Fundamentals of Chinese Culture 9048554128, 9789048554126

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Fundamentals of Chinese Culture

Fundamentals of Chinese Culture

Liang Shuming Translator: Li Ming

Amsterdam University Press

This translation, authorized by Horizon Media Co., Ltd., a Division of Shanghai Century Publishing Co., Ltd., was sponsored by Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences [Grant Number: 16WSH008] First published as 《中國文化要義》, Horizon Media Co., Ltd., a Division of Shanghai Century Publishing Co., Ltd., 2005.

Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden Typesetting: Crius Group, Hulshout isbn 978 94 6372 965 9 e-isbn 978 90 4855 412 6 (pdf) doi 10.5117/9789463729659 nur 694 © Li Ming / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2021 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.

Contents About Liang Shuming and Fundamentals of Chinese Culture 9 Acknowledgements 13 Preface to This Translation 17 Liang’s Preface 19 Chapter One Introduction 25 1.1 Definition of Chinese Culture 25 1.2 Specifics of Chinese Culture 26 1.3 Features of Chinese Culture 27 1.4 Referential and Supporting Evidence 47 Chapter Two “Family” to Chinese People 51 2.1 Fung Yu-lan’s Interpretation 51 2.2 Partiality of Fung’s Interpretation 53 2.3 Formation of Culture and its Characteristics 58 2.4 A Ladder-like Progress View versus a School-based View 63 2.5 Additional Remarks 68 Chapter Three Westerners Living as a Group 71 3.1 Contrasting Chinese Society and Western Society 71 3.2 Divide between Chinese Culture and Western Culture 75 3.3 Christianity and Group-centered Life 78 3.4 Medieval Society in Europe 83 3.5 The Seeds of Modern Society 88 Chapter Four Chinese People’s Lack of Group-centered Life 93 4.1 Westerners’ Merits and Our Demerits 93 4.2 Chinese People’s Lack of Group-centered Life 98 4.3 Incompatibility between Group-centered Life and Family Life 104

Chapter Five China as an Ethics-Oriented Society 109 5.1 Definition of Ethics-Orientedness 109 5.2 Ethics in Economic Life 113 5.3 Ethics in Political Life 116 5.4 Ethics as a Religion 118 5.5 The Ultimate Outcome 122 Chapter Six Morality as Religion 129 6.1 Definition of Religion 129 6.2 Religion in China 135 6.3 Non-Religious Nature of the Moral Cultivation of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius 138 6.4 Morality in Place of Religion in China 141 6.5 Rites of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius 147 6.6 Organizing Society through Morality 153 Chapter Seven Rationality – A Human Characteristic 163 7.1 Definition of Rationality 163 7.2 Two Inclinations and Two Misconceptions 167 7.3 Chinese People’s National Spirit 172 Chapter Eight Class Divisions and Professional Distinction 185 8.1 Definition of Class 185 8.2 Are There Classes in China? 191 8.3 Definition of Professional Distinction 199 Chapter Nine China: A Nation or Not? 207 9.1 China: Unlike a Nation 207 9.2 A Nation Derived from Class Rule 216 9.3 The Collapse of Feudalism in China 220 9.4 Uniqueness of China’s Politics 234 9.5 Reasons for the Progress of Western Politics 240 Chapter Ten Governance and Times of Peace and Prosperity 245 10.1 Chinese Social Structure 245 10.2 A Life of Inner Discipline 251 10.3 Splendor in Chinese Civilization 256 10.4 The Function of Scholars in Chinese Civilization 267 10.5 Governance versus Times of Peace and Prosperity 271

Chapter Eleven A Cycle of Times of Peace and Prosperity and Periods of Chaos 281 11.1 Recurring Periods of Chaos in China 281 11.2 Lack of Revolutions in China 284 11.3 Absence of an Industrial Revolution in China 294 Chapter Twelve Human Cultural Precocity 315 12.1 Lack of Democracy in China 315 12.2 Lack of Human Rights and Freedom in China 322 12.3 Lack of Government by the People 330 12.4 Human Cultural Precocity 335 Chapter Thirteen China after Cultural Precocity 351 13.1 Lack of Science as a Result of Cultural Precocity 351 13.2 Good at Rationality but Bad at Reason 361 13.3 Stagnation of Progress in China 365 13.4 Five Maladies in Chinese Culture 370 Chapter Fourteen Conclusion 377 14.1 Summary of Previously Discussed Characteristics 377 14.2 Shaping of National Character 396 Select Bibliography 411 Index 415



About Liang Shuming and Fundamentals of Chinese Culture

Liang Shuming (Chinese: 梁漱溟; pinyin: Liáng Shùmíng; Wade-Giles: Liang Shu-ming; sometimes Liang Sou-ming, October 18, 1893-June 23, 1988), born Liang Huanding (梁焕鼎), courtesy name Shouming (壽銘), was one of twentieth-century China’s most influential thinkers. A neo-Confucian philosopher and writer, he was an active participant in and a witness to the modernization of China, who, despite living through great social changes dedicated himself to an independent and unique style of cultural thinking, whenever needs arose, so that his powerful voice would be heard far and wide. Born in Beijing, he received a modern education, including substantial study of Western writings. In 1917, he was recruited by Cai Yuanpei, then president of Peking University, to join the philosophy department of Peking University, where he wrote an influential book based on his lectures – Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, released in 1921. In this book, Liang writes: “What is culture? It is the lifestyle of a people. What is life? It is the expression of inexhaustible will – something quite close to the will in Schopenhauer – always being satisfied and yet not fully satisfied”. For Liang, will decides life and life decides culture, so cultures vary because the wills and desires of the people who populate them differ. According to Liang, there are three orientations of the will: (1) the desire to change and affect one’s surroundings so that they bend to one’s will; (2) the desire to change one’s will in order not to desire to change one’s surroundings; (3) the desire to eliminate will entirely, understanding that much of the world is an illusion, that one no longer desires anything. These three orientations of will, which are not unconnected, form a progression. Liang argues that, since knowledge comes into being by applying reason to one’s surroundings, the first orientation is the most formative. This leads to an imbalance, where one must start to use intuition to relate morally to the world. Yet as intuition subsequently develops, it leads to hardship instead of relieving it. This leads to direct perception, which is the third orientation. Liang maintains that the West is characterized by the first orientation, China by the second and India by the third. Liang’s most representative work, Fundamentals of Chinese Culture, was published in 1949. In this book, Liang contrasted Chinese culture with Western culture. He did this by exploring the relationship between the

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social structures in China and in the West, arguing that social structure creates the cultural factors that determine everything else about the two cultures. Liang suggested that social structure is heavily influenced by cultural viewpoint, which in turn is defined by the social foundation of the society. Liang viewed society as being made up of three components: collectives or communities, families and individuals. A cultural viewpoint that heavily emphasizes one combination of these will differ greatly from a viewpoint that emphasizes different elements.1 Liang believed that while China stressed the importance of family, the West focused on the relationship of the individual to the collective: China thus developed into an ethics-oriented society, while the West produced an individual-oriented society. The influence of kinship and emotional bonds, which dominated Chinese society and culture, led China down this path. The West, placing emphasis instead on mutual rights, proceeded down a different path, revolving around class distinction, economic independence and the rule of law. Chinese society, on the other hand, being based on professional divisions due to greater social mobility, could rely on mutual responsibility and personal bonds for the maintenance of order. In Fundamentals of Chinese Culture, Liang posits his “three cultures” theory and outlines China’s position in this schema. He argues that China skipped straight to the second stage, bypassing the first, and consequently did not develop the benefits related to profit and power. Rather than suggesting that China regress to the first cultural stage, Liang suggests that Western science and democracy should instead be introduced into Chinese society in order to promote development in those areas.2 Due to its enduring influence, this book has been acclaimed as one of the greatest cultural studies of the Chinese nation and a classic among comparative studies on Western culture. By comparing, at the outset, the different cultural traditions and lifestyles of Chinese people and Westerners from the perspective of social structure, it advances the thesis that Chinese society is organized around ethical standards. Subsequently, drawing on an exhaustive investigation into religion in China, the argument runs that this ethics-based organization ensures that Chinese society is capable of great transformation. Liang also dismantles basic notions about the essential structure of Chinese society, on one hand diagnosing the maladies inherent in its culture and on the other revealing what he argues is the essence of the Chinese national spirit. 1 2

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liang_Shuming See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liang_Shuming

ABOUT LIANG SHUMING AND FUNDAMENTALS OF CHINESE CULTURE

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Regarding Western civilization as doomed to eventual failure and Western methods and doctrines unsuitable to China, Liang did not advocate complete reform and adoption of Western institutions. He believed that, in order to make China equal to the rest of the world, reform was needed, and that once the people of the Chinese countryside were awakened by enlightened understanding, the land would become a repository of traditional Confucian values, ending the need for continued struggle or revolution on the part of the Chinese people. He therefore pushed for socialism to adapt, starting at the grassroots level. As a believer in the unity of thought and action, Liang founded the Shandong Rural Reconstruction Research Institute, from where he directed the rural reconstruction of Zouping County, Shandong Province between 1931 and 1937. The Institute had three departments: the Research Department on Rural Reconstruction, headed by Liang himself, the Training Department of Service Personnel, and the Rural Reconstruction District. Liang’s main emphases in rural reconstruction were the cultivation of collective unity, development of science and technology, and the elimination of outdated traditions.3 The great improvements seen in that area are often attributed to his involvement. Liang identified as a Buddhist. His deep interest in Buddhism began in his youth: he often attributed this fascination to his instinct that many of the mistakes of his past were caused by relying on the external world for answers that should come from within. Like many intellectuals of the time, he was very critical of Chinese folk religion, considering it too primitive to allow society to reach a high level of socialization, and at the same time as promoting a conservatism that impeded social development and promoted low moral standards and selfishness. He felt that Confucianism was China’s answer to religion, as it provided a way to harmonize with the cosmos instead of being isolated from it.

3

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liang_Shuming.

Acknowledgements Translating a good book takes a lot of effort. Translating a great book demands even more. I began my translation project in 2016, sponsored by the Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences [Grant Number: 16WSH008]. My thanks are due to many people for their assistance over that period of time – so many that it is impossible to mention them all. Throughout the translation of this book, the support I have received from Professor Lu Hongmei, my wife, has been invaluable. She acted as a sounding board for my ideas about how certain culturally related elements in the book should be understood, and the discussions we had during the process of translating the book helped me to clarify my understanding of the source text and my vision for the translation. Her drafts of two translated chapters were very impressive, and her support and help to me at each stage have been unparalleled. Next, I would like to acknowledge my debt to Dr. Li Siyi, who was still a doctoral student studying comparative literature and translation at Shanghai Jiao Tong University when he drafted translations of four chapters in this book. His erudition and accurate judgement have impressed me profoundly. I also owe a special debt of gratitude to Professor Zhang Xiuqiang, a specialist in Japanese language and culture, who has kindly helped me all the way by providing me with translations of the Japanese names that appear in the book. I would also like to express my deep appreciation for the efforts of Professor Yang Feng and Professor Chu Dongwei, editors-in-chief of their respective journals – Contemporary Foreign Languages Studies and Chinese Literature and Culture – in publishing three excerpts from this translation. To Professor Chen Kaiju and Professor Xie Yanming I also owe many thanks for their suggestions and help during the translating of this book. Special thanks go to my graduate students, including Li Guanxi, Zheng Rong, Qi Yufan, Xu Hui, and Zhou Zijun, as well as my visiting scholars Yuan Hongyan and Hu Aiqing, who have all made contributions in one way or another to the process of translating this book. I would like to thank Professor Li Ruilin, whose inspiration, help and love for the world of translation have been crucial in my career, and from which I derive every encouragement. A special mention goes to my dear colleagues Professor Zhang Baohong, Professor Lan Hongjun, Professor Xing Jie and Professor Hu Zhengmao, who have a profound understanding

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of translation and who were always willing to give up their valuable time to help me improve this translation. At Amsterdam University Press, I would like to thank Dr. Saskia Gieling for her interest in this translation and I am greatly obliged to Dr. Vicki Blud for all the conscientious efforts she has made to copyedit this translation. I thank Dr. Thierry Meynard for writing Preface to this book and for his good suggestions. Thanks go to my peer reviewers for their kind and helpful suggestions and encouragement. Any remaining flaws are, of course, my own responsibility. Finally, I would like to extend my profound gratitude to my closest friends and all my family members, who have sustained me with unwavering encouragement, strengthened my powers of self-discipline, instilled in me the love of languages and cultures (both Chinese and English), and endowed me with a firmer conviction that I am, after all, engaged in something worthy of a person’s lifelong efforts. This translation is dedicated to intellectuals everywhere who seek a more profound understanding of Chinese culture, and of the crucial differences between Chinese and Western culture.

Profile of the Translator Dr. Li Ming is Professor of English in the School of Interpreting and Translation Studies, researcher in Institute of Hermeneutics, and researcher in Center for Foreign Literature and Culture, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, PRC. His areas of research include Translation Studies, Translation Criticism, Functional Linguistics, Sociolinguistics, Social Semiotics, Text Linguistics, Stylistics and Studies in Translation for Business Purposes. He has published over sixty academic papers on a variety of topics, in journals that include Foreign Language Teaching and Research, Foreign Languages, Chinese Translators’ Journal, Shanghai Journal of Translators, Foreign Languages Research and Translation Quarterly. His published works include Language Studies and Translation (2014), An English-Chinese Translation Course for Business (2010), Translation Workshop (Chinese-English Translation) (2006), Chinese-English Translation in Interaction (2016), Chinese-English Translation for International Business (2007), Translation Appreciation and Criticism (2006; 2016), English-Chinese Translation in Interaction (2016), Interlingual Translation from a Sociosemiotic

Acknowledgements

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Perspective (2005), English-Chinese Translation for International Business (2011), Essentials of Chinese-English Translation (1997) and A Basic Coursebook for Translators (2020) among others. His translated works include English-Chinese translations of The First Blast of the Trumpet (2001), A Christmas Carol (2016), The Million Pound Note (2015), Leading through Uncertainty (2014) and A Thousand Miles of Miracle in China: A Personal Record of God’s Delivering Power from the Hands of the Imperial Boxers of Shan-si (unpublished); he has also published ChineseEnglish translations of Old City of Beijing: Its Grandeur and Splendours (2014), Are You Ready? – A Guide to Emergency Preparedness and Response (2012), Atlas of Shaoguan City (2009) and several other works.



Preface to This Translation

Liang Shuming is an important Chinese philosopher who is often credited as one of the founders of the neo-Confucian movement, which aims to rejuvenate ancient Confucianism in the twentieth century. When the New Culture movement and Chinese Marxism rejected Confucianism as an obstacle to the modernization of the country, Liang was among the first to proclaim its relevance not only for China, but for all humanity. As a philosopher, he was concerned with the question of the ultimate meaning of life, finding his answer in Buddhism, but he dealt with this question in his other works, as can be seen in my doctoral dissertation on this topic at Peking University, published in English as The Religious Philosophy of Liang Shuming: The Hidden Buddhist (Brill, 2011). In Fundamentals of Chinese Culture translated here by Li, Liang’s focus is on social and moral philosophy, attempting to express the specificity of Chinese experience compared with that of the West. His project is not to refuse the modernity brought by the West; on the contrary, he considers that the absence of a capitalist economy and of a nation-state has hindered the social development of the country. But he wants to combine this modernity with Chinese social and moral traditions. As he says, a strong social body needs also a strong spirit, and Liang finds this spirit in Confucianism as a practice by which a person can return to their true self, through introspection and ethics. Liang received no academic training and he had a short academic career at Peking University. This explains why many of his works may appear to be collections of personal ideas, lacking systematicity. This is particularly true of the original work of this translation, which was written over the course of a nine-year period marked by the war against Japan and by the civil war. The original work was published in 1949, only a few months before the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China. For the reader today, the book presents three points of particular interest. The first is historical, allowing the reader to become familiar with the debates that agitated Chinese intellectuals before 1949. Liang is in contact with many important thinkers and he avidly reads their works that nourish his thought. The second aspect concerns the actuality of his thought. In the seventy years following its publication, China experienced remarkable economic development, but not much space is left for the development of Confucian personal cultivation and morality, except in very fragmentary forms, and this makes Liang’s ideas even more relevant. The third facet of the work is truly philosophical, beyond the question of China. In this work,

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Liang elaborates a vitalist philosophy in which human beings and societies are on a quest for a deep spiritual communion, and here lies the universal significance of Liang’s philosophy. Prof. Li Ming is to be congratulated for translating this lengthy work into English. The language and the vocabulary used by Liang are quite different from contemporary Chinese, and the translator requires great agility to render it into English. Following the work of Michel Masson S.J. of the Ricci Institute of Paris, who translated the work into French as Idées maîtresses de la culture chinoise (Cerf, 2010), this English version will enable yet more readers to discover this important thinker and one of his major works. Thierry Meynard S.J., Sun Yat-sen University Guangzhou, China July 2020



Liang’s Preface

This is my fourth book, following the completion of such works as Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies (1920-1921), The Final Consciousness of the Chinese National Liberation Movement (1929-1931), and Rural Reconstruction Theory (1932-1936). During the spring of 1941, I gave a two-month series of specialist lectures at Guangxi University, and during the next spring, I set out to write the book in Guilin, a city in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in China. By 1944, I had finished six successive chapters totaling about 80,000 Chinese characters, but I stopped in the middle of writing when Guilin was invaded by the Japanese. After China’s victory, I promoted domestic peace throughout China and could afford no time to do any actual writing. In November 1946, I returned from Nanjing to Beibei, a district in China’s southwest Chongqing City, where I resumed my writing; meanwhile, I was also delivering some lectures. The original manuscripts I had prepared in Guilin, however, only served as the raw material, which had to be reorganized and restructured. But now (i.e., June 1949), the whole book has been finished at last, after a struggle of nine years’ duration from the beginning to the end. In these four books, which have been written successively, it has become essential to restate certain ideas. This is because certain issues under discussion are basically related to each other or are simply different versions of the same issue. Moreover, my thought continues to derive from the same tradition, and though there might be a difference in the maturity of these ideas, my philosophy is fundamentally unchanged. Indeed, as the fourth book is connected to the third, there is a closer relationship between these books. As a result, if you have managed to read the third book, you can better understand the key points in the fourth book. The third book, Rural Reconstruction Theory, once entitled The Future of the Chinese Nation, consists of two parts. Part I is concerned with gaining an understanding of the problems in China and Part II with finding solutions to the problems in China. To resolve a problem, efforts must be made to understand it. Problems in China arise out of the international exchanges over the last hundred years, as Western influence and Western culture spread to the East. To understand the problems in China, one has to be clear about both the changes that have taken place and the internal and external situations in Chinese society in the last century. This provides an understanding of why the former Chinese society was unchanged and what the preconditions are for its future development. The present book, with the title Fundamentals

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of Chinese Culture, is an expansion or an elaboration on the features of the former Chinese society, which have already been discussed in the third book. It can be seen from this that I do not pursue academic learning for its own sake. Compelled by my concern with the problems in China, I am determined to commit myself to finding solutions, so as to fully understand China by tracing its history and its culture. In the beginning, I never thought of concepts such as “social history of development” and “philosophy of culture”. From one perspective, the Chinese people are motivated by practical things (this, indeed, is their shortcoming), which is the root cause of China’s lack of academics. But from another perspective, this is neither bookish knowledge nor pedantic research, but rather insight gained from living with everyday problems and material concerns. It is the culmination of my whole life, not just my intellectual activities. With my forty years’ experience integrated into this work, I want to assure my readers that I am not using empty words or false concepts. As a native Chinese, living at a time when China’s problems in recent decades loom large, naturally, I feel totally obsessed with all these problems. Both my family environment and my social environment have acquainted me with these problems.1 Once, it seemed that I was involved in such tribulations and that it was my nature to pay attention to the general situation and the current affairs in China. Though I am now over fifty years of age, I often lament that “ultimately I will be a man of thought instead of being a man of action; I will wholeheartedly engage in thought so as to let others take actions.” However, ever since childhood, I have always been an enthusiastic “doer”.2 I was always fond of actions without being willing to indulge in empty talk. Whenever one has the idea of withdrawing from the world like a recluse, he will live like a recluse. And whenever one has revolutionary ideas, he will mount a revolution. To find the solutions to the problems in China, to find the way out, I participate in all revolutionary practices for fear of falling behind others. I have been hard-working all my life, as can quickly be seen from my experience.3 1 See Section Four and Section Five of my book Wǒde zìxué xiǎoshǐ《我的自學小史》A Short History of My Independent Study, 1947. 2 This refers to the time when I was eight years old, when I had already begun to distribute leaflets in Peiping. See Wǒde zìxué xiǎoshǐ《我的自學小史》A Short History of My Independent Study, 1947. 3 As a teenager, I was active in the constitutional monarchy movement. Later on, I took part in the 1911 Revolution. After the year 1927, I began the rural reconstruction movement. From 1937, I was busy in the Anti-Japanese War. Up to the time when we were victorious in the War, I strived to secure and promote peace domestically.

Liang’s Preface

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Before and after exerting my efforts to find solutions to the problems in China, I surely have ideas or thoughts of my own, which have been gained from my own experience. As a Chinese, how can I abstain from committing myself to facing these genuine problems? However, some problems are either not prominent enough or have passed unnoticed. I give more consideration to or indulge more in retrospection of certain problems. On this basis, I have very different ideas or actions from other people. Even if these ideas or actions are not revealed to the outside world, they are in my heart. In other words, I have ideas of my own, and I have learned much from my work and study. Thus, from my feelings come my actions, from my actions comes my knowledge gained in work and study, from the accumulation of what I have learned in work and study come ideas of my own, and from these ideas of my own come further actions of my own. In such a cyclic accumulation, each reiteration of the cycle goes one step further. During this process, I read a lot. But what I read and what I research are closely related only to what I am concerned about. I never read superficially, nor do I carry out research superficially. To this day, in terms of opinion or thought, the deeper it is, the more expansive this system becomes. Though I wish to say that I am ignorant so that I can keep on learning from others, how much more can I learn from them? My opinion or thought, of which I speak here today, naturally arises from both the stimulus of problems and the response to actions. It must be noted, however, that just because a person is forced both to face real problems and to give themselves over to dealing with real problems, he cannot be expected to come up with any opinion or thought of profundity. He must at the same time go beyond what he is concerned with and meditate upon it before he can come to any such result. Here, I would like to tell you what happened to me when I was young. A little while after I felt called to action by the problems in China, I was profoundly impressed by the problems of life itself, so I began to make an in-depth study of them and could not help but meditate on them. 4 The problems of life, compared with the current problems in China, are more extensive, more fundamental and more profound. Thus, they cannot be confined only to the category of real-world problems. Over my past forty years’ meditation on these two different categories of problems, I laid special emphasis sometimes on one category and sometimes on the other. Though 4 I began to meditate on the problems of life at about seventeen and when I reached twenty, I became fascinated by the life in which one withdraws from the world like a recluse, seeking Buddhist doctrines.

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such irresolution never yields any result, these two categories of problems are closely related and complementary. In addition, as I have been both active and quiet, at different points in my life I have sometimes busied myself with hard work and sometimes retired to tranquil meditation. I have alternated between activity and tranquility on quite a few occasions.5 So, when I was active, I was not blindly active, and when I was meditative, I was not emptily meditative. Fortunately, I am not so shallow as to follow those who, in this aspect, are indeed shallow. My obsession with the problems of life inspires me to go and search, with an open mind, for answers in philosophical works by thinkers from both the West and the East. However, as soon as I seem to have grasped something about the truths of life, I make no further explorations. If philosophy is considered to be the type of learning that everyone should have a little bit of, it is just this little bit that I have understood. This is the difference between me and those who specialize in philosophy. Moreover, when I dedicate myself to exploring the problems of life, I research repeatedly into both issues of “withdrawing from the world” and of “returning to the world”. That to which I am dedicated is found not only within knowledge and speculation but also beyond them. This is another difference between me and ordinary philosophers. No further discussion, then, is needed concerning similarities and differences, and gains and losses. In the end, I have my own understanding of and thoughts on the problems of life and, what is more, on the way in which I now conduct myself. In a similar manner, the pressing problems in China that have been unresolved for several decades cannot do otherwise but compel me to take action and to acquiesce to such academic disciplines as politics, economics, history and social culture. However, once China’s prospects seem promising, I will no longer continue to make academic learning my major occupation. However, what can be counted as academic learning and what cannot are not to be discussed here. So in the end, I have my own understanding and my own opinion of the problems in China. What is more, I have my own propositions and actions for today. It can thus be seen that “I have no intent at all to devote myself to academic learning”, that “I am simply not a learned man”, and that “philosophers cannot understand me from their perspective.” Such confessions of mine (for which see all my previous published books) are, to me, by no means 5 Altogether, there have been three stages in the past when I devoted myself with tranquility to self-study and meditation: (1) from the latter half of the year 1912 to the first half of the year 1916; (2) from the spring of the year 1925 to the spring of the year 1928; (3) from the time of my withdrawal from domestic peace talks in 1946 up to the present day.

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banal statements. I hope that when friends of mine hear someone ask the question, “What kind of person is that Mr. Liang?” they would answer for me: “He is a person with ideas.” Or: “He is a person who has ideas and acts on his own ideas at the same time.” Or rather, the following might be the most appropriate and the most desirable answer: “He is a thinker and at the same a social transformation activist.” That would be the highest of compliments. This book, which is mainly about my views on Chinese history and culture, draws on a variety of disciplines. It was not originally intended for scholars and experts, but is a book from which scholars and experts can be expected to learn a lot. I hope to make this clear to readers before they begin reading it, so that they will not rush to regard this book as either too difficult or too easy for them. “Understand Old China so as to build New China” is a slogan that I favor. Following the completion of this book, I will begin writing another book, to be titled Researching Modern China’s Political Issues. The turmoil of domestic politics in recent decades and the constant failure to get on the right track indeed constitute the focus of the anguish caused by the problems in China. The construction of New China can only be ensured by political means: this is certain. However, once an understanding of Old China is assured, we will have our own understanding of why China has witnessed this endless turmoil in recent decades. What the road ahead for China’s future politics may be, or not be, can also be hinted at here in my next book. I would like to continue to seek advice from my readers. Liang Shuming, October 10, 1949 Preface to the reprint of Fundamentals of Chinese Culture: I have been taking “Understand Old China so as to build New China” as a slogan of mine ever since I wrote the book Fundamentals of Chinese Culture to seek advice from my countrymen. The first edition of the book was printed and distributed by Luming Bookstore in Chengdu; few copies were printed but there were many missed or wrongly written characters. Now I would like to revise the book for reprinting in Shanghai, with the hope of being granted instruction from my countrymen through its wider circulation, which is a blessing to the writer himself! Liang Shuming, February, 1986



Chapter One Introduction

1.1

Definition of Chinese Culture

“Culture” is everything we rely on as we live in this world. For example, we have to rely on agricultural and industrial production in order to live. Connected to this are tools, technologies and their social systems, which constitute an important part of culture. Our lives also depend on social security and order. Therefore, those things that ensure and maintain that social security and order, such as national politics, legal systems, religious beliefs, morality, law courts, the police and the army, undoubtedly constitute an important part of culture. What’s more, since we are born capable of nothing, we need to acquire learning in order to gain ability. As a result, all facets of education are indispensable to us and also to the transmission and the incessant progress of culture. Needless to say, written language, books, learning, schools and so on are thus considered elements of culture. The popular view that written language, literature, ideology, education, and publication are elements of culture is rather narrow in scope. My statement that culture is everything that we rely on in life insists that culture is concrete. In its literal sense, culture should encompass economy, politics and almost everything else. However, can music, drama and all kinds of recreation be thought of as things that we rely on in life? My answer is: they seem to be something we enjoy, rather than something “we rely on”. But human beings often need something more than mere food and clothing. Thus people often use the expression “spiritual food”. Viewed from this perspective, music, drama and other kinds of pastimes soothe and nourish the soul and cultivate and foster the spirit, and can to this extent be considered essential. We designate as “Chinese culture”, our own culture, that which differs from alien cultures. This refers in particular to everything that we Chinese people are used to depending on in life. As culture originates from transmission and communication, it is almost impossible for us to make a distinction between “our own culture” and “foreign cultures”. Moreover, due to the sharp rise in communication in recent one hundred years, Chinese culture has been so greatly influenced by Western culture that it has almost lost its original flavor. As a result, we take as Chinese culture only the fundamental part that remains intact after the past century. But culture is all-encompassing and it is impossible for this book to be inclusive. As Chinese people have been focused on mundane things and

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incurious about logic and reason, we will discuss Chinese culture specifically from the perspective of social life.

1.2

Specifics of Chinese Culture

Compared with other cultures, Chinese culture has certain distinctive characteristics, which can be described as follows: First, Chinese culture grew gradually out of its own independent development. Unlike Japanese culture and American culture, it is not a culture which is fostered by other cultures. Second, Chinese culture has its own features and its unique systems (for example, its writing system, legal system, etc.) which are radically different from those of other cultures. It is natural, of course, for one culture to be different from another culture while, at the same time, sharing some similarities with that other culture. However, Chinese culture, Indian culture, and Western culture are generally acknowledged to be the world’s three great distinct cultural systems because each of them has its own structures. Third, while ancient cultures that were counterparts to Chinese culture, such as Egyptian, Babylonian, Indian, Persian and Greek cultures, either disappeared or were transformed or lost their national independence, only Chinese culture still survives today, having ensured its status as an independent nation has remained uninterrupted. Fourth, it can be well seen from China’s past history that from the very beginning, Chinese culture has possessed the greatest capacity to assimilate other cultures and absorb their advanced elements without being subject to any transformation itself. Fifth, thanks to this great power of assimilation, China has been able to integrate its neighboring countries and other ethnic groups into the huge nation it is now. It can be said that Chinese culture not only exceeds all other cultures in longevity, but also goes beyond them in space. For example, the huge unified society which has grown out of Chinese culture boasts a huge percentage of the world’s population. Sixth, in its enduring life span (i.e., more than two thousand years), Chinese culture witnessed a lack of change or progress, especially in recent centuries. This seems to show that Chinese culture is so inherently appropriate and harmonious that it has attained cultural maturity. Seventh, the impact of Chinese culture upon its surrounding areas is both great and far-reaching. Its sphere of influence has reached Siberia in the north, the South Sea Islands in the south, Pamirs Plateau in the west, and

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Korea and Japan in the east. Needless to say, not only China’s neighbors, such as Vietnam and Korea, but also countries like Japan, Thailand and Myanmar, derive their culture mostly from Chinese culture. In places like Europe that are further away, modern civilization has also been greatly influenced by Chinese culture. As is well-known, modern European civilization originated in the Renaissance, between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, and Renaissance culture actually benefited from several Chinese inventions such as paper making and printing, which supported its material basis. Later, the Age of Enlightenment and the Age of Reason in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries also drew illumination from Chinese thought, which served as its spiritual inspiration.1 It has only been in the last hundred years that Chinese culture has begun to fall behind other cultures, becoming subject to changes under the influence of foreign cultures or even succumbing to radical alterations.

1.3

Features of Chinese Culture

So, we cannot help but ask: What is Chinese culture? Does it refer only to a geographical space or a certain period in history? Or is it related to a certain meaning or spirit? The unique features of Chinese culture described above may prompt us to investigate the solid foundations behind its elasticity and greatness, or they may suggest that there is a certain meaning or spirit derived from them. If such a spirit can be discerned, isn’t it of great significance to describe it so that people can discover more about it and cherish something lively or spiritual in their hearts? This is precisely the task of the present book, Fundamentals of Chinese Culture. This entails the following things: Firstly, efforts will be made to identify those particulars of culture that are easily visible and often referred to. As many of them as possible will be enumerated, from the most obvious to the least obvious. When this is done, we will naturally find that some of them are closely related to each other and can therefore be incorporated into one element, since they mean the same thing. What are then to be highlighted will be only a few particulars. Secondly, having selected a certain feature as the starting point for our research, we will turn our efforts to each of the other features in turn. Through thorough interpretation and illustration, we will gain more insights and shed light on other features in the meantime. If these other features are 1

See ZHU Qianzhi, Influence of Chinese Thoughts upon European Culture, 1940.

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also explicated through the above method of interpretation and illustration, we will apply our gains in understanding to still more features, until in the end, if it becomes clear that all these features when placed together are found to be from a shared source, it can then be said that we have traced their primary source. Consequently, we will be able to say we have fully explored Chinese culture and fully grasped its fundamentals. This is the rationale for the writing of this book. However, I have experienced certain ups and downs while writing, which I will now describe. I began writing this book in the fifth year of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (1941). It was indeed startling for us to see that during the war in Europe, which began much later, so many European nations were being destroyed, one after another. China, however, still stood solid as a rock in its Western territory. In terms of weapons, national defense and economic, political and cultural powers, we could never compare to those nations. However, though each of these countries fell, generally in only a few months, a few weeks or even a few days, China was the exception, and sustained itself for five years with no sign at all of being destroyed. This stark contrast is due to the fact that China is such a huge country, while those European nations were so small. When a country is small, there is no way to escape during a war. And when that happens, it is doomed to fall. When a country is huge, though our enemies may conquer, they end up feeling helpless upon seeing that our expanse of land is still vast, our population is still huge and our resources are still abundant, even if we are in continual retreat. While we can still sustain ourselves, our enemies begin to see that the war is so laborious and so time-consuming that they feel powerless and frustrated. Seldom do we realize the advantage of living in a huge country until such a moment, when a warm feeling toward our motherland suddenly wells up from the bottom of our hearts. This, of course, is the legacy of our ancestors and also a cultural achievement on which later generations fully capitalize. But upon a second glance, those who capitalize on it are also encumbered by this immensity. This explains why, on the one hand, it is not easy for China to perish and why, on the other, it is not easy for China to prosper. For example, over the years, China’s biggest problem has been its disunity. Suppose that China were only as large as Guangxi Autonomous Region. Shouldn’t it have been united a long time ago? When such a complicated situation needs to be dealt with, it is no easy matter to find a capable leader. Someone who is skillful in handling simple situations may become ineffective in complicated situations. Even if he is extremely competent, it still takes a long time to encounter the right opportunities and to gain seniority and prestige,

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which itself is far from easy. On the other hand, more people mean more problems and more complicated situations mean more complicated problems. When something goes wrong in one part, the whole will be affected. When the center is in chaos, its surrounding areas will not be pacified. It is particularly notable that in a small collective, every member is well aware of his or her responsibility. Yet the bigger a collective is, the more diminished each member feels their responsibility is. When a collective is too big, its members will eventually be insensitive to their responsibilities. Because of this, members of a big family are susceptible to laziness and the business of a big family can easily be neglected. On the contrary, a small family can be easily invigorated. An analysis of this phenomenon points to the reduction in perceptibility on one hand, and to a diminished vitality on the other hand. As an example from history, a war that swept Guangxi Autonomous Region lasted for two years, but in Beijing, only those of us who have relations in Guangxi knew anything about this, while most people were indifferent to it. When the four provinces in northeast China were occupied by enemy forces, their neighboring provinces often felt endangered, because of the proximity of the threat to them. The event gradually faded from the memories of the people in faraway provinces in south China, however. This is a case in point showing how perceptibility is reduced in an outsized country. Sometimes, people may perceive the problems, but they have neither the courage nor the concern to resolve them. Or they might just act on impulse, undertaking many activities but without applying persistence. That is ample proof of a lack of vitality. The situation is like a person of little strength with an onerous burden: either he simply does not intend to do anything at all, or even if he raises his arms to try to lift the burden, he gives it up in the end. It must be noted that when undertaking activities, what is to be feared are not the objections to them but the lack of responses to them. When there are no responses, there is no motivation for further action. In such a huge country as China, such is often the case. That living in a huge country may be both a blessing and a disaster must never escape our attention. It is by no means accidental that this is the case. Indeed, it may be taken as one of the most important features of Chinese culture for us to study in detail. In his book A History of Chinese Culture, Liu Yizheng posed the following three questions: Firstly, China comprises a vast territory, with which no other country can compare. How did our ancestors manage to capture such a vast territory? Secondly, China boasts amazing ethnic diversity. Yet the Han nationality has doubtless absorbed and assimilated over one hundred ethnic groups and

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today, all those ethnic groups have sunk into oblivion. How did it develop such absorptive and communicative power? Thirdly, China was civilized at a very early stage. How could it endure over such a long period of history without being replaced as a cultural power? These three questions constitute three key features of Chinese culture, as follows: First, a vast territory with a large population;2 Second, the assimilation and integration that goes into building such a huge nation; Third, a long history with no peer among other nations. It can be seen from these three features that, undoubtedly, when we talk about Chinese culture we may conceive of a great power. But where that great power lies, no one can figure out. As we all know, in human culture, true power lies in knowledge. As the Westerners say, knowledge is power, and we couldn’t agree more with this summary. In the past, the superiority of Chinese culture over other cultures was undoubtedly attributable to the power of knowledge. But it seems that knowledge no longer prevails in the Chinese nation. This can be seen from the fact that, though China’s civilization emerged so long ago and its culture has enjoyed such a long life span, it could not generate its own science in the end. Science is the right path, the exemplar of knowledge. Only scientific knowledge can genuinely be considered systematic, and only science can ensure the development of knowledge. The fact that the Chinese people never embarked on this path shows that science is, indeed, not one of their strengths. Furthermore, as we also know, from ancient times economic power has played a decisive role in the formation of a nation’s culture. Is it simply that huge economic power has consolidated Chinese culture so effectively? Certainly, China’s past victories over its foreign neighbors can be attributed to economic factors. As regards the economy, priority should be given to industrial and commercial industries. The Chinese people, however, have clung to their primitive agrarian society throughout history and are simply not entrepreneurial. So, how can we attribute Chinese cultural power to its economic power? 2 China, with a territory of 4.3 million square miles or 11.1 million square kilometers, is larger than the whole of Europe. The area of the prewar Japanese Empire was only about six percent of China’s total area; China’s four northeastern provinces are almost twice as large as the total area of the Japanese Empire. China, whose population numbered 430 million (according to the 1933 estimate by the Social Science Research Institute, Academia Sinica), accounts for one-fifth of the world’s population.

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Yet can we attribute it to China’s military and politics? Of course, China owes its existence and development to military and political power. As is well known, however, owing to the emphasis in Chinese culture on the spirit of peace, the Chinese people tend to be rather vulnerable and, as Chinese politics advocates passivity and non-action, the Chinese people lack organizational power. Consequently, it seems improbable to say that the power of Chinese culture lies in its military or politics. On the contrary, if knowledge, economic power, military forces and politics are considered together, they constitute China’s weakness rather than its strength. It is necessary to look beyond these four aspects of culture to discover China’s strength. But apart from these, what else could be thought of as the locus of “great power”? It is indeed difficult to work out. Isn’t it queer that, on the one hand, Chinese culture obviously possesses incredibly great power, but on the other hand, no one can really figure out where on earth that great power lies! And how odd it is that, on the one hand, no one can tell where the great power lies, but on the other hand, everyone clearly feels that such power is incredibly great! How odd it is, indeed! Such can be considered as another one of the features of Chinese culture, i.e., the fourth feature. When we have answered this question, we will almost certainly understand the fundamentals of Chinese culture. As we often hear, China is a mystery to the whole world. This has been so since ancient times and it became so once again during the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, which revived the concept. Especially among those who are learned, this view remained etched in their minds. Naturally, though unfortunately, this cannot be easily perceived by Chinese people as they view the incident from inside it. Some shallow young people, however, just clouded this peculiarity of Chinese culture. In a paper in 1930, the author pointed out two oddities of Chinese culture: First, it is an unchanging society with a stagnant culture; Second, the people lead a life with almost no religion. Respectively, these two may be taken as the fifth and the sixth features of Chinese culture, as will be briefly stated in the following. Let me say something about religion first. It has been observed by many scholars that in Chinese culture, there is a certain lack of religion and that people in China are alienated from religion. This is the general impression ever since Chinese thought and the state of its social affairs were made known to Western society in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. Recently,3 the British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) identified 3

Translator’s note: This refers to the time when Liang Shuming wrote the present book.

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three generalized features of Chinese civilization 4 and considered “the substitution of the Confucian ethic for religion” as one of the features of Chinese culture. Of course, another scholar5 also said that China is a country with multiple religions. These two views seem to contradict each other. But actually, they mutually enhance one another. As one of the major features of Chinese culture is unity, when we say that it has multiple religions instead of a unitary one, isn’t it proof that Chinese culture is not unified under one religion and that religion itself does not occupy an important place in Chinese culture? What’s more, the value of religious belief lies in people’s devotion and loyalty. In a single society with different religions, conflicts easily arise. But historically, the countless numbers of tragedies and long wars as a result of religious disputes that have occurred in Europe, and all over the world, are seen extremely rarely in China. Here in China, though religions are varied, they are on good terms with each other. Or they can even coexist peacefully under the same roof or be integrated into one faith. In that case, isn’t the religious flavor greatly enhanced? With the introduction of Western culture to the East, some Chinese people wished that they could replace China’s armaments with Western armaments, to replace China’s politics with Western politics, to replace China’s economic thought with Western economic thought and to replace China’s style of education with a Western style of education. Once, such campaigns flourished and seemed to go on continually. There have never been any campaigns, however, which aim to replace Chinese religions with Western religions. This suggests that Chinese people lack interest in religion and think that religion no longer holds sway in the West. If, however, no comparison between China and the West is made or no discussion of their respective religion is held here, it will be regrettable that the surprising fact that there are no religions in China is not made known to the world. This will be further discussed in Chapter Six. Next, let’s talk about the stagnation of Chinese culture and the constancy of Chinese society. This involves two problems. First, it is strange that China should witness no progress in the past two thousand years. Second, it is strange that, from the perspective of social history, difficulties arise when people try to judge what kind of society China represents. This is because, to 4 Bertrand Russell, in his book The Problem of China, 1922 (p. 34), listed three features of Chinese civilization: (1) The use of ideograms instead of an alphabet in writing; (2) The substitution of the Confucian ethic for religion among the educated classes; (3) Government by literati chosen by examination instead of by a hereditary aristocracy. 5 See WANG Zhixin (ed.) An Outline History of Chinese Religious Thought, 1977.

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social historians, from ancient times up to the present day, human society has generally progressed in different stages. However, China, a country with a history of over two thousand years, is the only exception, for it is hardly possible to divide its history into different stages. These two problems are clearly differentiated, but actually they stem from the same source. In the following, these problems will be illustrated respectively with examples. In his work A History of Chinese Philosophy, for example, Fung Yu-lan divided Chinese history from the Zhou and the Qin Dynasties to the end of the Qing Dynasty into only two periods. The first period, the Hundred Schools of Thought Era, which lasted from Confucius’ time to the time of Liu An, King of Huainan, represents an interval of less than four hundred years. The second period, the Confucian Classics Era, which lasted from Dong Zhongshu’s time to Kang Youwei’s time, spans over two thousand years. Based on this division, China has Ancient Philosophy and Medieval Philosophy but no Modern Philosophy, because there is not much difference between its Modern Philosophy and its Medieval Philosophy. Though it lasts over two thousand years, it is counted only as one single period. In the West, however, this is not the case: not only are Medieval Philosophy and Modern Philosophy different in their chronological development, but they are also different in their spiritual outlook. This differentiation is something that China’s periodization lacks. Fung further stated: even now, China is still in its Medieval Age. In many aspects, China lags far behind the West and its history lacks a late antiquity period. In terms of its philosophy, China only pays special attention to one end of the historical timeline.6 That is why the above question has been raised. When we say that China’s history lacks a late antiquity period, we mean that historically speaking, though China has entered the late antiquity period chronologically, every aspect of Chinese culture remains at the same level as it was in the Medieval Age. In other words, Chinese culture has so far neither stepped out of the Medieval Age nor reached a new stage. Far from the Western Han Dynasty to the end of the Qing Dynasty, this stagnation has lasted for over two thousand years. Among Yan Fu’s translations of the masterpieces by noted scholars from the West is A History of Politics (1910) by the British writer Edward Jenks (1861-1939), a book on the history of social development. Generally speaking, human society develops first from the totem society to the patriarchal society, and then from the patriarchal society to the military society. The feudal society can be considered as “an imperial reign not in the conventional line of succession” between the patriarchal society and the military society. 6 See FUNG Yu-lan’s A History of Chinese Philosophy, 1947 (p. 495).

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Observing China from Jenks’s point of view, Yan Fu felt that it was odd for China to be so secularly stagnant. In the preface to his translation, he wrote, For over two thousand years from the reign of (legendary) Chinese Emperors Yao and Shun up to the Zhou Dynasty, China had been a feudal society where “the patriarchal system” prevailed. Its saints and its systems and classics were both the end products of a patriarchal society. Where there is poverty, there are surely changes. Ever since the time of Shang Yang (about 390-338 BC), Qin Shi Huang (259-210 BC), founder of imperial China, and Li Si (about 284-208 BC), a campaign was mounted all across the country to burn books and to have scholars buried alive. It was done solely for the ruler of the kingdom with almost no consideration at all for the common people. This practice was not an attempt to transform the patriarchal system but to do what a military society usually does. Between the Qin Dynasty and the present day, another two thousand years have passed. As the rulers who govern this territory are not of the same descent, China still fluctuates between governance and disorder or chaos. Alone, I read its politics and law and examined its customs, and when I conversed with its outstanding citizens about what they thought, I found that ideologically, they were citizens of a patriarchal society. It is surprising that such a period should undergo such a long evolution. And this process has lasted four thousand and several hundred years in this region.

Yan Fu also felt that it was difficult to judge at what stage China was in social history. If we say that China’s patriarchal society is developing into a military one, a comprehensive view reveals that its patriarchal features make up seventy percent and the military ones make up only thirty percent.

This leads to the discussion of the following issue. This issue was most heatedly discussed during the period from the seventeenth year (i.e., 1928) to the twenty-second year (i.e., 1933) of the Republic of China (1912-1949). The well-known debate on China’s social history took place during this period, when articles related to the discussion were compiled and printed in four huge books, and a slew of other monographs and papers were also published. The debate derives from the interest of one powerful school – Marxism – in social history. After the Northern Expedition of the Kuomintang Army, controversies arose among revolutionary theorists. They

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tried to work out the nature of Chinese society in order to decide the nature of the Chinese revolution. This is because, according to Marxist thought, if it was a feudalist society, the Chinese revolution would be a bourgeois revolution and if it was a bourgeois society, it would be a proletariat revolution. If it was regarded as a bourgeois revolution, the bourgeoisie would be the main revolutionary force. And if it was regarded as a proletariat revolution, the bourgeoisie would be the target of revolution. Dangling between these two possibilities, two opposing views emerged. It matters to such a great extent as this is not merely a question of historical study, but more importantly a question of how history informs the current reality. But in what category does Chinese society belong? As to this question, opinions differ and no one is really clear about it. From the members of the Third International, who were commanding the Chinese revolution far away in Moscow, to all revolutionists at home, from either the Communist Party or Kuomintang, people debated it incessantly. Their divisions resulted in several different schools of thought. Wang Lixi, editor of Debates on Chinese Social History, made the following statement: The period from the Qin Dynasty to the beginning of the Opium War was a lost period in the history of China’s social development. This lost period was also the most important period in China as it witnessed comparatively more authenticated historical records from which answers to post-Qin history could be found. On the other hand, as it was closest to China’s modern history, no account of the ancestry of modern Chinese society could do without an adequate understanding of this period. It could be said that historically, this period served as a hub for Chinese history, but as this period lasted for over two thousand years, one may wonder how Chinese society was able to remain constant for such a long time? This is indeed an elusive issue. Many history scholars from both home and abroad simply get lost in the mire of history.7

As it was not easy for debaters to determine the nature of Chinese society, they constantly reworded their statements, referring to Chinese society as “either a degenerated feudal society”, or “a semi-feudal society”, or “a society at a pre-bourgeois epoch”, or “a society with no feudal systems but which still has feudal forces”. Some scholars (from Russia and China) such as Madjer and Kokin even quoted Marx’s “Asian production method”, taking 7 See WANG Lixi’s “The Lost Period of the History of China’s Social Development” in Vol. III of Debate on China’s Social History, 1936.

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oriental societies like India and China as typical cases. The whole period of the previous one hundred years, during which China was unaffected by the bourgeoisie of the West, the country remained in the same state.8 And the so-called oriental society witnessed a long-term stagnation, which constitutes one of its characteristics. On the other hand, that China’s familial ethos plays an important role and is deeply rooted in all of Chinese culture is also known all over the world. In China, there are such old sayings as “the whole nation lies in the family” and “many families make a nation”. China’s legal system stipulates clearly that families be considered organizational units.9 That is why China has been considered a patriarchal society even up to the present day. Historians of China’s legal systems state that: It has always been the case that in China’s social organizations, the first priority is given to the family instead of each individual or even instead of the nation. As the first priority is not given to individuals, the liberalism from the West cannot prevail in China. And as only the last priority is given to the nation, nationalism in modern history is not something that is practiced here. As a result, family-centeredness is one of the characteristics of China.10

Researchers studying China’s national traits state that: There is a fundamental difference between China and the West: Westerners consider the individual and society as two opposing entities. The Chinese people, however, place their families in the center of their social lives, thus having eliminated the opposition of these two entities.11

The views stated above are, on the whole, correct. No one, however, has more profoundly and ingeniously expressed their views than Lu Zuofu: To the Chinese people, family life is their first layer of social life and the relationship between relatives, neighbors and friends is their second layer of social life. These two layers of social life satisfy both their needs and wants, delimit their activities, and regulate their social morality and 8 9 10 11

See CENG Ji (trans.), M. Koknh (auth.) Ancient Society of China, 1933. See CHEN Guyuan (auth.) A History of Legal Systems in China, 1934. See CHEN Guyuan (auth.) A History of Legal Systems in China, 1934 (p. 63). See ZHUANG Zexuan, National Traits and Education, 1939 (p. 560).

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political legal systems. … Very often, the Chinese people are blamed for being aware only of their own families, but not of their society. Indeed, to them, outside of their families, there is simply no society. In agriculture, the unit for agricultural management is just a family. In business, very often, behind every store can be found a family. In industry, a household with several looms installed will become a factory. In education, it is in their own family home that teachers teach their students, and in others’ family homes that they tutor their students. In politics, a yamen would serve as a family and the arrival of a government off icial means the arrival of the head of a family. … From cradle to grave, no one is separable from his family life, especially from the interdependence of his family members. You can live without a career, but you can never do without a family. Your food, your clothing and your shelter are all provided by your family. When you are ill, your household will become the hospital where your family members will take care of you. You are brought up by your family members and when you are old, only your family members will support you. When you die, only your family members will conduct a funeral for you. Your family may hopefully rely on your success and may also facilitate your success. You must do your utmost to maintain and support your family. You must make efforts to increase its wealth and to improve its status. You are expected to do so much not only by your own family, but also by people around you, and you are therefore rewarded or punished according to what you have done for your family. It is in your best interests to make sure your family prosper. It is better for you to be able to do enough to maintain your family successfully. It is most pitiful to be so unfortunate as to dissipate your family fortune. That is the way your family always envelops you so that you can never get away from it. … In family life, the dependence of family members upon each other is so great that it can easily eclipse other social relationships, or at least become a barrier to them.12

We take this as the seventh feature of Chinese culture. As far as I see, there are so many oddities concerning the discussion of Chinese culture. For example, though civilization China began early, even as far back as in the Han and the Tang Dynasties, with great achievements in both culture and learning, ultimately it did not generate any scientific knowledge. That is the first oddity.

12 See LU Zuofu (auth.) Issues on Construction of China and the Training of Professionals, 1934.

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From ancient times, the Chinese people have adopted many developments and made many discoveries. Western countries before the sixteenth century benefited a great deal from Chinese inventions such as the compass, gunpowder, banknotes, movable type printing, the abacus, and most importantly, paper-making. Wales stated this most clearly in “How Paper Liberated the Human Mind”, Section 4 of Chapter 34 in his An Outline of History: he thought that the Renaissance in Europe was only made possible by the introduction of paper-making from China. The smelting of iron was also said to be an invention made first by Chinese people. It can be seen from what has been said above that scientific knowledge should have developed in China. Why did it not turn out this way? In The Biographies of Shaman Doctors Bian Que and Chun Yuyi from the Records of the Grand Historian, the famous doctor Yu Fu’s ancient anatomy of the human body is mentioned. It is made clearer in The Biography of Shaman Doctor Hua Tuo from the History of the Later Han Dynasty: When neither acupuncture nor medicine works, ask the patient to take anesthetic powder dissolved in liquor. After the patient has been anesthetized and is unconscious, perform surgery on him by cutting open the front or the back of his body and remove the tumor in the stomach. If the tumor is in the intestines, cut open and wash the intestines, remove the tumor in them, and then sew them up and apply some magic ointment to the wound. Within four or five days, the wound will heal and within one month, the patient will be completely recovered.

This is obviously a case of field inspection and a practice conducted by scientists. If it is not considered to be scientific, precisely, it at least belongs to the realm of science. But why do skilled doctors of later generations seem to know nothing about this, such that it has all been classified as the applications of a set of metaphysical concepts? Logic and mathematics constitute the groundwork of science. Their development and their progress are inseparable from the development and progress of other natural sciences and social sciences. Logic was discussed from time to time during the Zhou and the Qin Dynasties, when all schools of thoughts contended for recognition, but not by people of later generations. Though arithmetic was once a topic of great, continual advancement, its development ultimately stalled. To make things worse, it made little progress after that and even failed to be handed down to subsequent generations. Take, for example, the circumference ratio discovered by Zu Chongzhi, a native of the Southern Qi Dynasty during the Northern and Southern

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Dynasties (420-589). It was said “that Zu Chongzhi was the most accurate in the world, discovering the circumference ratio in the fifth century, and that during his time, as India and the West lagged behind in this respect, from his position of superiority he could well look down on the rest of the world” (see Mao Yisheng’s paper “A History of China’s Circumference Ratio” in the fourth issue of Science, Vol. III). His original idea, it was said, “was only referred to in the West by Valentin Otto, a German, in the year 1573 – more than one thousand years later” (see Li Yanzhuo’s A History of China’s Arithmetic). Yet however brilliant your culture may be, when neither widespread popularization or development occurs, nor is continuing progress made over time, a halt is bound to follow. Such stagnation is obviously responsible for the failure to establish a scientific discipline in China. But the reason such stagnation exists is what we really feel curious about. To sum up, academic learning in China is not geared toward scientific principles. This we take as the eighth feature of Chinese culture. It should next be pointed out that popular demands for such things as democracy, liberty, equality and legal systems resembling those of the Europeans are absent in China. This is very odd indeed. The word “liberty” is so clear, so concrete, and so precious to Europeans. It is a word used in their daily speech and writing. In Chinese, however, we cannot even find an equivalent for it in translation. When it was first introduced to China, Yan Fu translated it as “自繇” instead of the presently accepted “自由”. In Zhang Dongsun’s recent book Rationality and Democracy, he states in Chapter Five, entitled “Liberty and Democracy”, that “I daresay that since ancient times, China has never had a concept of ‘liberty’ like that in the West.” Much of his research aims to prove that in China, only the expression “自得” (complacent) from “無人而不自得” (“No one is not satisfied”) seems to be an approximate equivalent for “free”. Apart from this, no other expressions can be found. One may wonder: short of radical structural differences between the two societies, how else can they be psychologically and mentally so incompatible with each other? We cannot take this as sure proof that China used to be a feudal society, in which there was definitively no concept of “liberty” in the modern sense. Let us not talk here about the concept of “liberty” that has a more ancient origin in the West. When, in medieval times, people demanded liberty by force or purchased liberty peacefully from the aristocratic lords, they drafted countless charters and contracts. It can be seen that liberty was not a concept which emerged overnight in modern times. In addition, if China was at that time a feudal society, one might assume that people should have eagerly sought liberty, and when the concept of

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“liberty” in the modern sense developed in China in the late Qing Dynasty, people should have been enthusiastic and overjoyed at being liberated. Surprisingly, though, their reaction was quite otherwise. Yan Fu described the Chinese of this era as “often stunned, shockingly unaware of what they mean when they came across such terms as ‘equality’ and ‘liberty’ in Western philosophy”.13 In my book Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, I also stated, Concepts like “equality” and “liberty” are not only never cherished by the Chinese people, but also, so far, unknown to them when they see them. …They simply adopt two attitudes toward Westerners’ demands for freedom. One is indifference, with no knowledge of the significance of such demands. The other is astonishment, with the idea that such demands would surely cause disorder to the whole world!

It is not only ordinary people who have such attitudes: what should especially be noted is that even Yan Fu, who introduces liberalism through his translation of J.S. Mill’s On Liberty 《群己權界論》into Chinese, says that “personal liberty is not an urgent matter at the moment”. Just as surprisingly, not only the Reformists of the Reform Movement of 1898 but also Sun Yat-sen, the sole forerunner of the Chinese Revolution, cherished the same idea. Sun Yat-sen even complained that the Chinese people have too much liberty and that personal liberty should be eroded in order to form stronger ties within a collective.14 As to whether or not these views are correct, there is not enough space here for further discussion. But these examples at least serve as proof that historically, the demand for liberty has never been proposed in China and that in this regard Chinese society is extraordinary indeed. Words such as “equality” and “democracy” are not commonly used by the Chinese people either. But the spirit of equality and that of democracy are by no means unfamiliar to the Chinese people. Plentiful evidence can be found for this: read Liang Qichao’s A History of Political Thought during the Pre-Qin Period, and you will get a general idea. Let’s expand on this a little bit. In ancient times, Mencius made these scathing remarks: “To a state, its citizens are of the greatest importance. Next comes the state. 13 YAN Fu (trans.) Charles Louis Montesquieu (auth.) The Spirit of the Laws, Vol. IXX, Chapter 17, 1916. 14 See SUN Yat-sen’s talk on the Principle of Democracy, one of Three Principles of the People proposed by Sun Yat-sen himself.

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And last comes the sovereign.” “If the sovereign treats his off icials like dirt, his officials will treat him like a foe.” “It has been said that the brutal ruler Emperor Zhou of the Shang Dynasty has been killed, but it has never been said that he has been murdered.” In modern times, Huang Zongxi expressed this idea most fully and incisively in his Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince. Because of these remarks, Mencius was stripped of his rank as a recorder of sacrificial rites and Huang Zongxi’s book Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince was reprinted and distributed by revolutionists in the late Qing Dynasty on a massive scale, so as to inspire revolutionary thought. Such being the case, it should be noted that at most, the revolutionists only aspired to a government of the people and for the people. But a system or approach by the people has never been proposed by anyone. To be more exact, to realize the goal of setting up a government of the people and by the people, the Chinese people have already taken some measures and established some systems. But these measures and systems were never intended to enable the Chinese people to predominate by making their own decisions, through voting by ballot or the application of a representative system. It is understandable that no thought be given to this lack of predominance for a certain period of time. But how can it be that no thought has ever been given to it? This is something most peculiar. If the integration of the concepts “of the people” and “for the people” generates no such predominance, it can be well understood because these two ideas are radically unrelated. A long, long time ago, they were already closely related to each other, but they could never be fused together. As has been stated above, if there are no fundamental differences between the two societies in terms of structure, how can they be psychologically and mentally so incompatible with each other? It has been said that neither Chinese society nor Chinese politics can be said to be anti-democratic or undemocratic by any means, but rather, they represent another sort of democracy. What is called “democracy” in the West can be called “freemocracy” here in China. This is what Lin Liru told me over ten years ago. Though it was only a joke, it is clear to any person of vision how peculiar Chinese society is. Thus the lack of any proposal for democracy, liberty and equality, or the establishment of a legal system can be counted as the ninth feature of Chinese culture. It can be seen that if a reference is made to both the eighth and the ninth features, neither science nor democracy is a factor. This is the same pattern as the fifth feature, which is (as stated above) that China only had a medieval history without a modern history and thus remained culturally stagnant. As a result, these features can be treated

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either respectively or synthetically. There are many examples we can draw on here, which will be made clear in the following. When US Vice President Wallace came to China for a trip to Chengdu in 1944, he published an article entitled “The Future of China’s Democracy”, which was translated and printed in the June 26 editions of all the newspapers in Chengdu. The article pointed out that China had originally been the principal booster and indirect creator of Western democratic politics. The Americans who led revolutions and established the constitutional government based their thoughts and actions on the philosophy of Western political thinkers. Western political thought, however, was greatly inspired by Chinese culture. As ordinary people knew little about the history of the Western world in this period, they did not fully comprehend his point. Here, Wallace was referring to seventeenth or eighteenth century Europe, whose people were overwhelmed with admiration for Chinese culture. For a brief survey, readers may read such chapters as “Enlightenment and Chinese Culture”, “Chinese Philosophy and French Revolution” and “Chinese Philosophy and German Revolution” from Zhu Qianzhi’s book Influence of Chinese Thoughts upon European Culture. Here, let us examine the features of Chinese culture in the eyes of those Europeans. Certainly, they were keen on more than one aspect of Chinese culture, but the things that impressed them most were Chinese society and its politics. The following points drew their closest attention: First, as a fundamental law, politics is combined with ethics with no separation from each other, so that ethics and politics are integrated into a single branch of learning. China is the only country in the world with such an insight. Second, the common ground for politics and ethics lies in what the Chinese people call “the heavenly principles or the moral principles”. In this case, rationality exerts an incredible effect on sovereign rights. Third, in the Europeans’ view, what the Chinese call “the heavenly principles or the moral principles” is just what they call “natural law” in the West. For this reason, they believe that China’s cultural products and social institutions are as long-standing and imperishable as nature itself. The incorporation of the state and society into human relations and politics and rituals into moralization, with morality dominating culture, or at least with a heavy moral atmosphere pervading the totality of its culture, is indeed a reality in China. As Confucianism clearly states, “Ethics and politics have ultimately been integrated into a single branch of learning”. That is why Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, which touched upon China’s cultural products and social institutions, gave the translator

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Yan Fu no choice but to “bend his head in acknowledging his extraordinary insight”. This is also why, in his book A History of Political Thought during the Pre-Qin Period, Liang Qichao proposed such expressions as “principles of governance by virtues” and “principles of governance by rites”. Without citing from his complicated elaboration, one further instance will suffice to illustrate the point. When jurists talk about the legal systems in the world, they classify them into either sixteen systems, nine systems or eight systems, or at least three or four systems. Generally, however, it is considered that altogether there are five legal systems in the world. Regardless of how many there are, the Chinese legal system surely occupies an important position. The importance of its position not only extends its power, but also ensures that it remains independent. First, the founding of New China is based on morality, ethical codes and the feudal order of importance or seniority in human relationships instead of the law. Thus the law only occupies a subsidiary position. Second, legislation in China is based on morality, ethical codes and the feudal order of importance or seniority in human relationships instead of particular rights. Laws in various other countries in the world are intended to protect human rights, with civil law giving the first priority to real rights and outstanding claims and the second priority to family inheritance. These laws are based on rights. The laws in China differ (with duties in a more important position than rights). Third, as the laws in China are subordinate to morality, ethical codes and the feudal order of importance or seniority in human relationships, they are often very simple and long-standing: since the Han Dynasty to the late Qing Dynasty, they have remained constant.15 Thus, we can ascertain that a pervasive moral atmosphere may be counted as the tenth feature of Chinese culture. However, if we look back at the sixth feature – Lack of Religion in China – we will find that the tenth and the sixth features are actually two of a kind. The only difference is that one is a presence and the other an absence. In other words, lack of religion is a negative aspect and pervasive moral atmosphere is a positive aspect. They can actually be well integrated. For the purpose of research, however, it is of more use to treat them differently. Both the ninth and the tenth features are concerned with politics. This allows us to identify what the concept of nation means to the Chinese 15 See YANG Honglie (auth.), “Preface to Chapter One”, in A History of Chinese Legal Theory, 1984.

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people. The Chinese people used to replace the concept of “nation” with the concept of “the world under heaven”. They are preoccupied with the hope that “the world under heaven is at peace” without giving any thought to “national prosperity”. This is radically different from European perspectives. Though fused in this view are the great ambitions of their ancestors, it is a rumination on the fact that China has existed for two thousand years, owing to either the easily achieved unification (thanks to its geography), or a lack of international competition (except for a short period of time), or other factors. At this point, it is indeed no easy matter to delve too deeply into this. In a word, China is not a nation of the general national type but a super-nation. Quite a few scholars from Europe, America and Japan hold this view, and scholars have also pointed this out here in China. In his famous book The State, the German sociologist Franz Oppenheimer talks about the emergence, development and future of a nation. He believes that in the future, there will be a possibility for what his term of “freemen’s citizenship” to be established. At that time, there will be no state or nation but only society. For Oppenheimer, China has long been close to being “a Libreville Group”.16 Chen Jiayi, one of my friends, wrote the following to me in a letter in 1920: When Bertrand Russell first came to China and made a speech in Shanghai, he declared solemnly that “China is actually a cultural body rather than a state or a nation”. When I suddenly came across this amazing remark, I instantly kept it in mind, thinking how sharp-sighted Russell is! Later on, when I briefly viewed books by Western scholars on Chinese culture, I began to realize that this remark was actually first made by Russell.17

Then, in the year 1934, American sociologist Robert E. Park lectured at Yenching University for the whole year. Toward the end of the year, he published a collection of papers in which he made similar remarks. The gist here was also that China was not a nation but in fact a cultural society, exactly like the West.

16 See TAO Xisheng (trans.), Franz Oppenheimer (auth.), The State, 1929 (pp. 92 and 208). 17 See 1st Issue, Vol. I,《村治月刊》Village Governance Monthly. (A 1929-1930 photocopy of the Republic-of-China Journal with 13 Issues, 1,881 pages.)

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The learned Japanese scholar Hasegawa Nyozekan made the following witticism: British people in modern times consider their nation as “a necessary evil” while the Chinese people, for two thousand years, have considered their nation as “an unnecessary evil”.18

Lei Haizong, professor of history from Tsinghua University, said in his book: China, a country with a history of over two thousand years, can only be said to be a huge society or a huge cultural district with loose political forms. It is totally different from the Seven Powers in the Warring States Period or the various nations in the West in modern times.

He is of the opinion that the large family system does indeed stabilize Chinese society and ensures it remains stable even after countless social upheavals. However, it can by no means coexist side by side with a nation. Since the Spring and Autumn Period, China has witnessed the decline of its patriarchal clan system and the appearance of a nation in its early form. The Seven Powers in the Warring States Period began to evolve into unified and complete nations in the truest sense. Yet since the Han Dynasty, when the family system once again flourished, China has reverted and is no longer a nation in the same sense.19 Recently, Luo Mengshan, in his book On China, emphasized that as China is, on one hand, world-oriented, and on the other hand, nation-oriented, it can thus be considered a “world state”. When a nation self-governs its own nationalities, it is a nation state. When a nation governs other nationalities, it is an empire. When a nation asserts leadership over other nationalities for the purpose of co-government, it is a world state. A world state, which surpasses a nation state and opposes an empire, is a form of national progress, or is perhaps the nation’s most progressive form. Those who think that China “is not yet a country” are utterly mistaken. Rather, China has been too culturally advanced in the past.20

18 See Hasegawa Nyozekan, Chinese Revolution by Scholars from the East and the West, 1929 (p. 152). 19 See LEI Haizong (auth.), “China’s Family System” in Chinese Culture and China’s Soldiers, 1940. 20 See LUO Mengshan’s On China, 1943.

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On this topic, more discussions will follow in later chapters. Though scholars differ in their views, they all hold that what is particular about China is that it is not a state of the common type. We take this as the eleventh feature of Chinese culture. Lei Haizong, as has been mentioned, is the author of the book Chinese Culture and Chinese Soldiers. Based on historical records, he points out that China after the Eastern Han Dynasty is a culture without soldiers. The so-called “culture without soldiers” refers to the abnormal situation in which only gangsters become soldiers, soldiers and gangsters cannot be differentiated, and soldiers and civilians hate each other, or foreign soldiers are employed due to the lack of native soldiers. Normally in this situation, there are two possibilities. One is that a hierarchy emerges among soldiers and civilians, with the former composing the upper stratum of a society (i.e., the feudal society of ancient times). The other is that no distinction is made between soldiers and civilians, so that all citizens of a country can function as soldiers. In modern times, most countries follow this pattern. Historically, China has witnessed both situations but in later generations, neither of them has appeared, which has attributed to China’s decline. Though quite a few scholars deny such a view, we feel that this is something worth studying. We take this to be the twelfth feature of Chinese culture. Qian Mu, professor of history, expressed in a paper21 the view that Chinese culture is “a filial piety culture”. Recently, Xie Youwei, professor of philosophy, published his book Filial Piety and Chinese Culture, in which he stressed that: Chinese culture, in a certain sense, can be considered as “a filial piety culture”. Filial piety plays a significant role and enjoys a superior status in Chinese culture. A discussion of Chinese culture with disregard for filial piety would betray one’s ignorance of the essence of Chinese culture.22

He elaborated on this view by drawing on such aspects as morality, religion and politics. We do not quote from his book here; as with the work by Lei Haizong, this is only a collection of published papers rather than a systematic monograph, and as such is inadequate for a profound discussion of both filial piety and Chinese culture. However, this issue of filial piety has been raised since it is certainly of significance. As a result, we take filial piety as the thirteenth feature of Chinese culture. 21 Refer to The Dagong Daily in Chongqing, the November Issue of the thirtieth year of the Republic of China, i.e., 1941. 22 See XIE Youwei, Filial Piety and Chinese Culture, 1946.

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In another book, Chinese Hermits and Chinese Culture, Jiang Xingyu points out that the noun “hermit” itself and the group of people to whom it refers are peculiar only to Chinese society. Thus Chinese hermits have a frame of mind and a way of living which can by no means be understood by Westerners. Though these hermits are a tiny minority, they are inseparable from Chinese culture. There is much in what Jiang says, but alas, no further elaboration is provided in the book. We take this as the fourteenth feature of Chinese culture for further study. To the features listed above, many more may be added. But in this book, we intend to discuss only these fourteen features.

1.4

Referential and Supporting Evidence

In our research, we will take both merits and demerits of national character as referential and supporting evidence. Sometimes there is no distinction between merits and demerits of national character, or sometimes we simply do not wish to differentiate between them. But usually, when national character is mentioned, its typical merits or demerits – or, to put it more precisely, its special qualities – often elicit in-depth discussion. These special qualities have mostly been molded by national culture. Therefore, it is appropriate to use them as supporting evidence in the study of culture. With the indication of cause and effect, the situation will be made clearer. Presently, there are two scholars in China committed to the study of national character. One is Pan Guangdan, who studies national character from the perspective of eugenics. He is the author of both National Character and National Hygiene and Humanistic History. The other is Zhuang Zexuan, who studies national character from the perspective of education. He is the author of the monumental book Nationality and Education. These two scholars, by capturing data about foreigners’ various views on the physique and psychology of the Chinese people, provide us with no small amount of information. Zhuang, in particular, is most conscientious in gathering data in his book. Apart from his enumeration of various comments from the works of Westerners, Japanese, Chinese and many others, he also gleans evidence through analysis of the data from China’s drama, fiction, mythology, riddles, proverbs, axioms, couplets and ballads. To own such a book is to own many others. Moreover, when Japanese invaders occupied North China, with the intent of conquering the whole country, this book, which used to be entitled Researching Chinamen’s Psychology and which was published in pamphlets, was supplied to every Japanese soldier in China and every overseas Chinese.

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Zhuang’s narration in the book was also based on his reflections on his own experience over the years. When in the heart of enemy territory, we will be able to sufficiently improve ourselves against them. Apart from this, in bookshops we can find translations of the works of such Japanese writers as Uchiyama Kanzo, Hara Sobee and Watanabe Hidekata.23 Although the views of these Japanese writers are excerpted both in Zhuang’s book and in those pamphlets, those books are still worth reading. Here we sum up the views from all sources to determine the more generally accepted characteristics of the Chinese national character, as follows: (1) Selfish. Chinese people show overriding concern only for their own families without social morality, they are in a state of disunity without being cooperative, they lack organizational capacity and responsibility for their country and their public bodies, and they submit to self-interest at the expense of public interest and sate their own lust for personal gains. (2) Industrious and Thrifty. The Chinese people, simply out of habit, are industrious, thrifty, assiduous and indefatigable, often so frugal that they become stingy, and they exhibit a strong spirit of utilitarianism and pragmatism. (3) Overly Polite. On the one hand, in social communication, the Chinese people pay so much heed to ritualistic formalities, hokey polite preliminaries, various forms and face-saving that they appear to be rather deceptive or pretentious, but on the other hand, they would rather sacrifice their actual gains for the sake of saving face, or sooner bring their family to ruin than forsake their dignity or pride. (4) Gentle, Tender and Moderate. Chinese people are meek and moderate, and ashamed of resorting to violence, laying stress on the civil arts over the military arts; they are so refined and cultured as to be rather feeble; they are keen on making compromises and concessions, and adopt a middle-ofthe-road philosophy, seeking balance in everything in the belief that they should never embarrass themselves, and that enough is enough. (5) Content. Chinese people are content with what they have, enjoy their own lives and pursuits, and take delight in pleasing themselves; they feel happy and never complain, even when living in poverty, they readily accept their destiny and do their best and leave the rest to Heaven; they are indifferent to fame and material gains, with deep love for natural scenery,

23 These include YOU Bingqi (trans.) Uchiyama Kanzo (auth.) A View of China from the Perspective of a Japanese, 1936; GAO Ming (trans.) Watanabe Hidekata (auth.) On National Character of China; and WU Zaoxi (trans.) Hara Sobee (auth.) Decoding Chinese National Character.

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and they neither boast of their power nor give any thought to the idea that “human beings can be more powerful than Heaven”. (6) Conservative. Generally, Chinese people favor the past over the present; they follow old practices and rest on their laurels, showing little enterprise or adventurous spirit, and they are attached to their native land, reluctant to leave it, believing that an active life is trumped by a peaceful one. (7) Sloppy (Imprecise). Chinese people are careless or sloppy, they do not pursue exactness, have no regard for time, and no precision about numbers; they are perfunctory, conservative, and un-thorough, and they tend to share things with others without following certain rules. (8) Patient and Cruel. By “cruel”, it is implied that the Chinese people have no sympathy for other people or for certain situations, which is most severely condemned by Westerners. The idea of patience or perseverance signifies that the Chinese people can endure a great deal, a quality that is exemplified by self-control, self-encouragement, and fortitude in the face of humiliation and losses. Related to this is also a duty of honesty to both one’s family members and non-family members. (9) Tenacious and Elastic. Tenacity stops short of hardness and elasticity entails springiness. The Chinese people’s tenacity and elasticity are not only manifested in their own lives, but also attested in the whole nation and in their whole history. These qualities are represented in their psychology and spirit, but also in their physiques and physiological makeup. As a result, the Chinese people are metaphorically referred to as “stewed lukewarm soups” or “sticky candies”. (10) Skilled and Mature. As the general feature of Chinese nationality, it completes the list. This idea describes the fact that the Chinese people are relaxed and unhurried, level-headed, experienced and reserved, sophisticated, tactful, fair and reasonable, impartial, and capable but modest, possessing great adaptability and potential. The above ten characteristics briefly constitute the major aspects of the Chinese national character. Since these are the fruits borne by Chinese culture, in this research, we should blaze a trail in uncovering the origin of Chinese culture and ensure that there is no inconsistency or incoherence between the incidental and the fundamental or between cause and effect. In addition, my research, roughly speaking, mainly focuses on society and human life with no all-round discussion of their related concepts. For example, the particularities of the Chinese language have captured worldwide attention, and it is doubtless that this constitutes a major part of Chinese culture. But as the author here, to his shame, has insufficient knowledge of the Chinese language as a subject of linguistic analysis, he

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does not dare pass comment. What’s more, areas such as literature, logic, philosophy, music, painting, sculpture, ceramics, palace construction, garden layout, medicine, sports, shadow boxing, agriculture, and industry in China also possess unique features. Many dissimilar features in all these different areas have an inherently close link to the features of society and human life under discussion. As a matter of fact, these features can serve as referential and supporting evidence for our present research. If they are used for mutual corroboration and mutual excavation, much greater enlightenment will surely be gained and the fundamentals of Chinese culture will surely be more accurately brought to light. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find a person who is so learned and who understands everything so well. Perhaps this research can be completed by working with collective wisdom and concerted efforts. To sum up, Chinese culture, I believe, is an integral whole (or at least its various elements and various aspects are both coherent and consistent). It is the achievement of the Chinese people, and it in return supports the Chinese people and works to their benef it. Its many features are most arresting and highly acclaimed. To determine the source of each of these features is certainly a difficult task. My every effort, however, is devoted to these difficult questions to which I hope to find answers. In addition, I also hope to find the root of Chinese culture and to figure out a fundamental reason for my explanations. This book serves only as my first attempt.



Chapter Two “Family” to Chinese People

2.1

Fung Yu-lan’s Interpretation

Here we could proceed from any one of the fourteen features of Chinese culture identified for further study in the preceding chapter. We will start from the discussion of the critical importance of “family” in the social structure and in the actual lives of Chinese people (see the seventh feature of Chinese culture). As is well known, family is extremely important to Chinese people in their daily lives, which is especially apparent when compared with their Western counterparts. What are the reasons for this? In Fung Yu-lan’s recent book, On the New Age, chapters such as “About Family and Nation” and “About Children” seem to offer answers to this question. Fung essentially approaches this phenomenon from the perspective of historical materialism, comparing the differences between the production methods used before the industrial revolution and those used after the industrial revolution. In a place that has never undergone an industrial revolution, whether the place is located in the East or in the West, the methods of production in this period of time will be family-oriented. In other words, in such a place, production is familialization.1 In a place that has undergone an industrial revolution, however, where production has been mechanized, family-oriented production methods are replaced by society-oriented production methods. In such a place, production is socialized. Because of this, Fung said, In a society where production is family-oriented, people depend only indirectly upon society for a living but depend directly upon their family. In a society where production is socialized, however, socialized production methods go beyond the boundary of a family and people no longer directly depend upon their family for a living but, rather, upon society.

1 Here, “familialization”, an indirectly translated term meaning “to make familial”, is used in contrast to “socialization”; this is a coinage for the present translation.

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Then he stresses that these constitute two different cultures: To follow a certain production method, a society must have certain organizations and people must display certain behaviors. Such behaviors are prescribed in society by morality. … A production method cannot be put to use at will because its adoption entails the use of certain tools of production. If these tools have not yet been invented, this production method cannot then be adopted and neither do people know such a method exists. Therefore, production methods are determined by production tools, social organizations are determined by production methods and morality is determined by social organizations. Just as production methods cannot be implemented at will, so social organizations cannot be created at will and morality cannot be enforced at will. The existence of a family-oriented production method signif ies the existence of a family-oriented production system, which in turn suggests the existence of a family-oriented social system, in which all social organizations are family-centered. All interpersonal relationships must be associated with family relationships. Among the five cardinal relationships (i.e., the relationships between ruler and subject, between father and son, between husband and wife, between brothers, and between friends) that prevailed in the old days in China, three of them are related to family. The other two, though they are not themselves familial, are nevertheless analogous to family relationships. For example, “ruler” is analogous to “father”, and “friends” are analogous to “brothers”. … It can be said that the so-called “industrial revolution” means the substitution of society-oriented production methods for family-oriented production methods and the substitution of a society-oriented production system for a family-oriented production system. … As a result, in a society which has undergone an industrial revolution, one cannot make a living by staying with his own family but do so away from his family. Consequently, family-oriented behavior is neither practical, nor necessary. This was totally unknown to people in the early Republic of China. They thought that they could act at will to implement whatever social system they chose. They severely attacked the Chinese tradition of family as the all-important foundation and focal point of life, regarding it as a major weakness or a disadvantage. They did not realize that any society in which production is familialization would be like this. In this case, a focus on family is by no means a major weakness or a disadvantage. It is actually what is needed in such a society, and also in the social system in which production is familialization. People in the early Republic of

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China, however, did not know the importance of treating a set of systems as an integral whole. They paid attention only to minor issues and when they found something that did not conform to their preconceived ideas, they would regard it as incongruous.

Of course, of the two cultures that Fung has examined, it happens that one is an ancient culture and the other is a modern culture. They are not so different as Chinese culture and Western culture. As we know, China is currently undergoing a transitional period as it becomes a modern society. This view is similar to that of Lu Zuofu, quoted in the preceding chapter. Nevertheless, he did not use expressions such as “the familialization of production” and “the socialization of production”. His only explanation is as follows: As the economic unit for an agricultural nation is very simple, so that one economic unit needs only one family, social life in an agricultural nation is centered round the family life. Even though social life sometimes goes beyond the boundary of family, it is in fact an extension of family relations.

Here, “agriculture” refers to the unindustrialized or unmodernized agriculture of the past. Unindustrialized agriculture and unmodernized agriculture may be taken as very similar.

2.2

Partiality of Fung’s Interpretation

The views of both Fung and Lu are only partly true, of course, and they are representative of the views of the general public at present. But we need to ruminate on this further: The Chinese people pay special attention to family ethics, which gradually develops into a family system. Though this family system is an inheritance from ancient times, we can observe some variations at different times and in different places. During the Warring States Period, for example, drastic changes were made to the family system, especially in the State of Qin, where Shang Yang’s Constitutional Reform took place. According to historical records: Shang Yang abandoned such virtues as courtesy and integrity without advocating benevolence and kindness. He devoted himself wholeheartedly to striving for the prosperity of his state through his reforms. After two years’ implementation of his proposal for reforms, however, the State of

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Qin witnessed the deterioration of social customs. So in the State of Qin, as soon as the sons of rich families grew up, they would divide up the family property and live apart, and as soon as the sons of poor families grew up, they would marry into and live with their wives’ families. When children lent farm tools to their fathers, it was as if their fathers were under their patronage, and when their mothers used their children’s dustpans or brooms, they would be blamed for what they had done. When daughters-in-law nursed their babies, they would sit opposite their fathers-in-law with their legs outstretched. When mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law were unhappy, they would quarrel or even fight with each other. Parents doted on their sons for their lust after all kinds of profits, so that one could see little difference between these parents and beasts. Shang Yang, however, did everything in compliance with the then-current situation, and forged ahead heart and soul. He intended, of course, to defeat the other six states so as to unify the whole China. In the end, he achieved both success and fame.2 If there are two or more sons in one family, they must divide up their property and live apart when they grow up. Unless they set up separate homes, taxes will be doubled and a corvée will be levied on them.3 2 See “Biography of Jia Yi” from The History of the (Former) Han Dynasty. The History of the Han Dynasty, compiled by BAN Gu班固 (32 AD-92 AD), an Eastern Han Dynasty historian, and annotated later by YAN Shigu顏師古 (581 AD-645 AD), is one of The Twenty-Four Histories (a general term for the twenty-four historical books written for each dynasty at different times in Chinese history) and the first biographical dynastic history of China. It is also called The History of the Former Han Dynasty, which represents another important historical book in ancient China after The Records of the Historian. Together, The Records of the Grand Historian, The History of the (Former) Han Dynasty, The History of the Later Han Dynasty and The Records of the Three Kingdoms are called “The First Four Histories”. Apart from these four histories, the other twenty histories include: The History of the Jin Dynasty, The Records of the Song Dynasty, The History of Southern Qi Dynasty, The History of the Liang Dynasty, The History of the Chen Dynasty, The History of the Wei Dynasty, The History of the Northern Qi Dynasty, The History of the Zhou Dynasty, The History of the Sui Dynasty, The History of the Southern Dynasty, The History of the Northern Dynasty, The History of the Old Tang Dynasty, The History of the New Tang Dynasty, The History of the Old Five Dynasties Period, The History of the New Five Dynasties Period, The History of the Song Dynasty, The History of the Liao Dynasty, The History of the Jin Dynasty, The History of the Yuan Dynasty and The History of the Ming Dynasty. 3 See “Biography of Lord Shang Yang” from The Records of the Historian. Also called The Records of the Grand Historian, etc., The Records of the Historian is a biographical history written by the Western Han Dynasty historian SIMA Qian. It is the first biographical history in China which records events that took place over more than three thousand years, dating as far back as the legendary Yellow Emperor’s time to fourth year of Emperor Wudi’s reign in the Western Han Dynasty.

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Father and son(s), and grown-up brothers are prohibited from living under the same roof. 4

From the standpoint of the whole state, Lord Shang’s intention was to implement militarism and to reward people who were engaged in agriculture and war, so as to be ready to fight fiercely against external enemies. Therefore, it was necessary to break the boundaries of the family in order to oblige individuals to become engaged in state affairs. There is much evidence to support this. For instance, he made population census a legal requirement:5 Within the four boundaries of the state, men and women get their names registered at the government officials’ registration offices. While the new-born are registered, the dead are deregistered.6 Efforts are made to record the number of people, with the living registered and the dead deregistered from the household registration book.7 Corvée is apportioned to a merchant family according to the total number of family members. Those people, whether they are woodcutters, drivers, or servants, should get registered at the government officials’ offices.8

Other laws, similar to the military recruitment laws or military service laws of later generations, were also used to mobilize the populace at the time, but will not be discussed here. The phrase “If a lodger is without an identification card, then both he and the owner of the dwelling place are found guilty”, which saw Lord Shang himself prosecuted under his own laws, suggests that citizens also had identification cards at that time. In his “Farmers as Soldiers”, Lord Shang said, “As anyone who administers a country fears that his people are undisciplined and cannot be marshaled, a wise king or emperor hopes that his people can concentrate their attention 4 See “Biography of Lord Shang Yang” from The Records of the Historian. 5 According to The Critical Biography of Shang Yang, by CHEN Qitian (first published by The Commercial Press in Shanghai in 1935), China was the first country in the world to implement a law enforcing population registration, and it was Lord Shang Yang who first enacted this law. As there is doubt about this statement, however, it will not be discussed in the present book. 6 See “Within the Boundary” from The Book of Lord Shang Yang. The Book of Lord Shang Yang, one of the presentative works by the Legalist School during the Warring States Period, is a compilation of the works of Shang Yang, a noted figure in Chinese history, and his followers. 7 See “Empowering the State” from The Book of Lord Shang Yang. 8 See “Land Reclamation Law” from The Book of Lord Shang Yang.

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only on farming.” He also said that only “assembling people” can ensure “the puissance of a state”. To sum up, he meant nothing other than that a state should be able to directly manipulate its people, without the slightest inclination to tolerate families or clans who might obstruct, impede or slacken its organizational relationships. Anyone with discerning eyes cannot help but see that clearly Europe is in exactly the same situation – or even, that such a situation is the very situation in Europe. The progress of production tools and production methods is by no means the only factor that causes the disintegration of families or clans. Whether the State of Qin at that time witnessed any progress in terms of production tools and production methods, even detailed textual research cannot tell us. In my view, perhaps Fung cannot say for certain that there was indeed progress in terms of production tools and production methods at the time. The economy can indeed be considered the basis of all superstructure (which includes morality, the legal system, etc.). But it is not the case either that we can say with certainty that all superstructure is determined by the economy. Just like the State of Qin at that time, it may perhaps be the other way around. That is to say, in this case it was superstructure (the newly enforced laws) that greatly promoted the development of the economy. Here is another example. Switzerland enacted a civil law in 1907, placing a high value on the institution of the family.9 Beginning at Article 331, included in the civil law was a special section entitled “Family Power” which, crucially, was shared by householders; in addition to parental power, paternal power was also stipulated. But we keep wondering: Up until the twentieth century, has Switzerland never undergone any industrial revolution? The third example concerns the Soviet Union. My continual attention to the Soviet Union has enabled me to observe that in recent years it has seen changes on such issues as women, marriage and family. In my notebook I find the following data: (1) The article “The Change of Moscow” (an abridged translation by Xi Fung), which was carried in China Press on February 24, 1939, was a news report by someone who had recently visited Moscow. The fourth point stated in the article is: Moscow has also witnessed the revival of the importance of family life. Ten years ago, its slogan was “the nation is the best guardian of children”. Today, however, the principal of a state school in Moscow can 9 We cannot figure out yet the positive reasons for the high value that Switzerland places on family system. From the negative side, perhaps due to the fact that Switzerland is a permanently neutral state, it does not have to implement militarism and to be always prepared for the fight against the external enemies just like what Shang Yang did in the State of Qin.

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declare openly that “children’s teachers are in fact their parents, not school teachers.” (2) On February 22, 1943, Ta Kung Pao in Guilin, Guangxi Autonomous Region in China, carried a long news report about the Soviet Union containing this observation: what is most impressive is the revival of the views on puritanical marriage. Though getting divorced is still possible, it is by no means an easy matter. Especially among workers and farmers, divorcees are rare. Thus families have once again become deeply rooted organizations which are considered to be the cornerstone of national life. (3) On March 5, 1944, the International Herald Tribune in New York published an interview with Olga Misikova, a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union. A Chinese translation by Ms. Wang Shiyin, wife of Zhang Junmai, was carried in the second issue of Volume I of The Constitution, where one can read the following paragraph: “I remembered that in 1932, when I came back from Germany, as I was very nostalgic for my parents and my son, I passed by Moscow and saw the typical new Russian women and all the family structures that had been socialized, such as nurseries and public canteens. It was a great shock to me and I felt a spasm of sadness. In my view, if the human ideal only aims to develop socialism and individualism – which are two extremes – the full realization of the socialist system in the Soviet Union will mean the extreme collectivization and mechanization of human life. The abolition of the family system means that both the love of human nature and the affection between husband and wife and between parents and children will disappear, in which case the ruthlessness of group-centered life can hardly be imaginable.” But actually, the Soviet Union, instead of developing in the way Ms. Misikova feared, ultimately saw a complete transition. That interview is mainly about the Soviet Union’s practice of thoroughly separating women’s education from men’s education, from primary school to university. This practice, a prewar decision, was still followed even during the war when Germans invaded the Soviet Union. Misikova said, “After all, a woman is a woman. We used to ignore the special education a woman has to receive, i.e., the education needed to enable her to become a good wife and loving mother.” The question is, as Fung has said: With different modifications of the production tools and of the production methods – in the first stage, families were almost abolished before the family system was again valued and consolidated – would this change in the Soviet Union have been brought about? It goes without saying that no answer could be determined concerning this question.

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From the three instances (the State of Qin, Switzerland and the Soviet Union) stated above, it is quite clear that Fung’s remarks are by no means exhaustive. Nor can the particular importance of families to the lives of people in China be explained by the single point about “familialization of production”. Aside from this, Fung Yu-lan and Lu Zuofu made another mistake. Take what Lu said for example: the agricultural economic unit is very simple and it can be as simple as one unit, which needs only one family. Take what Fung said as another example: in the society in which production is family work, a family is an economic unit. This unit surely cannot coexist with other economic units (families), but they are related to one another in various ways without the possibility of being integrated into one whole. Both Fung and Lu mistook the economic mode adopted by the petty farmers, petty workers and petty tradesmen of Chinese families for the general mode of the medieval economy. They did not realize that actually, the reverse is true. Cases like these are in fact very rare in other parts of the world, as the following chapters will make clear.

2.3

Formation of Culture and its Characteristics

China has long been an agrarian society without undergoing any industrial revolution. Undoubtedly, its traditional customs, morality and etiquette must have adapted to this. Especially when scrutinizing a culture that has endured through two thousand years of history but seen so few changes, it is not unreasonable to conclude that its economic base and its superstructure have reached a high degree of compatibility and that they are very closely interrelated. However, we have no reason to rashly claim that the customs, morality and etiquette of China have been determined and shaped by this economy. On the contrary, perhaps it is that the tools and methods of production which have been used in China for over two thousand years, but which have stagnated in comparison to those in industrialized countries, have been influenced by customs, morality and etiquette in Chinese culture. This point will be discussed here. The economy plays an essential role in everyone’s lives, without exception. It is not hard to discern its great influence upon the totality of culture. With socioeconomic change, it is inevitable that change comes to the family system, which is a fact of life for everybody. But it cannot yet be determined whether this change gives partial or decisive force to culture. In his book Material Culture and Social Systems in a Simple Nation, Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse attempted to work out the correlation coefficient between social systems and material culture, but his findings suggested only a weak

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relationship between them. Ethnological data suggested that examples abound of different patterns of co-ordination between different elements within a culture.10 In his remarks on culturology,11 Huang Wenshan cited three sentences from Wu Jingchao, as follows: First, the same mode of production coexists within different systems and schools of thought at different times and in difference spaces. Second, other cultural elements may undergo changes, but no changes will initially be observed in the mode of production. Third, the same system or school of thought, however, can be observed in different modes of production. Huang also pointed out – citing Franz Boas, an authority in anthropology – that “the economic condition, more than geographical conditions, is undoubtedly more closely related to culture because economy is one part of culture. It is not, however, the only determinant of culture. On one hand, it may determine culture, but on the other, it is itself determined by culture.” Though Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were the creators of historical materialism, their theories are not what people generally understand by this idea. In his letter to Ernst Bloch (dated September 1890), Engels declared vigorously that it was absurd to take economy as the only determinant. He affirmed that although economy was the foundation, super-structural elements like politics and religion also played their parts in the historical process. Given their influence upon economy, super-structural elements interact with it very closely. That being the case, Huang, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels do not differ from each other in terms of their views. Economy is no more than a partial influence, which diminishes as history progresses. Here, we can quote Tugan Bananouski: At the beginning of social evolution, all social life and economy are integrally combined. … As social evolution ascends to higher and higher planes, social action gradually develops independently and its “radioactive rays” gradually travel far from their center. In short, the social action initiated by social life is very much like a ladder whose bottom rung is analogous to the production of the bare necessities of life. At a higher rung of the ladder, the economic labor intensity steadily diminishes. This is because the action required to satisfy the desire for high-level pursuits does not very much depend on economic labor intensity. Consequently, high-level social action assumes the significance of breaking away from 10 See FEI Xiaotong (trans.) William Fielding Ogburn (auth.) Social Change, 1936. 11 See HUANG Wenshan, Collected Papers of Culturology, 1938.

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economy and gaining its own independent existence, and it cannot be considered the product of or subject to the economy, or as simply a rumination on economy. The significance of historical progress lies precisely in the progress of the spiritualization of human beings. Human spiritualization is the focus of human life, moving from the maintenance of low-level essential desires to the pursuit of high-level spiritual desires.

In Fei Xiaotong’s translation of W.F. Ogburn’s book Social Change, he states that some aspects of culture are closely related to each other and others are relatively independent of each other. The element of “intangible material culture” that is most readily adaptable to material culture can be isolated and called “adaptive culture”. It changes in accordance with changes in material culture; however, this change does not necessarily take place at the same time and sometimes it lags far behind. This lag can be considered a problem in modern times. – This is another way of looking at it. This, however, corroborates his view that the mechanistic interpretation is unhelpful. In An Evolutionary History of Society, F. Müller Lyer states that “the driving force of culture obviously comes from man himself”. This is because every aspect of culture descends from man’s inventions and innovations. But regarding inventions, after presenting many instances one by one, Lyer concludes by saying: No matter which perspective we investigate the history of invention from, it can be seen that invention is obviously not the result of necessity. Necessity can compel people to be hardworking but only leisure can be the mother of invention. Invention is not like placing an order, which can be done beforehand.12

Müller Lyer also said that “man’s genius for invention is nothing but the instinct for playing games.” Likewise, I said a long time ago in my book Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, “culture is something that is every bit the creation of geniuses and a result of their running wild with ideas accidentally. There is something predestined about it all, but never a definite reason for it.” But from the very beginning, we do not deny that necessity has much to do with inventions and innovations. Necessity may attract people’s attention to a certain area so that, in this area, there are many more opportunities for inventions and innovations. It can also direct 12 See Chapter Two, Book Four of TAO Menghe (trans.) F. Müller Lyer (auth.) An Evolutionary History of Society, 1924.

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seemingly irrelevant inventions and innovations to this area, where they are picked up and taken forward rather than being left to fall into oblivion. This is why many inventions and innovations often ensue from necessity. Thus, we should not take it for granted that culture is something that adapts to the necessities of people’s lives. – This is the first point. Necessity does not mean objectivity, either. – This is the second point. Necessity should not be confined to the area of economy. – This is the third point. The errors in all mechanistic views, generally speaking, are covered by these three points. With an understanding of these three negative propositions and subsequently an awareness of their positive counterparts, certainly one will not take a mechanistic view. This is a wise technique. As culture is shaped neither by a unitary mode nor by a mechanistic mode, there is a peculiarity about the way every culture comes into being. The Japanese writer Seki Eikichi’s The Sociology of Culture reveals his view that each type of culture should be interpreted in the light of its national character, its class character and its epochal character. Only by doing so can one venture an accurate interpretation of a human culture. What I mean by “peculiarity” here is probably equivalent to what he means by “national character”. In his book, he bears witness to the substantial differences between the English, the Germans, the French and the Soviets concerning democracy in modern culture.13 This is what he means by “national character” and what I mean by “peculiarity”. A look at the world since World War II shows you that there is no country in this world that is not tired of wars and there is no nation in this world that does not believe in democracy. The difficulty of achieving harmony in a short time and the bitter discord that currently breeds are doubtless both results of the differences between cultures. These cultural differences, however, are related not so much to levels of education as to cultural peculiarities. Seki also pointed out that, although the national character of culture is undeniably shaped by the natural environment, not enough attention has been paid to this factor. For example, surrounded by the sea as they are, Britain and Japan are situated in the same kind of natural environment. Yet, while Britain had already enjoyed a long maritime hegemony, Japan did not break its ban on maritime trade until the middle of the nineteenth century. Every culture has its own peculiarity, and accordingly this varies from culture to culture. Chinese culture exhibits the most striking peculiarity, as has been discussed in Chapter One, which is best illustrated by the 13 See ZHANG Ziping and YANG Yitang (trans.) Seki Eikichi (auth.) The Sociology of Culture, 1930 (p. 116).

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overwhelming importance of family to Chinese people. It is not the result of the familialization of production. Neither is it a common practice, or as Fung Yu-lan calls it, “a universal phenomenon” in societies in which production is family work. The Japanese scholar Inaba Kunzan once remarked: The only shield that protects the Chinese nation is its family system. In terms of solid support, even the Great Wall cannot compare. Scholars all agree that the introduction of Christianity into the Roman Empire resulted in the collapse of the familial spirit in ancient Rome. Yet since the Tang Dynasty, when Nestorianism was first introduced, through preaching in the Ming and the Qing Dynasties, up to the present day, China has long been influenced by Christianity, but its family system still remains the same. What’s more, the family system in China tends to familialize Christianity itself. Buddhism has a much longer history in China, but it can never be considered an overstatement to say that Buddhism has become subject to this family system. What a wonder this is! Our belief that a gap exists between China and European society is adequately confirmed by these facts.14

A quote from Master Taixu’s article15 verifies the validity of what has been stated above about Buddhism: The Buddhist samgha was originally a group which aimed to treat different individuals as equals and to harmonize all the monks in a Buddhist temple. But when it was introduced into China, it became the great temple of the middle-class families and the small Buddhist convent of lower-class families with only lineage inheritance, but no longer a place of harmony among monks. This can well demonstrate the great popularity and the great degree of familialization.

Additionally, Shi Haizong, a historian, has said, Buddhism, originally anti-family and non-family, became Sinicized soon after being introduced into China. … The Buddhist observance for 14 Inaba Kunzan’s original paper seems to have been published in a Japanese journal called Oriental Magazine, under the title “Peculiarity of Chinese Social Culture”. This is quoted from Book II of The External Book by Liu Jianquan, a native of Shuangliu District in Chengdu City, Sichuan Province, China. 15 See HUANG Wenshan, Collected Papers of Culturology, 1938 (p. 180).

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releasing the souls of one’s ancestors for seven generations from purgatory, held on the fifteenth day of the seventh month of the lunar calendar is, in the minds of most people, the most majestic ceremony in Buddhism. As regards the deeper meaning of Buddhism, unrelated to families, it is not uppermost in their belief. Here, a foreign religion which is anti-family has been turned into a support for the maintenance of families. (See the paper “Sorrows of the Times”, in the fourth issue of Wisdom Weekly.)

As far as we know, both Buddhism and Christianity are antagonistic to the family system. In other words, though they are originally incompatible with each other (as we will see in later chapters), they become closely related in the end. From this it can well be seen how unyielding the Chinese family system is. Thus in his article “Chinese Culture and its Remolding from the Perspective of Culturology”, Huang Wenshan declared solemnly: I have the conviction that family ethics is the key factor that actually makes China dwell on agricultural production and prevents it from being able to quickly enter capitalist production.16

In Huang’s view, this factor best explains why, since China did not experience an industrial revolution, it could not socialize its production. To put it another way, it is the Chinese family system that actually determines the destiny of China’s social economy and even the destiny of China’s entire culture! Whether this statement is convincing enough to be taken as a final conclusion is left aside for the moment. To sum up, the family is extremely special to the Chinese people, as can be seen from many of the quotes I have included here. Fung Yu-lan did not regard this as having any special significance, but rather as a common practice that could be observed everywhere before the industrial revolution; but on the one hand, this reveals an ignorance of Chinese culture, and on the other hand, a misinterpretation of the history of other countries.

2.4

A Ladder-like Progress View versus a School-based View

Convinced (through making his translation) by the doctrines in Edward Jenks’s A History of Politics, Yan Fu attempted to place China within the three phases of social development – namely, the so-called totemistic society, 16 See of HUANG Wenshan’s Collected Papers on Culturology, 1938 (p. 181).

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patriarchal society and military society. When he failed to do so, he was greatly astonished by the eccentricity of China’s social history but never doubted the reliability of his own learning. In recent years, others have tried to identify feudal and capitalist phases of China’s social development. Despite the failure of these efforts, they continue to try and force China to conform, declaring its absurdity without ever considering the existence of other theoretical interpretations. All this is actually part of a misunderstood “unilinear development view” or “ladder-like progress view” of the evolution of human society. In My Views on Current Affairs, Fung Yu-lan demonstrated his credulity in hewing to this simple thought. In the unilinear development view, cultural evolution follows a single, steady path of development all the way along, incorporating distinctive features, each of which represents one stage along this path. Each stage is fixed, with some nations progressing at a faster rate and others at a slower rate, but they all progress step by step with no leapfrog development. As to class division, opinions differ from scholar to scholar. Some scholars divide the whole culture into different stages while others make their divisions with reference to sectors of society such as different classes. Broadly speaking, by today’s standards, these were outdated ideas that were perhaps popular forty or even fifty years ago. From the perspective of ethnology and anthropology, their hypotheses have been almost completely disproved. Not only is it difficult to divide a whole culture into different stages, but it is equally impossible to judge whether cultural sectors have different stages. For example, the matriarchal clan society did not necessarily come before the patriarchal clan system; incestuous marriage was not a common practice in primitive society; communal marriage was not universal in previous eras; family was not the product of the emergence of clans. Concerning the evolutionary stages of religion, whether it be Labuk’s six-stage hypothesis, Spencer’s ghost worship, or Durkheim’s totemistic stage theory, they are all untenable. In the study of art history, no one can figure out in which order geometric paintings and realistic paintings emerge. In economics, production methods such as hunting, farming and agriculture, or types of tools such as stone wares, copper wares and iron wares, also emerge in different orders.17 The concept of social evolution, which was in fact influenced by the fantastic spurt of human civilization in the nineteenth century and Darwin’s theory of evolution, excited some scholars to such an extent that they became anxious to find a universal law of social evolution, so as to give 17 See LIN Huixiang, Cultural Anthropology, 1934 (p. 42).

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an account of how human beings ascended from low-level primitive life to the apex of the brilliant nineteenth century civilization. Half by guesswork and half by making farfetched interpretations and subjective assertions, they hastily published their articles. Their research methods are actually deductive and subjective (as opposed to inductive and objective), which is considered unscientific. Later scholars found them completely inadequate and discredited their ideas. These scholars just wanted to discern the truth about certain small units, paying attention only to particular individual cases, and they were very cautious in their research, rather than attempting to establish an audacious universal principle or theory. Their work constitutes the so-called Critical or Historical School. (The present book, by maintaining a clear-eyed attitude in general, is intended to put these methods into practice.) The following fallacies must be pointed out. One view is that all human beings, regardless of race and region, are considered to possess the same nature. The most typical view is this: “Human beings, so long as they have human bodies, basically follow the same evolution whatever their race may be – red, yellow, black or white. So does the society that comprises human beings. A catchphrase among the Chinese goes like this: we have different national conditions. Such national prejudice is held by almost every nation. Since the Chinese are neither gods nor monkeys, the society that comprises the Chinese people should not be any different.”18 This is sheer nonsense, because those who hold this view shut their eyes to facts. Facts prove that it is quite otherwise. Another view is that different social cultures, while their dissimilarities undeniably exist, share a general resemblance with only slight variations that need not be paid attention. As should be clear, what really counts lies precisely in those minor differences. In an organic tissue, any tiny difference will result in a radically different organism, and in movement, just as the saying goes, “a miss is as good as a mile”. The same is true in the biological sphere, where plants and animals are similar, with only tiny differences. Physiological anatomy also reveals that even cats, dogs and human beings are alike, with only small differences. If we mix up these tiny differences, there would be no point in doing scholarly research. Still another view, represented by the constant progress theory, is that history is in constant and daily progress, the most frequently used expression

18 See Preface to GUO Moruo’s Research on Ancient Chinese Society, 1930. Such a view has also been adopted by LÜ Zhenyu in his book Lectures on the Ancient History of China, 1987.

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being “the wheel of history”. This is indeed a little ridiculous.19 If human history is taken in its entirety, the story will be quite different. But can the narrative of any historical period or of any nation be like this? Doubtless, progress is inevitable, but setbacks often prevail as well. History may be cyclic, with neither progress nor setbacks. Situations of similar kinds are hard to describe, and instances of these situations abound. A case in point, as discussed in Chapter One, is that ancient China witnessed the seeds of scientific discovery but later began to retrogress. My analysis reveals that in the ensuing two thousand years, China has lapsed into a cyclic state, with no progress at all. To assume that any nation at any point in history is in constant progress runs counter to the facts. This last view, the evolutionary progress view, lacks the awareness of such concepts as overstepping, skipping a grade or rank, abrupt change, or encountering something that could not have been predicted. This is a view that has been fabricated with no evidence, as was made clear previously. It should be acknowledged that though the evolution of life, which is totally unrestricted, is very likely to follow a natural and smooth order, it does not necessarily abide by a rule that is consistent and unchanging. What is our view, then? Human society evolves out of nothing else but living things. Both human society and living things represent the great universe of life, with the former being the continuation of the latter; they are thus fundamentally identical or closely inter-connected. In the biological sphere, it is not the case that there is only progress, without any regression. The same is true of human society. In the biological sphere, though there might as well be species that are relatively superior or inferior to one another, there are, however, no ranks or a definitive course of evolution. For example, among animals there are higher animals. Among higher animals, there are primates. Above primates, there are human beings. They are certainly unequal, in terms of superiority or inferiority, but they belong to different species which are undergoing their own evolutionary process. Just like tree branches stretching out wildly, they are by no means different phases along a single line. According to the theory of evolution, humans and apes are descended from the same ancestor, two branches on the same tree trunk. To say that further evolution of apes 19 See PAN Guangdan, Humanistic Interpretation of History, 1937. In the book there is one article on the maintenance and abolishment of surnames, marriages and families which mockingly states that ancient people believed in Fate, but that the Europeans and Americans of the latter half of the eighteenth century, and Chinese people today, share the belief that there is a Spirit of Progress. Reference can be made to this article.

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and monkeys will result in them becoming humans, however, would be a misunderstanding. Since apes and monkeys have taken another path, how could they evolve into human beings? In the same way, a survey of all the peoples in the world shows that their cultures are different from each other and are unequal in profundity and superiority. Thus the school-based view can never be mistaken for the ladder-like progress view. Culture and the biological sphere, however, differ radically from each other. All species that have evolved into their current states are the outcome of heredity and are devoid of any opportunity for innovation. Even if they receive outside help, there is an ultimate limit to their betterment. Human culture, however, though it is rooted in our natural characteristics, is mainly derived from our acquired cultivation. It is constantly subject to alteration as well as innovation. In particular, no one can prevent different cultures from engaging in exchange, teaching and learning. So whereas in the biological sphere, different species are isolated from each other, in the world of culture, different nations are inter-connected. There is no possibility of turning an ox into a horse, but Japan, an oriental country, can be westernized within the span of only a few decades. In the past, due to lack of convenient transport, opportunities for cultural exchange differed from place to place. The history of an area, then, is either in progress, in regression or in a cyclic state, which cannot be concluded in a hasty manner. Generally speaking, history is in regression in most cases. In the last hundred years, during which period transport has become more efficient all over the world, through mutual stimulation and mutual initiation, cultures of different localities have become closer and may eventually merge into a single culture, except for those certain cultures that tend to resist any progress. Consequently, if we take human history as a whole, without considering the specifics of every locality and/or of every period, a dominant trend of progress can be easily discerned. It can be seen then that the evolution theory, after being revised, can still hold water. It is said that in anthropology, there has emerged in recent years a “new evolution theory”.20 This theory provides no inevitable law but only certain principles or trends of evolution. It has undergone specific modifications, apart from its focus on general principles. Its supporters have also espoused the principle that “the same goal can be attained by different means”. The traditional view holds that similar things all arise out of the same course. It is now known that in actuality this is very rare, whereas there is an enormous abundance of similar things that arose out of different types of development. In fact, I 20 See LIN Huixiang, Cultural Anthropology, 1934 (p. 58).

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think that the best prospect of analyzing human culture lies in modifying the view that the same goal can only be attained by the same means, as expounded in the original theory of evolution, into the view that the same goal can only be attained by different means. In my opinion, the whole course of human history may possibly look like this: during the earliest period, when severe physical, physiological, mental and environmental restrictions were imposed on mankind by nature, every locality happened to exhibit some similarities or were even identical in some ways. Later, the typical features of each locality gradually emerged, with each going its own way. During this process, through contact, integration, rapid advancement and vigorous leadership, several primary paths appeared. With the development of both efficient transport and the power of comprehensive interconnectedness, the so-called “world culture” will gradually emerge in the future. Within this world culture, every locality will naturally still have a different sentiment and style of its own. But again, this world culture is not invariable. Instead, it in turn may possibly develop in several phases.

2.5

Additional Remarks

The main points stated above were already illustrated some time ago in my previous books. The “ladder-like progress view versus a school-based view” was mentioned in The Final Consciousness of the Chinese National Liberation Movement, published seventeen years ago; its ideas originated in Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, published twenty-seven years ago. Over the last twenty to thirty years, my views on Chinese culture have naturally seen many modifications and supplements, but they basically remain very little altered. The following four points were stated in my previous books. To conclude this chapter, they should be restated here: First, China is neither slow nor backward in its progress. To many worldly people, it seems that China has lagged behind the West in many respects (for example, the West has undergone an industrial revolution but as yet, China has not): while the West is quick to progress, their swiftness ensuring they are the first to make great leaps forward, China’s progress is slow, lagging behind the West. In fact, it is wrong to make this assumption. We should recall that slow walkers, so long as they walk steadily, will in the end arrive at their destination. But if they walk in another direction, their destination can never be reached. China is in this second situation. So, as I once said: if Western culture does not come into contact with Chinese culture, China will

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remain completely isolated from the outside world and even after another three hundred years, another f ive hundred years or another thousand years, it will still be absolutely impossible to obtain these advancements in ships, trains, flying boats, scientific methods and democracy.21 It is not that China has not entered the stage of scientific development, but that China cannot enter the stage of scientific development. It is not that China has not entered the capitalist arena, but that it cannot enter the capitalist arena. It is not that China has not entered an era of democracy, but that it cannot enter an era of democracy.22 Second, China has already begun to stagnate. China has taken a different road from that of the West. As this road has come to a dead end, China has been going around in circles, making no progress. Historically, China witnessed only cyclic governance and chaos but never a revolution – a manifestation of this circling state. I once said that it was a major remote and undefined disease and China would remain so forever if no external force were imposed on it and there were no change in environment. I also pointed out that it “was impeded in every way and was driven to the last ditch”. The reason for this has been elaborated in the two books mentioned above;23 the present book will take this exploration further. Third, compared with the West, China has fallen behind because it went too far ahead at first. For example, China witnessed a budding scientific enlightenment and the advent of democracy a very long time ago. But both science and democracy later disappeared as a result of the decline or neglect of practice. That decline or neglect did not come about so suddenly for no reason, but for the reason that China was on a path toward a different sort of development. As a result, Chinese culture is inferior to Western culture in some respects and superior to it in others. It was, however, precisely its superiority that incurred its inferiority later on. I have already discussed this in my previous books but I will explore its significance later in this one. Fourth, Chinese culture is suggestive of human precocity. – This has been my unaltered fundamental belief for the last twenty to thirty years. I advocated this idea in my previous books and I will take it further here in the present book.

21 See LIANG Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, 1921 (p. 65). 22 See LIANG Shuming, The Final Consciousness of the Chinese National Liberation Movement, 1933 (p. 97). 23 See LIANG Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, 1921 (p. 65) and The Final Consciousness of the Chinese National Liberation Movement, 1933 (p. 97).



Chapter Three Westerners Living as a Group

3.1

Contrasting Chinese Society and Western Society

Now we proceed with the issue of “the Chinese Family”, and the best way to so is to contrast Chinese society and Western society. The social structure in evidence at a certain time in a certain place truly embodies the “backbone” of that whole culture at that time and place, while all the other cultural elements constitute merely the flesh attached to the backbone. If there is virtually no difference between two places in terms of social structure, it follows that their cultures must be basically similar. On the other hand, if there is difference between two places in terms of social structure, it is impossible for all the other elements to be the same. This does not mean that all other elements are determined by social structure, but from this foundation one can discern the essentials of a culture. That is why we have taken “the Chinese Family” as our starting point. However, as the old saying goes, “How can I know what a mountain looks like, except by looking at it from the outside?” As the Chinese people are contained within the social structure of China, they can never get a clear idea of what their culture is. A look at another culture with reference to one’s own will therefore be quite revealing. For example, a cursory glance at the outside world will make you aware of the antagonism between the UK and the US, on one side of the divide, and the Soviet Union, on the other. The ways in which their countries have developed – that is, their social structures – differ from each other in that the former axis constitutes an individual-oriented society, while the latter consistutes a community-oriented society. The problem lies in the fact that, since they possess diametrically opposed views, each side lays the blame for these hostilities squarely on the other. If we probe into this further, we will see that this is an old problem in Western society. From the Middle Ages to modern times, and from modern times to the present, popular thought in Western society has swung back and forth between two poles, the collective versus the individual, vacillating as regards which one should be afforded priority and importance and which should be relegated to the subordinate position. This constitutes one of the biggest problems (it might even be considered the single biggest problem) in Western culture, resulting in conflicts both in people’s lives and in ideology. In the West,

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issues such as “individualism”, “liberalism”, “socialism”, “totalitarianism” and “collectivism” have provoked intense, endless debates, but they have even never been mentioned in Chinese history. If you mention the word “individualism” to someone in old China, your greatest efforts to explain might still leave him dumbfounded, with no understanding of what has been said; for, since he has never encountered individualism in his life, he has no way to conjure up this concept in his mind. Although it has already been several decades since the term “individualism” as a catchword was imported from the West, ninety-nine percent of Chinese people still take it as a substitute for “selfishness”, not knowing its connotations. This serves as convincing evidence of how radically different the social structure in China is. This Western vacillation between the two poles must be elaborated on more explicitly. The best place to start is from the discussion of “democracy”. Democracy, despite having emerged in political life as far back as ancient Greece, is, after all, a feature that characterizes modern times. Society and life in the West underwent an enormous change during the period from the Middle Ages to modernity. This period saw movements such as “the Reformation”, “the Renaissance”, “Humanism”, “the Enlightenment” and “ the Declaration of Human Rights”, which can in fact be traced to the same origin, though they initially look so different: they are closely linked to each other. It was also during this time that the democratic mood became pervasive. Yet it was only through a series of widespread movements, countless struggles and even revolution and bloodshed that democratic principles could be finally established and the democratic system finally implemented. Certainly, this is a phenomenon that had never existed in the previous centuries; nor could it exist anywhere else. It should be remembered that this great change in modern times was in fact a reaction to the social structure and conditions of life in medieval times. When we say that “the Reformation” is closely linked to “the Declaration of Human Rights”, we simply mean the awakening of “oneself” as a concept or, directly or indirectly, the rise of individualism and liberalism. Individualism and liberalism set the prevailing trend that persists into modern Western culture. From ideology to everyday life, and from one aspect of life to the next, these notions thrived, became pervasive and ultimately changed everything. This was nothing less than a revolt incited by the strain of un-individuated life, which, due to its alienating force, had to be crushed. As a result, if we can start from this point and look backward and forward, we can gain a holistic view of these changes. A contrastive study will reveal the difference between China and the West in terms of social evolution.

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Indeed, the democratic mood can serve as a proof of the great progress of human social life. The so-called democratic system simply refers to a progressive mode of group-centered life. Here, “progressive”, in contrast to “regressive”, is characterized by the fact that gradually, every member of the collective develops a sense of their own self, having originally lacked a sense of self, and becomes active rather than passive. Thus the collective cannot but respect every member’s individual freedom, and joint decisions are made about public affairs. As studies have shown, the doctrine of the Social Contract does not describe the actual state of affairs we perceive in human history. The group-centered life of human beings is not a result of purposeful combination. In such a mode of living, most people are simply passively engaged, as has been the case since time immemorial. A gradual change to this state of affairs can be expected only after a society witnesses economic progress and cultural advancement. The same is true with any society with a more advanced culture. Take medieval Western society as an example. The ultimate power of a certain collective suppressed individuals and conditioned with their business so much that it incited a very obvious backlash. Though in social life, the emergence of the alienating force is not a good sign, it is nevertheless well suited to the achievement of a balance in this case. A balance is the best that may be hoped for. The group-centered life, in which all members of a collective actively participate, is especially lively and vigorous. It has contributed to the enormous vitality and fast development of Western society over the past century or two, and the brilliant civilization that has been created in the West in the past few decades. In a similar way, Japan, a tiny agricultural country in the Orient, has been able to assume dominance in East Asia in as little as four or five decades due to its burst of progress, its improvement in cultural standards, and having developed in parallel with Western countries, thanks to the Meiji Restoration, the acceptance of modern trends, the conferring of liberty and citizenship on its people and the stability of its social life. The so-called modern trend here, however, is no longer in vogue and has now become a thing of the past. The turning point is marked by the first European War. Since that War, it has been replaced by another trend that is still prevalent. This is a community-oriented philosophy, the opposite of individualism, with an emphasis on control and a lack of regard for liberty, which succeeds at the cost of interfering with popular inclination. This new trend swept across Europe from two directions: from Russia, initiated by the Bolsheviks, and from the Fascists in Italy and the Nazis in Germany. Though the UK and the US, for example, had long histories of prioritizing individualism and advocating freedom, and France indulged and

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catered for many different tastes, these countries were nevertheless affected by the spirit of the times with no exception. Japan, however, followed the footsteps of Western countries in all things while China was often left in passivity. After World War II, though the campaigns of Germany, Italy and Japan ended in failure, they did not deviate from this trend. Perhaps this is because it was more than merely a certain practice at a certain time, but a movement that it was believed would usher in a new era in human society (i.e., the emergence of a community-oriented society). The reason for such drastic reversion of the replacement was hardly imaginable to people living over one hundred years ago.1 This was perhaps because from the very beginning, when individuals became liberated, those who benefited substantially from individual gains and free competition inflicted intense sufferings upon their society. In particular, their mindless production resulted in economic anarchy, which then evolved into periodic panics with no capability of self-recovery. With internal struggles between classes and external struggles between nations, the whole world was made miserable and uneasy, and human civilization was under threat of self-destruction. Just at the time when both the positive and the negative were balancing out, there had already arisen opposing theories and even opposing movements. This trend of movements opposed to the ongoing struggles, however, did not have time to play out as in fact, it could by no means make a turn due to the outbreak of World War I. At last, around the end of World War I, the time came for such “an underground stream” to surge. As backgrounds and conditions differed from place to place, they exhibited dissimilar features in representations. Their consistency in inclination, however, was self-evident. In a word, the collective once again suppressed individuals, and their protections and interventions replaced individuals’ unrestrained freedom. Thus, the most popular contemporary trend has simply served to counteract the previous trend. Over the past thirty years (1917-1947), these two opposing political forces have undergone many subtle changes. Even today, one force is still potent enough, and that is represented by the UK and the US. The other force, though it is brand new, is both strong and stable, and that is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The subtle changes they have seen could indeed not be stated fully here, but they could be summarized in a single sentence. That is to say, each force has resolutely stuck to its own tenets, and concerning the two extremities – the collective and the individual – has 1 Former British Prime Minister and Liberal Party Leader David Lloyd George once made such a remark, with a deep sigh. See newspaper reports published in February 1934.

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made their own choices either to suppress or to highlight one or the other. As to the subtlety, it can be said that it is almost related to the overturn of the trend. The respective subtle changes in these two doctrines over the past three decades, however, serve as a sounder proof that this was exactly where the problems of the West lie. No elaboration is necessary. Here, then, is the question: How did the Westerners run into these problems and how can our Chinese people avoid the same mistakes?

3.2

Divide between Chinese Culture and Western Culture

In my view, it is religion that constitutes the divide between Chinese culture and Western culture. In the very beginning, the society of ancient China and the societies of ancient Greece and Rome differed little from each other. But since that time, societies in the West have witnessed a cultural development that centered round Christianity. China, meanwhile, has taken the path of non-religious morality, with the Duke of Zhou’s Rituals and Confucianism for its focus. This has become the defining difference between China and the West in the evolution of their respective social structures. The Duke of Zhou’s Rituals and Confucianism, “being extremely tactical in that they are ‘middle of the road’”, effected no abrupt changes to the social life of a patriarchal society but enriched it with courtesies and rituals and increased its spirituality. As a result, China gradually evolved into a society in which ethical standards ensued from family life. Western society, however, took its cue from Christianity and turned to large-scale group-centered life, with families occupying an unimportant position and clans being integrated. This is the big difference between Chinese society and Western society. If we examine more historical evidence, we will not find it difficult to see how Westerners run into problems. In the following section, we will firstly talk about the societies of ancient Greece and Rome. Ancient Greece and Rome differed not only from modern European society, but also from medieval society. Yet, interestingly, they were very similar to the society in ancient China. This can be seen in the French historian Fustel De Coulanges’s book The Ancient City: A Study of the Religion, Laws, and Institutions of Greece and Rome. This book, both accurate and comprehensive, is a masterpiece in this area of research. In a translation published by the Commercial Press, the careful translator, Li Xuanbo, added annotations, richly embellished with allusions and quotations, to many of the examples of this conformity between the Greco-Roman tradition and

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the rituals and customs in ancient China. Li’s annotations, though by no means entirely accurate, were highly conducive to readers’ understanding of the similarity between ancient society in the West and ancient society in China. Briefly, the argument in the aforementioned book is that the so-called “patriarchal societies” are those that arise from family systems with ancestor worship. Societies of this sort tend to rely on certain types of religion. Though these societies have laws, politics, wars and entertainment, everything is conducted in the light of religion and religious matters. In the classical Greek and Roman era, people held their gods in awe and veneration. But each family had its own god and no two families shared the same god. What’s more, each family, with its own private religious practice, led a secluded life and eschewed any kind of jealousy. Likewise, Edward Jenks, in his A History of Politics (which was translated into Chinese by Yan Fu), when discussing the religion of a patriarchal society, also said that it had three major features: (1) that religion is made private instead of public; (2) that religion is made personal instead of celestial; (3) that religion is made obscure instead of manifest. Several families make a village, several villages make a tribe, and several tribes make a city-state. It is therefore crucial to treat the expansion of social organizations and the popularization of religious entities as interdependent. Social organizations can, at most, be expanded to the city-state level, and their beliefs can, at most, be developed into the gods of a city-state. Within a limited group (such as a family, a village or a tribe), however, people can still offer sacrifices to gods or their ancestors, celebrate their own festivals, hold assemblies or elect their own chieftains. This is what we understand as polytheism. Later on, what seemed to be most unexpected was that Rome, one of thousands upon thousands of city-states in Greece and Italy, could have conquered all the other city-states. This surely indicates the irresistibility of the advancement of human social units. But on the other hand, Rome, with its own particular set conditions, happened to follow an ingenious path. This perhaps suggests that human life can by no means remain unchanged after several centuries, that ideology necessarily grows more sophisticated and that people by temperament cannot be confined only to the worship of family gods or city-state gods. Thus it is inevitable that larger organizations of people go beyond the boundaries of city-states. At the time, the Romans were fortuitously not a religious people belonging to only one family clan or one religion. They were hybrid. It was difficult for them to determine from which language, or even the name of their own city – “Rome” – originated. Some said it was Greek, others said it was Latin and still others believed it

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was Italian. It was the case in ancient times that people gathered together due to their belief in the same religion. If two city-states shared the same religion, they would be considered relatives. Since Rome observed a hybrid religion, it followed that it was connected with other city-states. Rome, then, saw the importance of preserving the documents of these “relatives”. For example, Rome kept up the custom of commemorating Iona for the sake of her relatives across more than thirty cities in Italy, Sicily, Greece, Terras, Asia Minor and others. – This, then, describes the special conditions of Rome as it then was. The greatest ingenuity of Roman policy lies in the fact that it never imposed its own gods upon those it conquered, but instead enlarged its pantheon of gods by adopting and absorbing more deities from the people in conquered regions. Consequently, Rome, seemingly a gathering place of various religions, worshipped more gods than other city-states. Exploiting the affinity of different religions facilitated its governance. By adopting this ingenious policy, which dovetailed effectively with the mindset of contemporaries and worked in tandem with the relentless conquest of all other city-states, Rome saw step-by-step progress that culminated in the mighty Roman Empire. It was, however, precisely the degradation of the religious spirit of family gods and state gods that resulted in the situation where only personal religious custom was preserved, to the detriment of the organizational maintenance of the state. Yet now, this mighty Empire possessed no correspondingly great religion. The Roman Empire could be said to have risen with the decline of its old religions, and as it prospered, its old religions declined further with each passing day. Due to this lack of religious cultivation, however, its citizens were lacking in their spiritual life; the mighty Roman Empire could thus by no means survive, but would surely decline. Here, it is worth quoting Fustel de Coulanges once more: Ancient people (primitive people) were so different from each other and so uninhibited and capricious that it was by no means an easy matter to develop a social bond and to achieve social unification … Naturally, there has to be one thing that is mightier than the actual strength, nobler than the actual interest, more specific and accurate than philosophy, and more secure than a contract. This thing, which has authoritative weight over everyone and in everyone’s heart, is the religious belief. Our belief, as the product of our mind, cannot be easily changed at will. It is our creative work of which we are unaware. It is “subject to man” but is regarded by us as “god”. It is the result of our own power but is more powerful to us than anything else … Man can doubtlessly subdue nature to his own avail, but he is forever the slave of his own thought.

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At that critical moment, since Rome was without complete legal systems, it became inevitable that corruption pervaded the society. Not until Christianity was introduced from the East to Rome was this inadequacy overcome. Under such a circumstance, this unexpected lifesaver sustained the ancient Western civilization and, in the end, nurtured its modern civilization, which will be discussed in later chapters.

3.3

Christianity and Group-centered Life

According to historians, “Spartans stayed in the open in the daytime and at night, they slept in tents. As they had food and drink together, they had no time themselves and they stood little chance of having a family life.”2 This was an extreme example of the group-centered life, which was then associated only with the warlike and valiant Spartans, as opposed to the usual customs of social life at the time. It should be noted, however, that in ancient Greece and Rome, generally people did live as a collective. Though social life at the time was focused on the family, given the fact that there were many subordinates, distinctions of social strata, the authority of the householder and the co-ownership of estates, family was inevitably still considered as being affiliated to a collective. But as this type of group-centered life was characterized by a flagging spirituality and a narrow mentality, it had no possibility of developing into the life of a large institution. Such a collective would no longer take the family or the family name as its focal point, and only with the spread of religions such as Christianity and Islam could this type of large collective finally be established. Edward Jenks states in A History of Politics (as translated by Yan Fu): “The natives do not strongly repel foreigners, and the foreigners are skilled in making peace, whereas it is Christianity that promised to build a large state.” This supports what we have said. Ever since the collapse of the patriarchal system, whenever the collective is mentioned, it refers to an organization that transcends the family. Only a “super-family” organization can be adequately called a collective. To expand on this, let’s look at how Christianity established a super-family collective organization. The Christian spirit goes utterly against that of old religions in the following three ways: First, God is considered as the only absolute existence. This differs radically from the earlier beliefs that recognized as many gods as there 2

See FUNG Xiong (trans.) Lynn Thorndike (auth.) A Short History of Civilization, 1930 (p. 117).

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were families or states. This one god does not live in this world but, rather, dominates this world from far beyond it. Thus both the meaning and the form of religions have undergone a complete overhaul. The original fear of gods (the fear that gods will fly into a rage and misfortunes will befall people) has developed into the love of gods. Furthermore, neither food nor sacrifices have to be offered to such gods, and prayers are no longer incantations. Second, in the doctrine of universal love and brotherhood, God is taken as the father, and all the people of the world are as close as brothers. Again, this is completely different from the earlier practice of differentiating between the people from one’s own clan and those outside one’s own clan, and of obtaining private interests for one’s own clan while inciting hatred toward outsiders. Christianity makes its own doctrines known to the public as part of its great zeal for the salvation of the world, as opposed to the former practice of seeking private interests. Third, the Christian imperative to go beyond worldly affairs contrasts fundamentally with the ancient practice of busily engaging oneself solely in pursuing a secular life. Being composed of body and soul, in the present world each person can only live their bodily life. His soul, however, is free, and can ascend directly to God. Since the things to which religions accord priority do not exist in the material world, the fewer worldly affairs a person attends to, the better it is for them. So Jesus says, “Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s.” Religion is thus separated from politics and, by the same token, state governments became independent. What’s more, religion admonishes people to perform their duties without paying heed to affairs concerning secular rights that are stipulated by laws. Christianity was the first religion that did not affiliate itself with any law, a fact to which the progress of the Roman Code was greatly indebted. The work by Fustel De Coulanges mentioned above contains the following conclusion: “When faith was first practiced, human society began to have organizations. When faith changed, society underwent constant reforms. When faith collapsed, society would also collapse or become unbalanced.” Here, we may add: from every new faith that comes to dominance arises a new type of social organization. The end of the patriarchal system and the emergence of the ultra-family organizations are in fact the result of this new spirituality. However, we can by no means mistake the large-scale group-centered life for merely the creation of the consciousness of religionists. It has been facts, rather than ideals, that have shaped the group-centered life of the West. Nevertheless, these facts have special connections with Christianity,

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and the bloody struggle that Christianity has incurred is one of the ways in which this connection has manifested. The rise of Christianity indeed amounted to a violent revolution against the society of the era. Firstly, advocates of Christianity overthrew the family god of every family and the state god of every state, opposed idol worship of whatever kind, and never hesitated to make enemies of paganism. Thus it was said that “since Christianity derived no satisfaction from erecting its own altars, it went so far as to destroy the altars of any type of paganism.” Secondly, Christianity disrupted small family groups and class systems so that all people, being deemed “brothers”, were subsumed into the superfamily group – the church. The church was an organization that Jesus resolutely enjoined his disciples to uphold. Early Christians also believed that in order to keep their faith pure and undivided, such an amalgamation was indeed necessary. The earliest iteration of Christianity yearned for the resurrection of Christ, the realization of heavenly life and the equitable division of food and clothing among Christians, with no differentiation, with such a system relinquishing all industries to the state. It seemed that, since the earliest organization of Christianity was extremely firmly closeknit internally, while externally, it advocated extremely radical action, its collective spirit naturally grew to a great pitch. As the religion was extremely exclusive and, at the same time, was itself forcibly excluded, nowhere could it be tolerated by other groups. The slaughter of Christians, however, only resulted in greater unity among the religion’s adherents. In addition, though Christianity advocated the separation of state and religion, this was not allowed to happen for pragmatic reasons, and the two were soon to blend once more (in the year 325, Christianity was designated as the state religion of the Roman Empire). Though Christianity did not aim to eliminate pagans by force, it did, in fact, eliminate them in the end. At that time, it was almost inevitable that culture would take religion as its central focus. Due to the special governing and centralizing effect of organized religion, no form of social organization could therefore be separated from it. We might suppose that in this era, religion was separable from the state and became self-supporting. It can be hardly imagined, however, that the state was separable from religion. The medieval feudal system depended on religion, which itself became politicized in turn, as evidenced by, for instance, the Pope’s interventions in politics in general, and bishops acquainting themselves with vassals’ government affairs through his own participation in them. What’s more, the archbishop and the bishop in the church and the abbot of the monastery would ultimately also become part of the feudal class. This had two results:

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First, autocratic rule within group-centered life became too stringent. Generally speaking, religious beliefs work as cohesive ties between different people and state power further restricts people’s freedom. The incorporation of state and religion makes autocratic rule possible. Indeed, when people cannot escape from this too-strictly-governed form of group-centered life, this constitutes the basis for revolutions that are triggered later on, which is extremely important. Second, this makes the struggle between different groups more frequent and fiercer. Generally speaking, wherever power lies is where conflicts occur. As religion does not assume power, it does not witness many conflicts. Consequently, from the religious sector group confrontations arise most easily, and the struggle for power does not depend on religious organizations and it may not be intended for the whole group. The incorporation of state and religion thereby obscured the religious issues, the political issues, the racial tensions and the personal clashes. In this incorporation, tragedies of various scales and wars of various lengths continued for over a thousand years without an end in sight. This millennium-long period of recurrent and fierce struggle has tempered the group-centered life of Westerners, which is another extremely important point. “Religious issues”, as has been mentioned above, arose initially from the conflicts between Christianity and paganism. Later on, as Christianity developed, a gradual decline in external conflicts saw the rise of internal sectarian conflicts. These conflicts became more violent when Protestantism emerged. And the statement above that “the struggle for power does not depend on religious organizations and this struggle may not be intended for the group” can be best exemplified by what the contenders for the throne did when one dynasty was replaced with another in Chinese history. Two or three leaders would vie with each other but most other aspirants were nothing but subordinates, as the lack of religious affiliation made it impossible for contenders for the throne to combine their forces. Consequently, Han Xin, a war strategist during the Warring States Period in Chinese history (475 BC-221 BC), rendered his services to the State of Chu but could also submit to the State of Han. Xiang Bo, a native of the State of Chu, offered protection to Liu Bang, King of Han, the enemy of the State of Chu. During the Three Kingdoms Era (220-265) in China, the Zhuge Brothers, namely, Zhuge Liang, Zhuge Jin and Zhuge Dan, could and did render their services simultaneously to three different kingdoms – Shu Han (221-263), Wu (222-280) and Wei (220-265) respectively. Conflict of this kind is not the same as violent clashes. Any collective must have both an inner circle and an outer circle. Otherwise, it would be diff icult to form a collective at all. Perhaps

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counterintuitively, the tighter a circle is, the greater its unity will be. This is the first point. A collective must also have its opponents or competitors. Only this can make group-centered life more vital and its organization more compact. By contrast, a lack of such antagonists would doubtlessly lead to a collective becoming undisciplined or even disappearing. This is the second point. Further, when a collective meets with adverse circumstances or suffers persecution, its members will become more cohesive. On the other hand, when a collective is in a favorable situation, its members will either become easily fractionalized or even foster internal disputes due to their lack of cohesion. This is the third point. A survey of these three points makes clear that the best opportunity to temper the group-centered life is none other than the bloody struggle sustained in Europe under Christianity. When a person is locked in a struggle, he thinks of gathering a collective around him. But when a collective is formed, the struggle ensues more easily. The collective and the struggle are almost inseparable from each other. Montesquieu’s statement that “the struggle always co-exists with the collective” in his book L’esprit des Lois (The Spirit of the Laws) makes just this point. In contrast, quietness is so closely interrelated with peace that the more indolent, the more peaceful and the more peaceful, the more indolent. Since the advent of Christianity, Westerners have always lived a group-centered life but with constant struggles – despite the fact that Christians advocate peace. Ever since China’s moral philosophy was established by both the Duke of Zhou (?-c. 1095 BC), a statesman and thinker during the Western Zhou Dynasty, and Confucius (551 BC-479 BC), people there have lived an indolent and peaceful life on the whole – though Confucius also remarked that “every peaceful alliance must be backed by military force”. On this point, more will be said with regard to China later. In the West, however, it was only the merger between Christianity and Western culture that enabled Western society to embark on such a route. Naturally, however, the group-centered life of the West cannot be totally attributed to Christianity. Irrespective of the lifestyle inherited from Greeks and Romans, the primitive barbarian lifestyle also counts as one of the factors contributing to Western culture. Their society being characterized originally by collective action (the barbarian migration’s collective action in looting was different from the peaceful but dispersed life style that was characteristic of an agrarian society), a low barbarian culture and a certain impulsiveness, they became devotedly attached to Christianity once they embraced it. Many bloody tragedies resulted from precisely such religious intolerance as only one single religion was adopted across a wide area.

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Medieval Society in Europe

Group-centered life can certainly be well controlled in a life and death crisis, but it can also be necessarily fostered in daily routine. The former can ensure the strong cohesion and discipline of its members. But the acquisition of organizational capacity, the spirit of the rule of law and social ethics relies to a great extent on the latter. To make this clearer, it is necessary for us to describe the social life of medieval Europe. In medieval Europe, socially, politically and economically, all aspects of life revolved around one collective or another, on which people depended in daily life. Those big or small units in the feudal system, the guilds and the autonomous cities all belonged to collectives. In historical terms, this feudal society, rather than being the result of the evolution of previous generations, was a step backward. Politically, the decline and disintegration of the Roman Empire provided the opportunity for the rise of local feudal lords, obliging weaker members of the local population to become affiliated with their respective lords for survival. Thus many feudal collectives were established. Though the system was composed of numerous strata from top to bottom, with the larger collectives dominating the smaller ones and the smaller collectives serving the larger ones in a rigidly hierarchical manner, it was not well-ordered. Rather, these were heterogeneous and independent collectives. Economically, the sudden emergence of the Islamic societies on the historical scene, by their conquest of the eastern, southern and western shores of the Mediterranean Sea, severed the main artery of local cultural and business communications as the two hostile worlds of the Crescent and the Cross faced each other. The economic equilibrium of antiquity, which had survived the conquest of the barbarians, collapsed under the invasion of Islam. Over the course of the eighth century, the interruption of commerce brought about the disappearance of merchants, and the urban life they had maintained collapsed at the same time. The new monetary system, which the Islamic conquerors instituted in place of the old Roman gold solidus, is clear proof of their rupture with the ancient economy, or, rather, with the Mediterranean economy. Meanwhile, as the traffic along the Danube River, the Elbe River and the Saale River was obstructed, no regular trade could be conducted. From the end of the eighth century, the whole of Western Europe had sunk back into a purely agricultural state, with a natural economy. Social status was predicated on the possession of land. Because of this, state military systems and administrative systems were indolent and incoherent, and it became impossible to safeguard the sovereignty of the head of state.

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The political formulation of the feudal system was probably based on this economic fact.3 At this time, economically self-sufficient units under the feudal system, both big and small, unexpectedly developed into collectives. Consequently, this retrogression or frustrated progress offered Europeans a golden opportunity to foster group-centered life. Thereafter, both the revival of commerce and the re-emergence of cities opened opportunities for the group-centered life to progress. – But this is another story, and it also illustrates how “the progressive group-centered life” that we have described above came into being. It can be seen that from the beginning to the end, the process is so clear that it is as if it is taking place before our eyes. Under the feudal system, the former agricultural society naturally went through many changes over a thousand years and in different places; in certain ways, it is quite difficult to discern similarities. Generally speaking, however, the most typical systems were the latifundium and the manorial systems. These will be discussed briefly below, with reference to the work of various scholars. It is estimated that on average, a large estate was made up of three hundred farms or ten thousand acres, but it could include even more than that. These were the possessions of the Church, the abbeys or the aristocracy. Lands of such considerable acreage could not be easily joined together and were sometimes scattered in places separated by large distances. Dispersed though they were, their cohesion was underpinned by a powerful administrative system. In this era, when commerce enabled an estate’s products to be transported and sold and when cities provided it with daily necessities, each estate took part in general economic activity as both producers and consumers. At the point at which commerce was brought to a standstill, every large estate developed into what was called “a closed large estate economy” in the sense of self-governing commune and the tools needed for farming and making clothing and other articles of daily use had to be produced in-house, in its own workshops. The whole estate was generally divided into several lots, each of which consisted of one or more villages, administered by a manor. The manor, which was not only an economic organization but also a collective society, dominated the life of its residents, functioning as a small world of its own with its landlord as the ruler. The residents were not only the landlord’s tenants, but also his subjects. From an agricultural perspective, this could 3 See HU Yimo (trans.)《中古歐洲社會經濟史》Zhōnggǔ ōuzhōu shèhuì jīngjìshǐ, 1943 (p. 5) and Henri Pirenne (auth.) Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937.

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be counted as a shareholding arrangement with the majority of the farmers, including the aristocrats, being like shareholders. Though they belonged to different social strata, they were nevertheless all Christians. Consequently, everyone could get along with other people on an equal footing and everyone had their own rights and duties. Whether they were a freeman or a serf, everyone could have his say in public affairs. The manor also housed quite a large variety of craftsmen, shepherds, swineherds and beekeepers. All of them had their own identities, duties and legitimate rights. Farmers could be roughly divided into freemen and serfs. Freemen were in the minority and were retained by contracts signed with their landlord. In France, freemen owned land, but elsewhere in Europe, freemen generally rented their land but owed less service to their lords. The freeman, however, was entitled to leave whenever he liked. He could also bring a suit against the King’s court. The majority of the population, however, were serfs, who were only customary tenants. They were confined to the land and could by no means leave at will. The whole manor, except for the landlord’s lot, was shared by all. On the shared land, every tenant worked a hereditary lot, from which he supported his family and paid taxes and fees to his landlord. Even features such as grasslands, meadows, forests and marshes were shared by all, with no distinction. In farming and harvesting, it was not only the landlord’s land that had to be cultivated with all tenants’ concerted efforts. Each tenant’s lot was also cultivated by the joint efforts of all tenants. Facilities such as mills, stables, wine presses and even ovens were usually for public use. Below the landlord and the local aristocracy were the bailiffs, who dealt with all administrative affairs on their behalf, along with legal affairs. Acting on behalf of serfs and assigning them work to do were the provosts. Besides these, there were other kinds of minor officials. The manor was also a judicial entity, whose jurisdiction was determined by the rights granted by the monarch. Manorial courts arrived at a verdict on each case and dealt with all internal problems in accordance with general customs and the usual practice of the manor, with the consent of the landlord. The manor, the smallest unit of land and communal life, tended to overlap with the parish, the smallest unit of Church administration. In each manor there was a church and a priest. The priest, usually a friend of the landlord who provided pastoral care for all residents, preached and offered advice on all aspects of life. He standardized their social life in the liturgical year as well as in their lifetimes, through such rituals or ceremonies as the naming ritual (baptism), the confirmation ritual, the wedding ceremony and the funeral ceremony, and through such customs as Sunday prayers, feasts or

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fasts. In front of the church was the lawn that usually served as a space for recreation and on which country dance parties were held. The ringing of the church bell was a spiritual sustenance to all living in the manor. This way of life centered round the instructions of the landlord and the church naturally brought about such a group-centered life. Consequently, all architecture – from fortresses, private residences, churches, halls, lodgings, serfs’ huts, various workshop rooms and warehouses to stables and cowsheds – had the various buildings accommodated in the layout of the manor as a unit of land, as shown in the records. 4 All the detail provided above aims to make the point that medieval agricultural life in the West was actually a group-centered life. This disproves the statements, made by Lu Zuofu and by Fung Yu-lan respectively, that “the economic unit of an agricultural nation needs only one family” and that “in places with no industrial revolution, whether they are in the east or the west, they witness the familialization of production, in which one family is one economic unit”. These scholars assumed that what they saw as the case in China was also generally the case in all medieval-era societies. They also applied their assumptions about medieval culture to the interpretation of events in China. They never realized that the Chinese practice of each family living its own self-contained life was actually rare in the medieval world. Basically, under the so-called “open field system”, whatever farmers did must be teamwork with inevitable constraints, let alone when they did things for one family as an economic unit. Just as Jenks said in his A History of Politics, “in farming in ancient times, a clan or a village was considered as a unit. In farming at present, a farmer or an individual is considered as 4 See HU Yimo (trans.)《中古歐洲社會經濟史》Zhōnggǔ ōuzhōu shèhuì jīngjìshǐ, 1943 (p. 5) and Henri Pirenne (auth.) Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937; HE Bingsong何炳松 (trans.) A History of Medieval Europe, 1924; FUNG Xiong (trans.) Lynn Thorndike (auth.) A Short History of Civilization and “Series of Social Economic Histories of Different Countries”, 1930; WU Lifu (trans.) Hayes, C. J. H. and Moon, P. T. (auth.) A History of the Medieval World, 1969. In “An Account of the Village-Run Schools in Henan Province in China” which I wrote in 1929, I made the following remarks: “Chinese society has always been a village society. If you wish to explore the so-called Chinese society, how can you attempt it without knowing that there are 300,000 villages in China? Or is it the case that in Europe there are no villages? The answer is: Since ancient times, there have been villages in Europe. But only in the Middle Ages did they become the basic level of the feudal social system. There are still villages in Europe today, but in modern times they constitute only the dots and lines of the capitalist social organizations. Here, society has villages but villages are not regarded as a society. Therefore, European society cannot be called a village society. It is just said about this.” (Translator’s note: Reference can now be made to LIANG Peikuan梁培寬 and WANG Zongyu王宗昱 (eds.) 梁漱溟卷《中國近代思想家文庫》Liang Shuming Volume: Library of Modern Chinese Thinkers. Beijing: China People’s University Press, 2015.)

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a unit.” “Up to the present day, the disintegration of villages facilitates the implementation of the landlord system.” “Man enjoys freedom and land is his real estate.” Next, let’s look at industry and commerce in the medieval period. Apart from the various manorial workshops described above, the latter half of the eleventh century witnessed the rise of centralized industry and commerce and the gradual development of urban centers. Europe’s industrialists and businessmen also tended to live and work as a collective until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when collectives became increasingly fragmented and was replaced by the liberal institutions of modern times. This type of liberal institution is known as the “guild” in English and “同業 公會” or “行會” in the Chinese translation. On the one hand, the guild was a voluntary organization, but on the other hand, it had legitimate power. It firstly took into account the public interests of consumers and consequently based its operations on producers’ own requirements. The character of guilds differs from place to place, though there is not enough space to go into more detail about this here. But the salient point is that the guilds were so firmly united and so hugely influential that they became a powerful force capable of infiltrating and meddling in local politics, which is something Chinese businessmen and workers could never dream of. The guild representing a certain place or a certain industry was in many cases actually a monopoly, which made the participation of other people very difficult. Stringent regulations were enforced around the acceptance of new members, with a set age limit for apprentices and a limit placed on the number of apprentices each master could accept. Since this practice aimed to be exclusive and to protect the interests of the guild’s own fellows, efforts had to be made to prevent too much license in working practices or in undercutting the competition, and to exercise close supervision, so as to enhance the guild’s effectiveness. Such practices aimed to prevent the formations of monopolies and the obstruction of consumers’ public interest so as to avoid unfair practice. At the same time, every effort also had to be made to sell genuine goods at a fair price in public transactions, with strict prohibitions on using inferior materials and turning out substandard goods, and of gaining excessive profits. The fulfillment of this ideal required more supervision and more interference, which resulted in a proliferation of extremely cumbersome and extremely rigid rules and regulations. These rules and regulations evolved into a set of very thorough management techniques. To exercise its management duties, the guild itself played the role of a small government. It had its own elected leader, clerks and administrative officials, and held various kinds of conferences. It had its own autonomous regulations, its own finance

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and treasury, and a court for resolving disputes. On the other hand, though its operations were naturally based on their economic significance, they could never be separable from religion. As a result, apart from its economic functions, the guild also had various social functions. All professions and occupations had their respective guardian angels, festival dinners, parades and games, amusements and various kinds of social contact. In times of poverty, illness, death and losses, they had the compassion of their guild brothers. Each guild had its own banners and even wore unique costumes.5 Here, we can look at further convincing examples of this dynamic: A (a mason) built B’s house so shoddily that it fell down; not only A, but A’s guild was liable to B. A (a merchant) incurred a debt to B. Not only A, but A’s town was liable to B (as we see in Edward Jenks, A History of Politics, Chapter 12, “The State and Legislation”). One of the guild system’s most curious manifestations was the right of reprisal practiced by merchants right up to the end of the Middle Ages. If an Antwerp merchant, for example, did not pay a debt he owed to a Bristol merchant, the Bristol merchant’s guild seized the goods of any other Antwerp merchant who was unlucky enough to be in Bristol at the time. (See Edward Jenks, A History of Politics, Chapter 11, “The State and Justice”). To make the example more immediate: if A and B belong to the same guild in Tianjin, and B has not paid a debt he owes to C in Shanghai, C can detain A’s goods, which happens to be in Shanghai. Is it not then as clear as crystal that the medieval guild was tightly and highly organized? This begs the question: Does this bear any resemblance to the examples of a printing house and a blacksmith’s shop that Fung Yu-lan cites in his book?

3.5

The Seeds of Modern Society

At the same time, autonomous urban areas, generally called “liberal cities”, were growing. While guilds were professional organizations, urban autonomies were local organizations. It might be said that guilds were economic organizations and urban autonomies were political organizations that might be seen as a “hangover” from the guild system. 5 See HU Yimo (trans.) Henri Pirenne (auth.) Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, 1943; XU Xiaotian (trans.) Tsuneo Hori (auth.) Social Economic History in the UK, 1937; XU Hanchen (trans.) Tetsuji Kada (auth.) Social Economic History in Germany, 1937; CHEN Jianmin (trans.) Charles Seignobos (auth.) Cultural History in Medieval and Modern Times, 1935; FUNG Xiong (trans.) Lynn Thorndike (auth.) A Short History of Civilization, 1930; WU Lifu (trans.) Hayes, C. J. H. and Moon, P. T. (auth.) A History of the Medieval World, 1969.

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The ancient Graeco-Roman culture took cities as its centers, and modern civilization can be considered an “urban civilization” to an even greater extent, with the culture of the medieval period being the exception to this pattern. But in the latter half of the medieval period (i.e., from the end of the eleventh century to the beginning of the twelfth century), industry, commerce and cities gradually revived, marking the transition to the modern age. This revival suggested and in fact became a reaction against the medieval feudal culture, which would continue until this culture was finally overturned. This development was a breath of fresh air. As historians have said, industrialists and businessmen were mostly escapees or freemen from the fief and the rise of cities functioned as either peaceful resistance or resistance by force against the feudal lords. These industrialists and businessmen as “freers” constituted a brand-new class in society. This means that while it may seem as if they were promoted to monkhood or knighthood (i.e., the so-called “bourgeoisie”), they needed to be empowered as a collective before they could be self-determining and launch counterattacks against the feudal system in order to accomplish their historical mission. These collectives – i.e., the two kinds of organizations mentioned above – facilitated each other’s efforts and at the same time they relied upon each other. In collective effects, guilds enjoyed more powerful internal influence and urban autonomous collectives put up external stronger resistance. These were typical examples of group-centered life, but urban autonomies were the source of a more advanced sort of group-centered life. At the beginning of the urban revival, there was no region that did not seek autonomy (generally speaking, the defense of a city was organized first and then a specially designed judicial administration was established). But different localities witnessed different developments later on. In their heyday, some big cities were just like independent states with their own sovereignty, their own navy and their own army. Internally, they established their own rule and externally, they proclaimed war and made peace. They were concerned not only with municipal administration but also with foreign affairs. It has been said that some of the tactics and techniques used in today’s international diplomacy are relics of that era. Eventually, closer to modern times, nations as we know them today were founded, one by one, with cities merging into one nation to ensure local autonomy. For example, three metropolitan cities in the Germanic territories, including Hamburg, did not become part of Germany until as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century. If we focus on the High Middle Ages, this period, which lasted for at least four hundred years, was a time when these countless city-states and feudal lords were competing with each other for decisive

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victories. Medieval Europe witnessed political tumult for over one thousand years, and for the latter half of the period this rivalry was a deciding factor. The national awareness and patriotic mood of modern Europeans were first fostered in these three metropolitan cities and then extended to the whole nation state. In particular, their political capacity (the capacity to administer a country) was fostered here. The preceding paragraph discusses how Christianity generated conflicts that served as the ruthless imposition of group-centered life, but nothing has yet been said about the organization of Christianity itself. However, this was exactly where Westerners learned about the nature of large-scale institutions. First, we must consider that within such a pervasive organization it becomes almost impossible for an individual to bear in mind that he is affiliated to a collective, and that this collective has direct control over the individual. Second, from within this collective, one can recognize that everyone is equal. This is vitally important and it is precisely this that the Chinese people lack. – Never have the Chinese people had an opportunity to gain such awareness. As to the self-contained system made up of internal church organizations, from large units to smaller ones, it is beyond the scope of this chapter. A paragraph from Chapter Sixteen of He Bingsong’s A History of Medieval Europe will suffice: Since the collapse of Western Roman Empire, nothing was more everlasting and more powerful in Western Europe than the Christian Church. … A medieval history without the Church would utterly lack substance.6

The medieval Church and the modern Church (whether Protestant or Catholic) differ radically from each other. The following four points summarize the most significant differences: First, in medieval times, everyone belonged to a church, just as everyone in the present day belongs to a country. No one should betray his church, or he could be put to death. Second, apart from owning huge tracts of land, the medieval Church was entitled to collect taxes from believers. The faithful were under obligations to pay tithes in the same manner as people in our time pay national taxes. Third, the medieval Church was in essence no different from a nation, in that it had its own laws, its own courtrooms, its own prisons and its own authority to sentence someone to life imprisonment.

6 HE Bingson, A History of Medieval Europe, 1924 (p. 25).

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Fourth, not only did the medieval Church perform the duties of the state, it also possessed a national organization. The Pope was not only the ultimate legislator but also the supreme justice, ruling over the churches across Western Europe and being busily engaged in countless government affairs. Both the cabinet members and the other papal officials constituted the Curia. And the correspondence between the churches in different localities took place in Latin, the lingua franca of the era.7 This paragraph is quoted to illustrate the great power of the Church in this period and how the people of the medieval West were subject to its discipline and control.

7

HE Bingson, A History of Medieval Europe, 1924 (pp. 127-129).



Chapter Four Chinese People’s Lack of Group-centered Life

4.1

Westerners’ Merits and Our Demerits

The distinction between the group and the individual constitutes the longrunning issue of Western culture. The whole of Western history can be viewed through the prism of this issue. Westerners, since they have been raised with and absorbed this issue, naturally possess many advantages that can be viewed in the light of these two perspectives. Those aligned with the perspective of the individual will be discussed later; those aligned with the perspective of the group can be roughly listed as follows: First, sense of the collective; Second, the habits of discipline; Third, the capacity for organization; Fourth, the spirit of the law. These four points can also be covered by the expression “collective morality”, which refers to the principles that are indispensable to group-centered life. Collective morality is the very thing that the Chinese people lack, though in the past this largely went unnoticed until our contact with Westerners. Forty-five years ago, Liang Qichao advocated “the new democratic theory”, which was considered to be fundamental to the transformation of Chinese society that would save China. As I mentioned earlier, “collective morality” was the first topic he tackled, in exhaustive detail. I will explain this further below. Let me start with the fourth point – the spirit of the law. Here a contrast will be made between Western law enforcement and the Chinese practice of favoritism. In a large collective, the only way to deal with the public effectively and to handle all kinds of administrative affairs as they arise is to make legal provisions and encourage strict compliance with those provisions by treating everyone equally, without discrimination. In this situation, little discussion is required, disputes can be avoided and public affairs can be handled quickly so that social order is enforced and public feelings can be calmed. Although it is inevitable that occasional cases may be neglected, disagreements are decisively resolved and disharmonies are worked through in a reasonable fashion. If it were otherwise, nothing could ever be accomplished. That is why the need arises for the rule of law. Between families or between members of the same clan, however, the

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situation is quite otherwise. In a family, particular factors related to age, seniority, gender and health are clearly understood by everyone, in which case one is never vexed when dealing with other people and can consider a problem on its own merits. Moreover, as family members are so close to each other, even their subtle complications are so well known to one another that they can never be disregarded. As they are intimately connected by flesh and blood and they need each other like brothers, there is no doubt that they display considerable delicacy and thoughtfulness in order to develop more perfect relationships and make everyone’s lives easier. Consequently, there is no need for the rule of law and furthermore, there is no law that could establish the rules in this scenario. Though what we are discussing here is not the same thing as the practice of favoritism, it could be possible that what people give most consideration to in this case is sentiment of a different kind. The practice of favoritism is deployed when only a comparatively large group of people needs to be dealt with. This results from the fact that on the one hand, as both the range and number of people grow and they cannot by any means be coped with on a casual basis, a gradual need arises for some sort of law, and on the other hand, as a natural difference exists between close and distant relationships, it is difficult to obey a law that requires you to entirely give up your claim to favor. In their everyday lives, the Chinese people used to invariably place heavy emphasis on the relationship between families and between members of the same clan, until relatively recently, when they began to merge into large super-family groups. They still favor a practice that can be summed up as “the love of a family member or relative should be extended to the love of other family members or relatives and the love of one friend should be extended to the love of other friends”. Thus, they would always prefer to ask someone to intercede on their behalf. If you say that “official business should be done according to off icial principles”, you will be accused of “talking bureaucratese”. If there is no established rule of law, everyone adopts a laissez-faire attitude, the social order is liable to be disturbed and the feelings of the populace will not be assuaged. Undoubtedly, then, it is keenly felt when such a major defect of the Chinese national character is severely denounced by public opinion. Next comes the capacity for organization. This refers to one’s ability to become one of the members of a group. The essential factor here lies in an inexorable unifying drive and the spirit of patient advancement through negotiation. It has been said that “a Chinese is either self-abnegating or selfimportant. He feels it is fine to be a humbly obedient citizen as a temporary

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measure, instead of wanting the right to speech, the supervision rights or even freedom. Either he just wants to become emperor, or he would not want to be emperor at all even if he were given the chance.”1 Instances to back this up can indeed be seen everywhere. A case in point is that in recent decades, ever since the rise of the organization “Limited Liability Co., Ltd”, very often, only a handful of people control the affairs of the corporation while most shareholders, who are indifferent to the business dealings, are dominated at the mercy of these people. So long as they can receive dividends, they feel greatly satisfied. And if they suffer loss of capital, they merely accept their bad luck, without any complaints. Unless they intend to make a deliberate disturbance, rarely do they make any efforts to seek inside information or to inquire into the accounts. Let’s look at another example. Ever since 1918 or 1919, an enthusiast from the students’ unions in all localities has been so much absorbed in his pursuits as to neglect sleep and meals, and he could be considered as having sacrificed everything for success. But everything must be done his way. If his project founders for lack of enthusiasm, he becomes disheartened and loses interest in it. When he gets in a rage, he feels justified in stirring up so much trouble that his whole group gets disbanded. When a situation arises in which no one will yield to each other, he also feels it is quite alright for him to leave aside the group events. Let’s take one more example. Matters arising in a township or a locality are usually dealt with according to the orders of the local magistrates, without any complaints. They can also be accomplished when one or two magistrates take the responsibility for a decision. However, once the local magistrates gather together for the public good to settle an issue through public discussion, violent disagreements will arise and no consensus can be reached, so that, contrary to what one might suppose, nothing can be done at all. If orders were given at this moment, no one would take them. In short, a Chinese prefers either to fall under the control of others by being a humbly obedient citizen or to gain control over others by taking the responsibility for a decision himself. Independent of each other, the Chinese people are by no means apt to seek cooperation through negotiation. Similar examples abound. The mockery of the Chinese people in public opinion as being as disunited as “a tray of loose sand” or as uncooperative and unenthusiastic “as groups with more than three Chinese people who work together for more than five minutes” may possibly refer to this.

1 See FU Daling’s paper “Real Chinese and Their Disease Sources”, in Kwo Wen Weekly No. 17, Vol. 9.

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Actually, this is not surprising. The Chinese people all used to be obedient citizens, and at the same time they were all also emperors. When he is at home, being insulated from the outside world, a Chinese man is emperor to both his wife and children. When he is outside his home, obedience and peacefulness are second nature, along with his ready-to-suffer-losses philosophy (to be discussed later) which is his particular strength, and he becomes an easygoing and obedient citizen. Seldom in his life has he been prepared to enter into negotiations that are neither humble nor arrogant, or to seek co-operations that are neither familiar nor distant by participating in a group (which is especially the case in the lives of scholars and farmers). The late Hu Shiqing travelled all over the world in the first few years of the Republic of China. He made a point of visiting places in North America, South America and the South Pacific where overseas Chinese live. He used to tell stories about those overseas Chinese which concluded with the belief that the capabilities of an overseas Chinese can never be exceeded by any other overseas national (an overseas Japanese, for example) or by any local resident. He can perform beautifully in whatever he does. He can distinguish himself even as a robber or a beggar. But one point worth noting is that all these are the capabilities of only one individual, rather than arising out of successful organizations through collective wisdom and joint efforts. Due to their inferior organization and lack of state protection, the Chinese people are ultimately outdone by Japanese nationals and humiliated by the local people. This serves as an excellent example of a wider phenomenon. In such a competitive world, this is indeed the biggest reason that the Chinese people often lose out. The lack of organizational capacity brings with it a lack of political capacity, as in some ways a nation can be considered as nothing but a large group. Forty or fifty years ago, Liang Qichao tried hard to argue against the Chinese people’s obsession with the autocratic system of government on account of this consequent lack of political capacity. His counterargument was that if the Chinese people were obsessed with the autocratic system of government, how then could they overlook the failures of this system to avert the change of a dynasty, to support industry, commerce and education, and to reach colonized areas overseas (especially the failure to export this system to San Francisco one hundred years ago, where nothing had been achieved)?2 In 2 See LIANG Qichao. On the New People, 1936. It was during the period from 1851 to 1874 that ethnic Chinese migrated to San Francisco by boat, only a few decades after the founding of the United States of America.

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his Travelogues of the New Continent, Liang briefly reasoned that there are in the West “ethnic Chinese” but not “Chinese citizens”, and there existed only ethnic autonomy or home village autonomy, but no urban autonomy like that in the West. Urban autonomy encourages political capacity in the West while ethnic or home village autonomy conceals political capacity in China. Though the two different evolutionary paths that produced Chinese society and Western society had not yet been explored in depth or detail, his arguments were quite to the point. A further point is the habit of discipline. This is the type of discipline that need not be declared on occasions when many people gather together, and which the populace has observed so long that it is second nature. As regards prohibitions, for instance, there is no talking or coughing at meetings, no noise when walking or crowding at entrances or exits; in general, one avoids hindering others in every act. As regards positive instructions, for instance, when people sit, there are rows; when people queue, there are columns; when one speaks, there is propriety; and when one acts, there is cooperation and coordination. It would be difficult to enumerate every such instance of this sort of discipline. Whether a practice is prohibited or encouraged, one sentence well sums up the key point: to make things smooth and effective without causing disturbance or consuming time, collective actions are required. Look at the ticket windows at the bus or railway stations or at the theatres, and you will see that Westerners naturally follow in an orderly way, one after another, while the Chinese either jump the queue or scurry everywhere, and it is diff icult to keep order even when there are policemen around. A lack of order actually results in slow or even no progress in the things that one needs to do. Only by preserving good order can we accomplish our goals most effectively. Westerners have acquired a deeper understanding of this from experience – or research – while the Chinese people are not aware of this due to the lack of adequate information. If we think again of meetings, the Chinese people tend to approach the occasion as they would in their own home, watching, listening and moving quite casually with no awareness of group requirements and no awareness of their interference in public affairs – this is commonly observed. These habits do not have much to do with whether people have received an education or not. It is wrong to think that differing attitudes to discipline result from the popularization of education in the West and from the existence of such a huge untaught population in China. It should be noted that this behavior is most probably not something that is consciously learned but rather something that arises out of habit. Habit, as the product of interaction

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between one’s body and his environment, is fostered in everyday life. A person who lives in a society (e.g., the Chinese society) that relies heavily on family life is likely to make these same mistakes even if he has received a university education. Westerners’ habit of discipline arises not from their own culture but rather from their militaristic customs – that is, from team exercises. This is just like the practice in present-day schools, where both team-building and physical education are still emphasized, and where students being taught physical education are trained to perform collective actions through athletic contests of various kinds. These stem from the same practice. There is no doubt that one’s character is developed without his awareness, but meanwhile, it should also be acknowledged that a sense of the collective is, after all, the foundation underlying all public virtues. Sense of the collective can refer to various situations, such as citizens’ sense of their country, local people’s sense of their neighborhood, religious people’s sense of their religion, party members’ sense of their party and commune members’ sense of their commune. The Chinese people, who are indifferent to things beyond themselves and their families, seldom have such a sense. What has especially astonished many foreigners is their weak national sentiment. For example, in 1932, when the January 28 Incident raged in Shanghai, a Morning Paper journalist from Paris somewhere not far from Shanghai saw that people there acted as if nothing had happened. The journalist was greatly puzzled at this because it was simply incomprehensible to him. Later on, Ma Junwu wrote an article with a counterexample illustrating how on March 16, 1934, after the news broke that Germany had restored conscription, a sixty-year-old landlady from Berlin dropped dead of shock. Actually, this difference is by no means innate in people, nor is it something that is learned or acquired in one’s life. Rather, the difference in social structures and in living arrangements brings about the difference in people’s sentiment and habits.

4.2

Chinese People’s Lack of Group-centered Life

From what Westerners have struggled with long and grimly, but the Chinese people do not have, and from what Westerners are good at but the Chinese people are not good at, it can be well proved that the Chinese people lack group-centered life. It is still worth looking at this from the perspective of religion, economy and politics.

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First, however, we must define what we mean by group-centered life. Varied as it is (as we have previously stated), the so-called group-centered life can be unanimously regarded as possessing the following elements: (1) There must be an organizing principle which goes beyond a certain relationship. Such an organizing principle is characterized by keeping to certain boundaries and limits and by having a control center, which in turn requires a central institution or committee. (2) Its own boundaries go beyond the family by not relying on the family clan as its starting point. It mostly relies on an area, a profession, a religious belief or a form of membership. (3) Within the boundaries of the group, everyone is subject to certain constraints but they always have a large stake in the organization. Only when these three conditions are met can a way of living be considered a collective one. By this yardstick, the Chinese people may be considered a group of people who lack a collective way of life. The reasons are as follows. First, perhaps 90 percent or more of the Chinese people do not practice a particular religion. When a Chinese youth in India was asked about his religion and he answered that he had no religious belief, the Indians were greatly puzzled and astonished by this. His answer would also have been incomprehensible to people in medieval Europe. However, isn’t this generally the situation among young people in China? On the other hand, I would not say that this total lack of belief was the case for 90 percent of the Chinese people. Among the great majority of the Chinese people, in fact, just the opposite is true. They worship idols of all different types – sages, saints, immortals and Buddha – with no differentiation at all. Unlike the Japanese, who make a point of visiting one temple but not the other, and who worship one deity but not the other, the Chinese people simply make no distinction between these two. Therefore, what concept of organization do they have in this regard? Second, concerning the state as an organization, this problem also looms large among the Chinese people, as we pointed out in the eleventh feature of the Chinese culture in Chapter One. As a consequence, the Chinese people show a distinct lack of group-centered life. This will be specifically addressed in later chapters. Given that the control exercised by the state over its administration is somewhat indolent, local governments and professional communes may be strong in influence. Indeed, the maintenance of China’s social order and social life relies more on society itself than on the state. There have been quite a number of cases in which local and professional autonomy

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has been in operation. Regrettably, most of these cannot be easily tracked down from the extant historical records and thus it is quite difficult to draw a broader conclusion. Concerning local autonomy, there are two points that merit attention. First, China has autonomous townships but no urban autonomy, which is the exact opposite of the West, in which local autonomy started from urban areas. Second, the concept of “the local government” lacks a clear definition with any solid substance, and the term “local government” is sometimes confused with the term “official government”. The first point was made long ago by Liang Qichao in his book Travels in the New World: Our society is organized with families rather than individuals as its basic units. Hence comes the idea of regulating families before administering a state. There is no doubt that autonomy developed very early in the West, but local autonomy in China has the same great potency as it does in the West. Thus, how can it be that Western countries organize their states according to their brand of autonomy but we cannot do the same without our local autonomy? Can we conclude that their development is based on their urban autonomy while ours is based on the autonomy of the family system? Try visiting some villages in China, and you will surely find it is easy to discern their degree of autonomy. These villages have no more than two or three thousand permanent residents but their legislative and administrative bodies are kept in good order. Institutions like these can well serve as the foundation for a state. If you visit metropolises, you will find they are in incredible disorder. Observations like these can well serve as proof that the Chinese people can only be members of an ethnic group, not urban citizens. This conviction has been deepened by my observation of the overseas Chinese on my visit to the Americas. By breaking away from their homeland and living as individuals in the most liberal metropolises, they bring with them and establish nothing but the family system on which their maintenance of social order must rely.

In the section on Social Organization in his book A History of Chinese Culture, written in his old age, Liang Qichao talked about township governance and metropolises (in Chapters Seven and Eight). After years of research, his findings could be summed up in one single sentence: “China has autonomous townships but no urban autonomy.” In Chapter Seven, he outlined in detail the autonomous organization of his hometown – Chakeng

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Town, Xinhui County, Guangdong Province3 – and drew the following conclusion: This autonomy in townships, which seldom deals with judicial cases apart from collecting money and/or grains as taxes, is almost wholly unrelated to the local government. It seems to me that such a degree of autonomy is still pervasive in China. Although general acceptance of township autonomy varies from township to township, there is, on the whole, not much difference between them. This is probably a residual legacy from the patriarchal system, where a simple and reasonable organization was established through a spirit of mutual assistance that came very naturally. This perhaps has everything to do with the survival and the development of the whole of the Chinese society.

I would say there is no doubt that this has everything to do with the survival and the development of the whole Chinese society. To be even more direct, this is the core principle that enabled the Chinese society to grow so large and so enduring over its thousands of years of survival and development. Only by understanding this can we acquaint ourselves with the Chinese culture. But there is a difference between this and the group-centered life of the West, which will be discussed in later chapters. Let’s now come to the second point – that the concept of “local government” lacks a clear definition with solid substance while “local government” can be confused with “official government”. This refers to the situation in which sometimes governance falls to local authorities but at other times to official governments. This continually alters with the passage of time and changes in dynasties. What’s more, the organization, the power and the division of government are also in constant flux. Take, for example, the situation that has existed since the founding of the Republic of China. The grass-roots organizations below county level have at some points been merged into bigger units or at other times have been divided into smaller units. These systems are subject to such chaos and constant changes that they have become virtually impossible to predict. Even the very names of these places have witnessed countless changes. Although this phenomenon occurred in China in the past, the evidence available on the situation in ancient times can be well utilized to examine China’s flimsy foundation. This is not the case in the West, however. In 1789, when the French Revolution 3 LIANG Qichao, A History of Chinese Culture, 1922. Also see Vol. 18 of LIANG Qichao, Collected Works at the Ice-drinking Room, 1936.

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began, feudal privileges, serfdom and the guild system were all abolished. The Church’s lands were confiscated, and priests were now chosen by civil election. Reforms of all kinds were almost all-encompassing. Special efforts were made to sort out the system for designating local administrative areas, with the preservation of the existing 44,000 urban and rural autonomous regions that had been sites of local governments since the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 4 By 1921, over one hundred years later, as society and communication between regions progressed, there was a natural decrease in the number of units. France nevertheless still preserved 37,963 urban and rural autonomous regions. The UK, however, continued to preserve the size of its local administrative divisions, with the only exception being the abolition of the administrative division known as a “hundred”.5 From this, we can see the solid foundation upon which local governments in the West are established. In essence, in the West each of these units is indeed a group, while in China, although there is an intimate relationship between fellow villagers or townsmen, the collective bond between them is nonetheless very weak and only faintly discernible. – What has been discussed above is concerned with local communities. Now we come to the discussion of occupational groups. First, farmers in China did not have today anything like the so-called “Farmers Associations” as were first established in 1923 but only such organizations as the “Young Crops Societies”, which began to be established during the period between 1368 and 1398 to monitor the ripening crops. With no special gatherings for occupational purposes, they naturally included their neighbors among the villagers or townsmen as members of their organizations and joined a group on the basis that it was their local group. These groups, as stated above, were usually established on the basis of family relationships. People such as farmers and worker merchants, who were scattered throughout the country, naturally were affiliated to these groups. Second, the first occupational groups were formed by only a small number of worker merchants, who were living in urban areas or had made their way in comparatively large numbers to one place. Because of this, there were still no labor unions or chambers of commerce of the sort we would recognize today. Organizations such as farmers’ associations, labor unions and chambers of commerce are products of more recent decrees rather than traditions inherited from the past. As a result, it is not a straightforward task today to scrutinize in detail 4 See FUNG Xiong (trans.) Lynn Thorndike (auth.) A Short History of Civilization, 1930 (p. 568). 5 See WANG Jian (trans.) G.M. Harris (auth.) 1922. A Survey of Local Autonomy throughout the World, 1922 (p. 225).

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the autonomous occupational organizations for merchants in the past. The variety of terms such as “hongs”, “gangs”, “public affairs offices” and “guild halls” can well reveal the following disadvantages: First, there were, generally speaking, no national organizations such as today’s “All-China Federation of Chambers of Commerce”, which suggests an extremely limited recognition of the same trade in the society. Second, the establishment of some of these trade organizations was based on local ties between relations or family clan relations, which shows that these trade organizations were rather casual. This indicates that neighborliness and religious consciousness prevailed over trade instincts. Third, from the Chinese proverb “Two of a trade can never agree”, it can well be seen that jealousy and competition arose between people plying the same trade, and these people simply lacked the unwavering team spirit of the medieval guilds in the West. Among the four main occupations, i.e., scholars, farmers, workers and traders, being a scholar was originally regarded as practicing a trade. At most, they kept little contact with each other and thus could not be said to have comprised a group. For, on the one hand, they were people of remarkable character but on the other hand, they lacked a common interest. As was said earlier, the undisciplined character of the Chinese people derived firstly from scholars, and secondly from farmers. Scholars and farmers constitute the most essential components of Chinese society. If they are undisciplined, the whole of China will likewise be undisciplined. In Liu Yizheng’s article “On Communities”, published in the journal Xueheng (Volume 54), great efforts were made to study how the Chinese folks had historically organized themselves into groups and assemblies. There are faint traces from the historic records that show that such groups did indeed exist. Their scarcity, however, is profound. People’s assemblies and associations as we know today were very scarce before the 1911 Revolution, which took place more than thirty years ago.6 These assemblies and associations were simply unheard of fifty to sixty years ago. Even large schools, big factories and huge corporations, which had previously been sparsely located old-style private schools, or scattered petty farmers or workers or tradesmen respectively, were imported from other countries. It was even more strictly forbidden to organize political activities. Historically, some links were maintained between different parties in the Tang and the Song Dynasties, but without partisan organizations like what we have today.

6 Translator’s Note: Here “thirty years ago” refers to the time before LIANG Shuming was writing this book. The same is true of “fifty to sixty years ago” in the next sentence.

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Incompatibility between Group-centered Life and Family Life

It cannot be said that there is no group-centered life in China at all, but only that there is a lack of it. The difference between China and the West in this regard is only a matter of degree; it can never be absolute. As stated earlier, the evolution of human society is in reality the continuation of biological evolution. In the biological world, no living things are absolutely different from one another. Even the difference between plants and animals is a matter of degree, to say nothing of other living things. Perhaps all living things exhibit only a tendency or a type of behavior, which incorporates some preferences but never an absolute “yes” or “no”. This is because a clear-cut line of division can never be drawn between different species. Such being the case, different tendencies, as they develop, may foster variations that create serious problems. Westerners show a preference for group-centered life while the Chinese people display a preference for family life. It is precisely because they proceeded in opposite directions that they have cultivated two contrasting cultures. Group-centered life and family life are quite incompatible with each other. Christianity opens the way only for the former and at the same time suppresses the latter. The late Zhang Yinlin pointed this out very clearly in one of his papers: Under the influence of Christianity, people’s duties to their religion far exceed their duties to their families. The cohesion of the Church was created at the cost of the cohesion of families. The ethics that is revealed in two readings from New Testament runs counter to China’s traditional ethics, which means that the principal Chinese versions have had to be adapted to a considerable extent. The first records Jesus’s words, “Anyone who wants to become one of My followers must love Me far more than he does his own father, mother, wife, children, brothers, or sisters – yes, more than his own life – otherwise he cannot be My disciple. And no one can be My disciple who does not carry his own cross and follow Me. But do not begin until you count the cost.” (Luke 14: 26) The other verse contains the following words by Jesus: “I have not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to turn a man against his father, a daughter against her mother, a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law – a man’s enemies will be the members of his own household.” (Matthew 10:34-36) Since Christianity was cultivated in the West for one thousand and several hundred years, people’s zeal for showing loyalty to larger

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groups, beyond families, at the cost of smaller groups like their own families, constitute the moral air that ordinary people breathe daily. Later on (in modern times), though Christian institutions have been replaced by other larger groups beyond families (i.e., nation states), this moral air has remained constant.7

Christianity paved the way for Westerners’ collective way of living. Meanwhile, what paved the way for Chinese people’s family life, needless to say, were the moral teachings of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius. Strictly speaking, both family life and group-centered life were essential to the earliest people and neither mode of living was new to them. We might compare this to instinctive behavior and taught behavior that were intrinsic to the animal world; it was not until the emergence of arthropods and vertebrates that instinct and Reason began to diverge into different paths. This is where China and the West diverge from each other in terms of their social structures. Consequently, it should be clear that the path taken by the West is geared toward Christianity, and that the path taken by China is geared toward the doctrines of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius; religion constitutes the divide between Chinese culture and Western culture. When Christianity was introduced into China, these two opposing tendencies reached a deadlock but Chinese culture never yielded to Christianity. On the contrary, Christianity had to effect a compromise with Chinese culture. As well as making revisions from the source text in the Chinese translation of the New Testament, the Christian churchmen also acknowledged all Chinese rituals and customs of ancestor worship and Confucianism. Though this compromise was at one point suspended because of disputes and conflicts (e.g., in 1742, the Pope flatly refused to sanction the practice of Chinese courtesies), it was eventually reinstated in 1939.8 This definitely shows that Chinese culture is deeply rooted and does not easily yield to other cultures, but its acknowledgement by Christian leaders is explained by the way Chinese culture accords with both human feelings and human sentiment. This is because ancestor worship at most suggests people’s sincere desire to 7 See ZHANG Yinlin’s paper, “On Cultural Differences between China and the West”, published in Thought and Times, Volume 11. 8 In the sixteenth century, when the Jesuit Matteo Ricci came as a missionary to China, he acknowledged Chinese rituals, which he thought were not incompatible with Christianity. Later on, disputes arose within the Church, causing conflicts between the Pope and the Chinese emperors and ultimately leading to their schism. For a time, Roman Catholicism almost died out in China. Later, as China did not inflame these tensions, they subsided. In 1939, the Pope finally acknowledged the Chinese rituals.

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do their filial duty and Confucianism at most suggests people’s reverence for Confucius as a person of exemplary virtues. Nothing about this can be deemed unconvincing. Before the rise of Protestantism, Christianity itself had already undergone some changes, and after this the Church was radically different from what it had been. Thus, the cooperation between Chinese culture and Christianity was much improved. In a similar way, Buddhist principles were incompatible with China’s family ethics. But when Buddhist religion was introduced into China, it likewise underwent changes. This point about the submission of both Christianity and Buddhism to Chinese culture has been quoted previously from Inaba Kunzan (1876-1940) and Master Taixu (1890-1947), the leading authorities on Buddhism. One of Master Taixu’s articles sums up this situation like the following: “Such family layers, with one layer easily disbanding the public group and the other layer hampering individuals’ specific actions, can ensure that a nation enjoys a long period of peace and stability if there is no foreign invasion from enemy states.” He has well observed the gain and loss of this and the incompatibility between groups and families. Readers: if you cross-reference this with Shang Yang’s Constitutional Reform in the State of Qin, as quoted in the preceding chapter, and with Lei Haizong’s conviction that only the Seven Powers in the Warring States Period could be considered states in the real sense and that China has no longer been a nation ever since the revival of family life in the Western Han Dynasty, you will understand this better. What Shang Yang did was achieved simply by adopting the stance of a nation. But to gain direct control over every individual, he had to destroy family ethics, a policy that was denounced by Confucianism. In the Warring States Period, it was amid acute inter-state tension that the Seven Powers exercised tight control over its people domestically, before they began to devolve into other states. To historians, for over two thousand years ever since the revival of family life in the Han Dynasty, China can only be said to be a huge society or a huge cultural area. Issues related to states or nations will be discussed in detail in later chapters. Here, the difficulty in the coexistence of group-centered life and family life is cited as a proof that China lacks ways of group living. From the emphasis on family life, neither a state nor a nation can be built, nor can an autonomous government be formed in an extremely large area. Liang Qichao’s view, as quoted previously, that China has only members of an ethnic group but no urban citizens, and that China has autonomy only in ethnic enclaves or home villages but no urban autonomy, reveals that he found out this problem by chance. All these points will also be mentioned in the same breath in later chapters.

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One late friend of mine, Lu Kangji, a man of unparalleled intelligence, said to me over ten years ago, “Karl Marx wrote the book Das Kapital on the basis of which Western society was unraveled. Now I am going to write On Family to illustrate the social history of China.” At one point, he travelled to Japan, where he did some research into this and within several years, collected a huge pile of manuscripts for his book. Regrettably, he died before the completion of his book, the manuscripts of which I have never seen. This job must be taken on by someone in our academic circle. This is the task to which I most aspire.



Chapter Five China as an Ethics-Oriented Society

5.1

Definition of Ethics-Orientedness

Chinese people’s lack of group-centered life results in their reliance on families and clans. Apart from this, little else apart from what has been said above by Fung Yu-lan and Lu Zuofu needs to be added. The lack of group-centered life and the reliance on family life are two sides of the same coin, which has been made crystal clear by the illustrations of the differences between China and the West. Every human being, either as a husband or as a wife, or as a father or as a son, has a family. But how can we claim families are important to the Chinese people in particular? Surely, families do not belong exclusively to the Chinese people. But their lack of group-centered life and the tenuous relationship between the group and the individual naturally combine to underscore family relationships. Moreover, they are obliged to give priority to family relationships and keep family members closely interrelated. It is not that Westerners do not have families, but that they set too much store by group-centered life at the expense of family relationships. If one aspect becomes lax, the other aspect will be consolidated. If one aspect is highlighted, the other aspect will be subsumed. Thus these two aspects are two sides of the same coin. In a group in which relations are strained, the group directly controls and interferes with individuals. When individuals gain self-awareness, they f ight for their freedom and for their status in the group. The group and the individual are interdependent, just like the left and the right. Only when there is a left can there be a right, and vice versa. In the West, since group-centered life is highlighted, individual’s personality derives from this contrast. In China, however, as there is a lack of group-centered life, there is nowhere for individuality to be displayed. In the West, then, the two entities are simply the group and the individual, with the family being regarded as something insubstantial. The Chinese people, on the other hand, put the family relationship front and center by dissolving the two extremes (to which they do not seem to relate) – that is, the individual and the group respectively, by organizing the society according to ethical relations.

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Diagram 1  Social Life between China and the West

(1) The font size indicates the relative importance of the placement; (2) The two-way arrows indicate direct mutual relationships; (3) The dotted line indicates relationships that are ambiguous.

I once made two diagrams1 to show the difference between China and the West in terms of social life. One of the diagrams is as follows: This difference actually reflects the different paths taken by Chinese culture and Western culture respectively. Theorists find that due to the boom in modern industry, family life, which was already becoming less nuclear, was no longer as solid as it had been; that in this modern mindset personal independence and freedom were eagerly sought after; and that the causal link between industry and family life helped develop the modern states in the West. Based on this finding, they envisaged that when individual identity was subsumed in family groups, the heavy emphasis on family life in China would doubtless be symptomatic of its lack of culture, which was similar to the situation in medieval times in the West. Consequently, they assumed that this was the difference between the early and the later stages in the evolution of society. Their understanding of the present situation was not derived from a detailed comparison of the historical backgrounds of both China and the West, but merely making inferences about China through a hasty observation of the situation in the West. How could they hope to be correct? So, has Chinese society invariably been family-centric? This is not, in fact, the case. We would say, however, that the modern society in the West may be counted as a culture of individualism, with the UK and the US as its two most remarkable examples. The society-oriented country closest to the West is the Soviet Union, a most remarkable example. By contrast, we 1

See LIANG Shuming, Rural Reconstruction Theory, 1937 (p. 54).

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would say that China is an “ethics-oriented society”. Thus it is inaccurate to say that China is “family-based” and there is no evidence to support this. Only patriarchal societies can be deemed “family-based”. About this, one can refer to Jenks’s A History of Politics. China, however, was born out of a patriarchal society, a point that Zhang Taiyan tried to clarify in his book A Discussion on A History of Politics.2 It should be noted that, in terms of the mutual relations between the society and the individual, when emphasis is placed on the individual, “individual-oriented” is referred to. In this same relationship, when emphasis is put on society, “society-oriented” is referred to. Both these two definitions, which are formulated through contrast, describe a relationship between the society and the individual. In the case of China, the term “ethics-oriented” seems to best describe the situation, and this idea can reveal the nature of relationships in Chinese society and serve as the solution to the question above. The term “family-based” sounds both narrow and biased. From the moment someone is born, he is connected with other people around him (parents, siblings and so on). Throughout his life, he invariably thrives by developing relationships with others. It can thus be said that he actually lives on his relationships of various kinds. These relationships constitute various sorts of ethics. Ethics, or the maintenance of human relations, simply refers to the contact between people in a society. It is from this contact that their relationships emerge. Taking the relationships between family members and especially the parent-child relationship as their most natural and basic relationships, in matters of ethics, people first attach the utmost importance to their families. Their first relationships are always with their parents and only after that their relationships extend to their brothers and sisters. Only when they grow up do they get married and have children. It is also from this dynamic that religious families arise. When they make their way into a wider society, they might foster a teacher-student relationship in teaching, a stakeholder-partner relationship in economic affairs, and a monarch-subject or official-civilian relationship in politics, and they normally have a great deal of contact with and support from their friends and neighbors when anything unusual crops up. As they grow older and begin to build their own lives, they gradually develop all kinds of distant or close relationships with people from far and near. These relationships 2 YAN Fu, following the argument in A History of Politics, took the elimination of Manchu as the result of patriarchal thought. ZHANG Taiyan, however, identified many cases during the Spring and Autumn Period in which xenophobic practices did not develop, showing that China has long been incompatible with patriarchal society. See Chapter Eight of this book.

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can be all counted as part of an ethics that starts in the immediate family but extends far beyond individual families. Our affection toward one another and our care for one another have developed in the image of the natural bonds and ethical relationships such as those between family members or those with one’s own flesh and blood, so that we naturally entertain friendly sentiments toward those that we get along with as our contact becomes closer and more constant. Out of these sentiments comes righteous behavior. A father is being righteous when he shows loving care. A son is being righteous when he practices filial piety toward his parents. An elder brother is being righteous when he is friendly. A younger brother is being righteous when he is respectful. Between couples, between friends and even between people that we get along with, it is natural that mutual obligations be scrupulously observed. Ethical relationships are in fact friendly relationships, which stipulate that people are under binding mutual obligations between themselves and others. The English term “ethics” has a two-character Chinese equivalent “倫理”, consisting of “倫” (ethical relationship) and “理”(reason or logic). The reason or logic (理) of “ethics” ( 倫理) in Chinese is probably manifested most clearly in this friendship and this righteousness. To express further cordiality and to enhance their mutual friendship and righteous behavior, people often call a teacher “master”, and think of him as having “disciples and followers”; they often call an official “a parent official”, who has “offspring citizens”; people also call each other “Uncle” or “Brother” among neighbors and friends. In this way, all kinds of relationships throughout society are made totally family-based, ensuring that the affection and obligation to behave with honor toward each other are deepened. Every person living in such a society is thereby each made responsible for fulf illing their respective obligations regarding ethical relationships around them. By the same token, everyone who has ethical relationships with that person, far and near, is likewise responsible for fulfilling obligations toward them. Consequently, the whole society, with everyone being interlinked with one another in one way or another, gradually becomes an organization. – When I stated above that “the Chinese people develop their family relationships and organize society by means of ethics”, I was referring exactly to this. Such a custom is incompatible with a group organization. It has no boundaries and does not stage any confrontations. On the contrary, it ensures the management of the world either from close to distant or, in a more intense fashion, from distant to close. How there could be any boundaries between one person and another is barely remembered. From ancient times, legend had it that in Chinese culture, “the world under heaven is of one family” and “all men are brothers within the ‘four corners

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of the earth’.” A question thus arises: In what sort of place can a patriarchal society be so farsighted and so broad-minded？As we know, a patriarchal society tends to be extremely exclusionary. For example, how can it be that family-centeredness and the patriarchal system in Chinese culture are the sole elements to which we attribute such a huge expansion of the Chinese nation in spatial terms and such a prolonged existence in chronological terms? It should be noted that the role of family and patriarchy is only loosely defined, which readily suggests that, rather than these elements alone, something that extends far beyond them must exist. Where, then, does the power lie in this sort of social system? Please read on.

5.2

Ethics in Economic Life

Generally speaking, the nature of a social organization is primarily observed in the economy. The modern Western society is an individual-oriented society, as property within it is privately owned. People may be as kind to each other, like father and son, but their properties are clearly divided. They may be as close to each other as husband and wife, but still, their properties are clearly divided. Occasionally, they may borrow money from each other, but they will have it on loan from each other. Right from the very beginning, a son does not have the responsibility of supporting and waiting upon his parents, for this idea does not prevail in this society and neither is it present in the law.3 Parents who reside in their children’s homes in their old age should pay their rent and pay for their food. It is not a common practice that their son will provide everything free of charge or at a discount. Just as everyone has his own physical freedom, “the right to own property” is also guaranteed by state law and social attitudes. Conversely, in a society-oriented culture like that of the Soviet Union, the land and the means of production all belong to the whole society. An ethics-oriented society, however, has nothing in common with either of these cases. In an ethics-oriented society, husband and wife, like parent and child, are effectively considered in endearments as a single personage, with no division of their property. When their parents are still alive, there is no division of property between siblings. As long as the grandparents are alive, there is no division of property between the three generations. A division 3 But it is stipulated in the civil laws in most countries that children are obliged to care for their parents if they cannot sustain themselves due to being unable to make a living.

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of property would be considered to go against good reason or conscience (it was strictly prohibited in ancient times). – This is called the commitment to the share of property. As far as ethical considerations are concerned, there is naturally a hierarchy of those closest to and those who are distant from the family and that living further from the family home marks this hierarchy. Consequently, the property cannot be shared forever. Thus, between brothers or near relations of the same clan, there is the commitment to the division of property. The division of property occurs first when they begin to live apart, and after that the richer family members may once again divide the property among the poor. Between relatives, friends and neighbors, there is a mutual exchange of assistance. In principle, such assistance is to be repaid. There may be a natural difference in the distinctions of rank or social status. However, as it is offered to others in times of emergency, it is extremely common that such help requires no repayment. Likewise, should some opportune occasion arise, giving others money is also an obligation. This is perhaps, ethically speaking, a relationship of the broadest kind. In short, economically speaking, everyone should have compassion toward one another and take responsibilities for one another. Otherwise, they will be considered mean people. In addition, much of the land dedicated to offering sacrifices to gods or ancestors, much of the land for feeding the poorer clansmen, some free private schools, and so on, are shared by members of the whole clan. In the same way, many public granaries for storing grain for lean years in ancient times and public land historically reserved for the use of school campus are common property shared by fellow villagers or townsmen. These are mostly used to provide relief to orphans, widows and the poor, and to subsidize education. This is an arrangement that originated from the concept of ethical responsibility, but it is quite similar to group living. In a way, the code of ethics that governs economic life is somewhat like a shared property. However, the shared property is not collectively managed. How much is shared depends on how close or distant the ethical relationship between the members involved is. The closer the ethical relationship, the more the property is shared. Meanwhile, it also depends on how large the property is. The larger the property, the more people will come to share it. If one person is unable to bear the burden, he can be forgiven by others. If a person is able to bear heavier burdens, he is required to fulfill greater obligations. As the Chinese proverb goes, “a huge snake must have a huge hole”. Another proverb is, “one cannot be considered rich when he has relatives from three poor families. One cannot be considered poor when he has relatives from three rich families.” However, property is not a personal

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possession, nor a social possession, or even possessed by a family. It is shared among whoever is encompassed in a particular ethical relationship. Hence we have the ethics-oriented society. Who says this method of dividing property is not just as good as any other? The laws in China were codified long, long ago, and this was done so effectively that they were both accurate and detailed. As far back as the Tang Dynasty (618-907), for example, the legal regulations have much in common with the law codes of modern countries. But issues concerning real rights and creditor’s rights that are stipulated in detail in the modern law codes of other countries have been ignored in the laws in China for thousands of years. This may be precisely because the social organization, from the perspective of ethical friendship, highlights human relationships, thus diminishing the importance of property. This is the first point. In an ethical system, human relationships prevail and morality and justice naturally follow. The laws in China are all codif ied on the basis of the concept of duty, rather than of the concept of rights. This is the second point. Clarity on this point enables one to understand that naturally, both real rights and creditor’s rights are implied. This characteristic is sufficient to prove the above statement that property is shared according to ethical relationships. Let’s look at this further by contrasting China with the West. In countries like the UK and the US, very often, millions of unemployed workers survive by drawing unemployment benefit from the State all year round – something that is unheard of in China. Besides this, whatever problems arise, they will ask the government to resolve them, since the West historically adopted a system of group responsibility. In China, however, whenever one encounters any problems, he seeks help from among his own circle in order to find his way out of trouble. As he lives in an ethically organized society, someone is naturally responsible for him. So those who need relief can always be helped out discreetly. The current 4 Anti-Japanese War has received eight years’ worth of economic support. Apart from those who live self-sufficiently in rural areas and who have more options, a large number of intellectuals and some of those from the upper middle classes, who have over time survived both migration and leaving their homes, have actually relied heavily on this ethical organization. People at home and abroad have noticed and discussed this.

4 Translator’s note: Here, “current” is a reference to the time when LIANG Shuming was writing the book.

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As a result of the ethicization of the social economy, people tend not to take the so-called “production-oriented” capitalist road. This will be discussed in Chapter Ten.

5.3

Ethics in Political Life

As far as ethically centered organization is concerned, it manages the world either from the nearby to the distant or, more intensely, from the distant to the nearby. Thus there are neither boundaries nor rivalries. Since there are neither boundaries nor rivalries, there exists no nerve center; in other words, it is a non-group. A non-group has no politics, as politics is nothing more than the public affairs of a whole group. But a family has its own boundaries and its own nerve center, and thus it has its own public affairs – its own politics. However, according to the three conditions for group-centered life discussed in 4.2, this cannot truly be considered a large group. But township governance and the state government affairs in China in the past were, generally speaking, rooted in such non-group. In the political structure of China in the old days, the monarch was the Number One person under heaven, while the magistrates were compared to fathers and the state to a large family. Hence the saying that “there is filial piety and therewith the sovereign should be served; there is fraternal submission and therewith elders and superiors should be served; and there is kindness, and therewith the multitude should be treated”. The essence of governing proverbially lies in “acting as if you were watching over an infant”. This custom has been handed down since ancient times and it has been like this for several thousand years. So while it is clear that there are ethical obligations between the monarch and his subjects and between officials and ordinary people, this is not the relation that exists between the public and the state. Consequently in China, there is no difference between public law and private law and neither is there any difference between criminal law and civil law. Most ordinary countries are subject to class rule but China is subject to an ethical relationship. Although China has been compelled by its current realities to develop into a nation, as its conditions are undesirable (we will elaborate on this later) and its ideology is different, the class rule that prevails in ordinary countries naturally has to be either blurred or eliminated in China. Not only is China’s whole political structure incorporated into ethical relations, its political ideals and means are both derived from and ascribed to ethics. Welfare and progress are political requirements in the West. This

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ideology does not exist in China. The ideal cherished by the Chinese people is that “peace reigns under heaven”. This expression means that everyone does their best in their ethical obligations. For example, fathers do their duties as fathers and sons do their duties as sons. In this case, everyone will live peacefully and harmoniously with others and have nothing to regret as they go through life. As to political means, since ancient times, there has been a popular saying in China – “to govern the whole of China with filial piety”. Modern Westerners may not be convinced by this and wonder whether social welfare can be naturally and constantly advanced out of people’s enlightened egoism? A comparison can thus be made. In other words, being filial to your own parents at the outset will in time naturally secure the governance of the whole world. Thus, to the emperor, nothing compares with the efforts to encourage his subjects to be filial. Though China and the West pursue different goals, they are similar in that both of them take permissive attitudes and tend toward noninterference. This can be seen from the following three paragraphs in The Spirit of the Laws, by Charles de Montesquieu: Therefore in China, the practice of filial piety is not confined to one’s parents. A veneration for one’s parents was necessarily connected with a suitable respect for all who represented them, such as old men, masters, magistrates, and the emperor. This respect for parents supposed a reciprocal love towards children, and consequently the same return of affection was expected from old men to the young, from magistrates to those under their jurisdiction, and from the emperor to his subjects. This formed the ethics or the rites, and these rites built the general spirit of the nation.5 The principal object of the Chinese legislators was to have their people live in peace and tranquility. They wanted men to have abundant respect for each other; they wanted each person to feel at every instant how much he owed to others; they wanted every citizen to depend, in some respect, on another citizen. Therefore, they extended the rules of civility to a great many people. Thus the inhabitants of the villages of China practice amongst themselves the same ceremonies as those observed by persons of an exalted station: a very proper method of inspiring mild and gentle dispositions, of maintaining peace and good order, and of banishing all the vices which spring from an asperity of temper.6 5 See Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, 1989 (p. 320). 6 See Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, 1989 (p. 317).

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The legislators of China went further. They confounded their religion, laws, manners, and customs; all these were morality, all these were virtue. The precepts relating to these four points were what they called rites; and it was in the exact observance of these that the Chinese government triumphed. They spent their whole youth in learning them, their whole life in the practice. They were taught by their men of letters, they were inculcated by the magistrates; and, as they included all the ordinary actions of life, when they found the means of making them strictly observed, China was well governed.7

5.4

Ethics as a Religion

The Chinese people seem to derive immense pleasure from the ethical life that they have adopted. As Mencius8 said, The essence of benevolence is attending to one’s parents. The essence of righteousness is deference toward one’s elder brother(s). The essence of wit is an understanding of both benevolence and righteousness, with no deviation from them. The essence of etiquette is courtesy and reverence. The essence of pleasure is willingness to do things out of both courtesy and reverence. Thus pleasure can be elicited from both courtesy and reverence. The pleasure, once elicited, cannot be inhibited. Since the pleasure cannot be inhibited, a person will jump for joy in spite of himself. Here is an annotation made by Zhu Xi, a neo-Confucianist: By the sentence “pleasure can be elicited from both courtesy and reverence”, we understand that a sense of attending to one’s parents and of deference toward one’s elder brother(s) wells up in one’s heart like plants coming into blossoms. Since such pleasure is brought to life, its abundance and exuberance naturally overflow. Hence it is said that “it cannot be inhibited”. In addition, such pleasure burgeons so that one cannot help jumping for joy!

Of course, this somewhat refined ideal and attitude to personal cultivation are not necessarily accessible to everyone. However, the possibility of enjoying such great and pure pleasure is genuine without cynicism. For ordinary 7 See Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, 1989 (p. 318). 8 Translator’s note: Reference has been made to Book VII Li Lou Part I of James Legge, The Works of Mencius, 2011 (pp. 143-144).

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people, this is none other than what is said in the popular expression, “in family life, people naturally have the happiness of a family union”. As more profound implications are to be explored, for several thousand years, the Chinese people have been born with the persistence that enables them to aim straight for this goal. On the other hand, being a widower, being a widow, living in solitude and being alone have all been considered since ancient times to be the bitterest states in life, since they mean “having no one to turn to for help”. The expression “having no one to turn to for help” is worth thinking about. It means that what is in one’s mind cannot be told to anyone else. Why does being unable to share what is in one’s mind make one feel so very bitter? Having no one to turn to certainly means being unable to get assistance from others, but what is more important is not whether a person can get assistance from others or not, but whether he has someone to whom he is so close they are like a single person – that is, someone on whom he can depend day and night and from whom he can gain spiritual solace. For example, when one person wails or smiles, the other responds in the appropriate way, and if one person has a pain or an itch, the other offers sympathy. – Such a person is what we would call “kin”. Sharing the joy of people dear to you will heighten the joy. Sharing the sorrow of people dear to you will lighten the sorrow. Thus psychological resonance is triggered through the combination of heartfelt emotions with a soulful communion. So, as soon as one’s sufferings are poured out, before he attains consolation, his sufferings have already been relieved. In the West, it is usual that parents live apart from their children but it is not considered normal that couples live apart from each other. It is always those who are socially isolated who are emotionally isolated and those who are physically alone who feel lonely, and people assume no responsibility for making the effort to live together, but rather, often tend to live apart. What is unusual to us is quite normal to them. This difference in customs between China and the West can more readily reveal what the Chinese people value in their emotions. Meanwhile, as China is a professional society rather than a class society (which will be discussed in detail later), it is possible for every family to elevate its social status, which greatly encourages family ethics. Every family (including their grown-up children and siblings) is always involved in combined efforts to mold the future of the whole family. From this perspective, it seems that this is their aim in life. Why is this? The following points offer an explanation: (1) Families make joint efforts. This is why proverbs like “when elder and younger brothers are of one mind, even the soil in front of one’s door can be turned into gold” and “household harmony ensures

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success in everything a family undertakes” are popular. Perfect harmony and whole-hearted cooperation can be extremely effective in promoting openmindedness and unselfishness. Even if they face great peril, they are willing to endure hardships and, in the end, newfound happiness allows them to forget all their suffering. (2) All their efforts are exerted not for themselves but for the whole family, or even for their ancestors or later generations. In doing so, they aim either to elevate their family status by commending their parents, or to carry on their predecessors’ tasks, managing all their affairs well without doing harm to the family’s reputation, or to cultivate their virtues and accumulate their wealth so as to leave a legacy for later generations. In all these ambitions there may be something grave, solemn, sublime or fair, according to the interpretations of different people with different degrees of self-cultivation and understanding. But they all have in common a sense of sacred responsibility. When they have fulfilled their responsibility, they feel well at ease even in their dreams. (3) Meanwhile, before them there is a prospect that often encourages them to continue their work. When they grow fatigued, they draw renewed dynamism from their sense of responsibility and their prospects, and continue to make strenuous efforts to go forward. Every time they face family poverty, with the risk of slack business and widowed mothers with orphans, they feel greater responsibility to their ancestors and thus apply their utmost efforts to rejuvenating their families. No small number of great figures in history have built themselves up in just this way. Based on these principles, the Chinese people set themselves goals for further efforts throughout their lives. These goals take a lifetime to achieve and people seem to find in them much sustenance. As I once said, in one’s life, religion can be both comforting and encouraging, but here, the Chinese code of ethics serves as a substitute for religion.9 Life becomes meaningful only when one rejects shallowness. When a person is shallow, it is not possible for him to take control of his life so as to devote himself to it. Food and sex, and fame and power are indeed what 9 WANG Hongyi often said: Birds and beasts only know the present, but human beings have the conception of more than that, knowing the existence of both the past and the future, and so in their lifetimes, they cannot focus purely on the present. Religion aims to resolve the “three periods” problem with descriptions of pure land in paradise or the transmigration into hell. The Chinese, however, take three generations – ancestors, oneself and one’s descendants – as the three periods. Their past beliefs reside in the minds of their ancestors and parents, their present solace resides in the harmony of their family members and their hope for the future resides in the minds of their descendants. Compared with the resolution offered by religion, this distinction is simpler to apply and more realistic. It is thus supplied here for reference.

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people thirst for, but these desires are much too trivial. Doing everything on one’s own account is indeed how human nature works, but that is hardly an openhearted outlook. Drifting along in shallowness and self-absorption, one is bound to get bored sometimes. This is especially true of those with great vital energy, since they are very demanding. They may easily form a low opinion of these pursuits and come to favor its polar opposites, such as chastity and abstinence, and generosity and sacrifice, which they feel are meaningful. Therefore, the desire for power is not as meaningful as the sense of responsibility, as the latter may trigger the greater vitality exhibited by people of more momentous accomplishments. Such circumstances arise from the two original poles of human nature: one is the inclination toward thinking from the perspective of the body, and the other is the inclination toward thinking beyond the body. Between these are endless more complex variations. Religion represents the latter inclination. The great role that it plays in stabilizing life lies in the opportunity it offers to go beyond mundane reality and think beyond the body, rather than restricting life to shallow and narrow-minded pursuits. Those with vital energy live a steady life due to their own self-discipline and so do ordinary people. In China, the familybased system of ethics has become a substitute for religion because it is capable of integrating Otherness and Me by effectively eliminating the body, and though it is not separated from reality (even as it simultaneously extends beyond it), ethics helps people to find the greater depths and profundity of meaning in life. It is indeed one of the variations between the two poles. What I have said above shows that ethics can function in the stead of religion, and that China lacks religion, so the familial ethical life is used to bridge the divide. But we can also consider that China does have religion, which consists in offering sacrifices to ancestors and deities. In the past, there were in Beijing the Imperial Ancestral Temple, the Altar of the God of Land and Grain, the Temple of Heaven, the Temple of Earth, and the Altar of Agricultural God, where emperors held ceremonies. In ordinary families, people worship the memorial tablet “Heaven-Earth-SovereignParent-Teacher”. It was said in The Book of Rites that “everything in this world is a derivative of Heaven and man is descended from his ancestors”. The meaning of offering sacrifices to Heaven and to ancestors consists in “ensuring that debts of gratitude are paid”. The ideas of ensuring that debts of gratitude are paid, and even honoring others’ virtues and repaying obligations, suggest that people may have many objects of worship (for example, in Sichuan Province, there is the Sichuan Temple where people offer sacrifices to Li Bing and his son, who initiated the irrigation works in Guanxian County). As the ultimate goal is not to worship Heaven, this sort

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of religious practice cannot be called “the Heaven-Worshipping Religion”. Nor can it be classed as “the Ancestor-Worship Religion” that is popular in patriarchal societies, since its ultimate goal is not to worship ancestors. It has no name, let alone a church organization for its followers. There is no alternative but to call it “the religion of ethics”, as its religious doctrine consists of nothing more than ethical concepts like these, and its followers are just ordinary Chinese people. It is impossible to know whether it is such a faith that breeds such a society or whether it is such a society that breeds such a faith. In any case, they are commensurate with each other.

5.5

The Ultimate Outcome

The Chinese people always seem to take their time in daily life. This is naturally something different about an agrarian society compared to an industrial and commercial society. An individual, however, also lives a different life at home, compared with life in an organization. It is in just this type of natural, non-stressful and quite casual family atmosphere between father and son that the display of one’s emotions becomes perfectly normal. At the same time, the fact that China is a professional society means the whole family must depend on each other for survival in real life (to be discussed further later). Consequently, they are dearly attached to each other. By extension, an ethical society is one in which interpersonal relationships are most valued. In striking contrast, while in Chinese society one can see everywhere the friendships among people who get along with each other, in the West one sees confrontation everywhere. This confrontation occurs not only between ordinary people and the government, but also between laborers and their employers and even between husbands and wives. These generalizations, of course, describe Chinese culture and Western culture since they have attained maturity. Their sources are too ancient to trace. Western society will be discussed later. As for China, the road it has taken would naturally be one based on the measures recommended by ancient sages, rather than having evolved from a patriarchal society. When society originally came to be organized by ethics in China, someone with great insight found that virtues such as sincerity and kindness are both derived from and cultivated in families. Thus, on one hand, he proposed and reminded others of such virtues as “filial piety”, “loving kindness” and “brotherly love”. And on the other hand, he extrapolated from the family structure a set of principles on which to erect a social structure – an “ethics”. We might note that in interpersonal relationship, one invariably cherishes

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the other party but forgets himself, but regarding one’s own desire, one only knows what would benefit oneself, irrespective of the other party. To give examples of the former impulse: a loving mother is always ready to do everything for her children, regardless of personal danger, and a filial son is always ready to do everything for his parents, regardless of personal danger. Between couples, between brothers and between friends, those who value interpersonal relationships think always of the other party and hold them in high regard, while remaining modest about themselves. The attitude of “being affective and thus righteous” derives from a relationship with another person, rather than from one’s own point of view. The latter point (that one can only know one’s own desire), can be seen from the fact that, for example, to gratify his desire for food, a person will go to any lengths to put fish and meat on his chopping block. Wenchers, i.e., those who solicit prostitutes, never show any regard for women’s personalities. It is from this that all the problems in this world arise – benefiting oneself at the cost of others. The former – being affective and thus righteous – is indeed the basis for solidarity and harmony in human society. The ancient Chinese thus learned that benevolent impulses such as filial piety should be promoted. What is more important is that efforts were made to accord different ranks and statuses to the various members of society in their relationships with others, and that their duties toward others were designated so that each person was always aware of what they should do with reference to the ranks and statuses of others. Those who promote civilization through customs cultivate their own attitudes so as to ensure their morality. As is written in ancient books, “the sovereign is required to ‘remain benevolent’; the minister is required to ‘remain reverent’; the son is required to ‘remain filial’; the father is required to ‘remain kind’; and fellow countrymen are required to ‘remain in good faith’.” Such being the case, the bonds of society are naturally cemented and everything is kept in proper order. This type of arrangement and advocacy do not seem to be the work of one person, nor one moment’s endeavor. The representative figures, naturally, are the Duke of Zhou in the Zhou Dynasty (1046 BC-256 BC) and Confucius. What is valued in an ethical society is, in a word, respect for others. What is a good father? The one who values his son is a good father. What is a good son? The one who values his father is a good son. What is a good elder brother? The one who looks after his younger brother is a good elder brother. What is a good younger brother? The one who looks up to his elder brother is a good younger brother. When a guest comes, the one who values his guest is a good host. And the one who is considerate of the host and not self-absorbed is a good guest. Everything then is in proper order. By

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“ethics”, we mean only that everyone should be aware that he is always in a relationship with other people and in each relationship, the other person should be valued. I stated in one of my previous books that “ethical relationship is a kind of obligatory relationship and in this relationship, one seems to live not for oneself but for others.”10 Recently, I have read Rationality and Democracy by Zhang Dongsun; in Chapter Three, subtitled “On Humanity and Personality”, he exactly expresses the same idea: In Chinese thought, traditional attitudes never admit the independence of individuals but invariably regard them as “dependent beings”. This does not mean that their existence must depend on others but that in their lifetime, they must assume certain responsibility, and doubtless it is for this responsibility that they live.

One more paragraph from Zhang will suffice to demonstrate what I have said above: I once said that China, in terms of its social structure, is one big family with many levels made up of countless small families. It can be said to be “a hierarchical system of families” in which the so-called “sovereign” is the father of the country, and the minister the son of the sovereign. In this hierarchically organized society, there is no such thing as an “individual”. All people are either fathers or sons, either the sovereign or the minster, either husbands or wives, either elder brothers or younger brothers. These five cardinal relationships in feudal China constitute China’s social organization. Without these relationships we would not have the social organization in which each individual is located hierarchically, giving him his due status and imposing on him certain responsibilities. For example, a father assumes paternal responsibilities and a son fulfills a child’s duties; a minister assumes ministerial responsibilities and a sovereign also fulfills his own responsibilities. … In a family, a distinction is made not only between males and females, but also, naturally, between the old and the young. When these natural differences are mapped onto society as a whole, that society will become one in which different people collaborate closely.11 10 See LIANG Shuming, The Final Consciousness of the Chinese National Liberation Movement, 1933 (p. 86). 11 See ZHANG Dongsun, Rationality and Democracy, 1946 (p. 8).

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In addition, Fei Xiaotong, in a speech entitled “Cultural Barriers to Social Changes in Modern China” given at the London School of Economics, used the English concept of “sportsmanship” as a metaphor for China’s social structure. His opinion also confirms what I have said here, though there is not sufficient space to reference it in detail here. In China, there exists no sense of “individual”. It seems that a Chinese does not live simply for his own sake. In the West, however, it is the other way around. Zhang’s explanations of the origin of the “individual” in the West, in the light of Greek culture, Hebrew culture and Roman laws, are extremely valuable from an academic perspective. But we need not go that far. I merely want to add that this sense of the “individual” is a product of modern times, which results from the reaction against the way of life in the medieval West. It is commonly acknowledged that Westerners, following this trend, experienced what was for the most part a “personal awakening” which was motivated by two aspects. First, medieval Christian asceticism incited a backlash in Western life, so that a desire-oriented life, as what we might call, became prevalent in modern times. The recognition of desire entails the recognition of individuals. Second, it was strong collective organizations in the medieval West that inspired another backlash, effected of course by individuals. Given the greater importance accorded to personal desire on the one hand and the mounting intolerance of undue interference on the other hand, is it any wonder they developed the theory of freedom of human rights? In modern times, the “individual-oriented society”, as we might call it, has emerged in exactly this way as a revolution that overturned medieval values, so that in terms of social organization, it revolves around the individual and in terms of law, it privileges rights. Consequently, whereas in China a sense of duty pervades, in the West the enforcement of rights is paramount. In other words, in China, a person is almost invisible, but in the West, society is based on and centered round the self. – The contrast between them is sharp indeed. Such a difference can be easily seen in the everyday etiquette in China and the West. For example, when Westerners entertain guests, they themselves sit in the very middle with their guests sitting on either side. They have their distinguished guests near to them, on their left-hand side and on their right-hand side respectively, with other guests sitting farther away from them in order of importance. After the banquet, if they want to take a picture, the dozens of other people likewise serve only as a foil. In China, however, whenever a host receives a guest, he makes a point of inviting the guest to take the seat of honor, while he himself serves. At the banquet, the honored guest is accorded the seat of honor which is the one farthest

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away from the host, on the left- and right-hand sides of whom are merely accompanying guests on end seats. This implies that we respect the other person involved and make ourselves humble before them, while Westerners show intimacy in way that still centers round themselves. – These are two completely different attitudes. The Chinese term “權利” (quánlì), an exotic import from the West in recent decades, is translated from “rights” in English. Right (in English) originally meant “just”, which at first glance conforms to the principle advocated by the Chinese people. But the significant difference lies in that quánlì in the West is claimed not due to the recognition from the other party, nor with the general acknowledgement of the third party, but by one’s own assertion. For example, when children benefit from their parents bringing them up and feeding them, who can deny they have the right to do so? But if these children said to their parents, “I have every right to enjoy your upbringing and feeding,” or, “You should feed me and pay my education expenses,” that would be totally at odds with the accepted practice in China. However, if parents said to their children, “I should bring you up,” or, “I should provide a proper education for you,” that would completely conform to the customary practice in China. Even if parents claim their own rights from their children, it is also considered to be inappropriate. However, having educated their children since infancy, parents require filial respect from their children. This sounds unpleasant to only the ears if they do not show this respect. Relationships of other kinds can be inferred from this. In short, everyone in China is supposed to fulfill his own duties in order to be granted his own rights by another person, which he cannot claim for himself. This is the practice that is widely followed in Chinese social ethics. Moreover, in the process of fulfilling their duties, people maintain their own rights without waiving them or deferring them. This means that, while circumstances may remain the same, the spirit can change greatly. Since World War I, the world has witnessed many changes. These changes will never reach such an extent that people, as individuals, do not expect any intervention from the State, but instead, in times of need, they expect aid from the State. So, in the new constitutions of many countries (the Reich Constitution of August 11, 1919 is a typical example), as well as prohibitions in law, many more positive rights, such as rights to subsistence, rights to employment and rights to education have also been stipulated. Another change is that, with the rise of society-oriented thought, some countries have attempted to adopt interventionism so as to impose heavier obligations upon their people. Added to the new constitutions are therefore such obligations as “how to use property”, “how to receive education”, “how to work” and even “how to

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cast a vote in an election”. These obligations have to be imposed on people by these countries. These two changes, which obviously result from one tendency, indicate that the nation as a group assumes greater importance. Though the tendency remains the same, observed from a different point of view, these changes inevitably witness contradictions. Contradictions arise when either party claims their own rights and at the same time imposes obligations upon the other party. Observed from the viewpoint of ethics, as far as a nation is concerned, casting a vote in an election must be deemed the right of every citizen and should be respected, and open elections must be an obligation that is to be fulfilled by any nation. Without elections, no other issues can be resolved. Are there any further differences and contradictions? Westerners, who are customarily self-centered, neither notice nor discuss these contradictions. They either think and speak for themselves if they are individualists, or think and speak for their countries if they are group-oriented. As we said previously, in the interrelationship between society and the individual, those who place particular stress on individuality are individual-oriented and those who place particular stress on society are society-oriented. Admittedly, the ethics of the Chinese highlights only the interrelationship between this person and that person but ignores that between society and individuals. This is the inevitable outcome of China’s lack of group-centered life. But the practice of mutually valuing one another can contribute to society at large. In other words, priority is never automatically given to either party but rather to the mutual exchange of their relationship. Those who are ethics-oriented are in fact relationshipcentered. It is only by cementing the relationship that a balance can be struck between intimate and distant relationships without favoring one over the other. If such a practice were applied to the relationship between society and individuals, wouldn’t that be a good idea! The relationship between collective power and individual freedom, as one of the thorniest issues in the West since antiquity, is difficult to resolve. In all fairness, both group power and individual freedom are equally important. Bias toward either aspect will incur great losses. This would ideally be resolved in the following manner: First, in ordinary times, the balance needs to be maintained without bias toward either collective power or individual freedom; Second, whenever necessary, maximum flexibility must be increased according to different situations. Yet how can such an ideal be achieved? The declaration that “no bias should be given to either collective power or individual freedom, and there

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is a need to strike a balance” amounts to empty words, which make no sense and amount to nothing. If this statement is meant to serve as a directive for people to adopt without any bias, only an allusion to ethics can dictate that those who take the side of collectivism should respect individuals and those who take the side of individuals should nevertheless place the collective above everything else. There is no other way out of this dilemma. In fact, the current situation suggests that it was quite wrong to establish at the outset the dichotomy between “individual-orientedness” and “group-orientedness”. In other words, no objective criterion should be laid down for people to fulfill. An utterance should be understood according to who makes the utterance. It will be no utterance if no one makes it. Standards for what is called “an utterance” may vary from person to person and they are never ultimately fixed. This is just the so-called “theory of relativity”. This theory of relativity is the truth, the most easily accessible truth in the universe. Chinese ethical thought incorporates precisely such a theory of relativity. It holds that in this world, only when both parties value the other can balance be well maintained. But as group-centeredness and individual-centeredness are never rigidly stressed, Chinese ethical thought thus becomes a living reality that can naturally be flexible when necessary. – A tough issue has at last been brought to a satisfactory conclusion.



Chapter Six Morality as Religion1

6.1

Definition of Religion

Intrinsic to the earliest cultures were clan life and group-centered life. Later on, however, the Chinese developed a stronger inclination for family life while Westerners hewed to group-centered life. They each took their own path. In the West the road was paved by Christianity, but in China the way forward was opened up by the moral code of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius. Therefore, the difference between Chinese culture and Western culture lies in religion, as suggested in the discussion above. To explain this further, we must now turn to the moral codes of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius and their influence upon Chinese culture, and the influence of Christianity upon Western culture. To this end, we must talk about religion in general. Human culture begins with religion and whenever a culture emerges, religion is central to it. Both social order and the politics of a group or a mass of people stem from religion, as do ideology and all kinds of learning. Even today, there are still cultures in which religion is at the heart of 1 Concerning the reasons China lacks religion, Chang Yansheng attempted to give an explanation from the perspective of geographical history (see his paper “How Can the Chinese Nation Survive to the Present” in On the State, Volume III: issues 12, 13 and 14). His explanation is cited here for reference. Among all the ancient civilized nations, the Chinese nation is the only one that developed in a temperate region rather than a tropical region. Chinese culture originated in the arid Yellow River Plain, rather than the fertile Yangtze River Basin and the Pearl River Basin. The primitive Chinese, at the very beginning of human history, lived in a rather adverse environment. Here in China, there is no regular flooding as there is in the Nile River Valley, and neither is there such an abundance of natural resources as there is in the Gangetic Plains. Since ancient times, the flooding from the Yellow River has been a constant source of disaster to people living along its banks. As the mountain ranges in the northwest areas are not high enough to keep out the cold wind from the deserts in the north, people had to shelter on the plateau to the southwest of Shanxi during the period of flooding disasters, competing for survival with beasts and snakes. As the Yellow River was not f it for boats, traff ic was rather bad and the opportunities to communicate knowledge were scarce. People had to toil and moil all day long in order to sustain their living, so they had little time to spare for further ruminations. As grand religious organizations and majestic philosophies, like those of Egypt and India, could not be produced in China, nor could their imaginative religious and mythological literature, the primitive religions in China were largely based on deity worship and witchcraft related to human affairs. Consequently, the Chinese nation was long ago moved to accept the concept of “man” in the modern world. The Chinese nation is the world’s first down-to-earth nation, as the ancient Chinese had an ideological vision that never went beyond life in the real world to dreams for the kingdom of heaven in the future.

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everything – Tibetan culture is one such example. Not only is this the case when a culture is not yet mature, it is also the case even after a culture has matured, as it very often takes the shelter of a great religion in order for it to be well nurtured and developed, as we see with the European and American cultures of modern times, for example. As history shows, no great nation can be established without a higher culture, and the unity of such a nation relies in every way on an established religion. The downplaying of religion is only a recent phenomenon. For the most part, human culture consists of nothing more than the tools and measures, the methods and skills, and the organization systems, but though they make up the lion’s share, all these aspects occupy only a subordinate position. The aspect that plays the central role involves people’s attitudes to life and their value judgements within that culture. In other words, what matters most in a culture consists in its people’s life Difficult though it is to make a detailed study of the historical facts of the period that extends from the reign of Emperor Yao (c. 2333 BC to 2234 BC) to the Shang Dynasty (c. 1600 BC to 1046 BC), one thing is known to us: there was no religious power at that time that could compare with political power. In Chinese history, no religious hierarchies have so far been discovered that would have been equivalent to Ancient Egyptian priests, Jewish rabbis, and Indian Brahman. In ancient China, a monarch was both an emperor and a leader. As a political leader, he also took care of religious matters, but he doubtless gave more thought to human affairs. In China, a religion can never develop into a concept of a single Almighty God; this, of course, is also why religious power cannot override political power, and why before a kingdom united by religiosity under heaven came into being, a politically united empire had already been established. As a result, religious rule no longer stands a chance of coming into being. The Shang nation was perhaps the only group who worshipped an almighty God in ancient times. The concept of “God” was introduced into the Chinese cultural system by merchants from the Huaihe River Basin. However, the relationship between the Shang nation and the more advanced Xia nation was very similar to that between the Assyrians and Babylonians. After it was conquered by force of arms, due to its limited cultural development, the Shang nation was obliged to accept the cultural heritage of the conquerors, the Xia dynasty. Therefore, the incorporation of such a concept as “God” into the Chinese cultural system remained at most the addition of a mightier god to the old religion, rather than the extermination or demotion of the original gods. Additionally, due to the assimilation of the primitive Chinese’s practical notions, a so-called “God” was not attached to any such concept as “Heaven”, and was thus a single entity. As ancient Chinese culture was essentially dialectical, every worshipped deity stood for an object that was beneficial to people’s livelihoods (like heaven, earth, mountains, rivers and so on). God thus served as a representation of the largest substance. Mo-tse, descendant of the religious Shang dynasty, attempted to add another religion centered on the worship of God, but was ultimately unsuccessful as by that time it was too late. Furthermore, in An Outline of the History of Chinese Religious Thought, 1977, WANG Zhixin offered a similar explanation for this. Papers such as XU Siyuan’s “Reasons for the Underdevelopment of Religion in China” in the first and the second issues of the newly published The East and the West, and TANG Junyi’s Mo-tse and Western Religious Spirit are both worth reading.

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choices, their likes and dislikes, what they consider right or wrong, and their approach to life. If these questions can be answered, other things will naturally fall into place. Cultures differ from one another in precisely this respect. Likewise, this is where a culture witnesses transformation, not in any of its constituent parts. If there is no transformation of these values, although there may be a variety of changes in other aspects of the culture, such changes are a matter of no consequence. Such attitudes toward life or such value judgements, visible or not, are conceived ubiquitously in all cultures, especially in religion, morality, etiquette and customs, and legislation. Morality, etiquette and customs, and legislation are all derived from religion: originally, they were part of religion and inseparable from it. Thus it can be said that human culture could not have come about without religion, for which it has a central position. Certainly, there are reasons why human culture must start with religion. As people in the earliest times had only very loose social ties, it was vital that they should need each other and care for each other, and people could by no means remain independent of one another. Had they been separated and alienated from each other, there would have been no society, and neither would there have been any culture. Religion, then, provided just the right sort of authority and cohesion. This is the first point. In addition, social life cannot be maintained without the establishment of order. But an order established out of reason and in which people could get to know each other well and live harmoniously with one another could not be expected of people in this early era. On the other hand, as some people were so impulsive or so tough that even the harshest punishment became useless, there was virtually no way to establish social order. In this instance, religion provided the ideal form of discipline and conditioning. This is the second point. Both these functions originate from one point – a goal rooted in common belief established when those people lived in fear and delusion, and in fantasies of uneasiness. Once this goal was established, those people, who were divided, would naturally come close together to agglomerate with each other and at the same time adopt various approaches in order to tame the brutality of some of their members. What is religion? This question cannot be easily answered. But it must be pointed out that religions of all kinds have much in common: all religions, based on things far beyond human knowledge, magnify the importance of soothing human feelings and of stimulating human will.2 An analysis of this idea brings up these two points: 2

See LIANG Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, 1921 (p. 90).

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First, religion must take either soothing or stimulating human feelings as its objective. Second, religion must be based on its detachment from and independence of human knowledge. Everything in this world exists because a need arises. Religion emerges at just such a time when human feelings become uneasy. However, whether human feelings are easy or uneasy, or strong or weak, they change over time. This is why religion, from ancient times, has tended to wax and wane. – This is what we can see in retrospect. If we look at it from a prospective viewpoint, we see that although religion exists in a realm that goes far beyond knowledge, how it exists – how religion comes into being – must be determined by the culture of knowledge among the people in a particular area. Human knowledge varies from time to time and from place to place. Therefore, religions differ from each other to a certain extent. From this point, we can observe that in the early stages of human civilization, religion was indispensable. This is because at that time, human beings knew nothing about their natural environment, and consequently they could by no means control it. Since they could not control it, their natural environment posed a hazard to them, and they lived in fear and unease. On the other hand, human beings at that time could naturally only develop extremely naive superstition as the simplest form of religion, as this was all their knowledge culture could support at the time. Later, human beings generally acquired more sophisticated knowledge and a greater ability to control and predict nature. Although natural disasters were evidently on the decrease and manmade disasters only occurred from time to time, people still lived in a state of severe emotional unease. Moreover, though legislation and morality gradually emerged, they did not play a central role in culture. To maintain social order and develop culture, people found that religion was especially vital. Therefore, in both ancient and medieval times, religion was prevalent. It took a long time until the emergence of modern European civilization before this could change. This is because: First, as science advanced, knowledge took the place of superstition and fantasy. Second, as the power to control and predict nature progressed at a vigorous pace, humans were increasingly able to impose their will. Third, the spirit of rational criticism gradually became irreconcilable with unreasonable beliefs. Fourth, people’s mutual need, their mutual care and their detachment from each other were established economically, but the social order was

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subject to politics. Religion, as the center of culture, was gradually submerged in morality, etiquette, customs and legislation. Fifth, people were in competition with one another and temptations abounded due to their material gains. In their lifetime, they were constantly kept busy dealing with things around them and frittering their time away. As people had far less need for religion than ever before and their secular wisdom and intelligence made it far more difficult for religion to survive, its decline in modern times up to today became inevitable. Some people prematurely concluded that from this time on, religion would no longer play any role in human culture. We see this, for example, in the fact that some farsighted thinkers from Europe and America, being alert to the crisis of modern civilization, focused their interest again on religion, but some were still in the dark about why this decline occurred. To illustrate this point, we have to go a little further. What is religion? As I wrote in my book Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, Religion means the transcendence of human life. The very moment that human culture emerges is the very moment that religion emerges. The moment when religion emerges is the moment when human beings seek to transcend human life. Human beings’ inclination for living life to the full is the positive attitude, in which people are the subject, while human beings’ attempt to transcend life is the opposite or negative attitude, in which life is the object. Thus there is a positive and a negative approach, and a subject and an object. They complement each other so as to maintain human life and support its culture.3

As I mentioned in the previous chapter, human life has two opposite impulses: one is the inclination toward thinking from the perspective of the body and the other is the inclination toward thinking beyond the body. … Religion represents the latter inclination. The essence of religion lies in the transcendence of human life. Transcending human life is what we are to depend upon in the world. The world is limited, but it depends upon the limitless. The world is relative, but it depends upon the absolute. The world witnesses birth and death, but it depends upon the non-birth and the non-death. Super-body or anti-body – i.e., that which goes beyond physical matters – is nothing more than another name for the inclination toward transcending life. Such an inclination opens the 3

See LIANG Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, 1921 (p. 113).

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door for human beings to be free of any confinement that other organisms are subject to. The evolution of organisms into human beings opens up a whole new world. While average organisms are all limited to “opposition”, only human beings, based on “opposition”, achieve “unity” – i.e., they, on the one hand, stand in “opposition”, and on the other hand, achieve “unity”. 4

The world and the transcendence of life and death in the world represent neither oneness nor difference, because they are both separated and not separated. When standing in “opposition”, they are separated, and when achieving “unity”, they are not separated. There is only so much that can be written on this here; to elaborate further would require a whole book. Human beings, consciously or unconsciously, or directly or indirectly, tend to escape their own lives if they cannot tolerate living in the secular world. In such cases, it might be necessary to develop a religion. That is exactly where the essence of religion lies. In the first chapter of his book The Essence of Christianity, Ludwig Feuerbach concluded that “the sense of dependence is the root of religion”. Being religious, as we have put it, can also often be called “conversion to a religion”, in which such a sense of dependence can also be felt. Dependence, however, comes in various forms. Religion at the very beginning could be said to be the pretext for the actions of external forces. Such external forces were actually human beings themselves. What people were expected to depend on was only a cherished idea. But this change of heart was surprisingly effective because people possessed boundless power though they were made unaware of it. The magnitude, the loftiness, the immortality, the sincerity, the goodness, the kindness and the purity of all things in religion were originally virtues that human beings actually possessed but that they themselves believed they could never attain. By having such a change of heart, a person would instantly become magnanimous and pure, without any self-consciousness. Thus his self-denial was, in every sense, a further self-aff irmation in another way. In the end, religion, which is no longer a pretext, totally transcends human life and by dependence upon what human life depends for affinity, it liberates itself and accomplishes itself. Therefore, the same worship and prayer, or the same confession and meditation, inevitably differ from person to person in content. This is 4 See LIANG Shuming, The Final Consciousness of the Chinese National Liberation Movement, 1933 (p. 342).

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exactly why religion invariably changes its status according to the culture of an age. As Feuerbach has said, “Only after one becomes weak does he need religion, but only after one becomes foolish does he accept religion.” This was perhaps the case in the past. It cannot be applicable to all cases. As Hu Shiqing has said, “It is from the highest point of reason that faith arises”. This means that reason has its limits, and that reason and faith must be fundamentally incompatible. Christians say that “the value of religion is that it enables people to gain the greatest reward.” Here, “reward” means “immortality”. A Christian concept though it is, the meaning of “immortality” can be extended to refer to anything. Though these two quotes yield no profound answers, considering both the possibility and the necessity of religion reveals certain clues.

6.2

Religion in China

Religion in China possesses its own particular features besides the same general features as religions in other places. Religion is the fountainhead of culture, and China is no exception here. As Wang Zhixin writes in An Outline of the History of Chinese Religious Thought, in its earliest form, Chinese religion included the general practices of totem worship, fetish worship and god worship. These continuous sacrifices to heaven and to ancestors that have gone on since ancient times, however, must be observed from a different perspective. Before emergence of the moralization in the doctrines of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius, such sacrifices could also be considered a religion. After the rituals of Zhou and Confucianism emerged, such sacrifices may seem not to have changed much on the surface, but if examined carefully, they actually took on a particular significance. In other words, Chinese culture since then has shifted its focus to the non-religious moralization in the doctrines of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius, of which sacrifices to heaven and to ancestors constituted only one requirement. When the late Hu Shiqing5 talked about religion in China, it seemed that he did not notice this difference. Here, I would like to cite what he said before I state my opinion. Hu divided world religions into three classifications, namely, the Hebrew, the Indian and the Chinese. He said, “If we consider the mark of a great religion to be that it is all-encompassing, then only the Chinese religion 5

See HU Shiqing, A Survey of Humanism, self-printed (p. 34).

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can be considered great.” The Chinese religion advocates “unity of man and nature and all-inclusiveness”, adopting the following three major principles: First, showing reverence for heaven. “The greatest virtue of heaven is the love of life”, and “the essence of all things on earth is heaven”, as the Chinese proverbs go. Man can never exist beyond heaven and earth. Second, paying respect to one’s ancestors. “Man is the lord of creation” and “man is descended from his ancestors”. No one would exist without his ancestors. Third, singing the praises of good virtues and meritorious deeds. All things that fulfill our daily needs, such as fishery, livestock husbandry, industry, houses, vessels, vehicles, cultural products and social institutions, are without exception gifts granted by our ancestors. These three principles, all of which have the advantage of total honesty, never exploit people’s weakness or play on their irrational fears so as to avoid complications. They set no rules on how to gain admission into religion. They establish no religious organizations to impose restrictions on religious believers. Local customs and outside religions that are not contrary to these principles neither interfere with nor reject them, so that from time immemorial, no religious wars have ever taken place. Therefore, the Chinese religion is indeed the most upright and the freest in human belief. (See Chapter One and Chapter Three of A Survey of Humanism by Hu Shiqing.) Hu, on the one hand, did not exclude China from religious parts of the world, and on the other hand, did not distort the typical situation in China in a way that would disparage the distinctive spirit of the Chinese nation. This is a popular assessment of him, and we accept it without argument. I would like, however, to point out that what has been said here is only second-hand material from the Duke of Zhou and Confucius and not, I am afraid, something original from remote antiquity. From my inference, the China of the previous three thousand years followed a general way of development, but the China of the most recent three thousand years was another matter. It seemed that Hu invariably took the China of the most recent three thousand years as standard and applied these observations broadly to the China of the previous three thousand years. In what follows, I will expand on my opinion. In Chapter One, one of the features of Chinese culture, “a life with almost no religion” suggests that within Chinese culture there is a lack of religion. This statement is made only with reference to the Chinese culture of the most recent three thousand years. How can it then be said that Chinese culture stagnated ever since the Duke of Zhou and Confucius, without taking into

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account what went before? This is because the wide-ranging development of Chinese culture has proceeded only in the most recent three thousand years – that is, since the time of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius. This is the first point. The Chinese culture that has endured to the present era and which has actually benefited the Chinese people has been the culture that developed since the time of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius. The earlier stage of culture, more than three thousand years ago, has little to do with the later stages and only makes up a small proportion of cultural history. This is the second point. Some post-Zhou and post-Confucian elements of Chinese culture obviously belong to the category of religion. How can it then be said that China lacks religion, that its culture is “a life with almost no religion”? This is because the developments of those three thousand years did not take religion as their center. As we said previously, no great nation can be established without a mature culture and the unification of the cultures of such a great nation invariably depends on a great religion. To unify the cultures of China, a great nation with such a large territory, characterized by such diversity of local customs and practices, by such drastic difference of dialects and by so many obstacles in transportation, there must certainly be a commonly cherished, commonly implicated and commonly cultivated spirit that functions as the core for the whole society across the nation. Only with such a core can its culture become ubiquitous, its life as a nation be prolonged, and its culture be able to readily assimilate any outside cultures. In other cases, such a core would be a great religion, but here, as everyone knows, it is instead the moral codes of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius. The Chinese culture of moral cultivation has for over two thousand years placed Confucius at its center. Unquestionably, various religions coexisted at the time. At first, they followed the practice, passed down from ancient times, of offering sacrifices to heaven and to ancestors. However, this practice has since greatly altered so that it now constitutes part of Confucian moralization. Later, quite a few outside religions, such as Buddhism, Islam, Christianity and so on, appeared on the scene. However, it may be well asked: Which of these unfamiliar religions affected Confucius’s central place in any way? Not only were these religions unable to take over that central position, but they almost fostered a veneration for Confucius instead, which shows that they were not in conflict with Confucianism or that they shared the same spirit. Consequently, they coexisted in peace, and those religions became “supporters” of Confucianism. Thus, in confirming that the moral code of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius was non-religious, we can certainly say that China lacks religion.

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6.3

Non-Religious Nature of the Moral Cultivation of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius

The development of several thousand years’ moral cultivation in China owes its greatest debt to the influence of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius. The Duke of Zhou can be said to represent those who came before him and Confucius can be said to represent those who came after him. Hence we have “the moral cultivation of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius”. The Duke of Zhou and those he represented contributed mostly to specific aspects of moral cultivation, such as the system of rites and music. Confucius, however, seems to have possessed great insight into how to nurture thinkers in ancient times and thus he educated other people by promoting his theories. The creation and development of his system of reasoning was naturally a more fundamental contribution, one that enlightened many more people for generations to come. Thus, in terms of their influence over the latter two thousand years, Confucius has been far more influential than the Duke of Zhou. If we are to decide whether their moral cultivation can be considered a religion, it is first necessary to get to know a little about Confucius’ conduct and the learning style of his disciples. Many scholars consider the doctrines of Confucius and his disciples secular. The American scholar Lynn Thorndike, for example, stated in his book A Short History of Civilization that: Confucius never considered himself to be summoned or inspired by any god. Also, “the Master never talked of extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder or spiritual beings.” Confucius was without any male offspring. His disciples did not take him for a god, either. Confucius did not seem to be enlightened suddenly like a Buddha, but he always learned without satiety. When he had faults, he surely did not fear to correct them. Confucius never intended to live as a recluse. Instead, he toured the various states in his time, expecting to find someone who shared his views so as to attain the goal of reforming people’s thought (which shows that, in terms of religious transcendence, Confucius was a secular). By answering his disciples’ questions, Confucius once said, “While you are not able to serve the living, how can you serve their spirits?” “While

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you do not know life, how can you know about death?” “To devote oneself to the people’s just cause, and, while respecting spiritual beings, to keep aloof from them, may be called wisdom.”

In his Lectures on the Essence of Religion, Ludwig Feuerbach once said, “Man’s grave is the birthplace of God.” He also held that, “If there were no such thing as death, it would be impossible to have religion.” These are wonderfully precise remarks. In the secular world, that which is most emotionally disturbing is none other than the death of one’s beloved and of oneself. At the same time, death is the most unpredictable and the most unknowable matter there is. It therefore fulfills the two conditions for the rise of religion: there is both an emotional need for religion and an intellectual comfort in the establishment of religion. However, concepts like “life”, “death”, “ghosts” and “gods”, which are inseparable from religion, are matters Confucius never concerned himself with. This amply demonstrates that Confucianism is a non-religion. With such matters as “life”, “death”, “ghosts” and “gods” arise concepts such as sins and blessings in religion, and all religious behaviors surrounding prayers and sacrifices. However, when Confucius talked about prayer with other people, he would first ask, “Is there such a thing?” Then, he would continue, “My praying began a long time ago!” When he was asked by other people whether it was better to pay court to the kitchen-god than to the god in the south-west corner, he would say, “It is not true. He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he can pray.” Confucius had none of the elements that are essential in religion, and a spirit which is non-existent in religion. That is, he believed that all men possess rationality and human beings have full faith in themselves. As he said, the feeling of approval and disapproval is a trait common to all men. What should be done and what should not be done can only be made known through rationality. Thus Confucius did not hand down dogmatic criteria to other people. Instead, he expected that other people could improve themselves through self-examination. For example, Zai Wo, one of his disciples, thought that three years’ mourning was too long and that one year’s mourning was surely enough. Confucius would never denounce such a misconception but only mildly asked him, “Would you then feel at ease eating good rice and wearing silk brocades?” Zai Wo answered, “Quite at ease.” Confucius then said, “If you can feel at ease, do it. But a superior man, when in mourning, does not enjoy pleasant food, nor does he derive pleasure from music. If he is comfortably lodged in his home, he does not feel at ease either. That is why he abstains from these

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things. But now you feel at ease, you may do it.” Confucius only stated his reasoning, letting his disciple make his own judgement. Let’s look at another instance. Zigong wanted to do away with the offering of a live sheep at the arrival of each new moon. Confucius said, with a sigh, “Ci! You grudge the sheep; I love the ceremony!” He stated their respective views without drawing a conclusion. It is well known that the Confucian school values propriety highly. From these instances, you can see that he could dexterously reformulate his ideas at will, something which is absolutely impossible in any religion. No major religion is without its own internal orthodoxy, but very often, the slightest discrepancy in even a minor detail might result in f ierce disputes or even terrible disasters. Let’s cite one comparable example: King Henry VIII once tried the Protestants for their faith in Zwingli’s theology and cited passages from The Bible to prove that both the blood and the body, as expected, manifested in the Eucharistic rites, according to orthodox belief. Thus he sentenced them to death by burning. In 1539, the English Parliament again passed a set of laws known as the “Six Articles”, declaring that after the consecration of the Eucharist, the substance of the body and the blood of Christ openly coexists with the substance of the consecrated bread and wine and that whoever is reckless enough to doubt it would be burned.6

How superstitious, obstinate and illogical this was! This, to us, is both appalling and ridiculous, but to Christians at that time, was actually unsurprising. Religion originally required people to observe the commandments of God instead of obeying man’s decisions. Its criteria were external, fixed and absolute. When Confucius taught people the salute they should offer, it was considered to be something that man himself should do because he thought it appropriate to man’s emotional nature. This echoes what is said in The Book of Rites: “It was neither from Heaven nor from Hell. It was only an essential part of man’s emotional nature.” Confucius’ criteria were internal rather than external and flexible rather than fixed. According to what Wang Zhixin has said in An Outline of the History of Chinese Religious Thought, from ancient times, the Chinese people have believed in “Heaven”. This religious belief underwent some changes during the Eastern Zhou Dynasty and occasioned a divide when it came to the 6 See HE Bingson, A History of Medieval Europe, 1924 (p. 278).

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Spring and Autumn Period, during the Contention of a Hundred Schools of Thought. The Confucian school and the Taoist school were at odds with each other, while the Mohists represented faith. Taoists like Lao-zi and Zhuangzi were obviously atheists, materialists and mechanists. Confucius, though he did not deny the existence of God, expressed equivocally that his God seemed to exist only in his subjective cognizance. Consequently, in his Dialogues, Mo-zi mocked them by saying that “even if there are no ghosts, yet it is beneficial to study sacrifices and rituals”. Then came the era of Mencius and Xunzi. Mencius still tried to understand the will of Heaven as the will of the people. Xunzi, however, simply denied the will of Heaven, saying that “a man reveres what lies within his power and does not long for what lies with Heaven.” He opposed the view that “accordingly if you cast aside the concerns proper to Man in order to speculate about what belongs to Heaven, you will miss the essential nature of myriad things”, which has the same meaning as that expressed in The Zuo Commentary: “when a nation rises, everything follows the will of the people, and when a nation perishes, everything follows the will of Heaven.” Later on, Wang Chong of the Eastern Han Dynasty, who wrote the book On Balance, did his utmost to get rid of superstition, a practice which originated from the Xun school. The Mohist school of thought was no longer passed on to later generations owing to its god worship and its great influence upon the lower class in China. This is a general summary; the last point will shortly be discussed further.

6.4

Morality in Place of Religion in China

Confucius never attempted to reject religion or to criticize religion (an act that would have been foolish at the time), but he was in fact the deadliest enemy of religion as he made every effort to awaken man’s rationality. Among all the ancient classics in the world, the Confucian classics in China boast an unparalleled open-mindedness, being not in the least unreasonable. This was either because the precepts that dealt with mythology and superstition were few, or because Confucius deleted them. Consequently, this enabled the Chinese people to encounter fewer barriers to their thought. The Analects well acquainted us with the teaching method of the disciples of Confucius. Those disciples on the one hand did their utmost to refrain from any superstition and dogma that were practiced in religion, and on the other hand devoted their efforts to teaching enlightened rationality. Apart from the two examples provided above of Zai Wo and Zigong, everywhere

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else in his precepts, Confucius did nothing but guide people toward personal introspection. For example: Do not do to others what you would not wish done to yourself. I daily examine myself several times: have I been conscientious in working for others? Have I been sincere in dealings with friends? Have I reviewed what my teacher taught me? When three are walking together, I am sure to find teachers among them. I will identify their good qualities and follow them, and likewise identify their bad qualities and avoid them. When we see a man of virtue and talent, we should think of emulating him; when we see a man of a contrary character, we should turn inwards and examine ourselves. The Master said, “Alas! I have never seen one who could perceive his own faults and accuse himself inwardly.” Sima Niu asked what kind of person a superior man was. The Master said, “A superior man has neither anxiety nor fear.”  “No anxiety and no fear!” said Niu, “Does this constitute what we call a superior man?” The Master said, “When internal examination f inds nothing wrong, what should he be anxious about? What should he fear?” The Master said, “I can talk with Hui, one of my disciples, for a whole day without his ever differing from me. He seems to be stupid. But when he is not with me, I examine his conduct and find he is able to illustrate my teachings. He is by no means stupid.” A superior man has nine cares. In seeing he is careful to see clearly; in hearing he is careful to hear distinctly; in his countenance he is careful to be benign; in his manner he is careful to be respectful; in his words he is careful to be sincere; in his work he is careful to be diligent. When in doubt he is careful to ask others; when he is angry, he has a care for the consequences, and when he sees there is gain to be had, he thinks of righteousness.

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Qu Boyu sent a messenger to Confucius. Confucius sat with him and asked, “What is the master doing?” The messenger replied, “He is trying to make his faults few, but he has not yet succeeded.” Zigong, one of Confucius’ disciples, was criticizing other people. The Master said, “Have you been perfect? I myself have no time for this.” The Master said, “Not until he is eager to know but feels difficulty do I instruct; not until he wants to speak out but fails to express himself do I enlighten. If I present him one corner and he cannot from it infer the other three, I do not continue the lesson.”

Such examples abound in The Analects, from which it can be imagined what sort of teaching method and learning style Confucius’ disciples used two and a half thousand years ago. He taught others on every occasion to examine their own thoughts and conduct by thinking for themselves so as to cultivate their own discretion. In particular, he urged others to be vigilant so that whenever they made mistakes, they should never reconcile themselves to those mistakes. Confucians never taught others any dogma. If anything was taught to them, it was only this: to cultivate introspection in themselves. Except for the rationality of having faith in themselves, nothing else was worthy of their faith. What a spirit this was! Even with another ten thousand years of human progress, such a spirit could never be crushed! What, then, do we make of this? This is morality. It is not religion. Morality is rationality that exists in one’s self-consciousness and self-discipline. Religion is belief that is scaffolded by the believer’s observance of commandments. The Chinese nation has been greatly influenced by Confucianism ever since it emerged, and accordingly it has taken the path that replaces religion with morality. This is the exact opposite to the practice of religion in which people are taught to believe in external things by abandoning their own self-confidence and relying on other powers by surrendering their own powers. To individuals, both religion and morality are a means toward aspirational values and kindness. But religion is so highly effective and so immensely powerful that it seldom encounters failures. To a society, they might well represent the same influence. Both religion and morality can help groups of people to form good disciplinary order, but their respective effects can scarcely be compared. This is also what is implied by the view that religion was originally a method but morality simply was not. Religion, as the previous analysis suggests, is actually the use of external force, but such external

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force is actually exerted by the person himself. It is more meaningful than morality, and that is exactly the source of its marvelously miraculous effect. Throughout human cultural history, morality has appeared on the scene far later than religion. Although human beings are rational animals, rationality has to be developed gradually in man. In individual life, rationality manifests itself with age and physical maturity. In social life, only with the progress of social and economic civilization as its foundation can rationality develop in an unimpeded manner. It is indeed very surprising that the ancient Chinese accomplished such a difficult task earlier than anyone else. This is exactly what I mean by “human cultural precocity” with respect to Chinese culture. If there were no successor to Confucius, it would have been a mystery how things might have developed later on. Fortunately, Mencius came at the right time to inherit the spirit of Confucius. He was the very person to show others what is meant in practical terms by “rationality”. A few words from him will illustrate the point: When I say that all men have a mind that cannot bear to see the sufferings of others, my meaning may be illustrated thus – even nowadays, if men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress. They will feel this not as grounds on which they may gain the favor of the child’s parents, nor as grounds on which they may seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor from the threat to one’s reputation if one has been unmoved by such a thing. From this case we may perceive that the feeling of commiseration is essential to man, that feelings of shame and dislike are essential to man, that feelings of reverence and respect are essential to man, and that feelings of approval and disapproval are essential to man. The feeling of commiseration is common to all men; so are shame and dislike, reverence and respect, and approval and disapproval. The feeling of commiseration implies the principle of benevolence; shame and dislike imply the principle of righteousness; approval and disapproval, the principle of knowledge. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety and knowledge are not infused into us from without. We are certainly furnished with them. And a different view is simply from want of reflection. … Therefore I say: Men’s mouths agree in tasting the same relishes; their ears agree in enjoying the same sounds; their eyes agree in recognizing the same beauty; shall their minds alone be without that of which they similarly approve? Of what, then, do they similarly approve? It is, I say,

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the principles of our nature, and the determinations of righteousness. The sages only apprehended before me that which my mind approves of in common with other men. Therefore the principles of our nature and the determinations of righteousness are agreeable to my mind, just as the flesh of grass and grain-fed animals is agreeable to my mouth. A man who commands our liking is what is called a good man. Let a man not do what his own sense of decency tells him not to do, and let him not desire what his sense of decency tells him not to desire; to act in this way is all he has to do. So, I like life, and I also like righteousness. If I cannot keep the two together, I will let life go, and choose righteousness. I like life indeed, but there is that which I like more than life, and therefore, I will not seek to possess it by any improper means. I dislike death indeed, but there is that which I dislike more than death, and therefore there are occasions when I will not avoid danger. If a man can give full expression to the feeling that makes him shrink from injuring others, his benevolence will be more than equal to any situation. If he can give full expression to the feeling that prevents him from trespassing by breaking rules, his righteousness will be more than equal to any task.

There could not have been a more ideal person to inherit the spirit of Mencius than Wang Yangming. As he said, “As long as one follows his conscience and his likes and dislikes, whether something is right or wrong is self-evident.” He simply yielded the code of conduct in life to a person’s emotional demands. How audacious this was! That is why I say that his outlook “has full faith in man himself”. In ancient times, none except the Chinese people or, to be more exact, Confucianists, could adopt such an audacious position. It would naturally be hazardous to simply yield propriety to emotional demands. Here, I would like to cite only one example for religious comparison: In Gansu, a northwest province in China, where the Hui people and the Han people live alongside one another, the two ethnic groups differ markedly from each other in terms of morale and order. The Hui people are never addicted to opium (among many other good habits in life). Among the Han people, however, most are addicted to opium, though some are not. When people are addicted to opium, they become lazy and poor, from which many shortcomings arise. The reason for this is that the Hui

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people, who are religious, maintain their code of conduct in accordance with the rules of their religion and are under the direct supervision of the church rather than being free to do as they please. The Han people worship Confucius but they do not have religious precepts and church organizations, so they each act according to their own will and many people become debauched. Such a failure was certainly something that neither Confucius nor Mencius was aware of. Even if either of them was aware of it, however, he still did not necessarily intend to abandon his proposition. They seemed to flatly deny that there were any external criteria to follow. Consequently, Mencius consistently argued that righteousness lies within rather than without. To his mind, making efforts to find external criteria for righteousness was liable to simply become a substitute for righteousness itself, and the pursuit of benevolence and righteousness rather than through benevolence and righteousness. This was a compelling argument. However, this is the true spirit of Confucianism. This is morality without a trace of hybridity or falsity, nor of unacceptability or lack of awareness. However, can the task that religion shoulders on behalf of society be so easily replaced by each individual’s self-consciousness and self-discipline? Certainly not. In ancient times, religion used to prevail over politics, but as well as etiquette and custom and the legal system, the whole of society depended on it for its organization, and the whole culture depended on it for its center. How could it be simply replaced by individual morality! Even if the focus was shifted to morality, the cultivation of morality seemed to depend on one thing – propriety. In fact, religion in China perished precisely because it was replaced, for two main reasons: First, to organize society in accordance with ethical status; Second, to cultivate rationality through rites and music. With the integration of these two reforms, nothing had anything to do with religion.7 Both the advocating of filial piety and the implementation of rites and music in ancient times can be subcategorized under the idea of “propriety”. Thus what took the place of religion in China was actually “the propriety” of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius. Nevertheless, its purpose was to direct people toward morality, which differs sharply from religion. On this basis, we may say: morality takes the place of religion in China.

7 See LIANG Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, 1921, in which I argue that the combination of advocating f ilial piety and of implementing rites and music constitutes Confucius’ religion (pp. 140-141).

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Rites of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius

“Morality” and “religion” are two nouns that exist only today. No such distinction was ever made in ancient times and there was no possibility for Confucius to even intend the replacement of religion with morality. Nevertheless, from what came afterwards, we can see that the key to such a development in Chinese history lies with Confucius, who conceived a passionate love for and a deeply held belief in rationality. He aimed to awaken the rationality of others in order to realize his goal of establishing “a completely rationalized society”, and his method was to deploy the traditions of rites and music. Rationality in human beings, which originated in thought or language, though, can never make any difference unless it is enlightened or realized. The abstract idea of rationality is far less effective than tangible rites and music. Concrete rites and music act upon one’s vigor. One’s mentality and sentiments suddenly and unconsciously change amid the performance of rites and music, and rationality can predominate as if by magic. Such rites and music are long lost to later generations. What has been handed down to us today is at most merely a record that can be found in such Confucian classics as The Book of Rites and Etiquettes. Only through a comprehensive understanding of this inheritance can we be armed with the key to understanding these rituals, which consist of four words – “clean”, “just”, “peaceful” and “harmonious”. Let us consider what has been said: The sage’s morality, conduct and will are as bright and clear as those of the gods. Therefore, the junzi (a superior man) goes back to human nature to set man’s will in order, and uses music to educate the people. The use of music inspires people to take the right path in matters of moral conduct. Moral conduct is a manifestation of man’s nature. Music is its flower. Metal, stones, string and bamboo are the instruments it plays. Poetry shows the will of music, song uses notes to express music, and dance shows the inner beauties of music. Poetry, songs and dance all come from the heart and play the supporting roles to music in a performance. The feeling revealed by music is so deep and clear that it well shows the remarkable talent of the composer. So music alone cannot be hypocritical. Ceremony and music should not be neglected even for a moment. Music may be used to strengthen one’s mental accomplishment, and amiable, upstanding, kind and sincere deeds are then produced in nature. When

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a person’s heart is amiable, upright, kind and sincere, he will be pleased in his mind. If he is pleased, he is at ease and peaceful. When his mind is at ease and peaceful, he will retain his accomplishments for a long time, and he will be conscious of the natural law; if he knows the natural law, he may communicate with gods and spirits. He who knows heaven’s way will be respected without words, and he who may communicate with gods and spirits will be dignified without anger. This is the result of strengthening mental accomplishment by music. When the use of ceremony is to correct one’s appearance, he will be grave and reverent. If he is grave and reverent, he will be powerful. Anyone who is not calm or joyful for a moment will find meanness has entered his mind. Anyone whose appearance is not grave or respectful for a moment will find laziness and carelessness have entered his mind. So music affects man’s mind and ceremony affects man’s appearance. Music causes man’s mind to be calm and peaceful. Ceremony causes his appearance to be respectful and submissive. If he is calm in his mind and submissive in his appearance, no one will get into strife with him when seeing his countenance, or be lazy and careless when seeing his look. … The truth is that practicing ceremony and music makes it an easier task to govern in the world. Therefore, music promotes human relations, makes sight and hearing sharp and distinct, and the disposition calm and easy. It can remove the prevailing habits and customs and bring peace under heaven.

What is rationality? This will be elaborated on in the next chapter. Here, only four words – “clean”, “just”, “peaceful” and “harmonious” – are used to describe it. Obviously, however, there are two things which work against rationality: one is unreasonable bigotry and the other the impulse toward violence. These two invariably exist side by side, and even when only one of them appears, rationality is hampered. To put it bluntly, it is man himself whose misconduct most endangers his rationality. This is what Confucius most feared. Originally, Confucius did not detest religion, but he could not tolerate these two behaviors. As they were practically indispensable in any ancient religion, and he could not help but shrink away from them, his only option was to find a way to avoid religion. The most tragic disasters to man originate from man himself. Compared with natural disasters, man-made disasters are far more devastating than natural disasters. It was less the case when civilization was underdeveloped, but become more so as civilization grew more and more developed. This century’s world wars are obvious examples. Transforming outmoded habits

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and customs makes the world peaceful, which was the ideal cherished by Confucius. In my understanding, his ambition was to protect the world from man-made disasters. How, then, can such disasters be avoided? This requires us to figure out exactly where man-made disasters start. Many say that they originate from selfishness, thinking that selfishness is human nature. This is a complete misunderstanding. We will not expand on this for the moment, but one question should be raised: Should a sensible person also be selfish? Perhaps some people admit that sensible people are not selfish. However, the evil lies with lack of sense. It should also be asked: If a selfish person is extremely sensible, should he still have to harm others in order to benefit himself? It seems that many things reveal to us that this is not so. (What is particularly revealing is this: when things are beneficial to the parties involved, they are real benefits; when one does harmful things to others, he will also harm himself; to benefit himself, nothing should be done to harm others.) The problem still lies, however, with the fear of lack of sense. It can also be imagined that, selfish though man is, he is never cruel. In this case, can disasters be alleviated? I believe that it must be admitted that they can be alleviated. However, selfishness is not to be feared. What is to be feared is brutal violence. To sum up, catastrophic man-made disasters actually arise from foolish bigotry and violent impulses. If both foolish bigotry and violent impulse can be prevented, selfishness alone will be insufficient to cause disasters. To put it even more plainly, if both of these tendencies could be prevented, there would be no selfishness either. Nevertheless, these aspects of our nature are so deeply buried that most people have acquired no knowledge of them. In a word, foolishness, violence and selfishness are one side of the story, while the rationality that emerges from being “clean”, “just”, “peaceful” and “harmonious” is the other part of the story. Departure from this way of living means entry into that other way of living. Man as perpetrator of disasters is inevitably subject to foolish bigotry. If people followed rationality, there would certainly be no man-made disasters. In ancient times, as Confucianists acquired a deeper understanding of this idea, they made painstaking efforts to initiate a great ritual and music movement in order to imperceptibly eliminate man-made disasters. They aimed to make every aspect of human life well ordered by dignifying it and refining it, or simply by completely rationalizing it. In ancient times, since people’s lives – whether public or private, ranging from politics, law, military matters and diplomacy, to the support of their parents when they were alive and the arrangements for their funerals upon their deaths – are virtually inseparable from religion, Confucianists firstly turned ancient religion into ritual and later ritualized everything that was not dealt with in religion. This is what is meant by the saying that “ceremony

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(i.e., ritual) and music should not be neglected even for a moment”, which obliges people on a daily basis to habitually be “clean”, “just”, “peaceful” and “harmonious”, and certainly far from unknowingly foolish and violent. The practice that Confucianists turned ancient religion into rites, was described a long time ago, as was most keenly observed by Fung Yu-lan. He stated it in one of his published papers and later on included it in his book A History of Chinese Philosophy (pp. 417-432). He cited Confucianists’ own theory as proof that all their ritual ceremonies of sacrifices and funerals were only poetry and art, rather than religion. Such rites on the one hand could subtly and profoundly bring people consolation, and on the other hand were seen to be enlightening without being against rationality. He wrote: George Santayana, a modern philosopher, poet and humanist, proposed that religion should give up its superstition and dogmatism and model itself after poetry. But according to the interpretation of rites such as sacrifices and funerals, for which they advocated, Confucianists long ago amended ancient religion to make it poetic. Rites such as sacrifices and funerals or religious services in ancient times had no lack of superstition and dogmatism, but Confucianists originated new theories on the basis of the old truth, for clarification, and endowed them with new meanings so as to enable them to be transformed from religion to poetry. This is the greatest contribution that Confucianists have ever made.

Essentially, in their own discourse of Confucianism, everything has already been clearly stated. Hence, I say that sacrifice originates in the emotions stirred by remembrance and recollection of the dead and by thinking of and longing for the departed, expresses the highest loyalty, faithfulness, love, and reverence, and is the fulfillment of ritual observances and formal bearing. If it were not for the sages, no one would be capable of understanding the meaning of sacrifice. The sage clearly understands ritual, the scholar and gentleman find comfort in carrying it out, officials of government have as their task preserving it, and the Hundred Clans incorporate it into their customs. For the gentleman, ritual observances are considered to be part of the Way of Man. Among the Hundred Clans, they are thought to be a matter of serving the ghosts of the departed.8 8 Translator’s Note: Reference has been made to John Knoblock, Book 19, “Discourse on Ritual Principles” from Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, 1994 (p. 72).

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If you pray for rain and there is rain, what of that? I say there is no special relationship – as when you do not pray for rain and there is rain. When the sun and moon are eclipsed, we attempt to save them; when Heaven sends drought, we pray for rain; and before we decide any important undertaking, we divine with bone and milfoil. We do these things not because we believe that such ceremonies will produce the results we seek, but because we want to embellish such occasions with ceremony. Thus, the gentleman considers such ceremonies as embellishments, but the Hundred Clans consider them supernatural.9

Rites, which range from offering sacrifices to Heaven and to ancestors, to offering sacrifices to the hundred gods, can be said, from a negative perspective, to have been subject to no abrupt changes or to abolition so as to remain astonishingly eye-catching and on the positive side, to have an accepted and appropriate manner of expression. What Fung Yu-lan meant by “endowing it with new meanings” was actually no more than rationalizing it (whatever could not be rationalized was not recorded in the sacrificial rites, as has been said in Sacrificial Rites from Sacrificial Methods). Such rites either inspired high-minded ideals or lengthened enduring old friendships and acquaintances so that people were encouraged to exercise their benevolence and to enhance their virtues, and would surely assume a serious attitude and achieve their high ideals. So it is that in human life – stable, tough and interesting – nothing more is required from without. This is where Confucianism differs fundamentally from religion. Judging by appearance, its difference from religion lies in that it eschews superstition. It must be considered, however, why ordinary people should be superstitious. How did Confucius teach people not to be superstitious? Generally speaking, superstition actually arises out of the mentality that people have some requirements that must come from without. In one of my previous books, I wrote: Why is religion, something that cannot serve as food when people are hungry and as drink when people are thirsty, so much favored by people? It is because, since people mostly live by hope, religion can help them with this. People often need to have hopes and requirements. They are comforted by satisfying their hopes. They are encouraged when they come close to their hopes. They endure and are encouraged as their hopes 9 Translator’s Note: Reference has been made to John Knoblock, Book 17, “Discourse on Nature” from Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, 1994 (pp. 19-20).

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constantly rise. Disappointment and desperation are embarrassing to them. However, how could there be no disappointment or desperation! I am afraid that it is normal that people’s desire cannot be satisfied, and that it is an exception if people’s desire can be satisfied. Who can tolerate such a small, demanding world? Consequently, people would naturally go beyond their bounds of knowledge by breaking through the coldness of reason so as to open up an extraordinarily mysterious world and further expand the range of their expected requirements. Thus the content is more substantial, the meaning is more profound, and what is more, the result is more uncertain. This is just how an ordinary religion originates. It is precisely because of this that such practices as praying, averting a misfortune or disaster by prayers and washing away evil influence are indispensable to all ordinary religions. Though these are none other than the benefits that ordinary people get from religions, they are of no profound significance. However, religion then helps people stabilize their lives, enabling everyone to live on without suffering from mental breakdown.10

Confucius merely intended to stabilize human life, but what he had actually stabilized was something else. I once wrote in a previous book: He permeated people’s whole lives. He made you feel well without needing to receive anything, instead of making you satisfied by receiving something. He made you forget everything, including yourself, instead of making you distinguish yourself from other things so as to create further pursuits. How did he come by such great ability? It was thanks to his ritual and music.11

Ritual and music inspire people to be poetic and artistic so that so-called superstition is no longer superstitious and superstition comes from nowhere. Confucius only taught people to be superstitious, but it seems that he never made any efforts to get rid of superstition. His ritual and music functioned like a religion but had none of the flaws of religion. It was also because his ritual and music were so close to religion that he himself rejected religion in the end. 10 See LIANG Shuming, The Final Consciousness of the Chinese National Liberation Movement, 1933 (p. 67). 11 See LIANG Shuming, The Final Consciousness of the Chinese National Liberation Movement, 1933 (p. 67).

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Organizing Society through Morality

Ritual and music and bows to others, which are intended to express rational behavior, form one aspect of propriety or rite. Another aspect is “the arrangement of hierarchy and strata by ethics in order to organize the society”. These will be briefly discussed, as follows: As was stated in the previous chapter, China is an ethics-oriented society. This ethics undoubtedly was born out of the ancient patriarchal society, just as ritual and music were inherited from ancient religions. When Confucius himself said, “I have transmitted what was taught to me without creating anything of my own”, perhaps he was referring to this fact. But in reality, his own creation existed precisely in his transmission of what was taught to him, and his transmission of what was taught to him served as a way to create something of his own. The devolution of ancient religions into ritual and music and the translation of the ancient patriarchal clan system into ethics were obviously due to evolutions from previous practices. Ritual and music were mostly the contributions of our forefathers. The ethical hierarchy and strata, however, were derived mostly from Confucius’ teachings. Confucius’ contribution to this can be best illustrated by his so-called “rectification of names” in his Analects. That his teachings are all contained in The Spring and Autumn Annals, and “The Spring and Autumn Annals as an explanation for the hierarchy and strata” refers to just this. (See Chapter 33: Under Heaven, in Zhuangzi.) At the outset, I did not very much like the expression “hierarchy and strata”, thinking it was indeed too feudal, and I did not show much interest in Confucius’ emphasis on “the rectification of names”. So when I talked about Confucius in my book Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, I discussed everything about him except this. In my point of view, it was not very logical or reasonable for him to talk about rectifying names. But as I did not know what he really meant by that, I saw no harm in attending to what he said. It was after experiencing many breakthroughs that I suddenly came to realize that social structure is the backbone of culture and that the peculiarity of Chinese culture has to be cognized, as a first step, from the fact that Chinese society is an ethics-oriented society. This is something that I did not perceive when I previously talked about the differences in culture and philosophy between the East and the West. Admittedly, when I elaborated on the rural reconstruction theory, I pointed out how an ethics-oriented society is different from the individualist society or the collectivist society in the West. However, I was only vaguely aware that it was a transmutation of a family-oriented patriarchal society, without

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knowing much about its origin. It was only later that I finally learned that Confucius had specifically directed his attention to and exerted his greatest efforts on these notions of “hierarchy and strata” and “the rectification of names”, which I did not understand. Without such an intervention, history might have slipped by and an ethics-oriented society might not necessarily have come into being. In a feudal society, there are distinctions between different strata and different statuses. This is the so-called “hierarchy and strata”, a seemingly elaborate term. To highlight hierarchy and status has political and economic significance but their establishment and consolidation are dependent on religion. Generally, all patriarchal and feudal orders have to rely on religious authority and take religion as their foundation, which is true all over the world. It is precisely because of this that there emerge insurmountable or inviolable class identities. The ethical hierarchy and strata in China undeniably originated from the ancient patriarchal clan system and ancient feudalism. But after Confucius’ time, this idea no longer possessed its original patriarchal and feudal connotations and as time went by, it became less and less patriarchal and feudal. Such a change is closely associated with the rise and fall of ritual and music (and of religion), which also results from the rise of rationality. Here, we would like to cite a few basic examples: Both India and China, societies with ancient traditions, do not much change in their respective social histories. But they demonstrate this acute difference: India is the society where class identities are the most strictly differentiated while China is the society where class identities are the most loosely differentiated (such a comparison certainly does not include modern European and American societies). Such differentiations in India amount to several thousand types, among which the most prominent differentiations number more than eighty types. This is both incomprehensible and unimaginable to the Chinese people. In India, there are what is known as “untouchable people”, which is absurd to the ears of Chinese people, none of whom would countenance such a thing. This set of extremes is related to another set of extremes. The other extreme is this: India is a place where religion is extremely widespread while China is a place that, on the whole, lacks religion. India is a place where religion helps proliferate rigid customs and ideas throughout the whole society. China, however, is a place where open-mindedness prevails, which explains why rationality emerges there. Another example is Japan. In his book On the National Character of China, Watanabe Hidekata, a Japanese author, pointed out that Chinese people tended to repay others’ loving-kindness with loyalty, which is different

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from that pledged by Japanese samurai.12 For example, Zhuge Liang, a statesman and strategist, prime minister of the Kingdom of Shu in the period of the Three Kingdoms (220-265), would invariably think of Liu Bei’s kindness in seeking his help by paying him three visits. His loyalty grew out of his gratitude to Liu Bei, the late Emperor of the Kingdom of Shu, for his appreciation of his ability. Loyal ministers in Japan, however, do not have such underlying gratitude. Does this mean that if Liu Bei visited him only twice or once instead of three times, he would have less reason to be loyal? Watanabe Hidekata did not know that this is precisely the difference between loyalty in an ethical society and loyalty in a feudal society, a point that he unwittingly addressed. In a feudal society, such a relationship is fixed and rigid, but in an ethical society, the relationship is determined according to reason. As Mencius once said, “When the prince regards his ministers as his hands and feet, his ministers regard their prince as their belly and heart; when he regards them as his dogs and horses, they regard him as any other man; when he regards them as the ground or as grass, they regard him as a robber and an enemy.” Such is the Confucian theory, and in general such is also the theory of Chinese society, which has been influenced by Confucianism. Though Japan inherited the Chinese culture, its social essence is different from that of China, just as its social essence is different from that of the West, though it acquired Western culture later on. This point (i.e., that Japanese society is feudal instead of ethical) will be discussed in later chapters of this book. Let’s turn to the third example. Chinese society always stresses the importance of observing proper formalities between the old and the young. This is certainly one of the principles of an ethical society but it is rarely practiced in a feudal society. But even if in a society where proper formalities between the old and the young are observed, there is still a proverb that goes, “A senior, even if his beard is so long that it drags on the ground, is still not correct if he is unreasonable.” It can be seen from this that his seniority depends on the spirit of rationality. It can be well seen from the above three examples that they represent an antipathy toward the spirit of class status. The reason for this lies in all the efforts Confucius exerted (such as the so-called “rectification of names” and “The Spring and Autumn Annals as an explanation for the hierarchy and strata”). As is known, the old order, which was the chief source, was not emphasized, but a new, rational assessment added new meanings to it wherever possible. Let’s take an obvious example: Isn’t ministerial 12 Watanabe Hidekata, On the National Character of China, Shanghai: Beixin Press, 1929 (p. 23).

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heredity, from the perspective of the patriarchal clan system or in the light of feudalism, inevitable? The Spring and Autumn Annals, however, ridiculed those aristocrat officials as indecent. To take another example, both regicide and patricide should naturally be absolutely prohibited, but according to the doctrine of The Spring and Autumn Annals, these were very complicated matters. Some were accused of positive regicide, making rebels and traitors scared. Some people were threatened with execution, making tyrants and fierce fathers scared. Later on, Mencius said, “I have heard of the cutting off of the fellow Zhou of Yin, but I have not heard of the putting of a sovereign to death, in his case”. This originated from this idea. Sima Qian once said, “The Spring and Autumn Annals altogether has tens of thousands of Chinese characters, but its essence is captured in only several thousand words.” Works with such “sublime words with profound meanings” and “extraordinary and perverse theory” were very common. The old order gradually deteriorated and out of the old order a new order was gradually born. The new order refers to the order of an ethical society, as has been briefly mentioned in the previous chapter. Its birth came far later, that is, after the collapse of feudalism around the time of the Western Han Dynasty. However, it must ultimately be attributed to Confucius. Confucius’ great efforts to revise the then feudal order with the intention of making it an ideal society turned out to be ineffectual at first. However, his efforts, though they did not yield immediate results, produced indirect effects: The first point is that he provided enlightenment on human reason, enabling all old customs and ideas to shed the arbitrariness of irrefutability and non-negotiability, and instead strike a balance with reason. No doubt, those subtle and tricky doctrines in The Spring and Autumn Annals are not easy to understand. But rationality naturally inhabits man’s heart, and once it is inspired, it will acquire a significantly unifying force which gradually and irresistibly comes to be the measure of all things. This is essentially how the new order was born. The second point is that he emphasized with earnestness and tirelessness the importance of filial piety and fraternal duty by urging with honesty and sincerity the loving-kindness between family members and between father and son, and by extending this application from the near to the distant so that human relations in society would be built on amiability. Again, this direction is determined by the inherent nature of men’s minds, with such feelings flowing out in an irresistible flood. The gentle and mild atmosphere in Chinese society accords greater prestige to certain statuses. That is why ethics ultimately became the new order in place of feudalism.

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The feudalistic nature of ethics became the new order, which can be illustrated with one aspect. For example, two blood brothers, when they live at home with their parents, are naturally affectionate. How could there be any difference between them? However, when they grow up in a feudal society, the elder brother will inherit all the privileges upon the father’s death. Then, the two blood brothers will be accorded entirely different treatment: the elder brother will be accorded all the ranks and benefits of nobility and all the property while the younger one will receive nothing. Where does this primogeniture come from? In his famous book Ancient Law, Henry S. Maine advocated a principle: “any political system of inheritance is surely primogeniture.” Generally speaking, both the feudal order and the patriarchal order were established because it was then politically and economically necessary, but the collective life of super families built up an immensely powerful force for suppressing family sentiments. Up to the point that circumstances changed with the passage of time so that there was no longer any need for them, such customs passed down unchanged from generation to generation without anyone knowing where they came from. Consequently, such a system of inheritance tended to exist automatically. In the year 1936, before the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, I visited some villages in Japan where I was greatly surprised to see what they called the “Eldest Son School”, and asked about it. I got to know that by convention, the farm land was to be accorded to the eldest son while the younger sons would be accorded nothing at all. Most often, the younger sons were to be transferred to cities to make a living while the eldest sons mostly remained in the countryside. Consequently, they differed from each other in terms of education. This clearly shows that it was not long since the society had ceased to be a feudal one, and traditional customs still remained. In fact, most European countries still practiced such traditional customs until quite recently. Only China, however, does not. Its custom divides the parents’ heritage among all the male children equally. According to what Liang Qichao said in his book A History of Chinese Culture, this practice has lasted for almost two thousand years (see Collected Works at Ice-drinking Room, Vol. 18). This is no small matter. Nor is it a coincidence. It eliminates the unnaturalness of the feudal order by means of man’s natural capacity to be reasonable. What we have called “ethics in place of feudalism” is one noteworthy aspect of this. In general, it is the power of the large group, outside the family, that governs family relations. It can be said that from the external to the internal, many aspects of society, even if they were unreasonable, irrational or unfair, were not easily rectified until modern times. But this locates the relationships between family members, between

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father and son, and between brothers in the larger society. It can be said that from the center to the margin, such practice also makes this larger society both equal and intimate, a feature that never existed in any ancient society. People changed in spite of themselves. Ethical order was not born in a day. It came about through etiquette culture, which was separated from religion and feudalism, and which came into being in society itself. – Etiquette culture in general was not attached to religion, and religion was generally separate from feudalism, yet etiquette culture nevertheless gained support from feudalism. But etiquette culture resulted from the illumination by a certain school instead of being attached to religion, which has ultimately declined since then. Etiquette culture won widespread support in society without relying on feudalism or any other force and feudalism was now simply giving way to it. Etiquette culture has been the backbone of the Chinese culture for two thousand years. It immutably dictates the organizational structure of Chinese society, remaining stable in essence. The issue of Chinese social history, which is surprisingly incomprehensible the world over, owes much to this culture. What we have called a long-lasting society with rare changes and a long-stagnant culture can both be attributed to this etiquette culture. Why, then, has it remained unchanged for such a long time? Francois Quesnay (1694-1774), the eighteenth-century European advocate of the natural order, tried to answer this question by saying, “What the Chinese people call ‘the heavenly principles’ and ‘the laws of nature’ is simply the natural law itself. The Chinese system of cultural relics is fundamentally the natural law itself. Consequently, it lasts as long as nature.” Such remarks are not meaningless. Since etiquette culture varies from time to time, such endurance is surely based on the will of the people with no forces whatsoever sustaining it. As Mencius said, “The sages only apprehended before me that of which my mind approves along with other men.” The timely efforts by Confucius to offer enlightenment to others were truly indispensable. In my view, what Confucius highlighted was not so much the social order or the social organization as the individual, which is, how an individual governs himself – just as the old Chinese saying goes, “how one conducts himself in society is of prime importance.” Nevertheless, an individual is only one point in the networks of multiple relationships. The question of how one conducts himself in society addresses precisely this, and so the social organization and the social order are also naturally highlighted. For example, in ancient Greece, the two concepts of “the wholesome personality” and “the best citizen” could not be easily differentiated. Here, an individual was observed as one member of a group or a city-state. Thus

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group relation was emphasized. The situation in China, even from the earliest times, was quite different. If we turn to Confucius, then, he did not hold the same view and emphasized that he was one of the members of a family. And in his family, it could be easily seen that he was part of a series of relational human connections, such as the son of his father and the father of his son; the membership of the group or the extended family were secondary to interpersonal relationships. An individual with a wholesome personality would naturally represent the combination of a filial son, a loving father, and so on. It would not be said that such an individual would be the best of all his family members, such an expression being too abstract and elusive. This is the first step. From here, two paths diverge. One emphasizes the relationship between the group and the individual, and the other emphasizes the relationship between one individual and another, which starts from within the family. An individual can be a filial son and a loving father. Being filial and loving is no more than being earnest and committed. How such feelings should be made honest and sincere was naturally Confucius’ focus. – This is the second step. This is the most prominent difference between the Confucian school and other schools (whether in China or even in the rest of the world). It is common knowledge that the Confucian school was most vividly characterized by its honest and earnest filial piety, and all kind and sincere affections. A filial son or a loving father, on a personal level, distinguishes himself; socially speaking, a certain organization or a certain order also distinguishes itself on this basis. It is simply all part of the same thing instead of two separate things. It is like when a Greek distinguishes his own personality: at the same time, he distinguishes the organization of the city-state. Nevertheless, while the status relations and the rights and obligations of citizens in their city-states are more prominent than the laws, these can only develop into etiquette culture and cannot be treated as laws. – This is the third step. This is exactly how the hierarchy and strata advocated by the Confucian school arose. How, then, does etiquette culture differ from the law? In The Spirit of the Laws, Charles de Montesquieu said, Laws are established, manners are inspired [here, “manners” mean what we call “etiquette culture”]; these proceed from a general spirit, those from a particular institution.”13

13 See Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Chapter XII, Book XIX, 1989.

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This briefly states the discrepancy in how they came about. Indeed, this discrepancy exhibits an essential difference: While etiquette culture shows people what they should ideally aspire to, so they will be spurred on to attain their goals, the law shows people the actual facts, so that the state can supervise and administer situations so everything goes smoothly. Though these two processes are sometimes indistinguishable, that is how I see it. Most obviously, some requirements which lack objective standards can hardly be included in the terms of the law. Whatever aspirations are encouraged can only be dictated by traditional customs, moralization and etiquette culture. The law does not condemn people for lack of morality. This would go beyond the remit of law. Etiquette culture, however, expects people to act according to morality and when this morality is ubiquitous, it then becomes etiquette culture. – When we understand this, we can also understand why membership based on ties of friendship, such as China’s ethics, can only develop into etiquette culture. In his book Rationality and Democracy, Zhang Dongsun said that ever since the ancient Greco-Roman era, their states and their social order are most prominently stipulated in the law. Only in China does this not occur. Since ancient times, the so-called law in China has been only criminal law. What is stipulated in the law in China must be related to punishment. The law in China does not stipulate the function of social organizations, only the measures for preventing people from impairing the established order. The vast majority of social organizations and social order is encoded in “etiquettes”, which are practiced in the common law instead of in the written law.14 Zhang also saw this point, which is sufficient to verify mine above. But why one is enacted into law while the other is oriented toward etiquette culture, he did not discuss. If we now wish to trace a cause, we will find one: the third step, as mentioned above, was determined by the first step. Beginning in the West, like the city-states of ancient Greece, the relationship between the group and the individual was greatly valued. As a consequence, it was inevitable that attention was paid to power for the group and rights and interests for the individual. Their distinctions seemed to be rigid: the more unequivocal, the better. Consequently, people relied heavily on the law, only requiring verifiable facts, with the expectation that an ideal life could be guaranteed by law. From the very first, however, China was different. Ever since the Duke of Zhou and Confucius, the relationship between family members and 14 See pp. 62-67 in Zhang’s Rationality and Democracy. This is a summary of the text, which is rather long.

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between father and son has been more distinctly emphasized, and what is cherished in one’s heart is nothing other than this sentiment and personal loyalty. Their distinctions seemed to be flexible, and the more honest and sincere they were, the better. Consequently, what was practiced in China later developed into etiquette culture, modeling what people ideally aspired to, and establishing the organizational order. The ethical hierarchy and strata advocated by Confucian school were naturally intended to develop certain customs and notions. Based on such notions, the ideal moral qualities can be clearly identified and at the same time, an organizational order can also be introduced when different hierarchies and strata, which are nothing more than different job titles, combine to constitute a society. The definition of “hierarchy and strata’ in The Spring and Autumn Annals is indeed the counterpart to the formulation of a legal code in other countries. Right or wrong, or tolerance or rejection, are at the center of this culture, and value judgments are thus made clear to all; a social structure that takes culture as its backbone is herein established. These points are crucial. No wonder Confucius said, “Yes? It is The Spring and Autumn Annals which will make men know me, and it is The Spring and Autumn Annals which will make men condemn me!” This is not, however, a legal code but etiquette culture. It concerns only the relation between one and the other(s), and between due sentiment and personal loyalty, with the result that everyone is expected to be self-conscious and self-motivated. Just like the laying of railway tracks, etiquette provides a path for people to follow in order to uphold morality and at the same time, initiates the practice of ritual and music and of showing deference to others. Hence morality may become something very natural to man. Aside from sanctions in public opinion, it is not like a legal code, which is to be supervised and administered by an authority that sits high above the common people. Up to this point, then, what we have termed “replacement of religion by morality” is accomplished. Otherwise, religion could never be replaced by morality. Nevertheless, the order as envisaged in The Spring and Autumn Annals has never been realized. This echoes my earlier point, that Confucius’ efforts to revise and idealize the existing feudal order turned out to be in vain. What he bequeathed to later generations remains only the broad outline of an ethical order.



Chapter Seven Rationality – A Human Characteristic

7.1

Definition of Rationality

Based on the previous study, it can be seen that the difference between Chinese culture and Western culture actually lies in the divergence between their religious beliefs. China lacked religion and developed rationality early. Thus, it won’t do if no definition of rationality is given. To my understanding, rationality is an essentially human characteristic, and at the same time, the key to understanding Chinese cultural characteristics. As it will be the most important concept in this book, it is crucial for us to discuss it here, though an explication of it would require a whole book. What is rationality? First, I will say this: rationality starts from thinking and speaking. Men are animals in their actions. But at the same time, they can tell the difference between actions reflecting benign speaking or thinking and actions reflecting subtle speaking or thinking. Dynamic actions can belie a quiet nature and quiet actions can belie a dynamic nature. As regards thinking and speaking, there is a belief in psychology that “thinking is silent speaking and speaking is voiced thinking.” Originally, there was no need to make a distinction between them. Sure enough, rationality starts from thinking and speaking. But that man can think and speak is attributed to his very rationality. It is necessary to make a further distinction between them, therefore. So, are you willing to work out where rationality lies? You may observe other people or engage in self-reflection: when they stay calm and reasonable without any distracting thoughts in mind, when they can most effectively take in what other people say, and when it is the easiest for two speakers to accept what each other says, that is the very moment at which a person possesses rationality. This so-called “rationality” means nothing more than the peaceful and sensible state of this mind of ours. It seems rather simple and ordinary, but it is indeed the most treasured state in the universe. In all creation, the only species that has never been stuck at a mechanical stage of development is human beings. And among human beings, the only characteristic that has never remained mechanical is their rationality. Generally speak+ing, human beings are characterized by their Reason. This used to be nothing out of the ordinary. But what I want to emphasize here is that human beings are characterized by their rationality. How, then,

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can rationality and Reason be differentiated? Are they the same thing or two different things? Words such as “rationality” and “Reason” are in fact often seen in books published in China only in the last thirty or forty years. Usually, there seems to be no differentiation between them and they refer to the same thing. Cases in which they are used differently and refer to different things are rarely seen.1 This is partly because these two concepts are closely related and thus it is difficult to make a distinction, and partly because these two nouns are neologisms with similar literal meanings, lacking specific definitions. But here in this book, we will try to demarcate them. Living things evolve their own way of living. Plants feed themselves on inorganic material by staying fixed in one place, while animals hunt for food by roaming from place to place. Obviously, they develop in their own ways, with the former being static and the latter being dynamic. Animals can be classif ied into two types – arthropods, which tend to live by instinct, and vertebrates, which tend to live by Reason. The former follow their innate drives. The latter, by contrast, being less endowed with innate capabilities, need to learn new things before they can make progress in life, which is living according to Reason. The former are best represented by bees and ants and the latter only by human beings. We can thus conclude that plants, arthropods and vertebrates represent three modes of life for living things. A comparison between these three ways of living reveals that plants live a life that is least defined by effort, those that live by instinct have to expend more effort to survive and those that live by Reason have the most complex lives. Parasitic animals, which are lazy animals, have reversed their course to find the life that demands least effort. Fish, birds, mammals, apes and humans (which are vertebrates) grow, in roughly this order, more and more attuned to Reason and develop further beyond instinct. Though they all tend to live by Reason, they can never attain their goals if any slight deviation occurs in their evolution. Here “deviation” means something that tends toward living a less effortful life. Living things that tended toward this sort of life long ago had gone astray even longer before. Only those that consistently have no fear of taking trouble can be expected to attain their goals – and these are human beings. 1 In his Preface to ZHANG Dongsun’s Thoughts and Society, ZHANG Junmai argues that rationality is part of Reason and he seems to have made a distinction between the two. Unfortunately, however, when discussing these two concepts, he does not make this distinction clear enough, especially as concerns what “Reason” is.

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Human beings have made the most progress toward living according to Reason. But Reason is merely an instinctive tendency that goes against instincts. As a consequence of such a tendency, instincts become both ill-defined and weak, which is not true of human life. Through application of Reason, human beings do not live by instinct at all. For other species, the less developed their Reason is, the more they are surely dependent upon their instincts. Consequently, generally speaking, aside from human beings, other higher animals still live by instinct. Human beings are liberated from their instinctive life. Those that live by instinct only have a finite number of life tools, which reside in their bodies. Human beings, however, create an infinite number of tools that are separate from their bodies and use them to their best advantage. Those that live by instinct are either born with certain abilities or develop them within a short period of time after birth, ending up with a finite number of those abilities. Human beings, however, seem to have no abilities at all when they are born, but in time they are capable of doing anything – with their future prospects ultimately brilliant and unlimited. Human beings’ liberation from instinctive life started from the unspecified behavioral relationship between life itself and the external world but it alienated a comfort mentality or even broke away from the freedom of such a comfort mentality. This also entails weakening the functions of the bodily senses and organs in specific situations and improving the heart-and-mind. The heart-and-mind, by relying on accumulated experience, intervenes to transform specific experiences into abstract concepts in order to make them more widely applicable. Indecision precedes an act. Indecision that is prolonged is calmness, from which knowledge is derived, and by virtue of knowledge, problems may be resolved. This is a general idea of what it is to live by Reason. Human beings’ Reason is shown by two proofs. The first proof is that humans possess language, and the second is that they have a childhood learning phase. Languages, which are representative of their perceptions, are indeed greatly conducive to the generation of their knowledge. The extension of childhood on the one hand helps cultivate children’s practical and physical habits, which take the place of their instincts, and on the other hand gives them time to absorb their predecessors’ experiences and enrich their own knowledge. Those who live by Reason therefore rely heavily on post-natal learning. In terms of their way of life, human beings are doubtlessly characterized by their Reason, a point made in the above discussion. But inadvertently, this obscures a significant change, one that has taken humans beyond the

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condition in which living things are preoccupied simply with the problems of living (including individual survival and racial reproduction) without going any further. Human beings, however, have evolved further and transgressed this limit. If we solely observe their way of life without recognizing the special nature of life itself, we are simply reversing the order of importance. Instinctive acts are endeavors to survive, with each act contributing to that goal. As human beings head toward Reason, their lives begin to transcend their instincts. This means that they are no longer constrained by their way of life but suddenly become enlightened, so that they reach the realm of non-action. They may generate interest in anything that falls outside what is necessary for simply surviving. Naturally, of course, it is very likely that humans also do things simply for the sake of survival, either consciously or unconsciously. For instance, both the determination to seek the truth and the intention of doing good are endeavors naturally motivated by both the power and the profundity of human life, which cannot be interpreted as a means of striving for survival or as a stage of evolution. Reason is inherent in the deep calmness of non-action before it can be put to the best possible use. It fosters an impersonal feeling – that is, rationality. Rationality and Reason are both aspects related to the heart-and-mind. The intelligence-related aspect is called “Reason” and the emotion-related aspect is called “rationality”. These two aspects have long been intimately interconnected. Take the calculation of numbers, for example. While the endeavor to calculate is “Reason”, the mentality of striving for correctness is “rationality”. An erroneous calculation does not entail ignorance of oneself, which is an overwhelming emotion. This emotion is impersonal and does not cause any problems in life. Analysis, calculation, hypothesis, inference, and so on are all applications of Reason which do not involve particular assertions. Making assertions is an act of rationality. Various choices are derived from rationality, but selfless feeling2 should be placed in a central position. This forms a much grander conception that human beings harbor – a strong desire for self-fulfillment in the pursuit of a reasonable way of life, which is something quite different among human beings than among other animals, whose sole purpose in life is survival. Human beings both started and quitted their instinctive life out of necessity and they would not make any errors if they were not prone to being anxious. Higher animals also make mistakes but it is rarely possible 2 Impersonal feeling was alluded to by the British philosopher Bertrand Russell in his Principles of Social Reconstruction. I use this term in nearly the same sense as he does. Readers may refer to his book for further detail.

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for them to be both aware of this and responsible for this. Only human life consistently depends on the heart-and-mind, which means that nowhere can mistakes be prevented. As soon as errors become evident, they should never be reconciled. Making no mistakes is not to be over-valued. Mistakes themselves have no value in and of themselves, but making mistakes and at the same time being reconciled to them is of great value. This is just what we mean by “rationality”. Consequently, rationality outweighs everything else. Human features are made more profound and prominent when they are scrutinized through rationality rather than Reason. Hence my conclusion: human beings are characterized by rationality.

7.2

Two Inclinations and Two Misconceptions

The superiority which human beings are considered to have over other animals actually resides in the heart-and-mind. The “heart-and-mind” may be contrasted with functional (or sensory) organs. Among higher animals, the heart-and-mind, inseparable from the functional organs, does not develop beyond the initial stage and tends to be concealed by the functions of the sensory organs. Only in human beings can the heart-and-mind be fully implemented and exceed the capacities of the functional organs. By the same token, it should really have been said that human beings are characterized by the heart-and-mind. Words such as “Reason” and “rationality”, which in common practice are used interchangeably, in fact refer precisely to the heart-and-mind. In other words, the statement with which I began this chapter – “rationality starts from thinking and speaking” – also applies to the heart-and-mind. However, when I conduct my analysis in the light of the heart-and-mind, I find that there are indeed two different aspects – i.e., Reason and rationality – which is self-evident. So I treat these two words as two different concepts, with “the heart-and-mind” as an umbrella term, which seems to be the clearest and the most appropriate solution. (It is a pity, of course, that the term “heart-and-mind” cannot express what is meant by “reason” or “accordance with reason or law”.) From human beings’ exercise of the heart-and-mind – which is their unique strength – comes human culture, and culturally prosperous nations and regions like ancient China and the modern Western world have brought their respective strengths into full effect. On the other hand, it seems that they often follow their own tendencies. In other words, Westerners are strong in Reason but lacking in rationality, while the Chinese are strong

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in rationality but lacking in Reason. To confirm what I say here, a fuller explanation must be made of the distinction between rationality and Reason. The Chinese used to say that “studies instill Reason in a person”. In the countryside, it is more often said that someone is reasonable simply because he has completed his studies. What is meant by “reasonableness”? With no need of further explanation, the Chinese people know its meaning very well. Certainly, it excludes reasoning on physics, on chemistry, on all natural sciences and even on social sciences. It may be that the same utterance, to the ear of a Westerner, even fosters a different understanding! Many books are published both in China and in the West. No book is concerned with anything other than what is considered reasonable. But a browse through all of them will make you aware that some things seem very different. While books published in China ultimately prefer reasonableness in daily acts such as extending a father’s kindness, practicing filial piety toward one’s parents, developing a sense of shame, conceiving love for others, treating others with fairness and being trustworthy, the books published in the West are concerned with principles related either to natural science or to social science, or to pure abstract mathematics or reasoning. So, when the Chinese people say that “studies make one reasonable”, Westerners will think that studies merely allow one to understand the principles of those sciences. The principles of the sciences are a fixed type of knowledge. People are content to know something “is the case” and have no motivation to carry on any further. The reasonableness that the Chinese people value, however, aims to give direction to people’s actions. It is often represented by such powerful maxims as “I do not know how a man is to get on without truthfulness,” or “In the face of money trouble, a true gentleman will never ask for it, and in distress, a true gentleman would rather die for a just cause than evade death like a coward.” Such sentences are as abstract as possible, without referring specifically to any one person or thing, but the interpretation of them is dynamic rather than static. Of course, the principles of the sciences can be related to a certain action, but they do not offer people direction. For example, we might know that “an electric shock can cause death”. But whether you expose yourself to getting an electric shock or not depends solely upon you. Due to the fear of death, most people will doubtless try to avoid it. But those who want to commit suicide, however, may quite possibly get an electric shock on purpose. Generally, science follows a formula: “such being the case, so it is the eventual outcome.” There is a significant disparity between the two respective understandings of “reason”. The former, “the reason for cultivating a human relationship”, can be summarized as “reasonableness”, while the latter, “the reason

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for formulating the principles of sciences”, can be summarized as “the scientific principle”. From a cognitive point of view, a distinction should be made between these two. A popular saying in Chinese concerns “the sense of righteousness”. The sense of righteousness, a kind of emotion, is the ready acceptance and advocacy of justice, and the detestation and denial of non-justice. These two aspects constitute the cognitive ability to recognize justice, without which justice itself can never be strived for. The same is true with the reasoning behind both right and wrong and good and evil. Nodding one’s head means “yes” and shaking one’s head means “no”. Good resides in admiration, respect and appreciation, and evil resides in detestation, indignation and cynicism. But though this is true of the reason for cultivating a human relationship, just the opposite is true with regard to the reason for formulating the principles of sciences. The reason for cultivating a human relationship cannot be recognized in the absence of one’s own biases, but the reason for formulating the principles of sciences can be recognized only in the absence of one’s own biases. In other words, the reason for formulating the principles of sciences has to be figured out from a personal perspective and this practice depends on one’s sensory perception and reasoning. One’s sensory perception and reasoning, originally the calmer outcome of human beings escaping their instincts, can only be fully exercised after all human feelings are, out of necessity, removed. Consequently, scientists are renowned for their calmness. But even in this opposition there is still something in common with feeling: reasonableness, though prominent emotionally, must be selfless. Selfless emotions, likewise, are the outcome when human beings calm down after escaping their instincts, which has been pointed out before. In a word, these two different “reasons” are derived respectively from two kinds of cognition: the cognition which is sharp and profound after personal feelings are quelled is called “Reason” and the cognition which passes a clear and settled judgment with no bias for good or evil is called “rationality”. Animals live by instinct. They hardly ever make any errors. Nor are they aware of any errors. Errors belong only to human beings. It is extremely easy for human beings to make errors, which fall into two different categories. For example, when students in school give wrong answers to examination questions, this is one type of error – an error in knowledge. But if students cheat in school examinations, that will be another type of error – an error in conduct. The former error, a mental block in study, raises the issue of intelligence while the latter error raises the issue of morality. The intelligence issue has to do with Reason and the moral issue has to do with rationality.

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The student’s perception of his error afterward results in the former case from Reason, while in the latter case it results from rationality. These two different kinds of errors are naturally concerned with the two different uses of reason as stated above. We sometimes see our errors due to these reasons and sometimes approve of these reasons because of our errors. In particular, the reason for the latter reasonableness enables us to acquire common knowledge through trial and error. If no errors occur at all, men will never work out the reason for them. The reason is constant but the errors are varied. It is, however, almost true to say that there is more variety than constancy. People easily and often make both kinds of errors, i.e., an error in knowledge and an error in conduct. What accounts for that? All errors result from the perception that two options are both or may be both possible, or that either one is possible. In such cases, Reason loosens instinct. Since life’s mechanical aspect is loosened, then, without resorting to this aspect, life exhibits its own value. This naturally ensures both flexibility and appropriateness, which can be the best as it can be. But can life invariably manifest itself? Here is where the problem lies. If life can invariably manifest itself, then no errors will ever occur. But the problem is: after life is freed from its mechanical aspect, there may be both excitement and slackness so that no eternal constancy can be ensured. Its blank space, however, forever needs to be filled by life. One moment’s slackness will result in erroneousness so that at this very moment, there is neither exactitude demonstrated by machines nor flexibility demonstrated by human beings. Though errors may be of two kinds, the reasons for errors lie to the greatest extent in here. Since it is indeed difficult for human life not to be slack, human beings, inevitably, are hardly ever prevented from making errors. The difficulty of not growing too relaxed is that not only is laxity itself considered relaxing, but also excitement is considered relaxing. Why then is excitement regarded as being relaxed? Clearly, excitement is always the state of being excited. It can be induced in one way but can distort in another way. Consequently, it also displays inconstancy. This inconstancy is laxity. Allow me to reiterate: instinct is the organized inborn reaction of the senses to the outside world and Reason is a threat to instinct, “the loosened state” as has been identified above. Only by filling the gap left by the retreat of instinct can life itself define its value, which is then referred to as the heart-and-mind. But the heart-and-mind that can never reach the outside world has to resort to human organs (the senses) before it can define its value. The difference is that on the one hand, organs function by themselves, but on the other hand, all organs center round the heart. This mechanism works subtly and their subtleties are hardly discernible. Being

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constant simply means being constant in these mechanical subtleties. Can that be achieved? Without it, constancy relies solely on the power of mechanical organs without the presence of the heart-and-mind. Excitement and relaxation may seem to be the opposites, but here, they are indeed of the same nature. Nevertheless, no error can be so grave as doing evil deliberately; an unintentional fault is only a slight error. An unintentional fault results from carelessness and negligence. A deliberate evil, however, obscures rationality out of either resentment or desire, but under the guise of using Reason as a tool, the exaltation born of both resentment and desire results in what is called “acting on impulse”. An impulsive act occurs when one follows his instincts, and the instinct is excited when he relies on his bodily senses. As has been previously said, all instincts have their own self-serving functions but rationality has no such functions. As has also been said before, Reason and rationality are two aspects of the heart-and-mind, that is, knowledge and sentiment. Something that is greatly treasured by human beings is that their physical reactions gradually crumble while the function of the heart-and-mind slowly improves, and that as they become composed and steady, they become detached emotionally. So, when people’s embitterment overshadows their rationality in the guise of Reason, their favoritism appears in place of their self-preservation, their calmness is submerged under their excitement and their sensory organs are given priority while their heart-and-mind enslaved by the sensory organs. The heart-and-mind is not where evil lies but where kindness originates. The sensory organs are not where evil lies but where actions are initiated. In human life, breeding evil is no easy matter. All evils arise from nothing but the reversed order of the heart-and-mind and the sensory organs. All evils, no matter how much they vary, follow this simple pattern. When excitement abates and the evil-doer experiences regret, it means that rationality has won out and the heart-and-mind and the sensory organs are restored to their original conditions. Consequently, no one can be prevented from making errors, which may be determined by Reason (which loosens instincts), and no one can be reconciled to any errors, which can be determined by rationality (which is selfless). These two kinds of errors can be easily and are infrequently committed. It seems, however, that errors in knowledge are not so colossal as errors in behavior. Just think of the disputes that break out between different countries throughout the world. It is often the case that one country considers the other country wrong and thus they blame and contend with

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each other. This is most probably due to errors in behavior, and from these errors arise disasters that are far more devastating. With the present state of science and the accumulation of wisdom, however, human beings risk self-destruction. This is an issue related to behavior rather than knowledge, and to rationality rather than Reason.

7.3

Chinese People’s National Spirit

As I often say, unless the Chinese people have been living in vain for the past several thousand years, and if they have ever made any contribution, that contribution would be their understanding of why human beings are human beings. On the contrary, in modern times up to the contemporary era, though people in Europe and the US have accomplished far more brilliant academic achievements than their predecessors, about this point they appear to be rather naive. For over twenty years, I have been preparing for the writing of the book The Heart-and-Mind and Life with the intent of seeking advice from my contemporaries. Though the book is not yet finished, my accumulation of knowledge year after year has, as I expected, confirmed my view. In the present era, when academic research flourishes vigorously but man-made calamities are more dire than ever before, Westerners have gradually realized that their research (which is totally concerned with the material world) has lost sight of human beings to such an extent that even though so much is known about the material world, very little is known about man himself.3 It is only recently that people have begun to shift their focus and commit themselves to the study of human beings. It seems that not many achievements in this direction have ever been produced. How do I dare say they are naive? Today, there are also many disciplines which are concerned with human beings. Psychology, in particular, ought to be a discipline that is specifically designed to study human beings. As to its methodology, its objective and scope of study, people differ in their views and no consensus has thus far been reached. Compared with other disciplines, doesn’t it end up seeming rather naive? Among scholars who differ in their views, their understanding of human beings is almost completely 3 In Issue 2, Volume I of the weekly Observer, the paper “On Human Control and Material Control” by Pan Guangdan states that current academic research and education have already so completely ignored human beings that humans now fall outside the scope of scientific research and are left in a no-man’s-land. The book Man, The Unknown, by the US scholar Alexis Carrel, also deals with this problem.

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incompatible with that of the ancient Chinese, but really quite compatible with that of their own forefathers. Since the Greeks, it seems that the concept of “man being kind by nature” has disappeared. Since the appearance of Christianity, it seems more commonly accepted that man is born with sin. Modern psychologists, by resorting to various scientific methods and disciplinary feats, also find out exactly this: that man himself is ruled by various forces, which are not necessarily harmonious. They say that “what now needs to be explained is not why man engages in many unprincipled conducts but why people’s conducts can still be principled.”4 Of course, this cannot be considered the same as religion, which practices asceticism, or as metaphysics, which treats the human body as the source of all evil. Both religion and metaphysics, however, are unexpected occurrences and they seem to follow each other. What stands in sharp contrast is this: First, the ancient Chinese justifiably found harmony in human life – first, a person finds harmony within himself (the expression, “Courtesy with no rituals and music with no sound” refers to just this); second, the person-to-person relationship is harmonious (as implied in the saying, “The world can be regarded as one family and China can be regarded as one man”); third, the whole universe, with man as the center, becomes harmonious (and hence we say, “When the states of ‘Centrality’ and ‘Harmony’ have been achieved, Heaven and Earth will be in their rightful places and all things will be nourished and will flourish” and “those who are nurtured and transformed by heaven can form a triad with heaven and earth”). Confucians cannot help but continually marvel at the universe and human life. They always value human beings highly. In particular, they always have faith in human beings and never regard them as problematic, so they do not need to find a way to cope with them. Such harmony, the representation of a clear and tranquil mind, is what we mean by rationality. All living things are restricted to “opposition”. Only human beings, however, have progressed from “opposition” to the realm of “unity”. Having a clear mind means living in harmony. Both these two states of being are a result of this shift away from binarism. As might be expected, the belief in harmony has been asserted since this shift away from binarism. If this belief were not entertained, there would be no way to achieve this state of being. Probably whether a mind is clear or not, or whether someone experiences harmony or not, has everything to do with life itself. When it concerns human beings, it is self-evident and self-knowing, 4 This is quoted from William McDougall, a psychologist who specializes in research on instincts, and his theory has also been mocked by metaphysicians.

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and self-proving and self-believing. Whenever efforts are made to create such states of being, they have to go to the outside world for help. But life is not found in the outside world. In today’s world, the methods adopted by scientists are always simply derived from the opposition mode that living things adopt toward the outside world, a mode that is only a shadow of a life and, at the same time, tends to be rather mechanical. Here, harmony cannot be found but problems certainly can. In reality, human beings are absolutely not free from problems. To say that problems lie with human beings is by no means incorrect. But it should be known that problems do lie with all human beings. The resolution of these problems is still within the power of human beings themselves, not external forces. If no trust is placed in human beings, what then? Should trust be placed in God? Should trust be placed in one’s country? Or should trust be placed in …? Westerners often resort to placing trust in external forces, but never will Chinese people do so. As Confucius assumed an honest attitude, he did not display his optimism (he did not advocate goodness in man by nature) and he only taught others wherever possible to be introspective (see the previous citations from Analects of Confucius), which means that everyone should cultivate rationality. As Mencius assumed an open-minded attitude, he showed others exactly where rationality lies. Such statements as, “The function of the heart-and-mind is to think”, “Following one’s own heart-and-mind in conduct will make one a noble person, while always thinking of gratifying one’s own senses will make one a base person”, and “When important matters are established, the less important ones will not be led astray” all clearly indicate that the heart-and-mind function is more important than the senses, and should not be obscured by them. His analogy, “Just as reason and righteousness please my heart-and-mind, meat pleases my mouth”, his theory of “fear” and “compassion” as arising from one aspect of the heart-and-mind function, point directly to rationality. Lastly, he advised, “Never do what one should not do and never lust for what one should not desire. That is all!” How straightforward he was: his remarks undoubtedly made his contemporaries swiftly enlightened. The Japanese scholar Gorai Kinzō once said, “From Confucianism, we can well see the victory of rationality.” What Confucians revere is not Heaven, nor God, nor the monarch, nor the state power, and not the majority of the people either. Only if these (Heaven, God, the monarch, the state and the majority of the people) are used as synonyms for rationality would they revere them. It is quite accurate to say that if Confucians had an “-ism”, it would be called “rational conciliarism”.

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Under the inspiration of Confucianism, for over two thousand years, the Chinese people have fostered a general mood, or a national spirit, in its society. Except for recent decades, which saw the gradual disappearance of this general mood or national spirit (which is not easily discernible), the life of the Chinese people and the development of their national life in the past all depended on this spirit. If we analyze this spirit, we find that it consists of roughly two elements: one is the aspiration to greatness and the other is deep friendship with one’s peers. A strong desire for self-fulf illment suggests a state of mind in which one is not satisfied with making errors, in which one has his sense of what is right and just, in which one is willing to be good and acknowledges goodness, in which one requires that everything be just and reasonable, in which one upholds justice, in which one develops a strong sense of shame, and/or in which one detests laziness but bounces back from a state of depression… In short, notwithstanding personal gains and losses in life, there is always a strong desire for self-fulf illment, which can be summed up as “a positive life”. Adopt such an attitude in life, and you will feel greatly at ease though you are not aware of your specif ic gains. Abandon such an approach to life, and you will experience regret and feel uneasy, as if you have lost something, even though you cannot see what this something may be. To the ancient Chinese people, this something was “righteousness” or “reason”. It is innate in human beings. However, when human culture lacked progress and reason was completely overshadowed by taboos, worship, superstitions and social customs, no individual’s consciousness was ever awakened; even if it was, it was not noticeable. Even in a highly civilized society, if a certain religion or a certain authority is so powerful that it dominates the minds of the people, such consciousness could not possibly develop here, either. Consequently, Europeans in the Middle Ages could not be said to have developed adequate consciousness. Modern Europeans, though their personal consciousness has indeed been awakened, focus pitifully on securing their survival and pursuing happiness. As they were habitually utilitarian, their thinking about external matters roamed freely but they lacked the intuition to even perceive this inner consciousness. Contemporary Europeans, needless to say, have surpassed their predecessors in every aspect of culture, but in this one respect, they have made no progress. Only the ancient Chinese, who managed to refrain from religious belief, became the f irst to fully recognize the human spirit, and accordingly centered all their attitudes toward life and their value judgments around it. Though such a spirit was not popularized at the

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time because it arrived too early,5 its prevalence as a general mood in this society is overwhelming. As regards attitudes toward life, what is often seen elsewhere seems to invariably pit one approach against another. In India, for example, religions that are no longer concerned with the affairs of the secular world (fame, social status, wealth, etc.) make up one faction and the school of Lokaayatika makes up the other. Likewise, in Europe, for example, religion in the Middle Ages formed one side of the contention while modern or even contemporary attitudes toward life constituted the other side. The former deny earthly life and show no concern for earthly affairs, suppressing all sensual desires. The latter value earthly life, conceiving life simply as the satisfaction of all desires. Who has ever seen a genuine third road? But it is the Chinese people who have opened up a middle way (which is, indeed, very difficult) instead of following a compromised path (which must be clearly understood). The Chinese take a positive attitude toward life and devote themselves to earthly affairs, which has absolutely no connection at all with those religions that show no concern for such earthly matters and preach the suppression of all sensual desires. They do not, however, overvalue earthly happiness and they particularly denounce all sensual desires. They devote themselves wholly to the following: Not to cultivate virtue, not to review what is learned, not to do the righteous though having heard of it, not to rectify what is not good – these things are what I worry about. (7.3, Chapter VII, Analects of Confucius) A superior man does not seek satiety in his food nor ease in his dwellingplace. He is earnest in what he is doing and cautious in his speech. He associates with those who possess the Way and thereby he may be rectified. Such a person may indeed be said to love learning. (1.14, Chapter I, Analects of Confucius)

If you browse through Analects of Confucius or Mencius, you will find that similar sentences abound and they are all highly quotable. Since they were written, the debate between “reason” and “desire” and that between “righteousness” and “profit” have dominated the two thousand years of Chinese history. This is a unique phenomenon in the history of Chinese thought, 5 The reasons for these two problems (i.e., not having become widespread and arriving too early), will be elaborated on in Chapter Thirteen.

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as the most these debates achieve is to repeatedly address the component issues so that debaters can pick a side. As a result, China’s social economy has been stagnant for a period of over two thousand years. Not until modern trends from the West were introduced into China did the general mood in society begin to change. Confucians probably think that the value of human life lies in unremittingly practicing Reason as they see this as a conscious ascent to a higher level. Broadly speaking, there are numerous ways to ascend in life, but strictly speaking, this is the only way to ascend in the truest sense. This can be illustrated in two steps. First, all human inventions suggest an effort to move to a higher level. Human life is different from the material world – which has its limits: “That’s all there is to it”, as we might say – and its prospects can be opened up infinitely. Its unfolding, which is an observable phenomenon, is represented by the progress of human culture. Inventions and creations, including the cultural products and social institutions of all periods of history, and even the realization of an ideal future society, all belong to this category. There is also a person’s internal development or an unfolding of his personal prospects. This refers to the achievements of a person’s everyday perception, and the development of his profundity and sensitivity, which are reflected clearly in his public morality. This, as is commonly seen, is the result of educational achievement, and from antiquity to the present, the successes in cultivation in various Eastern or Western academic schools or religions (if they are not illusory) all belong to this category. The creations of the former category are outside of oneself, while those of the latter category are closely related to one’s own life. Every achievement, however small, is accomplished thanks to the efforts to ascend to a higher level. Hence the first point here is aspiration. Secondly, in the moment when thought is devoted to nothing but ascending in and of itself, that is “ascending” in the truest sense. Creators who tend to care for things that are external to themselves overlook life itself, while those who care only for life itself (especially, for example, adherents of some religions) simply disregard mundane affairs. They take these paths freely through their own volition, and they can be measured neither by gains nor by losses; it is especially inappropriate if they are measured by the standard of “ascent”. The very statement that “We should unremittingly practice reason, as we see it as a conscious ascent to a higher level” reveals the truth about the relationship between ourselves and the world. Here, “we see it” means “we see how we should act in this special situation” and “we should practice reason as a conscious ascent to a higher level” means that because we see it, we make every effort to do it. Without forgetting the present moment, we strive only for righteousness. There is an

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old saying that sages are the yardstick by which we judge whether a person is an upright one or not, and what we call reason here is none other than ethics. This is very much related to the ideal of “deep friendship”, which is to be discussed below. Human beings empathize with the world around them and their empathy is pervasive. Thus the ancient people once remarked: So, when a person sees that a child is falling into a well, he will naturally experience fear and sympathy for the child. This means that his kindheartedness is directed towards the child, as the child belongs to the same species as him. When he sees that birds and beasts are crying sadly or are trembling with fear, he will naturally not be able to bear to see or hear it. This means that his kind-heartedness extends to these birds and beasts, as they are also intelligent animals. When he sees that grasses are trampled down and that branches of the trees are broken, he will naturally have compassion or sympathy for them. This means that his kind-heartedness extends to these grasses and trees, as they are plants full of vitality. When he sees that bricks and tiles and flagstones are damaged or smashed, he will naturally feel sorry for them. This means that his kind-heartedness extends even to these bricks and tiles and flagstones.6

Perhaps this is exactly what the earlier statement that living things are restricted to existences predicated on “opposition”, with only human beings having shifted from such “opposition” to the realm of “unity”, suggests. The suspension between utilization of and resistance to external phenomena is “opposition”, and though “unity” goes far beyond utilization and resistance, it seems that they are integrated as a whole. Affection of such an allencompassing nature originates from rationality and cannot be considered the same as the affection higher animals have toward each other. Among higher animals – between parents and their offspring, between males and females and even between those of the same sex – solicitude for each other can also be clearly seen. But that is only instinctive affection which arises not from social need but either from propagation of the species or from individual survival. This is biological destiny. For human beings, this instinct, though far from having completely vanished, has drastically subsided. The fidelity between husband and wife may not be expected of everyone. But among certain kinds of birds, none of them has the slightest tendency to 6 See “Grand Learning” in Editorial Committee of Cheng Chung Book (eds.) WANG Yangming (auth.) Collected Works of Wang Yangming, 1953.

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change partners, which remains the case generation after generation. Among birds and beasts of other kinds, the unwavering attachments between parents and their offspring is the same. Among human beings, there are indeed many loving parents in this world, but there are also incidents of drowning daughters at birth or of killing babies. As one’s affection can be either deep or shallow, when it is necessary that it be deep, it should be deep and when it is necessary that it be shallow, it should be shallow. If such affection is stable, it obviously is not the same as that of animals. The affection of animals arises from their instincts while the development of man’s affection is derived from the decline of their instincts. How can we fail to differentiate these two kinds of affection? Reason lets loose the instinct. The greater the gap after the instinct is loosened, the more breathing air a person will have. Such air is human affection and human affection is such air. The human heart or the human brain, in the modern sense, is the aperture through which one can see anything. So, whether a person is rich enough in affection depends on the degree to which the mechanical takes precedence in his life, with which there is an inverse correlation (i.e., the less significant the mechanical aspect is, the richer he is in affection). This is different from the affections of animals, which are annexed to the mechanical aspect of their struggle for survival. Human life is able to have access to and inseparable from everything in the whole universe and is different from animal life in that the latter is confined to the mechanical struggle for survival. As I said above, in his desire, man only ever knows what he himself needs, irrespective of the other party. Conversely, concerning affections in life, one often only cares for the other party, irrespective of himself (see Chapter Five). As a matter of fact, the other party at this moment is himself. Whoever he entertains a deep concern for is the equivalent of himself; why should he care so much about his own body? Showing universal concern is surely tantamount to a universal undertaking of whatever tasks arise, just like a mother who undertakes the task of rendering her service to her son. Hence the old saying, “Whatever happens in the universe is what is conjured up in my mind” (a quote from Lu Xiangshan, also known as Lu Jiuyuan, a heart-and-mind philosopher); such is human beings’ rationality. However, this pervasive affection naturally has its place of origin, and this place of origin is located among one’s flesh and blood, the members of a family. In Motherhood by Ellen Key, it is said that children’s love of their mothers is the basis for their emotional development and from this basis their development then extends far beyond. This order of development cannot be reversed, just as a tree cannot be grown upside down. We can

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see in old Chinese sayings like “Filial and brotherly conduct is the root of humaneness” and “A person must be affectionate toward his family before he can be humane toward people around him and he must be humane toward people around him before he can be loving toward all creatures”, that the sequential relationship – the distant to near relationship or the intimate relationship – is a natural one. The statement, “Ethical relations start from the family but never end with the family” suggests that these relationships extend outward from close relations to distant ties. When we talk about “integrating all relationships in the whole of society into a network like that of a family” (see Chapter Five), it means that these relationships also extend inward from those distant from us to those close to us, in which case those distant from us often fear that their feelings are not profound enough. The formation of an ethics-oriented society in China certainly aims to build a society in which “people in the world under heaven are one family and people throughout China are like one single person”. Though this did not become widespread because it was ahead of its time,7 its spiritual existence must meet with no denial. It is a fact that China, as an ethics-oriented society, was founded on etiquette and customs mostly advocated by Confucians. As we will explain, their advocacy resulted from their deep understanding of both rationality and human life. Any one person is naturally inseparable from the people around him and from the world he lives in. That is why in the section “Organizing Society through Morality” in Chapter Six, I stated that what Confucius focused on was not how to organize a society but rather on how to become a fulfilled person oneself, independently. A person’s life never ends with himself as he is ethically related to other people. The ethical relationship, or in other words, the amicable relationship, is an obligation between different people. The superiority of human beings over other animals lies in the possession of such sentiment and virtue. The idea that “men are expected to unremittingly practice reason as they see it” perhaps means no more than this: that being possessed of their understanding of such sentiment and virtue, they put them into practice. Through this process, their “aspiration toward greatness” and their “deep friendship with their peers” are not totally analyzable and expressible. The abiding understanding and the continual practice eventually enable one to become what might be called a “sage”. In China, those held in high esteem are the sages. In the West, those who enjoy great esteem are great men. 7 The reasons for these two obstacles (i.e., not becoming widespread and having been ahead of its time), will be elaborated on in Chapter Thirteen.

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In India, it is the Buddha. This may well reveal the differences in terms of social practice and national spirit from country to country. Everyone possesses rationality. But mental state or depth of affection may differ from person to person. Even the same person may become very different at times. This explains why it is difficult for psychologists with no understanding of what we have called rationality to conduct tests in their experiments. It also explains why the ancient Chinese, with their understanding of rationality, could only consistently nudge other people into going forward. It was only the ancient Chinese that gained an understanding of rationality, believing that “it was something that Heaven had so generously bestowed upon them” and that this was where the value of life must lie. There was nothing beyond Heaven to be gained from pursuing rationality. If they did not pursue rationality, how would human beings be any different from animals and beasts? In their view, what they called learning should strive for rationality, without which there would be no learning; what was called education should cultivate reason, without which there would be no education. Even politics could no longer be practiced without rationality. As a result, they introduced the whole nation into the framework of ethics and integrated law into the framework of morality, so that politics was replaced by moralization (what we have called the “unification of politics and moralization”). For two or three thousand years since the Duke of Zhou and Confucius, Chinese culture has retained this as its focal point and the most concentrated attention has been paid to it. Should the Chinese people have a strong point, this strong point could not be sought anywhere else. Should the Chinese people have a weak point, this weak point must surely result from it. The Chinese all share blessings which are obtained from this unification. They also suffer disasters which are incurred by it. In short, this unification brings gains and losses, and blessings and sufferings, which all have a bearing on this pursuit of rationality. Custom of whatever kind, notwithstanding its tendency to overspread and its long-time prevalence, would naturally become mechanized with the loss of its original significance, and in the end, only its form would remain. Though it is no longer a cherished spirit, this is proof that such a spirit did exist to begin with. If this observation is applied to Chinese society, then, of the mechanized forms that are preserved in the customs, “the strong aspiration toward greatness” and “the deep friendship among peers” are the greatest in number. For example, whenever a Chinese begins a conversation, they will utter without thinking or hesitation such expressions as, “Would you give me guidance” or “Would you grant me instruction”. These are the mechanized forms that the ancient Chinese passed down

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because they valued modesty and which originated from the mentality that harbored a keen aspiration to greatness. To take another example, when two friends in Western countries take a drink at a café, they may go Dutch. But this would not do in the same case in China. They would feel it was embarrassing if they went Dutch in China, for that would mean that too much distinction is made between them and one should pay the total amount. This is another custom that has been handed down through the cultivation of “deep friendship” in the very beginning. What is more, beyond the loss of their original significance, some mechanized forms have even turned into jokes and situations that incur malpractice abound. Let’s take one example that is very relevant to our purposes – the system of selecting and promoting talents throughout Chinese history. In ancient feudal China, it was said that the system of selecting geniuses prevailed, as has been recorded in The Rites of the Zhou Dynasty and The Book of Rites. Whether this is true or not, we dare not say. From the Election System in the Western Han and Eastern Han dynasties, to the Nine Rank Judging System in the Wei and the Jin dynasties, to the Imperial Examination System in the Sui and the Tang dynasties, it can be seen that all these systems are meant to appoint people according to their integrity and ability so as to do away with classes, and that the legislative spirit has obviously been greatly significant in these dynasties. Apart from the practice of taking a person’s writing, ability and learning as the criteria in the imperial examination, in village elections and in recommending candidates for feudal offices of the nine ranks, it has been common practice to take a person’s moral quality and conduct and virtues as the criteria. For example, “being clean-handed”, “practicing filial piety”, “being able and virtuous”, “being upright”, “being earnest and deep”, “being modest”, “being loyal”, “being faithful” and “being diligent” are all virtues that are taken into account. This, to foreigners, is naturally incomprehensible, but to those who understand the spirit of the Chinese nation, it is completely comprehensible. Though later on, these practices linger in name only and countless numbers of ridiculous mistakes occur as a result, the initial good intention behind this practice can never be denied. From the Wei and the Jin dynasties to the Sui and the Tang dynasties, as family names and family statuses were especially highly valued, the nobility in society would naturally forge an inseparably close relationship with those in power. However, if we look back at how the notion of family names and family statuses came about, we find that they were based on the fact that moral quality and family tradition in these families had been respected and used as a model by the wider public, and that initially, their status did not result from their power. Furthermore, their statuses retained their value,

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which could not be eclipsed by their power. Emperor Wenzong of the Tang Dynasty once sighed that so far, even several hundred years’ worth of the Li-clan family of emperors in the Tang Dynasty could not be compared with this. Naturally, it is a good joke or a serious malaise that the initial intention of doing away with classes ended up with the evolution of different classes. Such a joke or malady could arise from nothing else but this. How can its fascination be ignored and not recognized! It is generally known that throughout the world and throughout the ages, classes inevitably come into being in a society. They may result from religion, or power, or capital, or revolution. They vary from time to time and from place to place. Only China, whose rationality witnessed the earliest development with neither prejudice from preoccupations nor resistance to all powers, has had the least chance to form different classes. Therefore, it is very surprising that classes originating from rationality should come into being, as described above. On the other hand, as classes in China naturally exhibit their unique features, perhaps they can serve as an addition to the total number of classes in the world. Although this is said somewhat in jest, it can probably contribute to comparative culture studies.



Chapter Eight Class Divisions and Professional Distinction

8.1

Definition of Class

Chapters Two to Seven have shown that Chinese society is ethics-oriented, which differs from the practice in the West where society is alternately individual-oriented and society-oriented. Ethics-orientedness, however, is only one aspect of China’s social structure. The other aspect we must consider is that, whereas the West can be considered as a society with class divisions – both between aristocratic landlords and serfs in medieval times and between capitalists and laborers in modern times – China can be considered a society with professional distinctions. Ethics-orientedness and class divisions are two sides of the same coin. To discuss issues related to class, the first question we have to ask is: What is class? Generally speaking, aside from the initial stage of human society, when class divisions did not yet exist, and the future of the human society, when class divisions will no longer survive, between these two poles of human history, class exists. If we cannot develop an understanding of the evolution of class between these two stages – both from its non-existence to its existence and from its existence to its non-existence – we can by no means be prepared to discuss cultural issues and to look to the future of mankind. Since “class” is such a big issue, it would be impossible to fully elaborate on it within the space of several dozen lines in this book. What follows is my attempt to summarize. Broadly, the division between the superior and the inferior, and between the rich and the poor, might well be considered to represent “class”. But class, as we are calling it here, should emerge only when there is opposition between different groups of people or a fight for supremacy in the economic or political arena. Here, the specific case of the West, both in medieval times and in modern times, is used as an illustration. As the classes that illustrate “class divisions” are non-existent in China, the discussion will be limited to these classes only. Moreover, class in the real sense, that is, the idea of class that plays the most vital role in the cultural process, will also be discussed to such an extent. In this way, the key points about what class connotes will be made clear. The opposition between classes is predicated on economy. Every social economy places its agricultural and industrial production above everything

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else and every social economy is therefore agriculture- and industry-oriented. Although booming modern industry has outpaced agriculture, agriculture in most cases still takes top priority. Agricultural production is inseparable from land. If land is in the possession of one social group but is cultivated by another group, and the former group has a much greater share of the farm produce than the latter group, a relationship based on exploitation prevails. Such a relationship existed between the feudal landlord class and the serfs in medieval times. Likewise, modern industrial production is inseparable from machinery and equipment in industrial and mining regions. If the machinery is in the possession of one social group but is operated by another group and the former group has a much greater share of the products than the latter group, a relationship based on exploitation also prevails. Such a relationship exists between the industrial capitalist class and the workers in modern times. To sum up, in a society where the tools of production are separated from the work of production, those who have the tools do not work and those who work do not have tools of their own. This situation stokes opposition between the classes. The opposing classes in a society are interdependent and inseparable from each other on the one hand, and diametrically opposed to each other in terms of gains and losses on the other hand. The establishment of such an economic relationship certainly relies on an institutional hierarchy. For example, it was acknowledged in medieval times that all feudal landlords were entitled to their own land and other kinds of property, and it is now acknowledged that all capitalists can privatize their own properties and other possessions. Such a practice was also accepted and protected by not only religion, but also morality, law and convention. This brought about a social order which enabled all activities in a society to be performed routinely. A working social order depended on two aspects: a generally accepted justifiability and a strong force backing it up. The strong force was often a state or country. Hence it is the domain of politics. Politics meant the affairs of state. States put introducing and maintaining order first on the agenda, and this was what we would call governing. An economically exploitative class became a political ruling class, a practice so common it was almost impossible to change. The nobles monopolized the land on which the farmers depended so much, and directly imposed their rule over the population. Such was the case in medieval times. With the change of time so that everyone was able to own private property, free competition unwittingly brought about the emergence of the capitalist class which takes advantage of its privileges in order to indirectly impose its rule over the population. This has been the case in modern times. The integration

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of maintaining its economic status through its rule and of enhancing its political power through exploitation makes class divisions more prominent. Class should, as has been said before, emerge only when there is opposition between different groups of people or a fight for supremacy in economy or politics. Social status concerning servility or nobility, or poverty or wealth, is related purely to this opposition. Social status in and of itself is not sufficient to create a true class. Since only when the situation is firmly established does a class become more powerful and only when a class is stabilized does a class solidify, the following points are worthy of our attention: (1) All those superstitions and prejudices that suff ice to make class divisions; (2) Those customs or systems that prevent different classes from getting married; (3) The class hereditary system, or an equivalent or near-equivalent system. All these points, with the third in particular, are sufficiently thoroughgoing that they can construct class divisions. Conversely, if there were no prejudice, with everyone being treated equally, if no constraints were placed on marriage, and especially if there were no stability of class status with no necessity for inheritance from father to son, it would be difficult for classes to emerge. In the medieval feudal society, as almost all these factors existed, class divisions were prominent. In modern times, the first two factors seem to have disappeared and the last factor has been somewhat altered, from a hereditary system to the current hereditary tendency. Thus it can be said that classes still exist. Classes probably began to emerge with the economic exploitation of an underclass and the political occupation of such resources as land. Conversely, at the beginning of human civilization, the resources for preserving longevity were readily accessible to everyone. Meanwhile, as there was no social division of labor, no one produced anything extra from their labor beyond what they needed to feed themselves. Thus it was impossible at this stage for classes to emerge. Doubtless, classes are not the products of rationality; rather, they are anti-rational. Classes are based on two processes. On the one hand, they are imposed upon people. On the other hand, they derive advantages from the creation of beauty. But though they are not derived from rationality, rationality originates from them. How can this be so? Though human beings are animals that possess rationality, in a class system, however, rationality toward other human beings must be gradually exploited. To an individual, rationality relies on his or her physical and mental development but to a society, it relies on the economic progress. Classes, then, are the very

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things that human society must go through in its development. Without classes, no social progress would be possible. The reasons for this must be explained here briefly. As stated in the preceding chapter, human beings’ greatest skill is their use of mentality (including both their rationality and their Reason). All social progress and cultural development are derived from this. But here is one plain fact: if one’s time and energy are fully or mostly occupied by physical labor, then mental activities will either be suppressed or impeded, or even be made impossible. With no mental activity, there would be neither creativity nor progress, which would be absolutely no good at all. It is necessary, then, that time should be spared to allow for mental exercise. – To be frank, a person of vision may have noted a long time ago that ever since people began to live in groups, Nature has been progressing toward this goal. This was originally what Nature offered in order to continue the progressive opening-up of the human mind ever since living beings emerged. But the Creator did not show up to say anything, nor did people have any selfawareness. Such being the case, who could have allotted spare time to each person? Consequently, some people in society were born to a laborious life and others to an idle life. – In this way there emerged the two opposing classes in the world. From slavery in ancient times, to serfdom in medieval times, and through to the labor system of modern times, though it could be said that “there was no benevolence in heaven and earth”, these systems certainly accomplished their historical missions. In later generations, people are indebted to the legacy of the Greeks in matters of academic research, and the legacy of the Romans in legal systems. It should be remembered, however, that at that time these were achieved through the slaves’ sweat and toil. In the same way, civilization in medieval times benefited from the efforts of serfs and in modern times from the industry of laborers. All creations and inventions no doubt owe their continuing advancement at the present stage to the direct contributions of one group of people but also to the indirect achievements of another group of people. If there were no classes in social history, there is no knowing how human civilization could have come into being. But does it mean that human beings must live on like this at the expense of certain people? Certainly not. History obviously reveals that progress tends toward the gradual increase of production on one hand, and the reduction of human burdens (especially physical burdens) on the other hand – an indication of economic progress. With economic growth, on the one hand, people gain more varied pleasures day by day, and on the other hand, they have ample time at their disposal. Thus their opportunities

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for pursuing knowledge and for receiving education are naturally greatly enlarged. Accordingly, people’s thoughts and desires also become more intense – an indication of cultural progress. Isn’t such cultural progress as this also shared by the underclass in a society? When they are able to express thoughts or desires, they certainly cannot be satisfied with their past status as it shows that society is structured in a way that demands certain alterations or adjustments be made. After these adjustments, the society is slightly more peaceful. More time passes, further progress is made and further adjustments need to be made in turn, so the social structure witnesses another change. This has been the case from ancient times and will continue to be so into the future. Generally speaking, there are three inevitable developments. The first change is the shift from slavery in ancient times to serfdom in medieval times. This is a change from recognizing slaves only as objects, not as human beings at all, to a greater recognition of serfs as human beings. Previously, what a slave had produced belonged wholly to the slave-owner, and only part of it was used by the slave-owner to feed the slave. Now, what a serf produced was his own apart from a portion of it that was offered to the landlord as a tribute. He now began to secure some degree of status and rights, as a human being, but he was still not a free man in the real sense. The second shift is from serfdom in medieval times to the labor system of modern times. This is the evolution from some recognition of serfs as human beings to complete recognition of laborers as human beings. Everyone now can claim equality within the same group and in principle, everyone in the group enjoys the same status with complete freedom and the right to participate in government and political affairs. But in essence, they are still not equal in life (in terms of the labor of production and the distribution of production) – an indication of economic inequality. The third stage of this evolution is from the modern labor system to the abolition of classes altogether. This is simply the realization of socialism, which ultimately removes economic inequality and other inequalities. As long as there is economic equality, all other inequalities will be completely dismantled. At this point, the society will revert to an organic whole in the true sense, without class distinction. Each of these three changes in social structure entails a change in a nation’s situation – from a slave state to a feudal one, and then to a constitutional one and lastly to the elimination of states. Every change to the state also suggests political progress. Economic progress, cultural progress and political progress proceed in a cyclic progression without necessarily fitting into a pattern of cause and effect. However, for the sake of an

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in-depth discussion, a particular angle has to be chosen. But economy, which resembles a certain mechanical force working from within, can make the discussion easily comprehensible. It is worth adding that changes and progress, which are in reality infinitely subtle, cannot be figured out even by a crude approximation. However, for the purposes of this discussion, a crude approximation is all we have. In a text as short as this, only something decidedly straightforward can illustrate this example. On the other hand, as it is a fact that circumstances vary from time to time and from place to place, life does not evolve by following regular rules. Learning, however, values the search for internal mechanisms and temperaments and offers enlightenment to others, so readers can well comprehend these mechanisms without taking them as absolute rules, which is a blessing. An important caveat here: so long as there is no progress in the technology of production and no abundance of production, there can be no class. As the old saying goes, “it is inequality rather than scarcity that causes the greatest trouble”. It is a fact that scarcity cannot secure equality. An equitable distribution of economic and political benefits requires similarly a brilliant intellect and competence from everyone. It is not the equitable distribution of enjoyment but the equitable distribution of competence that is deemed key to equitable distribution. To be frank, unless everyone receives equal higher education, classes can never be removed. However, education is indeed a crowning luxury (and higher education is more so). This suggests that there must be spare time that represents surplus labor force in society. The education of a group of people like us is indeed attributable to considerable progress in productivity, on the one hand, and to many people’s services in production on the other hand, which enables us to spare some time for education. If these people were required to receive equal education at the same time, people would have no food to eat. To simultaneously receive equal education and have enough food requires soaring productivity through the replacement of manual labor by universal physical power. It must also be understood that what we have called “receiving equal education” must be “receiving equal higher education”, and the food must be delectable food. If it is only secondary education and coarse food, that is equality derived from scarcity. That won’t do, either. So the soaring productivity here really means extremely high quality productivity. At this point, on the one hand, everything that is needed will be prepared, but on the other hand, spare time will be ample. Then, it will be natural for people to receive higher education equally. If everyone receives an equal higher education and has acquired similar knowledge and competence, it will naturally follow that equality will exist, without classes. No high-handed acts to the contrary can come to anything.

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This implies the unexpressed meaning of “seizing the means of production”. Only when the means of production are under public control and economic life is socialized will social unity be brought about. People in society, inseparable from each other like an organic whole, naturally have nothing unequal among themselves. Equality cannot be attained from the concept of equality in and of itself, but only from social unity. We will discuss the issue of the state as composed of different classes and the necessary role that classes play in political progress later. Here, a conclusion is to be made. As has been discussed above, human history firstly establishes different social classes but then liberates them one by one. Every endeavor of class liberation is a step forward in human rationality. The ultimate emergence of an equal society with no classes accords completely with the requirements of rationality. This is undoubtedly a general progression, as is clear for all to see. The above statement that though classes are not derived from rationality, rationality originates from them, refers to just this point. Consequently, Mencius’ statement that “he who uses his brain governs; he who uses his labor is governed; he who governs is fed by others and he who is governed feeds others” conforms closely to the principle of historical progress. The proposal of Xu Xing, an ancient Chinese thinker, that “the wise king, together with his subjects, works on the farm for food and cooks breakfast and supper while governing his country” instead of “feeding himself by snatching food from others” is well-intended, but it is only a fantasy and an old-fashioned idea.

8.2

Are There Classes in China?

I have already outlined my view of human cultural history in Chapter Two. Apart from the very earliest period when, due to the restrictions imposed by natural conditions, different cultures might have been similar to one another, and “world culture” is set to gradually emerge in the future thanks to global traffic. In the intervening period, each culture has followed its own path, with no compulsion to resemble each other. The history of social class, as recounted above, covers that intermediate period. Whatever has been said about how classes have witnessed step-by-step emancipation aims to clearly state that there are cases like these, which means it is easiest, but not inevitable, for classes to evolve in this manner. Shallow analysis, with the theory of historical materialism in mind, insists that history follows a certain constant progression. Consequently, its adherents insist on dividing the period of Chinese history from “the three dynasties” (i.e., the Xia Dynasty,

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the Shang Dynasty and the Zhou Dynasty) to the late Qing Dynasty into a sequence of different periods and incorporating them into a formula. When they cannot suggest a thought-out explanation for the two thousand years of history after the Qin and the Han dynasties, in a ridiculous argument, they blame the history of this period for its own mysteriousness rather than acknowledging any insight into the unsoundness of their views. My own academic attainments are insufficient to enable me to expound my views on the whole history of China. But my interest lies only in understanding Chinese society over the last one hundred years. As this book is not the one that specializes in Chinese social history, I will not delve into it further. For the moment, to analyze the issues of class, in what follows I will discuss Chinese society for the last hundred years and give a brief explanation of its character by looking back to the Zhou and the Qin dynasties. Chinese society as it was a hundred years ago had undergone very little substantial change over the previous two thousand years, ever since the Qin and the Han dynasties, as is generally acknowledged. I often say that it is in a circling state with no possibility of fundamental change. So, a discussion of “Chinese society one hundred years ago” is almost equivalent to a discussion of “Chinese society over the past two thousand years.” But still, there is a small difference. On the one hand, it is crucial that we understand that the problem of China’s lack of emancipation over the past one hundred years up to the present day developed precisely because of the nature of Chinese society one hundred years ago. Meanwhile, our intimate acquaintance with the events of the past hundred years also facilitates our discussion. What is more, between class divisions and professional distinction – though over the past two thousand years, the general trend has been toward the latter – there is often an alternation of progress (i.e., eliminating class divisions and favoring professional distinction) and retrogression (i.e., favoring class antagonism) followed by further progress and further retrogression, in endless cycles. As the Qing Dynasty a century ago was the point at which this trend was most pronounced, it will form the case study for our discussion. However, rather than simply being a point in history, the situation as it was a century ago is used to refer to the inherent social situation in China more recently, which has not yet been influenced by the West despite the emergence of globally integrated traffic. If we want to discuss whether there are classes in an agrarian society like China, land allocation should naturally become the key issue. On this topic, in my view, two points need to be mentioned: Firstly, free land transactions enable everyone to possess land.

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Secondly, there is no apparent centralized monopoly of land; as a general estimate, the majority of people own their land. The first point can be accepted by almost everyone with no need for further elaboration. The second point can easily foment disputes and efforts must be made to explain this. As China boasts a vast land area with a huge population, its cadastral lists have not been checked for a long time. Although some investigations have been made since the establishment of the Republic of China, those conducted, for example, by both the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce of the Beijing Government before the Northern Expedition and the National Government during and after the Northern Expedition were simply not reliable. Some investigations were indeed reliable, but as they were privately carried out by academic experts (both domestic and foreign), they were considered too small in scale and a partial investigation could not supply the whole picture. Consequently, no one could fully comprehend the whole picture of land allocation in China. To the best of my knowledge, China has more owner-peasants in its northern provinces and more tenant peasants in its southeastern and southwestern provinces. In some places in the south, however, it is not unusual for there to be no concentration of land ownership. Meanwhile, in places such as Shanxian County and Caoxian County in Shandong Province in the north, situations in which big landlords pass on their land from generation to generation are also common. Moreover, in many places, the situation in the east of a county might be different from that in the west of the county and the situation in the south of a county might be different from that in the north of the county. All in all, it is difficult to fully account for the whole picture. As a result, critics very often make their own claims according to their own understanding of the situation. Naturally, I can likewise only make comments according to my own understanding. But in the interests of impartiality, I will by no means make excessive claims. For two generations, my family grew up and lived in the north and I can already be said to be a northerner. What I observe, then, is certainly the actual situation in the north, where the great majority of the people have their own land. Though in counties adjacent to Peiping (which belonged to Shuntian Prefecture in the old days) much of the land belongs to Bannermen (i.e., the Eight-Banner aristocrats), their tenants enjoy the right of permanent tenancy. For example, neither the increase of rent nor the eviction is allowed, as if the landlord and the tenants had divided the ownership of the land equally between them (this is somewhat similar to the division of the two different rights – the surface right and the ground floor right – that is practiced in south China). Although in both Henan Province and Shandong Province,

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where I once engaged myself in rural work, there is never a lack of prominent landlords, on the whole, there is no centralized monopoly of land. Especially in Zouping County, where I stayed for quite a long time, people without land are rarely encountered. Our survey of the cadastral lists for the whole of Zouping County was to be completed in the first half of the twenty-sixth year of the Republic of China (i.e., 1937), but as the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression currently results in acute need, no reliable statistical report is available. But it can be safely said that over 90 percent of the people in the whole county have their own land and that only some people have very little land. This situation is exactly the same as that in Dingxian County in Hebei Province – another rural working area of mine. There is a report on this in the dense volume A Survey of the Social Situation in Dingxian County.1 According to the report, investigations were made in three different rural districts: Village No. 62 in District One, with 10,445 families; Village No. 71 in District One, with 6,555 families; and Village No. 63 in District One, with 8,062 families. Their conclusions can be summarized as follows: (1) More than ninety percent of the families have their own cultivated land. 1 According to LI Jinghan in his A Survey of the Social Situation in Dingxian County, 1933 (pp. 618-663), the land allocation in Dingxian County can be categorized in three ways, as in the following cases: The first case goes like this: Among the 10,445 families at Village No. 62 in Dongting Township, aside from 155 families, the other 10,290 families are engaged in farm work. Only 220 of these families have more than 100 mu of cultivated land, which accounts for 2 percent of the total number of families, and 10,070 families have less than 100 mu of cultivated land, which accounts for 98 percent of the total number of families. According to another investigation, among the 838 families in Village No. 6, aside from 48 families, the other 790 families are engaged in farm work; among them, 11 families hold a life tenancy with no land and the remaining 779 families all have their own land, in varying amounts. The second case goes like this: Among the 6,555 families at Village No. 71 in District One, aside from 379 families, the other 6,176 families are engaged in farm work, and 5,529 of these families have their own land (in varying amounts) and 647 families have no land of their own. Compared with the first case, there are more tenants without land. They account for only one-tenth of the total number of families, however. Those with more than 100 mu of cultivated land account for 2 percent of the 6,555 families, those with more than 300 mu of cultivated land account for one thousandth of the total and those who have cultivated land but do not engage in farm work account for 1 percent. The third case goes like this: Among the 8,062 families at Village No. 63 in District Two, aside from 323 families, the other 7,739 families are engaged in farm work, and 7,363 of these families have their own land (in varying amounts) and the rest of them (about 5 percent) are tenant farmers with no land. Among the landowners, those with more than 100 mu of cultivated land account for 2 percent and those with more than 300 mu of cultivated land account for three thousandths of the total.

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(2) Those with no land (including those who do not make a living by cultivation) account for less than ten percent. (3) Those with more than one hundred mu of cultivated land account for two percent and those with more than three hundred mu of cultivated land account for one or two per thousand people. (4) Those who have land but who do not engage in farm work account for one or two percent. This investigation, conducted by Li Jinghan, a sociology researcher, with sympathetic understanding toward and assistance from some local people, is completely reliable. To a class-based society, in this situation there is a glaring disparity between those people who own farmland but do not engage in farming and those people who engage in farming but cannot own the land they farm. I admit that this situation is by no means common. But our two rural working groups, when they first selected Zouping County and Dingxian County as their working areas, did not specifically choose the counties with the least concentration of cultivated land in the whole of Shandong Province or the whole of Hebei Province. The results, surprisingly, were contrary to their expectations, since the situations in these two counties were very much alike, which suggested these situations were not uncommon in all the provinces of northern China. It should be noted that this was far from miraculous but simply a natural coincidence. In what was then Dingxian County, one mu of moderately fertile land was worth no more than forty yuan on average. A long-time hired hand (a farm laborer), however, can usually expect to earn more than forty yuan in a year, apart from the meals and accommodation provided by their employers. After depositing their savings for a few years, it would be natural they should consider buying a mu of farmland for themselves. Thus it is not too difficult to acquire one’s own farmland. This also explains why a high percentage of households do indeed own their own farmland. In addition, according to the common custom in China, a man’s legacy is divided equally among all his sons.2 Large estates will therefore shrink after one or two generations. In cases in which the descendants are neither hardworking nor thrifty, the estate will dissipate more quickly. In other words, even if one builds up a large estate, it is no easy matter to retain it. This explains why the percentage of households that own more than one 2 Concerning inheritance, The Code of the Qing Empire stipulated as follows: a man’s sons of close descent, whether born of his wife (or wives), or of his concubine(s) or of his maidservant(s), equally share his legacy. His illegitimate son(s) and adopted son(s) are given half of what sons born of his wife (or wives), concubine(s) or maidservant(s) receive.

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mu of farmland is so low. Hence the proverb in Hebei Province: “A piece of land changes hands a hundred times in a thousand years, and in ten years’ time, there is no distinction between the rich and the poor”. Derived from this proverb is another one: “When the poor accompanies the rich, both will end up having no pants to wear”. Such being the case, then, how can the cultivated land in the southern provinces of China be so concentrated and the number of tenant farmers so huge? This is partly due to industrial and commercial power and partly due to political power. As the old saying goes, “To people who want to rid themselves of poverty and get rich quick, farming is not as good as working for others and working for others is not as good as going into business” (see Records of the Grand Historian of China: Biographies of Merchants). Contemporary economists point out that there is far less competition in agriculture than in industry and commerce. To concentrate the land yield is far less straightforward than to concentrate the capital. In industry and commerce, large-scale management may overwhelm small-scale management but this may not be necessarily true in agriculture. The free management of land itself after the post-feudal liberation of Chinese society cannot develop into such a situation. Only those who have made an ample fortune in industry and commerce or those who are rich and politically powerful can acquire large amounts of land. But generally speaking, among Chinese industrialists and commercialists, and also among off icials, far more of them were born in the south than in the north. This seems to explain why such a signif icant difference exists between the south and the north in terms of land allocation. But people still want to possess land simply because they believe only real estate is a reliable investment, as it can be bequeathed to their descendants. Of course, their interest does not lie in investment, so this does not mean they intend to switch professions. Though this is inevitably affected by land allocation, to concentrate land yield is certainly not a natural tendency. Fostering such an unnatural tendency is possible, but surely it cannot be done by industrial and commercial powers instead of by political powers. Directly or indirectly establishing a centralized monopoly on land throughout the country by exploiting political power would be a reversion to feudalism for a society that has just been liberated from it. Such a reversion cannot be sustained for long, for history as I understand it ebbs and flows. Therefore, by splitting the difference between northern China, where there are more owner-peasants, and southern China, where there are more tenant peasants, and by splitting the difference between the period of

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transition and the period of reversion in history, I am willing to hazard a generalization: “Cases in which there is a centralized monopoly of land are not conspicuous. It is estimated that landowners are a large majority.” – Cases do exist in which there is a centralized monopoly of land, but on the whole, they are not yet prominent. The proportion of landowners to the landless is more than 51-49. I am sure this is absolutely no exaggeration. China’s industry and commerce, after achieving its earliest growth during the Pre-Qin Period and the Warring States Period and experiencing a boom during the Tang and the Yuan dynasties, witnessed very little progress (or even regression in some respects) over a span of around 1,200 years, from the Tang Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty (the Opium War Period). During this time, the two following restrictions were perhaps most significant. It is commonly accepted that industry and commerce are mutually enabling. Only when there are big commercial markets to trade in can industrial production be stimulated to improve in leaps and bounds. Similarly, only when industrial production increases can commerce expand. Otherwise, if there were no commerce, industry would not flourish, and if there were no industry, commerce would not thrive. However, commerce mostly relies on maritime transportation and international trade. The West was dependent on the Mediterranean Sea in ancient times and on overseas trade later on. The great leap forward in modern industry, as history clearly shows, is actually the result of prioritizing sea travel and overseas expansion. In Chinese culture, however, expansion is regulated from the northwest to the southeast of the country, with its inland areas controlling its coastal areas, contrary to the practice in the West, where coastal areas dominate the inland areas. For thousands of years in China, the ban on maritime trade was a common practice, despite the fact that it was not always possible to enforce this ban and sometimes it was imperative to lift it. Still, many contradictions are exposed. For example, A History of China’s Commerce, by Wang Xiaotong, on the one hand recounts the seven thoroughfares for foreign business and the four big ports located in Longbian, Guangzhou, Quanzhou and Yangzhou in the Tang Dynasty, and on the other hand declares that: It was legislation from the Tang Dynasty that actually advocated extreme isolationism. Though with their mighty military power, Emperor Taizong (Emperor Li Shimin) and Emperor Gaozong (Emperor Li Zhi) subjugated states such as Dashi and Bosixu as their annexed territories, it has never been suggested that the slightest effort was ever made to pursue foreign

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trade. Instead, foreign trade was greatly repressed, from which it can also be seen how restricted the thought of our Chinese people is.3

In other words, at most, foreign businessmen were given a chance to conduct trade with us while our own trade was hardly ever given a chance to expand overseas, and the sale of Chinese-made goods was rarely promoted overseas. As a result, this fundamentally limited China’s trade to the exchange of necessities between urban and rural areas in inland China. Thus the stimulation of industrial manufacturers was also rather restricted, as is common knowledge. In inland areas like the Changjiang River Basin, the situation was adequate as the area benefits from convenient water transportation. Otherwise, wherever there were obstacles to transportation, there were obstacles for business. If transportation remains as difficult today as it was in the old days, inland areas in China, despite their vast size, cannot necessarily be considered ready markets. A direct limit on trade means an indirect limit on industry. On the other hand, industry itself has its own limitations. The limitations on industry result from the fact that people’s attention and acumen are not focused on industry. With no progress in either the tools or the technology of production, productivity is therefore very restricted (this will be discussed in detail later). The spurt in industry in modern times in the West results precisely from the fact that there, attention and acumen are focused on industry. But before that, Western industry, just like China’s, did not see much progress either. Hence we read that: Until the middle of the eighteenth century, inventions had been very rare. In fact, before the year 1750, technology had been quite at a standstill for several thousand years. From then until modern times, inventions within one single year often outnumber all the inventions of the thousand years before 1750. 4

In other words, if Westerners’ attitude toward life had remained the same as it had been in medieval times, even another thousand years would not have produced an industrial revolution in the West. Clearly, there is indeed a difference between the Chinese attitude toward life and medieval Western attitudes. But in terms of the failure to apply intellectual effort to the matter 3 See WANG Xiaotong, A History of China’s Commerce, (p. 112). 4 See Wang Feisun’s translation of H.E. Barnes’s Social Evolution (New Life Publishing House), p. 211.

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of industry, there is no difference at all between China a century ago and the West in the Middle Ages. The only difference is that Westerners eventually shifted their focus to industry while the Chinese have never done so. In other words, if there were no importation of new industrial technologies from the West, China would never produce any inventions itself. While one practice hampers commercial development, the other hinders industrial progress. While industry lacks the stimulus of commerce, commerce lacks the stimulus of industry. Among other things, these two restrictions have hampered China’s industrial and commercial progress as they have circled around for over two thousand years. Is this so strange, one might ask? It seems that in a place where industry and commerce are so agriculture-reliant, though people continue to make efforts to purchase land so as to increase their affluence more easily, they cannot manage their land purely for the sake of making money and it is quite clear that they can by no means exploit their land beyond agriculture production. Thus the resulting monopoly on land helps foster two classes – the land-owning class and the tenant peasant class. On the one hand, as industry and commerce have undergone no revolution, there is no notable tendency toward the concentration of either production or capital. On the other hand, as people follow the custom of dividing the inheritance equally among sons, though capital might be amassed, it is soon decentralized. So here there are immutably no more than petty industrialists and businessmen. The self-evident opposition between the laboring class and the capitalist class in modern industrial societies is not to be discussed here. It can be concluded that ever since the Qin and the Han dynasties, if purely viewed from an economic perspective, China’s agricultural production and industrial production have not resulted in opposing classes. What arouses concern is the impact of political power upon land allocation.

8.3

Definition of Professional Distinction

As we know, the economically exploitative class and the political ruling class are usually bound together. In the discussion above, we have already examined briefly whether there is an economic opposition between different classes. In the following, let’s examine how classes are represented politically, the two systems being interconnected. Comparatively speaking, Chinese society’s economic liberation is much more obvious than its political liberation from feudalism. Only the Zhou Dynasty was associated with a feudal aristocracy. This can be seen from the

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practice whereby “emperors confer the rank of nobility on feudal princes but do not reward them with land, give them official ranking but grant them no right to administer the people, and allow them to enjoy official salaries but do not require them to deal with state affairs” (see A Survey of Verifying Documents), which has long since been abolished. Since the Warring States Period, from the central government to local governments, all of those with power and who rule over the people are officials. The key difference between officials and aristocrats is that officials no longer rule for their own benefit. Rather, they enjoy a type of power that is neither hereditary nor lifelong, and are only temporary appointments. Should officials enforce rules on their own behalf, it would naturally evoke opposition among the ruled class. Since they are temporary agents, why should they bother to do this? Enforcing the rules for one’s own sake would strengthen one’s sense of belonging to the ruling class. Since they are appointed temporarily, however, officials clearly do not belong to the ruling class. Moreover, opportunities to secure official positions are meant to be open to everyone. As can be seen from the situation in the Qing Dynasty, everyone can study at a school, every intellectual can take the imperial examinations and when he passes all the examinations as required, he can secure an official position. Such a custom often produces mobility between the ruling class and the ruled class. How, then, would opposition arise between the ruling class and the ruled class? Even to date, the practice of appointing civil officials according to qualifications, rather than aristocratic power, has existed for less than one hundred years in Britain. If we compare this to the custom in China, the situation in China seems nothing short of miraculous. No wonder the British philosopher Bertrand Russell deemed this one of the three crucial features of Chinese culture. Today, no one who lacks suff icient funds can expect to go beyond secondary-level education. Our forefathers, however, had extremely easy access to schooling in the past and their superior educational opportunities are scarcely imaginable today. This is because: First, only a very limited number of books was required as the subjects at that time were not as complex as the subjects and foreign languages of today; except for pen and paper, no tools or equipment were needed for experiments or practical sessions, either. Second, free private schools were found everywhere. Common property shared by the same clan, as well as being used in sacrificial ceremonies, was invariably used in innumerable ways to support the schooling of their children as the highest priority. At the same time, those who taught in their own private schools charged only a modest fee or even waived the

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fee altogether, in contrast with the more rigid regulations in schools today. Teachers in private schools might even be most willing to help students with their schooling instead of charging fees from students. Third, after several years’ schooling, students would be educated on the one hand and have their academic achievements assessed on the other hand, through which they could receive subsidies for tuition fees in private schools in order for them to pursue advanced studies. It can be said that at that time, it was not difficult at all for one to be educated if he aspired to be. The obstacle was not in acquiring education itself, but in passing the imperial examination and securing an official position upon the completion of one’s education. Generally speaking, those who could pass the imperial examination and secure official positions represented an extremely tiny proportion of those who tried. That is why sons from average families would rather engage in agriculture, industry or commerce for fear that they might be poverty-stricken all their lives without ever having the chance to rise in the world, owing to having received an education. It was not because there were barriers to education itself. Learners were very familiarly referred to at that time as “poor scholars”, “destitute students” or “poor talents”. But on the other hand, a certain destitute student might pass the imperial examination and rise from poverty. Many novels and dramas of that period present an accurate rumination on society as it was then. I admit that in places like Suzhou, those who lived in urban areas were mostly families who had held high official positions for generations while those tenant peasants who lived in the country did not aspire to gain an education. They were essentially two entirely different classes. But this was a very unusual case. Generally speaking, there was no such distinction. Thus “learning to make a living and to conduct oneself” and “cultivating the farmland while receiving schooling at the same time” became axiomatic among the general people. The father cultivated the land while the son rose to fame via success in schooling; it was likewise often the case that of two brothers, one would pursue an education while the other worked the land. As the proverb says, “One may be just an ordinary farmer in early life, but he can become an official or even a monarch later in life”. In his The Theory of the Leisure Class, Thorstein Veblen argues that in every society productive labor is habitually deemed humble and degrading and is thus avoided.5 It should be clear that in China, things are quite different. Though Confucius 5 See HU Yimo (trans.) T. Veblen (auth.)《有闲阶级论》The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions, 1936 (pp. 29-37).

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did not favor learning to grow crops or vegetables as an activity for a scholar, the fact that one of his disciples sought advice from him about this showed that Confucius did not shun productive labor either. People such as Changju, Nieni and an old man carrying a tool for weeding across his shoulder, whom Zilu met in the fields, were obviously highly educated sages. Yet they never stopped working in the fields. The old man’s self-mocking remark, “I toil with my four limbs and cannot even afford enough time to sow five grains over the field”, reveals more clearly that productive labor was valued. In addition, in past dynasties the emperor was known to ceremonially till the land himself as a personal symbolic gesture, which contrasts markedly with the tendency to look down on or stay away from productive labor. Xu Xing’s view that “monarchs and the common people till the farmland together” is not borne out in reality. Wu Kangzhai, a scholar from the Ming Dynasty, really did farm the fields, but this is a rare case. The most reasonable summary is this: in China, both farming and schooling and scholars and peasants are essentially interconnected. Since scholars and peasants are inseparable, how can scholars be isolated from workers and businessmen? Originally, scholars, peasants, artisans and merchants represented four different professions that made up this wider society. They all needed each other and this promoted good teamwork. Isolation introduces opposition among different classes while interconnectedness is characteristic of the need for good teamwork among the professions. As a consequence of this situation, emperors in China who ruled over these four kinds of people did indeed become “totally isolated”, in the truest sense. This was quite different from feudal society in Europe, where lords of different ranks formed a single ruling class that ruled over the laboring classes. The following is my analysis: First, though the emperor might be able to rely on someone from his clan, from among his relations or someone else close to him, who shared the same concerns or the same fate, he was ultimately powerless because the extent of his power was in central government; he never had direct power over land or people. Also, it must be recalled that such influential people were only a tiny minority; whether the remaining majority shared his concerns or his fate is far from a simple question. This is reflected in the policy of reducing the number noble titles held in the vassal states and the amount of rice paid in salary during Emperor Jiajing’s reign (1522-1566) in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644): those below the rank of “general” were so poor that they could hardly survive. From the fifth year of Emperor Xizong’s reign (1621-1627), as the salary limit was enforced, the number of poor people had greatly

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increased and they often caused unrest. This can be imagined from the fact that Lin Run, imperial superintendent at the time, reported to the emperor that people had been heard to remark: “Any official under a feudal ruler who defends the territory of his country fears whatever changes ensue”. Second, both he and his co-administrators were officials. All the land and all people under heaven were entrusted to officials at all levels who were drawn from among the people (i.e., society at large) and who could at any time retire from office and return to their native village. This indicates that they certainly did not share the same interest or the same fate as the emperors. Third, officials were mostly scholars. Their clansmen, relatives, neighbors, townsmen, friends and confidants are no more than these four kinds of people – scholars, peasants, artisans and merchants. Their coexistence in life and even their frequent contact with each other meant they naturally shared similar or even the same psychological views and practical interests. That is to say, generally speaking, officials were on the side of the public, not necessarily in opposition to them. Fourth, officials, to be sure, must be loyal to emperors, but precisely because of this loyalty, they must “love the people as if they were their own children” and “point out frankly the faults committed by emperors”. Only by doing so can they maintain peace and protect the throne. “Loving the people as if they were their own children” means taking the needs of the people into consideration whenever necessary; “pointing out frankly the faults committed by emperors” implies that not every proposal an emperor produces must be enacted. An official must stand firm at all times. The only exceptions occur when an official’s personal wealth and position are out of step with the overall situation of the public and, at the same time, he himself is both selfish and short-sighted; in this case, an official will then disengage from the public. This, however, cannot be considered as class stand of any kind. Since no opposition exists between two classes politically, such a situation bears out the saying that “one man is above while thousands of others are under his rule”. Since the Qin Dynasty, when feudalism could no longer be restored and/ or whenever an emperor contemplated its restoration, he would feel that he was powerless and in danger. At this moment, inescapably isolated as he was from society at large, he could not afford to be antagonistic toward it. The old saying, “Those who win support from the people will prosper and those who do not will perish” suggests that his only option was to be intimate with the populace instead of being hostile to them. Should he fall

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from power and the whole country be thrown into utter turmoil, everyone would suffer. As it was necessary to accommodate each other, an institutional culture naturally came into being. Whether in terms of safety or danger, or in terms of gains or losses, the emperor was simply inseparable from the general population. Such being the case, he did not remain aloof from society but instead became a part of it. Generally speaking, no country is not under the rule of a particular class. In other words, only when there are classes can it be said that there is a rule. In China, the ruling class is invisible: what is visible is only the ruler himself. One person, however, cannot possibly maintain this rule. It is already difficult enough for him to cope with a less complicated situation and it would be unimaginable for him to have to cope with a more complicated one. Just imagine: How could one person rule China, a country roughly equivalent to the whole of Europe in land area and population? He can at most be a symbol of that rule. It would be impossible for him to rule over such a huge country in the literal sense. For two thousand years, the situation in China was one of non-interference, rather than any active rule. As a country, China has gone beyond the general national type, having developed a political system with its own characteristics. All this will be elaborated in later chapters. It should be pointed out here that the not-yet-established opposition between the political ruling class and political subjects follows exactly the same pattern as the not-yet-established opposition between the economically exploitative and the economically exploited. China’s lack of social classes proves to be more obvious if it is contrasted with the situation in the West. Its original quasi-classes, “ministers, officials and scholars”, have gradually lost their class attributes since the Warring States Period and become professionalized as scholars and officials of later generations. Just like their counterparts in industries such as agriculture, industry and commerce, they have their professional duties that make them indispensable elements of the social structure. This view can be adequately attested from the juxtaposition of the four kinds of citizens – scholars, peasants, artisans and merchants – and the old idea of “official salary as a substitute for farming”. Mencius’ division between “those who govern” and “those who are governed” in ancient times absolutely does not mean that human beings are born either to a noble class or a low class. Instead, he cited the maxim that “no craftsman’s work can be done while farming at the same time” as the principle for the social division of labor. It can be seen that, conceptually, the roots of this professional tendency can be traced back a long time, and it is easily developed. The Japanese scholar Seki Eikichi stated that culture has not only an epochal character but also a national

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character. The change from class to profession in political affairs is related to the epochal character of culture. Its early adoption in China, however, is related to the national character of culture. We certainly cannot say that ancient China was a society of equality, without class distinction, but we can say that it was a society with no classes. This can be evidenced by the following: First, there was a huge number of independent producers. These included tenant peasants, craftsmen who had their own tools, and household industrialists. Everyone worked for himself and made his own living. A comparison with the situation in Britain at the turn of the century, where ninety percent of the people were wage earners and four percent of them were employers, shows how remarkable this difference is. Second, economically, ownership of both land and capital was decidedly decentralized, and in constant flow, which means that they were never rigidly monopolized by a certain group of people. In Britain, however, they were centralized in the hands of this four percent of the people and this situation was virtually permanent. Third, political opportunities were also open to the general public. In imperial examinations, roughly equal opportunities were afforded to every locality. Though meritorious service could secure an official position for the next generation, it was definitely a rarity and political status was not monopolized by a fixed group of people. Though we can find no statistical data for this now, it can be well imagined that the situation in ancient China was much better than that in Britain in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. In Britain, though the right to vote has gradually been opened to the general public and efforts are made to pursue equal political opportunities for everyone, the investigation into the situation in Britain in the half-century before 19056 reveals that about seventy-five percent of prime ministers, chancellors, diplomats, military officers, judges, bishops and premiers of banking and railway industries were still from old and well-known families. They were almost always from eleven “public schools” and both Oxford University and Cambridge University. Those universities, “public” though they may be called, actually charged students high tuition fees. They were inaccessible to ordinary people, but only open to different generations of certain families. It can be concluded that modern Britain is a society rife with class antagonism whereas ancient China was not, which was attributed to its decentralization of land and capital and its flow between the upper stratum 6 See ZOU Taofen (trans.) Pat Sloan (auth.) On Soviet Democracy, 1946 (pp. 319-334).

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to the lower stratum. When we say that there were no classes in China, we do not mean that there was no exploitation and no rule. No exploitation means no culture, as has been discussed previously. Throughout all of human history, there has not yet appeared a society based on equality, with no classes. How can a society exist with no exploitation and no rule? The only difference is that in one case, everything is centralized and fixed and in the other, everything is decentralized and in constant flow. To represent this opposition in the social structure, we choose the term “professional distinction” to refer to the latter to distinguish it from the former term “class antagonism”. Here, two points need to be made clear: Firstly, as has been said above, the lack of classes is peculiar to Chinese society, whereas formation of social classes is the general rule in human society. China could not afford to totally shed its general features, either. Consequently, its historical tendency to form different classes lingered on in the last two thousand years. At the same time, its eccentricity also loomed large. The alternation between its generality and its eccentricity is represented by their cyclic nature, lacking unidirectional development. Secondly, though China witnessed no unidirectional development, its distinctiveness was undeniably prominent. Those who cannot discern its particularity but merely assume that China follows convention in its development are not considered to know China. By pointing out its particularity while not denying its conventional aspects, I hope that this can allow others to truly know China. Chapter One contained a joke: “if it is democracy in the West, then, it is freemocracy in China.” In modern Britain, a nation that represents the West, its society and politics were believed to be full of both the spirit of democracy and democratic atmosphere. In Old China, however, there was likewise both the spirit of democracy and democratic atmosphere. Another aspect will be explored further in later chapters, to wit: Is this lack of classes not one of the evidences? If a criticism is made of China on this account, I think it is inadequate. The comparison between Chinese society and British society that has been made above can well serve as an intense criticism of Britain. All that can be said is that they represent themselves in different ways with each having their own strengths and weaknesses. It is just the same with Britain and the Soviet Union. While one nation values political democracy, the other nation values economic democracy. Each nation has its own attainments and there is no necessity to favor one over the other.



Chapter Nine China: A Nation or Not?

9.1

China: Unlike a Nation

As indicated in Chapter One, China is not a nation in the usual sense, which is one of the characteristics (i.e., the eleventh) of Chinese culture. So, why is China so special? In general, a country is under the rule of a dominant class. But China tends toward professional distinctions, rather than class divisions. In this chapter, I put forward my view on the issue. China’s dissimilarity from most nations can be first observed from its lack of the functions it is usually acknowledged a nation has. This explains why China has always been politically passive and inactive. As a widely followed practice from generation to generation, “not disturbing the people” is its ultimate creed and “doing the least possible government work and ensuring the fewest possible criminal cases need to be handled” is the supreme ideal. Lü Xinwu, an official in the Ming Dynasty with a wealth of political experience and outstanding achievements, said in his book On Governance: The Tao of being an official can be summed up as follows: taking “not disturbing the people” as the means to enable them to live in peace, taking “not drinking people’s life-blood” as what is offered to them, taking “not harming the people” as doing what is beneficial to them and taking “not wasting resources” as promoting what is beneficial and abolishing what is harmful.1

This was what the author had learned from his own experience, rather than from empty talk. Though it was a personal view, it accurately represented what people generally thought at the time. The only difference was that it portrayed such a negative attitude so starkly. Consequently, in the county government office one could often see this couplet: “Scholars and farmers, devote all your time to your own affairs; workers and traders, never come through this door except on an errand.” How “individual-oriented” the official was at the time, especially when the county magistrate proclaimed publicly that there was no need to contact the officials, can well be imagined. In fact, contact between the public and officials takes the form of either tax payment in rice or lawsuits. As the proverb among the folks in Hebei Province goes, “Having made your tax payment in rice, you feel as well 1

See “On Groaning”.

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at ease as the king.” This means that as soon as you have paid your tax in rice, you no longer live under the control of the government officials, let alone under the control of other people. As for lawsuits, so long as you did not sue the government officials in court, they would never find fault with you. Whether it is civil cases or criminal cases, it is preferable for most of them to be settled out of court (this will be discussed in detail later). In Western society in earlier periods, most people had too little freedom, but it could be said that in old China, the people enjoyed too much freedom, as Sun Yat-sen once said. Legend had it that “the Chinese people start work at daybreak, retire at sunset, do farm work for food and dig wells for water. What does the power of emperors have to do with me?” Or this may simply be a literary invention, or hearsay that may not necessarily have been the case. However, in a world where there is peace and everything is in order, it is more likely that the state and its people easily overlook each other, which is the actual situation in China. This style of governance through non-action can be said with ample evidence to date back to the Western Han Dynasty (202 BC-8 AD), if not earlier than that. Legend has it that in the Western Han Dynasty, Prime Minister Cao Can effectively failed to govern his country due to his tendency to overindulge in alcohol, and Prefecture Chief Ji An was known to “govern in bed”. There is an abundance of such juicy anecdotes, but we are not convinced that these off icials were influenced by the thoughts of the Yellow Emperor (2697-2589 BC) and of Lao-tzu (about 571-471 BC). This resulted mainly from the fact that China’s social structure, which favored ethical and professional distinctions, was gradually taking shape at this time and the need to govern this country through non-action (which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Ten) was recognized by discerning people. The earlier quote from Hasegawa Nyozekan – that “modern Englishmen deem their nation a necessary evil without realizing that the Chinese people had long regarded their nation as an unnecessary evil” – illustrates this attitude. Second, China’s dissimilarity from other nations can be clearly perceived from its lack of international rivalry. As we know, functionally, a nation takes care of internal affairs on the one hand and external affairs on the other. China, however, tended to be slack on internal affairs while not being a source of stress for its external neighbors. Usually, a nation’s international rivalries seem to have much to do with its power as a nation. In the case of China, however, while its power cannot be said to be weak, its competitiveness on the international scene has always been very slight. Its lack of

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international ambitions, however, is still not detrimental to its national power, as can be seen by the following points. First, China’s national defense was historically neglected. For example, pilotage rights in coastal ports, as important international secrets, are never granted to foreigners. But in China, foreigners were allowed to serve as pilots even for inland navigation, which was unheard of anywhere else. In the battle between China and France in the tenth year of the reign of Emperor Guangxu in the Qing Dynasty (i.e., in the year 1884), the French warships were piloted into the Minjiang River in Fujian Province by Americans, whose licenses were issued by Chinese Customs. This was recorded in Muer’s public international law and cited by scholars from various countries as an absurd event. It was said that foreigners accounted for about half of all ship pilots registered by China Customs. This is only one case; it is not difficult to find many more cases of similar neglect of national defense. Second, regarding the nationwide survey of its household register and land registration, matters in China were extremely unclear. Both its household register and land registration were originally the assets supporting international relations, which needed to be constantly assessed, revalued and surveyed for expansion plans. China did not even take stock of its own assets, which shows how indifferent it was to them. Someone who knew nothing about China might think that the Chinese people were too simple-minded to care about this, but they would be wrong. The story of how, when Xiao He (a prime minister in the Han Dynasty) conquered the City of Xianyang, he confiscated all the maps of the territory and the household registers of the Qin Dynasty, is well-known to history. Those maps and household registers were those very assets. Actually, they had existed as early as the Pre-Qin Period and the Warring States Period. It was just that, after two thousand years, people no longer paid attention to them. Third, as the civil arts were prioritized over military prowess and civilians were not trained as soldiers, China nearly became “a state with no soldiers”. Thus, in Chapter One, echoing Lei Haizong’s Chinese Culture and Chinese Soldiers, we listed as one of the features (the twelfth feature) of Chinese culture “being without soldiers after the Eastern Han Dynasty”. As is known, no state can be founded without military support. Soldiers enjoy unequivocally and legitimately high status in a state. In the feudal age, soldiers and civilians were separated and soldiers were considered to be the superior rank in society. Such was the case in the states before the Spring and Autumn Period in China. In modern states, soldiers and civilians are drawn from the same rank, with the nationwide recruitment of soldiers. The Seven Powers in the Warring States Period all tended to recruit soldiers

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in this way, with the Qin Dynasty being the first to follow this practice in order to unify China. But in the two thousand years since then, this practice did not survive and an anomalous situation would often arise. The so-called anomalous situation would go as follows: good people did not serve in the army; hooligans, gangsters or even criminals made up majority of soldiers in the army, to the point where soldiers and gangsters could scarcely be differentiated and soldiers and civilians harbored hatred against each other. This was the first stage. The upshot of this situation, then, was that though the whole state was so vast, no soldiers were reliably available and when a war broke out, foreign troops had to be depended on for support. During the Han and the Tang dynasties, in spite of their prosperity, this practice was quite common. This was the second stage. The “state with no soldiers” is so called not because there were no soldiers within the state, but because within the State, there was no practical working arrangement with its soldiers. China, a country with a vast territory and a large population and a culture more advanced than that of its neighboring countries, was historically often invaded and even ruled by those neighboring countries. Is this not a patent absurdity? Whatever accounts for its cumulative weakness, it can never get around its culture. It is not the case that China’s culture was not advanced, but what is important, concerning such a significant issue, is that it lacked a workable system. Would we then be wrong to call such a culture “the culture with no soldiers” and to argue that it suffered from cumulative weakness as a result? Quite a few scholars, who disagree with Lei,2 have adduced evidence from historical documents to show that this was not the case. Actually, though, they have at most proved that there the situation alternated between the normal and the anomalous. The anomalous can surely not be denied. Historically, China witnessed many cyclic changes. Amid these cycles of change, though no situation remained in place permanently, isn’t it of value to have observed these periods of anomaly? This point alone demonstrates amply the uniqueness of Chinese culture, and is worthy of further research. From this point, we can at least get a sense of China’s extreme impotence in international affairs, which is absolutely incommensurate with its impressive national power (displayed by its vast territory, large population and advanced culture). Lastly, in Chinese people’s traditional way of thinking, it can be seen that there is simply a lack of the concept of the State. What’s more, they love to 2 Regarding his view that China had no army, many scholars disagree with LEI. A case in point is a paper published in the monthly magazine Thought and Times entitled “Military Service and Military System of Over Two Thousand Years in China”, written by ZHANG Qi-yun.

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talk about “the world under heaven”, which more clearly reveals this lack of international rivalry and shows that, in this sense, China is not at all like most states. On this point, Liang Qichao wrote some time ago that: The word “State” is a relative term that implies comparison with other States. When a country is labeled as a State, it must be compared with other countries before it comes into view. This is just like the situation in which only when there are “others”, can we discern an “I”. … It is not that a State exists but is not loved by its people, but that, as there is no such a thing as a State, people simply have no State to love. … When foreign rule was imposed on them, it was tantamount to the world being ruled by people from another world. Since there was no confrontation between one State and another State, the situation goes on like this.3 As its notion of outward enmity is rather faint, China’s special inward consolidation is, as one might feel, not necessary. In this regard, it is quite fair to say that among the Chinese people, it is not easy to organize a state; it is also fair to say that among the Chinese people, it is not possible to organize a State. Whether it is not easy or not possible, it is quite obvious that statism, to put it simply, has never been something that we have inherited. In other words, anti-statism or ultra-statism has been deeply rooted among the Chinese people. A review of China’s two-thousand-year history reveals that this has brought about a half-gained and half-lost outcome. Specifically, China’s periodic subjugation to foreign races is its loss, but the ravagers’ rapid assimilation is its gain. To finally settle the account, what is gained is more than sufficient to cover what is lost, with the result that “the Chinese people” as constituent elements are constantly augmented and the extent of its so-called “world under heaven” has been increasingly expanded. That is perhaps why, returning to the present, Europe is a place with dozens of large and small countries, but China has long been an integrated state. 4

Concepts such as “the State” and “society” that we often talk about today are not ones that were ever present in the traditional way of thinking. They are only newly imported concepts that have arrived since China has been 3 See LIANG Qichao’s article “China’s Future and Its National Responsibility” in Collected Works at the Ice-drinking Room, 1936. 4 See Chapter I of LIANG Qichao, A History of Political Thought during the Pre-Qin Period, 1922.

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open to navigation and air traffic with foreign countries. The two Chinese characters “國家” (guó jiā), in the traditional sense, are two different words, with the former character “國” (guó) referring to vassals’ fiefs (roughly symbolizing the imperial court or the imperial household) and the latter character “家” ( jiā) referring to senior officials’ fiefs in ancient times. These two characters did not have the same meaning as they do today, as they are now used as a single word referring to “state”, “nation”, “country” or “homeland”. Ever since suffering foreign invasions and importing the new concept “state”, “nation”, “country” or “homeland”, the Chinese people have acquired a better understanding of the relationship between citizens and the State, and also of citizens’ responsibilities. An often quoted saying by Gu Tinglin, stating that the rise and fall of the world under heaven rests with every citizen in that world, well expresses his intentional meaning. It has even been directly reworded as “The rise and fall of a nation rests with every citizen in that nation.” This is totally oblivious to what the original text says. The original text goes as follows: There are cases of the collapse of state power and of the world under heaven. How, then, can the collapse of state power be differentiated from the collapse of the world under heaven? This is how: the change of dynasties or the change of the title of a reign means the collapse of state power; in spite of overflowing benevolence and righteousness, virtues and morality cannot be fostered and enhanced, rulers tyrannize their people and constant disputes arise among the people, which means the collapse of the world under heaven. … Consequently, knowing the importance of defending the integrity of the world under heaven takes precedence over knowing the importance of defending the integrity of one’s nation. The safety of a state or the danger it faces rests with those in charge of state affairs, whereas the rise and fall of the world under heaven rests with every citizen in the world.

This is a quote (published in Daily Understanding) from a piece on customs and propriety written by Gu Yanwu, a noted thinker, historiographer and linguist during the late Ming and the early Qing dynasties. The original text discusses the ups and downs of the customs of successive dynasties from a purely rational cultural standpoint. “國” (guó), the State, for which he said we do not have to be responsible obviously refers to the imperial court or the imperial household, rather than a state, a nation, a country or one’s homeland. Is “天下” (tiān xiá), the world under heaven, for which he said we should be responsible therefore equivalent to a state, a nation, a

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country or one’s homeland? In the whole of Gu’s text, from beginning to end, there is simply no concept of “the State” as it is used nowadays! On the contrary, what he suggests everyone should be responsible for protecting is neither a state nor a race, but a culture. Gu never framed the concept of “the State”. Instead, he developed the practice of “ultra-statism”. “When barbarians come to Central China and learn Chinese culture and customs, they become members of the Chinese nation. When Chinese people enter into remote areas and borderlands and acquire barbarians’ culture and customs, they become barbarians.” – This reveals the orthodoxy of Chinese thought, and Gu represents this type of thought. It expresses neither national supremacy nor racial supremacy, but rather cultural supremacy. As to states and races, it seems that they are non-existent: the power is exclusively cultural. Ninety years ago (i.e., in 1859), exactly this sort of cultural stand was taken by Zeng Guofan (a statesman, strategist, neo-Confucianist and man of letters in the late Qing Dynasty) and Hu Linyi (a statesman and general in the late Qing Dynasty) when they called upon their fellow countrymen to fight against Hong Xiuquan (1814-1864, the well-known leader who established the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in the late Qing Dynasty) and Yang Xiuqing (one of the generals in the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in the late Qing Dynasty) by vehemently denouncing them.5 The failure of the doomed Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was also attributed to its violation of China’s fundamental customs and cultural practices. Thirty years ago (i.e., in 1918), my father, Liang Ji (1958-1918), bitterly grieved over the disappearance of Chinese culture and sacrificed his life by drowning himself in the icy Jingye Lake in Peiping in winter.6 This spirit of endeavoring to defend traditional moral principles is almost tantamount 5 In the Battle of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, HONG Xiuquan and YANG Xiuqing, in order to denounce Hu Linyi, issued an official call to arms, publicly flaunting racialism. ZENG Guofan and HU Linyi, however, issued a countering call to arms to denounce HONG and YANG in their cultural stand. The original texts can be verified by modern historical data. In the end, HONG and YANG were wiped out by ZENG and HU. Due to naivety of HONG and YANG’s religious beliefs, what they did was mostly not in conformity with the inherent cultural awareness. This indeed can be counted as the root cause that prevented them from accomplishing much. Their demise was hardly caused by the Qing Dynasty. 6 I have written in more detail about my late father in Posthumous Writings of Liang Ji, a Native of Guilin, published in 1927 by The Commercial Press in Shanghai. Before he sacrificed his life, the writings he left behind, such as A Letter to All in the World and A Letter to Sons and Daughters in the World, were unknown to most people as they were distributed by mimeographs. The following is an important passage from the book: “if there is no nationality for my country, what’s the point of my living in this world? Though I am not solely responsible for whether or not there is nationality, since I see no nationality for my country, is ours a country in the truest sense? I consider it imperative to sacrifice my life so my fellow countrymen can be made aware

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to the action of a religionist. Rather than a belief in superstition, however, it arises from the genuine love of rationality. Liang Qichao, in the book A History of Political Thought during the Pre-Qin Period, elaborates on the differences between different schools of thought on this subject, and only discusses politics in terms of the world under heaven, viewed from the perspective of cosmopolitanism. He often aims to research the deeds of whoever is attainable but is never satisfied to do so only in part. His Confucianist attitude, then, is particularly distinct. The following are some examples: Spring and Autumn Annals, a classic of sublime prose with deep meanings, divides human history into three evolutionary stages: The first is the chaotic-times stage when one’s ruling area (i.e., the State of Zhou during the Spring and Autumn Period) is treated as the home state while all Central States are treated as foreign. The second is the peaceful-times stage, when all Central States are treated as home states while all other peripheral minorities are treated as foreign. The third is the times-of-peace-and-order stage, when all Central States and peripheral minorities under heaven, far and near, big and small, are of great unity and even barbarians are promoted to nobility.7 Thus the concept of the State is the most appropriate term only in the chaotic-times stage. In the “chaotic-times stage”, governance proceeds according to the specific situation. Such governance aims to establish peace for all people in the world. Gradually, chaos develops into peace and further development secures peace and order. When it comes to times of peace and order, there no longer exists a State, nor any ethnic groups. In the time when Mencius lived, confrontations between various states were much more bitter and statism was rejected outright. … Any debate about Rule by Virtue and Rule by Force in Confucianism is a debate about Cosmopolitism and Statism.8

Intellectuals of later ages have certainly been enlightened by this, as they never open their mouths without talking about the world under heaven. that nationality is indispensable to the founding of a country or a state.” Nationality here refers to the inherent customs and cultural practices of a country. 7 Translator’s Note: Reference has been made to The Fourteenth Year of Duke Ai’s Reign (481 BCE), a note in Harry Miller’s The Gongyang Commentary on “The Spring and Autumn Annals”, A Full Translation, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015. 8 See LIANG Qichao, A History of Political Thought during the Pre-Qin Period, 1922 (pp. 263-265).

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Far more than intellectuals, however, ordinary people in sectors such as agriculture, industry and commerce also share the same consciousness. We never have the same clear and acute consciousness of state, consciousness of class (which is correspondingly inseparable from state consciousness) and consciousness of race (which comes before state consciousness, but is categorized differently) as Westerners. What the Chinese people have in mind is either themselves and their families, or the world under heaven. Apart from this, other matters are mostly ignored. Why do Chinese people’s minds work this way? If this were considered, in all cases, as the outcome of ideological guidance from great thinkers of the past, this would be an inaccurate conclusion. Rather, this way of thinking naturally demonstrates an important phenomenon: the State is submerged in the society, and the society and the State are incorporated. There is opposition in a State but not in the society. Thus we have the concept of the world under heaven. The following is the second comparison diagram. Diagram 2  Difference between China and the West China

The West

The World at Large The Group

The World at Large The Group

The Family The Individual

The Family The Individual

Graphic symbols: (1) “The world under heaven” in general refers to society or the human world or the international community, or a similar concept; (2) “The Group” refers to the State, religious groups, racial groups or class groups; (3) “The Family” refers to an individual’s family and relatives; (4) The font sizes indicate the acute or dim consciousness of the concept or its high or low status.

Ranging from a single individual to the most expanded social relationship that an individual may have, there are four levels, as indicated in the above diagram. Each level has its own features: (1) The individual, as the starting point; (2) The family, as the natural relationship between husband and wife, father and son, and so on; (3) The group, as an organization without geographical boundaries; (4) The world under heaven, as a community of equals. In the consciousness and the lives of Westerners, the most important positions are occupied by two levels of society: the individual and the group.

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To the Chinese, however, occupying the most important place in their consciousness and in their lives are their families and the world under heaven. This is the key difference between China and the West. As someone has said, historically, China develops as a world instead of a state.9 This is, on the whole, true.

9.2

A Nation Derived from Class Rule

In Europe, there are numerous small states and most of them are at odds with one another because of the fiercely competitive international scene. As people rely on their respective states for their own protection, they are very attached to their states. On the other hand, as these states depend on their people to enable them to compete with their neighbors, naturally they must extend their influence over everything their people do within reason. But in China, a state with the same geographical area as Europe ever since the great unification that took place during the Qin and the Han dynasties, there has been no fierce competition such as there was during the Warring States Period. Although during this time there were neighboring states or hostile tribes with less developed cultures, the lack of inter-state competition meant that within the state, people slacked off, did not apply themselves, and became passive. This situation was exactly like the last hundred years, which means we have had to become politically more active to meet a new world environment. Such geographical and historical factors are not in dispute. Fundamentally, however, China’s social structure proper is not suited to competition with foreign states, nor is it suited to internal governance. This is the key point I made above: “when a State melts into society, society and the State are fused together.” Must “society” and “the State” be so sharply juxtaposed with each other? Judging by the concept as derived from historical realities in the West, this is indeed the case. In the preface to his well-known book The State, Franz Oppenheimer said: The concept of Society as a contrast to the concept of the State first appears in Locke and from his era onwards. This contrast grew more and more pronounced…

9

See LIN Yutang, The Spirit of Chinese Culture, 1941.

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He also added that it was the third estate (i.e., the laboring class) that first began to regard itself as “society”, and subsequently rose in opposition to the feudal “State”. Later, as above – the fourth estate in turn began to regard itself as “society”, and rose in opposition to the “State” that the third class now represented. They shared the view that the “State” was a privileged community that had survived through the violation of natural law, while “society” was a combined entity of both man and the way of heaven, in conformity with natural law. Perhaps they both saw the “State” as Civitas Diaboli (i.e., the city of demons), and the “society” as Civitas Dei (i.e., the city of God). The difference here is that the State asserted that capitalist society is the result of natural law, while society claimed that only when a socialist society appears can this process be finished. In Western Europe, this was the most prevalent view. Only scholars from Germany tended to hold the opposite view, and revered the State. They regarded the State as paradise and society as hell. Later, however, they revised their ideas and accepted the more generally accepted view in Western Europe. This is illustrated in the work of Karl Marx and other scholars. Franz Oppenheimer was also part of this school of thought. Oppenheimer, who referred to many sources throughout his book, merely pointed out how this concept of the State historically arose and how it was likely to vanish. His main idea is that, in the struggle for survival, human beings use two different means in order to obtain what they need. One is a person’s own labor or the equal-value exchange of one’s own labor with the labors of others – that is, economic means. The other is to appropriate others’ labor by force, rather than for pay – that is, political means. “Society” develops from economic means, while the “State” is derived from political means. Since ancient times, the development of human history has been driven by the contest for supremacy between economic means and political means, with the latter gradually being overcome. In the end, political means will be eradicated and there will remain only “society”, without the “State”. The “State” then becomes what Oppenheimer calls “a Libreville People’s Group” with “freemen’s citizenship”, namely, a libertarian group, which is organized purely on the basis of natural relationships, with no power to govern by military force. – Regarding this point, readers may cross-reference with the preceding chapter discussing why social classes come into being and why liberation is inevitable in the end, and everything will be clear. Certainly, the State is founded on military force. But to say that military force is maintained expressly for the purpose of exploitation and that the State originates from and consists in military force alone would be an oversimplification. Even though the State may be the outcome of military

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force, this is obviously not the only reason that the State survives and thrives. The State exists because, on the one hand, it can defend itself from foreign invasion, and on the other hand, it can unleash internal force so as to bring security and order to its society. When there is no social stability or social order, no one is able to live safely. Naturally, it is best if social stability or social order can be secured through rational methods. But when communication fails, either externally or internally, military force becomes the last resort. The institution that maintains military force and is responsible for dealing with both internal and external affairs is the State. This state of affairs requires human culture to have developed to the point that conflict resolution is governed by rational principles, a stage that comes before military force can be abolished – in which case the State will naturally also be transformed. However, this will take place only after remarkable economic progress has been achieved, which may arrive in the future. The State must rule through military force, as is made clear above. But why must it be the rule of a particular class? This is because military force is merely a tool, which must be wielded by a body. This body is invariably a certain class. Theoretically, military force should belong to the State, which is its body. But this is an empty assertion, for in order for the State to come into being it requires that all of its people consistently bend to one will. We might well ask if this is possible. We can observe, within a state, that there are differences between classes, ethnic groups, religions, professions and localities, and inevitably standpoints vary. In these cases, it rarely occurs that an enthusiastic agreement can be secured. In particular, classes cannot disappear, and contradictions between classes cannot be glossed over either, though sometimes foreign aggression can distract from them, not to mention internal problems that may also arise. Since military force often backs up internal subjugation, isn’t it clear then who is employing the force? The entity that directs the military does so in the name of a state, but it is in fact a class – the ruling class, the exploiting class. During the feudal period, the ruling class was a powerful group that best succeeded under the class system. Later on, due to cultural progress exemplified by the emergence of various states, military force began to abate and classes seemed to become, in legal terms, non-existent. However, whether one is economically exploiting or exploited depends on legal order, and the maintenance of legal order is backed up by both the military police and the state’s courts. This was merely an indirect way of maintaining rule. There was certainly a ruling class. Next, as should be clear, no one outside this class exercises subjectivity. The subject and the tool must match well. If they do not, it would be

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better that the subject is more powerful than the tool, but not the other way round. When the situation is otherwise, the tool will be a burden or a barrier instead of a source of power. As we said in the preceding chapter, the State is a mighty coercive power. Such coercion must be applied when two sides are in conflict. Though the number of people may not necessarily be well-matched on both sides, it won’t do, however, for one person to face the public alone. Thus, the descriptions in Chinese history of the State’s mighty military force consisting of only one person or only one family name stack the odds too high and are too fanciful to be plausible. Only in a fight among rivals for the throne or in a situation where two armies both maintain their ground will one person be hailed as a chieftain, with his orders being decisive in securing a victory. At that moment, the chieftain becomes the subject that wields the military force. Once the opposite side has been vanquished, however, it is no longer necessary for the generals on the winning side to forever be willing to obey one person. This was the toughest issue for the founders of past dynasties to cope with, as Emperor Taizu of the Song Dynasty admitted. It was also he who removed all his ministers from military positions over cups of wine, in order to make his life easier. Other emperors, however, would invariably become suspicious and jealous of their advisors, or even savagely kill those worthy people who made joint efforts with them to seize the power of the State. There are countless stories about this and this is precisely the reason behind them. Consequently, when efforts are made to seize power over the State in China, military force has historically been obligatory. But when power has actually been seized, military force is set aside and military rule can no longer be deployed. As the old sayings go, “power over the State can be seized by force of arms, but a state can never be governed by force of arms”; moreover, “efforts should be made to desist from military activities and to encourage State culture and education”. What is expressed here should be clear enough on this point. Lei Haizong once pointed out that such a large country not only recruited foreign troops to protect itself from invasions on its frontiers, but also to ensure the security of the royal capital and its surrounding districts. To have a situation without troops like this seems to be bereft of reason. A state is founded on class rule. As no class system developed in China, there was no possibility of maintaining rule through military force. This was the real reason why China was not like a state. That emperors of past dynasties in China tried to alleviate corvée and to reduce taxes, to share joys and sorrows with their people, to overwhelm their citizens with kindness, to promote education and to even govern according to filial piety, all indicated

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that they would give up their rule, with the expectation that they could get along peacefully with their citizens. An emperor, by so doing, may have had only good intentions and a desire to keep a low profile in order to preserve his throne. In such cases, it is fair to say that the emperor dared not employ military forces, or even that he had no military forces to employ. There seems to be no other explanation for China’s several thousand years’ unbreakable passive quietism in politics.

9.3

The Collapse of Feudalism in China

What we have discussed above, of course, is concerned with the China after the Qin and the Han dynasties. Its lack of a class system and general characteristics of a state represent what is absent. The fusion of its ethics-oriented and professional distinctions, that is, the fact that society is considered to be the State, is the positive angle. The uniqueness of such social forms must have been present in China from antiquity, but it started to unfold only after the disintegration of feudalism. I will say more about those distinctions China possesses in the next chapter. Presently, let’s come to the two points related to absence: (1) Why China is not like a state, due to its lack of class system (cause). (2) What China’s future will be, since it is not like a state owing to this lack of a class system (effect). Therefore, we have to talk about the disintegration of China’s feudal system. As stated in Chapter Two, the history of human culture does not follow a linear path of development. Compared with Western culture, Chinese culture has followed a quite different track. In the discussion of class-related issues in the preceding chapter, I explained why history can be divided into five stages, which, from the perspective of historical materialism, are highly distinctive. The present discussion of the collapse of feudalism in China implies that China also experienced a feudal age just like the one described in Western social history, precisely by pointing out that this is where its differences from the West lie. Two main points need to be noted first: First, during the transition period after feudalism and before capitalism, the major political development in the West was the emergence of a concentration of monarchical power. But very quickly, the concentration of monarchical power evolved into the restriction of monarchical power (that is, constitutional government). Hence, the transition period was very

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brief. Conversely, what was a comparatively short period in the West lasted an extremely long time in China. When China tried to eliminate feudalism, a significant concentration of monarchical power also emerged. No one expected that such a situation would be perpetuated for so long. This period was drawn out for more than two thousand years. Had China not been influenced by the West in the last century, the abrupt change in the course of Chinese history would not have come about. Second, closely related to China’s long-unchanged political situation is its long-term economic stagnation. Although its industry and commerce were originally well developed, which took place during the pre-Qin period, their development slowed so that they remained merely average, even after more than two thousand years. Had the capitalist industrialism of the modern West not spread to China, this might have remained the case indefinitely! This is both undeniable and also difficult to apprehend. The two thousand years since the Qin and the Han dynasties have reputedly been a secretive era. In a discussion of Chinese social history, if no satisfying and reasonable interpretation can be given, what has been said about the era following the Qin and the Han dynasties then will amount to nothing. Yet it would be more ridiculous still to ignore or obliterate this period. However, those who have been misled by superstition and prejudice struggle with their inability to obliterate it, which will be shown in the following points. Before we embark on this discussion, it should be asked: What is feudalism? How can we distinguish feudalism from the relief from feudalism? Simply put, feudalism is a kind of super-economic and mandatory pattern of exploitation imposed by landowners upon their land cultivators. This is the key point. Economically, feudalism is a derivative of the natural economy, socially a manifestation of administrative subordination, politically a dispersion of socioeconomic units of various sizes and ideologically a product of religious superstition; in general, all these facets naturally stem from the same key factor (i.e., the exploitation of land cultivators). Liberation from feudalism means eradicating all of these facets, with the focus on removing the key factor (exploitation). Another question is: How can these phenomena be eradicated? Generally speaking, according to Franz Oppenheimer, this process should be a one-time assertion of the supremacy of economic means over political means. These two methods are applied to the same purpose. When the economic means is more readily available and the ends cannot be achieved through political means, the process will gradually diverge from political means and economic means will be deployed instead. The fact that with each passing day, economic means are more readily available but political means less feasible, suggests that economic means have triumphed

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once and for all but feudal exploitation has been removed. This is roughly how feudalism ended in Britain. France, however, had to undergo a violent revolution as here, the political route was not practicable and therefore unavailable. Perhaps when social situations differ from place to place, their histories also differ from each other. Has China already been liberated from feudalism? As is well known, over the years, scholars at home and abroad have differed in their opinions. Quite a few of them (Li Ji, for example) believe the disintegration of China’s feudal system could be traced back to the pre-Qin period and the Warring States Period and that the society after the Qin Dynasty should be discussed separately. 10 In general, this can be considered reasonable. But other scholars consider the long period from the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (770-256 BC) up to the Opium Wars (1840-1856) represents the feudal era in China. Such a proposition, seemingly irrespective of how those related matters stand, grasps the key point – enforced exploitation in rural areas, which is considered to have existed in China at the time. This is not unreasonable either, but many doubts remain. First, as we have seen throughout both Zouping County and Dingxian County, their land is a post-feudal land and their people are post-feudal people. It goes without saying that a few tenant farmers and farm laborers, who cannot own land, are exploited by others. However, this is simply the same kind of exploitation that all workers suffer from in modern times. What was described above as “super-economic exploitation”, however, is currently non-existent. This can be confirmed by the reports on renting out land to tenants in the book A Survey of the Social Situation in Dingxian County.11 I do not deny what has been said about the long existence of exploitation by land-owners in rural areas in China. But I harbor doubts about how much exploitation there is throughout the country. A counter-example such as this is sufficiently arresting as to call the preceding proposition into question. Second, the case in which land cultivators were dependent on their land and were not allowed to leave it during the feudal period did not occur later on in Chinese history. It seems that this (i.e., their confinement to their own land) cannot be directly attributed to the scarcity of land and the density of population, nor to the lack of job opportunities in industry and commerce. Thus the claim that forcible exploitation ever existed has been refuted to a great extent. – Both the first and the second points above are skeptical about that key point. 10 See LI Ji, Criticism on Debate of Chinese Social History, 1934. 11 LI Jinghan, A Survey of the Social Situation in Dingxian County, 1933 (pp. 629-635).

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Third, according to the situation at the time, it is difficult to predict what sort of additional economic, social, political and ideological matters may or may not arise. Generally speaking, it has been proved that feudalism has already been abolished (that seems to be the reason why those who make the argument above only highlight exploitation as the key point). Given the basis of popular sayings – such as “The practice of both cultivating the land for a living and of cultivating oneself as a citizen has been handed down from generation to generation” and “Though in the early years of his life, he was only an ordinary farmer, later in his life, he became an official in the imperial court. No one is born an official in the imperial court and anyone who wants to achieve his goal should exert himself” – it may well be asked: Where in the world did such a feudal society ever exist? Lastly, it must be pointed out that the biggest drawback of the argument above is that it forced an awkward merger of two manifestly incompatible periods of history (i.e., the Qin and the Han dynasties and the Eastern Zhou Dynasty). By simply turning a blind eye to the two significant facts we have already mentioned earlier, they refuse to engage with their implications and instead casually use “feudalism” as an umbrella term. Is this convincing? On the other hand, of course, their methodology leaves them no other recourse in this matter, for without the acknowledgement of the different roads that China and the West have taken, they insist that all social evolution develops along a single line, and with their blind faith in constant progress in history, they are not aware that history may be progressing or not, that it is not a constant process. These two facts can be best explained as follows: (1) Chinese social history has moved in cycles (rather than making gradual progress) ever since the Qin and the Han Dynasties; (2) The disintegration of feudalism in China followed quite a different route from that of the West. Naturally, the first point originates from the second point. The mystery of what has occurred since the Qin and the Han dynasties is folded into the unique way feudalism disintegrated in China. Starting from this point, it will be straightforward to unfold the total mystery. How, then, can we go about this? As has been seen, China does not have a class system and here we have these two important factors, which are mutually supporting. As the last chapter showed, without class, there would be no possibility of social progress. Class must facilitate the cyclic promotion of economic progress, cultural progress and political progress before it can later be dismantled, step by step. This is perhaps a common sense view of history. The present classless China has witnessed long-term economic stagnation and unchanging politics. Doesn’t this prove that there is variation

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in history! Since China certainly had feudal classes, such variation obviously starts with the collapse of feudalism. Now, by comparing this collapse in the West and in China, we should not find it difficult to trace the route of this variation. The breakdown of feudalism in the West is mainly attributed to economic progress. Only after industry and commerce developed and people began to compete for and pursue commercial and industrial profits did they stop expending effort in the countryside in exploiting each other. The convenience of economic means induces feudal classes to abandon their political means. This abandonment is the most radical step. Only after industry and commerce have developed can the third estate arise, and all people have achieved individual freedom can enforced person-to-person exploitation cease to be viable. This means that feudal classes have only to be impelled to abandon their political means. This is the most decisive factor. At this point, though political influence has yet to be completely obliterated, the situation can never be reversed. There is no doubt that economic progress has propelled the development of culture and politics so that the whole of society bore witness to a changed scene. This can also be said to be the usual way this process turns out. Now, let’s look at China. Its social structure underwent epochal changes during the Warring States Period before the Qin Dynasty unified the whole country, and thus ushered in a new era. This meant, as was stated in The Doctrine of the Mean, that “in the world today, carts are identical in axle length, texts are identical in script, and conduct is identical in all roles”; there was no more resistance at the frontiers, no more heterogeneous government decrees and no more situations arising from barriers and estrangements. As in a feudal society, this involved a top-down division of society into several classes, but units of various sizes scattered around everywhere were unified under one king so that monarchical power was centralized and autocracy was the method of government. Meanwhile, the system of enfeoffment and land-granting developed into the free trade of land, i.e., land could be bought and did not have to be granted, with no limit placed on the number of acres of land a farmer could till. So, what kind of change did this represent? If what has been said by Minogatov is correct, i.e., the feudal system lies simply in the regional tenor of its political relations and in the political tenor of its land relations, it should be the case that feudal emancipation took place. However, does such emancipation also benefit from economic progress? That is difficult to say. Economic progress is shown by historically well-documented evidence such as commodity production, a monetary economy, the rise of cities and a well-developed transport system.

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If we seek only the political means Westerners would recognize, such as so-called inducement and enforcement, there is difficulty in discerning the signs of emancipation. On the contrary, this shows that success through economic means is neither thorough nor decisive and that political means must loom large from time to time. In other words, though this success can only be secured by certain economic conditions, it is not the result of promoting economic progress. Rather, it is culture and politics that have in turn exerted influence upon the economy. What, then, do we mean by “political means looms large from time to time”? As I wrote in the last chapter: To a society which has just been emancipated from feudalism, directly or indirectly securing a centralized monopoly of land throughout the country by political means is a reversal. Such a reversal cannot be sustained for long, for historically, it ebbs and flows, as I understand it.

Obviously, toward the end of the Western Han Dynasty, for example, the problem became very serious. The enslaved people were so many and so much of the land was centrally monopolized. Directly or indirectly, these effects can be attributed to the impact of political powers. The situation therefore precipitated Wang Mang’s major land reform. Historically, reforms of this kind, whether on a large scale or on a small scale, have been continuous, and so are movements such as those aimed at “limiting private land” and “equalizing shared land”. Chinese history is full of just this kind of keen rivalry between progression and retrogression. This is because social progress and class emancipation are not instigated by economic change – if they were, political means would never be a factor – but rather, by cultural and political shifts. The breakdown of feudalism in China was set in motion by such cultural and political changes, and this was embodied in the collapse of the aristocracy and the emergence of scholars. As is well known, feudal classes (referring, in fact, to both the feudal lords and the aristocracy of ancient times) were initially founded by military force and thereafter maintained through religion. It has always been the case that aristocracy, military force and religion are interconnected. It is true both in the countries of the West and also everywhere else. Therefore, except for the classes derived from the pursuit of profit and proliferation of property in later ages, which seem rather loose in their organization, all aristocracies routinely come together as groups in their society. Why is that? This is because groups are associated with struggles. When an organization is secured by military force, how can

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it be bound together as a group? The cohesive energy experienced by people in religious settings is certainly a basis for bringing a group together from the very beginning. That military force and religion are often combined is in no way surprising. What is strange, however, is that China is, to some extent, an exception. In his book A History of Chinese Culture, Liang Qichao endeavors to explain what is different about China’s aristocratic politics, which are in stark contrast with those of Europe. The differences are: First, there was no institution equivalent to the Roman Senate (or the elite assemblies of medieval societies). Second, though aristocrats and common people enjoyed different statuses, there was no impassable barrier between them. Third, when aristocrats and common people participated in government and political affairs, they did not yield to each other any distinction, for even common people could be informed about the actual state and policy of the government. The first point is easy to understand, so no elaboration is required. In support of the latter two points, Liang cited some examples from the Spring and Autumn Period to illustrate his point. (As there is not enough space here, I will not include these citations.) In fact, these three points do reveal that the aristocracy of the era had not formed a cohesive group. As regards the first point, if there had been such an institution among the aristocracy at that time, it would show that those aristocrats had joined forces as a group. Since there was none, it can be assumed that they did not. From the second point, it can be seen that there was no strict division between insiders and outsiders. From the third point, it can be seen more clearly that those aristocrats did not secure an exclusive monopoly in social terms. Again, this is a sign of their inadequate cohesion as a group. Generally speaking, when a country’s class prejudice is not ingrained, neither its racial prejudice nor its national prejudice is deep-seated. These three points are inextricably linked, as can be seen from the examples cited by Liang to elucidate the latter two points. In his paper “A Discussion of the Problems in A History of Politics”, Zhang Taiyan (1869-1936), a democratic revolutionist and thinker, also used many examples from the Spring and Autumn Period to show that in China, racial exclusion such as we find in a patriarchal society stopped existing a long time ago. But if you try to compare this with the situation in ancient Rome in the West, you will instantly realize the crucial difference. The Romans founded their great Empire by conquering countless ethnic groups from near and far. The status of being a Roman, since they were one ethnic group and also one class, was confined only to those families who originally attended religious ceremonies, without admitting new members. They extended firstly

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their dominion and secondly their territory; to the conquered, they denied recognition. In other words, the conquered were considered outsiders or even enemies from the beginning to the end. The conquered peoples’ requests to become Romans were indignantly denounced as extremely unreasonable. They even went so far as to start violent revolutions in pursuit of their goals and initiating what we might call “social campaigns”, but their appeals were still denied. Once in a while, they resorted to some circuitous approaches by, for example, being sold as slaves to Romans and then, through legitimate liberation, intermingling with Roman citizens, which occasioned quite a lot of trouble. Such class struggles existed for centuries before they were resolved. We should not think of Romans as being odd. It was the Chinese who were in fact extremely unusual! Concerning the feudal class in China, why was it so lax and so mild toward the people? The reason must be China’s early rational enlightenment combined with its lack of religion. The lack of religion results in the enfeeblement of group-centered life. Feudalism therefore relies on both military force and religion. Rationality, however, is incompatible with either of these influences. When enlightenment dawns, feudalism itself is dissolved with no need for external force to accumulate against it (see Chapter Eleven). Its instability becomes inevitable due to the impact of the emphasis on people’s hearts and minds, and the cohesive force over which religion exercises strict control is no match for the awakening of consciousness in every individual. The rites and music of the Duke of Zhou during the Zhou Dynasty inspired people to regain their gentleness and kindness instead of exercising brutality. This explains why people here seldom apply brute force against each other, why they do not alienate a different class to a high degree and why they are so mild toward other people. Some people say that China never experienced the “slavery society” period. Or in other words, China shifted to the feudal era directly from clan collectivism (in Du Wei’s view). Alternatively, after a transitional era in Asia, China entered the feudal era (in Li Ji’s view). As I did not conduct a close investigation into it, I cannot form a judgment here. But I do feel that the view that China did not experience a period of slavery in society seems to be true. Class rule in such a society is harsher than in feudal society, just as it was in ancient Rome, and this seems to be inevitable. Only China was spared from experiencing slavery in society. Consequently, the Chinese people were also spared spiritually from suffering this type of severe trauma, and the class problems of the feudal period were also simpler, and ultimately tended to be dissolved. As a result, having been a country of great magnificence for several thousand years, China remains a state with very little class consciousness, racial consciousness or national consciousness

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even up to the present day. Whether it concerns suffering under religious obstruction or suffering the trauma of slavery in society, this all bespeaks an absence in China’s history, and the positive aspects of Chinese history lie in its early enlightenment – a historical characteristic of our nation, which has been maintained from ancient times for many generations. The seeds of the dissolution of the aristocratic class were sown long ago in its instability and in the lack of boundary around feudal territory. In such a society, which generally lacked religion, when aristocrats were stripped of their military force, what else was left for them? What was left was their accumulated knowledge and early enlightened rationality. These people were exactly what I mean by “scholars”. It was just these scholars who destroyed feudalism in China. They did their best to facilitate the dissolution of the class and they were themselves also the end product of this dissolution, in a case that is unique to China. The disintegration of feudalism in China was no more than the dissolution of this class so that rule by military force was replaced by peaceful co-existence based on rational principles. This dynamic differs from the substitution of the new class for the old one in the West, where only the entity that wields military force is changed. In this view, it is from here that advances in both culture and politics arise. The word “士人 (shìrén)” is a derivational noun. Here, I use it as an umbrella term for those who also belonged to this group of people in ancient times. They are characterized by being educated and learned. As the late Zhang Yinlin said, Why did the Chinese character “士(shì)” first refer specifically to warriors wielding weapons of war or a bow and arrow, but then change its meaning to refer specifically to scholars committed to studies and to debates? Understanding this change entails understanding the big difference between society before the Spring and Autumn Period and society after the Qin and the Han dynasties. Before the Spring and Autumn Period, what we would call education can be considered as the education of warriors, as warriors were the most educated people at the time. After the Qin and the Han dynasties, what we would call education can be considered as the education of men of letters, as at this time men of letters were the most educated people. The Chinese character “士(shì)” invariably refers to those specially educated people, but the change in the context of education means the character’s implications have also changed.12

12 See ZHANG Yinlin, An Outline of Chinese History before the Eastern Han Dynasty, 1944 (p. 56).

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As has been previously mentioned, education, as an intellectual privilege of the highest order, was available only to a small number of people, like monarchs and aristocrats. Besides this, scholarly attainments, acquired through accumulation of experience, were available only to off icials. Because of this, officialdom and scholarly attainments were inseparable from each other. Thus the eventual widespread circulation of scholarly attainments among the common people indicated no less than the decline of the aristocracy. Their status was diminished either by national conquest or change of circumstances, or by being proved guilty of wrongdoing or being exiled to a distant land. Opportunities also needed to be offered to people by society before they could be encouraged to give lectures or to attend schools willingly. It is generally agreed that by running private schools and providing education for all, without discrimination, Confucius initially popularized schooling and paved the way for ordinary people to become court officials in later generations. Scholars and their ilk, whose education was not inaugurated by Confucius, were inspired to greater heights of attainment purely because of his influence. Admittedly, it should be acknowledged that long before Confucius’ time and also during it, it was not uncommon to see that some well-educated common people did not hold any office, or that some virtuous and capable people who lacked an office because of estrangement or disadvantage could rise to become court officials. It was Confucius who made it possible to train scholars of later generations. But on the other hand, without the existing foundations laid by what previous teachers had advocated, how could the Confucius we know today have existed? Confucius, not some miracle (i.e., he was a person, not a legend), served as a link between the past and the future, enabling history to undergo gradual development and radical social change. Scholars were precisely these people who held the qualifications of those in office but did not have to hold an office. They could obtain the same qualifications for office as the aristocrats had, but they did not enjoy the same status as the aristocrats. Let’s suppose that one day, when the aristocrats became so few in number that they eventually vanished, and among the common people, the number of people with qualifications for office increased, political status could then be entirely secured by one’s qualifications, with no one born high or low in social status. This is how feudalism in China ended. Indeed, the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period stood a good chance. On the one hand, as the states underwent many vicissitudes during the Spring and Autumn Period, their resources could be overstretched since they had a greater number of people. On the other hand, as the powerful chiefs of the Warring States Period competed to secure the services of

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virtuous, capable people and held them in high esteem by bringing them into their retinue and supporting them, they blazed a trail. As Confucius was born at a time just between the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period, his advocacy of the practice of giving lectures and of being informed of the current state and policy of the government, with reference to different philosophers and authors of the time, played a decisive role. We can account for this practice as follows. In the feudal era, naturally warrior education prevailed (in fact, it was the combined cultivation of both literary talent and military ability), but how, then, could warrior education develop into the education of literary talents rather than military training, which would have made those warriors unmanly? This resulted from the enlightenment of rationality which presented the opportunity to emphasize literary education at the expense of military training, even in ancient times. Scholars, due to their gradual enlightenment of the mind and their growing diversity of interests, once they were separated from the group, would give up their old careers. Though they gave up military training in order to receive literary training, they did not follow the religious practice. Regardless of the lukewarm religious atmosphere, skepticism (all schools except for the Mohist School were skeptical: see Chapter Six) gradually prevailed; there simply were no church organizations, no religious posts and no tithes, so this group imagined that they could live as Westerners did. Their power needed to be decentralized. Except for a small number of people, they had to depend on both knowledge and intellect for a living. Except for those who were mediocre and incompetent, they had to get involved in politics. Roughly, this concerned three groups of people: (1) Those who were happy to seek neither fame nor wealth and earned their own living by agricultural and industrial production. This group of people was certainly small in number, but there are many descriptions of them in ancient texts.13 (2) Those who were so mediocre and ordinary that they made a living either by assisting in performing ceremonies at weddings or funerals or by teaching students. I do not believe there was any lack of people in this group. (3) Those who, with outstanding talent, gave lectures, kept themselves upto-date about the current government policy and affairs, became lobbyists or knights-errant, or even engaged in doing trade. – Perhaps the majority of people engaged in doing trade. 13 See Chapter Six of ZHANG Yinlin, An Outline of Chinese History before the Eastern Han Dynasty, 1944. For further reference, see for instance Zuo Zhuan, Mandarin and The National Policy.

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The third group of people were destroyers of feudalism. They had the same qualifications as those in office, but they were not entitled to power and position. Consequently, they opposed the aristocrats under the emperor and the feudal princes, rejected the nepotism in the system of appointing officials and even advocated for the ideal that the throne should be abdicated and handed over to another person. Once this group came to power, they would make enemies of the aristocrats, abolish the feudal system, establish provinces and counties and replace the aristocrats with government officials. Gradually, the situation changed so that aristocrats could no longer own land and people indefinitely. Both land and people under the yoke of feudalism would be emancipated. Though Confucius unintentionally destroyed the feudal square-fields system for the sole purpose of achieving flexibility and a more idealized system, several major figures such as Li Kui, Wu Qi and Shang Yang were among his second or third generation of disciples. But all along, as the royal clan was powerless, roaming scholars monopolized the affairs of State, and along with the three states that dated from the Jin Dynasty (i.e., the State of Han, the State of Wei, and the State of Zhao), the State of Qin and the State of Chu had flimsy foundations in their patriarchal clan system, with only shaky feudal influence, they thus struck the first blow. At the time when the Qin Dynasty unified the whole of China, this success was fully realized. These events cannot be recounted in detail here. However, we can see in the histories the ceaseless contact between different states and the various occasions on which they gathered together to “hold council without governance”, which indicates that a great social transformation was brewing. Those who had won the emperor’s favor and trust either became ministers or prefecture chiefs, and they could put their cherished principles into practice. Nothing was more important to them than seeking wealth or securing power, and historic feats were accomplished in this process. Highly influential at that time were lecture-giving, which was once so prevalent, and the cultivation of scholars, which was so large in scale.14 14 In Book Four of Collected Works at the Ice-drinking Room (1936), LIANG Qichao writes on the difference between the disintegration of feudalism in China and that in foreign countries. It is quoted here for reference：“Europe and Japan witnessed the abolition of the feudal system and the flourishing of civil rights, but China witnessed the abolition of the feudal system and the increased potency of monarchical power. Why? Because in Europe there are municipal governments, but in China these do not exist. Because Japan has a gentry class but China does not. … In modern times, all monarchs in the newly founded nations in Europe rely on the power of the municipal governments in order to thrive. Yet the abolition of the feudal system was not attributed to the monarchs but to the people. … During the Meiji Restoration of 1868 in Japan, the only activists were the samurai. These samurai relied on the forces of their vassal states to overhaul the shogunate through concerted efforts while rewarding the royal family. With

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In short, the emancipation from feudalism in China differs from that in the West in these ways. The emancipation from feudalism in the West arose from the struggle between and coercion of the external forces rising in the cities. The the collapse of the shogunate, it was clear that the vassal states could by no means exist side by side, and thus it was contrived that all of them were abolished. The abolition of the feudal system was thus not attributed to the monarch but to the samurai. … This was not the case in China. It was the monarch who promoted feudalism and it was also the monarch that abolished feudalism. It was the monarch who appointed himself the defender of feudalism; it was also the monarch who himself feuded with feudalism. A strong feudal system dilutes the personal power of the monarch; the decline of feudalism increases the monarch’s individual puissance. … As researchers acknowledge, the decline of civil rights is attributed to their suppression by despotism and the prevalence of despotism is attributed to the lack of civil rights. Otherwise, how can the rise and the fall of feudalism in China far precede this phenomenon in Europe, whereas despotism in China lags far behind that in Europe?” The thinking behind his insightful view on the aristocracy can also be gleaned from Liang’s book： “To sum up, since the Qin and the Han dynasties, the aristocracy has vanished. Aristocratic power was reduced to administration in Europe, America and Japan only in modern times, or even quite recently. China, however, already possessed an aristocracy two thousand years ago. … Equality and freedom in China should thus be stronger forces than in Europe and America, but the results have been entirely to the contrary. How can we account for this? The aristocrats, in arithmocratic terms, were not only traitors of both the country and its people, but also bitter enemies of the absolute monarchy. Let’s cite some facts from Western history. … The aristocracy used to be the mediator of arithmocracy. There is no political gain that does not arise from a victory in the dispute between the majority and the minority. Compared with the common people, the aristocrats certainly formed only a small minority, but compared with the monarch, the aristocrats commanded a large majority. Therefore, the aristocrats could suppress the monarch and require the monarch to earn the rights they were due. Thus the fundamentals of a national constitution could be roughly established. After this, the common people could also follow this pattern and model their own behavior on this framework. They applied the aristocrats’ technique of repressing the monarch to repress the aristocracy in turn, so as to earn their due rights. This is the first point that meant the aristocracy was in fact conducive to civil rights. The monarch alone demanded honor by calling himself saint or divine. People did not often dare to plunge into this sort of beautiful fantasy and were not so submissive as to regard the monarch’s despotism as their God-given right. If the aristocracy exercised despotism, the many among the minority, i.e., the aristocrats, would outshine the many among the majority, i.e., the common people. This could naturally occasion a pang of guilt by nursing the idea that people should fear them. This is the second point that made the aristocracy conducive to civil rights. In earlier times, the monarch colluded with the aristocracy in maltreating the common people, but now, unexpectedly, he collaborated with the common people to weaken the power of the aristocrats. The end of the autocratic monarch was the collaboration of the aristocrats with the common people to repress the monarch. All three entities both restricted and supervised each other’s influence, so no one was ever unrestrained. This was the third point that made the aristocracy conducive to civil rights. Thanks to these three points, in Western countries with aristocracies, their civil rights expanded. In China, however, there were no aristocrats, and civil rights were, on the contrary, diminished, which should be well accounted for.”

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emancipation from feudalism in China, however, arose from the syncretism of internal distinctions. It was the contest of class versus class and the collective versus the collective that finally resulted in the rise and fall of the new classes. The aristocratic class, which the newly emerging scholarly class in China coped with (as scattered individuals) was also extremely disorganized. Up to the time when the class system was dismantled and class antagonism was replaced by professional distinctions, the whole society seemed to lack discipline. In the West, it was the flourishing of industry and commerce that broke feudalism, and culture and politics changed in step with the economy, in a shift from matter to mind and from bottom to top. In China, it was lecturing and scholar-cultivating that broke feudalism, and culture and politics promoted the economy in a move from mind to matter and from top to bottom. The immovable property that scholars lacked did not represent economic forces, but what they did promoted economic progress; Li Kui and Shang Yang, two politicians and reformists during the Warring States Period, may be taken as exemplary in this regard. What has been said above is an attempt to account for how feudalism in China collapsed, and at the same time shows that from this point onward, China, due to its lack of a class system, was unlike any other country. At this point, it might be asked: Moving forward from here, can China achieve a classless society without ever becoming a country? This would certainly be impossible. First, it cannot insure against foreign aggression. Second, it cannot insure against internal strife. For any country that people aspire to, there should be no lack of the above two points. Though China tends to be unlike a country, these factors compel it to become a country. Facts compel it to gain a mighty military force so as to deal with both internal and external affairs. It is certainly not difficult to gain a military force, but the question of who is to control this force becomes a big problem. As China can no longer return to the stage of class antagonism, it lacks appropriate commanders of military force. The military force that lacks an appropriate general is bound to be weak, on the one hand, and domineering, on the other. The former case is the origin of what is censured by Lei Haizong as the “culture without soldiers”. The latter case is what Franz Oppenheimer terms political means. The practice of imposing territorial dominance and the exploitation of peasants seems as if it is heading back to feudalism. But such military weakness cannot persist forever, and such a reversion cannot remain in place permanently, either. For over two thousand years, there has never been any possibility of progress and neither is there any possibility of retrogression. Therefore, China is balanced between being

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state-like and being a non-state, and between the existence of politics and the absence of politics, which then evolves into a transformation or even into a malformation. Such is the eventual outcome of having no class system and being unlike a country.

9.4

Uniqueness of China’s Politics

Since the West replaced old customs with the new, its classes have indeed been further emancipated. There, social structure and statehood have changed (we might even say, “have been revolutionized”). Observed from the perspective of human history as a whole, the West has indeed taken one step further. Though China never attempted to keep away from emancipation, it seemed as if classes were replaced by professions and military rule was replaced by rationality and peace. But from the beginning to the end, it got entangled in this paradox. Thus, the emancipation from feudalism cannot be completed in such a short time and in the long run, the complete abolition of the class system becomes an elusive hope. Something must be said about the peculiarity of politics in China for the past more than two thousand years: First, politics was treated as a concept related to ethics. Friendship was valued more than the scramble for power and the feudal ethical code was used in place of the law. We call this the ethicization of politics: the result of syncretizing both the class and the State into an ethical society. Second, only passive peaceful coexistence both internally and externally was pursued, with an aversion to being overwhelmed with too many political matters, which is well-nigh the abolition of politics. We call this the inactivation of politics. This is probably the inevitable outcome of the lack of a class system and a weakened military force. Third, due to the centralization of national power, a culture of caution and self-examination is particularly established within the political institution. In consequence, China’s political structure and statehood are denied the opportunity for progress. Since the first two points have already been discussed previously, no further discussion is needed here. The third point can be expanded as follows: What has been said here about “the centralization of national power” refers to the separation of three powers with “checks and balances”. Such separation never occurred and will never occur in China. How can we account for this? A survey of how this happens in the West will facilitate our understanding. In the West, the separation of three powers, which began in Britain, was initially not by design but evolved out of the realities of the contemporary situation. Among the three powers, the separation and the

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opposition of the legislative and administrative ranks came first. These two were originally both included in the scope of monarchical power. How did a separate legislative body arise? Unequivocal separation dates to modern times but originated in the medieval period. The medieval parliament was first mainly comprised of aristocratic monks, besides the citizen representatives. Later on, the separation of legislative and administrative powers in fact originated in the domestic confrontations between the different classes. The hierarchical powers included (1) the king; (2) the aristocratic monks; (3) the third estate, the laboring class of the city. Among these, the third force looms the largest. The abolition of feudalism was attributed to the cooperation between the third estate and the monarch. Conversely, the restriction of monarchical power was attributed to the joint efforts of this third class and the monks. At the start, the king wielded executive power, but parliament, which was comprised of monks and citizens, wielded legislative power. Later on, as the king no longer had any real power, he withdrew from this confrontation. At this point, confrontation emerged between the monks and the citizens. At this moment, the king and parliament simply controlled neither the administrative body nor the legislative body but formed an alliance with other political parties. These two bodies competed with each other. From then up until recent decades, the influence of the House of Lords waned and the aristocratic monks exited the political arena. Contending with each other now were the newly ascendant working class and its political party, which constituted two emerging forces. This history clearly shows that if a society is not in a state of separation and confrontation, there will be no basis on which the decentralized system can function, and if there is no backdrop of mutual competition, it will not be possible for the decentralized system to operate. What, then, is the social situation in China? As I said earlier, the collapse of feudalism in China resulted from the internal division of the aristocratic class; scholars made use of and expanded the powers of the monarch, which could certainly not muster a mighty force by itself; furthermore, the society adopted a system of professional distinction and became more and more disorganized. Throughout the country, since an antagonistic force was nowhere to be found, this meant that the supreme executive power was invested in one reverent person. Power was left in the hands of one person. Why was this so? Indeed, he who has centralized national power can do as he likes, but his every act may exert such great influence that neither he himself nor other people can afford to free themselves from all inhibitions and do as they like. What, then, is to be done about this? The only way forward is to constantly exercise his vigilance and timely introspection. As a result, though a Chinese

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emperor’s absolute power is indivisible and unconstrained, since ancient times, it seems that much attention has been paid to the ways in which emperors should be on the alert and make time for introspection. This is illustrated in the following paragraph by Liang Qichao: Upon becoming established as the monarch of a State or a nation, he would have an official historian responsible for recording his deeds, a dietary clerk responsible for recording his meals, a person responsible for reminding him to stand under the banner when receiving well-intentioned advice, and another person responsible for recording the evil-doings when persuading him to do good and dissuading him from doing evil. Those who were bold enough to remonstrate with their superiors could also beat a drum in order to display vigilance. The blind official historian could offer advice by reciting ancient poetry, the musician could play a melody of exhortation, a senior official in feudal China could offer advice and suggestions, and the scholars could deliver people’s views on politics. In a word, many well-devised schemes were contrived to prevent the emperor from doing as he pleased. When it came to observing the teachings of our ancestral sages, the person with the least freedom in the world was the monarch. As he was especially fearful of his shortcomings, he made use of the superstitious psychology of ancient times, declaring that all natural calamities were entirely in the power of the monarch alone and telling people that they should examine their conscience and seek perfection through reverence of nature. When the emperor passed away, he was honored by having the posthumous title “Son of Heaven” conferred on him, which had been most famously associated with Emperor You and Emperor Li, two unprincipled, dim-witted rulers in the Zhou Dynasty. This remained unchanged for a very long period of time.15

To my understanding, this sounds as if it truly existed in ancient times, in more or less these terms, but undoubtedly this underwent a huge injection of hype by Confucians. As Confucians upheld rationality, they naturally needed to advocate it so as to establish it as a system. But historical evidence and advocacy alone were not sufficient. Only after feudalism had collapsed was it indeed really necessary or possible for such a system to be established. Let’s discuss this in more detail.

15 See the article “Hope for China’s Future and National Responsibility”, Book Ten, in LIANG Qichao, Collected Works at the Ice-drinking Room, 1936.

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As feudalism broke down, national power came to be centralized and unified. At this point, as power increased and became more concentrated, it more urgently required the emperor to be vigilant and introspective. This is one point to consider. Another is that, at this moment, as the emperor occupied a position high above the masses, he was caught in a situation of isolation and danger (see the preceding chapter). To secure his safety and also the safety of the general environment, the need for vigilance and introspection became more pressing. This is an even more important factor. On the other hand, in the feudal era, monarchs of states, large or small, were numerous and they all became officials. Whereas in the past, only the monarch was watched or inspected, now the inspection extended to the majority of government officials. (Nevertheless, the emperor was still the only person to be talked to.) Again, this is a new requirement, for on this basis, the emperor’s absolute rule could be established. The evolution of the systems of successive dynasties is too elaborate to recount here. Generally speaking, as regards relations with superiors, there were cases in which off icials dissuaded the emperor from an action, or in which they sent back the imperial edict by sealing it and refuting its validity, or otherwise supplied the emperor’s def iciencies. Concerning the command of inferiors, there were cases of officials being supervised from both within and without the court, of censuring and impeaching all officials or even of impeaching officials on the basis of a rumor. Apart from that, if natural calamities or disasters occurred, actions such as issuing an imperial edict, submitting a written statement to a higher authority as required by the monarch, bearing the blame oneself and appointing or dismissing officials (as in the case of the three councilors dismissed during the Eastern Han Dynasty) on behalf of the emperor meant an imperial decree would follow. It seems there were numerous cases of this kind, which were never seen in any other political systems of the medieval period, and indeed it is almost exclusively a Chinese characteristic. However, since you know so well how it came about, you will not be surprised. Sun Yat-sen advocated “the constitution of five powers”. He said that among these five powers, two – namely, the supervisory power and the examining power – originated from the Chinese political system itself. He also acknowledged these two powers as being specific to China. However, it must be more fully understood that these two systems, namely, the supervision system and the examination system, followed each other and complemented each other perfectly. Typically in Chinese politics, they are required to be combined before China becomes unified. Accordingly, the

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examination system in later generations originated from the practice in the Sui and the Tang dynasties. If it were traced back, it would be related to the elections of the Western Han and the Eastern Han dynasties. If we went further back, practices from the Warring States Period such as “recommendation”, “submission of a written statement to a higher authority” and “cultivating scholars” could be considered its actual forerunners. Its source can be traced even further back, to ancient times. In short, new members were recruited from among the people to participate in politics. The currency of power between the ruling and the ruled did not have to be based on the imperial examination; however, the establishment of this system was abandoned after the collapse of feudalism. Prior to that, however, class barriers did not run deep and when the examination system was f irmly established, it was possible to eliminate class barriers. Again, this is something that cannot be seen in any other political systems of the medieval era. However, the very time when this latter system was gradually being established was also the time when all the foundations of the former system were exposed. Dear readers, if you are retrospective, don’t you think what I say here is true? Besides, the former system naturally prompts those in power to become vigilant and introspective, but that which incites their vigilance and introspection are the opinions of others – those opinions from outside the ruler’s circle and more importantly, those opinions from the ruled. The real significance of the former system lies not so much in the correction of personal negligence as in the flow of thought between superiors and inferiors. However, the exchange of ideas between interlocutors is essential to the flow of thought. If there is no such exchange, those who supposedly have a responsibility to offer their opinions will be conf ined to a small circle, in which case this flow of thought will be stymied. Therefore, presenting advice or suggestions to the government or superior departments constitutes a sound basis for starting one’s official career. The latter system not only makes the former system necessary, but also makes it possible. This is just what I mean when I describe the systems as “following each other and complementing each other perfectly”. If both systems can play their respective roles well and simultaneously, through official meetings and recommendations by ministers in court before being approved by the emperor for appointment, they can both work cooperatively so as to reach peak performance, then all incumbents can come from among the people through legal procedures and all government measures can entirely reflect the will of the people. Otherwise, only the emperor, high above the masses, symbolizes the political unity of the whole nation, though

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national power is indeed centralized. But what harm does that do? When we say that Chinese politics uniquely requires these two systems to be co-structured, we just mean this. What I have written above describes the general trend and the objective of Chinese politics since the collapse of feudalism. Except for occasional retrogressions, this trend has undergone no significant changes. Precisely because people have never attained their ideals but are never denied the possibility of attaining them, they are always hard-working and hopeful – endeavoring to enable the systems to work properly, to improve them or even to readjust them, without ever attempting to do anything else. But then, can the latter system outdo the former so as to achieve gradual progress? Such a possibility cannot be realized either. Except for particular attention paid to certain details, no further progress can be traced. Though no progress can be shown, after repeated changes of dynasties in the past two thousand years, China witnessed no new ideas or different movements or campaigns. Does that mean that the Chinese people are stupid? Certainly not. Here are the reasons. Briefly, three points are noteworthy: First, every political system emerges out of both the internal situation and the external environment of a society. Of these two, the internal situation is the principal foundation. Ever since China’s feudal system broke down, its social situation remains disorganized. When no new situation emerges, it is impossible for new ideas to take root or movements or campaigns to start. In such a disorganized situation, the centralization of national power remains unchanged. When there is no change to the centralization of national power, no further resolutions are available. Second, from start to finish, the Chinese system seems to value propriety more highly than law. It places emphasis on every individual, which means that in moral issues the onus is on the individual to act appropriately. It does not resort to interactions based on mutually opposing two or more forces so as to achieve a balance between them. Instead, it always depends on whether the person concerned is good or bad. If he is sufficiently good, he will achieve good results. If he is bad, he will have to endure negative consequences. Thus a person’s attention is often focused on their own behavior. But the moral behavior of individuals or common people is more an expectation than a certainty. Circling back thus becomes frequently inevitable. For over two thousand years, most of our efforts have been exerted in this way. Third, Chinese history has gone through a continual cycle in which various scenarios are repeated (see the next chapter).

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Reasons for the Progress of Western Politics

However, after the disintegration of feudalism, politics in the West obviously underwent gradual and traceable progress. What accounts for this? This shows that in the West, the class system emerged in society, which created ladders for promotion to higher positions. This has been described in the preceding chapter as an illustration of issues related to class. What, then, is political progress? We might summarize this as the practice of gradually opening up the political power of the State to common people, as opposed to just a handful of people from a certain class, and of enabling politics to become gradually more democratic. Its ultimate aim is for the State to evolve into an autonomous group with neither a ruling class nor a ruled class. To achieve such an aim without a class system, China, however, interestingly, has to rely on classes as a transition. Here, classes serve a variety of functions: First, democracy arises out of the expectation that human rights are respected and starts from the principle that monarchical power is restrained. A line demarcating monarchical power and human rights, with neither one overriding the other, would be the ideal. But if an individual wants to protest against the monarch in order to attain a proper balance of power, how can they do this? History reveals that it all depends on the relative power of different classes. First, it was the nobility that lent support to the principle of balance and demarcation (Magna Carta in England serves as a good example). Later, it was the bourgeoisie. Finally, it was the laboring class that became an indispensable force. Different classes, each superseding the other, took on different missions in their time. In addition, it could not be guaranteed which class would respect human rights and which class would not. It was the close contest between the power of one class and that of another that helped attain a proper balance between human rights and monarchical power. If political “checks and balances” are said to have ensured human rights and freedom, the relative power of different classes could be said to have generated these interventions, and the different classes themselves are their users. Prior to the present time, had it not been for this power dynamic between different classes, the gate to human rights would not have been open, and there would have been no possibility of building the road to human rights. From now on, individual power that has been cultivated under the support and protection of various classes will become all the more important. Finally, in terms of educational status and knowledge, everyone will be on an equal footing and everyone will be able to self-actualize, and social order will thus surely and naturally become

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rational. By that time, a society will no longer be predicated on the power dynamic of a class system and neither will there be any social classes. Second, political democracy originally means extending political power to all people, which means that when it comes to internal affairs within a group, all of its members will take part in discussions and make their own decisions. The reasons for the popularization of such a practice in the city-states of ancient Greece are as follows: First, Greece was a small country with a small population at the time; second, Greece was a society of slave owners. It was precisely because it was a small country with a small population, wherein nothing could escape the notice and the attention of everyone else, that the democratic decision-making system could genuinely be developed, not just an empty gesture. It was precisely because, as slave owners, certain people were freed from labor and therefore had the leisure time, money and energy to practice politics. This supports the idea that political democracy could not have appeared without the class system. The seeds of democratic politics in modern times were sown in the medieval period. The existence of the council of magnates in the era of Magna Carta in England indicated that the State’s political power was beginning to open up to the nobility and the Church. Outside this circle, there was no democracy, but inside it, it was fairly democratic. Later, between 1254 and 1265, a successive number of civilian representatives from various counties were included in this circle. In the beginning, they all attended the council together but later on, they were divided into the House of Lords and the House of Commons. Today’s British Parliament started like this. In the beginning, its power was weak but gradually it grew until Parliament was all-powerful. While originally the locus of power was with the House of Lords, it was gradually transferred to the House of Commons, until finally the House of Commons possessed almost full control. At first, the right to vote for Members of Parliament was confined to a certain group of people, but ceaseless efforts were made to expand this small circle until eventually general elections were held with universal suffrage. In Britain today, the king or the queen possesses no political power, neither does the nobility and even capitalists have largely left the stage. Instead, it is the Labour Party, in conjunction with the fourth estate such as the press or the media or the proletariat, that rules the country. That is the ultimate result of the extension of political power, without exceptions, to the domestic public. Though it could not have been dreamed of centuries ago, it is the natural outcome of progress. It should be pointed out that, although the cases of such progress cannot be counted individually, they are likewise both reasonable and logical. How can it possible for what was feasible in a small country (the

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city-states of ancient Greece) with only a few thousand people to be also feasible in a large country (Britain) with tens of millions of people? Although what modern people see, hear and think is little different from what ancient people had experienced, modern people have more ingenious and more varied tools. With a newspaper in hand every day, one has no difficulty keeping himself updated about the current affairs of his country and the world. Why were politicians of the past all slave-owners while ordinary workers of today can also become politicians? In fact, workers of today can also be seen as slave owners – it is just that their slaves are no longer human beings but electricity and iron instead. To put it plainly, they benefit from tools. Though we are all human beings, there is a difference between people of today and people of the past, and this difference lies in the possession of tools. It still follows the principle that only the interest of all people within a certain circle has been taken good care of can things become workable. Otherwise, the extension of political power to common people will become an empty ideal that cannot actually be put into practice. When things cannot be put into practice, probably such a need is not likely to arise. But when a need does arise, the time will probably arrive for it to be fulfilled. When both a need and a possibility arise, they certainly cannot be stopped by a small number of people. Of course, if there is neither a possibility nor a need, no one can turn it into a reality. Both the possibility and the need are influenced by the tools available. Here, tools include both the knowledge and the skills which are needed when making tools and using tools, and which at the same time represent the culture of the age. The invention of tools and the advancement of culture can evidently not be accomplished at a stroke. From a historical perspective, however, it should by now be clear why the opening up of political power must be a gradual process. It must be noted that the eventual opening of the franchise of political power to the whole population was initially based on the extension of political power to a small circle of the nobility. Every subsequent stage of this progress must build on the previous step on the ladder. Up to now, although the right to vote has been expanded and the bourgeoisie is still powerful in Britain, because most people do not own much property and are not yet sufficiently educated, it seems that the laboring class needs to be in power for a period in order to finish remolding the economy and eliminating class divisions before political democracy in Britain can be achieved in the fullest sense. This point, however, is made here in the knowledge that historically, there has never been the need for a bloody revolution in Britain. This has not necessarily been the case for many other countries. In France, for example, democracy was also seeded in the Middle Ages, but its “Estate General”

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was kept in place for as long as 175 years until, finally, the country went through the Great Revolution of 1789, and many successive revolutions. Democracy, indeed, is not fostered in steady progress, but it must be noted that a violent revolution depends instead on the impetus of class warfare. Though a revolution seems to represent a dramatic change in the situation, at the time, what has been resolved is at most a temporary situation and the democracy that seems to be established is only a possibility. There is no revolution without class divides and after revolution, class rule is still needed so as to enable further social progress to be made. Once a new class rises, another revolution looms. Consequently, whether it is steady progression or abrupt revolutionary change, looked at from the process of human history as a whole, there will be no difference between them, as both need class struggle to bridge a transition. Third, apart from the two points above, in terms of achieving democracy, class struggle functions indirectly as well as directly. This is why, over the past two hundred years, the advent of industrialization and the progress of human culture have indeed benefited from bourgeois rule. On one hand, it eliminated all large- and small-scale feudal wars so that long-term stability could be secured, while on the other hand, it removed all feudal restrictions on its citizens so that they were totally emancipated. With the successive introduction of various inventions and the rapid progress in human culture, political democracy could be promoted further. This indirect effect can also be seen in the proletarian rule exemplified by the Soviet Union. It was precisely in recognition of economic progress and of the rise in the general level of culture as the foundation of political democracy that the Soviet Union was constructed and executed in a planned manner. It did not need the bourgeoisie but the proletariat as the agents of its transition, which is simply a reversal of the ladder principle. Though it made progress in planned construction, it differed from the progress based on free competition in Western Europe. However, it still originally relied on class rule to secure stability and progress and to realize democracy. It is not the case in China, where there is no class system and where it can be hardly said there is any rule. This will become clear in the next chapter. To sum up, countries in the West, since they tend to espouse the classbased society, are States, which rely on hierarchical order and have achieved political progress. This has been discussed above in detail, in order to draw a contrast with China which, due to a lack of a class system, is unlike a state and has rarer opportunities for further progress.



Chapter Ten Governance and Times of Peace and Prosperity

10.1

Chinese Social Structure

China’s dissimilarity to a nation in the usual sense and its lack of class distinction represent what it does not have, but its ethics-oriented system of professional distinction, that is, its consideration of society as the nation, without distinguishing between these two, represents what it does have. The absences in Chinese political culture have already been discussed. What is present in this culture – ethics and professional distinction – has also been hinted at above but needs to be discussed in more detail. This chapter elaborates on these aspects. As has been previously mentioned, both family life and group-centered life inhered in the people in the earliest times. But with the passage of time, family life prevailed in China and collective life prevailed in the West. As a result, family life in China gives rise to ethics-oriented culture, which develops into professional distinctions in society, while group-centered life in the West alternated for a long time between individual-orientedness and society-orientedness, and then evolved into class divides. Class divides result from the differentiation between groups, but this does not occur in an ethics-oriented society. An ethicsoriented society naturally lends itself to professional distinction. Ethics and profession are so intimately associated with each other that they form a wonderfully intriguing match. How, then, do class divisions result from the existence of different groups? Classes arise in two ways: either through foreign conquest and rule or internal divisions within. The former is the combination of two groups into one and the latter is the division of one group into several. In short, classes are formed according to the power to be gained from within the group. That is a perfectly sound fundamental principle. If the group-centered society is said to be three-dimensional, then the ethics-oriented society can be considered to be two-dimensional. By ethics, I refer to the friendly (clearly non-power-based) relationship between one person and another (clearly not group-centered). As the ethics-oriented society takes shape and when people’s friendly relationships between one another emerge, the group tends to become divided and the power gradually declines. Such being the case, class divides do not arise.

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Ethical order came to prominence after the disintegration of feudalism, and following this class dispersion, professional distinction was observed instead. The mutual benef it and close interaction between these two underpin Chinese society. For example, an inheritance is shared equally among all the sons of a family instead of falling only to the eldest son. This feature is unique to the ethical society: though it is something of a rarity in both Western countries and Japan, it has been practiced in China for over two thousand years. In an economy based on ethics, the property is owned by husband and wife, and father and son(s) in a close relationship, and is shared by all people within an ethical relationship, even within a distant relationship. This means that among brothers, property is equally divided, among relatives and friends, property is mutually exchanged, and among clansmen, joint property is created. The more substantial the property you possess is, the greater responsibility for offering financial assistance you take. This is enough to disrupt the economic concentration so that the economy is decentralized, and to impede capitalist reproduction on an extensive scale so that it is obliged to follow the demands of consumption instead of the demands of production. Thus people say that “it is inequality rather than want that is the troublemaker” and similarly, “it is unrest rather than poverty that is the troublemaker.” In the West, people can accumulate personal surpluses, as is often the case, but in China, people frequently desire instead to alleviate the shortage of the general public. The equal division of inheritance, which is derived from this state of affairs, is a purposeful decision. Some say that the core of a feudal society is the practice of primogeniture, a system of inheritance by the eldest son. It was the reliance on precisely such a system, with the concentration of economic power that first enabled the rise of capitalism in England. As a combined force, the commercial ventures of feudal lords and the big farming and husbandry firms of the bourgeoisie have helped lay the foundation for today’s capitalist society. That China could never become a capitalist society was not because it was stifled by a feudal society, but because it was in fact held back by its inheritance system, in which property was divided and economic power could not be concentrated. Such a remark is indeed insightful.1 As should be clear, such passivity prevents class antagonism from developing in Chinese society and consequently promotes professional distinction. 1 I once noticed that the late LI Weitang, who had studied in the UK, expressed such a view in his writings. Unlike continental Europe, the UK follows the practice of primogeniture, the custom of inheritance by the eldest son. See YANG Renpian (trans.) T. S. Hoyland (auth.), An Outline of World Cultures. 1933.

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Let’s contrast China and the West once more, which will help us understand this better. It was on the basis of personal profits and free competition that capitalism in the West greatly flourished. The precondition for this is the fact that as property ownership is the domain of individuals, individuals have complete freedom to allocate their property. Only by doing this can people develop activities related to their self-actualization, and only by doing this can people use their property more efficiently. This situation results, however, from the fact that modern laws usually follow the pattern of Roman laws. The Roman law codes belong to the category of ownership-based laws geared toward issues such as real rights and outstanding claims. Chinese laws, however, are based on ethical organizations, and their traditional spirit is just the opposite of the Roman laws (which will not be discussed here). Without such laws in the West, the foundations of the cooperative life that existed in the countryside during the Middle Ages could not have been completely destroyed and the class-based society that evolved out of free competition would not have been able to emerge. Conversely, a look at China will reveal that in practice, an ethics-oriented social organization like China not only becomes a large drag on an individual’s economic initiative, but also fundamentally proves inimical even to the display of such initiative. As Huang Wenshan once said, with a fair degree of certainty, “It is my conviction that China’s family ethics is indeed the only crucial thing that causes us to remain at the level of agricultural production without being able to move quickly into capitalist production.”2 This remark describes precisely what we have just discussed. An ethics-oriented society, as a country, is totally foreign to the growth and prosperity of capitalism. There can be no doubt about that. But if people simply have no economic initiative, can’t this also be a major crisis to their society? This point, however, can once more be illustrated by one aspect of professional distinction. When a person is born in a class-based society, his destiny in life has almost been predetermined. This is especially true of feudal societies, but the capitalist society is no exception. Serfs certainly cannot turn into aristocrats, and workers cannot turn into capitalists either. If they want to expand their own prospects, their only option is to reverse this social order or to start a revolution. However, in China, a society based on professional distinction, this is not the case. All kinds of political and economic opportunities are open to each person. Whether a person wants to be a scholar, a farmer, an artisan or a businessman, they can make choices completely on their own, with no prior restrictions placed upon them. The 2

See HUANG Wenshan, Collected Essays on Culturology, 1938 (p. 181).

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proverb “Every profession produces its own foremost master” suggests that, just as scholars certainly can achieve renown by pursuing official positions, so farmers, artisans and businessmen can also start from scratch. Rich or poor, receiving promotion or dismissal, everyone can map out their own future. Though there are degrees of difference between reliance on and independence of other means, such “reliance” can never be reliable. “It all depends,” as the saying goes, “on whether or not one is eager to excel.” One’s initiative, therefore, happens to receive comprehensive backing here in China. Consequently, ethical standards in conjunction with professional distinctions have been consistently popular for over two thousand years, being applied to every aspect of social life. If it were otherwise, these principles would not work. Chinese society remained somewhat stranded at the stage of professional distinction mainly because its land had been liberated from feudalism but its production remained at the same level as it had been before the Industrial Revolution, and the economy saw no centralized monopoly of capital. At this time, in terms of production technology, small-scale business had its advantages as large-scale business was far from indispensable. What’s more, there was no guild system like that in medieval Europe. Therefore, throughout society, there were unsurprisingly only petty farmers, workers and businessmen, who made a living in scattered places. The so-called “familialization of production” illustrated by Fung Yu-lan with examples such as a family-run lithographic printing shop and a family-run blacksmith’s shop, refers to this exact situation. Whatever line of business it was – farming, working or making deals – everything depended on the concerted efforts of family members who were “fathers and sons fighting as soldiers in a battle”, just as the saying goes, and who the rest of the family depended upon for survival. The Chinese people love to talk about and indeed value “flesh and blood affection” and “fraternal affection”. Such ethical sentiments became consolidated and reinforced through the emergence of professional distinction. On the other hand, the situation was quite otherwise in class-based societies. For example, in modern times, in big factories or large companies, family members could be working men, working women and child laborers who would all make their own living and who, needless to say, did not have to be related to each other at work. Even in the medieval period, it never happened that all the members of a family worked together to handle their self-operated business. Instead, people lived in groups – a way of life quite different from the ethical interdependence of family members. What’s more, vertically, there was a distinction between different groups, and horizontally, there was a distinction between different classes. This tendency toward

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separation and opposition, mutual competition and restraint, suppressed people’s interdependence, and especially hampered the development of codes of ethics. China was not without its guilds, but these guilds, unlike those in Europe, which were strongly bonded groups, were crucially incorporated into every household or family. As they could not grow into larger groups, the relationship between masters and their apprentices and between owners and their staff members was one of ethical interdependence. Among these small groups there might be some personal enmity, between one person and another, but there never was any class antagonism, which in Europe was fueled by the guilds system. Classes emerge only from the interaction between different groups. The following can serve as a testimony. In modern industrial societies, when employers and employees are in accord, both parties gain benefits; when they pose a threat to each other, both parties suffer. Whatever crops up between them is resolved in accordance with the law without involving any personal relationships. In such cases, when masters and their apprentices, and owners and their staff members are in close quarters morning and night, they may make friends with one another depending on how kind people are to others, how they treat others and how diligent they are at work. As employers and employees, though it is impossible for them to take the same side and share the same fate, they may nevertheless stick together through thick and thin. With the development of class antagonism, ethical relations are impaired. When class differentiation cannot be marked, every profession will rely heavily on ethics. Besides, as no one knows how his fortunes will rise and fall, and scholars, peasants, artisans and merchants all have a future to anticipate, everyone cherishes ideas like the family background and family fortune. Similarly, through mourning one’s ancestors, or entertaining great expectations for one’s descendants, and with fathers’ instruction of their sons and elder brothers’ encouragement of their younger brothers, everyone is inspired to devote themselves assiduously to ethics and to be more conscientious about their work. In China, everything – from scholars’ taking on apprentices or taking examinations to petty farmers, workers and businessmen earning a living – is the business of an individual or a family. It has almost nothing to do with other people at all. As everyone pursues his own course, collective cooperation is rarely seen. Neither is it necessary for people to take counsel together, nor do they interfere with each other’s affairs (only in a class-based society do people interfere with each other’s affairs). Therefore, Chinese society appears to be particularly indolent and the Chinese people are often derided

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as being like a tray of loose sand which lacks the spirit of cooperation, a group of people who show excessive concern only for themselves (see Chapter One). This is by no means a misunderstanding (see Chapter Thirteen). It goes without saying that such a tendency is horrible indeed. Why, then, does Chinese society not ultimately reveal its own social problems? This should be attributed to its embrace of professional distinction together, which coordinates with its ethical orientation to offer a remedy. As has been said previously, the affection between family members, between father and son, and between brothers, has always been highly valued in China. Organizing such a society according to ethics means ethicizing all social relations: in short, treating them as family issues, so that family members become more intimately and staunchly related. Hence it is incumbent on everyone who lives in such a society to cultivate an ethical relationship with the people around them and at the same time, on everyone around them to cultivate an ethical relationship with that person. People throughout the whole society are thus so interconnected that, imperceptibly, they become a big family. Given the compassion that people show toward each other, how can anyone harbor what we would call “selfishness”? Professional distinction is coordinated by ethics-orientation in just this way, which it has steadily maintained for over two thousand years. If it had not been suddenly drawn into the vortex of group competition, wherein it almost suffered complete destruction over the last hundred years, it would be no easy task to find its weaknesses. Moreover, it is from exactly this interaction and harmonization between politics and economy that an ethics-oriented professional distinction arises. For example, apart from the factors illustrated previously and in Chapter Eight – that land concentration and capital concentration cannot be easily sustained and that an economic monopoly cannot be permanently secured by certain groups of people – political campaigns such as “Limiting Private Land” and “Emphasizing Agriculture at the Expense of Commerce” also constitute potent factors. Such campaigns have been consistently recorded ever since the Western Han Dynasty. Admittedly, apart from the moderate success of the Land Equalization System, adopted during the period spanning the Northern Wei Dynasty to the Sui and the Tang dynasties, the actual effects of such systems is far less powerful than their impetus. But despite their limited success, these initiatives do more harm to capitalism than might be expected. Ever since principalities were turned into prefectures and counties, the ruling class has managed to subdue the indolence and lack of cohesion among the people. At this time, the situation in which, politically speaking, there is no class and rarely a monopoly, naturally does

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not facilitate any economic monopoly or the creation of classes. It remains the case that only scholars who aim to destroy feudalism are actively involved in economic monopoly and the creation of classes. What history reveals is very plain. As scholars, who are knowledgeable and sensible, have no power, no political position and no real estate, they are not only opposed to the erstwhile monopoly of power and position, but also the future monopoly of capital. If we do not say that scholars serve as a representation of rationality, it is certainly appropriate for us to talk about their potential to represent rationality. Once they see an opportunity, they will insist on what they propose. As capitalism has not been practiced in China, there is no rule by the bourgeoisie like that in Europe and in America. This is another case in which economy has been influenced by politics. In general, economy and politics interact with each other as both cause and effect. Without classes, the rule of the State becomes a problem. Hence China’s politics has had to be ethicized. To ethicize politics means to professionalize the society and conversely, profession becomes conducive to ethics. So, ethics and profession, and politics and economy are complementary to each other and inextricably linked.

10.2

A Life of Inner Discipline

The Chinese-style life is most typically characterized by its inner discipline, exactly the opposite of the Western-style life, typically characterized by its outward exertion. Most likely any society made up of certain aspects – to wit: ethics orientation and professional distinction – would invariably require people to exercise inner discipline. These two aspects will be illustrated as follows: When a person is born in an ethical society, he will be encircled by various ethical relationships and he will be required to shoulder countless responsibilities, from which he cannot abscond until his death. As perhaps befits the whole spirit of ethics, as soon as one’s ethical relationship is established, he is prohibited from shirking its obligations. Father and son certainly cannot break away from each other. How could brothers or couples break with each other? Nor can friends, or the monarch and his subjects break with each other. The habit of not cutting ties with one another originates from one’s own emotional restraint, which is actually a form of bitter distress. Such habits then develop into etiquette culture, the practice of which society so closely surveils that people lament that “they seem never able to succeed in escaping from among heaven and earth”.

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Within the context of such practices, there are endless grievances that one has to tolerate. Furthermore, beyond simply tolerating such practices subjectively or facing the problem of being blamed by others, if one simply broke away from all those relationships, it would be impossible for them to live on in real life. As people are already so interdependent, one person cannot be separated from the others around him. First, if you cannot develop a good father and son, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, husband and wife, elder brother and younger brother relationship, you simply cannot get on in this world. As to the relationships between grandparents and grandchildren, between uncles and nephews, between all the other relatives, such as maternal relatives and spousal clan, between neighbors and associates, between masters and their apprentices and between owners and their staff members, one has to be careful about all of them. The reality compels you to sustain the cultivation of good relationships. Many of these issues pertaining to humanity are totally different from those pertaining to the material world (for details, see Chapter Twelve). They require people to control themselves inwardly in order to find solutions to these issues. For example, those who cannot please their parents have to look back on their own behavior in order to figure out why they have lost favor with their parents. Through self-examination, they reproach themselves and become much more careful and more complaisant. Never ask how your efforts turn out; all you should do is be filial and obedient. This is indeed the most effective way to gain your parents’ favor. Apart from this, there is no other way. On the contrary, if you only know how to look outward by discovering faults in your parents, or by flatly contradicting them, your relationship with them will gradually worsen and in the end deteriorate without ever being re-established. Other ethical relationships follow the same pattern. Varied as they are, what actually happens is infinitely more intricate. What people aspire to is nothing but the reconciliation of each other’s sentiments and an empathetic understanding between the heart-and-mind of another and one’s own heart-and-mind. Such conciliation and empathy will be better effected if you strive for them energetically, and will see you and others estranged if you try to acquire them by tricks. Exerting efforts outward is not the way to go about things. If you do not believe it, just try it! Therefore, traditional moral teachings such as self-examination, selfreproach, self-control, being courteous to others and learning to suffer losses all evolve from the reality of this social structure in the background; they surely cannot be taken as a philosophical preference. As pointed out in Chapter Eight, ancient China was a society characterized by professional distinction. In such a society, there was uncertainty in life

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as to whether you would be rich or poor, or high or low in social status, just as the saying goes: “Fortune knocks once at every man’s door.” Though its freedom and democracy could be likened to those of today’s Britain, where opportunities in politics and economic endeavors are open to all people, people were still naturally restrained by their own status quo due to their class, so such a comparison is not straightforward. The two situations vary greatly, a fact that must be fully apprehended: class antagonism surely provokes outward fights while professional distinction opens the way for people to focus their efforts inwardly. Those who make concerted efforts tend to exercise inner discipline. The Chinese proverb, “If you are not laborious, you can never be expected to become glorious”, and one sentence from the Chinese children’s book the Three-Character Primer – “In your study, you must make painstaking efforts, as exemplified by tying your hair to the house beam and jabbing your side with a needle to keep yourself awake” – can best illustrate the point. In a class society, things are quite otherwise. Most obviously, in medieval feudal society, people’s standing and statuses were to a great extent an accident of birth. Generally speaking, people with higher social statuses did not need to make further efforts to rise; there was no point in people with low social status to make further efforts. Neither of the two sayings above was applicable to a class-based society where, on the contrary, people were required to make outward exertions. Most obviously, those who were part of the lower class, in order to carve out their own destiny, had to fight those above them. This fight might develop into a strike or even a revolution. But those feudal lords, or the capitalist class, in order to protect their vested interest, would certainly be on close guard and were constantly out to suppress threats. Hence the Marxist theory of “class struggle” is considered credible. In short, their efforts would naturally be directed outward. Let’s look again at Chinese people in the old days. When an opportunity knocked, since there was no impediment at the time, their efforts had to be directed inward as no outward exertions could be made. Let’s take intellectuals as an example. Opportunities for receiving education were open to all people, but under the examination system, results determined the future of intellectuals. Whether an intellectual could pass the imperial examination to become a xiucai, or a juren, or a jinshi, or could be chosen to be a member of the Hanlin Imperial Academy, was decided firstly by his perseverance in his studies in spite of hardships, and secondly by his aptitude. If he was intelligent and at the same time persistent, he had every chance of being successful. If he could write good essays but still could not pass the imperial examination, he could only blame himself for his bad luck

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in life. Hence we have such sayings as “One’s ancestor does not do a good deed to his credit in the next world”, “There is no geomantic omen in the graveyard” and “An evil destiny dogs a person in his life”. In short, all he could do was blame himself or attribute his failure to some unknown factor, instead of blaming others. He might at most blame his examiner’s blindness to his competence at the same time, but he would never think it necessary to abolish the examination system. That is to say, his exertions could in no way be directed outward. What he could do was merely linger upon his self-resolution, self-efforts, self-reproach, self-invigoration, self-fulfillment, and/or self-remorse. Everything exists in this sense of the “self”. Especially if he amounted to nothing, he would ascribe it to his unsuccessful pursuit of virtues, a typical case of pure inner discipline. As to farmers, workers and businessmen, though there was obviously no examination system devised for them, they knew quite well that “every profession produces its own foremost master”. So whoever was capable could always find a chance to demonstrate his capabilities. This is no different if a person starts from scratch. Perhaps that was because everyone could buy land and essential items for production were very simple since they could rarely secure the privilege of owning them or get a patent on them. If they received a bequest, it would be divided equally among the heirs and even the amassed land assets could soon be dispersed. People did not have to depend on each other but they staked their destiny on their talents. Generally speaking, industry and prudence help a person achieve their destiny but extravagance and indulgence make an adverse destiny inescapable. Being trustworthy and sober, one can amass a great fortune by ceaseless accumulation, but if one gains property by trickery or by force, this fortune will soon vanish. To gains and losses, and to successes and failures, there is often a sure route, as is commonly observed and believed by all. It is simply the testing and discriminating ground for one’s talents and moral standards. There are even a few unfortunate people who end up in a state of isolation, but they cannot blame their luck or other people. – So, in like manner, no one is necessarily tempted to direct their exertions outward. The idea of “industry” or “thrift” is a common creed that the Chinese people adhere to. By observing this principle, people can start their own businesses or maintain the achievements of their predecessors. Such a wellacknowledged precept has been passed down from generation to generation since ancient times. In a class-based society, however, this word does not make much sense. For whom would the serfs under the feudal system and the workers under the capitalist system be industrious? For whom would they be thrifty? Even if they are industrious, so what? Naturally, therefore,

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these two words were not much mentioned. But in China, “industry” or “thrift” is a household truism. What does “industry” or “thrift” mean? The former means “the spur to oneself” and the latter means “self-enforced abstinence”. In such cases, whatever efforts are expended here represent inner discipline. To sum up, since the social structure (i.e., professional distinction) provides the factual background, it gives rise to such traditional precepts as “Be industrious and thrifty in managing a household”, “Suffer certain hardships so as to be self-motivated”, “Only when you are laborious can you have the prospect of success”, “Every tub must stand on its own bottom”, “Where there is a will, there is a way”, “Nothing is difficult if you put your heart into it” and “Man is not born to greatness; he achieves it by his own efforts”. Even an emperor in China is no exception. He, too, must exercise inner discipline. As has been pointed out in Chapter Eight, an emperor in China stands alone, high above millions of people. He is indeed in extreme danger. If he can win the hearts of the people, he will be prosperous and if he cannot, he will perish. As a result, his fate (whether his status will be assured or endangered, whether his dynasty will flourish or decline, or whether his national power is prospering or waning) must also be secured by himself through cautiousness and conscientiousness. Also, just like scholars, peasants, artisans and merchants, he has a sure route to gains and losses, and to successes and failures. His sure route can likewise be called “exercising inner discipline”, which means that he restrains himself from being befuddled and tyrannical, and from being arbitrary and reckless. Because of this, in Chinese political institutions in the past, there were special posts such as “speaking officials” and “imperial censors”. The holders of such posts were supposed to make the emperor more vigilant and introspective. The speaking officials would narrate for the emperor lessons from the rise and fall of past dynasties with reference to Confucian classics and history, in order to make him more vigilant. The imperial censors would often remind the emperor and dissuade him from doing certain things according to the situation at hand. In short, they were simply helping the emperor retain his inner discipline. It can be said at the same time that the traditional passive non-action (especially, for example, efforts to prevent the use of military might to indulge in aggressive wars, and refraining from going in for large-scale construction) from a political perspective aimed to dissuade the emperor from outward exertions, but to encourage him instead to be abstemious and austere. We can cite an old saying from ancient texts: “Whoever he is, from the son of Heaven to the common people, the most

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basic thing for him is to cultivate himself.” All these are perhaps determined by China’s unique social structure, as should be clear from Chapter Nine. In his book National Character and Education, Zhuang Zexuan includes a table entitled “Chinese National Ideal and Character” which describes the life of Chinese people who are “full of introversion”. Such introversion, of course, is a telling illustration of the Chinese national ideal and character. Its origin then can be clarified instead of being seen as an oddity.

10.3

Splendor in Chinese Civilization

Ku Hung-ming once ridiculed the European states: either the monks overstepped the authority conferred on them by God in order to frighten people (in medieval times), or the state military police controlled people via the long arm of the law (in modern times), and without them, there was no peace or tranquility even among brothers and neighbors.3 In his book A History of Social Evolution, Müller Lyer also said, “China, as a state, has been maintained by millions upon millions of people who are content with their lot and who are law-abiding. European states, however, cannot be maintained without the use of force.”4 What is most astounding about the ancient Indian civilization is the overwhelming popularity of the trans-mundane dharmas of its religion (which also represents its achievements). In modern times to date, what is most astounding about Western civilization is the advancement of science and technology that aims to tame and profit from the world (which also represents its achievements). In the old days, what was most astounding about Chinese civilization was its consistent maintenance of social order without the exertion of any compelling force. Anyone with a discerning eye should perceive that it is thanks to such contradictions that human society ultimately progresses. Though contradictions exist, human society will not progress without social order. If there is no social order, social life cannot continue. Even social order itself is built on contradictions: How, then, can force be overlooked? In fact, it takes time for human rationality to gradually develop, as social order is built solely on rationality. The expectations associated with rationality are typically entertained as a distant future, so how could they have been achieved in the past? Such being the case, it 3 Ku’s original work was written both in English and in German and was published after World War I as a caution to Westerners. This is quoted from the appendix of LIANG Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies. 4 See Müller Lyer, A History of Social Evolution (p. 62), published in German.

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is all the more amazing that China seems to have got to this point so long ago. However, as we might expect, it can easily be comprehended why its social structure (as described above) is peculiar. It is likely that social order in human society originally derived from religion. It was only later that etiquette culture, morality and the law grew out of religion, one after another. These four aspects vary from culture to culture in terms of whether they emerge one by one, whether they are divided or integrated, or whether they are treated lightly or seriously. Morality isolated from religion was perhaps hardly imaginable in the West in medieval times. Social order isolated from the law is rarer in modern countries. However, in ancient China, it was precisely morality that replaced religion, and etiquette culture that replaced the law, exactly the opposite of the practice in Western states. Morality is the responsibility of individuals, but etiquette culture is pervasive in society. In the West, the medieval Church and the State in modern times exercised absolute authority over individuals and society, a dynamic that has indeed never existed in China. Now, let’s talk about the last aspect – the law. It is common practice for foreigners to go to court and no one shies away from being litigious. The Chinese, however, are extremely reluctant to engage in lawsuits. Once friends and relatives become involved in a lawsuit, they will feel that their feelings are hurt and it will be awkward for them to see each other again. In the West, a lawyer is a first-class profession, but in China, a law practitioner is utterly despised and bitterly detested. In the old days, if a person was ever involved in a lawsuit, people would point the finger of scorn at him by saying, “He once engaged in a lawsuit,” which means, “He is not worth bothering with” or “We need to throw doubt on his conduct”. So in China, there is a proverb which goes, “I’d rather starve to death than become a thief; I’d rather succumb to death than bring a lawsuit against someone.” Such profound detestation and revulsion at lawsuits against others is incomprehensible not only to foreigners, but also to Chinese people today. Why is there such a radical difference between China and the West? It is because in the West, people live in groups and everything depends on the groups they live in while in China, people do not depend on a group. Where there is a group, it must have its own law. If we trace this idea back to medieval times, we will find that whatever sort of group it was, it had its own law and its own court: a king had his own court, a church had its own court, a village had its own court, a city or a municipality had its own court and even a guild had its own court. Within a group, if problems arise among people, what alternative do they have except to go to court? Whatever law is observed, it is compulsory. It is only in modern times that such a compulsion has been

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centralized and unified under the aegis of a single powerful group – the State. China’s historical development diverges widely from this, however, as has been discussed in previous chapters. In an ethical society which was initially not a group, since its membership credentials were based on ties of friendship it could only develop into an etiquette culture rather than continuing to evolve into a system of law, as has been elaborated in Chapter Six. For over two thousand years, though circumstances have compelled China to become a state, it is nevertheless difficult for an ethics-oriented society like this to develop a regional rule based on class. In other words, it has always seemed that China is not very much like a state in the strict sense. Except to observe that it has witnessed some changes in recent years due to the influence of Western thought, no conclusion will be drawn here as to how China will develop. If we look at its past, it was impossible for China to have cultivated concepts such as “group power” and “personal interests” in its early history; for it to have been otherwise would have meant starting all over again. Consequently, China could only establish its own systems based on etiquette culture by integrating the state into society and essentially building its organizational structure on etiquette culture, instead of on the basis of law. What is more, it can almost be said that there was no such thing as the law. Since ancient times, the so-called “law” has been no more than criminal law, a supplement and auxiliary to etiquette culture or something that is used perforce. Traditionally in China, virtues were valued while penalties were denigrated. Thus force was not respected. The law was only necessary due to force of circumstances, and might not be applied at all. Fundamentally, however, the law in China was merely held in abeyance. In reality, the law in China rarely needed to be enforced. This can be explained by the following two facts. First, disputes among ordinary people (whether civil or criminal) were resolved among themselves. Through the mediation of either the relatives or friends of the involved parties, or through moral judgment and public arbitration, such disputes would be resolved on an ad hoc basis in teahouses in every locality. This was called “negotiation in a teahouse”. Such judgments were made on the basis of two simple words – common sense – and they were in fact grounded on local etiquette culture and local habits. There also existed conflicting parties in a lawsuit. The parties would go to a certain elder who had the confidence of the people, or to their chieftain, seeking advice or instructions from them. Usually, the conflicting parties would be taught a lesson and be obliged to fulfill their respective ethical obligations. They were required to apologize to each other and be reconciled, as was

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appropriate in ethical ties. Through the mediation or arbitration of an elder or a chieftain, disputes could often be resolved. Apart from that, those who committed adultery or theft would be punished by their clansmen or townsmen. This certainly was not permitted under national law but was common practice in some remote places. This could not be counted as an aspect of etiquette culture, but it revealed that recourse to the law was beyond the reach of ordinary people, who lived and perished with no want of support from others and no need of anything from the State. Why was it not difficult for them to resolve their disputes? Why could people live and die without needing anything from the State? Anyone familiar with the uniqueness of the Chinese social structure should firstly be aware that Chinese society tended to be rather idle. That was its most basic inclination. Such a tendency resulted from its lack of religion and also from its early enlightenment. Apart from “exercising inner discipline”, this – i.e., indolence – became the default mode to a large extent. As we have said before, “The group and the struggle are closely interrelated, and indolence and peace are also closely interconnected” (see Chapter Three). This does not mean that there are no conflicts between individuals but it does mean that the bigger picture has been broken up into parts so that the conflicts become less marked and can be easily resolved without being unnecessarily protracted. Whenever conflicts do emerge between groups, they are often egregious and prolonged ones which cannot be easily resolved. Again, because of their duration, these disagreements would further permeate the rest of society or have wider repercussions. This is one implication of this approach to conflict resolution. When there are irreconcilable conflicts between individuals, there is no lack of third parties whose capacity to mediate is strong. But when there are irreconcilable contradictory conflicts between groups, the ability of outside third parties to mediate is far less strong. And the larger the groups are, the weaker an external mediating authority becomes, until such an intermediary can no longer make any headway. This is the second implication. Assemblies of people who, psychologically speaking, rely on instinct, are often oblivious, impulsive and not given to introspection, but dispersed individuals tend to be more peaceful and tranquil, and more easily talked around. Though the Chinese people changed from being rational to being idle, it is also easier, on the other hand, for them to revert to being rational from being idle. As expressed in the proverb, “When you are justified, you can go anywhere in the world; when you are not, you will have difficulty taking a single step”, a belief in the importance of upholding rationality is also the outcome of an idle society. In a world where collective forces of different proportions exist independently and confront each other, the only option for them is to

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compete with each other instead of reasoning things out. This is the third implication. An understanding of these with reference to the following points will help find answers to all the questions above. Second, perhaps there are fewer disputes and riots. We will discuss two aspects here: one is that individuals are reconciled to the situation they encounter, and the other is that people make compromises and concessions between one another. These points can be briefly explained as follows: Individuals are reconciled to the situation that they encounter. We can break this down further into three points. (1) Due to the aforementioned custom of professional distinction, a trail has been blazed for the Chinese people, each of whom pursues his own course in life. This is quite different from the situation in a class-based society, where most people attempt, often very indignantly, to break the status quo. “Reconciliation to the situation people encounter” refers mainly to the general situation in a professional society. Naturally, this also includes a person’s own situation. (2) Due to the aforementioned ethics-oriented organization in society, when people are obliged to eke out a hopelessly scanty living (as is the inevitable result of the disturbance of social disorder), they are ready to sympathize with each other and to become accountable to each other in consideration of their ethical and amicable relationship. Even if someone cannot obtain help in one way, they can be helped out in another way. All kinds of relationships around them imperceptibly afford them protection, so instead of being led down a blind alley, they can always find a way out. This is the overall situation in which every individual takes delight in living. (3) Thanks to the integration of professional distinction and ethics-oriented organization, people may or may not be afforded the same chances everywhere. Successes or failures seem to follow their respective natural way and to be widely unknown to people. People are thus inspired to believe in destiny and live in peace while at the same time working diligently. In addition, as people often strive for inner discipline and tend to be introspective, they enjoy “the pleasure of self-fulfillment” and are “content with their lot in life” and seek as few outward pursuits as they can. So, for ordinary people, having few desires, feeling satisfied with what they have, abiding by the law and behaving themselves do not mean that they have understood the philosophies of Laozi and Zhuangzi, but rather that, even with their lack of awareness, they are the products of its social structure. People arrive at compromises with and make concessions to one another. Whenever they encounter problems, they know how to give and take, and resolve their problems by reaching a compromise. This becomes virtually the only way the Chinese people resolve any problem, as is acknowledged the

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world over. As the proverb known throughout China goes, “When you quarrel with someone about something, you can easily become a laughing stock; but when you give and take, everything will be settled to the satisfaction of you and the other party.” Such a mentality, in which a quarrel will make you a laughing stock, is certainly incomprehensible to Westerners. They seem to have no idea that by giving and taking, both sides can be vindicated. Consequently, they will certainly suffer great losses and perish together before too long. In the old days, people would say, “Take it easy when you sometimes suffer losses”. With this maxim, men of the world would admonish young people. These men, of course, were nothing but hypocrites, but what they said, of course, to a great extent helped maintain peace for the whole of society. Aside from making a temporary compromise when something crops up, the Chinese invariably strive for smoothness and appropriateness, without bias, and especially without feeling the need to go to extremes when devising a system, coordinating planning or proposing an arrangement. Perhaps it is their firm belief that compromise is the safest course of action, the most enduring and the most foolproof. Popular in China are such sayings as: “An arrogant dragon will surely have regrets, and the fullest state can never remain the same forever”; “By human nature, arrogance is detested while modesty is appreciated”; “If, in his speech, he has any excess, he dares not allow himself such license”; “Never should anyone go to extremes”. This philosophy of mediation has since ancient times been familiar to and practiced by wise men and fools alike. It seems that the reasons are as follows: (1) By nature, organisms always attack things around them with no sign of retreat. Only the human heart-and-mind is well developed, but this is not necessarily the case with every person. People with reason, however, by taking a holistic view of what happens, can look far beyond what they presently see. People with rationality, on the other hand, can see others as clearly as themselves and easily empathize with others. Compromises and reconciliations are the embodiment of the characteristics of the human heart-and-mind. Thanks to the early development of the Chinese people’s rationality, this – i.e., compromise – is clearly in evidence. (2) The relationship that exists between family members – like father and son, and husband and wife – is affection, and the relationship that exists between one group and another, and between a group and its members, is power, most likely with very little affection. Ethics in China values the affection toward family members and all other social relationships. Highlighting other-centeredness ensures that people will not become antagonistic to each other. In the West, however, there is opposition almost everywhere. Inevitably, there is opposition even between family members, fathers and

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sons, and husbands and wives. Such opposition can all too easily create problems or even conflicts. In a society where opposition seldom rises, even when it does create problems, it can be easily eliminated or alleviated. (3) When there is lack of groups, no opposition will arise. If opposition does arise, it is best to establish harmony. But if establishing harmony is no easy matter either, the remaining option is estrangement. For example, when the Chinese government exercises restrains and maintains peace, the less officials and ordinary people communicate, the better. This is also the only route to a peaceful life. (4) An argument about something breaks out simply because each party takes his own standpoint, but mutual concession, politeness and courtesy mean mutual consideration of each other. As Chinese ethics emphasizes other-centeredness, an individual does not live solely for his own sake (see Chapter Five). This attitude certainly cannot replace the attitude of selfish departmentalizing that human beings have always possessed, which means that human beings are always selfish, and nothing can ever completely change this. These two mentalities, however, vary greatly between the two extremes. In the West, everyone claims his own rights but reciprocally imposes duties upon the other party. In China, however, everyone takes the initiative to execute his own duties but his own rights are to be granted by the other party. It is the integration of both the inclination to reconcile and the inclination to argue that makes this mindset obviously different. (5) In the West, people devote their endeavors to external activity, or when they do use their brains, they do not use them adequately. In China, people endeavor to exercise inner discipline and though they may encounter many more setbacks, they base their actions on thinking grounded in patience or moderation. Because of this, they become more patient or moderate later on. The Chinese people’s patience is infinite, and they are renowned for it throughout the world (see the discussions on national character in other parts of this book). Within such boundless space and over such a long period, however many contradictions and conflicts there are, they are all endured through patience, without rising to the surface. (6) Inner discipline demands greater use of the heart-and-mind, while outward exertion requires greater application of physical strength. Those who use physical strength become increasingly fond of resorting to strength, while those who use the heart-and-mind become increasingly fond of putting the heart-and-mind to use. Look at games and recreations. Chinese people (in terms of individuals) also tend here to use their heart-and-mind more than their physical strength. Westerners (in terms of groups), however, tend to use their physical strength more than their heart-and-mind. Westerners are robust in health while Chinese people appear delicate. Perhaps this

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outward aspect was determined by the early appearance of rationality several thousand years ago. Those who are robust in health, due to their restlessness, readily create disputes or cause disturbances, but those fraillooking people never do. We have noted that China’s coercive force is reserved only for possible future use, and in fact, it is very rarely used. The best proof for this is that on the one hand, China still has a government, soldiers and the criminal law, but on the other hand, it governs through passive non-action. What historians say about “rare lawsuits and idle politics” and “putting aside the criminal law without ever using it” is not untrue.5 Whatever is kept for possible future use can never be adequately prepared. How simple and weak the governing body was in past dynasties can be exemplified by looking at two phenomena: one is fighting with weapons among groups of people and the other is roving bandits. Regarding fighting with weapons among groups of people, this could be witnessed at times in villages where people lived together as big families in places like Guangdong Province and Fujian Province. In these places, people’s morale and their folk customs seemed very similar to those found in the West. In addition, with family names as boundaries and ancestral halls as the main centers for public activities, awareness of being part of a group gradually grew among them. Invariably, they would fall to feuding with each other and fighting against each other. When they fought with each other, no one would come to stop them as even the county authorities had no knowledge of it. How could this conflict then be stopped or prevented from taking place? To the extent that several people were killed, even court litigation could not resolve the issue. As both parties in the lawsuit refused to obey the court decision, they continued to fight against each other. They had complete freedom to fight as no officials could stop them from doing so. Most often, “they resolved their issue by leaving it unsettled”, which means their issue remained to be resolved among themselves. Regarding roving bandits, during times of peace in the past, when stability was in evidence throughout the state and everyone abided by the law, there were no riots anywhere in society. But this does not mean that at that time the state had any way to prohibit riots from occurring. Once a 5 When I was at Zouping, a village in the countryside, I often heard the elders say that it was very rare to see a homicide case in any locality. In the twenty-first year of Emperor Guangxu in the Qing Dynasty, when a homicide case occurred in a village, people ran about telling each other the news or walked dozens of miles to witness the autopsy. People felt that it was such great news that they should take it very seriously. It was estimated that within an area measuring between fifty and one hundred square kilometers, they never saw any such cases.

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riot erupted, bandits were likely to spread like flames. Bandits, which were non-existent in the West, were the products of Chinese society since the Qin and the Han dynasties. In medieval times, under the feudal system, every region exercised control over its territory by erecting barricades along the borders. Incursions into each other’s regions only occurred from time to time. Thus there were only very few bandits. Up to modern times, into which the household registration system has endured, the state established a strict household registration system with a police system that covered the whole state. Though burglaries and physical violence might not be absolutely unavoidable, it was not possible for people to gather together to form a gang in the forest, to say nothing of roving about. If invaders were able to rove about, you can imagine that they would do exactly as they pleased and force everyone to do their will. Such a situation only arose in Chinese society in the old days, when countless households lay scattered across the vast land. Within its borders, with its vast expanse of land and easy access to any place, China was indeed radically different from a feudal society, but it was to a great extent similar to a modern state, only lacking the organization of a modern state. In conclusion, China in the old days could not be free of social conflicts such as exploitation and dominion, but it broke up the whole into parts and replaced force with a certain attitude, so that those disagreements were dissolved and reconciled. Though in the end, China’s social order could not rely solely on state laws, it fused the State into society and assimilated its laws into etiquette culture. Thus, the maintenance of social order was certainly ascribed to both the individuals’ and the society’s power instead of being reliant on force. However, if the groundwork had not been laid by “morality in place of religion”, there would be no “etiquette culture in place of the law”. The pivotal development was “morality in place of religion”. Since this point has already been made in Chapter Six, I will only briefly summarize the major points here: “Religion at the very beginning could be said to be the pretext for the actions of external forces. Such external forces were actually human beings themselves.” “The sense of dependence is the root of religion.” (Dependence simply means reliance on external forces.) “The magnitude, the loftiness, the immortality, the sincerity, the goodness, the kindness and the purity of all objects in religion were originally virtues that human beings actually possessed but that they themselves believed they could never attain. By having such a change

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of heart, one would instantly become magnanimous and pure, without any self-consciousness.” “Confucius had a spirit which is non-existent in religion. That is, he believed that all men possess rationality and human beings have full faith in themselves.” “Confucians never taught others any dogma. If anything was taught to them, it was only this: to cultivate introspection in themselves. Except for the rationality of having faith in themselves, nothing else was worthy of their faith.” “Mencius consistently argued that righteousness lies within rather than without. To his mind, making efforts to find external criteria for righteousness was liable to simply become a substitute for righteousness itself, and the pursuit of benevolence and righteousness rather than through benevolence and righteousness.” (For all the above quotes, please refer to Chapter Six)

In short, the difference between morality and religion is no more than the difference between the self and the other, and between the internal and the external. In Gansu, a place cited as an example earlier, the Hui people suffered less from opium addiction compared with the Han people, because their commandments were so clearly laid out that it was simple for them to observe them; moreover, the churches, with their organizational power, supervised the observance of these precepts. The Han people, however, had neither commandments nor church organizations. Though they held Confucius in great reverence, they actually did whatever they pleased. Under this social order, it was obvious that the Hui people were constrained more by force while the Han people strongly emphasized self-discipline. Of course, what promoted good social order among the Hui people also had much to do with their morality, but on the whole, they invariably integrated morality into religion. Meanwhile, the reason the Han people could maintain their social order was that their religious cult empowered the people themselves. Such power, of course, was merely dispersed among the minds of individuals, so its advancement was dependent on their self-discipline. What we have called “morality in place of religion” also means “individuals in place of organizations”. “Religion was originally a method but morality simply was not”, we stated in Chapter Six. It would not do if morality was to directly replace religion since it involves different ceremonies (including ritual, music, bowing, and the hierarchy and strata). Such etiquette, on the surface, is not dissimilar to religious rites, but their purposes differ from each other. As a

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result, religious rites served as a complement to religious faith, but etiquette aimed to awaken rationality and to realize morality. Ritual, music and bowing are certainly conducive to rationality, as are hierarchy and strata. The key point is: by nature, human beings, who are empathetic to things around them, consider their own lives as being inseparable from those of others around them. Therefore, they impose on themselves all kinds of obligations. To them, the fulfilment of an obligation is the essence of life, and the essence of life is the embodiment of morality. Morality, when it becomes widespread, is embodied in the prevailing custom, which then develops into etiquette culture. Although etiquette culture and morality, and morality and etiquette culture, develop in a cyclical manner, they can never develop into a system of law. How could they? The law may either impose obligations on people, or fulfill obligations for people. In short, the obligations themselves are externalized. But from the perspective of morality, everything is encountered as an issue that one addresses for oneself and everything is internal instead of external. Etiquette culture can provide encouragement in this endeavor through morality, but the law does not hurl reproaches on people through morality. This is beyond the scope of the law. This is how they differ from one another as they follow different modes of development. Law perhaps originated from religion and protected individuals in the name of an institution. In as much as they both imposed external control on people’s internal impulses, law and religion followed the same developmental route. At first, the idea that morality instead of religion, that etiquette culture instead of the law, and that a person’s own authority or rationality instead of external force, is relied on, seems to be a very high-concept – it may be very difficult to take in. In fact, though, if you understand China’s social structure, you will see that it is both very natural and very common. This is because the expectations of society can be summed up in only four words: namely, “filial piety, industry, frugality”. With these four ideals, everything will be available to you. There is no lack of filial piety in an ethics-oriented society such as China, and there is no lack of industry and frugality in a vocational society such as China. Morality, then, can be deemed to be nothing more than this, and etiquette culture can likewise be deemed nothing more than this. These four concepts, which represent benefits to other people as well as to oneself, can be easily understood and easily put into practice. With no mention of the original roots of human rationality, it could be well asked: When such a social structure is established, as an individual, can one do nothing but strive to be filial, industrious and frugal? This is dictated by circumstances so that social order can be maintained – it

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is far from unusual. I once read the following remarks, made by Chen Duxiu thirty years ago: People might say that the Chinese people enjoy living peacefully, in harmony with the land, that the Indians enjoy a life free from desires and pains, … and that Westerners are combative and bellicose. There is not a word in the history of civilization in Europe that was not written in blood.6

I did not quite understand it then. Observed from today’s perspective, the expression “living peacefully on land” is indeed very much to the point and very much in line with the reality of life in China, which cannot escape the attention of perceptive people. I would guess this is a remark by some foreign scholar, but I do not know who made it.

10.4

The Function of Scholars in Chinese Civilization

As stated above, the maintenance of social order in ancient China did not rely on external force but rather on every individual’s own selfcontrol. However, though external force is rarely used, moralization is an indispensable measure as the Chinese government favors a passive attitude toward politics and but actively encourages moralization. The underuse of external force perhaps results from the lack of class hierarchy, which supports the assembly and deployment of military force. The indispensable quality of moralization is related to the awakening of rationality, the cultivation of etiquette culture and the empowering of individuals. This in turn is closely related to scholars. As the first among the four classes of people in China (i.e., scholars, farmers, workers and businessmen), scholars are considered to show particular reverence for society precisely because they play a major role in enlightening people through education and they serve as examples for all through their intelligence and reasonableness. It is they who enable the social order to be dynamic and effectual. Thus all people, whether farmers, workers or businessmen, can live and work in peace and contentment. Although scholars are not engaged in production like the other classes, they play an absolutely preeminent role in society. Morality, etiquette culture and moralization exert mutual influence upon each other. They do not necessarily follow a fixed order and the link 6

Chen Duxiu, Fundamental Differences between the East and the West, New Youth No. 4, Issue I.

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between them is rationality. Rationality, broadly speaking, is the mental disposition of the people. In a narrow sense, it refers to established emotional ties (see Chapter Seven for more detail). It is impossible to possess moral consciousness and self-discipline without the corresponding mental disposition among the people. With no sense of emotional ties, morality would no longer retain its vividness and power. In a pre-existing etiquette culture, ordinary people are not necessarily conscious of it, but since etiquette culture exerts great power, albeit subtly, ordinary people cannot truly be said to be self-disciplined. However, concerning what this culture is composed of, it is clear that there is something all people in the society understand and believe in, and this something is rationality. Rationality, as distinct from religious etiquette and custom, was the subject of the enlightenment received from Confucianism (see Chapter Six). Certainly, moralization is connected to the awakening of rationality. Though it was advocated by rulers, moralization was not always intended for the purpose of enlightening rationality, but rather for achieving rulers’ own ill intentions. There were also cases in which scholars were knowingly or unknowingly exploited by rulers. Nevertheless, scholars in China differ from priests in the West in that the former do not function within an organizational network like that of churches and parishes. Neither do they have formal institutions like the Christian missions, to say nothing of regular quasi-religious congregations. Scholars are all dispersed among the common people, each taking every opportunity to bring what they have learned into play. Because of this, it is difficult to control and utilize them. On the contrary, we can see that in the traditional view, the power that rulers hold should yield to rationality, as represented by scholars. In reality, there is no doubt that this is not necessarily the case, but power, in many cases, cannot take care of everything concerning rationality. In the past, scholars were obviously respected by society and as teachers they were most highly reverenced since they were representative of rationality and performed the duties of educators. As has been said in The Book of Rites, “There are two occasions the sovereign dares not treat his subjects as subjects. One, when a subject is the deceased, and the other, when a subject is his teacher.” From the beginning, military officials were all required to line up in front of the king facing north, and the king was to appear in front of his military officials facing south. However, when the king met up with his teacher, he was to appear in front of the teacher with facing north while the teacher was to appear before the king facing south. In the medieval West, God was used to suppress the sovereign’s supremacy. Here in China, however, it is not necessary to do so. China is a place where “the teacher

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is respected and thus the way to be a man may be respected”, and where rationality is understood never to yield to supreme power. – This means that except for your own sake, you should never try to become king. This can be expressed as follows: The sovereign The teacher (the scholar) The populace (including the scholar) Ideally in China, the sovereign should be the teacher. Thus there are such sayings as these: “Heaven has produced the inferior people and appointed for them rulers and teachers”; “Only when you are able to be a good teacher can you become a leader, and only when you are able to be a good leader can you become a king”; “To rule is to set straight” – which is the function of politics. “When a ruler’s personal conduct is correct, he will be obeyed without the need to issue orders. If his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue orders, but they will not be followed.” At this point, there was no longer any need to talk about the unification of politics and moralization. But the reality was never as good as the ideals. As the sovereign and the teacher were not necessarily the same entity, it was no good attempting to bring rationality under the power of the ruler. As a result, there were discussions about the nobility of man and the nobility of Heaven (see Mencius, Book XI Gaozi Part I) and debates about the nobility of the scholar and the nobility of the sovereign (see National Policy). After that, every scholar aspired to become the teacher of the true sovereign. In the light of historical facts, in the end, social order could only rely upon the sovereign’s supremacy, which was inevitable, and thus the sovereign still occupied the highest position. Consequently, a scholar had to adapt to a position between the sovereign and the populace, acting as a regulator or a buffer. This is summarized in the following diagram: the sovereign ← the scholar → the populace

The exercise of power, which does not follow rationality, cannot avoid problems among the people. If the people meet with force, tragedies rapidly occur and people suffer disasters. At this point, the only thing to do is stimulate people’s rationality – in the narrow sense or in the broad sense

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– so that people are obliged to be somewhat self-restrained in all aspects of their lives. But who will arouse rationality? It is the scholars who are to act as the go-betweens in this case. When the Chinese nation, one that has been gradually enlightened by rationality, cannot find someone who will command authority with the highest regard for rationality, such will be the situation. The monarchical power is certainly the highest power, but it is best for the monarch not to come into direct contact with the populace. In fact, it may be considered that the more the monarch uses his power, the less secure he becomes. Perhaps it is indeed a better policy to show leniency toward people and to encourage their instruction, which is the embodiment of rationality. As far as the populace is concerned, in essence, no power should need to be exercised, but if power exists, it is expected that there should be no disturbance erupting in people’s lives. But of course, this is on the condition that everyone is filial, industrious and frugal and only when no problems arise can people be exempt from any interference by authority. Consequently, scholars come to act as gobetweens. On the one hand, they would often advise the monarch to use his power as seldom as possible and to make efforts to sympathize with his people. On the other hand, they would often admonish the populace to be loyal to the sovereign and respectful to their elders, to value earnest and deep friendship, and to act dutifully. They would always demonstrate to each side the general principle of ethics in order to stir their rationality and urge them to fulfill their own duties. In the meantime, they would suggest to them, “It is best for each of you to go the most worthwhile and most reliable way you can, which will cater for the needs of all so that conflicts between people can be avoided.” Otherwise, it would certainly prove the case that once the monarch demonstrated his authority, it would be impossible for ordinary people to tolerate it, but on the other hand, when ordinary people rise up in rebellion, it is also difficult for the monarch to ward off danger. What scholars do is make constant efforts to bring about a reconciliation between the ruler and the populace so as to stabilize the overall situation. How much rationality can be induced need not be dwelled on here, but broadminded tolerance and inner discipline have almost become second nature among the Chinese people. Just as Montesquieu once said, “The Chinese people are mild in nature and modest in aspirations.” It is indeed the case. A person of shortsighted and narrow views mistakes this for the result of the pressure exerted on people by tyrannical monarchs. The fact is that that person knows nothing about the law of nature: pressure surely builds resistance. But in China, no such result will ever be brought about.

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Governance versus Times of Peace and Prosperity

When such a social structure emerges, the situation will surely be the one the old saying describes: “Whoever he is, from the Son of Heaven to a common man, the most vital thing for him is to cultivate himself.” Scholars, who only have to act according to the needs of the situation, offer suggestions or call attention to other people. The Son of Heaven could be expected to be in need of such guidance, and through cautious and conscientious efforts, would maintain the Tao of his nation’s destiny. The four classes of people – scholars, peasants, artisans and merchants – would also do their utmost to behave ethically and pursue their onward journeys professionally. Such being the case, no one would be a hindrance to others, and through mutual coordination, the social structure would bring about its magical effect. When all people are on good terms, it brings times of peace and prosperity. Such periods are characterized by an ease, freedom, tranquility and happiness which make it impossible to compare them with any period of Western history, from the Middle Ages to the modern era. Conversely, if even the Son of Heaven could not meet these standards by doing everything he could to fulfill his own destiny, neither could the four classes of common people. In this instance, the Son of Heaven would constitute a hindrance to the common people and the common people would in turn hinder the Son of Heaven. In this case, hindrance would be put in each other’s way, and the magical effect of the social structure would be nullified. After the breakdown of the relationship between people, periods of chaos or turbulent periods will ensue. During such times, persecution would arise, which would be followed by turmoil and riots. Different from class revolution, periods of chaos lack a sense of direction and clear-cut barriers. Both “times of peace and prosperity” and “periods of chaos”, two terms of outdated use to us, are applicable only when events in Chinese history are referred to, but they are obviously not applicable when events in Western history are referred to. As has been discussed in this chapter and in previous chapters, the way how a society is structured and the way how a society maintains its social order (especially how a society self-maintains its social order) manifest their governance and times of peace and prosperity. Concerning periods of chaos and why such times arrive, they will be discussed in the next chapter. Times of peace and prosperity and periods of chaos are only relative terms and it is difficult for us to have a clear-cut differentiation between them. Governance, however, should be immediately effective in fulfilling its goals, or it suffers a decline in periods of chaos. Such variation can never escape the notice of anyone who is observant and conscientious.

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What then is governance? Broadly speaking, it refers to the total social structure (including the special political system) and all that is sustained and applied. Put simply, “self-cultivation as the most essential thing for anyone” (or living a life with inward exertion) can also serve as a generalization. Fundamentally, it can simply be treated as human rationality. All this can be traced back to the first emergence of rationality in a society. Being confined to facts in every way, the narrowly developed scale and orderliness need to be replenished by rationality before it can be endowed with life. In addition, let’s just say that such governance is the Tao of Confucius. Just ponder over the considerable effectiveness of governance in the past, and we will see: Were successful statesmen in the past not scholars – people of Confucius kind – who were constantly making their endeavors? As a matter of fact, it seems that the specific Chinese etiquette culture, the product of a certain time and of a certain locality characterized by its contemporaneity and regionalism, cannot be directly attributed to Confucius’ descendants who still know very little compared to his contemporaries. Furthermore, nearly two thousand years’ development was pioneered during the Qin Dynasty and it was obviously the utilitarian school and legalists rather than the Confucian school during the Warring States Period that destroyed feudalism by introducing a new outlook. Conversely, the doctrine of kingcraft and the practice of slowness favored by the Confucian school were originally discarded during the period from Shang Yang’s Constitutional Reform to the annexation of the six states by the State of Qin to found the Qin Dynasty. It must be known, however, that why the Qin Dynasty was so short-lived just resides in this point. It was simply under the curse of the common people that the Han Dynasty had its rise. When the Han Dynasty ruled, corrupt practices in the Qin Dynasty were deprecated and the State could only be governed through both tranquility proposed by the Yellow Emperor and Laozi, and earnestness and depth proposed by the Confucian school. The ethos at that time also overturned the trend of ideology from the Warring States Period. Till the reign of Emperor Wu in the Han Dynasty, the practice of rejecting the other schools of thought but respecting only Confucianism was to a greater extent crystalized. Since the Han Dynasty, Confucianism, which assumed undisputed authority, has become the main Chinese philosophy, so that the Han Dynasty, different from the Qin Dynasty, could flourish for a long time. Consequently, though Confucianism did not open up the new prospect of great unification, it stabilized the overall situation of great unification. In other words, though Confucianism did not initiate things, it helps accomplish things. As a result, over the following two thousand years, governance cannot be ensured

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without Confucianists and Confucianism.7 In his book A History of Ancient China, Xia Zengyou said, “Confucius alone has been the source for unifying politics and moralization in China and the Chinese history is the history of Confucius alone.” It seems that his importance has been overemphasized, but this is certainly not nonsense. Naturally, things are not that simple. Some people may well ask: Since the legal system at the beginning of the Han Dynasty was probably inherited from the Qin Dynasty and its ethos was based on what was proposed by the Yellow Emperor and Laozi, how can only Confucianism be used to generalize it all? Certainly, the events of over two thousand years of Chinese history reflect the fact that the Confucian School, the Taoist School, the Legalist School, and the Buddhist School coexisted in a hybrid manner. But on the other hand, it must be known that there is a flat contradiction: the Confucian School was oriented toward contemplation while the Legalist school based itself on the reality. Ideally, different people would maintain their own principles according to their natures, rather than being forced to conform, until they finally merged. But such an ideal could not be fulfilled since the reality of the situation was that force dictated everything. What the Confucian School aimed to do was evoke human rationality and consequently, Chinese society became more ethics-oriented rather than group-oriented, as if there arose the possibility of resorting to the principles of nature by forgoing the force. Hence the school was more reluctant to give up its ideal. But in reality, force certainly could be forgone and what is more, it could be used to the best advantage. Why, in view of this, did the Legalist School not have its own set of propositions? Not only during the chaotic Warring States Period did the Legalist School play the most crucial part, but also after the unification of China, a country which was unlike a country, decrees and penalties were still a must. The last two thousand years witnessed a combination of both the Confucian School and the Legalist School for use, which is certainly natural. The Taoist School, however, was but only an 7 Concerning this point, suff icient examples can be obtained from CHEN Guyuan’s book A History of Legal Systems in China, 1934: (1) The dominance of Confucianism over China is discussed as the Tao of governance for several thousand years, with no exception, and it has certainly provided the substance of the Chinese legal system; the uniqueness of its legal system lies in the fact that Confucianism has great appeal in the world of academia (see p. 54). (2) With regard to the discussion about the greatest changes to the Chinese legal system, these are attributed to the following people: Shang Yang from the Qin Dynasty, WANG Mang from the Han Dynasty, WANG Anshi from the Northern Song Dynasty and KANG Youwei from the Qing Dynasty. However, while changes did occur, one of the central forces that determined success or failure remained constant, and that force is Confucianism (see p. 29).

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intermediary between them. The pure Taoism, the pure Legalism or even the pure Confucianism can only be seen in thought but never in actual politics. From a historical perspective, in most cases, Taoism, Legalism and Confucianism alternate tension easily, with one of them playing a major role but the other playing a minor role. During this process, Confucianism naturally plays a dominant role but at the same time governs the other two. Not only is it so in actual politics, it is also the case in political thought. This can be explained by no other reason than the fact that China as a state has already been integrated with the whole society so that it naturally has the law included in etiquette culture. The status of Confucianism of the past two thousand years was already totally determined at the time when such a social structure with such social order was gradually formed. The position of Confucianism could not be assailed by any Han Dynasty scholars, nor could a single emperor’s proposition contest it. From here, we can answer the question: Why has China remained unchanged for even one day of the last two thousand years, despite having always been a site of negotiation between the outside world and its own territory while in the West, nation states were created after the emergence of Christendom in the medieval period? It is only recently that this question has been debated. The questioners regard nation states as advanced, regretting that China has not become a state in the true sense of the word and asking earnestly when this will happen. We are not concerned here with judging which type of state is all the more advanced. Let’s just make a contrast between China and the West: (1) In most of Western Europe in the Middle Ages, it was Christianity and Latin that ensured the emergence of a large culturally unified unit. This was quite comparable to the ethical culture unified by Confucianism after the Han Dynasty in China, and to the unifying influence of the Chinese language. (2) The Chinese seem to be conscious that there is a land united under heaven instead of merely a state. Westerners at that time also felt the same way about their culturally cohesive territory. Though such notions as a modern state’s political unity and modern people’s consciousness of a state had not yet developed, the feudal political units of the time were originally embedded in a large culturally unified territory. (3) The Christian Church in that era, from the holy see down to local parishes, not only frequently interfered with political affairs at every level, but also formed a large organizational system in itself, which functioned as if it were simply another kind of ruler. Consequently, the unification it imposed was cultural, but also went beyond that. China, however, was a

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large culturally unified territory on the one hand, but, more often than not, it was also a large politically unified unit on the other hand. That is, it was a land united under heaven as well as a state. (4) But the unification under Christian culture fell to division in the end and from such division emerged the modern Western nation states. Consequently, the consciousness of a state was installed in place of the consciousness of a land united under heaven. People were no longer united within one culture, but instead aspired to achieve political sovereignty. However, the situation differed greatly in China. Nothing ever impedes China’s cultural unification. As a result, people never cease to view the world as a land under heaven. Being politically divided is unfailingly considered abnormal. The strategy of “each party trying to secure its own political autonomy” may prevail in the West but never in China. It should therefore be asked: Why does the West invariably fall to division even though it is unified by Christian culture, while Chinese culture has remained the same for over two thousand years? Briefly stated, the following five points can account for this: (1) All the usual features of ancient religions, such as myths, superstitions, arbitrariness and inflexibility, exist in Christianity. When a person’s knowledge develops so that he becomes more and more perceptive with each passing day, his faith will naturally waver and collapse. Confucianism, as a non-religion that places complete faith in human beings themselves and in the sure enlightenment of rationality, encounters no such problems. (2) Before the Middle Ages, Christianity exhibited a marked tendency to renounce the world. Once people turned from asceticism to the pursuit of modern life and worldly happiness, how was it possible to prevent such radical changes and such schisms from taking place? Confucius, however, from the very first, taught people to value their earthly life. As a result, problems of this kind do not arise in China. (3) As Confucianism is non-religious, it does not matter whether a person is a believer or not; neither does it entail a church-like organization as its coherence does not rely on its form. Christianity is quite the opposite. Since it forms its own organization, it can be divided. Since its coherence is predicated on its form, it can be easily disrupted. But an unconfined and formless entity cannot be either split up or disrupted in any way. (4) It was actually the corruption and degeneration of both the Church and the papacy that triggered the religious schism in the West. In fact, this was the most influential turning point, without which the weaknesses in the previous three situations would not have been exposed. In China, however, such a problem would never be able to occur in the first place.

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(5) At that time, Latin was the lingua franca of the Christian Church and its use was conducive to the development and unification of Western culture. However, the language, which was only in widespread use in the super-stratum of society, was not particularly accessible and not practical for common people. Up to the time when the religious schism took place, the earthly life was accepted and people’s attitude toward life witnessed great changes. Consequently, all kinds of languages and literature began to gain ground. From that point, national consciousness began to develop and national sentiment became stronger. Where once religion, which renounced the world, had held the popular psyche together, it was now the perception of nationhood. With this development, the Latin language also underwent great changes. The culturally united territory was hence split into many smaller politically unified units. In China, however, since the idea that “in the world today, the words used for writing are the same; carriages travel on the same paths; and the morality by which people live is the same rule” prevailed, the language used throughout the country has been a unifying feature from beginning to end. This perhaps can be attributed to the fact that the Chinese language is composed mainly of pictograms instead of alphabetic symbols. Though its pronunciation varies from region to region, this has never hindered the Chinese language from unifying its speakers. Though some variations do occur between ancient Chinese characters and modern Chinese characters in terms of form and phonology, the barrier can still be easily overcome. Thus, the breadth of such cultural unification can be further extended (e.g., making efforts to popularize the Chinese language in neighboring countries or states or among people of other nations) and further depth can be attained (e.g., its literary temperament, historical memory, and etiquette culture can be transmitted to a greater extent). Never did the division of the country take place, and perhaps it never will. Today, except for Inner Mongolians, Tibetans and the un-Sinicized Hui people, who are physically within China’s borders but who are not yet amalgamated into China as a cultural unit (which we will not dwell on at the moment), the rest of the people throughout China can be said to have long been amalgamated into one integrated whole which cannot be divided. The Qin and the Han dynasties can be viewed as the initial fruits of the project of national amalgamation and unification. The preQin Period and the Warring States Period were a time when great steps were made toward amalgamation. The culturally unif ied large unit of China originally consisted of smaller politically unif ied units. In other words, integration came out of division. China’s Seven Powers in the

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Warring States Period were the equivalent of the so-called “Great Powers” among modern Western countries. But it must be noted that China was an amalgamation of what was previously divided while Western countries were divided where they were once united, that China developed from politics to culture while Western countries developed from culture to politics, and that China evolved from a country to a land united under heaven while Western countries evolved from a land under heaven to become nations. Such a contrast results from the great disparity that originally existed between the two cultures. The foundation of this disparity can be seen in the comparison between Confucian ethics and Christianity. The reason these two can be compared is that both offer different groups of people guidance on value judgements in life and that each of them is defined by its position as a cultural nexus. In addition, they each set up their respective ideals and apply them to the whole world (this refers to the land under heaven). But in terms of their essential character, they differ from each other: one is oriented toward individual morality but the other is oriented toward group religiosity. Though they can both bring about social order, one of them is oriented toward enlightening the inner mind while the other is oriented toward externalization. They differ radically from each other in terms of profundity. Untold bloody struggles have been endured since the rise of Christianity. Perhaps no matter what religious belief it is, if one belief is deemed to be true, then all the rest will certainly be deemed false. Therefore, it is often said that “if Christianity does not draw satisfaction from erecting its own sacrificial altar, it will surely come to destroy the sacrificial altar of heresy.” But the notion of Confucianism as a single authoritative doctrine is the result of a slow evolutionary process, and even when this notion was gaining acceptance, only a sketchy description can be found in historical records: In the first year of Emperor Wu’s reign in the Han Dynasty, Wei Wan petitioned the emperor: “Among all the recommended authorities, in answering Your Majesty’s questions, some of them quoted Shen Buhai, Shang Yang, Han Fei, Su Qin and Zhang Yi, and as a result the affairs of state have been led astray. Please, Your Majesty, do not put them in important positions.” Emperor Wu then agreed to this petition.

This suggests nothing more than that the court officials no longer listened to what was said by people from various other schools. To later generations, such a practice seems to have become a religion through a gradual process

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over a great many decades. It may be asked: Where else can such cultural unification be found, that reaches such profound depths, and who is capable of splitting such a culture? Besides, Christianity in the West is dramatically different from Confucianism in China. Chinese culture is monistic, and in the accounts of its earliest era, Confucius made the greatest achievements. Western culture evolved from two wellsprings. Not only did it evolve from the Hebrew religion, it also evolved from the law codes of Greece and Rome. Due to the very fact that the former could in no way cover all aspects of the latter, Christianity ultimately came to replace the Hebrew religion in nation states. The alteration that has occurred between medieval times and modern times is in fact simply the revival of Hellenism and the spirit of Roman governance amid the suppression of Christianity. Contemporary social order totally depends on an understanding of law that takes rights as standard, which has nothing to do with Christianity. In such cases, national consciousness has been heightened but humanity and the world around us are not very much respected. In the face of a human future in which “no peace means destruction”, whether or not there should be a revival of Hebraism is not a settled matter. Zhang Dongsun once stated that the reason for the continuous progress of Western culture stems from the fact that there exists such conflicting dualism.8 I unhesitatingly acknowledge his view here. One should recall, however, why monism and dualism emerged. If it is taken for granted that this is the result of historical decisions, that is a superficial understanding of the situation. Supposing the ancient Chinese had not demystified human life and had not been deeply rooted in its fundamentals, there would have been seven or eight “-isms” within such a vast space and over such a long period. How could monism then be tolerated from beginning to end? Conversely, as dualism is only vaguely rooted in the fundamentals of human life, it has not yet grasped its principles. In addition, some scholars argue that Confucianism has been established as a single authority and this is why China witnesses no opportunities for further progress. I do not disagree. It should be noted, however, that in the first place, religious intolerance and ideological constraints are not wholly the result of human stupidity. Half the time they are also naturally required by society. Thus it is necessary to establish common ground in value judgements before a society in which people can live together may be organized. After the grand unification, each sector in society will exhibit its own features. To cater to the demands of 8

See ZHANG Dongsun, Rationality and Democracy, 1946 (p. 12).

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this grand unification, a patriarch is indispensable. Tung Chung-shu, the scholar-statesman who was instrumental in institutionalizing Confucianism and civil-service examinations, advocated the following proposals: First, “the monarch only has a unified state when his subjects know well how to defend their state.” Second, “only after a unified state has been established can the system of laws and decrees be unified and will the subjects know whom to serve.” Obviously, there are also appeals from the people. As it turns out, amid everything that goes on in the world, you may have the time to attend to some of them, but never will you be able to attend to them all. Chinese culture can almost be said to be unaltered from the time when the Duke of Zhou and Confucius sowed its origins to the time when the Qin and the Han dynasties reaped its benefits. Specifically, the seeds sown by the Duke of Zhou and Confucius can be considered the causes for the collapse of feudalism – the basis for the state being integrated into society – and the effects reaped by the Qin and the Han dynasties were assimilation and integration on the one hand and the merging and unification of the country on the other. Here, “unaltered” means that since that time, China has been an entity combining the world or the land under heaven (society) with the state, and that Confucianism has been used as the primary principle of administration, along with legalist thought. China after the Qin Dynasty, though inevitably politically divided, no longer followed the practice of “each party trying to secure its political unity”, unlike every nation state in the West. This is because, on the one hand, the Chinese people were already close to becoming an integrated whole with no differentiation between individual nationalities, and on the other hand, molded and educated by such a culture and with classes absorbed into an ethical system and the state submerged into society, the Chinese people would definitely aim for unity rather than division. Divided, wars will erupt and the state will be vulnerable. United, politics will be inert and the state will be hidden from view. To such an ethically integrated and culturally unified society, unity means governance of the world and peace in the world, and division means periods of chaos in the world. For three thousand years, we have been well on the way to being “a society” rather than “a state”. Becoming a state would constitute a reversal. However, historically speaking, statehood is actually the only way forward for human beings. Accordingly, for over two thousand years, China has been suspended in a situation between a feudal state and a capitalist state, and to a greater extent between a society and a state. Its social organization derives enlightenment from the Confucian school, which explains why Confucianism became the fundamental element of the governance of China. It can also be understood why the Legalist school is

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so adaptable to the needs of a state. If China had not suddenly been drawn into the vortex of international competition over the past hundred years and been compelled down the path to statehood, we would have retained our world consciousness as before and China would have been governed as it was for the past two thousand years.



Chapter Eleven A Cycle of Times of Peace and Prosperity and Periods of Chaos

11.1

Recurring Periods of Chaos in China

In a society with such a unique structure, a person needs to maintain a spirit of reflexivity at all times – the practice of inward self-examination, as discussed above. This is not only for his own sake but also for the sake of society at large. On the basis of this practice, social order can then be independently maintained without resorting to enforcement, as the situation in China makes clear enough. People here are well aware that they should be self-motivated to maintain social order and have already cultivated this habit as their second nature. (Where such a habit has not been cultivated, it indicates that the social structure has not been fully established.) If something more than individual action is required, certain scholars set an example for the people and illuminate them. In short, this means that Chinese society relies heavily on rationality, manners and customs during times of peace and prosperity, for it lacks either of the two powerful elements that would otherwise ensure peace – religion and state. Without these two, what is left of a society? The reason a well-governed society is well-governed is predicated on the reason a chaotic society is chaotic. Throughout history, periods of chaos ensue precisely when people “act without regard for any authority”. If a person acts with no regard for authority, it suggests that he is likely not to show respect for others and what is more, he is not likely to practice self-control, an attitude contrary to governance. This, of course, is the first point. But what is more important is that acting without regard for authority serves as the proof that manners and customs in a society have been allowed to break down. Manners and customs in fact anchor the social order in a society like China, with such a unique structure. They are considered to be most effective when an upsurge takes place in the society, and to be more effective when a limit is placed on people’s behavior. Although the practice of these manners and customs is not subject to supervision by any institution, public opinion will serve as a mode of sanction. Acting without regard for authority, if the incidents are sparse, may result in a gradual decline in the effectiveness of public sanctions; and if the incidents are routine, it may result in the total invalidation of public

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sanctions. If things have been brought to such a state, is it any surprise periods of chaos ensue in the society? Acting without regard for authority predicts that periods of chaos will soon follow in the society, which is quite clear to the older generation, with their subtle mentality and rich experience. However, whenever a certain critical period begins, very often the lack of regard for authority becomes. This can be best illustrated from three perspectives: from the perspective of emperors, from the perspective of the general public and from the perspective of scholars. The occurrence of these acts of defiance is in fact almost always an inevitability. (1) Defiance of authority from the perspective of emperors: Throughout the ages, most of those who established dynasties, being from the common folk, were well acquainted with the sufferings of the common people and with the evils of their society. As they were exceptionally talented, they conducted themselves very well and knew how to get along with other people, and this naturally ensured no problems arose. But over the generations, their successors gradually became mediocrities. In addition, as they were born in the Forbidden Palace and were brought up by women, they knew nothing about the problems of society. They would even, like Emperor Hui of the Jin Dynasty, ask the person who brought reports of a lean year, “Why do they not eat meat paste when there is no food?” In this case, even imperial censors or officials could not help. Fatuous and tyrannical, these emperors imposed heavy punishments on their people and even carried out wanton slaughter among the population, levied excessive taxation, abused their power and continually found fault with others while completely lacking any self-awareness. A look at recorded history reveals that this has been a near-universal rule, with no exceptions. (2) Defiance of authority from the perspective of the general public: Chinese society, which was at peace for a long time, experienced a yearon-year growth of its population, but its territory saw no expansion: this was partly because there was no ambition to invade other countries, and also because production technology saw no progress. (This happens without fail in Chinese culture, which is to be discussed in detail later.) If a society suffered successive natural disasters (the most dreadful thing that can befall an agrarian society), the problem of food shortages could not be resolved. In this scenario, nothing more could be done to squeeze any more effort out of the people, for any attempts to do so would be rejected physiologically. This was also the time when people were motivated to rise up in revolt against oppression by officials, due to the emperors’ fatuous and self-indulgent rule.

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Once provoked, starved people would become roving bandits, which was almost a standard practice in history. (3) Defiance of authority from the perspective of scholars: Not only do both emperors and the common people become troublemakers in due course, but so do scholars. In a society that is at peace for a long time, high rank and emoluments become especially enviable and not a day passes without scholars resorting to flattery and inviting secular admiration by using esoteric expressions, so that even high-ranking scholars become degenerate. As such a scholarly ethos gradually permeates the whole society, scholars give themselves over to yearning for mere external things, without any self-awareness or responsibility. They cannot offer their emperors any helpful criticisms, or they may even become complicit in a tyrant’s evil deeds. These scholars either cannot exercise their leadership over society or bring about corruption. This has been attested by history and is almost expected. When social order has been brought to such a state of affairs that it cannot be maintained, the whole of society is thrown into boundless chaos. After much killing or slaughter, the emperor may indeed be overthrown, but on the other hand, countless deaths and injuries are brought to the common people. But as time passes, no one can endure such suffering and people grow awfully tired of such chaos. At this juncture, a certain innovator is expected to find a solution to the situation, or people anticipate the arrival of someone who is no longer a government official but who lives in seclusion. Out of sympathy and compassion, he would save people from untold miseries. As the population decreases, governance will once again return to normal. After a period of restoration comes a time of great peace and prosperity, but the long period of peace will once more be followed by chaos, which will be followed again by peaceful governance. Thus we see a cyclic turn of governance and chaos specific to Chinese history.1 This, of course, is only the sketchiest account. The so-called “chaotic society” doubtless refers to the society that goes through several changes 1 One paragraph from XIA Zengyou, Ancient History of China, 1933 (p. 252) can be quoted here for reference: “Historically, China often follows a general rule: A time of great peace and prosperity will surely arrive forty to fifty years after a revolution or after the use of military forces. At this point, a period of prosperity usually begins that lasts for about a hundred years. After this, disruption again ensues. The next several decades will result in total chaos which again leads to revolution. Typical examples of this pattern are the Han, the Tang, the Song and the Ming dynasties. … Following the chaos, the population declines and natural products generate a large surplus. Among the dead are both heroic people and troublemakers, and those who survive get tired of chaos and live on in degradation, with no further desires. This is why peace reigns in the country. As for monarchs, they gain more peace and quiet so that greater efficiency can be achieved.”

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of dynasties. After the Qin and the Han dynasties, ethics-oriented conduct and professional distinction gradually became the prominent social structures. If these guidelines are observed carefully, orderliness will be well maintained so that society will be well governed. If on the other hand these guidelines are not observed, the social structure will be undermined and when the peace has been shattered, society will become chaotic. Both the tumult of war and the great disorder that war causes are symptoms of chaos. The arguments made above – suggesting that “Chinese history is a history of two competing forces that reverse and advance” and that “it is difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between a well-governed society and a chaotic society” refer to exactly this point. The only thing that has remained the same over several thousand years is that the opportunity for quelling chaos hinges on prudence and reverence versus arrogance and impudence. In China, the consistent preference for emphasizing personal ethical requirements may be attributed to this phenomenon. Since it is difficult to fulfill such requirements, it is hard for governance to be maintained for long. The prevalence of chaos over governance is the ultimate result.

11.2

Lack of Revolutions in China

Since the Qin and the Han dynasties, Chinese history has been a cycle of peaceful and prosperous period and periods of chaos, without any revolution. Revolution means the transformation of society by replacing the old structure with the new structure and by replacing the old order with the new order, just like the replacement of feudalism with capitalism and the replacement of capitalism with socialism. Although some people may also call even the overthrow of a government a revolution, that is too broad and it is not what we mean here. Observed historically, China’s social structure may at one time have been destroyed, but soon, it was restored to normal and regained its effectiveness. This is an intermittent state of affairs that has continued in China for over two thousand years with no essential transformation. Changes of dynasties add up to no less than a dozen, but none of these changes amount to anything radical. Hence we say it is “the same old stuff with a different label.” Thus China can be said to lack any revolutions. Had it not been for the integrated traffic in the world which, due to the importation of modern western civilization, triggered the transformation, it is hardly imaginable how its cyclic turn of governance and chaos can be broken.

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If an inquiry is made into why revolutions no longer take place in China, anyone who has taken in the preceding chapters will have no difficulty f iguring out the answer. However, it is worth elaborating on this from several further perspectives. Firstly, it must be pointed out that there is a difference between chaos and revolution. The difference, as mentioned above, is this: “Persecutions of various kinds and turmoil and riots in a chaotic society differ from class revolution in that class revolution follows a certain direction with very clear barrier distinctions.” Here, it is only right to quote the late Liang Qichao’s paper “A Study of the Revolution in Chinese History” as an illustration.2 He pointed out that China differs from other countries in seven ways: Firstly, in China there are private revolutions rather than group revolutions. That is to say, revolutions in the West, which are based on the demands of the populace, take place as group actions. Ever since the War between the State of Chu and the Western Han Dynasty in China, however, conspiracies, the joining of forces, bloodshed, and victories are likely to be affairs that involve only a few people. Second, these are revolutions of ambition instead of revolutions of selfdefense. This can be best illustrated by the farmers’ rebellion leader Chen Sheh’s remark, “If someone among us attains prosperity, he should never forget the rest of us”, by the hero Xiang Yu’s remark that “this First Emperor of the Qin Dynasty [259-210 BC] can be replaced by me” and by Liu Bang, King of the Han Dynasty, who told his father, “Compared with my brother Liu Zhong, who you consider is more successful, who has attained greater achievements?” It can thus be seen that revolutions in China are totally different from those in the West, which are stirred up amid great popular pressure and in revolt against the government for self-defense and for the right to live. Third, there are no middle-class revolutions. It is well known that revolutions in the West in modern times have been revolutions among the middle classes. Revolutions in China, however, were initiated either by people from the lower classes in society, such as those of Liu Bang, Emperor Gaozu of the Western Han Dynasty (206 BC-24 AD) and Zhu Yuanzhang, Emperor Taizu of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1398), or by people from the upper classes such as Li Yuan, Emperor Gaozu of the Tang Dynasty (618-626). Revolutions initiated by people from the middle stratum were never seen. Fourth, there has been a succession of uprisings throughout China, but each insurrectionary army was a composite of different elements. It was 2

See Volume 5 of LIANG Qichao, Collected Works at the Ice-drinking Room, 1936.

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unlike the following cases: in Britain, for example, there has only been one revolutionary army – the warring faction led by Oliver Cromwell during the “Long Parliament” in the seventeenth century; likewise, in America, there has only been George Washington’s faction during the American War of Independence. Apart from these, there have been no other revolutionary armies. These two examples show that they are not “a composite of different elements”. But in China, it was still, as ever, a case of “rival warlords fighting for the throne”. Fifth, it takes a long time before peace and stability can be restored after periods of chaos in China. This is a consequence of the fourth point. That is to say, after the overthrow of the old government, all the other competing revolutionary armies have to be wiped out and only one leader singled out from among these forces before peace and stability can be finally restored. But this takes even a longer time than the overthrow of the old government. It seems that in the West, this never happens. Sixth, there are disagreements aplenty within the revolutionary camps. The fifth point already indicates these disagreements, but what is more, it is often the case that even within the same faction, further fighting and killing ensue. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom famously owes its failure in part to internal conflict. Such cases abound in Chinese history but we need cite no more instances here. Although in the West, the French Revolution witnessed mutual slaughter between different parties, it was nevertheless different from what generally occurred in China. Seventh, the growth and decline of foreign forces vary greatly. Every domestic revolutionary period in China coincides with a period of foreign invasion. Throughout Chinese history, the correlation between domestic revolution and foreign invasion and their outcomes fall into the following five categories: (1) The revolutionary army turns to foreign forces in order to overthrow the old government; (2) The old government turns to foreign forces in order to wipe out the revolutionary army; (3) Both the revolutionary army and the old government, in the first case, perish together; (4) Both the old government and the revolutionary army, in the second case, perish together; (5) After the defeat of the revolutionary army, foreign forces are recruited but they become a thorn in the government’s side. Examples that illustrate these five categories abound in Chinese history and they do not need to be cited here. In the West, however, after the French Revolution, foreign forces were capable of fighting against the intervention of other nations through coalition. These seven points, taken together, reveal the full extent of the chaos peculiar to China, but chaos of such sorts cannot be called revolution.

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Revolution is the struggle of one class against another in order to satisfy the insurgents’ own common demands. It is neither a fight among rivals for the throne, nor a rough-and-tumble fight with no distinctions between the parties. This is obviously a manifestation of the loss of ethical order in a professional society with no class distinction and tending toward indolence, where every individual and every household pursues their own future. Besides these seven points, one more can be added here. The old Chinese saying, “Clambering over the dragon and following the phoenix”, meaning climbing the political ladder on the strength of one’s influence with those in power, amply demonstrates that a group is formed only when a struggle is anticipated, a practice that differs from the revolutionary mode in the West, where a group launches the struggles itself, whatever form they may take. In China, such a group is formed with one leader at the center, so the leader is considered essential while the group is considered almost expendable. Again, this is different from the West, where a leader is chosen from among the group, and the group is considered the essence of the movement while the leader is not considered indispensable. The first point made above, then, must be substantiated here in order to make it clearer. There is good evidence to show this: historically, whenever there was chaos and disorder all over China, some people would command their clansmen and relatives to seek refuge in the mountains. Gradually, these people would form a tribe. What Tian Chou did toward the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty is one such example. According to historical records, Tian Chou went up into the Xuwu Mountains and chose to settle in a deep and steep valley of great strategic importance, where he farmed by himself to support his parents. Many homeless people came to surrender voluntarily to him. In a few years’ time, the number of people reached as many as over five thousand families. Then, Tian Chou said to those elders one day: “I am so greatly honored to have gained your trust in me and you have all come a long way to join me. With such a large number of people, we have already founded a city. However, every one of us does things in our own way. That is not the way to maintain lasting peace and stability. Could I suggest that we elect someone as our head?” All of them said yes and Tian Chou was elected as the head. … Tian Chou said, “I have a half-baked idea and I’m willing to put it into practice with you all. Is that acceptable?” All of them agreed. Tian Chou then enacted twenty decrees altogether, concerning the punishment of those who commit crimes such as murder, intentional injury, theft, disputes and lawsuits etc. The punishment was to be inflicted according to the seriousness of

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the crime that was committed, with the severest punishment being the death penalty. Later on, he formulated regulations concerning the rituals of marriage and the procedures for running a school and for lecturing, which were disseminated to the public. From these regulations people benefited greatly, and they responded positively to these regulations, creating a good atmosphere in which no one would, for instance, pick up and pocket anything lost on the road. Tian Chou’s fame then spread far and wide in the whole border region of the north, so that Wuwan State and Xianbei State even sent envoys with presents to pay tribute to him. Tian Chou accepted all these gifts and at the same time persuaded them from becoming bandits again.3

Sun Xiafung had a similar experience toward the end of the Ming Dynasty. Liang Qichao recounted another incident that occurred in Huaxian County, Guangdong Province in the late Ming and the early Qing Dynasty: My home, Huaxian County in Guangdong Province, was a no-man’s land on the border of Panyu Area in the Ming Dynasty. As roving bandits were rampant, its people built fortresses for self-defense. When the Manchu troops entered Guangdong, they clung to the practice of not cutting their hair and did not allow government officials to enter Guangdong. The taxes that were to be paid annually were collected two days before they were due and placed at the border, and feudal officials would come to the border to settle the account. All lawsuits were settled among the people themselves without any disputes. It was not until the twenty-first year of the reign of Emperor Kangxi that people began to pay taxes on their land in order to show their submission. Consequently, the Qing Court set up a special county called “Huaxian County” … two adherents of the late Ming Dynasty, including Tian Chou, planned and presided over the event. Before those two adherents died, they told their people not to cling to their old ways, and those people followed what they said. When I was young, my father even told me the names of those two adherents. 4

This could not possibly happen in a class-based society. It might be well asked, if a society is under class rule, with the old rule in the process of 3 See “A Biography of Tian Chou” from The Records of the Three Kingdoms. 4 See Volume 18 of LIANG Qichao, Collected Works at the Ice-drinking Room, 1936 and the chapter subtitled “the Governance of the Country” in LIANG Qichao, A History of Chinese Culture, 1922.

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being overthrown by revolutionary forces in a situation where everyone is either a revolutionary or the target of revolution, and when the two opposing classes are locked in a life-and-death struggle, who could possibly detach themselves from the world? How, then, can we account for the fact that certain echelons of people here stay aloof from the world and never care whether their society is in order or in chaos? Taohuayuan Ji (The Fountainhead of Peach Blossom), a literary account of an imaginary utopia by Tao Yuanming (also known as Tao Qian, 365?-427), one of the greatest classical Chinese poets and prose writers, who lived toward the end of the Eastern Jin Dynasty (317-420), was in fact hardly imaginary. What he described might as well have been fact. It was only by putting pen to paper that he turned it into a story. In a class-based society, what he described would be impossible, but in a classless society like China, where people are passive, careless and disordered, it is not at all unusual. Impossible though it is to detach oneself from a revolution, it is quite possible to stay aloof from chaos. What I mean when I say, “The social order is self-maintaining, without the use of force” and “the military rule seems to be replaced by peaceful coexistence with rationality” are both exemplified here, as is my statement that “such a society cannot be differentiated from a country”. Considering China as a whole, Chinese society is closer to what Franz Oppenheimer calls “Libreville People’s Group” where freemen’s citizenship is warranted. China’s peculiarity is fully revealed from these facts: Chaotic though it is, its tumult cannot be called a class revolution. Indeed, this is something of profound significance! On various occasions, particularly during the Yuan Dynasty and the Qing Dynasty when outsiders invaded China,5 it seemed that class rule had emerged to some extent. Toward the end of the Yuan and the Qing dynasties, China seemed to be almost on the brink of class revolution. In fact, it was hardly possible for this to have been the case. If these outsiders regarded themselves as rulers and aimed to transform China into a class-based society, they had two options: one was to introduce a more advanced industrial economy in China so as to control the capital themselves, and the other was to dominate the land by force so that China would once more revert to feudalism. Had they been able to impose the type of industrial civilization 5 Translator’s note: The rulers of the Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty (1271-1368), whose founder was Kublai Khan, were Mongols rather than Han Chinese and they were thus considered as outsiders who invaded China Proper. The rulers of the Qing (“Pure”) Dynasty (1636-1912), whose founder was HONG Taiji (Manchu name Abahai), were Manchus rather than Han Chinese and they were also considered as outsiders who invaded China Proper.

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seen in modern Western countries, it would have been possible for the rulers of both the Qing Dynasty and the Yuan Dynasty to have achieved greater success in the first half of their respective eras (the former lasting nearly three hundred years and the latter less than one hundred years). They were not successful, however. It was their civilizations that would eventually be assimilated by Chinese culture. Thus, how could it be possible for Chinese civilization to be assimilated by the outsiders? In the second part of both eras, though rulers in the Yuan Dynasty were not so readily assimilated into Chinese culture, they imposed harsh military rule and their reliance on class hierarchy figured more prominently. However, when the Yuan Dynasty rulers went north, China was still China, and in the end Chinese society underwent no qualitative changes at all, despite the Yuan ruling China for such a long period. As rulers in the Qing Dynasty were less audacious than their Yuan counterparts, and cleverer to boot, they voluntarily accepted the Chinese culture, thinking that as long as they themselves could secure their ruling status through their military strength, they could rule China in the way that China should be ruled. They never realized, however, that “when they ruled China in the way that China should be ruled”, because the Chinese social structure (crucially) did not change, this flatly contradicted their original intention and impeded their success. On the one hand, although incidents such as “practices like the ‘enclosure movement in England’” did occur, as was observed across China, the number of these incidents was negligible, which indicated a decline in the political power’s domination over the land since the Ming Dynasty. On the other hand, though the Manchu people and the Han people were prejudiced against each other, they ultimately had to use the examination system to employ scholars, which showed that the opening of political opportunities to common people remained the same as it had been in previous dynasties.6 That was why the Qing Dynasty lasted three times longer than the Yuan Dynasty. However, as it did not gain either an economic or a political monopoly, China still remained a professional society. However, since “all clansmen were soldiers”, to sustain themselves, they wasted all the soldiers’ provisions, and over time, they 6 In the Qing Dynasty, vacancies for government officials in the Imperial Court were divided equally among the Manchu people and the Han people (this practice was abolished in the late Qing Dynasty). As there was no lack of officials in other provinces, the number of Han officials usually took precedence over that of Manchu officials. This can be seen from “Comparison Chart of the Manchu and the Han Civil and Military Governors in Various Provinces during the reign of Emperor Shunzhi, Emperor Kangxi, Emperor Yongzheng, Emperor Qianlong, Emperor Jiaqing, Emperor Daoguang, Emperor XianFung, Emperor Tongzhi, Emperor Guangxu and Emperor Xiantong” appended to Chapter V of LIANG Qichao’s A History of Chinese Culture.

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gradually became useless. Within a few decades, the use of military force both internally and externally was once more the preserve of the Han people. Up to the time when the struggle for power commenced between Hong Xiuquan and Yang Xiuqing within the Taiping regime of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (1851-1864), this “power group by military force” had long since become good for nothing. This even included the standing army, the Green Banner Army – ultimately, those who rose up to stabilize the dynasty were the brave local troops of Han people defending their native land, such as the Hunan Army and the military force trained and commanded by Li Hung-Chang. It might well be asked at this point, how can we even tell which was the ruling class and which was the ruled class! A look at the Revolution of 1911 will reveal how odd it is that the Qing Dynasty – which was such a mighty empire and which maintained its rule for such a long time, undefeated against foreign aggressors – was to be so easily overturned within such a short time, a mere three or four months! Yet this is hardly surprising. We naturally cannot figure out the whys if we only look at the final battle between the ruling class and the ruled class, fighting for their respective destinies. The reasons are not so straightforward. We should note, however, that class-based rule did not exist at the time, and there were no two definitively contrarian positions across the country; that with everything in society left adrift and undisciplined, the idea of saving the nation from the people’s perspective took precedence over everything else; and that at the time, the major revolutionary force depended upon intellectuals who were well acquainted with the upper stratum of the ruling class, with the commanders of all border provinces representing the rule of the Qing government, and with the military force on which they relied as the tool of the ruling class. Bearing all these things in mind, it becomes clearer why it was straightforward for them to opt for revolution. Due to the Wuchang Uprising of 1911, which was heralded by all provinces, within only a month, the die was cast for the Qing Dynasty. It was no wonder that within three or four months, everything was entirely resolved. The rule by outsiders was a superb opportunity for creating a nation, but if a nation could not be made even under foreign rule, it can be sufficiently asserted that China was a society rather than a nation. The point that class rule did not emerge in China validates the argument that there was no reason for revolution here. If, however, a revolution is said to be “the replacement of an old social structure by a new social structure and the replacement of an old social order by a new social order”, the Revolution of 1911 should indeed be acknowledged as a revolution. It was also the only revolution after the collapse of feudalism in China. Before that, the social structure

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never went through any changes, but since then, it would not do if the social structure never saw any further changes. In his famous book The Great French Revolution, 1783-1793, Peter Kropotkin said, “A revolution is a swift overthrow, in a few years, of institutions which have taken centuries to root in the soil … It is the fall, the crumbling away in a brief period, of all that up to that time composed the essence of social, religious, political and economic life in a nation”.7 Indeed, the situation has remained the same ever since the Revolution of 1911. We currently witness such changes in expectation of the emergence of a new social order, as well as a new social structure. It can then be pointed out that over the past two thousand years, the lack of revolutions in China can indeed be attributed to the reliance of both the social order and the social structure on morality, etiquettes and customs, instead of on legal systems. That is why Charles-Louis de Montesquieu said in his celebrated book The Spirit of the Laws, Laws are established, manners are inspired; these proceed from a general spirit, those from a particular institution: now, it is as dangerous, nay, more so, to subvert the general spirit as to change a particular institution.8

Legal systems are the tools of the State (or to the Church, e.g., the ecclesiastical authorities in medieval times) while morality, etiquette and customs are the preserve of both individuals and society. Legal systems are permanently binding while morality, etiquette and customs are based on mutual comparison as well as self-examination, and mutual trust as well as one’s own self-confidence. The former seems to be an imposition while the latter results from the gradual evolution of the society itself. What is imposed upon people can be easily overturned, but how can one’s own evolution be overturned? Overthrow never occurs without a cause and no revolution does not evolve from contradictions. Here in China, however, there is an obvious lack of inner contradictions. What society does not have etiquettes and customs? However, a society like China cannot depend so heavily on its social structure and social order that its legal systems become merely subordinate. When a society subordinates its etiquettes and customs to its legal systems, its contradictions are sustained precisely because of its etiquettes and customs. Conversely, in a country like China, etiquettes and customs simply incur no contradictions. 7 See N. F. Dryhurst (trans.) The Great French Revolution, 1783-1793, 1927. 8 Translator’s Note: Reference has been made to Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Chap. XII, Book XIX, 1989 (p. 329).

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How can this be so? Here in China, on the one hand, as its classes have collapsed, its contradictions have become decentralized and lost their potency; on the other hand, as ethics highlights mutual respect between people, no antagonism between one another is aroused. Contradictions, then, being negated by etiquettes and customs, simply cannot come into existence. Because of this, reconciliations and compromises can be easily effected so that there is certainly no impetus for revolutions. What is more important still is that, although contradictions cannot always be resolved accordingly, they often enable people to cherish the hope of being committed to resolving them (scholars require and encourage both the monarch and the people to resolve their differences and the common people encourage each other or even encourage themselves to resolve them). If contradictions can be resolved to a certain degree, those etiquettes and customs will doubtless be approved more widely. If they cannot be resolved, the blame will be put on people themselves. Who can deny the validity of etiquette and customs on this account? That is why, for several thousand years, the Chinese people have remained so consistent in their understanding of and belief in those etiquettes and customs, without reservation. When social structure remains unchanged, clearly no revolution can occur. Legal institutions may occasionally change, but that is of less importance. Since legal institutions never go beyond the confines of traditional etiquettes and customs, how can there be any real changes? Historically speaking, all political and system reforms have been initiated by people from the upper echelons of society, which shows that those changes are not at all radical. On the other hand, no major social upheaval has ever witnessed a bitter campaign that represents an anti-system. This again shows that these changes are superficial rather than fundamental. Certainly, it is true that the Revolution of 1911, for example, was in a way rather different from both the changes that had taken place in the past and the system reforms of the past, but at most, it can be counted only as the beginning of the great change in Chinese etiquette and customs. After this, it was not until the “May Fourth” New Culture Movement that a head-on attack was launched on the feudal ethic code and the roots of this problem were scrutinized. Thus a genuine revolution took place in China. In this regard, the words of Charles-Louis de Montesquieu hold true: What are the manners and customs of a state? They are conventions which ought never to be overturned. If you overturn these, you overturn all.9 9 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Chap. XII, Book XIX, p. 329.

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This is indeed accurate! Such being the case, what then has been left to China? Changes that are unlike this cannot be counted as real change. However, how can such changes occur within Chinese culture? Were it not for the global traffic that has again and again triggered other changes from without, nothing would ever have changed. While changes that do not meet these criteria can be hardly considered as changes at all, those that do meet these criteria can by no means take place within Chinese society itself. This means that these changes are superficial rather than fundamental as stated above.10

11.3

Absence of an Industrial Revolution in China

It seems that much has been said so far about why China lacks revolutions. But in fact, nothing has yet been said about more fundamental concerns. These include China’s economic stagnation and the absence of an industrial revolution. These are the biggest issues of all, which result both in and from the lack of revolutions in China. The upshot of this is that on the one hand, due to its economic stagnation, its culture and politics (etiquette and customs, and legal institutions) remain consistent, and on the other hand, as its culture and politics remain the same, the economy does not progress. It is these very two impediments that oblige China to languish in a desperate situation. We must therefore make efforts to fully understand 10 China’s lack of revolutions or the long-standing inflexibility of its society can in fact be attributed to the assimilation of its legal institutions into its etiquette and customs. This was in part observed by XIA Zengyou, forty years ago. In his preface to YAN Fu’s translation of A History of Politics (1910) by the British writer Edward Jenks (1861-1939), XIA lamented that ever since the Sino-Japanese War, which lasted from 1894 to 1895, those who proposed political reforms aimed to save the nation from extinction and those who prevented political reforms blamed the lack of a monarchy. In fact, national salvation differs from the lack of a monarch, but those who proposed political reforms were confused on this point: this seemed to be incomprehensible. Afterwards, they framed a general rule that “when religion and politics are loosely connected, the society can be easily transformed, but when religion and politics are closely connected, the society cannot be easily transformed.” It was also said that in China, ever since the Qin Dynasty, politics and religion are inseparable from each other. Thus those who proposed the reform of politics naturally cannot avoid involving the reform of religion. Yet it was merely coincidence that national salvation and the lack of a monarchy represented corresponding views. They were originally very much entangled and thus indistinguishable. A situation never arose in which the old religion was not divided but the new policy could be transformed from within. The fact that for several thousand years, China did not diverge from patriarchal society can be attributed to the practice of religion. Here, it should of course be mentioned that what Xia means by religion is what I mean by etiquette and customs.

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this crucial point before uncertainties about the problem more generally can be resolved. Moreover, what has been discussed earlier must also be supplemented by this point in order to make this clearer. As to the reasons why China has had no industrial revolution, widespread views abound. In my previous book, I reviewed each of them (see The Final Consciousness of the Chinese National Liberation Movement).11 Rather than dwelling on this here, I would like to state the following directly: Industrial revolution refers to a certain stage which witnesses a marked development of a productive force. It is mainly characterized by the invention of machines, especially steam engines. Historical materialists measure social development in the light of the development of a society’s productive powers, which is of course justifiable. However, though this unconscious assumption of the development of the productive force seems to be taken for granted, how can the productive force be separated from human beings and develop by itself? Human beings are not necessarily the same. This can be clearly seen from what has been demonstrated by both the medieval and the modern culture of the West. Production is human beings’ control over or utilization of nature. This control or utilization benefits from their own observation of and experimentation with nature. The development of productive power naturally results from direct and indirect effects of human consciousness upon certain productive activities. How can the same result be yielded from a comparison between a negative attitude and a positive attitude toward life, and between those who indulge in superstition and fantasy and those who are committed to the trial of nature? Suppose there were no critical turn in modern human life in the West that helped facilitate the integration of human consciousness and production – who could then imagine the nineteenth-century industrial revolution or even the material culture of the modern world? Some say that the technological innovations that arrive every year in modern times outnumber all the inventions produced in the thousand years before 1750. This reflects exactly why ancient and modern people’s attitudes toward life differ so much (see Chapter Eight). Since it is undeniable that a people’s attitude toward life exerts an influence upon the development of its productive force, let’s examine the Chinese people’s attitudes toward life. A comparison between the respective attitudes of the Chinese and Westerners to life in modern times and that in medieval times reveals a crucial turn. Compared with Westerners’ attitude toward life, 11 See LIANG Shuming The Final Consciousness of the Chinese National Liberation Movement, 1933 (pp. 92-97). As the book was published in 1930, naturally, only the views that were then prevalent are under review in it and those that were advanced later are not touched upon.

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the Chinese people’s outlook seems to have been unchanging and typically Chinese since antiquity. According to my earlier classification, Westerners’ attitude in modern times embodied the first path in life; their religiosity in the medieval period epitomized the third orientation; and the Chinese have consistently taken the second path.12 Roughly speaking, the Chinese take a positive attitude toward life and never feel they should suppress sensual passions in life. This is different from the third path but close to the first. But on the other hand, they reject the way of life based on desire and seeking external material pleasures and tend to pursue inwardness. This is different from the first attitude but close to the third attitude. The third attitude, however, is the path to religion while this second attitude is the path to morality. With regard to nature, it seems they only know how to appreciate it by holding themselves aloof from the world and are reluctant to attempt the experiment of or control over it. People say that “people’s consciousness is closely connected with their production”, but exactly the opposite is the case here in China, where people’s thoughts and intelligence are decidedly not applied to their productivity. Their accumulation of knowledge and learning over thousands of years is wholly directed toward human affairs without any study of nature. Developing an economy and reaping profits are rather neglected by intellectuals in China. To my mind, this at least can partly explain why China’s economy stagnates and it has seen no industrial revolution. Moreover, besides the Chinese people neglecting to apply their mental effort and intelligence to seeking economic progress and development in productivity (as discussed above), they sometimes even try to deter these efforts. For example, historically there was “a prohibition laid on clever tricks and wicked craft in artistic production”, and it was common in past dynasties to look down on businessmen by endlessly enforcing laws and prescribing etiquettes and customs designed to control or to humiliate businessmen. Let’s take another instance. The frequent ban on maritime trade with foreign countries and the closed-door policy of past dynasties obstructed trade, which evidently impeded the development of industry and commerce. Apart from the obvious effects, there was much that was not directly indiscernible; as I argued in the last chapter, an ethical society is not amenable to either the birth or the growth of capitalism. History is full of instances of policies for the restriction of land use and campaigns to divide land equally, which fall under the same category. During the periods from 12 See LIANG Shuming Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, 1921 and also LIANG Shuming The Final Consciousness of the Chinese National Liberation Movement, 1933.

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the Western Jin Dynasty (265-316), to the Northern Wei Dynasty (368-534) and even to the Sui and the Tang dynasties, every time strict enforcement was further strengthened, “no selling or transaction was allowed”. If this is the case for hundreds of years, how is it possible for an economy to develop naturally? On the other hand, some may ask: Wasn’t it the same in the West in medieval times, and before that? In ancient times, their religions did not allow people to reap benefits. In the medieval period, generally speaking, politics and customs, and even their own industrial and commercial systems, all restricted the free development of the economy. It was only in the last two hundred years that the situation changed. Our answer is: Herein lies the problem! In the West, this was the case in the past, which means the impediment was ultimately ineffective. China, however, up until very recently, when it adopted the common practice in the West, witnessed no change in its approach. Wouldn’t that eventually become an impediment? This is consistent with what has been said above: the practice in the West originates from the third attitude toward life, established in the medieval period, and that in China evolves from its adoption of the second attitude toward life. Eventually, Westerners pivoted from the third path to the first path, which means that whatever was previously adverse to the development of their productive force was converted into something advantageous. The Chinese people, however, invariably maintain the second attitude, which means that whatever is adverse to the development of their productive force (from passive mindlessness to active impediment) remains there until the end. – This is the critical difference between China and the West. Therefore, it might be asked: How can these activities that hinder the development of the productive force undergo such a change in the West but not in China? And where do these activities originate in the first place? On this subject, I would like to firstly cite the view of my friend, the late Wan Minyi.13 Like me, he believes that historical materialism is somewhat insufficient to interpret all historical developments. He, however, does not argue from the angle of people’s attitudes toward life. In his view, human beings, in order to survive, have to cope with nature so as to maintain production. Consequently, the productive force develops and so does society, which, of course, is well supported by the evidence we see. But this is actually no more than what is called “sustenance” – one of the problems of survival. Human beings are obliged to exist as collective bodies. But any one collective body necessarily makes constant efforts to guard itself 13 See WAN Minyi’s “On Particularity of the Evolution of Chinese Society”, in A New Understanding of Livelihood Philosophy, 1940.

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against other collective bodies. Otherwise, their chances of survival are slight. This is “defense” – another problem of survival. At the same time, regular adjustments have to be made inside each collective body in order to maintain its stability. If there is no stability, the chances of survival are likewise slight. This “stability” constitutes yet another problem related to survival. Altogether, there are three problems of continued survival, and very often, more than one will arise at a given time. Human beings, naturally, never pursue activities related to one aspect only. When other problems occupy people’s minds, they are likely to delay or even impede the progress of the productive force. That is why different nations in the East and West cannot be confined to a unidirectional development. Historical materialism only grasps the sustenance issue, which does not adequately explain everything. In Wan’s view, Chinese culture is characterized by its focus on solving the problem of stability and its massive efforts to solve both the “defense” and “sustenance” problems as part of the “stability” problem. Its stance on “not being concerned about poverty but, rather, concerned about whether the wealth of a state is fairly distributed” obviously shows that what was originally a problem related to sustenance has been translated into a stability issue. Chinese culture’s ethical emphasis on mutual compassion and mutual responsibility, and its conversion of classes into professions so that the economy is not homogenized or monopolized, aim to locate the sustenance issue within the stability issue. This suggests the conviction that only through stability can the sustenance issue be addressed and that the solution to the sustenance issue does not lie in launching an attack on nature. For one more example, the doctrine of “one family from all over the world” and making efforts to win over and govern those from afar through conciliation indicates that, rather than making efforts to resolve the defense issue through external struggle, the Chinese treat it almost the same as they do the issue of internal stability. In this way, the Chinese devote their efforts specifically to the stability issue without any notion of handling all three problems separately, with the ultimate result that they largely fail to solve the issues of both sustenance and defense. When the population increases, people will feel that there is a shortage of land for sustenance. When natural disasters such as floods, droughts and epidemic outbreaks of disease occur, they cannot cope with them. They obviously suffer from feelings of powerlessness whenever they are oppressed or even conquered or ruled by foreign forces. Especially in the last century, compared with Westerners, who are characterized culturally by their willingness to confront nature and their group struggle against foreign forces, the Chinese apparently suffer bitterly in defeat. However, their defeat originates from their failures, which

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in turn stem from their delayed responses as regards endeavors to ensure sustenance and defense (especially their deadliest failures, stemming from their delayed industrial revolution). In their endeavors for stability, however, they never experience any failures. On the contrary, they have enjoyed great success in this aspect, securing both the expansion and the extension of their national way of life. Looking at the topography of China’s mountains and rivers and at their ethnic groups and languages, it would never do if their nation were divided into several different nations or states. As the Chinese nation is able to eliminate barriers and estrangements via both pacification and communication of affection and to substantially achieve the effect of assimilation and integration, it has ultimately developed into one of the greatest nations in the world. A comparison with the West will show us that a country in the West is probably smaller than a province or a county in China, and that its population is smaller than a Zhang Clan or a Li Clan in China. With so many states and clans of numerous sizes and so much complexity and endless struggles, how can national fusion or unification be expected, and how can the gains outweigh the losses and the successes outweigh the failures among all these groups? Only concerted efforts can yield certain effects – in sustenance and defense as well as in stability – in which case, the more effort people make, the broader their road is, and the more tenacious they become. But the farther they have gone, the more they have strayed off the route, and what has been left behind cannot be replaced. This is the very reason why China’s economy does not progress and its productive force does not develop. What Wan has said, which is both reasonable and interesting, cannot be dismissed out of hand. Influenced by historical materialism, he has also noticed the human pursuit of survival. But to a greater extent, he has found out that making a life involves something more important. If human relations are not well supported, “although the abundant grain was there, could I get enough to eat?” What constitutes a threat in the world at present: Is it food itself or is it how the food is to be acquired? Does the problem arise from the relationship between man and nature or between man and man? Noticing only the similarity between human beings and organisms in general, which is represented by their shared pursuit of survival in the natural world, is obviously too simplistic. Next, the classification of human relations into internal and external aspects is, generally speaking, not bad. But unfortunately, the “three problems” that he brings up, after all, concern only the problems of survival, and still treat human beings in too simplistic a fashion. Human beings have actually gone far beyond other organisms and are capable of infinite development. Thus, they may

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encounter infinite problems. For this reason, human activities and historical development cannot be limited to one or several problems. What Wan does not appreciate is that the more human history develops or the more advanced human culture becomes, the more distanced it becomes from human biological attributes. In human cultural history, the three problems Wan has identified have differed in importance as time goes on, and they do not exist as unalterable factors. In today’s world, the defense issue has already been gradually fused into the stability issue and once all human beings aspire to control nature, sustenance will no longer be a problem. All efforts to understand human historical motivation – their motivation throughout history – and to establish in historical and cultural studies a universally applicable theory would naturally be wishful thinking, save for historical materialism and Wan’s model. However, Wan’s conviction that the Chinese culture is characterized by its focus on resolving the stability issue as an internal matter is deep-rooted. For several thousand years, the Chinese people’s heart-and-mind and intellect have been indeed concentrated on human relations rather than on physical objects. “Stability” is just the right word to comprehensively cover the traditional Chinese practices that are ethically ordered as “cultivating oneself (修身, xiu), securing family unity (齊家, qi), preserving national order (治國, zhi), and maintaining peace for all (平天下, ping)”.14 It is only in relation to stability that it seems something has gone awry at an early stage, which has affected the situation overall, i.e., the whole culture. Though Wan’s view cannot adequately unravel the mystery of China’s economic stagnation and social stability, here I find it useful to elaborate on what he has said. 14 According to The Great Learning by Confucius, “The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things. Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy. From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of everything besides.” In Chinese culture, cultivating oneself is of vital importance; it is the precondition for regulating their families, and then for ordering their states, and lastly for maintaining peace for all. See James Legge (trans.) Confucius: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean. London: Trübner & Co., 1861.

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First, let’s look at this from the stability angle. In accordance with their natural tendency, people’s heart-and-mind and wisdom used to be employed for sustenance, i.e., for what Franz Oppenheimer termed economic means, by which people labored for production or the exchange of one’s own labor for other people’s labor. Even when they are directed toward what Oppenheimer termed political means – which is to say, taking other people’s production by force, without recompense – it is also only natural, as ordinary living beings tend to fight for health-preserving resources found in the outside world. Humans are also living beings and apart from their own “kin”, they originally could not differentiate between other “living beings” and other “living things”. Not only were piracy and commerce barely differentiated in ancient times in Europe, they were also equally legal even during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.15 This also implies that people were treated as external objects. Since antiquity, human beings have always acted reasonably only in their own circle; when they are outside their circle, they use force (this is a perennial truth). Who would care about stability if it were not for reason? Human beings’ awareness of the stability issue arises on the one hand from encountering resistance from another force and on the other hand from the feeling that it is no good and cannot be tolerated if humans are treated as if they were objects. This undesirability or intolerability surely occurs in their own circle – unlike the sustenance issue, which is a struggle against nature, or the defense issue, which is against outsiders – so in this case the accomplishment of an aim is mainly dependent upon one’s resources, with nothing else to take into account and nothing to fear. The bigger one’s own circle, the bigger the stability issue, which grows in proportion. The size of one’s own circle varies tremendously from person to person and theoretically it has no bounds. There are two points, however, that can be mentioned here: First, the more advanced human culture is, the greater this circle’s expansion. We may as well measure the height of a culture by the size of its population. Second, the enlargement of the circle. Usually, the cultural sphere rarely expands automatically and indiscriminately, but rather, it is more often expanded through the endeavors of the party who wishes to be included. This is very important. Generally speaking, humans’ heart-and-mind and intellect are primed to tackle the natural world daily with the result that not a day passes without 15 See TAO Menghe (trans.) F. Müller Lyer (auth.) An Evolutionary History of Society, 1924 (p. 285), in Vol. IV, All-Encompassing Library.

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attainment of knowledge and not a day passes without honing their tools. (See the passage in Chapter Nine illustrating that the difference between past and present lies in the tools at humanity’s disposal.) Objectively, since the relationship between heart-and-mind and intellect becomes more extensive and more intimate by the day, such a tendency must admit no struggle, but only moderation. Subjectively, humans also become more reasonable and more rational through cultivation. The integration of these two aspects results in the expansion of the cultural sphere and this gradual expansion ultimately results in universal harmony. If we look at today’s world, do we not observe that it is being shaped by circumstances into “one world or none,” so that people must certainly coexist peacefully, with rationality supplying the place of protection by armed forces, and that humanity’s future will contend only with the issue of stability, instead of defense? Again, as has been discussed in Chapter Eight, rationality needs to be derived from social classes; Franz Oppenheimer also advanced the theory that economic means gradually triumph over political means until at last, political means are completely displaced. All of these means can complement each other. Human history is no more than a history of how “one’s own folks” or “the consciousness of one’s own kind” is passively and gradually highlighted. Reason originates from these two forces – i.e., economic means and political means – and is generated by the unfolding of circumstances. It is not human rationality that generates history but history that generates human rationality. Though it may be unwise to adhere to the natural tendency like this, it is a path that is promising and accessible. Supported by facts, rationality can be ensured if each step is down-to-earth. It is often said that this applies in all cases, but as chance would have it, China does not follow the same route. Instead, Chinese culture advocates that “only being affectionate to one’s parents can one be lovingly disposed to people generally” and transfers to people far beyond one’s own circle the affections between family members, between father and son and between brothers. This constitutes an ethics-oriented society and automatically enlarges one’s circle. The issue of sustenance originally emerged before that of stability, which to the ancient Chinese was more worthy of attention. The stability issue originally arose after the defense issue, but regarding the ancient Chinese, their attitude toward outsiders also dictated their attitude toward insiders. As attested by Wan, they exerted too many efforts to resolve both the defense issue and the sustenance issue by treating them as part and parcel of the stability issue, which is nearly plausible. Indeed, as a deviation from the normal path, the ancient Chinese actually took a shortcut. Following the natural

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tendency would mean starting from the principle that man is to be treated the same as an ordinary organism, striving for health-preserving resources externally, and then turning slowly to the idea that man is different from an ordinary organism (i.e., what we have identified as rationality). But in China, however, this development all starts directly from man as man – from the principle that man is different from an ordinary organism. This means that in China, the starting point is almost the finishing point. Following such a route, one will surely come to a dead end. That the development of Chinese culture differs from that of other countries in general may be explained by precisely this. Questions might then be asked as to which aspects of human relations need to be prioritized, as to when “man is treated as man” and as to what efforts need to be made to achieve stability. “Treating man as man”, generally speaking, results from the balance of resolutions to these questions, but here in China, however, it is derived from rationality. This mindset therefore lacks objective facts to back it up. That the development of Chinese history differs from that of other countries in general comes down to exactly this. – This is what is meant by “coming to a dead end” which “might be easily repeated”, as will be shown in the following discussion. Next, let’s look at this from the angle of endeavoring to maintain stability: As we know, a group needs to have recourse to military force when trying to protect itself from outsiders, but even if it tries to secure its stability as a domestic issue, as a rule, it cannot dispense with military force here either. Governing a nation by military force has obviously been a political reality since the time of the ancient slave societies through the feudal era to the modern capitalist societies, and even to Soviet Union, which is regarded as a transition period to communism. The distinction between the ancient and the modern, and between what went before and what comes after, lies only in the degree of force used, which might be somewhere between light and heavy, between implicit and explicit, or between direct and indirect. This distinction diminished up to the capitalist era. But in the feudal era going back to time immemorial, the use of military force had to be heavy, obvious and direct. Meanwhile, to maintain a rigid distinction between social classes, military force was, needless to say, frequently used. Military force alone, however, was nowhere near enough to secure stability. On the other hand, religion became a more important means of control. Social classes emerged when originally, one group of people were assigned the productive labor while another body of people were committed to the use of military force externally and internally. Thus, the distinction between social classes lies in whether people are engaged in production or not. Religion, then, works chiefly to endow the social class order with belief values without giving

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people a reason for such values. In fact, as people were used to “acting without understanding and doing so habitually, without examination”, who would take any notice of what the reason was? Everything was taken for granted. In this way, society could then be stabilized through class contradictions. Generally speaking, these were just endeavors to stabilize society (i.e., integrating military force with religion in order to govern). Apart from this, what else should we pay attention to? As we know, doubtlessly it was only at a much later time that endeavors to sustain a living – both agricultural production and industrial production – received much attention and they then gradually developed into different branches of learning. It was absolutely impossible for stability to emerge earlier than this; indeed, it can rather be said to emerge much later. However, what is strange is that people in China, as far back as two or three thousand years ago, had already observed this and devoted attention to it. It was taken as the profession of scholars and the responsibility of the upper class. This can be clearly seen from the questions and answers Confucius and Mencius gave to other people: Fan Chi asked to be taught farming. The Master said, “I am not so good at that as an old farmer.” He asked to be taught gardening. The Master said, “I am not so good at that as an old gardener.” When Fan Chi left, the Master said, “A small man, indeed, is Fan Chi! If those above love propriety, the people will not dare to respect them; if those above love righteousness, the people will not dare to disobey; if those above love good faith, the people will not dare to hide the heart. Then, the people from all corners will come to him, bearing their children on their backs. What need will there be for farming?” (The Analects of Confucius, Book XIII)16 Zilu asked what constituted a superior man. The Master said, “A man who cultivates in himself the capacity to be diligent in his tasks.” “And is this all?” said Zilu. “He cultivates himself to give ease to others.” “And is that all?” “He cultivates himself to give ease to all the people,” said the Master, “To cultivate himself to give ease to all the people, even Yao and Shun, the two legendary emperors in China, still found it difficult.” (The Analects of Confucius, Book XIV)17 16 Translator’s Note: Reference is made to PAN Fu’en and Wen Shaoxia (trans.) Confucius (auth.) The Analects of Confucius, 1993 (p. 147). 17 Translator’s Note: Reference has been made to PAN Fu’en and Wen Shaoxia (trans.) Confucius (auth.) The Analects of Confucius, 1993 (pp. 177-179).

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Having an interview with Mencius, he [translator’s note: Chen Xiang] related to him [translator’s note: Xu Xing] with approbation the words of Xu Xing to the following effect: – “The prince of Teng is indeed a worthy prince. He has not yet heard, however, the real doctrines of antiquity. Now, wise and able princes should cultivate the ground, equally and along with their people, and eat the fruit of their labor. They should prepare their own meals, morning and evening, while at the same time they carry on their government. But now, the prince of Teng has his granaries, treasuries, and arsenals, which is an oppressing of the people to nourish himself. – How can he be deemed a real worthy prince?” Mencius said, “I suppose that Xu Xing sows grain and eats the produce. Is it not so?” “It is so,” was the answer. “I suppose also he weaves cloth, and wears his own manufacture. Is it not so?” “No. Xu wears clothes of haircloth.” “Does he wear a cap?” “He wears a cap.” “What kind of cap?” “A plain cap.” “Is it woven by himself?” “No. He gets it in exchange for grain.” “Why does Xu not weave it himself?” “That would injure his husbandry.” “Does Xu cook his food in boilers and earthen ware pans, and does he plough with an iron share?” “Yes.” “Does he make those articles himself?” “No. He gets them in exchange for grain.” Mencius then said, “The getting those various articles in exchange for grain, is not oppressive to the potter and the founder, and the potter and the founder in their turn, in exchanging their various articles for grain, are not oppressive to the husbandman. How should such a thing be supposed? And moreover, why does not Xu act the potter and founder, supplying himself with the articles which he uses solely from his own establishment? Why does he go confusedly dealing and exchanging with the handicraftsmen? Why does he not spare himself so much trouble?” Xu Xing replied, “The business of the handicraftsman can by no means be carried on along with the business of husbandry.” Mencius resumed, “Then, is it the government of the empire which alone can be carried on along with the practice of husbandry? Great men have their proper business, and little men have their proper business. Moreover, in the case of any single individual, whatever articles he can require are ready to his hand, being produced by the various handicraftsmen. If he must first make them for his own use, this way of doing would keep the whole empire running about upon the roads. Hence, there is the saying, ‘Some labor with their minds, and some labor with their strength. Those who labor with their minds govern others; those who labor with their strength are governed by others. Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern others are supported by them.’ This is a principle universally recognized. In the time

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of Yao, when the world had not yet been perfectly reduced to order, the vast waters, flowing out of their channels, make a universal inundation. Vegetation was luxuriant, and birds and beasts swarmed. The various kinds of grain could not be grown. The birds and beasts pressed upon men. The paths marked by the feet of beasts and prints of birds crossed one another throughout the Middle Kingdom. To Yao alone this caused anxious sorrow. He raised Shun to office, and measures to regulate the disorder were set forth. Shun committed to Yi the direction of the fire to be employed, and Yi set fire to, and consumed, the forests and vegetation on the mountains and in the marshes, so that the birds and beasts fled away to hide themselves. Yu separated the nine streams, cleared the courses of the Ji and Ta, and led them all to the sea. He opened a vent also for the Ru and Han, and regulated the course of the Huai and Si that they all flowed into the Changjiang River. When this was done, it became possible for the people of the Middle Kingdom to cultivate the ground and get food for themselves. During that time, Yu was eight years away from his home, and though he thrice passed the door of it, he did not enter. Although he had wished to cultivate the ground, could he have done so? The Minister of agriculture taught the people to sow and reap, cultivating the five kinds of grain. When the five kinds of grain were brought to maturity, the people all enjoyed a comfortable subsistence. Now men possess a moral nature; but if they are well fed, warmly clad, and comfortably lodged, without being taught at the same time, they become almost like the beasts. This was subject of anxious solicitude to the sage Shun, and he appointed Xie to be the Minister of Instruction, to teach the relations of humanity: – how, between father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and minister, righteousness; between husband and wife, attention to their separate functions; between old and young, a proper order; and between friends, fidelity. The highly meritorious emperor said to him, “Encourage them; lead t hem on; rectify them; straighten them; help them; give them wings; – thus causing them to become possessors of themselves. Then follow this up by stimulating them, and conferring benefits on them.’ When the sages were exercising their solicitude for the people in this way, had they leisure to cultivate the ground? (The Works of Mencius, Book V, Teng Wen Gong Part I)18

18 Translator’s Note: Reference has been made to James Legge (trans.) The Works of Mencius, 2011 (pp. 96-99).

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Peng Geng asked Mencius, saying, “… But for a scholar, performing no service to receive his support notwithstanding, is improper.” Mencius answered, “If you do not have an intercommunication of the production of labor, and an interchange of men’s services, so that one from his overplus may supply the deficiency of another, then husbandmen will have a superfluity of grain, and women will have a superfluity of cloth. If you have such an interchange, carpenters and carriage-wrights may all get their food from you. Here now is a man, who, at home, is filial, and abroad, respectful to his elders, who watches over the principles of the ancient kings, awaiting the rise of future learners: – and yet you will refuse to support him. How is it that you give honor to the carpenter and carriage-wright, and slight him who practices benevolence and righteousness?” (The Works of Mencius, Book V, Teng Wen Gong Part II)19 Gongsun Chou said, “It is said, in the Book of Poetry, ‘He will not eat the bread of idleness.’ How is it that we see superior men eating without laboring?” Mencius replied, “When a superior man resides in a country, if its sovereign employ his counsels, he comes to tranquility, wealth, honor, and glory. If the young in it follow his instructions, they become filial, obedient to their elders, true-hearted, and faithful. What greater example can there be than this of not eating the bread of idleness?” (The Works of Mencius, Book XIII, Jin Xin Part I)20

That such statements or views (along with many others not quoted here) prevailed more than two thousand years ago is problematic. My statement that the Chinese people attained rationality early may serve as the best evidence. Let’s look at the following points: (1) In the ancient slave societies or in the medieval feudal system, generally speaking, no one would deem productive labor as anything other than something low or something to be ashamed of, so as to avoid it.21 However, from Fan Chi’s request to be taught farming and gardening and Confucius’ answers here, their attitudes can be seen very clearly! There are many such 19 Translator’s Note: Reference has been made to James Legge (trans.) The Works of Mencius, 2011 (pp. 111). 20 Translator’s Note: Reference has been made to James Legge (trans.) The Works of Mencius, 2011 (pp. 261-262). 21 For more detail, see HU Yimo (trans.) T. Veblen (auth.) The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions, 1936.

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cases of learned scholars being willing to labor at that time (see Chapters Eight and Nine), which shows that those scholars could not tolerate those shallow views and bad habits. (2) The upper class lived an idle life, which was taken for granted everywhere. Who can reflect on this and have doubts? From these questions and answers, it can be seen that such an issue repeatedly provoked intensive debates and a group of people led by Xu Heng resolutely advocated the gesture of tilling land with farmers as an act against the idle life. How clear-sighted and persuasive these reasonable requirements are! (3) Though Confucius and Mencius were not esteemed by scholars for not tilling the land, they never said that all men are innately distinguished as superior and inferior, which would have acknowledged the existence of different classes. Instead, by following the principle of the social division of labor, they simply showed that the distinction between those who use their brains and those who use their labor is only a result of the fact that, as there is no way to fulfill both requirements at the same time, cooperation between “stability” and “sustenance” has to be fostered with a due division of labor. We may well ask in which feudal society such remarks could ever be found. (4) What is most unique is naturally that the art of addressing the issue of “stability” lies simply in the statement, “We cultivate ourselves to give ease to others”. What does this statement imply? Does it imply military force? Does it imply religion? Clearly, it is entirely off the feudal track. What the disciples of Confucius pursued can serve as a vivid representation. Later on, it developed into the practice that can be summed up as “cultivating oneself, securing family unity, maintaining national order and establishing peace for all”, and thus a style of learning that was sound in both theory and practice came into being. Over the next two thousand years, the dutiful functions of Chinese scholars in society and the situation “in which peaceful coexistence in rationality seems to have replaced rule by military force” thus emerged. If this is traced back to ancient times, Confucius would be found to be the initiator. Perhaps the internal circumstances in ancient China generated such enlightenment, and the awakening of rationality in turn reinforced the ability to moderate the social situation. Such interaction, a cause and effect that moves in cycles and produces continuous development, makes the general mood of society in this land different from that in other lands. But no single personage is credited with this distinction and no efforts need to be made to figure out how it began. This may be cross-referenced with the discussion of China’s dissolution of the feudal classes in Chapter Nine.

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(5) The idea of “cultivating oneself to give ease to others” means that the art of making the lives of others easier lies in cultivating oneself. The following two sentences mean the same thing: When a ruler’s personal conduct is correct, he will be obeyed without having to issue orders. If people were not greedy, then even if thieves were rewarded, no one would steal.

All in all, be not in search of ways of acting upon the outside world, but instead, make efforts to turn one’s heart-and-mind and wisdom inward instead. The aforementioned philosophy of “cultivating oneself, securing family unity, maintaining national order and establishing peace for all” demonstrates that cultivating oneself is the root of everything, and this cultivation is realized through investigating the world around oneself, extending to the utmost one’s knowledge, seeking to be sincere in one’s thoughts and purifying one’s heart. What Confucius and Mencius stressed here is, of course, the realization of human nature in practice. If you think that ancient Chinese people only addressed the issue of “stability” and that Mencius only emphasized the art of maintaining “stability”, that would be too narrow an interpretation and in particular it does not get to the root of the issue. In effect, ancient Chinese people, being keenly aware of the preciousness of human life, greatly cherished “stability”. Further, as they were deeply invested in the realization of human nature in practice, they considered that the art of cultivating oneself should take priority over everything else. In fact, we can never isolate ourselves from others and have only ourselves in mind. Cultivating ourselves and giving ease to others form a continuum with one another. It is a type of wisdom that is as simple as simple can be, but at the same time as profound as profound can be. Modern academic research, though it is said to be flourishing vigorously, has not yet investigated this. The Chinese people, unless they are considered to have lived in vain for several thousand years, can be credited with precisely this contribution. On this basis alone, I conclude that rationality was awakened early in China, and that this was a precocious culture. However, it is just here that we discover the problem. Often, people’s heart-and-mind and wisdom are directed beyond the issue of “stability” and cannot be brought back. Upon analysis, there are two critical points: One is the premature professionalization of classes, which is very reasonable. – A state may be abolished in the end, but some elements

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of its politics might remain intact. In this instance, government affairs will convert from class affairs to professional affairs. Thus, the collapse of China’s feudal system – that is, dealing with government affairs by turning class affairs into professional affairs – is a tendency toward progress, which is very close to the essence of Reason. Precisely because excessively rapid advancement cannot be facilitated, there can only be a tendency instead of a completion of the process. Precisely because it is very close to the ultimate Reason, it is not easily subject to change. It is said to be close to Reason, but it may be more than that. Those who use their brains are committed to an understanding of human affairs and those who exert their labor are responsible for production. Thus “stability” and “sustenance” work in tandem with a due division of labor. Isn’t this very sensible? People like Xu Xing wanted to till the land with farmers. Though it was a rational request, it was an attempt to turn back the clock in history. Just like class exploitation in general, though it was in conformity with the tendency toward progress, it violated the rationality of enlightenment. We might wonder – apart from the rapid progress of science and technology, and the enslavement of mechanical engineering by human beings without having to rely on their own physical power, who can imagine a sounder ideal than the integration of mental labor and physical labor? As a result, in China at that time (where rationality witnessed a gradual awakening and production technology remained backward), it was the only reasonable ideal, and nothing could take its place. Precisely because it was reasonable, it was pursued by the whole of society. Precisely because nothing could replace it, it remained unchanged. For over two thousand years, it was under exactly this permanent, invariable division that the matter of production (the issue of “sustenance”) was placed outside the remit of those who used their brains. This group of people, however, were indeed those who were endowed with intelligence and wisdom, who had time to utilize this intelligence and wisdom and moreover had tools and equipment (e.g., textbooks and the like) to help maximize their intelligence and wisdom. Production being outside their remit was tantamount to it being ignored by this great and excellent nation. This is because, as the main task for those who work is indeed just to labor, they seldom use their minds, and due to their mediocre intellect, limited free time and inadequate tools and equipment, though they deal with tasks every day, they can come to no avail. They f ind it especially diff icult to put their minds to something beyond what they currently need to do, which puts an end to an intensive investigation of Reason and thus to a scientific path. Though they may occasionally learn

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something in the course of their work, they can by no means open up an inviting intellectual prospect. The other point is the premature introversion of the heart-and-mind and wisdom, which is vitally important. When we say that those who use their brains are committed to an understanding of human affairs, it does not mean that they are committed to research into social science, but that they are committed to the practice of “cultivating themselves to give ease to others”, as discussed above. What people see, hear and think is naturally outward-focused. Shifting from comprehending external things to comprehending one’s own life is only occasionally possible to an individual, but if it is to be developed into the general mood of a society, it is possible only when the development of culture reaches a certain stage (see Chapter Twelve). It can thus be seen that China indeed took this step too early. At this point, as no concerted efforts were made to comprehend external things, and as there were at first only natural science and social science (especially biology, physiology and psychology, etc.) as a basis for investigation, suddenly, efforts that were directed toward a comprehension of one’s own life could easily cause confusion and frequent muddles (I refer here to neo-Confucianism). What’s more, this comprehension initially knew no bounds. Later on, however, the development of the heart-and-mind and wisdom seemed to have fallen into a bottomless abyss, a journey of no return. At this moment, not only was it difficult to turn outward, though great efforts were made to do so, but it was also impossible to take the path of science (to be elaborated in the following), like Western countries had in modern times. It must be clearly seen that China’s social order relies heavily on individual morality and its social structure has become the one in which “From the Son of Heaven down to the populace, all must consider the cultivation of the person as the root of everything else.” It is necessary to be unfailingly attentive to the internal world. Such necessity is ever present and people have constantly directed the heart-and-mind to inner contemplation. Even though analyses and investigations of external phenomena have been made, they are only skin-deep. Looking to the outside world from our perspective, whatever meets the eye are mundane things. These things are innumerable, to be sure, but our own life is the inestimable treasure. In India they were adept at making inward excavations while modern-day Westerners are the most skillful at making outward explorations. The Chinese people, however, opened the door to internality on the one hand, but blocked the road to externality on the other hand. Derived from this in particular is the habit of turning one’s immediate concern toward oneself. Its positive accomplishments

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are not to be recounted here. Its most negative consequences are: as the investigation of other things has long been skin-deep, that which can be commanded and utilized is superficial. The restrictions on the progress of production technology as a result of this attitude, though its effect can be said to be indirect, fundamentally prevent production from making further progress. Other additional consequences, for example, are that the tendency toward pursuing material gains in one’s lifetime and the tendency toward competition and fighting with others are drastically reduced. So concerning oneself, one can easily become contented and self-fulfilled, and concerning others, one will follow the principle of fairness and forgiveness. As another example, the dispute between reason and desire, and the distinction between righteousness and profit, are weighty philosophical issues and they are especially influenced by social life. For still another example, as the innate laws of nature are unclear (due to the lack of a scientific outlook) and one’s lot in life is not predetermined (due to the stress on professional, not class distinction), many religious superstitions are unwittingly very powerful and influential in the lives of the Chinese people. Consequently, they surely become negative politically by letting things take their own courses. Such practices, passively or actively, directly or indirectly, deter socioeconomic progress, which needs no further explanation. Broadly speaking, “professionalizing classes”, “cultivating oneself to give ease to others” and “turning one’s heart-and-mind inward” are not totally factual, but rather ideals. In fact, very often, professions unavoidably revert to classes and one cannot cultivate oneself nor give ease to others. Even the heart-and-mind does not turn inward at all. In this situation, it seems impossible to analyze what the wider consequences will be. However, this is not the case. It must be acknowledged that the promotion of ideals is exactly China’s approach to running a country. From its early enlightenment into rationality up to its common practice of etiquette and customs, since the beginning, instead of following the natural tendency, China followed a fork in the road in the development of its productive force. And since then, it consistently followed this alternative path, which explains why the development of its productive force has been obstructed. The way to run a country, which is in the constant pursuit of all people, is expected to bring peace and prosperity. It then constantly causes an obstruction to the development of its productive force. When the reality does not live up to expectations, it seems that relaxing the approach to running the country can resolve this obstruction. Yet there is no knowing whether at this point people will abandon their ideological restraint, and society will regress into feudalism. Thus, before efforts are made to claim credit for the promotion

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of production, society has already descended into chaos and the production has been sabotaged. Neither a natural development nor an about-face is an option here, so neither advancement nor retreat is possible. Consequently, the development of the productive force is stymied, which tallies with Chinese history. Meanwhile, its history is a cycle of governance and chaos in which revolutions are absent. To sum up, on the one hand, China’s early awakening of rationality and cultural precocity, in addition to its unique social structure, have resulted in the absence of an industrial revolution; on the other hand, the absence of an industrial revolution dictates that its social structure undergoes no changes. The more unchanged its social structure is, the more hamstrung the occurrence of an industrial revolution is and consequently, its society remains as unchanged as ever. Such is the interconnectedness and mutual entanglement between them and there can never be any turning movement. This explains why the Chinese economy stagnates and Chinese society remains persistently unchanged.



Chapter Twelve Human Cultural Precocity

12.1

Lack of Democracy in China

As mentioned in Chapter One, the ninth feature of Chinese culture is that it includes no provision for democracy, nor any established legal system. Much has been said in the preceding chapter about the whys and wherefores of the endurance of China’s social structure. I imagine my readers will have also acquainted themselves with this. In the following, however, we will explore the explanations for this further. First, what is democracy? As a spirit, it is not hard to observe democracy in human social life. It derives from a single essential attitude, which can be summed up in the following five points. (1) I acknowledge myself and I also acknowledge other people. I have my own emotional requirements, my own ideas and my own opinions, and so on. Other people also have their emotional requirements, their own ideas and their own opinions. All of these must be taken into account, and can never be obliterated, rejected or eradicated. This is the first essential point. The practice of “thinking only of oneself, never others” is anti-democratic. (2) Through the acknowledgement of other people, you will develop the spirit of “advancing mutual equality”. Within a group, “everyone is equal”. Thinking that “I should be revered and respected exclusively” is anti-democratic. (3) Mutual equality leads to the development of a spirit of “reasoned discussion”. When people have disagreements with each other, these disagreements should be resolved rationally. When an agreement has been reached about something, you give your consent and I give mine. That will suffice. Nothing should be done the hard way and no force should be applied to compel one’s own ends to be met. Those who are not reasonable or who do not convince others by reasoning are anti-democratic. (4) From equality and reasonable discussion naturally comes the accepted notion of “letting the majority take precedence over the minority”. Whenever something is the concern of the general public, an assembly discusses it and the decision ultimately rests with the majority. To summarize the above four points, we can thus interpret “民主” (mínzhŭ in Chinese pinyin, meaning “democracy”) in Chinese. “民” refers to the majority of the people and “主” includes such connotations as letting the majority of the people take the

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principal part, letting the majority of the people make decisions and letting the majority of the people take the initiative. (5) Personal liberty is held in reverence. Basically, this comes from the first point. When something concerns everyone, undoubtedly everyone should take responsibility for the decision. If something is entirely personal or has nothing to do with others, we should let the person concerned take responsibility for their decision, with no interference from others. The fact that there is a distinction between them must also be fully realized. No one’s will should be obliterated by any means, though the will of the public cannot be obliterated either. These five points provide a rough sketch of the connotations of democracy. It must be declared, however, that: (1) Democracy is a spirit or a tendency. In contrast with a material substance, it is difficult for us to flatly deny that it exists. Even a tiny trace of such a spirit or tendency can certainly be counted as democracy. A greater spirit or a stronger tendency suggests a stronger democracy. On the contrary, a shortage of such a spirit or tendency would result in a weak democracy, but a dire shortage of it would be anti-democracy. Thus, democracy arises from the correlative growth and decline of the positive and the negative, and also from their mutual comparison and contrast. It is by no means something absolute. (2) The democratic spirit is immutably witnessed in a narrower circle of life. In other words, a person imparts his democratic spirit among “his own people”. But if this spirit cannot be fostered further beyond this, it will remain close to zero overall. On the other hand, it is easy to inspire an occasional show of democratic spirit but difficult to establish a lasting exhibition of it. Therefore, if it has not become a common practice or a prevailing custom on a larger scale, as a rule, such a show cannot be acknowledged as democracy. (3) The foregoing five points – i.e., acknowledging other people, advancing mutual equality, reasoned discussion, letting the majority take precedence over the minority and reverence for personal liberty – are the manifestation of a single fundamental spirit. As spirit is an integral whole, these five points can be easily connected. But as social life varies from time to time and from place to place, the way this spirit is exhibited may differ from time to time and from place to place, quite apart from the fact that these five features may not be in evidence at the same time. As we know, there are both strengths and weaknesses in the UK and the US on one side, and the Soviet Union on the other; this is a case in point. Even the manner in which the same feature is exhibited differs radically from country to country. Instead of

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being considered as an either-or situation, these features should, rather, be more sensitively observed from a holistic perspective. Only by making an effort to understand all of these aspects can we be prepared for a talk about China. Naturally, the Chinese people do indeed have their own democratic spirit in life. A repeated probe of those books I have written readily reveals the principle of forgiveness that is encapsulated in the saying, “Do not unto others what you would not want done unto you”, which is the manifestation of the first aspect of the spirit of democracy. A comparison between the (classless) Chinese society and medieval (classbased) society in Europe, and a comparison between the (classless) Chinese society with Indian society (in which classes proliferate and are strictly stratified) will reveal the second aspect of the democratic spirit. The third aspect, in particular, is most skillfully practiced by the Chinese people – that is to say that the Chinese people are the best at working things out through reasoned discussion. What is commonly called the lack of democracy in China refers to its lack of the fourth and fifth aspects of this democratic spirit. Respectively, these are that no custom or system has been established for calling an assembly to make a majority decision when anything crops up; and that there is no custom or system of drawing a clear line of demarcation between individual and public life and between the individual and others. The former can be said to be a lack of political democracy, especially in governance by the people, though less so in terms of governance of the people and governance for the people. The latter can be said to be a lack of modern legal democracy, especially to an individualist view of power. To sum it up in one sentence, it is not that China lacks democracy, but that it lacks democracy as defined by modern Western countries. How does China differ so acutely from the West? History shows that clearly there are two lines. First, politics and legal systems were already beginning to take shape in the city-states of coastal countries very early on, in ancient times. Second, Christian churches have undergone more than one thousand years’ advancement: in the Church, since everyone was equal, everyone was directly subordinate to the group and the gap between the patriarch and the family was bridged, until the end of the period when from the free cities of the late Middle Ages emerge modern countries. In the steady progress of modern countries, politics and legal systems have undergone further development. This is precisely the process that unfolds through a relative excess of group-centered life. But a society with a relative excess of family life which evolves into an ethical society, like China, naturally lacks politics and legal systems. As Liang Qichao has pointed out, “China has no lack of people from ethnic groups but suffers a lack of citizens living

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in cities” and “China has no lack of rural self-government but suffers a lack of municipal self-government” (see Chapter Four). At first glance, this seems difficult to understand, but subsequent analysis reveals that it is a penetrating insight. Fellow villagers in China come together on a family-clan basis. Rural self-government means family-clan self-government, relying on people rather than on other aspects of governance. These people originally did not belong to groups in the real sense. The hometown self-government1 1 In the Chapter on Rural Governance in A Cultural History of China, Liang Qichao describes the self-governance in his hometown as follows: My hometown, which is called Chakeng Village, is an island more than five kilometers away from where the Yamen is located. On the island there is a hill, at the foot of which nestle several villages of about five thousand residents. Residents from my Liang Family total about three thousand, living at the eastern foot of the hill and forming a self-contained Bao (保; bǎo. According to the Bao-Jia System (保甲制; bǎojiǎzhì) in use after the Song Dynasty in China, ten households constitute a Jia, and ten Jias constitute a Bao). The rest of the residents, with family names such as Yu, Yuan and Nieh, live on the other three sides of the hill and they are called the other two Baos. Because of this, my hometown, together with the other two Baos, also has a general name, which is “Three Baos”. Rural self-governance of each Bao is usually executed by the Bao itself. If issues concerning the common interests of all Three Baos are involved, they will be resolved by the Joint Governance Committee of the “Three Baos”. The Joint Governance Committee is called “the Three Bao Temple”. The self-governance committee of our Bao is the Liang Clan Hall: the Folding Rope Hall. The ultimate authority of the self-governance committee is left in the hands of the members of the Aged People’s Conference, who are all over fifty-one years old and who are descendants of the people of the Folding Rope Hall. Those who are underage but who have won either a scholarly honor or an official rank (above the level of Xiucai (秀才; xiùcái), one who passed the imperial examination at the county level in the Ming and Qing dynasties, or was promoted above the level of Jiansheng (監生; jiànshēng), a student of the Imperial college in the Ming and Qing Dynasties）may also participate in the Conference. Participating in the Conference is called “going to the Clan Hall” (participating in the Joint Governance Conference is called “going to the Temple”). Issues from the same Bao, whether they are major or minor, are resolved at the Clan Hall. The Folding Rope Hall has four to six vacancies for council members, with one member in his prime taking exclusive charge of accountancy. Such a member, appointed annually by the Aged People’s Conference, can serve for consecutive terms for a span of over ten years. Every council member, even if he is under age, is required to sit in on the Aged People’s Conference. The head of each Bao, who is specifically assigned the task of offering responses to higher officials, enjoys a very low social status (i.e., despite being the head of each Bao, there is little status attached to such a position). Whoever is under age cannot sit in on the Aged People’s Conference. Membership of the Aged People’s Conference and the council is only honorary. They claim only the privilege of getting a double quantity of sacrificial meat at the time of sacrifice and of being seated in the Clan Hall when there is a banquet. The head of each Bao receives altogether three thousand sheng of rice for each household as a government salary (a sheng is a unit of dry measure for grain, equal to 0.625 kg). This measure of rice is called “the Rice for the Head of the Bao”, and is collected by the Head himself from door to door. The Aged People’s Conference is held twice a year, on the two days before the sacrif ices at the Spring Equinox and the Autumn Equinox respectively. The main business of the Conference at the Spring Equinox sacrifice is the appointment of council members for the coming year, and at the

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Autumn Equinox sacrifice it is the presenting the financial statement and briefing one’s successor on one’s work. So the Conference at the Autumn Equinox sacrifice sometimes lasts three to four days. In addition, when important things happen, an extraordinary conference is called. Perhaps twenty or more conferences are held annually. During the busy farming season conferences are seldom called, while at the end of winter and the beginning of spring conferences are called most frequently. The aged people often total sixty to seventy, but very often, less than half of these people are present at the conference. Sometimes, even if only a handful of people are present, the conference still goes ahead. Those who are under fifty years old can only be allowed to sit in on the conference. Whenever great events take place, several hundred people crowd in so that even the front hall and the front steps are occupied by people. Often, people take the floor, too, but when they say something inappropriate, they are always reproached for it by the aged people. The topics for discussion at the temporary conferences are mostly mediations or judgments of disputes. Whenever a dispute arises, there are at first calls for reconciliation between one’s relatives and friends, and the aged people. But if they refuse to comply, they will appeal to their respective branch temples. If they again refuse to comply, they will appeal to the Folding Rope Hall, the highest court of the village. If they still refuse to comply, they will bring the lawsuit to the feudal official and settle it there. It is considered immoral, however, to file lawsuits against someone because of their refusal to comply. Consequently, it is rare that anyone actually does so. If anyone from the younger generation commits such crimes as gambling or fighting, those who commit minor crimes will be reproached at the Clan Hall, those who commit major crimes will take a whipping by kneeling down before the shrine for ancestral tablets, those who commit greater crimes than these will receive no sacrificial meat (which has been a rarity since ancient times), for one whole season or even for one whole year, and those who commit still more monstrous crimes will be deprived of the right to receive any sacrificial meat at all. Those who are denied sacrificial meat for a season or a year will automatically regain the right to enjoy sacrificial meat after this period. Those who are deprived of the right to receive any sacrificial meat cannot automatically regain this right unless they are acquitted of their crimes at the next conference after the time is due. It can be seen from this that the deprivation of the right to receive sacrificial meat is a severe punishment. Those who plow the field of the Clan Hall but are in arrears with land tax and other levies receive no sacrificial meat, but as soon as they have paid land tax and other levies, they automatically regain the right to receive sacrificial meat. Those who commit theft are paraded throughout the village with their hands tightly bound and are humiliated by groups of children with choruses of angry shouts. This is called “being paraded in front of the crowd”. Whoever has been paraded in front of the crowd cannot receive sacrificial meat for at least one year. If someone commits rape, all the pigs throughout the village are gathered for slaughter and the meat from all these pigs is distributed among all the villagers. The family of the criminal is then ordered to repay the total price of all those pigs. This is called “the vending of pigs”. Whoever has committed a crime punishable by vending pigs is forever deprived of the right to receive sacrificial meat. The Clan Hall draws its major source of income from the clan estates or properties, which are in the possession of each branch Clan Hall. The Folding Rope Hall, which has about seven or eight acres of field, is the richest of all. All of the newly silted sand field belongs to the Folding Rope Hall and is not privately owned. The experimental field is plowed by descendants from this very Clan Hall and forty percent of the taxes are paid to the Clan Hall, which is called “the exchange for the field”. Any exchange for the field takes place at the end of each year through competitive bidding. But the current owner of the field, unless he is in arrears with his taxes, can most probably retain his right to plow the field without entering another round of bidding. If such disasters as floods, droughts and windstorms

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occur, there will be a reduction in rent. The rate of rent reduction is decided by the Aged People’s Conference and this rate serves as the standard for private field owners when reducing rent. The expenditure mainly covers the expenses of such activities as paying respects to a dead person at the tomb and offering sacrif ices at the Clan Hall. Whoever has made sacrif ices is allotted a piece of sacrificial meat and especially at the end of the year, when people get the largest pieces, which is the case with all branch Clan Halls. So, when people celebrate the Spring Festival, the Lunar Chinese New Year, even the poorest families can be well provided with food and clothing. There is a Home Guard. Our Bao and the Joint Governance Committee of the “Three Baos” have separate responsibilities but when it comes to the purchase of guns and ammunition, they share the expenses. The local militiamen are replenished by volunteers from the younger generations who are in their prime, but they must be granted permission to join from the Aged People’s Conference. The militiamen are entitled to get double sacrificial meat and all the guns are in their custody or in the joint custody of several militiamen. Those who steal and sell the guns will receive severe punishment and be forever deprived of the right to get sacrificial meat, in addition to being held responsible for compensation. The bullets are in the custody of the council members of the Clan Hall. In front of the village, there is a small canal. As the canal is often silted up, it has to be dredged every three to five years. Whenever it is dredged, the Clan Hall supplies the necessary materials and villagers aged from eighteen to fifty-one are all required to do labor. Excepting only the aged and the celebrated, who can be exempt from labor, all others who are reluctant or unable to undertake labor must pay for an exemption and the Clan Hall will hire other people to do it instead. The same procedures will be followed when projects such as building dams are launched. Whoever does not undertake labor and does not pay for an exemption will be punished by being denied sacrificial meat. In the village, there are three or four private elementary schools. In most cases, the village’s Clan Hall is borrowed for use as the classroom, with teachers who are always from the same village and who have received some education. There is no quota for tuition fees. At most, a little more than thirty silver dollars are needed every year and as the minimum, a few sheng of rice will do. Teachers receive double sacrificial meat from the Clan Hall. In recognition of this, and for borrowing the Clan Hall for teaching, they must assume the responsibility for ensuring that no children are prevented from receive schooling, even if they cannot afford the tuition fees. Flying festival lanterns and saying prayers for the departed souls in the f irst and seventh months, respectively, of the Chinese lunar calendar are major public entertainments for the villagers. The expenses are generally donated voluntarily by everyone, and if insufficient, they will be covered by the Folding Rope Hall. A play is performed once every three to five years, with a quarter of its expenses covered by the Three Bao Temple, another quarter by the Folding Rope Hall, another quarter by the Branch Clan Halls and other groups, and the last quarter by voluntary donations. In the village, there is a very interesting organization called the “Jiangnan Society” which is very similar in nature to the credit cooperative that is popular among Europeans. When such an organization is established, it must last twenty or thirty years. Three to five years after its establishment, it embarks on drawing lots for the repayment of principal investments, as those whose principal is repaid first get fewer benefits and those whose principal is repaid later get more benefits. The accrued interest, apart from the spending on sacrificial meat and the gaudy at the end of each year, is entirely allocated to all members of the organization. (Such a society often makes more generous donations when entertainment fees in the village need to be covered.）The society’s council members take turns each year to be appointed but have to serve consecutive terms. They receive no salaries, only the right to enjoy double sacrificial meat. Thirty years ago, when my hometown was thriving, there were three or four such societies.

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that Liang describes can well serve as a typical instance. Just look at its scale and orderliness, and its business operation. Is it not impressive? However, it should first be understood that this system cannot simply be transplanted into the governance of cities and secondly, it cannot well maintain its neat orderliness if it is extended to govern over fifteen hundred households or more than ten thousand people. Cities are home to people from all walks of life, and in such places matters are decided by their locality instead of their people, so the use of family ethical relations as the basis of metropolitan organizations is not appropriate. When an organizational unit expands and the population grows, laws must be enforced, for the insistence on propriety is insufficient, though it may have been the common practice before. This illustrates that in essence, the society that is directed by propriety differs from a group and its potential community life is no more than potential. The agricultural operation of the Three Kingdoms and the county jurisdiction of the late Ming Dynasty (see Chapter Ten) were recorded only occasionally, at unusual times. It was impossible for them to be sustained over a long period or widely expanded. To be fair, such a society has no lack of democracy – the hard evidence being that its internal order relies on rationality instead of on military force. As such a society cannot become a powerful group, what it actually lacks is politics, for politics and laws are the very things that powerful groups possess. In order for this organization to be expanded Among the younger generations of the village, who gained credit from the society, quite a few of them began in abject poverty but become middle class residents. There is also another organization which is quite similar to the Consumers’ Cooperative or Traff ickers’ Cooperative. The manure that my villagers need is called “ramie bran”. Very often, several households purchase a huge quantity of “ramie bran” following an agreement between them and take a small percentage of the profit before allocating it to members of the village. The major product in my village is called “the palm fan”. A number of families often agree to sell tangerines through their joint efforts, at a considerable profit. A certain amount is also withdrawn from the earnings by the society. Such groups are mostly organized on a temporary basis, but of course, some of them continue to exist for years on end. The earnings of such societies, apart from donating to cover entertainment fees, are totally expended toward the end of each year as fees for the purchase of sacrificial meat. Branch Clan Halls and various private organizations are purely simulations of the Folding Rope Hall. The Three Bao Temple is modeled after the structure of the Folding Rope Hall. The real power in governing our village, however, in nine cases out of ten, lies with the Aged People’s Conference and its council members. Social life in rural areas of China in the old days is most worthy of study to today’s researchers. A review of previous studies reveals that it was rarely researched, either because it was considered a common phenomenon or because previous studies missed the point due to its fragmentary nature. This passage is a brief description of its organizational system, its institutional application, its issues, its social sanctions, its litigation arbitrations, its labor services, its local security, its public entertainment, its economic cooperation and the education of its offspring. It can serve as most valuable material for further research. Consequently, it is quoted here in full length.

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or made more enduring, efforts must be made to fortify its military force, which was exactly how past dynasties were founded. However, even if that were the case, its politics would still languish in passivity and inactivity. Essentially, China, a society bound by the ethics of countless families, despite the fortification of its military force, still cannot become a geopolitical state under class rule. It maintains a passive and stable situation by following feudal ethics and rites, with the upshot that democracy does exist in some measure on the one hand, but its politics have been shut down on the other hand. As Liang Qichao said, “municipal self-governance results in the political capacity of Westerners but rural self-governance results in treachery and deception when exercising political capacity in China”. His observation is penetrating indeed.2 To sum up, it is not that China lacks democracy, but that it lacks group-centered life, politics and law. In other words, it is not that China’s lack of democracy results in the lack of point (4) and point (5) above but that its lack of point (4) and point (5) above results from its lack of group-centered life. The above is only a general survey. In the following, we will elaborate on why China lacks point (4) and point (5).

12.2

Lack of Human Rights and Freedom in China

Notions such as human rights and freedom are indeed not native to China. When these notions were first introduced to China, they met with public indifference, however. To reformers, these were not urgent matters, and as far as revolutionists were concerned, there used to be too much freedom anyway (see Chapter One). It can be seen from all this that the Chinese people do not, in fact, lack freedom; rather, they do not have clear ideas about it. In other words, the Chinese people live in conditions somewhere between freedom and lack of freedom, which means that they neither enjoy freedom nor suffer lack of freedom. Such an oddity can be explained clearly from the following. 2 Historical analysis of both China and the West enables LIANG to observe that “China has no lack of ethnicities but suffers a lack of citizens” and that “China has no lack of rural self-governance but suffers a lack of municipal self-governance”. He has also pointed out that Westerners’ municipal self-governance has fostered their political capacity but Chinese people’s rural self-governance has stymied their political capacity. But as he has not yet figured out the respective routes taken by the Chinese and the Westerners – i.e., the unilateral dominance of family life versus the unilateral dominance of group life (though he has alluded to something like this) – his observations do not yield particularly profound interpretations.

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To expand on this, the West must be taken as an example. The great popularity of notions such as human rights and freedom among Westerners in modern times results from the fact that each individual in modern society has become so powerful that he must claim his own particular recognition. A few remarks once made by Liang Qichao can furnish a good illustration: Before this, only those who had achieved superiority over others were considered mighty, but currently, those who are inferior are also mighty … When might encounters might and the two powers go head to head, their might is nullified so that their powers become equal. Thus, it can be said that freedom and power are actually the same thing.3 By “freedom”, I mean that everyone is free, but this freedom is conditional on the freedom of others. For example, imagine two people … Either of them increases his own freedom by extending his sphere of influence in an outward direction. When both spheres of influence reach such an extent that they meet each other, but neither of them will give in, a boundary is drawn … If one of the two is weak, the mightier will surely extend his influence across the border and the freedom of the weaker cannot be ensured. 4

As individuals are the subjects of freedom and freedom is an intangible part of an individual, a discussion of freedom has therefore to be conducted from the perspective of individuals. From the perspective of human history, however, the inhibition of freedom did not take place between one individual and the other but between one group and the other group and between one group and its members. The bitter enemy of freedom is the organ of power that represents a certain group, which is, at the national level, the government. Thus in his book On Liberty (which was translated by Yan Fu into Chinese as《群己權界論》), John Stuart Mill wrote: “What the monarchs try to secure is solely authority and what the common people want to enjoy is freedom”. In Chapter Nine, the paragraph which states in the light of Western history that “democracy originates from expecting that human rights will be respected and starts from curbing the royal power of the monarch” also points to the fact that the problem, which arises out of the antagonism between different classes, must be resolved through antagonism 3 See Unfettered Letters from the Ice-drinker’s Studio and Book II of Collected Monographs from the Ice-drinker’s Studio. 4 Ibid.

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between different classes and no individual efforts can amount to anything. It is of vital importance, of course, that an individual be empowered at this moment. But it is not possible for only a single individual to be empowered, neither is it possible for all individuals to be empowered at the same time. More often than not, only some of the individuals become empowered at first, and these people will constitute the so-called “emerging class”. When the social situation witnesses such a change, individual freedom is warranted by resorting to balancing the power of the contending classes. The emerging class should arise out of economic progress, and with the further progress of economy, more emerging classes (the fourth estate) arise so that more individuals are empowered and greater freedom is enjoyed. Maybe someday in the future when all people are empowered, and when everyone becomes very knowledgeable, freedom will become universal. This is the foreseeable future for mankind in the light of the social situation in the past in the West. As discussed in preceding chapters, democracy starts with the recognition of others. It can also be said now that democracy starts from the forced recognition of others. Recognition of others is a function of one’s rationality but forced recognition of others arises exactly out of such social condition as stated above. In the West, the route from the external to the internal and from the concrete to the reasonable is followed, or it is the route that is generally followed. As we have pointed out, reason is derived from the tension between two parties, which results from the development of facts; it is not that rationality generates history, but that history generates rationality (See Chapter Eleven).

It is just the reverse in China. In China, what prevails is taking the initiative to automatically recognize others. How can it be so? It should be known that whatever takes place between family members or between father and son is dictated by affection, but what exists between one group and the other or between one group and its members is dictated by power (see Chapter Ten). In the case in which affection is paramount, the Chinese people sometimes only attend to others irrespective of themselves. This was deemed moral by both the Duke of Zhou (c. 1045 BC) and Confucius (551-479 BC) and through concerted efforts, they helped the ethics-oriented Chinese society. In an ethics-oriented society, people place the other party first. This “other-centeredness” has long outdistanced the practice of “recognizing others”. Obviously, this is not a result of the specific situation, but it serves as a hindrance to such a situation. A situation emerges out of the opposition or the wrestling of two forces. In an ethics-oriented society,

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everything is conceived in friendship and any situation, because of its being already removed, is made invisible. While the Chinese people apply broadly the mutual intimate affection between family members to both the state and the society and fuse classes into ethics, Westerners whose group-centered life prevails extend the opposition between one group and the other group or between one group and its members to the relationship between one individual and the other, though father and son or husband and wife naturally are likely to oppose each other. Liang Qichao once lamented: The notion of “rights” can be seen as the unique essence of political thought in Europe and America. Even the simplest and the most intimate relationship, such as that between father and son, or between husband and wife, is sustained by this notion. Such a notion is totally beyond the comprehension of us Chinese. How can such things as “your right” and “my right” be differentiated between father and son, or between husband and wife? It is indeed beyond the ability of people like us to decode the essence of the delicate distinction herein.5

Likewise, Kong Dachong, who traveled around Europe and America, expressed his impressions as follows: The Chinese people are mud and water, which can easily make a mixture, while the Westerners are iron and rock, which is a case of “diamond cutting diamond”. The Chinese people are simply characterized by their “muddledness” while the Westerners are typically recognized by their “separateness”.6

So you see how drastically different China and the West are. In fact, the Chinese people never lack freedom, but the notions of “human rights” and “freedom” are not definitively established in China. That is why from the perspective of ethics-orientedness, Chinese society does not have the same social situation as that in the West where people have to lose their freedom first before they can secure it. However, what attributes to the Chinese people’s failure to secure such freedom is more related to their professional distinction in society. How can it be so? China, though it fuses itself as a state into the society, it is not very much like a state. Since it is a state, however, it inevitably has no lack 5 See LIANG Qichao, The History of Political Thought in the Pre-Qin Dynasty, 1930 (p. 147). 6 See Kong Dachong, Humanidades de la Tierra. Editorial de libros de Battlefield, 1943.

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of powerful forces. Such powerful forces are usually foregone, but they may sometimes still be applied. When that occurs, the Chinese people, a plate of scattered sand, are impotent against such forces due to lack of classes, and their wishes to limit royal power cannot be expressed in public. Every dynasty has to endure till it loses legitimacy and falls on its own before it can develop a balance of power so as to establish freedom. This is the ultimate consequence ever since feudalism was dismantled by scholars and classes were developed into professions. The ethics-orientedness, which gets the Chinese people muddled up about themselves without creating opposition to each other, nevertheless fails to make “freedom” an unequivocally established notion. In face of opposition when there are no opponents (as no individuals have the power to oppose), freedom cannot be unequivocally established. This situation is actually decided by professional distinctions. What has been discussed above concerns the social situation. As individual freedom is achieved in the light of the development of the social situation in the West, I would now like to talk about China with reference to the social situation between China and the West. However, lack of human rights and freedom in China has been, first and foremost, a result of its peculiar life philosophy. China has taken a step in the opposite direction from that the West has taken, with a preference for a route from the internal to the external, and from the reasonable to the concrete. This means that the difference in social conditioning simply arises from the early enlightenment of rationality. In China, beliefs that originate from rationality are varied but they center around two spiritual pursuits. One is the urge to maintain a positive outlook, which is also called “going upwards in life”. The other is the mutual affection between peers, which is also called “ethical friendship”. These were mentioned previously with regard to China’s national spirit and social morals, as discussed in Chapter Seven on rationality as a human characteristic. It is simply impossible for human rights and freedom to come about under such circumstances. This line of reasoning is not difficult to follow. When we consider how human rights and freedom came about in the West in modern times, we will instantly see why they were absent in the lives of the Chinese people in the past. Life in the West in modern times is a counteraction against life in the West in medieval times. Life in medieval times in the West had two features, the f irst being religion, which enveloped everything while at the time being inclined to practice withdrawal from the world and abstinence; the second was living in groups which impose undue interventions upon people’s lives. An individual was thus controlled like this body and soul

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through “working both ways”. All campaigns since the Reformation such as Renaissance and Enlightenment eras, which have been known as the times for “personal awakening”, were intended simply as a revolt against the suppression and the obliteration of one’s feelings, of one’s demands, of one’s thoughts, and of one’s opinions. The earlier statement that “each individual has been empowered” refers to just this process. Within the group, people make concerted efforts to elevate their own personal statuses and to avoid interventions in their pursuit of freedom, particularly the freedom of belief. In respect of religion, they instead placed emphasis on their desires by pursuing worldly happiness. At that time, such beliefs were popular: First, freedom means happiness; second, without freedom, how can there be happiness? Such a strong impulse prioritizes the establishment of freedom. But in China, freedom means something quite different in the light of the historical route its culture has taken and its cultural background. Unlike in religious life, which values seclusion from the world and has little regard for the earthly life, it is believed in China that, on the contrary, earthly life should be greatly valued and that a solemn life should be adopted in anticipation of losses. As the saying goes, “A high-minded man does not seek satiety in his food nor ease in his dwelling-place.” Here, since personal desires are spurned to some extent, how can one experience earthly happiness? To individuals, the only solution to this conundrum is to improve themselves by learning from the wise. To a society or a state, it is extremely important to ensure that its people are well aware of the standards of propriety and righteousness and that they receive moral instruction. It could be well asked who could insist that “my own business is up to me and my business is none of your business!” Here in China, on the one hand, there is no group that is as strong as any group in the West, which means that people insist on this type of freedom that consists in prohibitions. On the other hand, as people here are imbued with a mutually encouraging, positive spirit, freedom has long been implied without being readily brought to the fore. Such being the case, over several thousand years, as the relationship between oneself and others and also between an individual and the public has been invariably blurred, it has been difficult to make a demarcation between them.7 7 In Rationality and Democracy, 1946, Zhang Dongsun wrote, “As Westerners are not directly subject to a moral code, notions, such as ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’, are thus proposed. As the Chinese people, however, must be subject to their moral code, it is impossible for such notions as ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’ to emerge in such a context.” (See Chapter Three on Humanity and Personality, which serves as a good reference.)

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From another perspective, the practice of placing moralization as something of the first importance in China is derived from the relationship that parents or elders in a family or in a clan have with their children. Parents or elders in a family or in a clan are required to fulfill their responsibility for instructing the younger generations in order to ensure the fundamental elements of the culture, on which the survival of the society depends, are inherited. What we teach children certainly has less to do with the means, methods and techniques of life than, more importantly, value judgements pertaining to the norms in life. In an ethics-oriented society, since everything can be interpreted as something that one person does to another person, the social order and organization are dependent on the personal virtues of every individual. Thus personal virtues are highly valued. It seems that this emphasis on moralizing personal virtues is a commitment shared by governments at all levels, from the national government down to municipal self-government. As a result, the better half of personal freedom has been impaired for the Chinese people. It must be remembered that toward the end of the Qing Dynasty when a new criminal law was being drafted, whether adultery was a crime or not constituted one of the most contentious topics among the old and the new factions at the time. Such an issue reveals precisely where China differs from the West. Observed from Westerners, there are two issues here: First, without food and sex, how can there be any happiness in life? Second, when one’s personal life has nothing to do with other people and does no harm to the general public, it means that one enjoys freedom, which should not be disturbed by the state. On this basis, whatever mutually consenting men and women without spouses do is a matter of their own personal freedom. What crime can they be accused of? In addition, if this freedom of theirs is jeopardized, efforts should be made by the State to secure it. If the State itself interferes with it, it would be as absurd as someone interfering with other people’s diets. But the Chinese people think very differently: First, both food and sex are instinctive needs and a part of a person’s life. But of course, they must be enjoyed in a socially appropriate manner. If people only aim to satisfy their desires, regardless of anything else, they will be considered irrational as they are human beings instead of animals. Second, that male and female should dwell together is the origin of all ethical relations, and is thus “the greatest of human relations”. If this is not taken seriously, it would indeed have a deleterious effect on society. Third, when one has children but does not teach them, then as parents, elders, seniors or teachers, they have not fulfilled their obligations. When no ameliorating effect can be achieved through education, a criminal penalty will be imposed, which is designed to further educate the transgressors.

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Consequently, in the light of the theory that a person should fall within the scope of criminal law sanctions if his behavior goes beyond the norms of propriety and that punishment should be combined with education, even adultery cannot be considered as anything other than a crime. Western countries probably each have their own equally convincing arguments, which are the crux of the difference between cultures. The reasons freedom is not an established concept, as a person’s own imperceptible sphere of influence is in practice shielded by their positive outlook, has been briefly discussed above. But it seems to be a more powerful argument if this is considered as being shielded by friendship, since in ethical friendship, other-centeredness is stressed. This other-centeredness has long gone beyond “recognition of others”, to the extent that “it seems that one does not exist for himself, but for others”. Indeed, this is exactly what Zhang Dongsun refers to as dependent being (see Chapter Five). In the individualist Western society, the concept of individual rights permeates everything. Conversely, in China, where the concept of duties and obligations permeates, an individual has almost no social status of their own. At this point, an individual is subsumed in ethics, and he will almost never find himself in the ethical system. When the idea of freedom is not established, how can freedom itself ultimately emerge? In the early modern period in Western countries, freedom was genuinely valued more than life. Quite unexpectedly, it is simply like an abandoned object without an owner in China! The fatal error in Chinese culture stems from the fact that individuals seem never to be of any importance. Individuals almost lack even the chance to speak for themselves, with countless emotional appeals being suppressed or even obliterated. Since the May Fourth Movement, there have in fact been many more arguments for why the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius were damned as “the cannibalistic ethics of feudal society”. Dai Dongyuan was in mortal agony when he severely reprimanded the practice of Song-Dynasty Confucianism by saying, “When a person dies under the sanction of the law, someone might pity him, but when a person dies under the constraints of ethics, who pities him?” Tan Sitong’s claim to shatter all bonds was also directed at such notions. Those who know nothing about these incidents may think that China has been shackled by feudalism, but in fact, feudalism in China relied on nothing but force and superstition: its foundation was rather weak. How, then, could it exist for such a long time? In reality, entrenched in the minds of the Chinese people are ethical notions. Although such notions are acquired, they are far more deeply rooted in human rationality, and can thus only be modified rather

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than eradicated. Freedom, a notion that originated in Western history, was considered a self-evident truth, something that was very much held to be sacred and inviolable. Ethics, a quite different notion that originates in Chinese history, is likewise a self-evident truth – something sacred. As the Chinese people accepted the notion of ethics first, the notion of freedom could not become prevalent in China. Yet though it was not prevalent, the Chinese people were not without freedom. The fact of being “not without freedom” is just where the harm lies. In these circumstances, it becomes difficult to gain unequivocal freedom.

12.3

Lack of Government by the People

Whenever matters of urgency arise, with the agreement of most people, an assembly is convened. This is government by the people. For example, in the United Kingdom and the United States today, the general election (the parliamentary election in the UK and the presidential election in the US) indeed fully expresses the ideal that national affairs should be decided by the whole population. In China, however, though politics has long incorporated meanings such as “government of the people” and “government for the people”, for two or three thousand years, there has ultimately been no system of “government by the people”. More than the failure to establish such a system, we may ask the question: Who has ever even conceived of such an idea? Originally, these three aspects – that is, government by the people, government of the people and government for the people – were closely related. It can be said that the first two (i.e., government of and government for the people) were fully in play from the time of Mencius (c. 372 BC-289 BC) to the time of Huang Zongxi (September 24, 1610-August 12, 1695), but the last point (i.e., government by the people) has never been even imagined. Isn’t that absurd? However, two aspects can explain this: philosophy of life and social situations. China and the West cherish their respective notions in the light of their different backgrounds: government by the people in the West was born out of group-centered life, but the Chinese people live a family life. Convening meetings for dedicated discussions whenever occasion arises is habitual for people who live in a group. When people live a family-centered life, however, it is not necessary to have intense discussions. They are more accustomed to being led by their fathers and elder brothers with their children following suit. The notion of “government by the people” has existed in the West, as can be observed, for a long time. It is not a product of modern times. In

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contrast, this notion was rarely valued in China ever since antiquity,8 and it will never be necessarily initiated in the future. This perhaps results from the fact that Westerners prefer group-centered life while the Chinese prefer family life. This divergence has existed for a long, long time. It also has much to do with Christianity in the West and Confucianism in China. Through adherence to Christian values, group-centered life becomes increasingly stronger and more consolidated. Family life, on the other hand, which relies on Confucian ethics, and on honest and sincere friendships, stimulates the cultivation of the spirit and the prolongation of the life span. When a person grows up amid family-centered ethics, he commonly observes age hierarchy, the closeness of blood ties and other distinctions. In contrast, when a person lives among church-focused associations, he looks at the world only from the perspective of God’s teachings and everyone is seen as equal with no one being seen nobler than others. In this case, it stands to reason that the majority have the final say. In the former case, if the majority had the final say, grandparents would have to be obedient to their grandsons, which would be inconceivable to the Chinese people. This may best illustrate whether China has government by the people or not. The Christian view that everyone is equal is less conducive to “government by the people” as from the obverse, it has very limited influence. The separation of religion from politics, triggered by Christianity in modern times, is, from the reverse, the most conducive to “government by the people”. Such a contrast makes it easier for the situation in China to be understood. In China, the government takes charge of education, a practice that echoes the responsibilities that the elders take for educating the younger generations (as mentioned previously). The early emergence of its rationality and the difference in its outlook on life play an especially important role. The Chinese people have never endorsed the idea that man is born sinful. On the contrary, they think that because man possesses rationality, moral integrity does not have to be sought from God in external validation since even sages and masters are the same as us. So during one’s lifetime, one has to be unremittingly diligent and enterprising, seeking advice from others and committing as few errors as possible. Otherwise, 8 It was recorded in The Rites of Zhou that XIAO Sikou, who was responsible for affairs at the outer court of the Forbidden City, gathered people together to seek their opinions on how to drive invaders from their country, where to relocate their capital and who should be chosen as heir apparent to the throne. In Chapter Three of his A History of Political Thought during the Pre-Qin Period, LIANG Qichao, who had collected several examples from The Spring and Autumn Annals and other ancient works so as to prove the verity of this record, said that due to lack of post-Warring-States-Period documents, his efforts were suspended.

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one cannot be truly called a human being. In life, it will not do if one refrains from being enterprising. How, then, can politics be separated from religion? Whether it is due to the unification of politics and religion, or to the dominance of religion over politics, there will come a time when people are too preoccupied to be virtuous and to respect their teachers. If the minority are supposed to yield to the majority, it would be bizarre indeed. It is just the opposite in the West. The lifelong religious asceticism of medieval times has precipitated eudemonism in modern times, and at the same time prompted the separation of politics from religion. What we are calling “politics” is no more than the protection of private interests and the pursuit of public welfare. What a person does is known only to himself, and who can make decisions for him? Consequently, only someone who has a connection to a particular matter should be consulted for advice on it. When a matter concerns the public, assemblies have to be convened in order to gather opinions from everyone. When opinions vary, the minority have to reconcile themselves to the majority. This is government by the people, a very common practice in the past. Although government by the people existed in the West long ago, it was ultimately not until the modern era that it became popular and the system became more sophisticated. Apart from the fact that, thanks to the social development of the intervening years, there is now a longer history of this type of government, but ideologically, people’s outlook on life has been enhanced, which contributes to the so-called “the ideological trend in modern times”. But in China our philosophy of life has remained unchanged ever since the Duke of Zhou and Confucius laid its foundation. Also, since the Song Dynasty, people have tended to adopt a serious demeanor and more emphasis has been laid on the difference between the wise and the foolish. In most cases, such a difference is hardly imaginable. It should be acknowledged, however, that China’s failure to embark on the political path that was taken by most other countries certainly results from the difference in its philosophy of life compared with the West, but the modern West opting for such a path is the outcome of its social situation rather than a decision initiated by an idea. For example, parliamentarism did not arise as an idea but from the evolution of Western European countries. The right to elect Members of Parliament was opened to the public only gradually and under pressure. In other words, it was not originally a practice based on equality, with the general election system being the norm from the very start. The discussion in Chapter Nine on the gradual democratization of politics in Western countries as a result of their classes is an illustration of such social development. (Readers should please refer to that chapter.) In

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addition, Edward Jenks’s A History of Politics, which was translated by Yan Fu into Chinese under the title《社會通詮》(Shèhuì tōngquán), enumerated all that occurred when the system of government by the people was initially introduced into modern society, which, unfortunately, can only be briefly quoted here: Reverting, in conclusion, to the subject of political representation, we may say something about a feature which has everywhere become identified with it, and without which political representation, as understood at the present day, could not be worked; viz., the doctrine of majorities. Strange as it may sound to modern ears, it is yet unquestionably true that there was once a time (not so very long ago) when the fact that a proposal was supported by a majority was considered no reason whatever for its acceptance. … Primitive society was full of communities, i.e., groups of people having interests in common and conducting their business in common. Surely, it will be said, these communities must have had some method of settling differences of opinion by votes? No. The answer is that if custom did not settle the matter, or compromise, then the only remedy was a fight, in which the strongest party got its own way. Unanimity, or a fight, were the alternatives of primitive times. … Most things in the Middle Ages ended in a fight. The contested election was no exception. The victorious party routed its opponents, drove them from the hustings, and carried their man, i.e., to the sheriff, who forthwith recorded his name, and sent it up to the Clerk of the Crown. Most people, probably, have noticed that the language of election is somewhat bloodthirsty. Much of this is no doubt, the decorative language of the New Journalism; but it is interesting to find that the further back we go in history, the more nearly does it tally with the actual facts. It is one of the numerous examples of the survival, in language, of practices which have passed away in reality. … A fiction was gradually adopted, by which it was assumed that there had been a fight, and that one party had gained the victory. But which party? Well, other things being equal, in any fight the more numerous party will win. And so it seems to have gradually become the custom, where party feeling was not very strong, to settle the matter by counting heads instead of breaking them. Much of the machinery of voting recalls its origin. The first test is a shout. If one party greatly preponderates, its shouts will drown the other’s, and there will be no need to go further. But the shout is the old battle-cry. If there is still doubt, the next step is Divide, i.e., draw up in battle array. We do not allow this in parliamentary elections, because the temptation to resort

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to the ancient method would be too great. But, in calmer assemblies, it is the regular procedure. Thus we see what a rough test the verdict of the majority is. It is not based, historically, on any ethical considerations. It makes no allowance for difference of merit in the combatants, or for generalship, both of which tell in real warfare. But it is a very simple and enormously useful practical way of settling disputes, and it has had a world-wide success.9

Moving from action to knowledge (i.e., the idea that doing comes before knowing), tallies with what has been previously described as moving “from the external to the internal and from the concrete to the reasonable”. This is the very route that Westerners have taken. Jenks’s elaboration here is indeed valuable to cultural studies. This must be kept in mind as it will serve as the basis for further discussions. Certainly, the system of government by the people is built not only on one idea, but also on the objective situation. In Britain and America today, national affairs are the preserve of their people and also of their social situation. Strictly speaking, in both Britain and America people can do very little about what happens in their respective countries. This circumstance is not attributed to the vagueness of rationality but to the immaturity of their respective social situation. The fact that government by the people was unestablished in the past in China was initially attributed to the hindrance brought about by its disparate ideas, and also to the difference in its social situation. Such difference in its social situation arose when China’s feudal system began to collapse, and when it came to the Qin and the Han dynasties, it sharpened suddenly. If we traced this difference back, it would be found that the ancient Chinese aristocracy was not sufficiently coherent and lacked clear class boundaries. As pointed out by Liang Qichao, Chinese aristocratic politics never witnessed any shared forums like the Roman Senate or the noble Councils in medieval times, which was one of its major features. It was impossible for China to adopt the practice of making public its political power in a circle, like in Western Europe, as the fountainhead of the system of government by the people. When there is no fountainhead, there is certainly no development. It was also impossible for China to install a system of government by the people, with classes acting like ladders per the practice in Western countries. (Again, please refer back to Chapter Nine.) The problem lies with the lack of a class system and an unclear social situation. In China, especially after the Qin and the Han dynasties, classes 9

See Edward Jenks, A History of Politics, 1900 (pp. 135-138).

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became vague as they were obscured by ethics and dissociated in professions. How could such a situation exist under these circumstances? As I pointed out in Chapter Nine, it is impossible for such a social situation to breed the separation of three powers. Instead, it can only breed the centralization of national power, which means specifically embedding into the national power a power structure for self-awareness and self-examination. Such a political system and such a social situation are identical in nature and inseparable from each other, almost as if they were the same thing. This will remain unchanged in perpetuity. This unchanging nature was obscured at the very start, when the situation was still unclear. What has been said here constitutes the obverse. Its reverse would be the failure to establish government by the people. It is something certain that it is impossible for China to establish the system of government by the people. This, however, does not mean that the Chinese people do not assemble in order to gather opinions from the population at large. Actions like gathering public opinions are also readily observed in Chinese people’s daily lives and from the very beginning they have never been unusual. Quite a few examples can be found even in Liang Qichao’s overview of self-government in his hometown. In particular, just like economic cooperative organizations like the “Jiangnan Association”, people certainly canvas popular opinion whenever they need to find a solution to an issue. We can follow the previous example by saying: in China, there is not necessarily freedom, but neither is there necessarily a lack of freedom; there is not necessarily government by the people, but neither is there necessarily no government by the people at all.

12.4

Human Cultural Precocity

In preceding chapters, to address certain issues, expressions like the “early awakening of rationality” and “cultural precocity” have frequently been used. What does “cultural precocity” mean? This chapter will provide a clearer definition of such expressions. For the sake of convenience, we will continue where we left off in the previous section. Here, two aspects (i.e., “difference in ideas” and “difference in social situations”) of the comparison between China and the West are cited to illustrate why there is lack of freedom and of government by the people in China. Now, we will explore this still further, starting from these two aspects. A comparison between China and the West in terms of “ideas or notions” reveals that ideas espoused by the Chinese people invariably are more

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advanced than, instead of inferior to, those of Westerners. For example, public affairs require the cognitive engagement of its citizens. If people cannot reach a consensus, the majority rule applies. How is it possible that the Chinese do not know this? How is it possible that the majority rule does not become popular in China? It is precisely because people don’t value it very much and don’t use it as a guiding principle, and because even if it makes sense to follow the majority rule, people will doubt whether this is the only truth or whether there is more beyond that truth. Obviously, there are more reasonable solutions. The majority rule may not be feasible or reasonable in every instance, as is recorded in the Commentary of Zuo: Someone said to Luan Shu, the ruling minister of the Kingdom of Jin, “The monarch’s wish is the same as that of the general public, so he can succeed. Why don’t you listen to the public opinions? You are the ruling minister, and you should consider the opinions of the general public, so he can succeed. Why don’t you listen to the public opinion? You are the ruling minister, and you should consider the opinions of the people…” As is said in the Shang Shu, “When three individuals divine, follow the opinions of two.” This is another example of the majority rule. Luan Shu said: “Only when the two parties are fairly correct do we observe the majority rule.” The greater good, as it were, is led by the public.

Although such a statement does not deny the majority rule, it contains a deeper insight. As one of the least troublesome solutions in the endless debate, the majority rule constitutes a feasible option. But whether it accords with the principles of our nature is another question. Human beings, however, are rational animals. Fundamentally, they should be true, or good, or beautiful, or skillful (referring, in practice, to the most economical and the most effective traits). Together, these qualities are “in accordance with the principles of our nature”. Human rationality develops day by day, and these basic requirements are increasingly stringent. It would be undesirable to rigidly observe the majority rule without considering whether it accords with the principles of our nature. When legislation has been enacted in the West in recent years, sometimes opinions are sought from experts instead of the general public.10 At first glance, it seems that the minority view is valued while that of the majority is discarded, but in fact, what experts express 10 See LIANG Shuming, Rural Reconstruction Theory, 1937 (pp. 154-159), which discusses the majority rule at meetings, citing the “expert legislation” and “technology administration” of the West in recent years as an illustration.

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is indeed the will of the general public. As Luan Shu said, “The good is led by the public”. This means that a good outcome can issue from the will of the general public and the will of the general public aims to find the best outcome. Rather than being limited to the observance of the majority rule, it is more reasonable to respect virtue and wisdom. This, in fact, demonstrates progress in the system of governance. Therefore, how can it be called the demise of the democratic spirit? As concepts such as “government of the people” and “government for the people” are fully understood by the Chinese, they are not implemented in the form of self-governance. It is not that China has no access to the system of self-governance, but given its rationality, China is one step ahead of the West. China “contracts its maladies” through its wisdom rather than its foolishness, which is the most important thing to bear in mind. Let’s take one more example. A person in China tends to be permitted only to fulfill obligations rather than to enjoy their own rights. Such practice results from the observance of ethics and respect for the other party: a person seldom has a chance to speak from his own standpoint. Although it seems that his will is repressed and obliterated, such repression and obliteration are due to the observance of “ethics”, not observance of “law”. His obligations, which are self-imposed due to his affection toward people around them, are moral rather than legal. When each person is concerned only with his own position, the result is controversy. When one person stands in the other person’s shoes, the result is comity. The Chinese people indeed suffer losses because they value comity, and because they regard others as more important than themselves. This is more than merely “recognition of others”, and quite the opposite of disregard for others. It is through conflicts that modern Westerners have achieved reciprocal recognition, and have thus managed to maintain peace. We can by now come to the conclusion that there is indeed something that China cannot be expected to attain. What China cannot be expected to attain, however, stems precisely from the way in which it has surpassed the West. It is not that China falls behind the West simply because it cannot keep up. In my view, any conclusions about China’s falling behind in this respect can be said to echo this case in point. This is another point that our readers should bear in mind. Based on previous discussion, let’s now discuss the respective social situations in China and in the West. This inevitably advanced idea originates from rationality, rather than being forced by the objective situation, which itself has already changed. This, indeed, is the root of all the differences between China and the West. All the differences in social situation as discussed above can be traced to these causes. As aforementioned, the

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differences in the social situation in China were clearly revealed during the Qin and the Han dynasties due to the collapse of the feudal system. As discussed in Chapter Nine, this was very different from what happened to the West: the West began to flourish thanks to its economic progress – a determined victory of economic means over political means. That is, feudalism in the West was defeated by a burgeoning external force as a replacement. China, on the other hand, was disintegrating from within, instead of having its political means defeated in the end by economic means so that its feudalism was not immediately replaced by the emerging powers but fell unavoidably into a cyclic turn. In such integration and unavoidable cyclic turn, there exists an inherent power contradictory to feudalism. Feudalism relies firstly on military force and secondly on religion. China, however, due to its early enlightenment of rationality, tends to rely more on moral consciousness with inadequate influence from religion. Moreover, as the early enlightenment of rationality does not affect people as if they were simply the objects of this action, and affects outsiders the same way it affects insiders, the only thing that is valued is living in peace with each other instead of resorting to military force (on this subject, see Chapter Eleven), from whence arises contradiction. It is in fact the force of rationality that introduces this contradiction. Feudalism in China, then, incorporates this contradiction in order to soften the dismantling process, and dismantling is unavoidably intermingled with this contradiction. It is very clear that the uniqueness of China’s social situation for over two thousand years is derived, since the very beginning, from people’s budding subjective enlightenment. To sum up the above discussion in one sentence: Western culture starts from the body and gradually develops to the stage of the heart-and-mind, while Chinese culture starts directly from the heart-and-mind, which exerts an influence on the overall situation. The former represents sequential progress while the latter represents precocity. “Cultural precocity” means just this, which is to be explained further below. This also supports what was said earlier about moving “from the inside to the outside”, “from the principles of our nature to matter”, and, as mentioned in Chapter Nine, that “culture and politics have influenced economy, which seems to proceed from the heart-and-mind to matter, or from top to bottom”. What is meant by “starting from the body”? What is meant by “starting directly from the heart-and-mind”? Let’s refer back to our lengthy discussion in Chapter Seven. As the tool that supports all activities of an individual in life, the body is what human beings and other animals have in common. Though it cannot be said that other animals have no hearts, their heart-andmind functions are mostly concealed in their bodily functions and are not

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easily observable. But with human beings, due to the suppression of their physicality, they can execute their heart-and-mind functions. Thus they are said to have heart. The workings of the heart-and-mind encompassed both Reason and rationality. Here, it only refers to rationality, which is “heart-and-mind”. What I have called “starting from the heart-and-mind” simply means “starting from a perspective of rationality”. As a result, “the early enlightenment of rationality” and “cultural precocity” can be regarded as synonymous expressions. Why then is rationality referred to as “heart”? As we mentioned previously, all living things are limited to a relationship of “opposition”, and only human beings have achieved “unity” by going beyond “opposition”. Only rationality constitutes one aspect of “unity” of human life. Human activities related to the “opposition” aspect resort to either the use or the lack of Reason by prioritizing nothing but physicality. Since the comparison was originally intended to be between China and the West, on the basis of “opposition” and “unity”, the “heart-and-mind” is used specifically to refer to rationality. What is meant by “opposition”? What is meant by “unity”? When relationships are confined to utilization and resistance, “opposition” occurs. When they go beyond utilization and resistance, “unity” occurs, in which case, integration seems to emerge. Human beings are governed by their biological requirements (individual survival and reproduction), and their activities can never go beyond either utilizing something or being resistant to it. But in every case of utilization, there is resistance and in every case of resistance, there is utilization, so it is difficult to differentiate between utilization and resistance. This is what we mean by “opposition”. In addition, other activities, such as the pursuit of fame and striving for triumph, seem not to be much related to those biological requirements, but it is certainly obvious that they fall under the category of “opposition”. In their physical origin they are no different. Only by going beyond these requirements or by nurturing aspirations of greatness or by empathizing with others can self-consciousness be developed, independent of external actions. That is what we mean by “unity”. At the outset, Reason is nothing but a tool, and when it sometimes comes into play along with rationality, it also represents “unity”. But it is mostly used to cope with physical, external issues, in which case it may be considered part of the “opposition” mode. We talk about the heart-and-mind in contrast with the body, which refers to rationality in contrast with Reason. The very significance just lies in exactly this contrast. All these points, and the previous discussion, should facilitate our understanding of “starting from the body” in the West and “starting directly from the heart-and-mind” in China. However, something more needs to

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be said about the relationship between the body and the heart-and-mind before the idea of precocity can be made clearer. I also brought up the topic on precocity of Chinese culture among all human cultures twenty-seven years ago (see my earlier work Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies). My view was this: the variation between the attitudes toward life exhibited by the ancient Greeks, the ancient Chinese and the ancient Indians is the fundamental root of the difference in their respective cultures. These three different attitudes toward life correspond, in fact, to the three problems of human life: the first attitude conforms to the first problem, the second attitude to the second problem and the third attitude to the third problem.11 As complexity varies from problem to problem, all problems in human culture should actually arise in chronological order, so that human culture should be presented through three phases in sequence. Essentially, the first phase of human culture has not yet been completed, but the ancient Chinese had already addressed the second question and adopted the second attitude as a creation, and the ancient Indians had already addressed the third question and adopted the third attitude as a creation. That’s why we say it is precocious. As only 11 Translator’s Note: To make this clear, I would like to cite the following. In Liang’s view, there is a difference between Chinese culture and Western culture, and Indian culture: “It is that Chinese culture knows of human ‘rationality’. Chinese culture believes in the human; it does not believe in God, as with Western culture or in Allah, as in Islamic culture. Chinese culture is built upon and trusts the human. The distinguishing characteristic of Confucianism is that it relies on, and is built upon, humans, not some other being. This is what Mencius later pointed out – that ‘human nature is good.’ Confucius himself said no such thing, but Mencius mentioned it specifically. So the distinguishing characteristic of Confucianism is that it believes in, and is confident in, humans. Humans can make mistakes, or sink into degeneracy. But how can you correct the human who makes mistakes? How can you keep him from moral degeneracy, from doing evil? What do you rely on to do this? Aside from the human himself, there is nothing else that is dependable. So I feel that the distinguishing feature of Confucianism is that it has faith in man. In foreign countries, in Christianity, it is said that Adam ate some fruit. There is such wording? (Alitto: Yes, there is.) There is such a theory. […] This is in the West. In India there is something different still. India is very strange indeed. From ancient times [the tradition of] India was to deny human life, to negate it. It held that human life itself was a mistake. This was the common attitude and convention in ancient India. Were there any exceptions to this attitude? Yes. In Buddhist writing there is the saying ‘to act in accordance with the world, its ways and customs, and with non-Buddhist doctrines.’ Act in ‘Accord’ with the ‘World.’ This was a non-Buddhist sect, and was held as a heretical, outside path. A lot of other religions, aside from Buddhism, also excluded it and considered it a cult. This was the one and only affirmation of life in ancient Indian thought. Aside from this, all others held that human life was bafflement. The ancient traditions of India were quite different from everywhere else. This is very strange.” See LIANG Shuming and Guy S. Alitto, Has Man a Future? – Dialogues with the Last Confucian, 2010.

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a comparison is to be made between China and the West, India is not to be discussed here. My views remain roughly the same as before, but they are worded slightly differently here: The first problem concerns the relationship between man and things, which constitutes the first attitude, the one which exerts an influence upon the external world. It is now phrased as “starting from the body”. The second problem concerns the relationship between one person and another, which constitutes the second attitude, the one which turns into a person’s inner discipline. It is now phrased as “starting from the heartand-mind (rationality)”. Under normal circumstances, creatures always fight for survival against threats from the outside world, and from the human perspective, everything is an entity. The “entities” here entail all living things, non-living things and even other human beings. Problems related to survival arise between the body and the objects in the outside world. The body strives for the supplies it needs, and meanwhile fights for its own survival. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to call the first problem “the body problem”. This problem is at the root of all other problems, and human intelligence is used first to address this predicament. Eyes look outwards, ears listen outwards, hands reach outwards, and the mind thinks outward… These are natural propensities. In order to solve the problem, it is also certain that we should start with the external, with the other party, and change the external conditions in order to transform the objective environment. This is what I have called the first attitude, the inherent attitude aligned with the body. When humans continue to move and solve problems with the belief that the first problem conforms to the first attitude, this kind of activity is the one that starts from the body, and its corresponding solutions belong to the first phase of human culture. An individual can be treated both as a “thing” and as a “person”. When I take care of them emotionally, I regard them as a “person”; when I disregard their emotions and wishes, I merely regard them as an object, or treat them as an obstacle and exclude them. For example, when two armies are fighting and slashing at each other, they cut the other side down like grass or trees. But things are different when they sit down to negotiate: here, it seems that they have to take each other’s feelings and wishes into consideration, and this is when threats and temptations all come out. It is somewhat similar to taming a dog or a horse. If we truly care about the other party’s feelings and wishes, and both parties take equal care in this regard, the other party also assumes a place in our consciousness. Therefore, when encountering difficulties, we do not just consider the problem from our own perspective.

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This is otherwise known as “recognition of others”. The person-to-person problem, the second problem, can only occur based on this premise. The first problem starts from the body, while the second arises from rationality. Twenty-seven years ago, I had no idea about “rationality”. But I realized that the success of human social life relies on external factors far beyond personal consciousness, so I believed in the “social instinct” theory after I read Peter Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution. I believe that the awakening of consciousness promotes the rise of individualism, and the constitution of society is based on social instinct. Since both flora and fauna live in society, they may also have social instincts. But once it was known that human life was emancipated from instincts, and that its focus would rather be placed beyond instincts, it would mean that it was certainly not true that human society grew out of intelligence, and furthermore, it was especially groundless if we say it was based on instincts. This is because, no other species can be compared to human beings, as human beings are social animals; on the other hand, human intelligence is clearly beyond the reach of other animals. If these two features of human life are closely related to each other and such a description is justifiable, how can it be said that it makes sense then if we attribute them to the instincts that human beings are not good at just because they are superior beings in comparison with other species? A review of the gregariousness and the mutual assistance of all species and even of their self-sacrifice for their group benefits (though this happens occasionally), reveals that all species have their limitations. As a result of this, their social life also has its own limitations. Surely these are the so-called “instincts”. Due to the limitation of social life that exists among other species, they still focus on individuality. Mankind, however, has long evolved from a focus on individuality to its reliance on society. Human social life changes expansively and limitlessly with each passing day, but how can such limitlessness rely on instincts? How can such instincts be limitless again? What then is the basis for psychology of human society? It is life itself which has been revealed after instincts have been loosened. Life itself is contrasted with tools. For species, life itself has long been obstructed by life tools such as instincts and the body without being revealed. Ever since human beings have been emancipated from instincts, life is no longer confined to the body, but is connected with other lives instead. In particular, it is connected with the lives of other people, and thus humans can quickly sense the existence of each other, which is something that ordinary species are incapable of. The statement in Mencius that “even nowadays, if men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress, which means that everyone can

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show solicitude for others” is very illustrative. We have said in preceding chapters that: “In interpersonal relationship, one invariably cherishes the other party but forgets himself.” (Chapter Five) “Human beings empathize with the world around them and their empathy is pervasive.” (Chapter Seven) “A person’s life never ends with himself as he is ethically related to other people.” (Chapter Seven) “Whoever he entertains a deep concern for is the equivalent of himself; why should he care so much about his own body?” (Chapter Seven)

These statements are all mutually supporting. They all show empathy with the outside world, and are not in opposition with each other, so this is what we may call “unity”. When manifested in one’s consciousness, this is known as rationality. When people are rational, they will show concern to people around them by empathizing with them. Only by showing concern to them can we empathize with each other. Since we are empathetic with each other but our wills differ, person-to-person problems may arise. That is why we say that the second problem arises out of rationality. If the second problem does not arise out of rationality in the narrow sense of the word, it surely does in the broad sense of the word. That is: apart from acknowledging the other party emotionally, people are also likely to acknowledge the other party based on their own considerations (interests). In short, person-to-person problems are actually based on the premise that the other party has already had a place in my consciousness. The exclusion of the other party occurs only when excessive instinctive impulses have concealed rationality and Reason. At this moment, the second problem also turns to become the first problem. The second problem arises out of rationality, but must at the same time be resolved by rationality itself. Generally speaking, we must constantly exert our efforts inward. Why is that? In comparison, the first and the second problems differ drastically. The obstacle in the first problem is currently nothing more than an object in the external world, and all objects can be controlled and transformed by people so that they can meet our requirements. However, the obstacle in the second problem is not an object, but our counterpart – a living person, or more specifically, his heart-and-mind. Other

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people’s hearts-and-minds can only be influenced and inspired, and are not necessarily available to us, let alone subject to our control and transformation. For example, if I want to possess a woman physically, that is related to the first problem, and the objective is not difficult to achieve by exerting external forces, such as resorting to tricks or to violence. But if I really want to be loved by this woman, that is related to the second problem. If I force her through violence, the situation will be even worse; if I use tricks, our feelings will encounter even more conflicts. Outward thinking and physical strength are not the acceptable way. The said person-to-person problem is actually the heart-to-heart problem. People move and inspire each other, and only with sincerity can they touch each other. This is rationality in the narrow sense of the word, and it is also the purest internal force. In general, the situation may not be so extreme (that is, pertaining either to the body or to the soul). And once it involves considering the other party’s feelings or wishes, it also enters the category of the second problem. As occasions for one to exert external force are limited, people are obliged to exert their efforts inward. First, what I have to do is but to influence the other party’s heart-andmind. Beyond this, there is nothing I can do. This is the first limitation. When my own desires affect the other party, I need to be retrospective by looking at myself from time to time, so that I can amend my behavior so as to adapt myself to the other party. As the ancient Chinese saying goes, “We must seek the cause in ourselves instead of in others.” Second, however I exert my efforts, the result lies with the other party instead of being solely decided by me. This is the second limitation. When we seek to satisfy our desires from the external world, we cannot expect that we will surely succeed. The focus of our desires thus shifts from the external to the internal. What we hope to do is to exert our utmost efforts without feeling sorry or regretful. Just as the old Chinese saying goes, “Do as much as I can.” Naturally, these two aspects take cyclic turns initially between the external and the internal and mostly in the broad sense of rationality. But if continued efforts are exerted to resolve problems, they will surely gradually turn to pure inwardness in the narrow sense of rationality. This is what I mean when I say that “the second attitude conforms to the second problem”. All these can be cross-referenced with the first two paragraphs in Chapter Six that discuss the issue of peace and the efforts to achieve peace. The issue of peace is related to the second problem, while the efforts to achieve peace require one’s self-cultivation, which means exerting efforts inward. In terms of individual human life, when the mind and the body grow and mature, the mind matures as the body grows, which means that the

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body comes first and the mind comes second. The same sequence also fits in with social life. As is known, society develops as its culture evolves. The emergence and the development of culture first and foremost center round the survival issue from the very start. Thus the growth and the development of society actually reside in those activities which set out from the body. Roughly speaking, the body is the tool for survival and in pursuit of survival, human beings constantly create many tools (including knowledge and skills) both inside and outside the body so that their bodily activities are extended and strengthened to a greater extent and are made even more nimble. Thanks to the advancement of these tools, social connections are becoming increasingly close, and social units are becoming increasingly expansive. This is what we say by “social growth and development”. However, this constitutes only one aspect of social growth and development – one that is more closely related to the human body. Meanwhile, there is the aspect of the human mind. What is meant by “the human heart-and-mind aspect”? As is known, human beings cannot survive without tools; neither can they do without forming a society. But human beings cannot form a society by solely taking advantage of each other intentionally or unintentionally (instinctively). Apart from tools and society, they are more reliant on their heart-and-mind connections that go far beyond their bodies. Between people, when they only follow their bodies, they are separate and divided; but when they follow their heart-and-mind, they are separate but undivided. In the end, however, for the sake of their bodies, such undivided heart-and-mind can easily become divided. Thus culturally, there must constantly be a way to interlink and to interconnect before forming a society. The socalled “human heart-and-mind” in fact refers to what it contributes to the formation of a society, which, at the beginning of cultural development, was, more often than not, religion. Religion was the beginning of social culture in terms of the heart-and-mind. From this development arise etiquettes and customs, law, morality and others. But religion can never be eradicated due to its successors or variants of religion. Instead, it witnesses infinite changes and developments. Other variants are not replacements of one religion either. Generally speaking, these four aspects – namely, religion, etiquettes and customs, law, and morality – are essentials for the establishment, for the maintenance and even for the prosperity of society. Only with them can there be society, and only with society can there be the advancement of tools of various kinds. While tools are related to the development of the body aspect, these four aspects are related to the heart-and-mind aspect.

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For example, the practice of being brutal and ingenious to others has been acquired by all people, which is not at all surprising, though it has been so since ancient times. No one really knows, however, how many changes have taken place during this lengthy span of time. What can be obviously seen are the following: (1) Ancient people were far less likely to do such evil than their descendants; in societies of later times, thanks to good moral cultivation, people were also less likely to do such evil. The former case was only attributed to the purity and simplicity of human nature while the latter case was attributed to culture. Between them, there has obviously been a long period of historical development. (2) That such evil has been acquired by people both of ancient times and of modern times is not at all surprising. But from another viewpoint, such a practice is something that has not been allowed by people both of ancient times and of modern times. In other words, human beings are bounded in by both limits and boundaries. It is not surprising, then, for human beings to be confined to these limits and boundaries. Such limits and boundaries constitute what we call “culture”. The way of being confined to these limits and boundaries varies from place to place, but to put it the most simply, it cannot be practiced only in one’s own circle. Otherwise, society can no longer be society and there is no possibility for human beings to survive either. Each person’s own circle has obviously become more and more expansive from ancient times until today, and presently, the United Nations is endeavoring to form the largest circle so as to endow the whole world with legality and morality. Though it is a pity that it has not yet succeeded, and being brutal and ingenious to other nations in the international community is still a common practice, a retrospective of the United Nations as a small circle well shows that it has already witnessed astounding development! The so-called “culture” actually includes the above two aspects, i.e., limits and boundaries. With their gradual development, society grows and develops. Usually, it should be that these two aspects in turn make cyclic progress and advancement. Between these two, there must be the most appropriately commensurate relations. When they are incommensurate with each other, things will surely go wrong. However, it must be known that: growth tends to be at first more associated with the body and only later more associated with the heart-and-mind. When the body grows to maturity, the heart-and-mind aspect continues to develop. To put it plainly, when society has economically achieved integration, no longer will there be struggle for existence among people. The time when people stand together to govern the natural world is a key turning point in cultural development and serves as a dividing line between two adjacent periods. This is because,

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since society has economically achieved integration, the issue for existence seems to have been made clear. Henceforth, people do not have to worry about each other, and activities that start from the body gradually come to a halt so that human rationality (the heart-and-mind) can be brought to the fore. The practice of developing culture which centers round the first problem before this has now become a thing of the past and it has now been shifted to the second problem. The second problem in place of the first one has been in the possession of the heart-and-mind, from which culture at the second phase is generated. It is not true that at the first phase, the second problem is non-existent, but though the first problem is present, no one can afford the time to pay attention to it. As a result, its accomplishments mainly reside in the advancement of tools both within and without the body. When tools are so adequately advanced that society has economically achieved integration, then the body aspect can be said to have grown up and the human culture at the first phase to be completed. It is not true either that at the second phase, the first problem is non-existent, but since everything has already been readily arranged, things that are non-existent can be done. Meanwhile, how to act in accordance with the body aspect (or the advanced tools) so as to realize the goal of social integration just requires people to have the heart-and-mind aspect. As a result, if the first phase can be called the body culture, the second phase can be rightly called the heart-and-mind culture. Human culture at the first phase at most laid the foundation for people’s lives while that at the second phase is human beings’ authentic life. The division of the adjacent periods can be illustrated through the use of “force”. Force is related to the body. To animals that lack the heart-and-mind, the problems they encounter are no more than related to the body, and the resolutions to those problems only rely on fighting against each other. This indeed should not be the case with human beings. At the first phase of human culture, however, against foreign invaders, human beings waged wars and on domestic criminals, human beings impose the death penalty. The use of force is the most typical feature at this phase. The restraints at this phase reside in that force cannot be reused. How can it be said that force cannot be reused? It should be known that at this phase, human culture centers round the advancement of tools so as to strengthen the power of the body. When tools are advanced to the late stage, the power of the body is strengthened to such an extent that it will bring about two results: First, the world is made smaller, nature is brought under control, productivity soars, and society is economically and inseparably interwoven so that full preparation is made for “society as an organic whole” and “the world under

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heaven as one family”. Second, there is also the power which can destroy this small world with a limited number of human beings. The power remains the same but may be used differently. Whether it is used in the first case or in the second case, it will achieve astonishing effects which are good as good can be or fatal as fatal can be. What I say by “force cannot be reused” means exactly the same as “either peace or destruction”. Since ancient times, there have been armistice movements which have never been successful. War invariably exists as one of human beings’ systems. It is considered as a system because war has been universally acknowledged to effectively solve some of the problems. In other words, war can serve as a certain solution to some of the problems. Maintaining or abolishing this system is a human cultural issue, dictated by the degree to which human rationality develops instead of being decided solely by the subjective requirements of a small group of people. The time is now ripe for the abolition of such a system, however. For one thing, due to the advancement of tools, the education that people receive and the universally substantial improvement of educational level, people are made more fully aware that their lives are precious. For another thing, due to the advancement of tools, war witnesses such increasing destructive power that it may destroy everything. These two points impose absolute abolition of whatever war. Since the objective situation promotes the development of human rationality, after a long period of cultural cultivation, human beings are no longer so impulsive, and after many trials and tribulations, international organizations will eventually reach their goals. As for the death penalty, the signs indicate that it is likely to be abolished. As a system, the death penalty exists in the present world naturally for many reasons. The ultimate reason for its existence lies in that no other method can be as economical as death penalty. However, things are valued on the premise that human beings are disregarded and things are disregarded on the premise that human beings are valued. In the future when production is well developed, material resources are abundant and economic life is socialized, reform education through persuasion and exemplary deeds and redemption will surely be used instead of the death penalty. Whatever rational ideas, etiquettes and customs, and systems emerge in place of old ones represent the development of rationality in the social culture. The development of rationality prompted by the social situation is indeed the thoroughfare to the development of rationality. For example, if society is economically interwoven, and the world is interconnected, people of all races must surely actively seek common ground for cooperation. Again, if everyone is well educated and his mind is well developed, surely no one

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can belittle others. Consequently, the second problem that is discussed above comes into being, and the objective needs for rationality are thus created. In the meantime, on the one hand, due to economic progress and abundant material resources, needs of all kinds can be well answered, and on the other hand, with all conditions necessary for establishing new methods and new systems being thus in place, everything is made possible. From Chapter Eight onward in the present book, causes and effects related to this social situation have been adequately discussed. You may well understand them through cross-references. Hence human culture at the second phase is actually based on human culture at the first phase and the sequence of “the heart-and-mind arising from the body, and the body pre-existing the heard-and-mind” is followed not only by individual life but also by social life. An understanding of this and a browse through the beginning of this chapter on a comparative study of freedom and government by the people between China and the West will surely enable you to fully comprehend the statements that “Western culture moves from the body to the heart-andmind while Chinese culture starts straightly from the heart-and-mind”12 and “Chinese culture is human cultural precocity”.

12 The paragraph “From Spirit to Flesh and from Flesh to Spirit” in LU Xun (trans.) Kuriyagawa Hakuson (auth.) Out of the Ivory Tower, 1932, is very much related to the discussion here and is worth referring to.



Chapter Thirteen China after Cultural Precocity

13.1

Lack of Science as a Result of Cultural Precocity

Our initial efforts were focused on the quest for Chinese democracy, before the mystery of its precocious culture could be revealed; now this has been revealed, what must be first pointed out is that there is no longer a tradition of scientific inquiry. Democracy deals with interpersonal relationships while science arises from the relationship of humans to objects. Once the Chinese people shifted their focus to interpersonal relationships, they could no longer attend to the human-object relationship, let alone delve into it more deeply. Here, we will explain this further. Though science seems not to be completely confined to the study of objects, as there the social sciences exist as well as the natural sciences, scientific study stems from the interaction of humans with objects in their environment. We can also say that science originates from human-object interactions in which objects come into existence only after humans. This is not the place to discuss whether or not objects exist without man, but objects of human knowledge have only existed since humans themselves came into being. Through man’s knowledge of these objects, science emerges. Science is nothing but the accurate and systematic application of human knowledge. As previously stated, the heart-and-mind function is hesitation before action, and the prolongation of hesitation produces the calmness from which knowledge is generated (see Chapter Seven). Observing calmly, when life is no longer strenuous and becomes relaxed, we see space expanding before us and objects appearing before us. This moment marks the very beginning of the perception of objects and also the very beginning of the imparting of knowledge. What we perceive (see) then are objects, from which space may be rationally deduced. Life was not originally tranquil, but perception and rationality are the most tranquil parts of life. Knowledge comes from life; though life was not tranquil, knowledge tended to be extremely tranquil. From knowledge, accuracy and exactitude are obtained. Wait and see, and you will acquire objectivity. Science displays a tendency to follow a natural course and knowledge must acquire objectivity before it can become a science. Concerning material things, gratification is never obtained from what one feels that one has; further investigation into the material nature of things suggests that science embraces the concept of materiality. This

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consists in interpreting what we see around us as objective material facts, so that they can be incorporated into larger reserves of knowledge that can then be organized and codified into a system. Only when knowledge is precise and systematic can it indeed be considered a science. Thus science and matter, or matter and science, are inseparable from each other. Organisms have life, which means that they possess something that goes beyond mere matter. The higher the organism, the more intellectual power it has and the farther away they are from material concerns. As for human beings, their potency is incomparable and it goes without saying that they are far more potent than mere matter. Although we incorporate many organisms and even human beings into scientific research, with the intention of producing precise and systematic knowledge, to be probed into just as matter is probed into, it often turns out that this is not quite possible. Consequently, what we grasp is only the aspect that is concerned with matter, that is, the fraction that is relatively mechanical, to the neglect of the rest. Whether it is biological science or social science, when less can be grasped and more is neglected, the science can attain no exactitude and thus cannot be said to be a science. It is precisely because of this that social science can at most be considered a “quasi science”. On the other hand, if human behaviors or social phenomena are observed only from the perspective of outward actions, without understanding them from the perspective of the affections – a perspective which cannot be gained without experiencing these emotions – then what is the point of conducting research into them? An affective understanding requires a retrospective attitude toward one’s own experience (i.e., this observation should never be directed blindly outward), but more importantly, the matter should be considered empathetically (i.e., the observation should never be thoughtlessly rigid). In particular, applied disciplines such as law, politics and economics can never be separable from human beings’ affective responses and ideal requirements. How can simple objectivity be used as the yardstick to settle the whole matter? In this process, we should look upon others as we would ourselves, and judge others as we would ourselves. This is chiefly a reasonable approach, instead of merely a rational one. Science originates from rationality but what originates from rationality is not categorized as science. The greater part of science consists merely of thoughts (including philosophy and doctrines) but not knowledge. When the Chinese people pursue learning, they tend to elaborate on human affairs while ignoring the logic pertaining to the physical world, which is a well-known approach that the Chinese people adopt to learning. Nine out of ten Chinese books, or perhaps even more, are concerned with

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human affairs, as can be seen from a survey of Chinese publications. Why are the Chinese people so biased toward only one aspect of knowledge? This is the first issue to be addressed. Though Chinese people’s learning is said to be concerned with human affairs, it does not tally with the so-called social science of today, as social science, by following the path of natural science, is based as much as possible on objective research. Concerning this issue, however, the Chinese consistently conduct their research subjectively – which is to say, they adopt a moral point of view, or rather than a practical or artistic perspective. In other words, their objective exposition is infused with subjective evaluation and rarely can pure objective research be seen. Not only is their object of study biased in favor of one aspect, but their attitudes toward research and their application of research methods are also radically different. What is the reason for this? This is the second issue to be addressed. Neglect of these two vital issues would result in ignorance. Note, however, that if we do not avail ourselves of the explanations that have been offered from Chapter Eleven onward, we cannot resolve these issues either. Ever since classes were turned into professions and aristocrats into scholars, in a society, those who undertake mental labor are required to understand human affairs and those who tackle physical labor have been responsible for production. Such a division entails the exclusion of certain material from the Chinese people’s learning. Thus their learning is concerned only with human affairs. Those who are required to understand human affairs were originally engaged in cultivating themselves to ease the burden of others. When they concerned themselves with human affairs, as part of this objective, naturally, they would consistently adopt simply a moral point of view or a purely practical perspective instead of following an objective and scientific path. This was particularly the case during the last two thousand years of history. It was in the society of the last two millennia that China’s ethical standard and professional distinction emerged, and likewise during this period that its academic trend was firmly established, which is widely accepted. (The ethical standard facilitates the learning of self-cultivation for the benefit of others and professional distinctions enable a classification of agriculture, industry and commerce, which are excluded from learning.) As we said earlier, “The seeds of Chinese culture were sown by the Duke of Zhou, monarch of the Zhou States (eleventh century BC-256 BC), and Confucius (551-479 BC) and its fruits were reaped during the Qin and the Han dynasties” (see Chapter Ten). All the issues dealt with in the ensuing two thousand years have likewise been further related outcomes. Prior to the Qin Dynasty, academic learning was not yet well established in China. But since the time of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius, thanks to the absence of

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religion in China and to the early dawn of rationality, the Chinese attitude toward life became significantly different from the mindset of those in other countries. Before the first problem in life is resolved, there arises the second problem along with the second attitude toward life, from which a spirit is derived that is understandably applicable to human affairs to the neglect of the material world. In other words, when it comes to worldly affairs, Chinese culture lacks adequate motivation to deal with them. Because of this, its science is seldom credited with any accomplishments. This does not mean that the Chinese people are not clever, nor does it mean that their culture progresses slowly, but rather, it means that their cultural development has taken a different path. This has been most keenly observed by Zhang Dongsun, who, in his book Knowledge and Culture, presented his argument for why there is such a difference between the academic tradition in China and that in the West, and offered a brilliantly illuminating insight in his explanation. As his views are scattered in different texts, it is difficult to provide citations from the original texts. Here, let me summarize his main ideas, as follows: Syntactically, it can be seen that a sentence in a European language must have a subject and a predicate, and that the main information in a sentence is foregrounded. It can be seen from the perspective of ideology and attitude that when Westerners ask questions, they invariably begin with, “What is it?” so that they can be said to prioritize the “What”, and that the Chinese people invariably ask, “How will it be?” so that they can be said to prioritize the “How”. Science is concerned with objects while history is concerned with things. Westerners value objects highly, and even convert things into objects. The Chinese people, however, value things highly, and even convert objects into things. In English, one of the Western languages, the verb “to be” yields a noun form, “being”, which is related to the notion of the object. Ontology in Western philosophy originates precisely from this. In Chinese thought, however, it seems that there only exists “becoming”, not “being”. Western philosophy dissects an object as if it were penetrating it from above. Chinese philosophy only addresses how one image is related to other images, as if they were horizontally connected with each other. As a logical consequence, people in the West fundamentally adhere to the principle of identity while people in China follow the principle of correlation, paying little heed to identity.

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Philosophically, Westerners begin with ontology and make it one of the issues they take most seriously. The Chinese people, however, never endeavor to make due inquiries into ontology. In the West, whatever happens, cosmology can only serve as a prelude to people’s outlook on life and the two can by no means be merged into one. But in China, cosmology and people’s outlook on life are smelted in the same furnace, or rather, cosmology is simply absorbed into the theory of life. Simply put, it can be said that in China there is practical philosophy, but no pure philosophy.1

The points made above indeed offer a coherent theory. As Zhang points out, there is a discrepancy between the Chinese mentality and that of Westerners. This disparity may not be significant at first, but over time, the repeated subtle mental imprints have ultimately induced them to go their separate ways. Westerners go along the route that leads to the development of science while the Chinese people wend their way toward a lack of accomplishment in science. To put it plainly, Westerners cherish the notion of objects but the Chinese people do not. Although strictly speaking, the notion of objectivity was devised by Western scientists in modern times (starting from the sixteenth century), it originated from ancient times. Some believe that the difference in thought and academic learning between China and the West is merely the difference between the past and the present rather than the difference between China and other countries. Obviously, this is not the case. The disparity in their mentalities that Zhang proposed means that, to put this idea in my own words, Westerners attain the acme of their Reason by taking their own bodies as a starting point. The Chinese, however, attained rationality early and their Reason has been suppressed and restrained. Considering the body as a tool for survival, its pinnacle is Reason. It is just like the blade of a sword. Only when Reason is used can survival be secured to the greatest extent. However, if Reason is directly applied to the purpose of survival, its use will be rather limited. Only when both Reason and physicality are deployed to advance knowledge of the world around us, as the basis on which to resolve problems of survival, can they be put to most effective use. This requires an alteration provided by curiosity or a playful instinct. Curiosity or playfulness, with the gradual development of Reason in biological evolution, is to some extent innate among higher animals and is most advanced among human beings. It is, on one hand, an instinctive interest in the body, with a calmness that differs from Reason, and on the 1 See ZHANG Dongsun, Knowledge and Culture, 1946, especially Chapter Two and Chapter Three of Part III, and Appendices I, II, III and IV, which are of particular importance.

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other hand, a requirement for survival which is independent of the body; curiosity is thus close to the non-action of Reason and serves as a bridge between the body and Reason. In particular, curiosity almost constitutes the end of action and the beginning of quietness. The celebration of learning for learning’s sake is in fact what characterizes knowledge, learning and creation. Westerners have been highly praised as “lovers of wisdom” since antiquity and their science is derived from philosophy. That China lacked science in later generations suggests that it had no philosophy in ancient times. Philosophy is something that is only possessed by Westerners, just as science is only possessed by Westerners. In ancient China, philosophy was nothing more than a by-product of morality, and in ancient India, it was no more than a by-product of religiosity, which means that philosophy has never existed on its own in these two countries. Doesn’t it seem that this difference in thought reflects a difference in attitudes toward life? In terms of academic learning and culture, obviously there was a very early division into different schools of thought in the East and the West. How can this be considered merely the difference between the past and the present? The difference between China and the West in terms of academic learning can also be considered as the difference between the past and the present, however. We did not completely deny this at first. In other words, as a combination of learning and skill, learning can never develop independently of skill, as was common practice in ancient times and has been common practice in present-day China as well. For thousands of years, China has made no distinction between learning and skill. Its so-called scholarship is, on the whole, skill rather than learning, which is the most serious problem it faces. As a result, there has surely been no learning, nor any development of skill in China, which validates the old Chinese saying, “Without learning, how can there be skill?” This was poignantly revealed in my previous book, Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies.2 As to why such practice was 2 My previous book argues: “Elaborated in ancient records were many ideas on certain items related to economics, politics and other matters, but they were all fragmentary and unsystematic. In addition, these ideas were mostly advanced for the purpose of application, and pure theoretical knowledge that did not concern application could hardly be conceived of. All that has been said here about implied applications can at most be considered as acquiring skills, rather than learning. In China, scholarship is mostly concerned with skill instead of learning or even a blend of learning and skill. If there were no agriculture and horticulture, there would be no botany. If there were no medical classics or treatment of diseases, there would be no pathology, not to mention physiology, anatomy, and so on. … Surely the upshot of this would be that there would be no learning, but nor would there be any development of skill, as skill is generated from learning.” See LIANG Shuming Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, 1921 (pp. 26-31).

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common in ancient times, the answer would be: at the beginning, when human beings developed their culture, they started from the body at a time when they were not coolheaded enough to develop Reason. Only by starting from the body and taking this to its logical conclusion can Reason be developed without getting involved in its application, and thus all efforts are devoted to seeking knowledge which then develops into learning. This has been the path that Westerners have followed, the usual sequence being that knowledge is sought and then application develops. Quite beyond people’s expectation, the Chinese people have consistently followed the tradition of their early ancient ancestors. The Chinese people’s inability to separate knowledge from practical use has previously been observed by perceptive personages. As well as Zhang Dongsun, the late Zhang Yin-lin also mentioned this.3 He also added: Many Chinese people firmly believe that Western civilization is essentially a utilitarian civilization and that the Chinese people’s tendency to lag behind in all things – like giving full rein to the role of things, so as to encourage prosperity – results from their not being consistently utilitarian. This is absolutely dead wrong. 4

Actually, what Zhang Yin-lin says here also reveals that he knew only one side of the story. The common misconception was to neglect the fact that academic achievements in the West result from Westerners’ tranquil pursuit of knowledge but never from their anxiety for quick success and instant benefit. Zhang’s denouncement was indeed justifiable. However, if it is asserted solely on this basis that Westerners are not utilitarian but the Chinese people always are – which is a total reversal of “always” versus “generally” – is this fair and just, and is this even the point? Perhaps Zhang himself cannot be sure. This shows that he has not taken into account the twists and turns of human life. Being utilitarian, a manifestation of the human struggle for survival, originates from the needs of the human body. However, when it reaches its apex, it turns into reasonable tranquility, which seems to be inactive. Tranquility is originally the prolongation of hesitation and though it seems to be a form of inaction, it is actually still a 3 In one of his papers, ZHANG Yin-lin said that in the past, the fundamental difference between Chinese culture and Western culture lay in the fact that the Chinese showed far more interest in actual activities than in theoretical activities and that in Chinese ideology, practical value overwhelms conceptual value. For the original text, please refer to the monthly journal Thought and Times, issue 11. 4 See ZHANG Yin-lin’s paper “Cultural Differences between China and the West”, in the monthly journal Thought and Times.

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state of being utilitarian. This explains why Westerners ultimately cannot free themselves from utilitarian impulses. In short, human beings cannot go beyond utilitarianism unless they go beyond the limitations of their physical bodies to the limitlessness of their hearts. Western civilization in modern times, generally speaking, has followed the path that develops bodies as tools (see the preceding chapter) as people regard this as being utilitarian. Is this not reasonable? The fact that learning cannot exist without skills in China certainly results from the lack of tranquility. But this lack of tranquility results from two points: one is the general rule and the other is the variation. Zhang has not made a distinction between them. As a general rule in remote antiquity, physically, people were powerful enough but mentally, they could not yet be considered reasonable. This was obviously not the case in China. How can we make this argument? First, such a physical and mental state can be best exemplified by Edward Jenks’s description in A History of Politics: Westerners, assembling their first government and knowing nothing about voting, experienced a kind of vote meeting and a kind of election contest (see the citation in the preceding chapter) which, I am afraid, would never have occurred in China. On the contrary, urbanity, stateliness and rationality in the place of impulsiveness had been first witnessed in China. To tell the truth, ever since the Duke of Zhou and Confucius brought enlightenment through the ritual of music, the Chinese people’s physical power has been weak rather than strong. Second, calm analysis is less effective than logic and mathematical skill. Logic and epistemology were prevalent during the pre-Qin period, but later on, they became non-existent. What a long time ago it was that Zhou Bi Suan Jing 《周髀》(one of China’s earliest works of mathematics and also a work of astronomy) and Jiuzhang Suanshu 《九 章》(Nine Chapters on the Mathematical Art) were devised; nevertheless, calendar calculation was still reliant on Islam and Westerners. It can be seen from this that it was not the case that China did not enter the stage of Reason, but that it entered the stage of Reason and then retrogressed thereafter. In respect of the eighth feature of Chinese culture in Chapter One, it was pointed out that science bourgeoned in China long ago, but it was not fostered due to this retrogression. It is not unusual for a state to go through a state before arriving at Reason, but it has to be considered a variation for it to actually retrogress. The first point above can be taken as a general rule. The second point can be taken as a variation. How does such a variation come about? Chinese culture, which also follows a general rule, starts from the physical body. But on the occasion of entering the stage of Reason, rationality, which focused on selflessness, was awakened as a dynamic rather than a static state of mind. The dynamism of the physical

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body was then translated into the mental dynamism of rationality and instinctive feeling was imported into rational feeling. It won’t do to say that one replaced the other. However, it is very easy to get them mixed up. Thus, from this lack of advancement in Reason comes the lack of calmness. Subsequently, the following three circumstances arise: As we mentioned before, “Whenever meeting with objects, one is at a loss how to deal with them”, and this has everything to do with this era. This era saw extensive integration between man and nature, unlike in the West where the natural world was closed off and man fought against it. This was the great difference between China and the West in their attitudes toward life, as scholars frequently observe.5 An understanding of objects in the external world requires knowledge, which lies in a clear differentiation between different objects. The Chinese people, however, due to such integration, have greatly repressed their inclination to seek differentiation and determination in the outside world. So in the Chinese academe, invariably chaos supplants differentiation and flexibility replaces definition: that is to say, thought replaces knowledge. The identification of objects is ensured by knowledge, and knowledge comes from the objects in the outside world. As the Chinese have little propensity for knowledge, they cannot obtain a good understanding of objects. The earlier point that “when people’s minds are absorbed in human affairs, they tend to ignore the material world” also has everything to do with this era. At this point, as the interconnectivity between people was readily revealed, the person-to-person relationship was unlikely to be totally concealed by the man-to-object relationship. During the early stage of human civilization, when human beings struggled for survival, objects were prioritized – people were objectified, dealt with as if they were objects. Generally speaking, the man-to-object relationship conceals the personto-person relationship, but China is the only exception in this regard. As I have said, the second issue and the second attitude emerged in China long ago. Chinese culture is unique in that it prioritizes the issue of stability over that of sustenance (see Chapter Eleven), as the late Wan said; this is also 5 To Westerners, man and nature seem to be separate from each other and antagonistic toward each other, but to Chinese people, they are integrated with one another. Dewey talked about this in his speech at Peking University. Additionally, in Renditions under the Wall, his translation of Kuriyagawa Hakuson’s Natural Poetics between Easterners and Westerners, LU Xun discussed this in great detail. ZHANG Dongsun also expressed this idea in his recent book Democracy and Socialism, saying that separating nature from man is the unique feature and major contribution of Western culture. The scholars from both home and abroad who have discussed this are too numerous to list here.

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related to this priority. The habit of cultivating oneself and putting others at ease and the way of training a scholar is likewise based on this priority (on this point, please refer back to Chapter Eleven). Furthermore, the aforementioned effect that “efforts are no longer made to attend to objects, nor is it possible to attend to them” also reflects this era. In this period, the second issue bred the second attitude, which rather than looking at the world in the usual way – looking outward – tends instead to look inward. As my previous book argued: By looking outward, what one encounters is static matter and space. (This is actually an act that turns the universe into matter and space. In particular, it is customarily natural to say that what one encounters is matter and space.) Here, reasonable analysis and division as in scientific categorization can be most harmoniously and conveniently carried out. Looking back at oneself, one will then encounter the life of dynamism and time. (Here “time” connotes a new meaning, which is not the usual meaning as “the segment time”.) Here, reasonable analysis and division cannot be carried out harmoniously and conveniently. In the West, where geniuses and people of surpassing wisdom apply their heart-and-mind and intellect outwardly, they naturally generate material science and scientific approaches, with scientific approaches being universally applicable. In China, however, geniuses and people of great wisdom apply their heart-and-mind and intellect inwardly, i.e., they apply their efforts to their own physical bodies…6

When their heart-and-mind and intellect are applied to their own physical bodies, it means that they no longer attend to objects. To reach an accustomed reflexive understanding of the dynamism of life, even if one makes careful observations, due to the shift of perspectives and the change in one’s train of thought, it is impossible to delve into objects. – In Zhang Dongsun’s words, that will only amount to “horizontal connection” rather than “vertical penetration”. It is to be concluded that only in the West can its own religion develop and thus can its science be fostered. Custom can only witness the conflicts between religion and science without knowing the positive correlation between them. Apart from his elaboration in his book Knowledge and

6 See LIANG Shuming, The Final Consciousness of the Chinese National Liberation Movement, 1933 (p. 77).

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Culture, Zhang Dongsun also cited sources from Western philosophers as evidence: Oswald Spengler said, “There is no Natural science without a precedent Religion” (The Decline of the West, vol. I. p. 380). Alfred North Whitehead also said that the rise of modern science is related to the religious beliefs of the Middle Ages. This, it seems, was confirmed long ago by Western scholars, and I am not the first to suggest this idea. Since science comes from religion, then it can be seen that in Western culture, science and religion are twin flowers.7

This has, for the most part, to do with the train of thought. In fact, were scientific research and its dissemination not ascribable to clergymen? What has to be especially acknowledged is this: scientific progress belongs to the realm of knowledge. In a society, the progress of this realm of knowledge certainly relies on the steadiness of people’s emotions, but in the West, it relies totally on religion. Without religion as a cultural center to maintain society, the rise and development of modern science would have been unimaginable. In contrast, China witnessed an early awakening of rationality and consequently, it has neither religion nor science.

13.2

Good at Rationality but Bad at Reason

Since the Chinese people witnessed the early enlightenment of rationality, they gradually developed a strong sense of rationality but a weaker application of Reason. Westerners, on the contrary, are strong in Reason but weak in rationality. Upon examination, the following points become clear: (1) In the cultural exchange between China and the West, China did indeed transmit certain material inventions to the West, but this only showed that our cultural development was one step ahead of Western culture. Later on, Chinese culture suffered a setback. During the seventeenth century (the late Ming and early Qing dynasties) when Jesuits came to preach their religion in the East, China received the welcome gifts those Jesuits brought with them – astronomy, mathematics, physics, meteorology, geography, physiology, medicine and other technologies – rather than any beliefs about humanity. The Chinese culture that was worshipped so reverently by Westerners in the eighteenth century was only concerned with 7

See Paragraph Nine in Appendix Three, ZHANG Dongsun, Knowledge and Culture, 1946.

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social ideals, ethical organizations and political systems that made sense of human life. Though those Germans and Frenchmen idealized Chinese society, they also saw clearly the deficiency of natural science in China. Since the nineteenth century, this situation has remained unchanged. The Chinese people therefore had a fright when they glimpsed the material development of the West, and at once lost their social and cultural self-confidence. In his speech at the Philosophical Research Society of Peking University in 1920, Dr. Dewey also said that “the Chinese people always attend more to human affairs while Westerners always attend more to nature”, and that in the future, efforts should be made to pursue their integration and communication.8 To perceive what is reasonable – i.e., reason – intuitively is rationality and to verify the physical world objectively is Reason. That China and the West have their own preferences is the first point here. (2) In the West, efforts are made to develop knowledge and to make exhaustive analyses of knowledge itself. This has been the goal of epistemology since Kant. Continual pursuit of both knowledge and calmness enable Westerners to reach the apex of Reason. In China, however, people are inclined to rationality, valuing ties of friendship instead of knowledge, and when Wang Yangming’s philosophy was advanced, it attained a level never seen before. It follows the dictates of one’s conscience and values one’s diligence in action (i.e., it emphasizes the unity of knowing and doing). Conscience gains nothing from acquired knowledge, and diligence in action entails the opposite of calmness. Being conscious of conscience is, invariably, a matter of likes and dislikes, though myriad changes may occur. The type of action in the expression “intelligence in action” refers only to the implementation and practice of such likes and dislikes. That China and the West, lying far apart from each other, each go to their respective extremes, is the second point. (3) Since antiquity, Westerners have been dependent on religion. They know what sins and blessings are but not what is right and wrong. But from ancient times, due to China’s lack of religion, the consciousness of the Chinese people has been greatly enlightened by the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius and whatever they do has consistently been driven by conscience and rationality. Should there be anything we dare not do, it must be something we feel ashamed to do: it is unreasonable to do it since we know 8 In the ninth year of the Republic of China (i.e., the year 1920) when Dewey came to China, he made a speech at the Philosophical Research Society of Peking University in which he made a particular point of this remark. ZHANG Shenfu tried to translate this remark as “harmony between man and nature”, which does not seem to fully capture the sense.

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it is wrong to do it. Westerners, however, fear going against admonitions or offending God. In Europe, a person with no religious belief is deemed someone who would act against law and public opinion, and who is immoral. So, after his trip to China, Russell sighed deeply that the Chinese people have no concept of “sin”. He added also that in China, “suspicion about religion” does not arouse a corresponding “moral suspicion”, as commonly seen in Europe.9 Here, the weakness of rationality can be clearly seen. It was not until the later religious reforms that people’s consciousness was awakened. However, due to the so-called “rationalism” of the West and the so-called “school of rationalism” in Continental philosophy, the eighteenth century was referred to by historians as “The Age of Reason” or “The Age of Enlightenment”. Compared with this so-called “rationalism”, the heartand-mind could not yet make any clear impression amid the strong bias toward Reason. It can be seen that the great change that has occurred in the ethos of modern times is derived merely from the pursuit of earthly happiness. Though philosophies have emerged as a replacement for religion, the most popular philosophy is the down-to-earth thought represented by utilitarianism, eudaemonism, instrumentalism and pragmatism, for example. In highlighting the necessity of establishing individual freedom and safeguarding individual rights, this philosophy serves to delimit desirable activities before they are taken to extremes. When speaking of economy, we take economy as the starting point. When speaking of law, we take rights and interests as standard. When speaking of politics, we only seek the satisfaction of public and private desires. In short, life centers round desire and Reason is used only for calculating gains and losses. The difference between this and life in the Middle Ages lies only in the fact that its sins and blessings are replaced by gains and losses and its admonitions are replaced by law. Both the concept of gains and losses and the notion of sins and blessings share a common thread and they have undergone no radical changes. Doesn’t the West still lack righteousness and benefit, right and wrong, and a strong desire for self-fulfillment? China’s national spirit, as we said in Chapter Seven, is simply “a strong desire for self-fulfillment and a deep instinct for caring for each other in interpersonal relationships”. Thus the merits and demerits of the respective notions of rationality in China and the West constitute the third point. (4) The Chinese are keen on reasoning with others; even religions, instead of simply accepting the system of names, specific ceremonial forms and 9 See ZHAO Wenrui (trans.) Bertrand Russell (auth.). The Problem of China, 1924 (pp. 35 and 189).

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superficial relationships, try to discover the reasons behind them. Often, people try to integrate all the major religions, as indicated by the earlier theory of “three religions originating from the same source” and the current theory of “five religions being combined into one”. Cases like these abound. They tend to say, “Religions are many, but reason is one”. This of course sounds rather ludicrous, but it shows plainly that the Chinese actually believe directly in reasoning but only indirectly in religion. In other words, such abstract comprehension represents the epitome of the development of rationality. The development of rationality, however, is not amply sufficient to remedy its inadequacy in Reason and many childish and ignorant superstitious practices are still in vogue even among educated people. In the West, on the contrary, though morality cannot replace religion, science can replace superstition. Their respective strengths and weaknesses on this score constitute the fourth point. (5) Reasoning with others is incompatible with pugnacity. Between two parties involved in a quarrel, if one party takes the initiative to use force, bystanders will instantly disapprove of what he does, even though this party may be in the right. As common sense dictates that we should reason with others in an unhurried manner so that things can be made clear, any use of force denotes unreasonableness and unreasonableness is a glaring fault. The virtue of being ashamed of practicing violence was admired deeply by perceptive visitors from abroad, such as Bertrand Russell: If any nation in the world could ever be “too proud to fight”, that nation would be China. The natural Chinese attitude is one of tolerance and friendliness, showing courtesy and expecting it in return … The ethical qualities of the Chinese people are supreme. … Among these qualities I place first the pacific temper, which seeks to settle disputes on grounds of justice rather than by force.10

Russell’s admiration for China arose from his self-enlightenment about the drawbacks of the West. Formerly, uneducated people, as they were stimulated more by impulse than by Reason and did not know right from wrong in a dispute, often had their final say in a duel. This practice remained commonplace in Europe until early modern times, both among individuals and in public. This can be seen from Edward Jenks’s A History of Politics. The

10 See ZHAO Wenrui (trans.) Bertrand Russell (auth.). The Problem of China, 1924 (p. 192).

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election campaign in the old days as quoted above is one of these examples. As Edward Jenks says in his book, When winners win, losers remain silent. If two parties arrive at a stalemate, there must be a fight between them for the final outcome. Even if sometimes the person in the wrong defeats the one in the right, it should be the end of the election.

What Edward Jenks says conforms exactly to the saying, “Might is right”. Since there is so much progress toward civilization, the idea of witnessing a bloody duel seems unthinkable. However, between laborers and capitalists in industry, one party uses strikes as a means of redress and the other party uses factory closures as a weapon to settle their disputes. It is clear from this that everything is settled by force rather than by reason, and right from wrong is decided by victory over defeat. Such a practice has spread so far and wide that even young people in today’s China pepper their speech and writing with the word “fight” – mimicking the Bolsheviks – which had never been seen before the Northern Expedition in China. The respective merits and demerits of China and the West in regard to rationality constitute this fifth point. These five points, though by no means exhaustive, have addressed the main issues. But if we want to figure out the advantage of the rationality practiced in the West over that practiced in China, we can also add one more point, which is this: superficial as rationality in the West is, it develops as society develops, quite unlike rationality practiced in China, which is precocious. When rationality is precocious, it is often the case that though there are clear ideals, the facts are too numerous to take in. It can often be witnessed among only a small number of people but is never popularized in an entire society, especially with a lack of objectivity to guarantee it, so it naturally becomes precarious. If rationality is gradually developed, it follows a path from instinct to reason and from body to soul. Thus it becomes steady and reliable instead of being otherwise. Such precocity is a malady, as we will explain below.

13.3

Stagnation of Progress in China

As we discussed in Chapter Eleven, China went through a cycle of governance and chaos, without revolution and without any sort of industrial revolution taking root. It can now be understood that the lack of an industrial revolution

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may be attributed to the lack of science. In terms of the heart-and-mind, the divergent routes taken by China and the West have resulted in totally different cultural outcomes. Though China witnessed the germination of science before it opted for this path, in the end, its science died young with no possibility at all of being able to thrive when China eventually did take a different route. In the meantime, in their pursuit of erudition people were committed to achieving self-betterment and promoting others’ welfare, whereas technologies related to agriculture, industry and commerce were excluded from their development and placed beyond the remit of those who used their brains. In their academic research, they tackled elusive topics that were limited in scope, circling round and round without making any progress. On the other hand, as sectors such as agriculture, industry and commerce could not be promoted by academic research, there was no means of facilitating their progress. Their academic endeavors are isolated from economic needs, placing both of them in a hopeless situation, so that the Chinese view on the first issue in human life remains the same as it was before the Industrial Revolution. For clarification, let’s consider the contrast by using the following table: People in the West

People in China

(1) In terms of the heart-and-mind, they are motivated more by Reason. (2) Viewing everything in terms of objects, they tend to treat human beings as objects. (3) Scientific knowledge is greatly developed. (4) They integrate scientific research with sectors such as agriculture, industry and commerce. (5) Their academic research facilitates the development of agriculture, industry and commerce, which in turn stimulates further research. The cycle of mutual promotion between academic research and economy ensures the intensive exploration of nature. Consequently, the great strides that Westerners have made with regard to the first issue of human life have to date enabled them to come near to achieving the momentous accomplishments in the first phase of human culture.

(1) In terms of the heart-and-mind, they are motivated more by rationality. (2) By ignoring objects, they value human beings. (3) Scientific knowledge has advanced little. (4) They exclude sectors such as agriculture, industry and commerce from their academic research. (5) Their academic research stagnates and in general its economy also stagnates. In addition, as their academic efforts and social economy tend to be isolated from each other, they rarely facilitate one another’s development. On the contrary, they foster a prolonged stagnation. As the Chinese people languish in a holding pattern (i.e., a sort of limbo or a loop) as regards the first issue in human life and only meagre accomplishments have been achieved in the first phase of human culture, there is little hope of them attaining further achievements.

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When we say that “their academic thoughts and social economy tend to be isolated from each other” and that “they rarely facilitate each other’s development”, this is exemplified by such cases as Confucian Classics Studies in the Western Han and the Eastern Han dynasties, Idle Talk in the Wei and the Jin dynasties, neo-Confucianism in the Song and the Ming dynasties, and Textual Research and Poetry and Prose Studies in later generations. But additionally, aren’t things like China’s ethicized economy, its ethicized politics and its inward-looking life powerful factors that impede the progress of the Chinese people with regard to the first issue of human life? This has already been explored in Section 11.3 above. Various factors combine to emphatically prevent the Chinese people from making any progress in the first issue of human life. Where do these many factors come from? They are simply the result of one fundamental event – the early enlightenment into rationality. This acts as a trigger for the second issue and the second attitude in human life. If a people progresses toward the second phase of human culture, the first phase will be passively suspended and actively impeded. One more question, then, is this: If the route through the second phase comes to a dead end, can they then return to the first? This is likewise impossible. Returning to the second route having taken the f irst one means returning from rationality to the focus on the physical body and the replacement of an inward-looking life with an outward-looking life. This is tantamount to retrogression in human life and it would prevent anyone from transcending the initial focus on the physical body. In Chinese history, this has been considered a reversion. One cannot return either to the state in which one was never nurtured, through rationality. In other words, this would simply turn accomplishment to destruction. This can be seen from Chapter Nine (The Collapse of Feudalism in China) and Chapter Eleven (“Periods of Chaos in China”). As there was no possibility of either progress or regression, the only option is circling around, for with biological phenomena things are never at a total standstill. In Chinese history, the alternation between governance and chaos certainly suggests that they are caught in a cycle. But when there is no progress, if both economy and academic research are circling around, that is indeed a curiosity in human culture. I pointed this out a long time ago in one of my previous books: He can never retrace his steps along the first route, which is followed by Westerners, nor can he go along the third route, which is followed by Indians. If no external force is brought in and the environment remains unchanged, he will remain the same forever! … From then on, there is

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hardly a way out. Even if there is, it is perfunctory. What an indescribable malady!11

Observed purely from the economic point of view, the Chinese society of the past two thousand years was undoubtedly a state somewhere between a feudal society and a capitalist society. Of course, perhaps it was transitioning from feudalism to capitalism. But why is it always in transition without ever actually achieving transition? Those who refuse to plot a third route beyond feudalism and capitalism feel disconcerted if they are unable to resolve this problem. Yet those who have actually plotted a third route (one such example here is the theory of “the pre-capitalist production method” established by Li Ji) still feel unsure that they have resolved the problem. All these suggest that circling around economically is mistaken for slow progress and that the particular is disguised as the norm. If historical materialism cannot be properly understood but one’s own views are stubbornly adhered to, people will naturally be caught up in this obstruction. I also pointed out in another book of mine that the reason for this circling around lies in reciprocal impediment. In the light of this social situation, there is indeed the necessity of making people adopt the second attitude towards life. But whether there is possibility of making them do so is hard to say. Here at least two problemrelated issues may arise: The first issue is that in one’s lifetime, it tends to be easy to ascertain the first attitude but difficult to ascertain the second one … The second issue is that it is naturally necessary to adopt the second attitude, but the first attitude is also necessary at the same time. In terms of interpersonal relationships (which is the second issue), though, naturally, adopting the second attitude is necessary; the first attitude can almost be inapplicable. – This is the difference between Chinese society and Western society. In terms of the relationship between people and objects (which is the first issue), however, it is necessary to adopt the first attitude but the second attitude is inapplicable. – Here no difference exists between Chinese society and Western society. Due to the alternation between these two necessities and also the two attitudes, for thousands of years, people in China thus suffer reciprocal impediment and self-contradiction. Among the above two problem-related issues, though the second attitude is what the Chinese people endeavor to attain but 11 See LIANG Shuming, Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, 1921 (p. 203).

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sometimes fail to preserve, for thousands of years, the frequent alternation between governance and periods of chaos in Chinese society best exemplifies this.12 … It is observed that since another route (the second route) has been taken, both the lack of industrial revolution and the lack of industrial capital must be attributed to a certain cause. What is more, it is seen that the route that was left behind (the first route) has been abandoned and that the other route, which was the one that has been taken, ultimately has also its limitations and stops within the bounds of possibility. At the same time, due to its impediment, there is no way to recover the second route, as mentioned above. Thus the reciprocal impediment results in a desperate situation.13

It must be specifically pointed out that when there are only professions but no classes, this will be a society instead of a state, the latter being the eventual destination. If the first route is followed, this destination will ultimately be reached. The Chinese, however, simply did not follow the first route but proceeded directly to the second route, turning classes into professions and merging the State into the society. This might achieve the entry into the second phase of culture, but due to the limitation of the mean achievement in the first phase, there is no possibility of integrating mental work with physical labor. Consequently, the only option is to dismantle the classes while precluding the possibility of becoming a classless society. This is what is meant by the earlier expression “stopping within the bounds of possibility”. When there is a professional division between mental work and physical labor, it ushers in an era in which academic thought is isolated from social economy, in which the heart-and-mind is focused only on self-cultivation for the sake of putting others at ease instead of on material production. While this former aspect (the process of making classes into professions), due to its entry into the second phase, closes off the first route, the latter aspect (isolating academic from social development), due to the insufficiency of the first phase, cuts off the second route. If efforts are made to return to the first route, the process of turning classes into professions will be hindered by rational progress (as neither 12 See LIANG Shuming, The Final Consciousness of the Chinese National Liberation Movement, 1933 (p. 85). 13 See LIANG Shuming, The Final Consciousness of the Chinese National Liberation Movement, 1933 (p. 95).

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political monopoly nor economic monopoly is permitted), preventing any reversion. If efforts are made to proceed any further along the second route, no actual merging of mental work and physical labor (in terms of great progress of production technology) can be expected to arise. This is what I have called “the reciprocal impediment”. The cases of such reciprocal impediment abound and they can be readily perceived through careful observation. For the Chinese people, the superiority and preeminence of their intelligence, their incomparably huge number, and their very long history stretching back to the Qin and the Han dynasties, oblige them in cultural terms to follow the beaten track without witnessing any further innovations. Should there be no such reciprocal impediment that wears down their wits within themselves, where would their wits be directed then? Yet this reciprocal impediment cannot be eliminated because its resistance is so strong.

13.4

Five Maladies in Chinese Culture

Chinese culture, which was originally obsessed only with the malady of precocity, was described metaphorically in one of my previous books: It can be compared to a person whose mental growth should correspond to his physical growth, or, alternatively, whose mentality should develop as his physical body develops. But China, just like a clever child, is physically immature, but mentally precocious. In other words, the precocity of his wits in turn represses his physical growth, which results in the unsound growth of his mentality as well as the unsound growth of his physical body.14

Though there is only one malady, its symptoms are of five types: (1) Naivety. – Chinese culture is, in fact, a mature culture. However, it sometimes appears to be naive. For example, the subordination in interpersonal relationships, a symbol of the feudal society, still endures in Chinese society. Children belong to their parents, and women belong to their husbands. Even masters and slaves still exist in many places. This fully explains why China, though it is now neither a patriarchal society nor a feudal society, is nevertheless always considered to be a patriarchal 14 See LIANG Shuming, The Final Consciousness of the Chinese National Liberation Movement, 1933 (p. 95).

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society or a feudal society. In fact, it follows the track that highlights ethics and the bonds of interpersonal relationships. It rarely witnesses excessive oppression or interference, such as occurred in the Middle Ages in the West, nor has it witnessed any definite establishment of personal freedom, like that of the modern West. It does not take freedom as the only criteria for self-fulfillment, as I discussed in the preceding chapter, and individuals will never be visible. Consequently, a trace of patriarchal feudalism has to some extent been left intact. As I mentioned before, not a few naive and ridiculous superstitions persist among the people, and this also seems to be symbolic of cultural naivety. In fact, the ancient Chinese were already very open-minded, even as far back as two or three thousand years ago, which made them unlike people of any other nation, and they had far fewer myths and superstitions than people of other countries or regions. But as China failed to take the road that would lead to science, to put nature to the test and generate authentic knowledge, this enabled many of these naive superstitions to remain current, rather than being obliterated. Other examples of this kind are too numerous to recount here. In short, China, whose culture is inherently not naive, exhibits some naive features, especially in terms of the tangible or substantial aspects of culture. The commonly held view that China’s malady is represented by its insistence on remaining both naive and backward is not factual. In fact, if China were merely a society that had yet to make any progress, wouldn’t all its problems have been resolved a long time ago, without all these troubles it faces today? (2) Senility. – Chinese culture originally maintained its vitality, which was unparalleled by any other societies. However, due to its diffusion over the centuries, its vitality has gradually declined and that is what I have here called caducity. Take riding a bicycle as an example. When we begin learning to ride a bicycle, it is crucial to look attentively and warily right and left. As long practice becomes second nature, consciousness is filtered out and the action becomes mechanical. Only by complying with the necessity of mechanical repetition can we exert our efforts to attain a more advanced stage, where we can perform various ingenious acrobatics on the bicycle. The same is also true of society. Often, many things which are suitable for practical use through retention and transmission have become customary. From one perspective, this is especially convenient for social life, which is good. But from another perspective, due to their mechanical and rigid quality, these customs become such ingrained habits that they simply cannot be cast off, which is bad. Chinese culture possesses neither a severe and uncompromising religion nor a stringent law, but all possible efforts

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are exerted to forge the bonds of human relationships and this practice has already developed into a ritual or custom. Initially, its social organization and social order were loose and flexible. But due to the slow progress of long-term mechanization, its severity is more powerful than religion, and its stringency and inexorability perhaps exceed those of the law. That explains why, when a new ideological trend emerged between 1918 and 1919, it was condemned as “the cannibalistic ethics”. For example, children must practice filial piety out of respect for their parents, and women must observe chastity out of respect for their husbands. From the view of basic spontaneous acts of affability, they indeed show a magnanimous spirit and this can never be censured. However, because later on, such practices cater to the needs of the society, they are bestowed and diffused widely and thus become a means of maintaining social order. As their primeval elements are stripped of their spirituality, such practices come to be mechanized and formalized, and become dull and uninteresting. In the meantime, people will become obstinate and uncompromising, leaving no room for discussion, for suspicion or for even the slightest offence. Should there be any offence taken, society will severely oppress it and even crack down on it. But the moment it is inspired by the fresh air represented by Western thought, society naturally suffers detestation and resistance from the people. The detestation arises from lack of comprehension of its implications and the resistance results from the unwillingness to submit to such mandatory oppression. If Chinese culture were still in its initial stage, when it was still growing and its etiquettes and customs were just taking shape, and its tastes were kept fresh with no lack of conscientiousness, there would never be such protests. In this regard, China’s malady may be entirely attributed to its caducity. (3) Inability to resolve issues. – Western culture, which is based on the needs of the body, aligns easily with reality. Chinese culture is founded to a greater extent on the activity of the mind and it inevitably encounters more ideals than facts, thus being obsessed with the malady of its inability to resolve issues. What is reality? What is an ideal? Reality consists in two things, nothing more: one is the gain derived from benefits, and the other is the force derived from power. Powers enable people to pursue benefits, which in turn bestow powers. Both powers and benefits undergo cyclical development and they can be merged into one. That is just what the culture based on the physical is dedicated to. It can be said, then, that Western culture keeps to the path of realism. Conversely, if a culture sets out from rationality with no consideration of reality, it is based on an ideal. The Chinese culture – the society and the lives of the Chinese

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people – which is based on the activities of the mind, keeps to this very road.15 Kindness, filial piety, benevolence and righteousness, which originally were no more than the criteria of rationality, developed so prominently that they became etiquettes and customs, with the purpose of merely showing that they are upheld as ideals. However, the Chinese people essentially depend on these for their social organization and social order, with no explicit objective criteria. This is the root for China’s inability to settle issues. China’s political system, for example, is considered one part of its rites. To say that it is either autocratic or democratic is equally inappropriate. Since it never adopted democracy as one of its rites, how could it take autocracy as one of its rites? But in actuality, it might unavoidably become autocratic, which was not something that was originally intended. When the law works as it was originally intended, it works with a high degree of rationality, but this is relatively unusual. As has been previously mentioned, China’s social order is consistently self-maintaining. It never resorts to coercive force, which can be clearly seen. This is something that Westerners could never dream of. However, in China there are fewer periods of peace and more times of trouble. Indeed, the absence of internal disorder that has endured for nearly two hundred years in places like Western Europe is something we could never dream of. When describing Chinese culture, we certainly cannot base this on the situation in periods of chaos but rather we discuss the approach to running a state, and the periods of peace and prosperity. But I would think that such a description would contain more ideals than 15 ZHANG Dongsun’s recent book Democracy and Socialism contains the following paragraph (p. 17): “European liberalism stems from their resistance to freedom. For example, the so-called ‘Great Charter Movement’ in England in 1215 only established a number of trivial matters which reflected the actual circumstances at that time. Likewise, ‘the Human Rights Code’ in 1789 listed only certain cases which involved the incursion of the monarch upon the Parliament, so as to prevent the monarch from repeating this incursion. As I write, it suddenly occurs to me that the situation in China is the exact opposite of that in the West. Westerners actually undo or reject one fact after another if they infringe upon their freedom and then realize all the abstract senses of freedom. In China, however, ever since the 1911 Revolution, it is the ruler himself who promulgates an abstract constitution of freedom, but it is still he who actually infringes on the freedom of the people, one by one.” Zhang’s view – that Westerners’ abstract concept emerged later but that the reverse is true of China – naturally holds water. Illustrating this with reference to the period after 1911 as the only example suggests that he has not yet understood that Western culture is a culture of the body but Chinese culture is a culture of the mind. In other words, one culture progresses from reality to rationality, with abstract ideas coming last, while the other culture progresses from rationality to reality, with ideas coming first. Western culture and Chinese culture differ so much from each other.

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facts. I often say that democracy in China exists as an idea, but in the West it exists as a fact. In the former case, though the idea is there, it is not put into action as a fact. Even if the idea is brilliant, it settles no issues. In the latter case, since it has become a fact, the idea has become visible. Though perhaps there is minimal significance, it has a stable foundation. This shows that in the West, it is from reality (i.e., the reality of benefits and powers) that rationality develops. The Chinese, however, avoid mentioning powers and are ashamed of talking about benefits, with the result that neither benefits nor powers can develop. They shy away from reality and publicize their ideals. In the end, ideals remain only ideals and the reality remains the reality. The Chinese culture is a culture that seems perpetually unable to resolve issues. (4) Negativity, with no promise for the future. – Related to the malady of being unable to settle issues is another malady – the malady of being negative. As for the idea of politics as power, perhaps more to the point, however, this will not be accepted unless it incorporates a modicum of rationality. Similarly, the idea of economy as benefits must always integrate some sense of rationality. In brief, human affairs are never entirely without rationality; it is simply a matter of degree. With the advance of human culture, benefits, powers and ideas undergo cyclic progressions. However, on the one hand, with daily awakening of rationality, the status of benefits and of powers decreases gradually. On the other hand, as benefits thrive, people’s needs are gradually all satisfied and then benefits are no longer of significance. With the proliferation of powers, people all gain their own reserves of power and then it is diff icult to subdue others through the use of such powers. In the end, socialism has been endorsed in economic practice, and democracy in political practice. This means that benefits, powers and ideas are all augmented and enriched, but rationality assumes the highest importance, retaining the decisive power. As Western countries progress by following a realist road and can gradually reach such a stage in their development, Western culture is positive. China, however, due to the early dawn of its rationality, views ethics as its benefits and thus becomes economically underdeveloped: with its economy becoming less and less active, it loses its opportunity to achieve further development and progress. In addition, it obscures its power in ethics and thus becomes politically underdeveloped: with its politics stuck in a cycle, it loses its opportunity to achieve further development and progress here, too. China seems to be strong in rationality rather than in the acquisition of benefits and powers, but Reason cannot play its role without these benefits and powers. Thus Reason cannot ultimately be enacted, and when a perfunctory attitude to

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Reason is taken, the lofty ideals of rationality have to be abandoned. This explains why Chinese culture often appears negative. On the other hand, it does not predict a brilliant future, either. (5) Equivocation and obscurity. – A contrast between Chinese culture and other cultures (e.g., Western culture) will make one feel acutely that Chinese culture “cannot be understood clearly” or “cannot be figured out neatly”. Take religion, for example. Westerners have religions; this is as clear as day. Chinese people, however, might seem to have religions, or no religions, or many religions. There never seems to be a definite answer. Similarly, take freedom as another example. When we say that Westerners were not free in ancient times, they did not, indeed, have any freedom at all. When we say that Westerners have freedom in modern times, they do, indeed, have freedom. This is crystal clear and absolutely accurate. But looking at China, it seems that Chinese people seem to enjoy freedom, or no freedom, or too much freedom. Other questions we can ask include: Is China a state or not? Does it have classes or does it have no classes? Is it feudal or non-feudal? Is it patriarchal or not patriarchal? Is it democratic or undemocratic? …All these questions can be easily answered in the West, but in China, just one of these questions might provoke an endless debate and tens of millions of words. This can be attributed to the hybrid nature of its high and low culture on the one hand and to its historical progress and regression on the other hand. This malady, which was characterized by ambiguity and obscurity, results in the same unvarying situation.



Chapter Fourteen Conclusion

14.1

Summary of Previously Discussed Characteristics

From where we began in Chapter One, which enumerated fourteen key features of Chinese culture, taking in everything we have discussed since, this book now comes to its conclusion. All in all, Chinese culture is concerned with only one issue – the early enlightenment into rationality through cultural precocity. Here, let me bring together what has been discussed in the previous chapters so as to make my point clearer. (1) Very clearly, the twelfth feature of Chinese culture, the so-called “culture without soldiers”, is a consequence of its eleventh feature, “being unlike the usual type of state”. This is explained in Chapter Nine, and I will not discuss it further here. (2) China’s dissimilarity from the common type of state can be attributed to its integration of the state into society, which is also discussed in Chapter Nine. How, then, does it achieve this fusion? This is firstly due to the fact that in the earliest stages of history, both family life and group-centered life were essential. The Chinese people display a preference for family life while Westerners show a preference for group-centered life. They have each chosen their own route. By living a group-centered life, the West has come to embrace statehood; by living a family life, China has cultivated its own kind of society. This has been discussed above in Chapter Three and Chapter Four. However, if a certain group’s social life is confined only to family life, or its society is purely family-centered, it is impossible for that group to become powerful, and especially to achieve sufficient growth. Its many weaknesses mean it cannot survive long in this competitive world. In other words, in the evolutionary process, the survival of the f ittest should benefit the powerful, huge group. It is not difficult to understand why the Chinese people lack group-centered life, but it is more difficult to understand how Chinese culture can have survived so long despite its lack of group organization. What is more, the Chinese people can attain alarming development. What is the reason for this? Here we come to the second reason – the early rational enlightenment achieved in China. Since China received its moral codes through the Duke of Zhou’s Rituals and through Confucianism, the broadly patriarchal system of ancient times has evolved into a special type of ethical system, and China’s ethics-orientedness has replaced its family-centeredness. Ethics education starts in the family home but extends far beyond the family, on a grander scale and with a more

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intense consciousness. It would have been impossible for a family-centered society to survive unchanging until the present day, but an ethics-oriented society has much more potential. For more on this argument, see Chapter Five and Chapter Six. However, though China and the West diverged from each other a long time ago, this divergence was not so distinct in the early days. The China in which the Duke of Zhou’s Rituals and Confucianism emerged, during the feudal period, was like a state. The Seven Powers in the Warring States Period, on the one hand, were more like different states, but on the other hand, they suggested the beginning of the fusion of different states. Not until Zhou’s Rituals and Confucianism took effect was feudalism overthrown, with classes being replaced by professions and the state being fused into society. This is explored in more detail in Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine. (3) My answer to the question of why China is not like a state also explains why families are so important to the Chinese people. This is the seventh feature of Chinese culture. Perhaps it is just family affection, the parent-child relationship and the notion of fraternity that have made China into an ethicsoriented society rather than a geographical state with class rule. Moreover, it is precisely the lack of group organization that is key to this way of living, since people have to depend on family members and relatives, bound by ethical obligations. As well as the aforementioned chapters, Chapter Two and Chapter Ten also consider answers to this question. (4) The so-called “democracy” of the modern West requires that people have the right to participate in state affairs and the right to freedom, both of which are an outcome of the improvement of the status of individuals in collective life. In this sense, the lack of democracy in China, which is the ninth feature of its culture, originates from the lack of groups rather than from the state. Never, however, should it be mistaken for a lack of democracy in China due to too much pressure from the State on its citizens. The reasons for this have been examined in Chapter Twelve. (5) Group-centered life or family life – people can only choose one of them. The close attachment between family members and between father and son in a Chinese family is not usually found in families in the West, but equally, the strong, demonstrative sentiment that citizens in the West have toward their state cannot usually be found among people in China. Why China and the West diverge so dramatically from each other on this point stems from the difference between the respective moral outlooks represented by Zhou’s Rituals and Confucianism in China and by Christianity in the West. Thus I argue that religion constitutes the divide between Chinese culture and Western culture. For discussion of

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these issues, see Chapter Three, Chapter Four, Chapter Five and Chapter Six respectively. Generally speaking, culture develops around religion. Chinese culture is an exception, however. To summarize the sixth feature of Chinese culture, religion is replaced by the non-religious morality of Zhou’s Rituals and Confucianism. As we know, religion as a sentiment did not arise from Reason and moreover, it is far from rational. Likewise, the moral code of Zhou’s Rituals and Confucianism did not arise from Reason either. Yet though this was indeed based on sentiment, it is not so far removed from Reason. This is what we might call the “rationality” of this type of morality. Rationality is no more than the acknowledgement of human relationships. People who believe in religion tend to be fanatic and bigoted, and sometimes they can become unreasonable or even inhuman. Therefore, the Duke of Zhou and Confucius sang the praises of human life and attached great importance to human relations, exactly the opposite of those who tend to leave their families. In religious life, the way to move or to touch people is invariably something out of the ordinary. The moral code of Zhou’s Rituals and Confucianism, however, which carries connotations of amiable relations, does not have to move or to touch people but no one can escape it. When this moral outlook assumes a position as a major element of culture, we might say that morality functions as religion (see Chapter Six). Thus Chapter Seven, on the one hand, elaborates on the sixth feature (lack of religion), and on the other hand, illustrates the tenth feature, “moral outlook, with morality dominating culture or a moral atmosphere pervading the culture”. (6) In the medieval period, Western society relied on religion but in modern times, it relies on the law. In my view, however, Chinese society relies on morality in place of religion and on etiquette in place of the law. In a comparison of the two cultures, this means that the West took the path of religion and the law while China took the path of morality and etiquette. The formation of a group is stimulated by religion in the first instance, while the law determines the group’s structure and order. Thus religion and the law are closely related. Morality differs from religion in that it is based on self-consciousness and self-discipline, rather than observing commandments from God. Etiquette differs from the law in that it evolves naturally in society through a gradual process instead of being imposed on a state. These two points are consistent in principle. The vast difference between the ancient Chinese people and the ordinary non-Chinese is due to their trust in people themselves, observing the brightness and the honor of the human soul. Such fundamental consistency clearly suggests that the Chinese people rely on internal force, as opposed to external forces, to which Westerners must

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resort. What I talk about an “early rational enlightenment”, I mean just this. This is covered in more detail in Chapter Six, Chapter Seven, Chapter Ten, Chapter Eleven and Chapter Twelve. Only rationality can be considered the genuine motivation for morality in human life. (7) What do we mean by “self-consciousness” and “self-discipline”? Knowing when to value good and loathe evil is called “self-consciousness”, and doing only what one likes on the basis of self-consciousness is called “self-discipline”. For example, if I love fairness but detest unfairness, I will follow my own inclination, not because I yield to any external force or am tempted by anything profitable, or I will change my mind if I choose, again not due to any external force or promise of profit. This is a good case in point. Rationality, then, refers to the natural orderliness of self-consciousness and self-discipline, and unity refers to the integration of self-consciousness and self-discipline. Morality, which is based on rationality as the ideal state of being, is the highest expression of human life. Quite beyond expectations, the ancient Chinese kept social order by relying on morality, resorting to neither law nor punishment.1 As Mencius said, “Never do what you are incapable of doing, and never desire what you detest having.” Thus, since the Chinese trust people, they love them; as they love people, they trust them. Such a broad view of the world was indeed rare. Having developed on the basis of such a view, Chinese culture over the past three thousand years thus differs from any other culture in the world. In those other cultures, wherever possible, people try by any means to strike a balance between power and profit. They take advantage of their power to extract the maximum profit, which in turn facilitates the increase in their power. Their power will then help them reap higher profits, which will further help them augment their power. Such a cycle will never end, and profits and power become one and the same. Observed from the perspective of the existence and evolution of living things, this is exactly what happens. Any human culture originates from the human body, China’s differences from other nations include first, being passive politically, and second, being passive economically. Politically speaking, China, as it lacked group-centered life, was not like a state. Thus, as it was basically very passive politically, it did not witness any development in politics. Why did this happen? As we know, groups arise from 1 To better understand this principle, we may refer to The Analects of Confucius: “If the people are guided by law and kept in order by punishment, they may try to avoid crime, but have no sense of shame. If they are guided by virtue, and kept in order by the rules of propriety, they will have a sense of shame, and moreover will come to be good.”

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struggle, and states originate with the establishment of military forces. So a thorough understanding of “politics” can only be acquired from an understanding of “power relations”. Though the Chinese people cannot simply transcend the cycle of benefits and power, it is by no means the case that they accomplished nothing concerning the use of power. This reveals what people secretly aspired to, and it also inspired people to compete for the knowledge of how to enlarge their political power amid the chaos. This was the case during the period from antiquity to just before the start of the Warring States Period, when classes were not quite solidified and lacked boundaries. After the Warring States Period until toward the end of the Qing Dynasty, the classes were transformed into professions and peaceful coexistence between different classes or professions replaced the government through class divisions. The repetition over the past two thousand years of the cycle of governance and chaos, without any revolution and with no political progress, can be attributed to this transformation, as we discussed in Chapters Nine to Thirteen. Economically speaking, agriculture, industry and commerce were not researched as scientific disciplines, for scholars showed no interest in these activities. Academic endeavor and social economy tended to be isolated from each other, and neither of them was usually conducive to the other. China’s economic stagnation over the past two thousand years stems directly from this impasse, as we discussed in Chapter Eleven. The indirect cause of this economic stagnation is more decisive, however: the premature death of science in China. How was it possible for China to accomplish nothing in science for so long? As we have seen, the foundation of the human sciences is reason, but the foundation of human morality is rationality. Morality and science do not clash with each other and rationality and Reason do not go against each other. However, due to its precocious development, rationality has concealed Reason. (Please refer to Chapter Thirteen.) It can be seen from this that the key to both the fifth feature – i.e., being in a cyclic state with only rare changes over a long period of time – and the eighth feature, “lack of science”, lies in the premature replacement of religion by morality. Generally speaking, cultures develop with religion as their focus. Morality, on the other hand, is something that appears at a far later date. China is the only exception. Hence it is regarded as a precocious human culture. Of the fourteen features enumerated in Chapter One, the fifth to the twelfth are drawn together above, with reference to the relevant chapters. The thirteenth and fourteenth, along with the first four features, which have not been discussed yet, can be efficiently strung together here.

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(8) Chinese culture is said to be “a filial piety culture”, a statement which, of course, is not wrong. It not only suggests that the filial piety of the Chinese people is the most famous and the most fervent, but furthermore, as can be seen from the following, that it is the very root of such a culture. Firstly, Chinese culture evolved from family life rather than collective life. Relations between parents and children are at the core of family life and the expression “filial piety” is the epitome of what is valued in this culture. It specifies that such a culture is not founded in religiosity, as religion invariably opposes such family affection (see Chapter Four). It also indicates that such a culture is not founded in statism, as any state will reject such kinship. Indeed, Chinese legalists such as Shang Yang and Han Fei once denounced filial piety and brotherly love as being in violation of the interests of the state.2 Second, from another perspective, Chinese culture stands opposed to the individual-oriented and egocentric practices of the West in modern times. Ethics is a pervasive spirit that prioritizes the ties of relationships rather than considering oneself. Such a spirit must naturally, however, focus on and take its cues from filial piety and fraternal duty. Third, social order in China, unlike that in the West, which relies on the law, is reliant on etiquette. If social order relies on the law, rights and obligations must be dictated with crystal clarity, with no interference with each other. A culture that relies on etiquette, however, only stresses the importance of manners and customs. In a place where the people are honest and warm-hearted, people can naturally get along very well with each other. But the closeness of the ties between people can be first and foremost testified by the relationship between father and son. This explains why, when the State chooses a person for a job, it demands “filial piety and a clean record, with no crimes”. In addition, morality is the foundation of etiquette and no morality can fail to be developed and enhanced by filial piety, as has been said in The Classic of Filial Piety. (9) Neither is it wrong to say that recluses constitute one of the features of Chinese culture. (It is a pity that Jiang Zhu, a noted historian, does not have a full understanding of recluses in China.) Generally speaking, master recluses share the following three characteristics: First, politically speaking, the emperor cannot be treated as a minister and dukes and princes under an emperor cannot be treated as friends. However, though they may send invitations to recluses time and again, with 2 In HAN Fei’s book On Five Insects, he discussed the monarch’s outspoken ministers, a father’s unfilial son, a father’s filial son, the monarch’s rebel ministers, and so on, so as to expound the opposition of filial piety and brotherly love to the interests of the state.

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courtesy, those recluses flatly decline their invitations to render services to them. It might be well asked: Would this possibly happen in any other feudal or despotic state? Even in a capitalist constitutional state, a proletariat dictatorship, or any other state, this would never be possible. Only in a loose society which is not like a state, like China, could such personages possibly exist. Not only did such personages exist, they abounded in large numbers in past dynasties and they even had a place in historical biographies. Second, economically speaking, those recluses enjoyed tranquility and were satisfied without having to work for financial purposes. This is exactly the Sinotype religious asceticism and the opposite of modern Westerners’ ambitiousness. Though these recluses were not powerful enough to exert any influence upon China’s economic stagnation, they were a symbol of why China’s economy faces difficulty. Third, in terms of their attitude toward life, the Chinese people love nature and are close to nature. As has been said previously, the Chinese know how to appreciate the natural world but do not test their capacity to control it. Attracting the praise of Western philosophers, the Chinese are skilled at working with nature, rather than creating deep divisions between themselves and nature. Consequently, Chinese art can attain sublime heights but cannot develop into a science. (10) The first four features enumerated in Chapter One can be combined into one issue, for the purposes of this discussion. The formation of this huge unit – i.e., a vast territory with a large population (its first feature) – has been demonstrated in previous chapters (especially in Chapter Ten), but was originally based on cultural unity, and following that, on political unity, with all land under heaven and the state combined into one entity. Internally, people live peacefully with each other by observing a code of ethics instead of living under class rule. Relations with people are more highly valued than geographical proximity and the law is absorbed into etiquette, with the state being fused into society. To put it plainly, its expansion on such a large scale relies on culture rather than on military force, which serves as mutual proof and interrelatedness between the second and the third features. This second feature of Chinese culture – that in such a vast territory, many tribes or ethnic groups coexist and they can be integrated into one great nation through the obliteration of their differences, save those that become obsolete due to evolution – can be attributed to no other cause than China’s especially strong powers of cultural assimilation. The third feature of Chinese culture, its enduring history, is predicated on the condition that neither its national life nor its cultural life suddenly perish due to a momentary inadequacy or failure of its military force, but instead

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have been revived every time that has occurred. When China rules foreign populations, it can certainly assimilate them, not only through military force, but also through culture. Even at the time when China itself was ruled by a foreign force, because these foreigners took every chance to use its culture to rule it, it was in the end able to assimilate them into itself. Hence, it may be defeated by military force at first, but it is victorious in the long run through cultural assimilation. Because China is so enduring, it is not difficult for it to become powerful; and precisely because China is powerful, it is not difficult for it to endure. These two features are founded on the second feature – assimilation and integration of foreign races. But from the beginning to the end, these three features can actually be attributed to the superiority of its culture. So, the one question that needs to be answered is: What constitutes the superiority of the Chinese culture? As we have seen in the fourth feature, China is obviously seen to excel at neither knowledge, nor economy, nor politics, nor military science (or rather, China can be said to be good at none of them), but obviously, what China has achieved is underpinned by a great power. What is this power? To truly understand how extraordinary China is, it is important to compare it with India, the West and China. As we know, India and China, two famous ancient cultures, both boast a vast territory with a large population. But their situations are in complete contrast with one another. China is a nation that is closely integrated while India is a nation that is so varied, so complicated, so divided, and so divergent. In India, apart from the bitter hatred that different religions maintain against each other, there exists racial discrimination as well as customs forbidding intermarriage, so as to keep bloodlines pure. What’s more, according to its caste system, people are divided into more than two thousand different classes – an amazingly disjoined nation. Besides this, there are more than two hundred different languages in India, among which fourteen are particularly important (their users number respectively more than five million people). Because of this, India’s intellectuals are unfortunately forced to use the spiritually unrelated English language in both education and communication at present. You can imagine how unfortunate that is. In his book Nationality, Its Nature and Problems, Bernard Joseph said, “What a researcher on India should know is: there is indeed no India at all, as there is simply no Indian nationality”, adding that “even the whole European continent is not so varied and complicated as India.” However, when he turned to the Chinese people (excluding Mongolians and Tibetans), he highly praised their cultural unity and national integrity. Here in China, though there are three religions – Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism – they complement each other instead of interfering

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with each other. If we trace China’s origin, we will find that it was formerly comprised of many different ethnic groups, but they are now obliterated. Though dialects inevitably vary from place to place, Mandarin Chinese is on the whole understandable to all people. Importantly, the language used by all Chinese people is unified. Whatever history, literature, etiquette and beliefs that are disseminated throughout the country via the classics of such a language, have cultivated directly or indirectly the consciousness and the temperament of every Chinese. So, though people live as far apart from each other as the Jiangsu-Zhejiang Provinces and Gansu Province, or Northeast China and Yunnan Province, they have no difficulty at all in understanding each other. If they happen to see each other on foreign soil, they will treat each other like their own family members. The assimilation or integration of 0.3 to 0.4 billion [translator’s note: now 1.4 billion] people into one big nation is hardly imaginable not only to India, but also to the West. Though the West is not as disjointed as India, its situation also tends to be the opposite of that in China. Invariably, China is able to reconcile divergences to achieve agreement and turn from division to unity. And uniting the whole nation can open up great prospects. For several thousand years, this has been a decided tendency. In the West, however, things are different. People prefer division to unity, as if they are more dedicated to division than to unity. The fact that medieval Western Europe, which was unified by Christian culture, was nevertheless divided into different national states is a case in point. In the formation of modern states, so many cases of blending can be seen; but time and again, those multicultural states cannot get along and they experience great difficulties assimilating to each other. The voices calling for national self-determination linger continually. Once a savage war is over, there usually emerge many small states or revived states. As it seems rather difficult for them to become united, they feel more at ease when they are divided. If things took their own course, Europe, which has roughly the same population and acreage as China, would be divided into different national units beyond our calculation. By contrast, it is more natural for us Chinese people to be united and we feel ill at ease when we are divided. If efforts were to be made to divide it, no one here knows how this huge state could be apportioned. One more thing needs to be said here. The Jewish people possess the strongest national character, as is known worldwide. After their nation perished, they wandered from place to place; yet they have continued to observe customs inherited from their ancestors for thousands of years. But although they are never assimilated into other countries, they do become intensely assimilated, unexpectedly so, when they come to China. During

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the Ming and the Qing dynasties, some Jewish people went so far as to take imperial examinations in order to become officials. At present, within the city of Kaifeng in Henan Province, commonly used titles such as “Qing Huihui” or “Yisrael Religion” refer to this group of people. “China is an exception to almost all principles”, as Westerners invariably say, and which proves justifiable indeed. We must, then, ask the question: What power is behind this? This question once caught the attention of the late Liang Qichao. Included in his Collected Works at the Ice-drinking Room is an article entitled “A Survey of the Chinese Nation in History”, with the appendices “An Inspection of the Names of Non-Chinese Peoples of the North and the West in The Historical Records and Biography of Huns” and “A Table of Non-Chinese Peoples of the East and the South during the Spring Autumn Period”. The article and the appendices seem to have been written early in his career. In later years, he wrote the article “Research on the Chinese Nation in History”, in which he pointed out that altogether there are seven ways in which the Chinese nation assimilate all foreigners, and China’s especially well developed capacity for assimilation is considered an eighth method. These eight methods are as follows: First, we reside on our great plain where a principal cultural lineage has been established. Whoever lives on this vast territory is inevitably influenced and subject to this cultural lineage and no other can be expected to flourish. Second, we use our ideographic language: although all ethnic groups in China have extremely complicated languages, inevitably they must use our ideographic language to express themselves or as a tool for public communication. On the basis that we use the same language, we gradually develop into an inseparable nation. Third, for a long time our nation has taken bringing about peace for all as its loftiest ideal. Not only do we despise the notion of “ancient tribes”, we are also indifferent to the notion of a “modern state”. We have been taught to value relations with friends from afar and are rarely exclusionary. As a result, we never confine ourselves to a narrow idea of nation and we warmly welcome every new member who joins us. Fourth, since China boasts a vast territory with a sparse population, it can well accommodate the mutual resettlement of different ethnic groups, who as a result can enhance each other’s cultural lives. Fifth, our nation loves peace and follows the course of the Golden Mean. We show profound reverence for the habits and customs of other ethnic groups. As we say, “We uphold the religious beliefs of ethnic minorities and do not change their habits and customs by force. Though we use unified

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government decrees for national administration, we do not change their traditional modes of production, their lifestyle or their manners and customs.” In so doing, we can help eliminate the possible hazard of resistance movements from other ethnic groups and, in time, effectively assimilate them. Sixth, the belief that marriage between people bearing the same surname should be forbidden is strongly reinforced. Since China rejects the practice of inbred marriage, mixed marriage with other ethnic groups is prevalent, which enhances this process of assimilation. Seventh, our nation’s economy has reached a high level of development, leaving us residual energy that we can use to expand outwards, and also to help new members assimilate economically and organizationally. Eighth, our repeated military failures and general martial weakness and guilelessness have enabled less civilized ethnic groups from the northwest to invade our cultural heartlands, but their culture, being naturally nurtured by ours, has gradually been transformed. On the other hand, people from our cultural center have gone to the south several times, and promoted our culture across China’s southeast areas so that the whole region attains equal development. What has been said here is justifiable, but must be explored much further before these methods can be fully understood. The Chinese language is conducive to the unification of its culture. This can be clearly seen by comparing and contrasting the Chinese language and Western languages. In human civilization, mutual association and communication stemmed from the use of language. It is language that enables people to cherish and reciprocate affections toward each other and to codify and organize experiential knowledge. Language resides in sounds. Without sound, language cannot be understood in a different time, nor can it reach a different place. The Chinese writing system, made up of graphic symbols, also enables language to be fully utilized and widely applicable. But Western languages are only representations of sounds – that is, its graphic symbols are attached to language. Human language varies from place to place and from ethnic group to ethnic group, and changes over time. So do such sound-based graphemes. What we have identified as “enabling language to be fully utilized and widely applicable” actually has its limitations. The unified Western European culture of medieval times has become divided in modern times, a change marked by the rise of different national languages in place of the former lingua franca, Latin. This is simply a result of historical development – changes do take place and the past does not conform to the standards of the present. Similarly, different races do not

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necessarily make an effort to follow each other’s lead. Vernacular literature fosters national sentiments, and rising national consciousness encourages people to adhere to their traditional language. They also tend to be divided into national groups instead of unified across a larger area. Later on, when the countries of Eastern Europe became independent, one after another, their boundaries were drawn according to what language people spoke. Even among Slavic people, communication broke down through the use of many Slavic languages. If China had followed this path originally, it would have seen a similar result. It would have been absolutely impossible for so many ethnic groups from all over the region to have been assimilated into the huge nation we know today. But the Chinese language uses logograms as its main elements and Chinese characters multiply by adapting existing forms. It gradually develops in parallel with its characters. In the beginning, Chinese characters were not affiliated to the Chinese language. Instead, the Chinese language served as a subcategory of the characters. Thus they are closely related to each other, and there is little difficulty in understanding both classical and modern Chinese. Time and distance thus seem to be reduced. As the literal meaning resides in the form of each Chinese character, following them presents no difficulty for other races or people in other countries (for instance, Koreans, Japanese and Vietnamese use many Chinese characters in their languages, or as a consequence of the spread of Chinese classics). As a result, racial barriers have been eliminated and language restrictions have been removed. As time passes, the need for assimilation will be obliterated. The country’s 0.3 or 0.4 billion people [the population of China in Liang’s day], who are obviously a multiracial group, share a common historical memory and without exception consider themselves descendants of the Yellow Emperor. Language is a tool with which human beings connect with one another, but whether or not the life of language is linked to the life of human beings is hard to say. Systems of writing are simply instruments of cultural transmission. It may be that the straightforward success of cultural unification in China is attributable to the Chinese language. But cultural unification relies firstly on the attitude toward life in etiquette and customs, and secondly on knowledge and experience, and practical approaches to life, rather than on language. Perhaps it is not surprising that the neighboring countries and other races around China became civilized at a comparatively later time. In terms of knowledge and practical aspects of life, they must therefore have learned some things from China. This is no doubt the key to the assimilation of these cultures. But if merely knowledge and methods are to be imitated and appropriated, no gains can yet be achieved. As customs and education

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vary, and priorities in life differ, the complete unification of culture becomes impossible. Only when all these cultures are emotionally integrated and live in peace with each other can they build a society and be united into one nation. – The connectedness between different lives is precisely the point here. The third and fifth points that Liang Qichao has proposed are concerned with attitude toward life and mutual affections. Unfortunately, his discussion of these points is somewhat superficial. It could well be asked, if the Chinese people support peace for all, does this mean that foreigners have no such ideal? The case of Catholicism, the religion whose center is the Vatican, is illustrative enough. To a Christian, there is no such concept as “state” or “nation”. Yet Westerners have the keenest awareness of the concepts of both “state” or “nation”, but lack awareness of a concept that means something more like “the world” or “land under heaven”. It should be emphasized that cherishing an ideal is, in and of itself, good for nothing. Only when people make efforts to discover the fundamental difference between the ideal and human life can it be a force for good. This is exactly what I have been saying: the Chinese people proceed from perfect rationality while Westerners invariably proceed from relatively physical and material concerns (see Chapter Twelve). As they differ from each other on a fundamental level, an ideal is not simply the same ideal everywhere, but subject to different attitudes which become more influential as they endure. When such influence is exerted on social structure, classes become unstable and fragmental until an ethics-oriented society based on professional distinction emerges. China then becomes a society in place of a state. Antagonism may exist within a state but there is no antagonism in a society. Consequently, the concept of “the world” or “land under heaven” is permanently established in China, as distinct from the West, where such a concept is more ephemeral. Where there is no antagonism, there is no division but steadier expansion. Our great and impressive country is indeed unparalleled. Compared with a great number of small countries in the West, China differs radically because it boasts a deeply rooted culture, which has long been observed by anyone with discerning eyes. However, the great assimilatory potential of a culture that developed out of rationality must be understood from two perspectives. Generosity, kindheartedness, humility and rapport, as mentioned above, constitute only one aspect. The other entails open-mindedness and prudence without obsession and obstinacy. Those who are obsessed with one thing will avoid those who are obsessed with another thing. When someone is obstinate, it is certainly impossible for them to get along with others. Ever since the time of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius, China has been committed to

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rational consciousness and steers clear of religious superstition. Common people of later generations have invariably worshipped sages and men of virtue, and celestial Buddha, and they believe directly in the principles of nature and indirectly in religion (see Chapter Thirteen). They seldom remain obstinate. So when opposition arises between different races, seldom do any estrangements or conflicts occur. This is the first point. At the same time, on the other hand, if you endeavor to lead people in a rational manner, who will not swear allegiance to you? All those who have been assimilated should not be made to feel ignored when they surrender to China. That is why the power of assimilation can be so strong. As we know, it is only recently that human beings have begun to doubt ancient religion. How, then, could the ancient Chinese have avoided being beguiled by religion so long ago? This point should not be ignored. Superstition is born of fears and desires. It was inevitable that ancient people would be superstitious, since at that time they experienced many natural disasters along with a shortage of daily necessities. Humans naturally felt threatened, as they lacked the knowledge to address and resolve their problems. Whether or not the ancient Chinese people differed radically from other nations in terms of the natural disasters they suffered, the daily necessities they lacked, and the knowledge they acquired, seems to be difficult to prove today. Presumably, they faced a more or less similar situation to those in other places. Thus it is indeed miraculous that the ancient Chinese were so open-minded and put so little store in superstition. Although I cannot explain such a phenomenon, I would like to point out that those fears and desires that generated superstition were actually related to the body, as no fears were induced outside the body, and that uprightness, open-mindedness and prudence constitute the essence of rationality. As I have said, everything emerges from the experience of the body, but the only fact is that China was enlightened to rationality early on. This can again prove that what I have said is not erroneous. There is no doubt that both kindness and open-mindedness can help the most when assimilating other races. It must be remembered, however, that what these two qualities represent is a proper attitude in life. What is an appropriate attitude toward life? This is indeed hard to define. It can be explained with reference to two traits: namely, abstinence (as practiced in medieval religion in the West) and lechery (a tendency in modern Western life). By nature, carnalists would unremittingly elicit bodily pleasures while ascetics would act contrary to bodily needs. While abstinence is prompted by lechery, practicing abstinence can easily descend into lechery if one is not careful. Whether one practices lechery or abstinence, it spoils the harmony

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of human life and it is an act contrary to Nature. Conversely, seeking unity between man and nature by promoting harmony in human relations is an impeccable life. Kindness with tolerance and open-mindedness, without resistance, are external representations of such an outlook. The emergence of non-religious culture in ancient China suggests that some at that time had already come to embody and experience this kind of life. This sort of person is what we call a “sage”. Based on his life experience, a sage offers people guidance on how to live a meaningful life. Hence, we have Zhou’s Rituals and Confucianism. The assimilation of other races means assimilating them to the kind of life to which we mutually aspire, and cultural unification means our unified aspiration for this kind of life. It is certainly not easy to define how to act properly and moderately, but being serious in life without practicing either lechery or abstinence has become a common practice in this country. The main point is that this commonality of practice differs acutely from the situation in the West and in India. It goes without saying, of course, that such an attitude toward life, briefly sketched here, is very reasonable. It is the most easily assimilatory, per se. What is more, as the language that is most conducive to transmission across time and space, it achieves the most significant and miraculous effect. Since its various approaches to knowledge became comparable advantages, given that its military politics were no weaker than those of other states, China unexpectedly achieved greatness. Let us then return to the question that has been asked previously: Since China’s strengths lie not in knowledge, not in economy, and not in military politics, what power, then, does it rely on for its success? We may now answer this question: it is the power of rationality. To make this clear, let’s return to the contrast between the situation in India and the West, and that in China. As was pointed out in Chapter Twelve, human society flourishes as its culture evolves. This actually involves two things. One is the body and the other is the heart-and-mind. The body was the original tool of human survival. In his endeavor to survive, man continually made various kinds of tools, which worked both with and independently of the body (including knowledge and skills) so as to enhance his physical capacity and make himself more dexterous. The advances enabled by these tools also allow social relations to become increasingly close and social units increasingly expansive. This can be deemed the bodily or physical aspect of the process of a society’s progress. As can clearly be seen, from the Industrial Revolution until today, both the progress of Western culture and its social evolution display an especially strong bias toward this aspect of social progress. Purely because of its success in this field, its social life is demonstrably less fragmented than India’s, and its greatness is displayed by

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such states as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Soviet Union. But these two examples are states, not nations. They are politically unified entities, but not culturally integrated ones. In other words, their greatness is derived from “the body” rather than from “the heart-and-mind”. This is different from the situation in China. As China remains in the same state as it was before the Industrial Revolution, in terms of the extension of the body capacity it likewise remains to be so underdeveloped that today it is miles behind the West. Most villages still develop a natural economy, with few possessing better public transport by land and water than their primitive forbears. So if people can only increase their numbers within their own race, and are obstructed by topography such as mountains and rivers, how can it be possible for them to be united as an integral whole? Nevertheless, in China such a society has indeed arisen, which despite being such a large unit has become a culturally integrated and undivided nation, quite unlike the merely politically unified states in the West, which can be divided at any moment. Such a contrast reveals our greatness, which arises from the cultivation of the heart-and-mind, rather than the body. In other words, we cannot make tools advanced enough to make people economically interconnected and politically farsighted, so that our society flourishes solely on the basis of material advantage. But due to our advancement in another aspect of culture, we can enhance our people’s mutual understanding of each other and their successful assimilation, so that they enjoy a very harmonious relationship and, in the end, our society flourishes on the basis of shared psychology. When it comes to interpersonal relations, if you follow the dictates of the body and physicality, you will be divided and isolated; if you follow the heart-and-mind, you will be physically divided but not isolated. Yet since people usually end up privileging material concerns, the heart-and-mind that is not isolated to begin with can easily become isolated. As a result, culturally speaking, there is always a need for association and connectedness before human beings can form a society where they live together. As soon as human society came into being, religion emerged to serve just this purpose. Religion, morality, etiquette, law and so on are all related to culture. When we speak of “the heart-and-mind”, it refers to rationality (see Chapter Twelve). The development of a society in terms of physical and embodied concerns suggests material progress through intellect, whereas development in terms of the heart-and-mind suggests human progress through rationality. Material progress via Reason is nothing more than the control and use of natural resources by human beings, and its manifestation lies in the advancement of tools of various kinds. Human progress via rationality

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is nothing more than the elimination of conflicting ideas and suspicions, and of narrow-mindedness and ignorance, which are mostly acquired, not innate, and which exist between different groups and between different races, so as to revive people’s original openness. Its manifestation lies in the grandeur, the majesty, the clarity and the accessibility of religion, morality, custom and law. Religion is a strange thing. On the one hand, it contains elements of rationality, but on the other hand it obstructs rationality. It enables people to be easily connected and at the same time isolates them from one another. If the aforementioned “conflicting ideas and suspicions, and narrow-mindedness and ignorance” are not the product of religious superstition, they are at least related to religion. The cultures of the West cannot be unified and its nationalities cannot be easily integrated; even today, Europe is still being endlessly divided into a great number of entities. This was inevitable, as Europe took the road of religion from the very beginning. China’s advantage is that it has long since broken away from religion and fostered a non-religious culture. In population and area, China is equal to Europe. While Europe has made great economic progress, China has not been able to. By comparison, in life relationships, people in China are far more alienated from each other and though the whole region appears to be very vast, it has been closely integrated and politically unified. This is unobtainable in the West but is obtainable to the Chinese people. This means that, although Chinese culture cannot triumph by Reason, the Chinese people can communicate well through sensibility. Although Westerners are physically close, intellectually they are separated from each other. Although the Chinese people are physically far away from each other, they are intellectually close to each other. A closer look at India in comparison with China and the West will show that in India, religious life is extremely varied as well as very widespread, in which regard neither the West nor China can compare. As a result, there has been no Chinese-style social development and progress in India. At the same time, India seems to lag behind China in making tools of various kinds, and the West even more so. As a result, there is no Western-style social development and progress in India, either. As India does well in neither aspect, it is no wonder that its society tends toward fragmentation. All in all, it can be concluded that the difference between China, the West and India lies in religion. In social development and progress, the body and the mind were originally related to each other and they evolved together with mutual involvement and mutual advancement. But as the West moves from a focus on the body to focusing on the heart-and-mind, and China moves in the opposite direction, each tends to become one-sided and lose the balance between the body and

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the heart-and-mind. In the West, this imbalance can be most easily seen in modern capitalist societies, where thousands of people live together around a big factory or a big corporation and yet, though they are interdependent, they make their own living and lack mutual acknowledgement and mutual understanding. They are simply parts in a machine, coordinated in going forward by faithfully working for a certain public result, but one for which they lack recognition and interest. As they coexist only mechanically, instead of cooperating with each other rationally, they cannot restrain themselves for the common good. Conversely, they sometimes destroy the public purpose for their own benefit. People throughout Western society live in a mechanistic way, just like this. Their interlocking relationships are mostly geared to exploit physical capacity and as such it can be said that people in the West lack a sense of heart or mind. That is why Dr. John Dewey wrote in Democracy and Education that, although Europe and the US can today be said to be advanced societies, they still have something “unsocial” about them. If they are now compelled in any way to turn to socialism, they are compelled by nothing but a mechanical force, with little regard for lack of rationality. Urgent efforts to compensate for such a lack of sensibility will be imperative needed for the future of the West. For the Chinese people, the positive point is that there is no estrangement between them, but the weak point is that there is a lack of unity between them. Westerners are just the opposite. For them, the positive point is that there is no lack of unity between them, but the weak point is that there is much estrangement between them. As a result, in the West, there is much unity when there is no estrangement; in China, this is not the case. In his Nationality, Its Nature and Problems, Bernard Joseph, on the one hand, heaped lavish praise on China’s cultural unanimity, but on the other, he criticized the Chinese people as lacking national consciousness and national feeling. He did not consider the Chinese people as belonging to one nation in any real sense. This is quite incomprehensible to Westerners. How can it be possible that the Chinese culture is so united but that the Chinese people lack national consciousness and national feeling? Generally speaking, national consciousness and national feeling are fostered through a nation’s unity against foreign powers. Sometimes it is not difficult for Westerners, who are used to uniting against foreign powers even when they are discordant culturally, to be united as one nation. Yet interestingly, the Chinese people, who are not used to uniting against foreign powers but who are culturally extremely unified, cannot become one nation in a practical sense. If we seek evidence from the Anti-Japanese War, perhaps it is an overstatement to say that the Chinese do not possess a national consciousness. However,

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the Chinese tend to be undisciplined and disorganized and very often, they place their attachment to family and hometown above their attachment to state and nation. They even do so when they are abroad, a fatal mistake indeed. Why does this happen? This question can be answered in one sentence: as a society, China has experienced overdevelopment of the heart-and-mind, but underdevelopment of the body. The body is in contrast to the heart-and-mind. When society facilitates the development and growth of one aspect of the body, it firstly resorts to religion so as to unify itself against foreign powers, and following this, it relies on religious progress so as to increase this strength of unity (see Chapter Three). After this, it may not be so reliant on religion, but it still maintains its unity against foreign powers. This is exactly what happened in the West. China lacks this legacy as it experienced its enlightenment early. Its deficiency is more pronounced, as such a society is organized in the light of ethics instead of into different groups. The way China’s non-estrangement emerges as rationality combines with its lack of national unity to produce its lack of physical development. This is as clear as day. Due to the underdevelopment of tools of various kinds, physical movements cannot be increased or intensified, economy tends to be self-sufficient and politics tends to be passive, which makes people all the more loosely related, or almost unrelated. Needless to say, this is a manifestation of the underdevelopment of the body aspect. However, it cannot be denied that although it is def icient in this aspect, China’s integration and unification in the other aspect is miraculously great. This is just what we mean by “overdevelopment of the heart-and-mind aspect”. It can be concluded that China’s greatness is ultimately its greatness of human rationality. China has no lack of rationality. Instead, due to its early stage of enlightenment, it demonstrates cultural precocity. We must understand clearly what position rationality occupies in human life and how it can be steadily exploited, before we can understand the whole process of how human culture develops. At the same time, we must also clearly understand that China experienced both early enlightenment and cultural precocity, and as a result, the mystery of such a culture’s lack of comprehension can ultimately be solved, and its advantages and disadvantages, its gains and losses can all be unfolded. Many features of Chinese culture (as has been exemplified or not yet exemplified above) can in fact be attributed to this general feature, that is, “cultural precocity”. This is an unambiguous conclusion so far. Someone may then ask: Where does China’s precocity come from? My answer is: precocity is simply precocity; it is not bestowed on a culture. Western culture has never been precocious, but it has an inferiority complex due to its late development, as the development of its rationality

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cannot accord with its physical growth. One region favors this, and the other favors that, as we can see from the comparison between China and the West. It is pointless to ask why one favors this but the other favors that. Not only do China and the West display such differences, other cultures around the world also exhibit their differences, and these differences are a result of such localized biases. Such differences must be attributed to their differences in geography, ethnicity, history, and so on. Though such factors can be specified, they can never be enumerated. Every culture is a creation. It is not simply an adaptation to external circumstances. The greater a culture is, the truer this statement becomes.

14.2

Shaping of National Character

As I stated in Chapter One, the Chinese national character can serve as a strong reference for the study of the Chinese culture. When we attempt to draw conclusions in Chinese culture studies, the Chinese national character should be considered a source for both exploration and verification. Before enumerating the ten features first listed in Chapter One, I would like to specifically state how the Chinese national character is formed, as follows. I have recently read Lei Haizong’s article “Instinct, Reason and National Life”,3 and here I would like to devote special attention to a comparison between the Chinese nation and the English nation. Generally speaking, of the two, the British people possess the stronger survival instinct. Conversely, the Chinese people have the weaker survival instinct, to the extent that such an instinct has seemingly just been removed from them. People who sacrifice the fundamental interest of the state for the sake of establishing theories are many. Except in Britain, people of such kind exist more or less in every country, but they are the hugest in number in China. Whatever “-ism” or “system” is to be established, in the West it takes a concrete, material expression, but in China, it becomes metamorphic and is turned into a pure theory. Such a concept is unrelated not only to past history, but also to today’s reality. What is worse, many people prove themselves willing to sacrifice everything for this notion, not only at the expense of their own selves but also at the expense of the state. Ever since its first contact with the West, China has suffered such a malady, and still does, even today. To the British people, it is almost unimaginable that people would adopt such a 3 This article by LEI was originally published in the newspaper Independent Comments on Current Issues, but the present citation is from a reprint of Reality Digest, Issue 3, Volume 2.

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state of mind. The British people have strong instincts without impairment to their depth of Reason, and the depth of their Reason, likewise, does not conceal their strong instincts. What is oddest about the Chinese people is that they have a less developed sense of Reason, but their instincts are also weak. Poignantly, this observation can reveal the difference between the Chinese national character and the British national character. Regrettably, a thorough understanding of human life is still to be desired. For example, Lei says in his article, Reason is the tool of instinct, rather than its owner. That which expedites the progress of history, governs society and controls our lives is instinct. It is by no means Reason. If idealists find this regrettable, there is nothing we can do about it. To state that Reason is a tool is certainly correct, but it must be acknowledged that instinct is also a tool. As a mode of contemplation, Reason does not distinguish between likes and dislikes and it is certainly not where the impetus for historical motion lies. But biological instinct has long been in decline in human beings. How, then, can it bring about historical progress, govern society and control our lives? The missing piece of the puzzle here lies in a lack of understanding of what rationality is. Twenty-seven years ago, I had no understanding of rationality, either. I agreed with P.A. Kropotkin’s theory of “morality as an outcome of instinct”, but not with Bertrand Russell’s trichotomy of instinct, reason and spirituality. 4 Up to the point when I understood the necessity of separating rationality from Reason (see Chapter Seven for details), I suddenly realized that Russell’s trichotomy is an unalterable truth. What Russell called “spirituality” is simply what I mean by “rationality”. Lei’s praise of the strong British survival instinct and of their simultaneous development of Reason is correct; his reproach of the weak Chinese survival instinct and of their underdevelopment of Reason is also correct. His mistake was in dichotomizing instinct and Reason and regarding them as conflicting forces. Lei originally cast one as the owner and the other as the tool. But can the owner and the tool be in conflict with one another? Clearly, he was wrong. Now, two more examples also prove that he was wrong. In my view, instinct and Reason, though they differ in that one is dynamic and the other is static, are two aspects of the body, but Reason stays conceptually at the top (see Chapter Thirteen). The characteristics shown by the British people illustrate that they are successful in “starting from the body”. What the Chinese people suffer is a result of their early enlightenment in terms of rationality, which

4

See Bertrand Russell’s Principles of Social Reconstruction.

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is unknown to Lei. To illustrate the point, I would like to cite a paragraph from another scholar: When something happens to a Chinese, he only takes into consideration “whether or not he should do something about it”, not “whether or not he is willing to do something about it”. – This is what I have heard from some of my friends when they were gossiping. I had paid no attention to what they talked about before that, but these two sentences were indeed impressed on my memory because they went to the core of the problem that I have been obsessed with. When Chinese people do something, they are not especially spirited and tend to lack enthusiasm and devotion, because they only take into consideration whether or not they should do something, without asking themselves whether or not they are willing to do something. That is why there is such a huge number of hypocrites in society, and actually they are villains. … Even sages would scarcely teach you how important it is for you to be aware of your own being. – Since I do not live in this world, how should I know whether or not I can sense the existence of others? … I would like to urge you to be aware of your own being and start by considering yourself. – My own life in this world is lived mainly for my own sake, not for the sake of being a father. On this point, Westerners are wiser than Easterners, for they do not have as many moral imperatives as we do. … It is actually quite enough for us to look upon human beings as animals that must have meals every day.5

This paragraph suggests that the Chinese people’s early enlightenment went too far, and it serves as a call to return to the body and the instinct. For several thousand years, the Chinese people’s bodies and instincts, observed from a certain perspective, have certainly declined. Whether “ethics-orientedness” versus “ego-centricity”, or “starting from rationality” versus “starting from the body”, they have exhibited a distinct lack of coordination! It is rationality, especially those habits which resemble rationality, that makes the Chinese people weak in terms of instincts. Rationality, instincts, likes and dislikes vary from person to person. But all of these are aspects of human feelings. The Chinese people’s imperatives were not originally imposed upon them by external forces like religion or God. It is precisely because they are so close to their instincts that they repel their instincts. That which is imposed upon them by external forces 5 See the paper “The Principle of Loyalty and Consideration”, which seems to have been written by Ge Yandi, published in The Guide, Issue 12 (1946).

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will eventually encounter resistance, with the result that it will either enhance or impair their instincts. Consider Westerners since the Middle Ages. Do they not fit the description above? However, there should be no misunderstanding of the conflict between rationality and instinct. Human life can be emancipated from biological instincts by Reason. However, on the one hand, people’s likes and dislikes should still not be attached to instincts. – This is what we mean by rationality. On the other hand, their instincts alone are inadequate as tools and must be complemented with the acquisition of others. – This is the combination of instinctual habits and those habits in human life in which pure instinct is almost invisible. Strictly speaking, rationality is the “master”, but Reason, instincts and habits serve as tools. But rationality, whether in relation to individual life or in relation to social life, is to be developed gradually. When it is not developed, or underdeveloped, human beings naturally live according to their instincts and habits. Up to the time when rationality becomes enlightened, human beings still act on instincts and habits most of the time. In addition to the fact that Reason, with no likes and dislikes, functions as a tool but never as a master, instincts and habits often usurp the throne of rationality. When it can be said that there are no conflicts between rationality and instinct, then rationality functions as the leading principle and instincts function as its tools; only when rationality performs through instincts can there be no conflict. But when instincts take over and rationality is nonexistent, how can there be any conflict? However, though rationality is prominently manifested in likes and dislikes, which may seem equivalent to instincts, it is internally clear and self-conscious, and externally calm and peaceful. Hence it is full of Reason, but different from instinct. Instincts are inseparable from the body, but rationality, which is distinct from physicality, is invariably above outer forms, or even opposed to outer forms. As the Chinese people’s period of enlightenment came early, in the long term, their instincts were certainly not analogous to those of the British people who departed from the body. In terms of mentality, the Chinese people are accustomed to reasoning, and their sense of obligation has replaced sincere willingness. In terms of conduct, since it has been a prevailing custom since time immemorial to display elegance and grace, movement and gesture based on seeming rationality have mostly replaced instinctive reactions. It is crystal clear that instinct, together with physicality, has become very feeble. In the meantime, as their Reason functions only through rationality (or seemingly rational habits) – unlike the habit of the British, which is much more physical – Reason, together with the functions of the body, is repressed and can thus in no way develop.

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For example, to Westerners, handshaking, kissing and hugging are rituals of daily life. So are cheering and clapping among large groups of people and throwing a welcomed guest into the air. When Chinese people see these rituals for the first time, however, they immediately feel that this sort of behavior is intolerable. These are examples of Westerners, in their everyday rituals, address endearments to others and derive affection from others through their physicality and express themselves through the body. The Chinese people, however, in their everyday rituals, address respectfulness to others and they derive affection from others through their rationality. Though rationality cannot be expressed through the body itself, courtliness and reservedness are indeed far removed from physical gestures. Though actions such as handshakes and applause are to some extent imitated modern Chinese, showing that human nature is similar, ultimately, they cannot tolerate acts such as hugging and kissing, clear proof of the increasing decline of both body and physical instincts among the Chinese over the past several thousand years. – Several thousand years ago, though the Chinese people certainly did not favor such acts, they did not find them as intimidating and intolerable as they do today. In the wake of the decline of physicality and instinct, however, the Chinese people’s rationality also wanes. As life is an integral whole, it could never be possible for both body and instinct to decline but for rationality still to thrive. That is why modern Chinese people are to some extent less rational than Westerners. For example, the Chinese people’s brutality toward other people or animals (e.g., putting people to death by dismemberment), as attested in the eighth feature of Chinese culture, has been most severely denounced by Westerners. Generally speaking, national character consists of two aspects. What has been said above concerns one aspect, that is, the aspect of national character that is inherited and has evolved. The other aspect consists of habits formed during a person’s life due to their response to stimulus in the social environment. All the features of Chinese national character can be understood in the light of these two facets. For example, the fourth feature of Chinese national character, that it is “gentle, tender and moderate”, derives from cultural inheritance and is refined over a person’s life. The latter stage mainly consists in the fact that “groups are associated with struggles and indolence is closely interrelated with peace”, as we analyzed in Chapter Ten. However, in contrast to other races that eschew the physical, the Chinese people, who adopted rationality early on, are fundamentally peaceful and were long before there was such contentment in their society. The taming effect of the early onset of

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rationality on the body is the fundamental reason for their gentleness and seeming frailty. Many seemingly rational habits in Chinese society, like commending civility instead of advocating militarism, naturally stem from this. The fifth point, that the Chinese tend to be “content”, suggests that on the one hand, life is harmonious due to this early adoption of rationality, and on the other hand, that the Chinese have been conditioned by their special social structure, which can be clearly understood from the discussion of how “individuals are reconciled to the situation that they encounter” in Chapter Ten. The second characteristic – being “industrious and thrifty” – suggests that China is a society based on professional distinction and that individual pursuits make political and economic progress less of a priority when everyone can map out their own futures with their desired outcomes (see Chapter Ten), which is mainly brought about by learned behavior. But the Chinese people’s psychological tendency to be pragmatic and utilitarian seems to show that their inborn Reason lacks calmness (see Chapter Thirteen). The third characteristic, being “overly polite”, is certainly derived from the mutual respect people show each other in such an ethics-oriented society. But false displays of affection and of civilities can be considered to be seemingly rational acts or habits, as has been mentioned above. They are especially abundant when physicality and instinct is suppressed by learned behavior and rationality thus becomes insufficient. The sixth characteristic, “conservative”, which indicates a lack of adventurous and enterprising spirit and stresses that staying put is preferable to mobility, is symbolic of the decline of physicality and instinct, but the necessity of being conservative is also determined by circumstances encountered in a person’s life. A case in point is that China, since the Qin and the Han dynasties, has experienced a cycle of peaceful, prosperous times alternating with troubled times, without being able to develop innovation through critical assimilation of the old in terms of social structure. Social structure is the backbone of culture and without the adaptation of such a backbone, no element attached to it will evolve either. This state of affairs has been nurtured by the conservatism and habits that have been inherited over the past two thousand years. In addition, as the ancient Chinese acquired profound wisdom (due to their early enlightenment period) and achieved great things due to their cultural precocity, the Chinese of today possess and continue to practice only what they have inherited from their predecessors. The more research people of later generations pursue, the more they feel that the ancient Chinese were a great and profound people. No wonder they esteem the past over the present. A third consideration is that this academic research follows the methods of artistic research instead

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of scientific research. Art is the preserve of talented people and relies on personal ability, unlike science, which seeks objectivity and accuracy, following the golden rule that every skyscraper is built from the ground, and in which latecomers always get the upper hand. In art, due to the decline of the Chinese people’s aptitude, latecomers have great difficulty in attaining the level of the ancients in terms of talent. Thus it is natural that Chinese people follow the example of the ancients, a practice quite different from that in the more scientific West, where keeping pace with the times is valued. The seventh characteristic, being “sloppy, inexact or imprecise”, is most deeply felt by the late Li Jinghan, who conducted social investigations in rural areas in Hebei Province. This was best understood by the Japanese social activist Uchiyama Kanzō (1885-1959). In his view, only when the Chinese people have enough of a thing do they say they have it at all, and when they do not have most of what they require, they say they have none; it is not the case that when they have one thing, they say they have it, and that when they have nothing at all, they say they do not have anything. It can be seen here that the latter style of tabulation represents a model-thinking method, while the former represents a material-thinking method, that the latter is concerned with thoroughness while the former is not, and that the latter is theoretical and article-oriented while the former is practical and life-oriented. Therefore, Kanzō considers the Chinese culture to be a life-centered culture in contrast to the material culture of the West.6 His view is very close to the view of Zhang Dongsun, cited above, that a radical difference exists between the mentality of the West, where science is valued, and the East, where there is no science. Knowledge, in essence, lies in distinction and unambiguousness and it is obtained from the observation of the external world as experienced through the body. As the enlightenment period in China brought rationality early, but rationality is interlinked with instinct one way or another, life in China tends to be integrated with nature so that its inclination to seek knowledge from the outside world declines (see Chapter Thirteen). Edification through learned behavior, of course, is also a factor. According to the aforementioned eighth characteristic – being “patient and cruel” – the Chinese people’s tenacity (the quality or state of being stubbornly unyielding) obviously results from the long-term training provided by a life of inward exertion (see Chapter Ten) and to some extent it can also be said that tenacity is capable of breeding brutality. The ninth 6 See YOU Bingqi (trans.) Uchiyama Kanzō (auth.) A View of China from the Perspective of a Japanese, 1936.

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characteristic, “tenacious and elastic”, can be viewed as the actual performance that derives from tenacity. Many particulars based on this point surprise doctors, military officers and priests in the West, as can be seen from books published both in China and in Western countries, which we do not have time to go into here.7 Only the paper “The Climate Adaptability of the Chinese Nation”8 by geographer Sha Xuejun is of academic value, and is briefly cited here for illustration. It is accepted that climate in every locality – whether it is cold or warm, wet or dry – is formed according to such factors as latitude, distance from the sea and topography. Altogether, the whole world can be divided into eleven time zones. The fact that Chinese communities can be found in every time zone proves that the Chinese people are the most adaptable to different climates, more so than people from any other nation. Climate adaptability is chiefly measured by two indices: First, that in a certain climate, people can still labor and be active in both mind and body; second, that people can survive and produce offspring in fixed settlements. For example, white people have difficulty adapting themselves to tropical climates, the Japanese are sensitive to cold, but the Chinese are adaptable to both cold and hot weather. Though Russians have a reputation for being resistant to cold, the Chinese people are far more so. We may ask, what makes the Chinese people so special? In terms of physique, the Chinese are not as strong as the Russians; indeed, the Chinese can be rather weak. Moreover, they do not pay much attention to physical exercise, hygiene and nutrition. In other words, they do not have particular advantages in either natural endowment or acquired skills. If you focus on life only in physical terms, you will certainly not find the answer to the question. But if you know that the body is nothing but a tool for life and that, from the very beginning, life was not confined to this body but had a more profound source, then you will have no difficulty in understanding the strengths of the Chinese people. These strengths lie solely in drawing vitality from the profound source of life, unlike Western shallowness and casual exhaustion of vitality. Ever since human beings were emancipated from concerns of the body and instinct, their lives have focused mainly on the heart-and-mind rather than on the body. As we said earlier, “Only by filling the gap that has opened up can life itself define its value, which we call the heart-and-mind” (see Chapter Seven). But the heart-and-mind, not being externalized in and of itself, still has to be expressed through 7 See PAN Guangdan, National Character and National Health, 1989. 8 This is a weekly paper published on Chongqing Ta Kung Pao on June 30, 1948. The paper enumerates many additional facts but here, only the major points are presented.

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human organs before it can assert its value. The Chinese people’s great adaptability to climate is not attributed to the robustness of the body but to soundness of the heart-and-mind. What is unfortunate is that among the Chinese people, the body tends not to be sound enough. Otherwise, they would perform even better. Westerners’ inadequacies are not due to any insufficiency in external tools such as the sound body and the sound method, but to the undeveloped internal capacity, which leaves no room for maneuver in terms of their adaptability. Though their tenacity and elasticity may be all-inclusive, these only account for one characteristic. Generally speaking, however, it is the one on which all other characteristics depend. Given their exertion in external activity, Westerners naturally make more advanced tools, while due to their diligence in internal matters, the Chinese people naturally lead more cultivated lives. Thus in terms of industry, China falls behind the West, but in terms of quality of life, the West falls behind China. This comparison is very significant. The tenth characteristic – being “skilled and mature” – can be considered the general feature of the Chinese national character. As it has many connotations, it is difficult to demarcate them all. However, readers can easily see that this echoes the point that has been illustrated throughout this book: Chinese culture is mature rather than naive, and profound rather than superf icial. They will also come to view as clearly wrong the idea of a f ixed social history of development, the insistence on a ladder-like progress view of culture and the assertion that China lags behind the f irst and the second stages of development (as seen in the UK, the US and the Soviet Union). But from the very beginning, we never denied that in some respects, the UK, the US and the Soviet Union are more advanced than China. It is precisely this contrast between sophistication and backwardness that brings me to the conclusion that the Chinese culture is representative of human cultural precocity. The statement that Chinese culture “hides its light under a bushel but has the greatest adaptability and potential” testif ies that cultural precocity lies within, in the way of living, rather than without, in the tools for life. Westerners today, on the other hand, suffer through their inadaptability in terms of human culture and progress. The increasing number of mentally ill indicates that their success is clearly external, that is, in the tools for life, rather than in their way of living. Lastly, let’s discuss the first characteristic – “selfish”. In Pan Guangdan’s view, this was something we inherited from our ancestors, and he acknowledged the humanist geographer Ellis Huntington’s explanation for the Chinese national character in the light of natural selection and

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reproduction.9 According to Huntington, for thousands of years, China has witnessed continuous floods and droughts and in order to survive and reproduce, people must be selfish, or they will perish, a result which is brought about by elimination. We can hardly give this credence. It is clear that Pan focuses only on genetics in his eugenic research, without taking into account China’s unique social structure and how the Chinese people have developed its habits as a second nature. The difference between China and the West in terms of social life has been addressed time and again throughout this book. The most notable aspects are shown in the two diagrams comparing China and the West (see Chapters Five and Nine, respectively). As these diagrams show, an individual is generally connected to his society on four levels. To Westerners, the individual and the group are the two dominant levels, but to the Chinese, life is dominated by the family and the world under heaven. The group and the individual, to Westerners, are simply two different entities, and the family is almost a phantom. The Chinese, however, organize society according to ethics by starting from the family as a central focus and extending and promoting family ties, so as to obscure the concepts of both the individual and the group. – To the Chinese, these extremes seem non-existent. Only when this difference is fully understood can the following be made clear. First, due to their lack of group-centered life, the Chinese people have no sense of being part of a general public, no habits of discipline, no organizational capacity and no spirit of law (see Chapter Four). In a word, they lack all those moral conventions that are indispensable for the collective life – public virtues. This for the most part explains why they are considered selfish. Westerners are not born with public virtues. Their public virtues are forged by bloody struggle on the one hand, and cultivated in daily life on the other hand. Such virtues originated in religious organizations and they have been successfully cultivated ever since the advent of municipal autonomy in the medieval era (see Chapter Three). Second, the cultivation of public virtues lies in the conformity between the public interest and the private interest. In other words, the public interest is the private interest, and vice versa. For example, in international economic competition, a citizen tends to consume his domestic products. Doubtless, his choice can be said to be patriotic, but at the same time, it is also an act that sustains his own livelihood. Let’s take another example. In party election campaigns, a party member may busy himself soliciting votes for his party. This may show that he is devoted to his party, but on the other 9

See PAN Guangdan, National Character and National Health, 1937.

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hand, he can also be said to be fighting for his own future. The same is true of relationships such as that between the followers of a religion and their church, between craftsmen and their guild, between modern industrial workers and their hierarchical structure, and so on. In brief, public interest and private interest should be integrated, rather than separated, and in the long run this will become a natural tendency. Conversely, if public interest and private interest are treated as two different matters – that is, when public interest is preserved at the expense of private interest, or when private interest is preserved at the sacrifice of public interest – there is simply no possibility of cultivating public virtues. Therefore, it can be safely said that it is ultimately private interest that has helped cultivate Westerners’ public virtues. Third, if it is said that the cultivation of public virtues means merely reflecting human feelings and the course of nature, without lapsing into what we might call “selfishness”, I completely agree. But I want to propose that the Chinese people’s failure to cultivate public virtues also reflects human feelings and the course of nature, without being “selfish”. It is certain that no one can live if he is separated from society, but social structures vary from nation to nation. Westerners are inseparable from their groups and organizations, which have existed from ancient times, whereas the Chinese people are inseparable as a result of the ethical relations both close to home and which sustain distant connections. Ethics differs conceptually from “groups” or “organizations” in that we perceive neither a demarcation of its scope nor a confrontation between different people; rather, ethics proceeds from close proximity to distant connections, or the other way around. To the Chinese, by “closeness” is meant “oneself” and “one’s family” and by “distant” is meant “the world under heaven”. Their ultimate orientation is interestingly geared to ideas that “all men are brothers within the ‘four corners of the earth’” and “the whole world is of one big family”. Is such a spirit not magnanimous enough? How can this be considered selfishness? It is a pity, however, that when what the Chinese people have in mind is small, it is much too small, and when what the Chinese people have in mind is large, it is much too large – so large that it has no boundaries and can never be within one’s grasp, never secure enough. It is, in short, “too unconfined”. Conversely, in the West, though matters may range from those as small as oneself and one’s family to those as big as the world under heaven, people are still moderate in scope. Their integration of public interest with private interest effectively facilitates the cultivation of public virtues. It seems that Westerners are not to blame for their failure to cultivate public virtues. It should be clear that those who rely on collective life can be expected to

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cultivate the habits indispensable for this way of life, and those who rely on ethics can be expected to cultivate the habits indispensable for ethical life. Meanwhile, people are often unaccustomed to that which they find dispensable. The Chinese are not accustomed to being patriotic and gregarious, just as Westerners are not accustomed to being filial and respectful. This is hardly surprising. However, those who are unfilial or disrespectful are never criticized but those who are unpatriotic or ungregarious are severely denounced. That is the reality. When it comes to the present era, when national consciousness and group action are urgently needed, the Chinese people ignore this necessity and stick to their old habits, too lazy to make any changes. Life is constantly changing and as the current situation evolves, people should be ready at any moment to adapt themselves to a new environment. Frankly, it is not overstating the case to accuse the Chinese people of attending only to themselves and their families even up to the present day, and to consider them perhaps selfish for caring only for their old friends and acquaintances. But it would be foolishness to conclude the Chinese people have been living in selfishness for thousands of years! To be thoroughly selfish – “an antisocial action” – is unacceptable in any society. If this were systematic in a nation, it would have perished long ago. How could it then be explained that the Chinese nation has endured so much longer than any other nation in the world? Thus, it is unjustified to say that selfishness is part of the Chinese national character. The Chinese are not necessarily all that more selfish than Westerners. Fourth, I would like to point out that, on the other hand, Westerners are actually more selfish than the Chinese. Needless to say, modern Westerners, who are individual-oriented and egocentric, are obviously more selfish than the Chinese, who are ethics-oriented and respectful toward others. To put it another way, in terms of collective life in the West, apart from such organizations as cooperatives, there is almost no organization that is not highly exclusive. In his book Merits and Demerits of Patriotism, Bertrand Russell wrote that the British customarily incite hatred and jealousy of foreign nations in order to foster patriotism among their citizens. First, they inspired hatred against the Spanish, later against the French, and later still against the Germans. Who knows who they will turn against next.10 As Charles de Montesquieu said in his book The Spirit of the Laws, “Competition and groups are two things that can be seen at the same time.” By not prioritizing themselves and their families, Westerners appear to be selfless. However, by forming groups, they show themselves to be selfish 10 See LIANG Qichao, A History of Political Thought during the Pre-Qin Period, 1930 (p. 3).

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on the greatest scale instead of being unselfish in the real sense. For the virtue of selflessness, one has to look among the Chinese people. From time immemorial, the Chinese people have invariably cherished the idea of “the world under heaven”, which indeed demonstrates the greatest selflessness, the result of their rationality. Such is the very national character of China, if we are to talk about national character. In today’s world, there seems to be no justice, so people cannot live in peace. This results precisely from the difficulty of reforming Westerners’ settled practice, due to their embrace of the collective life.11 In my opinion, the time when Chinese people were derided as selfish will soon pass; rather, it will instead be thought that Westerners are selfish. Actually, there is no need for us to argue who is selfish, as time will tell. Fifth, to sum up the previous discussion, the crux of the problem lies in the differences in social structures and current needs, as there is simply not much difference between the Chinese and Westerners. If there is any difference, it is only insofar as Westerners take the body and the material world as their cultural starting point while the Chinese adopted rationality early on. From this point of view, the Chinese are comparatively unselfish. But this was the case in the past, not in the present. Nowadays, the Chinese, unlike Westerners, who remain more or less the same, tend to be either selfish or selfless. As Western culture originally evolved from material and bodily concerns, they made great efforts to distinguish themselves from other creatures out of “a sense of superiority”. Such being the case, as they were human beings, whose lives were the basis for this distinction between humans and creatures, they unwittingly revealed their selflessness much more than their selfishness. With the gradual development of rationality as the social situation changed, the social circle – “people of one’s own” – was enlarged step by step (see Chapter Eleven) and people in such a circle tended to become increasingly benevolent. From major issues to minor ones, since 11 Visionary thinkers have devoted much discussion to the supremacy of national sovereignty as a doctrine, which they see as the crucial turning point that has plunged the world into anarchy and prevented peace. This inflexible concept is the ultimate outcome of the West’s long-standing collective life. The Japanese scholar Fujisawa Chikao, secretary of the International League for many years, became disillusioned in the end with the League, though he had been enthusiastic at the outset. In his disappointment, he found he was suddenly able to draw insight from the theory of benevolence and military force elucidated in Confucian classics, coming to the firm belief that only Chinese culture can bring peace to the world, the state of which Westerners can do nothing at all to improve. So he went back to Japan and founded the “Dongguang Academy” in order to teach Confucian classics to the younger generation. In 1932, he came to visit university professors in Peiping, but quite surprisingly, few people paid him any attention. I had a talk with him and he gave me one of his books as a gift.

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many systems of etiquette have been devised, people who live by such customs will exhibit little difference in terms of selfishness or selflessness. The exception is people who live in today’s China. This is because, on the one hand, due to the destruction or the chaotic nature of many systems of etiquette, most people have nothing to anchor them and they thus easily lapse into degeneracy, but a small number of people feel that their rationality has become more acute; on the other hand, as people become weaker in instinct and lacking in vitality, they become greedy and miserly. As the old saying goes, “in old age, when one’s physical powers are decaying, one guards against greed.” However, although the majority of people continue to follow this practice, the rationality shown by the minority shines through obscure. So it seems to be a fact that the Chinese of today are more selfish than Westerners. But on the other hand, they are also far more selfless than Westerners. – It is just that only some of them inherit this quality. Thus we can see through our exploration that the Chinese culture is unique, as has been detailed in previous chapters, and it can accurately be said that Chinese culture and the Chinese national character are mutually supporting. This book thus comes to an end.



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ZHANG Yinlin张荫麟. 1944. Dōnghàn qián zhōngguó shǐgāng《东汉前中国史纲》 An Outline of Chinese History before the Eastern Han Dynasty. Shanghai: The Youth Bookstore. ZHANG Ziping 張資平and YANG Yitang 楊逸棠 (trans.) Seki Eikichi (auth.). 1930. Wénhuà shèhuìxué《文化社會學》 The Sociology of Culture. Shanghai: Shanghai Lequn Bookstore. ZHAO Wenrui赵文锐 (trans.) Bertrand Russell (auth.) 1924. Zhōngguó zhī wèntí《中国之问 题》 The Problem of China. Shanghai: China Publishing House. ZHU Qianzhi朱謙之. 1940. Zhōngguó sīxiǎng duìyú ōuzhōu wénhuà zhī yǐngxiǎng《中國思想 對於歐洲文化之影響》 Influence of Chinese Thoughts upon European Culture. Shanghai: The Commercial Press. ZHUANG Zexuan 莊澤宣. 1939. Mínzúxìng yǔ jiàoyù《民族性與教育》 National Traits and Education. Shanghai: The Commercial Press. ZOU Taofen鄒韬奋 [鄒恩潤] (trans.) Pat Sloan (auth.) 1946. Sūlián de mínzhǔ《苏联的民主》 On Soviet Democracy. Shanghai: Life Bookstore.

Index Buddhism 11, 17, 62-63, 106, 137, 340, 384 chaos 29, 34, 69, 101, 214, 271, 279, 281-313, 359, 365, 367, 369, 373, 381 Charles Louis Montesquieu 40, 42, 82, 117-118, 159, 270, 292-293, 407 Chinese civilization 32, 256, 267, 290 clan system 45, 64, 153-154, 156, 231 class distinction 10, 189, 205, 245, 287, 312 class rule 116, 216, 219, 227, 243, 288-289, 291, 322, 378, 383 collective 10-11, 29, 40, 71, 73-74, 78-84, 87, 89-90, 93, 96-99, 102, 128, 157, 233, 245, 249, 259, 297-298, 378, 382, 405-408 collective life 157, 245, 378, 382, 405-408 Confucianism 11, 17, 42, 75, 105-106, 135, 137, 139, 143, 146, 150-151, 155, 174-175, 214, 268, 272-275, 277-279, 311, 329, 331, 340, 367, 377-379, 384, 391 Confucius 33, 82, 105-106, 123, 129, 135-156, 158-161, 174, 176, 180-181, 201-202, 229-231, 265, 272-273, 275, 278-279, 300, 304, 307-309, 324, 329, 332, 340, 353, 358, 362, 379-380, 389 Christianity 62-63, 75, 78-82, 90, 104-106, 129, 134, 137, 173, 274-275, 277-278, 331, 340, 378 cultural precocity 144, 313, 315, 335, 338-339, 349, 351, 377, 395, 401, 404 cultural studies 10, 183, 300, 334, 396 culture 9-10, 13-14, 17-18, 20, 22-23, 25-34, 36-53, 58-65, 67-69, 71-73, 75, 80, 82, 86, 89, 93, 98-101, 104-106, 110, 112-113, 122, 125, 129-133, 135-137, 144, 146, 153, 155, 158-161, 163, 167, 175, 177, 181, 183, 191, 197, 200, 204-207, 209-210, 213, 216, 218-220, 224-226, 228, 233-234, 242-243, 245-246, 253, 257-259, 264, 266-268, 272, 274-279, 290, 294-296, 298, 300-303, 309, 311, 315, 327, 329, 338, 340-341, 345-349, 351, 353-354, 356-359, 361, 366, 370-375, 377-389, 391-396, 400-402, 404, 408-409 Chinese culture 9, 14, 25-34, 36-37, 39-40, 42-44, 46-47, 49-51, 53, 58, 61, 63, 68-69, 75, 99, 101, 105-107, 110, 112-113, 122, 129-130, 135-137, 144, 153, 155, 158, 163, 181, 197, 200, 210, 213, 220, 275, 278-279, 282, 290, 294, 298, 300, 302-303, 315, 329, 338, 340-341, 349, 353-354, 357-359, 361, 370-375, 377-380, 382-384, 393-396, 400, 402, 404, 408-409 etiquette culture 158-161, 251, 257-259, 264, 266-268, 272, 274, 276

Western culture 9-10, 14, 19, 25-26, 32, 40, 53, 60, 68-69, 71-72, 75, 82, 93, 105, 110, 122, 129, 133, 146, 155, 163, 220, 276, 278, 338, 340, 349, 357, 359, 361, 372-375, 378, 391, 395, 408 culture without soldiers 46, 233, 377 democracy 10, 39-42, 61, 69, 72, 124, 160, 205-206, 240-243, 253, 278, 315-317, 321-324, 327, 351, 359, 373-374, 378, 394 disunity 28, 48 Duke of Zhou 75, 82, 105, 123, 129, 135-138, 146-147, 181, 227, 279, 324, 332, 353, 358, 377-379, 389 economic power 30-31, 246 Edward Jenks 33, 63, 76, 78, 88, 294, 333-334, 358, 364-365 enlightenment 50, 69, 156, 158, 190, 227-228, 230, 259, 268, 275, 279, 308, 310, 312, 326, 338-339, 358, 361, 364, 367, 377, 380, 395, 397-399, 401-402 ethical obligations 116-117, 258, 378 ethical standards 10, 75, 248 ethics 17, 42-43, 53, 63, 83, 104, 106, 111-114, 116-122, 124, 126-128, 153, 156-157, 178, 181, 234, 245-247, 249-251, 261-262, 270, 277, 293, 322, 325, 329-331, 335, 337, 371, 374, 377, 382-383, 395, 405-407 ethics-oriented society 10, 109, 111, 113, 115, 153-154, 180, 245, 247, 258, 266, 302, 324, 328, 378, 389, 401 ethics-orientedness 109, 185, 325-326, 377, 398 etiquette 58, 118, 125, 131, 133, 146-147, 158-161, 180, 251, 257-259, 264-268, 272, 274, 276, 292-294, 296, 312, 345, 348, 372-373, 379, 382-383, 385, 388, 392, 409 external forces 69, 134, 143, 174, 227, 232, 264, 266-267, 338, 344, 367, 379-380, 398 family-centeredness 36, 113, 377 family life 36-37, 53, 56, 75, 78, 98, 104-106, 109-110, 119, 129, 245, 317, 322, 330-331, 377-378, 382 feudalism 154, 156-158, 196, 199, 203, 220-225, 227-229, 231-240, 246, 248, 251, 272, 279, 284, 289, 291, 312, 326, 329, 338, 367-368, 371, 378 filial piety 46, 112, 116-117, 122-123, 146, 156, 159, 168, 182, 219, 266, 372-373, 382 Fung Yu-lan 33, 51, 58, 62-64, 86, 88, 109, 150-151, 248

416  governance 34, 43, 69, 77, 100-101, 116-117, 207-208, 214, 216, 231, 245, 271-273, 279, 281, 283-284, 313, 317-318, 320-322, 337, 365, 367, 369, 381 group-centered life 57, 73, 75, 78-79, 81-84, 86, 89-90, 93, 98-99, 101, 104-106, 109, 116, 127, 129, 227, 245, 317, 322, 325, 330-331, 377-378, 380, 405 group organization 112, 377-378 heart-and-mind 165-167, 170-172, 174, 179, 252, 261-262, 300-302, 309, 311-312, 338-340, 343, 345-347, 349, 351, 360, 366, 369, 391-393, 395, 403-404 individual-oriented society 10, 71, 113, 125 internal force 218, 344, 379 knowledge 9, 20-22, 30-31, 37-38, 40, 49, 129, 131-132, 144, 149, 152, 159, 165, 168-172, 189-190, 193, 198, 228, 230, 240, 242, 263, 275, 296, 300, 302, 309, 334, 345, 351-357, 359-362, 366, 371, 381, 384, 387-388, 390-391, 402 legal system 25-26, 36, 39, 41, 43, 56, 78, 146, 188, 273, 292, 315, 317 loyalty 32, 104, 150, 154-155, 161, 203, 29 Lu Zuofu 36-37, 53, 58, 86, 109 military forces 31, 82, 217-220, 225-228, 233-234, 267, 283, 291, 303-304, 308, 321-322, 338, 381, 383-384, 408 moral codes 129, 137, 377 morality 17, 25, 36, 42-43, 46, 48, 52, 56, 58, 75, 93, 115, 118, 123, 129, 131-133, 143-144, 146-147, 153, 160-161, 169, 177, 180-181, 186, 212, 257, 264-268, 276-277, 292, 296, 311, 345-346, 356, 364, 379-382, 392-393, 397 mutual responsibility 10, 298 patriarchal society 33-34, 36, 64, 75-76, 111, 113, 122, 153, 226, 294, 370 patriarchal system 34, 78-79, 101, 113, 377 politics 22, 23, 25, 31-34, 37, 41-43, 46, 59, 63, 76, 78-80, 86-88, 98, 111, 116, 129, 133, 146, 149, 181, 186-187, 206, 214, 220, 223-226, 228, 230, 233-234, 236-241, 250-251, 253, 263, 267, 269, 273-274, 277, 279, 294, 297, 310, 317, 321-322, 330-334, 338, 352, 356, 358, 363-364, 367, 374, 380-381, 384, 391, 395 professional distinction 185, 192, 199, 206-208, 220, 233, 235, 245-248, 250-253, 255, 260, 284, 325-326, 353, 389, 401 rationality 42, 124, 139, 141, 143-144, 146-150, 154-156, 160, 163-164, 166-174, 178-181, 183, 187-188, 191, 214, 227-228, 230, 234, 236, 251,

Fundamentals of Chinese Culture

256, 259, 261, 263, 265-270, 272-273, 275, 281, 289, 302-303, 307-310, 312-313, 321, 324, 326-327, 329, 331, 334-344, 347-349, 351-352, 354-355, 358-359, 361-367, 372-375, 377, 379-381, 389-395, 397-402, 408-409 reason 9, 26, 112, 131, 135, 152, 155-157, 168, 170, 174-178, 180-181, 216, 219, 312, 324, 362, 364-365, 381, 397 Reason 105, 163-172, 177, 179, 188, 302, 310, 339, 343, 355-359, 361-364, 366, 374-375, 379, 381, 392-393, 396-397, 399, 401 reasonableness 168-170, 267, 364 religion 10-11, 31-32, 43, 46, 59, 63-64, 75-82, 88, 98-99, 104-106, 118, 120-122, 129, 130-141, 143-144, 146-154, 158, 161, 163, 173, 175-177, 186, 218, 225-228, 256-257, 259, 264-266, 275-278, 281, 294, 296-297, 303-304, 308, 326-327, 331-332, 338, 340, 345, 354, 360-364, 371-372, 375, 378-379, 381-382, 384, 386, 389-390, 392-393, 395, 398, 406 rule of law 10, 83, 93-94 science 10-11, 30, 38-39, 41, 69, 132, 168-169, 172, 256, 310-311, 351-356, 358, 360-362, 364, 366, 371, 381, 383-384, 402 self-consciousness 134, 143, 146, 265, 339, 379-380 self-discipline 14, 121, 143, 146, 265, 268, 379-380 Shang Yang 34, 53-56, 106, 231, 233, 272-273, 278, 382 social order 94, 99-100, 129, 131-132, 158, 160, 186, 218, 240, 247, 256-257, 264-267, 269, 271, 274, 277-278, 281, 283, 289, 291-292, 311, 328, 372-373, 380, 382 social structure 10, 51, 71-72, 75, 98, 105, 122, 124-125, 153, 161, 185, 189, 204, 206, 208, 216, 224, 234, 245, 252, 255-257, 259-260, 266, 271-272, 274, 281, 284, 290-293, 311, 313, 315, 389, 401, 405-406, 408 stability 73, 106, 187, 218, 227-228, 243, 263, 286-287, 298-304, 308-310, 359 transformation 10, 23, 26, 93, 131, 231, 234, 284, 344, 381 unity 11, 32, 80, 82, 130, 134, 136, 173, 178, 191, 214, 238, 274, 279, 300, 308-309, 339, 343, 362, 380, 383-385, 391, 394-395 Yan Fu 33-34, 39-40, 43, 63, 76, 78, 111, 294, 323, 333 Zhang Dongsun 39, 124, 160, 164, 278, 327, 329, 354-355, 357, 359-361, 373, 402 Zhou’s Rituals 75, 377-379, 391