German Yearbook of International Law / Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht: Vol. 41 (1998) [1 ed.] 9783428499007, 9783428099009

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GERMAN YEARBOOK OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L LAW

V O L U M E 41 · 1998

DUNCKER

& HUMBLOT

· BERLIN

GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL Volume 41 · 1998

LAW

Founders: Rudolf Laun · Hermann von Mangoldt Editors: Jost Delbrück and Rainer Hofmann A s s i s t a n t E d i t o r : Jill M . Sears Walther-Schücking-Institut für Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel

A d v i s o r y B o a r d of the I n s t i t u t e :

Daniel Bardonnet l'Université de Paris I I Rudolf Bernhardt Heidelberg Lucius Caflisch Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, Genève Antonius Eitel Münster Luigi Ferrari Bravo Università di Roma Louis Henkin Columbia University, New York Tommy T. B. K o h Singapore John N o r t o n Moore University of Virginia, Charlottesville

Fred L. Morrison University of Minnesota, Minneapolis Albrecht Randelzhofer Freie Universität Berlin Krzysztof Skubiszewski Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw; The Hague Christian Tomuschat Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin Sir A r t h u r Watts London Rüdiger Wolfrum Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Heidelberg

GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW JAHRBUCH FÜR INTERNATIONALES RECHT

Volume 41 · 1998

DUNCKER & HUMBLOT / BERLIN

Beginning i n 1995, the Institut für Internationales Recht an der Universität K i e l has changed its name to Walther-Schücking-Institut für Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel.

The views presented are those of the contributors and do not reflect or represent the Views of the Editors, Assistant Editor ; or Walther-Schücking-Institut für Internationales Recht.

This Yearbook may be cited: G Y I L 4 1 (1998)

Please address communications to: Editors German Yearbook of International Law Walther-Schücking-Institut für Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel Olshausenstrasse 40, D-24098 Kiel fax 49 431 880-1619 email [email protected]

All rights reserved © 1999 Duncker & Humblot GmbH, Berlin Printed by Berliner Buchdruckerei Union GmbH, Berlin Printed in Germany ISSN 0344-3094 ISBN 3-428-09900-1 Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem (säurefreiem) Papier entsprechend ISO 9706 θ

Contents Focus Section : International Law in the Information Age: The Law and Policy of Communications Regulation

Klaus W. Grewlich : Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy

9

Karl-Heinz Ladetir: Monitoring and Blocking Illegal Content on the Internet — a German and Comparative Law Perspective

55

Fred L. Morrison:

84

Sex, Lies, and Taxes: New Internet Law in the United States

James M. West: Legal Regulation of Internet Communications in South Korea Peter-Tobias Stoll/Bernd

Goller: Electronic Commerce and the Internet

101 128

John King Gamble: New Information Technologies and the Sources of International Law: Convergence, Divergence, Obsolescence and/or Transformation

170

Articles P. R. Ghandhi: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Fifty Years: Its Origins, Significance and Impact

206

Péter Kovacs: Quelques considerations sur l'appréciation et l'interprétation de l'arrêt de la Cour Internationale de Justice, rendu dans l'affaire Gabcikovo-Nagymaros . . . . 252 Alexander Böhmer: The Struggle for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment — an Assessment of the Negotiation Process i n the O E C D

267

Stefan Muckel: The 'Church of Scientology' under German Law on Church and State

299

Sabine von Schorlemer: Stolen A r t

317

6

Contents Reports

Karsten Nowrot: The Activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Years 1997 and 1998

344

Martin Mennecke/Christian Tams: Die Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 391 Solveig Hansen/Birgit Kessler: Die Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte i n den Jahren 1997 und 1998 439 Tilmann Laubner/Fabian Marschall: Die Tätigkeit des Ministerkomitees und der ParlamentarischenVersammlung des Europarates i n den Jahren 1997 und 1998 492 Jasper Finke/Christiane Wandscher: Die Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 523

Book Reviews Bauer: Effektivität und Legitimität. Die Entwicklung der Friedenssicherung durch Zwang nach Kapitel V E der Charta der Vereinten Nationen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der neueren Praxis des Sicherheitsrats (Nowrot)

555

Becker: Der Tatbestand des Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit (Bodendiek)

557

Betten/Grief:

559

E U Law and Human Rights. European Law Series {H ofmann)

Boyle/Anderson

(eds.): Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection

(Riedinger)

560

Brown Weiss (ed.): International Compliance w i t h Nonbinding Accords (Riedinger)

..

562

Cohen/Deng (eds.): Masses in Flight — The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement; The Forsaken People — Case Studies of the Internally Displaced (Geissler) 563 Farber/Sherry: Beyond A l l Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in American Law (Peters) 565 Fassbender: U N Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto. A Constitutional Perspective (Tams) Gomaa: Suspension or Termination of Treaties on Grounds of Breach (Feist) Grewlich : Konflikt und Ordnung in der globalen Kommunikation (Happ) Hailbronner/Renner

(Hrsg.): Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht (Hofmanri)

567 571 573 575

Contents Hufnagel: UN-Friedensoperationen der zweiten Generation. V o m Puffer zur Neuen Treuhand (Nowrot)

578

Jenisch: Bibliographie des deutschen Schrifttums zum Internationalen Seerecht 1982 1996 (König)

579

Kiss/Shelton: Manual of European Environmental Law (Riedinger) Kreutzer/Scheuing/Sieber

(Hrsg.): Europäischer Grundrechtsschutz (König)

Lailach: Die Wahrung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit als Aufgabe des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen (Tams) Martenczuk: Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrates (Bodendiek)

580 582

584 586

Ress/Bröhmer: Europäische Gemeinschaft und Medienvielfalt — Die Kompetenzen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft zur Sicherung des Pluralismus i m Medienbereich (Tietje) 588 Seelmann-Eggebert: Internationaler Rundfunkhandel — Das Recht der World Trade Organization und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Tietje) 588 Röben: Die Einwirkung der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs auf das mitgliedstaatliche Verfahren in öffentlich-rechtlichen Streitigkeiten (König)

594

Sander: Der Europäische Gerichtshof als Förderer und Hüter der Integration: Eine Darstellung anhand seiner Einwirkungsmöglichkeiten auf die einzelnen Dimensionen des Einigvingsprozesses (Peters) 597 Scott: EC Environmental Law (Hofmann) Talmon: Recognition of Governments in International Law: W i t h Particular Reference to Governments in Exile (Buchenau) GrafVitzthum/Talmon:

599

600

Alles fließt. Kulturgüterschutz und innere Gewässer i m Neuen

Seerecht (Nowrot)

602

Books Received

605

List of Contributors

607

FOCUS SECTION: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE INFORMATION THE L A W A N D POLICY OF COMMUNICATIONS

AGE:

REGULATION

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy B y Klaus W . G r e w l i c h

I n the European U n i o n , the development towards an ' I n f o r m a t i o n Society', 1 distinguished b y state of the art telecommunications 2 and prospering i n f o r m a t i o n content markets, 3 was progressing s l o w l y u n t i l the early 1990s. T h e advent of informat i o n n e t w o r k s w i t h global c o n n e c t i v i t y , 4 however, fundamentally changed the public perception of the commercial, cultural and political importance of the developing digital e n v i r o n m e n t , for w h i c h the metaphor 'Cyberspace' 5 is often used. I t has o n l y been since the appearance of the Internet and the W o r l d W i d e W e b 6 i n particular, that the basis of a commercial m u l t i m e d i a development has been formed. 1 European Parliament, Resolution of 21 November 1996 on new policy priorities regarding the Information Society, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. C 376,1996,1; Alain Dumort/ John Dryden, The Economics of the Information Society, 1997. 2 Klaus W. Grewlich , Konflikt und Ordnung in der globalen Kommunikation — Wettstreit der Staaten und Wettbewerb der Unternehmen (Conflict and Order in Global Communications — Struggle among States and Competition between Enterprises), Law and Economics of International Telecommunications (LEIT), vol. 33, 1997, 47 et seq. 3 Fondation I D ATE, La Société face au Multimédia — Enjeux économiques et culturels pour les Européens — Rapport 1995,1998; Martin Bullinger/Ernst-Joachim Mestm 'àcker ,Multimediadienste — Struktur und staatliche Aufgaben nach deutschem und europäischem Recht, LEIT, vol. 30, 1997, 20 et seq. 4 See Ministerial Conference, Global Information Networks, Bonn 6 - 8 July 1998, Background Report, 1997. 5

Klaus W. Grewlich, Governance in 'Cyberspace' — Access and Public Interest in Global Communications, 1999 (forthcoming). 6

International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Challenges to the Network — Telecoms and the Internet, 1997; I T U , World Telecommunication Development Report — Trade in Telecommunications, World Telecommunication Indicators, 1997.

10

Klaus W. Grewlich

Underlying the perceived 'convergence' 7 of telecommunications, broadcasting, and computer networks/information technologies are the commercial, technological, legal and regulatory dynamics, that are driven by a multitude of factors, notably: — first entrepreneurial vision and will, — second the technological phenomenon of digitalization and the related economic importance of fast declining unit costs pertaining to switching, processing and storing of information, and — third the commercial realignment of market actors both across sectors (horizontal) and along the multimedia value chain (vertical). Intimately interrelated with these developments is the technical and commercial phenomenon that information, communication and entertainment content, whether voice data or images, w i l l soon be 'platform-independent', thus allowing content to be transmitted in ways that are different from today's approach. The technological and economic developments in the field of telecommunications were interrelated with a pressure to reform the legal framework. As a result, by 1999 the regulatory system pertaining to the telecommunications infrastructure has been reformed to a considerable extent due to accomplishments in national, 8 European, 9 and international (notably W T O ) 1 0 legislation, regulation, agreements and arrangements. Global information networks, such as the Internet, had considerably increased this pressure to achieve appropriate legal and regulatory adjustments and reforms and now cause a shift of the focus of attention from technical transmission to content, so to speak from the 'communication infrastructures' to 'knowledge based societies'.

7

See European Commission, Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications of Regulation — Towards an Information Society Approach, C O M (97) 632,3 December 1997 (hereinafter Green Paper on Convergence). 8 For the member countries of the European Union see Squire , Sanders & Dempsey/KnAysis, Adapting the E U Regulatory Framework to the Developing Multimedia Environment — A Study for the European Commission (Directorate ΧΙΠ ), Annex 2, 1998; for the United States see Leon T. Knauer/Ronald Κ Machtley/Thomas M. Lynch , Telecommunications Act Handbook, 1996. 9

European Commission (Directorate ΧΠΙ), Status Report on European Union Telecommunications Policy, 26 January 1998. 10

World Trade Organization (WTO), Agreement on Telecommunications Services (Fourth Protocol to General Agreement on Trade in Services), 15 February 1997, I L M , vol. 36, 1997, 354 (with introductory note by Laura B. Sherman ); see also the assessment contained in I T U (note 6), 98 et seq.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy Access was and remains a key element of the required regulatory adjustment, comprising access both at the technical and the market levels: i.e. notably access to networks and essential facilities; interconnection; access for consumers to the network and to content; access of market actors to the consumers; access of content producers and packagers to networks; access by different market actors to different forms of content. I. Notions: Globalization — Information Society — 'Cyberspace' — Digitalization — Multimedia Value Chain — Convergence Globalization, information society and 'Cyberspace' are political, economic and societal notions; digitalization is a technological phenomenon; and multimedia and convergence are both technological and commercial fields of action. A l l these notions and their implications must be clear, before the legal and regulatory issues pertaining to access to global information networks and European telecommunications law and policy in a cooperative international legal system can be properly addressed. 1. Globalization 'Globalization' is a multifarious notion. It implies particularly first, the worldwide effects of advanced technology in terms of communication and transport, second, free trade, free capital and financial flows, and third, an entrepreneurial and political outlook that is transnational in perspective. Globalization is not to be understood as a reality that has been achieved, but rather a description of a current development and an objective to be reached. While global information networks would in principle allow for worldwide 'information fulfilment', and navigators, browsers and information brokers allow for 'selection in the wealth of information', many people in a number of countries still have difficulty grasping the extent and nature of the changes being brought about and the benefits that the 'Cyber-age' may bring to their lives. For many, these developments represent positive new opportunities and prospects. For some, however, the expected changes w i l l introduce new insecurity and risk. The challenge is to maximize the opportunities while keeping the risks to a minimum. A t present, while many developed nations are experiencing a boom in telecommunications via the growth of new systems and technologies, like mobile cellular telephony and the Internet, the vast majority of the world's people do not have easy access to a simple telephone. Only around 20 percent of the world's 600 million phone lines are located in developing countries, yet these countries are home to 85 percent of the world's population. This grossly uneven distribution of telecommu-

12

Klaus W. Grewlich

nications resources is at its worst in the rural areas, where there is frequently less than one telephone for every one hundred people. 2. The Information

Society

The notion of 'Global Information Infrastructure' 11 used in the United States, corresponds in Europe to the 'Global Information Society'. 12 Both expressions are of a political nature. They convey the idea that in an adapted economic and social framework, i.e. in a liberalized and de (re) regulated environment, business w i l l be able to fully exploit the global opportunities of the new communications environment and develop state of the art networks, services and applications, and society w i l l benefit from an increasing choice of innovative services, reduced prices and new creative job opportunities, which would compensate for employment lost because of the introduction of modern information and communication technologies. Countries and regions attach great importance to a successful transition towards thé knowledge based economy/information society, firstly because the growing demand for technology, information and communications services and for technical as well as artistic software creates jobs; secondly because modern information and communications have a rejuvenating effect on traditional economic sectors, i.e. are significant for the overall economy, and thirdly because of the importance of media and 'information power', i.e. the perception that "stars and stories allow to colonize the imaginations of audiences everywhere." 13 Thus, countries and regions strive to establish the right conditions for the success of future-oriented industries operating in their areas of influence, but with global reach. In April 1997, the European Commission published a European Initiative in Electronic Commerce. One of the objectives of this policy document is "vigorous growth of electronic commerce in Europe" and the strengthening of "Europe's com11 US Department of Commerce, The Global Information Infrastructure — Agenda for Cooperation, 1995. 12

Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper Living and Working in the Information Society, C O M (96), 389 final, 24 July 1996; to understand the policy intentions see also Commission of the European Communities, Growth, competitiveness, employment — The challenges and ways forward into the 21st century, C O M (93) 700, 5 December 1993; Commission of the European Communities (note 7); Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Globalization and the Information Society — The Need for Strengthened International Coordination, C O M (1998) 50 final, 4 February 1998. 13

See for instance David Puttnam> The Undeclared War — The Struggle for Control of the World's Film Industry, 1997; Joseph S. Nye/William A. Owens , America's Information Edge, Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, 1996, 20 - 36.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy petitiveness in global markets." 14 In the same month, Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry released a draft policy paper Towards the Age of the Digital Economy — For Rapid Growth in the Japanese Economy in the Twenty-First Century. This paper postulates that increased investment in information technology will invigorate and transform the Japanese economy. 15 In July 1997, US President Clinton issued the Framework for Electronic Commerce. That policy paper assumes that "commerce on the Internet could total tens of billions of dollars by the end of the century" (!), with sales estimated at US$ 200 million in 1995.16 These papers are important first strategic statements about the Internet and Cyberspace coming from the leading industrialized countries. The documents might also provide some policy orientation for the beginning negotiations on multimedia and global information networks. Thus, the Japanese paper postulates the rapid and prosperous progress towards the age of the digital economy by contrast w i t h the long period of stagnation after the bursting of the 'economic bubble'. The US policy statement refers to the Global Information Infrastructure (Gil), while the European document positions itself in the wider framework of the development towards the Information Society. 17 3. ' Cyberspace ' The metaphor Cyberspace may be conceived as indicating the phenomenon of the 'interconnected, networked planet'. A n 'electronic sphere' of signals, waves and information elements enmeshes the Earth and reaches beyond it. The visible side of this phenomenon is the equipment of electronic systems: for instance terrestrial and maritime cables, satellites, space crafts and planes (as part of military control, command and communication networks), telecommunication towers, earth satellite stations and 'dishes', switching centers, routers, cellular telephones, telephone ter14

Available on-line at http://www.ispo.cec.be/ecommerce/initial.html.

15

Available on-line at http://www.glocom.ac.jp/news/MITI-doc.html.

16

Available on-line at http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/Commerce/ .

17

Commission of the European Communities, Europe and the global information society, Recommendations to the European Council, 26 May 1994; Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Europe at the Forefront of the Global Information Society: Rolling Action Plan, C O M (96) 607 final, 27 November 1996; Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Cohesion and the Information Society, C O M (97) 7 final, 22 January 1997; Commission of the European Communities, Building the European Information Society for all of us, Final policy report of the high-level expert group (Employment & Social Affairs), April 1997.

14

Klaus W. Grewlich

minais, T V sets and computers. Closely tied to this are the 'invisibles', notably the different forms of software, the storage of human knowledge in data banks and expert systems, and 'artificial intelligence' allowing for computation, search and retrieval of information. In the non-territorial, non-geographical 'Cyberspace' where ubiquity and instantaneousness of information are key features, objects recognized through human senses relate not necessarily to physical objects, but are rather, in form and character, made up of data and pure information. This information may in part be derived from the existing physical world, but is derived primarily from the immense traffic of symbolic information — images, sounds and 'impressions' — that constitute the human enterprise in science, art and culture, business and politics. 18 'Cyberspace' may be described here as the invisible, intangible world of electronic information and processes stored at multiple interconnected sites, with controlled access and manifold possibilities for interaction. 4. Digitalization The technological innovation of digitalization has generated a powerful momentum, that eventually leads to global information networks, cyberspace and multimedia. Digital technology allows a wide range of content to be stored, retrieved and transported electronically in the form of encoded19 text, audio and video traffic — w i t h higher transmission speed, better quality and lower cost. This is why telecommunications organizations saw a commercial incentive to upgrade their networks to digital transmission and to develop digital broadband transmission systems, such as those based on 'Asynchronous Transfer Mode' (ATM). 2 0 It has also influenced the decisions of broadcasters to develop digital television and digital audio broadcasting, which provide more efficient spectrum usage, better quality and the potential of upstream channels to develop into interactive services. Digital technologies, i.e. digital micro-electronics, software and digital transmission, play a key role in the creation and packaging of content in both the cinema and broadcasting worlds. The technological/commercial 'laws' that characterize the digitalization process and its impact on global information networks, such as the Internet and its successor generation, are 'Moore's Law' and 'Metcalfe's Law'.

18

Willard Uncapher , Trouble in Cyberspace — Civil Liberties at Peril in the Information Age, Humanist, September/October 1991, 5, 9; Matthew R. Burnstein , Conflicts on the Net — Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 29, 1996, 75, 78. 19

Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital, 1995; Frank Koelsch , The Infomedia Revolution — H o w it is Changing our World and Your Life, 1995. 20

A T M is a high bit rate transmission technology.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy — Moores Law is based on the observation that the maximum processing power of a microchip, at a given price, doubles roughly every eighteen months. That means computer power increases at an extremely fast rate, and conversely the price of a given level of computing power decreases accordingly. — Metcalfe's Law , on the other hand, describes a technological and economic force that pushes the growth of the Internet. As networks grow, the utility of being connected to those networks grows even more. Thus Metcalfe's law says that the value of a network is equivalent to the square of the number of nodes.21 Closely related to this phenomenon, from an 'economics of competition law' point of view, are the effects of 'positive network externalities'. 22 The technological and economic dynamism of the transition towards the knowledge based society, as exemplified by the Internet, is perceived as resulting from the simultaneous manifestation of these two 'laws'. Both 'laws' are seen to intersect in fact on the Internet. The core infrastructure which constitutes the Internet comprises routers (computers designed to receive and forward packets of data), hosts (which store programs and data) and transmission facilities which connect the hosts and routers. These facilities, however, do not form a 'network' in the conventional sense. The constituent parts of the Internet are owned by third parties. Thus, hosts and routers are owned by public and private parties, whereas the transmission facilities are most often owned by the 'operators', the telecommunication companies. As a result, the Internet is a 'virtual' network which in principle is not regulated as such; subject to regulation, however, is the underlying infrastructure over which global information networks operate. In certain cases, parts of the underlying infrastructure, for instance so-called backbones (high capacity lines), are dedicated to Internet traffic.

21

The 'law' postulates that if η people are in a network, the value of the overall network is η squared, given the myriad new connections that can be made to the nth participant. A simple way to understand this is that a fax machine is more useful the more people are connected to it. This is also true of the Internet. (Robert Metcalfe was at the origin of the Ethernet , a foundation of today's office LANs). 22

Telecommunications display, above all, positive externalities: having a phone is all the more valuable if more people have one. Because of this 'network effect', benefits accrue to the existing customers from the attachment of an additional customer. 'Adoption externalities' create economies of scale on the demand side. D. Carlton/J. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization, 2nd ed., 1994; M. Katz/C. Shapiro , Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility, American Economic Review, vol. 75, 1985, 424.

16

Klaus W. Grewlich 5. Multimedia

Following a 'topical method', 23 some features may now be summarized which tentatively would characterize the phenomenon called 'multimedia': — One of those features is the combination of works and activities, which are traditionally classified in different categories, such as texts, image sequences and sounds. A l l of them are transformed into the same format, namely a digital format, and this means that they can be stored on the same data carrier, — e.g. on a C D - R O M — that they can be transmitted via the same communication system very quickly and in a great mass, and that they can be manipulated by the user easily and comprehensively in a varying context. 24 One basic building block is the MPEG range of standards 25 for the digital encoding of moving images. — Another feature is the combination of information technology and communication technology, again as a result of digitalization, thus providing access to information stored in databases. This feature is closely related to the phenomenon of convergence. — The most important feature characterizing multimedia is the principle of interactivity, i.e. the possibility of a dialogue between the user and the information/ communication system used. Thus, multimedia may be regarded as a hybrid of technologies which formerly were used separately but converge as a result of digitalization. Interactive multimedia, thus, is a tentative concept referring to the representation, storage, retrieval and dissemination of machine-processable, digitalized information, expressed in multiple media such as text, voice, image, audio and video. It combines informatics, video and telecommunication. Whatever 'definition', 'exploratory notion' or 'emerging concept' one uses, it is important to understand that multimedia fundamentally is distinguished by three main ideas: firstly , the combination of different types of information; secondly , two-way communication or interactivity; and thirdly, the ap-

23 That is, creating 'topoi' ('pertinent vantage points') around the subject matter to be analyzed, thus looking at it from different points of view in an orderly and transparent manner. 24 For recent developments i n the military area see US National Research Council, Commercial Multimedia Technologies for Twenty-First Century Army Battlefields — A Technology Management Strategy, 1995; US National Research Council (Computer Science and Telecommunications Board), Modeling and Simulation — Linking Entertainment and Defense, 1997. 25

M o t i o n Picture Experts Group (MPEG). The family of standards extends from MPEG-1 to MPEG-4, of which MPEG-2 (studio-quality television and multiple CD-quality audio channels) is the most widely used.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy proximation, substitution or even the convergence of networks, terminal equipment and applications. 6. fConvergence ' The concept of convergence comprises the coming together of content (from the audiovisual and publishing industries), infrastructures (such as those supporting telecommunications services or broadcast television) and the processing and storage capabilities of computers and consumer electronics, servers and terminals. This definition of convergence does not yet correspond to a full reality, but there are a number of developments pointing in this direction. It remains to be seen, whether the information society and the full exploitation of global information networks w i l l be based on comprehensive or only partial convergence.

a) The Concept of Convergence Governments and regulatory agencies are now realizing the need to develop or adjust policy frameworks to become responsive to the potential of a new dynamic marketplace resulting from — advances in technology that enable information highways by creating greater capacity and more power for processing and transporting information 26 — and, particularly, innovative services, such as commonalities between telecommunications, information technology and the audiovisual. There is widespread agreement that convergence, pertaining to telecommunications, information technology and broadcasting, is occurring at the technological level. That is to say that digital technology now allows both traditional and new communication services — whether voice, data, sound or picture — to be provided over many different networks. 27 Developments such as home banking and home shopping over information networks, voice transmission over the Internet, data services over digital broadcasting platforms, web-TV and webcasting suggest, however, that convergence is not just about technology but is about new ways of doing business and of interacting w i t h individuals and society. Some therefore consider that convergence w i l l lead to the complete and rapid transformation of existing telecommunications media and information technology services in such a way that currently separate groups of services 26

Hans Scboof/Adam Watson Brown , Information highways and media policies in the European Union, Telecommunications Policy, vol. 19, 1995. 27

Commission of the European Communities (note 7), ii.

2 GYIL 41

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Klaus W. Grewlich

w i l l merge into one another. Convergence would thus happen on the technological level, at the market level (e.g. Deutsche Telekom's investment in the Internet telephony supplier VocalTec; or Microsoft's take-over of WebTV) or in other cases at the service level (e.g. digital broadcast companies developing home banking). Three stages of convergence may be distinguished: technology and network platforms, industry alliances and mergers, services and markets: — First , technological convergence is already happening, and continuing advances in technology w i l l further consolidate this process. — Second , in addition, many observers indicate a trend towards industry convergence, seen in alliances, joint ventures and mergers which build upon the technical and commercial know-how of their partners. Horizontal joint ventures between firms operating in the same part of the value chain are a well-known phenomenon. In the meantime there increasingly exist various forms of vertical cooperation and concentration involving enterprises operating in different parts of the value chain. — Third , at a comparatively early stage of convergence it is difficult to be precise about services and markets arising from convergence. Many new services w i l l result from an 'immanent' technological and commercial process and may only to a minor extent result from cross-sectoral activities. Other services w i l l be a direct result of convergence and cross-fertilization between telecommunications, broadcasting and information technology. b) Assessment of the Concept of Convergence The responses given by states, regulators, E U institutions, associations, companies and individuals during the consultation period 28 which followed the presentation of the E U Commission's Green Paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology sectors 29 provide enlightening indications on the perceived nature and pace of convergence, the economic and social impact of convergence, possible barriers to convergence and specific regulatory issues pertaining to convergence, such as market entry and licensing, access issues,

28 Commission of the European Communities (Directorate-General X/Information, Communication, Culture, Audiovisual Media; Directorate-General ΧΙΠ /Telecommunications, Innovation and Exploitation of Research), Working Document of the Commission — Summary of the Results of the Public Consultation on the Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors: Areas for further Reflection, SEC (98) 1284, 29 July 1998. 29

Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Convergence (note 7).

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy the frequency spectrum, standards, pricing, consumer interests, public interest objectives and the international context. While there was widespread recognition that technological convergence was a reality, and convergence of fixed and mobile communications was seen as particularly relevant, there was broad agreement that the future digital environment was more likely to be characterized by diversity and competition between different services supplied over a number of networks than by a single pipe or network through which all services would be delivered. A range of concrete examples of new developments were cited, such as the use of cable television networks to provide Internet access or normal telephone services, the delivery of more than 650 (mostly local) broadcasting stations over the Internet ('webcasting'), the large number of broadcasters and newspapers ('electronic publishing') that have their sites on the World Wide Web. Electronic commerce was seen as developing rapidly w i t h the introduction of electronic payment cards for home shopping and the take-up of home banking packages. Others pointed to the strong growth in second phone lines and I S D N as signs of greater use of on-line services. There was broad acknowledgment that comprehensive convergence, however defined, was an evolutionary process, at an early stage and characterized by uncertainty. Moreover, clear differences were seen between sectors in the extent and speed of convergence. As is normal in a competitive market, uncertainty prevailed with regard to which technologies would be successful, which markets would be commercially viable and, notably, what users actually were looking for. In view of experiences with technological/commercial top-down approaches, such as I S D N 3 0 or 'BTX', 3 1 and early trials of video on demand services in the US and Europe, which despite their technical feasibility, had not attracted a great deal of consumer support, particular stress was placed on the fact that companies would only be successful in the market if they offered userfriendly content and services which people actually wanted. A wide variety of views was expressed about the interrelationships between convergence and the regulation of telecommunications, information technology, publishing and the audiovisual.

7. The Multimedia Value Chain — Platform Independence The 'multimedia value chain' and 'platform independence' are two notions that are intimately intertwined with developments described as convergence. Fully understanding these concepts is of key importance for dealing in the following with

30

Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN). In the beginning I S D N was conceived as a 'monopoly strategy' and not sufficiently user-oriented; i n the meantime I S D N has become successful. 31

2*

Bildschirmtext.

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Klaus W. Grewlich

access to global information networks from the perspective of European communications law and policies in a cooperative international legal system. a) The 'Multimedia Value Chain' Typical for the value chain in the traditional telecommunications and broadcasting sectors were the delineations of separate markets, in which monopoly providers often dominated several levels of the value chain and as owners of the pertinent infrastructures controlled the relationship with customers. Even after considerable liberalization and de (re) regulation measures, in many markets, the former incumbents have still maintained a considerable amount of infrastructure-based market dominance. Instruments for maintaining this position are: the control of billing relationships and delivery mechanism to the customer as well as of privileged access to information, for instance on calling patterns and customer spending. O f great importance in the respective national markets, but also for transborder activities and international direct investment, is the incumbent's ability to leverage the position as the 'historical national infrastructure provider'. However, the traditional value chain, implying obstacles and separation of markets, as just described, is a matter of the past. For a number of reasons these value chains will not retain their current separation or structure in the new multimedia market: — Digitalization allows the telecommunications and the broadcasting infrastructure to carry the same services; it thus erodes the distinction between separate markets. — Open network architectures, as exemplified by the Internet, are freeing service providers and content packagers from the control of infrastructure owners; — particularly as service provision is becoming 'unbundled' from infrastructure provision. — Content providers may establish direct access to the customers, e.g. via electronic commerce. Thus, the market power for content creators/originators and packers increases. As a result of the liberalization and deregulation of telecommunications markets leading to the introduction of stronger competition, the termination of a number of cross-subsidiary mechanisms, and the crumbling of the international accounting rate and settlement system, a new value chain is emerging: 32 It reaches from the content originator over the content and services packaging entity, to the service provider, the infrastructure operator and finally the user. 32 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Convergence (note 7), 2; Squire, Sanders & Dempsy/Analysis (note 8), 87 - 88.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy The communications 'infrastructure' is now tending to become a 'commodity' market. The economics of the new market implies high levels of concentration and low margins. Enterprises strong and large enough to gain the necessary 'economies of scale' may survive in such markets; smaller companies must find 'niche opportunities'. But also the larger enterprises w i l l find it important to attempt upward integration on the value chain and bundle, if possible, infrastructure with higher level services and some content packaging. Telecommunications organizations, thus, try to broaden their business scope and to enter market segments where margins are still higher and vulnerability is smaller. Simultaneously, powerful new entrants from the computer industry are entering the telecommunications market. Service provision, which was often bundled together w i t h infrastructure, will in many cases become a distinct category in itself. This may be observed in the applications pertaining to the Internet and related software which allow enterprises to deliver services without owning a complete telecommunications network themselves. Content packagers bundle service delivery with service packaging. Service provider competition may, on the other hand, lead packagers to 'unbundle' the pricing of content packages from service delivery. Broadcasters will no longer have a unique delivery mechanism for their content and may have to allow other packagers and content originators direct access to their multimedia service delivery platforms. Content originators may choose to offer their work directly to the public. Such bundling and unbundling activities 33 mean that 'flows of money' in the future multimedia market will be fundamentally different from what they are today as a number of actors on the value chain, who in the past owned 'their' customers, w i l l be bypassed. Content w i l l become even more important in the new emerging market structure. A challenging question is whether telecommunications organizations, broadcasting companies and information technology manufacturers will carry over into the age of cyberspace the same degree of market power that they have today. This very much depends upon their strategic and commercial abilities to take advantage of the new 'mobility flexibilities' on the multimedia value chain. It of course also depends upon future legal frameworks and regulatory practice. In any case the existing relationships between the different partners and competitors are changing and the position of today's leading companies may, therefore, be substantially different in mature multimedia markets.

33 Klaus W. Grewlichj Regulation — Its Impact on Bundling, in: Conference IQPC, Bundling Telecommunications Services, 23 - 24 March 1997.

22

Klaus W. Grewlich b) Platform Independence

In the digital multimedia environment, 'platform independence' means that digitalization, and notably the Internet Protocol (IP standard), enable a wide range of multimedia services to be delivered to the customer, independent of what platform, i.e. network, the customer is using and independent of whether the customer's terminal is a PC, T V or a multimedia mobile handset or whatever 'technology mix' of these. Content and information providers, as well as service/access providers — along the value chain — in a 'compete and/or cooperate mode' will have a variety of alternative facilities through which to distribute their digitalized work and carry out their digitalized transactions. The ideal of platform independence and 'convergence' is a bit stream comprising varying forms of electronic communication in which information can be stored manipulated, and exchanged over various (competing) communication networks and delivered on demand to individual users' computers or 'multimedia' equipment. Thus, at the same time as reductions as to the relevance of time and distance occur, it is a particularly pertinent element in the transition to 'Cyberspace' that IP and related protocols may work with different platforms and delivery mechanisms. This has been recognized by firms operating at the different levels of the value chain, from PC manufacturers to content providers. The beginning multimedia 'terminal battle' is one of the more visible aspects of this development towards platform independence. W i l l the future multi-functional multimedia terminal look like a T V receiver or a personal computer or an upgraded telephone network computer? The answer to this question should be given by the play and counter play of free competition and market forces in an adequate (minimum) regulatory framework.

I I . E U Telecommunications Law — The Regulation of Access Competition, liberalization and deregulation have been the major causes of the development towards the coalescence/'convergence' of telecommunications, computing and broadcasting at the network level and the resulting dynamics on the multimedia value chain. But conversely, as the emerging new reality of 'convergence' feeds back to the regulatory environment and as this resulted in regulatory inconsistencies, the necessity to achieve a certain amount of 're'-regulation, i.e. some adjustment of existing regulatory schemes, was recognized. As these processes are interrelated, the notion of 'de(re)regulation ' is used, whenever these interrelations and feedback processes are referred to. In an open and competitive economic environment the functioning of the market can be left to the invisible hand. Specific sectorial competition-related de(re)regulation is not needed and thus, if specific regulation remains, it may be phased out.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy General antitrust laws and competition policy may suffice to safeguard the integrity of market forces. Telecommunications, however, is characterized by market failures. These pertain mainly to network externalities and to the market power that the incumbent telecommunication companies continue to enjoy, even after liberalization. Market failures call for pro-competitive de (re)regulation. But the kind of regulation to adopt in a liberalization context of transborder and global relevance is a controversial issue. A multi-layered approach may be needed, comprising the national and regional (European) levels, and the international/global level (e.g. the World Trade Organization (WTO)).

1. Regulatory

Challenges — Overview

Convergence is a complex challenge for public regulators. For them it w i l l be less possible to separate telecommunications from networked computer based communications and global information networks such as Internet and electronic media and content. These w i l l at the level of technology and network infrastructure eventually melt down into something deeply converging, a stream of data. But this stream is likely to flow not in one pipe but in many network-independent pipes competing with each other. There is likely to be as much interdependence and convergence as competition of business activities. This does not mean that convergence of either markets (in terms of economic actors involved) or services and service content immediately follows. But to regulate this secular, fast evolution, an integrated, or at least interrelated, approach with a strong cooperative international dimension is needed. What entices regulators to regulate; what are the reasons for regulating? Observation tells us that these mainly are citizens'/users' needs; the competitive situation; network technologies and market trends; industry relationships and roles; and the emergence of multimedia alliances. The critical question is whether the development of new services and new business opportunities could be hindered by the existence of a range of barriers, including regulatory barriers at different levels of the value chain and converging markets; and whether governments and regulators w i l l be wise enough to avoid such constraints? What regulatory rules, then, should or will govern behavior within the global networked environment? What shape, for instance, should copyright protection take as instantaneous undetectable copying becomes possible? Should the "right to receive and impart information and ideas" (Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 34 comparable to the First Amendment to the US Constitution 35 ) 34

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 5 ETS 1; P. van Dijk/G. J. H. van Hoof> Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd ed., 1990. 35

"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . .

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Klaus W. Grewlich

encompass a right to send encrypted messages that are for all intents and purposes immune to eavesdropping by law enforcement? What standard of liability should be imposed on system operators and service providers in regard to the availability of 'obscene' material? W i l l and should these questions be answered with a focus on substantive rule-making, 'legal centralism' or is 'decentralized' law-making and social control, i.e. self-regulation, both in industries and network communities, possible and adequate? In addition, it is important to look at the following areas that become prominent: these are access issues including backbone access, local access and user interface; on another level, there are the developments pertaining to the Internet domain name system (DNS); and last but not least, what regulatory schemes w i l l allow advantage to be taken of new business opportunities, such a 'creative bundling' under conditions of convergence? The advent of 'Cyberspace' and the promotion of a flourishing multimedia market require even more key regulatory issues, of a fundamental nature, to be tackled: Is infrastructure-based regulation still the right model, or should regulators apply a 'services based model'? Does the existing static model of 'vertical regulation' (separating telecommunications from broadcasting and publishing) require a re-evaluation; and if yes: how to avoid the extremes of overregulation or minimum, i.e. standard, regulation with unjustifiable arbitrary effects; which market players would actually deserve under what circumstances legal protection to ensure competition? Should political decision makers consider a horizontal approach (having for instance understood the importance of platform independence and of emerging alliances) and should they seek to regulate key common issues which cut across the vertical lines of sectors to facilitate the take-off multimedia and cyberspace? Would this approach provide for an optimum of new commercial opportunities, while avoiding abuse of market dominance? To what extent may regulation be used as a tool to achieve industrial, social and cultural objectives in a highly competitive environment?

2. From Monopolies to Full Competition — Telecommunications Regulation in the European Union

Policy and

As of 1 January 1998 telecommunications services in Europe have been liberalized. 36 This is the result of concentrated and sustained political, legal and regulatory efforts that had their starting point in 1987,37 when the Commission of the Euro(The Constitution of the United States of America, First Amendment). 36

Joachim Scher er, Telecommunications Laws in Europe, 3rd ed., 1995.

37

There was an 'introductory phase' of European involvement in telecommunications from 1984 to 1987, that witnessed the beginning of E U initiatives in telecom, w i t h an action

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy pean Communities (EC) launched a Green Paper on telecommunications. 38 A t that time, with the exception of the United Kingdom, the European telecommunications industry was organized in state monopolies along national boundaries. Indeed, for most of the post-war period it had been conventional wisdom that the market failures in the utilities industries were so great as to merit state ownership, vertical integration and monopoly. 39 The EC Treaty did not mention Télécommunications' as such. What was, then, the rationale that made the EC Commission feel that it was time to dismantle the national monopolies? A t least four reasons may be identified. 40 Firstly , because of the pervasive force of digitalization a heavily regulated market (telecommunications) and an almost unregulated market (computers, information technology) were coming close to each other; — but, which regulatory regime should prevail? Secondly, the existence of national monopolies is not compatible with the EC Treaty's legal objective of a single internal market. With national barriers telecommunication costs are higher within the EC, putting European companies at a disadvantage as they compete on global markets. In addition, the less than satisfactory performance of monopolies, not only in cost but also in quality, was recognized, as the monopolies were unable to provide the plethora of new products and services available. Thirdly , some Member states had recognized the necessity to privatize their T T T monopolies' in order to finance the huge capital outlays required in the telecommunications sector. Fourthly y the United States, having liberalized to some extent the American communications market and divested A T & T , 4 1 started an effort in terms of Reciprocity' to open foreign markets; — named 'Market Access Fact Finding Missions' (MAFF), to avoid the impression of 'trade in services negotiations'. In program to coordinate the future development of ISDN, digital mobile communications, precompetitive R & D activities, and the establishment of common standards to facilitate network connectivity; see Klaus W. Grewlich y Europa i m globalen Technologiewettlauf — Der Weltmarkt wird zum Binnenmarkt, 1992, 49 et seq. 38 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment — Towards a Dynamic European Economy, C O M (87) 290,30 June 1987. The objectives of liberalization stated in the paper are: the creation of an internal market (harmonious development of economic activities); the increase of user benefits (better quality at lower cost); the enhancement of the competitiveness of the European economy (impact on the trade of services i n general and the location of economic activities). 39 D. Helm/T. Jenkinson , The assessment: Introducing competition into regulated industries, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 13, 1997, 1. 40

1, van Bael/J. F. Bellis , Competition Law of the European Community, 3rd ed., 1994; Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (ed.), Kommunikation ohne Monopole Π — Ein Symposium über Ordnungsprinzipien i m Wirtschaftsrecht der Telekommunikation und der elektronischen Medien, Law and Economics of International Telecommunications, 1995, 116 et seq. 41

Steve Coll , The Deal of the Century - The Breakup of A T & T , 1986.

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Klaus W. Grewlich

fact these M A F F talks put pressure on the European Communities and its Member States and contributed to the liberalization of the European telecommunications markets — in the pursuit of enlightened economic self-interest. Thus, within a decade, telecommunications in the European Communities have undergone a complete reshaping pertaining to the legal and economic environment, and gone from a monopolistic regime to full competition. The 1992 Single Market goal played an important part in the policy shift, supported by mainstream economic liberalism, the extraordinary technological breakthroughs which occurred from the 1970s onwards, and the landmark ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the British Telecom 42 case which confirmed the application of competition rules to the telecommunications sector. The legal and regulatory opening up of the telecommunications markets was undertaken on a step-by-step basis following particularly the strategy developed in the '1992 Review of the telecommunications services sector', 43 on the basis of a three pronged approach: — Liberalization Directives adopted by the Commission under the competition rules of Article 90(3) EC Treaty, namely the Satellite Communications Directive, the Cable T V Directive, the Mobile Directive and the Full Competition Directive. 44 These were accompanied by:

42

Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission , 1985 ECR 873. T w o subsequent cases upheld the legality of Commission — as opposed to Council — directives, which where used to open the markets for equipment and services respectively. These judgments allowed the Commission to sidestep important political obstacles to liberalization; see Cases C-202/88 French Republic v. Commission, 1991 ECR 1-1259 and Joint Cases C-271/90, C-281/90, C-289/90 Spain etal. v. Commission, 1992 ECR 1-5859. 43

Commission of the European Communities, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the consultation on the review of the situation i n the telecommunications sector, C O M (93) 159, 28 A p r i l 1993; — on the basis of Commission of the European Communities, 1992 Review of the situation in the telecommunications sector, SEC (92) 1048, 21 October 1992. 44 EC Directive 94/46 of 13 October 1994 amending EC Directive 88/301 and EC Directive 90/388 i n particular w i t h regard to satellite communications, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 268, 1994, 15; EC Directive 95/51 of 18 October 1995, amending EC Directive 90/388 w i t h regard to the abolition of the restrictions on the use of cable television networks for the provision of already liberalized telecommunications services, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 256, 1995, 49; EC Directive 96/2 of 16 January 1996 amending EC Directive 90/388 w i t h regard to mobile and personal communication, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 20, 1996,59; EC Directive 96/19 of 13 March 1996, amending EC Directive 90/388 w i t h regard to the implementation of full competition i n telecommunications markets, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 74, 1996, 13.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy — Harmonization Directivesunder Article 100a EC Treaty of the Council, and from 1993 of the Parliament and the Council. A t the same time the ongoing liberalization of European telecommunications was reinforced through the — Application of competition rules set out in Articles 85 and 86EC Treaty (including Regulation 17 and merger control). 46 After the removal of legal barriers and the introduction of full competition in telecommunications, the effectiveness of competition in 'real life' will have to be ensured. There are three major areas47 where the structure of European telecommunications markets will have to be monitored, to ensure that the benefits of liberalization are fully realized. These areas are: first , access and interconnection; second , restructuring and strategic alliances; and third , convergence and multimedia. 48 a) The Significance of Access and Interconnection Access to networks and to customers is one of the key regulatory issues. In a competitive multimedia environment the terms and conditions pursuant to which interconnection and access is obtained to one another's networks will determine the degree of effectiveness of market forces. Platform independence and interconnection are essential, and if they were fully realized market forces could freely play. For a number of reasons, however, there w i l l remain for some time bottleneck problems

45 The Liberalization and Harmonisation Directives are listed in: European Commission (Directorate ΧΠ Ι), Status Report on European Union Telecommunications Policy and reproduced in: European Commission (Directorate General ΧΠΙ), Official Documents of Community Telecommunications Policy, 1996, update 1998. 46

See, e.g., EC Commission Decision Case No. IV/34.857 (BT-MCI) of 27 July 1994, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 223,1994, and other Commission actions, including Decisions under Regulation 17/62 (Art. 85/86 EC Treaty) and under Regulation 4064/89 (Merger control) reproduced in: European Commission (Directorate-General I V — Competition), Official Documents, Community Competition Policy i n the Telecommunications Sector, 1998; see also Commission of the European Communities, Guidelines on the application of EC competition rules in the telecommunication sector, Official Journal Eur. Comm., N o . C 233, 1991; David R. F. Cox y European Competition Law, in: Management Center Europe, Global Management 1996, 88 - 95; Bellamy & Child , Common Market Law of Competition, 4th ed., 1993. 47

As indicated by the Member of the E U Commission responsible for competition Karel van Miert y Mapping the New Open Telecommunications Marketplace, E C Telecommunications Forum, 7 July 1997; speech available on-line at http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/ speech. 48

This part of the contribution addresses the first of these issues; as regards the other two (strategic alliances and multimedia/'cyberspace') see sources cited supra (notes 2, 5).

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Klaus W. Grewlich

concerning access to customers. This is because of the situation in the local loop of telecommunication networks. It is generally assumed that a limited number of access routes to individual users w i l l prevail for the near future. This in principle would justify regulatory open access requirements to be applied to local loop infrastructures. Such regulation is seen as an essential requirement for stimulating effective service-based competition. Increasing entrepreneurial 'mobility' on the multimedia value chain (reaching from the content originator over the content and services packaging entity, to the service provider, the infrastructure operator and finally the user) advocates ensuring access by content providers to the available distribution channels. Thus, many of the commentators that participated in the public consultation on the E U Green Paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology sectors,49 supported nondiscriminatory access by operators to digital television platforms 50 and argued that these principles should apply to access systems in general. Many commentators also called for a consistent set of rules to be applied to digital gateways, namely access to customers through 'conditional access systems', navigation and operating systems e.g. set-top boxes, electronic program guides (EPGs) and application program interfaces (APIs). Such open access may not only be needed for reasons of fair competition and consumer choice but also to ensure plurality in terms of freedom of expression and information of citizens. A n overriding legal and regulatory issue here is whether specific regulation to guarantee non-discriminatory access and competition is really needed or whether access issues could be best resolved by application of the competition rules, particularly Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, building on evolving concepts of 'essential facilities'. Thus, the issues pertaining to network effects and 'network externalities', regulatory rights of access and obligations to provide access, the application of competition rules under EC law have to be scrutinized in the following sections. The regulatory solutions, as established by the O N P Interconnection Directive, 51 and its links with the competition rules of the EC Treaty receive particular attention. 49

Commission of the European Communities (Directorate-General X /Information, Communication, Culture, Audiovisual Media; Directorate-General ΧΙΠ /Telecommunications, Innovation and Exploitation of Research), Working Document of the Commission — Summary of the Results of the Public Consultation on the Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors: Areas for further Reflection, SEC (98) 1284, 29 July 1998, 6 - 7. 50 As provided for i n European Parliament and Council Directive 95/47/EC of 24 October 1995 on the use of standards for the transmission of television signals, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 281, 1995,51. 51 EC Directive 97/33 of 30 June 1997 on Interconnection in Telecommunications w i t h regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the principle of Open Network Provision (ONP), Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 199, 1997, 32 (hereinafter O N P Interconnection Directive).

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy b) Network Effects and Network Externalities Like switched telecommunication services, interactive computer network services rely on the complex multi-layered telecommunications infrastructure. What is the architecture of a telecommunications network? In simple terms, the local fixed network, also called the local loop, links the end user to a local exchange. Local exchanges are linked by transmission lines to a trunk exchange. High capacity trunk lines link trunk exchanges to each other. Some of the latter are connected to the international network (comprising maritime cables and satellites). In addition, apart from cable networks, there are mobile communication networks, computer networks and broadcasting networks. Global information networks, such as the Internet, the Network of networks', function on top of the existing telecommunications architecture. There are routers and servers; there may be also special backbones, to conduct high capacity traffic. 52 Competition in many parts of the network may develop through 'alternative telecommunications infrastructures', such as the ones already existing in other utilities, for instance railways or energy. A certain degree of intermodal competition is developing; mobile telephony is the most obvious example. Technically, telecommunications networks are one functioning body, the biggest machine that mankind has ever built. From a strictly business economics point of view, however, telecommunications networks are not homogeneous; the local loop network is economically different from the long distance network. This is to a great extent because of cost structures. 53 Networks involve important fixed costs, which are sunk; moreover they represent a considerable share of the total cost of providing telecommunications services. Intermodal competition does not change the basic fact that sunk costs remain important. The local loop links in principle only one 'user* to the rest of the network. The function cost of residential local loops, therefore, is much different compared to high capacity transmission lines with obvious economies of scale. While in other parts of the network, particularly in the long distance lines, competition 'between* networks is sensible and free market forces may entail price reductions and better quality, in the local loop the total output may be produced most cost-effectively by a single firm rather than by several ('natural monopoly'). Thus, in industries like

52

A short introduction to network configuration and the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model is contained i n Thomas Kiessling, Optimale Marktstrukturregulierung in der Telekommunikation — Lehren aus den USA und anderen Ländern für die EU, LEIT, vol. 34, 1997, 21 et seq. 53

1994.

See for instance W. J. Baumol/J. G. Sidak , Toward Competition in Local Telephony,

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telecommunications that are clustered around networks, competition is bound to be imperfect. End users w i l l most probably keep being connected to one single network, at the most two, i.e. a wire based and a mobile. However, this is not to say that there should be a systematic policy that would exclude more competition in the local loop. Costs of duplicating networks may have to be assessed against the longer term benefits competition may give in terms of price reduction and increases in efficiency and quality. The point here is that while only one firm produces, many others must have access to the local loop! As the 'natural monopoly* has no or only a limited economic interest to grant access to others, there is thus a case for regulation! Interconnection and access to the customer on reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions must be guaranteed by the legal framework and enforced by specialized regulators. The importance of guaranteeing interconnection is enhanced by the economic phenomenon of 'network externalities\ 54 In a nutshell, 'externalities' result from actions of the collective, and benefit or harm every member of that collective without any of them taking these directly into account in its economic decisions. Externalities are "goods or bads that are not priced in a market." 55 A well-known negative externality is pollution. Telecommunications display above all 'positive externalities'. Having a phone is all the more valuable when more people have one. Because of this 'network effect', benefits accrue to the existing customers from the attachment of an additional customer. 'Adoption externalities' create economies of scale on the demand side. The externality is reflected in the number of calls made between any existing nodes and the new node. O n the other hand, services provided over a partial network are of little attraction to potential subscribers. Network externalities lead to considerable first-mover advantages, which may act as a barrier to entry. A n instance of a 'first mover advantage' may be observed in the complex investigations at the US Department of Justice against the firm Microsoft. As the computer software Windows is so widespread it might be difficult for any system to enter the market — even if it were of better quality. The negative side effect of 'positive externalities', as far as competition between the incumbent network and new entrants are concerned, raises the case for 'interconnection . Without interconnection a small network would be severely disadvantaged relative to a large one. For new entrants of telecommunications markets inter54

Telecommunications display positive externalities; 'adoption externalities' create 'first mover' — advantages; see M. Katz/C. Shapiro , Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, American Economic Review, vol. 75, 1985,424; D. Carlton/J. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organisation, 2nd ed., 1994. 55

See M. Armstrong , Competition in Telecommunications, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 13, 1997, 64.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and 31 Policy connection of networks allows competition to develop without requiring a new infrastructure. Appropriate regulation may allow new entrants the exploitation of the positive externalities that networks display. 'Interconnection' is generally understood to mean the physical linking of separate networks. It is to ensure any communications among citizens. Access, on the other hand, is a broader concept which comprises the full range of requests by market players to obtain access to a network operator's assets or its customers. 56 This distinction has become blurred both in different legal instruments and especially under various states' laws. 57 Key in all this is 'interconnect pricing'. This follows the principle that regulation is acting as a surrogate for competitive pressures to bring prices down towards cost! 58 In this context a remarkable feature of convergence and network independence becomes prominent: call origination issues are different from call termination issues. While call origination becomes a contestable, i.e. increasingly competitive market, call termination over a single number or address over a given network may still need regulation of interconnection prices. Market forces should on the other hand be allowed to determine the appropriate level of tariffs for all other forms of access to the network. In the broadcasting sector the concept of interconnection has been essentially irrelevant from a regulatory point of view, with independent networks having direct access to consumers without cooperating with other market players (i.e. unlike telecommunications). O n the other hand, most E U Member States impose 'must carry' obligations upon cable T V operators. More recently the issue has arisen in various E U Member States whether telecom-style Open Network Provision (ONP) rules should apply so as to require cable T V operators to provide satellite T V broadcasters w i t h access to their networks. c) Obligations to Provide Access — 'Essential Facilities' — Open Network Provision (ONP) — Interconnection Obligations for dominant undertakings to provide access in certain circumstances have been developed when applying and interpreting competition rules. The pertinent set of obligations carries the label 'essential facilities doctrine'. While these rules evolved as part of ex post application of competition rules, the principles of the essential facilities doctrine also constitute important building blocks for ex ante 56

Squire, Sanders & Dempsy/Analysis (note 8), 191 et seq.

57

Id., Annex 2 (National reports).

58

See also O E C D , Information Infrastructure Convergence and Pricing: The Internet, O E C D / G D (96) 73, 1996.

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regulatory action, notably the regulatory framework established for access and interconnection by the O N P Interconnection Directive. 59 aa) 'Essential Facilities , The unfair competitive advantage that the control over an 'essential facility ' may give to a competitor is the rationale for the limitation of the principle of 'freedom of contract', i.e. it is an exception to the broad general rule that allows firms to deal with whom they choose. In the case of an essential facility the dominant firm is able to maintain its dominance not because of higher efficiency, but rather because of externalities that make the duplication of that facility economically impossible for the firm's rivals. 60 The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted, more than a decade ago, the 'Open Network Architecture' (ONA) principle, to ensure that enhanced services providers and information service providers had non-discriminatory access to the network, on the basis of a 'regulated monopoly model'. This O N A approach (namely to pricing) reflects the essential facilities doctrine, derived from caselaw interpreting the prohibition on monopolization or attempts to monopolize under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The essential facilities doctrine was applied in the pertinent antitrust cases in the context of 'refusals to deal', where a firm with monopoly power controlled scarce resources, that were vital for the economic success of competitors. Under US law, a plaintiff invoking the doctrine must prove that:first, a monopolist controls the essential facility; second, the competitor is practically or reasonably unable to duplicate the essential facility; third, there is denial of access to the facility; fourth, the facility could be provided (feasibility). 61 The approach as developed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in dealing w i t h Article 86 EC Treaty is, in comparison to the American doctrine, more prone to 'detect' essential facilities. Pertinent cases under EC law are not exceptions to normal rules, but "specialized examples of general rules about discrimination and competitive handicaps created by the dominant companies." 62 Indeed, what a nondominant firm would be allowed to do is not permitted for a dominant one, because 59

O N P Interconnection Directive (note 51).

60

/. S. Venit/J. J. Kallaugher , Essential Facilities — A Comparative Law Approach, 1994, 315 -334. 61

MCI Communications Corp. v. A T&T\ 708 F. 2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 464 US 891 (1983); Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnely Information Publishing, 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988), affd, 933 F. 2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991). 62

John Temple-Lang, Defining Legitimate Competition — Companies' Duties to Supply Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 18, 1994, 437, 487 et seq.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy it may negatively affect the competitive structure of the market. A commercial conduct that is not performance based, that hinders the maintenance of the existing degree of competition or prevents that growth of competition, can be qualified as an abuse of dominant position. 63 As a consequence the ECJ has to a considerable degree encroached upon the right of firms to deal with whom they please, if firms are qualified as dominant. 64 The first time the EC Commission used the term 'essential facility' was in 1992 in the Sealink decision.65 It defined an essential facility as "a facility or infrastructure without access to which competitors cannot provide services to their customers." The dominant undertaking is not allowed to place competitors at a competitive disadvantage by refusing access to the essential facility. In Sea Containers 66 the Commission restated the Sealink principle and added that it also applied to new entrants in the relevant market. In British Meadlandt 1 the EC Commission seemed to accept that a facility can be said to be essential, even though this qualification applies only for a limited period of time. In ICG/ICCC Morlaix 6* the EC Commission ensured access to the Port of Roscoff on the grounds that there was no physically and economically valid alternative and the Roscoff harbor was the only facility providing acceptable conditions for access. The definition of essential facilities as developed by the ECJ and used so far in practice is not without controversy. Its critics argue that the doctrine helps competitors and not competition and that the loose definition brings with it a threat of having to share precious assets and that this may discourage investment. 69 Another issue pertains to the understanding that the essential facilities doctrine is perceived as following the traditional regulatory model for telecommunications, where a service was regulated in close context with the underlying infrastructure; is this concept still valid in a situation of 'platform independence'? In an environment of full digi-

63

Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission (Vitamins), 1979 ECR 401; Joined cases 6 & 7/73, Commercial Solvents. , 1974 ECR 223; Case 27/76 United Brands, 1978 ECR 207; Case 311/84, Télémarketing, 1985 ECR 3261; Case C-333/94P, Tetra Pak II, 1996 ECRI-5951; Cases C-241 and 242/91P, RTE and Others v. Commission (Magill), 1995 ECR 1-743. 64

Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission, 1983 ECR 3461.

65

Commission Decision of 11 June 1992, Sealink/B&I, Common Market Law Reports, vol. 5, 1992, 255. 66 Commission Decision of 21 December 1993, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 15, 1994, 8. 67

Commission Decision of 26 February 1992, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 96, 1992, 34. 68

Commission Decision of 16 May 1995.

69

See D. Ridyard, Essential Facilities and the Obligation to Supply Competitors under U K and EC Competition Law, European Competition Law Review, vol. 8, 1996, 438.

3 GYIL4I

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talization, convergence and IP protocols, where re-routing and platform independence abound, the notion that any single given network infrastructure constitutes an 'essential facility' in all circumstances may be challenged. Thus, for the time being the notion of essential facilities should be confined to natural monopoly activities, i.e. to facilities no one has an economic incentive to duplicate. 70 The EC doctrine on essential facilities provides a number of principles for the introduction and enhancement of competition in telecommunications. The interconnection requirement originates from the need to access facilities such as the local loop, that is likely to remain a bottleneck facility. The ex post application of competition rules to access and interconnection may be insufficient, as in rapidly expanding markets delay in granting access or interconnection may impair competition. Thus, the essential facilities doctrine has been used as an 'inspiration' for ex ante regulation. The objective of such a regulatory framework is to facilitate access for newcomers to the networks of the dominant incumbent operators. The Agreement on Telecommunications reached in the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 7 1 and the W T O Regulatory Reference Paper give an international dimension to access to essential facilities, defined in the W T O Reference Paper as "facilities of a public telecommunications transport network or service that: (a) are exclusively or predominantly provided by a single or limited number of suppliers; and (b) cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted in order to provide a service." 72 In the communications sector there is a fundamental debate: 'Regulated Infrastructure Monopoly v. Services Competition Models'. One school of thought sees the future of the telecommunications sector as competition among a number of local access infrastructure providers, comprising the incumbent carriers, local cable T V companies, mobile operators, satellite operators and alternative infrastructure providers, wireless loop operators and an increasing number of fixed networks that are run by subsidiaries of public authorities (e.g. 'city networks'). A second school visualizes a regulated monopoly model, in which there w i l l be many service providers competing forcefully and having nondiscriminatory access to a very limited number of local access networks.

70 The Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector (the Access Notice) (Provisional text of 31 March 1998 available at http://europa.eu.int/.) contains in para. 68 the following statement: "The expression 'essential facilities' is used to describe a facility or infrastructure which is essential for reaching customers and/or enabling competitors to carry on their business, and which cannot be replicated by any reasonable means." 71

Agreement on Telecommunications Services (note 10).

72

IdAnnex,

46.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy Most regulators have not yet adopted clear policy lines pertaining to these alternatives. While some market actors voice some concern relating to bandwidth in the local loop, others have commented that the rapid build-up of infrastructure may result in such excess capacity that leasing the needed infrastructure would be the right commercial direction. The spread of multimedia will to a large extent depend upon the relative availability of bandwidth, which will, as a mathematical function, increase considerably in relation to the amount of infrastructure deployed. The regulated infrastructure model may provide regulators with the transparency (in pricing) they need to determine 'best practice' for access and interconnection. The regulatory policies in adjusting to multimedia and global information networks (interconnection, access, end-user pricing) should be market driven, i.e. regulation must allow, in a competitively neutral manner, both the network and the service providers to sustain themselves. bb) O p e n Network Provision* (ONP) The O N P directives are based on Article 100a EC Treaty. These directives aim at the establishment of harmonized conditions for open and effective access to and use of public telecommunications networks and services. In practice the approximation of conditions for access deals particularly with technical interfaces, usage conditions and tariff principles. The use of O N P standards carries the presumption that the operator provides open and efficient access. O N P conditions must comply with the fundamental principles of transparency, objectivity and non-discrimination. Access can be restricted for no other reason than an exhaustive number of 'essential requirements ,73 : security of network operations, maintenance of network integrity, interoperability of services in justified cases, protection of data, as appropriate. O N P in essence requires regulators to ensure that the prices of operators enjoying significant market power are cost-oriented and non-discriminatory. This would apply to all services, and in particular to interconnection, leased lines and public voice telephony services. In addition, prices for telecom services are in many countries subject to a price cap.74

73

See EC Directive 90/387 of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for telecommunication services through the implementation of open network provision, Art. 3, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 192, 1990, 1. 74

Trice cap' regulation should have the following results: To pass technology improvements in terms of falling unit costs to telecommunications customers and to other market players (as would be the case in a fully competitive market) rather than resulting in higher profits for telecommunications organizations.

3'

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Klaus W. Grewlich

T o prevent potential abuses of market power, the Ό Ν Ρ voice telephony Directive' 75 mandates that tariffs for facilities be 'sufficiently unbundled' to ensure that customers are not paying for facilities which are not necessary for the service requested. However, this unbundling requirement may not be used, according to the directive, to preclude the offer of tariff packages. Such offers, though, must be fully transparent and non-discriminatory. cc) Ό Ν Ρ Interconnection Directive' In the US, the Federal Communications Commission issued a report and order on the 'interconnection' between local exchange carriers (LEC) and commercial mobile radio service providers. The reasons for doing so are summarized as follows: The 1996 Telecommunications Act encourages competition by removing barriers to entry and providing an opportunity for potential new entrants to purchase unbundled incumbent LEC network elements to compete efficiently to provide local exchange services. We believe that the prices that potential entrants pay for these elements should reflect forwardlooking economic costs in order to encourage efficient levels of investment and entry. 7 6

The framework of open network provision (ONP), which had been originally developed for ensuring access to value-added services for the network of the former monopolies, is now being adapted in the E U to a multi-operator environment through the O N P Interconnection Directive. 77 O N P thereby becomes the natural framework for the definition of basic principles for access to public networks in the EU. The liberalization directives based on Article 90 EC Treaty had provided for continuously increasing competition up to the Full Competition Directive. 78 Accordingly, the O N P directives provided for a certain restriction imposed on the conduct of telecommunications operators, in order to avoid ex ante abuse of the dominant position the grant of exclusive or special rights had conferred upon them. O N P could then be seen as implementing in the regulatory field the liberalizing drive of

75

EC Directive 95/62 of 13 December 1995 on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 321, 1995, 6. 76 US FCC, The First Report & Order in the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 — Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Provider, adopted on 1 August 1996, FCC 96-325 (para. 672). 77 78

O N P Interconnection Directive (note 51).

EC Directive 96/19 of 28 February 1996 amending EC Directive 90/388 regarding the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 74, 1996, 13.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy Art. 90 EC Treaty. 79 After the introduction of full competition in 1998 there has been a shift in the nature of the O N P principle. 80 Through asymmetric regulation the incumbent operators are regulated in a stricter manner than other competitors in order to counterbalance the incumbent's strong bargaining power. A new generation of operators, not incumbent but with 'considerable or significant market power', are likely to emerge soon. This development provokes the question whether the O N P Interconnection Directive does not lead to an 'oversized regulatory basis', because "firms may be classified as dominant without possessing factual market power on specific submarkets." 81 Interconnection means the physical and logical linking of telecommunications networks used by the same or a different organization in order to allow the users of one organization to communicate w i t h users of the same or another organization, or to access services provided by another organization. Services may be provided by the parties involved or other parties who have access to the network. 8 2

There is a growing practice and experience regarding interconnection and access issues in markets distinguished by early liberalization, like the United Kingdom and the United States, that is useful for the daily work of regulatory agencies applying the O N P Interconnection Directive. 83 In the new concept, the role of the monopoly network operator is replaced by the concept of public network operators acting in competition, endowed with a number of rights and duties. Duties are, notably, to offer network access to others but also to guarantee or share in the burden of universal service. The rights pertain, firstly , to interconnection with the networks of competitors of the same category. These operators are of four types: providers of public (fixed or mobile) networks or services, which allow control of the means of access to users via official telephone numbers; providers of leased lines to user's premises; providers of international telecommunications circuits with third countries, for which purposes they have exclusive or special rights; service providers who are permitted at the national level to interconnect. 84 79

V. Hatzopoulos , L'Open Network Provision (ONP) — Moyen de la dérégulation, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen (RTDE), vol. 30, 1994, 63. 80 Adrian Hunt , Regulation of Telecommunications — The Developing E U Regulatory Framework and its Impact on the United Kingdom, European Public Law, vol. 3, 1997, 93, 106 - 107. 81 Gunter KniepSy Phasing out Sector-Specific Regulation in Competitive Telecommunications, Kyklos — Internationale Zeitschrift für SozialWissenschaft, vol. 50, 1997, 325. 82

O N P Interconnection Directive (note 51), Art. 2 (1) (a).

83

See Herbert Ungerer , Regulatory developments in European Telecom Markets, Contribution to Institutional Investors Salomon Bros, 23 September 1997, available on-line at h t t p : / / europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/speech/seven/en/sp97045.html. 84

Whether 'pure' service providers (resellers), i.e. those who do not have their own

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Klaus W. Grewlich

Secondly , a general duty to supply exists in particular for those public network operators that exercise 'significant market power'. These operators have not only a right and an obligation to negotiate interconnection, but they must meet all reasonable requests for access to the network, including access at points other than the termination points offered to the majority of users. 85 This concept is in line with the notion of 'major supplier' contained in the W T O Reference Paper. 86 In the O N P Interconnection Directive operators with a significant market power are defined indicatively (presumption) as those w i t h a market share of more than 25 %. National regulators shall assess 'significant market power' in the individual case and, in doing so, shall take into account the following factors 87: the operator's ability to influence market conditions; its turnover relative to the size of the market; its control of the means of access to end-users; its access to financial resources; and its experience in providing products and services in the market. 88 Regarding the establishment of the details of interconnection, priority is to be given to commercial negotiations. National regulators, however, retain a strong role concerning the control of the process and come in particularly in case of failure of commercial negotiations. The Directive also provides for conciliation procedures for transnational problems at the E U level.

d) Competition Rules/Antitrust — Access Regulation to Digital 'Gateways' Access issues at different levels, relating to the network (local loop), to set-top boxes, Electronic Programming Guides and Internet search facilities, to digital services and content, are central commercial and regulatory issues in a converging digital environment transiting to 'Cyberspace'. One of the key regulatory, i.e. legal policy, questions is whether solutions should be found through the application of competition laws only, or through the development of sector-specific rules, or through a combination of both. The most likely outcome of legal clarification, i.e. jurisprudence, administrative practice and legislation, is a combination of both competition rules and sector-specific regulation. This answer, of course, is too general to be satisfactory. What really matters is first , what 'light-handedness' means in practice, in accordance to what standards, and second, whether there w i l l be legislative action to introduce 'sunset clauses' to phase out regulation at some stage, in fainfrastructure, enjoy rights (and obligations) of interconnection w i l l then depend on Member States' policies. 85

O N P Interconnection Directive (note 51), Art. 4 (2).

86

Agreement on Telecommunications Services (note 10), Annex 367 - 368.

87

O N P Interconnection Directive (note 51), Art. 4 (3) al. 2.

88

A n operator's international links are added as a sixth factor by Recital 6 O N P Interconnection Directive (note 51).

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy vor of the general competition law framework that is effective but not sectorspecific. As the subject of regulation is a transborder, even global, matter the competition framework to be genuinely effective would have to evolve towards global reach, starting from present concepts of antitrust cooperation and 'positive •

, 89

comity . Elements put forward in answering the question should reflect convincing legal rationales but also a clear understanding of present legal developments as to competition rules and specific regulation. aa) Competition Rules In parallel, with the transition to full competition in both networks and services as of January 1998, the application of the E U competition rules comes to the forefront. This is also foreseen and promoted by the W T O Reference Paper's requirement to ensure 'competitive safeguards'. 90 The 1991 Guidelines 91 on the application of competition rules to the telecommunications sector and the Notice of the E U Commission on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector are of particular relevance. 92 O N P rules to be executed by the national regulatory agencies and competition rules are, in principle, applied in parallel. The notion of 'significant market power' contained in the O N P Interconnection Directive describes a position of economic power on a market less than that of dominance: "that an undertaking has significant power under O N P rules w i l l generally therefore not lead to a presumption of dominance, although in a particular situation, this may prove to be the case."93 Thus, the difference is in the degree of economic power. 'Significant market power' involves a broad predetermined legal definition of the market, whereas the definition of relevant market under the competition rules follows the economics of competition law. 94 89

Klaus W. Grewlicby 229 et seq.

Konflikt und Ordnung in der globalen Kommunikation (note 2),

90

Agreement on Telecommunications Services (note 10), Annex, 367 - 368. "Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices. ,> 91 Commission of the European Communities, Guidelines on the application of EC competition rules in the telecommunication sector, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. C 233, 1991 (the 91 Guidelines). 92

The Access Notice (note 70).

93

Id., 37- 38.

94

See id. and Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market power for the purposes of Community competition law, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. C 372,1997, 3 (De-

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Klaus W. Grewlich

Competition rules have full application even when O N P rules have been adopted. However, according to the Access Notice, the proper application of the O N P rules should normally avoid the need for the application of the competition rules. The latter may, thus, be seen as a 'safety net* in the event that the O N P rules, for whatever reason, are not applied, or if competition is restricted by an (incumbent) operator in a way that is not anticipated in the O N P instruments. 95 Having notified an access agreement to a national regulatory agency does not exempt it from notification to the E U Commission in view of Articles 85 and 86 EC Treaty. In the unlikely but possible case that a national regulatory agency were to require parties to an agreement on access and interconnection to include terms contrary to Articles 85 and/or 86 EC Treaty the Member State would be in breach of the EC Treaty and exposed to an action under Article 169 EC Treaty because of failure to fulfill Treaty obligations. 96 When applying ex post Article 86 EC Treaty to access and interconnection rules, the essential facilities doctrine is important. It notably allows dealing w i t h cases of vertical foreclosure under conditions where the incumbent supplies its consumers with a bundle of its upstream and downstream activities and where, even in a digital platform-independent environment, a firm is leveraging its dominance from one market into another upstream, downstream or adjacent market. The 'essential facility' doctrine, however, is applied by regulators whose professional task it is to promote competition and to free the market forces, in competition law like in regulation, with some hesitation. The reason is that in perfectly competitive markets interconnection should not exist at all, as competitors would not use each other's assets. By interconnection, to some extent, the very meaning of competition is undermined which actually makes the road towards real full competition w i t h numerous market players cumbersome. Moreover, access and interconnection imply highly complex economic issues, particularly that of pricing. The mand substitutability, supply substitutability and potential competition). The relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by consumers, because of the products' characteristics, intended use and prices. The relevant geographic market normally comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned are commercially involved, in which the conditions of competition in the supply of products and services are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be clearly distinguished from neighboring areas. 95 Forrester , Norall & Sutton , The Institutional Framework for the Regulation of Telecommunications and the Application of the EC Competition Rules, Report to the European Commission (DG IV), 1996. 96 O n the application of competition rules to E U Member States, see, e.g., Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed, 1989 ECR 838 and Case 267/86, Van Eyck, 1988 ECR 4769. Regarding the obligation of an affiliate or emanation of a state to comply w i t h provisions of a directive, see Case 103/88 Fratelli Constanzo, 1989 ECR 209.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy shape and structure of tomorrow's communications markets will be influenced by the way the regulators handle such issues. Given such doubts, it would be recommendable to phase out at least sector-specific regulation as soon as possible. The EC rules on access and interconnection do not, however, provide for a 'sunset clause', i.e. a clear rule as to when sector specific regulation would recede in favor of the application of the general competition law framework. 97 bb) Competition Rules and Specific Regulation: Bottlenecks in Infrastructure, Conditional Access Systems and Content (i) A number of aspects of legal application of competition rules in a multimedia environment need some further clarification: notably first , the notion of 'relevant market' in global information networks; second, 'bundling', particularly how to ensure, without impeding creativity, that the advantages of the former monopoly operator are not used to the detriment of new entrants on the multimedia value chain; third 'gatekeeper positions' in broadcasting, notably with regard to 'conditional access systems' (e.g. set-top boxes/decoders). (a) Fully digitalized on-line services in general and the Internet in particular w i l l further increase the porosity of national or regional geographic markets of communications and broadcasting. As a result of the 'death of distance' and the availability of sophisticated (Internet) search engines, geographic markets for the provision of many types of multimedia services are becoming more internationalized. In fact, in this case it is legitimate to use the word 'global'. This recognition may lead to adjustments of the concept of the 'relevant market ' and substantive antitrust rules and procedures, in an effort to achieve improved cooperation between antitrust authorities, which may pragmatically base itself in the beginning on 'positive comity'; continuously this could then foster developments towards a 'world competition order' that would be an integral part of the world trade order. 98 As 'convergence' is evolving in the multimedia world the concept of 'innovative markets' may be introduced. This is particularly important for unbundling and creative forms of bundling. That concept would allow regulators to balance losses in the current generation product market with gains in a future developing market in terms of 'dynamic competition'. (b) Both access to backbone and local access are vital for the 1bundling ' or debundling of services and the use of facilities (also in terms of accounting). Given the commercial and technological constraints on providing competing local access 97 Article 22 of the O N P Interconnection Directive (note 51) is not a 'sunset clause', but simply an obligation on the European Commission to submit a report by 31 December 1999. 98

Klaus W. Grewlich , Konflikt und Ordnung in der globalen Kommunikation (note 2), 229 et seq.

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mechanisms, it w i l l be fundamentally important to ensure, first, that competition in the local loop develops and, second , that network operators of the local loops are not the only service providers over those networks. In this context it makes great sense to separate at least structurally the cable business and copper operations. Unbundled access to the local loop is in any case fundamental! In certain instances bundling can itself constitute an abuse under Article 86 EC Treaty. This has been clarified in a judgment of the European Court of Justice in the TetraPak case." In addition, however, refusing to unbundle where such unbundling would allow competitors to invest in infrastructure (thus to be able to bundle themselves), which would in a number of cases upgrade the narrowband copper telecommunications network to broadband capability backbones and selectively also broadband local loops, could, depending on the circumstances, constitute a separate abuse under Art. 86(b) EC Treaty — that of "limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers"! Dominant actors may be tempted to refuse to supply necessary interface information — reference is made here to the IBM Bull case of 1984 100 — or their actions pertaining to software may constitute 'unlawful bundling '. The US Department of Justice has begun legal action against Microsoft, alleging that some of Microsoft's agreements violate the 1995 Consent Decree, 101 which is substantially identical to the Microsoft 1994 undertaking to the Commission of the European Communities. This prohibits Microsoft "from entering into any operating system licence agreement that is expressly or implicitly conditioned upon the licence of any . . . other product" (Section IV(E)(i)), — i.e. from bundling other products with its desktop operating systems. Section IV(E)(i) goes on to state that: "this provision shall not be construed to prohibit Microsoft from developing integrated products." Microsoft argues that there is such an 'integrated product'. Regulators are convinced that competition rules, properly applied, do not prevent technological progress. Rather, in the E U they even have as one of their objectives the promotion of technological progress. However gatekeepers should not be permitted to unlawfully bundle thus preventing others from bundling to create new innovative market opportunities. Another critical matter for Internet related bundling is that in the residential Internet service provider market, a number of incumbent telecommunication organizations seek to enter the retail ISP market. There is concern, first, about pricing and, second, about cross-subsidization, prédation and more favorable treatment of a

99

Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pack International SA v. Commission , 1996 ECR 1-5951.

100 101

EC Commission, I B M Undertaking, Bulletin of the EC, vol. 17, 1984, No. 10, 105.

Consent Decree MICROSOFT and Department of Justice Petition, available on-line at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases3/micros2/ 1236.htm.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy telecommunication organization's own subsidiaries or operations, while discriminating against competitors. Therefore the EC Guidelines for competition in telecommunications indicate: "Proper allocation of costs is more easily ensured in cases of structural separation, i.e. creating distinct entities for running each of these categories of activities." (ii) In broadcasting the concept of public broadcasting now coexists with private broadcasting thus raising issues of open access to broadcast networks for all types of service providers. (a) A cable television operator, for instance, may hold a position of market dominance, because access to cable networks may be the only way to reach consumers of television programs. The dominant position may, in accordance with antitrust rules, inhibit the cable operator from charging differential fees to television producers unless there are objective reasons for discriminating and the differentiation does not inhibit competition. Should ex-ante ONP-style rules be applied to one-way broadcast networks in a multimedia environment? In contrast to voice telephony, video services, for instance, are not 'point to point' (any to any) services, but 'point to multipoint' (one to many) services and, quite different from voice telephony, there are no network externalities involved: The broadcasting network does not get more valuable in economic terms to individual users as the number of users increases. O n the other hand, the ability of the network to carry point to multipoint as well as point to point services may in a future multimedia environment call into question any argument for the application of ONP-style rules. Furthermore, it is difficult to see an 'essential facility' parallel with the networks of incumbent telecommunications operators because from the point of view of the content packager (programmer), if network convergence as a result of digitalization and competition really takes place, there would be multiple transmission options to obtain access to the customer, including building its own cable satellite stations, accessing digital terrestrial networks, sending via enhanced global information networks (such as Internet or 'next generation Internet'), using 'third generation broadband mobile communication' (UMTS), 102 using existing telecommunication networks (with

102

The Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) w i l l have cellular, cordless, satellite, wireless local loop (WLL) and Radio Fixed Access (RFA). The key distinguishing characteristics of UMTS w i l l be the gradual integration of fixed, mobile and satellite networks to the eventual point where a customer w i l l not be differentiated between the different technologies used to transmit its communications over the respective networks. This process of integration w i l l most likely generate a regulatory dynamic towards 'horizontal convergence* of licensing procedures for applications/content and delivery platforms which at present are governed by different specific regulations.

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xDSL, i.e. variable upgrading and enhancement technologies for copper wires) or getting to the consumer through video cassettes.103 O n the other hand, individual market actors may, in the multimedia environment, control certain assets to which competitors require access in order to compete in some or all levels of the multimedia value chain: — Where a content packager, for instance, integrates upstream or downstream in the value chain (e.g. by merging with a content producer, a service provider or a private network operator) there w i l l be a natural temptation to favor access to its own products or facilities, to the disadvantage of other actors on the market. Given this threat to competition, it might be reasonable to extend the regulatory norms as applied to telecommunications. The pertinent rules require that operators with significant market power deal with their own affiliates or joint ventures at 'arm's length', i.e. on terms which are, compared with the business terms offered to independent partners, non-discriminatory, proportionate and transparent. — Certain private resources, such as conditional access systems for digital services, directory services and 'navigation' systems, the 'inside wire' in a home, privileged positions in content packaging and proprietary standards may be tantamount (with regard to their significance for effective competition) to public resources such as the allocation of frequencies, rights of way, access to numbers and address resources such as Internet domain names.104 The existence of technical and proprietary rights in the hands of one or a limited number of market actors may result in 'gatekeeper' positions. In the digital environment of the multimedia value chain, this particularly applies to conditional access systems, navigation systems and directory services. Gatekeeping positions resulting from control of such technologies may create bottlenecks or 'essential facility' situations, unless access to these private technological resources is administered in accordance w i t h the principles of nondiscrimination and proportionality. The anticompetitive effects of such gatekeeping positions may become more important in cases of vertical integration along the length of the multimedia value chain! The arising problems may be dealt with by application of anticompetition rules, either in the form of specific legislation or on a case by case basis under competition rules, such as Art. 86 EC Treaty.

103

See Squire , Sanders &Dempsy/Analysis (note 8), Annex 1, 177 - 178. The study points to the fact that the most valuable renewable resource available to a broadcaster is its subsisting copyright over a work. 104

Jonathan Stoodley , Internet Domain Name System and Trademarks, European Intellectual Property Review, vol. 9,1997, 509; Klaus W. Grewlich , Governance in 'Cyberspace' (note 5), Chapter Seven.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and 45 Policy (b) Broadcasting, in practice, has been treated as a public good. 105 The focus of open access in broadcasting was to ensure access for all types of opinion to the broadcasting network. 1 0 6 Public broadcasting now coexists with private broadcast channels. Thus, issues arise with regard to open access to broadcast networks for different service providers. Particularly relevant issues in this context are the potential scarcity of channels 107 and conditional access (set-top boxes/decoders). Content traded in the multimedia chain must pass through conditional access systems. Content providers, such as broadcasters, publishers and individual content creators like artists and authors see as vital issues: their market positioning on the value chain and, particularly, whether they are foreclosed by exclusive positions or alliances (operators — service providers — content packagers) and whether access to the customer is open. Where the conditional access system is dominated by an enterprise or a business alliance that is vertically integrated along the multimedia chain this enterprise may enjoy substantial market power, favor its own content and possibly take advantage of its 'first mover' position. First mover advantages may occur if the research and development investment (e.g. for the development of the set-top box/decoder system) and the minimum cost efficient scale of operation äre so high, that this results in an oligopolistic market, where in addition the 'settop box' is subsidized to achieve demand creation. Thus, the challenge for the regulators and the European Commission (DG IV Competition Law) is to balance the commercial interests of investors, who require adequate returns on their heavy investment in set-top boxes, software and other high technology applications and, on the other hand, the interests of individuals/citizens/consumers and other actors in the multimedia value chain who need fair, open and non-discriminatory access and a choice of access to various content. Achieving the proper balance is further complicated by the fact that the operator of a conditional access system may also operate other 'gateway' facilities, such as 'navigation systems' or Electronic Program Guides (EPG) or Internet search engines. If proper regulatory or antitrust action is not undertaken, there is a danger that consumers become 'locked-in' to single suppliers. 108 Dominant market actors may seek to leverage their market power into neighboring markets, not only to reinforce their dominance in the primary market but also to become dominant in 105

I.e. a good which is so abundant (inexhaustible) or in so plentiful supply (but not inexhaustible) that one person can consume without affecting the ability of another person to consume the same good. 106

Offenheitspflege, see Bullinger/Mestmäcker gendschutz i m Fernsehen, 1998, 54 et seq.

(note 3), 26 - 27; Josef Isensee/Peter Axer, Ju-

107

Spectrum management authorities may have to consider the amount of spectrum given to broadcasting or to other civilian or military uses in the light of the potential for new services to be transmitted over broadcast networks. 108

See Squire , Sanders & Dempsy/Analysis (note 8), Annex 1, 225 et seq.

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ancillary markets. 109 EPGs and Internet content search engines will, in a global multimedia environment, gain great importance, as custom-tailored supply of information will draw from the entire world's content resources. Access to key forms of commercially valuable content 110 can be close to ownership or exclusive control of an 'essential facility' or bottleneck. 'Invisibles', intangible rights (copyright) may have the characteristics of an 'essential facility' in the same way as tangible rights (access to network facilities and content selection instruments). Thus, it is not excluded that, in the future, legislation along the lines of the O N P Interconnection Directive w i l l be developed to deal with cases where key forms of content are under control of actors that are vertically integrated along the multimedia value chain. A gate-keeping position may also result from private proprietary standards, notably if these are supported by intellectual property rights protection and become competitive advantages in multimedia and global information networks. Solutions for these issues exist at the infrastructural level; the focus will now be on service creation and conditional access to delivery of content. In the process of 'convergence', standardization experience 111 gathered in the computer and information technology sector, which have experienced proprietary standards may be helpful.

109

I n the telecommunications sector this leverage is best reflected by the efforts of incumbent operators to dominate the lucrative market of (print or electronic) directory publications and services. The incumbents enjoy a 'first mover' advantage in a liberalized environment. I n the broadcasting sector important case precedent exists under Article 86 of the EC Treaty on abusive behavior w i t h respect to advertizing or programing guides; see Case C-311/89 Centre Belge d'Etudes du Marché-Telemarketing SA (CBEM) ν. Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Télédiffusion , 1985 ECR 3261; Case T-69/89, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1991 ECR-Π 485. 110

Where high value content such as first release of films or sporting events lies i n the hands of only a few market actors, others may consider that content to be an 'essential facility', to which they should be provided access on fair and nondiscriminatory terms. The revised Television Without Frontiers Directive contains a 'light-handed' regulatory scheme. It requires E U Member States to ensure that broadcasters under their jurisdiction do not exclusively broadcast events that are of major importance for society in a way that deprives a substantial proportion of the public of the ability to receive the event, free to air, via live or deferred coverage. E U Member States must draw up lists of national and non-national events considered to be of major importance for society; see EC Directive 89/552 of 3 November 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 298,1989, 23, as amended by EC Directive of 30 June 1997, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 202, 1997, 60 (to be implemented by 31 December 1998). 111

Klaus W. Grewlich , Europa i m globalen Technologiewettlauf — Der Weltmarkt wird zum Binnenmarkt, 1992, 122 et seq.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and 47 Policy cc) Principles In the public consultations on the E U Green paper on Convergence 112 many comments from business users, the information technology sector, publishers and Internet service providers stressed the need to achieve 'light regulation' of on-line content and to avoid 'heavy' broadcasting rules being applied to Internet content. Extending current broadcasting regulation to a transactional world where there are multiple channels, switched services, transfrontier service provision, and increased consumer choice might indeed exacerbate some problems. Such an approach would risk institutionalizing barriers to entry. It would also lead to increased inconsistencies and confusion. These are already beginning to become apparent between different E U Member States, and also between E U regulatory concepts and broadcasting regulations within different E U Member States.113 O n the other hand, in the public consultations on the E U Green Paper on Convergence there was a general agreement that in a digital environment access to customers and networks would be key regulatory issues. Recognized was the inherent tension between the need of economic actors to recover investments, which advocates proprietary access systems, and the need to ensure a degree of openness in order to guarantee access by competitors, and hence access to consumers. It was underlined that open access was not only a matter of respect of competition rules but would also ensure consumer choice and plurality. Thus particular attention is focused on rules which might apply to set-top boxes, application programming interface (APIs) and EPGs. Some felt that access issues could best be resolved in the context of the EC Treaty competition rules, building on current concepts of 'essential facilities'. Many of the commentators supported the core principles of the Television Standards Directive, 114 which was seen as providing for non-discriminatory access by operators to digital television facilities. Thus, commentators advocated applying the principles contained in this directive to access systems in general. The Television Standards Directive applies with equal force to the transmission of digital signals, regardless of whether a set-top box is used or signals are trans-

112 Commission of the European Telecommunications and Audiovisual Convergence — Report for the European Commission, Brussels Communities (Directorate-General X/Information, Communication, Culture, Audiovisual Media; Directorate-General ΧΙΠ /Telecommunications, Innovation and Exploitation of Research), Working Document of the Commission — Summary of the Results of the Public Consultation on the Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors: Areas for further Reflection, SEC (98) 1284, 29 July 1998. 113

KPMG/(European Commission), Public Policy Issues Arising for Telecommunications and Audiovisual Convergence, 1996. 114 EC Directive 95/47 of 24 October 1995 on the use of standards for the transmission of television signals, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 281, 1995, 51.

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mitted on cable, terrestrial or satellite television systems. Operators of conditional access systems are requested by the Directive to offer access to all broadcasters on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. Licences of rights (IPR) must be granted to conditional access systems on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. Proprietary access systems are not prohibited nor are common interface settop boxes made mandatory. The Directive, however, mandates open access. 115 I I I . The A r t of Regulation — Access to Global Networks — O r d o ' Three developments in global communications, thus, advocate reviewing the current regulatory framework, and in addition for asking a number of fundamental questions pertaining to the 'art of regulation' of access to global networks: — First, the degree of liberalization that is being achieved (notably on the basis of the following instruments: the E U Full Competition Directive 116 ; the US 1996 Telecommunications Act 1 1 7 ; and the W T O Agreement on Telecommunications Services with the Reference Paper 118 ); — second, the convergence 119 of information technology, telecommunications and broadcasting; — third, the revolutionary emergence of global information networks and notably the Internet as a viable medium, where practical experience w i t h multimedia may be acquired, for the benefit of both users and the other actors on the multimedia value chain, and regulators. (i) The test to apply for assessing whether regulation is justified or not may be succinctly outlined as follows: The real question the regulator must ask is not whether in theory the market can be improved but whether the defects found are sufficiently serious to outweigh the costs of intervention This is not to argue that regulatory intervention is never warranted. What it does mean, however, is that intervention should not be undertaken on the w h i m or

115

The Directive foresees three levels of potential open access (single, interworking, common interface), but leaves open the choice between common interface and access to proprietary systems, to take economic trade-offs into account. 116

EC Directive 96/19 of 13 March 1996, amending EC Directive 90/388 w i t h regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 74/13, 1996, 13. 117

Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56; Knauer/Machtley/Lynch

(note 8).

118

Agreement on Telecommunications Services (note 10); the Reference Paper contains a core of principles designed to ensure that the advantages of the former monopoly operator are not used to the detriment of new entrants on the telecommunications market. 119

A t least as far as networks are concerned but possibly also comprising service offerings.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy hunch of the regulator. A series of systematic rules should be followed to gauge whether regulation is likely to improve matters. 120

The disadvantages and costs of regulation are well understood by economists. One example are the costs of federal regulatory agencies in the US: The FCC is only one of 53 US federal regulatory agencies. Spending of these was approximately US$ 14 billion in 1993. The regulatory system was staffed by more than 125,000 people, up from less than 70,000 people in 1970. The O E C D has undertaken work designed to identify a number of 'down to earth principles' for improving the quality of government regulation. 121 The following checklist (of questions) for regulators' decision-making would respond to the need to develop and implement better regulations: Is the problem defined? — Is government action justified? — Is regulation the best form of government action? — Is there a legal basis for regulation? — What is/are the appropriate level/levels of government for the pertinent action? — Do the benefits of regulation justify the costs? — Is the distribution of effects across society transparent? — Is the regulation clear, consistent, comprehensible, and accessible to users? — Have all interested parties had the opportunity to present their views? — H o w will compliance be achieved? A number of communications markets have been liberalized to a large extent. In Europe the radical change from monopoly to open competition is being driven by regulatory developments at the level of the European Union. The legal ideas and principles behind the secular liberalization and de (re) regulation success, that have been achieved in a number of O E C D and W T O countries are: subsidiarity, proportionality, minimum intervention, application of the maxim that liberalization should be the rule and regulation the exception, and transparency as to public policy needs. Thus, there are four basic principles to be observed 122: — no regulation for regulation's sake; — regulation must be based on and foster 'Single Market Freedoms'; — any regulation must take account of business realities; —· any regulation must meet general interest objectives effectively and efficiently. 120 W. Bishop y Antitrust Enforcement and the rule of Law (Editorial), European Competition Law Review, vol. 10, 1998, 1. 121

O E C D , Recommendation of the Council of the O E C D on Improving the Quality of Government Regulation, O E C D Working Papers No. 74, 1995; Christian Joerges/Karl-Heinz Ladeur/Ellen Vos (eds.), Integrating Scientific Expertise into Regulatory Decision-Making — National Traditions and European Institutions, 1997. 122

European Commission, A European Initiative in Electronic Commerce, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, C O M (19) 157 final, 16 April 1997; available on-line at http:/www.ispo.cec.be/ecommerce/initial.html.

4 GYIL 41

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(ii) Regulatory framework responses, observing such principles of freedom, are essential, from the establishment of the business to the promotion and provision of electronic commerce activities; from the conclusion of contracts to the making of electronic payments. The European legislator and the different regulators w i l l find themselves on a stormy sea. There w i l l be challenges on all sides: There w i l l be challenges to the sector of traditional operators from non-traditional sources, particularly the largely unregulated information technology industry. The Internet w i l l challenge the 'stable worlds' of broadcasters and publishers as its capacity increases. If this commercial dynamic is not understood, properly translated into policy considerations and de (re) regulatory legal action, broadcasters wanting to enter into the digital age may find themselves hampered rather than protected by petrification of current regulation. By 'cozy relationships' with the regulators they would indeed be prevented from facing new competitive threats and from positively responding to these by realizing and using new technological and business opportunities. Incremental adjustments to existing regulatory frameworks may not be sufficient. N o w might have come the time for a fundamental conceptual effort pertaining to regulatory principles as a result of 'convergence'. To properly understand the phenomenon of convergence and to respond, as necessary, with full liberalization or an optimum policy mix, a horizontal approach is required. The transformation of the existing regulatory framework for communications in the E U requires indeed a cross-sectoral evaluation. The common and key policy issues which underpin the regulation of telecommunications, broadcasting, publishing, and — where appropriate parallels can be discovered — the information technology sector, must be identified. A number of main key drivers exist in the regulatory framework for 'convergence'. These are:first ,market entry, particularly licencing; second , conditions in the markets, notably the interconnection of and the access to networks; third > the relationship between the different regulatory functions and institutions. But in all this regulatory wisdom and self-restraint it is necessary, for instance, not to deter investment required in the infrastructure (notably the creation of abundant bandwidth!) 1 2 3 or the development of high quality and user-adapted services and content! There w i l l be a number of 'public interest' and content-related issues where no broad consensus can be established between states. For any workable regulatory model it will be important to clearly identify in a 'bottom-up approach' in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity (Article 3b EC Treaty) those aspects of regulation which primarily fall within the competence of states; other tasks may be left to self-regulation. For the rest, there is freedom and market forces may play.

123

Klaus W. Grewlich, Infrastructure Development in the New Communications Market — Financing Requirements and Financial Markets, Communications & Strategies (IDATE), vol. 29, 1998, 165, 168.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy Responding to the request for a fundamental conceptual effort pertaining to regulatory principles as a result of 'convergence' primarily means: a radical re-evaluation of the traditional model of 'vertical* regulation, that followed a sectoral approach establishing vertical lines respectively between telecommunications, broadcasting and publishing, and that regulates services together with underlying networks. A n adjusted and forward-looking regulatory approach would be more 'horizontal' in nature. 124 There are increasingly common issues that cut across different sectors and their delimitations, that have in part been drawn for the convenience of regulators but not in view of what is optimal for the consumers/individuals/citizens or the pertinent economic and cultural entities acting on the multimedia value chain. (iii) Globalization and global information networks necessitate the internationalization of rule-making in terms of de- and re-regulation. This concerns both the access to networks and content-related regulation. The provision of information and entertainment over global networks challenges the traditional civil and also criminal law notions of legal liability for the provision of illegal or harmful content. The challenge concerns the question of which actor on the multimedia chain (network operator, service provider or content packager or content producer) should be held liable for 'harmful' or injurious content (notions that remain to be agreed upon in terms of international minimum standards). This challenge also pertains to the issue of jurisdiction, — i.e. which state shall have the legal right of possible intervention in networks w i t h widely disseminated content and global reach. This is forcing governments particularly to review public law traditions 125 and seek innovative forms of regulatory cooperation. Such a development may be observed more generally in the EU, where a European administrative and regulatory law is evolving, based on different national legal traditions, but at the same time forcing these national laws and regulatory practices to adjust to new common European legal and regulatory standards. 126 The quality of regulatory decisions in one government becomes a matter of concern to other states that are exposed to cross-border effects, or linked by agreements and arrangements for regulatory harmonization, mutual recognition or coordination. Improving regulatory quality at the level of national governments is an important condition for sustaining and enhancing an open world trading system 127 and transborder schemes for cultural exchange. 124

See Squire , Sanders & Dempsy/Analysis (note 8), 161.

125

Friedrich Schoch, Öffentlich-rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen einer Informationsordnung, Veröffentlichung der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, vol. 57, 1998, 158; Christoph Engel, Regulierung durch Organisation und Verfahren, in: Festschrift Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, Baden-Baden 1996, 119 - 138. 126

Jürgen Schwarze, Der Beitrag des Europäischen Gerichtshofs zur Europäisierung des Verwaltungsrechts, Europarecht, vol. 32, 1997, 419, 430 - 431. 127

Michael J. Trebilcock/Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 1995, 408 et seq.; Matthias Herdegen, Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht, 2nd ed., 1995, 107 et seq.

4*

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Klaus W. Grewlich

Due to the absence of geographical frontiers for global information networks, such as the Internet, de (re) regulation behind national frontiers, to be effective, has to be complemented by adequate international cooperation. The critical question is whether such cooperation w i l l follow the traditional inter-governmental approach, or whether the transformation power of global information networks w i l l generate new flexibility and resiliency in 'governance' and international relations. W i l l the impact of global networks decenter and redistribute the combination of power and legitimacy, that we call sovereignty of states? W i l l national sovereignty be partly 'unbundled' and assigned, in limited ways, to a multiplicity of institutional arenas and actors, comprising states, industry federations and transborder civil society groups? The effects of global information networks can be observed, to mention one example, in the 'virtual' financial and short term capital markets, which are a permanent threat to the stability of national and regional economies. Other instances relate to security, human dignity and privacy. The very absence of a predictable legal framework, encompassing also tariffs and taxation, rules pertaining to the digital signature and electronic payment systems, a 'uniform commercial code for electronic transactions', intellectual property protection, creates legal uncertainty and inhibits the growth of electronic commerce. 128 Liberalization and deregulation may have left some voids; the 'horror vacui' may cause these voids to be filled in unexpected ways. Overregulation, on the other hand, would kill some valuable economic, cultural and societal Internet developments in the cradle. The question is whether anarchy will prevail or whether an adequate legal architecture w i l l be established to match the forces of global networks. There are some solid legal foundations: Good examples are the W T O Telecommunications Agreement or the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. 129 Cooperation pertaining more specifically to global information networks could comprise the establishment of a light-handed 'steering instrument', 130 'code of conduct', 'set of guidelines' or 'charter' 131 (whatever name might be suitable), containing — firstly , principles of liberalization and regulatory self-restraint but also international minimum standards that would allow, where legitimate, safeguarding public interest concerns, 128

Klaus W. Grewlich , Wirtschaftsvölkerrechtliche Ordnung für das Internet — Multimediadienste und elektronischer Geschäftsverkehr i m internationalen und europäischen Wirtschaftsrecht, Kommunikation & Recht, vol. 19, 1998, 81. 129

Klaus W. Grewlich, Governance in 'Cyberspace' (note 5), Chapter 8.

130 131

Steuerungsinstrument.

See Grewlich (note 2), 283 et seq.

Klaus W. Grewlich y A Charter for the Internet, Telecommunications Policy, vol. 22, 1998, 273; Klaus W. Grewlich , Global Communications — The Need for a Framework of Ordering Principles, in: Leon T. Knauer/Ronald Κ Machtley/Thomas M. Lynch , Telecommunications Act Handbook, 1996, 153 - 170.

Access to Global Networks — European Telecommunications Law and Policy — secondly , an international coordination mechanism, in close relationship w i t h emerging self-regulation schemes, thus allowing states, international organizations, international business federations and transborder 'civil society' entities (notably non-governmental organizations NGOs) to participate. It is correct that at present, in many parts of the world, transgressing the O E C D area, the current runs for liberalization and against legal regulation. Privatization, deregulation, releasing individual initiative are clearly important, and only market forces, not voluntary governmental policies, will in the end inject sustainable growth into the world economy, foster globalization and the transition to the age of 'Cyberspace' and get the collapsed state economies out of the rut. The level playing field in networked markets might, however, favor economic concentration (trusts and mergers) and the 'winner take all' practice. If this observation is correct, the underlying phenomenon must become the subject of legal policy and economic philosophy. Market forces not only have to be released; they also must be contained by accepted and enforced rules of the game. The social market economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft was always regarded as a particular form of economic order, or 'ordering principles' ('ordo'). 132 Liberalization, de (re) regulation and competition are primarily designed to reach economic objectives, such as competitiveness of enterprises, sustainable economic growth and more employment, but should also create better conditions for freedom, personal responsibility and human growth. 1 3 3 The greatest economic happiness for the greatest number as a result of free competition is a legitimate objective. A n d the liberal creed relies on full competition and framework laws to ensure that competition works. But, policy and law, including de (re) regulatory law and practice designed to guarantee access to global networks, are substantially more than mere facilitators and auxiliary instruments for technological and economic advancement. The 'transformative power' of global networks is not a result of technological determinism but is man-made and can thus be adjusted by human intervention. Whatever the details of an innovative and effective international architecture of ordering principles for global information networks should be, also in the transition to 'Cyberspace', legal practice and public policy

132

I n the thinking of Eucken and of other members of the 'ordo-liberal school' of human rights, the rule of law and free markets are intimately intertwined; see Walter Eucken , Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Principles of economic policy), Introduction by Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker , 6th ed., 1990; Gerhard Schröder/ Alfred Müller-Armack/Karl Hohmann/Johannes Gross/Rüdiger Altmann (eds.), in: Ludwig Erhard, Beiträge zu seiner politischen Biographie; Festschrift zum fünfundsiebzigsten Geburtstag, 1972. 133 Friedrich A. von Hayek , The Constitution of Liberty, 1960 (German edition: Die Verfassung der Freiheit, 1983); David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neoliberalism, Competition Law and the 'New' Europe, American J. of Comp. Law, vol. 42,1994, 25.

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must remain faithful to the rule of law, respect human rights and fundamental principles as contained in written or unwritten constitutions and live up to international agreements and arrangements, thus supporting the evolution of a "public international law of cooperation. M134

134

Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law, 1964; Pieter Verloren Van Themaat, The Changing Structure of International Economic Law, 1981; Rüdiger Wolfrum, International Law of Cooperation, in: Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 9,1st ed., 1986; Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum (ed.), Völkerrecht, 1997,18 et seq.

Monitoring and Blocking Illegal Content on the Internet — a German and Comparative Law Perspective By Karl-Heinz Ladeur

I. Introduction: The Internet — a N e t w o r k of Relationships out of the Reach of State and Law? The Internet has increasingly developed into a challenge (also) for legal science. Assessments range from the uncertain assumption that the existing legal structure, in particular the restraints on action in the penal and civil law, really needs adjustment to the new technologically determined conditions of communication, to further reaching considerations on a fundamental shift in legal relationships, over and above the links to territoriality typical for the traditional understanding of law and the state.1 For the former, the phenomenon is more something that necessarily accompanies technical change, requiring adjustment to the law but not calling its basic structures into question. For the others, what is emerging in the Internet is the formation of a 'cyberspace' outside the state, completely escaping the reach of traditional legal instruments. In the one interpretation the point is to enhance the state's technological competence (particularly that of the organs of criminal prosecution), to specify possibilities of intervention in an appropriate technological fashion, and especially to improve international cooperation among states.2 For the others, the Internet is one of the manifestations of a dissolution of stable identities, in particular of the individual as bearer of subjective rights and the state as bearer of sovereignty, and their transformation into a combinatory pattern of multiple 3 fragmentary roles and nodes of relationships within a network. The 'law of the net' would refer, then, no longer to 'whole' physical persons, but to variable positions, in particular 'accounts'. According to the same logic, the state should not just be fixed on more intense international cooperation, but should be replaced by new institutions appro-

1

David R. Johnson/David Post , Law and Borders — The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, Stanford Law Review, vol. 48, 1996, 1367, 1387 et seq. 2 3

Lawrence Lessig, Zones of Cyberspace, Stanford Law Review, vol. 48, 1996, 1403 - 1411.

Johnson/Post (note 1), 1400 - 1401; for a critique cf. Jack L. Goldsmith , Against Cyberanarchy, University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 65, 1998, 1199 - 1250.

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priate to the network, which the net citizens ('netizens') must first create in accordance w i t h their own principles of legitimacy. This w i l l be in connection with other forms of a new global law over and above the state, as reflected in the lex mercatoria , a sort of cooperative, self-organized law. 4 A number of questions of principle raised in this connection will be discussed further below. It should be stated first of all, though, that in fact new forms of productivity of knowledge 5 are developing, imposing the relational rationality of combinatory patterns linked to a variable network of relationships, and not least calling into question the separation between general empirical and regulatory knowledge and knowledge capable of being privately appropriated, protected in particular by patent and copyright laws. This can also be seen in newer forms of production outside the Internet, which in particular, through linked research in common by firms that are otherwise competing, make possible new forms of formation of networks of firms among hierarchically ordered groups of firms and the market. O n the other hand this ought not to hide the fact that innovative technologies and forms of production and communication also provide new conditions for quite traditionally destructive forms of criminal or other powerful forms of action 6 , against which even traditional sanctions like penalties or government bans may prove indispensable, particularly since the very openness of the net offers a stimulus for anti-social conduct. Here it cannot readily be seen that and how involvement of 'whole' persons on the one hand and the state as institution on the other can be done without. A t this point a more exact distinction must be drawn between the diffuse, anarchical conception of the 'net' related more or less antithetically to the state and involving technically enabled spontaneous self-organization of subjects, and another conception that stresses a more 'trans-subjective' relational rationality of networks that departs from the rationality of rules oriented towards controlling behavior. 7 For the first the Internet's 'disorder' is to be assessed positively as a growth of individual freedom; it is moreover supposed that the multiplicity of possible technical combinations practically

4

See the illuminating contributions in Gunther Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a State, 1997. 5

Helmut Willke , Organisierte Wissensarbeit, Zeitschrift für Soziologie, vol. 27, 1998, 161 177; Karl-Heinz Ladeur (ed.), Liberal Institutions, Economic Constitutional Rights and the Role of Organizations, 1997. 6

Christoph Engel, Inhaltskontrolle i m Internet, Archiv für Presserecht, vol. 27, 1996, 220, 226. See generally Hans Heinrich Trute, Öffentlich-rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen einer Informationsordnung, in: Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (VVDStRL), vol. 57, 1998, 216 - 273. 7

Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Zur Kooperation von staatlicher Regulierung und Selbstregulierung des Internet, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht, vol. 41, 1997, 372 - 384.

Monitoring and Blocking Illegal Content on the Internet

57

rules out state intervention (in a democracy). 8 For the others, what is involved is a new law operating no longer with the 'whole' person or physically delimited objects (property) and the state as a territorially delimited unit, but necessitates a new area of 'cyberlaw\ The technical conditions of the Internet's presumed uncontrollability would still need closer consideration, but in neither variant should one neglect the repercussions of the formation of a separate Internet (dis) order on the existing state law policing action outside the Internet: (and in so far as) an autonomous 'cyberlaw' with a legitimacy of its own indeed develops in the Internet, this must inevitably have repercussions on the state possibilities of sanctioning as a whole. To be sure, in a pluralist society differing practical or legal standards, for instance on protection of personal honor in different segments of the public, may be tolerable, 9 but these differences themselves require monitoring and legitimization to prevent exposing society's law to a process of erosion. This is also the justification for a state practice wishing in the first place to operate with the 'old' legal institutions for allocating individual or organized responsibilities for breaches of existing restraints on action. But it emerges here that in addition to technical problems of applying national law because of the Internet's derealization 10 , problems of content arise too in defining traditional limits to offensive expression (pornography, slander etc.), which have been played down by various sub-sections of the public (general media, sub-cultural publications, demonstrations, the art world, etc.). But the Internet is distinguished precisely for overstepping these bounds. Alongside this issue, questions arise again over and above the technical problems, of the tenability of gradual or fundamental distinctions in assessment standards among individual states. Even among western countries there are differences of degree in the definition of standards of prohibition on utterances, especially pornography, while fundamental differences have developed, for instance, regarding punishability of political expression between, e.g., Germany and other western countries. These differences of content, but also the previously mentioned ones of principle, are exacerbated further by the technical flexibility of the Internet: not only is there illegal conduct in one's own interest, but also 'civil disobedience' in the form of offensive application of competing interpretations of the state's density of control even where evaluations of content are in principle the same. In particular, one can 8

Wilhelm Mecklenburg, 'Internetfreiheit', Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht, vol. 41, 1997, 525 - 543. 9 Thomas Vesting , Soziale Geltungsansprüche in fragmentierten Öffentlichkeiten: Zur näheren Diskussion über das Verhältnis von Ehrenschutz und Meinungsfreiheit, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, vol. 122,1997,337 - 371; Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Meinungsfreiheit, Ehrenschutz und die Veränderung der Öffentlichkeit in der Massendemokratie, Archiv für Presserecht, vol. 24, 1993,531 -536. 10

See for a radical perspective on the consequences of derealization of state and law JeanMarie Guéhenno, The End of the Nation State, 1995.

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note in the Internet a phenomenon of opposition to state sanctions even of utterances those concerned disapprove of: for instance, the dissemination of neo-nazi propaganda repressed in Germany is irradiated even by foreign universities, who disseminate such content through their nets, even where there is no doubt as to their rejection of the content itself. 11 This example shows that it is problematic to suppose an entirely different rationality for the Internet and accordingly seek some entirely new 'cyberlaw'. The protagonists of this entirely new law are certainly right that it cannot be just a matter of a technical problem of applying the existing state law under new conditions of complexity; on the other hand, observance of the linked up possibilities, but also the constraints on linkage, of traditional state law is indispensable. It should not be forgotten here that state law has to deal even outside the Internet with so many new problems connected with rapid changes in society (consider only the new High Technology Law, or nuclear law, genetic engineering law, regulation of information and media technologies outside the Internet, product liability law). 12 Accordingly it would be wrong to oppose 'territorial· state law referring to 'whole' individuals and their limitable rights schematically in favor of some 'cyberlaw'. 13 State law is itself undergoing radical change, sparked off not least by the transition 'experimental society', 14 the development of which is no longer following stable trajectories within which rules and their application, empirical knowledge and continual individual variation, could be separated. 15 N o t just the options within a relatively fixed bandwidth of possibilities but the room for options themselves is changing. This also transforms the relationship between the law and its infrastructure, first and foremost by the linking of practical, accumulated knowledge and socially formed expectations in legal relations. In this way, as in the past, the equivocal concept of 'requisite care in transaction' which, with the development 11

Neo-nazi propaganda in particular has been transferred to servers abroad once they have been banned from German servers: Stephan Wilske/Teresa Schiller , International Jurisdiction i n Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate the Internet, Federal Communications Law Journal, vol. 50, 1996, 117, 129; Andreas v. Bonin/Oliver Köster, Internet im Lichte neuer Gesetze, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht, vol. 41, 1997, 821, 825; Ulrich Sieber , Kontrollmöglichkeiten zur Verhinderung rechtswidriger Inhalte in Computernetzen Π, Computer und Recht, vol. 13, 1997, 653, 665. 12

Rainer Pitschas, Die Bewältigung der wissenschaftlichen und technischen Entwicklungen durch das Verwaltungsrecht, Die öffentliche Verwaltung, vol. 42, 1989, 785 - 800; Bernhard Schlink, Die Bewältigung der wissenschaftlichen und technischen Entwicklungen durch das Verwaltungsrecht, VVDStRL, vol. 48, 1989, 235 - 264. 13

Lessig (note 2), 1403 - 1411.

14

Michael C. Dorf/Charles F. Säbel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, Columbia Law Review, vol. 98,1998, 267 - 473; Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Postmoderne Rechtstheorie, 2nd ed., 1995, 173 et seq. 15

Olivier Favereau, L'incomplétude n'est pas le problème, c'est la solution, in: Bernadette Reynaud (ed.), Les limites de la rationalité, vol. 2, 1997, 219 - 233.

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of high technology that draws no longer on general, empirical positions, but on experimental scientific modeling oriented towards generating 'the new', has to follow along in order to uphold the linkage function between virtual situations and knowledge of requirements. 16 Here, explicit, organized statements in the form of standards from the industries involved (but also from private or public bodies) are playing a steadily greater part. This means the emphasis is shifted towards self-regulation, while what is actually possible and knowledge of requirements were not up to now so closely connected. These procedures of standard setting must open up to the systematic search for new knowledge and differ, particularly in this way, from the traditional forms of self-organized creation of expectations in transactions in the light of the specification of performance and restraints on actions. Much the same applies to product liability: the point is to adjust the law more closely to the production of new knowledge and to compensate for the inadequacy of experience-oriented criteria of 'requisite knowledge in transactions'. 17 Below, the development of German and American law in relation to dealing with responsibility for utterances in the Internet will first be sketched out. 18 The international law questions of delimiting territorial competence of states w i l l also be taken into account. The attempt will also be made, starting from the technical conditions and limits of Internet control, to arrive at considerations on 'network adequate' regulations that both link up with existing approaches to making state law more flexible and are appropriate to the complexity of the Internet. The point here w i l l be to find new forms of cooperation between self-regulation and hetero-regulation at both state and transnational levels. Here the question arises, also in connection w i t h the development of the new law of technology, of the relationship between penal, civil and public regulatory law in tying down technologically induced uncertainties. 16

Hans-Heinrich Trute , Die Verwaltung und das Verwaltungsrecht zwischen gesellschaftlicher Selbststeuerung und staatlicher Regulierung, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, vol. 112,1996, 950 - 964; Michael Kloepfer/Thomas Eisner, Selbstregulierung i m Umwelt- und Technikrecht, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, vol. 112, 1996, 964 - 975. 17

For product liability see Gert Brüggemeier, Gesellschaftliche Schadensverteilung und Deliktsrecht, Archiv für die zivilistische Praxis, vol. 182,1982, 385 - 452; George L. Priest, The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5,1991, no. 3, 31 -50. 18 For liability of the content provider himself see Sieber (note 11), 654; v. Bonin/Köster (note 11), 823; Niels Bortloff, Neue Urteile i n Europa betreffend die Frage der Verantwortlichkeit von Online-Diensten, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht, vol. 41, 1997, 167 175; this report on court practice concerning liability of Internet providers shows that divergence w i t h i n Europe should not be overestimated. The French Conseil Constitutionnel has recently blocked a law which would have expanded liability beyond positive knowledge (see Bortloff, 173). The But in Japan as well seems to be willing to limit liability.

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I I . Liability for Utterances on the Internet According to the General Law 1. The Liability of Utter er s Themselves The liability of the producer for punishable pornography or libelous utterances (with private or public reference, e.g., from neo-nazi groups, terrorists etc.) according to the general law (penal and civil) does not at first sight raise any new problems. This form of dissemination of utterances, located at the start of the chain of dissemination, does not have any particularly special features, any more than the receipt of illegal content, at the end of processing through the network (where especially punished, as in the case of child pornography). However it emerges that, here, there are not just the general problems of determining the limits to freedom of opinion, particularly in relation to the law of personal honor. I n interpreting Art. 5 (2) Basic Law, the German Federal Constitutional Court 1 9 has used an emphasis on the value of utterances to reduce problems of demarcation between opinion and facts heavily in favor of the former, and to limit the protection of personal honor, at least in the political arena, in the interest of freedom of opinion — in rather unclear case law. But specific questions20 arise in relation to the protection of youth, especially because what is on offer can also be accessible to young people directly without further control by third parties (as is the case for films or books). 21 For both German and American law a special problem presents itself at the level of legislation, since the German Länder are responsible for media regulation whereas the federal government is competent to protect young people and for telecommunications and economic law. The result is a number of demarcation problems that

' 1 9 See Vesting (note 9). 20

Ruf us Pichler, Haftung des Host Providers für Persönlichkeitsverletzungen vor und nach dem Teledienstgesetz, Multimedia und Recht, vol. 1, 1998, 79-88. 21 Yanan Akdeniz , The Regulation of Pornography and Child Pornography on the Internet, The Journal of Information, Law and Technology 1997, no. 1, http://elj. warwick. ac.uk/jilt/ internet/97-lakdz/; up to now Internet café owners have not been held responsible for access of minors to pornographic contents on the Internet, see e.g. Decision of the Attorney at Landgericht Munich I of 16/1/1997 (467 Js 319998/96). I n the USA, on several occasions public libraries were involved i n criminal investigations for not preventing minors from accessing pornographic contents on the Internet; see Giorgio Bovenzi , Liabilities of System Operators on the Internet, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, vol. 11, 1996, 93 - 146; for protection of minors from harmful contents on multimedia systems see Wolfgang Schulz , Jugendschutz bei Tele- und Mediendiensten, Multi-Media und Recht, vol. 1, 1998,182 -187; see also Communication on illegal and harmful contents on the Internet of 16 October 1996 by the European Commission (ECC (96) 487); for an evaluation of potential effects of pornography see Ann Wells Branscomb , Internet Babylon? Does the Carnegie Mellon Study of Pornography on the Information Superhighway Reveal a Threat to the Stability of Society?, Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 83, 1995, 1935 - 1957.

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are all the sharper with the increasing blurring of the existing boundaries between technique and content. Thus the inter-state agreement on media service concluded by the German Länder is present alongside the federal act on television services which regulates other data as "media services." Here in turn a number of demarcation problems arise, partly reduced by the largely overlapping limitations on sanctions in both acts. The inter-state agreement on media service (MStV) provides, in addition to a ban on particular content that may endanger young people (para. 8 (1)), for measures as to content in relation to 'distributive services', that possibilities for young people to see them must be controlled particularly by time restrictions (or in other ways). For 'call-up services', which are, as is usual on the Internet, available without limitation, the user must make a block possible (para. 8 (3)). Here a password system has been developed allowing access to material only when an identification number has been assigned and typed in (e.g. adult check). Its allocation is based in principle on a credit card number. It is problematic, however, that much pornographic material, especially non-German, is accessible also on the basis of confirmation of mature age given by clicking. Additionally, providers must by para. 8 (4) appoint a youth protection officer, or be a member of a voluntary self-control organization. This provider self-control on content has been created in the meantime by providers of media services. In procedural terms it is problematic that the MStV provides in para. 18 (2) for the competence of Länder youth protection authorities for prohibitions or blocks on providers, whereas under the general youth protection law a federal control center for media that endangers youth, particularly heavily staffed, is provided. According to German press law (of the Länder) the press is polizeifest , that is, sequestration of printed material of the periodical press by the administration of the police depends in principle on authorization from a judge. 22 The fact that according to the new law a new media service can be blocked by an administrative act looks like a questionable retreat from formal protection against sequestration attained for the press; on the basis of the general version of the relevant regulation in the MStV, it also covers services similar to the press. 23 As far as self-regulation by media service providers goes, let us merely note that regulation in an area where there are obvious conflicts of interest seems questionable if based only on the membership of a homogenous group of producers. 24 More 22

See only Martin Löfjfler/Reinhard

Ricker, Handbuch des Presserechts, 3rd ed., 1997, 51.

23

Schulz (note 21); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Untersagungsanordnungen gegen Btx-Informationsangebote, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, vol. 39, 1986, 2748 - 2752. 24 Schulz (note 21), 185; for rating systems based on self-control and self-regulation, growing more and more differentiated and sophisticated, see e.g. PaulResnick y Filtering Information on the Internet, Scientific American, vol. 276, 1997 (March), 54 - 56; The Platform for Internet

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over, the procedure is as clumsy as could be conceived: while complaints can be brought before this self-regulation body on-line the only sanctions provided for are references, disapprobation or reprimand that sometimes must be published by those concerned. 25 Here we see the dilemma of media regulation visible in our legal questions in connection with the Internet too: on the one hand there is a formal legal possibility of severe intervention in the form of prohibition by youth protection authorities (of the Länder); on the other, an unstructured form of self-regulation is presented where neither the interest patterns are specifically born in mind, nor coordination with governmental monitoring effected through an obligation to cooperate. The traditional 'command and control' approach, however, can hardly be applied to the Internet, since, first, there is no systematic system of monitoring by the youth protection authorities, and second, a control system dependent on official interventions cannot in any case be practicable. The sole practical alternative is a procedural variant of regulation aiming at developing a rating system and underpinning it by an electronic blocking system to be used by operators of terminals. This should exist as the object of institutionalized cooperation between the state and providers with the aim of a flexible version of Internet monitoring, adequate for the complexities. 26 This combination of self-regulation and hetero-regulation could also have been supported by the announcement that, should no satisfactory regulation be arrived at, content that could endanger young people must as far as possible be banned from the Internet entirely. O f course, here too a problem of 'regulatory competition' arises, but youth protection is regarded in all countries at least as a regulatory task, and even commercial providers cannot shift their material arbitrarily from one country to another, especially if they have to reckon with subsequent tightening of the rules there too. This sort of cooperative regulation could also become the object of international law or European agreements, which would set this sort of system on a stable footing. A further object of rational proceduraliza-

Content Selection Home Page is available on the World Wide Web at http://www.w3.org/ PICS; an advanced system has been developed recently by the American organization Recreation Software Advisory Council on the Internet (RSACi), see Regulierung i m Internet zwischen Selbstkontrolle und staatlicher Aufsicht, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 September 1998, N r . 211, 20. 25

Michael Rath-Glawatz/Arthur Waldenberger y Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Multi-Mediadienste-Anbieter e.V., Computer und Recht 1997, 766 - 769; for the proposal of a Convention on Self-Control of the Internet see Klaus W. Grewlich , A Charta for the Internet, Telecommunications Policy, vol. 22, 1998, 273 - 279. 26 O n filtering systems see C. D. Martin/]. M. Reagle, A n Alternative to Government Regulation and Censorship — Content Advisory Systems for the Internet, Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal, vol. 15, 1997, 409 - 427. Diane Roberts , O n the Plurality of Ratings, Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal, vol. 15, 1997, 105 - 134; Marci A. Hamilton , Reconceptualizing Ratings: From Censorship to Marketplace, Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal, vol. 15, 1997, 403 - 408.

Monitoring and Blocking Illegal Content on the Internet tion, though for the moment allowing only a weak standard, would also permit new considerations as to whether and to what extent youth protection (and whatever else standards might allow) also to be underpinned by stricter institutional differentiation between the various techniques of dissemination. For on-line services the standards might be higher without thereby negatively sanctioning fundamental questions of setting the limits on 'explicit sexual content' in periodicals or similar media. This variant of institutional separation is a means appropriate to liberal law for easing conflicts where a solution in principle is hard to find. 2. Dissemination by Third Parties of Material that is Punishable or Infringes Private Rights According to Existing Law The debate has moved on to questions of liability for utterances by third parties particularly because the utterers themselves can often escape government action by becoming anonymous or by moving to other servers. Yet as has rightly been pointed out, the problem is not fundamentally new: for printed works, films and other media too, the question of assigning responsibility for unlawful utterances of third parties has already frequently arisen. This is true, e.g., of publishing houses, libraries 27 , booksellers 28, or television documentaries 29; in Germany it arose in a special version related to the question of allocating election broadcast time to radical parties. Over and above the problems of author responsibility itself, in relation to the dissemination by third parties the particular problem of guaranteeing freedom of reporting arises: the punishable call to set a bomb, accompanied by instructions, at the same time becomes a public event that can be reported on. This leads to a dilemma because reporting can enhance the possible danger, or even lead to it in the first place — for instance in the case of utterances that have remained entirely ignored and gain attention only through the media. 30 This problem is only severe because no 27

Karl-Heinz Ladeur , Verhaftete Drucksachen, University of Bremen, Library, 1977.

28

For a parallel between liability of press and Internet providers, see Landgericht Stuttgart, jur-pc 1992, 1714 - 1716; Engel (note 6), 226; for liability of the press for republication of communications of third persons see Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW), vol. 49,1996,1131; BGH, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 1997, 722; Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken, NJW, vol. 50, 1997, 1376; for liability of the press for advertisements see Bundesgerichtshof, NJW, vol. 39,1986, 2503; for the US see Frank P. Darr, A Proposed Defamation Standard, Hastings Communication and Entertainment Law Journal, vol. 18, 1996, 267, 276 - 277. 29 30

For liability for third party utterances see BGH, NJW, vol. 50, 1997, 1148.

The perverse effect has to be taken into account when tiny groups only attract public interest by criminal prosecution see Sieher (note 11), 665.

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stable practice in application to traditional media can be linked up. In particular for publishing houses, booksellers, libraries, but also broadcasting institutions in cases of disseminating transmissions by third parties, the rule has developed in civil law that responsibility links first to knowledge of content, with an obligation to verify differentiated according to professional position. 31 In particular for the press, because of the fundamental right to press freedom, there is only a limited obligation to check the illegality of utterances reported on; here a reduced standard of 'press related' care applies. This is connected with the fact that in a liberal society priority interest must attach to maintaining the freedom of a 'marketplace of ideas'. Liability for further dissemination of utterances by third parties can easily lead to private censorship, especially where relatively high investments are at stake. In any case the publisher, for instance, is exposed to the risk that a book may not be distributed, or only with restrictions, if it contains particular unlawful content. 32 The problem of the negligent dissemination of unlawful content that has not been noticed does not arise in the case of the press, but does in that of booksellers, publishers, libraries, etc. But here the case law starts from the position that the third party can rely in principle on verification by the provider, and the problem of liability arises only where disseminators have positive knowledge of unlawful contents. 33 The case law and the literature have sought also to link rules for responsibility for Internet content to this differentiated allocation of responsibility for content — especially before the entry into force of the Act on Telecommunication Services (TDG) and the MStV. A problem that certainly arises here is the classification of the provider in particular. Here the focus should be first on the host or service provider, storing material on their computers (by contrast with the access provider, providing only technical access). O n the one hand there is the argument that it is impossible to check the content of all the material: 34 it is countered that it is just this unchecked dissemi31

Pichler (note 20), 85.

32

For liability of content providers in general see Sieber (note 11); Gerald Spindler, Deliktsrechtliche Haftung i m Internet — nationale und internationale Probleme, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht, vol. 40,1996, 533 - 563; Christian Pelz, Die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit von Internet-Providern, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht, vol. 42,1998, 530, 532; Arthur Waldenberger, Teledienste, Mediendienste und die Verantwortlichkeit ihrer Urheber, Multi-Media und Recht, vol. 1, 1998, 126. 33 I n traditional cases of liability for republication of contents, court practice expects only a level of superficial control, B G H , NJW, vol. 39, 1986, 2503; B G H , Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, vol. 99, 1997, 722. 34 See in particular the overview given by Sieber (note 11); for protection of intellectual property on the Internet see Arthur Waldenberger , Zur zivilrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit für Urheberrechtsverletzungen, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 1997, vol. 41,176 - 188; in comparative perspective, see Alexander Klett, Urheberrecht i m Internet aus deutscher und amerikanischer Sicht, 1998.

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nation of content that brings a social risk that goes beyond the one associated w i t h the graduated responsibility for utterances by third parties in other media. In particular publishers are protected also because they can rely on the responsibility of the author, generally known to them, 35 and for the press there is the additional point that the reduction of liability is associated with a special interest that exists in speeding dissemination of information. Newspaper sellers too, for instance, can rely on monitoring by the preceding stages of production and dissemination of information, and cannot in other respects develop any special competence here. Here again there emerges a characteristic difference between traditional media and their forms of dissemination on the one hand, and the heterogeneous 'network of networks' or 'system of systems' of the Internet on the other 36 : the host provider conveys a wealth of services and material that does not admit of any stable professionally differentiated gradation of responsibility to a comparable extent. While the host provider is not responsible for the content, he is at the same time the one who certainly develops specific control competence which prior stages in part not only fail to develop in practice, but can hardly be expected to do in normative terms. This is in turn connected with the blurring of the boundaries between functions and services in the Internet: dissemination at any rate by the service provider no longer comes about through 'neutral' channels indifferent to content (like the transport of newspaper wholesalers); instead, packages of bits have to be assembled and actively processed through various programs. 37 For this very reason the host provider also has to develop many-sided technological intelligence, whereas the distribution level in a traditional distribution pyramid consists of each case specialized in one thing only. Here it is rightly pointed out in the literature that the requirements of care must be determined not just by acceptability (in cost terms) for the provider, but also by the degree of care required, an objective consideration, in a transaction. But the 'public' has to assume that the host provider stores a multiplicity of content on a computer without verification, and it is from this point that expectations of a control have to start. This would, on one view, at least have to apply to commercial providers. 38 But this is based on a typically wrong conclusion: the information 35 Risks related to activities of host providers are in fact different from those created by traditional editors of books, journals, etc., Pichler (note 20), 84; Spindler (note 32), 533, 536. 36

E. M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization: From the Network of Networks to the System of Systems, in: Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem/Thomas Vesting (eds.), Perspektiven der Informationsgesellschaft, 1995, 49 - 59. 37

See the contributions in Brian Kahin/Janet Abbate (eds.), Standards Policy for Information Infra-structure, 1995. 38

Landgericht Stuttgart, jur-pc 1992, 1714, 1716.

5 GYIL 41

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about the generally accepted view can be assumed for print media; it is the outcome of a long search process in which, for instance, press liability basically changed with changes to constitutional law. A generally accepted view arises from linking up trial bargaining, self-observation and hetero-observation of consequences, professional and public evaluations, involvement of the judiciary, technical differentiation, public expectations of performance* to name only a few factors affecting the development of orientational standards of conduct. What 'the public' expects of a host provider is by contrast quite unclear, since there are not (yet) any criteria for that. Again regarding the question of whether the opening up of such an uncontrolled medium involves claims to care at all, 39 there is no 'generally accepted view'. As regards avoidability (external care) which can be distinguished from predictability as 'internal care', there is no generally accepted view, 40 especially because there is no role specification at all for the 'requisite care in transactions' of the provider, that could be guided by 'general (average) requirements on conduct'. This is connected particularly with the peculiarities of the structure of a 'network of networks', which at any rate for the moment does not allow the particular roles to be associated w i t h the particular expectations. Moreover, the technology itself is still in a development phase; and for that reason too it is hard to form 'average' expectations that could be derived from a general stock of experience. Similarly, broadly treated liability on the host provider would also have to fail, though, because of the constitutional criteria of broadcasting and press freedom (Art. 5 (1), second sentence, Basic Law). To that extent, the question does not even arise in a liberal democracy of whether the use of the Internet medium as such could be contrary to duties of care. Before the entry into force of the new multimedia law, the view was accordingly widespread in the literature that at least spot-checks ought to be made, 41 and additionally, where the breaches of law became known, liability limited to severe illegality would be assumed.42 A further view sought from the outset to limit the duty to verify to infringements that have actually become known. 4 3 The latter view must be taken as the prevailing one.

39

Pichler (note 20), 84; Spindler (note 32), 536.

40

Gert Brüggemeier, Deliktsrecht, 1986, no. 106.

41

Pichler (note 20), 85.

42

Before the introduction of the new multimedia law (Teledienstegesetz und Mediendienste-Staatsvertrag) in 1997 some authors expected host providers to check contents at least on a random basis, Jochen P. Marly , Die Verteilung von Artikeln und Programmen in Datennetzen aus urheber- und wettbewerbsrechtlicher Sicht, jur-pc 1992, 1442 - 1449. 43

Pichler (note 20), 84 - 86.

67

Monitoring and Blocking Illegal Content on the Internet 3. The Legal Position Following

Entry into Force of the Multimedia

Law

a) L i a b i l i t y for Producing Material and Setting ' L i n k s ' T h e T D G and the M S t V , as m e n t i o n e d earlier, make, i n accordance w i t h the d i s t r i b u t i o n of legislative powers between the federation and the Lander

i n ac-

cordance w i t h the Basic L a w , 4 4 coordinated regulation, w i t h the same content o n the decisive points, for media-related and other data services. Responsibility for content is regulated i n para. 5 T D G / M S t V . 4 5 T h i s makes service providers w i t h i n the meaning of b o t h acts first of all responsible for content of t h e i r o w n w h i c h t h e y ' p r o v i d e ' . A user t o o m a y be a p r o v i d e r b y m a k i n g content accessible t o t h i r d parties t h r o u g h a h o m e page. Even those w h o identify foreign content e x p l i c i t l y b y frames set a r o u n d communications f r o m someone else, o r the like, c o u n t as content providers. 4 6 I t is disputed above all w h e t h e r b y setting l i n k s 4 7 someone makes another text t h e i r o w n and becomes responsible for its content. (This p r o b l e m arises particularly i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h c h i l d p o r n o g r a p h y , 4 8 where even the use is punishable.) I n p r i n 44

For separation of competencies for telecommunications and media law i n Germany, see Martin Bullinger/Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, Multi-Mediadienste, 1997,139; Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Zur Notwendigkeit einer flexiblen Abstimmung von Bundes- und Landeskompetenzen auf den Gebieten des Telekommunikations- und des Rundfunkrechts, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 1998, vol. 42,261 - 269; for a British conception of cooperation between content related regulation and anti-trust, see OFTEL, Response to the European Commission on the Green Paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology sectors, and the implication for regulation, http://www.oftel.gov.uk/broadcast7eu398 . htm. 45

Pelz (note 32).

46

For responsibility of republication by 'frames' see v. Bonin! Köster (note 11), 823.

47

Court practice is somewhat uncertain on attribution of responsibility for 'links': Amtsgericht Berlin-Tiergarten (Markwardt case), Multimedia und Recht, vol. 1, 1998, 50 (with a comment by Hütbig) declined responsibility for links to illegal contents because defendant restricted herself to setting the link without taking into consideration the contents in detail; in another case, Landgericht Hamburg (with a comment by Arthur Waldenberger, id., 373 - 375) expected the author of a link to take his distance from illegal contents (this was i n fact a nontypical case), Archiv für Presserecht, vol. 29, 1998, 421; the same is valid for literature which complains that traditional doctrine is not adapted to the relational rationality of the Internet, see DetlevMüller-Using, Archiv für Post und Telekommunikation, vol. 49,1997,101,107; Pelz (note 32), 532; ν. Bonin/Köster (note 11), 823; Norbert P. Flechsig/Detlev Gabel, Strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit i m Netz durch Einrichten und Vorhalten von Hyper-Links, Computer und Recht, vol. 14,1998, 351; see also the overview given by Ireni Ε. Vassilaki, Computer- und internet-spezifische Entscheidungen der Strafgerichte, Multimedia und Recht, vol. 1, 247 - 250 (for Internet cafés see 249). 48

5*

For criminal sanctions against child pornography see Theodor Lenckner, in: Schoenke /

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ciple, liability cannot be assumed in this case, as it is initially a mere unspecified linkage, neutral as to content. But that only shows the problem, because even those who 'offer' foreign material are, at least if they know the content, responsible for the content within the limits of the technically possible and the acceptable. According to a view presented in the literature, it follows that those who make a link to a punishable page must a priori be liable, since this can only be intentional. 49 This conclusion is not at all convincing. Especially in cases of criminality of utterances, 50 something not exactly rare at least in Germany, it must be born in mind that — apart from calumnies, in case of which one may presume liability through links — the matter is one of protecting public goods against diffusing endangerment, the punishability of which amounts to shifting the boundary of the permissible interest sphere of opinion (beyond the borderline of action related consequences). The inclusion of third parties in a diffuse zone of endangerment must itself be strictly delimited. This problem becomes still bigger in international criminal law where the setting of links may make pages accessible in Germany but may in the country of origin, say the US, be distributed without punishment. This sort of liability risk would be all the more awkward since this operation of referencing and linking in the 'network of networks', by contrast with traditional media, can happen for quite different reasons: for instance, Nizkor, an organization of Jewish Holocaust victims, includes a link to the home page of the neo-nazi Zündel. It would hardly be plausible to treat this as punishable. O n the other hand, it would also be problematic to focus on a particular position or ideology of those who make such links. 51

b) Liability as Host Provider of Others' Material By para. 5 (2) T D G / M S t V , the host provider is responsible only where he has knowledge of others' material that he 'provides' and it is technically possible and acceptable for him to prevent its dissemination. The concept of 'providing' here contrasts with the adoption of others' material as one's own, if understood technically, that is in the sense of storage on one's own computers ready to be called up. 52 This includes in particular news groups and user web pages: as follows from what

Scbroeder , Strafgesetzbuch, Commentary, 25th ed., 1997, § 184, No. 63, 65; Kristian Kuekl, in: Lackner/Kuehly Strafgesetzbuch, 22nd ed., 1997, § 184, No. 8b. 49

For a critique of the unclear conception of the new multimedia law see Müller- Using (note 47). 50 Amtsgericht Berlin-Tiergarten (note 47); the unclear meaning of the law leaves some leeway to courts because links to contents of third parties w i l l never be set w i t h complete ignorance of their contents. 51 32

For a critique see Pichler (note 20), 86. 87.

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we have said on the general law, here too when it comes to the reference framework of 'knowledge' the distinction has to be drawn between facts themselves and the evaluative assessment as unlawful. In the prevailing opinion under criminal law, it is sufficient for the perpetrator to have properly grasped the position: intention need not extend to knowledge of the unlawfulness. 53 In another view, the object of intent has to be treated more broadly, but in the case of many offenses of utterance even dolus eventualis (conditional intent) can suffice. In civil law however, negligent failure to recognize unlawfulness would in general suffice. This entails considerable uncertainty for the host provider, since a warning from a government office against 'providing' material may already lead to a justification of responsibility, so that the risk of civil and criminal liability w i l l exist. A n active prosecution service can, thus, through mere 'notification', create considerable uncertainty that will strengthen the inclination rather to block a page in cases of doubt — where the possibility exists.54 In this respect the new literature largely agrees that the multimedia law has brought clarity to the extent that mere 'reason to know' unlawful content cannot by itself bring liability for the host provider, but that the risk of wrong assessment of known content continues. A n d this very risk may, the more the prosecution services activate their Internet monitoring, be considerably increased through the number of 'warnings' that can be increased arbitrarily. 55 In view of the increasing heterogeneity of values in pluralist societies it would be necessary to structure more strongly a definition of the limits of the permissible through a procedural variant adapted to the mobility of the 'network of networks', as has happened in the case of both public and private broadcasters through the formation of external or internal supervisory bodies. Here too an additional duty on Lander supervisory bodies to coordinate by agreement on joint substantive and procedural criteria has been introduced into broadcasting laws; this sort of cooperation and coordination is all the more needed in the interest of laying down standards for Internet material. The existing combination of private self-regulation (individual or organized) and unpredictable intervention by government bodies (public prosecution services or youth services), in turn poorly prepared for a task that is difficult to structure, is about the worst possible solution. Instead, technically adequate solutions ought to

53

Id.

54

These activities create a lot of uncertainty among providers, see Gabriele Hoof acker, Flickwerk. Die Online-Gesetze in der Praxis, c't (a Computer Magazine), 1998, no. 16, 156 - 158; Christiane Scbulzki-Haddouti , Grobschnitt. Das Online-Recht muß nachgebessert werden, c't 1998, no. 16, 160-161. 55 For the interpretation of the major concepts of the new multimedia law see Waldenberger (note 32).

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be found, like rating systems, to be developed by public bodies in cooperation with providers, the computer industry and other social groups. 56 A further problem emerges at the level of securing knowledge (to be distinguished from correct classification of material): in practical terms an incentive is created for the provider to know as little as possible, since it is only then that the verification obligation is triggered. 57 Even when complaints are actually made by third parties, it is unclear when knowledge is to be expected.58 The provider indeed has an interest in not systematically setting up an internal organization to monitor problems, since attribution of liability is not as easy as when a complaint office is set up. Here we meet a similar problem as with environmental and product liability 5 9 : on the one hand, complex risks cannot simply be attributed wholesale, for purposes of compensation for damage, to the one causing a risk where this cannot in typical situations of hazard liability be kept limited and graspable, e.g., by recourse to a technical system. In particular, basic liability for wrongful action by third parties — which is of concern here — can lead to incalculable liability risks. O n the other hand, however, with new technologies there are no standards of conduct to guide a criterion of care. What suggests itself at first sight is linking liability w i t h incurring risks; but this has the perverse effect mentioned that it creates a downright 'incentive not to know', which in view of a dynamic development of technology must be undesirable, if only because the risks are often accessible only to those actually involved. In the area of product and environmental liability, where technologies are involved whose operations and consequences are beyond ordinary observation, there is a strong incentive for firms to keep knowledge secret (or not even to produce it), if it could lead to intensification of liability. One has to bear in mind in such cases that the state (courts in particular) or the public at large can generate knowledge of their own only to a limited extent. Accordingly, solutions must be found here that combine rational limitation of liability with incentives to develop knowledge. This can be guaranteed by, e.g., procedural obligations: where firms develop a search system oriented to producing knowledge about risk, liability for development risks should otherwise be limited. A similar solution suggests itself for the Internet: the host provider should be obliged to develop a self-organized cooperative procedure of searching for and testing of, in particular, technological systems of monitoring, control, evaluation and,

56 For Germany see Roth-Glawatz/Waldenberger (note 26). 57

Pichler (note 20), 87.

58

Pelz (note 32), 533; Pichler (note 20), 87.

59

(note 25); for the USA see Martin/Reagle

For environmental and product liability see only Karl-Heinz Ladeur , Die rechtliche Steuerung von Entwicklungsrisiken zwischen zivilrechtlicher Produkthaftung und administrativer Sicherheitskontrolle, Betriebsberater, vol. 48, 1993, 1303 - 1312.

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if necessary, blockage of legal content, and define a 'best practice' which either they themselves lay down or possibly may be found in cooperation w i t h the state. This sort of cooperative model could and should from the start be internationally oriented (European or worldwide), since the net too is global. This model could admit various forms of involvement of industry: one might for instance also think of involving the computer and software industries, which would bring a different interest into the self-organized process of experimentation and could thus guarantee more openness. This sort of solution is appropriate both to the technology and to the substantive problem of controls and standards: in accordance w i t h the dynamics of the technology itself, operations should be done in steps with corresponding increasing levels of requirements on standardization. As long as Internet use is not very widespread, low standards are acceptable: this applies in particular to doing without complex technological solutions of monitoring and evaluation, whereas w i t h growth in net use the search for technical solutions would have to be enhanced at the same time. c) Acceptability and Technical Possibility of Control (1) Technical Possibilities The host provider's liability presupposes not only knowledge of the content and appropriate classification of the content as unlawful, but also the technical possibility and reasonableness of blocking or deleting data. The host provider has the possibility, using the operating system's software of the W W W server, to block individual pages or the entire offer of individual content providers or entire news groups. 60 This first step will, to be sure, very often have no effect or only a very limited one, where a user — as often occurs in practice — 'mirrors' a blocked page on another server making its use possible through the latter. A further question for the host provider, once he has applied a blockage in general law (conditional intent), is that the blocked page w i l l be made accessible in another way, and measures must be taken against this. Individual monitoring is, in view of the quantity of data, to be regarded, technically, as practically impossible. 61 A search filter would certainly be conceivable, but available new server programs apparently do not at present contain such filter programs, which would accordingly first have to be developed.62 For the moment it cannot be assessed how such systems would function, whether they are at all effective and at what cost (slower data flow?) such monitoring would be pos-

60

Sieber (note 11), 655.

61

Id., 656.

62

Id.

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Karl-Heinz Ladeur

sible. Experience so far is anything but encouraging, but this would be a practical task for the above mentioned procedure of experimental self-regulation. Especially in a legal perspective, it would not be sensible to reckon fully on this possibility and assume filtering to be technically possible. It is however entirely conceivable that this is a promising technical prospect for the future, which could be advanced still further using artificial intelligence technology. This would be all the more so if it were possible to establish basic criteria of content and confine oneself to relatively easily recognizable patterns. 63 In the area of child pornography, for instance, it might be helpful to develop systems that would identify pictures already disseminated and be able continually to relocate them. According to police findings, the pictures involved are overwhelmingly already long gone and continually redistributed. Especially if agreement could be reached in relation to gross breaches, a filter program would seem entirely practicable, whereas producing such programs would inevitably be the more difficult the more they have to be loaded with differentiation of content. A web page or news group can also be shifted to a different news server and called up from there again. This sort of practice, conceivable in very different ways, can be prevented by the original host provider that made the blockage by blocking the IP address of the other news server. But this constitutes a considerable interference with the rights of third parties, whose material could not be called up either. Moreover it can be evaded by changing the IP number of the server. This was a 'game' that had to be played again by the German D F N association, the bearer especially of the research network, when on a complaint from the federal Attorney General the pages of the (radical left) magazine 'Radikal' were blocked and then made accessible over the Dutch server xs4all. There is again the possibility of making data anonymous, concealing its origin and thus avoiding such a block. 64 Further possibilities of blockage that would have further restrictions as a consequence will not be gone into here. Let us merely mention particular difficulties w i t h operating against individual pages on the W W W (which should be distinguished from the Internet service for news groups). Blocking individual pages is still harder because their data is not on a single Internet service provider but on a multiplicity of the computers controllable only by their operators. 65 The W W W is accordingly not in practice controllable, at least not with available means. The law further distinguishes between providing others' material on one's own server and providing access for reaching material stored on other servers. According to the systematic act, it cannot be assumed that a host provider who has, e.g.,

63

For the evolution of monitoring technology see Sieber (note 11), 656; Resnick (note 24).

64

Sieber (noie 11), 663.

65

Id. , 646.

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blocked a news group on his server is obliged by special activities to block access to the data transferred to other servers. (2) Reasonableness of Blocking Liability for pages that have become known and have not been blocked exists initially only within the limits of the possible, and is, moreover, limited by reasonableness viewpoints. The first question is how far the responsibility of the 'providing' service providers ranges, especially whether it reaches even beyond blockage on their own servers and mandates other measures the extent of which would then be limited by the viewpoints of reasonableness. This has to be called unclear, given the mutually contradictory arguments of the federal government and the Bundesrat (the upper house, where Lander representatives sit), as well as the views represented in the literature. The question is, as far as can be seen, not raised explicitly; instead, it is often tacitly assumed that the service provider that first offered content from others is also obliged to prevent use through other servers too, within the limit of reasonableness.66 Possibly what is being assumed here is a sort of guarantor position, at least in relation to material it itself provides. However, this seems inappropriate. By para. 5 (2) (3) T D G / M S t V , the host provider is liable only insofar as and as long as he 'offers' content. As soon as he has effected blockage or deletion, he is, according to the pattern of para. 5, no longer responsible, since his actions then amount to aversion of provision of access unless he in turn produces an altered version of active provision through links to other servers. But access provision is no longer subject to fault liability, so that then the question of the reasonableness of further measures to obstruct or prevent access to material still on other servers no longer arises. This is also confirmed by the fact that momentary storage in the course of access provision does not count as providing content (with the corresponding extended liability). However, this gives new meaning to the provision of para. 5(4), to date rather ignored, which exposes the access provider only to strict liability according to police law or civil law (claims to removal or cessation). Further effective blocking action (independently of previously 'content provision') may be imposed on the blocking host provider through civil law or according to police law principles (here in connection with para. 18 MStV). Here, however, the obligation needs to be fleshed out, especially where action against the host provider is taken according to public law (police law), that is, by the administration, since regulatory law cannot be expected to impose a general obligation to remove dangers without more detailed specification of the action to be undertaken. This consequence also seems fairly 66

Restriction of liability to cases of positive knowledge has the perverse effect of creating incentives not to check contents at all. Akdeniz (note 21); Darr (note 28), 268, 279.

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Karl-Heinz Ladeur

appropriate since the framework of the technically possible and the reasonable is very hard to define. Ultimately, therefore, on administrative grounds and competence considerations, the provision is, to the extent that it involves the competence of youth offices for regulatory orders to cease and desist, scarcely practicable. If this area of strict liability is included, the meaning of the term 'reasonableness' appears in a different light: while the use of indefinite legal concepts to describe obligations on the citizen is in principle admissible, it has to be assessed differently where the area of action itself and the limits to objects of legal protection and the range of possible actions (and the consequences and costs) are highly uncertain. Reasonableness refers to typical clashes of interests the multiplicity of which requires a situation to be specified, but it can nonetheless refer to a differentiated stock of values, weightings, cost-benefit balances, preference rules, options for action, etcon the basis of accumulated social experience. This is just what is not the case in relation to control measures. For the more complex variants of linkages on the Internet there is not (yet) any practicable estimate, because technical possibilities, costs and efficiency have to be calculated. In this sort of situation where it is not just the options that have to be defined situationally alongside a variable spectrum of possibilities, but the 'domain of options' itself has to be created, a rule of reason cannot suffice. The only alternative then, failing a contrary stock of experience, can again only be a procedural solution deferring, e.g., to standards of 'best practice' or the like to be defined by some regulatory body, which can then if necessary be differentiated at the second level through reasonableness considerations for situational and personal specification. It cannot, however, replace such stipulations. Here it can again be seen that the point is the creation of a dynamic technology that cannot be developed by individual steps of trial and error from case to case. A functional equivalent for the missing experience in the form of standards must first be found. Then the variant of strict liability according to general police regulatory law and according to civil law, so far rather neglected, might very well prove a more flexible way to flesh out control obligations legally. If liability, as advocated here, is narrowly defined and responsibility confined to provision of material on one's own server, not including other support provided by conveying access to other servers, then the concept of reasonableness seems barely sufficiently defined, since the requisite relating and weighting of several objects of legal protection can be given adequately concrete form by proceduralization, that is, the organized establishment of standards. I n other respects, however, even the technically possible filtering out of prohibited material arriving from other servers cannot be imposed either from the viewpoint of a duty to terminate (former) provision of such material, nor from the viewpoint of avoiding a new version 'providing' material from other servers in terms of penal or civil liability independent of fault.

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The Federal Attorney General 67 treated the allegation of responsibility more broadly in the case, to be set out further below, of the magazine 'Radikal', which could be accessed from a Dutch server, even insisting that the access provider accept the reasonableness and technical possibility of blocking material, in particular by installing a proxy cash server or a new control program ('webblock'), allowing selective exclusion of URLs with prohibited content simply and cheaply. This concept has, moreover, been presented by another self-regulatory institution, the Internet Media Council, but even the Federal Attorney General admits that the practicability (effectiveness of filtering and costs because of slowing the flows of data) cannot at the moment be assessed. This is at the same time the best reason why the recourse to an open concept of reasonableness is wrong. According to the view presented here, accordingly, the conditions for fault liability are not present. By contrast, an administrative act could impose involvement in the search for and testing of filter systems. This decision has however been criticized in the literature, partly on the ground that it uses a fairly arbitrary argument to bypass the fact that the legislation has ambiguously restricted the access providers' liability instead of furthering liability independent of fault, and accorded a general wish to exclude criminal liability. In the area of strict liability, questions of reasonableness could arise only in relation to whether and how far the blocking of all news groups can be legitimated by individual breaches by participants. O n the other hand, the reasonableness of blocking does not disappear simply because it can relatively easily be evaded. First, the blocking may very well make dissemination via other servers harder; this is particularly true of commercial providers who are dependent on particular forms of presentation. Second, here, too, special importance attaches to the viewpoint of cooperative, experimental regulation of responsibility for material on the Internet: it may very well contribute to easing the relation of international rules on post-provider liability if such providers are initially obliged not to 'offer' such prohibitive material on their servers, although other servers may help to overcome such blocks. This may at any rate lead to the position that conditions are created for a sort of 'competition of institutions', and governments and non-governmental organizations induced to make mutual observation and harmonization of differing supervision practice; in that way the problem at least becomes more visible and better structured. If the concept of 'providing' is taken more broadly, a contradiction arises in evaluating the legislature's intent: the 'access provider' is according the legislature's will, freed of any fault liability, but then the requirements on host providers too cannot be extended beyond the actual conveying of content from their own servers. Otherwise it becomes difficult to distinguish activity that establishes liability from the 'neutral' operations of the access provider from those that do not.

67

See Multi-Media und Recht, vol. 1, 1998, 93, w i t h a comment by Thomas Hoeren.

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Karl-Heinz Ladeur

A t any rate, the Acts' terminology again seems unsuited to the complexity of the problem. The distinction between 'providing content' and 'providing access' is not differentiated enough and borrows ultimately from traditional distribution systems, which make relatively unambiguous distinctions of function. What would be technically more appropriate would be a regulation that starts from the technical network architecture and defines the different program levels and the control possibilities inherent in them, in order then to lay down a regulation of responsibility which is differentiated and fosters experimentation with the new. A t this point consideration is also appropriate on the relation between public law, criminal law and civil law. The criminal in particular leads to relatively simple laws on international actions, breach of which can lead to penalties. In civil law, too, attention must be paid to the restriction that liability always sets in 'after the fact', so that if penalties are too severe perverse side effects have to be borne in mind (disappearance of products from the market, incentive to suppress knowledge), whereas public law can be oriented more strongly towards actively guiding conduct, and therefore better limit uncertainties. This problem has also emerged in environmental law. Particularly in criminal law, however, the use of indifferent legal concepts can easily clash with the requirement of statutory definition of the punishability of actions.68 (3) Internet Liability in Practice: Sample Court Judgments In a case that became particularly well-known in Germany and abroad, the Munich district court imposed liability on CompuServe Deutschland GmbH, and in particular its managing director Sommy in connection with criminal dissemination of a total of 282 'problematic' news groups: Somm was given a suspended sentence of two years since he had provided only a temporary blocking of access to pornographic material from servers at the parent company in Ohio (this server was linked with the German company's computer by a fixed line). This verdict was, rightly, severely criticized by the German public and in the legal literature, since it failed to resolve precisely neither the restriction on liability, nor the technical possibilities, nor the exact legal responsibility of the German managing director for the practice of the American parent company, and, in particular, misunderstood the multimedia liability restrictions which were already applicable to this case.69

68 See the opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE), vol. 13,153,161; vol. 31, 33, 42. 69

Amtsgericht München misunderstood the new multimedia law and extended criminal responsibility for illegal (pornographic) contents to providers and sentenced Somm to two years of prison (under reservation), decision of 28 May 1998; Multimedia und Recht, vol. 1, 1998,429 - 448, w i t h a critical comment by Ulrich Sieber; it has also been severely criticized in

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Another publicized case concerned the propaganda pages of the neo-Nazi Zündel, a German-Canadian whose material was blocked in Germany but then offered on a number of servers, especially in the US. A third spectacular case concerned the already mentioned magazine 'Radikal' which, after blocking of its material at the insistence of the federal Attorney General, was stored and offered on other servers. 70 Here there was even a temporary blockage on the Dutch server xs4all, which had evaded this block in Germany. In the 'Radikal' case the issue was the punishability of the German access provider, since the service provider was domiciled in the Netherlands. The investigations were ultimately suspended by the prosecution service (federal Attorney General's office), not because of the accused's innocence, but instead its 'minor guilt' within the meaning of para. 153 (1) StPO. The reasoning shows that even after statutory clarification of the legal position, liability risks exist in practice for access providers, too, though according to the unambiguous tenor and meaning of the act they have been freed of strict liability by para. 5 (3) T D G / M S t V . N o t only did the prosecution service regard it as acceptable in principle to hamper access to prohibitive material via proxy servers and new models of filters, but it refrained from bringing charges only because the legal position was — and one has to add 'still' — regarded as unclear because of the debate in the literature, but otherwise the association concerned had even effected temporary blockage of access to the Dutch server. This decision by the federal Attorney General, which in turn claimed to 'clarify' the legal position for the future, was, rightly, heavily criticized in the literature because it openly ran counter to the meaning of the act. This view was shared in the whole of the relevant literature. Even if the law is by no means, as already indicated, a model of clarity in other respects, the legislature's intention in this respect has not been subject to any reasonable doubt. In a further case the Hamburg regional court considerably restricted the liability of operators of Internet cafés because of the open possibility of access to punishable material. A similar direction was taken in the already mentioned judgment of a Berlin district court, severely limiting liability for setting up links to prohibitive content. 71 The examples show that the case law and practice of prosecution services in Germany is very uncertain; it cannot be assumed that there is any unambiguously clear legal position. Abroad, the practice is often wrongly assessed because only those spectacular judgments mentioned are regarded as representative. Yet in view of the fairly unambiguous opinion in the literature tending towards restricting liability, as the computer literature: Norbert Ernst/Christiane land gegen Internet, c't 1998, no. 11, 34. 70

Generalbundesanwaltschaft (note 67).

71

See sources cited in note 47.

Schulzki-Haddouti,

Bundesrepublik Deutsch-

78

Karl-Heinz Ladeur

in the legislation too, it is very unlikely that this view w i l l settle into stable legal practice. The divergent judgments are the symptom of an uncertainty associated with the diffuse nature of the Internet, but at the same time show that the legislature has not succeeded in creating any clear guidelines for practice. 72 I I I . A Comparative View of the Legal Position i n the US In the US too, the case law resulting from the first cases to deal with provider liability for others' material initially sought guidance from analogies to familiar media for producing and distributing material. According to the ruling in the Netcom case,73 the network provider should be excluded from liability. According to the decision of the court in Cubby v. CompuServe on the dissemination of defamatory material by third parties (libel) liability attached only when there was knowledge of the contents. 74 In the Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy case,75 interestingly, the activity of a provider in screening materials stored on its server was seen as a reason for treating the host as a 'producer' but not as 'distributor' in a traditional distribution system. This was a manifestation of the risk that the liability of a particular responsible provider only increases because he procures more information. The US cases, mentioned here only by way of example, show that the case law initially tried to draw a distinction between access provider and host provider. For the latter, liability is strictly limited, while for the former, in the US too, there is ultimately uncertainty as to how far a reason to know to is necessary, and what measures are regarded as reasonable. This uncertainty is also reflected in the investigations started in various states against libraries that make Internet material available to young people without 'adequate' controls. Again similarly to Germany, legislation attempted to respond to the case law, especially the Stratton Oakmont case, which put on-line operators at high risk, and in particular exposed the very ones who sought a search system to a higher risk than others who had less information. (As mentioned above, this sort of effect may arise in Germany too.) The 1996 Telecommunications Act now contains, in para. 230 (c) (1), a regulation limiting the treatment of stored material as one's own, and 72

This problem is also known from environmental law, see Günter Hager, Das neue Umwelthaftungsgesetz, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, vol. 44, 1991, 134, 136. 73 Religious Technology Center v. Netcom Online Communication Service, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D.Cal. 1995 'Netcom Γ). 74 75

Cubby. , Inc. v. CompuServe, 776 F.Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Serv. Inc., No. 31063194 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1995), quoted by Ian C. Ballon , Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace: Towards a Coherent Theory for Imposing Vicarious Copyright, Trademark and 'Liability' for Conduct Occurring on the Internet, Hastings Communication and Entertainment Law Journal, vol. 18, 1996, 729, 758.

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treating the host provider more like a bookseller on press principles. Liability is correspondingly limited to 'actual or imputed knowledge'. In other respects the use of filters as similar control techniques is privileged: as long as 'good faith' can be assumed the provider is otherwise exempt from liability. Even if this regulation is not free of ambiguity, the approach nonetheless seems reasonable in seeking not to deter the servers from control techniques by assigning increased responsibility. The continuing uncertainty in the US too, despite the legislative regulations, over an appropriate strategy to regulate the Internet can be seen also in the federal legislature's passage of the Communications Decency Act, which was intended to extend liability substantially for 'indecent communication'. The Supreme Court ultimately declared this act unconstitutional in particular because of vagueness.76 We cannot go into this judgment in detail here. However, the outcome seems plausible if only because here, too, one can see that a post-modern society overwhelmed w i t h value conflicts can tie down the indeterminacy of values only through procedures of establishing guideline standards. Otherwise there is the danger of divergent opinions and 'judgments' without the possibility to assume that individual decisions here w i l l lead to a productive search procedure: ultimately the old basic conflicts are replicated again and again. Also at least partly questionable it would seem, is the issue of regulation by the states, itself very different, which is hard to reconcile w i t h the federal legislation and above all subject to doubt regarding its implementation. Thus, an act of the state of Georgia 77 was intended in particular to punish the anonymous production and dissemination of material despite the present uncertainty as to how far this is technically feasible. Similar one-off norms, especially to protect children and young people against Internet material, have been adopted by the states of Minnesota and New York. The New York state act in particular was found unconstitutional on the grounds that it overtook federal power. The act of the state of Minnesota 78 is interesting also in the light of the problems, to be considered below, of the limits in international law to national Internet regulation. The state of Minnesota explicitly warned that any dissemination of punishable Internet material that could endanger young people on its territory would be prosecuted. Ultimately, then, as we see, the case law in Germany and the US is not so fundamentally different, and ultimately the legislature has not yet been able to provide any appropriate structure for government controls.

76

Decision no. 96-511 of 26 June 1997, http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-511. ZX.html; cf. now Children's Online Protection Act (October 1998). 77

Joseph S. Faber , Regulation on the Internet: A Lesson i n Reaching too Far, h t t p : / / w w w . cyberlaw.com/regint.html. n

Id.

80

Karl-Heinz Ladeur I V . International Law Possibilities of and Limits to Implementing Legislation

The blocking of prohibitive content on national servers, simple but not very effective, can ultimately, through the criminal law (perhaps also the civil law), become a risk for foreign disseminators of material where penalties or civil awards independent of fault can be made, or imposed, by national courts. According to the rules of international law, especially the territoriality principle, a state can in principle take measures even against actions undertaken from a foreign territory where effects of this action arise on its own territory. 79 This is basically the case with the border-crossing dissemination of Internet materials. The problem arises in the US, as mentioned, in an internal variant, too, where the legislation of states in relation to the Internet differs. 80 The territoriality principle has certainly not become fully obsolete as many assume, but it must nonetheless, as in other cases too (bordercrossing pollution, etc.) y be adjusted to the special conditions of intensified exchange relations in the process of globalization: for instance, no Internet provider can be expected to check pages or news groups stored on its server and accessible worldwide, against the rules of all states and if necessary effect blockages on this basis.81 A first problem here is the legal classification of problematic material that has actually become known. One cannot of course, conversely, expect states to determine the application of their laws according to the de facto development of technical filters. Particularly in cases of access by using credit cards, however, the operator certainly becomes aware of a transfer to a particular country. The state concerned may then demand, according to international law viewpoints, that unlawful pages in news groups not be transferred to its territory. Here, however, questions of reasonableness arise: to the extent that control systems exist, differentiation is possible and reasonable. The American case law also allowed itself to be guided by this consideration in the Playboy case, which concerned protection of trademark rights. 82 Here language may also be taken into account; for instance, where material in German is accessible from the US or Canada, a national reference is much more likely as this

79 v. Bonin/Köster (note 11) for general opinion; a more restricted approach is favored by Barbara Breuer , Anwendbarkeit des deutschen Strafrechts auf exterritorial handelnde Internetbenutzer, Multi-Media und Recht, vol. 1, 1998, 141 - 145; Engel (note 6), 220; for the American literature, see Wilske/Schiller (note 11), 147] Alexander Gigante , Ice Patch on the Information Superhighway: Foreign Liability for Domestically Created Content, Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal, vol. 14, 1996, 523 - 552; for court decisions, Playboy v. Chuckleberry Publishing, 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 80

Wilske/Schiller

81

Id., 130 et seq.

82

Id., 134 - 135.

(note 11), 131.

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very much suggests access in the German speaking area to disseminators. 83 The trial court in the Playboy case explicitly focused on the Internet's special nature as an international network and found a general prohibition on the dissemination of material because of breach of active individual countries to be unlawful. 84 Thus, the dissemination of the German magazine 'Radikal· on Dutch servers could very well be punished according to the traditional conception, since, due to the language, a special reference to Germany was obvious here. But with English language pages the reference to particular countries is far less unambiguously definable. Then the punishability of the dissemination of prohibitable content in other countries depends in particular on the narrower or broader claiming of competencies; this too establishes new uncertainties. T o limit the resulting divergences, international or European regional (etc) regulation would be necessary which could make an important contribution to greater calculability of legal regulation by harmonizing basic requirements of domestic law. What is needed is not just the establishment of substantive (basic) criteria, but in particular also procedural regulations (the search for filter software) or the establishment of a decision-making procedure appropriate to the complexity and variability of the Internet. In the EC, in the area of telecommunications, there is an obligation on member states to develop a flexible decision-making procedure outside the courts for disputes about open net access.85 This might give an example for perhaps only temporary regulation, adequate to the network, about the blocking of material by an international arbitration body that would decide on-line on the basis of submissions pro and con, while the ultimate decision could remain to national courts on the basis of national statutes, at least initially. According to one view presented in the literature, the Internet should be treated more like an 'international territory' outside national territorial reach, like the Antarctic. 86 The comparison seems problematic, however, since ultimately, like the view sketched out at the start, it assumes that the Internet has to be subject to a quite different order over and above the state. But this cannot be, if only because the effects are ultimately also localized, and harmonization with other domestic 83

Id, 135.

84

Playboy v. Chuckleberry

(note 79); Wilske/Schiller

(note 11), 134.

85

This flexible mediation procedure is increasingly introduced into telecommunications law; ONP-Directive of the EC (98/10 of 26 February 1998, OJ L 101 of 1 April 1998, 24 et seq.); for the W T O dispute settlement see Debra P. Steger /Susan M. Hinsworth , World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: The First Three Years, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 1, 1998, 199 - 226; for online services cf. Recommendation of the EC Council, OJ L 270 of 7 October 1998, 48 - 55. 86

Daniel Menthe, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces, Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review, vol. 4, 1998, 3.

6 GYIL 41

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Karl-Heinz Ladeur

media law is necessary. Specifically the Internet as a 'network of networks' is an example of the fact that close transnational linkage of communications and operations does not necessarily lead to a unitary centralized legal order. This is so particularly if it is possible to differentiate filter software for the future and a flexible procedure of international cooperation and coordination can be brought in; uniformity of regulation can at least in part be done without. For a transition period the productivity of competition of rules and institutions could also be tried: it could make visible the alternatives available to contribute to rationally coordinated regulation. The point would, however, especially in the first place, be to formulate and apply particular minimum standards on which agreement can rapidly be reached. This is the case for child pornography and a procedure of control over access to pornographic material, particularly the use of credit cards. In particular, access to pornographic material in the form of 'free' and 'pictures' ('on trial') with no requirement of identification, as is widespread for instance in the US, should be prevented. N o r should it be all that easy to dodge such a regulation since commercial providers at any rate cannot transfer their offerings efficiently as easily as other, non-commercial providers. In many cases differentiated standards are entirely acceptable: for instance, it is of politically symbolic importance that nazi material cannot be accessed from German servers even if such material is freely available on servers from other countries. 87 The reference to the Holocaust is in fact more provocative in the one case than in the other. In other cases one might equally well live with different standards, because evaluations are different. It may well then be entirely productive at least to observe differences systematically, and draw comparisons. 88 V . Conclusions Both domestically and internationally, we shall have to get used to the fact that regulations on the use of complex technologies can often no longer be stable, but must gradually be formulated and applied in a procedure oriented from the outset to incompleteness and private-public cooperation. However, for the formulation of standards of conduct to come about in an organized procedure, one cannot assume

87 88

For the Zündel case see v. Bonin/Köster

(note 11), 825; Sieber (note 11), 665.

In annex Β to the above-mentioned response to the European Commission, the British O F T E L rejects the idea of a common regulation of contents (not to speak of the possibility of establishing a European regulatory agency); the OFTEL opts for self-regulation (including rating systems) and shifting responsibility in an 'open state' to private actors and consumers. This position is probably quite representative for many countries.

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common values or available stocks of knowledge in relation to either social evaluations or technical controls. Complex regulations must be oriented towards harmonizing values through procedures and the production of knowledge where there is no longer a component of generally accessible experience.

Sex, Lies, and Taxes: New Internet Law in the United States By Fred L. Morrison

I. Introduction In the midst of the political turmoil surrounding the possible impeachment of President Clinton in October 1998, the United States Congress enacted four new laws relating to the Internet. Like the original charges against Clinton, which related to his sexual peccadillos and alleged lies in testimony prepared for court proceedings, the new statutes related to sex, and to lies (about privacy), but also to taxes and international trade. 1 These laws were the product of the unusual legislative stalemate of the time. Originally proposed as four separate bills, they and a dozen other unrelated provisions were 'packaged', together with most of the annual budget for the federal government, into a single bill, the Omnibus Appropriations Act. 2 Negotiators for the Republican-dominated Congress and the Democratic Clinton administration agreed that each house of Congress would pass that bill, more than 1,000 pages long, in a single vote, and that the President would then approve it as a whole, without separate review of its parts. This unusual legislation has further complicated Internet law in the United States. There is no single body of 'Internet law' in the United States. Although scholars study the law of cyberspace, and journals dealing with this subject matter now abound (some of them published in electronic format), the law addressed to the issue cannot easily be summarized or separated from other legal doctrines. Rather, American law of the Internet combines the application of basic principles of law developed in other contexts with the enactment of statutes designed to address specific limited problems of the Internet. Common law and constitutional rules define the extent of state and national jurisdiction, establish limits on the ability of governmental units to regulate the content of Internet messages, and restrict their authority to tax this new medium and the transactions that are consummated on it. 1 2

The situation thus brings to mind a recent motion picture, Sex, Lies, and Videotape.

Public Law 105 - 277 (1998), 112 US Statutes-at-Large 2681, hereinafter referred to as the "Omnibus Appropriations Act." Only parts of the law w i l l be codified into the United States Code; other portions are of only temporary applicability.

Sex, LieSy and Taxes: New Internet Law in the United States 85 The Internet offers opportunities for communication and commerce. It permits information to move from point to point around the globe without the intervention of human intermediaries. Because the connection is instantaneous and the volume of messages is enormous, efforts to control the transmission of information can no longer effectively take the form of censorship or prior restraint of the individual message. They must rather be directed in other ways to the control of those who transmit and communicate the information or to those who receive it. Even the delays that post offices and telegraph operators could put in the way of the transmission of information are gone, and many of the costs associated with transportation, customs duties, and the like have been reduced or eliminated. Because of the broad reach of the Internet, it can serve as the basis for the communication of valuable information. A host of scientific, commercial, and political information is transmitted over its lines every day. It can also be the basis for less desirable activities, such as the communication of pornography, the dissemination of hate messages, the invasion of privacy and the perpetration of commercial fraud. Because it exists in cyberspace, a ubiquitous electronic ether, it is difficult to isolate a specific locus which is primarily responsible for the control of the use, misuse or abuse of this important medium. If there is authority to control, there must be authority to tax. Units of government are increasingly viewing Internet transactions as a potential source of revenue, as this form of commerce increases in value. But which government can appropriately levy taxes may be a difficult question, because the transactions appear, at least superficially, to have taken place everywhere — or nowhere at all. American public policy has broadly favored freedom for Internet commerce. The principles supported by the United States for regulation of global electronic commerce were set forth in a 1997 presidential directive that established a working group to address these issues. The principles are: 1. The private sector should lead. 2. Governments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce. 3. Where governmental involvement is needed, its aim should be to support and enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple legal environment for commerce. 4. Governments should recognize the unique qualities of the Internet. 5. Electronic commerce over the Internet should be facilitated on a global basis.3 In the 1998 legislation, Congress took up this direction, declaring: It is the sense of Congress that the President should seek bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements to remove barriers to global electronic commerce through the World Trade Or-

3

A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (1997).

86

Fred L. Morrison ganization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the trans-Atlantic Economic Partnership, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, the N o r t h American Free Trade Agreement, and other appropriate venues.4

The Internet is seen as an opportunity for efficient providers of goods and services efficiently to offer those commodities throughout the world, without expensive local intermediaries or excessive local regulation. The Internet itself is the unintended consequence of scientific research in the United States. Electronic communication was originally introduced as a means of expediting the transmission of messages between researchers at different universities and other locations within the United States. It originated as the A R P A N E T , the Advanced Research Programs Agency Network, an interconnection of fewer than a hundred computers, used primarily by scientists for the transmission of data and information about joint scientific projects. The creation of technical standards for transmissions, the assignment of user names and domain designations were initially a matter entirely within that scientific community. Thus, it was a largely unregulated activity. The minimal management of the Internet that originally existed was provided within the scientific agencies that developed it, and eventually under the aegis of the National Science Foundation. Its control was not treated so much as 'regulation', but rather as the kind of control that the owner of a computer system would use in managing its operation or that scientists cooperating on a common problem would apply to it. So its rules were not 'laws' or 'regulations', but scientific 'protocols', and were adopted in the same manner as scientific practices, not by formal legislative or rule-making processes. As public users began to participate in the system, the National Science Foundation and its subsidiary organizations continued to provide basic system maintenance, by assigning domain names (the part following the @ sign in an e-mail address, or the equivalent portion of a website address) and establishing system standards. The federal government, however, viewed most of the development of the Internet for general use as a function more properly performed by the private sector and mandated that its management be transferred to private entities, a process that is not yet fully completed. A non-profit organization of principal Internet users, the Internet Assigned Names and Numbers Corporation (IANNC), was scheduled to take over many of the central management functions by late 1998, although this deadline was initially missed. Federal law includes a number of provisions that directly concern the operation of the Internet itself and Congress has had a substantial interest in the health of the new form of communication. Indeed, because of the overload of communications 4 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, § 1203(a). Ironically, the same Congress had, only a few days earlier, refused to renew the President's authority to negotiate trade agreements under the so-called 'fast track' process.

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on the ordinary Internet, Congress appropriated funds to begin the creation of an additional, new electronic communications network, which w i l l again provide faster communications but be limited to connections between the major universities and research institutions, the original users of the system. Federal law has also authorized charges on telephone users to support the installation of communications lines to schools and public libraries to give them cost-free access to the information superhighway from those locations. Other statutes establish criminal penalties for 'hacking', i.e., for tampering with federal computers or those affected with a federal interest, such as computer systems used by banks and credit card companies.5 States also have computer crimes statutes that cover 'hacking' in other computers and other wilful damage to computers within their separate jurisdictions. 6 This distinction between 'federal interest' computers and 'other' computers simply replicates the law in a number of other areas, in which federal law protects federally-related activities and those in interstate commerce while state laws provide the basic protections against criminal activity. So here, federally owned computers and those of the key players in interstate commerce, the banks and credit card companies, are protected by federal law, while other private computers are protected only by state legislation. The development of the Internet in the United States is now accomplished largely through private competition subject to limited federal regulation. There is now stiff competition among various firms to provide Internet access to private customers. In addition to the many traditional Internet Service Providers (ISPs), which engage in this activity as their primary business, telephone companies, both long distance companies and local companies and their subsidiaries seek to provide Internet service throughout the country. (In the United States, local telephone service and long distance telephone service are commonly provided by different companies. Each local telephone company provides local telephone service in one region of the country w i t h little competition, but subsidiaries of several of them are beginning to offer Internet service in competition with one another throughout the entire country. The major long distance companies are also entering the business.) Other enterprises, such as cable television providers and even gas and electric utilities, are also seeking to enter this field. Since there is no grand theory behind the regulation of Internet activities in the United States, ordinary principles of law have generally been applied to this newly emerging situation. Rules relating to the management of the telephone systems or to the publication of print media are applied in part to the new electronic communications medium. Whether these time-tested rules will work effectively in the new environment remains to be seen. Several aspects of these principles deserve special mention. 5 6

18 U.S.C. § 1030.

See, for example, Minnesota Statutes, §§ 609.87 - 609.8911, prohibiting damage to computers, theft of information, and unauthorized access. Other states have similar statutes.

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First is the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 7 Since the Internet is clearly in interstate commerce, this authority is unquestioned. A n d federal law prevails over any state law. 8 If federal law conflicts with state law or if federal law preempts a field, either by fully occupying the area in question or by expressly excluding any supplementary regulation, it will prevail over state and local legislation. Some federal statutes in this field, especially those dealing with technical and commercial regulation and with some aspects of competition, clearly preempt local regulation. Competition between providers is subject to antitrust regulation, as modified within the structures of a regulated industry. The Communications Act gives the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) some role in regulation. But Congress cannot regulate constitutionally protected speech. The principles protecting freedom of expression contained in the First Amendment provide that: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ." 9 American law is very protective of freedom of speech and generally requires that a governmental unit that wishes to impose a content-based restriction must show a compelling public interest before content-related regulation can take place.10 Even commercial speech, advertisements promoting a product or service that is not itself illegal, is entitled to constitutional protection albeit with a lower level of scrutiny than political speech.11 If commercial speech concerns lawful activities and is not misleading, a state can only regulate it if the state has a substantial interest, the regulation is directly related to that interest, and is no more extensive than necessary. Next are the jurisdictional limitations. The individual states have legislative jurisdiction (competence) to regulate activities only if there is a substantial nexus of those activities to that particular state. State courts have judicial jurisdiction over a party who is not physically present within their boundaries only if constitutionally sufficient contacts are established. These rules are applications of the long-established principles based on the Due Process Clause. The well-known Supreme Court decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington 12 sets forth the applicable limits on both the exercise of legislative jurisdiction (competence) and judicial jurisdiction. These standards are similar to principles of public international law limiting the jurisdictional competence of nation states and those of private international law regarding the recognition of judgments. 13 In the case of Internet activities, the exist7

US Constitution, article I, sec. 8, clause 3.

8

Idart.

9

US Constitution, amend. I.

VI, para. 2.

10

Carey v. Brown. , 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980).

11

Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission , 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

12

326 U.S. 310 (1945).

13

I n the latter case, however, there is a clear difference. Under the "full faith and credit"

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ence of a jurisdictional nexus is particularly difficult to assess, since the communication may originate in one place, be transmitted through a server in a second place, through an Internet service provider in a third, to a recipient in a fourth, etc. Indeed, since the information travels in 'packets', different parts of the same message may use different paths and pass through different jurisdictions on their way. For the World Wide Web, as opposed to electronic mail, this is magnified, since the provider of the website does not actively transmit the information. He merely posts it in a way that is accessible to potential recipients who may access his server to retrieve copies of it. This raises the question of who is the active participant in this transaction: the poster of the message (usually a seller of goods), who posts the message in the hope that it w i l l be retrieved and acted upon by thousands, or the individual purchaser (who fetches it electronically from its resting place). The technical reality of the electronic medium may contradict the practical reality of the transaction. Doctrines derived from the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, 1 4 which prohibit the states from imposing "undue burdens on interstate commerce," have also had an impact here. Jurisdictional questions have arisen in a number of contexts. One of these is whether a state's laws can regulate the conduct of individuals in another state who are engaged in Internet commercial activities with individuals in the first state. For example, if the laws of State A prohibit gambling, but those of State Β do not, can State A prohibit individuals in State Β from entering into gambling transactions w i t h State A's residents over the Internet? Taxation is a related question. Can a state impose a tax on an out-of-state business that is engaged in significant business transactions with in-state parties? In the United States this is usually raised in one of two contexts. One is efforts to collect income tax on that portion of a business's overall business that represents the proportion of business done with residents of the state. The other is efforts to impose on out-of-state vendors a duty to collect local sales taxes from in-state purchasers and to remit those sales taxes to the state treasury. Neither problem is new. Both have arisen in the case of catalogue merchants who sent catalogues into a state and supplied merchandise from outside. Finally, there are the questions relating to the jurisdiction of courts to adjudicate cases in which the only contact with a state is that carried out over the Internet. Again, the rules are long established, in the context of telegraph and telephone connections, but the application is much more problematic in the case of Internet activities.

clause of the United States Constitution, the judgment of a court in one state must be enforced i n another, if the first court had jurisdiction. US Constitution, art. IV, sec. I. Thus jurisdictional issues have a special significance. 14

US Constitution, art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3.

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In its 1998 session, Congress considered a range of legislation on Internet topics. Four of those were enacted. One, encouraging the negotiation of international agreements to encourage electronic trade, has already been discussed. The three others deal with pornography, privacy, and taxation. Other topics, which originally had attracted legislative attention, failed to achieve success in this session. Among them was a proposal to limit use of the Internet for gambling purposes. I I . Sex The transmission and receipt of pornography is a major use of the Internet. As access to and use of the Internet blossomed, Congress became concerned about the proliferation of indecent or pornographic sites. There have been two major legislative efforts to control indecent material on the Internet. The first, enacted in 1996, was quickly declared unconstitutional. The second, enacted in the fall of 1998, has not yet been fully tested. The congressional concern with sex on the Internet reflected its concern with public morality generally, but legislative attention focused on a particular concern: the fear that juveniles might have access to pornographic material through unsupervised use of computers connected to the Internet. The first effort to control access of minors to pornographic sites was contained in the Communications Decency Act of 1996.15 It contained two principal prohibitions. The first provision prohibited the knowing transmission or posting of 'obscene or indecent' messages to any recipient under the age of 18.16 The other prohibited the knowing sending or display of a 'patently offensive' message in a manner that was available to a person under the age of 18.17 The law thus went far beyond established standards for the prohibition of obscenity by also making criminal the publication of 'indecent' or 'patently offensive' messages to youngsters. The rationale for doing so was in part the anonymity of the medium. The child could obtain the picture or other message from a remote site without identification of its age. In contrast, if the child had sought to purchase the same material from a bookstore or news vendor, the lack of maturity would have been evident. The effect of the law, however, was to put any purveyor of this material to consenting adults at risk, if any juvenile happened to acquire it over the Internet. The law did, however, permit a publisher of such material to avoid criminality, if he could show that he had taken "good faith, reasonable, effective and appropriate actions" to preclude transmission to minors, 18 or if he required certain 15 47 U.S.C. § 223. Although portions of the law were held unconstitutional, other portions were upheld. The statute remains included in the United States Code. 16

47 U.S.C. § 223(a).

17

47 U.S.C. § 223(d).

18

47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A).

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proofs of age before granting access.19 The law thus placed a duty on the originators of indecent or patently offensive material to take steps to exclude access by juveniles. Civil liberties organizations saw this as an unacceptable intrusion of the government into the control of the content of speech and were concerned that this would have a chilling effect on free communication of information, even among adults. The American Civil Liberties Union and other plaintiffs immediately filed suit. A United States District Court struck down most of the new law, finding that its overbreadth prohibited communications that were constitutionally protected by the First Amendment. 20 In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union , the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision and invalidated most of the law. 21 In an opinion by Justice Stevens , the Court applied the standard precedents that would have applied to indecent material in ordinary print media. Under American constitutional law, the government may prohibit the publication of 'obscenity', but other speech is protected, even if it is immoral or indecent. Obscenity is narrowly defined. In order for a communication to be prohibitable, a court must examine the following questions: a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 22 Under this standard, much material that is merely 'indecent' or 'offensive' cannot be restricted because it is not also 'obscene'. In Reno, the Court found that the statute failed the Miller test because it did not sufficiently 'specifically define' the offensive communication, as required by the second portion of the standard. It also noted that the statutory prohibition on this material was not limited to 'sexual conduct', and was not specifically defined. Thus it was unconstitutionally overbroad. 23 Only that part of the statute that prohibits truly obscene material (as defined by the Supreme Court) remains in force.

19

47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(B).

20

929 F.Supp. 824 (E.D.Pa.1996).

21

521 U.S. 844, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997).

22

Miller v. California,

23

521 U.S. 844 at - , 117 S.Ct. 2329 at 2345.

413 U.S. 15, 24 - 25 (1973).

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In its opinion, the Supreme Court brushed aside arguments that the Internet was somehow 'different' from other means of communication. The government had argued that the possibility of unsupervised, anonymous access to Internet sites by juveniles warranted a higher degree of protection. Indeed, the Supreme Court's opinion reaffirmed the District Court's finding that "[communications over the Internet do not 'invade' an individual's home or appear on one's computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content 'by accident'." 24 Federal and state law does, however, prohibit the dissemination of pornography portraying juveniles, commonly known as child pornography or 'kiddie porn'. 2 5 In contrast to the tight rules on the restriction of publications on the ground of obscenity, this prohibition has been upheld as an extension of the government's power to protect children against exploitation. 26 The underlying theory is that the law is aimed at protecting the children portrayed in the material from abuse, not in protecting the morality of the recipients. Federal investigators and prosecutors have pursued an active campaign against 'kiddie porn', resulting in a number of convictions. Federal courts have also upheld prohibitions on the sale of harmful material to juveniles under the age of 17, in circumstances in which the vendor clearly knew that the purchasers were underage. 27 In the closing days of the 1998 session, Congress tried again. It enacted a new version of the law, the Child Online Protection Act, as Title X I V of the Omnibus Appropriations Act. 2 8 The new law attempts to avoid the limitations expressed by the Supreme Court in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union , by focusing on the harm to children, rather than on the content of the publication. It provides: Whoever knowingly and w i t h knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than $ 50,000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both. 29

Material that is 'harmful to children' is defined using the Miller standards with one significant alteration. Each branch of that test is modified to make the relevant reference group juveniles, rather than to the general population. So the test is whether the material is prurient for minors, whether it violates contemporary community

24 25

Id., 117 S. Ct. at 2343. 1 8 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260.

26

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).

27

Ginsberg v. New York , 390 U.S. 629 (1968).

28

Omnibus Appropriations Act, §§ 1401 et seq.

29

Omnibus Appropriations Act (Child Online Protection Act) § 1403, to be codified as 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1).

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standards for minors, and whether it has redeeming social value for minors. 30 This is indeed a significant change, because it places upon the vendor of the material the duty either to publish only material that meets these juvenile-based standards or to operate in such a way as to assure that minors have no access to the site. As in the previous legislation, persons charged under the act may raise, as an affirmative defense, that they have taken good faith measures to restrict access to minors, by requiring credit card or identification information or other reasonable measures.31 Enhanced penalties may be imposed on intentional violators. 32 Common carriers and Internet Service Providers are exempt because they are not expected to review or control the messages that pass through their systems.33 The new law appears to have been drafted to seek to avoid the Supreme Court's decision in Reno by several steps. First, it applies only to communications 'for commercial purposes'. This approach is an obvious attempt to invoke the less stringent standards applicable to limitations on commercial speech, rather than the tight standards that apply to the regulation of the content of other speech. This limitation is, however, defined to include anyone who devotes time, attention or labor to a work w i t h the objective of earning a profit, even if none is earned. 34 It seems unlikely to prevail because, if generalized to other media, this rationale would mean that most newspapers and publishing houses would also cease to enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment, because they, too, are engaged in speech for commercial purposes. The second distinction from the previous legislation is its concentration on the 'harm to the child', rather than on the content of the speech. The authors appear to be relying on those cases which have upheld legislative actions designed to protect children against abuse, e.g., child labor legislation and the prohibitions on the sale of alcohol and tobacco to juveniles, as well as the precedent in Ferber , the 'kiddie porn' case. This may also be a distinction without a difference. In the tobacco, alcohol, and child labor cases, the injury is a physical one to the child itself. In the 'kiddie porn' cases, the court also focused on the physical or emotional harm to the child who was depicted, not to some intellectual or moral injury to the recipient of the pornographic material. In a third effort to provide a difference, the statute also allows the Federal Communications Commission to impose a civil penalty of up to $ 50,000 for each viola-

30

Id. , to be codified as 47 U.S.C. § 231 (e)(6).

31

Id., to be codified as 47 U.S.C. § 231(c).

32

Id., to be codified as 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(2).

33

Id. , to be codified as 47 U.S.C. § 231(b).

34

Id., to be codified as 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2).

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Fred L. Morrison

tion. 3 5 This is an obvious effort to avoid the strictures of the criminal prosecution process, including jury trial. Again, a constitutional challenge has been filed by groups opposing the legislation. Within a month of its enactment, a federal court had issued a temporary restraining order preventing its enforcement until a trial could be conducted. 36 I I I . Lies (about Privacy) Unlike most European countries, the United States has no general legislation protecting privacy. The protection of privacy is fragmented. Federal agencies are required to keep most personal information about individuals private, and to have plans to protect data about individuals on their own computers. 37 Education organizations are required to keep most data about students private. 38 Credit-reporting agencies, which make a business of collecting and selling financial information about individuals, are also subject to some restrictions. 39 Videotape libraries must keep information about the tapes that individuals borrowed confidential. 40 Certain other businesses are also restricted. But, unless information is covered by one of these relatively limited laws, private firms can (and do) create databases about individuals from all available sources. By analyzing the interests, purchasing practices, and other attributes of citizens they can determine who is most likely to purchase fishing equipment or to contribute to humanitarian causes. They then sell this information to others. Companies seek likely purchasers. Non-profit groups look for potential donors or supporters of their causes. Indeed, the absence of adequate general privacy protection has been a concern repeatedly expressed by the European authorities. 41 The European Union has threatened to embargo the transmission of data to the United States, unless safeguards for privacy equivalent to those prevailing in Europe were put into place. Although there is no direct protection of privacy against private incursion, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has general authority to prohibit 'unfair and deceptive trade practices\ 42 Acting under that authority, it has long prohibited the ob35

Id. , to be codified as 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3).

36

American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, (Civ. A-98-5591), 1998 W L 813423 (E.D.Pa.).

37

5 U.S.C. § 552a.

38

20 U.S.C. § 1232q.

39

15 U.S.C. SS 1681 et seq.

40

18 U.S.C. § 2710.

41

See EC Directive 95/46 of 24 October 1995, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 281,

1995. 42

15 U.S.C. § 45.

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taining of information about individuals by deceptive means. It required those who gathered this information to inform the subjects of the information that it might be sold to third parties, and to give them the opportunity to forbid such passing on of their information to third parties. In the summer of 1998, FTC investigators reported that a number of Internet sites were gathering private information and using or reselling it without fulfilling the assurances of privacy that they had given. Congress was concurrently considering issues involving the Internet. One of its particular concerns was the practice of some interactive Internet sites of soliciting personal information from relatively young children. Congress reacted by enacting the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 199843 as Title X I I I of the Omnibus Appropriations Act. This law expressly authorizes the FTC to prohibit any operator of a website from disclosing any personal information obtained from a child under the age of 13, and gives the Commission specific authority to make rules and regulations in this area. Several aspects of this law are worthy of further examination. The age cut-off for this protection of juveniles is lower (by 4 years) than that for the obtaining of pornography. Apparently Congress believes that teenagers need to be protected against pornography, but not against enterprises that seek to exploit personal information about them for commercial gain. The law is written to permit industry groups to establish self-regulatory measures and to encourage the F T C to treat compliance with any such self-regulatory schemes as compliance with the requirements of the law. 44 A resort to industry selfregulation has been a recurrent theme in legislation dealing with the Internet. The new act adds very little to the regulatory power that the FTC already possessed, other than to make it more explicit. It does, however, demonstrate a legislative concern w i t h the area, something that is likely to spur the Commission to more intense regulatory effort. O n another level, this legislation does show some concern with broadening privacy protection. This legislation is another, quite small, gain for the protection for privacy, but it leaves most personal information and data fully available for commercial exploitation. I V . Taxes The third new law which Congress passed was the Internet Tax Freedom Act. 4 5 Despite its name, the new law does not give freedom from taxes. Rather, it primarily establishes a limited moratorium for three years, on new state and local taxes on Internet commerce and activities. 43

Omnibus Appropriations Act, Title ΧΙΠ, §§ 1301 et seq. (not yet codified in U.S.C.).

44

Id., § 1304.

45

Omnibus Appropriations Act, title X I , §§ 1101 et seq.

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Fred L. Morrison

The concerns that stimulated the legislation appear to have been twofold. One, of which only traces remain, was apparently a concern that states might begin to impose 'bit taxes' or other levies on the amount of electronic traffic flowing through (or originating in) their jurisdictions. The statute has a very complex and thorough definition of a 'bit tax', 46 but then, oddly, never again uses the term in any way! This again shows that different pieces of legislation were hastily cobbled together into the Omnibus Appropriations Act without careful review. A federal prohibition of 'bit taxes' was not adopted, but a definition of them was. The real concern of the statute was the application of ordinary taxes to Internet transactions and to firms that transact business over the Internet. T w o major taxes were in question: state taxes on corporate (or business) income and state sales taxes. The primary legal issue is the state's authority to levy these taxes on out-of-state businesses or to impose on those businesses the obligation to collect them from others on behalf of the state. American constitutional law permits a state to impose income taxes on a multi-state business, if that business has a sufficient nexus with the state and if the tax is 'fairly apportioned'. The leading case on this point is Complete Auto Transit v. Brady. 47 It provides that a state tax is compatible with the requirements of the Commerce Clause only if there is a substantial local nexus, if the tax is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce and is fairly related to services provided by the state. The apportionment rules are not prescribed by federal law; each state sets its own. Since they can use any system of apportionment that has a rational basis, the system can, in fact, lead to multiple taxation of the same income. Federal constitutional law also permits a state to impose on a multi-state business the obligation to collect sales taxes (or the equivalent use taxes) from its residents and to pay the proceeds to that state, if it has sufficient minimum contacts in the state. The sales tax is a tax on the purchaser, not on the vendor, whose only responsibility is to collect it for the state. The tax, in fact, increases the cost of the goods for the purchaser, because it is added to the purchase price, not incorporated within it. A t a higher price, the goods will, of course, be less competitive. (Local merchants in the state, against whom the Internet entrepreneurs compete, see this as providing a level playing field.) If the multi-state merchant must collect the tax for other states, it must establish an accounting system that can take into account the differing tax rules for each of the 50 states and must file regular returns with each of them. Many firms found this a nearly insuperable administrative burden. In order for a state to impose either of these taxes, the merchant must have a 'sufficient nexus' with the taxing state.48 Under applicable constitutional law, it is clear 46

Id., § 1104(1).

47

430 U.S. 274 (1977).

48

Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 421, 464 (1959) (income tax), National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (sales tax).

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that the establishment of a store, office, factory, or other facility is a 'sufficient nexus'. 49 It is also clear that an occasional shipment of a catalogue or of goods ordered by telephone or e-mail by itself, or even the occasional presence of traveling sales persons, would not be sufficient to justify the imposition of state taxes.50 The question arises between these two extremes. A t what point does the merchant's conduct become sufficient to subject it to the taxing jurisdiction of the state? This originally became an issue as mail-order firms began to compete with local merchants. The mail order firm might not be subject to local income taxes, and could not be required to collect sales taxes from the purchaser. It would also not be liable for sales taxes in its home state, since the sales transaction took place elsewhere. This led to a certain loss of revenue for the states involved. As the volume of Internet related business transactions has increased, a number of states have been seeking to interpret their existing tax laws to cover out-of-state businesses that had substantial transactions over the Internet with in-state customers. They argue that the magnitude of the individual company's interactions with the state creates a sufficient nexus for it to impose tax liabilities. States have used a number of arguments to bolster these claims. Some have argued that the simple magnitude of the transactions accomplished over the Internet and the immediacy of contact with the individual consumer creates the necessary nexus w i t h the out-of-state firm. Others have argued that the local Internet Service Provider (ISP), which provides the connection to the World Wide Web is an agent for the out-of-state vendor, which knows that its messages w i l l necessarily pass through some service provider in the local jurisdiction (although it may not know which one), and has thus submitted to the jurisdiction for taxation purposes. These arguments are given a degree of plausibility by the relatively broad concept of 'minimum contacts' that is used for purposes of judicial jurisdiction in United States courts, although it should be realized that the contacts required to support judicial jurisdiction over a case may be different from the nexus necessary for regulatory or fiscal jurisdiction to enact legislation. Both concepts, however, flow from judicial interpretations of the same clause of the United States Constitution, the Due Process Clause. The new federal statute expressly leaves all pending cases to be resolved in the courts under the current law. 51 A l l it does is to forbid states which have not already done so to expand their tax laws or to interpret or apply their existing tax laws more broadly in the case of Internet transactions during the moratorium. It also cre49

Moorman Manufacturing v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (income tax), National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977) (sales tax). 50

1 5 U.S.C. SS 381 - 384 (income taxes); National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (sales tax). 51

Omnibus Appropriations Act, § 1101(c).

7 GYIL41

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ates a 19 member commission, composed of three federal officials, eight state and local taxing officials, and eight representatives of business groups, including those engaged in electronic commerce. In addition to studying barriers to foreign commerce imposed by other countries (of which the threatened E U restrictions based on the lack of privacy protection is probably the key concern), the commission is to make recommendations, both to Congress and to the states, for legislation that w i l l provide standards for the imposition of taxes, which should be 'tax and technologically neutral and apply to all forms of remote commerce'. 52 Parallel issues also exist on an international scale, and may become magnified as electronic commerce increases. Consumption taxes are common throughout the world. They usually take the form of a 'value added tax' (VAT), which is structurally different from the usual American sales tax. Within Europe they are harmonized by directives of the European Union, something that has not been effected within the United States. Unlike sales taxes, they are dealt with under the structure of the W T O / G A T T as border taxes. Whether such adjustments for dealing with 'border taxes' are appropriate or practical for the increasingly interconnected world of electronic commerce remains to be seen. When it first permitted states to impose taxes on interstate commerce, the Supreme Court said that '[interstate commerce must pay its way'. 5 3 Internet commerce w i l l also need to pay its way, both domestically and internationally. Issues regarding the distribution of authority among competing claimants w i l l undoubtedly be a major international concern, as well as a constitutional concern within the United States. In addition to the moratorium on new state and local taxes on Internet commerce, the new law declares the intent of Congress to levy no new federal taxes on Internet activities. 54 This is a statement of political intent, and no more. It is limited by two factors. One is the general rule that Congress cannot bind itself by ordinary legislation, so any future Congress could enact new Internet taxes and repeal this law in the process. Indeed, the section is written only as a declaration of policy and not as a prohibition. The other is a specific exception, provided within the nonbinding declaration itself, preserving taxes on Internet activities that were authorized by the Communications Act of 1996. These were the taxes that were imposed for improvements of the Internet system and for the provision of access to libraries and schools. The force of the general declaration is thus muted by its own internal recognition of its inefficacy in controlling the Congressional appetite for revenue.

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The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity under the U N Charter, CalWIntJ, vol. 4, 1974, 203; L. S. Wiseherg , Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Nigerian Civil War, Human Rights Journal (HRJ), vol. 7, 1974, 61; C. Joyner , The United States Action on

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Fifty Years

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tions occurred from time to time in the 19th century mainly on the ground of prevention of the continued persecution of religious minorities. However, from earliest times the potential for abuse was recognized because the motivations for such interventions were often blatantly political. There was also some doubt as to whether this right really existed. Certainly, no state could be required to act in this way. The Charter of the U N , particularly the provisions of article 2(4),22 may have Grenada: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion, AJIL, vol. 78,1984,131; /. N. Moore , The United States Action in Grenada: Grenada and the International Double Standard, AJIL, vol. 78, 1984, 145; S. Davidson , Grenada: A Study i n Politics and the Limits of International Law, Aldershot 1987; I. Pogany , Humanitarian Intervention in International Law: The French Intervention i n Syria Re-examined, I C L Q , vol. 35, 1986, 182; F. R. Téson , Humanitarian Intervention: A n Enquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd ed., New York 1996; M. Akehurst , Humanitarian Intervention, in: H. Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics, Oxford 1984,95; N. S. Rodley (ed.), To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights, London 1992; D. F. Vagts , International Law under Time Pressure: Grading the Grenada Take-Home Examination, AJIL, vol. 78,1984, 169; R. J. Beck , International Law and the Decision to Invade Grenada: A Ten Year Retrospective, Virginia Journal of International Law (VaJIL), vol. 33, 1993, 765; R. P. Dieguez ) The Grenada Intervention: "Illegal" i n Form, Sound as Policy, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 16,1984,1167; L. Doswald-Beck , The Legality of the US Intervention in Grenada, Netherlands International Law Review (NILR), vol. 31, 1984, 355; N. S. Rodley , Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case Law of the World Court, I C L Q , vol. 38, 1989, 321; F. R. Téson , Le Peuple, C'est Moi! The World Court and Human Rights, AJIL, vol. 81, 1987, 173; V. P. Nanda , The Validity of United States Intervention i n Panama under International Law, AJIL, vol. 84,1989, 494; T. Farer , Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm, AJIL, vol. 84, 1989, 503; A. D*Amato , The Invasion of Panama was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, AJIL, vol. 84,1987,516; S. Alam, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka and International Law, N I L R , vol. 38,1990,346; N. Chandrahasan , Use of Force to Ensure Humanitarian Relief — A South Asian Precedent Examined, I C L Q , vol. 42,1993, 664; T. Farer , Human Rights and Foreign Policy: What the Kurds Learned (A Drama in One Act), H R Q , vol. 14, 1992, 62; M. Stopford , Humanitarian Assistance in the Wake of the Persian Gulf War, VaJIL, vol. 33,1993, 491; C. Greenwood , Is There a Right to Humanitarian Intervention?, World Today, February 1993, 34; D. P. Forsythe/K. K. Pease, Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics, H R Q , vol. 15, 1993, 290; M. Bettati , The Right of Humanitarian Intervention or the Right of Free Access to Victims? Review of the International Commission of Jurists, vol. 49, 1992, 1; R. A. Falk , The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for the United Nations, Harvard International Law Journal (HarvIntLawJ), vol. 36, 1995, 341; R. B. Lillichy Humanitarian Intervention Through the United Nations: Towards the Development of Criteria, Zeitschrift Für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV), vol. 53, 1993, 557; D. Schweigmann , Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law: The Strife for Humanity, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 6, 1993, 91 and Y K. Tyagi , The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 16, 1995, 883. 22

" A l l Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent w i t h the Purposes of the United Nations."

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changed the position, i f indeed such a r i g h t existed i n customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w i n the first place, so that it m a y be argued that such interventions are i n v i o l a t i o n of international law. I t is also necessary t o distinguish between interventions t o protect o r rescue an intervening state's o w n nationals and those that are intended t o determ i n e gross violations c o m m i t t e d b y a state against its o w n citizens. H o w e v e r , i t is possible t o argue that, i n the light of recent events relating t o the interventions i n Iraq, Liberia, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia for instance, as Marc Weiler has done, that [l]imited armed action on behalf of a population in danger of being exterminated by its own government is legally justified, even in the absence of positive authorization from the Security Council. There is now emerging an international practice which permits the international community to pierce through the armour of state sovereignty when atrocities of this magnitude are being committed. 23

5. The Covenant of the League of Nations T h i s m e t h o d of an incremental or m i n i m a l i s t approach at international protect i o n aimed at selective classes of person or subject matter up t o and i n c l u d i n g W o r l d W a r I received a n e w lease o n life i n the Covenant of the League of N a t i o n s concluded at the end of the war. O n l y t w o articles of the League Covenant made reference t o h u m a n rights w i t h o u t , however, m e n t i o n i n g the term. T h e reason for this was, as John Humphrey

points out, that

President Woodrow Wilson had wanted a reference in the covenant to religious freedom, but when the Japanese quite appositely suggested that, if freedom of religion were to be in-

See also article 2 (7) which says that: "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially w i t h i n the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." O n domestic jurisdiction see, for example: R. Bernhardt , Domestic Jurisdiction of States and International Human Rights Organs, HRLJ, vol. 7, 1986, 205; M. Bossuyt , Human Rights and Non-intervention in Domestic Matters, RevICJ, vol. 35, 1985, 45; /. E. S. Fawcett , Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction, in: E. Luard (ed.), The International Protection of Human Rights, London 1967, 286; V. Leary , When Does Implementation of International Human Rights Constitute Interference into the Essentially Domestic Affairs of a State — the Interactions of Article 2 (7), 55 and 56 of the U N Charter, in: /. C. Tuttle (ed.), International Human Rights Law and Practice: The Roles of the United Nations, the Private Sector, the Government and their Lawyers, Chicago 1978, 15; M. Markovic , Implementation of Human Rights and the Domestic Jurisdiction of States, in: A. Eide/A. Shou (eds.), International Protection of Human Rights, Proceedings of the Seventh Nobel Symposium, Oslo, 25 - 27 September 1967, Stockholm, 1968, 47. 23

The Times, 20 August 1992.

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eluded, there should also be some mention of racial equality, this so frightened some countries whose law restricted Asiatic immigration that both suggestions were withdrawn.

Article 22(5) of the League Covenant refers to "freedom of conscience and religion" and "the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade" but only in regard to "mandated" territories. Essentially, "mandated" territories were colonies or territories which: (1) had ceased to be under the sovereignty of states which formerly had governed them as a result of the late war; and, (2) which were inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world (viz. underdeveloped); and, (3) which were put under the "tutelage" of "advanced nations" who as mandatories on behalf of the League were made responsible for their administration under conditions which would guarantee the aforementioned rights. The last mandated territory of S.W. Africa or Namibia as it is known now achieved independence in 1990. Furthermore, under article 23 of the League Covenant the Members of the League agreed that they "will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend," "undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control" and "entrust the League w i t h the general supervision of the execution of agreements w i t h regard to the traffic in women and children." The League also established an Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Women and Children which was soon divided into two committees each with its own individual sphere of operation. Both these committees performed useful work within the subject matter of their brief, as did the Committee on the Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs. The League also established in 1921 a refugees organization. This was the original precursor of the current U N High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva.

6. Protection of Minorities Additionally, and as a corollary of the fact that it was decided not to deal w i t h the protection of minorities in the League Covenant itself, the Allied and Associated Powers insisted that certain newly created and territorially war-aggrandized states protect the rights of their religious, racial and linguistic minorities. This was by far the most important of the various human rights matters dealt with by the League. Essentially, the arrangements took a variety of forms. First, there were five special treaties w i t h the allied or newly created states; secondly, various chapters on minority rights were included in the peace treaties with the former enemy states; thirdly, some states were required to make particular declarations as a specific con-

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dition of their admission to the League; fourthly, four local conventions were concluded; finally two conventions on exchange of population were incorporated. These provisions were put under the guarantee of the League of Nations and consisted in the main of rights such as freedom of religion, right to use their own language, right of minorities to sustain their own religious and educational establishments, equality before the law provisions and right to use the minority language as a teaching medium where the minority was, in effect, a substantial proportion of the population. The real importance of these provisions lay in the fact that proper methods of implementation were devised to vindicate these rights. Thus it was very important from the point of view of the recognition of the rights of individuals. Minorities had the right to petition the League. If the claim was declared admissible by the Secretary-General of the League, an ad hoc Minorities Committee would be established by the League to conduct an investigation and attempt an amicable solution; thereafter, the complaint could be referred to the League Council which, in turn, could refer the matter to the PCIJ. The most celebrated case in which this occurred was the Minority Schools in Albania case,24 where the Court held that the closure of certain minority schools was not commensurate w i t h the requisite of equality of treatment. Apart from the League provisions, other provisions such as the German-Polish Convention on Upper Silesia 1922 existed. The importance of this treaty lay in the elaborate system of implementation it set up which proved to be very hardy and adaptable. The general view is that the arrangements of the League worked remarkably well until they were undermined by Hitler's use of their essence as a justification for German invasions of Austria and Czechoslovakia. There is little doubt today, in the light of events in former Yugoslavia, that the question of minority rights is one of the most troublesome human rights problems of our time. 25 24 25

1935 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 64, 17.

See generally, C. A. Macartney , League of Nations' Protection of Minority Rights, in: E. Luard (ed.), (note 22), 22; P. De Ascdrate, League of Nations and National Minorities — A n Experiment, Washington 1945;/. F. Green , Protection of Minorities in the League of Nations and the United Nations, in: A. Gottlieb (ed.), Human Rights, Federation and Minorities, Canada 1970, 180; L. B. Sohn, The Rights of Minorities in: L. Henkin (ed.), The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York 1981, 270; C. Tomuschat , Protection of Minorities under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in: R. Bernhardt et al. (eds.), Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte: Festschrift für Herman Mosler , Berlin 1983, 949; C. A. Macartney , National States and National Minorities, London 1934; /. Stone, International Guarantee of Minority Rights: Procedure of the Council of the League of Nations i n Theory and i n Practice, Oxford 1932. / . Stone, Regional Guarantee of Minority Rights: A Study of

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7. The ILO Finally, one further contribution of the Paris Peace Treaties of 1919 cannot be overlooked. These treaties set up the I L O . Since then, this now specialized agency of the U N , the constitution of which is contained in Part X I I I of the Treaty has concluded a plethora of over 150 conventions in the economic and social field, most particularly in the context of employment-fixing international standards. 26 The arMinority Procedure in Upper Silesia, London 1933; I. L. Claude , National Minorities: A n International Problem, 4th ed., New York 1971; H. Lannung, Rights of Minorities, in: Melanges Offerts à Polys Modinos, Problèmes des Droits de l'Homme et de l'Unification Européenne, Paris 1968, 181; J. Robinson , International Protection of Minorities: A Global View, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (IsYHumRts), vol. 1, 1971, 61; P. Thornberry , Minority Rights, Human Rights and International Law, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 3, 1980, 248; /. W. Bruegel , A Neglected Field: The Protection of Minorities, HRJ, vol. 4, 1971, 413; /. Claydon , The Transnational Protection of Ethnic Minorities: A Tentative Framework for Inquiry, Canadian Yearbook of International Law, vol. 13, 1975, 25; Y Dinstein , Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, I C L Q , vol. 25, 1976, 102; R. Monaco , Minorities Nationales et Protection Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, in: René Cassin , Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber I, Problèmes de Protection Internationales des Droits de l'Homme, Paris 1969, 175; T. Veiter , Commentary on the Concept of "National Minorities", HRJ, vol. 7, 1974, 273; B. Whitaker , Minority Rights of Self Determination, in: D. P. Kommers/G. D. Loescher (eds.), Human Rights and American Foreign Policy, Notre Dame 1979, 63; G. Ashworth (ed.), World Minorities, London 1977; U. Haksar , Minority Protection and the International Bill of Rights, Bombay 1974; V. Van Dyke , Self Determination and Minority Rights, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 18, 1969, 223; /. Pejic , Minority Rights i n International Law, H R Q , vol. 19, 1997,666. See also the comprehensive study prepared by Capotorti entitled 'Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities', U N Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384 (Rev.l 1979); U N Pub. E.78 X I V . 1. For the leading modern monograph on the subject see: P. Thornberry , International Law and the Rights of Minorities, Oxford 1991; see also: Y Dinstein/M. Tabory (eds.), The Protection of Minorities and Human Rights, Dordrecht 1992; C. Brölmann/R. Lefeber/M. Zieck , Peoples and Minorities i n International Law, Dordrecht 1993, and /. Packer/K. Myntti (eds.), The Protection of Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities i n Europe, T u r k u / A b o 1993. See further: World Directory of Minorities, Minority Rights Group International, London 1997. 26

For an up to date compilation of I L O instruments, see: International Labour Conventions and Recommendations 1919 -1991, 2 vols., I L O , Geneva 1992. For an excellent annotated bibliography, see: A Guide to Selected Sources, I L O , Geneva 1991. For a selection of literature see the following: C. W. Jenks , Human Rights and International Labour Standards, London 1960. C. W. Jenks , Human Rights, Social Justice and Peace: The Broader Significance of the I L O Experience, in: A. Eide/A. Shou (eds.), (note 22), 227. C. W. Jenks , The International Protection of Trade U n i o n Rights, in: E. Luard (ed.) (note 22), 210; P. Juvigny , L'Office International du Travail, in: René Cassin , Amicorum Discipuloruque Liber I, Problèmes de Protection Internationale des Droits de l'Homme (note 25), 121; TV. Valticos , The International Labour Organization, in: S. Schwebel (ed.), The Effectiveness of International Decisions, Papers of a Conference of the American Society of International Law, and the Proceedings of the Conference, Leiden 1971,134. N. Valticos , Normes de l'Organisation Internationale de Travail

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ray of topics legislated upon are impressive and include: equal pay for work of equal value, trade union rights, social security, unemployment, adequate remuneration, freedom of association, abolition of forced labour, non-discrimination in employment and occupation, conditions of work especially for children and young workers, women's rights in respect of maternity leave, night work and the like. Thus standard-setting by way of conventions is a very important part of its work and this is supplemented by the power to adopt non-binding recommendations. Very elaborate methods of enforcing the engagements of states are employed: one of the principal methods of achieving this is through the so-called I L O reporting system designated by articles 19 and 22 of its Constitution whereby all member states are obliged to make reports to the I L O on the measures they have adopted in implementation of the standards set. States must report on how they have implemented the Conventions they have signed and ratified and must indicate difficulties and prospects of ratification of those they have not yet ratified. 27 The other main method of implementation is by a close examination of government reports. This takes place in two stages. First, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations — a body of eighteen experts appointed by the governing body of the I L O — examines the reports together with the comments of both employers' and workers' federations for compliance with the international obligations assumed. The Committee of Experts then forwards its observations' on any matter which it regards as a breach of the obligations assumed in its annual report to the International Labour Conference. It may also direct requests to governments in a closed ventilation system to make explanations or rectifications. The second stage involves the annual appointment of a Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations by the Conference itself. This body — which consists of government, workers' and employers' representatives — examines the report of the Committee of Experts and calls for explanations from governments where divergence between accepted obligations and actual practice have been held to occur. Finally, there is an inter-state complaints procedure whereby one state party may bring an action against another state party if it is of the view that the latter state is not complying w i t h its obligations under a particular convention. Like en Matière de Protection des Droits de l'Homme, HRJ, vol. 4,1971,691. TV. Valticos, The Role of the I L O : Present Action and Future Perspectives, in: B. G. Ramcharan (ed.), Human Rights: Thirty Years After the Universal Declaration, The Hague 1979,211. N. Valticos , The I L O , in: K. Vasak (ed.), Les Dimensions Internationales des Droits de l'Homme, U N E S C O Manual, Paris 1978,363; E. A. Landy , The Effectiveness of International Supervision — 30 Years of I L O Experience, London 1966; F. Wolf, Human Rights and the I L O , in: T. Meron (ed.), Human Rights i n International Law — Legal and Policy Issues, Oxford 1985, 273. 27

Copies must be sent to national employers' and workers' organizations which may make comments that must be communicated by the government to the ILO.

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some other international inter-state procedures it has rarely been resorted to. Where a complaint is lodged, the governing body of the I L O must set up a Commission of Enquiry which has the power to see witnesses and conduct on site visits to review the case.28 I n addition, since the I L O is particularly concerned with freedom of association it has special procedures applicable to all members of the organization and not just those that have signed and ratified the pertinent instruments such as the Convention on Freedom of Association 1948 and that on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining 1949. Once again, a two-tier system of control operates: first, there is a Committee on Freedom of Association, consisting of nine members of the governing body, three drawn from each of the three constituents. O n a complaint being lodged by any one government or a workers' or employers' organization, the matter is examined and a report delivered to the governing body containing its recommendations; secondly, there is a Fact-finding and Conciliation Commission. This consists of independent appointees of the governing body whose function is to marshal the facts and attempt to reach a friendly solution of the matter. It must be observed, however, that this Commission cannot exercise these powers without the consent of the government concerned and this is, for obvious reasons, not always forthcoming. 29 O n the whole, one must conclude that the I L O has made a significant contribution to the protection of human rights falling within its remit and many of its procedures could well be emulated by other U N organs concerned w i t h human rights to good effect.

8. Declaration of the International Rights of Man 1929 So far only state practice has been referred to. However, the mounting evidence of treaty and state practice eroding the traditional doctrine in the years leading up to and after World War I was paralleled by similar advances in international legal thought. Significantly, the prestigious Institute of International Law, at a session in New York in 1929, adopted the Declaration of the International Rights of Man which revealed an increasing awareness that individuals and their rights were a proper subject of concern to international law. The preamble refers to "the juridical conscience of the civilized world demanding] the recognition for the individual of rights preserved from all infringement on the part of the State." The text then artic28

For further details of this procedure see L. Swepston , Human Rights Complaints Procedures of the International Labour Organization, in: H Hannum (ed.), Guide to International Human Rights Practice, 2nd ed., Philadelphia 1992, 99. 29

For an example of proceedings under the Freedom of Association umbrella, see S. Corby , Limitations on Freedom of Association in the Civil Service and the ILO's Response, Industrial Law Journal, vol. 15, 1986, 161.

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ulates a number of basic rights which it is the duty of every state to recognise: article I specifies "the equal right of every individual to the life, liberty and property" and demands it as a duty of the state to protect such rights without distinction on any irrelevant ground; article I I delineates "the duty of every state to recognise the right of every individual to the free practise, both public and private, of every faith, religion, or belief, provided that the said practise shall not be incompatible with public and good morals"; article V outlaws all direct or indirect discrimination. Professor Brown has summed up the importance of the document thus [i]t aims not merely to assure to individuals their international rights, but it aims also to impose on all nations a standard of conduct towards all men including their own nationals. It thus repudiates the classical doctrine that states alone are subjects of international l a w . . . . It marks a new era which is more concerned w i t h the interests and rights of sovereign individuals than w i t h the rights of sovereign states.30

I I I . The Charter of the U N Whereas the Covenant of the League of Nations manifested an incremental or ad hoc approach to human rights, the Charter of the U N elevated world concern w i t h human rights to the international arena on a generalized and conceptual basis for the first time. John Humphrey has commented that references to human rights run through the U N Charter like a "golden thread." 31 This was a giant step forward. Professor Louis B. Sohn has said in this regard that "[t]he Charter of the United Nations presents a radical departure from previous approaches to the international protection of human rights." 32 But what caused the drafters of the Charter to deal w i t h human rights in this way when it had been almost ignored at the preparatory conference at Dumbarton Oaks? One of the principal differences between the Covenant of the old League of Nations and the Charter of the new United Nations was the fact that the Charter gave the matter of human rights and fundamental freedoms particular prominence. The reason is not hard to find. The events leading up to the Second World War and the terrible atrocities perpetrated by Nazi Germany, both in those years before the war 30

AJIL, vol. 24, 1929, 127. See also the American Law Institute's 'Statement of Essential Human Rights', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science No.243, Jan. 1946, 18. See further: L. B. Sohn, H o w American International Lawyers Prepared for the San Francisco Bill of Rights, AJIL, vol. 89, 1995, 540. 31

See N o Distant Millennium: The International Law of Human Rights, UNESCO, Paris

1989. 32

L. B. Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the Charter, Texas International Law Journal, vol. 12, 1977, 129. For a monumental review of the whole of the Charter provisions see B. Simma etal. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Oxford 1994.

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and during it, provided the springboard for a detailed consideration of human rights issues. However, even this, as we shall see, very nearly never occurred. 33 During the war, the Allies felt compelled to reiterate on several occasions the protection of human rights as one of their stated war aims: thus, from this time on, the rights of individuals began to acquire greater authority in the realms of both theory and practice of international law. The Allies made it clear that the war was being fought to re-establish and protect fundamental human rights. Prime Minister Churchill at the outset of the war had described it as one "to establish, on impregnable rocks, the rights of the individual." 34 In his famous "Four Freedoms" speech of 6 January 1941 to the U.S. Congress, President Roosevelt "look[ed] forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms" which he described as no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation. That kind of world is the very antithesis of the so-called new order of tyranny which the dictators seek to create w i t h the crash of a bomb. 3 5

The four delineated freedoms were: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship God in his own way, freedom from want and freedom from fear. In the Atlantic Charter of 14 August 1941 Churchill and Roosevelt, meeting in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland on the cruiser Augusta which brought the President and the battleship Prince of Wales which brought the Prime Minister, expressed their hope that after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny there would be established a peace which w i l l afford to all the nations the means of dwelling in safety w i t h i n their own boundaries, and which w i l l afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from want and fear. 36

Rather similar expressions were included in the Declaration by the United Nations of 1 January 1942 which was signed by the representatives of 26 countries including the USA, the U K , the USSR and China in which it was proclaimed that "complete victory . . . is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice . . ." 37 . 33

For a particularly well written account of how the human rights provisions were inserted i n the Charter see /. P. Humphrey , The U N Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in: E. Luard (ed.), (note 22), 39. 34

Hansard (Commons), vol. 351, col.295.

35

Text i n F. E. Dowrick (ed.), Human Rights: Problems, Perspectives and Texts, Farnborough 1979, 150. 36

See /. P. Humphrey , The U N Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in: E. Luard (ed.), (note 22), 39. See generally, /. Stone, The Atlantic Charter: New Worlds for Old, Sydney 1943. 37

See L B. Sohn/T. Buergenthal (note 17), 507.

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P. R. Gandi

As the war in Europe was drawing to a close, in late summer 1944 the four principal powers met at Washington to draw up a grand plan for a new world organization to take the place of the defunct League. These discussions or conversations, which took place at Dumbarton Oaks, a large and secluded estate in Washington D C , were published in the form of the 'Dumbarton Oaks Proposals' which, in the chapter on international economic and social co-operation, 38 stipulated that w i t h a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, the organization should facilitate solutions of international, economic, social and other humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Responsibility for the discharge of this function should be vested i n the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly in an Economic and Social Council.

This could only be described as a particularly feeble response to the barbarities of the war. However, pressure from outside the official process was also being felt. Professor Sir Hersch Lauterpacht published his International Bill of the Rights of Man 39 in 1945 which had been written in 1943, which he described as "part of the fundamental constitution of International Society." This clearly reaffirmed that individuals (rather than states) could be the subjects of international law. He envisaged the adoption of the Bill by "appropriate means" as part of the domestic law and constitution of a state. He also envisaged that the highest judicial tribunal of the state or a special constitutional Court of Liberties should have jurisdiction to pronounce upon conformity with the Bill of domestic laws, judicial or executive action. The San Francisco Conference which succeeded the Dumbarton Oaks discussions produced the final draft of the Charter on 24 June 1945. The Charter was signed on 26 June and entered into force on 24 October 1945. The Charter contains a number of human rights provisions — the human rights clauses of the Charter. H o w this transformation came about, that brought these human rights clauses into the Charter, has been explained by two particular features of the Conference. 40 First, the delegation of some of the smaller countries present at the San Francisco Conference agitated strongly in favour of their inclusion and secondly, the 42 private organizations or N G O s which had been invited to the Conference by the US State Department as consultants to the US delegation and which included representatives of ethnic groups, peace movements, trade unions and churches lobbied hard in the corridors in favour of the inclusion of human rights provisions and managed to secure the support of the US delegation for a number of their proposals. Initially, 38

Ch. I X , Sec. A. para. 1.

39

New York 1945.

40

See/. P. Humphrey , The U N Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in: E. Luard (ed.), (note 22), 39.

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the US delegation, fearful of any repeat of the refusal of the US Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, blocked the aspirations of the consultants by refusing to support their amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. But at the last minute Edward R. Stettinius , the Secretary of State, bowed to the pressure after a personal intervention by Judge Proskauer, 41 with the result that the Charter acquired the provisions on human rights which it now contains, by virtue of the fact that the US delegation then managed to convince the other Conference sponsoring powers of the need for the inclusion. 42 Indeed, some governments would have gone further than the Charter provisions. The Chilean, Cuban and Panamanian delegates suggested the inclusion of provisions which would guarantee the protection of particular human rights. The government of Panama (and to a lesser extent Chile and Uruguay) pressed for the inclusion of a Bill of Rights incorporated into the Charter itself. The Panamanian suggestion was that the Charter proclaim it to be a purpose of the United Nations to maintain and observe the standards set forth in . . . the Declaration of Essential Human Rights which are appended to the present Charter and which are made an integral part thereof.

However, all these proposals came to nothing principally because of the opposition of the USA and the U K in particular and, in general, other states' unwillingness to accept such a radical curtailment of their sovereignty at one stroke. In addition, it was clear that once the Commission on Human Rights was set up under article 68 of the Charter, its first task would be to draft an international Bill of Rights. The reasons for including the human rights provisions in the Charter are probably many. As Louis B. Sohn has said [s]ome countries, such as the United States and France, have long pioneered i n the development of Bills of Rights for the protection of their own citizens, and their representatives felt that humanity as a whole should benefit from their experience. Others wanted to prevent the repetition of the totalitarian atrocities of the 1930's which shocked the conscience of mankind. Another group, dissatisfied w i t h the workings of the minority treaties which were imposed on some states of Eastern Europe and the Middle East after the First World War, felt that the problem of protection of minorities can be solved only in the broader framework of a Bill of Rights applicable to all. 43 41

See /. H Proskauer , A Segment of M y Times, New York 1945 and /. H. Proskauer/A. Blaustein , A World Charter for Human Rights, New York, 1945. 42

A l l the proposed amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals are discussed in /. Robinson , The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, New York, Institute of Jewish Affairs of American Jewish Congress and World Jewish Congress, 1946. See, i n particular, 20 et seq. 43 A Short History of the United Nations Documents on Human Rights, in C. M. Eichelberger (ed.), The United Nations and Human Rights, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Eighteenth Report of the Commission, New York 1968, 39.

P.

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Whatever the m o t i v a t i o n of the authors of the provisions may have been, i t led t o the inclusion of seven explicit references t o h u m a n rights i n the Charter. T h e first explicit reference t o h u m a n rights occurs i n the second clause of the Preamble, the first draft of w h i c h was w r i t t e n b y Field-Marshal Smuts of South Africa. I t reads [W]E T H E PEOPLES O F T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S D E T E R M I N E D . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights in the dignity and worth of the human person, i n the equal rights of men and women of nations large and small, . . . H A V E RESOLVED T O C O M B I N E O U R EFFORTS T O A C C O M P L I S H THESE AIMS. 4 4 T h e second explicit reference t o h u m a n rights is t o be f o u n d i n article 1(3) and declares that one of the three m a i n purposes of the U N is t o achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Humphrey

suggests that this reference, w h i c h was directly traceable t o the l o b b y i n g

of the N G O s at the San Francisco Conference, is " o f m o r e t h a n rhetorical i m p o r tance" 4 5 and cites i n support the report s u b m i t t e d t o the General Assembly b y the U N C o m m i s s i o n o n the Racial Situation i n the U n i o n of South Africa, w h e r e i n i t was stated that certain measures adopted b y that c o u n t r y were c o n t r a r y t o the purpose stated i n article 1(3) of the C h a r t e r . 4 6 A n o t h e r instance of referral t o article 1(3) was i n 1955 w h e n the General Assembly instructed its C o m m i t t e e o n I n f o r m a t i o n f r o m Non-Self-Governing Territories t o examine summaries and analyses of article 73(e) " i n the spirit of article 1, paras. 3 and 4 . " 4 7 T h u s , Humphrey

concludes that

the Assembly can and w i l l undertake investigations, and make recommendations to member states, concerning the application of the purposes of the organisation; and that, in the view of the majority of member states, such investigations and recommendations do not constitute intervention within the meaning of article 2, para.7 [of the Charter]. 48

44

Smuts was an eloquent champion for the inclusion of human rights clauses i n the Charter. A t the sixth Plenary Session, 6 May 1945, he suggested that: "the Charter should contain at its very outset and i n the preamble, a declaration of human rights and of common faith which has sustained the Allied Peoples i n their bitter struggle for the vindication of these rights and that faith We have fought for justice and decency and for the fundamental freedom and rights of man, which are basic to all human advancement and progress and peace." 45

The U N Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, in: E. Luard (ed.), (note 22), 41. 46

See Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Supplement no.l, vol. I, para. 21.

47

Id., para. 22.

48

The U N Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in: E. Luard (ed.), (note 22), 42.

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The next reference to human rights (also attributable to the efforts of the consultative organizations present at the San Francisco conference) occurs in article 13 and addresses the issue of the competence of the General Assembly in human rights matters. It reads [t]he General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of: . . . (b) promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Since 1945, the human rights and humanitarian work undertaken by the General Assembly and its Third Committee which deals with social, humanitarian and cultural affairs has been conducted under article 13. The fourth reference in article 55, which must be read in conjunction w i t h article 56, "probably creates the only clear legal obligation on the Charter on members to promote respect for human rights." 49 Article 56 states that [a]ll members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation w i t h the organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in article 55.

Article 55 enumerates three purposes, including in paragraph (c) "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion" which the U N shall promote w i t h a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

It is interesting to observe that the text of what is now article 56 originally suggested a pledge "to take separate and joint action and to co-operate with the Organization." The San Francisco Conference thus envisaged a threefold pledge to take "separate action", "joint action" and "to co-operate with the organization." This clearly suggested "separate action" by members of the organization regardless of whether or not other members took any action. The USA found this formula unacceptable; other drafts were unacceptable to other delegations and, accordingly, the present text emerged. 50 From the drafting history one may deduce that no obligation to take action exists unless it is in co-operation w i t h the Organization. Goodrich , Hambro 49

Id., 42. The author supports this view by citing several General Assembly Resolutions. For example, i n 1952 the General Assembly adopted a resolution referring to the racial situation in South Africa which declared that governmental policies which were not directed at certain goals viz. equality before the law to all persons but which were "designed to perpetuate or increase discrimination, are inconsistent w i t h the pledges of the members under article 56 of the Charter." 50

See L. B. Sohn/T. Buergenthal (note 17), 512.

15 G Y I L 41

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and Simons p u t f o r w a r d the thesis that article 56 obliges members " t o refrain f r o m obstructionist tactics and co-operate i n good faith t o achieve the goals specified i n article 5 5 . " 5 1 A t any rate, it w o u l d seem that there is a d u t y t o co-operate particul a r l y i n the l i g h t of the extensive standard setting undertaken b y the O r g a n i z a t i o n i n the h u m a n rights field. T h e f i f t h reference t o h u m a n rights is contained i n article 62(2) w h i c h states that the E c o n o m i c and Social C o u n c i l " m a y make recommendations for the purposes of p r o m o t i n g respect for, and observance of, h u m a n rights and fundamental freedoms for all.* T h i s deals w i t h the competence of the E C O S O C i n h u m a n rights matters. U n d e r this a u t h o r i t y the C o u n c i l has made a very i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the h u m a n rights programme. T h u s , the U N h u m a n rights complaints procedures w h i c h have gradually evolved over a p e r i o d of years c u l m i n a t i n g i n the famous Reso l u t i o n 1503 ( X L V I I I ) 27 M a y 1970 owe their existence t o C o u n c i l initiatives. 5 2 Furt h e r m o r e , although article 62(1) w h i c h says that the C o u n c i l may make or initiate studies and reports w i t h respect to international economic, social, cultural, health and related matters and may make recommendations w i t h respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned

51

Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 3rd and revised ed., New York 1969, 381. 52 O n the U N procedures see particularly: T. J. M. Zuijdwijk y Petitioning the United Nations: A Study i n Human Rights, New York, 1982; /. P. Humphrey , The Right of Petition in the United Nations, HRJ, vol. 4, 1971, 463; F. Ermacora , Procedure to Deal w i t h Human Rights Violations: A Hopeful Start in the United Nations?, Revue des Droits de l'Homme (RDH), vol. 7,1974, 670; A. Cassese, The Admissibility of Communications to the United Nations on Human Rights Violations, R D H , vol. 5, 1972 - 3, 375; /. P. Humphrey , The United Nations Commission on Human Rights and its Parent Body, in: René Gassin , Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber I, Problèmes de Protection Internationale des Droits de l'Homme (note 25), 108; /. W. Bruegel , The Right to Petition an International Authority, I C L Q , vol. 2, 1953, 542;/. Carey , Progress on Human Rights at the United Nations, AJIL, vol. 66,1972,107; M. H Guggenheim , Key Provisions of the New United Nations Rules Dealing w i t h Human Rights Petitions, N Y U Jour, of Int. Law and Politics, vol. 6, 1973, 427; M. Prasad , The Role of NonGovernmental Organizations in the New United Nations Procedures for Human Rights Complaints, Denver Jour, of Int. Law and Policy, vol. 5, 1975, 441;/. Th. Moller , Petitioning the United Nations, Universal Human Rights, vol. 1 (no.4), 1979, 57; A. Cassese, The New United Nations Procedure for Handling Gross Violations of Human Rights, La Community Internazionale, vol. 30,1975,49; F. C. Newman , The New United Nations Procedures for Human Rights Complaints: Reform, Status Quo, or Chambers of Horror?, Annales de Droit, vol. 34, 1974, 129; P. Haver , The United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (ColJTransLaw), vol. 21, 1982, 103.

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does not mention human rights explicitly, this has not inhibited ECOSOC from conducting, either itself or through the Commission on Human Rights or through its Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, numerous studies and reports. Significant among these are the so-called thematic or country-oriented examinations of particular human rights issues, e.g., enforced and involuntary disappearances, mass exoduses, summary and arbitrary executions and torture, or in relation to the particular situation in a given county (the origins of which may be traced to the A d Hoc Working Group of Experts on the situation of human rights in Southern Africa established by the Commission in March 1967)53 and including the appointment of ad hoc working groups, special committees or individual special rapporteurs. 54 It must also be observed that articles 62(3) and (4) authorize the Council to prepare "draft conventions" for submission to the General Assembly in respect of matters falling within its competence and call "international conferences" on matters again falling within its competence. These powers have been utilized frequently by the Council in the human rights field. The sixth reference to human rights is contained in the key article 68 of the Charter. This declares that the ECOSOC shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its function.

This article owes its place in the Charter to the concerted efforts of the lobbyists at San Francisco. It was under the authority vested by this article that the Commission on Human Rights, the cornerstone of the U N human rights edifice, was established. The Human Rights Commission has borne the brunt of the drafting of the human rights legislative programme including, of course, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic Social and Cultural Rights and numerous other declarations and conventions in the human rights field. It is interesting to note that in 1951 the ECOSOC voted to abolish the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and the Sub-Commission on the Freedom of Information and the Press. 55 The reaction to the manoeuvre in the General Assembly was hostile and the

53

Resolution 2 (XXIII).

54

For a full discussion of these procedures see: M. Bossuyt , The Development of Special Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, HRLJ, vol. 6,1985,179 and M T. Kamminga , The Thematic Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, N I L R , vol. 34,1987,299. See also/. G. Merrills (note 17), 78 for an excellent account of these procedures. 55

15'

Res. 414 (ΧΠΙ).

228

P. R. Ghandhi

Council was forced to re-establish the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination, though the other Sub-Commission remained axed. The seventh and last explicit reference to human rights in the Charter is contained in article 76 where one of the basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance w i t h the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in article 1 of the Charter, is said to be (c) to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world.

There is, however, no similar provision making reference to human rights in the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories in article 73 under chapter XI. So far, we have mentioned only those articles of the Charter which contain a specific reference to human rights. However, any article which refers to the 'purposes' of the U N must by implication also refer to human rights. Furthermore, article 10 gives the General Assembly the authority to "discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter" — and this certainly includes all human rights questions. Thus, in the Russian Wives case, the General Assembly stated, in the preamble to the resolution calling on the USSR to withdraw measures contrary to the Charter, that Article 1(3) of the Charter binds all member states to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 56

Also, article 11(2) permits the General Assembly to "discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security." Finally, article 66(2) authorizes the Council to "perform services at the request of members of the United Nations." This provides the ECOSOC with the constitutional basis for the advisory services programme of the U N in the field of human rights: this consists, inter alia , of training fellowships, organization of seminars and provision of expert assistance to members, and is highly valued. 57 It is clear that the Charter stipulation on human rights suffered from two defects: first, there was no definition of human rights; and, secondly, there were no measures of implementation. Nevertheless, these lacunae were not considered fatal because they were intended to be rectified as soon as possible by the drafting of an in56 57

G A Res. 285, U N Doc. A/900, 34 (1949).

For further details of such programmes, see United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights, 1974. See also L. B. Sohn/T. Buergenthal (note 17), 545.

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ternational Bill of Rights. As President Truman declared in his closing address to the San Francisco Conference [u]nder this document [viz. the Charter] we have good reason to expect an international bill of rights acceptable to all nations involved. That bill of rights w i l l be as much a part of international life as our own Bill of Rights is part of our own Constitution. The Charter is dedicated to the achievement and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Unless we can attain those objectives for all men and women everywhere without regard to race, language or religion —- we can not have permanent peace and security i n the world. 5 8

Sohn sums up the importance of the Charter thus: "[t]he Charter of the United Nations presents a radical departure from previous approaches to the international protection of human rights." 59 The central question in relation to the human rights clauses of the Charter is whether states members of the U N by becoming parties to the Charter have undertaken any legal obligations in the matter of human rights. 60 Since 1946 the views of scholars on this issue have been divided. Professor Hudson took the view that "[t]he Charter is limited to setting out a programme of action for the Organization of the United Nations to pursue, in which the Members are pledged to co-operate." 61 Thus, the Charter did not in any way impose on the members of the U N a legal obligation to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. Similarly, Professor Kelsen held that "the Charter does not impose upon the Members a strict obligation to grant to their subjects the rights and freedoms mentioned in the Preamble or in the text of the Charter." 62 So too, Henkin characterizes the Charter provisions on human rights as lacking in "definiteness and definition" and containing only "hortatory phrases." 63 Moskovitz also argues that the Charter is not by itself a source of legal obligations in reference to human rights. 64 Despite these incantations of the Charter's failure to impose a duty in respect of human rights, other leading publicists took a very different view. Judge Jessup said that "[i]t 58

U N C I O Docs. 717 (1945).

59

See L. B. Sohn (note 32), 129.

60

Many commentaries have discussed this question. Among the most helpful are A. Petrenko , The Human Rights Provisions of the U N Charter, Manitoba Law Journal, vol. 9, 1978, 53; L. B. Sohn (note 32), 129; F. C. Newman , Interpreting the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter, HRJ, vol. 5, 1972, 283 and J. Robinson , Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Charter of the United Nations, New York 1946. See also, O. Schachter , The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provisions i n American Law, Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 4, 1951, 643. 61

Integrity of International Instruments, AJIL, vol. 42, 1948, 105, 107.

62

The Law of the United Nations, London 1950, 29.

63

The United Nations and Human Rights, International Organization, vol. 19, 1965, 504.

64

Human Rights and World Order - The Struggle for Human Rights, New York 1958,31.

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P. R. Ghandhi

is already the law, at least for Members of the United Nations, that respect for human dignity and fundamental human rights is obligatory. The duty is imposed by the Charter, a treaty to which they are parties." 65 Quincy Wright says that article 56 leads to the conclusion that there is a duty on states to effect protection of human rights in their own legislation and domestic forum. 66 Frank Newman agrees that "[bjecause of the U N Charter and its human rights clauses, every nation has obligations not to violate human rights." 67 Similarly, Sohn asserts that [t]hese provisions express clearly the obligations of all members and the powers of the organization i n the field of human rights. While the provisions are general, nevertheless they have the force of positive international law and create basic duties which all members must fulfil i n good faith. . . . The Charter is the cornerstone of international jus cogens, and its provisions prevail over all other international and domestic legislative acts. Should a state conclude a treaty or issue a legislative act or regulation which constitutes a gross violation of human rights, such a treaty or act would be clearly invalid as contrary to a basic and overriding norm of the Charter, and any tribunal, international or domestic, which might be asked to apply such a treaty, act or regulation, should refuse to do so. 68

The views of leading academics must of necessity also include those of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht .69 Lauterpacht admitted that the human rights clauses of the Charter exhibited considerable restraint but warned against drawing the easy and inaccurate conclusion that its provisions on the subject were a mere declaration of principle devoid of any element of legal obligation. He added that [a]ny such conclusion is no more than a facile generalisation. For the provisions of the Charter on the subject figure prominently in the statement of the Purposes of the United Nations. Members of the United Nations are under a legal obligation to act i n accordance w i t h these Purposes. It is their legal duty to respect and observe fundamental human rights and freedoms.

He points out that: (1) there is a mandatory obligation implied in the provision of article 55 that the U N : "shall promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms"; (2) the same could be said of article 13 whereby the General Assembly "shall make recommendations for the purpose of assisting in the realization of human rights and freedoms"; and (3) there is a distinct element of a legal duty in the undertaking expressed in article 56 in which "[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in article 55." Lauterpacht argues that 65

A Modern Law of Nations: A n Introduction, USA 1948, 91.

66

National Courts and Human Rights - The Fuji Case, AJIL, vol. 45, 1951, 62, 73.

67

Interpreting the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter (note 60), 283.

68

See L. B. Sohn (note 32), 131.

69

See Sir Hersch Lauterpacht (note 2), esp. chapter 9 passim.

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the cumulative legal result of all these pronouncements cannot be ignored. The legal character of these obligations of the Charter would remain even if the Charter were to contain no provisions of any kind for their implementation. For the Charter fails to provide for the enforcement of its other numerous obligations the legal character of which is undoubted.

Lauterpacht concludes that the legal nature of the obligations of the Charter in the matter of human rights are not decisively influenced by the fact that the Charter does not define the human rights and fundamental freedoms which the Members of the U N are bound to observe, although he admits that that circumstance may impair the juridical character of the obligations because of a lack of clarity and precision. In sum, the Charter provisions mark a revolutionary step towards the recognition of the individual as a subject of international law. The practice of the United Nations seems to confirm Professor Lauterpacht' s view. In the Russian Wives case, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the subject, in which it declared that Soviet measures preventing Russian wives from leaving the Soviet Union with their foreign husbands were "not in conformity w i t h the Charter." 70 Thus, the resolution relied on what it regarded as the binding obligations of the Charter in the matter of human rights, citing in particular the terms of article 1(3) and 55(c) of the Charter. State practice may also be cited in support of such a view. When the Iraqi government publicly executed fourteen individuals convicted of espionage in Iraq, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, on instructions from Secretary of State Rogers, wrote on 29 January 1969 to the President of the Security Council that [t]he Government of the United States recognizes the legal right of any government to bring to trial and administer justice to any of its citizens. However, the manner in which these executions and the trials that preceded them were conducted scarcely conforms to normally accepted standards of respect for human rights and human dignity or to the obligations i n this regard that the United Nations Charter imposes upon all members. . . . 7 1

A similar view about the legally binding nature of the human rights stipulations of the Charter may be found in the statement of the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in a written statement to Parliament that [t]he [ U K ] Government believe that articles 55 and 56 [of the United Nations Charter] impose on member Governments of the United Nations the positive obligation to pursue policies to promote human rights and to co-operate w i t h the United Nations organs and instruments to that end. 72

70

G A Res. 285, U N Doc. A/900, 34 (1949).

71

Cited by F. C. Newman (note 60), 285.

72

See BYIL, vol. 49, 1978, 367.

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P. R. Ghandhi

Whether the Charter expresses legal norms in its human rights clauses has also been the subject of review by the ICJ in its celebrated advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (SW Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276(1970)P The Court held 13 - 2 that the continued presence of South Africa i n Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory.

The advisory opinion and the Court's pronouncement on the human rights clauses of the Charter may only be properly understood in the light of the historical background to the case. In Resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 the General Assembly, being convinced that the administration of the Mandated Territory of S.W. Africa by South Africa had been conducted in a manner contrary to the Mandate, the Charter of the U N and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, had declared that South Africa has failed to fulfil its obligations i n respect of the administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the moral and material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of S.W. Africa and has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate.

The General Assembly then decided that the Mandate conferred on South Africa was therefore terminated and that South Africa had no other right to administer the Territory. It was alleged by South Africa that the General Assembly had acted ultra vires. The Court made three findings of fact: (1) that South Africa had materially breached its obligations; (2) that the supervisory powers of the Council of the League of Nations had passed to the General Assembly; and (3) that the General Assembly had validly terminated the mandate. The South African government, however, argued that, before the General Assembly could conclude that South Africa had failed to fulfil its obligation under the Mandate or the Court pronounce upon the validity of the General Assembly's action, a detailed investigation was required. The Court however, found that

73 1971 ICJ 16. There is a huge amount of literature analysing the Court's opinion. See especially: E. Schwelb , The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter, AJIL, vol. 66, 1972, 337. For further reading see: D. Acheson/C. B. Marshall , S.W. Africa Opinion of the ICJ: Applying Dr. Johnson's Advice, ColJTransLaw, vol. 11,1972,193; P. Brown , The 1971 ICJ Advisory Opinion on South West Africa (Namibia), VandJTransLaw, vol. 5, 1971, 213; C. /. R. Dugard , Namibia (South West Africa): The Court's Opinion, South Africa's Response, and Prospects for the Future, ColJTransLaw, vol. 11, 1972, 14; R. Higgins , The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which U N Resolutions are Binding under Article 25 of the Charter?, I C L Q , vol. 21, 1972, 270; O. /. Lissitzyn , International Law and the Advisory Opinion on Namibia, ColJTransLaw, vol. 11, 1972, 50; A. W. Rovine , The World Court Opinion on Namibia, ColJTransLaw, vol. 11, 1972, 203.

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no factual evidence is needed for the purpose of determining whether the policy of apartheid as applied by South Africa in Namibia is in conformity w i t h the international obligations assumed by South Africa under the Charter of the United Nations. In order to determine whether the laws and decrees applied by South Africa in Namibia, which are a matter of public record, constitute a violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the question of intent or governmental discretion is not relevant; nor is it necessary to investigate or determine the effects of those measures on the welfare of the inhabitants. 74 C r i t i c a l l y , i n relation t o the h u m a n rights clauses of the Charter the C o u r t held that [u]nder the Charter of the United Nations, the former Mandatory had pledged itself to observe and respect, in a territory having an international status, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race. To establish instead and enforce, distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter 75 as a w h o l e . F r o m this extract, i t emerges quite clearly that the C o u r t t o o k the v i e w that the Charter provisions o n h u m a n rights d i d indeed create b i n d i n g obligations. 7 6 T h i s is also the verdict of the late President Nagendra Singh of the I C J w h o declared that [i]n short, therefore, there is the clear authority of the Court behind the interpretation of the human rights clauses of the Charter as creating binding legal obligations which was so correctly emphasised by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht several [5*'c] years before the Court's pronouncement. I n addition, i t should be observed that the I C J has had the occasion t o refer t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of h u m a n rights o n a variety of occasions. I n the Case Concerning

United States Diplomatic

and Consular Staff in Teheran , USA v. Iran 78

the

C o u r t p r o n o u n c e d that [w]rongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical constraint i n conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible w i t h the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as w i t h the fundamental principles enunciated i n the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

74

Para. 129 of the judgment.

75

Para. 131 of the judgment.

76

The Security Council in Resolution 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971 (26 S.C.O.R, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1971, S/INF/27, 7) took note w i t h appreciation of the advisory opinion and expressed its agreement w i t h the Court's opinion. The General Assembly at its plenary meeting on 20 December 1971 adopted its Resolution 2871 (XXVII) i n which it noted w i t h satisfaction the advisory opinion of the ICJ. 77

Human Rights and the Future of Mankind, New Delhi 1981, 22.

78

1980 ICJ 42.

234

P. R. Ghandhi

In the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Case79 the ICJ recognised the rights of individuals in international law in categorical terms when it observed that [s]uch obligations [viz. in relation to human rights] derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law; others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.

Judge Riphagen in a dissenting opinion observed that: customary international law recognises — in particular since the second world war — respect for fundamental human freedoms as an interest of the international community. 8 0

Also, in the Interpretation of the Peace Treaties Case (Second Phase)? 1 Judge Read in his dissenting opinion expressed the importance of human rights thus: [t]he importance of the maintenance of human rights and fundamental freedoms is emphasised by their inclusion in the purposes of the United Nations as set forth in Article 1 of the Charter, and by the central position taken by the Human Rights Articles of the Treaties of Peace.

Apart from these views of the Court there is the unequivocal expression of the Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights of 27 March 1968 by international experts that "[t]he Charter of the U N , the constitutional document of the world community, creates binding obligations for members of the U N w i t h respect to human rights." 82 To that may be added the clear expression in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1975 in its principle V I I that "[i]n the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States w i l l act in conformity w i t h the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations . . Λ 8 3 O n the whole therefore, one may conclude legitimately that the Charter of the U N does impose binding obligations in the field of human rights on members of the UN. I V . The Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights The U.D.H.R. has been the bedrock of the efforts of the U N to legislate in the human rights field since 1948. The I L A reported in 1992 that "[t]he Universal Decla79

1970 ICJ 32.

80

1970 ICJ 338.

81

1950 ICJ 231.

82

Journal of the International Commission of Jurists (JIntCommJur), vol. 9. 1968, 95.

83

Text i n Blackstone's International Human Rights Documents (note 6), 186, 189.

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235

Years

r a t i o n remains the p r i m a r y source of global h u m a n rights standards, and its recognit i o n as a source of rights and law b y states t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d distinguishes it f r o m conventional obligations." 8 4 There is little d o u b t that the U . D . H . R . is one of the most talked about and w r i t t e n about h u m a n rights documents of o u r t i m e . 8 5 Perhaps the most t h r i l l i n g firsthand account is p r o v i d e d b y John Humphrey.

86

I t has

been the inspiration b e h i n d international, regional and domestic setting of h u m a n rights standards. Its importance is second o n l y t o that of the Charter. O u r purpose here is t o o u t l i n e its drafting h i s t o r y and t h e n assess its juridical status i n an attempt t o place it w i t h i n the overall f r a m e w o r k of the U N h u m a n rights efforts. A s has been explained previously a n u m b e r of smaller delegations at the San Francisco Conference, especially that f r o m Panama, pushed for a B i l l of Rights t o be inserted i n the Charter itself. Such an insertion, i n the constitutional d o c u m e n t

84

Cairo Conference 1992, Committee on the Enforcement of Human Rights Law, 446,

448. 85 The vast amount of literature includes: Sir Hersch Lauterpacht (note 2), chapter 17; Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, BYIL, vol. 25,1948, 354; R. Cassin, Looking Back at the Universal Declaration of 1948, Review of Contemporary Law, vol. 15, 1968, 13; /. P. Humphrey, The U N Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in: E. Luard (ed.), (note 22), 39; /. P. Humphrey , The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character, in: B. G. Ramcharan (ed.), The Hague, 1979, 21; /. L. Kunz, United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, AJIL, vol. 43, 1949, 316; N. Robinson, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its Origin, Significance, Application and Interpretation, Institute of Jewish Affairs, New Y o r k 1958; E. Schwelb, Human Rights and the International Community: The Roots and Growth of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 - 1963, Chicago 1964; A. Verdoodt, Naissance et Signification de la Declaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme, Louvain 1964; J.-B. Marie, Les Pactes Internationaux Relatifs aux Droits de l'Homme Confirment-ils l'Inspiration de la Déclaration Universelle?, R D H , vol. 3, 1970, 397; E. Schwelb , The Influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on International and National Law, ASIL Proc., 1959,217; P. Alston , The Universal Declaration at 35: Western and Passé or Alive and Universal, Rev. ICJ, vol. 31,1983,60; R. Gassin, La Declaration Universelle et la Mise en Oeuvre des Droits de l'Homme, Recueil des Cours (RdC), vol. 79, 1951, 237; A. Verdoodt , The Present Significance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, World Justice, vol. 7,1965,158; Β. V Bitker, Application of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights W i t h i n the United States, De Paul Law Review, vol. 31,1971,337; F. M. van Asbeck, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Its Predecessors, 1949, Studie-en Informatiecentrum Mensenrechten (No.9), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its Significance in 1988, Report of the Maastricht/Utrecht Workshop held from 8 -10 December 1988 on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration. Finally, for a recently published article by article analysis see A. Eide/G. Alfredsson/G. Melander/L. A. Rehoff/R. Rosas, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Oslo 1992. 86

See his account i n Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure, Transnational Publishers, New York 1984, and that i n N o Distant Millennium — The International Law of Human Rights, UNESCO, Paris 1989.

236

P. R. Ghandhi

of the world community, would have given such a Bill enormous authority. However, the vast majority of states represented at the San Francisco Conference were unwilling to go so far at one stroke; and anyway, it was envisaged that the Commission on Human Rights, once it was set up under article 68 of the Charter, would begin the process of drafting such a Bill. Thus, the Preparatory Commission of the U N 8 7 and its Executive Committee, 88 which met in autumn 1945, recommended that the work of the Human Rights Commission when it was set up should be devoted to an elaboration of an International Bill of Rights. The General Assembly in its first session,89 agreed w i t h the Executive Committee's recommendation. Its directive was then incorporated by the ECOSOC into the terms of reference of the Commission on Human Rights. 90 The Commission on Human Rights was set up, as envisaged, in 1946 and instructed immediately to begin preparations to draft an International Bill of Rights. Even at this stage the Panamanian delegation to the first session of the General Assembly attempted to have their draft adopted. However, the General Assembly saw no reason why ECOSOC's plans should be upset and referred the draft to the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission's first regular session began on 27 January 1947. The Commission's bureau consisting of its Chairman (Eleanor Roosevelt), the vice-chairman (P. C. Chang) and the rapporteur (Charles Malik) were entrusted w i t h the preparation of the first draft. The bureau met immediately and ordered the director of the Human Rights Division, John Humphrey , to prepare a preliminary draft. However, following an objection by the USSR that the drafting committee was unrepresentative, Eleanor Roosevelt expanded the committee to include Commission members representing Australia, Chile, China, USA, France, Lebanon, U K and USSR. O n 9 June 1947, John Humphrey presented his draft to the drafting committee. This became known as the Secretariat Outline even though it was actually a preliminary draft. 91 The story of how the first draft was produced makes fascinating reading. John Humphrey assisted by Emile Giraud produced the first draft, which consisted of 48 short articles, in a week at the Lido Beach Hotel. He had the inestimable benefit of a variety of texts to work from, including ones by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, H.G. Wells, the American Association for the United Nations, the American Jewish Congress, the World Government Association, the Institute of International Law and 87

Report of the Preparatory Commission of the U N (PC/20), Chap.HI, Section 4, paras. 15 - 16. 88

Executive Committee Report on Committees and Commissions of the Economic and Social Council (PC/EX/95), section B, para. 21, p. 18. 89

G A Res.7 (I) of 29 January 1946.

90

ECOSOC Res.5 (I) of 16 February 1946.

91

See Yearbook on Human Rights for 1947, United Nations Lake Success, 1949, 484.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Fifty Years

23 7

the American Law Institute upon which he relied most heavily. 92 The Commission and its drafting committee, (holding two long sessions) completed its work and submitted its draft via the ECOSOC to the General Assembly in time for its third session which opened in Paris on 21 September 1948. The General Assembly referred the draft to its Third Committee (on Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions) which spent 81 meetings on the text and the 168 formal amendments that had been proposed. Humphrey comments that, despite this exhaustive process, "the text which finally emerged was surprisingly like the one that had been prepared by the Commission on Human Rights." 93 Humphrey suggests that one reason for this was that the chairman of the Third Committee — Charles Malik — and a number of other influential representatives had worked on the draft in the Commission. After the text had been adopted finally by the Third Committee on 6 December the USSR sought to have all further discussion postponed to the following year. This move, which was rejected, was attempted again at the plenary session which (after adopting one amendment to article 2 proposed by the UK) proclaimed the Declaration on 10 December 1948 without any dissenting votes. 94 Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukraine, the USSR, Yugoslavia (the six Communist states then Members of the U N ) together with Saudi Arabia and South Africa abstained. The Communist bloc gave a variety of reasons for their abstention including the fact that the Declaration suffered from serious defects and omissions and was not pervaded by sufficiently revolutionary zeal. South Africa based its abstention on its view that since the Declaration (although not a treaty) would impose certain obligations on states member of the U N because it would probably be recognized as an authoritative definition of the rights stipulated in the Charter, member states that voted for it would be bound in exactly the same way as if they had signed a treaty to that effect. The Saudi Arabian abstention can probably be explained by the questionable interpretation that article 18 of the Declaration — which recognised the right of everyone to change his religion or belief — violated the rule in the Koran. The Universal Declaration was intended as the General Assembly proclaimed it as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping the Declaration constantly i n mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. 92

See /. P. Humphrey , Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure (note 86), 31. 93

The U N Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in: E. Luard (ed.), (note 22), 148. 94

Res. 217Α (ΙΠ ).

238

P. R. Ghandhi

T h e Preamble also recognises that the "inherent d i g n i t y and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the h u m a n f a m i l y is the f o u n d a t i o n of freedom, justice and peace i n the w o r l d " and the fundamental faith t h a t h u m a n rights must be protected b y "the rule of l a w " " i f m a n is n o t t o be compelled t o have recourse, as a last resort, t o rebellion against t y r a n n y and oppression." T h e Preamble also issues the reminder that Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation w i t h the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. T h e rights stipulated i n the Declaration are most comprehensive. McDougal

and

Bebr encapsulate the coverage of the U . D . H . R . thus: [t]hey include, among many items, not only provisions for equality of treatment w i t h respect to all rights and freedoms set forth i n the Declaration, 'without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property birth or other status', and the traditional rights such as freedom of and security of person, right to a fair trial, and freedom of thought, expression, opinion, religion, assembly, association and movement, but also certain more recently emerging political, economic, and social claims, such as those to nationality and freedom to change nationality, to asylum from persecution, to take part i n government and to have equal access to public service, to social security and choice of employment, and to education, leisure, participation i n cultural life, and an adequate standard of living. 9 5 M r s . Roosevelt hailed the U . D . H . R . as "first and foremost a declaration of the basic principles t o serve as a c o m m o n standard for all N a t i o n s . I t m i g h t w e l l become the Magna Carta of all m a n k i n d . . Λ 9 6 W i t h o u t d o u b t , the U . D . H . R . was an astonishing achievement: given the huge ideological differences between the C o m m u n i s t bloc and the so-called liberal Western democracies that emerged w i t h the onset of the C o l d W a r , and indeed, differences between Western nations themselves about the rights i n c l u d e d and their content, the drafting process of less t h a n t w o years is t r u l y remarkable. T h e h i s t o r y o f the U N W o r l d Conference o n H u m a n Rights 1993 and the ideological differences over the universality or 'culture specific' 9 7 nature of basic h u m a n rights w h i c h 95

Human Rights i n the United Nations, AJIL, vol. 58, 1964, 603, 614.

96

G.A.O.R., 3rd Session, Pt.I, 1948, 262.

97

For literature on the universality or cultural relativity of human rights see among other studies, A. D. Renteln , The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights, H R Q , vol. 7, 1985, 514; A. Pollis/P. Schwab (eds.), Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives, New York 1979; /. Donnelly , Human Rights and Human Dignity: A n Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights, American Political Science Review, vol. 76,1982,303;/. Donnelly , Cultural Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights, H R Q , vol. 6,1984,400; F. R. Téson , International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, VaJIL, vol. 25, 1985, 869; C. Tomuschat, Is Universality of Human Rights an Outdated Concept?, in: Das Europa der Zweiten Generation: Gedächtnisschrift für Christophe

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dogged that conference w o u l d u n d o u b t e d l y mean that such a 'universal' declaration w o u l d n o t be acceptable t o all nations t o d a y . 9 8 T h e reason w h y the Declaration was adopted so speedily may, paradoxically, be p u t d o w n t o the fact that most of the governments present at the Paris session of the General Assembly clearly believed t h e y were n o t adhering t o a d o c u m e n t imposing legally b i n d i n g norms. T h e General A s s e m b l y had already instructed the H u m a n Rights C o m m i s s i o n t o prepare a c o n v e n t i o n (or t w o Covenants as t h e y emerged later) covering the same rights: such an operation w o u l d have been completely otiose if i t had been intended that the terms of the U . D . H . R . should be legall y b i n d i n g . F u r t h e r m o r e , the o r t h o d o x t h e o r y , despite arguments t o the contrary, is t h a t generally speaking, resolutions o f the General Assembly are o n l y recomm e n d a t o r y and n o t l a w creating. 9 9 I n 1962 the C o m m i s s i o n o n H u m a n Rights Sassey vol. 2, Kehl, Strasbourg, 1981, 585. C. Tomuschat , Human Rights in a World-wide Framework: Some Current Issues, ZaöRV, vol? 45, 1985, 547; R. Bystricky , The Universality of Human Rights in a World of Conflicting Ideologies, in: A. Eide/A. Shou (eds.), (note 22), 83; F. Capotortiy H u m a n Rights — The Hard Road Towards Universality, in: R. St. J. MacDonald/D. Johnston (eds.), The Structure and Process of International Law, Dordrecht 1983, 977; R. Higgins , Human Rights: Some Questions of Integrity, Modern Law Review (MLR), vol. 52, 1989, 1. R. Higgins , Responding to Individual Needs: Human Rights, in: Problems and Process: International Law and H o w We Use It (note 13), 95; R. Donoho, Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search for Meaningful Standards, Stanford Law Journal, vol. 27, 1991, 345; N. Valticos , Universalité des Droits de l'Homme et Diversité des Conditions Nationales, in: René Cassin , Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber I, Problèmes de Protection Internationale des Droits de l'Homme (note 25), 383; M. wa Mutua , The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: A n Evaluation of the Language of Duties, VaJIL, vol. 35,1995,339; F. S. Nariman , The Universality of Human Rights, Rev. ICJ, vol. 50, 1993, 8; C. F. Murphy , Objections to Western Conceptions of Human Rights, Hofstra Law Review, vol. 9,1981,433; A. Pollis , Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism, H R Q , vol. 18, 1996, 316; F. Jhabvala , The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a Vehicle for the Global Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, IsYHumRts, vol. 15, 1995,184; D. Warner (ed.), Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: The Quest for Universality, The Hague 1997; M. J. Perry , Are Human Rights Universal? The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, H R Q , vol. 19, 1997, 461; A. E. Mayer , Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash w i t h a Construct, MichJIL, vol. 15,1994, 307 and D. A. Bell , The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflections on an East-West Dialogue, H R Q , vol. 18, 1996, 641. 98

For the text of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, see Blackstone's International Human Rights Documents (note 6), 331. For a frank appraisal of the Conference, see S. Marks (note 4), 54. See also P. Alston , The U N ' s Human Rights Record: From San Francisco To Vienna and Beyond, H R Q , vol. 16, 1994, 375. 99 O n the vexed question of whether declarations of the General Assembly are constitutive or declaratory only see: R. Higgins , The United Nations and Law-making: The Political Organs, ASIL Proc., 1970,37. R. Higgins , The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations, Oxford 1963; R. Y. Jennings , Recent Developments in the International Law Commission: Its Relation to the Sources of International Law, I C L Q ,

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sought an o p i n i o n as t o the meaning of the t e r m "declaration" i n U N practice. T h e U N Office of Legal Affairs replied [i]n United Nations practice, a 'declaration' is a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated, such as the Declaration on Human R i g h t s . . . . A 'declaration*... is adopted by a resolution of a United Nations organ. As such it cannot be made binding upon member States, in the sense that a treaty or convention is binding upon the parties to it, purely by the device of terming it a 'declaration'. . . . However, i n view of the greater solemnity and significance of a declaration, it may be considered to impart, on behalf of the organ adopting it, a strong expectation that Members of the international community w i l l abide by it. Consequently, insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon States.100 A c c o r d i n g l y , some delegations insisted o n the n o n - b i n d i n g character o f the U . D . H . R . T h u s , M r s . Roosevelt speaking o n behalf of the U S A , said that the U.D.H.R. is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles of human rights and freedoms to serve as a common standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations. 101 H o w e v e r , other representatives d i d take different v i e w s . 1 0 2 T h u s , Hernan Santa Cruz of C h i l e said that: " v i o l a t i o n b y any state of the rights enumerated i n the Declarat i o n w o u l d mean v i o l a t i o n of the principles of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . " René Cassin of France said that the U . D . H . R . " c o u l d be considered as an authoritative interpreta-

vol. 13, 1964, 385; I. Detter , Law Making by International Organizations, Stockholm 1965; S. A. Bleicher , The Legal Significance of Re-citation of General Assembly Resolutions, AJIL, vol. 63,1961,444;/. Castaneda , Legal Effects of United Nations Declarations, New York, 1969; R. A. Falk , O n the Quasi-Legislative Status of Resolutions of the General Assembly, AJIL, vol. 60, 1966, 782; H. Guradze , Are Human Rights Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly Law-Making?, HRJ, vol. 4, 1971, 453; O. Asamoah, The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations, The Hague 1966; K. Skuhis· zewski , Enactment of Law by International Organizations, BYIL, vol. 41,1965 - 66, 198; F. B. Sloan, The Binding Force of a "Recommendation" of the General Assembly of the United Nations, BYIL, vol. 25,1948,1; N. Onuf, Professor Falk on the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, AJIL, vol. 64, 1970, 349; G. R. Lande, The Effect of Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, World Politics, vol. 19, 1966, 83. G. R. Lande, The Changing Effectiveness of General Assembly Resolutions, ASIL Proc., 1964, 162; D. Johnson, The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, BYIL, vol. 32,1955 - 56, 97; F. B. Sloan, General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years After), BYIL, vol. 58, 1987, 39. F. Β Sloan, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions i n Our Changing World, New York 1991. 100

U N DOC.E/CN.4/L.610, 1962.

101

Dept. State Bull., vol. 19, 1948, 751.

102

For the statement of other delegates see The United Nations and Human Rights, Eighteenth Report of the Commission to Study the Organization for Peace, New York 1968.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Fifty

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241

t i o n of the C h a r t e r " ; he also suggested that the principles enunciated i n the Declarat i o n m i g h t be considered t o be "general principles of l a w recognized b y civilized nat i o n s . " 1 0 3 Professor Dehousse of Belgium also ascribed t o the U . D . H . R . an "undeniab l y legal character." P. C. Chang of C h i n a i n the T h i r d C o m m i t t e e stated that the Charter c o m m i t t e d member states t o the observance of h u m a n rights and that the Declaration "stated those rights e x p l i c i t l y . " Clearly, at the t i m e of its adoption, there was some disagreement about its precise status, t h o u g h the m a j o r i t y of representatives were against conferring legal effect o n it. Perhaps, Professor Sohn most accurately summarizes its status i n 1948 w h e n he says [t]here seems to be an agreement that the Declaration is a statement of general principles spelling out i n considerable detail the meaning of the phrase 'human rights and fundamental freedoms' in the Charter of the U N . As the Declaration was adopted unanimously, without a dissenting vote, it can be considered as an authoritative interpretation of the Charter of the highest order. While the Declaration is not directly binding on U N members, it strengthens their obligations under the Charter by making them more precise. 104 Irrespective of the precise status of the Declaration i n 1948, the question is w h e t h e r i n the light of the extraordinary impact i t has had b o t h w i t h i n and outside the U N , i n its application b o t h i n domestic 1 0 5 and international legal fora, i n its constant citat i o n and re-citation, i n its i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n treaties i n the constitutions o f i n d i v i d u a l states 1 0 6 and domestic legislation and regulations, i t can n o w be held t o have the 103

See article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the ICJ.

104

A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights, i n C. M. Eichelberger (ed.), The United Nations and Human Rights, Eighteenth Report of the Commission to Study the Organization for Peace, New York 1968. This was also the view of Sir Humphrey Waldock who said that the Declaration could be referred to "for indications of the content of the human rights envisaged in the Charter": see RdC, vol. 106,1962,199. Similarly, General Assembly Resolution 285 (HI) adopted on 25 A p r i l 1949 in the famous Russian Wives case cited article 13 — the right of everyone to leave any country including his own — and article 16 — the right to marry without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion — and stated that "measures which prevent or coerce the wives of citizens of other nationalities from leaving their country of origin w i t h their husbands or to join them abroad are not i n conformity w i t h the Charter." Although the Resolution does not refer specifically to the juridical character of the Declaration, it states expressly that the measures adopted by the USSR were a breach of the Charter stipulations on human rights; accordingly, it would seem that the Resolution was deploying the U.D.H.R. as an authoritative interpretation of the Charter. So too, i n the S. W Africa Cases, Second Phase, Judge Tanaka commented that the U.D.H.R. interpreted and applied the human rights clauses of the Charter. See 1966 ICJ 6, 293. 105 Many of the instances are catalogued in the I L A Cairo Conference Report, 1992, Committee on the Enforcement of Human Rights Law Report. Included of course, is the famous decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala which held that the prohibition of torture has become part of customary international law, as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d. Cir. 1980). 106

A t the international conference on Human Rights in Teheran in 1968 the SecretaryGeneral of the U N , U. Thant was able to say that there were then no fewer than 43 consti-

1

G Y I L 41

242

P. R. Ghandhi

force of l a w either b y v i r t u e of having passed i n t o customary international l a w or because its contents represent "general principles o f l a w . " 1 0 7 T h e Declaration has had an enormous impact o n w o r l d p u b l i c o p i n i o n . Some say i t represents the greatest achievement of the U N . I t is n o t intended, i n the context of this article, t o give an elaborate account of its impact because this w o u l d necessitate a very extended evaluation of the evidence i n favour of the p r o p o s i t i o n that its terms have passed i n t o customary international law; it w i l l be sufficient t o outline the m a i n strands i n its development and m e n t i o n briefly the views of academics. 108 T h e General Assembly and o t h e r U N organs and specialized agencies, such as U N E S C O and I L O , have i n v o k e d its principles o n countless occasions i n condemn a t i o n of countries that have failed t o observe their h u m a n rights obligations under the Charter, such as i n c o n d e m n i n g South A f r i c a d u r i n g the apartheid era 1 0 9 o r used it as a yardstick t o be guided b y i n t h e i r legislative w o r k . T h e Assembly and the agencies have adopted a m u l t i t u d e of other conventions, declarations or recommendations w h i c h have been influenced heavily b y the U . D . H . R . I n 1960, the General tutions which had been adopted recently which were clearly inspired by the U.D.H.R. and that examples of legislation expressly mentioning the Declaration could be found on all continents. 107

As suggested by the French delegation at the 1948 session of the Assembly. If this is so, and there seems little doubt that it is, it would be because they are recognized i n the independent legal systems of civilized nations and not because of the quality of the Declaration. 108

For a detailed analysis of the impact of the U.D.H.R. see: E. Schwell· , The Influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on International and National Law, ASIL Proc., 1959, 217 who comes to the conclusion that the provisions of the U.D.H.R. belong to a "twilight zone which is not yet law but in which social and moral considerations are especially persuasive." See also: /. P. Humphrey , The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character, in: B. G. Ramcharan (ed.), (note 26), 21; P. Alston , The Universal Declaration at 35: Western and Passé or Alive and Universal?, RevICJ, vol. 31,1983, 60. See further I L A Buenos Aires Conference, 1994, Committee for Enforcement of Human Rights Law. 109 Examples include SC Res. S/5471 of 4 December 1963 wherein the Council condemned apartheid as being in violation of the obligations assumed by South Africa as a Member of the U N and the provisions of the Universal Declaration and G A Res. 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 whereby the Assembly terminated the mandate of South Africa over S.W. Africa on the ground that the mandate had been conducted contrary to the Charter and the U.D.H.R. Both these resolutions lend further credence to the theory that the Declaration may be considered at least as an authoritative interpretation of the Charter. See also SC Res. 310 of 4 February 1972 in which it condemned "the recent repressive measures against African labourers in Namibia" and called upon the government of South Africa "to end immediately those repressive measures and to abolish any system of labour which may be in conflict w i t h basic provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." See the comment by E. Schwell·, A n Instance of Enforcing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights — Action by the Security Council, I C L Q , vol. 22, 1973, 161 in which he argues that the Council treated the particular provisions of the U.D.H.R. as creating legal obligations.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Fifty Years

243

Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People, 110 in article 7 of which it is stated that "[a]ll states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of . . . the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . Λ A l l the countries, except South Africa, that abstained in 1948 voted for article 7. In 1963, the Assembly adopted unanimously, with the exception of South Africa, its Declaration on the Elimination of A l l Forms of Racial Discrimination 1 1 1 in article 11 of which it is declared that "[e]very State . . . shall fully and faithfully observe the provisions o f . . . the Universal Declaration of Human Rights »

Several regional human rights Conventions, part at least of the inspiration of which may be traced back to the U.D.H.R., have been adopted. Most well-known, of course, is the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 which mentions the influence of the Declaration in the first paragraph of the Preamble. The American Convention on Human Rights 1969 mentions the U.D.H.R. in the third (and fourth) paragraphs of its Preamble. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 1981 refers to the U.D.H.R. in its Preamble and in its operative article 60 enjoins the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights "to draw inspiration from . . . the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Domestic human rights charters, such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms also make reference to the Declaration. 112 Furthermore, the U.D.H.R. gave birth to the I.C.C.P.R. itself. A unique example of the Declaration finding its terms incorporated into an international treaty is that of the Special Statute annexed to the Memorandum of Understanding regarding Trieste of 5 October 1954 whereby the Italian and Yugoslav (now Slovenian) authorities are obliged to act in accordance w i t h the principles enunciated by the U.D.H.R. in their administration of their respective areas. 113 Before the views of academics, commentators and international judges on the subject of whether or not the U.D.H.R. is now part of customary international law can be explored, the nature of custom in international law must be examined briefly. There is no consensus on what precisely constitutes custom in international law. 1 1 4 In essence, however, custom requires state practice or usage which is accepted as law. The Statute of the International Court declares in its article 38(1) (b) that 110

G A Res. 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

111

G A Res. 1904 (XVm) of 20 November 1963.

112

See M. Cohen/A. F. Bayefsky, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Public International Law, Canadian Bar Review, vol. 61, 1983, 265. 113 114

£. Schwelb, The Trieste Settlement and Human Rights, AJIL, vol. 49, 1955, 240.

For the particular problems of customary international law in relation to human rights, see: I. R. Gunning , Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of Human Rights, VaJIL, vol. 31, 1991, 211. See generally, T. Meron , Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary International Law, Oxford 1989.

1

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P. R. Ghandhi

"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law," is to be applied by the ICJ as one of the formal sources of law. Thus, this would appear to be the orthodox position. 115 Article 38 is considered to be an authoritative determination of the sources of international law. The critical issue is, of course, what constitutes state practice? There is here, if anything, even wider disagreement among the commentators. Professor D'Amato has advocated an extremely restricted view of what type of act can constitute state practice. He maintains that only physical acts count. Thus, he says "[cjlaims . . . , although they may articulate a legal norm, cannot constitute the material component of custom." 116 Dr. Thirlway, less restrictively than D'Amato y suggests that the mere assertion in abstracto of the existence of a legal rule does not amount to state practice: there must be some specific concrete dispute or disagreement in the context of which the statement is made. 117 However, even this does not seem to take into account adequately the fact that, in modern international law, particularly w i t h the burgeoning growth of international institutions, states have far more opportunity to express their views about the existence of customary international law by other means such as in resolutions passed by the representatives of states at meetings of international organizations. Thus, Kunz takes the view that the practice of international organizations may be taken as evidence of the crystallization of a rule of customary international law. 1 1 8 Professor Higgins says that with "the development of international organizations, the votes and views of states have come to have legal significance as evidence of customary law." 1 1 9 Akehurst agrees [i]t is impossible to study modern international law without taking account of declaratory resolutions and other statements made by States in abstracto concerning the content of international law. 1 2 0

There seems no good reason why international conference resolutions should not be held to amount to be proof or evidence of state practice. However, some authors go further and suggest that collective acts of international institutions such as resolutions may themselves be evidence of the creation of customary international law. 1 2 1 115

See also the views of the ICJ in the Continental Shelf cases, 1969 ICJ 3.

116

The Concept of Custom in International Law, Ithaca 1971, 88.

117

International Customary Law and Codification, Leiden 1972,58 where he says: . . the occasion of an act of state practice contributing to the formation of custom must always be some specific dispute or potential dispute." 118

The Nature of Customary Law, AJIL, vol. 47, 1953, 662.

119

The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations (note 99), 2. 120

Custom as a Source of International Law, BYIL, vol. 47, 1975, 1, 7.

121

For instance, see R. A. Falk , The Status of Law in International Society, Princeton 1970,

154.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Fifty Years

245

Finally, on this point, it must be noted that Professor Brownlie includes among the items that may be called in evidence of international custom the following: diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions of official legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions, e.g. manuals of military law, executive decisions and practices, orders to naval forces, etc., comments by governments on drafts produced by the International Law Commission, state legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals i n treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organizations, and resolutions relating to legal questions i n the United Nations General Assembly. 122

Here, one other factor (among several other relevant ones such as uniformity and consistency, generality of practice and the requirements of opinio juris) m must be considered in relation to custom: that is the time element or duration. Clearly, this used to be a very important factor. It is sometimes claimed that immemorial usage is required. 124 The view of more modern writers is that the time element is much less important than the number of states taking part in the practice or the number of acts of which the practice is composed. 125 Bin Cheng has even suggested that in certain cases customary international law may be generated almost instantly. 126 In any event, the point is not critical in relation to the U.D.H.R. since almost 50 years of practice must be considered to be substantial by all accounts. Professor Lauterpacht, writing in 1950, shortly after the adoption of the Declaration commented thus [t]he language of the Universal Declaration, the circumstances and the reasons of its adoption, and, above all, the clearly and emphatically expressed intention of the States, Members of the United Nations, who voted for the Resolution of the General Assembly, show clearly that the Declaration is not b^ its nature and by the intention of its parties a legal document imposing legal obligations.

Lauterpacht then argues that it is unlikely that any tribunal or other authority administering international law would accept the suggestion that the U.D.H.R. was an authoritative interpretation of the Charter declaring that 122

Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed., Oxford 1990, 5.

123

See generally: C. Parry , The Sources and Evidences of International Law, Manchester 1965; for textbook treatment see I. Brownlie , Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed., Oxford 1990; see also O. Elias, The Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary International Law, I C L Q , vol. 44, 1995, 501; see further K. Wolfke , Custom in Present International Law, 2nd ed., Dordrecht 1993. 124 For example, in his dissenting opinion on the European Commission of the Danube case, Judge Negulesco said that custom required immemorial usage: 1927 PCIJ (ser. B), No. 14, 105. 125

See M. Akehurst (note 120), 17.

126

United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary Law, IJIL, vol. 5, 1965, 23. 127

Sir Hersch Lauterpacht (note 2), 408.

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P. R. Ghandhi

[t]o maintain that a document contains an authoritative interpretation of a legally binding instrument is to assert that that former document itself is as legally binding and as important as the instrument which it is supposed to interpret. 128 Q u i t e r i g h t l y , he also rejects the possibility of deriving legal status for the Declarat i o n o n the basis that i t is a resolution of the General Assembly. [I]t is idle to attempt to kindle sparks of legal vitality in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by regarding it as a recommendation of the General Assembly and by enquiring into its legal effects as such. F i n a l l y , he even doubted its m o r a l a u t h o r i t y asserting that [t]he moral authority and influence of an international pronouncement of this nature must be i n direct proportion to the degree of sacrifice of the sovereignty of States which it involves. . . . The Declaration does not purport to imply a n j sacrifice of the sovereignty of the State on the altar of the inalienable rights of m a n . . . , 1 9 T w o factors need t o be borne i n m i n d w h e n w e i g h i n g up Professor Lauterpacht's criticisms: first, he was w r i t i n g before the development t o convert the Declaration i n t o b i n d i n g l a w had really begun; and secondly, his i n t e n t i o n was t o berate the doc u m e n t i n the belief that this m i g h t encourage the U N t o adopt a d o c u m e n t w i t h measures o f i m p l e m e n t a t i o n w i t h greater alacrity. 1 3 0 O t h e r jurists are m o r e generous i n their appreciation of the Declaration. T h u s , Sir Humphrey

Waldock has spoken that " [ t h e ] constant and widespread recognition

of the principles of the Universal Declaration clothes i t , . . . , i n the character of cust o m a r y [international] l a w . " 1 3 1 Professor Sohn agrees. Today the Declaration not only constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the Charter obligations but also a binding instrument in its own right, representing the consensus of the international community on the human rights which each of its members must respect, promote and observe. 132 W r i t i n g i n 1979, John Humphrey

(one of the greatest original h u m a n rights protago-

nists of the U N ) declared that [i]f the Declaration is now part of the law of nations and therefore binding on all states whether they voted for it or not, this is not because it was adopted by the Assembly, important as that may have been, but for other reasons including subsequent events and the emergence of a juridical consensus evidenced by the practice of states that the Declaration 128

Id., 408.

129

Id., 419.

130

"Somewhat paradoxically, the realisation of the ineffectiveness of the Declaration per se must tend to quicken the pace of less nominal measures for the protection of human rights" (note 2), 425. 131 Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the Significance of the European Convention, I C L Q , Supp.Pub. No. 11, 1965, 1, 15. 132

(Note 32), 133.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Fifty

Years

247

is now, whatever the intention of its authors may have been in 1948, binding as part of the law of nations. 133 O t h e r p r o m i n e n t judicial figures have made similar pronouncements. T h u s i n the Advisory

Opinion

in Namibia, 134

on the Legal Consequences of the Continued

Judge Ammoun

Presence of South Africa

said that the principles enshrined i n the Declaration

c o u l d be considered b i n d i n g because " t h e y have acquired the force of custom t h r o u g h a general practice accepted as l a w . " I n the SWAfrica 1966 ns

Cases (Second Phase),

Judge Tanaka i n his dissenting o p i n i o n expressed the v i e w that

. . . the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly i n 1948, although not binding i n itself, constitutes evidence of the interpretation and application of the relevant Charter provisions. 136 M r . Justice Lallah (of Mauritius) a former member of the H u m a n Rights C o m m i t t e e has declared that the U . D . H . R . "is universally regarded as expounding generally accepted n o r m s . " 1 3 7 Similarly, M r . Justice Haleem has added that . . . the Universal Declaration is now widely acclaimed as a Magna Carta of humankind, to be complied w i t h by all actors in the world arena. What began as a mere common aspiration is now hailed both as an authoritative interpretation of the human rights provisions of the U N Charter and as established customary law, having the attributes of jus cogens and constituting the heart of a global bill of rights. 138 Interestingly, the A m e r i c a n L a w Institute's Restatement (Third)

of Foreign

Relations

Law of the United States provides [a] State violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.

133 I n The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: its History, Impact and Juridical Character, in: B. G. Ramcharan (ed.), (note 26), 33. 134

1971 ICJ 16.

135

1966 ICJ 6.

136

A t 293.

137

Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence: The Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms, Judicial Colloquium i n Bangalore, 24 - 26 February 1988, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1988, 7. See also M. Kirby , Implementing the Bangalore Principles on Human Rights Law, Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 58, 1989, 206. 138

O n the subject of human rights and jus cogens see, for example, F. Domb, Jus Cogens and Human Rights, IYHumRts, vol. 6, 1976, 104.

248

P. R. Ghandhi

T h e proscriptions against slavery, arbitrary deprivation of life, t o r t u r e , arbitrary det e n t i o n and racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n are included e x p l i c i t l y i n the U . D . H . R . and those against genocide and gross violations c o u l d be said t o be i m p l i c i t i n the document. Some further aspects of state practice m a y also be taken i n evidence. F o r example, F i n l a n d has stated i n the U N that Members of the U N have pledged themselves t o p r o m o t e the e n j o y m e n t of h u m a n rights and fundamental freedoms and that: [t]hese rights and freedoms are defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which i n the view of the Government of Finland, can be considered to constitute an obligation for the members of the international community. This is so, because it is generally agreed upon that customary international law can come into being only if a great majority of States hold a common view to this effect. The existence of such a view in regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has already been amply evidenced. 139 I n its m e m o r i a l t o the I C J i n the Case Concerning

United States Diplomatic

and Con-

sular Staff in Teheran , the U S A pleaded that [t]he existence of . . . fundamental rights for all human beings, nationals and aliens alike, and the existence of a corresponding duty on the part of every State to respect and observe them, are now reflected, inter alia , in . . . the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 140

T h e Canadian government has declared that . . . the obligation on states to observe the human rights and fundamental freedoms enunciated in the Universal Declaration derives from their adherence to the Charter of the United Nations. 1 4 1 As far as the U K is concerned, Foreign P o l i c y D o c u m e n t N o . 2 1 5 Human

Rights in

Foreign Policy issued b y the Foreign and C o m m o n w e a l t h Office i n January 1991, m e n t i o n s the U . D . H . R . and continues: Four decades after its proclamation, the Declaration is widely accepted as a gauge by which Governments can measure their progress in the protection of human rights. Although it is not i n itself legally binding, much of its content can now be said to form part of customary international law. It is quoted in many international legal instruments, including the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Constitution of the O.A.U. It is also referred to in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation i n Europe and it has inspired many national •

•

142

constitutions.

139

Statement by Finland in the Third Committee of the U N General Assembly on 13 November 1980, summarized at 35 U N G.A.O.R. C.3 (57th meeting) 4, U N Doc. A/C.3/35/SR.57 (1980). 140

1980 ICJ 71.

141

Letter from the Legal Bureau, 9 January 1979, reproduced in Canadian Practice in International Law, CanYIL, vol. 18, 1980, 302, 326. 142

BYIL, vol. 62, 1991, 592.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Fifty

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249

F i n a l l y , the field of international relations and conference resolutions m a y offer further guidance o n state practice. T h e Intergovernmental Proclamation of Teheran of 13 M a y 1968, w h i c h concluded an international intergovernmental conference at w h i c h 84 governments were represented, proclaims i n its paragraph 2 that [t]he Universal Declaration of Human rights states a common understanding of the peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human family and constitutes an obligation for the members of the international community. 1 4 3 A t the same venue the Secretary-General of the U N p r o n o u n c e d that the Declaration not only constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the Charter obligations but also a binding instrument in its own right, representing the consensus of the international community on the human rights which each of its members must respect, promote and observe. 144 T h e V i e n n a Declaration and Programme of A c t i o n of the W o r l d Conference o n H u m a n Rights 1993 uses the w o r d " d u t y - b o u n d " i n relation t o the U . D . H . R . i n its paragraph 33. 1 4 5 T h e M o n t r e a l Statement of the A s s e m b l y for H u m a n Rights of 27 M a r c h 1968 (albeit unofficial) expressed the general consensus of international experts that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the Charter of the highest order, and has over the years become a part of customary international law. 1 4 6 Lastly, further evidence of the obligatory character of the U D H R m a y be located i n the F i n a l A c t of the H e l s i n k i Conference o n Security and Co-operation i n Europe, 1975 (the so-called H e l s i n k i Accord). I n its Principle no. V I I i n its final paragraph i t states that [i]n the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States w i l l act i n conformity w i t h the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and w i t h the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They w i l l also fulfil their obligations as set forth i n the international declarations and agreements i n this field . . . , by which they may be bound. 1 4 7 T h e conclusion must be, o n a review of the evidence as a w h o l e that [t]hose who urge acceptance of the Declaration in toto as customary law are i n a clear minority, and there is insufficient state practice to support such a wide-ranging proposition at present. Unless one wishes to interpret the proposed customary international law norm as merely expressing general agreement w i t h the desirability of the principles i n the Declaration, it would appear difficult to make the case that states recognize an international 143

Text i n Blackstone's International Human Rights Documents (note 6), 329.

144

U N Doc. A / 7 2 0 / A d d . l (1968), 13.

145

Blackstone's International Human Rights Documents (note 6), 331, 338.

146

JIntCommJur, vol. 9, 1968, 94, 95.

147

Text i n Blackstone's International Human Rights Documents (note 6), 186.

250

P. R. Gandi

legal obligation to guarantee, e.g., periodic holidays w i t h pay, full equality of rights upon dissolution of a marriage, or protection against unemployment. However, there would seem to be little argument that many provisions of the Declaration today do reflect customary international law. T e w claim that any state that violates any provision of the Declaration has violated international law. Almost all would agree that some violations of the Declaration are violations of international law'. Almost no state has specifically rejected the principles proclaimed i n the Universal Declaration, and it constitutes a fundamental part of what has become known as the Universal Bill of Rights. 148

This has several effects: first, those provisions that are held to be part of customary international law w i l l be binding on all states that have failed as yet to sign and ratify the I.C.C.P.R.; secondly, in the unlikely event of any state being expelled from the U N , the same provisions of the U.D.H.R. would remain binding on it; 1 4 9 thirdly, in those states in which customary international law is automatically a part of its own domestic law, those principles of the U.D.H.R. accepted as customary international law could be pleaded for and applied by its own domestic courts. 150

148

I L A Buenos Aires Conference, 1994, Committee for Enforcement of Human Rights Law, 525, 544. 149

Article 6 of the Charter reads: "[a] Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." 150 O n the domestic applicability of human rights norms see generally: B. Schlüter , The Domestic Status of the Human Rights Clauses of the United Nations Charter, California Law Review, vol. 61, 1973, 110; L. Henkln , Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol.116,1968,1012; L. A. Stagno , The Application of International Human Rights Arguments in United States Courts: Customary International Law Incorporated into American Domestic Law, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, vol. 8,1982,207; R. B. Lillich , The Enforcement of International Human Rights Norms i n Domestic Courts, in: J. C. Tuttle (ed.), (note 22), 105. R. B. Lillich , Invoking International Human Rights i n Domestic Courts, University of Cincinatti Law Review, vol. 54, 1985, 367. R. B. Lillich , Role of Domestic Courts in Promoting International Human Rights Norms, New York Law School Law Review, vol. 24,1978,153. R. B. Lillich , The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law, ASIL Proc., 1980, 20; C. H. Schreuer , The Impact of International Institutions on the Protection of Human Rights i n Domestic Courts, IsYHumRts, vol. 4,1974,60; M. Bossuyt , The Direct Applicability of International Instruments on Human Rights (with special reference to Belgian and US Law), Topical Law, vol. 5, 1981, 1; T. Opsahl, Human Rights Today: International Obligations and National Implementation, Scandinavian Studies i n Law, vol. 23, 1979, 149; F. Jhabvala , Domestic Implementation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, N I L R , vol. 32, 1985, 461; A. Brudner , The Domestic Enforcement of International Covenants on Human Rights: A Theoretical Framework, University of Toronto Law Journal, vol. 35,1985, 219; O. Schachter , The Obligation of Parties to Give Effect to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, AJIL, vol. 73, 1979, 462.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Fifty Years

251

V . Conclusion This is not the occasion to be grudging in one's praise for the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. After the Charter, it is the next best known contribution in the legislative work of the U N in the human rights field. O n all six continents of the world it is looked up to as the basic yardstick of the existence of fundamental human rights. It is an inspiration for all those oppressed peoples of the world, struggling to find some dignity to their everyday lives. It is the foundation of and an essential component of the international bill of rights. It has given birth to a spectacular number of specialist human rights treaties on a worldwide scale. It has indeed become a Magna Carta for the whole world that Mrs. Roosevelt prophesied it might, so many years ago. The modern crusade for human rights began at San Francisco in 1945 but the torch of universal human rights was lit on the night of 10 December 1948. It is the duty of international human rights lawyers to see that it is never extinguished. The author is certain in his own mind that the flame of the Universal Declaration w i l l burn brightly into the next millennium. In sum, it is still the most significant document for the lawful rights of mankind.

Quelques considérations sur l'appréciation et l'interprétation de l'arrêt de la Cour Internationale de Justice, rendu dans l'affaire Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Par Péter Kovâcs*

I. Introduction La société hongroise est consciente du fait que les Nations Unies disposent d'un tribunal international dont le siège est à La Haye et qui (sous certaines conditions) est habilité à rendre des arrêts dans des litiges interétatiques. Je tiens à souligner le poids relatif de cette phrase introductive car vraisemblablement le résultat d'une enquête portant sur l'existence, le siège ou les compétences de cet organe aurait été proche de zéro, si on l'avait organisée il y a quelques années. Certes, il est facile de dire que l'Etat paie cher pour un élargissement des connaissances en droit international de ses citoyens. En ce qui me concerne, j'estime qu'on ne peut pas surestimer l'importance du fait que les gens de la rue (les Kovâcs ou les Szabo, les Dupont et Durand hongrois) réfléchissent sur une question de droit international, qu'ils sentent qu'il y a un certain ordre juridique différent et supérieur à l'ordre national. Bref, ils se sont rendu compte de l'existence du droit international. Bien entendu, il est évident que les points de repère du droit international sur le différend concernant Gabcikovo-Nagymaros sont trop abstraits et trop compliqués pour que le citoyen puisse prendre une décision pour ou contre. Le même constat vaut pour la problématique complexe composée de la protection de l'environnement, de l'utilisation des eaux, des effets des grands chantiers sur la nature et la pêche et surtout de la probabilité de ces facteurs. I l lui est surtout difficile de tenir compte du conflit né entre les règles positives du droit international, par nature conservatrices, et le ton quelquefois avant-gardiste des résolutions des conférences internationales ou des organisations internationales mais surtout des ONG-s. I l n'est pas évident pour lui de bien apprécier la valeur réelle de ces documents plutôt de

* L'auteur de ces lignes veut souligner qu'il présente le point de vue d'un Hongrois à propos de cet arrêt. I l n'a donc pas l'ambition d'exprimer une «communis opinio doctorum» des Hongrois ou de la communauté scientifique hongroise. Tous les propos ci-dessous exprimés n'engagent que leur auteur.

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Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 253

type soft law qui anticipent la législation internationale et appellent à compléter le droit existant. Comprendre la formation du droit international, apprécier la différence entre le hard law et le soft law , ce n'est pas du tout facile. Le citoyen est souvent noyé dans les vagues d'informations médiatisées, il est déchiré par les prises de positions ultaoptimistes et défaitistes, les propos contradictoires des politiciens et des hommes d'Etat, les vrais documents officiels de l'Académie Nationale des Sciences et les écrits qu'on attribue à cette institution. Suite à cette cacophonie, il est fort possible que dans l'avenir proche, l'intérêt manifesté envers le droit international soit suivi d'un Katzenjammer , donc d'une gueule de bois. . . . La vocation de cette modeste contribution n'est donc, ni plus, ni moins, que de porter des notes sur l'arrêt et ceci essentiellement de deux points de vues. Le premier concerne les paragraphes, considérés comme les plus importants pour la Hongrie; le deuxième porte sur les thèses formulées assez abstraitement par la Cour Internationale de Justice qui peuvent être considérées comme l'acquis jurisprudentiel, où le jeu des formules du type ratio decidendi et des obiter dicta pourra générer la jurisprudence postérieure. Et enfinqu'on ne parle de l'effet des adages de la Cour Internationale de Justice dans l'enseignement universitaire du droit international et dans les milieux scientifiques. . . . I l est évident que la séparation des thèses «conjoncturelles» et «structurelles» peut être qualifiée d'artificielle. Certes, elle l'est, quelle que soit la bonne volonté de l'auteur de ces lignes. Elle peut montrer cependant l'issue d'une situation, où on donne trop d'importance au dilemme de savoir qui a gagné et qui a perdu. Car, bien évidemment, c'est la communauté internationale tout entière qui a gagné. . . . La Cour Internationale de Justice a été obligée de suivre le chemin tracé par les formules du compromis et la nature des questions qui y étaient posées. Le compromis 1 visait essentiellement la problématique du droit international des traités et 1

Selon le paragraphe 2 du compromis, signé le 7 avril 1993 à Bruxelles:

1) La Cour est priée de dire, sur la base du traité et des règles et principes du droit international général, ainsi que de tous autres traités qu'elle jugera applicables: a) si la République de Hongrie était en droit de suspendre puis abandonner, en 1989, les travaux relatifs au projet de Nagymaros ainsi qu'à la partie du projet de Gabcikovo dont la République de Hongrie est responsable aux termes du traité; b) si la République fédérative tchèque et slovaque était en droit de recourir, en novembre 1991, à la «solution provisoire» et de mettre en service, à partir d'octobre 1992, ce système, décrit dans le rapport en date du 23 novembre 1992 du groupe de travail d'experts indépendants nommés par la Commission des Communautés européennes, la République de Hongrie et la République fédérative tchèque et slovaque (construction d'un barrage sur le Danube au kilomètre 1851,7 du fleuve, en territoire tchécoslovaque, et en conséquence en résultant pour l'écoulement des eaux et la navigation); c) quels sont les effets juridiques de la notification, le 19 mai 1992, de la terminaison du traité par la République de Hongrie.

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Péter Kovdcs

il s'intéressait peu aux règles juridiques précises de la protection de l'environnement et à l'implémentation de celles-ci. I l ne serait pas juste de jeter un blâme aux rédacteurs du compromis. Sans une telle soumission de type conventionnel, il n'aurait pas été possible d'emmener la Slovaquie devant la Cour Internationale de Justice. De son point de vue, la Slovaquie s'est attachée selon la bonne logique du «do ut des» à la formulation de questions où les juges ont pu puiser d'avantage dans leur jurisprudence. Malgré cela, l'arrêt est beaucoup plus favorable pour la Hongrie qu'on ne le considère en général. I l est vrai d'ailleurs, que la Cour Internationale de Justice a laissé la possibilité aux Parties de s'entendre différemment sur les dispositions de l'arrêt. Bien évidemment, l'utilisation des clauses de type «sauf si les Parties en conviennent autrement» n'a de raison d'être que dans le cas où le résultat en serait plus avantageux que le contenu de l'arrêt. Or, l'arrêt contient des repères qui sont certainement favorables à la Hongrie. I l ne serait donc pas judicieux de le perdre de vue. I I . Quelles sont les dispositions de l'arrêt favorables à la Hongrie? La Cour Internationale de Justice a déclaré sans hésitation que la Hongrie n'est pas obligée de construire le barrage de Nagymaros 2 , car les juges, après avoir lu les documents déposés par les parties, sont arrivés à la conclusion que «la Cour ne saurait pas davantage ne pas tenir compte de ce que non seulement l'ouvrage de Nagymaros n'a pas été construit, mais qu'il n'y a plus aucune raison de le construire puisque les deux Parties ont, dans les faits, écarté l'hypothèse d'une exploitation en régime de pointe.» 3 Par conséquent, il n'y a aucune raison d'entamer une quelconque construction ni à Nagymaros, ni ailleurs, dont la finalité serait essentiellement liée au fonctionnement des ouvrages en régime de pointe. Ceci a des conséquences secondaires quant au calcul des dommages-intérêts, car on voit mal pourquoi le calcul du dommage subi par la Slovaquie serait fait à partir des avantages prétendus du régime de pointe. Certes, les politiciens slovaques et hongrois ont indiqué maintes fois que le fait que la Cour ait constaté que le traité de 1977 était en vigueur était la «défaite» de la partie hongroise. I l est indéniable que la Hongrie avait l'ambition de faire dire à la Cour que la dénonciation du traité avait été licite et que par conséquent le traité 2) La Cour est également priée de déterminer les conséquences juridiques, y compris les droits et obligations pour les Parties, de l'arrêt qu'elle rendra sur les questions énoncées au paragraphe 1 du présent article. 2

CIJ: l'arrêt rendu le 25 septembre 1997 dans l'affaire du projet Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hongrie/Slovaquie), Recueil 1997 [abrégé infra: «Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros»], § 134. Ce constat est répété dans le § 150. 3

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 14.

Considérations de l'arrêt dans l'affaire

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 255

n'était plus en vigueur. Cette position n'a pas été suivie par la Cour. Cependant, la Hongrie a fait jouer un motif subsidiaire pour pouvoir répondre au défi que constitue la coordination du fonctionnement des ouvrages avec les impératifs de la protection de l'environnement. De ce point de vue, le résultat est très proche d'une «égalité», comme on va le voir infra. I l est indéniable que la décision de la Cour portant sur la vigueur du traité de 1977 n'est que le point de départ (même si elle a des conséquences logiques dans les dispositions postérieures de l'arrêt) et elle ne dit point qu'il faudrait l'exécuter mot à mot, dans sa version originelle. L'arrêt précise à juste titre et d'une manière non équivoque qu'il faut interpréter tous les points qui relèvent de la problématique de l'environnement dans le traité de 1977 à la lumière des connaissances de la protection de l'environnement dont on dispose en 1997. «Ces normes nouvelles doivent être prises en considération et ces exigences nouvelles convenablement appréciées, non seulement lorsque des Etats envisagent de nouvelles activités, mais aussi lorsqu'ils poursuivent des activités qu'ils ont engagées dans le passé.»4 Ceci dit, si les Parties veulent conclure un traité précisant les modalités de l'exécution de l'arrêt et du fonctionnement des ouvrages, ledit traité devrait préciser dans ce sens les clauses portant sur la protection de l'environnement. 5 Même si la mise en oeuvre de la variante C a été déclarée illicite, la Cour Internationale de Justice a constaté que l'ouvrage de Cunovo de facto remplaçait l'ouvrage de Dunakiliti, donc il devrait y être conforme de jure aussi6. Le barrage de Cunovo 7 et celui de Gabcikovo 8 (qui sont gérés depuis leurs mises en oeuvre uniquement par les autorités slovaques) devraient aussi se transformer en établissements dont le fonctionnement est assuré en commun (système de double-clés), car le traité de 1977 a aussi prévu les ouvrages comme des établissements de gestion en commun. Cette transformation ne dépend que d'une seule condition: que la Hongrie la souhaite. Selon la Cour, la Hongrie est en droit d'exiger la conclusion d'un traité assurant une forme ou une autre de son mot à dire, donc sa participation à la gestion. L'arrêt constate que toutes les deux parties devront dédommager l'autre car toutes les deux parties ont commis des illiciétés croisées9. Les Parties devront donc entamer des négociations sur le dédommagement mutuel, mais apparemment, la Cour suggère le zéro solde, comme solution optimale et simple: «la question de l'indemnisation pourrait être résolue de façon satisfaisante, dans le cadre d'un règle4

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 140.

5

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 140.

6

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 145.

7

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 145.

8

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 150.

9

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 152.

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Péter Kovdcs

ment d'ensemble, si chacune des Parties renonçait à toutes ses demandes et contredemandes d'ordre financier ou les annulait.» 10 . La Hongrie a droit (pourvu qu'elle entre dans la gestion en commun) à la moitié des bénéfices 11, sauf accord différent des Parties 12 ainsi qu' à la répartition équitable et raisonnable des eaux13.

I I I . Quelles sont les dispositions de l'arrêt favorables à la Slovaquie? Bien évidemment, le constat portant sur la vigueur ininterrompue du traité de 1977, et le rejet des éléments contestants de la requête hongroise, sont considérés à juste titre comme des succès pour la Slovaquie. En même temps, il ne faut pas oublier que dans la phase actuelle des négociations (la 2e phase préjuridictionnelle), la Slovaquie peut souligner l'importance des points plutôt défavorables à la Hongrie. Si la Hongrie voulait être associée à la gestion conjointe des ouvrages de Cunovo, il lui faudrait assumer une partie proportionnelle des «coûts de construction et de fonctionnement». 14 Mais quels coûts de construction et de fonctionnement? Les coûts de construction et de fonctionnement de Cunovo, ou bien les coûts de construction de Cunovo plus les coûts de fonctionnement de Cunovo et de Gabcikovo? Puisque la formulation de cette phrase manque de précision, la lecture ne va pas de soi. O n pourrait prétendre que l'approche de la Hongrie serait judicieuse, si elle interprétait cette disposition de la manière suivante: si la Hongrie ne veut pas d'électricité, mais elle veut «mettre la main sur le robinet» de Cunovo, (déclaré commun par la Cour), il lui faut assumer les coûts de la construction, ainsi qu'une partie égale des coûts de fonctionnement de l'ouvrage de Cunovo. Si la Hongrie prenait la décision de bénéficier aussi de la production d'électricité (dont la Hongrie n'a pas vraiment besoin, selon les calculs des experts), il faut prendre en compte les coûts de fonctionnement de tous les ouvrages (donc non seulement ceux de Cunovo, mais aussi ceux de Gabcikovo). En ce qui concerne la partie des eaux due à la Hongrie, la Cour Internationale de Justice a été très réticente, elle a évité de se prononcer sur la répartition strictement

10

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 153.

11

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 145.

12

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 144.

13

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 146.

14

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 154.

Considérations de l'arrêt dans l'affaire

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 257

égale des eaux; au lieu de cela, elle emploie le terme: «répartition équitable et raisonnable»15 d'une manière conséquente. I l est vrai que le 50 % est révoqué par un renvoi «de ricochet» quand la Cour cite l'arrêt que son prédécesseur, la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale, a rendu dans l'affaire de la juridiction territoriale de la Commission internationale de ÏOder et que la Cour semble approuver 17 , bien qu'elle y ajoute tout de suite la remarque que c'est le principe de la proportionnalité qui a été violé. 18 Même si la Cour Internationale de Justice a souligné la pertinence du droit international de l'environnement de 1997 (et non pas de l'état de ce droit en 1977), et que cette prise de position est certainement favorable pour la Hongrie, il est néanmoins difficile de savoir ce que la Cour entend précisément par là. La pertinence de la convention onusienne sur la biodiversité, signée à Rio de Janeiro, a été soulignée dans les plaidoiries hongroises. Même si la Cour Internationale de Justice y fait allusion quand elle récapitule les éléments de la position hongroise 19 , il est à noter qu'elle le fait sans aucun jugement de valeur in merito. La suggestion du zéro solde est bien évidemment positive 20 pour la Hongrie, mais elle est répétée ultérieurement d'une manière sensiblement différente quand la Cour stipule que «sauf si les Parties en conviennent autrement», la Hongrie devra indemniser la Slovaquie et la Slovaquie devra indemniser la Hongrie, pour les pertes subies.21 I l est vrai cependant qu'on ne peut pas prétendre que c'est uniquement le § 155 qui contienne une obligation. La Cour Internationale de Justice précise dans l'arrêt où prend fin la partie descriptive et commence la partie normative 22 . Or, 15

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, §§ 50, 78, 85, 147.

16

CPJI série A nE23 p. 27.

17

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 85:

Le développement moderne du droit international a renforcé ce principe également pour les utilisations des cours d'eau internationaux à des fins autres que la navigation, comme en témoigne l'adoption par l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, le 21 mai 1997, de la convention sur le droit relatifs aux utilisations des cours d'eau internationaux à des fins autres que la navigation. 18

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 85.

19

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 125.

20

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 153.

21

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 155/D.

22

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 131:

I l revient maintenant à la Cour, sur la base de ses conclusions précédentes, d'établir quel devrait être le comportement des Parties a l'avenir. La présente partie est plus normative que déclaratoire, parce qu'elle définit les droits et les obligations des Parties. C'est à la lumière de cette définition que les Parties devront rechercher un accord sur les modalités d'exécution de l'arrêt, ainsi qu'elles en sont convenues à l'article 5 du compromis.

17 G Y I L 41

lh

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toutes les deux allusions au renoncement mutuel au dédommagement se trouvent dans la partie normative. Puisque Γ arrêt de la Cour Internationale de Justice est une totalité solidaire, la faculté de «convenir autrement» renvoit logiquement à l'autre §, déclarant le zéro solde. La logique inhérente de ce constat suggère que l'option de choisir le zéro solde veut dire qu'elle ne sera pas accompagnée d'autre facteur d'effet équivalant au dédommagement. Ceci est d'ailleurs conforme à la bonne logique, car si une des parties doit donner quelque chose avant qu'elles se dédommagent, c'est en fait cette partie-là qui porte le fardeau du dédommagement. Donc, on ne pourrait pas parler de dédommagement mutuel, mais seulement d'un dédommagement unilatéral. La Cour ne peut pas suggérer de non-sens. . . . I V . L'arrêt de la Cour Internationale de Justice — regardé d'une tour d'ivoire . . . Dans cette partie de mon analyse, je voudrais évoquer les points de l'arrêt qui contiennent les dicta de la Cour Internationale de Justice formulés d'une manière abstraite dont l'importance est évidente même à long terme, pour toute la communauté internationale et le droit international en général. A cause de leur importance et de leur formulation souvent théorique, ces phrases peuvent donc être séparées du différend bilatéral car elles vont bien au-delà. . . . Le choix ci-dessous est peut-être arbitraire, dicté aussi par les limites de cette contribution. I l contribue cependant à une meilleure compréhension de l'essence, de la logique et du rouage internes de l'arrêt. Puisque la Cour Internationale de Justice n'a pas pu quitter le chemin tracé par le compromis, il est évident que les dicta prononcés sont liés en premier lieu au droit des traités internationaux. 1. Les considérations les plus importantes liées au droit des traités a) En ce qui concerne la thèse de la partie hongroise, portant sur la justification de la dénonciation du traité de 1977 par le biais du principe inadimplenti non est adimplendum , elle a été rejetée parce qu'une telle dénonciation peut avoir lieu uniquement dans des circonstances exceptionnelles: La Cour établirait un précédent aux effets perturbateurs pour les relations conventionnelles et à l'intégrité de la règle pacta sunt servanda , si elle devait conclure qu'il peut être unilatéralement mis fin, au motif de manquements réciproques, à un traité en vigueur entre Etats, que les parties ont exécuté dans une très large mesure et à un coût considérable pendant des années.

23

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 114.

Considérations de l'arrêt dans l'affaire

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 259

b) La convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités et la coutume veulent que c'est uniquement la violation du traité lui-même (c'est-à-dire le traité que la partie veut dénoncer) qui peut être considérée comme titre licite de dénonciation: . . . la Cour estime que seule une violation substantielle du traité lui-même par un État partie audit traité peut mettre l'autre partie en droit de s'en prévaloir pour mettre fin au traité. La violation d'autres règles conventionnelles ou d'autres règles du droit international général peut justifier l'adoption par l'État lésé de certaines mesures y compris des contremesures, mais elle ne saurait justifier qu'il soit mis fin au traité sur la base du droit des „

· / 24

traites.

c) La partie hongroise a aussi évoqué l'état de nécessité ou plus exactement un «état de nécessité écologique », comme titre justificatif de la dénonciation. En faisant abstraction de la démontrabilité d'une telle situation, la Cour n'a pas donné gain de cause à cette démarche car il n'y a pas de tel motif de dénonciation dans la Convention de 1969. Par ailleurs, la Cour en a tenu compte comme motif de la suspension. A cet égard, la Cour se bornera à observer que même si l'existence d'un état de nécessité est établie, i l ne peut être mis fin à un traité sur cette base. L'état de nécessité ne peut être invoqué que pour exonérer de sa responsabilité un État qui n'a pas exécuté un traité. Même si l'on considère que l'invocation de ce motif est justifiée, le traité ne prend pas fin pour autant; i l peut être privé d'effet tant que l'état de nécessité persiste; i l peut être inopérant en fait mais i l reste en vigueur, à moins que les parties n'y mettent fin d'un commun accord. Dès que l'état de nécessité disparaît, le devoir de s'acquitter des obligations découlant du traité renaît. 25

d) U n des arguments de la Hongrie était le principe de la clausula rebus sic stantibus. Or, la Cour Internationale de Justice n'a pas accepté le changement de régime politique comme tel. Elle a considéré que l'investissement n'était pas si intimement lié aux circonstances politiques et que le changement de régime n'avait pas modifié l'ampleur des obligations à exécuter. Les craintes formulées par rapport à la rentabilité n'ont pas prouvé non plus le changement radical des obligations. Ainsi, la Cour Internationale de Justice est-elle arrivée à l'expression d'un point de vue traditionaliste (conservateur, si on veut), donnant la priorité au principe pacta sunt servanda face à la clausula rebus sic stantibus. U n changement fondamental de circonstances doit être imprévu; les circonstances existant à l'époque où le traité a été conclu doivent avoir constitué une base essentielle du consentement des parties à être liées par le traité. Le fait que l'article 62 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités soit libellé en termes négatifs et conditionnels indique d'ailleurs clairement que la stabilité des relations conventionnelles exige que le moyen tiré d'un

24

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 106.

25

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 101.

17*

260

Péter Kovcs

changement fondamental de circonstances ne trouve à s'appliquer que dans des cas exceptionnels. 26

2. Les thèses portant

sur la succession d'États

a) U n des arguments hongrois a p r é t e n d u que la Slovaquie n'était jamais partie contractante au traité de 1977, car la scission entre la Tchéquie et la Slovaquie aurait empêché la c o n t i n u i t é d u traité de 1977 conclu entre la H o n g r i e et la Tchécoslovaquie sauf dans le cas de l'existence d ' u n accord bilatéral entre la Slovaquie et la H o n grie q u i l'aurait confirmé expressément. O r , u n tel accord n'a jamais eu lieu. Cette thèse a été rejetée par la C o u r Internationale de Justice q u i a suivie la théorie des «situations

objectives » consacrée par le d r o i t c o u t u m i e r de la succession

d'États. Selon cette théorie, o n peut avancer sous certaines conditions la thèse de la c o n t i n u i t é même p o u r des traités bilatéraux. [Le] traité (. . .) porte principalement sur un projet de construction et d'exploitation conjoint d'un vaste complexe intégré et indivisible d'ouvrages et d'installations sur des parties bien définies des territoires respectifs de la Hongrie et de la Tchécoslovaquie, le long du Danube. Le traité a aussi établi le régime de navigation applicable à un tronçon important d'un cours d'eau international, notamment en faisant désormais passer le chenal principal de navigation internationale par le canal de dérivation.. Ce faisant, i l a inévitablement créé une situation our les utilisations des cours d'eau internationaux à des fins autres que la navigation (...). 6

La Cour Internationale de Justice a souligné l'importance de la prise en compte des impératifs de la protection de l'environnement ainsi que le durcissement du matériel juridique qui s'y rattache. Elle a pu le faire avec d'autant plus de souplesse que déjà en 1996, dans son avis consultatif, rendu sur la Licéité de la menace ou de l'emploi d'armes nucléaires , elle avait pris position en faveur de la protection de l'environnement. Ainsi, la Cour Internationale de Justice a pu trouver un dictum convenable, en rappelant que: l'environnement n'est pas une abstraction, mais bien l'espace où vivent les êtres humains et dont dépendent la qualité de leur vie et leur santé, y compris pour les générations à venir. 3 7

I l était donc logique de transposer l'analyse des risques engendrés par rapport aux exigences récemment formulées dans la protection de l'environnement: (. . .) la Cour tient à relever que de nouvelles normes du droit de l'environnement, récemment apparues, sont pertinentes pour l'exécution du traité et que les parties pouvaient, d'un commun accord, en tenir compte (.. .) La conscience que l'environnement est vulnérable 35

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, §§ 83 - 87.

36

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 85.

37

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 112 (CIJ: avis consultatif, rendu sur la Licéité de la menace ou de l'emploi d'armes nucléaires , Recueil 1996, § 29).

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et la reconnaissance de ce qu'il faut continuellement évaluer les risques écologiques se sont affirmées de plus en plus dans les années qui ont suivi la conclusion du traité [en 1977].38 Aux fins de l'évaluation des risques écologiques, ce sont les normes actuelles qui doivent être prises en considération. (. . .) La Cour ne perd pas de vue que, dans le domaine de la protection de l'environnement, la vigilance et la prévention s'imposent en raison du caractère souvent irréversible des dommages causés à l'environnement et des limites inhérentes au mécanisme même de réparation de ce type de dommage. (. . .) Ces normes nouvelles doivent être prises en considération et ces exigences nouvelles convenablement appréciées, non seulement lorsque des Etats envisagent de nouvelles activités, mais aussi lorsqu'ils poursuivent des activités qu'ils ont engagées dans le passé. Le concept du développement durable traduit bien cette nécessité de concilier développement économique et protection de l'environnement. 39 b) Mais que faire in concreto , l o r s q u ' i l s'agit d'appliquer u n traité international, r e c o n n u formellement valide, mais perçu inapplicable en cas d'espèce, o ù en t o u t cas, l'applicabilité abstraite ne veut donc p o i n t dire l'applicabilité concrète de tous les articles et o ù l ' i m p l é m e n t a t i o n nécessite des adaptations continues? C o m m e n t concilier le traité de 1977 avec les exigences modernes de la p r o t e c t i o n de l'environnement? Ce sont justement les points d o n t les parties devront t e n i r compte lors de la conclusion d ' u n nouveau traité. E t voici, c o m m e n t la C o u r a précisé les lignes directrices de cet accord: Ce sont les Parties elles-mêmes qui doivent trouver d'un commun accord une solution qui tienne compte des objectifs du traité — qui doivent être atteints de façon conjointe et intégrée — de même que des normes du droit international de l'environnement et des principes du droit relatif aux cours d'eau internationaux. (.. .) 40 L a C o u r Internationale de Justice a été consciente d'ailleurs que ces négociations ne seraient pas aisées et elle a cité le dictum célèbre de l'arrêt rendu dans l'affaire d u Plateau continental

de la mer du Nord :

les parties ont l'obligation de se comporter de telle manière que la négociation ait un sens, ce qui n'est pas le cas lorsque l'une d'elles insiste sur sa propre position sans envisager aucune modification. 41 E t la C o u r a continué c o m m e suit: Ce que la règle pacta sunt servanda , telle que reflétée à l'article 26 de la convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traités, exige en l'espèce des Parties, c'est de trouver d'un commun accord une solution dans le cadre de coopération que prévoit le traité. (. . .) Le

38

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 112.

39

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 140.

40

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 141.

41

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 141 (CIJ: l'arrêt rendu dans l'affaire du Plateau continental de la mer du Nord , Recueil 1969, § 85).

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Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 265

principe de bonne foi oblige les Parties à l'appliquer de façon raisonnable et de telle sorte que son but puisse être atteint. 42

V . Conclusions L'importance de l'arrêt de la Cour Internationale de Justice, rendu dans l'affaire du projet hydroélectrique de Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dépasse largement celle d'un simple différend bilatéral, d'importance secondaire. L'affaire a mis en lumière des aspects très intéressants du droit des traités, de la succession d'États et de la protection de l'environnement, et la Cour Internationale de Justice a essayé d'y apporter des réponses conformes à l'état actuel du droit international positif. La difficulté de cette tâche et le nombre de nuances possibles se reflètent dans la longue liste des opinions individuelles et des opinions dissidentes. Je voudrais tout de même souligner deux éléments: 1. U n procès devant la Cour Internationale de Justice ressemble fort bien à un procès devant les tribunaux internes ordinaires. Les avocats se penchent sur une affaire dont les éléments factuels sont déjà prêts ainsi il faut parcourir un chemin prétracé. La faiblesse inhérente de la position hongroise était liée à la situation née avant le procès: car après avoir démarré la construction lentement, la Hongrie l'a d'abord «accélérée», pour la suspendre un peu plus tard et l'abandonner définitivement après. U n des paragraphes de l'arrêt de la Cour Internationale de Justice n'est pas exempt d'ironie quand il indique que: la Cour n'en ignore pas pour autant que de profonds changements étaient en cours en Hongrie en 1989 et que pendant cette phase transitoire, i l pouvait s'avérer bien plus difficile qu'à l'ordinaire de coordonner les différents points de vues qui prévalaient à divers moments. 43

Et puisque la Slovaquie a pu réaliser la variante C, considérée auparavant comme un bluff [qualifié «tigre de papier» par les politiciens et écologues hongrois] et qu'elle a «pris possession» de la direction du Danube, elle s'est trouvée dans une position favorable lors de la formulation du compromis car en cas d'espèce, (malgré la soumission d'une acceptation facultative de la part de la Hongrie), faute d'acceptation unilatérale slovaque de la juridiction de la Cour, ceci était le seul moyen d'emmener l'affaire à La Haye. Ainsi les questions posées ont été formulées dans le sens de la doctrine traditionaliste dupacta sunt servanda , disposant d'un acquis jurisprudentiel riche et beaucoup moins dans le sens de la protection de l'environnement, pauvre en «précédents».

42

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 142.

43

Arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, § 57.

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2. Le pur fait de porter une affaire devant la Cour Internationale de Justice est très important et en soi symbolique. Car deux États d'Europe centrale ont été capables de s'entendre sur l'acceptation d'un moyen de règlement juridictionnel, malgré le fait que sous la pression de la doctrine soviétique de droit international d'avant la chute du mur de Berlin, ceci ait été carrément impossible. C'est pourquoi le fait d'essayer de régler une affaire à la Cour Internationale de Justice, vaut mainte fois plus que des déclarations solennelles — mais peut être sans pertinence du point de vue du droit international — qu'on va régler les relations avec les voisins car les exigences de l'Union européenne le suggèrent. . . . La règlement juridictionnel international est bien plus sérieux et plus crédible que des promesses vagues. En tenir compte et en être fier, c'est un défi pour les États candidats à l'adhésion. Finalement: la Cour Internationale de Justice n'est pas du tout submergée d'affaires intentées (ou acceptées par voie compromissoire) par les États occidentaux. Ainsi, sans doute, l'arrêt Gabcikovo-Nagymaros est-il le succès du droit international, comme tel.

The Struggle for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment — an Assessment of the Negotiation Process in the O E C D By Alexander Böhme/

I. Introduction The negotiations of a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI), begun under the auspices of the O E C D in September 1995, ran into shallow water at the beginning of 1998. Some commentators were even claiming 'the sinking of the Μ Α Γ . 1 Unfortunately they were right. This sinking of the M A I at least in the context of the OECD, however, is rather unfortunate since there is a compelling economic case in favor of a strong M A I . Despite the East Asian and Russian economic crises, investment liberalization does still have the potential to be the next great boost to the world economy if it is implemented reasonably. Indeed the economic crisis in some of the emerging market economies shows that there is a compelling need for investor protection without which governments can easily reconsider their investorfriendly policies and start to impose measures on foreign investment which can even have the effect of old-fashioned expropriations or restrictions on the free transfer of capital. Since the bulk of foreign direct investment (FDI) 2 is concentrated among O E C D countries, there seemed to be a good argument to start negotiations on this topic under the auspices of the OECD. During the O E C D ministerial meeting of May 1995 the O E C D Council committed itself to "the immediate start of negotiations in the OECD aimed at reaching a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) by the ministerial meeting of 1997, which would:

This article was written during an internship in the German Federal Ministry of Economics. The author wishes to thank all who supported him. 1 2

The sinking of the M A I , The Economist, 14 March 1998, 85.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one form of capital flow between firms in different countries which gives the investor not only a financial stake i n the foreign venture but also involves managerial control. Mere portfolio investment gives the investor only a financial stake in the foreign venture.

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— provide a broad multilateral framework for international investment with high standards for the liberalization of investment regimes and investment protection and w i t h effective dispute settlement procedures; — be a free-standing international treaty open to all OECD Members and the European Communities, and to accession by non-OECD Member countries, which w i l l be consulted as the negotiations progress." 3 However, the primary goal of reaching a conclusion of these negotiations by 27 April 1998 was not achieved. A ministerial statement on the M A I was issued after the deadline expired. According to the statement, the ministers decided on a "period of assessment and further consultation between the negotiating Parties and with interested parts of their societies." While the first part of this quotation points to the ongoing disputes between governments and the negotiators themselves, the second part pays tribute to the fact that the M A I had become the focus of opposition to 'globalization'. National parliaments and representatives of 'civil society' argue that a treaty such as the M A I is unacceptable unless it is accompanied by binding international rules governing the behavior of investors. 4 The commitment ministers made in April was not mere lip-service. The period of consultation has been used, for instance, by the German government to discuss the aims of the M A I with various German NGOs. Similarly, in France, a comprehensive consultation procedure has been established. The ministerial statement goes on in emphasizing the need for the M A I to be consistent w i t h the sovereign responsibility of governments to conduct domestic policies. This can be understood as a reaction to the widespread fear of governments and especially national parliaments of losing their sovereignty to groups of experts in international fora with no direct democratic legitimation. While it is a positive development that modern societies through their representatives now try to participate in the negotiation process, one has to make sure that the process itself is not to be disturbed by widespread fears and misconceptions. There is the danger that the M A I may serve as the scapegoat for the concerns raised by the process of globalization; at the same time, there is the danger that a too ambitious M A I would restrict the possibility of governments to react flexibly to economic crises and to pursue normal regulatory policies pursuant to their legitimate national interests. 3

O E C D Documents, Towards Multilateral Investment Rules, 1996, 3. Thomas L. Brewer/ Stephen Young, , Towards a multilateral framework for foreign direct investment: issues and scenarios, Transnational Corporations, vol. 4, 1995, 69 et seq., give an overview of issues and scenarios for an international agreement concerning foreign direct investment. 4 See for the German Parliament, Kleine Anfrage des Abgeordneten Michael Müller u. a. und der Fraktion der SPD betreffend „Multilaterales Abkommen für Investitionen (MAI)", BTDrucksache 13/9549; see also the European Parliament Resolution on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Res. No. A4-0073/98 adopted on 11 March 1998, Official Journal Eur. Comm., N o . C 104 as of 6 A p r i l 1998.

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It was due to these concerns that by mid-October 1998 France opted to withdraw from the negotiations and raised a number of concerns with respect to the substance of the negotiations. Thus, the consultations on the M A I on 20 October 1998 in Paris were reduced to an informal meeting of negotiators. By the end of 1998 it was certain that future negotiations would not be pursued under the umbrella of the O E C D , since without France there can also be no membership of the E U to the M A I which makes the M A I unattractive to the US and Japan. It is no wonder that in the face of such fundamental criticism culminating in the final abolition of the project in the realm of the OECD, the negotiation history of the M A I has been one of a constant downsizing of a very ambitious project, even including at the beginning far-reaching liberalization commitments by the negotiating parties. However, it would be too early to declare the death of the M A I , possibly only the forum of negotiations will be shifted to the W T O . The question remains to be asked, whether this process of downsizing the M A I will lead in the end to a ' M A I Light* and whether this would still be worth the effort? This article takes the position that it would be, since mere numbers speak in favor of a M A I . While companies' exports from their home countries have risen only a little over the past five years, F D I from 1985 to 1996 rose faster than at any time in history, with inflows surging from US$ 65 billion to 349 billion. 5 Whereas F D I was a marginal factor for the world economy fifteen years ago, it is now central. T w o main reasons explain this development from the business perspective. First, proximity to the end market is considered a major competitive advantage. Second, a move abroad may be intended to obtain access to better quality or cheaper resources, including in particular the availability of skilled labor. Significantly, labor costs are a relatively secondary concern for site selection, as are financial incentives.6 In a recent survey, the factor of effective protection of foreign investment placed fourth in the ranking of localization criteria. 7 However, this ranking of criteria is an average; each corporate function has special features entailing a different ranking. But still there is enough evidence that investment protection plays a role as a localization criterion. 8 For the host country, F D I complements domestic savings, involves a transfer of technology and know-how, and results in employment and 5

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ( U N C T A D ) , World Investment Report 1997, 4. 6 Fabnce Hatem, Invest in France Mission, International Investment: Towards the Year 2002, 1998, 21. 7

Id ., 32. The first priority was potential profits, second growth potential of local markets and finally the size of local markets. g

O n the general issue of the role legal factors may play in determining investment decisions of multinational enterprises see Peter T. Muchlinski , Multinational Enterprises and the Law, 1995, 38, 44.

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training of the employees.9 As the recent financial turmoil in East Asia and Russia shows, the long-term commitment flowing from F D I is an advantage over more volatile portfolio investments. Although a final agreement in the O E C D failed, it is worth considering the outcome of the O E C D M A I negotiations, since the problems and issues raised during these negotiations will continue to be on the international economic law agenda regardless of which forum deals with them. Also because it is likely to serve as a starting point for future negotiations of a M A I , the M A I Negotiating Text as of 24 April 1998 is of considerable value for analyzing the specific problems which were faced by negotiators. 10 Therefore this text will be discussed in more detail in this article. The M A I Negotiating Text as of 24 April 1998 contains as its core the principle of non-discrimination. This principle commits the M A I Parties to treat foreign investors and their investment no less favorably than they treat their own investors ('national treatment' (NT)) and not to discriminate among the investors or investment of different M A I Parties ('most favored nation treatment' (MFN)). The main innovation of the M A I would have been a broad definition of investor and investment including F D I as well as portfolio investment. According to the M A I Negotiating Text, the M A I was expected to provide legal guarantees not only for the investment itself ('post-entry stage') but also for the making of an investment ('pre-entry stage') and aimed to cover measures taken at all levels of government (central, federal, provincial and local). Another innovation of the agreement would have been a clause on binding arbitration of disputes, not only between host and home States but also between the investor and the host State by giving the investor standing in local and international courts and arbitration bodies. The biggest innovation in the field of treaty-making technique of the M A I Negotiating Text is to be seen in its 'top-down' approach. Contrary to the 'bottom-up' approach followed by GATS, 1 1 'top-down' means that parties make an overall commitment to the non-

9 See on these aspects John H. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 1993, 287 et seq. 10

This O E C D document resulted from the work of expert groups and has never been adopted by the M A I Negotiating Group. It therefore only consolidates the text of the agreement considered so far. 11

GATS extends national treatment (NT) and most favored nation treatment (MFN) only to sectors which have been listed i n country-specific schedules. See, e.g., for the N T commitment, Art. X V I I para. 1 GATS: "In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule , and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers" (emphasis added). GATS and all the other results of the Uruguay Round are reprinted in: John H.

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discrimination provisions and absolute standards of the M A I and then list countryspecific exceptions for those areas they do not want to be covered by these obligations. The problem with this approach for negotiating parties is that they have to be sure of the effects such an agreement w i l l have on certain areas of their economies and regulatory systems. After positioning the project of a M A I in the context of international F D I regulation, this article w i l l emphasize some of the general positions of the proponents and opponents of the M A I including the 'developing country issue'. The basic achievements of this ongoing bargaining process, as well as the still unresolved issues, w i l l be spelled out in more detail in the fourth part of this article. Starting with the discussion of the definition of 'investment' in the M A I Negotiating Text, this part w i l l highlight the crucial 'cornerstones' of the agreement and then deal with some of the major contentious issues such as the inclusion of environmental and labor standards in the M A I . Finally, the prospects for future negotiations of a multilateral agreement on investment w i l l be discussed.

I I . The Project of a M A I i n the Context of F D I Regulation The prominent position of F D I in the world economy is reflected in the tendency of governments to create a web of bilateral and multilateral treaties dealing with FDI. 1 2 As of 1 January 1997, there was a total of 1330 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in the world, involving 162 countries. 13 O n the multilateral level, treaties having strong implications for investment include the achievements of the Uruguay Round, 14 in particular GATS, TRIPS, and TRIMS, as well as chapter eleven of N A F T A , 1 5 the O E C D Codes on the Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations and on the Liberalization of Capital Movements adopted by the O E C D Council on 12 December 1961,16 and the Energy Charter Treaty. 17

Jackson/William J. Davey/Alan O.Sykes , Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, Documents Supplement 1995. 12 For an 1992 overview see Franziska Tschofen , Multilateral Approaches to the Treatment of Foreign Investment, ICSID Review — Foreign Investment Law Journal (ICSED Rev.-FILJ), vol. 7, 1992, 384 et seq. 13

U N C T A D , World Investment Report 1997, 19.

14

See supra (note 11).

15

N o r t h American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 8/11/14/17 December 1992, reprinted in: International Legal Materials (ILM), vol. 32, 1993, 289 et seq. 16 17

OECD/C(61)95; OECD/C(61)96 as amended.

Energy Charter Treaty as of 17 December 1994, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil Π (BGBl. II), 1997, 4; ICSID Rev.-FILJ, vol. 10, 1995, 258.

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The existence of these treaties and instruments together with the general change in economic thinking led to many countries turning away from the strict regulation of foreign ownership and control of investment, thereby leading to a liberalization of national investment regimes. 18 In 1996, 98 liberalizing changes were made in the regulatory F D I frameworks of 65 countries (10 developed and 55 developing countries). 19 This change of perception supports the view that the argument in favor of a strong investment agreement is well established. In fact, traditional trade-oriented frameworks are becoming anachronistic given the globalization of markets and production processes. F D I and trade have become linked in international production especially with the increasing role played by multinational enterprises. Therefore, whereas traditional approaches focused on trade access, the difficult matter now to be resolved concerns freedom of the firm in contesting markets irrespective of the modality used to contest them (sales, licensing, branches, subsidiaries). The problem is that this tendency towards a liberalized access to goods, services and factors of production, if laid down in internationally binding rules, impedes national regulatory powers, i.e. the sovereignty of the nation state, in an even more comprehensive way than was the case with regard to tariff reduction through the G A T T process in the past. National policy options and choices can be reduced by binding regimes, although this very much depends on the content of such treaties. It is this very interference with state sovereignty which made the negotiations of a M A I so difficult. Although there are already BITs regulating F D I in place, the net of these treaties — though for some countries like Germany very consistent 20 — is only a patchwork with many gaps and differing standards of protection. Taking into account the partial regulation of F D I in the Uruguay Round, especially in GATS and the TRIMS agreement, there are already now many overlaps in the existing system of investment protection treaties. Thus, it would help to increase predictability and stability to install one coherent treaty regulating FDI. 2 1 Once successfully imple18

A comprehensive overview of this process can be found in Muchlinski (note 8), Chapter 6 and 7. 19 U N C T A D , World Investment Report 1997,18: these changes included the opening of industries, streamlining or abolition of screening procedures and the establishment of incentive regimes. 20 21

Germany had concluded as many as 120 BITs as of September 1998.

A further problem w i l l be the relation of the M A I to BITs. Since some BITs may contain a higher protection standard than the final version of a M A I , the M A I M F N clause would mean that the two parties of a BIT have to apply the better standard to every other M A I party, without getting reciprocal benefits. The filing of country-specific exceptions for BITs may be a way out of this free rider dilemma, see Joachim Karl , Das Multilaterale Investmentabkommen (MAI), Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW), vol. 44, 1998, 438.

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mented, a M A I could play a constitutional role comparable to G A T T , helping not only foreign investors to rely on a higher standard of protection but also helping governments to resist interest groups in their national political systems. Finally, enforcement of a multilateral agreement might be easier than for bilateral investment treaties. The breach of a multilateral treaty means a breach against every contracting party thus raising the danger of more effective sanctions.22 However, the present system of BITs might result in a more flexible approach. By maintaining countries' bargaining positions, their possible strengths in negotiating a BIT as well as investment agreements with investors might be better served. This is an argument which has to be taken into account especially w i t h regard to the introduction of strict rules to prohibit performance requirements in a M A I . There might be in fact an argument that the host states should be allowed to bargain w i t h every single investor for what is best for them. The bargaining strength of a developing country which, e.g., does have natural resources required on world markets might be in fact quite strong, thereby giving countries the ability to make the most of an investment for their own economic development.

I I I . Proponents and Opponents of the M A I Although the main reason to pursue negotiations on a M A I in the O E C D was that this might be a more homogenous group where agreement could more easily have been reached, it has turned out that the decisive detriment to the success of the M A I results from differences between O E C D members themselves. The 29 members of the O E C D and the European Union were expected to be founding members of the M A I . W i t h a view to their becoming founding members of the M A I another 9 countries were participating in the negotiations as observers. 23 While the German position favored a strong agreement containing possibly even commitments for further liberalization of sectors now exempted from the proposed M A I text, the French position has always been more reluctant towards the M A I . It was mainly due to French intervention that the conclusion of the text was postponed in order to consult further with the representatives of civil society. There was especially a deep and widespread concern reflected in the French press that the M A I obligations would undermine the French cultural heritage in the film industry. 2 4 National sovereignty was the another big pillar of French resistance especially 22

See, e.g., Art. 60 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U N T S

331. 23

These are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Hong Kong, China, Latvia, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic. 24

Philippe de Villiers , I l faut rejeter L ' A M I , Le Figaro, 18 February 1998; Pierre Zarka , Adieu L ' A M I , L'Humanité, 13 March 1998.

1

G Y I L 41

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in the ruling socialist party which wants to be free to impose rules on the economy. The third pillar of French demands was to be found in France's request for strict rules in the area of environment, worker protection, social concerns and binding obligations for investors. But also the position within the national realms of negotiating parties has not been homogenous in itself. W i t h regard to Germany it is interesting to give some further attention to concerns raised by German members of parliament (,Bundestag ). The underlying concern was that the M A I could lead to a decline of the nation state's sovereignty with regard to economic matters. 25 Government officials were seen as deliberately withholding information from the parliament and the general public in order to secretly build a 'world constitution for powerful multinational enterprises', a 'charter of rights and freedoms for multinational enterprises', or to give company executives a 'higher category of citizenship' through the provisions of the M A I . 2 6 These worries were supported by a case in Canada where the USbased Ethyl Corporation sued the Canadian government, inter alia , for a breach of N A F T A and the Canadian agreement on internal trade because Canada restricted the inter-provincial trade and import of the gasoline additive M M T . The Ethyl Corporation was offered compensation of US$ 13 million in damages in an out-of-court settlement and the restrictions have been lifted by the Canadian government. This case served as a model for M A I opponents supporting them in their views that the M A I would effectively prohibit governments from imposing environmental protec-. tion laws. It is thus understandable that there was some resistance to the M A I from environmental groups on the Internet trying to stir up public opinion against the project. These environmental NGOs and also NGOs concerned w i t h the interests of developing countries fried very hard to lobby governments in order to change the proposed contents of the M A I . Thus, the M A I negotiating process can be seen as an example of the increasing role of non-state actors in the process of treaty negotiation in public international law. 27 By mentioning the 'interested parts of their societies' even the ministerial statement recognized this increased role of N G O s in the international community. However, it would overestimate the role played by N G O s if one would claim they have a direct impact on the negotiation process. What they have developed via their publications on the Internet and their lobbying work with government officials is a strong indirect impact on the M A I negotiating 25

See, e.g., Kleine Anfrage des Abgeordneten (note 4).

lb

ld.

27

Stephan Hobe calls them 'agents of public interest'. Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of Nongovernmental Organizations, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, vol. 5,1997, 191, 209. The trouble is, and the history of the M A I in the O E C D is a good example of this, that there can be in fact a lot of dispute about what policy really is in the public interest.

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process. Many governments under the negotiation parties were attuned to the environmental, labor and social aspects raised by N G O lobbying. Further, by indicating some of the problematic effects a certain provision in the M A I could have, they made a valuable contribution to the development of a coherent M A I . The problem is that many N G O s and individuals representing them seemed not to want to have a M A I at all. This fundamental opposition of some NGOs was intractable, and unlikely to die down without a clear admission of defeat on the part of any possible negotiating parties in the future. Besides fundamental opposition and environmental criticism, the 'developing country issue' was one of the major focus points raised by the M A I critics. It is closely connected with the question whether the O E C D or the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the proper forum for negotiations of a M A I . Europeans wanted the negotiations to be on the W T O agenda, because they wanted a level playing field including developing countries' interests. 28 Canada also consistently maintained the view that the W T O is the best place to negotiate a M A I , since there is little new net investment protection to be achieved from an agreement among O E C D countries which have broadly compatible and liberal investment regimes. But the US opposed this approach and urged the O E C D to do it, since in its view the developing countries (DCs) would refuse it anyway. The US view was that developing countries could join later on. But it is in fact questionable whether they will join an agreement if they have not been involved in the negotiating process. DCs strongly resent a far-reaching loss of sovereignty through a binding commitment on the liberalization of investment. The possible gains from joining such an agreement are not immediately visible as was the case with regard to the cross-sectoral trade-offs for the developing countries in the Uruguay Round negotiations. There, market access and liberalization in, e.g., agriculture and textiles were traded against, e.g., a strong agreement on intellectual property. The argument is that, unlike in trade negotiations, given the fact that many DCs do not have multinational enterprises of their own, DCs signing a M A I would effectively be granting unilateral market access to potential investors from developed countries. Although developing countries are no longer trying to negotiate a 'New International Economic Order', 29 they still have a different emphasis in which they stress topics like restrictive business practices, technology transfer, standards of behavior for foreign investors vis-avis the host, and labor mobility. Together with the general mood in DCs that dur-

28

See the Communication of the Commission to the Council ' A level playing field for direct investment worldwide', COM(95), 42 final, 1 March 1995,9. O n this issue see also Leon Brittan , Investment liberalization: the next great boost to the world economy, Transnational Corporations, vol. 4,1995,1,9; Renato Ruggiero , Foreign direct investment and the multilateral trading system, Transnational Corporations, vol. 5, 1996, 1 et seq. 29

See U N General Assembly Resolutions on the New International Economic Order, Res. 3201 of 9 May 1974, Res. 3202 of 16 May 1974, reprinted in: I L M , vol. 13, 1974, 715 - 766.

1*

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ing the Uruguay Round of G A T T they gave more than they received, the DCs are at the moment reluctant to negotiate a M A I . 3 0 During the negotiations in the OECD, there was at least some input from DCs and emerging economies in the negotiations of the M A I . Although Mexico, three central European countries and South Korea are the only emerging economies able to actively participate in the M A I talks in the OECD, the group of countries w i t h observer status consisted of DCs as well. 3 1 In fact, developing countries have gained a considerable share of F D I in recent years. They received in 1996 US$ 129 billion and invested US$ 51 billion abroad. Their share of total world outflows rose to 15 percent while their share of inflows grew to 37 percent, from 30 percent the previous year. 32 Thus, their importance for F D I is not to be found only as host to investment but also as investor home countries. Adherence of developing countries would not only advance the value of a M A I itself, but also promote economic development in those countries by enhancing investor confidence and the credibility of economic policies through adherence to binding international rules. 33 One way to ease the accession to the M A I considered during the negotiations in the O E C D was to introduce a general clause that in case of accession of developing countries, the M A I parties could grant DCs special concessions. Alternatively, it has been regarded as sufficient that at the time of accession DCs issue country-specific exceptions in areas where they feel that their industry should not be open to foreign investors. There were also plans to grant DCs very specific exceptions from the national treatment obligation with regard to the post-investment phase (e.g. regarding subsidies for infant industries). If the M A I negotiations continue in the W T O , the interests of DCs w i l l be articulated more forcefully. Since these interests are often incomparable with what developed countries regard as a modern standard of investor protection, negotiations of a M A I w i l l not be more easy in the W T O than they have been in the OECD.

30

DCs have their own proposals for the content of a M A I . See for example the proposals for an international agreement on investment issued by the CUTS Centre for International Trade Economics & Environment, Multilateralisation of Sovereignty, 1998, 85 et seq. 31

See supra (note 23).

32

U N C T A D , Word Investment Report 1997, 5; different numbers are issued by the International Monetary Fund where developing countries received in 1996 a net private capital inflow of US$ 207.4 billion, consisting of US$ 100.8 billion direct investment and US$ 106.5 billion of net portfolio investment and other net investments, see International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook, October 1997, 29. 33

For a study on the link between policy reforms and F D I in DCs based on the experience of six countries, see O E C D , Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Development, Lessons from Six Emerging Economies, 1998.

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I V . Basic Achievements of the M A I and Unresolved Issues A number of options are available to companies wishing to establish a presence abroad. Starting with licensing or sub-contracting, options range from strategic alliances or joint ventures to offices or branches and finally wholly owned subsidiaries. W i t h the dismantling of tariff and non-tariff barriers within the framework of the W T O and a growing number of countries liberalizing their foreign investment laws, licensing and sub-contracting are no longer the only means for entering a foreign market, but joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions are going to increase rapidly. 34 Thus, a M A I should necessarily cover all forms of investments be they majority or minority interests in shares, intellectual property rights or bonds. 1. The Definition of Investment As is the case in BITs, the M A I Negotiating Text commences w i t h a provision defining the 'investments' of the Contracting Parties which are covered by the treaty. W i t h regard to BITs, traditionally the capital-exporting states tend to favor broad definitions that include not only physical assets and equity but also non-equity investments. The term 'investment' under the United States Model Agreement, e.g., includes not only tangible and intangible property but also "a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value." 35 Similarly the German Model Treaty refers to "claims to money which has been used to create an economic value or claims to any performance having an economic value." 36 Interestingly, the Mexican Model Treaty reduces the scope of non-equity investment by stating that investment includes "claims to money or to any performance having an economic value, except for claims to money that arise solely from commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services. . . ." 3 7 In the context of the M A I negotiations in the O E C D a debate arose about whether to include mere portfolio investment in the investment

34

Hatem (note 6), 33 et seq.-, the U N C T A D , World Investment Report 1997, 9, concludes that i n all regions of the world, especially i n the United States and Western Europe, mergers and acquisitions played an important role in driving FDI. 35

See Art. 1 (a) (i), (iii) of the US Model Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment as of February 1992, R. Dolzer/M. Stevens , Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1995, 240. 36

See Art. 1 para. 1 (c) of the German Model Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments as of August 1997 (internal). However, i n Germany the definition of investment is understood as meaning only direct investment, see Karl (note 21), 433. 37

See Art. 1 (a) of the Mexican Model Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (internal, emphasis added).

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definition. The M A I Negotiating Text as it stands on 24 April 1998 defines 'Investment' broadly, including: Every kind of asset owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by an investor, including: (i)

an enterprise (being a legal person or any other entity constituted or organised under the applicable law of the Contracting Party, whether or not for profit, and whether private or government owned or controlled, and includes a corporation, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, branch, joint venture, association or organization);

(ii)

shares, stocks or other forms of equity participation i n an enterprise, and rights derived therefrom;

(iii)

bonds, debentures, loans and other forms of debt, and rights derived therefrom;

(iv)

rights under contracts, including turnkey, construction, management, production or revenue-sharing contracts;

(v)

claims to money and claims to performance;

(vi)

intellectual property rights;

(vii)

rights conferred pursuant to law or contract such as concessions, licenses, authorizations, and permits;

(viii) any other tangible and intangible, movable and immovable property, and any related property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens and pledges.

Thus, in the M A I Negotiating Text portfolio investment (whether debt or equity) is included in the definition of investment. While the definition should not be so wide as to cover mere commercial trade, especially from the investor's perspective, the definition should be broad enough to ensure that all forms of investment, including portfolio investment, are covered by the agreement and not only direct investment. The majority of delegations decided the problem from an economic perspective due to which foreign investors operate on the financial markets of a host country just as any domestic investor does. Thus, portfolio investment is regarded by the M A I Negotiating Text as just a different form of investment which, although it gives the investor only a financial stake in the foreign venture without any managerial control, needs to be protected by a M A I . Since the difference from direct investment is to be found only in the factor of managerial control it is hard to differentiate both forms of investment in practice anyway. The meaning of this broad investment definition in the M A I Negotiating Text can only be fully appreciated in connection with the fact that the proposed M A I covered both the making of an investment (pre-establishment phase) and the investment once made (post-establishment phase). Thus, there should have been an obligation under the M A I with respect to the treatment of an investor who wishes, e.g.y to buy shares or stocks or to establish an enterprise (pre-phase) as opposed to the treatment of an investor having made his investments already (post-phase). There are two major problems following from this broad investment definition. As the financial turmoil in East Asia and Russia has shown, the volatility of port-

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folio and financial investments has to be taken very seriously, since such investments are of a much shorter duration than direct investments. Thus, there was a connection between the broad investment definition and the envisaged provision to ensure free transfer of payments which is a standard provision of many BITs: 38 If portfolio investment would have been included in the investment definition the claim of many delegations to include in the M A I a provision allowing the restriction of transfers in the case of a balance-of-payments crisis could not have been ignored. The result would have been that the free transfer provision, which some delegations regarded as a core provision of the M A I , would be watered down. Secondly, the risk of a host country to be involved in investor/state arbitration is increased by a broad definition, since mere portfolio investors could have standing against the host state.39 Taking account of these problems, the M A I Negotiation Group agreed "that this broad definition of investment calls for further work on appropriate safeguard provisions. w40 I n order to narrow the scope of the investment definition it has already been agreed that an interpretative note w i l l be required to indicate that, "in order to qualify as an investment under M A I , an asset must have the characteristics of an investment, such as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk." 4 1 It is, however, doubtful whether this interpretative note would have really limited the scope of investment and to what degree it would have done so. The Commentary to the M A I Negotiating Text states, e.g., that claims to money resulting from a sale of goods or services are not generally considered as investments.42 Further negotiations were required also on certain other topics w i t h regard to the definition of investments. The M A I Negotiating Text does include investment indirectly owned or controlled by investors of a party. Different views exist, however, as to the coverage of investment by an investor established in another M A I party, but owned or controlled by a non-MAI investor or investment by an investor established in a non-MAI party, but owned or controlled by a M A I party investor. 43 38

Generally the free transfer of payments provision entails an obligation to guarantee to investors free transfer i n connection w i t h an investment as the principal and additional amounts to maintain or increase the investment, the returns, the repayment of loans, the compensation for expropriation etc. See, e.g., Art. 5 of the German Model (note 36). 39

Karl (note 21), 433.

40

The M A I Negotiating Text as of 24 A p r i l 1998 (hereinafter Negotiating Text), Art. II, footnote 1. 41

Negotiating Text, Art. Π , footnote 2.

42

Commentary to the M A I Negotiating Text as of 24 A p r i l 1998 (hereinafter Commentary), Art. Π , Investment para. 11. 43

Id., Art. Π , Investment para. 2 - 6.

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Some delegations argued that it would not be desirable if non-MAI countries would indirectly benefit and 'free ride' on the liberalization achieved by the M A I . 4 4 A further unresolved issue was the relationship of the M A I to other international agreements relating to intellectual property rights (IPRs). As in many BITs intellectual property in all forms is included in the definition of investment of the M A I Negotiating Text. There were some worries that this broad inclusion of intellectual property would disturb the balance of the existing network of intellectual property treaties. These are most prominently the Paris Convention 45 established in 1883 (patent and trademark protection), the Berne Convention 46 established in 1885 (protection of authors' rights) and the TRIPs agreement. For example, there was a problem w i t h regard to the exceptions which are provided under the Berne Convention and the TRIPs agreement. The Berne Convention contemplates 'special agreements' between particular member States of the Berne Union on exceptions.47 The TRIPs agreement includes these exceptions by exempting generally from its M F N treatment clause "any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity accorded by a Member . . . (d) deriving from international agreements related to the protection of intellectual property which entered into force prior to the entry into force of the W T O Agreement. . . ." 4 8 These exceptions to M F N and N T accepted by the existing treaties on intellectual property and based on the principle of reciprocity would have been overruled by an unrestricted M A I giving IPRs full protection. Furthermore, in the copyright legislation of all countries many provisions on exceptions and limitations of rights can be found which are in conformity with the existing standard set out by treaties. For instance, under the TRIPs agreement compulsory licensing of patents is allowed under certain conditions. 49 The interpretation and effect of the provisions on expropriation and compensation in the M A I Negotiating Text would be in direct contradiction to these exceptions. Finally, there is the danger of forum shopping since contracting parties to the M A I and, e.g., TRIPs could choose the dispute settlement authority which for them seems to be more appropriate. The way out of these difficulties should not be to restrict the forms of intellectual property to which the protection of a M A I should be granted. The way forward AA

Karl ( note 21), 434.

45

Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, 31 October 1958, 828 U N T S 107. 46

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 9 September 1886, 14 July 1967, 828 U N T S 221. 47

Id., Art. 9 para. 2.

48

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs), Art. 4 (d), reprinted in: I L M , vol. 33, 1994, 1197. 49

Id., Art. 31.

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would be to exempt the exceptions to N T and M F N in existing treaties like TRIPs from a M A I by introducing a speciality clause indicating that a M A I is not to impede existing obligations under other intellectual property related treaties. 50 2. The 'Cornerstones' of the MAI Negotiating Text a) Market Access, National Treatment and the Most Favored Nation Clause The implications of a broad investment definition cannot be fully understood if one does not take into account the second most important innovation of the M A I Negotiating Text: The investor's protection in the pre-establishment phase, i.e., the introduction of a right to establishment. While most BITs reserve the right of the host state to regulate the entry of foreign investments into its territory 5 1 the M A I Negotiating Text commitment on the treatment of investment applies to: the establishment , acquisition, expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and sale or other disposition of investments. 52

This inclusion of a right of establishment is a strong interference with the sovereign right of the host state to control the presence of aliens within its territory. Although direct investment laws of many countries are in a continuing process of further liberalization 53 there are still techniques of controlled access to the host state's economy in place in significant markets such as China. 54 The technique of investment protection in the M A I Negotiating Text follows well-known paths. The cornerstone of G A T T and of the BITs is the principle of

50

There are at least two options to do this. First, one could add to the principles of N T and M F N a provision clarifying which aspects of IPRs protection should be covered: " A Contracting Party w i l l not be required to comply w i t h the [ M A I N T and M F N provisions] to the extent that exceptions to national treatment and M F N are allowed under Articles 3, 4 and 5 of TRIPs." Alternatively, one could add to item (v) of the clause containing definitions a lex specialis clause: "Investment... including . . . (vi) intellectual property rights accorded under the provisions of applicable national and international law in the Contracting Party where the investment is located. Such provisions are not affected by the provisions of this Agreement." 51

Muchlinski (note 8), 620.

52

Negotiating Text, Art. ΙΠ para. 1, 2.

53

For examples see Muchlinski (note 8), 172 et seq. and supra (note 19).

54

See, e.g., The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, Art. 3, Beijing Review, 7 -13 May 1990: " A l l parties of a joint venture shall submit their agreements and contracts, and articles of association to the state department concerned w i t h foreign economic relations and trade (hereinafter referred to as examining and approving authorities). The examining and approving authorities shall decide whether to approve or disapprove the joint venture within three months."

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non-discrimination. It would have become the cornerstone of the M A I as well. The Negotiating Text grants investors national treatment and most favored nation treatment. By accepting the principle of N T the expert groups agreed in the M A I Negotiating Text that the parties should treat foreign investors no less favorably than they treat their own investors. 55 Contrary to the concerns raised by M A I critics, this also means that parties have no obligation to grant foreign investors more favorable treatment. But of course this treatment concerns not only laws or regulations directed at the operations of a foreign investor but also laws or regulations which govern any economic activities. Areas of applications are, inter alia, competition law, intellectual property rights, consumer protection, other regulations relating to trade and commerce, investment incentives, labor laws, laws for the protection of the environment, social policy regulations and general public services. According to the principle of M F N , once a country has accorded a given treatment to a foreign investor or a foreign investment of a particular state, it cannot grant less favorable treatment to any other investor or investment coming from a different state.56 This has a multiplier effect, since according to the M F N obligation if a M A I member country accords a favorable treatment to an investor coming from a country not party to the M A I it has to treat an investor coming from another M A I member country according to the same standard. The basic non-discrimination obligations of N T and M F N are intended to cover both de jure and de facto discrimination. This increases their scope of application since it means that where measures do not formally provide discriminatory treatment of a foreign investor, but nonetheless limit the ability of a foreign investor to 55 Negotiating Text, Art. ΙΠ , para. 1: "Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Contracting Party and to their investments, treatment no less favourable than the treatment it accords [in like circumstances] to its own investors and their investments w i t h respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and sale or other disposition of investments." There was some dispute between delegations as to whether to include the phrase 'in like circumstances' into this provision i n order to define the comparison between the situations of foreign and domestic investors. The danger is that this would reduce the standard of protection since a government could discriminate against a foreign investor pointing out that there is no 'like circumstance' affected. The problem of circumvention through different classification of sectors may evolve in the same way it has evolved in many G A T T Panels having dealt w i t h the classification of goods for tariff purposes. Some delegations consider that the comparative context indicated through the phrase is implicit i n the concepts themselves and the phrase is therefore unnecessary. 56

Negotiating Text, Art. ΙΠ para. 2: "Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Contracting Party and to their investments, treatment no less favourable than the treatment it accords to investors of any other Contracting Party or of a non-Contracting Party. . . ."

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compete on equal terms, such measures would be incompatible with the M A I Negotiating Text. For instance, due to a widespread practice in many states, the number of investors in a particular market may be limited by the authorities with a view to preventing, in practice, the entry of foreign investors. This would constitute a de facto discrimination since the market then would be de facto closed to foreign investors. It is important to point out the fact that the N T and M F N standards are relative standards, requiring a comparison between the treatment of a foreign investor and the treatment of a domestic or third country investor. This means that governments of course still have the ability to impose different treatment on domestic and foreign investors as long as they are not in a comparable situation ('in like circumstances'). Thus, e.g., a residence requirement for getting a state subsidy can only be demanded by an investor having a residence in the particular state. If he does not have a residence, he w i l l not be discriminated against by not getting the subsidy. b) General and Country-specific Exceptions The investor protection effect gained from N T and multiplied by the M F N principle establish a very high standard if these principles are applied fully. In a multilateral agreement on economic law this has not been achieved so far. There are always general and/or country-specific exceptions to the N T and M F N principles to be found. 57 In fact, it is questionable whether an application of N T and M F N without any exception would fit w i t h the economic and political reality at all. Countries have different economic structures and are in different stages of development. Also there is always the possibility of economic or political crisis. Thus one may argue that the value of an investment agreement is determined not only by the strictness of its obligations but also by the flexibility it allows the parties in reacting to difficult situations and in pursuing different economic policies to some degree. Since the M A I Negotiating Text entails such a broad investment definition this must be balanced by broad exceptions. N A F T A , the O E C D instruments and the M A I Negotiating Text follow a similar technique of standard setting. They provide for general exceptions, they suspend their obligations only for those sectors which are listed in country-specific reservations annexed to the agreements ('top-down' approach) and finally, these reservations are subject to a 'standstill'. The standstill commitment means that aside from the existing exceptions listed in the country's reservation list new discriminatory measures cannot be introduced. Nota bene, non-discriminatory measures are certainly allowed to be introduced. Standstill does not prohibit any future legislation in 57

Even the EC Treaty, considered the most advanced economic integration entity, includes exceptions to its basic freedoms, see Arts. 36, 48 (3), 55, 56, 66 ECT.

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general, but only with regard to discriminatory regulations. Also general exceptions are carved out from the standstill principle. Furthermore, N A F T A and O E C D instruments include a 'ratchet effect' and a 'rollback' approach. 'Rächet effect' means that once a certain sector is liberalized this status is irreversible. The concept of 'rollback' involves a progressive liberalization of those areas where countries have issued country-specific exceptions. It entails a political objective demanded by the spirit of the M A I Negotiating Text, but there are no binding obligations in the M A I Negotiating Text with regard to further liberalization as there have been in GATS. The 'rollback' approach as a political demand logically follows the line which has been set by the other O E C D instruments like the Codes on the Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations and on the Liberalization of Capital Movements adopted by the O E C D Council on 12 December 1961.58 As with regard to other multilateral trade agreements, 59 there is a national security exception in the M A I Negotiating Text. 6 0 However, since compensation in case of expropriation is considered central to investor protection, the majority view of the delegations was that the M A I should provide an absolute guarantee that an investor w i l l be compensated for an expropriated investment. 61 Thus, it is made clear in the proposed text that the exception of national security shall not apply to the expropriation and compensation provisions. 62 Otherwise, the exception w i l l apply to all commitments of the agreement. The interpretive authority whether to apply the exception rests with the members themselves and the arbitration mechanism can not be invoked for interpretation of the exception. 63 58 59

Supra (note 16).

See GATS, Art. XTVbis; para. 1; N A F T A , Art. 2102.

G A T T , Art. X X I ; US Model Agreement (note 35), Art. X

60

Negotiating Text, Art. V I para. 2: "Nothing i n this Agreement shall be construed: a. to prevent any Contracting Party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests: (i) taken in time of war, or armed conflict, or other emergency i n international relations; (ii) relating to the implementation of national policies or international agreements respecting the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (iii) relating to the production of arms and ammunition; b. to require any Contracting Party to furnish or allow access to any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; c. to prevent any Contracting Party from taking any action i n pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security." 61

Commentary, Art. V I para. 1, No. 3.

62

Negotiating Text, Art. V I para. 1.

63 O n l y a State-State Consultation Procedure can be invoked i n the case that a "Contracting Party has reason to believe that actions or measures taken by another Contracting Party under

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Furthermore, an exception can be invoked by a Contracting Party if it is necessary for the maintenance of public order. While until now delegations have recognized the interest of state in ensuring the application of, e.g., its criminal laws, antiterrorist measures, and money laundering regulation, not all delegations were convinced that it is necessary to discriminate between foreign and domestic investors in order to protect public order. 64 In fact, the reason for such a discrimination can be found only in the assumption that foreign investors may cause more of the problems involved than nationals of the respective country, a proposition hard to prove. Furthermore, temporary safeguards are allowed under the M A I Negotiating Text in the event of serious balance-of-payments and external financial difficulties or where, in exceptional circumstances, movements of capital cause serious difficulties for macroeconomic management.65 Finally, some delegations demanded exclusion of cultural matters from the principles of the M A I . This meant that investments in the cultural sector like the press and film industry would not be touched on by the M A I . Fears especially from industry lobby groups were articulated that existing national subsidies systems could be extended to foreign investors leading to a misuse of, e.g., Hollywood producers of German film promotion subsidies. These problems are again a result of the broad definition of investment in Article I of the M A I Negotiating Text. In fact, if investment is to include portfolio investment, a Hollywood company could benefit at least indirectly via a film fund from, e.g., a German film promotion subsidy. However, negotiators should refrain from introducing a general exception clause into a M A I . The important thing is to make sure that the regulations of the GATS agreement are not impaired. In the GATS agreement the E U and the member states have not agreed upon obligations in the area of culture regarding N T and there are exceptions from M F N treatment in the audio-visual sector as well. There must be a clause in a M A I to make sure that the agreement is not to interfere with these GATS obligations and exceptions; otherwise a country-specific exception would have to be listed with regard to the audio-visual sector in a M A I . The other mechanism of improving the support for strict core obligations is introduced by Article I X of the M A I Negotiating Text. This provision offers the possibility of listing country-specific exceptions to N T , M F N and performance requirements. The core provision of the draft Article I X of the Negotiating Text 'grandfathers' existing non-conforming measures as set out by a contracting party in its Schedule and, even more important, prevents the introduction of more restrictive

this article have been taken solely for economic reasons, or that such actions or measures are not i n proportion to the interest being protected . . see Negotiating Text, Art. V I para. 5. 64

Commentary, Art. V I para. 3, No. 1.

65

Negotiating Text, Art. V I para. 1.

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measures.66 Thus, the country-specific exceptions should have been subject to a 'standstill* obligation. Furthermore, liberalization measures once introduced are irreversible ('rächet effect') and a 'rollback' of existing restrictions could be achieved by implementing into the agreement a periodical country or sectoral review mechanism. One of the heavily disputed issues of the negotiations was whether to include a part Β in Article I X of the M A I allowing parties to introduce new non-conforming measures after the Agreement came into force (so-called 'list Β exceptions'). For example, the United States reserved the right to adopt or maintain any measure relating to subsidies or grants, including government-supported loans, guarantees and insurance as a 'list B' exception to N T and M F N . It is not always clear whether such a clause allowing for future exceptions, e.g., in new technologies or areas of subsidies has to be seen only negatively. The inclusion of such a provision makes it easier to preserve high standards in the disciplines of the agreement by allowing flexibility to countries in lodging new exceptions. O n the other hand, the standstill approach, as well as the M A I disciplines to which it applies, would be undermined through such a provision. The M A I negotiating parties including the E U issued several hundred pages of proposed exceptions. It has been claimed by the press that by advancing several hundred pages of proposed exceptions from the general rules of M A I , the negotiating parties were therefore not so enthralled by freeing foreign investment. 67 However, screening the proposed exceptions reveals that the scope of the exceptions was partly due to different opinions with regard to the outcome of the negotiations. Furthermore exceptions have been made which are partly irrelevant for FDI, e.g. the exceptions in connection with residency should be deleted since a residency requirement does not contradict N T . The exception list could have been shortened considerably if a general provision were introduced into the M A I allowing contracting parties to refer to their respective GATS commitments since this treaty already contains liberalization rules as far as investment in services is concerned. c) The Classical Investment Protection Clauses: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Expropriation with Compensation, Free Transfer of Payments While relative principles like N T and M F N treatment establish a 'ceiling' in that they represent the highest standards of treatment that can be accorded to foreign 66 Negotiating Text, Art. EX A: "Articles X (National Treatment), Y (Most Favoured Nat i o n Treatment), do not apply to: (a) any existing non-conforming measure as set out by a Contracting Party in its Schedule to Annex A of the Agreement, to the extent that the measure is maintained, continued or promptly renewed i n its legal system. . . 67

Supra (note 1).

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investors, the classical absolute investment protection standards provide a 'floor' in that they grant investors a minimum level of protection. O n top of this 'floor' stand absolute standards as the principles of fair and equitable treatment, expropriation w i t h compensation and free transfer of payments. To begin with, Article I V of the M A I Negotiating Text demands fair and equitable treatment of the investor and full and constant protection and security. Those principles are too vague to create real rights for investors but serve as guiding lines for the interpretation and application of the whole treaty. The protection in case of expropriation and the obligation to allow free transfer of payments, on the other hand, are principles which impose strict duties on host states. The contentious issues surrounding their inclusion in a M A I are to be found in the scope of these obligations (with regard to expropriation) and the exceptions to the obligation (with regard to the free transfer of payments). Although the legality of expropriation has been one of the most contentious problems in international law in the past, an international minimum standard for the treatment of property belonging to aliens has been developed in international law. It is enshrined in bilateral investment treaties even though many capital-importing countries traditionally are more hostile to this concept. Under the concept of the international minimum standard, 68 expropriation is only lawful where it is carried out for a clear public purpose, without discrimination and upon payment of 'prompt adequate and effective compensation'. 69 Against this background the drafting of the provision on expropriation and compensation has proceeded relatively quickly. 7 0 By the provision set out in the M A I Negotiating Text a "Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalise directly or indirectly an investment in its territory of an investor of another Contracting Party or take any measure or measures having equivalent effect. .. ." 7 1 This broad definition of expropriation includes 'creeping' expropriations. Codifying international standards, expropriation is only lawful "a) for a purpose which is in the public interest, b) on a non-discriminatory basis, c) in accordance with due process of law, and d) accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. . . ." 7 2 Furthermore, compensation shall be paid without delay and shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the

68 For a definition see Ian Brownlie , Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed., 1990, 524. See for the acceptance of this principle Muchlinski (note 8), 503. 69

The so-called 4 Hull formula', which appears in a Note from the US Secretary of State, CordellHull , see id., 532. 70

Frans Engering , The Multilateral Investment Agreement, Transnational Corporations, vol. 5, no. 3, 1996, 150. 71

Negotiating Text, Art. IV.2.1.

72

Id., Art. IV.2.1.

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expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation occurred. 73 Further agreement was still needed on the question how to calculate compensation in order to protect the investor against losses from currency fluctuations before date of payment. 74 But the most contentious issue surrounding the expropriation provision of the Negotiating Text and the M A I in general is that governments have to pay foreign investors for expropriation because of regulations they have imposed on them in order to conduct domestic policies, e.g., in the area of environment or public health and safety. For instance, it can be easily established that to prohibit an investor from importing raw materials which he needs for his production is a "measure having equivalent effect" to an expropriation if the investor is not able to substitute the raw materials and consequently goes out of business. But what if the imported raw material contains substances which are regarded as detrimental to the host country's environment or public health? There is a strong need for a M A I to make clear that governments are still able to impose laws and regulations if they are not discriminatory to foreign investors. It would be worthwhile to consider an exception clause or an interpretative note that compensation is not to be required if the losses of an investor are due to non-discriminatory regulation in the public interest. During the negotiations there was widespread agreement among all delegations that the free transfer of returns is a critical element of the protection of the investors and thus is to be seen as a core provision of a M A I . 7 5 The provision on the free transfer of payments is among the most important ones in BITs. 76 The free transfer of income and the repatriation of capital on the termination of the investment are vital elements to attract foreign investment. 77 Since many BITs allow members to restrict transfers in case of a balance-of-payments crisis, 78 some delegations were insisting on the inclusion of such a provision 73

Id. y Art. IV.2.2./2.3.

74

Commentary, Art. I V para. 2, No. 8.

75

Id. y Art. I V para. 4, No. 1; Engering (note 70), 151.

76

German Model Agreement (note 36), Art. 5; US Model Agreement (note 35), Art. IV; Mexican Model Agreement (note 37), Art. 5. 77

W i t h regard to the M A I , free transfer relates to: "a) the initial capital and additional amounts to maintain or increase an investment; b) returns; c) payments made under a contract including a loan agreement; d) proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of an investment; e) payments of compensation under Articles 2 and 3; f) payments arising out of the settlement of a dispute; g) earnings and other remuneration of personnel engaged from abroad in connection w i t h an investment." Negotiating Text, Art. IV.4.1. 78

E.g. Mexican Model Agreement (note 37), Art. 5 para. 4: "In case of serious balance of payments difficulties each Party may temporarily restrict transfers, provided that such a Party implements measures or a programme i n accordance w i t h international standards. These

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into a M A I . This demand has gained more support since the economic crisis in East Asia has shown that volatile capital flows can impose a real danger on emerging market economies and subsequent capital restrictions can again be a realistic threat to investors. Even E U law gives member states the right to intervene in capital movements with regard to third countries if the balance-of-payment is seriously in danger. 79 W i t h regard to the general question, it should be kept in mind that the free transfer of capital was not mainly responsible for the East Asian crisis, but the inadequate financial system of many emerging markets. 80 Furthermore, F D I capital is not as volatile as mere portfolio investment since it depends on long-term profits. However, if the scope of the investment definition in a future M A I would be reduced with a tendency to protect predominantly direct investment the problem can be resolved more easily. d) Dispute Settlement The M A I as it was envisaged by the O E C D would have been especially significant because its rules can be enforced. As a legally binding treaty it would have given investors the ability to enforce its provisions, either via diplomatic protection and by demanding a state-to-state arbitration from his home government or by issuing a claim against the host government himself. The procedures for state-to-state arbitration envisaged by the M A I Negotiating Text are modeled on the mechanisms contained in many BITs. 81 In addition, the Negotiating Text also establishes an investor-to-state dispute settlement procedure. 82 Under the M A I investor-to-state dispute settlement, the investor alleging loss or damage as a result of a breach of an obligation can choose the local courts, international arbitration, or any other method the parties have agreed upon. 83

restrictions would be imposed in an equitable, non-discriminatory and in good faith basis." There is no longer any such provision in the German Model Treaty. 79

EC Directive 88/361 of 24 June 1988, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 178, 1988, 5.

80

Steven Radelet/ Jeffrey D. Sachs, The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 1, 1998, 1, 71. 81

Compare for instance Arts. 10 and 11 of the German Model Treaty (note 36) to Art. V A , B, C of the M A I Negotiating Text. 82 Negotiating Text, Art. V D l.a. defines the scope of investor-to-state arbitration including "disputes between a Contracting Party and an investor of another Contracting Party concerning an alleged breach of an obligation of the former under this Agreement which causes loss or damage to the investor or its investment." 83

Although similar to the solution which has been found w i t h regard to Art. 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty, the proposed text of the M A I leaves the investor the possibility to choose between national remedies and international arbitration; it is likely that in future nego-

19 G Y I L 41

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A lexander Böhmer

While recourse to a local court of the host country is an accepted remedy for most countries, the idea of suing governments before international arbitration bodies was seen by many states as an encroachment on their sovereignty. Indeed, since the N T and M F N principles apply even to the pre-establishment period of an investment, the investor-to-state dispute in front of an international arbitration forum can also occur with respect, e.g., to an infringement of the right to entry and to establish a subsidiary in the host country. To include a procedure for arbitration of disputes between an investor and a host country into a M A I would be quite a progressive element in international economic law. Although many BITs include such a provision 84 on the multilateral level an investor-to-state dispute settlement can be found only in the Energy Charter Treaty (Art. 26). The W T O dispute settlement system gives investors no rights to standing.85 But it is not clear yet that any M A I in the future will contain an investor-to-state dispute settlement which extends to pre-establishment disputes, nor is it quite clear anymore that there w i l l be an investor-to-state procedure at all. The overall criticism that a M A I as it has been proposed by the M A I Negotiating Text grants too many rights to investors accumulates in the provision on investor-to-state arbitration. This is an area where government sovereignty would be affected most decisively. A n investor, the arguments runs, being excluded from a certain sector by the host government's laws or regulations could start proceedings against this government in an international arbitration body, while there would not be a corresponding right of the government as against the investor. It should be noted that the government can of course sue the investor in the national courts and that the investor is subject to all the laws and regulations of the host country. However, this might be merely a theoretical possibility if the foreign investor simply leaves the country taking all of his assets with him. Thus, as in some BITs Germany has concluded with other countries, 86 the host government should be given a right to sue investors in international arbitration bodies as well. tiations some parties w i l l not permit an investor to switch between local courts and international arbitration after he has chosen one procedure. This 'fork-in-the-road' approach could be annexed in form of a reservation comparable to Annex DD of the Energy Charter Treaty. 84

See, e.g.y German Model Treaty (note 36), Art. 11. The inclusion of an investor-to-state dispute settlement clause into many BITs was caused by the Washington Convention of 1965, setting up the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). If the BITs refer to ICSID they also accept investor-to-state arbitration, although the precise wording of the clause referring to ICSID arbitration is important, see Muchlinski (note 8), 634. 85 This investor-to-state arbitration procedure constituted under the M A I is i n danger of negatively affecting the W T O dispute settlement system. Since GATS includes the right of establishment in the form of setting up a commercial presence there might be room for overlapping jurisdiction if a M A I is successfully established in the future. 86

E.g. the BIT concluded w i t h Poland 10.11.1989, BGBl. Π, 1990, Nr. 23,606, Art. 11 sec. 2.

The Struggle for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment What speaks in favor of a similarly constructed investor-to-state arbitration is the de-politicizing effect it may have as against a state-to-state settlement. However, the effect of an investor-to-state arbitration is that new laws and regulation, if they constitute an expropriation or are applied merely de facto in a discriminatory manner, can become a case for an arbitration body, while without such a procedure it would be a matter of the political process and the national courts. As investors from emerging markets investing in developed countries are starting to increase in numbers, even some O E C D member states are beginning to think about the loss of sovereignty involved in such a procedure. It is not the least for this reason that any downsized version of a M A I in the future is likely to exclude investor-to-state arbitration at least with regard to the pre-establishment phase. 3. Other Contentious Issues O f the many other contentious issues of the M A I negotiations such as the questions of entry and stay of key personnel, the issue of investment incentives, the issue of N T and M F N treatment with regard to all kinds of privatization, the issue of monopolies and of corporate practices and the issue of secondary investment boycott (as a reaction to the Helms-Burton law 8 7 of the US) only the ones which have a broader political implication shall be treated more thoroughly here: the O E C D Guidelines for multinational enterprises, the inclusion of environment and labor issues, the issue of performance requirements and the REIO clause. a) O E C D Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Environment and Labor Issues One of the fundamental criticisms of the M A I Negotiating Text was that it grants rights to investors while not imposing any duties on them. These political imperatives cannot be neglected; otherwise public support for any M A I will not be found. The proposal during the M A I negotiations to at least annex the non-binding O E C D Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 88 to the agreement in order to increase their importance as well as proposals to include clauses relating to environmental and labor standards can be seen as a reaction to these concerns.

87

Reprinted in: I L M , vol. 35,1996,357. O n the issue see Vaughan Lowe , US Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Helms-Burton and D'Amato Acts, International & Comparative Law Quarterly (ICLQ), vol. 46, 1997, 378 et seq. Although the E U and the US reached an "Understanding w i t h Respect to Disciplines for the Strengthening of Investment Protection" on 18 May 1998 it is unlucky, to say the least, that this emotional topic has been connected w i t h the M A I by the negotiators. 88

19*

See for the original version of the Guidelines I L M , vol. 15, 1976, 961 et seq.

291

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Alexander Böhmer

The Guidelines were adopted as an Annex to the O E C D Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises passed by the governments of the member countries on 21 June 1976. They cover issues relating to the activities of multinational enterprises such as information disclosure, taxation, competition, environment, employment and industrial relations. They are not legally enforceable but carry the weight of a joint recommendation by the O E C D governments. 89 This commitment to the Guidelines could be reaffirmed in a M A I . However, some chapters dealing with labor relations and the environment should be strengthened in order to give those issues more weight in a M A I . The issue of environment and labor relations was supposed to emerge in the M A I negotiated in the O E C D on two other occasions as well. First, in the preamble, reference should have been made to sustainable development of the environment as well as commitment to the Copenhagen Declaration of the World Summit on Social Development and to the observance of internationally recognized core labor standards. However, the scope of these references were disputed. Secondly, there was strong support to include in the M A I a 'not lowering standards' clause which would prohibit parties from encouraging investment by lowering health, safety or environmental standards or relaxing labor standards. 90 It was quite questionable whether such a broad and unspecific reference would have been enough to satisfy ongoing concerns surrounding environmental and labor issues. As we know now, this solution was not enough, since environmental concerns were one of the main reasons for the abandonment of the M A I negotiations in the OECD. Furthermore it must be pointed out that the objective of protecting government regulators if they legislate in a non-discriminatory fashion is a broader issue, not just relevant to labor and environmental regulation. It affects, inter alia, the scope of expropriation and N T , the issue of de facto discrimination and expropriation, the limits in the performance requirement articles and the application of the dispute settlement article. Similar to N A F T A one could add provisions establishing a presumption that normal measures taken, e.g., for the sake of environmental protection do not violate the M A I obligations. 91 A n alternative is a general exception for environmental measures modeled on Article X X of G A T T . 9 2 89

Muchlinski (note 8), 580.

90

This clause is modeled on Art. 1114 para. 2 N A F T A .

91

Art. 1114 para. 1 N A F T A states: "Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent w i t h this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity i n its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns." 92

This would mean the introduction of a general exception clause giving parties the right to adopt, maintain or enforce measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health" if such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction" on investment. See Art.

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Whatever the outcome w i l l be, there are substantial links between foreign direct investment and the environment and labor issues. This has to be reflected in the provisions of any M A I in the future, otherwise the acceptance of regulating foreign direct investment by an international treaty regime is not likely to be achieved. b) Performance Requirements From the perspective of neo-classical economic theory, in a world completely free of restrictions on the movement of goods, services, and capital, any measure that distorts the global allocation of productive resources would be world welfare reducing since it leads to market distortions. 93 However, for the country imposing them, so-called performance requirements may be beneficial in the short run at least if they are imposed sensibly. In so far, the neo-classical objections to performance requirements are overstated. 94 Performance requirements are measures that governments impose on investors in order to achieve economic benefits for the country as a whole or for a particular region. Local content and local resourcing requirements are the most prominent forms of performance requirements. There are not many existing rules on performance requirements. The TRIMS agreement covers only trade-related investment measures. It refers to local content, local sourcing requirements, trade balancing requirements and some import/export restrictions. 95 N A F T A has more far-reaching prohibitions 96 and the Energy Charter Treaty 9 7 also contains some obligations on performance requirements. The proposed M A I Negotiating Text tried to extend the existing prohibitions to non-trade-related investments. It includes a quite strong prohibition of performance requirements: The articles lists 12 specific performance requirements which are generally prohibited. 98 There is also an exception clause allowing a contracting party to impose certain performance requirements on an investor if they are linked to the receipt of an advantage, e.g., in the form of an investment incentive. Furthermore, X X G A T T and the proposals i n Commentary, Art. ΙΠ , Proposed Additional Article on Labour and Environment, notes 12 and 13. 93

Michael J. Trebilcock/Robert

94

Muchlinski (note 8), 259.

95

Illustrative list annexed to the TRIMS agreement (note 11).

96

Art. 1106, 1107 and 1108 N A F T A .

97

Energy Charter Treaty (note 17), Art. 5.

98

How se, The Regulation of International Trade, 1995, 275.

Besides the requirements already prohibited by the TRIMS agreement, the M A I list includes, inter alia , the prohibition of requirements to transfer technology, to locate headquarters i n the territory of the host country, to achieve a given level of R & D i n the host's territory, to hire a given level of nationals, to establish a joint venture w i t h domestic participation.

294

Alexander Böhmer

a country can list a country-specific exception with regard to specific performance requirements. These exceptions allow developing countries to impose, for instance, a transfer technology requirement or a requirement to achieve some research and development in its territory. There was ongoing dispute on the question whether there should be more far-reaching exceptions, e.g., to secure compliance w i t h national laws and regulations, to protect human, animal or plant life or health, or for the conservation of natural resources." From a general point of view any M A I should be more flexible on the issue of performance requirements. There is good reason to believe that it should be the sole responsibility of any country to impose performance requirements. Since the nations of the world are competing for foreign direct investment, restrictive performance requirements are outmoded anyway. The discussion shifts more to the issue of investment incentives 100 and their detrimental effect on competition between different nations. In fact, the issue of performance requirements and investment incentives are two sides of the same coin. They are both trade and investment distorting. However, as neo-classical economic theory fails to recognize, countries may be able to create a competitive advantage by intelligent economic policy. 1 0 1 Thus if a developing country as a host country to foreign investment has a strong bargaining position, e.g., because it has natural resources, any M A I should not prohibit this country from imposing performance requirements on foreign investors. Vice versa w i t h regard to investment incentives: there might be a benefit for a developing country not having any natural resources to set up, e.g., export processing zones which offer cheap tax and tariff rates in order to attract at least some foreign investment. Again a M A I should refuse to sanction such behavior. Also for the sake of reaching a settlement of this very contentious issue, a M A I should restrain itself on the question of performance requirements and refer to the standard achieved in the TRIMS agreement instead.

c) The Regional Economic Integration Organization Clause The issue of the Regional Economic Integration Organisation (REIO) clause was one of the most prominent points of conflict between the US and the European Union negotiating parties. The idea behind a REIO clause is that members of a regional economic integration zone should not be obliged by the M F N provision of the M A I to extend their internal liberalization measures to third countries. The 99

Negotiating Text, Art. ΙΠ , performance requirements, para. 4.

100

There is ongoing dispute about whether to include an explicit prohibition of investment incentives into the M A I . That they should be subject to N T , M F N and transparency has been generally agreed between the negotiating parties. 101

See M. E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, 1990.

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members of a REIO may grant each other certain advantages on the basis of reciprocity which they do not want to offer to non-REIO States. If there were no REIO clause in international trade agreements allowing members of a REIO to liberalize inside without granting the benefits from this liberalization to non-REIO members, due to the M F N principle third countries could take advantage of the liberal level of investment in a REIO without being obliged to treat REIO investors in their countries as favorably (the so-called 'free rider* problem). For instance, w i t h respect to banking, non-EU investors are treated in the same way and can access the Single European Market only if EU-based investors are offered reciprocal rights of entry and treatment in non-EU markets. 102 The concern of the E U that free access to the single market for non-EU investors is granted without a reciprocal obligation of the non-EU state for equal treatment of E U investors is a general concern which justifies the introduction of a REIO clause into the M A I . 1 0 3 In the M A I Negotiating Text there was only a proposal of a REIO clause to be found. According to this provision the M F N clause of the M A I shall not prevent a Contracting Party which is a Member State of a REIO from according more favorable treatment to investors and their investments from other Member States of the organisation as a result of the measures applied within the framework of that organisation than it accords to investors and their investments from other Contracting Parties.

The definition of what constitutes a REIO in the M A I is very restrictive. A REIO is an organization of sovereign states which have committed themselves to abolish in substance all barriers to investment among themselves and to which these states have transferred competence on a range of matters within the purview of this Agreement, including the authority to adopt legislation and to make decisions binding on them in respect of those matters. This definition raises one immediate question: who besides the E U is going to fulfill these criteria? Only a supranational organization such as the E U is in a position to adopt legislation which is binding on its member States. So the REIO clause in reality might be seen as an E U exception clause. In future negotiations of a M A I one should give credence to the concerns the US has with regard to the possibility that not only the E U but more and more REIOs w i l l declare themselves as falling 102 See EC Directives 89/117 of 13 February 1989, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 044, 1989, 40; 77/780 of 12 December 1977, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 322, 1977, 30 amended by 89/646 of 15 December 1989, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 386, 1989, 1; 83/350 of 13 June 1983, Official Journal Eur. Comm., No. L 193, 1983, 18. 103

Joachim Karl elaborates that there is a case for a REIO clause w i t h regard to E U directives based on the concept of mutual recognition to which non-members do not adhere or the concept of reciprocity. Karl suggests that an exception to M F N treatment i n a REIO clause should exclude non-EU investors from M F N treatment only as far as the teatment would be better than national treatment, Multilateral investment agreements and regional economic integration, Transnational Corporations, vol. 5, 1996, 19, 44 et seq.

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Alexander Böhmer

under the definition of this clause. This could hamper the multilateral approach any M A I tries to achieve. Thus, it might be more appropriate to rename the REIO clause and define it as an E U exception clause, though it could be difficult to explain why the E U should be given a privileged status which other REIOs can not achieve. The M A I Negotiating Text provision on a REIO clause claims also to allow the REIO to apply new harmonized measures which are adopted within the REIO under the condition that such measures maintain/enhance the level of investment liberalization of the REIO and its member states overall. If this succeeds there would be the possibility that although the liberalization standard overall is maintained in certain member states of the REIO, the standard could be still lowered in the future (as long as there would be a higher standard in other member states). This would give up the standstill approach which was seen as a crucial element of the M A I Negotiating Text. It would further serve as a justification for list Β exceptions (exceptions for the future) as part of the country-specific exception list issued by some negotiating parties (especially by the US in the field of subsidies and government procurement) which are also detrimental to the standstill approach. 104 If included in a future M A I , a REIO clause should be as restrictive as possible. V . Conclusion — Prospects for Future Negotiations on a Multilateral Investment Agreement Some general conclusions can be drawn from the discussion of the standards reached by the M A I Negotiating Text so far. First, negotiating international economic law has become more technically complex and demanding since the net of international rules has increased considerably. In areas where strong regulations exist, as in intellectual property protection or services, any future M A I has to make sure that it does not impair the balance which has been established in those regimes. Secondly, the procedure of negotiating international economic law treaties seem to change w i t h respect to participation. As the public has started to show a vivid interest in the broader issue of 'globalization', international and government negotiators have a much more difficult job to do than in the past. N o t only do they have to integrate different national interests including the interest of supranational negotiating parties like the EU, but they find themselves in the center of a public debate which finds its way to them through national parliaments and NGOs. Since the repercussions of the process of globalization on the way we work and live at the na-

104

I n terms of negotiation tactic there was a connection between the list Β exceptions (supported by the US and Canada) and the REIO clause (supported by the EU). A compromise could be to skip the list Β exceptions and to introduce a formulation similar to Art. 16 GATS into the R E I O clause, allowing parties affected by a future deliberalization to claim compensatory measures.

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29 7

tional level are only becoming more and more obvious, this broader public debate is overdue. O n the other hand it must still be possible for democratically elected governments to negotiate successfully treaties on topics they regard as advantageous for the people they represent. This can be very easily impaired by lengthy public debates and too much participation by different groups in the negotiating process. N o t in the least because of this last point the threat of 'the sinking of the Μ Α Γ 1 0 5 gained reality as France by mid-October 1998 declared it would not participate in future negotiations of the M A I in the O E C D context, which led to the abandonment of the whole project in the O E C D at the end of 1998. Finally, the more general question lurking behind this is whether national sovereignty to legislate would be diminished through the M A I as proposed by the Negotiating Text in a manner not acceptable to the civil society and national parliaments. If this fundamental point cannot be resolved w i t h regard to any future M A I by a strong political push, negotiation in the W T O may continue but on a scale of slow burn, which could become a deep freeze. The more optimistic possibility would be a strict downsized ' M A I Light* which would basically codify the average standard of bilateral investment agreements including N T , M F N , free transfer of payments, protection against expropriation, and a moderate version of investor-state arbitration only w i t h regard to the post-establishment stage since pre-establishment disputes have a stronger impact on domestic investment policies in general. Vital points which have to be resolved in future M A I negotiations are environmental and labor standards, exceptions in the area of culture and intellectual property, the R E I O clause, the prohibition of performance requirements, the investor-state dispute settlement, possibly the problem of secondary boycott (Helms-Burton ) and the legal quality of guidelines including obligations for investors. Also one has to note that the developed states w i l l not be prepared to go back behind the standard they have achieved already in the network of BITs or the soft law of the O E C D . The basic principles of non-discrimination, protection against expropriation, general legal security and the commitment to keep the M A I open for new accessions have been agreed upon among the negotiating parties under the O E C D M A I . Thus, there is a bottom limit for possible future negotiations in the W T O if the M A I is not to be further pursued by the O E C D . The developing countries, on the other hand, are not showing many signs of interest in pursuing negotiations even in the W T O context at the moment. By way of conclusion one should highlight the basic consent behind a M A I . The M A I , as it is still likely to be evolving sometime in the future, is at its core a simple agreement on the protection of foreign investors' standing as such in the tradition of international law of the treatment of aliens (Fremdenrecht ). Especially a down105

Supra (note 1).

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Alexander Böhmer

sized version would not infringe nation states' sovereignty. N o new international organization to which competencies are being transferred is envisaged by the M A I . It is correct, on the other hand, that the M A I is a further step in developing a constitution for the international economy. But some of the basic principles about how this constitutionalization of the international economy should be structured are — unlike in the recent past — no longer contentious. Free access to markets w i t h regard to goods and services, non-discrimination of foreigners, protection of property, reduction of trade barriers, including both tariffs and non-tariff barriers, reducing sectoral restrictions on FDI, downgrading screening mechanisms, strengthening of competition law and intellectual property rights and, on a more general level, also the aim of full participation in the world markets, taking advantage of comparative advantages one possesses as an industry or country, liberalization and privatization of industries and development driven by the private sector seemed to be basic principles of a new international economic order upon which everyone agreed. However, the ongoing volatility of financial markets and the economic crises in parts of the emerging economies also raised new questions on how strong the case for a radicaly liberalized international economy and complementary international regulation really is, or whether some moderate restrictions are more adequate. As a key focus of this debate, any future negotiation process of the M A I and the M A I itself, if it finally is concluded, are likely to reflect these questions in some form.

The 'Church of Scientology' under German Law on Church and State By Stefan Muckel

I. Introduction 1. The 'Church of Scientology' The 'Church of Scientology' was founded in the United States of America. It has also established itself in many other countries. New surveys list 2475 'churches', 'missions' and other institutions in 107 countries. 1 In the Federal Republic of Germany the 'Church of Scientology' was established in the 1970s and claims to have 30,000 members there. 2 Recently the general public was reminded again of the 'Church of Scientology' through an open letter of several American movie stars and other socialites to then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl m the International Herald Tribune of 9 January 1997.3 The authors of this letter, stressing that they are not Scientologists themselves, protested therein the alleged discrimination against Scientologists in Germany. They also compared the treatment of the 'Church of Scientology' in Germany today with the persecution of Jews in the times of National Socialism: "In the 1930s, it was the Jews. Today it is the Scientologists."4 This letter started a broad public political discussion on the 'Church of Scientology' in Germany. 5 Meanwhile the 'Church of Scientology' is under surveillance for hostile activities against the German constitution by the Constitutional Protection Agencies of several German Länder .6 In May 1996 the German House of Representatives ÇBundestag ) installed an

1 See Hans-Gerd Jaschke , in: Depart, of the Interior Northrhine-Westphalia (ed.), Scientology — eine Gefahr für die Demokratie. Eine Aufgabe für den Verfassungsschutz?, 1996, 7. 2

Compare this figure w i t h Jaschke (note 1), 7.

3

Also printed in the 18 January 1997 issue of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9.

4

Id.

5

See the newspaper reports i n the issues of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 10 January 1997, 7; 11 January 1997, 4, 27; 13 January 1997, 2. 6

See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 11 April 1998, 4 and 24 A p r i l 1998, 4 (Report of the Hamburg Constitutional Protection Agency); Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 21

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Stefan Muckel

enquête committee 'Sogenannte Sekten und Psychogrupperi on so-called religious groups and groups employing psychological tactics. This committee explicitly supports the surveillance of Scientology organizations by the Constitutional Protection Agencies.7 The teachings of the 'Church of Scientology' were developed in the 1950s by Lafayette Ron Hubbard , who until then was an author of science-fiction books. Scientologists claim that several million years ago galactic princes fought each other as a matter of life and death. The fight was won by Xenu , an immortal 'Thetan'. He then sent the souls of his defeated opponents onto earth. There they searched for and found new bodies, but henceforth forgot about their origins. Scientology now offers techniques to reconcile the human being to his spiritual origin from space. That shall lead him to psychic harmony. One of these techniques is called 'auditing', where the person (the 'preclear') reveals his thoughts, emotions and recollections to a Scientologist. During those sessions 'fields of spiritual indisposition' are diagnosed through a so-called Ε-meter. 8 Those who manage to liberate themselves from their psychic problems with the help of 'clearing courses' finally become 'operating Thetans' and can leave their bodies for journeys in space and time. The 'Church of Scientology' called the attention of the general public on itself, once it became known that those attending 'clearing courses' had to pay a considerable amount of money to the organization. Amounts of 10,000 D M and more for a single course were mentioned. 9 This attention is further supported by a criminal conviction of active and former members of the 'Church of Scientology' for fraud and negligent manslaughter in Lyon, France. The French court found proof that the Scientologists were responsible for the suicide of a former member who was not able to repay his debt to the 'Church of Scientology'. 10 Therefore, it is no surprise that Scientologists are often blamed for the financial and mental exploitation of their members, who are also said to become dependent on the church. 11 In connec-

August 1997,4 and 25 April 1998,4 (on the surveillance of the 'Church of Scientology' by the Constitutional Protection Agency of Baden-Württemberg). 7

See the interim report of the enquête committee 'Sogenannte Sekten und Psychogruppen \ in: Deutscher Bundestag Drucksachen 13/8170, 37. 8 O n auditing see Hansjörg Hemminger y Tsychotechniken', in: Hans Gasper/Joachim Müller/Friederike Valentin (eds.), Lexikon der Sekten, Sondergruppen und Weltanschauungen, 4th ed. 1996, 854, 856. 9 See Werner Thiede, Geistesmagie für eine finanzstarke Kundschaft, in: Rheinischer Merkur, issue of 7 October 1994, 93. 10

See newspaper reports in Süddeutsche Zeitung of 23/24 November 1996,14; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 25 November 1996, 9 and 29 July 1997, 3. 11

This is claimed, e.g., by the weekly magazine 'Die Zeit' in its issue of 31 January 1997, 1; also see Süddeutsche Zeitung of 9 January 1997, 38.

The ' Church of Scientology * under German Law on Church and State tion w i t h these accusations, L. Ron Hubbard is quoted again and again as having said: "Make money, make more money, help others, to make money." 12 There are other Hubbard quotations that make the Scientology organization suspicious, e.g. "The only way to control people, is to lie to them," and "Remember, churches are regarded to be reform groups. Therefore, we have to present ourselves as a reform group." 13 Finally, the 'Church of Scientology* is said to infiltrate and undermine corporations and state agencies. Further it is accused of having the political goal of changing the state and society according to its views. 14 Since this would lead to a totalitarian regime, the 'Church of Scientology* is claimed to be a danger for the free and democratic society, as provided for by the constitutions of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Länder ,15 2. Constitutional Problems Presently, dealing w i t h new religious and ideological concepts creates a lot of legal problems and insecurities. The interpretation and construction of the core rules of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland), the German constitution, was developed after World War Π to deal w i t h the established Christian churches which dominated the religious scene in Germany at the time, i.e. the Protestant Church and the Roman Catholic Church. But for some years now the religious situation in Germany has been changing. Today only about 70 % of Germans are still members of one of the two established churches. 16 Religious life in Germany now is not only shaped by the decline in membership of the two established churches but also by hundreds 17 of 12

Quotation taken from Andreas Platthaus, Kapitalismus als Religion, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 24 October 1997, 41. 13

Quotations taken from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 11 April 1998, 4.

14

See Jaschke (note 1), 56.

15

Id., (note 1), 56.

16

For more on these changes see Stefan Muckel, Religiöse Freiheit und staatliche Letztentscheidung. Die verfassungsrechtlichen Garantien religiöser Freiheit unter veränderten gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen, 1997, 1 et seq. 17

See the answer of the Federal Government to a Parliamentary Inquiry "Maßnahmen der Bundesregierung auf dem Gebiet der Aufklärung über sog. Jugendsekten und Psychogruppen einschließlich der mit ihnen rechtlich, wirtschaftlich oder in ihrer religiösen oder weltanschaulichen Zielsetzimg verbundenen Organisationen", Bundestags-Drucksachen 13/4132,2; Rainer Scholz, Probleme mit Jugendsekten, 1; especially on 'Church of Scientology', see "1. Bericht der Interministeriellen Arbeitsgruppe für Fragen sog. Jugendsekten und Psychogruppen", in: Landtag Baden-Württemberg Drucksachen 11/4643; Gasper/Müller/Valentin (note 8); Horst Reiler/ManfredKießig/Helmut Tschoerner (eds.), Handbuch Religiöse Gemeinschaften, 4th ed.

30

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new (pseudo-)religious or ideological associations. These associations are often called sects or youth sects.18 The largest and best known associations in Germany besides the 'Church of Scientology' are 'Transcendental Meditation' (TM), the 'Unification Church' of SunMyungMun , the Hare Krishna Movement (ISKCON/Hare Krishna) and the Osho Rajneesh Movement, formerly known as Bhagwan Association. 19 They have gained influence since the early 1970s and continue to grow. 20 Another marker for the change of the religious situation in Germany is Islam. In the early 1950s, Islam, for practical purposes, was nonexistent in Germany. Today Islam is the second largest religion in this country after Christianity. 21 Those new associations in Germany and their teachings create a lot of legal problems. So far the authorities and courts which have jurisdiction over those questions have not solved them satisfactorily. The main question is, whether and to what extent the above mentioned associations are covered by the protections of art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 of the German constitution (GG). These provisions guarantee the freedom of religion for all people, individually and as a group. Art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 G G read: (1) The freedom of faith, the freedom of conscience and the freedom of religious and ideological confession are inviolable. (2) A n undisturbed exercise of religion is guaranteed.

Additionally in art. 140 G G the constitution guarantees to the religious and ideological associations the right to freely organize and administer themselves. In Germany this right of self-determination originally could be found after the abolition of the monarchy in art. 137 sec. 3 of the Constitution of 11 August 1919, the so-called Weimar Constitution {Weimarer Reichsverfassung, WRY). This provision reads:

1993; from older publications see Fnedricht Wilhelm Haack , Jugendreligionen. Ursachen, Trend, Reaktionen, 1979; Manfred Müller-Küppers/Friedneb Specht (eds.), Neue Jugendreligionen, 1979; Albrecht Schöll (ed.), Handbuch Jugendreligionen. Informationen — Analysen — Alternativen, 1981; Hermann Schulze-Berndt/Wolfram Viertelhaus/Norbert Weidinger, Neue religiöse Bewegungen innerhalb und außerhalb der Kirchen, 1986. 18

The terminology is often not consistent, see Haack (note 17), 7 et seq.; Ralf Bernd Abel, Inhalt und Grenzen der Religionsfreiheit in Bezug auf die neuen Jugendreligionen, 2, note 2; id., in: Paul A. Engstfeld et al. (eds.), Juristische Probleme i m Zusammenhang mit den sogenannten neuen Jugendreligionen, 34 w i t h note 1; Schulze-Berndt/Viertelhaus/Weidinger (note 17), 10 et seq. 19

Scholz (note 17), 1.

20

For an attempt to explain the success of these new (pseudo-) religious and ideological groups see Juergen Eiben, Neue Religiosität in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 41 et seq. (with further references). 21

I n the 1950s less than 0.1 % of Germans were Muslims, see Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1965,45; figures for today's presence of Muslims in Germany can be found in Stefan Muckel, Muslimische Gemeinschaften als Körperschaften öffentlichen Rechts, D Ö V 1995, 311 et seq. (with references).

The ' Church of Scientology under German Law on Church and State A l l religious associations independently organize and administer themselves obeying all laws and statutes applicable to them. They commission their officers without any involvement of the state or the municipality.

Art. 137 sec. 7 W R V explicitly states that the above provision does not only apply to religious associations but also to associations for the joint exercise of an ideology. This and other articles of the Weimar Constitution on the law of church and state (Staatskirchenrecht) 22 have been incorporated into the German constitution by art. 140 GG. They are valid constitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Art. 140 G G reads: The provisions of art. 136, 137,138,139 and 141 of the German Constitution of 11 August 1919 are an integral part of this Basic Law.

Besides art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 GG, the application of art. 140 G G together w i t h the provisions of the Weimar constitutional provisions on church and state, especially art. 137 sec. 3 WRV, creates problems as well. It is especially unclear whether the teachings of those associations which are new in Germany, are covered by the terms 'faith', 'religious' or 'ideological' and whether the organizations mentioned above are 'religious associations' or 'associations for the joint exercise of an ideology', socalled ideological associations (Weltanschauungsgemeinschaften). These problems especially have arisen in Germany, because for decades the courts had to utilize the constitutional guarantees in question almost exclusively in controversies related to claims on the basis of Christianity. As long as the courts mostly had to deal with Christian churches and Christian teachings, the question whether these associations are a 'religion' or a 'religious association' never arose. The main question then was whether a certain act could be seen as an exercise of religion. 23 T o decide this issue, the courts accepted the self-assertion 24 of the religious association in question. 25 The logically preceding question, whether a conviction can be understood as a religious faith, whether a teaching can be understood as a religion or whether a group of people can be understood as a religious association, has only come up after the novel groups mentioned above and Islam have appeared. Since then the religiously influenced legal terms have been "the open flank of every construction of basic rights

22

For the term 'Staatskirchenrecht', which describes the sum total of all laws and statutes on the relationship between the state and religious associations, i.e. especially the churches, see Alexander Hollerbach, in: Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof (eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts, vol. 6, 1989, § 138 marg. 1 et seq. 23

E.g. BVerfGE 24, 236 (collection of old clothing).

24

O n the legal relevance of 'self-assertion' i n general see Martin Morlok, Selbstverständnis als Rechtskriterium, 1993, 42 et seq. (for a broad understanding of 'self-assertion'); on 'selfassertion' i n the law of church and state, see Axel Isak, Das Selbstverständnis der Kirchen und Religionsgemeinschaften, 1994. 25

Especially clear: BVerfGE 24, 236, 247 et seq.-, see also infra at Α.Π.1.

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because of their indefiniteness. Therefore, again and again they cause new conflicts construing them." 26 Although the problem has been recognized by now, a homogeneous solution has not been found yet, especially not by the courts. The Federal Constitutional Court in obiter dicta in its decision of 5 February 199127 spoke to the question, under what circumstances an association w i l l be regarded as religious within the meaning of art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 GG: A mere claim and the self-assertion alone that the association would profess a religion and, therefore, should be regarded as a religious association, should not justify the application of the religious freedoms of art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 G G to the association and its members; rather the outward appearance and the intellectual content would have to speak for a religion and a religious association.28 State agencies should take on the task of investigating and deciding on those questions of definition and construction, if a controversy arises, because the provisions in question are part of the secular legal system. But in doing so they should not be totally free. Instead, they should take into consideration and give preference to the purpose of the constitutional guarantees from which the terms come. 29 The continuing uncertainty in the application of art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 G G (and of art. 140 G G together with art. 137 sec. 3 WRV) is especially apparent when different courts focusing on the same association, here the 'Church of Scientology', rely on the above mentioned decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, but come to opposite results on the question whether the association can be regarded as a religious or an ideological association respectively. 30 The courts orient their interpretation of the factual prerequisites, the so-called Schutzbereich (protected area), of the freedoms granted in art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 G G on the self-assertion of the individual or the association involved. Therefore the courts are forced to make allowance for the necessary interests of society which are opposed to the exercise of the freedom of religion on the next level of the constitutionality test, i.e. the so-called Schranken (the barriers or limitations of the basic right). T o that extent the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the freedom of religion can only be limited by those interests that found their way into another article of the constitution. 31 This forces the courts to watch for such a "constitu-

26 JörgMüller-Volbehr, 1995, 301.

Das Grundrecht der Religionsfreiheit und seine Schranken, D Ö V

27

BVerfGE 83, 341.

28

BVerfGE 83, 341, 353; confirmed by BVerfG, N V w Z 1993, 357, 358.

29

BVerfGE 83, 341, 353.

30

See BAG, N J W 1996, 143, 146 et seq. (neither a religious nor an ideological association) and O V G Hamburg, N V w Z 1995, 498, 499 et seq. (ideological association). 31

BVerfGE 44, 37, 49 et seq. (with further references).

The ' Church of Scientology ' under German Law on Church and State tionally accepted interest of society or a basic right of another individual," 32 which is of higher value compared to the freedom of religion. 33 Difficulties often arise when the exercise of religion is restricted by sub-constitutional statutes. I n order to uphold such a restriction, the courts must show that the restricting provision of the sub-constitutional statute in reality is supported by a constitutionally accepted interest that takes precedence over the freedom of religion. But this is not always possible.34 Often in such a case, the courts still want to achieve a solution that takes the interests of society into account. They try then to distinguish their case from former Constitutional Court precedents. Thereby the courts avoid applying the test provided by the Constitutional Court for the barriers of the freedom of religion. 35 It has been stated, e.g., that the 'Church of Scientology* would have to accept restrictions if they want to put up information booths in pedestrian areas of public streets, because the freedom of religion has to stand back for the security and the easy flow of traffic on the streets, which would be constitutionally based upon the freedom of free enjoyment of one's personality, art. 2 sec. 1 GG, the general principle of equality, art. 3 sec. 1 GG, and the freedom of ownership, art. 14 sec. 1 GG. 3 6 It is obvious that this most general and questionable chain of argumentation is a sign of the courts' dilemma.

I I . The Protection of Religious Freedom by A r t . 4 Sec. 1 and 2 G G 1. The Teachings of the 'Church of Scientology'as 'Religion'or within the Meaning of Art. 4 Sec. 1 and 2 GG

\Ideology '

According to firm precedents, art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 G G provide all individuals as well as religious and ideological associations with a comprehensive freedom of religion, which is broadly construed. This freedom covers the desire to put up information booths in pedestrian areas37 as well as the organization of old clothing collections in order to sell the collected clothes and to use the proceeds for charity. 38 Indeed, in view of the problems that the novel associations have caused for the 32

Quote from BVerfGE 33, 23, 32.

33

For this method of defining limitations, see Martin Morlok , in: Horst Dreier (ed.), Kommentar zum GG, 1996, art. 4, marg. 93 et seq.; Abel (note 18), 112 et seq.; Jörg Müller- Volbehr, Religionsfreiheit und Tierschutz: Zur Zulässigkeit religiös motivierten Schächtens - BVerwG, N v w Z 1996, 61, JuS 1997, 223, 225 et seq. 34

For more on this see Muckel (note 16), 16 et seq.

35

For more see Muckel (note 16), 16 et seq.

36

V G Berlin, NJW 1989, 2559.

37

See V G Berlin, NJW 1989, 2559; V G Hamburg, KirchE 23, 211, 214.

38

BVerfGE 24, 236.

20 G Y I L 41

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courts, it has been proposed recently to exactly distinguish between the different guarantees of art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 G G (to have a faith, to confess a religion and to exercise a religion). 39 But as long as the courts continue to construe art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 G G to provide for a comprehensive freedom of religion, this traditional view w i l l guide the action of all players on the field. Therefore, the following is also based on art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 G G providing for a comprehensive freedom of religion. Whether an association is a religious association, protected in its teachings and its exercise by art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 GG, in a first step depends on its own self-assessment. One has to ask if the association in question sees itself as a religious association and understands its teachings to be a religion or an ideology. The 'Church of Scientology' obviously passes this first test simply by reference to its name. Then the selfassessment must be examined for plausibility. If the association in question can refer to its own "ecclesiastical law" or in other ways can refer to legally testable religious goals, one has to assume for the present that indeed it is a religious association or a religion. This test is not restricted to Christian groups or other religious associations traditionally present in Europe. The term 'religion' in the German legal system is not based on a specific theology, denomination, or ideology. Therefore, it is not possible to restrict the protection of art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 GG to typically Christian teachings or behaviors, 40 because of the principle of neutrality of the state on religious and ideological questions. This neutrality asks for a construction of constitutional terms according to generally acceptable principles instead of denominationally or ideologically bound principles. Therefore the number of convictions protected by the German constitution as a religion or an ideology is principally unlimited today and in the future. 41 Nevertheless the constitution provides a few hints for a construction of the terms 'religion', 'ideology', 'religious association', etc. The function of the freedom of religion is to specifically protect the individual and also groups of people in their religious or ideological beliefs as well as in their religiously or ideologically motivated conduct. The German constitution distinguishes between 'religion' together with the confession of a religion on the one hand and the general freedom of expression and speech, specifically on political questions, on the other hand, the latter being protected on its own in art. 5 sec. 1 and 2 GG. The German constitution also distinguishes between the freedom of religious association in art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 G G and 39

Muckel (note 16), 126 et seq.

40

See Joseph Listl , Glaubens-, Bekenntnis- und Kirchenfreiheit, in: Joseph Listl/Dietrich Pirson (eds.), Handbuch des Staatskirchenrechts, vol. I, 2nd ed. 1994, 439, 452; Müller-Volbehr (note 26), 301, 304; Thomas Fleischer, Der Religionsbegriff des Grundgesetzes, 1989, 59 et seq.; Juliane Kokott, in: Michael Sachs (ed.), Kommentar zum GG, 1996, art. 4 marginals 16, 27 w i t h further references, also to the opposite view. 41

For more on state neutrality w i t h regard to religion or ideology, see Muckel (note 16), 71 et seq. w i t h further references.

The ' Church of Scientology ' «ra/er German Law on Church and State the general freedom of meeting which can be found in art. 8 GG. Such a separate protection for religion and ideology in art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 can be explained by the fact that a religion or an ideology is a conviction specially obligatory for those holding it and part of their personal identity. A conviction w i l l create a higher commitment if it covers questions of the origins and aspirations of our existence, the position of mankind in the world and abstractly covers the purpose of life. 42 This indeed w i l l be true for many of the novel associations. From the outset the 'Church of Scientology' may be able, as well, to claim such specifically obligatory teachings. The definition of the terms 'religion' and 'ideology' as they can be found in the German constitution has to be amended by some negative criteria. Such criteria are related to the distinction between religion, business and politics. Associations harboring business goals under some circumstances may not be regarded to be religious or ideological associations. The German constitution accepts the idea that one can separate religious- and business-oriented conduct, because it distinguishes between the freedom of religion (art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 GG) on the one side and the freedom of profession (art. 12 sec. 1 GG) as well as the freedom of ownership (art. 14 GG) on the other side. It is true, though, that organizations connected w i t h the two established Christian churches are active in business fields as well. But this is part of the traditional charity work of these churches, whereas a novel association presenting itself as a religious or ideological community cannot claim a similar longstanding tradition of religious or ideological performance in the business field. The teachings of such a novel association have to be accepted as a religion or ideology if their discussion of the origins of our existence and the purpose of life are more than a pretext for business activities. The business activities must not be the true motivation of the association's conduct. 43 The outward appearance44 of the group in question w i l l determine whether its religious teachings are more than a mere pretext. In this regard one has to keep in mind that the 'Church of Scientology' asks its members to participate in courses, each costing several thousand Deutsch Marks. 45 Additionally the case decided in Lyon 4 6 proves that the 'Church of Scientology' is prepared to inexorably collect its members' debts. The 'Church of Scientology' also asks its members on a large scale to sell books to non-members (especially their basic publication 'Dianetik*by L. Ron Hubbard). 47 In addition, the 'Church of Scientology' has tried to sue for the permission to operate a commercial employment

42

For the whole see Fleischer (note 40), passim.

43

See BVerwGE 90,112, 118; BAG, JZ 1995, 951, 953.

44

See BVerfGE 83, 341, 353.

45

See supra (note 9), and BAG, NJW 1996, 143, 147 (though without exact figures).

46

See supra at I. 1.

47

See V G H Baden-Württemberg, NJW 1996, 3358, 3359 et seq.

20*

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Stefan Muckel

agency.48 It founds new commercial corporations and w i t h great effort tries to gain influence in existing ones.49 Finally one has to add the quotations of the founder of the Scientology organization on making money and on the necessity to lie to people. 50 This shows that the 'Church of Scientology' is neither a religious nor an ideological association within the meaning of the German constitution. A t best it uses religious or ideological aspects as a pretext 51 for its other business goals. Also, political views can be distinguished from religious and ideological convictions, just as standing up for a political goal can be distinguished from the confession and exercise of a religion or ideology. The distinction between politics and religion may be difficult in some cases — as is shown by the so-called political Islam. 52 But the German constitution provides for a secular understanding of state. Thereby it postulates that a distinction between religion and politics is possible. The separation of state and church as provided for in art. 140 G G together w i t h art. 137 sec. 1 W R V very much underlines this point. 5 3 Indeed, religious associations are not forbidden from influencing politics or issuing statements on political questions. The German constitution does not postulate that religion is only one's private business. But religion and politics must be distinguished, not only for the separation of state and church, but also in the interest of being able to separate the freedom of religion from other constitutional freedoms, especially the freedom of opinion (art. 5 sec. 1 GG) and the freedom of meeting (art. 8 GG). To speak of a religious association, politics must not be the core goal of the association in question, whereas at the same time religion stays on the sideline.54 Groups that mainly want to change the existing political system are not religious or ideological associations, even if they justify their goals w i t h religious or ideological arguments and are motivated accordingly.

48

Rheinische Post, issue of 22 October 1994, section Politische Umschau \

49

See Liane v. Billerbeck/Frank Nordhausen, Der Sektenkonzern. Scientology auf dem Vormarsch, 1993, 118 et seq., passim; Karl Hermann, Filiale Bundesrepublik. Wie der ScientologyKonzern die westdeutsche Wirtschaft unterwandert, in: Jörg Hermann (ed.), Mission mit allen Mitteln. Der Scientology-Konzern auf Seelenfang, 1992, 99 et seq. 50

See supra (note 13).

51

The exact words of BAG, 1996 NJW 143, 146 et seq., where the 'Church of Scientology' is called an "institution for the boosting of specific products"; on the other side, O V G Hamburg, N V w Z 1995, 498, 500 i n its case could not find proof for that "at least not by a preponderance of the evidence." 52

O n 'Political Islam' see Muckel (note 21), 312 w i t h further references.

53

Art. 137 sec. 1 W R V reads: " A national Church does not exist." For the idea of separation of state and church deriving therefrom, see Axel v. Campenhausen, Staatskirchenrecht, 3rd ed. 1997, 94 et seq. 54 Peter Badura, Der Schutz von Religion und Weltanschauung durch das Grundgesetz, 1989, 56.

The ' Church of Scientology under German Law on Church and State 309 Today many claim that the 'Church of Scientology* has political goals. In a political science study undertaken for the Department of the Interior of the State of Northrhine Westphalia, 55 Hans-GerdJaschke claims that the 'Church of Scientology* is a political organization with a long-term political goal to transform society according to Scientological principles. 56 According to Jaschke this new society would develop a modern form of totalitarian government. Therein would be no place for the fundamental principles of democratic and constitutional systems.57 Like Jaschke 58 other new studies come to the conclusion, too, that the 'Church of Scientology* is a totalitarian political organization. 59 If this assessment is correct, the 'Church of Scientology* is not a religious association within the meaning of the German constitution because of its business goals as well as its political goals.60

2. Conduct Protected by Art. 4 Sec. 1 and 2 GG Since the teachings of the Scientology organization are neither religion nor ideology, they are not protected by the constitutional freedom of religion. But if we assume in contrast to the previous section of this study that the 'Church of Scientology* is a religious or ideological association, we have to ask how far any conduct typical for this community is protected by the freedom of religion in art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 GG. I n order to answer this question the following has to be considered. If Scientology were a religion or ideology, it would be constitutionally protected to embrace this religion (freedom of religious faith). O n the basis of art. 4 sec. 1 G G it would also be possible for Scientologists to confess their faith and to stand up for it (freedom of confession). Finally 'auditing* 61 would be constitutionally protected by art. 4 sec. 2 G G (freedom of religious exercise). But this would only be true, of course, as long as those exposed to an 'auditing* session are not suffering psychic damages therefrom on a regular basis, which sometimes is contended. 62 But all of 55

Supra (note 1).

56

Id., 56.

57

Id.

58

Id., 57. But Jaschke understands the 'Church of Scientology' to be an ideological associa-

tion. 59 See Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Berlin (ed.), Die 'Scientology'-Organisation, 1997, 9; Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg. Behörde für Inneres. Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz (ed.), Der Geheimdienst der Scientology-Organisation, 1998, 71 et seq. 60 The enquête commission "Sogenannte Sekten und Psychogruppen" (see supra (note 7)) comes to the same conclusion i n its final report. See report in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 June 1998, 2. 61

Supra (note 8).

62

O n the exclusion of those activities from the protection of the freedom of religion, which

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these activities are not the ones that have been criticized most regarding the 'Church of Scientology\ Rather its attempt to gain influence in business and politics by subversive methods is criticized. 63 This is not covered by the freedom of religion. These activities cannot be associated with religion within the meaning of the freedom of religion in art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 GG. It is further claimed that the 'Church of Scientology' even operates its own detention camps, where insubordinate members are disciplined. 64 Critics of the 'Church of Scientology' spread information that 'Church' members in these camps are treated in a manner incompatible w i t h the human dignity inviolably protected in art. 1 sec. 1 GG. 6 5 Activities violating the human dignity of others from the outset are not covered by the protections of the freedom of religion as provided for in art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 GG. 6 6

3. The Limitations of the Constitutional Freedom of Religion as Provided for in Art. 4 Sec. 1 and 2 GG If a certain activity of the 'Church of Scientology' were protected by the freedom of religion — again only assuming that the teachings of it could be regarded as a religion or as an ideology, a further question would arise whether the state is constitutionally permitted to limit the freedom. For example, the distribution of religious information and material at information booths on public streets is generally protected by the freedom to exercise religion. Still, the state w i l l be allowed to proceed against this activity if a constitutional limitation of the freedom of religion covers such state action. It is disputed as to which constitutional limitations exist for religiously or ideologically motivated exercise. The dispute turns on the question whether art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 G G operates without limitations or whether art. 140 G G together w i t h art. 136 sec. 1 W R V must be understood as a 'limitation by statute' (Gesetzesvorbehalt) of the religious freedoms of art. 4 GG. Art. 140 G G together w i t h art. 136 sec. 1 W R V provides that the civic and citizenship privileges and duties are neither granted under the condition of the exercise of the freedom of religion nor limited by the exercise of the freedom of religion. Under the Weimar Constitution the duty to obey and follow the statutes was understood to be a 'citizenship duty'. Thereinterfere w i t h the freedom of life and limb protected in art. 2 sec. 2 GG, see Muckel (note 16), 222 et seq. 63

See the articles i n Jörg Hermann (ed.) (note 49); v. Billerbeck/Nordhausen

64

(note 49).

See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, issue of 16 January 1997, 4 "Beckstein: Scientology unterhält Straflager für unbotmäßige Mitglieder" (on the knowledge of the existence of such detention camps at the Bavarian Department of the Interior). 65

Id.

66

See Muckel (note 16), 215 et seq.

The ' Church of Scientology under German Law on Church and State 311 fore, art. 136 sec. 1 G G was read as providing a 'limitation by statute* for the freedom of religion of art. 135 WRV. But then art. 136 sec. 1 W R V only had a declaratory effect, because art. 135 sentence 3 W R V already contained a 'limitation by statute* for the guarantees of art. 135 WRV. Under the present German constitution on the basis of an older decision of the Federal Constitutional Court 6 7 the courts and most voices in jurisprudence agree that the limitation of art. 140 GG, together with art. 136 sec. 1 W R V cannot be applied to art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 G G despite the fact that the phrasing of the limitation would be an argument for its applicability. 68 In this view art. 140 G G in connection w i t h art. 136 sec. 1 W R V is superceded by art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 G G in its relevance and importance in the context of the constitutional system.69 O n this basis the courts only accept constitutionally established interests of society and the basic rights of other individuals as limitations on the freedom of religion. 70 According to this, e.g., information booths of a religious or an ideological association on public streets can be prohibited if traffic security is so much reduced that life and limb of other individuals — equally protected in the constitution (art. 2 sec. 2 GG) — are at risk. However, this is only seldom the case. Properly, constitutionally established interests are of no importance here. The German constitution contains a 'limitation by statute* in art. 140 G G together w i t h art. 136 sec. 1 W R V which limits the guarantees of religious freedom in art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 GG. This view is in accord with a growing number of voices in jurisprudential publications. As I have pointed out in a previous publication, 71 these voices can base their arguments on the phrasing of the constitution, on the historic development of the law of church and state as a unified body of law, on the history of art. 140 G G in the Parliamentarian Council and on the claim that art. 140 G G is a perfectly integrated part of the constitution ('vollgültiges Verfassungsrecht' 72). Art. 140 G G together w i t h art. 136 sec. 1 W R V creates a 'limitation by general statutes* (Vorbehalt der allgemeinen Gesetze) for the guarantees of religious freedoms provided by art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 GG. 'Citizenship duty*, within the meaning of art. 136 sec. 1 WRV, is especially the duty to obey those laws which are not specifically tailored against faith, confession and religious exercise, i.e. laws that do not

67

BVerfGE 33,23, 30 et seq.

68

See the references in Muckel (note 16), 224.

69

BVerfGE 33, 23, 30 et seq.

70

See BVerfGE 33, 23, 32; BVerfGE 44, 37, 49 et seq. (with further references); shorter recently also i n BVerfGE 93, 1, 21; BVerfG, NJW 1997, 2669, 2670. 71

Muckel (note 16), 224 et seq. w i t h further references.

72

BVerfGE 19, 206, 219; BVerfGE 53, 366, 400; BVerfGE 66, 1, 22; BVerfGE 70, 138, 167.

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contain any special provisions against the freedom of religion and therefore are 'general·. 73 Such a general law, e.g., is the street law that regulates the use of public streets. If the erection of information booths is a so-called special use (Sondernutzung), then a special permit by the competent authority is necessary.74 Whether the permit can be denied in a particular case and, therefore, the information booth must not be erected or has to be removed, depends on several circumstances. One factor may be how much a use of the public street in this sector w i l l restrict the use of the streets by other individuals. 75 Also, the 'Church of Scientology' cannot avoid any responsibilities arising from business law, 76 labor law, 77 social security law and tax law by claiming protection under art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 GG. A l l those regulations are general laws within the meaning of art. 140 G G together with art. 136 sec. 1 WRV, restricting the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion of art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 GG.

I I I . The Right of Self-Determination of Religious and Ideological Associations As already mentioned above,78 the constitutional right of art. 4 sec. 1 and 2 GG, the freedom of religion, is supplemented by the right of self-determination of religious and ideological associations. The latter can be found in art. 140 G G together w i t h art. 137 sec. 3 and 7 WRV. 7 9 According to art. 140 G G together w i t h art. 137 sec. 3 WRV, each religious association organizes and administers its affairs within the limitations of those laws that apply to everybody. According to art. 140 G G together w i t h art. 137 sec. 7, this is also true for ideological associations. Since the 'Church of Scientology' is neither covered by the term 'religious association' nor by the term 'ideological association' within the meaning of the German constitution, 8 0 it cannot claim the right of self-determination of art. 140 G G together w i t h art. 137 sec. 3 WRV. 73

For more on this see Muckel (note 16), 230 et seq. w i t h further references.

74

For an example of respective state law see § 18 Straßen- und Wegegesetz Nordrhein-Westfalen (streets and alleys statute Northrhine-Westphalia). 75

See further Muckel (note 16), 250 et seq.

76

Id., 251.

77

O n the duty of the 'Church of Scientology' to pay equitable wages to their employees, see BAG, N J W 1996, 143 et seq. 78

Supra at I. 2.

79

O n the right of self-determination of religious and ideological associations, see v. Campenhausen (note 53), 105 et seq.-, Hollerbach (note 22), § 138 marg. 114 et seq., § 139 marg. 11 et seq.-, Muckel (note 16), 181 et seq., 276 et seq. 80

Supra at Π. 1.

The ' Church of Scientology ' under German Law on Church and State Those not sharing the opinion presented here, who understand the 'Church of Scientology' to be covered either by the term 'religious association' or by the term 'ideological association', in particular cases face the question whether a certain claim is generally covered by the guarantee of the right of self-determination and whether this right may be restricted constitutionally by state prerequisites. The question arises, e.g., when the 'Church of Scientology' has founded a members club, which acts commercially in a way inconsistent with the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch , BGB). The manner in which a religious association organizes itself and associated organizations is protected by art. 140 G G together w i t h art. 137 sec. 3 WRV. Therefore it is covered by the right of self-determination as provided by art. 140 G G together with art. 137 sec. 3 WRV. Art. 140 G G together with art. 137 sec. 3 WRV explicitly provides for the restriction of such a right of self-determination by those statutes that apply to everybody. This means nothing more than the 'general statutes'81 of art. 140 G G together with art. 136 sec. 1 WRV, which do not contain provisions specifically tailored against religion. 82 The law on members clubs in §§ 21 et seq. of the Civil Code is such a general statute. Indeed, in rare cases these provisions of private law may partly have to give way, if a religious association wishes to organize itself in a specific way. 83 But this w i l l not regularly effect the enabling of business activities for an association that is organized as a members club, because German law provides enough legal forms for business activities of associations such as private partnerships (Offene Handelsgesellschaften), limited partnerships (Kommanditgesellschaften), and limited liability corporations (Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung). The 'Church of Scientology' may not claim protection under the freedom of religion in order to run business-oriented members clubs, although they are generally outlawed by §§ 21 et seq. German Civil Code. 84 I V . The Public School System 1. Religious Instruction According to art. 7 sec. 3 G G religious instruction is a regular subject taught at public schools. It is taught in accordance with the basic principles of the religious

81

Supra at Π. 3.

82

For more, see Muckel (note 16), 276 et seq.

83

See BVerfGE 83,341 et seq.\Muckel, in: Listl/Pirson references. 84

(note 40), 827, 832 et seq. w i t h further

But see more recently BVerwG, DVBl. 1998, 525 et seq. w i t h further references.

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Stefan Muckel

association in question. The provision mentioned above in its wording only refers to religious associations, but not to ideological associations. The provision of art. 140 G G together with art. 137 sec. 7 WRV, equalizing religious and ideological associations before the law, 85 cannot be applied to art. 7 sec. 3 GG, because of its systematic position within the constitution. Despite that, religious instruction within the meaning of art. 7 sec. 3 G G may also be taught under an agreement w i t h an ideological association, then as ideological instruction. The reason for this is that a distinction between religious and ideological associations is not possible, even though art. 7 sec. 3 GG could be read as an argument to the contrary. Religion and ideology cannot be distinguished according to abstract criteria. The courts have tried to distinguish religion and ideology under the categories of 'Transcendence' and 'Immanence'. Whereas a religion should be based on an all-embracing reality that exceeds humanity ('transcendental·), an ideology would be restricted to an internal ('immanent') reference to the world. 8 6 But thereby the courts overlook the fact that philosophy, the science of religion, and theology regard the distinction between transcendence and immanence to be antiquated and obsolete.87 Since jurisprudence thereby has lost all practical criteria to distinguish between religion and ideology, both phenomena have to be treated equally wherever they appear in the constitution and therefore also in art. 7 sec. 3 GG. 8 8 But it already has been pointed out that the 'Church of Scientology* is neither a religious association nor an ideological association. Therefore under no circumstances does it have any right to religious instruction or ideological instruction in public schools. 2. Parochial Schools or Ideological Schools But the 'Church of Scientology* could found private schools. Art. 7 sec. 4 G G guarantees the freedom to found private schools. One prerequisite among others for the necessary (state) license is that the private school w i l l not be inferior to public schools in its objectives, its equipment and in the scientific education of its teachers (art. 7 sec. 4 sentence 3 GG). W i t h this provision the German constitution sets requirements for the qualifications that pupils may obtain at these schools as well as

85

Supra at I. 2.

86

See BVerwGE 90, 112, 115; also Kokott (note 40), marg. 17 et seq.

87

See Klaus Obermayer, in: Rudolf Dolzer (ed.), Bonner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, art. 140 (Zweitbearbeitung, 1971), marg. 42 w i t h further references. 88

For more see Muckel (note 16), 135 et seq.

The ' Church of Scientology ' under German Law on Church and State 315 for the educational objectives of these schools.89 The religious or ideological objectives the school adheres to must not restrict the obtainable qualifications. 90 Whether the 'Church of Scientology* is allowed to found a private school with regard to these requirements, needs to be examined carefully. T o found a private 'Volksschule*, i.e. a primary school, art. 7 sec. 5 G G puts up additional requirements. A private primary school may only be licensed if the school administration accepts the existence of a special educational interest. If, upon the application of parents, the private school shall be founded as a non-denominational school ( member of the Russian Parliament (Duma), in: Heimweg für die Kriegstrophäen aus Rußland gesucht, Zum Problem der Rückgabe europäischer Kulturschätze, Osteuropa-Archiv 46, 1996, 296. 25 Theoretically there is a possibility that Russia could exclude the application of customary international law for itself if it behaved like a 'persistent objector': a State which consistently opposes itself to a general norm of customary international law in statu nascendi may succeed in making this norm inapplicable to it; it may "contract out of a custom in the process of formation," Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed., 1990, 10; Alfred Verdross/Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht, 3rd ed., 1984, 352 w i t h further references; as Malcolm N. Shaw pointed out, "actual protests" are necessary to break the legitimizing process, Malcolm N. Shaw , International Law, 4th ed., 1997, 70. However, Russia's opposition to customary law is of recent origin and does not go back to the genesis of the norm. 24

Stolen Art 3. General Principles Subsidiary to treaty obligations and customary international law some general principles could be important to the German-Russian controversy on stolen art.

a) Unjust Enrichment Nobody shall enrich himself by the damage of somebody else (nemo cum damno alterius locupletiorfieri debet). 26 The basic principle that a person who has been enriched at the expense of another without legal justification must either restore the object or make compensation is also applicable in international law. As the German cultural property was taken away by some individuals and members of the Soviet army after 1945, one could argue that Russia committed an unjust enrichment vis-a vis Germany. O n the other hand, it could be asked whether the fact that the German artworks were declared Russian property by the Federal Law of 199727 constitutes a legal justification. Even if unjust enrichment in international law is a vague concept, suffice it to say that in domestic legislation the causa is necessary at the moment of the act. 28 A t the time of the seizure of German artworks by the former Soviet Union, however, there was no such legal justification, as w i l l be shown (see infra IILl.a)).

b) Nullus commodum capere potest de sua propria iniuria Nobody shall take advantage from wrongful acts he himself committed. The general principle is that states cannot profit from their own wrong as a ground absolving them from performance of their international obligations and that rights cannot be derived from wrongdoing. 29 Depending on the question whether the Soviet seizure of cultural property was indeed unlawful (which is contested by the Russian side, see infra ΙΠ.1.), the fact that the legal successor of the Soviet Union, Russia, passed a statute half a century later in which it declares itself the rightful owner of the objects concerned, seems inadmissible. Russia may not take advantage from the fact that it had committed a wrongful looting.

26

Hermann Mosler , General Principles of Law, EPIL, vol. Π, 1995, 511, 520. A comment on the Federal Law is to be found infra HE.l.d). 28 See § 81211, 2, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, Eingriffskondiktion. 29 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, RdC 1957 Π, 117. 27

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Sabine von Scorlemer c) Pacta sunt servanda

Most important in the present context is the general principle that every treaty is binding for the contracting parties, and once a treaty is in force it has to be implemented in good faith (pacta sunt servanda)? 0 As Verdross and Simma put it, to fulfil a contractual obligation in good faith (bona fide) requires taking the 'social purpose of a law* into consideration. 31 So, when the Russian negotiators in the bilateral restitution commission started arguing w i t h regard to Article 16 of the German-Soviet Union Agreement 199032 that the property concerned was neither 'lost* — because some Soviet officials knew about its whereabouts — nor 'unlawfully taken', 33 this may be seen as a literal interpretation of the obligation not consistent with the overall 'social purpose' of the Treaty. The German-Russian Agreement is supposed — as its title indicates — to further good neighborliness, partnership and cooperation between former war enemies. It was concluded in the spirit of friendship and evidences the will to settle the question of dispersed cultural heritage after World War II. The will of the contracting party to promote the "cultural and spiritual heritage" of Europe is also found in the Charter of Paris concluded in the same year. 34 It might be seen as incompatible with the overall purpose of fruitful cooperation between the state parties to reduce the main obligation of the German-Russian treaty (Art. 16) to a narrow application that is, practically, void of any importance. I n concluding the bilateral treaty with Germany in 1992, Russia decided freely to comply w i t h the provisions of that treaty. Valid treaty norms must be kept; they can only be revised de lege ferenda by appropriate procedures. Besides, Russia itself formally admitted the relevance of international treaty law, 35 among which the principle of pacta sunt servanda figures as an important element. 30

See Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS, 331 et seq. I n the Nuclear Test Case the International Court of Justice ruled that one of the "basic principles governing the creating and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith," Nuclear Test Case (Australia v. France), 1974 ICJ 252, 268; see, however, the former Soviet reservation to the principle of pacta sunt servanda , discussed by Josef L. Kunz , Soviet Comments on International Law and Relations, American Journal of International Law (AJIL), vol. 48, 1954, 640 et seq. 31 Alfred Verdross/Bruno Simma (note 25), 281; see also Manfred Lachs, who states that the role of good faith has w i t h the passage of time acquired even greater importance, Pacta sunt servanda, EPIL, vol. ΙΠ, 1997, 847, 850 et seq. 32 Respectively Article 15 of the German-Russian Treaty, see supra H i e ) . 33 The problem of whether the works of art were taken 'unlawfully' or 'lawfully' is discussed below i n ΙΠ .I.a). 34 Charter of Paris for a New Europe 1990, 30 I L M , 193, 204. 35 See Article 1 (6) of the Soviet-German Treaty of 1990 (supra ILl.d)) which reads: "The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics w i l l ( . . . ) guarantee the precedence of the universal rules of international law in their domestic and international relations and confirm their resolve to honour their contractual obligations."

Stolen Art

32 7

I I I . Problems of Restitution If a state violates an international obligation it is held responsible for the violation perpetrated. Restitution is one of the available remedies within the system of reparations resulting from an internationally wrongful act. According to Siehr "it has now been well established that for 150 years any kind of pillage, capture or acquisition of works of art as booty during times of war, armistice or occupation is prohibited by public international law." 3 6 As outlined above, the Soviet taking of German cultural property between 1945 - 1949 violated the basic rule not to loot or take away any cultural property during occupation. 37 The sanction for the violation of an international law obligation is basically restitutio in integrum , i.e. actual restoration of the objects by the state responsible for the violation. If restitution is not possible, compensation has to be paid. A n exception to this rule is made if some circumstances exist which exclude the wrongfulness of the act committed. 38 The Russian negotiators presented several arguments which could preclude the wrongfulness of the seizure of cultural objects during Soviet occupation of Germany. 1. Legal Objections a) Russian Claims of Legitimate Ownership Different efforts were made to justify the seizure of German art works after World War II. aa) Right to War Booty Referring to such legal documents as the Act of Unconditional Capitulation of Germany, the Yalta and Potsdam decisions on reparations, the Paris Peace Agreement of 1947 and the enemy clause of the U N Charter, 39 Russia pointed out that 36

Kurt Siehr (note 4), 131. See, however, the Russian arguments described in m.l.a). 38 However, even if the wrongfulness of an act of state is precluded, the state concerned may have an obligation to make reparation, see Alfred Verdross/ Bruno Simma (note 25), 869 w i t h further reference. 39 Art. 107 of the U N Charter is also mentioned by Art. 2 of the Federal Law O n Cultural Values Removed to the USSR as a Result of World War Π and Located i n the Territory of the Russian Federation; however, according to western scholarship Art. 107 is no longer applicable, see Alfred Verdross/Bruno Simma (note 25), 148; Volker Epping, Internationale Organisatio37

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bringing art treasures to Russia after World War I I was not illegal. It considers itself as the rightful owner of the cultural treasures because they were seized as spoils of war by one of the victorious parties over the Nazi regime. As a matter of fact, the customary principle for centuries was that any movable property belonging to the enemy state and captured on the battlefield constituted 'booty of w a r \ The right of the victorious side to seize cultural property as 'trophies' was recognized as conforming to the rule of uti possidetis.^ However, provisions of international law gradually developed which forbade this practice 41 and finally, as outlined above, Article 56 of the Hague Regulations (1907) put an end to the legitimacy of so-called 'war booty'. 4 2

bb) Unconditional Surrender Another possible argument of the Russian side consists in pretending that the former war enemy, the 'German Reich', no longer existed in the period following the unconditional surrender (7/8 May 1945) and the collapse of the German government. Consequently, the cultural objects taken away were derelict and could be appropriated by a party acting with animo domini. However, the main stream of scholarship interprets the act of surrender differently, holding that Germany did not cease to exist in 1945.43 Besides, even in times

nen, in: Knut Ipsen, Völkerrecht, 3rd ed., 1990, 346, 373; Ulrich Beyerlin , Gewaltverbot, in: Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern (ed.), Lexikon des Rechts. Völkerrecht, 2nd ed. 1992,112,113; Dieter Blumenwitz, Kriegsende, in: Seidl-Hohenveldern id., 188,191; Dieter Blumenwitz, Enemy States Clause i n the United Nations Charter, EPIL, vol. Π, 1995,90,95; Rudolf Bernhardt, Germany, Unification of, EPIL, vol. Π, 1995, 590, 592; Georg Ress, Germany, Legal Status After World War Π, EPIL, vol. Π, 1995, 567, 578 et seq. 40 According to the uti possidetis principle states could continue to possess what they actually possessed after the end of hostilities w i t h the consequence that the status quo ante did not have to be restored; i n ancient Rome enemy property was regarded as res nullius, consequently soldiers could appropriate such assets, see Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Enemy Property, EPIL, vol. Π, 1995, 87 w i t h further references; as to the legitimacy of taking works of art as 'war booty' see also Byrne Sutton , Le trafic international des biens culturels sous l'angle de leur revendication par l'Etat origine, 1988, 23 et seq.; Ludwig Engstler (note 18), 91 et seq.; Stefan Turner (note 10), 62. 41 See Arts. 245 - 249 Peace Treaty of Versailles. 42 For Article 56 of the Hague Regulations see supra Π. 1 a); see also Art. 14 of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (see supra Π. lb)). Kurt von Laun. The Legal Status of Germany, AJIL, vol. 45, 1951, 267, 271; for further references see Georg Ress, Germany, Legal Status After World War Π, EPIL, vol. II, 1995, 567; Blumenwitz, Kriegsende (note 39), 188, 190 w i t h further references; but c.f. Hans Kelsen, who saw i n the existence of an independent government an essential element of the state and

Stolen Art of armistice and occupation Article 56 of the Hague Rules continues to be applicable. For that reason, there is no valid legal argument that German cultural property could have been taken lawfully after the unconditional surrender of the German military forces. cc) Authorization of the Allied Control Council Moreover, it was brought forward that a general authorization of the Allied Control Council existed which allowed seizure of German artistic works as a means of reparation. 44 However, there is no evidence of such a binding authorization which could be used as justification of the wrong done. 45

dd) Danger to German Cultural Objects Another argument consists in saying that the wrongfulness of carrying off German cultural property to Russia is excluded because the objects concerned were in danger. As far as the artistic works returned to the former GDR are concerned, the official Soviet version maintained that the removal had been necessary in order to protect the works of art from wartime destruction. 46 If the Soviet Union had acted in order to protect German cultural property against pillaging or destruction, the transport to its territory could have been legitimate. However, the removal in question took place after the end of military operations. According to experts 47 neither conservatory nor security reasons necessitated the transport of precious German cultural objects from the Soviet occupation zone after therefore concluded that Germany "has ceased to exist as a sovereign state." The Legal Status of Germany According to the Declaration of Berlin, AJIL, vol. 39, 1945, 518, 519. 44 A n internal memorandum of the Russian Ministry of Cultural Affairs dating from the end of 1995 stated that the Soviet confiscations were justified as "compensatory" decisions of the Allied Control Council (see SZ Online, 24 February 1996). 45 Wilfried Fiedler (note 18), 175,180; Wilfried Fiedler, Kulturgüter als Kriegsbeute, 1995,17; Kristiane Burchardi/ Christoph Kalb, Unterwegs nach Europa. Rußland, Deutschland und der Streit um die Beutekunst, D A , vol. 6, 1997, 939, 940; see also Waldemar Ritter (note 4), 1190. 46 Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden, Der Menschheit bewahrt. Schätze der Weltkultur — vom Altertum bis zur Gegenwart — von der Sowjetunion vor Kriegsschäden bewahrt, vor Verderb und Zerstörung gerettet und der D D R übergeben, 1959; N. /. Sokolova, Die Rettung der Dresdner Kunstschätze, Staatliche Kunstsammlung Dresden, 1961. 47 See interview w i t h Professor Werner Schmidt, Director-General of the Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden, also member of the German Russian Restitution Commission, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) Nr. 59, 10 March 1995, 45; Wilfried Fiedler (note 18), 175, 180; Andrea Gattini (note 10), 19, 75; Stefan Turner (note 22) , 109, 130; Christine Höhn, Die Verlagerung Deutscher Kuturgüter nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg aus Völkerrechtlicher Sicht, Humanitäres Völkerrecht, Heft 1, 1995, 26, 29.

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the end of fighting. Besides, the name of the special sections of the Red A r m y entrusted with the evacuation of German art works ('Trophy Commission') shows that the main intent was not to save works of art, but to hold in pledge artistic treasures of defeated Germany for the latter's war reparations. ee) Right to Compensation There shall be a right to war reparations for 'cultural genocide' of the Jews and Slavs.48 The idea seems to be that Soviet losses caused by German war faring could be compensated by unilateral appropriation of war 'trophies'. However, the concept of compensation is limited by basic rules of international protection of cultural property. The protection of cultural property in wartime, armistice and occupation lies in the interest of all mankind 49 — artistic treasures are not supposed to be prone to unilateral annexation by one of the war faring states w i t h the aim of individual compensation. 50 Also, it is at least difficult to see to what extent those objects which were clearly identified as of German origin, 51 could serve the purpose of compensation.

ff) Preparation of Restitution in Kind Only in cases where unique cultural objects have been destroyed, restitution by replacement (restitution in kind) may be considered as an available remedy. 52 As a matter of fact the Soviet Union and the USA began to prepare restitution in kind even in 1943, e.g. by drawing up lists of objects of national importance. The plan

48

Interview w i t h Michail Piotrowskij, Director of The Hermitage, Saint Petersburg, Osteuropa-Archiv 46,1996,290,292; Piotrowskij held that because of the 'cultural genocide' committed, the whole people had a right to compensation. 49 § 3 Preamble of the U N E S C O Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 249 UNTS, 240 reads: "damage to cultural heritage belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind." 50 Article 1 (3) of the Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property i n the Event of Armed Conflict (1954) provides that cultural property taken from occupied territories contrary to Article 1 (1), may not be retained as war reparations at the cessation of hostilities; see also LyndelPrott , Principles for the Resolution of Disputes Concerning Cultural Heritage Displaced During the Second World War, Summary of the Lecture held at the International Conference 'Spoils of War' in New York (19 - 21 January 1995), Principle 4, Spoils of War No. 1, http://www.dhh-3.de/biblio/bremen/sowl/ principles.html. 51 N o t all objects i n question are of German origin; France, the Netherlands, and other countries are also eager for the return of cultural assets first removed by the Germans and then taken to the Soviet Union. 52 See Prott (note 50), Principle 8.

Stolen Art was to replace lost cultural objects of high quality with German cultural property of comparable quality. 53 The decisive question is whether at the time of carrying off, i.e. 1945 - 1949, a rule of international law existed that allowed for restitution in kind. In several peace treaties w i t h individual states special cases of restitution in kind were agreed upon, e.g. Art. 247 (1) of the Peace Treaty of Versailles 54 as well as the peace treaties with Italy (Art. 75 (9)), Hungary (Art. 24 (3)) and Bulgaria (Art. 22 (3)). However, there are some strong arguments against restitution in kind. First of all, state practice is not uniform. There are other peace treaties with states, e.g. w i t h Romania and Finland, which lack an analogous provision. There was no uniform state practice of the Allies after World War II. Secondly, it is difficult to decide whether such a form of reparation can also take place without a peace treaty, 55 even against the will of the defeated country or, as in the German case, without its knowledge. Furthermore, the content of the principle of restitution in kind is vague, e.g. it is difficult to determine when an object of art is 'unique* or when another piece of art is of 'comparable* or 'similar* quality. 56 N o art object likens another, in particular not if they emanate — as in the case of restitution in kind — from different countries. In this author's view, the bringing of German art works to the Soviet territory after World War I I cannot be justified today by restitution in kind. For that reason the Federal Law effected by the Russian Parliament in 1998 which is based on the principle of compensatory restitution, 57 has to be viewed critically. 53

For details see Klaus Goldmann, Patrimoine. L'art et les prises de guerre, Archäologisches Nachrichtenblatt, vol. 1, 1996, 219, 220. 54 Art. 247 al. 1 of the Versailles Peace Treaty reads: "Germany undertakes to furnish to the University of Louvain, within three months after a request made to it and transmitted through the intervention of the Reparation Commission, manuscripts, incunabula, printed books, maps and objects of collection corresponding in number and value to those destroyed in the burning by Germany of the Library of Louvain"; see also the special obligations to restitute two great artistic works to Belgium, Art. 247 al. 2, RGBl. 1919. 55 See Stefan Turner (note 22), 134, who views the possibility of a clause of 'restitution i n kind' in a peace treaty as illegal today (violation of ius cogens). 56 See Andrea Gattini (note 10), 72 - 73. 57 The notion of compensatory restitution is defined i n Article 4 of the Federal Law as: the kind of international legal material obligation of an aggressor state, applied whenever the enforcement of the said state's liability i n form of a regular restitution is impossible, to compensate for the material damage inflicted on another state by handing over to the damaged state objects of the same kind (or by the acquisition by the damaged state in his own favour) as those plundered and illegally removed by the aggressor state from the territory of the damaged state. See infra EŒ.l.d).

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Sabine von Schorlemer b) Waiver of Restitution in the Paris Treaties of 1954

Recently it has been claimed that the Paris Agreements of 1954 could hinder German restitution claims to cultural objects located on Russian territory 5 8 because Germany took the obligation not to claim damages for losses of German property during occupation. Art. 1(1) of Chapter V I of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation reads that "the problem of reparation shall be settled by the peace treaty between Germany and its former enemies or by earlier agreements concerning this matter;" according to Art. 1 of Chapter I X neither German nationals nor the Federal Republic shall assert "claims of any description" against countries which have been at war with Germany; also, neither private nor public claims may be asserted "arising out of acts or omissions of the Three Powers or any of them" which took place after 5 June 1945 (Art. 3 (2) Chapter I X of the Settlement Convention). 59 Even if the wording of the provisions in question could be interpreted as to apply also to cultural property, there is strong evidence of state practice which shows that the western Allies did not intend to include cultural property. 60 Furthermore, the Paris Agreements were concluded among the three western Allied Powers and Germany. They only concern German objects transferred to western countries; they do not, however, apply to the removal of cultural objects behind the Iron Curtain. 61 If, nevertheless, one would conclude — as Klausewitz seems to do 6 2 — that the Paris Agreements of 1954 might hinder German restitution claims against Russia today, it has to be taken into consideration that in the meantime the former Soviet Union and Russia concluded two treaties w i t h special reference to cultural property claims. 63 According to the rule lex posterior derogat legi priori (a later law supersedes an earlier one) applicable in the case of collision of treaty provisions inter partes, the latter treaties of 1990 resp. 1992 have priority over the Paris Agreements; a result which is in conformity with the rule of lex specialis derogat legi generali (general pro-

58

Compare Wolfgang Klausewitz, who proposes to set up an independent legal commission to examine that question. Beutekunst — Versuch einer Dokumentation, Museumskunde 57 (2/3) 1992, 130, 136. 59 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation, 332 UNTS, 219 et seq. (Oberleitungsvertrag). 60 For further details see Stefan Turner (note 22), 153. 61 W i t h regard to reparations i n the Soviet occupation zone and in the German Democratic Republic the Soviet Union waived all further reparation claims against Germany in an agreement of 22 August 1953. 62 See supra (note 58). 63 See supra H l . d ) and e).

Stolen Art visions are displaced by specific provisions) which applies if a matter is regulated in a special treaty. Consequently, according to this author, the Paris Agreements do not represent a legal objection to German restitution claims.

c) Acquiescence and Prescription Without knowledge of the German state and the German owners, the former Soviet Union held German cultural property in possession for more than four decades. It may be asked, therefore, whether the German claims to restitution are extinguished by acquiescence or prescription. A state may acquire state territory due to the fact that the neighbor state accepted the former's activity without contradiction and for a long period of time (acquiescence)!* However, there is no state practice with respect to cultural property that allows for an analogous application of the rule of acquiescence to cultural property. The same holds true for prescription, a concept which — in principle — is unknown to public international law. 65 As Gattini underlined, the specialist literature tends to consider prescription with regard to the subject of restitution of cultural property inapplicable in relations between states.66 As a matter of fact, there are no uniform rules for prescription dates, w i t h the exception of contractual ones (the latter do not exist in the German-Russian context). As already mentioned, German artworks were also looted by private Soviet citizens. The application of prescription under international law, however, requires the possession of a sovereign, not — as in the case of occupation — possession of the objects by unauthorized private citizens. 67 Furthermore, it should be remembered that the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes against Humanity underlining

64

" Q u i tacet consentire videtur si loqui debuisset ac potuisset," Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 162 ICJ, 6, 23; although acquiescence applies to all sorts of claims, the legal term of 'acquiescence' is to be found mainly in the context of territorial disputes, see Jörg Paul Müller/ Thomas Cottier , Acquiescence, EPIL, vol. I, 1992, 14, 15. 65 See Alfred Verdross/Bruno Simma (note 25), 873; see also Prott (note 50), Principle 6 for restitution: " N o time limits can be set." 66 See Andrea Gattini (note 10), 79 w i t h further reference. See, however the judgement of the Hohe Rat in The Hague, May 1998, which ruled that a painting of Jan van der Heyden , which was presumably taken by a Soviet soldier i n 1945 from the Dresden Gemädegalerie was not to be restituted because of prescription (30 years i n the Netherlands); the federal state of Saxony had claimed its restitution, after the painting was sold by a Russian to a Dutch citizen i n 1990, reported in: SZ, 9 May 1998. 67 D. W. Greig , International Law, 2nd ed., 1976, 164.

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that war crimes are not subject to prescription 68 — a principle which might also be of some relevance to the looting of cultural property in the p05i-surrender phase. If today the Russian side would — theoretically — object to restitution of cultural property to Germany because of prescription, this could also contradict the rule of venire contra factum proprium. As German art objects have been hidden in secret places for years, German owners had no knowledge of their location and could not, consequently, claim their restitution. The Russian side should not take any advantage from that.

d) New Title to Property? The Federal Law of 1998 In the Federal Law O n Cultural Values Removed to the USSR as a Result of World War I I and Located in the Territory of the Russian Federation 69 Russia exerted property rights over several categories of works of art.

aa) Drafting History In 1994 the Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute for State and Law, presented a Report about the Legal Basis for the Solution of the Questions Concerning the Cultural Property Transferred to the USSR as a Result of World War II. W i t h reference to this report, the Council of the Federation presented two drafts for a Russian law; however, the Duma rejected both drafts at the first reading on 7 June 1995. A new draft was presented in May 1996 in the state Duma and was accepted on 5 July 1996. Unexpectedly, the Council of the Federation this time rejected the law on 17 July 1996. Subsequently, the draft was referred to the mediation committee. The final version of the law was almost unanimously accepted by the state Duma on 5 February 1997. The Council of the Federation authorized the law which was subsequently handed over to the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin. He exercised his veto on 17 March 1997, because, from his point of view, the law did not take into account norms of international law. He also argued that the bill did not differentiate between Nazi German artworks and art that the Nazis had seized from other countries and individuals in Europe. The state Duma confirmed the law in the beginning of April 1997 and it was also accepted by the Council of the Federation. However, the president refused to sign

68

U N Doc. A/Res. 2391 (ΧΧΠΙ) of 9 December 1968. A n unofficial translation of the text is to be found in Spoils of War No. 4, http:// www.dhhh-3.de/biblio/bremen/sow4/rlaw.html; see also Pierre d'Argent, The Russian Law on Removed Cultural Property: Some International Law Remarks, Spoils of War No. 4 (note 22), 20 - 24; Mark Boguslavskii , About the Basic Legal Principles of the Russian Law, id. 69

Stolen Art it and sent the law back to the Council of the Federation arguing that the formal procedure of the voting in the Council of the Federation (the Council of the Federation had voted in written form in order to ensure the voting of all members) was not correct. In June 1997 the Council of the Federation returned the law to President Yeltsin who called on the Constitutional Court. O n 6 April 1998, the latter ruled in favor of the parliament, saying that President Yeltsin was required to sign the bill into law despite his objections. 70

bb) Legal Provisions A n analysis of the law shows that it declares all cultural valuables71 located on the territory of the Russian Federation which were brought to the territory "by way of exercise of its right to compensatory restitution" as federal property (Article 6). There are two exceptions for former enemy states72: one is for objects that were either property of religious organizations or private charities and which did not serve the interests of militarism and fascism; the other is for objects that belonged to persons whose property was confiscated because of their active fight against National Socialism or because of their participation in national resistance movements. W i t h regard to these objects the former enemy states, such as Germany, may file a restitution claim within 18 months of the coming into force of this Federal Law. Under the condition that the claimant state (Germany) enacts a law to meet its own obligation to return to the Russian Federation cultural valuables that were plundered and illegally removed by former enemy states,73 the objects may be handed over to the rightful owners (Art. 10 (1)). If no such claim is filed the objects automatically become federal property (Art. 10 (2)).

70

The Court said in a statement: "We confirm the obligation of the president of the Russian Federation (. . .) to sign and promulgate the federal law on cultural treasures transferred to the Soviet Union during World War Two and now found on the territory of the Russian Federation," Reuters, 7 April 1998. 71 The term cultural valuables is used in a broad sense, see Art. 4 al. 3: "any property of a religious or secular nature which has historic, artistic, scientific or any other cultural importance, as works of art, books, manuscripts, incunabula, archival materials, components and fragments of architectural, historical and artistic monuments, as well as other categories specified i n Russian Cultural Law." 72 Former enemy states are Germany and its Second World War allies, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania and Finland. 73 That means claims w i l l only be admissible if the claimant states themselves are ready to restitute to Russia its plundered cultural values free of charge. For the problem of quid pro quo see infra ΙΠ.2.

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O n l y states can claim cultural valuables74 and each return w i l l take place on the basis of a federal law (Art. 2 (3)). This means that the decision to restitute property depends in the future entirely on the Russian Parliament. Without the passing of an appropriate federal law, no removed cultural valuable may be the subject of an act of transfer, donation, exchange or any other form of transfer. These very strict regulations, which according to experts might enable restitution only in rare cases, are supplemented by the provision that the claiming state (Germany), has to pay for the identification of the objects, expert's examination, storage and restoration as well as for transportation costs (Art. 18 (4)).

cc) Legal Appraisal The new law w i l l effectively confiscate 75 in a somewhat haphazard manner 76 the cultural objects seized in Germany after World War II. It is interesting to analyze the effect the existence of the new federal law might have on German restitution claims. There are several open questions. If the Federal Law was understood to mean that all the cultural objects transferred to the USSR between 1945 - 1949 now located in the Russian territory are the national property of Russia, German restitution claims could be subject to objection. However, the legal appraisal of the Federal Law shows that it only applies to all cultural valuables "removed to the USSR during World War I I and located in the territory of the Russian Federation" (Art. 3). Its title indicates that it is valid for "cultural valuables removed to the USSR as a result of World War II." Thus, the Federal Law does not apply to all removed cultural objects, but only to those which were removed to the territory of the USSR pursuant to orders of the Soviet army military command, the Soviet military administration in Germany or instructions of other competent bodies in the USSR. Works of art looted by individuals may be restituted.

74

See Art. 18; however, Article 19 reads that claims for removed family relics may also be filed by representatives of the families that used to be the owners of these valuables. If a claim is accepted the newly established Federal Body for the Preservation of Cultural Values (Art. 16) w i l l pass a decision to restitute the family relic against payment of its value as well as reimbursement of the costs. Thus, exclusively private individuals may demand restitution. 75 A host state may take alien assets for a public purpose by direct confiscation, expropriation or nationalization, but also deprive the owners of the effective use of their property, see Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern , Aliens, Property, EPIL, vol. I, 1992,116,117; as to problems of discriminatory expropriation and confiscation of cultural property see generally Kurt Siehr (note 4), 133 et seq. 76 Kurt Siehr rightly underlined that the Federal Law was "carelessly drafted," see Kurt Siehr , Comment on the Russian Federal Law of 1997 on Cultural Values, Spoils of War No. 4 (note

22).

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Second, the relationship between the Federal Law and the former German-Soviet Treaty (1990) resp. the German-Russian Treaty of 199277 has to be clarified. Art. 1 (6) of the Treaty of 1990 rules for priority of international law over national law. Also, the Russian Constitution shows respect for the validity of international law. 78 Consequently, from the point of public international law, the new Russian Law is in contradiction with Article 16 (2) of the Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Partnership and Cooperation signed in November 1990, and also with Article 15 of the Cultural Agreement between Germany and Russia concluded in 1990. Despite the fact that the contracting parties had agreed to return lost or unlawfully transferred art treasures which are located in their territory, the Russian Parliament recently passed a unilateral act that runs counter to these former obligations. This violates the basic principle of pacta sunt servanda J 9 Furthermore, Russia may not appeal to internal law in order to evade its international law obligations. A state cannot plead provisions of its own law in answer to a claim against it for an alleged breach of its obligations under international law. 80 For that reason, Russia is formally obliged to implement the treaty obligations undertaken in 1990 and 1992. From a strictly legal point of view one has to conclude that Russia may not apply the provisions of the new Federal Law. Politically speaking, the matter is more complex, as w i l l be shown briefly in the subsequent paragraphs. 2. Political Objections From the legal point of view it is clear that artworks are not supposed to be used for war reparations; however, politically the problem is more difficult. The German claim to return the artworks that were confiscated as war reparations by Soviet troops raises the question whether a country whose troops overran Europe in a devastating war has the moral right to recover its own treasures from one of the victors. Actually, German restitution claims meet with firm national opposition in Russia today:

77

See supra H l . d ) and e). Art. 15 (4) of the Russian Constitution reads: "The commonly recognized principles and norms of international treaties of the Russian Federation are a constituent part of its légal system. If an international treaty establishes other rules than those stipulated by the law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply." Rossiiskaya gazeta, Ν 237 (853), 25 December 1993 (as amended by presidential decrees Ν 20 of 9 January 1996 and Ν 173 of 10 February 1996). 79 See supra Π.3. c). 80 Ian Brownlie (note 69), 35; see also Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS, 331. 78

22 G Y I L 41

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— in the bilateral restitution commission Russian negotiators claim 'trophies' as compensation for the losses and destructions of Soviet cultural values by German troops; — the mainstream of Russian Parliament members consider the German cultural values located on Russian territory to be the rightful property of Russia; — the Russian population voices opposition to restitution, too; when it was asked in a telephone poll by Moskovskii Komsomolets ' 'Public Voice' in 1997 whether the works of art removed to the Soviet Union should return to Germany, 80% of the people asked considered that there should be no return; 81 — large parts of the Russian media back up those nationalistic trends. 82 The arguments brought forward by the different groups have in common the underlying assumption that a regrettable asymmetry exists. As Victor Akulenko, of the V. Koretsky Institute of State and Law of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, put it: To consider such a complicated problem as the return of cultural values lacks perspective if the restitution responsibility of Germany and its satellites for their damage to cultural values of the former USSR people (...) is not taken into account. 83

According to Russian public opinion it is unjust that only Russia is obliged to restitute looted art — not former war enemy Germany. Consequently, there should be no restitution of German art works without a quid pro quo. The problem is that, at the end of the war, practically all looted and displaced artworks found in Germany were collected by the Allies in four central collecting points and subsequently returned to their countries of origin, the Soviet Union included. For that reason, there is no longer a significant number 84 of Russian art

81 1 6 percent of the Russian population are in favor of a return and 4 percent still doubt, see Evgenia Korkmasova , Review of the Russian Press for 1997 on the Question of the Restitution of Cultural Values, Spoils of War No. 4 (http://www.dhh-3e/biblio/bremen/sow4/srpl . html). %1 Id. 83 Victor A kulenko, A Bill which Faces the Past, Spoils of War No. 4 (note 22); see also Pressezentrum des Deutschen Bundestages, WiB Heft 10/25 May 1995,1; Wilfried Fiedler, Legal Issues Bearing on the Restitution of German Cultural Property in Russia, in: Simpson (ed.), (note 1), 175, 176. 84 There are no reliable numerical data about destroyed or lost Russian cultural property during World War Π, see Deutscher Bundestag, Heft 13/9 September 1997. Between 1945 and 1948,14 transports w i t h about 534,000 objects were sent from the western collecting points to the former USSR; between 1952 and 1953 there were two more transports; Wolfgang Klausewitz (note 58), 135 speaks of some long forgotten boxes w i t h stolen art which might be i n German museums and pointed out that not all of the underground art depots i n Germany have yet been found because their entries were blown up at the end of the war; see also Wolfgang Eichwede , SZ Online 24 February 1996.

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works on German territory. Apparently, Russia is still missing hundreds of thousands of works of art, 93 % of which are not even mentioned in lists of missing objects. 85 The cultural damage to Russia is estimated at 1.2 -1.3 trillion US$. 86 For that reason, there is a de facto imbalance in the German-Russian relationship with regard to the restitution because Russia cannot obtain equivalent works of Russian origin.

3. Practical Problems Finally it should be mentioned that there are also problems of a practical nature which render the process of restitution difficult. Among them figure: — problems of identification: closed special files (spezfondy), unknown even to Russian archivists, used to exist; 87 it was not until 22 January 1998 that Russia listed all the cultural objects which were stolen or lost during World War II; — loss of objects: even until the end of the 1970s the former Soviet state sold several objects of stolen art on international art markets; as an art market existed within the former Soviet Union, part of the stolen art today is to be found in non-accessible private Russian collections. Furthermore, some Russian museums started to sell German treasures on the grey market; — perishing of objects: as some depots were humid or for some other reason not appropriate to store works of art, several objects may no longer be restituted for physical reasons (mainly drawings, graphic arts, and printings).

I V . Possible Solutions Several solutions exist to settle the German-Russian conflict over stolen art. 1. Waiver of Property Claims Artworks such as the Trojan Treasures belong to all mankind; they are part of the world's cultural heritage. Thus, it would be theoretically possible that the Ger-

85

Wostok Spezial 3/1995, 54. Professor Jewgeni Ussenko, advisor of the Duma, spoke of damage to Russia's cultural valuables of 1.3 trillion US$, see Berliner Morgenpost, 15 March 1997; see also Wolfgang Klausewitz (note 58), 133; former minister of culture, Nikolai Gubenko , even demanded 1.2 billion US$ from Germany for lost or destroyed cultural objects. 87 See Andreas Grenzer , The Russian Archives and their Files — Researching the Soviet Losses of Property, Spoils of War No. 1 (note 4). 86

22*

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man state give up unilaterally its claims to stolen art located in Russia.88 The objects concerned would stay in Russia forever. However, the German state may only speak for itself, i.e. give up title to state, but not to private, property of museums and individuals. For that reason, the German-Russian controversy would not be settled in to to. It was also suggested that Germany and Russia, in a common declaration on property, renounce titles to objects which were taken to each other's territory. A newly established foundation, which is supposed to be financed by both countries, would acquire title over the objects.89 The main argument against the transfer of property to a German-Russian foundation is that this possibly would legitimate ex post the looting of art and, thus, would undermine important obligations of public international law. Besides, as Fiedler underlines, the German-Russian foundation would be a 'special solution' (Sonderlösung) which in no way would settle other restitution claims against Russia, e.g. from Poland, Ukraine and others. 90 2. Incentives to Promote the Restitution Process There is some hope that the German-Russian restitution process could experience a stimulus if the German side would be ready to offer something in exchange for the objects returned. 91 Germany could show its willingness to make up for some of the damage done by Nazi officials to the Russian cultural heritage, for example by contributing to the restoration of Russian monuments. 92 Also, German and Russian ex88

See the proposal of the Munich politician of the Christian Social Union (CSU), Peter Gauweiler (BT Drs. 13/9081); apparently, 63 percent of the German population were willing in 1997 to disclaim the stolen art; they even opposed the treaties w i t h Russia which foresee restitution to Germany, Berliner Morgenpost, 3 A p r i l 1997. 89 Kristiane Burchardi/Christof Kalb (note 45), 940; see the reply of Wilfried Fiedler, Unterwegs zu einem europäischen Beutemuseum? Zum Vorschlag der Einrichtung einer deutsch-russischen Kulturstiftung, D A 6, 1997, 258, 259; the German Party B Ü N D N I S 90/DIE GRÜN E N formally proposed the creation of a German-Russian foundation. For details see Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 13/221 of 4 March 1998, 20220; among others, the foundation is supposed to document the objects lost during World War Π and to make art works accessible to the public; Robert Hughes suggested a "symbolic museum of trophy art without discoverable heirs, to which the German state would waive all claims"; The Spoils of War, Time Domestic, 3 April 1995, vol. 145, No. 14, 3. O n 25 March 1998, presidential advisor Sergej Schachrai proposed an international fund which is supposed to return art objects on a global scale. 90 Fiedler, id. , 259. 91 As for the problem of asymmetry see supra ΙΠ.2. 92 Robert Hughes suggested an agreement to pay for the restoration of the church frescoes of Novgorod, destroyed by the Nazis (note 89), 3.

Stolen Art perts for restoration could be trained together, Russian museums could be modernized, their infrastructure improved, and so on. T o protect its cultural heritage, Russia needs financial, technical and personal help — here Germany may lend a helping hand. 3. Sanctions In case of a material breach of a bilateral treaty by one contracting party, the other contracting party is entitled to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part. 93 Russia is not implementing its treaty obligations laid down in Art. 16 of the German-Soviet Treaty of 1990 and Art. 15 of the German-Russian Treaty of 1992. Thus, Germany could suspend the application of those treaties. Furthermore, sanctions may be applied against a country that holds displaced cultural property of a foreign state on its territory in violation of international law. However, it would be politically difficult for Germany to apply sanctions against Russia. 4. Mediation by UNESCO Germany and Russia could take recourse to the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation established in 1978. This committee, composed of 22 member states of UNESCO, could mediate and make recommendations on how to proceed. 94 The Committee is responsible mainly for facilitating bilateral negotiations with regard to restitution/return of cultural property to its countries of origin and for promoting bi- and multilateral cooperation of states with a view to that end. Its major role is seen as a "negotiating forum at assisting the member states of UNESCO to resolve claims for the restitution or return of cultural property to its country of origin." 95 In case bilateral negotiations show no result and if the Inter93

See Arts. 60, 65 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS, 331, 332. The work of this Committee is described in G A Res. 48/15 of 2 November 1993; see also gopher://gopher.un.org/ 00/ga/docs/50/plenary/498. 95 Lyndel Prott/Jan Hladik , Division of Cultural Heritage, UNESCO, Paris, h t t p : / / w w w . dhh-3.de/biblio/bremen/sow4/srl.html; see also Lyndel Prott, The Role of U N E S C O "Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property" in the Resolution of Disputes Concerning Cultural Property Removed i n Consequence of the Second World War, Spoils of War No. 4 (note 22). Prott underlined that only for a minority of restitution cases (about 10 %) the Intergovernmental Committee may perform a useful role, Lyndel Prott, 94

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governmental Committee would like to be available for the resolution of the German-Russian dispute it could hold a special session dealing with the issue;96 it could also create an ad hoc subcommittee or a working group to study the problem. I n any case, to address restitution problems in a neutral forum of UNESCO could help the parties to the conflict to exchange their legal and political points of views and find a solution.

5. Judicial Settlement of the Dispute If no bilateral agreement is reached, the states may apply to an arbitrator to settle the conflict. The German Social Democratic Party (SPD) suggested in the German Parliament international adjudication of the question. 97 Indeed, the Foreign Ministry of Germany had made a proposal to that end; however, Russia refused. 98 The same holds true for a procedure before the International Court of Justice. A t the end of 1997 the German government offered in a note to the Russian Government to have the issue decided by the ICJ; however, Russia did not react (as of March 1998). This means that the necessary consent for a judicial settlement of the dispute is lacking. Only for private claims is there the possibility of legal action before German courts. 99 As there are no compulsory international judicial procedures, Germany has to continue its diplomatic efforts.

The View of U N E S C O on Cultural Objects Displaced During World War Π , Spoils of War No. 1 (note 4); Lyndel Prott (note 50), Suggested Method of Procedure IV. e). Jan Hladik , UNESCO, N i n t h session of the Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation, IJCP, vol. 6, 1997, 151 et seq.; see also Report by the Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution i n Case of Illicit Appropriation on its Activities (1996-1997), UNESCO Doc. 29 C/REP.12, 5 August 1997, VE. 96 A t a symposium i n Kiev from 12 - 13 December 1996, it was recommended that the Committee should be asked to hold a special session to discuss issues related to cultural propert y removed as consequence of the Second World War. However, until today the German Russian conflict has not been dealt w i t h by the Committee. 97 See Plenarprotokoll 13/221 of 4 March 1998, 20219. 98 See response of K.-H. Laermann (FDP), Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 13/221 of 4 March 1998, 20221; see, however, Kurt Siehr (note 4), 119 who considers court proceedings against Russia an inappropriate remedy to enforce the provisions in question. 99 For more details see Andrea Gattini (note 10), 87 et seq.

Stolen Art 6. Solutions de lege ferenda It has been suggested to establish a special international tribunal as an instrument to settle cultural matters, and restitution matters in particular. 100 Apart from the problems arising generally from the establishment of an international court it is doubtful whether a new judicial organ offers any advantage. The International Court of Justice in The Hague is generally competent for inter-state disputes; however, the jurisdiction of the ICJ is not accepted by Russia in the case concerned. There is no reason, according to this author, why another newly created tribunal would be accepted better. V . Perspective The General Assembly of the United Nations underlined that the "restitution to a country of its objets d'art y monuments, museum pieces, archives, manuscripts, documents and any other cultural or artistic treasure contributes to the strengthening of international cooperation and to the preservation and flowering of universal cultural values through fruitful cooperation." 101 However, the legal dispute between Russia and Germany over stolen art is protracted and complex. After the Russian Parliament's recent passage of the Federal Law declaring Russian property rights over the objects in litigo , it is highly possible that Germany has to say good-bye to millions of cultural objects. Apart from the cultural loss implied and the damage for the owners, respectively their heirs, this scenario is highly unsatisfactory — especially w i t h regard to the rule of law. Reliability of public international law is of high value to the international community, especially in times of transition. Whoever disregards legal norms should be aware that one day he himself may need protection by them. It is to be hoped that Russia w i l l fulfil its legal obligations in the near future and that Germany may recompense for that achievement.

100

See Ann P. Prunty , Toward Establishing an International Tribunal for the Settlement of Cultural Property Disputes: H o w to Keep Greece from Losing its Marbles, Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 72, 1984,1155,1167 et seq. ; according to Prunty , the new court should have jurisdiction for, among others, disputes over transfers of cultural property which was not stolen from a museum, public monument, or similar institution. The tribunal should comprise 21 members, who would serve a nine year term; judgments would not be subject to appeal. 101 G A Res. 50/56 of 2 February 1996, para. 2.

REPORTS

The Activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Years 1997 and 1998 By Karsten Nowrot

O n 25 May 1998 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia celebrated its 5th anniversary. 1 While in the course of the first three years of its existence only eight persons came into custody at the Hague and decisions in the pretrial proceedings dominated the activities of the Tribunal, 2 the prosecution of those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia has, despite still existing deficits, gained considerable momentum in the last two years. 3 By the end of 1998, twenty-six accused were in custody of the Tribunal, four trial and one appeal proceedings against ten persons were taking place, the Tribunal had imposed in four judgments sentences upon six accused persons, and in one case, the proceedings against Drazen Erdemovic , the Tribunal delivered a final decision. In addition, in 1998 the President of the Tribunal as well as the prosecutor have asserted the jurisdiction of the Tribu-

1

O n the establishment of the Tribunal in 1993, see Kai Koschorreck/Miriam Müller , Report on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, German Yearbook of International Law (GYIL), vol. 39,1996,409 et seq., covering the activities of the Tribunal up to 1996. 2

Id. For a critical comment on the activities of the Tribunal in that period, see Lucas W. Andrews , Sailing around the Flat Earth: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as a Failure of Jurisprudential Theory, Emory International Law Review, vol. 11, 1997, 471,483 et seq. 3

See the Fourth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U N Doc. A/52/375 (1997), 9; also Christopher Greenwood , The Development of International Law by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 2,1998,97,98; and the address by the President of the Tribunal, Judge McDonald , to the United Nations General Assembly on 19 November 1998, available on the Internet under h t t p : / / w w w . un.org/icty/ pressreal/speechP.htm.

The Activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia nal over the recent events in Kosovo, thus opening up a new field for the activities of the Tribunal. 4 I. Changes i n the Structure and the Composition of the Tribunal The years 1997 and 1998 saw considerable changes in the structure as well as in the composition of the Tribunal. Responding to requests by the President of the Tribunal 5 and the Secretary-General of the United Nations 6 for an institutional enlargement of the Tribunal due to the growing number of accused awaiting trial, the Security Council decided in Resolution 1166 of 13 May 19987 to amend Articles 11, 12, and 13 of the Statute of the International Tribunal in order to establish a third trial chamber and, for this purpose, the election of three additional judges.8 O n 27 August 1998, the Security Council forwarded with Resolution 11919 a list of nine nominees to the General Assembly for election in accordance with Article 13 Sec. 2 (d) of the Statute of the Tribunal. From the list of candidates, the General Assembly on 16 October 1998 elected David Anthony Hunt (Australia), Patrick Lipton Robinson (Jamaica), and Mohamed Bennouna (Morocco) as judges to serve on the third trial chamber 10 ; they were sworn in on 16 November 1998.11 In addition to these changes in the institutional structure, the General Assembly on 20 May 1997, with the end of the first term of the judges approaching, elected eleven judges to serve four-year terms at the Tribunal, beginning on 17 November 1997.12 Five of the judges, Antonio Cassese (Italy), Gabrielle Kirk McDonald (United States of America), Claude Jorda (France), Lai Chand Vohrah (Malaysia), and Fouad 4

See infra Part IV.

5

Bulletin of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, No. 20, 1998, 4. 6

See U N Doc. S/1998/376 of 5 May 1998.

7

SC Res. 1166 of 13 May 1998.

8

The same institutional enlargement was decided by the Security Council for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in SC Res. 1165 of 30 A p r i l 1998. O n the work of this tribunal, see, e.g., Lyal S. Sunga, The First Indictments of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 18,1997,329; and Paul J. Magnarella , Expanding the Frontiers of Humanitarian Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Florida Journal of International Law, vol. 9, 1994, 421. 9

SC Res. 1191 of 27 August 1998.

10

Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 19 October 1998. 11

Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 20 November 1998. 12

1997.

Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 21 May

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Abdel-Moneim Riad (Egypt), were reelected. The six new judges are Richard George May (United Kingdom), FlorenceNdepeleMwachandeMumba (Zambia), RafaelNieto Navia (Colombia), Almiro Simoes Rodrigues (Portugal), Mohamed Shahabuddeen (Guyana), and Wang Tieya (China). 13 In addition, the Security Council decided in Resolution 1126 of 27 August 199714 that Adolphus Karibi-Whyte (Nigeria), Elizabeth Odio Benito (Costa Rica), and Saad Saood Jan (Pakistan) w i l l continue to serve as judges upon completion of the Celebici case. O n 19 November 1997, the judges, meeting in plenary session, elected Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald as President of the Tribunal, 15 following Judge Antonio Gassese who held this office during the first term. In the same session, Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen was elected Vice-President and the composition of the chambers was announced. 16 I I . Changes i n the Rules Governing the Tribunal The most important change in the rules governing the Tribunal took place on 9 and 10 July 1998, when the judges, meeting in plenary session, concluded an indepth review of the judicial procedure by adopting six new Rules of Procedure and Evidence and amending twenty-five others with the aim of streamlining and expediting the proceedings. 17 Among the main changes are the assignment within each trial chamber of a pretrial judge for each case who w i l l conduct all pretrial proceedings and is empowered to rule on most of the pretrial motions. Furthermore, Rule 50 of Evidence and Procedure as amended provides that any amendments to the existing indictment before the beginning of the trial w i l l be considered by the same judge who confirmed the initial indictment. Another important change is the fact that in the future a chamber w i l l render one combined judgment, not only determining whether the accused is found innocent or guilty but also, in the latter case, imposing the sentence. In addition, the Tribunal adopted on 12 June 1997 a "Code of Professional Conduct for Defense Counsel Appearing before the International Tribunal" in which it 13

Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 12 November 1997. 14 15

SC Res. 1126 of 27 August 1997. Bulletin, No. 20 (note 5), 5.

16

For a detailed description of the composition of the new chambers, including Trial Chamber ΙΠ, and the assignment of the cases, see Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 20 November 1998. 17

Bulletin of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, N o . 21,1998, 1, 20. The latest version of the rules governing the Tribunal can be found on the Internet under http://www.un.org/icty/basic.htm .

The Activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia laid down, inter alia , rules on the obligations of counsel to clients, the conduct before the Tribunal, and on the maintenance of the integrity of the profession. 18 I I I . Legal Proceedings of the Tribunal The legal proceedings of the Tribunal consist of the pretrial proceedings on the one hand and the trial and appeal chamber proceedings, including sentencing judgments, on the other. While the pretrial proceedings still make up a substantial part of the activities of the Tribunal, this reporting period is especially characterized by an increasing number of trial and appeal chamber proceedings. 1. Pretrial Proceedings A n overview of the pretrial proceedings of the Tribunal may be divided into indictments, arrest warrants, subpoenas, and decisions on preliminary and interlocutory motions. Special attention w i l l be given to the decisions in the Blaskic case, dealing w i t h the competence of the Tribunal to issue subpoenae duces tecum to states and state officials which is of great significance for the future work of the Tribunal and its relationship w i t h states.19 a) Indictments A t the end of 1998 the Tribunal had issued twenty-two public indictments against a total of fifty-seven individuals. 20 In addition, the chambers confirmed a number of non-disclosed indictments in accordance w i t h Rule 53 of Procedure and Evidence, that are only made public when served on the accused. b) Warrants and International Arrest Warrants Arrest warrants in accordance with Rule 55 of Procedure and Evidence have been issued against all accused persons. In addition, the Tribunal has currently issued 18

The text of the code can be found on the Internet under http://www.un.org/icty/codee.htm. 19

See also Peter Malanczuk, The International Criminal Tribunal's Power to Issue Subpoena Duces Tecum , in: Erik Denters/Nico Schnjver (eds.), Reflections on International Law from the Low Countries — I n Honour of Paul de Waart , 1998, 260. 20

Fact Sheet of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 12 January 1999, available on the Internet under http://www.un.org/icty/glance/fact.htm . O n the procedure for indictments, see also Koschorreck/Müller (note 1), 417; and Kai Ambos, Strafverteidigung vor dem UN-Jugoslawiengerichtshof, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, vol. 51, 1998, 1444.

34

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eight international arrest warrants, following five proceedings in accordance with Rule 61 of Procedure and Evidence. The accused persons in question are Dragan Nikolic, Milan Mar tic, MileMrksic , Miroslav Radie , Veselin Sljivancanin , Ivica Rajic , Radovan Karadzic , and Ratko Mladic. 21 Beginning in the middle of 1997, a new form of execution of international arrest warrants was adopted, when members of the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) started to arrest indictees in Eastern Slavonia and Prijedor. 22 These developments, which continued through 1998, have already been regarded as a "historical turning point" 2 3 in the developments towards an international police power to assist international criminal jurisdiction. 24

c) The Blaskic Case: The Competence of the Tribunal to Issue Subpoenae Duces Tecum One of the most important decisions in the reporting period dealt w i t h the question whether and to what extent the Tribunal has the competence to issue subpoenae duces tecum , which is only rudimentarily regulated in Rule 54 of Procedure and Evi-

21

Fact Sheet (note 20). O n Rule 61 proceedings generally, see Koschorreck/Müller (note 1), 419; Mark Thieroff/Edward A. A m ley, Jr., Proceeding to Justice and Accountability in the Balkans: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rule 61, Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 23, 1998, 231; and Brian T. Hildreth , Hunting the Hunters: The United Nations Unleashes Its Latest Weapon in the Fight Against Fugitive War Crimes Suspect — Rule 61, Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 6, 1998, 499, 512 et seq. 22

For a detailed description, see Fourth Annual Report (note 3), 9, 18, 23, 34 - 35, 60 - 61; Lori Fisler Damrosch , Enforcing International Law Through Non-forcible Measures, Recueil des Cours, vol. 269,1997,9,234 et seq.; and Paul Tavemier, The Experience of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 37,1997, 605,616 et seq. For a critical view on the prior reluctance of SFOR to arrest indicted war criminals, see Richard Goldstone , Assessing the Work of the United Nations War Crimes Tribunals, Stanford Journal of International Law, vol. 33, 1997, 1, 7 et seq. 23 24

Fourth Annual Report (note 3), 9.

Damrosch (note 22), 234. O n the legal issues, see Kai Ambos, Zur Rechtsgrundlage der Festnahme mutmaßlicher Kriegsverbrecher durch Sfor i m ehemaligen Jugoslawien, Juristenzeitung, vol. 52, 1997, 887; Paola Gaeta, Is N A T O Authorized or Obliged to Arrest Persons Indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia?, European Journal of International Law, vol. 9, 1998, 174; and Stephanie Scholz , Die Zulieferung an den Jugoslawien-Strafgerichtshof, 1998, 69 et seq.

The Activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia dence,25 to states and high government officials, as well as the appropriate remedies for non-compliance. In the pretrial proceedings of the case against Tihomir Blaskic 26 Judge McDonald , at the request of the prosecutor of 10 January 1997, issued on 15 January 1997 two subpoenae duces tecum addressed to the Republic of Croatia and its Defense Minister Gojko Susaky 27 as well as to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Custodian of the Records of the Central Archives of what was formerly the Ministry of Defense of the Croatian Community of Herceg Bosna respectively. 28 These subpoenae requested the production of documentary evidence relating to the Blaskic case by 14 February 1997. It further ordered that, if compliance was not possible, a representative of the state in question and the Croatian defense minister or the custodian would respectively have to appear in court. I n a letter of 10 February 1997, the Republic of Croatia challenged the legal authority of the Tribunal to issue a subpoena duces tecum to a sovereign state and objected to the naming of a high governmental official in a request for assistance pursuant to Article 29 of the Statute. Following a number of hearings before Judge McDonald in February and March 1997, the matter was submitted to Trial Chamber I I for hearing on 16 and 17 April 1997.29 Besides orders to the parties to file briefs, requests for leave to submit amicus curiae briefs on the issues in question also were invited in accordance w i t h Rule 74 of Procedure and Evidence.30

25

Rule 54 of Procedure and Evidence:

A t the request of either party or proprio motu , a Judge or a Trial Chamber may issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as may be necessary for the purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial. 26

O n the history of the case, see Koschorreck/Müller

27

The subpoena is reprinted in: Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 1,1997,

(note 1), 420.

399. 28

Bulletin of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, No. 18,1997, 10; see also Malanczuk (note 19), 261 et seq. 29 30

For a detailed description, see Bulletin, No. 18, id ., 10.

See, e.g., the amicus curiae brief submitted by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law by Jochen Abr. Frowein , Georg No lté , Karin Oellers-Frahm, and Andreas Zimmermann , reprinted in: Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 1, 1997, 349; and the amicus curiae brief by Peter Malanczuk, reprinted in: Malanczuk (note 19), 267 et seq. For a complete list of the amici curiae briefs submitted, see Bulletin, No. 18 (note 28), 11.

350

Karsten Nowrot aa) Decision of the Trial Chamber

The trial chamber handed down its decision on 18 July 1997, reinstating the subpoena duces tecum and ordering Croatia and Defense Minister Susak to comply with it within thirty days.31 The chamber considered at "the heart of this dispute" the question whether the Tribunal in general possesses the authority to issue binding orders to states.32 Emphasizing the Tribunal's character as an independent international court and stressing the need for its capacity to act autonomously of the Security Council for its fair and effective functioning, 33 the trial chamber held that the absence of an express grant of authority in the Statute to issue subpoenae to states and government officials does not preclude the existence of such a power. 34 First, the trial chamber found that the Tribunal has the inherent power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and other evidence necessary for a proper execution of its judicial functions. 35 Citing the requirement of a fair and expeditious trial laid down in Article 20 of the Statute and reviewing a number of national legal systems, the chamber held that it is necessary for a criminal court to be vested w i t h the authority to provide for the production of all relevant evidence.36 Thus in adopting the teleological method of interpretation, the trial chamber based its decision on the doctrine of implied powers by relying, inter alia , on statements made by the International Court of Justice.37

31 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, 18 July 1997 (Trial Chamber Π), Decision on the Objection of the Republic of Croatia to the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum. See also Gerhard Hafner, Limits to the Procedural Powers of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in: Karel Wellens (ed.), International Law: Theory and Practice — Essays i n Honour of Enc Suy , 1998, 651, 658 et seq., and Yves Nouvel , La Preuve devant le Tribunal Pénal International pour ΓΕχ-Yougoslavie, Revue Générale de Droit International Public, vol. 101, 1997, 905, 938 et seq. 32

Blaskic — Trial Chamber Decision (note 31), paras. 14 et seq.

33

Id., para. 23.

34

Id., para. 26.

35

Id., para. 41.

36

Id., paras. 32 - 40.

37

See, e.g., Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (advisory opinion), 1949 ICJ 173, 182; Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tnbunal (advisory opinion), 1954 ICJ 47,56; Certain Expenses of the United Nations (advisory opinion), 1962 ICJ 151,168. See also ManuelRama-Montaldo, International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International Organizations, British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 44, 1970, 111, 147 et seq.

The Activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia In its next step, the chamber, referring to Chapter V I I of the United Nations Charter as the legal basis of the Tribunal and relying on Articles 15,18, 19 and especially 29 of the Statute, determined that the Tribunal has in general express power to direct mandatory orders also to states.38 After reviewing the power of other international courts and tribunals to obtain evidence,39 the chamber concluded that the Tribunal has the authority to issue subpoenae duces tecum to states for the production of government documents. 40 Concerning the issue of the Tribunal's power to address binding orders to government officials, the trial chamber relied, inter alia, on Article 18 (2) of the Statute, which grants the prosecutor the authority to deal with "State authorities" in particular and thus demonstrates that the Tribunal is not required to proceed through designated state channels but can approach government officials directly for compliance.41 In addition, the judges found that the power of the Tribunal to issue binding orders to states, in the light of its practicability and effectiveness, "by necessary implication carries the authority to issue such orders to their officials." 42 After elaborating on and emphasizing the duty, challenged by Croatia, of states as well as individuals to comply with orders of the Tribunal, 43 the chamber turned to Croatia's final contention that its national security interests relieved it of any obligation to comply with the subpoena." Taking into account Rule 66 (c) of Procedure and Evidence 45 and reviewing the practice of other international tribunals and the regulations in municipal laws, the trial chamber found that national security in-

38

Blaskic — Trial Chamber Decision (note 31), paras. 42-51.

39

Id., paras. 52-57.

40

Id., para. 64.

41

Id., para. 67.

42

Id. , para. 69.

43

Id., paras. 70-98.

44

See also H. A. Strydom, The Legal Authority of the International Criminal Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia to Order the Disclosure of Evidence, South African Yearbook of International Law, vol. 22, 1997, 76, 81 et seq. 45

Rule 66 (C) of Procedure and Evidence:

Where information is i n the possession of the Prosecutor, the disclosure of which may prejudice further or ongoing investigations, or for any other reasons may be contrary to the public interest or affect the security interests of any State, the Prosecutor may apply to the Trial Chamber sitting in camera to be relieved from the obligation to disclose pursuant to Sub-rule (B). When making such application the Prosecutor shall provide the Trial Chamber (but only the Trial Chamber) w i t h the information that is sought to be kept confidential.

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Karsten Nowrot

terests have to be taken into account but do not constitute an absolute privilege. 46 Rather the Tribunal, by holding in camera as well as ex parte hearings, has the power to review the legitimacy of such claims in order to determine whether the national security interests outweigh the interest of the international community in gaining access to crucial evidence.47 Following the decision, on 25 July 1997, Croatia filed a notice of appeal and request for stay of the trial chamber's decision. The appeals chamber, on 29 July 1997, declared Croatia's request admissible pursuant to Rule 108 bis of Procedure and Evidence and stayed the execution of the subpoena duces tecum.

bb) Decision of the Appeals Chamber O n 29 October 1997 the appeals chamber handed down its judgment, unanimously deciding to quash the subpoena duces tecum addressed to Croatia and its defense minister. 48 The appeal chamber first determined that, contrary to the holding of the trial chamber, the term 'subpoena' in Rule 54 of Procedure and Evidence has to be interpreted narrowly as "referring only and exclusively to binding orders addressed by the International Tribunal, under threat of penalty, to individuals acting in their »49

private capacity. Taking this definition, the appeal chamber held that a subpoena cannot be applied or addressed to states, since the Tribunal does not possess the power to take enforcement measures against them. Such a power cannot be regarded as being inherent in the functions of an international judicial body but rather would have been expressly provided for if the drafters of the Statute had intended to vest the Tribunal

46

Blaskic — Trial Chamber Decision (note 31), para. 134.

47

Id., para. 149.

48

Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108 bis, 29 October 1997 (Appeals Chamber), Judgement on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber Π of 18 July 1997. For an analysis of this decision, see Yves Nouvel, Precisions sur le Pouvoir du Tribunal pour ΓΕχ-Yougoslavie dOrdonner la Production des Preuves et la Comparution des Témoins: L'Arrêt de la Chambre d'Appel du 29 Octobre 1997 dans l'Affaire Blaskic, Revue Générale de Droit International Public, vol. 102, 1998, 157; Göran Sluiter, Obtaining Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A n Overview and Assessment of Domestic Implementing Legislation, Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 45, 1998, 87; and Herwig Roggemann, Die Internationalen Strafgerichtshöfe, 2nd ed., 1998, 134 et seq. 49

Blaskic — Appeals Chamber Decision (note 48), para. 21.

The Activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia w i t h such a power. 50 However, the appeal chamber upheld the finding of the trial chamber that the Tribunal can in general issue binding orders to states in accordance w i t h Article 29 of the Statute, based on Article 25 and Chapter V I I of the U N Charter as well as the Security Council resolutions adopted pursuant to those provisions. 51 The chamber thereby emphasized that the duty to cooperate in Article 29 of the Statute has to be regarded as an obligation erga omnes52 in positing a community interest 53 in its observance. I n case of non-compliance by a state, the Tribunal, despite its lack of enforcement or sanctioning power vis-a-vis states, has the inherent power to make a judicial finding concerning the state's failure to comply and may report the matter to the Security Council in accordance with Rule 7 bis of Procedure and Evidence.54 The chamber held that following such a judicial finding, not only may the Security Council take enforcement actions under Chapter V I I of the U N Charter, but due to the erga omnes nature of the obligation under Article 29 of the Statute, other states also may react individually or through intergovernmental organizations. 55 W i t h regard to the question whether the Tribunal is empowered to issue binding orders to state officials, the appeal chamber first decided, contrary to the finding of the trial chamber, that the Tribunal cannot issue subpoenae to state officials acting in their official capacity, since such officials "are mere instruments of a State and

50

Id., para. 25.

51

Id., paras. 26-31. O n the constitutional law issues i n Germany w i t h regard to the extradition of potential German war criminals to the Tribunal, see, e.g., Kirsten Schmalenbach, Die Auslieferung mutmaßlicher deutscher Kriegsverbrecher an das Jugoslawientribunal in Den Haag, Archiv des Völkerrechts, vol. 36, 1998, 285; Burkhard Schöbener/Winfried Bausback, Verfassungs- und völkerrechtliche Grenzen der 'Uberstellung' mutmaßlicher Kriegsverbrecher an den Jugoslawien-Strafgerichtshof, Die Öffentliche Verwaltung, vol. 49,1996,621; and Juliane Kokott, in: Michael Sachs (ed.), Grundgesetz — Kommentar, 2 n d ed., 1999, 645, 653. 52

O n the erga omnes nature of international obligations, see, e.g., Case Concerning Barcelona Traction , Light and Power Co., Limited (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 ICJ 3, 32; Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, 1997; Jochen Abr. Frowein, Die Verpflichtungen erga omnes i m Völkerrecht und ihre Durchsetzung, in: Rudolf Bernhardt et al. (eds.), Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung — Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit — Menschenrechte, Festschrift für Hermann Mosler, 1983, 241; and recently Jost Delbrück, Laws in the Public Interest — Some Observations on the Foundations and Identification of erga omnes Norms i n International Law, in: Volkmar Götz et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Günther Jaenicke — Z u m 85. Geburtstag, 1998, 17. 53

See thereto Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest i n International Law, Recueil des Cours, vol. 250, 1994, 217. 54

Blaskic — Appeals Chamber Decision (note 48), paras. 33 and 34.

55

Id., para. 36.

23 G Y I L 41

353

354

Karsten Nowrot

their official action can only be attributed to the State" and thus they enjoy 'functional immunity' from any sanctions or penalties inherent in a subpoena.56 In addition, the judges found that the Tribunal also lacks the general power to address binding orders to state officials. 57 The decision cannot be based on a 'domestic analogy' as adopted by the trial chamber, since the basic structure of the international community characterized by a dominance of sovereign states and a lack of any central government with the attendant separation of powers makes it impossible to transpose constructs prevailing in national law of modern democracies onto the international realm. 58 The judges found that under customary international law, aside from a few exceptions arising from norms of international criminal law under which government officials may be held personally responsible, 59 acts of state officials are to be attributed to the state itself and judicial orders thus have to be issued to the state as a whole. 60 The appeal chamber further held that also Article 18 (2) of the Statute merely grants the prosecutor the right to seek assistance from a state official but does not provide for a legal basis to address binding orders to such persons.61 Concerning the Tribunal's competence to issue binding orders to individuals acting in their private capacity, the appeals chamber held that such a power derives from the general object and purpose of the Statute and is furthermore spelled out in Article 18 (2) of the Statute.62 The judges emphasized that this competence also extends to state agents who, for instance, witnessed a crime or found evidentiary material before they took office as well as to government officials "who, while engaged on official business, witness[es] a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal being committed by a superior officer." 63 Only state officials who act as a member of an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement force are exempted from the last 56

Id. y para. 38; see also Danesh Sarooshi , The Powers of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 2, 1998, 141, 155 ei seq. 57

Blaskic — Appeals Chamber Decision (note 48), para. 43.

58

Id. y para. 40.

59

O n some new developments concerning the personal responsibility of state officials in connection w i t h the re-unification of Germany, see Stephan Hobe/Christian Tietje f Government Criminality and Human Rights, GYIL, vol. 37, 1994, 386; and by the same authors, Government Criminality: The Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 24 October 1996, GYIL, vol. 39, 1996, 523. 60

Blaskic — Appeals Chamber Decision (note 48), para. 41.

61

Id. y para. 42.

62

!d. y paras. 46 - 48.

63

Id., paras. 49 and 50.

The A ctivities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 35 mentioned rule. 64 The appeals chamber further found that, when issuing binding orders to private individuals, the Tribunal generally has to go through the national authorities, especially when the order requires the cooperation of the judicial organs of the state where the individual is located. However, there are certain exceptions to this rule where the Tribunal may enter directly into contact with a private individual: first, individuals in the former belligerent states or entities of ex-Yugoslavia;65 second, if the Tribunal is authorized by the legislation of the state concerned to enter in direct contact with the individual; 66 and third, if the authorities of the state concerned prevent the Tribunal from fulfilling its functions and cooperation of the Tribunal w i t h judicial organs of the state where the individual is located is not necessary, e.g. y in the case of seizures of evidentiary material. 67 Concerning the legal remedies for non-compliance the appeal chamber held the view that, normally, the Tribunal should turn to the relevant national authorities. 68 However, the judges also emphasized the remedies available to the Tribunal itself, ranging from an inherent general power to hold individuals in contempt of the Tribunal to the specific contempt power provided for in Rule 77 of Procedure and Evidence.69 The appeal chamber found that in case the individual in question also fails to attend the contempt proceedings there is even the possibility of in absentia proceedings on the condition that the fundamental rights to a fair trial are safeguarded. 70 Finally, the appeal chamber upheld the decision of the trial chamber that states are not allowed, on the claim of national security interests, to withhold evidentiary material requested by the Tribunal. 71 In contrast to Article 49 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 29 of the Statute of the Tribunal "is worded in strong mandatory language"72 and "does not envisage any exceptions to the obli64

Id. y para. 50.

65

Id., para. 53.

66

Id., para. 55.

b7

Id.

68

Id., para. 58. O n this issue, see also Françoise J. Hampson, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Reluctant Witness, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 47,1998,50,55 et seq.-, and ChnstopherL. Blakesley , Atrocity and Its Prosecution: The A d Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in: Timothy L. H. McCormack/Gerry J. Simpson (eds.), The Law of War Crimes, 1997, 189, 224 - 225. 69

Blaskic — Appeals Chamber Decision (note 48), para. 59.

70

Id.

71

Id., paras. 62 and 67.

72

Id., para. 62.

23*

356

Karsten Nowrot

gation of States to comply with requests and orders." 73 Furthermore, the judges found that to grant states the "blanket right to withhold, for security purposes, documents necessary for trial . . . would undermine the very raison d' être of the International Tribunal." 7 4 However, the appeal chamber also suggested practical methods and procedures to take legitimate state concerns related to national security into account. The relevant documents may be submitted by the state concerned only to one judge of the trial chamber, who scrutinizes the material in camera , in ex parte proceedings. 75 In addition, under exceptional circumstances and certain conditions a state might even be allowed to withhold documents that it considered too delicate from the national security point of view. 76

cc) Further Developments O n 30 January 1998, Trial Chamber I issued a confidential ex parte binding order to Croatia requiring disclosure of specified documents to the prosecution. 77 After a request of review by Croatia pursuant to Article 108 bis of Procedure and Evidence, the appeals chamber granted relief on 26 February 1998 and referred the matter back to the trial chamber. Following a hearing on 22 April 1998, the judges issued a new order to Croatia on 21 July 1998 as well as to Bosnia Herzegovina on 29 A p r i l 1998 for the production of documents. 78

d) Decisions on Preliminary and Interlocutory Motions

aa) The Jelisic Case Goran Jelisic was indicted in the 'Brcko indictment' on 21 July 1995 and is accused of the killing of countless unidentified detainees as well as of sixteen identified victims and of the beating of other detainees. He was detained by SFOR forces in

73

Id ., para. 63.

74

W., para. 65.

75

Id ., para. 68. But see the separate opinion of Judge Karibi-Wbyte , who argues against the proposition that a single judge of a trial chamber should be allowed to bind the chamber by a decision to grant the application for the exclusion of evidence based on the protection of national security interests. Separate Opinion of Judge Kanbi-Whyte , para. 13. 76

Blaskic — Appeals Chamber Decision (note 48), para. 68.

77

Bulletin, No. 21 (note 17), 7 - 8.

78

Id., 17.

The Activities of the International Cminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Bjeltina on 22 January 1998, and in his initial appearance before Trial Chamber I on 26 January 1998 entered a plea of not guilty to all charges. 79 O n 12 May 1998, the trial chamber issued an order authorizing the prosecution to amend the indictment by withdrawing the charges under Article 2 of the Statute in order to expedite the conduct of the trial. The accused is now charged with violations of the laws or customs of war on 19 counts, crimes against humanity on 18 counts, and genocide on one count. 80 O n 29 October 1998, Jelisic pleaded guilty to all counts with the exception of the count on genocide. The trial chamber decided that the sentencing would take place after the trial for genocide.81

bb) The Simic Case O n 26 March 1998, Trial Chamber I granted the defense's motion for provisional release pursuant to Rules 65 and 73 (a) of Procedure and Evidence of Milan Simic on grounds of ill health. The accused, who had surrendered himself voluntarily in February 1998, had signed an agreement endorsed by the Republika Srpska in which he agrees, inter alia , to return to the Tribunal for any proceedings and not to have contact w i t h any of the co-accused or potential witnesses in his trial. 82

cc) The Dokmanovic Case Slavko Dokmanovic , who had been indicted on 3 April 1996 for his alleged complicity in the execution of two hundred people forcibly removed from a hospital in Vukovar in 1991, had been arrested by U N T A E S on 27 June 1997 in Eastern Slavonia after he was lured back from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the transitional administration. 83 The trial chamber granted a defense's motion requesting safe conduct to protect witnesses to testify in the hearing on the legality of the accused's arrest. 84 In addition, the counsel for the accused filed a motion for release on the grounds that Dokmanovic was arrested in a 'tricky way', which could only be inter79

Bulletin, No. 20 (note 5), 8.

80

Bulletin, No. 21 (note 17), 18.

81

Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 29 October 1998. 82

Bulletin, No. 21 (note 17), 6.

83

Bulletin, No. 20 (note 5), 8.

84

/c/., 14 -15.

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Karsten Nowrot

preted as a 'kidnapping' and that the arrest violated the sovereignty of the FRY. The trial chamber rejected these arguments, finding that the means used to accomplish the arrest neither violated principles of international law nor the sovereignty of the FRY, 8 5 basing its decision on a distinction between an acceptable 'luring' and a possibly illegal 'forcible abduction'. 86

dd) The Kovacevic Case Milan Kovacevic , charged in an indictment on 13 March 1997 w i t h complicity in genocide, was transferred to the Tribunal on 10 July 1997 after his apprehension by SFOR forces. 87 I n the pretrial proceedings, the trial chamber denied on 5 March 1998 a request filed by the prosecution to amend the original indictment in accordance with Rule 50 of Procedure and Evidence by the addition of fourteen counts. The trial chamber held that the new counts involved an unacceptable increase, due to an undue delay, and were not promptly reported to the accused. The prosecution appealed against this decision, and on 29 May 1998 the appeals chamber reversed it. 8 8 In its decision of 2 July 1998, the appeals chamber stated its reasons for this order. 89 The judges held that, although increase in the size of the indictment can be taken into account, a court cannot deny the prosecution a right to amend on that ground only. 9 0 Furthermore, the chamber found by internationally recognized standards no undue delay 91 and no violations of the accused's rights by a failure to disclose the new charges promptly. 9 2 Finally the judges dealt with the defense's argument that there exists in customary international law a speciality principle which prohibits the prosecution of the accused on charges other than that on which he was arrested. The appeals chamber found that such a principle is associated w i t h the 85

Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic, IT-95-13a-PT, 22 October 1997 (Trial Chamber II), Decision on the motion for release by the accused, para. 88. O n the background of the case and for an analysis of the decision, see Michael Scharf, \ The Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic : Irregular Rendition and the I C T Y , Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 11,1998, 369; and Leslie C. Green , Erdemovic — Tadic — Dokmanovic: Jurisdiction and Early Practice of the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, vol. 27, 1997, 313, 362 et seq. 86 87 88

Dokmanovic — Trial Chamber Decision (note 85), paras. 67 and 77. F o u r t h Annual Report (note 3), 18. Bulletin, No. 21 (note 17), 10.

89

Prosecutor v. Milan Kovacevic , IT-97-24-AR73, 2 July 1998 (Appeals Chamber), Decision stating the reasons for appeals chamber's order of 29 May 1998. 90 n

Id. y para. 25. O n this issue, see also the separate opinion by Judge Shahahuddeen.

I d . y paras. 26-33.

92

Id. y paras. 34-36.

The Activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia institution of extradition as between states but does not apply to the operations of the Tribunal. 93 Following the amendment of the indictment, Kovacevic on 6 July 1998 entered a plea of not guilty on the fifteen counts. O n 1 August 1998, Kovacevic died in his cell. A n internal inquiry undertaken by Judge Rodrigues in accordance with Rule 32 (c) of the Rules of Detention was completed on 27 August 1998.94 It revealed that the Rules of Detention were observed and complied with during the accused's detention and that no indication of negligence on the part of the duty doctor or any other person responsible for the treatment of Kovacevic existed. ee) The Kupreskic & others Case The indictment in this case concerned the alleged ethnic cleansing of the village of Ahmici and originally encompassed eight accused. Zoran and Mirjan Kupreskic , Vladimir Santic, Drago Josipovic , Dragan Papic and Mannko Katava surrendered voluntarily on 6 October 1997. Vlatko Kupreskic was arrested by SFOR forces on 18 December 1997. A l l seven of these accused pleaded not guilty. O n 19 December 1997, the trial chamber granted the prosecution's request to withdraw the charges against Marinko Katava due to an insufficient basis to justify proceeding with a trial. The charges against the eighth indictee, Stipo Alilovic , were withdrawn on 23 December 1997 due to the death of the accused.95 The indictment was amended on 10 March 1998 in order to add, in respect of all six accused, a count of persecution. O n 15 May 1998, the trial chamber dismissed the defense's motion for separate trials. 96

ff) The Kordic & Cerkez Case Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez entered a plea of not guilty on 8 October 1997, two days after their voluntary surrender. O n 11 February 1998, the prosecution filed a motion for leave to amend the indictment which was granted on 30 September 1998.97 O n 20 February 1998, the defense filed an application requesting the disqualification of the judges Jorda and Riad, on the ground that they are currently sitting on the trial chamber hearing the Blaskic case which would result in an undue 93

Id., para. 37.

94

See Press Releases of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia of 3 August, 6 August, and 7 September 1998. 95

Bulletin, No. 20 (note 5), 7.

96

Bulletin, No. 21 (note 17), 18.

97

Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 7 October 1998.

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Karsten Nowrot

delay in the progress of the given case. O n 21 May 1998, the trial chamber rejected the application, stating that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence contain no provision which would link the disqualification of judges to a delay in the proceedings. 98 gg) Further Cases I n addition to the above mentioned cases, pretrial proceedings are currently under way against eight accused. Miroslav Tadic voluntarily surrendered himself on 14 February 1998. Simo Zaric turned himself in on 24 February 1998. Dragoljub Kunarac surrendered on 4 March 1998. Miroslav Kvocka and Mladen Radie were detained on 8 April 1998 by members of SFOR forces. Furthermore, Zoran Zigic surrendered voluntarily on 16 April 1998, while Milojica Kos and MiloradKrnojelac were arrested by SFOR forces on 29 May and 15 June 1998 respectively. 99 O n 27 September 1998, Stevan Todorovic was detained by members of SFOR forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 100 A t his first appearance on 30 September 1998, the trial chamber accepted the accused's request to undergo medical tests before entering a plea of guilty or not guilty. 1 0 1 O n 2 December 1998, SFOR troops in the US sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina detained Radislav Krstic who had been indicted on 30 October 1998 for, inter alia , committing genocide during and after the fall of the U N safe area of Srebrenica between 11 July 1995 and 1 November 1995.102 2. Trial and Appeal Chamber Proceedings a) The Tadic Trial O n 7 May 1997, exactly one year after the trial against Dusko Tadic commenced, 103 Trial Chamber I I delivered its judgment finding the defendant guilty of 98

Bulletin, No. 21 (note 17), 8 - 9.

99

/ i , 18-20.

100

Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 28 September 1998. 101

Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 30 September 1998. 102

Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2 December 1998. 103

O n the factual background and the history of this case, especially the important pretrial decisions on the legality and jurisdiction of the Tribunal, see, e.g., Koschorreck/Müller (note 1), 421 et seq.-, Claus Kreß, Friedenssicherungs- und Konfliktvölkerrecht auf der Schwelle zur Postmoderne, Europäische Grundrechtezeitschrift, vol. 23,1996,638; and RaulEmilio Vinuesa, La

The Activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia crimes against humanity in accordance with Article 5 of the Statute on six counts and of violations of the laws or customs of war in accordance with Article 3 of the Statute on five counts. 104 aa) Judgment of the Trial Chamber After outlining the procedural history of the case,105 the historical background of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, 106 and the personal background of the accused,107 the trial chamber turned to an extensive examination of the factual evidence regarding the 34 charges against the accused in the indictment. 108 The judges rejected the alibi defense raised by Tadic , who had argued he was elsewhere when each of those acts is said to have occurred, as unsubstantiated.109 The trial chamber next dealt with a number of issues relating to procedure and to evidence that arose during the course of the proceedings. After acknowledging the difficulties of both parties to access evidence in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, 11 0 the judges turned to the objections raised by the defense concerning the lack of specificity in the indictment as to an exact date for the occurrence of the offence in question. The judges held, relying on domestic jurisprudence, that while the prosecution is bound to prove each of the elements of the charged offence, it is not required to specify and prove the exact date of the offence unless this information is an essential part of the offence. 111 The trial chamber also rejected, after reviewing a number of national legal systems, the submission of the defense that the rule of unus Jurisdiccion del Tribunal Penal Internacional para la ex Yugoslavia segun la Decision de la Camara de Apelaciones en el Caso Tadic (sobre Competencia), in: Héctor Gros Espiell — Amicorum Liber, vol. 2, 1997, 1801. 104

Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (also known as 'Dule'), IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997 (Trial Chamber), Opinion and Judgment. See also Natasha A. Affolder, Tadic , the Anonymous Witness and the Sources of International Procedural Law, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 19, 1998, 445, 450 et seq.; Justin Hogan-Doran , Murder as a Crime Under International Law and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: O f Law, Legal Language, and a Comparative Approach to Legal Meaning, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 11,1998,165; and Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, American Journal of International Law, vol. 92, 1998, 462, 464 et seq. 105

Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), paras. 6 - 52.

106

Id., paras. 53 - 179.

107

Id., paras. 180 - 192.

108

Id., paras. 193-477.

109

Id., para. 528.

110

Id., paras. 530 and 531.

111

Id., para. 534.

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testis , nullus testis (one witness is n o witness) is required i n c i v i l l a w countries and thus s h o u l d also be applied i n cases before the T r i b u n a l . 1 1 2 T h e judges also addressed the questions of r e l i a b i l i t y of witnesses w h o were themselves victims of the conf l i c t , 1 1 3 the impact of pretrial media r e p o r t i n g o n testimonial evidence, 1 1 4 the defense challenges t o evidence of visual identification, 1 1 5 and the problems concerning the truthfulness of testimonies i n the light of the witness Dragan Opacic , w h o was later p r o v e n t o have lied. 1 1 6 I n addition, the admissibility of hearsay evidence was upheld.117 H a v i n g considered the factual evidence and procedural issues, the t r i a l chamber proceeded b y evaluating the legal questions relating t o the offences charged. T h e judges first t u r n e d t o discuss the general requirements of Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the Statute, namely w h e t h e r the alleged acts were c o m m i t t e d w i t h i n the context of an armed c o n f l i c t . 1 1 8 D e f i n i n g the t e r m 'armed conflict* as a "resort t o armed force be112 Id., paras. 535 - 539; see also the judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998 (Trial Chamber), para. 4. For a comparison of the two criminal tribunals, see Cathenne Cisse , The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Some Elements of Comparison, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 7,1997,103; and MarkR. von Sternberg , A Comparison of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals: Universal Jurisdiction and the 'Elementary Dictates of Humanity', Brooklyn Journal of International Law, vol. 22, 1996, 111. 113

Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), paras. 540 and 541.

114

Id., paras. 542 - 544.

115

Id., paras. 545-552.

116

Id., paras. 553 and 554. The circumstances surrounding Opacic' s testimony are also subject of an investigation by the prosecutor for false testimony under Rule 91 of Evidence and Procedure, see Order for the Prosecution to Investigate the False Testimony of Dragan Opacic , Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-T. See also Koschorreck/Müller (note 1), 431; Heike Spieker, "Zeugenprärarierung" i m Tadic-Prozeß vor dem Jugoslawien-Tribunal, Humanitäres Völkerrecht, vol. 9, 1996, 192; and Helen J. Brady/Jan Christoph Nemitz, The Offence of Perjury under International Law: The False Testimony of Witness L, Humanitäres Völkerrecht, vol. 11, 1998, 162. 117 Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), paras. 555 and 556. See generally Kenneth Mann, Hearsay Evidence i n War Crimes Trials, in: Yoram Dinstein/Mala Tabory (eds.), War Crimes in International Law, 1996, 351. 118 Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), para. 559. I n its assessment the trial chamber relied on the relevant findings of the appeals chamber decision on the defense motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-AR 72,2 October 1995 (Appeal Chamber), reprinted in: Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 16, 1995, 437 et seq. See thereto Koschorreck/Müller (note 1), 429 - 430; Marco Sassoli, La Première Decision de la Chambre d'Appel du Tribunal Penal International pour l'Ex-Yougoslavie: Tadic (Competence), Revue Générale de Droit International Public, vol. 100, 1996, 101, 122 et seq. ; and Chnstopher Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case, European Journal of International Law, vol. 7, 1996, 265, 275 et seq.

The Activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia tween States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State," 119 the trial chamber found that the conflict between the government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb forces fulfilled the required intensity of a conflict as well as the necessary degree of organization of the parties. 120 Further-more, the trial chamber determined that a sufficient nexus between the alleged offences and the armed conflict, necessary to establish the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, was established concerning the acts of the accused.121 The trial chamber next turned to the specific provisions of the Statute in order to determine whether the acts of the accused violated any of these provisions. After determining that the crimes listed in Article 2 of the Statute are a part of customary international law and thus their application does not violate the principle of nullum crimen sine lege., 122 the judges discussed the question whether the victims of the crimes alleged to have been committed by the accused are "persons . . . protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Conventions" to which Article 2 of the Statute refers. The test to be applied is whether the victims were in the hands of a party to the conflict of which they were not nationals. 123 The trial chamber, in adopting a broad interpretation of the term 'in the hands o f that is not restricted to situations in which the civilians are physically in the hands of a party but also includes the mere fact that the persons found themselves in a territory effectively occupied by a party, 124 found that, with the Republika Srpska being a party to the conflict, the first two requirements were fulfilled in this case.125 However, the judges determined that the victims were not in the hands of a party of which they were not nationals since at the time when the crimes were committed the victims as well as the armed forces of the Republika Srpska were nationals of the Republic of Bosnia

119

Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), para. 561.

120

Id., paras. 562 - 570. O n this issue, see also Chnstine Gray , Bosnia and Herzegovina: Civil War or Inter-state Conflict? Characterization and Consequences, British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 67,1996,155; Theodor Meron, Classification of Armed Conflict i n the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua's Fallout, American Journal of International Law, vol. 92, 1998, 236; and Stefan Oeter, Kriegsverbrechen i n den Konflikten u m das Erbe Jugoslaviens, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, vol. 53, 1993, 1,6 et seq. 121

Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), paras. 572 - 575.

122

Id., para 577.

123

Id., para. 578. See Geneva Convention IV, 12 August 1949, Art. 4, 75 U N T S 287, 290.

124

Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), para. 579. See also Jean S. Pictet et al., Commentary on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva Convention IV, 1958, 47. 125

Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), para. 582.

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and Herzegovina. 126 Although the trial chamber stated that the requirement of a different nationality would have been fulfilled if the armed forces were acting as de facto organs or agents of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the judges held that there was insufficient evidence to support such a proposition. 127 Due to the fact that Article 2 of the Statute is applicable only to acts committed against 'protected persons' within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions, the trial chamber, by majority with Judge McDonald dissenting, found the accused not guilty of the counts relying on that Article. 1 2 8 The judges next evaluated the requirements and conditions of applicability of violations of the laws or customs of war in accordance with Article 3 of the Statute. Relying on the above mentioned decision of the appeal chamber, the judges held that the provision requires: first, that, the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international humanitarian law; second, that the rule must be part of customary law; third, that the violation must be serious in the sense that it involves grave consequences for the victim; and, fourth, that the violation must entail the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule. 129 The trial chamber determined that these requirements, as well as the further conditions of applicability — the close connection to an armed conflict and victims who have not taken an active part in hostilities — had been satisfied in connection w i t h the alleged acts committed by the accused.130 Concerning the prohibition of crimes against humanity in accordance w i t h Article 5 of the Statute, the trial chamber first emphasized its status as customary international law. 1 3 1 The judges then turned to an extensive examination of a variety of conditions for the application of this provision. Aside from the broadly interpreted nexus between the act and an armed conflict, 132 the acts enumerated in Article 5 must be 'directed against any civilian population'. Based on the word 'any' the judges held that crimes can be committed also against civilians of the same nationality as the perpetrator as well as stateless persons. 133 With regard to the term 'civilian', the trial chamber adopted a wide definition including individuals who are actively in-

126

Id. , para. 584.

127

See id., paras. 585 - 607.

128

Id., para. 608.

129

Id., para. 610.

130

Id., para. 617.

131

Id., para. 623. See also Ottokar Tesar, Die naturrechtlichen Grundlagen der 'Crimes Against Humanity', in: Hans Wehberg et al. (eds.), Gegenwartsprobleme des Internationalen Rechts und der Rechtsphilosophie — Festschrift für Rudolf Laun, 1953, 423, 428 et seq. 132

Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), para. 627 - 634.

™ Id., para. 635.

The Activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia volved in a resistance movement. 134 Concerning the meaning of the term 'population', the judges determined that it has to be understood in a way that "the emphasis is not on the individual victim but rather on the collective, the individual being victimized not because of his individual attributes but rather because of his membership of a targeted civilian population." 135 According to the trial chamber, this definition contemplates that by his actions the accused must have participated in acts that are, first, committed in a systematic manner in the sense of being pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy, and, second, are undertaken on a large scale meaning that the acts are directed against a multiplicity of victims. 136 However, the judges emphasized that also a single act could qualify as a crime against humanity as long as there is a link w i t h a widespread and systematic attack. 137 In addition, the trial chamber decided that the widespread and systematic acts must be taken on, for example, racial, religious, ethnic or political grounds, thus requiring a discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity and not only for persecution in accordance with Article 5 (h) of the Statute. 138 Furthermore, the judges emphasized that for an act to qualify as a crime against humanity it must be based on some form of policy directed against a particular group of peoples. However, such a policy need not be formalized but can be deduced from the way in which the acts occur, namely if they take place on a widespread or systematic basis.139 The trial chamber also set aside the traditional conception that the policy must be that of a state 140 by finding that under current customary international law crimes against humanity can also be committed on behalf of non-state entities exercising de facto control over a particular territory without international recognition or formal status of a de jure state. 141 Finally, con134

Id. y para. 643. The trial chamber based this assessment, inter alia, on the decision of the French Cour de Cassation of 20 December 1985 in the Barbie case, Fédération Nationale des Déportés et Internés Résistants et Patriotes and Others ν. Barbie , in: Journal du Droit International, vol. 113, 1986,127. See also Leila Sadat Wexler , The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 32, 1994, 289; and Elisabeth Zoller , La Definition des Crimes contre l'Humanité, Journal du Droit International, vol. 120, 1993, 549, 560 et seq. 135 Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), para. 644. See also Egon Schwelby Crimes Against Humanity, British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 23, 1946, 178, 191. 136

Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), para. 648.

137

Id. y para. 648.

138

Id. y para. 652. For an earlier discussion of this issue, see Jean Graven , Les Crimes contre l'Humanité, Recueil des Cours, vol. 76, 19501, 427. 139 140

Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), para. 653.

See M. 248 et seq.

CherifBassiouniy

Crimes Against Humanity i n International Criminal Law, 1992,

141 Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), paras. 654 and 655. I n its decision the trial chamber refers, inter alia, to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

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Karsten Nowrot

cerning the subjective element of crimes against humanity, the judges held that the accused must have, first, knowledge, either actual or constructive, that the acts were occurring on a widespread or systematic basis and second, that he "does not commit his acts for purely personal motives completely unrelated to the attack on the civilian population." 142 The trial chamber next turned to the requirements of individual criminal responsibility in accordance with Article 7 (1) of the Statute. After reiterating the customary international law status of this conception, 143 the judges evaluated the term 'participation' in order to determine the individual responsibility in cases where the accused is not directly engaged in the actions alleged.144 The trial chamber held that the requirements of 'participation' are fulfilled if the accused "knowingly participated in the commission of an offence that violates international humanitarian law and his participation directly and substantially affected the commission of the offence through supporting the actual commission before, during or after the incident." 145 Finally, while applying the law to each count of the indictment, 146 the trial chamber gave, for the first time in the history of international criminal law, a definition of the crime of persecution in accordance w i t h Article 5 (h) of the Statute. The requirements for the crime of persecution are, in addition to the general elements of crimes of humanity, the "occurrence of a persecutory act or omission and a discriminatory basis for that act or omission on one of the listed grounds, especially race, religion or politics." 147 In addition, the persecutory act must be intended to Circuit i n the case Kadic ν . Karadzic , 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1995), reprinted in: International Legal Materials, vol. 34,1995,1592. See thereto Eric Johnson, Kadic v. Karadzic and Doe I and Π v. Karadzic: The Latest Stage i n Alien Tort Act Jurisprudence, GYIL, vol. 39,1996,434,443 - 444. For the same view, arguing for a wider scope of possible entities, see Akayesu — Trial Chamber Decision (note 112), para. 6.4; Yoram Dinstein , Crimes Against Humanity, in: Jerzy Makarczyk (ed.), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century — Essays i n Honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 1996, 891, 906; and Stephen R. Ratner , The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, Texas International Law Journal, vol. 33,1998, 237, 253. 142

Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), para. 659. See Astrid Becker , Der Tatbestand des Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit, 1996, 183. 143

Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), para. 669. See also, e.g., Sir Robert Jennings/Sir Arthur Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, vol. I, Introduction and Part 1, 9th ed., 1992, 505 et seq.; GeorgDahm, Zur Problematik des Völkerstrafrechts, 1956,62 et seq.; and Otto Triff ter er, Dogmatische Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung des materiellen Völkerstrafrechts seit Nürnberg, 1966, 158 et seq. 144

Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), paras. 673 - 692.

145

Id., para. 692. See Aso Akayesu — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 112), para. 6.2.

146

Id., paras. 694 - 765.

147

Id., para. 715. O n the crime of persecution, see also Olivia Swaak-Goldman, The Crime

The Activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia cause, and result in, an infringement on an individual's enjoyment of a basic or fundamental right and also includes acts that are not in and of themselves inhumane but are considered to qualify as such because of the discriminatory grounds on which they are taken. 148 The trial chamber found Tadic guilty of crimes against humanity pursuant to Article 5 of the Statute, namely 'persecution' in one count and 'inhuman acts' in five counts. In addition, the judges held that the accused had committed violations of the laws or customs of war pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute, namely 'cruel treatment of civilians' contrary to the common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 in five counts. Pursuant to the former Rule 108 (now Rule 88 bis) of Procedure and Evidence, both the defense on 23 May as well as the prosecution on 6 June 1997 have appealed against the judgment. 149 bb) The Sentencing Judgment After conducting a pre-sentencing hearing from 30 June until 4 July 1997 pursuant to Rule 100 of Procedure and Evidence, the trial chamber handed down its sentencing judgment on 14 July 1997.150 In determining the penalties to be imposed, the trial chamber, in accordance w i t h Article 24 of the Statute and Rule 101 of Procedure and Evidence, shall take recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia and shall take into account a variety of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. After making some general considerations concerning practice of the Yugoslavian courts, 151 the judges evaluated the circumstances relevant to sentencing for each of the crimes of which Tadic was found guilty. 152 O n one side, the trial chamber considered Tadic' s willingness to participate in the 'brutal treatment' of the victims who had already suffered before due to a military assault on the town of Kozarac, as well as his uncooperative attitude toof Persecution i n International Criminal Law, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 11, 1998, 145; and Bassiouni (note 140), 317 et seq. 148

Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), para. 715.

149

Bulletin of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, No. 19, 1997, 3. 150 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic , IT-94-1-T, 14 July 1997 (Trial Chamber), sentencing judgment. See also Bulletin No. 19 (note 148), 3. O n the sentencing guidelines generally, see William A. Schabasy Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, vol. 7, 1997, 461; and Daniel B. Pickard , Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal, vol. 20, 1997, 123, 130 et seq. 151

Tadic — Sentencing Judgment (note 150), paras. 6 - 10.

152

Id. y paras. 11-55.

3

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wards the prosecutor and the Tribunal as general aggravating factors to be considered in the sentencing.153 O n the other side, the judges were not convinced by the argument of the defense to take the fact that prior to the conflict Tadic was a lawabiding citizen into account as a mitigating factor. 154 However, the trial chamber recognized Tadic' s personal circumstances, especially "the virulent propaganda that stroke the passions of the citizenry in opstina Prijedor" 155 as contributing to the crimes, and considered them in determining the appropriate sentence. The trial chamber imposed on Tadic a variety of sentences, ranging from six to twenty years' imprisonment, to be served concurrently. 156 Pursuant to Rule 101 (e) of Procedure and Evidence, Tadic is entitled to credit for time during which he was detained in custody, in this case two years, eight months and six days so far. 157 The trial chamber also gave a minimum time recommendation of no less than ten years' 158

imprisonment. Concerning the enforcement of the sentence, the trial chamber has directed the registrar to submit a list of states who have indicated their willingness to accept convicted persons pursuant to Article 27 of the Statute. 159 However, since the parties have appealed the judgment of 7 May 1997,160 Tadic remains in the custody of the Tribunal in accordance w i t h Rule 102 (a) of Procedure and Evidence. 161 O n 22 January 1998, the appeals chamber heard oral arguments by the parties relative to the admission of new evidence, and on 2 February issued an order to the Republika Srpska to inform the defense counsel of the whereabouts of a number of witnesses as well as to allow the counsel access to requested documents by 2 March

153

Id., paras. 56-58.

154

Id., para. 59.

155

Id., para. 72.

156

Id., paras. 74 and 75.

157

Id., para. 77.

158

Id., para. 76.

159

So far, three states have signed agreements w i t h the United Nations on the enforcement of sentences imposed by the Tribunal, namely Italy on 6 February 1997, Finland on 7 May 1997, and Norway on 24 A p r i l 1998. See Bulletin, No. 21 (note 17), 2. For a critical view of the Tribunal's procedure for enforcement of sentences through states, see Jerome J. Shestack, A Review and Critique of the Statute of the International Tribunal, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, vol. 24, 1994, 149, 161. 160 The defense counsel also appealed against the sentencing judgment itself on 9 August 1998. See Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 13 August 1997. 161

Tadic — Sentencing Judgment (note 150), para. 78.

The Activities of the International Cnminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

3 69

1998. 1 6 2 O n 25 N o v e m b e r 1998, the appeals chamber issued an order setting the date for the hearing o n the appeal f r o m 25 t o 29 January 1999.

b) T h e Erdemovic

Trial

T h e legal proceedings against Drazen Erdemovic

m a r k e d the first case i n w h i c h

the T r i b u n a l delivered a final decision. A f t e r his plea of g u i l t y at his i n i t i a l appearance o n 31 M a y 1996, T r i a l C h a m b e r I , i n accepting the g u i l t y plea, sentenced Erdemovic t o ten years' i m p r i s o n m e n t i n its j u d g m e n t of 29 N o v e m b e r 1996. 1 6 3 O n 23 December 1996, Erdemovic

appealed this decision. 1 6 4

aa) Judgment of the Appeals C h a m b e r O n 7 O c t o b e r 1997, the appeals chamber handed d o w n its j u d g m e n t , f i n d i n g b y m a j o r i t y w i t h Judge Li dissenting, that the g u i l t y plea was n o t i n f o r m e d and holdi n g that the case must be r e m i t t e d t o another trial chamber pursuant t o Rule 117 (c) of Procedure and Evidence. 1 6 5 T h e t w o m a i n issues before the appeals chamber were, first, the requirements for a v a l i d g u i l t y plea, and, second, the related question w h e t h e r duress constitutes a complete defense t o a soldier charged w i t h a crime against h u m a n i t y and a w a r 162

Bulletin, No. 20 (note 5), 6.

163

Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic , IT-96-22-T, 29 November 1996 (Trial Chamber), sentencing judgment. O n the facts of this case as well as for an analysis of the judgment, see Sienho Yee , The Erdemovic Sentencing Judgement: A Questionable Milestone for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 26,1997,263; L. C. Green , Drazen Erdemovic: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia i n Action, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 10, 1997, 363; Jan Christoph Nemitz , Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances i n International Humanitarian Law — The Erdemovic-case, Humanitäres Völkerrecht, vol. 10, 1997, 22; and Koschorreck/Müller (note 1), 431- 432. 164

Bulletin of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, N o . 14, 1997, 1. 165

Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic , IT-96-22-A, 7 October 1997 (Appeals Chamber), judgment. See also Kann Oellers-Frahm/Britta Specht , Die Erdemovic- Rechtsprechimg des Jugoslavientribunals: Probleme bei der Entwicklung eines internationalen Strafrechts, dargestellt am Beispiel des Notstands, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, vol. 58,1998,389,397 et seq.; Jan Christoph Nemitz/Steffen Wirth , Legal Aspects of the Appeals Decision in the Erdemovic-case: The Plea of Guilty and Duress i n International Humanitarian Law, Humanitäres Völkerrecht, vol. 11, 1998, 43; and Olivia Swaak-Goldman , Prosecutor v. Erdemovic: Appellate Opinion of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on Guilty Plea and on Duress as Defense to Homicide, American Journal of International Law, vol. 92, 1998, 282.

24 G Y I L 41

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Karsten Nowrot

crime involving the killing of innocent human beings. Since the judges differed on the issues, both as to the reasoning as well as to the result, their views are set out in detail in a number of separate opinions w i t h the judgment in itself merely summarizing the opinions. Thus, to understand the appeals chamber's reasoning, it is necessary to take a closer look at these separate opinions. 166 aaa) Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah I n their separate opinion, which serves as the reasoning of the majority decision, the two judges first dealt with the requirements of a valid plea of guilty in accordance w i t h Article 20 (3) of the Statute and Rule 62 of Procedure and Evidence. "Noting that there is no international jurisprudence or authority to lend us further assistance,"167 the judges for their interpretation take recourse to national common law authorities. They justified their approach by stating that Rule 62 of Procedure and Evidence "incorporates the common law adversarial trial procedure." 168 Based on this finding and w i t h reference to the requirements of a fair trial pursuant to Article 20 (1) of the Statute, they determined as pre-conditions for a valid guilty plea, that it must be voluntary and informed and not be equivocal. 169 In applying these requirements to the proceedings before the trial chamber, the judges found that Erdemovic by making his plea of guilty was mentally fit to understand the consequences and was not affected by any threat, inducement or promise. 170 While the guilty plea thus qualifies as voluntary, the judges held that the accused's plea was not the result of an informed choice. 171 Erdemovic neither understood the true nature and consequences of making a guilty plea, 172 nor was he aware of what a war crime or a crime against humanity was in terms of legal requirements. 173 Furthermore, the judges saw in the fact that the accused pleaded guilty to the more serious accusation in their view, 174 of crimes against humanity, that Erdemovic did not comprehend the distinc166

See also Oellers-Frahm/Specht

(note 165), 397.

167

Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic , IT-96-22-A, 7 October 1997 (Appeals Chamber), Joint separate opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah , para. 6. 169

Id ., para. 8. See also The Prosecutor v. Jean Kamhanda , I C T R 97-23-S, 2 September 1998

(Trial Chamber), judgment and sentence, para. 6. O n this judgment, see Sascha Rolf Lüder, Die Verurteilung des ehemaligen ruandischen Ministerpräsidenten Jean Kambanda durch den Internationalen Strafgerichtshof für Ruanda, Humanitäres Völkerrecht, vol. 11, 1998, 109. 170 Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah (note 167), para. 13. 171

Id., para. 27.

172

Id., para. 16.

m

Id., para. 18.

174

Id., paras. 20-25.

The Activities of the International Criminal Tbunal for the Former Yugoslavia tion between the alternative charges and the consequences of pleading guilty to one rather than the other. 175 I n examining whether the guilty plea was equivocal because of Erdemovic' s statement that he would have been killed if he had refused to participate in the execution of civilians, the judges turned to the issue whether duress can be a complete defense in international law to the killing of innocent persons. After reviewing a number of decisions of the military tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo as well as of national courts and military tribunals, the two judges concluded that there is insufficient state practice and opinio juris to establish such a rule as part of customary international law. 1 7 6 Concerning the status of duress as a defense to crimes against humanity as a general principle of law in accordance w i t h Article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the judges held that there is no consistent rule in the principal legal systems of the world, especially since the civil law systems on one side and common law systems on the other take an opposing position on this issue.177 The two judges therefore adopted a "pragmatic approach bearing in mind the normative goal of criminal law" 1 7 8 to this issue, stating that "the law should not be the product or slave of logic and intellectual hair-splitting, but must serve broader normative purposes in light of its social, political and economic role." 179 By emphasizing that the Tribunal is "operating in the realm of international humanitarian law which has, as one of its prime objectives, the protection of the weak and vulnerable," the judges found that they "are concerned that, in relation to the most heinous crime known to humanity, the principle of law to which we give credence have the appropriate normative effect upon soldiers." 180 In adopting this teleological approach, guided by policy considerations of a general preventive effect, 181 the judges found that "duress does not afford a complete defense to a soldier charged with crimes against humanity or war crimes involving the taking of innocent lives;" 182 thus, Erdemovic' s guilty plea was not equivocal. 183 175

Id., paras. 26 and 27.

m

Id.,

paras. 41 -55.

177

Id., paras. 56-72.

178

Id. , para. 74.

179

Id., para. 75.

™Id. 181

See L. Cavicchioliy I I constringimento psichico come causa di esclusione della colpevolezza nei crimini contro Pumanità: I I caso Erdemovic, Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, vol. 80, 1997, 373, 382; and OellersFrahm/Specht (note 165), 400 and 408. O n the aspect of deterrence, see also Mark W. Janis, The U t i l i t y of International Criminal Courts, Connecticut Journal of International Law, vol. 12, 1997, 161. 182 Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah (note 167), para. 88. For the same view, see Yoram Dinstein, The Defense of Obedience to Superior Orders' in Internation-

2 *

371

372

Karsten Nowrot bbb) Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese

I n examining the requirements of a valid guilty plea, Judge Cassese started by criticizing the majority approach, as laid down by judges McDonald and Vohrah , to adopt the common law legislation and case law. In his view, for a variety of reasons, 184 reliance on legal concepts of national law can only be justified if international legal rules either make explicit reference to national law or if such reference is necessarily implied by the very content and nature of the concept. 185 However, taking his approach of determining the conditions for a guilty plea by relying directly on the rules as laid down in the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Judge Cassese arrived at basically the same conclusion as the majority opinion, 1 8 6 namely that the plea of guilty must be voluntary, entered in full cognisance of its legal implications, and must not be ambiguous or equivocal. 187 Concerning the status of duress as a defense in cases of killing of innocent persons, Judge Cassese, after an extensive examination of the relevant state practice, 188 found that under international criminal law duress may be generally urged as a defense 189 although no special customary law rule has evolved on whether or not duress can be admitted as a defense in case of crimes involving the killing of persons, 190 In criticizing the approach of the majority opinion, 1 9 1 he concluded that, since in the absence of any specific regulation the general rule on duress applies, this concept can also be urged in defense to a charge of crimes against humanity or war crimes involving the killing of innocent persons. 192 However, the application of duress depends on a number of strict conditions, namely: that, first, the act charged was done al Law, 1965, 80; and AbbeL. Dienstag } Fedorenko v. United States: War Crimes, the Defense of Duress, and American Nationality Law, Columbia Law Review, vol. 82, 1982, 120,142 et seq. 183

Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah (note 167), para. 89.

184

Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic , IT-66-22-A, 7 October 1997 (Appeals Chamber), Separate and dissenting opinion of Judge Cassese, paras. 3 - 6. 185

Id., para. 3.

186

Oellers-Frahm/Specht

(note 165), 401 - 402.

187

Opinion of Judge Cassese (note 184), para. 10.

188

Id., paras. 18-40.

189

Id., para. 12. See also Albin Eser, 'Defences' i n War Crime Trials, in: Dinstein/Tabory (note 117), 251, 263 et seq.-, and GeorgDahm, Völkerrecht, vol. 3, 1961, 312. 190

Opinion of Judge Cassese (note 184), para. 40.

191

See, e.g., id., paras. 11 and 49.

192

Id., paras. 44 and 50. See also Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes, British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 21,1944, 58,74; and recently KaiAmbos, Zur strafbefreienden Wirkung des 'Handelns auf Befehl' aus deutscher und völkerstrafrechtlicher Sicht, Juristische Rundschau, 1998, 221, 225.

The Activities of the International Cminal Tbunal for the Former Yugoslavia under an immediate threat of severe and irreparable harm to life or limb; that, second, no adequate means of averting the evil existed; that, third, the crime committed was not disproportionate to the evil threatened; that, fourth, the situation leading to duress must not have been voluntarily brought about by the accused; and, that fifth, there was no special duty on the part of the accused towards the victim. 1 9 3 In thus allowing in exceptional circumstances the defense of duress, Judge Cassese came to the conclusion that Erdemovic* s plea of guilty was equivocal and thus invalid. 1 9 4 ccc) Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen Judge Stephen agreed with the conclusion of Judge Cassese on the fact that duress is generally also applicable as a defense against a charge of murder, 195 thus holding Erdemovic' s plea of guilty invalid due to its equivocal nature. 196 However, he based his finding not on customary international law, but, after an examination of the case law and literature of common law systems,197 came to the conclusion that even under common law, duress is generally applicable in cases of murder if there is "nothing that an accused can do to save the life which the law seeks to protect, so that no question of choice concerning an innocent life is left to an accused."198 Thus he determined that duress can be regarded as a general principle of law in accordance w i t h Article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 199

ddd) Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li In his opinion Judge Li agreed with the reasoning of the majority, as laid down by Judges McDonald and Vohrah , that duress can only be a mitigating circumstance but not a complete defense to the killing of innocent persons. 200 However, he criticized the decision to remit the case to the trial chamber on the ground that the accused's plea of guilty was not the result of an informed choice. For a variety of 193 m

Opinion of Judge Cassese (note 184), para. 16. Id., para. 50.

195

Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, 7 October 1997 (Appeals Chamber), Separate and dissenting opinion of Judge Stephen, paras. 24 and 66. 196

Id., para. 68.

197

Id., paras. 26-61.

198

Id., para. 64.

199

Id., paras. 25 and 66. For a critical analysis, see Oellers-Frahm/Specht

200

(note 165), 403.

Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, 7 October 1997 (Appeals Chamber), Separate and dissenting opinion of Judge Li, paras. 5 and 12.

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Karsten Nowrot

reasons, Judge Li found that a crime against humanity is not necessarily more serious than a war crime as held by the majority. 2 0 1 Thus he saw Erdemovic' s plea of guilty as valid so that the appeals chamber should have re-evaluated the case in order to reach a final decision "as to whether the sentencing . . . was fair and just." 2 0 2 bb) The Sentencing Judgment After the accused pleaded guilty to the charge of a violation of the laws and customs of war on 14 January 1998 with the prosecution withdrawing the alternative count of a crime against humanity, Trial Chamber II, based on the findings of the appeals chamber, handed down its sentencing judgment on 5 March 1998, imposing on Drazen Erdemovic the sentence of five years' imprisonment. 203 In determining the sentence, the judges considered as aggravating factors the magnitude of the crime of killing up to a hundred people and the scale of the accused's role in it by participating in the executions for a whole day. 204 However, the trial chamber found a variety of mitigating circumstances, among them the character and background of the accused, his admission of guilt, and his full cooperation w i t h the prosecution. 205 Furthermore, the judges saw the requirements for duress fulfilled in this case206 and emphasized that Erdemovic "took no perverse pleasure from what he did." 2 0 7 I n giving the appropriate weight to the cooperative attitude of the accused by his truthful confession, the trial chamber stressed the Tribunal's duty "to contribute to the settlement of the wider issues of accountability, reconciliation and establishing the truth behind the evils perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia." 208 In a separate opinion to the judgment, Judge Shahabuddeen elaborated on two important issues of a general nature. 209 He first discussed the question of implementing 201

Id., paras. 18-26.

202

Id., para. 27.

203

Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic , IT-96-22-T, 5 March 1998 (Trial Chamber), sentencing judgment, reprinted in: 37 I L M 1182. See David Turns, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: The Erdemovic Case, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 47, 1998, 461, 472 et seq. 204

Id,

205

Id,

para. 15. para. 16.

206

Id., para. 17.

207

Id., para. 20.

208

Id., para. 21. O n this issue, see also Pay am Akhavan, Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 20, 1998, 737, 738 et seq. 209

Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic,

IT-96-22-T, 5 March 1998 (Trial Chamber), Separate

The Activities of the International Cminal Tbunal for the Former Yugoslavia the duty, as held by the appeal chamber, to confirm that the accused understands the nature of the charges and came to the conclusion that it is not necessary for the judges to explain each element. Rather it is sufficient if the trial chamber satisfies itself by reasonable inquiries that the accused understands the nature of the charges. 210 As a second issue, Judge Shahabuddeen pointed out the difficulties of translating into sentencing the ruling of the appeals chamber that crimes against humanity are more serious than war crimes. Since the penal regime established under the Statute does not differentiate in sentences between the two offences, he considered it problematic to find a rational basis for measuring what the difference in sentences should be. 211 Erdemovic has not appealed against the judgment which makes it the first case in which the Tribunal delivered a final decision. In August 1998, he was transferred to Norway where he w i l l serve his sentence. c) The Celebici Trial aa) Trial Chamber Proceedings The trial proceedings against Esad Landzo y Zelnij Delalic , Zdravko Mucic , and Hazim Delic , charged with crimes committed in the Celebici camp, began on 10 May 1997 and, after 146 hearing days, were closed on 15 October 1998.212 A number of motions were filed during the proceedings. 213 Among the most important for the relationship between the Tribunal and national jurisdictions was the decision of 2 September 1997 on the admissibility of evidence obtained by states in violation of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal, in which the trial chamber held that the violation of the right to counsel, even by domestic authorities, must lead to the exclusion of the evidence obtained. 214

opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen , reprinted in: 37 I L M 1197. See also OellersFrahm/Specht 165), 405. 210

Separate Opinion of Judge Shababuddeen (note 209), 1199.

211

Id. , 1200.

(note

212

Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 16 October 1998. O n the history of this case, see Koschorreck/Müller (note 1), 421; Faiza Patel King/Anne-Marie La Rosa, The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal: 1994 - 1996, European Journal of International Law, vol. 8, 1997, 123, 160 et seq.; and Bulletin of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, No. 15/16, 1997, 2 et seq. 213 214

See, e.g.y Bulletin, No. 20 (note 5), 6 and 11; and Bulletin, No. 21 (note 17), 7 and 17.

Prosecutor v. Delalic , Mucic, Delic , and Landzo , IT-96-21-T, 2 September 1997 (Trial Chamber), Decision on Zdravko Mucic 1 s motion for the exclusion of evidence. See Sluiter (note 48), 88.

376

Karsten Nowrot bb) Judgment of the Trial Chamber

O n 16 November 1998, the trial chamber handed down its judgment, which is the first one of the Tribunal involving multiple defendants and the first combined judgment in accordance with the recently amended Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 215 In addition, it is the first elucidation of the concept of command responsibility by an international judicial body since the cases decided in the wake of the Second World War. After restating the contents of the indictments against the four accused216 and the procedural history of the case,217 the trial chamber gave a description of the history of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, especially the role of military forces in the conflict, 218 the fighting in the Konjic municipality relevant to this case,219 and the establishment of the Celebici prison camp. 220 Before turning to the particular provisions of the Statute which were applicable in the case, the judges elaborated on the general principles of interpretation regarding the rules governing the Tribunal. 2 2 1 Reiterating the characteristics of the provisions as a synthesis of the common law and the civil law systems,222 the trial chamber held that the interpretation must take into account the objectives of the Statute as well as the social and political considerations which gave rise to the creation of the Tribunal. 2 2 3 In finding that the general conditions for the application of Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute — the existence of an armed conflict and a sufficient nexus between the alleged acts of the accused and this conflict — were fulfilled in this case,224 the judges turned next to the more specific requirements of Article 2 of the Statute. The trial chamber found that Article 2 of the Statute, in punishing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, requires determining whether the offences were committed in the context of an international armed conflict and wheth-

215 Prosecutor v. Zelnij Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic, and Esad Landzo, IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998 (Trial Chamber), judgment (hereinafter: Celebici — Trial Chamber Judgment). 216

Id.,

paras. 2 - 29.

Id.,

paras. 30-84.

217 218

Id., paras. 109-119.

219

Id., paras. 120- 140.

220

Id., paras. 141 -157.

221

Id., paras. 158-171.

222

Id., para. 159.

m 224

Id., para. 170. See id., paras. 182- 197.

The Activities of the International Criminal Tbunal for the Former Yugoslavia er the victims were 'protected persons' by the Geneva Conventions. 225 Concerning the nature of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, the. trial chamber found that, despite the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's A r m y QNA) troops, who were not of Bosnian citizenship, following Security Council Resolution 752 of 15 May 1992,226 this formal change in status left the command structure of the new Bosnian Serb army unaltered from that of the J N A , from which the Bosnian Serbs received their arms and equipment. 227 Thus the withdrawal "constituted a deliberate attempt to mask the continued involvement of the FRY in the conflict while its Government remained in fact the controlling force behind the Bosnian Serbs" and it would therefore be "wholly artificial to sever the period before 19 May 1992 from the period thereafter in considering the nature of the conflict." 228 Consequently, the international conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued throughout 1992 and did not alter fundamentally in its nature. 229 W i t h regard to the status of the alleged victims as 'protected persons', the judges found that even if Bosnia and Herzegovina had granted its nationality also to the Bosnian Serbs in 1992, the Tribunal chose to refuse to recognize this grant of nationality on the basis that there was an "insufficient link between the Bosnian Serbs and that State for them to be considered Bosnian nationals" under international law. 2 3 0 First, the trial chamber found that under customary international law there is no right for a state to automatically confer its nationality on a person after a state succession took place. 231 Second, the principle of 'effective link' as established by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebobm case232 has to be applied in a way that the common nationality in a formal sense between the accused and the victim does not preclude individual criminal responsibility for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions if there is no linkage to bind them. 233 Thus the trial chamber held that, contrary to the judgment in the Tadic case, all the victims of the alleged acts 225

Id. , para. 201.

226

SC Res. 752 of 15 May 1992.

227

Celebici — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 215), para. 227.

228

Id., para. 234.

229

Id.

230

Id. y para. 259.

231

Id., para. 256. See Paul Weis , Nationality and Statelessness i n International Law, 2nd ed., 1979, 156 et seq. 232

Nottebobm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) 1955 ICJ 4, 23. For a broad application of the principle of 'effective link', see also Ian Brownlie , Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed, 1990, 407. 233

Celebici — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 215), para. 266. See also B. Brown , Nationality and Internationally i n International Humanitarian Law, Stanford Journal of International Law, vol. 34, 1998, 347, 351 and 397; and Greenwood (note 3), 127.

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were 'protected persons' under the Geneva Conventions by being in the hands of a party to the conflict of which they were not nationals. 234 Concerning the violations of the laws and customs of war under Article 3 of the Statute, the trial chamber, after reiterating the requirements for the application of that article, 235 found that this provision also includes the substantive prohibitions contained in the common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions that can be regarded as part of customary international law 2 3 6 and are applicable to internal as well as international armed conflicts. 237 Furthermore, the judges held that, contrary to the submission of the defense, also the prohibition on plunder in accordance w i t h Article 3 (e) of the Statute is "firmly rooted in customary international law." 2 3 8 After reiterating the requirements for individual criminal responsibility under Article 7 (1) of the Statute as expressed by Trial Chamber I I in the Tadic judgment, 2 3 9 the judges turned to the conditions for establishing 'command responsibility' under Article 7 (3) of the Statute. The trial chamber concluded, following an analysis of the relevant state practice, especially the cases against German and Japanese war criminals following the Second World War, 2 4 0 that "the principle of individual criminal responsibility of superiors for failure to prevent or repress the crimes committed by subordinates forms part of customary international law." 2 4 1 Concerning the requirements of superior responsibility under Article 7 (3) of the Statute, the judges agreed with the prosecution's proposition that it is necessary to establish, first, the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; second, that the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and, third, that the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof. 242 234

Celebici — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 215), para. 274.

235

Id., para. 279.

236

Id., paras. 306 and 316.

237

Id., para. 314. See also Military and Paramilitary ragua v. United States of America), 1986 ICJ 14, 114.

Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nica-

238

Celebici — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 215), para. 315. The trial chamber thereby relied on the customary law status of Arts. 46 and 47 of the Regulations attached to the 1907 Hague Convention (TV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War, reprinted in: Dietnch Scbindler/Jiri Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflict, 3rd ed., 1988, 75, 89. 239

Celebici — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 215), para. 329. See also Tadic — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 104), para. 692. 240

Celebici — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 215), paras. 333 - 342.

241

Id., para. 343. See B. V.A. Röling, The Law of War and the National Jurisdiction since 1945, Recueil des Cours, vol. 100, 1960 Π, 323, 378 et seq.; L. C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 1993, 292; and Jordan J. Paust, Superior Orders and Command Responsibility, in: M. Cberif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, vol. 3, 1987, 73. 242

Celebici — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 215), para. 346.

The Activities of the International Criminal Tbunal for the Former Yugoslavia In regard to the quality of the superior-subordinate relationship, the trial chamber held that, although it is necessary that the superiors have effective control over the persons committing the underlying violations of international humanitarian law in the sense of having "the material ability to prevent and punish the commission of these offences," such authority can be based on a de facto as well as de jure position as superiors. 243 Furthermore, civilian superiors also can be held responsible under this concept as long as it can be shown that they exercise a degree of control over their subordinates which is similar to that of military commanders. 244 Concerning the mental element of command responsibility, the trial chamber found that it is required that the superior either had actual knowledge, established through direct or circumstantial evidence,245 or that "he had in his possession information of a nature, which at least, would put him on notice of the risk" of the fact that subordinates were committing or were about to commit crimes referred to under Articles 2 to 5 of the Statute by indicating the need for additional investigations. 246 In regard to the third element, the failure to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the crime or punish the perpetrator, the judges held that the "lack of formal legal competence to take the necessary measures to prevent or repress the crime in question does not necessarily preclude the criminal responsibility of the superior" as long as such measures were within his "material possibility." 247 Furthermore, no requirement of proof of causation as a separate element of command responsibility is required as demonstrated by the fact that no such causal link can exist between an

243

Id., paras. 354 and 378.

244

Id., paras. 363 and 378. O n the extension of this doctrine to civilian leaders, see also W. J. Fennck, Some International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, vol. 6, 1995, 103, 117 et seq.; Timothy Wu/Yong-Sung Kang, Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates — The Doctrine of Command Responsibility and its Analogues in United States Law, Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 38, 1997, 272, 291 et seq.; and L. C. Green, Command Responsibility i n International Humanitarian Law, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, vol. 5, 1995, 319, 371. 245

Celebici — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 215), paras. 383 and 386. See also Weston D. Burnett, Command Responsibility and a Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra, Military Law Review, vol. 107, 1985,71, 132 et seq. 246 247

Celebici — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 215), paras. 383 and 393.

Id., para. 395. See also William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, Military Law Review, vol. 62,1973,1, 83 et seq. But see the Report of the International Law Commission on the work of a Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U N Doc. A/51/10 (1996), 9, 38, requiring that the superior must have 'legal competence' to take the measures to prevent or repress the crime.

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offence committed by a subordinate and the superior's subsequent failure to punish the perpetrator. 248 After restating the requirement of specificity and the prohibition of ambiguity in criminal legislation, 249 the trial chamber next turned to an analysis of customary international law concerning the elements of the offences alleged in the case, which it categorized as wilful killing and murder, offences of mistreatment, unlawful confinement of civilians, and plunder. Concerning the crimes of wilful killing and murder, the judges stated that it requires the mental element of an intention on the part of the accused to kill, or inflict serious injury in reckless disregard of human life, that may be also inferred from the circumstances by relying on the forseeability of death as a consequence of the acts of the accused or the taking of an excessive risk which demonstrates recklessness. 250 W i t h regard to the offences of mistreatment, the judges first discussed the requirements for the crime of torture under customary international law. 2 5 1 The trial chamber classified the prohibition of torture as a norm of jus cogens character, 252 which, for the purpose of applying Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute, is constituted by, first, an act or omission that causes severe pain or suffering, whether mental or physical; second, is inflicted intentionally; third, for such purposes as obtaining information or a confession from the victim, or a third person, punishing the victim, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind; and, fourth, that such act is committed at least w i t h the consent or acquiescence of an official or other person acting in an official capacity. 253 Concerning the issue whether rape can be considered as torture, the judges, defining rape as "a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances that are coercive," 254 held that whenever rape or other forms of sexual violence meet the aforementioned four criteria, it can also be considered as violating the prohibition of torture under international law. 255 Under the category of offences 248 Celebici — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 215), paras. 398 and 400. But see Bassiouni (note 140), 372, calling the existence of causation an 'essential element' i n cases of command responsibility. 249

Celebici — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 215), paras. 402 - 418.

250

W., paras. 437 and 439.

251

Id. , paras. 452 - 474.

252

Id. y para. 454.

253

Id. y para. 494.

254

Id.y para. 479.

255

Id. y para. 496. O n this issue, see Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law, American Journal of International Law, vol. 87,1993,424; Christine Chinkin , Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women i n International Law, European Journal of International Law, vol. 5,1994,326, 330 et seq.; LyalS. Sunga, The Emerging System of International Crimi-

The Activities of the International Criminal Tnbunal for the Former Yugoslavia of mistreatment, the trial chamber furthermore discussed and defined the offences of wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body and health, 256 of inhuman treatment, 257 of cruel treatment, 258 and of inhumane conditions. 259 Concerning the charged offences of unlawful confinement of civilians, the judges held that such confinements during armed conflict may be permissible provided that they are in conformity with the requirements of Articles 42 and 43 of Geneva Convention IV. However, such measures of internment are only of an exceptional nature and can never be taken on a collective basis. Furthermore, an initially lawful confinement becomes unlawful if the detaining party does not respect the basic procedural rights of the detained persons and does not establish an appropriate court or administrative board as prescribed in Article 43 of Geneva Convention I V . 2 6 0 W i t h regard to the offence of plunder, the trial chamber rejected the contention made by the defense that it could not entail individual criminal responsibility, and held that the term plunder, for the purpose of the Statute, should be understood to embrace all forms of unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict, including those acts traditionally described as 'pillage'. 261 After elaborating on the appropriate standard of proof and finding that, while the prosecution has to prove the case alleged against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, 2 6 2 the accused is required to prove any issue which he might raise only on the balance of probabilities, 263 the trial chamber next turned to the superior responsibility of Delalic, Mucic , and Delic. While in the case of Zdravko Mucic , the trial chamber found enough evidence to determine that he was de facto commander of the Celebici prison camp, and thus criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates, 264 the judges held in the cases of Zejnil Delalic and Hazim Delic , that the prosecution had failed to prove that they were superiors for the purpose of ascribing criminal responsibility to them under Article 7 (3) of the Statute. 265 nal Law, 1997,172 et seq.; and Catherine Ν. Niarchos , Women, War, and Rape: Challenges Facing the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 17, 1995, 649, 671 et seq. 256

For the definition, see Celebici — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 215), para. 511.

257

Id., paras. 543 and 544.

258

Id., para. 552.

259

Id., paras. 554 - 558.

260

Id., para. 583.

261

Id., para. 591.

262

Id., para. 601.

263

Id., para. 603.

264

Id., para. 775.

265

See id., paras. 721 and 810.

382

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Following a consideration of each of the counts in the indictments, 266 and after dismissing a plea made by Esad Landzo of diminished responsibility and limited physical capacity in accordance with Rule 67 (A) (ii) (b) of Procedure and Evidence, 267 the trial chamber turned to the sentencing proceedings. W i t h regard to the factors worth considering in the determination of the sentence, the judges dismissed the theory of retribution, 268 but took into account the protection of society, rehabilitation of the accused and aspects of deterrence. 269 After considering the relevant factors in respect of each accused,270 the trial chamber found Zejnil Delalic not guilty of the eleven counts of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in accordance with Article 2 of the Statute and of violations of the laws or customs of war in accordance w i t h Article 3 of the Statute with which he was charged due to his alleged command responsibility. He was also acquitted of the count charging him as a direct participant in the unlawful confinement of civilians. Zdravko Mucic was found guilty on eleven counts for his superior responsibility for murder, torture, causing great suffering or serious injury, inhumane acts, and for his direct participation in the unlawful confinement of civilians in inhumane conditions, and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. Hazim Delic was found guilty on thirteen counts of murder, torture and rape, causing great suffering or serious injury, inhumane acts, and inhumane conditions, and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. Finally, the trial chamber found Esad Landzo guilty on seventeen counts of killing, torture, causing great suffering or serious injury, and inhumane conditions, and sentenced him to fifteen years' imprisonment. Pursuant to Rule 99 of Procedure and Evidence, Delalic was released immediately from the United Nations Detention U n i t , 2 7 1 while Mucic , Delic , and Landzo remain in the custody of the Tribunal awaiting the elapse of the time limit for appeal.272 Notices of appeal against the judgment were given on 24 November 1998 by Hazim Delic and on 26 November 1998 by the prosecution with regard to Delalic' s acquittal and the length of Mucic' s sentence.

2hb

Id., paras. 811 -1155.

267

Id.,

268

paras. 1186 and 1187.

I d . , para. 1231.

269

Id., paras. 1232 - 1234.

270

Id., paras. 1236- 1284.

271

Id., para. 1291.

272

Id., para. 1290.

The A ctivities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia d) The Furundzija Trial aa) Trial Chamber Proceedings After the accused pled not guilty on 19 December 1997, the trial of Anto Furundzija began on 8 June 1998 and was completed on 22 June after 7 hearings. However, on 9 July 1998, the defense filed a motion to strike the testimony of witness A due to prosecutorial misconduct. O n 14 July 1998, Trial Chamber I I ordered the reopening of the proceedings on the ground that the prosecution violated its obligation under Rule 68 of Procedure and Evidence to inform the defense that it had documents that had the potential to affect the credibility of the prosecution evidence.273 O n 23 July 1998, the defendant filed a request for leave to appeal which was denied by the appeals chamber on 24 August 1998. The trial proceedings reopened on 9 November 1998 and finished on 12 November 1998.274 bb) Judgment of the Trial Chamber O n 10 December 1998, Trial Chamber I I pronounced the judgment, finding the defendant guilty of violations of the laws and customs of war in accordance with Article 3 of the Statute on two counts and sentencing him to ten years' imprisonment. 275 After restating the procedural history of the case,276 the amended indictment against the accused,277 and the submissions of the prosecution as well as of the defense, 278 the trial chamber stated that it found itself satisfied with the evidence for the existence of an armed conflict between the Croatian Defense Council and the 273

Bulletin, No. 21 (note 17), 12. O n the defendant's rights, see also Vincent M. Creta , The Search for Justice i n the Former Yugoslavia and Beyond: Analyzing the Rights of the Accused under the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Houston Journal of International Law, vol. 20,1998,381; Antonia Sherman , Sympathy for the Devil: Examining a Defendant's Right to Confront before the International War Crimes Tribunal, Emory International Law Review, vol. 10, 1996, 833, 850 et seq.; and Anne-Marie Rosa, Reflexions sur l'apport du Tribunal pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie au droit à un procès équitable, Revue Générale de D r o i t International Public, vol. 101, 1997, 945. 274

Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2 December 1998. 275

Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998 (Trial Chamber Π), judg-

ment. 276

Id., paras. 2 - 37.

277

Id., para. 38.

278

Id. , paras. 39 - 50.

38

384

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A r m y of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the material time of May 1993,279 as well as for a sufficient link between this conflict and the alleged offences committed by the accused.280 Following the relevant factual findings that were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 2 8 1 the judges next turned to the applicable law in this case. Concerning the scope of Article 3 of the Statute, the trial chamber found that the list of offences contained in this provision is merely illustrative and that this article covers all serious violations of international rules of humanitarian law regardless of whether they occur within the context of an international or internal armed conflict. 282 W i t h regard to the legal issues in this case, the judges first discussed the contents of the prohibition of torture under international law. The trial chamber considered the prohibition of torture as part of customary international law in the area of international humanitarian law, 2 8 3 a violation of which gave rise to personal criminal responsibility even of heads of states284 as well as state responsibility as a result of state officials engaging in torture or failing to prevent torture or to punish it. 2 8 5 W i t h regard to international human rights law, the judges determined that the prohibition of torture is "an absolute right, which can never be derogated from" 2 8 6 and which leaves no legal loopholes. 287 From the status of the prohibition of torture as a norm of jus cogens, it follows that "every State is entitled to investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused of torture, who are present in a territory under its jurisdiction" 288 and that torture "must not be excluded from extradition under any political offence exemption." 289 The trial chamber furthermore upheld the findings made in the Celebici judgment, that Article 3 of the Statute also covers torture and outrages upon personal dignity including rape, 290 concerning the elements of torture in an armed conflict, 291 and w i t h regard to the qualification of rape as torture. 292 279

para.59.

280

Id., para.65.

281

Id., paras. 120- 130.

282

Id., paras. 132 and 133.

283

Id., paras. 137- 139.

Id.,

284

Id., para.140.

285

Id., para.142.

286

Id., para.144.

287

Id., para.146.

288

Id., para.156.

289

Id., para.157.

290

Id., para.158.

291

Id., para.162.

292

Id., para.163.

The A ctivities of the International Cnminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 385 I n their legal analysis the judges next turned to the prohibition of rape and other serious sexual assaults under international law. The trial chamber found that rape is explicitly prohibited by treaties in the field of international humanitarian law as well as by customary international law and that a violation of this prohibition entails criminal liability of the perpetrators. 293 Due to the lack of an accepted definition of rape under international law, 294 the judges considered it justified to rely upon national legislation under the conditions that all major legal systems of the world are considered and that account has been taken of the specificity of international criminal proceedings. 295 The trial chamber has seen fit to expand the definition of rape, first formulated in the Akayesu judgment 296 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and followed in the Celebici case,297 by regarding also forced oral penetration as rape under the Statute, 298 and defined rape as "the sexual penetration, however slight, either of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator, or any other object used by the perpetrator, or of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator, where such penetration is effected by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person." 299 Furthermore, the judges discussed the meaning of "aiding and abetting" as used in Article 7 (1) of the Statute. Since no treaty law on this subject exists, the trial chamber had to examine the relevant customary international law in this field of individual criminal responsibility. 300 The judges first turned to the requirements for the objective elements, the actus reus , of aiding and abetting. After examining the relevant international case law and international documents, 301 the trial chamber found that "two separate categories of liability for criminal participation appear to have crystallised in international law — co-perpetrators who participate in a joint criminal enterprise, on the one hand, and aiders and abettors, on the other." 30 2 W i t h regard to the objective requirements for aiding and abetting, the judges came to the conclusion that the assistance given need not be tangible but can consist of moral support if the status of the spectator was such that "his presence had a significant le-

293

Id ., paras. 165 - 169.

294

Id., para. 175.

295

Id., para. 178.

296

Akayesu — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 112), paras. 597 and 598.

297

Celebici — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 215), para. 479.

298

Furundzija — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 275), paras. 182 - 184.

299

Id., para. 185.

300

Id., para. 191.

301

Id., paras. 193 - 215.

302

Id., para. 216.

25 G Y I L 41

386

Karsten Nowrot

gitimizing or encouraging effect on the principals." 303 Concerning the effect of the assistance, the judges determined that the acts of the accomplice need not bear a causal relationship to, or be a conditio sine qua non for, those of the principal. 304 Rather they considered it to be sufficient if the assistance has "a substantial effect on the commission of the crime." 305 The trial chamber thus held that the actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal law "requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime." 306 W i t h regard to the subjective element, the mens rea necessary to establish aiding and abetting of a crime under international law, the judges found that "it is not necessary for the accomplice to share the mens rea of the perpetrator, in the sense of positive intention to commit the crime." 307 Rather it is sufficient for the accomplice to have "knowledge that his actions w i l l assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime." 308 Moreover, the trial chamber did not consider it to be necessary that the aider and abettor should know the precise crime that was intended and which in the event was committed, but that it is sufficient if he "is aware that one of a number of crimes w i l l probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact committed." 3 0 9 After giving this general definition of the constitutive elements for aiding and abetting, the judges discussed the specific issue of how to distinguish perpetration from aiding and abetting in the case of torture. In adopting the teleological method of interpretation, the trial chamber took a broad view 3 1 0 of the crime of perpetration of torture by stating that it is required that the accused must "participate in an integral part of the torture and partake of the purpose behind the torture, that is the intent to obtain information or a confession, to punish or intimidate, humiliate, co-

303

Id., para. 232.

304

Id., para. 233.

305

Id., para. 234.

306

Id., para. 235.

307

Id., para. 245.

™Id. 309 310

Id., para. 246.

Id., paras. 252 - 257. I n justifying this broad approach, the judges relied, inter alia, on the judgment of the Supreme Court of Israel in the Eichmann case of 29 May 1962, Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 ILR 277, 323; the Akayesu judgment (note 112), para. 541; and the statement of Lord Steyn in the Pinochet judgment of the House of Lords of 25 November 1998, available on the Internet under http://www.parliament.thestationary-office.co.uk/pa/ldl99899/ldjudgmt/jd98 1125/pino09.htm. See thereto KaiAmbos, Der Fall Pinochet und das anwendbare Recht, Juristenzeitung, vol. 54, 1999, 16, 20 et seq.

The Activities of the International Cnminal Tnbunal for the Former Yugoslavia erce or discriminate against the victim or a third person." 311 In order to be guilty of torture as an aider or abettor, a crime that according to the trial chamber may only exist in "very limited instances,"312 the accused must "assist in some way which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime and with knowledge that torture is taking place." 313 I n adapting these legal findings to the present case, the trial chamber found the accused, first, as a co-perpetrator, guilty of torture, 314 and, second, for aiding and abetting, guilty of outrages upon personal dignity including rape, 315 both crimes being violations of the laws and customs of war in accordance with Article 3 of the Statute. I n determining the appropriate sentence for the accused, the trial chamber took into account as aggravating circumstances that this case "presents particularly vicious instances of torture and rape," the accused's active role as a commander, and the fact that the victim was a civilian detainee.316 As mitigating factors, the judges took into account the young age of the accused, and, to a lesser degree, the fact that Furundzija had no previous convictions, and his family situation. 317 Furthermore, the trial chamber, citing the statements made in the sentencing judgment of the Erdemovic case,318 referred to the mandate of the Tribunal in contributing to reconciliation, to deter international crimes, and to combat impunity. 3 1 9 e) The Blaskic Trial The trial chamber proceedings against Tihomir Blaskic began on 23 June 1997 and is presently in the phase of presentation of evidence. In a decision rendered on 21 January 1998, the trial chamber rejected a motion by the defense objecting to the admission of hearsay evidence with no previous inquiry as to its reliability. The judges found that hearsay evidence is admissible since the conduct of the trial is not similar to an adversarial trial but moves towards a more hybrid form in which the pro-

311

Furundzija — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 275), paras. 257 and 252.

312

Id., para. 257.

m

Id.

314

Id., para. 269.

315

Id., para. 275.

316

Id., para. 283.

317

Id., para. 284.

318

Erdemovic — Sentencing Judgment (note 203), para. 65.

319

Furundzija — Trial Chamber Judgment (note 275), paras. 288 - 291.

25 1

387

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Karsten Nowrot

fessional judges possess the necessary ability to rule on the relevance and value of the hearsay evidence presented. 320 O n 29 April 1998, the judges admitted, within certain limits, the statement previously given under oath to the prosecutor's investigator, by a witness who had subsequently died. Furthermore, on 6 May 1998, the chamber allowed the prosecution's request for additional protective measures for witnesses who are members of humanitarian organizations. 321 f) The Dokmanovic Trial The trial proceedings against Slavko Dokmanovic began on 19 January 1998. However, after the accused committed suicide on the night of 28 to 29 June 1998, three days after the completion of the trial, Trial Chamber I I issued an order terminating the proceedings on 15 July 1998. Furthermore, the president of the Tribunal ordered an internal inquiry entrusted to Judge Rodrigues who presented his final report on 21 July 1998.322 g) The Aleksovski Trial The trial against Zlatko Aleksovski started on 6 January 1998. O n 23 January 1998, the trial chamber rejected the defense's motion for provisional release on the ground that the requirements of Rule 65 of Procedure and Evidence had not been fulfilled. 323 O n 24 November 1998 the defense counsel filed a new motion for provisional release on the grounds of the poor state of health of the accused and the long period of the accused's detention. h) The Kupreskic & others Trial The trial against Kupreskic & others began on 17 August 1998. O n 29 September 1998, the president of the Tribunal authorized an on-site visit to Ahmici for 20 October 1998 in accordance with Rule 4 of Procedure and Evidence. However, the visit was canceled due to an SFOR security assessment in the region. 324 Following a 320

Bulletin, No. 20 (note 5), 13 -14.

321

Bulletin, N o . 21 (note 17), 17. O n the issue of witnesses from humanitarian organizations, see also Hampson (note 68), 64 et seq. 322

Bulletin, No. 21 (note 17), 15 -16.

323

Bulletin, No. 20 (note 5), 16.

324

Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 19 October 1998.

The A ctivities of the International Criminal Tnbunal for the Former Yugoslavia defense motion filed on 21 November 1998, the trial chamber issued an order on 25 November 1998 adjourning the trial until 11 January 1999 on the grounds of the ill health of the defense counsel. I V . Activities of the Tribunal Relating to Kosovo Following the beginning of the violent conflict in Kosovo in February 1998,325 the prosecutor of the Tribunal in a statement of 10 March 1998 asserted the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in accordance with Article 1 of its Statute and announced the gathering of information and evidence in relation to the Kosovo incidents. 326 These investigations were also supported by the Security Council in Resolution 1160 of 31 March 1998327 and Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998,328 in which the Council stated the obligation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to cooperate w i t h and assist the prosecution in its efforts. After a number of investigation missions to Kosovo in the following months, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Serbia denied further visas to investigators at the beginning of October 1998, stating that they do not accept any investigations in Kosovo. 329 Despite the Security Council's reiteration of the duty to cooperate with the Tribunal in Resolution 1203 of 24 October 1998,330 the president of the Tribunal in a letter of 6 November 1998 again brought Yugoslavia's continued refusal to issue visas to investigators to the attention of the Security Council and sought from the Council "measures which are sufficiently compelling to bring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the fold of law-abiding nations." 331 O n 17 November 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1207, condemning the failure of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to execute the arrest warrants and reiterating its call upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yu325

O n the conflict in Kosovo, see the reports of the Secretary-General of 30 A p r i l 1998, U N Doc. S/1998/361; of 4 June 1998, U N Doc. S/1998/470; of 2 July 1998, U N Doc. S/1998/608; of 5 August 1998, U N Doc. S/1998/712; of 4 September 1998, U N Doc. S/1998/834; of 3 October 1998, U N Doc. S/1998/912; and of 12 November 1998, U N Doc. S/1998/1068. See also Richard Caplan , International Diplomacy and the Crisis i n Kosovo, International Affairs, vol. 74, 1998, 745. 326

Bulletin, No. 20 (note 5), 3.

327

SC Res. 1160 of 31 March 1998, para. 17.

328

SC Res. 1199 of 23 September 1998, para. 13.

329

See, e.g., the press releases of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia of 7 October 1998,15 October 1998,22 October 1998,4 November 1998, and 5 November 1998. 330 331

SC Res. 1203 of 24 October 1998, para. 14.

Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 11 November 1998.

3 89

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goslavia and the leaders of the K o s o v o A l b a n i a n c o m m u n i t y t o cooperate f u l l y w i t h the prosecutor of the T r i b u n a l . 3 3 2 O n 8 December 1998, the president of the T r i b u nal i n f o r m e d the Security C o u n c i l about the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's noncompliance w i t h the r e s o l u t i o n . 3 3 3

V . Conclusion T h e variety o f activities and increasing w o r k l o a d of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i m i n a l T r i b u n a l for the F o r m e r Yugoslavia i n recent years demonstrates that this institut i o n has established itself as an i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t o r t o the progressive developm e n t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i m i n a l procedure as w e l l as substantive c r i m i n a l l a w i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e a l m . 3 3 4 W i t h its w o r k , the T r i b u n a l also serves as a m a j o r step and a successful m o d e l o n the w a y t o the establishment of a permanent i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i m i n a l c o u r t , 3 3 5 and can be credited w i t h influencing the adoption of the statute at the U N Conference i n R o m e o n 17 J u l y 1998. 3 3 6

332

SC Res. 1207 of 17 November 1998, paras. 3 and 4.

333

See the address of the President of the Tribunal to the Security Council, Press Release of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 8 December 1998. 334 See Theodor Meron , The Normative Impact on International Law of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in: Dinstein/Tabory (note 117), 211 et seq.; KrzysztofPoklewski-Koziell , L'Évolution du Droit Pénal International, in: Makarczyk (note 141), 955, 961 et seq.; and Greenwood (note 3), 140. 335 Lucius Caflisch , Réflexions sur la Création d'une Cour Criminelle Internationale, in: Makarczyk (note 141), 859, 874. O n the history and preparatory work for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court, see, e.g., M. CherifBassiouni , From Versailles to Rwanda i n Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 10, 1997, 11; and Andreas Zimmermann , Die Schaffung eines ständigen Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes — Perspektiven und Probleme vor der Staatenkonferenz von Rom, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, vol. 58, 1998, 47. 336

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted on 17 July 1998, 37 I L M 999. For an analysis of the Statute, see Christian Tomuschat , Das Statut von Rom für den Internationalen Strafgerichtshof, Die Friedenswarte, vol. 73,1998,335; and Hans-Peter Kaul, Durchbruch in Rom — Der Vertrag über den Internationalen Strafgerichtshof, Vereinte Nationen, vol. 46, 1998, 125.

Die Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 Von Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams

I . Übersicht über die Entwicklung 1. Wie schon in den vergangenen Jahren ist auch im Berichtszeitraum 1 die Arbeitsbelastung des Gerichtshofes weiter angewachsen. I m Jahr 1997 waren insgesamt neun, im Jahr 1998 zehn Verfahren anhängig. Die Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen bat den Gerichtshof in Resolution 52/161 um eine Einschätzung seiner Situation. 2 In seiner Stellungnahme weist der Gerichtshof zunächst darauf hin, daß nicht nur die Zahl der Verfahren gestiegen sei, sondern es durch die häufige Erhebung von vorgängigen Einreden oder die Beantragung von vorsorglichen Maßnahmen zu dem Problem der „cases within cases" komme, wodurch die Arbeitsbelastung weiter steige. Daneben bemängelt der Gerichtshof die seines Erachtens unzureichende finanzielle Ausstattung. So betrage das jährliche Budget des Gerichtshofes 11 Mio. US-Dollar im Vergleich zu 70 Mio. US-Dollar beim JugoslawienTribunal. 3 Durch eine Reihe von Verfahrensstraffungen, wie z. B. die Reduzierung der beim Gerichtshof einzureichenden Schriftsätze, w i l l er in den kommenden Jahren effizienter arbeiten. Bereits seit Oktober 1997 versucht er, durch Veröffentlichung seiner Entscheidungen auf einer neu eingerichteten Internet-Seite zügig und umfassend über seine Tätigkeit zu informieren. 4 2. In den Jahren 1997 und 1998 hat der Gerichtshof ein Urteil zur Begründetheit gefällt und sich in einem Prozeßurteil für unzuständig erklärt. In drei Fällen verwarf er die vorgängigen Einreden einer Streitpartei und ließ die Klagen in der Hauptsache 1

Dieser Bericht schließt an die Darstellung von Ursula E. Heinz, Die Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1995 und 1996, German Yearbook of International Law, vol. 40, 1997, 460 - 513, an. 2 G A Res. 52/161 (1997), Abs. 4. 3 Stellungnahme des Gerichtshofes zu Resolution 52/161 der UN-Generalversammlung, abgedruckt als Annex I zum Bericht des Gerichtshofes über seine Tätigkeit i m Jahr 1997 - 1998, U N G A O R , 53rd Session, Supp. 4 (A/53/4). 4 Die Internet-Adresse lautet: http://www.icj-cij.org . Die i m folgenden zusammengefaßten Urteile sind unter dieser Adresse abrufbar.

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Martin Mennecke und Cstian Tams

zu. In zwei Fällen erklärte er die gegen eine Klage erhobene Widerklage für grundsätzlich zulässig. Eine neue Gutachtenfrage wurde dem I G H vorgelegt, und zwei neue streitige Verfahren wurden anhängig, von denen sich eines allerdings bereits wieder erledigt hat. I m einzelnen handelte es sich um folgende Verfahren: 5 a) I m Streit zwischen Katar und Bahrain über die Meeresgrenze und weitere territoriale Fragen zweifelte Bahrain in einer Erklärung vom 25. September 1997 die Authentizität von 81 von Katar eingereichten Dokumenten an. Es vertrat den Standpunkt, über die Frage der Echtheit dieser Dokumente sei vor Entscheidung in der Hauptsache gesondert zu verhandeln. Katar erklärte am 8. Oktober, eine Abtrennung der Frage von der Hauptsache sei nicht möglich. Beide Parteien verständigten sich darauf, auf die Frage der Echtheit in gesonderten Schriftsätzen einzugehen. Nach Einreichung der auf die Hauptsache bezogenen Schriftsätze verfügte der Gerichtshof am 30. März 1998, daß Katar bis zum 30. September 1998 in einer vorläufigen Erwiderung zur Echtheit der Dokumente Stellung zu nehmen habe und daß beide Parteien bis zum 30. März 1999 weitere Schriftsätze zu dieser Frage einreichen könnten. b) I m Verfahren zwischen Ungarn und der Slowakei über das gemeinsame Staustufen-Projekt beschloß der Gerichtshof in seiner Verfügung vom 5. Februar 1997, der Einladung beider Parteien zu folgen und erstmals in seiner Geschichte eine Ortsbesichtigung vorzunehmen. Zwischen dem 3. März und 15. April 1997 kam es zu den mündlichen Verhandlungen im Haag, am 25. September erging das Urteil (II.). Da die Parteien sich im folgenden nicht über eine Umsetzung des Urteilsspruches einig wurden, beantragte die Slowakei am 3. September 1998 ein zusätzliches Urteil des Gerichtshofes zu dieser Frage. Der Gerichtshof setzte Ungarn eine Frist bis zum 7. Dezember zur Erwiderung auf diesen Antrag. c) In den Verfahren zwischen Libyen und Großbritannien sowie Libyen und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika über den Flugzeugabsturz von Lockerbie fällte der Gerichtshof am 27. Februar 1998 zwei getrennte Urteile, in denen er die von Großbritannien und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika vorgebrachten vorgängigen Einreden zurückwies und sich in der Hauptsache für zuständig und die Klagen Libyens für zulässig erklärte (III.). In Verfügungen vom 30. März 1998 setzte der Gerichtshof zunächst den 30. Dezember 1998 als Frist für die britische und die US-amerikanische Klageerwiderung fest, verlängerte diese Frist aber in Verfügungen vom 17. Dezember 1998 bis zum 31. März 1999. d) I m Streit zwischen Bosnien-Herzegowina und Jugoslawien über die Anwendbarkeit der Völkermord-Konvention reichte Jugoslawien fristgemäß zum 23. Juli 5

Einen Überblick über die Entwicklung der einzelnen Verfahren geben die jährlichen Berichte des Gerichtshofes an die Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen, U N G A O R 52nd Session, Supp. 4 (A 52/4) und U N G A O R 53rd Session, Supp. 4 (A 53/4).

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 1997 seine Klageerwiderung ein. Darüber hinaus erhob es Widerklage gemäß Art. 80 der Verfahrensordnung des Gerichtshofes (VerfO), in der es BosnienHerzegowina vorwarf, selbst die Völkermord-Konvention verletzt zu haben. Entgegen dem nachfolgenden Vorbringen Bosnien-Herzegowinas stellte der Gerichtshof durch Verfügung vom 17. Dezember 1997 die grundsätzliche Zulässigkeit der jugoslawischen Widerklage fest (IV.) und bestimmte Fristen zur Einreichung weiterer Schriftsätze, die durch Verfügungen vom 22. Januar und 11. Dezember 1998 verlängert wurden. Bosnien-Herzegowina reichte seine Erwiderung fristgemäß zum 23. April 1998 ein; Jugoslawien hat seine Erwiderung zum 22. Februar 1999 einzureichen. e) I m Bohrinselstreit zwischen dem Iran und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika reichten letztere fristgerecht zum 23. Juni 1997 ihre Klageerwiderung ein und erhoben zugleich Widerklage im Sinne von Art. 80 VerfO. Nachdem der Iran deren Zulässigkeit bestritten hatte, erklärte der Gerichtshof in einer Verfügung vom 10. März 1998 die Widerklage für grundsätzlich zulässig (V.) und setzte den Parteien eine Frist zur Einreichung weiterer Schriftsätze, die in der Folge durch Verfügungen vom 26. Mai und 8. Dezember 1998 zweimal ausgedehnt wurde. f) I m Grenzstreit zwischen Kamerun und Nigeria hatte letzteres verschiedene vorgängige Einreden gegen die Zuständigkeit des Gerichtshofes und die Zulässigkeit der Klage erhoben. Der Gerichtshof wies diese Einreden mit Urteil vom 11. Juni 1998 zurück und erklärte die Klage Kameruns für zulässig (VI.). Durch Verfügung vom 30. Juni setzte er Nigeria eine Frist bis zum 31. März 1999 zur Klageerwiderung. g) I m spanisch-kanadischen Fischereistreit kam es zwischen dem 9. und 17. Juni 1998 zu den mündlichen Verhandlungen über die Frage der Zuständigkeit des Gerichtshofes. Kanada hatte diese unter Hinweis auf einen Vorbehalt zu seiner Unterwerfungserklärung bestritten. Spanien hatte demgegenüber vorgebracht, der Vorbehalt erfasse nicht die zwischen beiden Parteien streitige Frage, ob Kanada berechtigt war, ein spanisches Fischereiboot auf der Hohen See aufzubringen und in einen kanadischen Hafen zu verbringen. A m 4. Dezember 1998 entschied der Gerichtshof durch Urteil, daß er für die von Spanien vorgebrachte Klage nicht zuständig sei (VII.). h) I m Verfahren zwischen Botswana und Namibia über den Grenzverlauf zwischen beiden Staaten und speziell den Status der Kasikili-/Sedulu-Insel reichten beide Parteien innerhalb der ihnen gesetzten Frist Schriftsätze ein. In einer Verfügung vom 27. Februar 1998 ließ der Gerichtshof, dem Wunsch der Parteien entsprechend, weitere schriftliche Einlassungen bis zum 28. November 1998 zu. Die mündliche Verhandlung wurde auf den Zeitraum zwischen dem 15. Februar und 5. März 1999 festgesetzt.

Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams Ein neues Verfahren ist mit der Klageerhebung Paraguays gegen die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika am 3. April 1998 anhängig geworden. Paraguay machte geltend, die Vereinigten Staaten hätten in dem Gerichtsverfahren gegen einen paraguayanischen Staatsangehörigen ihre Verpflichtungen aus dem Wiener Ubereinkommen über konsularische Beziehungen verletzt, und beantragte daher die Aufhebung des gegen diesen ergangenen Todesurteils sowie den Erlaß vorsorglicher Maßnahmen, um die drohende Vollstreckung zu verhindern. Nach nur eintägiger Verhandlung am 7. April gab der Gerichtshof durch Verfügung vom 9. April 1998 dem Antrag Paraguays statt (VIII.). Obwohl die Hinrichtung dennoch vollstreckt worden war, wurde das Verfahren zunächst fortgesetzt und die beiden Staaten für die Einreichung von Schriftsätzen gesetzten Fristen durch Verfügung vom 8. Juni 1998 verlängert. Nachdem Paraguay zunächst am 9. Oktober 1998 seinen Standpunkt schriftlich dargelegt hatte, beantragte es am 2. November, den Fall von der Liste der anhängigen Verfahren zu nehmen. Nach Zustimmung der Vereinigten Staaten kam der Gerichtshof diesem Antrag durch Verfügung vom 10. November 1998 nach. Eine neue Gutachtenfrage wurde dem Gerichtshof vom Wirtschafts- und Sozialrat der Vereinten Nationen mit dessen Resolution 1998/297 vorgelegt. Dabei wird ein Gutachten zu der Frage erbeten, ob sich Dato Param Cumawasramy, ein Berichterstatter eines Unterausschusses des Wirtschafts- und Sozialrates, gegenüber verschiedenen in Malaysia gegen ihn erhobenen Schadensersatzklagen auf Immunität nach dem Ubereinkommen über Vorrechte und Immunitäten der Vereinten Nationen berufen kann. Dazu müßte er die ihm vorgeworfenen Handlungen — vermeintlich rufschädigende Aussagen in einem Interview — in offizieller Funktion vorgenommen haben. Die mündlichen Verhandlungen zu dieser Frage fanden zwischen dem 7. und 10. Dezember 1998 statt; das Gutachten soll im Frühjahr 1999 veröffentlicht werden. In einem weiteren neuen Verfahren erreichte den Gerichtshof am 28. Oktober 1998 ein Antrag Nigerias nach Art. 98 VerfO auf Auslegung des am 11. Juni desselben Jahres gefällten Urteils über vorgängige Einreden im Grenzstreit zwischen Kamerun und Nigeria. Es ist dies der erste Fall, in dem der Gerichtshof vor Entscheidung des Hauptverfahrens um Auslegung eines von ihm gefällten Urteils über vorgängige Einreden ersucht wird. Nigeria wünscht im einzelnen Klarstellung darüber, welche der von Kamerun behaupteten Grenzverletzungen durch Nigeria nun Bestandteil des weiteren Verfahrens seien. Der Gerichtshof setzte zunächst Kamerun eine Frist zur schriftlichen Stellungnahme bis zum 3. Dezember 1998. Ein weiterer neuer Streit wurde dem Gerichtshof schließlich am 2. November 1998 aufgrund eines Schiedskompromisses zwischen Indonesien und Malaysia unterbreitet. Dabei soll der Gerichtshof bestimmen, welcher der beiden Parteien die Souveränität über die in der Celebes-See gelegenen Inseln Pulau Litigan und

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 Pulau Sipadan zusteht. Durch Verfügung vom 10. November 1998 wurden die Fristen für die Schriftsätze und Gegenvorstellungen der Parteien auf 2. November 1999 und 2. März 2000 festgesetzt. 3. Auch in der Besetzung des Gerichtshofes gab es im Berichtszeitraum verschiedene Änderungen. Die am 6. November 1996 wiedergewählten Richter sowie die neu gewählten Gerichtsmitglieder PieterH. Kooijmans (Niederlande) und Francesco Rezek (Brasilien) traten ihr A m t am 6. Februar 1997 an. A m selben Tag wählte der Gerichtshof seinen vorherigen Vizepräsidenten, den US-Amerikaner Stephen M. Schwebel, für drei Jahre zu seinem neuen Präsidenten; neuer Vizepräsident ist Christopher G. Weeramantry aus Sri Lanka. 6 Gemäß Art. 32 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Art. 13 Abs. 1 VerfO hat dies in der Folgezeit dazu geführt, daß in allen Verfahren mit US-amerikanischer Beteiligung Vizepräsident Weeramantry als Präsident amtierte. Das Mandat der nach Art. 26 IGH-Statut errichteten Kammer für Umweltsachen wurde bis zur nächsten Wahl neuer Richter verlängert. 7 Der Kammer wurden aber auch im Berichtszeitraum noch keine Verfahren zugewiesen.

I I . Fall betreffend das Gabcikovo-Nagymaros-Projekt 8 (Ungarn gegen Slowakei) Urteil vom 25. September 1997 Besetzung des Gerichtshofes: Präsident Schwebet; Vizepräsident Weeramantry; Richter Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek; Ad-hoc-Richter Skubiszewski.

6

U N G A O R , 52nd Session, Supp. 4 (A/52/4), Abs. 3. U N G A O R , 53rd Session, Supp. 4 (A/53/4), Abs. 4. 8 Siehe dazu Karel Wellens , The Court's Judgment in the Case Concerning the GabcikovoNagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia): Some Preliminary Objections, in: Κ Wellens (ed.), International Law: Theory and Practice, Essays i n Honour of Eric Suy , 1998, 765 - 799; Daniel Reichert-Facilides , D o w n the Danube: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 47, 1998, 837 - 854; sowie die Fallanalyse i m Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 11, 1998, 287 - 355, mit Darstellungen von Johan G. Lammers, Malgosia Fitzmaurice und Jan Klabbers . Vgl. auch die Zusammenfassungen von Peter H. F. Bekker , American Journal of International Law, vol. 92, 1998, 273 - 278, und Karin Oellers-Frahm, Vereinte Nationen 4/1998, 151 - 153. 7

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und Anträge der Parteien

I m vorliegenden Fall war es zwischen Ungarn und der Slowakei zum Streit über ein Staustufen-Projekt an der Donau gekommen. In seiner Wiedergabe des Hintergrundes des Konfliktes 9 stellt der Gerichtshof fest, daß zwischen Ungarn und der damaligen CSSR am 16. September 1977 ein Vertrag über den gemeinsamen Bau eines Systems von Staustufen entlang der Donau geschlossen worden war. Dieser Vertrag, der am 30. Juni 1978 in Kraft trat, zielte auf eine „umfassende Nutzung der natürlichen Ressourcen des zwischen Bratislava und Budapest gelegenen Donauabschnittes zur Entwicklung von Wasserreserven, Energie, Transport, Landwirtschaft und anderen Bereichen der Volkswirtschaft der beiden Vertragsparteien" ab. 10 Zur Erreichung dieses Ziels sollten u. a. bei Gabcikovo auf dem Gebiet der damaligen CSSR und bei Nagymaros auf ungarischem Territorium zwei Staudämme errichtet werden. Bei den Bauarbeiten sollten nach Art. 15 und 19 des Vertrages Belange des Umweltschutzes berücksichtigt werden. Die Durchführung der Bauarbeiten oblag nach Art. 10 des Vertrages dem jeweiligen Territorialstaat. Beide Staaten trugen die Projektkosten aber gemeinsam und erarbeiteten einen gemeinsamen Durchführungsplan, so daß das gesamte Projekt insgesamt ein „integriertes und unteilbares Betriebssystem" bildete. 11 In den Jahren nach 1977 war der Vertrag durch mehrere Protokolle nachträglich abgeändert worden, insbesondere einigten sich Ungarn und die CSSR am 10. Oktober 1983 zunächst auf eine Verlangsamung der Projektdurchführung, dann aber am 6. Februar 1989 auf eine erneute Beschleunigung.12 A m 13. Mai 1989 jedoch ließ die ungarische Regierung aufgrund starker Kritik an dem Projekt die Bauarbeiten vorläufig einstellen. A m 27. Oktober wurden die Arbeiten am Nagymaros-Staudamm sowie an anderen ungarischen Bauabschnitten endgültig aufgegeben. Unterdessen verhandelten beide Parteien über Kompromißlösungen zur Vertragsdurchführung. Von der tschechoslowakischen Seite wurde als Alternative die sogenannte „Variante C" geplant, nach der die Donau auf dem Gebiet der CSSR umgeleitet und ein Kanal gebaut werden sollte, um die Versorgung des Gabcikovo-Staudamms zu sichern. I m November 1991 begann die CSRR mit der Umsetzung dieser „Variante C", woraufhin die ungarische Regierung am 19. Mai 1992 nach dem Scheitern weiterer Verhandlungen den Vertrag für beendet erklärte. I m Oktober 1992 wurde „Variante C" von der CSSR in Betrieb genommen. 13

9

Abs. 15 - 25 des Urteils. Präambel des Vertrages von 1977, wiedergegeben i n Abs. 15 des Urteils. 11 Abs. 15, 18 - 20. 12 Abs. 21. 13 Abs. 22 - 23. 10

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 A m 23. Oktober 1992 hatte Ungarn vor dem I G H Klage gegen die CSSR wegen des einseitigen Vorgehens erhoben; mangels Zuständigkeit wurde der Gerichtshof jedoch nicht tätig. Durch Vermittlung der Europäischen Kommission einigten sich Ungarn und die mittlerweile neu entstandene Slowakei darauf, die Streitigkeit dem I G H vorzulegen. In ihrem Special Agreement vom 7. April 1993 unterbreiteten sie dem Gerichtshof die folgenden vier Fragen: 14 1. War Ungarn im Mai und Oktober 1989 zur vorläufigen und endgültigen Einstellung der Bauarbeiten berechtigt? 2. Durfte die Tschechoslowakei im November 1991 mit der Umsetzung von „Variante C" beginnen und diese im Oktober 1992 in Betrieb nehmen? 3. Welche rechtlichen Folgen hatte die Erklärung Ungarns vom 19. Mai 1992, mit der es den Vertrag von 1977 für beendet erklärte? 4. Welche rechtlichen Konsequenzen ergeben sich aus der Beurteilung der ersten drei Fragen? 2. Berechtigung Ungarns zur Einstellung der Bauarbeiten Der Gerichtshof setzt sich zunächst mit der Frage auseinander, ob Ungarn im Mai bzw. Oktober 1989 die Bauarbeiten an den auf seinem Gebiet gelegenen Projekten einstellen durfte. 15 Dabei war unumstritten, daß der Vertrag von 1977 mitsamt seinen abändernden Protokollen zum relevanten Zeitpunkt im Jahr 1989 zwischen beiden Parteien in Kraft war und daß er selbst kein Recht zur einseitigen Einstellung der Vertragserfüllung enthielt. 16 Ungarn brachte vor, im Jahr 1989 nicht den Vertrag als solchen suspendiert, sondern lediglich einzelne Vertragspflichten nicht erfüllt zu haben. Zur Rechtfertigung des eigenen Verhaltens berief es sich in erster Linie auf einen „ökologischen Notstand", der zur Einstellung der Arbeiten berechtige, weil eine Fortführung des Staudamm-Projekts verheerende Auswirkungen auf Fauna und Flora im betroffenen Donauabschnitt gehabt hätte. 17 Daneben habe die Tschechoslowakei selbst den Vertrag von 1977 verletzt, indem sie auf einer Fortsetzung der Bauarbeiten bestanden habe, obwohl das Ausmaß der drohenden ökologischen Schäden erkennbar gewesen sei. Schließlich wies Ungarn darauf hin, daß für die Beurteilung des Verhaltens nicht allein auf das Recht der Verträge abgestellt werden könne, sondern daneben auch das Recht der Staatenverantwortlichkeit zu berücksichtigen sei, u. a. weil die Wiener 14 15 16 17

Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs.

2. 27 - 59. 39. 40.

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Konvention über das Recht der Verträge (WVRK) auf den vor ihrem Inkrafttreten geschlossenen Vertrag von 1977 nach ihrem Art. 4 keine Anwendung finden könne. Nach Ansicht der Slowakei ist die Rechtmäßigkeit des ungarischen Verhaltens einzig und allein nach dem Recht der Verträge zu beurteilen, weil den Bestimmungen über Vertragsbeendigung und -kündigung jedenfalls gewohnheitsrechtliche Geltung zukomme. Die Slowakei verneinte weiterhin, daß ein Rechtfertigungsgrund des „ökologischen Notstandes" existiere, und behauptete hilfsweise, daß ein solcher Notstand jedenfalls nicht vorliege, da durch Modifikation des Vertrages gravierende Umweltschäden hätten vermieden werden können. Sie bestritt, durch Festhalten an der Durchführung des Projekts selbst den Vertrag verletzt zu haben, und warf Ungarn zudem eine Verletzung des in Art. 27 des Vertrages von 1977 vorgesehenen Streitschlichtungsmechanismus vor. 1 8 Der Gerichtshof stellt zunächst klar, daß er zur Anwendbarkeit der W V R K auf den vorliegenden Fall keine Stellung nehmen müsse, da die relevanten Bestimmungen Bestandteil des Völkergewohnheitsrechts seien. Die von Ungarn vorgebrachte Unterscheidung zwischen der Suspendierung des Vertrages als solchem und der Suspendierung einzelner Vertragspflichten weist er zurück. 19 I m folgenden untersucht der Gerichtshof, ob, wie von Ungarn vorgetragen, ein „ökologischer Notstand" vorliege und dieser zur Einstellung der Bauarbeiten im Jahre 1989 berechtigte. Dabei bezieht er sich auf Art. 33 des von der International Law Commission erarbeiteten Entwurfs zur Staatenverantwortlichkeit und stellt dessen völkergewohnheitsrechtliche Geltung fest. 20 Ein Handeln kann demnach ausnahmsweise gerechtfertigt sein, wenn einem wesentlichen Interesse eines Staates eine schwerwiegende und unmittelbare Gefahr droht und diese nur durch die vorgenommene Handlung abgewendet werden kann. Eine Berufung auf Notstand ist jedoch dem Staat verwehrt, der selbst zum Zustandekommen der Notstandslage beigetragen hat; die Notstandshandlung darf ferner den anderen Staat nicht schwerwiegend beeinträchtigen. 21 Unter Berufung auf die Erläuterungen der International Law Commission zu Art. 33 des Vertragsentwurfs stellt der Gerichtshof zunächst fest, daß der Kreis möglicher „wesentlicher Interessen" grundsätzlich weit zu fassen ist und — unter Berücksichtigung der gewachsenen Bedeutung des Umweltschutzes — jedenfalls auch Ungarns Sorge vor einer Zerstörung der Fauna und Flora der Donau einschließt. 22 18

Abs. 43 - 45. Abs. 46 - 48. 20 Abs. 50-52. 21 Abs. 52 unter Verweis auf Art. 33 des ILC-Entwurfs. Der Gerichtshof stellt ausdrücklich klar, daß auch diese einzelnen Voraussetzungen Völkergewohnheitsrecht darstellen. 22 Abs. 53 unter Berufung auf die eigenen Aussagen i m Gutachten zur Legality of the Threat or the Use of Nuclear Weapons , ICJ Reports 1996,226 (241 - 242, Abs. 29); vgl. dazu den Bericht von Heinz (Anm. 1), 498 - 513. 19

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 Allerdings sieht es der Gerichtshof aufgrund der widersprüchlichen Sachverständigengutachten nicht als erwiesen an, daß Ungarn im Jahre 1989 bereits von einer unmittelbaren Gefährdung seiner Umwelt ausgehen konnte. Vor allem jedoch bestanden nach Ansicht des Gerichtshofes für Ungarn andere Möglichkeiten, möglichen Umweltschäden zu begegnen, als die einseitige Einstellung der Bauarbeiten. Insbesondere hätte es in den mit der damaligen Tschechoslowakei laufenden Verhandlungen auf eine Abänderung des Projekts dringen müssen, was aufgrund der Verankerung des Umweltschutzgedankens in Art. 15 und 19 des Vertrages auch erfolgversprechend gewesen wäre. Eine Berufung auf Notstand wäre nach Ansicht des Gerichtshofes Ungarn zudem auch deshalb verwehrt gewesen, weil es durch seine Mitwirkung am Vertragsschluß und den nachfolgenden Vertragsänderungen selbst zur Entstehung der Situation beigetragen habe. Da bereits aus diesen Gründen Ungarn im Jahr 1989 nicht zur Einstellung bzw. endgültigen Aufgabe der Bauarbeiten berechtigt war, geht der Gerichtshof auf die übrigen zur ersten Frage vorgebrachten Argumente nicht weiter ein. 3. Berechtigung der Tschechoslowakei zur Umsetzung und Inbetriebnahme von „ Variante C" im November 1991 bzw. Oktober 1992 I m folgenden befaßt sich der Gerichtshof mit der Frage, ob die damalige Tschechoslowakei im November 1991 zur Umsetzung der als „Variante C" bezeichneten Durchführungsalternative berechtigt war und ob sie diese im Oktober 1992 auch in Betrieb nehmen durfte. Die Slowakei argumentierte, daß es ihr aufgrund des ungarischen Verhaltens unmöglich geworden sei, ihren eigentlichen Verpflichtungen aus dem Vertrag von 1977 nachzukommen. Nach dem von ihr vorgebrachten Prinzip der bestmöglichen Vertragserfüllung (approximate application) ebenso wie aufgrund des Grundsatzes der Schadensminderung sei sie zu einer dem ursprünglichen Vertragsziel möglichst nahekommenden Durchführung des Projektes verpflichtet gewesen.23 Da die ungarische Seite aber jede Mitwirkung verweigert habe, sei eine einseitige Durchführung völkerrechtsgemäß gewesen. Alternativ brachte sie vor, daß ihr Verhalten jedenfalls als gegen den ungarischen Vertragsbruch gerichtete Gegenmaßnahme gerechtfertigt gewesen sei.24 Ungarn stritt ab, daß das Prinzip der approximate application Bestandteil des Völkerrechts sei. Auch der Hinweis auf eine Schadensminderungspflicht könne nicht zur Rechtfertigung eines an sich unrechtmäßigen Verhaltens dienen. Schließlich 23

Abs. 67-68. Zur Begründung des Prinzips der approximate application berief sich die Slowakei auf das Sondervotum von Sir Hersch Lauterpacht i m Fall Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, ICJ Reports 1956, 35 (46). 24 Abs. 69.

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seien die Voraussetzungen für eine Rechtfertigung als Gegenmaßnahme, insbesondere die Verhältnismäßigkeit, nicht gegeben. Das Verhalten der CSSR in den Jahren 1991 und 1992 stelle daher eine Verletzung des Vertrages von 1977 sowie völkerrechtlicher Regelungen zur Nutzung von Grenzflüssen dar. 25 Der Gerichtshof lehnt die slowakische Berufung auf das behauptete Prinzip der approximate application ab, weil — unabhängig von der Anerkennung des Prinzips im geltenden Völkerrecht — dieses jedenfalls voraussetze, daß sich das umstrittene „bestmögliche" Verhalten im Rahmen des ursprünglichen Vertrages bewege. Da der Vertrag von 1977 aber vor allem ein gemeinsames, unteilbares Projekt betraf, kann er nach Ansicht des Gerichtshofes durch ein einseitiges Vorgehen nicht „bestmöglich" erfüllt werden. Die Inbetriebnahme der „Variante C" verletzt somit den Vertrag von 1977. Dagegen kann der Gerichtshof in der bloßen Umsetzung der „Variante C" zwischen November 1991 und Oktober 1992, bei der lediglich Bauarbeiten auf damals tschechoslowakischem Gebiet durchgeführt wurden, noch keine Verletzung des Vertrages, sondern lediglich für sich genommen zulässige Vorarbeiten erblicken, da diese nicht zwingend zu einer unzulässigen einseitigen Umleitung der Donau führen mußten. 26 Der Gerichtshof folgt im weiteren dem ungarischen Vorbringen, daß sich auch aus dem Prinzip der Schadensminderung keine Rechtfertigung des vertragswidrigen Verhaltens ergeben kann. Auch lehnt er die slowakische Berufung auf ein Recht zum Ergreifen von Gegenmaßnahmen ab. Die einseitige Umleitung eines großen Teils des Wassers der Donau verletze den Grundsatz der gerechten Wasseraufteilung zwischen Gewässeranrainern in schwerem Maße und sei deshalb unverhältnismäßig. 27 Somit war die damalige CSSR zwar zur Umsetzung der „Variante C" im November 1991, aber nicht zur Inbetriebnahme derselben im Oktober 1992 berechtigt. 4. Rechtliche Folgen der Erklärung

Ungarns vom 19. Mai 1992

In folgenden untersucht der Gerichtshof die rechtlichen Folgen der Note der ungarischen Regierung vom 19. Mai 1992, mit der sie den Vertrag von 1977 für beendet erklärte. 28 Der Vertrag selbst enthielt keine besonderen Bestimmungen über eine Vertragsbeendigung, so daß die allgemeinen Regeln anwendbar waren.

25

Abs. 70-71. Abs. 76 - 79. 27 Abs. 82 - 87 unter Berufung auf die Rechtsprechung des Ständigen Internationalen Gerichtshofes i m Fall Territorial Junsdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder , PCIJ, Series A , No. 23, 27. 28 Abs. 89-115. 26

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 Ungarn brachte im einzelnen fünf Gründe vor, warum die Erklärung vom 19. Mai 1992 tatsächlich vertragsbeendigende Wirkung gehabt habe.29 Es berief sich auf einen Notstand aufgrund der Unwilligkeit der damaligen CSSR zu weiteren Verhandlungen, auf Unmöglichkeit der Vertragserfüllung im Sinne des Art. 61 W V R K , weil wegen des einseitigen Vorgehens der CSSR ein gemeinsames Staudammprojekt nicht mehr realisierbar gewesen sei, und auf einen Wegfall der Vertragsgrundlage im Sinne des Art. 62 W V R K infolge der politischen Umwälzungen in den ehemals sozialistischen Staaten und des einseitigen Vorgehens der Tschechoslowakei. Es behauptete darüber hinaus, aufgrund des vertragswidrigen Verhaltens der Tschechoslowakei sowie aufgrund der Entstehung neuer Normen des Umweltvölkerrechts — insbesondere des Vorsorgeprinzips — zur Vertragsbeendigung im Sinne des Art. 60 W V R K berechtigt gewesen zu sein. Die Slowakei erwiderte, die Voraussetzungen für eine wirksame Vertragsbeendigung lägen unter keinem der vorgebrachten Gesichtspunkte vor. Der Gerichtshof akzeptiert keines der fünf Argumente Ungarns. Er stellt dabei einleitend klar, daß den in Art. 60 - 62 W V R K kodifizierten Regeln zur Vertragsbeendigung gewohnheitsrechtliche Wirkung zukommt. 3 0 Bezüglich des vorgebrachten Kündigungsrechts infolge eines Notstandes stellt der Gerichtshof lediglich fest, daß Notstand zwar als Rechtfertigungsgrund im Völkerrecht anerkannt sei, nicht aber als Grund zur Beendigung eines Vertrages. 31 Die Berufung auf Unmöglichkeit wird zurückgewiesen, weil zum einen unklar sei, ob ein rechtliches Régime, wie die beiden Staaten es durch den Vertrag errichten wollten, überhaupt „unmöglich" werden könne. Vor allem aber lägen die Voraussetzungen einer dauerhaften Unmöglichkeit nicht vor, da weitere Verhandlungen noch zu einer Einigung hätten führen können. U n d schließlich wäre Ungarn die Berufung auf die Unmöglichkeit ohnehin verwehrt gewesen, da es durch sein eigenes einseitiges Vorgehen im Jahr 1989 zur Entstehung der Situation beigetragen habe.32 Ebensowenig können die Änderungen im Verhältnis zwischen den beiden Staaten oder die gewachsene Bedeutung des Umweltschutzes nach Ansicht des Gerichtshofes einen Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage begründen. Der Gerichtshof stellt insbesondere fest, daß die Planung des Projekts nicht zwingend mit der politischen Ausrichtung der CSSR und Ungarns als sozialistische Staaten verknüpft gewesen und daß die Bedeutung des Umweltschutzes bereits bei Vertragsschluß erkannt worden

29 30 31 32 33

Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs.

26 G Y I L 41

92-97. 99. 101. 102 - 103; vgl. Art. 61 Abs. 2 W V R K . 104.

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Bezüglich des vierten ungarischen Vorbringens, daß eine Beendigung aufgrund einer Verletzung des Vertrages von 1977 durch die CSSR zulässig gewesen sei, verweist der Gerichtshof auf seine Äußerungen zur zweiten Frage, wonach erst die der Beendigungserklärung nachfolgende Inbetriebnahme, nicht aber bereits die Umsetzung der „Variante C" eine Vertragsverletzung darstelle. Insofern sieht er die ungarische Vertragssuspendierung als verfrüht an und weist auch dieses ungarische Vorbringen zurück. I m übrigen wäre Ungarn aufgrund seines eigenen vertragswidrigen Verhaltens eine Berufung auf ein derartiges Suspendierungsrecht verwehrt gewesen.34 Hinsichtlich der Berufung auf neue Normen des Umweltvölkerrechts, die zu einer Vertragsbeendigung berechtigen sollten, betont der Gerichtshof die gewachsene Bedeutung des Umweltschutzes, weist aber auf die diesem Gedanken Rechnung tragenden Vertragsbestimmungen hin und stellt fest, daß jedenfalls kein dem Vertrag entgegenstehendes zwingendes Völkerrecht (ius cogens) entstanden sei.35 Somit kommt der Gerichtshof zu dem Schluß, daß Ungarn durch seine Erklärung vom 19. Mai 1992 den Vertrag von 1977 nicht beenden konnte. 5. Rechtliche Konsequenzen des Urteils I m folgenden setzt sich der Gerichtshof mit den rechtlichen Konsequenzen seiner Entscheidungen zu den ersten drei Fragen auseinander. Er macht zunächst deutlich, daß die Slowakei im Wege der Staatensukzession anstelle der Tschechoslowakei Partei des Vertrages von 1977 geworden ist. 36 Ungarn hatte vorgebracht, es fehle an einer völkerrechtlichen Grundlage für eine automatische Sukzession in bilaterale Verträge. Der Gerichtshof hingegen ordnete die Vereinbarung von 1977 als radizierten Vertrag ein, für den eine automatische Nachfolge anerkannt sei.37 Des weiteren äußert sich der Gerichtshof zu der Frage, zu welchem Verhalten beide Staaten durch das Urteil verpflichtet würden. 38 Dabei betont er, daß zwar der Vertrag weiter in Kraft bleibe, daß aber aufgrund der tatsächlichen Entwicklung eine exakte Vertragsdurchführung nicht mehr sinnvoll erscheine. Jedoch haben beide Staaten weiterhin die Pflicht, Verhandlungen zu führen, um sich über die offenen Fragen, wie z. B. die der Verteilung des Donauwassers, zu verständigen. Ein Er34

Abs. 105 -110. Abs. 111-113. 36 Abs. 117-124. 37 Abs. 123 unter Hinweis auf Art. 12 der Wiener Konvention über das Recht der Staatennachfolge in Verträge, dessen völkergewohnheitsrechtliche Geltung von keiner der beiden Parteien bestritten worden war. 38 Abs. 125 - 147. 35

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 gebnis dieser Verhandlungen gibt der Gerichtshof nicht vor, bekräftigt aber die Notwendigkeit der stärkeren Berücksichtigung des Umweltschutzes. Schließlich nimmt der Gerichtshof noch zu den aus den jeweiligen Vertragsverletzungen resultierenden Folgen Stellung. 39 Ohne exakte Beträge festzulegen, stellt er fest, daß beide Seiten für die jeweiligen Verletzungen Schadensersatz zu leisten hätten, und regt eine pauschale Abgleichung der gegenseitigen Ansprüche an. 6. Entscheidungsformel Aus diesen Gründen kommt der Gerichtshof zum Ergebnis, — daß Ungarn 1989 nicht zur Suspendierung und Einstellung der Bauarbeiten berechtigt war (14 : 1 Stimmen 40 ), — daß die Tschechoslowakei zwar im November 1991 mit der Umsetzung der „Variante C" beginnen durfte (9 : 6 Stimmen 41 ), diese aber im November 1992 nicht in Betrieb nehmen durfte (10 : 5 Stimmen 42 ), — daß Ungarn durch die Erklärung vom 19. Mai 1992 den Vertrag nicht beenden konnte (11:4 Stimmen 43 ), — daß die Slowakei in den Vertrag von 1977 nachgefolgt ist (12 : 3 Stimmen 44 ), — daß beide Parteien über die Beilegung des Konflikts zu verhandeln und ein gemeinsames Durchführungskonzept zu erstellen haben (13 : 2 Stimmen 45 ), — daß beide Parteien für die jeweiligen Völkerrechtsverletzungen Schadensersatz zu leisten haben (12 : 3 Stimmen 46 ) und — daß bei der weiteren Durchführung des Staudammprojektes die relevanten Bestimmungen des Vertrages von 1977 weiterhin zu beachten sind (13 : 2 Stimmen 47 ). Präsident Schwebelund Richter Rezek geben Erklärungen zum Urteil ab. Vizepräsident Weeramantry sowie die Richter Bedjaoui und Koroma fügen dem Urteil Sondervoten, die Richter Oda, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin und ParraAranguren sowie Ad-hoc-Richter Skubiszewski abweichende Meinungen bei. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

26*

Abs. 148 - 154. Gegenstimme Herczegh. Gegenstimmen Schwebel, Bedjaoui, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Rezek. Gegenstimmen Oda, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Parra-Aranguren, Skubiszewski. Gegenstimmen Schwebel, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Rezek. Gegenstimmen Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Rezek. Gegenstimmen Herczegh, Fleischhauer. Gegenstimmen Oda, Koroma, Vereshchetin. Gegenstimmen Herczegh, Fleischhauer.

404

Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams 7. Erklärungen,

Sondervoten und abweichende Meinungen

Zur ersten Frage vertritt lediglich Richter Herczegh eine von der Mehrheit abweichende Meinung. Er betont die Notwendigkeit der Auslegung eines Vertrages unter Berücksichtigung des jeweils geltenden Völkerrechts und kommt daher zu einer stärkeren Betonung des Umweltschutzes. 48 Nach seiner Ansicht lagen im Jahre 1989 die Voraussetzungen eines ökologischen Notstandes vor, da es jedenfalls in naher Zukunft zu einer gravierenden Umweltzerstörung kommen werde und alle Bemühungen um eine Vertragsmodifikation erfolglos geblieben waren. 49 Die differenzierte Entscheidung des Gerichtshofes zur zweiten Frage, wonach zwar noch nicht die Umsetzung, wohl aber die Inbetriebnahme der „Variante C" durch die Tschechoslowakei einen Völkerrechtsverstoß darstelle, wird in nahezu allen Sondervoten und abweichenden Meinungen kritisiert. Dabei wird einerseits vertreten, bereits die Planung und Umsetzung der einseitigen Alternative habe eine Vertragsverletzung dargestellt, weil durch sie bereits der Grundstein für das spätere einseitige vertragswidrige Verhalten gelegt worden sei.50 Andererseits wird der Tschechoslowakei auch das Recht zur Inbetriebnahme der „Variante C" zugestanden. Dieses Ergebnis wird zum Teil mit Verweis auf das von der Slowakei behauptete Prinzip der bestmöglichen Vertragserfüllung begründet, 51 zum Teil wird darauf abgestellt, daß wegen der Schwere des ungarischen Vertragsbruchs im Jahre 1989 und der Wichtigkeit des Projekts das einseitige Vorgehen entgegen der Mehrheitsmeinung als verhältnismäßige Gegenmaßnahme anzusehen sei.52 Zur dritten Frage, ob Ungarn den Vertrag durch seine Erklärung vom 19. Mai 1992 beenden konnte, werden vor allem von denjenigen Richtern, die bereits in der Umsetzung der „Variante C" durch die Tschechoslowakei im November 1991 eine Völkerrechtsverletzung gesehen hatten, abweichende Ansichten vertreten. Richter Herczegh und Fleischhauer halten das ungarische Vorgehen als Antwort auf die — von ihnen angenommene — Vertragsverletzung durch die Tschechoslowakei für rechtmäßig. 53 Fleischhauer hebt besonders hervor, daß zumindest durch die — auch von

48

Diss. Op. Herczegh, Seite 2, unter Berufung auf das Gutachten des Gerichtshofes zur Frage der Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Secunty Council Resolution 276(1970), ICJ Reports 1971,16 (31 32, Abs. 53). 49 Diss. Op. Herczegh , Seiten 4 - 7. 50 Sep. Op. Bedjaoui, Abs. 35 - 52; ähnlich Diss. Op. Ranjeva, Seiten 2 - 3, Diss. Op. Herczegh y Seite 11. 51 Diss. Op. Parra-Aranguren , Abs. 15 - 20. 52 Diss. Op. Vereshchetin, Seiten 2 - 4; Diss. Op. Skubiszewski , Abs. 6 - 8; ähnlich Diss. Op. Oda, Abs. 21 - 24. 53 Diss. Op. Herczegh , Seiten 12 -13; Diss. Op. Fleischhauer, Punkt 1.2; ähnlich Schwebel und Rezek in ihren Erklärungen.

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 der Gerichtsmehrheit angenommene — nachfolgende Vertragsverletzung durch die CSSR im Oktober 1992 der Vertrag nachträglich beendet worden sei und daß Ungarn durch seinen eigenen Vertragsbruch aus dem Jahr 1989 nicht an einer Beendigung gehindert gewesen wäre. 54 Die von der Mehrheitsmeinung abweichenden Stellungnahmen zu den rechtlichen Folgen des Urteils (Frage 4) ergeben sich im wesentlichen aus den unterschiedlichen Ansichten zu den ersten drei Fragen. Zum Problem der Nachfolge der Slowakei in den Vertrag von 1977 weichen die Richter Rezek, Fleischhauer und Herczegh von der Mehrheitsmeinung ab, weil sie den Vertrag als durch die ungarische Erklärung vom 19. Mai 1992 beendet ansehen und es deshalb zu keiner Nachfolge in ihn mehr kommen kann. 55

I I I . Fall betreffend die Auslegung u n d Anwendung des Montrealer Übereinkommes von 1971 aus Anlaß des Luftzwischenfalls i n Lockerbie 56 (Libysch-Arabische Dschamahirija gegen Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika und Libysch-Arabische Dschamahirija gegen das Vereinigte Königreich) Zulässigkeit vorgängiger Einreden Urteil vom 27. Februar 1998 Besetzung des Gerichtshofes: Vizepräsident Weeramantry (amtierender Präsident); Präsident Schwebel; Richter Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume , Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek; Ad-hocRichter El-Kosheri, Jennings 57.

54

Diss. Op. Fleischhauer, Punkt 1.3. Diss. Op. Fleischhauer, Punkt 1.3; Diss. Op. Herczegh , Seite 15; vgl. Erklärung Rezek, Abs. 2. 56 Siehe hierzu Peter H. F. Bekker, American Journal of International Law, vol. 92,1998, 503 - 508; zum Hintergrund des Verfahrens Torsten Stein, Das Attentat von Lockerbie vor dem Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen und dem Internationalen Gerichtshof, Archiv des Völkerrechts Band 31, 1993, 206 - 229; W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis i n the United Nations, American Journal of International Law, vol. 87, 1993, 83 - 100. 57 Sir Robert Jennings fungiert nur i m Verfahren Libyen gegen Großbritannien als Ad-hocRichter gemäß Art. 31 IGH-Statut, Libyen gegen Großbritannien, Abs. 9; vgl. auch die gemeinsame Erklärung der Richter Bedjaoui, Guillaume und Ranjeva. 55

406

Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams 1. Hintergrund des Konfliktes

und Anträge der Parteien

I n diesen beiden Verfahren hat der Gerichtshof über zwei getrennte, aber gleichlautende 58 Klagen Libyens zu entscheiden, denen ein Streit zwischen Libyen einerseits und den USA und Großbritannien andererseits über die Auslieferung zweier libyscher Staatsangehöriger an die USA bzw. Großbritannien zugrundeliegt. Wie der Gerichtshof im Rahmen der Darstellung der Prozeßgeschichte 59 ausführt, verlangen die USA und Großbritannien von Libyen die Uberstellung der zwei Männer, die sie für den Absturz einer Pan A m Maschine am 21. Dezember 1988 über Lockerbie, Schottland, und den dadurch verursachten Tod von 270 Menschen verantwortlich machen. Gegen die beiden Libyer ist sowohl in Schottland als auch in den USA Anklage erhoben worden. Der UN-Sicherheitsrat hat in mehreren Resolutionen Libyen aufgefordert, ein Gerichtsverfahren gegen die Beschuldigten außerhalb ihres Heimatlandes zu ermöglichen, und diese Forderung durch die Verhängung von Wirtschaftssanktionen gegen Libyen untermauert. Libyen hat sich an den Gerichtshof gewandt, damit dieser feststellen möge, daß es den Verpflichtungen des einzig anwendbaren Vertrages in dieser Sache, der Montreal Convention of 23 September 1971 for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (hiernach Montreal Konvention), vollständig nachgekommen sei, daß hingegen die USA und Großbritannien mehrere Bestimmungen dieses Vertrages verletzt hätten und in Zukunft derartige Vertragsverletzungen und die Androhung von Gewalt gegenüber Libyen zu unterlassen hätten. 60 I m Juni 1995 erhoben die USA und Großbritannien jeweils vorgängige Einreden, mit denen sie die Zuständigkeit des Gerichtshofes und die Zulässigkeit der Klage bestritten. Des weiteren behaupteten sie, daß die Klagen Libyens nach entsprechenden Resolutionen des UN-Sicherheitsrates in dieser Angelegenheit gegenstandslos und zu einer rein akademischen Angelegenheit geworden seien. 2. Einreden der USA und Großbritanniens und rechtliche Erwägungen des Gerichtshofes M i t ihrer ersten Einrede sprachen die beiden Beklagten dem Gerichtshof die Zuständigkeit ab, über die Anträge Libyens zu befinden. 61 Libyen hatte die Jurisdiktion des Gerichtshofes mit Art. 14 Abs. 1 der Montreal Konvention begründet, wäh58

I m folgenden werden die beiden Klagen Libyens und die hierzu ergangenen Urteile des Gerichtshofes gemeinsam besprochen, da diese sich weitgehend bis in den Wortlaut gleichen, vgl. zu dieser Eigenart der Verfahren Bekker, American Journal of International Law, vol. 92, 1998, 507. 59 Libyen gegen USA, Abs. 1 - 8 ; Libyen gegen Großbritannien, Abs. 1 - 8 . 60 Libyen gegen USA, Abs. 12; Libyen gegen Großbritannien, Abs. 13. 61 Libyen gegen USA, Abs. 18 -19, 23; Libyen gegen Großbritannien, Abs. 20.

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 rend die USA und Großbritannien die Voraussetzungen der genannten Bestimmung als nicht erfüllt ansahen. Ihrer Ansicht nach fehlte es an dem dafür erforderlichen, in den Anwendungsbereich der Konvention fallenden Rechtsstreit und, einen solchen hypothetisch angenommen, an dem Zusammenhang zwischen diesem Streit und der Montreal Konvention und somit auch an der Zuständigkeit des Gerichtshofes. Die USA und Großbritannien behaupteten ihrerseits, daß der Disput mit Libyen über die Anwendung der Montreal Konvention auf den Flugzeugabsturz über Lockerbie keinen rein bilateralen Streit im Sinne dieser Konvention darstelle. Es gehe um staatlich geförderten Terrorismus, mithin um eine Bedrohung des internationalen Friedens. Die Beklagten bestritten des weiteren die Jurisdiktion des Gerichtshofes, die Rechtmäßigkeit der von ihnen in dieser Sache unternommenen Handlungen zu beurteilen. Die USA erwähnten schließlich die weiteren Voraussetzungen des Art. 14 Abs. 1 der Konvention, namentlich die Durchführung von Verhandlungen und Schlichtungsverfahren, sowie das Einhalten einer sechs Monate währenden Frist vor der Anrufung des Gerichtshofes; Libyen sei diesen Bedingungen nicht nachgekommen. 62 Der Gerichtshof stellt zu Beginn seiner Ausführungen mit Blick auf den bisherigen Verlauf des Disputes fest, daß zwischen den Parteien sehr wohl ein Streit über die Auslegung und Anwendung einzelner Vorschriften der Montreal Konvention besteht. Der Gerichtshof wertet das unterschiedliche Einordnen des Konfliktes als Frage der Auslegung und Anwendbarkeit der Montreal Konvention und damit auch als Streit im Sinne dieser Konvention. 63 Insbesondere in bezug auf die Art. 7 und 11 der Konvention, d. h. bezüglich der Anwendung des Grundsatzes aut dedere aut iudicare und der Gewährung von Rechtshilfe, bestünde zwischen den Parteien Streit, so daß insofern auch eine Zuständigkeit des Gerichtshofes gemäß Art. 14 Abs. 1 Montreal Konvention gegeben sei.64 Der Gerichtshof sieht sich darüber hinaus aufgrund Art. 14 Abs. 1 der Konvention imstande, die in Frage stehenden Verhaltensweisen der Beklagten auf ihre Vereinbarkeit mit der Konvention zu untersuchen. Das Einhalten der weiteren Voraussetzungen des Art. 14 Abs. 1 dieser Konvention für die Klageerhebung beim Gerichtshof — das Abhalten von Verhandlungen, das Durchführen eines Schlichtungsverfahrens und das Verstreichenlassen einer sechsmonatigen Frist nach einem erfolglos durchgeführten Schlichtungsverfahren — könne dahinstehen, da angesichts des Vorverhaltens der Beklagten diesen keine Aussicht auf Erfolg beschieden gewesen wäre. 65 Auch insoweit sieht der Gerichtshof seine Zuständigkeit gemäß Art. 14 Abs. 1 der Montreal Konvention als gegeben an.

62 63 64 65

Libyen Libyen Libyen Libyen

gegen USA, gegen USA, gegen USA, gegen USA,

Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs.

19. 24; Libyen gegen Großbritannien, Abs. 25. 28 und 32; Libyen gegen Großbritannien, Abs. 29 und 33. 20; Libyen gegen Großbritannien, Abs. 21.

408

Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams

Unter Bezugnahme auf die an Libyen gerichteten Resolutionen des UN-Sicherheitsrates 66 wandten die USA und Großbritannien in einer weiteren Einrede ein, daß selbst bei Anwendung der Montreal Konvention der Streit nicht mehr vom Gerichtshof behandelt werden könne. 67 In den betreffenden Resolutionen sei die Uberstellung der beiden libyschen Staatsangehörigen an die USA oder Großbritannien verlangt worden und damit eine völkerrechtliche Verpflichtung entstanden, die die Libyen eventuell zustehenden Rechte aus der Montreal Konvention hinfällig machte. Die entsprechenden Rechtspositionen Libyens würden gemäß Art. 25 und 103 UN-Charta vom Handeln des UN-Sicherheitsrates verdrängt und damit auch die Klagen unzulässig. Die Beklagten führten weiter aus, daß seit dem Tätigwerden des UN-Sicherheitsrates dessen Resolutionen für sie die Handlungsgrundlage gegenüber Libyen bildeten, so daß alle Verweise auf die Montreal Konvention ins Leere zielten. 68 Libyen beabsichtige mit seinem Vorgehen allein, die Maßnahmen des UN-Sicherheitsrates rückgängig zu machen. Vom Einschreiten des UN-Sicherheitsrates an bestünde nur noch dieser Konflikt zwischen dem UN-Organ und Libyen, ein derartiger Disput falle jedoch nicht in die Zuständigkeit des Gerichtshofes. In seiner Erwiderung auf diese Einrede betonte Libyen, daß zum einen der U N Sicherheitsrat es in keiner der Resolutionen aufgefordert habe, die beiden Tatverdächtigen an die USA oder Großbritannien auszuliefern, zum anderen die Resolutionen im Lichte der UN-Charta zu interpretieren seien und danach ein solches von Libyen auch nicht verlangt werden könnte. Daher verfüge der Gerichtshof über die Möglichkeit, sich unabhängig von den Resolutionen des UN-Sicherheitsrates mit den Klagen zu befassen. Zudem sei der für die Zulässigkeit der Klagen ausschlaggebende Zeitpunkt der der Klageerhebung, und diese sei vor der Verabschiedung der Resolutionen vorgenommen worden. 69 Der Gerichtshof schließt sich dieser Argumentation an und hebt hervor, daß der UN-Sicherheitsrat seine Resolutionen erst beschlossen habe, nachdem Libyen die Klage beim Gerichtshof am 3. März 1992 erhoben hatte. In diesem Zusammenhang verweist der Gerichtshof auf seine ständige Rechtsprechung diesbezüglich; danach bleibt er zuständig, wenn er einmal zuständig geworden ist, nachfolgende Resolutionen sind insoweit unerheblich. 70 Die Resolution 731 des UN-Sicherheitsrates sei zwar vor dem 3. März 1992 angenommen worden, besitze jedoch lediglich empfehlenden Charakter und basiere nicht auf Kapitel V I I der UN-Charta. Folglich könnten die Klagen Libyens auch nicht für unzulässig erklärt werden.

66 67 68 69 70

SC Res. 748 (1992), 883 (1993). Libyen gegen USA, Abs. 36; Libyen gegen Großbritannien, Abs. 37. Libyen gegen USA, Abs. 40; Libyen gegen Großbritannien, Abs. 41. Libyen gegen USA, Abs. 41-42; Libyen gegen Großbritannien, Abs. 42-43. Libyen gegen USA, Abs. 43; Libyen gegen Großbritannien, Abs. 44.

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 I m Rahmen der dritten Einrede behaupteten die USA und Großbritannien, daß die beiden libyschen Klagen gegenstandslos geworden seien, nachdem der U N Sicherheitsrat sich mit den Resolutionen 748 (1992) und 883 (1993) der Sache angenommen habe. Jede Entscheidung des Gerichtshofes sei nunmehr bar jeder praktischen Bedeutung. Libyen wandte sich in seiner Antwort nicht gegen den Inhalt dieser Aussagen, sondern stufte die Einwände als nicht ausschließlich vorgängig ("exclusively preliminary character") ein und ordnete sie Art. 79 Abs. 7 der VerfO zu. Die Beklagten betonten demgegenüber die rein vorgängige Natur ihrer Einlassungen und verwiesen als Beleg darauf, daß die erhobene Einrede ohne die weitere Klärung umstrittener Fakten oder eine Beweiserhebung gehört werden könne. Der Vertreter Großbritanniens warnte außerdem vor der Dauer und den Kosten weiterer Verhandlungen. 71 Der Gerichtshof definiert zunächst den Begriff der „vorgängigen Einrede" nach Art. 79 VerfO als eine Einrede, die sich nicht auf Fragen der Zuständigkeit oder Zulässigkeit beschränken muß, die aber vor der Fortführung der Verhandlung entschieden werden muß. 72 In diesem Sinne könne auch die dritte Einrede der USA und Großbritanniens als vorgängig verstanden werden, zumal sie auch entsprechend den formellen Voraussetzungen des Art. 79 VerfO erhoben worden sei. Tatsächlich verlangten die Beklagten mit dieser Einrede jedoch mehr als nur eine Antwort darauf, ob durch die Resolutionen des UN-Sicherheitsrates die Klagen Libyens hypothetisch geworden seien. Festgestellt würde zugleich, daß die von Libyen aus der Montreal Konvention abgeleiteten Rechte unvereinbar mit den sich aus den Resolutionen ergebenden Verpflichtungen seien und aufgrund der Art. 25 und 103 UN-Charta auch keine Geltung diesen Verpflichtungen gegenüber beanspruchen könnten. Daher käme eine Entscheidung, der Einrede der USA und Großbritanniens zu folgen und das Verfahren in dieser Phase, vor der Begründetheit, zu schließen, einer die Klagen Libyens ablehnenden Entscheidung in der Begründetheit gleich. 73 Dies habe sich auch in der Argumentation der USA und Großbritanniens in den schriftlichen und mündlichen Verhandlungen gezeigt, da die Vertreter der amerikanischen Regierung dort implizit selbst zugegeben hätten, daß zwischen der dritten Einrede und der Begründetheit enge Verbindungen bestünden. Der Gerichtshof kommt deshalb zu dem Ergebnis, über die nach seiner Auffassung nicht ausschließlich vorgängige Einrede erst zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt im Verfahren zu befinden. Schließlich hatten die USA den Gerichtshof hilfsweise ersucht, für den Fall der Bejahung seiner Zuständigkeit und der Zulässigkeit der Klagen Libyens das Verfahren dennoch in diesem Stadium zu schließen, da die von Libyen erstrebten Ergebnisse nicht realisierbar, sondern ausgeschlossen seien.74 Der Gerichtshof lehnt dieses 71 72 73 74

Libyen Libyen Libyen Libyen

gegen Großbritannien, Abs. 48. gegen USA, Abs. 48; Libyen gegen Großbritannien, Abs. 49. gegen USA, Abs. 46, 49; Libyen gegen Großbritannien, Abs. 50. gegen USA, Abs. 15.

410

Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams

Ansinnen mit der Begründung ab, daß die USA mit dem Erheben vorgängiger Einreden eine verfahrenstechnische Wahl getroffen hätten, deren Konsequenz — die Fortsetzung des Verfahrens in der Begründetheit nach Ablehnung der Einreden — sie auch zu tragen hätten. 75 3. Entscheidungsformel Aus diesen Gründen — verwirft der Gerichtshof die Einreden der USA und Großbritanniens, wonach er mangels Streit über die Auslegung und Anwendung der Montreal Konvention keine Jurisdiktion haben sollte (13 : 2 bzw. 13 : 3 Stimmen 76 ); — sieht der Gerichtshof sich aufgrund von Art. 14 Abs. 1 dieser Konvention als zuständig für die Streitigkeiten zwischen Libyen und den USA bzw. Großbritannien an (13 : 2 bzw. 13 : 3 Stimmen 77 ); — verwirft der Gerichtshof die Einreden der USA und Großbritanniens, wonach die Klagen Libyens aufgrund der Resolutionen 748 (1992) und 883 (1993) des U N Sicherheitsrates unzulässig seien (12 : 3 bzw. 12 : 4 Stimmen 78 ); — erachtet der Gerichtshof die beiden Klagen Libyens für zulässig (12: 3 bzw. 12 :4 Stimmen 79 ); — verneint der Gerichtshof einen rein vorgängigen Charakter der Einrede der USA und Großbritanniens, die Klagen Libyens seien aufgrund der Resolutionen des UN-Sicherheitsrates gegenstandslos geworden (10 : 5 bzw. 10 : 6 Stimmen 80 ). Eine gemeinsame Erkärung zu beiden Urteilen geben zum einen die Richter Bedjaoui, Ranjeva und Koroma, zum anderen die Richter Guillaume und Fleischhauer ab. Eine einzelne Erklärung formuliert jeweils Richter Herczegh. Die Richter Kooijmans und Rezek fügen dem Urteil jeweils einzelne Sondervoten, Präsident Schwebel und Richter Oda jeweils getrennte, abweichende Meinungen bei. Das Urteil Libyen

75

Libyen gegen USA, Abs. 51. Gegenstimmen in Libyen gegen USA Schwebel, Oda; Gegenstimmen in Libyen gegen Großbritannien Schwebel, Oda, Jennings. 77 Gegenstimmen in Libyen gegen USA Schwebel, Oda; Gegenstimmen i n Libyen gegen Großbritannien Schwebel, Oda, Jennings. 78 Gegenstimmen in Libyen gegen USA Schwebel, Oda, Herczegh; Gegenstimmen i n Libyen gegen Großbritannien Schwebel, Oda, Herczegh, Jennings. 79 Gegenstimmen in Libyen gegen USA Schwebel, Oda, Herczegh; Gegenstimmen i n Libyen gegen Großbritannien Schwebel, Oda, Herczegh, Jennings. 80 Gegenstimmen in Libyen gegen USA Schwebel, Oda, Guillaume, Herczegh, Fleischhauer; Gegenstimmen i n Libyen gegen Großbritannien Schwebel, Oda, Guillaume, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Jennings. 76

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 gegen Großbritannien betreffend veröffentlichen die Richter Bedjaoui, Ranjeva und Koroma eine zweite gemeinsame Erklärung. Für dieses Urteil existiert auch eine weitere abweichende Meinung, nämlich die des Ad-hoc-Richters Jennings. 4. Erklärungen,

Sondervoten und abweichende Meinungen

Die Richter Bedjaoui, Ranjeva und Koroma bringen in ihrer gemeinsamen Erklärung zum Ausdruck, wieso sie die dritte Einrede der USA und Großbritanniens als nicht rein vorgängig begreifen. Ihrer Auffassung nach wird auf diese Weise klargestellt, daß der bloße Verweis auf die Tatsache, daß in Rede stehende Resolutionen des UN-Sicherheitsrates nach Kapitel V I I der UN-Charta beschlossen worden seien, nicht ipso facto und unmittelbar mit dem Ende der Uberprüfung des Handelns des UN-Sicherheitsrates gleichzusetzen ist. Ebenfalls zu diesem Aspekt äußern sich die Richter Guillaume und Fleischhauer mittels einer gemeinsamen Erklärung. Sie halten die betreffende Einrede für eine rein vorgängige und hätten bereits zum jetztigen Zeitpunkt über ihre Richtigkeit entscheiden wollen. Das Verschieben dieser Entscheidung widerspreche dem Sinn und Zweck des neugefaßten Art. 79 VerfO, insbesondere dem Ziel der Verfahrensvereinfachung. 81 Auch Richter Herczegh nimmt in seiner Erklärung Bezug auf die dritte Einrede der USA und Großbritanniens. Er schließt sich ihrer Argumentation an und betrachtet die Klagen Libyens aufgrund der Resolutionen des UN-Sicherheitsrates als erledigt. Die entsprechende Einrede hält Richter Herczegh für eine rein vorgängige. 82 Eine weitere gemeinsame Erklärung verfassen die Richter Bedjaoui, Guillaume und Ranjeva im Verfahren Libyen gegen Großbritannien. Darin legen sie dar, daß sie die Benennung eines Ad-hoc-Richters für Großbritannien nach dem Verzicht der Richterin Higgins für unzulässig halten. Richter Kooijmans nutzt sein Sondervotum, um die von der Mehrheit gefundenen Positionen zu unterstützen, aber auch um Stellung zu beziehen gegenüber einigen Argumenten, die von den Beklagten vorgebracht worden sind. So betont er die Kompetenz des Gerichtshofes, das Vorliegen eines Rechtsstreites festzustellen. Diese Verantwortung obliege dem Gerichtshof auch dann, wenn später sich der U N Sicherheitsrat mit derselben Angelegenheit befasse und Maßnahmen diesbezüglich beschließe.83 Die dritte Einrede der USA und Großbritanniens ordnet Richter Kooijmans wie die Mehrheit der Richter als nicht rein vorgängige Einrede ein; er ist aber darüber hinaus der Auffassung, daß die in Rede stehenden Resolutionen 748 (1992) und 883 (1993) keinen endgültigen Charakter besäßen und deshalb die Klage nicht zu einer rein akademischen Frage machen könnten. 84

81 82 83 84

Gemeinsame Erklärung Guillaume und Fleischhauer, Punkt I. Erklärung Herczegh, Abs. 2 - 3 . Sep. Op. Kooijmans, Abs. 7 - 9. Sep. Op. Kooijmans, Abs. 17 - 18.

412

Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams

Auf die Frage der Jurisdiktion, insbesondere auf das Verhältnis des Gerichtshofes zum UN-Sicherheitsrat, konzentriert sich Richter Rezek in seinem Sondervotum. Der Gerichtshof habe die Zuständigkeit in einem anhängigen Verfahren ohne Rücksicht darauf, ob dies die kritische Uberprüfung einer Entscheidung eines anderen UN-Organs bedeute. Aufgrund seiner Unabhängigkeit von politischen Einflüssen sei der Gerichtshof vielmehr prädestiniert, das Handeln anderer UN-Organe, auch das der politischen, am Maßstab des geltenden Rechts zu überprüfen. Präsident Schwebel lehnt in seiner abweichenden Meinung sowohl die Zuständigkeit des Gerichtshofes als auch die Zulässigkeit der Klagen Libyens ab. Zum einen bestünde zwischen den Parteien in Wirklichkeit Streit nur über die Bedeutung und die Rechtmäßigkeit der Resolutionen des UN-Sicherheitsrates und nicht über die vermeintlich die Jurisdiktion begründende Montreal Konvention; zum anderen sei bezüglich der Zulässigkeit der Klagen nicht allein auf den Termin ihres Einreichens abzustellen, sondern die weiteren Umstände, hier der Erlaß der die Montreal Konvention überlagernden Resolutionen, zu berücksichtigen. Richter Schwebel macht im weiteren generelle Ausführungen zur Frage eines „judicial review" der Handlungen des UN-Sicherheitsrates durch den Gerichtshof. Die Vereinten Nationen seien nicht mit einer demokratischen Regierung zu vergleichen. Er warnt davor, die in der U N Charta für den Gerichtshof vorgesehenen, bei der Gründung in San Francisco konzipierten Kompetenzen nicht nur weiter zu entwickeln, sondern eine neue, dem UN-Sicherheitsrat vorgesetzte Rolle im institutionellen Gefüge der Vereinten Nationen anzustreben. Insbesondere mangele es dem Gerichtshof an einer Kompetenz, das Handeln des UN-Sicherheitsrates im Rahmen von Kapitel V I I UN-Charta zu korrigieren. Anderenfalls ginge es nicht mehr um die Uberprüfung eines ultra vires Handelns des UN-Sicherheitsrates, womöglich handele dann aber der Gerichtshof ultra vires. 85 Richter Oda wendet sich in seiner abweichenden Meinung ebenfalls der Frage der Jurisdiktion zu. Er verneint das Vorliegen eines Streits über die Auslegung und Anwendung der Montreal Konvention und sieht somit auch nicht die Voraussetzungen des die Zuständigkeit auslösenden Art. 14 Abs. 1 der Konvention als erfüllt an. 86 In bezug auf die Resolutionen des UN-Sicherheitsrates vertritt Richter Oda die Ansicht, daß diese aufgrund ihres politischen Charakters keine Bedeutung für das anhängige Verfahren besäßen, in welchem allein Rechtsfragen zu klären seien. Zudem beträfe ein die Resolutionen einbeziehender Konflikt nicht Libyen und die USA bzw. Großbritannien, sondern Libyen und den UN-Sicherheitsrat. 87 I n seinem abweichenden Votum betreffend die Entscheidung Libyen gegen Großbritannien kommt Richter Jennings sowohl hinsichtlich der Zuständigkeit des 85 86 87

Diss. Op. Schwebel, Abschnitt Judicial Review. Diss. Op. Oda, Abs. 12, 22 - 23. Diss. Op. Oda, Abs. 42.

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 Gerichtshofes als auch hinsichtlich der Zulässigkeit der Klage Libyens gegen Großbritannien zu anderen Ergebnissen als die die Entscheidung tragende Mehrheit. Die Zuständigkeit könne nicht durch Art. 14 Abs. 1 der Montreal Konvention begründet werden, weil kein Streit im Sinne dieser Konvention, sondern ein Streit zwischen Libyen und dem UN-Sicherheitsrat vorliege. 88 Der Zulässigkeit der Klage stünden die vom UN-Sicherheitsrat nach Kapitel V I I UN-Charta beschlossenen Resolutionen entgegen. Den Verweis der Mehrheit auf die zeitlich früher liegende Klageerhebung und das Einstufen der von Großbritannien diesbezüglich vorgebrachten Einrede als nicht rein vorgängig bezeichnet Richter Jennings angesichts der Bedeutung der friedenssichernden Resolutionen des UN-Sicherheitsrates als formalistisch. Damit ermuntere der Gerichtshof interessierte Staaten, den UN-Sicherheitsrat im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus durch das Einreichen einer Klage zu behindern. Schließlich zweifelt Jennings an der Auslegung des Begriffes einer vorgängigen Einrede durch den Gerichtshof. 89

I V . Fall betreffend die Anwendung der Konvention zur V e r h ü t u n g u n d Bestrafung des Völkermordes 9 0 (Bosnien-Herzegowina gegen Jugoslawien) Zulässigkeit der Widerklage Verfügung vom 17. Dezember 1997 Besetzung des Gerichtshofes: Präsident Schwebel; Vizepräsident Weeramantry; Richter Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume , Herczegh, Ski, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans; Ad-hoc-Richter Lauterpacht, Kreca. 1. Hintergründe des Konfliktes

und Anträge der Parteien

I n seiner Zusammenfassung des bisherigen Prozeß Verlaufes 91 zählt der Gerichtshof die einzelnen Stationen des Verfahrens auf: das Einreichen der Klage Bosnien88

Diss. Op .Jennings, Abschnitt Jurisdiktion (c). Diss. Op. Jennings, Abschnitt Zulässigkeit. 90 Siehe dazu Peter H. F. Bekker, American Journal of International Law, vol. 92,1998, 508 517; zum bisherigen Verlauf des Verfahrens William L. Hurlock, The International Court of Justice: Effectively Providing a Long Overdue Remedy for Ending State-sponsored Genocide, The American University Journal of International Law and Policy, vol. 12, 1997, 299 - 327; Raffaelle Maison, Les ordonnances de la CIJ dans l'affaire relative à l'application de la Convention sur la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, European Journal of International Law, vol. 5, 1994, 381 - 400. 91 Abs. 1 - 4. 89

414

Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams

Herzegowinas am 20. März 1993, die zwei Verfügungen des Gerichtshofes betreffend die Verhängung vorsorglicher Maßnahmen vom 8. April 1993 und vom 13. September 1993 zum Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung im Bürgerkriegsgebiet, 92 das Erheben vorgängiger Einreden seitens Jugoslawiens gegen die Zuständigkeit des Gerichtshofes und schließlich deren Zurückweisung durch ein Urteil des Gerichtshofes am 11. Juli 1996.93 Die Klage Bosnien-Herzegowinas verfolgt den Zweck, durch den Gerichtshof feststellen zu lassen, daß Jugoslawien für zahlreiche Verletzungen der Völkermord-Konvention im Rahmen des Bürgerkrieges in Ex-Jugoslawien verantwortlich sei, in Zukunft die Einhaltung der Konvention zu überwachen habe und Reparationsleistungen für die erlittenen Schäden schulde. Innerhalb der Frist zum Ausarbeiten seines Schriftsatzes bis zum 23. Juli 1997 verfaßte Jugoslawien zusätzlich eine Widerklage nach Art. 80 VerfO, mit der es den Gerichtshof ersuchte, festzustellen, daß Bosnien-Herzegowina seinerseits die Völkermord-Konvention durch Verbrechen gegenüber Serben in Bosnien-Herzegowina verletzt habe, diese Akte künftig zu unterlassen habe und Kompensation schulde.94

2. Schriftsätze

der Parteien

Bosnien-Herzegowina wandte gegen die Erweiterung des laufenden Verfahrens um die Widerklage Jugoslawiens ein, daß diese keinen direkten Zusammenhang zum Gegenstand des Verfahrens aufweise und damit den Voraussetzungen des Art. 80 VerfO nicht gerecht werde. Begründet wurde die ablehnende Haltung mit dem Inhalt der Widerklage. Jugoslawien habe dort Behauptungen aufgestellt, denen ein gänzlich anderes Geschehen zugrundeliege als jenes, auf welches sich die Klage Bosnien-Herzegowinas stütze. Insofern lasse der von Jugoslawien vorgetragene Sachverhalt auch keinerlei Rückschlüsse auf den Gegenstand der Klage Bosnien-Herzegowinas zu. Dies betreffe auch die erga omnes geltenden und nicht reziproken Verpflichtungen aus der Völkermord-Konvention, die es ausschlössen, die rechtliche Bedeutung einer Verletzung der Konvention durch eine von einem anderen Staat begangene Verletzung der gleichen Bestimmungen zu vermindern. 95 Darüber hinaus bestritt Bosnien-Herzegowina, daß sich die Ausführungen Jugoslawiens überhaupt als Widerklage im Sinne von Art. 80 VerfO qualifizieren ließen. Eine Widerklage bestehe auch nach der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes und seines Vorgängers darin, der eigentlichen Klage einen Einwand entgegenzuhalten, 92 Dazu bereits Derte Pardo Lopez, Die Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes i n den Jahren 1993 und 1994, German Yearbook of International Law, vol. 37,1994,450 - 453 und 458 - 460. 93 Vgl. dazu Heinz (Anm. 1), 480 - 486. 94 Abs. 5. 95 Abs. 10- 12.

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 durch welchen die Klage abgewehrt oder eingeschränkt und der zuerst Klagende mit einem Gegen Vorwurf im Rahmen des laufenden Verfahrens überzogen würde. Das jugoslawische Vorbringen aber könne die Klage Bosnien-Herzegowinas weder ganz noch teilweise entkräften oder neutralisieren und ebensowenig einen Gegenvorwurf im Rahmen der bestehenden Klage begründen. Jugoslawien habe daher eine zweite, selbständige Klage formuliert, die dementsprechend gesondert zu erheben gewesen 96

ware. Jugoslawien hingegen hielt für Klage wie Widerklage dieselben Rechtsgrundlagen für einschlägig, namentlich die Völkermord-Konvention und die Grundsätze der Staatenverantwortlichkeit. Fürderhin liege beiden Anträgen derselbe Konflikt, der Bürgerkrieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina, zugrunde, so daß der Widerklage und den in ihr beschriebenen Vorgängen hinsichtlich der Klage Bosnien-Herzegowinas insgesamt große Bedeutung zukomme. Bezüglich der fehlenden Reziprozität der Verpflichtungen aus der Völkermord-Konvention stimmte Jugoslawien der Gegenseite ausdrücklich zu, wies aber zugleich auf die bestehenden Unterschiede in der Einschätzung des Geschehenen hin. Es versuche nicht, eine Verletzung der Völkermord-Konvention mit dem Hinweis auf eine andere zu entschuldigen, sondern es bestreite das Vorliegen einer solchen Verletzung in bezug auf die muslimische Bevölkerung Bosnien-Herzegowinas. 97 Auf die weiteren Argumente Bosnien-Herzegowinas eingehend legte Jugoslawien sein Verständnis der Voraussetzungen des Art. 80 VerfO dar. Bosnien-Herzegowinas Auslegung dieser Bestimmung lasse eine Auseinandersetzung mit der jüngeren Praxis des Gerichtshofes und der neueren Literatur vermissen. Tatsächlich sei nämlich der Rahmen für eine Widerklage wesentlich weiter als von Bosnien-Herzegowina dargestellt, ein Beschränken auf den Gegenstand der eigentlichen Klage sei nicht erforderlich. Dies drücke sich auch in Art. 49 Abs. 2 VerfO aus, wonach der Schriftsatz der beklagten Partei auch, soweit notwendig, zusätzliche Fakten präsentieren dürfe. Sei dies schon im Schriftsatz zulässig, müsse dies erst recht für die Widerklage gelten. 98

3. Rechtliche Erwägungen des Gerichtshofes Der Gerichtshof wendet sich zunächst der Frage zu, was eine Widerklage im Sinne von Art. 80 VerfO ausmacht. Der Auffassung des Gerichtshofes zufolge ist eine Widerklage einerseits ein eigenständiger Rechtsakt, andererseits aber auch abhängig von der eigentlichen Klage, indem die Widerklage sich gegen diese richtet. Letzteres 96 97 98

Abs. 13 -16. Abs. 18 - 21. Abs. 22-23.

416

Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams

könne die Widerklage aber nicht nur durch bloßes Zurückweisen der Klage, sondern gerade auch durch eine Erweiterung des Klagegegenstandes erreichen; hier liege der Unterschied zwischen der Widerklage und der Verteidigung und Erwiderung im Rahmen der Begründetheit. Belegt sieht der Gerichtshof seine Auslegung des Art. 80 VerfO durch die systematische Stellung der Vorschrift in Sektion D des Abschnittes I I I der Verfahrensordnung und in seiner Rechtsprechung. Insofern sei das Vorbringen Jugoslawiens grundsätzlich als Widerklage im Sinne von Art. 80 VerfO zu bezeichnen." I m folgenden überprüft der Gerichtshof, inwieweit die jugoslawischen Ausführungen auch inhaltlich den Anforderungen des Art. 80 VerfO gerecht werden. Zuerst stellt er dabei seine Jurisdiktion für die von Jugoslawien aufgeworfenen Fragestellungen fest. 100 Danach widmet er sich dem von Bosnien-Herzegowina vorliegend als nicht erfüllt betrachteten Erfordernis des inhaltlichen Zusammenhanges zwischen der Widerklage und der eigentlichen Klage. Nach Ansicht des Gerichtshofes ist diese Voraussetzung mangels einer Definition in der Verfahrensordnung von ihm selbst, unter Berücksichtigung der Umstände des jeweiligen Einzelfalles, näher zu bestimmen. 101 In diesem Kontext konstatiert der Gerichtshof, daß den Einlassungen der Parteien derselbe Tatsachenkomplex zugrundeliegt. Auch der erga omnes-C\iZr rakter der Verpflichtungen der Völkermord-Konvention ändere nichts daran, daß beide Parteien in Klage bzw. Widerklage den Gerichtshof ersucht hätten, Verletzungen dieser Konvention festzustellen. Schließlich werde ein Zusammenhang zwischen den Inhalten der Klage und der Widerklage auch in der Verfügung des Gerichtshofes vom 13. September 1993 betreffend die Verhängung vorsorglicher Maßnahmen offenbar. Somit liege eine ausreichende inhaltliche Verklammerung der beiden Verfahrensakte vor; die jugoslawische Widerklage erfülle die Voraussetzungen des Art. 80 VerfO. 1 0 2 Zur Sicherung der Interessen eventuell betroffener Drittstaaten veranlaßt der Gerichtshof, daß eine Kopie der Verfügung an diese übersandt wird. 1 0 3

4. Entscheidungsformel Diesen Überlegungen folgend kommt der Gerichtshof zu dem Ergebnis, daß die Widerklage Jugoslawiens als solche zulässig ist und einen Bestandteil des laufenden Verfahrens bildet (13 : 1 Stimmen 104 ). Damit treffe der Gerichtshof keinerlei Aus99

Abs. 27-29. Abs. 31-32. 101 Abs. 33. 102 Abs. 34-37. 103 Abs. 39. 104 Gegenstimme Weeramantry. 100

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gechtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 sagen über den weiteren Ablauf des Prozesses. 105 Des weiteren weist der Gerichtshof Bosnien-Herzegowina und Jugoslawien an, neue Schriftsätze einzureichen (13 : 1 Stimmen 106 ). Ad-hoc-Richter Kreca fügt der Verfügung eine Erklärung bei, Vizepräsident Weeramantry eine abweichende Meinung. Richter Koroma und Ad-hoc-Richter Lauterpacht geben Sondervoten ab.

5. Erklärungen,

Sondervoten und abweichende Meinungen

Ad-hoc-Richter Kreca erläutert in seiner Erklärung sein Verständnis der Widerklage nach Art. 80 VerfO. Insbesondere hält er diese nicht nur für einen eigenständigen Rechtsakt gegenüber der eigentlichen Hauptklage, sondern für gleichwertig, von der zeitlichen Nachrangigkeit abgesehen. Des weiteren kritisiert er den seiner Auffassung nach ungenauen Umgang der Mehrheit mit den einzelnen Voraussetzungen des Art. 80 VerfO und die Annahme, nicht nur über das Vorliegen einer inhaltlichen Verbindung zwischen Widerklage und Klage entscheiden, sondern darüber hinaus noch eine generelle Zulässigkeitsprüfung vornehmen zu können. Kreca stellt unter Berücksichtigung der Rechtsprechung des Ständigen Internationalen Gerichtshofes Überlegungen an, wie die verschiedenen Absätze des Art. 80 VerfO korrekt zu deuten seien. Richter Koroma zeigt sich in seinem Sondervotum besorgt darüber, daß inzwischen der Antrag Bosnien-Herzegowinas seit mehr als vier Jahren beim Gerichtshof anhängig ist, ohne daß mündliche Verhandlungen über die eigentliche Klage auch nur begonnen hätten. Dies sei insbesondere angesichts der Tatsache, daß in der Klage schwere Verletzungen der Völkermord-Konvention behauptet würden und der Gerichtshof bereits zweimal vorsorgliche Maßnahmen aufgrund der Ereignisse im jugoslawischen Bürgerkrieg verfügt habe, schwerlich hinzunehmen. Zwar habe der Gerichtshof bei seinen Entscheidungen in diesem Prozeß stets im Einklang mit den Bestimmungen des Statuts und der Verfahrensordnung gehandelt; dennoch dürfe er das Wahrnehmen seiner eigenen Aufgabe wie die Erfüllung des Klägerbegehrens, nämlich Recht zu sprechen, nicht weiter hinaus zögern. Koroma bezieht sich dabei auf Art. 80 Abs. 3 VerfO, wonach der Gerichtshof bei Zweifeln über die direkte Verbindung zwischen der Widerklage und der eigentlichen Klage darüber entscheidet, ob die Widerklage in das laufende Verfahren eingegliedert werden soll.

105 106

2

Abs. 38. Gegenstimme Weeramantry.

G Y I L 41

4

418

Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams

Das Nichtabhalten einer mündlichen Verhandlung über die Zulässigkeit der jugoslawischen Widerklage moniert Ad-hoc-Richter Lauterpacht in seinem Sondervotum. Diese zusätzliche Möglichkeit, den eigenen Standpunkt näher auszuführen und die Argumente der Gegenseite zu entkräften, hätte den Parteien, ihren Wünschen und Art. 80 Abs. 3 VerfO entsprechend, eingeräumt werden sollen. 107 I m übrigen stimmt er aber der Mehrheit darin zu, daß zwischen der Widerklage Jugoslawiens und der Klage Bosnien-Herzegowinas ein inhaltlicher Zusammenhang im Sinne von Art. 80 VerfO bestünde. Ausschlaggebend sei dafür die Tatsache, daß sich die behaupteten Verletzungen der Völkermord-Konvention im selben Konflikt zugetragen hätten. 108 Schließlich erwägt Lauterpacht, ob es nicht angesichts der Komplexität des den Klagen zugrundeliegenden Sachverhaltes und der Fülle des Beweismaterials angezeigt gewesen wäre, die Widerklage Jugoslawiens nicht an das laufende Verfahren anzugliedern. Lauterpacht kommt zu dem Schluß, daß ein solches Abtrennen der Widerklage zwar aufgrund des dispositiven Charakters des Art. 80 VerfO grundsätzlich möglich gewesen wäre, dies aber in Anbetracht der inhaltlichen Verbindung zwischen Widerklage und Klage wohl die Rechte des beklagten Jugoslawiens geschmälert hätte. 109 Vizepräsident Weeramantry setzt sich in seiner abweichenden Meinung intensiv mit den einzelnen Voraussetzungen einer Widerklage nach Art. 80 VerfO und dem Antrag Jugoslawiens auseinander. Letzterer stelle schon deshalb keine Widerklage dar, weil er nicht, wie es das Wesen einer Widerklage verlange, geeignet sei und auch nicht darauf abziele, die eigentliche Klage Bosnien-Herzegowinas zu entkräften. Ein solches Vorgehen sei ausgeschlossen, da ein Beschuldigter den Vorwurf, Straftaten begangen zu haben, nicht durch ebensolche Behauptungen zulasten des Klägers beseitigen könne. Dies gelte um so mehr, als es im laufenden Verfahren um die Verletzung von erga omnes-Verpflichtungen aus der Völkermord-Konvention ginge. I m übrigen ziehe der Gerichtshof mit seiner Entscheidung, den Vortrag Jugoslawiens als Widerklage zuzulassen, das bereits über vier Jahre laufende Verfahren weiter in die Länge. Angesichts der zu erwartenden Beweisfülle sei zu befürchten, daß der Gerichtshof auf diese Weise seine Autorität unterminiere. Von einer Widerklage ausgehend, hätte der Gerichtshof nach Weeramantrys Ansicht zumindest sein in Art. 80 VerfO, eingeräumtes Ermessen ausüben und die Anträge nicht zu einem Verfahren zusammenlegen, sondern als zwei getrennte Klagen betrachten sollen.

107 108 109

Sep. Op. Lauterpacht, Abs. 3 - 7. Sep. Op. Lauterpacht, Abs. 11-14. Sep. Op. Lauterpacht, Abs. 18 - 20.

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 V . Fall betreffend Ölbohrinseln 1 1 0 (Islamische Republik Iran gegen Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika) Zulässigkeit der Widerklage Verfügung vom 10. März 1998 Besetzung des Gerichtshofes: Vizepräsident Weeramantry (amtierender Präsident); Präsident Schwebel; Richter Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume , Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek; Adhoc-Richter Rigaux. h Hintergründe des Konfliktes

und Anträge der Parteien

Eingangs weist der Gerichtshof auf die Ursprünge des laufenden Verfahrens hin. 1 1 1 Der Iran hatte am 2. November 1992, gestützt auf den 1955 mit den USA geschlossenen Vertrag über Freundschaft, Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und konsularische Rechte, Klage gegen die USA eingereicht. Grund war die Zerstörung dreier staatlich betriebener Ölproduktionsanlagen im Persischen Golf durch US-amerikanische Kriegsschiffe in den Jahren 1987 und 1988, durch die nach Auffassung des Irans der Vertrag zwischen den beiden Ländern in mehrfacher Hinsicht verletzt worden war. Der Antrag des Irans ersuchte den Gerichtshof, diese Vertragsverletzungen festzustellen und die USA zur Zahlung von Reparationen zu verurteilen. Die USA hatten gegen diese Klage am 16. Dezember 1993 prozeßhindernde Einreden eingelegt, die der Gerichtshof aber in einer Verfügung vom 12. Dezember 1996 zurückgewies. 112 In ihrer Antwort auf den Schriftsatz des Iran, am 23. Juni 1997, erhoben die USA Widerklage gegen die Klage des Iran. Darin warfen die USA dem Iran vor, seinerseits durch Angriffe auf Schiffe, das Verlegen von Seeminen und andere militärische Aktivitäten den Vertrag von 1955 verletzt zu haben und Schadensersatz zu schulden. 113

2. Schriftsätze

der Parteien

Der Iran verlangte in seiner Erwiderung, daß der Gerichtshof zwecks Diskussion des US-amerikanischen Antrages gemäß Art. 80 Abs. 3 VerfO eine mündliche Ver-

110 111 112 113

2 *

Vgl. dazu Bekker, American Journal of International Law, vol. 92, 1998, 511 -517. Abs. 1 - 3. Vgl. dazu Heinz (Anm. 1), 486 - 493. Abs. 4.

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Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams

handlung anberaumt. Auf den Antrag eingehend bestritt der Iran zunächst die Zuständigkeit des Gerichtshofes. Eine Jurisdiktion nach Art. X X I Abs. 2 des Vertrages von 1955, wie sie der Iran für seine Klage beansprucht hatte, käme hier nicht in Betracht, da es an den als notwendig vorausgesetzten Verhandlungsbemühungen der USA fehle. Vielmehr seien die USA auf ein entsprechendes Angebot des Irans nicht eingegangen. Der Iran behauptete des weiteren, daß das Vorbringen der USA auch deshalb keine Widerklage im Sinne von Art. 80 VerfO darstelle, weil es nicht die nach Art. 80 Abs. 1 VerfO erforderliche, direkte Verbindung zur eigentlichen Klage aufzuweise. 114 Zwischen den US-amerikanischen Angriffen auf die iranischen Olbohrinseln und etwaigen iranischen Militäraktivitäten bestünde kein inhaltlicher Zusammenhang. Entgegen ihrer eigenen vorgängigen Einrede, den Verfahrensgegenstand möglichst eng zu begrenzen, würden die USA auf diese Weise die Verletzung weiterer Bestimmungen des Vertrages von 1955 unterstellen. Dadurch gerieten die USA auch in Widerspruch zu der Verfügung des Gerichtshofes vom 12. Dezember 1996, welche das Verfahren auf eventuelle Verstöße gegen Art. X Abs. 1 des Vertrages von 1955 beschränkt habe. Schließlich fielen die von den USA angeführten Handlungen nicht in den Anwendungsbereich des Vertrages von 1955, da nur Schiffe außerhalb des Handelsverkehrs zwischen den USA und dem Iran davon betroffen gewesen seien. Der Gerichtshof könne sich mit dem US-amerikanischen Vorbringen aus all diesen Gründen nicht befassen. 115 Die USA lehnten eine mündliche Verhandlung über ihren Antrag als überflüssig ab, da keine Zweifel an der Zulässigkeit der US-amerikanischen Widerklage bestünden und der Iran fälschlicherweise Analogien zu dem Verfahren über vorgängige Einreden nach Art. 79 VerfO ziehe. 116 Bezüglich der notwendigen inhaltlichen Verklammerung zwischen einer Widerklage und der eigentlichen Klage hielten die USA dem Iran vor, einem grundsätzlichen Mißverständnis zu unterliegen. Artikel 80 VerfO schreibe nicht vor, daß sich die Widerklage exakt auf denselben Antragsgegenstand beziehen oder diesen widerspiegeln müsse, sondern daß der Widerklage derselbe Konflikt zugrundeliegen müsse. Letzteres sei vorliegend aber gegeben, da die US-amerikanischen Angriffe auf die iranischen Olbohrinseln eine direkte Antwort auf iranische Attacken auf US-amerikanische Schiffe und Staatsangehörige darstellten. Eine Zusammenfassung der beiden Anträge innerhalb eines Verfahrens sei einer effizienten Vorgehensweise zuträglich und halte sich im Rahmen der bisherigen Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes und seines Vorgängers. 117

114 115 116 117

Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs.

6. 12-20. 22, 29. 23-26.

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gechtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 3. Rechtliche Erwägungen des Gerichtshofes Der Gerichtshof lehnt unter Hinweis auf die umfangreichen Schriftsätze der Parteien das Abhalten einer mündlichen Verhandlung über die Zulässigkeit des Antrages der USA ab. 118 Die Frage der Jurisdiktion betreffend stellt der Gerichtshof fest, daß die Widerklage der USA wie die Klage des Iran den Vorwurf enthält, die Gegenseite habe durch militärische Handlungen die nach Art. X des Vertrages von 1955 geschützte Freiheit des Handels verletzt. Unter Bezugnahme auf seine Verfügung vom 12. Dezember 1996 über die Zulässigkeit der US-amerikanischen vorgängigen Einrede hält der Gerichtshof diesen Vorwurf auch in diesem Fall für zuständigkeitsbegründend. 119 Hinsichtlich des Erfordernisses einer direkten Verbindung zwischen der Widerklage und der eigentlichen Klage weist der Gerichtshof erneut auf sein diesbezügliches Ermessen hin. Auf den vorliegenden Antrag der USA bezogen erachtet der Gerichtshof diese Verbindung für gegeben, da dieser sich wie die Klage des Iran auf Vorkommnisse im Persischen Golf stütze und insoweit dasselbe Geschehen zur Grundlage habe. 120 Zur Sicherung der Interessen eventuell betroffener Drittstaaten veranlaßt der Gerichtshof, daß diesen eine Kopie der Verfügung übersandt wird. 1 2 1 4. Entscheidungsformel Der Gerichtshof kommt zu dem Ergebnis, daß die Widerklage der USA als solche zulässig ist und einen Bestandteil des laufenden Verfahrens darstellt (15 : 1 Stimmen 122 ). Die Richter Oda und Higgins legen dem Urteil Sondervoten, Ad-hoc-Richter Rigaux eine abweichende Meinung bei. 5. Sondervoten und abweichende Meinung Richterin Higgins drückt in ihrem Sondervotum Zustimmung für das Ergebnis der von der Mehrheit getroffenen Entscheidung, aber auch Unverständnis für einzelne Aspekte der Entscheidung aus. Ihrer Auffassung zufolge hat der Gerichtshof einige Punkte des US-amerikanischen Antrages wie der iranischen Erwiderung nicht hinreichend gewürdigt bzw. deren Ablehnung nicht begründet. Beispielsweise habe der Gerichtshof sich nicht mit dem iranischen Argument auseinandergesetzt, wonach die iranischen Militäraktionen nur Schiffe betroffen hätten, die nicht vom

118 119 120 121 122

Abs. 31. Abs. 34-36. Abs. 37 - 39. Abs. 42. Gegenstimme Rigaux.

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Martin Mennecke und Chstian Tams

Vertrag von 1955 erfaßt seien. Dieser Tendenz, Schlußfolgerungen und Ergebnisse ohne eine entsprechende Begründung zu präsentieren, sei Einhalt zu bieten. Außerdem seien so Fragen der Zuständigkeit in einen späteren Verfahrensabschnitt verschoben worden. Richter Oda äußert in seinem Sondervotum unter Bezugnahme auf die Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes zur Widerklage grundsätzliche Bedenken an der Vorgehensweise des Gerichtshofes. Zum einen sei es zweifelhaft, ob eine Widerklage der beklagten Partei tatsächlich das Recht einräume, den Verfahrensgegenstand inhaltlich zu erweitern. 123 Zum anderen werde der Gerichtshof den Konsequenzen einer durch eine Widerklage anstehenden Ausweitung des Verfahrens nicht gerecht, wenn er, entgegen seiner früheren Rechtsprechung, auf das Abhalten einer mündlichen Verhandlung über die Zulässigkeit der Widerklage verzichte. 124 Der Gerichtshof benachteilige unter diesen Umständen den Kläger. V I . Fall betreffend die Land- u n d Meeresgrenze zwischen Kamerun u n d Nigeria 1 2 5 (Kamerun gegen Nigeria) Zulässigkeit vorgängiger Einreden Urteil vom 11. Juni 1998 Besetzung des Gerichtshofes: Präsident Schwebel; Vizepräsident Weeramantry; Richter Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume , Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi y Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek; Ad-hoc-Richter Mbaye, Ajibola. 1. Hintergrund des Konfliktes

und Anträge der Parteien

Zunächst stellt der Gerichtshof noch einmal den bisherigen Verlauf des am 29. März 1994 von Kamerun angestrengten Verfahrens bis zur Verfügung der vorsorglichen Maßnahmen am 15. März 1996 dar: 126 Kamerun hatte den Gerichtshof mit

123

Sep. Op. Oda, Abs. 8. Sep. Op. Oda, Abs. 9. 125 Siehe dazu die Urteilszusammenfassung von Peter H F. Bekker, American Journal of International Law, vol. 92, 1998, 751 - 755; zum Hintergrund des Verfahrens Julius Njinkeng Bekongy International Dispute Settlement: Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria — Origin of the Dispute and Provisional Measures, African Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 9, 1997, 287 - 310. 126 Abs. 1 -19; siehe auch Pardo Lopez (Anm. 92), 449; Heinz (Anm. 1) 477 - 480. 124

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gechtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 zwei Anträgen ersucht, über die Zugehörigkeit der Bakassi-Halbinsel und eines Gebietes in der Nähe des Tschadsees und über den Verlauf der Land- und Meeresgrenze zwischen Kamerun und Nigeria zu befinden. Nachdem sich die Konfliktparteien über eine Zusammenfassung der beiden Anträge zu einer Klage geeinigt hatten, hatte Nigeria acht Einreden gegen die Zuständigkeit des Gerichtshofes und die Zulässigkeit der Klage Kameruns erhoben. 2. Einreden Nigerias und rechtliche Erwägungen des Gerichtshofes Die erste prozeßhindernde Einrede Nigerias lautete, der Gerichtshof sei mangels Jurisdiktion unzuständig für die Klage Kameruns. 127 Nigeria habe sich zwar mittels einer Erklärung nach Art. 36 Abs. 2 IGH-Statut der obligatorischen Gerichtsbarkeit des I G H unterworfen. Dennoch sei die Klage Kameruns abzuweisen, da Nigeria zum Zeitpunkt der Klageerhebung nicht über eine entsprechende Unterwerfungserklärung Kameruns informiert gewesen sei und es somit an der notwendigen Reziprozität fehle. Zudem stelle das gerichtliche Vorgehen Kameruns angesichts der andauernden bilateralen Verhandlungen auf diplomatischer Ebene einen Verstoß gegen Treu und Glauben dar. 128 Kamerun berief sich in seiner Erwiderung hauptsächlich auf das Urteil des Gerichtshofes im Fall Right of Passage over Indian Territory. Dort wurde festgestellt, daß es für das Einreichen eines Antrages beim I G H nicht notwendig ist, daß zwischen dem Hinterlegen der Unterwerfungserklärung beim UN-Generalsekretär und dem Zusenden von Kopien dieser Erklärung an die übrigen Parteien des Statuts ein bestimmter Zeitraum vergangen sein muß. 1 2 9 Nigeria hielt dem entgegen, daß das besagte Urteil des I G H aus dem Jahr 1957 stamme und sich das Völkerrecht insbesondere im Bereich von Treu und Glauben fortentwickelt habe. Darüber hinaus komme den Urteilen des Gerichtshofes nur res iudicata-Wirkung zu, was sich auch in Art. 59 des IGH-Statuts ausdrücke. Kamerun schloß seine Argumentation hinsichtlich der ersten Einrede Nigerias mit dem Hinweis auf die grundlegende Bedeutung der betreffenden Urteilspassage für das Verständnis von Unterwerfungserklärungen im Sinne von Art. 36 Abs. 2 IGHStatut ab. 130 Der Gerichtshof geht zu Beginn auf die Verweise beider Parteien auf sein Urteil von 1957 ein und überprüft dessen Aussage hinsichtlich des Wirksamwerdens der Unterwerfungserklärung anhand eines Vergleiches zu der Wiener Konvention über das Recht der Verträge. Dabei gelangt er zu dem Ergebnis, daß auch dort in den Art. 16 und 24 die Regel formuliert wird, daß auf die Hinterlegung der Erklärung 127 128 129 130

Alle nigerianischen Einreden sind i n Abs. 19 aufgelistet. Abs. 22, 24, 36 - 37. Right of Passage over Indian Territory, ICJ Reports 1957, 125 (147). Abs. 23.

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Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams

abzustellen ist. 131 In bezug auf einen möglichen Verstoß gegen Treu und Glauben durch Kamerun stellt der Gerichtshof zunächst fest, daß dieses Prinzip einen gefestigten Grundsatz des Völkerrechts darstellt. Dieser begründet aber keine selbständigen Verpflichtungen, sondern lehnt sich an andere, bestehende an. Der Gerichtshof ist aber der Auffassung, daß es im Völkerrecht keine Regel gibt, die besagt, daß man andere Staaten über die eigene Absicht, eine Erklärung nach Art. 36 Abs. 2 IGH-Statut abzugeben oder eine Klage anzustrengen, zu informieren hätte. Demnach kann sich Nigeria nicht auf den Grundsatz von Treu und Glauben berufen, um die Zuständigkeit des Gerichtshofes auszuschließen. Zudem bestehen aus Sicht des Gerichtes an der tatsächlichen Unkenntnis Nigerias erhebliche Zweifel. 132 Auch die Reziprozität der Unterwerfungserklärungen hält der Gerichtshof für gegeben, wenngleich Nigeria nicht unmittelbar nach der entsprechenden Erklärung Kameruns darüber ins Bilde gesetzt worden ist. Der Begriff der Reziprozität erfaßt die Reichweite und den Umfang der Unterwerfungserklärung, nicht aber formale Gesichtspunkte wie den der Übermittlung von Kopien. Aus diesen Gründen verwirft der Gerichtshof die erste Einrede Nigerias (14 : 3 Stimmen 133 ). Als nächstes befaßt sich der Gerichtshof mit der zweiten Einrede Nigerias. Danach pflegten die beiden afrikanischen Länder seit 24 Jahren ihre Grenzstreitigkeiten im Wege bilateraler Verhandlungen beizulegen, so daß Kameruns jetziges Vorgehen, in einer solchen Angelegenheit zu klagen, die Verletzung eines implizit zwischen den beiden Ländern geschlossenen Vertrages, nämlich über Fragen des Grenzverlaufes zu verhandeln, darstelle. Des weiteren berief sich Nigeria auf die Grundsätze Treu und Glauben und pacta sunt servanda. Kamerun maß den bestehenden Verhandlungsmechanismen nur vorübergehenden und keinesfalls exklusiven Charakter bei. Ein Vertrag, konkludent oder ausdrücklich, über das Nichtanrufen einer Gerichtsbarkeit sei nicht geschlossen wurden, so daß die Prinzipien von Treu und Glauben wie pacta sunt servanda keine Anwendung finden könnten. 134 Der Gerichtshof widmet sich zunächst dem Verhältnis von bilateralen Verhandlungen und Gerichtsverfahren im Völkerrecht. Dabei stellt er fest, daß diese Methoden der friedlichen Streitbeilegung in Art. 33 der UN-Charta nebeneinander aufgeführt werden. Auch aus anderen Regelwerken wie dem Statut des Ständigen Internationalen Gerichtshofes oder sonstigen Bestimmungen des Völkerrechts sei nicht ersichtlich, daß das Erschöpfen sämtlicher außergerichtlicher Verhandlungsmöglichkeiten eine Vorbedingung für das Einreichen einer Klage darstelle. Die Teilnahme an bilateralen Verhandlungen mit Nigeria könne auch nicht als impliziter Verzicht Kameruns gewertet werden, die Sache vor den Gerichtshof zu bringen. Für eine vertraglich vereinbarte, exklusive Funktion der Verhandlungen seien keine Anzeichen, 131 132 133 134

Abs. 31. Abs. 38 - 40. Gegenstimmen Weeramantry, Abs. 48.

Koroma, Ajibola.

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 auch nicht im Verhalten Nigerias, ersichtlich, so daß die Grundsätze Treu und Glauben und pacta sunt servanda die Einrede Nigerias nicht tragen könnten (16 : 1 Stim135\ 136

men ). M i t der dritten Einrede wies Nigeria auf eine seiner Ansicht nach ausschließliche Kompetenz der Lake Chad Basin Commission als regionale Abmachung im Sinne von Art. 52 der UN-Charta hin, über Fragen der Sicherheit, also auch über Grenzstreitigkeiten, innerhalb der Region des Tschadsees zu entscheiden. Dieses Argument untermauerte Nigeria mit Verweisen auf das Statut der Kommission und die Praxis der Anrainerstaaten des Tschadsees.137 Kamerun bestritt, daß sich dem Statut oder der Praxis der Mitgliedsstaaten eine solche Exklusivkompentenz entnehmen ließe. Außerdem sei die Kommission keine regionale Einrichtung im von Nigeria behaupteten Sinne. Der Gerichtshof klassifiziert anhand des ihm vorliegenden Vertragstextes und der Staatenpraxis die Lake Chad Basin Commission als internationale Organisation, die zwar in einer bestimmten geographischen Region agiere, die aber nicht den Auftrag besitze, dort die Aufrechterhaltung des internationalen Friedens sicherzustellen. Insofern unterfalle sie nicht Kapitel V I I I der UN-Charta und könne auch keine ausschließliche Zuständigkeit beanspruchen. Ferner würde die Jurisdiktion selbst bei Bestehen einer solchen Organisation nicht beeinträchtigt. 138 Schließlich habe Kamerun im vorliegenden Fall die Zuständigkeit der Kommission zu keinem Zeitpunkt anerkannt. Aus diesen Gründen wird die nigerianische Einrede abgelehnt (15 : 2 Stimmen 139 ). Nachfolgend wendet sich der Gerichtshof der vierten von Nigeria vorgebrachten Einrede zu. Hiernach solle der Gerichtshof nicht über den Grenzverlauf im Tschadsee befinden, soweit dadurch auch die Republik Tschad betroffen sei. Der Gerichtshof anerkennt, daß die Zustimmung der in der Sache betroffenen Staaten zum Verfahren eine notwendige Bedingung für das Verfahren darstellt. In der von Kamerun vorgelegten Klage ginge es jedoch allein um die Klärung des Grenzverlaufs zwischen Kamerun und Nigeria. Kamerun stelle nicht die Grenze zum benachbarten und ebenfalls am Tschadsee liegenden Tschad in Frage. 140 M i t h i n könne der Gerichtshof die Streitfrage entscheiden, ohne die rechtlichen Interessen eines dritten Staates zu berühren (13 : 4 Stimmen 141 ).

135 136 137 138 139 140 141

Gegenstimme Koroma. Abs. 56 - 57. Abs. 61 - 62. Abs. 67 - 68. Gegenstimmen Koroma, Ajibola. Abs. 79, 82. Gegenstimmen Oda, Koroma, Parra-Aranguren,

Ajibola.

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Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams

I m Rahmen der fünften Einrede bestritt Nigeria, daß es mit Kamerun überhaupt einen Streit über den gesamten Verlauf der Grenze gebe. Der Gerichtshof definiert daraufhin zunächst unter Bezugnahme auf seine bisherige Rechtsprechung und die seines Vorgängers einen Streit als eine Meinungsverschiedenheit über eine rechtliche oder tatsächliche Frage, in der die beiden Kontrahenten entgegengesetzte Standpunkte einnähmen. 142 Dieser Definition zufolge bestünde unzweifelhaft Streit zwischen Kamerun und Nigeria über Gebiete am und Inseln im Tschadsee, über die Bakassi-Halbinsel und den weiteren Verlauf der Meeresgrenze. Damit herrsche zwar nicht Streit über die gesamte, sich über mehr als 1.600 k m erstreckende Grenze vom Tschadsee bis zum Meer; da aber Nigeria andererseits nicht bereit gewesen sei, den übrigen Grenzverlauf als unstreitig anzuerkennen und es auch an Grenzverträgen fehle, könne der Gerichtshof einen über die genannten Gebiete hinausreichenden Streit nicht ausschließen (13 : 4 Stimmen 143 ). 144 Mittels der sechsten Einrede behauptete Nigeria eine Mißachtung des Art. 38 VerfO durch Kamerun. In seiner Klage habe Kamerun es entgegen den Erfordernissen dieser Vorschrift versäumt, ausreichend Fakten wie Daten oder Orte angeblicher Grenzverletzungen durch Nigeria zu präsentieren. Als Folge könne Nigeria auf die erhobenen Vorwürfe nicht angemessen antworten und der Gerichtshof nicht über die von Kamerun gestellten Schadensersatzforderungen urteilen. Kamerun stützte sich in seiner Replik darauf, daß nach Art. 38 Abs. 2 VerfO lediglich eine kurze und bündige Präsentation der Fakten erforderlich sei und es im Verlaufe der folgenden Verhandlungen gewillt sei, die im Antrag formulierten Vorwürfe weiter zu spezifizieren. Der Gerichtshof richtet sein Augenmerk zunächst auf den Wortlaut des in Rede stehenden Art. 38 VerfO, insbesondere auf den Ausdruck „succinct". Bei dessen Untersuchung befindet der Gerichtshof, daß sich weder aus dem Wortlaut noch aus dem Zusammenhang, dem Sinn und Zweck der Bestimmung oder der späteren Praxis ablesen läßt, daß diesem Ausdruck hier die Bedeutung „komplett" zukommen soll. 145 Insofern sei es dem Antragsteller nicht genommen, in der Klage benannte Fakten zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt zu ergänzen. Auf den vorliegenden Fall übertragen hält der Gerichtshof die von Kamerun dargelegten Tatsachen für ausreichend im Sinne von Art. 38 VerfO (15 : 2 Stimmen 146 ). I m Zuge seiner siebten Einrede wandte Nigeria ein, daß es aus zwei Gründen zur Zeit keinen Rechtsstreit zwischen Kamerun und Nigeria über den Verlauf der Meeresgrenze gebe, der vom Gerichtshof einer Lösung zugeführt werden könnte. Zum 142 143 144 145 146

Abs. 87. Gegenstimmen Oda, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Ajibola. Abs. 91-93. Abs. 98 - 99. Gegenstimmen Koroma, Ajibola.

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gechtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 einen sei die Festlegung der Meeresgrenze vor einer Entscheidung über die Zugehörigkeit der Bakassi-Halbinsel nicht möglich; zum anderen müßten nach dieser Entscheidung über die Bakassi-Halbinsel von den Parteien Bemühungen unternommen werden, eine Einigung über den Verlauf der Meeresgrenze zu erzielen, bevor der Gerichtshof in dieser Sache konsultiert werden dürfte. 147 Der Gerichtshof stimmt Nigeria hinsichtlich der Vorrangigkeit der Frage des Status der Bakassi-Halbinsel zu. Jedoch stünde es in seinem Ermessen, die Reihenfolge, in der die vorgebrachten Streitgegenstände zu behandeln seien, dementsprechend festzulegen. 148 Das Erfordernis, vor einer Anrufung des Gerichtshofes Verhandlungen zu führen, besteht nach Ansicht des Gerichtshofes nur, wenn dieser gemäß Art. 36 Abs. 1 IGH-Statut in Verbindung mit Abschnitt X V der UN-Seerechtskonvention von 1982 tätig wird. Vorliegend sei der Gerichtshof aber aufgrund zweier Unterwerfungserklärungen nach Art. 36 Abs. 2 IGH-Statut, welche keine derartigen Voraussetzungen an die Eröffnung eines Gerichtsverfahrens knüpfen, tätig geworden. Aus diesen Gründen verwirft der Gerichtshof die siebte Einrede (12 : 5 Stimmen 149 ). In der achten und letzten Einrede argumentiert Nigeria, daß die Klage insofern unzulässig sei, als daß die von Kamerun beantragte Entscheidung über die Meeresgrenze zwischen Kamerun und Nigeria Rechte und Interessen dritter Staaten betreffe. 150 Der Gerichtshof teilt die nigerianische Ansicht, nach der ein Festlegen der Meeresgrenze ab einem gewissen geographischen Punkt im Golf von Guinea die Rechte und Interessen dritter Staaten betreffen könnte und deren Zustimmung zum Verfahren dann Voraussetzung für selbiges wäre. Inwieweit eine solche Grenzziehung Drittstaaten tatsächlich tangierte, ließe sich aber erst nach dem Festlegen dieser Meeresgrenze erkennen. Deshalb sei über die Frage der notwendigen Beteiligung von Drittstaaten erst im Rahmen der Begründetheit und nicht im Wege der vorgängigen Einrede zu entscheiden (12 : 5 Stimmen 151 ). 152 3. Entscheidungsformel Aus den zuvor genannten Gründen hält der Gerichtshof seine Zuständigkeit auf der Grundlage von Art. 36 Abs. 2 IGH-Statut in dieser Angelegenheit für gegeben

147 148 149 150 151 152

Abs. 104. Abs. 106. Gegenstimmen Oda, Koroma, Higgins, Kooijmans, Ajibola. Abs. 113. Gegenstimmen Oda, Koroma, Higgins, Kooijmans, Ajibola. Abs. 116-117.

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Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams

(14 : 3 Stimmen 153 ) und die von Kamerun am 29. März 1994 eingereichte und am 6. Juni 1994 erweiterte Klage für zulässig (14 : 3 Stimmen 154 ). Die Richter Oda, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren und Kooijmans fügen dem Urteil Sondervoten, Vizepräsident Weeramantry und Richter Koroma sowie Ad-hoc-Richter Ajibola abweichende Meinungen bei. 4. Sondervoten und abweichende Meinungen Die Richter Higgins und Kooijmans legen in ihren Sondervoten jeweils einen abweichenden Standpunkt hinsichtlich der siebten Einrede Nigerias dar. Beide folgen zwar der Mehrheitsmeinung, was die von Nigeria vorgebrachten Einwände angeht; sie sind jedoch darüber hinaus der Auffassung, der Gerichtshof hätte proprio motu entscheiden sollen, daß der von Kamerun behauptete Streit hinsichtlich der Meeresgrenze jenseits eines bestimmten geographischen Punktes nicht festzustellen sei. 155 Kooijmans wendet sich zudem gegen die Einordnung der letzten nigerianischen Einrede in die Begründetheit statt in die Zulässigkeit. Unabhängig von der generellen Verortung von Rechten und Interessen Dritter sei es hier dem primär betroffenen Aquatorial-Guinea aufgrund der von beiden Streitparteien vor fünf Jahren zugesagten Verhandlungen nicht zuzumuten, erst später gemäß Art. 62 IGH-Statut zu intervenieren. 156 Die Richter Vereshchetin und Parra-Aranguren sehen dagegen jeweils einen von Nigeria als vorgängige Einrede erhobenen Einwand als Frage der Begründetheit an und vermögen nicht der Mehrheit der Richter zu folgen, die diese Einreden bereits in diesem Stadium des Verfahrens als unzulässig verwarf. 157 In diese Richtung zielt teilweise auch das Sondervotum des Richters Oda, der mehrere Einreden Nigerias der Begründetheit zuordnet. 158 Die abweichenden Meinungen des Vizepräsidenten Weeramantry, des Richters Koroma und des Ad-hoc-Richters Ajibola kritisieren das Mehrheitsvotum vor allem im Hinblick auf Art. 36 Abs. 2 IGH-Statut und die A r t und Weise der Einbeziehung des Urteils Right of Passage over Indian Territory. Insbesondere Weeramantry und Koroma heben hervor, daß die Gerichtsbarkeit des Gerichtshofes auf dem Konsensprinzip basiere. Sie sehen ebenso wie Ajibola die Voraussetzungen von A r t . 36 Abs. 2 bzw. 4 vorliegend als nicht erfüllt an, da ein entsprechender Konsens nur her153 154 155

Gegenstimmen Weeramantry, Gegenstimmen Weeramantry,

Koroma, Ajibola. Koroma, Ajibola.

Sep. Op. Higgins, Seite 2; Sep. Op. Kooijmans, Abs. 8 -15. Sep. Op. Kooijmans, Abs. 21. 157 Sep. Op. Vereshchetin, Seite 2 (bzgl. der fünften Einrede Nigerias); Sep. Op. Parra-Aranguren, Seite 2 (bzgl. der vierten Einrede Nigerias). 158 Sep. Op. Oda, Abs. 3, 33. 156

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 gestellt werden könne, wenn die eine Partei über die Absicht der anderen informiert sei. Nigeria habe aber von der Erklärung Kameruns gemäß Art. 36 Abs. 2 erst nach Stellung des Antrages erfahren, so daß eine Zuständigkeit des Gerichtshofes zu verneinen sei. 159 In diesem Zusammenhang werfen sie der Mehrheit vor, die Schwächen des ihrem Votum zugrundeliegenden Urteils Right of Passage over Indian Territory zu verkennen, statt es einer gründlichen und notwendigen Neubewertung zu unterziehen. 160

V I I . Fischereistreit (Spanien gegen Kanada) Zuständigkeit des Gerichtshofes Urteil vom 4. Dezember 1998 Besetzung des Gerichtshofes: Präsident Schwebel; Vizepräsident Weeramantry; Richter Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume , Ranjeva, Herczegh, Ski, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek; Ad-hoc-Richter Lalonde, Torres-Bernardez. 1. Hintergrund des Konfliktes

und Anträge der Parteien

In diesem Verfahren hatte der Gerichtshof die Völkerrechtsmäßigkeit eines kanadischen Gesetzes zur Küstenfischerei und insbesondere der aufgrund dieses Gesetzes erfolgten Aufbringung des spanischen Fischereibootes Estai zu beurteilen. Er faßt den Hintergrund des Konfliktes wie folgt zusammen: 161 A m 10. Mai 1994 änderte das kanadische Parlament das Gesetz zum Schutz der Küstenfischerei dahingehend, daß es nunmehr auch im Regelungsbereich der Nordwestatlantischen Fischereiorganisation (NAFO), d. h. auch auf der Hohen See, Anwendung fand. Dadurch wie durch die nachfolgende Änderung von Durchführungsbestimmungen wurde der Fischfang durch ausländische Fischereiflotten im Bereich der Hohen See beschränkt und die Anwendung von Gewalt zur Durchsetzung von Fangverboten ermöglicht. A m 9. März 1995 brachten die kanadischen Küstenbehörden das spanische Fischereiboot Estai 245 sm vor der kanadischen Küste im Regelungsbereich der N A F O auf, verbrachten es in den Hafen von St. John's (Neufundland), beschlagnahmten Teile seiner Ladung und eröffneten ein Gerichtsverfahren gegen seinen 159 Diss. Op. Weeramantry, Seiten 4 - 7; Diss. Op. Koroma, Seiten 2 - 3; Diss. Op. Ajibola, Seiten 1 - 5 . 160 Diss. Op. Weeramantry, Seiten 1 - 3; Diss. Op. Koroma, Seiten 1 und 8; Diss. Op. Ajibola, Seiten 5 - 8 . 161 Abs. 13 - 22.

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Kapitän. Die spanische Regierung und die EG legten am 10. März 1995 offiziellen Protest gegen das kanadische Vorgehen ein. A m 16. April 1995 einigten sich Kanada und die EG auf eine Beilegung des zwischen ihnen schwelenden Konfliktes über Fangquoten und Durchsetzung von Kontrollmaßnahmen im Nordwest-Atlantik, woraufhin Kanada die bis dahin ergangenen Maßnahmen gegen die Estai zurücknahm. Spanien hatte bereits am 28. März den Gerichtshof mit dem Fall befaßt. Es machte geltend, daß sowohl das kanadische Änderungsgesetz von 1994 als auch die auf Hoher See vorgenommenen Maßnahmen gegen die Estai völkerrechtswidrig seien, weil sie insbesondere die spanische Souveränität, den Grundsatz der freien Schiffahrt auf der Hohen See und das Prinzip der ausschließlichen Hoheitsgewalt eines Staates über unter seiner Flagge auf Hoher See fahrende Schiffe verletzten. 162 Kanada hielt demgegenüber den Gerichtshof in der Sache für unzuständig. Dafür berief es sich auf Unterabsatz 2d) seiner zeitgleich mit der genannten Gesetzesänderung am 10. Mai 1994 abgegebenen Erklärung, durch die es sich zwar grundsätzlich der obligatorischen Gerichtsbarkeit nach Art. 36 Abs. 2 IGH-Statut unterwarf, aber einen Vorbehalt erklärte für „disputes arising out of or concerning conservation and management measures taken by Canada with respect to vessels fishing in the N A F O Regulatory Area, as defined in the Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 1978, and the enforcement of such measures". 163 Nachdem sich die Parteien darüber geeinigt hatten, zunächst gesondert zur Zuständigkeit des Gerichtshof zu verhandeln, brachte Spanien vor, der kanadische Vorbehalt erfasse nicht die Frage der Zuständigkeit Kanadas für Maßnahmen gegenüber fremden Schiffen auf Hoher See und sei, sofern es um die Möglichkeit der Gewaltanwendung gegenüber fremden Schiffen gehe, bereits wegen Verstoßes gegen die UN-Charta unzulässig. Kanada verwies demgegenüber auf den klaren Wortlaut seines Vorbehaltes. 164 2. Rechtliche Erwägungen des Gerichtshofes Der Gerichtshof stellt im Rahmen seiner rechtlichen Würdigung des Sachverhalts zunächst fest, daß beide Parteien vom Vorliegen einer Streitigkeit ausgehen, jedoch ihren Inhalt unterschiedlich definieren. 165 Nach dem spanischen Vorbringen betrifft der Fall im wesentlichen das Problem der staatlichen Souveränität bzw. ihrer unzulässigen Ausübung auf Hoher See sowie die Frage, ob ein möglicherweise völkerrechtswidriges Gesetz, durch das die kanadische Hoheitsgewalt auf internationalisierte Bereiche erstreckt wird, spanischen Fischern gegenüber wirksam wird. Spanien beruft sich dabei auf das Recht des Klagenden, durch den Inhalt seiner Kla162 163 164 165

Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs.

10. 11-12. 12. 23 - 28.

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 geschrift den Verfahrensgegenstand zu bestimmen. Kanada dagegen stellt darauf ab, daß der Anlaß des Verfahrens untrennbar mit kanadischen Schutzmaßnahmen innerhalb des NAFO-Regelungsbereiches verknüpft sei und folglich dem Zuständigkeitsvorbehalt unterfalle. Der Gerichtshof betont unter Verweis auf Art. 40 Abs. 1 IGH-Statut, Art. 38 Abs. 2 VerfO sowie seine eigene ständige Rechtsprechung die Notwendigkeit einer exakten Bestimmung des Streitgegenstandes. 166 Er verweist jedoch darauf, daß er selbst — durch objektive Auslegung der Klageschrift und unter Zuhilfenahme der Anträge der Parteien und sonstiger öffentlicher Stellungnahmen — zu bestimmen hat, was den Gegenstand eines Verfahrens bildet. 167 Dabei kommt er für den vorliegenden Fall zu dem Ergebnis, daß Spanien und Kanada darüber streiten, ob durch die kanadischen Gesetzgebung zum Fischereischutz und im speziellen durch die Maßnahmen gegenüber der Estai völkerrechtlich garantierte Rechtspositionen Spaniens verletzt würden und ob Kanada daher Wiedergutmachung schulde. 168 Bei der folgenden Untersuchung, ob er für diesen Verfahrensgegenstand zuständig sei, setzt sich der Gerichtshof zunächst mit Fragen der Beweislast auseinander. Beide Parteien hatten vorgebracht, die jeweils andere Seite trage für die Frage der Zuständigkeit bzw. Unzuständigkeit die Beweislast. Der Gerichtshof stellt demgegenüber fest, daß die Frage der Zuständigkeit von ihm selbst zu beantworten sei, ohne daß die Regeln der Beweislast eingriffen. 169 I m weiteren prüft der Gerichtshof, welche Regeln auf die Auslegung von Vorbehalten zu Unterwerfungserklärungen nach Art. 36 Abs. 2 IGH-Statut anzuwenden sind. 170 Spanien vertrat den Standpunkt, daß bei der Interpretation verschiedene einschränkende Grundsätze zu beachten seien:171 So dürfe ein Staat durch seinen Vorbehalt nicht das System der obligatorischen Gerichtsbarkeit unterlaufen. Bei der Auslegung seien Ziel und Zweck der gesamten Erklärung, vor allem der generelle Wille zur Anerkennung der IGH-Zuständigkeit, wie auch die Kernaussagen der U N Charta, des IGH-Statuts und Normen des allgemeinen Völkerrechts zu berücksichtigen. Bei unklaren Erklärungen sei nach der Grundsatz contra proferentem zudem die für den erklärenden Staat ungünstige Auslegung zu wählen. Kanada hob demgegenüber den Charakter eines Vorbehaltes als einseitige Rechtserklärung hervor, bei der der Wille des erklärenden Staates besonders berücksichtigt werden müsse.172 166

Abs. 29 unter Verweis auf u. a. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru/ Australia), Preliminary Objections, , ICJ Reports 1992, 239 (266 - 267, Abs. 69). 167 Abs. 30 - 33 unter Verweis auf die eigene Rechtsprechung ζ. B. i m Fall Nuclear Tests (Australia/France), ICJ Reports 1974, 253 (262, Abs. 29). 168 Abs. 34-35. 169 Abs. 37 - 38. 170 Abs. 39 - 56. 171 Abs. 43. 172 Abs. 43.

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Der Gerichtshof folgt in seinem Urteil diesen Ausführungen Kanadas und betont, daß zur Begründung seiner Zuständigkeit nach Art. 36 Abs. 2 IGH-Statut das beiderseitige Einverständnis nötig ist, wie es in einseitigen Unterwerfungserklärungen zum Ausdruck kommt. 1 7 3 Vorbehalte zu diesen Erklärungen sind demnach nach ihrem natürlichen Wortsinn und unter Beachtung des Willens der erklärenden Partei zu interpretieren. 174 Weder ist demgegenüber eine besonders restriktive Auslegung der Vorbehalte geboten, noch kann die auf das Vertragsrecht zugeschnittene contra proferentem-Regà Anwendung finden. Auch auf die Vereinbarkeit eines Vorbehaltes mit der UN-Charta oder sonstigen Völkerrechtsnormen soll es demnach nicht ankommen. I m Anschluß daran prüft der Gerichtshof, ob seine Zuständigkeit in Anwendung dieser Auslegungsregeln durch Unterabsatz 2d) der kanadischen Unterwerfungserklärung ausgeschlossen worden ist. Er betont zunächst, daß sich die kanadische Unterwerfungserklärung von 1994 von einer 1985 abgegebenen Erklärung gerade durch den neu eingefügten Unterabsatz 2d) unterscheide, dem deshalb besondere Bedeutung zukomme. Danach untersucht es die einzelnen Abschnitte des Unterabsatzes: Dabei war vor allem umstritten, ob die von Kanada gegenüber der Estai vorgenommenen Handlungen unter den Begriff der „conservation and management measures" gefaßt werden konnten. 175 Spanien hatte vorgebracht, die eigentlich weite Bedeutung des Begriffes „measure" müsse aufgrund der Regeln des Völkerrechts dahingehend ausgelegt werden, daß nur völkerrechtlich zulässige Maßnahmen wie z. B. einseitige Maßnahmen innerhalb der Ausschließlichen Wirtschaftszone eines Küstenstaates oder aber Maßnahmen auf Hoher See aufgrund eines internationalen Abkommens erfaßt seien. Kanada hatte demgegenüber eine am natürlichen Wortsinn orientierte, unbeschränkte Auslegung gefordert. Der Gerichtshof betont die Notwendigkeit der Auslegung unter Zuhilfenahme des sonstigen Völkerrechts, lehnt es aber ab, nur völkerrechtlich zulässige Maßnahmen unter den Begriff „measures" zu subsumieren. Dies würde zum einen der Bedeutung des Begriffs „conservation and management measures" in anderen völkerrechtlichen Verträgen wie z. B. Art. 62 Abs. 4 des UN-Seerechtsübereinkommens von 1982 und verschiedenen regionalen Fischereiabkommen und der Praxis der Staaten widersprechen, die es allesamt genügen ließen, daß die betreffenden Maßnahmen der Erhaltung und dem Schutz lebender Arten dienten. 176 Zum anderen würde dadurch der Wille Kanadas, das den Vorbehalt in Unterabsatz 2d) offenbar bewußt weit gefaßt hatte, mißachtet. Daher sieht der Gerichtshof die durch das kanadische Gesetz ermöglichten Maßnahmen wie das Aufbringen der Estai als „con173

Abs. 44." Abs. 47 - 49 unter Verweis auf die eigene Rechtsprechung in den Fällen Anglo-Ira η ian Oil Co., Preliminary Objections , ICJ Reports 1952, 93 (105) und Certain Norwegian Loans, ICJ Reports 1957 8 (27). 175 Abs. 64-73. 176 Abs. 70 unter weiterem Verweis auf u. a. Art. 2 des Genfer Fischerei-Ubereinkommens. 174

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 servation and management measure" im Sinne des Unterabsatzes 2d) der Unterwerfungserklärung an. Weiterhin bezog sich der kanadische Unterwerfungsvorbehalt auf „vessels". Spanien hatte unter Hinweis auf die Entstehungsgeschichte vorgebracht, davon seien entgegen dem Wortlaut nur staatenlose Schiffe oder Schiffe unter Billigflagge erfaßt. Der Gerichtshof lehnt diese einschränkende Interpretation unter Hinweis auf den klaren Wortlaut ab. 177 Schließlich war umstritten, ob die Aufbringung der Estai unter Anwendung von Gewalt als „enforcement of such measures" im Sinne von Unterabsatz 2d) angesehen werden könne. 178 Spanien hatte dies unter Hinweis auf die mögliche Völkerrechtswidrigkeit der Gewaltanwendung bestritten und zudem darauf verwiesen, daß Unterabsatz 2d) die Anwendung von Gewalt nicht erwähne. Der Gerichtshof hingegen befindet, daß bei vernünftiger und realitätsnaher Auslegung auch die begrenzte Anwendung von Gewalt unter den Begriff der Durchsetzungsmaßnahme subsumiert werden kann. 3. Entscheidungsformel Aus den genannten Gründen entscheidet der Gerichtshof mit zwölf gegen fünf Stimmen 179 , daß das kanadische Änderungsgesetz wie auch die zu seiner Umsetzung gegenüber der Estai vorgenommenen Maßnahmen in den Bereich des kanadischen Unterwerfungsvorbehaltes nach Unterabsatz 2d) der Erklärung vom 10. Mai 1994 fallen. Er erklärt sich daher zur Entscheidung des Falles für unzuständig. Präsident Schwebel sowie die Richter Oda, Koroma und Kooijmans fügen dem Urteil Sondervoten bei. Vizepräsident Weeramantry, die Richter Bedjaoui, Ranjeva und Vereshchetin sowie Ad-hoc-Richter Torres-Bernardez äußern abweichende Meinungen. 4. Sondervoten und abweichende Meinungen In ihren Sondervoten heben Gerichtspräsident Schwebel sowie die Richter Oda, Koroma und Kooijmans die Bedeutung der freiwilligen Unterwerfung der Staaten unter die Gerichtsbarkeit des Gerichtshofes hervor. Schwebel leitet daraus ab, daß Kanadas Unterwerfungserklärung, sofern man mit Spanien den in ihr enthaltenen Vorbehalt nicht anwendete, als ganze nichtig sei. 180 Koroma w i l l das Urteil des Gerichtshofes nicht als Zeichen der Schwäche des Systems der freiwilligen Gerichts-

177 178 179 180

2

Abs. 74 - 77. Abs. 78 - 84. Gegenstimmen: Weeramantry, Sep. Op. Schwebel, Abs. 7.

G Y I L 41

Bedjaoui, Ranjeva, Vereshchetin, Torres-Bernardez.

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barkeit ansehen, sondern macht deutlich, daß der Gerichtshof in anders gelagerten Fällen weiterhin die Berufung einer Partei auf einen Vorbehalt ignorieren kann. 1 8 1 Kooijmans schließt sich zwar der Mehrheitsmeinung an, äußert aber Bedauern darüber, daß nach der gegenwärtigen Rechtslage ein Staat aufgrund seiner weitgehenden Freiheit, Vorbehalte zu erklären, das System der obligatorischen Gerichtsbarkeit nach Art. 36 Abs. 2 IGH-Statut weitgehend unterlaufen kann. 182 Oda weist zudem darauf hin, daß Spanien vor Klageerhebung nicht versucht habe, den Streit auf diplomatischem Wege zu lösen, was unter Umständen möglich gewesen wäre. Er äußert Zweifel, ob nicht die Klage auch aus diesem Grund unzulässig gewesen ist, läßt die Frage aber offen. 183 Vizepräsident Weeramantry sowie die Richter Bedjaoui, Ranjeva und Vereshchetin sowie Ad-hoc-Richter Torres-Bernardez üben in ihren abweichenden Voten vor allem an zwei Aspekten des Urteils Kritik: Sie sehen das Recht des Klägers Spanien auf selbständige Formulierung des Verfahrensgegenstandes nicht hinreichend geachtet und betonen zudem die Notwendigkeit, bei der Auslegung des kanadischen Unterwerfungsvorbehaltes auf die Normen des Völkerrechts abzustellen. Zur Frage des Verfahrensgegenstandes bringen alle vier Richter vor, der Gerichtshof habe die spanische — auf den Prinzipien der Souveränität und Schiffahrtsfreiheit basierende — Klage einseitig uminterpretiert, indem er sie nur unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Durchsetzung des kanadischen Fischereischutzgesetzes behandelt habe. Mehrere Richter sehen zudem die Notwendigkeit einer intensiveren Befassung mit der Völkerrechtskonformität des kanadischen Vorbehaltes. Sie sehen es als fraglich an, ob eine unter Umständen völkerrechtswidrige Maßnahme — wie die Ausdehnung der kanadischen Hoheitsgewalt auf den Bereich der Hohen See — tatsächlich als „conservation and management measure" angesehen werden kann. Dagegen spricht nach Ansicht Bedjaouis insbesondere, daß der Schutz der Meeresumwelt ein nur durch internationale Zusammenarbeit erreichbares Ziel sei, das nicht durch einseitiges völkerrechtswidriges Handeln erreicht werden könne. Er ist der Meinung, der Begriff „conservation and management measure" in internationalen Abkommen könne nicht untersucht werden, ohne Aussagen zur völkerrechtlichen Zulässigkeit der betreffenden Maßname zu treffen. 184 Aus diesem Grund widerspricht er der Aussage des Gerichtshofes, daß bereits jede auf Umweltschutz ausgerichtete nationale Schutzmaßnahme als „conservation and management measure" anzusehen sei. Ebenso wie Vizepräsident Weeramantry sowie die Richter Ranjeva und Vereshchetin in ihren abweichenden Voten verweist er auf verschiedene internationale Do-

181

Sep. Op. Koroma, Abs. 7. Sep. Op. Kooijmans., Abs. 10 - 13, 20. 183 Sep. Op. Oda, Abs. 18 - 20. 184 Diss. Op. Bedjaoui , Abs. 94: «La question de la conformité au droit international fait partie intégrante de la definition internationale des mesures de conservation et de gestion; elle est 'built in'.» Vgl. auch Diss. Op. Vereshchetin , Abs. 14. 182

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gechtshoes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998

43

kumente, aus denen klar hervorgehe, daß nur völkerrechtlich zulässige Maßnahmen als Schutz- und Erhaltungsmaßnahmen angesehen würden. 185 Weeramantry, Ranjeva, Bedjaoui und Vereshchetin fordern daher, daß es zumindest zu einer Untersuchung der Rechtmäßigkeit der kanadischen Maßnahmen hätte kommen müssen. Dann aber hätte der Gerichtshof die Einrede Kanadas gemäß Art. 79 Abs. 7 VerfO zurückweisen müssen, weil sie nicht ausschließlich vorgängigen Charakter gehabt habe, sondern auch Fragen der Begründetheit berühre. 186 Ad-hoc-Richter Torres-Bernardez bringt in seiner abweichenden Meinung darüber hinausgehend Kritik an vielen weiteren Punkten des Urteils vor. Insbesondere macht er geltend, Kanadas Verhalten, einen gezielt auf ein spezielles — seiner Ansicht nach völkerrechtswidriges — Gesetz gemünzten Unterwerfungsvorbehalt zu erklären, sei rechtmißbräuchlich und nach dem Prinzip von Treu und Glauben Spanien daher nicht entgegenzuhalten.187

V I I I . Fall betreffend das Wiener Übereinkommen über konsularische Beziehungen 188 (Paraguay gegen Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika) Antrag auf Erlaß vorsorglicher Maßnahmen Verfügung vom 9. April 1998 Besetzung des Gerichtshofes: Vizepräsident Weeramantry (amtierender Präsident); Präsident Schwebel; Richter Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume , Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek.

185

Insbesondere wird verwiesen auf Art. 1 Abs. lb) des Abkommens der Vereinten Nationen über gebietsübergreifende und weit wandernde Fischbestände von 1995 („Straddling Stocks Convention") sowie Art. I des Übereinkommens zur Verbesserung der Befolgung von Schutzund Erhaltungsmaßnahmen der F A O von 1995 („Compliance Agreement"), Diss. Op. Ranjeva, Abs. 24 - 26, Diss. Op. Vereshchetin, Abs. 14 -15, Diss. Op. Bedjaoui, Abs. 75, 89, Diss. Op. Weeramantry, Abs. 39. 186 Diss. Op. Weeramantry, Abs. 73, Diss. Op. Vereshchetin, Abs. 23 - 24, Diss. Op. Bedjaoui, Abs. 65, 97, Diss. Op. Ranjeva, Abs. 41. 187 Diss. Op. Torres-Bernardez, Abs. 143 - 147. 188 Siehe dazu die Urteilszusammenfassungen von William J. Aceves, American Journal of International Law, vol. 92, 1998, 517 - 523, und Karin Oellers-Frahm, Vereinte Nationen 4/1998,154 sowie die Schwerpunktsektion des American Journal of International Law, vol. 92, 1998, 666 - 712, speziell die Beiträge von Jonathan I. Charney/ W Michael Reisman, Louis Henkin, Jordan J. Paust und LoH Fisler Damrosch.

2

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Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams 1. Hintergrund des Konfliktes

und Anträge der Parteien

Der Gerichtshof schildert in seiner Verfügung vom 9. April zunächst die Anträge der beiden Parteien des Streits und den Hintergrund ihrer Auseinandersetzung. 189 Der paraguayanische Staatsangehörige Angel Francisco Breard war im US-Staat Virginia im Jahr 1992 wegen Mordverdachts festgenommen und, nachdem er die Tat gestanden hatte, im Jahr 1993 zum Tode verurteilt worden. Dabei hatten es die USamerikanischen Behörden versäumt, den Angeklagten unverzüglich nach der Festnahme auf sein Recht hinzuweisen, bei einer konsularischen Vertretung seines Heimatlandes um Hilfe nachzusuchen, und dadurch gegen Art. 36 Abs. 1 lit. b) des Wiener Ubereinkommens über konsularische Beziehungen von 1963 (WÜK) verstoßen. Breard legte erfolglos Rechtsmittel gegen das Urteil ein und berief sich ab 1996, als er von seinen Rechten aus dem Konsularrechtsübereinkommen erfuhr, auch auf Art. 36 Abs. 1 lit. b) W Ü K . Die Vereinigten Staaten entschuldigten sich im Juli 1997 förmlich für die Vertragsverletzung bei Paraguay. Als Termin für die Hinrichtung Breards wurde der 14. April 1998 festgesetzt. 190 Paraguay beantragte am 3. April 1998, der Gerichtshof möge eine Verletzung von Art. 36 Abs. 1 lit. b) sowie von Art. 5 W Ü K feststellen und die Vereinigten Staaten dazu verurteilen, das Gerichtsverfahren gegen Breard in den Zustand vor seiner Verurteilung wiederherzustellen. 191 Wegen des direkt bevorstehenden Hinrichtungstermins beantragte es zudem den Erlaß vorsorglicher Maßnahmen nach Art. 41 Abs. 1 IGH-Statut, insbesondere die US-Regierung zu verpflichten, dafür zu sorgen, daß die Todesstrafe vor Entscheidung im Hauptsacheverfahren nicht vollstreckt würde. 192 Die Vereinigten Staaten hielten dem entgegen, daß Breard trotz der mangelnden Unterrichtung über seine Rechte aus dem Konsularrechtsübereinkommen alle notwendige rechtliche Unterstützung gehabt und das Verfahren im übrigen rechtsstaatlichen Ansprüchen genügt habe. Sie brachten vor, eine rechtzeitige Unterrichtung Breards hätte den Ausgang des Verfahrens nicht beeinflußt, und bezweifelten die Zuständigkeit des Gerichtshof zum Erlaß einer vorsorglichen Maßnahme. 193 In Anbetracht der drohenden Hinrichtung Breards fand bereits am 7. April 1998 eine mündliche Verhandlung statt.

189 190 191 192 193

Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs.

1-22. 2-3. 4-5. 6 - 9. 17-22.

Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 2. Rechtliche Erwägungen des Gerichtshofes Der Gerichtshof prüft die Voraussetzungen für den Erlaß der beantragten vorsorglichen Maßnahme nach Art. 41 Abs. 1 IGH-Statut. Er stellt zunächst fest, zum Erlaß einer vorsorglichen Maßnahme auch vor einer endgültigen Entscheidung über seine Zuständigkeit befugt zu sein, sofern eine prima ^ae-Zuständigkeit bejaht werden kann. 1 9 4 Eine solche sieht er aus Art. I des von beiden Staaten ratifizierten Fakultativprotokolls zum Konsularrechtsübereinkommen (FP) begründet, wonach Streitigkeiten über die Auslegung der Konvention seiner Gerichtsbarkeit unterliegen. Auch Art. I I und ΠΙ FP, die den Streitparteien den Weg zu einer schiedsgerichtlichen Lösung ihrer Konflikte unter dem Konsularrechtsübereinkommen eröffnen, ändern danach nichts an der durch Art. I unmittelbar begründeten Gerichtszuständigkeit. 195 Den Einwand der Vereinigten Staaten, daß wegen des Zugeständnisses der USA über eine Verletzung von Art. 36 Abs. 1 lit. b) W Ü K gar kein Streit bestehe, weist der Gerichtshof zurück, weil sich die Parteien jedenfalls darüber uneinig seien, ob aus der Verletzung der Bestimmung ein Anspruch Paraguays auf Aufhebung der USamerikanischen Gerichtsentscheidungen folge und dies für die Annahme einer prima y#ae-Zuständigkeit ausreiche. Das Vorbringen der Vereinigten Staaten, daß nach dem Konsularrechtsübereinkommen keine Wiedereinsetzung in den vorigen Stand geschuldet werde und daß eine rechtzeitige Unterrichtung des Angeklagten über seine Rechte am Ausgang des Verfahrens nichts geändert hätte, ordnet der Gerichtshof als Frage der Begründetheit ein, die erst im Rahmen des Hauptsacheverfahrens zu erörtern sei. 196 I m folgenden prüft der Gerichtshof, ob die materiellen Voraussetzungen für den Erlaß der beantragten vorsorglichen Maßnahme — die Dringlichkeit sowie eine drohende irreparable Rechtsverletzung — vorliegen. 197 Die Dringlichkeit wird unter Hinweis auf den für sieben Tage nach der mündlichen Verhandlung angesetzten Hinrichtungstermin bejaht. Da durch den Vollzug der Todesstrafe auch die paraguayanische Forderung nach Aufhebung der Gerichtsurteile und Wiederholung des Verfahrens unmöglich würde, droht auch ein irreparabler Schaden. In einem obiter 194

Abs. 23. Abs. 26 unter Berufung auf die eigene Rechtsprechung i m Fall United States Diplomatie and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of Amenca/ Iran), ICJ Reports 1980, 3 (25 - 26, Abs. 46 - 48), wo der Gerichtshof es für „crystal clear" erachtet, daß aus Art. I FP seine Zuständigkeit begründet werden kann. 196 Abs. 28 - 34. 197 Abs. 35 - 39. Z u den materiellen Voraussetzungen für den Erlaß einer vorsorglichen Maßnahme i m Sinne des Art. 41 Abs. 1 IGH-Statut verweist der Gerichtshof auf seine eigene ständige Rechtsprechung, zuletzt die Verfügung zu vorsorglichen Maßnahmen i m Fall Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Hercegovina/Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), ICJ Reports 1993, 3 (19, Abs. 34). 195

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Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams

dictum stellt der Gerichtshof klar, daß er durch seine Entscheidung keine Feststellung über die völkerrechtliche Rechtmäßigkeit der Todesstrafe treffe. 198 3. Entscheidungsformel

und Erklärungen zur Entscheidung

Der Gerichtshof gibt dem Antrag Paraguays aus den genannten Gründen einstimmig statt und verfügt, daß die Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten mit allen ihr zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln darauf hinwirken soll, da& Angel Francisco Breard nicht vor Abschluß des Hauptsacheverfahrens hingerichtet wird. 1 9 9 Präsident Schwebel sowie die Richter Oda und Koroma fügen der von ihnen mitgetragenen Verfügung gesonderte Erklärungen bei. In diesen wird jeweils Sorge darüber zum Ausdruck gebracht, daß der Gerichtshof in kürzester Zeit und nach nur eintägiger mündlicher Verhandlung zu komplexen Fragen Stellung zu nehmen hatte. 200 Richter Oda hebt weiterhin hervor, er habe sich der Meinung des Gerichts nur aus „humanitären Gründen" anschließen können und halte Paraguays Antrag auf Erlaß der vorsorglichen Maßnahme eigentlich für unbegründet, da die Verletzung von Art. 36 Abs. 1 lit. b) W U K keinen Einfluß auf den Ablauf des Gerichtsverfahrens gehabt habe. 201

198

Abs. 38. Abs. 40-41. Der Gerichtshof äußert sich nicht ausdrücklich zur umstrittenen Frage, ob den von i h m bezeichneten vorsorglichen Maßnahmen verbindliche Wirkung zukommt; vgl. dazu Karin Oellers-Frahm, Die einstweilige Anordnung in der internationalen Gerichtsbarkeit, 1975, 107- 115. 200 Erklärungen Schwebel, Oda und Koroma y jeweils Abs. 1. 201 Erklärung Oda, Abs. 3 - 4. 199

Die Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 Von Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

I. Allgemeines Dies ist der letzte Bericht über die Tätigkeit des EGMR in seiner jetzigen Form. Aufgrund der Ratifikation des 11. Protokolls zur EMRK durch Italien im Oktober 1997 konnte es gem. Art. 4 am 1. November 1998 in Kraft treten. Damit schlossen sich der bisher bestehende Gerichtshof und die Kommission zu einem neuen, ständig arbeitenden Gericht zusammen, das künftig nach den Art. 19 - 51 EMRK (n. F.) einziges Uberwachungsorgan der Konvention sein wird. 1 1998 erließ der neu strukturierte EGMR noch keine Urteile, daher befaßt sich dieser Bericht ausschließlich mit den vor der Reform ergangenen Entscheidungen in den Jahren 1997 und 1998.2 In beiden Jahren fällte das Gericht jeweils 105 Urteile. Damit erfolgte im Verhältnis von 1996 zu 1997 eine Zunahme der Zahl der Entscheidungen um 45 %, die hauptsächlich auf die ständig wachsende Zahl der Beschwerden zurückzuführen ist. I m Jahre 1998 kam darüber hinaus die Notwendigkeit hinzu, bis zur Zusammensetzung des neuen Gerichts die anhängigen Verfahren abgeurteilt zu haben.3 Angesichts der großen Zahl der Urteile mußte in dieser Rechtsprechungsübersicht eine schwerpunktmäßige Auswahl getroffen werden. 4 1

Für weitere Informationen über die Reform des EGMR vgl. Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Die Zukunft des Europäischen Menschenrechtsschutzes, EuGRZ 1996, 374 - 379, sowie Andrew Drzemczew ski/ Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Grundzüge des neuen EMRK-Kontrollmechanismus nach dem am 11. Mai 1994 unterzeichneten Reform-Protokoll ( N r . l l ) , EuGRZ 1994, 317 - 322. 2 Damit schließt der Bericht an den Vorjahresbericht von Marian Niestedt/Dominik Ziegenhahn, Die Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte i m Jahre 1996, German Yearbook of International Law (GYIL), vol. 40, 1997, 514 - 568, an. 3 A b Mai 1998 konnte nicht mehr auf die vom EGMR herausgegebenen Reports of Judgments and Decisions Bezug genommen werden, da ihre Veröffentlichung zum Zeitpunkt der Fertigstellung des Artikels noch ausstand. Die Verweise in den Fußnoten beziehen sich daher von diesem Zeitpunkt an auf die i m Internet unter der Adresse http://194.250.50.200/list9698.html veröffentlichte List of Judgments and Decisions 1996-1998 (LJD), unter der die einzelnen Urteile abrufbar sind. 4 Für weitere Übersichten über die Rechtsprechung aus dem Jahre 1997 vgl. Ann Sherlock/ John Andrews, Judgment of the Court of Human Rights 1997, European Law Review, Human

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I n erster Linie rügten die Beschwerdeführer (Bf.) in den berücksichtigten zwei Jahren eine Verletzung des Art. 6. Eine solche wurde in insgesamt 101 Fällen geltend gemacht.Auffällig war zudem die gestiegene Anzahl der Urteile, in denen ein Verstoß gegen Art. 2 und 3 festgestellt wurde. In fast allen dieser Fälle richtete sich die Beschwerde gegen die Türkei. I n den zwei Jahres des Berichtszeitraumes wurden insgesamt 24 Entscheidungen vor der großen Kammer des Gerichts verhandelt. In 123 Fällen stellte das Gericht eine oder mehrere Verletzungen der EMRK fest. In 12 Urteilen wurde aufgrund einer gütlichen Einigung der Parteien die Streichung des Falles im Gerichtsregister vorgenommen, darunter vier der insgesamt neun Urteile, die sich ausschließlich mit der Gewährung einer Entschädigung nach Art. 50 befaßten. Zudem erging eine Gerichtsentscheidung zur Auslegung eines Urteils. Schließlich betrafen zwei Entscheidungen die Frage der Wiederaufnahme eines Verfahrens. I m Rahmen der folgenden Rechtsprechungsübersicht soll zunächst auf die Behandlung der Zulässigkeitsfragen durch das Gericht und anschließend auf dessen Ausführungen zur Begründetheit der Beschwerden eingegangen werden.

I I . Zulässigkeit I n mehreren Urteilen äußerte sich der Gerichtshof zu Fragen der Zulässigkeit. Er bestätigte seine ständige Rechtsprechung, wonach der Umfang seiner Gerichtsbarkeit durch die Zulässigkeitsentscheidung der Kommission festgelegt ist und er neue Begehren nicht erstmals zulassen kann. Ein neues Begehren liegt jedoch nicht vor, wenn der Bf. der Kommission zumindest die Fakten unterbreitet hat, aus denen sich die gerügte Verletzung ergeben kann. 5 Der EGMR betonte darüber hinaus, daß die Kommission vorrangig für die Sachverhaltsermittlung zuständig ist. A n diese sei das Gericht zwar grundsätzlich nicht gebunden, dennoch werde es nur in Ausnahmefällen eine eigene Einschätzung des Sachverhaltes vornehmen. 6

Rights Survey 1998, 120 - 197, und Frédéric Sudre u.a., Chronique de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme en 1997, Revue Universelle des Droits de l'Homme 1998,81- 118. 5

Vgl. u. a. Urteil Findlay gegen Vereinigtes Königreich vom 25. Februar 1997, Reports 1997-1, 263 (277 f.), § 63. 6 Urteile Selcuk und Asker gegen Türkei vom 24. April 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 891 (904 f.), § 53; Gündem gegen Türkei vom 22. Mai 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 917, § 68.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gechtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 1998 1. Entscheidung über die Aktivlegitimation einer natürlichen Person -Art. 48Abs. 1 lit. e) I m Berichtszeitraum hatte sich in knapp 100 Fällen ein aus drei Richtern bestehender Vorprüfungsausschuß mit der Zulässigkeit unmittelbar an den EGMR gerichteter Individualbeschwerden zu befassen. I n den allermeisten Fällen lehnte er die Anträge ab, da die vorgetragenen Fälle weder schwerwiegende Fragen der Auslegung oder der Anwendung der Konvention enthielten noch einen anderen Grund, der der Prüfung durch das Gericht bedurfte. 7 Lediglich in Ausnahmefällen wurden die Beschwerden gem. Art. 48 Abs. 2 an das Gericht zur Entscheidung weitergeleitet. 8 2. Zuständigkeit ratione materiae Die große Kammer des Gerichts betonte im Fall Guerra u. a. gegen Italien, daß seine Zuständigkeit ratione materiae weder von den Beurteilungen der Kommission noch von denen der Bf. oder der Regierung abhängig ist. Vielmehr stünde dem Gericht nach Art. 45 und 49 selbst die Entscheidung über die Anwendbarkeit der Konvention auf den vorgetragenen Sachverhalt zu. Demzufolge sah es sich unter Hinweis auf seine bisherige Rechtsprechung dazu befugt, die durch die beanstandete Handlung möglicherweise verletzten Artikel selbst zu bestimmen, auch wenn deren Verletzung vom Bf. nicht ausdrücklich gerügt wurde. 9

3. Zuständigkeit ratione temporis I m Berichtszeitraum hatte sich das Gericht zudem mehrfach mit Einreden ratione temporis auseinanderzusetzen. Die Staaten bestritten die Kompetenz des Gerichts, weil es mangels ihrer Unterwerfung unter die Jurisdiktion des Gerichts zur Zeit der von den Bf. gerügten Maßnahmen nicht befugt sei, diese zu beurteilen. Dies galt beispielsweise für den Fall Zana gegen Türkei. Gegenstand der Klage war die Verurteilung des Bf. für eine Äußerung aus dem Jahre 1987, also vor der Unterwerfung der Türkei unter die Gerichtsbarkeit des EGMR im Jahre 1990. Das Gericht machte dagegen geltend, daß nicht die Äußerung des Bf. maßgeblich sei, sondern dessen Verurteilung durch die nationalen Gerichte. Diese erfolgte zeitlich nach der Unterwer-

7

Vgl. u. a. Urteil Bechter gegen Österreich vom 15. Januar 1997, Reports 1997-1, 1 (3).

8

Vgl. u. a. Urteil K.D.B, gegen die Niederlande vom 27. März 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 620 (623), § 2. 9 Urteile Guerra u. a. gegen Italien vom 19. Februar 1998, Reports 1998-1,210 (223), §§ 43 ff.; Assenov u. a. gegen Bulgarien vom 28. Oktober 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 1020, § 132.

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fung gem. Art. 46. Das Gericht war damit zuständig.10 In jenem Fall hatte das Gericht zudem darüber zu befinden, ob die nationalen Gerichte eine angemessene Verfahrensdauer eingehalten hatten. Hierzu berücksichtigte es den Stand des Verfahrens zum Zeitpunkt der Unterwerfungserklärung und nahm sogar die zuvor vergangene Zeit als Indiz dafür an, ob eine angemessene Verfahrensdauer vorlag. 11 I m Urteil Belziuk gegen Polen traf das Gericht eine ähnliche Entscheidung, indem es darauf abstellte, daß in einer nach der Unterwerfungserklärung stattfinden Berufungsverhandlung eine Anhörung verweigert wurde, während es den entsprechenden Beschluß vor der Erklärung unberücksichtigt ließ. 12 4. Zuständigkeit ratione personae Eine Beschwerde nach Art. 25 steht nur dem Opfer einer behaupteten Konventionsverletzung zu, das sich hierdurch beschwert fühlt. Mehrmals wurde von der türkischen Regierung der Einwand erhoben, die eingereichten Beschwerden seien nicht von den darin angegebenen Bf. erhoben worden, sondern von anderen Organisationen. Diese hätten ohne das Einverständnis der Bf. allein aus politischen Motiven gehandelt und seien damit nicht aktivlegitimiert. 13 Das Gericht sah jedoch keinen Anlaß, daran zu zweifeln, daß die Beschwerden von den in ihnen aufgeführten Bf. erhoben worden waren. Hinsichtlich der nach Art. 25 erforderlichen Beschwer führte das Gericht näher aus, daß diese bei einer rechtswidrigen Enteignung fortbesteht, selbst wenn inzwischen ein nationales Gericht einen Entschädigungsanspruch anerkannt hat; anders sei allenfalls dann zu urteilen, wenn die nationalen Stellen die angebliche Konventionsverletzung effektiv abgestellt hätten. 14 In einem weiteren Fall urteilte das Gericht, daß bereits das Ingangsetzen eines Verfahrens eine Beschwer darstellen kann. Ein Strafverfahren gegen die Bf. vor den nationalen Gerichten war wegen Fristablaufs, und damit aus prozessualen Gründen, eingestellt worden. Das Gericht befand,

10

Urteil Zana gegen Türkei vom 25. November 1997, Reports 1997-VE, 2533 (2545 f.), §§ 41 f.; vgl. auch Urteil Stamoulakatos gegen Griechenland vom 26. November 1997, Reports 1997-Vn, 2640 (2647 f.), § 28. 11

Urteil Zana (Anm. 10), § 74 und § 82.

12

Urteil Belziuk gegen Polen vom 25. März 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 558 (567), § 26.

13

Urteile Selcuk undAsker (Anm. 6); Gündem (Anm. 6), § 52; Kurt gegen Türkei vom 25. Mai 1998, Reports 1998-ΙΠ , 1152 (1174 f.), § 76; Ergigegen Türkei vom 28. Juli 1998, LJD 1996 1998, N r . 938, § 64. 14

Urteil Guillemin gegen Frankreich vom 21. Februar 1997, Reports 1997-1, 149 (163), § 50.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 19 daß sie dadurch bei Fortsetzung des beanstandeten Verhaltens weiterhin dem Risiko einer Anklage ausgesetzt und damit beschwert sei.15 5. Erschöpfung des Rechtsweges — Art. 26 I n mehreren Urteilen wiederholte das Gericht seine Grundsätze zur Rechtswegerschöpfung. Dieses Erfordernis dient in erster Linie dazu, den Vertragsstaaten die Gelegenheit zu geben, etwaige Konventionsverletzungen zu verhindern oder zu beseitigen.16 Eine gegen einen Vertragsstaat gerichtete Beschwerde ist daher zunächst zumindest der Sache nach und unter Einhaltung des vorgeschriebenen Verfahrens den nationalen Gerichten vorzulegen. 17 Allerdings ist Art. 26 mit einem gewissen Grad an Flexibilität und ohne übertriebenen Formalismus anzuwenden.18 Der einzelne ist durch Art. 26 verpflichtet, die Rechtsbehelfe zu ergreifen, die angemessen und effektiv der Konventionsverletzung abhelfen können. 19 Hierbei obliegt es dem betroffenen Staat, die Existenz solcher Rechtsbehelfe nachzuweisen, während der Bf. darlegen muß, daß diese im Einzelfall ineffektiv sind oder er sie aufgrund besonderer Umstände nicht ergreifen muß. 20 Gelingt dies nicht, lehnt das Gericht die Beschwerde als unzulässig ab. 21 In mehreren Fällen führte das Gericht näher aus, warum es nationale Rechtsbehelfe für ineffektiv befand. I m Fall Hornsby gegen Griechenland ließ sich mit ihnen entweder nicht das ursprüngliche Klagebegehren der Bf. verfolgen 22 oder das Verfahren würde auf die bestehende Situation hinauslaufen, da das nationale Gericht den Fall an die Stelle zurückweist, die bisland jede Abhilfe verweigerte. 23 Weitere Gründe für eine Befreiung vom Erfordernis der Rechtswegerschöpfung sah das Gericht

15

Urteil Bowman gegen Vereinigtes Königreich vom 19. Februar 1998, Reports 1998-1, 175 (185), SS 26 ff. 16

Urteil Van Oosterwijck gegen Belgien vom 6. November 1980, Series A , no. 40, 17, S 34.

17

Urteile Kopp gegen Schweiz vom 25. März 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 524 (539), S 47; Bahaddar gegen Niederlande vom 19. Februar 1998, Reports 1998-1, 250 (263), S 45. 18 19

Urteil Kopp (Anm. 17), S 48.

Vgl. Urteil Gautnn u. a. gegen Frankreich (1023), S 38. 20

vom 20. Mai 1998, Reports 1998-ΙΠ , 1009

Urteil Beis gegen Gnechenland vom 20. März 1997, Reports 1997-Π , 555 (569 f.), S 32.

21

Urteile Beis (Anm. 20), SS 34 ff.; Aytekin gegen Türkei vom 23. September 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 994, SS 82 ff. 22

Zu diesem Ergebnis kam das Gericht auch in vier anderen Urteilen, vgl. u. a. Urteil Aka gegen Türkei vom 23. September 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 990, SS 41 ff. 23

Urteil Hornsby gegen Griechenland vom 19. März 1997, Reports 1997-Π , 495 (509), SS 36 f.

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in der Aussichtslosigkeit einer Klage des Bf. vor nationalen Gerichten 24 sowie in einer Prozeßdauer von über 14 Jahren, aufgrund derer es dem Bf. nicht zuzumuten war, den Ausgang des im Mitgliedstaat anhängigen Verfahrens abzuwarten 25 . In den Fällen Mentes u. a. gegen Türkei sowie Selcuk und Asker gegen Türkei rügten die Bf. das Niederbrennen ihrer Häuser durch türkische Sicherheitskräfte. Unter Berufung auf seine frühere Rechtsprechung befand das Gericht, daß sie aufgrund der bürgerkriegsähnlichen Lage sowie dem Widerstreben der türkischen Behörden, eine solche Praxis zuzugeben, von der Pflicht befreit wären, den innerstaatlichen Rechtsweg zu erschöpfen. Es betonte jedoch, daß es sich hierbei um Einzelfallentscheidungen handele und daraus keine generelle Einschätzung der Effektivität der Rechtsmittel in der Region abzuleiten sei. 2 6

6. Sechsmonatsfrist

— Art 26

Für den Beginn der sechsmonatigen Frist für die Einreichung der Beschwerde bei der Kommission nach Art. 26 führte das Gericht im Urteil Worm gegen Österreich näher aus, daß bei einem längeren Urteil mit detaillierten Rechtsausführungen die Frist erst mit Erlaß des schriftlichen Urteils zu laufen beginnt, und nicht bereits mit dessen Verkündung. Dies folge aus Sinn und Zweck der N o r m . 2 7 In diesem Sinne entschied das Gericht auch im Fall Hornsby gegen Griechenland, in dem es die Frist erst mit der Weigerung der griechischen Behörden beginnen ließ, die Urteile des obersten Verwaltungsgerichts umzusetzen.28 Bezüglich des Fristendes bestätigte das Gericht, daß der Beschwerdeeingang maßgeblich sei, während der Registrierung lediglich organisatorische Bedeutung zukomme. 29

I I I . Das Recht auf Leben — A r t . 2 Das Recht auf Leben gem. Art. 2 Abs. 1 verpflichtet die Vertragsstaaten, Eingriffe in das menschliche Leben zu unterlassen sowie Maßnahmen zu dessen Schutz vor Angriffen Dritter zu ergreifen.

24

Urteil Raninen gegen Finnland vom 16. Dezember 1997, Reports 1997-Vm, 2804 (2818),

§42. 25

Urteil Guillemin (Anm. 14), § 50.

26

Urteile Mentes u. a. gegen Türkei vom 28. November 1997, Reports 1997-Vm, 2689 (2707 f.), SS 58 ff.; Selcuk und Asker (Anm. 6), SS 67 ff. 27

Urteil Worm gegen Österreich vom 29. August 1997, Reports 1997-V, 1534 (1547), SS 33 f.

28

Urteil Hornsby (Anm. 23), S 34 f.

29

Urteil Papageorgiou gegen Griechenland vom 22. Oktober 1997, Reports 1997-VI, 2277 (2287), S 32.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 199 In mehreren Fällen hatte sich das Gericht mit der Anwendung von Waffengewalt durch türkische Sicherheitskräfte auseinanderzusetzen. I m Urteil Kaya gegen Türkei konnte das Gericht nicht ermitteln, ob diese eine vorsätzliche Tötung begangen hatten. 30 Es stellte jedoch fest, daß Art. 2 Abs. 1 nur dann wirkungsvoll das Recht auf Leben schützen kann, wenn der Staat verpflichtet ist, im Fall der Anwendung von Waffengewalt durch staatliche Organe effektive Ermittlungen durchzuführen. 31 Diesen Gesichtspunkt führte das Gericht im Urteil Yasa gegen Türkei weiter aus. Es betonte, daß Art. 2 Abs. 1 die Behörden verpflichtet, von sich aus Ermittlungen einzuleiten, selbst wenn sie nur die Information erhielten, daß türkische Sicherheitskräfte für den T o d einer Person verantwortlich sein sollen. 32 Auch im Fall Gülec gegen Türkei befand das Gericht die Türkei einer Verletzung des Art. 2 aufgrund fehlender Ermittlungen für schuldig. Darüber hinaus sah das Gericht in dem unverhältnismäßigem Schußwaffengebrauch durch die Sicherheitskräfte während einer Demonstration eine Verletzung des Rechts auf Leben, die nicht durch Art. 2 Abs. 2 lit. c) gerechtfertigt war. 33 I m Fall Ergi gegen Türkei war die Schwester des Bf. von einer Kugel tödlich getroffen worden, während nahe ihres Dorfes ein Kampf zwischen türkischen Sicherheitskräften und Anhängern der PKK stattfand. Das Gericht sah Art. 2 zum einen wegen der mangelhaften Sorgfalt der Ermittlungen verletzt und zum anderen weil die Streitkräfte es unterlassen hatten, vor Beginn der Operation Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu treffen. 34 I n zwei Fällen machten die Bf. eine Verletzung der aus Art. 2 erwachsenden positiven Verpflichtung zum Schutz des Rechtes auf Leben geltend. I m Urteil L.C.B. gegen Vereinigtes Königreich rügte die in ihrer Kindheit an Leukämie erkrankte Bf., daß ihr Vater während seiner Teilnahme an den 1957 und 1958 stattfindenden Atomversuchen auf den Christmas Islands von den Behörden weder auf die damit verbundenden Gesundheitsgefahren hingewiesen worden war noch die Intensität der Strahlung mitgeteilt bekam oder ärztlich untersucht wurde. Nach Ansicht des Gerichts konnte die unterbliebene Messung der Strahlungsintensität nicht beurteilt werden, da dies vor der Unterwerfungserklärung des Vereinigten Königreichs gem. Art. 46 unterlassen wurde. 35 I n bezug auf die übrigen Beschwerden betonte das Gericht zunächst, daß ein Staat auch für die Gesundheit seiner Bürger verantwortlich sei. I m Einzelfall sah es jedoch keinen kausalen Zusammenhang zwischen der Leu30

Urteil Kaya gegen Türkei vom 19. Februar 1998, Reports 1998-1, 297 (322), § 78.

31

Urteil Kaya (Anm. 30), § 86.

32

Urteil Yasa gegen Türkei vom 2. September 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 967, § 100.

33

Urteil Gülec gegen Türkei vom 27. Juli 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 937, §§ 79 ff.

34

Urteil Ergi (Anm. 13), §§ 81 ff.

35

Urteil L.C.B. gegen Vereinigtes Königreich vom 9. Juni 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 928,

§35.

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kämieerkrankung der Bf. und der Teilnahme ihres Vaters an den Tests und lehnte daher eine Verletzung des Art. 2 ab. 36

I V . Das Verbot von Folter u n d unmenschlicher oder erniedrigender Behandlung — A r t . 3 Art. 3 verbietet Folter, unmenschliche oder erniedrigende Strafe oder Behandlung und ist als einzige N o r m der EMRK keinerlei Einschränkungen unterworfen. In seiner ständigen Rechtsprechung geht das Gericht von einem Stufenverhältnis der einzelnen Tatmodalitäten des Art. 3 zueinander aus. Dabei werden als Folter nur Grausamkeiten besonders hoher Intensität bezeichnet, während die erniedrigende Behandlung die untere Schwelle der durch Art. 3 verbotenen Mißhandlungen erfaßt. I m Fall Aydin gegen Türkei befand das Gericht, daß die Vergewaltigung der zur Tatzeit siebzehnjährigen kurdischen Bf. während ihres Polizeigewahrsams als Folter zu bezeichnen ist. Die Vergewaltigung einer Inhaftierten durch einen Staatsbediensteten stelle eine besonders schwere und verabscheuenswürdige Form der Mißhandlung dar, berücksichtige man die Machtstellung, die dieser im Verhältnis zum Opfer innehat. 37 Die Feststellung, ob eine Verletzung des Art. 3 vorliegt, ist in hohem Maße einzelfallabhängig. Beispielsweise sah das Gericht im Fall Selcuk und Asker gegen Türkei im Niederbrennen der Häuser der Bf. einen Verstoß gegen Art. 3. Es verwies insbesondere auf das relativ hohe Alter der Bf. (54 und 60 Jahre) sowie darauf, daß sie ihr Leben lang in dem Dorf gelebt hatten. Außer diesen persönlichen Umständen war es auch die A r t und Weise der Zerstörung der Häuser, die das Gericht dazu veranlaßte, eine unmenschliche Behandlung i. S. v. Art. 3 zu bejahen.38 Dagegen erachtete es im Fall Mentes u. a. gegen Türkei, in dem ebenfalls die Häuser der Bf. niedergebrannt wurden, eine Untersuchung des Art. 3 für nicht erforderlich. 39 I m Urteil Kurt gegen Türkei bejahte das Gericht ebenfalls eine Verletzung des Art. 3. Die Bf. bezichtigte türkische Sicherheitskräfte, ihren Sohn verschleppt zu haben. Sie mußte nach Ansicht des Gerichts eine lange Zeit der Unsicherheit und Verzweiflung ertragen, in der sie zwar wußte, daß ihr Sohn gefangen genommen worden war, sie jedoch keine Information hinsichtlich dessen weiteren Schicksals erhielt. Dies stelle eine unmenschliche und erniedrigende Behandlung i. S. d. Art. 3

36

Urteil L.C.B. (Anm. 35), §§ 37 ff.

37

Urteil Aydin gegen Türkei vom 25. September 1997, Reports 1997-VI, 1866 (1891), § 83.

38

Urteil Selcuk und Asker (Anm. 6), §§ 77 f.

39

Urteil Mentes u. a. (Anm. 26), § 77.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 199 dar. 40 Demgegenüber sah das Gericht in dem Verschwinden des Sohnes selbst keine Verletzung des Art. 3, da die Bf. nicht nachweisen konnte, daß ihr Sohn verbotenen Behandlungen i. S. v. Art. 3 ausgesetzt war. 41 Mangels ausreichender Intensität der Mißhandlung lehnte das Gericht eine Verletzung des Art. 3 im Fall Raninen gegen Finnland ab. Der Bf. hatte gerügt, in Handschellen abgeführt worden zu sein, obwohl keinerlei Veranlassung bestand, sie ihm anzulegen. Der EGMR befand, daß dies möglicherweise erniedrigend war, konnte jedoch keinen Zusammenhang zu einem später diagnostizierten unbestimmten Psychosozialen Problem erkennen. Darüber hinaus hatte der Bf. nicht nachgewiesen, daß die Abführung in Handschellen mit dem Ziel erfolgte, ihn zu demütigen. 42 In zwei weiteren Urteilen lehnte das Gericht einen Verstoß gegen Art. 3 ab, weil die behaupteten Verletzungen nicht sicher staatlichen Organen zuzuschreiben waren 43 oder die Mißhandlung nicht nachgewiesen werden konnte 44 . In mehreren Fällen nahm das Gericht eine erhebliche Ausweitung des Schutzbereiches von Art. 3 vor. I m Urteil H.L.R. gegen Frankreich führte es aus, daß eine Anwendung des Art. 3 nicht ausgeschlossen sei, wenn die Gefahr der Verletzung von Privaten ausgeht. Der Bf., dem die Abschiebung nach Kolumbien drohte, hatte in Frankreich gegen Drogenhändler ausgesagt, von denen er im Heimatstaat Racheakte befürchtete. Das Gericht bestätigte zunächst, daß die Ausweisung eines Ausländers grundsätzlich jedem Staat überlassen bleibt. Ausnahmen gelten jedoch für den Fall, daß der Betroffene dadurch dem ernstzunehmenden Risiko einer Verletzung seiner Rechte aus Art. 3 ausgesetzt wird, das auch von Privaten ausgehen kann. Voraussetzung ist, daß die Gefahr tatsächlich existiert und der Staat nicht in der Lage ist, den einzelnen vor diesen Gefahren zu schützen.45 Im Ergebnis lehnte es eine Verletzung des Art. 3 jedoch ab, da keine Hinweise für eine konkrete Gefährdung des Bf. vorlagen. Zudem hatte dieser nicht nachgewiesen, daß die kolumbianischen Behörden ihm keinen ausreichenden Schutz gewähren konnten. 46 In diesen Zusammenhang fällt auch die Entscheidung D. gegen Vereinigtes Königreich. Das Gericht hatte zu beurteilen, ob die Abschiebung eines wegen Drogenhandels straffällig gewordenen aidskranken Ausländers in seinen Heimatstaat (St. Kitts) gegen Art. 3 verstößt, da dieser dort weder Unterkunft, Familie, moralische und finanzielle Unterstützung noch Zugang zu adäquater medizinischer Versorgung hat. Grundsätzlich hielt das 40

Urteil Kurt (Anm. 13), §§ 133 f.

41

Urteil Kurt (Anm. 13), §§ 115 ff.

42

Urteil Raninen (Anm. 24), SS 55 ff.

43

Urteil Erdagöz gegen Türkei

vom 22. Oktober 1997, Reports 1997-VI, 2300 (2311 f.),

SS 39 ff. 44

Urteil Tekin gegen Türkei vom 9. Juni 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, Nr. 932, SS 53 f.

45

Urteil H.L.R. gegen Frankreich vom 29. A p r i l 1997, Reports 1997-ΙΠ , 745 (757 f.), SS 33 ff.

46

Urteil H.L.R. (Anm. 49), SS 43 f.

448

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

Gericht fest, daß die Ausweisung eine gerechtfertigte Reaktion auf den Drogenhandel darstellt. Zudem hätten Ausländer, die in einem der Vertragsstaaten Haftstrafen abgesessen haben und ausgewiesen werden sollen, keinen Anspruch, weiter in diesem Staat zu verweilen, um in den Genuß medizinischer, sozialer oder sonstiger Unterstützung zu gelangen.47 Andererseits befand sich der Bf. im letzten Stadium seiner Aids-Erkrankung, und eine Abschiebung würde seinen Tod beschleunigen. Zudem setzte sie ihn dem Risiko eines Todes unter menschenunwürdigen Bedingungen aus, da er im Heimatstaat weder angemessene moralische noch finanzielle und medizinische Unterstützung zu erwarten hätte. Aufgrund dieser außergewöhnlichen Umstände entschied das Gericht, daß eine Abschiebung gegen Art. 3 verstieß. 48 Darüber hinaus scheint das Gericht aus Art. 3 sogar positive Schutzpflichten abzuleiten. I m Fall A. gegen Vereinigtes Königreich hielt es Art. 3 für verletzt, weil ein Stiefvater für die Züchtigung seines 9-jährigen Stiefsohnes mit einem Rohrstock nach nationalem Recht nicht strafrechtlich zur Verantwortung gezogen werden konnte. Zwar untersagte das englische Recht grundsätzlich die Mißhandlung von Kindern. Dieser Schutz war nach Auffassung des Gerichts jedoch nicht adäquat, da sich der Stiefvater darauf berufen konnte, es habe sich um eine „angemessene Züchtigung" gehandelt, und diese Verteidigung von der Staatsanwaltschaft widerlegt werden mußte. 49 Schließlich verpflichte Art. 3 i. V. m. Art. 1 ebenso wie Art. 2 die nationalen Behörden, gründliche und effektive Ermittlungen einzuleiten, sofern ihnen bekannt wird, daß Polizeibeamte Mißhandlungen, die unter Art. 3 fallen würden, begangen haben könnten. Derartige Versäumnisse führten im Urtei\Assenov u. a. gegen Bulgarien zu einer Verletzung des Art. 3. 50 V . Das Recht auf Freiheit u n d Sicherheit — A r t . 5 Art. 5 garantiert die persönliche Freiheit und schützt vor willkürlicher Festnahme und Haft, indem er in erschöpfender Weise die Voraussetzungen definiert, unter denen eine Freiheitsentziehung zulässig ist. Außerdem legt er einzelne Rechte des Verhafteten fest. M i t einer Verletzung sämtlicher in Art. 5 festgelegten Rechte hatte sich das Gericht im Fall Kurt gegen Türkei zu befassen, in dem der Sohn der Bf. von staatlichen 47

Urteil D. gegen Vereinigtes Königreich v o m 2. Mai 1997, Reports 1997-ΙΠ , 777 (791 f.),

§46. 48

Urteil D. (Anm. 51), §§ 51 ff.

49

Urteil/4, gegen Vereinigtes Königreich vom 23. September 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 991, §§ 23 f. 50

Urteil Assenov u. a. (Anm. 9), §§ 100 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 19 Sicherheitskräften verschleppt worden war. Das Gericht stellte zunächst fest, daß die Verschleppung eine komplette Nichtbeachtung des Art. 5 darstellt. Daher verpflichte Art. 5 die Regierungen, vor derartigen Vorkommnissen zu schützen und im Falle des Verschwindens einer Person umgehend Ermittlungen einzuleiten. Diese Pflicht habe die türkische Regierung verletzt, indem sie keine Untersuchung anstrengte. Bei weitem schwerer wog jedoch die Tatsache, daß die von der Bf. glaubhaft behauptete Festnahme des Sohnes durch türkische Sicherheitsbeamte von der Regierung bestritten wurde und es hierüber auch keine Berichte gab. Dadurch wurde den Tätern die Möglichkeit gegeben, ihr Verbrechen zu verbergen und ihrer Verantwortung zu entgehen. Das Gericht nahm daher eine besonders schwere Verletzung des Rechts auf Freiheit und Sicherheit an. 51

1. Rechtmäßigkeit der Haft — Art. 5 Abs. 1 Eine Freiheitsentziehung ist gem. Art. 5 Abs. 1 unter der Voraussetzung zulässig, daß sie aufgrund einer innerstaatlichen Rechtsgrundlage in Befolgung eines ordnungsgemäßen Verfahrens angeordnet wurde, mindestens einer der Haftgründe aus Art. 5 Abs. 1 lit. a) bis f) einschlägig ist und die Freiheitsentziehung nicht willkürlich ist. 52 Hauptsächlich untersuchte das Gericht das Vorliegen eines Haftgrundes nach Art. 5 Abs. 1 und stellte nur in eindeutigen Fällen einen Verstoß gegen nationales Rechts fest. 53 Hinsichtlich des Vorliegens eines Haftgrundes bestätigte das Gericht im Fall Eriksen gegen Norwegen, daß die Liste der Haftgründe in Art. 5 Abs. 1 abschließend ist, in einem Fall jedoch mehrere Gründe gleichzeitig einschlägig sein können. Der Bf. hatte gerügt, in der Zeit zwischen dem Ablauf einer gerichtlichen Ermächtigung, ihm Sicherungsmaßnahmen aufzuerlegen, bis zu der Entscheidung, ob eine neue Ermächtigung gewährt wird, weiterhin inhaftiert gewesen zu sein. Das Gericht hielt die fortgesetzte Haft des Bf. zunächst nach Art. 5 Abs. 1 lit. a) für gerechtfertigt, da die ursprüngliche Ermächtigung zu Sicherungsmaßnahmen und jede mögliche Verlängerung aus einer früheren Verurteilung des Bf. folgten. M i t Blick auf dessen Strafregister entsprach die zwischenzeitliche Haft den Zielen der ursprünglichen Ermächtigung und war deshalb angebracht. 54 Darüber hinaus war nach Auffassung des 51

Urteil Kurt (Anm. 13), §§ 124 ff.

52

Urteil Winterwerp

gegen Niederlande vom 24. Oktober 1979, Series A , no. 33, 17 f., § 39.

53

Urteile Raninen (Anm. 24), §§ 46 f.; Lukanov gegen Bulgarien vom 20. März 1997, Reports 1997-Π , 529 (544 f.), §§ 42 ff.; Tsirlis undKouloumpas vom 29. Mai 1997, Reports 1997-Π Ι, 909 (924), SS 59 ff.; Steel u. a. gegen Vereinigtes Königreich vom 23. September 1998, LJD 1996 1998, Nr. 992, §§ 60 ff. 54

Urteil Eriksen gegen Norwegen vom 27. Mai 1997, Reports 1997-ΙΠ , 839 (862 ff.), SS 77 ff.

G Y I L 41

450

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

Gerichts Art. 5 Abs. 1 lit. c) einschlägig, da aufgrund der besonderen Umstände des Falles erhebliche Anhaltspunkte dafür bestanden, daß der Bf. in Zukunft ähnliche Straftaten begehen werde. 55 I n zwei Fällen hatten das Gericht darüber zu befinden, wieviel Zeit zwischen der Entscheidung, einen Inhaftierten freizulassen, und dessen tatsächlicher Freilassung verstreichen darf, ohne daß eine ungerechtfertige Freiheitsentziehung vorliegt. Guilia Manzoni hatte einen Verstoß gegen Art. 5 Abs. 1 lit. c) gerügt, da zwischen der Verkündung eines Urteils zur Bewährung und ihrer endgültigen Freilassung aus dem Gefängnis sieben Stunden vergingen. Das Gericht bemerkte, daß die Umsetzung einer Freilassung eine gewisse Zeit benötige, diese aber auf ein Minimum zu reduzieren sei. I m Einzelfall lehnte es eine Verletzung des Art. 5 ab. 56 Eine solche Ubergangszeit gilt jedoch nicht, wenn bereits zuvor gesetzlich eine Maximaldauer der Freiheitsentziehung bestimmt ist, wie in § 163 c StPO. Diese ist den Behörden im vornherein bekannt, und sie sind daher verpflichtet, alle notwendigen Schritte zu ergreifen, um diese Zeit einzuhalten. Daher verstieß eine um 45 Minuten verspätete Freilassung gegen Art. 5 Abs. I . 5 7 Bezüglich des Haftgrundes des Verdachts einer strafbaren Handlung gem. Art. 5 Abs. 1 lit. c) führte das Gericht im Fall Erdagöz gegen Türkei aus, daß der Verdacht, der eine Festnahme rechtfertigte, niedriger sei als der für die Erhebung einer Anklage erforderliche. Dennoch setze auch ersterer Hinweise voraus, die einen objektiven Beobachter von der Annahme überzeugten, der Betreffende habe eine Straftat begangen.58 In einem weiteren Fall entschied das Gericht, daß die Unterbringung eines Geisteskranken in einer psychiatrischen Anstalt nur dann rechtmäßig i. S. v. Art. 5 Abs. 1 lit e) sei, wenn hierfür eine geeignete Einrichtung vorhanden ist. 59 Der Bf. war ca. 7 Monate in einer nur seinem vorübergehenden Aufenthalt dienenden Gefängnispsychiatrie untergebracht worden, in der er weder ausreichend medizinisch betreut noch therapeutisch behandelt wurde. Das Gericht stellt daher einen Verstoß gegen Art. 5 Abs. 1 fest. I m Urteil Erkalo gegen Niederlande kam das Gericht zu dem gleichen Ergebnis, weil eine an sich rechtmäßige Verlängerung der Unterbringung in einer psychiatrischen Anstalt willkürlich ausgeübt wurde. Die erforderliche Uberprüfung der Verlängerung des Aufenthalts des Bf. in der Anstalt erfolgte erst nach 82 Tagen. Diese

55

Urteil Eriksen (Anm. 58), SS 86 ff.

56

Urteil Giulia Manzoni gegen Italien vom 1. Juli 1997, Reports 1997-IV, 1184 (1191), § 25.

57

Urteil K-F. gegen Deutschland vom 27. November 1997, Reports 1997-VII, 2657 (2675 f.), SS 70 ff., abgedruckt in EuGRZ 1998, 129 - 136. 58

Urteil Erdagöz (Anm. 47), S 51.

59

Urteil Aerts gegen Belgien vom 30. Juli 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, Nr. 944, S 46.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 199 Zeitspanne erschien dem Gericht trotz eines starken öffentlichen Interesses an der fortdauernden Unterbringung des Bf. in einer geschlossenen Anstalt unvereinbar mit Art. 5 Abs. I . 6 0

2. Unverzügliche

Vorführungspflicht

— Art 5 Abs. 3 Satz 1

Gem. Art. 5 Abs. 3 Satz 1 ist der Inhaftierte unverzüglich einem Richter oder einem Beamten, der ebenso unabhängig wie ein Richter ist, 61 vorzuführen. I m Verfahren Sakik u. a. gegen Türkei berief sich die türkische Regierung darauf, aus Gründen der Terrorismusbekämpfung Parlamentsabgeordnete wegen angeblicher Verbindungen zur PKK 12 bzw. 14 Tage ohne richterliche Vorführung auf der Polizeiwache festhalten zu dürfen. Das Gericht erkannte an, daß die Terrorismusbekämpfung die Staaten vor besondere Schwierigkeiten stellt. Dennoch seien die türkischen Behörden selbst für den Fall, daß die Anschuldigungen zuträfen, nicht befugt, die Bf. ohne richterliche Vorführung festzuhalten. 62 In einem ähnlichen Fall verbrachten die Bf. 16 bzw. 23 Tage in Polizeigewahrsam, ohne während dieser Zeit einem Richter vorgeführt worden zu sein. Im Unterschied zum vorhergehenden Sachverhalt geschah dies in einer Region der Türkei, für die gem. Art. 15 der Notstand galt. Das Gericht hatte daher die Auswirkungen der nach Art. 15 möglichen Einschränkungen auf Art. 5 Abs. 3 Satz 1 zu untersuchen. Es bestätigte zunächst, daß den betroffenen Staaten in jenem Fall ein größerer Ermessensspielraum als normalerweise üblich zusteht. Dennoch unterliege dieser seiner Uberprüfung, da gesichert sein müsse, daß die in Frage stehende Maßnahme tatsächlich durch den Notstand gerechtfertigt ist. 63 In dem Kampf gegen den Terrorismus sah das Gericht keinen Grund, der die lange Haft der Bf. ohne richterliche Vorführung rechtfertige. Auch die von der Regierung betonte Notwendigkeit besonders gründlicher Ermittlungen, die wegen des bestehenden Notstandes mehr Zeit in Anspruch genommen hätten, könne einer Einhaltung des Art. 5 Abs. 3 nicht entgegenstehen.64

60

Urteil Erkalo gegen die Niederlande vom 2. September 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 968,

SS 57 ff. 61

Vgl. Urteil

62

Urteil Sakik u. a. gegen Türkei vom 26. November 1997, Reports 1997-VE, 2609 (2623 f.),

u. a. (Anm. 9), SS 146 ff.

SS 44 ff. 63

Urteil Demir u. a. gegen Türkei vom 23. September 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 989, § 43.

64

Urteil Demir u. a. (Anm. 69), §§ 50 ff.

29*

452

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler 3. Angemessene Dauer der Untersuchungshaft

— Art. 5 Abs. 3 Satz 2

Art. 5 Abs. 3 Satz 2 gewährt Inhaftierten das Recht, innerhalb angemessener Frist abgeurteilt oder aus der Haft entlassen zu werden. I m Fall Muller gegen Frankreich hatte der Bf. gerügt, sich in der Zeit von seiner Festnahme bis zum Erlaß des erstinstanzlichen Urteils fast vier Jahre in Untersuchungshaft befunden zu haben. Das Gericht bekräftigte, daß der dringende Tatverdacht nach Ablauf einer gewissen Zeit allein nicht mehr ausreicht, um eine fortgesetzte Haft zu rechtfertigen. 65 Da der Bf. sofort geständig war und keine Fluchtgefahr bestand, wäre die Haft lediglich mit der Möglichkeit künftiger Verbrechen zu begründen gewesen. Das Gericht erachtete daher Art. 5 Abs. 3 für verletzt. 66 Hingegen vermochte das Risiko der Begehung weiterer Straftaten durch den Bf., die Gefahr, daß dieser Beweismittel beiseite schaffen könnte, sowie eine äußerst umfangreiche Beweisaufnahme eine fast drei Jahre dauernde Untersuchungshaft zu rechtfertigen. 67 In der Entscheidung I.A. gegen Frankreich hielt das Gericht allerdings fest, daß auch Gründe wie u. a. begründeter Tatverdacht, die Verhinderung von Unruhestiftung, Wiederholungsgefahr, Schutz des Bf. selbst sowie die Gefahr der Zerstörung von Beweismaterial mit zunehmender Zeitdauer immer weniger relevant werden und eine über fünf Jahre dauernde Untersuchungshaft nicht rechtfertigen können. 68 4. Recht auf Haftprüfung

— Art. 5 Abs. 4

Art. 5 gewährt jedem Inhaftierten ein Recht auf Haftprüfung. Eine einmalige Überprüfung der Rechtmäßigkeit der Haft innerhalb mehrerer Jahre reiche jedoch nicht aus, sondern ist in regelmäßigen Abständen zu gewähren. 69 Des weiteren hat die Haftprüfung unverzüglich zu erfolgen. I m Fall Sakik bestätigte das Gericht, daß eine Haftprüfung nach zwölf bzw. vierzehn Tagen diesem Unverzüglichkeitskriterium nicht genügt. Einen anderen möglichen Rechtsbehelf lehnte es ab, da dessen Erfolg in Ermangelung von Präzedenzfällen als nicht ausreichend gesichert erschien. 70 I m Fall R.M.D. gegen die Schweiz rügte der Bf., im Zuge mehrerer gegen ihn gerichteter Ermittlungsverfahren in verschiedenen Kantonen von einem Gefängnis 65

Urteil Mullergegen Frankreich vom 17. März 1997, Reports 1997-Π , 374 (388), §§ 34 f.

66

Urteil Muller (Anm. 71), § 44.

67

Urteil Contrada gegen Italien vom 24. August 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 957, §§ 58 ff.

68

Urteil I.A. gegen Frankreich vom 23. September 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 998, §§ 104 ff.

69

Urteil Assenov u. a. (Anm. 9), §§ 162 ff.

70

Urteil Sakik u. a. (Anm. 68), §§ 51 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gechtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 1998 zum anderen verbracht worden zu sein, so daß es ihm unmöglich war, wirksam sein Recht auf Haftprüfung wahrzunehmen. 71 Unter diesen Umständen sah das Gericht Art. 5 Abs. 4 als verletzt an. 72 5. Anspruch auf Schadensersatz — Art. 5 Abs. 5 Wer entgegen der in Art. 5 Abs. 1 bis 4 enthaltenen Garantien in Haft gehalten wurde, hat gem. Absatz 5 einen Entschädigungsanspruch. Voraussetzung ist, daß kein nationaler Anspruch besteht. I m Urteil Sakik führte das Gericht hierzu aus, daß dies auch der Fall sei, wenn nationale Normen zuvor noch nicht erfolgreich angewandt worden waren. 73 V I . Verfahrensgarantien — A r t . 6 1. Anwendbarkeit des Art. 6 Art. 6 verpflichtet die Vertragsstaaten, rechtsstaatliche Verfahrensgarantien einzuhalten. Der sachliche Geltungsbereich dieser N o r m setzt entweder zivilrechtliche Ansprüche und Verpflichtungen voraus oder eine strafrechtliche Anklage. Beides ist von nationalen Begrifflichkeiten unabhängig autonom durch das Gericht zu bestimmen. 74 a) Streitigkeit über zivilrechtliche Ansprüche oder Verpflichtungen Nach der ständigen Rechtsprechung des EGMR setzt eine Streitigkeit über einen zivilrechtlichen Anspruch dreierlei voraus: Es muß eine im nationalen Recht bestehende Rechtsposition vorliegen, diese einen zivilrechtlichen Charakter haben und schließlich streitig sein. I n mehreren Fällen verneinte das Gericht einen zivilrechtlichen Anspruch mangels materiell-rechtlicher Grundlage im nationalen Recht. 7 5 71

Urteil R.M.D. gegen die Schweiz vom 26. September 1997, Reports 1997-VI, 2003 (2013 ff.), §§ 43 ff. 72

Urteil R.M.D. (Anm. 77), §§ 54 f.; für eine weitere Verletzimg des Art. 5 Abs. 4 vgl. Urteil Soumare gegen Frankreich vom 24. August 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 958, §§ 38 ff. 73

Urteil Sakik u. a. (Anm. 68), §§ 58 ff.

74

Urteil König gegen Deutschland vom 28. Juni 1978, Series A , no. 27, 30, § 89.

75

Urteile Anne-Mane Andersson gegen Schweden vom 27. August 1997, Reports 1997-IV, 1407 (1416 f.), SS 33 ff.; M.S. gegen Schweden vom 27. August 1997, Reports 1997-IV, 1437

454

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

Das Verfahren Rolf Gustafson gegen Schweden gab dem Gericht Gelegenheit, Ausführungen zum Merkmal „Streitigkeit" zu machen. Es muß sich um einen echten Streit ernsthafter Natur handeln. Die Echtheit und Ernsthaftigkeit sind zu vermuten, es sei denn, es bestehen eindeutige Hinweise für das Gegenteil. Darüber hinaus muß der Ausgang des Verfahrens unmittelbare Auswirkungen auf das geltend gemachte Recht haben. 76 Hieran scheiterte es im Fall Balmer-Schafroth u. a. gegen die Schweiz. Die Bf. hatten sich unter Berufung auf ihr Recht auf körperliche Integrität, das sie zu ausreichendem Schutz vor den Risiken der Atomenergie berechtige, gegen die Verlängerung der Betriebsgenehmigung eines Atomreaktors durch die schweizerische Regierung eingesetzt. Das Gericht sah jedoch keinen unmittelbaren Zusammenhang zwischen dem Betreiben des Reaktors und dem Schutz ihrer körperlichen Integrität, zumal die Bf. nicht darlegen konnten, daß sie durch die Genehmigung einer ernsthaften, spezifischen und imminenten Gefahr ausgesetzt seien.77 Der zivilrechtliche Charakter entfällt dem Gericht zufolge bei politischen 78 sowie bei öffentlich-rechtlichen Ansprüchen. Letztere sind insbesondere Ansprüche aus dem Beamtenverhältnis, die die Einstellung, Beförderung sowie die Entlassung betreffen. 79 Anderes gilt, wenn die privatrechtlichen Aspekte der Ansprüche der beamteten Bf. die öffentlich-rechtlichen überwiegen. Dies ist bei wirtschaftlichen Rechten des Beamten der Fall, wie beispielsweise seinem Gehaltsanspruch. 80 Diese Unterscheidung ist jedoch zunehmender Kritik aus den eigenen Reihen ausgesetzt, da die Abgrenzung zwischen Klagen, die auf Geld gerichtet sind und solchen, die das Anstellungsverhältnis betreffen, höchst ungenau ist. 81 Als Beispiel hierfür ist u. a. der Fall Couez gegen Frankreich anzuführen. Der Bf. war Angehöriger der „Mobilen Sicherheitspolizei" und hatte bei der Teilnahme an einem Marathon, den diese ausgerichtet hatte, einen Herzanfall erlitten. Er beantragte, diesen Unfall als Arbeitsunfall zu klassifizieren. Das Gericht räumte ein, daß dieses Anliegen des Bf. auf den ersten Blick die Karriere und das Ausscheiden aus seinem Beruf betraf, betonte jedoch, daß der Ausgang des Verfahrens in erster Linie wirtschaftliche Kon(1451), SS 47 ff. 76

Urteil Rolf Gustafson gegen Schweden vom 1. Juli 1997, Reports 1997-IV, 1149 (1160),

SS 38 f. 77

Urteil Balmer-Schafroth

u. a. gegen die Schweiz vom 26. August 1997, Reports 1997-IV,

1346 (1359), SS 39 f. 78

Urteil Pier Bloch gegen Frankreich vom 21. Oktober 1997, Reports 1997-VI, 2206 (2223),

SS 50 ff. 79

Die bestätigte das Gericht i m Berichtszeitraum in 16 Urteilen, vgl. u. a. Urteil Neigeigegen Frankreich vom 17. März 1997, Reports 1997-Π , 399 (410 f.), SS 43 f. 80 Z u diesem Ergebnis kam das Gericht in neun Fällen, vgl. u. a. Urteil Hubergegen Frankreich vom 19. Februar 1998, Reports 1998-1, 105 (115), S 36. 81

Urteil Huber (Anm. 86), abweichende Meinungen von vier Richtern, 117 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 199 Sequenzen nach sich zieht. Insofern war es dem Gericht möglich, Art. 6 Abs. 1 auf diesen Fall anzuwenden. 82 In diesem Sinne entschied das Gericht auch im Urteil Paskbalidis u. a. gegen Griechenland. Es gestand den Bf., privaten Arbeitnehmern, die sich auf ein Gesetz zur Anrechnung von Sozialabgaben im Ausland beriefen, trotz gewisser öffentlichrechtlicher Aspekte einen zivilrechtlichen Anspruch zu, zumal deren Existenzgrundlagen betroffen waren. 83 Das Gericht entschied darüber hinaus, daß Entschädigungsansprüche für eine widerrechtliche Inhaftierung 84 und der Anspruch eines psychisch Kranken auf Uberweisung in eine andere Anstalt 85 zivilrechtlich sind. Hierum handele es sich auch bei Pensionsansprüchen 86 sowie dem Anspruch von Aktionären gegen die Bank von Griechenland auf Aufhebung der Entscheidung, das Kapital der Bank zu erhöhen. 87 Gleiches gilt für Verhandlungen, die zwar Disziplinarmaßnahmen betreffen, in denen es jedoch eigentlich um das Recht geht, weiterhin den Beruf als Privatmediziner ausüben zu können. 88 Ebenfalls zivilrechtlich waren die Ansprüche nordirischer Firmen, bei Ausschreibungen nicht aus religiösen Gründen diskriminiert zu werden. 89 I m Urteil Robins gegen Vereinigtes Königreich stellte das Gericht hinsichtlich des Umfangs eines zivilrechtlichen Anspruches fest, daß dieser auch das Verfahren über die Übernahme der Gerichtskosten beinhalte, weil darin eine Fortsetzung des Hauptverfahrens liege.90

82

Urteil Couez gegen Frankreich vom 24. August 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 960, § 25.

83

Urteil Paskbalidis u. a. gegen Gnechenland vom 19. März 1997, Reports 1997-Π , 473 (485),

SS 29 f. 84

Vgl. u. a. Urteil Georgiadis gegen Gnechenland vom 29. Mai 1997, Reports 1997-ΙΠ , 949

(959), SS 34 f. 85

Urteil Aerts (Anm. 65), S 59.

86

Urteile Pauger gegen Österreich vom 28. Mai 1997, Reports 1997-ΙΠ , 881 (894), S 45; Stamoulakatos (Anm. 10), S 31. 87

Urteil Pafitis u. a. gegen Gnechenland vom 26. Februar 1998, Reports 1998-1, 436 (456),

§87. 88

Urteil Gautnn u. a. (Anm. 19), § 33.

89

Urteil Tinnelly & Sons Ltd. u. a. und McElduff

u. a. gegen Vereinigtes

Königreich

vom

10. Juli 1998, L J D 1996 - 1998, N r . 935, §§ 61 ff. 90

Urteil Robin gegen Vereinigtes Königreich vom 23. September 1997, Reports 1997-V, 1801 (1809), §§ 28 f.

456

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler b) Strafrechtliche Anklage

U m zu bestimmen, ob eine strafrechtliche Anklage vorliegt, hat der EGMR in seiner Rechtsprechung drei Indizien erarbeitet. Erstens muß die die Zuwiderhandlung definierende N o r m dem nationalen Straf- oder Disziplinarrecht angehören. Zweitens ist die wahre Natur der fraglichen Zuwiderhandlung zu bestimmen und drittens die Natur und Schwere der angedrohten Sanktion zu berücksichtigen. Nach Anwendung dieser Kriterien kam das Gericht zu der Auffassung, daß eine strafrechtliche Anklage vorliegt, wenn Erben für die Steuerhinterziehungen der Erblasser Geldzahlungen auferlegt werden. Die zu beurteilende Geldbuße war von nicht unerheblichem Umfang und hauptsächlich strafend und abschreckend. Darüber hinaus bestimmte das höchste nationale Gericht, daß diese Buße als strafrechtlich anzusehen sei und von der Schuld des jeweiligen Steuerzahlers abhinge. 91 Zu diesem Ergebnis gelangte der EGMR auch im Fall Garyfallou ΛΕΒΕ gegen Griechenland. Zwar gehörte die Rechtsgrundlage der gerügten Geldbuße nicht dem griechischen Strafrecht an. Jedoch war der potentielle Umfang der Buße erheblich. Zudem konnten im Fall der Nichtzahlung Firmeneigentum beschlagnahmt und die Geschäftsführer für maximal ein Jahr in Haft genommen werden. In diesem Zusammenhang wiederholte das Gericht, daß es genüge, wenn lediglich eines der drei Kriterien vorläge. 92 Schließlich hatte das Gericht im Fall Pier Bloch gegen Frankreich zu untersuchen, ob darin eine strafrechtliche Anklage läge, daß dem Bf., einem Parlamentsabgeordneten, sein Mandat wegen übermäßiger Wahlkampfausgaben entzogen worden war. Ihm wurde die passive Wählbarkeit für ein Jahr aberkannt und die Pflicht auferlegt, die die zulässigen Ausgaben überschreitende Summe zurückzuzahlen. Der EGMR lehnte eine strafrechtliche Anklage ab, da die Rechtsgrundlage der Maßnahme nicht dem Strafrecht zuzuordnen war. Ebensowenig rechtfertigte die Schwere der Strafe die Annahme einer strafrechtlichen Anklage. 93 2. Verfahrensgarantien

des Art. 6Abs.l

Art. 6 Abs. 1 enthält bestimmte Anforderungen, die die nationalen Gerichte zu erfüllen haben, und gewährt verschiedene Garantien eines fairen Verfahrens.

91

Urteile A.P, M.P. und T.P. gegen die Schweiz vom 29 August 1997, Reports 1997-V, 1477 (1488), SS 39 ff. und E.L., R.L. und J.O.-L. gegen die Schweiz vom 29. August 1997, Reports 1997-V, 1509 (1520), SS 44 ff. 92

Urteil Garyfallou AEBE gegen Griechenland vom 24. September 1997, Reports 1997-V, 1821 (1830 f.), SS 32 ff. 93

Urteil Pier Bloch (Anm. 84), SS 54 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 19 a) Anforderungen an das nationale Gericht gem. Art. 6 Abs. 1 Art. 6 Abs. 1 stellt bestimmte Anforderungen an das nationale Gericht. Hierzu gehört das Recht auf Zugang zu einem unabhängigen und unparteiischen Gericht, das Gewähren einer öffentlichen Anhörung sowie die Entscheidung innerhalb einer angemessenen Frist. aa) Das Recht, vor einem unabhängigen und unparteiischen Gericht gehört zu werden (1) Das Recht auf Zugang zu einem Gericht Nach der Rechtsprechung des EGMR gewährt Art. 6 Abs. 1 ein eigenständiges Recht auf Zugang zu einem Gericht. Dies ist beispielsweise verletzt, wenn griechische Gerichte die Rechtspersönlichkeit der Katholischen Kirche von Canea verneinen, während sie sie bei der griechisch-katholischen Kirche und ihren Pfarrkirchen anerkennen. 94 Hiergegen verstoßen auch Berufungsfristen von drei Tagen, innerhalb derer ein Antrag beim Gericht sogar eingegangen sein muß. 95 Dies gilt jedoch nicht per se für kurze Fristen. 96 Das Recht auf Zugang zu einem Gericht wird verletzt, wenn nationale Gerichte die Überprüfung eines streitentscheidenden Dokuments verweigern, weil die Regierung sich darauf beruft, eine genaue Untersuchung sei mit den Erfordernissen der inneren Sicherheit unvereinbar. Selbst ein derart wichtiges Anliegen vermag eine gerichtliche Kontrolle nicht gänzlich auszuschließen.97 Auch ist es den nationalen Gerichten untersagt, eine Klage unter Berufung auf Immunitätsvorschriften als unbegründet abzuweisen, ohne auf den konkreten Fall näher einzugehen oder das Vorgehen zu begründen. 98 Ebenso ist es unzulässig, eine Geldsumme, die als Sicherheit für die Teilnahme als zivilrechtliche Partei an einer strafrechtlichen Verhandlung zu leisten ist, derart hoch anzusetzen, daß sie von der betroffenen Person unmöglich geleistet werden

94

Urteil Katholische Kirche von Canea gegen Gnechenland vom 16. Dezember 1997, Reports

1997-Vm, 2843 (2858 ff.), SS 39 ff. 95 Urteil Pérez de Rada Cavanilles gegen Spanien vom 28. Oktober 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 1019, SS 45 ff. 96

Vgl. Urteil Edificaciones March Gallego S.A. gegen Spanien vom 19. Februar 1998, Reports

1998-1, 279 (290), § 36. 97 Urteil Tinnelly & Sons Ltd. u. a. undMcElduff 98

Urteil Osman (Anm. 37), SS 151 ff.

u. a. (Anm. 95), SS 74 ff.

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Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

kann, und damit ihr Recht auf Zugang zu einem Gericht praktisch zu unterbinden." In zwei Fällen entschied die große Kammer des Gerichts, daß das Recht auf Zugang zu einem Gericht auch verletzt ist, wenn ein Berufungsverfahren allein wegen Nichtbefolgens eines Haftbefehles verweigert wird, da erst nach Durchführung dieses Verfahrens die Schuld der Bf. endgültig festgestellt werden kann. 100 Das Recht auf Zugang zu Gericht kann jedoch auch Einschränkungen unterliegen. I m Fall Brualla Gomez de la Torre gegen Spanien hatte die Bf. gerügt, daß eine kurzfristige gesetzliche Anhebung des erforderlichen Streitwerts ihr die Möglichkeit genommen habe, ein Revisionsverfahren anzustrengen. Das Gericht wies darauf hin, daß mögliche Einschränkungen ein legitimes Ziel verfolgen und hierzu verhältnismäßig sein müssen. Darüber hinaus dürfen sie dieses Recht nicht seines Inhalts berauben. 101 Ziel der Anhebung des Streitwertes war die legitime Entlastung des Revisionsgerichts. Die Einschränkung war darüber hinaus auch verhältnismäßig, da das Anliegen der Bf. bereits von zwei Instanzen in einer Weise gewürdigt worden war, die den Anforderungen des Art. 6 Abs. 1 entsprach. Das Gericht lehnte daher eine Verletzung der Bf. in ihren Rechten aus der Konvention ab. 102 In einem anderen Fall rügten englische Bausparkassen, in ihrem Recht auf Zugang zu einem Gericht verletzt worden zu sein, weil ihre Klagen durch eine rückwirkende Gesetzesänderung aussichtslos geworden waren. Das Gericht bemerkte, daß die Änderung die Bf. nicht hindere, vor Gericht zu klagen. Lediglich der Ausgang des Prozesses sei vorhersehbar aussichtslos geworden. Dadurch eine Verletzung des Art. 6 Abs. 1 anzunehmen, lehnte das Gericht angesichts der gewichtigen Interessen, die mit der Gesetzesänderung verfolgt wurden, sowie der Vorhersehbarkeit dieser Änderung ab. 103 Darüber hinaus sind die Staaten bei Streitigkeiten über zivilrechtliche Ansprüche verpflichtet, dafür Sorge zu tragen, daß der einzelne von seinem Recht auf Zugang zu Gericht in wirksamer Weise Gebrauch machen kann. I m Rahmen dieser Verpflichtung haben die Staaten jedoch freie Wahl, wie sie das Recht auf Zugang zu ei-

99

Urteiltit-Mouhoubgegen Frankreich vom 28. Oktober 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 1018, §§ 57 ff. 100

Urteile Omar gegen Frankreich vom 29. Juli 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 940, §§ 40 ff.; GueHn gegen Frankreich vom 29. Juli 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 941, §§ 43 ff. 101

Urteil Brualla Gomez de la Torregegen Spanien vom 19. Dezember 1997, Reports 1997-

Vm, 2945 (2955), § 33. 102 103

Urteil Brualla Gomez de la Torre (Anm. 107), §§ 36 ff.

Urteil National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society und Yorkshire Building Society gegen Vereinigtes Königreich vom 23. Oktober 1997, Reports 1997-VII, 2325 (2360 ff.), §§ 105 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 19 nem Zivilgericht ausgestalten.104 Die Ablehnung eines Antrags auf Prozeßkostenhilfe durch die zuständige Behörde mit der Begründung, die Klage habe keine Aussicht auf Erfolg, ist allerdings unzulässig, da es nicht ihre Aufgabe ist, die Begründetheit der Klage zu erörtern. 105 Das Recht auf Zugang zu einem Gericht ist nur dann effektiv, wenn das nationale Recht klare und praktische Möglichkeiten eröffnet, mit denen der Betroffene Rechtsverletzungen geltend machen kann. Hiergegen verstößt eine gesetzlich angeordnete Rechtsmittelverwirkung, die für den Bf. nicht vorhersehbar war. 1 0 6 (2) Das Recht auf ein unabhängiges und unparteiisches Gericht I n mehreren Verfahren setzte sich das Gericht mit der Frage auseinander, welche Anforderungen an ein unabhängiges und unparteiisches Gericht zu stellen sind. Nach ständiger Rechtsprechung des Gerichts sind für die Unabhängigkeit eines Gerichts die A r t und Weise der Ernennung seiner Richter sowie deren Amtsdauer von Bedeutung. Die Unparteilichkeit fordert zum einen, daß das Gericht frei von subjektiven Vorurteilen oder Neigungen ist. Zum anderen ist eine objektive Unparteilichkeit erforderlich, die sich an den äußeren Gegebenheiten orientiert. Damit sind die Begriffe der objektiven Unparteilichkeit und der Unabhängigkeit eng miteinander verbunden. Beide Kriterien erfordern das Vorhandensein ausreichender Garantien gegen eine Beeinflussung von außen sowie den nach außen hin vermittelten Eindruck von Unabhängigkeit, der über jeden legitimen Zweifel an der Unparteilichkeit erhaben ist. 107 Diese Kriterien waren im Fall Findlay gegen Vereinigtes Königreich nicht erfüllt. Die zentrale Position eines Gerichts hatte hier ein Offizier inne (sog. Convening Officer). Dieser war organisatorisch eng mit den Verfolgungsbehörden verbunden, hatte zu entscheiden, welche Taten angeklagt werden und wie die Zusammensetzung des Gerichts sowie der Strafverfolgungsbehörden auszusehen hatte und war schließlich befugt, das erlassene Urteil abzuändern. Nach Auffassung des Gerichts konnten diese grundlegenden Mängel auch nicht durch Schutzmechanismen wie z. B. durch die Möglichkeit, weitere Rechtsmittel einzulegen, ausgeglichen werden. Vielmehr muß bereits das Gericht erster Instanz den Anforderungen des Art. 6 Abs. 1 genügen.108 104

Urteil Andronicou und Constantinou (Anm. 38), §§ 199 ff.

105

Urteil Aerts (Anm. 65), § 60.

106

Urteil FE gegen Frankreich vom 30. Oktober 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 1021, § 47.

107

Vgl. u. a. Urteil Lauko gegen Slowakei vom 2. September 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 969, § 63. 108

Urteil Findlay (Anm. 5), 263 (281 ff.), §§ 73 ff.; vgl. auch Urteil Coyne gegen Vereinigtes

460

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

In den Fällen Incal gegen Türkei sowie Ciraklar gegen Türkei befand das Gericht, daß die Besetzung eines Gerichts mit einem Mitglied des Militärs, das immerhin der Exekutive angehört, das Recht auf ein unabhängiges und unparteiisches Recht verletzt. Selbst wenn die Regierung gute Gründe für ein solches Vorgehen hatte, beispielsweise dahingehend, daß der betroffene Richter Spezialist im Kampf gegen das organisierte Verbrechen war, schloß dies einen Verstoß gegen Art. 6 Abs. 1 nicht 109

aus. Die Kriterien der Unparteilichkeit sind darüber hinaus nicht nur auf Berufsrichter anzuwenden, sondern auch auf Geschworene. I m Fall Gregory gegen Vereinigtes Königreich hatte der Bf. gerügt, daß die Jury, die über seine Schuld befinden sollte, Anzeichen rassistischer Vorurteile gezeigt hatte. Das Gericht entschied jedoch, daß die daraufhin erfolgte nachdrückliche, detaillierte und klare Ermahnung durch den Richter, Vorurteile aller A r t unberücksichtigt zu lassen und allein aufgrund der Fakten zu entscheiden, ausreichte, um die Unparteilichkeit der Jury wiederherzustellen. Damit ist es aufgrund des Art. 6 Abs. 1 nicht zwingend erforderlich, daß die Jury in derartigen Fällen entlassen wird. 1 1 0 Probleme hinsichtlich der Unparteilichkeit von Richtern ergeben sich insbesondere dann, wenn diese mit einer Sache mehrfach befaßt sind. I m Urteil De Haan gegen Niederlande hatte das Gericht darüber zu befinden, ob die Unparteilichkeit eines Richters gewährleistet ist, der als Vorsitzender einer Kammer des Berufungsgerichts über die Beanstandung einer Entscheidung zu urteilen hatte, an deren Erlaß er selbst beteiligt gewesen war. Für dessen Parteilichkeit sprach offensichtlich, daß er als Vorsitzender über seine eigene Entscheidung zu befinden hatte und zudem einziger Berufsrichter in der Kammer war. Anders als im Urteil Findlay war das Gericht jedoch der Ansicht, daß diese Mängel hätten geheilt werden können, wenn die Entscheidung einer weiteren gerichtlichen Kontrolle unterlegen hätte, die den Anforderungen des Art. 6 Abs. 1 genügt. Vorliegend existierte ein derartiges nächsthöheres Gericht sogar. Dieses überprüfte in ständiger Rechtsprechung allerdings lediglich die Mißachtung formaler Anforderungen und unterließ es daher auch im Fall De Haan, die vorherige Entscheidung aufzuheben. Damit war Art. 6 Abs. 1 verletzt. 111

Königreich vom 24. September 1997, Reports 1997-V, 1842 (1854 f.) SS 56 ff. 109

Urteil Incal gegen Türkei vom 9. Juni 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 933, §§ 67 ff.; vgl. auch Urteil Ciraklar gegen Türkei vom 28. Oktober 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 1014, §§ 39 f. 110

Urteil Gregory gegen Vereinigtes Königreich vom 25. Februar 1997, Reports 1997-1, 296 (309 f.), SS 47 f. 111

Urteil De Haan gegen Niederlande vom 26. August 1997, Reports 1997-IV, 1379 (1392 f.), SS 51 ff.; vgl. auch Urteil Castillo A Igar gegen Spanien vom 28. Oktober 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 1016, SS 44 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 is 199 Nach ständiger Rechtsprechung des EGMR ist überdies das Recht auf ein unabhängiges und unparteiisches Gericht nicht auf die ordentlichen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten beschränkt. So kann beispielsweise die Entscheidung, Disziplinarmaßnahmen zu verhängen, durchaus auf berufsspezifische Einrichtungen verlagert werden, ohne daß die Verhängung einer Disziplinarstrafe durch dieses Gremium an sich gegen das Recht auf ein unabhängiges Gericht verstößt. Dies setzt voraus, daß diese Einrichtung entweder selbst den Anforderungen des Art. 6 Abs. 1 genügt oder der Uberprüfung durch ein Gericht unterliegen. U m selbst als unparteiisch zu gelten, muß ohne Zweifel festgestellt werden können, daß die betroffenen Richter nicht persönlich betroffen sind. 112 Diese Grundsätze wandte das Gericht im Fall Gautrin u. a. gegen Frankreich an, in dem die 105 beschwerdeführenden Mediziner, die einer privaten Organisation zur ambulanten Hilfe angehörten, die Verhängung von Disziplinarmaßnahmen durch ein aus anderen Medizinern gebildetes Gremium rügten. Dieses Gremium konnte nach Ansicht des Gerichts nicht den Verdacht der Unparteilichkeit aUSräU^^r,

1 1 3

men. Ahnlich urteilte das Gericht im Fall Lauko gegen Slowakei, in dem eine für die Bestrafung kleinerer Vergehen verantwortliche lokale Behörde, deren Mitglieder von der Exekutive ausgewählt werden, weder den äußeren Anschein von Unabhängigkeit erweckte, noch Unabhängigkeit gegenüber Druck von außen nachweisen konnte. Da zudem die von der Behörde getroffenen Entscheidungen von keinem Gericht überprüfbar waren, bejahte das Gericht eine Verletzung des Art. 6 Abs. I. 1 1 4 bb) Das Recht auf öffentliche Anhörung Eine ausdrückliche Garantie des Art. 6 Abs. 1 ist das Recht auf Öffentlichkeit des Verfahrens, insbesondere auf eine öffentliche Anhörung. M i t einem Aspekt dieses Rechts, der öffentlichen Verkündung von Gerichtsurteilen, befaßte sich das Gericht im Urteil Szücs gegen Österreich. Der Bf. hatte gerügt, die Urteile, in denen über seinen Entschädigungsanspruch wegen widerrechtlicher Inhaftierung entschieden wurde, seien nicht öffentlich verkündet worden. Die Regierung wandte dagegen ein, daß Dritten mit einem berechtigten Interesse Einsicht in die Urteile gewährt werden würde. Darüber hinaus diene das Verfahren auch dem Interesse des Betroffenen, da es helfe, die Unschuldsvermutung zu wahren. Das Gericht hielt fest, daß die Anforderungen an die öffentliche Verkündung von Urtei-

112

Urteil Gautnn u. a. (Anm. 19), §§ 57 f.

113

Urteil Gautnn u. a. (Anm. 19), § 60.

114

Urteile Lauko (Anm. 113), §§ 64 f.; Kadubecgegen Slowakei vom 2. September 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 970, §§ 57 f.

462

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

len unter Berücksichtigung der Besonderheiten des jeweiligen Verfahrens sowie des Zwecks des Art. 6 Abs. 1 zu bestimmen sind. Daß Dritte nur bedingt Einsicht in die Urteile erlangen können, befand es nicht als ausreichend, da diese Entscheidung im Ermessen der betreffenden Gerichte lag. Es ließ sich auch nicht von dem Argument überzeugen, die Unschuldsvermutung werde auf diese Weise gewährleistet. Seiner Ansicht nach bestand für die nationalen Gerichte in dem maßgeblichen Verfahren kein Anlaß, gegen die Unschuldsvermutung zu verstoßen. Diese mit Hilfe der gerügten eingeschränkten Einsicht in die Urteile zu schützen, war deshalb überflüssig. I m Ergebnis befand das Gericht daher Art. 6 Abs. 1 als verletzt. 1 1 5 Das Recht auf öffentliche Anhörung ist verzichtbar, sofern nicht gegen wichtige öffentliche Interessen verstoßen wird. 1 1 6 Ein Verzicht liegt jedoch nicht bereits schon dann vor, wenn der Bf. es unterläßt, in einem Verfahren eine öffentliche Anhörung zu beantragen, in dem diese regelmäßig ausbleibt. Es kann dem Bf. nicht zum Vorwurf gereichen, daß er einen aussichtslosen Antrag unterläßt. 117 I m Urteil Allan Jacobsson gegen Schweden (Nr.2) bestätigte das Gericht, daß das Recht auf eine öffentliche Anhörung in Verfahren, in denen das angerufene Gericht einzige Instanz ist, auch das Recht auf eine mündliche Verhandlung umfaßt. Die mündliche Verhandlung ist jedoch für die Fragen entbehrlich, die für die Rechte des Bf. nicht erheblich sind. 118 Erfolgte in einem erstinstanzlichen Verfahren eine öffentliche Anhörung, ist deren Ausbleiben in den Verfahren der zweiten und dritten Instanz zumindest dann gerechtfertigt, wenn in diesen nur Fragen bzgl. der Zulässigkeit der Berufung oder allgemeine Rechtsfragen erörtert werden. 119 cc) Das Recht auf Entscheidung in angemessener Frist Art. 6 Abs. 1 gewährt dem einzelnen einen Anspruch, daß sein Verfahren in angemessener Frist durchgeführt wird. Diese Entscheidung ist in hohem Maße einzelfallabhängig. Der Gerichtshof hat in seiner Rechtsprechung jedoch Kriterien erarbeitet, anhand derer er bestimmt, ob eine Verfahrensdauer angemessen ist. Entschei-

115

Urteil Szücs gegen Österreich vom 24. November 1997, Reports 1997-VII, 2468 (2480 ff.),

SS 41 ff. 116

Urteil Pauger (Anm. 92), § 58.

117

Urteil Werner gegen Österreich vom 24. November 1997, Reports 1997-VII, 2496 (2510),

SS 47 ff. 118

(168

Urteil Allan Jacobssongegen Schweden (Nr.2) vom 19. Februar 1998, Reports 1998-1, 154

f.), SS 46 ff.

119

Urteil KD.B. (Anm. 8), 620 (630), S 39.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 19 dend ist die Bedeutung der Sache für den Bf., die Komplexität des Falles sowie das Verhalten des Bf. und der nationalen Behörden. 120 Hinsichtlich des Fristbeginns bestätigte das Gericht, daß zumindest für Strafverfahren die zu untersuchende Periode nicht erst mit der ersten Verhandlung, sondern bereits mit der Festnahme einer Person oder der Mitteilung der Behörden, daß gegen diese ein begründeter Verdacht vorliege, beginnen kann. In einem Fall setzte es den Fristbeginn schon mit dem Zeitpunkt der ersten Arrestnahme der Bf. an. 121 Bezüglich des Verfahrensendes wies das Gericht im Urteil Torri gegen Italien darauf hin, daß über einen Anspruch erst entschieden sei, wenn auch dessen Höhe gerichtlich bestimmt ist. Damit bemißt sich die Verfahrensdauer in den Fällen, in denen ein Anspruch nur stufenweise mit Hilfe mehrerer Klagen vor verschiedenen Gerichtsbarkeiten durchzusetzen ist, als Summe der Dauer der einzelnen Verfahren. 122 I n die Berechnung der zu untersuchenden Verfahrensdauer fließt auch die Ausführung eines Urteils mit ein. Diese ist integraler Bestandteil eines Prozesses, da andernfalls Art. 6 Abs. 1 seines Gehaltes beraubt werden würde. Dies gilt um so mehr in verwaltungsrechtlichen Verfahren, die für die Grundrechte des einzelnen wesentlich sind. I m Fall Hornsby gegen Griechenland gewährte das Gericht den Behörden zwar eine gewisse Umsetzungsfrist. Da sich diese jedoch mehr als fünf Jahre weigerten, das die Bf. begünstigende Urteil umzusetzen, beraubten sie Art. 6 Abs. 1 seines Inhalts und verletzten ihn daher. 1 2 3 In mehreren Urteilen betonte der Gerichtshof, daß sich die betroffenen Staaten nicht auf das Argument berufen können, ihre Gerichte seien überlastet. Sie sind vielmehr verpflichtet, ihre Gerichtsbarkeit so zu organisieren, daß diese den Anforderungen der EMRK entspricht. 124 Dies gilt auch für Gerichtsreformen. Ein Staat ist verpflichtet, derartige Umstrukturierungen so zu organisieren, daß die Überprüfung anhängiger Verfahren dadurch nicht verlängert wird. 1 2 5 In anderen Verfahren hielt das Gericht eine Verfahrensdauer von zwischen drei bis acht Jahren für zulässig.126 Beispielsweise akzeptierte es im Urteil Pafitis u. a. ge120 Vgl. Urteile Paskhalidis u. a. (Anm. 89), §§ 34 ff.; Doustaly gegen Frankreich A p r i l 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 850 (859), § 48.

vom 23.

121

Urteil Reinhardt und Slimane-Kaidgegen Frankreich vom 31. März 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 640 (660 ff.), SS 93 ff. 122

Urteil Torri gegen Italien vom 1. Juli 1997, Reports 1997-IV, 1172 (1178 f.), SS 19 ff.

123

Urteil Hornsby (Anm. 23), SS 40 ff.

124

Vgl. u. a. Urteil Philis gegen Griechenland (Nr.2) vom 27. Juni 1997, Reports 1997-IV, 1074 (1084), S 40. 125

Vgl. u. a. Urteil S.R. gegen Italien vom 23. A p r i l 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 830 (835 f.), S 21.

126

Urteile Proszak gegen Polen vom 16. Dezember 1997, Reports 1997-Vm, 2765 (2772 ff.),

464

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

gen Griechenland als verzögernde Umstände, daß noch eine Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes ausstand, eine zügige Verfahrensabwicklung durch einen Streik der griechischen Anwaltskammer nicht möglich war und schließlich die Entscheidung in einem anderen Fall abgewartet werden mußte. 127 I n mehr als 20 Urteilen stellte das Gericht jedoch eine Überschreitung der angemessenen Verfahrensdauer fest. Besondere Anforderungen galten dabei für die Entschädigungsansprüche der durch staatliche Bluttransfusionen HIV-infizierten Bluter, deren Erkrankung sich bereits in einem fortgeschrittenen Stadium befand. In jenen Fällen verletzten bereits relativ kurze Verfahrensdauern von nur einigen Jahren Art. 6. 128 b) Grundsätze des fairen Verfahrens gem. Art. 6 Abs. 1 Neben den Anforderungen, die das Gericht zu erfüllen hat, gewährt Art. 6 Abs. 1 dem einzelnen besondere Rechte in Form eines Anspruchs auf ein faires Verfahren. Art. 6 definiert diesen Begriff nicht näher, doch der EGMR hat in seiner Rechtsprechung immer neue Elemente, die ein faires Verfahren ausmachen, erarbeitet. Hierzu gehören unter anderem das Recht auf rechtliches Gehör sowie das auf Waffengleichheit und ein kontradiktorisches Verfahren. aa) Allgemeines I m Fall Tejedor Garica gegen Spanien wandte sich der Bf. gegen seine strafrechtliche Verurteilung, die ermöglicht wurde, weil die seiner Ansicht nach verspätet eingereichte Beschwerde des Staatsanwaltes gegen eine für ihn günstige Einstellungsverfügung zugelassen wurde. Das spanische Recht sieht vor, daß der Staatsanwalt binnen drei Tagen zu entscheiden hat, ob er die Fortsetzung des Verfahrens verlangen will. I m Fall Tejedor Garcia wurde diese Entscheidung erst nach zwei Monaten getroffen. Aus der Prozeßakte ließ sich nicht entnehmen, wann die Staatsanwaltschaft die Akte erhalten hatte, weswegen das nationale Gericht davon ausging, daß die Frist dennoch eingehalten worden war. Der EGMR befand, daß es sich hierbei um die Frage der Interpretation nationalen Rechts handele, welche vordringlich den nationalen Gerichten zukomme, es sei denn, sie sei willkürlich. Dies sei vorliegend

§§ 32 ff.; Hozee gegen die Niederlande vom 22. Mai 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 916, §§ 52 ff.; I.A. (Anm. 74), §§ 121 f. 127

Urteil Pafitis u. a. (Anm. 93), SS 91 ff.

128

Val u. a. Urteil Pailot gegen Frankreich vom 22. A p r i l 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 787 (803),

SS 66 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 19 auszuschließen und daher eine Verletzung des Rechts auf ein faires Verfahren abzulehnen. 129 I m Verfahren Helle gegen Finnland wies das Gericht darauf hin, daß die Grundsätze eines fairen Verfahrens von den nationalen Gerichten verlangten, daß diese ihre Entscheidungen begründeten. 130 Der Umfang der jeweiligen Begründung sei einzelfallabhängig. Ausgeschlossen sei es lediglich, daß eine höhere Instanz die Entscheidung der Vorinstanz genehmigt und sich nicht selbst mit dem Vorbringen der Parteien auseinandersetzt. 131 Das faire Verfahren habe auch für die Beweisaufnahme zu gelten. Diese sei zwar grundsätzlich Angelegenheit des nationalen Rechts, das Gericht könne aber überprüfen, ob das Verfahrens einschließlich der Beweisaufnahme insgesamt fair verlaufen ist. 132 Besondere Aufmerksamkeit müsse dabei dem Einsatz von verdeckt arbeitenden Polizeibeamten zukommen. In einem von dem Gericht zu untersuchenden Fall hatten diese den Bf. zum Ankauf von Heroin veranlaßt, wofür er später verurteilt wurde. Diese Maßnahme ging nach Auffassung des Gerichts über die von Undercover-Beamten normalerweise ausgeübten Tätigkeiten hinaus. Zudem deutete nichts darauf hin, daß das Verbrechen auch ohne das Zutun der Beamten verübt worden wäre. Daher war das Recht des Bf. auf ein faires Verfahren verletzt. 133 Die Bf. McGinley undEgan rügten ebenfalls eine Verletzung ihres Rechts auf ein faires Verfahren. Sie seien während ihrer Tätigkeit auf den Christmas Islands nuklearen Tests unterzogen worden und verlangten für ihre Entschädigungsansprüche Zugang zu angeblich vorhandenen Dokumenten, die diese Vorfälle betrafen. Das Gericht räumte ein, daß das Recht auf ein faires Verfahren eine Regierung verpflichtet, Dokumente, die die Bf. zur Durchsetzung ihrer Entschädigungsklagen benötigen, herauszugeben. Allerdings war es im vorliegenden Fall für das Gericht nicht ersichtlich, daß derartige Aufzeichnungen überhaupt existierten. Überdies stand den Bf. zur Erlangung etwaiger Dokumente ein von ihnen ungenutzter Rechtsweg offen. 134 Demzufolge war eine Verletzung des Art. 6 Abs. 1 nach Ansicht der Mehrheit der Richter nicht auszumachen. Abweichende Meinungen einiger Richter sahen allerdings bereits in dem Fehlen von Aufzeichnungen eine Verletzung des Art. 6 Abs. 1. 129 Urteil Tejedor Garcia gegen Spanien vom 16. Dezember 1997, Reports 1997-Vm, 2782 (2796 f.), §§ 31 ff. 130

Urteil Helle gegen Finnland vom 19. Dezember 1997, Reports 1997-Vin, 2911 (2928 f.),

§55. 131

Urteil Helle (Anm. 136), §§ 60 f.

132

Urteil Teixeira de Castro gegen Portugal vom 9. Juni 1998, LJD 1996 -1998, N r . 930, § 34.

133

Urteil Teixeira de Castro (Anm. 138), §§ 37 ff.

134

Urteil McGinley und Egan gegen Vereinigtes Königreich vom 9. Juni 1998, LJD 1996 1998, N r . 927, §§ 86 ff.

30 G Y I L 41

466

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

Art. 6 Abs. 1 schützt den einzelnen auch vor Eingriffen des Staates, die bezwekken, den Ablauf eines Gerichtsverfahrens zu beeinflussen. Einen solchen sah das Gericht i m Fall Papageorgiou gegen Griechenland gegeben, in dem das Parlament ein Gesetz erließ, das die Rückzahlung von Lohnabzügen für die Zukunft ausschloß und bestimmte, daß alle diesbezüglichen Prozesse von den Gerichtslisten zu streichen seien, obwohl der Bf. in einem solchen Verfahren bereits Berufung eingelegt hatte. 135 Eine weitere Garantie des Art. 6 Abs. 1 ist das Recht, sich nicht selbst belasten zu müssen. I m Verfahren Serves gegen Frankreich sah der Bf. dieses Recht als verletzt an, weil ihm eine Geldbuße auferlegt wurde, als er sich weigerte, unter Eid auszusagen. Das Gericht führte jedoch aus, daß der Zweck der Buße nicht darin bestand, den Zeugen überhaupt zu einer Aussage zu zwingen, sondern zu einer wahrheitsgemäßen Aussage. Aufgrund dessen war der Bf. nicht verpflichtet, sich selbst zu belasten, da er die Aussage nach Ablegung des Eides hätte verweigern können. 136 bb) Das Recht auf Anhörung in billiger Weise Ein weiteres Element des fairen Verfahrens ist die Gewährung rechtlichen Gehörs in billiger Weise. I m Verfahren Georgiadis gegen Griechenland rügte der Bf., daß ihm verwehrt wurde, in einem Entschädigungsprozeß wegen widerrechtlicher Inhaftierung auszusagen. Das Gericht hielt fest, daß ein Verfahren, in dem gerichtlich über zivilrechtliche Ansprüche entschieden wird, ohne das Vorbringen der Parteien zu hören, mit Art. 6 Abs. 1 unvereinbar ist. 137 Nach ständiger Rechtsprechung des Gerichts liegt eine Verletzung der Verfahrensgarantien des Art. 6 Abs. 1 erst dann vor, wenn kein nachfolgendes nationales Gericht die mögliche Mißachtung überprüfen kann. Bei einem Vorbehalt gem. Art. 64, demzufolge das von dem Bf. angerufene Gericht von der Verpflichtung befreit ist, die Parteien mündlich anzuhören, liegt keine Verletzung des Art. 6 Abs. 1 vor, wenn die Vorinstanz ebenso handelt. N u r diese Lösung ist sowohl mit dem Zweck des Vorbehalts als auch mit der Konvention vereinbar. 138 I m Urteil Nideröst-Huber gegen Schweiz hatte sich das Gericht damit auseinanderzusetzen, daß nach schweizerischem Zivilprozeßrecht ein Kantonsgericht bei Berufungen zum Bundesgericht zusammen mit der Akte eine eigene Stellungnahme an letzteres weiterleiten kann. Der Bf. rügte, daß er keine Einsicht in diese Stellungnah135

Urteil Papageorgiou (Anm. 29), §§ 37 ff.

136

Urteil Serves gegen Frankreich

vom 20. Oktober 1997, Reports 1997-VI, 2159 (2173 f),

SS 46 f. 137

Urteil Georgiadis (Anm. 90), SS 40 ff.

138

Urteil Helle (Anm. 136), SS 46 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 199 me hatte, bevor das Bundesgericht seine Berufung ablehnte. Der Gerichtshof befand, daß gerichtliche Stellungnahmen zur Berufung — wenngleich ein seltenes Phänomen innerhalb der Mitgliedstaaten — als solche nicht gegen die Grundsätze des fairen Verfahrens nach Art. 6 Abs. 1 verstießen, da sie Zeit und Kosten sparen und von einem unabhängigen Gericht abgegeben würden. 139 Anderes gelte für den Umstand, daß der Bf. die Stellungnahmen nicht habe einsehen können. Die Parteien eines Gerichtsverfahrens müssen Gelegenheit haben, alle Beweismittel und Stellungnahmen zu kennen und zu kommentieren, 140 zumal eine einseitige Stellungnahme seitens des Gerichts, das sich bereits gründlich mit der Sache befaßt hat, vom Bundesgericht kaum ignoriert werden wird. 1 4 1

cc) Die Grundsätze der Waffengleichheit und des kontradiktorischen Verfahrens Eine weitere Voraussetzung eines fairen Verfahrens ist, daß den Parteien Waffengleichheit und ein kontradiktorisches Verfahren gewährt wird. Letzteres ist mißachtet, wenn dem Bf. verweigert wird, sich vor Ende der Anhörung zum Vorbringen des procureur général zu äußern. 142 Die Bf. DeHaes und Gijsels rügten eine Verletzung ihres Rechts auf Waffengleichheit. In einem Strafverfahren wegen übler Nachrede gegen die Bf., zwei Journalisten, hatten die belgischen Gerichte deren Ersuchen um die Beibringung von Dokumenten als Zeugnis für unsorgfältige Tatsachenermittlung gewertet. Das Argument der Bf., sie verfügten zwar selbst über Dokumente, die ihre Behauptungen stützten, könnten diese aber nicht dem Gericht vorlegen, ohne ihre Informationsquellen zu gefährden, wurde von den nationalen Gerichten nicht anerkannt. Der EGMR betonte dagegen, das Bestreben der Bf., ihre Informationsquellen nicht zu kompromittieren, sei legitim. Darüber hinaus würden sich bereits aus den Artikeln, die Grundlage des Verfahrens wegen übler Nachrede waren, Hinweise auf eine sorgfältige Tatsachenermittlung ergeben. Damit stelle die Ablehnung des Antrags der Bf. durch die nationalen Gerichte eine Verletzung des Prinzips auf Waffengleichheit dar. 143 Auch im Fall Mantovanelli gegen Frankreich beschäftige das Gericht das Recht auf ein kontradiktorisches Verfahren. Vor dem EGMR rügten die Bf., daß ihnen natio139

Urteil Nideröst-Huber

gegen Schweiz vom 18. Februar 1997, Reports 1997-1, 101 (107),

§22. 140

Vgl. auch Urteile Van Orshoven gegen Belgien vom 25. Juni 1997, Reports 1997-ΙΠ , 1039 (1051), §§ 41 f.;/./. gegen die Niederlande vom 27. März 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 603 (613), § 43. 141

Urteil Nideröst-Huber

142

Urteile Van Orshoven (Anm. 146), §§ 41 f.;/./. (Anm. 146), § 43.

143

Urteil De Haes und Gijsels gegen Belgien vom 24. Februar 1997, Reports 1997-1,198 (239),

§58.

*

(Anm. 145), §§ 24 ff.

468

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

nale Gerichte im Rahmen eines Kunstfehlerprozesses keine Gelegenheit eingeräumt hatten, bei der Erstellung eines für den Prozeßausgang wesentlichen medizinischen Gutachtens beteiligt zu werden. Hierfür wurden Angehörige des Krankenhauses befragt, in dem der mögliche Kunstfehler begangen wurde, darunter sogar die betroffenen Arzte. Der Antrag der Bf., ein neues Gutachten zu erstellen, wurde ebenfalls abgelehnt. Der Gerichtshof kam zu dem Ergebnis, daß die rein formalen Anforderungen für ein kontradiktorisches Verfahren erfüllt waren. Jedoch konnten sich die Bf. nicht wirksam zum wesentlichen Beweisstück des Prozesses äußern. Daher war ihr Recht, auf billige Weise gehört zu werden, verletzt. 144 In einer abweichenden Meinung wurde dies kritisiert, da dadurch eine Vorverlagerung der Grundsätze des kontradiktorischen Verfahrens in das Stadium der Beweiserhebung vorgenommen werde. 145 3. Die Verfahrensgarantien

für den Beschuldigten gem. Art. 6 Abs. 2 und 3

In Art. 6 Abs. 2 und 3 werden einem Angeklagten besondere Rechte eingeräumt, die ein faires Verfahren gewährleisten sollen. 146 a) Die Unschuldsvermutung des Art. 6 Abs. 2 Der Übergang strafrechtlicher Schuld von Toten auf die Erben verstößt gegen die Unschuldsvermutung aus Art. 6 Abs. 2. Dies stellte das Gericht anläßlich der Beschwerde einiger Erben fest, denen eine Geldbuße für Steuerhinterziehung ihrer Erblasser auferlegt worden war. Dabei ging es nicht um die — unstreitige — Verpflichtung zur Zahlung der rückständigen Steuern, sondern um die zusätzlich strafrechtliche Sanktion in Form einer Geldstrafe. Das Gericht betonte, es sei eine fundamentale Regelung, daß die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit nicht die Person des Täters überlebt. 147 Keinen Verstoß gegen die Unschuldsvermutung stellt hingegen die Einbeziehung psychologischer Gutachten in ein strafrechtliches Ermittlungsverfahren dar, in denen die Schuld des Tatverdächtigen vorausgesetzt wird. Dies entschied das Gericht im Urteil Bernard gegen Frankreich, in dem der wegen mehrerer bewaffneter Raubüberfälle angeklagte Bf. behauptete, die während der Ermittlungsphase erstellten Gutachten zweier Psychiater, die ihn für schuldfähig und nicht rehabilitations144

Urteil Mantovanelli gegen Frankreich

vom 18. März 1997, Reports 1997-Π , 424 (436 f.),

SS 34 ff. 145

Urteil Mantovanelli (Anm. 148), 444 f.

146

Vgl. u. a. Urteil Foucher gegen Frankreich vom 18. März 1997, Reports 1997-Π , 452 (464),

S 30. 147

Urteile ΑΡ., M.P. und TP (Anm. 97), §§ 46 ff.; E.L., R.L. undJ.O.-L. (Anm. 97), §S 51 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 19 fähig hielten, würden sein Recht auf ein faires Verfahren sowie das Prinzip der Unschuldsvermutung verletzen. Das Gericht betonte, daß es nicht befugt sei, eine eigene Beweiswürdigung vorzunehmen, sondern allein die A r t und Weise, in der die Beweise erhoben wurden, überprüfen kann. Diese sei vorliegend jedoch nicht zu beanstanden gewesen, selbst wenn die in Frage stehenden Gutachten die Schuld des Bf. voraussetzten: Die Gutachten dienten nur dazu, die Gefährlichkeit des Bf. zu untersuchen, und um herauszufinden, ob es einen psychisch bedingten Grund für die vom Bf. aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach begangenen Taten gab. Sie stellten zudem nur einen Teil der Beweisaufnahme dar, zu der u. a. auch vom Bf. eingebrachte Beweise gehörten. Ihre Einbeziehung in die Urteilsfindung führe daher nicht zu einer Verletzung des Prinzips der Unschuldsvermutung. 148 b) Die speziellen Verfahrensgarantien des Art. 6 Abs. 3 aa) Unterrichtung des Beschuldigten über die gegen ihn erhobenen Vorwürfe — Art. 6 Abs. 3 lit. a) Nach der Rechtsprechung des EGMR soll die nach Art. 6 Abs. 3 lit. a) erforderliche Unterrichtung den Betroffenen in die Lage versetzen, seine Verteidigung vorzubereiten. Dieses Recht hielt das Gericht im Fall Foucher gegen Frankreich für verletzt. Der Bf. hatte gerügt, in einem gegen ihn gerichteten Strafverfahren wegen Beleidigung keine Akteneinsicht erhalten zu haben, obwohl er beabsichtigte, sich selbst zu verteidigen. Dies wäre ihm lediglich über einen Anwalt oder eine Versicherungsgesellschaft möglich gewesen. Das Gericht war der Ansicht, daß der Bf. dadurch gehindert war, eine entsprechende Verteidigung vorzubereiten. 149 bb) Das Recht, sich selbst oder durch rechtlichen Beistand zu verteidigen — Art. 6 Abs. 3 lit. c) Explizit verwies das Gericht im Urteil Belziuk darauf, daß Art. 6 Abs. 1 i. V. m. Abs. 3 lit. c) auch dann verletzt ist, wenn dem Bf. zwar der rechtliche Beistand eines Anwalts gewährt, ihm jedoch das Recht, sich selbst zu verteidigen, versagt wird. 1 5 0 Ein Verzicht auf das Recht, sich selbst zu verteidigen, kann nur ausdrücklich erfolgen. Dies stellte das Gericht im Fall Zana gegen Türkei fest. Der Bf. rügte, daß er nicht selbst an einer Verhandlung des National Security Court teilnehmen konnte. Die Regierung berief sich darauf, daß die Tatsachenermittlung im Auftrag des National Security Court von einem anderen Gericht vorgenommen worden war.

148

Urteil Bernard gegen Frankreich

SS 37 ff. 149

Urteil Foucher (Anm. 152), S 36.

150

Urteil Belziuk (Anm. 12), S 38.

vom 23. April 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 867 (879 f.),

470

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

Vor diesem Gericht habe sich der Bf. jedoch nur auf kurdisch geäußert, was als Verzicht aufgefaßt wurde, sich zu verteidigen. Der EGMR betonte, daß angesichts der Bedeutung des Grundsatzes eines fairen Verfahrens weder eine indirekte Befragung mit Hilfe eines beauftragten Gerichts, noch die Anwesenheit der Anwälte des Bf. vor dem National Security Court den Anforderungen des Art. 6 Abs. 1 und 3 lit. c) genüge.151 I m Urteil Daud gegen Portugal unterstrich das Gericht, daß ein Staat nur ausnahmsweise dafür verantwortlich gemacht werden kann, wenn der Verteidiger seine Aufgaben nicht ordnungsgemäß erfüllt. Grundsätzlich habe ein Staat für ein nicht ordnungsgemäßes Vorgehen der Verteidigung nicht einzustehen, unabhängig davon, ob es sich um einen Pflichtverteidiger oder um einen privat finanzierten Rechtsbeistand handelt. I n Fällen, in denen kein effektiver Rechtsbeistand i. S. v. Art. 6 Abs. 3 lit. c) geleistet wird, ergebe sich allerdings ausnahmsweise eine Verpflichtung des Staates zum Einschreiten, wenn dieser davon in Kenntnis gesetzt wird. 1 5 2 I m vorliegenden Fall war eine Pflichtverteidigerin vom portugiesischen Gericht nominiert worden. Diese nahm jedoch ihre Aufgaben über einen Zeitraum von acht Monaten nicht wahr und gab schließlich ihr Mandat auf. Obwohl das nationale Gericht aufgrund von Anträgen des Bf. Anlaß gehabt hatte, hiervon Kenntnis zu nehmen, verhielt es sich zunächst passiv und wies dem Bf. erst drei Tage vor Verhandlungsbeginn einen neuen Pflichtverteidiger zu. Dies führte zu einer Verletzung des Rechts des Bf. auf rechtlichen Beistand. 153 Schließlich umfaßt die Verfahrensgarantie des Abs. 3 lit. c) das Recht auf einen Pflichtverteidiger. Die Tatsache, daß das griechische Recht keinen staatlichen Rechtsbeistand in Berufungsverfahren vorsah, obwohl sich der Bf. im Urteil Twalib gegen Griechenland für sein Berufungsverfahren keinen Anwalt leisten konnte, sah das Gericht als Verletzung des Art. 6 Abs.l i.V. m. Abs. 3 lit. c) an. 154 cc) Die Rolle von Zeugen — Art. 6 Abs. 3 lit. d) I m Urteil Van Mechelen u. a. gegen Niederlande hatte sich das Gericht mit der Rolle der Zeugen in einem Strafprozeß und insbesondere mit der Frage, wann Zeugen anonym bleiben dürfen, auseinanderzusetzen. Die Bf. hatten gerügt, in einem Verfahren wegen bewaffneten Raubes aufgrund der Aussagen von Polizeibeamten verurteilt worden zu sein, die selbst anonym blieben. Das Gericht stellte zunächst fest, daß eine Abwägung der Interessen der Verteidigung auf umfassende Information mit dem Interesse der Zeugen an ihrer Anonymität besonders problematisch 151

Urteil Zana (Anm. 10), §§ 69 ff.

152

Urteil Daud gegen Portugal vom 21. A p r i l 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 739 (749 f.), § 38.

153

Urteil Daud (Anm. 158), §§ 42 f.

154

Urteil Twalib gegen Griechenland vom 9. Juni 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 929, §§ 55 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 is 199 ist, wenn die Zeugen Angehörige der Polizei sind. Diese unterliegen einer besonderen Gehorsamspflicht und stehen regelmäßig den Strafverfolgungsbehörden nahe. Bereits diese Umstände sprechen dafür, ein anonymes Zeugnis nur unter außergewöhnlichen Umständen zuzulassen. Darüber hinaus gehört eine Aussage vor Gericht zum normalen Tätigkeitsbereich der Beamten. Andererseits erkannte das Gericht an, daß das Interesse der Polizeibeamten an der Wahrung ihrer Anonymität in bestimmten Fällen, wie z. B. um weiterhin verdeckt zu arbeiten, sich und ihre Familien zu schützen sowie künftige Einsätze nicht zu gefährden, auch berechtigt sein kann. Dennoch dürfe der hohe Stellenwert, den ein faires Verfahren in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft hat, nicht außer acht gelassen werden. Jede Maßnahme, die die Rechte der Verteidigung beschränkt, muß daher erforderlich sein, d. h. es dürfen keine milderen Maßnahmen in Betracht kommen. 1 5 5 I m vorliegenden Fall befand sich die Verteidigung bei der Zeugenvernahme in einem anderen Raum und konnte die Zeugen nur akustisch wahrnehmen. Auf diese Weise war es ihr verwehrt, die Reaktion der Zeugen auf direkte Fragen zu sehen und so ihre Glaubwürdigkeit zu überprüfen. Diese Einschränkung der Rechte der Verteidigung befand das Gericht als zu weitgehend, zumal keine milderen Maßnahmen in Betracht gezogen worden waren. Daher entschied das Gericht, daß eine Verletzung des Rechts der Bf. auf ein faires Verfahren vorlag. 156

V I L Der Grundsatz nulla poena sine lege — A r t . 7 Eine Verletzung des Art. 7 kommt insbesondere in Betracht, wenn eine N o r m den Erfordernissen des Bestimmtheitsgrundsatzes nicht genügt. Hierfür ist der Fall Larissis u. a. gegen Griechenland anzuführen, in dem es um ein griechisches Gesetz ging, das den Proselytismus, d. h. die Verbreitung der Thesen der Zeugen Jehovas, verbot. Das Gericht lehnte einen Verstoß gegen das Bestimmtheitsgebot mit der Begründung ab, die hierzu erfolgte Rechtsprechung habe ebenfalls zu dessen Konkretisierung beigetragen. 157 V I I I . Die Freiheitsrechte der A r t . 8, 9,10 u n d 11 Zur besseren Ubersicht werden die Freiheitsrechte der EMRK zusammengefaßt betrachtet. Dabei wird zunächst auf den jeweiligen Schutzbereich der Artikel einge-

155

Urteil Van Mechelen u. a. gegen Niederlande vom 23. A p r i l 1997, Reports 1997-ΙΠ , 691 (712), SS 56 ff. 156

Urteil Van Mechelen u. a. (Anm. 161), SS 60 ff.

157

Urteil Lanssis u. a. gegen Gnechenland vom 24. Februar 1998, Reports 1998-1, 362 (377),

SS 34 f.

472

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

gangen und anschließend die vom Gericht vorgenommene Rechtmäßigkeitsprüfung der Eingriffe dargelegt. 1. Eingriff

in den Schutzbereich

a) Das Recht auf Achtung des Privatlebens und des Familienlebens — Art. 8 aa) Anspruch auf Achtung des Privatlebens Der Begriff des Privatlebens ist sehr weit gefaßt und entzieht sich einer abschließenden Definition. 1 5 8 Das Gericht hat daher unterschiedlichste Aspekte dieses Rechts herausgearbeitet. Obwohl grundsätzlich nicht öffentlich in Erscheinung tretendes sexuelles Verhalten zur Privatsphäre gehört, 159 unterstrich das Straßburger Gericht im Fall Laskey, Jaggard und Brown, daß nicht alle hinter verschlossenen Türen vorgenommenen sexuellen Handlungen in den Schutzbereich von Art. 8 fallen. Wenn sich an den Handlungen, hier sado-masochistische Aktivitäten, eine größere Anzahl von Personen beteiligen, es zur Werbung von neuen „Mitgliedern" kommt, speziell ausgestattete Folterkammern zur Verfügung stehen und Videos gefilmt und unter den „Mitgliedern" verteilt werden, sei es zweifelhaft, ob die sexuelle Aktivität als „Privatleben" i. S. v. Art. 8 Abs. 1 anzusehen sei. 160 Demgegenüber gehören Telefongespräche zum Privatleben einer Person, so daß Abhörmaßnahmen einen Eingriff in den Schutzbereich des Art. 8 darstellen und zwar unabhängig davon, ob das häusliche oder das Diensttelefon angezapft wird. 1 6 1 Ob die hierdurch gewonnenen Aufzeichnungen anschließend verwertet werden oder nicht, ist für das Vorliegen eines Eingriffes unerheblich. 162 Vertrauliche Unterlagen über den Gesundheitszustand einer Person fallen ebenfalls in den Schutzbereich des Art. 8 Abs. 1. Das Veröffentlichen derartiger Akten während eines Ermittlungsverfahrens stellt daher ebenso einen Eingriff dar 163 wie

158

Urteil Raninen (Anm. 24), § 63.

159

Vgl. Urteil Dudgeon gegen Vereinigtes Königreich vom 30. Januar 1981, Series A , no. 45, 18, § 41. 160

Urteil Laskey t Jaggard und Brown gegen Vereinigtes Königreich vom 19. Februar 1997, Reports 1997-1, 120 (131), § 36. 161

Urteile Haiford gegen Vereinigtes Königreich vom 25. Juni 1997, Reports 1997-ΙΠ , 1004 (1016 f.), § 48; Valenzuela Contreras gegen Spanien vom 30. Juli 1998, LJD 1996-1998, N r . 943, §§ 59 ff.; Lambert gegen Frankreich vom 24. August 1998, LJD 1996-1998, N r . 959, § 21. 162

Urteil Kopp (Anm. 17), § 53.

163

Urteil Ζ gegen Finnland vom 25. Februar 1997, Reports 1997-1, 323 (345 f.), §§ 87 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 is 199 deren Weiterleitung von einer Behörde zu einer anderen während eines Entschädigungsprozesses für einen Arbeitsunfall. 164 I m Fall Guerra u. a. gegen Italien bestätigte das Gericht zudem seine ständige Rechtsprechung, wonach das Recht auf Achtung des Privatlebens dem Staat auch positive Verpflichtungen auferlegen kann. Hierzu zählt die Verpflichtung des Staates, das Privat- und Familienleben der Bf. vor den von einer Düngemittelfabrik ausgehenden Gefahren soweit zu schützen, wie es ihm möglich ist. I m konkreten Fall beinhaltete dies zumindest die Pflicht, über die von der Fabrik ausgehenden Gefahren zu informieren. 165 I m übrigen ergibt sich in Fällen, in denen der Staat selbst gefährliche Maßnahmen, wie z. B. nukleare Tests, durchführt, neben der Informationspflicht über diese Gefahren auch die Pflicht, den Bf. einen effektiven Rechtsweg zu eröffnen, durch den sie alle relevanten und geeigneten Informationen erhalten können. 166 Die Reichweite der positiven Verpflichtungen eines Staates ergibt sich aus dem Umfang der gebotenen „Achtung" des Privatlebens, wobei dem Staat bei dessen Bestimmung ein Beurteilungsspielraum zusteht. N u r wenn eine unmittelbare Verbindung zwischen den vom Bf. geforderten Maßnahmen und seinem Privatleben nachzuweisen ist, muß der Staat handeln. I m Urteil Botta gegen Italien, in dem der körperlich behinderte Bf. ein Recht auf Zugang zu den Privatstränden seines Urlaubsortes behauptete, war eine solche unmittelbare Verbindung zu seinem Recht auf Achtung des Privatlebens nicht festzustellen. Die hieraus resultierende Beschränkung der zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen des Bf. befand das Gericht als zu unbestimmt, als daß sie dem Staat positive Verpflichtungen aufbürden könnten. 1 6 7 bb) Anspruch auf Achtung der Wohnung In den Urteilen Mentes u. a. gegen Türkei sowie Selcuk und Asker gegen Türkei hielt das Gericht fest, daß das Niederbrennen eines Hauses durch türkische Sicherheitskräfte einen sehr schweren Eingriff in die Rechte der Bf. auf Achtung ihres Privatund Familienlebens sowie ihrer Wohnung darstellt und sie daher verletzt. 168 Einen nicht ganz so schwerwiegenden Eingriff stellte in einem anderen Fall eine Hausdurchsuchung dar. 169

164

Urteil M.S. (Anm. 81), § 35.

165

Urteil Guerra u. a. (Anm. 9), §§ 58 ff.

166

Urteil McGinley und Egan (Anm. 140), § 101.

167

Urteil Botta gegen Italien vom 24. Februar 1998, Reports 1998-1, 412 (422 f.), §§ 33 ff.

168

Urteile Mentes u. a. (Anm. 26), § 73; Selcuk und Asker (Anm. 6), § 86.

169

Urteil Gamenzind gegen Schweiz vom 16. Dezember 1997, Reports 1997-Vm, 2880 (2891), § 35.

474

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler cc) Anspruch auf Achtung des Familienlebens

Nach ständiger Rechtsprechung des EGMR stellt die Ausweisung von straffällig gewordenen Ausländern, die in dem Staat, aus dem sie ausgewiesen werden, eine Familie haben, grundsätzlich einen Eingriff in deren Recht auf Achtung des Familienlebens dar. 170 Für die Beurteilung des Familienlebens des Auszuweisenden ist auf den Zeitpunkt des Erlasses der Ausweisungsanordnung abzustellen. I m Fall Bouchelkia befand das Gericht daher, daß ein aus Frankreich ausgewiesener und abgeschobener Algerier sich nicht auf ein Familienleben i. S. v. Art. 8 berufen kann, wenn er nach illegaler Rückkehr nach Frankreich die Vaterschaft gegenüber einem Kind französischer Nationalität anerkennt und dessen Mutter heiratet. 171 I m Fall X, Y und 2 gegen Vereinigtes Königreich ging es um das Vaterschaftsrecht eines transsexuellen Mannes. Beschwerdegrund war die Weigerung britischer Behörden, den Bf. X , einen Transsexuellen, im Anschluß an seine Geschlechtsumwandlung als Vater für das Kind der Y einzutragen, welches durch künstliche Befruchtung mit dem Samen eines anonymen Spenders (AID: artificial insemination by donor) empfangen worden war. Diese Weigerung wurde als diskriminierend empfunden, weil im Vereinigten Königreich üblicherweise die Partner von Frauen, die über A I D empfangen, als Väter eingetragen werden können. 172 Das Gericht bejahte zunächst die Anwendbarkeit des Art. 8 und bestätigte dabei seine bisherige Rechtsprechung, wonach der Begriff des Familienlebens nicht auf die eheliche Familie begrenzt ist, sondern auch faktische Beziehungen erfaßt. 173 I m Ergebnis lehnte es jedoch einen Eingriff in Art. 8 ab. Zur Begründung stellte der Gerichtshof in erster Linie auf den den Staaten zustehenden Beurteilungsspielraum ab, innerhalb dessen sie das Interesse des einzelnen gegen das der Gesellschaft abwägen können. Dieser sei vorliegend sehr weit, da es in Europa keine einheitliche Regelung gebe, die die Elternrechte Transsexueller sowie die Beziehungen des sozial die Vaterrolle übernehmenden Teiles zu den Kindern, die mit Hilfe anonymer Samenspender empfangen wurden, betreffen. 174 Darüber hinaus berücksichtigte das Gericht das Interesse der Staaten an einem kohärenten Familienrecht, das das Wohl des Kindes an erster Stelle plaziert. Es verwies darauf, daß durch eine Eintragung des X als Vater möglicherweise nicht nur positive, sondern auch negative Auswirkungen in anderen Bereichen des Familienrechts zu befürchten seien und daher die restriktive Haltung der Staaten bei der Anpassung des Familienrechts nachzuvollziehen sei. Dagegen sei 170 Vgl. u. a. Urteil Mehemi gegen Frankreich vom 26. September 1997, Reports 1997-VI, 1959 (1969), § 27. 171

Urteil Bouchelkia gegen Frankreich vom 29. Januar 1997, Reports 1997-1, 47 (63), § 41.

172

Urteil X, Y und Ζ gegen Vereinigtes Königreich vom 22. A p r i l 1997, Reports 1997-Π , 619 (643 ff.), abweichende Meinung zweier Richter. 173

Urteil X t Y und Ζ (Anm. 183), §§ 36 f.

174

Urteil X, Y und Ζ (Anm. 183), §§ 44 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 199 es dem K i n d zuzumuten, in seiner Geburtsurkunde keinen Vater aufzuweisen. Überdies wäre X nicht daran gehindert, im sozialen Sinne als Vater des Kindes aufzutreten und könne zudem das gemeinsame Sorgerecht mit Y beantragen. 175 Aus diesen Gründen habe der Staat seinen Beurteilungsspielraum nicht überschritten. I m Urteil Bronda gegen Italien entschied das Gericht, daß das Recht auf Achtung des Familienlebens auch die Beziehungen zwischen Großeltern und ihren Enkeln umfaßt. 176 b) Das Recht auf Gedanken-, Gewissens- und Religionsfreiheit — Art. 9 Das Gericht betonte im Urteil Kalac gegen Türkei, daß Art. 9 nicht jede religiös motivierte Handlung schütze. Vielmehr könne der einzelne genötigt sein, bei der Ausübung seiner Religionsfreiheit auf seine besondere Situation Rücksicht zu nehmen. Daher habe der moslemische Bf., der seine angeblich aus religiösen Gründen erfolgte Entlassung aus dem Militär rügte, bestimmte Einschränkungen seiner Rechte und Freiheiten aufgrund der militärischen Disziplin zu akzeptieren. Da er nicht daran gehindert war, den Verpflichtungen, die ihm sein Glaube auferlegte, wie beispielsweise regelmäßige Gebete und Moscheenbesuche, nachzukommen, lehnte das Gericht einen Eingriff in Art. 9 durch die Entlassung ab. 177 Durch Art. 9 wird nicht nur der eigene Glaube geschützt, sondern grundsätzlich auch das Recht, andere von seinem Glauben zu überzeugen. Daher stellte die Verurteilung der Bf. im Fall Larissis u. a. gegen Griechenland, in dem die Bf., Offiziere der griechischen Luftwaffe, wegen der Verbreitung der Thesen der Zeugen Jehovas unter Mitgliedern der Luftwaffe verurteilt worden waren, einen Eingriff in Art. 9 Abs. 1 dar. 178 c) Das Recht der freien Meinungsäußerung — Art. 10 Das Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung ist für politische Parteien aufgrund ihrer Eigenschaft als Repräsentanten der Wähler besonders wichtig. Das Unterbinden der Verbreitung von Flugblättern einer politischen Partei und die daraufhin erfolgende strafrechtliche Verurteilung des Parteivorsitzenden stellen daher einen äußerst schwerwiegenden Eingriff in Art. 10 dar und bedürfen einer strengen Überprüfung

175

Urteil X, Y und Ζ (Anm. 183), §§ 47 ff.

176

Urteil Bronda gegen Italien vom 9. Juni 1998,, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 931, § 51.

177

Urteil Kalac gegen Türkei vom 1. Juli 1997, Reports 1997-IV, 1199 (1209), §§ 27 ff.

178

Urteil Larissis u. a. (Anm. 163), §§ 51 ff.

476

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

durch das Gericht. Diese Grundsätze wiederholte das Gericht im Urteil Incal gegen Türkei m Art. 10 schützt auch unliebsame, schockierende Meinungen. Dies bestätigte das Gericht u. a. im Fall Oberschlick gegen Österreich (Nr. 2)™ Der Bf., ein Journalist, war wegen Beleidigung des österreichischen Politikers Haider verurteilt worden, weil er diesen in einem Artikel einen „Trottel" genannt hatte. Das Gericht betonte, daß der Schutzbereich des Art. 10 umso mehr für Kritik an Äußerungen von Politikern gelte. Zudem dürfe die Äußerung des Bf. nicht für sich betrachtet werden, sondern müsse im Zusammenhang mit dem gesamten Artikel sowie der diesem Artikel zugrundeliegenden Rede des betroffenen Politikers beurteilt werden. Selbst wenn der Artikel des Bf. als polemisch verstanden werden könne, so sei er im Vergleich mit den bewußt provozierenden Aussagen des Herrn Haider dennoch nicht als unverhältnismäßig anzusehen. Das Gericht nahm daher einen Eingriff in Art. 10 an. 181 I m Fall Bowman gegen Vereinigtes Königreich war die Bf. angeklagt, in der Zeit des Parlamentswahlkampfes 25.000 von 1,5 Mio. Flugblätter verteilt zu haben, auf denen die Einstellung der Kandidaten ihres Wahlkreises zur Abtreibung dargestellt wurde. M i t dieser Handlung hatte die Bf. gegen das englische Wahlkampfrecht verstoßen, wonach zum Schutz der Chancengleichheit zwischen den Kandidaten während der Wahlkampfperiode Ausgaben unbeteiligter Dritter, die fünf Pfund Sterling übersteigen und der Unterstützung eines der Kandidaten dienen sollen, verboten sind. Die daraufhin erfolgte Anklage mußte zwar wegen Fristablaufs fallen gelassen werden, bewirkte jedoch nach Ansicht des Gerichts dennoch einen Eingriff in das Recht der Bf. auf freie Meinungsäußerung, da bereits das in Frage stehende Gesetz mit der darin enthaltenen Strafandrohung von bis zu einem Jahr Gefängnis unmittelbar die Freiheit der Meinungsäußerung der Bf. i. S. v. Art. 10 Abs. 1 beeinträchtigt habe und die Verurteilung allein aus prozessualen Gründen nicht erfolgt • 182

sei. I m Urteil Lehideux gegen Frankreich ging es um die Eingrenzung des Schutzbereiches des Art. 10 durch das Mißbrauchsverbot des Art. 17, der es dem einzelnen untersagt, unter Berufung auf die EMRK zur Zerstörung der Konventionsrechte beizutragen. In diesem Fall hatte sich die große Kammer mit der Frage auseinanderzusetzen, ob die unkritische Darstellung Philippe Pétains, Ministerpräsident der französischen Vichy-Regierung während des zweiten Weltkrieges, in einer Anzeige der Tageszeitung „Le Monde" in den Schutzbereich des Art. 10 fällt. M i t dieser Anzeige wollten die Bf. eine Revision des 1945 entschiedenen Verfahrens wegen Völkermor179

Urteil Incal (Anm. 115), § 46.

180

Urteil Oberschlick gegen Österreich (Nr.2) vom 1. Juli 1997, Reports 1997-IV, 1266 (1274 f.), § 29; vgl. auch Urteil De Haes und Gijsels (Anm. 151), § 46. 181

Urteil Oberschlick (Anm. 191), §§ 30 ff.

182

Urteil Bowman (Anm. 15), § 33.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 is 1998 des gegen Philippe Pétain erreichen. Für die durchweg positive Darstellung Pétains wurden sie von der Staatsanwaltschaft angeklagt, was nach Auffassung der Bf. einen Eingriff in deren Recht auf Meinungsäußerungsfreiheit darstellte. Die Regierung berief sich hingegen darauf, daß das Verhalten der Bf. gem. Art. 17 der EMRK aus dem Schutzbereich des Rechts auf freie Meinungsäußerung falle, so daß die gegen die Bf. erhobene Strafanzeige nicht vom Gerichtshof überprüft werden könne. Das Gericht sah sich dennoch dazu befugt, die Anwendung des Art. 17 im Zusammenhang mit Art. 10 zu beurteilen. Es kam dabei zu dem Schluß, daß die beanstandete Anzeige zwar die Taten Pétains sehr einseitig, unkritisch und polemisch darstellen würde, letztendlich jedoch keine erwiesenen Tatsachen, wie z. B. den Holocaust, bestreiten würde. 183 Zwar sei es richtig, daß die Rechtfertigung der nationalsozialistischen Politik unter Art. 17 falle und daher nicht vom Schutzbereich des Art. 10 umfaßt werde. Vorliegend sei in der in Frage stehenden Anzeige jedoch nur Pétain selbst, nicht seine Politik, glorifiziert worden. Daher sei die Anzeige von Art. 10 umfaßt und die Strafanzeige gegen die Verfasser mithin ein Eingriff in dieses Recht. 184 Weitere Eingriffe in den Schutzbereich der freien Meinungsäußerung stellten z. B. die Verurteilung von Journalisten 185 oder die Verhaftung von Demonstranten dar. 186 d) Versammlungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit — Art. 11 I m Fall Vereinigte Kommunistische Partei der Türkei gegen Türkei entschied die große Kammer des Gerichts zum ersten Mal, daß auch politische Parteien in den Schutzbereich des Art. 11 fallen. Daß Art. 11 explizit nur die Bildung von Gewerkschaften schützt, sah das Gericht als bloße beispielhafte Aufzählung an, aus der nicht geschlossen werden könne, daß politische Parteien nicht den Schutz der Versammlungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit genießen würden. Vielmehr müßten derartige, für eine Demokratie unverzichtbare Vereinigungen in Anbetracht der herausragenden Bedeutung der Demokratie in der EMRK erst recht den Schutz des Art. 11 genießen. Daher bejahte das Gericht, daß die Auflösung der „Vereinigten Kommunistischen Partei der Türkei" durch das türkische Verfassungsgericht einen Eingriff in Art. 11 darstellte. 187

183

Urteil Lehideux gegen Frankreich

vom 23. September 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 996,

SS 47 ff. 184

Urteil Lehideux (Anm. 194), S 53.

185

Urteile DeHaes und Gijsels (Anm. 151), S 49; Worm (Anm. 27), S 36.

186

Urteil Steel u. a. (Anm. 57), §S 100 ff.

187

Urteil Vereinigte Kommunistische Partei der Türkei u. a. gegen Türkei vom 30. Januar 1998, Reports 1998-1,1 (17 f.), SS 24 f.; bestätigt i m Urteil Sozialistische Partei gegen Türkei vom 25. Mai 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 919, S 29.

478

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler 2. Rechtfertigung

der Eingriffe

Ein Eingriff in die Freiheitsrechte der Art. 8 - 1 1 kann gemäß deren Absatz 2 gerechtfertigt sein. U m dies festzustellen, untersucht das Gericht zunächst das Vorhandensein einer Rechtsgrundlage für den Eingriff, einen legitimen Zweck des Eingriffs und schließlich die Notwendigkeit des Eingriffs „in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft." Insbesondere der letzte Punkt, in dem es um die Abwägung der unterschiedlichen Interessen einschließlich der Frage, ob ein „dringendes soziales Bedürfnis" für die Einschränkung besteht, geht, wurde im Berichtszeitraum äußerst ausführlich behandelt. Aus Platzgründen kann allerdings nur auf einige für das Gericht wesentliche Abwägungskriterien eingegangen werden. a) Gesetzlich vorgesehen Fehlende oder nicht hinreichend bestimmt gefaßte gesetzliche Regelungen bei Eingriffen in die Freiheitsrechte konnte das Gericht hauptsächlich in den Fällen des Abhörens von Telefongesprächen feststellen. 188 Dabei verwies das Gericht wiederholt auf die zahlreichen Mindestvoraussetzungen, die ein derartiges Gesetz erfüllen muß, um dem Bestimmtheitsgebot zu entsprechen. 189 Auch eine Ermessensnorm muß bestimmte Mindestgarantien berücksichtigen und darf daher den Behörden nur einen begrenzten Ermessensspielraum einräumen. Dies betonte das Gericht im Urteil Petra gegen Rumänien, in dem die Korrespondenz des Bf., die dieser aus dem Gefängnis heraus mit der Kommission führte, automatisch und ohne richterliche Anordnung auf der Grundlage einer sehr weit gefaßten Ermessensnorm überprüft wurde. Diese Rechtsgrundlage hielt das Gericht für nicht ausreichend, um die Erfordernisse des Art. 8 Abs. 2 zu erfüllen. 190 b) Legitimer Zweck Kein Eingriff in ein Freiheitsrecht scheiterte im Berichtszeitraum daran, daß der von ihm verfolgte Zweck nicht legitim war. Die von den Staaten angegebenen Ziele umfaßten dabei nicht selten derart wichtige Zwecke wie beispielsweise die Verbrechensbekämpfung 191, die Sicherung der nationalen und öffentlichen Sicherheit 192 oder auch den Schutz der territorialen Integrität eines Staates.193 188

Urteile Haiford (Anm. 167), §§ 49 ff.; Kopp (Anm. 17), § 75; Valenzuela Contreras (Anm. 167), §§ 59 ff. 189

Urteil Valenzuela Contreras (Anm. 167), § 46.

190

Urteil Petra gegen Rumänien vom 23. September 1998, LJD 1996 -1998, N r . 995, §§ 37 ff.

191

Urteil Mehemi (Anm. 181), SS 28 ff.

192

Urteil Gngoriades gegen Gnechenland vom 25. November 1997, Reports 1997-VII, 2575 (2586 f.), SS 33 ff. 193

Urteil Vereinigte Kommunistische Partei der Türkei u. a. (Anm. 198), §§ 38 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 199 c) Notwendigkeit in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft Bei der Abwägung der Interessen der Betroffenen gegen die des Staates spielte zugunsten des Staates insbesondere das Vorhandensein von Vorkehrungen zum Schutz vor willkürlichen Eingriffen 194 , wie z. B. die Notwendigkeit einer gerichtlichen Ermächtigung 195 oder das Hinzuziehen von Sachverständigen bei der Entscheidungsfindung durch nationale Gerichte 196 , eine wichtige Rolle für das Straßburger Gericht. Zudem räumte das Gericht bei der Frage, ob der jeweilige Eingriff tatsächlich „notwendig" war, den Staaten unterschiedlich große Beurteilungsspielräume ein. I m Fall Laskey, Jaggard und Brown, in dem es um die strafrechtliche Verurteilung sadomasochistischer Praktiken ging, gestand das Gericht dem Vereinigten Königreich einen beträchtlichen Einschätzungsspielraum bezüglich der Frage zu, bis zu welchem Grad konsensual zugefügte Körperverletzungen rechtlich zu tolerieren sind und verneinte daher eine Verletzung von Art. 8. 197 Vergleichsweise klein war hingegen der Beurteilungsspielraum des Staates im Urteil Z. gegen Finnland, in dem die mit dem HIV-Virus infizierte Bf. die Veröffentlichung ihrer medizinischen Daten während eines Strafverfahren gegen ihren ebenfalls infizierten Ehemann zu verhindern suchte. 198 Das Gericht erkannte hier ihr Interesse an der Geheimhaltung als außerordentlich groß und im konkreten Fall auch als überwiegend an. 199 In den Fällen der Ausweisung straffällig gewordener Ausländer berücksichtigte das Gericht mehrere Gesichtspunkte bei der Uberprüfung der Rechtmäßigkeit des Eingriffs in Art. 8. Entscheidendes Kriterium für einen ungerechtfertigten Eingriff war eine äußerst starke familiäre Bindung im Aufenthaltsland. 200 Hingegen konnten die Schwere der begangenen Tat 2 0 1 sowie bestehende soziale Kontakte zum Heimatland 202 den Eingriff rechtfertigen. I m Fall Larissis u. a. gegen Griechenland untersuchte das Gericht die Rechtmäßigkeit der Verurteilung der Bf., Offiziere der griechischen Luftwaffe, wegen Verbrei194

Urteil MS. (Anm. 81), §§ 41 f f .

195

Urteil Camenzind (Anm. 180), § 46.

196

Urteil Bronda (Anm. 187), § 62.

197

Urteil Laskey, Jaggard und Brown (Anm. 166), §§ 42 ff.

198

Urteil Ζ (Anm. 169), § 70.

199

Urteil Z. (Anm. 169), § 112.

200

Urteil Mehemi (Anm. 181), §§ 36 f.

201

Urteile El Boujaidi gegen Frankreich vom 26. September 1997, Reports 1997-VI, 1980 (1992 f.), SS 40 ff.; Boujilfa gegen Frankreich vom 21. Oktober 1997, Reports 1997-VI, 2250 (2264 f.), SS 42 ff.; Bouchelkia (Anm. 182), S 51. 202

Urteil Dalia gegen Frankreich vom 19. Februar 1998, Reports 1998-1, 76 (91), S 53.

480

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

tung der Lehre der Zeugen Jehovas. Es sah hierin eine i. S. v. Art. 9 Abs. 2 gerechtfertigte Beschränkung der Glaubensfreiheit, soweit es die Bestrafung wegen Bekehrung Untergebener betraf. Diese hätten aufgrund der hierarchischen Struktur des Militärs wenig Möglichkeiten gehabt, sich ihren Vorgesetzten zu widersetzen. 203 Eine andere Beurteilung ergebe sich hinsichtlich der Versuche, Zivilpersonen zu bekehren, da diese sich der Beeinflussung durch die Bf. ohne weiteres hätten entziehen können. Eine Bestrafung wegen dieser Aktivitäten verletze daher das Recht der Bf. auf Glaubens- und Gewissensfreiheit. 204 Zurückhaltend war das Gericht bei der Rechtfertigung von Eingriffen in die Meinungsäußerungsfreiheit. I m Fall Incal betonte es, daß ein Staat, auch wenn er den für eine Demokratie äußerst wichtigen politischen Diskurs in gewissen Maßen reglementieren darf, dennoch von strafrechtlichen Sanktionen soweit wie möglich absehen sollte. Die Behörden hätten daher den Bf., der Parteivorsitzender einer türkischen Arbeiterpartei war, für das geplante Verteilen von Flugblättern nicht zu sechs Monaten Haft verurteilen dürfen, sondern hätten vielmehr zunächst eine Änderung des Textes erwirken müssen.205 Auch im Fall Bowman war der Eingriff in Art. 10 durch das Verbot der Verbreitung von Flugblättern aufgrund eines Verstoßes gegen das Wahlkampfgesetz nicht gerechtfertigt. Nach Ansicht der Mehrheit der Richter spielte das in Frage stehende verletzte Gesetz angesichts der Vielzahl der „checks and balances" im britischen Wahlsystem für die Einhaltung einer fairen Wahl eine relativ geringe Rolle. Die damit verbundene absolute Beschränkung der Meinungsfreiheit war daher unverhältnismäßig. 206 Hingegen kann die strafrechtliche Verurteilung von Journalisten gerechtfertigt sein, wenn während eines laufenden Strafverfahrens eine einseitige und damit zur Beeinflussung der Richter geeignete Berichterstattung über den Fall vorgenommen wird. 2 0 7 Ebenso hielt das Gericht im Fall Zana gegen Türkei die Verurteilung eines ehemaligen Bürgermeisters zu einer Gefängnisstrafe wegen einer Äußerung gegenüber Journalisten für gerechtfertigt. Aufgrund der Mehrdeutigkeit der Aussage, die ein Sympathisieren mit terroristischen Aktionen der PKK nicht ausschloß, und der gesellschaftlichen Position des Bf. bestand nach Ansicht des Gerichtshofes ein „dringendes soziales Bedürfnis", das den Eingriff rechtfertigte. 208 203

Urteil LaHssis u. a. (Anm. 163), § 51.

204

Urteil Larissis u. a. (Anm. 163), § 61.

205

Urteil Incal (Anm. 115), §§ 54 f.

206

Urteil Bowman (Anm. 15), §§ 41 ff.

207

Urteil Worm (Anm. 27), § 50.

208

Urteil Zana (Anm. 10), §§ 57 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 199 Für vereinbar mit dem Recht auf Meinungsfreiheit hielt das Gericht zudem die vorübergehende polizeiliche Ingewahrsamnahme von Demonstranten zum Schutz vor einem „Friedensbruch", sofern andernfalls nachweislich eine Gefahr der Unruhestiftung bestand.209 I m Hinblick auf die Vereinigungsfreiheit gem. Art. 11 kann nach Ansicht des Gerichts die Gefährdung der territorialen Integrität eines Staates aufgrund der Bildung einer politischen Partei deren Auflösung rechtfertigen. Wird die Partei, wie die Vereinigte Kommunistische Partei der Türkei, allerdings unmittelbar nach ihrer Gründung aufgelöst, so bestehen keine ausreichenden Anhaltspunkte für derartige, eine Auflösung rechtfertigende Aktivitäten. 2 1 0 I X . Recht der freien Wahl des Ehegatten — A r t . 12 I m Urteil Sheffield und Horsham gegen Vereinigtes Königreich rügten die transsexuellen Bf., daß ihnen eine Heirat nur mit Partnern unterschiedlichen biologischen Geschlechts gestattet sei. Dies sah das Gericht jedoch nicht als Verletzung des Rechts zur freien Wahl des Ehegatten an. Vielmehr diene Art. 12 gerade dem Schutze der Familie. Daher könne ein Staat durchaus nur die traditionelle Heirat zwischen Partnern, die nach biologischen Gesichtspunkten eine Familie gründen können, unter seinen Schutz stellen. 211 X . Beschwerdemöglichkeit gem. A r t . 13 1. Anwendbarkeit Art. 13 kommt zur Anwendung, wenn für den einzelnen, der eine Verletzung der Konvention behauptet, keine wirksame Beschwerdemöglichkeit vor den nationalen Gerichten besteht. I m Fall Camenzind gegen Schweiz bekräftigte das Gericht seine Rechtsprechung, wonach die Anwendbarkeit des Art. 13 nicht zwingend eine Konventionsverletzung voraussetzt, sondern lediglich die vertretbare Behauptung einer solchen. Es untersuchte hier eine Verletzung des Art. 13, obwohl es festgestellt hatte, daß der Eingriff in das Recht des Bf. auf Schutz seiner Wohnung gerechtfertigt gewesen war. 2 1 2

209

Urteil Steel u. a. (Anm. 57), §§ 104 f.

210

Urteil Vereinigte Kommunistische Partei der Türkei u. a. (Anm. 198), §§ 59 ff.; bestätigt in den Urteilen Sozialistische Partei u. a. (Anm. 198), §§ 45 ff. und Sidiropoulos u. a. gegen Griechenland vom 10. Juli 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 934, §§ 44 ff.

3

211

Urteil Sheffield

212

Urteil Camenzind (Anm. 180), §§ 53 ff.

GYIL41

und Horsham (Anm. 176), §§ 66 ff.

482

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler 2. Eingriff

Die Verfahrensgarantien der Art. 6 und Art. 5 Abs. 4 gelten als lex specialis zu der der allgemeinen Beschwerdemöglichkeit des Art. 13. Die Frage, ob den Bf. wegen einer behaupteten Konventionsverletzung eine Beschwerdemöglichkeit vor einer nationalen Behörde eingeräumt werden muß, hat das Gericht daher stets für nicht erörterungsbedürftig gehalten, wenn es bereits eine Verletzung des A r t . 6 Abs. 1 bejaht hat. 213 In mehreren Fällen, in denen ein Verstoß gegen Art. 2 oder 3 bereits festgestellt worden war, betonte das Gericht, daß die Behauptung der Bf., während des Polizeigewahrsams gefoltert worden zu sein, die Behörden des betreffenden Staates nach Art. 13 dazu verpflichte, eine gründliche und effektive Untersuchung durchzuführen, um die Täter zu identifizieren und zu bestrafen. 214 Diese Verpflichtung wurde den Behörden gem. Art. 13 auch in den Fällen auferlegt, in denen die Bf. das Niederbrennen ihrer Häuser durch türkische Sicherheitsbeamte und damit einen Eingriff in Art. 8 rügten. 215 I m Urteil Camenzind sah die Rechtsprechung des zuständigen nationalen Gerichts vor, daß lediglich Personen, die gegenwärtig von einer Hausdurchsuchung betroffen waren, dagegen gerichtlich vorgehen konnten. Der Eingriff in die Rechte des Bf. hingegen war nicht mehr gegenwärtig. Ihm stand damit keine Beschwerdemöglichkeit offen. Darin lag nach Ansicht des Gerichtshofes eine Verletzung des Art. 13. 216 X I . Das Diskriminierungsverbot — A r t . 14 Das Diskriminierungsverbot des Art. 14 ist kein eigenständiger Beschwerdegrund, sondern muß in Verbindung mit einem anderen Recht geltend gemacht werden. Selbst eine Ungleichbehandlung aufgrund des Geschlechts kann nicht allein aufgrund einer Verletzung des Art. 14 geltend gemacht werden. In Betracht kam daher im Urteil Van Raalte gegen Niederlande, in dem es um die Beitragspflicht zu einem staatlichen Kinderförderungsprogramm ging, nur eine Verletzung des Art. 14 i. V. m. Art. 1 des 1. ZP. Die beanstandete Regelung nahm kinderlose Frauen von über 45 Jahren von der Beitragszahlung aus, während kinderlose

213

Urteil Vasilescu gegen Rumänien vom 22. Mai 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 915, § 43.

214

Urteile Aydin (Anm. 41), § 103; Tekin (Anm. 48), §§ 66 ff.; Assenov u. a. (Anm. 9), §§ 117 f.; Kaya (Anm. 30), §§ 107 ff.; Ergi (Anm. 13), § 98; Yasa (Anm. 32), § 115; Kurt (Anm. 13), §§ 139 ff. 215

Urteile Mentes u. a. (Anm. 26), §§ 89 ff.; Selcuk und Asker (Anm. 6), §§ 96 ff.

216

Urteil Camenzind (Anm. 180), §§ 53 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 is 1998 Männer gleichen Alters weiterhin Beiträge leisten mußten. Der Gerichtshof betonte, daß für eine Ungleichbehandlung allein aufgrund des Geschlechts besonders triftige Gründe angeführt werden müssen. Die Begründung, die Bevorzugung von kinderlosen Frauen über 45 sei deswegen gerechtfertigt, weil diese sich — im Gegensatz zu Männern gleichen Alters — nicht mehr fortpflanzen könnten, hielt der Gerichtshof für nicht ausreichend und nahm daher eine Verletzung von Art. 14 i. V. m. der Eigentumsgarantie des Art. 1 des 1. ZP an. 217 Demgegenüber lehnte das Gericht im Urteil Petrovic gegen Österreich eine Verletzung des Art. 14 i. V. m. A r t 8 Abs. 1 aufgrund der Weigerung der Behörden, dem Bf. Erziehungsgeld zu gewähren, ab. Unstreitig war, daß das nur Müttern gewährte Erziehungsgeld nichts mit dem unmittelbar nach der Geburt gewährten Wochengeld zu tun hatte und es daher keinen geschlechtsspezifischen Grund gab, dem Bf. aufgrund seines Geschlechtes die Zahlung von Erziehungsgeld zu verweigern. 218 Das Gericht stimmte jedoch der Ansicht der Regierung zu, wonach ein Anspruch auf Erziehungsgeld ohnehin über den europäischen Standard hinausgeht. Die Entscheidung des Vertragsstaates, nur der Mutter Erziehungsgeld zu gewähren, liege daher innerhalb des ihm zustehenden Beurteilungsspielraumes. Zudem verwies das Gericht darauf, daß der Gedanke, auch Vätern Erziehungsgeld zu gewähren, relativ neu ist, so daß es einem Vertragsstaat nicht angelastet werden kann, wenn er nur Müttern Erziehungsgeld gewährt. I m übrigen habe Osterreich ein Jahr nach der vom Bf. behaupteten Konventionsverletzung das Gesetz ohnehin dahingehend geändert, daß nunmehr auch Väter Erziehungsgeld beanspruchen können. 219

X I I . Verletzung von A r t . 25 Eine Verletzung des Rechts auf die Beschwerdemöglichkeit bei der Kommission gem. Art. 25 stellte das Gericht u. a. im Urteil Kurt gegen Türkei fest, in dem die Bf. durch massiven Druck der Regierung, u. a. durch die Vornahme von Verhören, davon abzuhalten versucht worden war, ihre Beschwerde bei der Kommission aufrechtzuerhalten. 220 Dabei betonte es, daß Art. 25 jegliche Art von Zwang erfasse, folglich nicht nur direkten, sondern auch indirekt ausgeübten Zwang. 221 In einem anderen Urteil verstieß die erzwungene Unterzeichnung notarieller Urkunden, in denen die Bf. die Anrufung der Kommission leugnen mußten, ebenfalls

217 Urteil Van Raalte gegen Niederlande vom 21. Februar 1997, Reports 1997-1, 173 (186 f.), §§ 39 ff. 218

Urteil Petrovic gegen Österreich vom 27. März 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 579 (587), § 35.

219

Urteil Petrovic (Anm. 229), §§ 41 ff.

220

Urteil Kurt (Anm. 13), §§ 162 ff; vgl. Urteil Ergi (Anm. 13), § 105.

221

Urteil Kurt (Anm. 13), § 160.

*

484

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

gegen Art. 25. 222 I m Urteil Petra gegen Rumänien waren es die verbalen Drohungen eines Gefängnisbeamten gegenüber dem Bf., der aus dem Gefängnis heraus mit der Kommission Kontakt aufnehmen wollte, die das Gericht als illegitim und daher als unvereinbar mit Art. 25 ansah.223 X I I I . Die Eigentumsgarantie — A r t . 1 des 1. ZP 1. Schutzbereich Art. 1 des 1. ZP schützt allgemein das Recht auf Achtung des Eigentums (Abs. 1 S. 1) und speziell vor willkürlichen Enteignungen (Abs. 1 S. 2) sowie vor ungerechtfertigten Nutzungsregelungen (Abs. 2). Dabei beschränkt sich der Eigentumsbegriff des A r t . 1 des 1. Z P n i c h t n u r auf bewegliche u n d unbewegliche Sachen, son-

dern umfaßt auch Vermögenswerte Rechte, sofern diese unbedingt entstanden sind. I m Urteil National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society und Yorkshire Building Society gegen Vereinigtes Königreich hatte sich das Gericht mit der Frage auseinanderzusetzen, ob auch RückZahlungsansprüche in den Schutzbereich des Art. 1 fallen. In diesem Fall wandten sich die beschwerdeführenden drei Bausparkassen gegen ein mit rückwirkender Wirkung erlassenes Parlamentsgesetz, das ihnen die Möglichkeit nahm, bereits gezahlte Steuern zurückzufordern. Das Gericht ging von der Arbeitshypothese aus, daß es sich hierbei um unbedingt entstandene Ansprüche gehandelt habe, die in den Schutzbereich des Art. 1 des 1. ZP fielen. 224 2. Eingriffe Einen Eingriff in Art. 1 des 1. ZP bejahte das Gericht im soeben dargestellten Urteil National & Provincial Building Society aufgrund des beanstandeten Parlamentsgesetzes, das die Ansprüche der Bf. auf Rückzahlung ihrer Steuern unterband. 225 Auch das Niederbrennen von Wohnhäusern stellte einen Eingriff in das Recht auf friedliche Nutzung des Eigentums i. S. v. Art. 1 Abs. 1 S. 1 des 1. ZP dar 226 , ebenso 222

Urteil Assenov u. a. (Anm. 9), § 170.

223

Urteil Petra (Anm. 201), § 44.

224

Urteil National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society und Yorkshire Building Society (Anm. 109), §§ 67 ff. 225

Urteil National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society und Yorkshire Building Society (Anm. 109), § 74. 226

Urteil Selcuk und Asker (Anm. 6), § 87.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 199 wie die andauernde Beschlagnahmung von Eigentum aufgrund staatlicher Anordnung. Letztere kann darüber hinaus eine de facto-Enteignung darstellen. Dies stellte das Gericht im Urteil Vasilescu gegen Rumänien fest. Angesichts der jahrelangen ergebnislosen Bemühungen der Bf., den Besitz an ihren beschlagnahmten Gegenständen wiederzuerlangen, sah es die ohne gesetzliche Grundlage erfolgten Maßnahmen der Regierung als nicht gerechtfertigte de facto Konfiskation an. 227 3. Rechtfertigung

der Eigentumseingriffe

a) Eigentumsentziehung i. S. v. Art. 1 Abs. 1 S. 2 des 1. ZP Neben den in Art. 1 Abs. 1 S. 2 festgelegten Rechtfertigungsvoraussetzungen für eine Eigentumsentziehung muß einer Enteigung eine angemessene Entschädigung gegenüberstehen, um verhältnismäßig zu sein. Dabei ist eine Enteignungsentschädigung nach Ansicht des Gerichts nur dann eine angemessene Wiedergutmachung, wenn sie die aus der Länge der Eigentumsentziehung resultierenden Schäden mitberücksichtigt und innerhalb eines vernünftigen Zeitraums gezahlt wird. 2 2 8 Selbst eine ursprünglich angemessene Entschädigung mit einer Verzinsung von 30 % jährlich kann allerdings durch Zeitablauf unangemessen werden, wenn, wie in den Fällen Akkus gegen Türkei und Aka gegen Türkei, eine Inflation von 70 % den Wert der Summe erheblich reduziert. 229 b) Eigentumsnutzungsregelung i. S. v. Art. 1 Abs. 2 des 1. ZP Nach Art. 1 Abs. 2 des 1. ZP ist der Staat zu Eingriffen berechtigt, die er für die Regelung der Benutzung des Eigentums in Ubereinstimmung m i t dem Allgemeininteresse oder zur Sicherung der Zahlung von Steuern für erforderlich hält. Die Einhaltung dieser Kriterien wurde im Urteil National & Provincial Building Society von den beschwerdeführenden Bausparkassen bei dem Erlaß eines Gesetzes, das die Rückzahlung von Steuern rückwirkend untersagte, in Frage gestellt. Nach Ansicht des Gerichts überwog jedoch das Interesse der Allgemeinheit an der Sicherung der Zahlung von Steuern die Interessen der Bf. Diese wurden durch das beanstandete Parlamentsgesetz nicht übermäßig beeinträchtigt, da das Gesetz nur dazu diente, eine aufgrund technischer Mängel für nichtig erklärte Ubergangsregelung zu ersetzen. Darüber hinaus rechtfertigte nach Ansicht des Gerichts bereits der Umfang potentieller Rückforderungsansprüche, die Interessen der Bf. zurücktreten 227

Urteil Vasilescu (Anm. 224), § 53.

228

Urteil Guillemin (Anm. 14), § 54.

229

Urteile Akkus gegen Türkei vom 9. Juli 1997, Reports 1997-IV, 1300 (1310), §§ 30 f.; Aka (Anm. 22), §§ 44 ff.

486

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

zu lassen.230 Aus diesen Gründen lehnte das Gericht eine Verletzung der Rechte der Bf. aus Art. 1 des 1. ZP ab. X I V · Freie Wahlen - A r t . 3 des 1. ZP I m Urteil Gitonas u. a. gegen Griechenland bekräftigte das Gericht, daß Art. 3 des 1. ZP sowohl das Recht verleiht, zu wählen, als auch das Recht, gewählt zu werden. Die Bf. wehrten sich in diesem Fall gegen die Annullierung ihrer Wahl ins Parlament. Sie waren von der passiven Wahlberechtigung aufgrund Art. 56 der griechischen Verfassung ausgeschlossen, da sie in den letzten drei Jahren vor der Wahl mehr als drei Monate im Staatswesen beschäftigt gewesen waren. Das Gericht betonte zunächst, daß das Recht aus Art. 3 des 1. ZP nicht ohne Einschränkungen bestehe, hinsichtlich derer die Staaten über einen weiten Gestaltungsspielraum verfügten. Ein besonders weites Ermessen stehe den Staaten bei der Ausgestaltung des Status und der Wählbarkeit von Parlamentariern zu. 2 3 1 Dennoch sei das Gericht dazu berechtigt, in letzter Instanz zu entscheiden, ob etwaige Beschränkungen das Zusatzprotokoll seines Gehalts berauben und damit unzulässig sind. Dies war nach Ansicht des Gerichts im konkreten Fall allerdings nicht erfolgt. Die Regelung verfolge ein legitimes Ziel, indem sie die Beeinflussung der Wählerschaft durch Kandidaten, die wichtige Amter im Staatswesen innehatten, zu verhindern suche. Darüber hinaus fand das Gericht keine Anhaltspunkte dafür, daß die Annullierungen widerrechtlich, willkürlich oder unverhältnismäßig waren oder den freien Willen der Wähler bei der Zusammensetzung ihres Parlaments mißachteten. Aus diesen Gründen verneint es eine Verletzung von Art. 3 des 1. ZP. 2 3 2

X V . Der Grundsatz ne bis in idem — A r t . 4 des 7. ZP M i t dem Grundsatz ne bis in idem , wonach niemand wegen einer strafbaren Handlung mehrmals bestraft werden darf, hatte sich das Gericht im Urteil Oliveira gegen Schweiz auseinanderzusetzen. Die Bf. war für einen von ihr fahrlässig verursachten Autounfall von zwei schweizerischen Gerichten zu Geldstrafen verurteilt worden: Von einem für die Nichteinhaltung der zulässigen Höchstgeschwindigkeit und von einem anderen für die von ihr verübte fahrlässige Körperverletzung. Das zweite Gericht hob zugleich die erste, weitaus niedrigere Geldstrafe auf. Dennoch sah die Bf. hierin eine Verletzung des Grundsatzes ne bis in idem. Der EGMR lehnte 230

Urteil National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society und Yorkshire Building Society (Anm. 109), §§ 79 ff. 231

Urteil Gitonas u. a. gegen Gnechenland vom 1. Juli 1997, Reports 1997-IV, 1217 (1233 f.),

§39. 232

Urteil Gitonas u. a. (Anm. 242), §§ 40 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 is 1998 dies jedoch ab. Das Verhalten der Bf. habe vielmehr zu zwei in Idealkonkurrenz begangenen Taten geführt, wovon die schwerer wiegende die geringere überlagere. Obwohl es grundsätzlich üblich sei, derartige Taten an einem Gericht zu beurteilen, verstoße die im vorliegenden Fall geübte Praxis zumindest nicht gegen den Grundsatz des Verbotes einer mehrfachen Bestrafung i. S. d. Art. 4 des 7. ZP. 2 3 3 X V I . Angemessene Entschädigung — A r t . 50 1. Allgemeines Grundsätzlich steht es nach Ansicht des Gerichts den Staaten wegen Art. 1 frei, darüber zu entscheiden, welche Maßnahmen sie treffen, um Konventionsverletzungen auszugleichen. N u r wenn das nationale Recht keine diesbezüglichen Regelungen enthält, sieht sich das Gericht befugt, eine Entscheidung über eine Entschädigung gemäß Art. 50 zu treffen. 234 Es gewährt den Bf. im Rahmen des Art. 50 jedoch nur eine Entschädigung in Geld, da es weder die Folgen einer Verurteilung ungeschehen machen lassen kann, noch den Vertragsstaat anweisen darf, die in Frage stehende N o r m nicht mehr anzuwenden. 235 2. Materieller

Schaden

In 16 Fällen lehnte der Gerichtshof Entschädigungsansprüche der Bf. mangels einer kausalen Verknüpfung zwischen der Konventionsverletzung und dem geltend gemachten materiellen Schaden ab. 2 3 6 Lag diese hingegen vor, wurden die Entschädigungsansprüche der Bf. bewilligt. 237 Dabei berücksichtigte das Gericht bei deren Berechnung auch den erwiesenen Verlust von Gewinnchancen. 238 I n anderen Urteilen lehnte das Gericht eine Entschädigung ab, wenn unklar war, ob der Bf. ohne Konventionsverletzung in seinem eigentlichen Verfahren vor den nationalen Gerichten einen Entschädigungsanspruch gehabt hätte. 239 233

Urteil Oliveira gegen Schweiz vom 30. Juli 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 945, §§ 26 f.

234

Urteil Clooth gegen Belgien (Art. 50) vom 5. März 1998, Reports 1998-1, 486 (491 f.),

SS 14 ff. 235

Urteil Incal (Anm. 115), § 72.

236

Vgl. u. a. Urteil K.-F. (Anm. 61), S 77.

237

Vgl. u. a. Urteil De Haes und Gijsels (Anm. 151), S 63.

238

Urteile Pammel gegen Deutschland vom 1. Juli 1997, Reports 1997-IV, 1096 (1113), S 78, abgedruckt i n EuGRZ 1997, 310 - 317; Prohstermeier gegen Deutschland vom 1. Juli 1997, Reports 1997-IV, 1123 (1139), § 73, abgedruckt i n EuGRZ 1997, 405 - 410; Doustaly (Anm. 126), §54. 239

Vgl. u. a. Urteil Mantovanelli (Anm. 148), S 40.

488

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

Gem. Art. 54 Abs. 1 VerfO-A und Art. 56 Abs. 1 VerfO-B kann der Gerichtshof die Entscheidung über einen Antrag auf Entschädigung nach Art. 50 der Konvention unabhängig vom Ausgangsfall auf ein späteres Verfahren verschieben, wenn er sich außerstande sieht, hierüber sofort zu entscheiden. 240 Hiervon machte das Gericht dann Gebrauch, wenn noch eine Entscheidung der nationalen Gerichte ausstand, die es abwarten mußte 241 , oder es den nationalen Behörden Gelegenheit dazu geben wollte, mit den Parteien eine gütliche Einigung zu erzielen und dadurch den Fall gem Art. 54 Abs. 4 VerfO-A 2 4 2 bzw. A r t 56 Abs. 4 VerfO-B im Gerichtsregister streichen zu lassen. Blieb die gütliche Einigung aus, mußte erneut verhandelt werden, wie beispielsweise im Fall Akdivar u. a. gegen Türkei, der bereits 1996 entschieden worden war. Die Regierung hatte hier zwar behauptet, es sei eine gütliche Einigung i. S. v. § 54 Abs. 4 VerfO-A erreicht worden. Die große Kammer lehnte dies allerdings unter Hinweis auf die vage Formulierung und das zweifelhafte Zustandekommen des ihr zum Beweis vorgelegten Dokumentes ab. 243 Konsequenterweise entschied sie nunmehr selbst über die den Bf. zustehenden Ausgleichszahlungen, wobei es sämtliche von den Bf. behaupteten Schäden — zerstörte Häuser, zwangsweise Aufgabe ihres landwirtschaftlich nutzbaren Bodens, Verlust von Tieren und Futter sowie Kosten von Ersatzwohnungen — berücksichtigte und anschließend die zugemessenen Entschädigungssummen aufgrund der hohen Inflationsrate in der Türkei in englische Pfund umrechnete. 244 Anhand der in diesem Urteil getroffenen Maßstäbe entschied das Gericht noch in zwei weiteren Fällen über die Höhe der Entschädigungssumme. 245 Stets lehnte das Gericht allerdings Schadensersatz als Strafe für die Konventionsverletzungen {punitive and aggravated damages) ab. 246

240

Urteil Mentes u. a. (Anm. 26), § 104.

241

Urteil Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. u. a. gegen Belgien (Art. 50) vom 3. Juli 1997, Reports 1997-IV, 1292 (1297), § 14. 242

Urteile Die heiligen Klöster gegen Griechenland (Art. 50) vom 1. September 1997, Reports 1997-V, 1565 (1572), § 12; Katikaridis u. a. gegen Griechenland (Art. 50) vom 31. März 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 699 (703), § 11; Tsomtsosu. a. gegen Griechenland (Art. 50) vom 31. März 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 705 (710), § 11. 243

Urteil Akdivar u. a. gegen Türkei (Art. 50) vom 1. A p r i l 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 711 (717),

§ 14. 244

Urteil Akdivar u. a. (Anm. 254), § 34.

245

Urteile Mentes u. a. gegen Türkei (Art. 50) vom 24. Juli 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 936, §§ 13 ff.; Selcuk und Asker (Anm. 6), § 115. 246

§21.

Urteile Akdivar (Anm. 254), § 38; Selcuk und Asker (Anm. 6), § 119; Mentes (Anm. 256),

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 is 199 3. Immaterieller

Schaden

Wie bereits im vorherigen Berichtszeitraum hielt der Gerichtshof in zahlreichen Fällen, in denen die Bf. einen immateriellen Schaden im Rahmen des Art. 50 geltend machten, bereits die Feststellung einer Konventionsverletzung als Entschädigung für ausreichend. 247 Es gab jedoch auch zunehmend Fälle, in denen der Gerichtshof die Verletzung der Rechte der Bf. für so schwer hielt, daß seiner Ansicht nach die Feststellung einer Konventionsverletzung nicht ausreichte. Hier gewährte das Gericht zusätzlich eine Entschädigung in Geld für immateriellen Schaden. So wurde beispielsweise im Urteil Z. gegen Finnland eine Entschädigung dafür ausgesprochen, daß ein nationales Gericht Namen und HIV-Infektion der Bf. in seinem Urteil veröffentlicht hatte. Hinsichtlich des Umfangs der Entschädigung betonte das Gericht, daß es nicht durch nationale Praktiken gebunden sei, diese jedoch als Anhaltspunkt für seine Festsetzung nehmen könne. 248 Der häufigste Grund, der im diesjährigen Berichtszeitraum zur Gewährung einer Entschädigung für immaterielle Schäden führte, war eine überlange Verfahrensdauer: In über 20 Urteilen wurde hier Schadensersatz gewährt. 249 Daneben gab es jedoch auch zahlreiche andere Konventionsverletzungen, für die das Gericht immateriellen Schadensersatz zusprach, beispielsweise für die Folterung oder die Tötung durch Sicherheitsbeamte 250, für unrechtmäßige Haft 2 5 1 oder ähnliche schwere Verletzungen des Art. 5 2 5 2 , für das Abhören von Telefonen 253 oder für die Auflösung einer Partei. 254 X V I I . Sonstiges 1. Antrag auf Auslegung eines Urteils — Art. 57 VerfO-A / 59 VerfO-B I m Fall Hentrich gegen Frankreich hatte die Kommission nach Art. 57 Abs. 1 VerfO-A beantragt, das Gericht möge ein früheres Urteil auslegen. Das Gericht 247

Vgl. u. a. Urteil Sidiropoulos u. a. (Anm. 221), § 57.

248

Urteil Z. (Anm. 169), § 122.

249

Vgl. u. a. Urteil Stamoulakatos (Anm. 10), § 49.

250

Urteile Aydin (Anm. 41), § 131; Tekin (Anm. 48), § 77; Kaya (Anm. 30), § 122; Gülec (Anm. 33), § 88. 251

Vgl. u. a. Urteil Lukanov (Anm. 57), § 53.

252

Vgl. u. a. Urteil Papageorgiou (Anm. 29), § 56.

253

Urteil Haiford (Anm. 167), § 76.

254

Urteil Sozialistische Partei u. a. (Anm. 198), § 67.

490

Solveig Hansen und Birgit Kessler

lehnte dies mit der Begründung ab, die betreffende Passage sei eindeutig und die Interpretation würde das mit bindender Kraft ergangene Urteil abändern. 255 2. Antrag auf Wiederaufnahme

eines Verfahrens

— Art. 58 VerfO-A / 60 VerfO-B

I m Urteil Pardo gegen Frankreich entschied das Gericht über die Begründetheit eines nach Art. 58 Abs. 1 VerfO-A beantragten Wiederaufnahmeverfahrens, nachdem es 1996 bereits dessen Zulässigkeit bejaht hatte. I m Ergebnis lehnte es eine Revision ab, da die Einbeziehung bestimmter Dokumente, aufgrund derer eine Wiederaufnahme beantragt worden war, ohne wesentlichen Einfluß auf das ursprüngliche Urteil gewesen sei. 256 Den Antrag des Bf. im Revisionsverfahren Gustafsson gegen Schweden auf Wiederaufnahme gem. Art. 60 Abs. 1 VerfO-B aufgrund eines Verfahrensfehlers wies das Gericht ebenfalls zurück. Der Bf. rügte, daß das Gericht im 1996 entschiedenen Ausgangsfall Argumente der Regierung mitberücksichtigt habe, die diese erst vor dem Gericht und nicht, wie eigentlich erforderlich, bereits vor der Kommission erhoben hatte. Das Gericht betonte demgegenüber, daß es zwar die Argumente zur Kenntnis genommen habe, diese jedoch keinen Einfluß auf den Ausgang des Verfahrens gehabt hätten. Daher bedürfe es keiner erneuten Beweiswürdigung. 257 3. Streichung im Gerichtsregister

— Art. 49 VerfO-A / 51 VerfO-B

Der häufigste Grund, der zur Löschung bzw. Streichung eines Urteils im Gerichtsregister führte, war eine gütliche Einigung der Parteien nach Art. 49 Abs. 2, 1. A l t VerfO-A, respektive Art. 51 Abs. 2, 1. A l t VerfO-B 258 . I m Urteil Sur gegen Türkei hatten die Parteien nach Art. 49 Abs. 2 VerfO-A eine gütliche Regelung erzielt, nachdem die Kommission eine Verletzung der Rechte des Bf. aus Art. 3 festgestellt hatte. 259 Auch in den Fällen Marte und Archherger gegen Österreich sowie Hatami gegen Schweden war ein Bericht der Kommission, in dem eine Verletzung der Konvention durch die betroffenen Regierungen festgestellt wur-

255 Urteil Hentnch gegen Frankreich (1290), § 16. 256

(Auslegung) vom 3. Juli 1997, Reports 1997-IV, 1285

Urteil Pardo gegen Frankreich vom 29. A p r i l 1997, Reports 1997-ΙΠ , 735 (744), § 22.

257

Urteil Gustafsson gegen Schweden (Revision) vom 30. Juli 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 947, §§ 25 ff. 258

Urteile Telesystem Tirol Kabeltelevision gegen Österreich vom 9. Juni 1997, Reports 1997ΙΠ, 970 (978), § 29; Paez gegen Schweden vom 30. Oktober 1997, Reports 1997-VE, 2436 (2445), §29. 259

Urteil Sur gegen Türkei vom 3. Oktober 1997, Reports 1997-VI, 2034 (2040 f.), §§ 28 ff.

Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte — 1997 bis 199 de, ausschlaggebend dafür, daß die Regierungen sich um eine gütliche Einigung gem. A r t 51 Abs. 2 VerfO-B bemühten. 260 I m Urteil Clube de Futebol Uniao de Coimbra gegen Portugal betonte das Gericht, daß es trotz einer gütlichen Einigung der Parteien gem. § 51 Abs. 4 VerfO-B zu einer Überprüfung des Falles berechtigt sei, wenn es das öffentliche Interesse erfordere . 2 6 1 I m Fall P. L. gegen Frankreich erfolgte anstelle einer gütlichen Einigung ein Gnadenerlaß seitens der französischen Regierung. Hierin lag nach Auffassung des Gerichts ein „anderer Umstand" i. S. d. Art. 49 Abs. 2 VerfO-A, „der geeignet ist, eine Lösung der Streitigkeit herbeizuführen." 262 I n mehreren Fällen entschied das Gericht zudem, daß eine von der Regierung einredeweise geltend gemachte gütliche Einigung der Parteien nicht wirksam war und daher eine Fortsetzung des Verfahrens erforderlich sei. So hatte der Bf. im Fall Pailot gegen Frankreich eine umfassende Verzichtserklärung unterzeichnet, mit der er der Regierung zusagte, eine Geltendmachung seiner Rechte aus Art. 6 der Konvention zu unterlassen. Diesen Verzicht hielt das Gericht für unwirksam, da er die Rechte des Bf. zu weitgehend einschränke. Ein Verzicht auf die in der Konvention niedergelegten Rechte muß aufgrund ihrer Bedeutung für den einzelnen zumindest minimale Rechtsschutzgarantien enthalten. 263

260 Urteile Marte und Archherger gegen Österreich vom 5. März 1998, Reports 1998-1, 493 (498), § 19; Hatami gegen Schweden vom 9. Oktober 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 1013, § 25. 261

Urteil Clube de Futebol Uniao de Coimbra gegen Portugal vom 30. Juli 1998, LJD 1996 1998, N r . 949, § 42. 262

Urteil P. L. gegen Frankreich vom 2. A p r i l 1997, Reports 1997-Π , 581 (588 f.), §§ 26 f.; ebenso Urteile Penditis u. a. gegen Gnechenland vom 9. Juni 1997, Reports 1997-ΙΠ , 983 (990), § 19; B.B. gegen Frankreich vom 7. September 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 985, §§ 37 ff.; Ali gegen Schweiz vom 5. August 1998, LJD 1996 - 1998, N r . 952, §§ 30 ff. 263

Urteil Pailot (Anm. 134), § 52; vgl. auch Urteil Richard gegen Frankreich vom 22. A p r i l 1998, Reports 1998-Π , 809 (822 f.), § 48.

Die Tätigkeit des Ministerkomitees und der Parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarates in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 Von Tilmann Laubner und Fabian Marschall

I. Allgemeines 1. Sitzungen des Ministerkomitees und der Parlamentarischen Wahlen

Versammlung;

Das Ministerkomitee des Europarates (MK) trat im Berichtszeitraum 1997 bis 19981 zu seinen Sitzungen N r . 100 bis 103 zusammen. Die 100. Sitzung fand vom 5. bis 6. Mai 1997 unter der Leitung der finnischen Außenministerin Tarja Halonen statt. 2 Den Vorsitz der 101. Sitzung am 6. November 1997 hatte der Minister für Europaangelegenheiten im französischen Außenministerium Pierre Moscovici inne. 3 A m 5. Mai 1998 tagte das M K unter Vorsitz des deutschen Außenministers Klaus Kinkel zum 102. Mal. 4 Die 103. Sitzung am 4. November 1998 schließlich leiteten Giorgios Papandreou und Yannos Kranidiotis als Vertreter des griechischen Außenministers. 5 Die Abgeordneten der Parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarates (PV) kamen in den Berichtsjahren für je vier Sitzungswochen zusammen. So tagte die PV im Jahr 1997 vom 27. bis 31. Januar, 21. bis 25. April, 23. bis 27. Juni und 22. bis 26. September. Die Sitzungen des Jahres 1998 wurden vom 26. bis 30. Januar, 20. bis 24.

1

Der Bericht schließt an die Darstellung von Martin Mennecke und Christian Tams, Die Tätigkeit des Ministerkomitees und der Parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarates i n den Jahren 1995 und 1996, German Yearbook of International Law (GYIL), vol. 40,1997, 569 an. 2

Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Documents, Working Papers (hiernach Doc.) 7841, 1. 3

Doc. 7982, 1.

4

Doc. 8137, 1.

5

Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Final Communique 103rd Session of the Committee of Ministers, http://www.coe.fr/cm/sessions/1998/fcl03.htm .

Ministerkomitee

und Parlamentarische

Versammlung im Europarat

April, 22. bis 26. Juni und 21. bis 25. September abgehalten. Zu ihrer Präsidentin wählte die PV auch für die Sitzungsperioden 1997 und 1998 die seit Januar 1996 amtierende deutsche Christdemokratin Leni Fischer. 6 Die fünfjährige Amtszeit des seit dem 20. Juni 1994 amtierenden schwedischen Generalsekretärs Daniel Tarschys endet im Jahr 1999. 2. Mitgliedschaft

und Beobachterstatus

M i t den Beitritten Kroatiens und Rußlands7 hatte die nach dem Ende der OstWest-Konfrontation einsetzende Welle von Aufnahmen in den Europarat 1996 ihr zumindest vorläufiges Ende gefunden. Nachdem zwischen 1989 und 1996 22 Staaten aufgenommen worden waren, erfolgte in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 keine weitere Erhöhung der Zahl der Mitglieder. Damit gehören dem Europarat nunmehr 40 Staaten an. Allerdings liegt eine Reihe von Bewerbungen beitrittswilliger Länder vor. A m 18. März 1998 übermittelte die Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien (Serbien und Montenegro) dem Generalsekretär ihr Beitrittsersuchen, 8 so daß die Liste der Mitgliedschaftskandidaten derzeit sechs Staaten umfaßt. In den vorangegangenen Jahren hatten bereits Armenien, Aserbaidschan, Weißrußland, Bosnien-Herzegowina und Georgien ihre Aufnahme offiziell beantragt. 9 M i t dem Antrag Georgiens wird sich die PV während ihrer ersten Sitzungswoche des Jahres 1999 vom 25. bis zum 29. Januar befassen. Nachdem sich sowohl die PV als auch das M K im Berichtszeitraum mehrfach kritisch mit dem jugoslawischen Vorgehen insbesondere im Kosovo befaßt haben, 10 werden die Erfolgsaussichten der Belgrader Bewerbung allerdings wohl zunächst als gering eingeschätzt werden müssen. Den Status von Beobachtern besitzen die Vereinigten Staaten, Kanada und Japan. I I . Rechtliche Zusammenarbeit I n den Jahren 1997 und 1998 legte der Europarat vier neue Vertragswerke sowie fünf Protokolle zu bereits bestehenden Ubereinkommen zur Unterzeichnung auf.

6

Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Official Report of Debates (hiernach Debates) 1997, 4; Debates 1998, 5. 7 Zu einem Uberblick über die betreffenden Aufnahmeverfahren siehe Mennecke/Tams (Anm. 1), 570 ff.; zur Erfüllung der Aufnahmeverpflichtungen durch die neuaufgenommenen Mitglieder siehe unter Iü.3.a.cc. 8

Doc. 8059, 1.

9

Council of Europe, The Council of Europe, Activities & Achievements, Straßburg 1998, 5. 10

Docs. 8037, 8149; Debates 1998, 411 ff.

493

494

Tilmann Laubner und Fabian Marschall 1. Übereinkommen zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und der Menschenwürde im Hinblick auf die Anwendung von Biologie und Medizin: Menschenrechtsübereinkommen zur Biomedizin (ETS 164)n

M i t der am 19. November 1996 vom M K verabschiedeten sogenannten „BioethikKonvention" (BEK) hat der Europarat das erste internationale Vertragswerk auf dem Gebiet des biomedizinischen Fortschritts vorgelegt. 12 Die Frage, ob erhoffter Segen der rasch fortschreitenden Entwicklung im Bereich der Medizin und der Biologie oder befürchtete negative Folgen für die Achtung der Menschenwürde und der Menschenrechte überwiegen, bewegt eine Vielzahl von Menschen auch außerhalb von Fachkreisen. 13 Entsprechend ausgiebig und kontrovers war der Konventionstext daher auch in der PV erörtert worden. 14 Die sich grundsätzlich gegenüberstehenden Prinzipien, Schutz der Menschenwürde einerseits und Nutzen für gegenwärtige und zukünftige Generationen andererseits, finden sich auch in der Präambel der BEK. M i t Blick auf dieses besondere Spannungsverhältnis soll die BEK die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention und andere, universelle Menschenrechtsinstrumente ergänzen. 15 Dabei stellt Art. 2 als Ausgangspunkt klar, daß die Interessen und das Wohlergehen des einzelnen dem alleinigen Interesse der Gesellschaft oder der Wissenschaft vorgehen. Entsprechend stellt der Schutz der Würde und Identität aller Menschen sowie die unterschiedslose Gewährleistung der Achtung ihrer Unversehrtheit und anderer Rechte im Hinblick auf die Anwendung von Biologie und

11 Vorläufige Arbeitsübersetzung des Bundesministeriums der Justiz abgedruckt in: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik, Bd. 2, 1997, 285. Zur Entstehung der Konvention sowie zu einzelnen Bestimmungen siehe Council of Europe/Directorate of Legal Affairs, Explanatory Report to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being w i t h regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (hiernach ER Bioethik), D I R / J U R (97) 5, abgedruckt in: Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 18,1997,139; Ludger Honnefelder, Das Menschenrechtsübereinkommen zur Biomedizin des Europarates. Zur zweiten und endgültigen Fassung des Dokuments, Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik, Bd. 2,1997,305. Einen umfassenden Uberblick zur völkerrechtlichen Dimension der Materie geben Frank Bodendiek und Karsten Nowrot, Bioethik und Völkerrecht — Aktuelle Regelungen und zukünftiger Regelungsbedarf, Archiv des Völkerrechts, Bd. 37, 1999, Heft 2. Z u m ethischen Hintergrund siehe Eibe Riedel, Global Responsibilities and Bioethics: Reflections on the Council of Europe's Bioethics Convention, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, vol. 5,1997,179; sowie zum Standpunkt Deutschlands Adolf Laufs, Das Menschenrechtsübereinkommen zur Biomedizin und das deutsche Recht, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, Bd. 50,1997, 776. 12

Bodendiek/Nowrot

13

Näher hierzu id., I.

14

Vgl. Does. 7210, 7223, 7234, 7622, 7654, 7664.

15

ER Bioethik, Abs. 12.

(Anm. 11), Il.l.a).

Ministerkomitee

und Parlamentarische

Versammlung im Europarat

Medizin Zweck und Ziel des Übereinkommens dar (Art. 1). Seine Bestimmungen bedürfen gemäß Art. 1 Abs. 2 der Umsetzung in nationales Recht. 16 Dies gilt insbesondere für Art. 3, nach dem der gleiche Zugang zu Gesundheitsleistungen sicherzustellen ist, und für Art. 4, der die Einhaltung der in den jeweiligen Vertragsstaaten geltenden17 Grundsätze der Berufsausübung zur Bedingung für alle Eingriffe im Gesundheitsbereich macht. Kapitel I I regelt die Frage der Einwilligung des Betroffenen in einen Eingriff im Gesundheitsbereich. Dem menschenrechtlichen Ansatz des ersten Kapitels folgend knüpft die Legitimität der medizinischen Intervention an das Prinzip der freien, jederzeit widerruflichen Zustimmung nach Aufklärung an (Art. 5).18 Grundsätzliche Regelungen zum Schutz einwilligungsunfähiger Personen trifft Art. 6: Eingriffe dürfen nur zu ihrem unmittelbaren Nutzen und mit Einwilligung des gesetzlichen Vertreters vorgenommen werden, wobei der Wille des Vertretenen soweit wie möglich zu berücksichtigen ist. Eine Geisteskrankheit darf nur dann ohne Zustimmung des Betroffenen durch Eingriff behandelt werden, sofern anderenfalls schwere Gesundheitsschäden drohen (Art. 7). Gemäß Art. 8 können medizinisch notwendige Eingriffe in Notfällen, in denen eine vorherige Einwilligung nicht zu erhalten ist, ohne diese durchgeführt werden, wobei frühere Willensäußerungen nach Art. 9 Berücksichtigung zu finden haben.19 Gegenstand des dritten Kapitels ist das Recht des Patienten auf Schutz seiner gesundheitlichen Privatsphäre (Art. 10 Abs. 1) und auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung (Abs. 2). 20 Letzteres kann im Interesse des Patienten eingeschränkt werden (Abs. 3). 21 I m Anschluß an die genannten allgemeinen Bestimmungen folgen in den Kapiteln I V bis V I I Regelungen zu einzelnen, spezifischen Problemfeldern. Kapitel I V zum menschlichen Genom 2 2 verbietet die Diskriminierung aufgrund genetischer 16

Für eine unmittelbare Geltung insbesondere von individuellen Rechten wie dem Recht auf Datenschutz (Art. 10) Riedel (Anm. 11), 182. 17

ER Bioethik, Abs. 30.

18

Honnefelder (Anm. 11), 307.

19

Weitreichende Bestimmungen zum Schutz des Patienten vor Eingriffen, die ohne sein Einverständnis erfolgen, waren — mit teilweisem Erfolg — insbesondere von der PV gefordert worden, vgl. Debates 1995, 172 ff., 175 ff.; Doc. 7210, Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Texts Adopted by the Assembly (hiernach je nach Inhalt Recommendation, Resolution oder Opinion) 1995, Opinion 184; Debates 1996, 1063 ff., 1092 ff.; Doc. 7622; Opinion 198. 20

Siehe auch Anm. 16.

21

Riedel (Anm. 11) sieht in dieser Einschränkung und der Unbestimmtheit des Wortlauts einen Hinderungsgrund für eine schnelle Ratifikation des Abkommens, 188. 22

Vgl. auch UNESCO, Allgemeine Erklärung zum menschlichen Genom und den Men-

495

496

Tilmann Laubner und Fabian Marschall

Merkmale (Art. 11) und läßt prädiktive genetische Tests, die u. a. der Prognostizierung genetischer Krankheiten und Anfälligkeiten dienen, nur nach einer Beratung und ausschließlich zu gesundheitlichen Zwecken zu (Art. 12). Arbeitsmarkt und Versicherungswesen bleiben damit der Möglichkeit von Gentests grundsätzlich entzogen, Zwangstests im Strafverfahren unter dem Vorbehalt des Art. 26 Abs. 1 hingegen zulässig.23 Ebenfalls zulässig ist die somatische Gentherapie zu medizinischen Zwecken, während die Keimbahntherapie, d. h. die auch auf das Erbgut von Nachkommen abzielende Veränderung des Genoms, verboten ist (Art. 13). Die fortpflanzungsmedizinische Auswahl des Geschlechts eines Kindes ist unzulässig. Ausnahmen läßt Art. 14 nur zur Vermeidung schwerwiegender, geschlechtsgebundener Erbkrankheiten zu. Zu den umstrittensten Bestimmungen zählen die des fünften Kapitels zur Forschung am Menschen. 24 Art. 15 gewährleistet die Forschungsfreiheit vorbehaltlich der konventionseigenen sowie anderer Vorschriften zum Schutze des Menschen. Die Zulässigkeit von Forschungsvorhaben wird jedoch gemäß Art. 16 an folgende Voraussetzungen geknüpft: das Fehlen einer Alternative zur Forschung am Menschen, die Verhältnismäßigkeit der damit verbundenen Risiken für den Betroffenen, die vorherige Billigung des Projektes durch ein unabhängiges Gremium, die Aufklärung der Testpersonen über Rechte und Sicherheitsmaßnahmen sowie deren ausdrückliche, beurkundete Einzelfalleinwilligung im Sinne von Art. 5. Art. 17 Abs. 1 spezifiziert die allgemeine Regelung des Art. 6 zum Schutze einwilligungsunfähiger Personen. In Ausnahmefällen läßt Abs. 2 der Vorschrift auch fremdnützige Forschung unter strengen Voraussetzungen und nur bei minimaler Belastung und Gefahr für den Betroffenen zugunsten anderer, gleichaltriger oder unter derselben Krankheit leidender Personen zu. Die höchstumstrittene Frage nach der Zulässigkeit der Forschung an Embryonen in vitro richtet sich gemäß Art. 18 Abs. 1 nach der jeweiligen Rechtsordnung der Vertragsparteien: ist sie zulässig, ist der Embryo in angemessener Weise zu schützen.25 Einigkeit herrschte hinsichtlich des ausdrücklichen Verbots der Erzeugung von Embryonen zu Forschungszwecken (Art. 18 Abs. 2). 26

schenrechten, 11. November 1997, abgedruckt in: World Health Organisation, International Health Digest, vol. 49,1998, 417. 23

ER Bioethik, Abs. 84 - 87. Laufs (Anm. 11), 776.

25

Nach dem Embryonenschutzgesetz von 1990 ist die Forschung am Embryonen in vitro verboten, siehe Laufs (Anm. 11), 777 m. w. N.; zum Hintergrund des Streits, der Ablehnung einer Fristenlösung durch die PV und den verschiedenen Auslegungsmöglichkeiten des Wortlauts hinsichtlich der »verbrauchenden' Forschung an sog. überzähligen' Embryonen siehe Honnefelder (Anm. 11) 312 f. und Riedel (Anm. 11), 184 ff. 26

Honnefelder (Anm. 11), 312.

Ministerkomitee

und Parlamentarische

Versammlung im Europarat

Zum Komplex der Organentnahme finden sich Regelungen in Kapitel VI. Art. 19 stellt klar, daß Organe und Gewebe nur dann einem Lebendspender entnommen werden dürfen, wenn kein Organ eines Verstorbenen oder eine andere Alternative in Betracht kommt und dies allein dem medizinischen Nutzen des Empfängers dient. Die Einwilligung im Sinne des Art. 5 muß ausdrücklich und für den Einzelfall erklärt werden. Personen, denen die Einwilligungsfähigkeit nach Art. 5 fehlt, dürfen Organe und Gewebe grundsätzlich nicht entnommen werden (Art. 20 Abs. 1). Ausnahmen für die Entnahme regenerierbaren Gewebes sind nur unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen wie zur Rettung von Geschwistern zulässig (Art. 20 Abs. 2). Kapitel V I I verbietet die Erzielung finanziellen Gewinns mit Teilen des menschlichen Körpers (Art. 21) sowie deren Verwendung zu anderen als den von der Einwilligung des Spenders umfaßten Zwecken (Art. 22). Verletzungen der Bestimmungen des Ubereinkommens (Kapitel VIII) sind von den Parteien zu verhindern und zu unterbinden (Art. 23). Etwaige Verstöße sind zu ahnden (Art. 25). Geschädigte haben einen durch nationales Recht zu bestimmenden Anspruch auf Entschädigung (Art. 24). Die Schrankenklausel des Art. 26 Abs. 1 erlaubt die Einschränkung der in der Konvention enthaltenen Rechte und Schutzbestimmungen im Interesse der öffentlichen Sicherheit, zur Verbrechensverhütung und zum Schutze der öffentlichen Gesundheit sowie der Rechte anderer. 27 Art. 27 stellt klar, daß die BEK weiterreichenden nationalen Schutzvorschriften nicht entgegensteht, sondern lediglich gemeinsame Mindeststandards festlegt. 28 Daß die Diskussion auf dem Gebiet der Bioethik mit der Verabschiedung der BEK nicht beendet ist, macht Art. 28 deutlich, nach dem die Vertragsstaaten für deren geeignete Weiterführung Sorge zu tragen haben. In Fragen der Auslegung des Übereinkommens können sowohl die einzelnen Vertragsparteien als auch ein, nach Art. 32 Abs. 1 zur Umsetzung der Folgemaßnahmen einzurichtender Ausschuß, den Europäischen Menschenrechtsgerichtshof ohne Bezugnahme auf ein anhängiges Verfahren um die Abgabe einer beratenden Stellungnahme ersuchen (Art. 29). Zu den Folgemaßnahmen gehören ferner eine Berichtspflicht der Staaten betreffend die Anwendung des Übereinkommens (Art. 30) und die Weiterentwicklung der in ihm niedergelegten Grundsätze durch die Ausarbeitung von Protokollen. 29 Vorbehalte zu allen Bestimmungen der BEK sind nur unter Verweis auf konkrete, entgegenstehende nationale Gesetze zulässig (Art. 36 Abs. 1). 27

Ausgenommen sind Art. 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20 und 21 (Art. 26 Abs 2).

28

ER Bioethik, Abs. 161.

29

PV und M K hatten sie ausdrücklich als Rahmenkonvention in Auftrag gegeben, Honnefelder (Anm. 11), 314.

3

GYIL41

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Tilmann Laubner und Fabian Marschall

Seit dem 4. April 1997 steht die BEK den Mitgliedern des Europarates sowie den an ihrer Ausarbeitung beteiligten Nicht-Mitgliedsstaaten und der EG zur Unterzeichnung offen. Bislang haben 24 Staaten die BEK unterzeichnet. Von den zum Inkrafttreten erforderlichen fünf Ratifikationen liegen bis dato vier vor. Deutschland zählt nicht zu den genannten Staaten.30 2. Übereinkommen zur Anerkennung von Qualifikationen in bezug auf das Hochschulwesen in der Europäischen Region (ETS 165) In Zusammenarbeit mit der United Nations Educational , Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) hat der Europarat das Übereinkommen zur Anerkennung von Qualifikationen in bezug auf das Hochschulwesen in der europäischen Region ausgearbeitet und am 11. April 1997 zur Unterzeichnung aufgelegt. Es soll auf europäischer Ebene die rechtliche Regelung dieses Gebiets vereinfachen und langfristig die betreffenden, bereits existierenden Abkommen im Rahmen des Europarates und der UNESCO ersetzen. 31 Dabei bindet es die Vertragsstaaten selbst unmittelbar, verpflichtet darüber hinaus aber auch deren im Bereich der Anerkennung solcher Qualifikationen zuständigen Gebietskörperschaften zu seiner Umsetzung; Hochschulen mit eigener Zuständigkeit in Anerkennungsfragen sollen nach Möglichkeit für die Übernahme der Regelungen des Übereinkommens gewonnen werden (Art. II.l). Der Begriff der höheren Bildung im Sinne des Übereinkommens umfaßt alle Arten von Studien- und Ausbildungsgängen im Anschluß an die Sekundarstufe, soweit sie von den zuständigen Behörden der Vertragsparteien als Teil ihres jeweiligen Hochschulsystems anerkannt sind (Art. I). Ziel des Vertragswerkes ist es, die Anerkennung von Qualifikationen, die in einem anderen Vertragsstaat erworben wurden, zu erleichtern. 32 Dies gilt sowohl für Qualifikationen, die den Zugang zu Hochschuleinrichtungen gewähren (Abschnitt IV), als auch für Studienzeiten (Abschnitt V) und für Hochschulabschlüsse (Abschnitt VI). Entsprechend den in Abschnitt I I I niedergelegten Grundsätzen sind Anträge auf Anerkennung bzw. die zugrundeliegenden Qualifikationen in einem fairen Verfahren zu bewerten und innerhalb einer angemessenen Frist zu entscheiden. Widersprüche gegen Anerkennungsentscheidungen sind zu ermöglichen (Art. Π Ι.ν). Die Vertragsparteien werden verpflichtet, die Qualifikationen der ge30 Siehe www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/treaties.htm mit links zu u. a. den hier behandelten Vertragswerken, ihrem Wortlaut und dem jeweils aktuellen Stand zu Unterzeichnungen und Ratifikationen. Stand der hier angegebenen Informationen: 15. Januar 1999. 31

Vgl. Art. XI.4 Abs. 1 lit a. Ansonsten steht das Abkommen jedoch bestehenden wie künftigen, anderweitigen, günstigeren Anerkennungsregelungen nicht entgegen (Art. Π.3). 32

www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/abstracts/ eeducation.htm#etsl65.

Ministerkomitee

und Parlamentarische

Versammlung im Europarat

nannten A r t grundsätzlich anzuerkennen; die Anerkennung kann nur verweigert werden, wenn grundlegende Unterschiede zwischen den jeweils zu erfüllenden Anforderungen bestehen (Art. IV. 1, V . l , VI.l). Den Beweis für die Nichterfüllung von Voraussetzungen hat das die Anerkennung verweigernde Gremium zu führen (Art. III.3 Abs. 5). I m Zusammenhang mit Zugangsqualifikationen (Abschnitt IV) werden darüber hinaus folgende Regelungen getroffen: von einer Partei festgelegte, besondere Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für bestimmte Bildungsprogramme gelten grundsätzlich auch für die Inhaber von Abschlüssen aus anderen Vertragsstaaten (Art. IV.4); wird die Berechtigung zur Hochschulausbildung in einem der Staaten nur durch das Ablegen weiterer Prüfungen zusätzlich zum Schulabschluß erworben, können die übrigen dies ebenfalls voraussetzen (Art. IV.5); Zulassungsbeschränkungen und Auswahlverfahren sind vorbehaltlich der in Abschnitt I I I niedergelegten Grundsätze zulässig (Art. IV.6); insbesondere können ausreichende Sprachkenntnisse zur Voraussetzung einer Zulassung gemacht werden (Art. IV.7). Nach Anerkennung eines Hochschulabschlusses (Abschnitt VI), hat der Antragsteller gleichen Zugang zu weiteren Studiengängen, Prüfungen und Promotionsvorbereitungen wie die Inhaber von Abschlüssen der anerkennenden Vertragspartei. Gleiches gilt für das Recht, akademische Titel zu tragen (Art. VI.3). Gegenstand einer eigenen Regelung (Abschnitt VII) ist die Anerkennung der Qualifikationen von Flüchtlingen, Vertriebenen und Personen in flüchtlingsähnlicher Lage. Selbst für den Fall, daß diese Personen ihre in einem der Vertragsstaaten erworbenen Qualifikationen nicht durch Dokumente nachweisen können, werden die Parteien verpflichtet, festzustellen, ob diese Personen den Anforderungen für den Zugang zur Hochschulausbildung, zu weiteren Hochschulprogrammen oder zu Beschäftigungsmaßnahmen genügen. Die Abschnitte V I I I und I X geben den Vertragsparteien auf, Informationen u. a. über ihre jeweiligen Bildungseinrichtungen, deren Programme, mögliche Abschlüsse und deren Anforderungen bereitzustellen, um Vergleichsmöglichkeiten zu eröffnen und die wechselseitige Anerkennung zu erleichtern. Zu diesem Zweck sind nationale Informationszentren einzurichten (Art. IX.2). Für die Überwachung und Förderung der Umsetzung des Abkommens (Abschnitt X) ist neben dem Europäischen Netzwerk nationaler Informationszentren (ENIC Netzwerk, Art. X.3) ein eigens zu diesem Zweck geschaffener Ausschuß zuständig (Art. X . l ) , der neben dem Europarat auch der UNESCO Bericht erstattet (Art. X.2).

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Tilmann Laubner und Fabian Marschall

Nach Unterzeichnung durch 36 Staaten — unter ihnen Deutschland — und Erreichung der erforderlichen Anzahl von insgesamt fünf Ratifikationen 33 tritt das Ubereinkommen am 1. Februar 1999 gem. Art. XI.2 in Kraft. 3. Europäisches Ubereinkommen zur Staatsangehörigkeit

(ETS 166) 34

Seit dem 6. November 1997 steht das Europäische Ubereinkommen zur Staatsangehörigkeit zur Unterzeichnung offen. Nachdem sich die bisherige Zusammenarbeit des Europarates auf diesem Gebiet auf den Gesichtspunkt der mehrfachen Staatsangehörigkeit beschränkt hatte, 35 liegt mit diesem Abkommen erstmals ein Vertragswerk vor, das alle Hauptaspekte des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts umfaßt. 36 Einen entsprechenden Bedarf hatten die rechtlichen Entwicklungen der vergangenen Jahrzehnte sowie die politischen Veränderungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa nach 1989 geschaffen. 37 Zweck der Konvention ist die Aufstellung sowohl allgemeiner Grundsätze als auch spezifischer Einzelregelungen; dabei wird klargestellt, daß diese zum einen der Übernahme ins jeweilige nationale Recht der Vertragsparteien bedürfen und zum anderen ausschließlich auf natürliche Einzelpersonen Anwendung finden (Art. I). 3 8 Der durchgängig gebrauchte Begriff nationality wird als rechtliches Band zwischen Staat und Person ohne jeglichen Hinweis auf deren ethnische Herkunft definiert (Art. 2 lit. a).39

33

Drei dieser Ratifikationen mußten aus dem Kreis der Mitgliedstaaten des Europarates und/oder der U N E S C O Europa-Region stammen (Art. XI.2). Das Abkommen steht auch den Vertragsparteien anderer Europarats- und UNESO-Ubereinkommen offen, siehe dazu Art. X I . 1 Abs. 1 lit. c. 34

Ausführlich zum Hintergrund der Entstehung sowie zu den einzelnen Bestimmungen siehe Council of Europe, European Convention on Nationality and explanatory report, Straßburg 1997 (hiernach ER Staatsangehörigkeit) und Roland Schärer, The European Convention on Nationality, GYIL, vol. 40, 1997, 438. Vertiefend zur europäischen Dimension Siofra O'Leary/Teija Tiilikainen (eds.), Citizenship and Nationality Status in the New Europe, London 1998, mit Abdrucken des Übereinkommens und des Explanatory Reports. 35

Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, 6. Mai 1963, ETS 43 sowie die zugehörigen Protokolle vom 24. November 1977, ETS 95 und 96 sowie vom 2. November 1993, ETS 149. 36

ER Staatsangehörigkeit, Abs. 12.

"Id., 38 39

Abs. 11.

Id., Abs. 20 f.

Zur Notwendigkeit einer jeden ethnischen Bezug verneinenden Definition siehe Schärer (Anm. 34), 441. Die Ausdrücke nationality und citizenship sind i m Rahmen des Übereinkommens als synonym zu betrachten.

Ministerkomitee

und Parlamentarische

Versammlung im Europarat

Unter den in Kapitel I I niedergelegten allgemeinen Prinzipien findet sich an erster Stelle der Grundsatz der Souveränität eines jeden Staates in Fragen der Staatsangehörigkeit (Art. 3 Abs. 1). Anknüpfend an die Entscheidung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes im Nottebohm-Fall 40 gilt dieser Grundsatz nicht uneingeschränkt. Nationales Staatsbürgerschaftsrecht ist von den übrigen Staaten nur unter dem Vorbehalt der Ubereinstimmung mit einschlägigem Völkerrecht anzuerkennen (Art. 3 Abs. 2). Bestimmte Grundsätze sind ihm zugrundezulegen: das Recht auf Staatsangehörigkeit, 41 die Vermeidung von Staatenlosigkeit,42 das Verbot des willkürlichen Entzugs der Staatsangehörigkeit sowie das Verbot automatischer Auswirkungen auf die Staatsbürgerschaft eines Ehegatten bei Schließung bzw. Auflösung von Ehen mit Ausländern bzw. bei Wechsel der Staatsangehörigkeit durch den anderen Ehepartner (Art. 4 lit. a bis d). Art. 5 verbietet die Diskriminierung durch Staatsangehörigkeitsvorschriften (Abs l). 4 3 Lediglich eine Absichtserklärung enthält die Vorschrift hinsichtlich der Gleichbehandlung von Staatsbürgern durch Geburt und nachfolgend in anderer Weise zu solchen Gewordenen (Abs. 2). 44 Auf diesen allgemeinen Grundsätzen baut das dritte Kapitel zu Erwerb (Art. 6), Verlust (Art. 7 und 8) und Wiedererlangung (Art. 9) der Staatsbürgerschaft auf. Kinder sollen bei Geburt die Staatsangehörigkeit ihrer Eltern erwerben; 45 der Staatsangehörigkeitserwerb durch nicht-eheliche Kinder kann durch nationale Verfahren geregelt werden (Art. 6 Abs. 1). Kinder, die bei Geburt keine andere Staatsangehörigkeit erhalten, sollen Angehörige des Vertragsstaates werden, in dem sie geboren werden: entweder durch Gesetz bei ihrer Geburt oder, bei staatenlos Gebliebenen, auf Antrag nach höchstens fünf Jahren legalen, gewöhnlichen Aufenthalts (Art. 6 Abs. 2). Anderen sich rechtmäßig, gewöhnlich im Inland aufhaltenden Personen ist nach einer Zeit von höchstens zehn Jahren eine Einbürgerung auf Antrag zu ermög-

40

Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), ICJ Reports 1955, 4, 23.

41

Vgl. u. a. Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte, G A Res. 217 (ΠΙ) vom 10. Dezember 1948, U N Doc. A/810, Art. 15 Abs. 1. Nicht umfaßt ist jedoch das Recht auf eine bestimmte Staatsbürgerschaft, welches aufgrund von Art. 3 Gegenstand jeweiligen nationalen Rechts ist bzw. sein kann, ER Staatsangehörigkeit, Abs. 32. Z u Existenz und Inhalt des Rechts auf Staatsbürgerschaft siehe Johannes M. M. Chan, The right to a nationality as a human right — The current trend towards recognition, Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 12, 1991, 1. 42

Der Begriff des Staatenlosen umfaßt allein den de jure nicht aber den de facto Staatenlosen. V o n Bedeutung ist dies insbesondere für den Status von Flüchtlingen, ER Staatsangehörigkeit, Abs. 33. 43

Nicht unter den Begriff der Diskriminierung fällt die bevorzugte Behandlung von Angehörigen bestimmter Staaten, z.B. Mitgliedstaaten der EU, bei der Einbürgerung, id., Abs. 40 f. 44 45

Id., Abs. 45.

Ausnahmen sind zulässig bei außerhalb des betreffenden Staates geborenen Kindern (Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. a).

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liehen (Art. 6 Abs. 3). 46 Schließlich ist für den erleichterten Staatsbürgerschaftserwerb durch bestimmte Personengruppen, wie z.B. Ehegatten eigener Staatsangehöriger, Gastarbeitern der zweiten und dritten Generation und anerkannten Flüchtlingen, Sorge zu tragen (Art. 6 Abs. 4). Art. 7 greift das Verbot des staatlichen Staatsbürgerschaftsentzugs auf und stellt einen abschließenden Katalog von Ausnahmen auf, wie z.B. die freiwillige Annahme einer anderen Staatsangehörigkeit, ein Verhalten wider die vitalen Interessen des Staates oder das Fehlen eines genuine link 47 zwischen Staat und seinem gewöhnlich im Ausland lebenden Staatsangehörigen. Voraussetzung ist dabei grundsätzlich, daß der Betroffene durch die Aberkennung nicht staatenlos wird (Art. 7 Abs. 3). Der Staatsangehörige selbst soll das Recht zur Niederlegung seiner Staatsbürgerschaft haben, sofern er dadurch nicht staatenlos wird und der betreffende Staat dieses Recht nicht seinen im Ausland ansässigen Angehörigen vorbehält (Art. 8). Ehemaligen Staatsangehörigen ist eine erleichterte Wiedererlangung der Staatsbürgerschaft zu ermöglichen; Art. 9 beinhaltet jedoch kein Recht auf Wiedererlangung. 48 Die Verfahrensgrundsätze des vierten Kapitels verpflichten die Parteien, Entscheidungen über Erwerb, Beibehaltung, Verlust, Wiedererlangung und Beurkundung einer Staatsbürgerschaft innerhalb einer angemessenen Zeit zu treffen (Art. 10), sie schriftlich zu begründen (Art. 11), sie einer verwaltungsmäßigen oder rechtlichen Überprüfung zu öffnen (Art. 12) und diese Verfahren nicht mit unangemessenen Gebühren zu verknüpfen (Art. 13). Kapitel V trifft Regelungen zum Komplex der mehrfachen Staatsangehörigkeit. Sie ist grundsätzlich bei Kindern und Ehegatten zuzulassen, die eine weitere Staatsbürgerschaft automatisch durch Geburt bzw. Eheschließung erwerben (Art. 14). Weitergehende, den Kreis der Begünstigten vergrößernde Regelungen sind den Vertragsstaaten freigestellt (Art. 15).49 Ist die Aufgabe einer anderen (bisherigen) Staatsangehörigkeit im Einzelfall nicht möglich oder kann sie vernünftigerweise nicht verlangt werden, 50 darf dies nicht zur Bedingung für Erwerb oder Beibehaltung einer Staatsbürgerschaft gemacht werden (Art. 16). Inhaber einer weiteren Staatsbürgerschaft als der des Aufenthaltsstaates sind dessen übrigen Staatsangehörigen rechtlich 46

Den Staaten bleibt es unbenommen, die Einbürgerung an weitere gerechtfertigte Bedingungen, insbesondere i m Hinblick auf den Gesichtspunkt der Integration, zu knüpfen, ER Staatsangehörigkeit, Abs. 51. 47

Z u möglichen Anhaltspunkten für das Fehlen eines genuine link siehe id., Abs. 71.

48

Id., Abs. 82.

49

Vgl. hingegen die Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality (Anm. 35), Art. 4; zur Entwicklung zwischen den beiden Vertragswerken siehe ER Staatsangehörigkeit, Abs. 1 ff., 96 ff. Das Abkommen von 1963 nebst Protokollen bleibt weiter anwendbar (Art. 26 Abs. 2 lit. a). 50

So ζ. Β. bei Flüchtlingen oder Fällen der Staatennachfolge, ER Staatsangehörigkeit, Abs. 99 f.

Ministerkomitee

und Parlamentasche Versammlung im Europarat

gleichzustellen; die völkerrechtlichen Regeln zu diplomatischem und konsularischem Schutz sowie die jeweiligen nationalen Vorschriften zum internationalen Privatrecht bleiben unberührt (Art. 17). Keine Regelung hingegen findet sich in dem Vertragswerk zum Konflikt zwischen mehreren Rechtsordnungen als Konsequenz von mehrfachen Staatsangehörigkeiten. 51 Unter dem Titel „Staatennachfolge und Staatsbürgerschaft" werden in Kapitel V I Grundsätze zu einem der Kernbereiche des Ubereinkommens aufgestellt. 52 Art. 18 greift zunächst erneut das Rechtsstaatsprinzip und die Menschenrechte 53 sowie die in Art. 4 und 5 niedergelegten Grundprinzipien auf. Es folgen mit dem genuine and effective link 54 des von der Staatensukzession Betroffenen, seinem Willen, seinem gewöhnlichen Wohnsitz und seiner geographischen Herkunft Kriterien, die von den beteiligten Staaten bei der Entscheidung über Gewährung oder Verbleib ihrer Staatsangehörigkeit zugrundezulegen sind. 55 Art. 19 verpflichtet Nachfolgestaaten, Fragen der Staatsangehörigkeit sowohl im Verhältnis zueinander als auch im Verhältnis zu Drittstaaten auf vertraglicher Basis und unter Beachtung des Übereinkommens zu regeln. Nachfolgestaaten haben solchen Angehörigen des Vorgängerstaates, die auf ihrem Gebiet ansässig aber nicht eigene Staatsbürger geworden sind, ein Bleiberecht zu gewähren und sie im Hinblick auf soziale und wirtschaftliche Rechte gleich eigenen Staatsangehörigen zu behandeln (Art. 20). 56 Hinsichtlich der Frage des Wehrdienstes in Fällen mehrfacher Staatsangehörigkeit (Kapitel VII) gilt, daß der Betroffene in nur einem Staat Dienst zu leisten hat (Art. 21 Abs. 1). Zivil- und Wehrdienst sind gleichgestellt; die Befreiung vom Wehrdienst wirkt als Erfüllung der Dienstpflicht (Art. 22 lit. a). Ist die betroffene Person Bürger eines Staates ohne Dienstpflicht, kommt dies einer Dienstpflichterfüllung in anderen Staaten nur dann gleich, wenn diese Person bis zu einem bestimmten Alter ihren gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt in diesem Staat hatte (Art. 22 lit. b). 57 Kapitel V I I I sieht Mechanismen zur Zusammenarbeit (Art. 23), insbesondere zum Informationsaustausch zwischen den Vertragsparteien (Art. 24), vor. Letzteres betrifft sowohl allgemeine Informationen zur jeweiligen nationalen Gesetzeslage als 51

Näher hierzu id., Abs. 13.

52

Das ursprüngliche Vorhaben einer umfassenden Regelung dieses Komplexes war an den Unterschieden zwischen den von den Mitgliedstaaten vertretenen Positionen gescheitert, Schärer (Anm. 34), 454. 53

Vgl. Statute of the Council of Europe, 5. Mai 1949, ETS 1, Art. 3.

54

Vgl. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), ICJ Reports 1955, 4, 23.

55

Vertiefend Schärer (Anm. 34), 454 ff.

56

Z u Ausnahmen betreffend die Beschäftigung i m öffentlichen Dienst siehe ER Staatsangehörigkeit, Abs. 123. 57

Kapitel V E kann von der Anwendung ausgeschlossen werden und gilt ausschließlich i m Gegenseitigkeitsverhältnis (Art. 25).

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auch — unter dem Vorbehalt datenschutzrechtlicher Bestimmungen — konkrete Angaben über den freiwilligen Erwerb einer Staatsbürgerschaft durch Angehörige einer anderen Vertragspartei. Das Ubereinkommen steht günstigeren nationalen und völkerrechtlichen Regelungen nicht entgegen (Art. 26). Vorbehalte hinsichtlich der Kernabschnitte I, II, und V I sind nicht zulässig (Art. 29). Das Ubereinkommen tritt drei Monate nach Ratifizierung durch drei Mitgliedstaaten des Europarates in Kraft (Art. 27 Abs. 3). Gegenwärtig haben es 18 Staaten unterzeichnet und zwei Mitgliedstaaten ratifiziert. Von deutscher Seite liegen weder Ratifikation noch Unterzeichnung vor. 4. Übereinkommen zum Umweltschutz durch Strafrecht

(ETS 172)

A m 4. November 1998 wurde in Straßburg das Ubereinkommen zum Umweltschutz durch Strafrecht zur Unterzeichnung aufgelegt. Klargestellt wird eingangs, daß zwar einerseits Beeinträchtigungen der Umwelt vorrangig durch andere als strafrechtliche Maßnahmen verhindert werden müßten, letztere aber eine zunehmend wichtige Rolle spielten. Bezug genommen wird in diesem Zusammenhang insbesondere auf Umweltverschmutzungen durch juristische Personen. Ziel der Konvention ist die effektive Verfolgung und Bestrafung von Umweltverschmutzungen und die Stärkung der entsprechenden internationalen Zusammenarbeit (Präambel). I m Anschluß an die Begriffsbestimmungen des ersten Abschnitts, schreibt Sektion Π (Art. 2 bis 11) des Abkommens Maßnahmen vor, die von den Vertragsparteien auf nationaler Ebene zu ergreifen sind. Art. 2 stellt einen Katalog von Handlungen auf, die unter Strafe zu stellen sind. Hierzu gehören u. a. die Freisetzung tödlicher, schwer gesundheitsschädigender oder -gefährdender Mengen von Substanzen und ionisierenden Strahlen, die rechtswidrige Beseitigung, Ausfuhr etc. von gefährlichen Abfällen, der rechtswidrige Betrieb gefährlicher Anlagen und der rechtswidrige Umgang mit radioaktivem Material. Beihilfe und Anstiftung sind ebenso zu bestrafen (Art. 2 Abs. 2) wie auch die lediglich fahrlässige Begehung der in Art. 2 genannten Tatbestände (Art. 3 Abs. 1). Die Fahrlässigkeitsstrafbarkeit kann von den Parteien auf Fälle grober Fahrlässigkeit beschränkt werden (Art. 3 Abs. 2). Als Straftaten oder Ordnungswidrigkeiten sind ferner beispielsweise die rechtswidrige Lärmerzeugung oder Veränderung von Nationalparks, Wasser- und anderen Schutzgebieten zu ahnden (Art. 4). Territorialitäts-, Flaggenstaats- und Registerstaatsprinzip sowie aktives Personalitätsprinzip und der Grundsatz des aut dedere aut judicare bestimmen die Zuständigkeit der Vertragsstaaten (Art. 5). 58 Der Katalog vorgesehener Sanktionen umfaßt Maßnahmen von Haft- und Geldstrafen 58

Zulässig sind Vorbehalte zu den beiden letztgenannten Grundsätzen (Art. 5 Abs. 4).

Ministerkomitee

und Parlamentarische

Versammlung im Europarat

bzw. -büßen über solche zur Wiederherstellung der Umwelt durch den Täter (Art. 6) bis zur Beschlagnahme von Betriebsmitteln und Gewinnen (Art. 7 Abs. I). 5 9 Neben natürlichen Personen sollen, anknüpfend an die Präambel, juristische Personen, deren Organe, Organmitglieder oder andere Vertreter, die in ihrem Auftrag Umweltverstöße begangen haben, zur Verantwortung gezogen werden können (Art. 9). 60 Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Umweltschutz- und Strafverfolgungsbehörden ist sicherzustellen (Art. 10). Umweltschutzverbände und -gruppen können von den Vertragsparteien an Umweltstrafverfahren beteiligt werden (Art. 11). Auf internationaler Ebene verpflichtet Abschnitt I I I (Art. 12) die Parteien zu einem Höchstmaß an Zusammenarbeit bei den Ermittlungen und juristischen Verfahren zu den durch das Abkommen festgelegten Straftatbeständen. Unter den Schlußbestimmungen des vierten Abschnitts sieht Art. 19 die friedliche Beilegung von Streitigkeiten hinsichtlich der Auslegung oder Anwendung des Abkommens, beispielsweise durch den Europäischen Ausschuß zu Kriminalitätsproblemen, ein Schiedsgericht oder den Internationalen Gerichtshof, vor. Das Abkommen tritt drei Monate nach der Ratifikation durch drei Mitglied- bzw. an der Ausarbeitung beteiligte Nicht-Mitgliedstaaten des Europarates in Kraft (Art. 13 Abs. 3). Bislang ist es von sieben Staaten — unter ihnen Deutschland — unterzeichnet, nicht jedoch ratifiziert worden. 5. Sonstiges Neben den genannten Ubereinkommen hat das M K in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 fünf Protokolle zur Ergänzung bereits existierender Vertragswerke verabschiedet und zur Unterzeichnung vorgelegt. a) Das Zusatzprotokoll zum Übereinkommen über die Verlegung verurteilter Personen (ETS 167)61 steht seit dem 18. Dezember 1997 zur Unterzeichnung offen. Es trifft Regelungen für die Übertragung des Strafvollzugs in zwei Situationen. Zum einen für den Fall, daß ein Verurteilter, der nicht Bürger des ihn verurteilenden Staates ist, vor dem vollständigen Vollzug seiner Strafe in seinen Heimatstaat flieht. Eine Auslieferung an den verurteilenden Staat scheitert in diesem Zusammenhang meist an einem im Heimatstaat bestehenden Verbot der Auslieferung eigener Staatsangehöriger. 62 Art. 2 ZPVP räumt dem verurteilenden Staat daher die Möglichkeit 59

Bestimmte Vergehen bzw. Mittel und Gewinne können hiervon ausgenommen werden (Art. 7 Abs. 2). 60 Diese sog. corporate liability kann ganz, teilweise oder für bestimmte Tatbestände ausgeschlossen werden (Art. 9 Abs. 3). 61

Näher erläuternd Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons and explanatory report, Straßburg 1998 (hiernach ER ZPVP). 62

Id Abs.

6 lit. a.

505

506

Tilmann Laubner und Fabian Marschall

ein, den Heimatstaat des Verurteilten zu ersuchen, den Strafvollzug zu übernehmen. Das Einverständnis des Verurteilten ist für die Übernahme des Strafvollzugs nicht erforderlich (Art. 2 Abs. 3). Die zweite Regelung (Art. 3) betrifft Personen, deren Verurteilung ihre Ausweisung oder Abschiebung im Anschluß an den Strafvollzug zur Folge hat. Auch hier kann der Heimatstaat der verurteilten Person ohne deren Einverständnis auf Ersuchen des verurteilenden Staates den Vollzug der Strafe übernehmen. Bei einer solchen Entscheidung hat er allerdings die Meinung des Verurteilten in Betracht zu ziehen (Art. 3 Abs. 2). Weiterhin gilt gemäß Art. 3 Abs. 4 der Grundsatz der Spezialität, mit der Folge, daß der zu verlegende Verurteilte im Heimatstaat grundsätzlich für keine anderen, vor dem Transfer begangenen Straftaten belangt und inhaftiert werden darf, als für diejenigen, für welche der Strafvollzug übernommen wird. Ausnahmen bestehen, sofern der verurteilende Staat sie zuläßt, der Verurteilte nach vollständiger Verbüßung der Strafe den Heimatstaat nicht binnen 45 Tagen legal verlassen hat oder freiwillig nach Verlassen wieder in diesen zurückkehrt. Art. 3 Abs. 6 ermöglicht es den Vertragsparteien, die Übernahme des Strafvollzugs allein auf die Fälle des Art. 2 zu beschränken. 63 Das Zusatzprotokoll steht nach Art. 4 und 5 allen Parteien des Übereinkommens zur Unterzeichnung bzw. zum Beitritt offen. Es tritt drei Monate nach Hinterlegung der dritten Ratifikationsurkunde in Kraft (Art. 4 Abs. 2). Bislang liegen elf Unterzeichnungen jedoch keine Ratifikationen vor. Deutschland zählt nicht zu den Unterzeichnerstaaten. b) A m 12. Januar 1998 wurde das Zusatzprotokoll über das Verbot des Klonens menschlicher Wesen zum Übereinkommen zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und der Menschenwürde im Hinblick auf die Anwendung von Biologie und Medizin (ETS 168)64 zur Unterzeichnung aufgelegt. Kernbestimmung ist Art. 1 des Protokolls, der die Erschaffung menschlicher Wesen verbietet, die einem anderen lebenden oder toten Menschen genetisch gleich sind. 65 Unzulässig sind sowohl die Techniken der Embryonenteilung als auch der Zellkernverpflanzung. 66 Nicht von dem Verbot umfaßt ist das Klonen von Zellen und Gewebe zu Forschungszwecken mit Blick auf eine medizinische Anwendung. 67 Das Klonverbot des Art. 1 ist nicht derogierbar unter Art. 26 Abs. 1 der BEK (Art. 2 ZPBEK) und ist als Zusatzartikel der BEK zu betrachten (Art. 3). Das Protokoll steht den Vertragsparteien der BEK offen und tritt drei Monate nach der Ratifikation durch fünf Staaten, unter denen mindestens 63

Siehe hierzu id ., Abs. 36.

64

M i t näheren Erläuterungen: Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being w i t h regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings and Explanatory report to the Protocol, D I R / J U R (98) 7, Straßburg 1998 (hiernach ER ZPBEK). 65

Dies würde einen Verstoß gegen die Menschenwürde darstellen (Präambel).

66

ER ZPBEK, Abs. 2.

67

Id., Abs. 4.

Ministerkomitee

und Parlamentarische

Versammlung im Europarat

507

vier Mitglieder des Europarates sein müssen, in Kraft (Art. 4 bis 6). Als Nichtunterzeichner der BEK gehört Deutschland nicht zu den bislang 24 Unterzeichnerstaaten bzw. den drei Staaten, die das Protokoll ratifiziert haben. c) Seit dem 5. Mai 1998 steht das 2. Protokoll zum Europäischen Rahmenübereinkommen über die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit zwischen Gemeinden und Gebietskörperschaften betreffend die interterritoriale Zusammenarbeit (ETS 169, hiernach 2. PGZ) zur Unterzeichnung offen. Es dehnt die Anwendbarkeit des Rahmenübereinkommens sowie des ersten Zusatzprotokolls 68 auf das Gebiet der interterritorialen Zusammenarbeit zwischen Gemeinden und Gebietskörperschaften aus (Art. 3 bis 5 2. PGZ). Interterritoriale Zusammenarbeit wird definiert als Zusammenarbeit zwischen nicht benachbarten Gebietskörperschaften zweier oder mehrerer Vertragsstaaten bis hin zum Abschluß von Kooperationsvereinbarungen im Rahmen ihrer Zuständigkeiten und gemeinsamen Interessen (Präambel, Art. 1 und 2). Das Recht zu solcher Kooperation ist von den Vertragsparteien anzuerkennen (Art. 2 Abs. 1). Vereinbarungen zwischen den Gebietskörperschaften müssen im Einklang stehen mit den internationalen Verpflichtungen der betreffenden Vertragsstaaten des Protokolls (Art. 2 Abs. 1) und verpflichten lediglich die beteiligten Gebietskörperschaften (Art. 2 Abs. 2). Gemäß Art. 8 können dem Protokoll die Parteien des Rahmenabkommens beitreten. Es tritt drei Monate nach Hinterlegung der vierten Ratifikationsurkunde in Kraft (Art. 9) und ist bislang von sieben Staaten unterzeichnet worden. Schweden hat das Protokoll auch bereits ratifiziert. Deutschland gehört nicht zu den Signatarstaaten. d) Das seit dem 22. Juni 1998 zur Unterzeichnung offenstehende Änderungsprotokoll zum Europäischen Übereinkommen zum Schutz von Wirbeltieren, die für Versuchsund andere wissenschaftliche Zwecke benutzt werden (ETS 170) enthält Ergänzungen zu Verfahrensfragen. Art. 30 des Ubereinkommens zu den regelmäßigen Beratungen der Vertragsparteien wird neu gefaßt und um die Verpflichtung zur Ausarbeitung von Verfahrensregeln erweitert. Ein neu eingefügter Art. 31 regelt das Verfahren zur eventuellen Änderung der Anhänge A (Richtlinien zur Unterbringung und Pflege von Tieren) und Β (Statistiken und Erläuterungen) des Ubereinkommens. Das Protokoll tritt 30 Tage nach Beitritt aller Vertragsparteien des Ubereinkommens in Kraft. Bislang wurde das Protokoll von acht Staaten unterzeichnet und von Schweden auch bereits ratifiziert. Deutschland zählt nicht zu den Unterzeichnerstaaten. Seine Ratifikation ist jedoch für das Inkrafttreten erforderlich. e) Seit dem 1. Oktober 1998 liegt ein Änderungsprotokoll zum Europäischen Übereinkommen über grenzüberschreitendes Fernsehen (ETS 171, hiernach APGF) zur Unterzeichnung auf. Es soll der Erweiterung des Kreises der Europaratsmitglieder sowie den technologischen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen auf dem Gebiet der

68

Zusammenfassend Mennecke/Tams

(Anm. 1), 582.

508

Tilmann Laubner und Fabian Marschall

Fernsehübertragung Rechnung tragen (Präambel). 69 Das Protokoll trifft zunächst veränderte Regelungen zu Detailfragen. Broadcaster im Sinne des Ubereinkommens ist gemäß Art. 3 APGF nunmehr der Träger der redaktionellen Verantwortlichkeit für die Erstellung eines Fernsehprogrammdienstes anstelle des das Programm konkret Erstellenden (Art. 3). Der Begriff der Werbung wird über den der Werbung für Produkte und Dienstleistungen hinaus ausgedehnt auf jede öffentliche Ankündigung zur Äußerung und Förderung einer Sache oder eines Gedankens oder zur Erzielung eines anderen gewünschten Effekts (Art. 4). Neuregelungen finden sich zum Bereich der exklusiven Berichterstattung über Ereignisse, die von hohem Interesse und großer Bedeutung für die Öffentlichkeit sind. Das Recht der Öffentlichkeit auf Information über Ereignisse von hohem Interesse kann von den Vertragsstaaten durch Maßnahmen wie ein Recht auf Kurzberichterstattung gesichert werden (Art. 9). Ferner haben die Parteien das Recht, Listen solcher bedeutender Ereignisse aufzustellen, für die sicherzustellen ist, daß nicht ein Großteil der Öffentlichkeit von ihrer Übertragung dadurch ausgeschlossen wird, daß sie beispielsweise allein im pay-tv erfolgt (Art. 10). Das teleshopping wird in die Bestimmungen des Übereinkommens zur Werbung (Kapitel III) einbezogen (Art. 5, 11, 14 bis 19, 21, 22, 26). Durch ein neu einzufügendes Kapitel IY bis wird die Geltung des Übereinkommens insgesamt auf Programmdienste, die ausschließlich Selbstdarstellungen oder teleshopping zum Inhalt haben, ausgedehnt (Art. 26). Ebenfalls neu eingefügt wird ein Streitschlichtungsverfahren vor dem Ständigen Ausschuß des Abkommens in Fällen des angeblichen Rechtsmißbrauchs durch einen broadcaster (Art. 30). Das Protokoll tritt im Monat nach der Ratifizierung durch alle Vertragsstaaten des Übereinkommens in Kraft, vorbehaltlich des Einwands eines der Vertragsstaaten jedoch spätestens zwei Jahre nach Auflegung zur Unterzeichnung, d. h. am 1. Oktober 2000 (Art. 35). Bislang ist es weder zu Unterzeichnungen noch zu Ratifikationen gekommen.

I I I . Behandlung allgemeinpolitischer Fragen i m Europarat 1. Das Zweite Gipfeltreffen

der Staats· und Regierungschefs

A m 10. und 11. Oktober 1997 fand in Straßburg das Zweite Gipfeltreffen der Staats- und Regierungschefs statt. Neben den Staats- und Regierungschefs der 40 Mitgliedstaaten nahmen auch die der Staaten Armenien, Aserbaidschan, BosnienHerzegowina und Georgien teil. Kanada, Japan, die USA, der Heilige Stuhl, die Europäische Union und die OSZE waren ebenfalls vertreten. Nachdem schon 1993 in Wien ein Gipfeltreffen stattfand, wurde der zweite Gipfel auf Vorschlag der PV 7 0 ab69

Verwiesen wird i n diesem Zusammenhang auch auf die EG-Richtlinie 97/36 vom 19. Juni 1997, Amtsblatt der EG, N r . L 202, 1997, 60. 70

Vorbereitende Dokumente: Does. 7637 (1303), 7732,7786 (1324), 7921 (1342); nachbereitende Dokumente: Does. 7958, 7968 (1352), 7987, 7988, 7995, 8075; die beiden Berichte des

Ministerkomitee

und Parlamentarische

Versammlung im Europarat

gehalten, um die Rolle des Europarates in einem erweiterten Europa und bei der Globalisierung neu zu überdenken. Ergebnis des Zweiten Gipfeltreffens waren die abschließende „Straßburger Erklärung der Staats- und Regierungschefs des Europarats" und der „Aktionsplan zur Stärkung demokratischer Stabilität in den Mitgliedsstaaten." 71 I n der Abschlußerklärung legten die Staats- und Regierungschefs die Aufgaben des Europarates zum Eintritt in das nächste Jahrhundert dar. Dabei bestätigten sie ihren Einsatz für die Verbreitung der Menschenrechte und zur Stärkung der pluralistischen Demokratie als Stabilitätsfaktor in Europa. Ferner erkannten sie die Bedeutung des sozialen Zusammenhalts als ein Haupterfordernis im erweiterten Europa an. Die Staats- und Regierungschefs teilten die Sorge der Bürger vor Bedrohungen ihrer Sicherheit und den Gefahren dieser Bedrohungen für die Demokratie. Sie drückten ihr Bewußtsein für die erzieherische und kulturelle Dimension der zukünftigen Herausforderungen aus sowie für die Bedeutung von Erziehung und Kultur im Hinblick auf das gegenseitige Verständnis und Vertrauen der Völker. Der Aktionsplan umfaßt schwerpunktmäßig die vier Themen Demokratie und Menschenrechte, sozialer Zusammenhalt, Sicherheit der Bürger sowie demokratische Werte und kulturelle Vielfalt. So begrüßten die Staats- und Regierungschefs u. a. den Vorschlag, das A m t eines Kommissars für Menschenrechte einzurichten. Die Einhaltung der durch die Mitgliedsländer eingegangenen Verpflichtungen soll mittels eines vertraulichen, konstruktiven und nicht diskriminierenden Dialogs im M K sichergestellt werden, wobei das Kontrollverfahren der PV berücksichtigt werden soll. Auf dem Gebiet des sozialen Zusammenhalts wollen die Staats- und Regierungschefs u. a. die in der Sozialcharta und anderen Instrumenten des Europarates verankerten Normen fördern. Zudem beschlossen sie, die Aktivitäten des Sozialentwicklungsfonds zu fördern und beauftragten das M K , eine neue Strategie des sozialen Zusammenhalts festzulegen. U m die Sicherheit der Bürger zu gewährleisten, fordern die Staats- und Regierungschefs zusätzliche Maßnahmen im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus. Ferner kamen sie überein, die Bekämpfung von Korruption und organisierter Kriminalität sowie Drogensucht zu verstärken und den Schutz von Kindern zu verbessern. I m Bereich der demokratischen Werte und der kulturellen Vielfalt vereinbarten sie, eine Initiative zur Erziehung zum demokratischen Staatsbürger ins Leben zu rufen und das europäische Erbe aufzuwerten. Außerdem wurde beschlossen, eine europäische Politik für die Anwendung neuer Informationstechnologien zu entwickeln. Nachbereitungskomitees sind i m Internet abrufbar unter http://www.coe.fr/cm/reports/ 1998/98cm69.htm und http://www.coe.fr/cm/reports/1998/98cml80.htm . 71

Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift (EuGRZ), Bd. 24,1997,523 ff.; auf französisch auch in: Revue Universelle de Droit de l'Homme (RUDH), vol. 9, 1997, 475.

509

510

Tilmann Laubner und Fabian Marschall

Neben den vier Schwerpunktgebieten enthält der Aktionsplan den Auftrag an das M K , Strukturreformen durchzuführen. Damit soll der Europarat an die neuen Aufgaben und seine erweiterte Zusammensetzung angepaßt und der Entscheidungsfindungsprozeß verbessert werden. Infolgedessen hat das M K daher auf seiner 101. Sitzung im November 1997 beschlossen, ein Komitee der Weisen zu errichten, dessen Bericht dem M K seit seiner 103. Sitzung im November 1998 vorliegt. 72 2. Das Ministerkomitee

73

a) Zentral- und Osteuropa Die Politik gegenüber Zentral- und Osteuropa war nach wie vor ein wichtiger Tätigkeitsbereich des M K . U m den neuen Schwerpunkten und Entwicklungen im Verhältnis zu Zentral- und Osteuropa besser gerecht zu werden, fügte das M K dem Haushalt den neuen Titel „Maßnahmen zur Entwicklung und Konsolidierung demokratischer Stabilität" (ADACS) zu. Dieser steht sowohl den Mitgliedern des Europarats als auch beitrittswilligen Staaten offen. 74 aa) Ehemaliges Jugoslawien Intensiv befaßte sich das M K mit der Lage im ehemaligen Jugoslawien. So beschloß es im April 1997 die Durchführung von Kooperationsprogrammen mit Bosnien-Herzegowina. Daneben entschied das M K , eine Reihe dringender Kooperationsprogramme mit Kroatien auf den Gebieten der Rechtsstaatlichkeit und der Wahlen durchzuführen. 75 Auf seiner 100. Sitzung im Mai 1997 drückte das M K seine Entschlossenheit aus, die Anstrengungen der internationalen Gemeinschaft zur Förderung der Menschenrechte, Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Bosnien-Herzegowina weiterzuführen und zu verstärken. 76 Der Außenminister Bosnien-Herzegowinas Jadranko Prlic folgte einer Einladung zu einem Meinungsaustausch mit dem M K . 7 7 I m März 1998 nahm das M K den Antrag der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien auf Mitgliedschaft im Europarat formell zu Kenntnis und setzte sich in der Folge damit 72

http://www.coe.fr/cm/reports/1998/98cml78.htm .

73

I m folgenden wird lediglich eine schwerpunktmäßige Zusammenfassung der umfangreichen Tätigkeiten des M K gegeben. Für eine detailliertere Ubersicht empfiehlt sich das Studium der Statutory Reports, Communications on the Activities of the Committee of Ministers, Docs. 7801, 7841, 7907, 7982, 8067, 8137, 8181. 74

Doc. 7982, 3.

75

Doc. 7801, 2 f.

76

Doc. 7841, 2.

77

Id., 4.

Ministerkomitee

und Parlamentarische

Versammlung im Europarat

auseinander. 78 Während seiner 102. Sitzung im Mai 1998 rief das M K die im Kosovokonflikt beteiligten Parteien dazu auf, jede Form der Gewaltanwendung zu unterbinden und einen konstruktiven Dialog unter Beteiligung einer dritten Partei zu beginnen. 79 Weiterhin forderte das M K die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawiens mit Blick auf die Krise im Kosovo zu einer radikalen Änderung ihrer Politik auf, um den Antrag auf Mitgliedschaft im Europarat ernsthaft untersuchen zu kön-

bb) Albanien I m März 1997 ermächtigte das M K den Generalsekretär, die Erörterungen mit der E U und der OSZE zu einer Mission in Albanien unter Beteiligung mehrerer Institutionen fortzusetzen. Dabei sollten die Ziele, Modalitäten und der Inhalt einer solchen Mission definiert werden. Weiterhin sollte ein angemessener Beitrag des Europarates durch Fachwissen zum Aufbau eines demokratischen Rechtsstaats vorbereitet werden. 81 Das M K behielt die Lage in Albanien unter ständiger Beobachtung und räumte den Maßnahmen zur Uberwindung der Krise in Albanien hohe Priorität ein. 82 Für die Zeit nach der Wahl autorisierte das M K das Sekretariat, Kooperationsprogramme mit Albanien durchzuführen. 83 Vom 18. bis zum 20. Januar 1998 besuchten hochrangige Vertreter des Europarates Tirana. Dort erörterten sie mit den zuständigen albanischen Behörden sowie mit Vertretern anderer internationaler Organisationen die Planung, Umsetzung und Bewertung der Kooperationsprogramme. Nach dem Besuch rief das M K die Mitgliedsstaaten des Europarates auf, zusätzliche Hilfsmöglichkeiten ihrerseits zu untersuchen. 84

cc) Weitere Staaten Zentral- und Osteuropas I m April 1997 unterzeichneten die Außenminister der drei Kaukasusstaaten Armenien, Aserbaidschan und Georgien die Europäische Kulturkonvention. Bei dieser Gelegenheit kam es auch zu einem Meinungsaustausch der Außenminister dieser Staaten mit dem M K . 8 5 I m Januar 1998 ermächtigte das M K das Sekretariat, mit der 78

Doc. 8067, 3.

79

Doc. 8137, 2.

80

Doc. 8181, 5 f.

81

Doc. 7801, 2.

82

Doc. 7841, 2.

83

Doc. 7907, 1.

84

Doc. 8067, 2.

85

Does. 7801, 3; 7841, 3 f.

511

512

Tilmann Laubner und Fabian Marschall

OSZE-Beratungs- und Beobachtungsgruppe in Weißrußland durch die Ernennung eines Verbindungsoffiziers und die Bereitstellung von Experten zu kooperieren. 86 b) Internationale Organisationen Die Tätigkeit des Europarates berührte sich häufig mit der anderer internationaler Organisationen. Insbesondere mit der Europäischen Union und der OSZE wurden Maßnahmen koordiniert, wie zum Beispiel in Albanien oder Weißrußland. 87 aa) Europäische Union I m April 1997 fand das neunte Vier-Parteien-Treffen des Europarates mit der E U statt, an dem hochrangige Vertreter der jeweiligen Institutionen teilnahmen. Unter anderem wurde dort über das Zweite Gipfeltreffen der Staats- und Regierungschefs und die Hilfe für die Staaten Zentral- und Osteuropas diskutiert. 88 Neben diesen Themen ging es beim zehnten Vier-Parteien-Treffen im September 1997 auch um eine verbesserte Koordinierung von unterstützenden Maßnahmen bei Krisen, wie zum Beispiel in Albanien und Bosnien-Herzegowina, sowie um die Zusammenarbeit im Kampf gegen Rassismus und Intoleranz. 89 Beim elften Treffen im April 1998 wurden vornehmlich Fragen zur Erweiterung der E U und zur Sicherheit im Rahmen der Tätigkeit der OSZE angesprochen. 90 In Ubereinstimmung mit der PV verwies das M K auf die Bedeutung der Ratifikation der EMRK als Kriterium für die Aufnahme neuer Mitglieder. In diesem Zusammenhang hob es auch die Rolle des Europarates für die Stärkung demokratischer Institutionen sowie der Rechtsstaatlichkeit und des Schutzes der Menschenrechte hervor. 91 Bei seiner 102. Sitzung im Mai 1997 zeigte sich das M K erfreut über die fortgesetzte Entwicklung der Beziehungen und der Zusammenarbeit des Europarates mit der Europäischen Union. 9 2 Kurz danach trafen sich die Delegierten des M K mit Carlo Trojan, dem Generalsekretär der EU-Kommission, zu einem Meinungsaustausch.93 Beim zwölften Vier-Parteien-Treffen im Oktober 1998 diskutierten die Teilnehmer erneut über die Erweiterung der E U sowie über die Erweiterung des Europarates. Weitere 86

Doc. 7982, 3.

87

Doc. 7801, 2 f.

88

Doc. 7841, 4 f.

89

Doc. 7907, 2.

90

Doc. 8067, 4 f.

91

Doc. 8081, 2 f.

92

Doc. 8137,41.

" I d , 4.

Ministerkomitee

und Parlamentarische

Versammlung im Europarat

Themen waren u. a. die Hilfsprogramme für Zentral- und Osteuropa sowie die Krise im Kosovo. 94 bb) OSZE I m Februar 1997 kamen Vertreter der OSZE und des Europarats zu einem hochrangigen sogenannten „2+2-Treffen" zusammen. Ein Ergebnis dieses Treffens war ein gemeinsamer Aufruf an die Mitgliedsländer, die Menschenrechtskommission für das ehemalige Jugoslawien freiwillig stärker zu unterstützen. 95 I m September 1997 billigte das M K den Vorschlag des Sekretariats, gemeinsam mit der OSZE ein zweites regionales Seminar zum Thema „Erziehung und bürgerliche Gesellschaft" abzuhalten. Außerdem mußte mit der OSZE der Tätigkeitsbereich des zukünftigen OSZE-Vertreters für die Freiheit der Medien koordiniert werden, um Überschneidungen mit bestehenden Strukturen seitens des Europarates zu vermeiden. Ein weiterer Schritt in der Zusammenarbeit der OSZE mit dem Europarat war die Übermittlung von Paßwörtern, wodurch die OSZE Zugang zu nichtöffentlichen Internetseiten des Europarates erhielt. 96 Zur weiteren Koordinierung von Aktivitäten fand im Januar 1998 ein hochrangiges Drei-Parteien-Treffen statt, an dem neben dem Europarat und der OSZE auch die U N O beteiligt war. 97 I m Februar 1998 kam der Generalsekretär der OSZE Giancarlo Aragona mit den Delegierten des M K zu einem Meinungsaustausch zusammen. Dem folgte im März das fünfte „2+2-Treffen" des Europarates und der OSZE unter Beteiligung des Generalsekretärs des Europarates und dem Vorsitzenden des M K Klaus Kinkel sowie den entsprechenden Vertretern auf Seiten der OSZE. Neben Fragen der Zusammenarbeit ging es dabei auch um regionale Belange, wie den Kosovo. 98 Auf seiner 102. Sitzung im Mai 1998 äußerte sich das M K zufrieden mit den Fortschritten bei der Zusammenarbeit des Europarates mit der OSZE. 99 Auf Einladung der Regierung der Niederlande nahm ein Vertreter des Europarates an einem Seminar über Menschenrechte und Demokratie in Den Haag teil, das unter der Schirmherrschaft sowohl der OSZE als auch des Europarates organisiert wurde. 100

94

Doc. 8181, 7 f.

95

Doc. 7801, 4.

96

Doc. 7907, 3.

97

Doc. 7982, 4.

98

Doc 8067, 4.

99

Doc. 8137,41.

100

Id. y 4.

33 G Y I L 41

513

514

Tilmann Laubner und Fabian Marschall cc) U N O

Neben der Koordinierung von Maßnahmen bei verschiedenen Projekten fanden zusammen mit der U N O eine Reihe von Zusammenkünften statt. So wurden im Februar 1997 und 1998 die Treffen zum jährlichen informellen Meinungsaustausch zwischen U N O und Europarat zu Fragen bezüglich der Menschenrechte veranstaltet. 1 0 1 I m März 1997 folgten weitere Konsultationen mit Elisabeth Rehn, der Sonderberichterstatterin der UNO-Menschenrechtskommission für das ehemalige Jugoslawien. 1 0 2 I m Januar fand das bereits oben erwähnte Treffen des Generalsekretärs des Europarates mit Vertretern der OSZE und der U N O statt. 103

c) Konferenzen einzelner Fachminister 1997 fanden sechs Konferenzen einzelner Fachminister statt. Die Justizminister trafen sich, um über die Bekämpfung des organisierten Verbrechens und der Korruption zu beraten. 104 Die Familienminister berieten über die Rolle der Familie in der Jugend. 105 Zu einer Konferenz mit dem Thema „Erziehung 2000" kamen die Erziehungsminister zusammen. 106 Die für regionale Planung verantwortlichen Minister berieten über nachhaltige Regional- und Raumplanung und den Schutz von Wasserressourcen. Eine weitere Fachkonferenz befaßte sich mit dem Thema „Demokratie und die Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau". 107 Bei der letzten Fachkonferenz des Jahres 1997 ging es um Massenmedien und die Informationsgesellschaft. 108 1998 trafen sich zunächst die Jugendminister zu einer Konferenz über die Rolle von Jugendlichen als Bürger. 109 Die Sozialminister kamen unter dem Thema „Sozia-

101

Does. 7801, 4; 8067, 4.

102

Doc. 7801, 4.

103

Doc. 7982, 4.

104

Doc. 7841, 32; dabei verabschiedeten die Minister auch die Strafrechtskonvention zur Korruption; der Text der Konvention, die am 27. Januar 1999 zur Unterzeichnung aufgelegt werden wird, findet sich unter http://www.coe.fr/cp/98/734a(98).htm . 105

Doc. 7841, 32 f.

106

Doc. 7907, 27.

107

Doc. 7982, 55.

108

Id., 55 f.

109

Doc. 8137, 37 f.

Ministerkomitee

und Parlamentarische

Versammlung im Europarat

le Sicherheit auf dem Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert" zusammen. 110 Die für den Sport verantwortlichen Minister berieten über ethische und rechtliche Fragen sowie den sozialen Zusammenhalt durch Sport. 111

d) Sonstige politische Inhalte 1997 und 1998 Neben den oben schwerpunktmäßig aufgeführten Themen befaßte sich das M K noch mit einer Fülle anderer Themen. Zumeist ging es dabei um die Bereiche des demokratischen, sozialen und kulturellen Zusammenhalts {cohesion). I m Zusammenhang mit dem demokratischen Zusammenhalt wurden u.a. Fragen zur Gleichberechtigung und zu den Medien behandelt. 112 Auf dem Gebiet des sozialen Zusammenhalts ging es beispielsweise um Gesundheits- und Umweltpolitik. 1 1 3 I m Bereich des kulturellen Zusammenhalts beschäftigte sich das M K u. a. mit Fragen der Erziehung, des Sports und der Jugend. 114 Ein weiteres Thema, mit dem sich das M K befaßte, war die Überwachung der von den Mitgliedstaaten eingegangenen Verpflichtungen. I m Rahmen seines vertraulichen, konstruktiven und nicht diskriminierenden Überwachungsmechanismusses zur Einhaltung von Verpflichtungen beschäftigte sich das M K insbesondere mit dem Funktionieren politischer Parteien, dem Justizsystem, freien Wahlen und kommunaler Demokratie. 115 I m November 1997 befaßte sich das M K mit den aus seiner Sicht „besorgniserregenden" Entwicklungen in den Bereichen politische Parteien und freie Wahlen sowie Beschränkungen der Meinungsfreiheit 116 und beschloß nach einer Überprüfung des Überwachungsmechanismusses im April 1998, diesen zu modernisieren. 117

110

Id., 38.

111

Id., 38.

112

Does. 7801, 5 ff.; 7841, 8 ff.; 7907, 6 ff.; 7982, 7 ff.; 8067, 8 ff.; 8137, 7 ff.; 8181, 13 ff.; zur Gleichberechtigung vgl. insbesondere Does. 7801, 4 und 5 f.; 7841, 8 f.; 7982, 7 ff.; zu Medien vgl. insbesondere Does. 7841, 9; 8067, 9 f. 113

Does. 7801, 7 f.; 7841,11 ff.; 7907,11 ff.; 7982,15 ff.; 8067,14 ff.; 8137,11 ff.; 8181,18 ff.; zur Gesundheitspolitik vgl. insbesondere Does. 7841, 13 f.; 7982, 17 ff. ; zur Umweltpolitik vgl. insbesondere Does. 7841, 14; 7907, 14 f.; 7982, 18 ff.; 8181, 16 und 19 ff. 114 Does. 7801, 8 ff.; 7841,15 ff; 7907,14 ff.; 7982,21 ff.; 8067,18 ff.; 8137,14 ff.; 8181,23 ff.; zur Erziehung vgl. insbesondere Does. 7982 ff.; 8067, 18 ff.; 8181, 23 ff.; zum Sport vgl. insbesondere Doc. 7982, 30 f.; zur Jugend vgl. insbesondere Does. 8067 26 f.; 8137, 20 f.

33*

115

Does. 7801, 1; 7841, 3.

116

Doc. 7982, 2 f.

117

Doc. 8137,3.

515

516

Tilmann Laubner und Fabian Marschall 3. Die Parlamentarische

Versammlung

a) Themen der Debatte aa) Die Lage im ehemaligen Jugoslawien Die Lage im ehemaligen Jugoslawien war mehrfach Gegenstand von Empfehlungen, Resolutionen und Debatten der PV. Wiederholt rief sie die Parteien auf, das Dayton Peace Agreement einzuhalten und die vom Kriegsverbrechertribunal für Jugoslawien angeklagten Personen festzunehmen und zu überstellen. 118 Die PV ging dabei insbesondere auf die Lage im Kosovo ein. Sie forderte mehr Autonomie für den Kosovo und die Einrichtung einer internationalen Beobachtermission. 119 Angesichts der sich verschärfenden Situation rief sie in einer Empfehlung vom Juni 1998 die Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien und die Führung der Kosovoalbaner dazu auf, keine Gewalt anzuwenden. Sie verlangte, humanitären Organisationen Zugang zum Kosovo zu gewähren und bat die angrenzenden Staaten, Flüchtlingen großzügig Asyl zu gewähren und sie solange nicht zurückzuschicken, bis ihre Sicherheit gewährleistet sei. 120

bb) Die Staaten Zentral- und Osteuropas Die PV befaßte sich im Januar 1997 zunächst mit der Sicherheit von Nuklearanlagen in Zentral- und Osteuropa. Unter anderem sei die Entwicklung einer Sicherheitskultur notwendig. Zu diesem Zweck schlug die PV beispielsweise Partnerschaften zwischen west- und mittel- bzw. osteuropäischen Kernkraftwerken vor. 1 2 1 Die PV beschäftigte sich daneben auch mit dem Fortschritt der wirtschaftlichen Reformen in Zentral- und Osteuropa. Die Reformen seien zwar schmerzhaft, müßten aber weiter vorangetrieben werden. 122 Ebenfalls mit Blick auf die Wirtschaft, aber auch als ein Mittel der Völkerverständigung, betonte die PV die Notwendigkeit, den Tourismus zu fördern. 123

118

Debates 1997, 770 ff.; Doc. 7842; Resolution 1130; Debates 1998, 116 ff.; Doc. 7986; Resolution 1146. 119

Recommendation 1360; Doc. 8037.

120

Doc. 8150; Recommendation 1376.

121

Debates 1997 112 ff. und 124 ff.; Doc. 7714; Recommendation 1311.

122

Debates 1997, 444 ff.; Doc. 7712; Resolution 1122.

123

Doc. 7976; Resolution 1148.

Ministerkomitee

und Parlamentarische

Versammlung im Europarat

I m Rahmen der Erörterung der Lage in den Staaten Zentral- und Osteuropas widmete sich die PV auch Albanien. Sie forderte Albanien auf, vor allem die Staatsanwaltschaft, Justiz und Polizei zu reformieren und empfahl dem M K , Albanien u. a. beim Aufbau der Verwaltung und bei der Ausarbeitung der Verfassung zu unterstützen. 124 Die Überwachung der von Albanien eingegangenen Verpflichtungen sollte höchste Priorität haben. 125

cc) Überwachung der von den Mitgliedsländern eingegangenen Verpflichtungen I m Januar 1997 beschloß die PV ein Komitee einzurichten, welches die von den Mitgliedstaaten eingegangenen Verpflichtungen überwachen soll. 126 Einen besonderen Raum bei dieser Überwachung nahmen die Staaten Zentral- und Osteuropas ein. Die PV forderte Rußland und die Ukraine auf, ein Moratorium auf Todesstrafen einzuhalten, zu dem sich die beiden Staaten verpflichtet hatten, und drohte damit, bei der.nächsten Sitzung die Vollmacht der jeweiligen Delegationen nicht anzuerkennen. 127 Dagegen beschloß die PV, das Überwachungsverfahren für Estland zu beenden.128 Neben Debatten zu einzelnen Ländern befaßte sich die PV im A p r i l 1998 auch allgemein mit dem Fortschritt bei der Überwachung der von den Mitgliedsländern eingegangenen Verpflichtungen. 129

dd) Menschenrechte und Rechte von Flüchtlingen Ein weiterer Schwerpunkt der Tätigkeit der PV waren die Menschenrechte. Unter anderem befaßte sich die PV mit der Bekämpfung von Folter, 130 dem Handel mit Frauen und Zwangsprostitution, 131 Landminen 132 sowie der Menschenrechtserziehung. 133

124

Debates 1997 188 ff.; Doc. 7716; Recommendation 1312; Resolution 1114.

125

Debates 1997, 539 ff.; Doc. 7806; Recommendation 1328.

126

Debates 1997, 199 ff.; Doc. 7722; Resolution 1115.

127

Debates 1997, 171 ff.; Does. 7745 und 7746; Resolutions 1111 und 1112.

128

Debates 1997, 252 ff.; Does. 7715, 7730; Recommendation 1313; Resolution 1117.

129

Debates 1998, 356 ff.; Doc. 8057; Resolution 1155; Recommendation 1366.

130

Debates 1997, 335 ff.; Doc. 7784; Recommendation 1323.

131

Debates 1997, 484 ff.; Doc. 7785; Recommendation 1325.

132

Debates 1997, 980 ff.; Doc. 7891; Recommendation 1343.

133

Debates 1997, 1114 ff.; Doc. 7887; Recommendation 1346.

517

518

Tilmann Laubner und Fabian Marschall

Insbesondere beschäftigte sich die PV mit Flüchtlingsfragen. Dabei ging es neben allgemeinen Fragen 134 u. a. um vorübergehend Geflohene, 135 das UN-Flüchtlingskommissariat 136 und die Situation von Frauen. 137

ee) Sonstige Themen I m Bereich Wissenschaft und Technologie diskutierten die Parlamentarier über neue Technologien und deren Wirkung auf Beschäftigung 138 und Demokratie 139 sowie speziell über neue Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien, deren weitreichende Anwendung die PV befürwortet. 140 Thematisiert wurde auch die europäische Raumfahrtpolitik 141 sowie die Grundschulung in den Bereichen Wissenschaft und Technologie. 142 Auf dem Gebiet der Wirtschaft befaßte sich die PV mit dem Internationalen Währungsfonds und der Weltbank. Sie schlug vor, daß diese sich in ihren Statuten zur Verteidigung und Förderung der Menschenrechte verpflichten sollten. 143 Die PV beschäftigte sich daneben auch mit der Europäischen Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung 1 4 4 und den Wirtschaftsreformen in Japan. 145 . Neben dem M K setzte sich auch die PV mit der Erweiterung der E U auseinander. Sie empfahl, Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der größtmöglichen Anzahl von Bewerbern zu beginnen. 146 In einer Empfehlung zum Verhältnis des Europarates zur 134 Debates 1997, 522 ff.; Doc. 7783; Recommendation 1327; zu Flüchtlingen in der Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten siehe Debates 1997,648 ff.; Doc. 7829; Recommendation 1334; i m Kaukasus siehe Debates 1997, 648 ff.; Doc. 7837; Recommendation 1335; zur Rückkehr von Flüchtlingen nach Bosnien-Herzegowina siehe Debates 1998,207 ff.; Doc. 7973; Recommendation 1357; zu kurdischen Flüchtlingen in der Türkei und i m Irak siehe Doc. 8131; Recommendation 1377. 135

Doc. 7889; Recommendation 1348.

136

Debates 1998, 196 ff.; Doc. 7972; Recommendation 1356.

137

Doc. 8066; Recommendation 1374.

138

Debates 1997, 272 ff.; Doc. 7713; Recommendation 1314.

139

Debates 1997, 421 ff.; Doc. 7772; Resolution 1120.

140

Debates 1997, 603 ff.; Doc. 7832; Recommendation 1332.

141

Debates 1997, 910 ff.; Doc. 7875; Recommendation 1341.

142

Doc. 8122; Recommendation 1379.

143

Debates 1997, 679 ff.; Doc. 7835; Resolution 1128.

144

Debates 1997, 711 ff.; Doc. 7834; Resolution 1129; Doc. 8132; Resolution 1162.

145

Doc. 8043; Resolution 1164.

146

Doc. 7955; Recommendation 1347.

Ministerkomitee

und Parlamentarische

Versammlung im Europarat

E U sprach sich die PV für den Beitritt der EG zu allen Konventionen des Europarates aus, bei denen dies möglich sei. 147 Zudem widmete sich die PV der Zukunft der Europäischen Sozialcharta, 148 der Stärkung des sozialen Zusammenhalts 149 und dem Sozialentwicklungsfonds. 150

b) Ansprachen von Regierungsvertretern und Vertretern internationaler Organisationen Wie schon in den Vorjahren richteten auch 1997 und 1998 eine Reihe von Staatsund Regierungsvertretern sowie Vertreter internationaler Organisationen Ansprachen an die PV. Der Premierminister Estlands Tiit Vähi dankte dem Europarat für seine große Hilfe beim Wiederaufbau Estlands nach Erlangung der Unabhängigkeit. 151 Er schilderte die Fortschritte seines Landes im Bereich der Wirtschaft und der Menschenrechte. Auf mehrfache Anfragen russischer Mitglieder der PV versicherte er, daß der russischsprachige Teil der Bevölkerung nicht diskriminiert werde. Die Unterstützung, die dieser Teil der Bevölkerung den Institutionen des estnischen Staates entgegenbrächte, sei nicht geringer als die des estnischen Bevölkerungsteils. Der Präsident der EU-Kommission Jacques Sanier würdigte die Rolle des Europarates beim Aufbau der Demokratien in Zentral- und Osteuropa. 152 Wichtig seien dabei auch seine begleitenden Programme zur Entwicklung einer demokratischen Kultur. Die Arbeit des Europarates sei gerade mit Blick auf die Erweiterung der E U wertvoll. Santer betonte, daß sich das Verhältnis zwischen Europarat und E U verbessert habe und beide partnerschaftlich an der Konstruktion des europäischen Kontinents arbeiteten. Durch diese Zusammenarbeit ergäben sich Möglichkeiten zur Rationalisierung, wenn Doppelarbeit vermieden und Wissen gegenseitig verfügbar gemacht werde. Ebenfalls zu Fragen der Erweiterung der E U äußerte sich das für dieses Gebiet zuständige Mitglied der EU-Kommission Hans van den Broek. 153 Als erster Generalsekretär der N A T O sprach im Januar 1997Javier Solana zu der PV. Auch er würdigte die Arbeit des Europarates bei der Schaffung demokratischer 147

Debates 1998, 320 ff., Doc. 8051; Recommendation 1365.

148

Debates 1998, 23 ff. und 148 ff.; Doc. 7980; Recommendation 1354.

149

Debates 1998, 157 ff.; Doc. 7981; Recommendation 1355.

150

Doc. 8124; Recommendation 1378.

151

Debates 1997, 10 ff.

152

M , 70 ff.

153

Debates, 1998, 226 ff.

519

520

Tilmann Laubner und Fabian Marschall

Strukturen in Zentral- und Osteuropa. Weiterhin schilderte er den Mitgliedern der PV die Pläne der N A T O für die folgenden Monate und ging dabei insbesondere auf die Rolle Rußlands, der Ukraine und des Mittelmeerraums sowie die Stärkung der Partnerschaft für den Frieden ein. I m April 1997 hielt der Präsident der Republik Bulgarien Peter Stoyanov eine Rede vor der PV, wobei er insbesondere auf die damalige Krise seines Landes einging. 154 Er war jedoch optimistisch, daß diese durch beschleunigte Privatisierungen, Anziehung ausländischen Kapitals und Bekämpfung der Korruption gelöst werden könne. Ein Jahr später hielt der bulgarische Premierminister Ivan Kostov eine Ansprache vor der PV, in der er versicherte, daß die Regierung die Korruption in den Griff bekommen habe und das Land wirtschaftlich stabil sei. 155 Beide hoben hervor, es sei wichtig, in Europa eine demokratische Kultur zu schaffen. Nachdem im Januar 1998 schon der Sprecher des rumänischen Senats Petre Roman vor der PV gesprochen hatte, 156 hielt im April 1998 der Premierminister Rumäniens Radu Vasile eine Rede vor der PV. 1 5 7 Beide betonten, sowohl Bürger als auch Regierung hätten das Ende der Überwachung der von Rumänien eingegangenen Verpflichtungen durch den Europarat mit großer Befriedigung aufgenommen. Daneben sprachen vor der PV u. a. der Präsident Griechenlands Constantinos Stephanopoulos, 158 der Premierminister Polens Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 159 die Parlamentspräsidenten Mourtouz Aleskerov (Aserbaidschan), 160 Janez Podobnik (Slowenien), 161 Dr. Schambeck (Österreich), 162 die Präsidentin des Nationalrats der Schweiz Judith Stammt der Präsident des spanischen Senats Juan Ignacio Barrero Valverde 164 und als damaliger Vorsitzender der OSZE der Außenminister Dänemarks Niels Helveg Petersen, 165

154

Debates, 1997, 462 ff.

155

Debates, 1998, 337 ff.

156

Id., 32 ff.

157

Id., 290 ff.

158

Debates 1997, 327 ff.

159

Id., 689 ff.

160

Id., 16 f.

161

Id., 597.

162

M , 801 ff.

163

Id., 320 f.

164

Id., 1041 f.

165

Id., 702 ff.

Ministerkomitee

und Parlamentarische

Versammlung im Europarat

4. CLRAE Der Kongreß der Lokalen und Regionalen Behörden in Europa (CLRAE) befaßte sich u. a. intensiv mit der Situation in der Ukraine, wohin er Delegationen, beispielsweise zur Wahlbeobachtung, entsandte.166 Ein weiterer Schwerpunkt seiner Tätigkeit war Albanien. Im Januar 1998 veranstaltete der Kongreß eine Anhörung, bei der es im wesentlichen um das Verhältnis der neuen Verfassung zur kommunalen Selbstverwaltung ging. 167 I m Mai 1998 begab sich eine Delegation des Kongresses, an der auch sein Präsident beteiligt war, nach Albanien. 168 Die Delegation schlug vor, eine Reihe von Artikeln zur kommunalen Selbstverwaltung in die geplante Verfassung aufzunehmen. Außerdem bot sie Hilfe bei der Ausarbeitung von Gesetzen auf diesem Gebiet sowie die Schulung von Mitgliedern der kommunalen Verwaltung an. Eine weitere Delegation beobachtete im Juni 1998 in Zusammenarbeit mit der OSZE kommunale Wahlen und kam zu dem Schluß, daß diese im wesentlichen zufriedenstellend verlaufen seien.169 Auch mit der Situation im ehemaligen Jugoslawien beschäftigte sich der Kongreß. So forderte er beispielsweise die Wiedereinsetzung der frei gewählten Vertreter der Stadt N o v i Pazar in der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien. 170 Eine zur Wahlbeobachtung nach Bosnien-Herzegowina entsandte Delegation erklärte, daß die am 12. und 13. September 1998 abgehaltenen Kantonal- und Kommunalwahlen trotz einiger ernsthafter Probleme im allgemeinen frei und fair abgehalten wurden. 171

I V . Ausblick Kurzfristig wird sich der Europarat u. a. mit den Aufnahmegesuchen der kaukasischen Staaten befassen. Zudem wird am 27. Januar 1999 die Strafrechtskonvention zur Korruption zur Unterzeichnung aufgelegt werden. Der Europarat wird sich weiterhin damit befassen, die abschließende Straßburger Erklärung sowie den Aktionsplan des Zweiten Gipfeltreffens der Staats- und Regierungschefs umzusetzen. Bislang liegen dem M K zwei von drei vorgesehenen Berich-

166

Does. 7907, 26; 7982, 53; 8067, 42.

167

Doc. 8067, 43.

168

Doc. 8137, 36 f.

169

Doc. 8181,42.

170

Doc. 7907, 26.

171

Doc. 8181,43.

521

522

Tilmann Laubner und Fabian Marschall

ten des Nachbereitungskomitees zum zweiten Gipfel vor. 1 7 2 Seinen dritten und abschließenden Bericht wird das Komitee auf der 104. Sitzung des M K vorlegen. Daneben wird sich der Europarat auch mit dem abschließenden Bericht des im Anschluß an den Straßburger Gipfel errichteten Komitees der Weisen befassen, der dem M K seit seiner 103. Sitzung vorliegt. 173 Wichtig werden vor allem Veränderungen bezüglich der Struktur des Europarates und seiner Rolle im Gefüge der europäischen Institutionen sein. I m Bereich der Struktur soll der Entscheidungsfindungsprozeß verbessert werden. Nach Ansicht des Komitees der Weisen soll das M K seine Effizienz verbessern. M K und PV sollen ihr Verhältnis in einer Resolution regeln. Dabei soll die PV besser in die Arbeit des M K eingebunden werden. Von Interesse wird auch sein, wie sich das Verhältnis von Europarat zu E U und OSZE weiterentwickeln wird. Das Komitee der Weisen hat vorgeschlagen, mit der E U ein Rahmenabkommen zu vereinbaren. Es regt eine ständige Vertretung der EU-Kommission in Straßburg an, so daß neben den hochrangigen Treffen auch bei der alltäglichen Arbeit besser kooperiert werden könne. Da sich die Arbeit der beiden Institutionen häufig überschneide, solle im Verhältnis zur OSZE vor allem der Informationsaustausch verbessert werden. Dies beträfe zum einen die Kommunikation bei Krisen sowie die gemeinsame Sammlung von Informationen. Zentrales Ereignis im Jahr 1999 wird der 50. Geburtstag des Europarates sein. Dazu sind Feierlichkeiten u. a. in London und Budapest geplant. In Budapest wird vom 6. bis 9. Mai 1999 anläßlich des ungarischen Vorsitzes die 104. Sitzung des M K abgehalten werden. Ein weiterer wichtiger Schritt wird die für 1999 geplante Ernennung eines Kommissars für Menschenrechte sein.

172

http://www.coe.fr/cm/reports/ 1998/98cm69.htm, 1998/98cml80.htm. 173

http://www.coe.fr/cm/reports/1998/98cml78.htm .

http://www.coe.fr/ cm/reports/

Die Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 Von Jasper Finke und Christiane Wandscher

Die International Law Commission (ILC) hielt im Berichtszeitraum ihre 49. und 50. Tagung ab, die jeweils von Mai bis Juli in Genf stattfanden. Die Kommission beschäftigte sich weiterhin 1 mit der Ausarbeitung von Konventionsentwürfen über — Auswirkungen von Staatensukzession auf die Staatsangehörigkeit natürlicher und juristischer Personen (I), — Vorbehalte bei Verträgen (II), — Staatenverantwortlichkeit (III), — die völkerrechtliche Haftung für Schäden aufgrund nicht-völkerrechtswidriger Aktivitäten (IV). Erstmalig beschäftigte die I L C sich mit — diplomatischem Schutz (V), — einseitigen Hoheitsakten (VI). A m Ende dieser Darstellung folgt ein Ausblick auf künftige Vorhaben. Folgende sind die 34 Mitglieder der ILC: Emmanuel Akwei Addo (Ghana), Husain Al-Baharna (Bahrain), Awn Al-Khasawneh Qordanien), Joao demente Baena Soares (Brasilien), Mohamed Bennouna (Marokko), lan Brownlie (Vereinigtes Königreich), Enrique J. A. Candioti (Argentinien), James Richard Crawford (Australien), Christopher John Robert Dugard (Südafrika), Constantin P. Economides (Griechenland), Nabil Elaraby (Ägypten), Luigi Ferrari Bravo (Italien), Zdzislaw Galicki (Polen), RaulL Goco (Philippinen), Gerhard Hafner (Osterreich), Qizhi He (China), Mauricio Herdocia Sacasa (Nicaragua), JorgeE. Illueca (Panama), Peter C. R. Kabatsi (Uganda), James Lutabanzibwa Kateka (Vereinigte Republik Tansania), Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja (Indonesien), Igor Ivanovich Lukashuk (Russische Föderation), Teodor Viorel Melescanu (Rumänien), Vaclav Mikulka (Tschechische Republik), Didier OperttiBadan (Uruguay), Guillaume Pambou-Tchivounda (Gabun), Alain Pellet (Frank1

Siehe dazu den Vorbericht von Jörg Föh und Ina Wiesner, Die Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1995 und 1996, GYIL, vol. 39, 1997, 598 - 622.

524

Jasper Finke und Christiane Wandscher

reich), Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao (Indien), Victor Rodriguez Cedeno (Venezuela), Robert Rosenstock (Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika), Bernardo Sepulveda (Mexiko), Bruno Simma (Deutschland), Doudou Thiam (Senegal), Chusei Yamada (Japan). I. Auswirkungen von Staatensukzession auf die Staatsangehörigkeit natürlicher u n d juristischer Personen Bereits während der 47. und 48. Tagung wurde dieses Thema auf die Tagesordnung der I L C gesetzt. Nachdem die Bewilligung der Generalversammlung zuerst nur unter der Maßgabe gegeben wurde, eine vorläufige Studie zu erstellen, wurde mit Resolution 51/160 Abs. 8 vom 16. Dezember 1996 der Auftrag erteilt, eine weitergehende Untersuchung des Themas vorzunehmen. Diese beschränkte sich zunächst, wie von Sonderberichterstatter Vaclav Mikulka vorgeschlagen, auf die Auswirkungen von Staatensukzession auf natürliche Personen. Das Problem der juristischen Personen wurde für die 49. Tagung ausdrücklich ausgeklammert. 1. 49. Tagung Während der 49. Tagung wurde der dritte Bericht von Sonderberichterstatter V Mikulka vorgelegt. 2 Die Kommission nahm nach erster Lesung 27 draft articles und die vorläufige Präambel an, um diese gem. Art. 16 und 21 des Statuts der Kommission durch den Generalsekretär an die Regierungen für Stellungnahmen und Anmerkungen zu übersenden. 3 a) Draft Articles Die draft articles sind in zwei Abschnitte unterteilt: Art. 1 bis 18 beinhalten allgemeine Grundsätze. I n Art. 19 bis 25 werden die Grundsätze, die auf bestimmte Fälle der Staatensukzession anzuwenden sind, aufgeführt. Abschnitt 1 enthält Vorschriften für den Fall der Abtretung von einem Teil des Staatsgebiets, Abschnitt 2 über die Vereinigung und Abschnitt 3 über die Auflösung eines Staates. Abschnitt 4 trifft Regelungen für die Staatsangehörigkeit im Falle der Abspaltung eines Teils oder von Teilen des Staatsgebiets. Den draft articles wurde auch eine vorläufige Präambel vorangestellt.

2

U N Doc. A/CN.4/480. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Ninth Session (1997), U N G A O R , 52nd Session, Supp. 10, U N Doc. A/52/10 (im folgenden I L C Report 1997). 3

Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und 525 1998 b) Inhaltsübersicht zu den draft articles und deren Kommentierung In der Präambel ist festgehalten, daß das Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht zwar den nationalen Regelungen vorbehalten ist, allerdings wird das Recht des einzelnen Staates, das Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht nach seinem Ermessen zu bestimmen, durch internationale Verpflichtungen begrenzt. Das Recht eines jeden Menschen auf eine Staatsangehörigkeit wird zum einen durch völkerrechtliches Gewohnheitsrecht und die allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsätze 4, zum anderen durch internationale Konventionen wie dem Internationalen Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte5, dem Ubereinkommen über die Rechte des Kindes 6 und der Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte 7 garantiert. Daraus ergibt sich, daß im Rahmen von Vorschriften zur Staatsangehörigkeit sowohl die legitimen Interessen des Staates als auch die des Individuums berücksichtigt werden müssen. Artikel 1 legt den Grundsatz der draft articles fest: das Recht auf Staatsangehörigkeit im ausschließlichen Zusammenhang mit Staatensukzession. Es bezieht sich auf die Formulierung in Art. 15 der Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte. Die Kritik, diese Vorschrift sei nicht effektiv, da nicht positiv festgestellt werden könne, wer im Falle der Geltendmachung eines solchen Rechts Anspruchsgegner sei, wurde von der Kommission zurückgewiesen, da gerade in den Fällen der Staatensukzession eindeutig festgestellt werden könne, welche Staaten daran beteiligt seien und somit in die Pflicht genommen werden könnten. 8 U m das Recht auf Staatsangehörigkeit effektiv zu gestalten, sind die beteiligten Staaten gem. Art. 17 verpflichtet, alle relevanten Informationen bezüglich der Auswirkung der Sukzession auf die Staatsangehörigkeit der betroffenen Personen auszutauschen und Verhandlungen aufzunehmen. In diesem Zusammenhang sind nicht nur Fragen der Staatenlosigkeit und der doppelten oder mehrfachen Staatsbürgerschaft anzusprechen, sondern auch alle mit der Sukzession in Verbindung stehenden Probleme. I n Art. 2 werden die für die draft articles gültigen Definitionen aufgeführt. Die Begriffe der „Staatensukzession", des „Vorgänger- und Nachfolgestaates", des „Drittstaates" und des „Zeitpunkts der Staatensukzession" sind mit denen der beiden Wiener Konventionen zur Staatensukzession9 identisch. 10 Neu eingeführt werden die

' I d . , 25. 5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G A Res. 2200 (XXI) vom 16. Dezember 1966. 6 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G A Res. 44/25 vom 5. Februar 1989. 7 G A Res. 217 (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U N G A O R , 3rd Session (Part I), U N Doc. A/810, 71 (1948). 8 I L C Report 1997, 28 f. 9 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties from 22 August 1978, I L M , vol. 17, 1978, 1488 (im folgenden Vienna Succession Convention); Vienna Con-

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Begriffe der „beteiligten Staaten" (states concerned) und der „betroffenen Personen" ( persons concerned). Beteiligte Staaten sind alle, die in dem jeweiligen Fall einer Sukzession territorial betroffen sind. Dieses schließt alle Staaten, die lediglich sonstige Interessen an der Sukzession haben und nicht territorial betroffen sind, von der Definition aus.11 Nähere Regelungen für die unterschiedlichen Formen der Sukzession finden sich in Art. 20 (Abtretung eines Teils des Staatsgebiets), Art. 21 (Vereinigung von Staaten), Art. 22 und 23 (mehrere Nachfolgestaaten im Falle einer Staatenauflösung) und Art. 24 und 26 (Abspaltung eines Teils des Staatsgebiets). Betroffene Personen sind diejenigen, die zum Zeitpunkt der Sukzession ihren Wohnsitz in dem betroffenen Gebiet und die Staatsangehörigkeit des Vorgängerstaates besaßen. Somit sind weder Staatenlose noch andere, die die Staatsangehörigkeit eines dritten und somit unbeteiligten Staates haben, von den draft articles erfaßt. Schwierigkeiten bei der Bestimmung der betroffenen Personen können allerdings in dem Fall auftreten, daß nur ein Teil eines Staatsgebiets von der Sukzession betroffen ist und der Vorgängerstaat nach der Sukzession als eigenständiger bestehen bleibt. 12 In Art. 3 werden die beteiligten Staaten verpflichtet, im Falle einer Staatensukzession geeignete Maßnahmen zu treffen, um Staatenlosigkeit zu vermeiden. Allerdings werden die Staaten dadurch nicht verpflichtet, absolute Staatenlosigkeit herbeizuführen, wenn bestimmte Umstände, wie z. B. das Vorliegen von zwei oder mehr Nachfolgestaaten, dies nicht zulassen, sondern nur, sich um diesen Erfolg durch geeignete Maßnahmen zu bemühen. U m auch nur vorübergehende Staatenlosigkeit für den Zeitpunkt zwischen Sukzession und der Verabschiedung von nationalen Gesetzen zur Regelung der Staatsangehörigkeit oder dem Abschluß von Verträgen zwischen den beteiligten Staaten zu vermeiden, beinhaltet Art. 4 eine gesetzliche Vermutung, daß alle betroffenen Personen, die ihren Wohnsitz in dem betroffenen Gebiet haben, die Staatsangehörigkeit des Nachfolgestaates erhalten. Diese gesetzliche Vermutung gilt nicht uneingeschränkt, da, wie in der Präambel aufgeführt, auch die Interessen der betroffenen Personen berücksichtigt werden müssen, so daß die Möglichkeit bestehen bleibt, gegebenenfalls eine andere Staatsangehörigkeit zu wählen oder die des Vorgängerstaates zu behalten. Zwar dürfen die beteiligten Staaten bestimmte Kriterien an die Erlangung der Staatsangehörigkeit knüpfen, doch wird durch Art. 15 verboten, daß das Recht der betroffenen Personen, die Staatsangehörigkeit des Nachfolgestaates zu erlangen oder die des Vorgängerstaates zu behalten, willkürlich durch nationales Recht oder internationale Verträge eingeschränkt wird. Die Gesetze und

vention on the Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives, and Debts, I L M , vol. 22, 1983, 306. 10 I L C Report 1997, 31. n Id., 32. 12 Id., 33.

Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und 527 1998 Verträge zur Regelung der Staatsangehörigkeit und andere damit zusammenhängende Probleme wie die Einheit der Familie (vgl. Art. 11 der draft articles), Militärverpflichtungen, Rente und andere Sozialleistungen sollen laut Art. 5 ohne ungebührliche Verzögerung und in Ubereinstimmung mit den draft articles erlassen werden. Welcher Zeitraum eine ungebührliche Verzögerung darstellt, ist bewußt offen gelassen worden, da dies von den Umständen der Sukzession abhängt.13 In Übereinstimmung mit dem Grundsatz, daß den Betroffenen ggf. ein Wahlrecht bezüglich der Staatsangehörigkeit zusteht, darf niemandem gem. Art. 7 gegen seinen Willen die Staatsangehörigkeit des oder der Nachfolgestaaten verliehen werden, es sei denn, daß er ansonsten staatenlos werden würde. Weiterhin gibt Art. 8 dem Nachfolgestaat entsprechend der internationalen Bemühungen zur Reduzierung oder Abschaffung der doppelten oder mehrfachen Staatsbürgerschaft 14 das Recht, die Verleihung seiner Staatsangehörigkeit an die Aufgabe der früheren Staatsangehörigkeit zu knüpfen. Auch dieses Recht ist entsprechend den internationalen Vereinbarungen zur Reduzierung bzw. Abschaffung der Staatenlosigkeit15 eingeschränkt. U m den Willen der betroffenen Personen bei der Wahl ihrer Staatsangehörigkeit einzubeziehen, sollen die beteiligten Staaten für den Fall, daß jemand die Voraussetzungen für eine doppelte oder mehrfache Staatsangehörigkeit erfüllt, ihm ein Wahlrecht zubilligen. Allerdings macht die Formulierung „shallgive consideration" deutlich, daß es sich dabei nicht um eine Verpflichtung handelt, auch wenn ein solches Verhalten in der Staatenpraxis durchaus üblich ist. 16 Dieses Wahlrecht sowie die Verleihung der Staatsangehörigkeit darf nicht durch diskriminierende Vorschriften beschränkt werden (Art. 14). Grundlage dafür bilden verschiedene internationale Vereinbarungen. 17 Die Vorschrift in den draft articles ist im Gegensatz zu den bisher existierenden Vereinbarungen bewußt weit formuliert worden (by discrimination on any ground), um jede Form der Diskriminierung, und nicht bloß die aus z. B. religiösen, ethnischen oder sprachlichen Gründen, zu unterbinden. Artikel 12 beinhaltet eine Ausnahme von dem Grundsatz, daß die draft articles nur die Staatsangehörigkeit zum Zeitpunkt der Sukzession regeln. Er legt fest, daß Kinder, die nach dem Datum der Sukzession geboren wurden und bei deren Eltern die Staatsangehörigkeit noch nicht geklärt ist, ihre Staatsangehörigkeit nach dem ius soli erhalten. Dies stellt eine Ausnahme von dem Prinzip dar, daß Kinder grundsätz13

Id., 40; die Kommission verweist auf Situationen von newly independent states, in U N Leg. Ser., ST/LEG/SER.B/17; vgl. auch das Gesetz zur Verleihung und Aufgabe der Staatsangehörigkeit der Tschechoslowakei vom 29. Dezember 1992 i n Zusammenhang mit der Auflösung der Tschechoslowakei. 14 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, UNTS, vol. 634, 224. 15 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, UNTS, vol. 989, 175. 16 I L C Report 1997, 52. 17 Art. 9 der 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness; Art. 5 Abs. 1 der European Convention on Nationality, Council of Europe, Doc. DER/JUR (1997) 6.

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lieh die Staatsangehörigkeit der Eltern erhalten, da ansonsten die Ungewißheit der Staatsangehörigkeit der Eltern direkte Auswirkungen auf das Kind hätte. Dies wäre ein Verstoß gegen das in völkerrechtlichen Verträgen festgeschriebene Recht des Kindes auf eine Staatsangehörigkeit. 18 Die draft articles schreiben weiterhin fest, daß die Rechtsstellung betroffener Personen als habitual residents durch eine Sukzession nicht berührt werden darf. Weiterhin werden die Staaten durch Art. 13 Abs. 2 verpflichtet, die notwendigen Maßnahmen zu ergreifen, um allen, die durch die Ereignisse, die zur Sukzession führten, zu displaced persons wurden, ihre Rückkehr zu ermöglichen. Dies ist insofern von Bedeutung, als daß die Staatsangehörigkeit im Falle der Sukzession bei mehreren Nachfolgestaaten an das Kriterium der habitual residents geknüpft wird. Artikel 18 setzt sich mit dem Verhältnis der Staatsangehörigkeit zu dritten Staaten auseinander. Abs. 1 gibt unbeteiligten Staaten entsprechend dem Prinzip der effective nationality das Recht, keine der betroffenen Personen als Staatsangehörige eines beteiligten Staates zu behandeln, wenn keine effektive Verbindung {effective link) besteht, es sei denn daß sie ansonsten als staatenlos zu behandeln wären. Dies begründet sich darin, daß zwischen Staatsangehörigem und Nachfolgestaat eine Verbindung bestehen muß, auf deren Grundlage der Staat beteiligte Personen als seine Staatsangehörigen behandeln kann. Die Voraussetzungen des effective link hat der I G H im Nottebohm-Fa\\ 19 festgelegt, und diese werden von der Kommission übernommen. I m Gegensatz zu Abs. 1 regelt Abs. 2 die Situation, daß ein beteiligter Staat entgegen seinen Verpflichtungen durch Diskriminierung oder Willkür betroffenen Personen die Staatsangehörigkeit nicht verleiht und diese dadurch staatenlos werden. Auch wenn dritte Staaten in einer solchen Situation auf die Verleihung der Staatsangehörigkeit keinen Einfluß haben, so können sie die betroffenen Personen, wie die Staatenpraxis zeigt, als Staatsangehörige behandeln. Da die Regelung die Position der auf diese Weise staatenlos gewordenen Personen verbessern soll, finden nur die für sie günstigen Vorschriften, die mit der Staatsangehörigkeit verbunden sind, Anwendung. Die im 1. Teil aufgeführten Grundsätze behalten auch für den 2. Teil ihre volle Gültigkeit (Art. 19). Insgesamt stellen die in Art. 20 bis 26 aufgeführten Vorschriften eine Leitlinie für Verhandlungen und die Ausarbeitung nationaler Vorschriften dar. 20 Artikel 20 legt in Übereinstimmung mit der vorherrschenden Staatenpraxis fest, daß im Falle einer auf Konsens der betroffenen Staaten beruhenden Überlassung 18 Art. 24 Abs. 3 der International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Fn. 5); Art. 7 Abs. 1 der Convention on the Rights of the Child (Fn. 6). 19 Nottebohm Case (Guatemala v. Liechtenstein), ICJ Reports 1953, 7. 20 Id., 72.

Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 eines Teils des Staatsgebiets diejenigen, die ihren ständigen Wohnsitz im fraglichen Gebiet haben, die Staatsangehörigkeit des Nachfolgestaates erlangen und die des Vorgängerstaat es verlieren, es sei denn, daß sie ihr Wahlrecht geltend machen. Das Wahlrecht soll entgegen einigen Beispielen für alle Personen gelten, die im betroffenen Gebiet leben und nicht nur für eine bestimmte Gruppe, die unwiderlegbare Verbindungen zum Vorgängerstaat besitzt. 21 I m Falle einer Vereinigung von Staaten wird allen betroffenen Personen, die die Staatsangehörigkeit des Vorgängerstaates besaßen, gem. Art. 21 unter Berücksichtigung des Art. 7 die Staatsangehörigkeit des Nachfolgestaates verliehen. In diesem Fall bezieht sich die Formulierung persons concerned auf alle Staatsangehörigen, unabhängig davon, wo sie ihren ständigen Wohnsitz haben.22 Artikel 22 und 23 klären die Staatsangehörigkeit betroffener Personen im Falle der Auflösung eines Staates. Die Vorschriften finden Anwendung, wenn die Gebiete des Vorgängerstaates in bereits bestehenden Staaten aufgehen und kein eigenständiges neues Völkerrechtssubjekt entsteht. 23 Da der Vorgängerstaat untergegangen ist, und mit ihm auch seine Staatsangehörigkeit, regeln Art. 22 und 23 die Verleihung der Staatsangehörigkeit der Nachfolgestaaten und — für einen bestimmten Personenkreis — die Einräumung eines Wahlrechts bezüglich der Staatsangehörigkeit. Das Kriterium für die Verleihung der Staatsangehörigkeit stellt grundsätzlich der ständige Wohnsitz (habitual residence) dar (Art. 22 Abs. a). Artikel 22 Abs. b regelt die Verleihung der Staatsangehörigkeit bei Personen, die außerhalb des fraglichen Gebietes wohnen, unter Berücksichtigung des Art. 7. Unterabsatz (i) richtet sich sowohl an Personen, die in Drittstaaten, als auch an Personen, die in einem anderen Nachfolgestaat leben. Die Voraussetzung, um diesen die Staatsangehörigkeit zu verleihen, ist eine angemessene rechtliche Verbindung zu einem Gebiet, das früher zum Vorgängerstaat gehörte und jetzt Teil des Nachfolgestaates wird, und die Zustimmung der betroffenen Personen. Unterabsatz (ii) regelt die Verleihung der Staatsangehörigkeit nur für den Fall, daß Unterabsatz (i) keine Anwendung findet. Damit ist sein Anwendungsbereich wesentlich eingeschränkt und kommt nur zur Geltung bei betroffenen Personen, die ihren ständigen Wohnsitz in einem Drittstaat haben und an appropriate connection zu dem Gebiet besitzen, das jetzt Teil des Nachfolgestaates geworden ist. Für den Fall, daß eine betroffene Person nach den Voraussetzungen des Art. 22 qualifiziert ist, die Staatsangehörigkeit verschiedener Nachfolgestaaten zu erlangen, sollen die Nachfolgestaaten gem. Art. 23 Abs. 1 dem Betroffenen ein Wahlrecht einräumen. Außerdem soll gem. Art. 23 Abs. 2 allen Betroffenen, die nicht unter die 21 22 23

3

Id. y 75. Id. y 78. Id. y 80.

G Y I L 41

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Regelungen des Art. 22 Abs. b fallen, ein Wahlrecht bezüglich einer Staatsangehörigkeit zugestanden werden. Anwendung findet der Art. 23 Abs. 2 auf betroffene Personen, die in Drittstaaten ihren ständigen Wohnsitz haben und die Staatsangehörigkeit des Vorgängerstaates aufgrund von Abstammung oder Einbürgerung erlangt haben. Die Art. 24 bis 26 sind das Äquivalent zu Art. 22 und 23 für den Fall, daß sich Teile eines Staates vom Vorgängerstaat abspalten, der letztere aber bestehen bleibt. 24 I m Grunde finden mutatis mutandis die gleichen Vorschriften Anwendung. Anknüpfungspunkt für die Verleihung der Staatsangehörigkeit bleibt entsprechend der vorherrschenden Staatenpraxis der ständige Wohnsitz. 25 Artikel 25 regelt für die betroffenen Personen den Verlust der Staatsangehörigkeit des Vorgängerstaates. Allerdings darf dieser seine Staatsangehörigkeit erst zurücknehmen, wenn erstens der betroffene Personenkreis nicht gem. Art. 26 für eine Beibehaltung der Staatsangehörigkeit des Vorgängerstaates optiert und zweitens der Nachfolgestaat seine Staatsangehörigkeit auch tatsächlich verliehen hat. I m Gegensatz zur Übertragung von Staatsgebiet in Art. 20 haben im Falle der Abspaltung nur bestimmte Personen ein Recht, die Staatsangehörigkeit des Vorgängerstaates zu behalten, obwohl sie in einem der von der Abspaltung betroffenen Gebiete wohnen. Die Voraussetzungen dafür sind in Art. 25 Abs. 2 enthalten. In Übereinstimmung mit den beiden Wiener Konventionen zur Staatensukzession schreibt Art. 27 fest, daß die draft articles im Falle von Sukzessionen in Übereinstimmung mit dem Völkerrecht im allgemeinen und der UNO-Charta im besonderen Anwendung finden. Da Art. 27 zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt in die draft articles aufgenommen wurde, ist noch nicht sicher, ob er in den endgültigen Entwurf mit übernommen werden soll. Dies soll erst im Laufe der 2. Lesung entschieden werden.

2. 50. Tagung Während der 50. Tagung 26 wurde der vierte Bericht des Sonderberichterstatters V. Mikulka vorgelegt, der sich mit den Auswirkungen von Staatensukzession auf juristische Personen beschäftigt. 27

24

Id., 80. Id., 87. 26 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fiftyth Session (1998), U N G A O R , 53rd Session, Supp. 10, U N Doc. A/53/10 (im folgenden I L C Report 1998). 27 U N Doc. A/CN.4/489. 25

Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und 531 1998 a) Vierter Bericht des Sonderberichterstatters V. Mikulka schlug in seinem Bericht vor, daß aufgrund der mangelnden Stellungnahmen von Regierungen zu diesem Thema innerhalb der Kommission ein vorläufiger Austausch über einen möglichen Ansatz stattfinden sollte, um so die zukünftige Arbeit der Kommission zu erleichtern. Zu diesem Zwecke wurden zu dem Thema einige Fragestellungen aufgeworfen, die im Rahmen einer Arbeitsgruppe erörtert wurden.

b) Vorläufige Ergebnisse der Arbeitsgruppe Der zweite Teil der Arbeit beinhaltet auch die Auswirkungen der Staatensukzession auf die Staatsangehörigkeit juristischer Personen. Die Arbeitsgruppe hat in diesem Zusammenhang keinen Arbeitsbedarf gesehen, da das Thema zu speziell und die praktische Notwendigkeit für eine Lösung nicht deutlich sei. Allerdings schlug sie der Kommission zwei neue Arbeitsansätze vor, die aber eine Neuformulierung des Mandats von Seiten der Generalversammlung voraussetzen würden. Eine Möglichkeit besteht in der Erweiterung des Themas, so daß generell eine Untersuchung zur Frage der Staatsangehörigkeit von juristischen Personen im internationalen Recht durchgeführt würde. Dies würde grundsätzlich zu einer Klärung des Begriffs der Staatsangehörigkeit von juristischen Personen beitragen. Probleme im Rahmen einer solchen Untersuchung könnten sich aus der Unterschiedlichkeit der nationalen Rechtsordnungen (nicht jede Rechtsordnung verleiht auch juristischen Personen eine Staatsangehörigkeit), der Uberschneidung mit dem Bereich des diplomatischen Schutzes sowie der erst einmal nur theoretischen Bedeutung der Untersuchung ergeben. Die zweite mögliche Herangehensweise würde im Rahmen des Themas der Staatensukzession bleiben, aber Fragen wie den Status von juristischen Personen und die möglichen Auswirkungen einer Staatensukzession auf die Arbeitsbedingungen mit in die Untersuchung einbeziehen. Einerseits könnte so zur Klärung eines weiteren Gebiets des Rechts der Staatensukzession beigetragen werden, andererseits ergäbe sich auch hier das Problem der Ungleichheit der nationalen Rechtsordnungen.

I I . Vorbehalte bei Verträgen Zur Frage der Rechtslage und Praxis bezüglich Vorbehalten bei Verträgen wurde 1996 während der 48. Tagung der zweite Bericht des Sonderberichterstatters Alain Pellet zur Diskussion vorgelegt, der jedoch aus Zeitgründen nicht eingehend behan-

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delt werden konnte. 28 Es kam daher erst im Verlauf der 49. und 50. Tagung zur eingehenden Beschäftigung mit diesem Bericht.

1. 49. Tagung a) Zweiter Bericht des Sonderberichterstatters Aufgrund von Änderungen innerhalb der Zusammensetzung der I L C seit dem 11. November 1996 wurde zunächst noch einmal der zweite Bericht des Sonderberichterstatters vorgestellt. Der Bericht gliedert sich in drei Kapitel. Das erste enthält Vorschläge zur weiteren Gliederung dieses Themas für die zukünftige Arbeit der Kommission. I m zweiten Kapitel wird erstens die Frage nach der Einheit oder Unterschiedlichkeit der rechtlichen Regelungen {legal regime) bezüglich Vorbehalten bei Verträgen und zweitens die Frage nach Vorbehalten bei Menschenrechtsverträgen aufgestellt. Schließlich enthält der Bericht einen Resolutionsentwurf zu diesem Thema. I m Zusammenhang mit diesem Thema diskutierte der Sonderbeauftragte die Frage, inwieweit eine Modifizierung der Regelungen zu Vorbehalten bei Verträgen unter Berücksichtigung des Zwecks und/oder der Natur des Vertrages notwendig sei. Er betonte, daß die Basis für solche Regelungen in den entsprechenden Bestimmungen der Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention von 196929 enthalten sei, die für alle multilateralen Verträge gelte, mit Ausnahme derjenigen, für die ausdrücklich besondere Regelungen innerhalb der Konvention vorgesehen seien.30 Das zeige, daß die aufgeworfene Frage schon zum Zeitpunkt der Entstehung der Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention berücksichtigt wurde. Trotzdem fehlen Ausnahmeregelungen zu normativen Verträgen. Als normative Verträge sind diejenigen zu verstehen, die neben Vertragsklauseln überwiegend normative Bestimmungen enthalten. Damit gelte es festzustellen, inwieweit die in der Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention enthaltenen Regelungen zu Vorbehalten bei Verträgen auch auf diese normativen Bestimmungen anzuwenden seien.

28 Vgl. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session (1996), U N G A O R , 51st Session, Supp. No. 10, Annex I, U N Doc. A/51/10; zum Thema auch: Rolf Kühner, Vorbehalte zu multilateralen völkerrechtlichen Verträgen (1986); John Κ Gamble, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State Practice, AJIL, vol. 74, 1980, 372 ff.; Monika Bauer , Vorbehalte zu Menschenrechtsverträgen (1994). 29 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties vom 23. Mai 1969, U N T S 1155, 331 (im folgenden Vienna Treaty Convention); ebenso nachfolgend: Vienna Succession Convention (Fn. 9); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations vom 21. März 1986, I L M , vol. 25,1986, 534 (im folgenden Vienna Treaty Convention between States and International Organisations). 30

I L C Report 1997, 101.

Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und Der Sonderbeauftragte stellte in seinem Bericht fest, daß kein Grund ersichtlich sei, die Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention, die sich durch hohe Flexibilität, aber auch ausreichenden Schutz auszeichne, nicht auf sogenannte normative Verträge anzuwenden.31 Selbst wenn die Integrität eines Vertrages durch Vorbehalte beeinträchtigt werde, so blieben Sinn und Zweck des Vertrages erhalten. Gleiches gelte jedoch nicht nur für normative Verträge, sondern auch für synallagmatische Verträge, weshalb nicht ersichtlich sei, warum zwischen beiden Unterschiede bezüglich der Vorbehaltsregelungen gemacht werden sollten. Zudem warf der Sonderberichterstatter die Frage auf, ob Menschenrechtsverträge als Sonderform der normativen Verträge besondere Vorbehaltsregelungen erhalten müßten. Er stellte hierzu fest, daß entgegen den Ansichten von Menschenrechtsspezialisten nicht die Anwendbarkeit der vorhandenen Regelungen in Frage gestellt werden dürfe, sondern lediglich die Unklarheiten und Lücken ausgefüllt werden müßten. 32 Gründe hierfür seien zum einen der allgemeingültige Charakter der Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention per se sowie die Tatsache, daß seit dem Inkrafttreten dieser Konvention weder Staaten noch Gerichte die Anwendbarkeit dieser Konvention angezweifelt haben und die Mehrheit der Menschenrechtsverträge entweder Regelungen enthalten, die ausdrücklich auf die Geltung der Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention hinweisen oder ihrem Wortlaut entsprechen. 33 Es müsse aber beachtet werden, daß, wenn eine Partei eines Menschenrechtsvertrages besondere Regelungen wünsche, der Sinn und Zeck des Vertrages ausdrücklich festgelegt werde, um diesen nicht mit solchen Ausnahmeregelungen zu verletzen. Zudem stellte sich die Frage nach der Rolle der Kontrollgremien zu Vorbehalten bei Verträgen. Hierzu werden zwei unterschiedliche Meinungen vertreten. Auf der einen Seite wurde erklärt, daß allein die Vertragsstaaten die Kompetenz besäßen, über Gültigkeit und Anwendbarkeit von Regelungen zu Vorbehalten zu entscheiden 34 , auf der anderen Seite, daß das jeweilige Kontrollgremium nicht nur die Berechtigung habe, zu entscheiden, ob ein Regelung bezüglich eines Vorbehaltes zulässig ist, sondern auch, daß es alle daraus resultierenden Konsequenzen ziehen könne. 35 Aus folgendem Grund hält der Sonderberichterstatter beide Ansichten jedoch für nicht zufriedenstellend: Kontrollgremien dürften nicht mehr Kompetenzen haben, als es für die ihnen zugewiesene Funktion notwendig sei.36 Dementsprechend müßte es erlaubt sein, daß solche Gremien das Recht hätten, Vorbehalte 31

Id., 103. Id., 104. 33 Id., 104. 34 U N Legal Counsel, 1976 U N Jurid Y.B. 219, 221, U N Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/14. 35 I L C Report 1997, 105. 36 Id., 106. 32

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zu Verträgen auf ihre Zulässigkeit zu überprüfen, wenn dieses für die Ausübung ihrer Funktion notwendig sei. Abhängig von ihrer Funktion habe beispielsweise ein Gremium zur Streitbeilegung das Recht, auch Fragen zu Vorbehalten bei Verträgen zu entscheiden oder seine Meinung darzustellen, je nachdem ob dieses Gremium bindenden oder beratenden Charakter habe oder gar richterliche Funktionen ausübe. Ihre Kompetenzen dürften jedoch nicht weiter gehen, da nach wie vor Verträge aufgrund von Willenserklärungen von Vertragsparteien entstünden und somit der jeweilige Vertragspartner derjenige sei, der als einziger genau bestimmen könne, wie der Vorbehalt auszusehen habe, zu dem er seine Zustimmung geben wolle.

b) Diskussion in der I L C Innerhalb der Diskussion der Kommission erhielt die Ansicht des Sonderberichterstatters, die Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention — in den meisten Bereichen als kodifiziertes Gewohnheitsrecht anzusehen — allgemeingültig anzuwenden, große Zustimmung. Zum Teil wurde jedoch vertreten, daß die Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention ein in letzter Minute geschlossener Kompromiß zwischen der damals sowjetischen Position, ein unbegrenztes Recht des jeweiligen Staates auf Vorbehalte bei Verträgen einzuführen, und westlichen Staaten, die eine striktere Regelung forderten, sei.37 Hiergegen wurde jedoch eingewendet, daß, selbst wenn sie ein in letzter Minute entstandener Kompromiß sei, sie doch bis zum heutigen Zeitpunkt zufriedenstellende Ergebnisse erzielt habe, wodurch der Entstehungsgrund ebenso irrelevant werde wie die diesbezügliche Unterscheidung zwischen Entwicklungsländern und Industriestaaten. 38 Vor allem wurde der Konvention in der Frage, welche Folgen verbotene Vorbehalte bei Verträgen hätten, eine Lücke vorgeworfen, die geschlossen werden müsse.39 Gleiches gelte für die Frage, inwieweit Regelungen zu Vorbehalten nur auf zulässige Vorbehalte oder auch auf unzulässige anzuwenden seien. Außerdem wurde befürwortet, den genauen Unterschied zwischen Vorbehalten und auszulegenden Erklärungen (i Interpretative declarations) herauszuarbeiten, um zu vermeiden, daß eine auszulegende Erklärung als verschleierter Vorbehalt gebraucht werde. 40 Einige Mitglieder hatten Bedenken, ob nicht der vom Sonderberichterstatter und einem Teil der Kommission befürwortete Leitfaden zur Wiener Vertragsrechts37 38 39 40

Id., Id., Id., Id.,

109. 109. 112. 114.

Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und 535 1998 konvention bezüglich der Anwendung von Vorbehalten eine zu große und komplexe Aufgabe darstelle, zumal dieser auch aktuelle Entwicklungen sowohl auf regionaler wie auch auf universeller Ebene einbeziehen müsse. Außerdem stelle sich die Frage, welche Stellung dem Leitfaden ohne rechtliche Bindung zukomme. 41 Zum Teil wurde diesbezüglich vertreten, daß es die Aufgabe der Kommission sei, allgemein anwendbare Regeln beispielsweise für Menschenrechtsverträge zu schaffen, um Unsicherheiten und rechtliche Auseinandersetzungen zu vermeiden. Dagegen wurde jedoch eingewandt, daß die praktische Relevanz aufgrund der Tatsache, daß in den maßgeblichen Bereichen vor allem bezüglich Menschenrechten bereits Verträge existieren, anzuzweifeln sei.42 Daher sei ein möglicher Weg, einen effektiven Dialog zwischen den Staaten und den zuständigen Kontrollgremien zu schaffen. 43 Zudem gab es innerhalb der Diskussion erhebliche Unterstützung für die Auffassung des Sonderberichterstatters, daß es sich bei der Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention um eine allgemein anwendbare Konvention handele, die auch für normative Verträge wie etwa für Menschenrechtsverträge gelte. Allein die Abgrenzung zwischen normativen und synallagmatischen Verträgen stelle sich als schwierig heraus. 44 Einige waren jedoch der Auffassung, daß nicht vor dem Ende der Studien entschieden werden dürfe, ob die Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention auch auf Menschenrechtsverträge anwendbar sei, da sich gezeigt habe, daß es in diesen Bereichen erhebliche Lücken gäbe, die durch gesonderte spezielle Regelungen gefüllt werden müßten. 45 Bezüglich der Stellung von Kontrollgremien zu Vorbehalten bei Verträgen wurde herausgestellt, daß diese seit 1969 erheblich an Autorität gewonnen und sich somit deren Aufgabenbereiche erheblich erweitert hätten, was zum Zeitpunkt ihrer Gründung nicht vorgesehen war. Es wurde angezweifelt, daß solche Kontrollgremien ohne rechtlich bindende Entscheidungsmöglichkeit die Zulässigkeit von Vorbehalten bei Verträgen effektiv überwachen könnten. Auch wurde vertreten, daß grundsätzlich das Recht zur Begrenzung der Zulässigkeit von Vorbehalten bei Verträgen bei den Vertragsstaaten liege, und daß Eingriffe in dieses Recht durch die Kontrollgremien nicht für notwendig erachtet würden, zumal die Vertragsparteien durch Grundsätze wie pacta sunt servanda in ihrem Recht begrenzt werden würden. Dies entspreche im übrigen auch den jetzigen Gegebenheiten auf internationaler Ebene; regional gebe es zum Teil Abweichungen, die sich jedoch nicht auf internationale Bereiche übertragen ließen, da die Kontroll41 42

43 44 45

Id., 114. Id., 115. Id., 115. Id., 116. Id., 117.

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gremien dort nicht über solche Kompetenzen verfügten, wie es etwa auf europäischer Ebene der Fall sei. Daher dürfe die Kompetenz der Kontrollgremien nicht überschritten werden, da dies zu ultra vires Entscheidungen führe und somit gegen allgemein anerkannte Regeln des Völkerrecht verstoße. Dies könne dazu führen, daß Staaten weniger bereit seien, Vertragsparteien zu Menschenrechtsverträgen zu werden. 46 Dagegen gab es ebenfalls Mitglieder der Kommission, die aufzeigten, daß durch die Kontrollgremien mehr Kooperation zwischen den betroffenen Staaten erreicht würde und daß sich dieses System bereits auf regionaler Ebene bewährt habe und deshalb auch in internationalen Bereichen zu fördern sei.47 Schließlich stimmten viele zum Ende der Diskussion mit dem Sonderberichterstatter überein, daß die Kontrollgremien die Kompetenz besitzen sollten, Vorbehalte bei Verträgen auf ihre Zulässigkeit zu überprüfen, solange es im Zusammenhang mit ihrer vertraglich festgehaltenen Funktion stünde. Dennoch blieb am Ende die Frage offen, ob die Kontrollgremien, wenn sie der Meinung seien, daß Vorbehalte unzulässig seien, die Kompetenz besitzen sollten, diese als nichtig zu betrachten und zu behandeln. c) Vorläufiges Ergebnis Aufgrund der aufgezeigten Diskussion entschied die Kommission ohne abschließende Entscheidung über die Form des Textes, den vom Sonderberichterstatter vorbereiteten Entwurf einer Resolution an das Drafting Committee zu übergeben. Unter Berücksichtigung des Berichts des Drafting Committees beschloß die Kommission, vorläufige Schlußfolgerungen zu Vorbehalten bei normativen multilateralen Verträgen, einschließlich Menschenrechtsverträgen zu erstellen. 48 U m denjenigen Mitgliedern näher zu kommen, die fürchteten, daß ein solches Ergebnis verfrüht sei und die Möglichkeit von Änderungen ausschließe, wurde der Text unter dem Titel „Vorläufige Schlußfolgerung der ILC zu Vorbehalten bei normativen Verträgen einschließlich Menschenrechtsverträgen" präsentiert. Der in zwölf Punkte untergliederte Text beinhaltet zunächst, daß die Kommission die Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention aufgrund ihrer Flexibilität auf alle Arten von Verträgen für anwendbar hält, speziell die Art. 19 bis 23 als Regelungsinstitut für Vorbehalte bei Verträgen. Dabei wird vor allem Ziel und Zweck des Vertrages als wichtigstes Kriterium für die Zulässigkeit von Vorbehalten bei Verträgen angese46

Id., 120 ff. Id., 120.

47

48 Der Text der vorläufigen Schlußfolgerungen ist in I L C Report 1997, C. 125 ff. abgedruckt.

Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und hen. Demgemäß hält die Kommission diese Konvention auch auf normative Verträge — unter Einschluß von Menschenrechtsverträgen — für anwendbar. Bezüglich der Verträge, die keine speziellen Regelungen enthalten, so die vorläufige Schlußfolgerung der Kommission, hätten die Kontrollgremien innerhalb des ihnen zugeteilten Aufgabenbereichs die Kompetenz, sich inter alia über die Zulässigkeit von Vorbehalten zu äußern und zu beraten. Sie hebt dabei hervor, daß diese Kompetenz der Kontrollgremien nicht die traditionelle Kontrolle durch die Vertragsparteien und die Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention ausschließe oder beeinflusse. Zudem schlägt die ILC vor, besondere Regelungen in normative Verträge, insbesondere Menschenrechtsverträge oder ausführliche Protokolle einzufügen, wenn Staaten die Kompetenzen zur Annahme oder Ablehnung der Zulässigkeit von Vorbehalten an Kontrollgremien übergeben wollten. Es müsse jedoch insgesamt darauf geachtet werden, daß die Kompetenz der Kontrollgremien nicht überschritten werden dürfe. Weiter fordert die Kommission die Staaten auf, mit diesen Gremien zusammenzuarbeiten und deren Empfehlungen anzunehmen. Die Kontrollgremien sind, so die Kommission, diejenigen, die bei der Unzulässigkeit von Vorbehalten reagieren müßten. 2. 50. Tagung a) Dritter Bericht des Sonderberichterstatters Auf der 50. Tagung stellte der Sonderberichterstatter seinen dritten Bericht vor. 49 Dieser gliedert sich in zwei Bereiche. Zum einen behandelt er kontroverse Punkte der vorherigen Sitzungen der Kommission, zum anderen beinhaltet er die Definition von Vorbehalten an sich und Vorbehalten bei bilateralen Verträgen innerhalb eines vorläufigen Guide to Practice. Innerhalb des ersten Abschnitts stellte der Sonderberichterstatter zunächst die Reaktionen zu den in der 49. Tagung verabschiedeten vorläufigen Schlußfolgerungen heraus. Diese wurden von der Mehrheit als großer Fortschritt gewertet, 50 führten aber auch bei einigen zur Aufforderung an die Kommission, dem Beispiel des Europäischen Menschenrechtsgerichtshofes zu folgen und den Kontrollgremien die Kompetenz zu verleihen, selbst Konsequenzen aus den Ergebnissen ihrer Nachforschungen zu ziehen. Da sich bis jetzt jedoch nur vier Staaten, namentlich China, Liechtenstein, Marokko und die Schweiz sowie der Vorsitzende des Menschen49 50

U N Doc. A / C N . 4 / 4 9 1 and Add. 1 - 6. Siehe U N G A O R , 52nd Session, Supp. No. 10, U N Doc. A/55/10, para. 157 (1997).

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rechtsausschusses, zu dieser Anfrage der Kommission geäußert haben, schlug der Sonderbeauftragte vor, diese Diskussion auf einen späteren Zeitpunkt zu verlegen. Die Anfrage bezüglich Vorbehalten bei Verträgen hatte hingegen regen Anklang gefunden. 51 I m zweiten Abschnitt des dritten Berichts des Sonderberichterstatters ging dieser zunächst auf die Definition von Vorbehalten zu Verträgen ein. Als Ausgangspunkt dienten die drei oben genannten Konventionen, genauer Art. 2, Abs. 1 (d) der Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention 52 sowie Art. 2, Abs. 1 (d) 53 und Art. 2, Abs. 1 (j) 54 der beiden Nachfolgekonventionen sowie die Vorarbeiten der Sonderberichterstatter James Brierly 55 und Humphrey Waldock 56. Der Sonderbeauftragte gelangte bei der Analyse der dort aufgeführten Definitionen zu dem Ergebnis, daß keine der drei Wiener Konventionen eine umfassende Definition biete. 57 Die dort vorhandenen Definitionen sind mit dem Titel Use of terms bezeichnet, was zeige, daß sie ausschließlich zum Gebrauch innerhalb der Wiener Konventionen gedacht seien, aber schließlich doch in der Rechtsprechung und innerhalb unterschiedlichster Verträgen gebraucht würden. Demgemäß sei es Aufgabe der Kommission, die Definition der Wiener Konventionen anzupassen und zu ergänzen. Sie untergliedert sich in unterschiedliche formale Komponenten. Zunächst wird eine einseitige Erklärung des Vorbehalts gefordert. Bezüglich dieser Komponente ist der Sonderberichterstatter der Auffassung, daß eine solche nicht erforderlich sei. Schon /. Brierly vertrat die Ansicht, daß Vorbehalte eine eher vertragliche Konzeption besäßen, da sie schließlich auf einer Einigung von Staaten beruhten. Er warnte vor der nicht notwendigen Form der einseitigen Erklärung im Hinblick auf ähnliche Vorbehalte von Staaten, die besondere Solidaritätsbindungen hätten, und Vorbehalte, die gemeinsam von verschiedenen Staaten vorgebracht würden. Demzufolge müßte im Guide to Practice enthalten sein, daß solche nichteinseitigen Erklärungen mit der Definition von Vorbehalten bei Verträgen vereinbar seien. Zweite formale Voraussetzung, die in der Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention bezüglich Vorbehalten genannt wird, ist der einzuhaltende Zeitpunkt einer Vorbehaltserklärung. Danach muß die Vorbehaltsformulierung bei der Unterzeichnung,

51

I L C Report 1998, paras. 484 ff. Vienna Treaty Convention (Fn. 29). 53 Vienna Succession Convention (Fn. 9). 54 Vienna Treaty Convention between States and International Organisations (Fn. 29). 55 U N Doc. A / C N . 4 / 2 3 , 222 ff. 56 Insgesamt gab der Sonderbeauftragte vier Berichte zum Thema Vorbehalte bei Verträgen heraus, vierter Bericht, U N Doc. A/CN.4/177 and Add. 1 and 2, 3 ff. 57 I L C Report 1998, para. 492. 52

Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und 539 1998 Ratifikation, Annahme oder Genehmigung eines Vertrages oder bei dem Beitritt zu einem Vertrag abgegeben werden. Der Sonderberichterstatter erklärte hierzu, daß es sich weder um eine ausführliche noch ausreichend strenge Auflistung handele.58 Die Bedeutung einer solchen Vorschrift liege darin, zu verhindern, daß die Vertragsparteien zu jeder Zeit Vorbehalte zu Verträgen formulierten, um große sich dahinter verbergende Unsicherheiten zu vermeiden. Damit hätte die Auflistung in Art. 2 Abs. 1 (d) das gleiche Ziel wie Art. 11 Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention. Folglich solle im Guide to Practice ausdrücklich auf Art. 11 verwiesen werden; eine Neugestaltung der Auflistung nach dem Vorbild des Art. 2 Abs. 1 (d) sei damit entbehrlich. 59 I m Zusammenhang mit Vorbehalten mit territorialem Geltungsbereich widerruft der Sonderberichterstatter die Möglichkeit, einen Vorbehalt zum Zeitpunkt der Ankündigung, daß sich die Annahme eines Vertrages auf ein Gebiet ausstreckt, anzumelden. Zudem macht er in seinem Bericht deutlich, daß die in der Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention gewählte Formulierung, Vorbehalte eines Staates dienten dazu, die Rechtswirkung einzelner Vertragsbestimmungen in ihrer Anwendung auf diesen Staat auszuschließen oder zu ändern, Probleme in sich berge. Zunächst beinhalte der Ausdruck „einzelne Vertragsbestimmungen" das erste Problemfeld. Zum Teil wurde vorgeschlagen, den Begriff „Vertragsbestimmungen" durch „Verpflichtungen" zu ersetzten. 60 Dies hielt der Sonderberichterstatter jedoch für falsch, da auch übertragbare Vorbehalte, die sich nicht auf eine einzelne Vertragsbestimmung beziehen, in der Praxis eine Rolle spielen. Demgemäß solle der Guide to Practice einen Artikel enthalten, in dem geregelt werde, daß sich Vorbehalte auf eine oder mehrere Vertragsbestimmungen beziehen könnten oder allgemeiner auf die A r t und Weise, in der ein Staat plane, den Vertrag als Ganzes zu erfüllen. Das andere diesbezügliche Problem betreffe das Ziel, das der jeweilige Verfasser mit dem Vorbehalt verfolgt. Der Sonderberichterstatter bemerkte, daß der Unterschied zwischen Vorbehalten und interpretative declarations herausgestellt werden müsse. Vorbehalte in bezug auf Nichtanerkennung seien in der Realität dann keine Vorbehalte, wenn ihre Verfasser gar keine wie auch immer geartete Wirkung auf den Vertrag selbst erzielen wollten. Der Sonderberichterstatter schlug vor, daß auch nicht rechtzeitig abgegebene Erklärungen bezüglich der Nichtanerkennung von Staaten ungeachtet des Zeitpunktes, wann sie gemacht werden, als Vorbehalte je nach Intention des Staates zu deklarieren seien.61

58

Id., para. 497. Id., para. 498. 60 U N Doc. A/ CN.4/491/ Add. 2, paras. 72 - 88. 61 I L C Report 1998, para. 502. 59

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Außerdem befürwortete der Sonderberichterstatter, daß eine Erklärung eines Staates oder einer internationalen Organisation, in der Verpflichtungen übernommen würden, die über die vertraglich auferlegten hinausgingen, zu keinem Zeitpunkt einen Vorbehalt begründe. Demgegenüber solle es sich zu dem Zeitpunkt, in dem der Staat oder die internationale Organisation ihr Einverständnis, sich an den Vertrag zu binden, bekunde und bei dem Vertrag die Verpflichtungen begrenzen möchte, um einen Vorbehalt handeln, wenn nicht neue Vorschriften zum Vertrag hinzugefügt würden. 62 Ebenfalls enthalten ist eine Definition von interpretative declarations in Abgrenzung zu Vorbehalten, obwohl sich diese als schwer zu gestalten herausstellte, da weder die drei oben genannten Wiener Konventionen Regelungen dazu enthalten noch bei den Staaten eine einheitliche Definition dafür verwandt wird. Interpretative declarations unterscheiden sich in zweierlei Weise von Vorbehalten: zum einen im Zeitpunkt wann sie abgegeben werden können, zum anderen zu welchem Zweck sie aufgestellt wurden. Sie dienen also im Gegensatz zu Vorbehalten, die zum Ausschluß oder zur Modifizierung von Vertragsbestimmungen aufgestellt wurden und nur zu bestimmten Zeitpunkten abgegeben werden können, lediglich dazu, den Vertrag oder Vertragsbestimmungen zu interpretieren, was keinen zeitlichen Vorgaben unterliegt. Es w i r d somit nur der Geltungsbereich und die Bedeutung des Vertrages festgelegt, die Bestimmungen an sich bleiben jedoch unangetastet.63

b) Diskussion der I L C I m Verlauf der Diskussion über den dritten Bericht wurde der Vorschlag des Sonderberichterstatters, daß eine Erklärung eines Staates oder einer internationalen Organisation, die Verpflichtungen auf sich nimmt, die über die vertraglich auferlegten hinausgehen, zu keinem Zeitpunkt einen Vorbehalt begründet, umstritten aufgenommen. Neben denjenigen, die die Aufnahme dieses Vorschlages in den Guide to Practice befürworteten, wurde geäußert, daß solche Erklärungen kaum oder gar nicht abgegeben würden und werden. 64 Die in diesem Zusammenhang vorgeschlagene Vorschrift, daß es sich zu dem Zeitpunkt, in dem ein Staat oder eine internationale Organisation ihr Einverständnis, sich an den Vertrag zu binden, erklärt und

62

Id., paras. 503. Id., para. 517. 64 Id., para. 521; Gegenbeispiele vom Sonderberichterstatter in U N Doc. A / C N . 4 / 4 9 1 / Add. 3, para. 213. 63

Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und 541 1998 bei dem Vertrag die Verpflichtungen begrenzen möchte, um einen Vorbehalt handelt, wenn nicht eine neue Vorschrift dem Vertrag hinzugefügt würde, wurde ebenfalls kritisiert. So wurde dem Sonderberichterstatter vorgeworfen, es handele sich nur um eine e contrario Definition von Vorbehalten, und daß sie der allgemeinen Definition von Vorbehalten sehr ähnlich sei. 65 Außerdem sei es, so einige Mitglieder der Kommission, unmöglich, im Wege der einseitigen Erklärung dem Vertrag neue Bestimmungen hinzuzufügen. Weiter wurden in bezug auf beide Vorschriften Bedenken geäußert, inwieweit nicht durch die Wortwahl generelle Vorschriften des internationalen Rechts aufgehoben würden. 66 Auf K r i t i k stieß auch der Vorschlag, in den Guide to Practice aufzunehmen, daß eine einseitige Erklärung, in der ein Staat die Geltung eines Vertrages zwischen ihm und einem oder mehreren Staaten, die er nicht anerkenne, ausschließen wolle, ein Vorbehalt sei ungeachtet des Zeitpunktes, zu dem sie gemacht wurde. Es wurde in Frage gestellt, ob es sich bei solchen Erklärungen wirklich um Vorbehalte handele, da sie nicht einzelne Bestimmungen, sondern den Vertrag als Ganzes beträfen und bei Vorbehalten grundsätzlich ein Wille zur vertraglichen Beziehung angenommen werde, 67 d. h., ob ein Vorbehalt die Annahme eines Vertrages in seiner Gesamtheit ausschließen dürfe. 68 A n den Vorschlägen wurde allgemein bemängelt, daß sie zwar versuchten, die größtmögliche Anzahl an Situationen abzudecken, aber sich dabei von dem klassischen Charakter von Vorbehalten entfernten. Bezüglich der Definition von interpretative declarations stimmten viele zu, daß hier der größte Bedarf an Klärung liege und die vorbereiteten Vorschriften dazu geeignet seien. Es wurde jedoch angefragt, ob es nicht möglich sei, die allgemeinen Bestimmungen der Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention zur Auslegung von Verträgen auch auf interpretative declarations anzuwenden. 69 Andere waren hingegen der Auffassung, daß nur eine Unterscheidung zwischen Vorbehalten und interpretaive declarations notwendig sei, nicht aber eine eingehende Beschäftigung mit der Definition von interpretative declarations an sich. 70

65

I L C Report 1998, para. 521. Id., para. 522. 67 Id., para. 527. 68 Id., para. 529. 69 Id., para. 533. 70 Id., para. 534.

66

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Nach dieser Diskussion nahm die Kommission den Guide to Practice zu Vorbehalten bei Verträgen mit einigen Änderungen an und fügte den einzelnen Bestimmungen Kommentierungen bei. Ganz entfiel der Vorschlag, nach dem eine einseitige Erklärung eines Staat oder einer internationalen Organisation, die Verpflichtungen auf sich nehmen, die über die vertraglich auferlegten hinausgehen, zu keinem Zeitpunkt ein Vorbehalt begründet, und der Vorschlag, wann man grundsätzlich von einem Vorbehalt sprechen kann. Auch die Definition von interpretative declarations wurde vollständig entfernt. In den Kommentierungen zu den einzelnen Bestimmungen wurden die Diskussionsergebnisse der letzten Jahre festgehalten. Demzufolge wurde bezüglich der Definition von Vorbehalten herausgestellt, daß es sich nicht um einen Definitionsersatz der drei Wiener Konventionen handele, sondern um eine Zusammenfassung und Ausfüllung, die die Ergänzungen der Konventionen von 1978 und 1986 mit enthalte und nicht nur die Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention reproduziere. 71 Trotz der Lücken und Ungenauigkeiten sei die Kommission der Auffassung, daß kein ausreichender Grund bestehe, die Definition der drei Wiener Konventionen zu ersetzen.

I I I . Staatenverantwortlichkeit 1. 49. Tagung Während der 49. Tagung 72 beschloß die im Laufe der 2477. Sitzung am 15. Mai 1997 eingerichtete Arbeitsgruppe, die Diskussion auf methodische und prozedurale Fragen zu beschränken, da schriftliche Anmerkungen von Regierungen zu den wichtigen Punkten der draft articles nicht vorlagen. Aufgrund der Vorschläge der Arbeitsgruppe beschloß die Kommission u. a. —

einen Arbeitsplan für einen Zeitraum von 5 Jahren zu entwerfen und dem Thema angemessene Priorität einzuräumen und

— James Crawford

71

als neuen Sonderberichterstatter für dieses Thema zu ernennen.

Dies war auch das Ergebnis i n U N G A O R , 50th Session, Supp. No. 10 (A/50/10), para. 491 (1995); ebenso 52th Session, Supp. No. 10 (A/52/10), paras. 116 -123. 72 I L C Report 1997, 128; zum Thema auch: André de Hoogh, Obligation erga omnes and international crimes, 1996; Bernhard Graefrath y Complicity i n the law of international responsibility, R.B.D.I. 1998, 370 - 380.

Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und 543 1998 2. 50. Tagung a) Unterscheidung zwischen krimineller und deliktischer Verantwortlichkeit (criminal and delictual responsibility) aa) Bericht des Sonderberichterstatters Ein internationales Verbrechen wird durch Art. 19 Abs. 2 definiert als ein völkerrechtswidriges Verhalten eines Staates gegen eine so essentielle N o r m zum Schutze fundamentaler Interessen der internationalen Gemeinschaft, daß der Bruch der N o r m von der gesamten Gemeinschaft als ein Verbrechen anerkannt wird. Nach der Ansicht des Sonderberichterstatters ist Art. 19 Abs. 2 problematisch, da er Verbrechen mit Verbrechen definiere, also einen Zirkelschluß zulasse. Diese Unklarheit würde durch Art. 19 Abs. 3 noch verstärkt: "It's obscurity made it impossible to know what, if anything, was a crime." 73 Weiterhin wird die strafrechtliche Staatenverantwortlichkeit bisher im Völkerrecht nicht anerkannt. Die einzige Vorschrift, die dahingehend interpretiert werden könnte, war der Kriegsschuldparagraph im Vertrag von Versailles. 74 Ansonsten ist in der Tradition der Nürnberger und Tokyoter Tribunale, fortgesetzt durch die Tribunale von Jugoslawien und Ruanda, nur eine internationale strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit von Individuen anerkannt. 75 Auch die von der Kommission als Nachweis für die Existenz von state crimes aufgeführten IGH-Urteile können eine strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit von Staaten im Völkerrecht nicht begründen. Aufgrund der Unklarheit des Art. 19 und des Begriffs der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit von Staaten unterbreitete der Sonderberichterstatter der Kommission bezüglich Art. 19 folgende Vorschläge: — Die Herangehensweise, wie sie bis jetzt in den draft articles enthalten ist, wird weiterverfolgt. — Der Begriff crime wird durch den des „besonders schwerwiegenden völkerrechtswidrigen Aktes (exceptionally serious international wrongful act) ersetzt. — Es wird ein grundlegendes System der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit von Staaten in die draft articles mit eingearbeitet. — Das Konzept der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit und state crimes wird zurückgewiesen.

73 74 75

I L C Report 1998, para. 243. Id., para. 248. Id., para. 250.

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— Der Begriff wird aus den bisherigen draft articles herausgenommen, ohne dabei deren generellen Umfang und die Möglichkeit einzuschränken, den Begriff der „state crimes" in einem eigenständigen Entwurf weiter zu bearbeiten. bb) Diskussion der I L C Grundsätzlich existierten innerhalb der Kommission im Hinblick auf das Thema der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit von Staaten zum Teil erheblich divergierende Ansichten. 76 Zum einen waren Mitglieder der Kommission der Meinung, daß die Rechtsprechung des I G H sehr wohl Grundlage für die Existenz von state crimes sei. In diesem Zusammenhang wurde auf die vorläufige Entscheidung des I G H in Application of the Genocide Convention verwiesen. 77 Völkermord sei ein internationales Verbrechen und weder aus Art. 1, noch aus Art. 4 und 9 der Konvention ergebe sich, daß nicht auch state crimes davon erfaßt seien. Dagegen wurde eingewandt, daß weder in den Ausführungen des I G H noch in den mündlichen Vorträgen der Parteien ein Hinweis darauf zu finden sei, daß eine strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit von Staaten existiere. Auch der Barcelona~Traction-F&\l 7* wurde erneut als Beweis dafür, daß das Völkerrecht die Existenz von state crimes kenne, angeführt. 79 Des weiteren ist der Zusammenhang von ius cogens und state crimes , der aus den ähnlichen Definitionen in Art. 53 der Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention und Art. 19 Abs. 2 der draft articles geschlossen wurde, nicht geklärt. Ebenso konnte in der Diskussion über das Verhältnis von erga omnes Normen und state crimes keine Einigkeit erzielt werden. Zum einen wurde vertreten, daß zwischen einem Bruch des Völkerrechts {breach) und der Verletzung einer erga omnes N o r m unterschieden werden müsse und daß letztere nicht adäquat in den draft articles berücksichtigt wurde. Als Konsequenz sollte u. a. in den draft articles ein gestaffeltes System der Staatenverantwortlichkeit eingeführt werden. Ein anderer Teil der Kommissionsmitglieder erkannte zwar die zwischen erga omnes Normen, ius cogens und state crimes bestehende Beziehung an. Der Begriff der state crimes stelle aber eine eigenständige Kategorie dar, die nicht dadurch an Bedeutung verlieren sollte, daß sie 76

Id., paras. 260 - 330. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Cnmes of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), ICJ Reports 1996, 595. 78 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Reports 1970, 3. 79 Vgl. zur Diskussion innerhalb der I L C aber erga omnes Normen als Grundlage für state crimes den Bericht von Christian Feist y Die Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1993 und 1994, GYIL, vol. 38, 1995, 385. 77

Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und 1998 entweder ersetzt oder als eine Form von ius cogens oder erga omnes Normen behandelt werde. Zu den vom Sonderberichterstatter unterbreiteten Vorschlägen äußerte sich die Kommission wie folgt: I n Zusammenhang mit dem ersten Vorschlag wurde als Antwort auf den Vorwurf, daß die Definition von state crimes , wie sie in Art. 19 enthalten ist, zu ungenau und verwirrend sei, vorgebracht, daß es in der Natur allgemeingültiger Definitionen liege, daß sie in irgendeiner Form schwierig und ungenau seien. Ferner sei die Definition der state crimes in Art. 19 Abs. 2 im Gegensatz zu der der peremptory norm of international law (ius cogens) in Art. 53 der Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention sehr viel eindeutiger und ausführlicher. Weitere Vorschläge gingen dahin, ζ. B. Art. 19 Abs. 3 völlig aus den draft articles zu streichen oder die Vorschrift wie folgt zu ergänzen: „Ein völkerrechtswidriger A k t , der aus der Verletzung einer Verpflichtung resultiert, die für den Schutz der Internationalen Gemeinschaft von äußerstem Interesse ist, hat besondere rechtliche Konsequenzen." 80 Umstritten war auch die Frage, wie state crimes im ersten Teil der draft articles zu behandeln seien. Zum einen wurde die Ansicht vertreten, daß dieser Teil ausschließlich für state delicts gelte und nicht für state crimes. Von der Kommission sei bisher nicht berücksichtigt worden, ob einige Vorschriften, um sie auch auf state crimes anzuwenden, neu formuliert werden müßten. Zum anderen wurde vorgebracht, daß Art. 1 und 19 auf derselben Grundlage basieren, so daß Änderungen in Art. 19 auch in den vorangehenden Vorschriften berücksichtigt werden müßten. Weiterer Regelungsbedarf bestehe in der Bestimmung des Begriffs der „verletzten Staaten" (injured states) in Art. 40 der draft articles insbesondere in bezug auf Verletzungen von ius cogens und erga omnes Normen, möglicherweise auch state crimes . Eine Lösung könne darin liegen, Art. 40 entsprechend Art. 60 der Wiener Vertragsrechtskonvention neu zu formulieren, so daß zwischen drei verschiedenen Kategorien von verletzten Staaten unterschieden wird. I m Zusammenhang mit den Rechtsfolgen, die sich aus state crimes ergeben, wurde der Kommission vorgeworfen, die Abgrenzung zu den state delicts in der ersten Lesung nicht hinreichend berücksichtigt zu haben. Die undifferenzierte Herangehensweise habe zur Folge gehabt, daß nur unzureichende Vorschriften erarbeitet worden seien. Die draft articles sähen weder einen pönalisierenden Schadensersatz (punitive damages) noch andere Formen von Strafe (criminalpenalties) vor. Deshalb wurde vorgeschlagen, Art. 53 der draft articles zu überarbeiten. Ähnlich umstritten wie der erste Vorschlag des Sonderberichterstatters waren auch seine vier weiteren.

80

I L C Report 1998, para. 289.

35 G Y I L 41

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Zum Teil fand der zweite Vorschlag in der Kommission positive Resonanz, da das Konzept der exceptionally serious wrongful acts eher dem sui generis Charakter der Staatenverantwortlichkeit gerecht würde. Dagegen wurde vorgebracht, daß der Begriff der state crimes nicht mit denselben Wertungen wie in nationalen Rechtsordnungen behaftet und die Terminologie ein nicht so wichtiger Punkt sei. Man könne den Begriff ersetzen, solange die hinter Art. 19 stehende Wertung erhalten bleibe. Bei einigen Mitgliedern der Kommission fand gerade der vierte Vorschlag des Sonderberichterstatters Zustimmung, das Konzept der state crimes gänzlich zurückzuweisen, da es weder notwendig noch praktikabel sei. Es wurde befürchtet, daß es von den Staaten und damit von der Staatengemeinschaft nicht akzeptiert werden würde. Außerdem hätte es nur eine nachhaltige Verzögerung der Arbeit der Kommission zur Folge. Da in keinem der Punkte ein Konsens erzielt werden konnte, wurde von der Kommission bezüglich Art. 19 ein vorläufiger Entschluß gefaßt: — Unbeschadet der Ansichten einzelner Kommissionsmitglieder wird die Diskussion um Art. 19 vertagt. — Es sollte in Erwägung gezogen werden, ob nicht eine Entwicklung von Kernbegriffen wie erga omnes Normen und ius cogens anstelle von state crimes in den draft articles als mögliche Kategorien ausreichend wäre. — Dies soll innerhalb einer Arbeitsgruppe und im zweiten Bericht des Sonderberichterstatters ausgearbeitet werden. b) Art. 1 bis 4 8 1 Der Sonderberichterstatter schlug der Kommission vor, Art. 1, 3 und 4 ohne Änderungen anzunehmen und Art. 2 zu streichen, da er nur eine überflüssige und allgemeingültige Regelung enthalte. Lediglich eine Änderung des Titels von „Ursprung der Staatenverantwortlichkeit" (origin of state responsibility) in „Grundlagen der Staatenverantwortlichkeit" (basis of state responsibility) könne in Erwägung gezogen werden, da der Begriff „Ursprung" den Eindruck erwecken könne, auch historische Bezüge darlegen zu wollen. Dieser Vorschlag wurde von der Kommission angenommen. Bezüglich Art. 2 wurde vorgeschlagen, zumindest im Kommentar die Gründe für die Streichung aufzuführen, um Mißverständnisse zu vermeiden. Der Sonderberichterstatter schlug vor, die Grundlage der Vorschrift — die Gleichheit der Staaten — auch in die Präambel mit aufzunehmen.

81

Id., paras. 332- 358.

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c) Art. 5 bis 8 und 1082 Der Sonderberichterstatter stellt in seiner Einleitung fest, daß die Grundlagen und einige Formulierungen dieses Teils in den letzten 20 Jahren Eingang in die Staatenpraxis und internationale Gerichtsbarkeit gefunden haben. Aus diesem Grunde werden die im folgenden aufgeführten Anderungsvorschläge auch nicht von grundsätzlichem Charakter sein. Wie auch im ersten Teil, schlägt der Sonderberichterstatter eine Änderung des Titels von The act of the State under international law in Attribution of conduct to the State under international law vor. Außerdem zieht der Sonderberichterstatter, in Ubereinstimmung mit einigen Regierungen, in Erwägung, Art. 5 zu ändern. Der Bezug auf das nationale Recht solle entfallen, um zu verdeutlichen, daß dies nicht der entscheidende Maßstab bei der Entscheidung sei, ob eine Person oder ein Rechtsträger ein Organ im Sinne der draft articles ist. Die Wichtigkeit des nationalen Rechts könne noch immer in der Kommentierung zum Ausdruck gebracht werden. Auch bezüglich Art. 6 sollen einige Änderungen vorgenommen werden: Zum einen soll der Ausdruck superior or subordinate position of an organ durch eine Formulierung ersetzt werden, die sich auf alle Staatsorgane bezieht, „ohne Rücksicht auf ihre Position in der Organisation des Staates" (whatever their position in the organization of the State). Zum anderen sollen Art. 5 und 6 zu einem Artikel zusammengefaßt werden, da Art. 6 keine eigenen Regelungen enthalte, sondern nur eine Klarstellung des Art. 5 darstelle. In Art. 7 Abs. 2 muß nach Ansicht des Sonderberichterstatters von der Kommission genauer geklärt werden, was unter der Ausübung staatlicher Gewalt (governmental authority) zu verstehen sei, um die unterschiedliche Staatenpraxis zu berücksichtigen. Bezüglich Art. 8 soll geklärt werden, ob unter Abs. 1 nicht nur ein Verhalten eines Rechtsträgers aufgrund direkter Anweisungen des Staates diesem zugerechnet werden könne, sondern auch, ob dies der Fall sei, wenn der Rechtsträger unter der Leitung und effektiven Kontrolle des Staates stehe. In Art. 10 sollen kleinere Umformulierungen und Ergänzungen vorgenommen werden, um die Vorschrift eindeutiger zu gestalten. Insgesamt müsse besonders darauf geachtet werden, daß ein in Wirklichkeit bestehendes Organ des Staates, das durch nationales Recht lediglich anders benannt wird, von den draft articles erfaßt sei, da Staaten ansonsten die Vorschriften über die Staatenverantwortlichkeit umgehen könnten. Innerhalb der Kommission wurde der Vorschlag zur Änderung der Uberschrift begrüßt. Weiterhin wurde eine Zusammenfassung der Art. 5 und 6 weitestgehend unterstützt. Die Diskussion ergab jedoch, daß kein Konsens bezüglich der Vorschläge des Sonderberichterstatters zu den Formulierungsänderungen gefunden werden konnte.

82

35*

Id , paras. 359 - 408.

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Jasper Finke und Christiane Wandscher d) Art. 9 und 11 bis 15 bis 183

Die Vorschläge des Sonderberichterstatters sehen vor, daß Art. 12 und 13 nicht in die draft articles übernommen werden, da sie nur eine Negativformulierung der in Art. 9 enthaltenen Vorschriften darstellen und somit überflüssig seien. Der zweite Regelungsbereich bezüglich der Staatenverantwortlichkeit internationaler Organisationen soll in den draft articles nicht berücksichtigt werden, da sich in diesem Bereich in den letzten Jahren komplizierte Probleme ergeben haben, die noch nicht hinreichend geklärt seien. Allerdings solle in die draft articles eine entsprechende Vorbehaltsklausel aufgenommen werden. Artikel 14 und 15, die das Verhalten von Aufständischen einem Staat unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen zurechnen, sollen nach Ansicht des Sonderberichterstatters zusammengefaßt und um eine Variante gekürzt werden. Eine Zurechnung solle nur in dem Fall stattfinden, in dem Aufständische die Regierung besiegt und ersetzt haben und nicht auch dann, wenn sie an der bereits bestehenden Regierung beteiligt werden. Denn das würde die Bemühungen zur friedlichen Konfliktbeilegung und der nationalen Aussöhnung erheblich minimieren. Schließlich solle auch Art. 11 gestrichen werden, da er nur eine Negativformulierung des Art. 15 bis darstelle. Während der Diskussion konnte sich die Kommission nur auf die Zusammenfassung der Art. 14 und 15 zu einem Artikel sowie auf die Streichung der Art. 11 bis 14 einigen. Artikel 9 fand generelle Zustimmung. Bezüglich der Verantwortlichkeit von internationalen Organisationen wurde vereinbart, dieses Problem außerhalb der draft articles zu untersuchen, aber eine Vorbehaltsklausel an dieser Stelle aufzunehmen. I V . Die völkerrechtliche H a f t u n g für Schäden aufgrund nicht völkerrechtswidriger Aktivitäten Auf der 48. Tagung lag der 12. Bericht des Sonderberichterstatters Julio Barboza u vor. Es wurde eine Zusammenfassung in Form eines Kodifikationsentwurfes mit allen vorläufig angenommenen Vorschriften erstellt. Auf der Grundlage dieser Zusammenfassung wurde auch auf der 49. und 50. Tagung das Thema weiter behandelt.

83

Id., paras. 409 - 451. U N Doc. A/CN.4/475; zum Thema auch: Raimund Harndt , Völkerrechtliche Haftung für die schädlichen Folgen nicht verbotenen Verhaltens (1993); Michael B. Akehurst , International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law, N Y I L , vol. 16,1985, 3 - 16; Christopher W. Pinto , Reflections on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law, N Y I L , vol. 16, 1985, 17-48. 84

Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und

199854

1. 49. Tagung Auf der 49. Tagung wurde vor allem das weitere Vorgehen zu diesem Thema geregelt. Dazu gehörte u. a. die Gründung einer Arbeitsgruppe, die aufgrund der Zusammenfassung der 48. Tagung und der schriftlichen Bemerkungen einzelner Regierungen85 einen Rückblick bis zum Jahr 1978 erarbeitete. Die Gruppe kam zu dem Ergebnis, daß die strittigen und unklaren Bereiche konzeptioneller und theoretischer Natur seien, entstanden aufgrund des Titels des Themas sowie der Abhängigkeit vom Bereich der Staatenverantwortlichkeit. Außerdem stellte die Arbeitsgruppe fest, daß die Kommission bisher unter dem Titel „Die völkerrechtliche Haftung für Schäden aufgrund nicht völkerrechtswidriger Aktivitäten" zwei Kernprobleme behandelt habe: erstens die Verhinderung solcher Aktivitäten und zweitens die völkerrechtliche Haftung, die in Zukunft getrennt behandelt werden sollten. Bezüglich des ersten Problems war die Arbeitsgruppe der Ansicht, daß sich die Arbeit der Kommission schon in einem fortgeschrittenen Stadium befinde. Daher könne mit diesem Teil in den nächsten Jahren abgeschlossen und die erste Lesung der draft articles vorgenommen werden. Uber die Form solle aber zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt entschieden werden. Hinsichtlich des zweiten Kernproblems, der völkerrechtlichen Haftung, kam die Arbeitsgruppe zu dem Entschluß, daß die Kommission dieses Thema beibehalten, aber weitere Stellungnahmen der Staaten abwarten solle, bevor Entscheidungen gefällt würden. Die Kommission beschloß, das erste Kernproblem unter dem Untertitel „Verhinderung von grenzübergreifenden Schäden aufgrund risikoreicher Handlungen" weiterzuführen, und ernannte Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao zum Sonderberichterstatter für diesen Abschnitt. 2. 50. Tagung Auf der 50. Tagung stellte der Sonderberichterstatter P. S. Rao seinen ersten Bericht vor, der einen Überblick über die seit 1978 geleistete Arbeit zu diesem Thema enthält. Der Sonderberichterstatter empfahl, die 1996 angenommenen darft articles 16 noch einmal zu erörtern und zu entscheiden, ob sie in den neuen Entwurf unter dem Aspekt der Verhinderung grenzübergreifender Schäden aufgenommen werden

85 86

U N Doc. A/CN.4/479, sect. C. U N G A O R , 51st Session, Supp. No. 10, Annex I, 238, U N Doc. A/51/10 (1996).

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sollten. Die Kommission entschied, die draft articles 1(a) und 2 der Arbeitsgruppe von 1996 an das Drafting Committee zu verweisen. Zudem wurde eine Arbeitsgruppe gegründet, um die Artikel 3 bis 22 im Hinblick auf die neue Uberschrift zu überarbeiten und um festzustellen, ob Vorgehen und Inhalt bezüglich der Pflicht zur Verhinderung angemessen berücksichtigt wurden. Vor dem Hintergrund des überprüften Textes schlug der Sonderberichterstatter eine überarbeitete Version der draft articles vor. Die Kommission entschied bezüglich der Überarbeitung, diese ebenfalls an das Drafting Committee zu übersenden. Aufgrund des Berichts des Drafting Committees wurden dann in erster Lesung 17 Artikel zur Verhinderung von grenzübergreifenden Schäden aufgrund risikoreicher Handlungen angenommen, und es wurde beschlossen, diese an Staaten zur Beurteilung und Kommentierung zu senden. Die überarbeitete Version der Artikel unterschied sich in folgenden Punkten von der 1996 angenommenen Fassung87: Art. 3 der alten Version über die Freiheit von Handlungen und ihre Begrenzungen wurde gestrichen, ebenso der ehemalige Art. 5 bezüglich der Haftung sowie Art. 12 über die NichtÜbertragung eines Risikos. Ansonsten sind alle Artikel mit ihrer jeweiligen Kommentierung beibehalten worden. Außerdem stellte die Kommission in einer allgemeinen Kommentierung heraus, welche Relevanz die Verhinderung von grenzübergreifenden Schäden aufgrund risikoreicher Handlungen hat. Verhinderung ist dabei als Vorgehen oder Verpflichtung zeitlich vor der Situation, in der ein tatsächlicher Schaden eintritt, anzusehen.88 Das Thema sei insofern von großer Bedeutung, als daß bei schon entstandenem Schaden der alte Zustand nicht mehr wiederhergestellt oder ausgeglichen werden könne. 89 V . Diplomatischer Schutz 1. 49. Tagung Erstmals kam es zur Behandlung des Themas „diplomatischer Schutz" während einer Tagung der Kommission. Gemäß der Resolution 51/160, Abs. 13 wurde eine Arbeitsgruppe zum diplomatischen Schutz gegründet, um Umfang und Inhalt der Bearbeitung des Themas unter Berücksichtigung der dazu abgegebenen Bemerkun87

Eine detaillierte Übersicht über die 1996 angenommene Version bieten Jörg Föh und Ina Wiesner, Die Tätigkeiten der International Law Commission i n den Jahren 1995 und 1996, G Y I L , vol. 39, 1997, 612 ff. 88 I L C Report 1998, para. 55, 2 (1). 89 Id., para. 55, 2 (3 ff.); vergleiche auch Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (advisory opinion ), ICJ Reports 1996, 15, para. 29.

Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und

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gen und Beurteilungen von Staaten anzugeben. Außerdem war es ihre Aufgabe festzustellen, welche strittigen Punkte im Zusammenhang mit dem Thema unter eingehender Betrachtung der Staatenpraxis, Rechtsprechung und Lehre in Zukunft behandelt werden müßten. Uber die Form der kommenden Ergebnisse solle, so die Arbeitsgruppe, noch nicht entschieden werden. In Betracht kommen aber möglicherweise eine Konvention oder guidelines. Aus Sicht der Arbeitsgruppe sind die relevanten Bereiche die Grundlagen, die beteiligten Parteien, Bedingungen, Modalitäten und Folgen innerhalb der Forderungen von Staaten im Namen ihrer Staatsangehörigen gegenüber anderen Staaten sowie analog dazu die Forderungen von internationalen Organisationen aufgrund des Schutzes ihrer Vertreter. 90 Die Arbeitsgruppe überarbeitete die im Verlauf der 48. Tagung aufgestellte General Outline 91 und entschied, daß der Umfang der Bearbeitung nicht den Schadensersatz aus der direkten Verletzung eines Staates gegenüber einem anderen, sondern nur den indirekten Schaden gegen natürliche oder juristische Personen enthalten soll. Demzufolge wurde Teil 3 der General Outline aus der weiteren Bearbeitung ausgeschlossen. Der Umfang des diplomatischen Schutzes beschränkt sich außerdem auf sekundäre Regeln des Völkerrechts, d. h. es sollen die Anforderungen für einen völkerrechtswidrigen A k t aufgestellt werden. Zudem ist der Begriff des diplomatischen Schutzes zu definieren. In der internationalen Rechtsprechung versteht man darunter die Forderung eines Staates gegen einen anderen Staat, das Recht zu erlangen, für seine Staatsangehörigen einzutreten, und eine Wiedergutmachung des möglichen Schadens zu erhalten. 92 Schließlich wurde Mohamed Bennouna von der Kommission zum Sonderberichterstatter ernannt und damit beauftragt, auf der Grundlage der Darstellung der Arbeitsgruppe einen vorläufigen Bericht zu den sich ergebenden Fragen zu diesem Thema auf der nächsten Tagung abzugeben. 2. 50. Tagung Im Laufe der 50. Tagung stellte der Sonderberichterstatter seinen vorläufigen Bericht vor. Darin sind die Regelungen zu diplomatischem Schutz sowie das Wesen der Regeln, die diplomatischen Schutz begründen, enthalten.

90

I L C Report 1997, 133 und 136 f. I L C Report 1996, 335 ff. 92 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. United Kingdom), P.C.I.J., Series A , No. 2 (1924), 12. 91

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Der Sonderberichterstatter stellte bezüglich der Herkunft heraus, daß diplomatischer Schutz viel kritisiert wurde, u. a. aufgrund der Tatsache, daß nur mächtige Staaten in der Lage waren, ihn gegen weniger mächtige Staaten einzusetzen. Zudem hob er die Anerkennung der Rechte des Individuums sowie die mit diplomatischem Schutz verbundenen Rechte hervor. Bezüglich des Wesens der Regeln, die diplomatischen Schutz begründen, warf er die Frage auf, inwieweit sich die Kommission wirklich nur mit den sekundären und nicht auch flexibler mit den relevanten primären Regeln beschäftigen solle. Zudem schlug der Sonderberichterstatter vor, den Titel des Themas auf „Diplomatischer Schutz der Person und des Eigentums" zu erweitern. Nach einer Diskussion über die gewohnheitsrechtliche Konzeption von diplomatischem Schutz, sein Verhältnis zu Menschenrechten, sowie die Vorbedingungen zur Durchführung von diplomatischem Schutz und das Verhältnis zwischen diplomatischem Schutz und Staatenverantwortlichkeit kam die Kommission zu dem Ergebnis, eine Arbeitsgruppe zu gründen, die die Schlußfolgerungen der Diskussion herausstellen und strittige Punkte auflisten solle. Diese sollten dann i m zweiten Bericht des Sonderberichterstatters auf der 51. Tagung bearbeitet werden.

V I . Einseitige Hoheitsakte 1. 49. Tagung

A u f Antrag der I L C beauftragte die Generalversammlung in Resolution 51/160 die Kommission, Rahmen und Inhalt des Themas zu erarbeiten. 93 Z u diesem Zweck wurde eine Arbeitsgruppe eingerichtet, die während der 2512. Sitzung ihren Bericht vorlegte. Die Arbeitsgruppe hielt es für ratsam und durchführbar, daß sich die I L C mit dem Thema der einseitigen Hoheitsakte eingehend beschäftige, da es in der Staatenpraxis praktische Relevanz auch für die Zukunft hat und auch bereits Gegenstand internationaler Rechtsprechung und wissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen war. Somit bestehe eine ausreichende Grundlage für eine eingehende Analyse der Kommission. Zuerst müsse geklärt werden, welche A r t von einseitigen Hoheitsakten Gegenstand der Arbeit der I L C sein sollen. Die Arbeitsgruppe schlug vor, folgende einseitige Hoheitsakte von der Untersuchung auszunehmen: Hoheitsakte, die keine rechtlichen Folgen haben, sogenannte joint acts , einseitige Erklärungen internationaler Organisationen, Erklärungen, die keine völkerrechtliche Relevanz haben, und solche, die bereits durch das internationale Vertragsrecht geregelt sind, wie ζ. B. Beitritt und Austritt.

93

I L C Report 1997, 139 - 146.

Tätigkeit der International Law Commission in den Jahren 1997 und 553 1998 Die Arbeitsgruppe empfahl, in den folgenden fünf Jahren einen Entwurf in erster Lesung abzuschließen. Des weiteren wurde der Sonderberichterstatter V. Rodriguez Cedeno für 1998 beauftragt, einen allgemeinen Uberblick über die Staatenpraxis und die internationale Rechtsprechung zu erstellen. 2. 50. Tagung Der erste Bericht des Sonderberichterstatters 94 analysierte die bestehende Staatenpraxis und Rechtsprechung. Dabei stellte er fest, daß einseitige Hoheitsakte, auch wenn vom I G H unterschiedlich in ihrer bindenden Wirkung beurteilt 95 , feste Bestandteile des Völkerrechts sind. U m eine umfassendere Untersuchung zu ermöglichen, solle zuerst eine Definition für die hier in Frage stehenden einseitigen Hoheitsakte gefunden werden. Als Negativabgrenzung sollten alle einseitigen Hoheitsakte, die politischer Natur sind, von internationalen Organisationen abgegeben werden oder keine rechtliche Wirkung entfalten, von der Untersuchung ausgenommen werden. Auch estoppel stelle an sich keinen einseitigen Hoheitsakt dar, da zum einen keine Notwendigkeit bestehe, dem Verhalten eines Staates aufgrund estoppel rechtsbindenden Charakter zuzuschreiben. Zum anderen stelle es auch kein eigenständiges einseitiges Verhalten dar, da es lediglich eine Reaktion auf ein Verhalten eines anderen Staates sei. Außerdem sei gerade aufgrund von IGH-Urteilen die Ansicht vertreten worden, daß estoppel ein Mittel sei, um vertragliche Beziehungen zu etablieren. 96 Es könne somit kein einseitiger Hoheitsakt sein. Der Sonderberichterstatter schlug deshalb folgende Definition vor: „Einseitige Hoheitsakte sind eigenständige Äußerungen mit einem klaren und eindeutigen Zweck, der öffentlich und ausdrücklich geäußert wurde, um eine völkerrechtliche Verpflichtung zu einem oder mehreren Staaten zu begründen, die nicht an der Ausarbeitung der Äußerung beteiligt waren." 97 Der Bericht des Sonderberichterstatters wurde innerhalb der Kommission kontrovers diskutiert. Insgesamt konnte zu keinem der vorgebrachten Vorschläge ein Konsens gefunden werden. Lediglich der Vorschlag der Arbeitsgruppe, den Sonderberichterstatter zu beauftragen, für die nächste Sitzung draft articles und einen diesbezüglichen Kommentar auszuarbeiten, wurde angenommen.98

94

U N Doc. A/CN.4/486. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), P.C.I.J., Ser. A / B , No. 53, 22; Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France, New Zealand v. France), ICJ Reports 1974, 253 und 457; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), ICJ Reports 1986, 554; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 1986, 14. 96 I L C Report 1998, para. 131. 97 Id., para. 142. 98 Id. , para. 199. 95

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Jasper Finke und Christiane Wandscher V I I . Zukunftsausblick

Es wurde eine Arbeitsgruppe eingerichtet, die sich mit möglichen Themen für die langfristige Arbeit der Kommission auseinandersetzte. Die von der Kommission angenommenen Vorschläge beinhalteten folgende Themen: Auswirkungen bewaffneter Konflikte auf Verträge, gemeinsame Naturressourcen (bezüglich Grundwasser, O l und Gas) und die Abschiebung von Ausländern." Auf der nächsten Tagung sollen erste Überlegungen zu diesen Bereichen innerhalb der Kommission angestellt werden. Außerdem soll eine Machbarkeitsstudie für eine Zahl anderer Themen durchgeführt werden.

99

Id., paras. 551 -554.

Book Reviews Andreas F. Bauer: Effektivität und Legitimität. Die Entwicklung der Friedenssicherung durch Zwang nach Kapitel V I I der Charta der Vereinten Nationen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der neueren Praxis des Sicherheitsrats. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1996, 309 Seiten. Die seit dem Beginn der 90er Jahre sowohl in quantitativer als auch qualitativer Hinsicht zunehmenden Aktivitäten des Sicherheitsrats i m Bereich der Friedenssicherung haben bei der internationalen Gemeinschaft große Hoffnungen i m Hinblick auf die Effektivierung des durch den Kalten Krieg paralysierten Systems kollektiver Sicherheit der Vereinten Nationen geweckt. Gleichzeitig wirft die neue Praxis des Sicherheitsrats aber auch eine Reihe von bislang nur unzureichend gelösten Rechtsproblemen auf, deren Bewältigung eine notwendige Voraussetzung für die fortbestehende Akzeptanz des Vorgehens des Sicherheitsrats durch die Mitgliedstaaten bildet. Bauer hat sich i n seiner Arbeit zum Ziel gesetzt, diese sich aus der neueren Praxis des Sicherheitsrats ergebenden Herausforderungen aufzuzeigen und die weiterhin bestehenden Defizite des Sicherheitssystems der Vereinten Nationen i m Hinblick auf seine Effektivität wie auch Legitimität i n rechtlicher Hinsicht zu analysieren. Die Monographie gliedert sich i n zwei Hauptteile, wobei sich der erste umfassend mit den Grundlagen des Sicherheitsmechanismus der Vereinten Nationen auseinandersetzt, während der Verfasser i m zweiten Teil sowohl die neuere Praxis des Sicherheitsrats unter verschiedenen rechtlichen Aspekten analysiert als auch die Rolle der Regionalorganisationen für eine effektive Friedenssicherung aufzeigt. I m ersten Hauptteil wendet sich Bauer zunächst der Idee der kollektiven Sicherheit als solcher zu, u m die theoretischen Grundlagen für sein weiteres Vorgehen und die Bewertung der Umsetzung dieses Konzeptes i n der Praxis zu legen. Der Gedanke der kollektiven Sicherheit wird sowohl von einem auf dem Gleichgewicht der Mächte basierenden System als auch der Idee eines Weltstaates konzeptionell abgegrenzt. Ausgehend von den Grundsätzen der kollektiven Sicherheit — die Erhaltung der Nationalstaaten bei gleichzeitiger Berücksichtigung des Primats des Rechts und der Gerechtigkeit als Leitmotiv zwischenstaatlicher Beziehungen (30) — erarbeitet der Verfasser die strukturellen Anforderungen an den rechtlichen Rahmen eines Systems kollektiver Sicherheit: ein umfassendes Verbot einzelstaatlicher Gewaltanwendung i n den internationalen Beziehungen, die Bereitstellung eines Systems der friedlichen Streitbeilegung sowie das Vorliegen von Verfahrensnormen i m Hinblick auf die Entscheidung über Sanktionen gegenüber Rechtsbrechern. I n diesem Zusammenhang w i r d auch vom Verfasser das Leitmotiv seiner Arbeit in der Theorie aufgezeigt, das Spannungsfeld zwischen Effektivität und Legitimität, i n dem sich Zwangsmaßnahmen in einem System kollektiver Sicherheit sowohl auf der Entscheidungs- als auch auf der Durchführungsebene bewegen (37), wobei Bauer den Anforderungen an die Legitimität von Zwangsmaßnahmen durch eine möglichst große Kollektivität i m Entscheidungsprozeß über Zwangsmaßnahmen einen größeren Stellenwert beimißt als i m Bereich der Durchführung (43).

Book Reviews Ausgehend von diesen theoretischen Grundlagen wendet sich der Verfasser der Ausgestaltung des Systems kollektiver Sicherheit in der Praxis des Völkerbundes und der Vereinten Nationen zu. Das Scheitern des Friedenssicherungssystems des Völkerbundes basierte nach Ansicht Bauers weniger auf den rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen als vielmehr auf „der Halbherzigkeit der Bundesmitglieder bei der Umsetzung" (57). Obwohl das Sicherheitssystem der Vereinten Nationen demgegenüber einige wesentliche Verbesserungen aufweist, zeigt der Autor auch hier die, insbesondere aufgrund der privilegierten Stellung der ständigen Mitglieder des Sicherheitsrates bestehenden, Effektivitäts- und Legitimitätsmängel auf, welche von Bauer aber im Hinblick auf ein realistisches Konzept der Friedenserhaltung als ein, zumindest i m gewissen Rahmen notwendiges, Defizit eines funktionsfähigen Systems kollektiver Sicherheit angesehen werden (80). Abschließend wendet sich der Verfasser im ersten Hauptteil den beiden herausragenden Versuchen in der bisherigen Geschichte der Vereinten Nationen zu, das ursprüngliche System der Friedenssicherung zu modifizieren — der „Uniting-for-Peace tt -Resolution und der „Agenda for Peace". Das Alternativkonzept der „Uniting-for-Peace"-Resolution wird von Bauer sowohl hinsichtlich seiner einseitig zur Überwindung des Vetorechts ausgerichteten Zwecksetzung als auch wegen der Umgehung der weiterhin bestehenden Legitimitätsproblematik kritisiert. Demgegenüber führt der Verfasser das weitgehende Scheitern der i n der „Agenda for Peace" unterbreiteten Vorschläge überwiegend auf die mangelnde Bereitschaft der Mitgliedsstaaten zu einer strukturellen Verbesserung des Sicherheitssystems der Vereinten Nationen zurück (112). I m zweiten Hauptteil beschäftigt sich der Verfasser mit den sich aus der neueren Praxis des Sicherheitsrats i n bezug auf militärische Zwangsmaßnahmen ergebenden Rechtsproblemen. Ausgehend von den Aktivitäten des Sicherheitsrats i m Irak-Kuwait-Konflikt, dem ehemaligen Jugoslawien, Somalia, Haiti und Ruanda, zeigt Bauer auf, daß die vorgenommene „Ermächtigungslösung" (167) sowohl den Einfluß des Sicherheitsrats auf der Durchführungsebene stark reduziert als auch durch die Ausweitung des Anwendungsbereichs von Kapitel V E auf ursprünglich in die inneren Angelegenheiten der einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten fallende Sachverhalte zu einer Verstärkung der Legitimationsproblematik bei der Entscheidung über Zwangsmaßnahmen führt. I n bezug auf die Diskussion über die Rechtsgrundlage für die neuere Praxis des Sicherheitsrats vertritt Bauer, nach einer ausführlichen Auseinandersetzung mit den verschiedenen Lösungsmöglichkeiten, mit überzeugenden Argumenten die, in der bisherigen völkerrechtlichen Literatur nur von einer Mindermeinung unterstützte, Theorie der rechtfertigenden Wirkung der Feststellung nach Art. 39 Hs. 1 der UN-Charta (185 - 187). Die expansive Auslegung des Anwendungsbereichs von Kapitel V E in der neueren Praxis des Sicherheitsrats hält der Verfasser für grundsätzlich begrüßenswert, erfordert aber seiner Ansicht nach zur Sicherung der notwendigen Akzeptanz durch die Mitgliedsstaaten eine Festlegung der rechtlichen Beschränkungen der Befugnisse des Sicherheitsrats sowie eine Diskussion i m Hinblick auf das zur Definition dieser Grenzen befugte Organ. Entgegen der teilweise in der Literatur vertretenen These, daß der Sicherheitsrat keinen rechtlichen Bindungen unterliege, kommt der Verfasser zutreffend zu dem Ergebnis, daß auch dieses Organ an die Ziele und Grundsätze der Vereinten Nationen, den Normenkatalog des ius cogens sowie den Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz gebunden ist. Einen entscheidenden Beitrag für die Uberwindung der aus der neueren Praxis des Sicherheitsrats folgenden Legitimitätsprobleme sieht Bauer jedoch in der dem I G H zustehenden Kompetenz, eine inzidente Überprüfung der Rechtmäßigkeit von ermächtigenden Sicherheitsratsresolutionen vorzunehmen. I n dem vom Verfasser selbst als „fragmentarisch" bezeichneten Abschnitt, welcher zur weiteren Diskussion anregen soll, spricht sich Bauer mit beachtlichen Argumenten für eine solche Kompetenz des I G H aus, um die Akzeptanz des Vorgehens des Sicherheitsrats bei den Mitgliedstaaten zu sichern und somit die ge-

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steigerte Effektivität der Friedenssicherung durch ein erhöhtes Maß an Legitimität zu ergänzen (250). Abschließend wendet sich der Verfasser dem in jüngerer Zeit verstärkt auftretenden Phänomen zu, daß der Sicherheitsrat bei der Ausführung von Zwangsmaßnahmen in verstärktem Maße Regionalorganisationen einsetzt. Nach Bauer liegt diesem Vorgehen weniger die Anwendung des ursprünglichen Subsidiaritätsgedankens zugrunde als vielmehr eine unter Effektivitätsgesichtspunkten begründete Notwendigkeit i m Hinblick auf die beschränkten Ressourcen der Vereinten Nationen (283). Der Verfasser spricht sich hierbei zu Recht gegen die Durchführung militärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch Regionalorganisationen ohne Ermächtigung durch den Sicherheitsrat aus, weist aber darüber hinaus darauf hin, daß auch bei Einhaltung des von der UN-Charta vorgesehenen Verfahrens die Gefahr der Schaffung von „sicherheitspolitisch unterentwickelten Regionen" besteht, welche sich aus einer zu starken Abhängigkeit des Sicherheitsrats von der Bereitschaft einzelner Regionalorganisationen, einen Einsatz durchzuführen, ergeben könnte. Die von Bruno Simma betreute Arbeit wurde i m Wintersemester 1995/96 von der juristischen Fakultät der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München als Dissertation angenommen und berücksichtigt die Entwicklungen der internationalen Friedenssicherung durch den Sicherheitsrat bis A p r i l 1995. Das von Bauer in seiner Dissertation aufgezeigte Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Effektivität und Legitimität bildet die Grundlage für eine umfassende Auseinandersetzung mit den sich aus der neueren Praxis des Sicherheitsrats ergebenden Rechtsproblemen und Herausforderungen, denen sich die Vereinten Nationen nach Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts zu stellen haben. Die Arbeit des Verfassers leistet hierzu einen wichtigen Beitrag. Karsten Nowrot

Astrid Becker; Der Tatbestand des Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1996, 317 Seiten. I n ihrer inhaltlich 1995 abgeschlossenen Regensburger Dissertation beschäftigt sich Astrid Becker mit dem „Tatbestand des Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit". Die Verfasserin leitet ihre Arbeit mit dem deutlichen Vorwurf an die Staatengemeinschaft ein, diese habe nichts aus der Geschichte gelernt. Sie habe auf die Greueltaten i m ehemaligen Jugoslawien wie schon auf die deutschen Greueltaten i m Zweiten Weltkrieg nur mit der nachträglichen Einrichtung eines internationalen ad-hoc-Straftribunals reagiert habe, anstatt rechtzeitig für die Schaffung und Durchsetzung eines internationalen Strafrechts zu sorgen. Zur weiteren Annäherung an ihr Thema erörtert die Autorin zunächst i n Abschnitt A die Geschichte des Völkerrechts und insbesondere des Völkerstrafrechts. Sie greift dabei weit aus und vollzieht die Entwicklung von der Ausbildung des Tötungstabus in der Steinzeit über die griechische und römische Antike, das Mittelalter bis zur Neuzeit nach, wobei sie sich i n der Neuzeit eng an die von Grewe entwickelte Periodisierung und Epochenbildung bezüglich der neuzeitlichen Völkerrechtsgeschichte anlehnt. Aufgrund des unvermeidlicherweise knappen Durchgangs durch die Geschichte kommt es mitunter zu gewissen Verkürzungen. So erscheint es z. B. etwas zu apodiktisch, wenn die Verfasserin schreibt, durch die Herausbildung des Kriegsverbots i n der Zeit nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg sei die Weiterentwicklung des nicht minder wichtigen ius in hello gefährdet worden (33). Gleiches gilt für die Feststellung, die Vereinten Nationen nähmen heute die „Intervention zu humanitären Zwecken" wahr (39).

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I m Anschluß schreitet die Verfasserin i m Abschnitt Β zu einer formellen Begriffsbestimmung des völkerrechtlichen Strafrechts und grenzt diesen Begriff insbesondere zu den innerstaatlichen Kollisionsnormen des „internationalen Strafrechts" sowie zum supranationalen Strafrecht ab. Weiterhin untersucht sie die Quellen des Völkerstrafrechts (Abschnitt C) und stellt dabei anhand des geltenden Völkerrechts eine grundsätzliche Bereitschaft der Staaten fest, Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit zu bestrafen (78). I n einem weiteren Schritt nimmt Astrid Becker in Abschnitt D die möglichen Adressaten des Völkerstrafrechts in den Blick. Sie lehnt es insoweit ab, den Rechtsgedanken der i n manchen Staaten eingeführten Strafbarkeit von juristischen Personen auf das Völkerrecht zu übertragen (90), und sieht als Adressaten des Völkerstrafrechts deshalb nicht die Staaten, sondern nur die natürlichen Personen (98). Vor der eigentlichen Erarbeitung des Tatbestandes des Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit erörtert die Verfasserin dann i n Abschnitt Ε noch zwei weitere Problemkreise. Zum einen behandelt sie das Problem der Kodifikation des Völkerstrafrechts, wobei sie sich eindeutig gegen die Schaffung rein regionaler Kodifikationen ausspricht (62 bzw. 172 ff.). Zum anderen diskutiert sie unter der Uberschrift „Vorrangfrage" in eher allgemeiner Form das Verhältnis von internationalem und innerstaatlichen Recht, die Frage der innerstaatlichen Geltung völkerrechtlicher Normen sowie die Frage des ius cogens. I m Abschnitt F ihrer Arbeit beginnt Astrid Becker dann mit der von ihr selbst gesetzten Hauptaufgabe, mit der Bestimmung des Tatbestandes des Verbrechens der Menschlichkeit. Als rechtlicher Ansatzpunkt dient Becker Art. 6 Abs. 1 lit. c des Statuts des Internationalen Militärtribunals von Nürnberg, i n denen die „crimes against humanity" unter Strafe gestellt werden. Unter anderem mittels einer Untersuchung des englischen und französischen Wortlautes dieser Vorschrift sowie einer Analyse der höchst unterschiedlichen Menschenrechtskonzeptionen der verschiedenen Kulturkreise der Welt kommt Becker zu dem Ergebnis, daß der topos der Menschenrechte auf universelle Ebene nicht überfrachtet werden darf und dementsprechend von einem Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit auch nur gesprochen werden kann, wenn die Verletzung fundamentaler Rechte, ζ. Β. des Rechts auf Leben und körperliche Integrität, i n Rede steht (147 f.). Weiter kommt die Verfasserin bei ihrer Suche nach allgemeinen Merkmalen des Menschlichkeitsverbrechens zu dem Ergebnis, daß von einem solchen Verbrechen nur gesprochen werden könne, wenn der Täter mit der Gesinnung handele, elementare Werte einer bestimmten bestehenden Werteordnung einer menschlichen Gemeinschaft gewaltsam zu bekämpfen (154/164). Hingegen komme der Frage, ob einzelstaatliche Organe zu einer strafrechtlichen Sanktionierung der Verbrechen fähig und willens sind, lediglich für die Verfolgungszuständigkeit i m konkreten Fall Relevanz zu (166 f.). Die Verfasserin schlägt die Schaffung eines globalen Rahmenvertrages, der einen allgemein gehaltenen Tatbestand des Menschlichkeitsverbrechens formuliert und mit Hilfe eines Austausches von völkerrechtlichen „Noten" für die einzelnen Kulturkreise konkretisiert wird (175 f.), als einzig gangbaren Weg einer völkerrechtlichen Kodifikation des Menschlichkeitsverbrechens vor. Sie benennt die einzelnen als „Rechtsgut des Menschlichkeitsverbrechens" zu schützenden Menschenrechte, insbesondere des Recht auf Schutz vor willkürlicher Tötung (185) sowie vor „unmenschlicher Behandlung", womit ähnlich wie i n den internationalen Folterkonventionen schwere physische und psychische Ubergriffe erfaßt werden sollen (185 ff.). Weiterhin w i l l Becker die Folter i m eigentlichen Sinne (188 ff.), Sklaverei und sklavereiähnliche Praktiken (191 ff.) sowie willkürliche Verfolgung und Verhaftimg (210 ff.) umfaßt wissen, Apartheid und Völkermord jedoch aus dem Tatbestand des Menschlichkeitsverbrechens ausgliedern (185/210). A m Schluß der Arbeit steht ein Formulierungsvorschlag für den Tatbestand des Menschlichkeitsverbrechens (217).

Book Reviews Astrid Becker ergänzt ihre Arbeit durch vier insgesamt ca. 70 Seiten starke Anhänge. Hier finden sich ganz unterschiedliche Dokumente, darunter verschiedene Resolutionen der U N O Generalversammlung und des Sicherheitsrates, u. a. betreffend das Internationale Tribunal für das ehemalige Jugoslawien, aber auch Menschenrechtstexte aus verschiedenen Kulturkreisen, z. B. Auszüge aus der Allgemeinen Islamischen Menschenrechtserklärung. Angesichts der mittlerweile erzielten Fortschritte auf dem Weg zur Errichtung eines Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes wird die eingangs geäußerte Kritik Beckers an der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft ein Stück weit relativiert. Trotz der neuesten Rechtsentwicklung der Jahre seit 1995 bietet ihre Arbeit aber immer noch durchaus eine interessante Beleuchtung verschiedener Aspekte des Problemkreises des Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit. Frank Bodendiek

Lammy Betten/Nicholas Grief: E U Law and Human Rights. European Law Series, Addison Wesley Longman Ltd., London/New York 1998, xv + 158 pages. The development of the position of human rights within the legal order of the European Communities and the European Union has been the subject of quite a large number of doctrinal treatises. Therefore, it seems justified to question the necessity of the publication under review. Bearing in mind the purpose of the Longman European Law Series, namely to provide for a series of brief and concise topic-based books on EC law aimed primarily at a student readership, the above question has to be answered in the positive: The authors provide their readers w i t h a timely account and analysis of the evolution, current situation and future prospects of human rights protection under E U law. The book is divided into seven chapters. It starts w i t h a brief, but sufficiently comprehensive description of the evolution of international protection of human rights on the universal level, and continues w i t h a similar overview of European developments, i.e. a presentation and analysis of the substance and the control machinery of both the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Social Charter (ESC). Having thus set the protection of human rights within their international legal context, the authors continue by examining the relevant ECJ case law (Stauder, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Nold, Rutili , Hauer y National Panasonic, and others). From a German lawyer's point of view, it is particularly interesting to note that this development of the ECJ jurisprudence is seen i n a context w i t h the Solange case law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht; on the other hand, however, it is to be regretted that the relevant jurisprudence of the Italian Corte Costituzionale has not been dealt with. This chapter ends w i t h a sound account of the conflicts possibly arising between Karlsruhe and Luxembourg in the context of the Community Regulation on the Common Organisation of the Market i n Bananas. The fourth chapter is devoted to a good assessment of the domestic implications of ECJ human rights case law. Most interesting aspects of the relationship between E U law and the E C H R are dealt w i t h i n the fifth chapter that examines the implications of the Strasbourg case law for the E U law on, inter alia , freedom of movement, equality, and the right to property. The sixth chapter consists of a sound account of the ECJ opinion 2/94 on the possibility of a Community accession to the E H C R and of a good analysis of the implications of the ECJ's (negative) response. I n the authors' opinion, the future accession of the Community to the ECHR, subsequent to the necessary amendment of the EC Treaty, "could be the first step towards the elaboration of a Bill of Rights incorporating not only civil and political rights but

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also economic, social and cultural rights, as laid down in the European Social Charter" (120). The final chapter is concerned w i t h the future of human rights protection i n the EU, w i t h a particular emphasis on the pertinent provisions of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and, since this book is primarily addressed to a U.K. readership, the effects of the recent incorporation of the E C H R into U.K. law. I n sum: This book offers a good introduction for students of E U and human rights law on the protection of human rights within the legal order of the E U and, as such, can be fully recommended. Rainer Hofmann

Alan Boyle/Michael Anderson (eds.): H u m a n Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998, xx + 313 pages. A decent human life is only imaginable i n a decent and healthy environment. Therefore, environmental law and human rights issues are connected w i t h one another, and the question of environmental rights as a means of environmental protection seems obvious to ask. The editors, A la η Boyle and Michael Anderson, undertake to examine this question in their publication and aim "to evaluate the role of environmental rights i n the overall landscape of environmental protection and human rights" (1). The 14 essays contained in the book fall into three parts: The introduction is followed by an evaluation of the international dimensions of the question of environmental rights and national case studies. Chapter 1 by Anderson is entitled "Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: A n Overview." Anderson first points out that the relationship between human rights and the environment is not unproblematic, since the full realization of human rights on an overcrowded planet might easily lead to "a rapid depletion of natural resources" (3). However, he goes on to describe environmental protection "as a means to the end of fulfilling human rights standards" and the protection of human rights as "an effective means to achieving the ends of conservation and environmental protection" (3). He further gives an overview of different human rights approaches to environmental protection and the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach. Chapter 2 of the introduction by /. G. Merrills deals w i t h "Environmental Protection and Human Rights: Conceptual Aspects" and highlights some theoretical considerations that "relate to the issue of rights i n general and environmental rights i n particular" (25), including the interesting question of who can have environmental rights, a question that is especially problematic i n relation to the position of future generations and animals and plants. The section "International Dimensions" is started by Boyle w i t h Chapter 3 on "The Role of International Human Rights Law i n the Protection of the Environment" i n which different approaches and problems of environmental rights are discussed. Boyle examines the problems of the right to a decent, healthy or viable environment and analyzes the argument of "(t)he environment as a solidarity right" (57) and a "procedural interpretation of environmental rights" (62) through participation. I n an appendix to this chapter the "Draft Principles on Human Rights and the Environment" ( U N Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (6 July 1994), 74) are reprinted. Catherine Redgwell then goes on w i t h " A Critique of Anthropocentric Rights" i n Chapter 4. The author discusses the question of whether the motivation behind recent shifts in the approach towards nature protection and conservation is still nature's "value to humans" (74) and whether animal rights or rights of the environment offer a solution. Chapter 5 by

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Robin R. Churchill follows w i t h an evaluation of "Environmental Rights i n Existing Human Rights Treaties." This chapter aims "to see to what extent environmental rights are found in existing human rights treaties", i.e. "treaties concerned exclusively w i t h human rights" (89). The analysis includes treaties concerned w i t h civil and political rights, treaties concerned w i t h economic, social and cultural rights and the one treaty containing "significant third generation rights" (104), i.e. the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The authors' interesting evaluation shows that only few human rights treaties so far expressly acknowledge rights to a decent environment, and derivative rights, such as the right to life, are rarely invoked to protect the environment. I n the eyes of the author, this "reinforces the doubts about the usefulness of human rights treaties as a means of protecting the environment" (108). I n Chapter 6 S. Douglas-Scott then deals w i t h the question of "Environmental Rights i n the European U n i o n - Participatory Democracy or Democratic Deficit?" This analysis of European U n i o n environmental law "concentrate^) on procedural or participatory rights" (112) and includes a case study on standing in the United Kingdom. Douglas-Scott concludes that the absence of substantive rights to the environment under EC law "is not yet really mitigated by truly effective participatory rights" (128). This is very much regrettable as public participation is elementary for the successful protection of the natural environment. The importance of public participation is again highlighted by James Cameron and Ruth Mackenzie in Chapter 7 on the "Access to Environmental Justice and Procedural Rights i n International Institutions." This chapter concentrates on the important role that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have to play in the development of international environmental law through participation in international institutions. Today, N G O s not only participate in the work of the United Nations and its specialized agencies but also i n economic institutions and are granted observer status under most environmental law treaties, thus actively participating i n the work of inter-governmental institutions. The authors in their interesting analysis conclude "that it is no longer possible, or desirable, to deny non-state actors access to international law-making and enforcement" (152). Finally, in the section of national case studies, Chapter 8 by François du Bois on "Social Justice and the Judicial Enforcement of Environmental Rights and Duties" contains a general examination of the national courts' role i n the implementation of environmental rights. I n Chapter 9 Jan Glazewski writes on "Environmental Rights and the New South African Constitution" which was adopted on 27 April 1994, and which contains an environmental clause. This is followed by Anderson in Chapter 10 w i t h an analysis of "Individual Rights to Environmental Protection i n India" and by Andrew Harding in Chapter 11 w i t h the examination of "Practical Human Rights, N G O s and the Environment in Malaysia." I n Chapter 12 on "Indigenous Peoples, Environmental Degradation, and Human Rights: A Case Study", Adriana Fabra deals w i t h the situation of the Huaorani of Ecuador from the point of view of Ecuadorian national law and also examines the international legal remedies for violation of the Huaorani's rights. This is followed by Edesio Fernandes ' Chapter 13 on "Constitutional Rights in Brazil" and, finally, Chapter 14 by Martin Lau on "Islam and Judicial Activism: Public Interest Litigation and Environmental Protection in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan." The editors state in their preface that "(i)f this volume contributes to critical and reflective study of the issues it addresses, our aspirations w i l l have been more than satisfied" (vi). Undoubtedly, this hope has been fulfilled. Boyle's and Anderson' s publication on "Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection" certainly constitutes a valuable collection of essays for anyone interested in this field of international law. Sonja Riedinger

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Edith Brown Weiss (ed.): International Compliance with Nonbinding Accords. Studies in Transnational Legal Policy No. 29, The American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C. 1997, χ + 264 pages. A central law-making authority does not exist in the international system, thus creating serious problems for the development of international law: States often hesitate to enter into binding agreements, especially i n areas of the law that touch on national self-interests, e.g the international environmental law where economic interests might be at stake, and the consensus that would be necessary to secure a binding agreement is hard to achieve. Therefore, nonbinding accords are often preferred, which in spite of their nonbinding nature create strong expectations of compliance, thus constituting the so-called soft law so that "countries under some circumstances may comply w i t h legally nonbinding instruments as well as they do w i t h binding ones" (1). Edith Brown Weiss' publication aims to serve the purpose of taking "an important first step toward refining the research agenda for understanding compliance w i t h soft law" (16). The essays contained in the volume are based on papers prepared for a workshop of the American Society of International Law on the question of compliance w i t h nonbinding accords i n 1996 and fall into three chapters of more general considerations of the issue of compliance w i t h soft law, and five chapters on compliance w i t h soft law in special fields of international law. First, however, Brown Weiss gives an introduction to the subject and the contents of the volume, i n which she highlights the important questions about compliance w i t h soft law that need to be answered. She sets out four criteria for a definition of legally nonbinding instruments: "First, the instrument does not purport to be binding and could not qualify as binding under the rules of international law (...) Second, the instrument has legitimacy in the international community. Third, there is a common intent or element of commitment attached to the instrument (. . .) Fourth, conduct that respects the soft law instrument cannot be deemed invalid" (4). However, she also points out that this definition leaves open important questions, e.g. who can make soft law. I n the section on the "theoretical aspects of compliance w i t h soft law" (9), Peter M. Haas starts out w i t h Chapter 1 on " W h y Comply, or Some Hypotheses i n Search of an Analyst" and discusses "possible elements for understanding patterns of compliance w i t h international law", drawing "principally from current theorizing i n the field of international relations" (21). The author thus examines several approaches to understanding states' choice to comply, even w i t h nonbinding accords, especially concentrating on the roles that institutions have to play, the socalled Functional Institutionalism. I n Chapter 2 on "The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law", Benedict Kingsbury then challenges "the tendency in the existing literature to view compliance in an under-theorized way simply as 'correspondence of behavior w i t h legal rules'" (50). The author presupposes that "(compliance w i t h law is not a free-standing concept" (49), but that the respective understanding of the term compliance' has to be seen in connection w i t h the underlying theories of law. Thus, different concepts of law relevant to compliance are examined and the author highlights several broad areas i n which further research is needed. Finally, in Chapter 3 Atsuko Kanehara writes on "Some Considerations Regarding Methods of International Regulation in Global Issues: 'Sovereignty' and 'Common Interests'", concentrating on issues of international environmental law. The author concludes that the sovereign state still dominates the international system and ways have to be found to reconcile the necessary achievement of common interests w i t h that concept.

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Dinah Shelton starts the second section of the volume on specific fields of international law w i t h Chapter 4 on "Compliance w i t h International Human Rights Soft Law", i n which primary soft law and secondary soft law, i.e. opinions of international institutions founded under a treaty i n the application of the same treaty on a legal question, e.g. the Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (123), are distinguished. The author highlights several problems that still need to be solved, e.g. in the measurement of compliance w i t h soft law instruments. This is followed by Richard W. Parker in Chapter 5 on "Choosing Norms to Promote Compliance and Effectiveness: The Case for International Environmental Benchmark Standards." Environmental harm is often caused by private actors and not by states in their sovereign capacity so that implementation of international environmental regulations is complicated. As one possible solution to this problem the author proposes benchmark standards, i.e. "any standard or economic incentive keyed to the environmental performance of products, production processes, or waste disposal practice" (148). Chapter 6 by Naomi Roht-Arriaza then treats "Compliance w i t h Private Voluntary Agreements: The Example of the International Organization for Standardization's ISO 14000 Environmental Management and Related Standards" which are especially interesting i n that they are negotiated w i t h i n a forum where private actors are dominant, although states participate, and "the standards developed (...) apply directly to private organizations, without the required mediation of any state agency" (205). Afterwards, David A. Wirth writes on "Economic Assistance, the World Bank and Nonbinding Instruments" in Chapter 7, in which he identifies several aspects that make nonbinding instruments useful for the World Bank i n the realization of its operational policies and which should be investigated further. Finally, Virginia A. Leary analyzes "Nonbinding Accords in the Field of Labor" in Chapter 8. As "in few other fields has there been such extensive and continuing legislative-type activity or such effective monitoring of standards" (247) as i n international labor law, this field of the law could serve as a good example for compliance w i t h soft law instruments. The author points out that equal emphasis on monitoring and promotion of nonbinding accords, and strong international agreement and negotiations over a substantial period may make nonbinding equally effective as binding standards. This volume is not intended to answer all questions relating to international compliance w i t h nonbinding accords, but rather to identify the problems and work towards the development of a research agenda for this interesting area of international law. Thus, the reader is provided w i t h some interesting and thought-provoking analyses and must agree that a lot of research still needs to and should be done on the problems that have been highlighted i n this publication. Sonja Riedinger

Roberta Cohen/Francis M. Deng (eds.): Masses i n Flight — The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement; The Forsaken People — Case Studies of the Internally Displaced. Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. 1998, 414 and 512 pages. According to evaluations of U N agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dealing w i t h internally displaced persons, there are more than 20 million persons worldwide who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence due to armed conflict, internal strife or systematic violations of human rights, but — unlike refugees — remain w i t h i n the borders of their home country. A t the same time governments, who either cause or

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tolerate internal displacement, do not provide the necessary protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, while the access of international actors is often refused or restricted. According to the U N Secretary General Kofi Annan, internal displacement has created an unprecedented challenge for the international community. Roberta Cohen and FrancisM. Deng (both at Washington D.C.) have been working most intensively on the challenging issue of internal displacement. Roberta Cohen is senior advisor of the US-based Refugee Policy Group and is Brookings Institution's co-director of its project on internal displacement, while Francis M. Deng, a former Sudanese diplomat, was appointed by the U N Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the representative on internally displaced persons i n 1992. His appointment was recently extended by the C H R until 2001. Since the plight of the internally displaced persons has come to the attention of international theory and practice, there has been a wealth of studies and publications related to the topic. I n collaboration w i t h numerous experts, who are all working at academic institutions, international humanitarian organizations or NGOs, Cohen and Deng now have edited an impressive compilation of the legal, institutional and political aspects of the topic and also gathered comprehensive case studies of internal displacement. The first volume, Masses in flight — The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement, is diveded into seven chapters. After an introduction and a global overview (chapters 1 and 2), which analyze the causes and consequences of internal displacement by taking into account the regional dynamics of the problem, chapter 3 deals w i t h the legal framework of the protection of internally displaced persons. This first core chapter, which was mainly written by Robert Κ Goldman (Washington D.C.) and Walter Kälin (Berne, Switzerland) is based on earlier studies that compile and analyse the existing legal norms, w i t h the purpose of developing a — nonbinding — normative framework for internally displaced persons. The "Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement", which were submitted to the C H R i n 1998 (to be found in the appendix), are the — i n large parts convincing — result of this research. The chapter describes the relevant international law, ie. human rights law and humanitarian law applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts, and points to the existing protection gaps due to insufficient normative protection. While the structure of this chapter may appear a bit confusing at first glance, it still gives a good overview of the key areas where insufficient legal protection can be observed, i.e. the right not to be displaced, protection from abitrary detention, the right to documentation and registration or the right to restitution or compensation. It also enters into the discussion on the question whether states have a duty to accept offers of assistance made by humanitarian organizations. Here, the idea of a generally reduced scope of sovereignty w i t h regard to human rights is seen in the light of recent action taken by the U N Security Council only, a point which certainly is i n line w i t h the lex lata but very cautious on further developments and arguments de lege ferenda. Notwithstanding this minor critique, the analysis of the legal framework is well refined and offers various sources for further research on this or related topics. I n chapter 4, the second core chapter, the institutional protection of internally displaced persons is analyzed. W i t h Cohen and Jaques Cuénod (Washington D.C.), another renowned expert and U N consultant on the issue of forced migration, give an excellent overview of the international organizations dealing w i t h internally displaced persons and, more important still, comment on the gaps in the international system. It may not suprise those dealing w i t h the U N system that the sheer number of organizations dealing w i t h internally displaced persons does not guarantee that legal and factual problems are effectively addressed. Cohen and Cuénod explain the causes of what they call a far from adequate international response: selectivity, ineffective coordination, neglect of protection and human rights concerns of internally

Book Reviews displaced persons as opposed to the provision of food, medical care and shelter (assistance) and, finally, insufficient attention to aspects of reintegration and development in post-conflict situations. But the authors do not leave the reader w i t h questions, they also propose concrete solutions, which are mainly aimed at a better coordination among agencies and integration of the protection needs. Chapters 5 and 6 are closely related to issues surrounding institutional protection, i.e. the role of N G O s and regional responses. The comparison of the regional responses shows that the respective approaches differ considerably between, e.g. Europe and Asia — a situation well known from concepts and institutions of regional protection of human rights. The final chapter 7 offers a broad range of strategies and recommendation of how to deal most effectively w i t h internal displacement. As most international actors rather respond to already existing crises of internal displacement, the authors quite convincingly propose a number of preventive mechanisms, e.g. improved early warning, institution building and good governance i n the countries concerned, as well as a strengthened right not to be arbitrarily displaced. Once internal displacement occurs and international actors may step in, they strongly urge to integrate protection w i t h assistance. Concerning humanitarian interventions i n situations of internal displacement, the authors are well aware of the underlying problems, especially the problematic record w i t h regard to protecting the physical safety of persons at risk i n socalled safe areas. While consent of the warring parties to the establishment of the areas as well as demilitarization might be necessary prerequesites, the crucial factor remains the commitment of international forces — and, of course, the design of the relevant mandate — to actually step in to protect civilians in situations of danger. The second volume, The Forsaken People — Case Studies of the Internally Displaced, is devoted to selected case studies of internal displacement. The case studies deal w i t h ten examples of countries or regions which all have experienced or do still suffer severe problems of internal displacement. The studies concern, inter alia, Burundi, Rwanda, the Sudan, the Northen Caucasus region, former Yugoslavia, and Colombia. The selection shows that there is no situation like the other and that every case calls for a different approach. The authors who all have acquired inside knowledge on the spot by researching on questions related to forced migration or by working w i t h U N agencies, provide for precise analysis of the country profiles i n displacement. I n the studies presented the authors give an account of the historical and factual background of the phenomenon, assess the security needs and describe the international responses to the crises. Finally, strategies and recommendations are presented, which can certainly contribute to possible solutions if prudently implemented. It is an important and rewarding piece of work which offers many insights, when dealing w i t h the countries or regions in question and looking for humanitarian solutions. Both volumes, which should be seen as a twin-edition, are very useful reference works for scientists and practitioners working on human rights questions surrounding internally displaced persons. They can be highly recommended. Nils Geissler

Daniel A. Farber/Suzanna Sherry : Beyond A l l Reason: The Radical Assault on T r u t h i n American Law. Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford 1997, 195 pages. This book is a convincing critique of a specific school in American legal thought, which Färber & Sherry call 'radical multiculturalism'. It is worth reading by non-American legal

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scholars, especially by all interested in international and comparative law. This is due to the application of the so-called critical approach, which is related to radical multiculturalism as described here, to international law (by David Kennedy and others) and is here used to deconstruct the concept of sovereignty, of rights, or of legal sources. International lawyers can profit from the uncovering of the (scary) implications of the most radical versions of such a critique. Second, the controversy set out i n this book is all about groups (defined by language, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, etc) and multiculturalism. I n the age of globalization, w i t h masses of people, and pieces of culture spreading and interacting all around the world, the issues of minority rights, group rights, integration, assimilation, and all related problems are already (and w i l l surely continue to be) one of the issues of international law. Finally, the fundamental question of ethics — relativism or universalism? — which underlies Färber & Sherry's critique is the one which moves everyone reflecting about (international) human rights. American radical multiculturalism, a progeny of the legal realism of the 1920s, and of the critical legal studies movement of the late 1970s, comprises critical race theory (represented, e.g., by Richard Delgado), radical feminism (e.g., Katharine MacKinnon), and gay legal theory (e.g., William Eskridge). It builds on French postmodernism as enunciated by Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Its core element is a rejection of the aspiration to universalism and objectivity, i n other words, a rejection of the "world view of the Enlightenment tradition" (36). Radical multiculturalism views reality as subjective and socially constructed. Law is merely the result of existing power structures and serves their perpetuation. Most specifically, radical multiculturalism criticizes the notions of knowledge, reason, merit, and rights. These concepts are only seemingly universal and neutral. For instance, knowledge is dependent on personal experience, which is in turn determined by group affiliation. Similarly, there are no neutral standards to define merit. Liberal rights form part of an ideological framework that coopts people into adopting the very consciousness they want to transform. I n consequence of this (legal) relativism, the method employed by critical multiculturalists are narratives and storytelling. The objective of this theory is to uncover and thereby help demolish pathological elements (notably racism and sexism) of legal doctrine and practice. I n American law, the issues on which radical multiculturalism concentrates are free speech (hate speech and pornography) and discrimination law (notably affirmative action). Needless to say, these questions are on the agenda of international law-making fora as well. The critique launched by Färber & Sherry is a pragmatic one: it attempts to show that the "ideology" (8) of radical multiculturalism is internally incoherent, and that it is not a viable vision of the best way of life for a community (50). Färber & Sherry first argue that radical multiculturalism has appalling implications, notably anti-Semitic ones. Second, the narrative method leads to distortions in scholarship and public discourse, because the refusal to separate the speaker from the message inevitably transforms scholarly arguments into personal attacks. Third, the radical denial of the idea of an objective truth makes us defenseless against even the most outrageous distortions of history, such as Holocaust denial; and its moral relativism makes us defenseless against totalitarianism. The book clearly shows these flaws of radical multiculturalism, not by philosophical argument, but rather through common-sense appeal: "It is not easy to give a philosophically coherent account of just what it means to say something is really wrong (not just 'wrong from m y personal point of view'). But it is a distinction we cannot afford to abandon." (106). O f course such a common-sense argument is exactly that kind of argument which is not accepted by radicals, because they negate the possibility of a neutral, reasonable, common-sense, obvious standard. Färber & Sherry realize this and correctly point out that — once we accept the

Book Reviews radicals' premises —, "[t]here is no foothold w i t h which a challenge can get started . . . radical multiculturalism has a marvelous self-sealing quality" (128 etseq). This 'immunity to critique' is probably the decisive feature of radical multiculturalism which forbids calling the approach a viable 'theory' according to the standards of the scientific community. Färber & Sherry s reproach of latent, inherent anti-Semitism in radical multiculturalism is surely the one which has attracted the most attention. Färber & Sherry argue that radical multiculturalism, which attributes all success to power "cannot account for groups that surpass white gentile America without resorting to racism and anti-Semitism. The radical theories inescapably imply that Jews and Asians enjoy an unfair share of wealth and status." (10, see also 69). Radicals retorted by calling this a "token" argument. The truth in this rebuttal is that the built-in possibility of anti-Semitism is — as Färber & Sherry admit themselves — no real and present danger of the doctrine, given the world-view of their proponents. However, everyone subscribing to the "narrative method" should — on her own premises — allow Färber & Sherry to give prominent space to the asserted anti-Semitic tendency, because the authors' Jewish affiliation makes them sensitive to that aspect. The authors' procession is extremely careful, if not scrupulous. They repeatedly remind us that they vise only the most radical wing of scholarship, they attempt to dissociate the criticized views from the persons holding them, etc . Benevolent readers w i l l appreciate that the authors really try not to misrepresent the position they criticize. They often provide the full quotes of radical statements, and give more references i n footnotes. O n the whole, the book is very engaged, makes good reading and appeals entirely to common sense. It w i l l disappoint those who search for a sophisticated philosophical discussion of (cultural) relativism, but w i l l delight those who are more pragmatically interested i n practical outcomes, implications, and mere internal coherence of an increasingly influential strand of thought that is spreading i n legal theory outside the United States as well as in international law. Anne Peters

Bardo Fassbender: U N Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto. A Constitutional Perspective. Legal Aspects of International Organization, Volume 32. Kluwer Law International, The Hague/Boston/London 1998, 421 pages. Debates on a reform of the United Nations system almost inevitably lead to the question of the future of the Security Council and the right of its five permanent members to veto decisions on non-procedural matters. The topic of a reform of the present regulation has been on the agenda of the General Assembly for nearly twenty years and assumes great prominence i n the media. The book under review w i l l certainly attract readers because it addresses this question of common interest. Its sub-title — " A Constitutional Perspective" —, however, suggests that it aims at more than a summary of the ongoing debate on the future of the Security Council, but rather treats the subject on the basis of a genuine approach to international law — a "constitutional" interpretation. This combination of a theoretical approach and its application to a specific issue is reason enough for a review of the study, which was submitted as a dissertation to the Faculty of Law of the Humboldt University (Berlin) by Bardo Fassbender in 1997. The book is divided into two main parts comprising ten chapters. I n the first part (19 -159, chapters I - VI), Fassbender examines "The Right of Veto as Part of the Constitution of the

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International Community." Starting from the premise that the right of veto — as embedded in Art. 27, paragraph 3 of the United Nations Charter (UNC) — forms an integral part of the U N Charter, Fassbender analyzes whether the U N system can be called a "constitution of the international community." He starts out w i t h a brief examination of the meaning of the notion "constitution" in national law and identifies supremacy as its basic feature (25 - 35). I n the following chapter (37 - 61) the attempts of various scholars to transfer the constitutional idea to the sphere of international law are presented, namely the ideas of Alfred Verdross (and Bruno Simma), the New Haven Approach, the Doctrine of the International Community (attributed to Hermann Mosler and Christian Tomuschat ), and a "constructivist" approach by Nicholas Onuf I n chapters HI and IV, which form the core of the first part (63 - 115), Fassbender discusses these approaches and elaborates why, in his view, the United Nations Charter already forms an international constitution. He bases his argument mainly on the fact that an "international community" has emerged as a holder of rights and responsibilities under international law. To support this view, he refers, inter alia , to Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties on ius cogens norms, to the dictum of the International Court of Justice i n the Barcelona Traction Case on obligations erga omnes, and to Art. 19 of the draft articles on state responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission. I n all these documents, reference is made to a community interest presenting more than the interests of the states involved in international interaction. Fassbender also mentions a "core area of agreement" on questions of the use of force or the protection of human rights (84 et seq.). Thus, he concludes that "states have come to acknowledge the international community as a 'normative reality'" (80). I n chapter IV, Fassbender addresses the crucial question: Does the Charter of the United Nations form a constitution of this international community? The consequences of such a finding would be far-reaching: As is the case w i t h states, all members of the public community regulated by the constitution would be bound by its provisions, irrespective of their consent. Transferred to the sphere of international law, this means that the obligations arising from the U N Charter are binding on non-member states as well as on all other possible actors under international law (international organizations, insurgents, individuals, possibly N G O s or multi-national enterprises). Because of its consequences, scholars whose "constitutional" approaches were discussed in chapter Π, have shied away from this conclusion and deferred to the principle of pacta tertiis. Fassbender nevertheless depicts several constitutional characteristics of the U N Charter, such as its drafting under "historic" circumstances, its establishment of basic functions of governance as well as of a hierarchy of norms (Art. 103), its regulation of membership (Arts. 3 - 6) and its claim to, i n principle, eternal validity. He concludes that at least during the last fifty years therefore the "constitutional predisposition of the Charter has been confirmed and strengthened i n such a way that today we can rightly call it a constitution" (115). The immense consequences of this qualification are summed up in chapter six: Fassbender once more states his conviction that the regulations of the U N Charter are binding on all subjects of international law. This reading of the Charter alone can, in his view, explain Art. 2, paragraph 6, Art. 103 U N C , or the fact that the Security Council recently has addressed nonstate entities when acting under Chapter V E U N C . It leads Fassbender to stress, on the one hand, the importance of a dynamic-evolutionary interpretation of the charter as a "living instrument." O n the other hand, the need to ensure reliability and stability is guaranteed through the provisions of Arts. 108, 109 on amendments. Besides the procedural guarantees of these provisions, Fassbender deduces from his constitutional reading of the charter that a core of substantive values — such as the prohibition on the use of force or the commitment to human rights protection — must not be altered if the charter is amended. Finally, Fassbender calls for

Book Reviews participation of all members of the international community in the interpretation of the constitutional Charter rules. Thus, in his view, non-member states are entitled to participate in the U N system, limiting the scope of Arts. 5,6 U N C . I n any Charter interpretation, the views of non-state actors forming part of the international community must furthermore be taken into account. I n the second part of the book (161 - 340, chapters V E - X), Fassbender applies his constitutional perception of the Charter to Art. 27, paragraph 3 U N C , thereby looking at the present reform discussion "from a constitutional angle" (162). To this purpose, he first gives a survey of the current legal status of the provision. After briefly summarizing the history of Art. 27, paragraph 3 U N C , he explains that, in his view, the rationale underlying the veto clause has fallen away after the break-up of the wartime coalition and w i t h the "Permanent Five" no longer representing a group of states whose combined action alone can preserve world peace. He therefore raises the question whether the validity of the provision could be challenged w i t h a view to the clausula rebus sic stantibus , but answers it i n the negative because the clausula cannot find application to constitutions as it does to "normal" treaties (173 et seq.). I n the eighth chapter, called "Premises of Reform", Fassbender outlines the main characteristics of Art. 27 U N C . First, he discusses the "classical" problems arising from an interpretation of the provision, thereby focusing on consequences of its reading as a "constitutional norm." Concerning the question whether abstentions or absence of one of the permanent members hinders a decision of the Security Council, he agrees w i t h a large part of the literature that an informal amendment of the charter provision has taken place. Given the constitutional character of the Charter and the existence of provisions providing for mandatory amendment procedures (Arts. 108, 109), he raises doubts as to the validity of such an informal amendment (182). He encounters a similar problem when treating the question of membership in the Council, more specifically the assumption of the Soviet permanent seat by Russia i n 1991, which he finds "unsatisfactory from a constitutional point of view" (189). He then outlines briefly that the international community i n future w i l l have to deal w i t h a number of "new" problems such as intra-state wars or military coup d'états. He approves of the recent Security Council practice to qualify these problems as possible "threats to the peace" in the sense of Art. 39 U N C and concludes that the Council has a mandate "broad enough to cover action responding to the most serious threats to humankind" (219). A lot, however, depends on the willingness of members and non-members to use the Security Council's powers to make the United Nations a functioning organization. I n this respect, consent is not only required on the goals of Security Council action, but also on the process of decision-making within it — a topic that Fassbender treats i n chapters I X and X . He starts out w i t h a summary of the various proposals for a reform of the Security Council which have been made i n the last decade (221 - 275). Among them figure plans for an extension of the number of non-permanent members as well as an increase in the number of the permanent members. Others want to introduce a third category of membership, combining permanence but no right of veto. I n the end, however, Fassbender is bound to observe that "discussions seem to have reached a deadlock" (275). He therefore brings forward, i n chapter X , his own proposals for a "constitutional right of veto" (277 - 340). He first reiterates that any reform must — because of the constitutional character of the U N Charter — respect not only the procedural aspects codified i n Arts. 108, 109, but also maintain the Charter's "constitutional" goals set out in the Preamble, Arts. 1 and 2. He then evaluates the main arguments brought forward in the course of debates on the Security Council reform. Beginning w i t h the concept of "equal sovereignty" advanced by many governments to challenge the legitimacy of the right of veto, Fassbender distinguishes between a necessary "core content" of the principle and justifi-

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cations for exceptions to the general rule. He maintains that the privilege of a right of veto can be justified if — but only then — the "privileged" states bear a special responsibility for the common interest of the international community. He advises that any new veto provision should include a clause enabling the international community to examine whether the "privileged" states have fulfilled these special responsibilities (295). As to the principle of representativeness, Fassbender takes a more cautious stand. He rejects the idea that representativeness is recognized by the United Nations Charter. From a constitutional point, it can therefore not be used to challenge the institutions of permanent membership and the right of veto. It might however be used to question the actual composition of the Security Council. Finally, the ideas of "effective governance" and "legitimacy" are evaluated. Both, in Fassbender's view, cannot be invoked against any specific type of Charter amendment. 'Effectiveness' is the goal of any international organization in fulfilling its purpose. It is however hardly predictable which way of reform in the end w i l l lead to effectiveness. 'Legitimacy' on the other hand, is but the result of equality, representativeness, and effectiveness, and does not add new elements to the legal debate. From a constitutional angle, the underlying connotations of the notion — such as justice, fairness, and morality — lie outside the realm of international (constitutional) law and are therefore mere political goals (318). O n the basis of these evaluations, Fassbender finally applies his theoretical concept to the two most important topics of debate: the permanent membership of five states in the Security Council and the right of veto. Concerning the first point, he argues that permanence of membership contradicts the underlying ratio of the veto clause if in the course of socio-political changes other states — formerly non-members of the council —· acquire a position enabling them to influence world politics significantly. The same holds true if permanent members of the Council lose their position as leading states. What is needed therefore is an amendment procedure allowing for a change of membership if the socio-political structure of the international system has changed. Under the present U N system, this possibility is nearly excluded because of the power of the "Permanent Five" to veto any change in the Council's composition according to Art. 108. Concerning the right of veto, Fassbender argues for, at least, a limitation of its application. The veto should, i n his view, no longer be applied in circumstances not touching upon questions of "community interests." He suggests that the veto be only used for the sake of the common good, i.e. i n situations i n which the "Permanent Five" assume increased responsibilities to foster the interest of the international community. Thus, the veto should essentially be confined to decisions under Chapter V I I U N C where the Security Council members act on behalf of the international community. O n the other hand, its application should be excluded when the Security Council deliberates decisions under Chapter VI, recommendations for the appointment of a U N Secretary-General, or requests advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice. The "constitutional perspective" therefore leads to a justification of the right of veto, but to limitations of its use as well. I n the last part of the study, Fassbender calls for a "Constitution-building without a Hegemon" and expresses his hope that i n the new millennium, the "peoples of the world w i l l . . . give new life and vigor to their constitution" (347). A synopsis, an extensive bibliography, and an index conclude the book. Fassbender's study deserves attention because of the variety of topics covered. The book could easily have been divided up into various dissertations. I n the first part, Fassbender not only treats an interesting theoretical question but also gives a very progressive answer to it which w i l l provoke further debate on the topic. As stated in the preface, it was Fassbender s

Book Reviews purpose "less to answer questions than to question answers" (XI, quoting InisL. Claude). Surely, he w i l l soon find his own answer to the question of constitutionality of the U N Charter questioned by more cautious writers. I n the second part, his argumentation w i l l even face stronger opposition as Fassbender challenges a number of privileges assumed by the "Permanent Five." The present reviewer concurs w i t h a large majority of Fassbender s conclusions and certainly w i t h the underlying tendency that international law no longer can be understood as a body of norms solely governing the reciprocal relations between states. Regarding the qualification of the U N Charter as a "constitution", he has difficulties seeing how Fassbender' s optimistic plea for inclusion of non-state actors in the interpretation of Charter norms is to be reconciled w i t h the Charter's own limitation to membership of states (Art. 4). Concerning the second part of the book, he is of the opinion that some of the problems dealt w i t h in the context of Art. 27 — such as the problem of abstentions or the assumption of the Soviet seat by Russia — exist irrespective of a reading of the U N Charter as a constitution and that Fassbender' s "new reading" of the Charter in this respect does not add new substantive arguments. These criticisms do not, however, aim at diminishing the value of the book. Its wide range of subjects treated and its progressive qualification of the role of the United Nations Charter make it a valuable contribution to the legal discussion of the present shape of the international community. It is to be hoped that Fassbender' s optimistic reading of the U N Charter w i l l give new momentum to the debate on Art. 27, paragraph 3 U N C . Christian Tams

Mohammed M. Gomaa: Suspension or Termination of Treaties on Grounds of Breach. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Den Haag/Boston/London 1996,201 pages. I n this monography Mr. Gomaa undertook a thorough revision of a particular aspect of the Law of Treaties which has rarely been worked on since the drafting of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was concluded. Apart from some articles on this issue there is hardly any scholarly work on art. 60 of the Vienna Convention. This very fact is surprising and disappointing because there has always been a strong need to analyse the regime for treaty breaches especially when it comes to breaches of multilateral treaties. The study is divided into three main parts. I n the first one the author deals w i t h the concept of breach, the second one is dedicated to the possible reactions to breaches and in the third part Mr. Gomaa tackles the issue of implementation of suspension and termination under the Vienna Convention. I n his first chapter, he appemts to define the wording of "material breach" (6 -15) while the second chapter is a content analysis of the concept of material breach w i t h respect to the particular types of obligations and treaties and the background i n general international law (16 - 59). He continues in examining the legal effects of a material breach. There is a distinction to be made between bilateral and multilateral treaties because in the case of a breach of a multilateral treaties there may be innocent parties to the treaty which are not affected by the breach. The legal status of the parties is described i n art. 60 paragraph 2. He concludes the chapter by restating the remedies for an injured party under general international law (61 - 69). The first chapters of the second part deal w i t h opinions of scholars and attempts to codify the law of treaties concerning the rights of innocent parties in the case of a breach (73 - 90). I n

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analysing the content of art. 60 of the Vienna Convention (95 - 122) the author discusses in length the regime provided for multilateral treaties and the exception of art. 60 paragraph 5. He argues that art. 60 paragraph 5 exemts all treaties of a humanitarian character and is both a refection of customary law and progressive development of international law (113 -114). The last section of the second part deals w i t h limitations of the right to suspend or terminate (115 130). He discusses whether law-making treaties or treaties establishing a "self contained regime" should be exemted from art. 60 of the Vienna Convention. He argues that in the case of such a regime the recourse to the remedies of general internaitonal law should be the ultima ratio (125 - 127). I n the case of a law-making treaty termination or suspension is generally not permitted (127). Additionally, there are certain general principles of law, such as estoppel, which l i m i t the scope of art. 60. I n the concluding chapter of the second part (131 - 136) the author restates the legal consequences of termination and suspension, especially w i t h respect to the survival of jurisdictional clauses. The first chapter of the last part describes the process of determination of the breach and the consequences in the absence of a system of compulsory jurisdiction (139 -156). This is followed by an analysis of the procedural rules applicable for unilateral termination and suspension (157 - 176). The last chapter of this part analyses critically the options of dispute settlement and unveils the deficiencies of the procedural rules of the Vienna Conventions (176 - 182). Mr. Gomaa offers us a thorough analysis of art. 60 of the Vienna Convention. He examines the prerequisites of the apllication of this provision and the legal effects. He made comprehensive use of the scholarly work and the international legal pracitce. The outline of his study is very convincing because it takes the reader to the whole procedure of the applicartion of the provision i n the chronological order. Thus, it makes the book easily accessible also for readers who are interested in just a particular issue. The language is carefully chosen and makes the study even easier to read notwithstanding that the topic is not an easy one. It has to be criticised, however, that i n some cases the reference to the background of general international law and the dogmatic foundations of international law is lacking. I t would have been easier to analyse the certrain different rules applying to multilateral treaties if the author would have made use of the workings of jurists who characterize the different structures of multilateral treaties according to the degree of reciprocity of the obligations (Erfüllungsstruktur). This would have given a guideline for the reader in order to understand the object and purpose of art. 60 paragraphs 2 and 5. Additionally the author fails to take into consideration the discussions on multilateral treaties as an instrument of legislation in the public interest. Admittedly, there has hardly been any scholarly writing on the repercussions of this phenomenon on the law of treaties. The reviewer hoped, however, that the author would have had something to say on this particular issue. Perhaps the expactations were not fulfillable, but the author could have at least noticed the ongoing discussion. A t last, the reviewer is unlike the author not of the opinion that art. 60 is a codification of a right to nonforcible self help. The author correctly points out that this provision has its sedes materiae i n the law of treaties and not i n the law of state responsibility. I n the law of treaties a right to termination or suspension may arise when the burden that a treaty could impose would be undue. This has nothing to do w i t h self-help as a means to react to an injury, but is a tool to reestablish the balance of rights and obligations. Perhaps the author meant exactly this by distinguishing between the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility but he should have made himself clearer.

Book Reviews But apart from these points of criticism the work by Mr. Gomaa is highly valuable, not only because there has not been any study on this particular aspect of the law of treaties. Christian Feist

Klaus W. Grewlich : Konflikt u n d O r d n u n g i n der globalen Kommunikation. Wettstreit der Staaten und Wettbewerb der Unternehmen (Wirtschaftsrecht der internationalen Telekommunikation, Bd. 33). Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1997, 307 Seiten. Die Globalisierung der Weltwirtschaft und deren mögliche Auswirkungen auf das internationale Handels- und Wirtschaftsrechts ist i n jüngster Zeit ein vieldiskutiertes Thema geworden. Der Prozeß der „Globalisierung" bezeichnet eine Vernetzung nationaler Volkswirtschaften und der gleichzeitig abnehmenden staatlichen Kontrolle über wirtschaftliche Prozesse. Motor der Globalisierung sind Auslandsinvestitionen, die eine internationale Arbeitsteilung und damit Vernetzung der nationalen Märkte bewirken. Sinkende Transportkosten erlauben es zunehmend, arbeitsintensive Industrien i n Drittländer zu verlegen, die Vorteile in Form niedrigerer Löhne und Steuern sowie liberalerer Arbeits- und Umweltgesetze bieten. Entscheidend vorangetrieben wird die Vernetzung der Weltwirtschaft durch globale Firmen, die sog. transnationalen Unternehmen. Ihre Investitionen sind es, die weltweite Arbeitsteilung bewirken und so die Märkte vernetzen. 1995 gab es ca. 37.000 solcher Firmen mit 170.000 Tochterunternehmen, die bis zu 40 % des Welthandels innerhalb ihrer Firmenstrukturen abwickelten. Ermöglicht wird dieses globale Handeln durch die Liberalisierung des Welthandels und die technologische Entwicklung der letzten Jahrzehnte, die zu sinkenden Transaktionskosten geführt hat. Es ist insbesondere die Entwicklung der Telekommunikation gewesen, die es Unternehmen erst ermöglicht hat, global zu agieren und ihre verstreuten Produktionsstätten zentral zu koordinieren. Das vorzustellende Buch untersucht die wirtschaftsvölkerrechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen globaler Telekommunikation vor dem Hintergrund dieser Entwicklung. Der Verfasser ist dafür geeignet wie kaum ein Zweiter. Klaus Grewlich, jetzt Privatdozent in Freiburg, hat lange Jahre i n der Rechtsabteilung eines internationalen Telekommunikations-unternehmens gearbeitet und kennt dieses Rechtsgebiet somit aus der Praxis. I n diesem Buch hat er es sich zur Aufgabe gemacht, die wirtschaftsvölkerrechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen der globalen Telekommunikation herauszuarbeiten und auf ihre Adäquanz zu untersuchen. Darunter versteht er, „ob der vorhandene völkerrechtliche Rahmen ausreicht, um die Urgewalt der modernen Kommunikation, das heißt der akzelierenden Technologieentwicklung, der Anwendungen und Inhalte, der raumgreifenden Operationen der Wirtschaftsakteure und der einschlägigen staatlichen Politiken und Rechtsetzungen für Frieden, Wohlstand und menschliche Entfaltung i n möglichst großem Umfange fruchtbar werden zu lassen" (25). I m ersten Kapitel klärt der Verfasser zunächst die Fragestellung, indem er u. a. die Interessenlage von Staaten und Unternehmen i n der Telekommunikation analyisert. Die Telekommunikationsunternehmen strebten nach globalen Aktionsfeldern, u. a. u m ihre weltweit tätigen Kunden einheitliche Dienste anbieten zu können. Ein Mittel, dies zu erreichen, sei die Bildung globaler Allianzen mit anderen Unternehmen. Das globale Handeln der Unternehmen stoße jedoch auf das territorial begrenzte Handeln der Staaten. Problematisch sei diese Inkongruenz, weil Staaten die wirtschaftliche und technologische Bedeutung der Telekommunikation erkannt hätten und die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der eigenen Industrien zu stützen versuchten. I m Ergebnis spiele sich die globale Telekommunikation somit in einem Spannungsfeld

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zwischen dem Wettbewerb der Unternehmen und dem Wettstreit der Staaten ab. Grewlich schildert detailliert technologische Konzepte und wirtschaftliche Probleme der globalen Infrastruktur, wobei die Ausführungen jedoch stets auch für mit der Sache unvertraute Leser verständlich bleiben. Er schließt das Kapitel mit einer Eingrenzung der Fragestellung dahingehend, wie die rechtliche Ordnung dieses Spannungsfeldes aussehe. Gegenstand des 2. Kapitels ist die so eingegrenzte „Ordnung für die globale Kommunikation". Der Verfasser stellt zunächst die regulierungs- und kartellrechtliche Rechtslage i n Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten dar. Nach einer Einführung i n die materiellen Rechtsgrundlagen werden die regulierungs- und kartellrechtlichen Verfahren in beiden Staaten anhand konkreter Einzelfälle durchleuchtet. Gegenstand der Darstellung sind z. B. die Allianzen „Newco", eine Kooperation von BT und M C I , sowie das Projekt „Global One", eine Kooperation der Deutschen Telekom, France Telekom und der US-amerikanischen Sprint. I n beiden Fällen wurden die Allianzen sowohl in den USA wie der EG geprüft. Durch die spiegelbildliche Gegenüberstellung gelingt es Grewlich, die komplexen rechtlichen Regelungen dem Leser anschaulich vor Augen zu führen und die rechtlichen und politischen Spannungsverhältnisse, innerhalb derer sich diese Allianzen abspielen, transparent zu machen. Die Analyse der Entscheidungen der EG-Kommission einerseits und der amerikanischen Behörden anderseits führt den Verfasser dann zu dem Ergebnis, daß Staaten nicht nur versuchten, auf andere Staaten einzuwirken, sondern auch durch Auflagen für grenzüberschreitende Allianzen versuchten, ihre ordnungspolitischen Interessen extraterritorial durchzusetzen. Dies führe — nicht nur für globale Kommunikationsallianzen — zu einem hohen Maß an rechtlicher Komplexität und Unsicherheit. Potentiell könnten solche Vorgehensweisen auch zu zwischenstaatlichen Konflikten führen. Auf dieser Grundlage untersucht der Verfasser dann i m zweiten Abschnitt des Kapitels, ob und inwieweit der wirtschaftsvölkerrechtliche Rahmen der globalen Telekommunikation diese Komplexität verringern könne. Dazu wird zunächst eine Bestandsaufnahme dieses Rahmens vorgenommen. Der Verfasser beleuchtet nacheinander den Handel mit Kommunikationsdienstleistungen, das Recht der internationalen Direktinvestitionen sowie bestehende Ansätze zu einer globalen Wettbewerbsordnung. Nach einer Übersicht über das jeweilige Rechtsgebiet werden dann konzentriert die Aspekte analysiert, die für die Telekommunikation relevant sind, und die Ergebnisse ausgewertet. Dem Verfasser gelingt es dabei, auch den mit den Regeln des GATS und der W T O oder des Investitionsschutzes kaum vertrauten Leser einzuführen. Er kommt zu dem Ergebnis, daß das Wirtschaftsvölkerrecht zwar einige spezifisch sektorale Regelungen biete, so z. B. i m GATS. Das Recht der Investitionen und des Wettbewerbs habe aber horizontalen, d. h. allgemeinen Charakter und sei nicht auf die Besonderheiten der globalen Kommunikation abgestimmt. Nichtsdestotrotz könnten möglicherweise Lösungsansätze darin erkannt werden. Noch fehle es aber an einem wirtschaftsvölkerrechtlichen Regelungswerk, das „bedeutungsgerecht die Lebenswirklichkeit des Wirtschaftsaustauschs reguliert i m Sinne einer Ordnung" und dem eine „sektorenübergreifenden völkerrechtlichen Systemkonzeption" zugrundeliegt. Die Untersuchung wird i m 3. Kapitel mit einer Zusammenfassung sowie Ansätzen zu einer solchen systemübergreifenden Konzeption aus dem allgemeinen Völkerrecht abgeschlossen. Ausgangspunkt ist die Überlegung, daß die Inkongruenz von tatsächlichem Geschehen und rechtlicher Lage an die Situation zur Zeit von Grotius erinnere. Es sei zu fragen, inwieweit von der Rechtsidee der friedlichen Koexistenz ausgehend, eine völkerrechtliche Neubesinnung notwendig sei. Dabei sei auch zu überlegen, ob und inwieweit die Rechtsidee der Kooperation schon Völkerrechtswirklichkeit und fruchtbar zu machen sei. Der Verfasser streift i m Rahmen dieser Erörterungen verschiedene weitere Fragen. Kern seiner Erörterungen ist, inwieweit die

Book Reviews globale Kommunikation von einem Rechtssystem geregelt werden sollte, das nicht nur interessenorientiert ist, sondern von den Staaten fordert, über ihre eigenen unmittelbaren Interessen hinauszuwachsen. Dies wird mit verschiedenen Argumenten befürwortet. Die Bedeutung der globalen Kommunikation, die notwendig entstehenden Konflikte und die menschenrechtlich fundierte Informationsfreiheit verlangten nach völkerrechtlichen Steuerungsinstrumenten, mit denen widerstreitende nationale Interessen befriedet werden können. Abschließend fordert der Verfasser i n einem Ausblick bestimmte völkerrechtliche Regelungen, die sich aufgrund der vorangegangenen Analyse als notwendig erwiesen hätten. So fordert er u. a. den Abbau staatlicher Interventionen und Regulierungen, damit sich die Fähigkeiten privater Akteure voll entfalten könnten. Dieser Uberblick zeigt den Wert der Arbeit deutlich. Dem Leser wird nicht nur ein umfassender und durch Praxiskenntnis bestechender Uberblick über die technologischen, wirtschaftlichen und rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen der globalen Telekommunikation geboten. Grewlich zeigt Diskrepanzen zwischen der tatsächlichen Entwicklung und den rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen auf, die nur durch diesen Uberblick sichtbar werden. Auch wenn man sich seinen Schlußfolgerungen nicht anschließen sollte, w i r d man von diesem Werk profitieren. Die Arbeit ist nicht nur von Interesse für Spezialisten i m internationalen Telekommunikations- oder Wirtschaftsvölkerrecht. Sie wird vielmehr jedem empfohlen, der sich für mögliche Auswirkungen der Globalisierung auf bestehende völkerrechtliche Konzepte interessiert. Richard Happ

Kay Hailhronner/GünterRenner (Hrsg.): Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht. Kommentar, 2., neubearbeitete Aufl., C. H . Beck*sehe Verlagsbuchhandlung, München 1998, X X I X + 1.000 Seiten. Als die erste Auflage dieses Kommentars i m Jahre 1991 erschien, gehörte das deutsche Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht zu den Materien, die außerhalb des Kreises von persönlich Interessierten und beruflich Betroffenen kaum größere Aufmerksamkeit fanden. Dies hat sich zwischenzeitlich grundlegend geändert: Seit dem Bundestagswahlkampf des Jahres 1994 stehen Fragen des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts, und zwar des Erwerbs der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit kraft Geburt durch Ausländer der dritten Generation in Anwendung des — dem deutschen Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts traditionell fremden — ius soli-Prinzips sowie der Einbürgerung unter Hinnahme von Mehrstaatigkeit, d. h. der Aufgabe der Notwendigkeit der vorherigen Entlassung aus der früheren Staatsangehörigkeit, auf der politischen Agenda. Dies wurde besonders deutlich anläßlich der heftigen — und leider nicht immer sachkundigen — öffentlichen Diskussion um die nach ihrem Wahlsieg i m Herbst 1998 bestätigten Pläne der neuen Regierung, das deutsche Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht um die genannten Punkte zu ergänzen. I n einer solchen Situation ist es naturgemäß sehr zu begrüßen, daß mit der zweiten Auflage des bereits jetzt als Standardwerk zu bezeichnenden Kommentars von Kay Hailhronner und Günter Renner, zwei ausgewiesenen Kennern der Materie, eine sachkundige und äußerst fundierte Kommentierung des geltenden Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts vorgelegt wurde. I n der angesprochenen Situation liegt der — aus der Sicht des Rezensenten — besondere Wert dieses Werkes aber nicht einmal so sehr i n der erwähnten umfassenden Kommentierung, d. h. einer Darstellung und Wertung der einschlägigen Rechtsprechung und Literatur zu den Bestimmungen der das — nicht sonderlich übersichtliche — deutsche Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht bildenden Normen. Diese Leistung kann von einem in der gelben Reihe des Beck-Verlages erschienenen Buch ohnehin erwartet werden. Besonderes Interesse verdienen vielmehr die um-

Book Reviews fangreichen Ausführungen der beiden Autoren in der immerhin 181 Seiten umfassenden Einleitung, die i n Wahrheit ein knappes, aber vollständiges Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts darstellt. Renner beschreibt zunächst kurz die Geschichte dieser Materie in Deutschland bis zum Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz von 1870 und stellt dann ausführlich die wahrlich komplexe Entwicklung des geltenden Rechts seit dem Inkrafttreten des Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetzes von 1913 bis zur Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands dar. Hierauf folgt eine wiederum äußerst sachkundige Behandlung von Begriff und Rechtsnatur der Staatsangehörigkeit (u. a. zu Status- und Rechtsverhältnistheorie, innerstaatlicher und völkerrechtlicher sowie funktioneller Staatsangehörigkeit), bevor Fragen des Verhältnisses von Staatsangehörigkeit und Internationalem Privatrecht aufgegriffen werden; hier ist — i m Zusammenhang mit der eingangs angesprochenen und wie erwähnt nicht immer sachkundigen Diskussion — etwa darauf hinzuweisen, daß Renner die — ohnehin klare — Rechtslage nach Art. 5 EGBGB hervorhebt, nachdem für Mehrstaater bei der Anknüpfung eindeutig von der effektiven Staatsangehörigkeit auszugehen ist. I m Anschluß hieran stellt Hailbronner in ausgesprochen gelungener Weise die Beziehungen zwischen Staatsangehörigkeit und Völkerrecht dar. Dabei behandelt er — aus der Sicht des Rezensenten: stets zutreffend — zunächst den Grundsatz der staatlichen Souveränität als Ausgangspunkt staatlicher Gesetzgebung und erläutert dann umfassend die völkerrechtlichen Grenzen der staatlichen Befugnis zur Regelung der Staatsangehörigkeit unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der zulässigen Anknüpfungspunkte (wie Abstammung von einem Staatsangehörigen und Geburt auf dem Staatsgebiet); besonderes Interesse verdient auch seine Diskussion der staatsangehörigkeitsrechtlichen Folgen der jüngsten Fälle von Staatensukzessionen. Hierauf folgt eine wiederum sehr instruktive Darlegung der mit der Staatsangehörigkeit verbundenen Rechte und Pflichten (diplomatischer Schutz, Aufnahmepflicht bezüglich eigener Staatsangehöriger und das ebenso aktuelle wie schwierige Problem einer Aufnahmepflicht für ehemalige Staatsangehörige sowie Fragen der Rückübernahme fremder Staatsangehöriger). I m Hinblick auf die eingangs erwähnte Diskussion sei seinen Ausführungen zur mehrfachen Staatsangehörigkeit (die um eine äußerst kundige Behandlung der Problematik der Staatenlosigkeit ergänzt wird) besondere Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt: So wird zunächst (96) zutreffend festgestellt, daß das geltende Völkerrecht doppelte oder mehrfache Staatsangehörigkeit nicht verbietet. Dann wird — wiederum richtig — dargelegt, daß bis vor kurzem eindeutig Bestrebungen zur Verringerung mehrfacher Staatsangehörigkeit vorherrschten, in jüngster Zeit sich aber Tendenzen zur Hinnahme mehrfacher Staatsangehörigkeit i m Völkerrecht wie i n den nationalen Rechtsordnungen verstärken (104 ff.). Anschließend setzt sich Hailbronner ausführlich mit den verschiedenen Vorschlägen zur Reform des deutschen Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts auseinander (115 ff.). Seine — aus der Sicht des Rezensenten: zutreffende — Auffassung läßt sich wie folgt zusammenfassen: Es ist grundsätzlich möglich, Mehrstaatigkeit in einem bestimmten Umfang hinzunehmen; insbesondere werde der Begriff der Staatsangehörigkeit i m Grundgesetz nicht erläutert, sondern vorausgesetzt, weshalb dem Gesetzgeber die Befugnis zustehe, die nach Deutschland eingewanderten Ausländer sowie deren Familienangehörigen in einem erleichterten Verfahren einzubürgern; ausreichend für die Aufnahme i n den deutschen Staatsverband sei eine hinreichend enge Beziehung zu Deutschland, wie sie durch die herkömmlichen Integrationserfordernisse (langdauernder Aufenthalt, Geburt als Kind von i m Inland seit langem ansässigen Eltern oder Ausbildung i m Inland) gekennzeichnet ist; das Völkerrecht stehe der Hinnahme von Mehrstaatigkeit nicht entgegen, Probleme der Zuordnung lassen sich durch Verträge oder den Vorrang der effektiven Staatsangehörigkeit lösen (121). Diese Position wird auch i n der von Renner besorgten Kommentierimg zu Art. 16 G G (Rdnr. 13 ff.) mit über-

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zeugenden Gründen vertreten, wo insbesondere klargestellt wird, daß dem Grundgesetz kein Prinzip der Ausschließlichkeit der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit zugrunde liegt, das die Entstehung von Mehrstaatigkeit unter allen Umständen untersagt (ibid., Rdnr. 19). Auch w i r d betont, daß „eine Modifikation des Abstammungserwerbs durch ius soli jedenfalls nicht verfassungsrechtlich ausgeschlossen ist" (ibid., Rdnr. 21). Anders formuliert: Weder aus der Verfassung noch aus dem Völkerrecht ergeben sich zwingende rechtliche Gründe, die den Gesetzgeber hinderten, das deutsche Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht dergestalt zu ändern, daß es die Entstehung von Mehrstaatigkeit i n größerem Umfang als bisher hinnimmt: Dies gilt sowohl für die Einführung der Möglichkeit des Erwerbs der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit kraft Geburt für Kinder, von deren ausländischen Eltern bereits einer i n Deutschland geboren und hier dauerhaft ansässig ist, wie für die Einbürgerung mit der Möglichkeit der Beibehaltung der bisherigen Staatsangehörigkeit. Abgeschlossen wird die Einleitung m i t einer von Hailbronner besorgten Darstellung der durch die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands weitestgehend gelösten staatsangehörigkeitsrechtlichen Probleme und der Entwicklung der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit nach der Wiedervereinigung sowie einer gewohnt kundigen Behandlung der Unionsbürgerschaft. Auch hier sei i m Hinblick auf die gegenwärtige deutsche Diskussion seine Analyse der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (EuGH) i n den Fällen Gullung (Slg. 1989, 111) und vor allem Micheletti (Slg. 1992-1,4358) erwähnt. I n diesen Urteilen hatte der E u G H klargestellt, daß sich Erwerb und Verlust der Staatsangehörigkeit eines Mitgliedstaates weiterhin nach dessen innerstaatlichem Recht richten, aber von dieser „Zuständigkeit unter Beachtung des Gemeinschaftsrechts Gebrauch zu machen" (Slg. 1992-1, 4262) sei. Nach Auffassung des Rezensenten wäre es i n der Tat wegen Verstoßes gegen die Gemeinschaftstreue gemäß Art. 5 EGV gemeinschaftsrechtswidrig, wenn ein Mitgliedstaat einer großen Gruppe von Personen, die mit diesem Mitgliedstaat nicht durch einen i m Völkerrecht und einer Vielzahl der nationalen Rechtsordnungen der Mitgliedstaaten anerkannten Anknüpfungspunkt verbunden sind, ohne vorherige Abstimmung mit den Gemeinschaftsorganen, insbesondere dem Rat, seine Staatsangehörigkeit verliehe, da diesem Personenkreis dann die mit der Unionsbürgerschaft verbundenen Rechte, namentlich die Freizügigkeitsrechte, zukommen. Diese Situation ist aber nach Ansicht des Rezensenten aufgrund der i n Deutschland vorgesehenen Reform des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts eindeutig nicht gegeben, entspricht doch die für Deutschland vorgesehene Regelung durchaus der bereits jetzt i n der Mehrzahl der Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen U n i o n geltenden Rechtslage. Zusammenfassend ist zu betonen, daß Hailbronner und Renner mit der hier angezeigten zweiten Auflage ihres Kommentars zum deutschen Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht eine wiederum sehr beachtliche Leistung erbracht haben. Das genaue Studium dieses Buches und eine gründliche Auseinandersetzung mit den vorgetragenen Auffassungen sei allen Beteiligten an der derzeitigen — und w o h l noch eine Weile andauernden — Diskussion nachdrücklich empfohlen. Über diesen aktuellen politischen Bezug sei aber nicht vergessen, daß es sich bei diesem Werk natürlich i n erster Linie u m eine höchst gelungene Kommentierung der Normen des deutschen Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts handelt, die es für Praktiker wie Wissenschaftler zu einem i n der Tat unentbehrlichen Arbeitsmittel macht. Rainer Hofmann

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Frank-Erich Hufnagel: UN-Friedensoperationen der zweiten Generation. V o m Puffer zur Neuen Treuhand. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1996, 349 Seiten. Die unter der Betreuung von Christian Tomuschat entstandene Arbeit wurde von der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn i m Wintersemester 1994/95 als Dissertation angenommen. Der Verfasser hat sich zum Ziel gesetzt, das seit dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts zu beobachtende neue Modell des UN-Peace-Keepings, insbesondere als Reaktion auf das Phänomen der „failed states", darzustellen und unter rechtlichen Gesichtspunkten zu analysieren (19). Die Arbeit gliedert sich in fünf Abschnitte, in denen sich an einen einführenden Teil eine empirische Darstellung und systematische Untersuchimg drei der jüngeren PeaceKeeping-Operationen der U N O anschließt. Es folgt dann als dritter Abschnitt eine Analyse der Rechtsgrundlage dieser neuen Einsatzform sowie, im vierten Teil, eine Auseinandersetzung mit den Grenzen und Vorgaben der Friedensoperationen der zweiten Generation. Abgeschlossen wird die Arbeit mit einer zusammenfassenden Betrachtung. Zunächst gibt Hufnagel i m einführenden Teil einen Überblick über die Vorläufer internationaler Friedensoperationen i m Rahmen des Völkerbundes sowie das traditionelle UN-PeaceKeeping zu Zeiten des Kalten Krieges. Seine Analyse ergibt, daß die „Blauhelme" vor allem eine „Pufferfunktion" in internationalen Konflikten erfüllten, sich aber aus den inneren Angelegenheiten der betroffenen Länder heraushielten (25). Hinsichtlich der rechtlichen Verortung dieser Friedensoperationen i n der UN-Charta schließt sich der Verfasser der überwiegenden Ansicht i n der Staatenwelt und der völkerrechtlichen Literatur an, welche die Kapitel V I und V I I der UN-Charta — auch als „Kapitel V I 1/2" bezeichnet — als Rechtsgrundlage ansehen (30). I m zweiten Hauptabschnitt folgt zunächst eine empirische Darstellung der UN-Friedensmissionen der zweiten Generation anhand der Beispiele Namibia, Kambodscha und Somalia. Als Gemeinsamkeiten dieser Operationen mit dem traditionellen Konzept des Peace-Keeping arbeitet der Verfasser die Beschränkung der Kompetenz zu ihrer Autorisierung auf den Sicherheitsrat, den internationalen Charakter des eingesetzten Personals sowie den weiterhin bestehenden Charakter der Freiwilligkeit bei der Rekrutierung heraus (209 - 210). Demgegenüber werden aber auch eine Reihe von Unterschieden zu den bisherigen „Blauhelm"-Einsätzen aufgezeigt: Bei den neuen Einsatzgebieten handelt es sich vornehmlich um Krisensituationen innerhalb eines Staates, i n den Peace-Keeping-Truppen mit der Aufgabe entsendet werden, die staatliche Ordnung und politische Stabilität des Landes neu- oder wiederaufzubauen, wobei sie teilweise auch selbst Staatsgewalt übernehmen und ausüben. Dieser auf dynamische Entwicklung gerichtete Aufgabeninhalt, welcher, wie Hufnagel hervorhebt, nicht völlig wertneutral ist, sondern sich an den demokratischen Aspekten des Selbstbestimmungsrechts und der Achtung der Menschenrechte orientiert (214), stellt einen wesentlichen Unterschied zur statischen „Pufferfunktion" traditioneller Peace-Keeping-Einsätze dar. Als nächstes wendet sich der Verfasser i m dritten Hauptabschnitt der Untersuchung der Rechtsgrundlage dieser neuen A r t von Friedensmissionen in der UN-Charta zu. Hierbei geht es insbesondere u m die Frage, ob auch diese, vom Aufgabenspektrum her erweiterten Operationen von der dem Sicherheitsrat nach Art. 24 der UN-Charta zugewiesenen Aufgabe der Wahrung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit gedeckt sind. Nach der Feststellung, daß den Kapiteln V I und V E der Charta ein einheitliches Friedenskonzept zugrunde liegt (225), kommt Hufnagel zunächst zu dem Ergebnis, daß die Konzeption der Friedenssicherung in der UN-Charta ursprünglich auf einem negativen Friedensbegriff im Sinne der Abwesenheit zwischenstaatlicher Gewaltanwendung basierte. Anhand einer umfangreichen Analyse der neueren Praxis des Sicherheitsrates sowie der diesbezüglichen Reaktionen der Staatengemein-

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schaft verdeutlicht der Verfasser jedoch, daß sich das traditionelle Verständnis i n bezug auf den Friedensbegriff aufgrund einer „dynamisch-objektiven" Interpretation i m Lichte der veränderten Umstände nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges gewandelt hat (279). Insbesondere die extensive Auslegung des Begriffs der Friedensbedrohung nach Art. 39 der UN-Charta, welche i n zunehmenden Maße auch innerstaatliche Konflikte basierend auf der Zielsetzung der Verhinderung des Zusammenbruchs staatlicher Strukturen erfaßt (280), verdeutlicht, daß die „auf die innere Entwicklung von Staaten konzentrierte Aufgabe der zweiten Generation des PeaceKeeping . . . somit von dem Mandat der U N O zur Wahrung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit in seinem neuen, weiteren Umfang gedeckt" wird (289). Des weiteren stellt der Verfasser klar, daß aufgrund des veränderten Instrumentariums der neuen Friedensmissionen, welche auch „robustere" Operationen i n Form von Kampfeinsätzen umfassen, ihre spezielle Rechtsgrundlage i n Kapitel V I I der Charta zu verorten ist (296). I m vierten Hauptabschnitt untersucht der Verfasser mögliche Vorgaben und Grenzen für künftige Friedensoperationen der zweiten Generation. I m Hinblick auf die äußeren Vorgaben i m Vorfeld eines Einsatzes wird zunächst, ausgehend vom Subsidiaritätsprinzip, auf die grundsätzliche Nachrangigkeit von UN-Peace-Keeping Missionen gegenüber einer eigenverantwortlichen Problemlösung durch den betroffenen Staat eingegangen, welche sowohl bei der Entscheidung über die Durchführung eines Einsatzes als auch hinsichtlich der zu übernehmenden staatlichen Aufgaben zu beachten ist (314). Weiterhin erörtert Hufnagel, ausgehend von der neueren Praxis der Vereinten Nationen, eine Reihe von Auswahlkriterien, welche die Entscheidung über die Durchführung von Friedensmissionen beeinflussen, wie die Erfolgsaussichten, eine gleichmäßige geographische Verteilung der Einsätze und die zu erwartenden Kosten. I n bezug auf die inneren Zielvorgaben werden von Hufnagel als gemeinsamer Bestandteil aller neueren Operationen unter anderem die Unterstützimg einer demokratischen Regierungsbildung sowie die Förderung der Menschenrechte hervorgehoben. Hinsichtlich der Feststellung des Verfassers, daß die inhaltliche Festlegung der Friedensoperationen auf einen demokratisch fundierten Staatsaufbau sich normativ auf rechtliche Grundentscheidungen der UN-Charta zurückführen läßt (321), wäre allerdings eine etwas umfangreichere Analyse dieses umstrittenen Themenkomplexes wünschenswert gewesen. Abschließend werden vom Verfasser noch eine Reihe von außerrechtlichen Grenzen, treuhänderischer Friedensoperationen, wie beispielsweise die bestehende Resourcenknappheit, sowie Mängel i m Operationsmanagement, aufgezeigt. Die Dissertation von Hufnagel zeichnet sich durch eine umfassende Analyse des sich seit dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts gewandelten Aufgabenspektrums von UN-Peace-Keeping Operationen aus, wobei in dem Werk die Entwicklungen bis August 1994 berücksichtigt werden konnten. Zur Verdeutlichung der fortbestehenden Aktualität und Relevanz der vom Verfasser getroffenen Aussagen braucht lediglich auf die weitere Zunahme von Friedenssicherungsmissionen, beispielsweise in den Nachfolgestaaten des ehemaligen Jugoslawiens sowie i n Haiti, verwiesen werden. Karsten Nowrot

Uwe Jenisch: Bibliographie des deutschen Schrifttums z u m Internationalen Seerecht 1982 - 1996. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1998, 136 Seiten. M i t dieser in der Schriftenreihe des Rostocker Ostseeinstituts für Seerecht und Umweltrecht erschienenen Bibliographie knüpft Jenisch an die ebenfalls von ihm verfaßte „Bibliographie des deutschen Schrifttums zum Internationalen Seerecht 1945 - 1981" aus dem Jahre 1982

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an. Daß die jetzt vorgelegte Bibliographie etwa den gleichen Umfang besitzt wie die vorherige, dabei aber einen Zeitraum von nur vierzehn Jahren abdeckt, zeigt bereits, daß die Beschäftigung mit dem Seevölkerrecht i n der deutschen Völkerrechtswissenschaft und auch i n der Praxis i m Vergleich zu früheren Jahrzehnten seit 1982 erheblich zugenommen hat. Diese Feststellung spiegelt die zunehmende Bedeutung des Internationalen Seerechts für die Entwicklung des modernen Völkerrechts seit dem Abschluß des VN-Seerechtsübereinkommens am 10. Dezember 1982 und seinem Inkrafttreten am 16. November 1994 wider. Wie Jenisch zu Recht bemerkt, bietet das Internationale Seerecht mit seinen innovativen Regelungs- und Durchsetzungsmodellen eine Vielfalt von Themen für künftige Diplomarbeiten, Dissertationen und Habilitationen. Die vorliegende, mit Sorgfalt zusammengestellte Bibliographie wird bei solchen Arbeiten wertvolle Hüfe leisten können. Sie beschränkt sich nicht nur auf deutschsprachige Beiträge, sondern bezieht — der Internationalität des Seerechts entsprechend — auch zahlreiche fremdsprachige Veröffentlichungen deutschsprachiger Autoren mit ein. I m Vergleich zur ersten Bibliographie von 1982 ist nicht nur das äußere Erscheinungsbild professioneller, sondern auch die Gliederung übersichtlicher geworden. Sie folgt weitgehend dem Aufbau des Seerechtsübereinkommens. Zusätzlich werden die Bereiche „Regionale Meere und Problemgebiete" und „Militärische Aktivitäten, Seekriegsrecht" abgedeckt. Unter dem Gliederungsabschnitt „Seeschiffe und Seeverkehr" werden nicht nur Rechtsstatus der Schiffe und Schiffahrtsfreiheit, sondern auch Schiffssicherheit und Haftung sowie Wracks und Bergungsrecht erfaßt. Hilfreich für den Benutzer ist außerdem die Zusammenstellung sämtlicher für den Bereich des Seerechts relevanter Bundestagsdrucksachen. Statt hierfür einen eigenen Gliederungsabschnitt ganz am Ende vorzusehen, hätte es sich allerdings wegen des Sachzusammenhangs angeboten, diese Aufstellung i n den ersten Gliederungsabschnitt „Dokumente, Materialen" hineinzunehmen. Ferner wäre es für den Benutzer etwas einfacher gewesen, wenn man das Verzeichnis der zitierten Zeitschriften und ihrer Abkürzungen direkt hinter das Allgemeine Abkürzungsverzeichnis gesetzt hätte. V o n diesen, eher als Anregungen für die nächste Bibliographie zu verstehenden Kritikpunkten abgesehen, ist die vorliegende Bibliographie für alle, die sich in Wissenschaft und Praxis mit dem Internationalen Seerecht beschäftigen, von großem Wert. Denn sie ermöglicht eine schnelle und gründliche Erfassung des einschlägigen deutschen Schrifttums und enthält überdies für den Bereich des fremdsprachigen Schrifttums eine umfängliche Zusammenstellung anderer Bibliographien. Dons König

Alexandre Kiss/Dinah Shelton: Manual of European Environmental Law. 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Grotius Publications Ltd., Cambridge 1997, xliii + 622 pages. The environmental law still is one of the younger areas of international as well as national and regional law-making efforts . Alexandre Kiss zndDinah Shelton have undertaken to examine this area of the law for the European legal system and their work has now been publicized in a second revised and updated edition. The chapters have been somewhat restructured and among some new documents, a new chapter on "Economic development and environmental protection" has been added. The scope of the publication, European environmental law, includes "international norms accepted by the European states, the law of the European Community, and the laws of European states related to environmental protection" (3). As their work is not restricted to the envi-

Book Reviews ronmental law of the European Communities, the authors refer to "a larger Europe including western republics of the former Soviet Union" (8) which is a positive aspect especially w i t h a view to the potential enlargement of the European Union. The Manual of European Environmental Law is divided into three parts (Overview, Sectoral Protection and Transsectoral Issues). The overview includes an introduction to the terminology and the basic characteristics of European environmental law; Chapter 2 on fundamental concepts briefly deals w i t h such concepts of environmental law as the precautionary principle and the concept of sustainable development which has dominated the environmental agenda ever since the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development i n Rio. Chapter 3 then gives an overview over the institutions and agencies on the national, European and international level that are of importance in the environmental context. Chapter 4 then analyzes the role of the public and especially non-governmental organizations in environmental law. This chapter has been extended in this new edition and rightfully stresses the important role that individuals and NGOs have to play in environmental protection issues and demonstrates how this fact "is increasingly recognized in law" (72). Case studies by Dinah Shelton on N G O s i n the European Community and by Blanche Vahle on N G O s i n central and eastern Europe complete the analysis of the role of the public i n environmental law. Even though especially N G O s have become more and more involved i n the negotiation and enforcement of environmental law in recent years, this matter is often neglected i n environmental law publications; the work of Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton constitutes a noticeable exception. Finally, Chapter 5 deals w i t h the "Techniques of environmental law", i.e. preventive, implementation and enforcement measures. I n sum, this first part of the publication in an uncomplicated manner establishes the foundation necessary to fully appreciate the sectoral and transsectoral issues i n the second and third parts. Part T w o on "Sectoral Protection" deals w i t h the issue of biological diversity and the protection of nature i n Chapter 6. A n overview introduces the reader to the techniques of the protection of specimens and species of flora and fauna on the one hand and the protection of habitats and ecosystems on the other hand; account is also taken of the growing issue of biotechnology and "the potential hazard associated w i t h the handling and introduction into the environment of genetically modified organisms" (207). The chapter is completed by case studies about nature protection in Switzerland, the Netherlands and Finland. Chapter 7 on the protection of soil only gives a short overview and is dominated by four different case studies from the national and regional points of view. Chapter 8 deals w i t h the fresh waters, an issue that might be the cause of conflicts and even wars in the future: Water is a scarce resource but "the demand for water continues to increase" (290), and even in Europe conflicts over water scarcity have to be resolved, as exemplified by the case study by Alexandre Kiss on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case recently before the International Court of Justice. The connected issue of the pollution of oceans is dealt w i t h in Chapter 9 on the protection of the marine environment. I n their overview, the authors analyze the different sources of marine pollution and the regulation of pollution on the national, regional and international scale, followed by case studies on the Baltic and the N o r t h Seas and related Spanish national legislation. Finally, the protection of the atmosphere is dealt w i t h i n Chapter 10. The well known problems of acid rain, ozone depletion and climate change are only a few and modern effects of atmospheric pollution that constitute a threat to human health, so that "as early as the fourteenth century measures to combat air pollution were enacted" (385). The authors give an overview of the national, regional and international law-making efforts to combat the atmospheric pollution,

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and the chapter is completed by case studies from the international, the European and the British points of view. Part Three of the Manual adds an analysis of different transsectoral issues of environmental law. Chapter 11 examines the regulation of different sources of environmental harm, e.g. hazardous substances, wastes and noise, and Chapter 12 deals w i t h the issue of "environmental planning and nature protection", a topic that i n the European Communities touches upon the principle of subsidiarity, as M. E. Williams points out in the case study on the environment i n European cities (518). Finally, Chapter 13 deals w i t h the question of "economic development and environmental protection", two issues that have become t w i n principles since the 1992 Rio Conference. The chapter also includes the question of international trade and the environment, which can have grave implications for national protection measures through G A T T panel decisions. I n their final conclusion the authors point out that "(environmental law as it stands today is a complex structure composed of international, Community, and domestic rules which are mutually reinforcing and intertwined" (616). The Manual succeeds in exemplifying this interplay of different sources of environmental law for the region of Europe, and this is supported by the case studies and documents at the end of every chapter. Additionally, a "Chronological Table of International and EC Documents and Cases" and a "Table of National Laws" have been included and facilitate the usage of the Manual. I n sum, Kiss and Sheltons work provides the reader w i t h interesting information and through its contents and practical approach to the matter can be recommended to teachers and students alike. Sonja Riedinger

Karl F. Kreutzer/Dieter H. Scbeuing/Ulrich Sieber (Hrsg.): Europäischer Grundrechtsschutz. Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1998, 95 Seiten. Die vorliegende Publikation, die i n der Würzburger Schriftenreihe „Ius Europaeum" erschienen ist, enthält fünf Beiträge zu den „3. Würzburger Europarechtstagen", die dem Thema „Europäischer Grundrechtsschutz" gewidmet waren. Die Tagimg ist von der Juristischen Fakultät der Universität Würzburg i n Zusammenarbeit mit dem Institut für Rechtsvergleichung, dem Jean-Monnet-Lehrstuhl für Europarecht, der Vereinigung für Europäisches Strafrecht e. V. und dem Europäischen Rechtszentrum i m Juli 1997 durchgeführt worden. Dementsprechend wird die Frage des Grundrechtsschutzes nicht nur aus europa- und völkerrechtlicher, sondern auch aus strafprozessualer Sicht beleuchtet. Es ging den Veranstaltern darum, das vielschichtige Zusammenspiel, aber auch die Inkongruenzen unterschiedlicher Schutzsysteme auf nationaler, europäischer und internationaler Ebene deutlich zu machen. Den Auftakt bildet der Beitrag des deutschen Richters am E u G H Günter Hirsch mit dem Titel „Gemeinschaftsgrundrechte als Gestaltungsaufgabe" (9 - 24). Seinem Amtsverständnis entsprechend, unterstreicht Hirsch die zentrale Rolle des E u G H bei der erstmaligen Anerkennung, Anwendung und Konkretisierung der Gemeinschaftsgrundrechte, die heute einen integralen Bestandteil des Gemeinschaftsrechts bilden (12). Auf der Grundlage der Rechtsauffassung des EuGH, derzufolge das Gemeinschaftsrecht eine autonome Rechtsordnung bildet, die auch dem nationalen Verfassungsrecht vorgeht, kritisiert er die Ausführungen des BVerfG i m „Maastricht-Urteil" zu den sog. „ausbrechenden Rechtsakten" und stellt klar, daß die Kontrolle über die Einhaltung der vertraglichen Kompetenzvorschriften ausschließlich dem E u G H zukommt.

Book Reviews Die gerade i m deutschen Schrifttum geäußerte Kritik am Schutzniveau der Gemeinschaftsgrundrechte relativiert er zwar, macht aber zugleich deutlich, daß sie vom Gerichtshof i m Interesse der Gewährleistung eines effektiven Grundrechtsschutzes ernst genommen wird (22). I m zweiten Beitrag untersucht Jochen Ahr. Fr owein die Auswirkungen des Straß burger Grundrechtsschutzes auf die nationalen Rechtsordnungen und das Gemeinschaftsrecht (25 37). Anhand einiger ausgesuchter Grundrechte, die i n der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention (EMRK) garantiert sind, legt er dar, daß die Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte (EGMR) i m konkreten Fall über das Schutzniveau der nationalen Grundrechte hinausgeht und daß folglich eine Anpassung an die europäischen Standards erforderlich ist. Kritisch vermerkt er i n diesem Zusammenhang, daß gerade die deutsche Rechtsprechung dem EGMR immer wieder einmal die Gefolgschaft versagt. Dies wertet er als Zeichen dafür, daß die deutsche Rechtsordnung stärker introvertiert ist als andere europäische Rechtsordnungen, und konstatiert einen entsprechenden Nachholbedarf i n der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft und Praxis. M i t Blick auf das Gemeinschaftsrecht unterstreicht er die Wichtigkeit der Ubereinstimmung von Konventions- und Gemeinschaftsgrundrechten und fordert den E u G H auf, sich künftig stärker an der Rechtsprechimg der Straßburger Organe zu orientieren (36). Der dritte Beitrag von Eckart Klein erweitert die Problematik eines adäquaten Grundrechtsschutzes u m die internationale Ebene (39 - 54). Als deutsches Mitglied des Menschenrechtsausschusses konzentriert er sich auf die i m Internationalen Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte garantierten Grundrechte und deren Auslegung und Anwendung durch den Menschenrechtsausschuß. Angesichts der unterschiedlichen Entwicklungen auf den jeweiligen Ebenen, die Grundrechte gewährleisten, weist er auf die wichtige flankierende Wirkung des internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes auf den europäischen und den nationalen Grundrechtsschutz hin und betont, wie wichtig das Offensein für Erkenntnisse anderer Instanzen für das gemeinsame Ziel des Menschenrechtsschutzes auf allen drei Ebenen ist (54). I m vierten Beitrag wird der europäische Grundrechtsschutz von Hans-Heiner Kühne i n bezug auf das Strafverfahrensrecht beleuchtet, das er als „Schnittstelle zwischen Staatsgewalt und Bürgerrechten mit hochsensibler Anzeigefunktion für die Rechtsstaatlichkeit eines Gemeinwesens" charakterisiert (55 - 71). I n kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit der seiner Ansicht nach weniger durch strenge dogmatische Ableitungen als eher durch wertschöpfende Behauptungen geprägten Rechtsprechung des EGMR kommt er zu dem Ergebnis, daß sich auf europäischer Ebene „ein kohärentes und zumindest als Strukturvorlage vollständiges Strafverfahrenssystem" entwickelt (65). Der letzte Beitrag von Norbert K. Riedel fällt thematisch aus dem Rahmen, ist aber i m Interesse zeitnaher Information mit aufgenommen worden. Riedel, der als Angehöriger des Auswärtigen Amtes an den Verhandlungen zum Amsterdamer Vertrag teilgenommen hat, gibt einen ersten Überblick über die neuen Bestimmungen und weist u. a. auf eine Reihe konkreter Fortschritte i m Bereich des europäischen Grundrechtsschutzes hin (73 - 94). Insgesamt gewähren die Beiträge in ihrem Zusammenspiel einen Einblick i n die komplexe Struktur des Grundrechtsschutzes auf nationaler, europäsicher und internationaler Ebene. Es bleibt zu wünschen, daß der Tagungsband dazu beiträgt, dem von Frowein zu Recht konstatierten Nachholbedarf deutscher Juristen auf diesem Feld abzuhelfen. Doris König

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Martin Lailach: Die Wahrung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit als Aufgabe des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen. Schriften zum Völkerrecht, Band 130. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1998, 349 Seiten. Die anzuzeigende Arbeit ist i m Wintersemester 1996 - 1997 von der Juristischen Fakultät der Göttinger Georg-August-Universität als Dissertation angenommen worden. I n ihr untersucht Martin Lailach den für das Verständnis des Systems der UN-Friedenssicherung maßgeblichen Aufgabenbereich des Sicherheitsrates bei der Wahrung des Weltfriedens und der internationalen Sicherheit nach Art. 24 Abs. 1 der Charta der Vereinten Nationen (ChVN). Lailach gliedert seine Arbeit in zwei Teile mit insgesamt 15 Kapiteln. Der erste Teil (Kapitel I - ΧΠ) ist der Untersuchung der Begriffe „Weltfrieden" und „internationale Sicherheit" gewidmet. I n den ersten beiden Kapiteln seiner Arbeit zeigt der Verfasser, daß sich der Inhalt des Begriffs „Weltfrieden" nicht allein aus dem Wortlaut von Art. 24 C h V N erschließt (35 f.). Vielmehr ist besonders die nachfolgende Praxis des Sicherheitsrates bei der Auslegung mit einzubeziehen (38). Dabei kann insbesondere auch die Organpraxis zu Art. 39 C h V N Berücksichtigung finden, da — wie Lailach unter Hinweis auf die enge Verbindung von Art. 24 und 39 feststellt — beide Normen trotz des leicht unterschiedlichen Wortlauts von einem identischen Friedensbegriff ausgehen (48). I m folgenden dritten Kapitel (69 -131) wird diese Praxis zu Art. 39 C h V N umfassend dargestellt und ausgewertet. Lailach geht sowohl auf das Verhalten des Sicherheitsrates i n den „frühen" Konflikten (u. a. Kongo, Rhodesien, Südafrika) als auch auf die mit dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion einsetzende Phase der ausgeweiteten Aktivität ein. Alle Konflikte sind klar und mit Blick auf die relevante Fragestellung nach dem Gehalt des vom Sicherheitsrat zugrundegelegten Friedensbegriffs dargestellt. Lailach belegt damit erneut das Ergebnis, daß der Sicherheitsrat seit 1990 in verschiedenen Fällen auch dann eine Friedensbedrohung feststellte, wenn es um Konflikte mit primär innerstaatlichen Auswirkungen ging. I n den folgenden Kapiteln untersucht der Verfasser, auf welche Kriterien sich das jeweilige Handeln des Sicherheitsrates zurückführen läßt. Neben bereits ausgetragenen oder drohenden internationalen Konflikten, die unzweifelhaft den Weltfrieden i m Sinne der Art. 24 und 39 C h V N betreffen, sind dabei besonders die Kategorien „Menschliches Leiden in extremen Ausmaßen" und „Integrität der Grundnormen der Völkerrechtsordnung" von Belang. I n bezug auf die erste problematische Kategorie — extreme menschliche Leiden — weist Lailach nach, daß das Eingreifen des Sicherheitsrates in den Fällen Somalia, Jugoslawien, Haiti, Angola und Ruanda zumindest auch unter Hinweis auf die extreme humanitäre Notsituation erfolgte. Während dabei zunächst immer der Bezug zu einer möglichen grenzüberschreitenden Auswirkung gewahrt blieb, sahen die Sicherheitsratsmitglieder in den Resolutionen zu Angola, Somalia und Ruanda das Leiden der Bevölkerung als solches — und nicht etwa durch dieses Leiden eventuell mittelbar entstehende zwischenstaatliche Gefährdungen — als eine Friedensbedrohung i m Sinne von Art. 39 C h V N an (134 - 140). Wie Lailach in der folgenden Untersuchung feststellt, steht dieses Handeln des Sicherheitsrates auch in Einklang mit den Zielen und Grundsätzen der Vereinten Nationen (171 - 183). Er schränkt das Ergebnis aber insoweit ein, als er unter Bezugnahme auf den Begriff „Bedrohung" in rein innerstaatlichen Konfliktlagen nur dann eine „Friedensbedrohung" sehen will, wenn eine konkrete Spannungslage vorliegt, die zu einem Friedensbruch eskalieren kann (205). M i t Blick auf die Frage, ob auch die Verletzung grundlegender völkerrechtlicher Normen als solche eine Verletzung oder Bedrohung des internationalen Friedens darstellen kann, kommt Lailach dann zu einem anderen Ergebnis. Zwar hat der Sicherheitsrat in Resolutionen zu den Situationen in Somalia und Angola ebenso wie bei der Errichtung der internationalen

Book Reviews Strafgerichtshöfe für Jugoslawien und Ruanda auch auf die Verletzung grundlegender Normen des (humanitären) Völkerrechts hingewiesen. Dabei lag es aber nahe, daß der Hinweis auf die Völkerrechtsverletzungen nur erfolgte, weil die jeweiligen Verletzungen zu extremem menschlichen Leiden führten und deshalb der internationale Friede bedroht war (143 f.). Auch die Untersuchung der Präambel und von Art. 1 und 24 C h V N führt Lailach zu dem Ergebnis, daß der Sicherheitsrat in erster Linie eine politische Aufgabe (der Friedenssicherung) zu erfüllen, nicht aber die Integrität völkerrechtlicher Normen sicherzustellen hat (208 - 213). Insofern kommt Lailach zu dem Schluß, daß „Weltfrieden" i m Sinne des Art. 24 Abs. 1 C h V N die „Abwesenheit internationaler bewaffneter Konflikte und extremer, durch Gewaltanwendung verursachter menschlicher Notsituationen" meint (216). Dieses gefundene Ergebnis stimmt, wie i m folgenden gezeigt wird, mit der Entwicklung besonderer Normkategorien wie ius cogens oder erga omnes:Verpflichtungen gerade auch auf den Gebieten der Gewaltanwendung und des Schutzes grundlegender Menschenrechte überein (230 - 236). A m Ende seines ersten Teils geht Lailach noch kurz auf den Begriff der „internationalen Sicherheit" gemäß Art. 24 Abs. 1 C h V N ein, den er vom Begriff des „Weltfriedens" unterscheidet und als primär durch Dauerhaftigkeit und Stabilität gekennzeichnet sieht (249 - 252). I m zweiten Teil seiner Arbeit (Kapitel Χ Ι Π - XV) untersucht Lailach den Begriff der „Wahrung" des Weltfriedens bzw. der internationalen Sicherheit i m Sinne des Art. 24 Abs. 1 C h V N . Er unterscheidet vorbeugende Vorfeldmaßnahmen, repressives Handeln zur Wiederherstellung des Weltfriedens und — unter Bezugnahme auf die „Agenda for Peace" — Maßnahmen zur Friedenskonsolidierung (253 - 256) und grenzt folgend die Tätigkeitsbereiche von Sicherheitsrat und Generalversammlung ab. Dabei kommt er zu dem Ergebnis, daß i m Vorfeld eines Friedensbruchs, also in Situationen der Friedensbedrohung (Art. 39 ChVN) bzw. der Friedensgefährdung (Art. 34 ChVN), die Friedenswahrung dann zur Aufgabe des Sicherheitsrates wird, wenn eine konkrete Spannungslage die Gefahr einer Eskalation befürchten läßt (275). Abschließend weist Lailach noch auf die Gefahr des Mißbrauchs der Befugnisse durch den Sicherheitsrat hin. Er fordert i n diesem Zusammenhang, der Sicherheitsrat müsse stärker als bisher gleichartige Situationen gleich behandeln, weil er an den allgemeinen Grundsatz von Treu und Glauben gebunden sei (287 f.). Die Arbeit wird durch eine englische Zusammenfassung, ein umfassendes Literaturverzeichnis und einen Index abgeschlossen. Die Arbeit von Lailach überzeugt durch Klarheit der Argumentation und durchgehende Berücksichtigung sowohl der Praxis des Sicherheitsrates wie auch der Normen der UN-Charta. Wenn auch an Untersuchungen der neueren Praxis des Sicherheitsrates kein Mangel herrscht — verwiesen sei u. a. auf die in derselben Reihe erschienen Arbeiten von Bauer und Hufnagel sowie Studie von Gading —, so gelingt doch Lailach eine präzise Darstellung der für das Konzept der UN-Friedenssicherung maßgeblichen Begriffe des „Weltfriedens" und der „internationalen Sicherheit". Insbesondere durch die Auswertung der der Verabschiedung von Resolutionen vorausgehenden Debatten innerhalb des Sicherheitsrates weist er die Ausweitung des Begriffs der „Friedensbedrohung" i m Sinne des Art. 39 C h V N überzeugend nach. Den jeweils gut begründeten Ergebnissen kann durchweg gefolgt werden. Allenfalls bleibt kritisch anzumerken, daß der von Lailach als Voraussetzung einer Friedensbedrohung genannte Begriff der „konkreten Spannungslage" (194 - 202) relativ vage ist, eine Vielzahl von möglichen Konstellationen erfaßt und daher nur bedingt eine eingrenzende Funktion erfüllen kann. Unabhängig von dieser Kritik i m Detail leistet die Studie aber insgesamt einen wichtigen Beitrag zur

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weiteren Erfassung der Rolle des Sicherheitsrates als zentralem Gremium der UN-Friedenssicherung und sei zur Lektüre sehr empfohlen. Christian Tams

Bernd Martenczuk: Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrates. Die Uberprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Schriften zum Völkerrecht, Bd. 125). Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1996, 321 Seiten. I n seiner inhaltlich i m März 1996 abgeschlossenen Frankfurter Dissertation beschäftigt sich Bernd Martenczuk mit „Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats". Er ordnet sein Thema i n den großen Zusammenhang der „neuen Weltordnung" nach Ende des Kalten Krieges und der damit verbundenen Zunahme der Funktionsfähigkeit des UN-Systems ein. Als Folgeproblematik der epochalen Wende, die insbesondere die „Wiederauferstehung" des UN-Sicherheitsrates (SR) i m Rahmen der Resolution 660 vom 2.8.1990 markiere, rückten nunmehr auch die Grenzen der SR-Befugnisse und die verfahrensmäßige Feststellung dieser Grenzen i n den Mittelpunkt des Interesses. Martenczuk w i l l seine Arbeit auf die Untersuchung des positiven Völkerrechts beschränkt wissen und verzichtet ausdrücklich auf eine rechtspolitische oder politikwissenschaftliche Argumentation, weil die positivrechtliche Argumentation eigenständige Bedeutung habe und ihre Möglichkeiten noch lange nicht ausgeschöpft seien. Er nimmt sich eine systematische Abarbeitung der auftretenden Rechtsprobleme, eine Zusammenschau aller relevanten Bestimmungen der UN-Charta, vor und wählt, um „kurzschlüssige Verengungen" auf Einzelprobleme zu vermeiden, die „juristische Versuchsanordnung" der Rechtskontrolle durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (IGH) (vgl. 27 f.). Die Fokussierung der Arbeit auf verbindliche SR-Beschlüsse, die nicht-militärische Zwangsmaßnahmen i. S. v. Art. 41 C h V N anordneten, rechtfertige sich aus deren exemplarischer Bedeutung und der Tatsache, daß anders als etwa bei der Anordnung von militärischen Maßnahmen durch den Sicherheitsrat nicht schon die konkreten Rechtsgrundlagen des Organhandelns als solche umstritten seien (45). Nach einigen Vorbemerkungen zu „Quellen und Methoden", die faktisch ebenfalls schon einer systematischen Verortung der um die Frage der Rechtsbindung kreisenden Probleme gleichkommen, wendet sich Martenczuk i m zweiten Teil seiner Arbeit zunächst den prozessualen Fragen einer Rechtskontrolle nicht-militärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen zu. Unter dem erklärten Vorzeichen, die Möglichkeit einer immanenten Stärkung dieser bestehenden I G H Kompetenzen auszuloten, erörtert der Verfasser insbesondere die verschiedenen gangbaren Wege einer rechtlichen Kontrolle nicht-militärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen des SR. Das Gutachtenverfahren gemäß Art. 961 C h V N , Art. 65 IGHSt ist nach seinem Urteil aufgrund der ausschließlichen Antragsberechtigung von Generalversammlung und SR insoweit ein wenig aussichtsreicher Ansatzpunkt (75 f.). Eine direkte Klage gegen die Mitglieder des SR mit dem Ziel, diesen ein bestimmtes Abstimmunsgverhalten vorzuschreiben, kann den gewünschten Zweck ebenfalls nicht erfüllen, da die Mitglieder des SR bei ihrer Stimmabgabe i m einzelnen Fall ein „freies und unbeschränkbares Mandat" innehätten, eine Rechtsposition des klagenden Staates also durch das Stimmverhalten noch nicht betroffen sein kann. Die beste Rechtsschutzmöglichkeit biete daher de lege lata die inzidente Kontrolle des SR i m streitigen Verfahren zwischen zwei Staaten (81). Auf sie konzentrieren sich konsequenterweise die weiteren Ausführungen Martenczuks.

Book Reviews Martenczuk weist in einem Abschnitt über einige Zulässigkeitsprobleme zunächst darauf hin, daß aufgrund des vor dem I G H bestehenden Erfordernisses des berechtigten Klageinteresses des Klägers nur solche SR-Beschlüsse i m streitigen Verfahren zwischen den Staaten der inzidenten Kontrolle unterworfen sind, die in Rechte des betroffenen Staates eingreifen. Etliche Beschlüsse des SR gemäß Art. 41 C h V N , etwa in bezug auf den Abbruch diplomatischer Beziehungen, unterlägen trotz ihres für die übrigen Staaten verpflichtenden Charakters nicht der gerichtlichen Uberprüfung (87). Die Zulässigkeit des Verfahrens vor dem I G H scheitere demgegenüber auch bei hochpolitischen Streitigkeiten nicht an den Einwendungen, die Streitigkeit sei aufgrund ihres politischen Charakters „nicht justiziabel" (94) oder könne aus Gründen des judicial self-restraint nach dem Ermessen des I G H nicht zur Entscheidung angenommen werden (97). Auch aus Art. 24 C h V N , der dem SR bekanntermaßen die Hauptverantwortung für die Erhaltung des internationalen Friedens zubilligt, lasse sich kein stichhaltiger prozessualer Einwand gegen die Beschäftigung des I G H mit der Gültigkeit von SR-Resolutionen herleiten. Die Zulässigkeitsprüfung des streitigen Verfahrens würde unnötigerweise mit der schwierigen Frage der Gültigkeit von SR-Beschlüssen belastet, ohne daß schon feststehe, ob nicht der Fall i m Stadium der Begründetheitsprüfung auch ohne Eingehen auf diesen Themenkreis gelöst werden könne (109). I m dritten Teil der Arbeit, gewissermaßen der Begründetheitsprüfung, gelangt Martenczuk nun endgültig zum Kernproblem, der Chartabindung des SR. Dabei weist der Autor gleich zu Beginn auf die Gefahren hin, die sich für die Funktionsfähigkeit der U N O und die Rechtssicherheit der beteiligten Akteure ergeben würden, wenn man die Bindung des SR allzu streng auslegen würde und die Mitgliedsstaaten sich in weitem Umfange auf eine etwaige Ungültigkeit der SR-Beschlüsse berufen könnten (120 f.). I m fundamentalen Konflikt zwischen Rechtssicherheit und inhaltlicher Richtigkeit könne ein eindeutiges Ergebnis aber nicht allein anhand der Auslegung von Art. 25 C h V N gefunden werden (133). Vielmehr müsse man mit weiterer Perspektive die U N O als System kollektiver Sicherheit betrachten und die Erfahrungen mit dem Scheitern des Völkerbundes berücksichtigen, die zeigten, daß die Funktionsfähigkeit eines Systems kollektiver Sicherheit entscheidend davon abhänge, daß ein kollektives Organ und nicht jeder Mitgliedsstaat für sich entscheiden kann, wann der Bündnisfall i n diesem System eingetreten ist (140). Diese Erörterungen dienen — ohne daß dieses Vorgehen methodisch völlig geklärt wird — als „Grundlage" für die Beurteilung verschiedener Ansätze, i m Interesse der Funktionstüchtigkeit des kollektiven Sicherheitssystems den SR von einer strikten Chartabindung freizustellen (142 ff.). Martenczuk kommt jedoch letztlich nach der Vorstellung der verschiedenen Ansätze zu dem Ergebnis, daß der SR jedenfalls grundsätzlich in vollem Umfange an die Charta gebunden ist und etwaige Freiräume des SR deshalb nur anhand konkreter Einzelbestimmungen der Charta festgestellt werden können (163). Dementsprechend wendet sich Martenczuk i n einem großen Abschnitt seiner Arbeit speziell der Reichweite und den Grenzen der Befugnis des SR zur Verhängung nicht-militärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen nach Kapitel V I I der UN-Charta zu: Nach einer Analyse der Praxis des SR und internationaler Gerichte sowie des völkerrechtlichen Schrifttums konstatiert Martenczuk eine insgesamt von Unsicherheit und Ungenauigkeiten geprägte Rechtsauffassung. U m diesem Defizit zu begegnen, bemüht er sich um eine entsprechende begriffliche Klärung des Handlungsspielraums des SR (189 ff.), wobei er i n starkem Maße auf die deutsche verwaltungsrechtliche Terminologie (Ermessen, Beurteilungsspielraum) zurückgreift, nicht ohne sich aber u m eine Sichtung der insoweit i m Völkerrecht bestehenden Ansätze zu bemühen. Auf der Tatbestandsseite des Art. 39 C h V N gelangt Martenczuk i m folgenden zu dem Ergebnis, daß dem SR — unter Zugrundelegung einer exakten Definition der Tatbestandsmerkmale,

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insbesondere des Begriffs der Friedensbedrohung — ein Beurteilungsspielraum hinsichtlich der Sachverhaltsermittlung zuzugestehen ist. Lediglich eine Kontrolle der „äußeren Plausibilität" der SR-Argumentation soll dem I G H möglich sein (244). Ein Prognosespielraum hinsichtlich der weiteren Entwicklung des betroffenen internationalen Konflikts komme dem SR hingegen nicht zu. Insbesondere weil eine irgendwie geartete Vertretbarkeitskontrolle eines solchen Freiraums Martenczuk nicht möglich erscheint, besteht er auf dem Erfordernis der objektiv nachvollziehbaren „hinreichenden Wahrscheinlichkeit" eines bewaffneten Konflikts (246). Dennoch, so Martenczuk, sei der Tatbestand der Friedensbedrohung gemäß Art. 39 C h V N hinreichend flexibel. Er lasse genügend Raum, um i m Zuge neuer politischer Entwicklungen, beispielsweise i m Bereich des Umwelt- oder Menschenrechtsschutzes dem SR bedarfsgerechte neue Handlungsmöglichkeiten zu eröffnen (253). Z u m Abschluß geht der Autor dann — in durchaus deutlicher Anlehnung an die deutsche verwaltungsrechtliche Begrifflichkeit — auf die Problematik des Ermessens hinsichtlich der Rechtsfolgen des Art. 39 C h V N ein. Dabei hebt er insbesondere hervor, daß das Ermessen des SR sich an dessen Aufgabe zu orientieren habe, bewaffnete internationale Konflikte zu vermeiden oder zu beenden, nicht hingegen dürfe sein Ermessen an dem Bestreben orientiert sein, in verbindlicher A r t und Weise materielle Rechtspositionen der beteiligten Konfliktparteien zu regeln (260). Insgesamt bietet die Arbeit von Martenczuk einen umfassenden Zugriff auf das i m Zusammenhang mit der Rechtsbindung des SR stehende völkerrechtliche Material. Sie ist auch für den Gebrauch in der völkerrechtlichen Ausbildung überaus hilfreich. Hervorzuheben ist insoweit das stete Bemühen, ein Gesamtbild der Problematik zu zeichnen, das in einem überaus politischen Bereich einen Weg zu mehr juristischer Klarheit und dogmatischer Nachvollziehbarkeit weist und daran erinnert, daß Friede zwar nicht nur durch rechtliche Mittel zu erreichen ist, andererseits das UN-System zur Sicherung der eigenen Akzeptanz auf eine rechtliche Fundierung aber nicht verzichten kann. Auch angesichts der in jüngster Zeit gegenüber den frühen neunziger Jahren etwa abgekühlten Aktivität des UN-Sicherheitsrates bleibt Martenczuks Arbeit von großer Aktualität. Frank Bodendiek

Georg Ress/Jürgen Bröhmer: Europäische Gemeinschaft und Medienvielfalt — Die Kompetenzen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft zur Sicherung des Pluralismus im Medienbereich (Marburger Medienschriften, Bd. 1), Institut für Medienentwicklung und Kommunikation, Frankfurt a. M. 1998, 170 Seiten. Sebastian Seelmann-Eggebert: Internationaler Rundfunkhandel — Das Recht der World Trade Organization und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Wirtschaftsrecht der internationalen Telekommunikation, Bd. 35), Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1998, 266 Seiten. Die Medienlandschaft ist national und international durch eine technische und damit verbunden inhaltliche Entwicklung gekennzeichnet, die eine noch vor wenigen Jahren ungeahnte Dynamik zeigt. Durch die fortschreitenden technischen Innovationen i m Bereich Ubertragungs- und Produktionstechnik wird der inhärent universelle Charakter des gesamten audiovisuellen Sektors ebenso deutlich, wie die zunehmende Kohärenz von Ubertragungsweg und

Book Reviews Empfangsmedium. Zwei maßgebliche gesellschaftliche Dimensionen kennzeichnen diese Entwicklung: Zum einen beeinhaltet der audiovisuelle Dienstleistungssektor ein wirtschaftliches Wachstumspotential, das klassische Bereiche des sekundären Produktionssektors deutlich in den Schatten stellt. Dementsprechend ist es nicht verwunderlich und unternehmenspolitisch geradezu zwingend, eine Expansionsstrategie in diesem Bereich zu verfolgen, die durch multimediale und gleichzeitig internationale Aktivitäten gekennzeichnet ist. Zur Gewährleistung der positiven gesamtgesellschaftlichen Wohlfahrtseffekte dieses ökonomischen Potentials ist es aus staatlicher und privater Sicht notwendig, den erforderlichen rechtlichen Ordnungsrahmen für die unternehmerischen Aktivitäten bereitzuhalten. Damit ist namentlich das Recht des europäischen und des internationalen Dienstleistungshandels angesprochen. Auf europäischer Ebene gewährleisten die Art. 43 ff. und Art. 49 ff. EGV (n. F.) weitgehend umfassend die Niederlassungs- und Dienstleistungsfreiheit. I n seiner globalen Dimension wird der Dienstleistungshandel insgesamt und namentlich i m audiovisuellen Sektor demgegenüber noch nicht so weitgehend wie i m europäischen Kontext freiheitsverbürgend gesichert. Hier befindet sich die Entwicklung i m Rahmen des allgemeinen Dienstleistungsabkommens der W T O (GATS) noch am Anfang; die zunehmende rechtliche Internationalisierung des Dienstleistungshandels wird aber i m GATS deutlich manifestiert. Es mehren sich aber auch die Stimmen, die dieser Entwicklung aus gesellschaftspolitischen Gründen kritisch gegenüberstehen. Internationalisierungs- und multimediale Konzentrationstendenzen i n den maßgeblichen Wirtschaftskreisen lassen die Bedeutung der Frage immer deutlicher werden, ob staatliche Eingriffe in den Wirtschaftsprozeß zur Sicherung der Informations· und Meinungsfreiheit notwendig sind. Insoweit wird insbesondere befürchtet, daß i m audiovisuellen Sektor Unternehmensstrukturen entstehen könnten, die aufgrund ihrer Konzentration ökonomischer Potenz und multimedialer Aktivität den Pluralismus und damit die Meinungsvielfalt i n einer demokratischen Gesellschaft gefährden. Das potentielle Spannungsverhältnis zwischen dynamischer wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung i m audiovisuellen Sektor und hierdurch möglicherweise erforderlicher staatlicher Intervention zur Sicherung des Informations- und Meinungspluralismus wird in den anzuzeigenden Werken zwar nicht explizit angesprochen, die inhaltliche Gesamtschau der beiden Studien weist hierauf aber gut hin. Während sich Seelmann-Eggebert i n seiner von Engel betreuten Osnabrücker Dissertation mit dem europa- und völkerrechtlichen Ordnungsrahmen zugunsten ökonomischer Prosperität i m audiovisuellen Sektor beschäftigt, untersuchen Ress und Bröbmer in ihrer aus einem Gutachten für den Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger e.V. hervorgegangenen Untersuchung die europarechtlichen Kompetenzen der EG zur Sicherung des Pluralismus i m Medienbereich. Beide Werke zeigen damit die zur Zeit bestehenden rechtlichen Strukturen i m Völker- und Europarecht auf, die die wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftspolitischen Aktivitäten i m audiovisuellen Bereich determinieren. Seelmann-Eggebert gliedert seine Untersuchung i n sieben Kapitel, wobei es zunächst u m begriffliche und methodische Vorfragen und ökonomische Aspekte des von ihm gewählten Oberbegriffes des Rundfunkhandels geht. Anschließend wird auf das institutionelle und materielle Recht der W T O eingegangen. Nachdem sodann i m vierten Kapitel die Unterscheidung von Ware und Dienstleistung für den Rundfunk akzentuiert wird, beschäftigen sich die folgenden Kapitel mit den gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Aspekte der Rundfunktätigkeit und abschließend nochmals mit einer Gesamtbewertung der maßgeblichen Aktivitäten der EG anhand der materiellen Regelungen i m Rahmen der W T O . M i t diesem Untersuchungsprogramm unterscheidet sich die Arbeit von den ebenfalls i m Jahre 1998 erschienen Dissertationen zu europaund völkerrechtlichen Aspekten der audiovisuellen Politik der EG von Baumann (Die Dienst-

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leistungsfreiheit auf dem Gebiet der audiovisuellen Medien, 1998) und Sandberg (Unzulässiger Protektionismus in der europäischen Medienpolitik?, 1998), die sich zwar in weiten Bereichen mit den auch von Seelmann-Eggebert fokussierten rechtlichen Fragestellung beschäftigen, hierbei aber primär die rechtspolitische und rechtsdogmatische Frage der Vereinbarkeit einzelner Regeln der EG-Fernsehrichtlinie mit der WTO/GATT-Rechtsordnung i m Auge haben. Seelmann-Eggebert sieht die Auseinandersetzungen um die Fernsehrichtlinie nur als „Anlaß, nicht [als] Gegenstand dieser Arbeit" (17). Ihm geht es vielmehr um eine Darstellung der wirtschaftlichen und rechtlichen Grundlagen, „die grenzüberschreitende Transaktionen i m Bereich des Rundfunks steuern" (17). Das damit gewählte Thema einer Darstellung rechtlicher Grundlagen ist ersichtlich deskriptiv angelegt. Die Arbeit bleibt dementsprechend auch über weite Strecken eine reine Darstellung, in der zwar einzelne Streitfragen behandelt werden, weiterführende analytische Ansätze aber kaum auszumachen sind. Insbesondere in diesem Punkt unterscheidet sich die Studie von den erwähnten Dissertationen von Baumann und Sandberg. I m Rahmen der begrifflichen Klärung legt der Verf. dar, daß angesichts der technischen Entwicklung keine abschließende Definition des Rundfunks angezeigt ist, sondern vielmehr „jeder Kommunikationsvorgang, der technisch übertragen wird, . . . Rundfunk sein [kann]" (23). Während diese Begriffsbestimmung noch überzeugend ist, zeigt die nachfolgende Auseinandersetzung des Verf. mit dem vielfach betonten Widerstreit der sowohl wirtschaftlichen als auch kulturellen Dimension des Rundfunks gewisse Schwierigkeiten auf. Hier wird die kulturelle Dimension zunächst auf kommunikationsspezifische Aspekte i m Sinne der aus Art. 5 Abs. 1 Satz 2 G G folgenden dienenden Funktion des Rundfunks verengt, die Verf. als die publizistische Perspektive — i m Gegensatz zur wirtschaftlichen Natur — bezeichnet. M i t Blick auf die internationale Ebene wird hieraus folgend konstatiert, daß es insoweit an einem übergreifenden Bezugspunkt fehle, so daß primär nur die wirtschaftliche Dimension untersucht werden könne. A n dieser Stelle wäre ein Blick auf die völkerrechtliche Diskussion zur kulturpolitischen und -rechtlichen Dimension des grenzüberschreitenden Rundfunks und die entsprechenden menschenrechtlichen Garantien hilfreich gewesen. Hieraus läßt sich nämlich durchaus ein Bezugspunkt ersehen, der die Regelung des grenzüberschreitenden Rundfunks i m Widerstreit zwischen wirtschaftlicher und gesellschaftspolitischer Relevanz determinieren kann (hierzu u. a. Delbrück, Die kulturelle und individuelle Identität als Grenze des Informationspluralismus?, in: Wolfrum (Hrsg.), Recht auf Information — Schutz vor Information, Menschen- und staatsrechtliche Aspekte, 1986, 181 ff.). Nach einer kurzen Darstellung des Produktionsvorganges von Rundfunk widmet sich Verf. sodann den ökonomischen Aspekten (31 ff.), wobei maßgeblich die Anwendbarkeit der Freihandelstheorie auf den Dienstleistungshandel vorgestellt wird. Darüber hinaus wird jeweils kurz auf mögliche und bestehende Handelsbarrieren des internationalen Rundfunkhandels und die spezifischen ökonomischen Probleme der europäischen Programmindustrie eingegangen. I m dritten Kapitel widmet sich Verf. der W T O und stellt diese historisch und anhand der bestehenden Rechtsregeln ausführlich vor. Die Darstellung ist zwar durchaus instruktiv, fraglich ist aber z. T. die Relevanz für den Untersuchungsgegenstand, insbesondere wenn es um die Entscheidungsstruktur in der W T O , um die Regeln des Streitbeilegungsverfahrens und umfassend dann um die materiellen Regelungen des G A T T 1994 geht (48 bis 82). Gerade die ausführliche Beschreibung der Regelungen des G A T T 1994 überrascht, da Verf. i m weiteren Verlauf seiner Arbeit deren Anwendbarkeit für den Rundfunkhandel mit Blick auf ein behauptetes Konkurrenzverhältnis zum — ebenfalls instruktiv dargestellten — GATS weitgehend ausschließt (siehe 119 f.). Die These von einem weitgehenden Exklusivitätsverhältnis zwischen G A T T und GATS ist zwar überaus streitig, Verf. legt seinen Standpunkt von einem Anwendungsvorrang des GATS aber i m vierten Kapitel mit Blick auf die Unterscheidung von Rund-

Book Reviews funk als Ware und Dienstleistung mit guten Argumenten dar (113 ff.). I n diesem Kapitel wird vom Verf. weiterhin dargestellt, wie insbesondere anhand der Rspr. des E u G H die Unterscheidung von Ware, Dienstleistung und Niederlassung i m Rundfunkbereich nach dem EGV vorzunehmen ist. Die gemeinschaftsrechtliche Unterscheidung von Ware und Dienstleistung leitet über in das fünfte Kapitel der Arbeit, in dem Verf. ausgehend vom Prinzip der begrenzten Einzelermächtigung, der Rechtsprechung des E u G H zu impliziten Regelungskompetenzen i m Bereich der gemeinsamen Handelspolitik und zu Art. 308 EGV (n. F.) sowie mit Blick auf die Kompetenzausübungsschranken aus dem Subsidiaritäts- und dem Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip umfassend die Zuständigkeit der Gemeinschaft zur Regelung des Rundfunks i m Binnenhandel und i m Außenhandel darstellt (131 -175). Da i n diesem Rechtsbereich bekanntlich nahezu alles streitig ist und einige Aspekte aktuell interessante Entwicklungsprozesse durchlaufen, muß Verf. mehrmals konstatieren, daß er nicht alle Probleme mit hinreichender Gründlichkeit behandeln könne. Hierdurch entsteht ein zwar sauber aufgearbeiteter Uberblick zu den vielfältigen Kompetenzstreitigkeiten zur gemeinschaftlichen Regelung des grenzüberschreitenden Rundfunks, dieser enthält allerdings kaum die bekannte Diskussion weiterführende neue Aspekte. I m sechsten Kapitel stellt Verf. die materiellen Regelungen der EG dar, die den grenzüberschreitenden Rundfunk betreffen. Ausgehend von der sich i n der Rspr. des E u G H abzeichnenden sog. Konvergenz der Grundgrundfreiheiten werden zunächst die anwendbaren Regelungen des Primärrechts (freier Warenverkehr, Dienstleistungs- und Niederlassungsfreiheit, Wettbewerbsrecht und Beihilferecht) dargestellt. Sodann folgt für das Sekundärrecht u. a. eine Beschreibung der maßgeblichen Regelungen der Fernsehrichtlinie, verschiedener weiterer bestehender und geplanter Maßnahmen zur Rechtsangleichung (Jugendschutz, geistiges Eigentum etc.) und Aktivitäten zur Förderung der Rundfunktätigkeit ( H D T V , M E D I A Π , Europäischer Garantiefonds). I m siebten Kapitel (231 - 241) bewertet Verf. schließlich die sekundärrechtlichen Regelungen des Gemeinschaftsrechts anhand des EGV und der WTO/GATT-Rechtsordnung. Er kommt hierbei zu dem auch von anderer Seite schon ausführlich dargelegten Ergebnis, daß namentlich die Quotenregelung einzelnen Normen des EGV widerspricht, da sie nicht den Anforderungen der Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung standhält. I m Rahmen der WTO/GATT-rechtlichen Bewertung macht Verf. einige interessante Ausführungen zur Reichweite der von der EG angemeldeten Ausnahmen nach Art. Π GATS und dem in die Fernsehrichtlinie neu eingefügten Art. 6 Abs. 4, der insoweit rechtswidrig sein könnte. I m übrigen muß er sich der gegenwärtigen Rechtslage entsprechend darauf beschränken, eine eher rechtspolitische Bewertung anhand des GATS vorzunehmen, da der audiovisuelle Sektor bekanntlich von dessen Anwendbarkeit noch weitgehend ausgeschlossen ist. Insgesamt ist die Arbeit von Seelmann-Eggebert eine sauber aufgearbeitete und insbesondere sehr gut lesbare Darstellung des gegenwärtigen Rechts von EG und W T O zum internationalen Rundfunkhandel. Der deskriptiv angelegte Untersuchungsansatz führt aber leider dazu, daß die bekannte Diskussion kaum u m neue Aspekte bereichert wird. Analytisch und argumentativ beeindruckend ist hingegen die in Deutsch und Englisch vorgelegte Studie von Ress und Bröhmer. Das ihr zugrundeliegende Gutachten für den Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger e. V. beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob eine Rechtssetzungskompetenz der EG für Regelungen besteht, mit denen insbesondere durch Marktanteilsobergrenzen für Unternehmensaktivitäten i m multimedialen Sektor der Pluralismus i m Medienbereich gesichert werden soll. Dem liegen Bestrebungen der Europäischen Kommission zugrunde, vereinheitlichte Regelungen i n der Gemeinschaft zur Sicherung des Medienpluralismus in

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allen Mitgliedstaaten durchzusetzen. Die Kommission hatte hierzu nach entsprechenden Vorarbeiten in dem Grünbuch „Pluralismus und Medienkonzentration i m Binnenmarkt" ( K O M (92) 480 endg. v. 23.12.1992) i m März 1997 den Entwurf einer Richtlinie mit dem Titel „Medieneigentum i m Binnenmarkt" vorgelegt, der Eigentumserwerbsregelungen bzw. -begrenzungen für Medienunternehmen vorsah. Zwischenzeitlich, nach Veröffentlichung des vorliegenden Gutachtens, scheint die Kommission ihr diesbezügliches Vorhaben zwar aufgegeben zu haben (siehe die Mitteilung in: AfP 1998, 297), dies ändert freilich nichts an der Aktualität der Thematik, die aus dem beschriebenen Spannungsverhältnis von wirtschaftlichen Konzentrations- und Liberalisierungsentwicklungen auf der einen Seite und gesellschaftspolitischen Vorstellungen einer gesicherten Meinungs- und Informationsfreiheit auf der anderen Seite resultiert. I n diesem Sinne zeigt die Untersuchung der Verf. erste rechtliche Schwierigkeiten auf, die sich mit Blick auf eine einheitliche europäische Regelung in diesem Bereich ergeben. Bewußt ausgeklammert wurde hierbei von den Verf. die Frage, ob Regelungen des zulässigen Höchstmaßes an Medienkonzentration auf EG-Ebene überhaupt sinnvoll und geboten sind. Hier wird auch in Zukunft sicherlich noch einiges zu sagen sein. I m einzelnen untersuchen die Verf. nach einer Darstellung der legislativen Planungsphase und der geplanten Regelungen zur Konzentrationsbeschränkung i m multimedialen Mediensektor (15 - 25) zunächst Art. 100a EGV (Art. 95 n. F.) als mögliche Rechtsgrundlage einer entsprechenden Richtlinie. Dies wird mit dem Argument abgelehnt, eine Harmonisierung nach Art. 100a EGV komme für rein hypothetische zukünftige Sachverhalte einer Behinderung des freien Warenverkehrs nicht in Betracht. Da die von der geplanten Richtlinie ins Auge gefaßten Beteiligungsrestriktionen für Presseunternehmen an multimedialen Aktivitäten bislang noch zu keinen tatsächlichen Problemen mit Blick auf den freien Warenverkehr geführt haben, scheide eine Harmonisierung nach Art. 100a EGV aus. Weiterhin geprüft wird sodann Art. 57 Abs. 2 EGV (Art. 47 Abs. 2 n. F.) isoliert und i. V. m. Art. 66 EGV (Art. 55 n. F.) als mögliche Rechtsgrundlagen der geplanten Richtlinie (32 ff.). Hier sehen die Verf. es als maßgebliches Problem, inwieweit der prima facie sehr weite Anwendungsbereich der Rechtsangleichungskompetenz i m Bereich der Niederlassungsfreiheit restriktiv zu interpretieren ist, um nicht eine Allzuständigkeit der Gemeinschaft für alles zu begründen, „was in irgendeiner Weise eine wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit auch außerhalb des eigenen Staates erleichtert" (34). Dies erscheint möglich, da heute nahezu jede wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit von den Mitgliedstaaten gesetzlich erfaßt ist, so daß es für jeden denkbaren Sachverhalt zur Harmonisierungsnotwendigkeit kommen könnte. I m Lichte u.a. der Maastricht-Entscheidung des BVerfG (E 89,155 ff.) und verschiedener Entscheidungen des EuGH, die eine restriktivere Anwendung des Effektivitätsgrundsatzes (effet-utile) andeuten (z. B. Gutachten 2/94, Slg. 1996, 1-1759 ff.; Gutachten 1/94, Slg. 1994, 1-5267 ff.) sowie mit Verweis auf Art. F Abs. 1 E U V (Art. 6 Abs. 1 n. F.) wird argumentiert, daß substaniierte materielle Kriterien die Koordinierungstätigkeit der Gemeinschaft i m Dienstleistungssektor begründen müssen. Dies wird für die Medienkonzentration maßgeblich mit Verweis darauf vereint, daß eine Rechtsangleichung i m Rahmen der Dienstleistungsfreiheit darauf gerichtet sein muß, Hindernisse zu beseitigen und nicht, noch größere Hindernisse zu errichten (40). Eben diese Wirkung sprechen die Verf. einer Richtlinie zum Medieneigentum zu. Damit stellt sich natürlich die ökonomisch relevante Frage, inwieweit sich ein hoheitlicher Eingriff unter Gesichtspunkten des market-failure als notwendig erweist. Dieser Aspekt wird zwar nur kurz angedeutet, i m Ergebnis konstatieren die Verf. aber, daß die Medienmärkte in den Mitgliedstaaten aufgrund kultureller und sozialer Gesichtspunkte national geprägt bleiben werden. Daher könne auf die europäische Ebene bezogen nicht von einem Freiheitszuwachs gesprochen werden, der die hoheitlichen Restriktionen kompensieren könne (40). A n diesem Punkt läßt sich einwenden, daß schon heute in

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vielen Multimediabereichen eine universelle kulturelle Überlagerung nationaler Eigenarten eintritt, die die These von der primär mitgliedstaatlich geprägten Medienlandschaft zumindest zum Teil i n Frage stellt. Obwohl die Kommission in ihrer Begründung zur geplanten Richtlinie — überraschend — nicht auf wettbewerbsrechtliche Kompentenzvorschriften einging, prüfen die Verf. anschließend Art. 87 EGV (Art. 83 n. F.). In Parallele zur FusionskontrollVO (VO 4064/89/EWG) w i r d hier kurz und bündig festgestellt, daß auch die Kontrolle von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen i m Medienbereich durch die Gemeinschaft nur geregelt werden dürfe, wenn i m jeweiligen Einzelfall eine gemeinschaftsweite Bedeutung vorliege. Da sich hierzu von der Kommission keine Angaben mit Blick auf multimediale Zusammenschlüsse finden und zudem viele Zusammenschlüsse ohne gemeinschafts weite Bedeutung erfaßt wären, scheide Art. 87 EGV als Rechtsgrundlage aus (46). Als mögliche Kompetenznorm verbleibt damit nur Art. 235 EGV (Art. 308 n. F.). Hier wird u. a. mit Blick auf den vom E u G H i m Gutachten 2/94 (EMRK-Beitritt) entwickelten Begriff der „verfassungsrechtlichen Dimension" eines Rechtsaktes argumentiert, daß eben diese Dimension dem Ziel der Pluralismussicherung i m Medienbereich zukomme. I m übrigen greifen i m Rahmen des Art. 235 EGV die bekannten Restriktionen auch unter Beachtung der schon für die anderen Vorschriften gewonnenen Ergebnisse. I m zweiten Teil ihres Gutachten befassen sich die Verf. hilfsgutachterlich mit Kompetenzausübungsschranken, insbesondere mit dem Subsidiaritäts- und Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz, Art. 128 EGV (Art. 151 n. F.), dem Demokratieprinzip und Art. 222 EGV (Art. 295 n. F.). Abschließend werden noch Art. 10 EMRK und verfassungsrechtliche Probleme in Deutschland i m Sinne des Maastricht-Urteils des BVerfG erörtert. Die aus der Sicht der Verf. gegebene Bedenklichkeit der geplanten Regelung wird jeweils unter Anwendung dieser rechtlichen Anknüpfungspunkte dargelegt. Als roter Faden durchzieht die Argumentation hierbei die These, daß Pluralismussicherung i m Medienbereich ein zentrales Anliegen der Verfassungsordnungen der Mitgliedstaaten sei und diese entsprechende Maßnahmen effektiver und nach dem Gesamtgefüge der Gemeinschaft sachangemessener regeln könnten. Auch wenn man den überaus lesenswerten Aussagen der Verf. in diesem Punkt folgen mag, bleibt auch hier unbeantwortet, wie das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Liberalisierungsmaßnahmen auf europäischer und internationaler Ebene i m Medienbereich und entsprechender globaler Unternehmensaktivitäten auf der einen Seite und pluraler Pluralismussicherung auf den nationalen Ebenen auf der anderen Seite zu lösen ist. Es entspricht dem Anliegen des Gutachtens der Verf., hierauf nicht näher einzugehen; i m Rahmen der zukünftigen Diskussion wird hierauf aber zurückzukommen sein. Insoweit wäre insbesondere zu überlegen, welche Probleme sich daraus ergeben können, daß Liberalisierungsmaßnahmen — ökonomischer Notwendigkeit folgend — âuf europäischer und internationaler Ebene erfolgen, während die hieraus (möglicherweise) resultierenden Gefährdungen für das demokratische Gemeinwesen ein Regelungsanliegen des nationalen Gesetzgebers bleiben bzw. bleiben soll. Die jeweils für sich interessanten und aktuellen Untersuchungen von Seelmann-Eggebert und Ress/Bröhmer zeigen damit in der Gesamtschau anschaulich, welche Probleme verstärkte Regelungsaktivitäten i n dem Mehrebenensystem der internationalen, europäischen und nationalen Rechtsordnung auftreten können, wenn gegenläufige Interessen bzw. sich an einem Grenzpunkt widersprechende Entwicklungen zur Debatte stehen. Die Liberalisierung des weltweiten audiovisuellen Dienstleistungshandel i m Spannungsverhältnis zur Pluralismussicherung i n die-

38 G Y I L 41

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sem Bereich bleibt in diesem Sinne ein spannendes Thema, für dessen Diskussion die angezeigten Werke hilfreich und anregend sind. Christian Tietje

Volker Röben: Die Einwirkung der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs auf das mitgliedstaatliche Verfahren i n öffentlich-rechtlichen Streitigkeiten. Springer-Verlag, Berlin/Heidelberg u. a. 1998, 478 Seiten. Diese umfängliche, von Prof. Rüdiger Wolfrum betreute Dissertation zeichnet sich durch die Systematisierung einer Fülle von Rechtsprechungsmaterial, eine sorgfältige Analyse und ihr hohes Abstraktionsniveau aus. Ziel der Untersuchung ist es, eine Antwort auf die Frage zu finden, ob die jüngere Rechtsprechung des E u G H zur Einwirkung des Gemeinschaftsrechts auf das nationale Verwaltungsprozeßrecht dogmatisch begründbar ist und damit die Funktionen von Recht, nämlich Rechtssicherheit, Zweckrationalität und Gerechtigkeit herzustellen, erfüllen kann (3). Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage geht der Verfasser deduktiv vor, indem er zunächst ein dogmatisches Einwirkungsmodell entwickelt, das als Matrix der nachfolgenden Einzelanalysen dient. Ausgangspunkt seiner Analyse ist die von Schmidt-Aßmann vertretene These von der Existenz eines ebenenübergreifenden gemeinschaftlichen Rechtsschutzsystems, in dem der E u G H und die nationalen Gerichte eine Funktionseinheit bilden. Er w i l l zeigen, das sich die jüngere Rechtsprechung des E u G H zum Verfahrensrecht i n dieses System einfügt und zu seiner Entwicklung beiträgt (5 f.). Bei der Untersuchung der Einwirkung ist nach Ansicht des Verfassers, der sich an Arbeiten Bydlinskis und A lexys anlehnt, zwischen zwei Ebenen zu unterscheiden, nämlich dem äußeren und dem inneren System. Das äußere System bezeichnet den Gegenstand der Einwirkung, das Verfahrensrecht vor einem mitgliedstaatlichen Gericht bei der Anwendimg materiellen Gemeinschaftsrechts. Der E u G H hat diesbezüglich, dem Leitbild des französischen Verwaltungsprozeßrechts folgend, vier prozessuale Systembereiche als regelungsbedürftig identifiziert: (1) die Rechtswegeröffnung zu einem zuständigen Gericht; (2) eine zeitlich effektive Rechtsschutzgewähr; (3) die Klage- und Entscheidungsmöglichkeit i m Hauptsacheverfahren gegenüber jedem belastenden Rechtsakt; und (4) ein justizförmiges Verfahren richterlicher Entscheidungsfindung (7). Dementsprechend gliedert sich die Untersuchung in vier Hauptteile, nämlich das zuständige Gericht, den vorläufigen bzw. zeitlich effektiven Rechtsschutz, die Hauptsacheentscheidung und schließlich die richterliche Entscheidungsfindung. Als inneres System bezeichnet er das gemeinschaftliche Rechtsschutzsystem, in dem die Abwägung zwischen zwei Prinzipien, nämlich den Individualrechtsschutz einerseits und die Bewahrung der Integrität des objektiven Rechts andererseits, die Rechtsprechung des E u G H prägt. Auf dieser Grundlage nimmt der Verfasser die Analyse in jedem der vier Teile in drei Schritten vor: i m ersten Schritt wird der Einwirkungstatbestand herausgearbeitet; i m zweiten Schritt werden die Aussagen des E u G H auf die genannten Prinzipien zurückgeführt; und i n einem dritten Schritt wird die Funktion der Einwirkung für die Entwicklung einer ebenenverklammernden Verfassung dargestellt. Dabei zieht der Verfasser zur Unterstützung seiner Erkenntnisse rechtsvergleichend das französiche, deutsche und US-amerikanische Verwaltungsprozeßrecht heran. I m 1. Teil (Das zuständige Gericht, 19 -137) untersucht der Verfasser folgende Teilaspekte: die Rechtswegeröffnung, die sachliche Zuständigkeit und die Kompetenzen der Gerichte. I n bezug auf die Rechtswegeröffnung stützt er sich insbesondere auf die Urteile Johnston und

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Francovichlund kommt zu einer bemerkenswerten Schlußfolgerung. Nach der neueren Rechtsprechung des E u G H kommt es nicht mehr darauf an, ob sich der Kläger auf eine direkt anwendbare N o r m einer Richtlinie stützen kann. Vielmehr ist der gemeinschaftliche Rechtsweg vor die mitgliedstaatlichen Gerichte bereits immer dann eröffnet, wenn die streitentscheidende N o r m eine hinreichend bestimmte Rechtspflicht der Mitgliedstaaten begründet und den einzelnen berechtigt. Entscheidend ist nach seiner Auffassung nicht mehr das formale Abstellen auf die Ausgestaltung der Norm, sondern auf ein materielles gemeinschaftliches Individualrecht. Damit nähert sich der E u G H an die Rechtsfigur des subjektiven öffentlichen Rechts i m deutschen Verwaltungsrecht an. I n bezug auf die sachliche Zuständigkeit vermerkt der Verfasser eine Tendenz des EuGH, die ausschließliche Zuständigkeit der Gemeinschaftsgerichte auszuweiten und dementsprechend den Raum für inzidente Klagen vor den mitgliedstaatlichen Gerichten zurückzudrängen. Leitender Gesichtspunkt bei der Verteilung der Zuständigkeit ist die Gewährimg effektiven Rechtsschutzes durch das sachnähere Gericht (81). I m Zusammenhang mit der Frage, inwieweit mitgliedstaatliche Gerichte die Kompetenz zur Prüfung und Nichtanwendung gemeinschaftlicher Rechtsakte haben, die gegen nationale Grundrechte verstoßen, zeigt er die Entwicklung eines neuartigen Lösungsansatzes auf. Gestützt auf die Entscheidung des E u G H i n der Sache Port, spricht er den mitgliedstaatlichen Gerichten die Kompetenz zu, gemeinschaftliche Grundrechtsnormen vorläufig i m Lichte nationaler Grundrechte auszulegen und anzuwenden. Kommt das Gericht dabei allerdings zu dem Ergebnis, daß der Gemeinschaftsrechtsakt mit den solchermaßen ausgelegten Gemeinschaftsgrundrechten nicht vereinbar sei, so muß es die Sache dem E u G H zur abschließenden Entscheidung vorlegen. N u r ausnahmsweise muß das Interesse an der Integrität der Gemeinschaftsordnung zugunsten einer Prüfungskompetenz des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zurücktreten, nämlich dann, wenn der Grundrechtsschutz durch den E u G H evident defizitär ist (106 f.). Es erscheint allerdings noch als etwas verfrüht, aus einer Entscheidung auf einen neuen Lösungsansatz zum Verhältnis zwischen Bundesverfassungsgericht und E u G H zu schließen. O b sich beide Gerichte hier wirklich aufeinander zu bewegen, bleibt abzuwarten. I m 2. Teil (Vorläufiger Rechtsschutz — zeitlich effektiver Rechtsschutz, 139 - 213) befaßt sich Roben mit dem vorläufigen Rechtsschutz sowie internen und Vorlagepflichten. Gestützt auf die Urteile Zuckerfabnk Süderdithmarschen und Factortame I kommt er zu dem Ergebnis, daß der E u G H i m Wege einer Abwägung von Individualrechtsschutz und der Integrität mitgliedstaatlicher bzw. gemeinschaftlicher Rechtsakte den nationalen Gerichten die i m Gemeinschaftsrecht begründete Befugnis zuerkennt, vorläufigen Rechtsschutz zu gewähren. Die Rechtsgrundlage ist dem nationalen Recht zu entnehmen, wobei mit dem Gemeinschaftsrecht kollidierende Vorschriften aber nicht anwendbar sind (165). Aufgrund seines rechtsvergleichenden Ansatzes stellt er fest, daß bei der Ausgestaltung des vorläufigen Rechtsschutzes, dessen tragendes Prinzip der Individualrechtsschutz ist, der Einfluß des deutschen Rechts in der jüngeren Rechtsprechung des E u G H besonders spürbar ist. Der 3. Teil (Die Hauptsacheentscheidung, 215 - 353) befaßt sich vorrangig mit den Klagemöglichkeiten, wobei zwischen Primär- und Sekundärklagen unterschieden wird, und der Kontrolldichte. Anhand zahlreicher Urteile des E u G H aus dem Bereich der Binnenmarktgestaltung und -Öffnung bestätigt der Verfasser seine anfängliche These, daß der E u G H hinsichtlich des Regelungsgegenstands der Klagemöglichkeit eine positive Vollregelung trifft, da die Klagemöglichkeit konstitutiv für den Schutz gemeinschaftlicher Individualrechte ist. Demgegenüber macht er in bezug auf Klagearten, Klagebefugnis und Klagefristen lediglich Vorgaben, um einen effektiven Individualrechtsschutz zu gewährleisten. Was die Klagebefugnis betrifft, so stehen sich das objektive Beanstandungssystem des französischen Rechts mit einer

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entsprechend weitgefaßten Klagebefugnis und der am subjektiven öffentlichen Recht ausgerichtete Rechtsschutz des deutschen Rechts gegenüber. Während ersteres die gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Vorgaben ohne weiteres erfüllt, respektiert das Gemeinschaftsrecht letzteren zwar als Ausdruck einer mitgliedstaatlichen Grundentscheidung. Diese wird aber durch das Gemeinschaftsrecht modifiziert, wenn ansonsten der Schutz eines bestimmten individuellen Rechts nicht sichergestellt wäre (254 f.). Die Kontrolldichte orientiert sich am französischen Verwaltungsprozeßrecht und reicht, je nachdem, ob es sich um eine primäre oder sekundäre Klage handelt, von der Vollkontrolle (contrôle normal) bis zur Vertretbarkeitskontrolle (contrôle réduit). Dabei hebt der Verfasser hervor, daß der E u G H i n jüngster Zeit ausdrücklich einen normativen Gestaltungsspielraum des mitgliedstaatlichen Gesetzgebers in Wirtschaftsfragen anerkennt. Entscheidend für die Verifizierung seiner Grundthese ist aber vor allem die Erkenntnis, daß der E u G H in seiner neueren Rechtsprechung auf bestimmte materielle Kernnormen wie das Diskriminierungsverbot abstellt, u m den Gestaltungsspielraum sowohl der mitgliedstaatlichen als auch des gemeinschaftlichen Normgebers zu beschränken. Diese Judikatur bildet nach Röbens Ansicht die Grundlage für die ebenenverklammernde Verfassung des Gemeinschaftsrechtsraums, die insbesondere durch eine bündische Kompetenzordnung, den Primat des Rechts und ein auf wirtschaftliche und politische Selbstbestimmung gründendes Menschenbild geprägt ist (317 ff.). I m 4. Teil (Die richterliche Entscheidungsfindimg — Das justizförmige Verfahren — Allgemeines Verfahrens- und Organisationsrecht, 355 - 405) untersucht der Verfasser schließlich, wie die Rechtsprechung des E u G H auf das allgemeine mitgliedstaatliche Verfahrens- und Organisationsrecht einwirkt. Zentral ist hier das Urteil van Schijndel, das deutlich eine vertiefte Berücksichtigung mitgliedstaatlicher prozessualer Grundentscheidungen durch den E u G H erkennen läßt. Diese Rechtsprechung ist wiederum das Ergebnis einer Abwägung zwischen dem Gebot effektiven Individualrechtsschutzes und der mitgliedstaatlichen Verfahrensautonomie bzw. der systematischen Geschlossenheit des nationalen Verfahrensrechts. Letztere geht i m Regelfall vor, stößt aber an eine Grenze, wenn eine bestimmte Verfahrensmaxime die Durchsetzung gemeinschaftlicher Individualrechte generell unmöglich macht (367). Insgesamt zeichnet sich die Rechtsprechung des E u G H bei der Einwirkung auf das nationale Verfahrens- und Organisationsrecht durch eine erhebliche Zurückhaltung aus, die nach Ansicht des Verfassers auf das verfassungsfunktionale Leitprinzip der Kompetenzzuweisung an Gemeinschaft und Mitgliedstaaten für die Ausgestaltung des Rechtsschutzsystems zurückzuführen ist (374 ff.). I n der Schlußbetrachtung (407 - 423) kommt der Verfasser zu dem Ergebnis, daß sich das von i h m eingangs konzipierte Modell eines ebenenübergreifenden Rechtsschutzsystems bei der Analyse der Rechtsprechung des E u G H bewährt hat. Er hat nachweisen können, daß die Einwirkung sich auf zweierlei Weise vollzieht, nämlich zum einen durch die das nationale Verfahrensrecht ergänzende Vollregelung und zum anderen durch die das mitgliedstaatliche Recht i n Anspruch nehmende Bildung eines Effektivitätsgebots. Dabei hat sich gezeigt, daß die gemeinschaftsautonome Regelbildung nur die spezifischen für den Rechtsschutz konstitutiven Fragen wie Rechtswegeröffnung, zeitlich effektiver Rechtsschutz und Klagemöglichkeiten erfaßt. Es ist ihm ebenfalls der Nachweis gelungen, daß diese Rechtsprechung des E u G H das Ergebnis einer Abwägung gemeinschaftsrechtlicher Prinzipien ist. Dies führt ihn schließlich zu der Erkenntnis, daß die Verwirklichung eines kohärenten ebenenübergreifenden Rechtsschutzsystems zur Entwicklung einer Verfassung für die Europäische Union beiträgt, die auf eine Verklammerung der mitgliedstaatlichen und der europäischen Ebenen gerichtet ist (413). Röbens Abhandlung enthält, weil er die Rechtsprechung des E u G H unter einem neuartigen Aspekt untersucht, zahlreiche innovative Erkenntnisse und Lösungsansätze zu der schwierigen

Book Reviews Frage des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Gemeinschaftrecht und den Rechtsordnungen der Mitgliedstaaten. Sie besticht durch die sorgfältige Auswertung der Entscheidungen und die stringente Analyse anhand seines dogmatischen Modells. Daher wird sie in der wissenschaftlichen Beschäftigung mit dem Europarecht einen wichtigen Platz einnehmen. Kritisch zu vermerken ist lediglich, daß der Leser aufgrund der Materialfiille und der Detailgenauigkeit manchmal den „roten Faden" zu verlieren droht. Das Verständnis wird zudem dadurch erschwert, daß sich der Verfasser einer abstrakten Sprache und eines komplizierten Satzbaus bedient, wobei die leider zahlreich auftretenden Druckfehler zusätzlich irritieren. Diese eher formale K r i t i k soll allerdings die hohe wissenschaftliche Qualität der Dissertation nicht schmälern! Doris König

Gerald G. Sander. Der Europäische Gerichtshof als Förderer und Hüter der Integration: Eine Darstellung anhand seiner Einwirkungsmöglichkeiten auf die einzelnen Dimensionen des Einigungsprozesses. Tübinger Schriften zum internationalen und europäischen Recht, Band 44. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1998, 131 Seiten. Das anzuzeigende Werk basiert auf einer Magisterarbeit, die 1994 an der Tübinger politikwissenschaftlichen Fakultät angenommen wurde. Es stellt die Frage, „inwieweit der Gerichtshof überhaupt in der Lage ist, durch seine Rechtsprechung die europäische Integration zu beeinflussen" (17) und ob die K r i t i k an der ausgreifenden Rechtsprechungstätigkeit des E u G H berechtigt ist. Diese Themenstellung ist für jeden Europarechtler von sehr großem Interesse. Sie berührt einen integrationspolitisch hochbedeutsamen Aspekt, der von den zahllosen (meist kritischen) Untersuchungen zur Rechtsfortbildung durch den E u G H jedenfalls so explizit nicht behandelt wird (siehe aber jetzt die Mannheimer Dissertation von Wolf-Niedermaier, Der Europäische Gerichtshof zwischen Recht und Politik: Der Einfluß des E u G H auf die föderale Machtbalance zwischen der EG und den Mitgliedstaaten, Baden-Baden 1997). Sander stellt zunächst den Gerichtshof als „rein europäisches Organ" dar, erklärt „Integration als Prozeß" und stößt dann zur eigentlichen Fragestellung vor: die Einwirkungsmöglichkeiten des Gerichts auf die Integration. Dabei werden Auslegungsgrundsätze, die quasi-gesetzgeberische Rolle des Gerichtshofs und die normativen Schranken der Befugnis zur Rechtsfortbildung behandelt. Des weiteren werden die wichtigsten integrationsfördernden Entscheidungen analysiert und der E u G H als „Integrationsfaktor" abschließend gewürdigt. Der interdisziplinäre Ansatz (laut Vorwort „Brückenschlag zwischen Jurisprudenz und Politikwissenschaft") scheint für die Behandlung des Themas besonders fruchtbringend und weckt hohe Erwartungen. Diese werden allerdings nicht ganz eingelöst. Zwar macht es sich für den juristisch gebildeten Leser (oft positiv) bemerkbar, daß das Buch von einem Politologen geschrieben wurde (21 ff.: eher soziologische Betrachtung von Zusammensetzung, Arbeitsweise und Willensbildung des EuGH; 68: erst werden politische Gründe für die Einschränkung der Zuständigkeit des E u G H i m Maastrichter Vertrag, dann die juristischen Gründe genannt; 91: unbekümmerte Behandlung von status activus und status negativus, 107: überraschende „grundlegende Aufgabe der drei Gewalten"). Die juristischen Ausführungen sind an keiner Stelle falsch, manchmal aber schief (z. B. 47 zu Gesetzeslücken: historischer Wille der Parteien soll keine Rolle spielen (?), 57: Wortsinnauslegung = i n dubio mitius (?); 62: zu platte Unterscheidung von rechtlichen und politischen Fra-

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gen, „wobei letztere nicht justiziabel sind"), oder sie treffen nicht immer unbedingt das Wesentliche (71 : Entscheidender Unterschied zwischen Rechtsprechung und gesetzgeberischer Tätigkeit soll die fehlende Kompromißfähigkeit der ersteren sein). Gut aber z. B. die Klarstellung des durch die Frage der Souveränität der Mitgliedstaaten gesteigerten Spannimgsverhältnisses zwischen Rechtssetzung und Richtermacht auf 17. A n dem Punkt, an welchem der Jurist nach politologischem Fachwissen giert, nämlich beim Integrationsbegriff und den Integrationstheorien, bleibt die Studie knapp und etwas unbefriedigend. Auch nach Lektüre der 2 6 - 3 1 hat die Rezensentin nur eine äußerst nebelhafte Vorstellung von föderalistischer und funktionalistischer Integrationstheorie, geschweige denn von ihren Vertretern und ihrem historischen Kontext. A m einleuchtendsten ist noch das soziokausale Modell, dessen sich der Autor i m Folgenden offenbar bedient, wenn er von institutioneller, sozialpsychologischer und Transaktionen-Dimension der Integration spricht (30 ff.). Unklar bleibt allerdings, wieso er die von Karl W. Deutsch beschriebene Reihenfolge der Integrationsvorgänge (erst Transaktionen, dadurch soziopsychologische Integration, und daraufhin institutionelle Verflechtung, vgl. 29 f.) einfach umdreht (30) und so die postulierte Kausalität implizit verneint. Ebenfalls bleibt unklar, warum die (Juristen geläufige) Unterscheidung von rechtlicher, wirtschaftlicher und politischer Integration vollständig verworfen wird (27). Kann man denn nicht auch bei dieser Aufspaltung die Tiefe der Integrationsvorgänge beachten, wie es der Autor zu Recht anmahnt? Schließlich kritisiert Sander die Konzentration der Integrationstheorie auf Aufgabenverteilung (28), nimmt aber später selbst diese Perspektive ein (85). Kurzum, die Rezensentin hätte sich eine ausführlichere Darlegung der Integrationsmodelle und statt dessen einen wesentlich knapperen Uberblick über die klassischen integrationsfördernden Entscheidungen des E u G H (Costa/ENEL; van Gend & Loos, Stauder, A E T R etc., 84 ff.) gewünscht. Europarechtler kennen diese bis zum Überdruß. Etwas irritiert wird der Leser dadurch, daß die jeweils neuesten Entwicklungen der Rechtsprechung, die zum Teil eine gewisse Tendenzwende markieren (z. B. die Keck-Rechtsprechung zum Warenverkehr, die W T O und OECD-Gutachten zu den Außenkompetenzen), erst in einem späteren, eigenständigen Abschnitt behandelt werden. Vielleicht zeigt aber die i n diesem Punkt geübte K r i t i k lediglich, daß es schwierig ist, i n einer interdisziplinär angelegten Studie beiden Leserkreisen gerecht zu werden. Als Autor neigt man sicherlich dazu, das „fremde" Terrain auszuwalzen und das „heimische" als selbstverständlich und nicht erwähnenswert anzusehen. Die schwierigste juristische Frage des Themas ist sicher die nach den normativen Grenzen der Rechtsfortbildungsbefugnis. Hier nennt Sander als Schranken Verfahrensarten, die „enge Auslegung" der Verträge, Rechtssicherheit und-klarheit, Aufgabenverteilung auf horizontaler Ebene, richterliche Selbstbeschränkung, Kompetenzverteilung auf vertikaler Ebene, Beschränkungen durch Vertragsrevision und Akzeptanz der Urteile. Nicht ausreichend deutlich wird dabei, daß es sich bei diesen „Schranken" nur zum Teil um normative, i m voraus festlegbare Grenzen handelt. Beispielsweise sind Vertragsrevisionen oder Protokolle von Mitgliedstaaten, um die Rechtsfolgen bestimmter Urteile auszuschalten, eine nachträgliche, auf den konkreten Einzelfall bezogene Reaktion, keine normative Leitlinie. Ahnliches gilt für die Frage der Akzeptanz von Urteilen. Dies ist eine rein formale, nur ex post festzustellende „Schranke" der Rechtsfortbildung. Dahinter steht die entscheidende Frage, welche materiellen Grenzen denn nicht überschritten werden dürfen, damit Urteile noch akzeptiert werden. Die „Grenze der vorweggenommenen Vertragsänderung" (66 f.) wird ähnlich oberflächlich behandelt. Diese Formel ist ja gerade kein „Kriterium" (so aber 66) für die Entscheidung über die Unzulässigkeit einer Rechtsfortbildung, sondern wirft die Frage auf, ob es überhaupt materielle Kriterien für

Book Reviews die Abgrenzung zwischen „bloßer Auslegung" (durch den EuGH) und „Vertragserweiterung" (die in Form der förmlichen Vertragsänderung erfolgen müßte) gibt. I m Rahmen dieses Abschnitts erstaunt ferner, daß Sander die spätere Korrektur von Urteilen durch den Gemeinschaftsgesetzgeber (in Form von Vertragsrevisionen und Protokollen) als „Eingriff i n das gemeinschaftliche Aufgaben- und Funktionsteilungsprinzip" (mit einem nebulösen Hinweis auf „systemtheoretische Gründe") verurteilt (69), obwohl er an anderer Stelle — m. E. zu Recht — diese Möglichkeit als Element der Legitimation der richterlichen Rechtsfortbildung, die eben nur unter Vorbehalt des korrigierenden legislativen Eingriffs gilt, ansieht (50 f. und 117). Sander resümiert, daß der E u G H den Integrationsprozeß fortgeführt hat, fordert aber für die Zukunft „mehr Fingerspitzengefühl" (114). Der E u G H solle sich nicht mehr bloß als Integrationsförderer sehen, sondern solle sich der Festigimg und Sicherung des Gemeinschaftsbestandes widmen. M i t dieser Empfehlung, die insb. seit 1992 immer wieder an den E u G H gerichtet wird, bewegt sich Sander i m main stream der europarechtlichen Forschung. Insgesamt macht die Studie eher den Eindruck einer Seminararbeit als den eines ausgereiften wissenschaftlichen Werkes. Eine teilweise etwas unbeholfene Sprache, die äußerst eigenwillige Kommasetzung (siehe z. B. 24, 49, 80, 47, 52, 56, 59, 61, 106, 113), verschiedentlich fehlende Nachweise (z. B. 1) und das verhältnismäßig magere Literaturverzeichnis verstärken diesen Eindruck. Es mag sich u m eine sehr gute Magisterarbeit (bzw. deren Überarbeitung) handeln, jedoch fragt man sich, ob das ausreicht, um ein käufliches Buch daraus zu machen (was nicht heißen soll, daß nicht schlechtere Dissertationen auf dem Markt sind). Jedenfalls ist der redaktionelle Standard einer „richtigen" Veröffentlichung nicht voll angemessen. Das schlampige Korrekturlesen zeigt sich an zahlreichen Endungsfehlern, die bekanntlich mit dem Rechtschreibprogramm nicht zu entdecken sind (z. B. 49, 58, 72, 113). Insgesamt ein lesbares, aber — jedenfalls für Juristen — nicht sonderlich aufregendes Werk. Anne Peters

Joanne Scott: EC Environmental Law. European Law Series. Addison Wesley Longman Ltd., London/New York 1998, xiv + 189 pages. Over the last three decades, the EC have enacted an ever increasing and in many aspects quite relevant body of environment-related legislation. Although it is true that there is no shortage i n doctrinal publications dealing w i t h this part of EC law, it is indeed to be welcomed that the publishers of the European Law Series decided to include the small, but concise book here under review into their series, thus offering to law students the possibility to familiarize themselves w i t h the basic principles of this branch of EC law. The book is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter describes the role of the EC as an environmental actor with, inter alia , a good presentation of the historical development of the pertinent EC competences. The second chapter deals, in a policy-oriented manner, w i t h the instruments for environmental protection such as target, performance and specification standards, and addresses the issue of uniformity (to be chiefly achieved by means of enacting regulations) or differentiation (to be best secured by means of enacting directives) in EC environmental law. This leads to the topic of the third chapter, namely the identification and analysis of the economic instruments of environmental protection such as, e.g., environmental charges

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and taxes, environmental subsidies, and, particularly interesting, tradeable emission permits. The fourth chapter addresses, under the title 'Trade and Environment', one of the most complex issues of EC law, i.e. the inter-relationship between the free movement of goods — principle as enshrined in Article 30 TEC and the possible restrictions thereon as based upon Article 36 TEC; this chapter consists, i n particular, of a thorough discussion of the pertinent ECJ case law and constitutes a valuable doctrinal contribution to this problem. The following chapter places the relevant EC law i n the international context by examining the impact of international trade law as embodied, in particular, i n W T O law upon EC law; this is, inter alia , reflected in a strong discussion of G A T T panels holdings such as in the Tuna/Dolphin case, and its possible repercussions on EC legislation. I n contrast thereto, the sixth chapter is, again, exclusively devoted to EC law, namely the — often highly controversial — legislation in the fields of nature conservation (Wild Birds and Habitats directives) and Environmental Impact Assessment; i n this context, it is to be stressed that i n many E U member states national legislators had failed to enact the necessary legislation and, in the end, only did so in order to respect their obligation to transpose EC directives into domestic law. The seventh chapter examines the practical relevance of EC environmental legislation and standards in the context of regional policies; this issue involves a closer look at the legal possibilities to challenge the environmental compatibility of such policies before the ECJ and national courts and is, thus, closely linked to the final chapter which deals w i t h the crucial question as to how and to what extent EC environmental law can be enforced, in particular by the Commission making use of Article 169 TEC, and, however to a much lesser extent, by national courts. I n sum: This is a solid and well-documented introduction into a complex branch of EC law which can be recommended not only to law students but also to practitioners wishing to gain a first insight into EC environmental law. Rainer Hofmann

Stefan Talmon: Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile. Oxford Monographs in International Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998, bcxii + 393 pages. This book is described in the preface by Ian Brownlie as a masterpiece of exposition both of the general issues of recognition and of the special concern of governments in exile, which remains a topic of importance in public international law. The first question raised by the author is whether the recognition of governments is still a problem worth discussing in international law, referring to the policy adopted by most states during the last few decades of recognizing states, not governments. But Talmon shows the lasting importance of the issue in several examples where even those states claiming to follow a policy of recognizing only states (not governments) continued to deal w i t h the term of recognition of governments. Moreover, in recent cases the examination of forces claiming to be the legal governing body of a certain territory could only encompass the question of recognition of this force and not the state as such, as, e.g., in the cases of the Iraq annexation of Kuwait, or the coup d'etat in Haiti. Especially by citing the case of Haiti w i t h the reinstallment of Aristide by the international community, recognizing him as the legal head of the state, Talmon shows the importance such an act of recognition of legal power can have for the tendencies in international law to support democratic governments. As the more recent case of Sierra Leone proves,

Book Reviews the 'pro-democratic tendencies' in international law remain an interesting topic to be discussed i n future. I n the first part, the author gives the theoretical basis for his analysis by clarifying the meaning of recognition of governments in international law. First he shows the different applications concerning the nature of a recognition, i.e. the extent, form and content. His case study proves his opinion that for one meaning it can be sufficient to show only a willingness to enter into official relations w i t h a governing body. O n the other hand, he shows the practice of governments to manifest an opinion on the legal status of a certain force. While both practices have taken place and been named as recognition of governments i n international law, they are usually dealing w i t h different constellations. Whereas the showing of the willingness of a state to enter into official, usually diplomatic, relations w i t h a particular government is used in cases where there exists an authority qualified by the rules of existing international law as a government and where the state i n reference decided to recognize it as the legal government to deal with, the second usage of recognition, as the manifestation of an opinion on the legal status of an authority, is used in cases where the question arises of qualifying a certain authority as 'something'. I n such cases the statement of the legal opinion of a state that the particular force i n question is a government, by fulfilling the criteria prescribed by international law for the status of government, recognizes the particular force to be a government but does not deal automatically w i t h the recognition of it as the legal government w i t h which the recognizing state wants to maintain official relations, as shown by the author in several examples. However i n general the two meanings of the term 'recognition' w i l l coincide. The author then examines the different variants of recognition and their meanings i n international law. He mainly compares the two well-known forms of de jure and de facto recognition, by showing the origins of these two forms of recognition, their early meaning as well as their meaning and usage today i n many general cases and by categorizing the different cases of de jure and de facto recognition i n four groups: secession; decolonization or partition of states; annexation; rival governments of the same state; and effective governments of states. To complete his study he shows briefly the meanings of every other existing variant of recognition, namely official recognition, formal recognition, political recognition, full, and full diplomatic recognition. The second part, which is the main part of the book, is a study of the legal status of authorities in exile recognized as governments. By examining the different treatment accorded to authorities i n exile i n the various areas of international intercourse, the author tries to establish the legal status of those governments and to make a presumption of their privileges and immunities. To this purpose, he inquires comprehensively into the legal transactions taken by authorities i n exile, their bilateral and multilateral relations and judicial proceedings, the fate of state property abroad, the jurisdiction of the authorities and their privileges and immunities. The strength of this study is that every case of the last century seems to be examined on the basis of these criteria i n various fields, e.g., treaty-making competencies, maintaining diplomatic relations, access to state property abroad, legislative jurisdiction, etc. just to mention the most interesting topics. He comes to the conclusion that the recognition of an authority as a government in exile has certain legal consequences which are mainly limited to the jurisdiction of the recognizing state and inter-governmental relations. However, comparing the recognized government i n exile w i t h a recognized government in situ he concludes that, w i t h the exception of legislative authority inside national territory, both have the same representative and jurisdictional competence and enjoy the same privileges and immunities in foreign states. Also he states that the recognition of governments in exile is a legal and not just a political act, which

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can entail the responsibility of the recognizing state against the state whose government i n exile is recognized. I n another important and interesting conclusion of the analysis, Talmon indicates the inconsistence of several meanings comparing the dispute of declaratory or constitutive effects of recognition, when it comes to the question of authorities in exile. The whole study is supported by three interesting appendices, one of which contains the responses given by several diplomatic and consular missions accredited to the United Kingdom, to a questionnaire sent out by the author i n regard to the state practice of recognition. A t least thirteen answers contained substantial responses, reproduced by the author. The second appendix gives short profiles of authorities in exile claiming to be the legal governing body of a state. This list gives cases of the whole century i n chronological order. The last appendix contains a list of treaties concluded by authorities in exile recognized as governments. These three appendices together w i t h the fullness of cases examined during the study makes this book not only interesting for the theory, but also for every practitioner who has to deal w i t h the problem of recognition of an authority in exile. Britta Buchenau

Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum/Stefan Talmon: Alles fließt. Kulturgüterschutz u n d innere Gewässer i m Neuen Seerecht. NomosVerlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1998, 203 Seiten. Bei der Frage des Schutzes von Unterwasserkulturgütern handelt es sich u m ein relativ neues Rechtsgebiet, welches zuletzt i m April 1998 Gegenstand eines von der U N E S C O und D O A L O S erarbeiteten Konventionsentwurfs geworden ist. Demgegenüber bildet die Rechtsordnung der inneren Gewässer bereits seit Jahrhunderten einen wichtigen Teilbereich des Seevölkerrechts, der dennoch aufgrund seiner traditionell Wandlungen unterworfenen sicherheitspolitischen und i n der heutigen Zeit in zunehmendem Maße umweltpolitischen Bedeutung weiterhin von großer Aktualität ist. Aus dem ständig wachsenden Regelungsgegenstand des internationalen Seerechts hat sich das anzuzeigende Werk zum Ziel gesetzt, diese beiden Teilfragen des Schutzes von Unterwasserkulturgütern und des Rechtsregimes der inneren Gewässer einer eingehenden Untersuchung zu unterziehen. Der hierbei gewählte sektorale Ansatz wird von den Autoren mit der zunehmenden Technizität und Spezialität des Seevölkerrechts begründet, welche um der gebotenen Detailschärfe und Untersuchungstiefe willen, eine Beschränkung auf die Behandlung von Teilfragen nahelegt (18). Zugleich geben die Autoren ihrer Hoffnung Ausdruck, daß durch zukünftige, ebenfalls auf sektorale Aspekte beschränkte Studien ein umfassendes Bild des See Völkerrechts erstellt werden kann (19). Das Werk gliedert sich in vier Abschnitte. A n die Behandlung der beiden Themenkomplexe i n den Hauptteilen schließen sich eine zusammenfassende Bewertung mit Ausblick sowie ein Anhang, i n welchem die wichtigsten Konventionen und Vertragsentwürfe des seerechtlichen Kulturgüterschutzes abgedruckt sind, an. Der erste Hauptteil des Werkes beschäftigt sich mit dem relativ neuartigen Thema des Schutzes von Unterwasserkulturgütern. Zunächst wird von den Verfassern eine umfassende Untersuchung dahingehend vorgenommen, inwieweit das internationale Seerecht selbst eine Regelung der Rechtslage i m Meer gefundener archäologischer und historischer Gegenstände enthält, wobei neben der schwerpunktmäßigen Analyse der Bestimmungen der Art. 149 und

Book Reviews 303 des Seerechtsübereinkommens der Vereinten Nationen von 1982 und des einschlägigen Völkergewohnheitsrechts auch die unter anderem von der International Law Association und der U N E S C O vorliegenden Konventionsentwürfe einbezogen werden. Die Verfasser kommen zu dem ernüchternden Zwischenergebnis, daß das See V ö l k e r r e c h t de lege lata für den Schutz des Unterwasserkulturerbes große Schwachstellen aufweist (55). Diese Schutzschwäche wird zum einen mit der eingeschränkte Regelungsbefugnis der Küstenstaaten in Bezug auf archäologische und historische Gegenstände auf dem Meeresboden begründet, welche auf die Meeresgebiete unter der Souveränität des jeweiligen Küstenstaates beschränkt ist. Zum anderen weisen die Verfasser darauf hin, daß die extraterritorialen Regelungsbefugnisse i m Bereich des seerechtlichen Kulturgüterschutzes, die den Staaten hinsichtlich ihrer Staatsangehörigen zustehen, bisher von keinem einzigen Staat ausgeschöpft worden sind. Aufgrund dieser schutzrechtlichen Defizite wird i n einem nächsten Schritt die Anwendbarkeit allgemeiner kulturgüterschutzrechtlicher Vorschriften des Völkerrechts auf archäologische und historische Gegenstände auf dem Meeresboden untersucht. Obwohl die allgemeinen Ubereinkommen zum Schutz von Kulturgütern grundsätzlich auch auf Unterwasserkulturgüter anwendbar sind, zeigen die Verfasser auch hier die Schwächen der bestehenden Rechtsregelungen, insbesondere i m Hinblick auf gegebenenfalls bestehende Rückgabeansprüche bei illegal entfernten oder unrechtmäßig exportierten Unterwasserkulturgütern, auf (58 - 60). Darüber hinaus analysieren die Autoren, in welchem Rahmen kulturgüterschutzrechtliche Bestimmungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften sowie auf nationaler Ebene in Deutschland das Gesetz zum Schutz deutschen Kulturguts gegen Abwanderung von 1955 i m Hinblick auf Kulturgüter auf dem Meeresgrund eine Schutzwirkung entfalten. Aufgrund der mangelnden Umsetzung der in Bezug auf maritime Kulturgüter bestehende Schutzpflicht von Seiten der Staaten ist aber auch in diesem Bereich das Rechtsregime i m Hinblick auf i m Meer gefundene archäologische und historische Gegenstände nur unzureichend ausgestaltet. I m zweiten Hauptabschnitt befassen sich die Autoren mit einem „Schlüsselinstitut des Seevölkerrechts" (69), den internationalen Rechtsregeln in Bezug auf die inneren Gewässer. Auf eine einführende Darstellung der Rechtsquellen und notwendigen Begriffsabgrenzungen in Bezug auf innere Gewässer folgt eine umfangreiche Analyse des komplexen Problemfeldes der Festlegung von Basislinien, wobei auch auf die Sonderstellung von Archipelstaaten eingegangen wird. Weiterhin enthält dieser Abschnitt eine Untersuchung des Rechtsstatus der inneren Gewässer, der Rechtsstellung ausländischer Schiffe sowie der zunehmenden Einschränkung der Souveränität der Küstenstaaten durch die wachsende Rechtsmaterie des Meeresumweltschutzes. Die Verfasser verweisen dabei immer wieder auf die Schwächen des UN-Seerechtsübereinkommens, welches einerseits nicht alle Rechtsfragen in Bezug auf innere Gewässer regelt, andererseits aber die Komplexität dieser Rechtsordnung eher erhöht als reduziert hat (144). In dem m i t „Bewertung und Ausblick" überschriebenen Abschnitt, der sich den beiden Hauptteilen des Werkes anschließt, wird noch einmal eine zusammenfassende Analyse der vorher erarbeiteten Ergebnisse i m Gesamtzusammenhang des internationalen Seerechts gegeben. Des weiteren finden sich hier aber auch eine Reihe von Vorschlägen, wie das Seevölkerrecht, insbesondere i m Bereich des Schutzes von Unterwasserkulturgütern, de lege ferenda ausgestaltet werden könnte, um jedenfalls einen Teil der vorher aufgezeigten Defizite zu beseitigen. Abgerundet w i r d das Werk durch den bereits oben erwähnten Anhang sowie ein umfassendes Literaturverzeichnis. Das Werk bietet eine umfassende Darstellung der beiden Rechtsmaterien des seerechtlichen Kulturgüterschutzes und des Rechtsregimes der inneren Gewässer unter Berücksichtigung der

604

Book Reviews

neusten Entwicklungen in der Praxis und der völkerrechtlichen Literatur. Es kann daher jedem an den aktuellen Problematiken des internationalen Seerechts Interessierten uneingeschränkt empfohlen werden. Karsten Nowrot

Books Received (Inclusion in this list neither assures nor precludes later review.)

Academy of European Law: Leading by Example: A Human Rights Agenda for the European Union for the Year 2000. Agenda of the Comité des Sages and Final Project Report. European University Institute, Florence 1998. 125 pages. Francisco R. Bossini/Mary Gleeson (eds.): Diccionario Bilingüe de Terminologia Juridica. Inglés-Espanol/Espanol-Inglés (Bilingual Dictionary of Legal Terms) (second edition). McGraw-Hill, Madrid 1998. X X I X + 554 pages. Hans-Bredow-Institut für Rundfunk und Fernsehen (eds.): Internationales Handbuch für Hörfunk und Fernsehen 1998/99. Nomos, Hamburg 1998. 830 pages. James J. Busuttil: Naval Weapons Systems and the Contemporary Law of War. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998. xx + 249 pages. Julio A. Vives Chillida: El Centro Internacional de Arreglo de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones (CIADI). McGraw-Hill, Madrid 1998. X X X + 358 pages. Roberta Cohen/Francis M. Deng (eds.): The Forsaken People. Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. 1998. xvi + 512 pages. Roberta Cohen/Francis M. Deng: Masses i n Flight. Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. 1998. xvii + 414 pages. Barbara Delcourt/Olivier Corten : Ex-Yougoslavie: Droit International, Politique et Idéologies. Bruylant, Bruxelles 1998. 202 pages. Eileen Denza: Diplomatie Law. Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatie Relations, 2nd Ed. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998. xix + 451 pages. Marina Franchi/Alessandra Lucbini/Bruno Nascimbene: La Giurisprudenza di Diritto Internazionale, vol. I (1921 - 1925). Jovene, Napoli 1997. XXXEX + 515 pages. Marina Franchi/Alessandra Luccini/Bruno Nascimbene: La Giurisprudenuza di Diritto Internationale, vol. Π (1925 - 1930). Jovene, Napoli 1997. 516 - 1006. International Court of Justice: Yearbook 1996 - 1997, No. 51.1.C.J., The Hague 1997. Χ Π + 280 pages.

606

Books Received

Pierre Klein : La responsabilité des organisations internationales dans les ordres juridiques internes et en droit des gens. Collection de droit international, vol. 37. Bruylant, Bruxelles 1998. X X X I I + 673 pages. Anne-Marie La Rosa: Dictionnaire de droit international pénal. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1998. xii + 118 pages. Jorge Cardona Llorens (ed.): Cursos Euromediterrane os Bancaja de Derecho Internacional, vol. 1. Aranzadi, Pamplona 1997. 456 pages. /. G. Merrills: International Dispute Settlement (3rd ed.). University Press, Cambridge 1998. xxiv + 354 pages. Bruno Nascimbene (ed.): La Libera Circolazione dei Lavoratori (Freedom of Movement for Workers). Giuffrè, Milano 1998. X X V I I + 318 pages. Bruno Nascimbene/Luigi Daniele: I l Ricorso di Annullamento nel Trattato Istitutivo della Comunità Europea. Giuffrè, Milano 1998. I X + 199 pages. Isabelle Pingel-Lenuzza (ed.): Les immunités des Etats en droit international. Collection de droit international, vol. 36. Bruylant, Bruxelles 1998. X V I + 442 pages. Michel Prieur/Stéphane Doumbé-Billé (eds.): Recueil francophone des traités et textes internationaux en droit de l'environnement. Bruylant, Bruxelles 1998. 719 pages. Revue belge de droit international, vol. X X X (1997 - 1). Bruylant, Bruxelles 1997. 445 pages. José Juste Ruiz: Derecho Internacional del Medio Ambiente. McGraw-Hill, Madrid 1999. X X I V + 479 pages. Philippe Weckel (ed.): Le juge international et l'aménagement de l'espace: La spécificité du contentieux territorial. Pedone, Paris 1998. 229 pages. Romain Yakemtchouk: Zones dénucléarisées. Studia Diplomatica (vol. L: 1997). Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, Bruxelles 1997. 252 pages. Pierluigi Lamberti Zanardi/Gabriella Venturini (eds.): Crimini di Guerra e Competenza delle Giurisdizioni Nazionali. Giuffrè, Milano 1998. X I + 326 pages.

List of Contributors Bodendiek , Frank

Doctoral Student, Walther-Schücking-Institut, Universität Kiel; Rechtsreferendar, Kiel/Hamburg

Böhmer, Alexander

Dr., LL.M. (LSE), Rechtsreferendar, Kiel

Buchenau, Britta

Doctoral Student, Walther-Schücking-Institut, Universität Kiel

Feist, Christian

Dr., LL.M. (Cantab.), Ass. iur., Kiel

Finke , Jasper

Cand. iur., Universität Kiel

Gamble, John King

Professor of Political Science and International Law, Pennsylvania State University, The Behrend College; B.A. (College of Wooster); Ph.D. (University of Washington); Director of the Law of the Sea Institute at the University of Rhode Island, USA

Geissler, Nils

Dr., Wiss. Mitarbeiter am Walther-Schücking-Institut, Universität Kiel

Ghandi, P. R.

Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Reading, M . A. (Oxford), LL.M. (London),

Goller , Bernd

Junior Research Associate at the Max Planck-Institute for Foreign Comparative and International Law, Heidelberg

Grewlich, Klaus W.

Dr. habil., Dr. sc. econ., LL.M. (Berkeley), Professor, College of Europe, Brugge; Privatdozent, Freiburg; former Director General and Board Representative for International Relations & Business Development, Deutsche Telekom, Bonn

Hansen, Solveig

Cand. iur., Universität Kiel

Happ, Richard

Doctoral Student, Wiss. Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für bürgerliches Recht und internationales Verfahrens- und Wirtschaftsrecht, Universität Kiel; Rechtsreferendar, Kiel

608

List of Contributors

Hofmann,

Rainer

Professor D r . Dr., Direktor des Walther-Schücking-Instituts, Universität Kiel

Kessler y Birgit

Doctoral Student am Walther-Schücking-Institut, Universität Kiel, Licenciée en droit (Orléans)

König y Doris

Dr., Privatdozentin, M.C.L. (Miami), Walther-SchückingInstitut, Universität Kiel

Péter

Dr. habil.; Professeur universitaire; Directeur du Département de D r o i t International de la Faculté de D r o i t de TUniversité Catholique Péter Pazmanyl, Budapest; Faculté de droit, Dép. de droit international, Université de Miskolc, Hongrie

KovacSy

Ladeur y Karl-Heinz

Professor D r . , University of Hamburg, Faculty of Law; European University Institute, Law Dept., Florence

Laubner y Tilmann

Cand. iur., Universität Kiel

Marschall, Fabian

Cand. iur., Universität Kiel

Mennecke, Martin

Doctoral Student am Walther-Schücking-Institut, Universität Kiel

Morrison, Fred L.

Popham H a i k Schnobrich/Lindquist & Vennum Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School, USA

Muckel, Stefan

Professor Dr., Ruhr-Universität Bochum

Nowroty

Karsten

Doctoral Student am Walther-Schücking-Institut, Universität Kiel, L L . M . (Indiana), Rechtsrefendar, Kiel

Peters, Anne

Dr., L L . M . (Harvard), Wiss. Assistentin am WaltherSchücking-Institut, Universität Kiel

Riedinger y Sonja

Doctoral Student, Wiss. Mitarbeiterin am Walther-Schükking-Institut, Universität Kiel

SchorlemeTy

S tolly

Sabine von

Peter-Tobias

TamSy Christian

Dr., D r . rer. pol., Privatdozentin, L u d w i g Maximilians Universität, München, University of Lausanne, Switzerland D r . , Research Fellow at the Max Planck-Institute for Foreign Comparative and International Law, Heidelberg Doctoral Student, Walther-Schücking-Institut, Universität Kiel

List of Contributors

609

Tietje , Christian

Dr., LL.M. (Michigan), Wiss. Assistent am WaltherSchücking-Institut, Universität Kiel

Wandscher , Christiane

Cand. iur., Universität Kiel

Westy James M.

J.D., University of Texas School of Law; S.J.D., Harvard Law School; Research Fellow, East Asian Legal Studies, Harvard Law School; O f Counsel, Shin & Kim, Seoul, Korea

39 G Y I L 41

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