From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role 9781400829187

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FROM WEALTH TO POWER

PRINCETON STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY AND POLITICS

Series Editors Jack L. Snyder, Marc Trachtenberg, and Fareed Zakaria

Recent titles: The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations by Christian Reus-Smit Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century by David Lake A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 by Marc Trachtenberg Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy by Etel Solingen From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role by Fareed Zakaria Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, ana the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan by Sarah E. Mendelson Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea by Leon V. Sigal Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars by Elizabeth Kier Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making by Barbara Rearden Farnham Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 by Thomas J. Christensen Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade by Randall W. Stone Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies by Peter Liberman Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History by Alastair Iain Johnston The Korean War: An International History by William Stueck

Fareed Zakaria FROM WEALTH TO POWER

THE UNUSUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICA'S WORLD ROLE

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Copyright© 1998 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Chichester, West Sussex All Rights Reserved Fourth printing, and first paperback printing, 1999 Paperback ISBN 0-691-01035-8 The Library of Congress has cataloged the cloth edition of this book as follows Zakaria, Fareed. From wealth to power : the unusual origins of America's world role I Fareed Zakaria. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-691-04496-1 (cl: alk. paper) 1. United States-Foreign relations-1865-1921. 2. International relations. I. Title. E661.7.Z35 1998 327.73-dc21 97-34245 This book has been composed in Sabon The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of ANSI/NISO 239.48-1992 (Rl997) (Permanence of Paper) http://pup.princeton.edu Printed in the United States of America 10

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ISBN-13: 978-0-691-01035-9 ISBN-10: 0-691-01035-8

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ To my parents _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ RAFIQ AND FATMA ZAKARIA

_________ Conren~--------Preface Chapter One

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Introduction: What Makes a Great Power? Chapter Two

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A Theory of Foreign Policy: Why Do States Expand? Chapter Three

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Imperial Understretch: Power and Nonexpansion, 1865-1889 Chapter Four

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The Rise of the American State, 1877-1896: The Foundation for a New Foreign Policy Chapter Five

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The New Diplomacy, 1889-1908: The Emergence of a Great Power Chapter Six

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Conclusion: Strong Nation, Weak State Index

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_________ Preface _________

THIS BOOK is a product of interest and frustration; interest in history and political science, and frustration with the study of international relations. International relations is studied nowadays with a serious involvement in either history or social science theory, but rarely both. (This is partly a reflection of the ever-increasing professionalization of disciplines in the academy.) I have tried to make a small contribution to what I think is a necessary joint enterprise, examining the historical record for insights and evidence that shed light on broad theoretical topics in world politics, such as the rise of new great powers. I was fortunate to have been in two ideal environments for scholarship, first as an undergraduate and then as a Ph.D. student. My interest in history was nurtured at Yale's dazzling history department, where Paul Kennedy, Robin Winks, and Vasily Rudich were particularly generous with their time and attention. At Harvard I learned to think like a social scientist. The Department of Government at Harvard was an extraordinary place, crammed with wide-ranging intelligence, erudition, and, above all, argument. For their advice, encouragement, and friendship I am deeply grateful to Samuel P. Huntington, Stanley Hoffmann, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and the late Judith Shklar. I was awarded fellowships by the Center for Science and International Affairs, the Center for International Affairs, and the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, which were indispensible to completing this project. At Foreign Affairs, James Hoge has generously allowed me the time and flexibility to write, which made it possible to turn a dissertation into a book. Princeton University Press has been enthusiastic and helpful from the start, for which I owe thanks to its director, Walter Lippincott; Malcolm Debevoise; and Malcolm Litchfield. Ronald Krebs helped greatly with the final revisions. lb Ohlsson drew an elegant map to help me make my point. Over the years, many friends have listened to parts of this project as it progressed from an outline to a book. I want to thank them all, but especially those who read some part of it: Gideon Rose, Andrew Moravscik, Sean Lynn-Jones, Robert Lieberman, Timothy Naftali, Thomas Christensen, and Nicholas Rizopoulos. The final product has lost many of its early scars because of their constructive criticism. Finally, some personal thanks. As I was growing up in India, my interest in the world was kindled by two extraordinary people: Khushwant Singh, who taught me how to write, and the late Girilal Jain, who

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PREFACE

taught me how to think. Gideon, Dan, and Joanna Rose and Sheri Berman have been a wondrous combination of friends and family. My brother, Arshad, has been a pillar of support since we both left home for college fourteen years ago. I did not know my wife, Paula, when most of this book was written. Had I, she would have lifted my spirits then as she does each day now. Finally and most importantly, thanks to my parents, Fatma and Rafiq Zakaria, to whom this book is dedicated and who gave me more than I can ever explain, let alone repay.

FROM WEALTH TO POWER

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ CHAPTER ONE _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Introduction WHAT MAKES A GREAT POWER?

WHAT TURNS rich nations into "great powers"? Why, as states grow increasingly wealthy, do they build large armies, entangle themselves in politics beyond their borders, and seek international influence? What factors speed or retard the translation of material resources into political interests? These questions, central to the theory and history of international relations as well as the world we live in today, guide this study of the rise of the United States. Throughout history, few events in international life have been as regular or as disruptive as the arrival of a new great power on the world scene. From the Peloponnesian War over two thousand years ago-caused, in Thucydides' famous words, by "the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta" 1to the rise of Germany in this century, almost every new addition to the ranks of the great powers has resulted in global instability and war. E. H. Carr correctly identified the "problem of peaceful change" as the central dilemma of international relations. 2 The strong are all the same, Michael Mandelbaum writes: "They expand. They send their soldiers, ships, and public and private agents abroad. They fight wars, guard borders, and administer territories and people of different languages, customs, and beliefs far from their own capitals. They exert influence on foreigners in a variety of ways .... The strong do to others what others cannot do to them." 3 Over the course of history, states that have experienced significant growth in their material resources have relatively soon redefined and expanded their political interests abroad, measured by their increases in military spending, initiation of wars, acquisition of territory, posting of soldiers and diplomats, and participation in great-power decision-making. Paul Kennedy concludes that "there is a very clear connection between an indi' Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1972), 49. 'Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 2d ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 208-23. '.Michael Mandelbaum, The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 134-35.

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vidual Great Power's economic rise and fall and its growth and decline as an important military power (or world empire)." 4 Consider the brief rise and fall of Sweden. At the start of the seventeenth century, Sweden was hardly a bright prospect for great powerdom. With a largely peasant population, little industry, few towns, and a barter economy, its economic foundation was extremely weak. But after significant foreign investment and internal reforms, Sweden's fortunes changed, and in a short time it became one of Europe's richest countries and the leading producer of iron and copper. This new wealth paved the way for a more powerful military and a more assertive diplomacy. By 1630, Gustavus Adolphus had eagerly joined the European political fray on behalf of the Protestant cause, and Sweden's tremendous military force was critical in checking Habsburg ambitions over the next twenty years. In subsequent decades, it acquired several trans-Baltic territories, intervened repeatedly in Poland, and dreamed of uniting Scandinavia under its throne. Then, over the next sixty years, Sweden's economic might declined, compared to that of the industrializing economies of western Europe, and correspondingly its role as a great European power dwindled. 5 Sweden is a clear example of a trend one can see among nearly all rising powers, from the Netherlands in the late sixteenth century to Britain in the late eighteenth century to Japan in the late nineteenth century. Prussia, for example, remained a second-rank power until its economic takeoff in the 1850s. Between 1830 and 1880, the German state's share of world manufacturing output climbed nearly 150 percent, while its two great continental rivals, France and the Habsburg Empire, saw rises of just 50 percent and 40 percent respectively. Germany's GNP doubled between 1840 and 1870, growing more than that of any other European state. Joined with the Prussian military revolution of the 1860s, this growth underlay the successful wars of German unification and the new Germany's triumph over France. After 1870 Germany, backed by its unparalleled industrial power and led by the adroit Bismarck, would dominate the European great-power system. Diplomats at the time noted that now all roads led to Berlin. 6 So common was this pattern that European statesmen viewed the state that did not turn its wealth into political influence as an anomaly. In the eighteenth century, they spoke in astonishment and scorn of "the Dutch disease, a malady that prevented a nation enjoying unequalled • Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to the Present (New York: Random House, 1987), xxii. 5 Ibid., 64-66. • Ibid., 149, 160-62, 171, 185-88.

INTRODUCTION

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individual prosperity and commercial prowess from remaining a state of great influence and power. " 7 With greater wealth, a country could build a military and diplomatic apparatus capable of fulfilling its aims abroad; but its very aims, its perception of its needs and goals, all tended to expand with rising resources. As European statesmen raised under the great-power system understood so clearly, capabilities shape intentions. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the United States was afflicted with the Dutch disease. While America emerged from the Civil War as a powerful industrial state, unquestionably one of the three or four richest nations in the world, its foreign policy was marked by a persistent reluctance to involve itself abroad. Many historians of the period have asked why America expanded in the 1890s. But for the political scientist, viewing the country's power and expansion in comparative perspective, the more puzzling question is why America did not expand more and sooner. The period 1865-1908, particularly before 1890, presents us with many instances in which the country's central decision-makers noticed and considered clear opportunities to expand American influence abroad and rejected them. Certainly, between the time when they get rich and when they acquire expansive political interests abroad, countries often experience a time lag, frequently because policymakers fail to perceive the shift in their country's relative economic position. But America's central decision-makers were well aware of its economic strength and proudly proclaimed it. Nevertheless, the country hewed to a relatively isolationist line, with few exceptions, until the 1890s-a highly unusual gap between power and interests, for it lasted some thirty years. The United States would thus seem to represent an exception to the historical record and a challenge to the greatpower rule. (Before proceeding any further, I should note that historians of American foreign policy sometimes restrict the meaning of the term expansion to the acquisition of colonial territories. This study employs a broader, more commonsensical definition of the term; expansion can certainly involve imperialism, but it more generally refers to an activist foreign policy that ranges from attention to international events to increases in diplomatic legations to participation in great-power diplomacy. The Soviet Union, by this definition, could be called expansionist in the 1970s even though it was not formally annexing parts of Africa and Central Asia. Using territorial annexation as one measure of expansionism, the thirty years from 1865 to 1896 still stand out as an anomaly in American history.) 7 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), xv.

6 CHAPTER ONE

UNITED STATES

Territorial Annexation (One index of foreign policy activism)

1783-1813 1783 The Thirteen States and Territorial Claims 1803 Louisiana Purchase 1810, 1813 Annexations

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