German rule in Russia, 1941-1945: a study of occupation policies 9780865311022

Citation preview

gTV Op, . te os %, of : ira 8A ey

nel d fa 4 ede piglets a 0)

i ek yee a ve ' ‘’ ms i |

ee ' fans Ege re wie 5 a east . ‘ we i’

6 aa ORIN th ay, sae Wr Fg ae y 4ae

* » tL A Te ae ° Gy °

4h RE eg EO ON, OF

1

» 44, 7 * Ds

+

'

GERMAN RULE IN RUSSIA 1941-1945 A Study of Occupation Policies BY

ALEXANDER DALLIN

Second, Revised, Edition

WESTVIEW PRESS/BOULDER, COLORADO

eniahadiias®

,

fie. Cli k 7 Second edition © Alexander Dallin 1981 arn mae All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be

a without permission , A First edition 1957

ay > reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, + ‘é | /

Ra wy va . Second, revised, edition 1981 Published by

THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD London and Basingstoke Companies and representatives throughout the world

Printed in Hong Kong

First U.S. edition 1957 Second, revised, U.S. edition 1981

Published in the United States of America in 1981 by Westview Press 5500 Central Avenue Boulder, Colorado 80301 Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher ISBN: 0-86531-—102-1

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 80—52877

PREFACE For a period of three years — from the summer of 1941 to the summer of 1944 —~ large parts of the Soviet Union were under German occupation. For another year thereafter, until the capitulation of the Third Reich, several millions of former Soviet citizens were under German control as soldiers, prisoners, labourers, and refugees. For the Soviet Government the German invasion consti-

tuted a crucial test of its ability to control its people at a time of crisis. ‘Io the sixty-odd million in German-occupied territory the war provided, for the first time in over a generation, an opportunity

to choose between two alternatives of allegiance. In one way or another every inhabitant was compelled, as Lenin had said in 1917, to ‘vote with his feet’. ‘Io the Germans the same events represented a unique challenge — militarily, politically, morally, economically. German policy, in the invasion, occupation, and retreat from Russia, is the subject of this book. The titanic proportions of the German-Soviet duel have made it

necessary to concentrate attention on certain of its facets. The intricate interplay of men, forces, and ideas which produces that which is, euphemistically and often incorrectly, called policy, had in the context of Nazi Germany a coloration all its own. The focus

of investigation has been the goals and methods —and disputes concerning them — at the top of the German pyramid, interspersed with brief excursions into the field of their implementation where they seemed essential for an understanding of wie es eigentlich pewesen.

It may be well to enumerate some of the problems which have not been discussed. First and foremost, the military aspects of the campaign as well as the general contour of Soviet war-time policy

have been taken for granted. Furthermore, the attitude of the Soviet population under German rule —a subject which is the logical complement of the present study — could not be treated in any detail. While inevitably the people’s feelings and behaviour were at least partially cause and effect of German occupation policy, a methodical discussion of them here would have exceeded all tolerable

limits. In the same manner, no extensive discussion has been

provided of developments which have received detailed treatment by others or which await separate thorough monographic analysis. Vv

v1 Preface The first group would include the Vlasov movement,! Ukrainian nationalism,? and the extermination of the Jews,3 The latter would include internal developments in the Baltic States under German occupation, industrial organization in the German-held U.S.S.R., and the history of the military collaborators of the Reich, the socalled Osttruppen. Part I of this book essays to describe the historical setting of the German invasion in 1941, the motivation of the Nazi leadership, the first months of the war, and the organization of German occupation government. Part II surveys German long-range goals, with particular emphasis on the nationality question, and their implementation in the various areas of occupation — Ukraine, Belorussia, Baltic States, Caucasus, Crimea, and Great Russia proper — each reflecting a different set of German premises, practices, and personalities, and provoking bitter disputes among them. Part III seeks to analyse the German approach to certain major functional areas, such as agriculture and industry, prisoners of war and forced labour, culture, education, and religion. Finally, Part IV discusses German political policy, propaganda, and utilization of defectors, and concludes with a sketch of the ‘political warfare’ experiments in the last year of the war.

One might add that the protagonists considered in this study appear in the peculiar context of what has been called Ostpolitik — the German outlook on the Russian East. If some of the personalities emerge from this particular piece of the historical mosaic without either the halo of perfection or the devil’s horns with which ‘public opinion’ has invested them, it should be recalled that the task here

has not been to assess reputations of men but to gauge their performance in one specific sector of history. If, beyond that, this volume contributes to an understanding of totalitarianism in action, as well as to an analysis of alternatives to Stalinism, the purpose of this study will have been well served. ALEXANDER DALLIN

1 See George Fischer, Soviet Opposition to Stalin (Cambridge: MHarvard

University Press, 1952), and sources listed on p. 553 below.

2 See John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945 (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1955).

3 See Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution (New York: Beechhurst Press, 1953).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Iam greatly indebted to the Social Science Research Council, Washington, D.C., and to the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, each of which supported part of the research on which this study is based. I further wish to acknowledge my gratitude for the stimulation and advice received from the late Franz L. Neumann,

from Professors Geroid T. Robinson and John H. Wuorinen, of Columbia University, and from my father, David J. Dallin. I am especially indebted to Professor Philip E. Mosely, who has unsparingly

given me the benefit of his invaluable advice, help, and encourage-

ment throughout this project. I am most grateful to Dr. Max Beloff, of Nuffield College, and Mr. Alan Bullock, of St. Catherine’s

Society, Oxford University, for kindly reading the completed manuscript and making helpful comments and suggestions.

I likewise wish to acknowledge the permission granted by the U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Public Information, to consult and cite a number of captured German records not hitherto available for private research, and the assistance of Lt.-Col. Harry L. Ginn in securing this permission. Others who have assisted and facilitated

my work by advice or information are: Dr. John A. Armstrong, University of Wisconsin; Dr. Raymond A. Bauer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. Paul W. Blackstock, Washington, D.C.; Dr. Karl Brandt, Stanford University; Dr. Herbert Dinerstein, The RAND Corporation, Washington, D.C.; Dr. Fritz T. Epstein, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Dr. George Fischer, Brandeis University; Dr. Harold J. Gordon, Arlington,

Va.; Dr. Anton Hoch, Institut fiir Zeitgeschichte, Munich, Ger- | many; Dr. Oleg Hoeffding, ‘The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica,

Calif.; Dr. Alex Inkeles, Harvard University; Mr. Melvin J. Lasky, Berlin, Germany; Mr. Michael M. Luther, New York City ;

Mr. Boris Nicolaevsky, New York City; Mr. Rudolph L. Pins, Washington, D.C.; Dr. Nicholas P. Vakar, Wheaton College; Dr. Gerhard L. Weinberg, University of Kentucky; Mr. Boris Yakovlev, Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., Munich, Germany ; my colleagues on the Harvard University Refugee Interview Project,

the Research Program on the U.5S.S.R., New York City, and the War Documentation Project, Alexandria, Va.

I am sincerely appreciative of the information, and in some Vil

Vill Acknowledgments instances documents, supplied by the following through interviews or correspondence: ! German Informants.—F ritz Arlt, Johannes Benzing, Otto Brauti-

gam, Friedrich Buchardt, Walter von Conradi, Artur Doellerdt, Hasso von Etzdorf, Nikolas von Grote, Hans von Herwarth, Gustav

Hilger, Peter Kleist, Rudolf von Kniipffer, Hans Koch, Ernst Kostring, Erhard Kroeger, Georg Leibbrandt, Gerhard von Mende, Siegfried Nickel, Alexander Nikuradze, Theodor Oberlander, KarlGeorg Pfleiderer, Walter Schenk, Otto Schiller, Ehrenfried Schiitte, Eberhardt Taubert, Melitta Wiedemann, Adolf Windecker. Refugee Informants.—Artashes Abeghian, Anton Adamovich, Mikhail Alchibaia, Vasilii Alexeev, Alexander Avtorkhanov, Shamba

Balinov, Mikhail Bobrov, Alexander Cordzaia, Abo Fatalibeili, Arkadii Gayev, Boris Karanovich, Mikhail Kedia, Edige Kirimal,

Mikhail Kitaeff, Constantin Krypton, Akhmed Nabi Magoma, Vladimir Melanders, Volodymyr Miyakowsky, Mecid Musazade, Mikhailo Orest, Alexander Philipov, Hryhory Podoliak, Vladimir Pozdniakov, Grigorii Saharuni, Mikhail Shatoff, Konstantin Shteppa, Dmitrit Stepanov, Garip Sultan, Kabarda Tamby, Evgenii Vetlugin.

Obviously the responsibility for the interpretation given in this study rests solely with the author. I trust that the informants will understand that, however grateful I am for their assistance, the effort

to achieve intellectual honesty and historical accuracy must take precedence over personal appreciation in cases of conflicting evidence and interpretation. Finally, I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the technical help

given by Peter Dornan and Nelson Glover, New York City, and Fri. Kathe Heidrich, Munich, Germany. ‘The interminable hours spent by my wife, Florence C. Dallin, in substantive, editorial, and technical help, have made this book in a very real sense a co-operative

effort and cannot adequately be rewarded by any expression of appreciation. 1 Names of those desiring to remain anonymous omitted.

PREFACE V CONTENTS

PAGE

NOTE ON SOURCES AND STYLE XVII Part I—THE SETTING

June 22, 1941 3

CHAPTER I— GERMANY AND THE EAST 3 Germany Views the East: the Background 4

Russia in the Nazi World 7 Sources of Dissent IO The Road to War 12 Barbarossa: ProRubicon and Con 18 15 Crossing the CHAPTER II — POWER AND PERSONALITIES: FEUDS

The Nazi Mosaic 20 The First Steps 22 Alfred Rosenberg 24 Heinrich Himmler 26

AND FISSURES OVER THE EASTERN QUESTION 20

The Army and the Commissar Decree 30

Heirs Presumptive 34 The Economic Agencies 38 The Foreign Office 40 The Propaganda Ministry 42 ALITY QUESTION 44 The Kremlin and the People 44

CuHapTer II] — POLITICAL GOALS AND THE NATION-

Rosenberg and the Nationality Question 46

Cutting of theConquest Cake 49 Blueprint 53 The Three Concepts 56

CuHaPTER IV — FACE TO FACE: THE FIRST SIX

MONTHS OF THE WAR 59 The Periods of the War 59 On the Wings of Victory 61

In the East 63 ix

x Contents The New Crusade 67 PAGE

The Untermensch 68 The Army and the People 70

Eye for Eye 76 74 Leningrad Behind the Facade 79 PIED EAST 34 The Ostministerium 84

CHAPTER V —'THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE OCCU-

Civil Government go Under Army Rule 95 Authoritarian Anarchy 98

The Golden Pheasants JOI Part IITI— PEOPLES AND POLICIES CHAPTER VI — GERMANY AND THE UKRAINE:

(1) EMIGRES AND NATIONALISTS 107

The Emigrés Ill Abwehr and OUN 114

The Ukraine in German Plans 107

Other Collaborators L’vov: the First Crisis 117 11g

CHAPTER VII — GERMANY AND THE UKRAINE :

(2) THE UKRAINIAN FULCRUM 123

Goring, Bormann, and Koch 123

The First Retreat 127 The Adloniada 133 The Duel: Act II 137 Zenith and Nadir I4I

The Duel : Rosenberg v. Koch 130 CuHapTerR VIII — GERMANY AND THE UKRAINE:

(3) REAPING THE WHIRLWIND 146

Politicians and Propagandists 146

The Army in Politics 151 Koch Again 154

The Battle Joined 157 His Master’s Voice 160 In the Wake of the Verdict 162

Between Hammer and Anvil 165

Contents XI PAGE

CuapTer IX — THE DIADOCHI AND THE EAST: 1943 168

Rosenberg and the SS 168 OMi and ProMi 176

STATES 182 Germany and the Baltikum 182 Lohse’s Realm 185

CHAPTER X — OSTLAND: LOHSE AND THE BALTIC

Touchstones of German Policy 189

The End of Ostland 197

CHAPTER XI — BELORUSSIA 199

Belorussia and the Germans 199

Kube and the SS 203 The Second Front 209 Nationalists andEnd Nazis217 213 Kube : The Puppets and Patriots 220

CHAPTER XII — THE CRESCENT AND THE SWASTIKA :

(1) TURKEY AND THE CAUCASUS 226

The Berlin—Tiflis Axis 226 From Ankara to the Adlon 231

The Army and the North Caucasus 238 German Rule in the North Caucasus 244

Caucasian Sunset 249

CHAPTER XIII — THE CRESCENT AND THE SWASTIKA :

(2) TATARS AND TURKS 253 Crimea: Gibraltar and Spa 253

The Army in the Crimea 259 Taurida 264 The Stillborn Muftiate 266 Idel-Ural and Turkestan 2'70 Between Turkey and Germany 257

Lebensraum 276 Generalplan Ost 282 OW

CHAPTER XIV — MASTERS AND SERFS 276

Volksdeutsche 288 Muscovy 293 The Cossacks 298

Xi Contents Part III— PROBLEMS AND PRACTICE CHAPTER XV — ECONOMIC POLICY: NAZI AIMS PAGE

~ ANDEconomic OUTLOOK 305 / German Goals 305 The Demands of the Hour 307 The Geopolitics of Starvation 310 The Economic Organization 313

CULTURE: I 320 The Kolkhoz Skein 320

CHAPTER XVI — GERMANY AND EASTERN AGRI-

Agrarian Reform : Pro and Con 325

The Agrarerlass 334 German Controls 339

CULTURE: II 344 Reform in the South 344

CHAPTER XVII — GERMANY AND EASTERN AGRI-

Vox Populi 352 The Carrot and the Whip 355 The Deficit Areas and Agrarian Reform 347

From Possession to Property 360 The Balance 365 Annex 373

ECONOMY 376 Industry and Mining 376

CHAPTER XVIIJ — GERMANY AND THE SOVIET

Soviet Property and the Reich 380 Conflicts of Interest 385 In Search ofObjects Profit 391 Subjects and 395 Transportation 399

Finance, Prices, and Wages 401 Summing Up 405 Annex 408

Nazi Premises 409

CHAPTER XIX — PRISONERS OF WAR 409 Indices of Treatment : Labour and Nationality 410

The Prisoners and Their Masters 414

Pawns of Policy 419 Statistics of Tragedy 423

Annex 427

Contents X11] PAGE

CHAPTER XX — OSTARBEITER 428

Recruitment and Conscription 428

Tightening the Vise 431 The Weight of Chains 435 Ostarbeiter and Ostministeri1um 442 Symbols of Infamy 444

Annex 451

CHAPTER XXI — KULTUR AND THE UNTERMENSCH 454

The Height of Folly 454 Knowledge for What ? 458 Higher and Special Education 462

The Letter and the Spirit 466

The Fine Arts and the Crude Arts 469

CHALLENGE ? 472 Nazism and Christianity 472

CHAPTER XXII — THE CHURCH: LEVER OR

To Use or To Suppress ? 474 Hitler and the Edict of Tolerance 478 The Ukrainian Churches 481 The Church in Belorussia 486 The Russian Orthodox Church in the East 488

The Politics of Belief 490 Part IV— POLITICAL WARFARE

A Fatal Error 497 . Three Concepts 500

CHAPTER XXIII — CAST AND CREDOS 497

Arms and the Men 505 CHAPTER XXIV — THE UPHILL STRUGGLE SII

The Battle of Memoranda 511 The Lessons of Experience 515

Civilian Efforts 519 A Russian de Gaulle ? 523

Soviet Collaborators 527

XIV Contents

PAGE

CHAPTER XXV — THE SWORD AND THE PEN 533

Subhumans Under Arms 533

Legends andofLegions 538 Momentum Protest 544 Sound and Fury 551

Andrei Vlasov 553

CHAPTER XXVI — VLASOV MOVEMENT: FIRST PHASE 553

No! 572 Vigil and Void 581 Rosenberg and the ‘ Russian Liberation Movement’ 558

Approaching the Climax 565 Propaganda and Proclamation 577 CHAPTER XXVIJI — THE SS: FROM DREAD TO DESPAIR = 587

Germany at the Crossroads 587

Straws in the Whirlwind 592 The Eastern Waffen SS 596

The Secret Weapon 602 . Again the Nationalities 606 CHAPTER XXVIII — THE CARDHOUSE CLIMAX 613

Himmler and Vlasov 613 Diplomacy of Despair 617 The Ukrainian Question 620

Insult and Injury 626 | Indian Summer, 1944 632 CHAPTER XXITX — ON THE BRINK OF THE ABYSS 637

Rosenberg : Impotence and Isolation 637

Between Army and SS 640 Dramatis Personae 647

Postlude 658

The End of Policy 653 CHAPTER XXX — A LAST LOOK AT OSTPOLITIK 660

GLOSSARY 691 INDEX 695

POSTSCRIPT TO THE SECOND EDITION 670

MAPS AND CHARTS

2. The 8S 28 3. The High Command 33 PAGE

1. The Power Structure of the Third Reich 21

4. German Postwar Plans for the East 55

5. The Ostministerium 87

6. German Administration in the Occupied East g2 7. German Civil Administration in the Occupied East 94

8. Scheme of German Military Government 97

10. Belorussia 202 11. The North Caucasus 245 g. The Rosenberg Plan: The Wall Around Muscovy 110

12. Schematic Plan of Future Ethnic Hierarchy in the East 277 13. German Control of the Eastern Economy (simplified) 318

14. The Eastern Front 591

XV

NOTE ON SOURCES AND STYLE THE sources used for this study include published materials as well as unpublished documents, manuscripts, and interviews. An effort

has been made to give full reference in footnotes to the text; to save space, it was decided to omit an extensive bibliography. The reader interested in more thorough coverage of the available source material is referred to a bibliography published separately.! Extensive use has been made of the materials presented at the International Military Tribunal and the subsequent United States war crimes trials at Nuremberg. Many of the key documents have been published, together with the proceedings of the IMT sessions, in the 42-volume Trial of the Major War Criminals ;2 some additional documents appear (at times in imperfect translation) in an 8-volume compilation, Nazz Conspiracy and Aggression.3 Extracts from the proceedings as well as a number of further documents presented in evidence at the subsequent twelve trials appear in the 15-volume 77ials of War Criminals. However, most documents introduced at Nuremberg remain unpublished and are available — in the original, photostatic or mimeographed copy, English transla-

tion, or in some cases extracts — at various depositories. ‘The collections used in this study were those of the United States National Archives, Washington, D.C.; the Federal Records Center, Alexandria, Va.; and the Columbia University Library, New York City.

The Nuremberg documents appear in consecutive numbers t Alexander Dallin, comp., The German Occupation of the U.S.S.R. in World War II: A Bibliography (Washington : Department of State, External Research Staff, 1955).

2 Trial of the Major War Criminals (Nuremberg: International Military

Tribunal, 1947-9), 42 vols. ; this is the so-called ‘Blue Series’, also available in French and German, carefully reproducing the documents in the original language. The American edition has been used in this book. 3 Office of the Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), 8 vols. + Supplements A and B; this is the so-called “Red Series’. It has been cited only where the document does not appear in the more thorough ‘Blue Series’. 4 Trials of War Criminals before the Niirnberg Military Tribunals (Washington :

Government Printing Office, 1949-54), 15 vols.; this is the so-called ‘Green Series’, conscientiously prepared but containing only a small fragment of the

documentation assembled for the twelve trials. References to the complete mimeo-

graphed proceedings in these cases are cited by Case number, e.g. ‘Case XI, Engl. transcript, p. 6250’. Documents introduced by the defence attorneys are listed numerically by name of defendant, e.g. ‘Document Berger-55’.

G.R.R.—B XViI

XVIII Note on Sources and Style under different letter series, usually according to source or subject-

matter. ‘The most important letter series for the problems dealt

macht).! .

with herein are the PS (‘Paris Storey’) documents in the case against

Goring et al.; and in the subsequent US trials, the sets introduced by the letters NO (Nazi Organization), NG (Nazi Government), NI (Nazi Industry), and NOKW (Nazi Oberkommando der Wehr-

In addition to the Nuremberg materials, unpublished documents and manuscripts have been consulted in various other depositories, referred to hereinafter as follows : BDIC Bibliotheque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine, Paris.

CDJC Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, Paris. CRS Captured Records Section, Departmental Records Branch,

Adjutant General’s Office, US Army, Alexandria, Virginia.

CU Columbia University, New York City. Himmler Records of Himmler’s personal staff, available in photostats

file in parts at the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., and at the Hoover Library, Stanford, California.

HL Hoover Library, Stanford, California. IfZ Institut fiir Zeitgeschichte, Munich, Germany. LC Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. NA National Archives, Washington, D.C. NYPL New York Public Library, New York City. RRC Russian Research Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

UotP University of Pennsylvania Library, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

WL Wiener Library, London. YIVO Yiddish Scientific Institute (YIVO), New York City. Unless credited to other depositories, unpublished documents or copies thereof cited in this study are in the possession of the author. 1 For further details on the organization and availability of the Nuremberg documents, see Robert M. W. Kempner, ‘The Nuremberg Trials as Sources’, American Political Science Review, xliv (June 1950), pp. 447-59 ; National Archives, Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the U.S. Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis

Criminality (Washington, 1949). See also the index and explanatory note in TMWC, xxiii; and Inge S. Neumann, comp., European War Crimes Trials : a Bibliography (New York : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951). There are no thorough indices to the unpublished documents and proceedings.

For the ‘Ministries’ case, see Hans-Giinther Seraphim, ed., ‘Sachindex zum

Verfahren gegen Ernst von Weizsacker u.a.’ (Géttingen : Institut fiir Vélkerrecht, 1952).

Note on Sources and Style X1X All unpublished materials (except interviews and letters to the author) have been indicated in the footnotes by an asterisk ( * ).

In a few instances, because of the frequency of references, abbreviated citations have been used throughout this book. These standard abbreviations are:

Braune Mappe RMfdbO., Richtlinien fur die Wiartschaftsfiihrung (Berlin, 1941-2).!

Buchardt Friedrich Buchardt, ‘Die Behandlung des

russischen Problems wahrend der Zeit des | national-sozialistischen Regimes in Deut-

schland’, MS*. Einsatzgruppen Reports Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Amt IV A [later

RFSS Kommandostab], ‘Ereignismeldungen UdSSR’.

GPT U.S.5.R., MID, Arkhivnoe Upravlenie, Dokumenty muinisterstva inostrannykh del

Germanu, vol. 1: Germanskaia politika v Turtsii (1941-1943 gg.) (Moscow: OGIZ, 1946).

Griine Mappe WiF Stab Ost, Richtlinien fur die Fiihrung der Wirtschaft (Berlin, 1941-2).?

HTT Eitler’s Table Talk (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1953). US ed. as Hitler’s Secret Conversations (New York: Macmillan, 1953).

IMT International Military Tribunal.

‘Materialsammlung’ WiStab Ost I/zbV, ‘Vom Chef WiStab Ost am 23.2.44 genehmigte Gliederung fiir die

Materialsammlung zur Geschichte des WisStab Ost’, Document 63-EC.

Meyer, Recht Alfred Meyer et al., eds., Das Recht der besetzten Ostgebiete and supplements (Munich: F. Eher, 1943).

NCA Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington : Government Printing Office, 1947).

NMT Trials of War Criminals before the Niirnberg Military Tribunals (Washington: Govern-

| ment Printing Office, 1949-54).

NSR Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948).

Protocol, Conference of December 18, 1942, ‘Proto-

December 18, 1942 koll’, January 4, 1943, Document NO1481*,

1 See also below, p. 305 n. I. 2 Ibid.

XX Note on Sources and Style Rosenberg, Portrait Serge Lang and Ernst von Schenk, Portrait eines Menschheitsverbrechers (St. Gallen: Zollikofer, 1947).

TMWC Trial of the Major War Criminals (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947-9).

VB-B Volkischer Beobachter (Berlin ed.). VB-M Volkischer Beobachter (Munich ed.). Interviews have been listed by numbers in two series: (1) a ‘G’ (German) series for interviews conducted by the author with German ex-ofhcials and officers; and (2) an ‘H’ (Harvard) series for interviews conducted with Displaced Persons from the Soviet Union as part of the Harvard University Refugee Interview Project in Western

Europe, 1950-1. The names of most former German officials interviewed and those of some refugee informants are listed in the acknowledgments (p. viii). ‘To avoid possible embarrassment, it was deemed preferable not to identify a given informant by name in every instance. At their request, the names of several informants have been omitted.

In transliterating Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian names, the Library of Congress system has been followed, omitting diacritical marks. Ranks of German or Soviet Army and SS personnel

have been indicated in their original rather than US or UK equivalents.

PART I

THE SETTING

CHAPTER I

GERMANY AND THE EAST Germany will become a world power, or it will not be at all.

. . . If we speak of new lands, we are bound to think first of Russia and her border states.— ADOLF HITLER, Mein Kampf

June 22, 1941 ‘SINCE I struggled through to this decision, I again feel spiritually

free’, Adolf Hitler wrote to Benito Mussolini, informing his Axis partner of the imminent invasion of the Soviet Union. The uneasy twenty-two months of the German-Soviet Pact were over. ‘I am now happy to be relieved of these mental agonies.’ ! While German planes were dropping their first bombs on Soviet installations, Joseph Goebbels, the master-mind of Nazi propaganda, read Hitler’s proclamation over the air : . . . Weighted down with heavy cares, condemned to months of silence, I at last can speak freely. . . . German People! At this moment a march is taking place that, for its extent, compares with the greatest the

world has ever seen. . . . I have decided today again to place the fate and future of the Reich and our people in the hands of our soldiers. May God aid us, especially in this fight ! 2

On June 22, 1941, hours before the sun rose over the long frontier between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, more than three million German troops began to move eastwards, into the endless space which for many years had alternately attracted and repelled German statesmen, soldiers, and thinkers. The crucial encounter was at hand, and the world held its breath in fearful anticipation.

Since the early autumn of 1939, Germany had subdued its continental opponents one after another with well-nigh miraculous speed. With its rear secured by the Nazi-Soviet Pact, it had raised

the swastika at the North Cape, over Crete, in Warsaw and at Boulogne. Only Britain held out in lonely stubbornness; the United States was but slowly awakening to the dangers of Nazi expansion. In the East, Germany and Russia had joined hands to divide wide stretches of land, from Petsamo, on the Arctic, to the 1 Hitler to Mussolini, June 21, 1941, US Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941 (Washington : Government Printing Office, 1948) [hereafter cited as NSR], p. 353. 2 The New York Times, June 23, 1941. 3

4 The Setting PT. 1 mouths of the Danube. Ancient feuds and recent recriminations seemed forgotten as that supreme diplomatic bombshell — the German-Soviet Pact — was launched to the apparent benefit of both partners.’ Now an unbelieving world was presented with a new and ultimate

reversal. The titans were at grips. Though amply forewarned, Moscow appeared startled and confounded by this ‘undeserved breach of faith’ by Hitler.2 Britain, long hopeful of a change of Soviet policy, now welcomed its latest and capital ally.3 The United States Government likewise acclaimed the Soviet entry into the war even while declaring Communism to be ‘as intolerable and as alien’ as Nazism.* The shaky and restive war-time alliance of Moscow, London, and Washington was in the making, and Adolf Hitler was its godfather. Berlin, on its part, aligned its allies and satellites for the Great

Crusade. One after another, Rumania, Italy, Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, and Albania declared war on the U.S.S.R. From Spain to Norway, the recruitment of ‘volunteers’ for the Eastern front began. Germany threw her own best forces into action. To the world at large, the German onslaught once again appeared as an irresistible Juggernaut. Germany Views the East: the Background

Throughout their history, Germany and Russia have had to choose between friendship and enmity. Tertium non datur. Each 1 On the German-Soviet Pact era, see NSR ; Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941 (Leyden: Brill, 1954) ; Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russta (London : Oxford University Press, 1949), il. 2 Warnings had come from Soviet spies as well as from American, British, Chinese, and German sources. See, for instance, Winston Churchill, The Second

World War (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1948), i, 354-61 ; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War (New York: Harper, 1953), pp. 527, 532. The Germans knew that Moscow had learned the precise day of the attack. See naval attaché report, April 25, 1941, Document 170-C, Trial of the Major War Criminals (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1949), xxxiv, 703 ; and Major Immisch, memorandum, April 10, 1941, Document 1023-PS*. [The 42volume collection, Trial of the Major War Criminals, is cited hereafter as TMWC.] In his secret speech of February 24, 1956, to the 2oth Congress of the Communist

Party, Nikita Khrushchev charged that ‘Stalin was kept informed of Hitler’s preparations by several parties. . . . But Stalin did not believe these warnings. Moreover, he issued a directive that similar information should not be trusted

since a provocation was involved.’ (Borba [Belgrade], March 20, 1956.) 3 In line with his comment that ‘If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons’, Churchill delivered a brilliant speech, promising ‘whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people’. (Churchill, op. cit. iii, 371-2 ; John G. Winant, Letter from Grosvenor Square [Boston : Houghton, Mifflin, 1947], pp. 203-4.) 4 The New York Times, June 24, 1941.

CH. I Germany and the East 5 country has had its proponents of each policy: co-operation or hostility.

In Germany, the ‘pro-Russian’ orientation pointed to a history whose landmarks included the Convention of Tauroggen in 1813,

when Prussia and Russia had joined hands against Napoleon ; Bismarck’s policy of befriending the East ' in order to gain a free hand elsewhere in Europe; the Treaty of Rapallo, where the two losers aligned themselves against the victors of the first World War. It was reinforced by visions of an economic bloc in which Russia supplied raw material and grain, while Germany provided industry

and know-how. In the 1920’s the ‘Eastern’ orientation in Berlin had the support of sizeable elements in the Government and in the Army. Extensive secret military arrangements between Berlin and Moscow, by which Germany managed to circumvent the limitations

imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, were the culmination of this policy, whose protagonists saw no obstacle to its implementation in the fact that Russia, for the time being, was under Bolshevik rule. By no means pro-Communist, it was purely a utilitarian espousal of German-Russian co-operation.

The General Staff found a theoretical underpinning for such a course in the writings and pronouncements of ‘pro-Russian’ generals

like Hans von Seeckt. Germany’s main effort, they had argued, must be directed against the West, and an understanding with Russia would secure the Reich’s rear and bolster Germany’s economic and military potential.2, As the official Nazi newspaper declared during

the brief honeymoon ushered in by the signing of the GermanSoviet Pact in 1939, “Germany and Russia have always fared ill when they were enemies, and well when they were friends’ .3 ' The use of the term ‘East’ in this study follows German war-time practice. Its derogatory connotations in Nazi parlance (in such combinations as Ostraum, Ostpolittk, Osteinsatz) will be amply apparent. Unfortunately, neither ‘Russia’ nor ‘Soviet territory’ adequately identify German-occupied areas of the U.S.S.R. or convey the spirit of Nazi terminology. 2 There is still no satisfactory history of German-Russian relations. For the attitude of the Reichswehr, see Helm Speidel, ‘Reichswehr und Rote Armee’, Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte (Munich), 1 (1953), 9-45 ; John W. WheelerBennett, The Nemesis of Power (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1953); Walter Gorlitz, Der deutsche Generalstab (Frankfurt : Frankfurter Hefte, 1950) ; Gordon A. Craig, ‘Reichswehr and National Socialism’, Political Science Quarterly (New York), xiii (June 1948), 194-229. On Seeckt’s views, see Friedrich von Rabenau, Seeckt : Aus seinem Leben, 1918-1936 (Leipzig : Hase, 1938), pp. 308-10; Hans von Seeckt, Deutschland zwischen West und Ost (Hamburg : Hanseatischer Verlag, 1933), PP. 6-45. 3 Vélkischer Beobachter (Berlin ed.) [hereafter cited as VB-B], August 25, 1939.

A substantially similar conclusion is reached by E. H. Carr in his German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951).

6 The Setting PT. | While the Army’s proponents of an ‘Eastern’ policy were motivated primarily by considerations of utility, the ‘pro-Russian’ wing of the German Foreign Office included in addition men who

not only adduced rational arguments about the complementary political and economic roles which the two continental powers could play, but who also were swayed by a profound emotional attachment

to the Russian people and Russian culture — men among whom some of the most prominent were ethnic Germans born in Russia. Count Werner von der Schulenburg, Germany’s last Ambassador to Moscow, belonged to this group, which was to exert a peculiar influence during the second World War.'

Nor was this grouping without its ideologists. The believers in the ‘decline of the West’ looked to Russia as the country of the future. Even a part of the younger German gentry endorsed this view in an amalgam of anti-Western attitudes, German nationalism, and leftish ‘social consciousness’. Ex ortente lux ! 2 On the other hand, the ‘anti-Russian’ school also had deep roots in Germany. Its ardent advocates appealed to the deeds of Charle-

magne, the Teutonic Order and the Swordbrothers, the Hanseatic League and the colonists who had carried German law and language,

customs, and cargoes far into Eastern Europe. The Drang nach Osten was the proverbial manifest destiny of the Reich. The first World War and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk were milestones in the implementation of the programme which the missionaries of German expansion propounded: a Russia subdued or conquered, reduced or partitioned, dependent on Berlin.3 After the October Revolution of 1917, anti-Communism provided this wing with a new, and in some quarters compelling, argument: the ‘red tide’ had to be stemmed

before it engulfed the Reich. Yet this group had neither great 1 For a good example of this attitude, see the memoirs of Gustav Hilger, The Incompatible Allies (New York: Macmillan, 1953). See also Carl E. Schorske, ‘Two German Ambassadors: Dirksen and Schulenburg’, The Diplomats, r91g91939, ed. by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 477-511 ; and Herbert von Dirksen, Moskau, Tokio, London (Stuttgart : Kohlhammer-Verlag, 1949), pp. 132-4. 2 See Oswald Spengler, The Hour of Decision (New York: Knopf, 1934), pp. 60-1. There were men of this orientation among the group that prepared the abortive coup against Hitler on July 20, 1944 (for instance, Adam Trott zu Solz) ; others were found in the Soviet espionage organization operating in Germancontrolled Europe under the name of ‘Rote Kapelle’ (for instance, its leader, Harold Schulze-Boysen) ; still others lent themselves to the Soviet utilization of this theme in the war-time ‘Free Germany Committee’. 3 Among writings of German publicists, see Max Sering, Westrussland in seiner Bedeutung fiir die Entwicklung Mitteleuropas (Leipzig : Teubner, 1917), and

Werner Daya, Der Aufmarsch im Osten (Dachau: Einhorn, 1918). Among military leaders, Ludendorff came to epitomize this policy. See Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit. pp. 511-12, 611-12,

CH. 1 Germany and the East ” influence on the policies of the German Republic nor any realistic or effective programme. It devolved on National Socialism to write a new and fatal page in the history of German-Russian relations. Russia in the Nazi World

For Hitler, relations with Russia were the ‘touchstone of the political capacity of the young National Socialist movement to think clearly and act correctly’.! At times haphazardly, he evolved a set of axioms and goals for dealing with the East. His days of imprisonment had given him leisure to chart his fantastic course. Freedom of existence, he posited, was guaranteed to a nation by one commodity : space to live. ... To guarantee the German nation the soil and territory to which it is entitled on this earth. . . . This is the only action which, before God and our German posterity, would seem to justify an investment of blood.

And, Hitler continued, ‘if we speak of new lands, we are bound to think first of Russia and her border states’.? His favourite analogy in this connection was a comparison of the future German East with British India.3 To him, India provided an object lesson of colonial exploitation and Machiavellian virtuosity ; he used it to buttress his conviction that the population of ‘Germany’s

India’ — the Soviet Union — was likewise no more than ‘white slaves’ destined to serve the master race. Characteristic of his landlocked outlook, he proclaimed that Germany’s primary colonies were

to be found not overseas but in Russia. Along with its manpower, the resources of the East were to assure the material well-being of the German people. 1 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Engl. trans., New York : Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939), Pp. 933. For excellent analyses of Hitler and Nazism, see Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York: Harper, 1953), and Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth (rev. ed., New York : Oxford University Press, 1944). 2 Hitler, op. cit. pp. 947-50. The same theme recurs frequently in Hitler’s pronouncements. See Hermann Rauschning, The Voice of Destruction (New York : Putnam, 1940), p. 125; and Hossbach, ‘Niederschrift iiber Besprechung in der Reichskanzlei am 5.11.37’, Document 386-PS, TMWC, xxv, 403-8. 3 Hitler, op. cit. p. 956; Alfred Rosenberg, ‘Der Ostraum als deutsche Aufgabe’, Probleme des Ostraumes (Berlin: RMfdbO., 1942), p. 14. Early in the war

Hitler reaffirmed that ‘the Russian space is our India’. (Hitler’s Table Talk

[London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1953] [hereafter cited as HTT], pp. 24, 33.)

4 On this point, see also H. R. Trevor-Roper’s suggestive essay in HTT, p. xviii. ‘The new Eastern colonies were to be regarded safest as well as most suitable for the purpose ; for to reign over them it would not be necessary to travel long distances by water. . . .’. (Generalkommissar Schmidt, [Report on conference with Hitler and Seyss-Inquart], September 26, 1941, Document NG-3513*.)

8 The Setting , PT. I If we had at our disposal the Urals, with their incalculable wealth of raw materials, and the forests of Siberia [he explained], and if the unending wheatfields of the Ukraine lay within Germany, our country would swim in plenty.!

This expansionism, extreme though it was, might have been accept-

able to the earlier proponents of the Drang nach Osten. The new elements introduced by the Nazi leaders were its linking with racism, the rejection of a ‘civilizing’ mission in the East, and the abandon-

ment of all moral scruples in the attainment of their goals. ‘The Germans were the master race, and the ‘Slavs are a mass of born slaves’.2_ Russian history needed to be — and was — rewritten in terms of the struggle between the superior German and the inferior Easterner: the Russian state was the product of Germanic civilizing

activity among ‘an inferior race’. ‘For centuries Russia drew nourishment from the Germanic nucleus of its superior strata of leaders.’3 The degeneracy of the Slav, Nazi historiography argued, had been intensified by contact with the Mongol East. Indeed, the Russian Revolution, according to the major ideologist of the Nazi crusade against Russia, Alfred Rosenberg, had been

the victory of the unconscious Mongoloid elements in the Russian organism over the Nordic ones and the eradication of this [Nordic] essence, which seemed hostile to them. . . .4

All this might have sufficed to justify, in the Nazi mind, the aim of subjugating the East. But Moscow as the locus of Bolshevism provided an additional subject of propaganda.’ Indeed, Bolshevism was depicted as a typical expression of the Russian national character, the product of a Byzantine and Mongol tradition and tsarist authoritarlanism, an expression of the much-abused ‘Russian soul’ with its alleged vacillations between brutality and servility, oppression and anarchism. At the same time, it was in substance ‘Jewry’s twentieth-

century effort to take world dominion unto itself’.6 Rosenberg 1 VB-B, September 13, 1936.

2 HTT, p. 33; Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 959. 3 Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 951. 4 Rosenberg, Der Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik (Munich : F. Eher, 1927), p. 88. See also his Die Pest in Russland, 1922 (reprinted, Munich : F. Eher, 1944); and Europas Schicksal 1m Osten : 12 Vortrdge der vierten Reichsarbeitstagung der Dienststelle fiir Schrifttumspflege (Breslau : F. Hirt, 1939).

5 Hitler claimed to welcome the fact that Bolshevism provided him with a rationale for eastward expansion. See Rauschning, op. cit. p. 132; HTT, p. 33 (‘The Bolsheviks did us a great service’) ; Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 951-2. 6 Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 960-1.

CH. I Germany and the East 9

=Jewry’.! 7

contributed the simple and effective equation, ‘Russia =Bolshevism > In these terms, relations between Germany and the East had all the features of an irrepressible conflict, and Hitler made no secret of it.

The Nordic race has a right to rule the world and we must take this racial right as the guiding star of our foreign policy. It is for this reason that for us any co-operation with Russia is out of the question, for there on a Slav-Tartar body is set a Jewish head.?

Germany’s mission in the East, as Hitler formulated it, was thus a dual one, reflecting a sense of both inferiority and superiority. On the one hand, the ‘Eastern menace’ must be eliminated once and for

all by ‘building a dyke against the Russian flood’; on the other, Germany must be allowed to settle in the new Lebensraum: ‘We must create conditions for our people that favour its multiplication’.

Whatever the inhibitions imposed on German policy during the early years of Nazi rule, this view of the East remained a constant. As Hitler himself declared in his ‘political testament’ to the German nation — a testament whose author was trying to become its executor as well:

The future goal of our foreign policy should be neither a [pro-] Western nor [pro-] Eastern orientation, but an Eastern policy signifying the acquisition of the necessary soil for our German people.

It was in line with this outlook that from 1933 on he rejected proposals for an entente with Soviet Russia. Hermann Goring once explained that German rearmament ‘start[ed] from the basic thought that a showdown with Russia is inevitable’. Down to the attack on the Soviet Union, the Nazi leaders remained faithful to their Fiihrer’s pronouncement : ‘If we want to rule, we must first conquer Russia’.é 1 This very theme appears in the earliest article he contributed to the first Nazi organ, under the title, ‘Die russischjiidische Revolution’ (Auf Gut Deutsch, No. 8). See also Alfred Baumler, Alfred Rosenberg und der Mythus des 20. Fahrhunderts (Munich: Hoheneichen-Verlag, 1943), p. 15. Rosenberg’s concept of Jewry as a parasitic ‘anti-race’ appears to have been inspired by one of his close associates, Arno Schickedanz. See p. 89 below ; and Albert R. Chandler, Rosenberg’s Nazt Myth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1945), p. 30. 2 Hitler to Otto Strasser, May 21, 1930, as reported in Otto Strasser, Ministersessel oder Revolution? pp. 12-14, trans. in The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, ed. by Norman H. Baynes (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), il, 989. 3 HTT, p. 33. On Nazi Germanization plans, see below, Chapter XIV. 4 Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 965-6.

5 Minutes of Council of Ministers, September 4, 1934, trans. in Peter de

Mendelssohn, Design for Aggression (New York: Harper, 1946), p. 4. 6 Rauschning, op. cit. p. 130.

IO The Setting PT. 1 Sources of Dissent

It was easy enough to speak of crushing the Russian state and of exploiting the East. It was another matter to evolve an integrated policy and a cohesive staff that would proceed with its fulfilment without doubts and conflicts. Some sources of dissent could scarcely

have been predicted before the Eastern campaign began; others were but an outgrowth of earlier divisions in German Ostpolitik.

A number of non-Nazi officials had survived Hitler’s rise to power. Some who formally became members of his Party did not subscribe to the involved syllogisms that foreshadowed German policy and practice during the war. In addition to those who refused

to accept some aspects of Nazi extremism on moral or religious grounds, there were two primary foci of potential dissenters who

continued to be active within the German state machine: the Foreign Office and the Army. Though reduced to a minority in both institutions, men with a European conscience (such as von Hassell), sincere friends of the Russian people (such as Count von der Schulenburg) as well as Eastern-oriented ‘realists’ in the Seeckt tradition (such as Generals Ernst K6string and Oskar von Niedermayer) still carried some weight.! Within the Nazi movement itself, anti-Communism had not always

been as axiomatic as might be assumed. Communists and Nazis, the two extreme parties, had repeatedly joined hands to combat the Weimar Republic. In the ‘twenties, the ‘revolutionary’ elements within the National Socialist movement had tended to crystallize in a ‘National Bolshevik’ wing.2 Not only had former leaders of Nazism espoused such a stand — suffice it to point to Strasser and Roehm — but many of its erstwhile adherents were still within the movement. Two key protagonists in this study, Joseph Goebbels, the Propaganda Minister, and Gauleiter Erich Koch, the brutal master of the Ukraine, had once belonged to the pro-Communist or pro-Russian group.’ 1 On Schulenburg, see also pp. 134-5. General Késtring, Seeckt’s adjutant, had been military attaché in Moscow until 1941. Niedermayer, a professor at the German military academy and Késtring’s predecessor as attaché in the U.S.S.R., was widely considered ‘pro-Soviet’. During.the war both generals were active in the command of former citizens fighting on the German side. See below, pp. 541-3.

2 See also Otto Strasser, Hitler and I (London: Cape, 1940). On German

Communism, see Ossip K. Flechtheim, Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik (Offenbach : Bollwerk Verlag, 1948) ; and Klemens von Klemperer, ‘Towards a Fourth

Reich? The History of National Bolshevism in Germany’, Review of Politics

(Notre-Dame), xiii (April 1951), 191-210.

3 On Goebbels, see Curt Riess, Joseph Goebbels (Garden City: Doubleday, 1948), pp. 24-5. Hitler told Rauschning in 1934 that Koch was ‘trying to persuade me that an alliance between Germany and Russia will instantaneously remove all our difficulties’. (Rauschning, op. cit. pp. 129-30.) See also Armin Mohler, Die Konservative Revolution (Stuttgart : Verwerk, 1950), pp. 59, 85, 98, 225 ff.

CH. 1 Germany and the East II Another group was formed by the ‘geopolitical’ school around Karl Haushofer. Although strongly influencing the Nazi movement, its advocacy of a continental bloc ‘from the Atlantic to the Pacific’ (including Russia and China) was bound to clash with orthodox Nazism. While Hitler borrowed liberally from his formulations, Haushofer remained out of favour, and only during the brief period of the German-Soviet Pact did his followers re-emerge to acclaim the new Eurasian power constellation.' To them it presaged a new era in which the Reich would lead the way in ‘opening up the East’. Yet, in the last analysis, the concept of ‘opening up the East’ was sufficiently malleable to serve two masters. ‘The anticipated unification of Russia with Germany might be peaceable or it might require conquest’, an analyst of geopolitics correctly comments. The goal remained, but with the German attack on the U.5.5.R., it ‘shifted from the realm of voluntary union to the theatre of war’.? Indeed, this was the rationale which many of the ‘Russophiles’ in Germany used to justify the invasion in their own minds. If their

efforts at German-Soviet ‘love’ had failed, the union had to be accomplished by a shotgun wedding.

Two distinct groups must be singled out among the policymakers and ‘Eastern experts’ in the Reich. Both came from the eastern border-lands. Indeed, ‘was it only an accident’, a German observer writes, ‘that the direction of National Socialist Ostpolitik

was determined by the Austrian Hitler and the Baltic-German Rosenberg ?’ 3 As for the Fuhrer, his experience within the AustroHungarian empire was frequently to colour his views. ‘I know the Slavs from my home country ’, he declared. Many of his angry antiUkrainian and anti- Hungarian remarks carried overtones of pre-1918 Austrian resentments.° 1 Johannes Kihn, ‘Uber den Sinn des gegenwartigen Krieges’, Zeitschrift fiir Geopolitik (Heidelberg), 1940, pp. 57-9. See also zb1d., 1941, pp. 369-70.

2 Derwent Whittlesey, German Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942), pp. 162-7. Haushofer and especially his son Albrecht were implicated in Hess’ flight to Scotland in May 1941 and the conspiracy of July 20, 1944. See The Von Hassell Diaries (Garden City : Doubleday, 1947), pp. 193-4; and Rainer Hildebrandt, Wir sind die letzten (Berlin : Michael-Verlag [1949] ).

3 Walter von Conradi, ‘Deutschlands Ostpolitik im 2. Weltkrieg’, MS*, p. 7. 4 Strasser, Mintstersessel oder Revolution? in The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, ii, 989.

5 Hitler’s reaction did, however, represent a psychological paradox. On the one hand, he recalled that the ‘Austrian Ruthenians’ (1.e. Galicians) ‘were miserable, even in the Austrian Army’. (FHQ, ‘Lagebesprechung’, March 23, 1945, Engl. trans. in Felix Gilbert, Hitler Directs His War [New York : Oxford University Press, 1950], p. 149.) At the same time, the very familiarity that bred contempt also induced him to keep the Galicians within close range and in a slightly more privileged status than the Soviet Ukrainians. See below, p. 598 ; also HTT, p. 16, and (Herwarth,] ‘Deutschland und die ukrainische Frage, 1941-1945’, MS®*, p. 3.

12 The Setting PT. 1 The Baltic Germans, on the other hand, came to constitute the largest single element in German cadres working on Eastern affairs. Born in the Baltic Provinces at a time when they were still a part of Imperial Russia, these men knew the Russian language and Russian culture well. While some were deeply attached to Russia, most had turned bitter and resentful. During the war, they were found in all the major camps as the internal German tug-of-war over war-time Ostpolitik developed. !

Behind the facade of totalitarian Gleschschaltung, the dazzling appearance of a nation united in victory, and the grandiloquence of Nazi triumph, there raged a conflict unfathomable to those who view modern dictatorship as an eraser of diversity. Concealed from the world, there thrived in the Reich a multiplicity of opinions, of groups vying for power and prestige, of men fighting out their personal feuds, and of officials competing for incompatible policies. ‘To stress this diversity is by no means to belittle the impact of the total state. It is precisely because of its totalitarian nature that, in the absence of

public opinion, disagreements must be reconciled or fought out backstage in an atmosphere that refuses to admit their existence and in which their resolution 1s accompanied by unique bitterness and retribution.?

It is to an examination of these differences, as they affected German policy in the East, that this study addresses itself. The Road to War

On June 22, 1940, in the forest of Compiegne, Adolf Hitler reached the climax of his career: Pétain’s plenipotentiaries accepted the terms imposed on a defeated France. One year later, to the day,

the invasion began in the East. The story of Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union has been well told in other books,3 and it will suffice here to retrace only its major steps. The earliest references to Hitler’s decision to prepare for an attack against the Soviet Union date from the second half of July 1940. With France out of the war, Britain unwilling to yield or compromise, and the Soviet Government garnering the harvest of the Pact by annexing the Baltic States and Bessarabia, Hitler returned to his old concept of eastward expansion. 1 See also the stimulating discussion in Artur W. Just, Russland in Europa (Stuttgart : Union deutscher Verlag, 1949), pp. 25-9. 2 See below, pp. 664-5. 3 See in particular Helmuth Greiner, Die oberste Wehrmachtfiihrung 1939-1943 (Wiesbaden : Limes Verlag, 1951), and Weinberg, op. cit. ch. vii.

CH. I Germany and the East 13 | Had he not himself told his generals one year earlier that the Pact was a temporary arrangement ? At present [he had declared] Russia is not dangerous. . . . We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West.! . . . At present all

reasons speak against Russia’s departure from neutrality. In eight months, one year, or even several years this may change. The greatest safeguard against any Russian attempt lies in a prompt demonstration of German strength.

Now Hitler’s old feelings revived with unexpected intensity, and

everything that served them was avidly seized upon as additional evidence of forthcoming Muscovite treachery. On rational grounds the decision to attack the Soviet Union while the war with Britain hung in the balance and while the Reich was deriving considerable

military, economic, and political benefit from the Pact was an absurdity. None the less, it must have been exceedingly appealing, almost irresistible to Hitler, who had always looked upon it as the culmination of his historic mission. Even though, as Hitler admitted in late July, ‘there are no signs of Russian activity hostile to us’, the chief of the Army High Command, General (later Field- Marshal) von Brauchitsch, and the head of the General Staff, General Halder, were ordered to prepare a staging operation immediately.

There is no doubt that Hitler seriously considered starting the attack as early as the fall of 1940. Within a few days after the order, the broad outlines of the campaign were defined ; on July 29 General Jod! explained to his aides the Fthrer’s determination ‘to eliminate

the permanent Bolshevik menace in this war’ since ‘some day this campaign would become inevitable, anyway’.* Military necessity compelled a postponement of the attack until spring 1941, just as the landing in England was postponed. But Hitler remained supremely confident : With Russia smashed, Britain’s last hope would be shattered [Halder summarized Hitler’s address to his senior commanders]. . . . Decision: Russia’s destruction must therefore be made a part of this struggle. Spring 1941. The sooner Russia is crushed, the better. . . . If we start 1 Hitler, address of November 23, 1939, Document 789-PS, TMWC, xxv,

2 ttn, memorandum, October 9, 1939, Document 052-L, TMWC, xxxvu, , * Franz Halder, Diary (Nuremberg: Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, 1946), iv, 128 (entry for July 22, 1940). 4 Warlimont, ‘Militarpolitische Vorgiange um den Feldzug gegen Sowyjetrussland’, MS, cited in Greiner, op. cit. p. 288 ; Warlimont, interrogation, Document NOKW-152* ; Harold C. Deutsch, ‘The Soviet-Nazi Liaison of 1939-1941’, The Historian (Bloomington, Indiana), Spring 1947, p. 121. G.R.R.—C

I4 The Setting PT. I in May 1941, we have five months to finish the job. ‘Tackling it this year would still have been the best, but uniform action would be impossible at this time.!

From July 1940 on, an invasion of Soviet Russia was firmly on the Nazi agenda. Hitler might have used his military preparations to compel Moscow to make new concessions; he could have called off the campaign at any time. But he did nothing of the sort. ‘he fundamental decision had been made, ‘and the negotiations with Foreign Minister Molotov in November had no primary significance as a cause of the invasion.2, Indeed as early as August the High Command began working out the details of the campaign, and the

transfer of troops from the West to the Soviet border got under way. At the very time when Molotov was in Berlin, Hitler on November 12 issued the secret ‘Directive No. 18’, which clearly indicated that

. . . whatever result this conference has, preparations are to be made for the Eastern campaign. Directives will be issued later as soon as I have seen and approved the fundamental plan of operations of the Army.

The next day the General Staff had completed its ‘notes for a report to the Fuhrer’ concerning the ‘planned [military] objectives of the

Eastern campaign’.* By early December its contents had been approved, and General Jod! submitted the final plan to Hitler.’ While Moscow awaited a reply to its latest note about a Four-Power Alliance with Germany, Italy, and Japan, recognizing among other

things Soviet aspirations ‘in the general direction of the Persian Gulf’,® Hitler, on December 18, issued the top-secret order for ‘Operation Barbarossa’. t Halder, Diary, iv, 143-5 (entry for July 31, 1940). 2 F. H. Hinsley, in his Hitler’s Strategy (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1951), appears to attribute excessive weight to German failure to take Britain as a motive for the Eastern attack. 3 Greiner, op. cit. p. 293; OKW [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, High Command of the Armed Forces], directive of August 27, 1940, cited in Anthony Martienssen, Hitler and His Admirals (New York : Dutton, 1949), p. 81 ; General Georg Thomas, ‘Grundlagen fiir eine Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Riistungswirtschaft’, MS, Document 2353-PS, TMWC, xxx, 272-3; Halder, Diary, iv, 1§1, 1543 V, 7-

4 Halder, Diary, v, 13; Directive No. 18, ‘Fiihrer Conferences on Naval Affairs’, Brassey’s Naval Annual (London, 1948), p. 166; Document 444-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 40-6. ‘The draft had actually been completed before Molotov’s arrival. (Heinz Holldack, Was wirklich geschah [Munich: Nymphenburger Verlag, 1949], p. 425.) For the Molotov visit, see NSR, pp. 247-59, 270. 5 Greiner, op. cit. pp. 321-31 ; also Halder, Diary, v (entries for October 29December 3, 1940) ; and Document NOKW-152*. 6 NSR, pp. 258-9.

CH. I Germany and the East 15 Barbarossa: Pro and Con

In 1190 after a glorious rule Frederick I, perhaps the most popular of German emperors, had taken the cross to lead his legions

into the Holy Land. He drowned in the attempt. It was his nickname, Barbarossa, that was adopted 750 years later as the code name for the campaign that was to realize the cherished dream of conquering the unfathomable East. Oft-quoted in recent years, the famous

‘Directive No. 21’ really marks only one step —a necessary and logical one, to be sure — on the road from complicity to duplicity. Gone were the last illusions of downing Britain ‘by one stroke’, gone was the pretence of German-Soviet ‘friendship cemented by blood ’.

The German Army [the Fihrer’s directive began] must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign (Operation Barbarossa) even before the conclusion of the war against England. For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available units. . . .

In full accord with the operational plans submitted to him by the General Staff, Hitler decreed that . . . the mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep armoured wedges; and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is

to be prevented. ... The ultimate objective of the operation is to establish a defence line against Asiatic Russia from a line running approximately from the Volga River to Archangel.

All preparations were to be completed by May 15, 1941.! A few phrases, and a new page of history was turned. Hitler had no reason to reverse himself. ‘Those generals, like Keitel and Jodl, who were blinded by unswerving obedience, admiringly prepared

the new campaign. The Party brass enthusiastically sharpened its teeth. But to some sober analysts it was an incredible decision.

Admiral Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, outspokenly condemned it. Insistent on the necessity of concentrating the entire war potential against Britain, he urged that the

Eastern campaign be postponed at least ‘until after victory over England’. Germany could not wage both campaigns at once.? Within the General Staff opposition was likewise widespread. The attitude of the Chief of Staff, General Halder, was ambivalent from

the start. He cautioned and questioned from the time he first 1 German text, Document 446-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 47-52; Engl. trans., NSR, PP aS ument 170-C, TMWC, xxxiv, 693-5 ; Document 066-C, TMWC, xxxiv, 276.

16 The Setting PT. 1 heard of Hitler’s plan.' While doing his utmost to prepare the attack, he reported in his diary with habitual conscientiousness the various discussions he had with the chief of the OKH,? General von Brauchitsch : Purpose is not clear. We do not hit the British this way. Our economic potential will not be substantially improved. Risk in the West must not be underestimated.3

Other senior commanders likewise had reservations — not so much

about the notion of an attack as about its timing and feasibility.¢ Even so loyal and dashing a general as Guderian later claimed (with

the benefit of hindsight, it is true) that he and his colleagues had been stunned when they were first briefed on ‘Barbarossa’. What I had believed impossible was to come true? Hitler, who had criticized the German political leadership of 1914 in such sharp terms because it had failed to save us from a two-front war, now, by his own free

will, intended . . . to produce that very two-front war. .. .5

And yet, convinced or confounded, the military remained loyal to their chief. Indeed, in disregarding their warnings, especially in the French campaign, Hitler had made such fools of his generals that they no longer dared speak out. With or without reservations, they carried out the orders they received.

Warnings from the German diplomatic corps were no more effective. ‘To the end, the Embassy staff in Moscow from Schulenburg down reported on Stalin’s peaceful and conciliatory intentions in more glowing terms than the facts warranted, not because of any

proclivity for Communism but because they wanted the Pact to endure.® But Hitler distrusted the ‘antediluvian homburgs’ in the Foreign Office, whose head, Joachim von Ribbentrop, the symbol of the German-Soviet Pact, was too servile a nonentity to argue with the Fiihrer.?, Glum and dejected, he accepted the end of his stardom, 1 Halder, Diary, iv, 128, 130, 132, 134. 2 OKH [Oberkommando des Heeres], High Command of the Army. 3 Halder, Diary, v, 98-100. 4 For instance, Generals von Beck, Heusinger, Falkenhausen, Field-Marshal

von Witzleben, and others. See Halder, Diary, v, 43, 99; Adolf Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit (Tiibingen: R. Wunderlich, 1950); Gérlitz, op. cit. pp. 548-61. For a time, evidently Goring, too, raised objections. 5 Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Heidelberg : Vowinckel, 1951),

P S NSR, pp. 331 ff. 7 On Ribbentrop, see also Paul Seabury, ‘Ribbentrop and the German Foreign Office’, Political Science Quarterly (New York), Ixvi (December 1951), pp. 545-7 ;

and André Francois-Poncet, The Fateful Years (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949), p. 187.

CH. I Germany and the East 17 overcoming his vainglorious instincts, so as to remain in step with the designs of his beloved master. Not so some of the ‘old school’. ‘Russia is no potential ally of the English’, State Secretary Weizsicker wrote Ribbentrop; as for the present goal of defeating the British, ‘to beat England in Russia — this is no programme’. Like many of his colleagues, he did not oppose the war on principle ; but he believed that this tremendous undertaking ‘will do us no good

either’.1 The economic experts who had engineered the trade agreements with Moscow likewise insisted that Germany could, by peaceful means, secure more food and raw materials from the Soviet

Union, thus obviating the need for war.2, Their arguments were bound to be as futile as those of Schulenburg and Weizsicker.

Opposition to the attack thus came not only from non-Nazi circles. Indeed the most dramatic instance of disaffection produced by the Barbarossa plan came from the very midst of the Nazi leadership. Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s own deputy, flew to Scotland on May 10 in a crazy effort to effect that Teutonic concord that Hitler himself had dreamt about. Unlike Weizsicker’s, his argument against the Russian campaign was not that it would weaken the German war effort in the West; on the contrary, to him a bloc with Britain was a

logical and necessary prerequisite for the war in the East. If the justification of the Pact had been the avoidance of two-front warfare,

Hess now argued for a similar policy in reverse. ‘The only reason he came to England was not humanitarian at all, but purely to allow Germany to fight her battle against Russia on one front only.’ ° The loyal opposition saw the danger clouds gathering — clouds

that were of Hitler’s own making. But — except for Hess, who removed himself from the scene — the critics were no more than meteorologists who could record and sometimes foresee the change in political climate. Their concept of duty and patriotism paralysed those among them who were in a position to act. I NSR, pp. 333-4; Ernst von Weizsicker, Erinnerungen (Munich: Paul List, 1950), pp. 299, 306 ; Halder, Diary, vi, 100. 2 NSR, pp. 334-46. See also Peter Kleist, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin (Bonn : Athenaéum-Verlag, 1950), pp. 126-8. 3 TMWGC, vii, 143 ; Weinberg, op. cit. pp. 122-4. Curiously, Hess was to see

Rosenberg at lunch the day he left for Scotland. Rosenberg was at that time

absorbed in war preparations against Russia. (Ilse Hess, England — Ntirnberg — Spandau [Leoni: Druffel, 1952], p. 17.) 4 It should be added that some genuine anti-Nazis in and out of the Government saw the prospects clearly. Ulrich von Hassell called the plan for the Eastern campaign an ‘insanity’ inviting ‘complete encirclement, deliberately arranged’. Von Nostitz, the German consul in Geneva, asked Hassell to ‘do everything’ to reverse the decision to attack. But a conference of the chief ‘conspirators’ — Goerdeler, Beck, Popitz, and Oster — led to the sad conclusion that nothing could be done and ‘nothing was to be hoped for now’. (The Von Hassell Diaries, pp. 172, 197-9.)

18 The Setting PT. I Crossing the Rubicon

Relentlessly war preparations proceeded. While continuing to

deceive not only Moscow but even Italy and Japan about his intentions, Hitler periodically held long conferences with his military

staff, weighing alternate plans for the campaign.' In April the date of the attack was postponed from May 15 to June 22 as a result of German intervention in the Italo-Greek war and the occupation of Yugoslavia.2, Perhaps crucial in Germany’s failure to attain her objectives in Russia in the fall of 1941, the decision to ‘clean up’ the Balkans before embarking on the Eastern invasion was of Hitler’s own choosing. On May 22 the “maximum effort’ of pre-invasion measures began; on June 1 the time-table for the next month was adopted. Hitler decided that June 22 would stand as the date for the attack. ‘Two days before, his proclamation to the troops was

secretely distributed, and at 03.00, June 22, the German Army crossed the Soviet frontier.3_ Hitler's prophecy had come true: ‘When Barbarossa starts, the world will hold its breath’.4

The striking aspect of German preparations for this, the greatest of campaigns, was the neglect of positive political planning. Military measures were outlined, discussed, and implemented with care and dispatch. Plans for the prompt utilization of economic resources in the occupied U.S.S.R. were developed with habitual thoroughness, and the personnel for these tasks assembled well in advance. But except for vague statements about the future of the German East, there is no evidence whatever of high-level discussions of political

problems — particularly of any attempt to enlist the help of the Soviet population — during the entire period from July 1940 to March 1941. Only during the last three months of preparation was some attention given to this vast field, but even then the German leadership failed to prepare for the use of ‘political warfare’. This basic fact was the logical corollary of the assumption that the campaign would be, in length and difficulty, only quantitatively different from the earlier blitz attacks of the war. From the summer 1 Halder, Diary, v, 81-6, 103, 105; ‘Besprechung iiber Fall Barbarossa’, Document 872-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 394-8. 2 ‘Besprechung tiber Lage Jugoslawien’, March 27, 1941, Document 1746-PS, TMWC, xxviii, 23 ; Assmann, ‘Die Seekriegsleitung und die Vorgeschichte des

Feldzuges gegen Russland’, MS, Document 170-C, TMWC, xxxiv, 702; ‘Besprechung bei Chef L [General Warlimont] am 30.4.1941’, Document 873-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 399. 3 Document 038-C, TMWC, xxxiv, 228 ; Document 039-C, TMWC, xxxiv, 229-30; Halder, Diary, vi, 129-39. 4 Document 872-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 396.

CH. I Germany and the East 1g of 1940 on, Hitler and the High Command consistently reckoned on

a campaign of about three months.! As late as April 30, 1941, General von Brauchitsch even estimated that after ‘up to four weeks’

of serious battles, the war would be little more than a mopping-up Operation against ‘minor resistance’.2 ‘The whole strategy was geared to the goal of rapidly exterminating the bulk of Soviet forces. Hence political factors, even propaganda, played but a negligible role. Under-estimating Soviet resistance in general (and disregarding the warnings from some of his experts), Hitler deemed political directives unnecessary. All that was required was a set of rules for the administration of the occupied territories. No provision was made for the Fiihrer’s fallibility. Ifthe campaign should last longer or if enemy defeats should be less than decisive, the Reich had no military reserves to throw into action, no plan for enlisting the Soviet

population on its side, and no blueprint of political conduct except the eradication of ‘undesirables’ in the occupied areas. The failure was symptomatic and ominous. ' Halder, Diary, iv, 128; Walter Giese, affidavit, Document 722-D, TMWC, xxxv, 405; Erich Kordt, Wahn und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart: Union Deutscher Verlag, 1948), p. 297; Document 066-C, TMWC, xxxiv, 280; Guderian, op. cit.

pp. 128, 137; Franz Halder, Hitler als Feldherr (Munich: Miinchener DomVerlag, 1949), P. 39. 2 Document 873-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 400. See also Greiner, op. cit. p. 326.

CHAPTER II

POWER AND PERSONALITIES: FEUDS AND FISSURES OVER THE EASTERN QUESTION Relations between the various high leaders can be understood

only if their aspirations are interpreted as a struggle for the

succession to Adolf Hitler.— ALBERT SPEER

The Nazi Mosatc

GERMAN war-time policy was neither uniform nor efficiently co-

ordinated. It was the product of a continual tug-of-war between feuding ‘blocs’ and ‘coalitions’ of various elements within the Nazi parallelogram of forces.1. There were eight major foci of power in this contest : (1) Adolf Hitler ; (2) Martin Bormann and the Nazi Party machine ;

(3) Alfred Rosenberg and the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories ; Hinrich Lohse, Reich Commissar for Ostland ; and Erich Koch, Reich Commissar for the Ukraine ; (4) Joseph Goebbels and the Propaganda Ministry ; (5) Joachim von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office ;

(6) Hermann Goring and the Four-Year Plan, as well as other economic agencies ;

(7) Heinrich Himmler and the SS empire ; (8) the Armed Forces, themselves divided by internal disputes.

These ‘Big Eight’ and most of their subsidiaries were frequently in conflict with each of the others. Their conflicts may be schema-

tized in four categories: Personal conflicts based on individual animosity (e.g. between Rosenberg and Ribbentrop); the struggle for power and prestige among individual contenders (e.g. Himmler, Goebbels, and Bormann) and among institutional groups (e.g. the Party, the State, the SS, and the Army); functional conflicts over jurisdiction (e.g. the contest for the control of communication media ' There is still no satisfactory analysis of the power structure within the Third Reich. Useful material may be found in Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth (New York : Oxford University Press, 1944) and Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler (New York : Macmillan, 1947). For a schematic indication of some of the power relations as they pertained to the Eastern question, see the chart on p. 21; for key to chart abbreviations, see Glossary, p. 679. 20

5|

-+| £2 ar \ Tie = NK EN\Hg\, I kA be zl CF -

\ I| e2a| = 2 | fg] | oll e Z I) 2/3 Z| 6 | 77 ee]“ure 1 als 8qo 2 =% Te2/4Gc E|2 —n 1s]O |” __ (i

ca& lad | z|° 38 eeeereoere | oa | 8} .% ao on eeoeree coos

pene oie Big Mit y-@.

wf ! | el re BG, bo ! 8): "O cn —_—— | ) | ~~ als 2 : ‘ O _| 2 —_— _ — + Sle :

>$

5% F “|? 8 : | =a E | aE ° | : YH | 31 | -Sp) a oe It | : | aie | | I" | rp =NES] | | |=f; ghaarcara! :7 mE | | ASHE TgLE = cle | 5} ot | aae | L oe ee |2ca] 8°J-$fl2--°1| 3 |elt -baSau! jee 31sSPSSSSSHe = +2 ~~ $2 8] .: | “eZ7 sf ng} A cesses esessss essa °

2 ALS | -| £

a0 mlm ° eee S16 e5$ | °1 2/4 | >| 3 2 8 \ aye —_ —_ . es &

|| -1 § 1659 EE 8 7) ef 25 > Res “||; oS, ~ ont °! ==6

a“z: :° |. |

|\ > pO HE oi 7° [| |~|FLO Old ° | 2 eee ees eeceece |e ° | a : soccer ceeeeoee |La3 a 21S) 6 18 e | 1 sig}

_=S|

22 The Setting Pr. 1 in the occupied East); political disputes on tactics or principles regarding the present and future of the East (e.g. the struggle over the fate of the collective farms).

These various areas of conflict overlapped considerably. The sources of some disputes antedated the Eastern campaign; others were crucially affected by factors unrelated to the war. Informal alliances were drawn among some of the competing men — alignments which themselves were subject to radical changes. Cynics and realists, idealists and opportunists, little men and able men, strong and weak — they were all there, working and feuding with each other at the same time. The First Steps

In the wake of the Barbarossa Decree, the General Staff gave some thought to the future administration of the areas to be occupied in the East. In January 1941 the Operations Division decided that in spite of security considerations only a minimum of armed forces was to be diverted to the ‘rear areas’.!_ And in the first half of February, General Eduard Wagner, Quartermaster-General of the Army, raised with the Chief of Staff the question of ‘setting up a military administration for ‘‘ Barbarossa’’’.2,) Even thereafter, however, the Army paid relatively little attention to the administrative aspects of the coming occupation. This was not only because of its absorption in purely military affairs. It was expected that after the conclusion of the brief campaign, the areas would cease to be the concern of the High Command. Moreover — and this was the complement of the first argument — since 1939 the Army had had several unfortunate experiences with military government.3 Its unwillingness to assume ‘excessive’ administrative responsi-

bilities fell in with Hitler’s own outlook. At a conference with Keitel on March 3, he had stated that the future tasks in occupied

Russia were so difficult that they could not be entrusted to the military. Hence, captured territories should speedily be turned over 1 OKH/GenStdH/Op.Abt., ‘Sicherungskrafte’, January 15, 1941, pp. 15-17, H 22/355*, CRS.

2 Halder, Diary (Nuremberg: Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes,

1946), v, 112. Three days later they again discussed an ‘OKW draft on executive power in ‘‘Barbarossa”’ ! Organize Military Government Russia’ (tbid. v, 115).

On the role of the Quartermaster-General in military government, see below, Ps his was particularly true in Poland, where it had also had bitter conflicts with the SS. See Erich Kordt, Wahn und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart : Union deutscher Verlag, 1948), p. 299; ‘Besprechung des Fiihrers mit Chef OKW’, October 20, 1939, Document 864-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 378 ; Keitel, affidavit, Document Keitel12, TMWC, xl, 380-2.

CH. 1 Power and Personalities 23 to a more permanent, civil administration.! As an outgrowth of this

discussion, Keitel on March 13 issued a special directive which

constituted the basic order for the future administration of the East.? It restricted the areas of military rule to a minimum : The zone of operations of the Army, formed through the advance of the Army beyond the borders of the Reich and the neighbour states, is to be limited in depth as much as possible. . . . As soon as the zone of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be bordered off in its rear. The newly occupied area to the rear of the zone of operations receives its own political administration.

Thus the military occupation was to cover only limited areas near

the front lines; it was to be of limited duration, with ever greater regions turned over to civil government as the armies advanced farther into enemy territory. The task of military government was intended to be so brief that considerations of utility were to prevail. The naive, unstated implication was that political decisions could be postponed until the time when the areas were more permanently organized.

The areas to the rear of the zone of operations, organized under a

‘political administration’, were to be divided according to two yardsticks: (1) by sectors held by each of the Army Groups — North, Centre, and South, and (2) according to existing ethnic borders. That these two yardsticks were mutually conflicting was evidently not realized. For the moment only the broadest directives

were given. ‘In these areas’, the order continued, ‘the political administration passes to Reichskommissare, who receive their directives from the Fiihrer’. Thus the newly-captured areas were to be turned over promptly to German civil rule, to be administered by the Fihrer’s plenipotentiaries, who assumed the unfor-

anywhere. |

tunate title of “Reich commissars’.3 No indigenous rule, no prospect of eventual autonomy or independence was mentioned With Hitler’s sanction, a more comprehensive decree ‘On the

Uniform Fulfilment’ of the Eastern assignment was issued on March 31, which General Wagner’s office spelled out a few days later in a set of ‘Special Directives’. ' Paraphrase in Helmuth Greiner, Die oberste Wehrmachtfihrung 1939-1943 (Wiesbaden : Limes Verlag, 1951), p. 369.

2 Keitel, ‘Richtlinien auf Sondergebieten zur Weisung Nr. 21’, March 13, 1941, Document 447-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 53-8. The text closely followed Hitler’s remarks of ten days earlier. 3 The selection of the term ‘commissar’ for the highest representatives of German authority which claimed to liberate the people from the ‘Red commissars’ was a minor but typical example of inept planning.

24 The Setting PT. I The systematic administration and exploitation of the country [it stated] can become a concern only at a later stage. It is not a task of the Army.!

The military had no reason to object to such instructions. It gave them those functions which the Army expected: no more than it wanted and no less than it needed. Only now, after the Army had established the priority and defined

the bounds of its jurisdiction, did planning for civil government begin. As part of the implementation of the decree of March 31, Alfred Rosenberg was entrusted on April 2 with the formation of a ‘political bureau on the East’. His authority was expanded when on April 20 Hitler named him to direct ‘centrally’ all questions of the

‘Fast European space’. His early planning memoranda echoed previous directives. ‘The occupation of the European East’, he wrote, ‘will take place in two stages: first, the immediate combat operations, and second, the speediest possible. transformation of military occupation into civil government, z.e. into the various Reich Commissariats. 3

By early May Rosenberg had gathered a staff which, at the signing of an appropriate decree by the Fiihrer, could — and soon after the outbreak of war did — become the ministry in charge of the German-held areas of the U.S.S.R. Alfred Rosenberg

Rosenberg, the son of a German shoemaker, was born in 1893 in

Reval (Tallinn), Estonia, then part of the Russian empire.* Here were two elements that made for the incongruity of his later career : ' OKH/GenStdH/Gen.Qu., ‘Besondere Anweisungen, Teil C’, April 3, 1941,

Document NOKW-1648*. ‘The text of the decree of March 31, 1941, is not

available ; it is referred to in Documents 877-PS and 884-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 402, 406.

2 See Rosenberg, appendix to ‘Denkschrift Nr. 2’, April 7, 1941, Document 1019-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 557; Hitler, decree, April 20, 1941, Document 865-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 383-6 ; Rosenberg, testimony, TMWC, xi, 476-7. The letter of transmittal asked Rosenberg to co-ordinate his efforts with the Four-Year Plan (Hermann Goring), the Ministry of Economy (Walther Funk), and the OKW (Field-Marshal Keitel). 3 Rosenberg, ‘Denkschrift Nr. 3’, April 25, 1941, Document 1020-PS*, p. 1. 4 For Rosenberg’s biography, see also his own memoirs written in the prison cell at Nuremberg after the war, available in an edited version which does not always fully reproduce Rosenberg’s original and contains the editors’ extensive comments — sometimes incisive, sometimes polemical: Serge Lang and Ernst von Schenk, Portrait eines Menschheitsverbrechers (St. Gallen: Zollikofer, 1947) {German ed. hereafter cited as Rosenberg, Portrait]; Engl. trans., Memoirs of Alfred Rosenberg (Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1949). An ostensibly unedited version in

German appeared after completion of this study, under the title Letzte Auf-

zetchnungen (Gottingen : Plesse-Verlag, 1955).

CH. I Power and Personalities 25 he was reared in a German home which fostered an attachment to German language and traditions; yet, he was also deeply steeped

in Russian culture and customs. Tolstoi and Musorgskii vied with Bismarck and the sagas of Germanic antiquity as highpoints in young Rosenberg’s education. But his studies left him unsatisfied. Rejecting Christianity, insecure and unhappy in his lower middle-class milieu, Rosenberg craved for an authority and a faith.

As yet there was no trace of his future ‘ideology’. His fraternity included both Russians and Jews. The first World War found him on the Russian side of the front — a circumstance that produced no

tragic soul-searching in him. Even the Russian Revolution did not galvanize him into political activity; he was still a casual on-looker.

Only after the German Revolution did he go to the Reich. Uprooted and unstable, he landed in the romantic revolutionary atmosphere of 1919 Munich. Here was the magnet that attracted a motley crew of fanatical idealists, déclassé veterans and frustrated politicians of all hues and persuasions. Soon Rosenberg found himself in the mainstream of a new and still amorphous group around Adolf Hitler. He joined, and in 1921 became editor of the organ of the young Nazi Party, the Voélkischer Beobachter.

After the dramatic but ridiculous ‘coup’ of November 1923, which resulted in Hitler’s imprisonment, Rosenberg could satisfy his craving for authority by ‘leading’ the remnants of the Party.' But he and Hitler quarrelled on tactics and, once back in public life,

Hitler kept the ‘philosopher’ at arm’s length. Though humiliated and unhappy, Rosenberg stayed in the movement, faithfully following

the Fiihrer’s commands. He became the foreign expert of Nazism and its ‘ideologist’; his confused and mystical apology of racism, The Myth of the Twentieth Century, by its pretence of erudition and

incomprehensibility, firmly established his reputation in Nazi circles. But he failed to ‘make good’. Even after Hitler took over the reins of government, Rosenberg did not obtain a ministerial portfolio :. Hitler knew that he was not a practical politician. He directed ‘ideological propaganda’, but even in this field, others, like Goebbels, successfully competed with him. He directed the Party’s foreign-policy staff,? but even with pull and protection failed to dislodge the professional, pre-Nazi diplomats.

Wherever he turned, he proved a failure. The Nazi-Soviet Pact ' Rosenberg, Portrait, p. 93 ; Alan Bullock, Hitler : A Study in Tyranny (New York : Harper, 1953), p. 110.

~ 2 APA [Aussenpolitisches Amt] = Foreign Policy Office.

26 The Setting PT. 1 seemed to write fimis to his carefully-nurtured avocation, antiBolshevism. Spurned by the Foreign Office, he was also at loggerheads with the SS because he had hitched his wagon to the Party’s storm-troopers, the SA, which viewed the SS as an upstart rival. It was from the SA that he proposed to draw the bulk of his personnel when finally in 1941 the first hint was dropped that Hitler wanted Rosenberg —the man who alone in the top Nazi leadership had first-hand knowledge of the East — to take charge of the vast spaces the German Army was about to seize. The task was to his liking. Greedily, childishly, he stretched out his hands for power. From the spring of 1941 to the last days of the Nazi State, he would insist on /zs prerogatives, on the sole jurisdiction of his office, on his exclusive right to decide and command. Yet he

was soon to realize that others would try to detract from the role of Germanic autocrat ruling the East which he had planned for himself. Incapable of intrigue, yet also incapable of straightforward outspoken-

ness to the Fiihrer, he was again doomed to frustration and futility. He could nominally head a huge ministry and even vaster staffs in the field. But in practice he was ignored, circumvented, forgotten. Hitler, his superior, as much as Koch, his subordinate, did what they

pleased, often not even bothering to inform the blunderer. The diabolical theoretician, the philosopher of German grandeur, the tribune of anti-Semitism, had become a hide-bound Munister who, though vested with a grandiose title, was hemmed in on all sides ; the father of a fantastic design he was unable to bring to life. Heinrich Himmler

‘SS’ was the generic term for the empire of Heinrich Himmler. Variously organized and reorganized, it actually included, in addition

to the original Schutzstaffel, the police, the Gestapo, and the élite combat divisions of the Waffen SS. The RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Main Office of State Security), which was also under Himmler’s command, and its affiliates came to cover a wide range of

varied activities. ‘This was the ‘state within the state’, and, as Reichsfiithrer-SS, Himmler was its undisputed master. His was real power, more autonomous than that of his rivals, dreaded by all who came to feel it and by those who vied with him for a place of honour in the Nazi Valhalla. ‘There was nothing terrible or volcanic in his character’, a keen historian has suggested. His coldness was ‘not glacial but bloodless.

He did not delight in cruelty, he was indifferent to it; and the scruples of others were to him not contemptible, but unintelligible. . .. Here was the Grand Inquisitor, ‘the mystic in politics,

CH. II Power and Personalities 27 the man who is prepared to sacrifice humanity to an abstract ideal’.! If Hitler saw himself as the master of Nazism, Himmler inherently

deemed himself the servant of the entire myth — Aryan purity, Germanic mission, and all the rest. ‘Half schoolmaster, half crank’ — so Albert Speer saw him — but also, a leader commanding the

loyalty of his followers. Preoccupation with ancient runes and cephalic indices did not prevent him from welding his private army into a powerful instrument.

Surrounding himself with ignorant astrologers, masseurs, butchers, and jockeys who had ‘made good’ in the SS, Himmler relentlessly strove for more and more power. One agency after another was absorbed into a labyrinth of political holding companies and interlocking directorates in which Himmler had a stake. Inevi-

tably the other Nazi apostles came to abhor this man. Hitler respected him, but never warmed up to him. Bormann deemed Himmler the most dangerous challenger of his own smooth-working camarilla. ‘The Army saw in the SS a horde of rowdies, rivals, and revolutionaries. ‘The Party and the SA — and Rosenberg, too — looked upon Himmler with a mixture of fear and disgust. Against the secret order which the 5S came to represent, there took form a silent and ineffectual front. Himmler succeeded in staking out his claim in the heritage of the East. As early as the first discussion on March 3, 1941, Hitler was inclined to give him broad prerogatives. At this preparatory stage it was the police functions that provided him with an opening wedge.

Yet his tasks were to go further: not only would he appoint high police officials and dispatch forces into the areas of civil government, but in the zone of operations of the Army [Keitel’s directive of March 13 read]

the Reichsfiihrer-SS receives special tasks in preparation for political administration, by direction of the Fuhrer; tasks which result from the final encounter between two opposite political systems. Within the framework of these tasks the Reichsfiihrer-S5S acts independently and on his own responsibility.3 1 Trevor-Roper, op. cit. pp. 17-23. See also Willi Frischauer, Himmler, the Evil Genius of the Third Retch (Boston : Beacon Press, 1953). On the SS, see the presentation at the Nuremberg Trials, TMWC ; Wolfgang H. Kraus and Gabriel A. Almond, ‘Resistance and Repression under the Nazis’, G. A. Almond, ed., The Struggle for Democracy in Germany (Chapel Hill: University of* North Carolina Press, 1949), pp. 33-63 ; Gunter d’Alquen, Die SS, Geschichte, Aufgabe und Organisation (Berlin: Junker und Diinnhaupt, 1939) ; Hans Buchheim, ‘Die SS in der Verfassung des Dritten Reiches’, Vterteljahrshefte fiir Zettgeschichte (Munich), iii (1955), 127-57 ; and the excellent sketch, Karl O. Paetel, ‘Die SS’, ibid. 11 (1954), 1-33-

2 Greiner, op. cit. p. 369. 3 Document 447-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 54.

. Zz2-~=~ gee s3E2 < «8 32 ~ ae ge < 15 ES Q a 2"a Oo9 wm oL Ae O

os ra] 7 Es

%_ >eo Q ty-

Byxis aese

0 fi _ < “~~ 4 B mT 8m Ze Le BAD ~ sO fx) Joie ‘S i m £0 1 3SEE 55 —# | & 0 2 < | #3 2 Bt ar Yu mm ane .N V——_— RG = a NS en por os ~ $4

ve:

eleningrad

ie, ESTO NIA a

rm

“a Fp) Riga a nm ® Pskov >

y? TON O wenn LATVIA

Wd

yy LITHUANIA™ ! ef olotsk

@ In the

following year, the Germans did indeed move into Belorussia various groups of ‘undesirables’, ranging from German Jews to Great Russians evacuated westwards from the combat zone.

The intrinsic conflict between the two contradictory German policies — making Belorussia a part of the ‘live wall’ against Muscovy

and artificially stimulating nationalism there, or reducing it to a continental dumping ground — was never resolved. Likewise, confusion reigned over the political status to be accorded the area. In a few instances, reference was made to eventual ‘statehood’. More ' Engelhardt, op. cit. pp. 12 ff ; Walter Zimmermann, ed., Auf I[nformationsfahrt im Ostland (Riga: RKO, 1944), pp. 19-20. 2 Percy Meyer, ‘Die Weissruthenen’, Deutsche Post aus dem Osten (Berlin), November 1941, p. 10. See also Friedrich Klau, ‘Europas unbekanntestes Volk’, Auf Informationsfahrt 1m Ostland, pp. 77-82. 3 Document 1017-PS, TMWC, xxvii, 549. 4 Rosenberg, ‘Denkschrift Nr. 2’ [April 7, 1941], Document 1018-PS*%, p. 21.

For Hitler’s implicit approval, see HTT, p. 87. 5 Document 1029-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 575. See also Rosenberg, speech, June 20, 1941, Document 1058-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 618. Wartheland was the name given to the former province of Posen (Poznan), which was enlarged by the addition of parts of Lédz province. 6 The otherwise well-informed Grosskopf naively told his superiors at the Foreign Office before the invasion that Rosenberg contemplated ‘an independent White Ruthenian state under German leadership’ extending to the Valdai Mountains. (Grosskopf to Weizsacker and Ribbentrop, June 4, 1941, Document NG-4633%*.)

>e2v w 2 % + w: cs E S| x & > °eo—_ rs) pains : “— @& . 2 ~@eeo® gio —_ ood J@ “trees, @mot a J =£ eee = \ Zz we xi" x, eiti eoeNe

: 3aO5¢fo-22 62 008 Ny ii i ee os iw S > 3 ete OSG rd - < O Nn < oo : Q ao ~Z oor 2 (9D . *Nn

> oS QO: °r— : . faeee er °C"«—~ e. ra x :< ta a O < I~ “xX m SirsOf £9) N 5 _ Zz

/ ors 6| e 3, dF IFO G é

3 Zz, Qe! , f ‘ < a 4 '
N 6& ey |o18) Oond \ "a f “wr~ %Py°Gos a : eyene! wd! !

< > ff O fF w eed v a) * i o) /\ >J "od

bh

240 Peoples and Policies PT. which was (without fanfare or even official approval from Berlin) given some genuine authority in regional government. The outward high point of the occupation was the celebration of Bairam, the Moslem holiday, in Kislovodsk on October 11. KoOstring, Schiller, and other high German officials were presented with precious gifts by the local Committee. The Germans, on their part, pledged the early dissolution of collective farms and announced the formation of a Karachai volunteer squadron of horsemen to fight with

the German Army. Késtring, whose speech in Russian evoked enthusiasm in the crowd, was literally lifted on the natives’ arms and tossed in the air as a token of acclaim and honour.

In Berlin, Wagner and Altenstadt approved of the regional government. ‘The lengths to which the authorities were willing to go in this instance was best illustrated by the unique procedure of recognizing the claim of the Karachai Committee to former state property :

The headquarters of Army Group ‘A’ has decreed that the former [Soviet] state property in the Karachai Autonomous Region is in trustee-

ship of the Karachai nationality. Accordingly the Karachai Regional Committee has claim to the proceeds of state enterprises, forests, etc., as directed by Army Group ‘A’ on November 8, 1942.?

‘he policy of giving indigenous groups some actual control over internal and cultural affairs as well as some authority in economic life apparently brought large rewards to the Germans: during the entire occupation, there was no evidence of anti-German activity in the Karachai area.3

In the Kabardino-Balkar area, the Mountaineers likewise accorded the Germans a warm welcome. While the Kabardins were somewhat reserved, the Moslem Balkars were particularly co-

operative. Here too the Germans permitted the formation of a regional committee headed by a local lawyer, Selim Shadov. According to his memoirs, the Germans (and to a lesser extent, the Rumanian occupying forces) ‘respected the indigenous authorities’,

staging formal conferences with Army officials, including the 1 Interviews G-1, G-2, H-81; Erich Kern, Dance of Death (New York : Scribner, 1951), pp. 124-5 ; Thorwald, op. cit. pp. 106-14. 2 Sonderstab Oberst Nagel [Wi Kdo 16], report, November 30, 1942, Wi/ID 2.1354*, CRS.

3 See also Einsatzgruppen Reports, September-December 1942*; and schiinemann, ‘Eine Fahrt durch das Gebiet der Karatschajer’, Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, November 4, 1942. 4 Until the war, there had been more unrest among the Balkars, who live in the higher mountain areas and are closely akin to the Karachai, than among the better adjusted Kabardins, a branch of Circassians living in the valleys.

CH. XN The Crescent and the Swastika 247 Field-Marshal himself. They willingly granted autonomy in cultural and religious affairs; gradually local economic problems were also

turned over to the committee. On December 18 the Kurman ceremonies were held in Nal’chik, the seat of the indigenous administration, in the presence of German dignitaries. Again gifts were exchanged, with the local officials giving the Germans magnifcent steeds and receiving in return Korans and captured weapons, and Brautigam made a public address about the lasting bonds of German friendship with the peoples of the Caucasus. Though roundly criticized for a variety of abuses and generally acclaimed with less enthusiasm than its counterpart in Karachai, the government of Kabarda in the sixty-five days of its existence gained general popular acceptance.!

The ‘new course’ pursued in the North Caucasus was highlighted by several specific measures. Prompt decision to reopen mosques and churches apparently evoked widespread satisfaction. Likewise, the election (rather than appointment) of local elders was acclaimed — though, in practice, often violated. When the SD em-

barked on its extermination of the Jews, it encountered a special situation with regard to the Tats, or ‘Mountain Jews’, who had for centuries resided among the aborigines and were considered a fully

indigenous element. When ordered to wear ‘yellow stars’ as a prelude to their liquidation, the Tats took their case to the Nal’chik Regional Committee, which promptly raised the problem with the Army staff. In December the latter ruled that the Tats were not to be discriminated against, and for once the SD was forced to desist.’ The problem arousing the greatest amount of dispute was the collective farms. While elsewhere under the German occupation — as will be shown in a subsequent chapter — a slow and often nomi-

nal agrarian reform was instituted, in the Caucasus a procedure was adopted which went further in meeting popular aspirations. Especially in the pastoral regions, more rapid reprivatization of cattle-holdings and land ownership was decreed, though in the grain-producing steppe regions the reform differed but little from that in the adjacent and Ukrainian provinces.3 1 [Shadov,] ‘Natsional’noe pravitel’stvo v svobodnoi Kabardino-Balkarskoi respublike’, MS*, pp. 2-8 ; interviews G-11, G-19, H-81, H-89, H-354.

2 Interview H-354; ‘’'Tatskii vopros v period 1942 goda’, MS*; Rudolf

Loewenthal, ‘The Judeo-Tats in the Caucasus’, Historia Judaica, xiv (April 1952), 79. Officially the Nazis classified the Tats as Jews. 3 Interviews G-2, G-6, H-89 ; [Shadov,] op. cit. "pp. 4-7. When the central economic staff for the East decided that in the Caucasus ‘not agricultural communes but private economies are to be created’, General Wagner urged Hitler to promise the dissolution of collective farms, for this ‘will be one of the most effective propaganda measures’. Since, however, many German economists objected to prompt

248 Peoples and Policies PT. In spite of the special policy pursued, it would be historically false to depict German rule in the Caucasus as an idyll unmarred by

abuse and brutality. Looting, physical maltreatment, and discrimination were widespread. Economic exploitation was attempted

on a wide scale. In cases of doubt, military demands had priority over indigenous interests. German reprisals for killings or pillage of Army stocks were as swift and savage as elsewhere in occupied Europe. Various Sonderftihrer— that peculiar assimilated rank which to many Russians symbolized the uniformed German interpreter or military government official — adopted the same methods they had used with impunity farther north. The clamour for the release of prisoners of war remained unanswered. After evacuations, drafts, and purges the lack of manpower was severe. ‘The tactfulness and flexibility of the German administration did not go beyond the narrow bounds of self-interest as the Army and economic agencies interpreted it. German monopoly of oil and mineral resources was beyond dispute. And the extermination of Jews was begun with the same thoroughness as everywhere else.

In spite of all this, German rule in the North Caucasus did not evoke the violent popular disillusionment and eventual hostility which it had farther north.!. This fact cannot be adequately explained without taking into account the brevity of the occupation. As the German offensive halted and material conditions deteriorated towards the end of 1942, pro-German sentiments began to ebb; yet, in the words of a refugee, ‘there was not enough time for thoroughgoing disillusionment’. Changes of attitude were not yet translated into hostile action.

Furthermore, the nature of the nationality problem — and the more ‘solicitous’ policy pursued — differed substantially from that in both the Ukraine and Belorussia. ‘The grant of a modicum of home rule was not predicated on Balkar or Karachai aspirations to sovereign statehood. Here autonomy was not a stepping-stone to acrimonious feuds between separatists and federalists, or between proponents of the Rosenberg concept and the advocates of a unitary policy. Applied to a thinly populated area, largely Moslem and nonand complete reprivatization, a compromise was reached by which in the pastoral areas (inhabited by the non-Slavic Mountaineers) kolkhozes would be abolished, while in the northern flatlands communes would be maintained but with larger holdings with more privileges to the individual household than were contemplated

in the Ukraine. (WiStab Ost, VO be1 OKH/Gen.Qu., ‘Vortragsnotiz fiir den Herrn Gen.Qu.’, June 29, 1942* ; WiStab Ost, ‘Durchfiihrung der Agrarordnung im Gebiet des Nordkaukasus’, September 24, 1942, Wi/ID 403*, CRS.) Though actually many collectives were promptly abolished, the reform was not officially enacted until December 1942. 1 Interviews H-101, H-135, H-182, H-354.

CH, XII The Crescent and the Swastika 249 industrial, regional autonomy struck a responsive cord without creating violent and new conflicts among either German or indigenous circles.

Finally, German support of the minor nationalities in the North Caucasus did not have the anti-Russian edge which the Ostminis-

terium sought to sharpen in Ostland and the Ukraine. Though occasionally discriminated against, the Slavic population was active and prominent, and Russian remained the official and only common language of the region.!

Berlin :

The occupation was as spectacular as it was short-lived. Arriving full of optimism and anticipating an early push into Transcaucasia, the Germans soon found themselves frustrated and all but cut off —

a situation mirrored in Kleist’s (probably apocryphal) message to In front of me, no enemy ; Behind me, no supplies.

With the battle of Stalingrad draining all available resources, and with Soviet forces in the Caucasus gradually restored to combat readiness, the troops south-east of Rostov were in danger of being isolated. Only in January 1943, however, did Hitler permit them to retreat intact rather than risk utter annihilation. With the withdrawal accomplished, only a small area around the delta of the Kuban’ River and the Taman’ peninsula remained in German hands until September 1943 as a bridgehead from which a new attack — which never came about — was to be launched. In the latter period of 1943, as the military situation worsened, German policy became

more intransigent. Hundreds of suspects were killed for helping non-existent partisans; in violation of directives, forced labour conscription was begun; whole stretches of land were laid waste and all inhabitants driven out. All inhibitions were swept aside as the Army indiscriminately requisitioned and evacuated, liquidated and destroyed. In the face of adversity, the tactics of calculated generosity evaporated, and Army policy reverted to what it was elsewhere in the occupied East. Caucasian Sunset

Turkey disappointed German hopes by staying out of the war.

It remains conjectural whether or not it would have entered if German troops had pushed on to Batum and Baku. Papen, for one, 1 Interviews G-11, G-19.

250 Peoples and Polictes Pro was quite optimistic when, at the peak of German victories, Foreign Minister Sikrii Saracoglu became Premier of Turkey. Publicly, to

be sure, Saracoglu was careful to steer the course of neutrality he had carefully charted during the preceding year. . . . Turkey has sought no adventures beyond her frontiers [he told the National Assembly]. She will continue to seek the means of remaining outside the war. . . . We have contractual or actual relations with states in both the opposing camps. Our attitude will be equally friendly and loyal towards these states.'

Yet the German ambassador and observers in Berlin sought to find veiled pro-German sentiments in his pronouncements. Moreover, in a private talk with Papen, Saracoglu went further.

| The Russian problem [Papen cited him as having said] can be solved by Germany only if at least half the Russians are killed, and if, furthermore,

Germany once and for all pulls out from under Russian control all the Russified regions inhabited by alien national minorities, sets them on their own feet, wins them to voluntary co-operation with the Axis powers, and rears them as enemies of Slavism.

If these were his words, albeit made in private, they were indeed

strong language for the leader of a neutral country. They were apparently calculated to impress upon Papen Turkey’s ‘legitimate interest’ in the fate of the Turkic minorities of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Saracoglu urged Berlin not to turn its back on the Turkic émigrés, for ‘the minorities will not disappoint us’. What he asked was in substance German recognition for the separatist ‘national committees’, a favour Hitler had emphatically vetoed a few months earlier.?

These suggestions, officially transmitted at the highest level, produced the contrary effect. Intimidated by Hitler’s ire, Ribbentrop decided in mid-September that the Ankara embassy was to ‘show greater reserve’ in such matters. ‘We are not interested at this time’, he wrote, ‘in entering into any conversations on these questions with the Turkish government and thereby prejudging the solution of these problems. We have no reason to give the Turks any assurances... .’ 3 His attitude correctly reflected Hitler’s adamant refusal to conciliate either Turkey or its refugee protégés. While Germany was 1 The Times (London), August 6, 1942.

2 Papen to German Foreign Office, August 26, 1942, GPT, pp. 97-104. See also HTT, p. 546. 3 Ribbentrop to Papen, September 12, 1942, GPT, pp. 116-20. It cannot be verified whether or not this draft was actually sent to Papen,

Cu. XI The Crescent and the Swastika 251 winning, there was no need to share the spoils. At the same time, the collaboration of large numbers of Moslem Mountaineers (as well as the formation of ‘volunteer’ fighting units on the German side) had impressed the Fiihrer. But for one casual comment one might remain unaware of his own views. In discussing the Caucasian formations established by the Wehrmacht, he remarked in December 1942 : ...1 don’t know about these Georgians. They do not belong to the Turkic peoples. . . . I consider only the Moslems to be reliable. . . .

All the others I deem unreliable. For the time being I consider the formation of these battalions of purely Caucasian peoples as very risky,

while I don’t see any danger in the establishment of purely Moslem

units. . . . In spite of all the declarations from Rosenberg and the military, I don’t trust the Armenians either.!

Hitler’s back-handed endorsement of the Moslems had been implicit in the sanctioning of Army policy in the North Caucasus ; yet only here did it become clear that he had moved away from the presumptions of Aryan superiority and, ignoring his own doctrine, placed the Moslems not only above the Armenians but also above the Georgians, Rosenberg’s protégés. A few weeks later, however,

the problem had become largely academic: the North Caucasus was lost, and no further Moslem areas were ever conquered by his men. Henceforth his decisions would affect only German treatment of Moslem collaborators. Moscow drew substantially the same conclusion as Hitler did from the events in the Caucasus. If the Fiihrer deemed the Moslems there to be the most ‘reliable’, the Soviet government found them

sufficiently untrustworthy to liquidate the national republics and districts of the Chechen-Ingush, Karachai, and Balkarians (just as those of the Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, and Kalmyks) and to

exile their population.2, To the people in these areas the brief 1 FHQ, ‘Lagebesprechung’, December 12, 1942*, UofP, pp. 3-5. This passage is omitted from the published edition, Felix Gilbert, ed., Hitler Directs His War (New York : Oxford University Press, 1950). 2 The ‘liquidation’ of the Moslem areas of the North Caucasus was decreed on February 11, 1944, and promptly carried out. (See Kolarz, op. cit.; Uralov, op. cit.; Robert Magidoff, The Kremlin vs. The People [Garden City: Doubleday, 1953], pp. 22-3; A.H., ‘Kak byla unichtozhena Checheno-Ingushskaia respublika’, Sotsialisticheskit Vestnik [New York], no. 600 [September 1947], pp. 178-9.)

It is a matter of speculation to what extent the German press contributed to the Soviet view of their ‘defection’. On February 21, 1943, an article in Goebbels’ weekly, Das Reich, spoke of the many ‘new allies’ among these nationalities who

had remained behind when the German troops left. Five days later the article was withdrawn and an order issued to make no further reference to the matter because it ‘jeopardizes the existence of various nationalities’. (Erwin Kirchhof, ‘Neue Verbiindete’, Das Reich [Berlin], viii [1943], February 21 ; and Zeitschriftendienst, item no. 8447 [February 26, 1943].)

252 Peoples and Policies Pr. foreign interlude thus spelled a tragic doom. !

For the Germans the retreat from the Caucasus meant an end to their dreams, coinciding as it did with the catastrophe at Stalingrad. The brief months of Army rule over the Mountaineers had shown that an alternative to the negative policy applied elsewhere could

viably be pursued to good effect. At the same time, the object lesson of the Caucasus, much as it taught some of its first-hand participants, remained unheeded in Berlin. The North Caucasus, conceived as a special case, remained an exception in German Ostpolitik. 1 The Kalmyks experienced a fate rather similar to that of the other liquidated nationalities. In their area, too, the brief German occupation, taking into account local traditions and Buddhist rites, seemed to meet with little popular hostility. A considerable number of Kalmyks joined the Germans in retreating westwards, some of whom later fought with the Wehrmacht against Soviet partisans. ‘The Kalmyk ASSR was ordered abolished by Moscow on December 27, 1943. (See interviews H-15, H-22, H-76; S. Galdanov, ‘Narod, dlia kotorogo ne ostalos’ mesta pod solntsem’, Novoe Russkoe Slovo [New York], July 25-26, 1947 ; Shamba Balinov, ‘K 8-i godovshchine likvidatsii Kalmytskoi Respubliki’, Kavkaz [Munich], no. 4-5 [November-December 1951], pp. 38-41.)

CHAPTER XIII

THE CRESCENT AND THE SWASTIKA: (2) TATARS AND TURKS I am trying to empty the Crimea to make way for our own colonists.—ADOLF HITLER

Crimea: Gibraltar and Spa SCYTHIANS and Cimmerians, Huns and Goths, Tatars and Turks had roamed through the mountains of the Crimea and basked in its

beautiful sun. Formally an ‘autonomous republic’ under Soviet rule, it remained the scene of social, political and religious tensions.! With its mixed Tatar and Slavic population and its strategic position in the Black Sea, its fate was bound to be of primary importance to the Reich.

Of the seven complexes into which Rosenberg divided the U.S.S.R. in his first blueprint, one was the ‘ Ukraine with the Crimea’.

His subsequent memoranda likewise made it clear that the Crimea

was to be part of the future Greater Ukraine under the name of Taurida.2 The considerable number of handwritten corrections which Rosenberg made on his drafts suggests that he had some difficulty in writing this section. Indeed, while Taurida was to go to the Ukraine, Rosenberg granted that the number of Ukrainians there was small. Simultaneously he insisted that Germany must have direct control of the peninsula. It took a Rosenberg to ignore the conflict between these elements. Rosenberg stressed the Germanic background of the Crimea to

justify Nazi intentions. Not only had ‘large areas of the Crimea belonged to German colonists prior to the first World War’, but it had been the Crimea ‘where the last Goths had survived as late as the sixteenth century’. Moreover, the Crimea and its approaches are a strategic key position for the rule of the entire Black Sea and the control of the Ukraine by Germany... . ' For the background, see Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies (New York : Praeger, 1952), pp. 76-81 ; and Edige Kirimal, Der nationale Kampf der Krimttirken (Emsdetten : Lechte, 1952). 2 Rosenberg, ‘Denkschrift Nr. 1’, April 2, 1941, Document 1017-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 549. ‘Taurida (or Tauris) was the ancient Greek name for the Crimea. In German. usage, it also included the northern approaches of the peninsula.

G.R.R.——S 253

254 Peoples and Policies pr. ul ‘Therefore’, Rosenberg declared in a typical non sequitur, the acquisition of the Crimea and its approaches by Germany ‘is entirely justifiable as compensation for what was lost’ (presumably referring

to the land holdings of German colonists, nationalized during the Soviet Revolution).

If furthermore [he continued] the German Reich, which is saving the Ukraine, is prepared to extend the Ukraine’s sovereign area [Hoheitsgebiet] beyond its ethnic boundaries as far as the Volga (for reasons of border strategy), the demand for the Crimea is likewise justified.!

While the Crimea was thus technically assigned to the Ukraine, in actuality the Reich intended to retain it under direct German rule. It was a revealing example of what Rosenberg meant by Ukrainian ‘sovereignty’. Once again, when Germany’s own demands were given priority, his ‘compassion’ for the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union vanished. Rosenberg’s plans for annexing the Crimea were a direct echo of Hitler’s twofold argument for its Germanization. The Crimea was to become the ‘German Gibraltar’ controlling the Black Sea. At the same time, it provided an appealing locale for the settlement of Germans in what Robert Ley, chief of the German labour front and of the ‘Strength through Joy’ movement, promptly defined as

‘one large German spa’.? Realism and fantasy mingled in engendering plans of conquest. At the policy-making conference of July 16, 1941, Hitler singled

out the Crimea among all the areas of the Soviet Union ‘to be cleared of all foreigners [z.e. non-Germans] and to be settled by Germans’. The plan was promptly elaborated in greater detail : ‘The Crimea with its Tauride hinterland shall go to Germany, and its Russian population shall be moved to Russia [proper]’. According

to the well-informed Etzdorf, Hitler commented at this point: ‘Where to, I really don’t care a bit; Russia is big enough’.? In the following months, in spite of his more pressing concerns, Hitler found time to give some thought to the resettlement of the Crimea, which, in view of its alleged Gothic heritage, was to be

renamed Gotenland. When Rosenberg went to see Hitler in December 1941, the Fiihrer reiterated that later he would ‘wish the

Crimea to be entirely cleared’ of its non-German population. In his account of the conference, Rosenberg added : 1 Rosenberg, ‘Instruktion fiir einen Reichskommissar in der Ukraine’, May 7, 1941, Document 1028-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 572-3. See also Documents 1035-PS*

and 1058-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 620. 2 Interviews G-5, G-19.

3 [Bormann,] ‘Aktenvermerk’, July 16, 1941, Document 221-L, TMWC,

xxxvili, 87 ; Etzdorf, ‘Diary’ (entry for August 12, 1941), Document NG-2775*.

CH. XIII The Crescent and the Swastika 255 I told him that I too had already worried about the renaming of the cities, and I thought of renaming Simferopol’ Gotenberg, and Sevastopol’ Theodorichhafen, in accordance with the directives of the Fihrer.!

It is clear from the context of various directives that, some time

in early 1942, Hitler issued instructions to proceed with the resettlement of the Crimea, but their text has not been located. A team of SS researchers and planners began detailing the colonization

project, in line with the SS’s special responsibility for matters of German settlement.2, An early project, intended to facilitate both strategic and demographic operations, was the construction of an Autobahn linking the Crimea with the German network of superhighways, so that (according to Hitler) one could ‘do the whole distance easily in two days’.3 This phase evoked no opposition — but remained on paper. More difficult, even in the planning stage, was the transfer of populations. The first group to be moved to the Crimea was the 140,000 ethnic Germans residing in Rumanian-held ‘Transnistria’. ‘The plan was held in abeyance until the Crimea was

fully subdued; by that time, an ingenious scheme had been advanced to solve the festering German-Italian dispute over the South Tyrol by moving the South Tyrolese to the Crimea.* The project,

stressing the dual advantages of Germanizing the Crimea and eliminating a source of friction between the Reich and Italy, was submitted to the Fiihrer by his appointee Generalkommissar of the

Crimea, Gauleiter Alfred Frauenfeld. Hitler enthusiastically approved : I think the idea is an excellent one. . . . I think, too, that the Crimea will be both climatically and geographically ideal for the South Tyrolese, ' HTT, pp. 110, 621; Rosenberg, ‘Vermerk iiber eine Unterredung beim Fuhrer am 14.12.1941’, Document 1517-PS, TMWC, xxvii, 272. Though no public announcement was made about the proposed destiny of the Crimea, the German press prepared the ground by a variety of articles stressing the IndoEuropean and above all Gothic background of the peninsula, which ostensibly provided the Nazis with ‘historicity’ for their claims. See, for instance, Wir erobern die Krim (Neustadt: Pfalzische Verlagsanstalt, 1943), pp. 259-76;

Hans-Joachim Kausch, ‘Auf der Krim’, Rheinisch-Westfdalische Zettung, July 16,

1943; Josef Tobias, ‘Die Halbinsel der Vélkerschicksale’, Deutsche Ukraine-

Zeitung (Rovno), August 30, 1942.

2 Interviews G-6, H-106 ; Meyer-Hetling, report, February 19, 1942, Document NG-1118*,

3 HTT, pp. 578, 599; Rosenberg to Meyer, October 20, 1941, Document

1057-PS* ; Document NG-1118*. 4 In his notes for a report to Himmler on May 28, 1942, Ulrich Greifelt, head of the Resettlement Office, suggested postponing the actual transfer because of technical difficulties (Document NO-3182*). The objections had been presented at a conference under Warlimont by OKW and OMzi personnel in May 1942. (Brautigam, op. cit. p. 21.) See also Conrad F. Latour, ‘Germany, Italy, and the South Tyrol’, MS* (American University, 1955).

256 Peoples and Polictes PT. 1 and in comparison with their present settlement it will be a real land of milk and honey. Their transfer to the Crimea presents neither physical nor psychological difficulty. All they have to do is to sail down just one German waterway, the Danube, and there they are.! The result was a specific Hitler directive early in July to evacuate

all Russians from the Crimea; the Tatars and Ukrainians would be

moved out later if necessary. This -order is revealing in several respects. On the one hand, it shows that, without subscribing to Rosenberg’s thesis, Hitler none the less began his purge with the Russians — in part, it would seem, because of the desired concord with Turkey ; in part, because there was no ‘logical’ place to move

the Tatars as there was for the Russians. Equally interesting is the fact that Rosenberg had anticipated this plan; in line with his own concept, he had proposed in October 1941 that Russians, Jews, and ‘Tatars be moved out of the peninsula, leaving only the Ukrain-

ians there when the German settlers started arriving.2 It is also worth noting that, once its protests proved futile, the OKW cooperated. As early as July 6, 1942, a conference of Army and 55S officers was held to outline such measures as the guarding of resettlement camps, liquidation of undesirables, and transportation facilities for the migration.3 After consulting with Hitler, Himmler was constrained to report that the T'yrolese movement had better be postponed until after the

war. Now Frauenfeld and Greifelt worked out a new scheme

calling for an eventual transfer of the 2000 Germans from Palestine to the Crimea; the fact that most of them were in British hands did

not deter the dreamers. Even Himmler now advised ‘postponement’ of such fantasies until the spring of 1943 or ‘another favourable

moment’. The end of the resettlement effort is well shown in General Thomas’ files. In mid-August he had ventured to protest

to Goring and Keitel about the contemplated evacuation of Russians and Ukrainians, if only because their removal — four-fifths of the

population of the Crimea — would paralyse economic life. ‘Gau-

leiter Frauenfeld’, he added, ‘is likewise of the opinion that an evacuation of Russians and Ukrainians . . . is impossible at this time. One should remove merely the evil elements.’5 Three weeks later a ' HTT, p. 548 (entry for July 2, 1942); Harry Picker, ed., Hitlers Tischgesprdache (Bonn: Athenéum-Verlag, 1951), p. 314. 2 Document 1057-PS*.

3 SS Obersturmfthrer Grothman to Rudolf Brandt, July 5, 1942, Document NO-1734*.

4 Himmler to Frauenfeld, July 10, 1942; Frauenfeld to Himmler, July 27,

1942 ; and Himmler to Frauenfeld, August 17, 1942 ; Document NO-2417*. 5 ‘Thomas, ‘Vortragsnotiz fiir Reichsmarschall und Chef OKW’, August 17, 942, Wi/ID 2.6 o2b*, CRS.

CH. XII The Crescent and the Swastika 257 telephone message from Géring’s office told Thomas to forget the whole matter: the evacuation would take place only after the war ; and a few days later his liaison officer with Jodl’s staff reported that ‘an evacuation of the Crimea is at present no longer under discus-

sion’.! Himmler still had his staff proceed with ‘all necessary planning for a later settlement of Germans’ in the peninsula, but as of late 1942 the programme was postponed indefinitely because of the military situation.2 As for the transfer of the Tatars, it was even more decisively postponed, with Himmler for once citing reasons of utility rather than principle : For the duration of the war, touching on the question of the Tatars and

their transfer to consolidated areas by all means must be avoided. We must not bring the least unrest to these people who incline towards us and have faith in us. This would be a catastrophic error.3

In principle, Hitler fully approved of the resettlement plans. Only once, at the height of German-Turkish negotiations, did he envisage restricting German fortifications in the Crimea to a single

base, so as to establish ‘really amicable relations with Turkey’. Even then he urged: We must organize the Crimea in such a manner that, even in the dim future, we should never be constrained to leave to others the benefits of the work we have done there. Between Turkey and Germany

The Crimean Tatars had strong traditional bonds to Turkey ; the leaders of the Crimean separatist movement — who characteristic-

ally called themselves Crimean Turks — had established residence

in Turkey; and of all the Turkic areas of the Soviet Union, the peninsula across the sea evoked in Ankara the greatest interest and

memories of past possession. Soon after the German attack, therefore, various Turkish circles started dropping hints concerning

the future of the Crimea. Some of these were brought directly to Papen’s attention. ‘They boiled down to two concrete proposals: granting self-government to the Crimean Tatars as soon as the Germans had ‘pacified’ the peninsula; and sending a Crimean Tatar delegation from Turkey to Berlin to act as advisers and perhaps tT [(OKW/WiRiti Amt,] ‘Aktennotiz’, September 9, 1942; and [OKW/WiRit Amt,] VO bei WFSt [Major von Illberg], ‘Aktennotiz’, September 14, 1942 ; both Wi/ID 2.602b*, CRS.

2 GPT, pp. 86-9; SSPF Krim, ‘Bericht tiber die Arbeitsergebnisse’, May 31, 1944, Document NO-4009* ; interview G-14. See also Conference at FHQ, ‘Aktennotiz’, August 17, 1942, Document NO-2703*.

3 Himmler to HSSPF Russland-Siid and SSPF Krim, January 20, 1943,

Document NO-2209*. 4 HTT, pp. 478-9 ; and Picker, op. cit. p. 82 (entry for May 13, 1942).

258 Peoples and Policies PT. I as representatives of their fellow-nationals. In early November 1941 Papen himself suggested to Berlin after the completion of the Crimean campaign, to establish there an administration in which the Crimean Tatars would significantly participate. This would have a strong political effect in Turkey.!

At the same time, General Erkilet asked the Auswartiges Amt to issue visas to two Tatars, followers of Cafar Seydahmet, leader of the

separatist émigrés. In mid-November, Ambassador von Hentig, who handled Near Eastern affairs at the Foreign Office, informed the Turks that the two men could proceed to Berlin.?, They soon arrived in Germany and set to work.3 This was the only instance during the Soviet campaign where the Reich formally sanctioned the participation, albeit nominal, of non-belligerents. ‘The deceptive nature of the German move becomes clear when one bears in mind that these spokesmen of Tatar nationalism were admitted at the very time when a firm decision had been taken to Germanize the Crimea

completely. When the Turks reiterated their hope for an independent Crimea, Rosenberg and Hitler agreed on the ‘danger of a pan-Turanic movement’ and on refusing the two Crimeans ‘from Constantinople’ permission to inspect prisoner-of-war camps where

their fellow-nationals were interned. ‘The only thing one might do’, Rosenberg’s notes indicated, ‘is to separate the 250 Crimean ‘Tatar prisoners of war and to treat them suitably, out of consideration for ‘Turkey.’ +

After the conquest of the Crimea they and other ‘l'atar ‘volunteers’ were organized in auxiliary military units to fight on the Ger-

man side. ‘This was the only rationale which the German press was permitted to cite for Tatar ‘rights’; pointing to the numerical superiority of the Russians and Ukrainians in the peninsula, one author considered it ‘therefore understandable that they [the Tatars] are hoping for a revision’ of their status. ‘By their participation in

the struggle against Bolshevism’, it was asserted, ‘. .. the Tatars have won the right to have their interests considered’ in the future reorganization of Eastern Europe.>

This ‘future reorganization’ remained studiedly undefined in 1 Papen to Weizsadcker, November 10, 1941, GPT, p. 44.

2 Hentig to Erkilet, November 17, 1941, GPT, pp. 46-7. Seydahmet (or Ahmed Dzhaferoglu) had been the representative abroad of the Crimean Parliament in 1919 and later prominent in the Prometheus movement. 3 Interview H-106 ; Kirimal, op. cit. p. 306. See also GPT’, pp. 50-1.

4 Document 1517-PS, TMWC, xxvii, 272; memorandum to Warlimont

(transmitted by Dittmann), January 23, 1942, GPT, p. 68.

5 Gerhard Christoph, ‘Die Halbinsel Krim’, Der nahe Osten (Berlin), iit

(1942), pp. 143-5 ; Volk und Retch, May 1942, pp. 290-302. Six Crimean Tatar

CH. XII The Crescent and the Swastika 259 public pronouncements. Only rarely did a remark foreshadow German plans : As the spa of all Europe [wrote an author with the blessings of Nazi censorship], the Crimea will march forward to a great future within the European Grossraum economy.!

To those who could decipher Nazi verbiage, the implications were clear.

The Army in the Crimea

The German armies reached the Isthmus of Perekop in Septem-

ber 1941 and, after a victorious battle, penetrated the Crimea. During the winter months, however, Soviet forces landed on the eastern shore and recaptured Kerch and Feodosia. Only after new

and bitter battles did the invading troops subdue the peninsula, recapturing Kerch and storming Sevastopol’ in May 1942, after a lengthy siege. ‘he Crimea thus came under military occupation. Until late 1942, the Crimea was the headquarters of Field-Marshal von Manstein, commander of the Eleventh Army, later of FieldMarshal von Kleist, chief of Army Group ‘A’. On the lower levels the military occupation was in many respects

much like that farther north, on the mainland. ‘There was some ‘utilitarian’ restraint on the part of the troops, but there were also atrocities and violence whenever ‘the situation demanded’ them.

The tone was set by Manstein’s insistence that ‘the JewishBolshevik system must be wiped out once and for all’. ‘Therefore’, battalions were recruited for police and anti-partisan duties largely under the direction of the SD. While the German command found them helpful, the extreme nationalists looked upon them as the nucleus of a future ‘Crimean army’. Among the rank and file their formation appears to have evoked neither enthusiasm nor violent hostility. For the orders providing for the recruitment of the Tatars and,

in rather strong and unusual terms, for circumspect treatment of them by the Germans, see AOK 11, O.Qu. to GenKdo Schwarzes Meer, O.Qu., January 6, 1942, Document NOKW-1277* ; AOK 11, Ic/AO, ‘’Tataren-Ersatz’, January 9, 1942, Document NOKW-1311* ; Einsatzgruppe D, ‘Die Rekrutierung der Krimtataren’, February 15, 1942, Document NOKW-1213*. See also Kausch, ‘Bericht tiber die Reise’, June 26, 1943, Document Occ E 4-11*, YIVO. 1 Axel von Gadolin, Der Norden, der Ostraum und das neue Europa (Munich : Rohrig, 1943), p. 161.

2 On conditions in the German-occupied Crimea, see Michael M. Luther, ‘The German Occupation of the Crimea in World War II’* (Russian Institute

Essay, Columbia University, 1954), publ. as ‘ Die Krim unter deutscher Besatzung,’ Forschungen zur osteuropdischen Geschichte (Berlin), 111 (1956), 28-98. Manstein’s behaviour is a chapter full of contradictory evidence, which both sides effectively marshalled at his trialin 1949. If the prosecution seems to have overstated the case against him, the apologia of his able British defence attorney must also be read with

considerable reservations (R. T. Paget, Manstein : His Campaigns and Hts Trial [London : Collins, 1951]). See also Dietrich von Choltitz, Soldat unter Soldaten (Zurich : Europa-Verlag, 1951), ch, iv, v,

260 Peoples and Policies PT. 1 the German soldier had to act ‘as avenger for all the cruelties com-

mitted against him and the German people... .’ At a moment when food shortages were becoming a matter of vital concern and a source of serious popular resentment, he ordered : Especially in the hostile cities, a large part of the population will have to starve. In spite of this, none of the goods which the fatherland gives us at the cost of privations may, out of a sense of mistaken humaneness, be distributed to prisoners and to the population — unless they are in the service of the German Wehrmacht.

And as far as anti-German elements were concerned, ‘the population must be more afraid of our reprisals than of the partisans’.'

On the other hand, some efforts were to be made to attract the support of at least a segment of the population. ‘The passivity of numerous allegedly anti-Soviet elements’, Manstein ordered, ‘must

yield to a clear decision in favour of active co-operation against Bolshevism. Where it does not exist, it must forcibly be brought about [erzwungen| by appropriate means.’ ‘The premise here, as the Army command saw it, was ‘just treatment of all non-Bolshevik

elements of the population’. Strict ‘respect of religious customs, especially of the Moslem Tatars’ was ordered; the confiscation of the farmers’ ‘last cow, the last chicken, or seed’ was forbidden; and an intricate system of bonuses and rewards was instituted for those elements of the population who actively assisted the occupying forces.2, The commanding general remained sceptical of the potentialities of such a policy. Though willing to try this narrow-gauge non-political collaboration drive, Manstein admitted the difficulties

of winning the support of the Soviet population. ‘In the last analysis, their interests . . . differ from ours.’ 3 Manstein acquiesced tacitly in the work of the SD action teams. In Simferopol’ the SD captured the card file of NK VD agents and

suspects, and indiscriminately proceeded to shoot people listed therein. The liquidation of the Jews was carried out with the same ruthlessness as elsewhere.‘ 1 Manstein, order, November 11, 1941, Document 4064-PS, TMWC, xxxiv, 129-32 ; Manstein, order, December 15, 1941, Document NOKW-502*. 2 Ibid.; Paget, op. cit. pp. 40-1 ; Luther, op. cit. ch. ii. 3 Manstein to Dirksen, May 9, 1943, GPT, pp. 135-6.

4 Interview H-106; Documents NOKW-502* and NO-2546* ; 4064-PS, TMWGC, xxxiv, 131. On the work of Einsatzgruppe D, see the transcript of the Nuremberg trial case, U.S. v. Ohlendorf et al. On the fate of the Krimchaks, see Rudolf Loewenthal, ‘The Extinction of the Krimchaks in World War II’, American Slavic and East European Review (New York), x, no. 2 (April 1951), 130-6. On the other hand, the Karaims were not considered Jews and were spared. See

Documents 084-PS, TMWC, xxv, 168; Occ E 4-13*, YIVO; and Gerald

Reitlinger, The Final Solution (New York : Beechhurst Press, 1953), pp. 241-2.

CH. XIII The Crescent and the Swastika 261 Less clear-cut was the policy pursued with respect to the nation-

alities of the Crimea. As a result of the general directives from Berlin aimed primarily against the Great Russians, and reinforced by the officials of the SS, Ostministerium, and some Army échelons, the Russians residing in the Crimea were subjected to some discrimination. They were extensively ousted from positions in the local government and economy, especially in the rural areas, and replaced with collaborating Tatars. On the other hand, a Russianlanguage newspaper, Golos Kryma, appeared under German censorship along with one in Turkic, Azat Kirim. Probably the greatest deterrent to the implementation of a clear pro-Tatar policy was the insistent reminder by some Army officers that the Crimean ‘Tatars

constituted only a minority of the local population and that any ‘realistic? German policy must avoid antagonizing the Slavic element. It was further evident that only a fraction of the Tatars expressed articulate national feelings, although Moslem religious consciousness was widespread among them.

Thus, when the Turkish faction, with Papen’s endorsement, pressed for local self-government in the Crimea, the Army decided upon a compromise solution. In effect it made a minor concession

to local Tatar sentiment while avoiding the granting of political

recognition: the formation of local Moslem committees was authorized ; the first was organized as early as mid-November 1941,

and in 1942 a central Moslem Committee was authorized in Simferopol’. Concerned primarily with local, religious and cultural rather than political affairs, the committees satisfied the aspirations

of some Crimean ‘Tatars for symbolic self-government, while German control over their overt activities assured the occupying power against the emergence of hostile trends.!

Like the other German-sponsored bodies intended to serve as innocuous ‘fronts’ — such as the Vlasov committee and the Belo-

russian separatists —the Moslem committees provided a convenient mantle for sub rosa efforts of non-Nazi activists. Though generally more anti-Soviet than anti-German, the latter — largely old Crimean nationalists who had returned from exile — occasionally

worked independently, even at the risk of defying the German authorities. Thus in late 1942, under a spurious pretext, a gathering of various Moslem committees was induced to establish a ‘plenum’

intended to become a representative body. The spiritus rector behind this effort was Ahmed Ozenbashly, a member of the Crimean cabinet in 1919 and a leading official until the dispersal of the Tatar ™ Kirimal, op. cit. pp. 305-7 ; RMfdbO., Propaganda-Dienst, no. 3 (August 27, 1942), p. 8; Document Occ E 18-19*, YIVO,

262 Peoples and Policies PT. 1 nationalist and fellow-travelling Milli Firka by the Communists in 1927. Ozenbashly now tried in effect to revive the organization and had the ‘plenum’ grant him broad authority to negotiate with the Germans. With German setbacks and greater intransigence towards the Tatars during the following winter, however, the sense of disappointment spread to nationalist circles. In 1943 Ozenbashly was telling his associates that ‘we have found ourselves between Scylla and Charybdis’.! Ozenbashly’s disillusionment was symptomatic of the general

change that had come over the population. Initial anti-Soviet feeling had run high. Now many factors contributed to the cooling of pro-German sentiments; among them were worsening material

conditions; conscription of forced labour; indiscriminate antipartisan operations, exacting a heavier toll among innocent civilians than among the bands; and German failure to institute a thoroughgoing agrarian reform.’ A more positive and somewhat more lenient approach became apparent only in 1943 when von Kleist, retreating from the Caucasus, sought to apply to the Crimea some of his newly gained experience.

In an independent move, he issued directives in February 1943 which reflected a different spirit from that which had heretofore prevailed. ‘They came in the wake of the Army demands made at the December 1942 conference in Berlin and followed the setbacks

at Stalingrad.3 Kleist now insisted that the reversal of military fortunes and the increasing decline in pro-German sentiment were due in large measure to German policy. More politically attuned than most of his fellow-generals, he ordered : ' Interviews H-7, H-106, H-3382; Wur erobern die Krim, pp. 286, 298. In

November 1942, Ozenbashly asked the Germans to recognize the Crimean Tatars

as a distinct nation, permit the return of émigrés, and establish a national and religious centre for the Crimean Tatars. (Azat Kirim [Simferopol’], November 19, 1942, cited in Kirimal, op. cit. p. 315.)

While Professor von Mende, in line with his general tendency, backed the Moslem committee project, Rosenberg himself, still intent on the Germanization plan, rejected the idea. See also Dittmann to Tippelskirch, August 5, 1942, GPT’, p. 87. 2 See Luther, op. cit., ch. iii, iv. The modest German agrarian reform was slow in coming, whereas the peasantry as elsewhere was overwhelmingly bent on regaining possession of the land. Therefore in the spring of 1942 the Foreign Office, in an effort to prove its ‘good will’ to Turkey, asked that the Tatars be given a privileged status in agriculture. HansJoachim Riecke, chief of Eastern agriculture, agreed to a change of rules: the Tatars were to have 40 per cent of their land transformed into communes during the first year (as compared with 1ro-20 per cent in the Ukraine) — a symbolic rather than a real privilege. (Riecke to Schulenburg, April 24, 1942, EAP 99/457*, CRS ; and RMfdbO. [Schiller,}] ‘Sonderbehandlung der Tataren bei der Durchfiuhrung der Agrarordnung’, May 22, 1942, Wi/ID .77*, CRS.) In practice, even

, the official reform was not carried out thoroughly. 3 See above, p. 153.

CH. XIU The Crescent and the Swastika 263 (1) The inhabitants of the occupied Eastern territories in the area of

Army Group ‘A’ are to be treated as allies. Treatment as inferiors strengthens the enemy’s will to resist and costs German blood. (2) The supply of the civilian population with food, especially bread, and also clothes, fuel, and consumer goods, is to be improved within the limits imposed by the war. . . . (3) Social services are to be expanded, e.g. supply of hospitals with medicines, and milk for women and children. (6) In principle, 20 per cent of all consumer goods produced are to be distributed among the civilian population. (7) The agrarian reform is to be carried out with greater dispatch. In

1943 at least 50 per cent of the collectives are to be transformed into communes. In the remaining collectives, the individual plots are to be given to the peasants as tax-free property. In appropriate cases individual

farms are to be established. .. . |

(8) Asarule . . . the delivery quota for agricultural produce shall not exceed that under the Bolsheviks. . . . (12) The school system is to be promoted widely. (14) Religious practice 1s free and is not to be impeded in any way. . . .!

This far-reaching and in many respects unique programme did not remain unknown to the higher authorities in Berlin. In particular, Riecke and Schiller protested that this represented unwarranted interference of the military in economic affairs — and also in hitherto

civilian areas of administration which, as a result of the Soviet advance, had been returned to military jurisdiction. But Kleist would not be budged: Riecke’s protests, he mordantly replied, amounted to an endorsement of Erich Koch’s Helotentheorte.?

In June 1943, when Rosenberg toured the Ukraine and the Crimea, he delivered a lengthy lecture to Kleist’s military staff, reiterating his political views. Rosenberg himself admitted that the speech was an utter failure. Kleist and his staff insisted that the war

must be fought with more positive and political methods than Rosenberg was willing to grant. The Ostminister, on the other hand, was disappointed because he failed to convert the Army officers : ‘All my explanations seemed to find little support since the generals ' Von Kleist, ‘Behandlung der Zivilbevélkerung im Operationsgebiet’,

February 17, 1943, EAP 99/1145*, CRS.

2 Interviews G-2, G-6, G-11. On the agrarian question, see also below,

Chapters XVI-XVII.

264 Peoples and Policies PT. want to go further in a [Great] Russian direction than we are’ in supporting indigenous anti-Soviet trends. In practice, the controversy was of little consequence to the Crimean population. By 1943 the lines were drawn, and in all probability not even the most generous policy could have restored confidence in the Germans. ‘The Crimean experience illustrated that, in contrast to the North Caucasus, Army rule did not neces-

sarily assure popular support, even in non-Slavic areas. ‘The change in indigenous sentiment must be attributed overwhelmingly to German occupation policy and performance. Taurida

The Crimea had been intended for German civil government ; at the July 16, 1941, conference, where it had been assigned to Koch’s

RKU as a General Commissariat, Gauleiter Alfred Frauenfeld was designated its civilian ruler.2, A fanatical Nazi and obsessed bigot, this Austrian enthusiastically busied himself with ‘research’ on the Gothic origins of Crimean culture. First he was busy compiling a photographic album entitled ‘From the Homeland of the Crimean

Goths’; then he set about writing a book on the history of the peninsula. His dream was to build a new capital in the Yaila Mountains and to make the Crimea a genuine spa of the New Europe. Absorbed in his ‘devotion to the fine arts’ (as he saw them), his outlook combined a measure of lassitude with a limited sympathy for the Tatar segment of the population — and expressed itself in bitter enmity against Erich Koch’s regime to the north. Frauenfeld is the perfect example of the contention that a relative ‘liberalism’ towards the indigenous population by no means involved a rejection or dilution of Nazism.3 Actually Frauenfeld, after serving as Foreign Office Observer in the north, took over only five districts which the Army relinquished as of September 1, 1942; these formed a temporary commissariat under the name of Taurida, which was to become a part of the future

General Commissariat Crimea once the Army agreed to turn the rest over to civilian rule. Curiously enough, all five districts were, strictly speaking, not a part of the Crimea but with Melitopol’ as 1 Rosenberg, ‘ Besichtigungsreise durch die Ukraine’, June 1943, EAP 99/431*, CRS, p. 13. 2 Document 221-L, TMWC, xxxvui, 92. 3 For Frauenfeld’s outlook, see his ‘Sowjetunion und Termitenstaat’, Wille und Macht (Berlin), ix (1941), no. 22, pp. 1-4; and his fantastic brochure, Ursache und

Sinn unseres Kampfes [Vienna, 1944]. Ten years later, in February 1953, he was among the group arrested for plotting a neo-Nazi coup against the Bonn government.

CH. XIII The Crescent and the Swastika 265 their capital lay to its north.!. The reason for this transfer of nominally Ukrainian counties to the Crimea is to be found in the plans

of Germanization: if the Crimea was to become a Reichsgau, Berlin reasoned, it needed a hinterland to strengthen its defences on land.

As chief of Taurida, Frauenfeld was nominally Erich Koch’s subordinate. Actually they were bitter foes. ‘Taking advantage of Hitler’s and Himmler’s plans to get rid of the Crimean population, Koch instituted a ‘blockade’ of food moving into T'aurida from the north. Frauenfeld co-operated with the military to overcome this measure, but the tension remained. In the winter of 1942-3 Frauenfeld repeatedly sent Rosenberg memoranda attacking Koch. When Rosenberg visited Frauenfeld in June 1943, Koch refused to come to his house. According to an eye-witness, Koch tried to make the

inspection trip “into a sort of inquisition’. Koch considered the situation in T'aurida an object lesson of an alternative to his ideas of

government and therefore suggested the abolition of Frauenfeld’s rump commissariat and its inclusion in neighbouring Nikolaev Province, which Koch had under his thumb. As one of Frauenfeld’s aides told Koch’s deputy, Paul Dargel, it may have been a mistake

to set up Taurida as a separate unit in the first place, but now ‘I would not deem it correct to attach them [the five districts] to a different office. . . . If temporarily assigned to another General Commissariat, [they] would be plundered rather than developed.’ 2

Frauenfeld remained on his job until the retreat late in 1943. Then, the end of his dream at hand, he sent Rosenberg a lengthy memorandum summarizing his own experiences and those of Koch and the Army as he had observed them. It amounted to a narrowly utilitarian vindication of a policy of calculated magnanimity: during the war Germany needed the Easterners, and therefore any promises should be made that would attract their support; after the war, any policy the Reich desired could be pursued, and no one would then be in a position to gainsay it. No one, he insisted, who advocated an ‘intelligent’ Ostpolitzk would for a second shrink back from terror and ruthlessness if German interests commanded them — even if thousands of foreigners had to be killed. But the evidence showed that his own policy obviated much of the brutality that had characterized Koch’s reign. In the economic field ‘Taurida had yielded more 1 On the planned organization of the Crimea, see Ostkartet (Berlin), 1943, v, no. 7, pp. 15-16; RKU, Zentralblatt, August 29, 1942, pp. 203-4, and January 9g, 1943, pp. 7 ff. ; and Document NO-2546*. 2 Homeyer, ‘Aktennotiz’ [March 1943], Document NG-1294* ; Kausch, op. cit.; Rosenberg, Portrait, pp. 305-6; interviews G-6, G-11.

266 Peoples and Policies pre per acre than the richer Ukraine because, he argued, the agrarian reform had been promoted and the people had been given a stake in the new regime. ‘The requisition of the last cow and the depriva-

tion of cultural opportunities were bound to make bad blood. Finally, the protagonists of the ‘policy of blind terror’ ‘publicized it insistently and at every inopportune occasion’. In brief, Koch’s ‘sledge-hammer’ treatment had been a ‘model of wrong treatment’.!

The discussion was by then academic. Koch could not be deterred, and Frauenfeld was more adept at criticizing others than

he had been at making his own domain a model of contented citizenry.

The Stillborn Muftiate

With the failure of the two-pronged German drive to the Near East early in 1943, German interest in the area waned. Shifting to a defensive position, Berlin stopped catering to the desires of the Turks.2, The general shattering of illusions was well illustrated by the change of: emphasis in the policy towards the non-Slavic peoples

in the East. With the Caucasus abandoned, General KGstring’s appointment as Inspector of ‘Turkic Troops symbolized the shift from occupation policy to concern for organizing ‘Eastern troops’ on the German side. In the following months, with Leibbrandt forced out, von Mende became in effect the master of the Ostministerium’s

nationality policy, embarking on a drive for the recognition of separatist ‘national committees’, primarily for the non-Slavic groups

—an effort which once more pointed up the shift from political work on ‘native soil’ to émigré politics.3 —The change of interests in the non-Slavs foreshadowed a similar shift with regard to the Slavic nationalities during the next year, when their home soil was likewise abandoned by the retreating German troops.

In November 1943 Soviet troops reached the approaches of the Crimea. The following April they broke through at Perekop and Kerch; and early in May 1944 the last German stronghold on the peninsula surrendered. But before the world of Soviet Islam was once again submerged behind the Iron Curtain — and the Crimean Tatars were exposed to exile and liquidation similar to that of their 1 Frauenfeld, ‘Denkschrift iber die Probleme der Verwaltung der besetzten

Ostgebiete’, February 10, 1944, Document NO-5394*. See also Frauenfeld’s

post-war comments, ‘Der braune und der rote Zar’, MS*, IfZ. 2 'This change of tactics found rational support in the evidence that the Allies

would not force Turkey to enter the war on their side. See L. C. Moyzisch, Operation Cicero (New York : Coward-McCann, 1950). As early as July 5, 1943, however, Foreign Minister Menemencoglu unequivocally disclaimed official interest in Turanic schemes. 3 On KéOstring’s and Mende’s activities in these fields, see below, pp. 558 ff.

CH. Xtit The Crescent and the Swastika 267 North Caucasus neighbours ' — a minor crisis arose over the religious representation of the Moslem world.

In the Caucasus and the Crimea, the German Army authorities, while permitting and at times encouraging the exercise of the Moslem faith, decisively balked on one point: the election of higher religious

dignitaries. ‘The reason for this was manifest. In the Crimea particularly, the mufti had traditionally occupied a position of such prestige as to become a political figure; so long as no all-Crimean assembly or ‘national government’ was permitted, it was consistent to bar the election of a mufti. Yet the potential value of a German-

oriented religious leader was equally obvious to those who, like Mende or Hentig, were concerned with Islamic opinion within and outside the Soviet Union. The argument of this group (as one of its spokesmen later restated it) ran as follows: ‘The Islamic world is a whole. German action toward the Moslems in the East must be

such as not to prejudice Germany’s standing among all Islamic peoples.’?, At the same time, the Crimean nationalists tried to influence the Ostministeri'um in the same direction, hoping to utilize the mufti for their own ends.3 Finally, a proponent of the muftiate emerged in Amin el-Husseini, the pro-Nazi Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.

The purposes of these elements were sharply divergent. The reasons for the Army’s stalling on the question of the muftiate were the very ones for which the Crimean nationalists, especially the pan-

Turkists, favoured it. At the same time, the Grand Mufti, who worked closely with German intelligence and propaganda agencies,

sought to centralize all Moslem activities in his hands. The panIslamic ideas which he propounded fell, however, on barren soil ; other emotions, other symbols proved far stronger than strictly religious ties which would have aligned Volga Tatars with Berbers

and Yemenites with Tadzhiks. The Grand Mufti was opposed especially by the pan-Turkist and pan-Turkestani refugees who saw in him a dangerous competitor.

On this one issue, however, all three groups saw eye to eye: ‘pro-Turks’ in the Reich, Crimean nationalists, and the Grand Mufti. In view of the Army’s opposition, however, the proposal lay dormant until October 1943 when the Soviet government, as part of its relaxation in anti-religious activities, and as a counterpart

to the re-establishment of the Orthodox patriarchate in Moscow, 1 See Pravda (Moscow), June 26, 1946. 2 Mende, letter to author, November 19, 1953. 3 Their hand was strengthened by the permission granted in Riga to invest a mufti for the area of Ostland.

268 Peoples and Policies PT. created a central muftiate in Tashkent. Now the Crimean section of the Rosenberg Ministry, in close conjunction with Mende, advanced a counter-proposal. In order effectively to counteract Bolshevism which, as recent events demonstrate, now seeks to win greater influence in the Moslem world [the head of the Crimean section, Richard Kornelsen, suggested], it is

imperative that we on our part generously marshal all means at our disposal to fight it. The most immediate step is to have the election of the ‘Tashkent mufti declared invalid . . . [and to show] that the mufti of Tashkent is nothing but a puppet in the hands of Moscow.

The most effective form of such a counter-move, he proposed, would be a congress of Moslem dignitaries representing the Crimea,

the Caucasus, Turkestan, and the Volga Tatars. It was recommended ‘at this congress to give solemn German recognition to a Crimean Tatar mufti, who would be selected in advance’.!

This move, to be successful, required enlisting the support of the SS through its representative in the Ostministerium, Gottlob Berger. Since the SS had given strong backing to Amin el-Husseini,

the suggestion was made to ‘ask the Grand Mufti to be a guest of honour’. Berger endorsed the memorandum, stressing the ‘extensive’ role to be assigned to the Grand Mufti.?

With the enthusiastic support of the Crimean Tatar refugees attached to Kornelsen’s office, the project of a Crimean muftiate was

submitted to the Army: the election would assure ‘the presence of

a trustworthy personality through whom the Tatar population could be influenced’. Furthermore, ‘the election of a mufti would be of greatest political and propaganda significance in its effects

both within the Soviet Union and in the Near East... All

possible objections were brushed aside with mysterious references to the ‘wish of the Fuhrer to make concessions [entgegenzukommen] to

the Moslem peoples’. The actual election was to be a sham ceremony : Kornelsen had already picked Ozenbashly as the candidate.: 1 Kornelsen, memorandum, November 11, 1943, Document NO-3112*. 2 Ibid. On SS relations with the Grand Mufti, see also Document NG-3768*, and Veli Kayum, interrogation, IMT, February 27, 1947*, NA. 3 Kornelsen to von Dreysling, December 1943, Document NO-3113*. The

reference to Hitler’s pro-Moslem stand presumably was to his statement of December 1942 (see p. 251 above). Hitler, who like the SS laboured under the misconception that the Grand Mufti was something of a ‘Moslem Pope’, once jokingly remarked to Bormann :

I’m going to become a religious figure. Soon I’ll be the great chief of the Tatars. Already Arabs and Moroccans are mingling my name with their prayers. Amongst the Tatars I shall become khan. The only thing I shall be

incapable of is to share the sheiks’ mutton with them. I’m a vegetarian. . . . (HTT, pp. 203-4.)

CH. XIII The Crescent and the Swastika 269 The mention of Ozenbashly only strengthened the Army’s suspicions that the new office would be little more than a cloak for political activities : in effect he was already holding the reins of the

Moslem committees in the Crimea. On the spot there was little sympathy for niceties of psychological warfare experiments addressed to a minority group, in which some elements in Berlin were belatedly taking an interest. ‘The Crimea was already a beleaguered bastion,

and the Army could not be bothered with a plan that was likely to arouse further tensions. The creation of a regional government on a Moslem basis [it replied]

and the formation of a grand muftiate of the Crimea are not contemplated. Nor are there any plans in this direction. They would constitute a break with the policy heretofore pursued and are out of the

question. ... Indicative of the change of popular temper in the Crimea was another

reason advanced in the reply: ‘Of late, the Tatars have proved extremely unreliable ’.! This verdict spelled the end of the project. The Rosenberg office

could not enforce its will, and a few months later the peninsula was

back in Soviet hands. However, the question of the muftiate was to be raised in Berlin once more. By then strictly an émigré affair, with possible effect only on the few Moslems under German control and of very slight propaganda value, it was resuscitated in the frantic search for new solutions after the military setbacks in the summer of

1944. In order to strengthen the indoctrination of Moslem troops on the German side, Mende and the Grand Mufti agreed on the continued advisability of ‘experimentally’ creating a muftiate. To a question whether the Grand Mufti would have any objection to the Crimean T'atar candidate, Ozenbashly [Mende reported], the Grand

Mufti replied that he considered him thoroughly suitable [probably something of an overstatement]. . . . Herr Ozenbashly has already been asked by telephone to come here.?

Ozenbashly, however, never came. He had hurriedly left the Crimea before the Soviet troops arrived. ‘Together with some of the Tatar units who had fought with the Germans, he went to Rumania.

He was disgusted with the Germans and, hoping that the British would land in Rumania, he refused to go to the Reich. He remained in Bucharest until the Red Army arrived, when he was arrested by a I OKH/GenStdH/O.Qu. to RMfdbO., February 28, 1944, Document NOIl . ° 2 Mende, ‘Gesprach mit dem Grossmufti von Jerusalem’, July 27, 1944*. G.R.R.—T

270 Peoples and Polictes PT. 11 group of Soviet officers and men who reportedly came in British

uniforms to fetch him.! The struggle over the Crimean muftiate illustrated the constel-

lation of contending forces in the Reich. Given the orientation of the Rosenberg group and, for once, implicit backing from the Fuhrer, here was an opportunity for psychological warfare which Berlin at first scorned, then tried belatedly, but never carried out. At no time

was there evidence of genuine sympathy for Moslem beliefs. The effects of the campaign would, moreover, surely have been secondary

or nil. Curious in this instance was the combination of factions

opposing it: some of the Nazi stalwarts, including the SS, sought to delay it because of their Germanization plans; men of the BormannKoch orientation saw in it an unwarranted surrender to the natives ; while a large part of the military and some of the diplomats opposed what they deemed scatter-brained experimentation with the granting

of fantastic and unreal titles to potentially hostile groups at the price of antagonizing the Russians.

Idel-Ural and Turkestan

Most of the Moslem areas of the Soviet Union never fell into German hands. Remote from the Reich both in time and space, their future disposition was discussed in Berlin in a far vaguer and

more casual fashion than was the fate of the Caucasus and the Crimea.

The initial outlook on the Soviet ‘Asiatics’ was decisively influenced by the insistent Untermensch campaign which sought to inculcate in the German soldier and civilian the conviction that the Russians were degenerate because they had been heavily permeated with Tatar and Mongol blood. If the Russian was a sub-human, a fortiori the Tatar and Mongol himself was one, too. The sequences of pictures of Soviet prisoners with ‘Mongol’ features; the prompt liquidation of all ‘Asiatic’ civilians apprehended in the occupied

areas; and frequent articles in the German press stressing the ‘Mongol bestiality’ of the Russians — all created an unmistakable climate of opinion in which the Reich was portrayed as the Western

defender against the ‘Asiatic menace’. Indeed, Hitler himself 1 Interview H-106. See also the appeal by Ozenbashly and Kirimal to the Germans to evacuate Crimean troops and specialists with their families, German

Military Attaché Bucharest to Foreign Office, April 17, 1944, Document NG-4243*.

2 See, for instance, Karl-Heinz Ridiger, ‘Uber den Lebensstil Osteuropas’, Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte (Berlin), December 1941, pp. 1013-14. Public expression of anti-Asiatic sentiments was slightly tempered because of concern over Japanese reactions.

CH. XIII The Crescent and the Swastika 271 viewed the future German settlement in Russia as a form of breakwater against the Oriental tide.! In his pre-invasion planning Rosenberg had made no qualitative distinction between Great Russians and the Tatar-Bashkir complex between Volga and Urals. According to Nazi classifications, some of the Volga Tatars — in the broadest sense — were Finnic, others Tatar, still others Mongoloid. ‘There was indeed no simple unifying element among Bashkirs and Chuvash, Mordva and Mari, Udmurts and Kazan’ Tatars. Initially, no cognizance was taken in Berlin of the synthetic concept propagated by some of the separatist émigrés

from this area under the name of Idel-Ural.2 Since the Reichskommissariat Moskau was to extend to the Urals, the non-Slavic part of north-eastern Russia was to be included within it, divided

into administrative units conforming with ethnic boundaries, roughly following the Soviet borders of Tataria (the Kazan’-Kuibyshev area),

Chuvashia, Udmurtia, Mordva, Mari, and Bashkiria. No attempt was made either to separate non-Slavs from Slavs or to group the Volga Tatars and Volga Finns in one political-administrative entity. This plan soon succumbed to the reappraisal of tactics which the Rosenberg Ministry and, within limits, German military circles undertook after their hopes for single-handed and lightning victory had been shattered. By early 1942 a new trend became evident, aimed at salvaging the ‘Idel-Ural peoples’ (the Ostministerium now became prone to adopt this nomenclature) from the ‘compost heap’ of Untermenschen. One reason for this change was that the Germans had a substantial number of Volga Tatar prisoners of war,

whom some Army officers wished to form into fighting units. Secondly, the Germans had become interested in defection propaganda aimed at Tatar and Bashkir soldiers in the Red Army. Finally, the Rosenberg faction extended its concept of a cordon sanitaire ' He spoke of a ‘giant wall which protects the New East against the CentralAsian masses’ and on another occasion of the need of a ‘living wall’ against sudden waves ‘foaming down from Asia’, that ‘disquieting reservoir of men’. (Picker, op.

cit. p. 45, and HTT, p. 40.) 2 Idel is the Tatar name for the Volga. For the background, see Bertold Spuler, Idel-Ural (Berlin : Biicherei des Ostraumes, 1942) and ‘Die Wolga-Tataren und Baschkiren unter russischer Herrschaft’, Jslam (Berlin), xxix (1949), 142-216; Richard E. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Unton (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954). Having to contend with considerable dissension in their own midst, the various proposed partners of the Idel-Ural state had to use Russian as the only common language they knew. Some German observers even suggested that the Soviets had effectively ‘proletarianized’ the Volga Tatars and Volga Finns out of distinct ethnic existence. (Volk und Retch, July 1941, p. 460.) 3 Dienststelle Rosenberg, ‘Die neuen Ostgebiete’, June 16, 1941, Document 1033-PS*, See also Documents 1035-PS* and 1036-PS*, June 18 and 25, 1941.

272 Peoples and Policies PT. 11 around Muscovy to complete the encirclement from the east by including the ‘Idel-Ural’ nationalities. The result was an awkward effort to discard the application of the Untermensch stigma to the Tatars. But how was one to convince the population at home that the Tatars, who appeared more ‘ Asiatic’ and alien to them, were really friends and allies, whereas the forced labourers brought in from Smolensk or Rostov, many of them tall,

blond, and blue-eyed, were sub-humans? ‘Though largely ineffectual and ambiguous, virtually all public German references to the Tatars in 1942-3 concerned themselves with this back-handed ‘rehabilitation’. It took its cue from Hitler’s mention of the Tatars among the Eastern nationalities who ‘participate[d] in the struggle

against the Bolshevik world foe’.' In August the Propaganda Ministry instructed the press not to engage in polemics against Tatars and Turkestanis.2, The Army followed suit with an order to consider ‘Turkic and Tatar soldiers fighting on the German side as ‘comrades and helpers’ whose national peculiarities ‘must be met with understanding and tact’.:

Perhaps the most authoritative appeal came in the generally serious Zeitschrift fiir Polittkh, where von Hentig, the Near Eastern expert of the Foreign Office, argued that the term ‘’Tatar’ was in no sense derogatory, and concluded by implicitly calling for a GermanTatar rapprochement. At atime when Schulenburg was preparing his Adlon conference, von Hentig’s article amounted to an overture to the ‘Idel-Ural’ spokesmen among the refugees in Turkey. The

émigré dream thus thrived in an atmosphere of German-Turkish accommodation.® 1 VB-B, April 27, 1942. 2 Zeitschriftendienst (Berlin), item no. 7434 (August 21, 1942). In view of the continued uncertainty, it was reiterated half a year later that ‘we would be latterday victims of old tsarist agitation, were we to say unfriendly things about the

Tatars, who have never done us Germans any harm... .’ (bid. item no. 8577 {March 26, 1943].) 3 Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Ukraine, ‘Anordnung Nr. 110’, December 12, 1942, RKU, Zentralblatt, 1943, no. 7, pp. 92-3.

4 W. O. von Hentig, ‘Turan-Tatarei’, Zeitschrift fiir Politik, March 1942, pp.

185-8. The situation remained none the less contradictory. The Rosenberg Ministry insisted that ‘the Slavic peoples are in no case to be designated as belonging

to the Asiatic race or family of peoples. .. .’ At the same time it decreed that the term ‘Tatar’ was a ‘collective Muscovite term of derogation for the Volga, Crimean, and Azerbaijani Turks’, which must be ‘avoided and replaced’; and the Nazi Party argued that since there was nothing derogatory to the term ‘Tatar’, ‘there are no objections to the retention of the expression’. (RMfdbO., Richtlinien

fiir die Pressezensur [Berlin, 1st ed., January 1943], pp. 9, 30; NSDAP, Verfiigungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben [Munich, 1943], i, 74.)

5 The ‘Idel-Ural’ group was led by Hayas Iskhaki, an old Socialist-Revolutionary who had worked closely with the Prometheus movement and had at times enjoyed support from various anti-Soviet powers.

CH. xiit The Crescent and the Swastika 273 The ‘Idel-Ural’ concept suited those who were striving for a partition of the Soviet Union — and that is why it was embraced by the Ostministerium, though it was fully aware of the artificiality of the notion. The same concept, however, was also the mainstay of

another group: those striving for a pan-Turanic bloc or union. Only on the ruins of a disintegrated Russian state could the Tatars and Bashkirs hope to erect a new sovereign unit that would allow them to weld together, synthetically and against powerful odds, the peoples between Volga and Urals. Highly impracticable and unnatural, the ‘Idel-Ural’ project led some of its proponents, precisely because of the heterogeneous ethnic and cultural base of its putative population and because of its isolation from all seas and the outside world, to advocate a super-state combination with other Turanic peoples. ‘Their eyes were drawn particularly to Central Asia, and the dream of a state ‘from Kazan’ to Samarkand’ fired the imagination

of the most hardy and visionary of ‘Idel-Ural’ politicians abroad. The pan-Turanic gambit was bound to run counter to the other

existing schemes. The Turkic nationalists fought this search for ‘safety in greater numbers’. The anti-separatists quite naturally opposed it. The initial German attitude towards such an Asian bloc — which in pre-war days Japan had at times encouraged — was of

necessity hostile. ‘The Mende group frowned on it, preferring to promote a ‘Little Idel-Ural’ — admittedly fantastic but perhaps less so than the pan-Turanic scheme, which, moreover, was deemed potentially hostile to the Reich. In Berlin blasts for Turanic unity were fired only intermittently. Hentig was one such exception who recalled the romantic search for cultural and linguistic unity which

the Turanists pursued. ‘Over there, in Russia,’ he wrote, ‘they were seeking the old Turan. Shall it be realized now?’ Thanks to our advance in Russia, the situation has fundamentally changed: a new movement presses for expression, seeks a name. The Turkic tribes from the Volga eastwards, which we are dealing with, from the Urals to Mongolia, all once belonged to the ulus of Chagatai [the son

of Genghis Khan]... . Hentig therefore suggested the name, ‘Chagataism’, for the ‘TatarTurkic unity movement and in his pronouncements implied German support.!

Actually the fate of the Volga Tatars and Volga Finns never became a practical concern of the Reich. With the armies stalled far from these lands, the pan-Turanic movement — just as the pan-

Islam and pan-Slavic — was out of favour in Berlin. Only at the ‘ Hentig, op. cit. pp. 187-88.

274 Peoples and Policies PT. 1 end of the war, when every means, however extravagant and unlikely, had to be marshalled to stave off German defeat, did some elements in the Reich come to pose as pan-Turanic advocates. !

Nor was there any need for urgent decisions on the future of Soviet Central Asia. The Ostministertum as well as the Army worked with émigrés who advocated an independent and united Turkestan, composed of all five Soviet Central Asian republics.? Their work was limited largely to propaganda and intelligence. In

practice, this fact, and German desire not to arouse Japanese suspicions by advancing claims to Central Asia, permitted the advocates of a United Turkestan to operate with relatively greater

ease than other separatist groups. ‘Turkestan was beyond the projected area of German occupation. Rosenberg’s plans naturally called for the separation of ‘Turkestan

from Russia. His earliest drafts singled out Central Asia for its hostility to Communism and generally to ‘things Russian’. He assumed that ‘after the military collapse of the Soviets in Europe,

it would be possible with very small forces to eliminate forced Muscovite dominion in Central Asia as well’. While stressing the political (anti-Russian) and economic (cotton) benefits of such a development, Rosenberg, interestingly enough, also pointed to the anti-British potentialities : One wonders whether these states [Iran and Afghanistan] could not thereby be brought to a more active advance against India, if such a course is at all desired. . . . The threat to British lines of communication to India thereby assumes real significance and will unquestionably force Britain to a greater deployment of forces [in Central Asia] which it will have to withdraw from Europe or another area. Nowhere further was the fate of ‘Turkestan authoritatively discussed.*

The subsequent blueprints of future government in the East stopped

short of the borders of Central Asia. Only by implication was it clear that Turkestan, allied with and dependent on the Reich, would constitute a final link in the chain of states around Muscovy. The German Army, on its part, made no specific plans of conquest ' See below, p. 601. 2 I.e. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kuirghizia, Turkmenia, and ‘T'adzhikistan. Other refugee factions from Soviet Central Asia found little or no support in Berlin. See also Sir Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire : The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism (New York : St. Martin’s Press, 1953), an erudite but hardly balanced presentation. 3 Document 1017-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 552-3.

4 A volume on Turkestan did, however, appear in the Leibbrandt series of brief handbooks on the Soviet Union (Johannes Benzing, Turkestan [Berlin : Biichere1 des Ostraumes, 1943}).

CH. X11 The Crescent and the Swastika 275 for the area. The whole question was restricted to the realm of refugee activities — the struggle over a national legion and a ‘ United

National Turkestan Committee’. The ‘Turkestani nationalists

occupied a stronger position in this contest than did their colleagues precisely because Germany’s selfish interest in this area was smallest and because their leader, Veli Kayum, was a major protégé of the Mende office.! Though beset by difficulties within his own Turkestan circles, Kayum remained in the good graces of the Ostministerium

to the end. Unknown in his own country, he remained an isolated émigré politician. Soviet Central Asia knew neither him nor the Germans.

On the public record, meanwhile, Berlin preferred to remain non-committal. ‘Whether the tribes of these regions . . . z.e. Tatars

and Turkestanis, will live as one people in one state organism [Staatswesen] or as two separate peoples, the future will tell. Either form may evolve from the present position of the Turkic groups.’ 2 The only definite point was that both groups were to be separated from Russia. ' "The Turkestanis had a prominent leader in Mustaffa Chokai (Chokaev), who died in December 1941 after a few months of half-hearted collaboration with the Germans. The German-reared Veli Kayum succeeded him. While Chokai had at one time been ‘leftist’ and French-oriented, Kayum was consistently close to the Nazis, repeatedly expressing his ‘faith in Germany’ as well as labelling the

‘imperialist, democratic, and liberal states’ enemies of Turkestan. (See, for

instance, his speech, January 24, 1943, Milly Turkistan [Berlin], no. 15, p. 9.) On Chokai, see also Yash Turkestan : pamiatt Mustafa Chokai- Beta (Paris, 1949), and Tiirkelt (Munich), 1951, no. 4, pp. 17-26. 2 Benzing, ‘Die Turkvélker der Sowjetunion’ [lecture at the Prussian Academy of Sciences], Der Orient in deutscher Forschung, H. H. Schaeder, ed. (Leipzig : Harrassowitz, 1944), p. 26.

CHAPTER XIV

MASTERS AND SERFS Nach Ostland wollen wir reiten, Nach Ostland wollen wir weit, Uber die griine Heiden, Da ist eine bessere Zeit. Old German song

Lebensraum

ALL through the war-time disputes and the changing fortunes on the battlefield, the overriding German purpose remained immutable : not merely to overthrow the Soviet state but to make the East, with its resources and manpower, the servant of the German Herrenvolk. The grand design called not only for a change of borders, but also for a drastic reshufHing of the hierarchy of ethnic groups in the East,

as a result of which the Germans would emerge as masters; Jews

and other ‘undesirables’ would be liquidated; and the Great Russians would be reduced to the lowest stratum of the new order. !

If, as has been shown, the future position of the intermediate

elements — the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union — was much disputed, that of the top and bottom strata — Germans and Great Russians — was a constant in German plans. It was axiomatic that the German people was to inherit the earth.

The Drang nach Osten was at last to give them an opportunity to settle and live on the long-coveted expanses. This gigantic scheme involved the annexation of some regions (notably the Baltic States and the Crimea) and the colonization of others (the bulk of the European U.S.S.R.); only certain parts of the Soviet Union (such

as the Caucasus and Russia-in-Asia) would not be subject to Germanization. In the regions to be annexed or colonized, the process was to involve several operations: (1) the liquidation of those elements which, in the topsy-turvy scale of Nazi values, were proscribed as unworthy to survive; (2) the mass transfer of other ‘inferior’ elements eastwards; (3) the gradual assimilation of the ‘better’ non-German elements who would be permitted to remain ; and (4) the settlement with German farmer and soldier immigrants of the spaces thus vacated.

The plan was an old one. In less virulent form, it had existed 1 See chart, p. 276. 276

"32, SCHEMATIC PLAN OF FUTURE ETHNIC HIERARCHY IN THE EAST

|||ke x.RK X N > / x XIN J N/

ENS AN ' ENN GERMAN SETTLERS

NN

Pp NN to be transferred to the East

| x x xxx XK KK KX KK OK KX KK KK KK KK KKK KX K KX X KX KX K XK x -« xX X ¥X X VOLKSDEUTSCHE * * * X X % X X K KX ¥&

| x x x KX x KN KX K KK KK KX KK KX KK KX KX KX K KX KX K K KK XK

: x x {TIN

x x N * \NON-SLAVS i (Balts)

xx N\NON-RUSSIANS x

** \\

NN (UKRAINIANS AND BELORUSSIANS)

I\

7: N | Yi VA UN J | x ;REAT-RUSSIANS | \,

/ Wr

\ ae

\ ‘UNDESIRABLES ’ (JEWS, GYPSIES, AND OTHERS)

AAAAUANRNRRANANY

lO BE ANNEXED TO GERMANY

(77) to be exterminated COT to be transferred castward to be ‘Germanized’

278 Peoples and Policies PY. 1 even prior to the first World War, and not only Ludendorff but even Seeckt had endorsed its principal features — minus the programme

of extermination, which Hitler and his aides had added. As early as 1932, a leading Nazi had developed the plan in Hitler’s presence. Picturing the future reorganization of the East, he concluded : All this, however, would remain an idle dream unless a planned policy of colonization and depopulation were carried out. Yes, a depopulation

policy. . . . It [will be] necessary to bring agricultural lands predominantly into the hands of the German Herren class.'

The formula remained sharply etched in Hitler’s mind: move the Slavs eastwards, and move Germans in to take their place. ‘The real frontier between Europe and Asia, he liked to say, was not geographical but ‘the one that separates the Germanic world from the Slav world. It’s our duty to place it where we want it to be.’ I would deem it a crime [Hitler told his associates] if I had sacrificed

the blood . . . of a quarter million dead and a hundred thousand disabled . . . merely for the conquest of natural riches to be exploited in capitalist style. . . . The goal of Ostpolitik is in the long run, to open up an area of settlement for a hundred million Germans in this territory.

Characteristic of his Germanic ethnocentrism, this argument provided an easy and potent raison d’étre for the entire war, whose

untold casualties would be more than compensated for by the increased birth-rate in the new Eastern settlements. Though there were tremendous difficulties involved in such a mass movement, ‘the whole is a problem of state power, a question of might’. Ethics were not involved: ‘If anyone asks us where we obtain the right to extend Germanic space to the East, we reply that . . . it’s success that justifies everything ’.?

In pre-invasion days, the outlines of the plan were still hazy. Rosenberg did not distinguish clearly between areas to be annexed forthwith and those to be colonized: the entire transfer of millions of men to the East was to be carried out in such a manner that ‘in the course of one or two generations we could annex this area as newly Germanized land to the German heartland [Kerngebiet]’.3 In October 1941 he was still uncertain about the fate of certain areas. Was the hinterland of the RKO between Lakes I!men and Peipus to ! Hermann Rauschning, The Voice of Destruction (New York : Putman, 1940), Pp. 33. See also above, Chapter I. 2 HTT, pp. 37-8, 261, 469; Harry Picker, ed., Hitlers Tischgesprdche (Bonn : Athendium-Verlag, 1950), pp. 52, 73-4, 393, 323. > Rosenberg, ‘Denkschrift Nr. 1’, April 2, 1941, Document 1017-PS, ‘TMWC, XXV1, 550.

CH. XIV Masters and Serfs 279 be reserved for ‘inconvenient elements or shall this whole territory

be opened up for Germanic settlement?’ he wondered, finally deciding on the latter.’ Likewise, the rate of resettlement was still vague. At one time, Hitler spoke arbitrarily of moving ten million Germans in ten years, at another time of twenty million; what was clear was that within his lifetime the work was to be well on its way,

if not accomplished. ‘Our colonizing penetration’, he insisted, ‘must be constantly progressive, until it reaches the stage where our

own colonists far outnumber the local inhabitants.’2 At any rate, ‘in twenty years’ time, European emigration will no longer be directed towards America, but eastwards’.3 In his vague estimates and forecasts Hitler lumped together the entire East — Poland and the ‘annexed’ as well as the ‘occupied’ areas. Borders would vanish

while forced migration plus liberal use of firearms and gas vans combined to ‘solve’ Europe’s ills.

There was a crucial difference between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Germanization programme. Nazi Germany wanted no part of the traditional Kulturtrdgertum which had prided itself on spreading

its advanced civilization to inferior nations. The new plan was organically distinct, for, as Himmler declared,

Our duty in the East is not Germanization in the former sense of the term, that is, imposing German language and laws upon the population, but to ensure that only people of pure German blood inhabit the East.‘

It was no accident that Himmler took such a determined stand. While Hitler issued broad directives setting the limits and pace of the colonization programme, it was the 5S that was called upon to fulfil the fantastic vision. Himmler’s empire included a Main Office for Race and Settlement Questions (RuSHA), a Commissariat for the Strengthening of Germanism (RKFDV), and other agencies

responsible for migration and settlement, particularly of ethnic Germans.5 The programme for the East was bound to attract men

whose power it would immeasurably enhance. The SS as the German élite was to provide the ‘racially high-grade’ manpower which would move into the East as a fresh and superior stock.® 1 RMfdbO., ‘Niederschrift uber die Chefbesprechung am_ 30.10.1941’, November 15, 1941, Document 1539-PS*.

2 HTT, p. 426. 3 Ibid. p. 42 (entry for September 25, 1941). See also Herbert Backe, ‘Erweiterter Nahrungsspielraum’, VB-M, January 1, 1942. 4 Das Schwarze Korps (Berlin), August 20, 1942. 5 See the RuSHA trial, U.S. v. Greifelt et al., NMT, v. 6 See, for instance, Picker, op. cit. p. 308.

280 Peoples and Policies prs 1 The prospect had such an uncanny grip on the Nazi leaders that as late as October 1943, with the German armies in headlong retreat, Himmler could still assert : For us the end of the war will mean an open road to the East... . We shall move the limits of German settlement eastwards by 500 kilo-

metres . . . into an area militarily secured for our grandchildren and great-grandchildren.!

The Crimea and parts of Ostland were to become Reichsland — not colonial dependencies but integral parts of the German state. With Hitler’s approval, far-flung schemes for the migration of ethnic Germans from other parts of the globe were worked out. In practice, none of them was carried out. Unlike the Crimea, whose indigenous population was not considered suitable for Germanization, Ostland presented a difficult problem in that several demographic transformations were required. As Rosenberg put it in his first directive to Lohse, the Reich Com-

missariat must become ‘a part of the Greater German Reich by means of [1] Germanization of the racially suitable elements, [2] colonization by Germanic peoples, and [3] exiling undesirable elements’.3 ‘These three objectives remained unchanged throughout the war. In his basic directives on resettlement, Himmler reiterated that the first post-war five-year plan of settlement would ‘provide

at least a German ruling layer in the Crimea and the Baltikum’.‘ The future transfer of recalcitrant and otherwise inferior elements

into the hinterland — Belorussia or Muscovy — was taken for granted. And the return of Baltic Germans, who had been uprooted and brought to the Reich in 1939740, was actually begun.5 The first area singled out for priority in German settlement — paradoxically, the one closest to the front lines — was Estonia: here Germanic elements were assumed to be strongest.© Actually, before

the programme could be implemented, the country was under Soviet attack. Ingria was the only area directly affected. 1 Himmler, Sicherhettsfragen, October 14, 1943 ({Berlin :] OKW, NS-Fithrungsstab, 1944), reprinted as Document 070-L, TMWC, xxxvil, 523. 2 See above, pp. 51-2 ; and Documents NO-2703* and NG-1118*.

3 Rosenberg, ‘Instruktion fiir einen Reichskommissar im Ostland’, May 8, 1941, Document 1029-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 574. See also Rauschning, op. cit.

P + Himmler, speech, March 13-14, 1942, summary, Document g10-PS, TMWC,

XXV1, 410. 5 Interviews G-g, G-31.

6 Conference at FHQ, ‘Aktennotiz’, August 17, 1942, Document NO-2703*.

| The Estonian population was well aware of such plans (Ants Oras, Baltic Eclipse [London : Gollancz, 1948], p. 234).

CH, XIV Masters and Serfs 281 Ingria, or Ingermanland, was the name of the area between Lakes Peipus and Onega, an area which had once been inhabited by the Finnic Ingrians but had since lost all ethnic and cultural identity.!. Now the concept of ‘Ingria’ was revived. According to Hitler’s wishes, ‘the Crimea and Ingria [were] to be colonized first’, and the first comprehensive settlement plan in mid-1942 singled out, in addition to the Crimea, ‘Ingria, Petersburg District’.2. Some saw in it an effort to justify the extension of Estonia and perhaps Latvia to the vicinity of Leningrad.3 Finally, in view of the impasse over the disposition of the city of Leningrad, the idea emerged in mid-

1942 to make the area a separate Hauptbezirk, not to be placed under the Ostland administration but directly subordinate to Berlin. Since both the Rosenberg Ministry and the SS wanted it to go neither to the future Reich Commissariat Muscovy, nor to Ostland, nor to Finland, the idea of such an enclave promised to resolve the deadlock and also provide an area for immediate settlement.4 It did not take the German press long to start argu-

ing the ‘Germanic’ character of Ingria to justify resettlement plans. In preparation for the future transfer, it was decided to remove the Ingrians. Early in 1942, the Finnish government was told that it could have the Ingrians ‘back’, but except for the movement of

individual volunteers, nothing was done until 1943. After an exchange of communications, a Finnish-German inspection commission visited the area, and on October 6, 1943, a ‘repatriation’ agreement (a blatant misnomer) was signed in Riga, later confirmed

by diplomatic exchange. As a result, by the spring of 1944 some 1 Meyer-Hetling, report, February 19, 1942, Document NG-1118* ; [MeyerHetling,] Generalplan Ost : Rechtliche, wirtschaftliche und rdumliche Grundlagen des Ostaufbaus (Berlin, 1942) ; abstract, Document NO-2255*.

2 For a German war-time account, see Walter Liebing, ‘Ingermanland und Ingermanlander’, Deutsche Arbeit (Berlin), xliii (1943), 274-8; and Heinrich Laakmann, Ingermanland und die ingermanldndischen Finnen (Berlin: Publi-

kationsstelle Ost, 1942). 3 “The two northernmost districts, Estonia and Livland, shall extend far to the

east, until short of Leningrad, so as to make room for possible resettlements.’ (Dienststelle Rosenberg, ‘Allgemeine Richtlinien fiir die politische und _ wirt-

schaftliche Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete’, June 25, 1941, Document 1037PS*. Actually, two small pieces of Russian territory — at Narva and Pechory — were attached to the Estonian Generalkommissariat. 4 Peter Kleist, memorandum, May 1, 1942* ; and RMfdbO., [4, ‘Errichtung

eines reichsunmittelbaren Hauptbezirks Leningrad’, January 13, 1943, EAP 99/56*, CRS. 5 See Ostland (Riga), 1, no. 11 (May 1943), and Document NO-3222*.

6 Interviews G-9, G-16, G-31. The pertinent diplomatic exchange does not yet appear to have been published. See also Franz Pasendorfer, ‘Heimkehr nach Suomi’, VB-B, June 21, 1943. In addition, several thousand Estonians of Swedish origin were allowed to migrate to Sweden. (Oras, op. cit. p. 268.)

282 Peoples and Policies PT. 1 65,000 men and women had been moved out.' An incongruous operation, it ‘solved’ a non-existent minority problem and created a

new one in Finland. As for German plans for colonizing Ingria, they remained on paper. Generalplan Ost

Responsibility for drafting detailed plans for the colonization programme lay with the SS’s Planning Office of the ‘Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of Germanism’, directed by Professor Konrad Meyer-Hetling. His staff evolved an over-all plan, which was submitted to Himmler in completed form in May 1942 under the name of Generalplan Ost.

In addition to Germans temporarily stationed in the East and residing at central ‘strong-points’, permanent settlers were to be moved in to form a network of Marken, or frontier marches. During the period of settlement, these marches were to be separated from the civil administration and placed as enclaves under the jurisdiction

of the SS. Ambitious though it was, the Generalplan was less drastic than some of Hitler’s and Himmler’s pronouncements would

have led one to expect. Since during the first phase the bulk of settlers would migrate to areas directly annexed by the Reich, the ‘settlement marches’ would have a total of only 3-5 million Germans at the end of the first 25 years.3

Those natives who ‘could not be considered feligible] for Germanization’ were to be moved eastwards — if need be, by force. Some, it was ‘realistically’ assumed, would have to be left behind, to perform menial tasks for the new German masters. At any rate, the local population would own no land and no capital.

Gradually the marches would become the dominant form of organization. In the meanwhile, through the period of migration, two other types of German settlement would exist. On the one hand,

there would be ‘strong-points’ peopled by Germans and serving administrative, economic, and military purposes. In Hitler’s view, ‘the Germans — this is essential — will have to constitute amongst themselves a closed society, like a fortress’. 1 Nya Dagligt Allehanda, May 10, 1944, and Finland radio, December 5, 1944, cited in Eugene Kulischer, Europe on the Move (New York : Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 267. 2 Reminiscent of the term Ostmark for Austria, and Mark Brandenburg. The earliest reference to this programme occurs in November 1941. 3 Generalplan Ost, op. cit., and Greifelt to Himmler, June 2, 1942, Document

NO-2255*; Meyer-Hetling, affidavit, Document NO-4726* ; Meyer-Hetling, report, February 19, 1942, Document NG-1118* ; Meyer-Hetling, testimony, Case VIII (U.S. v. Greifelt et al.), Engl. transcript, pp. 2231-8. 4 Wetzel to Brautigam, February 7, 1942, Document NO-2585*.

CH. XIV Masters and Serfs 283 A system of military strong-points must be evolved to cover the entire occupied country [he declared]. All Germans living in the eastern territories must remain in personal contact with these strong-points.!

They would have at hand mobile forces sufficient to quell any resistance by the remnants of the indigenous elements. At the same time the very process of agrarian settlement was also to serve military

purposes. Rather than maintain strong armies in the East, Hitler foresaw the creation of a peculiar military frontier, in which German ‘soldier-peasants’ would serve as both pioneer-farmers and fighters capable of stemming any onslaught from the East. A rash of research papers appeared, surveying past experiences with military frontiers

ranging from Cossack to Austro-Hungarian settlements. Since Hitler foresaw no ‘formal, juridical end to the war’ but merely a displacement of Russian forces into ‘Asia’, it was permissible to say in print that ‘in one form or another, an open military frontier will [have to be maintained] for a long time’.2, Himmler blithely predicted that ‘we will have a perpetual eastern military frontier which, for ever mobile, will always keep us young. . . .’ 3

The new privileged settlers were to include the veterans of the second World War. Erich Koch was among those who subscribed to the thesis that ‘the German soldier has conquered the Ukraine . . . to provide the descendants of German front-line soldiers with a chance of settling there. . . ..+ ‘The basic cadres of the future, veterans or not, were to be farmers, and once again the

SS offered to supply the men who could best combine ‘racial’ qualifications with farming experience and fighting skills. The prospect of German farms in the fertile Eastern plains delighted many an SS ofhcer.

The Ukraine is really a blessed country [ran a typical letter]... . One wishes again to be twenty years old and to work as a pioneer farmer ! What wonderful tasks await our young generation !

And after inspecting the first SS estates in occupied Russia, the head of the SS Race and Settlement Office, Otto Hofmann, wrote: ‘More than ever I am convinced that the East belongs to the SS’.5 1 HTT, pp. 34, 426; Picker, op. cit. pp. 73-4. See also Document NO-1878*. 2 HTT, pp. 16, 92; General Muff, ‘Militargrenzen’, Militadrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, viii (1943), 129-49 ; Rupert von Schumacher, ‘Die Erforschung der Militargrenze als Aufgabe der Wissenschaft’, Deutsche Arbeit, xlii (1942), 264-9. 3 Document 070-L, TMWC, xxxvil, 523. 4 Hans-Joachim Kausch, ‘Bericht tiber die Reise’, June 26, 1943*, Document Occ E 4-11*, YIVO. 5 Hofmann to Hans Raeder [November 1942], Document NO-4113*; Dr. Fritz Mennecke, letter, May 1943, Document NO-899*. Future settlement plans weighed heavily in the arguments against dissolving the Soviet collective farms (see p. 323).

284 Peoples and Policies PT. I Indeed, the SS wasted no time in beginning its appropriation of

agricultural estates. The Race and Settlement Office and the 55 Economic Office (WiVHA), vying with each other for influence, both tried to extend a hold over them. In July 1942, Oswald Pohl, the notorious chief of concentration camps, was put in charge of administering the SS farms in Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia ; and before the end of the year Hofmann reported that the RuSHA

‘manages a total of about 600,000 hectares in the area from the Ukraine to the Baltic Sea’. After an inspection trip he commented that these farms, in addition to supplying food to the troops, ‘at the

same time... have another purpose, namely to acclimatize wounded men to the East. . . . We have made a significant approach

to the settlement question.’! Not surprisingly, the 55 rampage provoked resentment — both among the local inhabitants, who saw their land taken from them, and among other German agencies, who

sought to further their own interests. Late in 1943 Himmler was constrained to issue a circular acknowledging that some subordinates had lost all ‘sense of measure’ in appropriating property in the East. Henceforth no one was to take possession of estates of more than 400 acres without his personal permission.?

It was ironical that, overpopulated as its leaders claimed it to be, Germany had no one available for migration to the new Lebensraum. The first cadres to be moved, it was ingeniously decided, were to be the ethnic Germans already uprooted or living in areas where their removal would assuage political tensions. Germans from the Banat,

Transnistria, and Bessarabia were among these. In addition, the Germanic neighbours of the Reich were permitted to take a hand in the future colonization. Such a policy was in line with the premise which considered them racially worthy of amalgamation into one Germanic mass under German leadership; it was also good politics at the time when Hitler sought to depict the Eastern campaign as a common crusade of the New Europe. As a matter of fact, months before the invasion, Rosenberg suggested the possibility of settling

not only Danes, Norwegians, and Dutch in the East but ‘after a victorious conclusion of the war, also Englishmen’.3 1 Himmler, decree, March 20, 1942, and Pohl-Hildebrandt agreement, June 1,

1943, Documents NO-4117*, NO-4118*, NO-4119* ; Pohl, circular, July 22, 1942, Document NO-4880* ; Hofmann to Lubkowitz, November 14, 1942, Document NO-4107* ; Hofmann to Berkmann, December 30, 1942, Document NO-4108*.

, 2 Himmler, circular, October 26, 1943, Himmler file 215*. 3 Document 1017-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 550.

CH. XIV Masters and Serfs 285 Hitler repeatedly reverted to this plan during the first months of the campaign. ‘Danes, Dutch, Norwegians, Swedes’ were the people

whose ‘surplus population’ was to be ‘steered into the Eastern regions, [for] they will become members of the Reich’. Such a movement, the Fiihrer dreamt, would be analogous in importance to the amalgamation of German states in the Zollverein a century earlier.! ‘Negotiations’ took place with Denmark from the fall of 1941 on,

and plans were made for Danish and Norwegian participation in the

Ostland economy, which the Danish Minister of ‘Transportation inspected in the spring of 1942.2 Above all, the Netherlands were encouraged to participate in the future development of Russia. As early as January 3, 1942, Rosenberg received Mussert to discuss the

project. ‘The German and Nazi Dutch press hinted at plans for Netherlands capital investments there; agronomists, gardeners, and

artisans were invited to volunteer for migration; and public pronouncements predicted that up to five million Dutch peasants might move to the East to relieve overpopulation at home. A Dutch “Eastern Company’ was established, and a group under Dr. Rost van Tonningen, a leading collaborator, toured the occupied areas in September 1942. Soon, however, Berlin was forced to admit that the difficulties in readjusting the Dutch economy from her overseas colonies to a new base in Russia were considerable.+ Though a few

groups of Dutch specialists were assigned to the East (and some defected to the Soviet partisans), virtually nothing was accomplished, largely because the fortunes of war turned against the Reich.

Of the ambitious resettlement plans, only one was actually 1 HTT, pp. 16, 34, 55; Picker, op. cit. p. 45. The Swiss, Hitler added characteristically, would be used ‘only as inn-keepers’. 2 Ostland (Berlin), xxiii, no. 11 (June 15, 1942), 193. Subsequent agreement

with Sweden provided for an exchange of raw materials such as flax from the occupied East for Swedish hardware and dairy equipment. (RMfdbO., Chefgruppe Wirtschaftspolitische Kooperation, /nformationsdienst, 1943, no. 2/3, p. 4.)

Though no French migration was anticipated, Rosenberg’s representative encouraged French participation in Eastern industry. (Rosenberg, ‘Meldung an den Fuhrer’, March 20, 1943, Document o40-PS*.) 3 VB-B, June 14, 1942; Ostland, xxiii, no. 20 (October 15, 1942), 356, and no. 24 (December 15, 1942), 421-6; Rost van Tonningen, ‘De Nederlandsche Oostcompagnie’, Nieuw Nederland (Utrecht), ix (1943), no. 9, 576-97 ; S. Coedhuys,

‘Niederland im Osteinsatz’, D.O.K. (Berlin), no. 18 (August 12, 1943), pp. 1-3; Deutsche Arbeit, xl1i (1942), 265-70 ; Deutsche Ukraine-Zettung (Rovno), September

20, 1942. For a useful summary of foreign participation in the East, see Claude Moret, L’ Allemagne et la réorganisation de l Europe (Neuchatel : Baconniére, 1944),

Pp. 137-42. See also Rosenberg to Goring, January 21, 1942, Wi/ID .77*, CRS.

* At the time of Stalingrad, Berlin forbade further mention of the Dutch migration prospects in the press. (RMfdbO., Richtlinien fiir die Pressezensur, p. 7.)

G.R.R.—U

286 Peoples and Policies eT. undertaken. It was, ironically, not one of those projected by the Generalplan Ost. Hitler had remarked in the summer of 1942 that the Ukraine ought to be Germanized within twenty years; and Koch

had approvingly spread the good word. When Himmler, on a visit to the Fiihrer’s headquarters at Vinnitsa, echoed the thought by commenting that the partisans were menacing the Volksdeutsche and that there ought to be ‘only German spoken here’, his anxious aides

interpreted this as an order to Germanize the area — specifically, the ethnic German settlement of Hegewald, near Himmler’s field headquarters. In mid-August 1942, Himmler actually sanctioned a ‘consolidation’ of German villages there after the harvest was in; 10,000 ethnic Germans were to be moved into the Hegewald district, where the settlers (unlike the rest of the population) were to receive land in private ownership.! Indeed, in November 1942 the first seven villages were cleared of

their Ukrainian inhabitants, and ethnic Germans from Volhynia were moved in. Both groups were moved under duress and were exposed to outright terror; material conditions among emigrants and immigrants were atrocious. In December the Volksdeutsches Gebiet Hegewald was established as a distinct administrative unit and, in line with the Generalplan, was exempted from the jurisdiction

of the civilian administration.2, Though a few more experiments along similar lines were undertaken by the SS, the German retreat stopped further wholesale transfers of population. What little was done reverberated in a manner out of all proportion to the actual moves ; to the indigenous population, it symbolized German intentions

for the future. Although the actual resettlement experiments were small in scope and limited to a few villages in the raions of Zhitomir and Kalinovka [writes a leading German agrarian specialist], the grapevine carried the story to the farthest corners of the Ukraine and caused profound political resentment. Repeated protests against such measures by leading representatives of the agricultural administration remained ineffective.3

Indeed, the whole matter added a new subject for controversy in Berlin. As usual, Rosenberg — himself a quixotic advocate of forced Germanization — objected not to the substance of the SS 1 Document NO-2703* ; interview G-2. 2 RKU, circular, December 12, 1942, Zentralblatt, i (1942), 515 ; interview G-2. Hegewald, about 200 square miles large, was listed as having a population of % Cito Schiller, in Karl Brandt, et al., Management of Agriculture and Food in the

German-Occupied and Other Areas of Fortress Europe (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1953), p. 69.

CH. XIV Masters and Serfs 287 moves but to the fact that his office was being deprived of authority.! When the Hegewald project was put in effect, he again wrote Himm-

ler that it was Azs business to authorize it but, now that the SS had already begun, he would retroactively approve it ‘to make it legal’. Some of Rosenberg’s subordinates put their concern into cautious inquiries. Reporting on the Hegewald move, two officials wrote : This can be interpreted as the beginning of the Germanization of the Ukraine. What shall be done with the Ukrainian population is not clear.

(Germanization of racially desirable parts? Shift of the Ukrainian ethnic area beyond the Volga? Maintenance of the Ukrainians in their present area with less political freedom ?) 3

Likewise, the economic: branches under Go6ring objected to this ‘child’s play’: to their way of thinking, such measures were premature and of no help to the war effort. Others, such as the Army and the Foreign Office, eyeing the SS aggrandizement efforts with concern, privately dissented but preferred to remain silent.

Himmler, on his part, was dissatisfied with the slow progress being made. According to Meyer-Hetling’s masterplan, at the end of the 25-year programme, half the residents of the Marken would be Germans, while about one-fourth of the strong-points’ residents would be Germans. This was not enough for the Reichsfiihrer-SS. Himmler therefore wrote back that he had evidently been misunderstood. This twenty-year [szc] plan must include

the Germanization of Estonia and Latvia [in their entirety]... . I personally am convinced that it can be done.

When Meyer-Hetling asked for more detailed guidance, Himmler, oblivious to the difficulties, added [Lithuania and Belorussia (in addition to Ingria and the Crimea) to his list of ‘must’s’. L’appetzt vient en mangeant. ‘The Planning Staff returned to its work, and by ' In early 1942 Rosenberg’s deputy, Alfred Meyer, protested to Heydrich about the rounding up of Baltic orphans to test their ‘Germanizability’, for ‘we

would thereby expose our policy’. Rosenberg promptly joined in: ‘It is the exclusive right of the [Ostministerium] to determine the policy to be adopted .. .”’

(Jeckeln, circular, February 17, 1942; Meyer to Heydrich, April 27, 1942; Rosenberg to Lammers, May 6, 1942; all Document NG-g51*.) See also Documents NO-4101* and NO-4104*.

2 Rosenberg to Himmler, September 28, 1942, Himmler file 57*; and

Himmler to Koch, September 8, 1942, Document NO-2277*. 3 Firgau and Gallmeier, ‘Bericht’, March 18, 1943, Document Occ E 4-13*, YIVQ. As early as April 1942 Rosenberg’s ‘racial expert’, Dr. Wetzel, submitted a careful criticism of the plan’s earliest version, deeming the projected eastward removal of some thirty million Slavs to be unrealistic. (Wetzel, ‘Stellungnahme und Gedanken zum Generalplan Ost’, April 27, 1942, Document NG-2325*.) + See Documents 1539-PS*, and 264-PS, TMWC, xxv, 317.

288 Peoples and Policies pro it February 1943 a revised Generalplan was ready.' As late as January 12, 1943, Himmler was ready to proceed. The

next day, with the crisis at Stalingrad imposing a spirit of ‘total war’, Hitler issued a directive to stop work on all long-range postwar projects. Reluctantly Himmler had to recognize that other matters had higher priority, and the resettlement plans fell victim to setbacks at the front. The Germanization projects may seem visionary at first sight. Yet they were an organic element of both doctrine and blueprints which the Nazi leadership had adopted for the East. They also typified the unique dualism inherent in the SS: a practical attempt

to extend its own power; but also, not unlike the work of the Einsatzgruppen, a promotion of long-range, ideologically-conditioned

projects rather than an implementation of tasks that might have immediately contributed to the war effort. V olksdeutsche

Prior to the second World War, the largest concentration in Russia of German colonists, who had moved there by the thousands

over the course of centuries, was found in the Volga-German Republic.3. An outpost of Deutschtum far to the east, it was the object of special Soviet as well as German attention. In 1941, when

the map of the Soviet Union was being cut up in anticipation of German victory, the Volga-Germans, too, were considered. Though

the German advance to the Volga was axiomatic, Hitler failed to

indicate the precise fate of the colonists there; consequently Rosenberg’s plans also lacked finality.

Some of his staff proposed the creation of a ‘channel’ through which the Reich could establish direct ties with the Volga-Germans

and perhaps include them in the belt of anti-Muscovite border states. Initially he considered forming a synthetic Cossack region which was to extend northwards as far as Saratov “so as to provide administrative contact with the territory of the Volga-Germans’.4 But the idea of such an arbitrary gerrymander was soon dropped in 1 [Meyer-Hetling,] Generalplan Ost; Himmler to Greifelt, June 2, 1942; Himmler to Meyer-Hetling, January 12, 1943 ; Greifelt to Himmler, February 15, 1943 ; all Document NO-2255*.

2 Meyer-Hetling, testimony, Case VIII, Engl. transcript, pp. 2231, 2237;

and SSPF Krim, ‘Bericht iiber die Arbeitsergebnisse’, May 31, 1944, Document NO-4009*. 3 The 1939 Soviet census listed about 1,425,000 Germans in the U.S.S.R., of whom about one-third lived in the Volga-German A.S.S.R. German war-time claims went so far as to speak of over two million persons of German ancestry in the East — a considerable exaggeration. + Document 1017-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 551. See also below, pp. 298-9,

CH. XIV Masters and Serfs 289 favour of a ‘Greater Ukraine’. Thus at the time of the invasion, the Rosenberg office recommended that ‘the Volga-German Repub-

lic, too, be included in the Ukrainian state so as to extricate it entirely from Russian influence’.' So unsure was he of the German

sympathies of the Wolgadeutsche that Rosenberg felt safer in assigning them to the Ukraine.

At the same time Rosenberg did not want to leave the VolgaGermans in their ‘exposed position’ in the east, especially since he assumed initially that ‘in any case the Volga is only an outer line which will not be held indefinitely’. He therefore outlined a plan to move ‘suitable German settlers from among the Volga-Germans’ to the Baltic States, to the annexed provinces of Western Poland, or at least to the Ukraine. At the price of permitting ‘less worthwhile’

elements to go under, the so-called best ethnic forces would be consolidated in areas destined for thorough-going Germanization.? Actually, Berlin never had to cope with this problem. Not only did the German troops never reach the Volga-German ‘Autonomous’ Republic, but on August 28, 1941, the Soviet government ordered

it liquidated and its population exiled to Asia for alleged treason.

The same decree provided for the forcible evacuation of other Volksdeutsche from the path of the advancing Wehrmacht, evidently on the assumption that they would be prone to collaborate with the invaders. Even though considerable numbers were thus removed,

especially from the Crimea,3 by September the Germans had occupied many of the areas, particularly along the Black Sea coast, where there were Russlanddeutsche communities. These ethnic Germans became a special problem for the occupation authorities. Rosenberg’s staff, in particular Georg Leibbrandt,

had conducted extensive researches and had published a series of

monographs on their location and activities. The instructions compiled on the basis of these findings were contradictory. Initially,

the Volksdeutsche were to be handled like the other residents ; applications for German citizenship were not to be accepted. At the same time, the OMi directed that ‘those unmistakably established as ethnic Germans [will] even now enjoy advantages which are generally accorded to German citizens’.4 1 It was presumably to form part of the Saratov district. See Dienststelle Rosenberg ‘Die neuen Ostgebiete’, June 16, 1941, Document 1033-PS*; *Besetzte Ostgebiete’, June 25, 1941, Document 1036-PS* ; Document 1037-PS*.

2 Document 1017-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 550; Rosenberg, ‘Denkschrift Nr. 2’

[April 7, 1941], Document 1018-PS* ; interview G-12. 3 See Gerhard Wolfrum, ‘Die Riickfiihrung der Deutschen aus der UdSSR’, Deutsche Arbeit, xliv, 164-8 ; Dr. Maurach, ‘Die Krim’, Deutsche Post aus dem Osten (Berlin), August-September 1942, pp. 36-7. 4 Document 1056-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 604.

290 Peoples and Policies PT. 1 The SS, as usual, sought to advance its own interests. As early as July 1941 Himmler authorized the Repatriation Office for Ethnic

Germans [Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, or VoMi] to register all Volksdeutsche in the occupied areas and generally to favour them so

as ‘to lay the cornerstone for German leadership . . . in close cooperation with the special action teams and the Security Police’.! The VoMi promptly established a special Sonderkommando to carry out the registration. Although some 45,000 responded in 486

districts of the RKU, the Germans continued to cite a figure of 200,000 ethnic Germans in their estimates.

The difficulty of their status was heightened by the overwhelming impression that the calibre of the ‘liberated’ fellownationals left much to be desired. A majority barely spoke German ;

intellectually and ‘racially’, it was reported, they were inferior to their Slavic neighbours. After five months of war a high economic official complained that ‘the ethnic Germans in the Ukraine do not constitute an element on which the administration and economy of the country can rely’. And their ‘unsuitable quality’ induced the 55 to plan the assignment of special advisers to rehabilitate them. None the less, the Volksdeutsche were given a distinctly privileged

position under the Germans. Few in numbers, they invariably received leading posts in local government. As the military government

office of the rear area of Army Group South decreed, ‘Ethnic Germans are to receive special consideration in filling positions in

economy and administration’. They enjoyed numerous formal privileges in such fields as taxation, property rights, marriage, and education.’ ‘They had easier personal access to Germans from the Reich and tended to become a superior caste. A German commandant would naturally prefer to make an ethnic German chief of the local police, deeming him to be more reliable and able to make him! Himmler to Lorenz, July 11, 1941, Document NO-2474, NMT, iv, 851-2.

2 See Documents NO-2703*, and Occ E 4-13*, YIVO. See also Sonderkommando, Ortsberichte, a series of reports from ethnic German communities, mostly in the Ukraine, Containers 146-154*, Deutsches Auslands-Institut records, LC.

3 ‘Das Deutschtum in Witebsk’, Deutsche Arbeit, xlii, 82-3; Frauenfeld, ‘Denkschrift’, February 10, 1944, p. 14, Document NO-5394*; Riistungs-

Inspekteur Ukraine to General Thomas, December 2, 1941, Document 3257-PS, TMWC, xxxu, 75 ; Document NO-2703* ; Firgau and Gallmeier, op. cit. pp. 4-7. 4 Befh. riickw. Heeresgebiet Siid, Abt. vii, order, August 16, 1941, Document NOKW-1691*. See also Document NOKW-2513*. 5 See Meyer, Recht, sections U I Ag, U I A8, U II C5 ; RKU, Zentralblatt, ii (1943), 483-4; RMfdbO., Verordnungsblatt, i (1942), 77; Reichsstelle fiir das Auswanderungswesen, Nachrichtenblatt, xxiv (1942), no. 11; Ostland (Riga), ii,

no. 4; Kinkelin to Schiller, ‘Begriindung fiir die Sonderstellung der Volks-

deutschen in der neuen Landordnung’, July 31, 1942, Wi/ID .77*, CRS.

CH. XIV Masters and Serfs 291 self understood without an interpreter. In Nikolaev, a Swiss reporter observed, posters read: ‘The Volksdeutsche in the Ukraine

stand under the protection of the German Wehrmacht. Whoever abuses them or their property will be shot.’! The advantages of the Volksdeutsche, though varying from area to area, were significant enough for the rest of the people to view them as the most privileged group — so much so that some non-

Germans sought to demonstrate the existence of an imaginary ‘German grandmother’ in order to share in the privileges.2_ Here is how former residents of different parts of occupied Russia recalled the situation : The Volksdeutsche received German food rations. They provided the cadres of interpreters for various official agencies, agricultural units, work teams, etc. In Polotsk, the interpreter of the first mayor was a German. Another woman translator was with the Army bakery. The daughter of the German pastor was with the Ortskommandant but was later arrested as a Soviet agent. The separate stores for ethnic Germans caused irritation among the

population in the Ukraine. Hatred was growing against the German colonists — something that had not existed before. In Khar’kov, the Volksdeutsche were in a privileged position. They received better rations, work, and preferential housing. When a German

tried to rape the daughter of a friend of ours, another soldier told him, ‘Let go, these are Volksdeutsche ’.3

The ethnic Germans were among those due to be resettled in the new Marken. The SS pressed for the migration, but — like Goring and his economic agencies — Koch and his aides hampered 1 Paul Werner, Fin schweizer Journalist steht Russland (Olten : Walter, 1942), p. 167; Gustav Fochler-Hauke, ‘Die ersten Wiederaufbaumassnahmen’, VB-M, November 7, 1941. See also Deutsche Post aus dem Osten, December 1941, p. 4; and Walter Engelhardt, Klinzy: Buildnts einer russischen Stadt (Berlin : NibelungenVerlag, 1943).

2 The tabulation of answers to a group of questionnaires given to a random sainple of Soviet refugees shows the following® replies to the question, ‘Which of

the following groups fared best under the German occupation?’ It should be

borne in mind that some respondents came from areas where there were no ethnic Germans.

Russians 20 Ukrainians 137

Caucasians 29

Crimean Tatars 28 Volksdeutsche 710

Others 26

(Project on the Soviet Social System, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, ‘Wartime Occupation Code Book’ *, WO 1o.)

3 Interviews H-59, H-96, H-102, H-121, H-488. See also Document NO4009*,

292 Peoples and Polictes PT. I the work of the SS screening teams at every step, faithful to their dictum that everything that did not help the war effort was unessential and had to be postponed.! Indeed, the SS resettlement endeavours had little connection with the demands of the hour. In

the words of a German official, ‘the Reichsfiihrer-SS wants to create ethnic German settlements for political reasons, without considering the lack of men and the unsuitable nature [of the Volks-

deutsche]. . . . It is a matter of political prestige to give them . . .

a new home.’ 2

Only a few ethnic Germans were moved. In the summer of 1943, another effort was made, as a result of the registration, to grant German citizenship to some categories of Volksdeutsche.3

This, too, remained unfulfilled because of the German retreat. Some of the ethnic Germans had by then come to question the

benefits of ‘liberation’. Yet for them there was no returning to the Soviets, for they could expect little clemency. With the German withdrawal, they too were evacuated westwards — over 300,000 men,

women, and children (probably not all, strictly speaking, ‘ethnic Germans’).4 Thus ended their brief heyday of glory and graft. Even then, however, a bitter dispute arose over their disposition. The VoMi and RuSHA objected violently to the plans of the OMi underlings (backed by Berger) to keep the Volksdeutsche ready for a

return to the East as soon as the German ‘reoccupation’ began. Still dreaming of a new advance, the administrators sought to make the ethnic Germans into cadres of ‘indigenous’ leadership on which

they could rely in the future. The SS Resettlement Office, on the other hand, promoted the segregation of ethnic Germans from ‘genuine Easterners’. It recognized, once the whole experiment was over, that because the ethnic Germans have absorbed to a large extent Bolshevik and Russian doctrine, they cannot be considered suitable persons for guidance and leadership in Russia. ! Documents Occ E 4-13*, YIVO; and NO-2277*. 2 “Vermerk tiber die Tagung in Rowno vom 26.-28.8.1942’, Document 264PS, TMWC, xxv, 317. Berlin proudly wrote that ‘No German family shall in the future live alone among alien nationalities : wherever the Germans are scattered, they will be pulled out and concentrated in German villages’. (Zierke, ‘Sammlung der Versprengten’, VB-M, July 13, 1943.) 3 Frick and Rosenberg, decree, May 19, 1943, RKU, Verordnungsblatt, ii, no. 12. Full ‘Germanization’ was admitted to be impossible. See also Brautigam, ‘Uberblick iiber die besetzen Ostgebiete’ (Tiibingen : Institut fiir Besatzungsfragen, 1954), pp. 78-9. 4 Wolfrum, op. cit. pp. 164-8 ; DNB report, July 13, 1944, cited in Kulischer,

op. cit. p. 267; and Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee, eds., Hitler’s Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 84-5.

CH. XIV Masters and Serfs 293 With Himmler’s approval, they were therefore to settle in the West Polish provinces annexed to the Reich.!

It was a sad admission of failure, however questionable the explanation. Ideological tenets and narrow concepts of ‘utility’ had combined to make this group the salt of the earth, not on the basis of merit but by the shibboleths of race. Now Berlin had to admit that its ‘mainstay’ had proved incapable of leading the Untermenschen. Meanwhile German and Soviet policies had cost the Volksdeutsche their homes and hearths. Muscovy

In the new socio-ethnic hierarchy which Hitler and Rosenberg planned to establish, the Great Russians were to form the lowest stratum — preserved from physical obliteration but reduced to the role of labourers and servants. The attitude of the Nazi leadership toward Russia and the Russians has become amply manifest in the preceding chapters. It remains only to review some of the specific directives which were to determine the political destiny of ‘Rump Russia’.

Rosenberg echoed Hitler’s dictum that superior power gave Germany the right to dispose of the conquered areas as it saw fit. Russia was not to be a member of the family of nations; ‘given the

might of the German Wehrmacht, she is no longer a subject of European politics but an object of German policy’.2 The wishes of the population could be ignored with impunity ; Germany’s interests

alone were to prevail. Rosenberg formulated these in his first memorandum after receiving his assignment from Hitler: in addition to the elimination of Communists and Jews, they were (1) the destruction of Russia as a state, and the assurance of her permanent weakness ;

(2) the economic exploitation of Russia by Germany ; (3) the use of Rump Russia as a dumping ground for undesirables.3

As has been shown, the last of these goals remained almost entirely on paper. The plans and practices of economic exploitation will be discussed in subsequent chapters. The first goal, Russia’s impotence, was to be attained by the permanent destruction of her armed forces, and also, as Rosenberg never tired of stressing, by the partition of the U.S.5.R. into a number of distinct political entities. The new German-controlled national areas to be formed around the 1 Briickner to Lorenz, March 18, 1944, Document NO-5328, NMT, iv, 820-1. 2 Rosenberg, ‘Rede des Reichsleiters’, June 20, 1941, Document 1058-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 613. 3 Document 1017-PS, TMWC, xxv, 549.

294 Peoples and Policies PT. 1 perimeter of Rump Russia were awarded, beyond their ethnic borders, ‘considerable regions of the Russian heartland’. Thus the Ukraine was to obtain the vast Great Russian provinces of Briansk,

Kursk, Vorenezh, Saratov, and Stalingrad; the Caucasus was to include Krasnodar, Stavropol’, and Astrakhan; Ostland was to extend eastwards beyond Novgorod and Smolensk; Leningrad was

either to be razed to the ground or set up as a separate German

district. ‘The remainder of the ‘heartland’ was to become a Germancontrolled Reich Commissariat Muscovy (RKM); the term, Russia, was to be barred for ever.

The choice of the name ‘Muscovy’ suggested the assumptions underlying Rosenberg’s concept — and 1n its anti-Russian aspects it fully mirrored Hitler’s own attitude: the aim was to throw Russia backwards and eastwards. Long before the war, Rosenberg had spoken of the necessity to have ‘the Russians move their centre of gravity to Asia’: The sense of history has proceeded not from east to west . . . but ‘from west to east’, from the Rhine to the Vistula, from Moscow to Tomsk: this is how it must resound once again. The ‘Russian’ whom Peter [the Great] and Catherine [II] cursed was the genuine Russian. One should not have forced Europe upon him.!

Now this ‘Europeanizing’ was to cease. After the separation of the non-Russian nationalities, Rosenberg pontificated, the remaining Russia will be far removed from the present German borders and will be fenced in, on its western side, both from the north and from the south. Corresponding to its actual population, its centre of gravity should then lie in the Urals if not in Siberta.?

There was no German plan to occupy all of Siberia; Hitler repeatedly commented that he would be content to let the Russians live behind the ‘mobile frontier’ he planned to erect. Of course, ‘in case of necessity, we shall renew our advance wherever a new

centre of resistance is formed’. But the main point, the Fuhrer told his associates, was this: We must take care to prevent a military power from ever again establishing itself on this side of the Urals. . . . When I say, on this side of the Urals, I mean a line running two or three hundred kilometres east of the Urals. This space in Russia must always be dominated by Germans.3 ' Rosenberg, Der Mythus des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts (Munich: Hoheneichen-Verlag, 1935), pp. 641-2. 2 Document 1037-PS*. 3 HTT, pp. 5, 15 (entries for July 5 and 26, 1941).

CH. XIV Masters and Serfs 295 As far as the Russians on ‘this’ side of the prospective new border were concerned, Hitler declared, ‘We're not going to play at children’s

nurses: we're absolutely without obligations as far as these people are concerned’.' Rosenberg had used almost the same phrase in describing the Great Russians on the eve of the invasion: Germany had ‘no responsibility whatsoever’ for feeding them. We know [he stated] that this fact is the result of dire necessity, unaffected by any feeling. Unquestionably a very extensive evacuation will be necessary, and the Russians must look ahead to very hard years. . . . The reversal of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which will require strong personalities.

Rosenberg concluded his revealing discussion with a favourite excursion on his views of the ‘Russian soul’. The primitive Russian, he granted condescendingly, was a good artisan or dancer. He was

much unlike the ‘European’, however, and contact with the West produced a conflict in him. As symbolized by the struggle between Turgenev and Dostoevsku, the Russian soul, rent in two, found no way out. If, however, the West should once more be closed to the Russians, they will be obliged to fall back on their genuine, original forces and on the space where they belong.

. . . Perhaps in a hundred years a historian will see this decision in a different light from the way it seems possible for a Russian to view it today. While periodically reverting to his pseudo-psychoanalysis of the Russian — a favourite pastime in German ‘intellectual’ circles — Rosenberg was soon absorbed in more practical concerns.

On the formal side, Muscovy was to become a Reichskom-

missariat. Yet compared with Ostland, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus, the policy to be implemented in the RKM was to be admittedly one of ‘thorough-going ruthlessness’. Its eight General Commissariats would extend from the Arctic Ocean to the borders of

Turkestan, including the Central Russian area of Moscow and Gor’kii, as well as Tataria, Chuvashia, and Bashkiria, and the vast Komi region to the north; beyond the Urals, the Sverdlovsk commissariat would encompass the industrial areas of Magnitogorsk and

Cheliabinsk. ‘Thus the RKM would have a population of some sixty million, would extend somewhat beyond the Urals to include 1 Ibid. p. 69 (entry for October 17, 1941). 2 Document 1058-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 622-3. Italics mine. 3 For a specimen of the pseudo-scientific analyses of the ‘Russian national character’ then in vogue in Germany, see the curious article, G. R. Heyer, ‘Zur Psychologie des Ostraumes’, Zeitschrift fiir Geopolitik (Heidelberg), July 1942, pp. 312 ff.

296 Peoples and Policies pro the richer adjacent areas, and would incorporate sizeable nonRussian minorities. !

‘This occupation’, Rosenberg predicted about Muscovy, ‘will evidently have an entirely different character from that of the Baltic provinces, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus.’ The problem here was not to raise or develop but to keep down. His choice to conduct the policy of ‘suppression’ there was Erich Koch, the man he deemed too brutal for the Ukraine.2, However, when Hitler assigned Koch to the RKU, the post in Moscow went to a high SA officer, Siegfried Kasche.3 Kasche’s SA background earned him the prompt hostility of Himmler, who told Rosenberg that he considered Kasche ‘a man of the desk, in no wise energetic or strong, and an outspoken enemy of

the SS’.4 Probably another storm would have broken, had the RKM been brought to life, but Moscow never fell to the Germans, and Kasche never assumed office. Assigned as German ‘Minister’ to puppet Croatia, Kasche as late as 1944 naively continued to look forward to his assignment in Moscow.5

The various parts of the Russian republic between the Gulf of Finland and the Sea of Azov which fell into German hands, were completely under military rule. The Ostministerium never exercised

control over any of them. Much of the Great Russian territory remained part of the front-line zone, where no full-fledged administra-

tion was established ; in the Army and Army Group rear areas, the occupation was shorter lived than in Ostland and the Ukraine. Each German military government unit followed its own standards of conduct within the framework of very broad and vague directives prescribed from above. Conditions varied from village to village, from year to year, as commandants and detachments were moved. From 1942 on, increasing chunks of these areas fell under the control ™ Documents 1030-PS*, 1033-PS*, 1035-PS*, 1036-PS*. ‘Though never officially published, the planned borders of ‘Muscovy’ were hinted at in an article, ‘Russland — nicht Staat, sondern Volksboden’, Ostland (Berlin), April 15, 1942.

See also map, p. §5 above. Rosenberg in April 1941 did not propose to make

Muscovy a co-equal Reichskommissariat but had added it to his list by early May 1941. See Document 1018-PS*, and interview G-14. On the Idel-Ural problem, see above, pp. 270-3.

2 Rosenberg, appendix to ‘Denkschrift Nr. 2’ [April 7, 1941], Document

1019-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 557.

3 [Bormann,] ‘Aktenvermerk’, July 16, 1941, Document 221-L, TMWC, XXXVI, QI.

4 Himmler, ‘Aktennotiz’ on conference with Rosenberg, November 15, 1941, Document NO-5329*. See also Document NG-2775*. 5 Erich Kordt, Wahn und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart : Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1948), p. 305 n.

CH. XIV Masters and Serfs 297 of Soviet partisans, restricting effective German occupation to towns

and major arteries of transportation. It is thus impossible to speak of any distinct ‘policy’ pursued in the occupied areas of Russia proper. The activities of military government and indigenous local administration cannot meaningfully be construed as the expression

of any over-all standards of conduct. The bulk of Army com-

mandants and economic officials made little fundamental distinction between Great Russia, Belorussia, and the Ukraine. Their attitude

and course of action among the Great Russians were generally as good or as bad as elsewhere. The major issues that animated the population were the same as

elsewhere in the occupied East. The fate of collective farming, material standards, cultural activities, the treatment of prisoners of war and forced labourers, and Russian political aspirations were foremost among them. Each will be considered below, and it will be found that in each instance certain ‘tactical’ concessions were made by the Germans in the face of setbacks. The policy of ‘ignoring the population’, adopted on the eve of the attack, proved impossible

of execution. Most frequently, however, retreats from Berlin’s extreme intentions were undertaken by the commanders in the field. Hitler and Rosenberg and Himmler, almost to the very end, frowned on such endeavours. From 1942 on, Berlin only rarely found the leisure to discuss the future of Muscovy. Yet the tenacity and rigidity of official thinking were reflected in what little material German censorship passed on

this subject. A widely-heralded book published in Germany by a Finnish-born professor, Axel von Gadolin, for instance, confirmed the determination of the ‘New Europe’ to render impossible the re-emergence of a Russian state — not only a ‘Red’ or ‘White’ Russia but even in a ‘national totalitarian’ form. A Nazi Russia might within a few generations become “as great a danger as Russia

was under Peter the Great’. Hence, in Rosenberg style, the book advocated the ‘extermination of the Russian state tradition’ by a process of double migration : The complete settlement of the East presupposes a double eastward

transfer of peoples: from the west the European element gradually streams into the Russian plains; and a wave of Russians returns [sic /] east of the Volga to make room for the former.!

Nothing had changed. Only once, after all was lost, did Rosen-

berg personally reopen the question of the future Russia. In ! Axel von Gadolin, Der Norden, der Ostraum und das neue Europa (Munich : Rohrig, 1943), pp. 138-42, 158.

298 Peoples and Polictes PT. October 1944, at a moment of supreme crisis, when Hitler and Himmler seemed to have moved away from his ‘anti-Muscovite’ concept,

Rosenberg restated his own position in a desperate appeal to the Fiihrer.' Waging a losing battle, he was willing to concede to the Great Russians, along with the other Soviet nationalities, some kind of state in the future. Yet he still maintained that above all the Russian space, whose people are today being compelled to act as the carrier of Jewish world revolution, must be assured that it will be able to mobilize its cultural and economic forces in its Lebensraum — Siberia. . . .2

Not even in the face of defeat did Rosenberg, who had compromised so often, find it possible to yield on this fundamental point. At the beginning as at the end of the war, Russia was slated to be the orphan satrapy of the New Order. The Cossacks

German policy toward the Slavic population of the Soviet Union

made one purposeful exception to the general rule of derogation. The object of this unusual attitude were the Cossacks. A group endowed with distinct traditions, an aura of ‘counter-revolutionary’ convictions, and a genuine record of military prowess, the Cossacks lived scattered in their own settlements — stamitsas — along the Dnieper, Don, Kuban, and Terek Rivers. Descendants of Russian, Ukrainian, and other soldiers, adventurers, peasants, and fugitives,

they formed a social and cultural entity without being a distinct ethnic group. Much publicized in Germany (thanks to the contacts with influential German circles of some of their leaders abroad, such as General Peter Krasnov), the Cossacks occupied a separate position in the eyes of German policy-makers.3

Rosenberg had originally toyed with the idea of an inflated Cossack *Don-and-Volga’ Region, to reduce the area of Muscovy and to form a bridge between the Ukraine and the Caucasus in the

Rosenberg shelter-belt of buffers.4 Since this area had none of the ‘pronounced national feelings’ which he hoped to foster in the Ukraine and Caucasus, and since the Cossacks were basically much ™ See below, pp. 629-31.

2 Rosenberg, ‘Vorschlag fiir eine Regelung der Ostpolitik’, October 12, 1944, Document Rosenberg-14, TMWC, xli, 192. 3 'There are no adequate English-language studies of the historical and cultural background of the Cossacks. For a popular account, see Maurice Hindus, The

Cossacks (Garden City: Doubleday, 1945). See also [SS Wannsee-Institut,] ‘Das Kosakentum’ [Berlin, 1942]*. * Document 1017-PS, TMWC, xxvi, 551.

CH. XIV Masters and Serfs 299 like the Russians, ‘the administration will undoubtedly have to be sterner here [since] the Don-and-Volga area must, at first anyway,

be regarded as hostile’.! This synthetic gerrymander stretching from Rostov to Saratov and combining heterogeneous areas and various ethnic groups was soon abandoned even by the Ostministerium. In this decision one factor was the desire to create a strong Ukraine which would include some of the Cossack settlements, but leave those along the Kuban and Terek to the future RKK.2 Using national allegiance as the touchstone of its policy, Rosenberg’s staff refused to recognize the Cossacks as a bona fide nationality.

On the other hand, they were exempted from the status of Untermenschen. So strong were the stereotypes of their antiBolshevik record that even before the end of 1941 the OKW sanctioned the formation of Cossack military units to fight on the German side — at a time when no other Slavs were permitted to

bear arms. On April 15, 1942, Hitler personally permitted the use of Cossacks, both in anti-partisan warfare —the primary duty assigned to them— and in combat.3 In the summer of 1942, when the German Army was poised to push south past Rostov, directives specified that the Cossacks were to be treated as ‘friends’ .4

As soon as Army Group ‘A’ had occupied the Kuban area, its ‘enlightened’ military government officers requested permission

from Berlin to establish a ‘Cossack District’ — not as the nucleus of a future state but as an experimental area 1n which, with all but one

German agency withdrawn, the indigenous population would be permitted to establish full self-government. Freedom in cultural, educational, and religious activities was to be granted; razon chiefs and mayors would be groomed for a prospective ‘ataman government’; and, contingent on their co-operation, the Cossack peasantry was to be promised the early dissolution of collective farms. With 1 Rosenberg, ‘Denkschrift Nr. 2’ [April 7, 1941], Document 1018-PS*. 2 In July 1942, when the transfer of further areas from military to civil rule was contemplated, Rosenberg — largely to restrict Koch’s domain — revived momen-

tarily the plan for a fifth Reichskommissariat from Saratov to the Caspian and Sea of Azov. (Rosenberg to Hitler, July 29, 1942, EAP 99/1002*, CRS.) 3 For the Nazi attitudes towards collaborator army units, see below, Chapter xxv. The details of Cossack history during the war include many moot areas deserving of further investigation. Cossack ‘hundreds’ (sotnt) were formed as early as 1941,

and it is claimed that Hitler authorized their activation on October 22, 1941. (Boris Nicolaevsky, ‘Porazhencheskoe dvizhenie 1941-1945 godov’, Novyi Zhurnal

[New York], xviii, 214; and David Chavchavadze, ‘The Vlassov Movement’, MS* [Yale University, 1950], pp. 78-9.)

4 Sdf. Siefers, ‘Bericht tiber Versuchsgebiet im Kuban-Kosakenraum’,

January 10, 1943, EAP 99/463*, CRS.

300 Peoples and Policies PT. 1! the approval of General Wagner’s office in Berlin, the District was

activated as of October 1, 1942, including for the time being six rations north of the lower Kuban, with an initial population of about 160,000, but which was to be enlarged at a later date.!

The order was issued without co-ordination with the Ostministerium. When Schickedanz learned of the proclamation of the

‘first autonomous state under our sovereignty’ in the East, he resentfully requested clarification: his office tolerated no proCossack or pro-autonomy ‘deviations’. At the OKH he was told that all rumours of a Cossack republic were ‘utterly unfounded’. When they were, none the less, confirmed, Schickedanz protested against both the independent action taken by the Army and the project itself.2 The SS likewise objected to the District for ‘ political

reasons’. None the less, on November 5 the QuartermasterGeneral formally approved its formation. A local police force was recruited; by January 1943 the District’s borders were to be ex-

panded, and a Cossack army commander was to be appointed ; discussion began on the problem of long-range autonomy, which would not preclude entry into loose federation with the Ukraine, Russia, or the Caucasus.3 Far-reaching reforms were contemplated in agriculture, though in practice little was achieved. Other plans called for the recruitment of 25,000 Cossack volunteers to fight with the German Army, but again there was no time to implement them.

By January 1943 the Army Group was in full retreat, and the experimental district collapsed.‘ A short-lived experiment, the Cossack District showed how the Army (or at least some of its elements) could within limits defy the Ostministerium and other agencies in Berlin. It also showed some

German officials that, where the Soviet population was given a chance to work out its own problems, not only no calamity ensued

but the population was generally inclined to work more wholeheartedly with the Germans. When Kleist’s army withdrew from the Kuban, considerable numbers of Cossack refugees joined the exodus,

and by late 1943 more than 20,000 Cossacks — or rather, men 1 Sdf. Siefers, ‘Bericht tiber Versuchsgebiet 1m Kuban-Kosakenraum’, interview H-500. On the policy of Army Group ‘A’, see above, pp. 238-41. 2 Brautigam, memorandum, October 14, 1942* ; Schickedanz, ‘ Aktenvermerk’, November 4, 1942, EAP 99/39*, CRS ; Brautigam, ‘Diary’,* LC. 3 Siefers, op. cit. pp. 8-11. 4 Ibid. pp. 18-26. There were considerable differences among German agencies as to whether only the indigenous Cossacks were to receive land or whether the recent immigrants as well as Great Russian residents were to be granted equal status. Characteristically, the Ostministerium argued for the removal of Russian

non-Cossacks from the stanttsas to the unpartitioned state farms, and for the allotment of land to old-time Cossacks only.

CH. XIV Masters and Serfs 301 claiming to be Cossacks — were fighting in various Germansponsored formations.! German policy towards the Cossacks was never entirely clarified. While most agencies, including Rosenberg’s, held that ‘the Cossacks

are not a nationality’ and deserved no special treatment, the Army, less wedded to the Nazi acid test of race, favoured them for practical reasons: the manpower shortage was beginning to make itself felt. A small minority of Cossacks and Germans, however, went further. They insisted that ‘according to the latest research, the Cossacks are descendants of a mixture of Nordic and Dinaric races . . . and have thus preserved strong blood ties to their original German homeland’.

Ludicrous and fantastic, this ‘theory’ suited well those Cossack nationalists who agitated for a ‘Gothic-Circassian’ Cossack state, a

‘Greater Cossackia’ stretching from the central Ukraine to the Samara River or even to the Emba, in Siberia. 2

In practice, the Army’s utilitarian approach prevailed. The pro-Cossack spokesmen persuaded both Keitel and Rosenberg to issue a joint proclamation to the Cossacks. ‘This manifesto, released on November 10, 1943, pledged the eventual return of their homelands and privileges, including a modicum of autonomy and private

land ownership. Until their return home was possible, Germany appointed itself their protector.3 The proclamation, unique in German Ostpolitik, was symptomatic of the change in tactics. The exemption of the Cossacks from the Untermensch formula was pushed

through largely because of military necessity and primarily by military men. ‘The consent to make sweeping and (from the 1941 ' The best source on Cossack war-time activities is the Cossack press; for a bibliography, see ‘Kazach’ia presa v 1941-1945 gg.’, Kazachti vestnik (Paris), no. 1/92 (June 15, 1951). See also Aleksei Alymov, ‘Stavropol’ — Berlin’, Chasovoi (Brussels), nos. 292-300 (1949-50) ; interview H-500 ; Documents NO-2419* — 2424*. Two fictional accounts are Croixelles (pseud.), Antlitz ohne Gnade (Celle :

Schneekluth-Verlag, 1950), and Edwin Erich Dwinger, Sie suchten die Fretheit (Freiburg: Dikreiter, 1952). See also below, p. 538. 2 This faction was led by the Cossack Nationalists (KND) under Vasilii Glazkov, editor of Kazachi Vestnik (Prague, 1941-5). "The members of this group had to ‘recognize the Fiihrer Adolf Hitler as the supreme defender of the Cossack Nation’. Its organ abounded in anti-Western and anti-Semitic themes. Another conflict in Cossack circles was due to friction among the ‘territorial’ (Don, Kuban, Terek) Cossacks. Formally, General Krasnov remained head of the ‘Central Cossack Office’ in Berlin, but German support was divided to the very end. See also John Kay, ‘Kosakia’, Deutsche Arbeit, November 1942, pp. 325-39 ; and Himmler file 334%. 3 Text in Jahrbuch der Weltpolittk (Berlin), 1944, pp. 200-1. The promise of a privileged ‘land grant’ to the Cossacks aroused the enmity of other Osttruppen

fighting on the German side. The manifesto, like the transfer of most other

military collaborators out of Soviet territory a few weeks earlier, was intended to raise the morale of and stem the increasing desertions from among the Osttruppen. G.R.R.—X

302 Peoples and Polictes PT. 1 point of view) most unorthodox promises to any group of Soviet citizens epitomized the increasing shift from the domain of occupation policy to efforts calculated to rally and persuade those Soviet citizens who — in military units, Ostarbeiter camps, and prisonerof-war camps — remained under German control.

PART III

PROBLEMS AND PRACTICE

,

.

..

CHAPTER XV

ECONOMIC POLICY: NAZI AIMS AND OUTLOOK In terms of long-range economic policy, the newly occupied Eastern territories shall be exploited from colonial points of view and with colonial methods.—GoOrING, directive, November 8, 1941

German Economic Goals

THE constant and barely concealed German aim for the Eastern economy was to exploit it for the benefit of the Reich. This aim shaped both the long-range plans of colonization and the shortterm feeding of Eastern resources into the German war machine. At no time were the interests of the indigenous population given serious consideration. ‘The yardstick of policy in the East, Berlin decreed in its basic economic directives, was ‘the welfare of the German Reich and People’.! The traditional German outlook on the complementary economic

roles of an industrial Germany and an agrarian Russia had left its mark on the blueprints drawn up in 1941. In contrast with earlier schemes based on reciprocity, however, the approach — exploiting Eastern agriculture and banishing industry from Russia — amounted to pure colonialism. As a leading official of the Ostministerium put it, the East would supply Europe with raw materials, and in return Germany would ship manufactured goods to the East.” 1 RMfdbO., Richtlinien fiir die Wirtschaftsfiihrung, Teil A, 2nd ed. (Berlin, April 1942), p. 5. The two sets of basic economic directives, published in book form, were the above Richtlinien, originating in the Ostminister1um and known (and hereafter cited) as the Braune Mappe (Brown Folder) and nicknamed Braunes Kamel (Brown Camel); and the analogous Richtlinien fiir die Fiihrung der Wirtschaft published by the Wirtschaftsfiihrungsstab Ost, whose role is discussed below (p. 315); this publication was conveniently abbreviated (and is cited hereafter) as

the Griine Mappe (Green Folder) and was customarily referred to in derogatory terms as the Griine Esel (Green Jackass). Both consisted of several parts and went through several editions, most of which were introduced at the Nuremberg trials, as indicated below.

Braune Mappe, Teil I (Ostland), preliminary draft, June 1941, Documents

1037-PS, 1056-PS. Teil If (Ukraine), Document 702-PS. Teil A, 1st ed.,

December 15, 1941, draft, Document 1529-PS ; 2nd ed., April 1942, Document

NI-rorig.

Griine Mappe, Teil I, 1st ed., June 1941, Document 1743-PS; 2nd ed., July 1941, Documents 472-EC, NI-1409, NI-6366. Tel IJ, 3rd ed., September 1942,

Document 347-EC. 2 'Ter-Nedden, ‘Erschliessung und Neuaufbau der Wirtschaft in den besetzten

Ostgebieten’, Probleme des Ostraumes (Berlin: RMfdbO., 1942), p. 47. Even 395

306 Problems and Practice PT. 111 These goals were not entirely conditioned by the Nazi view of

Russia alone. The Grossraum concept restricted the economic functions of ‘inferior’ areas — and these included Poland, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and others in addition to the U.S.S.R. — to the more rudimentary processes, primarily to extractive branches of economy : agriculture, mining, and raw materials.' ‘The transparent political aim of this approach was to retain the more highly developed

forms of economic life, particularly heavy industry and control of finances, at the hub of power, Germany. While steadfastly refusing to ‘integrate’ the Russian nation into the European political community, Hitler insisted on ‘integrating’ the Eastern economy into that of Europe so as to make its resources available to the West. Formerly [the Fiihrer maintained] it would have been impossible for a large state with almost unlimited resources to exist in Eastern Europe . . . while densely populated Central and Western Europe lack raw materials, which they must import from overseas. We must therefore completely open up the territories of the European East, so rich in raw materials, to the highly populated areas of the European West.

In return, Hitler speculated, Russia would provide a vast market for

German products. After the war, European industry ‘would no longer need any foreign markets’ because the Soviet population ‘lives on so low a standard that all industrial products, beginning with the simplest waterglass, could be marketed there’.2 Official plans therefore foresaw that ‘the occupied Eastern territories [would] always be available to the West as an outlet for products requiring

intensive labour. . . .’ 3

more outspoken was the policy pronouncement of G6ring, who at a conference on November 8, 1941, expressed German aims and methods in terms which serve as the motto for this chapter. (Nagel to Thomas, November 25, 1941* ; see also Document NI-440, NMT, xiii, 857-66.) Whatever the war-time demands, it was publicly declared, ‘in the long run, the agrarian and raw-material character of these [Eastern] territories must be preserved as much as possible’. (Deutsche Post aus dem Osten [Berlin], November 1941, pp. 4-5.) 1 For the most comprehensive Nazi discussion, see Werner Best, ‘Grundfragen einer deutschen Grossraum-Verwaltung’, Festgabe fiir Heinrich Himmler (Darm-

stadt: Wittich, 1941), pp. 33-60; for a discussion of German economic policy, see Karl Brandt et al., Management of Agriculture and Food in the GermanOccupied and Other Areas of Fortress Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953).

2 Generalkommissar Schmidt [Report on conference with Hitler and SeyssInquart], September 26, 1941, Document NG-3513* ; HTT, pp. 42-3 (entry for

September 25, 1941). 3 Braune Mappe, Teil A, 2nd ed., p. 12. ‘The obverse of this plan contributed

to the decision to attach the agrarian Ukraine to the West more closely than the industrialized areas of the U.S.S.R. Ukrainian food surplus sold to Germany could ‘be paid for only if it [the Ukraine] obtains its industrial consumer goods

CH. XV Economic Policy 307 Germany’s benefits from the Eastern economy were to go even

further. ‘My plan’, Hitler told his associates, ‘is that we should take profits on whatever comes our way.’! In this future scheme of things, Soviet industry had no raison d’étre. A de-industrialization (or ‘naturalization’) policy would redound to the Reich’s political and economic advantage in that ... (1) it prevents the politically undesirable concentration of the native population in industrial centres ; (2) the production and utilization of products of intense labour remain with the Reich and the old industrial countries of Europe, assuring them of a satisfactory standard of living.?

The bulk of Soviet industry was destined, in the long run, either to be destroyed or, as Hitler suggested on one occasion, to be transferred

to the West. If the East was no longer ‘primitive’ and ‘agrarian’, it had to be made so. Where theory and reality diverged, facts were

to be changed to conform with dogma. ,

The Demands of the Hour While quest for economic gain had not been the most compelling motive for Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, to the men concerned

with the economic exploitation of the East the immediate demands

for grain, oil, and raw materials were the alpha and omega of Germany’s occupation policy. ‘The members of the economic staffs responsible for the utilization of Eastern resources were neither diplomats of the old school nor ivory-tower economists, nor, finally, dogmatic extremists. Coldly collecting and analysing facts, the war economists calculated months before the invasion that the Soviet territory west of the so-called ‘AA’ (Archangel-Astrakhan) line would suffice to compensate for most German shortages during the balance of the war.

According to them —and the entire economic-administrative edifice from G6ring down — long-range political plans (whether of

the Bormann or the Rosenberg variety) were subordinate to the urgent economic demands of the war: The immediate goal, having top priority . . . for the newly occupied Eastern territories, is to win the present war, to which the Eastern from Germany or Europe. Russian competition . . . must therefore be eliminated.’ (WiStab Ost, Gruppe Landwirtschaft, ‘Wirtschaftspolitische Richtlinien’, May 23, 1941, Document 126-EC, TMWC, xxxvi, 144.) 1 HTT, p. 43. 2 Braune Mappe, Teil A, 2nd ed., p. 12. According to Goring, ‘it [was] the task of European, and especially German, industry to improve and process the

raw materials and semi-finished goods from the occupied East and to satisfy the most urgent demand for industrial consumer goods and means of production in the colonially exploited Eastern territories’. (Nagel to Thomas, op. cit.)

308 Problems and Practice PT. 111 territories must contribute extensively by securing the independence of Europe in food and raw materials. This immediate goal has priority even when occasionally a measure necessary for the prosecution of the war is in conflict with intentions for the future shaping of the Ostraum.!

The conflict between dogma and practice was recognized in the domain of economics earlier than in some other areas. Maximum exploitation meant the neglect of long-range political and economic

transformations which Berlin proposed to carry out. ‘For the duration of the war the demands of the war economy are the supreme law of all economic activity in the newly occupied Eastern territories.’ ”

Reluctantly Rosenberg and his staff had to recognize the cogency of this argument. German needs were particularly acute in agriculture. ‘According to the orders of the Fiihrer, all measures must be taken which are necessary for the immediate and maximum exploitation of the occupied

areas in favour of Germany.’ In 1939 Germany’s grain reserves had

totalled about seven million tons; by 1941 they had shrunk considerably, though under the terms of the commercial treaty of 1940 the Soviet Union had undertaken to deliver sizeable quantities in the following year. On the eve of the invasion the economic planners expected the armies in the East to live off the land and counted on amassing some seven million tons of grain a year from the future

German East. An increase in productivity of 10 or 20 per cent, Berlin anticipated not unrealistically, should not prove an insuperable task ; it would suffice to make up the deficit for German-controlled

Europe. What mattered above all was neither quality of grains nor

the future structure and social relations on the farm but sheer quantity of produce and efficiency in collection — a thesis well in line with the over-all outlook upon the East.3 _ In agriculture the immediate demands of the war economy did not initially necessitate a radical re-thinking of German long-range ' Braune Mappe, Teil A, 2nd ed., p. 5. 2 Nagel to Thomas, op. cit. It was publicly admitted that the immediate goal was to produce ‘war-essential goods, in the broadest sense of the term, as speedily as possible’. (Hans Thode, ‘Lebensraum im Osten’, Die Ostwirtschaft [Berlin], xxx! [March 1942], 37-8.)

3 Grune Mappe, Teil I, 1st ed., p. 3. Riecke, ‘Aufgaben der Landwirtschaft im Osten’, Probleme des Ostraumes, p. 32 ; Brandt, op. cit. pp. 56-7 ; Niederschlesisches Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung, Erndhrungsreserven im Osten (Breslau,

1943 ?), Teil iii, p. 29. Hitler, more ambitious than the technicians, at times

expected that ‘from the East we shall get between ten and twelve million tons of grain annually’ — not an impossible figure ; at other times, he recklessly spoke of ‘increasing agricultural production in the Ukraine by only 50 per cent’ as sufficient to provide bread for 25 to 30 million more people. Such an increase, he added, in a revelation of his lack of understanding, would be a ‘trifle’. (HTT, pp. 128, 623.)

CH. XV Economic Poltcy 309 plans: both pointed towards maximum production and collection. In other branches of economy the conflict between short-term and ultimate goals was more striking. For the needs of the moment it was imperative to resort to ‘maximum exploitation of the relatively limited means of production’ — even in industry — rather than let them wither for political reasons.'. It was not necessary, however, to restore all branches of Soviet industry, trade, and mining. ‘It

would be utterly erroneous to maintain that we must uniformly pursue the line that all enterprises in the occupied territories are speedily to be put in order and restored. . . . The use of industry may be resumed only in branches where there are shortages.’ The urge for all-out, immediate exploitation led to the utilization of resources and facilities with a minimum of organizational and administrative change. It was simplest to postpone such problems

as reprivatization and decentralization, and to avoid issues of organizational revamping — unless they bore directly on productive capacity. ‘Thus it was, above all, the economic-minded among the

German planners who urged that after the seizure of the East the status quo be maintained as the line of least resistance and effort. Even before the invasion they prevailed upon Rosenberg to order all economic enterprises in the East to carry on after the German occupation just as they had under Soviet rule.3 The Soviet price scale was to be retained,* as was most of the administrative machinery

on the local level.s | And so, more crucially, was the entire agrarian system of state and collective farms: any change was expected to entail a breakdown, or at least a serious disruption of agricultural production. Promptly, a second argument appeared favouring the maintenance of the status guo in agriculture: the state farm and collective farm system permitted more efficient control and collection | Braune Mappe, Teil A, 2nd ed., p. 13. 2 Griine Mappe, Teil I, 1st ed., pp. 3, 24; Braune Mappe, Teil A, 2nd ed., pp. 16-17. See also [Thomas ?] ‘Aktennotiz’, May 2, 1941, Document 2718-PS, TMWC, xxxi, 84; Colonel Musset, afiidavit, Document Korner-473*. Among

the branches singled out for special attention even before the invasion began were oil, manganese ore, and transportation. See also Géring’s basic decree, July 27, 1941, Document NI-3777, NMT, xii, 848-51, reprinted in Grtine Mappe, Teil I, 3rd ed., p. 16. 3 Rosenberg, ‘Denkschrift Nr. 3’, April 25, 1941, Document 1020-PS*. ‘The time has not yet come’, a German magazine stated in November 1941, ‘to solve questions of property rights, such as the transfer of enterprises to private owners [even in the Baltic provinces]. Such questions must remain for future clarification.’ (Gitinter Rosenpflanzer, ‘Zum Wirtschaftsaufbau im Baltikum’, Deutsche Post aus dem Osten, November 1941, p. 29.) * “A decree or announcement of the simplest kind will prohibit under threat of

punishment the raising of prices and other remunerations, including wages.’ (Griine Mappe, Teil J, 1st ed., p. 26.) 5 See above, p. 95,

310 Problems and Practice PT. 11 of produce than would a galaxy of individual households to be created on the ruins of the Soviet system. Hence the directives of May 1941 declared bluntly : The premise for [maximum] production and the seizure [Erfassung] of

surpluses is the maintenance of large enterprises (collective farms and

state farms). ... A splitting into several million peasant economies would make the exertion of German influence on production utopian. Every effort to dissolve the large [agrarian] units must therefore be fought tooth and nail.!

The economic staffs willed that the collective farms must serve the

Germans as they had the Soviet regime. ‘The aspirations of the Soviet peasantry were of no consequence. The Geopolitics of Starvation

The defence of the status quo thus became the common denominator both of the political officials in their dogmatic resistance to popular aspirations in the East, and of the economic-minded who

gave absolute priority to immediate exploitation. Here was the point of intersection between the courses pursued by Koch and Goring. For a variety of reasons, Rosenberg, engrossed as he was in his plans of political gerrymander and racial engineering, could not long abide by this outlook. His clash with the economic exploiters was hastened by their rejection of his policy of national ‘differentiation’.

Both Rosenberg and the economic staffs agreed in assigning special importance to the Ukraine and the Caucasus. But while Rosenberg urged a privileged political status for these areas, the economic staffs proceeded with their plans for the ruthless utilization of Ukrainian grain and Caucasian oil. A policy of special favours clashed with a policy of special burdens. The conflict was never resolved in practice. On paper it was composed by agreeing

to the priority of German over indigenous interests and to the disregard of the needs of ‘deficit’ areas.2_ Food consumption in the East was to be reduced so that Germany could obtain the margin. ‘This fact is the cornerstone on which our measures and economic policy are to be built.’ ' Document 126-EC, TMWC, xxxvi, 146; and Document NI-3777, NMT, xin, 848-51.

2 This situation provides a counterpart to the political struggle (discussed in Chapter XIV above), where agreement was reached on the privileged status of the Germans at the apex of the new social pyramid and on the lowly status of the Great Russians ; there, too, it was the non-Russian areas, particularly the Ukraine and the Caucasus, which remained in dispute,

CH. XV Economic Policy 311 As agreed upon by the economic agencies and the Rosenberg office, the plan in substance called for a division of the ‘East’ into two zones: the forest regions and the black-soil areas. Our task in reincorporating [the Soviet economy] . . . into Europe means tearing asunder the present economic balance within the U.S.S.R.

. .. The treatment will have to vary according to the types of areas [Landstriche]. Only those areas will have to be furthered economically and urgently kept in order which can provide significant food and oil reserves for us.

The rich southern surplus region, which was almost coterminous with Rosenberg’s Greater Ukraine, rather than feeding the rest of the Soviet Union, ‘must in the future turn its face to Europe’. As for the ‘superfluous’ north, except to provide for the troops stationed there (Berlin stated a month before the invasion), ‘Germany has no interest in preserving the productive power of these regions’. More than that, the directive ordered that any ‘shipment of food from the fertile south to the north must be blocked’. The population of these [northern] regions, especially the urban, will have to look forward to the severest famine. It will be essential to drive the population into Siberia.

It was not that the war economists were so preoccupied with the

prospect of collecting tons of grain and herds of cattle that they overlooked the humans living in these areas. With striking frankness they weighed the alternatives and concluded : Efforts to save the population from starving to death by bringing in surplus food from the black-soil region [to the northern areas] can be made only at the expense of feeding Europe. They undermine Germany’s ability to hold out in the war and to withstand the blockade [imposed by Britain]. There must be absolute clarity on this point. [From this fact] . . . there follows forcibly the extinction of industry as well as of a large percentage of the human beings in the hitherto deficit areas [of Russia].!

The courses suggested by economic and political extremism proved to be identical.

Rosenberg went along with the anti-Muscovite parts of this project. Yet the ‘Brown Camel’ plan drawn up under his direction 1 Document 126-EC, TMWC, xxxvi, 138-56 ; Griine Mappe, Teil I, 1st ed., p.3; Tel I, 3rd ed., p.16; Teil A, 2nd ed., pp. 14 ff. See also Documents 1017PS, TMWC, xxvi, 548, and Probleme des Ostraumes, p. 34. The directive, amplified by instructions for every area, had ‘received the approval of the highest authorities, since it is also in unison with the political tendencies [to be promoted with the aim

of] pushing back the Great Russians. . . .’

312 Problems and Practice pT. 1 expounded a point of view slightly different from that contained in the parallel ‘Green Jackass’ of the war economists. Rosenberg’s dilemma stemmed from the priority which he assigned to political goals, while still recognizing the necessity of economic exploitation. Once again he was caught between the advocates of indiscriminate confiscation and the few spokesmen for ‘enlightened self-interest’,

who argued behind the scenes that the first job was to satisfy the demands of the Soviet population — particularly the peasantry. Unable to support both, he proceeded to propound the impossible. Though fully cognizant of the unpopularity of the Soviet collective

farm system, he insisted that ‘the agricultural enterprises must remain intact, and the peasant must willingly offer his collaboration’! German plans — and in this deficiency Rosenberg’s office was by no means alone among the galaxy of agencies in Berlin — failed

to answer the elementary question of how an unwilling peasant could ke made to do what he did not like. If the collective farm system (as most German experts agreed) required compulsion to function, it was obvious that it would also take force to maintain it

or to institute any other system which rode roughshod over the peasants. he alternative was to introduce incentives which would persuade the rural population in the East to work devotedly and diligently in their own interest. Given the general orientation of the German leadership, however, it is hardly surprising that, initially, little attention was paid to this possible course — or, more broadly,

to the exploitation of tensions in Soviet society. There was no effort to work on vulnerable spots in the economic and social fabric of Soviet labour. Even more strikingly, the peasantry — truly an Achilles’ heel in the Soviet system — was eschewed as a source of

vulnerability. It was inevitable that the collective farmer would judge any alternative to the Soviet system against the background of

his pre-war grievances. Given the German outlook in 1941, one could predict that, unless a radical change occurred in German agrarian policy, the peasant would find it sadly wanting. Inescapably, National Socialist tenets on agriculture permeated German thinking on future rural life in the East.2. These concepts, however, had been formulated against the background of, and were

designed to apply specifically to, the German situation. Such notions as the glorification of the hereditary German farm — the Erbhof — and the weird myths of Blut und Boden were utterly ' Braune Mappe, Teil I, 1st ed., pp. 28-9. 2 For the Nazi view of agriculture, see R. Walther Darré, Um Blut und Boden

(Munich: F. Eher, 1940), and the analyses in Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth (New York : Oxford University Press, 1944), and Otto Nathan, The Nazi Economic System (Durham : Duke University Press, 1944), ch. iv.

CHL NY Economic Policy 313 inapplicable to the Eastern peasantry, for whom a different code of ethics and behaviour was to prevail. The earliest public pronouncements on agriculture after the invasion provided the new rationale. The Russian, it was claimed, was incapable of effectively organizing his environment; this was as true of agriculture as of political and military affairs. ‘Organically’, Berlin asserted, the Russian was a mass-being, a ‘collectivist’. ‘Thus one of Germany’s tasks was to

‘help’ restore the Russian to his ‘true self’. The hypocrisy of the concept is well illustrated in the conclusions drawn from this view : As the old order of the mzr [village commune] and artel’ [co-operative]

is resurrected, we shall also witness the revival of . . . the concept of collective responsibility.!

Underneath this thin veneer, German self-interest remained the genuine motive. Its impact was especially strong because agrarian policy was being formulated by a power keenly aware of its dwindling

resources. However, grain was neither the sole nor the supreme German target. Others competed with it — all ‘logical’ in themselves and, within Nazi premises, defensible, but impossible to reconcile with each other. Notably, three sets of demands were bound to clash : (1) to procure the greatest amount of food from the East ; (2) to secure the greatest possible labour force from the East ; (3) to win the good-will and co-operation of the Eastern peasantry.

The third of these — never an end in itself --- was initially not even

recognized as a necessity of German rule. The second, likewise, loomed important only after the initial phase of the war had failed to

achieve the destruction of the foe. Only the first was influential from beginning to end. The Economic Organization

An intricate network of agencies and offices was established in the occupied East for the exploitation and control of the economy. Subject to multiple authorities, conflicting jurisdictions, and contradictory directives, the formal and actual functions in the economic field remained mystifying even to those appointed to administer the system.’ | Werner Dietzy ‘Osteuropa’, Nationale Wirtschaftsordnung und Grossraumwirtschaft [Berlin], 1941, no. 7-9 (July-September), p. g2. _ ? The theory and practice of German economic organization and administration in occupied Russia still await monographic treatment. For convenient, if somewhat incomplete and inexact, summaries, see United States, Civil Affairs Handbook ~— Occupied Europe, vol. 2] (Washington,: Government Printing Office, 1944),

314 Problems and Practice pT. 1 On the higher levels, the conflicts stemmed in part from the parallel planning activities of several distinct agencies, notably the Four-Year Plan, the Armed Forces, and the political arm. ‘The actual director of Goring’s Four-Year Plan, Paul K6rner, also became

chief of the small policy-making body that was to lay down the broad outlines of economic goals and methods for the East, the socalled Wirtschaftsftthrungsstab Ost [WiFStab Ost], or Economic Executive Staff East. Though represented on the latter, the OKW’s Office for Armament Economy [Wirtschafts- und Rtistungs-Amt, WiRii Amt] under General Georg ‘Thomas independently conducted most of its planning for economic exploitation. !

For all practical purposes, the Rosenberg ofhce was from the start excluded from decision-making in the economic sphere. Though Rosenberg had, even before the invasion, made tortuous efforts to prevent Hitler from delegating economic authority to

Géring, his efforts failed completely. When the Fuhrer named Rosenberg Minister for the Occupied East, he also appointed Goring, as head of the Four-Year Plan, in charge of the Eastern economy.?

Under the Reich Marshal, Paul Korner wielded much of the actual authority, sharing G6ring’s narrow economic orientation. General Thomas, on the other hand, represented a more curious phenomenon. At one time pro-Russian, he had gone to the Soviet Union in 1933 and had, by his own confession, been ‘deeply impressed’. From 1934 on, he had worked with the Nazis, had later clashed with them, and finally associated himself with the antiHitler forces in the Army to the point of being vaguely implicated in the July 20, 1944, attack on the Fiihrer. His former pro-Russian views and his clashes with the Nazi leadership, however, did not pp. 10-13; Brandt, op. cit. ch. vi; also the Griine and Braune Mappen, and Docu-

ments 472-PS, 1024-PS, and 1157-PS. Valuable but scattered information is contained in the presentations and arguments in the Krupp trial and especially the so-called ‘Munistries Trial’ (Case XI) before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal. ' For the development of Thomas’s staff for the East in 1940-1 (under the code-name ‘ Oldenburg’), and economic planning, see above, pp. 38-40; Thomas’s own account, ‘Grundlagen fiir eine Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Riistungswirtschaft’, MS, Document 2353-PS* (excerpts in TMWC, xxx, 260-80) ; Documents 1294-PS*, 1157-PS, TMWC, xxvii, 32-8 ; 1317-PS, TMWC, xxvii, 169-71 ;

1456-PS, NMT, xii, 1266; and Korner, testimony, NMT, xii, 1317-21. The basic order establishing the Wirtschaftsstab organization with its various subdivisions is OKH/GenStdH/Gen.Qu., Abt.Kr.Verw. [Wagner], ‘Wirtschaftsorganisation’, May 14, 1941, Document NOKW-3335*.

2 See above, p. 24; and Lammers to Keitel, May 20, 1941, with enclosure of draft decree on G6ring’s jurisdiction and Rosenberg’s counter proposal, Docu-

ment 1188-PS, NMT, xiii, 1273-4. Rosenberg saved face by receiving the

authority to ‘co-ordinate’ the economic efforts of all agencies involved, and by having the heads of sections in the Wirtschaftsstab hold analogous positions in personal union in his Ministry.

CH. XV Economic Policy 315 ‘prevent him from organizing, with that extreme efficiency of which the German General Staff was capable, the economic exploitation

of the Nazi invasion of Russia’.' Many of the most calculated, roldly cruel statements of economic aims cited earlier in this chapter came from his pen. ‘The central agency in charge of the Eastern economy, operating formally under Kérner’s WiF Stab Ost, was the Wirtschaftsstab Ost [WiStab Ost], or Economic Staff East. This was a complete hybrid

whose limits of authority remained ill-defined. It included representatives of the Four-Year Plan, the Quartermaster-General’s Office of the OKH, the Rosenberg Ministry, the Ministry for Food

and Agriculture, and the Ministry of Economics. Several of its major sections were headed by men who simultaneously officiated in the Rosenberg Ministry and in the Four-Year Plan, and in this manner became little tsars in their own branches. Miunisterialdirektor Hans-Joachim Riecke, for instance, was in effect the boss

of Eastern agriculture as an official in the Ministry for Food and Agriculture, head of the agriculture section in the Economic

Staff East, and chief of the department for agriculture in the

Ostministerium.? The organization in the field consisted of Economic Inspectorates

[Wirtschafts-Inspektion, or Wiln]— one for each Army Group Rear Area (North, Centre, South, and later Caucasus) and for each

of the two Reich Commissariats (Ostland and Ukraine).3 In the operational areas of the armies, closer to the front lines, their place was taken by the Army Economy Chiefs [Armee-Wirtschaftsfihrer, or AWiFi], operationally under Army jurisdiction but technically subordinate to the Wirtschaftsstab edifice. The next lower level — operating in an area roughly equivalent to one or two Soviet oblasts — was the so-called Economic Command [Wirtschafts-Kommando, or WiKdol, which had a variety of German and indigenous staffs under its control. The channels of command and the division of jurisdiction among

the economic agencies (as well as their relations with military, civilian, and police organs) were altered repeatedly in the course of the

war. Conflicts between the economic staffs and the administrative 1 John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1953), p. 432; and Georg Thomas, ‘Gedanken und Ereignisse’, Schweizer Monatshefte (Zurich), xxv, no. 9g (December 1945), 537-59, where he studiously avoids discussing his role in the utilization of Soviet economic resources. 2 See Brandt, op. cit. pp. 73-4; also chart, p. 318 below. 3 In the areas of civil government, they were renamed Ristungs-Inspektion [RiuIn], or Armament Inspectorate, and later Wehrwirtschafts-Inspektion [WWiln], or War Economy Inspectorate.

316 Problems and Practice Pr. if machinery were frequent; in the course of time, the subordinates of the Wirtschaftsstab clashed with the 55 and the offices for labour recruitment. ‘Top-level orders were issued not only by

the Wirtschaftsstab itself but also by the Four-Year Plan, the Ostministerium, the Quartermaster-General, and after September 1942 also by each of the armies in the field — often with significant differences in emphasis and intent.

Finally, there was considerable friction between such top personalities as Thomas, Keitel, Goring, and Albert Speer, the Reich Minister for Armanent, who gained influence and power as the war progressed, largely at the expense of the Army and the Four-Year Plan. Thomas, as head of the WiRii Amt of the OKW, opposed the policies of General Schubert, who headed the Wirtschaftsstab Ost, because of his ‘excessive preoccupation with theoretical ideas for the future’ rather than with maximum exploitation for the present ; as a result, Schubert was relieved in July 1942. After a brief interlude, when Thomas himself headed the Economic Staff, General Stapf became its chief. By then the struggle between the Army’s economic agencies and Speer’s civilian ministry had reached a

crisis; the WiRt Amt was broken up and part of it absorbed by Speer. Finally, in February 1943, General ‘Thomas resigned.' This left Speer, on the one hand, and the various bodies sponsored by the Four-Year Plan, on the other, as victors in the inter-departmental jungle warfare. The economic agencies had gradually succeeded in

wrenching control from both the Rosenberg Ministry and the military. The demands imposed by the prolongation of war had catapulted the economic spokesmen to a position of authority exceeding that of administrators and soldiers. A special network of German officials was required to supervise

agricultural activity in the East. The great extent of the agrarian areas and the priority assigned to the collection of produce accounted for the growth of this apparatus. Each of the economic inspectorates

had its agricultural section, paralleled by an agricultural section in

each of the territorial administrations. Likewise, the economic commands as well as the district commissariats and field kommandaturas had their sections for agriculture. At the bottom of 1 For Thomas’s own account of the struggle, see Document 2353-PS*, pp. 426-44, 515 ff.; see also K6rner’s and Pleiger’s testimony and the prosecution brief in Case XI, excerpts published in NMT, xiii; and Chapter XVIII below. By mid-1943 Speer had won control over virtually all German production. The name of his Ministry was then changed from Arms and Munitions to Armament and War Production. Thomas was succeeded by Major-General Kurt Waeger.

CH. XV Economic Policy 317 this complex pyramid was the Landwirtschaftsftihrer, the ‘agricultural leader’ who represented German interests on the local level and supervised the peasants’ work. Often the only German official on the spot, he became a man of exceptional importance in day-today dealings betwecn conqueror and conquered.

It was recognized that ‘in view of the size of the area and the limited availability of German experts, the administration of agriculture must use the indigenous apparatus to a certain extent’. At the same time, the war economists maintained from the start that productivity and exploitation would not be assured without a sizeable German administrative apparatus.'. While the civilian administration

sought to reduce the functions of economic officialdom, Goring decreed that

... it is essential that in agriculture in the occupied territories, and especially in the surplus areas, as many German leaders as possible be committed and that they try to attain the highest possible production and assure the flow of the products wherever they are most needed in the interests of the German war economy.?

The area to be controlled was so immense that, in spite of the flood of directives, the La-Fiihrer (as they were known) were, more often than not, left to their own devices. Conditions varied considerably from area to area and often from village to village, and finding solutions to problems required considerable ingenuity on their part.

If, on the one hand, they were not consulted about broad policy decisions in agriculture, their relative independence was written into law — and generally welcomed by them. ‘Thus there emerged the ‘corps’ of La-Fihrer, some 14,000 strong. ‘They were a varied lot,

including a fair number of incompetent, corrupt, and ignorant officials. German as well as refugee descriptions frequently point out that many of them, as the sole representatives of the Herrenvola for miles and miles, looked upon their bailiwicks as private estates. If at times this was conducive to arousing a sincere interest in their ' Braune Mappe, Teil A, 2nd ed., p. 9. 2 Document NI-3777, NMT, xiii, 848-51. 3 Brandt, op. cit. p. 82 ; WiStab Ost I/zbV, ‘Vom Chef WiStab Ost am 23.2.44 genehmigte Gliederung fiir die Materialsammlung zur Geschichte des WiStab Ost’ [hereafter cited as ‘Materialsammlung’], Document 63-EC*, pp. 148, 163. See also Deutsche Volkswirtschaft (Berlin), xii (July 1943), 611 ; Document NO1481*. The initial instructions to the La-Fiihrer read : This task requires the greatest initiative arid willingness to work. . . . Men who do not possess such initiative are unfit for the job and should be replaced as soon as possible. . . . The men must understand that they are dependent on themselves and that in the vast spaces they cannot wait for written or telephone orders from above. (Document 126-EC, TMWC, xxxvi, 155.) G.R.R.— Y

G) PA 5 a = TT — as ~ 7m 2. oo © fg "CO? OO. %= ~ ot. eof -©O. < oO ~ ; ‘a “|. Ey} 2 Me yo | gt © 2 = aZ. O Aa--,| |g2=¢z tc 2

>|_

> S | $i 2 Z 3 | Z|: © 1 [Ee] & (x) ( | ISiE oe Ted aa = | me aps a EX as ! | Hf . Ae , ee ste a 8 | © 3. 2m, 4 oe Q ° o L& fx) |.s. To < (2) a4cc es |! 7 < +l]. ate S S |< ez. | 5 2 : e | fe 2 (LE) fz YE ma Is n 3 é Ae E = fas e ° (ee ~ O Q, nd ‘oe = ut oe @ EX i 4 & L jee) eed Y 6 oe 7 8 6 ” eos oBESES 28 S28os Ts 2.8.5

— ano DB) ' rr & ore— aeae} ~S& iS en8“”wy

~aeesee 8 aie +3825 : |+ Boe8Pé | n eS aeRSe” Ss I~ . Wig & 354% =Cc nooO QA — PLS |8 Ne? bore +& a Co pet CO ™|LS 1&2 os o9ee (2) co a3 Ky 8 ZO 2. | _ 7g P= = oO et ty ee ) ee (1) ~ Pao S S °o 8 | —— ee sane wef 7+ Q" » | wn A OG O on & Syaaa aEce| _~ es)a. O°Of3584 S &ia_ ee 1 &S2

ae} OG we5) Han &O98 + Vom on) 0°68 ‘a G90F a) ro NI ee Wt oat oO > ao g | SS SUNS? oq — (x) 5) 6578 AGEs Ho OF exigent83° i!

Ze PePeee eae: wY Qoem8 BEET ir > om Ogg ad D y o & oO i 33 | 3 & | ea = fggsie CZf22 nue | BN 435 eo) rae 3 Sea —_~ oA SS eR 33 SE> ZEB Bae —] ow eet oOgO | oR=Boor ONS OMS

LZ, ew ws oc O wm coo ~~ reel fa a8 r“4mv nNVe ne” |© ——_———— 6QD 2en => alWoe os wee a& To earr)~€&LOS !m

5 2 Lé eae Q —_ me ek : as o & > ) = 2 | © Pay, mu oon ~ Se2gs2s ae 5 ™ Q's pasar ~ ~AS he fx >Sin oO' 2fo) | N- | |Ch c See é eo ee ———-—— ges B25 oo & = = 8 ~T 2yon! eo 5 >= | 1 A fES 80 e | oO Foe => i sg _< “oo & |a“aU ec as? g | |Oo ie | Be ses oS O% | Ss a3=k 2saaay adxHSs ao #nora ¥% ge

. | 6 |2a wos Les mony Ooeres 3S5Perret: aEO on,eS Say =O [Os LAs BOs 3aeae £a es Wgeon®) OD: o boo 8 x one --—____ —_-—__-. PQ | ns

373

t po | oie rt SS o r af oe -S, 42..|om ae] 2 4g Be

< - .Pa ee7 2 , ; | coe

~ oO «|| " iA2> S| B4: Ovs

;~ | oO an & (a) ys) + R Jl BE Z. | J CN a SS < (oe; ¢ : 7 .:S |oe” ra. d i= @

° 5 | Ove

, Ke

Nn — a oO | | 523

iH —_—_-— oO N man o | S23

> + a ae : 3 bd j)”* mm ”| oe : "- :bee met =.) Ss 3 | my A» 3| o+0 foRf S28 — oO | Oe ie ~ | o/ mR E a az 5 ie | | | ieee ioO” =) a > : HE Be “ ae] 3 i | an a = : : a ag ae & oo +| |S: :aei ow - FE) coon; ro Q»° MMos aor o 2 | ee ce .

any Belg i 3dE ee’ :8o2 gS| See ! 55 oid 7 aefee ia3

to on05 2 1 et “5 ie © | —_—_ | Sz a

‘oe, ! i o| |o22D2ey Hg e s af

fH Saametiinnnn ikeonetiinean| BBE | : sie

' :a2 £s2ass Tn 3 & uw 2 : :;x § P Oe 06 4| 5ego 233° 23 wy me) = : “we” ¢ gant © :itS 3 Orn ” ozo me] 5268 O aC SY 5 ian oS : af BeePo Bo>. 3 OZem ee > & 209 00 g & “2

a

Om pees ate & BES ans a & os ah ee ee et -tcaa1S§~ oom O

374

TABLE IIl Grain in the Occupied U.S.S.R. July 1941-Miarch 1944, approximate, in thousands of tons. (Excluding ‘Vransnistria, Galicia, Bialystok, and North Caucasus) !

z) b(d eo t) e(b a) d e f

Platvent ‘Votal German Percentage "Phereof, Shipped to] German Distribution

Collection ot Harvest to Army Germany i occupted ateas

Iggt 42 1 3,000 [2,100] 350 2,450

759 [1,000]

1943/44 [5,300] [1,450? 170 1,000

(through March)

1,150

‘TOTAL | [30,000] 10,000

' ‘the figures are computed from various, and not always agreeing, sources. Wherever two sets of figures ure viven, the upper indicates the available official (usually ZHO) data, while the lower represents the figure as adjusted by the author on the basis of other computations. Figures in brackets indicate estimates or alternative figures from other sources. ‘he percentage of the harvest collected by the Germans (column c) is computed on the basis of toil sawn area, mehiding partisan-held territory behind the German lines.

TABLE IV PLANNED DISTRIBUTION OF GRAIN CROP

.i .. i

An approximation of Soviet and German designs can be obtained by comparing data for Soviet harvest distribution for 1938 with the projected German harvest distribution for 1943 (not actually carried out because of

the retreat, the diminution of the area under German control, and other factors). State farms are not included in either rubric.

|: (in| (A)? | (By? percentage of total) | percent © percent | || Feed Jation = II | Seed 14 18 15 20 | | SOVIET, 1938 | GERMAN, 1943

| oh

_ Deliveries to state and Army 15 25 :

'| Deliveries Sales to state and on free market 5 ! and sales to feed urban popu- |

MTS, experimental stations, and other | ||| ‘To expenditures 21 7 For use of peasant population 27 22

. 100 100 i ' Based on Lazar Volin, A Survey of Soviet Russian Agriculture (Washington : Depart nent of Agriculture, 1951), p. 188.

2 Based on WiStab Ost, Chefgruppe La, ‘Vermerk: Getreideernte 1943’,

n.d., Wi/ID .346*, CRS.

375

CHAPTER XVIII

GERMANY AND THE SOVIET ECONOMY The real profiteers of this war are ourselves, and out of it we shall come bursting with fat ! We will give back nothing and will take everything we can make use of. And if the others protest I don’t care a damn.—ADOLF HITLER, August 11, 1942

Industry and Mining WHILE extractive activities in the East — mining and oil-drilling — were to be stepped up in war as well as in peace, German theory on

the eve of the invasion provided for the eventual elimination of virtually all other segments of Soviet industry.!. In practice, the issue of ultimate de-industrialization was scarcely mentioned after the war began. Much of the destruction of the economic potential of the occupied areas was carried out, paradoxically, not by Hitler’s

men but by Stalin’s, and, as the war continued, the increasing shortages in the Reich dictated the use of all available resources in utter disregard of long-range visions. After the chaotic withdrawals in June-July 1941, Soviet destruc-

tion battalions, with the aid of the Red Army and the NKVD, instituted a thorough demolition of economic installations and stocks which had not been evacuated from the war zone. Heavy industry was moved out and rebuilt far to the east, with many of the same engineers, managers, and skilled labourers being transported

to the new locations for war-time duty. Thus, upon their arrival, the German economic staffs often found little more than rubble. As one eye-witness described it : The whole centralized system of trade and distribution is disrupted ;

supplies have been burned, evacuated, or looted; the administrative apparatus has been dissolved, withdrawn, or liquidated. Factories and enterprises have been destroyed in part or in their entirety, their machinery

wrecked. Sources of power have been blown up, and their equipment scattered or hidden. Spare parts cannot be located or have wilfully been mixed up. All rosters of parts and machinery have been destroyed.

Fuel and lubricants have been burned or looted. There is no electric

power. Often the water supply is out of order, and there are no specialists to make repairs.? 1 See above, pp. 305-7. 2 Viadimir Dudin, ‘Novye nachala’, MS*, pp. 4-5. 370

CH. XVII Germany and the Soviet Economy 377 Only in exceptional circumstances, usually because of the speed of the German advance, were plants and mines left more or less intact.! Even if the Germans’ anti-industrial policy had suddenly been

abandoned, full reconstruction would have been a physical impossibility. In the absence of clear directives, German officials in the newly won areas were compelled to improvise; the later editions of such compilations as the ‘Green Folder’ therefore amounted to

an amalgam of individual and often disconnected instructions on special branches and phases of economic activity, rather than an integrated plan of action.

Reconstruction actually began with little delay and was often undertaken locally by enterprising military or economic officials.” Workshops were reopened haphazardly — here, to repair German tanks; there, to produce shoes for the troops; elsewhere, to build horse-carts for transport over the muddy country roads. Mailitary utility won out on the spot, at the expense of Nazitheory. Especially after the severe crisis during the first winter at the Eastern front, a long series of German directives provided for large-scale requisitioning and increased production of textiles, leather goods, horse-carts,

sleighs, and other items needed by the troops. As the war continued, emphasis shifted further towards harnessing

Eastern industry and resources for the Reich, even to the point of reviving armament production — a goal that stood in fundamental conflict with long-range Nazi plans for the future Russia.4 By July 1942 the basic change of tactics had been accomplished, and Hitler spoke of ‘relieving pressure on home production by the manufacture

of munitions in the Donets Basin’.s Thereafter miscellaneous directives, one by one, lifted the restrictions on the use of Eastern

plants, and a variety of items ranging from light-bulbs to heavy generators were shipped in from the Reich to permit the resumption

of production. Priority was now assigned to (1) Army needs, (2) demands of various economic branches in the East, (3) requirements 1 For the Soviet account by a leading official, since purged, see Nicholas A. Voznesenskii, Soviet Economy During the Second World War (New York: International Publishers, 1949). For details in German reports, see ‘Materialsammlung’,

pp. 172, 199; Einsatzgruppen Report, no. 61 (August 23, 1941)* ; Documents Korner-328* and Korner-474*. 2 In some instances — for example, Bobruisk and Krivoi Rog — indigenous engineers and workers restored and reopened their plants without German help. (Interview H-357 ; Krakivs’ki Visti [Cracow], November 22, 1941.) 3 ‘Materialsammlung’, pp. 212-13. 4 In limited form, it is true, General Thomas’s office had foreseen the necessity of using captured Soviet war industry during the conflict. See Thomas, ‘Grund-

lagen fiir eine Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Riistungswirtschaft’, MS, Document 2353-PS, TMWC, xxx, 278. 5 HTT, p. 665 (entry for August 27, 1942).

378 Problems and Practice PT. Mi of that part of the local population which ‘works in the common

interest’.!

The efforts expended in procuring the requisite machinery, technicians, and labour were considerable; the results varied from excellent to abominable. The manganese ore deposits at Nikopol’ were of decisive importance for the German armament industry. Badly wrecked by the Soviets, they were restored sufficiently to permit small-scale exploitation by the end of 1941, though work suffered from frequent stoppages until mid-1942. From then on, manganese was extracted at a rapid rate. Compared with the Soviet pre-war output of about 100,000 tons of ore per month, German management secured only 36,000 tons in the summer of 1942 but reached nearly 120,000 tons by early 1943, when the military crisis forced curtailment of operations. The Donets coal mines were another primary object of German exploitation. Of 178 mines, however, only 25 were usable when the Wehrmacht arrived. Even their exploitation was severely crippled

by lack of labour, electric power, and equipment. In June 1942, when 2,500 tons were being mined per day, Hitler decreed that ‘the speediest possible reconstruction of coal mining in the Donets Basin is one of the most essential prerequisites for the pursuit cf operations in the East and the utilization of the Russian space for the German war economy. .. .’ Asa result 60,000 Soviet prisoners of war were assigned to coal mining; and a special plenipotentiary with summary authority was appointed to boost the coal output at all cost. Indeed, by the turn of the year production had risen to 10,000 tons a day and was optimistically expected to climb to 30,000 tons (go00,000 tons a month). Actually, after a dip to about 250,000 tons after the crisis of early 1943, output rose again to about 400,000 tons in June. This

level was attained only at the cost of extreme exertion and compulsion; even so coal had to be hauled from Upper Silesia to keep the Ukrainian economy operating.?

As for oil, so important in the German war economy, the situation was considerably worse. ‘The administrative machinery

had been prepared in the form of a special corporation — the Kontinentale Oel — and a huge para-military ‘Technical Brigade for Mineral Oil’ (TBM). However, the only substantial oil areas 1 Friedrich Edding, ‘Industrielle Betriebe an der Arbeit’, Deutsche OstKorrespondenz (Berlin), no. 2 (April 22, 1943), pp. 3-4; Griine Mappe, Teil II, 3rd ed., pp. 153 ff. 2 See ‘Materialsammlung’, pp. 191-3. 3 See ‘Materialsammlung’, pp. 173, 185-8; Hitler, decree, June 28, 1942, Wi/ID 2.1307b*, CRS ; WiStab Ost to Goring, January 1943, Document NO3470*.

cH. Xvi Germany and the Soviet Economy 379 reached by the German Army, in the North Caucasus, had been crippled beyond easy repair, and the area was abandoned before any sizeable amounts of oil could be secured. Thereafter, only the rich

slate deposits in Estonia remained for intense exploitation by the Reich. !

Electric power was badly needed for the armament enterprises as well as for the indigenous population. About three-fourths of all stations were wrecked when the Germans arrived. After immense technical difficulties, only 20 per cent of pre-war electric capacity had been restored by the summer of 1942. Thereafter, with efforts to repair and utilize Soviet facilities stepped up considerably, power was made available in close to sufhcient quantities, especially after

the giant Dneprostroi dam was restored to operation in January 1943. Of vital importance in German economic plans was the restoration

of iron and steel facilities in the East. The iron ore mines at Krivot Rog had been severely crippled during the Soviet retreat. Only by the end of 1942 were they again producing significant quantities — about 5000 tons of ore a day; German plans to raise mining quotas to 15,000 tons were not nearly fulfilled. For the first period of the occupation, iron and steel mills, like those at Stalino and Zaporozh’e, wrecked and handicapped by lack of power and equipment, lay idle. After the change of German tactics in mid-1942, they too received special attention, and raw steel output was resumed by early 1943 in quantities varying between 3000 and 6000 tons a month.3 This was

still far short of Hitler’s order to restore the Donets Basin’s steel production to one million tons in 1943 and two million in 1944 (Soviet output had exceeded five million). In 1943, just prior to the Soviet counter-attack, the whole project of intensified restoration of the war industry, especially in the south, was gaining momentum.‘ Soviet victories forced first a cutback and then the abandonment of the entire area in the course of 1943. Another phase that received attention after the change in German policy was production of agricultural machinery for use in the East.

While a good deal was shipped in from the Reich, several plants producing ploughs, tractors, scythes, and spare parts were restored, 1 See above, pp. 242-3, and ‘Materialsammlung’, pp. 180-4. The use of peat for fuel was likewise stepped up in the occupied East.

2 ‘Materialsammlung’, pp. 177-9; Document 2353-P5, TMWC, xxx, 277; Documents Korner-475* and Kérner-468* ; Hadamowsky and Taubert, ‘Bericht

liber die Propaganda-Lage im Osten’, December 17, 1942, Document Occ E 18-19*, YIVO, pp. 24-7. 3 ‘Materialsammlung’, pp. 191-4 ; Hadamowsky and Taubert, op. cit. 4 “Materialsammlung’, pp. 173-5, 201 ; Document K6érner-493*.

380 Problems and Practice PT. 111 for instance in Khar’kov, Rostov, and Berdiansk. ‘hough production was uniformly low, by 1943 an upswing was noticeable.! Elsewhere, more primitive efforts at reconstruction were under-

taken. In the area of Economic Inspectorate North, for instance, a number of pottery, brick, and peat works resumed operation, as did

saw mills, lime kilns, and leather processing shops. Whatever official theory had intended, it was these small enterprises, requiring little labour, capital, and raw material, that proved easiest to reopen. At the same time, small-scale production at home — the old Russian kustar’ system — was mobilized for Army needs. Home production, for instance, accounted for millions of pairs of shoes delivered to the

German troops; of the local population, only active collaborators and Volksdeutsche were eligible to receive them.

Industrial and natural resources in the East, to the extent that

they could be exploited, contributed to the German survival, especially of the German armies. The contribution, though appreciable, was by no means decisive. Even in the face of Soviet destruction, it would have been greater, it seems, had the occupying power approached the problem without preconceived notions. In the end, considerations of utility — so difficult a weapon to forge in the political smithies of war-time Berlin — prevailed. Yet the change in German tactics from selective annihilation to maximum restoration

of Eastern economy ushered in no significant changes of attitude towards the population that manned it. Soviet Property and the Reich The cardinal question of who would own what in the future East

raised problems which require separate study. ‘The following survey is intended only to suggest some of the approaches and areas of conflict. The problems were, first, the disposition of Soviet state property, 1.e. all industry, natural resources, transportation, trade, and utilities ; second, controlling and deciding among competing German agencies

and interests which injected themselves into the Eastern economy, notably the State itself as owner and manager, government-owned corporations, the Army, the 5S, and private German concerns; and, finally, determining the property rights of the indigenous population. Even without the specific war-time circumstances any solution of 1 Richard Gogarten, affidavit, Document Korschan-115*. 2 Wiln Nord, Wirtschaftsgefiige der Whirtschafts-Inspektion Nord ([Pskov,]

mar Me abO.. Chefgruppe Wirtschaftspolitische Kooperation, IJnformationsdienst, 1943, no. 4, pp. 2-4; ‘Materialsammlung’, pp. 213-14.

CH. XVIII Germany and the Soviet Economy 381 these problems involved considerable difficulty. ‘Ihe continued maintenance of a government machinery in charge of the economy required a new centralized bureaucracy and threw to the winds the

propaganda advantages of an appeal to individual initiative and ownership. ‘To establish private property in industry would have required a class of qualified managers and officials as well as new capital investments. Any effort to return property to its previous owners was bound to antagonize large strata of the population and, moreover, would have left unresolved the disposition of considerable values created since Soviet nationalization.

As in agriculture, a return of industrial property to indigenous hands was scarcely envisaged in Berlin when the invasion began. In the disputes over the disposition of property, the local population

was invariably the last and weakest claimant. First, Rosenberg proclaimed as a matter of general policy, and then Brautigam elaborated in a quasi-legal argument, the principle that by international law the occupying power was authorized to ‘dispose’ of the state property it took over.! In the light of this decision, a category of ‘special property’ [Sondervermédgen] was legally established to include ‘the total property of the U.S.S.R., its member states, public corporations, trusts, and combinations’, which was ‘confiscated and secured by order of the military command’. The Reich Commissars,

under direction of the Ostministerium, were to determine the

disposition in any given case, consulting with the Four-Year Plan whenever more permanent changes were involved.?, The crux of the

argument was the disposition among German contenders, not between Germans and Russians.

The Nazi leadership had never given a simple or definitive answer to the question of state v. private enterprise even within the Reich. State control was a sine qua non of totalitarian economics ; vet state, public, and private enterprise existed side by side in Nazi

Germany in a not always consistent amalgam. Within the Party itself, one could distinguish the remnants of two basically different ' Brdutigam, ‘Eigentumsfragen in den besetzten Ostgebieten’, Ostwirtschaft (Berlin), xxxi, 69-72. The problem was of special relevance to the former German owners of property in the U.S.S.R. Though their claims were deemed void as the result of the settlement reached under the Rapallo agreement, Rosenberg decided that ‘former German values will be the property of the Greater German people’,

though ‘without regard for the individual former owner’. (Rosenberg, ‘AIlgemeine Instruktion fiir alle Reichskommissare in den besetzten Ostgebieten’, May 8, 1941, Document 1030-PS, TMWC, xxv, 579.) 2 Braune Mappe, Teil A, 2nd ed., p. 27; Rosenberg, decree, May 28, 1942, RMfdbO., Verordnungsblatt, 1 (1942), 21. A German financial expert insists that a major purpose of this device was to neutralize ‘the numerous private economic interests . . . whose covetous desires it was impossible [otherwise] to eliminate’. (Friedrich Vialon, affidavit, Document Schwerin-von-Krosigk-50*.) G.R.R.-—2C

382 Problems and Practice PT. 111 concepts, which in some measure found expression in the arguments

over reprivatization in the East: the ‘revolutionary’ wing of anticapitalists and statists; and the spokesmen of German business, advocating respect and privileges for private property and initiative. Enterprises like I.G. Farben were naturally interested in extending their domain to the East, acquiring sources of raw material, markets, and perhaps cheap labour; while Nazi officials on the spot, jealous

of any effort to impinge on their own authority, viewed private business as an illegitimate interloper seeking to enrich itself ‘at the expense of German blood’. For months, several alternatives were debated in Berlin. They were analysed in a research paper produced by Robert Ley’s Labour Front organization, which concluded : (1) Colonial exploitation by private capitalist companies under conditions of quasi-monopolies would lead to a maldistribution of profits and benefits within the master nation.

(2) One could re-establish private enterprise in the East, assuring essential German control by means of wage and price regulation. In practice, however, this would be the most difficult technique to enforce.

(3) Private property could be encouraged in certain branches of economy, such as handicraft and agriculture. At any rate, Germany would need to exercise stringent control over foreign trade and keep the purchasing power of the population low by means of taxation, so that the Reich could buy surplus goods. (4) Rather than leave matters to private German companies, the State

should take colonial utilization into its own hands as a monopolist in certain key branches. ‘The indigenous labour force would receive whatever the German Reich grants it, while the total residual product would be made available by the Reich to the German people at such prices as would be deemed just on the basis of economic and political considerations.’ !

A different formula was advanced by Brautigam, who handled the reprivatization issue in the Rosenberg Ministry. Like most officials

who publicly expressed themselves on the subject, he started from the assumption that ‘in principle’ and at least ‘eventually’ National

Socialism supported private enterprise. On the other hand, he argued, revoking Soviet nationalization by decree was impossible for

political, administrative, and economic reasons. ‘The new order must, axiomatically, correspond to ‘Germany’s interests’; the implication was that reprivatization needed to be affirmed as a goal but would largely have to be postponed or implemented slowly.’ 1 Paraphrase, Deutsche Arbeitsfront, Arbeitswissenschaftliches Institut, ‘Erwagungen zur Nutzung der eroberten Gebiete durch das deutsche Volk’, 1941,

Document Occ E-30*, YIVO, p. 4. 2 Brdutigam, op. cit.

CH. XVIII Germany and the Soviet Economy 383 Accordingly the policy directives provided for ‘transformation step by step’. Additional arguments for postponement were the plans

for rewarding German troops by giving them future priorities in acquiring property in the East; the razing of many enterprises if and when de-industrialization was carried out; and the lack of experienced indigenous managers and officials.! Actually, several forms of German control emerged side by side.

For such goods as salt and sugar, and later tobacco and liquor, the German State reserved for itself the operation and exploitation of

classical monopolies. ‘The purpose of the direct part which the government assumed in these branches was frankly to raise revenue.? Far more significant was the special institution established to handle

state property and economic activity in the East, the trusteeship company. ‘The Reich, as custodian of former Soviet property, created government corporations — known initially as ‘monopoly companies’, later redesignated ‘Eastern companies’ — to operate as

‘trustees’ in lieu of the former Soviet administration. These

companies, which were granted a monopoly for a given branch of economy, were government-financed but operated with the active participation of German private business. The entire trusteeship phenomenon was considered a transitional device whose virtue was the combination of government activity in economic direction and private enterprise in execution.3

The new companies which mushroomed in rapid sequence might be grouped as follows: (1) those organized to procure goods and make them available to other agencies, such as the corporation

for trade in raw materials (Rohstoffhandelsgesellschaft); such organizations were not peculiar to the occupied Fast; (2) industrial

and mining enterprises, including the three colossi: the BHO (Berg- und Hiittenwerk G.m.b.H.) in mining, the Kontinentale Oel ' Braune Mappe, Teil A, 2nd ed., pp. 25 ff. As an intermediate step, and in cognizance of indigenous interests, the economic sections of the Rosenberg Ministry and Wirtschaftsstab Ost were willing to approve the participation of managerial personnel in the sharing of profits of state-owned enterprises, especially

smaller shops. Managers could be either Germans or local residents, such as

former owners. (See ibid., and ‘Materialsammlung’, p. 251.) There is no indication that this system was ever enacted. 2 See, for instance, Meyer, Recht, section O iv C; and RMfdbO., decrees on monopolies, December 3, 1942, Verordnungsblatt, i (1942), 90-4.

3 Goring, decree, July 27, 1941, Document NI-3777, NMT, xiii, 849-50 ; Braune Mappe, op. cit.; Hans Thode, ‘Unternehmertum im Osten’, Ostwirtschaft, XXxX1 (1942), 125-36. Only one of the ‘Eastern companies’, the Kontinentale Oel, was intended to be a permanent organization, partly because of Géring’s and Rosenberg’s personal interest in it. See above, pp. 272-3 ; Document rorg-PS, TMWGC, xxvi, 556 ; and the evidence in Case VI, NMT (especially against Krauch, Flick, and Bitefisch).

384 Problems and Practice PT. 11 A.G. in oil, and the Ostfaser company for wool fibre; (3) trading companies, such as the ZHO in agriculture, discussed earlier, and its

counterpart in timber; and (4) service companies like Chemie-Ost and Superphosphat-Ost.! In addition to these forms of government operation — direct and indirect — a third device permitted a larger participation of German business. ‘This technique was foreshadowed in Géoring’s original decree establishing the Eastern companies. Initially it was planned to establish only a few government corporations ; for the rest [the order provided] it will suffice for the purpose of safeguarding German interests during the transition period, if particularly important branches of industry and commerce are administered by German firms acting as individual trustees.?

However, as government corporations mushroomed during the first

months of the war, the private firms were more or less left out. When the new tactics adopted in mid-1942 called for a speedier restoration of Eastern industry and mining, big business corporations were at last encouraged to take over Soviet enterprises as sponsors

or ‘foster-parents’ [Paten] in order to carry out a more rapid and efficient reconstruction. As an incentive, these German firms were given to understand that their efforts would be ‘duly rewarded’. Even if [Wirtschaftsstab Ost stated] the ultimate recognition of private property rights of companies active in the Eastern economy cannot as yet be decided upon, it will be possible to give assurances to [these companies] that their efforts and material expenditures will be recognized and taken cognizance of in the future.3

Large firms closely associated with the cartels and holding companies, which had direct representation and contacts at the top level of the German economic edifice, were assigned Eastern ‘foster1 For basic directives on the trusteeship companies, see Griine Mappe, Teil I],

3rd ed., pp. 123-9; Meyer, Recht, sections O i A and O iv C. See also Griine Mappe, Teil II, 3rd ed., pp. 16, 173-4; Documents 3566-PS, 38-EC, NG-5702, NI-3689, NI-3777, NI-4332, NI-5261, NI-5287, NI-5481 ; Der deutsche Volkswirt

(Berlin, 1941-3) ; WiStab Ost, Chefgruppe W, ‘Ubersicht tiber die Aufgaben der Ostgesellschaften’ [February 5, 1942], Wi/ID .79*, CRS. The monopoly companies were authorized by Goring on July 27, 1941, and as early as the following week the first companies were brought to life. As a typical example, the Ostfaser

company was created on August 4, 1941, with strong participation of private German interests but with ownership retained by the Reich. Its president, Hans Kehrl, was a high official of the Economy Ministry in Berlin. Soon it established subsidiaries in each of the Reich Commissariats and Economic Inspectorates, beginning an activity whose turnover amounted to millions of Reichsmarks. (Ostfaser-Gesellschaft m.b.H., Berlin, ‘Tatigkeitsbericht’, 1941-2, Document 172-EC*, and ‘Gesamtbericht, 1941-1944’, Document 2566-PS*.)

2 Document NI-3777, NM, xii, 849.

3 ‘Materialsammlung’, p. 251 (entry for Junc 15, 1942).

CH, XVITI Germany and the Soviet Economy 385 children’. In the fall of 1942 Krupp received the Azovstal’ plant in Mariupol’ and several others in Dnepropetrovsk. The HermannGoring combine and its subsidiaries took over the huge steel works at Zaporozh’e and plants at Krivoi Rog. Other enterprises went to Mannesmann and the Flick concern, while a number of mines were assigned to German mining and smelting firms. Big business thus found an opportunity for direct intervention in the East. Its role, however, went far beyond this overt penetration.

The new Eastern companies, like the staff of the Four-Year Plan, included among its directors men who combined big business with

government service. Paul Korner himself was chairman of the administrative council of the ZHO. Hans Kehrl, a director of the Hermann-Go6ring Works and head of the planning branch of ‘Central

Economic Planning’, became chairman of the board of Ostfaser ; Pleiger, Keppler, and other Four-Year Plan officials drawn from private business likewise obtained key positions in the new trusteeship scheme.” Other captains of German industry were gladly ‘lent’ to government agencies in anticipation of reciprocal favours. Gustav Schlotterer, head of the economic (industrial and trade) sections of

the OMi and WiStab, was a director of the Flick concern. A bevy

of smaller officials and managers came from various Ruhr and Silesian companies. This peculiar recruitment process, which had its distinct implications for economic policy, was considered un-

avoidable if the Reich wanted to establish a sizeable corps of experienced administrators for the economic exploitation of the East. As early as February 1941 it was agreed that as a matter of policy reliable personalities from German concerns shall be employed wherever

appropriate [in Soviet economy], since only with the help of their experience can successful work be performed from the start. . . .3

Even when these officials had no specific mission to fulfil for their mother-companies at home, their general outlook and attitude were bound to reflect those of German big business. Conflicts of Interest Inevitably, clashes arose over the control of the Eastern economy.

Of these, the most important developed along two axes: the conflict 1 “Aktennotiz fur Herrn Pleiger: Vergabe von Patenschaften’ [September 2, 1942], Document NJ-5480* ; BHO, ‘Auszug aus dem Arbeitsbericht der BHO fiir das Jahr 1942’, Document NI-4332*, p. 3. See also Document NI-2896* ; and Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee, eds., Hitler’s Europe (London: Oxford

University Press, 1954), p. 202. 2 See NMT, xiii, 19-20, 27, 179.

3 [OKW/WiRw Amt,}] ‘Besprechung beim Herrn Amtschef Gen. der Inf.

‘Thomas am 28.2.41’, Document 1317-PS, TMWC, xxvil, 170-1.

386 Problems and Practice PT. 111 of ‘left’ and ‘right’, and the contest between economic and political-

administrative agencies. ‘The Party’s left rallied against the companies that promoted huge economic combinations in ignorance or defiance of the political programmes master-minded by the Rosenberg office or its stubborn Reich Commissars in the field. In turn, private interests exercised sufficient pressure and were so crucial in

the war economy at home, that Goring, ostensibly with Hitler’s consent, laid down the rule that organs of the State, Party, and Army cannot be considered for the direction of economic enterprises, which they would be unable to carry out. Enterprises whose recognition is desired are rather to be turned over

primarily to firms and personalities possessing the requisite expert knowledge and possessing or managing similar enterprises [in the Reich].!

While private business seemed to take a lead over subsidiary government agencies, it did not fare so well when it tried to take a source of revenue from the Reich itself. When a German tobacco

manufacturer, a personal friend of Goring, sought to secure the monopoly for the East, Hitler ‘roundly forebade this and stressed that the tobacco monopoly could be exercised only by the Reich itself’.2, The situation was more complex when it came to trusteeship corporations. Goring (as well as K6rner and Rosenberg) had to acknowledge at an early date that ‘certain differences of opinion’ had developed over their role; yet a solution to the disagreements was not easy to find.3 In November 1941 Goring had argued that trusteeship implied no right of future ownership. In May 1942 he confirmed, but in a far weaker tone, that property rights were left for future settlement.¢ At a conference of German experts on the

Soviet economy held in October 1942, Professor Eugen Sieber presented a detailed paper on Eastern industry, which made clear that private ownership, though in principle a desirable goal, was as

remote as ever. Stressing that in Soviet industry ‘there exist numerous tasks which would probably constitute too high a risk for the private entrepreneur’, Sieber came out for continued primacy

of the German state and its protégé companies; the Reich must assure ‘the leadership of at least the most important, z.e. the largest 1 Vierjahresplan, ‘VP 19203/6 g. Anlage’, November 18, 1941, Document NI-440, NMT, xiii, 863. 2 Bormann, memorandum, March 25, 1942, Picker, ed., Hitlers Tischgesprdache (Bonn : Athendum-Verlag, 1951), p. 136. See also Document NG-2918, NMT,

es Chine Mappe, Teil II, 3rd ed., pp. 123-4; Rosenberg, ‘Vermerk’, May 13, 1942, Document 1520-PS, TMWC, xxvii, 285. 4 For details, see Otto Braiutigam, ‘Uberblick iiber die besetzten Ostgebiete’ (Tiibingen : Institut fiir Besatzungsfragen, 1954), pp. 49-50.

CH. XVIII Germany and the Soviet Economy 387 industrial enterprises by German concerns. . . .’ He waved aside the objections that as a result (as some circles argued) a small German master layer would face an alien proletariat and thereby

would intensify national tensions; that, furthermore, the number of Germans available for such leadership would not suffice.

So far as he was concerned, ‘we shall have to overcome overt and

covert resistance precisely among that layer [of the indigenous population] which, if any, would have to assume leading positions. We must expect lack of understanding of our goals as well as indolence.” Since, moreover, Bolshevism had stifled private initiative and managerial experience (he continued in a striking misreading of Soviet reality), Germany had to assume the ‘burden’ of leadership and control.!

Such comforting rationales failed to resolve the tug-of-war among the German competitors. Initially, the economic branches of the armed forces had sought to attain maximum control over Eastern resources. Gradually, their role was whittled down, as were the economic functions of the civil administration. In their stead, economic agencies gained the ascendancy. Just as the WiRti Amt of the OKW was, piece by piece, absorbed and decimated by Speer’s

Armament Ministry, similarly Pleiger and other civilians, in their dual capacity as representatives of the Four-Year Plan and of big business, all but eliminated the Army’s Economic Inspectorates from

effective control.2 A report prepared for Friedrich Flick, a leading German industrialist, summarized the trend as of the fall of 1942: Especially in the field of iron and mining, Herr Pleiger has lately eliminated the influence of the Eastern agencies [the Economic Inspector-

ates] to a far-reaching extent. In the question of ‘foster enterprises’, the Inspectorates and Reich Commissars no longer have any say. The new head of WiStab Ost in Berlin, General Stapf, recently issued a directive that the ‘foster-parents’ in mining are to be assigned by Herr Pleiger . . . and Herr Speer declared that the RKU and WiStab Ost no longer have anything to say in matters of armament enterprises. . . . In general, one can at present observe all along the line a strengthening of the influence of the monopoly companies, while the administrative apparatus

of the economic agencies and the OKH (Wirtschaftsstab Ost) has lost much of its importance.’ ' Eugen Sieber, ‘Finanzierung der Industriebetriebe im Ostraum’, Verein deutscher Wirtschaftswissenschafter, Osteuropdische Wirtschaftsfragen (Leipzig : Meiner, 1944), pp. 92-106. 2 On the Speer-Thomas struggle, see above, p. 316. 3 Kiittner, ‘Notiz fiir Herrn Flick’, October 24, 1942, Document NI-1981*.

On 51 pe ff. see Louis P. Lochner, Tycoons and Tyrant (Chicago: Regnery, 1954), pp.

388 Problems and Practice PT. 11 The civilian administration suffered as much as the military. In a variety of memoranda to their chief, members of the Ostministerium complained in vain that the trusteeship companies should have been

placed under their control from the very start.' These companies had in fact acquired a momentum of their own and tended to reflect business rather than Party interests. In the Ukraine they boomer-

anged with a vengeance. Initially Koch had sponsored a score of government corporations in an attempt to wrench control of the economy from the Rosenberg office in Berlin and put it under his thumb. Actually by 1943 his civil administration (including its lower levels) was compelled to struggle against what it called the ‘excesses’ of its corporations.2, Almost always, the administrative organs — civil and military alike — were the losers in their fight against the economic agencies — both governmental and private. At the same time, competition grew both among the governmentsponsored corporations seeking to encroach on each other’s jurisdic-

tion, and among German state agencies seeking to eliminate each other from the supervision of Eastern economic affairs. ‘The details, complex and tedious, need not be unravelled here. Symptomatically,

they produced an emphatic outburst from the customarily meek Finance Minister, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, a Nationalist holdover from pre-Nazi days who was close to German business circles.

When the Four-Year Plan and the civil administration sought to restrict the Finance Ministry’s role in the East to a minimum, von Krosigk opened a blast against the occupation regime. Accusing the officials of ‘risky deviations’ because of their pursuit of ‘selfish motives’, he launched an indictment of the new bureaucracy. Serious doubts must arise [he wrote] when for some time organizations, companies, and formations of all descriptions sprout like mushrooms. . . . Even German officials hardly know their way around, and the population

has to cope with an administrative superstructure it cannot fathom... . I am told by reliable quarters: ‘We no longer know what constitutes an Authority and what does not; what is assigned to an Authority, what to a quasi-Authority company, and what to a big group of selfish hyenas on the battlefield’.

After this reference (which immediately dubbed the message as the ‘hyena letter’) the Finance Minister continued : For tasks which could very well be entrusted to a special adviser to the Reichskommissar, there is created a company, whose head receives a ™ Interview G-31.

2 Korner, ‘Die neve deutsche Ukrainepolitik’ [April 20, 1944], Document 1198-PS ;_ Frauenfeld, ‘Denkschrift iiber die Probleme der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete’, February 10, 1944, Document NO-5394*, pp. 32-3.

CH, XVIII Germany and the Soviet Economy 389 very high salary even by German standards but fabulous in the East... . Highly paid trustees are put into enterprises where modestly paid natives do the real work by virtue of their . . . better knowledge of conditions.!

Citing chapter and verse, the Finance Minister sought to bring about

some change — at least in procedure, if not in policy. The upshot was, if anything, negative. Thereafter all direct correspondence between the East and the Finance Ministry was prohibited, and an effort was made to have Schwerin von Krosigk resign, with Koch and Bormann leading the assault against him.? On only one issue did the German economic and civilian agencies

see eye to eye, however much they quarrelled among themselves : the Eastern economy was not to be turned back to the indigenous

population. Berlin was aware of the impact of this policy, and Rosenberg bluntly told the Fihrer that the fact that ‘naturally the entire direction of the economy is in German hands has produced a

deterioration of [popular] morale’. Reports from various parts of the occupied territories urged a clear German pronouncement on indigenous property, if not in heavy industries and utilities (which no one on the spot demanded), at least in small-scale retail trade and real estate. The issue inevitably assumed political overtones. Brautigam, in his oft-quoted memorandum of October 1942, noted that expropriation without compensation had cost the Bolsheviks heavily in popularity; German silence benefited the enemy, who could read into it anything he wanted.4| The military government officials meeting with the Ostministertum in December specified the range of possible reforms. In their opinion private property could be revived ‘for small enterprises only’, partly for political and partly for economic reasons. ‘Their recommendation read : In industry, small enterprises, especially those which have been repaired by the population, shall be turned over to the people. Here, too [¢.e. as in agriculture], the concept of private property must to some extent be revived.5

Now the Rosenberg Ministry took the unusual step of asking its agencies in the field to advance suggestions on the desirability of ' Schwerin von Krosigk to Rosenberg, September 4, 1942, Document NG4900, NMT, xii, 885-91. 2 Walter Eckhardt, affidavit, Document Schwerin-von-Krosigk-49*. 3 Document 1520-PS, TMWC, xxvu, 285. 4 Brautigam, ‘Aufzeichnung’, October 25, 1942, Document 294-PS, TMWC, XXV, 336-7.

5 Protocol, December 18, 1942.

390 Problems and Practice PT. 111 transferring ‘small enterprises’, primarily in trade and crafts, to

private hands. The timeliness of the measure, it was argued, depended on the judgment whether the political benefit to be derived from it (as well as the anticipated increase in production) would outweigh the difficulties in controlling the flow of raw material

and labour.! At last a political factor was given some weight, even though no action was taken.

The whole matter was particularly acute in the Baltic area, which had been singled out for preferential treatment. Elsewhere, nationalization had taken place so long ago as to reduce the urgency

of the problem.? In Ostland, on the other hand, pressure was considerable both from German and indigenous circles. Lohse, as was shown earlier, was in essence a ‘statist’ who insisted on strict government regulation, if not outright ownership, of economy.3 He looked with scorn and fear upon all reprivatization efforts. In an address to his aides in Riga he emphasized that if there are already unceasing cries for reprivatization, especially from the Reich, and if they say that we — Ostland — would become the owners of

the monopolies we have created, I can only repeat: we don’t want to talk about this today. This question will be decided after the war. lI resist the desire of German concerns and big business to take over enter-

prises in Ostland; for, if a distribution of enterprises must take place, priority goes to those who today are risking their lives for the nation on

the field of battle. ...

Thus provided with a ‘patriotic’ argument, Lohse espoused government ownership or custody, vetoing all plans for reprivatization either by permitting German companies to take over or by returning properties to their former indigenous owners.‘ Brautigam had good reason to single out Lohse’s stand on the property issue in his indictment of German policy : 1 RMfdbO., Chefgruppe Wirtschaftspolitische Kooperation, [nformationsdienst, 1943, no. 2-3 (February-March), p. 2. 2 The old émigrés who dreamt of regaining their possessions were decisively left out. The official argument insisted that the Reich was not shedding its blood to ‘restore the castles and latifundia’ of the Russian grand-dukes who had caused the first World War. Hence ‘the return of property to its former owners 1s out of

the question ; they have no claim to restitution’. (Ostwirtschaft, xxxi, 73;

RMfdbO., decree, July 27, 1943, RKU, Zentralblatt, 11 [1943], 595.) While motivated above all by a desire to keep a group of meddling moribund aliens out of influence, this German decision, for once, met with approval among the population

in the East. 3 See above, p. 187.

4 Lohse, speech, February 23, 1942, MS, Document Occ E3-54/56*, YIVO ; Hadamowsky and Taubert, op. cit. p. 8. A hostile SD officer who had ample contact with Lohse described him as ‘the principal enemy of reprivatization of [Baltic] real

estate, which the Russians had nationalized in 1940-1’. (Martin Sandberger, affidavit, Document NO-3972*.)

CH. XVIII Germany and the Soviet Economy 391 To the boundless surprise of the population [he wrote] the German administration [of Ostland] preferred to play the part of receiver of the

goods stolen by the Bolsheviks. . .. Even after the Four-Year Plan gave up its initial objections, realizing that procrastination on the reprivatization issue was harmful to German economic interests, the recognition — as a matter of principle —of pre-Bolshevik property relations failed to ensue, in violation of political common sense and as a result merely of the unfounded protests of the Reich Commissar [Lohse].!

It took long and difficult ‘negotiations’ to push through, in February 1943, a general directive on the ‘re-establishment of private property in the General Commissariats of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania’. It was finally implemented with a variety of conditions attached, and some restitution followed, though its practical significance remained limited.2) The reform in the Baltic area was

adopted primarily for political reasons: it reflected the slightly privileged status which the Baltikum was to enjoy in the future New Europe.

The general relaxation of ‘statism’ which occurred in 1942-3, partly under the pressure of economic concerns, partly as the result of political action, benefited German private business rather than the indigenous population. Soon a variety of companies moved in;

advertisements in the local press, especially in the Baltic area, announced the German concerns which had established branch offices. Their expansion was slow, however, and was handicapped by official restrictions and difficulties of transportation and supply. In overall terms, the economic significance of German firms doing business in the East remained small. The question of property rights remained basically unresolved, as German agencies vied with each other for economic power but

joined enthusiastically in preventing the local population from becoming economic or political competitors through the device of private ownership.

In Search of Profit

By providing goods and services, the occupied areas were to defray the so-called ‘internal occupation costs’, 2.e. occupa-

tion expenditures of the Reich. It was a basic tenet of the ' Brdutigam, op. cit. 2 Meyer, Recht, section O 111i A rr ; RMfdbO., Verordnungsblatt, ti (1943), 57. Some small-scale reprivatization had taken place earlier in the Baltic region; see Probleme des Ostraumes (Berlin: RMfdbO., 1942), pp. 76-8 ; Braune Mappe, Teil “1, 2nd ed., p. 12; Meyer, Recht, sections O iii Ga 1-4.

392 Problems and Practice br. 1 Ostministerium that ‘the costs of the total administration must be borne by the [occupied] country itself’. In addition, Berlin was resolved not only to have its troops live off the land but to have the Reich make a profit in the occupied areas. ‘This was one purpose behind the establishment of government monopolies, which were to reap financial gain from Eastern

raw materials and mining. If the war cost billions, Hitler once declared, the East’s resources in minerals alone would make up a good part of the expenditure. The trusteeship companies, likewise, ‘assured the attainment of profits as a contribution towards balancing war expenditures ’.?

Our goal [Hitler stated] must be to reduce the war debt by from ten to twenty billion marks a year and thus become the only belligerent of this war to be free of war debts within ten years, and be in a position to concentrate, broadly speaking, on the colonization of the territories acquired. . . . The real profiteers of this war are ourselves.’

Under these circumstances, it was axiomatic that ‘the Russian

people must bear as much of the burden of the war as they are capable of bearing’. The recipe was to keep their living standards and hence production costs as low as possible. . . . We shall open up a source of income for the Reich in this fashion [Goring asserted] which will make it possible to get rid of a substantial part of the debts assumed for the financing of the war within a few decades and with the greatest indulgence for the German taxpayer.*

The major instrument which Hitler foresaw for the enrichment

of the Reich was trade: Germany would sell its goods at a high price and buy up Eastern products cheaply. We'll supply cotton goods, household utensils, all the articles of current consumption. .. . My plan is that we should take profits on whatever comes our way. . . . All deliveries of machines, even if they’re made abroad, will have to pass through a German middleman, in such a way that Russia will be supplied with no means of production whatever, except of absolute necessities. 1 Rosenberg, memorandum, n.d., Document 1056-PS, TTMWC, xxvi, 607.

2 Picker, op. cit. p. 142 (entry for April 12, 1942); Sieber, op. cit. ; WiStab Ost to Goring, September 14, 1943, ‘Materialsammlung’, p. 282d. 3 HTT, p. 625 (entry for August 11, 1942). 4 Goring, directive, November 8, 1941, Nagel to Thomas, November 25, 1941*.

Economy Minister Funk was reported to have stated that the East could pay off German war debts ‘in twenty years’. (Interview G-31.) For a more detailed contemporary discussion, see Professor Karl Theisinger, ‘Kosten und Preise in den besetzten Ostgebieten’, Verein deutscher Wirtschaftswissenschafter, op. cit. pp. 107-25.

CHL NVUL Germany and the Soviet Economy 393 ‘This was the Fuhrer’s position when the invasion began. Karl Albrecht (Loew), a German who had gone to Russia in 1924 and managed to become a deputy commissar for forestry there, had returned to Berlin in the 1930s and then joined Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry. After directing a ‘ black’ Russian-

CH. XXVI Vlasov Movement: First Phase 569 Meanwhile the growth of the Wlassow-Aktion permitted a stepping up of the Army’s propaganda campaign. Vlasov himself was given a headquarters (or, in effect, was placed under house

arrest) in a swanky suburb of Berlin; a training camp for ROA propagandists was established at Dabendorff; the Russian-language

newspapers — Zaria [Dawn] for the civilians, and Dobrovolets [Volunteer] for the ROA — were reorganized and expanded; in mid-March, for the first time, the German press carried Vlasov’s appeal — an event which provoked considerable stir abroad; and in April 1943 a ‘conference of former officers and soldiers of the Red Army, now prisoners of war’ was held at Brest-Litovsk, with leading Vlasovite officers participating. On the whole the Germans seemed to be satisfied with the success

of these efforts. While the bulk of prisoners remained hostile, incredulous, or passive, thousands joined the battalions that went under the collective name of ROA; many more in the East succumbed to Vlasov’s charisma and began to wonder whether indeed a basic reversal of German tactics was not in the offing. Encouraged by the success of Vlasov’s first trip, Wehrmacht Propaganda arranged

a new series of speeches and appearances, this time taking him to Riga, Pskov, and Gatchina in the north. His reception seemed to be equally favourable. As the diary of the economic inspectorate — in no sense a sympathetic faction — recorded in Pskov, Vlasov is an excellent speaker and makes the impression of an honest and very intelligent man who is sure of his goals. He spoke of his career, his attitude towards Bolshevism and Stalin, his impressions of Germany, and the necessity of collaboration. In 1812-13, the Russians had helped

the Germans to be free; now the Germans would repay this debt of gratitude if they enabled the Russians to build their new house. Only by joined Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry. After directing a ‘black’ Russianlanguage radio station, Albrecht, in the spring of 1943, sought support for a ‘ League for the Struggle for Social Justice’, whose programme appealed for the salvation of Russia from Jews and Bolsheviks and urged honourable peace. If there was to be a Russian leader, Albrecht told friends, he had once occupied a higher position than Vlasov. (Interview G-31 ; Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels [London : Westhouse, 1947], pp. 47-8.) After the war Albrecht sought to depict his position and wartime role in an entirely different light. Both his testimony in defence of Berger and his ‘memoirs’ must, however, be considered thoroughly unreliable. (Case XI, Engl. transcript, pp. 6249-306 ; Karl I. Albrecht, Sie aber werden die Welt zer-

stéren [Munich: Herbert Neuner, 1954].) Albrecht did, however, intervene at different times for an improvement in the status of prisoners and Ostarbeiter and for the withdrawal of the Untermensch pamphlet. (See also NMT, xiii, 472; and Documents NO-2089*, 2090*, 2091*.) 1 See W. Wladimirow, Dokumente und Material des Komitees zur Befreiung der

Volker Russlands (Berlin, 1944, ‘Nur fiir den Dienstgebrauch’), pp. 58-67 ; Fischer, op. cit. p. 206 ; Peter Kleist, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin (Bonn : AthendaumVerlag, 1950), pp. 318-26.

570 Political Warfare PT. 1V unselfish work could the new Russia win its place in the new Europe, equally far from Bolshevism and capitalism, and assure itself a new, secure, happy existence. The Russians listened to Vlasov with the greatest attention and showed their approval by active applause... . Vlasov’s appearance, as he himself remarked in jest, dispelled all rumours

that he had died or even that he had never existed. It is entirely superfluous and inexpedient [the German recorder added] to worry whether this enterprise [z.e. Vlasov] comes too late, what its prospects are, and whether Vlasov has honest intentions.!

At the same time, his backers also appeared content with the effort directed to the Soviet side of the front. Even Goebbels commented that from a number of statements by Bolshevik prisoners I gather that General

Vlasov’s appeal caused some discussion after all in the Soviet Army. The appeal will be even more effective if we get behind it more energetic-

ally. . . .2

And General Hellmich, who nominally ‘commanded’ all the Osttruppen, wrote : The attempts to have the Russians addressed by Russians have had convincing success. For example, the use of pamphlets which are signed by the Russian Committee of General Vlasov and give the impression of a Russian group collaborating with Germany, have had the desired effect.

According to reports by prisoners of war and orders we were able to listen to, the Soviet government has forbidden conversation on the topic of the ‘Russian Army of Liberation’ and has charged the organs of vigilance with special attention in regard to Vlasov’s pamphlets.3

After ample preparation there was initiated on April 20 ‘Opera-

tion Silberstreif [Silver Lining]’ aimed at increasing the rate of voluntary desertion from the Red Army. For the first time, crude defection propaganda, anti-Semitism, and material inducements were subordinated to the combined appeal of the ‘Russian Committee’ and the German army’s pledge to treat all deserters separately

from and better than other prisoners of war. Basic Order No. 13, issued over Zeitzler’s signature, reproduced in leaflet form in Russian

and dropped in large quantities over the Soviet lines, spelled out how money, valuables, insignia, and decorations were to be retained by the voluntary defectors, who were to receive good quarters and I Wiln Nord, ‘Kriegstagebuch’, entry for April 30, 1943, Wi/ID .133*, CRS. See also Vlasov’s interview, ‘Beseda s generalom Vlasovym’, Novyi put’ (Riga), no. 10 (May 1943), p. 2. 2 The Goebbels Diaries, p. 330 (entry for April 15, 1943).

3 Hellmich, ‘Vortragsnotiz betr. Osttruppen’, March 23, 1943, Document NG-3534*.

|

CH. XXVI Vlasov Movement: First Phase 571 rations, an assurance of free return home after the war, and the best medical attention. Such men were not to be considered prisoners ; after one week they were to be given a choice of joining the ROA or one of the national ‘liberation’ units, or of working as civilians in

the German-held areas. In a substantial departure from earlier practice, this decree provided for the ‘satisfaction of cultural demands’ of defectors, including literature, musical instruments, and showing of motion pictures.!

Desertions did rise from 2500 in May to 6500 in July. It is doubtful to what extent this increase was attributable to the leaflets ; various other factors, including the weather, encouraged defection. Certainly the statistical difference, interesting though it was as a test-case of psychological warfare, was not substantial enough to affect the course of battles. ‘The German counter-offensive that was to have been launched almost simultaneously with Szlberstreif was postponed and eventually fizzled out without marked results. Nevertheless, the first reports on the leaflet campaign in May 1943 acclaimed it as a success.” At the same time, the prestige of the Vlasov movement in German eyes was boosted by the official Soviet reaction to it. After remaining

silent for months, in the spring of 1943 Moscow apparently found

the challenge too serious to ignore. While the population on the Soviet side was never told of Vlasov’s activities, the Red Army’s Main Political Administration began to ‘reply’ by releases and articles

in the army press and lectures to troops who had been exposed to the Vlasov leaflets or broadcasts. In good Soviet fashion Vlasov was

now dubbed a Trotskyite, an associate of Tukhachevskii and a German and Japanese agent for years before the war. ‘This counter-

propaganda was striking because it dealt entirely with Vlasov’s career and with German intentions and behaviour in Russia — ! OKH/GenStdH/Gen.Qu. Abt. Kr.-Verw., ‘Grundsatzlicher Befehl Nr. 13’, ,

April 20, 1943*, HL. It also pertained to political officers in the Red Army. For the same text in Russian leaflet form, see Prikaz Nr. 13, RAB 690/IV/43, signed by Colonel Gehlen, April 21, 1943, when Zeitzler refused to sign its Russian text. See also Thorwald, op. cit. pp. 220-4 ; and interviews G-4, G-19, G-32. These sentiments were rapidly echoed by lower échelons at the front. The following order of 2nd Panzer Division was typical : Out of the recognition that there is at present a greater willingness among the Russians to defect, considerably more intensive propaganda aimed at inducing desertion is to be conducted. . . . The Russian soldier must be convinced that he is not deserting to his enemies but to his fellow-countrymen who are fighting against Communism for a free, independent Russia and are being treated correspondingly. 2.Pz.-Div., Ic, ‘246/43’, May 4, 1943*, HL.)

2 Interviews G-4, G-31. Actually, as will be seen, the Vlasov theme was

initially avoided in Silberstrezf.

572 Political Warfare PT. 1V colonialism, atrocities, abuse. Moscow made no effort to counter Vlasov’s political or social programme. !

No! The crisis came unexpectedly. On March 4, 1943, Himmler sent Bormann a memorandum :

Please inform the Fiihrer that, according to my information, the Wehrmacht has established and is giving publicity to a Russian committee and army of liberation. This would clearly contradict the Fiihrer’s recent

directives. I ask for information on the Fihrer’s decision.

Having operated for months in the twilight of illegality and having attracted increased attention in Germany and abroad, the entire Vlasov enterprise was bound to incur the hostility of various elements ranging from Russian reactionaries and non-Russian separatists to Nazi extremists both in the SS and of the BormannKoch persuasion. Once attention was focused on Vlasov’s activity, hostile evidence against him and his associates was easily amassed within a few weeks. In particular, his speech at Gatchina aroused protests and indignation. Some day, he had declared, he hoped to be host to the German officers in liberated Leningrad. How could this Soviet prisoner, the extremists exclaimed furiously, brazenly dream of entertaining the conquering Germans, and of all places in

Leningrad, which the Fuhrer wanted razed from the face of the earth! In mid-April, there came a formal inquiry — and thinly veiled threats —from Keitel to Wedel about Vlasov’s political pronouncements. If earlier non-Nazi remarks had been written off as clever propaganda or swallowed as a ‘lesser evil’, the attention of headquarters was now drawn to them, and WPr IV was obliged frantically to drum up high-level support for its protégé. Thanks largely to Gehlen’s insistence that, for intelligence reasons, the Smolensk Committee was needed, the first storm was weathered.3 Its backers, however, had no illusions about the transitory nature of the

delay : in mid-May OKW submitted the entire problem to Hitler. On May 19 the Fuhrer decided the Rosenberg-Koch controversy in favour of the extremists. While Vlasov did not specifically figure 1 See Alexander Dallin and Ralph S. Mavrogordato, ‘The Soviet Reaction to Vlasov’, World Politics (Princeton), viii, no. 3 (April 1956), 307-22.

2 Himmler to Bormann, March 4, 1943, EAP 161b-12/306*, CRS. Just what

directives he had in mind is unclear ; probably the delay in accepting the Rosenberg plan of February 8 was meant.

3 Interview G-4; Thorwald, op. cit. pp. 215-22 (which may overly dramatize the crisis). On March 30, Bormann also informed the Foreign Office that the RSHA had ‘proof’ of OMi plans to establish a Ukrainian national committee under German auspices. (Interview G-31.)

CH. XXVI Vlasov Movement: First Phase 573 in it, by implication the decision dealt a body blow to the whole concept of political warfare.'. A quick attempt was made by Vlasov’s

backers to rally support for their project. At the QuartermasterGeneral’s Office Wagner and Altenstadt displayed considerable activity on its behalf; Tresckow and Gersdorff even persuaded Kluge to endorse it in writing.2 Gehlen penned a long report seeking to show that, since Vlasov had been launched as a propaganda

manceuvre, the Reich could not shelve him without considerable loss of prestige, while the positive effect of using him was so great that it was possible, essential — and safe — to take the next step:

a proclamation by Hitler on self-government in Russia under Vlasov’s leadership.3

Finally, an attempt was made through Brautigam to enlist Rosenberg’s support. If the military could not count on Keitel to be their spokesman, perhaps the Ostminister would present the issue from a political point of view? Rosenberg, however, was reluctant to stick his neck out again. Momentarily the Ostminister forgot his anti-Muscovite bias; if the Vlasov movement was to be buried, so also would be his separatist committees. Informed that

the issue was due to be decided by Hitler, he sent the OKW a peculiar plan for the use of Osttruppen in psychological warfare, calling for the assignment of Ostministerium plenipotentiaries to each army group ‘to supervise and politically direct this activity’. In the end, Rosenberg let himself be persuaded to notify Keitel of his willingness to see the Fiihrer, together with Jodl, about Vlasov. 1 See above, Chapter VIII. 2 OB Heeresgruppe Mitte [von Kluge] to Chef, OKH/GenStdH [Zeitzler], May 22, 1943, Document NOKW-3521*. Kluge’s letter, unusually determined for its frequently indecisive author, presented no new arguments but had as an enclosure a ‘Plan for the Establishment of a National Committee in the Army Group Centre Rear Area’, spelling out the proposed authority and composition

of the committee.

3 Fremde Heere Ost [Gehlen], ‘Entwicklung und Lage der militirischen Propaganda im Osten seit Herbst 1942 (Wlassow-Aktion)’, June 1, 1943*. Gehlen castigated the Rosenberg Ministry for its delays and lack of enthusiasm for Vlasov,

who ‘had proved thoroughly reliable . . . and knows that for him there is no way back to Stalin’. Enclosures to the memorandum, forwarded to Hitler’s headquarters, included reports on Soviet and Western reactions to Vlasov. 4 He also sent Bormann a new project for the formation of committees for the various Soviet nationalities as well as a statement purporting to show Vlasov’s assent to the future establishment of a sovereign Ukraine and Caucasus. (Rosen-

berg to OKW/WFSt/Q II, May 29, 1943, OKW/690*, CRS; Rosenberg to Bormann, September 7, 1944, Document NO-2997* ; Thorwald, op. cit. p. 234 ; and Chavchavadze, op. cit. p. 65.) On the Vlasov statement, see below, p. 608. Thorwald’s account, particularly of the Brautigam-Wagner conference (actually Wagner did not attend at all) seems greatly misleading (op. cit. pp. 223-33). (Brautigam, ‘Vortragsnotiz fiir den Herrn Reichsminister’, May 27, 1943, M/L 474*, CRS ; interview G-11 ; Brautigam, letter to author, August 20, 1955.) G.R.R.— 2 P

574 Political Warfare br. Vv Having relieved his conscience and mollified his insistent aides,

Rosenberg departed for the Ukraine. In his absence, on June 8, 1943, at a conference with Keitel and Zeitzler, Hitler dealt the Wlassow-Aktion the final blow.

One reason why Keitel had insisted on submitting the entire problem to the Ftihrer was the prospect of joining the ROA proffered

to defecting Soviet troops in one of the basic leaflets used in the Silberstreif campaign. ‘This in itself did not arouse the Fuhrer’s ire. Divorcing psychological warfare from political intent, Hitler found nothing fatal in such appeals, even though they had exceeded the sanctioned limits on the use of Vlasov’s name. The real danger, he felt, lay in the political implications which not the Red Army, but some Germans, like Kluge, were reading into these tactics. It

was essential to keep Vlasov propaganda precisely that: not to permit it to blossom into a genuine political movement. Germany had no use for an indigenous collaborator leader in Russia : We must avoid the least encouragement of the opinion on our side that

in this way [by boosting Vlasov] we might really find a compromise solution — something like the so-called free or national China [of Wang Ching-wei] in East Asia.

As Keitel rephrased the Fiihrer’s desires, We consider the signing of these propaganda leaflets by Vlasov, the National Committee, to be purely a propaganda device.

Hitler’s decision restricted Vlasov to lending his name to German propaganda appeals addressed to the other side of the front lines. As for the occupied territory, ‘I don’t need this General Vlasov at

all in our rear areas’. Curiously Hitler sensed what many of the general’s German promoters did not: the prospect that the ROA and its political leadership might some day break with the Nazis. ‘We must not turn over [the Osttruppen]’, Hitler concluded, ‘to a third party which gets them into its hands and then says: ‘Today we work with you and tomorrow we don’t’’.’!

Once again Hitler was more consistent than his ‘flexible’ subordinates. The irreconcilable nature of German-Russian relations, as Hitler saw them, was well revealed in his remark that, ‘if [the collaborators] opposed the interests of their own people [by working

with Germany], they would have no honour; if they tried to help their people, they would be dangerous’. Given his goals and methods, 1 For the protocol of this important conference, see ‘Besprechung des Fihrers’, Document 1384-PS, Journal of Modern History, xxiii, no. 1 (March 1951), 63-71 ;

Engl. trans. in Fischer, op. cit. pp. 176-87. See also above, pp. 160-4; and Document NO-3125*.

CH. XXVI Vlasov Movement: First Phase 575 meaningful positive political co-operation of the Third Reich and a non-Stalinist Russia was smpossible.

The Fihrer’s decision signalled a sudden suspension of the political warfare campaign. In one conference Hitler had destroyed

the plans of three groups which had worked, though at crosspurposes, on different variations of the political theme. He had administered a decisive setback to Rosenberg’s anti-Koch policy and his promotion of the non-Russian separatists, to the Army sponsors of bigger and better Osttruppen, and to the protectors of the political Vlasov movement. The matter was of sufficient importance for Hitler to discuss it in

a special talk delivered to the commanders of the Army Groups on July 1, 1943. He was concerned lest the value of the indigenous auxiliaries promoted by the Army be overrated, and that, above all,

no political inferences be drawn from their establishment. The German soldier was interested not in the programme of Russian or Ukrainian freedom, he argued, but rather in the prospect of settling

| in the East as a pioneer farmer after the war. ‘The problem, as

: Hitler put it, was

to find the way which, on the one hand, leads to the goal — the formation of battalions in the East — and, on the other hand, avoids their becoming

armies and avoids political promises which we would have to redeem [enlésen] some day. . . .!

Meanwhile Keitel drafted a formal letter to Rosenberg containing

the Fiihrer’s verdict. ‘The summary memorandum — pertaining not only to Vlasov but also to the non-Russian national committees — read: (1) The National Committees are not to be used for the recruitment of volunteers. (2) Vlasov is not to appear in the occupied territory.

(3) For the continuation of the Vlasov propaganda operation, the Fuhrer has not refused his consent only in so far as none of the points of the Vlasov programme is to be carried out without the Fihrer’s express sanction. No German agency must take seri-

ously the bait [Lockmittel] contained in the 13 Points of the Vlasov Programme.?

Once the decision was made, Hitler’s obedient followers rapidly fell in line. Jodl told K6string with reference to Vlasov that ‘only ' [Hitler,] ‘Auszug aus der Ansprache des Fiihrers an die Heeresgruppenfiihrer pp. am 1.7.43 abends’, Document 739-PS, Vierteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte (Munich), 11 (1954), 312.

2 Memorandum, n.d., ‘Brief Keitel ./. Rosenberg Juni 1943, Abschrift z.d.A.’, AA 17*, CRS. See also Thorwald, op. cit. p. 240.

576 Political Warfare PT. IV the most stupid calves pick their own butchers’:! the Russian ‘liberation movement’ was too explosive a weapon to handle. Erich Koch zealously echoed the Fihrer’s attitude: the Vlasov army was bound to be nothing but ‘cold coffee’. It was silly, he told a German journalist, to believe that 500,000 men in the ‘Vlasov army’ might

replace 500,000 German soldiers; in the end, they would only permit an enemy break-through which would take 500,000 German soldiers to repair. As for the political prospects, Koch repeated the Fihrer’s argument : Why the detour? If one gave Vlasov’s army a flag and his soldiers honour, one would have to treat them as comrades with natural human and

political rights, and the national Russian idea would break through. Nothing could be less desirable to us than such a development.

The backers of the ‘Russian liberation’ enterprise were themselves discouraged. Outsiders and convinced anti-Nazis like Ulrich von

Hassell exclaimed, ‘Too late!’ Grote concluded that nothing more could be done. Strikfeldt, who had become a close personal friend of Vlasov’s, despaired of the whole project. One by one, all proponents of ‘political policy’ had failed, regardless of their means and intentions.

The setback was bound to have its repercussions on Vlasov and his followers.+ Their attitude towards the Reich grew perceptibly cooler. Some of the collaborators were henceforth more receptive

to Soviet offers to return to the Red Army or join the partisans. Others came to view the entire operation as merely a means of survival and a source of livelihood. A few held out in disbelief that ‘Hitler could be so dense’, trusting that the inevitable lightning

of insight must soon strike the Fihrerhauptquartier. Still others

concluded that it was too late and there was little choice between the two warring sides. ! Denike, op. cit. p. 277. 2 Kausch, ‘Bericht tiber die Reise’, June 26, 1943, Document Occ E4-11*, YIVO. In July Koch again spoke of the Vlasov enterprise at a conference with

Rosenberg, Sauckel, and other officials. According to the minutes, ‘Koch

demanded the dissolution of the so-called Vlasov liberation army and the transfer of Hiwis to labour. An unmistakable order of the Fuhrer on this matter must be obtained.’ (‘Sitzungsvermerk’, July 13, 1943, Document NO-1830*.)

3 Interviews G-4, G-11, G-31; The Von Hassell Diaries (Garden City:

Doubleday, 1947), p. 297. Almost tragi-comically, Ribbentrop, so often out of step, was at last persuaded by his Russland-Gremium to intervene with Hitler in favour of reviving the Vlasov cause. (See the memorandum by Hilger, ‘Betr. Wlassow’, June 29, 1943*.) Though thoroughly briefed in advance, the Foreign Minister emerged from his conference with Hitler once again convinced that the Fihrer was right. 4 A letter written by Vlasov in critique of Nazi policy, ostensibly in July 1943,

may or may not be authentic. See xxx, ‘Euer Fiihrer Hitler muss sich jetzt entscheiden ’, Wiking-Ruf (Hameln), ii, no. 9 (September 1954), 15-16.

CH. XXVI Vlasov Movement: First Phase 577 Hitler’s decision of June 1943 ended one chapter of Ostpolitik. The same year, as has earlier been shown, ushered in, largely under the impact of defeats and shortages, a new phase of somewhat more

conciliatory German tactics. Significantly, the change in tactics was limited to fields like propaganda, economy, and inter-personal

relations; it did not yet percolate to the most sophisticated area, that of political warfare.

At the same time, the summer of 1943 saw a shift of German attention from the occupied territory to the prisoners, labourers, and collaborators in the Reich. Given the continued defeats of the Army

and the growth of the partisan movement in the East, the major concern of the framers of German Ostpolitik was henceforth the one remaining variable: the Osttruppen.

Propaganda and Proclamation : The period between the December 1942 conference of the military and civil government officials in Berlin and the Fihrer’s veto of positive political warfare in June 1943 was characterized by great expectations, in certain quarters, in connection with another project: a formal proclamation which the Fuhrer (or, if need be, someone else) would address to the peoples of the Soviet Union. Informally discussed at the Berlin conference of December 1942, the idea recurred in Altenstadt’s ‘Note on the Eastern Question’, submitted two weeks later. He wanted a ‘declaration by the Fuhrer guaranteeing equal rights as Europeans . . . to all Russians who join in the fight against Bolshevism’.! However, after the fiasco of its pre-Christmas ‘alliance’ with Rosenberg, the OKMH was in no mood to assume overt initiative in political affairs. A proclamation by Hitler —a sheer propaganda move — would require no actual changes in the occupied areas, would cost the Reich nothing. Moreover, its backers naively hoped, the very fact that the German government made an official pledge and that Berlin addressed the people

directly, would have a salutary effect on morale in the East. Here was political warfare in its most watered-down form. , It was easy for the authors of the plan to arouse the interest of Wehrmacht Propaganda and, through it, of Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry. Colonel Martin, the chief of WPr IV, was an admirer of Goebbels and served as a convenient transmission belt. By the end of January 1943 the stronger and more original personality of the Propaganda Minister — just then engaged in reassessing strategy — 1 OKH/GenStdH/Gen.Qu./Abt.Kr.-Verw., ‘Aufzeichnung tiber die Ostfrage’, January 3, 1943, Document NG-3415*.

578 Political Warfare PY. IV had seized the initiative in the matter of the Fiihrer proclamation. ! The week following the surrender of Field-Marshal von Paulus at Stalingrad, Goebbels drafted an appeal for Hitler’s signature. It is interesting that he sought to coordinate his project in advance with

two groups which, he assumed, were likely to back it: logically enough not Himmler or Bormann, but Rosenberg and Zeitzler. Rosenberg’s response was ambivalent. On the one hand, he was sour because he considered such a proclamation to be the exclusive concern of his Ministry and he objected further to the joint appeal to Russians and non-Russians alike. On the other hand the stepping up of political propaganda coincided with his views at this particular

moment and would have relieved the pressure which was being applied to him by his staff. Actually, he had incorporated a paragraph on this subject in his letter to Hitler in mid-January, stressing

that an authoritative name was needed to give punch to German appeals, but implying that he, rather than Hitler, would suffice as the signatory.’ Having received no answer, he discussed the plan at his conference

with Hitler on February 8. According to Rosenberg’s subsequent letter to Keitel, Hitler turned down the idea of a personal proclamation but left open the possibility of ‘some sort of declaration by the Ostminister’ —- probably not an entirely exact account.3 Moreover, Rosenberg had apparently tried to use the opportunity for one of his jealous jibes against Goebbels.* A week later during a visit to Hitler’s headquarters at Vinnitsa,

Goebbels again raised the question of the proclamation. He was forced to record that, although ‘the Fiihrer fully endorses my antiBolshevik propaganda’,

. . . the Fuhrer does not want to consider a proclamation for the East at this time. . . . He believes that Bolshevism is so hated and feared by the peoples of the East that the anti- Bolshevik tendency of our propaganda

is quite sufficient. I try again to convince the Fiihrer of the opposite. I believe, however, the real reason [for his opposition] is the fact that he '_ On Goebbels’ changing attitude on Russia, see above, pp. 176, 356.

2 Document CXLIV-433*, CDJC. He, like Goebbels, enclosed the draft of such an appeal. 3 'That it may have been wishful thinking on Rosenberg’s part is also suggested

by the fact that ten days later he felt compelled to protest Bormann’s minutes, which apparently made no reference to such a proposal. Lammers, after checking

back with the Fuhrer, informed the Ostminister that ‘at present the Fuhrer

rejects . . . any proclamation to the peoples of the East’. (Rosenberg to Goebbels, February 11, 1943, and Rosenberg to Lammers, February 13, 1943, Document

Occ E 18-19*, YIVO; Lammers to Rosenberg, March 8, 1943, EAP 99/76*, CRS ; Rosenberg to Keitel, July 17, 1943*.) 4 The Goebbels Diaries, p. 261 (entry for March 2, 1943).

CH. XXVI Vlasov Movement: First Phase 579 does not want to do anything that might be interpreted as readiness to yield at a moment of temporary weakness.!

Goebbels kept working on hts ‘draft proclamation. Its final text, which was addressed ‘To all the peoples of the East’, began with a survey of Hitler’s accomplishments in improving the lot of the people

and in combating the capitalist and Communist conspiracies. Though rather cleverly worded, the appeal still betrayed the author’s inability to grasp what were likely to be the most persuasive argu-

ments for the Ostmensch. Only towards the end did it contain a paragraph which reflected in substance what the Germans had found to be the major aspirations of the people in the occupied

areas and what Goebbels was perfectly willing to promise,

without concern for fulfilment :

Fight on with us against hated Bolshevism, bloody Stalin, and his Jewish clique ; for freedom of the individual, for freedom of religion and of conscience, for the abolition of slave labour, for property and possession, for a free peasantry on its own land, for your own homestead and freedom of labour, for social justice, for the right of all toilers to receive fair wages

for your labour, for a happy future for your children, for their right to advancement and education without regard to origin, for state protection of the sick and infirm, for their right to adequate material sustenance, for everything of which Bolshevism has deprived you.?

Though it was never issued, this end-product of Goebbels’ efforts remains a monument to his agility in making promises he had no intention of redeeming, to his insight into conditions in the East,

and also to the blinders which Nazism imposed on his field of vision.

In April Goebbels tried again. Finding solace in a report which Vidkun Quisling had submitted,3 he reflected: ‘We would certainly be able to stir up many of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. against Stalin

if we knew how to wage war solely against Bolshevism but not against the Russian people’. And the next day Goebbels noted that

the Vlasov appeal would be more effective if it received more energetic backing. ‘Of course this depends upon the issuance of a proclamation for the East, which the Fiihrer can’t as yet be persuaded

to do. We must not only wage war in the East: we must also doa political job there.’ + 1 Ibid. p. 284 (entry for March g, 1943). 2 ‘An alle Volker des Ostens’, n.d., Document Occ E 18-19*, YIVO. 3 “The very absence of a proclamation’, Quisling had written, ‘was having a most deleterious effect on the whole conduct of the war.’ See also below, p. 585. 4 The Goebbels Diaries, pp. 328, 330 (entries for April 14-16, 1943). A clue to why the otherwise realistic Goebbels should have promised himself so much from

580 Political Warfare PT. IV The question of the proclamation was decisively settled in the negative during the Hitler conference with Rosenberg and Koch on May 19, 1943. According to the triumphant Bormann, the Fihrer told Rosenberg that ‘a proclamation to the population of the occupied Eastern territories may be issued only with the Fihrer’s approval’, and that he had no intention of granting it. His opposition to such political warfare endeavours had the same roots as his objections to increased Osttruppen recruitment: in the occupied East, German

policy had to be so tough as to numb the population’s political consciousness. After all, in the Ukraine he expected that ‘no soldiers would be willing to die for us in view of the extremely severe demands which we are forced to impose’. More generally —

Hitler liked cheap historical parallels — ‘history has proved the impossibility of using subjugated nations as allies. One should merely remember that the Romans tried this policy in vain with regard to the Gauls.’! Ten days later, in a message to Bormann, Rosenberg tried once more to revive the proclamation project. He never received a reply. In his memorandum of June 1, Gehlen likewise urged an official German declaration, preferably by the Fiihrer.3 Yet Hitler wanted no part of it; at the June 8 conference with Keitel and Zeitzler, he wrote finis to the project. Curiously enough, he explicitly accepted Goebbels’ thesis of the divorce between propaganda and practice, insisting that ‘we must distinguish between propaganda directed at the other side and what we ourselves eventually [intend to] do’. He was prepared to undertake propaganda moves to win the Russians, ‘provided that in practice not the slightest consequences are drawn

from them... .’* In the last analysis, he was more afraid of ‘liberalism and sentimentality’ among his subordinates than he was attracted by the prospect of greater defections from the Red Army. Thereafter the question of a Fihrer proclamation was not raised. This episode confirmed that to be a partisan of political warfare was in itself no indication of friendly intentions in the East, nor of

sincere criticism of Nazi goals and methods. It was above all a the issuance of such a proclamation may be gleaned from his remark that the senior military in the East were looking to him as their spokesman on this issue :

‘They are placing great hopes in me and expect me to persuade the Fihrer’. ee tewel notes, in Etzdorf, ‘Aufzeichnungen’, Document NG-3288*. See also Thorwald, op. cit. p. 256. Goebbels seems to have been forgotten in this context, and he himself apparently never returned to the project.

2 See Rosenberg to Hitler, October 12, 1944, Document Rosenberg-14,

TMWC, xli, 187 ; and Document NO-2997*. 3 See above, p. 573. 4 ‘Besprechung des Fiihrers’, op. cit. pp. 63-4.

CH. XXVI Vlasov Movement: First Phase 581 symptom of realism, an effort to rescue something for the German

cause. Of such tactics various manners of men were capable — Goebbels as much as Schulenburg, Strikfeldt as much as Rosenberg. It was naive to assume that a proclamation alone, without a basic reorientation of policy and practice, could have saved the day or even

affected significantly the course of events. So much the more indicative is its failure in the year that saw defeat at Stalingrad and in North Africa, Mussolini’s defection and Allied mass bombing of the Reich.

Vigil and Void

The months following Hitler’s verdict of June 1943 were strikingly void of major developments in Ostpolittk ; | initiative was numbed, and the status quo threatened to endure indefinitely. One writer calls it the long vigil; another speaks of it as the ‘policy of limited means’. Asa contemporary put it, all the ‘realists’ could do was wait for military necessity to ordain what persuasion had failed

to produce, and meanwhile be content with small, piecemeal successes.”

The only legitimate surviving complex was the Osttruppen, now integrated into the German armed forces, though still divided into small and separate units.3 With Stauffenberg out of the Organization Section of the OKH, after requesting in a fit of disgust to be relieved and sent into combat, there was less opportunity for the ‘realists’ to manipulate assignments. What remained was to settle such minor

matters as furloughs for Eastern troops, permission for them to marry Ostarbeiter or Germans, their use of public vehicles, and room and board for refugees streaming back with the retreating German armies.

While these attempts were under way to improve the physical 1 There was a curious lag between policy decisions and their implementation in the Press. ‘The German public was offered more news about Vlasov and the Osttruppen from May 1943 on than ever before. Likewise, the foreign Press reported more amply on them in May and June 1943. (For interesting selections from the neutral Press, see the semi-official News Digest [London, 1943] on the relevant dates.) The New York Times reported from Stockholm on May 3, 1943, that Berlin intended to use Vlasov for a Russian army, but that Rosenberg opposed the plan. On July 4 it stated that Vlasov had been relegated to an inferior position because the Germans were ‘disappointed’ with him. 2 'Thorwald, op. cit. p. 245 ; [Herwarth,] ‘Germany and the Occupation of Russia’, MS*, p. 20. 3 Zeitzler reported at the June 8 conference that there was one regiment, 78 battalions, and 122 companies of Osttruppen listed as part of the German armed forces, in addition to some 60,000 auxiliary police and guards in the East, and about 220,000 Hiwis. (‘Besprechung des Fiihrers’, op. cit. p. 67.) These figures were decidedly incomplete. See above, p. 541 ff.

582 Political Warfare PT. tv and moral living conditions of the Osttruppen in small and often trivial ways, the extremists at the other end of the political gamut were dissatisfied with the very existence of these units. To men like Koch, they constituted a betrayal of German goals. An effort of his to have them transferred to forced labour (where, unarmed, they were less of a risk than as unreliable troops) collapsed rapidly, however, in the face of unanimous opposition from the Army.! A more serious problem arose in September 1943 when Hitler was informed, through the SS anti-partisan command, of the growing number of defections from the Osttruppen to the partisans. Accord-

ing to some sources, Hitler was so infuriated by this news that he momentarily ordered the units disbanded; there is no proof that

such an order was actually issued. At any rate, the fate of the malitary collaborators now hung in the balance, after political collaboration had been shelved and shaved down to pretence and propaganda. It took the combined efforts of all German elements ‘backing’

the Eastern troops to preserve them.” Hellmich’s staff, the various intelligence agencies and Wehrmacht Propaganda all intervened. Gehlen once again proved powerful enough to secure a delay and in the end a compromise. On October 10, 1943, came the decision not to dissolve the Osttruppen zm toto; all ‘reliable’ units were to be transferred away from Soviet partisans and propaganda to France, the Lowlands, Italy, and the Balkans, where they would be used to fight the local underground; the ‘unreliable’ formations were to be promptly disbanded on the spot. As Zeitzler wired the army groups on October 19: The Osttruppen are becoming more and more unreliable. . . . It is better to have no security units in the rear areas than to have unreliable elements who in a crisis desert to the partisans together with their weapons. Unreliable indigenous battalions must be dissolved in the shortest possible time. . . . Independently, the exchange of reliable formations for German security battalions will continue. . . .3

Berlin was aware of the devastating effect which the transfer of the battalions was bound to have on the fighting spirit of the Eastern ' Interviews G-1, G-Ig. 2 There was widespread agreement, however, on the need to tighten discipline among the military collaborators. An order issued by Kostring’s office over Keitel’s signature provided for summary court-martial and severe punishment, including

immediate death sentence, in all cases of attempted desertion or subversion. (OKH/GenStdH/Gen.d.Osttr., “Verfigung’, September 26, 1943, 75131/94*, RO eitzler to Kiichler, October 19, 1943, cited in Blackstock, op. cit. ch. vi, p. 44. Zeitzler at one time in the crisis agreed to transfer 60 per cent of Osttruppen

to forced labour; actually some 5000 ‘unreliables’ were shifted. (K6string, Jetter to author, November 26, 1950.)

CH XXVI Vlasov Movement: First Phase 583 troops. Indeed, former members of the ROA assert that there were instances of mutiny when they were ordered to France. For men whose sole rationale of defection and collaboration was anti-Soviet activity, it was bewildering to be ordered to fight the maquis. Precisely for this reason the Army tried to secure Vlasov’s explicit support for

the transfer. But tor him the shift was further proof of German failure to understand the Russian problem and support his aspirations. Zeitzler reportedly dismissed the whole matter by remarking,

‘Let them be happy they are getting out [of the East]’. Even K6string, who had a fair understanding of Russian psychology, supported the decision because the capture of Osttruppen by the Reds, he assumed, meant certain punishment if not death.! Yielding to pressure from above, Wehrmacht Propaganda composed an ‘open letter’ in Vlasov’s name, explaining to the Russian

battalions the ‘reasons’ for their transfer to the West. Evidently Jodl released the appeal before Vlasov’s consent was secured.

Whether or not Vlasov ever signed it remains uncertain. For him and his associates each new insult was a source of soul-searching

and recriminations. ‘The hiatus between the Germans’ and the Russians’ aspirations was increasingly apparent.* Jodl, however,

was content with his little trick. In a speech in November he declared :

The use of foreign peoples as soldiers must be regarded with the greatest scepticism. ‘There was a time when something approaching a psychosis radiated from the Eastern front under the slogan, ‘Russia can be beaten only by Russians’. In many heads there was the ghostly idea of a giant Vlasov army. We then established over 160 battalions. Experiences were good so long as we were victoriously advancing. They became bad when the situation changed and we were compelled to retreat. Today ! Interviews G-1, G-19 ; Thorwald, op. cit. pp. 283-300. At the same time, in an effort to raise the morale of the non-Russian Osttruppen, it was decided to

step-up the formation of indigenous military liaison staffs with the ‘national committees’ which had been established under Rosenberg’s wing (see also p. 609 below), and to raise the morale of the Cossacks by issuing a special proclamation to them (see p. 301 above). ([Mende,] conference protocol, September 30, 1943,

EAP g9/471*, CRS. The conference included representatives of OMi, WPr, RSHA, and WESt.)

2 Thorwald, op. cit. pp. 300-9; Viacheslav Artem’ev, ‘History of General Vlasov’s Army’, MS*, p. 4. According to a person who claimed to have been an eye-witness, Vlasov insisted on the insertion of the phrase, ‘by order of the German

High Command’, in the text. (Bor’ba [Munich], November 1948, pp. 21-2; Chavchavadze, op. cit. p. 72. For text of the open letter, see Parizhski Vestnik [Paris], no. 76 [November 27, 1943].) The evidence concerning Vlasov’s withholding of consent is not sufficiently clear-cut, however, to disprove the suspicion

that the entire episode may have been apocryphal only. Grote, for one, cannot recall the details. (N. von Grote, ‘Einsatz der Ostverbinde im Westen’, MS*, IfZ.)

584 Political Warfare PT. IV there are only about roo Eastern battalions in existence, and almost none of them is in the East.!

Henceforth the Osttruppen were reduced to the status of mercenaries fighting for an alien cause against an enemy they did not know and

had no reason to hate. It was anything but an Army of Liberation. All endeavours to reopen the Vlasov issue were in vain. What could be said had been stated and restated with sickening reiteration. Wehrmacht Propaganda had lost faith. Canaris’ Abwehr was itself on the verge of being absorbed by the 5S. ‘The Foreign Office was still barred from Eastern affairs. The military government officials

had neither power nor channels to make themselves heard. The Ostministerium was isolated and organically incapable of taking the

initiative. Now that all was lost, Rosenberg sent memoranda to Keitel complaining of the Army’s excessive preoccupation with the

Great Russians; and his subordinates toyed with their céterie of fictitious national ‘leaders’ and ‘committees’.2, Only some of the more perceptive men in the Ministry continued to argue for a new political offensive. In another survey of the situation Brautigam reiterated the same familiar recommendations, such as a declaration

about the fate of Russia. ‘What the mass of the people wants to know is not details but above all that we do not consider the country

a colony and the population merely objects of exploitation.’ The summer and autumn of 1943 passed without the German offensive in the East that had previously restored the balance. ‘So much the more must politics and propaganda endeavour to shatter the enemy’s psyche by other means.’3 But all this was nothing but a pious hope and offered no new approach.

With the original sponsors of political warfare prostrate, it is 1 [Jodl,] ‘Vortrag des Chefs WFSt. General Jodl am 7.11.43 in Miinchen’, Document 172-L, TMWC, xxxvil, 663. 2 Rosenberg to Keitel, July 17, 1943* ; Berger to Himmler, July 27, 1943,

Himmler file 67*. Rosenberg saw Hitler once more — for the last time — in November 1943, but, as one of his aides, Walter Labs, stated in retrospect a year later :

To my personal regret, the Ostministerium missed a really suitable opportunity to further such ideas [of political warfare] when Reich Minister Rosenberg saw the Fiihrer in November 1943, and failed to present the ideas concerning

the granting of autonomy to Estonia and Latvia. Had the Ministry taken this step and embarked on a constructive policy in Belorussia, which would necessarily have spread to the Ukraine and other occupied areas, German policy would unquestionably have followed a different course and the Ostministerium would today be in a different position. (Document NO-3125*.) On the national committees, see below, pp. 609-11. 3 Brautigam, ‘Aufzeichnung’, August 15, 1943, Document 295-PS*.

CH. XXVI Vlasov Movement: First Phase 585 symptomatic that the only figures on the Vlasov stage in the winter of 1943-4 were ‘outsiders’ — individual Nazis and non-Nazis. The ‘converted’ Dwinger and the ‘unreconstructed’ Wirsing submitted plans for new political experiments. Melitta Wiedemann, a Russian-

born journalist and editor of the Anti-Komintern journal, Die Aktion, incurred the hostility of more sedate organs by enthusiastic-

ally seeking to promote the cause of the Vlasov movement by unconventional visits upon Nazi dignitaries and by arranging dinner

parties at which ROA generals were introduced to SS._brass.! Surprisingly, as staunch a Nazi as Baldur von Schirach, leader of

the Hitlerjugend, shifted his view. In July 1943, soon after the Hitler ban, he received Vlasov and wrote Hitler urging ‘far-reaching political utilization’ of him.2, Likewise, Gtinther Kaufmann, editor of the HJ’s magazine, Wille und Macht — militantly ‘pan-Nazi’,

anti-Western, and anti-Semitic — after an initial enthusiasm for ‘colonizing’, joined the advocates of political warfare in the East.

In September 1942 he had pressed a ban on the Untermensch brochure ; a memorandum he submitted to the Propaganda Ministry recommended appealing to Russian national and peasant aspirations. In 1943 his magazine published not only Vlasov’s open letter but also an article by Dwinger positing as the best warrant of victory ‘the capture of the Russians’ genuine sympathies, making at least those in the occupied areas into Europeans’ — a piece that netted Dwinger a personal reprimand from Berger and Kaltenbrunner’s wrath.3

All such efforts may have contributed a little to the mobilization

of public opinion.* ‘They did nothing to change German policy. 1 Interviews G-3, G-23, G-24. 2 Martin to Berger, July 30, 1943* ; Buchardt, p. 219. 3 Edwin Erich Dwinger, ‘ Der russische Mensch — Der Weg zur Uberwindung

des Bolschewismus’, Wille und Macht (Berlin), xi, no. 4 (April-June 1943), 14-16; Kielpinski to Brandt, September 14, 1943, Himmler file 286* ; Dwinger,

‘Was muss im Augenblick geschehen, um Stalins System zu stiirzen’*, n.d. [summer 1943]. On Kaufmann, see also Karl Michel, Ost und West (Ziirich : Thomas, 1947). Overtones of ‘friendship’ with the Eastern troops and peoples freed from Communism were also apparent in Junges Europa, ‘organ of the academic youth’. (See Tedor Nedkoff, ‘Der Freiheitskampf der Kaukasier’, Funges Europa [Berlin], 1943, no. 1-2, pp. 42-4; and Oberst Blau, ‘Die grosse Kameradschaft : Europas Soldaten im Osten’, ibid. no. 3, pp. 25-6.) See also Thorwald, op. cit. pp. 259-66.

4 A final effort came from an unexpected quarter. Vidkun Quisling, who considered himself something of an expert on Russia, after intervening with Goebbels in 1943, submitted a 29-page report to Hitler in early 1944, which contained these theses : Russia cannot be held without the support of the population; hence like Wang Ching-wei ‘one must form a national counter-government’ : the Dnieper would form the historic Eastern border of Europe, with everything to

the west of it subject to Germanization ; to the east, a number of autonomous

586 Political Warfare pT. Vv The impasse was complete. The entire range of men and means that had produced the struggle for and against political approaches was exhausted. Of the foci of power in the Reich, one after another had been eliminated from the scene. There remained but one giant, steadily growing: the SS. national states under German tutelage would be fashioned. (Quisling, ‘Denkschrift uber die russische Frage’, February 2, 1944, EAP 161b-12/150*, CRS.)

CHAPTER XXVII

THE SS: FROM DREAD TO DESPAIR Viasov . .. this butcher apprentice [is] a dangerous Bolshevik.—HIMMLER, October 1943

I wish you full success 1n the interest of our common cause.— HIMMLER to VLASOv, November 1944

Germany at the Crossroads THE drama that had begun with the victorious advance in June 1941

had turned against its authors. The military reverses set off a chain reaction inside Germany which resulted in the. increased concentra-

tion of power in the hands of the Party and the 5S; and in the proclamation of ‘total war’ as a last-ditch effort to overcome the severe shortages of men and matériel. By 1943 the long duel between Hitler and the military leadership

was over. ‘The political dogmatists and military amateurs had defeated the professionals. Henceforth the Fiithrer had no one but himself to blame for the continuing defeats. Apparently unable to grasp the objective difficulties of the situation, he insisted on holding

on to every square foot of Soviet soil. Meanwhile the Western Allies had stepped up their operations — strategic bombing of the Reich, the defeat of the Afrikakorps, then the invasion of Italy. The

Duce was ousted, and a new Italian regime made peace with the West. All over Europe, underground and resistance movements were trying the nerves of the jittery Wehrmacht. In the spring of 1943 Hitler once again ordered a major offensive

in the East. After months of delay, the German troops made a brief advance which was rapidly spent, and the Soviet armies promptly

counter-attacked. Orel, Khar’kov, Smolensk, and the Donets Basin were soon in Soviet hands again. Even the winter did not halt the

advancing Red Army; Kiev, Zhitomir, Dnepropetrovsk were abandoned by the Germans as 1943 drew toaclose. Hitler frantically reshuffled army corps and field-marshals, but to no avail.

While every last reserve was being marshalled, war weariness and doubt increasingly crept over German officialdom. This period

saw an upsurge of two distinct but causally related phenomena within the Reich: the anti-Hitler movement and the advocacy of separate peace. Neither group was homogeneous or clear-cut. The resistance included anti-Nazis of long standing as well as bitter 587

588 Political Warfare PT. 1V fanatics of yester-year who now blamed Hitler for losing the war. The proponents of separate peace were to be found at the apex of the Nazi pyramid, and among those who opposed the regime. Both groups continued to attract more and more adherents as the war ground on.!

In the field, all semblance of ‘policy’ was abandoned as the retreating troops burned, ransacked, and frequently ran amok with or without the blessings of their superiors.2, Now that there was nothing to gain in the East, all inhibitions vanished. ‘The ruthless effort to halt the Red Army by any means included a last-minute mobilization and evacuation of local manpower, especially of ablebodied youths. A ‘youth movement’ had been established in Belorussia in 1943

as a token concession to indigenous demands for organized selfexpression. Under the direction of a Hitlerjugend officer, Siegfried Nickel, it energetically recruited volunteers from among the local 1 See also above, pp. 152, 546. Among top Nazi advocates of separate peace, Goebbels appears to have been the first and most determined, with Ribbentrop, too, on occasion wistfully recalling his pleasant trips to Moscow in 1939. Numerous

suggestions for peace negotiations came from Italy. Curiously, most such discussions within the Nazi edifice concerned peace with Russia. The anti-Hitler resistance was divided, with some military men (Beck) as well as civilians (Hassell,

Gisevius, Goerdeler) Western-oriented, but others seeking a modus vivendi or even a bloc with Moscow. Although the latter group may have been exaggerated in some post-war accounts, it did exist, thriving on a combination of geopolitical

and anti-democratic traditions as well as a reaction against the Western ‘unconditional surrender’ announcement and the formation of the ‘Free Germany Committee’ in Russia. On the other hand, the frequent assertion that Schulenburg was prepared personally to go to Moscow to negotiate can hardly be taken seriously until more weighty evidence is adduced. Likewise, the classification of Stauffen-

berg as ‘pro-Soviet’ appears to be unjustified. As Wheeler-Bennett also finds, however, ‘far from sympathizing with Communism or with an authoritarian Russia, von Stauffenberg was essentially an “‘Easterner’’ by orientation and before

him there shone in all its glistering enticement the vision of a Germany and a Russia liberated from despotism, free and united’ —- and presumably capable of jointly controlling the Continent. (John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis of Power {New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1953], pp. 613-19. See also above, p. 544; The Von Hassell Diaries [Garden City: Doubleday, 1947], pp. 309-10, 315-16, 321-2;

Gerhard Ritter, Carl Goerdeler (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954] ; The Goebbels Diaries [Garden City : Doubleday, 1947], pp. 436-7, 477-8 ; Robert M. W. Kempner, ‘Stalin’s Separate Peace in 1943’, United Nations World [New York], March 1950, pp. 7-10; Peter Kleist, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin [Bonn : Athendéum-Verlag, 1950], pp. 230-84; and Maxime Mourin, Les Tentatives de paix dans la seconde guerre mondiale (Paris: Payot, 1949].) Actual efforts at negotiations were made primarily in the summer of 1943. Subsequent feelers are discussed below, pp. 619-20.

2 See also above, pp. 60-1; Documents NO-1869*, NO-2545*, NOKW024*; Document Occ E 3a-8*, YIVO; and Major O. W. Miiller, ‘Monats-

bericht’, July 1944*. : ty o t + ‘ ‘ O ¢S “

Ps cc + oO » zm, @ c

Zz. f§ © me + )>.O OS 2 3s 0 +

:Ee 2 g= pt o° rs es 2) at 8 3 5 dé O > x he & 5 cz @ ox ° ° ‘ i °.. 5@ec © (x, e ra ,

ud f :

7x©) 6 ~< e < Z sy i > “Ni‘fx) -

E y, ” ~% a < “A 3° e008, oss eeoeeoose eeee 2 .

ce f i= ¢ a re) — x $ 2 : ; o Cc , ss a : ~(JD& ttt oe r ~~ ff @> 2 + ~ Sy xty De PT el or yy BS eo = ~© -—

a 3 ,£>g a

GIs & xa tte ne . *

%xoct. nt . z x *hu pd O CS : A ++*Q KRoO | O)of0°°*svs ® ex

c

PAS YE

592 Political Warfare PT. IV over the professional officers, diplomats, and non-Nazi civil servants. !

Invasion, retreat, and revolt were telescoped into a few short weeks. Before the end of July four facts had become plain: Allied victory was assured; Soviet soil was virtually rid of the invader ; the SS had triumphed in the crumbling Reich; and Ostpolittk had entered its final, post-mortem stage. Straws in the Whirlwind

By 1944 the Himmler empire had emerged as the most power-

ful block within the Reich. Police, Gestapo, Security Service, concentration camps, SS combat divisions, intelligence services, V-weapons, later the home army and prisoner-of-war camps, were one

after another gathered into the eager hands of the power-hungry Reichsfithrer-SS. Had it come to a showdown not even the cunning Bormann could have marshalled effective competition.

Throughout the war, the 5S had been the most determined proponent of extremism in the East. One may refer to Himmler’s opinion of the growing demand for political warfare, expressed privately to Schellenberg and Naumann, two close aides, as the eastward expansion reached its peak. The Russians must never be promised a national state. We would be issuing too many promissory notes [if we did], as certain circles of the Wehrmacht are doing, and some day they would have to be redeemed. Questions about the political future of their homeland can be answered — if Russians raise them — only to the effect that the leadership will quite surely mete out justice [Gerechtigkert widerfahren lassen wird] to the several

nations in the New Order of Europe ... that for the time being the Russian people is being freed from Bolshevism by the blood of the German 1 The widespread thesis according to which the plotters hoped to rally the Osttruppen to their side in the event that the coup of July 20 provoked civil war, must be discounted as not grounded in fact. It is true, as indicated earlier, that the ‘political warfare’ group overlapped considerably with the inner German

resistance. Herwarth, a friend of Stauffenberg’s, tipped off K6string a week

before July 20, but the old general replied, ‘We Germans don’t know how to make

revolutions’. According to a first-hand witness, ‘on July 20, 1944, no use of Eastern troops was contemplated. I recall considering the whole issue. But we decided that (1) this was a business which the Germans had to take care of them-

selves; (2) many of the Eastern troops were not sophisticated enough, nor

sufficiently anti-Hitler, to understand the sort of twist we had in mind. Had it succeeded, afterwards they would have understood, but they could not be used in the planning.’ An ex-official of WPr IV states that no use of Osttruppen was contemplated. However, a ‘bridge’ existed from WPr over Roenne and FreytagLoringhoven to Stauffenberg. A responsible SS officer states: ‘After the July 20 affair I asked the interrogating officers whether the Eastern question had been

involved. I was told that it had never come up.’ (Interviews G-1, G-3, G-4, G-6, G-19.)

CH. XXVII The SS: From Dread to Despair 593 soldier; moreover, that for the peasant even the present state of affairs is a substantial improvement over the past. . . .!

A year later, in October 1943, Himmler made two major addresses —on the 4th before a group of senior SS officers in Poznan, and on the 14th before another group of officers at Bad Schachen. Both speeches confirmed that, at least on the surface, he had not moved an inch.?

In the long run, he declared, the Easterners were ‘incapable of bringing about a further development of culture’. Individual leaders are exceptional phenomena ‘ caused by fortunate mixtures — unfortun-

ate for us Europeans, of course...’ In reality the Slav was ‘an uninhibited beast who can torture and inflict pain on other men in a

manner no devil could imagine’. Hence the iron reafhrmation of the Untermensch thesis: ‘We must swear off false comradeship, misunderstood charity, false softness and false excuses to ourselves’.

Obviously ‘in this war it is better for a Russian to die than a German’. Only in this respect had the 1941 thesis been amended under the pressure of events: the use of Russians on the German side was justified if they provided cannon fodder and labour for the Reich. As for their work conditions, How the Russians or the Czechs are doing is a matter of total indiffer-

ence to me. . . . Whether these peoples live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our Kultur. Whether 10,000 Russian females drop dead from exhaustion while digging

an anti-tank ditch interests me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch 1s finished for Germany.

Nor had his view of the future changed since the beginning of the war :

At the end of the war . .. we shall be the only decisive power in Europe . . . and will push the borders of Germanism eastwards by 500 kilometres.

It was the Vlasov movement that particularly attracted Himmler’s

attention — curiously so at a moment when it seemed dead and buried.

Great hopes were placed in this General Vlasov [Himmler remarked].

The hope was not so well founded as some people have assumed... . Herr Vlasov — and this surprised me no end — engaged in propaganda 1 Himmler, memorandum, November 18, 1942, Himmler file 62*. 2 The following excerpts are from [Himmler,] ‘Rede des Reichsfiihrers-SS bei der SS-Gruppenfihrertagung in Posen am 4. Oktober 1943’, Document 1919-PS,

TMWC, xxix, 110-73; and Himmler, Sicherhettsfragen ([Berlin :] OKW NSFiihrungsstab, 1944), reprinted as Document 070-L, TMWC, xxxvii, 498-523.

594 Political Warfare PT. IV and in simply grotesque form lectured us Germans. . . . Herr Vlasov began to tell us stories, with his Russian superciliousness. He said: ‘Germany has never yet been able to defeat Russia. Russia can be beaten

only by Russians.’ You see, gentlemen, this sentence constitutes a mortal danger to a people and an army.

Himmler had nothing but scorn and ridicule for the ‘politicals’ : They would establish an army of liberation under General Vlasov ...: Give this Vlasov 500,000 or 1,000,000 Russians, they say, arm them well, give them German-style training, and then this Vlasov fellow will be so kind as to take off against the Russians and kill them for us!

Such an attitude was ‘dangerous’ for German honour and German morale. In illustration Himmler cited a specific example of how Vlasov had lectured in the presence of German officers. At his feet sat amazed members of the German leadership, their jaws wide open, their noses dropping into their mouths, astounded by what such a Bolshevik could do. . . . This is what Herr Vlasov said: ‘It’s a shame the way the Germans treat the Russian people. We Russians had abolished whipping decades ago. (Sure, they abolished it. Instead they shoot them. . . .) You Germans reintroduced whipping — how dirty, how barbarian!’ The entire audience 1s ashamed. A few minutes later, the man tells how national-minded the Russians are — you must appeal to this national soul. . . . Nobody protests.

Obviously Himmler had no use for these aspects of the ‘Vlasov merry-go-round’. Yet he would have allowed the Vlasov enterprise to function purely for propaganda purposes. I would have no objection to putting Herr Vlasov, like any other Slavic subject wearing a Russian general’s uniform, to work with us in

order to make propaganda against the Russians. . . . [But] instead of conducting clever propaganda aimed at demoralizing the Russian army, this propaganda has turned partly against us and has weakened the ability and will to resist in our own ranks through a series of errors and misconceptions.

Himmler had in effect retained his basic Untermensch outlook, tempered by willingness to utilize collaborators as ‘devices’, never as trusted partners. He followed close in the Fiihrer’s footsteps,

and at least formally his chief aides — Berger, Kaltenbrunner, Schellenberg, Ohlendorf — shared his view. Yet, in 1944, the SS executed a policy switch as unexpected as it was incredible. Its causes were many and complex.

There is no evidence that the old Initiativgruppe around Wehrmacht Propaganda — the promoters of the first Vlasov enterprise in

CH. XXVII The SS : From Dread to Despair 595 1942-3 — consciously examined all possible channels of action and found the SS to be the only one yet untried. On the contrary, StrikStrikfeldt was a bitter enemy of the SS; Gehlen and Wagner were its active opponents ; indeed, Grote states, ‘the shift of the WlassowAktion from WPr IV to the SS was not planned by us and was not

thought through in advance’.'. Nevertheless, there did emerge a small circle of ‘Vlasov fans’ within the SS structure. Even the SD — Himmler’s Security Service — included individual officers whose views on Russia were in no way compatible with the official line. A few such officers began discussing Ostpolitik informally. Over a dinner or a glass of beer at a Wannsee Stammtisch they would cautiously explore the prospects of new ‘political’ action. None of them played a policy-making role, but backstage they were able to exert a telling pressure.”

For most of the men in this small circle the purpose of the operation was exclusively to help the Reich. ‘Only one or two had visions of an autonomous Russian movement working for the sake of a better future. The SS equivalent of the Free Russia group — a quantité négligeable, considering its vast staff — realized only too well

that, given the previous failures, the political purpose of the entire

project must be concealed. None of the other power centres in Berlin could be relied upon for support. Within the SS itself, Himmler had just reaffirmed the official line. The powerful Gestapo

was unalterably opposed to all ‘Russian experiments’. Goaded on by its monarchist émigré agents, it had once and for all declared Vlasov and his movement to be taboo and crypto-Communist. Moreover, it claimed to have evidence of increasing anti-German sentiments among prisoners and Ostarbeiter in the Reich. Giving Vlasov a freer hand, the Gestapo claimed, would only augment their

demands for changes. Finally, it suspected some of the Russians around Vlasov of seeking contacts with the British.3

Concern for the loyalty of the millions of Soviet citizens in the Reich was a double-edged sword. If the Gestapo argued that their potential disaffection made hazardous the sponsorship of any political movement with which they might be identified, it was also possible to insist that a pro-German ‘liberation movement’ (or even a fictitious

one) would, on the contrary, anchor the allegiance of prisoners and

labourers. Indeed, in the course of time this proved to be one ' Grote, letter to author, December 19, 1953. 2 Most of them were Baltic Germans. Like the other two conflicting schools of ‘Russia experts’ — Rosenberg and Leibbrandt in one camp, and Hilger and K6string in the other — these were men who had spent their youth in Russian schools amidst Russian culture. 3 Interviews G-3, H-433 ; Buchardt, pp. 232-41.

596 Political Warfare PT. IV consideration which swayed the SS leadership to change its course.

The SS ‘politicals’, aware of the Gestapo’s hostility, decided to work through their own contacts in the SS and SD. Ultimately they themselves did not play a decisive role; they did, however, help to crystallize opinion and influence others behind the scene.!

There were other hints of the coming 5S policy change. The tactics of the new SS Generalkommissar for Belorussia, von Gottberg, 1n supporting the extreme Belorussian nationalists spelled

acceptance of a political orientation, whatever its rationale and effect.2, Individual SS officers assigned to other ministries — like Peter Kleist, Ministerialrat in the OMi — had for some time advocated the use of political devices in order to win popular support in

the East. Dispersed and insignificant against the background of Einsatzgruppen and Untermensch brochures, concentration camps and terror raids, they none the less managed to gain converts. 5o,

in spite of their setbacks, did journalists cognate to the SS like Dwinger. Moreover, some younger officers in the 5S Hauptamt had adopted the idea of an all-European SS and pursued it to the point of ‘accepting’ the Russians as prospective members. Other SS officials, it will be seen, were known proponents of the Rosenberg

line; so were some of the SS and SD officers in Galicia.3 Yet, in perfect analogy to the situation in the Army, the most powerful factor in the change of SS tactics was neither insight nor persuasion,

but tangible evidence of help in the war: the establishment of Eastern units by the Waffen SS. The Eastern Waffen SS

In the course of the war the Waffen SS — the military arm of Himmler’s octopus — expanded from a mere handful of armed units to 12 divisions in 1943 and nearly 30 at the end of 1944. Because of the crippling manpower shortage, it was obliged to lower its original

standards of ‘purity’ designed to make it the élite of the German armed forces. From 1942 on, with Himmler’s full approval, it established Flemish, Danish, Dutch, and other “Germanic’ units; shortly thereafter such ‘non-Germanic’ groups as the Wallonians were permitted to don SS uniforms. Step by step, regulations were loosened, until at the end of the war the SS had on its roster Latvian, Ukrainian, Cossack, Uzbek, Estonian, Belorussian, Polish, Bosnian, Arab, and Indian units. The snobbery of ‘purity’ yielded to a thirst 1 Interviews G-8, G-22. See also below, pp. 603, 615. 2 See above, Chapter XI.

3 Interviews G-8, G-g, G-21, G-24; Jiirgen Thorwald, Wen sie verderben wollen (Stuttgart : Steingriiben-Vrelag, 1952), p. 329.

CH. XXVII The SS: From Dread to Despair 597 for manpower arising from a sense of competition with the weakening Wehrmacht and a quest for authority within the Nazi élite.! The Baltic peoples were the first in the East to be involved in this expansion. While Lithuania was largely written off as a racially inferior hotbed of discontent, Latvia and Estonia provided an untapped source of troops. When the proposal was submitted to him

in May 1942, Himmler winced: ‘The formation of SS units consisting of Estonians, Latvians, or even Lithuanians is surely enticing; however, it [is fraught with] very great dangers’. Yet a

few months later the recruitment of Latvian and Estonian ‘volunteer brigades’ was begun, and in 1943 they were transformed into fullfledged SS brigades and divisions with a total of over 30,000 men.

In return, the SS promoted important indigenous collaborators ; Rudolf Bangerskis, formerly divisional commander under Kolchak

in Siberia and Latvian War Minister in 1927, became Gruppenfiihrer, lieutenant-general of the Waffen SS, and Inspector-General

of the Latvian SS.3. It was this need for Baltic manpower that moved the 5S to embark on its first overtly ‘political’ step in the East: Himmler’s support of the drive for Latvian and Estonian

autonomy in the latter part of 1943.4 Here was an important precedent for the subsequent retreat of the SS from its Untermensch tactics: military collaboration engendered a slight political mellowing. L’appetit vient en mangeant. Next came Ukrainian SS formations.

Here things were more complicated in that German policy, particularly as administered by Erich Koch, frustrated all efforts to establish 1 In addition, both Amt IV (the Gestapo) and Amt VI (the foreign intelligence service) of the RSHA (Reich Main Security Office) employed Eastern personnel. Amt VI in particular handled the subversive Zeppelin operations behind Soviet lines. For a highly one-sided account of the Waffen SS, see Paul Hausser, Die Waffen-SS 1m Einsatz (Gottingen : Plesse-Verlag, 1953). 2 Himmler to SS-Sturmbannfihrer With [n.d., reply to memorandum of May 21, 1942], Himmler file 26*. 3 Hitler gave Himmler a free hand to deal with this matter. (See also ‘Besprechung des Fuhrers’, June 8, 1943, Document 1384-PS, YFournal of Modern History [Chicago], xxi, no. 1 [March 1951], 69.) On the recruitment and activities

of the units, see Documents NO-4995*, NO-4630*, NO-2271*, NO-2757*, NO-5800*, NO-1855* ; and {[Himmler,] ‘Auszug aus der Rede des ReichsfiihrersSS vor dem Fihrerkorps der estnischen SS-Freiwilligen-Brigade’, September 28, 1943, Document 1919-PS*. 4 See above, pp. 195-6. A subsidiary development that tended to establish an atmosphere congenial to further concessions along similar lines was the role of the

SS in the training of indigenous auxiliary police and in the command of antipartisan units in occupied Russia. See, for instance, Leibbrandt to Berger, March

24, 1943, Document NO-1817, and their agreement on the indoctrination of

Schutzmannschaften, March 15, 1943, Document NO-1818, NMT, xiii, 288-90 ;

RuSHA, SS-Fuhrer Russland-Siid, ‘Arbeitsbericht fiir die Zeit vom 1.-1§.

Oktober 1942’, October 25, 1942, Document NO-3224*.

598 Political Warfare PT. IV a Ukrainian armed force under that name, and by 1943 the Ukrainian

nationalist partisans in the RKU were largely aligned against the Germans. It was something of a fortuitous coincidence that in the other German-controlled area of the Ukraine — Galicia — which had even earlier been the stronghold of pro-German and nationalist sentiments, the governor, SS Brigadefiihrer Otto Wachter, as well as a number of other SS officials on his staff, espoused something close to the Rosenberg position. At the same time, the collaborating

Ukrainian committee in Cracow, under Professor Volodymyr Kubiovych, established a ‘military section’ which sought to influence the authorities in favour of establishing a Ukrainian legion or corps to fight on the German side. By late 1942 the idea of a Galician SS

unit was gaining support, and a few months later it became a reality.

In March 1943 Gottlob Berger, with Mende’s and Kinkelin’s support at the Ostministerium, secured Himmler’s approval for Wachter’s plan to recruit 3500 Ukrainians for what was initially called ‘Police Regiment Galicia’.'. At the end of April, the recruitment drive was solemnly opened in L’vov; a proclamation hailed the participation of the Galicians in the war effort. Renamed SS Division Galicia (technically the 14th Volunteer Infantry Division of the Waffen SS), it attracted many recruits; almost 100,000 men volunteered, fewer than 30,000 of whom were accepted. Himmler, apparently impressed, agreed to grant the division the same equipment and arms as German troops. The Latvian and Estonian SS men were deemed ‘Germanizable’

in time; the Slavic Galicians were not. What, then, led to the creation of the Galician SS? Berlin’s approval was due in part to persuasion by SS and SD personnel in L’vov and to the backing of

Rosenberg’s subordinates. A more material argument was the shortage of Germanic SS replacements; if the barriers had to be lowered further, Galicia could claim special status: here was an area which under Habsburg rule had supplied the Central Powers ' Berger to Brandt, March 20, 1943, Document NO-3172* ; Brody : Zbirnyk stattet 1 narysiv (Munich: Bratstvo kol. 1 Pershoi UD, 1951), pp. 25-9 ; John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945 (New York : Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 168-72. 2 Walter Miiller, ‘Ukrainische Freiwillige marschieren’, VB-B, May 30, 1943; German radio, April 29, 1943, cited in News Digest (London, 1943) ; interview G-22; Berger to Himmler, June 3, 1943, Himmler file 263*. Koch continued to oppose the division, claiming that most of its men were deserting to the partisans —a fact angrily denied by the Ostministerium. (Brandenburg, memorandum,

September 16, 1943, Document NO-3469*.) For a detailed examination of Wachter’s and Himmler’s attitudes towards the formation ot the division, see Basil Dmytryshyn, ‘The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division ‘‘ Galicia”’’, American Slavic and East European Review (New York), xv, no. 1 (February 1956), I-10,

CH. XXVIE The SS: From Dread to Despair 599 with troops during World War I. Himmler forbade calling the Galician Division ‘Ukrainian’.' And Bormann used the same argument to support his own negativism :

If the success of the SS recruiting campaign among the Galician Ruthenians [sic] is given as proof of the possibility of political cooperation, he [Bormann] can only state that what is involved is the former Austrian Galicia, whose attitude has nothing in common with that in the Russian Ukraine.?

Himmler intended no political concessions in permitting the establishment of the Galician SS. It remained under German control, even though a Ukrainian officer, Dmytro Paliiv, was given colonel’s rank and made divisional inspector. Only in the spring of 1944, when the first signs of a general reorientation of the 5S were at hand, did Himmler remark that if the division showed its worth in combat, the issue of political rights could be raised in recognition

of its loyalty. Yet even such an offer, gratuitous and nebulous, marked a new departure. Indeed, as early as June 1943 officers in Riga cited the precedent of SS Division Galicia in urging Berlin to establish a Belorussian legion.3

Paradoxically the establishment of Ukrainian SS units imbued with distinctly anti-Russian sentiments proved to be a steppingstone towards the SS’s reassessment of the Vlasov movement, which the Galician separatists considered their bitterest foe in the emigration. So was the transfer to the SS of the Cossack formations under

Lieutenant-General von Pannwitz in their commander’s obvious effort to capitalize on the growing power of the $5.4 The importance

of this shift lay in the willingness of the 55 to absorb and sponsor Slavic military units — something that could not have happened in

1941-2. Step by step the barricades were cleared as the Russian Kaminskit Brigade, a Belorussian 55S division, and, later, another 1 Himmler, memorandum, July 14, 1943, Himmler file 263%. 2 Hewel, notes in Etzdorf, ‘Aufzeichnungen’, Document NG-3288*. 3 Interviews G-6, G-9, G-22. In July 1944 the Galician SS was thrown into action at Brody, in the Western Ukraine, in a desperate German effort to stem the Soviet advance. The division

was decimated ; of those who managed to break out of the encirclement some rejoined the German lines and formed the core of a new Ukrainian SS infantry brigade, and the rest joined the separatist partisans, who had viewed the formation of the Galician SS with ambivalence. In strictly military terms, the contribution of the 14th SS was trifling. On the battle of Brody, see the book by that name, cited above. See also Gottlob Berger, interrogation, October 15, 1947*, NA; and Fritz Arlt, ‘Die Entwicklung der politischen Vertretung der Volker des Ostens’, MS*, appendix. 4 On the Cossacks, see p. 539 above. ‘The shift by Pannwitz was due partly to the better equipment and arms the SS could provide.

600 Political Warfare pro iv Russian unit were absorbed into the SS.!- ‘The Watfen SS was no longer a volunteer formation nor a German Elite. Most symptomatic of the lowered admission requirements of the SS was the acceptance of Soviet Moslems and Turkic troops. Along with its promotion of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the drafting of Bosnian Moslems, there came the formation of an ‘East Turkic 5S’ — a step that involved toleration of a novel political outlook in 5S circles. Intelligence considerations and the promise of operations in the Soviet Moslem areas contributed to its acceptance.2 Another element was Himmler’s own attitude, which once again paralleled

Hitler’s. As the Reichsftihrer put it shortly after Hitler had expressed his trust in the Soviet Turkics and a modicum of autonomy had been given to the Caucasus Mountaineers, . . . as for political goals and propaganda, we must never swallow the idea of this Russian general [Vlasov], for if we did, we would be creating a new Russian nation, organized with our own help. What we can offer, however, is independence for the Caucasus republics and Mountaineers ;

a very good statute for the Cossack states on the fringes of our future territory ; and, most importantly in my eyes, the establishment of a free Siberian peasant state. . . .3

Here were overtones of Himmler’s visions of the future ‘mobile frontier’ and military settlements ; of Cossack dreams of expansion ; and implicit recognition that the Caucasus somehow rated a better, less discriminatory fate.

The principle of ‘Aryan’ membership in the SS was dropped when, towards the end of 1943, the project of a ‘Turkic-Moslem Division was broached seriously. Amt VI, it seems, had argued for some time that such a unit could be of distinct intelligence interest,

but it had had no means to push the proposal. Now, with the Osttruppen withdrawn from the East, largely because of the SS’s own intervention, it dawned on some people in the RSHA and SSHA that the Wehrmacht had handled the Soviet Moslems ‘very ineptly’ and had let their devotion decline. The solution advocated was an SS-controlled division of Soviet ‘Turkic prisoners, including

the 450th Turkic Battalion, commanded by the old China hand, Meyer-Mader. Mader, it is true, became lost in the intra-55S feuds t See also below, p. 641 ; and Liibbe to Mende, January 9, 1945, Document NO-2586*. 2 Interviews G-6, H-106. 3 Himmler to von dem Bach-Zelewski, n.d. (received by Bach on January 6, 1943), EAP 161b-12/355*, CRS.

CH. XXVII The SS: From Dread to Despair bo! and by February 1944 had to defend himself against charges of wilfully torpedoing the project.' Yet the idea of the Turkic SS force remained alive.

By May 1944 Himmler agreed to an expansion of the Turkic regiment which was then operating as an anti-partisan unit in Belorussia.2_ In mid-July, referring to Hitler’s permission to have the

SS recruit such prisoners as it needed for its own purposes, he, sanctioned the consolidation of all ‘East Turkic’ units — Turkestanis, Crimean and Volga ‘Tatars, Azerbayanis, and North Caucasians.3 ‘The official justification was simple : The East Turkics (Turko-Tatars) are the strongest non-Slavic minority in Soviet Russia. From time immemorial [sic] they have opposed Russian

and Bolshevik ideology for national, cultural, linguistic, and religious

reasons. . .. All Eastern Turkics whom the SS can recruit will be assembled in the East Turkic Corps. This will not be a tactical unit but only a political-propagandistic entity. It will never be employed as a whole; rather, its units, divided into regiments and battalions according to nationalities, will be allocated separately as needed.4

This was substantially similar to the earlier plans of the Army for the ROA and the Ostlegionen. Just as in the case of the Russians, again it proved impossible to establish military formations without opening the door to political demands. The peculiar aspect of the Ostttirkischer Waffenverband was its distinctly pan-'Turkic orientation. At a stage when it was grasping for more authority and manpower, the SS was willing to support a new concept, one which had at least the merit of being as yet untried

and — this was crucial because of its conflict with the Ostminis-

terlum — ran counter to the nationality policy pursued by Rosenberg and Mende. The main protagonist of pan-Turkism in the SS was Dr. Rainer

Olzscha, a physician whose interest in the East had been aroused by a professional investigation of epidemics and who later had co-edited a book on Turkestan. ‘The notion of intelligence teams 1 SSHA, Abt. I [HStuf. Hermann] to Berger, December 14, 1943, EAP 161c32-16*, CRS. See also above, p. 541. Meyer-Mader was killed in an anti-partisan operation in Western Belorussia in April 1944. 2 Himmler to Berger, May 2, 1944, Document NO-1894*. See also Document NO-3306*. 3 SSHA, Amtsgruppe D [Olzscha], ‘Vermerk’, August 2, 1944, EAP 161c32-16*, CRS. 4 Berger to Himmler, July 14, 1944, Document NO-1894*. The commander of this SS Osttiirkischer Waffenverband was an adventurous and erratic Austrian officer who had been converted to Islam and had adopted the name of Harun-elRashid. A former colonel of the Turkish General Staff, he had worked with Enver

Pasha ; during World War II he was liaison man between the RSHA and the Grand Mufti before being transferred to the Moslem command.

602 Political Warfare Pr. Iv operating deep in the enemy’s rear fascinated him and led him to endorse the plan of some Tatar refugees in Berlin for a united ‘Turko-

Tatar state ‘from Kazan’ to Samarkand’. Pan-'Turkism — an idea

revived particularly by a few members of the weakest Moslem nationalities who sought safety in numbers — was sold to the SS as a

new experiment that ‘could do no harm’ and would help rally a large and presumably reliable segment of the defectors.! This tactical shift can be explained in part as an anti-Rosenberg

move rather than a basic reorientation of the 55.2. There is no evidence that Himmler or even the officers who handled the Eastern

5S units had become converted to pan-Turkism. But there is another explanation. ‘The Ostministerium’s insistence on the separation of each ethnic group of the U.S.5S.R. into a distinct entity under German rule met with impatience on the part of other agencies.

To the SS officer, in particular, it was a confusing, difficult, and seemingly petty concept that required dealing with ‘hordes’ of bickering refugees speaking different tongues and each arguing a

different line. How much clearer and more appealing was a Grossraum-Konzeption as advanced by the geopoliticians — sweeping

plans that made one large chunk of the small atomized remnants of the Soviet Union! ‘To make things more palatable, the contemplated

‘Turko-Tatar’ territory lay outside the area immediately coveted

by the Reich. For the moment, the support of such a scheme involved no commitments. Viewed in this light, the Moslem experi-

ment was even compatible with a simultaneous shift towards an equally insincere support of the other Grossraum-Konzeption: the Vlasov movement; it too opposed the atomization of the Soviet

Union; it too lined up Himmler on the side of Rosenberg’s opponents.

The SS had evolved to the point of forfeiting its dogma. One refugee leader recalls a conversation with Olzscha in 1944, which might stand as the epitaph of the reorientation : I asked him: ‘Why did it take you so long to get wise ?’ He replied: ‘We have proved to be weaker than we thought.’ 3 The Secret Weapon

Himmler’s speeches in October 1943 revealed his preoccupation with the Vlasov question; at times he sounded as if he were trying ! On pan-Turkism, see above, p. 232; Rainer Olzscha and Georg Cleinow, Turkestan (Leipzig: Kohler und Amelung, 1942); Mende, ‘Besprechung mit Dr. Olzscha’, September 18, 1944, EAP 99/1100*, CRS. 2 Interviews G-30, H-106, H-122, H-533. 3 Interview H-106.

CH. XXVII The SS : From Dread to Despair 603 to persuade himself. Little incidents in the following months made his close associates wonder whether the Reichsftihrer was not after all questioning some of the premises of German policy and weighing alternative tactics.

A few fortuitous occurrences facilitated the opening of a new offensive by the ‘politicals’. In the early spring of 1944 Himmler asked the SD to prepare a report with recommendations on German

policy in the event of Stalin’s death. The pro-Vlasov grouping helped write the memorandum, which (according to one of its authors) showed that the present German Ostpolitik scarcely offered any opportunity to draw from such a contingency political advantages for the benefit and relief of military operations, unless a fundamental change of the present attitude towards political warfare were decided upon.

At the same time, Himmler asked the SD to assign to his headquarters an officer trained in the Russian language and in Soviet affairs. ‘This man turned out to be Waldemar von Radetzky, a Baltic German who was temporarily assigned to Amt VI and a friend of Obersturmbannfiihrer Friedrich Buchardt, who handled émigré affairs in Amt III and was a strong advocate of the Vlasov movement. Through Radetzky it proved possible to feed Himmler various reports aimed at disposing him more favourably towards Vlasov. !

The ground was thus prepared for the appearance of the engineer

of the new SS policy, Gunter d’Alquen. The son of a Rhenish merchant and a ‘self-made’ intellectual, he was editor of the SS weekly, Das Schwarze Korps, a paper known for its Nazi fanaticism,

but also for its occasional lack of orthodoxy. During the war d’Alquen headed an SS unit of war correspondents which repeatedly

earned Himmler’s praises. His experience in the East gradually 1 One such report summarized interrogations of Soviet prisoners, purporting to show Soviet concern over the effect of Vlasov leaflets to the Red Army; the idea was to demonstrate that Moscow deemed Vlasov dangerous. Other reports stressed the high performance of forced labourers or Eastern anti-partisan units. Finally, one of Radetzky’s longer memoranda to Himmler made these four points : (1) high morale and loyalty among the Eastern Waffen SS, Osttruppen, and Hiwis could be maintained only if they were given more positive assurances about the future ; (2) German efforts to undermine Soviet fighting morale could be effective only if a political programme was made credible ; (3) the same was needed to insure high productivity of the Ostarbeiter ; (4) unless a clear political programme was Offered, the millions of Soviet prisoners and workers in the Reich could easily succumb to discontent and disorder. (Interview G-3 ; Buchardt, letter to author, January 2, 1954.) Radetzky received a twenty-year sentence at Nuremberg, largely for participation in the Einsatzgruppen, but was paroled in 1951. (See also Francois Bayle, Psychologie et éthique du national-socialisme [Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1953], pp. 155-60 ; and NMT,, 1v, 573-8.)

604 Political Warfare PT. Iv prepared d’Alquen for a reassessment, if not of values, so at least of tactics. At first, however, Himmler tensed whenever he was approached by the Standartenfiihrer in this regard. I forbid once and for all [he wrote d’Alquen in mid-1943] that the SS go along in any way whatsoever with the plans of this Bolshevik, Vlasov,

staged by the Wehrmacht and clearly turned down by the Fiihrer. The Fiihrer has permitted the Wehrmacht to make propaganda with it [the Vlasov movement]. Unfortunately, however, we in Germany cannot keep propaganda apart from our own convictions. I therefore forbid this dangerous playing with fire.!

Meanwhile d’Alquen’s gradual conversion to the political war-

fare camp continued, and in 1944 it was his intervention with Himmler that brought about the revival of the Vlasov game by the 55.2

The opportunity for a change of tactics was provided by an analysis of the decreasing rate of desertion from the Red Army. The evidence of the decline, neatly summarized by WPr IV, was submitted to Himmler in late April 1944. During the first year of the

war, no statistics had been kept to distinguish voluntary deserters from other captives. In the second half of 1942 alone, voluntary desertion brought over 61,000 Red Army soldiers to the German lines. However, in all of 1943 there were only 29,000 deserters (and of these some 13,000 came in July and August under ‘Operation Silberstreif’). In the first three months of 1944 the number dropped to a mere 2200.3 It was specifically to encourage desertion that a new SS operation, with the code-name of Skorpion, was to be launched under d’Alquen’s direction. It had only the Red Army as its target ;

no promises were to be made to Russians already under German

rule. However, after some argument back and forth Himmler permitted d’Alquen to use members of the Vlasov group in this

project. The whole thing was an experiment, and Himmler acquiesced in it partly to test the effectiveness of the approach. D’Alquen was to be free to use Vlasov’s or anyone’s name. As he later recalled, Himmler had explained away this concession by remarking : ‘Who compels us to keep the promises we make ?’ D’Alquen became convinced that of all slogans that of a genuine 1 Himmler to d’Alquen, July 1943, EAP 173a-10/1*, CRS. 2 Thorwald (op. cit. pp. 347-94) distorts d’Alquen’s position considerably. For two contemporary documents crediting d’Alquen with ‘ having pushed through the new Vlasov policy’ in the SS, see RMfdbO., II, 1c [Labs], ‘Vermerk betr. General Wlassow’, November 25, 1944, Document NO-3125*; and Taubert’s final report, December 31, 1944, Document G-Pa-14*, YIVO, p. 30. 3 OKW/WPr IVc, ‘Kampfpropaganda in den Feind’, April 27, 1944, Himmler file 69*.

CH. XXVII The SS: From Dread to Despair 605 ‘Russian liberation movement’ was still the most powerful. He seemed equally convinced that there was but one remaining lever which could mobilize the Soviet prisoners, soldiers, and workers in the Reich: unrestricted use of General Vlasov and his committee.! Though its officers were disillusioned and sceptical, d’Alquen’s

conversion — if only in tactics — was enough to induce Wehrmacht Propaganda to try once more and to assign some of Vlasov’s top aides to Skorpion, among them Zhilenkov and Zykov. By May and June 1944 the revival of the Vlasov cause in the garb of defec-

tion propaganda was under way. In reply to a memorandum of d’Alquen’s, which had summarized the planned use of Russians in propaganda, a special approach to Ukrainian nationalist partisans, and a separate appeal to provoke Red Army defection, Himmler informed d’Alquen on June 14: ‘I am likewise in agreement with your planned utilization of Zhilenkov and Zykov. . . . Commence

with the operation as soon as possible.’ 2 | Now a dramatic incident occurred which throws a curious light on the situation within the SS. Zykov ‘disappeared’, literally on the eve of his departure for the eastern front, where he was to participate in a Skorpion operation. A widely discussed mystery, his abduction appears to have been perpetrated by two low-level agents of the Gestapo, perhaps acting at the behest of others to whom Zykov was a ‘Marxist’, a Jew, and a dangerous brain-trust for Vlasov. While one arm of the SS was promoting the use of such people, another arm was seizing and killing them. Skorpion had little tangible success. ‘The military situation was too favourable to the Soviets to encourage desertion even if German abuses had been less widely known. Meanwhile, however, d’Alquen

had come to like some of the Russians he was working with. In July he suggested starting a new ‘Russian Liberation Movement’ master-minded by the SS and headed by Georgi Zhilenkov, who was already his subordinate. For an instant, the opportunistic vainglorious Zhilenkov considered accepting, but his colleagues persuaded him to decline. Vlasov was and remained the movement’s symbol.‘

Himmler yielded step by step to d’Alquen’s insistent pleas. He ™ Interviews G-4, G-22 ; and Buchardt, p. 244. 2 Himmler to d’Alquen, June 14, 1944, Himmler file 69*. On Grote’s attitude, see also Document NO-1867*.

3 On Zykov, see above, pp. 530-1. Several former German officials state that the Gestapo claimed it had no leads, though it suspected the NKVD. Others insist that Gestapo chief Miiller was at least indirectly informed about the abduction and subsequent assassination of Zykov. (Interviews G-3, G-4, G-21; A. Kazantsev, ‘Tret’ia sila’, Posev [Limburg], 1950, no. 27, p. 15. See also Thorwald, op. cit. pp. 360-1.) 4 Interview H-433. G.R.R.—2R

606 Political Warfare PT. AV had nothing to lose. In mid-July he agreed to receive General Vlasov, the Untermensch whom a few months earlier he had labelled a Bolshevik butcher’s apprentice. Vlasov represented one last untapped source of power. At a moment when nothing seemed capable of arresting Germany’s collapse, with enemy divisions converging

on its heartland and fleets of bombers pounding it from above, Vlasov was one more ‘secret weapon’. As the V-1’s and V-2’s were

failing, here was what one German official called V-100 — the final, desperate trump. What Himmler had earlier spurned and ignored, he now agreed to promote. Again the Nationalities The belated change of tactics was bound to encounter opposition

within the far-flung SS empire itself. Inevitably, personal and departmental feuds left their imprint on the Vlasov affair.! Both d’Alquen and Berger were outside the jurisdiction of Kaltenbrunner’s

RSHA and thus had direct access to Himmler or at least to his personal staff. Kaltenbrunner himself was at first neutral with regard to Vlasov. He forwarded to Himmler the Gestapo reports warning against the Vlasov experiment as well as the SD reports stressing the need for political warfare. In this early phase, in the spring of 1944, the struggle within the RSHA lay between Amt III and Amt IV, with the former — the 5D — strongly influenced by the pro-Vlasov ‘initiators’, and the latter — the Gestapo — holding

out stubbornly against them. In spite of considerable pressure from the Gestapo, the SD refused to turn over Vlasov’s personnel file. Ressortegoismus pushed the SD closer and closer to Vlasov’s side. Meanwhile Kaltenbrunner had awakened to the potentialities of this weapon in the bureaucratic jungle warfare which went on within the SS and decided to exploit it against Gottlob Berger, a foe of long standing. In the second phase of this intra-SS struggle the two poles of conflict were Kaltenbrunner.and Berger.

The problem around which opinions crystallized for and against Vlasov was once again the nationality question. Berger sided

with the Ostministerium (and its protégé separatists) to which he was assigned, while Kaltenbrunner leaned towards Vlasov and his followers. Himmler, though apparently fond of Berger personally, placed more trust in the judgment of the RSHA, especially after Kaltenbrunner had mobilized against Berger the support of Schellenberg, the ‘sophisticated’ young SS general who headed Amt VI. Berger was isolated. Initially Schellenberg had no political ‘concept’ 1 On the organization of the SS, see above, p. 28.

CH. XXVII The SS: From Dread to Despair 607 for the East, as his Amt VI had to work with anyone useful in intelligence. It supported both the Great Russian Druzhina and extreme Georgian nationalists like Mikhail Kedia. Only after the failure of Zeppelin efforts with non-Russian refugees from the Soviet

Union did Schellenberg come to back a non-separatist stand. By the time d’Alquen had persuaded Himmler to risk the Vlasov project,

Kaltenbrunner along with the SD’s domestic and foreign branches was willing to endorse it, while the Gestapo continued to adhere to its extreme anti-Russian position.! It was symptomatic — both for German war-time policies and for

the character of the Soviet emigration — that the nationality feud erupted with such violence at this, the post-mortem stage of German

Ostpolitik after the occupied areas had been abandoned. ‘There is

no evidence that Himmler himself ever understood the issue. Though anxious to exploit any fissures in the enemy’s ranks — including national tensions 2 — he was in no‘sense committed to the

separatist cause as was Rosenberg. On the contrary, once he had sanctioned the Vlasov movement as the supreme nostrum of the day,

it was natural for him to pin all hopes on it and to seek monistic, simple solutions that accorded with the Fihrerprinztp. ‘Thus he came to prefer, intuitively rather than rationally, the Vlasov position

which opposed promising separate statehood to any of the constituent parts of the Soviet Union, to that of the separatists, who insisted on national independence for their own group as a prerequisite for, and primary goal of, the common struggle against ‘Muscovy’.

Vlasov’s stand on the nationality question had changed somewhat since the early days of bewildered ignorance following his capture.’ His evolution combined the Soviet-bred art of mimicry and accommodation with elements of opportunism which, along with strains of principle and idealism, marked his new course. At heart he apparently remained firmly opposed to the various projects for the disintegration of Soviet (or post-Soviet) Russia. He was enough of a patriot to want to preserve the integrity of his homeland.

He did not view the non-Russian nationalities as antagonistic elements, and he was sure that a free poll would give overwhelming ' [hese power struggles are summarized from reconstructions, largely by men who participated inthem. (Interviews G-2, G-3, G-8, G-22, G-25.) Schellenberg and d’Alquen were among the handful of North Germans who frequently clashed with the Bavarian and Austrian elements among the SS brass. 2 The war against Britain was so difficult, Himmler said in October 1943, ‘because England has no national minority which we can set to fighting against it’. (Document 070-L, TMWC, xxxvii, 506.) + See above, p. 559.

608 Political Warfare PT. IV majorities to federalist, rather than separatist, elements in the non-

Russian republics. It was partly for this reason, and partly as a result of his prior Soviet experience that ‘self-determination’ was an axiom for him. Tactically, however, Vlasov quickly found that in the atmosphere of 1943 Berlin it was necessary or desirable to appease certain groups

so as to secure their support for his movement. Foremost among these was Rosenberg, who, of course, feared precisely Vlasov’s ‘Great Russian imperialism’. Vlasov’s ambition to succeed was so pronounced that, under the pressure of his German mentors and Russian aides, he actually made far-reaching compromises in a memorandum submitted to Rosenberg, who promptly forwarded it to Hitler, in May 1943, as the crisis at the Fiihrerhauptquartier

loomed. Long a subject of bitter disputes,! this memorandum actually sought to demonstrate that a non-Stalinist Russia would not constitute a danger to either Germany or the minorities. Seeking to conciliate the Rosenberg faction, Vlasov emphasized the rift between himself and the Russian rightists who eschewed self-determination in favour of a centralized ‘indivisible’ Russia. The clever way out of the dilemma, probably suggested to Vlasov by one of his German friends, was a United Europe: The Great Russians [he wrote] maintain that Russia can never renounce the Ukraine and the Caucasus. This, however, is true only so long as the obsolete view of past centuries is maintained, [namely,] that Europe is an accidental conglomeration of states, each of which must fend for itself, rather than a natural family of nations. . . .

If the ‘fruitful notion’ of a United Europe were adopted, ‘the greater idea of a European family of nations would supplant Russian

centralism and imperialism’. While sharing the Ukraine and the Caucasus with the rest of Europe, Russia in return would benefit from the whole of European culture and economy. As a ‘valuable and independent member’ of such a European federation, a ‘national 1 Rosenberg referred to it 1n a subsequent letter to Hitler in October 1944 (Document Rosenberg-14, TMWC, xlhi, 187), and Wallace Carroll (Life [Chicago],

December 19, 1949, p. 85) later reiterated that Vlasov ‘not only conceded selfdetermination to the minorities but indicated — according to German sources — that in the future peace settlement he would be willing to give up the Ukraine and the Caucasus’. ‘This assertion provoked angry retorts from Vlasov’s former chief of chancellery and from Germans associated with the defector movement, who denied that Vlasov had ever changed his mind to such a degree. (See, e.g. K. G. Kromiadi, ‘Otkrytoe pis’mo’, Posev, 1950, no. 19, pp. 15-16; Strik-Strikfeldt, letter to author, December 19, 1953 ; Erhard Kroeger, letter to author, June 26,

1952.) For a good discussion of the controversy, see George Fischer, Soviet

Opposition to Stalin (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 62-3.

CH. XXVII The SS: From Dread to Despair 609 Russia possessing the same rights’ as the other member-states would have no cause to object.!

Rosenberg was impressed momentarily and, as has been seen, made a weak effort to support Vlasov along with his own separatist committees, whose future now seemed brighter. These committees had meanwhile grown timidly in the beneficent shadow of the Ostministerium. Only after Stalingrad did Rosenberg himself become

bolder in dealing with them. In 1943 the committees were reorganized. Since the Army gave some support to their propaganda work among the legions, greater emphasis was placed on recent defectors who were more likely to appeal effectively to their fellownationals. Finally a satisfactory formula was devised to allay the fears of German sceptics: instead of ‘national committees’, each ethnic group was to have its Muittelstelle — liaison office — at the Rosenberg Ministry. The refugees thus became employees of the ministry but were tacitly permitted the fiction of calling themselves the representatives of national committees. Later these agencies were renamed Leztstellen, as greater emphasis was placed on the ‘guiding’ functions they were to perform among their compatriots under German rule. Step by step, in a manner almost analogous to the first phase of the Vlasov campaign, the committees became semiautonomous. In November 1943, in an effort to overcome friction between the OMi and OKW, they were empowered to designate

special liaison staffs to the military units in which their fellownationals were serving with the Wehrmacht. Thanks to Mende’s effarts, some of the national groups — Azerbayanis, Volga ‘Tatars, Turkestanis — were permitted to stage ‘congresses’ so as to establish

more ‘representative’ committees or in some instances to allow leadership to be transferred to individuals more amenable to the Ostministerium.

Much of this frantic activity amounted to shadow-boxing. Nevertheless, almost imperceptibly, other German offices began to ‘deal’ with the committees and their spokesmen. ‘The scope of their work expanded. Some of their members went to work for the propaganda agencies, while others toured among the Osttruppen, who, it is true, often looked upon the politicians as incompetent chairwarmers. The general trend, as in certain other facets of Ostpolitik, was

one of gradual relaxation of German intransigeance. At first, reference to national ‘independence’ had been barred. But as the struggle between Rosenberg and the Russian-oriented groups became more bitter, and as the need for more dramatic propaganda t A. A. Vlasov, ‘Ist ein Nationales Russland eine Gefahr fur Europa ?’ May 13, 1943*, forwarded by Rosenberg to Hitler, May 28, 1943.

610 Political Warfare Pr. tv experiments increased, even ‘independence’ was _ backhandedly

sanctioned in 1944—not by formal pledge or promise but by passive acquiescence of the censors. Some of the groups, such as Kalmyks, Crimean ‘Tatars, and ‘Idel-Ural’, were tolerated but enjoyed no special support. ‘hey were too insignificant, too synthetic, or too remote to matter.' By contrast, the two groups that were distinctly favoured were the spokesmen for Turkestan and for the Caucasus.

The Turkestani committee, as was shown, enjoyed favour in vart because of the geographic distance of its home territory and the

correspondingly smaller German interest in averting the rise of autonomous movements there. Largely for the same reasons, the OMi backed a joint ‘’Turkestani’ committee claiming to represent all five nationalities of Soviet Central Asia, in spite of their linguistic,

cultural, and political differences. Mende’s personal support helped make Veli Kayum its leader. While propounding an extreme

anti-Russian line, he remained relatively aloof from the other nationality spokesmen and from their struggles with the Vlasov groupings. ‘The Caucasian committees were closely identified with their German sponsors. As the war progressed, their leadership under Mende’s guidance passed to Mikhail Kedia, a Georgian refugee from Paris, an able politician of extreme pro-German and antiRussian convictions, who had many contacts in both Abwehr and SS. He and his hand-picked opposite numbers on the other three ' The story of these committees has been well-nigh neglected and there are virtually no published sources on them. See above, pp. 560-5 ; interviews G-6,

G-8, G-30; Arlt, op. cit.; Gerhard von Mende, ‘Die besetzten Ostgebiete’,

Jahrbuch der Weltpolittk (Berlin, 1944), p. 200; and Rosenberg to Hitler, October 12, 1944, Document Rosenberg-14, TMWC, xli, 187. On the Kalmyks, see also

Thorwald, op. cit. pp. 118-19; interview H-76. On the Crimean ‘Tatars, see above, pp. 258-63 ; and Edige Kirimal, Der nationale Kampf der Krimtiirken (Emsdetten : Lechte, 1952), pp. 305 ff.; interview H-106. On the ‘Idel-Ural’ group, see also above, pp. 271-3; interviews H-122, H-133, H-533; Mende, ‘Politische Richtlinien fir die Turkverbande und die Ostmuselmanische SS Division’, March 15, 1944, Document NO-2958* ; [Garip Sultan,] ‘Griindung

der Wolga-Tatarischen Legion’, MS* ; Jdel-Ural Qurultaj (Berlin, 1944). 2 However, a faction of the so-called ‘United Turkestani Committee’, after clashing with Kayum, worked for other agencies such as the SS and promoted a serious split in the ranks of the committee, which was already rent by conflicts between Uzbek and Kazakh factions. Mende, over Berger’s opposition, organized the Turkestani congress in Vienna in June 1944, which was held with a maximum of pomp and circumstance. (See above, pp. 274-5 ; interviews G-6, G-8, G-30 ;

Arlt, op. cit. p. A7.) Important material on the Committee is contained in its magazine, Milltj Ttirkistan (Berlin, 1942-4). The Propaganda Ministry’s Zezt-

schriftendtenst (Berlin, 1944, item A 329) warned on June 2, 1944, against uncensored

reports from the congress, on which short items appeared in the German press (Hamburger Fremdenblatt, June 16, 1944).

CH, XXVIT The SS : From Dread to Despair O11 Caucasian committees represented the antithesis of the Vlasov concept. Their formula was: ‘No united struggle against Bolshevism, but joint struggle of all non-Russians against the Russians’. In the closing stages of the war, the ‘Caucasian clover-leaf’ was to exercise considerable pressure within the Ostministerium.'

Thus, in order to offset the Vlasov manceuvre and further its own political plans, the Ostministertum bred potential governments-

in-exile for the non-Russian areas of the U.S.5S.R. Though often treated with cynicism and condescension, they were useful pawns in Rosenberg’s struggle against his domestic foes. At the same time,

they on their part sought to use Rosenberg for their ends. ‘The classical question was who was to be the master.

The SS itself set the match to the nationality fuse. It is likely that at first Berger did not sense the full extent of the conflict which

was brewing. In defence against his enemies in the RSHA and under the influence of his associates in the Rosenberg Ministry, he was being pushed into an increasingly pro-separatist position. More-

over, hé favoured the non-Russian groups because of their preponderance in the Waffen 5S. Indeed, it was to overcome the confusion and multiplicity of groups (and to obtain formal jurisdiction over them) that in July 1944 Himmler approved the formation of a special agency in Berger’s SSHA to handle the Eastern SS.? The man whom Berger chose to head this Freiwilligen-Leitstelle

was Dr. Fritz Arlt, a young Silesian 55 officer who had studied Eastern Europe and had directed the nationality section in the Government-General of Poland. Before long, a new ‘axis’ was forged between Arlt’s office and the national committees operating under Mende’s aegis. In the search for allies, at long last Rosenberg’s men had also found a little SS support. Learning of the new Vlasov move in the summer of 1944, the national committees and their OMi protectors became alarmed. A military rationale was found for opposing it : We objected [a German sponsor recalled] to an overly rapid development of the Vlasov army because in our view it would have involved a great danger of infiltration of Soviet agents and tremendous difficulties of military reorganization at such a critical moment.3 ™ Interviews G-6, G-8, G-30, H-89, H-102, H-135, H-375, H-545; Arlt, op. cit.; Thorwald, op. cit. p. 111 ; Kedia, letter to author, June 2, 1951 ; Abo Fatalibei, ‘Otchet azerbaidzhanskomu narodu o bor’be ego synov’ and ‘Iz doklada

A. Fatalibei na azerbaidzhanskom kongresse 6 noiabria 1943 g.’, Azerbaycan (Munich), 1951, no. I, pp. 13-29.

2 See Document NO-346*. This was Amt III [Freiwilligen-Leitstelle Ost]

in Department [Amtsgruppe] D of the SSHA. 3 Interview G-8,

612 Political Warfare PT. IV The picture now became even more complex. In July 1944, with Berger’s blessing, Arlt appointed Dr. Erhard Kroeger head of the Russian desk of his Leitstelle, which was to have desks for each of the Soviet nationalities. Oberfiihrer Kroeger, a Baltic German, after being active in the Nazi youth movement in Latvia, had been repatriated to the Reich in 1939. What Arlt did not know was that Kroeger was also an official of the SD — Arlt’s own bitter enemies — and in fact belonged to the pro-Vlasov faction there. Kroeger simultaneously became head of a Sonderkommando Ost established by the SD, and, through Ohlendorf, could report directly to Himmler without the knowledge of Arlt, his nominal superior — much as Koch could go to Hitler through Bormann over Rosenberg’s head. Henceforth the nationality aspect of the Vlasov question was vitally

influenced by the implacable duel between Arlt and Kroeger, spokesmen for two diametrically opposed orientations within the SS. There is no doubt that Vlasov had never become a ‘separatist’, as Rosenberg hopefully assumed from the general’s memorandum of May 1943 — a document forgotten or ignored by everyone but the

Ostminister. Whatever tactical flexibility Rosenberg had maintained was lost by late summer of 1944. With the extremists on the nationality question forcing the more moderate elements to align themselves on one side or the other of the controversy, all efforts at

compromise proved vain. ‘The lines were drawn. The Vlasov Orientation was taken to represent the ‘all-Russian’ position, accepting self-determination ‘in principle’ but postponing any resolution of the problem ‘until after victory’. The separatist

committees stood firm on the liberation of their homelands from the Muscovite yoke and on the pledge of sovereignty as preconditions of co-operation with either Germans or Vlasovites. Perhaps it was precisely because the real prospects of success

were already so dim and the significance of the entire problem primarily symbolic, that both sides, acting as it were for the benefit of history, indulged in the luxury of obstinacy more freely than they

might have under other conditions. Behind them, the interested German agencies had taken up positions, with Himmler now leading one camp, undergirded by men like d’Alquen and Kroeger, exerting

efforts on Vlasov’s behalf; and Rosenberg in the opposite camp, with Mende and Arlt as major promoters of the separatist committees. The stage was set for the last act. 1 Interviews G-3, G-5, G-6, G-24 ; Thorwald, op. cit. pp. 346-7.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE CARDHOUSE CLIMAX The Vlasov movement is a menace to Germany.—ROSENBERG to HITLER, October 1944

The Fiihrer has made definite commitments in the Vlasov matter.—LAMMERS to ROSENBERG, November 1944

Himmler and Vlasov

ON July 20, 1944, Claus von Stauffenberg placed his brief-case containing a time-bomb under the conference table at Hitler’s headquarters at Rastenburg and, hearing the explosion from outside

the building, flew to Berlin assuming the Fiihrer to be dead. The coup, staged there by an opposition which included some illustrious military men and a sprinkling of liberal and conservative civilians, was short-lived. By nightfall its failure was manifest, and a roundup of the would-be rebels began. The cruel purge had three direct

repercussions on Ostpolitik. It left the SS in a stronger position than ever, sweeping aside its perennial foe, the Army, as a power factor. It eliminated from the scene many of those who had taken a far-sighted stand on the Russian question — men like Wagner, Stauffenberg, Tresckow, Schulenburg, and Hassell. Finally, it had a direct impact on the fate of the Vlasov affair.

The coup of the 2oth of July delayed the contemplated shift of 9S tactics. Three days before, d’Alquen had persuaded the Reichsfiihrer to meet Vlasov personally. Himmler had agreed and asked the SD for personal data on the Russian defector leaders, setting the reception for July 21. Vlasov was about to entrain for Himmler’s field headquarters when news arrived of the explosion at the Fuhrerhauptquartier. The visit was postponed indefinitely.: For a while Himmler was too busy to bother with Vlasov. There

were traitors to purge, the home army to put under SS control, prisoner-of-war affairs to take over from the Army, and Himmler was

soon to try his own hand at commanding an army group. Meanwhile, too obtuse or too uninterested to see the gulf between the Vlasov move and the OMi’s separatist concept, Himmler let Berger

handle the matter. A few days later, in the first overt departure from the earlier SS line, Berger gave Vlasov a sumptuous dinner. ' For details, see Jiirgen Thorwald, Wen sie verderben wollen (Stuttgart : Steingriiben-Verlag, 1952), pp. 366-71 ; Buchardt, pp. 254-5. 613

614 Political Warfare pT. 1V He seemed favourably impressed and (other guests reported) promised to press for an audience with Himmler, for an improvement in the status of the Ostarbeiter, and for the consolidation of the dispersed ROA battalions into a coherent fighting force under Vlasov’s command. Just how much of all this Berger meant to fulfil is a matter of conjecture. ! In late July Vlasov, accompanied by Strikfeldt, left Berlin for a

rest at Ruhpolding. Both appear to have been highly sceptical about the prospects of substantial policy changes in Germany. ‘The noose around the Reich was tightening rapidly. And among Russian defectors, instead of receiving Vlasov, Himmler now sanctioned the transformation of Kaminskii’s fighting and marauding force into the 29th Division of the Waffen SS. Kaminskii’s ‘concept’ was the antithesis of Vlasov’s. His was a mercenary force symbolizing the absence of political integrity.2, Other events seemed to reduce even further the prospects of a German volte-face. ‘The transfer of the

Vlasov question to Berger cooled Kaltenbrunner’s favourable disposition and made him listen to the Gestapo’s objections. All the sycophants, noting Himmler’s procrastination, again exhibited reluctance to help the ‘Vlasov cause’, while some of those who continued to agitate on his behalf occasionally alienated the authorities by making themselves obnoxious.3 Berger threw a number of non-ROA units (a large part of the Kaminski Division along with Turkic and other 5S detachments) into action against the uprising of the Polish patriots in Warsaw. When a revolt erupted in Slovakia, Berger was dispatched there to take command of the SS troops battling the rebels. August passed without action on Vlasov.‘

1 Interview G-24 ; Buchardt, pp. 256-7. 2 See above, p. 568.

3 Interviews G-21, G-24, G-25 ; Buchardt, pp. 259-60. Frau Melitta Wiedemann (see p. 585), for instance, was arrested at the insistence of the SS as a meddlesome maverick seeking to disrupt ‘official policy’. (See Documents NO-5898¥*, NO-5899*, NO-5900*.) 4 A phase which remains to be studied in detail is the performance and morale of the ex-Soviet troops thrown into action against the Allies in France, Italy, and

the Low Countries. While some fought stubbornly, others turned against their German masters and revolted en masse. Interesting in this connection is the visit of Colonel Buniachenko, former divisional commander in the Red Army (and later commander of the First Vlasov Division), to Berlin from the Normandy front, where he was reported to have fought bravely.

He is a soldier and not a politician [a German memorandum summarized

his complaints in Berlin}. However, he considers it his duty to point out that . . . since on the German side nothing is being said about the future of the Russian people, the Russian soldier does not know what he is. He feels like

a mercenary. ... In addition to this general insecurity comes the inferiority feeling underscored by a variety of German measures toward him. . . . (Mende, ‘Empfang des russ. Oberst Bunjatschenko’, August 12, 1944, Document NO-3043*.) See also Thorwald, op. cit. pp. 395 ff.

CH. XXVIII The Cardhouse Climax 615 Yet the little group of SS activists, men like Buchardt and Kroeger, persisted in their efforts. They argued that Vlasov already doubted German sincerity; that foreign powers were interested in

the affair;! and that, if the SS did not start a new operation,

Rosenberg would — and in the process would ‘submerge’ Vlasov among a dozen representatives of Soviet minorities. Schellenberg passed on Radetzky’s memoranda to Himmler, apparently without committing himself but wishing to keep a hand in the entire affair. Finally, on September 9, 1944, Vlasov was directed to report to Himmler one week later. ‘The ‘secret weapon’ was to be tried at last. In spite of personal reservations — the same which led him to veto the Army-directed Vlasov operation in 1943 — Hitler now

approved the new SS plans, though only in their most general form. Indeed, some of the subsequent difficulties may have been due to the uncertainty of Himmler, Bormann, and Rosenberg as

to how the Fihrer felt about the whole matter. That Hitler’s

views were not basically changed is clear from the protocol of a conference held a few months later, after the last ‘Vlasov operation’ had been officially launched. After a discussion of German setbacks, the conversation continued : GOr1iNG: They [Vlasov’s men] shouldn’t be running around in German uniforms. .. . HITLER: I was against putting them into our uniforms. And who was for it? Our darling army, which had its own ideas. GOrING: That’s the way they run around now. HiTLeR: Well, I can’t make them change uniforms now, we don’t have any. . . . [The Army] puts any tramp into German uniform.¢4

The fact that Hitler did not otherwise choose to intervene in the Vlasov affair may be taken as an indication of his opinion that it did not deserve major attention. He did not consider making Vlasov an ‘ally’, but in substance subscribed to the argument which d’Alquen had presented to Himmler: ‘We are in a situation where the stakes are victory or defeat. ‘The consequences shall interest us only later.’ 5

' See below, p. 652. 2 Interviews G-3, G-24.

3 In his letter to Hitler dated October 12, 1944, Rosenberg stated that the Himmler-Vlasov conversation had taken place ‘with your approval’. (Document Rosenberg-14, TMWC, xli, 187.) Hitler’s consent to the meeting is confirmed by

interviews G-22, G-24, Buchardt, pp. 275-6, and Thorwald (on the basis of d’Alquen’s statements), op. cit. pp. 369-70, 378-9.

Before the end of August, Hitler ordered the Cossack divisions operating in the Balkans transferred to the SS. (FHQ, ‘Lagebesprechung’, September 17, 1944*, CRS, p. 27 ; Schmundt, ‘Tagebuch’ [entry for August 26, 1944], H4/12*, ee BHO, ‘Lagebesprechung’, January 27, 1945, Document 3786-PS, TMWC,

XXX1l1, 102-3. See also below, p. 632. 5 'Thorwald, op. cit. p. 366.

616 Political Warfare PT. IV For that matter, regardless of his tactical flexibility, Himmler’s

own outlook had scarcely changed. Ironically, a letter he had dictated and corrected in mid-July was sent off to Kaltenbrunner on July 21 — the day after the coup, when the meeting with Vlasov was

to have taken place. It is a fantastic monument to Himmler’s lunacy, incongruously unreal in the twilight of revolt and retreat. Before the German Ostwall which we shall build some day, we must erect a defensive frontier in the East [Ostwehrgrenze] of neo-Cossacks, after the great models of the Austto-Hungarian armed frontier and the Russian model of Cossack and soldier settlers.

Only in these frontier settlements were Russians and Ukrainians to

serve as border troops for the Germans and, in return, to receive

homesteads of their own. All the land to the west of this line would be set aside for German settlement, with some indigenous peasants working in co-operatives under German rule. Himmler conceded that the Easterners needed some general system of values, but it was madness to spread Nazism among them, and to revive the Orthodox or to promote the Catholic church in the East was dangerous. He believed the solution consisted in cultivating those religious sects which preached non-violence. ‘Thus he would spread Buddhism ‘among all Turkic peoples’ —7z.e. Moslems! Among the Christian

Slavs, he would promote the teachings of Jehovah’s Witnesses [Bibelforscher], whose members within Germany had been confined in Nazi concentration camps. ‘They would be suitable because, he believed, they were pacifist, ‘anti-Catholic’ farm hands who neither

drank nor smoked. Hence —in July 1944 — he urged Kaltenbrunner to start screening the inmates of German concentration camps to find suitable ‘bible students !’ !

The only other contemporary expression of Himmler’s views came in his lengthy speech to the top Party and SS leadership at a conference on August 3, 1944, which surveyed the results of the coup

of July 20. He now sought to persuade his listeners (and perhaps himself) that Germany would again advance over ‘many thousands of kilometres’ of Russian soil. The goal had been and remained German conquest of the East up to the Urals, where troops and the air force would stand guard to assure for the German people a carefree future for centuries to come.? It was in this mood that Himmler agreed to see Vlasov.

' Himmler to Kaltenbrunner, July 21, 1944, Himmler file 26*. 2 [Himmler,] ‘Reichsfiihrer-SS Himmler auf der Gauleitertagung am 3. August 1944 in Posen’, Vuerteljahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte (Munich), i (1953), 357-94.

CH. XXVIII The Cardhouse Climax 617 Diplomacy of Despair

As an official transcript of the Vlasov-Himmler conference of September 16 is not available, this strange meeting has been the subject of a number of contradictory accounts. For several hours the two men conversed in the presence of Berger, d’Alquen, Kroeger,

Standartenfiihrer Ehlich of Amt III (SD), and Colonel Sakharov, a Russian émigré from Vlasov’s entourage. Beyond this, the evidence

becomes more controversial. An account circulated to his Party agencies by Bormann quite naturally minimized the results, in line with his opposition to the whole enterprise. Bormann stated that, upon invitation of the Reichsfitihrer, Himmler and Vlasov had met at the former’s field headquarters and agreed on three moves: (1) An appeal to the Ostarbeiter in Germany and their use [Ausrichtung] in the anti-Bolshevik struggle ; (2) In addition, a similar anti-Bolshevik use of the Hiwis from Russia ;

(3) Further measures useful for Germany in the struggle against Bolshevik Russia.!

The vagueness of the last point and the failure to spell out the political aspects of the agreement were more typical of Bormann than of the meeting itself. The other bit of documentary evidence is an unsigned memoran-

dum from Berger’s files, apparently composed in the days immediately following the conference. It was the draft of a formal covenant between the German government, as represented by Himmler and Rosenberg, and the Russian Liberation Movement, as represented by Vlasov. It provided that : (1) After the overthrow of Bolshevism, Russia becomes a free and independent state. The Russian people decides on the form of its government [Staatsform]. (2) The basis for the state territory is formed by the borders of the RSFSR as of 1939. Changes are subject to special agreements. (3) The Russian Liberation Movement renounces the territory of the Crimea.

(4) The Cossacks receive far-reaching self-government. Their future form of government is subject to special agreements. (5) The non-Russian peoples and tribes resident in Russia receive farreaching cultural autonomy. (6) The Reich Government and the Russian Liberation Movement reach agreements on the common military protection of Europe. These agreements must be such as to make impossible a recurrence of the Bolshevik menace as well as new European civil wars.? «1 Bormann, ‘Rundschreiben 282/44 gRs.’, September 26, 1944, EAP 99/156*,

CRS. 2 Memorandum, no title, n.d., EAP 99/55*, CRS.

618 Political Warfare PL. LV Unfortunately, this memorandum is of little help. It attests to continued German interest, even at this late date, in the acquisition of the Crimea and in a special status for the Cossacks. However, a confusion in terms veils the crucial nationality question. The draft speaks of the RSFSR — the Russian Republic — as the territory of

the future Russian state, thus excluding the other fifteen Union Republics. However, unless the U.S.S.R., and not the RSFSR, was meant, several references are meaningless: the Crimea was an autonomous republic; the reference to non-Russian ethnic groups is far

more meaningful if the U.S.S.R. as a whole is meant; and the affirmation of 1939 borders can refer only to the Ukraine and Belorussia, since the boundaries of the RSFSR had not been changed as a result of the German-Soviet Pact. Among secondary sources, Thorwald gives a detailed narrative based largely on an oral account by d’Alquen, made about 1951.! D’Alquen confirms that Vlasov made an impression of determination

and integrity, stating in substance that, while no one in Russia would believe in a belated change of German war aims, a Russian army of liberation as the bearer of a ‘national idea’ could still win popular support for an anti-Bolshevik movement. Vlasov therefore

sought approval to form his own army from among ex-Soviet prisoners in Germany and the scattered units of the ROA. Stressing the shortage of arms and equipment, Himmler finally sanctioned the

prompt establishment under Vlasov’s command of two divisions, with three more to follow. ‘The decision (so d’Alquen claimed to recall seven years later) was reached with Hitler’s explicit consent. Himmler turned down the proposal to place the Ostarbeiter under Vlasov’s authority, but promised to secure Hitler’s approval for all other points, anticipating no difficulty and even vaguely referring to the prospect of a political and military alliance. As the visitors were leaving, Himmler took d’Alquen aside and told him that Vlasov had made an excellent impression but that d’Alquen should not forget that Vlasov was a Russian. D’Alquen’s account slurs over the key problem of relations with the national committees. It asserts that Vlasov requested an end of the German practice of dealing separately with the Great Russians and the minorities; instead he favoured a convention among them, recognizing a federation as the desirable form of government for the peoples of the Soviet Union, with himself as at least the temporary leader of all. Buchardt’s account, recorded in 1946 and based on a

report prepared for Kaltenbrunner by him and Ehlich, confirms ' Thorwald, op. cit. pp. 380-94 ; ‘Niederschrift einer Besprechung mit dem friheren SS Staf. Gunther [sic] d’Alquen’*, IfZ, pp. 54-5.

CH. XXVIII The Cardhouse Climax 619 that Himmler agreed in substance to Vlasov’s assuming command of an integrated ROA and to the formation of a Russian liberation committee under his chairmanship. The official protocol (no longer available) was apparently worded so vaguely as to permit contradictory inferences on the nationality question. ‘The various sources agree that Vlasov insisted on united action of all nationalities, whose future status and interrelationship would remain open. Himmler, who apparently assumed some manner of merger between Vlasov’s

organization and the separatist committees, approved Vlasov’s ‘leadership’ over the Osttruppen — presumably without national distinction — and over a future committee for the ‘peoples of Russia’ rather than for the Great Russians alone. However, as Mende and Arlt argued for the remaining months of the war, no commitment was made to subordinate the national committees and national legions to Vlasov, just as Vlasov made no pledge to

‘recognize’ them.' ,

What remained was for the SS to publicize the conference. At the meeting it had been agreed that a communiqué would appear in the German press on the following day, with a picture of Himmler and Vlasov. According to two eye-witnesses, some North German

papers of September 17 actually came off the presses with the announcement and the picture. Suddenly they were ordered withdrawn and destroyed ; some 15,000 copies of the Berliner Nachtaus-

gabe had already been sold. Apparently Kaltenbrunner had issued

the order. However, he refused to give his subordinates in the RSHA an explanation, declaring merely that 1t was a temporary matter and that the item would probably be released in a few days. This led the Initiativgruppe in the RSHA to suspect that the delay had some connection with the clandestine feelers being made in Stockholm on behalf of the SS for a separate peace with Russia.

Indeed, Taubert, whose informants were well scattered, confidentially wrote Lammers on September 22 that On the well-known withdrawal of the communication about Vlasov I learn that in substance nothing has changed. But someone wished to postpone the release for a week. The reason indicated is that considerations of foreign policy were decisive.? ' Buchardt, pp. 265 ff., 275, 316; Buchardt, letter to author, January 2, 1954 ;

Kroeger, letter to author, June 26, 1952; interviews G-3, G-6, G-8, G-24; Peter Kleist, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin (Bonn : Athenéum-Verlag, 1950), p. 215.

2 Buchardt, pp. 270-3; and Taubert to Lammers, September 22, 1944,

Document Occ E-3*, YIVO.

620 Political Warfare PT. IV It was understandable that a communiqué about Vlasov on the front pages of the German press might have prejudiced the chances of success, if any, of the tortuous and quixotic negotiations which were being conducted in Stockholm. The German negotiator was

Dr. Peter Kleist, an SS officer who had been with the Foreign

Office before the war and had later headed the Ostland section of the Rosenberg Ministry. After the initial contacts through Josef Clauss, a Ukrainian-born businessman residing in Stockholm, in mid-1943,

the feelers were renewed in the summer of 1944 and lasted until

September 21, when Kleist finally returned to Berlin. By late September the RSHA had recognized the futility of further efforts,

and on September 29 the German press finally carried a brief announcement that the Vlasov-Himmler meeting had resulted in ‘fullest agreement’ on questions of ‘using all forces of the Russian people in the struggle for the liberation of their homeland from Bolshevism ’.!

The following week (Kleist reported after his mission was over), Clauss informed him on behalf of his Soviet contacts that the promotion [Eimsetzung] of General Vlasov had aroused great wonderment and that one had to take it as an indication that Germany sought no reconciliation [Ausgleich] with the Soviet Union.?

By October 1944 the prospects for a negotiated peace with either , West or East were virtually nil. This realization seemed to remove the last hurdle to the public promotion of the Vlasov affair. The Ukrainian Question The tug-of-war over the two conflicting approaches to nationality policy became even more bitter as Rosenberg’s national committees

were reinforced by the appearance of the two ‘big brothers’, the

Belorussian and Ukrainian political centres. In the summer of 1944, as the Soviet troops approached, the ‘Belorussian Central Rada’ \eft Minsk, and before long its leaders, with Astrotiski at their

head, had established themselves in Berlin under Mende’s supervision, side by side with the other non-Russian committees. In a move designed to checkmate Himmler’s sudden intrusion into Eastern émigré politics, it was announced that Rosenberg had received ‘Professor’ Astrotiski, ‘the President of the White-Ruthenian

Central Council’.3 Actually, the Belorussian extremists repre1 VB-M, September 30, 1944 ; Das Archiv (Berlin), September 1944, p. 444.

2 See Alexander Dallin, ‘Vlasov and Separate Peace’, Journal of Central European Affairs (Boulder), January 1957.

3 ‘Weissruthenen bei Rosenberg’, VB-B, November 2, 1944. On the Belorussian Rada, see above, pp. 220-4. Even earlier, the Ostministerium had asked K6string’s office not to permit Belorussians in the ROA but instead to form them

CH. XXVIII The Cardhouse Climax 621 sented no political force, were divided among themselves, and had virtually no civilian following. Far more complex was the state of Ukrainian affairs.

Following the arrest of the leaders of the OUN/B in 1941, the Ukrainian nationalists had occupied an ambivalent position in the German scheme. In German eyes they were simultaneously proscribed pariahs and preferred partners. The separatists considered both Moscow and Berlin as foes but were prepared to collaborate with the Germans. When the German forces proved inadequate to control the Ukrainian countryside, there developed, in addition to Communist partisans, a variety of other Ukrainian groups. Among those which had gathered momentum, in 1943-4 the UPA [Ukrains’ka

Povstans’ka Armyia, or Ukrainian Insurgent Army] dominated the field. A ‘Supreme Council of Liberation’ (known by its Ukrainian initials as UHVR) was established, in an effort to broaden the base

of the UPA and to provide it with a political arm which might become a future government. Whatever the attitude of their rank-

and-file, the UPA and UHVR remained bitterly nationalist — fighting Communist and hostile Ukrainian groups, Poles, Russians,

Jews, and Rumanians. As the Germans retreated from the Soviet Ukraine, the centre of nationalism reverted to its traditional strong-

hold in Galicia. At that time the increasingly hard-pressed UPA was again prepared to work against the Red Army in step with the Wehrmacht, which on its part was willing to supply it with arms and goods in order to maintain a small ‘second front’ behind the Soviet lines.!

Military collaboration-— or its mirage — again provided an impetus for political revisionism. The situation became acute in July 1944 when the Galician SS Division was defeated at Brody and

some of its remnants then joined the UPA. Now both Army and SS sought to establish direct contact with the nationalist partisans beyond the Soviet front. By late August liaison had been set up, and a German captain was parachuted to the partisans in an optimistic effort to co-ordinate a two-pronged attack on the Red Army. Actually, the UPA was already on the decline, even if some of its

contingents still operated for some time in Galicia and the Carpathians. The military value of the undertaking was ephemeral. into a separate ‘national army’. (Braéutigam to Késtring, October 11, 1944, Document NO-1871*.) The Baltic émigré groups and their military counterparts

had likewise moved to the Reich by late 1944; they are omitted from further consideration since they maintained no direct contact with the Vlasov movement, which, in fact, never claimed to represent the Baltic States. ' The most thorough discussion is John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945 (New York : Columbia University Press, 1955), ch. vi. G.R.R.— 2S

622 Political Warfare PT. IV One significant political fact was the mellowing of the hitherto recalcitrant UPA leaders. ‘After the recent events at the front’, Army Group North Ukraine reported on August 20, ‘the leadership of the UPA has recognized that it cannot wage the struggle against the Bolsheviks by itself and has repeatedly asked the Wehrmacht for support in the form of arms.’! With the German withdrawal and the revival of political warfare efforts in Berlin, it was natural for the Mende group to reopen the question of creating a Ukrainian national committee. Some nationalists had continued to collaborate with Nazi Germany all along — a few old émigrés like Hetman Skoropadskii; some in the Government-General, such as the advisory committee of Professor Kubyiovych ; a number of new refugees like the mayor of German-occupied Khar’kov, Alexander Semenenko, by then in Berlin. None possessed sufficient stature or support to make him acceptable to the Germans

as potential ‘Ukrainian Vlasov’s’. ‘The leaders of the two other J strands of nationalism — Andrit Mel’nyk and Taras Bul’ba — had, like Bandera in 1941, been arrested by the Germans.? In the spring of 1943 the effort of the Rosenberg Ministry to form a Ukrainian committee had failed — partly because a number of Ukrainian politicians had sided with Vlasov rather than with Rosenberg ; partly because the entire political warfare drive had collapsed under the impact of Hitler’s veto in June of that year; and partly because the SS had refused to release the imprisoned nationalist leaders. The only ‘progress’ the OMi had made was the establishment of a Ukrainian Leitstelle (analogous to those created for all the other Eastern nationalities) under Semenenko. Pressure for co-operation with the Ukrainian nationalists developed suddenly from another quarter, the Eastern section of the

Propaganda Ministry. As early as October 1943, its head, Dr. 1 RMfdbO. to RFSS, September 4, 1944*. See also Taubert, ‘Die deutsche Ostpolitik’, MS*, pp. 18-19 ; Buchardt, pp. 325-7 ; interviews G-6, G-8.

; 2 On Mel’nyk, see above, pp. 114-6. He was arrested in January 1944 for the publication by one of his followers of an illegal brochure sharply criticizing German policy ; its publication gave ‘Gestapo Miiller’ an opportunity to ‘clean up’ the OUN/M and confine Mel’nyk in Sachsenhausen as an ‘honourable prisoner’

[Ehrenhdaftling]. (See Armstrong, op. cit. pp. 177-8; Mende, letter to author, November 19, 1953.) During a visit to Ohlendorf, Mende and Kinkelin tried to arrange his release, but in vain. ‘Bul’ba’ was the pseudonym of Borovets’, the colourful leader of the original

| UPA, more liberal and moderate than the Bandera group. After futile feelers with

both Germans and Soviets, he was lured to Warsaw and there arrested by the SD. His unit was defeated and its remnants absorbed by the Bandera force, which then assumed the name of UPA. On Bul’ba, see also Alexander Hrytsenko, ‘Armiya bez derzhavy’, Ukrains’ki Vistt (Neu-Ulm), nos. 465-71 (December 28,

1950—January 17, 1951). 3 Interview G-6.

CH. XXVIII The Cardhouse Climax 623 Taubert, had urged Berger ‘to establish contact with some groups of [Ukrainian] partisans, 1f only to split them and play them off against

each other’.' In February 1944 he recommended that Goebbels advise Hitler to

(1) Create a Ukrainian national council ; (2) Amnesty Ukrainian partisans who had opposed the Germans ; (3) Release the Ukrainian nationalists from jail ; (4) Institute an ambitious propaganda campaign aimed at disposing the Ukrainians in Germany’s favour.

A few months later, he again urged increased supply of arms to the

UPA and creation of a Ukrainian ‘united front’ including all nationalist factions, to be headed by a ‘representative personality’. At the end of the year he reiterated his warning — piping a tune

similar to that of the OMi— against permitting the Vlasov-led Russians to ‘crush’ the Ukrainian nationalists. Wrote T'aubert :

Ever since the beginning of the Vlasov affair, the Ost section [of the Propaganda Ministry] has been intent on preventing the Ukrainians from being overrun [by the Great Russians] . . . since the national Ukrainians are waging an extraordinarily successful partisan struggle against the Soviets in the form of a general popular revolt.4

The influence, if any, of Taubert’s pleas is difficult to assess.

In any case, by May 1944 the SS had agreed in principle to the release of the nationalists — at the very time when d’Alquen was scoring his first successes with Himmler on the Vlasov issue. Gestapo chief Miiller held on to the Ukrainian captives, using them as a pawn in his private tug-of-war with Berger’s SSHA. Only in the summer was there final agreement on their release. Military arguments apparently proved decisive. Thus the Vlasov enterprise, which had been lubricated by the formation of non-Russian SS units, in turn contributed to speeding up the release of the Ukrainian separatists. Bul’ba’s release in August had no political implications as Berlin

planned to use him for purely military purposes. Then, promptly on the heels of Himmler’s reception of Vlasov, Rosenberg obtained 1 Taubert to Berger, October 21, 1943, Document Occ E 4-1*, YIVO. 2 Taubert and Kurtz to Goebbels, February 17, 1944, Document Occ E 4-1*,

eS Taubert to Lammers, September 22, 1944, Document Occ E-3*, YIVO.

4 Taubert, ‘Tatigkeit im deutsch-sowjetischen Krieg’, December 1944, Document G-Pa-14*, YIVO, p. 31. Actually the UPA never exceeded 50,000 men. Taubert (like Arlt and Mende) omitted from consideration those Ukrainians who sided with the ‘all-Russian’ federalist elements around Vlasov.

624 Political Warfare PT. IV from Kaltenbrunner the release of Bandera, on September 25, and of Mel’nyk on October 17. In his talk with Kaltenbrunner, Rosen-

berg stressed the ‘equality’ of all nationalities and the need for ‘cutting down’ the Great Russians, and proposed placing at the head

of the Ukrainian committee a man ‘who would have authority vis-d-vis Vlasov’.' Without delay the principals went to work, making the recent ‘jailbirds’ into leaders of the Rosenberg-sponsored Ukrainian National Committee.?

The Ostministerium wanted the committee to be as broadly representative as possible of the various nationalist groups. With a modicum of pressure Mel’nyk, assigned to form the committee, within a week ‘reached agreement among all Ukrainians from the socialists to Skoropadski [the monarchist] and from Levyts’kyi [representing the UNR, a left-over of Petliura’s Civil War movement] to Bandera’ — of course encompassing separatist groups only.3

The Mel’nyk committee prepared a document which, while acceptable to ‘pro-Ukrainians’ like Mende and Arlt, went too far for most of the German officials whose approval was needed. The proposed declaration would have pledged the establishment of a ‘ sovereign Ukrainian state within its ethnographic borders’. Though Rosenberg was ready to endorse propaganda leaflets to the UPA beyond the front pledging ‘a free Ukraine independent from Bolshevism’,

neither he nor Berger would give an émigré committee formal 1 [Rosenberg,] ‘Punkte fiir die Besprechung mit dem Leiter des RSHA Ogruf. Dr. Kaltenbrunner am 25. September 1944’*. 2 Briutigam, ‘Gegenwartiger Stand der ukrainischen Frage’, September 28, 1944*; Arlt, ‘Vorgang in Sachen Ukrainisches Nationalkomitee’, November 21, 1944, Document NO-3039* ; interviews G-8, G-22. 3 Prior to Mel’nyk’s nomination, Bandera suggested as a compromise candidate for leadership a Galician doctor, Volodymyr Horbovyi, who had headed the Cracow

‘united front’ in June 1941, but he could not be located. Persistent reports

asserted that he had remained in Cracow when the Red Army arrived ; later reports placed him in Prague in 1946 — facts that have given rise to suspicion that he may have been a Soviet agent. (See interviews G-8, G-22 ; Petro Yarovyi, ‘ Ukrains’kyi natsionalystychnyi rukh 1 diial’nist’ banderivshchyny’, MS*.) 4 Berger is reported to have objected because the declaration, especially paragraphs 3 and 4, implied diplomatic recognition of the Ukraine. (Interviews G-6,

G-8.) They read : The Government of Greater Germany declares its disinterest in Ukrainian territory and solemnly declares that with the entry of German troops on to Ukrainian soil, sovereignty of the Ukrainian State, called into being by the will

of the Ukrainian people, shall be respected. . . . The Government of Greater

| Germany hails the Ukrainian National Committee as the representative of the

Ukrainian people on German soil, grants it hospitality and pledges it full support in its preparatory work for the erection of a State and grants it the opportunity to represent the interests of all Ukrainians who, voluntarily or involuntarily, find themselves in Greater Germany. (‘Entwurf einer Erklarung der Reichsregierung’, n.d., Document NO-3040*.)

CH. XXVIII The Cardhouse Climax 625 recognition that would have transformed it into a government-inexile.!

The fate of the Ukrainian committee hung in the balance. On October 5 Berger received Bandera, but with no practical results.

He concluded that Bandera was a tough and tricky partner, ‘at present extremely valuable for us, later dangerous’.2 The Ostministerlum remained confused and somewhat at loggerheads. Berger took sick. During the following weeks preparations for the official launching of the Vlasov committee absorbed all attention. It was only after the formal issuance of the Vlasov ‘Manifesto’ in mid-November that Arlt again urged the Ukrainians to come to an agreement, even though by then the battle to forestall or dilute the ‘all-Russian’ movement seemed lost. Continued bickering delayed the creation of the separatist counter-committee. Levyts’kyi was

too much the ‘democrat’ to be acceptable to Rosenberg; Skoropadskii was too unpopular to be a symbol of unity; Bandera was feared as unreliable and independent; Mel’nyk had too many enemies; Semenenko was rejected as too much of a mediocrity. After new attempts, Mel’nyk ‘returned his mandate’ and admitted failure.

Only at the turn of the year was a ‘solution’ found in the person of a ‘dark horse’ acceptable to the Ostministerium and to all national-

ist factions except the monarchists: General Pavlo Shandruk — politically not prominent, in the past Petliura’s chief of staff and then an officer of the Polish army, a nationalist but as an Eastern Ukrainian presumably more palatable to the Soviet refugee mass, acceptable

to Berlin because he had collaborated since 1941. Obviously no ‘counter- Vlasov’, Shandruk (with Semenenko and Kubyiovych as deputies) was a figurehead through which the Ostministerium could

finally launch its Ukrainian Committee. Now it was Rosenberg who delayed the new departure. It was some weeks before he sanctioned a farcical miniature constituent conferencein Weimar. By

then it was February 1945, and contact with the UPA in the field was all but lost. ‘The Wehrmacht was again in headlong retreat, and the Vlasov movement had been launched by other German groups, with scant regard for the separatists.3 1 Rosenberg to Lammers, September 19, 1944, Document NG-1293* ; [Herwarth,] ‘Deutschland und die ukrainische Frage, 1941-1945’, MS*, p. 8. 2 Berger, memorandum, October 6, 1944, EAP 161b-12/362*, CRS. Most of their conversation consisted of inanities, typified by Berger’s effort to tease the Ukrainian with the threat of a German-Soviet peace — much on Berger’s mind in those days —- and by Bandera’s retort that Stalin would massacre the Nazis before he would touch the Ukrainian nationalists.

3 Interviews G-6, G-8, G-11, G-22; Brautigam, note, January 3, 1945,

Document NO-3041*. See also below, pp. 645-6.

626 Political Warfare PT. IV Insult and Injury

The ‘national committees’ were the last creations of the Ostministerium. Strictly speaking, by the autumn of 1944 there were no more ‘Occupied Eastern Territories’ to administer, and Goebbels commented sarcastically that Rosenberg reminded him ‘of the many

European monarchs without countries or subjects’.!. As in earlier moments of crisis, Rosenberg became even more jealous of his power,

convulsively clutching his:last bits of authority. He had lost all support and sympathy. Hitler added a final humiliation when, largely

at the suggestion of Bormann and Himmler, he transferred what little territory of the Ukraine remained in German hands, not to Rosenberg but to the 5S-directed administration of Belorussia, and in effect put Erich Koch in charge of Ostland. On the heels of the violent exchange between Rosenberg and Lohse — in which the latter, though blind to his own faults and misdeeds, castigated the

Ostminister unmercifully — Koch, already in charge of defence fortifications in ‘his’ East Prussia, was boosted into what remained of Lohse’s job during the latter’s illness and subsequent withdrawal.

The man who was officially still Minister for the Occupied East

was not even so much as consulted on these moves.?

Rosenberg was furious. This new appointment, which gave Koch increased power, aroused him sufficiently to compose a memo-

randum to Hitler. He complained that ‘in all these questions the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, appointed by the Fuhrer, was, in violation of the Ftihrer’s directives, not consulted,

but was merely informed afterwards’. Rosenberg’s fear of a clash

with Hitler was apparently greater than his pride. The evidence seems to indicate that the memorandum was never sent off.3

Rosenberg was now isolated. Even more crucial to him than these rear-guard skirmishes was the loss of his one link tothe SS. In 1 Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels (London: Westhouse, 1947), p. 156 (entry for October 6, 1944).

2 Lammers to Rosenberg, July 16, 1944* ; Lammers to Rosenberg, July 26, 1944* ; Keitel, teleprint circulars, September 5 and 8, 1944, Document 743-PS,

TMWC, xxvi, 280-3 ; Hauptmann Rahlenbeck [liaison of GK Lithuania to PzAOQK 3] to FHQ, September 11, 1944*. On the Lohse-Rosenberg fight, see above, pp. 196-8. Earlier, Rosenberg had suggested in a 21-page review of German adminis-

tration to be submitted to Hitler, that the Reich Commissariats be abolished (a reflection of his difficulties with Koch and Lohse) and that he be appointed German Viceroy or Protector [Statthalter oder Reichsschutzherr] for the East. (Rosenberg, ‘Die Verwaltung in den besetzten Ostgebieten, Erfahrungen und Vorschlage’, April 24, 1944, EAP 99/64*, CRS.) 3 Rosenberg, ‘Organisatorische und politische Lage 1m Ostland’, September

13, 1944*. For the further development of the Koch-Rosenberg dispute, see Rosenberg to Bormann, October 17, 1944, Document 327-PS, TMWC, xxv, 353-60 ; and Koch to Rosenberg, December 21, 1944*.

CH. XXVIII The Cardhouse Climax 627 his activity on Vlasov’s behalf, Berger, the wavering sycophant and would-be dictator whose views had been influenced by his colleagues at the OMi, now sided with d’Alquen.! Rosenberg could no longer

count on him. He tried in vain to approach Hitler directly, but after July 20 the Fiihrer was kept away from even his own ministers. Each effort by Rosenberg met with interference from Bormann and

Lammers, who now represented Party and State as vicars of the ailing Fuhrer. Humbling himself, Rosenberg sent a new letter to Bormann, on September 7. After a lengthy review of his policy — alike pathetic and ludicrous — he pleaded : I believe, much esteemed Party Comrade Bormann, that by dint of your intervention you have assumed a certain share of the responsibility for things, since you have repeatedly taken an official position with regard to the problems of the East. I therefore ask you now to take this question

to heart and again ask the Fihrer to set a date for me to report to him. .. .?

When a week had passed without action, Rosenberg gave a copy of his request to Lammers, who took still another week to reply : Yesterday I discussed with Reichsleiter Bormann the contents of your

letter of September 7. . . . We agreed to urge the Fiihrer strongly to grant you an interview as soon as possible, together with the Reichsfiihrer-5S.3

Almost casually, Lammers had injected Himmler as a partner of Rosenberg’s, and had delayed his reply until after the HimmlerVlasov meeting. ‘This was not all. Only a few hours later Lammers sent off another wire to the Ostmumnister : . . . L regret to inform you that during the next few weeks the Fihrer

will not be able to receive you for a verbal report. ... I therefore recommend that you, first of all, reach an agreement with the Reichsfiihrer-SS on the principles and directives concerned. . . .4

Here was an insult Rosenberg could not forget. He was never to see

Hitler again. Ostpolittk had been imperceptibly stolen from his Ministry and handed over to a bitter rival. Yet he ignored the advice of Lammers and other advocates of ‘peace on the home front’ that he iron out his difficulties with the 5S. He was urged repeatedly

to seek a personal meeting with Himmler, but he consistently 1 “Who has kept this fellow Vlasov hidden from me for so long ?’ he exclaimed when he was directed to receive the general in Himmler’s stead. (Interview G-6.) 2 Rosenberg to Bormann, September 7, 1944, Document NO-2997%*. 3 Lammers to Rosenberg, September 22, 1944, Document NO-2996*. 4 Lammers to Rosenberg, September 22, 1944, Document NO-2995*.

628 Political Warfare PT. IV refused, barricading himself instead behind a paper wall of ‘delegated authority ’.!

At the same time Rosenberg continued his wearing exchange

with Lammers :

As for the principles and directives for the political guidance of the Eastern nationalities [he wrote], these have always been provided by me. .. . [he intervention of the Ostministerium has always been the right thing.

Since Hitler refused to see him, Rosenberg forwarded a lengthy “Report to the Fuhrer’, summarizing the accomplishments of his

Ministry during the previous three years. Almost in a spirit of resignation, he noted the conflict between his insistence on political

warfare and the course pursued by Hitler and the SS. Curiously confusing the problem of political warfare with the nationality concept he cherished, he reared up — and immediately buckled

under :

As the Fuhrer does not at present wish to give assurances [to the Eastern peoples] regarding their political future, it becomes of course dificult to keep up general policy with any success. According to the wish of the Fihrer, political promises will not be made. I will continue negotiations with the Reichsfiihrung-SS (RSHA and SSHA).?

The agreement between Himmler and Vlasov provided for the

formation of both a military and a political arm of the Russian Liberation Movement. The former was to consist of troops drawn from among existing Osttruppen, Soviet labourers in the Reich and prisoners of war; the latter was a new body, to be proclaimed with

a maximum of pomp. In addition, the propaganda-conscious sponsors insisted, with Vlasov’s wholehearted approval, that the launching of the “Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia’ (known by its Russian initials as KONR) was to be accompanied by a new statement of programme. By October 1944 a draft of the forthcoming Vlasov ‘manifesto’ was being circulated. When a copy reached the OM, its text — not 1 “The Herr Reich Minister [one of his subordinates recorded a few weeks later] wrote him [Himmler] a letter dealing largely with the question of competence,

| especially with reference to the Fiihrer decree of July 1942 which dealt with the division of jurisdiction between the Ostministerium and the Foreign Office [to demonstrate how much authority he was supposed to hold]. . . . No reply was

ever received.” (RMfdbO., II 1c [Labs], ‘ Vermerk betr. General Wlassow’, November 25, 1944, Document NO-3125*.) 2 Rosenberg to Lammers, September 28, 1944, and enclosed memorandum to Hitler, Document NOQ-2544*.

CH. XXVIII The Cardhouse Climax 629 surprisingly — spurred the ‘pro-nationalists’ to action. ‘The Ostministerlum had evolved a formula which, it hoped, provided a graceful ‘out’. It welcomed the Vlasov enterprise if, and only if, it was restricted to the Great Russian nation. In that case the OMi would ‘recognize’ it on the basis of parity with all other national committees, in effect sanctioning the partition of the U.S.S.R. into a number of constituent parts, one of which was ‘Vlasov Russia’. This was the idea which had been bandied about in the spring of 1943, when the first Vlasov operation was being launched. It had not changed a year and a half later, and it became the more or less official line which the Ostministerium now opposed to the Vlasov draft.! The hostility to the KONR project was especially marked among

the separatists. In particular, Mikhail Kedia, the Georgian ‘master-

mind’, often with Mende’s help, got his ‘Caucasian clover-leaf’ (Kedia for the Georgians, Kantemir for the North Caucasians, Dzhamalian for the Armenians, and Alibekov for the Azerbaijanis) to compose reams of protests on behalf of the national committees. At the heart of the Kedia concept was the demand that the Reich recognize the separatists “as equivalent partners and allies’. Unless this was done, ‘we can no longer assume any responsibility

before our peoples or Germany’. On October 6 the Caucasian committees sent Rosenberg one more ultimatum (co-ordinated in advance with Mende): if recognized, they would ‘continue the

struggle against Bolshevism with all the other peoples’; while welcoming Russian participation, they rejected any Russian-directed enterprise, and their promise of collaboration held only if the struggle remained under German rather than Vlasov’s leadership.

Rosenberg was desperate. He had tried for years to fight for 1 As an official of the Rosenberg Ministry put it in retrospect a few weeks later,

. .. at the last moment the Ostministerium intervened and pointed out in a discussion led by Reich Minister Rosenberg that the goal of German Eastern policy had heretofore consisted of aiming at a decomposition of the Ostraum

and its peoples. Now [the SS] wanted to follow the opposite course and practically continue the tsarist and imperial Bolshevik goals. ‘The Eastern Ministry must therefore express itself against this sort of use of Vlasov and

suggests using Vlasov only as a representative of the Russian people. (Document NO-3125*.) See also interviews G-3, G-6, G-8. 2 Kedia, ‘Ursachen unserer Riickschlage 1m Osten und die daraus zu ziehenden Schliisse’, June 6, 1944*, p. 11 ; Kaukasischer Vertrauensrat to OKH/GenStdH/ Gen.d.Freiw.-Verb., September 13, 1944*; Dzhamalian, Alibekov, Kedia, and Kantemir to Rosenberg, November 7, 1944* (citing their memorandum of October 6,1944). See also A. T'somaia, ‘Michael Kedia’, Voice of Free Georgia (New York), no. 7 (November 1955), 25-32; and Sh. N. Maklakelidze, ‘Pis’mo v redaktsiiu’, Zaria vostoka (Tiflis), December 9, 1954.

630 Political Warfare PT. IV his brand of political warfare. The struggle had netted him the determined enmity of Bormann, Goring, and Koch; Goebbels and Himmler despised him; and Hitler ignored him. Now that political warfare had at last become salonfdhig, it was waged by his enemies, who were actively undermining his pet concepts. At the same time the beneficiaries of his abortive policy of decomposing the U.S.5.R. were turning on him, accusing him of weakness and compromise. On October 12, 1944, Rosenberg offered Hitler his resignation.

One may wonder why Rosenberg had not resigned earlier. Indeed, only his loyalty to Hitler and his inordinate craving for authority had enabled him to endure interminable frustrations and defeats over a period of three and a half years. It is a measure of the shock inflicted on him by the Vlasov enterprise if, when all was lost, he now asked to be relieved of his post. Pathetically, to make his point to Hitler, he cited the protests of his émigrés, for whose influence on him Hitler had repeatedly taken him to task. The key to his complaint was the adoption by the SS of the term ‘peoples of Russia’ as an official concept. ‘This phrase, Rosenberg argued,

‘signifies the recognition of the entire old territory as Russian property and the incorporation of all non-Russians into this concept’. The natural result of this demand for military-political leadership [by General Vlasov] over all non-Russian peoples and for their submission to his command has been unanimous hostility. I permit myself, my Fiihrer [Rosenberg continued], to enclose copies of protests from the President

of the National Turkestani Unity Committee [Veli Kayum]; similar declarations have been made by the White-Ruthenian Central Council and the Caucasian peoples, as well as by Ukrainian groups. . . .

The alternative which he supported was to build up the separatist centres :

. . . I established at the Eastern Ministry for all the peoples of the East Leitstellen, which may now be considered to have been well-tested

. . . and are ripe to be recognized as National Committees, if such corresponds to the aims of German policy.

Rosenberg knew that it did not. He felt on safer ground venting his pet complaint against the intrusion of outsiders. I am confronted by a situation in which the most diverse government agencies believe themselves able to master the problems of the East by themselves, and I must note that the first public efforts are so ominous for

Ostpolittk that I feel compelled to submit my worries to you, my Fihrer.

CH. XXVIII The Cardhouse Climax 631 Like a spoiled and mistreated child, he appealed : I beg you, my Fihrer, to tell me whether you still desire my work in this field. . . . In view of developments, I must surmise that you no longer deem my activity necessary.!

There is no evidence that Hitler ever answered or that Bormann and Lammers ever gave him the letter. Rosenberg was outplayed

and he knew it. Nevertheless, receiving no instructions to the contrary, he stayed on.

As if to cap the insult, there now reappeared on the scene that other German casualty of Ostpolittk — the only one against which Rosenberg had once carried the day — Ribbentrop and his Foreign Office. ‘The Vlasov issue allowed it, conveniently, to recoup a little

of its lost influence. At the very time when the Fihrer refused to see Rosenberg, Himmler and Ribbentrop went to see Hitler and apparently obtained his approval to an arrangement by which the 5S would handle the domestic aspects of the Vlasov problem, while the Foreign Office would cope with its international repercussions.

The Initiativgruppe welcomed this development as further ‘committing’ Himmler on the side of political warfare. Nor were Vlasov

and his aides averse to this scheme: having more or less lost Strikfeldt, jettisoned because of his hostility to the SS, they were glad to acquire a new and morally less objectionable ‘ally’ than the

5S. Moreover, the participation of the Auswartiges Amt raised, naively, in their minds the vague hope of securing ‘diplomatic recognition’ of Vlasov by the Reich. For the balance of the war, the Foreign Office maintained an uneasy, ineffectual alignment with the SS in supporting KONR, thus forging another link in the chain around Rosenberg’s phantom realm.?

The preparations of the SS and its associates had meanwhile progressed to the point where the place and date for proclaiming the

new Vlasov committee could be set. Over Rosenberg’s frenzied opposition, Prague -— a symbol of pan-Slavism — was selected as the locale of the announcement,; and the personnel of the ‘Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia’ was hand-picked. 1 Rosenberg to Hitler, October 12, 1944, enclosed with Rosenberg to Lammers, October 12, 1944, and ‘Vorschlag fiir eine Regelung der Ostpolitik’, Document Rosenberg-14, TMWC, xli, 185-94.

2 Buchardt, pp. 278-81; interviews G-3, G-24, G-31; Thorwald, op. cit.

p. 406 ; Document NO-3125* ; Lammers, memorandum, December 15, 1944, Document NG-3876*. At the same time, Himmler continued his efforts to oust Ribbentrop. (See Walter Petwaidic, Die autoritdre Anarchie [Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1946], pp. 114-15.) 3 'The SD, on its part, reported that a rally of collaborationist Czech functionaries in Prague on November 2 had been galvanized by a speech in which Vlasov

632 Political Warfare PT. IV In the face of urgent demands of his aides and the émigré leaders,! Rosenberg again asked for a personal meeting with Hitler before

November 14, the date set for the proclamation of KONR. In letters to Bormann and Lammers Rosenberg expressed his fear that the forthcoming Prague ceremony could ‘easily further pan-Slavic ideas’. He was still waiting for an answer when on the morning of November 14 — just as the session in Prague was about to open — he received a wire from Lammers : . . . Obergruppenfiihrer Schaub [Hitler’s aide] has today informed me by telephone that, for reasons that I cannot elaborate on here, he could not submit your request for a personal conference with the Fuhrer before November 16. Therefore you cannot count on being received by the Fiihrer in the near future. In this connection, Obergruppenfihrer Schaub confirms that the Fiihrer has made definite decisions in the Vlasov

matter to the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reichsfiihrer-SS. Under the circumstances I believe it necessary to advise you to contact the Reich

Foreign Minister and the Reichsftihrer-SS directly concerning your reservations about the planned further treatment of the Vlasov matter.?

Rosenberg had lost. Indian Summer, 1944

Prague in mid-November 1944 saw the peak of Vlasov’s career on the German side, the apex of official Nazi acceptance of political warfare towards Russia, and the victory of the federalist over the separatist concept. Yet Vlasov’s victory was hollow, German tactics were futile, and the federalist success was deceptive. After extensive preparations, what the world saw was the festive proclamation of

the ‘Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia’ and its ‘Manifesto’ adopted under Vlasov’s chairmanship in Prague’s ancient castle, the Hradcany, in the presence of official German representatives who hailed the Soviet defectors as allies. Official had been eulogized as the exponent of a new hope and alternative — something the SD both feared, as an omen of pan-Slavic sentiments, and welcomed, as offsetting pro-Bolshevik attitudes. (RSHA, Amt III B, ‘Anlage zum Tagesbericht Nr. 96/44’, November 10, 1944, EAP 172a-10/1, CRS*.) 1 On November 7 the four Caucasian committees sent Rosenberg another

memorandum, with copies to Himmler and Ribbentrop: ‘It would be funda-

mentally wrong if Germany in the execution of this experiment were to create the impression that the Great Russian Empire of Stalin was to be replaced by a similar one under Vlasov ; for we are firmly convinced that Russia — no matter whether under Stalin or Vlasov — will always be an enemy of Germany, whereas the nonRussian peoples are naturally and by destiny allies of Germany’. (Dzhamalian, Alibekov, Kedia, and Kantemir to Rosenberg, November 7, 1944*.) This document was written by Kedia and is typical of his outlook.

2 Lammers to Rosenberg, November 13, 1944*; Document NO-3125* ;

Thorwald, op. cit. p. 426.

CH. XXVIII The Cardhouse Climax 633 German publicity was generous, and Himmler himself telegraphed to Vlasov his wishes for ‘full success in the interest of the common cause’.!

Both Germans and Russians were acting as if it all still meant something. ‘They were performing before history, with one eye on the Western powers and the other on Moscow. The Prague session took place at the moment when the Allied armies on both sides were about to enter German soil. Only a few weeks earlier the Volkssturm

had been proclaimed in a desperate German attempt to corral the last manpower reserves by a levée en masse. On the political warfare front Berlin was also busy establishing similar ‘governmentsin-exile’, from an Albanian and a Croatian committee to a French exile authority at Sigmaringen.* Vlasov was a part of these tactics of despair. With all its sound and fury, the climax at Prague on November 14

merely concealed the tension which was building up behind the scenes. Not unexpectedly, KONR’s relations with the Germans and with the separatists contributed to its exacerbation. Prior to Prague, there had been prolonged ‘negotiations’ between Vlasov’s staff and the German liaison over the text of the proposed manifesto.3 A few clauses seem to have provoked serious disagreement, in particu-

lar the references (or absence thereof) to Nazism, Jewry, and the Western Allies. According to two independent, reliable sources — one German, one Russian — Himmler himself finally insisted that

derogatory references to the West and to the Jews be added. Buchardt communicated these requests to Vlasov, who somewhat impatiently agreed to a ‘compromise’ which incorporated antiWestern references of a fairly moderate sort, but barred anti-Semitic

sentiments. In the end Vlasov’s view prevailed. Even a good Nazi could maintain (as did the Propaganda Ministry) that by late 1 Himmler to Vlasov, November 15, 1944, VB-B, November 16, 1944. See also editorial, Siegfried Drescher, ‘General Wlassows Kampfprogramm’, and

1951), Pp. 277. .

‘Die russische Freiheitsbewegung’, VB-B, November 15, 1944. 2 See, for instance, Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter (New York : Macmillan,

3 The events at Prague and their background have been amply described. See, in particular, George Fischer, Soviet Opposition ‘to Stalin (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 85-90, for a perceptive analysis ; Buchardt, pp. 283298, for some of the backstage relations ; and Thorwald, op. cit. pp. 425-57, for the most detailed description. For an official contemporary account, including the speeches of various Vlasovite dignitaries, see W. Wladimirow, Dokumente und Material des Komitees zur Befretung der Woélker Russlands (Berlin: KONR, c. 1944).

4 Buchardt, p. 287; and Iurii Pismennyi (pseud.), ‘Ob odnom voprose sviazan-

nom s manifestom’, Vlasovets (Munich), no. 3, pp. 7-8 (1950). There is (and probably can be) no documentary substantiation for this episode.

634 Political Warfare PT. IV 1944 there was more to be gained from an anti-Western than from an anti-Jewish pronouncement.!

The manifesto as finally proclaimed had been co-ordinated among the various German agencies, but it also incorporated the essence of the drafts produced by Vlasov’s staff. The ‘Fourteen Points’, which rapidly became a credo for Vlasov’s followers, made

only minimal references to Nazi Germany,? while insisting on ‘a new free people’s political system without Bolsheviks and exploiters’ and on ‘the restitution to the peoples of Russia of those rights which they fought for and won in the people’s revolution of IQI7’.

On the nationality question, the formula finally adopted pledged ‘equality of all peoples and their genuine right to national development, self-determination, and statehood [gosudarstvennuiu samos-

toiatel’nost’|’. (Art. 1.) On the surface, the appeal went a long way towards conciliating the separatists. In practice, reconciliation

was beyond the power of words. At heart, neither side sought to reach it.

A special effort was made to find representatives of the nonRussian groups who were willing to join KONR. Of those who accepted, most (with a few striking exceptions) were figureheads without political prestige or following. Of the Rosenberg committees, only the smallest — the Kalmyks — joined Vlasov; of the others, only individuals went over to KONR. A month later, in an obvious move to checkmate the separatist committees, Vlasov’s new paper, Volia Naroda, announced the formation of national councils for each major ethnic group within KONR.3

Between the Vlasov-Himmler meeting and the launching of KONR other factors had intervened to loosen the bonds even before they were tied. Some of the SS elements, having now become aware of the separatists’ activity, insisted that the support tendered 1 Interviews G-14, G-31. 2 KONR ‘welcomes Germany’s help under conditions which shall not impair the honour and independence of our country. This help is at this moment the only tangible opportunity for an armed struggle against the Stalin clique.’ (KONR, Manifest [Prague, 1944] ; also in Volia Naroda [Berlin], no. 1 [November 15, 1944] ; Engl. trans., Fischer, op. cit. pp. 194-200.) 3 Volia Naroda, December 17 and 20, 1944. See also interviews H-76, H-354,

H-384, H-546; [Buchardt ?] ‘Deutsche Ostpolitik im Kriege’, Christ und Welt (Stuttgart), January 12 and 19, 1950. The version adopted for the public by the German press was that both Vlasov and the anti-Vlasov nationalists were good anti-Bolsheviks, and that the role of the Reich must be merely that of an “honest broker’. (Robert Krétz, ‘Wlassow-Aktion und Nationalitaétenfrage’, VB-B, December 29, 1944.) 4 D’Alquen, who had repeatedly propelled Himmler into action, was seriously ill and no longer influential.

CH. XXVIII The Cardhouse Climax 635 KONR must in no wise involve the jettisoning by the SS of the anti-Vlasov minorities. Though incompatible, both KONR and the separatists must ‘co-exist’ within the German orbit, just as, in the last analysis, Arlt and Kroeger, Mende and Hilger, Rosenberg and Himmler, ‘co-existed’ in the government machine. In addition, Rosenberg had unwittingly led his opposite numbers

to circumscribe their project a bit more narrowly than they had intended. The promoters of the Vlasov cause in the SS and the Foreign Office chose to step softly lest they give the Ostminister a pretext to reopen the whole issue at a higher level. Thus they abandoned the initial plan to have an array of State Secretaries address the Prague gathering, and instead restricted German speechmaking to Karl-Hermann Frank, who in his capacity of ‘Protector’ of Bohemia-Moravia was the official host, and Werner Lorenz, a high-ranking but undistinguished SS official, who represented the authorities in Berlin.! Finally, there is a suggestion — apparently not demonstrable in documentary evidence, yet entirely in line with the Party Chancellery’s preoccupation with fencing in the power-greedy SS — that Martin Bormann, while ignoring Rosenberg’s appeals and memoranda, used the Ostminister’s opposition to make the 55 soften its stand on the Vlasov affair. Bormann asserted that Hitler would ‘for reasons of principle’ never acquiesce in a dissolution of the Eastern Ministry, since (Bormann gave Himmler to understand) the Fihrer wished the foundations of Ostpolittk preserved. As in the spring of 1941, Bormann was thus prepared to use Rosenberg as a pawn 1n his game to checkmate Himmler. In this particular case, Vlasov was the one who felt the backwash.? Other German quarters who a few weeks earlier had lent their voices in acclaim, also slowly began to draw away from the Vlasov enterprise. ‘Taubert increasingly accepted Arlt’s arguments. ‘The Army feared that Vlasov and the SS would demand control over all Osttruppen. And the Gestapo kept dropping hints that individuals

in KONR and the ROA were seeking to establish contact with Western and neutral powers. The whole consolidation of Russian forces, it feared, was but a device to wring more concessions from the Reich. It could point in evidence to a Vlasovite paper which,

commenting on the proclamation at Prague, insisted that, ‘the stronger militarily our armed forces, the more will they become a ™ Others, like Késtring and Hilger, attended but remained on the sidelines. The Rosenberg office was not represented. Of those invited, only the Gestapobacked Russian monarchists under General Biskupskii sought to ‘sabotage’ the gathering.

2 Interviews G-3, G-22,; Buchardt, pp. 291-2.

636 Political Warfare PT. IV political instrument, a weapon in our political struggle... .’! Other materials, files, and leaflets found among the Vlasovites also indicated that more and more elements — democratic or solidarist or non-political nationalist — were preparing to desert the German cause.

The SD was guided, perhaps more than some of the other agencies involved, by the response to the announcement of the Vlasov-

Himmler meeting among the Ostarbeiter and other Soviet personnel

in the Reich. Internal reports frankly described the division in

their midst :

The minority maintains that Germany has lost the war one way or the other and will be occupied by the Anglo-Americans. . . . Among these Russians the view prevails that after their victory England and America will destroy Bolshevism in Russia and establish ‘genuine democracy’. ‘If today we go with Vlasov’, these Russians say, ‘the Anglo-Americans will not forgive us this.’ The other part of the Russians feels that . . . victory over Bolshevism

in Russia 18 possible only with the help of a real Russian army. The Russians also say: ‘We often expressed the wish to join the Vlasov Army,

but it has always been turned down. Instead we were told to join the Waffen SS. This we haven’t wanted, because it is not a genuinely Russian force.’ 2

Neither of these groups could be considered by the Germans wholly

devoted to their cause. For that matter neither could the Soviet

refugees and prisoners view the Germans as entirely reliable allies.

A tenuous deal had been struck at Prague, dramatic in form, yet constructed on shaky and rotten foundations. Like a dying star, the brightness of the political warfare campaign at this late hour concealed its decomposition. No tokens and trumpets could alter the fact that Germany — and with her the collaborators — had lost the war.

1 K. A. Bykovich, ‘Politicheskie zadachi osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia’, Golos voina (n.p.), no. 8 (November 16, 1944). See also the semi-official comment by Grote that ‘the peoples of Russia and of the East fight against Stalin for objectives of theirown’. (Hauptmann von Grote, ‘Millionenfront gegen den Bolschewismus’, Deutsche Ost-Korrespondenz, no. 5 [December 1, 1944].)

2 SD-Abschnitt Weimar, Aussenstelle Weimar, ‘Betr.: Aktion des Generals

Wlassow’, October 7, 1944, EAP 173b-14-10/6*, CRS.

CHAPTER XXIX

ON THE BRINK OF THE ABYSS Vlasov is all we have left.—SCHWERIN-KRosIGK, February 1945

Vlasov is nothing.—HITLER, January 1945

Rosenberg : Impotence and Isolation

THE Ostministertum had been bombed out and a large part of its archives had been burned.! Many of its personnel had been turned over to the armed forces. Still the jungle warfare continued. In the wake of Prague, Rosenberg instructed his staff that, regardless of all other projects, work with the separatist committees was to continue so as to make them, as an aide paraphrased his directives, ‘a necessary counter-weight to imperial strivings emanating from Vlasov’.? If there had been any faltering in Rosenberg’s anti-Vlasov mood,

it was promptly corrected by the separatists. On November 18, in reply to the KONR manifesto, Mikhail Kedia persuaded the various

committees, at the instigation of Mende, to submit a collective protest to Rosenberg. Calling themselves the ‘plentipotentiaries’ of their peoples, the nine men insisted that Vlasov’s activity ‘must be limited to Russia, in the ethnographic sense of the word’. Refusing

to recognize either Vlasov or the non-Russian spokesmen cooperating with him, they concluded with a formal demand addressed to the German government : (1) To forestall all of General Vlasov’s demands for leadership of our peoples ;

(2) To recognize, effective immediately, the right of our peoples to independent statehood and to grant definitive recognition to our national representations ;

(3) To permit, for the struggle against Bolshevism, the formation of our national units under the sole command of our officers, subordinated operationally to the German Wehrmacht, but leaving 1 ‘The Reichskommissariate and Generalkommissariate were formally ordered

dissolved as of November 10, 1944. (H.Gr. Mitte, OQu/VII [Mil.-Verw.], ‘Monatsbericht fiir Oktober 1944’, November 15, 1944, Document NOKWer’ RMfdbO.. II, rc [Labs], ‘Vermerk betr. General Wlassow’, November 25, 1944, Document NO-3125*.

G.R.R.— 2 T 037

638 Political Warfare PT. IV the political leadership within these formations to our national representations. !

At the same time, the committees established a co-ordinating centre

to ‘represent the common interests of our oppressed peoples in solidarity to the outside world’.? Rosenberg could no longer control the committees which he had

expected to use as alluring puppets. Helplessly, he let Mende and Arlt engineer appeals, councils, and rallies and barricaded himself behind a wall of memoranda, ignoring the efforts of those who wished him to seek some common ground with the pro-KONR

forces or the SS. Rosenberg sought succour in other quarters. According to Berger, the Ostminister saw Lammers eight times between December 1 and 20.3 On November 29 he submitted to Lammers the draft of a proposed new Fiihrer decree aimed at ‘streamlining’ policy towards the East. Instead of giving it to Hitler, Lammers forwarded it to Himmler and Ribbentrop, urging Rosenberg henceforth to settle such problems with these two colleagues, who, of course, could always outvote him.* Next the Ostminister tried to drum up support for his nationality concept from Ley, the Labour Front chief who feared that too many Ostarbeiter would be

induced to volunteer for the KONR forces, and from Goebbels, who, Rosenberg assumed, supported Taubert’s ‘pro- Ukrainian’ line.5

This sophomoric hunt for support could not hold up the crumb-

ling Ostministerium. Brdutigam, under attack by the SS among other things for his stand on the nationality question, resigned from

the Rosenberg Ministry. Next it was Berger’s turn. He resigned 1 Letter to Rosenberg, November 18, 1944, Document NO-2998*. It was signed by Shafi Almaz (Volga Tatars), Dzhamalian (Armenia), Alibekov (Azerbaijan), Kedia (Georgia), Kantemir (North Caucasus), Kirimal (Crimean Tatars), Sharimi (Turkestan), Astrotski (Belorussia) ; Ukrainian participation was assured by having Mel’nyk sign ‘on behalf of Ukrainian national political groups’. 2 ‘Grundlagen der Zusammenarbeit der Vertreter der von Russland unter-

driickten Volker ; Protokoll der Tagung . . . vom 18. November 1944’*. Asa smaller unit within the centre, the four Caucasus committees formed a ‘Caucasian [Confederative] Council’. (Interviews G-6, H-546.) 3 Lammers to Rosenberg, December 17, 1944* ; Berger to Himmler, December 20, 1944*. 4 Lammers to Rosenberg, December 6, 1944*. 5 Ley to Rosenberg, December 14, 1944* ; Rosenberg to Goebbels, December 23, 1944*. See also Rosenberg, ‘Richtlinien fiir die Presse und Propaganda im Bezug auf die allgemeine Ostpolitik und die Behandlung der Ostvélker im deut-

schen Hoheitsbereich’, December 19, 1944, Document NO-3102*. On Ley’s opposition to the draft of labour for the new ROA, see Buchardt, p. 331. 6 Braiutigam to Rosenberg, December 19, 1944, Document NO-2539*. See his testimony, Case XI, Engl. transcript, p. 1024 ; and Bréutigam, letter to author, August 20, 1955.

CH. XXIX On the Brink of the Abyss 639 from the Ostministerium in January 1945 after a series of sharply worded exchanges with Rosenberg, who demanded his undivided

‘loyalty’ and insisted that the SSHA be kept out of Ostpolitik. This demand Berger could ignore once he was out of the Ministry. Indeed, through the Eastern section of Amt D, the Waffen SS, and other SS agencies, Berger now fancied himself an arbiter of Eastern affairs. His crowning insult to Rosenberg was to begin his summary report to Himmler with the words : ‘Subject: Reich Ministry for the no longer occupied Eastern territories.’ !

Meanwhile Rosenberg was goaded on by his own ego, which refused to accept defeat, by his German inferiors, who refused to abandon their intrigues, and by his Eastern politicians, who refused to be stooges. He had to make some effort to dramatize his conflict with the 5S-backed Vlasov endeavour and at least to try to restore the balance. Increasingly reckless in his charges and angered over the pilfering of the last remnant of his phantom empire, Rosenberg baldly accused Vlasov of subversion and in particular of ‘preparing a

Great Russian dictatorship with the aid of unknown strawmen’ claiming to represent the other nationalities of the U.5S.5S.R._ If KONR insisted that the struggle against Stalinism must take place under its unified command, ‘the Vlasov committee overlooks the fact that such unity can be assured only through the German command’. The various efforts of KONR to establish national sections and to ‘intrude’ into such fields as social and youth work which

the OM: considered its bailiwick, were, to Rosenberg, simply ‘deliberate provocation’ on Vlasov’s part.? At his last major conference with Berger, Rosenberg charged the SS with sanctioning a fatal course, for which he refused all responsibility. ‘Vlasov, instead of being used for external propaganda, does virtually nothing but establish on German soil organizations aiming

at a Great Russian power.’ ‘The SS had not shown him the draft of the Prague Manifesto until after it had been approved. He had never been able to procure a copy of the Himmler-Vlasov protocol 1 Berger to Himmler, December 20, 1944, and Berger to Brandt, December 30, 1944*; Rosenberg to Berger, December 23, 1944, Document NO-3101* ; Rosenberg to Berger, January 20, 1945, Document NO-347, NMT, xii, 382-3 ;

interview G-8. 2 Rosenberg, ‘Wlassow und die Nationalitéten’, enclosure with Rosenberg to

Lammers, January 3, 1945*. Earlier, in arguing with Berger, Rosenberg had

castigated Vlasov’s ‘three demands’ for Ostarbeiter : equal status, elimination of Ost insignia, and freedom of movement. ‘These demands’, Rosenberg added, ‘have of course been refused.’ (Rosenberg to Berger, November 23, 1944, EAP 99/1006*, CRS.)

640 Political Warfare PT. IV of September 1944. Hitler, Rosenberg added naively — and erroneously — would surely have forbidden this entire Vlasov nonsense if only someone had told him about it: he, Rosenberg, could no longer reach the Fiihrer in person or by letter. And unless

someone did, the Ostminister added (at a moment when Allied troops were already on German soil) ‘our children will have to face a centralized [Russia] within thirty years’ after the German victory and Vlasov’s installation as a Great Russian ruler — and this only because ‘some agencies [the SS] had not understood the development of things’.! Who still listened to Rosenberg ? Incapable of breaking with the Nazi cause which he still claimed as his own, lacking the intestinal fortitude to provoke a show-down, Rosenberg strung along to the end. He had no choice. Between Army and SS In the remaining months of the war the issue of political warfare

was no longer central in Ostpolittzk. Attention now shifted to the two substantive complexes: troops and propaganda. In both, the crucial issue was the nationality question. The solution sought by both the Army and the SS was to support simultaneously the two mutually exclusive formulas and their spokesmen — federalist and separatist. This basic similarity in tactics of Army and SS, in both

cases purely utilitarian, did not alleviate other tensions between them. On the contrary, the last phase of the war saw the culmination of the cat-eat-mouse game that Himmler had set out to play. In the field of propaganda, the rush to use all possible resources

propelled Wehrmacht Propaganda to issue a directive on ‘Vlasov propaganda among non-Russians’ : Though the concentration [Zusammenfassung] of all anti-Bolshevik forces is necessary for the common struggle against the Soviet terror system, there is no intention of incorporating the non-Russian units into

the ROA. The continued separate existence of the national units of Caucasians, Turkestanis, Ukrainians, and Cossacks has been pledged to the respective national groups.

It was against this background that Wedel, the head of WPr, denounced all Vlasovite propaganda calling for the subordination of the national legions to KONR as based on misinformation or on wilful

distortion of German policy. His plan was to continue using separatism in propaganda along with an emphatic, stepped-up 1 Rosenberg, ‘Vermerk uber eine Unterredung mit SS-Obergruppenfihrer Berger am 11.1.45’, Document NO-353*.

CH. XXIX On the Brink of the Abyss 641 Vlasov theme, which, he stressed, did not mean a ‘united indivisible Russia’ but rather a ‘united indivisible struggle against Bolshevism’.! However, WPr IV was itself about to lose its autonomy to the SS octopus. By the end of 1944 it had been placed under the direction of d’Alquen’s deputy, SS Sturmbannftihrer Kriegbaum, who, it is true, interfered little in the actual workings of its remaining staff. Strikfeldt, who continued to view the SS with undisguised hostility

and its endorsement of Vlasov as ‘neither repentance nor insight but sheer egoism and deceit’, left the WPr. As a policy factor, Wehrmacht Propaganda had come to an ignominious end.? Henceforth attention was focused almost entirely on the military

utilization of the Easterners. The Army’s attitude was ambiguous. After July 20 it had lost every vestige of power in the Nazi state. Stripped of many top-ranking officers, politically cowed, increasingly resigned to defeat, the Wehrmacht refused to become deeply involved

in the Vlasov affair. Neither the KONR leaders nor their opposite

numbers among the separatists had direct contact with Jodl or Keitel. General Guderian was the only leading military man who was still actively interested in the maximum utilization of Osttruppen.3

The sole operating agency of the armed forces still involved in Eastern ‘policy’ was General KOstring’s office for volunteer formations (General der Freiwilligen-Verbinde). K6string’s position

was made difficult by his strife with the encroaching SS, and at the same time his efforts to stave off transferring the command of Eastern troops directly to Vlasov and his ROA.

The SS had staked out bigger claims for control over military affairs. After July 20 Himmler had assumed command of the Home,

or Replacement, Army (he liked to refer to himself with studied forgetfulness as commander-in-chief of the Army in general), and this new responsibility provided the rationale for the 5S’s initiative in the formation of ‘Vlasov divisions’. Although their establishment was an organic part of the September 1944 agreement, the questions I OKW/WPr IV(A), ‘Wlassow-Propaganda unter Nichtrussen’, November 7, nar Interviews G-3, G-6, G-25 ; Strik-Strikfeldt, letter to author, December 19, 1953 ; Eugen Dirksen, deposition transcript, ZS 402/I, 2-7*, IfZ. The old boss of WPr IV, Colonel Hans Martin, was removed in May 1944 for implication in a

widespread black-market network, along with State Secretary Gutterer of the Propaganda Ministry.

3 Until he encountered opposition from both the SS and KONR, Guderian

toyed with the idea of making Ké6string, the nominal head of Eastern units, colonelgeneral actually in command of a larger ROA; he courteously wired Vlasov best wishes for success; but otherwise even he did not burden himself with the ‘Eastern

question’. (Interview G-1 ; VB-M, January 20, 1945 ; Buchardt, p. 302; Jiirgen Thorwald, Wen sie verderben wollen [Stuttgart : Steingriiben-Verlag, 1952], p. 412.)

642 Political Warfare PT. IV of who was to command them, how they were to be supplied, armed, and put into action, and what relations were to exist between German

and Russian personnel, had not been spelled out. Apparently Himmler was not committed to turning over command of the ‘Russian divisions’ to Vlasov, while Berger hoped that a German

officer could be placed in command of all Russian units. Even prior to the public announcement of the Vlasov-Himmler meeting, Berger had urged the Reichsfithrer-SS to appoint to this job Count Thun, a former Habsburg cavalry officer who had worked in the German Foreign Office, later in the Abwehr and in anti-partisan warfare. Because of Thun’s linguistic excellence and his ‘familiarity with the mentality of the Eastern peoples’, Berger urged Himmler

to have him promoted, transferred to the SS and ‘entrusted with the leadership of the Russians, like Pannwitz for the Cossacks’. Amazingly, Himmler consented promptly and authorized Berger to request Thun’s transfer.!

Someone in the 5S hierarchy apparently realized that such a move was incompatible with the Vlasov operation, and the Thun plan was abandoned. Instead there emerged another plan, logically just as incompatible, which was to lure K6string into the 5S, perhaps

through promise of a promotion. Feelers were put out even prior to the September 16 conference and more substantial efforts came in October and November, but the old general resisted successfully.

With all his limitations, he perceived clearly that the Vlasovites looked upon the German-commanded Osttruppen as ‘mercenaries’,

while the Osttruppen, in turn, considered the SS Eastern units as Schweinehunde (to use his term) who were used to quell anti-Nazi uprisings throughout conquered Europe. Under the circumstances,

he preferred to remain under the OKH —a status accepted by Himmler at their conference on December 7, 1944, when, in the aftermath of Prague, the formation of the first independent ‘KONR division’ was authorized. ‘Thus Ko6string survived the reorganization, although many expected him eventually to be absorbed by the Himmler empire. Indeed, at the time he resigned from the Rosenberg Ministry, Berger expected Késtring shortly to be placed under the RFSS by Hitler’s order.” 1 Berger to Himmler, September 26, 1944, and Himmler to Berger, September 27, 1944, Himmler file 112*. 2 Kostring, ‘ Freiwilligenverbande’, MS*, p. 7 ; interviews G-1, G-8; Berger

to Himmler, n.d., Document NG-4642* ; Buchardt, p. 302. Himmler’s attitude was that if the Russians proved themselves to be good fighters on the German side, he would authorize the expansion of their forces and the transfer of further units to Vlasov’s own (rather than German) command, without German personnel built into key positions of control and guidance.

CH. XXIX On the Brink of the Abyss 643 Kostring had been in favour of the Vlasov enterprise. At Prague he had sung and drunk lustily with the KONR crowd. At the same

time he was eager neither to lose influence nor to jeopardize the morale and strength of the nationality units under his supervision.

He regarded KONR as an addition to, rather than a substitute for, the diverse Ostbataillone scattered from Norway to Yugoslavia. The purely military task was to increase the number of men fighting

for Germany. Kd6string and his adjutant, Hans von Herwarth, looked upon Vlasov as something of a political roof for the variegated

Eastern units; muzlitarily, they refused to yield the command to him.

Although many members of the non-Russian legions apparently

favoured some form of integration with the ROA, the prevalent separatist mystique and control were so iron-clad that the German command did not dare raise this question, lest morale and combat

efhciency be further impaired. K6string refused to sanction the transfer of non-Russian Osttruppen to the new KONR command — not so much for reasons of conviction as primarily for the sake of

military convenience and security, and also for fear that Vlasov might emerge as a ‘competitor’ who would deprive the German staff of its raison d’étre.}

The resulting attempt to straddle the nationality fence was reflected as late as March 1945 in a directive on the treatment of

ex-Soviet troops. For purposes of recruitment, training, and assignment, prisoners due to become Osttruppen were to be segregated by nationality. ‘In particular, it is useful to separate Russian volunteers from the other Eastern volunteers.” On the other hand, the Vlasov committee was to provide the political programme for the Russian volunteers, and the common purpose for all Eastern troops, regardless of nationality, was the short-range goal of defeating

Bolshevism. ‘Only after its attainment can the long-range goal of politically reshaping the Soviet area be tackled.’ The Ko6string office again tried to sidestep the issue of separatism.?

In all this the Army had not bothered even to consult the Ostministerium. ‘To this extent it saw eye to eye with the SS, which arrogated to itself the prerogatives of political guidance without any legal or formal props. The order providing for the establishment of 1 Interviews G-1, G-8, G-19; Ko6string, op. cit.; Buchardt, pp. 316, 353-5 ; Rosenberg to Goebbels, December 23, 1944*; Brautigam, ‘Aufzeichnung tiber den Besuch des Generals der Kav. Kostring, Gen. der Fretw.-Verbande, beim Herrn Reichsminister am 20.11.44’*. 2 OKH/Gen.d.Freiw.-Verb. [Lt.-Col. Hansen], ‘Hinweise fiir die Behandlung von ostvolkischen Freiwilligen in deutschen Einheiten’, March 15, 1945, Document NO-3977*.

644 Political Warfare PT. IV one, and then two ‘Vlasov divisions’ dealt a body blow to the Ostministerium: ‘The political goals are to be set by RFSS/SSHA’.! The first inclination in the SS, and particularly on the part of

Berger, had been to make the new Vlasov units divisions of the Waffen SS, just as the Kaminskii Brigade had been slated to become the 29th Waffen SS Division. Such a status carried with it treasonable and mercenary connotations which made it unpalatable to any

but the most unprincipled of KONR personnel. After a heated exchange, the SS dropped the subject, and in December 1944 the formation of the first KONR Division was finally authorized by Himmler acting as chief of the Home Army. A second division was activated only in late January 1945.7 Various factors accounted for the limited scope and long delay in the formation of KONR units. Suspicion was rampant regarding the entire Vlasov enterprise, and specifically concerning the reliability

and future performance of his troops. Inertia, red tape, and a growing sense of futility contributed their share. By the turn of the year it was indeed a feat to procure supplies and arms for a “Russian

division’ when there was not enough for the Wehrmacht itself. The recruitment of soldiers from among prisoners and forced labour

encountered hostility from German supervisors as well as ambivalence from the prospective troops. The KONR forces were held to a maximum of 50,000 men, compared with what might well have been over half a million had separate ROA and other Eastern battalions and Cossack troops been transferred to one command.

Politically and symbolically most: significant, perhaps, was the

transfer on January 28, 1945, of the formal command authority from the Wehrmacht (and Hitler as commander-in-chief) to KONR (and Vlasov as commander) — a move that produced sparks of hope (as well as bureaucratic over-expansion at headquarters) in KONR, and led to the prompt and lusty removal of German insignia by the troops.? 1 OKH/Obfh.d.Ersatzheeres/AHA, ‘Aufstellung der 600.1.D. (russ.)’, December 1, 1944, and ‘Aufstellung der 650. I.D.(russ.)’, January 23, 1945, H 37/87%*,

Ibid. A third division planned by Vlasov for recruitment in Austria never went beyond the preliminary stages. In addition, various auxiliary units —a reserve brigade, a small ‘air force’, a construction battalion, and an officers’ replacement pool — became part of the KONR armed forces. 3 On the KONR armed forces, see George Fischer, Soviet Opposition to Stalin

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 94-8, 210-11 ; Buchardt, pp. 296-9; Viacheslav Artem’ev, ‘History of General Vlasov’s Army’, MS* ; Vladimir Pozdniakov, ‘Pervaia pekhotnaia diviziia vooruzhennykh sil KONR’, MS*. See also Thorwald, op. cit. pp. 457-86 ; and David Chavchavadze, ‘The Vlassov Movement’, MS* (Yale University, 1950).

CH. XXIX On the Brink of the Abyss 645 The KONR forces emerged in a never-never land of autonomy, suspended in limbo between Wehrmacht and SS, and poised uneasily

between the crumbling Reich and the advancing Allies. In the three-cornered struggle each faction had compromised. K6string remained at the head of the OKH office for Eastern troops, though his difficulties rapidly came to outweigh any satisfaction he derived

from his position. Vlasov obtained direct command over some armed and organized men, though far fewer than he had hoped to have for either combat or bargaining power. Himmler remained ultimate judge and master of the entire enterprise, although he delegated some authority and to the very end entertained doubts about the experiment.

The ambivalence exhibited by the SS in the military field was also apparent in its conduct of political affairs — in particular, in the thorny nationality problem, over which the SS was rent between two diametrically opposed orientations typified by Arlt and Kroeger. It is hard to believe that Himmler viewed the entire political warfare episode as anything more than a tactical aberration which he would have gladly dispensed with on the day of victory. He still followed

the precept of ‘divide and conquer’. ‘The Ukrainian-Russian tensions [among the émigrés], which in themselves are in no sense displeasing to us, must not grow to the point where they impair our

combat position vis-a-vis the outside world.’ Hence, a formula which would neither subordinate the Ukrainian nationalists to Vlasov nor permit them to establish a committee of their own : It is to be recommended to General Vlasov that he appeal, again and again, to the non-Russian nationalities as allies in the struggle against Bolshevism and tell them that their future fate will correspond to their [combat] performance. The RFSS does not desire that nationalities who do not wish to, should be forced under General Vlasov’s command. Yet a united front against Bolshevism is mandatory towards the outside. . . . The RFSS does not desire the formation of a Ukrainian Committee independent of General Vlasov, as it would make our policy towards General Vlasov appear in a double-dealing light.!

Surprisingly enough, at this late stage there emerged the outline of a modus vivend: between Vlasov and Shandruk. Both were more

pliable than some of their aides, and both had been informed of Himmler’s prospectiveattitude. A plan proffered by Vlasov (probably 1 [No author], ‘Vermerk tiber die Besprechung beim RFSS 8.1.1945’, Document EAP 161c-32-10/9*, CRS.

646 Political Warfare PT. 1V at the suggestion of his SS advisers) seemed to pave the way for a compromise: Shandruk with his Ukrainian Committee, still ‘unrecognized’, would be formally installed as representatives solely of Galicia — which Vlasov willingly acknowledged as non-Russian. Shandruk would command a Ukrainian (Galician) army; another division consisting of Eastern Ukrainians who wished to place themselves under Vlasov’s banners would be formed under KONR. At

his second and last encounter with Vlasov, in February 1945, Himmler sanctioned this idea in principle. Informed of it by Ribben-

trop, Hitler impatiently admonished him to stop playing games.! Thus the project collapsed. On February 23, 1945, Rosenberg, with the consent of the SS, formally empowered Shandruk to head a Ukrainian National Committee, the last separatist body to emerge under the Ostministerium’s wing.? Himmler had come through these minor skirmishes unscathed

and eager for action. The intrigues at home were to continue. Himmler instructed Berger that ‘the nuisance operations [Stéraktionen| which the Ministry for the Occupied East is currently conducting, be deflected by deft handling into a conflict between the Foreign Office and the Eastern Ministry’. ‘Two weeks later Berger

obediently informed the RFSS that ‘I am trying by all means to keep out of this power struggle [between Rosenberg and Ribbentrop]

in order to be that much more active in the inner infiltration’. Nor had Himmler’s attitude towards Russia changed. His gestures toward KONR were but a ploy. He still maintained — in 1945 ! — that Moscow must form the western border of the future Russia. ‘The centre of gravity of a future Russia must be an East-Russian Siberian state, whose expansionism must be channelled towards the Gulf of Persia. Presupposing a [Russian] renunciation of a policy aimed at westward expansion, friendship with Russia is entirely 1 Interviews G-1, G-3, G-6, G-8, G-24 ; Buchardt, pp. 320-6; [Herwarth,] ‘Deutschland und die ukrainische Frage, 1941~1945’, MS*, p. 8; Fischer, op. cit, pp. 207-8. Vlasov and Shandruk met on January 30, 1945. In his memoirs, Shandruk does not refer to any of the compromise variants or ‘deals’ discussed above and reported by other informants. (P. Shandruk, ‘Tse bulo tak’, Rozbudova derzhavy [Cleveland], vi [1954], no. 3, 37-39.) 2 Rosenberg to Shandruk, February 23, 1945, RMfdbO., InformationsdtenstOst, no. 1 (March 21, 1945), LC. The policy of compromise between Vlasov and

the Ukrainians was accompanied by a change of personnel which made SSGruppenfiihrer Otto Wachter, the ex-governor of Galicia, the SS middleman to Vlasov and the nationalists. Strongly Nazi, anti-Western, and anti-Semitic in his public utterances, Wachter was given credit by his associates, however, for a measure of tact and ability to bring different factions together. See his article in Verwaltungsakademie Wien, Das grossere Reich (Berlin: Verlag fiir Sozialpolitik, 1943), and his speech in May 1944, published as ‘Galizien, Europa und der Bolschewismus’, Die Aktion (Berlin), v (1944), 165-9.

CH. XXIX On the Brink of the Abyss 647 conceivable. . . .2!_ Himmler could not but know that even Vlasov and his staff had accepted no ‘settlement’ of this kind, but that did not disturb him in the slightest. Dramatis Personae

As a process of piecemeal atrophy began to afflict the organs of the German government machine in the last months of the war, its

conflicting and increasingly self-propelled elements gave little thought to what was still optimistically called Ostpolittk. With Germany itself feeling the brunt of two-pronged invasion, the Nazi

élite was preoccupied with matters of greater urgency. The progressive breakdown of central controls, as well as the inertia generated among the Germans by a sense of futility and doom, gave the Soviet

defectors a greater opportunity to take into their own hands if not their fates, at least their immediate activities. Yet, almost to the eve of surrender, German officials went on with their deeply engrained routines, acting out the motions of policy-making and report-writing, responding to bureaucratic stimuli in a world of make-believe. For most of the leading figures of the Reich, the ‘Eastern problem’ now boiled down to their own attitudes towards Vlasov and other leading defectors. Personalities had replaced policies. Hitler lived in a world of his own, dictating as in a fever, perceiving the outside only dimly. He still expected to recapture the Ukraine, if only because ‘the raw materials there are indispensable for us to carry on the war’.2, He had no conception of émigré relations and 1 *“Vermerk’, op. cit.; and Document NG-4662*.