Gender and Violence in Islamic Societies: Patriarchy, Islamism and Politics in the Middle East and North Africa 9780755608256, 9781780765303

Citation preview

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Canan Aslan-Akman is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, The Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. Mariam al-Attar is Head of the Department of Ethics, Philosophy and Religion EPR, King’s Academy, Jordan. Claudia Corsi is a Civil Servant at the Ministry of Interior, Prefettura of Milan, Immigration Office. She is also a Postdoctoral researcher in Comparative Law and Integration Processes. Moha Ennaji is Professor of Gender Studies and Linguistics, International Institute for Languages and Cultures, Centre for Intercultural Dialogue and Migration Studies, University of Fez, Morocco. David Ghanim is Senior Research Fellow, Department of Philosophy, Linguistics, and Theory of Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. Hiam Salaheldin Elgousi is Post Doctoral Research Fellow, School of Modern Languages and Cultures, University of Leeds.

Salhi_Prelims.indd vii

5/7/2013 6:50:24 PM

viii

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

Raoudha Kammoun is Assistant Professor of English and Linguistics, Faculty of Letters, Arts & Humanities, University of Manouba, Tunisia. Ibrahim Kharboush is Professor of Maternal and Child Health, High Institute of Public Health, University of Alexandria, Egypt. Consultant in the Research Department, Alexandria Regional Center for Women’s Health and Development. Heba M. Mamdouh is Lecturer of Maternal and Child Health, High Institute of Public Health, University of Alexandria, Egypt. Consultant in the Research Department, Alexandria Regional Center for Women’s Health and Development. Fatma Zohra M. Nedjai teaches in the Department of English, Faculty of Letters and Humanities, University of Mouloud Mammeri, Tizi-Ouzou, Algeria. Zahia Smail Salhi is Professor of Modern Arabic Studies in the School of Arts, Languages and Cultures, Faculty of Humanities University of Manchester. Fatma Tütüncü is Associate Professor, Department of Public Administration, Abant Izzet Baysal University, Bolu, Turkey. Souryana Yassine is Lecturer, Department of English, Faculty of Letters and Humanities, University of Mouloud Mammeri, TiziOuzou, Algeria.

Salhi_Prelims.indd viii

5/8/2013 12:32:55 PM

INTRODUCTION GENDER AND VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC SOCIETIES: PATRIARCHY, ISLAMISM AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

In December 1993, the United Nations in its General Assembly made the following declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women: ‘Violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women’, and defined violence against women as ‘any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life’. Although violence against women is present in every country and no society can claim to be free of such violence, wide variations exist in the ways it is perceived and addressed by different societies. Such perceptions are always shaped by various factors including culture, religion, economics and politics. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) unequal power relations between men and women still prevail and are sustained by

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec41

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

2

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

patriarchy and the rise of Islamism in the last few decades. These two entities shape the political discourse of the ruling elite and have serious repercussions for the ways family laws are constructed and in consequence the manner gender and violence are perceived and tackled. It is a common phenomenon in the MENA region that under the apparel of patriarchal culture and misinterpretations of religion women’s human rights are removed and violated. It has to be noted, however, that while these countries share a strong sense of patriarchal culture, Sharia-based Family Codes, and rising Islamic extremism which all contribute to maintaining and sustaining certain forms of violence against women, the levels and forms of violence differ from one country to another. It would be a grave error to overlook diversity in the types of violence that exist in each country, the intensity, and the processes of addressing such violence. Although there is no universally accepted definition of violence against women this study is based on the gender-based roots of violence as it is inflicted on women and girls specifically because of their gender, and targets their self-worth and their right to life with dignity and security. Violence has deep-seated physical and psychological effects on the victims and it is perpetuated by intimate partners and other family members, and by the state. It occurs both in the public and the private spheres, in the family, within the general community, at work and in various state institutions. Violence is perceived not only as physical harm which targets women’s bodies, but includes various forms of violence directed at women because they are women and these include segregation in the workplace and limiting women’s access to wealth, gender stereotyping through textbooks and the media, verbal aggression and humiliation, control of women’s finances and income, forced veiling and restricted access to education and health care. This volume is set to be a forum among academics in various disciplines, practitioners and activists as they approach the subject of gender-based violence in the Middle East and North Africa. Their accounts testify to the urgency of addressing the phenomenon of gender-based violence not only in terms of putting in place adequate legislation to protect the human rights of women as universal rights

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec42

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

INTRODUCTION

3

but also and most importantly by enabling women to become aware of their human rights and therefore reject all forms of violence directed at them mainly by understanding that they should not bear suffering in the name of male honour. The book delves into an area which is considered highly sensitive and more often than not designated as a taboo topic, especially in the case of honour killings, female genital mutilation and marital rape. It does so through firsthand studies by experts from the region and includes both quantitative and qualitative research. In addition to studies based on recent observations of gender violence and sociological interpretations of the phenomenon, the book incorporates chapters on religious ethics and lends an interpretation to violence from that perspective. This is so mainly because in the MENA region Islam is used as the reference to all legislation especially concerning family law. The chapters on religious ethics aim to debunk wrong beliefs and prevailing stereotypes of Islam as a misogynist religion aimed at controlling and repressing women. Although the subject of ‘Gender and Violence’ has received adequate attention in the Western world, in the Eastern world it still remains a taboo subject which is difficult to approach and therefore less studied. We believe that tackling such a critical issue will both expose the hideous phenomenon of gender-based violence as the most pervasive form of human rights violation which continues to challenge every country in the world, and bring about an awareness about its causes and consequences. This volume is an amalgam of theoretical grounding to the subject of violence against women and a collection of case studies. It highlights the diversity in the ways gender-based violence is practiced, interpreted and dealt with across the MENA region and proposes a fresh interpretation of the religious sources on the topic and a deep understanding of the mechanisms that both encourage the perpetration of violence and the maintenance of many of its extreme forms as a means to control and discipline women. To do so, such forms of violence are often falsely backed up with a religious tenet that gives them legitimacy and makes them difficult to shift or remove.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec43

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

4

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

While the main purpose of this volume is to understand the root causes of violence against women in the MENA region and the strategies adopted by various parties including women’s organizations to fight violence, it proposes to investigate several forms of genderbased violence as practiced in the region from a multidisciplinary perspective, thus enhancing the actual debate in the social sciences and exploring the ways adopted by women activists and academics both on the national and international levels to change the society’s awareness with regard to violence. Furthermore, this volume will seek to shed some critical light on the current state of the research, offering a new, innovative and pioneering contribution which strives to examine configurations of the hidden links among violence, patriarchal states and Islamism. Chapter one lays the foundations for the overall theme of this volume and is divided into two main parts. The first part defines violence in general and violence against women in particular as it is perceived in Western and Middle Eastern sources and discusses the various interpretations of violence and the general disagreement among researchers in relation to definitions, methods and the resulting findings concerning both the direction and the impact of gender-based violence. The politics of naming and definition is indeed an important theme in feminist theory, and while various terms have been used invariably to describe the problem as ‘violence against women’, ‘sexual violence’, ‘family violence’, ‘intimate partner violence’, and ‘gender-based violence’, some terms are more relevant than others depending on the focus of the undertaken research. The chapter reviews the actions of the United Nations through its Decade for Women and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and its impact on the MENA region in terms of individual countries’ reactions and ratification of the UN conventions and their seriousness in proscribing and eradicating violence against women. The second part of the chapter explores the means and possibilities of ending gender-based violence in the MENA region and the various obstacles that obstruct gender equality as the base root of such violence. To do so it investigates the roles of patriarchy, Islam and politics and the functioning of this trio in maintaining the status

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec44

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

INTRODUCTION

5

quo. The chapter argues that gender-based violence is fundamental to the functioning of the patriarchal gender order that governs daily life in many societies across the globe, and institutionalized violence in gender relations is fundamental to the systems of patriarchal domestic control, authoritarian state control and political violence. It concludes that the general reluctance to address the problem of gender-based violence in the Muslim world in general and in the MENA region in particular, is mainly due to the conservative interpretations of Islam, the strong hold of patriarchy and the culture of kin, states’ compromises with Islamists and religious authorities to secure and maintain their position in power, states’ dominance over women’s organizations resulting in controlled state feminism which impacts negatively on women’s movements’ ability to challenge issues that oppose the state’s agenda, the proliferation of anti-western discourse including feminism as a Western trend, and a general lack of political will to engage with the issue of violence against women. Chapter two provides a mapping of prevailing forms of violence against women in the Middle East and North Africa and discusses the pervasiveness of domestic violence and the multiple forms of sexual violence in the region, including rape, incest, forced and early marriage, and female genital mutilation. It focuses on the centrality of the concept of honour in the perpetration and toleration of femicide in societies that are still dominated by a strong sense of honour and shame. It highlights how the patriarchal gender structure builds gender conflicts in society, constructs violent gender roles and relations between the sexes, and conditions men to perpetrate violence against women. Patriarchy plays an essential role in initiating, supporting, and spreading violence because the innately violent patriarchal gender structure makes a significant contribution to the normalization and condoning of violence by constructing gender roles that are based on control, intimidation and submission. Chapter three focuses on the interplay among feminism, religion and politics and launches its critique from a dispute on honour killing in Jordan between human rights activists who have called for the cancellation of article 340 in Jordanian law which provides a cover

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec45

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

6

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

for murder committed in the name of honour, and Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF) who issued a fatwa saying that the proposal to abolish the article would ‘destroy our Islamic, social and family values by stripping men of their humanity when they surprise their wives or female relatives committing adultery’. In issuing this fatwa the IAF were motivated by political, rather than religious reasons. mainly because, among the justifications for amending the article a governmental committee included that the law needed to be changed in response to the human rights organizations’ constant criticism of the existence of article 340. Based on the Islamic Normative Ethical Theory, the chapter argues that such immoral actions contradict the Qur’anic ethos and the purposes of Islamic law (maqasid al-Sharia). Almost all Muslim scholars accept that the sources of legislation in Islam are the Qur’an, the Hadith, ijma‘ (consensus), and qiyas (analogy). It has been well established by the majority of Muslim scholars that the underlying principle of all rules and legislations including those explicitly mentioned in the Qur’an is the principle of al-maslaha (public interest/the wellbeing of the community). Based on this principle some rules need to be amended and others suspended or reinterpreted in a way to serve the wellbeing of the community. Medieval Muslim scholars provided us with a theory that can be developed to serve this purpose. Al-Shatibi (d. 790/1388) maintained that the five necessities (al-kulliyat al-khamsa), are not final and can be expanded and modified in accordance with the Qur’anic ethos. Thus, justice, freedom and human dignity should be included as necessities for the wellbeing of human existence. The chapter proposes the use of the historical method in studying Islamic texts and emphasizes the importance of articulating a normative ethical theory established on usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence), a theory which can provide the theoretical basis for reforming Islamic family laws. Alternative methods that were sought to provide support or basis for reform are first examined and criticized including attempts to interpret texts that discriminate against women and attempts to impose reform by Western interference in Arabo-Islamic internal affairs.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec46

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

INTRODUCTION

7

Chapter four explores the ways various forms of male violence against women which include honour killing, feminisation of poverty, sexual commoditification and politico-religious reification of the feminine body, sexual harassment, rape, physical and verbal abuse, are widely politicised and well integrated into the legitimate vocabularies of democratic public politics in Turkey. The chapter analyses the determinants of the state strategies towards dealing with male violence under multiple domestic and international pressures in the specific case of the religiously conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) since it came to power in 2002. Although the AKP government announced its ‘zero tolerance for violence against women’, in the conservative worldview of the party women are identified with the family and the home and are considered as vulnerable to male violence hence in need of protection from the state. Women’s insidious fear of men prevents them from claiming their rights, while preventive and rehabilitation measures fall short of recognising women as autonomous individuals. Lack of systematic and coherent policy and the political will to mobilise all sections of the state apparatus for preventing gender-based violence demonstrate the absence of a paradigm for change on the maledominated state’s approach to violence against women. Chapter five demonstrates that women’s restricted access to the private sector in Jordan has been a far more complex phenomenon than is usually realised and it cannot be simply linked to social and cultural factors. Discrimination against women feeds on prejudices and a consolidated patriarchal system of cultural norms, related to tribal values and religious beliefs. Gender stereotyping spreads into school textbooks, banishing female roles to the home and childcare and emphasising the importance of women’s honour and modesty. Women’s marginalisation strengthens the conviction that men should be given priority in higher education, weakening women’s self-confidence and self-worth. The chapter argues that institutional impediments play a major role in placing obstacles in the way of the female labour force. The lack of legal coverage increases working women’s vulnerability to harassment, while some legal dispositions reduce female employment

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec47

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

8

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

opportunities. Although the Jordanian government has facilitated women’s access to employment in the private sector through qualifying industrial zones, the latter fail to guarantee decent working conditions for women. Chapter six focuses on violence against underage female domestic workers in Morocco who are particularly vulnerable to exploitation. They are usually isolated, with hardly any opportunity to see their relatives or meet new people and consequently no one to turn to for assistance. Girl domestic workers are often badly exploited, beaten up by their employers, and live in deplorable conditions. While they are the most frequent victims of domestic violence in Morocco, they rarely approach the authorities for assistance because they are not aware of their legal rights on the one hand and because they believe that the police are often biased against women on the other. This chapter includes recommendations for reform of practices and laws with the purpose of eliminating violence against women in both the private and the public spaces and proposes education, legislation and law enforcement as valuable tools to combat such violence. Chapter seven explores the prevalence and the factors which expose women to spousal violence in Alexandria. It hypothesizes that spousal violence is a widespread phenomenon in Egypt with variations in its occurrence across different socio-demographic characteristics such as age, education, occupation and income, marital status, age at marriage and duration of marriage. Therefore, the chapter aims to quantify the different forms of spousal violence that exist in the Egyptian society and identify factors that might put women at higher risk of spousal abuse. Although the study confirms the high prevalence of all forms of spousal violence across all socio-demographic strata in Alexandria, Egypt, some socio-demographic factors such as large family size, low monthly family income, differences in occupational attainment between the couples, divorce status or separation between the couples, low husbands’ educational level, husbands’ habits such as smoking and drug use and husbands’ psychological status were the correlates of all forms of spousal violence by logistic analyses in the study. Results confirm that spousal violence is widespread and

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec48

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

INTRODUCTION

9

alarming, and highlight the urgent need for government and civil society to address the issue. Chapter eight discusses female genital mutilation among culture, religion and politics in Egypt. It explains how following a CNN broadcast of an FGM/C operation as it was performed on a young girl in September 1993, the Egyptian government was compelled to take active steps in condemning the practice. Yet, this measure turned the issue of FGM/C into a confrontation platform between the Egyptian government and the al-Azhar Ulama who persistently defended the practice. While on the one hand this confrontation resulted in placing the FGM/C practice once again but firmly under the spotlight, which facilitates the engagement of different key players in the discussion, such as the establishment of the National Taskforce against FGM/C in 1994 consisting mainly of NGOs, it also highlights the dynamic of the relationship between the two major key players in Egyptian society (religion and politics) in terms of who has the upper hand when it comes to issuing legislations that aim to enhance the status of women. It is also a clear reflection of how the issue of FGM/C becomes highly politicised, as each of the players has their own agenda. Having said so and despite the wide spectrum of views represented by the government, health practitioners, conservative religious institutions and other key players, there are also many dedicated individuals and NGOs who campaign against FGM and work relentlessly towards defeating all obstacles which stand in the way of eradicating the practice, putting forward progressive interpretations of religious texts which reject the practice and expose FGM as a violation of women’s human rights and a form of violence against women. Chapters nine, ten and eleven mainly focus on gender and language. The purpose of chapter nine which is titled ‘The Insidious Violence: A Study of Husband-Wife Power Relations in the Algerian Context’, is twofold. On the one hand it examines how unequal power relations between husband and wife in the Algerian context have been culturally and historically constructed and legalized by patriarchal

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec49

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

10

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

ideology, oral tradition and Islamic orthodoxy, leading therefore to husband’s physical and insidious violence against his wife by denying her dignity as a full citizen who aspires for freedom of action and thinking. On the other hand, this chapter analyses women’s testimonies collected in the cities of Tizi Ouzou and Boumerdes and discusses their attitudes and reactions to all forms of violence against women be they visible/physical or invisible/psychological, in the way they are used to control women’s finances and mobility. Chapter ten scrutinises gender use of expletives and profanities in Tunisia. The data analysis and findings of this research indicate that women use milder or softer kinds of vulgar or profane words and that they generally use them in all-female groups. Given that expletives as well as blasphemy are perceived as intrinsically aggressive, women who engage in such behaviour are seen (unlike men) as breeching a taboo, hence transgressing cultural stereotypes and symbols of femininity. Cultures and societies (Eastern and Western) may not use the same kind of expletives and profanities, but the taboos are generally the same. This is true for Tunisian society, where a general increase in the use of coarse and aggressive language publicly, concerning the entire society, has been noticed lately, causing only limited worry and concern. If women use the same ‘swear words’ as men, they are not judged on an equal footing; they are still thought to invite judgments regarding their moral standing and aspirations. Women have been easy targets for all types of violence: verbal, physical, psychological and sexual. Although long-standing programs of mass education and progressive laws in favour of women have legally empowered Tunisian women, societal attitudes toward women have not kept up with the legal reforms and the socioeconomic growth and remain overtly gender-biased and male-chauvinist. This chapter argues that while Tunisian legislation provides great protection for the physical integrity of women, there is hardly anything that protects women from verbal abuse which is commonly classified as a form of domestic abuse. This is generally viewed as a private issue which does not require the intervention of the authorities.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec410

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

INTRODUCTION

11

Chapter eleven is on gender and language discrimination in EFL textbooks in Algeria and takes female invisibility in such textbooks as a form of gender-based violence. It argues that despite tangible recent progress and the recognition of more women’s rights in MENA, personal status laws are still unfavourable to women and continue to reinforce gender discrimination in both the private and the public spaces. Gender violence is so enmeshed in the cultural fabric of MENA societies that its condemnation seems trivial. The chapter analyses the representations of gender in New Prospects (2007), a locally designed Algerian EFL textbook currently used in high schools, as concerns female invisibility and shows how it contributes to reinforcing covert violence against women through language discrimination. To make the analysis more subtle the evaluation tackled the linguistic and the non-linguistic elements so as to account for female invisibility and language discrimination in the textbook assuming that it does not follow the gender neutral language advocated by many sociolinguists. Written against the stereotype of Muslim/Arab women as being passive and submissive to male control and violence the chapters in this volume have demonstrated that more than ever before women in the Middle East and North Africa are challenging the rule of patriarchy and questioning the validity of all forms of gender control in a quickly changing region. There is no better testimony to this than the contributors to this volume who come from the MENA region or lived there for a period of time, and the way they perceive, denounce, question, and analyse gender and violence. Their chapters articulated their first hand experiences and their strong voices to revoke all forms of violence against women if only by denouncing them and bringing awareness to their serious ramifications on women’s health and the wellbeing of the whole society.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec411

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

CHAPTER ONE GENDER AND VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: NEGOTIATING WITH PATRIARCHAL STATES AND ISLAMISM

Zahia Smail Salhi

Violence against Women/Gender-Based Violence: Definitions The word ‘violence’ covers a broad spectrum. It is defined as ‘any act carried out with the intention of, or perceived intention of, causing physical pain or injury to another person’ (Gelles 1986:27), the exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse (Merriam-Webster Dictionary), and the expression of physical force against one or more people, compelling action against one’s will on pain or being hurt (Oxford English Dictionary). The American National Council limits its definition of violence to ‘behaviour by persons against persons that intentionally threatens, attempts, or actually inflicts physical harm’ (1996:9), and the World Health Organisation defines it as the ‘. . . intentional use of physical

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec412

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

13

force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation’(WHO 2002:38). While both latter definitions exclude unintentional behaviour that may cause harm, Gelles’ definition includes acts that may be perceived by the victim as intentional. El-Bushra and Piza Lopez add another dimension to the above definitions by defining violence as an assault on a person’s physical and mental integrity, and insisting on it being an underlying feature of all societies, and an undercurrent running through social interaction at many different levels (El-Bushra and Piza Lopez: 1993). As to violence against women (VAW), it is often defined as acts of violence carried out against women, which often implies that such acts are carried out by the opposite gender i.e. men and often by intimate partners. It is the form of violence used to establish and enforce gender inequalities and keep gendered orders in place. Although it is often assumed that gender-based violence is perpetrated by men against women, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (1993) defines it as violence that is directed against women because they are women, or violence that affects women disproportionately, and noted that such violence could be perpetrated by assailants of both genders, family members and even the ‘State’ itself. The United Nations General Assembly on the other hand defines violence against women as: ‘any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or mental harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life’ (1994:18). One thing the two definitions have in common is targeting the victims on the basis of their gender. Many feminist theorists (Radford and Friedberg 2000) draw attention to the limitations of the term ‘violence against women’, which while it highlights the gendered nature of the violence, it fails to specify any connection with the abuse of children, and they emphasize the interconnectedness of woman and child abuse as a longstanding theme of feminists analysis.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec413

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

14

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

Dobash and Dobash draw attention to the general disagreement among researchers in relation to definitions, methods and the resulting findings concerning both the direction and the impact of violence between women and men in intimate relationships (1992:258–84). Most importantly, we find their point on ‘what counts as violence and to whom’ (Dobash and Dobash 1998:4) extremely relevant to the present study as in many Muslim countries in general and in the MENA region in particular, certain forms of violence are not seen as being violent acts such as verbal abuse and intimidation especially by intimate partners and/or family members. It is a fact that verbal abuse in such cases is considered a legitimate and mild method of correcting women and children. Some other forms of violence are ridiculed and remain shrouded in secrecy such as marital rape which is severely discredited by religious authorities and culturally immersed views as it is the duty of the wife to satisfy her husband’s sexual needs at all times. Female genital mutilation and infibulations are also not seen as forms of violence against women in the countries where they are practiced, and to some extent even honour killings are not viewed as punishable violence since they are practiced for the reason of redeeming family’s or the clan’s honour. What would be considered as violence is in fact the control of such societies in the way they guarded their women and therefore their honour. Intervening in their ways of life and the ways they have organised it for centuries is often seen, especially in rural and tribal settings, as a severe interference and a threat to the structure of the clan, the village or the tribe. Another important point raised by Dobash and Dobash, is that of the source of the definition of violence: ‘Do we use the perspectives of victims? Of those who perpetrate these acts? Of researchers? Of the law? Of policymakers? Should researchers attempt to develop distinct, abstract, and definitive conceptualisations of these acts?’ (1998:4). These questions indicate that more work is needed in terms of clearer definitions both in defining what is and what is not violence, but also, the diversity of cultures across the globe results in the diversity of definitions of what is and what is not a form of violence against women.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec414

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

15

The politics of naming and definition is indeed an important theme in feminist theorising, and while various terms have been used invariably to describe the problem, as among other things ‘violence against women’, ‘sexual violence’, ‘family violence’, ‘intimate partner violence’ and ‘gender-based violence. Some terms are more relevant than others depending on the focus of the undertaken research. Gender-based violence reflects culturally-defined notions of masculinity and femininity which serve to reinforce women’s subordinate position. It embodies the power imbalances inherent in patriarchal societies and may take an endless spectrum of forms, such as rape, including marital rape, rape as a tool of repression against particular classes or groups and rape as a form of ethnic cleansing; domestic violence; child abuse; female foeticide and infanticide; denial of health care and nutrition for girl children; sexual and emotional harassment; genital mutilation; forced prostitution; pornography; population control; enforced sterilisation; war and state violence; exploitation of refugees; political violence including that directed at the families of political targets and reduction in state services leading to increased stress and workload for women (El-Bushra and Lopez 1993:1–9). The EUROMED Gender Equality Programme defines genderbased violence as one of the most humiliating, degrading and harmful human rights abuses that extend over borders and cultures (2008–11).

Men and Women as Perpetrators of Gender-Based Violence While the term ‘violence against women’ solely targets women as victims of violence directed to them as women, and ‘domestic violence’ relates to violence experienced in the domestic realm or the private sphere often from intimate partners, ‘gender-based violence’ is not limited to violence against women by intimate partners but extends to include violence against children in addition to violence against by male as well as female partners. The Equal Justice Foundation (EJF) website offers a forum for men victims of domestic violence and presents the case as receiving very

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec415

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

16

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

little interest compared to violence directed to women. The main tendency is that this type of domestic violence is less studied not only because men often do not report cases of violence by their male or female partners for reasons of male honour on the one hand and other considerations including absence of legislation and prevailing stereotypes on the other, but also because no one seems to promote research into violence against men or encourage men to report their experiences of violence. It is a fact that research into women’s violence against men is very scarce, and that the subject of violence against women, despite the proliferating number of studies being currently conducted in the Northern hemisphere, remains a relatively new subject. It is also a fact that in the Southern hemisphere including the MENA region the subject of gender-based violence is very new and often not fully accepted as addressing a lived reality. In their article ‘Women’s Violence to Men in Intimate Relationships: Working on a Puzzle’, Dobash and Dobash argue that intimate partner violence is symmetrical as women are as likely as men to perpetuate violence against an intimate partner, which goes to contradict the common view that it is overwhelmingly men who perpetrate violence against women partners, which they call asymmetry. With the purpose of considering more carefully the nature of the violence that forms the claim of symmetry of violence between men and women, Dobash and Dobash (2004:324–49) examine in detail the nature, severity and consequences of violence perpetrated by women against male partners. In order to do so, they scrutinized and presented results of a study which included 95 couples in which men and women reported separately on violence in their relationship. They conclude that women’s use of violence differs from men’s use of violence in nature, frequency, intention, intensity, injury and emotional impact. Furthermore, while men use violence as intimidating and coercive forms of controlling their partner’s behaviour women do not. On the other hand, men testified that women’s violence was ‘inconsequential’ and did not affect their wellbeing and safety, which resulted in them rarely reporting it or seeking protection unlike women who tend to over-report their own violence (ibid).

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec416

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

17

This notion of symmetry in violence could only be observed in the realm of domestic violence or between what Dobash and Dobash designate as intimate partnerships and should be referred to as either domestic violence or family violence. Gender-based violence occurs in both the private and the public spheres and is perpetrated by intimate partners, family members such as fathers and brothers in patriarchal structures and male strangers. In the context of the MENA region, embedded stereotypes of gender-based violence often put forward men as sole perpetrators and women and children as sole victims. It is almost impossible to find portrayals of men being abused by women or other men in intimate relationships in the MENA region such cases do exist. This area remains a secret topic and a taboo subject mainly due to deep-rooted patriarchal structures which position men as symbols of power; victimising the male figure would be a serious offence and threat to patriarchy. Most research findings, however, suggest that heterosexual intimate violence is gendered, with abuse, power and control wielded by men over their female partners, and that when women use violence, it is typically in self-defence or for non-aggressive reasons. In their study ‘Women’s Use of Force: Voices of Women Arrested for Domestic Violence’, Susan L. Miller and Michelle L. Meloy (2006: 89–115) posit that ‘A single act of violence committed by a woman can eclipse a history of abuse and victimisation by a male partner’ (2006:108). They observed 95 cases of women on court-mandated Female Offender Programmes. Out of the total of 95 women, only 5 used behaviours which could be deemed ‘aggressive violence’, while 90 used violent behaviours and not systematic ‘battering’ or aimed at establishing power and control over their partners as is usually the case in men’s violence. Miller and Meloy indicate that the behaviours which led to arrest were for the most part either ‘frustration response’ or ‘self-defence’. Most of the women in question were trying either to get away from a partner during a violent incident or to leave to avoid further violence, especially where they sensed that their children were or could be in danger of violence.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec417

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

18

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

It is a fact that women’s motivations to commit violent acts tend to be more closely related to expression of feelings of anger and response to a partner’s abuse which we may also call self-defence and retaliation, than to the desire for coercive control of their partners, although some argue that both men and women use violence in equal measure for coercive control (Hamby 2009), and others posit that men and women may define and use control differently; women may use violence to gain autonomy in the relationship while men may use it to demonstrate authority (Kernsmith 2005). In order for us to understand the reasons why researchers arrived at such conflicting findings, we need to better understand the meaning of violence as well as define what counts as violence and what does not. To do so, we need to focus on concept formation, definitions, forms of measurement and the context in which violence takes place. Furthermore, to avoid generalisations and oversimplifying matters, we have to consider the complexity of women’s motivations for using violent behaviours, which is in most cases a result of the inconsistency in forms and intensity of such violent acts. Many internal and external factors contribute to this inconsistency and these revolve around cultural and economical factors, as well as individual factors which may include personality traits in terms of overt and covert reactions to violence and childhood experiences in terms of exposure to violence (Swan and Snow 2006). One factor we should always take into account when dealing with such violence is its gendered nature. Miller and Meloy insist that an over-reliance on the criminal justice system to protect women from domestic assaults fails to address the gendered nature of the violence: ‘This failure can be attributed to the movement away from a critique of the underlying social, legal and political structures that underpin male privilege and use of violence, towards a more individual focus on the pathologies of offenders and victims’ (2006:108). In her book Victims as Offenders: The Paradox of women’s violence in relationships (2005) Miller further argues that Legal policies must recognize that women commonly use intimate partner violence in response to their partners’ abuse, and contends that mandatory arrest

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec418

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

19

policies fail to recognize that many such women are also victims, thus inappropriately subjecting a proportion of women to court-mandated batterer’s programs, which in most cases are modelled on male’s perpetrations of violence and are not adapted to meet the needs of women who are not regular batterers, but often resort to overt aggression as a one off reaction to long term stifled anger and frustration.

Gender-Based Violence as a Continuum In her ground breaking study Surviving Sexual Violence (1988) Liz Kelly puts forward the concept of ‘a continuum of sexual violence’. In her analytical framework, she posits that the entire spectrum of violence is correlated and interlinked and that no particular manifestation of violence falls into a single category. Rather than focusing on the different forms of violence and abuse as separate issues, the continuum recognizes commonalities between them in women’s experiences and theoretically as forms of violence reinforcing the power and control of patriarchy. Developed to facilitate theorization of these commonalities and connections, Kelly’s continuum of violence is constituted through difference: the different forms of sexual violence, their different impacts, and the different community and legal responses to women, positioned differently, within and among cultures and through history (Radford and Friedberg 2000:2) Kelly explains her approach in the following terms: First: a basic common character that underlies many different events; and second, a continuous series of elements or events that pass into one another and which cannot be readily distinguished. The first meaning enables us to discuss sexual violence in a generic sense. The basic common character underlying the many different forms of violence is the abuse, intimidation, coercion, intrusion, threat and force men use to control women. The second meaning enables us to document and name the range of abuse, intimidation, coercion, intrusion, threat and

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec419

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

20

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

force whilst acknowledging that there are no clearly defined and discrete analytic categories into which men’s behaviour can be placed (Kelly 1988:76). The ‘continuum of sexual violence’ illustrates the hollowness of the frequent criticism that radical feminism, in focusing solely on commonalities in women’s experiences, offers universalistic explanations. By including both a global dimension and experiences of women and children often excluded from research agendas – black women and girls and women involved in prostitution, for example – Kelly’s continuum further demonstrates that this criticism lacks foundation. She contends that although women’s awareness of the threat and reality of sexual violence is now, perhaps more than ever before, publicly acknowledged, this fact continues to be almost wholly ignored. Kelly’s study which is based on in-depth interviews with 60 women is perhaps the first to cover the experience of a range of forms of sexual violence over women’s lifetimes. Drawing on feminist theory, developing a critique of male research and quoting extensively from the women interviewed, it develops feminist thought in several key areas: the similarities and differences between forms of sexual violence; the ways women define their experiences; and the strategies women use in resisting, coping with and surviving sexual violence. Kelly stresses the importance for all women of recognizing the incidents of sexual violence in their lives and seeing themselves and other women as survivors rather than mere victims. In highlighting the ways in which the media, the criminal justice system and even the ‘helping’ professions contribute to the trivialization of sexual violence, she demonstrates the necessity of women organizing collectively to end this suffering. Highlighting the survival aspect in lieu of the victimisation of women yields a positive view on women’s resilience and strength which she refers to as the positive outcome of the abusive experiences (see also Walby 1994:1). Instead of keeping to the status of helpless victims women are actually doing a more positive job by surviving and the power this act entails. Kelly claims: ‘to survive means to continue living; Survival refers to continued existence, after or in spite

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec420

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

21

of, a life-threatening experience’ (1988:162). She argues that the lack of this positive perspective presents women as vulnerable, docile and passive victims of their experiences. This substitution not only highlights the coping mechanism, resistance and strength that abused women adopt but also implies respect towards surviving the violent incidents and manifests an overall positive attitude.1 The global perspective on gender-based violence following the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has been influential in effecting a more recent shift in the language of gender-based violence. In their book Women, Violence and Strategies for Action (2000), Radford et al. insist on the effects of the UN decade of women on bringing gender-based violence to the fore of feminist inquiry across the globe. Their study highlights two vital headings; one is ‘Changing international contexts’ and the other is ‘Changing national contexts’. They posit that the changed global context, highlighted by The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women (1995), and subsequent conferences like the International Conference on Violence, Abuse and Women’s Citizenship (1996) have resulted in the inclusion of feminist activists and researchers in consultative processes by international bodies and many national and local governments. These initiatives were informed by feminist understandings of and research on gender-based violence, its nature, impacts, prevalence and critiques of the limited responses on the part of law, police and community at the national level. Furthermore, they explain how the changed international context has also had an important influence on national governments (Radford and Friedberg 2000:3–4). Signatories to the Beijing Declaration are required to report regularly to the United Nations on progress made on critical areas of concern relating to the ‘advancement of women and the achievement of equality between women and men’ as a matter of human rights (United Nations 1996:33). In fact, this is the most important factor that brought regions such as the MENA to take a more serious approach to gender-based violence in their individual countries, where such acts remained invisible

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec421

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

22

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

and under-reported for many decades. A most successful example is that of Turkey, which in order to become a member of the European Union has taken huge strides in improving its legislation on women and the family and on addressing issues relating to women’s welfare and gender-based violence. Presenting feminist research and activist collaborations at the global, national and local levels carries forward the global feminist aims of ‘bringing Beijing home’ by illustrating the significance of thinking globally while acting locally in the development of feminist resistance strategies in relation to gender-based violence and the eradication of all forms of discrimination against women.

The UN Decade for Women and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action The United Nations decade for women (1975–85) brought the topic of gender-based violence/violence against women to global attention. This came as a result of the successful lobbying of the UN Commission on the Status of Women of the UN General Assembly to designate 1975 as the International Year of Women. The highlight of the year was the first World Conference on Women, held in Mexico City, which recommended a UN Decade for Women.2 This was followed by the UN World Conference of the Decade for Women in Copenhagen in 1980 and the Nairobi conference in 1985 whose main objective was to review the achievements of the Decade for Women and to create a ten-year action plan for the advancement of women across the globe. The resulting document, Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women to the Year 2000, served as a benchmark to measure improvements in women’s conditions. Despite having begun with divergent goals, the UN Decade for Women succeeded in finding common ground between activists from both the Northern and the Southern hemispheres and further legitimized activities to promote women’s rights within the UN system and beyond.3

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec422

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

23

The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action The official name of the Beijing Conference is ‘The Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace’. One hundred eighty nine governments and more than 5,000 representatives from 2,100 non-governmental organizations participated in the conference whose principal themes were the advancement and empowerment of women in relation to women’s human rights, women and decision-making, the rights of the girl child, women and poverty, violence against women and other areas of concern. The resulting documents of the Conference are The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action with a prime message that the issues addressed in the Platform for Action are global and universal. The conference condemned deeply ingrained attitudes and practices which maintain and promote inequality and discrimination against women across the globe. Accordingly, implementation requires changes in values, attitudes, practices and priorities at all levels. The discussions at the conference indicated a clear commitment to international norms and standards of equality between men and women, and that measures to protect and promote the human rights of women and girl-children as an integral part of universal human rights must underlie all action and that institutions at all levels must be re-oriented to accelerate implementation. In brief, the outcome of the Beijing Conference is an agenda for women’s empowerment through the removal of obstacles to women’s public participation in all spheres of public and private lives through a full and equal share in economic, social, cultural and political decision-making. The Beijing Platform for Action set out a number of actions that should lead to fundamental changes by the year 2000; the Five Year Review of the Beijing Conference at a Special Session of the UN General Assembly (Beijing +5). The Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action is chiefly the responsibility of individual governments, but also of institutions in the public, private and non-governmental sectors at the community, national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec423

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

24

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

The Platform acknowledges that significant progress will depend on building strategic partnerships and involving all stakeholders in the efforts towards change. One of the most important achievements of the Platform is the appointment of a UN Rapporteur on violence against women to monitor and document the causes and consequences of violence on the lives and welfare of women.

Bringing Beijing Home? The Case of the Middle East and North Africa Gender Profile In the Middle East and North Africa women experience a plethora of forms of gender-based violence which in some cases are experienced and silently endured from the very beginning to the end of their lives. Patterns of gender segregation are embedded in people’s minds and shape attitudes towards women to the point where they are almost incontestable. In some countries women are often treated as less than second-class citizens and are often kept back, confined to breeding and nurturing roles. Such roles are consolidated by sets of ‘family laws’ which legalise women’s inferior position in society and render them minors for life by putting them under the guardianship of male family members. Although diversity should always be born in mind when discussing the region, Muslim women from across the MENA area experience numerous if not all forms of gender-based violence at various levels and with varied intensity from one country to another. The spectrum of violence fluctuates from female foeticide and infanticide to segregation against female girls in terms of food and access to health and education, to female genital mutilation which in some countries amounts to infibulations, forced marriages, traditional marriage ceremony which is mainly practiced where FGM and infibulations take place,4 child abuse and incest, sexual harassment at school, at work and in the street, intimidation in the streets and at work, acid attacks in the street, domestic violence, rape (including gang rape

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec424

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

25

and marital rape) and femicide in the form of honour killing and terrorist/Islamist femicide (Salhi 2010b:161–83). While daily occurrences of verbal abuse, marital rape and general segregation between males and females are not recognised as forms of violence, many extreme forms of gender-based violence remain largely under reported for reasons of honour and shame. When women are sexually assaulted or raped, they are told to keep silent. Disclosing or reporting their ordeal would result in tarnishing the family’s honour which incurs many severe punitive measures ranging from the killing of the survivor of rape (as in some countries such as Pakistan, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon), forcing the rapist to marry his victim (as practiced in Sudan, Morocco and Turkey), and the locking up or the dismissal of the survivor of rape from the family home. Although differences between women need to be borne in mind at all times to avoid generalisations especially when discussing a region as vast as the MENA area, Muslim women are largely restricted in decision making even in issues which directly affect their personal lives including mobility, dress code, and decisions over their children, access to resources, including their own income, property and inheritance. Apart from Lebanon, women in the MENA region only inherit half the share of men and in some areas they are denied inheritance altogether as in the case of the Berber regions of Morocco and Algeria5, and Upper Egypt. Men’s manipulations of economic, political and social resources enable them to maintain power over women and control their lives. Examining gender-based violence in the MENA region raises questions about its close association with patriarchy on the one hand and the proliferating Islamist ideology in the last three decades on the other. Women from the region live in a climate of fear and oppression from early girlhood to the end of their lives which becomes even more exacerbated under the rule of Islamist regimes. It is a fact that the latter factor exacerbated the general condition of Muslim women across the MENA region and resulted in the loss of secured legal rights by women and the declining of their condition in the region in general as some countries have adopted more

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec425

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

26

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

conservative views and attitudes towards women in both the private and the public spheres. Furthermore, this wave of conservatism has affected women’s attitudes and reactions. Many describe the younger generations of women in the MENA as being far less emancipated than the generations of their mothers and grandmothers. In many cases women adopt conservative attitudes as both learned behaviours and as a way to negotiate their access to the public sphere. One example of such attitudes is the proliferation of veiling amongst women of all generations across the region. It has become clear that donning the veil is no longer a sign of religiosity or piety but rather a means for many ends including evading harassment in the street, gaining access to employment, gaining parents’ trust and safeguarding one’s good reputation which do not exclude the initial religious significance of veiling. One must also not ignore forced veiling whereby women are forced to wear the veil despite their will. In some Muslim countries the veil was made obligatory by law such as in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Sudan. While these countries are declared Islamic states or republics, this phenomenon has reached other Muslim countries which until recently have been known as secular states. Such occurrences take place in times of peace as is the case across the majority of the countries in the region at present but also in times of war or civil unrest as was the case in Algeria during the 1990s when veiling was forced on women by Islamic fundamentalists (Salhi 2010b). Regardless of the reasons for veiling, the non-veiled women in MENA have become the minority. The whole landscape has been overturned and while many would argue that this is not a sign of women’s submission to the rule of patriarchy and Islamism, one cannot ignore the fact that in the Middle East and North Africa women can be divided into two broad camps; that of the Islamist women who believe that salvation lies in the re-Islamisation of the region since Islam guarantees women’s human rights, and that of the secular women who believe that Islamism is detrimental to women’s human rights as it harbours a misogynist ideology which not only discriminates against women at all levels and is severely patriarchal but in some cases adopts violent attitudes against women to the point

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec426

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

27

of waging physical attacks against their bodies which amount to femicide as witnessed by Algerian women (ibid) and Afghan women. In her study ‘Religion, Male Violence, and the Control of Women’ Marie Macey argues, ‘Religion can be used by individuals, groups, and societies in a variety of ways; it can serve to oppress or liberate, to comfort or kill. It is an extremely powerful resource which has been intimately involved in the construction of our world’ (Macey 1995: 48).

Gender-Based Violence between Patriarchy, Islam and Politics Gender-based violence is fundamental to the functioning of the patriarchal gender order that governs daily life in many societies across the globe and institutionalized violence in gender relations is fundamental to the systems of patriarchal domestic control authoritarian state control, and political violence. For a better understanding of gender-based violence in the Middle East and North Africa, as a largely patriarchal region, a discussion of patriarchy will shed further light on the way these societies view violence. Patriarchy is often defined as the power that men exercise over women, which is reinforced by their occupation of certain social roles, such as being a father, a brother, a husband, a superior or a ruler. While Sylvia Walby defines patriarchy as a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women (1990:4), according to Kaufman (1987), men may also exercise power over other men based on age, class or race. He identified the school, family, church, club, media and other social institutions as responsible for shaping and expressing male power which is usually embodied in physical power and is associated with masculinity, which is rooted in boys before the age of six and reinforced during adolescence. Other scholars define patriarchy as women’s subordination to men as men and not as fathers or brothers (Jones 1993, Phillips 1993 and Eisenstein 1994). In this context patriarchy is the power

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec427

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

28

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

wielded over women in absolute terms. The prevalence is mainly due to women’s acceptance of it and, more importantly, maintaining its order. On the other hand, another group of scholars would maintain that patriarchy is mainly sustained by women and without their continued support for patriarchal patterns of power and hierarchy patriarchy would not be able to survive. In fact, it resembles the slavery system; without slaves masters would not exist and visa versa. While we would argue that this state of affairs is a result of long and systematic indoctrination which renders older women the guardians of the rule of patriarchy, we would insist that younger women continuously negotiate with the rule of patriarchy and often manage to carve several exits from its throes. This is to say that these women are not entirely passive victims, as it is widely held, but they actively work behind the scenes to challenge patriarchy though through peaceful and understated ways. What we would like to highlight, however, is that such ‘peaceful’ and ‘understated’ negotiations do not reflect the real need to challenge the rule of patriarchy nor do they make tangible change to the way things are perceived by the patriarchal order. Such actions do not constitute coordinated effort by women to effectuate change and therefore in the eyes of the guardians of patriarchy such women are seen as being all accepting and fully abiding to its rule as men are constantly being made to believe that ‘their’ women are perfectly abiding when in real terms they are not. This condition results in a complicated situation: Do Muslim women effectively challenge patriarchy and therefore enjoy a certain level of agency or do they maintain its rule and therefore collaborate with their oppressors? While Anita Weiss asserts that Muslim women today are forced to renegotiate traditional norms, values and power relationships, in order to achieve social change (1998:127), and Sylvia Walby posits that ‘All women actively make choices, but many of the circumstances under which they act are not of their own making’ (1996:16), we strongly argue that Muslim women should battle against their own fears and that claiming agency while working within patriarchal

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec428

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

29

boundaries results in deep contradictions and restrictions as in one way or another they are in actual fact colluding with their patriarchal oppressors. Choosing to wear the veil in order to freely access the public sphere is in our opinion a mere illusion as in reality these women are entering the public arena while carrying with them the walls of the private sphere in the form of a veil which isolates them from public view and restricts their movements especially with some types of strict veiling as in the case of burqa and chador. The key question is: Is it still possible to be full agents while abiding by the rule of patriarchy and keeping to its set boundaries? In her article ‘Key Concepts in Feminist Theory’ Sylvia Walby speaks of private and public forms of patriarchy in Western societies and insists on highlighting the differences between these forms. She argues for ‘the separation of different degrees of patriarchy; the distinguishing of six patriarchal structures in paid employment, the household, the state, male violence, culture and sexuality; and differentiating more detailed patriarchal practices within these’ (1996:1). Furthermore, she insists on the importance of separating between degree and form of patriarchy and highlights the fact that in feminist theory there is a constant dilemma over the extent to which women’s actions are seen to be constrained by patriarchal structures. She explains: ‘If the account is theoretically led by structural concepts, there is a danger that women are seen as passive victims’ (1996:2). This approach has been seriously criticised as wrongly denying women agency. She demonstrates that theories which conceptualise gender relations in terms of patriarchal structures have often been criticised for portraying women as victims as well as for underestimating their agency and capacity for political action. In contrast, she says, ‘If the account is theoretically led by voluntarist concepts of women’s actions, then there is a danger that women will be seen to be colluding with their patriarchal oppressors’ meaning, that if we accept that women have full agency and decision making powers, this may then lead to the conclusion that they choose or collaborate with their oppressors (ibid:2). In line with Walby’s view we argue that such a condition results is a ‘classic’ dilemma in feminist theory. We are here faced with two

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec429

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

30

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

symmetrically problematic positions; if women are seen as having agency then they must be seen as choosing and accepting their oppression, but if we argue that they do not chose their oppression then they are passive victims. This dilemma is in fact very manifest in Muslim women’s lives across the Middle East and North Africa. While most women claim to be visible in the public sphere we would argue that their visibility under the veil is in some way ambiguous, and while they may claim financial independence because they work outside the home and earn salaries, the majority of Muslim women have no access to their income. Such phenomena cause great hurdles to feminist theory and make it extremely difficult to decide whether Muslim women enjoy full agency as well as financial independence while they continue to abide to the rule of patriarchy. In Walby’s words, Muslim women ‘are subordinated in a structural manner in a system from which men as a collectivity, if not every individual man, benefit’ (Walby 1996:14). In her book My Cousin, My Husband: Clans and Kinship in Mediterranean Societies, Germaine Tillion explains how cycles of older women’s control over younger women are maintained and perpetrated through the mother in law versus daughter in law relationships (Tillion 2007:196–8). The son would entrust his mother to head and control resources in the household in which the daughter in law is expected to annihilate her personality completely and accept ceaseless bullying. Tillion explains that this treatment is often unavailing and results in souring the relationship between mother in law and daughter in law with the former making life unbearable for the latter and often leading to domestic violence when the son is brought into the conflict. While popular views stipulate that such a stand by the mother in law is her way of making the daughter in law go through the same hardship as she did rather than an unconscious manner of safeguarding the rule of patriarchy, we would posit that her stance is the result of many years of indoctrination which render her an agent of the patriarchal order. Camille Lacoste-Dujardin (1990) further elaborates on this issue in her book Des mères contre les femmes: maternité et patriarcat au

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec430

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

31

Maghreb (Mothers against Daughters: Maternity and Patriarchy in the Maghreb). Her study is guided by the following research question: How in patrilineal and patriarchal societies, such as those of the Maghreb, where men’s dominance over women is a known fact, could a category of women, mothers of male offspring, play the role of the chief traitors for male domination and oppression of other women? Deniz Kandiyoti, on the other hand explains how this cyclical nature of women’s power in the household and their anticipation of inheriting the authority of senior women encourage a thorough internalization of this form of patriarchy by the women themselves. She says, ‘In classic patriarchy, subordination to men is offset by the control older women attain over younger women’ (Kandiyoti 1988: 279). In his book Gender and Violence in the Middle East (2009) David Ghanim contends that the inherent violence of gender relations in the Middle East feeds the authoritarianism and political violence that plague public life in the region. He explains how men as well as women may be said to be victims of the structural violence inherent in Middle Eastern gender relations and that the different forms of physical violence against women for which the Middle East is notorious (such as honour killings, female genital mutilation and obligatory beatings) are simply eruptions of an ethos of psychological violence and the threat of physical violence that pervades gender relations in the Middle East. Ghanim looks into the complementary roles played by both men and women in sustaining the system of violence and oppressive control that regulates gender relations in Middle Eastern societies. Like Tillion and Dujardin, he reveals that women not only are victims of violence but also welcome the opportunity to become perpetrators of violence in the married female life cycle of subordination followed by domination. He contends that the mother-in-law plays a crucial role in supporting the structure of patriarchal control by stoking tensions with her daughter-in-law and often provoking her son to commit what can be denoted ‘sanctioned’ violence against his wife. We would add that in some areas in the Middle East and North Africa the mother-in-law as well as the father-in-law actually use physical violence against the daughter-in-law. In some instances the in-laws

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec431

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

32

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

would repudiate the daughter-in-law by judging her as unsuitable for their son or unable to bear male heirs. In most cases the son finds himself in a position where he is obligated to accept his parents’ decision and formally divorce his wife. If, however, he chooses to oppose his parents’ decision he may end up thrown out of the family home and judged as being not ‘manly’ enough or having been bewitched by his wife. It is, in fact this type of reaction from some sons and husbands which, in the last few decades, has contributed to the trend which has seen the decline of the extended family and the diminishing of the role of the patriarch, but not of patriarchy itself. Suad Joseph (2001) on the other hand argues that the centrality of the concept of kinship in the Arab world has implications on patriarchy, since it communicates patriarchy into the various spheres of social life. Social patriarchy is also produced in the Arab world through men and seniors in the family who are considered superior to women. Joseph uses the term economic patriarchy to highlight the superiority of Arab men over women in terms of control over resources, wealth and land. While both Muslim and Arab Christian women are entitled to inheritance (half the share of men for Muslims and an equal share for Christian women), most Middle Eastern and North African women, be they Muslim or Christian, neither claim nor obtain their share of inheritance especially in terms of land and property. There is a silent agreement that it would be better for female heirs to give up their share to their male kin for fear of reprisals and exclusion. Although the above discussion incorporates women’s roles in maintaining if not perpetrating violence and the rule of patriarchy, it is nevertheless an irrefutable fact that patriarchy is ‘a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women’ (Walby 1990:214) and that the rule of patriarchy transcends the private sphere to the public sphere and rules and regulates domestic and political orders. Patriarchy is often defined as, The manifestation and institutionalization of male dominance over women and children in the family, and the extension of male

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec432

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

33

dominance over women in society in general. It implies that men hold power in all the important institutions of society and women are deprived of access to such power. It does not imply that women are either totally powerless or totally deprived of rights, influences, and resources (French 1985:239). Women in Muslim societies including those in the Middle East and North Africa play vital roles in maintaining the status quo, not only in the domestic realms as in the above discussion but also and more importantly in the public realms. Examples can be drawn from electoral campaigns where women are nominated to run for important offices in power. In such cases (e.g. Louiza Hanoune, the Head of the Workers’ Party in Algeria, the first Arab woman to seek office in the presidential elections of 2004), it is observed that generally women do not mobilise to promote other women to positions of political power and it is often held that the primary obstacle to women’s emancipation and success is other women. While this state of affairs may be rather bewildering, such attitudes may be understood as the ultimate result of embedded patriarchal norms and authoritarian systems which imprison women in patterns of domination under the tenet of patriarchy. These societies adopt cultural rules deeply rooted in a system of values which implement that it is right for men to rule over women and control their female kin as well as guard them from others in return for their obedience and passivity. As such, the use of violence both to control women and to maintain the order of patriarchy is seen as acceptable. Such cultural norms imply the routinisation of gender inequality and violence against women as an expression of social power to dominate and control women; husbands control their wives and brothers control their sisters within legitimate social acceptance (Chapman 1990). Morgan (2006), Kleiman (2000) and Hearn (1998) note that if daily social dynamics are governed by such gender inequalities, violence becomes normalised. They argue that these gender powerdynamics are clear in the everyday communication between men and women, and can be seen in the language and phrases used between couples, even within joking or swearing. As such attitudes that ground

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec433

5/7/2013 6:39:59 PM

34

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

violent behaviours become interwoven into daily life and are often present within daily communications, work and household shores. A scrutiny of proverbs and idioms from the MENA region would demonstrate the extent to which Arab and Muslim cultures enforce masculine power over women and present stereotypes of women as roaming dangerous creatures that need to be controlled and dominated, even if that necessitates the use of extreme violence. One good example is the following Egyptian proverb: ‘If a man breaks a girl’s/ woman’s rib she will grow twenty four new ribs’, which suggests the acceptance of violence against women and conjures an image of the evil woman as embedded in people’s subconscious. Another example of these proverbs can be found in the Kabyle sobriquet, which calls a powerful woman a female man, meaning a woman with male attributes, T¸hargazth, argaz being the man, and a weak man is described as being a woman or is given a woman’s nickname, as in ‘He is not a man, he is a Halima’, Halima being a female name. This leads us to the culture pattern mode of violence. According to Levinson (1989) the culture pattern of violence encompasses a social learning dimension. Some societies adopt a set of values and beliefs that incorporate violence and in some cases violence becomes a lifestyle. Levinson argues that violence against women is a learned behaviour adopted by a group of people whose value system accepts and encourages it. Violence against women is transferred from one generation to another in societies which emphasise the use of physical force to achieve socially accepted norms. If culture and the patriarchal order prevailing in the Middle East and North Africa perpetuate patterns of gender-based violence, what role does Islam as the religion of the majority of the inhabitants of this region play in promoting equality between the genders and guaranteeing the rights of women? While it is common knowledge that Islam freed women from many prevailing ills in the Arabian pagan society and brought justice to women and the girl-child in terms of banning infanticide and guaranteeing women’s rights to inheritance and to own property, the views of feminists diverge greatly vis-à-vis women and their rights in Islam.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec434

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

35

While secular feminists argue that Islam is a patriarchal religion that reinforces violence against women, Islamic feminists argue that Islam is not patriarchal and that it saved women from the throes of pagan society which enslaved them (Pinar 2002, Ahmed 1991, Mernissi 1987). Many agree that while Islam granted women the same rights and duties as men (Baffoun 1982) it also introduced sexual inequalities and unequal inheritance rights. Pre-Islamic women were not all treated in the same way and infanticide was not commonplace throughout the Arabian Peninsula, let alone in the countries to which Islam expanded. Hajjar (2004) argues that the Qur’an offers several verses that are discriminatory towards women. In some cases Islam opposes equality between men and women and reinforces hierarchal domestic relationships. Gender inequality is based on the view that God created men and women differently, which in turn results in different family roles and duties. Since inequality is regarded as a cause of violence against women any religion that supports inequality will be directly or indirectly supporting violence against women. In many cases Islam is interpreted to tolerate some forms of violence against women. One common interpretation of sura 4, verse 34 positions men as the heads of families and entrusts them with control and guardianship over their women, which asserts the principle of qawwama/ authority, and ta‘a/obedience in Islam. Another verse is interpreted to allow men to beat their wives if and when they are disobedient. The verse says: ‘As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill conduct (nushuz), admonish them, refuse to share their beds, and beat them’ (surat al-Nisa’, verse 34). Four interpretations are provided for this verse as follows: First, the verse explicates that wife battering is permitted in Islam as a corrective measure if the wife fails to obey her husband. The interpretation that allows wife battering is based on other verses in the Qur’an that assign men the role of being in charge of women and therefore their protectors. The collective interpretation of these verses grants men a position of superiority over women, and views this power relationship as God-given.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec435

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

36

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

A second interpretation argues that wife battering is permissible in Islam only as a last resort, in cases when the wife is unfaithful and violence should be resorted to after admonishing or reprimanding her and abandoning her bed. In these cases the husband is allowed to beat his wife lightly with the use of a thin stick, which is smaller than a toothbrush (Abu Firas 2000), which sounds rather incongruous. The third interpretation argues that the verse about wife battering addresses exceptional cases and that it is allowed though not desirable. It supports this view with Prophet’s description of husbands who beat their wives as lacking in faith. Finally, the fourth interpretation builds on linguistic rules to argue that the verse does not refer to wife battering. The word idhrubuhunna has a range of meanings of which only one refers to wife battering (Mernissi 1991, Scott 2009). Hajjar (2004b) and Al-Hibri (2001) argue that the above verse lends itself to the interpretation that God sanctions beating disobedient wives as a last option after admonishing them and abandoning their beds. Al-Hibri (2001:78) supports her argument by quoting the Trophet saying: ‘the best among you are those who are best towards their wives’. Prophet Mohamed suggested solving marital problems through gentleness and dialogue. Only if this does not work would the husband resort to physical punishment, which is said to reflect ‘weak faith’. This huge divergence in the interpretation of the same verse is indicative that the Qur’an is open to many interpretations and that time-honoured cultural norms would automatically influence the way the verse is interpreted. Based on this view, we would argue that in addition to the ubiquitous patriarchal outlook already contained in the Qur’an, established patriarchal norms influence its interpretation and in some cases even overlook its dictates. One good example of this is the case of female inheritance among the Berbers of Algeria and Morocco and in Upper Egypt as already referred to in this chapter. According to Haeri, ‘Islam has become so intertwined with national [local] culture that people often fail to distinguish between what is merely social custom’ (2002:27). This state of affairs would

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec436

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

37

lead us to the various types of family laws which regulate the lives of Muslim women across the Middle East and North Africa. Family laws vary among the MENA countries depending on the legal school adopted by the country. Despite the fact that all Arab/ Muslim countries with the exception of Lebanon base their family laws on Sharia, they all differ in terms of Islamic juristic opinions, rules and hence their interpretations of it. Furthermore, a scrutiny of the family laws used in the Maghreb region (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) which are all based on the Maliki fiqh shows huge discrepancies among the three sets of family laws. One good example is polygamy, which, while fully banned in Tunisia is permitted in Morocco and Algeria with varying formalities. We would argue, nevertheless, that despite these inherent discrepancies all Islamic family laws contain within themselves a conception of gender and a conception of kinship. It is a fact that all family laws are constructed to regulate gender relations according to prevailing norms, be they religious or cultural. Modifications brought to existing family laws as a result of feminist activism and struggles as well as external pressures remain unsolicited by many factions in a any given society. Mounira Charrad explains how Islamic family laws place ‘women in a subordinate status by giving power over women to men as husbands and as male kin. Islamic law in effect sanctions the control of women by their own kin group. Any family law also offers an image of kinship in that it defines some relations in the kinship unit as privileged and other relations as less significant’ (Charrad 2001:28). As such, the majority of women in MENA view family laws as synonymous with ‘legal subordination of women’ as their dictates legitimize the control of women’s lives by male members of their kin group and render them minors for life. Furthermore, the institution of family laws often take place without involving women scholars at their seminal stage and are issued as male-made sets of laws to control and regulate women’s lives. As such, they have become the feminist platform for many women’s and feminist movements from across the MENA region, making the prime demands of their movements the total eradication of existing Family Codes (see Salhi 2010b).

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec437

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

38

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

While feminist movements mobilise to eradicate these codes they are opposed by Islamist conservatives whose belief is that existing Family Codes are not Islamic enough and that a stricter observance of Islam should be adopted by the governments of all Muslim countries. Consequently, Muslim women from the MENA region are today battling among embedded patriarchal modes of gender segregation, rising Islamic fundamentalism whose violence against women amounts in some cases to femicide and sets of Family Codes that confine women to subordinate positions in society, but above all with governments who compromise with the fundamentalists to maintain their seats in power.

Bringing Beijing Home? The leading question is: How could Beijing be brought home if the above combination of restrictive measures is in place and indeed well anchored in the socio-cultural fabric of the Muslim Middle Eastern and North African societies? One of the main priorities of Arab/Muslim states can be seen to be the necessity to contain Islamists, striking a balance between their using Islamist ideology and the Islamists’ demands. This is often reflected in the constitutional amendments that declared Sharia as the key source of legislation in such states and the issuing of Sharia-based Family Codes which often roll back secured rights from women. The Middle Eastern and North African states’ tactic of compromising with Islamic fundamentalist groups ultimately result in making concessions in women’s rights, and their military campaigns to contain Islamists also often result in sacrificing public liberties and especially women’s liberties and freedom of movement. This explains the existing limitations in implementing the CEDAW in the Middle East and North Africa which are caused by the reservations made by a big number of MENA countries to various articles, such as to article 9 which grants equal rights to men and women with respect to their children’s nationality, and article 16 which relates to the equality between men and women with regards to marriage and divorce.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec438

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

39

The ratification of CEDAW shows how scholars interpret Islam in different ways across the region. While Bahrain, Egypt and Morocco expressed reservations concerning article 16 which concerns marriage and family relations, Jordan accepted this article and raised only one concern regarding the paragraph on marriage dissolution, relating to maintenance and compensation. It is evident that each country provides its own interpretation and understanding of religion to support its political agenda. While 17 out of 20 Arab states signed and ratified the CEDAW (Qatar, Sudan and Somalia have not ratified it), they all used their right to enter reservations on the convention on any article which from their standpoint, contradicted the Sharia. Dates of signing the CEDAW also varied from one country to another. While the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) requires that countries party to the Convention take all appropriate steps to end violence against women the continued prevalence of such violence demonstrates that this global pandemic of alarming proportions is yet to be tackled with all the necessary political commitment and resources. In MENA, states remain unwilling to admit the real extent of violence against women, and do not fulfil the international conventions and agreements that they sign and ratify. Lack of state commitment to address violence against women is reflected in lack of public policies as well as lack of services for survivors of violence. Ratifying and signing international conventions as well as holding or removing reservations, constitute crucial state-based measures for responding to the problem of violence against women. The Arab Human Development Report (AHDR), an independent report sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), indicates that available empirical data reveal a serious deficiency in engaging with issues relating to violence against women, while Amnesty International (2007) insists on the negative impact of delays and failures in addressing violence against women in Arab countries, and denounces the existing obstacles that result in restrictions on freedom of expression, restrictions on women’s organisations, restrictive laws imposed on NGOs and lack of civil liberties.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec439

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

40

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

According to the Arab Human Development Report (AHDR), three types of violence against women are predominant in Arab/ Muslim countries, namely honour killing (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon), female genital mutilation (Egypt, Sudan and Yemen) and domestic violence. As to other forms of ‘mundane’ domestic violence such as verbal abuse, marital rape, preventing women from achieving their full potential through education and work, sexual harassment, slapping and battering by parents or intimate partners they remain unspoken of and hugely under reported.

Conclusion The general reluctance to address the problem of gender-based violence in the Muslim world in general and in the MENA region in particular, is mainly due to the conservative interpretations of Islam as the religion of the majority of the MENA countries, the strong hold of patriarchy and the culture of kin, states’ compromises with Islamists and religious authorities to secure and maintain their position in power, states’ dominance over women’s organisations resulting in controlled state feminism (which impacts negatively on women’s movements’ ability to challenge issues that oppose the state’s agenda), the proliferation of anti-Western discourse including feminism as a Western trend, and a general lack of political will to engage with the issue of violence against women. While one should not deny that in many MENA countries progress has been made in terms of reporting violence and rejecting it as a mandatory form of correcting women and of safeguarding family honour, the pattern varies from one country to another according to levels of illiteracy which remain relatively high in some MENA countries. Recent figures issued by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation’s (UNESCO) Institute of Statistics indicate that on average 73 per cent of the adult population in MENA is literate with an average of 81 per cent of male adults compared to 64 per cent of female adults. While these figures show a clear progression in terms of eradicating illiteracy, this average

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec440

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

41

varies from one country to another. The gender gap in these figures also varies from one country to another, while in Morocco female literacy rates represent only 44 per cent male literacy is at 69 per cent. On the other end of the spectrum the gender gap becomes much narrower in Qatar where the gap between male and female literacy is rather insignificant.6 While male and female illiteracy constitute a stumbling block for gender equality and women’s awareness of their human and legal rights, what is of paramount importance at present is to break the rule of patriarchy and work towards the empowerment of women at all levels. It is our belief that gender inequality in all its forms and at all levels e.g. (political, religious and cultural) is the main cause of genderbased violence and as things currently stand in the Middle East and North Africa the way to achieve gender equality is long and tortuous. This does not in any way suggest that Muslim women in MENA are passive victims of gender-based violence on the contrary their battles to subvert the current condition are daily occurrences, and against the odds, women are mobilising to change their condition.

Notes 1. We find this surprisingly true when aged Berber women are represented positively for their stamina and endurance to the point of becoming some type of idols and symbols of resilience. Popular culture in the form of songs is replete with such images which should be handled with caution as it is women’s suffering that is rendered a form of heroism when it should not have occurred. 2. For more information see: Women’s Rights – U.N. Decade For Women And World Conferences On Women http://science.jrank.org/pages/9668/ Women-s-Rights-U-N-Decade-Women-World-Conferences-on-Women. html#ixzz1ECwTqaz3 3. Women’s Rights – U.N. Decade For Women And World Conferences On Women 4. The traditional marriage ceremony consists of deflowering the bride’s hymen on her wedding night to prove her virginity. This is done by the midwife in the presence of the bride’s and groom’s relatives whereby she breaks the

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec441

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

42

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

hymen with her finger and displays a smeared sheet to the guests to prove the bride’s virginity. 5. In her book My Cousin, My Husband: Clans and Kinship in Mediterranean Societies, Germaine Tillion explains how the Berbers reacted to the advent of Islam and the Qur’anic prescriptions that give women the right to inheritance. She says that this posed a cruel dilemma to them as applying the law of Islam would severely compromise the integrity of the patrilineal tribe. As such, to save the tribe they chose to violate religious law and stick to tribal law. She writes, ‘The peasants of the Maghreb all devout Muslims, it goes without saying have opted for hell-fire rather than sacrifice the appropriation of their land by their lineage’ (p.165). At present, female members of the tribe are denied their right to inheritance and are not allowed to purchase land in the tribe. Families who do not have male heirs are prevented from selling their land by their cousins who are the potential heirs, so that it does not go to strangers. In some cases such ‘unfortunate’ families may live in dire poverty while their land could not be sold to alleviate their hardship. This is particularly the norm in Berber villages in Algeria and Morocco. 6. For further details see: Adult literacy rates per country and gender (2005– 2009), UIS Statistics in brief, Regional literacy profile.www.stats.uis.unesco. org. Accessed 18 November 2011.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec442

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

CHAPTER TWO GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: A UBIQUITOUS PHENOMENON

David Ghanim

Patriarchy and Violence in the Middle East and North Africa Patriarchy plays an essential role in initiating, supporting and spreading violence in MENA societies. The innately violent patriarchal gender structure makes a significant contribution to the normalization and condoning of violence in society by constructing gender roles that are based on control, intimidation, and submission. When patriarchal gender relations are supported and sanctioned by culture and religion, societal violence becomes naturalized, tolerated and accessible to everyone, particularly when this violence is perpetrated in the name of honour. Patriarchy generates structural cycles of violence and animosity that are difficult for both men and women to break away from. Violence breeds violence at a cumulative rate and the patriarchal structure helps to fashion a conflict model of gender relations that comes to dominate the lives of citizens.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec443

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

44

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

Patriarchal structures that are founded on the supremacy of men and the inferiority and submissiveness of women strongly contribute to the spreading and escalating of gender-based violence. There are extensive forms of such violence in the MENA region: physical violence; psychological violence; intimate violence and wife battering; cultural and religious sanctioning of women’s obedience; sexual violence in the form of rape (including marital rape and gang rape); incest criminalization of pre- or extra-marital sex (including death by stoning for adultery cases); honour killing; forced, early, and child marriages; forced pregnancies; criminalization of homosexuality; sexual harassment in the workplace and in the streets; female genital mutilation; forced veiling; trafficking in women; polygamy; men’s unilateral right to divorce and divorce threats; suppression of freedom of expression; deprivation of basic rights; gender-based discrimination; male guardianship and rigid restrictions on the mobility of women. Despite the fact that violence against women is pervasive, incidents of violence are rarely documented and draw little attention in public. Statistics of gender-based violence are hard to trace and most incidences go unreported; the few that are reported are not taken earnestly by authorities and are perceived as the private business of the family and therefore considered as inconsequential incidents. Furthermore, women who report violence risk facing the consequences of reprisals from their abusers. Because of solemn concerns about divorce, losing the custody of the children and economic dependence, women do not generally report cases of abuse against them until they reach an insufferable level. Still, little protection is offered in these cases. A case study involving college-educated Kuwaitis reveals that nearly 30 per cent of females reported that they had been subjected to some kind of violence, and nearly 30 per cent of males admitted that they had abused a woman (Nazar and Kouzekanani 2007:643). Another official study involving Qatar University female students disclosed that 63 per cent had been beaten, usually by male relatives.1 A 2006 official study in Bahrain indicates that 95 per cent of the respondents admitted that women are exposed to violence at home and at work.2

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec444

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

45

According to estimates by an organization against family violence, violence affected more than 48 per cent of women in Saudi Arabia during the first half of 2010, of which the parents cause 72 per cent of these incidences (Elaph 2010a). A study conducted by a social studies centre reveals that 93 per cent of Saudi women are subject to violence from their husbands. Eighty-three per cent said their husbands used various forms of physical violence, and 13 per cent admitted that their husbands force them to have sexual intercourse with them. Violence against Saudi women included preventing them from seeing their parents, appropriation of their salaries and in case of resistance or hesitation, the husbands prevented them from working. Incidences of incest have also been reported (Elaph 2010b). In April 2004, Rania al-Baz a celebrity television host was the victim of her husband’s brutal beating, which nearly killed her. Her husband savagely assaulted her, slamming her face against the marble-tiled floor of their home causing it 13 fractures. He left her unconscious for two hours while he showered and changed his clothes. He then bundled her up in a sheet and put her in the family van to dispose of what he assumed to be her dead body. When she showed signs of life, and, panicking, he took her to a hospital. After four days in a coma and following 12 operations, she survived. She decided to give permission to allow the photos of her grotesquely disfigured face to be published. This act effectively shattered the wall of silence surrounding domestic violence in Saudi Arabia. Yet, there was a price to pay for her courageous decision; she had to pardon her husband publicly, allowing his original sentence of 300 lashes and six months of imprisonment to be halved, in exchange for divorce and the custody of her three children. Because of this incident, she was dismissed from work (Al-Ghalib 2004, Al-Jadda 2004). A 2003 report conducted by the Organisation Mondiale Contra Torture (OMCT), a nongovernmental organisation based in Geneva, pinpoints that domestic violence is a pervasive problem in Turkey. A study found that 88 per cent of the women surveyed were living in violent situations and 68 per cent had been beaten by their husbands. Another study conducted by the Istanbul Bilgi University found that

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec445

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

46

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

more than 32 per cent of women were beaten by their husbands and 22 per cent by their fathers (OMCT 2003). A 2002 report conducted by OMCT revealed that more than 46 per cent of women in Yemen had experienced violence from their spouses or other family members at some point in their lives (Hassan 2007a). Reports by the World Health Organization (WHO) indicate that 24 per cent of Iraqi women were subject to physical violence and 33 per cent to psychological violence in 2010 (Elaph 2011a). A 2008 official report states that 10 per cent of women in Algeria are battered every day.3 According to Algerian police records, there were 8,000 female victims of violence in 2006, 7,400 in 2005, and 5,845 in 2004. Lamia, a 35-year-old woman tolerated her husband’s battering in the presence of her young children for five years before she was kicked out of her house ending up in the street as even her parents could not keep her. Fatiha, another 35-year-old woman, was so severely battered by her husband that she was hospitalized for three months as she suffered from fractures and severe wounds. Her crime was that she wanted to become a singer. The constant violence committed against her also caused her children psychological trauma, with one of her daughters making a suicide attempt.4 Even in Tunisia where women have benefited from the most progressive legislations and enjoy the highest status in the Arab world, a study reveals that 20–40 per cent of Tunisian women experience physical violence and 50 per cent experience verbal violence.5 In Egypt, 52 per cent of the women who participated in the 1995 national census had been beaten by their husbands at least once during the year 1994, and 17 per cent had been beaten three to six times or more (Arab Women Solidarity Association 2003: 223). Reports from Land Centre for Human Rights; a nongovernmental organization disclose that violence toward women has led to the death of 301 women in 2009, 384 in 2008, and 467 in 2007.6 In Jordan, a study conducted by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) in 2007 found that at least 25 women have been killed in 2000–03 because of physical abuse from family members (IRIN 2007a). In Lebanon, ‘Enough’, an organization which focuses on antiviolence towards women estimates that physical violence from

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec446

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

47

husbands and relatives reaches three-quarters of Lebanese women. Every year more than 500 women take refuge in women protection centres. There are only four such centres with a total capacity of accommodating 40 women. What makes the situation even worse for women is that there is no civil law in Lebanon. The ethno-sectarian political arrangement in the country includes 15 religious courts with different rules and legislations. Most of these courts are discriminatory against women in issues of marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, honour cases and rape (Elaph 2009a). In a study on domestic violence in Lebanon, Keenan, el-Hadad and Balian concluded that the factors which trigger abuse fall under three main categories: unmet marital role expectations, conflict with in-laws, and alcohol abuse. They point out: ‘Traditional Middle Eastern social and family structure is patriarchal and characterised by male dominance and authority . . . Clearly defined gender and marital role expectations prevail within the family’ (Keenan, el-Hadad and Balian 1998: 358). One Lebanese woman recalls: ‘He came home after work and the meal was not ready, so he beat me . . . My children are not doing well in school. He holds me responsible, so he beats me’; another woman mentioned: ‘The baby was crying at night and I couldn’t stop him. My husband got upset and hit me’ (ibid:359). In Palestine, the organization ‘Together Combating Violence against Women’ draws attention to increasing violence against women and children and that violence is becoming the norm in the interaction among Palestinian people. The organization says that their 24-hour help line receives 1,000–1,200 phone calls daily (Elaph 2010c). A 2006 official report revealed that 23 per cent of Palestinian women had experienced domestic violence, but only 1 per cent had filed a complaint.7 Another study indicates that 77 per cent of women in Gaza are subject to violence from their husbands and parents (Elaph 2010d). Social pressures lead to the phenomenon of committing suicide, particularly among teenagers and young women. In Gaza, 95 women attempted suicide during the first half of 2009, leading to 7 deaths (Elaph 2009b). The first official study on violence toward women in Syria, in 2006, states that 22 per cent of married women were assaulted either verbally or physically for reasons ranging from neglecting household

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec447

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

48

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

duties to ‘bombarding husbands with too many questions’.8 Another study cited physical violence as the cause of 90 per cent of divorce cases initiated by women. A woman who works at the only shelter for abused women in Syria observed: ‘Violence is in every home in the Arab world. Women start to feel that abuse is a normal part of life. They no longer believe it is violence’ (Roumani 2006).

Sexual Violence in the Middle East and North Africa Sexual violence is a sobering problem in the MENA countries. Ninety-eight per cent of rape cases in Egypt go unreported because of the social consequences associated with reporting. Incest is also common, despite the widely held belief that these are rare occurrences (Association of Solidarity of Arab Women 2003:224). According to the National Council for Social Research, there are 20,000 cases of rape in Egypt every year; 60 per cent of these are cases of incest (Syrian Women Observatory 2008). Sexual harassment affects 66 per cent of Egyptian women in their workplaces (ibid:206). A study in Qatar shows that 4.3 per cent of women have been sexually harassed and that 2 per cent have experienced ‘strong violence’ such as rape (Gulf Times 2008). Sexual assault and rape of children in Morocco became a solemn problem. According to reports from the organization of Do Not Touch My Child, rape of children has increased from 20 cases in 2006, 50 cases in 2007, to 306 rape cases in 2008 (Elaph 2009). Sexual assault and incest against children is also widespread in the Palestinian territories that often occur with the knowledge and silence of the mothers. A legal councillor states that 80 per cent of mothers to children sexually assaulted by their fathers or brothers are aware of the situation but they choose to be silent because they are afraid of divorce or shame (Elaph 2009c). Incest could also cause death in the family as was the case of a Jordanian father who raped his daughter for five years with the knowledge of her mother. When the father found out that his daughter who had reached the age of 19 had been impregnated, he himself performed a caesarean operation on her, leaving her to bleed to death (Elaph 2010e).

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec448

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

49

However, rape cases are extremely difficult if not impossible to report for many reasons including the stipulation that when reporting a case to the authorities a male guardian must accompany the victim of rape. Ruggi points out that according to Palestinian legislation, if a woman is raped, she cannot go to court on her own and her case is considered valid only with the presence of a father or a brother (Ruggi 1998:14–15). This stipulation discourages reporting rape cases to the authorities, considering that the honour of men and the family is at stake. The Islamic stipulation that adultery cases can only be accepted if proved by four witnesses also complicates the choice to report cases of rape. What is worse, if a rape case is reported and is not substantiated by four witnesses, which is a difficult condition to achieve, the case may result in accusing the victim of adultery. The cultural debasement of women in this Region and their low status in society contribute to the possibility of adultery accusation against women, which could lead to very harsh sentencing including incarceration, flogging or death by stoning. A visit by Human Rights Watch (HRW) to Libya in 2005 revealed serious violations of the most basic principles of human rights in the operation of the so-called social rehabilitation facilities. Calling these facilities de facto prisons, the report says: ‘The government of Libya is arbitrarily detaining women and girls in ‘social rehabilitation’ facilities for suspected transgressions of moral codes, locking them up indefinitely without due process . . . Some are there for no other reason than that they were raped, and are now ostracized for staining their family’s honor’ (Human Rights Watch 2006). In case of rape crimes, the victim is often blamed for the rape and is held accountable for illicit sexual behaviour. This fact is well illustrated in the Yemeni proverb: ‘A dog won’t come unless it is called’. Another proverb of the same sort states: ‘Don’t put the gas next to the match’ (Boxberger 1998:119–120). Blaming the victims is widespread in rape cases in the MENA. In June 2006, an 18-year-old Saudi girl and the man she was with were gang raped by seven men in the city of Qatif, in the Eastern province of the kingdom. The rapists were sentenced to various terms of lashing

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec449

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

50

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

and imprisonment. However, the rape victims were also sentenced to 90 lashes each for what is called khulwa, being with an unrelated male or female. The couple were sitting in a car in a shopping mall car park when the incident occurred. Her sentencing implies that it was her fault for being outside her home with an unrelated man, which has led to the rape. However, when she appealed the verdict, the appeals court not only increased the assailants’ sentences but also increased the victims’ sentences to 200 lashes as well as a six-month term of imprisonment (Human Rights Watch 2007a). A court in Tehran passed a death sentence on an 18-year-old girl, Nazanin, who stabbed an assailant while fighting off three men who attempted to rape her and her 16-year-old niece. Thirteen-yearold Zahila Izadi is another Iranian girl who also received a death sentence – later commuted – after being impregnated by her older brother (MacEoin 2006). There is also the case of an 18-year-old Emirati woman who in June 2010 accused six men of gang-raping her resulting in her being sentenced to serve a one-year sentence for consensual sex, because the court was posturing against extramarital sex rather than rape. Human Rights Watch comments that it is very difficult for women to prove that they were in fact raped because the attention is deflected from rape and assault and the concentration now lies on an act that was committed outside of marriage (Katz 2006). Thus, for victims of rape, the penalties they face may discourage reporting. Conflicts that lead to a worsening political situation and insecurity affect women negatively. During the high insecurity and violence in Iraq in the aftermath of regime change in 2003, the terrorists that were thought to belong to al-Qaeda have committed numerous rape crimes against Iraqi women. There is the case of a woman who was repeatedly raped under the threat of arms for several years. Her 15-year-old daughter has also been raped. Both mother and daughter bore children out of these rapes. The mother says ‘Every time I look at my child I remember what happened to me. It is difficult for me to love him, but I remind myself that he is innocent’ (Elaph 2011b). In Algeria, there were many instances of rape used as a weapon by the militant Islamists during the decade-long civil war following the December 1991 elections. There have been an estimated 1,600

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec450

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

51

known cases of ‘terrorist rape’, while many others remain hidden to avoid family shame (Salhi 2010b). In a Region that suffers from deficiency in social capital, there is a tradition that tends to worsen female victimization in that the rapist is forced or asked to marry the victim. This sort of ‘compromise’ offers the victim the chance to marry, since being a victim of rape jeopardises her chances of ever getting married. By accepting to marry the victim, the rapist avoids legal prosecution and jail sentencing. Yet, it is not rare that the abuser will agree to marry the victim only to divorce her shortly afterward. The cultural toleration of rape and sexual violence not only fails to combat sexual abuse but also actually legalizes it. This absurd cultural tradition of conciliation tends to subject women to a double sense of victimization. Thus, once a woman is sexually abused there is no way to break away from a longterm condemnation, degradation and victimization. Early, forced marriage is a common form of sexual violence in the MENA region and a phenomenon that is strongly tied to the concept of honour. In addition to economical factors, early marriage is a solution to the fear of loss of virginity before marriage. In tribal disputes, settlement may also involve giving women away in marriage. From another perspective, it is difficult for girls who are forced into early marriage to take care of their own children in a proper, healthy way considering that they are merely children themselves. Furthermore, because of the drastic age difference between husband and wife, the possibility of creating a successful marriage is often remote. In the Eastern and South-Eastern regions of Turkey, more than 16 per cent of women are married before the age of 15. One in every 10 women lives in a polygamous marriage, although polygamy has been banned under the 1926 civil code. Fifty-one per cent of women were married without their consent, while under Turkish law the consent of both parties is a precondition for marriage (OMCT 2003). Early child marriage is widespread in Yemen. It is deeply rooted in the local customs and is enshrined in an old tribal expression: ‘Give me a girl of eight, and I can give you a guarantee of a good marriage’ (Worth 2008). Even though Yemeni law establishes the age of 15 as the legal age of marriage, tribal customs and strict interpretations

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec451

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

52

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

of Islam often overlook the law. A 2006 study conducted by Sana’a University reported that 52 per cent of girls were married by the age of 18, while the average age of marriage in rural areas is 12 to 13. According to this study, the most important reasons for marrying children at a young age are poverty, fear of abduction and forced marriage, and the cultural tradition and belief that a young virginal bride is most easily shaped into a dutiful wife (Daragahi 2008). Sally is a Yemeni child who, at the age of 11, was forced to marry a 25-year-old man. Amina was a Yemeni girl accused of killing her husband and was subsequently sentenced to death even though she was only 15 years old at the time.9 There is another case of a Yemeni man who was so poor that the only dowry he could offer his bride’s family was his 10-year-old sister, in marriage to the 40-year-old brother of the bride. Her husband and her brother, who was mostly interested in preserving his own marriage, beat the girl constantly causing her physical harm and deep depression (ibid). It is not uncommon that early marriage leads to death, as in the case of Ilham, a 13-year-old who died after four days from her forced marriage to a man in his thirties in March 2010. Due to severe damage to her genitals, she bled to death. Another Yemeni girl died in September 2009 when she gave birth to a child while she was only 12 years old. These cases have been called in the media and civil society as the ‘brides of death’ (Elaph 2010f). Nujood Ali, a 10-year-old Yemeni girl, was forced by her impoverished and unemployed father of 16 children with two wives, to marry a 30-year-old man who abused her sexually and beat her regularly. She recalls: ‘Whenever I wanted to play in the yard he beat me and asked me to the bedroom with him’. A lawyer commented: ‘Nujood did not get married, but she was raped by a 30-year-old man’. Her husband, on the other hand, defended himself: ‘Yes, I was intimate with her, but I have done nothing wrong, as she is my wife and I have the right and no one can stop me’. When she complained to her parents, they refused to help her, for they feared that breaking the marriage would expose the family to shame. Her father told her: ‘My cousins would have killed me if you dishonoured the family by asking for a divorce’. Nevertheless, on 2 April 2008, Nujood mustered the courage to go

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec452

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

53

to court on her own and request a divorce. She was freed from her marriage in June 2008. The husband agreed to divorce her under the condition of paying him $250, the equivalent of four months’ salary for a poor Yemeni. As for Nujood, following the ordeal, she said: ‘All I want now is to finish my education. I want to be a human rights lawyer. I want to defend oppressed people. I want to be an example for all the other girls’ (Hamad 2008, Daragahi 2008). This case has sparked a public debate regarding child brides and the appropriate age of marriage in Yemen. Only one month after Nujood’s landmark legal case, another girl, Arwa, aged nine, demanded a legal divorce. The case revealed that her husband had beaten and sexually abused her during the entire period of eight months of her arranged marriage. Mariam is a 16-year-old Iranian girl whose father gave his word of ‘honour’ to marry her to a relative. After discovering the relative was a drug addict, she protested the forced marriage and her father reacted violently. He told her ‘even if I have to kill you you’re going to marry him’. She said: ‘He beat me till I was black and blue . . . eventually he kicked us all out, my mother and her seven children’. Mariam was taken out of school (Kousha 1997:104–105). Another form of sexual violence against women in some the MENA countries is female genital mutilation (FGM). In 1995, WHO estimated the rate of FGM among women in Egypt was 97 per cent and 89 per cent in the Sudan (WHO 1998:13 and 17). However, a UNICEF survey conducted in 2005 revealed that the rate of FGM among women in Egypt and the Sudan has remained virtually unchanged for the past decade (IRIN 2005). FGM is a deeply rooted tradition in these two countries. In Egypt, both Muslims and Coptic Christians practice it while in the Sudan only the Muslims practice it, unlike the Christians in the South. About 85 per cent of FGM cases practiced in Sudan are of the most severe type, i.e. infibulations. It is usually performed on girls between the ages of four and seven, by traditional practitioners under improvised, unsanitary conditions, causing severe pain, trauma and risk of infection to the child. FGM is also believed to be practiced in other parts of the MENA region, such as Yemen, Oman, Bahrain, Northern Saudi Arabia, the

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec453

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

54

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

United Arab Emirates, Southern Jordan and Syria and also among the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria (ibid). It is also practiced within some African and Middle Eastern immigrant communities in the Western world. A survey conducted by a German non-governmental organization, WADI, involving 40 villages in the region of Iraqi Kurdistan, revealed that about 60–70 per cent of women living in these villages are circumcised. Other estimates indicate that about 10–20 per cent of women living in Iraqi Kurdistan go through this mutilation (IRIN 2005, Esfandiari 2005, Birch 2005). UNICEF figures suggest that 23 per cent of women in Yemen are affected (UNICEF 2005:4). In some regions of Yemen, these figures can even reach 50 per cent, particularly in communities trading across the Red Sea (IRIN 2005). Interestingly, a UNICEF study reveals that there is little variation, if not a negative correlation, among educational level household wealth and place of residence and the prevalence of the practice of FGM in the three Middle Eastern countries included in the study: Egypt, Sudan and Yemen. In 2000, the prevalence rates of FGM among illiterate people in Egypt, was 98.8 per cent, while among those having secondary education or higher it was 94.8 per cent. While Egypt shows a modest positive variation, the other countries demonstrate a negative correlation between education and the performance of FGM. In Sudan, the prevalence rate was 85.2 per cent among illiterate people and 97.6 per cent amongst educated people. Likewise, the figures for Yemen were 22.1 per cent and 34.1 per cent, respectively. With respect to household income, prevalence figures of FGM in Egypt were 98.2 per cent among the poorest 20 per cent of the population and 92.1 per cent among the richest 20 per cent. For Yemen, the figures were 30.2 per cent and 26.3 per cent respectively. No figures were available for Sudan (UNICEF 2005:33). The same study found that only Egypt shows some differences in the practice of FGM in urban versus rural place of residence. The prevalence rate for women of 15–49 years old having at least one daughter circumcised in Egypt was 52.9 per cent for urban women and 39.8 per cent for rural women. Yet, the figures for Sudan were almost the same; 58.7

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec454

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

55

per cent and 58.1 per cent respectively and likewise for Yemen; 19.7 per cent and 19.6 per cent respectively (ibid:35). FGM is a form of violence not only against women but also against children and the very concept of childhood. The WHO study states: ‘FGM is usually performed on legal minors with no power or faculties to consent. Consent of parents or guardians is not acceptable when the act performed is damaging rather than beneficial to the child’ (WHO 1998:58). The fear and pain associated with this practice are enormous and have pervasive psychological effects on girls. Considering the strong link between FGM and violence, it is natural that the trauma, fear and pain a genitally mutilated woman experiences will gradually nurture her more negative, violent, abusive, and apathetic characteristics. A deeply traumatizing experience leaves severe psychological scars that will affect the personality of the woman and her relation to the outside world. A study conducted by UNICEF found evidence of a correlation between women’s support of FGM and their condoning of wife beating. In Egypt, women who support FGM are 2.3 times more likely to agree that wife beating is acceptable, and are 3.2 times more likely to agree that a husband is justified in beating his wife if she argues with him (UNICEF 2005:24–25). The impact of these views of condoning violence is even more serious considering that 79 per cent of women support this practice in Sudan, 71 per cent in Egypt, and 21 per cent in Yemen (ibid:18). Moreover, FGM, as the physical expression of fear of female sexuality, is a form of violence against women and female sexuality and a violation of a woman’s right to own and to enjoy the functioning and feeling of a healthy body.

Violence on the Temple of Honour Much of the gender-based violence and femicide in the Middle East are related to the honour of the family that is principally linked to the sexual conduct of women. In her study on honour crimes, Chesler considers that honour killing is a worse type of domestic violence, due to several distinct characteristics. These crimes are carefully planned,

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec455

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

56

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

and death threats are often used as a means of control. The planning and execution of these crimes involve multiple family members and can include mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, male cousins and uncles. Most of these cases are carried out with barbaric ferocity and extreme violence. Teenage girls and young women are the target of these crimes, which are linked to dishonouring the family. There is strong condoning of these crimes and the perpetrators are celebrated as real men and heroes (Chesler 2009). According to a 2007 UNIFEM study, at least 97 women were killed for ‘honour reasons’ in Jordan from 2000 to 03 (IRIN 2007a). Another source indicates that honour crimes constitute 25 per cent of the annual homicides in Jordan, where 25 women are killed annually in the name of family honour. Most are buried in unmarked graves and are disgraced even in death. Three Jordanian brothers killed their 40-year-old divorced sister in an honour related crime in September 2009. They planned the murder and waited until her five children had gone to school, to stab her with a knife 15 times and then set her house on fire to cover up the crime (Elaph 2009d). In Lebanon, an average of one woman per month is killed by a close male relative in honour related crimes (Mediterranean Women 2001). Official statistics show that in 2004 alone, 20 girls and women were murdered in the Palestinian territories, another 15 survived murder attempts and 50 women committed suicide (Mediterranean Women 2005b). It is suspected that 70 per cent of all murders in Gaza and the West Bank are the result of honour killings (Ruggi 1998:13). Between January 2006 and March 2007, 17 women were targeted and killed in Gaza for reasons of honour which represents an increase from an average of 10 honour killings per year recorded from 2000 to 05. Armed religious groups rather than family members carried out about half of the recent honour killings in Gaza a new and alarming phenomenon (Human Rights Watch 2007b). There is, after all, a Palestinian proverb that says: ‘The best way to treat filth is to bury it!’ Honour killings are rampant in the Kurdish areas of Turkey, Iran Syria, and Iraq. According to the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, UNAMI, there were 118 female deaths during the first quarter

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec456

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

57

of 2007 and 137 in the second quarter in the Kurdish enclave in Northern Iraq. From August to November 2007, at least 27 Iraqi Kurdish women were murdered for allegedly having illicit affairs, while 97 other women tried to commit suicide by self-immolation (IRIN 2007b). According to Warfin, 32 women were killed in Iraqi Kurdistan during the month of September 2011 alone (Warfin 2011). A network against violence estimates that more than 12,000 women were killed in the name of honour in Iraqi Kurdistan from 1991 to 2007 (Leland and Abdulla 2010). There are no reliable statistics, but it is thought that at least 60 women die in honour killings in Turkey each year. Others believe the real figure is much higher.10 However, these statistics do not portray the full picture or the severity of the problem of honour killing in the Middle East. The figures that exist are based on cases that have been reported to authorities or have come to court and many honour crimes are disguised as accidents or suicides. A UN report on the high rate of suicide among young girls in Turkey states: Girls commit suicide in large numbers because they have lost their virginity or because they have been forced into marriage or sent away to special re-education establishments. Oftentimes, a woman who has somehow violated the family ‘honor’ is given the choice of committing suicide, rather than being killed by a family member, and usually women choose this option (OMCT 2003). In an interview regarding the incidences of honour killings, Palestinian police officers stated that there is an apparent trend in society to cover up the crime in order to reduce the subsequent damage to the family and community. One officer stated ‘They do what they feel they need to do to protect their honour, but then they cover it up with stories such as she fell, was burned or wanted to commit suicide. We suspect that it was murder rather than suicide, but we also do not want to add pain to the family. The woman is dead, why cause more pain?’ (Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2000:69).

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec457

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

58

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

Honour killing is strongly related to the protection of honour in patriarchal societies. Perpetrators of these crimes are loaded with the pressures of a male-centred culture. The honour of men and the community is mostly, if not solely, linked to the restriction of female sexuality, thereby establishing a cult of virginity. Forced virginity testing by family members continues to be widespread. A man’s masculinity is socially constructed through his ability to deny other men sexual access to his female relatives. Therefore, masculinity is also related to punishing transgressions of this moral code. In her study of Palestinian society, Shalhoub-Kevorkian argues ‘The concept of “rujuleh” (manhood) is incorporated in the mental perception of the family. One cannot remain a “rajul” (man) if he remains silent towards perceived sexual transgressions by his female relatives’ (ibid:51). Under the rule of the strictly rigid moral code, there is zero tolerance toward women who violate this moral code to the point that they are expected to defend it until death. If a woman has not died defending the honour of the family, it is the duty of the men to make sure that she does. One Palestinian tribal leader put it this way: ‘So if they are still alive, which they should not, then they do not deserve to survive the dishonouring and therefore they should die’. Another tribal notable stated ‘Women in this society know very well that behaving contrary to social norms could very well lead to their death and no one will hold the killer responsible for this act. To the contrary, he will be seen as honourable’ (ibid:49). Elsewhere I argued ‘In societies in which culture revolves around a strong and central form of the male ego, shaming the honour of men is considered to be the real crime rather than the killing of women. According to this dubious reasoning, the offender is not the killer, but the girl who has tarnished the family’s honour and reputation. In this sense, honour killing is considered justice’ (Ghanim 2009: 44). Since the honour of men is often constructed through the need to control female sexuality, condoning honour killing can be found to be widespread throughout the Middle East. Parrot and Cummings contend that the deeply rooted cultural acceptance of these crimes is connected to perceptions of worth of women and their role in society (Parrot and Cummings 2006:178). Very few reported cases of honour

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec458

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

59

killings reach the trial stage due to social condoning of these acts that are considered family business rather than crimes. The exceptional cases that do end in conviction receive only token sentences. This leniency renders the law inadequate for the protection of women’s human rights, particularly the right to live. Most of the penal codes in the region contain conditions of leniency in cases involving men’s honour. A few months of incarceration are a common punishment for these crimes. Honour killing is such a culturally entrenched tradition that very few killers ever express remorse. A UN report mentions the story of a 17-year-old who killed his female cousin to uphold his family’s honour, for which he received only a six-month prison sentence in Jordan. A few years later he did not regret his crime: ‘I would do it again if I had to. People here would have stigmatized my entire family if I had not killed her and shame would have followed us wherever we went’ (IRIN 2007c). Most of the cases of honour killings are based on merely suspicion and not real acts. Autopsies reveal that most of the girls killed in these crimes are still virgins. Norma Khouri is a Jordanian woman who wrote a book dedicated to her 25-year-old friend and business associate, Dalia, whose life was precipitately ended in a crime of honour. Dalia had defied the strictly rigid moral and religious code on two accounts; first, she had fallen in love in a culture that criminalizes premarital love; second, she loved a Christian man while she was a Muslim woman (Khouri 2003). Even though the autopsy confirmed that Dalia was still a virgin, the outcome of her dual insolence proved to be the tragic end of her life in the name of honour. Another crime was reported in 2007 in the village of Ba’shiqa in Northern Iraq. Du‘a, a 17-year-old girl from a Yazidi sect and Muhannad, a 19-year-old Sunni Muslim, fell in love and wanted to get married. However, their decision outraged their respective communities. The lovers fled but were soon found together in an olive grove. They were suspected of illicit sexual behaviour and Du‘a told her mother in what would prove to be a poignant last meeting, ‘I promise you I am still a virgin, I did nothing wrong, Mama’. While Muhannad was locked up in prison, Du‘a found herself being dragged to the marketplace to be stoned to death. A mob of more

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec459

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

60

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

than 25 male relatives came with guns and stones, shouting and screaming in anger, demanding that she be killed in order to ‘cleanse the family honour’. She came under a hail of stones and her face and clothes were soon covered in blood. Finally, one cousin smashed a large piece of concrete over her head to end the spectacle and her body was tossed in a rubbish pit. This atrocious scene was filmed using a mobile phone and was posted on the Internet. Afterward, even her grave was attacked. A grenade was lobbed into the garden of her family home, shattering windows and leaving the family in no doubt that the community wanted them to leave. Every day after sunset, the mother would throw herself on the mud grave and cry in deep bitter grief, howling ‘Come to mama, Du‘a . . . the last thing you told me was that you were hungry. Come home. Let me cook, and feed you . . . You were a good girl, you were honour itself and I miss you, so please come to me in my dreams, I beg you’ (Jaber 2007). Du‘a’s final words pleading her innocence had been confirmed afterward with an autopsy; she was a virgin.

Conclusion In the Middle East and North Africa, issues surrounding gender have generally been overlooked, or dismissed as an unimportant area of concern, or simply a marginal issue that is primarily the concern of women. On the contrary, gender issues, particularly gender-based violence, affect not only women, but also men, children and society as a whole. Gender violence is a pervasive phenomenon in the region that is associated with high physical, psychological, health and economic costs for the society. It is an utter dissipation of human resources in the name of honour and shame when these societies need to mobilize their potential for productive purposes. The high levels of obvious, open male violence toward women precipitate female resistance that can also take various forms of violence. This is a natural consequence of male violence because total submission and acceptance of violence is more a myth than a reality. Gender-based violence causes the entire society to plummet into a cycle of animosity, conflict and societal violence. Gender violence is dehumanizing for both the victim and the perpetrator.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec460

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

61

The traditional, patriarchal gender structure prevalent in MENA societies leaves both men and women little room for choice as violence is an innate part of the patriarchal gender structure. Mernissi asks, ‘Why does patriarchy assume the guise of legality in Arab countries, whereas in the developed countries it is acknowledged that its very structure is incompatible with the aspiration of democracy?’ (Mernissi 1988:37). It is high time for the MENA Countries to challenge the violent and destructive patriarchal ideology that is predominant in this region. Women need to go beyond the status of victimization and channel the various forms of female power and influence into a national female power capable of changing their lower status in society. Men, women and society are all responsible for deemphasizing gender conflict and societal violence and gradually building a more tolerant and peaceful society based on mutual respect and appreciation. In this high time of revolutionary changes in the region, gender-based violence should be a serious item on the agenda of Middle Eastern and North African societies.

Notes 1. Gulf Times, 25 January 2008. 2. Asharq al-Awsat, ‘A study in Bahrain: 95% admit that women are abused’, 20 March2006. 3. ‘Governmental report: One in every ten women are battered in Algeria’, Asharq al-Awsat, 6 February 2008. 4. Syrian Women Observatory, ‘Algerian Women: As Second Class Citizens’, 15 January 2008, http://www.nesasy.org/index2.php?option=com_content. 5. ‘Tunisia stresses combating violence against women’, Elaph, 26 November 2010, http://elaph.com/Web/news/2010/11/613901.html. 6. Land Centre for Human Rights, various years. 7. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2006. 8. Syrian Women Observatory, ‘Domestic violence, a global phenomenon that we keep in the dark’, 23 November 2007. http://www.nesasy.org/languages/ index.php/En/2007/11/23/domestic_violence_a_global_phenomenon.th 9. Staff Editor, ‘Sally: A victim of civil society organizations and the authorities in charge’, Yemen Observer, 26 February 2008. 10. ‘One honor killing is a tragedy. Many others are just statistics’, Turkish Daily News, 7 April 2007.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec461

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

CHAPTER THREE WOMEN AND VIOLENCE IN LIGHT OF AN ISLAMIC NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY

Mariam al-Attar

Introduction: Colonial Feminism It is ironic that the same power that constantly violates human rights in our region ordains itself as a guardian and protector of women’s rights. Unfortunately, ‘women’s rights’ is becoming a slogan that is used as a political tool, just as ‘democracy’ is being used to justify intervention in other countries’ affairs. ‘Western Women’s movements stood silent when tortures and rapes of Iraqi women detainees came to light. Western “feminists” are ready to attack with ferocity Muslim “fundamentalists” and community leaders, but they failed to lift a finger when innocent Iraqi women and girls are detained, tortured and raped by sick colonial soldiers’ (Hassan 2010). The revelation of tortures and rapes of Iraqi prisoners of war and Iraqi female detainees constitute the writing on the wall for a decadent civilisation which has been proclaiming its moral superiority to the world for some centuries now. ‘Western culture has never stood lower in Muslim and Arab Eyes’ (ibid).

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec462

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

ISLAMIC NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY

63

No wonder that some Muslims feel threatened whenever the issue of women’s rights is mentioned. Unfortunately, this issue became associated with Western polemic against Islam and with colonialism. Haifa Zangana maintains that ‘women rights became a slogan that is used as an ideological weapon by the West in an attempt to disguise their political and economic interest in the region and to give their continuous interference a moral justification’ (Zangana 2007:16). In her book City of Widows, Haifa Zangana states that ‘the promotion of Iraqi women’s rights as a justification for the invasion has proven to be the mother of all failures’ (ibid). Long before that, Leila Ahmed has pointed out that colonial feminism was a Western discourse which ‘introduced the notion that an intrinsic connection existed between the issue of culture and the status of women, and in particular that progress for women could be achieved only through abandoning the native culture . . .’ (Ahmed 1992:144). Whether in the hands of patriarchal men or feminists, the ideas of Western feminism essentially functioned to morally justify the attack on native societies to support the notion of comprehensive superiority of Europe (ibid:154). In order to gain credibility, the activists who raise their voice in condemnation of the unjust legislations that discriminate against women need to be consistent in condemning injustices and oppressions against men and women and all kinds of discriminations based on gender, ethnicity, religion or nationality. The fact that the same powers that waged war against Afghanistan and Iraq and supported Israel have declared themselves as protectors of democracy and the guardians of women’s rights has actually harmed the cause of women rather than served it. This must have had a great impact on delaying the progress of Arab and Muslim societies and on hindering the reform of laws and legislations that discriminate against women. Foreign interference, in any form, has proven to be dubious and has resulted in hampering the development process, even when practiced with good intention. The attempt to impose norms by those who consider themselves in charge of the world order has been and will continue to be faced with great resistance, even when those norms are proper and could have been voluntarily adopted or internally

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec463

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

64

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

developed given better political circumstances. Reform should happen from within and can never be imposed on any community. Concerns for women’s rights cannot be separated from concerns about preserving human dignity, national liberation and economic development. It is the empowerment of all citizens that necessitates the empowerment of women. Women will not be empowered in an oppressed and humiliated society and as far as the discourse of women’s rights remains greatly westernised, it will be resisted, not only by conservative patriarchal parties who are against any social change or reform but also by ordinary people. Patriarchal discourse will remain the prevailing discourse and will continue to marginalise any attempt for social reform in the name of opposition to Western culture and its associated colonial ideology, which will remain the most popular cause in the Arab and Islamic world and will continue to appeal to people from divergent political and social backgrounds. Therefore, it is essential for those who are sincere in seeking social and legislative reform to distance themselves from any foreign allegiances while emphasising the universal normative values that are in total agreement, as will be argued below, with the ethos of the Qur’an, the first source of legislation in Islam which is the prevailing religion in the Arab world. Social and political reform movements need to uncover the un-Islamic underpinnings of various unjust rules and legislations including those that discriminate against women. It is only an independent and anti-colonialist movement that can lead social change and reform the social, economic, legal and political status of women. It is only within an independent, anti-colonialist movement that human dignity can be restored in the Middle East and North Africa. A prominent Muslim feminist has maintained: The majority of Muslim women who are attached to their religion will not be liberated through the use of a secular approach imposed from the outside by international bodies or from above by undemocratic governments. The only way to resolve the conflicts of these women and remove their fear of pursuing rich and fruitful lives is to build a solid Muslim feminist

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec464

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

ISLAMIC NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY

65

jurisprudential basis which clearly shows that Islam not only does not deprive them of their rights, but in fact demands these rights for them (Al-Hibri 1997:309).

The Case of Honour Crimes In Jordan, the result of a campaign against the so called ‘honour crimes’ and the laws that discriminate against women is a good example of what has been said above about the religious conservative parties that reject any attempt of reforming laws that discriminate against women, when reforms are perceived to be a result of external pressure. In Jordan, women’s rights activists have exposed and criticized laws that clearly discriminate against women. In a recently published book, Murder in the Name of Honor, Rana al-Husseini, a Jordanian journalist, and a women rights activist talks about a campaign against honour killing in Jordan. The campaign focused on the cancellation of article 340 in Jordanian law which provides a cover for murder committed in the name of honour. The article contains a clause that can bear various interpretations: ‘He who discovers his wife, or one of his female relatives with another in an adulterous situation, and kills, wounds or injures one or both of them, benefits from a reduction in penalty’. The government responded to the campaign, but among justifications for amending article 340 a governmental committee included that ‘the law needed to be changed in response to the human rights organizations’ constant criticism of the existence of article 340’ (Husseini 2009:37). In response to that Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), a powerful political party, issued a fatwa saying that the proposal to abolish article 340 would ‘destroy our Islamic, social and family values by stripping men of their humanity when they surprise their wives or female relatives committing adultery’ (ibid:69). The IAF, in issuing this fatwa was motivated by political, rather than religious reasons. A journalist commented on the position of the Islamists by writing: ‘Most Islamists opposed the draft law because it was the result of international pressure’ (ibid:73). Later, the president of the IFA Fatwa Committee said, ‘The government amended article 340 because this is what Americans want’.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec465

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

66

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

The amendment, however, was simply that the article was expanded offering women the same reduction in penalty as men. Even this irrelevant amendment was later rejected by the Parliament elected in 2003, where a total of 50 MPs out of 89 present at the session raised their hands to reject the new amendment. Women rights organisations are alleged to benefit from Western institutions and reflect Western ideologies and colonialist agendas. This, of course, is not always the case. However, in order to achieve the much needed reform the issue of women rights has to be approached from within by activists dedicated to the cause and committed to the Arabo-Islamic culture, rather than to any Western or foreign ideology. Moreover, any women rights movement needs to emphasise the difference between old patriarchal customs and traditions and the Qur’anic ethos. The unfair laws based on customs and traditions need to be condemned on the basis of their injustice and contradiction with the basic Islamic teachings. Harmful and unjust social norms and practices should be condemned and criticised from an Islamic ethical perspective. Social norms and customs that encourage violence against women should be exposed and declared as primitive and against the teachings of the All merciful and compassionate God, and therefore against the most essential teachings of Islam. Indeed, many of the countries most notorious for honour killing are Arab or Muslim countries Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Palestine. This feeds a general impression that honour killing is somehow related to Islam, which feeds into a general xenophobia against Muslims and the phenomenon is used by racists and xenophobes as yet another stick with which to beat Muslims, attempting to characterise these murders as a ‘pious act’, approved by Islam.1 However, the custom predates the Islamic faith and is by no means unique to Muslim cultures; also, there is little evidence of honour crimes occurring in other Muslim countries such as Indonesia. The extent of cultures following the ‘honour ethic’ is more geographical than ideological, comprising the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean regions. For some Hindus, an honour killing may be motivated by a woman marrying

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec466

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

ISLAMIC NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY

67

across caste boundaries. Moreover, honour killing was only abolished as a specific category in 1981 in Italy, where murders in the name of honour still occur. In Brazil, men could be acquitted for murdering their wives up until 1991, and there have been 800 recorded such murders in a single year (ibid). Even within the Middle East, honour killing is not restricted to Muslims. In Yemen, a Jewish father killed his daughter after a rebuke from the rabbi for her extra-marital pregnancy, and in Palestine in 2005 Faten Habash was beaten to death with an iron bar wielded by her Christian father because she wanted to marry her Muslim boyfriend (ibid). There is no evidence in the Qur’an or the Hadith that could justify honour killing. It also should be noted that ‘in America, not in the Muslim world, between 40 per cent and 60 per cent of women killed, are killed by their husbands and boyfriends, but such murders of course are no longer even called “passion” crimes; much less “honour” crimes’ (Ghali 2004). However, what they do reveal is an element of what can be termed ‘misogynistic’ strains that can be found at the heart of imperial American culture (ibid). Mohammad Fadel, in a response to the fatwa issued by the Jordanian IFA provided a traditional Islamic ruling on the matter that concerned the IFA committee. He argues that Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr (d. 463/1071), a wellknown Maliki scholar and the author of Al-Istidhkar, recorded the following Hadith regarding one who discovers a [non-Mahrim] man with his wife: ‘Malik narrated from Suhayl b. Abi Salih al-Samman, from his father, from Abu Hurayra that Sa‘d b. ‘Ubada, said to the Prophet (S) “Suppose I discover a man with my wife. Should I leave him be unless I bring four witnesses?” The Prophet (S) said, “Yes”’. According to the above Hadith the following legal principles should be considered: the prohibition against applying a legal penalty without legal authority and without witnesses; cutting off the means to shedding the blood of a Muslim based merely upon the claim of his accuser, the one seeking the shedding of the accused’s blood. Therefore, application of legal punishments is exclusively for the government. After investigating other relevant Hadith reports, Mohammed Fadel concludes that whether in regard to honour crimes, or other than that, punishment is the domain of the government, and

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec467

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

68

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

not something which an individual can take upon himself to perform; ‘To allow it would be to make an individual prosecutor, judge, and executioner at one and the same time’.2 Honour killing is bound to patriarchal control and tradition. Nothing in the verses of the Qur’an lends the slightest support to such behavioural choices. On the contrary, the text strongly upholds the sanctity of life, the honour of women and integrity in delivering justice (Kassam 2010:11). Even the perpetrators of ‘honour crimes’ are fully aware that their crimes are immoral and illegal according to Islam. Rana Husseini reports how a killer was fully aware that killing his sister was against Islam. His sister who had been raped by her brother-in-law, turned herself to the police station to seek protection from her family’s reaction, yet later she was killed by her brother. When challenged by pointing out that his action contradicted the teachings of Islam he said ‘I know that killing my sister is against Islam and it angered God, but I had to do what I had to do . . .’ (Husseini 2009: 10). Another killer told her ‘He realized that what he did was against the Sharia but, he added, society is stronger than him or religion’ (ibid.: 16).

Textual Controversies In defence of Islam, it is usually argued that all social practices and laws that discriminate against women are against Islam and that customs and traditions that predate Islam are to be blamed for all kinds of violence against women including honour killing. However, there are many verses in the Qur’an that can be cited in support of women’s inferiority, and such verses are used as a basis for family laws that discriminate against women. Progressive Muslim scholars have struggled to interpret verses that were usually understood to endorse women’s inferiority. Most familiar examples include Q 4:34 which says

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec468

5/7/2013 6:40:00 PM

ISLAMIC NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY

69

Men are in charge of women, because Allah hath made the one of them to excel the other, and because they spend of their property (for the support of women). So, good women are the obedient, guarding in secret that which Allah hath guarded. As for those from whom ye fear rebellion, admonish them and banish them to beds apart, and scourge them. Then if they obey you, seek not a way against them. Lo! Allah is ever High, Exalted, Great (34). Verse 4:34 of the Qur’an has been used to justify wife-beating. However, many Islamic feminists claim it was never meant to do so. In 2007 Laleh Bakhtiar published a translation of the Quran, with her translation of verse 4:34 substituting ‘go away’ for ‘beat’ (They are the same word in classical Arabic). Her translation of Verse 4:34 reads: Men are supporters of wives because God has given some of them an advantage over others and because they spend of their wealth. So the ones who are in accord with morality are the ones who are morally obligated, the ones who guard the unseen of what God has kept safe. But those whose resistance you fear then admonish them and abandon them in their sleeping place, then go away from them; and if they obey you, surely look not for any way against them; truly God is Lofty, Great. 3 She translates ‘qawwamuna’ as ‘supporters’ rather than ‘in charge of women’. Yet, whether supporters or in charge, women’s inferior status which was a reality in the time of revelation is still endorsed. That men are a degree above women is often repeated in the Quran as in (Q 2:228): . And they (women) have rights similar to those (of men) over them in kindness, and men are a degree above them. Allah is Mighty, Wise (Q 228). It is important to notice that this is a descriptive rather than normative statement. It describes the condition of women during the time of revelation, and it by no means prescribes injustice. Another

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec469

5/7/2013 6:40:01 PM

70

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

verse was used to establish inheritance laws that discriminate against women as in (Q4:11):

Allah (thus) directs you as regards your children’s (inheritance): to the male, a portion equal to that of two females: if only daughters, two or more, their share is two-thirds of the inheritance; if only one, her share is a half. Verse 2:282 says:

And call to witness, from among your men, two witnesses. And if two men be not (at hand) then a man and two women, of such as ye approve as witnesses, so that if one of the two erreth (through forgetfulness) the one of them will remind . . . And the verse that has traditionally been quoted in defence of polygamy (Q 4:3):

And if ye fear that ye will not deal fairly by the orphans, marry of the women, who seem good to you, two or three or four; and if ye fear that ye cannot do justice (to so many) then one (only) or (the captives) that your right hands possess. Thus it is more likely that ye will not do injustice. Many scholars have struggled with these verses trying to give them a different interpretation that is compatible with the Qur’anic concept of unity and justice, by interpreting the meanings of ‘qawwamuna’ and ‘idhrubuhunna’ for example. However, this method of allowing multiple meanings or divergent readings of the text still allows different parties to stick to different possible meanings and it is obvious

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec470

5/7/2013 6:40:01 PM

ISLAMIC NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY

71

that the prevalent meaning of these words supports women’s inferiority. However, the work done in this direction is impressive and its importance in diluting the dogmatic literal approach cannot be denied. Yet, what should have precedence over textual interpretation is a historical method that allows for a different approach to studying sacred texts on the one hand and emphasizing the Qur’anic ethos and normative moral theories that are based on the Qur’anic universal message to human kind on the other hand? Verses that might support women’s inferiority and might be used to justify biased laws should be treated in the same way as verses on slavery. They are irrelevant to the present social reality and merely reflect the biases and prejudices that were present in the past and could not have been surpassed by the time of revelation. It is important to notice that texts that are usually used to sustain the notion of gender inequality and women’s inferiority in Islamic culture are analogous to other texts found in different religions, including Christianity. And as stated in The Encyclopedia of Feminist Theories, ‘Christianity is the dominant religious tradition of the western world, a primary cultural site for the development, transmission, and maintenance of gender ideology’ (Warne 2000:86). The status of women in history and in modern times has been formed and influenced on the whole, or in a great part, by prevailing religious beliefs. It is not surprising, considering the almost total gender domination of Church leadership by men, that women’s status was somewhere between property and personal slave, to those men.4 Similar to their Muslim counterparts, Christian theologians and religious leaders have expressed their misogynic views, including such important figures as Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE), Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 CE) and Martin Luther (1483–1546 CE). For example, Saint Augustine said ‘What is the difference whether it is in a wife or a mother, it is still Eve the temptress that we must beware of in any woman . . . I fail to see what use woman can be to man, if one excludes the function of bearing children’ (St Augustine, cited in Armstrong 1986:52–62). Aquinas stated ‘As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec471

5/7/2013 6:40:05 PM

72

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from a defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence’ (ibid). And Luther said, ‘If they [women] become tired or even die, that does not matter. Let them die in childbirth, that’s why they are there’ (Luther 1912–21:25). Those theologians did not merely express their personal views; their beliefs were rooted in the Bible. Examples of verses that are cited to promote women’s inferiority include Colossians 3:18 ‘Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as it is fit in the Lord’; Ephesians 5:22–24 ‘Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the Church: and he is the saviour of the body. Therefore, as the church is subject unto Christ, so let the wives be to their own husbands in every thing’; and Corinthians 11:3 ‘But I would have you know, that the head of every man is Christ; and the head of the woman is the man; and the head of Christ is God’. Women, according to the Bible are not even allowed to speak in the Church, as in Corinthians 14:34–36: ‘Let your women keep silence in the Churches: for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but they are commanded to be under obedience as also saith the law. And if they will learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home: for it is a shame for women to speak in the church’. These are examples from the New Testament, not to mention the many passages from the Hebrew Bible (Old Testament) that perceive women as inferior to men. A number of verses describe a woman as the property of her father. At marriage, her ownership is transferred to her new husband.5 In Gratian’s twelfth-century Decretum,6 the first systematic treatise of early Christian law, the rule of husbands was justified by the rationale that women – in the form of Eve – had brought about the fall of mankind. Therefore, it was considered right that he who had been led into wrongdoing should control the one who had caused the sin, so that the wrongdoing should not happen again. In 1782, Sir Francis Buller, an English jurist, reportedly coined the infamous rule of thumb, which permitted husbands to chastise their wives, but only with a stick the width of a thumb. The rule later entered

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec472

5/7/2013 6:40:05 PM

ISLAMIC NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY

73

the jurisprudence of a number of states in the United States (Warren 2008–09:43–44). Consequently, just as Christianity cannot be credited for the achievements of women in the West, Islam cannot be blamed for the tardiness of Arab and Muslim women in achieving their aims. Indeed, all religious sacred texts whether in Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism or even Buddhism endorse patriarchal values and norms that were dominant in ancient civilisations. Different scholars have acknowledged the role played by Islam in seventh-century Arabia in reforming women’s status. It was maintained that the later scholars are the ones who interpreted the Qur’an in a way that serves their interests. Islam has been manipulated to keep the male elites in religious and political power, like the Christian and Jewish societies before it (Jabar 2007:7). The literal meaning of the text cannot serve as a source for legislation. It is true that the Qur’an is, according to all Muslim scholars, the first source of law. However, that does not mean that certain verses which describe or even approve women’s inferiority should be observed while establishing laws. It is rather the universal values and principles that should provide us with the basis for deriving laws. Indeed some verses reflect old patriarchal cultural norms that no longer apply to the contemporary social reality. During the era of the companions of the Prophet some incidents can be found in which some rulings of the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions were suspended or replaced because they no longer served the purpose for which they were initially introduced. One example is when the second caliph Umar b. al-Khattab (d. 23/644) suspended the share of the people whose cooperation was important for the victory of Islam (mu’allafat al-qulub), in the Alms revenues (Zakat). The Qur’an assigned a share for them, which the Caliph discontinued on the ground that God exalted Islam and it was no longer in need of their support. The Caliph therefore, departed on purely rational grounds from literal adherence to the Qur’an, to be in harmony with the spirit of the text (Kamali 1999:111–112). Umar was aware of the reasons of revelation (asbab al-nuzul) which are indispensable for understanding various verses. Similarly, ‘a leading reformist commentator on

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec473

5/7/2013 6:40:05 PM

74

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

the Qur’an, Parvez, has convincingly argued that since the verses on polygamy were revealed after the Battle of Uhud, in which over 10 per cent of the Muslim male population were slain, leaving large numbers of orphans and widows, it is only in circumstances such as these, that polygamy is allowed’ (Urfan 1995–96:31). Also, slavery is clearly and expressly permitted in the Qur’an. However, all Muslim countries ratified the international convention on the abolition of slavery, including Saudi Arabia, by believing in the abrogation of the Qur’anic verses on slavery. Why is it, then, that the verses which discriminate against women cannot be abrogated? (ibid).

Islamic Liberation Theology Asma Barlas is a good example of a Muslim feminist who argued for a Qur’anic liberation theology, emphasizing the importance of the Qur’anic core values in providing a basis for interpreting different verses. She applies the Qur’anic principles of unity and justice to argue for liberation theology. According to her, the Qur’an cannot designate men as rulers over women or as intermediaries between God and women since that encourages male worship, which undermines the principle of Tawhid (Believing and worshiping one God). She maintains, ‘The Qur’an also tells us that God is just and God’s justice lies in never doing zulm [injustice] to anyone by transgressing against their rights. As such, I believe that the Qur’an also cannot teach men to do zulm’(Barlas 2005: 8). It is interesting that Barlas, as explained in her own words, ‘came to the realization that women and men are equal as a result not of reading feminist texts, but of reading the Qur’an’ (ibid:11), since it was not until later in her life that she encountered feminist texts. Na‘eem Jeenah has also emphasized the general message of the Qur’an by introducing the concept of ‘hermeneutical keys’. He contends: I use the term ‘hermeneutical keys’ to refer to Qur’anic concepts that are critical values by which to measure any interpretation of the Qur’an or Hadith. While there could be many such ‘keys’, I discuss only three that I believe are essential in the development of an Islamic feminist hermeneutic. These are: Tawhid, Taqwa and Justice.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec474

5/7/2013 6:40:05 PM

ISLAMIC NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY

75

These keys are the lenses which help shape interpretations of Islamic scriptures (Jenaah 2001:54). The concept of tawhid is also seen as providing the imperative for the unity of humankind and – in a broader sense – it is used to refer to an integrated understanding of all aspects of life (ibid: 53). He further explains that the notion of ‘tawhid is extremely important for feminist hermeneutics. The implication of a unity of humankind also implies equality in responsibility and rights of component parts of that unity. Notions of gender inequality, of misogyny or patriarchy all militate against the concept of tawhid ’ (ibid: 54). Taqwa is usually translated as ‘fearing God’ or ‘piety’. However, the root for taqwa means ‘to protect’, ‘to save from destruction’ or ‘to preserve’. The importance of this concept as a hermeneutical key for feminist interpretation is that, according to the Qur’an, it is also the only distinguishing factor in determining the ‘worth’ of a person (ibid:55). Verse 49:13 states:

O humankind! Behold, We have created you all out of a male and a female, and have made you into nations and tribes, so that you might come to know one another. Verily, the noblest of you in the sight of God is the one who has most taqwa (is most deeply conscious of Him). Therefore, according to Jeenah taqwa trumped class, ethnicity, lineage and physical disability (ibid:56). Another hermeneutical key he mentioned is justice which is ‘next to taqwa’. Q 4:135 says:

Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to God, even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be (against) rich or poor; for God can best protect both. Follow not the lusts

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec475

5/7/2013 6:40:05 PM

76

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

(of your hearts); lest you swerve, and if you distort (justice) or decline to do justice, verily God is well-acquainted with all that you do. Justice is such an important pillar of Islamic mission that Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (d.751/1350) said it was the raison d’être of religion: God has sent His messengers and revealed His books so that people may establish qist upon which the heavens and the earth stand. And when the signs of justice appear in any manner, then that is the reflection of the Sharia and the religion of God (ibid:57). According to Jeenah, there are many other important hermeneutical keys that may be extracted from the Qur’an and that can serve as critical lenses through which Islamic scripture must be approached in order to produce feminist readings (ibid:58). Dahlia Eissa maintains that ‘The Qur’an is universal, and therefore its interpretation cannot be limited to the expressions of the revelation in seventh-century Arabia. We must ascertain the Divine objective, and interpret it according to contemporary circumstance and our contemporary appreciation of rights and responsibilities as individuals, and members of a community, of justice, compassion, harmony, spiritual awareness, and moral responsibility’ (Dahlia Eissa 1999:47). While Sa‘diyya Shaikh develops an additional perspective. She proposes ‘a Qur’anic hermeneutics that consciously reflects on the real life experiences of Muslim women (Sa‘diyya Shaikh 2007:69). She calls the Qur’anic exegesis that she proposes ‘a tafsir of Praxis’ suggesting an interpretation based upon the the understanding of the Muslim women who suffer the most from patriarchal and mysogenic understanding of religion. Shaikh seems to suggest that it is the real experiences of the marginalized, oppressed and abused people, and the analysis of such experiences that can make a change rather than a theoretical engagement with the text and any attempt to provide an alternative interpretation that might be highly controversial and thus contested by the main stream Muslim clerics. She explicitly challenges dominant perspectives that limit the creation of religious meaning to scholarly elite including Asma Barlas and Amina Wadud (ibid:89). She claims that the embodied understanding of verse 4:34, as understood by the women that she interviewed,

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec476

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

ISLAMIC NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY

77

‘constituted a “tafsir through praxis” that contested violence against women and asserted women’s full humanity in religious terms’ (ibid). The women whom Shaikh interviewed rejected their husband’s violent behaviour as contrary to real Islam. Her sample was limited to eight women from South Africa. Most of them were subjects of extreme violence which lead them to reject the possibility of such action being allowed by Islam. However there remains a need to challenge traditional interpretations by influential scholars and legislators who provided the basis for various kinds of violence against women including mental and physical abuse. Thus, I suggest a philosophical basis for reforming the laws that discriminate against women.

Philosophical Basis for Reforming the Law It is important to emphasize that Islam has been understood by the majority of Muslim scholars as a religion that supports reason and encourages its use in various fields of human knowledge. Most probably this had a great impact on the advancement of science during the golden age of Islamic civilization. It is well established that the wellbeing of the community was accepted by all Muslim scholars as the underlying basis of all legal judgments. This entails that no rules or Qur’anic principles can possibly be understood as arbitrary rules imposed by blind divine will on the contrary it has been maintained by most scholars of (usul al-fiqh) or Islamic jurisprudence that (al-maslaha) which can be translated as public interest or wellbeing lies behind all the injunctions and behind all the commands and the prohibitions derived from the Qur’an. Rules and principles articulated under Islamic Law should be supported by reason, serve the wellbeing of the community and never contradict the principle of justice. What by some scholars call ‘hermeneutical keys’ are but core Qur’anic universal moral values long accepted by different schools of thoughts in Islam. The Mu‘tazilite scholars, for example were called the people of unity and justice (Ahl al-‘Adl wal-Tawhid) because of their outstanding emphasis on these core values. Traditional Muslim scholars have developed a theory in Islamic jurisprudence that has been widely accepted. That is the theory of the Purposes of Law (Maqasid

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec477

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

78

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

al-Sharia), introduced by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) and elaborated by al-‘Izz bin ‘Abdul Salam (d. 660/1261) and Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d. 790/1388). Traditionally it has been maintained that the purposes of law are derived from the general meaning of the Qur’an and that they reflect the divine intentions, which are to preserve the five ‘universal necessities’ (al-kulliyat al-khamsa). The theory states that the purposes behind all divine commands and prohibitions are to preserve those five necessities, which are life, mind, religion, progeny and property. Needless to say these universal necessities do not exhaust all what is valuable, and are themselves open to various interpretations. The principle of unity (tawhid) and justice are the most fundamental values and provide the underpinnings of all commands and prohibitions. Thus, no unjust law can be accepted and no law that discriminates against women can be imposed, nor any injunctions that subordinate women to other than God should be obeyed. Emphasising the purposes of law and the universal values of the Qur’an can guard against injustice and provide Islamic feminism, along with any reform movement with a normative ethical theory that is pertinent to contemporary social reality, moral norms and religious aspirations. It is significant that some great scholars of the past like al-Shatibi, the fourteenth century Maliki scholar, maintained that the five necessities (al-kulliyat al-khamsa) are not final and can be expanded and modified in accordance with the Qur’anic ethos. Laws that discriminate against women have to be abolished, as they are in contradiction with the Qur’anic ethos and with morality. Divine injunctions cannot be understood in a way that contradicts the concepts of unity (al-tawhid) and justice (al-‘adl). Any legal judgments that claim divine basis and that have been traditionally accepted as part of the Sharia or divine law need to be examined in light of a moral theory that is based upon understanding the principles, rules and sources of Islamic normative ethics elaborated in usul al-fiqh literature. Moreover, it is crucial to emphasize the conceptual distinction between Sharia and fiqh. The former includes what is unchangeable and universal and consists of the core teachings of the Qur’an, whereas, fiqh, which literally means

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec478

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

ISLAMIC NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY

79

knowledge, contains all the man-made rules that are based on a specific understanding of the (Sharia). The decline of the Islamic civilization with the associated decline in all fields of scholarship and the stagnation of jurisprudential scholarship had a great impact on preserving the laws that were articulated by men in patriarchal societies and hampered the progress of women in our communities. Moreover, fiqh, which stands for human understanding and articulation of divine law, was identified with Sharia, and the legislations derived by fallible human beings were raised to the status of divinely ordained laws. The dynamic and flexible process of legislation that was encouraged in Islamic jurisprudence gradually became rigid and the laws and regulations derived by the creative scholars of the past became dogmatic teachings that were followed and adhered to without questioning their appropriateness and authority. Imitation of the past became the standard, and the laws became rigid and, though created by human beings, they were elevated to the status of the divine, so that no one would dare to question them. All the rules that treat women as second class citizens were articulated by men who lived in a society where slavery was considered a social reality and was accepted as such. Patriarchal fiqh is a human product and should not be treated as divine law.

Conclusion Theories established by some great Muslim scholars might provide us with some guidelines for articulating a modern normative ethical theory. Such a theory should acknowledge that any moral or legal judgment presupposes a set of norms and conditions, including purposefulness, universality, impartiality, objectivity and rationality. Those conditions were first elaborated by ‘Abd al-Jabbar al-Mu‘tazili (d. 415/1024) against those who argued that obligation is established only by revelation (Al-Attar 2010:69). Like Abu al-Hasan al-Ash‘ari (d. 324/936), the founder of the Ash‘arite school, ‘Abd al-Jabbar held the concept of rational obligation (taklif ‘aqli or wujub ‘aqli). Moral principles like the ‘evilness of injustice’ and ‘the obligation to return

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec479

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

80

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

a deposit’ constitute necessary moral knowledge, and are, according to ‘Abd al-Jabbar, the basis for rational obligation (taklif ‘aqli) (ibid:76–79). Thus, some Muslim scholars have clearly distinguished between rational obligation and religious obligation. The latter only applies to those who accept the religion of Islam, whereas the former applies to all rational human beings, regardless of their religion. It is on the basis of the rational rather than religious obligation that ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s ethical theory was established. However that does not imply that those who do what they are rationally obliged to do are not going to be rewarded. ‘He explicitly stated that an agent deserves praise and “reward from God” for rational obligations such as refraining from injustice and returning a deposit’ (ibid:77). The condition of purposefulness excludes ought judgments that cannot be accepted because they are simply ‘out of touch’ and do not fit among divine or human purposes. Accordingly, any moral or legal judgment that is purposeless is irrational and arbitrary and cannot be considered Islamic judgment. Moreover, if the purpose is evil and misogynic then it cannot possibly be ascribed to God. In this regard we should remember that the institutionalization of practices deeply rooted in patriarchy happened in the post-prophetic years. Purposefulness, objectivity and rationality are necessary conditions of moral judgments, including divine moral judgments. Divine judgments cannot possibly be considered arbitrary, irrational or without a purpose. The convention that good and evil are objective and can be known by reason, clearly oppose the doctrine of ethical voluntarism. According to ethical voluntarism, good and evil are established by God’s will, and obligation is only valid when obliged by God. Ethical voluntarism, held by early Ash‘arite theologians is not the prevailing theory in Islam. Such credit should go to what might be called ‘divine purposes theory’ elaborated by late Ash‘arite scholars. Moreover, ‘Abd al-Jabbar maintained that ‘being obliged by God is not a condition for obligation’. ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s views concerning the language of morals and his analysis of moral judgments provide us with a linguistic and philosophical basis for understanding moral obligations in Islamic ethics

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec480

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

ISLAMIC NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY

81

and the laws based upon it. It is worth mentioning that the necessary conditions for the validity of moral judgment were also discussed and acknowledged by many of the usul al-fiqh scholars (ibid:111). In order for women to achieve their rights and change the laws that clearly discriminate against them, the law has to be criticized from within, taking into consideration the Islamic principles of jurisprudence usul al-fiqh and using some established Islamic moral theories. It has been argued that interpreting verses which clearly discriminate against women and opposing them with other verses that support women’s rights is basically a ‘war of texts’ that can never be won. It is better to acknowledge that the verses that discriminate against women reflect an old patriarchal culture and no longer relate to the contemporary social reality. It is only through elaborating a normative ethical theory, based on some understandings of usul al-fiqh that a philosophical moral basis for reforming family law can be established.

Notes 1. Islamawareness. Honour killing outside the world of Islam. islamawareness. http://www.islamawareness.net/HonourKilling/outside.html. Accessed 15 January 2011. 2. Fadel, Mohammed, ‘Honor Killings’, islamawareness. http://www.islamawareness.net/HonourKilling/honor1.html. Accessed 15 January 2011. 3. Bakhtiar, Laleh, The Sublime Quran. http://www.sublimequran.org/ , Accessed 10 February 2011. 4. ‘Women in the Bible’, Bible Anomalies. http://www.bibleufo.com/anomwomen.html. Accessed 10 January 2011. 5. ‘Religious Tolerance’. The status of women in the Hebrew Scriptures (Old Testament). http://www.religioustolerance.org/ofe_bibl.htm. Accessed 10 January 2011. 6. A collection of Canon law compiled as a legal textbook by the jurist known as Gratian.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec481

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

CHAPTER FOUR THE STRUGGLE AGAINST MALE VIOLENCE WITH AN EGALITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE AND RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT: THE CASE OF SECULAR TURKEY

Canan Aslan-Akman and Fatma Tütüncü

Introduction Various forms of violence against women including honour killing, feminization of poverty, sexual commodification and politicoreligious reification of the feminine body, sexual harassment, rape, physical and verbal abuse on a daily basis have been bitter truths of social life in Turkey. Recognition and translation of these social truths into a political vocabulary have required a long-term, multifaceted political labour including street protests, intellectual hard work and individual confessions on intimacies via which the frontiers of the private/individual/apolitical and the public/communal/political have been shifted positively for the sake of women in society.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec482

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

THE STRUGGLE

AGAINST

MALE VIOLENCE

83

Shifting frontiers between the public and the private1 is crucial in struggling with male violence because most social and individual problems, demands and needs can become legitimate political matters requiring structural public policies, legal enforcements and resource allocations if they are not deemed as the matters of domestic, personal and intimate. Politicization of violence by feminist activists and scholars in the Turkish context has made it possible to comprehend, define and see various forms of violence which were previously invisible. Feminists have brought new ways of seeing, interpreting and speaking about social truths from which women suffer in various degrees and at different times in the course of their lives. In this chapter, we bring a discursive and institutional political stand in analyzing women’s achievements and problems.2 We observe and argue that without translating women’s needs, interests, demands and problems into a political discourse in the political sphere, they remain underrepresented, ignored, unsolved and untouchable. Producing a political discourse by articulating various elements from social, familial and local discourses and somehow from enclosed discourses which are shared by intimate enclaves has been quite difficult particularly in a culture blended with Islamic moral credentials, secular public/private divide and politically liberal privacy discourse. That is, Islamic morality on the primacy of mahremiyet, which mostly problematises women’s visibility in public, politically liberal privacy which conceives freedom as the freedom from public affairs, and secular understanding which emphasizes public life while relegating religiosity and its norms into the private without transforming or targeting power relations in the private, are all three stakes that intensify difficulties for eliminating male violence as a political problem. The discursive politics is very important because it provides tools for contesting a wide range of issues embedded in almost all spheres of life, creates styles of narrations of the problems that can become politically comprehensible, and establishes modes of subjectivities which constitute conditions of possibilities of contemporary political actors (ibid). However, the institutional politics with its parliament, law-making capacities as well as conventional political agents such

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec483

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

84

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

as political parties is the real target in the political culture of Turkey, where jurisprudential claims of rights usually result in a more egalitarian legal structure and legal codes despite the fact that the process would be slow and laborious. Given this framework, this chapter briefly contextualizes the politicization of male violence in the literature, at the national and the global levels by underlining different forms, scope and rate of male violence against women in Turkey. Then, it analyses the effects of discursive feminist politics on the institutional politics by analyzing the transformation of the state policies and the legal changes. It sheds some light on implementation problems and deficiencies. Furthermore, it focuses on the policies, mentalities and discursive strategies of the AKP as a religiously conservative party in government on the issue of gender equality and violence. And finally, it problematises the discursive ‘over’-proliferation on the struggle against male violence in Turkey and searches for its possible results and action strategies for women.

Scope, Dimensions and Reasons of Male Violence against Women in Turkey In sociological terms ‘violence’ is conceived as an extreme form of social control, which usually involves physical force, psychological pressures and linguistic assaults, and which is usually structural in articulating state institutions such as the military, medical institutions and the courts (O’Toole et al., 1997). In psychological terms, violence is comprehended as an uncontrolled form of male aggression. Scholars of counselling psychology define types such as non-abusive versus abusive men, who are remarkable by their higher rate of violence during childhood, more use of alcohol, lower occupational and educational achievements, higher rates of distress, and so on (Hage 2000:797–828). Scholars of medicine are also interested in violence as a matter of public health caused by personality disorders, substance abuse or experiencing and witnessing violence, which would be prevented in a similar vein to the methods used for the prevention of other diseases (Kruget et al., 2002:1083–1088). While in these

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec484

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

THE STRUGGLE

AGAINST

MALE VIOLENCE

85

disciplines, violence is deemed as a kind of subversion, extremity, abnormality and disease, in the discipline of political science, violence together with its various connotations such as coercion, force, power, effect and authority constitutes a central and legitimate position. The very definition of the state as a privileged institution and actor of the politics is based upon a Weberian idea of ‘legitimacy in monopolizing the use of violence’ and on a Marxist understanding as an ‘instrument of force’.3 Hence politics as an arena of power play normalizes violence as an integral part of ‘establishing and maintaining order’. Accordingly, in the patriarchal states men as the privileged actors deem violence as their legitimate right and they do not hesitate to use it whenever they see it necessary. What seems most tragic is ‘violence by a man to a woman within the safe haven of the home and in the midst of a close relationship’ (Mooney 2000:1). Feminist scholars have observed that in contemporary societies violence is mostly used to maintain ‘the asymmetrical gender systems of power’ (O’Toole 1997:xii). Articulation of male violence as a prominent vocabulary of feminist politics at the international level has been possible within the last 30 years, particularly thanks to the women’s movement of the 1970s. Nurtured by the power and awareness of second-wave feminism, it questioned the ‘male hegemony over women’s bodies in the home’, contested the ‘conceptions of male supremacy in the family’ and exposed the way in which ‘the individual power of the patriarch was supported and legitimized by the state’ (Miccio 2005:249). Since then women from different parts of the world have organized against male violence in their national and local contexts and re-configured their struggle and discourse in an interactive way (Merry 2009:25). Hence, by the 1990s, they were able to create an international human rights movement to eliminate violence against women by constructing the problem of male violence as a serious crime against women’s human rights. While violence against women is recognized as a global issue, which is also symbolized by the ‘International Day for Elimination of Violence against Women’, the national and the local patterns of male violence are so embedded and complicated that without a strong contextual and community-based struggle and

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec485

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

86

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

solidarity, global awareness may remain unsubstantiated. In the same vein, feminist scholars underline that global ideas on women’s human rights, their bodily integrity and individual autonomy can only be effective, if these ideas are ‘translated into local terms and situated within local contexts of power and meaning’ (Merry 2006:1). In addition to the global level that affects women’s politics in the Turkish context, the situations of women and politics in the Muslim world have been important in understanding the power struggle and meaning-making world of Turkish women. While the secular character of the state, its secular legal structure as well as its modernization zeal aiming to be integrated with the West have shaped the political and public life in a peculiar way in comparison with other Muslim-majority states, Islam has always been a significant reference in social, in politico-cultural and even in institutional senses given the existence of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, for instance, as one of the primary state institutions offering religious service to Sunni Muslims. However, Sharia as a legal discourse of Islamism has never been effective not only because it is forbidden within the secular legal structure but also the popular support for Sharia has been very limited. In this sense, Turkey as a Muslim-majority society has been unique with its complete secular character by being outside of the triple construction of state, power and Islam relationship in terms of legal structure: As defined by Hajjar, Muslim societies are characterised by one of these three forms: first, there is a separate religious law from the national legal regime (communalisation) second, religious law is incorporated into the national legal regime (nationalisation) and third, national legal regime is defined by the religious law (theocratisation). Still, being a Muslim-majority society certain Islamic moral norms guide conservative families in Turkey in their in their ordinary lives, and thus Hajjar’s argument on the effect of Islam on the ‘maintenance of male authority over female relatives’ (Hajjar 2004:1–38) constitutes one of the primary factors of gender inequality in social and familial life. On the other hand, the 1970s Islamist revivals and their demands for an Islamic form of government have found some resonance among certain sections of Turkish people as well (particularly among urban poor and lower middle-class youth).

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec486

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

THE STRUGGLE

AGAINST

MALE VIOLENCE

87

Since the 1980s feminism and Islamism started to become two significant movements transforming, shaping and enlarging the conceptual tools of the political public discourse in Turkey. Apparently then both Islamism and feminism have taken ‘local’ forms by being nurtured by ‘global’ developments; their discursive priorities have been mainly oppositional to the hegemonic structure and to each other especially about the rights and positions of women in society, while they have both made women visible as political activists. The global-national-local track of struggle against male violence in the Turkish context has been shaped by three specific conditions that help to identify ‘violence’ in general and ‘violence against women’ in particular: 1. The conditions of the coup d’état: on 12 September 1980 the military regime seized power; 650,000 people were arrested, 171 people died in prison because of torture (Demirel 2005: 252). Martial law, and the beating, torture and intimidation (in short physical, verbal, psychological and emotional violence) that took place, were carved into the consciousness of ordinary people, especially those who were politically active. 2. When conventional public politics was restricted, power dynamics and hierarchies within the private sphere, especially invisible and unspeakable domestic violence were able to be problematised and gained a more significant place. 3. The rise of feminist literature especially translations helped shape women’s reactions to violence (Is¸ık 2009:41–72). Rising awareness among women in comprehending and identifying violence in its various forms has created a political stand mainly supported by the argument that violence against women is not an individual and social problem, but a political one arising from the asymmetrical gender system of power. Asymmetrical gender systems of power are maintained mainly at three levels: family, community and the state. At the familial level, physical (such as murder, beating and mutilation), sexual (such as rape and incest) and emotional violence

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec487

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

88

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

(such as insult and threats) are common. At the communal level, the community may be a religious group, an ethnic group or a cultural group in a neighbourhood or a town. Here, violence may take the forms of physical and verbal abuse, beating, chastisement and rape. The workplace is also a significant place for communitybased violence including sexual aggression, harassment, intimidation, commercialized violence, trafficking and forced prostitution. At the state level, violence includes illegitimate detention, forced sterilization, virginity control, forced pregnancies and tolerating gender violence by non-state agents (Schuler 1992). In the Turkish context, the most common forms of violence against women include physical violence, psychological/emotional violence, sexual violence and economic violence all of which can be traced at the familial, communal and state levels. That is, Turkish women are exposed to battering, insults, sexual abuse, marital rape and incest not only inside their private homes, but also in the public sphere. State violence involved not only torture but also sexual assaults which were particularly widespread in Turkey in the context of inhuman treatment of detainees at the hands of the security forces until the late 1990s. A recent survey conducted by the Directorate General on the Status of Women (Ankara 2009) indicates that violence by husbands is the most common form of violence against women. One out of ten women reported having been beaten during pregnancy, and four out of ten have been subjected to physical violence by their intimate partners. One of the most extreme forms of violence against women is honour killing. Although the rate of honour killing is unknown, the general rate of physical violence perpetrated by husbands among ever married women (life time) is 39.3 per cent and 9.9 per cent in the last 12 months (ibid). The rate of sexual violence perpetrated by husbands to ever married women is 15.3 per cent (lifetime) and 7.0 per cent in the last 12 months. The rates of both physical and sexual violence are 41.9 per cent (lifetime) and 13.7 per cent in the last 12 months. The rate of emotional violence is 43.9 per cent (lifetime) and 24.7 per cent (in the last 12 months).

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec488

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

THE STRUGGLE

AGAINST

MALE VIOLENCE

89

Economic violence includes controlling resources, controlling women’s right to work, and not informing them about the income and expenditures of the family. An earlier nationwide research conducted by Ays¸e Gül Altınay and Yes¸im Arat (2009) similarly indicates that the rate of women who ever experienced violence by their husbands is 35 per cent and this rate increases to 63 per cent if women contribute more income to the family than do their husbands. Both researches conducted by the state institutions and feminist scholars commonly underline the general ‘silence’ of women when they are exposed to violence by their intimate partners. Despite the fact that 9 out of 10 women in the above research argue that wife-battery is not justifiable and that domestic violence is not a private affair that could be solved within the family, this is interpreted by Altınay and Arat as follows: ‘The feminist struggle against domestic violence has not only been successful at changing the terms of the debate in the media or introducing new laws and state policies, but that the main message had reached, and had been internalized by the great majority of the women in Turkey’ (ibid:x).

State Policies toward Physical and Sexual Violence against Women in Turkey: From Double-Standards and Inaction to Progressive Legal Changes The change in the approach of the Turkish state and political actors towards violence against women and the onset of progressive legal and policy changes are the cumulative result of more than two decades of developments involving both domestic and international actors. In the 1990s Turkey ushered in an accelerated process of integration with the West resulting in the promotion of women’s human rights (Arat 2001:27–34). After 2000, there came ‘revolutionary changes on the rules of gender discourse’ as reflected in the reform of major laws governing the dominant gender regime in the patriarchal system (Kardam 2005:119). The prevailing gender regime was shaped by the Kemalist westernization reforms as a result of which ‘Islamist patriarchy’ had been replaced ‘with that of a secular Western one’ (Arat 1994:57). While Kemalist state feminism was preoccupied above else

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec489

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

90

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

with the public visibility of women and equality of the genders in the public sphere, it turned a blind eye to the sexual double standards and the constraining impact of the private roles of women (White 2003:147). During the early Republican period women’s emancipation was regarded as part and parcel of modernization, which implicitly held that as social secularization and development in the country proceeded gender inequalities would be eradicated. In the 1980s, feminist awakening politicizing and pursuing issues of discrimination against women provided the first real impetus for societal pressure on the Turkish state (Tekeli 1986:179–199). Turkey ratified CEDAW in 1985, and the first significant feminist campaign had the objective of pressuring the government for the endorsement of the Convention. The organization of a march in May 1987 called ‘Women in Solidarity against Beating’ was very important in terms of making the voice of women heard over domestic violence and sexual harassment endorsed by traditions, norms, the male-dominated judicial system and discriminatory laws. For the first time in Turkey, women took to the streets in flashy actions as in the case of the ‘Purple Needle’ campaign to draw attention to the weight of prevailing sexist norms and actions threatening and violating women’s bodily and individual integrity. In 1992 the CEDAW Committee explicitly referred to physical, sexual, psychological and economic violence against women in the framework of discrimination against women and made states responsible for taking measures to eradicate violence. As part of a worldwide campaign to endorse human rights on the eve of the 1993 Vienna World Conference, violence against women was condemned in Turkey in a major petition campaign carried out to secure the acknowledgement of women’s rights as human rights. The Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation and Women’s Solidarity Foundation, which were engaged in the building of shelters in cooperation with the local governments, were pioneers in pursuing the gender violence issue in the public debate.4 In the 1980s and the 1990s the achievements of the women’s movement in Turkey which ‘could not be comparable to other opposition movements’ at the time5 prepared a convenient ground for the state

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec490

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

THE STRUGGLE

AGAINST

MALE VIOLENCE

91

to act on the growing significance of international forces towards the acknowledgement of gender-based violence as a political issue. Feminists spearheaded subsequent reforms to amend the laws justifying violence against women. One case in point was the activism of women’s groups supported by media attention to the Article 438 of the Criminal Code which granted reduced sentences for rape if the victims were prostitutes. The provision in question was repealed in the Parliament in 1999 following protests challenging a Supreme Court ruling (1989) in a pending trial that the article was not in violation of the equality clause of the Constitution, since it aimed to protect ‘respectable women’ (Ertürk 2006: 96). Overall, transnational dynamics particularly after the Beijing Platform for Action (1996) and the EU accession process in Turkey in the late 1990s coincided with the feminists’ accomplishments on agenda-setting and raising social awareness on gender violence. In the early 1990s, research and data on the extent of violence against women in Turkey were scarce, as it was not an issue of academic and legal research. The national machinery for women (Directorate General for the Status and the Problems of Women, KSSGM) was established in 1990. It prompted and supervised Turkey’s active engagement with international gender regimes in cooperation with civil society organizations. The Beijing +5 Conference in 2000 issued the Outcome Document which called for the criminalization of violence against women punishable by law and referred to honour crimes as a harmful traditional practice (Kardam 2005:111). However, until the 1990s domestic violence was conspicuously absent in state policies and laws which turned a blind eye to the unequal power dynamics embedded in the family. Cultural norms upheld the sanctity of the private sphere, as reflected in the popular notion that ‘the husband could love and beat’ which negated women’s individuality. Cases of women beaten up by their husbands at the local police stations who were sent back to their homes by the police underscored the fact that the private sphere based on the superiority of the male followed the logic of community norms which saw whatever happened between the husband and the wife as a private matter.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec491

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

92

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

In this atmosphere, women who filed against abusive husbands were rare under the previous Penal Code of 1926, which required a complaint to be filed by the victim; yet, due to concerns over social condemnation and stigma, fears from the husband and concerns over sustaining the family in case the male breadwinner were to be prosecuted and imprisoned, women remained largely submissive to abusive husbands (Kardam 2005:116). Until recent reforms, the Turkish legal system condoned the masculinist social norms subsuming women under the family and identifying their chastity and bodily integrity with that of the husband’s, the family and the community’s honour. Hence, acts of sexual assault were covered in the original Penal Code of 1926 under the category of ‘Felonies against Public Decency and Family Order’ reflecting the same collectivist mentality considering the woman lesser than an autonomous individual. Accordingly, the Code imposed increased sentences for the rapists if the victim were a virgin (implying that the damage incurred by the family of a virgin would be greater in the patriarchal society) and lifted it if he were to marry the victim. Considerations of ‘reduction of severe provocation’ in the penalties for perpetrators of honour killings by the judges reflected the ingrained sexist attitudes justifying the double standards for women in the legal system. Since the 1990s state institutions have been legally responsible for developing programs to prevent domestic violence. However, due to a precarious political conjuncture, and the eclipse of gender equality in the political agenda, no systematic and visible policy on violence against women could be discerned. Meanwhile, concerns among women’s groups in the face of the resurgence of political Islam did not turn out to be ungrounded; municipal administrations controlled by the Islamist Welfare party were not particularly sympathetic to the work of feminists, and proceeded to close the shelters and counselling centres. The Ministry in Charge of Women’s Affairs and the Family and the national women’s machinery (KSSGM) attached to it operated in the 1990s under conservative premises. For example, one woman minister appointed from the centre-right True Path Party was duly criticized for her indifferent attitude towards virginity controls

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec492

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

THE STRUGGLE

AGAINST

MALE VIOLENCE

93

despite her rhetorical support for promoting gender equality based on international norms.6 Women were treated as the vulnerable group in society along with the handicapped, the elderly and children. In the increasingly fragmented and polarized political system, demands for opening up the political system for the recognition of the rights of marginalised sectors did not pay particular attention to the predicament of women. Overall, in the turbulent years of democratisation in Turkey, progress on human rights and democracy was uneven and emerged as compromises among contending political forces in particular conjunctures under external pressures. Nevertheless, the passing of the Domestic Violence Act in January 1998 emerged as a milestone achievement in the transformation of the prevailing parameters of the state’s approach towards domestic violence. For the first time, legal sanctions for abusive or violent husbands (or other male members of the family) were introduced. The state’s judicial and security institutions were given the responsibility of protecting the family members by enabling the prosecutors to issue protection orders for the victims of violence, including the provision of shelters. Perpetrators of violence would now face various restrictions such as leaving the domicile for a specific time period, confiscation of arms, payment of temporary alimony and staying away from alcohol. The law also introduced sanctions for noncompliance with the court order in the form of imprisonment from three to six months. In fact, as indicated by the then Minister of State in Charge of Women’s Affairs, the maledominated Parliament approved the bill on the Law on the Protection of Family without being aware of what it substantially involved.7 Although the women’s movement made a significant contribution to the adoption of the Domestic Violence Act and the reforms on the Civil and Penal Codes, without the EU process which was the prime motivating factor for the passing of the Domestic Violence bill, the reform would not have seen the light of day at that conjuncture. It can be contended that the new Civil Code (2002) passed by the Parliament during the coalition government preceding the electoral victory of the AKP was the first comprehensive framework acknowledging women’s individual existence. It also envisioned the

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec493

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

94

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

family as a union among equal persons thereby destroying the ground upon which existing sexist laws and judgments had been based. Among the most important novelties was the elimination of the institution of head of the family and the introduction of a new property regime according to which in case of divorce both partners would share the assets acquired after marriage equally. These provisions were revolutionary although the prevailing gender regime at the societal level in Turkey did not seem to be conducive to a thorough transformation of gender relations based on the new egalitarian jurisprudence.8

Beyond the Domestic Violence Act: Deficiencies and Implementation Problems As explained above, by the time the AKP came to power in 2002, the foundations of a legal framework to mobilise state agencies for dealing with domestic violence had been laid down. The fact that the party was formed (2001) by the leading figures of the defunct Welfare Party (WP) which was closed by the Constitutional Court for its anti-secular activities following the 28 February 1997 military memorandum stained it with mistrust among the secular sectors of the society and the state. (Hale and Özbudun 2010:22) In this context, calling itself a ‘conservative democratic party’, AKP governments (2002 to present) took up the EU-led reform process towards the liberalisation of Turkey’s legal and constitutional system to realize its agenda of integrating Turkey with the global forces and also to prove its pro-democratic credentials. In this context, in 2003, Article 462 of the Penal Code which granted reduced sentences for ‘honour killings’ was abrogated. This specific regulation had long been the target of criticism by women’s groups which lobbied for proposals to the Penal Code during the same period. The Penal Code of 2004 was introduced to meet the Copenhagen criteria for the onset of accession negotiations with the EU. Its provisions harmonised domestic law principles and the CEDAW principles with the new Civil Code which preceded it. However, the general provision of the Penal Code (in Article 51)

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec494

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

THE STRUGGLE

AGAINST

MALE VIOLENCE

95

referring to ‘severe provocation’ as a ground for reduced sentences for the offender of homicide, assault or battery cases remained applicable for honour murders. Moreover, ineffective and uneven implementation of the Domestic Violence Law meant that further news of the murder of married, divorced and engaged women by male family members for sexual misconduct continued to make their way into the national media. The novel provisions of the Penal Code were revolutionary in the sense that it criminalised physical and sexual violence against women. Sexual assault and battery cases against a person’s sexual integrity were defined as ‘crimes against the individual’ rather than ‘crimes against family decency’. The difference between the categories of woman and girl on the basis of chastity was abandoned. Honour crimes were defined as voluntary manslaughter. Marital rape, sexual harassment and incest were defined as crimes. The clause ‘Unfair/ heavy Provocation’ was abrogated as a ground for defence and lesser punishment for honour crimes. Hence, the road for the rapists to escape punishment by marrying the victim was closed.9 By the time the new Penal Code went into effect in June 2005, data regarding honour killings were scarce.10 An ad hoc Parliamentary Commission on Custom and Honour Killings formed in 2005 produced a detailed report to reveal the nature and the extent of the problem. The report revealed that in terms of frequency these murders were more common in the more developed regions rather than the more backward south-east,11 an indication of the fact that it was not a matter of socio-economic development. The Penal Code classified these murders under the ‘qualified homicide’ category; it made it difficult for the perpetrators to get away with it especially if committed by a male member of the family below the legal age of majority. However, as underlined by lawyers working on violence against women, owing to the prejudices of male justices in the Turkish legal system, ‘reduction of provocation is not yet a thing of the past’.12 The AKP government addressed the problem of domestic violence and gender-based violence through legal, institutional and policy instruments by demonstrating its determination to deal with it in the

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec495

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

96

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

context of social policy and its democratisation agenda. However, as observers, policy-makers and legal experts underlined, on most occasions the introduction of progressive laws and institutional arrangements would not be expected to make a dramatic impact on the domestic violence issue given the deep-grained cultural norms. Despite the adoption of new legal norms, their consistent implementation and the cultural transformation necessary for the endorsement of these rules have proved tremendous challenge in view of the patriarchal structure of the Turkish state and society. In addition, problems in the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act by the judicial system administrative authorities and security offices need to be underlined. To start with, the existing Domestic Violence Act and the by-laws of Prime Ministry issued to facilitate its implementation suffer from specific deficiencies although the government claims that the law is very progressive and sufficient when compared to similar laws in other countries. For example, the decisions of the family courts on domestic violence cases for protection orders are final; as such, they are not subject to the review of the Supreme Court. This gives rise to the discrepancies and contradictions of implementation as reflected in the decisions of the justices in local courts. This means that there is a lack of consistency in implementation. As a result, ‘two judges along the same corridor in the court could and often do reach different decisions on similar cases’.13 This is attributed by experts to lack of clarity in the law about its implementation. In the year 2000, the police were entrusted with the task of monitoring and reporting the implementation of the Domestic Violence act. To this end the Directorate of Security prepared specific guidelines for the police on the treatment of the victims of violence at police stations. There was also in-service training for the police provided by the Directorate to ensure the implementation of the law. The government enacted circulars to ensure and to monitor effective implementation of the Domestic Violence act, yet, to what extent this implementation and monitoring are taking place is concern among policy-makers, legal experts and NGOs working on gender-based violence.14 The mere lack of sanctions for the neglect of these responsibilities by authorities or their noncompliance is a frequently noted

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec496

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

THE STRUGGLE

AGAINST

MALE VIOLENCE

97

deficiency by legal experts and civil society organisations specialising in gender violence. The Circular of Prime Ministry in 2006 entitled ‘Precautions on the Prevention of Violence against Children and Women and Custom and Honour Killings’ made the Ministries of Interior and Justice responsible with specific tasks for the implementation of the law. However, the State Ministry in Charge of Women and Family suffers from immobility because it stands out at the cross-section of many bureaucratic entities and ministries which were supposed to supply it with the record of the violence incidents.15 Weakness in the institutionalisation of practices and policies for facilitating the due process of law means that solutions to the problems arising in the judicial process are left to personal initiatives. As one lawyer put it, ‘In the lawsuits there is still the problem of security of life for the female victims and the witnesses. They sometimes come to court with security provided from the Directorate of Security and by changing their appearance so that they won’t be identified . . . these acts are carried out through personal efforts, by the lawyers among us . . .’.16 Legal action on the basis of the Domestic Violence Act is not initiated on the complaint of the victim herself. Judicial authorities can initiate action on the notification of third parties outside of the family. The state imposes important responsibilities to the police in terms of monitoring the victims and the perpetrators about the compliance of the legal orders. It also makes provincial health authorities responsible for the treatment of the victims. However, as legal experts underline, it is the protection orders taken by the public prosecutor are not always communicated to the local family courts on time and the implementation of the protection orders is not effective if the perpetrators did not pick them up at the local police station, and currently there are no effective mechanisms in the law for dealing with this problem.17 With the infamous Opuz Decision, the European Court of Human Rights declared in 2009 that the Turkish government violated the European Convention on Human Rights by failing to protect victims of domestic violence and imposed on it a fine for compensation of the victims.18 This was followed by other cases of

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec497

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

98

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

international condemnation and criticism of the Turkish government which received extensive media coverage. However while they were condemned by the government representatives, the government criticized the ‘embarrassing’ decision of the ECPR in the Opuz case for ‘unjustly penalising Turkey for an event which was also common in other countries’. It was also claimed by the head of the Parliamentary Commission on Equality of Opportunity for Women that it was ‘unfair to penalise Turkey on the basis of a single unfortunate event as significant work was carried out after 2002’. This reaction itself is indicative of how the government’s defensive reflexes override human rights concerns over the most dramatic incidents of female murders, when the issue is perceived in terms of the state’s international standing and reputation. Problems abound also regarding the shelters for the female victims of violence. The Institution of Social Service and Child Protection (SHCEK) opened in Turkey the first women’s guesthouse in 1990. Since 1997 women’s shelters are referred to as social service institutions by SHCEK which now runs shelters and community centres where counselling is provided to the victims. However, as a representative of the central administration, SHCEK’s institutional structure remains significantly weak especially in the Eastern provinces due to inadequate personnel and funding. Local administrations stand out as the most important partner in the implementation of the national policies against gender-based violence. With a recent change in the law on local administrations, municipalities (with a population over 50,000) were made responsible for opening shelters, referred to as guesthouses in the laws. However, the opening, operation and sustaining of women’s shelters, whose ultimate objective needs to be the empowerment of victims, have also been problematic. In practice, the opening of shelters was left to the initiative and the goodwill of the municipal administrations conditioned by their financial capacity. Most of the existing shelters suffer from funding problems and lack of a professional approach to victims’ rehabilitation. There have also been some successful experiences with shelters operated with the cooperation of civil society, municipal and central administration. While such examples are rare, some of them were forced to close

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec498

5/7/2013 6:40:07 PM

THE STRUGGLE

AGAINST

MALE VIOLENCE

99

before they become institutionalised.19 The political perspectives of the municipal administrations also seem to make a difference. A representative from Istanbul Bar Association testifies, With our Women Guesthouse Project our friends visited every single municipality in Istanbul to convince them of the necessity of opening shelters and to take steps to prevent further damage to the victims of abuse and violence . . . This is very important but you see that municipalities do not put the necessary effort in this with the understanding that ‘I can open a guesthouse for the needs of my region but the others don’t interest me’, an approach which should be surmounted.20 Legal experts underline the need to take additional measures to facilitate the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act, for example, through periodic occupational training for all those involved in the implementation; the police, judges, local security forces, health personnel and the staff of the Forensic Medicine. While effective implementation would entail the cooperation of individuals and institutions responsible for the prevention of violence, it is obstructed by politicised and overloaded institutions in the Turkish bureaucracy. To make things worse, the impunity of male public employees involved in the sexual abuse of women and girls remain another major problem which sometimes makes the headlines of the print media. It is striking that such acts are brought to the justice mechanism long after they have been committed.21 In fact, impunity is made possible through male solidarity.22

The Policies and the Approach of the AKP: The Clash of Human Rights-Based Policies versus Islamic-Conservative Discourse The AKP approach toward gender-based violence suffers from an underlying dilemma: it is, after all, a religiously conservative party with its conservatism centred on the family and traditional gender roles (C¸ıtak and Tür 2008:455–469.) The AKP holds a vision of

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec499

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

100

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

the family based on women’s homemaking and childrearing roles, in which a woman resigns herself to the Islamic notion of ‘gender complementation’. While its social conservatism is largely embedded in the institution of traditional family, the woman question and gender relations have become one of the major arenas through which it could prove its democratic and modernising credentials. As Arat contends, this dilemma also renders a ‘democratic paradox’ in which the AKP’s emphasis on religious freedoms and its policies to endorse them in the name of liberalisation amidst the ambivalence of the secular sections have posed a threat to gender equality (Arat 2010:869–884). It is striking that this paradox is accompanied by the government’s championing of gender equality within its broader democratisation agenda. As part of the recent constitutional changes which were passed in the parliament in May 2010, the road was opened for the state to legislate ‘special measures to materialise gender equality’, i.e. positive discrimination.23 However, this specific amendment does not represent a substantive improvement over the original gender equality principle; it failed to give the state and the private sector specific responsibilities for protecting women against male violence, and so far, it has not been followed by relevant legal measures to materialise positive discrimination for women. The rhetoric of the government during the referendum campaign on the constitutional amendments mentioned above indicated once again that equality was perceived as legal equality and equality of opportunity. The major thrust of the government policies on women was intertwined with consolidating the unity of the family. As Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan emphasised in a speech in July 2010, ‘strengthening the institution of the family’ was a priority and ‘motherhood was the most important role of women who were entitled to equal rights with men although physically they were not equal to men’. As the Prime Minister drew attention to the track record of the government on gender equality especially on the struggle against domestic violence local administrations were now made responsible for establishing Konukevleri (Guest houses), used as an euphemism for the women’s shelters. Erdogan’s idealisation of the happy and peaceful family seemed to be evident in his praise of the Hotline, launched

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4100

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

THE STRUGGLE

AGAINST

MALE VIOLENCE

101

to aid victims of violence, as he put it, ‘if accidentally a sister of us and or her children experienced violence’.24 At a meeting with the representatives of selected women’s civil society organisations (July 2010) Erdogan reiterated that equality between the sexes could only be in the realm of access to rights beyond that women were different (read: unequal) due to their innate nature. In fact, the term shelter had been for some time dropped in the discourse of the government in favour of the Huzurevleri reflecting its uneasiness with the word. In his reply to women’s organizations which complained about the inadequacy of the shelters, Erdogan stated that, ‘our women should never be put in a position of seeking shelter’.25 Government policies through which myriad institutional and legal instruments are mobilised to combat gender violence indicate the importance it gave to this problem. However, as long as the state’s legitimate authoritative power is not mobilised to put effective and sustained pressure on the security organs critical for the implementation of the protection orders (of the courts), preventive measures would not have any impact.26 The Chair of the Custom and Honour Killings Commission, Fatma S¸ahin, emphasised three challenges in the struggle against violence against women; increasing girls’ schooling, women’s social integration through employment and social relations and overcoming ‘macho’ culture through educational campaigns.27 However, the conservative outlook on women regarding her status in the polity within ‘the ideology of familialism’ perpetuates the ‘democratic paradox’ which works against the struggle against deeply engrained societal stereotypes on women on the basis of ‘honour’. The commission’s declared objectives to cooperate with the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in campaigns to educate people by preaching that such violence had no justification in Islam need to be evaluated under this light (Tütüncü 2010:595–614). Finally, the government’s recent attempt to amend the Domestic Law Act to make up for its deficiency to offer greater protection for the female victims of violence came in the aftermath of the outcry of the women’s groups at another tragic murder of a woman by her

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4101

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

102

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

ex-husband. The victim in question (Ays¸e Pas¸alı) had been exposed to violence during and after her marriage and had applied for a protection order which was rejected. The state remained incapable of protecting women from violence, and ineffective in the monitoring and implementation of the law. In this case the same judge who rejected the demand of Pas¸alı for a protection order ruled for a protection order for another (divorced) woman shortly after the murder of Pas¸alı. This event also demonstrated that state policies failed to ensure consistency in the decisions of the judicial organs whose discretion on specific cases continues to be the most important factor shaping the fate of the victims and the perpetuators. At the end of 2010, the government called on women’s NGOs to provide their suggestions as to the required changes to ensure the implementation of in the existing Domestic Violence Act. However, the task of revising the law was left to the new government to be formed after the June 2011 general elections. Following the elections there has been a restructuring within the state bureaucracy. In this context, the Ministry of Women and Family was replaced by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. The national machinery of women was put under the new ministry, and SHCEK was dissolved as its functions were transferred to the provincial administrations The consequences of these institutional changes are yet to be seen in the realm of the policies on violence. They were criticised by women’s organisations for weakening the ground necessary for the struggle against women’s oppression and violence.28 They also challenged the dominant approach of the government which subordinated women’s individual existence to the well-being of the family. On 14 November 2011 Turkey became the first country to sign the European Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (the Istanbul Convention). The Convention is legally binding on the states and obliges them to ensure legal and de facto equality of gender to prevent violence against women.29 At present, the proposed amendments to the existing Law on the Protection of the Family were submitted to the parliament in the form of a draft law.30 The draft law aims at strengthening the measures to prevent violent men from exerting violence on women through empowering

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4102

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

THE STRUGGLE

AGAINST

MALE VIOLENCE

103

the state agencies and institutions involved in the endorsement of the law as well as ensuring the psychological rehabilitation of the victim and the perpetrator. This would mean facilitating the cooperation of the state agencies and reorganizing the Ministry of Justice, strengthening the security official’s authority. In the aftermath of the ratification of the European Council Convention by the Turkish Parliament in January 2012, the Minister of Family and Social Services declared that violence against women was ‘above all a matter of security’.31 However, in the absence of a direct challenge to the prevailing sexual double standards, besides guaranteeing women’s right to live, a comprehensive struggle against male violence as foreseen by the Convention is not likely to be put into practice. So far, the political will to accomplish this task has not been discerned given the weakness in the commitment to increasing women’s employment, struggling against early marriages, combating sexual stereotypes in the media and creating a women-friendly environment, which would cater to the special needs of mothers and increase safety for all women in public spaces. These are only some of the issues involved in the root causes of ‘discrimination against women’ in Turkey and the very bases of male violence against women. Despite the AKP’s rhetoric and policies against violence, recent statistics exposed by the Ministry of Justice show that violence against women has increased dramatically over the past decade: while, 66 women were killed in 2002, this number rose to 257 in 2011.32 Feminists protest the increasing rate of murders at various occasions such as on Saint Valentine’s Day by chanting ‘Man’s love kills three women everyday’.33

Conclusion Turkey’s secular system extended to women equal legal rights since the 1920s. The Civil Code of 1926 and other secular laws followed the disestablishment of the Sharia as the law of the state. This stands in stark contrast with Muslim countries where religion dictates the position of women. However, besides the problem of sexism which permeated the secular legal and education system, the modernising

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4103

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

104

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

state has turned a blind eye to the subordination of women in both public and private realms. The hypocrisy of the patriarchal state in upholding traditional gender roles especially in the private sphere and its endorsement of secular gender-neutral rights played a significant role in defining the woman citizen as lesser than man. In this context violence against women was often regarded as an anomaly attributed to men and as a social problem destined to disapear with modernization. It has also hindered the denunciation and problematization of violence. The Turkish state was patriarchal both nominally and substantially and the very few women politicians could not be transformed into autonomous actors with feminist agendas. Although violence against women in Turkey is a widespread problem justified by traditions, religion and cultural norms subordinating women in patriarchal society it was not raised in the public and political agenda until the women’s movement took it up in the late 1980s. Turkey’s international commitments on gender equality, human rights and democratisation exerted increasing pressure on policy-makers, which made state interests and the interests of the feminists coincide in the 1990s on the issue of physical and sexual violence against women. The acceleration of the ‘Europeanisation’ process in terms of policies and the institutionalisation of feminism have been behind the progressive changes on gender equality and specific policies against gender-based violence in Turkey. The Turkish state recognised and acknowledged the role of the state in the protection of women exposed to domestic violence with The Domestic Violence Act of 1998 (the Law on the Protection of Family). This law became the legal instrument of protection orders for the victims of domestic violence, and it prioritised women’s vulnerability in the private domain of the family. This legislation conferred on various state institutions (ranging from the courts and police stations to health departments) responsibilities for the protection of women. However, its effective implementation was problematic as over the past few years the number of women killed by intimate partners (husbands, boyfriends, fiancees, ex-husbands)

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4104

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

THE STRUGGLE

AGAINST

MALE VIOLENCE

105

and the number of cases of sexual assault and rape have increased dramatically. The religiously conservative AKP government announced its policy of ‘zero tolerance for violence against women’ echoing its previous policy on the human rights question in Turkey. However, in the conservative worldview of the party women were identified with the family and the home. Women were considered as vulnerable to male violence and hence in need of protection from the state. Research indicates that an overwhelming number of women victims of violence still refrain from applying for state protection. Women’s pervasive fear of men prevents them from making use of their rights introduced by the new legal framework. Preventive and rehabilitative measures are not yet supported by a change in outlook in the legal and political system which would recognize women’s autonomous existence from the national collectivity based on traditional gender roles. Lack of systematic and coherent policy and the political will to mobilise all sections of the state apparatus for preventing gender-based violence demonstrate the absence of a paradigm for change on the maledominated state’s approach to violence against women.

Notes 1. The shifting boundaries and meaning of the public and private are perfectly articulated by Susan Gal. She particularly argues ‘Activities such as wifebeating, which were considered a private concern a few decades ago, are not the subject of public legislation around the globe. . .’ (2002:78). Susan Gal, ‘A Semiotics of Public/Private Distinction’, Differences: a Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, Vol. 13(1) 2002, pp.77–95 2. For more details see Nancy Fraser 1989:291–313. 3. In classical Marxist jargon the state is defined as ‘a mere organ of coercion’. For similar connotations of the state see Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field’, Sociological Theory, Vol.12(1) (1994), pp.1–18. 4. The Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation was established in 1990. It built the first councelling center and shelter in Turkey 1995. 5. This point was emphasised by a representative from the Foundation of Women for Women’s Human Rights New Ways in Istanbul during an interview conducted for this study by Canan Aslan-Akman (1 February 2011).

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4105

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

106

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

6. Virginity controls over young girls were condoned and practiced on the basis of specific status and regulations for disciplining women’s bodies for the sake of public order especially in public schools. As a result of the pressures and the protest of the women’s groups and the recommendations of the Directorate General of Women’s Status, in January 1999 virginity exams were banned by a statute passed by the Ministry of Justice which outlawed ‘bodily examinations of women for reasons of disciplinary punishment against their consent’ p.123. The following year reservations placed on CEDAW by the Turkish government were removed, and this was followed by the ratification of the CEDAW Optional Protocol. 7. This point was made by a representative from the Istanbul Bar Association, which organized a panel discussion on gender-based violence in 2010. The Women’s Rights Commission of the Istanbul Bar Association which organised this panel was the first body to implement this law to defend the rights of female victims of violence: Custom, Violence and Women: Panel Notes (Istanbul Bar Association: Istanbul 2010:96). 8. The elected deputies were hesitant to legislate that the new property regime (equal participation of men and women in the property acquired after the marriage act) would be applicable to both new and old marriages. Hence the provision in question was organized to become applicable for marriages after 2000. 9. What Does the New Penal Code Bring for Women? (Ankara: The National Education Commission of the Volunteer Organizations, 2005) (in Turkish). 10. The report of the Commission indicated that Between 2000 and 2006 in 1091 recorded honor killings, 1190 women and girls were murdered. Those who lost lives in suspicious suicide cases were not even included in this number. http://www.turkcebilgi.com/kose_yazisi_100143_taha-akyoltore-cinayetleri-kurtler.html Accessed 15 January 2011. 11. Interview of Canan Aslan-Akman with a feminist lawyer specializing in family disputes; Ankara, 2 February 2011 12. Interview of Canan Aslan-Akman with a feminist lawyer specializing in family disputes; Ankara, 2 February 2011 13. Report of the Parliamentary Research Commission Established with the Purpose of Investigating the Custom and Honour Killings and the Reasons of Violence Against Women and Children and of the Identification of the Necessary Precautions to Prevent Them, http://www.kadininstatusu.gov.tr/upload/mce/eski_site/Pdf/ tbmmkom-bolum1.pdf. Accessed 15 January 2011. 14. This was expressed to us by the the Purple Roof Foundation representatives in Istanbul and the Woman’s Solidarity Foundation in Ankara. Interviews on 27 January 2011 and 25 January 2011 respectively. 15. Custom, Violence and Women, 28

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4106

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

THE STRUGGLE

AGAINST

MALE VIOLENCE

107

16. Custom, Violence and Women, p.98 17. Interview with a feminist lawyer in Ankara, 2 February 2011. 18. In the Opuz case, Turkey was the first country to be penalised on this ground by the Court. Eren Keskin, ‘Custom, Violence and Women’, Amargi, Feminist Quarterly, Fall. 2009, No.14, p. 119. 19. Custom, Violence and Women, 28 20. This example was cited by the vice-president of the Kadıkoy mayor; Custom, Violence and Women, p. 102. 21. One such incident was a recent trial in January 2011, of a ‘collective rape’ case of a young woman in the Mugla Province in Western Turkey by a group of men including several public employees. This was not brought to trial even after the lapse of six months following the decision of the Supreme Court in 2010. 22. Canan Aslan Akman, Interview with the same lawyer, Ankara, 2 February 2011. 23. With an addition to Article 10, which stipulates that those measures to be taken with the (gender equality) objective could not be interpreted as violations of the principle of equality. 24. Televised speech of Prime Minister Erdogan during the referendum campaign, 30 July 2010 (author’s notes) and Hatay speech, ‘Erdogan: Equality between men and Women is Not Possible’, http://www.internethaber.com/erdoganinkadin-erkek-esitligi-yorumu-277864h.htm, retrieved 25 January 2011. 25. http://www.10aralik.org.tr/pdf/esitlik_yok.pdf. retrieved 25 December 2010. 26. Interview with the same lawyer, Ankara, 2 February2011. 27. http://eski.bianet.org/2005/11/01_k/69745.htm. Accessed 19 December 2011. 28. http://www.kadinininsanhaklari.org/haberler.php?detay=67 29. http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/09/europe-landmark-domestic violencetreaty-launches retrieved 20 December 2011. 30. With the amendment, the existing law (which was composed of four articles only) would turn into a more detailed piece of legislation comprising 24 articles. 31. http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/676543-fatma-sahin-ismimizde-kadinin-bulunmamasi-bir-eksiklik Accessed 20 October 2011 32. Kazete 7 November 2009, ‘7 yılda kadın cinayetleri %1400 arttı‘www. kazete.com.tr. Accessed 07 November 2009 www.showhaber.com/Nov 22, 2012 accessed 25 February 2013. 33. ‘We do not want love which kills us’, Istanbul Feminist Kollektif protested against violence against women on 14 February 2011, by stating that man’s love kills three women everyday and in the last ten years more than 5,000 women were killed. www.bianet.com. Accessed 15 February 2011.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4107

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

CHAPTER FIVE WORKING IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: FEMALE LABOUR SEGREGATION AND WOMEN’S IMPEDIMENTS TO PRIVATE SECTOR OPPORTUNITIES IN JORDAN

Claudia Corsi

Introduction Jordan is listed amongst the ten most water-deprived countries in the world. Limited natural resources affect its agricultural and industrial development, weighing heavily on social welfare. Jordan currently produces a skilled labour force with high educational attainments, as a result of governmental investments in the education sector which were higher than other lower-middle income countries, and it has increased life expectancy for both sexes in comparison to previous statistics relating to the Middle East and North Africa. Article 6 of Jordan’s Constitution guarantees citizens’ right to education, and the Education Act n. 27 of 1988 extends free compulsory

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4108

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

WORKING

IN A

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

109

schooling to the first ten years. The government launched a comprehensive modernization program for the basic education system in 2003, to reduce illiteracy. Jordan has attained Goal 3, Target 4 of the Millennium Development Goals, Targets and Indicators, named ‘Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and at all levels of education no later than 2015’. This chapter endeavours to illustrate and explain how, despite these adversities, women’s impediments to private sector working opportunities in Jordan still exist. This will be done through an examination of what can be seen to be women’s empowerment during and after structural adjustment reforms. Despite the rate of improvement in women’s health and education, female participation in the economy is still very low. We aim to analyze the consolidated patriarchal system of cultural norms related to tribal values and religious beliefs producing job segregation, gender gaps in wages and benefits, unemployment and underemployment. The discussion aims to understand the evolution of women’s capability for economic growth, through their effective participation in the private sector as employees and entrepreneurs.

Economic Reforms and Living Conditions in Jordan During the early 1980s, Jordan’s foreign capital fell sharply and the international collapse in oil prices led to the economic slowdown of the whole Arab region. Oil-related revenues decreased, including foreign aid from Gulf countries and workers’ remittances, generating an exacerbation of the economic and fiscal crisis, the spread of high levels of inflation, debt and vulnerability to external factors. The Jordanian government responded by expanding public spending financed by external borrowing to stimulate the domestic economy, but during the first months of 1989 it had to withdraw a loan request of $150 million due to the dearth of subscribers (Satloff 1992:134–7).1 Moreover, the public sector had been increasing immoderately and the inefficient tax system and trade regime led to a series of devastating economic and financial problems.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4109

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

110

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

But the economic crisis became entrenched, and the government turned towards the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a loan, the terms of which included the application of an IMF structural adjustment package, including hard austerity measures. The IMF and the World Bank collaborated closely on structural programs, with the World Bank stipulating the need for regulatory and legislative reforms in order to promote privatisation and improve the investment climate. There were common fields of work for both IMF and World Bank, such as price deregulation, trade politics, privatisation and the energy sector. King Hussein initiated an economic reform program approved in December 1989, which the World Bank supported with a $150 million Industrial and Trade Policy Adjustment Loan. The project complemented a macro-economic stabilization program supported by an IMF Stand-by Arrangement. These structural adjustment programs were, to a great extent, congruent with the neoliberal model of a market-oriented economy to which both of these international organisations generally subscribe. The structural reforms were implemented in an effort to attain three main goals: economic stabilization, deregulation and liberalization. Economic stabilization entailed a new fiscal policy, which chiefly aimed to reduce the foreign debt through exoneration and rescheduling, at the same time decreasing the budget deficit. Deregulation aimed at efficiency improvements in business through reductions in the trade tariff and discretionary rules. Liberalization consisted of a shifting of the orientation of the markets, primarily through the privatisation of state-owned firms (Ramachandran 2004:10). The project complemented a macro-economic stabilization program supported by an IMF Stand-by Arrangement, which had the purpose of implementing structural reforms to strengthen the supply side of the national economy. State influence on the economy was reduced in line with neoliberal economic theory, mainly by expenditure restraint and privatisation. And in order to improve exports, investments and the general business climate, deregulation and liberalisation were pushed to the top of the agenda.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4110

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

WORKING

IN A

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

111

The policy changes had to be accompanied by reforms of the legal and regulatory regimes to stimulate investment and achieve sustainable growth, creating a legal system in the field of commercial law. Many new legal measures were aimed at liberalising the economy with the purpose of creating a more open market-oriented economy which would be open to foreign investment and to activate market forces. These structural adjustments in Jordan had a deep impact on the social landscape of the country. The subsequent reforms limited publicsector employment, which at the same time constituted half of all employment in the kingdom (Marra 2005:105–106). The deterioration of living standards and the temporary increasing of poverty were considered ‘temporary adverse social effects of structural adjustment’. The World Bank and the IMF recognized some failures of their structural adjustment policies in terms of poverty and inequality they triggered and they elaborated a new strategy. The World Bank arranged for a policy of Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), which involved every country identifying its priorities and the level of assistance needed, which would be in line with its macroeconomic performance. The IMF, instead, produced the Policy Framework Paper (PFP) to show macroeconomic and structural objectives and to grant ESAFs (Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility) in coherence with the needs of each borrower. In 1999, the IMF renamed ESAF the ‘Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility’ (PRGF), a new program produced in order to integrate poverty reduction with macroeconomic policies, placing emphasis on good governance and competition in international markets. The PFP was replaced with ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’, which had the aim of focusing loan operation on strategies dedicated to poverty reduction. Nevertheless, Jordan still suffers from economic problems, with 14 per cent of Jordanians living below the poverty line. The incidence of poverty increased from 14.4 per cent in 1990 to 23.8 per cent of the population in 2005. Because of population growth and questionable economic activities, the number of poor people in Jordan increased by about 213,000 between 1990 and 2005 (Louzi 2007:25–44).

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4111

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

112

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

Geographic distribution of poverty in Jordan at sub-governorate level shows certain areas of chronic poverty, such as the remote desert areas. Thirteen out of 73 Jordanian sub-districts are in severe poverty, with more than 34 per cent of the population categorised as being poor. According to the World Bank ‘19 percent of the rural population is poor, compared to 13 percent in urban areas. Poverty in rural areas is declining more slowly than in urban areas, resulting in a widening rural-urban gap between 1997 and 2002’ (World Bank 2004:9). Jordanians residing in rural areas and living off agricultural incomes tend to be poorer (World Bank 1994:35), due to high unemployment and low wage rates as a result of the presence of landless citizens who depend on informal employment as sharecroppers, smallscale farms and large families with limited access to government services. The groups most vulnerable to poverty include large rural households headed by illiterate or poorlyeducated people, households headed by women, households with sick or elderly people, and households that do not own or have very little land. Divorced women are more at risk of descending into poverty than widowed or married women. Separated women have a poverty percentage of 37 per cent, making them the most vulnerable of all female-headed households. Jordan’s active-to-total population ratio is one of the lowest in the world, with an average of four non-active individuals depending on a single worker. Globalisation and privatisation processes often involve a labour market which is characterised by greater instability due to subcontracting, which is related to the growth of dominating ‘firms’, which in turn resort to particular modes of division of labour in the production process. The putting-out system can be interpreted as a subcontracting form where the owners of the industry control only the product, the whole production process later falling under their mastery with the rise of the factory. Subsequently, the growth of the integrated firm entailed subcontracting as a vertical quasi-integration, which allowed the big-business to consolidate the power of the huge dominating corporations. Jordanian Labour Code does not deal

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4112

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

WORKING

IN A

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

113

with subcontracting, except for Section 15, subparagraph 5, of the fourth chapter. Under this law: Workers employed by a subcontractor may take direct legal action against the principal contractor and the project owner. The amounts claimed in such action may not exceed payments that are due, at the time when action is taken, to the principal contractor from the owner and to the subcontractor from the principal contractor. These workers shall have a preferential claim to the payments due to the principal contractor and the subcontractor, and their claims shall be settled proportionately, each according to his share (Law 8 of 1996). The labour market in all MENA countries consists of three segments: the rural sector, the informal urban sector and the formal urban sector. The first employs a large fraction of the labour force; the second is defined mostly by self-employment and a limited proportion of hired labour, a high degree of wage flexibility, no enforcement of labour regulations and low employment security. Finally, in the formal urban sector workers are hired on the basis of explicit contracts and the degree of compliance with labour regulation is relatively high (Agénor et al., 2005:5). Jordan suffers from structural unemployment, as the economy fails to absorb the annual influx of new job seekers. Evaluations of labour markets are distorted by the number of Jordanian labour expatriates, the number of which is estimated to be 641,154 (see the UNDP development Prospects Group), of which the majority are located in the Gulf States. They are highly skilled and through their considerable remittances, contribute to the country’s growth. But it is this so-called ‘brain drain’ which deprives the country of vital talent, and a knock-on effect can be seen in the difficulties which face development efforts. Nevertheless, many labour positions left vacant by Jordanian workers are filled by foreign workers (see Nazli 1978) in low-skilled and manual jobs, mainly in agriculture and domestic services. The regional distribution of labour is unbalanced, with districts of Amman, Irbid and Zarqa representing more than two-thirds of

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4113

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

114

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

the total number of the unemployed. In the Jordanian labour market there is a low economic participation rate which ‘is a result of the population’s age structure, the large number of students, and low female participation in the labour market and the early retirement age in the public sector’ (European Training Foundation 2005: 7). Labour productivity is also low, partially due to the low level of education and skills of the workforce. The Jordanian government’s efforts to improve higher education haven’t (at least so far) helped to create new employment. Those who are highly educated usually find employment in the public or services sectors, both of which have recently grown in an unprecedented manner and today account for more than a third of the labour force.

Women’s Advancement in Jordan In comparison to their equivalents throughout the rest of the MENA region, Jordanian women boast the highest average of the number of years spent in school. Illiteracy among women has fallen to 11.4 per cent (but it is still important to compare this to the figure of 4.1 per cent for men). The Ministry of Education has opened pioneering centres in different parts of the country for the development of literacy plans for illiterate women.2 According to statistics provided by the Jordanian Ministry of Education, 95 per cent of young boys and girls aged from 6 to 15 are enrolled in compulsory primary education. Girls account for 49.4 per cent of all pupils enrolled in primary schools and 51 per cent in secondary education, while at the university level, there are 102.6 female students for every 100 male students. On the whole, most girls drop out of school because of marriage, while the pressure to obtain a job is the main reason boys drop out of school. The secondary school dropout rate for boys is higher than that of girls. But even though more men drop out of school, as a rule, women need to have a higher level of education than men for the same job. Although fertility rates have fallen from 6.8 births per woman in 1980 to 3.6 in 2008,3 and the maternal mortality rate is 30 per 100,000

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4114

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

WORKING

IN A

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

115

live births, they remain higher than the MENA regional averages. It is worth noting that it is generally held that ‘lower fertility rates mean that women have more time to spend on income-generating activities’ (World Bank 2005:25). Gender mainstreaming, namely the public planned strategy to achieve gender equality, is implemented in the Government’s action plans and was incorporated for the first time in the national plan reform of 1999–2003. As a part of this reform initiative, women were granted legal equality on various issues such as health care, freedom rights, political participation and employment. In 2010 the amendments of the Personal Status Law of 1976 contained many positive changes, such as the judicial process of divorce in which the courts have to consider not only physical violence against women but also psychological violence against intimate partners. The new law introduced 141 articles which have positive bearings on women and their children. Subjects tackled within this law include male polygamy, divorce initiated by the wife and the raising of legal age of marriage. In civil courts, women can testify as eyewitnesses or experts, and their testimony is considered equal to that of men. They have the right to be applicants and defendants. Women can act as translators in courts, but their access to justice is limited in a variety of ways. For instance, in Islamic courts a woman’s testimony is equal to half of a man’s testimony. Muslim women are forbidden from marrying non-Muslim men unless they agree to convert to Islam, while Muslim men are permitted to wed non-Muslim wives. Many Jordanian laws contain certain provisions that discriminate against women in the fields of civil and penal judgments, retirement and benefits (Tabet 2005:12–15). Under the Nationality Law (No. 6 of 1954) women cannot pass their citizenship to their spouses or children, while men can transfer their citizenship to foreign spouses. The rationale of this provision is that ‘allowing women to transfer their citizenship to their husbands and children would encourage the immigration and assimilation of non-Jordanians, particularly Palestinians, which in turn would undermine the effort to secure Palestinian statehood and the right of return for Palestinian refugees’ (Kelly and Breslin 2010). This situation is problematic, as a lack of

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4115

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

116

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

Jordanian citizenship creates many obstacles for children in terms of access to education and health services. For example, they have to pay fees to attend government schools, while primary education is free for Jordanian citizens. Gender discrimination also occurs in penal legislation. Article 308 of Jordanian Penal Code allows rape charges to be dropped if the perpetrator agrees to marry the victim and therefore save her honour, and he is prohibited from divorcing her for a period of three years. Moreover, Article 98 prescribes sentences of three months to two years for ‘honour killings’ in which a woman is murdered by a relative to retrieve family honour in case she commits or is subjected to an act deemed ‘dishonourable’, such as rape, sexual harassment or being suspected of extramarital relations. Jordanian women still suffer from gender-based violence including marital abuse, honour killings and sexual violence. In recent years criminal courts have issued stricter sentences for honour killings and a new specialized tribunal was created in 2009. However, because of the persistence of cultural norms which sanction sexual behaviour outside of marriage, many women still think that if they seek protection through the legal system they will shame their parents. Various Qur’anic verses commend the respect of the family4 and condemn the violating of this provision, a condemnation which can lead to acts of violence. Article 41 of the Social Security Law, No.19 of 2001 settles that old-age pension may become due at 60 years of age for males, and 55 for females. The retirement provisions seem to be advantageous to women, but reduce women’s participation in the economy. Article 56 of the same law states: The husband shall be entitled to his share from his insured deceased wife if he is totally disabled and has no other private income equivalent to the share he is entitled to from the survivors’ pension. If such income is less than what he is entitled to from that survivors’ pension, the difference shall be made up for him, and the remainder shall be distributed among the other beneficiaries.’

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4116

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

WORKING

IN A

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

117

The Civil Service Regulations No. 55 of 2002 states that ‘family allowances are not paid to a female employee for her children if their father is alive and not retired; while they are paid by virtue of the permanent disability of her spouse.’ These provisions reinforce the perception that women’s income is considered to be a secondary source of support for the family. One important measure of women’s economic advancement is their access to decision making. Women are increasing their participation in civic life through professional organisations, which are frequently engaged in political activity. Many social organizations have recently been set up with the aim of increasing female involvement in public life, such as the Jordanian Women’s General Federation and the Jordanian Gathering of Women’s Committees, created in response to an initiative by Princess Basma. Women currently constitute almost 21 per cent of the 100,000 members of professional organisations in Jordan. But they are underrepresented in their governing bodies, making up only 23 per cent of trade unions membership, 10 per cent of political parties and 22 per cent of voluntary associations (Al-Attiyat et al., 2005:31). The Jordanian women’s movement has won important battles. First of all, the publication of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discriminations against Women (CEDAW) in the Official Gazette (al-Jarida al-Rasmiya), in 2007. Although Jordan ratified CEDAW in 1992, it had previously introduced opt-out clauses relating to Article 9 on nationality and Article 16 on women’s personal status issues.5 As for women’s participation in the executive branches, in 1976 Inaam Mufti was appointed the first female Cabinet member as Minister of Social Development. For the most part, female participation in political life has for the most part been confined to ‘traditional’ ministerial portfolios, such as family or social development, with the exception of Rima Khalaf, who at one point headed the ministries of industrial, trade and planning, and Laila Sharaf who was appointed Minister of Information. The Jordanian National Commission for Women, a semi-governmental body established in 1992 to craft policies and legislation concerning women’s issues, shows that female

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4117

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

118

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

contribution at the highest level of governance is very limited. Women represent four per cent of judges and 12.4 per cent of diplomatic bodies. According to USAID, in 2009 women represented 5.5 per cent of members of the Chamber of Deputies and 12.7 per cent of the Chamber of Notables (the lower and higher houses of the Jordanian Parliament, respectively). The government amended the election law with the law no. 42 of 2003 to expand women’s political roles, including a quota for women of six parliamentary seats out of 110. In 1993, only one woman had won a seat in direct elections. The government added a 20 per cent quota in favour of female members for the July 2007 municipal elections, which resulted in women winning a total of 215 seats across 93 municipalities, 195 of which through the quota and 20 through direct elections. The quota system was deemed necessary in part because of the voting system used by Jordan, the Single Transferable Vote (STV). But there are critics of both this system and the gender quota, as ‘it used to determine the wins of the seats set aside for women in the legislature but cancels out the chances of female candidates from large electoral districts’ (ibid: 20). Moreover, the system of STV can be seen to reinforce the influence of tribalism in Jordanian politics, because tribes will often support male over female candidates, sidelining the effect of political parties on voter behaviour. As Al-Attiyat argued, Jordanian civil society cannot be reduced only to formal institutions, because informal tribal, religious and family groups are persistent and thus the formal frameworks of governance serve more as functions than formal civil society organizations (ibid: 43). In 2007, Ihsan Barakat was appointed by the Jordanian Judicial Council as the first female judge in the country’s history to occupy the role of Chief Justice of the West Amman Court of First Instance. Nowadays, she is Amman’s Chief District Attorney of Judicial Council.

Women’s Impediments to Private Sector Working Opportunities One often unrecognized form of gender-based violence (GBV) is workplace discrimination. This kind of concealed discrimination, which

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4118

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

WORKING

IN A

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

119

negates gender equality, undermines women’s dignity, diminishes productivity and on a large scale, reduces national competitiveness. The most dangerous aspect of this kind of workplace discrimination is its psychological impact upon women, further cementing the feeling that the society around them places them in a position which is inferior to that of men. Forms of workplace violence can include bullying, mobbing and harassment, and the effects of these are a debilitating lack of self confidence and general social isolation. Victims tend to minimize the offences due to a fear that if they speak out, they will lose their jobs. Workplace, which is generally understood in a narrow sense as the place where an individual works, includes also related contexts where GBV can take place, such as in public transportation going to work, or returning back (Cruz and Klinger 2011:11). In June 2009, the resolution by the International Labour Conference concerning gender equality in the workplace promoted the importance of using both a rights-based and an economicefficiency approach to the problem of gender inequality. The ‘decent work’ concept formulated by ILO is based on the assumption that all women and men should be able to work in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity. Despite improvements in social and human development, gender inequalities are still present in the Jordanian employment market. In 2008, the unemployment rate for men stood at 10.1 per cent, whilst for women it was 24.3 per cent, resulting in a gender gap of −14.3. Furthermore, the youth unemployment rate was 22.7 per cent for men and 48.8 per cent for women, with a gender gap of −26.1.6 Jordan records a female labour force participation rate of 14.9 per cent, consistently below that of similar lower middle-income countries.7 The official estimation by the Department of Statistics indicates that the percentage of women in the Jordanian labour force is less than 15 per cent, but other estimates of women’s labour force participation vary widely, from 12 to 28 per cent (USAID 2007:13). The potential of women in the Jordanian economy remains largely underutilized as the actual level of female labour force participation is only about half of its potential (World Bank 2005:xiii).

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4119

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

120

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

Marriage, conservative values and social attitudes contribute significantly to preventing women from entering the labour force (Muzi et al., 2008). This may, in part, be down to the tribal and Islamic values that pervade Jordanian social and labour structures. As Sharabi suggested, Jordan is a ‘neopatriarchal Society’, a mixture between patriarchal and modern attitudes, in which the elderly male (or males) represents ultimate authority. In the construction of modern family relations where the conventional status of women has changed because of progress in education, birth control and access to salaried work, neopatriarchy can be seen at its most efficient in the realm of the political.8 The persistence of extended families and tribes produces and maintains relationships of control, while one can postulate that democratic relations are related to nuclear families (Sharabi 1988:7). In a tribal context, women acquire individuality only as daughters, mothers or wives. On the other hand, in nuclear families, anonymity, individuality and women’s self-affirmation predominate and serve to weaken patriarchal social control. In the creation of the Jordanian modern state, Bedouin traditional authority networks were incorporated within the state structure, with the result that Jordan can be characterised as a ‘bedoucracy with its emphasis on family and kin relationship’ (Fathi 1994:185). Jungen explains ‘to be tribal, to claim tribal characteristics, to support tribalism becomes a way of claiming Jordanian authenticity’ (Jungen 2002:201). In Jordan the reservation wage rate, which is the minimum wage rate at which an agent will accept employment, discourages women from employment. Reservation wage rate is generally greater than zero because the agent’s alternatives to paid employment have positive value with the alternatives being taking care of children rather than paying for child care services or pursuing education. But in Jordan the cost of childcare takes the entire female wage. The only option for women is to use an older child’s help, usually a girl, for childcare and domestic services, making girls take adult roles prematurely. Other disincentives to women’s involvement in private sector work include gender stereotyping which re-enforces perceptions that some jobs are more appropriate for women: ‘Women are perceived

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4120

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

WORKING

IN A

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

121

as the primary source of affection and care for children and responsible for domestic duties’ (UNDP 2004:113) and if a married woman works outside the home, her work is perceived as being secondary to that of a man. Women are encouraged to study and to find so-called ‘female-appropriate jobs, such as in the sectors of education, the arts, the humanities, medical and nursery services. Traditional gender roles are often emphasised in the school textbooks. According to different studies, 96 per cent of references to gender roles in textbooks are for male roles in public life, while twothirds of female roles are in the family setting, as mothers wives and daughters. Male roles in many textbooks are related to traditional traits of bravery, independence or leadership and they are more often employed in business, politics or professional occupations. On the other hand, female roles are associated with concepts of sensitivity and kindness, emphasising the importance of women’s honour and modesty. Female roles in public life are limited to teaching, training and service jobs (USAID 2007:17). The family is described as being the core component of the larger society, and the primary purpose of the family and marriage is for the production of children. Islamic textbooks support large families because ‘the Umma needs sufficient numbers of people to man its armed forces and, along the way, to help the society advance economically, socially and intellectually’ (Anderson 2007:73). Women are cautioned that if they limit the number of children, the resulting level of anxiety might endanger their health (ibid:79). Gender stereotyping reinforces the conviction that men should take precedence when it comes to access to higher education. Consequently, a large number of girls decline to attend academic or technical vocational training courses, particularly in the rural areas, where traditional attitudes are more evident. Many Jordanian women undervalue their capacity to contribute meaningfully to the labour market, which can be seen to result in job segregation, gender gaps in wages and benefits, unemployment and underemployment. The civil service employs the largest proportion of the female labour force, accounting for 48 per cent of employed women. Nearly 54,000 women are employed in the Ministries of

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4121

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

122

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

Education, Health, Social Development, Planning, and Post and Telecommunications. Education is the only area of activity where a significant proportion of women are employed (41 per cent). The Ministries which have the lowest percentage of women employed at decision-making levels are those of Tourism and Antiquities, while there are only 50 women out of the 3,837 employees who work at the Ministry of Awqaf: Islamic Affairs and Holy Places (World Bank 2005:52). The public sector offers job security, better wages, shorter working hours and non-wage benefits, while in the private sector ‘women-friendly’ opportunities are limited (Moghadam 2005:128–29). Labour requirements and benefits in the public sector are more secure and immovable than those in the private sector. Paid maternity leave consists of 90 days and the costs are covered by the government, while in the private sector, maternity leave is restricted to 70 days covered by the employer. Women employed in the private sector tend to have a higher level of education than men and it reflects a hidden facet of underemployment. In 2003, 76 per cent of female job seekers had an intermediate diploma or higher, while 64 per cent of unemployed males had an education level that was lower than secondary education (Abu Aliqah 2008:10–16). The majority of Jordanian male employees have an education degree below secondary level, while most female workers have a higher diploma. Before entering the labour market, many women continue their studies to a higher level than their male counterparts in order to be eligible for positions with favourable conditions (ibid). Underemployment results when employees accept positions that are below their educational and skills qualifications. This affects women more than men in Jordan; estimates show that the average working woman is expected to have 12.3 years of education, compared to 9.3 years for a male equivalent holding the same job.9 There is evidence of vertical and horizontal occupational segregation along gender lines. Vertical segregation, a phenomenon known as producing a ‘glass ceiling’, indicates that women are gathered around the lower wage levels of organizations. Horizontal segregation denotes the existence of more female intensive professions.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4122

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

WORKING

IN A

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

123

Vertical segregation involves for the most part Jordan’s private labour sector, with men holding the majority of the highest-ranking positions, whereas women are concentrated in the low and middle ranks. Segregation depends on social and cultural obstacles to women’s full integration into the labour market. Fathers or husbands often decide whether and where women have to work (El-Azhary 2003:89–99). Women tend to choose training and educational fields in which the market is saturated. The opposition between limited female decisional power and women’s aspirations leads to their lower participation in the work force. In the private sector, the distribution of female labour is as follows: 8 per cent of women are employed in industry, 16.0 per cent in the agricultural sector and 66.8 per cent in services.10 As for their employment status, 17.5 per cent are paid employees, 22.6 per cent work as governmental civil servants, 5.3 per cent are employers, 4.2 per cent are self employed, 18.5 per cent are unpaid family workers and 30.8 per cent are unpaid workers.11 The measures and regulations required by Jordanian law often actually operate as disincentives to hire women in the private sector. The Labour Code introduces legal provisions to support women. For example, night work is generally prohibited for women between 19.00 and 06.00. Section 27 of the Code forbids to terminate the employment of a worker or give the latter notice if the worker is a pregnant woman who has reached at least her sixth month of pregnancy, or a woman on maternity leave, except if the worker is employed by another employer during these periods. Under section 68 of the code it is stated that ‘Every worker, male or female, shall have the right to take unpaid leave once for a maximum period of two years to accompany his or her spouse if the latter is moved to a work place in a province other than the one in which he or she normally works or abroad’. Moreover, the private sector has to grant maternity leave under the provisions of sections 70 and 71. Women are entitled to maternity leave with full pay for ten weeks including rest before and after delivery.12 Leave after delivery shall be no less than six weeks and employment before the expiration of such period is prohibited. After the end of maternity leave, every woman has the right, within one year of delivery, to

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4123

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

124

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

take paid time off for the purpose of nursing her baby, for no more than one hour per day. Employers who employ twenty or more married women have to provide an adequate facility under the care of a trained nurse for any children less than four years of age, if at least ten of the children are in such an age group. Under the law, every establishment employing ten or more workers is forced to grant women a maximum of one year unpaid leave to tend to bring up their children. Consequently, private sector employers often use the excuse that they are dissuaded from hiring women employees, especially married women, due to the additional costs associated. Employers are also discouraged from hiring and training women because of their tendency to stop working after marriage. As a result, only 7 per cent of married women are formally employed in Jordan (USAID 2007). They are often forced to accept low-productivity jobs in the informal economy, characterised by exploitation and absence of legal and social protection. There are no specific assessments of the size of the informal economy, but it is estimated that around 200,000 people in Jordan are working in this sector. More than half of them are active in the informal sector as unpaid rural workers and petty traders or in informal enterprises (Charmes 2004:165–183). Women who own businesses have serious difficulties and represent 4 per cent of all entrepreneurs in the formal sector, although small and medium enterprises represent nearly 90 to 95 per cent of all nonpublic firms registered in Jordan. Most often, they face difficulties when they look for financial resources for their businesses. Interest rates are considered too high and the banks do not grant loans without guarantee. Financial institutions are more reluctant to loan to women, though this is solely due to gender discrimination as a result of societal norms rather than any regulation, as Jordanian property laws recognise a woman’s right to own property with no restrictions. A recent study on women entrepreneurs in Jordan provides analysis on the subject of the use of resources to meet the financial needs of their businesses. The survey results indicate that ‘the highest percentage of women business owners (35.4 per cent) do not rely on external financial resources and that 20.9 per cent rely on private resources (personal

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4124

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

WORKING

IN A

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

125

savings, friends and families); 27 per cent depend on the earnings of their business, 14.2 per cent acquired business/commercial bank loans, 9.2 per cent received micro-finance loans, and 8.1 per cent took out personal bank loans.’13 Most of the women-owned businesses are in the personal services sector, followed by the non-durable manufacturing sector such as food and clothing, and wholesale trade. More than half of the women entrepreneurs have a husband or another male family member involved in the management and ownership of the business (ibid:44).

Women’s Opportunities in the Private Sector: the Qualifying Industrial Zones The government’s strategy to reduce unemployment in Jordan includes a stress placed upon the importance of Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs). These export processing zones were initially established after the signing of the Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994 to create economic cooperation between the two countries. The Presidential Proclamation no. 6955 of 1996 approved an extension of the USA-Israeli Free Trade Agreement to allow duty-free status to designated ‘border areas’. A QIZ is defined as an area designated by local authorities and Office of the United States Trade Representative Office as an enclave which encompasses portions of territory of Israel and Jordan, and which has been designated by local authorities as a space where all goods produced in merchandise may enter duty free into the US market, provided that the rules of origin and value added taxes are respected.14 There are fourteen QIZs, distinguished in public and private owner zones. The public QIZs are Al Hassan in Irbid, Al Hussein Bin Abdullah II in Karak, Aqaba and Ma’an and King Abdullah II Ibn AL Hussein in Sahab. The private owner zones are Al- Muwaqar, Cyber City in Irbid, Jordan Gateway, Al-Tajamu‘at, Al-Zay, Al-Qastal, Al-Hallabat, Al-Mushatta and Al-Dulayl. Over 90 per cent of the projects established in QIZs are in the textile and garment sectors. The apparel industry represents 99.9 per cent of all QIZs exports and 89 per cent of all Jordanian exports to the US (Cassing and Salameh 2006:18).

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4125

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

126

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

It is in these sectors that new job opportunities have been created, and women have particularly benefited from this. By mid-2003, more than 18,000 Jordanians were employed in these new zones, the majority of whom were young, single women from rural communities.15 According to a recent report by the Jordanian Ministry of Labour, women account for 70 per cent of QIZs employees, a large number of which are unskilled workers. Nevertheless, the QIZs have not contributed substantially to the attempts to reduce unemployment in Jordan. This is because in some companies the percentage of foreign labour (mostly from countries such as Bangladesh, China, Sri Lanka and India) exceeds 85 per cent: 36,807 foreign workers compared to 13,241 Jordanian workers16 Any employer who wants to employ non-Jordanian workers has to follow the instructions for the conditions and procedures provided for in Regulation No. 36 of 1997 and its amendments. But some inspections conducted by the Jordanian Ministry of Labour show that many legal provisions in the QIZs companies are ignored. In 2006 there was evidence of violations of the labour rights of migrant workers, including trafficking, in Jordan’s garment sector, in violation of Article 13 of the 1952 Constitution, Article 5 of the 1929 Anti-Slavery Law, Article 178 of the 1960 Criminal Code, Article 18 of the 2003 Passport Law, and Article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons. These provisions established that compulsory labour may not be imposed on any person and the sale, trade or exchange of a person or treatment of a person as a slave is subject to punishment. Consequently the Ministry of Labour and USAID developed the framework for the Joint Labour Assessment and Training Project, to be implemented through inspection activities in cooperation with the Directorate of Labour Inspection and Occupational Safety and Health. This project consisted of a series of assessments on 70 of 111 garment factories in the QIZs through visits by teams consisting of two Lead Monitors and one Jordanian Labour Inspector. In 14 of 70 factories, no written contracts were issued for all or some categories of workers and in the 56 factories where written contracts were in existence, ten contained clauses that were not in line with the law and

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4126

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

WORKING

IN A

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

127

20 used contracts that were either unclear or not comprehensive. In the 63 factories that had migrant workers, 14 did not prepare contracts in a language that employees could understand.17 In only seven of 70 factories workers received the wages they were entitled to. Forty-seven of the 70 factories did not respect hours of work in 32 factories workers were not provided with paid annual leave and in 42 per cent of the factories paid sick leave was not provided. In 27 factories, verbal abuse was reported including threats of job termination (ibid:37). As for gender discriminations, three of 70 factories employed only men. In 51 factories, paid maternity leave had never been provided and female workers were pressured to resign when they got married and none of the factories provided nursing leave. Workers were not aware of their entitlements to child-raising leave and of the 16 factories that employed 20 or more married women only one had a day care centre which was not even appropriate for that function. In four factories with dormitories for night work female workers’ entry into and exit from of dormitories was restricted while male workers could enter and exit freely or with fewer restrictions (ibid:22–24). In six factories, workers indicated that female workers were subjected to sexual harassment. Unfortunately, studies on violence against women within the workplace and in the public sphere (i.e. sexual harassment and physical attack or sex trafficking) are not available,18 which reveals the nature of the underestimation of the serious problem of GBV in the country. Most active associations mainly focus on domestic violence, with the most prevalent form being physical aggression primarily committed by husbands, fathers and brothers. The Jordanian Department of Statistics shows that 87 per cent of women justify wife beating which the victims are reluctant to report to authorities out of shame or fear of social unacceptability.19 Physical violence or sexual harassment against pregnant women is prevalent (Oweis et al., 2010:437–445). Although there is no direct connection between domestic violence and sexual harassment, victims of domestic violence are more hesitant to report sexual abuses.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4127

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

128

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

Employment in QIZs is characterised by low wages, long working hours and limited investment in training. QIZs factories present poor management, inadequate market strategies and fragile facilities which serve to add to the evidence which suggests that Jordanian women are often forced to accept indecent working conditions.

Conclusion Jordanian women working in the private sector are constrained in a hostile environment, dominated by a covert form of violence which produces job segregation and gender gaps in wages and benefits. In 2005, the government launched a new National Strategy for Women, adopting policies to attempt to improve women’s economic and political advancement. The Jordanian National Agenda includes action plans to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women. In the National Agenda, increasing women’s contribution to the economy is encouraged to ensure their participation in the development process. However, stereotyped gender roles still prevail in society. One solution to this problem is to recognise the role played by social norms, and to invest in democratic processes which involve women in civil society. Eradicating gender-based segregation and negative gender stereotyping would also improve women’s access to education and reinforce their self-confidence in their capabilities, ensuring equality and reducing the negative impact of tribal rules which often regulate political activity along patriarchal lines. A women-friendly reform should start by evaluating school curricula to identify and eliminate stereotyping in school textbooks and enhance knowledge about positive gender policies. Furthermore, Jordan should enforce laws to protect women from gender-based discrimination in the labour market and improve supervision activities to encourage women’s hiring and benefits. In the private sector it is important to impose tougher punishments for employers who transgress existing laws on maternity leave and to remove all forms of discrimination against women. Finally, Jordan has to increase women’s representation in elected councils and official decision-making positions.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4128

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

WORKING

IN A

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

129

Notes 1. The few lenders showed limited confidence in Jordanian credit potential. 2. Jordanian National Commission for Women, ‘The Jordanian Women: Reality and Future Aspiration.’ The Jordanian National Report to the Fourth International Conference of Women in Beijing, September, 1995:49. 3. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics, Jordanian Woman Indicators, Gender Perspective, 2008. 4. See, for instance, Quran XVII:23; XXIX:8; XXXI:14. 5. CEDAW reservations concern Article 15, regarding residence and freedom of movement for women with no consent of their husband or family member. There was a real political battle in which the Islamic Action Front Party and its secretary Zaki Bani Rsheid criticized the government for ratifying CEDAW, because its clauses in article 15 give women freedom of mobility and choice of residence, contradicting the teachings of Islam for which the authority over women’s mobility is in the hands of their husbands if they are married and in the hands of brothers or father if they are single. 6. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics, Jordanian Woman Indicators Gender Perspective, 2008. 7. National Centre for Human Resource Development, ‘Human Resources Indicators in Jordan 2008–09’. 8. The concept of modern Jordanian cultural and national identity is inextricably intertwined with the country’s Bedouin heritage. Both state and tribe are security-oriented collectives and the king is historically seen as ‘sheikh’ of Jordanian tribes. 9. Economic and Social Council, Female Labour Force Participation in Jordan, Policy Paper, p.5. 10. The percentage of women employed in agricultural sector is surely higher than 16 per cent, which is reported as official value in the Statistical data, because it incorporates the large incidence of the informal sector. 11. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Department of Statistics, Jordanian Woman Indicators Gender Perspective, 2008. 12. Civil service regulations of 1998 increased maternity leave for the public sector to 90 days. It makes this sector more and more desirable. 13. The Centre of Arab Women for Training and Research and The International Finance Corporation Gender Entrepreneurship Markets, Women Entrepreneurs in the Middle East and North Africa: Characteristics, Contributions and Challenges, June 2007, p.43. 14. In order to receive unrestricted access to the US market any goods produced in the QIZs would have to have a certified amount of material input of a

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4129

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

130

15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

minimum level of the 35 per cent added value. A minimum value added has to come from the Israeli economy (8 per cent) and minimum of 11.7 per cent Jordanian economy. In February 1999 the amount of content from Israel was decreased to 7 per cent for high-technology goods produced in QIZs. UNDP, Jordan Human Development Report, Building Sustainable Livelihoods, 2004:7. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Labour, Annual Report, Amman, 2006. Joint Labour Assessment and Training Project Jordan, Working Conditions in Jordan’s Garment Sector, Amman, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2006:16. United Nations, Violence against Women: Assessing the Situation in Jordan, 2009:10. The Jordan Department of Statistics, The Criminal Statistical Report, Amman, 2006.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4130

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

CHAPTER SIX VIOLENCE AGAINST UNDERAGE GIRL DOMESTIC WORKERS IN MOROCCO

Moha Ennaji

Introduction Girl domestic work is a major gender issue as it relates to genderbased violence, risk of sexual assault and family attitudes about the slight value of girls’ education.1 According to estimates of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), domestic service is today regarded as the most popular form of employment for girls under the age of 16 the world over. It is estimated that approximately 90 per cent of child domestic workers are girls. Girl domestic work is widespread throughout the world but it is claimed that Asia is home to about 60 per cent of girl domestic workers. In Indonesia alone, there are 1.5 million; in the Philippines, there are over one million girls in domestic work. Latin America and Africa are also most affected by this problem. In Latin America, the figures are equally high with 300,000 in Haiti and 110,000 in Peru. In Africa, ILO estimates mention 300,000 in Kenya, 100,000 in Morocco with a figure of more than 23,000 in Casablanca alone, and over 53,000 in South Africa. The ILO estimates that domestic work is the single largest source of employment for girls under 16 worldwide.2

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4131

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

132

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

However, because of its undocumented aspect, it is difficult to have accurate data that show the gravity of girl domestic work. Nevertheless, the recent figures by the ILO’s Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme on Child Labour (SIMPOC) ) shows that at least 15 million minors (aged 5 to 17) were active in domestic work in 2008.3 In Morocco, thousands of underage girls work as domestic helpers. This phenomenon is not only socially and culturally accepted but might be considered a protective kind of work for the girl-child. The maintenance of conventional female roles and tasks within the household, and the perception of domestic work as part of a woman’s training for adulthood and marriage, also contribute to the low appreciation of house service as a form of economic activity, and of girl domestic work as a form of labour. Disregard for the risks these underage housemaids might be exposed to in this type of work is an upsetting reality in many urban centres of Morocco. It is also one of the motives for the prevalent institutional unwillingness to tackle the problem with specific measures and policies and why the issue has only recently come to the forefront of the national debate as potentially one of the most predominant ‘worst forms of child labour’.4 This chapter is based on fieldwork I undertook between 2009 and 2011 in the cities of Fez, Casablanca, Rabat and Beni-Mellal. It is also based on official documents and on previous research in the field by Moroccan and international scholars. The theoretical approach adopted, which specifies that gender equality in modern society depends on the full abolition of the gender discrimination of all social roles, especially work roles, whether performed in the private sphere or in the public sphere, whether paid for or unpaid (Buber 1984, Agassi 1992). Due to its hidden nature, it is impossible to find reliable figures and statistics on how many underage girls are exploited as domestic workers. Girl domestic workers are generally below the age of 18 years who are employed within households to perform domestic chores. They can be as young as six or seven years old. They usually belong to impoverished families living in rural areas or in shanty towns. The great majority are utterly illiterate or barely literate.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4132

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

UNDERAGE GIRL DOMESTIC WORKERS

IN

MOROCCO 133

Their work consists of cooking, cleaning (dusting, sweeping the floor and mopping the house), washing clothes and/or utensils, ironing, running errands, minding the children and caring for the elderly and the disabled. They may be paid or unpaid. Those who are not paid for their work receive ‘in-kind’ benefits, such as food, medical care and shelter. Many girl domestic workers are brought from villages and rural areas to work in large cities such as Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakesh, Fez and Tangier. Girls from poor families are sent to live in houses and apartments, with the hope that they will be treated as their ‘own’ children. Some young girls begin their work while being in debt to the employer who had paid an advance to the family member or to the recruiter. The semsar (Arabic for middleman) searches out and recruits village girls to work in houses in the city. Families in the slums of cities also send their children to work as domestics in middle class families. There is, generally, no contract at the time of employment. The girl’s parents are often promised that in addition to paying a salary, the employer will protect and meet the health care expenses of the girl. The salary usually varies between 300 and 1000 Moroccan hirham per month (approximately between US $40 and US $120). There are two types of girl domestic workers: Live-in workers live with the families 24 hours a day, seven days a week. They work nonstop all day and most of the night. They often work between 10 and 18 hours a day without taking a rest, and are unable to object to work. These girls have hardly any opportunity for recreation and social interaction. They cannot go out and meet friends, family members or new people. The second type of girl domestic workers work only during the day and spend the night with their families, usually without taking the weekend break. Girl domestic workers in Morocco are generally subject to illtreatment and exploitation, as they work long hours for little money and are routinely deprived of adequate sleep, rest, food, health care and education, as well as social contacts and loving care from their parents or guardians. Those complicit in this negligence and abuse

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4133

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

134

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

include parents who send the girls to domestic work and do not keep in close contact; intermediaries never check on the children after being recruited to see whether they are happy in the new family, for all they care about is receiving their recruiting fees. Most girl domestic workers are deprived of the opportunity to attend school and are under the total exploitation and grip of employers who do not have their best interest as a priority. Girl domestic workers are popular with employers because they are accessible and docile; they can be used to meet the needs of employers; they can be paid less, and they are less troublesome because of their unawareness of and inability to demand their rights. The new Moroccan labour code stipulates that there shall be no discrimination against women in employment and wages, and considers, for the first time, acts of sexual harassment as serious crime. The recent legislative reforms will have a very positive effect on gender relations in the long run. Nevertheless, these changes will only become truly significant if they lead to a change in the mentalities of all Moroccans and if they benefit the daily lives of Moroccan women of all ages. This remains a major challenge, for Morocco is a Muslim society where modernity and tradition compete – not to mention a country in transition toward democratization, integration into the global economy and urbanization (Ennaji 2005, Hijab 2003:15).5 In 2003, Morocco passed its Family Law, a landmark step in guaranteeing women equal rights within the family, including by ending the custom of male ‘guardianship’ (see section below). In 2008, Morocco withdrew all its reservations about CEDAW, in a speech made by King Mohammed VI, with the aim to enhance the legal position of women on the basis of the principle of equality of opportunity between men and women and the application of international instruments and declarations ratified by Morocco. This decision may be regarded as an important indication that Morocco is committed to gender equality and to combating violence against women. The 2011 Moroccan Constitution recognizes the primacy of international law to which Morocco adheres over domestic legislation, although such conventions do not have pre-eminence over the Constitution itself without a revision of the latter.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4134

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

UNDERAGE GIRL DOMESTIC WORKERS

IN

MOROCCO 135

Considerable endeavours have been made by the State to improve the situation of women in Morocco in recent years. Other signs of progress have been the election of a record number of women to political office, making Morocco a reference point for progressive women’s movements across the MENA region. The legislative elections of 25 November 2011 brought to Parliament 67 women MPs as a result of the quota system. The adoption of a gender approach in all ministries is a testimony to the commitment of the government to combat discrimination against women and to improve their representation in politics. As a result of the quota system, Morocco has 3,428 women elected in the municipalities. This said, discrimination against women persists, and laws remain to be modernized. Two groups of women who continue to suffer severe exclusion and discrimination are single mothers and girl domestic workers. Despite these positive changes, women still face violence in both the private and the public spheres, as well as societal discrimination in many walks of their lives. Gender discrimination persists, and inequalities between Morocco’s urban and rural populations in terms of access to education, employment, and health care are flagrant (Ennaji 2010, Ennaji and Sadiqi 2011).

Root Causes of Girl Domestic Work There are several major causes of girl domestic work. Gender discrimination, domestic violence, rural exodus and loss of parents due to diseases, are just some of the multiple reasons for child domestic workers. Poverty, ignorance, and promise of a better future sometimes drive parents to send their children into domestic service. It is often believed by these parents that domestic work can be a solution to poverty. They think that their daughters are better off because they get food, shelter and clothing and they have one fewer mouth to feed. They think that domestic work is non-hazardous and less tedious and that once the children are almost adopted, they will be settled in a comfortable home. Parents often send their children to work for a wealthy family thinking that it will bring them new opportunities. However, this is just wishful thinking that is far

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4135

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

136

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

removed from reality. There are obviously hazards associated with cooking, cleaning, boiling water, chopping meat or vegetables and carrying heavy loads. Burns, for instance, are quite frequent among girl domestic workers. In case of committing a mistake, breaking dishes or utensils or providing poor service, the housemaid may be harshly punished. Accusations of laziness or bad performance can escalate to the point of violence. Domestic workers are often subject to wounds or sickness but are not treated with the same exigency or medical urgency as a family member. In their seclusion, girl domestic workers are especially exposed to sexual abuse, harassment and the possibility of child pregnancy. Employers often think that they are doing domestic girls a ‘favour’, claiming that they are protecting them and providing them with food and clothes but fail to recognise the level of exploitation and abuse they submit them to. Girl domestics are much sought after by Moroccan career, working or functionary urban women, who prefer to work outside the home or run a business leaving the housework to the maid. Today, with the privatisation and the liberalisation of the economy, and given the high cost of commodities, there is an increasing need for the women of the household to have a ‘replacement’ at home that will enable many of them to enter the labour market, and contribute to the improvement of the living standards of their families. Despite remarkable headway recently made towards gender equity, gender relations still face serious challenges in Morocco like illiteracy and poverty. For instance, illiteracy is very high among women despite government and civil society efforts to reduce it. Only 36 per cent of adult women know how to read and write, compared to 62 per cent of men (UNICEF 2008). The illiteracy rate among the young is 41.7 per cent for girls and 23.9 per cent for boys (percentage of people aged 15–24),6 reflecting the discrepancy between educational levels for women and men. The general primary schooling rate is 94 per cent for both girls and boys, and the net primary schooling rate is 77 per cent for boys and 64 per cent for girls.7 According to the 2009 United Nations Development Programme, only 40 per cent of those registered in the first, second and third levels of education are girls.8

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4136

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

UNDERAGE GIRL DOMESTIC WORKERS

IN

MOROCCO 137

According to the UN Arab Human Development 2009 Report, the female adult literacy rate in Morocco is 39.6 per cent, while the youth literacy rate is estimated at 60.5 per cent; thus, the ratio of female rate to male rate is 0.60. It should also be noted that there exist great disparities in school enrolment between rural and urban areas. NGOs make considerable endeavours to teach literacy to girls and women and to rehabilitate schools and other public infrastructures. Some 33 per cent of young girls in the Middle East and North Africa have never attended school.9 Yet an education is perhaps a child’s strongest barrier against violence and poverty, especially for girls. Educated girls are likely to marry later and have healthier children. They are more productive at home and better paid in the workplace, better able to protect themselves against HIV/AIDS and more able to participate in decision-making at all levels. Moroccan NGOs encourage families to invest in the education of their children and call governments and donors to step up efforts on behalf of education for all children. Programmes include help with funding, logistics, information technology, schooling, water and sanitation and a gender-friendly curriculum. Sexual stereotyping of women and girls in officially assigned textbooks is commonplace. Despite the National Charter of Education and Training that has imposed reforms in the educational system since 2000 and stipulated equal opportunities in education for both girls and boys, women and girls are depicted as housewives, maids, cooks, cleaners, secretaries and as minors in many Arabic textbooks of the primary level of education (Belarbi 1987). About one fifth of the population suffers from poverty, which is more apparent in the suburbs and in the countryside. Several factors render women, especially widows and divorcees, at a higher risk of being impoverished. Women-headed households are likely to be large and poor partly due to the high illiteracy rates among women, and because of the discrimination in access to wealth both in terms of inheritance and in terms of work opportunities available to them.10 Women in rural areas are affected by other difficulties linked to poverty, such as widespread illiteracy; poor access to education; poor health care; lack of amenities like running water, and electricity; and

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4137

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

138

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

poor access to land, information, training and bank loans. They have less access to property and bank credits for lack of financial guarantees. Many of them have recently benefited from micro-credit programmes but only to start small income-generating activities, given that they have less access to alternatives, such as traditional bank loans because banks treat women entrepreneurs less favourably than men. Those women who gain access to loans ‘are often subjected to higher interest rates – an average 0.5 per cent more on a business loan than men – or must accept more burdensome guarantees and collateral requirements’ (Hertz 2011).

Ramifications and the Bitter Reality on the Ground In general, the working conditions of girl domestic workers are appalling. They can be dismissed at any time. They are under the total control of the employer and are at the mercy of the household (parents, relatives, and children). They are deprived of any kind of education be it formal or informal and are dependent on their employers for all their needs. Girl domestic workers grow up in an environment without parental love and affection. Many of them suffer from depression, development and psychological disorders and are vulnerable to various types of psychological, physical and sexual abuse. They are often subjected to verbal violence, which demeans them and negatively affects their sense of pride. Many are beaten up sometimes to the point of death. And what is most difficult about pinpointing this sort of violence is the fact that they work hidden behind the closed doors and remain invisible and unheard. Uprooted from their family environment and planted in a totally alien surrounding, child maids have no one in whom they can confide their suffering. They are treated neither as members of the family nor as workers. Though they are promised food, shelter and medical care, they are often treated as second class citizens or slaves (Lahlou 2009). According to Association Démocratique des Femmes Marocaines (ADFM), one out of four wage-earning women in urban areas is

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4138

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

UNDERAGE GIRL DOMESTIC WORKERS

IN

MOROCCO 139

employed as a maid o often are under the age of twelve. Over 80 per cent of the child maids are illiterate and over 75 per cent are from rural areas.11 These young girls frequently work in extremely difficult circumstances are deprived of their basic rights and are overexploited as they work between 10 and 14 hours a day (cf. Schneider 1999). The government has recently taken measures to combat the exploitation of maids, as mentioned above.12 Despite the secret and hidden nature of these forms of abuse and violence, many cases have reached both the courts and the media; in 2009, a judge and his wife battered their twelve-year-old maid, Zineb, in the city of Oujda. The wife was sentenced to three years in jail, and her husband was suspended from his position in the magistrates court (see the Moroccan Arabic daily Al-Massa’: 30 October 2009). In September 2011 the Moroccan media reported the killing of an eleven year old maid by the daughter of her employer in the city of El Jadida. She was beaten for an hour, first with a hose and then with the heel of a shoe until she died. The maid, by the name of Khadija, had been brought from a small village called Tagadirt, southwest of Marrakesh. The police investigation revealed that the killer, a thirty-one year old educated Moroccan woman, had been disappointed because Khadija ‘ruined her dress while washing it’ (see Taibi 2011). In another case reported by Moroccan media, a child died in Casablanca after her employer threw her out of a fifth floor window; another was burned with an iron by her employer; and yet another was forced to work day and night without any food or sleep. Many underage housemaids are also vulnerable to sexual abuse. The Ministry of Family, Solidarity and Development revealed that in the 1990s, 80 per cent of reports of rape, attempted rape, and other acts of sexual abuse came from girl domestic workers. Halima was just 14 years when her parents decided to send her to Rabat to work in a family of five members. She said: ‘I refused to go there with the recruiter. But my mother said she badly needed the money. I was crying because I had no choice’, Halima recalls. For two months, Halima worked as a fulltime helper for a military officer’s family. Then one night,

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4139

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

140

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

the worst happened: ‘His 27-year old son knocked on my door at 1am. I opened the door, he got in and locked it immediately. He put his hand on my mouth so that I don’t cry; I cried and begged him to go away, but he wouldn’t. I tried to fight back but he was strong. Then he raped me’. The ordeal lasted for two months. With the help of another recruit, Halima eventually left that family (interview with the author). Girl domestic workers are often asked to perform skilled tasks such as childcare with very little training and are severely punished when they make mistakes. Mina was only 13 years old when her step mother took her to Fes as a housemaid. ‘My employer informed me that my job would be limited to house cleaning, but when I started work, she obliged me to do more than cleaning. In the morning I would wake up at around 6am and would do the laundry and prepare breakfast for the children and their parents. Then, I would sweep the floor, wash up the dishes, do the bedrooms and help prepare the lunch. In the afternoon, I had to do the dishes, iron clothes, do errands, help cook dinner and care for the children until late at night. I only slept five hours a night, with no right to rest during the day. When I made a mistake concerning child monitoring or broke a kitchen utensil, my employer beat me up severely (ibid). Girl domestic labourers can be on call day and night. Instead of the love of family, comfort of school, and friends, domestic workers are burdened with constant demands and responsibilities. In a 60-page report, entitled ‘Inside the Home, Outside the Law, Abuses of Child Domestic Workers in Morocco’, the New York-based organisation Human Rights Watch cited the cases of girls as young as five working 100 hours per week for 6.5 Moroccan dirhams ($0.71) a day, with no rest breaks or even a day off. There are thousands of cases of underage girls from the countryside given away by their parents to work in homes in big cities.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4140

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

UNDERAGE GIRL DOMESTIC WORKERS

IN

MOROCCO 141

An example of this phenomenon can be found in the case of Fatima. Six years ago Fatima’s mother, Khadija, sent Fatima, at the age of nine to work as a housemaid in the city, where her first employer beat her. ‘In the city my daughter will dress well and eat well’, said Khadija of her decision. She is paid 500 Moroccan dirhams ($60) monthly for Fatima’s work. ‘Me and my husband cannot look after her and the other four children’. Fatima is one of tens of thousands of girls working as domestics in Morocco, who according to a 2006 Human Rights Watch report face physical and psychological abuse as well as economic exploitation (Zakia Abdennebi 2007). No official numbers exist, but one NGO called ‘Bayti’ has counted 23,000 underage housemaids in Casablanca alone. Amina L-Hamil, the director of ‘Bayti’ states that most girl domestics come from the countryside, where people have low income and too many children. ‘If they send a girl away, that’s one less mouth to feed, plus she can send money home’. And the parents, she says, ‘think they’re doing something nice for their daughter, that they’re saving her from the tough conditions in the countryside where there is no electricity and so on. The parents think that at least their daughter will be fed in the city’ (A radio story broadcast by PRI’s The World 2009). A recent government survey indicated that 2.5 million children aged under age 15 drop out of school, and more than half a million are forced into child labour. Thousands of parents contract their children to urban families to work as housemaids in dreadful conditions. Mediators or dealers can make up to $200 per child. Civil society activists have been vociferous in their calls for the government to both regulate and guarantee the rights of housemaids for social security and improve their working conditions. ‘In Morocco, a home is considered a castle,’ says Najat Majid, the founder of Bayti. ‘We have no right to enter homes, even when we know maids are being abused.’ Sixty per cent of the children in her refuge, she says, are victims of sexual abuse (see Nick Pelham 2000).13 The manager of an NGO that provides assistance to unmarried mothers told Human Rights Watch that victims of domestic violence and rape were usually young girls who lack emotional family relationships and whose childhood is ravaged by misery. A government

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4141

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

142

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

survey revealed that many former domestics accounted for the vast majority of unwed mothers in the Casablanca and Rabat areas and that a great number of them had first worked as housemaids.14 In Morocco, human rights groups are protesting the use of children as housemaids. They say that every year thousands of girls from poor families are sent to work for the wealthy. The government is considering measures to outlaw the child maids, but so far it has not taken any action. A recent government survey carried within the city of Casablanca revealed that eight out of ten cases of violence against maids who come to the centres are perpetrated by their employers.15 Although there are no estimates as to how many children are employed in domestic service due to the hidden nature of the work, United Nations agencies and most NGOs underline the prevalent abuse of young girls working as household maids, which is one of the major issues confronting Moroccan children (ibid).

Government and Civil Society’s Action and Reaction Significant measures have been taken by the state to promote gender equality in the educational system through the National Program for Promoting Human Rights Culture in Schools. The government, however, has not taken any action against parents who do not send their daughters to school. Moroccan human rights NGOs endeavour to reduce gender inequalities in education through projects enhancing girls’ education in rural areas and through surveys and reports on discrimination, violence, and sexual harassment in schools. As a result of the literacy campaign launched by the government in 2002, girls’ enrolment in primary schools increased within one year by more than 10 per cent. The secondary school enrolment rate is 44 per cent for boys compared to 34 per cent for girls.16 Since 2003, the government has passed laws to eradicate child labour, but the political will to ensure that these are effectively implemented seems to be lacking. Civil society associations like Bayti, Touche pas à mon enfant, Manal, and NSAF have launched several programmes and advocacy campaigns to fight against child

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4142

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

UNDERAGE GIRL DOMESTIC WORKERS

IN

MOROCCO 143

work, which is considered a crime by NGOs in Morocco although it is not actually on the official record as being one. As part of the efforts to punish the exploitation of and violence against child maids, Nouzha Skalli, ex-Minister of Social Development, Family, and Solidarity declared. ‘We want to regulate the work of housemaids, insisting that no girl under the age of 15 should be employed as a domestic servant’ (2008 Parliament speech). She set a target of eradicating the problem of young maids by 2010. This, she stated, depends on all partners working together. However, the suffering of girl domestics continues. The Ministry of Social Development, Family, and Solidarity has been working hand in hand with government departments and Moroccan women’s NGOs to fight violence against women in general, and violence against domestic workers in particular. While reforms to criminal legislation have allowed some protection for women from gender-based violence, violent practices against women in the public and private spheres continue to occur, including sexual harassment and violence against domestic workers.

Family Law in Morocco In the new family law initiated by the government in 2004, men and women are equal before the law. The reform makes husband and wife jointly responsible for the family. The previous law treated women as dependent and minors; women were considered more like men’s property than independent individuals. The new family law also stipulates that a woman is no longer under the guardianship of her father or her husband. The minimum age for marriage is 18 years for both men and women. Under the old code, the minimum age for marriage was 15 for girls and 18 for boys. Under the new family law, polygamy is so highly restricted that it has become practically impossible, and the woman has the right to impose a condition in the marriage contract whereby her husband will refrain from taking a second wife. In the 1957 personal status law, a husband could take up to four wives without the consent of his first wives. Under the 1993 law, the consent of the first wife and

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4143

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

144

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

of the would-be wife is necessary. After the new reform, the judge decides whether there is reasonable justification for polygamy with the wife’s approval. Divorce is the prerogative of both the husband and the wife. Whatever the case, and before the divorce is authorized, it has to be ascertained that the divorced woman gets all the rights to which she is entitled. Divorce cannot be duly registered until all monies owed to the wife and children have been paid in full by the husband. Verbal repudiation is no longer considered valid. Under the new Family Code, a wife has the right to file for divorce if the husband fails to observe any of the conditions in the marriage contract, or if he harms her through lack of financial support, absence of sexual intercourse, violence, or any other wrongful deed. In the previous law, a woman could ask for divorce (al khoul‘a) only under special restricted circumstances (like being abandoned without any financial support for a long period of time by the husband), or only if she paid a material compensation to the husband. Regarding the management, by husband and wife, of the property acquired during marriage, and while confirming the principle of separate estate for each one of them, the couple may agree, in a document other than the marriage contract, on how to manage and invest the assets acquired jointly during marriage. Previously, only the marriage contract counted, and the wife had no right to obtain or manage her part of the property and wealth accumulated during marriage. Since the promulgation of the new family law, and mainly due to the efforts of women’s NGOs, violence against women has drawn much media attention, as well as being prominent on social and political agendas of both civil society and state actors (Sadiqi 2009). Headed by an Islamist feminist Bassima Hakkaoui, the Ministry of Social Development, Family, and Solidarity, has adopted a new strategy to combat violence against women, guaranteeing gender equality.17 In 2007, a unit for female victims of violence was created in some hospitals and police stations across the country.18 Nevertheless, domestic and sexual violence continue to be considered by many to be a private matter which does not represent a

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4144

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

UNDERAGE GIRL DOMESTIC WORKERS

IN

MOROCCO 145

human rights violation or a crime that needs serious investigation or analysis. Violence against women continues to be surrounded by silence and consequently, it continues to be underestimated. According to figures released by the Ministry of Social Development, Family, and Solidarity, 95.8 per cent of violence against women in Morocco is perpetrated by the victim’s close relatives, mostly by husbands. From December 2005 to October 2006, some 27,795 cases of violence were reported. These include physical abuse (30.8 per cent), sexual abuse (9.2 per cent) and economic violence (0.8 per cent). Approximately 94 per cent of violence victims live in big cities—mainly in Casablanca, Agadir, Marrakesh, and Fez. In this regard, the government has adopted a battery of measures, including the setting up of crisis centres for beaten women in all courts, the criminalizing of sexual harassment and the adoption of a new law banning the work of underage girls on 12 October 2011.19 But despite these actions, these laws are ever hardly enforced. Women NGOs and human rights organisations have multiplied actions to improve the situation of women and to improve the conditions of the most vulnerable parts of the population. NGOs have initiated extremely important projects for women in the areas of literacy, micro financing and micro credit. Moroccan NGOs, with the help of the government’s National Initiative for Human Development, have also established many centres and shelters where women can obtain training, information and legal aid. Nevertheless, government efforts to protect and upgrade women’s economic rights remain insufficient. The government’s annual development budget is rather deficient and fails to reduce women’s hardships, especially in rural areas (Naciri 2003). This reality highlights the magnitude of underage servants in Morocco. Morocco’s Ministry of Social Development outlines the gravity of the issue and is determined to combat it. It has initiated a set of commendable programmes to alleviate the problem. Nevertheless, the Children’s National Action Plan (PANE), the Integration Programme (INDIMAJ) (a program established to reintegrate street children into society) and the National Plan to Save Children and to eradicate child labour (INQAD) have all failed to

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4145

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

146

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

wipe out this phenomenon. The government’s and NGOs’ endeavours to promote children’s rights within Moroccan society and to raise awareness about the harmful consequences of child work on the country’s development have been for the most part unsuccessful (see Taibi 2011).

Recommendations Civil society has a great role to play in the eradication of child domestic work. Considering the hidden nature of the violence explored in this chapter, NGOs’ efforts have been limited. Bearing this in mind, associations should organize large advocacy campaigns on local and national levels. They should work with school children to establish child to child networks, encouraging them to speak to their elders about the issue of child domestic workers. This increases access to the victimised children and raises awareness about the risks and harmful consequences of child domestic work. NGOs should actively be involved in the lobbying and campaigning for children’s rights and justice for maids as workers, also assisting in the rehabilitation and reintegration of victimised and abused children in domestic work. Networking with organizations like UNICEF, the ILO, community centres and welfare agencies at both national and international levels ought to be developed, with the aim of implementing the child labour ban and promoting the concept of the rights of children. Given the complexity of the phenomenon of girl domestic work, various measures are needed to protect these young girls from exploitation and abuse. There are long-term interventions and short-term solutions. The former are related to educating parents and imposing the obligatory schooling of young girls. Government and non-government agencies should aim to change social perceptions and policies in order to obtain a more effective ban on child labour and to protect girls’ right to schooling, recreation and health care. Teachers can also play a vital role in inspiring girls to stay in school and believe in the benefits of education as a way to control their own destinies.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4146

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

UNDERAGE GIRL DOMESTIC WORKERS

IN

MOROCCO 147

A campaign for girls’ access to education needs to be supported with efforts to protect and rescue young housemaids from abusive situations. It is urgent to bring domestic work under the existing labour code and to enact specific laws for the protection of child and adult domestic workers. NGOs should press the government to enforce these new laws and show their adherence to existing international legislation to protect women and children from social violence and abuse. Short-term measures are to be taken to save girls who suffer from violence in the workplace. A girl who is rescued from an abusive employer needs immediate protection, adequate shelter and access to legal counsel and education services. Improved access to education either through evening and weekend classes or through informal or alternative learning systems will help these rescued girls reintegrate into society.

Conclusion The non-recognition of domestic work as legitimate work combined with the private nature of the worksite results in exploitative living and working conditions and sometimes forced labour and abuse. Reports of exploitation and violence are many, with young housemaids facing, among other things, extremely long hours of work, absence of rest and vacation, deprivation from food and adequate housing, delaying or non-payment of wages, underpayment and physical and sexual violence. In an attempt to eradicate child domestic work, the Moroccan government and civil society have sought to mobilize families and employers against the phenomenon of girl domestics and to provide respectable working conditions. Special campaigns have been organized to encourage access to social security, raise housemaids’ awareness about their rights, create opportunities for fair mediation and allow for free weekends and holidays. Work contracts are encouraged to formalize the relationships between domestic workers over the age of fifteen and their employers. More efforts are to be made to

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4147

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

148

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

comply with the labour code, limiting the working hours of maids, and allowing their access to social benefits. Girl domestic workers are the most frequent victims of violence in Morocco. However, these housemaids rarely approach the Moroccan police for assistance. In light of the new reforms enacted since the implementation of the new Family Code, the Moroccan police are engaged in activities to try to encourage women to report all forms of violence, but such measures may take significant time to permeate down to local levels. Whilst the Moroccan police have shown a reforming zeal in announcing their intention to appoint thousands of new female police officers, it will be a while before they are fully trained and integrated. Great progress has been achieved in education and employment given the increasing presence of women in education and the workplace. Nevertheless, more efforts are badly needed to eradicate poverty and illiteracy among women in particular in the rural areas. Economic development and better public education are key tools to discouraging the work of child maids. Tougher laws are also sorely needed to reduce the intensity of this phenomenon. The government and charities must consider strict legislation if they are to change mindsets among a great many Moroccans, who do not see the employment of girls under 15 years of age as a punishable crime. There have been plenty of public awareness campaigns at the national level, but what is needed is for those who employ young girls to realise that their abusive actions are crimes punishable by the law.

Notes 1. I would like to thank very warmly Zahia Salhi and an anonymous reader for their judicious comments which led to the improvement of this chapter. An earlier but very different version of this paper was published online in The NIEW Journal: The Voice of NAM Woman. Volume 2, pp.33–46. URL: http://niew.gov.my/index.php?option=com_flippingbook&view= book&id=11:the-niew-journal-the-voice-of-the-nam-woman-volume. 2. For more figures on the global level, see Cecilia Flores-Oebanda (2006). ‘Elimination of all forms of discrimination and violence against the girl child’

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4148

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

UNDERAGE GIRL DOMESTIC WORKERS

3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

16. 17.

IN

MOROCCO 149

UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ daw/egm/elim-disc-viol-girlchild/ExpertPapers/EP.10%20%20Flores%20 Oebanda.pdf. Cf. the website of ILO: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/press-andmedia-centre/insight/WCMS_160515/lang--en/index.htm. See this link about the international debate about child domestic labour: http://www.ilo.org/ipec/areas/Childdomesticlabour/lang--en/index.htm. Nadia Hijab, Laws Regulation and Practices Impeding Women’s Economic Participation in the MENA Region, shadow report, submitted to the World Bank 2001, quoted in Rabéa Naciri and Isis Nusair, The EuroMediterranean Human Rights Network, The Integration of Women’s Rights into the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 2003, p.15. World Bank: http://genderstats.worldbank.org. UNICEF statistics, consulted 19 May 2003. http://www.unicef.org/efa/ girlsed.htm#Morocco. www.undp.org/hdro/08gdi.htm. See the UN Millennium Project overview report: http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/index.htm. According to the Unicef 2011 Report, women are still the poorest of the world’s poor, representing 70 per cent of the 1.3 billion people who live in absolute poverty. Nearly 900 million women have incomes of less than US $1 a day. See this link: http://www.unicef.org/mdg/poverty.html. Report on the mission of the Special Rapporteur on Children (28 February 3 March 2000), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/78/Add.1. US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2002. Report by Nick Pelham for the BBC: http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/ people/highlights/streetlife.shtml. See also the Human Rights Watch Report titled ‘Inside the Home Outside the Law, Abuse of Child Domestic Workers in Morocco’. 25 December 2005, Vol. 17, No 12(E). ‘Statistical survey of girl domestics under 18 years of age in the administrative district of Casablanca’ (Ministry of Economic Forecasting and the Plan, Regional Delegation of Greater Casablanca, with support of UNICEF and UNFPA). UNICEF, World Education Forum, Dakar 2000 See also the UN Arab Human Development Report, 2009. The Minister, Nouzha Skalli, who was speaking at a G8 conference on violence against women on 10 September 2009, stressed ‘the empowerment and emancipation of women’ as a way of combating gender-based discrimination and all forms of violence against women (Maghreb Arab Press).

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4149

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

150

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

18. Rabéa Naciri, La Violence basée sur le genre au Maroc, Atelier ‘Femmes et hommes au Maroc: Analyse de la situation et de l’évolution des écarts dans une perspective genre’, Royaume du Maroc, Premier Ministre, Département de la Prévision Economique et du Plan, Direction de la Statistique, UNDP, UNIFEM, ESCWA, 18–19 March 2003. 19. These figures were revealed at a meeting in Fes on 2 January 2007 entitled ‘Violence against Women: Realities and Perspectives’. The meeting, attended by representatives from the police, lawyers and women rights advocates, discussed Morocco’s efforts to curb this phenomenon, with a special emphasis on gender-friendly education. Report by Siham Ali for Magharebia.com in Rabat, 20 October 2011.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4150

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

CHAPTER SEVEN GENDER AND VIOLENCE IN EGYPT: PREVALENCE AND FACTORS EXPOSING WOMEN TO THE RISK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN ALEXANDRIA

Heba M. Mamdouh and Ibrahim F. Kharboush

Introduction Violence against women (VAW) continues to be a global epidemic that kills and tortures physically, psychologically, sexually and economically (Sushma 2000). It includes acts that take place in the home or the community as well as those that are perpetrated or tolerated by governments. It is recognised as a global public health and human rights problem in need of urgent attention (UNFPA 2005). VAW is present in every country, cutting across boundaries of culture, class, education, income, ethnicity and age. The United Nations defines violence against women as ‘any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivations of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life. It is often referred to as “gender-based” violence because

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4151

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

152

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

it stems from women’s subordinate status in the family and Society’ (UNFPA 2005). Similarly, the terms ‘domestic violence’ and ‘spousal violence’ are often used interchangeably and refer to husbands as the perpetrators, because this is most often the case. Domestic violence is by far the most common form of gender-based violence. Spousal violence can take many forms, including physical, sexual, economic and emotional violence (Ellsberg 2006:325–332). Domestic violence occurs in all cultures. People of all races, ethnicities, religions, sexes and classes can be perpetrators of domestic violence; the only variation is in the patterns and trends that exist in various countries and regions. The global dimensions of this violence are alarming, as highlighted by studies on its incidence and prevalence. The results of WHO multi-country study on VAW indicate that 15 to 71 per cent of women world-wide are victims of domestic violence at least once in their lives (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2005). In Egypt, according to the 2005 Egypt Demographic and Health Survey (EDHS), physical violence is the most common form of violence, with one third of women who have ever been married reporting to have been subjected to some form of physical violence at least once by their current or most recent husband (El-Zanaty and Way 2006:221–230). Gender-based violence is rooted in the structural and the personal levels. At the structural level it is grounded in patriarchy – a system that positions men over women (and other men) and instils a sense of entitlement and privilege in many men. Patriarchy is also linked to the social, cultural and legal contexts that permit gender-based violence. At the personal level, gender violence is also based on the pressures, fears and stifled emotions that underlie many of the dominant forms of manhood espoused in different settings. Added to this, are the individual experiences of violence (Kaufman 1998). Though the definition of structural violence, as emphasized by Galtung in the 1960s, could not be applied to all aspects of domestic violence, it can help to understand some of its dynamics. Structural violence is explained as violence that is built into the social system and expresses itself in the unequal distribution of power which results in unequal opportunities (e.g. inequality in the distribution of income, education opportunities). Galtung linked the many forms

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4152

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

EGYPT

153

of structural violence with gender, thus putting women at higher risk of even experiencing more structural violence. He further introduced cultural violence as those aspects of culture that can be used to justify or legitimate the use of direct or structural violence. While there is no justification for spousal violence in any form, certain characteristics of women and their husbands reinforce the subordinate position of women in the family and therefore put some women at greater risk of experiencing their husbands’ violent and abusive behaviour. Conversely, there are characteristics of women and their husbands that create more egalitarian relationships, which lower the risk of spousal violence (Kharboush et al., 2010). There are many different theories as to the causes of domestic violence. These include social theories which consider external factors in the perpetrator’s environment, such as family structure, stress and social learning, as well as psychological theories that consider personality traits and mental characteristics of the perpetrator. Also among the many theories comes the power and control theory, where violence is posited to arise out of a perceived need for power and control. As with many phenomena regarding human experience, no single approach appears to cover all cases.

Methodology 1. Study design: A cross-sectional survey was conducted to provide an overview on prevalence and factors affecting spousal violence experienced by a sample of Egyptian women during the period from October 2009 to June 2010. 2. Target population: The sample consisted of ever-married women attending the Family Health Centers distributed in the seven districts of the Alexandria Governorate. 3. Sampling and sample size: With a precision of 2.5 per cent taking 95 per cent confidence interval with design effect of 2 and an unknown prevalence of 50 per cent, the minimal estimated sample size was calculated using epi-info 6 as 3,096 women. A total of 3,271 ever-married women were interviewed to compensate for missing data. The sample was proportionately allocated according to the rate of attendance to these centres.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4153

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

154

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

After reviewing the available literature, a structured interview questionnaire was developed. The questionnaire explored the socio-demographic background of the sampled women, prevalence of all types of spousal violence and women’s and their husbands’ characteristics that may affect their exposure to spousal violence. The questionnaire obtained detailed information on the forms of violence that ever-married women had experienced in the relationships with their current husband or, in the case of widowed, divorced or separated women, their most recent husband. Trained data collectors interviewed eligible women to complete the pre-designed questionnaire. The survey explored various types of spousal violence, including physical violence, sexual violence, emotional violence and economic abuse. Physical abuse could be manifested by slapping, beating, arm twisting, stabbing, strangling, burning, choking, kicking, threats with an object or weapon, and murder. Sexual abuse could include coerced sex through threats, intimidation or physical force and forcing unwanted sexual acts. Psychological abuse includes behaviour that is intended to intimidate and persecute and takes the form of threats of abandonment or abuse, destruction of objects, isolation, verbal aggression and constant humiliation. Economic abuse includes acts such as the denial of funds, refusal to contribute financially, denial of food and basic needs, and controlling access to health care and employment. This study was part of a larger survey conducted by the Alexandria Regional Centre for Women’s Health and Development (ARC) and funded by the Ford Foundation. Informed consent was obtained from the participants at the start of the interview. In addition, at the start of each module, each respondent was read a statement to inform her that the next set of questions would be very personal in nature and would explore different aspects of a woman’s life. The statement also assured the respondent that her answers would be completely confidential. The survey was approved by the ethical review committee of the ARC. Data entry and analysis were carried out using SPSS version 16. Univarite analysis was performed with Chi-square test whenever

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4154

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

GENDER

AND

VIOLENCE

IN

EGYPT

155

applicable. Logistic regression analyses were used to identify variables that were significantly related to all types of spousal violence. The outcome variables were ever having exposure to the four types of spousal violence with women’s and their husband’s characteristics taken as a covariate (independent variables).

Results Data from Table 1 reveal the socio-demographic characteristics of the sampled women. Women’s ages ranged from 16–68 years, with a mean age of 36.6 ± 9.8 years. Regarding the educational level, 38.5 per cent of the participants were illiterate or could just read and write, while 30.5 per cent had secondary education. Most of the participants were currently married (87.6 per cent), with about three-quarters of them (73.6 per cent) reporting being married before the age of 25 years. Among women who had ever been married, 28.5 per cent reported having been married for 20 years or more. Of the participants, 71.8 per cent were housewives, 5.6 per cent held professional jobs, and 56.9 per cent had a family size of 4–5 persons. Finally, the table reveals the monthly family income of the sampled women. Nearly one-fourth of the women were living in families earning less than 400 Egyptian pounds (E.P) per month (23.6 per cent), with about half of them having monthly family income of 400 to less than 900 E.P. (51 per cent). Table 2 provides socio-demographic data of the husbands. Almost half of the surveyed women had their husbands being married before age 30 years (55.4 per cent). As for the husbands’ education, 37.4 per cent of the husbands were illiterate or could just read and write, with 29 per cent having secondary education or technical diploma, and 17.4 per cent were university graduates or higher. Almost half of the husbands were manual workers (54.5 per cent), with only 5.1 per cent of the women reporting that their husbands were not working. Sixtysix per cent of the husbands were smokers, 12.4 per cent were drug addicts, and 4.2 per cent were alcoholics. Finally, the table shows that 3.8 per cent of the participants reported that their husbands had been treated for psychological illness.

Salhi_Chapters.indd Sec4155

5/7/2013 6:40:08 PM

Table 1

Socio-demographic characteristics of the sampled women. Characteristic

No.

%

335 549 549 561 467 756

10.4 17.1 17.1 17.4 14.5 23.5

Education Illiterate/Read and write Primary/Preparatory Secondary/Diploma University/Post graduate

1244 554 984 445

38.5 17.2 30.5 13.8

Marital status Married Divorced/Separated Widowed

2865 226 178

87.6 7.0 5.4

Occupation Housewife

2185

71.8

257 430 170

8.4 14.2 5.6

Age in Years