This was, indeed, one danger to guard against. But there was also another danger, of which our Government seemed almost wholly unaware. Although the rearmament program had scarcely been begun in western Europe, its impact was already serious. T h e Italian elections showed that, in spite of Marshall aid, Vatican support, and American propaganda, the communists were still actually gaining strength, even though they were kept by legal devices from pushing their way into political power. T h e chief reason for this was the appallingly low living standard of the Italian masses which was now threatened by the increased burden of rearmament. T h e French elections showed a slight diminution in the communist vote, but they also showed a marked weakening of the democratic Center and a shift toward the Right in the alignment of power. Here, too, the additional burden of rearmament tended to create discontent and political instability. In Britain, the rearmament program caused Aneurin Bevan and two other members of the Labour cabinet to resign their posts in protest at what they considered the imposition of a burden beyond the capacity of the British economy. One could not help thinking that, if a peace settlement should actually be reached in Korea, a way might be found to meet both the danger of premature relaxation by the United States and the danger of permitting rearmament to undermine the political and economic health of Western Europe.

170

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With peace in Korea, presumably not more than half of our veteran divisions would be required to garrison our Far Eastern bases. In addition, our training program was rapidly producing another ten combat-ready divisions. Assuming that three divisions were to be freed from the Far East and not over four required in this country and Alaska, there would be available something like three American army corps of three divisions each, which might be employed elsewhere. What if these troops were transferred to General Eisenhower's N A T O command? Could it not be that such a move might go far toward meeting both dangers? It would prevent a huge army here at home from going stale and from being subjected to popular pressure for partial demobilization. At the same time, it would add so much immediate strength to the defenses of Western Europe that some of the heat would be taken off the already overburdened European economies. Obviously, the dispatch of nine additional divisions to Germany, if undertaken simply as an accelerated augmentation of the N A T O program, would be highly provocative and inadvisable. But suppose that these troops were transferred not to Germany but to Western Europe, and that this action were accompanied by something like the following declaration: "The N A T O powers are willing to renew negotiations with the Soviet Union for a just and honorable German settlement, providing for the fixing of frontiers, unification under a freely elected Government pledged to safeguard the civil liberties, and freedom for the German people to determine their own destiny, provided only that they seek their objectives by peaceful means. The N A T O powers would favor the withdrawal from Germany of all occupation forces, provided that a United Nations Commission would be appointed to insure continued disarmament and demilitarization. "If Russia agrees to cooperate in negotiating such a settlement, the N A T O powers declare that, pending the outcome, any augmentation of their defense forces will take place west of the Rhine and not in Germany, provided that the Soviet Union will agree not to increase its forces in Germany pending the negotiations. The N A T O powers further agree, if negotiations are resumed, to postpone the inclusion of any west German forces in the Western

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defense establishment, provided that Russia will agree to suspend all training and rearming of East German forces." Would it not be reasonable to suppose that such a move might accomplish the following useful purposes? The creation of a more powerful deterrent to aggression than could be provided for at least two years under the existing program. The reduction of the strain upon the European economies, without increasing the cost to the United States. The removal of a major cause of dissension within the N A T O group. Notice to the German people that there were no Western obstacles to their unification and freedom. The foregoing proposal was published in July, 1951, 2 but immediately thereafter lost its relevance when the Korean truce negotiations were suspended. It is mentioned here for two reasons: first, because it was again to become relevant in 1953; and, second, because it evoked two revealing comments from the Truman Administration. The following letter from the late Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut, expressed a sentiment which undoubtedly had much to do with the Administration's attitude: "I enjoyed very much reading your letter to the Times on the European situation. Some of the points you mention deserve serious consideration and I regret lacking the time to discuss them at length. However, I could not sponsor, directly or indirectly, a plan under which the United States would sign a compact with the Soviet Government for a free election in Germany. We did that in good faith as to Poland and the Soviet Government promptly violated its solemn pledge in one of the most cynical betrayals in history. Any American Government which sponsored such a plan for Germany at this stage would get a very ugly response from the American people." The analogy cited by the Senator was somewhat faulty. In the first place, the Yalta Agreement as to Eastern Europe had been based upon the unrealistic assumption that the Russians would act in good faith in carrying out concessions made to the Western powers concerning an area which was going to be under their 2

In a letter to the New York Times, July 27, 1951.

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absolute military control. In the proposal under discussion, Germany would not be under Soviet military control. The German peace settlement suggested would not rest upon the assumption of good faith but upon the assumption that the Russians would know, once they had agreed to such a settlement, that they could not violate it without precipitating a major war. In the second place, the Senator's analogy broke down because the Yalta Agreement provided no means for supervising and enforcing the promised free elections in eastern Europe, whereas the proposal under discussion did provide for United Nations supervision and enforcement. Irrespective of the flaws in the Senator's supporting argument, his letter revealed the basic fear and distrust of any and all negotiation or agreement with the Soviet Union, which constituted one of the major factors in the making of our policy. The logical extension of this reasoning would have been that, since no agreement of any sort was possible, war, sooner or later, must be inevitable. Another revealing comment came from a State Department official. Explaining why the United States could never agree to the sort of German peace settlement which had been proposed, he said: " W e have complete faith in the ability of Western democracy to emerge victorious from any struggle with communism, when such a struggle is conducted on even terms. However, in the face of communist subversive tactics, with which we are not prepared to compete, a contest on even terms is impossible." In other words, we did not want what we professed to want in Germany. W e feared that, even with free elections and a democratic constitution and even with United Nations enforcement of the peace treaty, the Russians would win control of Germany, unless the struggle were conducted "on even terms"—meaning, unless the Russians ceased to be communists. Therefore, we preferred to go on occupying "our" two-thirds of Germany and to take no chances on democracy. 8. West German

"Democracy"

As a matter of fact, the State Department official just quoted was quite right to fear for the future of Germany — not because of the "subversive tactics" of the communists with which he felt that we were "not prepared to compete," but because the Bonn Republic, under our guidance, was developing into the kind of state which

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would, some day, be fertile soil for totalitarianism of one sort or another. From the economic point of view, the American-sponsored laissez-faire policies of the Adenauer Government were once more creating the kind of nation in which the rich would grow richer while the poor grew poorer. In addition, the American retreat from a policy of destroying or controlling monopoly tended to return the control of Germany to the same groups which had in the past led the German people to disaster. From the political point of view, democratic forms had been created. But the democratic substance was almost wholly lacking. The Government acted like a benevolent dictatorship. The people were apathetic. The Government's "popularity" rested chiefly upon its alliance with the big industrialists and the satisfaction it had provided to German nationalist sentiment by its remarkable skill in finessing its way back to sovereignty and domination of that "United Europe" so eagerly sought by Washington. Even the usually optimistic quarterly review of the American High Commissioner contained the following revealing paragraph in its account of the developments in the last quarter of 1951: "Unhappily, most of the established political parties have been stocking the merchandise of nationalism. Individuals and circles and, in a few cases, even the controlling elements of an entire state political organization, have expressed high nationalistic sentiments, either out of conviction or as a vote-getting device. Even some Federal Ministers have not been above such action . . . The use of the nationalistic narcotic creates the need for larger doses. Worse, the users must ultimately find that they cannot subsist on talk alone but must resort to some action to avoid decline. The consequences of such a course, if long continued, must be general disaster." The suspicion that National Socialism might yet revive and that it had already infiltrated the Bonn Government was not without foundation in fact. On October 16, 1951, Chanceller Adenauer admitted to the Bundestag that, out of 383 employees in his Foreign Ministry, 138 had served under von Ribbentrop and 134 had been members of the Nazi party. The first man appointed to head the foreign section of the Federal Press Office, with the rank of Ministerialrat (Councillor), was Dr. Schwendemann, who had won distinction as press officer to the notorious Otto Abetz when the latter was Hitler's ambassador to France. As his personal assistant, the Chan-

174

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cellor had appointed Ministerialdirektor (Undersecretary of State) Globke — a former legal adviser to the leading Nazi, Wilhelm Frick. Globke had once written an official commentary on the Nuremberg racial laws. The Press Chief to Vice-Chancellor Franz Bluecher was one Gustav Adolf Sonnenhol, an early member of the Nazi party and later a captain in the S.S. The list of former Nazi officials reemployed by the Adenauer Government could be extended to considerable length. The attitude of Adenauer Government and of most of its supporters in the Bundestag was, to say the least, complacent. While the employment of former Nazis might perhaps be condoned on the grounds that no other trained personnel was at first available, there was no indication that any great effort was being made to supplant such officials as soon as new men could be trained. It was a healthy sign that the Social Democratic opposition continually criticized the Government for its laxity, but among the German people as a whole the question seemed to arouse little interest. On the contrary, the new "Socialist" Reichspartei, led by the former Nazi General Ernst Remer, attracted a considerable following on the basis of overt Neo-Nazism. (This party officially disbanded on September 12, 1952, after its propaganda had been banned as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court at Karlsruhe.) Another factor which might well have given more cause for concern than those communist subversive tactics which the State Department so greatly feared, was the rising pressure within West Germany for more unrestricted trade with the Soviet orbit. Our cold-war policy demanded that no member of the Western coalition should permit any potentially strategic materials to be shipped across the Iron Curtain. Beginning with a perfectly logical and necessary prohibition on the shipment of arms or materials to be used in the manufacture of weapons — to which none of our allies objected — our policy had developed into what amounted to a wholesale interdiction of any trade with Soviet orbit. Moreover, this restriction became a matter of coercion, rather than persuasion, when Congress passed legislation conditioning American aid upon strict compliance with this edict. Germany was perhaps more directly affected by this policy than any other European nation, not only because it had traditionally traded in both directions, but because Germany itself was cut in two by the Iron Curtain. There

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was, therefore, a growing resistance, particularly among the German industrialists, to a policy which denied Germany both markets and sources of raw material. A Senate Committee, after investigating the undercover infractions of German traders, reported that the Bonn Republic, in 1951, had become "a veritable open channel for the flow of goods of strategic significance to the East." There were, without doubt, three major elements of danger to be faced if an All-German settlement were to result in the creation of a neutral, demilitarized German nation: There was the danger that this new Germany would be seduced into an alliance with Russia by a deal at the expense of Poland, returning to Germany all or part of the lost provinces. This could be met by insistence upon a partial frontier revision before any new German Government were given freedom to conduct its own foreign relations. There was the danger that the new Germany might be seduced by trade opportunities and concessions. This risk could be reduced if an All-German settlement relaxed the extreme tensions of the cold war and if the Western powers were willing to permit Germany a reasonable share in overseas trade. Finally, there was the danger that an All-German Government might take on the increasingly nationalist coloration of the coalition which governed the Bonn Republic. Although in all probability free All-German elections would result in a victory for the Social Democrats, this would not necessarily reduce the nationalist direction of German policy. The Socialists might reduce the chances of mass discontent by domestic policies aimed at greater social justice and more stable employment; and this, in turn, might reduce the need for chauvinistic slogans as diversions from domestic dissatisfaction; but the Socialists had so far used chauvinistic appeals more freely than the Christian Democrats and almost as freely as the Right-wing parties in the Adenauer coalition. These were real risks. They could not be entirely eliminated. But these dangers were scarcely considered by our Government because of its already fixed determination to keep Germany divided, rationalized by its obsession with the nightmare of "communist subversive tactics." T o contend that the State Department had lost its sense of perspective as to the risks involved in an All-German settlement is

I 7 34. i4 I _ I 4 2 > >45. '47. ! 48, >49150, 153, 155, 156, 163, 169, 177, 185, 187, 194, 198, quoted 203, 204, 207, 208, 211, 213, 214, 239-240, 243, 251, 275, 276, 291 Adams, Sherman, 251 Adenauer, Konrad, 117, 118, 119, 120, 125, 129, 132, 138, 140, 145, 146, 155, 159, 163, 164, 165, 167, 173, 176-179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 189, 193, 194, 203-213 passim, 223, 228, 230, 236-239, 240-241, 243, 264, 284, 292293, 295, 297, 298, 299, 304, 307, 313316; background, 120-123 Adenauer Government, 146, 148, 159, 1 73» '74. 204. 2I 3> 242> 3 0 2 Africa, 2, 3, 56, 75, 273, 319 Allied Control Commission (Germany), 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 50, 62, 117, 133, 246, 258 Alphand, Hervé, 168 American Political Science Association, 127 Americans for Democratic Action, 250 American Society of Newspaper Editors, 290 Anglo-American relations, 14, 34-38; American financial aid, 34-35,47,181 ; on Asia, 37; exchange controls, 47; on France, 37, 58, 159, 261; on Germany. 37. 42> J ' . 55-5 6 . 58, 62, 132, 247, 257, 261; on Middle East, 37; on Near East, 75; post-war change in, 35-36; on Russia, 294-295, 303. See also Council of Foreign Ministers; European Recovery Program; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Western Three-Power Coalition Anglo-French relations: on Germany, 132, 160, 246, 295

Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, 160 Arab nations, 1, 152 Army, U.S., 87, 122-123, 154, 155, 165, 180, 234 Asia, 1, 2, 3, 19, 56, 75, 128, 149, 150, 217, 273, 319 Atlantic Charter Declaration, 14, 15, 17, 26, 245, 255 Attlee, Clement, 20, 21, 49, 143, 255, 2 95 Auriol, Vincent, 232, 240, 302 Austria, 5, 42, 43, 86, 109, 302; treaty, 109, HI, 112, 290 Bavaria, 116, 146, 257 Belgium, 14, 58, 139-140, 157, 168, 189, 233, 282, 293 Beria, Lavrenti, 304, 308 Berlin, 116, 119, 123, 124, 125, 135, 183, 206, 234-235, 246, 313; administration of, 20, 111 ; division into sectors, 65-66; Soviet sectors, 62 Berlin Blockade, 65-69, 70-71, 88-89, 104, 112, 116; Allied Airlift, 65, 68, 71, 112; proposal to end deadlock, 67-68, 84 Berlin Treaty (1926), 121 Beuve-Mery, Hubert, 164 Bevan, Aneurin, 169, 178, 223 Bevin, Ernest, 12, quoted 45, 58, 109110, i n , 119, 132, 133, 142, 143 Bidault, Georges, 12, 45, 64, 240, 257, 2 95> 3 3'5; G e r m a n ratification, 210, 212, 214, 221-222, 225, 228-229, 2 3 ° ' 2 3 2 > 2 36, 2 37 _2 39> 240, 292-293, 304, 307, 314-316; United States ratification, 200, 208209, 210-211, 248. See also European Defense C o m m u n i t y T r e a t y Council of E u r o p e : Strasbourg meeting, September, 1952, 223-224; W e s t G e r m a n membership in, 129, 163, >78 Council of Foreign Ministers, 70, 85, 88, 246; Four-power meetings: Paris, 1946, 30, 33-34; L o n d o n , N o v e m b e r , '947. 54-55; Paris, June, 1949, 109, 110-112, 123; T h r e e - p o w e r meetings: London, May, 1950, 135; N e w York, September, 1950, 142; Bonn, May, 1952, 206; London, February, 1952, 185; L o n d o n , June, 1952, 213; Washington, July, 1953, 303-304, 310, 311 Curzon Line, 17, 26 Czechoslovakia, 3, 46, 48, 59, 135, 189, '99. 234> 246> 249, 252, 254, 264, 279, 285, 308, 313

INDEX Dalton, Hugh, 222 Da vies, Ernest, 162 De Gasperi, Alcide, 117-118, 180, 307, 314—315 De Gaulle, Charles André, 64, 196, 2 57 Democratic Party (U.S.), 215, 217, 249, 2jo, 287, 299 Denmark, 14, 234, 280, 283 Deputy Foreign Ministers, 111 ; fourpower meeting, Paris, March-June, 1951, 162, 168, 198 Dewey, Thomas E., 69 Disarmament, universal, 177, 262-263, 32I> 323 Displaced persons, 12, 26, 246, 253-254, 256. See also W e s t German Federal Republic Donnell, Forrest, 92 Douglas, Lewis W . , 47, 219 Douglas, William O., 150, 215 Dulles, John Foster, 69, 71, 216-217, 241, 251, 275-276, quoted 276, 287, 288-289, 2 9 2 i 293> 294> 295 East Berlin anti-communist uprisings. See East German Democratic Republic Eastern Europe, 3-4, 5, 36, 58 East German-Polish Treaty, 137-138, 176-177, 267 East German Democratic Republic, 6, 26, 162, 176, 204, 273, 279, 302, 308, 310, 314; anti-communist riots, 303, 306, 309, 310-311, 313; creation of, 123-124; economy, 267-268; "Peoples' Police" (Bereitschaften), 129130, 137, 141, 143, 226, 281. See also Allied Control Commission; East German-West German relations; European Advisory Commission; Germany; Germany, Occupation of; Reparations East Prussia, 10, 21, 27, 253, 255-256 East German-West German relations, 10-11, 188, 234-235, 252-253, 307-308, 312-313; Eastern Manifesto, 124-125; on free elections, 204, 205, 206, 214; frontier issue, 175, 176-177, 192; trade issue, 131, 174-175; unification issue, 176-177, 193-194, 226, 314

335

Economic Cooperation Administration, 62 Economist (London), quoted 118, 126, 127, 187 Eddy, Manton, 234 Eden, Anthony, quoted 13, 177, 185, 205, 207, 213, 222, 224, 292, 303 Egypt, 152, 231 Ehlers, Hermann, 226 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 16, 148, quoted 157, 166-167, 182, 216-217, 218, 219, 220-221, 235, 241, 244, 251, 276, 285, 288, 290, 291, 293, 295, 296297, 299-300, quoted 304-305, 306, 314, 315-316; letter to Adenauer, 310-313; survey for N A T O , January, 1951, 154-155, 156-157. 163, .65 Eisenhower, Milton S., 251 Eisenhower Administration, 241, 245249, 250, 275, 276, 287, 288, 289, 292, 3'7 Elbe River, 96, 229 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, quoted 47 Erhard, Ludwig, 123, 131 Eule, Herr, 186 Europe, 7, 75, 108, 128, 150, 180, European Advisory Commission, 16, 246 European Army, 153, 156-157, 165169, 177, 181, 185, 196, 207 European Coal and Steel Community. See Schuman Plan European Defense Community ( E D C ) , 130, 131, 182, 184, 185, 186, 191, 196, 203, 205, 207, 208, 209, 231, 241, 265, 281, 282, 284, 297, 298, 3°4. 3°5> 306-308, 310, 312-313, 316, 326. See also European A r m y ; European Defense Community Treaty; Pleven Plan European Defense Community Treaty (Paris, May 27, 1952), 206, 207-208, 209, 211-214, 215, 248, 275, 292, 293, 305, 307, 308, 314-315, 326; Benelux countries' ratification, 293; British ratification, 211, 221-223; French ratification, 209-210, 304, 307, 315; German ratification, 210-212, 214, 221-222, 225, 228-229, 230, 232, 236, 237_239> 24°> 2 9 2 _ 2 93' 3°4. 3°7- 3 r 4~

INDEX

336

315, 316; Italian ratification, 293, 307, 3H-3I5 European Economic Commission, 289 European Recovery Program, 44-46, 47. 56, 57. 6 ° . 6L> 75I 82, 94, 97, 109, 124, 128, 1 3 1 , 135, 169, 243, 247;

participating nations, 46, 59, 63

F a r East, 1, 77-78, IIJ, 152, 195. See

also China, Communist; China, Nationalist; Indo-China; Japan Federal Republic of Germany. See West German Federal Republic Federation of German Trade Unions,

117, 118, 120, 212, 237, 307

Freitag, Walter, 228 French-German relations, 134, 148, 196, 207, 218, 240, 251, 277; rearmament issue, 146-147, 148, 154, 155, 168, 185, 248, 262-263;

o n

^ e Ruhr,

21-22, 25-26, 27, 2 1 2 - 2 1 3 , 258; o n t h e S a a r , 21-22, 25-26, 27, 64, 129, ' 3 3 . !34I '59. I8 3> 203-204, 228, 236238, 246, 254, 257-262, 278, 314; a n d

the Schuman Plan, 134, 135, 136-137, 140

207, 228

Fette, Christian, 228 Fierlinger, Zdenek, 59 Finland, 48, 101 Flanders, Ralph, 323 Foreign Economic Administration, U.S., 16, 17 Foch, Ferdinand, 257 Foreign Affairs, quoted 264, quoted 265

Fowler, Henry H., 233 France, 3, 20, 56, 58, 60, 75, IOJ, 119, 128, 149; in Allied Control Council, 19, 21, 22; American aid, 45, 209, 232; colonial war, 56, 75, 166, 231, 292, 295, 302; German policy, 23, 24, 25, 42, J5, 88, 89, no, 134, 142; National Assembly, 64, 184; and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 143, 166, 181, 276; political instability, 46, 68, 74, 1 2 4 - 1 2 J ,

Schuman Plan; Reparations; Western Three-Power Coalition Frankfurter Rundschau, quoted 230 Free Democratic Party (Germany),

166, 169, 180, 195,

243, 257, 296, 302, 31J; ratification of London Agreement, 64; rearmament, 169, 177, 185, 19s, 232, 233; security fears, 22, 42, 51, 64, 68, 78, NO, 125-126, 1 4 1 , 143, 146-147, 148, 184-185, 186, 197, 20J, 208, 209, 210, 230-231, 240, 246, 251-252, 260, 2 6 1 -

262, 279-280, 282. See also Allied Control Commission; Contractual Agreements; Council of Foreign Ministers; European Army; European Defense Community; European Recovery Program; FrenchGerman relations; High Commission; Neutralism; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Pleven Plan;

French-Soviet relations, 24,122; French territorial annexations, 27, 42; on Germany, 160, 226 French-U.S. relations, 126, 216; French colonial problems, 231-232; French security issue, 156, 195-196, 246; French territorial annexations, 32, 33, 159, 258; on Germany, 80, 156; Pleven Plan, 156; United States "offshore purchase program," 232-233 Frick, Wilhelm, 174 Gaullists Party (France), 240 German Democratic Republic. See East German Democratic Republic German Party, 118 Germany: all-German government, proposed, 42, 144, 145, 188; allGerman peace settlement, proposed, 251-287; armament issue, 19, 42, 63, 73»

8L

>

85,

93,

97,

143,

262-263;

character today, 5-6, 38, 128, 248; denazification, 19, 248; disarmament, 19, 190-193, 264, 265, 269, 272, 278,

287; economic importance, pre-war, 13; economic organization, proposed, 267-269; frontier issue, 21, 25-27, 32, 42, 85, 246, 252-262, 263-

264, 277-278, 280; international p o -

lice force, proposed, 28; Nazi-, 3-4, 8, 9, 13, 15, 21, 120-122, 258; n e u -

tralization of, proposal for, 68, 203, 252, 254, 263-265, 271-272, 278, 280-

282, 283-285, 313; peace treaty issue,

144,

145,

162,

163,

189-190;

political organization, proposed, 269-

INDEX 271; popular attitudes, 9-10, 50, 130, 154, 252, 271, 283-284, 285; territorial losses, 10, 20-21, 253-254, 286; unification, 27, 50-51, 68, 70-71, 7273, 84-85, 109, u o - i i i , 132, 137, 144, 162, 163, 167, 262, 273-274, 279, 284, 290, 294, 297, 298, 306-307, 313. See also Germany, Occupation of; National Socialist Party, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Western Europe; specific states and cities Germany, Occupation of, 8-38; American zone, 10, 24, 58; Bizonia, 50-51, 55, 58, 63; British zone, 10, 24, 58, 122; currency reform, 65, 66-67, 68, 70, 131; French zone, 9, 10, 21, 24, 63; four-power competition for German support, 32, 67, 71, u o - i i i , 112, 134, 192, 193, 201, 258, 265; four-power disharmony, 12, 14, 4 1 42, 49, 65, 74-75, 137, 197-198, 246; French obstructionism, 22, 23, 24, 65, h i , 124-125, 246; industrial control, 19, 23, 51, 63, 72, 85, 124-125, 144-145; Joint Military Board, proposed, 63; "Morgenthauism," 15-16, 24, 124, 245, 248; political and economic conditions, 10-14, 49-50, 75, 131-132, 190, 246, 253, 256, 290; quadripartite government, 20, 21, 22; Soviet zone, 9, 10, 24, i n ; withdrawal of occupation forces, 33, 6364, 66, 67, 70-71, 85-86, 132, 144, 161-162, 183, 186, 189, 263, 277, 279, 281; zoning, 17-19, 21, 66, 88, m , 246. See also Allied Control Council; East German Democratic Republic; Occupation Statute; political parties by name; West German Federal Republic; specific states and cities Gillette, Guy, 108, 133 Globke, Herr, 174 Qoettinger Arbeitskreis, 286 Grandval, Gilbert, 183, 258 Great Britain, 3, 5, 13, 56, 58, 60, 75, 105, 128, 181, 248; arrest of Naumann group, 242-243; economic position, 34, 47, 109; and European Army, 166, 168, 177, 184, 185, 241242, 243, 247, 283; German policy, 23, 24, 25, 37-38, 88, 109-110, 122,

337

131-132, 142, 204, 294-295; and Greek crisis, 40; and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 143, 166, 182, 263, 283; rearmament, 169, 177— 178, 195, 232, 233-234; and Russia, 160-161; and Schuman Plan, 134, 137, 138-139, 140, 177, 223, 224, 247, 260. See also Allied Control Commission; Anglo-American relations; Anglo-French relations; Contractual Agreements; Council of Foreign Ministers; European Recovery Program; High Commission; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Western Three-Power Coalition Greece, 5, 40, 56, 181, 186; American aid, 40, 60, 61, 74, 243 Gromyko, Andrei, 162 Grotewohl, Otto, 124, 176 Hallstein, Walter, 122, 123, 157, 158, 183, 264-265 Hammarskjold, Dag, 289 Harriman, W . A., 182, 239-240 Heinemann, Gustav, 286 Herriot, Eduard, 230-231 Hesse, Germany, 146 Heusinger, von, Adolf, 154 Heuss, Theodor, 118, 120, 177, 212, 238-239, 292 Hickenlooper, Bourke, 92, 93, 210 High Commission (Germany), 88, 116, 176, 188; Charter of, 88, n ò li 7; quarterly (American), quoted 173; "A Year-end Summary of Rightist and Nationalist Sentiment in West Germany" (U.S. report), 242-243. See also Petersberg Agreements Hiss, Alger, 79, 147 Hitler, Adolf, 5, 6, 118, 120, 122, 124, 130, 242, 286 Hoffmann, Johannes, 133, 236-237, 259 Hoover, Herbert, 52, 147, 250 House of Representatives, U.S., Committee on Un-American Activities, 150-151 Humphreys, George, 293 Hungary, 12, 48, 246, 254, 279 Imbric, James, 104 India, i, 56, 75, 152, 194, 301

338

INDEX

Indo-China, i, 5 6 , 7 5 , 1 6 6 , 2 3 1 , 2 9 2 , Lovett, Robert, 4 7 , 2 3 9 - 2 4 0 295, 302 Luxembourg, 5 8 , 1 3 9 - 1 4 0 , 1 5 7 , 1 6 8 , Indonesia, 5 6 , 7 5 , 1 5 2 282 Iran, 4 1 , 1 0 1 , 2 3 1 Israel, 5 6 , 7 5 , 1 5 2 M a c A r t h u r , Douglas, 1 5 0 , 1 5 2 M c C a r t h y , Joseph, 1 4 7 , 1 5 0 , 1 5 2 - 1 5 3 , Italy, 5 , 1 4 , 4 6 , 7 j , 9 7 , 1 5 7 , 1 6 8 , 1 6 9 , 219, 287-288, 295, 299, 3 1 5 1 8 0 , 223, 233. See also European DeMcCloy, J o h n J., 1 6 , 2 5 , 1 1 6 , quoted fense C o m m u n i t y 1 3 0 , 1 3 1 , 1 3 2 , 1 3 7 , 1 4 0 , quoted 141, 1 5 8 , 1 6 4 , 1 6 7 , 1 6 8 , 1 8 0 , 2 3 0 , 2 4 2 Japan, 1-2, 3 8 , 1 5 2 , 2 0 3 , 2 1 7 , 3 0 1 , 3 2 2 McCormick, A n n e O ' H a r e , quoted Jessup, Philip, 8 8 , 8 9 , 1 5 2 - 1 5 3 , 1 6 2 1 2 3 - 1 2 4 , quoted 2 1 9 - 2 2 0 Johnson, Louis, quoted 1 2 6 M c M a h o n , Brien, quoted 1 7 1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., 1 6 , 19; DiMaier, Reinhold, 3 0 7 rective 1 0 6 7 , 1 9 , 2 0 , 2 3 Malya, 7 5 Joxe, Luis, 2 2 5 , 2 2 6 Malenkov, Georgi, 2 8 8 Juin, Alphonse-Pierre, 2 3 4 , 2 4 3 Malik, Jacob, 8 8 , 8 9 Jutland, 2 8 1 Manteuffel, von, K u r t , 1 2 9 Marie, André, 6 4 Kaufmann, Karl, 2 4 2 Marshall, George Catlett, 3 9 - 4 0 , 4 1 - 4 3 , Kennan, G e o r g e F., quoted 8 0 , 1 2 6 quoted 4 3 - 4 4 , 5 3 - 5 4 , 5 6 , 5 7 , 6 4 , 6 9 , Kiesinger, K u r t , 2 2 4 7'i 77. 93. 2I 9> 2 5 1 « 2 5 8 ; H a r v a r d Kirkpatrick, Ivone, 1 5 5 University address, June 5 , 1 9 4 7 , Knowland, William, 2 9 9 quoted 4 5 Koenigsberg area, East Prussia, 10, 32, Marshall Plan. See European Recov253. 25 287 Pripet Marshes, 6, 279 Progressive Party (U.S.), 104 Psychological warfare, assessment of, 318-319 Queille, Henri, 91, 96 Radical Socialist Party (France), 230231, 240

INDEX Rally of the French People (France), 2

3 '

Rapallo Treaty (1922), 121 Raymond, Jack, 212 Reber, Samuel, 229 Remer, Ernst, 118, 174 Reparations, 19, 29, 33, 42, 43, 84, 144, 206, 246, 253, 266-267, 2®5> 28i>; British demands, 19, 84, 179; French demands, 179; Russian demands, 19, 24, 42, 190, 198, 226, 266-267; United States demands, 19, 85, 179 Republican Party (U.S.), 91, 102, 104, 215, 227, 230, 250, 287, 288, 291, 295, 296, 297, 299, 317, 321 Reston, James, quoted 134, 187, 241 Reuter, Ernst, 207 Rhee, Syngman, 296-297, 298, 299, 316 Rhine frontier, 6, 21-22, 32, 96, 279 Ribbentrop, von, Joachim, 173, 298 Ridgway, Matthew, 233, 240, 241, 243 Roberts, Chalmers, 306 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 4, 14, i j , 16, 17-18, 20, 35, 36, 181, 218-219, 2 4J. 2

4 9

Roosevelt, Theodore, quoted 114 Ruhr, i i , 16, 21, 22, 26, 32, 37, 42, J3, 69. 7 1 ! 72> 75. 85, 92, 123-124, 157, 158, 258, 259, 260, 261. See also Ruhr Agreement; Ruhr Coal Authority Ruhr Agreement, 72, 78-79, 89; evaluated, 72-74, 79 Ruhr Coal Authority, proposed, 30, 63.

7 3 - 7 4 .

" 7

Ruhr Coal Sales Syndicate, 212 Rumania, 4, 48 Russia. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Saar, 26, 32, 42, 58, 64, 129, 132, 159, 167, 177, 183, 201, 203, 228, 231, 236238, 257-262 Salisbury, Harrison, quoted 225-226 Salisbury, Marquess of, 303, 313 Schacht, Hjalmar, 13 Schleicher, von, Kurt, 122 Schumacher, Kurt, 49, 118, 119, 132, 141, 146, 159, 165, 204, 206, 228 Schuman, Robert, 64, no, 129, 132, ' 3 3 .

' 3 4 .

1

38.

i4

2

>

«5

>

8

5 .

204, 205, 207, 208, 211, 213, 228, 231, 236, 240, 307, 315

Schuman Plan, 133-140, 153, 157, 168, 177, 223, 247, 260, 261, 265, 269, 285; compromise, 157-158; Council of Ministers, 223; High Authority, 223; reactions to, 134, 135-137, 140. See also Council of Europe; European Defense Community; French-German relations; Great Britain Schwendemann, Dr., 173 Scott, John, 48 Seeckt, Hans von, 6 Selective Service, 60, 61, 62 Senate, U.S., 62, 87-88, 99, 102-103, 107, 112, 115, 174, 202, 215; Committee on Foreign Relations, 90-91, 93, 101-102, 104, 108, 109, 113, 115, 189, 194, 195, 202, 210, 243 Silesia: Lower, 10, 21, 27, 253, 256; Upper, 10, 21, 26, 27, 32, 192, 253, 256 Smith, Walter Bedell, 62 Snyder, John, 239-240 Social Democratic Party (Germany), 49, 59, 117-118, 119, 120, 123, 138, 141, 146, 159, 174, 175, 180, 193, 204, 206, 207, 211, 212, 213, 224, 228, 229, 230, 236, 237, 238, 241, 263, 264, 270, 286-287, 292-293, 307, 315 Socialist Party (France), 118, 185, 231 Socialist Party (U.S.), 104 Socialist Reichspartei (Germany), 174 Sokolovsky, Vasili, 31, 62 Sonnenhol, Adolf, 174 Soustelle, Jacques, 240 Soviet-United States relations, 40-41, 60; American aid, 4; and the cold war, 68, 71, 131, 134-135, 174, 175, 200, 235, 247, 248-249, 272-273, 309310; on Eastern Europe, 4-5, 59; European opinions of, 69, 164; on Germany, 30-32, 41-42, 43-44, 137, I 53 - I 54, 163-164, 173, 192, 198, 201, 290; Russian opposition to the European Recovery Program, 45-46, 53-55. See also Neutralism; Russia; United States Foreign Policy; United States Policy in Europe Speidel, Hans, 154 Stalin, Joseph, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 43, 68, quoted 124, 225, 226, 241, 249, 255, 256, 274, 287, 288, 308, 321 Stassen, Harold, 241, 276, 293

INDEX State Department, U.S., 8, 16, 17, 25, 30, 40, 63, 77, 79, 80, 83, 87, 88, 98, 99, 122-123, i2j, 126, 128, 135, 137, 154, ij6, 165, 172, 174, 175, 180, 213, 22 4> 2 34 Steel Production, 11, 30, 37, 51, 63, 133, 138-139, 158, 259, 260. See also Coal production; R u h r ; Saar; Schuman Plan Stevenson, Adlai, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220-221, 291, 299 Stresemann, Gustav, 6, 120, 121, 298 Sudetenland, 12 Sweden, 14, 101 T a b e r , John, 52 T a f t , R o b e r t A., 108, 147, 156, 215-216, 217, 218, 219, 287, 295-296, 299 T e h e r a n Conference, 4, 248, 287 T h o m a s , Elmer, quoted 126 Time, 48 Times ( L o n d o n ) , quoted 58, 125, 205, quoted 218-219, quoted 227, quoted 2 37> 2 Ö 4. 2 9 ' T i t o (Josip B r o z ) , 66, 322 Trieste, 5, 24, 163 Tripartite Commission on G e r m a n Debts, 179 T r u m a n , H a r r y S., 4, 21, 34, 36, 39, 40-41, quoted 41, 44, 46, 47-48, 57, 60, 61, 62, 71, 77, 79, 93, 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 , quoted 112-113, 115, 126, 135, 141, 148, 150, 156, 167, 208, 214, 217, 235, 239, 243, 244, 255, 291, 293, 316, 317 T r u m a n Administration, 39, 115, 149, 171, 196, 199, 202, 209, 210, 211, 215, 228, 243, 249, 273, 275, 305, 317, 318 T r u m a n Doctrine. See United States Foreign Policy T u r k e y , 101, 181, 186, 302; American aid, 40, 60, 243 Ulbricht, W a l t e r , 137 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ( U S S R ) , i, 7, 11, 48, 58, 59-60, 97, 98, 106, 114, 115, 126, 145, 150, 160, 197, 217, 308-309; a n t i - N A T O policy, 225, 263, 293; Austrian policy, 43; and the Bizonal Charter, 62; and China, 322; Cominform, 48-49, 66; and the Czech coup, 59, 199; exploitation of Eastern G e r m a n y , 53,

34 1

145, 266; and G e r m a n participation in N A T O , 153, 160, 163, 177; G e r man policy, 23, 24, 25, 42-43, 49, 52, 53, 55, 64, 66, no, 143, 162-163, 176, 193-194, 198, 203, 205-206, 248, 251, 264, 270, 278, 286, 302, 304, 306307, 309; and the L o n d o n Agreement, 64, 65, 66-67; manifesto on G e r m a n y (October, 1949), 123-124; "Molotov Plan," 49, 74; "peace o f fensive," 288-289, 302, 303, 308; Prague proposal, 143-145, 164, 248; proposal of March 10, 1952 f o r G e r man peace settlement, 189-191, 192, 201; and her satellites, 5, 48, 5859, 66, 74, 135, 137, 160, 273, 277, 285, 308-309, 310, 322; and the Schuman Plan, 137; territorial annexations, 4, 7, 10, 12, 21, 26, 27, 32, 167, 192, 246, 253, 254-256; and unification of G e r m a n y , 137; in the United Nations, 68, 152; and a W e s t G e r man Republic, 67, n o , 123-124, 164. See also Allied Control Commission; Berlin Blockade; Council of Foreign Ministers; East German Democratic Republic; G r e a t Britain; Reparations; Soviet-United States relations; W e s t e r n T h r e e - P o w e r Coalition United Nations, 41, 60, 68, 69, 70, 83, 86, 87, 88, 94, 95-96, 140, 149-150, 152, 172, 176, 177, 178, 188, 190, 203, 205, 220, 231, 261, 265, 282, 289, 296, 297, 300, 313, 320, 323 United Nations Charter, 62, 191, 192, 262-263, 301, 323 United Nations Commission on Disarmament, 185, 323 "United Nations Declaration," 14, 26 United States foreign policy, 79-80, 209; causes of post-war failure, 2-3; collective security measures, 62, 81, 107-108, 112, 163; criticized, 6 1 93-95, 114-H5. 2 45 _2 5°> "devil theory," 60-62, 291; disarmament proposal, 85-87; Eisenhower A d m i n istration, 241, 275-277, 287-292, 294295, 299-300, 317-319; effect of 1952 Presidential campaign, 215-221, 228; f o u r - p o w e r mutual assistance treaty (April, 1946), 23, 42, 58-59; policy of containment, 5, 36, 77, 80, 93, 94,

INDEX 247, 316-317; policy of liberation, 36-37, 216-217, 3'9; positive liberation policy, proposal for, 319— 324; Roosevelt-Hull-Stettinius period (1943-1945), 245-246; TrumanAcheson period (1949-1952), 247248; T r u m a n - B y r n e s period (1945— 1946), 246; T r u m a n Doctrine, 40-41, 44-45, 56, 60, 199, 209, 247; T r u m a n Marshall period (1947-1948), 247; and the United Nations, 69, 70. See also Acheson, Dean G . ; Byrnes, James F.; Council of Foreign Ministers; Dulles, J o h n Foster; E u r o pean R e c o v e r y P r o g r a m ; Marshall, G e o r g e Catlett; N o r t h Atlantic Security P r o g r a m ; N o r t h Atlantic T r e a t y Organization; United States policy in specific areas; United States relations with individual countries United States News and World Report, quoted 126 United States policy in Africa, 56 United States policy in Asia, 1, 2-3, 5 6 . 77-7 8 . >5'. 153» 2 i 6 > 25°> 2 94' 296-297, 300-301, 322 United States policy in E u r o p e , 1, 6-7, 49. 53-55. 6 9-7°. 181, 256; aid to W e s t e r n Europe, 47-48, 56, 61, 174, 210, 243-244, 293; criticized, 127128, 149-151, 153, 216; and the Schuman Plan, 134, 138-139, 140, 148, 149, 158; "troops f o r E u r o p e " issue, 153, 157, 161, 170, 210, 280, 282. See also Acheson, Dean G . ; Byrnes, James F.; Council of Foreign Ministers; Dulles, J o h n Foster; E u r o p e a n D e fense C o m m u n i t y T r e a t y ; E u r o pean R e c o v e r y P r o g r a m ; Marshall, G e o r g e Catlett, Military Assistance Bill; N o r t h Atlantic Security P r o gram; N o r t h Atlantic T r e a t y O r ganization; W e s t e r n T h r e e - P o w e r Coalition United States policy in G e r m a n y , 1, 6, 20, 23-24, 32, 53, 56, 88, 119, 133, 146, 290, 292, 312; American troops in G e r m a n y , 93, 142, 154, 156, 166, 178, 208; creation of W e s t G e r m a n state, 52—53, 63, 67, 80, 88, 89-90, 250; criticized, 5-6, 39, 127-128, 147-

148; decartelization, 38; demilitarization, 33, 145; frontiers, 31-32, 201; on German economy, 24-25, 33, 131, 142; on G e r m a n steel production, 51-52; G e r m a n Youth Association incident, 229-230; rearmament of W e s t G e r m a n y , 126-127, ' 4 ' i '45> !4 6 . '53- '54. I 5 5 - ' J 6 . 163, 168-169, 196, 200, 201, 263; revisions suggested (proposal of August, 1946), 25-31; revisions suggested (February-March, 1949 proposal), 84-85; significance of 1953 G e r m a n elections, 314-316; sovereignty issue, 155-156; on unification, 54-55, 78, 85, 109, 145-146, 153-154, 161, 175, 198-199, 210, 214, 248, 249, 305-306. See also Acheson, Dean G.; Allied Control Commission; Byrnes, James F.; Contractual Agreements; Dulles, J o h n Foster, E u r o p e a n Defense Community Treaty; High Commission; Marshall, G e o r g e Catlett; United States relations w i t h other countries; W e s t e r n Three-Power Coalition United States policy in Latin A m e r ica, 2-3 United States policy in Middle East, 2_ 3. 4 ' . 56 United States policy in the N e a r East, 1, 2-3, 152, 153 Universal Military Training, 60, 61 Vandenberg, A r t h u r , 40, 52, 102, 104, 107, 108, 113 V a n d e n b e r g Resolution, 62 Vatican, 75, 119, 169 Versailles T r e a t y , 121, 257 Vinson, F r e d M., 71 Vishinsky, Andrei, 68, 110, 111, 177 W a g g o n e r , W a l t e r H . , quoted 214 Wallace, H e n r y A., 221, 290-291 W a r b u r g , James P., 102-104; G e r m a n settlement, proposal f o r (December, 1952), 251-275; Berlin deadlock, proposal on, 67-68; F r a n c o - G e r m a n frontier, proposal of August, 1946, 25-31; G e r m a n policy, suggested revision of, 84-85; on G e r man rearmament, 127; letter to

INDEX Eisenhower, June, 1953, quoted 298; letter to New York Times, May 13, 1949, quoted 106-108; letter to New York Times, June 3, 1953, 29^~z99\ Military Assistance Bill, memorandum on, 113—114; North Atlantic Treaty, examination and proposed modification of, 80-84; North Atlantic Treaty testimony (Senate, 1949), 93-101; on N A T O appropriations, Senate hearing, 1952, 194202; NATO-Soviet negotiations on Germany, proposed, 170-173; Ruhr Agreement, memorandum on, 7274, 79; Treaty of Europe, proposal for, 85-87 War criminals, 19, 183, 186, 206, 212 War Department, U.S., 8, 16 Warsaw Communiqué (June 24, 1948), 66-67, 7'i 247 Washington Post, 306 Weir, Cecil, 224 Wessel, Helene, 286 Western Europe, 1, 4, 5, 56, 58, 69, 73-74, 119, 136, 219, 252; American aid, 47, 56, 82, 195, 209, 276; defense of, 69-70, 78, 81, 82, 87, 89, 91, 92, 96, 97-98, 99, 102, 105-106, 107, 108, 114, 126, 127, 132, 140, 141, 142, 155, 156-157, 166, 170, 182, 194, 195, 198, 199, 209, 215, 222, 240, 242, 243, 247, 274, 277, 278, 280, 326; economy, 46, 47, 49, 75, 96, 97, 99, 268; Germany's role in, 130, 131, 167, 187, 2 75. 284-285, 297-298, 304, 305, 310; political and economic integration. 157, 167, 224; post-war problems, 3, 11. See also European Defense Community; European Recovery Program; Neutralism; North Atlantic Security Program; United States policy in Europe; specific countries by name Western Hemisphere Defense Pact, 62 Western Three-Power Coalition: guarantee of West German defense, 132, 143; London Conferences, June, 1948, 63-64; negotiation with Russia, proposed (1952), 197-199, 201-202; policy criticized, 22-23, 31; policy in Germany, 14-

343

25, 44, 65, 68, 88, i n , 112, 116, 125, 135, 136-137, 143, 144, 146, 148, 155, 160, 163, 165, 175, 176, 178, 184, 191192, 222, 224, 227-228, 237, 246, 257, 262-263, 270, 277, 284-285, 294-295, 304, 308, 316; relations with Russia, 54. "32> I i 6 > i59-!6o, 163, 164, 177, 178, 189, 191, 205, 213-214, 226, 228, 241, 245, 248, 249, 252-253, 254, 270, 274, 278, 302, 315; United States role in, 17, 213, 224, 227. See also Allied Control Commission; Berlin Blockade; France; Germany; Germany, Occupation of; Great Britain; High Commission; Occupation Statute; Reparations; United States foreign policy, West German Federal Republic West German Federal Republic, 6, 125, 128, 149, 173, 178-179, 180, 234, 248; Bundesrat, 212, 238, 292, 293, 307; Bundestag, 118, 146, 159, 174, 176, 183, 186, 188, 207, 211, 213, 230, 2 35" 2 3 6 . 237> 2 3 8 . 239> 292> 302> 3°7. 3 1 1 ; Constitution, 1 1 1 , 116; creation of, 52, 63, 67, 84, 88, 90, 112, 116, 135; demilitarization, 125, 136, 161, 282; denazification, 125; economic restrictions, 127, 135, 142, 143, 175, 183; economy of, 267; elections, 117-123, 146-147, 193, 204, 229, 304, 307, 311, 312; nationalism, 173, 175, 201, 237, 242-243, 256, 257, 260, 261, 263, 265, 286, 315; neo-Nazism, 293, 315; political parties, 117-118; popular attitudes, 131, 164, 174, 212, 242243, 252; rearmament question, 126, 129, 130, 132, 136, 140-141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 154-155, 157, 162-163, 164, 166, 169, 178, 182, 183, 184, 187, 194, 200, 202, 209-210, 223, 233, 242, 292, 305; refugee problem, 131, 183, 184, 268, 302, 312; religious character, 117, 307-308; role in Western Europe, 130, 132, 136, 142, 148, 155, 161, 196, 211, 247; and the Schuman Plan, 135, 138-139, 140, 157-158, 169, 224; security guarantee, 132, 143, 146, 154; sovereignty issue, 127, 155, 163, 167, 168, 178, 183, 186, 196, 298; Supreme Constitutional Court, 212, 238, 292, 293, 314, 315; taxation is-

344

INDEX

sue, 183-184, 187; territorial issue, 137—138, 186, 252; unemployment problem, 124-125, 130, 268; unification issue, 129, 131, 135, 183, 189, 197, 203, 204, 213, 224, 297, 302, 311, 312, 313-314. See also Adenauer, Konrad; Coal production; Contractual Agreements; Displaced persons; East German-West German relations; European Defense Community; French-German relations; Germany; Germany, Occupation of; Neutralism; Pleven Plan; Schuman Plan; Western Europe; Western Three-Power Coalition White, William S., quoted 102-104

W i l e y , Alexander, 91, 243 Wilson, Charles E., 293 Winner, Percy, quoted 119-120 Wuerttenberg-Baden, Germany,

146

Yalta Agreement, 4, j , 15, 20, 171, 172, 2I 7> 245-24 6 . 2 4 8 . 249> 255> 2ÖÖ> 2 g 7 ; provisions of, 17-19 Yugoslavia, 48-49, 66, 71, 74, 75 Zentrum Party (Germany), 119, 120, 121 Zhdanov, Andrei, quoted 49, 71, 7475 Zinn, August, 229 Zinnkann, Heinrich, 229