Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China 9811911142, 9789811911149

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Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China Junuguru Srinivas

Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China

Junuguru Srinivas

Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China

Junuguru Srinivas Political Science, School of Liberal Arts and Humanities Woxsen University Hyderabad, Telangana, India

ISBN 978-981-19-1114-9 ISBN 978-981-19-1115-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1115-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Dedicated to My family

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor. Prof. Anuradha M. Chenoy, whose keen supervision, able guidance, and steadfast support have made this work a success. I am incredibly grateful to her for the utmost care, and enormous trust bestowed on me. I owe solemn gratitude to all of my Center for Russian and Central Asian Studies teachers, JNU, for their solicitous nature, amicability guidance during my research, and their critical role in inculcating in me a great interest in this beautiful and dynamic area of study. Though only my name appears on the cover, many grateful people have contributed to its production. Their valuable assistance and adequate guidance have aided in completing the thesis. A special thanks to University Grant Commission (UGC) for providing Fellowship for five years and the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) for granting financial support for the field trip. I want to express my heartfelt thanks to Vera Nikolaevna, International Department, Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University (MSU), for providing accommodation at MSU hostel during the field trip in Moscow, Russia. I want to thank all the experts who have validated the field survey for my research. Professor Eugenia Vanina, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Prof. Alexander Sergunin, School of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University, Nikolai Fedorov, Associate Professor, American Studies Department, School

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University, Alexei D. Voskressenski, Dean, School of Political Affairs, Moscow University of International Relations, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ekaterina Koldunova, Associate Professor, Deputy Dean, School of Political Affairs, Senior Expert, ASEAN Centre, Moscow University of International Relations, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Andrey Sushentsov, Associate Professor, Department of Applied Analysis of International Problems, School of Political Science, Moscow University of International Relations, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Anna Kireeva, Deputy Dean, Associate Professor, Department of Asian and African Studies, School of Political Affairs, Moscow University of International Relations, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prof. Tatiana Shaumyan, Head of the Center for Indian Studies, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Prof. Aleksandra Sergeeva, Department of Political Science, Moscow State University, Institute of Asian and African Studies, Prof. Lena Kutovaya, Department of Political Science, Moscow State University, Institute of Asian and African Studies, and Liya Kravchenko, expert at Russian International Affairs Council, Member of International Political Science Association, not only for their valuable time, insightful comments, and precious suggestion but also for the tricky question which incented me to widen my research form various perspective. The validation field survey could not have been successful without their passionate participation and input. I want to express my sincere thanks to the JNU library staff and the Institute of Defense and Strategic Analysis (IDSA) library for providing exceedingly worthy materials adding enrichment. I also extend my special thanks to my friends Naresh, Sudhakar, Naveen, Kishore, Eswar, Raju, Vijay et al. I’m gratefully indebted for their contribution. Last but not least, I am pleased to express my heartfelt appreciation to all my family members, especially my mother Laxmi and father Banaiah. They are the most incredible soul of inspiration to me. Words cannot express how grateful I am to Praveen-Thriveni, Swaroopa-Rajalingu, Kavitha-Poshetti, Vamshi, Nikhil, Vaishnavi, Varshini, Hemalatha, Thoka Manishi, Navaneeth, Shreyansh, Sujatha, Swaranjali, and Rajkumar, also to my in-laws Mallaiah-Mallu Bai, Chinna Poshanna-Poshavva for their endless love, affection, support, encouragement, and motivation doing the work, a success. Finally, I must express my profound gratitude to my beloved wife, Haritha, and my dear son, for their understanding, unfailing support, continuous encouragement, patience, and unwavering

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love throughout years of studying and writing the book. This accomplishment would not have been possible without them. Having been privileged in receiving such support and sympathy, I own responsibility for all the errors or omissions that might have crept into the book.

Contents

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1

Introduction and Conceptual Framework

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The Evolution of Brics and the International System

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3

Russia and BRICS

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4

China and BRICS

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5

Russia and China in BRICS: Convergences and Divergences

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Conclusion

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Index

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About the Author

Dr. Junuguru Srinivas is currently working as an Assistant Professor in the School of Liberal Arts & Humanities, Woxsen University, Kamkole, Sadashivpet, Sangareddy, Hyderabad, Telangana. Previously Dr. Srinivas worked in the GITAM School of Humanities and Social Sciences, GITAM (Deemed to be University), Visakhapatnam, India. He got awarded Ph.D. in 2018 from the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He completed his MPhil from the same center in 2013. He did his Master’s Degree with a political science specialization in International Relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University in 2011. He presented many papers in national and international seminars in cities like New Delhi, Cuttack, Pondicherry, Russia, Canada, Turkey, and Nepal. He chaired one session at the University of Geneva (Switzerland) during the summer school in 2017. I attended the UNCTAD Summer School 2020 on Globalization and Development Strategies, jointly organized by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Institute of New Economic Thinking Young Scholars Initiative (YSI) held virtually from August 15–23, 2020. Dr. Srinivas has published articles in various national, and international UGC and SCOPUS indexed Journals, and also his book is going to be published by Palgrave Macmillan. On October 24, 2018, Dr. Srinivas organized a one-day national seminar on Indian foreign policy and UN roles. Further, Dr. Srinivas organized two Webinars recently on China and COVID-19. He did six MOOC Courses from

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

the University of London, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia, University of Hong Kong, University of New South Wales, and the University of California, US. He published articles in various reputed national, and international SCOPUS indexed Journals. Srinivas was awarded Junior Research Fellowship (JRF), conducted by UGC in International relations, 2011. He was also awarded Data Collection Fellowship from ICSSR in 2017.

Abbreviations

ABM AE APEC ASEAN AU BASIC BRIC BRICS CIS CPC CSTO EMDE EU EurAsEC FPC G-7 G-8 G-20 G-77 GDP IBRD IBSA IMF IR MD NAM

Ballistic Missile Treaty Advanced Economies Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Association of Southeast Asian Nations African Union Brazil, South Africa, India, and China Brazil, Russia, India, and China Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa Commonwealth of Independent States Communist Party of China The Collective Security Treaty Organization Emerging Markets and Developing Economies European Union The Eurasian Economic Community Foreign Policy Concept Group of Eight Countries Group of Eight Countries Group of Twenty Countries Group of Seventy-Seven Countries Gross Domestic Product International Bank for Reconstruction and Development India, Brazil, and South Africa International Monetary Fund International Relations Military Doctrine Non-Aligned Movement xv

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ABBREVIATIONS

NATO NSC OECD OSCE POCOM PPP RIC SAARC SADC SCO SIPRI SU THAAD UK UN UNSC US USA USSR WTO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Security Concept The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Pacific Command Purchasing Power Parity Russia, India, and China South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation South African Development Community Shanghai Cooperation Organization Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Soviet Union Terminal High Altitude Area Defense United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Security Council United States United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics World Trade Organization

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 2.3 Fig. 2.4

Fig. 2.5

Fig. 2.6

Fig. 4.1

Fig. 5.1

BRICS map (Source www.mapsofworld.com/.../bricscountries-map.html) Share of World population, 2018 (Source BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 2020, p. 17) Share of world territory, 2018 (Source BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 2020, p. 17) BRICS percentage share of public expenditure on education to GDP (%) (Source BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 2020, p. 82) Projected structure of the global economy (2014–2060) (Source Economic Outlook No. 95: Long-term-Baseline Projections Dataset, Organization for Economic Cooperation for Development [OECD], May 2014. The data is calculated in percentile) BRICS references to international institutions, 2008–2012, percentage share of references made (Source Larionova 2012, BRICS in the System of Global Governance, p. 42) World Bank lending to China for investment on multiple sectors (in percent) (Source The World Bank Simadatabase, data was taken till July 15, 2003 [World Bank, “Data and Statistics 2003”, 2003, http://www.worldbank.org/ data/datatopic/GDP_PPP.pdf]) Number of Materials in the Western press, by country, 2013–2014 (Source Marakhovsky [2015], ‘BRICS in the Western Media’, pg. 137)

52 54 55

57

62

67

120

179

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3

Table 2.4 Table 2.5 Table 2.6 Table 2.7 Table 2.8 Table 2.9 Table 2.10 Table 2.11 Table 2.12 Table 2.13 Table 2.14

Annual GDP growth rates of dominant countries between 1000 and 1998 The Military spending of the great powers in peacetime 1870–1913 and 1920–1938 World trade volumes of goods and services (during the global financial crisis) (annual percent change) Selected countries GDP growth rate Merchandize trade volume and real GDP, 2015–2021 (Annual percentage change) Overview of the World Economic Outlook-2021 projections Real GDP projections for 2021 and 2022 (%, year on year) Estimated foresight on polarity General information on BRICS as per data available in 2020 BRICS population, health and environment data by 2014 Selected data on the labor force of the BRICS countries Value of imports and exports of goods and commercial services (million US$) Age structure and dependency ratio of the BRICS population Inflows of FDI (million US$)

33 34

37 39 40 41 42 45 53 56 58 59 59 60

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.15 Table 2.16 Table 2.17 Table 2.18 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 3.5 Table 3.6 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 5.1 Table 5.2

Outflows of FDI (million US$) The historical and projected annual growth rate of GNP per capita, % BRICS in the World Economy for 2000–2018 (percentage of Global Indicators) Foreign exchange reserves (million US$) Russian Federation Annual GDP growth rate of 1990–1993 Russia’s total exports and share of arms exports Russian defense budget, billion USD in current prices Russia’s trade with BRICS countries from 2007–2015 (US$Billions) Russia’s trade with the BRICS members NDB financial help to the Russian Federation from 2016 to 2020 (in US $million) China’s net receipts from all donors between 1980 and 2000 (US$million) Foreign direct investment into China’s economy between 2000 and 2014 ($millions) Deconstructing China’s growth: 1950–2007 GDP rate of China, United States, and Japan since 2010 to till 2020 Share of countries in gross world product (at PPP, %) BRICS Priorities in 2008–2012, percentage share of subjects UN peacekeeping forces

60 61 61 61 81 86 86 94 95 96 118 119 121 123 132 166 171

CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Conceptual Framework

Introduction Over the last three decades, the global economy has been transformed with several countries like Brazil, India, China, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa in the post-globalization era. Countries in the European Union (EU) have faced stagnation and recession, while several southern countries have shown high growth and economic development levels. Russia leveraged its oil sales and export of weapons to induce its transition following the Soviet disintegration of 1991. The fast-growing economies of China, India, and Brazil have stood out and have accelerated their growth. This trend catalyzed several changes within the international system. Following the end of the Cold War1 between the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and America in the mid-twentieth century, the United States of America (USA) emerged as a dominating player in international politics. It faced political resistance from Russia and China, who sought to construct a new economic structure of several global powers. It has resulted in what is termed as a ‘multipolar’2 political and economic

1 It can be termed as war of ideology started after the end of World War II between USSR and the United States and continued till the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991. 2 Having or relating to multiple powers at the same time.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 J. Srinivas, Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1115-6_1

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system, challenging the earlier ‘bipolar’ model that was based on a duality between the East and the West. Despite an economic crisis in the traditional Superpower countries, which include the EU and the United States, have continued to hegemonize international forums and institutions around the world, for instance, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the G-8,3 and G-20,4 which were largely West-dominated. It has led to the need for new formations, and the ‘BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)5 was thus conceptualized and established in 2009. The aim of BRICS was evident at the outset: the reform of the international financial and political system through such a parallel new forum (First BRIC Summit declaration 2009). In a 2014 meeting at the Brazil Summit, BRICS took essential steps to create an ‘Infrastructural and new development bank’6 (Fortaleza BRICS Summit declaration 2014). Russia and China had a particular interest in BRICS, mainly because they believed it would differ from the G-8 and G-777 groups. It provided them with the opportunity to take positions that could help to enhance both Russian and Chinese foreign policy interests in international relations.

3 It was established in 1975 with six members. It is a group of highly industrialized countries. The group consists of UK, United States, France, Germany, Canada, Japan, and Russia. However, Russia withdrew its membership from the G-8. 4 The group G-20 was formed in 1999. It is an international forum that brings together the world’s industrialized and emerging economies, and consists of 85 percent of the world’s GDP and two-thirds of the global population. 5 It was formed in 2009 in Yekaterinburg, Russia. Earlier, it was known as BRIC before South Africa became a member. 6 The process of establishing BRICS new development bank started in 2012 New Delhi BRICS summit and it was materialized in 2014 BRICS Fortaleza summit and established formally in 2015 with authorized capital of US$100 billion. But, the initial capital shall be US$50 billion equally shared by all its founding members. The basic objective of the BRICS new development is to provide infrastructure and sustainable developmental aid to the BRICS countries and other emerging countries as well. 7 It was established in 1964, on June 15, by 77 developing countries. These countries are the signatories of the ‘Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries,’ issued at the end of the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva, abbreviated as UNCTAD.

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Background The disintegration of the Soviet Union (SU) in 1991 is considered a watershed moment in contemporary world politics. It paved the way for the end of the Cold War and triggered a unipolar8 moment in international politics under the US hegemony. The United States became the sole Superpower in global politics within every domain—military, economic, and socio-cultural. While it signaled an end to bloc politics, it unchained many Third World countries from the constraints imposed by the Cold War and gave these countries the scope to exercise autonomy within foreign policies. With rapid economic growth, expanding international trade, and technological revolutions, the world order became more complex, and interdependence and inter-connectedness deepened. While the United States remains highly powerful, alternate power centers have emerged to contribute to world politics significantly. The equation between these power centers came closest to the system of multiple powers, unlike the bipolar dominance during the Cold War period that had characteristics of ‘Pax Americana and Sovietica.’ Wohlforth (1999) remarked that even the nineteenth-century Victorian period was not just ‘Pax Britannica,’ but from 1815 to 1853, it was ‘Pax Britannica et Russia.’ From 1853 to 1871, there was no concept of ‘pax.’ Between 1871 and 1914, it was ‘Pax Britannica et Germanica.’ In other words, several states were powerful and balanced each other out and vied for retaining and expanding their colonies. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the structure of the international system has been continuously changing with multiple dimensions. The current world is highly interconnected. There are various sources of interaction between states, businesses, and people. In such a scenario, a single actor cannot achieve the long-term goals of sustainable economic development and make it the winner of global politics because diverse resources and competencies play a crucial role in becoming a global actor. That is the way countries will go for a collaborative mood with other like-minded states to enhance their position in international relations collectively.

8 Having or relating to single pole or kind of polarity.

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Regionalization and Decentralization A severe political clash between the Eastern bloc (led by USSR) and the Western bloc (led by the United States) created a bipolar world order in a post-Cold War atmosphere. The ‘Bipolar System,’ also emerging out of two ideological extremities defined by these two polar power centers, was a phenomenon based on what is known as a ‘Eurocentric’ vision (Waltz 1993). During this phase, the global south solidarity emerged with the evolution of the Non-Alignment Movement. After decolonization and solidarity groupings like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the rise of the global south led to a contestation through independent positions. Because of this, the military role has been depleted despite the peak of the bipolar interpretation of the world. This Cold War of ideology partially ended only with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. The end of the bipolar system of international relations started transiting toward a new approach in world affairs. The drive to retain Western hegemony continued as well. It has also led to the rise of the regionalization of global politics. With a growing localization and regionalism in international politics from 1991 onwards, functional theorists like David Mitrany and K. Deutsch (1957) formulated a theory of ‘integration,’ which they described, would be the basis for regulating normative world politics in the times to come. They argued that: An increasing role and influence of international organizations and agencies will ensure stronger international ties and interdependence.

As mentioned above, the states that establish strong relations with other like-minded states also benefit both countries. It has been reflected in post-Cold War period international relations. Prof. Tatiana Shaumyan (2017), Head of the Center for Indian Studies, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, stated that the process of integration of the world started in the twenty-first century. From then onwards, many countries form regional, inter-regional, and global groups for mutual benefits. They integrate with the world to share their concerns on a common platform for urgent solutions. Therefore, Russia is also participating in the change and accepting the changing trend of world politics.

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The best example is the BRICS. The BRICS group countries are considered to be the largest emerging markets in contemporary international relations. The BRICS is gradually taking a geopolitical role that stimulates a global shift in international relations power politics (Sheresheva 2020). Apart from that, southern world countries like China, India, Brazil, and several others have played a significant role in international relations. These countries have been cooperating and taking positions on many global issues. In the process, these countries have been actively cooperating in international relations. With this trend, the world has become more integrated and interconnected. According to Ivanov (2013), the world has shifted toward more interdependence during the last twenty years. In this global integration process, the modern world transformed extensively, and international relations accelerated so rapidly that global culture, societal, scientific, and political developments significantly impacted. Currently, it is possible to say that no country is so strong in the present world that it is more self-sufficient than any other or that it can solve all its problems on its own. The isolationism once practiced by numerous countries is now seen as a dead-end. The consequences of such a non-inclusive approach could lead a nation to stagnation, backwardness, or inevitable decline. In this context, Russia undertook a mission to initiate and support a multilateral dialogue of cultures, civilizations, and states in international relations to enhance Russia’s relations. Russia took this initiative due to various historical and sociological reasons. Karaganov (2016) observed that while economic, scientific, and technological factors massively influence world politics, regional and global power politics also greatly influence. We are witnessing today the rapid expansion of international relations. In the process, Russia and China have also played a significant role in transforming global politics. This is why it is essential to contextualize Russian and Chinese foreign policy within the BRICS, with a relatively high level of strength and stake. The reason for Russia and China is their participation and involvement in surfacing the global south voice in international relations because they have a chequered history with the Western world. Putin on October 24, 2014, at Sochi (Russia), while speaking at the ‘Meeting of the International Discussion, Valdai, said the following:

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Fundamental changes are occurring in international affairs, with an increasing loss of control. The numerous changes mean we need a new global consensus of responsible forces. Thus, it should be possible to rule out any local deal or division of spheres in classical diplomacy’s spirit and anybody’s complete domination over that consensus. One more reason for this is the strengthening and growth of individual regions on the planet. This gives rise to an objective need to institutionalize such extreme poles, create a powerful regional organization, and develop the rules on their interaction. Cooperation between such centers would be a serious factor of stability in global security, politics, and economics.

This trend symbolized SCO,9 IBSA,10 BASIC,11 BRICS, etc. Kirabaev (2015) stated that the member countries in these groups were previously referred to as ‘peripheral’ and had begun to move to the fore. The ‘code of behavior’ within the international relations sphere had acquired new positive trends and had retreated from traditional biased norms. Kirabaev (2015) also observes that regionalism and regional integration accompany globalization, which became a significant force for the emergence of macro-regions in various corners of the world. Further, it managed to blur the categories between macro-regions and sub-regions as the economic, social, and humanitarian contact between them developed considerably. In this way, states became an integral space. It is understood that states cooperation is the main instrument to ensure political stability, security, economic growth, and social and cultural development (ibid.). While in earlier political history, control was usually sought through the use of colonial force, such as in Europe, for example, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (De Ouro-Preto 2013). Therefore, the time has come for seeing the world in a multidimensional way. Hence, there is the need for a multipolar world order in an increasingly globalized world following the Cold War of the 1980s. It has led to laws being created for closer integration of economies to facilitate the entry 9 SCO is an inter-governmental organization, established in 2001, and consisting of six members, which includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. It is a political, economic, and military alliance of these countries. 10 IBSA is a coordinating mechanism among three emerging multi-ethnic and multicultural democracies. These are India, Brazil, and South Africa. It was established in June 2003. 11 BASIC consists of Brazil, South Africa, India, and China. The unity of these countries came together during the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in 2009.

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of capital and technology (Rozanova 2003). However, not that it had given negative consequences. But, Hirono (2010) argues that globalization has both positive and negative effects. On the one hand, there has been an improved global economic growth and structure, be it industrial, developmental, or transitional. On the other hand, the benefits of globalization have not been universal. Have benefited a few countries and has concentrated capital in the hands of fewer people than ever before. Notably, unprecedented changes occurred in the global south countries because of globalization. Further, the narrative that has dominated international relations over the years is Realpolitik.12 There is a greater emphasis on capital and material wealth with the advent of globalization and capitalism in the 1990s. It was also the period that saw the end of the Soviet dissolution when a fierce war on terror began—through counterinsurgency struggles in the early 2000s (Wohlforth 2015). During this period, growth was reflected in economies such as maritime, cyber, and other domains. Some emerging and developing economies like China, India, and others gained and not traditional economies. The emergence of such environments and sub-cultures from the margins of the world’s economy led scholars like Fareed Zakaria to term the phenomenon the ‘Rise of the Rest’ (Zakaria 2008). In this instance, by the mid-2000s, China joined approximately 66 international organizations, whereas France joined nearly 92. The United States and the UK joined 77, Russia joined 71, and India joined 61 (Xu and Cai 2007). And yet, traditional scholars claimed that emerging countries did not have adequate strength in the older global institutions. In contrast, new scholars like Srikanth Kondapalli and Priyanka Pandith (2016: 5) argue that emerging economies have merely not been able to put forward a cohesive, comprehensive, and universally acceptable international and regional order but also started playing a significant role in emerging international relations. That is why scholar Zhang Maorong (2011) defended establishing the BRICS countries in international relations. Maorong says that when the BRICS were trying to upgrade their economic profile, the US-led Western powers registered negative consequences in the global framework due to 12 Realpolitik is about material wealth, with a greater emphasis on capital in the economy, rather than ideology, and its relationship with legitimacy, influence, and authority. In a realpolitik discourse, these material aspects combine together in order to achieve desired outcomes.

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their financial crisis affecting these emerging economies nations. International institutions also failed to stand by the emerging nations when needed help. This was why a new group such as the BRICS was crucially needed to be formed to sustain itself, i.e., Global South countries. Thus, the formation of BRICS at Yekaterinburg in 2009 received worldwide attention. Nikolai Kodorov (2017) stated that: The BRICS is a forum of regional powers, pretending for a more significant role in world politics to bring change in global governance, “alternative” to G7.

The demand for a more democratic international order and a just and equitable representation in global institutions intensified within such a context. It led to the emergence of BRICS as a robust forum. In this process, southern countries have been forming regional and inter-regional groups to ensure their interests collectively. The quintessential groups include BRICS, BASIC, RIC (Russia, India, China), and IBSA. Among all these groups, BRICS is the most prominent because of its transcontinental nature and the scope of the multilateral work that it can carry out. Thus, BRICS displays a critical paradigm shift in world politics. Cox (2012) says that the clout of the Western world in international relations is now being sapped of its power rapidly. The southern world has been rising since the early twenty-first century, which the BRICS group is replacing. BRICS collectively defends the reform of global institutions in promoting their economic and political interests (De Ouro-Preto 2013). Therefore, the Western world regularly negates the rise of the BRICS group in international politics. However, apart from that, the West was forming policies to destabilize the BRICS global role. One such policy was former US President Obama’s strategy for rebalancing Asia.

Obama’s Pivot Asia: Seizing Global Security Russia and China came together to intensify their strategic cooperation over the period, notably after President Obama issued the ‘Pivot Asia’13 strategy in 2011. After the United State’s rebalancing strategy, the United States deployed 360,000 military personnel under the ‘Pacific 13 The Pivot Asia strategy was the United State’s attempt to seize security around several Asia Pacific region initiated by the then US president Barak Obama in 2011.

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Command’ (PACOM). The POCOM positioned 200 ships, including five aircraft carrier strike groups (Aneja 2014). Further, China’s 2020 research report on the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region says that the United States has deployed 375,000 enlisted members of its Indo-Pacific Command, 60 percent of the US Navy ships, 55 percent of its Army, and two-thirds of its Marine Corps. And with 85,000 forward-deployed soldiers and a large amount of high-tech and new weaponry. The report says that the US military has maintained its absolute supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region over the years, considering the growth of China and Russia’s military strength (Xuanzun 2020). Therefore, Russia and China have sought support from other southern world countries like India and Brazil and mulled over establishing a new collective security system and arrangement (Aneja 2014). The best opportunity for them in this regard seemed like it was going to be through BRICS. The question now arises: how can Russia and China cooperate in changing security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region to compete with the USA’s Asia pivot strategy? With whom else can Russia and China focus the most on their worldly affairs? Even if they go along with southern countries focusing on multipolarity, they have ever contending objections on many global and regional issues. At the same time, how would they receive highly competing powers like India, Brazil, Japan, and some other states to play a vital role in global affairs? And how would they promote the group of BRICS as their tool to constrain a Western hegemonic order? And lastly, do they have the intention to make the BRICS group more secure? The book will examine some of these questions.

Rise of BRICS Each BRICS countries have its own civilizations place and cultural matrix, its view on development and security in international relations. However, all the five BRICS countries cooperate across the old dividing lines: East–West or North–South. The BRICS collaboration reflects the ‘concert of civilizations’ than the ‘clash of civilizations’ (Observer Research Foundation 2017: 68).14

14 Observer Reseaarch Foundation (2017), Realizing the BRICS long-term goals: Road-maps and pathways, A proposal by the BRICS Think Tanks Council, https:// www.nkibrics.ru/system/asset_publications/data/595a/0f00/6272/6948/82d5/0000/ original/Realizing_the_BRICS_Long-Term_Goals._Road-Maps_and_Pathways._A_prop osal_by_the_BRICS_Think_Tanks_Council..pdf?1499074302.

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The political shaping of BRICS begun as early as 2006 during the UN General Assembly Session in New York, United States. It was the first of a series of high-level meetings among BRICS countries. Since then, BRICS has evolved into a multilateral grouping. The first cooperation among the BRICS group countries started with deputy ministers and heads of government agencies. The BRIC acronym was first created by the Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill in 2001 while projecting the growth rate of these countries. He foresaw these countries to have the potential to overtake other developed countries. O’Neill argued that the West should shift their economic policies toward the BRIC countries region, as these countries would have safety for advanced countries’ investments (O’Neill 2001). Furthermore, the World Bank report ‘World Development Indicators’ of 2021 claimed that China became the second-largest global economy, India became the sixth largest global economy, Russia became the eleventh largest global economy, and Brazil became the twelfth largest global economy. South Africa became the thirty-ninth largest economy (World Bank 2021). And that the BRICS countries have 43.03 percent of the world’s population, 18 percent of the nominal GDP, 25 percent of the GDP per capita, 25.91 percent of the planet’s land area (Reis 2013). Russian President Putin was the first person to take the initiative to propel this group into a political group and coordinate the group to work toward more democratic world order, with the multipolarity concept in international relations (Akulov 2012). The first Summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009 (Mielniczuk 2013). South Africa became an official member of BRICS during the Sanya Summit (Yan 2011). The tradition to hold an annual summit had been started in the year 2009. Every Summit took place with a specific theme and mainly stressed the prevailing global problems and lacunae in the international system. Since then, there have been eight summits held so far. (The thematic explanation of each Summit has been given below.) The first Summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009. The second Summit was held in Brasilia, Brazil, in 2010, and the Third Summit was held in Sanya, China, in 2011. During Sanya Summit, South Africa officially became a member of the BRIC, and since then, the BRIC has become BRICS. Likewise, the fourth Summit was held in New Delhi, India. The fifth Summit was held in Durban, South Africa, in 2013. The sixth Summit was held in Fortaleza, Brazil, in 2014. The Seventh Summit was held in Ufa, Russia, in 2015, and the eighth BRICS summit at Goa in 2016. The ninth BRICS

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summit took place in Xiamen in 2017, China. The tenth BRICS summit was held in Johannesburg in 2018, South Africa. The eleventh BRICS summit took place in Brasilia in 2019, Brazil, and the twelfth BRICS summit was supposed to be held in Russia in 2020 due to the Covid-19, but it got postponed and held in virtual mode. The thirteenth BRICS summit happened in New Delhi, India. During the 63rd UN General Assembly convened in 2008, the then Brazilian president Lula Da Silva stated that Southern world countries have stepped up their efforts to design a multipolar world order, such as India, Brazil, and South African initiatives. The BRIC countries asserted the alliances with the traditional developed world and stressed that there would be no competition between the North and South over global order (Lula Da Silva 2008). As far as current trends in the East and West’s relations are concerned, they are always in a problem with one or the other. Nonetheless, change is inevitable, and BRICS will remain a balancing factor for future international relations between the southern and Western world (Grace Guerrero 2011). On the one hand, BRICS plays the role of a united forum for resistance against Western control. On the other hand, BRICS was a beacon for Russian and Chinese foreign policy interests. Every year, the BRICS meetings discuss new and existing global issues. For instance, in 2012, in New Delhi, the theme of the meeting was ‘BRICS Partnership for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity,’ dealing with the Iranian Nuclear issue and Afghanistan (Ministry of External Affairs of India 2012). In the Durban Summit in South Africa in 2013, for instance, BRICS declared that the international community should reject further militarization of Syria because the problem could be resolved through formal dialogues (Department of International Relations and Cooperation South Africa 2013). The recently held UN resolutions on the Ukraine crisis to condemn Russian aggression on Ukraine and siege the military operations, China and India abstained from all the voting. It indicated that both China and India took positive neutrality. Furthermore, BRICS countries started focusing on strategic affairs too. Combating terrorism became one of the most critical issues. This was intensified at the Goa summit, held in 2016 (Goa Summit Declaration 2016). In this regard, on September 4, 2016, at the sidelines meeting of the G-20 Hangzhou, the Russian foreign ministry stated that BRICS countries had underlined the importance of further strategic cooperation in the union. The Russian ministry also said that BRICS leaders

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exchanged views on a wide range of important issues concerning global politics, security, economics, and global management, all of common concern. Further, it is stated that strategic cooperation is based on openness, solidarity, equality, mutual understanding, inclusivity, and collaboration (Guneev 2016). Likewise, on February 23, 2017, China’s state councilor Yang Jiechi stated that the September 2017 BRICS summit would be about a strengthened partnership. That is, ‘BRICS: Stronger Partnership for Brighter Future. He also said that the objective of the Summit that China will focus on four aspects, which include, strengthening of solidarity and collaboration among BRICS members, the improving of global governance, deepening pragmatic cooperation to achieve mutual benefit, increasing the number of people-to-people exchanges, the enhancing of public support, and the strengthening of institutional mechanism and improving collaborative platform (The State Council, the Republic of China on February 24, 2017). The BRICS can be instrumental in shaping global governance while filling the gaps. It includes reforming the multilateral international institutions as there is a lot of hiatus between the developed and developing countries. Further, there is a lack of coordination between the regional institutions like trading blocks, regional development banks, and regional financing arrangements. There is no such mechanism in the global governance system at present. Further, there is an acute need to expand reserve currencies available in the global economy (Lissovolik 2020). For this, the BRICS have a more prominent role to play as a balancing role in reforming the ill-formed present international institutions. Further, the Covid-19 pandemic severely damaged the liberal global order. The majority of the countries have taken unilateral decisions to contain the virus. Many Western organizations failed to bring the collective fight on the common problem of the Covid-19. However, scholar Suslov (2020) stated that the BRICS played a constructive role during the pandemic. The critical point is that India and China also tried hard to keep the antagonistic attitude aside. Another crucial aspect of the BRICS is that no BRICS members cross redlines of the group principles. For instance, due to the different views on the Venezuela incidents in 2019 and Brazil’s continental leadership ambitions, the Venezuela issue was left out of the BRICS final declarations. That is how India and China border disputes also have no place to be part of the BRICS discussions (Panova 2021). It indicates that the bilateral contradictions may not hinder the progress of the BRICS group. The BRICS group members signal that they do not want to go away from the BRICS group.

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Chinese Perspective on BRICS: Institutional, Not Oppositional The Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (2011), while responding to questions from a reporter, claimed that the BRICS cooperation is open and very inclusive and that the critical aspect of the group is that it would cement North–South cooperation (Consulate General of the Peoples Republic of China in San Francisco 2011). Further, a Chinese foreign ministry affiliated think tank affirmed that ‘BRICS is an ad-hoc political group and is not an anti-US bloc’ (Gordon 2011). While giving a written answer to the media on March 28, 2012, the Chinese president Hu Jintao stated that the ‘BRICS group is the defender and promoter of the southern world countries in the coming period’ (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Republic of India 2012), BRICS has very prominence position in Chinese foreign policy as it can diversify economic development goals with other major developing countries. Further, China would bolster its relations with these countries, unlike earlier periods (Yue 2013). According to Li Lianmin (2014), a research fellow of Russian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social sciences, BRICS should become a strategic cooperative mechanism of greater binding power among developing countries (Xinhua 2014). Scholar Cheng (2015) observed that after the Cold War, the international relations system power was configured by one superpower country and several major powers. However, the global combat of terrorism and the 2008–2009 financial crisis had reduced the predominance of the United States in international relations. Further, the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq had proved too costly to handle. So it is in this context the role of BRICS has been defining factor of emerging international relations due to its global approach. Hence China would like to use the BRICS platform to enhance its position in world politics as all the countries share similar views of global politics. While meeting with BRICS foreign ministers, China president Xi Jinping on June 19, 2017, argued that the BRICS countries should push forward with international order to develop in more fair and global demand. And Xi prompted them to call for joint efforts to create a new golden decade for the BRICS bloc (An Baijie et al. 2017). Further, China is mulling to expand the BRICS group and make it more ‘BRICS Plus’ for greater South-South cooperation. Because, on March 8, 2017, foreign minister of China, Wang Yi, during the press conference for the fifth session of the 12th national

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People’s Congress at the Beijing, China, ‘BRICS countries are like five fingers, short and long if extended, but a mighty fist if clenched together.’ During this, Yi underscored the point that China would work with other members of the BRICS to make it ‘BRICS Plus’ for world peace and development (Huaxia 2017). However, the critical part of China’s intention to make the BRICS as ‘BRICS Plus,’ is consideration of the other major powers of the group. Notably, India and Brazil. Otherwise, the future of the BRICS will be a question mark. With this trend, BRICS has played a positive role in Chinese foreign policy objectives. However, Ukraine crisis-like incidents will have a more significant impact on the BRICS progress. Because one of the critical players of the BRICS, Russia, is directly involved in the crisis. Therefore, it is tough for the BRICS members to stand and take positions.

Russian Perspective: Self-Adoption of BRICS Model Russia believes that its national government would eventually adapt to the new system of global governance that BRICS also upholds. It would ultimately contribute to making global institutions like the IMF, World Bank, WTO15 (World Trade Organization), UNSC16 (United Nations Security Council), as well as the international financial system more fair, stable, and efficient (Toloraya 2014). According to the new Russian Foreign Policy Concept (2013), Russia attaches excellent prominence to the sustainable manageability of global governance. For that, collective leadership by the central states of the world is required. This, in turn, should be represented in geopolitical and civilizational terms. Scholars Aleksandra Sergeeva (2017) and Lena Kutovaya (2017) of the Institute of Asian and African Studies said that the Russian foreign ministry has a separate department dealing with BRICS affairs. That shows how much importance that Russia is giving to BRICS in its foreign policy framework.

15 It was established on January 1, 1995, comprising of 160 members. The purpose of the WTO is to regulate international trade. 16 It is a UN body comprising of 15 members in it. Out of the 15 members, five members have permanent membership and the remaining 10 countries have changing membership after every 2 years.

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Furthermore, Alexei D. Voskressenski (2017), Dean, School of Political Affairs, Moscow University of International Relations, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, believed that; Russia has the alternate platform to stress upon its global reach. With this kind of fora Russia builds it relations with emerging nations in global politics. However, that does not mean that BRICS completely negates the existing world order. However, trying to make it a more democratic, representative, innovative and pragmatic world order. Due to these objectives of BRICS Russia’s objectives will also be fulfilled its global affairs objectives.

And, ‘The Concept of participation of the Russian federation in BRICS 2013,’ which is based on a new Russian federation constitution, regarded that: ‘The establishment of BRICS reflects an objective trend in global development, one towards the formation of a polycentric system of international relations. This one is increasingly characterized by the use of non-institutionalized global governance mechanisms, network-based diplomacy, and growing economic interdependence of states.’ The BRICS group can influence Russia to extend its foreign policy multi-directional to expand language, culture, and information. Thus, that BRICS challenges the Western world’s hegemonic power. Again, scholar Aleksandra Sergeeva (2017) and Lena Kutovaya (2017) of Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University stated, RIC led to the establishment of the BRICS forum. BRICS has a larger perspective and scope in present world politics. It is a unique association for Russia’s foreign policy. It is a reflection of the objective reality of Russian foreign policy. BRICS is trying to implement its decisions in international relations. However, it focuses on cultural, social, and humanitarian aspects. So, Russia will have a global role with it.

Another scholar Tatiana Shaumyan (2017), Head of the Center for Indian Studies, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, argued that: According to the lens of Lenin, the future of humanity belongs to Russia, China, and India. The process of world integration is essential in present global politics for solving common social, economic, political, and security issues. The RIC forum paved the way for establishing BRICS. Every year, BRICS importance is growing due to its global representation. BRICS is

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trying to bring regional and international issues to the mainstream level. With this trend of BRICS, can Russia have space to build close relations with these countries?

Scholar Ekaterina Koldunova (2017), Associate Professor, Deputy Dean, School of Political Affairs, Senior Expert, ASEAN Centre, Moscow University of International Relations, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, believes that ‘Russia is the only country which is gradually trying to make BRICS as a center of new global political clout.’ However, the Ukraine crisis will be a game-changer in emerging international relations. The situation will have more considerable repercussions. The Post pandemic world is threatened by oodles of traditional and non-traditional security forces. The NATO’s resources have been exhausted. The developed world is indeed at a phase where the idea of war saturates. The Ukraine crisis indicated that NATO has some limitations. Thus, the securitization of BRICS seems to be inevitable along with the BRICS Bank to defend the interest of developing countries. However, many of the Russian scholars were ambivalent about this idea; for example, Scholar Nikolai Fedorov (2017) of St. Petersburg State University stated that, Russia needs new partners in the sphere of international security. Cooperation with India, Brazil, and South Africa is possible, but only in fields where all BRICS states have consensus (e.g., struggle with international terrorism, piracy etc.

Similarly, Professor Tatiana Shaumyan (2017), opined that when it comes to the institutionalization of BRICS, it is not sure how Russia can coordinate with other group members. Because India, Brazil, and South Africa, as all these countries, have different opinions on BRICS’s global security role. However, scholar Deich (2013) argued that: ‘During the past decade, Western countries have been curtailing their participation in the UN peacekeeping/peacemaking operations, with the consequent niche being filled by the rising states, including BRICS, which tends to take the lead in these activities. But,’ Aleksandra Sergeeva (2017) and Lena Kutovaya (2017) observed that Russia might not make BRICS a NATO. However, it stresses upon BRICS global security role. BRICS is improving upon its UN peacekeeping measures and reducing Western control daily. Thus, BRICS’s next step should be in thinking about how

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systems in the southern countries could be resolved without any intervention from the Western world. Further, the evolution of the BRICS also caused for promotion of the multipolarity concept in international relations.

Multipolarity: Russian and Chinese Perspectives Multipolarity was conceptualized in Russia in 1993 (Ambrosio 2007) when the first foreign minister of the new federation, Andrei Kozyrev (1994) said that the twenty-first century would not be going toward ‘Pax Americana’ but toward multilateralism. Likewise, former Russian president Boris Yeltsin argued (1997): We are for a multipolar world… where there is no diktat by any single country. Let the US be one pole, Russia another, Asia, Europe, and several other poles. This is the base for the world to stand on and ensure common security.

There are several reasons why Russia’s proposal for a ‘multipolar’ world order emerged. The expansion of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), its consequent isolation of Russia and China, and its attempts to create threat and insecurity were probably the first triggers. But the US attacks on many of Russia’s allies, like on Afghanistan and Iraq, besides NATO’s war with Yugoslavia, and the overt attempt by the United States to gain clout in the southern region fueled the need for multipolarity further. America’s plans for a missile defense system were opposed by both Russia and China (Ambrosio 2007). These incidents made Russia build alternative power centers in global politics so that Russia could constrain the West’s influence on Russia and in international politics. Jiang Zemin, the then-China president, officially incorporated multipolarity (duojishijie) into Chinese foreign policy during the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1992. This supported China’s stance that a fair, just, and peaceful world was possible only through multipolarity (Lo 2008). In 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Boris Yeltsin released a ‘Joint Declaration on Multipolar World and the Formation of a New International Order’ (Lo 2002). Since then, the efforts of these two countries have been to construct a new world order continuously. In 2000, Russia incorporated multipolarity in its foreign policy. ‘Russia has two things to focus on now, strengthening a

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political and economic situation of it … and multilateral governance in the international system. It would strive to create a multipolar world order’ (National Security Concept of Russian Federation 2000). Since Jiang’s leadership, Chinese foreign policy has acknowledged that a singular and unchecked superpower can be very dangerous, as exemplified by the US invasion of Iraq without any UN sanction and the US/NATO actions in Kosovo (Grace Guerrero 2011). The China–Russia 1997 Joint Statement strongly emphasized that a fair and just society could only be possible in a multipolar world and not in a unipolar one. Furthermore, on March 26, 2007, Putin said during the opening ceremony of the year of China in Russia that Russia and China both share several positions in the international arena and are driven by the same goals. ‘Our efforts are to maintain and strengthen the principles of the multipolar setup to preserve the strategic balance in the world’ (Kremlin 2007). Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov (2012), wrote an article titled ‘International Affairs’ and underlined that the BRICS country’s influence stems from Russian and Chinese inclusion in the UN Security Council. And also, all its remaining members of the BRICS group are the members of the leading international organizations and entities such as the United Nations, G-20, the Non-Alignment, and the group of 77. At the same time, these countries are also key players in critical regional organizations. Russia is a member of CIS,17 CSTO,18 and the

17 It is an abbreviation of Commonwealth of Independent Countries, formed in December 1991 consisting of ten former Soviet Union republics. 18 It is an abbreviation of Collective Security Treaty Organization. It was a group of countries established on May 15, 1992, by former Soviet Union republics to strengthen their political authority and positions at the international sphere, and also to provide stability and security on the international and regional levels.

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EurAsEC.19 Russia and China are members of the SCO and APEC. Likewise, Brazil is a member of the AU20 and SADC21 ; India is a member of SAARC22 and SCO. Russia cooperated with many states like China, Brazil, and India. So, again, President Putin, at the G-20 meeting on September 6, 2013, in Saint Petersburg, at the sideline meeting, while mentioning the importance of the Eurasian Union, claimed that a multipolar world emerges soon. Thus, Russia’s foreign policy principle promotes multipolarity in international relations to benefit from a great power status or superpower status country. However, Russia has been emphasizing China’s partnership in its objective, thinking that China historically is more critical of the existing global order than Russia. The frequency of Russia–China state officials is higher than any other country globally. Later, on January 28, 2014, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cheng Guoping and Russian Ambassador to China Andrey Denisov jointly held a press conference. During the meeting, both the leaders stressed that China and Russia should develop strategic cooperation in bilateral cooperation and enhance the interaction in the practical sphere. They must also cooperate in ensuring peace, stability, and the creation of multipolar world order. These countries propelled themselves to establish regional and inter-regional groups to foster their relations. Groups like SCO, BRICS, RIC,23 and BASIC are prominent and influential groups in present world affairs. But the evolution of BRICS has made the idea of a multipolar world order more engaging due to its growing clout in world affairs.

19 The Eurasian Economic Community was established by the Russian Federation in its post Soviet space, in order to create economic to integration. 20 It is an abbreviation of Africa Union, established in on May 25, 1963, by 32 African countries at the Addis Ababa, and Ethiopia immediately after getting independence. 21 It is an abbreviation of the Southern African Development Community, a regional economic community consisting of 15 member states. The SADC was established in 1992. 22 It is an abbreviation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, established on 8 December, 1985, by the South Asian countries and comprising of 8 countries. 23 RIC is an abbreviation of Russia, India, and China. It advocates creating new types of international relations based on principles of the United Nations Charter and developing a multipolar world.

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Russian and Chinese Foreign Policy, a New Vision and Scope Historically, Russia has had to fight various wars to remain a great power in international relations. Again, right after the Soviet disintegration, Russia’s power capability declined substantially. It lost one-sixth of its territory, its economy shrank by around fifty percent, and the state was divided by influential individuals (Wallander 2003; Tsygankov 2010). Three essential security documents of the Russian Federation originated in the 1990s. They are National Security Concept (NSC),24 Foreign Policy Concept (FPC),25 and Military Doctrine (MD),26 which cued that Russia was to emerge as a great power and crucial actor country in the international arena (De Haas 2010). But, Russia was sidelined throughout the entire period of the last decade of the twentieth century. The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (2000) declared: Several states are stepping up efforts to weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily, and in other ways. Attempts to ignore Russia’s interests when resolving significant issues in international relations, including conflict situations, can undermine global security and stability and inhibit the positive changes occurring in international relations.

After the Yugoslavian breakup and conflict,27 Russian policymakers changed their policy structure significantly. Russia and China settled their long-standing border issue of 4300 km (De Haas 2010). Further, a more pragmatic and assertive foreign policy emerged since Putin’s reign. Putin emphasized southern world countries like China, India, and Iran through political, economic, and military tools, especially ‘pariah’ states like North Korea and Cuba (ibid.). The Russian Constitution clearly stated that it 24 It is a systematic view on how to secure the individual, society and the state against external and internal threats in every sphere of national life in the Russian federation. 25 It provides a systematic vision of the basic principles, priority areas, goals and objectives of the Russian federation foreign policy. It is formed on the basis of the Russian constitution. 26 The military doctrine of the Russian federation contains the main provisions of the military policy and of military economic support for a defense of the state based on the analysis of military risks and military threats facing by the Russian federation. 27 NATO bombarded Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999, against the ethnic cleansing launched by Serbian forces. It was against the interests of Russian federation.

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was ‘reviving the sovereign statehood of Russian federation and asserting the firmness of its democratic basis of world politics’ (Russian Federation Constitution 1993). In August 2008, when Russian forces invaded and occupied large parts of Georgia, Russia gave the impression to the international community that it was back as a powerful country (De Haas 2010). The foreign policy of Medvedev also underscored that their primary focus would be the Troika states, i.e., India and China. Russia became more powerful in the later part of Putin’s regime in the Kremlin. At the same time, the Arab crisis, the predominantly Syrian crisis,28 Iran’s nuclear issues, and the Ukraine crisis29 plunged Russian and Western relations to the nadir level (Akulov 2013a). Likewise, the rise of China as a great power with huge ambitions had started since World War II, after the collapse of Germany and Russia (Robinson and Shambaugh 1994). But throughout the history of the Cold War period, China was in search of its destiny with several internal and external problems and remained a mere supporter of the USSR till the early 1960s. However, China’s foreign policy was changed after the USSR demolition in 1991. In 1991, Qian Qichen stated that Chinese foreign policy would be guided by five principles: non-aligned movement, mutual respect for sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference, equality, and peaceful coexistence. Later, over some time, China emerged as a robust global economy. With the rise of the Chinese economy, China’s emergence as a significant economic, political, and military power is now a reality due to 28 The wave of Arab unrest that began with Tunisian revolution reached Syria on March 15, 2011. It kick started on April 29 of town of DAARA by a group of 13 years old boys, wrote on the side of the school ‘the government must go.’ This sparked for democracy revolution in Syrian. Since then Syria has become a battleground for enormous rebel groups and for global powers as well. 29 The conundrum begin in 2013 when Ukraine president Viktor Yanukovych withdrew its government plans to be closest trade ties with the European Union. It can be considered as the one of the worst ever crisis after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in Ukraine. The crisis was due to paucity of policies in solving the forty five million people multiple identities in Ukraine. The peace process jeopardized when Crimean parliament voted for joining in Russian federation. Russia and EU blaming each other for the escalation of the crisis, both have the different views for the issue. EU wants expand NATO’s membership as so that could bolster its strength if war like situation comes between West and Russia, where as Russia intends to hinder their policies. For Russia Ukraine is their legitimate territory. So, it is very intriguing phase in West-Russia relations.

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its economic, military, and political clout (Zhu 2008). However, recent trends in US foreign policy compelled China and Russia to re-check their military expenditure and foreign policy objectives and aspirations. The US encirclement of the Eurasian region, coupled with the NATO expansion toward legitimate Russian territory, and the ‘Asia pivot,’ or the re-balance of Asian strategy to counter China has created concern. Nazemroaya (2012) said Pentagon seems to be encircling the ‘Eurasian Triple Entente’ consisting of China, Russia, and Iran … and argued that neither one among these countries would sit idly. According to the changes in US foreign policy, Russia–China is also building its economic, political, and military strength over time. Indeed, the United States has become a common threat to the Russian and Chinese foreign policymakers. Russia and China are enhancing their military expenditure to become secure if war occurs. According to Akulov (2013b), who claimed that the spending of China and Russia on military equipment increased gigantically, ‘Emerging military superpowers China and Russia sharply increased military expenditures in 2012, while spending by the United States and most NATO-aligned European countries contracted’ (Akulov 2013b). Furthermore, according to a 2013 report by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which is an independent think tank, military investment of Russia and China along with other developing nations was increasing, whereas, in the developed world like in the United States and other NATO members, it was decelerating. Further, the think tank said, the US share of the world’s military spending in 2012 lessened below 40 percent. This has happened for the first time in US history since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. China and Russia raised their expenditure sharply, with China from 7.8 percent or $7.8 billion to $166 billion in 2012. Likewise, Russia mushroomed its spending by 16 percent, from $12.3 billion to $90.7 billion (ibid.). Again, according to the same think tank 2016 report, Russia’s share on military spending from its GDP is 5.3, whereas the US share from its GDP on military spending is 3.3 percent only (Nantian et al. 2017). Further, the SIPRI 2020 report says that total military expenditure rose to US$1981 in 2020. It is an increase of 2.6 percent in real terms from 2019. The five biggest spenders United States, China, India, Russia, and the UK, accounted for 62 percent of global military expenditure. The more interesting facet of the report is that China’s military spending grew for the 26th consecutive year. It is estimated that China has spent US$252 billion in 2020, representing an increase of 1.9

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percent over 2019 and 76 percent over the decade 2011–2020. Likewise, Russia’s military expenditure increased by 2.5 percent in 2020 to reach US$61.7 billion. However, there is a slight shortfall in Russia’s military spending from its military budget compared to previous years (SIPRI 2021). Russian and Chinese cooperation, therefore, increased ever before, with their state representatives meeting frequently. Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov, on June 22, 2016, during Putin’s visit to Beijing, stated that Russia and China would adhere to similar or close potions literally on all critical issues of world affairs. Russia and China cooperate at the international sites, prominently, United Nations, BRICS, and SCO (Metzel 2016). So, in the twenty-first century, two intrinsic factors will affect Russia and China’s foreign policy. First is continuing economic globalization, and second is a gradual decline of Western power. In economic globalization, these two countries will continue to seek to preserve a regional and global power status by creating new alliances in international relations. However, what was earlier a soft model of an exclusive military club in international relations will now be an inclusive model driven by countries’ specific economic and political needs (Tsygankov 2010). However, the big question is, how will the other emerging countries react to the Russian federation and China’s. That is the way the Ukraine crisis is a crucial phase of emerging international relations.

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An Baijie, Li Xiaokun, and Zhou Jin. 2017. Xi Encourages BRICS Countries. China Daily, June 20. Beijing. Aneja, Atul. 2014. China Readies Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent Against US. The Hindu, December 26. Cheng, Joseph Y.S. 2015. China’s Approach to BRICS. Journal of Contemporary China 24 (92): 357–375. Consulate General of the Peoples Republic of China in San Francisco. 2011. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Answers Questions from Domestic and Overseas Journalists on China’s Foreign Policy and External Relations, March 7. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cgsf//eng/xw/t804437.htm. Cox, Michael. 2012. Power Shifts, Economy Change, and the Decline of the West? International Relations 26 (4): 369–388. De Haas, Marcel. 2010. Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond. London: Routledge. De Ouro-Preto, Celso Affonso. 2013. A New Confirmation of Power. In Brazil, BRICS and International Agenda, ed. Jose Vicente De Sa Pimentel. Brasilia: The Alaxandre de Gusmao Foundation (Funag). Deich, Tatian. 2013. BRICS: A New Actor in Global Security. Russian International Affairs Council, [Online: web]. http://www.russiancouncil.ru/en/ inner/?id_4=2813. Accessed 23 June 2014. Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Government of South Africa. 2013. Fifth BRICS Summit Declarations, March 27, [Online: web]. http://www.gov.za/fifth-brics-summit. Accessed 12 July 2014. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Republic of India. 2012. President Hu Jintao Gave Written Interview to BRICS Media, March 28, [Online: web]. http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/BRICS2012/t929077. htm. Accessed 14 May 2014. Gordon, Ross. 2011. BRICS to Promote More Inclusive Global Partnership. Pressroom, [Online: web]. http://pressroom.ipc-undp.org/brics-to-promotemore-inclusive-global-partnership/. Accessed 14 May 2015. Grace Guerrero, Dorothy. 2011. The Rise of China: A Multipolar in the Making? Focus on the Global South, [Online: web]. http://www.focusweb.org/con tent/rise-china-and-brics-multipolar-world. Accessed 14 July 2014. Guneev, Sergei. 2016. BRICS Leaders Underline Importance of Further Strategic Partnership. TASS, Russian News Agency, [Online: web]. http://tass.com/ politics/897755. Accessed 9 Nov 2016. Hirono, Ryokichy. 2010. Globalization in the 21st Century: Blessing or Threat to Developing Countries. Asia-Pacific Review 8 (2): 28–46. Huaxia. 2017. BRICS Mechanism Will Shine More Brightly: Chinese FM, Xinhuanet, March 8. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/08/c_1 36112470.htm.

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CHAPTER 2

The Evolution of Brics and the International System

Introduction Over the last several decades, international relations have remained in constant flux with shifting geostrategic priorities, domestic politics, regimes, and regional re-balances. Shifts in the global political systems had begun to create a renewed sense of the nation-state as early as the seventeenth century, after signing the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Henceforth, a more modern concept of the nation-state developed. This phenomenon is central to international relations and continues to be the basis for new world order. However, the current international relations (IR) system is very dynamic in it that it has been consistently changing through multiple features. It is essential to explore the changing realities of new emerging political trends. The regional and inter-regional groups are changing like the BRICS, SCO, EU, ASEAN, and several others. However, among all the groups, the BRICS has significance and stakes to claim due to its continental nature. Further, the BRICS has various resources essential to becoming the center of international relations. The role of the BRICS is vital because of the BRICS population, GDP, land, world trade, and global forex. The BRICS countries have been cooperating in various areas. Presently, the BRICS sectoral cooperation accounts for more than 30 subject areas. The landmark incident took place in 2014 when the BRICS established a New Development Bank

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 J. Srinivas, Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1115-6_2

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(NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) (Alam Iqbal 2021). The institution’s objective is to aid infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS member countries. The BRICS is actively taking positions on various international issues. With this trend in international relations, the global order is being transformed into Multipolarity politics in emerging international relations. Another critical aspect of the BRICS is that it can bring stability and normality to the global order and regional politics despite fractures within the BRICS group.

Questioning Bipolarity The concept of polarity has been prevalent in the political thinking of international relations since the history of humankind, be it in the Peloponnesian by Thucydides,1 in the hegemonic politics between Rome and Carthago, or in some pre-modern times, like in Sumerian, Chinese, Indic, Greek, Maya, and Italian civilizations (Kegley and Raymond 1994). The earliest and most famous traces of multipolarity was in the nineteenthcentury Concert of Europe,2 established after the defeat of Napoleon (Kratochvil 2002). However, the international system was described theoretically by Hans Morgenthau as late as in the twentieth century, whose study was based on the beginnings of the Cold War, postulating that bipolarity was the most stable international order. Morgenthau, in his book Politics among Nations, said that: The changed structure of the balance of Power has made the hostile opposition of two gigantic blocs possible, but not inevitable. Quite the contrary, the new balance of Power is a mechanism that contains the potentialities for unheard-of good and unprecedented evil. Which of these potentialities will be realized depends not on the mechanics of power balance, but on moral and material forces which use that mechanism for the realization of their ends. (Morgenthau 1948: 289)

1 The book titled ‘The History of the Peloponnesian War,’ written by Thucydides in the year 431 BCE was translated by Richard Crawley. Thucydides is considered to be the first ‘international realist.’ It can be read at: http://classics.mit.edu/Thucydides/pelopwar.1. first.html. 2 This idea was suggested by the Austrian Chancellor, Kaunitz, and was a series of power alliances established in March 1814 between Great Briton, Prussia, Russia, and Austria.

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Later, a prominent neo-realist scholar, Kenneth Waltz, elevated the concept of such polarity to the systemic level in 1979. He said that structures were defined by identifying a principle within the respective system, and further, by the specification of its system units. Next, they further illustrated the distribution of capabilities across units (Waltz 1979: 100–101). Waltz explained that the international system always remained anarchic, as its main components were nation-states, which are considered ‘units’ within that global system. Then, it is clear that the only changing feature of the international system is the capabilities of these nationstates. So, the neo-realists argued that bipolarity was more stable than the multipolar system. Given the context of the time they were writing in, there was justification to their argument because, during that particular period, almost all countries tried to expand, establish alliances, and exploit resources. It helped them remain in a safe zone during the war and protect themselves from external aggression. But, the question also arose: which country should have that absolute Power to carry forward an order? And what gives one country the right to dominate or lead the international charge instead of another?

Which Countries Can Influence World Order? IR theorists have debated the relations, structures, and hegemony prevalent within the international system. They discovered that these are some of the prominent features within international relations. Scholars like Hans J. Morgenthau (1948) and Kenneth Waltz (1979) argued that the hierarchy of the global system is based on the Power of certain select countries. A country with many resources tends to maintain or carry forward the world order, which implies its political, economic, and cultural authority. However, merely having a quantitative bulk of resources is insufficient to lead a country to a dominant position. For, Gilpin (2009), for instance, said that to handle the global order costs, the dominant state should be powerful enough; besides, it must have the resources of coerciveness to share the costs. That means it should have the political, economic, and military resources to bear the cost of the world order and have the competence to develop credibility while leading other nations. Countries that maintain a great power status in the history of world affairs, for instance, have allocated a substantial military budget, but at the same time, have had a

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higher GDP growth rate compared to other countries. As scholars like Ivan Timofeev (2013) briefly elaborate: A superpower can project its influence globally in a wide range of fields at one point in time, i.e., in economics, politics, ideology, culture, etc. A great power has regional ambition in these areas or projects its influence globally in various fields.

Table 2.1 explains how historical influence on world order, selected countries/regions. Table 2.1 explains how great power regions and countries have performed in their respective economic growth charters to emerge as power regions. Western Europe indeed was the most dominant in the history of international relations. It started registering an impressive growth rate from 1000 AD onwards due to multiple reasons, including the industrial revolution. According to the above data, Angus Maddison explained that Western Europe registered 0.30 percent in its global GDP from 1000 through 1500 AD. During the same period, the Western Offshoot countries registered 0.07 percent. Japan 0.18 percent, other Asian countries put together (excluding Japan) was 0.13, Latin America was 0.09 percent, Eastern Europe and former USSR was 0.20 percent, Africa was 0.06 percent, and the rest of the world growth rate was 0.15 only. Further, Western Europe’s growth only accelerated following 1500– 1820 AD at 0.41 percent. The Western offshoot countries registered 0.78 percent growth, while Japan was 0.31 percent. The rest of Asia (excluding Japan) was at 0.29 percent, Latin America was at 0.21 percent, Eastern Europe and former USSR was at 0.44 percent, Africa at 0.16, and the rest of the world registered at 0.32 percent. Western Europe during the period of 1820–1870 was 1.65 percent. The period of 1870–1913 registered 2.10 percent, the period between 1913 and 1950 was 1.19 percent, while from 1950 to 1970 it was 4.81 percent, and between 1973 and 1998 it was 2.11 percent. The above data clearly stated that whatever regions and countries dominated, they registered impressive growth rates during their heyday. Likewise, military spending also plays a crucial role in determining the country’s domination in world affairs. Table 2.2 diligently explains how the two phenomena share a symbiotic relationship and are dependent on each other.

0.30 0.07 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.20 0.06 0.15

0.41 0.78 0.31 0.29 0.21 0.44 0.16 0.32

1500–1820 1.65 4.33 0.41 0.03 1.37 1.52 0.52 0.93

1820–1870 2.10 3.92 2.44 0.94 3.48 2.37 1.40 2.11

1870–1913 1.19 2.81 2.21 0.90 3.43 1.84 2.69 1.85

1913–1950

4.81 4.03 9.29 5.18 5.33 4.84 4.45 4.91

1950–1970

2.11 2.98 2.97 5.46 3.02 −0.56 2.74 3.01

1973–1998

3 Consisting of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States, these countries have experienced much more rapid growth since 1820 than Western Europe.

Source Angus Maddison in OECD (2001), ‘The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective,’ p. 127

Western Europe Western Offshoots3 Japan Asia (excluding Japan) Latin America Eastern Europe and former USSR Africa World

1000–1500

Annual GDP growth rates of dominant countries between 1000 and 1998

Regions/countries

Table 2.1

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Table 2.2 The Military spending of the great powers in peacetime 1870–1913 and 1920–1938

Country

Austria–(Hungary) France Germany Italy Russia (USSR) UK Japan USA

Military spending of GDP % 1870–1930

1920–1938

3.5 3.7 2.3 2.8 3.9 2.6 5.0 0.7

0.9 4.3 3.3 4.4 7.1 3.0 5.7 1.2

Source Eloranta and Harrison (2008), ‘War and Disintegration, 1914–1950,’ p. 18

Table 2.2 explains how the power centers countries increased their military strength during World War I and II. Between 1870 and 1938, the countries mentioned above were considered a high point in world affairs. It elaborated that Hungary’s military budget between 1870 and 1914 was 3.5% of its GDP. However, it got reduced to 0.9 percent between 1920 and 1938. France, between 1870 and 1914 allocated 3.7 percent of its GDP, but this increased to 4.2 percent of its total GDP during 1920– 1938. Germany’s military budget was 2.6 percent of its GDP during 1870–1914 but increased to 3.3 percent in the second phase. Likewise, the significant period of 1870–1938 saw immense bolstering of military capabilities in these countries. With the two tables (Tables 2.1 and 2.2), it is clear how the dominant countries held both economic and military control. With this, political influence and Power automatically increased. It proved that powerful nations of their period had the economic, military, political, and cultural resources to be powerful enough within world affairs—not just one. It has been reflected in international politics.

Post-Soviet Era and Rise of the US Hegemony Following the Soviet dissolution and the breakdown of Russia’s global Power, the rivaling US power remained dominant in world affairs, with Japan and West-European countries being seen as secondary. Patrick E. Tyler (1992) noted that the United States drafted a policy statement that foresaw a superpower monopoly. No collection of allies or foes

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was allowed to rival the United States in the post-Cold War era. Quansheng Zhao (2008) says that after the collapse of the USSR, the world system changed drastically, and the global order shifted from bipolar to unipolar. At that point, such a new dynamic was seen as a threat by many countries. The era of the US-dominated world order emerged; with a monolithic strategic, political, economic, and technological global policy (Huntington 1999). Countries like Japan, Russia, and other WestEuropean countries had minimal say and influence. This phenomenon in world politics is termed a paradoxical ‘Uni-Multipolar’ world order by Huntington (1999). Thus, the United States created a regime that maintained, defended, and expanded a liberal economic order to serve US national economic and security interests (Mastanduno 2009). The US security pattern also changed to a certain extent. It had to preserve its importance and defense by focusing on the combination of phenomena like terrorism, rogue-states, and weapons of mass destruction to contain a policy of states that did not concur with US policy. Allies and peerstates like Japan and West Europe were powerful enough but subservient, while the US hegemony worked in exchange for US security (Mastanduno 2009). Hence, global politics became a US show in the last decade of the twentieth century in international relations. However, with this development, there also was not any fear of threat to US dominance. Some scholars asserted there would not be any threat to US importance as long as it considered other country’s interests as interests of second-class states. On top of that, the raw power influence of the United States also had sway. For instance, William Wohlforth (1999) observed that the natural power advantage of the United States means that the second-tier states face incentives to bandwagon with the unipolar Power. But skepticism for the US-imposed unipolar world order sustainability was already growing with the unilateral behavior of the US. Neo-realists like Kenneth N. Waltz (1997) regarded the unipolar global system as the least stable of all structures. Any great concentration of Power threatens other states and could cause a situation where action may be needed to restore a balance in the international system. Later, it also proved that the global political dynamics started changing for many reasons. Because it this time, there was a nascent rise of the Global South countries in international relations as stakeholders of the emerging global order.

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Evolution of Global South in International Relations From the twenty-first century onwards, world politics has been changing with the rise of India, China, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey. In 2006, the then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi at the NAM annual summit remarked that the Global South had emerged on the international stage as a leader of multilateralism. It vigorously advocated global peace, harmony, and joint development and that China had accepted that the rise of developing nations is an irreversible trend in the twenty-first century. Further, the World Bank report on the global economy in 2011 also says that: The world economy is in the midst of a transformative change. One of the most visible outcomes of this transformation is the rise of dynamically emerging market countries at the helm of the global economy. By 2025, emerging economies like Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and the Russian Federation will likely be significant contributors to global growth, alongside the advanced economies. (World Bank 2011: 13)

Furthermore, Aleksei Arbatov (2013) argues that the United States failed to establish a long-lasting unipolar order. A polycentric system in global affairs replaced the bipolar order. Many power centers like the United States, China, and the EU and some emerging regional powers like India, Brazil, and Japan emerged. Due to this, the unipolar world system could not sustain itself for very long, and a financial crisis increased with globalization. With emerging nations like China, India, and Brazil, and the evolution of middle powers like South Korea, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey, a new trend in world affairs was initiated (Toloraya 2013).4 Emerging countries like China, India, Brazil, and South Africa started claiming an equal stake in global decision-making, especially within financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF, and the reform of the global institutional structure of world politics. Apart from that, over a period, the economic performance of these emerging nations was quite impressive. For instance, the 2010 Annual GDP rate says that China’s economic rate was $4.909 trillion, Brazil’s was $1.572 trillion, India’s 4 The new group called ‘MIKTA’ (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia) emerging as a shadow group of BRICS. These countries can be called ‘Middle Powers.’

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Table 2.3 World trade volumes of goods and services (during the global financial crisis) (annual percent change)

World Trade Volume (goods and services) Imports advanced economies Emerging and developing economies Exports Advanced economies emerging and developing economies

2007

2008

2009

2010

7.7

3.0

−10.7

12.8

5.2 13.8

0.6 9.1

−12.4 −8.0

11.7 14.9

6.8 10.2

2.1 4.7

11.9 −7.7

12.3 13.6

Source World Economic Outlook 2011

economy rate was $1.296 trillion, and Russia’s economy was $1231 trillion (Badannath 2010). At the same period, other Global South countries registered an impressive growth rate, like Indonesia at $540 billion, while Mexico’s economic rate was $875 billion. Despite the economic recession that had prevailed over the global economy (World Bank Report 2010), the growth rates of these countries’ trade and service sectors were improving considerably. Table 2.3 explains this with detailed facts and figures. The data has been taken from the World Economic Outlook 5 of the IMF in 2011. The IMF report in the World Economic Outlook 2011 reveals how rising power nations have become sound in economic growth. Table 2.3 explains how the so-called developed countries were in deep trouble during the 2008 global financial crisis and how developing or emerging nations registered impressive trade and service sector improvement at that very point in time. Table 2.3 says that the world trade in goods and services in 2007 was 7.7 percent, in 2008 it was 3.0 percent, in 2009 it was 10.7 percent, and in 2010 it was 12.8 percent. In 2007 in global trade imports, the developed countries’ share was 5.2 percent, whereas the emerging nation’s share was 13.8. In 2008, the number of developed countries contributing to global imports was 0.6, whereas rising power nations were 9.1. In 2009, the developed countries’ import share was − 12.4 percent, whereas growing power nations were at −8.0 percent. In 5 It is published by IMF economists, and analyzes global economic development, issues affecting advanced, emerging, and developing economies, and other topics of current interests.

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2010, the developed countries’ global share was 11.7 percent, whereas the developing countries’ share was 14.9 percent. Furthermore, rising power nations registered an impressive improvement in global exports too. In 2007, developed countries’ exports were 6.8 percent, whereas the developing countries’ share was 10.2 percent. In 2008, the number of developed countries shared in global exports was 2.1 percent only, whereas developing countries’ share was 4.7 percent. In 2009, developed countries’ share in global exports was 11.9 percent, but developing countries’ share was −7.7. However, in 2010, developed countries’ share in global exports was 12.3 percent, whereas developing countries’ share was increased and stood at 13.6. Not only were global imports and exports rising, but even the presence of powerful nations was also growing year after year. These countries’ share in global GDP also improved drastically in the past. Further, the IMF’s World Economic Outlook on ‘World Real per Capita Output’ says that in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. However, in between the Covid-19 pandemic hit the world in 2020. During this time, the world economy got shattered due to the Covid19 induced lockdowns by various countries. It has disrupted the lives of all nations and communities. It is estimated that the virus reduced global economic growth in 2020 to an annualized rate of −3.4 to −7.6 percent, with a recovery of 4.2–5.6 percent projected for 2021. International trade is estimated to have fallen by 5.3 percent in 2020. However, it is projected that the global economy will grow by 8% in 2021. The human costs in terms of lives lost will permanently affect global economic growth. It has increased the poverty levels of the people, lives upended, careers derailed, and increased social unrest. It is said that 95 million people may have entered into extreme poverty in 2020, with 80 million more undernourished than pre-pandemic levels (The US Congress Report on Covid-19 impact on global economy 2021).6 Further, 8.8 percent of international working hours were lost in 2020 and which is equivalent to 255 million full-time jobs, an amount that is four times greater than the job losses during the 2009 global financial crisis. It is estimated that the pandemic had pushed 119–124 million people into poverty in 2020. Apart from that, aviation passenger traffic declined by 60 percent in 2020.

6 The US Congress (2021), Global Economic Effects of COVID-19, July 9, 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R46270.pdf.

Brazil India Russia China US UK Canada Japan Germany France Advanced Economies Emerging Markets and Developing Economies World

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

2.7 6.3 4.9 10.0 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.7 1.3 0.6 1.0 4.8 2.5

2012 2.1 5.1 1.5 7.2 1.2 1.5 1.3 2.2 0.2 0.1 0.9 3.5 2.0

2013

2017 0.5 5.7 1.8 6.4 1.7 1.1 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.0 3.4 2.5

−0.3 −4.4 −4.1 6.2 6.8 7.1 −1.1 −2.2 0.0 6.9 6.5 6.2 1.8 2.3 1.0 2.1 1.6 0.9 1.8 −0.1 0.0 0.5 1.7 0.8 1.8 0.6 1.4 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.6 1.9 1.2 3.1 2.8 3.0 2.2 2.1 2.0

2015

2016

2014 1.0 5.4 2.9 6.3 2.4 0.6 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.5 1.9 3.2 2.4

2018 0.6 2.9 2.1 5.5 1.7 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.3 1.3 1.2 2.3 1.6

2019

4.6 −8.7 −3.1 2.0 −4.0 10.3 −6.5 −4.5 −5.0 −8.4 −5.1 −3.5 −4.4

2020

3.0 11.5 3.8 8.1 5.8 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.4 5.5 4.8 5.3 4.9

2021

1.9 5.9 3.8 5.3 2.9 4.6 3.5 2.9 3.3 3.9 3.3 3.8 3.4

2022

Source IMF (2021), World Economic Outlook, Managing divergent economies on Per Capita Income of the world and some of the selected countries, April 2021, p. 40

Country

Selected countries GDP growth rate

S. no

Table 2.4

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Table 2.5 Merchandize trade volume and real GDP, 2015–2021a (Annual percentage change) 2015

2016

Volume of world marchandize tradeb 2.3 1.4 Exports North America 2.6 0.7 South and Central America 0.6 1.3 Europe 2.9 1.1 Asia 1.3 2.3 Other regionsc 1.8 3.5 Imports North America 5.2 0.3 South and Central America −7.6 −9 Europe 3.6 3 Asia 2.1 2.2 Other regions −3.9 −4.5 Real GDP at market exchange rate 2.8 2.4 North America 2.8 1.7 South and Central America −0.8 −2 Europe 2.4 2.1 Asia 4.3 4.2 Other regions 1.5 2.4

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

4.7

2.9

−0.1

−9.2

7.2

3.4 2.9 3.7 6.7 0.7

3.8 0.1 2 3.7 0.7

1 −14.7 −2.2 −7.7 0.1 −11.7 0.9 −4.5 −2.9 −9.5

10.7 5.4 8.2 5.7 6.1

4.4 4.3 3 8.4 3.4 3.1 2.4 0.8 2.8 4.8 1.9

5.2 5.3 1.5 4.9 0.3 2.8 2.8 0.6 2.1 4.1 2.1

−0.4 −8.7 −2.1 −13.5 0.5 −10.3 −0.6 −4.4 1.5 −16 2.2 −4.8 2.1 −4.4 −0.2 −7.5 1.5 −7.3 3.9 −2.4 1.4 −5.5

6.7 6.5 8.7 6.2 5.6 4.9 3.9 3.8 5.2 5.9 3.5

a Figures for 2020 and 2021 are projections b Average of exports and imports c Other regions comprise Africa, Middle East, and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),

including associate and former member States Source WTO Secretariate for trade, consensus estimates for GDP (WTO. 2020. Trade shows signs of rebound from COVID-19, recovery still uncertain, October 6, 2020, https://www.wto.org/eng lish/news_e/pres20_e/pr862_e.htm)

The Human Development Index recorded its first drop since 1990 due to the pandemic.7 The IMF’s 2021 ‘World Economic Outlook’ predicted that in Table 2.6. Likewise, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released its Economic Outlook interim report in September. It says that, due to the various government’s efforts, central 7 The Committee for the Coordination of Statistical Activities (CCSA) (2021), How COVID-19 is changing the world: a statistical perspective, Volume 111, https://unstats. un.org/unsd/ccsa/documents/covid19-report-ccsa_vol3.pdf.

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Table 2.6 Overview of the World Economic Outlook-2021 projections Projections S. no

Countries

2020

2021

2022

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Brazil India Russia China USA UK Canada Japan Germany France Advanced Economies Emerging Markets and Developing Economies World Output

−4.1 −8.0 −3.1 2.3 −3.5 −9.9 −5.4 −4.8 −4.9 −8.2 −4.7 −2.2 −3.3

3.7 12.5 3.8 8.4 6.4 5.3 5.0 3.3 3.6 5.8 5.1 6.7 6.0

2.6 6.9 3.8 5.6 3.5 5.1 4.7 2.5 3.4 4.2 3.6 5.0 4.4

Source IMF (2021), World Economic Outlook, Managing divergent economies, April 2021, p. 8

banks’ support, and the progress in the vaccine distribution, the global economic recovery remains strong. However, many countries are still facing a plethora of challenges. It also projected a positive GDP growth rate in 2021 and 2022 (Table 2.7). That is how the Global South countries evolve as significant players in international relations. At the same time, the Russian Federation and China started to develop a multipolarity concept in international relations. Through which Russia and China wanted to counter Western hegemony in international relations.

Multipolar World Order, A Conceptual Understanding The concept of multipolarity exists at multiple levels of interest and centers of Power. The World Bank report of 2011, titled ‘Global Development Horizons’ says that multipolarity implies more than two growth poles in the world economy, which are measured by the degree of concentration on growth poles. There would be a greater degree of multipolarity (World Bank 2011: xvii). However, it is primarily in a developmental perspective of a region. It will give a different connotation when it comes

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Table 2.7 Real GDP projections for 2021 and 2022 (%, year on year)

S. no

Countries

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

China Turkey Argentina Spain UK India France Mexico G-20 USA Italy World Canada Brazil South Africa Korea Australia Indonesia Germany Russia Japan Saudi Arabia

2021 (%)

2022 (%)

8.5 8.4 7.6 6.8 6.7 6.7 6.3 6.3 6.1 6 5.9 5.7 5.4 5.2 4.6 4.2 4 3.7 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.3

5.8 3.1 1.9 6.6 5.2 9.9 4 3.4 4.8 3.9 4.1 4.5 4.1 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.3 4.9 4.6 3.4 2.1 4.8

Source OECD Economic Outlook interim report in September 2021, https://www.oecd.org/economic-outlook/

to political relations perspective. As scholar Herolf (2011) observed that multipolarity is about the distribution of power, in which more than two nation-states have equal amounts of military, political, cultural, and economic sway. Multipolarity is also considered interpolar in the age of interdependence. International scholars emphasized that the rise of a unipolar world would not last for long and that it’s an illusion. The multipolar world order is inevitable with the rise of third world countries as global powers (Pape 2005). In this concept, one superpower could coexist with other major powers. Multiple power centers would play a key role in world affairs. Established powers were challenged explicitly because of their privileged position in global affairs in systematic terms (Hart and Jones 2010). Professor of Law and Head of International Law Chair at Sao Paulo University, Brazil, Paolo Borba, says that the emerging world is more innovative, independent, and an original model of international

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relations, which is demonstrating respect toward cultural and historical originality in most of the southern world states (Grazini 2012). On April 28, 2012, Chinese vice-premier Li Keqiang remarked at the famous Moscow State University that world affairs consist of two critical phenomena: globalization and a trend toward a multipolar world order progressing similarly. Scores of forces are forming a new balance of Power. At the same time, developed countries are going through a transformation, and emerging economies are rising. With these changes, no force can form the evolution of world affairs on its own. Aleksei Arbatov (2013) argued, ‘In the foreseeable future, contrary to what was seen in the later twentieth century, nuclear weapons will lose their function as a status symbol and as a basic guarantee of the leading powers’ security.’ The growing interdependence in this century has helped the world from abstaining from war over little reasons; instead, they cooperate and share their concern equally. It could probably be solved through negotiations, consultation through emissaries, or diplomacy if this is not the case. For instance, conflict in the Korean Peninsula,8 and the Iran nuclear imbroglio,9 in which negotiations have taken place at regular intervals. In addition to that, the Russia–China territorial conflict, the frequent India–China skirmishes along the border, and the UK and Argentina’s dispute over Falkland Island, China–Japan over the Kuril island issue, the India–US trade disputes, and the ongoing Arab and Ukrainian crisis are quintessential examples for the modern world’s political instability and cross-cutting issues. During the visit to Russia in 2013 on March 23, the Chinese president Xi Jinping10 at the Moscow State University spoke about a multipolar world. He stated that peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit are prominent features in international relations. After colonialism 8 The Korean conflict was held during the period of 1950–1953, Korea was divided into territory’s called South Korea supported by the United States and North Korea supported by USSR. this conflict was not sorted out till today. 9 The conflict started when Iran started building its nuclear reactors to produce electricity, however, Western world believed that Iran building Nuclear weapons so imposed economic sanctions over Iran. 10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China (2013), ‘Xi Jinping Calls for the Building of New Type of International Relations with Win–Win Cooperation at the Core in a Speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations’, Xi Jinping speech on March 23 [Online: web], accessed on June 23, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov. cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpcf1_665694/t1024781.shtml.

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and the Cold War, no country or group could dominate present-day world affairs single-handedly. No country can live thinking about the fuddy-duddy or zero-sum mentality of the Cold War period. And he said that an international balance of power continues to evolve toward peace and development in the world.

Multipolarity, A Theoretical Underpinning The tabular explanation of the multipolar world’s theoretical basis can be built as drawn in Table 2.8. Table 2.8 describes how different theories position the concept of multipolar world order in international relations. Below is a tabular explanation of the multipolar world’s theoretical basis. Table 2.8 describes how different theories position themselves on the concept of multipolarity in international relations. Some of the examples of the influential groupings in IR theory dealing with multipolarity. The concept of multipolarity became popular during Primakov’s term in the foreign ministry from 1996 to 1998 and during his prime ministerial term from 1998 to 1999. However, it gained momentum after the Kosovo incident.11 Indeed, it got legitimacy and was backed by substantial financial support under Putin’s presidency. The foreign policy concept adopted by the Russian Federation in July 2008 asserted that multipolarity is an emerging trend in world affairs (Makarychev and Morozov 2011). And also, both the scholars Makarychev and Morozov (2011) synthesized Russian discourse on multipolarity. And they have made two distinctive components. One is that multipolarity is based on global interests and normative strategies. The second is state-centric and beyond the state, involving a wider gamut of participants. Traditionally, Western scholars ignored the concept of multipolarity, and scholars like Morgenthau, Waltz, and Wolfforth went further on and said that it is a non-peace provider. Makarychev and Morozov (2011) observed that emerging international relations are a new pattern within the multipolarity discourse in world affairs as an alternative to Western hegemony. Kremlin believes that promoting multipolar discourse in world affairs is essential, as Russia is unhappy with the Western hegemonic domination. Noted Russian scholar Alexander Dugin (2014) stated that IR was 11 It is located in southern part of Yugoslavia. So, they wanted independence from it, in support of Kosovo rebellion on October 1998 against the wishes of Yugoslavia and Russia. This incident happened during the period of March 5, 1998, to June 11, 1999.

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Table 2.8 Estimated foresight on polarity School of thought

(Neo)realist-declinists, e.g., Waltz

(Neo)realists hegemonists, e.g., Wohlforth

Neoliberals, e.g., Lebow, Kegley, etc

What is the relevance of system polarity? What is the probability of the birth of a multipolar system? What is the probability of multipolarity systems What is the probability of stability in a bipolar system What is the probability of stability in a unipolar system? What is the polarity of the current international system?

Very important

Very important

Some relevance

Very high

Not probable in the Probable near future

Unstable

Unstable

Dependence on circumstance

Most stable

Stable

Depends on circumstances

Extremely unstable

Most stable

Depends on circumstance

Bipolarity, but shifting rapidly toward multipolarity

Unipolar, but it will remain so for a long time. However, it is changing its stand with China, India, Brazil, and other nations in global political and economic affairs

Unipolar. However, the multipolar world prevailed in world politics with the increasing economic strength and political strength of rising power nations

Source Petr Kratochvil (2002), ‘Multipolarity: American Theory and Russian Practice’ Note The author’s analysis is included in the table

regarded as an Anglo-American social science for a long time. However, since the recent past, the discipline of IR drifted toward China, India, Africa, and elsewhere for non-Western perspectives on IR and IR theory. Most IR theorists paid little attention to the Russian perspective on international relations and its practice. The concept of multipolarity in international relations was first used by the Russian scholar Nikolay Danileskey more than a hundred years ago. However, it was not taken seriously. But, most of the current IR theorists follow Samuel Huntington’s thesis about the plurality of civilization. While Western scholars

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talk about nation-states, Russian scholars assert civilizations in multipolarity. Furthermore, nation-states are similar, but civilizations are multiple and more subjective. There is a vast gap between Western multipolarity and Russian–Chinese multipolarity (Titarenko and Petrovsky 2015). The concept of multipolarity is not in global integration but regional integration. According to changes occurring in current world politics, all major powers like Russia, China, India, SCO countries, and some other developing countries believe that the current world order is unbalanced and needs reformation. Therefore, it is necessary to place multipolarity as a new trend in world politics (ibid.). Nonetheless, Russia and China were the first countries that promoted multipolar strategies in world affairs.

Russian Multipolarity The conceptualization of multipolarity in Russia was done around 1993 (Ambrosio 2007). After the Soviet Union event, the new Russian federation thought there should be a multipolar world order rather than a US-centric unipolar world. The United States started sidelining Russia’s role in world affairs. In this context, Russia initiated the project of multipolarity in its foreign policy strategy. The first foreign minister of the new Russian Federation, Andrei Kozyrev (1994), said that the twenty-first century would not be going to Pax Americana. Instead, multilateralism will prevail, where multiple actors will be involved in international relations. But, Russia was not so aggressive in promoting this concept back then. State representatives mentioned it on several occasions. Further, as former Russian President Boris Yeltsin (1997) argued: We are for a multipolar world where there is no diktat by any single country. Let the US be one pole, Russia another, Asia, Europe, and so on, still other poles. It is the base for the world to stand and ensure common security.

Later, a sudden shift appeared in Russia’s approach toward its multipolar strategy when Primakov became foreign minister of the new Russian Federation in January 1996. In 2000, Russia incorporated ‘multipolarity’ into its foreign policy concept. It says Russia has two things to focus on now: strengthening the international system’s political and economic situation and multilateral governance. It would strive to create a multipolar world order (National Security Concept of Russian Federation

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2000). Primakov mobilized other like-minded nations to join the strategy, like India, China, and Brazil. India started advocating the multipolar world order in international affairs by accepting Primakov’s initiative. For example, on May 29, 2004, the then Congress government included multipolarity and democratic reform of the international order in its ‘Common Minimum Program.’ It stressed India’s opposition to unilateralism in international affairs (Baruah 2004). Thus, India opposed all forms of unilateral decisions in the UN resolutions at regular intervals. As Anuradha Chenoy and Kamal Chenoy (2007) stated, from 1995 to 2005, India opposed the United States in the UN with all 80 percent of its votes. Likewise, Brazil also emphasized a more democratic representation of international relations and more multipolarity. For instance, Brazil’s then foreign minister Celso Amorim on April 25, 2008, at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, argued that Brazil’s foreign policy works with other nations to create a less static and democratic world order. Furthermore, another Brazil foreign minister (under Dilma Rousseff), Antonio Patriota, at the BRICS Policy Center in May 2011 stated that a multipolar structure of international relations guides Brazil’s foreign policy and can be called ‘benign multipolarity’ or ‘inclusive multipolarity.’ Here, there is a necessity for participation from emerging economies and developing nations in the international decision-making process (Jesus 2014). Scholar Cohen (1997) illustrated that Primakov brought a multipolar concept to reduce the US power and made Russia a more influential force in international relations. He also stressed building a Eurasian counterbalance against the US-led NATO by forging closer ties with China and Iran. However, the most important actors in the game were Russia, China, and India. Primakov visited South America to mobilize for this strategy and offered supporting membership in the United Nations Security Council membership. Countries like Russia and China have resisted a hegemonic trend in world politics and wanted to re-construct an international system where they would have a better, if not equal, say. So, the concept of the multipolar system supported by Russian and Chinese foreign policymakers was seen as a viable possibility to bring changes in the existing world order after the Soviet demise. In this context, Russia and China developed the concept of multipolar world order in international relations.

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Cooperation with China on Multipolarity Historically, the Chinese had accepted the concept of multipolarity in the 1992 Party Congress meeting of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and found it very useful with the changing circumstances in international relations. It adopted multipolarity in its foreign policy strategy (Lo 2008). During the same time, China started rebuilding its ties with Russia due to the US unilateral decision-making process in world affairs. As part of integrating with the world, China explored new avenues and strategies in foreign policy objectives. As part of it, Jiang Zemin, the then Chinese president, officially incorporated the concept of a multipolar world (duojishijie) into Chinese foreign policy at the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1992. Later, it supported China’s stance that a fair, just, and peaceful world is only possible through multipolarity (Lo 2008). By the time relations between China and Russian became routine, they had started cooperating again in world affairs with the positivity of both side leaders. On April 23, 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Boris Yeltsin met in Moscow and signed the ‘Joint Declaration on Multipolar World and the Formation of New International Orders’ (UN General Assembly 1997). As part of it, Russia and China affirmed creating a new international order, in which multipolarity was the basic phenomenon. In this context, both countries observed profound changes at the end of twentieth-century international relations. The relations between major countries, and the former Cold War period adversaries, were also growing over the period (ibid.). In this process, diversity in political, economic, and cultural relations became the new norm, and a growing number of countries started to recognize the need for mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefit. And leaders acknowledged that all the world countries—whether small or large, strong or weak, rich or poor—are equal numbers of the international community (ibid.). Again, on July 16, 2001, Chinese President Jiang Zemin went to Russia and signed the ‘Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation in Moscow. In this treaty, Russia and China underscored the importance of promoting and establishing a just and fair new world order based on universally recognized principles and norms of international law (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peoples Republic of China 2001). Furthermore, on November 4, 2006, during the Forum for Chinese and African

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cooperation, Chinese President Hu Jintao delivered a speech and said that the world is in a state of a complex condition. It is moving toward a multipolarity with the rise of the Global South countries in international relations. Further, he remarked that economic globalization had brought increasing interdependence among nations. It has led to an imbalanced development and widened the gap between the global North and global South. Thus, he argues for closer cooperation between emerging countries for building a multipolar world order. Hence, the time has come for the international south countries to increase their relations. Even Russian leaders have also expressed the same view on changing global politics. Apart from that, Russia started shouldering China on various global issues. Because, again, in 2007, Putin discussed that Russia and China share several positions in the international arena and are driven by the same goals: our efforts are to maintain and strengthen the principles of the multipolar setup to preserve the strategic balance in the world. Further, Putin asserted that the Russia–China interaction would help to build just international order (Putin 2007). It paved the way for Russia and China to grow their international relations. At the same time, Russia and China have been branded as antagonistic countries of global peace and stability. Therefore, Russia and China tried to build regional groups to share common concerns with other like-minded nations. Thus, Russia had to create alternative power centers in international relations. Russia needed to pursue a multipolar world order in international relations to survive and regain independent status. Over time, NATO started to expand its Eastward side, strategically located close to Russia. Since NATO isolates Russia and China and creates threats and insecurity for them, the United States has attacked many allies of Russia like Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Russia opposed the attacks on Afghanistan, Iraq, NATO’s war with Yugoslavia, and the United States attempt to gain clout in Russia’s strategic areas, like the Asia–Pacific region, Central Asia, Baltic States, and the near abroad part of Russia. Further, the American plan for a missile defense system was opposed by both Russia and China. Yet, America went ahead with it (Ambrosio 2007). All these incidents made Russia and China rethink the current global order. Furthermore, Russia and China issued a ‘Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation on major international issues’ on May 23, 2008. In this statement, both countries reiterated that the world is undergoing a remarkable transformation and that peace, development, and cooperation have become essential elements of the

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present international relations. With this, the trend to establish a multipolar world order became inevitable (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2008). China’s foreign policy since Jiang’s leadership has acknowledged that a singular and unchecked superpower can be very dangerous, as exemplified by the US invasion of Iraq without UN sanction and the US/NATO actions in Kosovo (Guerrero 2011). Later, President Putin, at the G-20 meeting on September 5, 2013, in Saint Petersburg, at the sideline meeting, remarked while mentioning the importance of the Eurasian Union that a multipolar world would emerge soon. In that, Russia and China would play a significant role. In that way, Russia and China are regularly involved in building a multipolar world order. And also, both countries were committed to constructing a multipolar world order. Later, again, during Putin’s visit to China on May 20 in 2014. In the meeting of the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, Cheng Guoping (2014) stressed that China and Russia should develop strategic cooperation in bilateral cooperation and enhance the interaction in the practical sphere. They must also cooperate in ensuring peace, stability, and the creation of multipolar world order. Evidently, these countries propelled themselves to establish regional and inter-regional groups to foster their relations. Groups like SCO, BRICS, RIC, IBSA, and BASIC are prominent and influential. Still, the evolution of BRICS has made the idea of a multipolar world order more engaging due to its growing clout in world affairs. Both Russia and China have established and promoted regional and inter-regional forums and groups in the process. And become very active and vocal as part of their strategy, encouraging and convincing other like-minded nations. Furthermore, other southern world countries have started realizing their importance globally, forming regional and interregional organizations and groups to put forward their interests globally. In this instance, BRICS, IBSA, BASIC, SCO, and RIC are quintessential examples of modern-day changing world politics. As mentioned above, BRICS has maximum political clout and say in these groups.

Theoretical Underpinning of the BRICS Group Thus, the scholarly and relevant approach to analyzing BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is under its nearly universal nature. The evolution of BRICS has created an ‘uncomfortable’ or exceptional case for research. Earlier, IR theorists primarily tried to apply the study

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of BRICS in an institutional manner or through an international mode of scholarship, which was a substandard approach and did not work (Sergunin 2015: 74). Such research also lacked empiricism. However, the popular neo-realist theory, ‘Power Transition Theory,’ developed by A. F. K. Organeski (1958), and his followers Wittkopf (1997) and Tammen et al. (2000)—comes closer to a theoretical method in studying BRICS. This theory is apt to describe the rise of BRICS within international relations (ibid.). It primarily argues that the This theory aims to explain the cause of international conflicts and wars through the rise of emerging powers, which are discontent with international rules established by dominant powers. (ibid.)

According to the power transition theory, states can be classified into ‘status quo’ and ‘revisionist.’ However, this theory still falls short of a sufficient understanding of BRICS because BRICS nations do not belong to either of these two phenomenons. BRICS leaders clarified that they are not ‘revisionist’ groups, nor do they want to change the ‘status quo’ of the existing world’s political structure. BRICS asserts that it intends to reform the global order and make it more democratic. Further, Sergunin (2015) observed that this theory ignores the ‘reformist’ states, which define the rising power nations like that of BRICS (Coning et al. 2014; Odgaard 2012)—and a relatively new concept in IR. Some scholars prefer to see such states as ‘pluralist’ or ‘non-aligned.’ The reformist states primarily argue that while they question the existing rules of the game and even try to change them, they are not radically trying to reform them or adapt them to changes during that time. Instead, this creates a provision for accommodating more states in the game and broadening the rubric or canon. Such states prefer bringing changes in the system gradually without challenging others through negotiations and consultations (Sergunin 2015). This phenomenon has been reflected within the BRICS group in present international relations. That is how BRICS countries behave: like revisionists and status quo states. However, that is not the truth. Instead, the BRICS group is trying to make the existing global order more democratic and representative to reflect the voices of the periphery. Now, it is true that BRICS countries are unhappy with the West’s global geopolitical and geo-economics sphere domination. BRICS member countries do not want to destroy the existing rules that the UN legal and institutional

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system is based on, but push changes on the global political and economic structure of international relations peacefully, based on the international law framework (Sergunin 2015). BRICS policy statements, summit declarations, and stand on a plethora of global issues, increased the IMF’s quota and established the BRICS development bank for financing the southern world countries infrastructural development, clearly stating that BRICS is not going against the global norms. Instead, by following the existing institutional international standards trying to reform them for more pluralistic. And the BRICS has the potential to do it. For example, scholars Larionova and Shelepov (2021) observed that after analyzing the qualitative and qualitative discourse of the BRICS evolution and its activities, the BRICS is not a challenger to the Western dominated international order and its international monetary system. Instead, it acts cooperatively, seeking to make the international financial architecture and global regulation more representative and responsive to emerging markets and developing economies. Further, the BRICS strengthened international and domestic financial markets (Larionova and Shelepov 2021). The reformist/emerging countries also believe that non-Western, inclusive institutions can help promote international security cooperation. Particularly in conflict resolution, drug trafficking, non-proliferation of

Fig. 2.1 BRICS map (Source www.mapsofworld.com/.../brics-countries-map. html)

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weapons of mass destruction, combating global terrorism menace, piracy, money laundering, illegal migration, and much more (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian federation 2013: 6–7). Traditional IR paradigms such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism also contribute to the rise of the BRICS group. These theories mostly assert the material interests of the states. According to many international organizations and respective government statistical reports, all BRICS countries have military might and economic strength, which I have explained in the following passages and chapters (Fig. 2.1). The green shading represents the BRICS countries region. The map clearly shows that BRICS has inter-continental representation in group membership (Table 2.9 and Fig. 2.2). According to the report on BRICS statistical publication, 2020, BRICS countries share is 41.9 percent of the world population. Brazil’s share is 3 percent, Russia’s share is 2 percent, India’s share is 17, China’s is 18 percent, and South Africa’s share is 1 percent. That implies it is a humongous amount within the global population share. Human resources are the primary element in developing and becoming a significant power (Fig. 2.3). Geography also has great importance in world politics. Fig. 2.3 illustrates BRICS countries’ share in the global territory, which is 6 percent: Brazil, 13 percent: Russia, 3 percent: India, 7 percent: China, and 0.9 percent: South Africa, which implies cumulative contribution to the global territory as 30 percent. The rest of the world’s share is 71 percent.

Table 2.9 General information on BRICS as per data available in 2020 Countries

Brazil Russia India China South Africa

Area of territory (1000 sq. km) 8516 17,125 3287 9600 1221

Capital city

Mid Year population (million population)

Brasilia Moscow New Delhi Beijing Pretoria

210 147 1338 1398 59

Source BRICS Joint Statistical Publication, 2020, p. 9

Population density (persons per km) 24.7 8.6 407 146 48.1

National currency

Real-R$ Rouble (Rub) Rupee Renminbi-RMB Rand-ZAR

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Brazil Russia 3% 2% India 17%

Rest of the World 59%

China 18%

South Africa 1% Brazil

Russia

India

China

South Africa

Rest of the World

Fig. 2.2 Share of World population, 2018 (Source BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 2020, p. 17)

BRICS Economic Strength in Global Economy The critical aspect of the BRICS group is that due to their domestic solid demand-driven growth model. For example, India and Brazil. At the same time, significant outward linkages of China and Russia. Further, South Africa benefits from its large resource base and proximity to the untapped growth potential of the African continent region (Observer Research Foundation 2017, p. 68).12 The research says that BRICS group countries will dominate the future of international relations for several reasons. The tables and figures give a positive picture of BRICS’s rise in the global economy. The critical aspect 12 Observer Reseaarch Foundation (2017), Realizing the BRICS long-term goals: Road-maps and pathways, A proposal by the BRICS Think Tanks Council, https:// www.nkibrics.ru/system/asset_publications/data/595a/0f00/6272/6948/82d5/0000/ original/Realizing_the_BRICS_Long-Term_Goals._Road-Maps_and_Pathways._A_prop osal_by_the_BRICS_Think_Tanks_Council..pdf?1499074302.

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Brazil 6% Russia 13%

India 3% China 7%

Rest of the world 71%

Brazil

Russia

India

China

Rest of the world

Fig. 2.3 Share of world territory, 2018 (Source BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 2020, p. 17)

of these group projections is they are published by international institutions like World Bank, IMF, OECD, and many other global institutions. A slew of renowned scholars of international relations predicted positively about the BRICS group’s role in emerging international relations. The below pages describe BRICS strengths and objectives in upcoming international ties (Table 2.10). Table 2.10 is based on the report by World Bank’s population reference Bureau in 2015. As I explained the population and territory, it is considerable enough to be decisive in world affairs. Table 2.10 presents the health indicators of the BRICS countries, and it focuses on up to 2014 only. Table 2.10 says Brazil’s birth rate per 1000 population was 15, Russia’s was 13, India’s was 21, China’s was 12, and South Africa’s was 10. The death rate in these countries is 6 for Brazil, 13 for Russia, 7 for India, 7 for China, and 10 for South Africa. The infant mortality rate in these countries is 19 for Brazil, 9.3 for Russia, 42 for India, 12 for

204.5 144.3 1314.1 1371.9 55.0

Population mid-2015 (millions) 15 13 21 12 22

Births per 1000 population 6 13 7 7 10

Deaths per 1000 population 19 9.3 42 12 34

Infant mortality rate13 24 16 29 17 30

Percentage of population below age 15

7 13 5 10 6

Percentage of population above 65

2.8 2.1 17.2 19.7 0.7

Percentage in world population

14 It calculates number of children who would be born for a thousand women.

year. This rate is often used as an indicator of the level of health in a country.

13 It compares the number of deaths of infants under one year old in a given year in a given year per 1000 live births in the same

1.8 1.8 2.3 1.7 2.6

Total fertility rate14

Source World Bank, Population Reference Bureau, 2015: World Population Data Sheet

Brazil Russia India China South Africa

Countries

Table 2.10 BRICS population, health and environment data by 2014

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China, and 34 for South Africa. Further, the total fertility of these countries is 1.8 for Brazil, 1.8 for Russia, 2.3 for India, 1.7 for China, and 2.6 for South Africa. The BRICS countries’ percent of the total population is below 15 percent: Brazil’s 24 percent, Russia’s 16 percent, India’s 29 percent, China’s 17 percent, and South Africa’s 30 percent. That means BRICS has a considerable population dividend in the coming period of international relations. Likewise, the percent of the population above 65 is the following: Brazil’s is 7 percent, Russia’s is 13 percent, India’s is 5 percent, China’s is 10 percent, and South Africa’s is 6 percent. Figure 2.4 illustrates BRICS’s public expenditure share on education from its GDP. It is another crucial indicator of the country’s growth rate in making it a significant power. This figure is according to BRICS Joint Statistical Statement in 2020 brought by BRICS countries. The data says that other BRICS members have consistently invested in education except for India and Russia. Because, it will create human resources, which will enhance the strength of the BRICS economy. The below-mentioned data primarily talks about it. 8 7

6.6

6.9

6.2

6 5

4.9 4.1

4.1

4

3.7

3.5 3.1 2.7

3 2 1 0 Brazil

Russia

India 2010

China

South Africa

2018

Fig. 2.4 BRICS percentage share of public expenditure on education to GDP (%) (Source BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 2020, p. 82)

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The below-mentioned data primarily talks about the human resources classification and their status. The information has been gleaned from the BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 2020 (Table 2.11). Table 2.11 Selected data on the labor force of the BRICS countries

Brazil

Russia

India

China

South Africa

Labor force (million persons) Unemployment rate (%) Age groups (%) 15–24 years 25–59 years 60 years and older Labor force (million persons) Unemployment rate (%) Age groups (%) 15–24 years 25–59 years 60 years and older Labor force (million persons) Unemployment rate (%) Age groups (%) 15–24 years 25–59 years 60 years and older Labor force (million persons) Unemployment rate (%) Age groups (%) 15–24 years 25–59 years 60 years and older Labor force (million persons) Unemployment rate (%) Age groups (%) 15–24 years 25–59 years 60 years and older

2015

2016

2017

101.2 8.7

102.7 11.5

104.3 12.5

15.9 77.1 6.9 76.6 5.6

14.4 78.4 7.1 76.6 5.5

14.8 77.8 7.4 76.3 5.2

76.2 4.8

75.4 4.6

7.6 87.3 5.1

7 87.7 5.3

6.2 88.2 5.6

5.7 88.4 6

5.5 88.1 6.4

5.51

5.41

2018

2019

105.5 106.5 12.3 12.1

6.1

5.27

774.5 13.8

776 13.8

776.4 13.6

775.9 774.7 13.5 13.1

9.7 81.2 9.2 21.1 25.3

8.9 81.3 9.8 21.5 26.7

8.5 81.5 10 21.3 27.5

8 81.9 10.1 22.5 27.1

7.6 82.1 10.5 22.9 28.7

8.7 88.7 2.6

8.1 89.4 2.5

8 89.3 2.7

7.5 89.8 2.8

6.9 90.2 2.8

Source BRICS joint statistical publication 2020, p. 38 Note India’s unemployment rate is based on the data of Statista.com15

15 Statista (2021), India: Unemployment rate from 1999 to 2020, https://www.statista.

com/statistics/271330/unemployment-rate-in-india/.

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The positive aspect of the BRICS is that every BRICS country has a considerable amount of natural and human resources. Therefore, BRICS members should use the resources for the development of their countries. That will, in a way, enhance the stature of the BRICS group in international relations. Further, Table 2.12 examines the exports of goods and commercial services of the BRICS countries from 2014 to 2019. The data are taken from the BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 2020. However, there is fluctuation in the BRICS members’ goods and commercial services trade. Again, Table 2.13 explains the BRICS population ratio in different phases. The data is taken from the UNCTAD. Table 2.14 explains the FDI inflows in the BRICS countries from various sources. It says that FDI has been consistently increasing in the BRICS and contributing to the development of the countries. However, there has been a downslide since 2019 due to several global factors— notably, the United States and China trade war. Table 2.12 Value of imports and exports of goods and commercial services (million US$) Countries Brazil Russia India China South Africa

2014

2015

2016

2017

582,862 991,449 997,988 4,704,505 226,104

466,988 674,824 882,242 4,362,434 195,709

420,916 598,450 918,998 4,140,108 179,706

473,265 737,731 4,641,545 202,650

2018

2019

532,641 852,146 836,235 844,157 600,088 5,199,017 5,122,632 219,022 208,063

Source BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 2020, p. 168

Table 2.13 Age structure and dependency ratio of the BRICS population Year

BRICS

1950 2019 2050

Population (Millions)

Dependency ratio (percentage)

0–14

15–64

65+

Child (0–14)

Old-age (65+)

411 707 574

719 2213 2226

49 296 682

57.1 31.9 25.8

6.9 13.4 30.6

Total

64 45.3 56.4

Source UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2020, p. 68, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-doc ument/tdstat45_en.pdf

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The positive thing with the group says that the BRICS countries also started spending their FDI’s to other countries. Remarkably, the Western countries. Table 2.15 says how it is happening and improving outflows FDI’s from the BRICS countries. Table 2.16 says how the BRICS group growth rate will increase in the coming decades. The critical aspect of this projection is that the BRICS exceeds the United States, the EU, and other Western countries’ growth rate. Table 2.17 examines the GDP growth rate, exports, and the BRICS’s imports from 2000 to 2018. The BRICS group performed exceptionally well compared to the other advanced countries and groups during this period. The data indicated that the BRICS performed well in the said areas despite the internal and external incidents. Further, Table 2.18 talks about the foreign exchange reserves of the BRICS countries. It says that the foreign exchange reserves of the BRICS countries are consistently increasing. The BRICS countries hold a significant share of the global foreign exchange reserves. It will give them an Table 2.14 Inflows of FDI (million US$) Countries Brazil Russia India China South Africa

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

97,180 22,031 45,147 119,562 5775

74,718 6853 55,559 126,267 1730

78,248 32,539 60,220 126,001 2235

70,332 28,557 60,974 131,035 2010

8785 62,001 134,966 5450

31,975 51,429 138,135 4624

Source BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 2020, p. 168

Table 2.15 Outflows of FDI (million US$) Countries Brazil Russia India China South Africa

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

26,040 57,082 4031 123,120 7675

13,518 22,085 8886 145,667 5747

12,816 22,314 6603 196,149 4475

6268 36,757

31,377

21,923

158,288 7377

143,037 4076

136,908 3119

Source BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 2020, p. 169

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Table 2.16 The historical and projected annual growth rate of GNP per capita, %

Country Group

2008–2017

2018–2022

2023–2030

1.7 5.4 0.7 0.6 0.8

2.4 4.7 1.4 1.5 1.2

2.5 4.5 1.3 1.8 1.4

1.1

2.8

2.8

World BRICS USA Europe Other developed countries Other emerging countries

Source Tamara Parfinenko (2019), International Economic Integration of BRICS countries-driver of regional and global economic growth, Atlantis Press, p. 430, Volume 131

Table 2.17 BRICS in the World Economy for 2000–2018 (percentage of Global Indicators) Indicator

2000– 2004

2005– 2009

2015

2016

2017

2018

13.1 25.6 22

24.04 24.29 15.58

24.98 24.58 15.74

25.31 24.09 15.62

23.58 23.88 15.94

12.4 9.7 29.1

16.43 10.64 25.35

15.72 10.61 21.4

16.09 10.23 26.04

20.31 12.41 32.62

10.5 14.1 24.17

14.92 13.4 24.17

14.66 13.42 24.17

15.4 13.06 24.17

15.84 12.57 24.17

GDP BRICS USA Euro Area BRICS USA Euro Area BRICS USA Euro Area

8.5 30.6 21.3 Export 7.9 12 30.9 Import 4 14.6 24.17

Source Tamara Parfinenko (2019), International Economic Integration of BRICS countries-driver of regional and global economic growth, Atlantis Press, p. 428, Volume 131

Table 2.18 Foreign exchange reserves (million US$) Countries Brazil Russia India China South Africa

2014

2015

2016

2017

363,551 327,727 304,223 3,843,018 49,102

356,464 309,387 341,638 3,330,362 45,787

365,016 308,031 360,176 3,010,517 47,356

373,972 346,507 369,955 3,139,949 50,722

Source BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 2020, p. 169

2018

2019

365,544 371,733 433,297 412,871 481,892 3,072,712 3,107,924 51,641 55,058

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Fig. 2.5 Projected structure of the global economy (2014–2060) (Source Economic Outlook No. 95: Long-term-Baseline Projections Dataset, Organization for Economic Cooperation for Development [OECD], May 2014. The data is calculated in percentile)

added advantage for the BRICS to play an important role in emerging international political-economic relations (Fig. 2.5). The report said that BRICS’ contribution to the global economy was 33 percent only in 2014, whereas the G-7 contribution to the global economy was 45 percent in 2014. However, by 2030, BRICS would cross the G-7 group and reach 41 percent, whereas the G-7 share would reduce to 37 percent by the BRICS contribution, getting 48 percent in 2030, whereas G-7’s would be around 30 percent only. That shows BRICS would dominate the twenty-first century.

Soft Power Nature of BRICS Group The importance of BRICS in Russian foreign policy discourse has led to prominent positions. Soft Power is a concept that indicates the inclusion of civil society, of institutions in its regular activities, the deepening of humanitarian cooperation, and also assertive information and communication frameworks, which includes the use of modern information technology and the Internet (Budaev 2015). In fact, in every summit declaration, BRICS emphasizes the importance of civil society’s role in

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removing grave threats to social problems. BRICS also asserts cooperation on environmental issues, societal change, and humanitarian assistance (BRICS First Declaration 2009). The new Russian Federation’s ‘Concept of Participation for the Russian Federation in BRICS’ was drafted and passed on February 9, 2013. It clearly stated that BRICS was not established against any group or association but purely based on Soft Power diplomacy. In this context, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister S. A. Ryabkov (2013) underscored that: ‘BRICS is not a bloc related organization … it is not designed for military-political, or military cooperation, and he emphasized that, in the future, BRICS will continue to gain influence and respect in the world through Soft Power and economic and social achievements, but not through the formation of a military alliance.’ Furthermore, nearly one-third of the 34 existing formats and forms of interaction under the BRICS umbrella represents a dialogue between numerous states of civil society, including the informal public. These include economic, commercial, social, and scientific research groups, organizations like the Civic Forum, the BRICS Trade Union Forum, the Youth Forum, the Exchange Alliance, the Meeting of Twin Towns and Municipalities, the Urbanization Forum, and also the meeting of the Cooperative Associations of the BRICS countries, as well as the Seminar on Population Studies (Budaev 2015). The impressive part about the BRICS group is that official diplomacy and intensive cooperation via multiple government agencies and organizations has been happening by non-traditional ‘Soft Power’ diplomacy methods only (ibid.). The importance of the Soft Power phenomenon in BRICS started from its very inception itself. It could be seen with the establishment of the BRICS Think Tank Council at the 2011 New Delhi BRICS summit. All five members signed the BRICS Academic Forum at the 2013 Durban Summit. It was intended for collaboration with diverse research organizations to research BRICS (Budaev 2015). Another vital aspect of the BRICS soft power asset is that BRICS strives to promote new rules and civilized standards of global governance. BRICS is a system that makes it possible to communicate between various civilizations, be it Indian, Chinese, Eurasian/Russian, African, or Latin American. Thus, this framework for inter-civilizational dialogue can promote the mutual advancement of several cultures and thwart a Westernized cultural expansion and its comprehensive policies by a few ‘golden billion’ countries (Titarenko and Petrovsky 2015). The question that then arises is: what

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makes BRICS unique, and what makes it unique given the number of groups in the international system?

Reasons for the Emergence of BRICS as a Decisive Group The inter-continental representation of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Eurasia gives the BRICS group a stellar identity in the history of international relations. China and Russia’s inclusion in the group, and their membership in the UNSC, give more advantage for influence in its present and future world politics. Renowned scholar Andrew Hurrell (2006) provides a few reasons for the BRICS collective. These are listed below. • BRICS countries have an equally high level of similar political, economic, and military power resources. They have some degree of cohesion regionally and inter-regionally, and they only can create a new international order. • All BRICS countries have the same ambition to become influential global powers. • The countries have hastened the cooperation among these countries regionally and inter-regionally. • These countries have some sort of unique differentiation of their own within the governments of emerging nations. The inability of many scores of other global bodies to handle the world’s political and economic affairs made these five big countries come together to reform them. The uniqueness with BRICS is the transcontinental representation, unlike other groups. It is a global body with a global agenda (Akulov 2012). As far as current trends in the East and West are concerned, they are always in a puzzle with one or the other. Nonetheless, things have changed, be it the Korean issue, the South China issue, or the other global issues like the Afghanistan crisis. The rise of BRICS as a global group will remain a balancing factor for future international relations among the southern and Western world (Guerrero 2011). Ever since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the balance of power in international relations has changed with the rise of BRICS

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countries. It is understandable that these countries naturally challenged the dominance of specific forces in the global decision-making processes (Akulov 2012). The BRICS group got international fame with their active involvement in global affairs. It was mainly during the 2011 UN Security Council meeting to pass Resolution Number 1973 over NATO’s bombing of Libya. During that time, Brazil, India, China, and Russia abstained from vetoing the decision in their solidarity as BRICS members, while South Africa was the only one to accept it (United Nations Security Council 2011). Thus, BRICS has been surfacing its voice on copious global affairs with unison and intensifying its unity through regular intervals and conventions. In a way, BRICS is a beacon for Russian and Chinese foreign policy interests. Every year, BRICS meetings take place amid new and existing global issues. For instance, in 2012, New Delhi, where the basic theme was ‘BRICS Partnership for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity,’ dealing with Iranian Nuclear issues and Afghanistan (Ministry of External Affairs of India 2012). And in the Durban Summit in South Africa, in which BRICS countries declared that the international community should reject further militarization of Syria because the problem could be resolved through formal dialogues only (Ministry of External Affairs of India 2013). Likewise, in every BRICS summit, the global issues will be dominated in the majority of the discussion of the BRICS summit. For instance, The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the BRICS group met on June 1, 2021, via Video Conferencing on the landmark occasion of the 15th anniversary of the BRICS. The Ministers reaffirmed that the BRICS countries shared values of peace, freedom, and the rule of law, respect for human rights, and democracy made all nations come together. The BRICS group aimed at for building a more fair, just, inclusive, equitable, and representative multipolar international system are the common, based on international law and the UN Charter, respect for their territorial integrity and mutual respect will help in building a better place for all the BRICS members. That is how the BRICS is committed to reform for the UN architecture, fighting for international peace and security, making the international financial architecture more inclusive, changing the rigidities of global trade and development, and facing global health issues together.16 16 Ministry of External Affairs of India (2021), BRICS Joint Statement on Strengthening and Reforming the Multilateral System, June 1, 2021, https://www.mea.gov.in/ bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/33888/BRICS_Joint_Statement_on_Strengthening_and_Ref orming_the_Multilateral_System.

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BRICS symbolizes the stand taken together by these two countries over the Arab crisis (Libya crisis and the Syria crisis), the Ukraine crisis, the energy cooperation. It made other BRICS countries take a collective stand during the BRICS annual summit (Burges 2011; Sweig 2014; Stuenkel 2012; Panova 2014). Gleb Ivashentsov, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, Deputy Director of Russian APEC17 study center, while giving an interview to Russia’s Direct Journal on July 8, 2015, said that BRICS tackles not only economic issues but also geopolitical ones. Though BRICS countries do not accept the pressure coming from the West over their economic and political issues, that does not mean that the BRICS does not build its own economic and political alliance against the West. That is how BRICS has called for making a polycentric and more democratic, fair, and safe world. Specifically, in every BRICS summit, there comes one vision and many issues, which have been explained in the following passages. Then what is the role and objective of the BRICS in present-day international relations? Reform of the present international relations structure is the fundamental objective behind the creation of BRICS. In each of the BRICS summits, declarations called for reform of the global institutional system of world politics. BRICS believes in a lack of democracy in international institutional representation and the membership and global decisionmaking process. BRICS wants to change with active cooperation from the global north and global south. BRICS regards that the changes occurring in present international relations should be given space for somewhat neglected and less developed countries in the global decision-making process. BRICS frequently mentions that the time has come to realize the importance of the global south in international relations. Whether the country is poor or rich, weak or powerful, there should be an equal say in any international relations decision-making process. Indeed, Fig. 2.6 shows how BRICS is using international organizations in their meetings and consultation in the process of calling them to create a reform filled with a democratic representative of global institutions. Larionova wrote it in 2012, where he mentioned how often BRICS countries had made references toward the reforming of international institutions from 2008 through 2012. 17 The full form is Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, established in 1989. It was established in response to the growing interdependence among Asia Pacific economies.

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Fig. 2.6 BRICS references to international institutions, 2008–2012, percentage share of references made (Source Larionova 2012, BRICS in the System of Global Governance, p. 42)

The figure explains that during its meetings, BRICS countries made references to the UN 22.45 percent of the time, 17.56 percent of the time to the G-20, 14.69 percent of the time to the IMF, 10.61 of the time to the World Bank, 10.2 percent of the time to the WTO, and 4.9 percent of the time to the UN General Assembly. It indicates how BRICS is trying to reform the global institutional structure. Therefore, the BRICS must strive for a new global order based on exclusivity, principles of inclusivity, the indivisibility of security for all, cooperative and sustainable security behavior, and sovereign equality of all states of global politics. It should also try to connect peace, security, and development. It should also strive hard to establish an international system based on the supremacy of international law and norms rather than force (Observer Research Foundation 2017, p. 68)18 because the BRICS can become a hub for global political economy in ensuing international 18 Observer Reseaarch Foundation (2017), Realizing the BRICS long-term goals: Road-maps and pathways, A proposal by the BRICS Think Tanks Council, https:// www.nkibrics.ru/system/asset_publications/data/595a/0f00/6272/6948/82d5/0000/ original/Realizing_the_BRICS_Long-Term_Goals._Road-Maps_and_Pathways._A_prop osal_by_the_BRICS_Think_Tanks_Council..pdf?1499074302.

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relations. The BRICS Think Tanks Council in 2017 argued the BRICS members to increase the collaboration of the BRICS hitherto neglected areas. The BRICS countries are located in different parts of the planet. They are closely interconnected through ocean sea-lanes and routes. The fact is that about 80 percent of the global trade takes place by Sea. Therefore, the BRICS members may increase the relations over the oceans to strengthen the collaboration.19 At the same time, the BRICS group can grow in Research and Development (R & R&D). Scholars Sokolov, Shashnov, and Kotsemir (2021) research said that except for South Africa in the group, other members of the BRICS have a lot of scope for science and technology development. However, BRICS group members have to invest in this sector. But, China’s R&D is three times higher than the combined expenditures of all other BRICS countries. For instance, in 2014, China reached 496.0 bln USD (PPP) in 2017, whereas the United States (the world’s R&D expenditure) was 543.2 bln USD in 2017. China’s R&D has been steadily increasing for the last 15 years, while other BRICS countries have remained essentially unchanged. Therefore, the BRICS group countries have to look into it. According to the NDB members, they currently represent 42 percent of the world’s total population and 20 percent of the global GDP, according to NDB members, which is not reflected in their voting power in the international monetary system. Notably, the NDB members oppose the informal arrangement that historically has been in place, as the World Bank presidency is always is from the United States and the IMF’s leadership is always is from Europe. And there is no significant change in the voting power despite continued demand for reforming them. It is said that even after the recent reforms, the BRICS holds 13.68 percent of the World Bank’s voting shares and 14.7 percent of the IMF’s (Hooijmaaijers 2019). Whatever may be the reason, the BRICS group with solid economic growth, the most substantial commonality between the members is that all the BRICS member’s governments explicit desire to acquire higher social status in international relations (Roren and Beaumont 2019: 429). Scholar Jim O Neill (2021) says that the actual growth rate of the world may not reach 4 percent surpassing the past two decades 3.7 percent of them could also be challenging. However, four factors will determine whether we get the growth required by the world. They are productivity

19 Ibid. 14, p. 74.

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in developed economies, how quickly China’s growth trend slows, the success of India, and whether the other highly populated emerging market economies like Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, and Vietnam emerge. Apart from that, In the aftermath of COVID-19, emerging market economies, especially the larger ones, must adopt intelligent fiscal policies that prioritize public investment. We need a different basis for assessing budgetary policy’s fundamental economic framework and circumstances. Specifically, the time has come to distinguish between government investment spending and consumer spending; the former is likely to have a positive multiplier effect and should not be treated from an accounting perspective the same as government expenditures on consumption. Tackling climate change and future health threats requires such investments. Emerging market economies’ achievement of their growth potential depends on such investment, arguably more critical for economic growth than financial conditions.20 Finally, China and Russia indeed have antagonistic political relations with the United States. However, India has a different perspective on this issue. Apart from that, India has invested heavily in India–US relations and participated in various groups the United States has initiated. Considering this, India may not feel okay with any diatribe against the US role in international relations. Therefore, the success of the BRICS depends on the bilateral relations the BRICS group will have (Rajagopalan 2020).

Conclusion This chapter explains how BRICS came about to be established and the history that led to its evolution, first through the nation-state’s emergence and then from the transformation of a bipolar to multipolar world order. It further discusses how the third world countered the uni-polarity of the American cultural hegemony and domination in establishing alternate institutions and security systems, particularly BRICS. The chapter goes into the history of polarity and focuses on multipolar world order in international relations. Later, the chapter stressed the theoretical background of multipolarity. It illustrated the Russian and Chinese versions of 20 Neill, Jim O (2021), Is the emerging World Still Emerging? IMF, Summer 2021, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2021/06/jim-oneill-revisits-bricsemerging-markets.htm.

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multipolarity and their cooperation over a multipolar strategy in international relations. Again, it explained how world politics changed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The chapter dealt with the changing dynamics of international relations and rising power nations, developing national contribution to the global economy. Finally, the chapter discussed the theoretical orientation of BRICS. It explained the basic information about BRICS, its commerce, health, education, social, and economic indicators. This chapter also expounded BRICS financial strength, BRICS’s contribution to global trade, and its GDP. It stressed how BRICS countries’ positive growth rate would surpass countries in business and economy shortly. It has been illustrated with pertinent institutional data. The chapter also describes the role that BRICS has played on global issues, global governance, and BRICS’ stand on specific international issues. Finally, the chapter ends with a systemic explanation of BRICS summit declarations since 2009 and up to 2021. According to the analysis of the above passages, it has been proven that the BRICS will be the critical center of world politics in the upcoming international relations arena. Notably, it indicated the growing multifaceted cooperation between group countries despite their bilateral relations sometimes causing trouble in the group coordination.

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Jesus Visira de, Diego Santos. 2014. The Benign Multipolarity: Brazil’s foreign policy under Dilma Rousseff. Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy 2(1): 19–42. Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Gregory Raymond. 1994. A Multipolarity Peace? Great Power Politics in the twenty First Century. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Kozyrev, Andrei. 1994. The Lagging Partnership. Foreign Affairs 73 (3): 59–71. Kratochvil, Petr. 2002. Multipolarity: American Theory and Russian Practice. In At the Conference of Annual CEEISA Convention, Moscow, 2002. Larionova, Marina and Shelepov, Andrey. (2021). BRICS, G20, and Global Economic Governance Reform. International Political Science Review. August 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121211035122. Lo, Bobo. 2008. Axis of Convenience. Washington DC: Brookings institution press. Maddison, Angus. (2001). The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Development Center Studies, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, [Online: web], accessed on August 27, 2015, http://theunb rokenwindow.com/Development/MADDISON%20The%20World%20Econ omy--A%20Millennial.pdf. Makarychev, Andrey, and Viatcheslav Morozov. 2011. Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Beyond: A Menu of Russia’s Policy Strategies. Global Governance 17 (3): 353–373. Mastanduno, Michael. 2009. System Maker and Privilage Taker: The United States and the International Political Economy. World Politics 61 (1): 121– 154. The Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 2000. National Security Concept of the Russian Federation 2000, January 10, 2000, [Online: web], accessed on June 16, 2014, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/off icial_documents//asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/589768. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peoples Republic of China. 2001. Treaty of GoodNeighborliness and Friendly cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, signed on July 16, 2001, [Online: web], accessed on September 28, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t15771.shtml. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2006. President Hu Jintao Delivers a Speech at China–Africa summit, November 4, 2006, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/tptb/t404200.htm. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peoples Republic of China. 2008. Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation on Major International Issues, issued on May 23, 2008, [Online: web], accessed on September 10, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/ 2649_665393/t465821.shtml.

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. 2012. Follow the Trend of World Development to Deepen China-Russia Strategic Cooperation, Chinese premier Li Keqiang speech at the Moscow State University on April 30, 2012, [Online: web], http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/ zzjg_663340/dozys_664276/gjlb_664280/3220_664352/3223_664358/ t933095.shtml. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 2012. Fourth BRICS SummitDelhi Declaration, this summit was held at New Delhi on March 29, 2012, [Online: web], accessed on June, 19, 2014, http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-doc uments.htm?dtl/19158/Fourth+BRICS+Summit++Delhi+Declaration. Ministry of External Affairs of Government of India. 2013. 5th BRICS Summit Declaration-eThekwini Declaration, this summit was held at Durban, South Africa on March 27, 2013, [Online: web], Accessed on November 19, 2015, http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/21482. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. 2013. Xi Jinping Calls for the Building of New Type of International Relations with Win-Win Cooperation at the Core in a Speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Xi Jinping speech on March 23, [Online: web], Accessed June 23, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpcf1_ 665694/t1024781.shtml. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China. 2014. Vice Foreign Minister Cheng Guoping and Russian Ambassador to China Andrey Denisov Jointly Hold Press Conference, it had held on January 28, 2014, [Online: web], accessed on May 19, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceil/eng/ zgxw/t1127382.htm. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation. 2013. C O N C E P T of participation of the Russian Federation in BRICS, adopted on May 7, 2012, [Online: web], accessed on February 19, 2015, http://static.kremlin. ru/media/events/eng/files/41d452b13d9c2624d228.pdf. Morgenthu, Hans. 1948. Politics Amongst Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Mac GraHill. Observer Reseaarch Foundation. 2017. Realizing the BRICS Long-Term Goals: Road-Maps and Pathways. A Proposal by the BRICS Think Tanks Council. https://www.nkibrics.ru/system/asset_publications/data/595a/0f00/ 6272/6948/82d5/0000/original/Realizing_the_BRICS_Long-Term_G oals._Road-Maps_and_Pathways._A_proposal_by_the_BRICS_Think_Tanks_ Council..pdf?1499074302. Panova, Victoria. 2016. Who makes BRICS more alive than BRICSers themselves. Russian International Affairs Council, [Online: web], accessed on June 10, 2016, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=7699#top-content. People’s Republic of China Consulate of Havan. 2006. Statement by Yang Jiechi Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Head of the Delegation of The People’s

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CHAPTER 3

Russia and BRICS

Introduction The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 is a significant incident in recent history of Russia. Since then, Russian foreign policy got drastically changed. The foreign policy became rudderless. Further, Russia had to face copious domestic and international challenges. However, after Primakov’s affairs, the Russian foreign policy gradually tilted toward Global South. While moving toward the global south, Russia encouraged third world countries to be vocal on various global issues. While collaborating with the Global South, Russia nudged the global south countries to be part of international and regional organizations. Thus, they would resolve common concerns and problems effectively. The best example in this regard is BRICS and SCO. After that, Russia is actively participating in those organizations. Specifically, the BRICS has been getting much attention from Russian foreign policymakers. The reasons are many due to the colossal impact of the BRICS in the subsequent international order. In this regard, the chapter will explore how Russia became part of the BRICS. The chapter expounds on the essential strategies of Russia to be part of the BRICS. It also explains how the BRICS will help the Russian foreign policy objectives. Historically, Russia has had to fight several wars to maintain its status as a superpower within international relations. After the Byzantine Empire’s

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fall1 in the fifteenth century, Russia became the center of Eastern Christianity.2 Subsequently, Russia fought the Ottoman Empire3 to defend Orthodox Christians in the Crimean and Balkan wars. Later in Russian history, Russia fought with the United States and Britain to protect its territorial spheres (Tsygankov 2010). Again, right after the Soviet disintegration, the United States had a chance to build a multilateral world order together with other major powers. But it lost this opportunity unwisely. The United States unprecedentedly attempted to remain as the sole superpower in international affairs. The United States began to substitute international law with a law of force and legitimate decisions of the UN Security Council, with directives of the US National Security Council. It also overrode the Organization for security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE)prerogatives with NATO actions, ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1996.4 Furthermore, NATO’s eastward expansion,5 the forceful partition of Yugoslavia, the illegal invasion of Iraq, and the blatant disregard for the UN and the OSCE, its arms control issues, and its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002—all collectively created an environment of a US power monopoly in world affairs. More importantly, the United States treated Russia as an inferior during this period, despite Russia’s decision to end the Soviet empire and the Cold War (Arbatov 2014). Therefore, naturally, it had aggravated the relations between the United States and Russia over some time. But, the Russian Federation, after the Soviet disintegration, tried

1 It was established by a man called Byzas, in an ancient Greek colony. It was the

continuation of the Roman Empire in the Greek-speaking, Eastern parts of the Mediterranean, which were Christian in nature. It was perennially in war with Muslims, flourishing during the reign of the Macedonian emperors. 2 It refers collectively to the Christian traditions and Churches that developed in Greece, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Asia Minor, the Middle East, Northeastern Africa and Southern India over several centuries of religious antiquities. 3 It emerged circa 1300, with the establishment by the Ottoman ruler Osman, which was a small principality bordering on the Byzantine territory of Western Anatolia. 4 It is a legal binding global ban on nuclear explosive testing and the final step in the vision laid out in the fifty years ago by the president John F. Kennedy. The CTBT was opened for signature in 1996. 5 It is a process of NATO’s enlargement towards Eastern Europe, with this all of the Eastern Europe became members of NATO over a period of time, which was once part of Soviet Union So Russia believes that it is a grave threat to its security.

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to have good terms with the United States and tilted its foreign policy toward the West. The Russian federation stayed with the West during the Yeltsin period. However, it did not continue for an extended period. However, the Kremlin foreign Policy structure completely changed with Putin coming into the picture. Russia became more pragmatic, assertive, and active in international relations. Russia’s stature also improved gigantically on a global level. As part of rebuilding Russia’s power status, Russia started increasingly connecting with the world to reform undemocratic representations within international institutional structures. In the process, Russia began pushing itself to establish new groups and forums. SCO and BRICS emerged as the best examples of organizational groups in this instance. Scholar Nikolai Fedorov (2017) of St. Petersburg State University stated that, ‘SCO is a regional organization dealing with a relatively close circle of problems. BRICS has a more global character, a forum of regional powers, pretending for a more significant role in world politics, “alternative” to G-7.’ That is the way Russia emphasizes more on the BRICS group. Apart from that, the BRICS political sway emerged because its member states are reputable members of other leading international organizations and entities, such as the UN, G-8, G-20, the Non-Aligned Movement, the group of 77, and so on. Furthermore, these countries are also part of several other regional organizations and associations (Concept of Participation of the Russian Federation in BRICS 2013). Particularly, since the Ukraine crisis onwards, the relations of Russia and the West have been continuously straining. Therefore, it has led Russia to reorient its focus toward non-Western institutions and cement its place with other like-minded nations. Apart from that, Russia initiated the Eastern Economic Forum (2015), extending the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) (Kapoor 2020). For instance, the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council is the highest supranational body of the Eurasian Economic Union. It is composed of the Heads of State or Government of Members States of the EAEU decided to extend its trade agreements with more countries sooner or later (Devonshire-Ellis 2021). Russia introduced the ‘Greater Eurasia’ project (2016) (Kapoor 2020). Russia is also actively involved in various global and regional organizations like the SCO, BRICS, G-20 to enhance its foreign policy and strive hard for a multipolar world order in international relations. However, Russia is giving more importance to the BRICS group due to BRICS potential and continental representation.

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The USSR Disintegration After the USSR’s disintegration, the United States remained without a competing power in equal scale or strength. Till the beginning of the twenty-first century, US power had gone beyond that limit. Hence, Washington believed that the world was moving toward a ‘single superpower’ long reign. Further, under George W. Bush’s Presidency, the United States had over-exerted itself to consolidate the unipolar system of world affairs (Rogov 2014). They remained the most powerful, while the rest of the Western European countries, and Japan, became second fiddle within international relations. With this trend, the United States often went against the wishes of its allies. For example, France and the UK were not okay with the invasion of Iraq. The United States became so powerful that it remained unquestionable at a certain point, to put it mildly. At the same time, Russia was experiencing the shocks of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, where politically, economically, and socially, Russia was in deep trouble. From 1992 to 1996, Russia’s economy contracted to 50 percent; livestock inventory fell by 48 percent, and railroad freight transportation declined by 47 percent. Sometimes, it was considered much more damaging than the 1930 American great depression (Sergey 2015). Incidentally, Russia lost its stature as a great power nation. Foreign policy objectives were becoming directionless. After the Soviet Union’s disintegration, Russia made Boris Yeltsin its President and Andrei Kozyrev its foreign policy minister at this critical juncture. In the beginning, the system was more or less West-oriented, and sometimes there was a desire to succumb to a West-imposed world order system only merely. In this connection, Nixon and Kozyrev’s conversation can be seen as contextual. During the discussion, Kozyrev asks Nixon, If you can advise us on how to define our national interests, we will be very grateful. (Mankoff 2009: 29 and Rumer and Wallander 2003)

At this point, Russia’s foreign policymakers could not independently define their foreign policy objectives. Russia ignored the fundamentals of its foreign policy objectives, and its foreign policy remained mostly West-oriented, as Chenoy (2001) remarked. Russian foreign policy tilted toward the West during Yeltsin and Kozyrev’s time (Chenoy 2001: 240). Further, when Russia separated from the USSR, there were complete chaos and anarchy in the policy condition. And, Russian foreign policy

3

Table 3.1 Russian Federation Annual GDP growth rate of 1990–1993

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Year

GDP annual growth rate (In %)

1990 1991 1992 1993

−3 −5.047 −14.5 −8.669

Source World Bank data files

became unstable, and a scarcity of subjective roots. Russia went under deep distress, internal political instability, and external debts. There was a severe economic crisis and spiraling inflation (Rumer and Wallander 2003). Russia’s power capability at the international level declined substantially. It lost one-sixth of the territory as the economy shrank by around fifty percent, and the State became divided by influential individuals (ibid.) (Table 3.1). With this background, the new Russian federation’s Constitution of 1993 clearly stated that ‘reviving the Russian Federation’s sovereign statehood and asserting the firmness of its democratic basis of world politics’ (Russian Federation Constitution 1993)6 was significant. Russia constructed a few doctrines to rebuild the Russian position within international relations. Three essential security documents of the Russian federation originated in the 1990s—National Security Concept (NSC),7 Foreign Policy Concept (FPC),8 and the Military Doctrine (MD),9 which

6 The Constitution of new Russian Federation adopted on December 12, 1993 and in preamble only they have mentioned these above mentioned words, [Online: web], accessed on June 12, 2014, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_ publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/571508. 7 The National Security Concept is the base for Russian security policy in internal affairs and in international affairs. It is adopted on January 10, 2000, [Online: web], accessed on June 12, 2014, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publis her/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/589768. 8 The new Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept is the base for framing of Russian foreign policy, [Online: web], http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_doc uments/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186. 9 The Russian Federation Military Doctrine (1993), https://fas.org/nuke/guide/rus sia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html#:~:text=The%20%22Basic%20Provisions%20of%20the% 20Military%20Doctrine%22%20determine%20the%20strictly,from%20the%20life%20of%20h umankind%2C.

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cued that Russia could emerge as a great power and crucial actor country within international arena (Hass 2010). But Russia was sidelined throughout the last decade of the twentieth century and ignored in international affairs after the Cold War. Without consulting Russian interests, the West also went ahead and divided Yugoslavia. Further, the NATO’s eastward expansion continued without any breaks. At this stage, Russian policymakers finally instigated to transform their policy structure significantly.

Independent Russia Since Twenty-First Century Russia welcomed the twenty-first century with mixed feelings. Their foreign policy slowly shifted toward southern world countries (Trenin 2004). Russia started changing with the accession of Putin into Kremlin. Putin was brought to Kremlin by Yeltsin and made Prime Minister in 1999. In 2000, as President of the new Russian Federation, Putin vowed to rebuild the Russian stature in international relations. And he declared that Russia wants to be a free, prosperous, wealthy, healthy, and civilized country (Putin 2000). For this to realize, Putin indicated that rebuilding Russia was his primary objective and priority through his policies. Putin changed the National Security Concept of Russian Federation policy objectives as part of this plan. The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation on January 10, 2000, declared that: Several states are stepping up efforts to weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily, and other ways. Attempts to ignore Russia’s interests when resolving significant international relations issues, including conflict situations, can undermine global security and stability and inhibit the positive changes occurring in international relations.10

Putin also realized the importance of the so-called underdeveloped countries and their role in international relations. For this, Putin gave importance to southern world countries, and the near abroad region, by

10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2000), “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation” adopted on January 10, 2000, [Online: web], accessed on June 10, 2013, URL: www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/ asset_publisher/.../58976.

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rejecting the one-sided decision-making process in international relations. As Chenoy (2001) observed, Russian foreign policymakers rejected theories of imperialism that had been the basis of the Soviet Union foreign policy, shunned contradictions with the West, and jettisoned beliefs on Russia’s natural alliance with the Third World…..and a debate between those who advocated “Atlanticism” and those who believed in “Eurasianism” as the basic Concept of Russian foreign policy ensued. (2001: 239)

Putin believed that Russia should also focus on the Eurasian region countries without ignoring the Western countries. Putin started building the Russian economy, which was under severe crisis. Russia established good relations with like-minded nations to improve international trade. For this to materialize, Putin extended his network of allies with many states, including Western ones (Kanet 2010: 209). Therefore, the main objectives of Putin during his initial presidency period were as below: ● To strengthen the Russian Federation’s stature on an international level. ● To restore the Russian Federations’ status as a global player in world politics. ● To bring back growth and stabilization of the economy and the revival of manufacturing and manage energy resources (Rumer and Wallander 2003). The restructured policies created fruitful results. The circumstances that prevailed in international relations also led to the Russian revival. Scholars like Rumer and Wallander (2003) said that Russia’s economy improved from 4.3 percent in 2001 to 7.1 percent in 2003. Its currency became very stable as it started re-paying international debts, and the population began receiving pensions and wages regularly. Russia also runs its economic surpluses. Inflation brought down marginally, and Russia’s central bank holds a foreign currency of more than 64$ billion. Later, Putin acknowledged several economic sectors’ value to uplift the shattered economy and affirmed the importance of oil and natural gases and natural resources. Further, Russia became one of the world’s largest oil and natural gas producers. It stood in third and second positions in gas production. With this trend, Russia made huge profits, Russia’s economy

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improved, and Russia became one of the stakeholders in the world’s oil and natural gas production (ibid.). Further, since 2000, Russia’s GDP has gone up to 70 percent, its industrial growth has been 75 percent, and its investments have increased by 125 percent. With this, Russia has become part of the top ten countries in the global economy again. Russia has become a super energy power, with a government-controlled oil and gas sector. With the state control of oil and gas companies, investors have become very open and transparent, for example, with companies like Gazprom and Rosneft (Sputnik International 2008). The Stabilization Fund was established in 2004 to manage oil and gas revenues. Within a year, oil profits accumulated to 500 billion rubles, which is equal to US$18 billion. After two years, Russia repaid all its Soviet Union debts. And deduction of the Stabilization Fund helped reduce the inflation pressure on its economy. With an exceeding amount of profits accumulated under the Stabilization Fund, Russia could finally divert its profits to other development institutions (ibid.). Industrial production increased. The 1998 economic crisis benefited Russia, with its industrial development growing. According to the Russian federal statistics service, the industrial growth rate was 11.9 percent in 2000 (Sputnik International 2008). However, within two years, it got reduced by 3.7 percent. But, a new rise soon began again, and industrial growth reached 6.3 percent in 2007. Personal income increased during this period because the average wage increased from 2200 rubles (US$90) to 12,500 rubles ($500) over eight years. Poverty also reduced from 30 to 14 percent by 2008. Likewise, average pensions increased from 823 rubles ($33) to 3500 rubles ($140) (ibid.). It was not merely Putin who gave the Russian foreign policies a u-turn, but several other factors and indicators. After Putin was made President of the new Russian Federation, a distinct ‘integrationist’ trend emerged, with more collaborative communication with the United States and other Western institutions. Then, decisive efforts were made by Putin to bring normal relations with the West and even reached a new level. Russia allowed the US military presence in Central Asia to support the antiTaliban operation in Afghanistan. Putin was the first to call Bush after the 9/11 incident (Ivano 2011) and express his solidarity. However, the scene had changed drastically with the United States’s diabolical policies leading west toward Russian geostrategic territorial areas in Russia’s post-Soviet space.

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Growing Assertiveness of Russian Foreign Policy Despite such efforts from Moscow, NATO continued with its geographic enlargement attempts, despite persistent objections from the Russian federation. Further, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Soviet-US ABM Treaty in 2002. It means that the United States was still trying to undermine Russia through a system of strategic balance between Moscow and Washington (Ivano 2011). Here, Putin had to redesign his foreign policy objectives and become more assertive and pragmatic. During the famous Munich International Security conference in 2007 on February 12, Putin criticized the US foreign policy by remembering Franklin D. Roosevelt’s words before World War II, when he emphatically mentioned that. Peace has broken everywhere. The peace of all countries everywhere is in danger. (Putin 2007)11

These words prevailed to be contextually significant in present-day world politics. The Munich Conference in 2007 on Security Policy was the clear-cut division between Russia and the West, where Putin lashed out at the West’s diabolic attitude toward Russia. The remarks he made mentioned here: Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy. We are not going to change this tradition today. At the same time, we are well aware of how the world has changed, and we have a realistic sense of our opportunities and potential. And of course, we would like to interact with responsible and independent partners with whom we could work together in constructing a fair and democratic world order, which would ensure security and prosperity not only for a select few but for all. (Putin 2007)12

Furthermore, the US aggression toward the Russian strategic region, and its active involvement in the CIS region, caused severe damage 11 President of Russia (2007), “Speech and the following discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy”, February 10, 2007, [Online: web], accessed on May 16, 2014, URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/page/251. 12 Ibid.

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to Russia and Western relations. Russia had to become more aggressive, considering the conditions that prevailed. In this context, the State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachev said that the new foreign policy concept should consider Russia’s unique role as a richer and more assertive power (Haas 2010). In this context, Russia started allocating more grants to its Defense Budget and investing excessively in military apparatus production. Gradually, Russia built its military potential, competed in the global arms trade, and started challenging the US military-technical areas. Due to this economic diversity, Russia’s economic growth and stature in international arms trade eventually increased. The forced circumstances around Russia’s territory also had Russia increase its defense budget rapidly (Tables 3.2 and 3.3). However, Russia displayed its strength during the Georgia incident in August 2008, when Russian forces invaded and occupied large parts of Georgia. Subsequently, Russia gave the international community the impression that it is back and capable of projecting itself as a powerful country (Hass 2010). Later, for the first time in August 2008, Russia used military forces abroad in South Caucasus (Arbatov 2014), a sudden shift in the Russian foreign policy strategy. Another major incident was Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Pifer 2020). It signaled that Russia was ready to take to war if required. Since then, the Russian foreign policy structure changed and emphasized significant developing countries like China, India, and Brazil. Table 3.2 Russia’s total exports and share of arms exports

Russia’s total exports in billion USD Share of arms export in percentile

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

243.6 2.52

303.9 2.13

354.4 2.13

471.6 1.77

334 2.96

400.4 2.59

Source Russian Federal State Statistics Service, CAST Calculations

Table 3.3 Russian defense budget, billion USD in current prices

Total Ministry of the Interior Ministry of Defense Exchange rates, roubles/USD

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

19.9 6.6 13.3 28.31

26.4 8.9 17.5 27.14

33.8 11.3 22.5 25.55

39.9 13.3 26.5 24.89

38.9 13.0 25.9 31.76

44.7 14.6 30.0 30.38

Source Russian Ministry of Finance, Russian Central Bank, CAST Calculations

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Southward Shift in Russian Foreign Policy The West became skeptical of Russia’s role in international affairs with this. Therefore, Putin once again shifted his foreign policy priorities. Putin emphasized southern world countries like China, India, and Iran, especially the so-called ‘pariah’ states like North Korea and Cuba, as part of that shift, with political, economic, and military tools (Arbatov 2014). After Putin, Dmitri Medvedev became the Russian President; however, Medvedev’s tenure was a mere extension of Putin’s foreign policy. Medvedev’s foreign policy also underscored that their primary focus would be Troika states, i.e., India and China. So during that time, three concepts were circling in Russian mainstream thinking and policy doctrines for global governance: the following. ● A Multipolar World ● Sovereign Democracy, and ● Multilateral Diplomacy (Zagorski 2010). Russian foreign policy continued to remain transparent, predictable, and pragmatic. Its foreign policy was consistent and continuous and reflected Russia’s unique role as a counterbalance in global affairs and the development of a worldwide civilization (Russian Foreign Policy Concept 2013).13 Russia maintained a balancing approach with the Western and Southern world countries. However, Putin’s bias toward the southern world nations was reflected in his foreign policy concepts and security concepts resulting from SCO, BRICS, etc. Russia’s relationship with BRICS has even become a debating point within international relations since 2009 due to several of BRICS objectives and actions. Russia was the first country to give a political shape to the BRICS and promote its activities in regular intervals. The growing instability, turbelent times and modern nation states are important actors of contemprary international relations rather than global institutions. While this changed with the rise of BRICS, how does Russia now view BRICS? What is Russia’s role in the evolution of the BRICS group? What is its approach toward BRICS? How will Russia use BRICS as a platform for change? Can Russia use BRICS as a platform to counter 13 Russian Foreign Policy Concept (2013), https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/for eign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186.

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Western hegemonic domination in international relations? The chapter further talks about it in a detailed manner. First and foremost, Russia realizes that Russia needs to play a decisive role in BRICS to make the BRICS an influential player in present world affairs. Indeed, Russia mobilized other group members to shape BRICS as a political and economic group. Furthermore, the role of Russia in BRICS would be a deciding factor in its dominance in international politics.

Russia’s Role in the Origin of BRICS Putin was the first to propel this group as a more political group and coordinate the group for a more democratic world order in international relations (Akulov 2012). Russia was the first country to establish the BRICS group and was one of the major geopolitical events at the beginning of the twenty-first century. After that, the group managed to change prominent factors in world affairs, and the establishment of BRICS became a landmark trend in forming a polycentric system within international relations. BRICS is increasingly characterized by using non-institutionalized global governance approaches, network-based diplomacy, and enhancing the economic interdependence of states (Concept of Participation of the Russian Federation in BRICS 2013).14 The Concept said that the international arena’s BRICS authority is based on a growing economic power within its member countries. Along with its natural resources and a share of the world population, it is a driving force within the global economy. However, the most intrinsic process of establishing BRICS took place only just before the Munich Security Conference. Putin delivered a speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007, underscoring Russia’s focus on southern world countries in emerging international relations. And Putin stated that Russia wanted to maintain an independent foreign policy to ensure international relations. Before that incident, he intensified meetings with China, India, and Brazil and made them take political form within the BRIC group. At the same time, at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, Putin

14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian federation (2013), “C O N C E P T of participation of the Russian Federation in BRICS”, adopted on May 7, 2012, [Online: web], accessed on February 19, 2015, URL: http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/eng/ files/41d452b13d9c2624d228.pdf.

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(2007)15 said that the rising power nations’ economic potential increased so that the political influence would increase. It would convert into a democratic world order. On September 20, 2006, Putin called for a ministerial meeting of the group members at the sidelines of the 61st United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. In the session, all the foreign ministers of China, Brazil, Russia, and India’s defense minister met and expressed a desire to expand multilateral cooperation under the BRICS platform (BRICS Information Organization 2015).16 In 2007, at the 62nd UN General Assembly meeting in New York, met all the BRIC members’ foreign ministers. After that, several meetings took place before the first summit was held. BRIC state heads met on July 9, 2008, at the G-7 Toyako-Onsen, Hokkaido summit, Japan. In the meeting, all the leaders agreed to have a complete discussion of BRIC countries in 2009. Again, on Russia’s initiative, all foreign ministers of group members met at Yekaterinburg on May 16, 2008. After the meeting, they issued a joint communiqué reflecting common stances on topical global development issues (Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2015).17 Later, Russia, Brazil, China, and India met at the same Yekaterinburg meeting in 2009 and issued a summit declaration as part of their global governance objectives. At the first BRIC summit held at Yekaterinburg on June 16, 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stated that BRICS would become an epicenter of world politics (Medvedev 2009).18 From then, Russia has stuck to the BRICS group through thick and thin. Furthermore, during the 2009 BRIC Summit, Medvedev opined as below: 15 President of Russia (2007), “Speech and the following discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy”, February 10, 2007, [Online: web], accessed on May 16, 2014, URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/page/251. 16 BRICS Information Organization (2015), “History of BRICS”, [Online: web], accessed on October 2, 2016, URL: http://infobrics.org/history-of-brics-2/. 17 Ministry of foreign affairs of people’s republic of China (2015), “Xi Jinping Attends 7th BRICS Summit at Ufa and Delivers Important Speech”, he delivered this speech on July 9, 2015, [Online: web], accessed on May 5, 2016, URL: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpcxjzgjldrdqchwhshhzzzcygyslshdswchy/t1280846.shtml. 18 Medvedev, Dmitri (2009), “Medvedev Press Statement of following BRIC Summit”, on June 16, 2009, [Online: web] accessed on May 28, 2015, URL: http://en.kremlin. ru/events/president/transcripts/4475.

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Overall, the pace of our economies’ development, China’s economic growth, India, Brazil, and Russia, will ultimately shape the result of many financial processes in the world and are a defining factor for industrial potential and, to a great extent, also for global security. Our goal, therefore, remains unchanged – we want to strengthen the collective and legal foundations of international life…[]…The BRIC summit aims to create the conditions for building a fairer world order and to create a favorable environment for resolving global problems. Simultaneously, we must not overlook our national issues and objectives, which are priorities for all of us and preferences for all respective leaders and governments. (Medvedev 2009)19

Since then, Russia’s regular adherence to BRICS has been continuously growing. The relations of BRIC countries are based on the below principles as according to Russia in BRICS, The relations between the BRICS countries based on the UN Charter, the universally recognized principles and norms of international law, and such principles as openness, pragmatism, solidarity, non-block nature and nonaggression towards third parties. BRICS is a vivid example of strengthening cooperative principles in world affairs. The states with cultural and civilizational differences build their relations on the principles of equality, strict consideration for each others’ interests, mutual respect, and openness to the outside world. (Russia in BRICS 2009).20

Srikant Kondapalli and Priyanka Pandith (2016) stated that Russia is the locomotive for the rise of BRICS. It was necessary to understand Russia’s bolstering multilateral ties with BRICS countries and its mobilizing support when facing west-imposed economic sanctions on Russia.

19 Ibid. 20 Russia in BRICS (2009), “Russia’s Participation in BRICS: Profile”, Russia in

BRICS, [Online: web], accessed 12 May, 2015, URL: http://brics.mid.ru/en_GB/ros sia-v-briks

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Russia’s Economic Profile in the BRICS The level of economic strength, development, and political impact became an indication of its power and influence in world affairs. As a member of BRICS, Russia has created a unique and completely different economic and political development model compared to the average Western country. The Russian Federation’s vital financial strengths are significant oil and gas-producing countries and vast foreign exchange reserves. By March 31, 2016, Russia has reached USD 328.871 million foreign exchange reserves (International Reserves of the Russian Federation 2017).21 Likewise, by May 2021, Russia’s foreign exchange reserves have gone up to US $600.9 billion. It is the highest level ever that is the US $2 billion more than the previous all-time high just before the global financial crisis (Aris 2021). More importantly, Russia has a very low government debt, at 17.7 percent only (Trading Economics 2015).22 However, Russia’s government debt rose to 40 percent by 2020. The Audit Chamber, a Russia’s government spending watchdog, says that Russia’s debt stood at 19 trillion rubles, equal to the US $257 billion at the end of 2020 and equivalent to 17.8 percent of Russia’s GDP. But one interesting fact is that it is still one of the lowest debt rates in the world (The Moscow Times, February 24, 2021). Russia is a market-driven economy, which is primarily dependent on energy exports. However, Russia has a weak environment filled with public and quasi-public companies (Kondapalli and Pandith 2016: xli). The Russian economy displays robust macroeconomic data, making it the 7th largest economy globally with its 143 million population. It has approximately 2 trillion 223 billion dollars of gross domestic product in purchasing power parity. Unlike other Western countries, Russia has been relatively resilient in the face of global volatility and other BRICS countries (Akulov 2012). However, it is slipped to the eleventh position by 2020. According to the IMF’s report, the country’s economy grew by 4 percent in 2010, 4.3 percent in 2011 and performed well in 2012.

21 International Reserves of the Russian Federation (2017), “Foreign Exchange Reserves of the Russian Federation”, [Online: web], accessed on March 23, 2017, URL: http://www.cbr.ru/eng/hd_base/default.aspx?Prtid=mrrf_m. 22 Trading Economics (2015), “Russia government Debt to GDP, 2015”, Trading Economics, [Online: web], accessed on July 15, 2016, URL: http://www.tradingecono mics.com/russia/government-debt-to-gdp.

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Even despite the West’s sanctions on Russia, it performed well with the help of China. In 2013, it was 1.3 percent; in 2014, it was 0.6 (IMF Reports of 2013 and 2014)23 percent, notwithstanding the geopolitical setbacks for Russia in International Relations. Likewise, the World Bank report says that Russia’s GDP growth is expected to rise at 3.2 percent in 2021, followed by 3.2 percent and 2.3 percent in 2022 and 2023, respectively. The World Bank reports also said global economic recovery, higher oil prices, and soft domestic monetary conditions in 2021 are projected to help a rally led by household consumption and public investment in Russia. Though it expected a slow growth rate in the coming years, it could never get as bad as the West. The damages recovered as trade between Russia and China continued to increase rapidly. And BRICS is mulling at removing dollars from the international trade transactions very soon. The World Bank (2010) report states that Russia’s per capita income is higher than other countries. According to the news, it was USD 19,840 in 2010, whereas China’s was USD 3586, Brazil’s was USD 10,700, South Africa’s was USD 7536, and India’s was USD 3586 (2010 World Bank Reports).24 Likewise, in 2015, Russia’s per capita income was USD 23,790, South Africa’s was USD 12,830, China’s was USD 14,160, Brazil’s was USD 15,020, and India’s was USD 6020 (World Bank 2015).25 That implies Russia is the wealthiest country within the BRICS group. The BRICS Joint Statistical Publication (2020) says that by 2019, Brazil’s per capita income increased to the US $8754, Russia’s is to the US $11,584, India’s is to the US $2045, China’s is to the US $10,276, and South Africa’s is to the US $5979. It indicates that Russia is the wealthiest country in the BRICS group.

23 International Monitory Fund (2015), World Economic Outlook Database, URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/index.aspx 24 The World Bank 2010, Developing Nation’s Development in 2010 Data for Nominal Report, Department of GDP Growth Rate Data, URL: http://data.worldbank.org/ind icator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG, accessed on June 17, 2016. 25 World Bank (2014), “World Bank GDP growth rate/Data since 2000 to 2014”, it is annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars, [Online: web], accessed on May 19, 2015, URL: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.

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BRICS and Russian Global Economic Strategies The establishment of BRICS resulted from the global economic recession during 2008–2009. Scholar Isachenko (2012) has underlined how BRICS membership can help Russia’s financial strategy in the long-term period. These areas are mentioned below: ● It would pave the way for improving access to foreign markets; ● BRICS membership creates greater transparency in trade policy; ● It would give space for the use of an effective dispute-resolution mechanism, and ● It can create an avenue for participation in multilateral trade negotiations and an opportunity to influence their decisions. The 2013 ‘Concept of Participation by the Russian Federation in BRICS’26 underscored that BRICS would help Russia create a more favorable environment for promoting mutual trade to encourage the Russian Federation export and the development and investment cooperation with BRICS members. The forum can help strengthen collaboration with BRICS states in international organizations, thus jointly promoting their global trade interests. Furthermore, in international trade with BRICS countries, Russia consistently increased its growth over some time. The west-imposed sanctions over Russia’s role in the Ukraine crisis also caused a significant reason. In the chart below, there is a description of how Russia increased its trade with BRICS countries (Table 3.4). Likewise, by 2020 Russia’s trade with the BRICS members has exceeded the expected targets. The following table says that (US $ millions) (Table 3.5). That is how Russia assumes that collaboration among BRICS nations in forming the international financial and monetary system will remain a long-term priority for cooperation.

26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian federation (2013), “C O N C E P T of participation of the Russian Federation in BRICS”, adopted on May 7, 2012, [Online: web], accessed on February 19, 2015, URL: http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/eng/ files/41d452b13d9c2624d228.pdf.

Source OECD Stat (2006–2015)

2059.03 1686.35 372.76

2007 2504.15 2123.97 380.18

2008 1988.95 1738.26 250.69

2009 2644.59 2397.63 246.96

2010 3279.29 3038.77 240.52

2011

3404.46 3163.84 240.62

2012

Russia’s trade with BRICS countries from 2007–2015 (US$ Billions)

Exports (in goods) Imports (in goods) Net trade (in goods)

Years

Table 3.4

3569.84 3287.97 281.87

2013

3635.60 3240.91 394.69

2014

3327.59 2667.99 659.60

2015

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Table 3.5 Russia’s trade with the BRICS members

Imports Exports

Brazil

India

China

South Africa

2010 1997.1

30,458.1 5798.6

4908.2 49,061

693.4 288.4

Source Statista: Value of Russian trade in goods

Russia’s Primary Goal in the Field (a) BRICS will bring the world economy into a robust, sustainable, and balanced growth (Concept of participation in the Russian Federation in BRICS, 2013).27 (b) The BRICS platform will help complete the IMF reform’s current stage, under the terms and conditions agreed by G-20 and the Stabilization Fund. (c) The Concept says that Russia can use it to reform the global monetary and financial system to make it more representative, stable, and predictable in terms of the international reserve currency system (ibid.).28 (d) Russia will use the BRICS forum to strengthen the G-20 as the premier group of international economic cooperation toward its members. (e) It will help enhance the role of national currencies. The mutual payments of BRICS countries develop cooperation in financial markets and bolster the BRICS countries’ financial stability (ibid.).29 At the 2015 Ufa BRICS meeting, Russian President Putin tried to strive hard at overcoming the sanctions imposed by the West. Putin mobilized the BRICS members and said that all group members should help each other, as Russia is under Western sanctions and faces a shortage of foreign financing. According to him, it was causing market instability and high volatility in oil and commodity prices. He concluded that

27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid.

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Table 3.6 NDB financial help to the Russian Federation from 2016 to 2020 (in US $million)

S.no

Year

Volume (in US $million)

1 2 3 4 5

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

100 529 840 1300 805

Source NDB annual report, 2020

in this connection, BRICS was using its internal resources through its development coffers (Mengjie 2015). Further, during the 2019 Brasilia summit, Putin said that Russia’s annual trade volume with the BRICS group exceeded the US $125 billion and grew by 22.4. Russia is ready to extend its help to the BRICS members in various areas, beneficial for all the members (Russia Briefing 2019). However, some unavoidable reasons and objectives forced Russia into the BRICS group. Russia knew they were not a superpower country; however, being a member of the UN Security Council made them one of the dominant countries in global politics. Simultaneously, for Russia, the New Development Bank (NDB) tries to meet everyday needs without anything attached. It would help mobilize Russian resources for infrastructure, sustainable development projects in the BRICS group countries and other developing countries. Notably, NDB had become an asset to solve its economic problems for Russia when the West imposed its sanctions on the Russian international trade federation (Sputnik International 2016). Russia’s rouble-denominated bonds would help the NDB finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects in the new Russian Federation (Sputnik International 2016).30 The process already started, for example, on July 20, 2016. BRICS approved a $100 million fund for a small-scale energy project in Karelia, Russia (Kulikov 2016). For instance, the NDB extended muchappreciated help to Russia since 2016. The table explains as below (Table 3.6). The question that arises is, what are the main objectives of the Russian foreign policy with the BRICS group?

30 Ibid.

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BRICS and Russia’s Foreign Policy Objective For Russia, BRICS is one means to achieve a strong position in world affairs and a channel for flexible international relations participation. Russia can enhance its influence in world affairs through BRICS. Therefore, BRICS would be one of Russia’s strategic tools to maintain global peace and stability to create a democratic world order (Russian Foreign Policy Concept 2008).31 For Russia, BRICS was a space for asserting its global player status—unlike at G-7/G-8, Russia had always been uncomfortable with partial integration with the West (Cynthia 2010). The Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in 2012 wrote an article for the Journal titled ‘International Affairs.’ The report stressed that Russia’s cooperation with the BRICS was a key long-term foreign policy strategy. Russia understood the step-by-step growth of BRICS and thus paved the way for collaboration into a multilateral strategic partnership and embraced a divergent range of global economics and political affairs issues. Notably, Russia supports positioning BRICS as a nuanced international relations model that overrides the old East–West or North– South binaries. Due to the enormous population represented by the BRICS group does not remain a mere bridge between the North and South or a ‘Mediator’ role. Russia accepted its new strategy for participation in BRICS on February 9, 2013. The process was named ‘Concept of the Russian Federation’s Participation in BRICS,’ which clearly stated that Russia wanted to make the bloc a comprehensive institution for daily cooperation on critical global issues. The document said it intends to restructure international financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank (the main focus is redistributing the quotas and votes) (Yuri 2013). While releasing this Concept, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ryabkov said that BRICS is one of Moscow’s foreign policy priorities. There are two main reasons behind the Concept: firstly, the group’s growing clout in international relations, and secondly, Russia and other group members’ shared strategic interests (Yuri 2013). The ‘Concept of the Russian Federation’s Participation in the BRICS’ lists out Russia’s primary objectives regarding BRICS, it says, including the transformation of BRICS from a forum of dialogue into a comprehensive mechanism of strategic and 31 President of Russia (2008), ‘Russian Foreign Policy Concept 2008’, January 12, 2008, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116.

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day-to-day cooperation on critical global economic and political issues. As far as Russia is concerned, BRICS is not a military bloc; however, it can strengthen international security (Yuri 2013). The Concept explained that Russia’s relations with BRICS based on the UN Charter and generally accepted principles and norms of international law, as well as principles agreed upon by the group members, such as openness, solidarity, pragmatism, non-bloc character, and a nonaggressive nature concerning third parties (Concept of Participation of Russian Federation in the BRICS 2013).32 Scholars like Nikolai Kodorov (2017) of St. Petersburg State University underscored that BRICS is an additional stage for dialogue and promoting Russia’s interests. Russia was the founding and linchpin in making this forum an influential group in present-day world politics, without which its structure would operate only within the political space of South-South countries. The 2013 Participation concept of the Russian Federation in the BRICS group is illustrated below. Being a member of BRICS and availing its Russian foreign policy has a long-term strategy. It is because, as a member, Russia seeks to achieve the following strategic objectives. (a) To provide a favorable international environment for developing and reforming the BRICS countries’ economies and financial systems, all member countries’ standard approaches must be equitable, stable, and practical (ibid.).33 (b) The group countries must be committed to the rule of law in world affairs and progressively expand the foreign policy cooperation with BRICS members in the interests of security and peace, with due respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. (c) As a member of BRICS, Russia should enhance its foreign policy’s multi-vector character, thus strengthening its international positions.

32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian federation (2013), “C O N C E P T of participation of the Russian Federation in BRICS”, adopted on May 7, 2012, [Online: web], accessed on February 19, 2015, URL: http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/eng/ files/41d452b13d9c2624d228.pdf. 33 Ibid.

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(d) Russia must develop privileged bilateral relations with BRICS countries to use the advantages emanating from cooperation opportunities fully (ibid.).34 BRICS provides Russia a platform to upgrade bilateral ties into a multilateral level with other group countries. Thus, Russia believes that cooperation within groups on specific issues must not replace the established bilateral relations among members. ● Considering the contradictory and still emerging character of reasons influencing the development of the BRICS group is one of the Russian foreign policy’s objectives, to facilitate in every possible way the centripetal trends in the group and neutralize negative factors (ibid.).35 ● Russia considers that with a strong political will of group countries to deepen cooperation, the association can become crucial to new global governance. It was particularly so in the financial and economic areas in the initial period. Also, Russia favors positioning BRICS in the world system as a new world affairs model, overarching the old dividing lines between the East and West and North and South (ibid.).36 Furthermore, scholars like Leonid Ivashov (2014) stated that for Moscow, the geopolitical rise of BRICS is in the process that helps Russia maintain its international stature and preserve its statehood and territorial integrity. Therefore, the success of the BRICS group is significant for Russian foreign policy objectives. And also, he observed that Russia is promoting BRICS for the following reasons: ● To coordinate affirmatively of BRICS countries in political, economical, secure, cultural, social, and environmental protection through an alliance ranks. ● To draw in one group of all the countries for sharing civilizational foundation alliances between current members. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid.

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● You are synchronizing decision-making in international politics within the BRICS group. ● To reform global organizations like UNSC, IMF, and World Bank for equal representation of all civilizations. ● It would establish a common market and economic coordination zone for BRICS. ● The creation of a BRICS shared security framework (Ivashov 2014). Scholar Boris Volkohnsky, the head of the Asian Department at the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, says that the BRICS group membership consists of multiple regions like South America and Africa. The BRICS group should cooperate on copious regional and global issues so that the cooperation among nations creates a new format to solve common problems (Huaxia 2015). Most of the time, bilateral ties affect multilateral relations. Therefore, as a member, Russia will have the opportunity to coordinate with them. Further, scholar Goergy Toloraya (2015) says that by participating in BRICS, Russia will gain the following benefits: ● International Monetary and Financial Institutions like the IMF and World Bank are fairer, more stable, and more effective. ● BRICS could help secure peace and security based on states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-interference in their internal affairs. ● It will succor in consolidating the multi-vector nature of its foreign policy. ● Over some time, the group can develop privileged bilateral relations with other BRICS members. ● The BRICS will broaden Russia’s linguistic, cultural, and informational presence (Toloraya 2015).37 Further, the involvement of Russia in the BRICS group will help initiate regular contact with Brazil and South Africa because, anyways, Russia, India, and China always have frequent interactions between them.

37 Toloraya, Georgy (2015), “Why Does Russia needs BRICS?”, Russia in Global Affairs, [Online: web], accessed on March 19, 2015, URL: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/ number/Why-Does-Russia-Need-BRICS-17373.

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A new regional office of the NDB is opened in Sao Paulo and Moscow. Another significant development that helped Russia overcome Westernimposed economic sanctions was the 2019 Brasilia declaration, noting a BRICS survey on an International Payment System that currently takes place through SWIFT. It has resulted in the Transfer of Financial Messages system for carrying out bank-to-bank transfers that came into force in 2017 (Kapoor 2020). However, the Ukraine crisis is a testing time for the progress of the BRICS group because the West imposed several sanctions on Russia. Notably, Russia was removed from the SWIFT payments, and several countries severed their ties with the Russian federation. Further, the cancellation of Mastercard, Visa, American Express, and many Western countries’ business companies like Pepsi, CoCa-Cola, McDonald’s, and several others are mulling to move away from Russia (Haider 2022). Likewise, the BRICS development bank also put all the transactions with the Russian Federations due to its attack on Ukraine (The Economics Times 2022). In this situation, groups like the BRICS would help approach the conflict-involved countries to resolve the rift amicably. In this instance, many Western countries approached India’s Prime Minister to contact Putin to halt the aggressive moves of Russia in the Ukraine crisis.

Russia’s Focus Shift to Security The initial objectives of the BRICS cooperation pertained to economic, trade, and international order issues. However, a later part of the BRICS summit declarations signaled that security is also one aspect of BRICS consultations due to the growing incidents of terrorism in international relations. Russian foreign policy is currently built based on three pillars. The essential Russian federation foreign policy posts are military strength, nuclear capacity—through energy and raw materials—and Russia’s membership in key international organizations. The central organization in concern is the United Nations Security Council. Thus, Russia preserved its international standing by leveraging these pillars (Ivano 2011). The global north struggled to overcome, whereas the non-west increased in the political and economic stream. Despite Putin’s regime in Kremlin, Russia was made more powerful. The Arab crisis, especially the Syrian issue, Iran’s nuclear issue, Snowden, and Ukraine crisis plunged Russian and Western relations to the nadir level (Akulov 2013).

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At the same time, the profound change that occurred in world politics was the downfall of the enormous power status of the global north, due to the West’s military and political failure in Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq, and its economic collapse due to the financial crisis in 2008–09. It came out as a painful blow to the West (Karaganov 2014). Therefore, Russia’s emphasis was on BRICS’s role in preserving global peace, security, and stability, including its region. It indicated the following in the 2013 Concept of the Russian Federation’s participation in the BRICS: Coordination: BRICS coordinate with each other on positions related to strategic stability, international and regional security, and settlement of regional conflicts, non-proliferation of weapons, mass destruction, and the maintenance of separate regional peace (ibid.).38 Combating Terrorism: BRICS can provide a common approach to international combat terrorism. It says there is a need to strengthen cooperation with the UN’s role in the fight against international terrorism and strive to implement the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and strict compliance with provisions of the relevant UNSC resolutions (ibid.).39 Anti-Drug Trafficking: With the membership of BRICS, Russia can make one agree upon approaches to combating illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and their precursors through the help of joint actions in the UN and regional organizations (ibid.).40 Information Security: to use the BRICS group while cooperating to ensure international information security, and use its potential for advancing initiatives in various international forums and organizations, primarily in the UN (ibid.).41 Prosecuting Pirates: The BRICS platform can help Russia bring cooperation to combat maritime piracy and build a judicial mechanism containing an international component to ensure prosecution and punishment of pirates.

38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid.

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Dialogue: The Concept said that this platform would help develop a mechanism for exchange, thus elaborating joint proposals and coordinating practical actions in international security. It would improve regular meetings of high representatives (ibid.).42 In 2014, President Putin said that despite the end of the Cold War, there would be no natural end to it without a clear and transparent agreement on respecting existing rules or creating new regulations and standards through a well-formulated peace treaty. The impression seemed that the so-called ‘victors of the Cold War had decided to pressure and reshape the world to suit their own needs and interests (Ilias 2014).’ Thus, in its second point, the ‘Concept of the Russian Federations BRICS Presidency in 2015–2016’ entirely focused on advancing Russia’s national security interests and BRICS’ common security interests to strengthen international security. And the Concept also stated that: Russia to coordinate positions of the BRICS States on strategic stability, international and regional security, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, settlement of regional conflicts, and the maintenance of regional stability.

Thus, Russia shifted the focus of BRICS toward global security affairs, and for this, India, China, Brazil, and South Africa also approved. Because on September 14, 2016, BRICS national security advisers met in New Delhi and discussed various security cooperation areas like counterterrorism, the creation of cybersecurity, and energy security (Ministry of external affairs of India 2016).43 While meeting China’s Foreign Ministry, Spokesperson Hua Chunying emphatically cleared that: The Chinese side would like to see BRICS countries play a larger role in international and regional security issues, step up coordination and cooperation on major issues concerning security, and contribute to peace,

42 Ibid. 43 Ministry of external affairs of India (2016), “Meeting of the BRICS High

Representative responsible for National Security”, held on September 15, 2016, [Online: web], accessed on November 18, 2016, URL: http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm? dtl/27401/Meeting_of_the_BRICS_High_Representatives_Responsible_for_National_Sec urity.

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prosperity, and stability in the world. (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Negara Brunei Darussalam 2016)44

Thus, Russia’s goal seemed to be coming from reality. With this shift, Russia may change the BRICS structure and its goals and objectives. Likewise, in the Xiamen summit declaration, the BRICS said that the seventh meeting of the BRICS high representatives for security issues was held on 27–28 July 2017 in Beijing. They focused on deepening the BRICS common understanding on global governance, counter-terrorism, security in ICTs, energy security, major international and regional hotspots, and national security development issues in the meeting (Press information Bureau 2017). Further, the 2018 Johannesburg BRICS summit underscored that the international community should establish a genuinely broad international counter-terrorism coalition and support the UN’s central coordinating role in this process. The group stressed that the threat of chemical and biological terrorism the BRICS would launch multilateral negotiations on an international convention to suppress chemical and biological terrorism acts besides at the Conference on Disarmament (Ministry of External Affairs of India 2018). Thus, eventually, the BRICS came up with a Counter-Terrorism Strategy aimed at strengthening the security of the BRICS group. The primary objective of the BRICS Counter-Terrorism cooperation is to complement and strengthen the existing bilateral and multilateral ties among the BRICS countries. And also to make a meaningful contribution to the global efforts of preventing and combating terrorism (Ministry of External Affairs of India 2020). It shows how the BRICS is tilting and prioritizing the Security issues. It shows Russia’s efforts to make the BRICS one of the prominent centers of global politics dealing with all the global problems.

Future Russian Strategies with BRICS Group Russia believes that BRICS will become one of the critical pieces in the global chessboard. Therefore, Russia regards BRICS as one of the alternative models for global relations, which can override the old 44 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Negara Brunei Darussalam (2016), “Foreign Ministry spokes Person Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference”, on September 14, 2016, [Online: web], accessed on June 19, 2015, URL: http://www. fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cebn/eng/fyrth/t1397608.htm.

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West–East, North–South binary in international politics. Thus, Russia naturally supports and promotes BRICS in world affairs (Lavrov 2012).45 During the election campaign of 2012 (Moskovskie Novosti, February 27 issue),46 the current Russian President Putin wrote an article called ‘Russia and the Changing World,’ where he mentioned that BRICS would have to work together more closely within the UN. He also asserted that Russia would continue to prioritize its relations with the bloc, ‘the most telling symbol of transferring from a unipolar to a more just world order’ (Putin 2012).47 What makes BRICS a more influential group in present global politics is that it has not emerged on geographical divisions or a particular issue of concern. Instead, it is a worldwide body with global objectives (Akulov 2012). It has to diversify its goals very soon to counter emerging threats to these countries. Further, the 2013 Concept Participation of the Russian Federation in the BRICS stated that: Russian federation’s long-term objectives as a member of BRICS is to gradually transform the group from a dialogue forum and base for a limited range of issues into a more strategic one for cooperation on crucial international political and economic problems. The Russian Federation has given some suggestions to fulfill all these objectives as a member of BRICS. (a) In the following two to three years, BRICS will try to boost its cooperation within BRICS in its present numerical composition. (b) Russia will strive hard to bring a system of informal political and working mechanisms to bolster coordination in all areas of activity within BRICS. It will ensure all this in groups’ work and the context of rotation of the Presidency and enhance dialogue on new directions and forms of cooperation (ibid.).48

45 Lavrov, Sergey (2012), “BRICS: A New-Generation Forum with a Global Reach”, International Affairs, 58(2): 1–5. 46 Putin, Vladimir (2012), “Russia’s place in a changing world”, Moskovskie Novosti, February 27 issue, [Online: web], accessed on September 16, 2016, URL: http://wor ldmeets.us/Moskovskiye.Novosti000001.shtml#axzz4od5LUh43. 47 Ibid. 48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian federation (2013), “C O N C E P T of

participation of the Russian Federation in BRICS”, adopted on May 7, 2012, [Online: web], accessed on February 19, 2015, URL: http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/eng/ files/41d452b13d9c2624d228.pdf.

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(c) Russia will elaborate on the BRICS development strategy, defining the group’s long-term objectives, operating principles, and cooperation mechanisms. (d) As a member, Russia will start a dialogue on the ways, pace, and concrete forms of possible institutionalization of BRICS and consider the inter-alia, or the issue of creating a permanent secretariat (ibid.).49 (e) Russia will promote the group’s external relations by dialogue with developing countries, the UN agencies, and regional organizations. Likewise, the BRICS group’s stature is immeasurable in Russian foreign policy objectives. It has given an intrinsic role to maintain the relations with the association’s members and other countries irrespective of any region. The new Russian federation’s 2013 foreign policy concept says that the current developments in international relations are characterized by profound changes in the geopolitical landscape, accelerated mainly by the financial and economic crisis. World affairs are in transition, the core of the difference in creating the polycentric international relations system. However, the change has large-scale implications globally and regionally (Foreign Policy Concept of Russia 2013).50 International relations became more complex and unpredictable, and the Western world’s ability to dominate world affairs seems to be diminishing like never before. The global power and development potential is now more scattered and shifting toward the East, particularly Asia–Pacific. Thus, the emergence of new global economic and political actors led to the competition between these two actors and made world affairs plunge into instability in international relations (ibid.).51 During the Fortaleza BRICS summit held on July 9, 2014, Russian President Putin requested other members establish a virtual secretariat for the BRICS group to intensify interaction among the group members and the public to access more information regarding the BRICS group. That is why Russia is stepping up its efforts to make BRICS a political entity

49 Ibid. 50 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2013), Foreign Policy

Concept of Russia, 2013, February 18, 2013, https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/for eign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186. 51 Ibid.

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(Putin 2014).52 Before starting the 2015 Ufa BRICS Summit, Putin, by giving an interview to Itar-Tass (2015), said that the BRICS association working on a joint declaration on the Syrian conflict and Afghanistan, Iran’s nuclear program and situation prevailed in the Middle East and on other issues too. He spoke that the group would become a mere dialogue forum to a full-scale strategic cooperation mechanism to look for critical political global problems (Putin 2015).53 Furthermore, the changing scenario in international relations and growing bonding within the BRICS group in multiple areas would be paved the way for faster solutions. However, Putin has specific goals to make BRICS a decisive group. Lo (2015) said that Putin has three options in the present world political scenario. They are, ● To facilitate an external environment that supports the stability of Putin’s regime. ● To secure international respect, if not support, to acquire Moscow’s interests in the post-Soviet neighborhood. And ● To promote Russia as one of the world’s leading powers while retaining strategic flexibility. Furthermore, for this to realize, Putin has to maintain a strategic balance with all the group members. The group’s future depended on how well the bilateral skirmishes would be resolved. Remarkably, China and India’s frequent frictions have the central block that BRICS has to strengthen its relations for greater cooperation in international relations. The group’s institutional establishment would be the best idea to resolve and make group strength assertive in international relations. Likewise, the BRICS role in Russian foreign policy has played a prominent role. Many universities in Russia have BRICS departments; for example, the BRICS studies center at Ural Federal University. Therefore, that shows how Russia emphasizes the BRICS’s role in global politics. Finally, scholar Goergy Toloraya (2015) says that:

52 Putin, Vladimir (2014), “Putin’s speech at the Fortaleza BRICS Summit”, it was held on July 9, 2015, [Online: web], accessed on November 14, 2015, URL: http://en. kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/49895. 53 Ibid.

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Russia’s conceptual documents set the goal of gradually turning BRICS from an informal dialogue forum and instrument for coordinating positions on a limited number of issues to a full-fledged mechanism for the strategic and current interaction. It will radically change the association’s position in the system of international relations. BRICS can serve as a locomotive for Russia’s geopolitical rise in the 21st Century (in contrast to the downward tendency at the end of the 20th Century).54

Likewise, during the 2020 BRICS summit time, Russia underscored several times that Russia’s BRICS membership aimed to strengthen multilateral principles in international relations and promote the shared interests of the BRICS members in international fora. It will further develop cooperation in trade, economy, and finance. Besides, it also strives hard to cooperate in the cultural and humanitarian spheres and enhance people-to-people contacts (BRICS Russia 2020a, b). Another significant development during the 2020 Russia BRICS summit was in July 2020, the trade ministers of all the BRICS members adopted an updated ‘Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2025.’ Brazil will review the strategy in 2025. The plan aimed at promoting information exchange enhancing transparency for the development of mutual trade and investment in intra-BRICS members. Further, the project says that the BRICS wants to develop and strengthen customs cooperation, collectively work for the inclusive growth of the BRICS members. The BRICS diversifies trade and investment cooperation and creates favorable conditions for promoting Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise cooperation and enhancing close collaboration of BRICS business communities (Ministry of Commerce and Industry of India 2020). It will undoubtedly help the Russian federation because the relations between Russia and the West are going toward the nadir level day after day. In such a scenario, the BRICS will play a significant role in keeping Russia’s economy intact. One of the largest economies in the world, China, is extending unprecedented economic cooperation with the Russian federation. In the 2020 Russia BRICS summit declaration, Russia reiterated that the BRICS is committed to multilateralism and the principles of mutual respect, sovereign equality, democracy, inclusiveness, and strengthened

54 Toloraya, Georgy (2015), “Why Does Russia needs BRICS?”, Russia in Global Affairs, [Online: web], accessed on March 19, 2015, URL: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/ number/Why-Does-Russia-Need-BRICS-17373.

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collaboration between group members. The BRICS will continuously strengthen and reform international governance and make it more inclusive, representative, democratic with meaningful and greater participation of developing countries in international relations. The BRICS strongly believes that the present interconnected international challenges should be addressed by strengthened international cooperation by reforming the existing multilateral system. The BRICS group underscores that global organizations like the UN, the WTO, the WHO, the IMF, and others are imperative. They should be driven by member states and promote the interest of all group members (Russia BRICS declaration 2020). For that, Russia will support the international system. However, it should be more open, transparent, and accountable to all the actors of international relations. For it to materialize, Russia has a herculean task ahead to manage all the board members of the BRICS. Otherwise, the BRICS will be another group of emerging international relations.

Conclusion The emergence of BRICS made Russia more confident, unlike in the early 1990s period. The period was more stressful for Russia in its international role. However, the BRICS has given Russia the other way to impact any global decision-making situation strongly. It proved a few times already. That is the way, for Russia, BRICS is one of the prominent avenues to put forward Russia’s foreign policy interests more effectively in international relations. Further, there is a lot of responsibility on the BRICS in these present global affairs. Notably, the Covid-19 pandemic hit the global economy unprecedently, precisely, the global south. Being one of the significant actors of the BRICS, Russia has the responsibility to coordinate and cooperate with other BRICS groups’ significant powers. There have been frequent skirmishes between India and China over border issues, which can hinder the progress of the BRICS group. Moreover, Russia and China also have different perspectives on China’s economic impact on BRICS affairs. Therefore, without sacrificing its interests, Russia should focus on increasing the stature of BRICS so that the BRICS common concerns would be achieved.

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CHAPTER 4

China and BRICS

Introduction In the recent past, it is visible that the structure of international relations has been rapidly changing. The COVID-19 Pandemic damaged the image of China at a worldwide level. Many countries blame China for its lackadaisical approach to handling the Covid-19. Further, China’s economy is declining in its annual growth. China needs a partner to revive its economy. Therefore, the chapter shall examine how China can use the BRICS resources to revive its economy in this context. It explores how BRICS is going to help in China’s foreign policy. Further, the global economy transformed over the last three decades with the rise of several countries like Brazil, India, China, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa since the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991. Over time, countries in the European Union (E.U.) and the UnitedStates have faced stagnation and recession, while several southern states

I took some of the portion from the book, Junuguru Srinivas (2020), “Rise of the BRICS and changing world order: Role of India and China”, edited by Geeta Kochhar, Snehal Ajit Ulman in book ‘India and China, Economics and Soft Power Diplomacy’, Routledge Critical Perspectives on India and China, Routledge India. https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Critical-Perspectiveson-India-and-China/book-series/RCPIC, ISBN 9780367335557. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 J. Srinivas, Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1115-6_4

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have shown high growth and economic development levels. This trend catalyzed several changes within the international political and economic system. Following the Cold War between USSR and America in the mid-twentieth century, the United States of America (USA) emerged as a dominant international political player. However, it faced political resistance from both Russia and China, who sought to construct a new economic structure made up of several global powers, including themselves. China and Russia’s international relations activities have resulted in what is known as a ‘multipolar’ political and economic system of international order. China, Russia, and other global south countries challenge the earlier ‘bipolar’ model based on a duality between the East and the West.

Evolution of China as a Global Player Historically, China was not an active player in international relations. Therefore, China’s evolution is classified into three distinct phases. The first phase included the period between 1950 and 1970 when it kept rejecting the existing international order. In the next step, it took on a more passive position between 1980 and 1990. And in the 2000s, when China wanted to take on a more selective and activist role, it sought international institution’s membership. It tried to learn the road rules, obeying them mostly (Shambaugh 2009: 125).1 However, from 1950 to 1970, China’s worldview was guided by Mao Zedong’s Three Worlds theory. According to such an approach, the first world consisted of two superpowers, the other developed countries known as the ‘Second World.’ The third of the developing countries known as the ‘Third World,’ Beijing’s leadership gave China the status of a Third World country and regarded itself as the Third World (Wang and Rosenau 2009).2 Later, China thought to be an active player in international relations. It needed to integrate with global organizations. From December 1978 onwards, China stopped the earlier development strategy followed by China for over three decades and launched an economic reform process, opening up to the outside world. China assumed a seat in the World

1 Shambaugh, David, China Goes Global (London: Oxford University Press, 2009). 2 Wang, Hongying and Roseneru, N., “China and Global Governance”, Asian

Perspective, 33 No. 3 (2009): 5–39.

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Bank in 1980 (World Bank 2005).3 Afterward, the structure of China’s society, culture, and the economy experienced tremendous change. With this change and the strategy from 1980 onwards, China continued to experience the most sustained per capita income growth rates in global economic history. After taking membership in the World Bank in the late 1970s, the then Deng Xiaoping remarks that: We can do it with or without you, but with you, we will do it very fast. (World Bank 2005)4

Therefore, after entering the international system, China received immense credit support from various international institutions and countries. Table 4.1 explains how much China received from 1980 to 2000. The data is taken from OECD beyond 2020’s CD ROM data, 2002. It says below. Likewise, other institutions like ADB, ADB Special funds, Japan, E.U Member countries, US multilateral and bilateral institutions, and several other donors provided immense financial support for China’s development. Over time, FDI started increasingly pumping in the Chinese economy with complimentary international and institutional assistance. Table 4.2 is from the BRICS Joint Statistical Publication in 2015 and written by BRICS countries commerce ministries. Further, other countries like the Korean republics, Taiwan, India, Brazil, Mauritius, and many others invested in the Chinese economy in FDIs. The grant that China got from the World Bank was used for the overall development of Chinese society. The chart below explains how China allocated the budget toward each sector in the figure drawn down. The data was taken from the World Bank Sima database; it was taken up until July 15, 2003 (Fig. 4.1). Out of the grant, China allocated 3 percent to the education sector, 26 percent to rural development, 22 percent to energy and mining, 32

3 World Bank, “China: An Evolution of World Bank Assistance”, 2005, https://ieg. worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/china_cae.pdf. 4 World Bank, “China: An Evolution of World Bank Assistance”, 2005, https://ieg. worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/china_cae.pdf.

2391.9 2643.26 75.38 9.02 13,929.3 8090.92 425 6505.84 23,271.26 170.38 29,948.78

IBRD IDA ADB ADB Special funds Japan EU–EU members US Total multilateral Total bilateral Other donors Total of all donors

8787.23 6488.03 5048.38 77.99 21,460.44 29,363.33 7853.27 21,981.12 61,185.39 2987.24 86,153.9

1991–1900 3799.17 3734.15 1712.15 77.99 17,833.39 12,915.34 3312 10,011.54 35,947.61 1863.65 47,822.95

1991–1995 4988.06 2753.88 3335.63 0 3627.05 16,447.99 4541.27 11,969.58 25,237.78 1123.59 38,330.95

1996–1900 1077.97 553.82 721.59 … 968.93 3343.27 144.85 2571.66 4643.33 529.24 7744.23

1998

788.34 406.81 704.32 … −1889.94 3187.07 1802.73 2072.88 3294.09 143.84 5510.81

1999

967.99 315.48 700.83 … −2295.75 946.46 −393.31 2119.55 −1576.42 210.84 753.97

2000

Source OECD Beyond 2020 CD ROM data, 2002 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “Economic Outlook 95—Long-term Baseline Projections Dataset”, 2014, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EO95_LTB)

1981–1990

China’s net receipts from all donors between 1980 and 2000 (US$ million)

Donors

Table 4.1

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17,949 9022 204 168 1948 3061 1361 2152 1530 908 21 25 106 82

2005 20,233 11,248 2260 3895 2095 2865 1538 2136 1979 1033 52 56 95 67

2006 27,703 16,552 3185 3678 2571 2616 2170 1774 734 1333 34 32 69 52

2007 41,036 15,954 4435 3135 3145 2944 2550 1889 900 1494 88 39 26 60

2008 46,075 11,299 3605 2700 2582 2555 2020 1881 1217 1104 55 52 41 32

2009 60,567 10,447 5428 2692 2499 3017 1773 2476 888 1129 49 57 66 35

2010 70,500 9725 6097 2551 2242 2369 2076 2183 1129 1139 42 43 13 31

2011 65,561 7831 6305 3038 1975 2598 1744 2847 1451 959 44 58 16 30

2012

73,397 6159 7229 3054 1668 2820 1858 2088 2078 910 27 23 13 22

2013

81,268 6226 5827 3966 1255 2371 1564 2018 2071 591 51 28 6 41

2014

Source BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 2015 (BRICS, “BRICS Joint Statistical Publication 2015”, published by all the BRICS countries, May 2015, http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/doc_2015/brics_eng.pdf)

15,500 3833 2172 1490 624 4384 283 2296 1041 265 10 4 9 16

2000

Foreign direct investment into China’s economy between 2000 and 2014 ($millions)

Hong Kong (China) Virgin ls Singapore Korea, Rep Cayman ls US Samoa Taiwan, China Germany Mauritius India Brazil South Africa Russia

Countries

Table 4.2

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World Bank Investment Lending for china (% of total investment) Urban Development and Sanitation and Water Supply 12%

Environment 5%

Education 3% Rural 26%

Transport 32%

Energy and Mining 22%

Fig. 4.1 World Bank lending to China for investment on multiple sectors (in percent) (Source The World Bank Simadatabase, data was taken till July 15, 2003 [World Bank, “Data and Statistics 2003”, 2003, http://www.worldbank.org/ data/datatopic/GDP_PPP.pdf])

percent to transport, 12 percent to urban development and sanitation and water supply, and 5 percent to the environment sector. The above trend helped China to register sound economic development. Scholar Xiaodong (2012)5 has elaborated a comprehensive picture of China’s economic structure from 1952 onwards, China’s per capita GDP growth, and the labor participation rate. Xiaodong analyzed the capital/output ratio, the average human capital, and the total factor productivity. The author made these calculations based on the reports of the Penn World Table (PWT7.0) (Table 4.3). According to the table, during the period 1952–1978, the GDP per capita was 2.97 percent, and during 1979–2007, it increased to 8.12 percent. The economy’s labor participation rate was 0.11 during 1952– 1978 and later grew to 0.57 percent. Furthermore, the capital/output ratio was 3.45 percent; however, it reduced to 0.04 percent from 1978 5 Xiaodong, Zhu, “Understanding China’s Growth, Past, Present and Future”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26 No. 4 (2012): 103–124.

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Table 4.3 Deconstructing China’s growth: 1950–2007 The average annual growth rate Period GDP per Labor capita participation 1952–1978 2.97 0.11 1978–2007 8.12 0.57 Contribution to per capita GDP growth Period GDP per Labor capita participation Rate 1952–1978 100 3.63 1978–2007 100 7.05

Capital/output 3.45 0.04 Capital/output Ratio 116.15 0.51

Average human 1.55 1.18 Average human Capital 52.25 14.55

TFP −1.07 3.16 TFP −72.3 77.89

Source Xiaodong (2012), Understanding China’s Growth, Past, Present and Future, p. 108 Note TFP-Total factor productivity

to 2007. The average annual human capital during 1952–1978 was 1.55 percent, and from 1978 to 2007, it decreased to 1.18 percent.

Shifting Chinese Foreign Policy But, that does not mean that the West ignored China’s development. The rapid growth of China’s economy led to the negative projection of China in global affairs. Because no country envisaged that China would become so influential in the world’s political and economic affairs, this was the game-changer in China’s foreign policy. It went on to become a vocal advocate of free trade globally economy. Concomitantly, China raised its voice to reform global institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. Further, China continuously challenged the existing international order (Yongjin 1998).6 Integrating China’s economy with the global economy was hindered by scores of international incidents and paved the way for evolving a critical understanding of China’s global affairs. Another incident caused a severe blow to China’s foreign policy with the West. Several incidents made China redraw its foreign policy when the United States bombarded China’s embassy in federal Yugoslavia in 1999 on May 7. The

6 Because Chinese reformers ceased to see the existing international system as a target for revolution.

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US-led NATO bombed it from multiple directions. During the tragic incident, three Chinese journalists posted in Yugoslavia were hit. They died heroically, and 21 diplomatic personnel were wounded in the incident (Ministry of foreign affairs of the People’s Republic of China 1999).7 The next day, China criticized the United States by saying it violated the Vienna convention diplomatic relations8 basic norms governing international relations. It is a gross encroachment upon China’s sovereignty. Since then, radical Chinese nationalists have pressed the Chinese government to increase its military investment and take global leadership. From then onwards, China demonstrated its strength in a global society. For example, Beijing is allowed to show some 700,000 Chinese citizens against America over its demolition of the Chinese embassy (Berger 2014). That is how China’s foreign policy is recurrently changing from then onward. Further, China has inculcated to take aggressive steps while engaging in global affairs. In the 2008 recession spiraled by the West and its macroeconomic crisis, China was at the crossroads of gaining a geo-economic rise. China realized that a ‘peaceful rise’ was no longer relevant. Given the changing times, force and power were essential to survive during times of threat and danger to its security when Beijing began to build upon military spending and modernization of its defense apparatus and the army doctrine (Berger 2014). For example, in March 2009, Chinese legislature spokesman Li Zhaoxing announced that China was mulling to boost its military spending to RMB 480.6 billion ($70.3 billion) in 2009 (Lawrence 2009). Furthermore, in 2009 January, China released its Defense White Paper. The paper said that the overall defense budget for 2008 was RMB 417.769 billion ($61.185 billion), in 2007 it was RMB 355.491 billion ($52.064 billion), and in 2006 it was RMB 297.938 billion ($42.635 billion) (Ministry of National Defense, People’s Republic of

7 Ministry of foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Strong Protest by the Chinese Government against the Bombing by the US-led NATO of the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Yugoslavia, 1999, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665 539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18047.shtl. 8 This treaty entered into force on April 18, 1961 at the Vienna. The basic objective of this treaty is that every state establishes relations with other country on mutual consent. To represent the state, the states send their diplomatic emissary to stay in the respective country. So, every state must respect it without violating the treaty norms.

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Table 4.4 GDP rate of China, United States, and Japan since 2010 to till 2020 Year Country

2010

2011

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

China US Japan

10.5 9.5 7.8 −2.56 1.55 2.25 4.19 −0.11 1.49

7.7 1.84 2

7.3 2.52 0.37

7.04 3.07 1.22

6.84 1.71 0.52

6.94 2.33 2.16

6.75 2.99 0.32

2020

5.95 2.3 2.16 −3.48 0.27

Source World Bank GDP growth rate (World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2020&locations=CN&start=1990)

China 2009).9 And China continuously registered an impressive growth rate during that period, when the United States was hit by the 2007 financial crisis that spread to several countries. China stood firmly at this time and registered an impressive annual growth rate. It is said that China’s financial caliber could be seen as China vowed to spend $586 billion by late 2008 and contributed $40 billion to the IMF to reinforce its strength (Wang and Rosenau 2009) (Table 4.4). That implies that China’s growth rate surpassed the US and Japan’s growth rate. The critical issue here I am trying to draw is that with the 2008 economic crisis, the international political economy structure loopholes have been exposed and made us rethink its developmental model in conjunction with the relatively robust Chinese economy. Further, China called for an alternative global governance model from time to time. In 2008, China hosted 43 nations at its Asia-Europe meeting. The then-premier Hu Jintao emphasized that China would act with a ‘sense of responsibility while handling the global economic recession’ (Lloyd 2008).

9 Ministry of National Defense, People’s Republic of China, Defense White Paper of China Military 2009, released in January, 2009, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/Whi tePapers/2009-07/21/content_4006240.htm.

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In 2009, on January 29, Wen Jiabao,10 the then premier of China, attended the World Economic Forum (WEF)11 and explicitly expressed the global financial architecture’s shortfalls. He lashed out at the existing institutional finance structure of the world economy. And he stated that the global financial crisis of 2008 had fully exposed several deficiencies in the system. As China views, the existing international system is unequal, undemocratic, and unjust. That is how China’s engagement with the global economic governance system was strictly based on a realpolitik calculation of national interest. Further, Jiabao pointed out how China will emphasize achieving a ‘win–win’ multilateral solution to solve global problems. Later, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying, 2010, on October 16, at the ‘Third World Policy Conference,’ Marrakech, stated that China was considered the world’s second-best economy after the United States, sometimes calling it E2 as well. However, Global Times, one of China’s popular newspapers, conducted a survey that said China was still a developing country despite its second-best economic status.12 Meanwhile, Beijing took the initiative to guide African Union countries to share the responsibility for Libya and ensure that any damage to its sovereign and territorial integrity was unacceptable, as it would affect all the A.U. countries (Volodin 2011). With this ‘shared responsibility’ phenomenon in global affairs, China has collaborated with international south countries. Though the US economy is still going strong, in another 20 years, the Chinese economy will surpass it and become number one in the global economy. Though mainly the global south, the international community desperately wanted China to lead them politically, economically, and in security affairs at the global fora. This was because China had already implemented economic reforms (Xuetong 2006). Since China was growing impressively, it wanted alternative markets other than the 10 Wen, Jiabao, Wen Jiabao Delivers a Special Message at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2009, he gave speech on January 29, 2009 at the World Economic Forum, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t534797.shtml. 11 WEF is established in 1971 as a not for profit foundation and headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. The forum engages the foremost political, business and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry agendas. 12 He lashed out at the Western media for scapegoating China over all the problems of world affairs. His speech was titled “Take China as Your Partner”. And, Kristof, Nicholas D. (2006), “The Chinese Scapegoat”, New York Times, May 29, 2005. Kristof, Nicholas D. (2007), “The New Democratic Scapegoat”, New York Times, July 26, 2007.

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West for fast growth and economic influence. Apart from that, other countries like India, Brazil, and Russia, like countries, kept pushing for reforming the existing world order. But it has been dodged. Therefore, China tried to lead the Global South country’s interests in global fora. Sometimes even influential personnel openly asked China to show the global south interests and requirements. For example, in 2004, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan remarked in a speech at the Chinese Tsinghua University that rich countries assume high responsibility levels. China still considers itself a developing country, which is understandable because it is the fastest developing country globally, even at that stage. And its high rate of success will lead to a greater responsibility toward poorer countries. In this way, China got a higher geopolitical status, and its share of responsibility in world security began to mushroom (Yan and Jiang 2004). During the first decade of the twenty-first century, several groups like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and many others were created. However, the BRIC can play the most significant political, economic, and economic role in global affairs due to its immense resources. Thus, it was the natural choice for China to move toward the BRICS group. The BRIC acronym was first created by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill in 2001 while projecting these countries’ growth rates. He foresaw these countries to have the potential to overtake other developed countries. O’Neill argued that the West should shift its economic policies toward the BRIC countries region, as they would have safety for advanced countries’ investments (O’Neill 2001). However, President Putin was the first to propel this group into a political group and coordinate the group to work toward a more democratic world order with the multipolarity concept in international relations (Akulov 2012). The first Summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009 (Mielniczuk 2013). South Africa became an official member of BRICS during the Sanya Summit (Yan 2011). Every Summit took place with a specific theme and stressed the prevailing global problems and cavities in the international system. Apart from that, China needs markets to grow its economy; thus, China’s natural result is to embark with BRICS in global affairs. Apart from that, in the years between 2020 and 2050 China’s growth can be divided into two stages because the 2035 target set by the 19th CPC Congress aimed to achieve a moderately advanced country by the middle of the twenty-first century, 15 years ahead of schedule. Further, by 2035, China’s GDP will be about $30 trillion, 25 percent of the total

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world GDP. Then, between 2035 and 2050, China’s economic growth will be approximately 25–40 of the entire world GDP. Thus, China can lead East Asia to grow into a region as powerful as North America and Europe (Wei 2017). Likewise, in February 2017, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) released a report called The World in 2050. It says that the world economy will grow 130 percent between 2016 and 2050, in which China’s share will be 20 percent, and it will become the number one country in the world. The emerging market economies would grow around twice as fast as advanced economies. It predicted that the order of the world’s ten largest economies could be China, India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, Mexico, Japan, Germany, and United Kingdom. That implies the future belongs to India besides emerging market economies (PwC 2017). However, the emerging markets have to build their infrastructure and institutional developments, which could only be possible. Primarily, various reports projected that China would become the number one economy in the global economy. However, China has some limitations also. The IMF said that China’s long-term achievements would depend on how China handles its internal challenges. China might face an aging population because the total fertility rate has declined to 1.7 per woman. An aging population will have social and economic issues. Likewise, China faces an underdeveloped financial system, insufficient innovation, and reliance on carbon-based energy resources. More importantly, China’s economic and trade relations with external actors (Dollar et al. 2021). Therefore, China needs trustworthy allies and like-minded nations with whom China can walk along. In this path, the BRICS will be a great group, and all of the BRICS also have the same ambition to become a significant power in international relations. Thus China would like to walk along with the BRICS group.

Evolution of China’s Cooperation with the BRICS Group In October 2007, at the 17th National Congress of the CPC, Hu Jintao mentioned that ‘China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world.’ Otherwise, the world would not enjoy the prosperity and stability of China’s presence. At the same 17th National Congress of the CPC meeting, Jintao expounded that tremendous changes and adjustments were happening within present international relations, propelling even

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closer interconnections between China’s future and destiny (Hu 2007).13 The Chinese leaders soon regarded how China, together with other likeminded countries, could construct a just and rational global order. China became a regional and inter-regional organization member to maintain friendships with other nations instead of engaging in conflicts. There is an old stratagem in China that succinctly defines the situation. ‘Making friends avoid war keeps the enemy wondering!’ (Dmitry 2015). That resulted from cooperating and taking membership in groups like SCO and BRICS. It was then that Chinese foreign policy strategy shifted toward alternative markets. Liu Junhong (2009) stated that a financial emergency originated from a US-devastated world economy, including BRIC members. However, BRIC countries overcame this crisis earlier than the West did. Thus, four countries’ stock markets rebounded by 40–70 percent between February and early June, creating hope for the global economy. While briefing the Media before the first BRIC summit, Chinese vice foreign minister He Yafei on June 9, 2009, expressed that China was expecting BRIC to expand strategic consensus and consolidate mutual trust among group members. This Summit would provide the scope for coping with the global financial and economic crisis and pave the way for a future development agenda (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2009).14 Furthermore, a scholar like Qin Zhilai (2009)15 termed the BRIC formation as ‘non-confrontational toward existing international institutions. However, China’s cooperation in the BRICS resulted from innovation in Chinese diplomatic theory and its practice in the post-Cold War period. China faced the changes that have been happening in the international system since 1990. In the process, China proposed a series of 13 Hu, Jintao, “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects”, Report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, on October 15, 2007, People’s Daily, October 25, 2007. 14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Holds Briefing for Chinese and Foreign Media on President Hu Jintao’s Upcoming Attendance at SCO Yekaterinburg Summit and BRIC Leaders Meetings as well as His State Visit to Russia, Slovakia and Croatia”, on June 9, 2009, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ zxxx_662805/t568288.shtml. 15 Qin, Zhilai, “The First Summit Meeting of the BRIC-Playing a New Chord of WinWin Cooperation”, International Strategic Studies Institute of the Central Party School, 5 (2009): 47–48.

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diplomatic ideas, which included establishing a democratic world order that was fair and reasonable, a concept of multipolarity, an emphasis on being a responsible power, and its deployment of harmony (Cui 2013). While the world was under the influence of a global financial crisis, the BRIC countries met at Yekaterinburg (Russia) on June 16, 2009. During the summit meeting, Hu Jintao, the then-China president, proposed a four-point proposal to deal with the financial crisis. They are as below: ● Recovery of the world economy ● Intensifying reform of the international financial system ● Implementing the U.N. Millennium Developmental Goals (MDGs), and ● Ensuring Food Security, energy resources, and public health.16 Hu argued that all the BRIC member countries should seize the historic opportunity to strengthen their unity and promote cooperation among their member countries. He also said that BRIC should jointly safeguard the overall interests of developing countries. Similarly, during the second BRICS summit, which was held in Brasilia (Brazil) on April 15, 2010, Hu delivered a speech titled ‘cooperation, openness, mutual benefit, and a win–win strategy,’ where he underscored that: The current international situation is complex, and the global landscape is undergoing profound adjustments. However, no matter how the international system changes, the goal of mutual benefit and the win-win results cannot change. The principle of democracy and fairness cannot change, the direction of mutual respect cannot change, and the spirit of sharing mutual concerns of the people in the same boat cannot change. (Jintao 2010)17

Then, the question arises about why China was so optimistic about BRICS at that critical juncture. What made China promote BRICS as a global player?

16 Hu, Jintao, “Speech and Proposal for Tackling Global Financial Crisis”, at the first BRIC summit held at Yekaterinburg, Russia, Xinhua, on June 17, 2009. 17 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s republic of China, Cooperation, openness, mutual benefit and at win-win strategy, China’s the then president Hu Jintao speech at BRIC Brasilia in April 16, 2010, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/ zyjh_665391/t683414.shtml.

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Why BRICS for China Yan Wang (2009) said that its influence would grow in the international system despite differences among BRICS members. Scholar Wang Yusheng (2010)18 observed five glittering points that make China more positive about BRICS. ● All BRICS countries are considered emerging economies and relatively humongous countries, with the fast development, great potential, and varying sustainability degrees. All four countries combine foreign exchange reserves that exceed US $3 trillion, equivalent to over 40 percent of the world’s total cost. It makes them the essential players in the international financial system. ● Instead of simply accepting the ‘Washington Consensus,’ all BRICS countries independently chose their development model based on their national traditions and requirements instead of merely taking the ‘Washington Consensus.’ ● BRICS countries hope to establish a more equitable, just, and reasonable international economic and political order. ● BRICS countries want a peaceful international environment, promote democratization and equality in world affairs, and disagree with the old Cold War mentality and confrontational policies. ● One of the most significant aspects of the BRICS group is that despite their different social systems and ideologies, they share a common strategic goal of constructing a more democratic and just, multipolar world. The U.N. plays a central role. Furthermore, another Chinese scholar Li Mingjiang (2011),19 underscored the reasons for China’s positive attitude toward BRICS and stressed three more aspects, which are:

18 Wang, Yusheng, “The BRIC’s: Rhythem of the Era”, Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, the 96th Issue, 2010, http://cpifa.org/en/q/listQuarterlyArticle.do:jsessi onid=034489E401F67668CDA8C0B81687E65?pagNum=5&articleid=165&quarterlyPag eNum=16. 19 Li, Mingjiang, Rising from Within: China’s Search for a Multilateral World and Its Implications for Sino-US Relations, in Li Mingjiang (eds) China Joins Global Governance: Cooperation and Contentions (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012).

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● All BRICS countries are solid economic powers in the world. Indeed, before South Africa joined in, the group’s combined contribution to the global population was 42 percent; it was 14.6 percent of the global GDP and 12.8 percent of the global trade. They also held a considerable amount of international foreign reserves. ● China believes that coming together in one group called BRICS was possible due to common positions and interests in world affairs, mainly economics. ● According to China, BRICS can serve as a powerful proxy to push for the reforms of global institutions. Again, when the BRICS Sanya (China) Summit took place in 2011 on April 14, Hu put forward four points to bring about peace and tranquility in twenty-first century humanity for shared prosperity. They are mentioned below: ● Maintaining world peace and stability ● Promoting the joint development of all the countries in the international system ● Strengthening international exchanges and cooperation, and ● Bolstering the BRICS partnership for joint development.20 Hu Jintao’s Work report to the 18th Communist Party Congress Party on November 17, 2012, stated that21 : ‘China will actively participate in multilateral affairs, and support the United Nations, the G-20, the SCO, BRICS, and other multilateral organizations in playing an active role in international affairs, and work to make the international order and system more just and equitable.’ As reflected in Jintao’s speech, China’s initiative and participation in BRICS have been significant and unprecedented (Soto 2012). Furthermore, at the New Delhi BRICS Summit, on March

20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation, Between China and Russia, Hu Jintao speech at the tenth anniversary of above treaty at the Moscow on June 26, 2011, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t833497.shtml. 21 Hu, Jintao, Hu Jintao’s Work report to the 18th Communist Party Congress Party on November 17, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/ 17/c_131981259.htm.

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29, 2012, the then China’s President Hu Jintao delivered a speech,22 where he said that: BRICS cooperation now stands at a new starting point, and we should seek ways to build on past achievements and take the BRICS cooperation to a new level through pioneering efforts.

Furthermore, Jintao put forward four proposals on further strengthening the BRICS cooperation. They are: ● Joint development and promotion of shared prosperity ● Equal consultation and deepening political mutual trust ● Adherence to pragmatic cooperation, and consolidation basis for collaboration, and ● Adhering to international cooperation and promotion of world development. The scholar Hu Angang (2012) of Tsinghua University said that if China implements its long-term goal of becoming number one globally, the US-led Western hegemonic domination of the global political economy will deteriorate. According to Hu’s forecast, China will become number one in the global economy by 2030. He also said that by the year 2030, China would complete its transition from a moderately well-off society to a society of shared prosperity, thus paving the way for China to become an economic superpower, an innovation-based state, and a ‘green country.’ The forecast he made as mentioned below (Table 4.5). So with this, the shift in the global economy was to take place soon in the international economy. Later, when Xi Jinping came to the helm of affairs in late 2012, the Chinese growth rate forecast shifted and was restricted to 2023. Because that’s when this fifth-generation leader’s regime would end and when the sixth-generation leaders of the Chinese Communist Party would come into action. The latest report was prepared by the ‘State Council’s Development Research Center,’ written by Liu Shijin in 2014. The data provides 170 percent growth of the nominal size of the GDP in 22 Hu, Jintao (2012), Hu Jintao’s Work report to the 18th Communist Party Congress Party on November 17, 2012, [Online: web], http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/spe cial/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259.htm.

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Table 4.5 Share of countries in gross world product (at PPP, %) Years/Countries

1920

1950

2000

2010

2020

2030

China India Russia Brazil USA EU Japan China/USA

70.3 16.1 5.4 0.4 1.8 23.7 3.0 18.3

39.5 4.2 9.6 1.7 27.3 27.1 3.0 0.2

43.0 5.2 2.1 2.7 21.9 21.5 7.2 0.5

52.4 8.0 2.4 2.6 18.4 18.1 5.4 1.1

60.5 12.2 2.7 3.6 16.7 15.7 4.4 1.7

66.9 18.6 3.0 5.1 15.1 13.1 3.3 2.2

Source Hu Angang, Yan Yilong, Wei Xing, 2030 Zhongguo Mai Xiang Gong Tong Fu Yu (China 2030—towards common prosperity), Beijing, Zhongguo Ren Minda Xue Chu Ban She, 2011, page number: 30 and Angus Maddison, Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 A.D., 2010, http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm Note 2020 and 2030 are predictions

2013–2014 prices over the decade. They predicted that there would be inflation. Also, a gradual slow down of the annual GDP growth rate from 7.5 to 5.5 percent was expected. However, the Pandemic has affected the predictions, but the global organizations are still expecting positive growth from China. One interesting fact is that during the pandemic time, also China registered a positive growth rate when all other countries reported a negative growth rate. During the 13th BRICS held in the virtual format on September 9, 2021, the Chinese President delivered a speech titled, ‘Advance BRICS Cooperation to Meet Common Challenges Together.’ He underscored that the Covid-19 Pandemic is still creating havoc around the world. The world seems bumpy, and the international order undergoes profound and complex challenges. Therefore, the BRICS group must coordinate world peace and development and advance a community with a shared future for humankind. Xi Jinping made key proposals to stay resolved, strengthen unity, and enhance practical cooperation under present circumstances.23 They are as mentioned below:

23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China (2021), Xi Jinping Attends and Delivers an Important Speech at the 13th BRICS Summit, September 9, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1906191.shtml.

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● First, the BRICS needs to strengthen the public health cooperation, and for that, the BRICS should step up the political coordination. The BRICS group countries must cooperate on the early launch of the BRICS vaccine R&D Centre in virtual format. ● The BRICS should strengthen the international cooperation on vaccines in the spirit of equitable access for all. He announced that on top of the 100 million US dollars donation to COVAX, China would donate an additional 100 million doses of vaccines to developing countries in the upcoming year. ● The BRICS further enhance economic cooperation in the spirit of mutual benefit. The BRICS earnestly implement the BRICS Partnership 2025 and expand cooperation in various areas like trade and investment, technology and innovation, and green and low-carbon development. He also said that since the BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution innovation center at the Xiamen, all BRICS member’s governments and business communities participate in it actively. ● The BRICS must enhance the political and security cooperation in the spirit of fairness and justice. For that, the BRICS countries should cooperate on common core interests and jointly safeguard the sovereignty, safety, and developmental interests, ● The BRICS countries should encourage people-to-people exchanges in the spirit of mutual learning. China suggested setting up a BRICS alliance to organize vocational skills competitions for vocational education. And also, China is ready to host the BRICS seminar on governance and the BRICS forum on people-to-people and exchanges and open an online training course for media professionals of the BRICS countries.24

Enhancing South-South Cooperation On June 7, 2015, China and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO, have signed a US $50 million agreement to support the developing countries in building sustainable food systems and inclusive agriculture value chains. China recognized the importance of collaboration between the south countries to fight against extreme

24 Ibid., 40.

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hunger and poverty. Since 1990, China has successfully lifted 138 million population out of chronic hunger and reached the World Food Summit Goal. China became the Millennium Development Goal of halving the prevalence of hunger ahead of the 2015 deadline. The then Vice Premier of China, who attended the meeting during this agreement, said that China is the leading agricultural producer among the developing countries. China is ready to cooperate with the FAO because it will benefit agricultural development and progress toward hunger reduction targets among poorer people. It is said that since the FAO and South-South cooperation initiative was established in 1996, China has been a frontrunner in sharing its agricultural expertise around the world and deployed 1023 experts and technicians to 25 countries by 2015. This collaboration encouraged China to establish a South-South Cooperation Trust Fund with a US $30 million initial contributions in 2008 (Emirates News Agency 2015). That shows how China is trying to enhance the Global South’s advancement in international relations. Most of the time, it is shouldering the global south. The BRICS is playing a significant role in Chinese foreign policy international relations. Apart from that, China is actively extending its financial support to various global organizations to share the concerns. Furthermore, on August 30, 2017, while responding to questions from the Journalists at the briefing for China and foreign media held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the occasion of the ninth BRICS Summit and Dialogue between Emerging Market Economies and Developing Countries (EMDC). Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi observed that BRICS is not limited to the BRICS group only. It goes beyond the borders of the five countries. Therefore, China intends to broaden the concept of the BRICS and make it more flexible for other EMDCs to consult, coordinate, and cooperate with the BRICS. Thus it would strengthen the BRICS globally and promote South-South cooperation in international relations25 Likewise, while addressing the 2020 virtual BRICS summit, Xi Jinping remarked that the key emerging economies uphold multilateralism and oppose unilateral sanctions and long-term jurisdiction in an unprecedented crisis. And he underscored the point 25 Wang Yi: “BRICS Plus” Pattern to Fully Release Vitality of BRICS Cooperation, On August 30, 2017, on the Ninth BRICS Summit and Dialogue between Emerging Market Economies and Developing Countries, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/top ics_665678/XJPZCJZGJLDRDJCHWHXXSCGJYFZZGJDHH/t1489003.shtml.

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that all BRICS countries are going under the same umbrella. He pointed out that we must focus more on our direction when the wind is strong and the high tides (Xie 2020). Furthermore, on September 22, 2020, during the Seventy-Fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly meeting, Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a speech. At the meeting, Xi highlighted that China would honor its commitment to providing US $2 billion of international assistance in the coming next years. Thus it would further international cooperation in agriculture, poverty reduction, education, women and children, and climate change. China would also support other countries in restoring their economic and social development. Covid-19 reminded us that we live in an interconnected global village with a shared stake. All countries in the world are closely interconnected and share a shared future. In this pandemic time, no country can gain from others’ difficulties or maintain stability by taking undue advantage of others’ troubles. All countries should collectively work, rejecting any attempt to build blocs to keep others out and play a zero-sum game. Instead, all countries should strive hard to pursue win–win cooperation and rise above ideological disputes. At the same time, China will continue to work as a builder of global peace, contribute to global development, and try to defend the global order. For that, China would support the U.N. to play a central role in international affairs. During the speech, Xi also announced that China would provide another US $50 million to the U.N. Covid-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan. China will extend the US $50 million to the UN-FAO South-South Cooperation Trust Fund. Further, China will support opening the Peace and Development Trust Fund between the U.N. and China by five years after it expires in 2025. Another critical announcement the Chinese President made was that China would set up a U.N. Global Geospatial Knowledge and innovation Center and an International Research Center of Big Data for Sustainable Development Goals to facilitate the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.26 Another significant development occurred recently; China’s State Council Information Office issued a white paper titled ‘China’s International Development Cooperation in the new Era’ on January 10, 2021. 26 Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China (2020), Statement by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China At the General Debate of the 75th Session of The United Nations General Assembly, September 22, 2020, https:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1817098.shtml.

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The document says that South-South cooperation focuses on China’s foreign policy. That is how China’s development cooperation is a form of mutual assistance between developing countries. It says that China is a staunch supporter of South-South cooperation. China will actively participate and be a critical contributor to South-South cooperation. Thus it would promote joint efforts for common development (China Daily 2021). When there was a Video Conference of the BRICS ministers of Foreign Affairs on June 2, 2021, China’s State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi observed that the BRICS meets at a time of significant changes and pandemics unseen in a century. The BRICS group should create opportunities during this crisis and secure new prospects. The BRICS countries should work together to enhance BRICS credentials further to project it as a responsible global player in global solidarity to address the global governance deficit and contribute to the BRICS share to tackling common challenges.27 However, things got changed a lot now. The impact and the fortunes of the BRICS individually and collectively have not lived up to the expectations. It is not the low level of economic growth or other reasons. But, the matter is that there is a gap in the BRICS group unity. Collective solidarity is sometimes not openly visible (Zeng and Beeson 2018). Therefore, unless or until China does not include other members of the BRICS, other members may feel alienated. So China has the responsibility to convince other members that China is extending the support to Global South countries to come out of the crisis rather than projecting itself as the big brother of the Global South and it can bully them. Then, how will China deal with the BRICS in the emerging global order?

The Future Role of China in the BRICS Scholars like Shield (2014)28 say that in the foreseeable future, what will drive China’s international behavior will be its domestic development, its pursuit of social stability, its issues of global and economic governance, 27 Remarks by State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi At the Video Conference of the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations on June 2, 2021, “Enhancing BRICS Solidarity and Building a Better Post-COVID World”, https://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/kjgzbdfyyq/t1880822.shtml. 28 Sheild, Will, “The Middle Way: China and Global Economic Governance”, Survival, No. 55 (2014): 147–168.

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and its domestic prioritization. For that to happen, the BRICS platform should be better than any other because China and other remaining members have a common goal and intention. A specific group of Western scholars considers BRICS a failed experiment of the southern world countries. While BRICS has been facing some difficulties, BRICS has performed well and has contributed 50 percent to global growth over the last decade. Trade between the BRICS group crossed over 350 billion dollars in 2013. It makes up half of the world’s total, so statements like those may also be understood as being made by those who consider BRICS as a threat to their dominance in global affairs. During the Ufa summit, Xi Jinping assertively said: ‘The more difficulties we face, the more confidence we have,’ and that we have to fathom that the growth path is not a straight line but a series of twists and turns (Wang 2015).29 During the Ufa summit in 2015, on July 9, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that BRICS should work together for further cooperation and prosperity of group countries. He stressed that emerging economies have great potential in overcoming economic recessions and other problems. He also said that China would endorse the group’s positive signal for maintaining global peace and stability and pushing forward international relations democratization. The BRICS group strives hard to improve global governance and enforce multilateralism (Mengjie 2015; Xuxin 2015).30 Scholars like Haibin Niu (2015) say that it is high time China regards BRICS at the political and soft power level, other than as an economic entity. It is also China’s interest to use BRICS’ collective voice to influence the reform and the decision-making process in major international institutions. China considers BRICS a safeguard for international peace and security by promoting cooperation in cybersecurity and anti-terrorism among its group members. And China still believes that BRICS has the opportunity to shape better world order. Furthermore, the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party regards BRICS as one of China’s most prominent platforms, and the country values its membership in BRICS.

29 Wang, Shang, “BRICS countries to maintain upward trend despite difficulties”, Xinhua, July 10, 2015. 30 Xuxin , “Xi China, Russia to Maintain High Level Coordination in SCO”, Xinhua, July 9, 2015 and Mengjie, “China: BRICS Should Work Together for Prosperity”, Xinhua, July 10, 2015.

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Along with other BRICS members, China feels that its member countries have been mistreated by West-biased institutions like the IMF and World Bank, especially where voting share and the leadership process is concerned (Haibin 2015).31 In this context, China should become more vocal to effectively put forward global interests and push forward faster reforming international forums to become more representative, democratic, and inclusive. Further, At the Ufa summit, Xi Chinese president, called to construct a four-prong partnership for BRICS. These are: ● ● ● ●

Safeguarding WorldPeace, Boosting common development Promoting Diversified Civilizations and Strengthening Global EconomicGovernance (Miou 2015).32

The Chinese government is moving ahead and arguing with the rest of the BRICS to institutionalize the cooperation rather than pursue domestic reform. China firmly believes that the powerful BRICS group would help safeguard all developing countries’ interests. For that, China is also spearheading the efforts to reform the global economic architecture, including pushing for reforms to the IMF’s weighted voting system (Zhao 2015). That is an explanation of how Chinese leadership regards BRICS. It is not the only time China has proposed four points, though. Scholar Srikant Kondapalli and Priyanka Pandith (2016) views Chinese policymakers, intellectuals, and non-state actors as meticulously articulating Chinese foreign policy toward the BRICS group because the global power structure has continuously changed. Therefore, Beijing is grabbing the opportunity and expanding its foreign policy wherever possible. Apart from that, power equations with the United States have been regularly reordered. Hence, China is ambitiously aiming for a significant place in emerging international relations. And trying to find and seek common ground, united front tactics to counterbalance.33 Likewise, Scholar Sakshi 31 Haibin, Niu, “A Chinese Perspective on the BRICS in 2015”, Council of Councils, 2015, https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global_memos/p36088. 32 Miou, Song,“President Xi Proposed Building For-Pronged Partnership Among BRICS Countries”, Xinhua, July 7, 2015. 33 Kondapalli, Srikanth and Pandith, Priyanka, China and BRICS, Setting Up a Different kitchen (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2016).

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Anand (2016: 204) argues that the China and Russian cooperation is significant here because Russia’s support is critical for achieving the target of the China’s One Belt, One Road. Apart from that, China intends to build a troika alliance by including India in the China partnership. In the process, China and Russia will be at the core level, and Brazil and South Africa will be at the periphery level”.34 While signing documents for BRICS to make Shanghai its headquarters on February 26, 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that the New Development Bank would serve for more significant development and connectivity of all its BRICS countries. The bank aimed at funding infrastructure and sustainable development projects. Yi emphasized that China must work with all group members for the economic and political cooperation of BRICS. While commenting on the downward trend in BRICS, he cleared that it was not only BRICS countries but also the whole world affected by the economic recession. Wang concluded that the group is poised to grow and enhance its role in international political and economic affairs (Huaxia 2016).35 Thus, China seeks to neither overturn the existing world order nor completely adhere to its status quo. The Chinese ambassador has opined this to the United States, Cui Tiankai (2016), where he said: You cannot say that the rules set up half a century ago can be applied without any change today. But what we want is not revolution. We stand for the necessary reform of the international system. But we have no intention of overthrowing it or setting up an entirely new one. (Tiankai 2016)36

Scholar Chen Zhimin (2016: 781) says that China’s main intention is to go for outside reform to create plurilateral parallel orders supported by new institutions outside the existing international order created by like-minded states, of which the NDB is an example. By joining and 34 Anand, Sakshi, China-Russia Relations, Eds, Kondapalli, Srikanth and Pandith, Priyanka, China and BRICS, Setting Up a Different Kitchen (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2016). 35 Huaxia, “China, BRICS New Development Bank Signs Documents Headquarters in Shanghai”, Xinhua, February 27, 2016. 36 Cui, Tiankai, “Beijing’s Brand Ambassador: A Conversation with Cui Tiaankai, China and US Focus”, 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/beijings-brand-amb assador-a-conversation-with-cui-tiankai/.

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establishing it, China would provide financial assistance for its big infrastructural projects that it has been announced. That is how China is trying to change the existing international economic order. China has the tools to restructure global economic governance. However, it is supportive of the BRICS. Because Xi Jinping and the PRC have the intention to promote collaborative and benign multilateralism to reduce the regional threat perceptions to China while enhancing its geostrategic influence with the BRICS group. Thus, China believes that BRICS can fulfill the aims of the Chinese foreign policy (Katada et al. 2017: 424). Further, China wants to change the BRICS policy. Beijing is trying to combine the BRICS and the BRI and become a leader in both. The Belt and Road Portal says that BRICS synergy with the BRI; thus, China is willing to share its development benefits with the other BRICS members and developing countries (Belt and Road Portal 2017). However, it is against the spirit of its foreign policy for India. And India since the starting of the BRI, India has been against it. Therefore, there is a possibility of a gulf between India and China. That’s the BRICS has to look into it. That China’s BRICS membership has some reasons and some purposes. The BRICS role will be crucial for China as the situation seems critical between the East and West. China has an arduous task to convince other group countries to make BRICS Plus from BRICS. Apart from that, China is getting space in the global economy due to Covid-19 expanding its economy. For that, BRICS would be the ideal avenue as the BRICS has scores of resources in their kitties in several forms. Hence BRICS is still relevant in China’s foreign policy. With China’s political and economic change in global politics, China can use the BRICS to enhance South-South cooperation and South-North economic integration (Wang et al. 2021). As the father of the BRIC’s term, Jim O’Neill (2021) says that although China’s economy will grow slowly, it will overtake the US economy. Nevertheless, it will be possible with the help of BRICS group members and others as the relations between the West and China are critical. However, the crucial point depends on how China handles the situation and how other BRICS react.

Conclusion China rose from isolation to become a global player, which has taken place over a brief period. China became active in membership in international institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and many others, leading

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to a spiraling FDI into its economy. China leveraged multilateral organizations’ role to become an economic giant in global affairs, rivaling the United States. It is estimated that it will surpass US growth in the coming years. China’s global governance approach is managed and found on Chinese interests and responds to the international system’s loopholes. Though China was not that rigorously interested in BRICS, the emergence of BRICS has given China another avenue to diversify its interaction with other major emerging economies like India, Brazil, and South Africa and prominent global player Russia. With the BRICS group, China can lessen the trade imbalance it has faced in the recent past. At the same time, China must not be aggressive with the BRICS members on policy matters and bilateral relations because it will again backfire on its foreign policy. Finally, the BRICS membership allows China to reform the democratic-deficit global governance system, as it maintains cordial relations with the BRICS member countries.

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CHAPTER 5

Russia and China in BRICS: Convergences and Divergences

Introduction Russia and China have successfully sorted out their cross-border immigration and territorial disputes within their bilateral relations. The Russia– China partnership also holds a compatible perspective on territorial integrity, and the two countries consistently denounced separatism within the two countries, such as Chechnya and Taiwan, for instance (Tsigankov 2009). In 2012, on April 30, the Chinese vice premier Li Keqiang remarked at the famous Moscow State University that the relationship between Russia and China had strong foundations from the past, which was a golden opportunity in the present, and considerable potential for the future. However, their relationship with BRICS is quite complicated because of its significance in foreign policies. Both Russia and China are founding members of the BRICS, and both countries share a joint stand. However, both have had their differences; despite this, Russia and China view BRICS as a group with tremendous potential in how it plays a part in development. In the recent past, the changing international relations scenario, particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic, signaled an unprecedented change in world politics. In this context, BRICS will play a crucial role in its upcoming international relations through Russian and Chinese foreign policy. However, before that, the chapter explores how Russia and China’s relations have evolved.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 J. Srinivas, Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1115-6_5

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Russia’s Shift Toward China Since the division of the Soviet Union, there were two kinds of policymakers within the Russian Federation. Firstly, these included the Western supporters who wanted to ally with the traditional West-dominated institutions, and secondly, the Sinophile discourse supporters (or those who supported and focused on China). These two groups influenced policymaking in the Russian Federation, but Western discourse support groups still managed to gather more say, as they were in the majority. Gradually, the tendency shifted to the East, focusing on China and the Sinophiles discourse group. Yet, even within the Chinese discourse supporters, there was further groupism. According to scholar Tsigankov (2009), there were two divisions in the Russian discourse of China, which included the ‘pragmatists’ and the ‘ideologists.’

Pragmatists The pragmatists supported the enhancement of relations within economic and security affairs. They believe that Russia’s preservation of sovereignty and independence, and its emphasis, would be better protected through closer economic and political relations. For example, Karaganov (2010) argued that Russia should think pragmatically, focus on building its ‘hard power’ (or realpolitik) capacity and military force, particularly given NATO’s strict control over the Russian territory. In this context, Russia was advised to build relations with China and other like-minded states who could help Russia when needed. Further, the leading Russian intellectual Vadim Tsymburski (2001) stated that Russia must preserve its control over its geopolitical responsibility area, mainly Central Asia and the Caucasus. He further advised that it should be followed by developing its political, cultural, and economic relations with China, India, and Iran. Furthermore, in 2003, the then Chair of the International Affairs Committee in the Federal Council, Mikhail Margelov, stressed the Sino– Russian nexus in the Russia–US triangle (Lo 2008: 163). The ‘Russian Doctrine’ was also prepared by renowned Russian scholars in 2007, supporting the notion of a long-term alliance with non-Western states to constrain the West and become self-sufficient. The same Russian doctrine stated that Russian nationalists must call for military alliances with nonWestern states, especially China, India, and Iran (Tsigankov 2009). This

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is because Russia never believed in the West or felt that there was a possibility of normalcy between Russia and the West over some time. The regular frictions on various issues were also another reason for Russia to move away from any Western alliance. That is why the pragmatist wants Russia to establish relations with non-Western countries.

Ideologists The Chinese discourse of the ideologists within Russia encouraged a nationalist and anti-Western ideology and aspired for a unique development model. The Communist Party of Russia and the Eurasianists advocated close alliances with China and Iran to bring Russia back to its cultural roots (Tsigankov 2009). They also regarded Western influences on Russia’s sovereignty as dangerous. This group promoted creating a Eurasian coalition, with China’s help, to create a meaningful counterbalance against the West. Thus, with China’s support, the United States would be evacuated from Russia’s traditionally influenced areas, and a Russia–Chinese model of state and culture-centered development would emerge (ibid.). Thus, there are three essential factors behind Russia’s shift toward China. They are: ● With the rapid rise of China’s economic growth, ● The need to break away from US unilateralism in global affairs, ● A relative weakening of Russia’s stature in international relations (Tsigankov 2009). And Russia needed economic support from other than Western countries. In this process, China had given them one option. The pressure from the West in the form of NATO eastward expansion was such that it had to build alternative power centers globally. The gradual evolution of Russia–China relations could be seen through the cumulative results of growing trade convergence and several intersections in global affairs policy.

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Early Attempts at a Partnership with China Territorial issues figured prominently in the Sino-Soviet dispute since 1960, and Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev pledged to ‘close the past and open the future’ in their 1989 summit meeting to normalize relations between the two countries (Wishnick 2001: 87–101). However, the disputes were kept continued between the two countries. Further, territorial, political, economic, financial, trade, and many other issues caused the relationship between the two countries. The new Russian Federation foreign policymakers gave a prominent position to its Eastern Policy. In February 1992, the New Russian Federation signed a border treaty with China. But, the then President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, and Foreign Minister Kozyrev remained wary of China. They thought that China was too anti-Western and critical of Russia’s democratic development (Tsigankov 2009). Thus, Russian leaders and politicians generally abstained from meetings with Chinese officials during that time. Yet, in March 1992, Kozyrev traveled to China to stimulate economic development between the two nations. The trip lasted for only thirty hours, and both the countries disagreed on human rights issues. Again, Yeltsin visited China in December of the same year (1992) to bring back the lost trade ties between the two countries; however, this trip remained futile (ibid.). Thus, relations between the two countries were kept under the mat until the mid-1990s, despite both countries’ efforts. However, when Russia’s foreign policy started fundamentally changing from 1996 onwards, Yevgeni Primakov aimed to improve Russia’s relative power position globally and sought to build multipolarity as a desirable aim with like-minded nations (Tsigankov 2009). In 1996 on January 24, at the Foreign Ministry’s Council on Foreign Economic relations, Primakov put forward four features to Russia’s foreign policy in the upcoming period. They are: ● The territorial integrity of the new Russian Federation. ● Support for Centripetal Tendencies within the former Soviet Union. ● Stabilization of International Relations, particularly on a regional level. ● Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and prevention of destabilization developments (Kratochvil 2002; Weydenthal 1996).

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In improving relations with Russia, on April 24, 1997, the then Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited Russia to sign an agreement between five Central Asian Republics and China for a mutual reduction in military forces along the border. During the meeting, Zemin met Yeltsin. Both leaders declared that the Russia–China alliance must let go of the past and embark upon a new road to build trust and cooperate on overall development. It was to seek cooperation strategically and respect each other’s sovereignty. Both leaders stressed creating a peaceful, equitable, just, and democratic world order based on multipolarity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China 1997). It was being done to counter the Western hegemonic domination in international relations, thinking that the West is seriously causing instability in their affairs and international relations. Later, both countries called to preserve the 1997 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The Russia–China alliance lifted the UN Security Council sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq regime (Cohen 2001). However, with changing times, the relationship between Russia and China has been increasing. The two become global partners to reform an existing undemocratic international order, stressing democratic equations. According to China’s foreign ministry, the two countries have very close relations. In 2013, the two presidents met five times during meetings, had three telephone conversations, and exchanged messages over 16 times, pushing their relationship to a new level that no other country could measure.1 Russia and China firmly support each other on sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and other core benefits. China supports Russia in its fight against terrorism, safeguarding Russian freedom and security. Likewise, Russia continually supports China’s principles and position on the Taiwan issue, Tibet and Xinjiang’s related frictions, and other matters at the regional and global levels (ibid.). Furthermore, during a visit to Russia in 2013, on March 23 at the Moscow State University, the Chinese President Xi Jinping said that the Russia–China relationship is one of the best in present-day world affairs. The high and robust-performance relationship between the two countries serves the interests of both countries. It provides a prominent 1 The meetings they held between them have been explained lucidly in an essay posted on China’s Foreign Ministry website [Online: web], accessed on June 23, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/dozys_ 664276/gjlb_664280/3220_664352/.

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safeguard to maintaining an international strategic balance and peace and stability in world affairs. These days, the Russia–China cooperation has gained momentum rapidly, strengthening from economic to political and even security domains. The growing Russian and Chinese axis provides more opportunities and temptations to its neighboring and distant states, resulting in the rapid institutional development of certain entities like BRICS and G-20 (Kortunov 2015). Thus, a gradual emergence of bipolarity emerged, with traditional divisions of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ global ‘good’ and international ‘evil,’ all of which reflect on the Cold War environment (ibid.). Like Russia, China was always discontent and suspicious of the Western world’s domination of international affairs and its double standards on human rights, a market economy, accountability, democracy, transparency, and law rule. China has provided its version of global governance and harmonious living (Wang and Rosenau 2009). So, on these issues, Russia–China is cooperating, unlike earlier, which is causing concern in the Western world. Both countries try to emphasize other southern world countries’ importance in their external policymaking. In the process, both Russia and China are heeding southern world countries’ concerns to reform the existing global order. They also think that there should be democratic representation in global governance.

Russia–China Views on Global Governance Global governance is less permanently established, fluid, and continuously constructed and reconstructed. The global governance mechanism consists of international organizations, including the United Nations and the slew of inter-governmental organizations at the regional level (Wang and French 2013). Scholar Trenin (2012) said that Russia and China have similar views on global governance. However, that does not mean that there are no differences, but cooperation is greater. In Russia, the concept of global governance is relatively new. Nearly ten years ago, the first time a researcher from St. Petersburg, Natalia Shveikina, published a state of domestic debate about global governance. However, it remained a puzzle regarding defining global governance in Russia. More importantly, there were no Russian scholars who wrote about global governance. The present researchers believe that global governance is a hierarchical system controlled from above or outside the system (Kulik and Yurgens 2016). According to Russian scholar’s practical knowledge of global governance, Russia intended to bring change since it is a hierarchical system. For that,

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BRICS is the primary tool to push forward for reforming the global governance system. Scholars Kulik and Yurgens (2016) observed that Russia is considered a partner of China. Both the countries trying to counterbalance to the United States led the Western world to get an effective global governance system. After the Cold War, the Chinese foreign policymakers proposed a just and rational international political and economic order and called for multipolar world order. However, Chinese policymakers were clueless about how to define it. Since there was more exposure to the outside world, Chinese foreign policy was primarily constructed around domestic and economic development and social stability. Though Chinese leaders propagated the global order’s institutional structure reform, the seeds came out for this sort of tendency when China became part of the WTO. In China, the Chinese scholar Wang Yizhou (1995) first used the phrase’ global governance’ in a conference to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the United Nations. It was held at La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia. Yizhou gave the impression that the UN would become the center of global governance, probably in peacekeeping and peace-building, to create a sense of preventive diplomacy.2 Later, the concept of a ‘harmonious world’ was first officially referred to in a joint declaration on China and Russia in October 2004, where the basic principles of the statements are mentioned below: ● ● ● ●

Mutual Respect Common Development Confidence Building, and Cultural Tolerance3

In April 2005, the Chinese premier Hu Jintao mentioned this concept at the Asia–Africa conference in Jakarta. But the watershed moment occurred when Hu delivered a speech at the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the United Nations, at an event called ‘Strive to establish 2 Since then, the concept of global governance became part and parcel of the Chinese media and official documents. Yizhou, Wang. (1995). Lianheguo Yanjiu Zhong de Ruogan Zhongdian he Dongxiang. Several foci and directions of UN studies, Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management), No. 6 (1995). 3 The detailed explanation has been mentioned in the Jiang Jemin’s speech of 16th CCP Congress in 2002 [Online: web], http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49007.htm.

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a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace.’ The Chinese government reiterated and elaborated this concept in its White Paper in December 2005 (Wang and Rosenau 2009). It elaborated on the four principles of such a harmonious world. International Politics Democratization: All countries have equitable rights to participate in international affairs and must be consulted on common international problems, not be dominated through institutions controlled by the West. Thus, they must seek to fix the democratic deficit in global institutions (Sun and Yu 2004; Wang and Rosenau 2009). That is why the Global South countries are joining together to surface their voice on international fora so that the Global South could firmly demand a democratic world order. Justice and Prosperity: China believes that globalization considerably widened the disparity between North and South. International trade, global capital flow, and the information revolution helped the developed world disproportionately. China argues that the increasing economic inequality between the rich and the developing countries is unjust; however, it can undermine world affairs, peace, and stability. So China called for shared development and prosperity among different countries (Wang and Rosenau 2009). Hence, China increased its aid to the Global South for a prosperous Global South. However, many critics of China’s belief is that China uses coercive methods in aiding the Global South. Therefore, the debate is on China’s aiding policy in international relations. Diversity and Tolerance: China believes that globalization was a double-edged sword and brought high economic interdependence levels with cultural imperialism. Thus, China believes that countries have different histories, cultural experiences, and economic conditions and that nobody must impose one’s values and models in other countries. It can make the world a better and stable place (Wang and Rosenau 2009; Hu 2005; Keping 2007). However, in practice, there is a lot of gap in Chinese foreign policy. Peaceful Resolution of Global Conflicts: This has been part of China’s foreign policy objective since 1953. The then Chinese premier Zhou Enlai had included five principles of Chinese foreign policy (Hongying and Rosenau 2009). These principles were frequently featured in the news, referring to their ethics as an evolution of new security dynamics within international relations. The media has continued to cover the phenomena as a ‘new security

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concept,’ a ‘common security,’ or ‘collective security and ‘confidencebuilding while describing China’s new approach to international security. China believes that every country has its approach to world affairs but will collectively tackle global security problems (Liu and Wang 2006). Thus, they have never accepted the existing structure of international order. According to China, the current global order has several loopholes, including the dominance of power politics, the growing disparity between the north and south, intolerance of different values, use of force to solve international conflicts, and neglect of the environment. China, therefore, seeks to reform the global governance system. The Russian federation’s ‘foreign policy concept’ (2013) mentions that China and Russia share the same fundamental position on critical global issues. Thus, Russia will promote foreign policy cooperation with China in reforming the existing global governance system. In the process, the two countries will seek to address new threats and challenges and cooperate within the UN Security Council, G-20, BRICS, EAS, SCO, and other multilateral forums. In this context, scholar Lo (2014) said that the fundamentals of Russia and China are unaltered. Both sides oppose global governance on Western terms and seek to limit growing American power in international relations. However, Russia and China have a different view of the twenty-first-century multipolar world order. Moscow sees itself as an equal and independent center of global power. At the same time, China’s focus is overwhelmingly on the United States, with Russia playing a secondary and supporting role for China. However, 2015 brought several international relations developments, particularly giving scores of challenges to the Russia–China partnership. For one, Russia’s economy registered a negative GDP growth rate with West-imposed sanctions and led to the Russian Ruble and Chinese Yuan’s devaluation. China also reported a slow growth rate. Nonetheless, Russia and China signed the ambitious $100 billion trade treaty between China and Russia (Gabuev 2015). A report written by Russian and Chinese experts (2016) called Russia–China dialogue by Russian International Affairs Council stated that Russia and China’s main strategic goal today is to build relations and increase the influence of both countries in regional and international affairs. Further, they want to coordinate more closely on critical actions in multilateral formats and regions and develop a typical response to challenge the problems created by the modern world.

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Since Russia and China consider that with BRICS, they will have the opportunity to bring back reforms in the international system, both have many convergences and divergences with the BRICS group. These are as follows.

Convergences Economic Issues In April 2009, during the London G-20 summit, individual BRICS countries issued an international reserve currency to replace the greenback. In March 2009, Russia suggested creating a supranational reserve currency issued by the international monetary institutions. China appeared to support this proposal given by the Russian Federation, as Zhou Xiaochuan, the Governor of the People’s Republic of China, called for creating a ‘super-sovereign reserve currency’ in the same month to replace the greenback (Lye and Yang 2010). Russia and China wanted to promote loans in local currencies and establish a currency exchange system to reduce dependence on the US dollar and lower its trade risks (Ying 2010). And again, in response to the media, the Russian President Aide Yuri Ushakov on July 10, 2014, clearly stated that: Russia will propose several specific issues for consideration, including establishing a BRICS energy association to ensure the energy security of its member states and conduct integrated research and analysis of global hydrocarbon markets. It is suggested that a fuel reserve and an energy policy institute for the BRICS be created within this association. (RT 2014)

Over some time, energy played a significant role in Russia–China relations. Thus, in 2014, Russia proposed establishing a BRICS energy association, which included establishing a fuel reserve bank and an institute of energy policies. BRICS members, including China, would benefit from this idea and give a cheerful hand in supporting Russia when it needs help from West-imposed sanctions (Tass 2015). Russia will benefit hugely from this move and become an energy consumer as an energy producer. Notably, after the Covid-19, the scope has increased abundantly. Chinese scholars like Yina and Jinghua (2015) opined that the energy cooperation between Russia and China could be a containment strategy against the US-led West. With BRICS, Russia and China can oppose Western domination and interference in internal affairs. While attending

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the 2014 Brazil summit, Putin (2014) cleared that Russia should prioritize its strategic and economic cooperation within the BRICS group. At the same Summit, Xi Jinping (2014) removed that China and Russia are on the same plane where financial affairs are concerned. After disbanding the G-8 Summit, Russia said it expected greater cooperation on health issues from BRICS. Later, all the countries signed up for it, including China (Niu Haibin 2015). The BRICS cooperation and its engagement with China provided essential and much-needed support for Russia due to the West’s economic sanctions. They led to its isolation from the international arena after the Ukraine crisis. With this regular contact with China, Russia could finally reduce Western sanctions’ impact and even get psychological support (Sakshi 2016: 206). Therefore, Russia and China would like to support this project.

Global Governance Global governance implies a complex inter-web of institutions and processes. During its 2009 Summit, BRICS countries said they firmly believe in reforming the world’s financial institutions to reflect changes in the world economy. The emerging economies and developing nations should have a more extraordinary voice and representation in global financial institutions, where heads and executives must be appointed in an open, transparent, and merit-based selection process. They said there is a strong need for a stable, predictable, and more diversified international monetary system (Kremlin 2009). Since the declarations made based on all group members like Russia and China also have the same opinion of reforming the international system. One of the critical components of Russia and China’s international relations is the BRICS promotion in international relations. The origin of BRICS was based on the need to reform the global governance system. Further, Russia and China have tried to veto several West-influenced resolutions by the United Nations Security Council. China’s stand sometimes created ambiguity, but Russia was more willing to adopt public declarative stances on the Libyan and Syrian crises. China was labeled with a more conservative approach, to its earlier economic rise. The perception of threat from China is primarily created by the West (Snetkov and Lanteigne 2015). In 2016, on July 12, when the International Law Tribunal went against Chinese interests over the South China Sea matter, Russia’s foreign ministry spokesperson Maria

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Zakharova stated that Russia would not be involved in this issue as it is an internal issue of China. But it is strongly opposing the external actor’s involvement in this issue. Further, she said Russia supports the code of conduct promoted by the ASEAN and China (TASS 2016). Hence, both the countries are involved in carrying forwarding wise diplomacy policy in their bilateral relations. Just before that incident, China and Russia came together. They gave a joint declaration for the Russian Federation and for the promotion of China on its international law principles on June 26, 2016, clearly stating that China and Russia had reiterated their total commitments to the principles mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations. The 1970 Declaration of the United Nations on the principles of International Law, vis-à-vis friendly relations and cooperation among several states, said that ties must be maintained according to the Charter of the United Nations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China 2016a). These are also guided by the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ within International Law, which are the cornerstone for just and equitable international relations, featuring ‘win–win’ cooperation among states. It creates a community of a shared future for humanity and establishes a shared space of equal security and economic cooperation (ibid.). Another significant development was when Crimean citizens voted in 2014, 95 percent agreed to secede from Ukraine and join Russia. The United States had no option except to impose economic sanctions (Barnett 2014). However, China stood by Russia and promised to sign on a $400 trade deal to shore up the Russian economy, and China did so. It shows how both the countries are helping each other when necessary.

Geopolitical Control Yevgeny Primakov stated that Russia and China were using a joint power of deterrence to oppose a Western use of force (Ivashov 2014). At the Brazil Fortaleza (2014) summit, the group established the BRICS’ New Development Bank and Contingency Reserve Fund (CRF). The wellknown fact was that the CRF was saving Russia from its shrinking foreign reserves (ibid.). No country opposed this, including China. On May 21, 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping remarked that the China–Russia partnership jointly proposed an Asia–Pacific and Security Initiative. At the fourth Summit of the ‘Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia,’ its theme was a ‘New Asian Security Concept

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for New Progress in Security Cooperation.’ This initiative played an essential role in strengthening and maintaining peace and security in the Asia Pacific region, and indeed, China was a staunch supporter of the Asian Security concept. China is working on making this concept materialize soon, and for this to happen, China is taking concrete steps to strengthen cooperation and security dialogue with other like-minded nations. Thus, other parties in the initiative jointly formulated a code of conduct for regional security and the Asian security partnership program (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2014). At the same meeting mentioned above, Jinping (2014) stressed that China was ready to discuss with regional nations to create an Asian forum for security cooperation. It would help respond to its major security emergencies by coordinating national efforts in the region. In 2014, during the Brisbane G-20 summit, when Russia was isolated from the meeting, the BRICS foreign ministers came forward to give a communiqué that Russia should not be excluded from the G-20 Summit. China wanted a peaceful solution to the Ukraine crisis and helped Russia stabilize its economy (Stuenkel 2015; Haibin 2015). Similarly, when the United Nations General Assembly voted in resolution no. 68/262 on March 27, 2014, by condemning the Russian policy on the Ukraine crisis, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil abstained from voting. China’s permanent representative to the UN, Liu Jieyi, condemned international interference in Russia’s internal affairs (United Nations 2014). Russia and China are together when the situation arises. When Russia intervened in the Ukraine crisis, no BRICS policymaker criticized the Russian act; however, they called for a peaceful resolution. Furthermore, India, China, South Africa, and Brazil, including 54 other countries, abstained from voting on the UN General Assembly resolution on the Crimean referendum and criticized it (Stuenkel 2015). All of these instances imply that BRICS countries are together, no matter what attempt the West makes to reduce the status of its member countries, and that BRICS will come together in unity. While responding to the media over whether anti-Russian international sanctions imposed by the Western world could hamper trade and commerce ties between China and Russia, the Chinese minister Zhang Jun (2015, at the Ufa summit) said: Unilateral sanctions imposed against Russia do not apply to BRICS members. (Sputnik International 2015)

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Furthermore, the West deployed R2P4 to justify its claim on Crimea, potentially a part of Eastern Ukraine. It threatened its Russian ‘compatriots’ and its Russian ethnicity and culture, and Russia reciprocated to it by citing the Kosovo case. In the Kosovo case, the United States supported the principle of self-determination of Kosovo Albanians. Both in the runup and after the declaration of independence by Pristina in 2008 (Putin 2013). In another issue in 2016, Russia immediately supported China’s position on it without any condition over a Hague-based permanent court arbitration over the South China issue. However, Russia clarified that its support is legal and not political (Sputnik International 2016b). The critical matter here is that it is not only China or Russia. Other members are also not bringing any other issues which are not part of the BRICS group. They are trying to highlight the cases when it belongs to the BRICS group on a common platform called BRICS. Brazil and India abstained from the resolution of the BRICS group members at the UN Security Council and on the authorization of force against Libyan Muammar al-Quadafi in 2011 (Nossel 2016). Another significant development took place from the Chinese foreign ministry while attending the UN headquarters on September 20, 2011, over the issue of the Libya conflict. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi clearly stated that China respects Libya’s sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity Libya, and any decision made should be based on the choice of the Libyan people. It indicates that BRICS group members are together when the situation arises.

Security While addressing the media after a meeting with BRICS at the sidelines of the G-20 Summit at Antalya in Turkey on November 15, 2015, the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov (2015) pointed out that all countries without any double standards should think about forming a universal front to quench the terrorism menace. Before this, at the same meeting, Xi observed:

4 The full form of it is “Responsibility to Protect”, it is new international security and human rights norms to address the international community’s failure to prevent, and to stop genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimese against humanity.

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The United Nations Charter and “recognized basic norms” of international relations must be the touchstone of devising a global counter-terrorism strategy. “The international community must join hands to step up counter-terrorism cooperation, in light of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and other recognized basic norms for international relations.” (Aneja 2015)

Remarkably, this coordination and cooperation intensified after the Paris terror attack. Later, in 2016, on September 16, BRICS security advisers met in New Delhi to issue a declaration. The declaration put forward by the Indian Government Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Vikas Swaroop: They deliberated on security issues such as counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, and energy security. We also exchanged views on the recent developments in West Asia and the North African region. In the area of cybersecurity and information security, they agreed to enhance cybersecurity through joint efforts by sharing the information and best practices combating cybercrimes, improving cooperation between technical and law enforcement agencies, and including joint cybersecurity of R and D capacity building. (Sputnik International 2016a)

BRICS countries also intended to establish Internet cables to avoid regular Internet traffic from the United States (Steve 2016). However, it is yet to materialize due to differences in BRICS. Sakshi (2016: 205) says that Russia and China would jointly support any military intervention in the United Nations Security Council resolutions. Both these countries vetoed six times in the UNSC. And both Russia and China are successful in coordinating with other countries in the BRICS. At the same time, both the countries advocated peaceful resolutions toward Libya, Syria, and Iran. While addressing the media after a meeting with BRICS at the sidelines of the G-20 Summit at Antalya in Turkey, the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov (2015) pointed out that all countries without any double standards should think about forming a universal front to quench the terrorism menace. Before this, at the same meeting, Xi observed: The United Nations Charter and “recognized basic norms” of international relations must be the touchstone of devising a global counter-terrorism strategy. “The international community must join hands to step up

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counter-terrorism cooperation, in light of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and other recognized basic norms for international relations.” (Aneja 2015)

Significantly, this coordination and cooperation intensified after the Paris terror attack. Later, in 2016, on September 16, BRICS security advisers met in New Delhi to issue a declaration. The declaration was put forward by the Indian Government Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Vikas Swaroop: They deliberated on security issues such as counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, and energy security. We also exchanged views on the recent developments in West Asia and the North African region. In the area of cybersecurity and information security, they agreed to enhance cybersecurity through joint efforts by sharing the information and best practices combating cybercrimes, improving cooperation between technical and law enforcement agencies, and including joint cybersecurity of R and D capacity building. (Sputnik International 2016a)

BRICS countries also intended to establish Internet cables to avoid regular Internet traffic from the United States (Tim 2015). However, it is yet to materialize due to differences in BRICS. Sakshi (2016: 205) says that Russia and China would jointly support any military intervention in the United Nations Security Council resolutions. Both these countries vetoed six times in the UNSC. And both Russia and China are successful in coordinating with other countries in the BRICS. At the same time, both the countries advocated peaceful resolutions toward Libya, Syria, and Iran. When Xi (2016b) attended the BRICS countries meeting at the sidelines of the G-20 Summit held at Hangzhou in China, he argued that all other members of BRICS join with equity, justice, and construct a peaceful and stable environment for its development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China 2016b). At the same G20 meeting in Hangzhou, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized the need for BRICS to promote political cooperation and develop approaches toward critical global problems. Russia and China share a joint stand on the worldwide terrorism issue, which is why they encouraged BRICS to set up a counter-terrorism mechanism.

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Divergences Economic Issues Despite regular exchanges of close cooperation between Russia and China, there was some mistrust. Scholar Lo (2010) observed that China’s increasing economic clout and a ‘rising China’ made Russia feel more threatened and was true, as some sections of Russian scholars said, a significant threat to Russia. Russia was also concerned about China’s growing involvement in Russia’s ‘near abroad’ affairs. It feared China’s demographic expansion in the Far East. Similarly, China has often worried about Russia’s imperial behavior. So, China has been cautious in dealing with Russia and not turning their friendship into any new alliance. And Russia never allows China to play a more significant economic role and push China’s currency as an exchange in the BRICS transaction (Stunkel 2015; Larionova 2012). At the same time, China’s increasing foothold in Russia’s strategic areas like Central Area and its military base in Tajikistan in 2016 may cause a rift between China and Russia in advancing the joint BRICS project. That is why the BRICS is still not fruitful in bringing their currency to replace the dollar’s role in the global economy.

Global Governance China and Russia have divergent views on the UN Security Council reforms because China’s interest arguably lies more on a bipolar rather than genuinely multipolar world order and the global economic effects of China’s currency (Cooper 2013). The rivalry between Russia and China over BRICS’ status was that Russia wanted BRICS to be a more powerful political group in present-day world affairs. On the other hand, China never regarded BRICS as a challenge to the world order because it will create a rivalry between China and the United States. China does not want this. It is an open secret that the United States never wanted BRICS to become more assertive and have China assume more responsibilities. However, the United States was alright with the Chinese global role. Somewhere, Russia did not accept the rising Chinese influence in the group either (Lye and Zhang 2010). Further, Scholar Lo (2014) very candidly said:

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Beijing sees Russia less as a counterweight to the United States than as a neighbor with whom it is important to stay on good terms. It aims to secure China’s “strategic rear” and preserve geopolitical flexibility. It recognizes that the United States, not Russia, is China’s truly indispensable partner… () Strategic trust remains elusive. Their partnership is an axis of convenience, driven by a pragmatic appreciation of the benefits of cooperation rather than deeper like-mindedness. Moscow worries about China’s growing assertiveness in East Asia, the displacement of the Russian influence from Central Asia, and the emergence of a China-centered or G-2 world. Russia would play a subordinate role. It is also anxious about the growing asymmetry of the bilateral relationship, and the extent to which Russia now depends on China, both within Asia and in the international system more generally.

China is a dominant country in the BRICS group, and in fact, wants to become rich, powerful, democratic, civilized, and harmonious as a modern, socialist country in the twenty-first century. However, if China wants to become a dominant political leader, no other country would accept it (Toloraya 2015). Likewise, scholar Lo (2015) says that Putin is committed to replacing the Western international order. To materialize, Putin rigorously promoted the BRICS stature in world affairs (However, not a revisionist approach). Putin wants to make BRICS open fora and a cohesive body so that BRICS could directly challenge the G-8 and Bretten Woods institutions. For Putin, promoting BRICS is more critical to affirm the Russian position internationally. For Beijing, BRICS is an added group in the China list and valuable but not indispensable. China does not want to bring any serious threat to its sovereignty by challenging the United States in its present scenario. For China, the importance of BRICS is just symbolic, whereas BRICS is efficient for Russia. The alliance of BRICS intends to stay away from becoming a military group like NATO, which is the collective West’s core. NATO is based on the United States’ harsh diktat, whereas the BRICS is based on several founding principles: a dialogue between equal states (Toloraya 2015). Besides economic factors, the basic idea of interaction in the BRICS group is to start heeding world peace’s security and stability (ibid.). Scholars like Lo (2015) said that Russia fundamentally wants to change the international order. Still, China is quite complacent with a US-led world order because China knows that they have benefited from that status quo for 30 years. The greatest ever socio-economic transformation happened under the US-led world order, which China got from it.

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Another essential aspect that Lo stressed was Putin envisaging a multipolar world order that is tripolar. Here Russia, the United States, and China believe that the United States is the only competitor in the present scenario. Further, China does not want to confront the United States because it has more benefits with the United States than with Russia. The Russian Federation intends to reform its excellent power status ambition again through BRICS but has not regained its earlier status for over twenty years. On the other hand, through the BRICS, China can counter its widespread perception of a ‘China Threat’ to neighbors and other countries (Senguin 2015; Lo 2016). China wants to change the existing international system; however, it is not aggressive. Instead, it is doing so in a way to reform. That’s the reason why China established multilateral cooperation with many neighbors and other countries. China still believes in South-South collaboration and North–South dialogue. In a nutshell, China’s BRICS engagement is the new mechanism of its twenty-firstcentury diplomacy and the result of China’s international responsibility and consciousness and its reflection of the reality of China’s economic strength (Yue 2013). In this context, Scholar Zhao Minghao (2015) said that, The Chinese government is now going further, urging the rest of BRICS to institutionalize their cooperation, not just pursue domestic reform. China contends that a stronger BRICS grouping would help safeguard all developing countries’ interests. To that end, the country is also spearheading the effort to reform the global economic architecture, including pushing its reforms to the International Monetary Fund’s weighted voting system. (Minghao 2015)

The BRICS existence and cohesion depend on how well China and Russia coordinate at the BRICS forum. Russia wants to make BRICS a geopolitical entity, as it often reflects upon states and their representatives, whereas for China, the BRICS is just another group to keep Russia happy. When there is a crisis, China will not let go of its Western alliances. Yet for China, BRICS is essential, but that does not mean that it will directly challenge the United States (Panova 2016; Lo 2016). So, China has neither intended to make it a geopolitical entity nor create a new international order. Instead, it just aimed at reforming the existing global structure.

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BRICS from a Security Point of View The 2008–2009 global economic recession brought out the issue of existing international relations structures and called for a new international order. It also exposed the lacunae in security cooperation (Lukov 2011). So, over time, BRICS has been diversifying its cooperation in strengthening itself, given how vital political and security affairs were getting prominence within BRICS consultations. In this context, the below-drawn table gives a broad picture of how BRICS deals with its global issues over time (Table 5.1). The above table explains how BRICS allocates a priority to existing domains of functionality. The survey covered between 2008 and 2012. Economic and financial affairs held primary importance during BRICS consultations and declarations. The average priority given to economic aspects from 2008 to 2012 was 28.15 percent, and finance went up by 19.67 percent. BRICS started giving importance to political affairs over some time because, in 2008, it was 0 percent, whereas it improved to 15.79 percent in 2012. Trade and development also held significant importance in BRICS consultations. The average priority was 7.16 percent and 7.82 percent, respectively. Further, the other important aspect of the BRICS’s consultation was energy, as the average received in that domain was 4.85 percent. Table 5.1 BRICS Priorities in 2008–2012, percentage share of subjects Aspects

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Average

Economy Finance Development Trade Other areas Security Environment Political issues Energy Health Science and education Crisis management Corruption

30.02 28.2 6.03 5.92 1.4 16.89 3.16 0 6.37 0 0 0 0

39 35.57 4.31 7.13 3.45 1.2 4.95 1.2 2.58 0 0.63 0 0

35.57 11.07 14.24 4.15 11.28 3.96 4.32 5.45 6.39 0.00 0 3.56 0

25.01 3.84 6.7 1.45 4.53 1.59 7.5 13.06 4.07 14.41 7.52 0.33 0

9.17 16.69 7.75 18.24 9.17 2.26 11.61 15.79 3.82 1.71 3.08 0.00 0.00

28.15 19.67 7.82 7.16 5.97 5.91 4.98 4.93 4.85 3.60 2.39 0.97 0.00

Source Larionova (2012) “BRICS in the System of Global Governance,” pg. 41

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This means that BRICS was also concerned about other problems that would emanate from emerging and developing countries, such as traditional and non-traditional security problems and the menace of terrorism. For the first time in the Yekaterinburg (2009) BRIC Summit, BRICS leaders reiterated no justification for any form of terrorism. It also called for an urgent draft of the UN’s ‘Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism.’ BRICS leaders declared that they strongly condemned terrorism wherever and in whichever form it originated. Later, the 2010 Brasilia summit underscored the importance of building cooperation among all the countries fighting against a growing terrorist threat to the world. There, they called for it as below: We condemn terrorist acts in all forms and manifestations. We noted that the fight against international terrorism must be undertaken with due respect to the UN Charter, existing international conventions and protocols and that the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council resolutions relating to international terrorism, and that the prevention of terrorist acts is as important as the repression of terrorism and its financing. In this context, we urge early negotiations in the U.N. General Assembly of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and its adoption by all Member States. (Brasilia Summit Declaration 2010)

Furthermore, the 2011 Sanya (China) summit also went ahead by including the widening of a technological threat in global affairs, where the leaders of five members said that: We reiterate our strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and stress that there can be no justification, whatsoever, for any act of terrorism. We believe that the United Nations has a central role in coordinating the international action against terrorism within the UN Charter framework and following the principles and norms of international law. In this context, we urge early negotiations in the U.N. General Assembly of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and its adoption by all Member States. We are determined to strengthen our cooperation in countering this global threat. We express our commitment to cooperate for strengthening international information security. We will pay special attention to combat cybercrime. (Sanya Summit Declaration 2011b)

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In this context, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov (2012) asserted that Russia calls upon adopting the following priorities in security cooperation among BRICS members. ● All BRICS countries should coordinate to take a position. In the future, BRICS members should advocate mutual interests for formulating joint proposals on strategic stability, international and regional security, non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and resolving and maintaining regional stability. ● BRICS should put together joint efforts to strengthen the UN’s coordinating role in the fight against the menace of international terrorism, and ensures the United Nations Global CounterTerrorism Strategy and the universal anti-terrorism conventions strictly abide by the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions. ● All members of BRICS should coordinate among themselves to combat illicit drug trafficking with the help of joint steps taken by the United Nations and regional organizations to address drug trafficking effectively. ● BRICS should bolster interaction to ensure international information security and also greater cooperation in combating cyberterrorism and cybercrime. ● The group should enhance cooperation with BRICS stakeholders in dealing with maritime piracy and step up joint efforts to set up an international mechanism for the punishment of pirates.

Security Politics at the BRICS Forum and Russia–China Role Present dimensions in world politics are entirely different from the nineteenth century’s ‘Concert of Nations’ because the critical centers of world politics are not central. The United States and NATO, the EU, and Japan share military and political alliances. Russia and China are increasingly in conflict with them and have been moving closer to each other because of their circumstances. Brazil and India, on the other hand, have been gravitating toward them. Domestic factors, economic interdependence, and commonly shared vulnerabilities to new rising security threats are much more critical to relations between states and unions (Arbatov 2013). The

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Chinese President Hu Jintao visited the Russian Federation on June 26, 2011, to attend the tenth anniversary of the signing of the treaty of ‘Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation, Between China and Russia,’ where Jintao remarked that this treaty had laid a solid foundation for the development of Russia–China bilateral and multilateral relations. Both the countries have increased their strategic cooperation sincerely since then. They have taken the same steps on a galaxy of regional and international issues, including promoting the SCO and BRICS group. The Russia–China partnership jointly advocated for the multi-polarization of international relations, global peace, and stability. Thus, this treaty has paved the way for a new security concept that features mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordination between these two countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2011a). On March 17, 2011, when voting on Resolution 1973 (which paved the way for NATO to bomb Libya), Brazil, India, Russia, and China abstained from giving their consent, while South Africa supported it (Deich 2013). Does that mean South Africa officially managed to keep it (positive neutrality)? BRICS’ official papers confirm that the resolution of its members works jointly on security issues. Furthermore, Russia and China were made to abstain from the UN Security Council Resolution of 1970, which permits armed interference in the Libyan conflict, and later Brazil joined in (Deich 2013). On the Syrian issue, too, BRICS had taken a different step, but all countries more or less took the same effort. The resolution passed by UNSC to depose Syrian President Bashar Assad saw Russia and China veto the resolution, while South Africa and India abstained. The Sanya summit’s declaration (held in China in 2011) says that: The Signees are deeply concerned with the turbulence in the Middle East and the North African regions, and sincerely wish that the states affected achieve peace, stability, prosperity, and progress, and enjoy their due standing and dignity in the world, according to legitimate aspirations of their respective country’s people. (Sanya Summit Declaration 2011b)

Likewise, the New Delhi 2012 Summit revolved around security aspects itself. The Summit theme was ‘BRICS Partnership for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity,’ dealing with the Iranian nuclear program, Afghanistan, and the Syrian turmoil. The Summit’s final declaration recognized the extreme importance of preserving stability, peace,

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and security in the Middle East and North Africa (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India 2012). The BRICS group advanced its security cooperation in the Durban summit too. The declaration rejected further militarization of the Syrian conflict. The group countries are not only on the forum of BRICS; they have furthered their cooperation on other platforms (5th BRICS Summit Declaration 2013). During the G-20 Summit in 2013, St. Petersburg came out unanimously against a new war in the Middle East. The then Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, was categorically against any military action while the Brazilian President took a firm stand. South African president Jacob Zuma expressed concern mentioning that small states feel increasingly vulnerable and insecure in the modern world. He also indirectly stated that more rich and powerful countries might use force against them at their discretion. At the end of the Summit, Putin said that power against a sovereign state must be used only in self-defense (Deich 2013). Vladimir Davydov (2011), director of the Russian Academy of the Sciences, Institute of Latin America, said that the recent trends in world politics signaled that specific forces were indeed working hard to suppress the BRICS group and Russia’s objectives. Likewise, Georgy Toloraya (2014), executive director of the Russian National Committee on BRICS’ research, also stressed that, unfortunately, the stability in world politics had come to an end, and BRICS got into this geopolitical trap (Metzel 2014). So, to be healthy, BRICS started focusing on political strength and Military might over some time.

From Economic to Security Cooperation at BRICS Therefore, the question that arises here is what is the future of this trend? Does BRICS have the capacity to build a security organization to balance out its stand on global issues? However, specific global political changes reason out that BRICS might go for securitization of its group. The group countries have been rapidly increasing their UN peacekeeping forces recently, and India is the most significant contributor at present. The data below shows the UN peacekeeping forces from BRICS countries (October 31, 2013) (Table 5.2). According to the table, BRICS countries’ share in the UN peacekeeping forces has gradually increased, whereas the Western country’s percentage is slowly decreasing. In the table of 2013, BRICS countries’ share in the UN Police forces had 1283 personnel, experts had 194

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Table 5.2 UN peacekeeping forces Country India South Africa China Brazil Russia BRICS countries All countries

Police

Experts

Military

Total

1001 61 172 11 38 1283 12,811

51 20 37 24 62 194 1899

6812 2120 1710 1676 5 12,323 83,611

7864 2201 1919 1711 105 13,800 98,321

Source U.N.

personnel, the Military had 12,323 personnel, and the total was 13,000 personnel. Likewise, other countries’ share in the UN Peacekeeping forces in the police was 12,811, personnel, experts were 1899 personnel, Military was 83,611 personnel, and total contribution was 98,321 personnel. With this explanation, the BRICS share of UN Peacekeeping forces is greater than the rest of the countries. The table says that the BRICS countries have a more considerable contribution within the UN Peacekeeping Forces, whereas the Western countries’ contribution is deteriorating day by day. It is true that the US security association in the region surrounding the BRICS is only bilateral and that it lacks a robust collaborative security institution. Further, neither NATO nor the Organization for Security has been present around the BRICS countries region. Cooperation in the European countries is also too deeply dependent within the United States itself and does not have much support from the BRICS region security. So, for a collaborative security engagement with Asia, the United States needs to encourage a much higher degree of multilateral military cooperation with its prominent Asian partners like Japan and South Korea (Binnendijk 2016). Furthermore, Russia and China have already cleared their stand on the reform of the Security Council. These two countries are now mulling over supporting other BRICS members as Security Council members and being vehemently vocal on any global issue. The position paper of the People’s Republic China at the 71st session of the United Nations General Assembly 2016, held on November 16, said that China supports the reform of the Security Council to fulfill its complete responsibilities, which were all prescribed in the Charter United

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Nations. The reform’s primary objective would be to represent developing nations in the Security Council. At present, China contributes 2600 UN Peacekeeping Forces at the ten operations. China is also the most significant troop contributor and the second-largest fund contributor to the UN peacekeeping missions, among the five most prominent members of the Security Council. On paper, China’s president pledged that China would play an active role in the UN for maintaining global peace and stability.5 The other reason for stressing more on BRICS securitization is because Russia–China is increasing its defense budget over the recent past.

American Led West Crackdown on Russia–China Realists have always emphasized how the international system’s power transition has led to military conflict among states. In this context, the Asia–Pacific region is not an exception to this game. For instance, scholars like John J. Mearsheimer (2001) stated that rising power nations like China have rarely been satisfied with the existing system and seek to create a regional or global hegemony. Though some scholars do not accept this assumption, the geopolitical changes cause concern. Thomas J. Christensen (1999) said that East Asia would be at the helm of a security dilemma, the reason behind this being that it will for long be characterized by significant shifts in the balance of power or by an unequal distribution of economic and political power within the region and between countries, and a relatively low level of intra-regional economic interdependence, or also by an anemic security institutionalization in the area. In 2011, the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in the article (‘America’s Pacific Century’) of Foreign Policy Journal, wrote that ‘the future of world politics will be decided in Asia; it is not in Afghanistan or Iraq, and the U.S. will be right at the center of this action.’ However, China rebuked this immediately in the People’s Daily, saying that the Asia Pacific Region belongs to all its people. It is not acceptable that the United States uses the term ‘diplomacy’ as if its phenomena were 5 The position paper of the Chinese has called for global cooperation for cyber security and for eradication of terrorism, and voiced concern for rising global problems in global affairs in many number of regions [Online: web], accessed on January 19, 2017, http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1395489.shtml.

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to be seen outside the area. Even if it is the ‘Pacific Century,’ it would be the ‘Pacific Century’ of all of ‘Asia’ (Oqanesyn 2011). The United States is seeking other countries’ assistance in the region (South Korea, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, and, if possible India), to establish a military-political bloc to counter the China–Russia sway in the region. As it is already clear, the US-led Western presence in the Asia Pacific region has increased rapidly since 2011. Later, to intensify the cooperation in November 2011, the United States announced a joint multilateral trade agreement with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Vietnam, Chile, and Peru to create a preferential trade regime in the Asia Pacific Region. The project was named ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership.’ However, America withdrew from this agreement under the Trump regime later. With these nations, the trade agreement reached US$171 billion in 2011 (Sushentsov 2012). The US military presence increased in the Asia Pacific region since Obama came into power in 2009. In 2012 and 2013, the United States officially announced that 60 percent of its naval vessels and 60 percent of its air force would be installed around the Asia Pacific region by 2020 (China Daily, November 25, 2016). But, China is also increasing its military budget over a period of time, on March 4, 2012, China announced that it was going to increase its defense budget by 11.2 percent to make it US$106 billion, and also according to the informal sources, China is mulling on the increase to $200 billion very soon (Sushentsov 2012). The SIPRI 2020 report says that total military expenditure rose to US$1981 in 2020. It is an increase of 2.6 percent in real terms from 2019. The five biggest spenders United States, China, India, Russia, and the United Kingdom, accounted for 62 percent of global military expenditure. The more interesting facet of the report is that China’s military spending grew for the 26th consecutive year. It is estimated that China has spent US$252 billion in 2020, representing an increase of 1.9 percent over 2019 and 76 percent over the decade 2011–2020. Likewise, Russia’s military expenditure increased by 2.5 percent in 2020 to reach US$61.7 billion. However, there is a slight shortfall in Russia’s military spending from its military budget compared to previous years (SIPRI 2021). However, the United States closely observed the steps taken by the Chinese government. Its annual report, prepared by the Ministry of Defense and the Defense Intelligence Agency for submitting to the US Congress, was named ‘Armed Forces and Security Policies of China,’

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published on May 18, 2012. The report’s main conclusions were as below: ● China is undertaking a long-term strategy for the thorough modernization of its armed forces. ● This program aims to bolster the capacity of the Chinese armed forces. ● The Chinese government has increased funding for programs related to nuclear weapons development and ballistic and cruise missiles (Sushentsov 2012). The United States in 2015 lambasted Russia in its ‘The National Strategy of the United States of America, 2015,’ where, in a document, they clearly stated that Russia was recurrently demonstrating that it did not respect its neighbor’s sovereignty and that Russia was ready to use force to achieve its ambitions. In the recent past, Russia’s military actions increased and undermined regional security dynamics directly and through proxy forces. Russia had violated scores of agreements that it had signed earlier in the process. Most of the treaties in Russia were signed based on international norms, which included the UN Charter, the Helsinki Accords,6 the Russia-NATO Founding Act,7 the Budapest Memorandum,8 and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.9

6 It was an agreement signed between 35 countries in 1975 that concluded the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, and was held at Helsinki in Finland. The act addressed important global issues, and in doing so, had a far-reaching effect on the Cold War and on US–USSR relations. 7 This act was signed by Russia and NATO in 1997. According to this act, the NATO should not establish any military base in Eastern Europe. 8 According to the memorandum, Presidents of Ukraine, Russia, US, and the Prime Minister of the UK signed three memorandums (UN Document A/49/765) on December 5, 1994, with the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The provision of this memorandum gave national security to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. 9 This was signed by the United States of America and Soviet Union on December 8, 1987. According to this treaty provision, both the parties have to destroy groundlaunched ballistic and cruise missiles within the range of 500 and 5500 km, their launchers, associated support structures, and support equipment within three years after the treaty came into force.

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Russia targeted China in the document; the document also said that the United States had supported China’s rise in the recent past. China’s actions in the Asia Pacific were causing troubles in the region. The document said that China claimed a large part of the South China Sea region. Despite cooperation from international actors, China was responding aggressively. And the record clearly stated that China’s actions made the United States install military forces in vital international sea lanes of the South China Sea (ibid.). Simultaneously, the document mentioned that no state was threatening US security but that the United States still wanted to engage itself in military-to-military contact with Russia and China while maintaining a close relationship with them on a common interest (ibid.). Thus, it could be seen through this document that attempts were being made to suppress Russia and the BRICS and thwart Russia’s intention in creating the BRICS group in the first place. In this context, Russia and China have intensified their cooperation in the recent past. It has been reflected in their regular and official meetings. The frequency of the discussions between the two countries’ representatives has been growing day by day. Both presidents met five times in 2014; later, other state representatives of both countries have met and discussed both countries’ security and strategic affairs. In 2013, between August 14 and 16, China’s State Councilor Yang Jiechi paid a visit to Russia and held a ninth meeting of the Russia–China strategic security consultation with Russia’s Federal Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, and also met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, including the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (Ministry of Affairs of People’s Republic of China 2015). Again, between October 29 and 31, Chinese General Xu Qiliang, the Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Central Military Council, went to Russia and co-chaired the 18th meeting of the Russia–China inter-governmental Joint Commission on military technology, with Russia’s defense minister Sergei Shoigu. Later, Chinese vice Premier Wang Yang from November 20 to 23, attended the closing ceremony of the ‘Year of Chinese Tourism’ in Russia and met with Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Olga Golodets (ibid.). If we closely observe the meetings, most exchanges hold security and strategic aspects. Both countries realized the importance of cooperation and consultation, considering the threat from Western powers around the Asia–Pacific region. To repeat the same in 2014, both countries intensified their collaboration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China website mentioned (in 2015) that

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from January 8 to 9, Russia’s Federal Security Council Secretary Patrushev, and China’s State Councilor Dai Bingueo, held the 8th round of China–Russia Strategic Security Consultation meetings. At the Summit’s sidelines, he met the CPC Central Committee Secretary Xi Jinping and State Councilor Meng Jianzhu. On February 25, Russian Deputy Minister Arkady Dvorkovich met Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan and co-chaired the Russia–China Energy Cooperation Committee in Beijing as part of regular meetings again. Later, from August 19 to 21 Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin and Chinese vice Premier Wang Yang met at Harbin and co-chaired the Russia–China ‘Prime Minister’s Regular Meeting Committee.’ On September 24, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Golodets and Chinese vice Premier Liu Yandong met in Guilin and held the Russia–China Cultural Cooperation Committee meeting. Russian Deputy Prime Minister on October 15 met Chinese vice Premier Yang Gaoli in Beijing and held the meeting of the China–Russia Energy Cooperation Committee. On October 18, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin and Chinese vice Premier Wang Yang met at Xian in the same month. They held the meeting of the Russia–China Prime Ministers Regular Meeting Committee (ibid.). On April 17, 2016, China’s Russian Defense Deputy Minister Anatoly Antonov, while giving an interview to Xinhua, underscored the importance of security cooperation with China and stated that Russia will always work together with China to safeguard regional peace and international security. He also emphasized that its missile defense system in the Asia– Pacific Region presented a direct threat to Russia and China (Huaxia 2016). However, by 2015, the United States had increased 368,000 military personnel in the Asia Pacific Region, including 97,000 who were stationed in the West of the International Date Line. The military personnel deployed by the United States in the Asia Pacific region accounts for more than 50 percent of its total military forces overseas (China Daily, November 25, 2016). In February 2016, according to the US Department of Defense reports, the US$583 billion of the defense budget in the fiscal year of 2017 had been proposed (ibid.). So it indicates that Washington was expecting a military confrontation with the second and third largest nuclear powers, Russia and China. On February 4, 2016, the International Committee of the Fourth International published a report, observing that the Pentagon had increased its defense budget to build the US military against Russia in Europe. It is

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projected to rise from US $800 million to US$3.4 billion. The United States had already deployed 65,000 troops in the European continent. Increased funds needed to be diverted to bolster the combat brigades into the former Baltic republics and East European countries (Auken 2016). The Baltic States have close border countries with the Russian federation. So, if war takes place, there will be a chance of speedy intervention of security forces. The United States was provoking Russia and China in a regular interval with the active installation of its defense forces near Russia and China’s doorsteps. On May 12, 2016, the US and NATO members opened the missile defense system in Europe (Romania). It directly threatened Russian security (Kramer 2016). The capability of the missile defense system is: Ballistic missiles are powered by rockets initially but then follow an unpowered, parabolic trajectory toward their target. They are classified by the maximum distance they can travel, which is a function of how powerful the missile’s engines (rockets) are, and the weight of the missile’s warhead. To add more distance to a missile’s range, rockets are stacked on top of each other in a configuration referred to as staging. (Reif 2016)

That is why Russia was considering it a grave threat to security. Likewise, the United States wanted to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System in South Korea to protect itself from the North Korean nuclear imbroglio. The first part of THAAD was installed at the Osan Air Base on March 5, 2017 (Hancocks and Berlinger 2017). The THAAD is designed to shoot down short, medium, and intermediate ballistic missiles that North Korea claims it has been testing over some time (Griffiths and Berlinger 2016). Immediately, Russian and Chinese ambassadors to the UN, Vitaly Churkin and Wu Haitao, respectively, on July 26, 2016, submitted a joint statement to the UN, signed by both the countries’ presidents opposing the United States plan to THAAD deployment in South Korea (Yonhap News Agency 2016). So China and Russia see it as a significant threat to their security. Later, the sixth China– Russia consultation on Northeast Asia’s security situation was pledged on January 12, 2017, to counter THAAD deployment in South Korea. The war looms over the Russian Federation as the first batch of US troops of more than 3500 arrived in Poland on January 12, 2017 (Zera 2017), defying Russian concerns. The second batch of around 3000 US forces had entered Norway on January 16, 2017. It was the first time the United

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States deployed its military forces in Norway after World War II. This is 900 miles away from the Russian Federation (Munoz 2017). So this is the intrinsic phase of relations between West and Russia–China relations. All the parties should see for bringing the possible harmony instead of exchanging war of words.

Western Media Coverage of BRICS The evolution of BRICS is a dramatic event in twenty-first-century world politics. For several reasons, most of the world community’s members, emerging markets, developing countries, and countries of transition economies have responded positively to its origin as a global forum (Davydov 2011). However, the Western media and experts have repeatedly projected negatively over the years, saying it does not have the compatibility for political and economic affairs. But, the irony is that it was West; they only coined the term of BRICS, Jim O. Neil, in 2001. However, the regular presence of BRICS growth made them project negatively in Western media. Scholar Jack A. Smith wrote in the Journal of Global Research (January 16, 2011) that the United States is increasingly frustrated with BRICS countries’ growing geopolitical influence. The BRICS group’s economic and political strength has only been increasing recently. It indicated in 2008 that the US’ National Intelligence Council document titled ‘Global Trends 2025’ predicted the coming international system would change radically, where the US power will relatively decline. Rising power nations have brought new rules and stakes in international relations, particularly by countries like those of the BRICS; it will become dominant in world affairs in the coming times. Thus, the media and the political community are tired of BRICS in the West, as there are no US or Western powers in the group. Without the West, they perceive an institution against the West (Filatov 2011). Scholar Joseph S. Nye Jr. (2013) asserted that BRICS is unsustainable due to social and economic differences among the member countries and group members who are competitive in many aspects. On November 10, The Washington Post wrote ‘Rise and fall of the BRICS’ (Drezner 2015). Furthermore, on November 25, 2015, Forbs wrote ‘the death of BRICS’ by lessening the importance of BRICS in present global politics (Wright 2015). Also, on January 28, 2016, Financial Times wrote, ‘BRICS is dead, long live Ticks’ (Steve 2016), and on October 24, 2016, Mint wrote, ‘BRICS: Falling

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apart’ (Sidhu 2016). The below-drawn table says much about how the Western media have covered BRICS affairs from 2013 to 2014 (Fig. 5.1). The figure displays the totality in which the Western media published coverage related to international relations. BRICS had a prominent position; however, it was mainly with a negative range. Germany published 31 percent; in fact, it is the country to publish the maximum international relations in the West. The second place is France, which has 21 percent, Austria has 11 percent, the United Kingdom has 13 percent, Switzerland 13 percent, and Spain 11 percent. That means the West is aware of BRICS activities and is cautiously observing its international relations steps. With this, we can analyze how much interest the West had in focusing on the BRICS group member countries and how it gives less importance to BRICS, except for those few countries like Germany. However, with the available data, it was clear that BRICS was being projected negatively for its role. This implies that the West was trying to lessen the importance of BRICS in world affairs. Furthermore, when BRICS New Development Bank was established, the West paid a lot of attention. For example, Stefan Wagstyl, on March 23, 2013, in Financial Times, wrote saying, ‘imagine few different courtiers building a holiday house, but are unable to agree on how much it would cost them.’ This was another attempt at showing the initiative of these countries down. Again, Kenneth Rapoza, on March 26, 2013, in Forbes Magazine, wrote that ‘despite a plethora of Western scholars’ opinions that BRICS is

Fig. 5.1 Number of Materials in the Western press, by country, 2013–2014 (Source Marakhovsky [2015], ‘BRICS in the Western Media’, pg. 137)

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an anti-American group and can challenge the United States in future world affairs, I believe it is just a political and economic opportunities coordination group.’ Immediately on March 27, 2013, in the Financial Times, Gideon Rachman pointed out that each of the BRICS countries is a bit of an anomaly. The group has lumped together very different states. Again, The Globe and Mail journalist Geoffrey York on March 24, 2014, stated in a critical tone that ‘when the entire western world was ready to accept sanctions imposed on Russia over its role on the Crimean crisis, BRICS was not in a mood to get them soon.’ To counter all this negative propaganda, BRICS on December 2, 2015, during the BRICS media summit, a declaration was released by all the BRICS members outlining six initiatives for media cooperation among BRICS members. They are liaison office, establishing a BRICS media foundation, BRICS Journalism Awards, Joint Photo Exhibitions, Training and Exchanges for BRICS Journalists, and joint media coverage of events (Larouche 2015). While reasoning out its establishment, Director General of Rossiya Segodina International Information Agency Dmitry Kiselev (2015) insufficient media cooperation among BRICS members led to the negative projection of BRICS by the third party, so we wanted to change it, and we did it (ibid.). But, then the frequent presence of BRICS material continues. However, it is a negative way only. The West is trying its best to undermine the role of BRICS in global affairs so that other countries give less importance to it.

Future Prospects On October 28, 2014, Vladimir Davydov, director of the Academy of Social Science, Institute of Latin America, said that the current situation signaled attempts being made to suppress Russia and the BRICS due to its intensive cooperation on global affairs and its stand taken together. The critical aspect of the BRICS group is the diversifying of its collaboration over some time. BRICS activities in international relations are growing, and cooperation in many areas has been causing a flutter in the Western world. Gleb Ivashentsov, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, Deputy Director of Russia’s APEC Study center, while giving an interview to Russia’s Direct Journal on July 8, 2015, said that at present there are more than 20 framework cooperation areas within the bloc in economy and finance, such as annual summits to working

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groups, which includes areas of international information security, health, agriculture, science, and technology. There is also cooperation in education and culture (Zubacheva 2015). Thus, the BRICS is diversifying their collaboration at the BRICS forum. That shows how these countries have intensified their relations in recent times. The reason behind their active engagement is the US’s diabolical diplomacy toward these two countries. The US military’s active engagement around the Asia–Pacific region and Russia’s strategic neighboring areas has been a constant threat to these two countries’ security. In 2015 at the US Senate’s armed services committee, America’s Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford, who criticized Russia, said Russia is the greatest threat to the United States’ national security. My assessment today… is that Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security. If you want to talk about a nation that could pose an existential threat to the United States, I’d have to point to Russia. And if you look at their behavior, it’s nothing short of alarming. (Kumar 2015)

It seemed as if the United States was anticipating war with Russia and China in the coming period. Later, Dunford’s views appeared in the BRICS and SCO summits of Ufa. This shows that China’s and Russia’s growing sway around the Eurasian landmass was alarming the Pentagon. China’s Vice Premier of State Council Zhang Gaoli, at the ceremony of opening the first annual meeting of the Board of Governors of New Development Bank (NDB) stated that BRICS members were confident that the tendency of its countries’ growing status will persist, and continued to boost BRICS’ influence in the international arena. He also said that NDB would continue to strengthen and contribute to the socio-economic development of BRICS countries and other developing countries (Felbein 2016). Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Russia and Iran have kept protecting themselves from the imposition of a US-led Western military action. It was a unipolar conspiracy to impose military action, and it was a multipolar world’s coordinated action that was saving Syria so far (Korybko 2016). That’s the reason why China and Russia are still standing shoulder to shoulder with the Syrian president and protecting him from having his regime overthrown. On November 5, 2016, Chinese premier Li Keqiang, while giving an interview to a Russian news agency

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TASS’s first director-general, Mikhail Gusman, stressed that China’s cooperation with the Russian Federation plays a significant role in the multilateral cooperation of G-20, APEC BRICS, and other organizations. The collaboration on these formats paved the way for promoting a sustainable recovery of the global economy, improving its economic management, and building an innovation-based, dynamic, interdependent, and inclusive system. Keqiang (2016) further emphasized that members of the UNSC, Russia, and China were making significant efforts to advocate the UN Charter’s purposes and principles and the basic rules of international relations. Thus, there will also be a political solution to pressing regional and international issues and promoting a more balanced and fair world order. In the final declaration adopted at the Goa Summit (2016), BRICS countries mentioned that all countries involved would work for a comprehensive and peaceful solution to the conflict, taking into legitimate aspiration the Syrian people through inclusive national dialogue and a Syria-led political process based on the Geneva Communique of June 30, 2012, and in pursuance of the UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and 2268 for full implementation (Druzhinin 2016). This has been reflected many times in BRICS declarations and positions that it has taken together on many global issues. Every BRICS summit comes up with new global problems and makes it one aspect of BRICS discussions. On May 30, 2020, former President of the United States Donald Trump said that the G-7 has become outdated and does not represent changing world affairs dynamics. And he observed that bringing Russia, India, South Korea, and Australia for the 2020 G-7 summit is ideal. However, it triggered resentment among other members of the G-7. However, Russia knows the intention to readmit Russia in G-7. Therefore, it is cautious about its objective and does not want to affect Russia’s relations with other established members for the sake of G-7, where it does not get the deserved respect (Bochkov 2020). Because, for Russia, China became a long-term trustworthy friend and shouldered with Russia when needed. Therefore, Russia will take a calculated step whenever the West destabilizes Russia and China. At the same time, Russia and China should also be mindful that if both the countries attempt to make the BRICS a most prominent geopolitical entity, it may destabilize the BRICS group. Because, for India, it wants to have a bonhomie with the Western countries thus it could get benefitted in international trade and economy.

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Conclusion This chapter dealt with Russia’s political shift toward China and its convergence with China on economic and governance issues through BRICS. It discussed how BRICS nations had come together to challenge the Western hegemony, American security frameworks, and the imposition of Western policies and sanctions. Finally, the chapter concludes by looking at how Russia’s rising power, China, and the BRICS group have become a matter of fear and alarm for the West, going by the widespread negative coverage in Western media and Western academia. So, as future world powers in international relations, Russia and China’s role is now a defining factor in the present global political dimensions. This chapter explained how the two countries had helped each other while taking a stand when the West tried to crack down on them. The chapter looked at the internal politics within the two nations and the BRICS group members. It examined Russia and China’s role over several international crises, be it Libya, Syria, or Ukraine. On the one hand, Russia’s stand over Ukraine was a crucial watershed movement within such international politics, especially concerning the rights of legitimate territories. China, on the other hand, took a positive stand, which could often be termed as ‘positive neutrality,’ where it has attempted to create a rival power for itself to the United States, and at the same time used diplomatic strategies to counter it instead of challenging it. Likewise, China’s supremacy became a threat to the West and its BRICS allies, particularly Russia. Yet, when North Korea became aggressive in the recent past over South Korea, and the US installation of its military equipment was based in South Korea, Russia’s stand became pro-China. Russia was in favor of both North Korea and China. However, there are many disagreements between Russia and the West on Libya, Syria, the Iranian nuclear program, post-soviet space, energy cooperation, and several other issues. Nonetheless, given all these internal ups and downs, cooperation between Russia and China has always been in good condition. They have come together to form a strong alliance through BRICS. The chapter drew a comparison between Russia’s approach through BRICS, which attempts to create an alternative institution to the West through a coalition of southern powers. China’s approach is more selfdriven, where they are mainly associating with BRICS to grow as a new world power in themselves. However, despite such divergences, Russia and China share a common goal. The Russian ambassador to China,

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Andrey Denisov, on June 20, 2016, stated that Russia and China are two modern independent states and that both countries play a prominent role in present-day world politics. They have their way of thinking and interest in world politics. Russia and China have differing views and many similarities in international politics (Bradshaw 2016). However, their cooperation will not be disturbed by an iota of challenge in furthering their international relations vision. Particularly, Russia– China relations are strengthening every year despite facing multiple bilateral and multilateral problems these two countries face. Both countries share a common approach to international politics while handling differences diligently. Further, Russia and China started promoting security more strongly, unlike earlier periods. The unprecedented moment of Russia–China relations in the BRICS group is that China has been supporting the security aspects of BRICS to handle since the recent past for Russia’s initiative.

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CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

The growing relations between Russia and China since the disintegration of the Soviet Union for building a new democratic and polycentric world order have been done through a southern world emphasis. Mainly, it is happening with the help of countries like India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, and South Africa. This has also been catalyzed from within the changed structure of new Russian and Chinese foreign policies. In the process, the two countries have established several regional groups like SCO, BASIC, IBSA, BRICS, etc. Among all the above groups, BRICS has the most prominent position in Russian and Chinese foreign policy objectives. This being the background, the present book titled ‘Future of the BRICS, role of Russia and China,’ comprehensively discusses the importance of BRICS. The book objective is to study and the Russian and Chinese foreign policy role in present-day world politics concerning BRICS. The BRIC acronym, which was first created by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill in 2001 while projecting the overtaking growth rate of these countries, consists of 43 percent of the world population, 18 percent of global trade, and 20 percent of the world GDP. BRICS has the potential to overtake the Western world by 2050 in the global economy. Prominent international institutions like World Bank have presented this report, IMF and many other organizations also project the same. Given this background, the study has sought answers to the following questions: How do China and Russia individually consider the rise of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 J. Srinivas, Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1115-6_6

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BRICS as a multilateral entity? What is the primary intention of RussiaChina foreign policy to promote BRICS? How would Russia and China counter the Western hegemony in international relations with the BRICS group? What are the main objectives of Russian and Chinese foreign policy in changing world political dynamics? What role have Russia and China played in creating a multipolar world order? Do Russia and China have the capacity and resources to make BRICS a security organization? All the chapters in this study are premised around such themes and seek to probe the relations of Russia and China within the BRICS group. The study acknowledges the Russian and Chinese role in promoting the BRICS in present international relations. However, recent trends in global politics made BRICS focus on international and regional security issues. BRICS regular meetings also emphatically discussed BRICS’s role in global affairs and indicated that in 2016, BRICS countries’ national security advisers had met in New Delhi to discuss global and regional security issues. The Russian strategic regions of the post-Soviet space and China’s strategic area of Asia–Pacific regions saw an increasing US military force presence on the Russian and Chinese border, creating instability in international politics. Notably, the THAAD placement in South Korea and nuclear missile defense system in Romania and Poland caused deep concern in the relations between Russia-China and the Western world. The biggest question circling international relations scholarship related to BRICS today is its securitization and creating an alternate security agency to the American or Western one. This is because BRICS countries have started cooperating on security affairs recently. BRICS national security advisers meeting in New Delhi, 2016, and its discussion about the security at the regional and international level will indicate its position, particularly about the internet, cyber security, and terrorism. Again, when Indian national security advisor Ajit Doval visited China on July 26, 2017, to attend the BRICS national security advisors meeting, they asserted that BRICS should prioritize security affairs. In the meeting, they underscored the point that terrorism issues becoming a grave threat to global peace, at least within the BRICS countries. Is it an indication of the process of making BRICS a security organization to address the world’s pressing challenges of terrorism and climate within the BRICS countries? However, the bilateral issues need to be rectified for this to happen so that BRICS can coordinate its forces to rescue nationals whenever it faces problems within the BRICS countries. At the same time, other BRICS members have different positions

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on various international issues. Because, it has indicated in the ongoing Ukraine crisis. During the UNSC and the UN resolutions to condemn and prevent Russia from further attacking Ukraine, India and China have abstained. Still, Brazil and South Africa participated and voted against the Russian federation. While China and Russia aim the BRICS to expand its membership, India and other members have a different approach to this. At the same time, the project of BRICS securitization is impossible considering the present scenario. Because, the Ukraine crisis paved the way for establishing new alliances in emerging international relations. Therefore, the future of the BRICS is there in the hands of Russia, China, and India.

Index

B Bipolarity, 30, 31, 45, 152 Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), 2, 5–16, 18, 19, 23, 29, 30, 36, 47, 50–70, 77, 79, 87–93, 95–109, 115, 117, 125–141, 147, 152, 153, 155–172, 175, 178–184, 193–195

F Federation, 15, 17–21, 23, 36, 41, 44, 46, 48, 49, 53, 63, 78, 79, 81–85, 88, 91, 93, 95–98, 101–103, 105, 106, 108, 148, 150, 155, 156, 158, 165, 169, 175, 177, 178, 182, 195

D Defense, 17, 35, 49, 86, 89, 122, 172, 173, 175–177, 194

G Geopolitical, 5, 14, 51, 66, 88, 92, 99, 106, 108, 125, 148, 164, 165, 170, 172, 178, 182 Global order, 11, 12, 19, 30, 31, 35, 49, 51, 67, 127, 135, 136, 152, 153, 155 Global south, 4, 5, 36, 49, 66, 77, 109, 124, 125, 134, 136, 154 Global South countries, 7, 8, 35, 37, 41, 49, 77, 116, 125, 136, 154

E Evolution, 4, 17, 19, 36, 43, 50, 52, 69, 87, 116, 149, 154, 178

I International relations (IR), 2–11, 13, 15–17, 19, 20, 23, 29–32, 35,

C Communist Party of China (CPC), 17, 48, 125, 126, 176

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 J. Srinivas, Future of the BRICS and the Role of Russia and China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1115-6

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INDEX

41, 43–55, 57, 59, 64, 66, 68–70, 77, 79–83, 87, 88, 92, 97, 101, 106–109, 115, 116, 122, 125, 126, 134, 137, 138, 147, 149–151, 154, 155, 157, 158, 161, 162, 166, 169, 178–180, 182–184, 194, 195 M Multipolarity, 9, 10, 17, 19, 30, 41, 42, 44–49, 69, 70, 125, 128, 150, 151 N North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 16–18, 20–22, 47, 49, 50, 65, 78, 82, 85, 122, 148,

149, 164, 168, 169, 171, 174, 177

P Peacekeeping, 16, 153, 170–172 Polarity, 3, 30, 31, 45, 69

R Russian foreign policy, 14, 15, 62, 77, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 96–99, 101, 106, 107

U Unipolar, 3, 18, 35, 36, 42, 45, 46, 80, 105, 181