From the President's Office: A Journey Towards Reconciliation in a Divided Cyprus 9780755620654, 9781848854116

Citation preview

00-Presidents Office_i-x

26/11/09

15:47

Page vii

Appendices

Speech by Ambassador E. Lagakos in Athens on 10 November 1988

303

outline Proposals for the Establishment of a Federal Republic and for the Solution of the Cyprus Problem

309

Exchange of Letters between the Prime Ministers Messrs A. Papandreou and T. Őzal

319

APPENDIx FoUR

De Cuellar’s Set of Ideas – Food for Thought

321

APPENDIx FIVE

Press Conference by the President of the Republic, Mr George Vassiliou, at the UN Headquarters, Friday 2 March 1990

329

APPENDIx SIx

Resolution 649 (1990)

335

APPENDIx SEVEN

Letters by President Vassiliou to President Bush and President Gorbachev and Reply by President Bush

337

APPENDIx oNE

APPENDIx TWo

APPENDIx THREE

APPENDIx EIGHT

Introductory Speech of President Vassiliou to the Common Session of the National Council, under the Chairmanship of the President of Cyprus, Mr Vassiliou, and the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr Mitsotakis 341

APPENDIx NINE

Statement by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on his Mission of Good offices in Cyprus

347

Extract from the Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good offices in Cyprus

351

APPENDIx TEN

vii

00-Presidents Office_i-x

26/11/09

15:47

Page viii

From the President’s Office APPENDIx ELEVEN

APPENDIx TWELVE

APPENDIx THIRTEEN

APPENDIx FoURTEEN

APPENDIx FIFTEEN

viii

Letter of the Secretary-General of the UN, Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to H.E. the President of the USA, Mr George Bush

355

Interview Given by the President of the Republic, Mr George Vassiliou, to Turkish Television on 4 June 1992

357

Set of Ideas on an overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus

367

Summary of the Current Positions of the Two Sides in Relation to the Set of Ideas (S/24472)

383

Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good offices in Cyprus

405

00-Presidents Office_i-x

26/11/09

15:47

Page ix

Preface

The publication of this book From the President’s Office – A Journey Towards Reconciliation in a Divided Cyprus could not come at a more opportune time. In the book we present the huge drive to promote a solution of the Cyprus problem in the period between 1988 and 1993. Unfortunately, during that time we did not reach an agreement. Currently, a new effort has been initiated which it is hoped will lead to the reunification of the island within a bicommunal bizonal federation. Negotiations between the two communities have restarted in earnest, shortly after the election of Mr. Christofias to the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus in February 2008. In the period since then a number of issues have been clarified to mutual satisfaction and now the two leaders, President Christofias and Mr. Talat, are engaged in an intensive direct negotiation process under the auspices of the UN. Both leaders are fully aware of the dangers and negative repercussions of a failure to reach an agreement. In such a case there will be no winners, only losers. Turkey is also aware of the negative consequences of being blamed for a possible failure to reach a settlement. She would lose all the advantages that she gained internationally from the acceptance of the Annan Plan. She would also send out the message that, in reality, her ultimate aim was to maintain the occupation of half of Cyprus. As a consequence, Turkey’s efforts to play a leading regional role in the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East and the Caucasus would go to waste, while her EU membership hopes could be thwarted for good. A detached and objective examination of the developments, and of the present process, reinforce the view that a Cyprus solution would be in the best interest of Cyprus – the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots – of the EU, and the international community in general.

ix

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

00-Presidents Office_i-x

26/11/09

15:47

Page x

From The President’s Office

The benefits of the solution would mean that: • The refugee problem will finally be resolved and there will be an end to illegal settlemen.t • The solution of the property issue would lead, among others, to an influx of hundreds of millions in Euros and would create the conditions for unprecedented development in Cyprus despite the global financial crisis. • Cyprus would finally be able to play its role as a financial, educational and medical centre for the region. • Tourism would grow significantly and would pave the way for more foreign investment. • The opening of the Turkish market would offer many opportunities for Cypriot businessmen and traders. • It would contribute significantly to tackling the water and energy problems through pipelines from Turkey. The fact that Cyprus is now a full member of the EU could greatly help in finding a solution. Issues that could give rise to endless disagreements, and ultimately deadlock, are today the principles on which the operation of EU is based and are binding for all its member-states. I am referring, among others, to: the four basic freedoms; the respect of human rights; and the security that the European Union provides to all of its members. Furthermore, Cyprus is today a full member of the Euro zone and thus any endless discussions on the currency of the Federal Republic have been avoided. The common currency is Euro and decisions on the monetary and financial policy are taken in Frankfurt and not Cyprus. All readers of this book will be able to understand the issues involved and the complexity of the Cyprus problem and, hopefully, contribute where possible towards its successful completion. Furthermore, they could draw useful lessons as to how to negotiate successfully and what it takes to mobilise the international community towards a desired objective.

x

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 1

Introduction

In 1988, to the surprise of many, both in Cyprus and abroad, I was elected President of the Republic. The surprise was due to the fact that I was neither a member nor a leader of any political party and not one of the close collaborators of President Makarios. It was of course known that my family played an active role in the creation and development of the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL), the leftwing movement on the island, a party with which I maintained friendly relations and which supported me for the election. In this book I present the strategy and initiatives developed, during my presidency, for breaking the deadlock and promoting the reunification of our country. The national, local but also international Cyprus problem, as one of selfdetermination, until the independence of 1960, and after that date as one of management in common with the newborn Republic of Cyprus by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, found itself torn, both before and after 1974: between political realism and ‘patriotic’ demagogy; between unilateral choices and tendencies to impose a solution on the one hand and a search for balancing interests and mutual compromises on the other; between conflict and dialogue. ‘Compromise does not mean cowardice,’ said John Kennedy. ‘Indeed it is frequently the compromisers and conciliators who are faced with the severest tests of political courage as they oppose the extremist views of their constituents.’ (John F. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage, Harper, 2006, p. 18.) The first President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, following the efforts to change the Zurich/London Constitution in 1963 and the ensuing civil strife that followed, realised the need for a compromise. He thus proclaimed in January 1968 the policy of the feasible, that is, of a solution agreed between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, in contrast to the desirable, for the most Greek Cypriots, that is, the union of Cyprus with Greece. Unfortunately, although talks 1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 2

From the President’s Office

with the Turkish Cypriots made progress almost to the point of reaching an agreement, the Greek junta and their partners in Cyprus, EOKA B, were resolutely against Makarios and his policy of the feasible, that is, the solution through an honest compromise. They created and encouraged the internal turmoil, and when this proved inadequate they proceeded with organising and carrying out the 1974 coup d’état and the assassination attempt against Makarios. The coup gave Turkey the excuse that she was waiting for to invade Cyprus and occupy its northern part (37 per cent of the territory, despite the fact that Turkish Cypriots represented only 18 per cent of the population and owned 12 per cent of the land). The invading army went on to expel by force from the occupied territories the Greek Cypriots living there and obliged all the Turkish Cypriots from other parts of the island to move to the occupied areas of Northern Cyprus. At the same time the invaders followed a deliberate policy to change the demographic composition of the island by promoting the settlement of thousands of Turks from Anatolia. It is estimated that by 2008 the number of settlers was significantly larger, nearly double the number of Turkish Cypriots (around 100,000). After the invasion, President Makarios, having examined in every detail all available options, reached the conclusion that under the circumstances only a bizonal, bi-communal federation could provide a feasible solution. He therefore went on to sign the 1977 agreement to that effect with the Turkish-Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash. Unfortunately he died before being able to implement it. The then Speaker of Parliament, Spyros Kyprianou, became President of the Republic and, after negotiations, in May 1979 he signed a new agreement with Mr Denktash, confirming the previous Makarios–Denktash agreement and adding new provisions to it. Any further progress stops at that point, as during the following ten years until my election to the presidency of the Republic there were no positive developments whatsoever on the issue. Mr Kyprianou, together with other Cypriot politicians, adopted the policy of ‘preconditions’,1 which, in combination with the negative stance of the Turkish side, led to the stagnation of the talks. As a result, from the second half of 1979, continuous UN initiatives under Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, at the beginning, and Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, subsequently, failed, to the disappointment of both the Cypriot public and the international community. This sterile policy gave Turkey and Mr Denktash the opportunity to consolidate their grip on the north of the island and in 1983 to proceed to the unilateral declaration of ‘independence’ of the so-called TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). The international conjuncture with the end of the Cold War created new possibilities and perspectives for the solution of national and local conflicts, while giving at the same time a new impetus to the European integration. It was our duty to try to take advantage of this climate. This was the reason I decided to be a candidate, although few believed that I would succeed. 2

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 3

Introduction

In 1987, during my campaign for the presidency, I promised an end to the stagnation and deadlock that was until then the mark of the Cyprus issue. In my electoral programme I made the following assessment of the Cyprus problem which, I think, is still relevant today: The dangers arising from the fact that our national issue is still in abeyance must be obvious to everyone. The continuation of the deadlock presents serious dangers for the Cypriot people and for our country as an independent sovereign member-state of the UN. The passage of time allows the invader to consolidate the partition and alter the face of Cyprus. It can also lead to negative developments both on the international level – with a possible acceptance of the status quo and the danger of recognising partition – and on the local level with the lack of contact between the two communities. The young Cypriots, Greeks and Turks grow up in a climate of suspicion without any possibility of meeting and making acquaintance with each other. That is why it is absolutely necessary to try and end the long-standing stagnation of the Cyprus issue. On the basis of these assessments, I tried hard, from the very start of my presidency, to make us move on from the stagnation, to create mobility and build an assertive and demanding new diplomatic campaign. Furthermore, we tried to establish in real terms a common course with Greece and achieve the maximum possible consensus within Cyprus. Building up our international credibility and mobilising the USA, EU, Russia and other international powers was the only recipe to make Turkey move towards a compromise on the Cyprus issue. We were convinced and tried to persuade all our interlocutors that a solution of the Cyprus problem would benefit everybody, first of all the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities and then Turkey, Greece and the UN in general. The success of such a strategy depended on the display on our side of the strong desire and the political will to reach an agreement as soon as possible.2 This policy was successful. The international powers and the UN increased their efforts to reach a solution to the extent that in 1992 the Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, submitted his ‘Set of Ideas’, which were unanimously endorsed by the Security Council in Resolution 789. Turkey, under President Őzal, showed signs of willingness to enter into serious negotiations. At this very critical moment, in February 1993, the leader of the rightwing party DISY, Mr Clerides, won the elections with a minute majority of a few hundred votes. Unfortunately, during the first years of his presidency, he abandoned the policy that he was supporting until mid-1992 so that there was again stalemate until the summer of 1997, when negotiations under the auspices of the UN resumed once again. To begin with no progress was achieved during several rounds of 3

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 4

From the President’s Office

negotiations, due to the negative stand of the then Turkish-Cypriot leader Mr Denktash. In 1998 the EU initiated negotiations for the accession of Cyprus, together with nine other candidate countries. I was nominated Chief Negotiator and Coordinator of the Cyprus effort, and after four years of hard work, in November 2002, as a result of our constructive policies in general and readiness to reach a compromise solution on the Cyprus problem, Cyprus was accepted into the EU. This fact changed radically the situation as it led to the Europeanisation of the Cyprus issue. The perspective of integration of the Turkish Cypriots into the EU and the reunification of Cyprus within a European frame created a never-beforeseen momentum within the Turkish-Cypriot community that overthrew Mr Denktash and the policy of non-solution, while bringing to the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots Mehmet Ali Talat. The UN in the meantime continued its efforts which led to the submission of the Anan Plan. At the referendum of April 2004 the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan following the strong appeal by President Papadopoulos to vote ‘No’. As a result the stalemate continued for four years until February 2008, when Mr Christofias, leader of AKEL, was elected President of the Republic. Shortly afterwards, as he had promised in his electoral manifesto, substantial negotiations started again. I believe that the conclusions and lessons of the period 1988–93, especially today when Cyprus is a member of the EU, can contribute to the efforts by President Christofias and the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mr Mehmet Ali Talat to solve the Cyprus problem. The lessons of the five-year period 1988–93 do not concern only why and how we did not reach a solution. They also contain the essence of a policy that created a momentum both within and without Cyprus, a policy that not only was following the dictates of the current reality, but also had a vision for the future, for a unified Cyprus. It is the duty of all who want to serve peace, security and cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots to support the leaders of the two communities in their efforts to reach an agreement in the near future. In order to make the presentation of the work and achievements during the period of the presidency easier to comprehend, we divided the five-year term into the following five periods: 1 First period, March to August 1988: An effort is made to pull the Cyprus issue out of oblivion, change the image of Cyprus and restart the dialogue. 2 Second period, September 1988 to August 1989: The restart of intercommunal negotiations. Submission, in January 1989, of our unanimously approved proposals for a mutually beneficial solution to the Cyprus problem. Continuation with the second and the third phase of the negotiations. Submission of the proposals ‘Food for Thought’ of the Secretary-General of the UN, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar. 4

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 5

Introduction

3 Third period, September 1989 to February 1991: Rejection of the proposals of the Secretary-General by Denktash and breakdown of the talks. Intensification of efforts to internationalise the issue and to put to good use the proposals of the Secretary-General. Submission of application to join the EEC. UN Resolution 649. 4 Fourth period, March 1991 to May 1992: Efforts are made to convene an international conference and increase the pressure on Turkey. Retraction by Turkey and new deadlock. Rejection of the Turkish terms with Resolution 716. Direct involvement of the Security Council and Resolution 750. 5 Fifth period, June to December 1992: New negotiations and the ‘Gali Set of Ideas’. Resolution 789. The Appendixes contain some of the most important documents of the period. It is with great pleasure that I hand over this book with the experiences and lessons of my presidency to the English-speaking public. I would like to thank the publishing house, I.B.Tauris, for giving me this opportunity and my friend, Mark Dragoumis, for translating the work. I hope that this publication will contribute to the better understanding of the Cyprus problem, while it will also serve as a source of information for those who want to study the contemporary history of Cyprus.

5

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 6

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 7

chapter one

First Period: February 1988 to August 1988 Introduction By 1988, 14 years had already elapsed since the invasion and the occupation was still in full swing because, in spite of the historical compromise of Ethnarch (Leader of the Nation) Makarios to have accepted the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal Federation, all the UN efforts to reach a solution had remained fruitless. The worst part of it was that for the first time a negative climate for us had taken shape internationally due to the rejection by President Kyprianou of the 1986 proposals by the UN Secretary-General, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar, and the breakdown of negotiations that ensued. Unfortunately the policy of ‘Preconditions’ (the insistence on the need for the Turkish army to leave Cyprus and for Greek-Cypriot refugees to be allowed back to their homes in the north of the island before any talks could start) that had been promoted by President Kyprianou with the full support of the parties DHKO, the Movement of Social Democrats (EDEK), the ‘Centre Union’, as well as a substantial section of the Right, only served Turkey’s interests. It would undoubtedly have been most welcome if the withdrawal of the occupying forces had been possible. It would also have been most desirable if the three basic freedoms, namely the return of the refugees, the removal of the settlers and the abolition of the guarantees could be secured. Unfortunately, however, these were all ‘midsummer night dreams’. Turkey refused bluntly to accept even a single one of these preconditions. The worst, however, was that Turkey had the support of the international community, which did not accept the theory of ‘preconditions’ and insisted that any agreement should be the outcome of negotiations. They were vexed by the fact that, while the Turkish-Cypriot side had accepted the proposals of the UN Secretary-General, our own side had, in essence, rejected them. 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 8

From the President’s Office

As a result, Turkey could safely consolidate the status quo, hoping that we would stick to our line, thus giving her the chance to promote the partition of Cyprus. It was obvious that delays and inactivity were becoming fatal for us. The new climate that had been created in the field of Greek–Turkish relations after the Papandreou– Őzal meeting at Davos in February 1988 increased the need for a change of policy. Obviously our main task was to break as soon as possible the deadlock that served only the interests of Mr Denktash and Ankara, and to change the negative image that had been created at our expense. We had to win international understanding and support in order to create the conditions for restarting the dialogue that would lead to a solution. This policy led eventually to a resumption of the dialogue, to changes in the international climate, the mobilisation of the international community on the Cyprus issue, the active involvement of the Security Council in the issue and the adoption of a series of Resolutions, each better than the previous one up until Resolution 789, as well as to the promotion of the ‘Gali ideas’. Our policy aimed, through the dialogue and the international promotion of our positions, to achieve the following: 1 We tried to render the continuing occupation painful and useless for Turkey. We tried to increase Ankara’s costs (in every field). By persistently keeping alive the Cyprus issue on the international scene we turned it into a nagging problem and a stumbling block for every step that Turkey took. The political cost Turkey incurred by keeping troops in Cyprus was steadily increasing in relation to the benefits she obtained from their presence there. Every single time that Turkey attempted within an international body to project the image of a modern democratic country – whether applying for membership of the European Economic Community, claiming to present herself as the protector of the rights of the Islamic populations in the former Soviet Union or pursuing her policies in former Yugoslavia and especially in Bosnia – she was confronted with the Cyprus issue. We tried to have all of Turkey’s political aspirations and interests assessed via her stance on the Cyprus issue. This goal was, on the whole, achieved judging by the statement, in May 1992, made by the then Turkish premier Turgut Őzal, who admitted that ‘wherever I go I find myself in front of a stone whose name is the Cyprus issue’. 2 We tried to create the necessary conditions to make international interest and solidarity effective in thwarting Turkey’s aims to partition Cyprus by having the northern pseudo-state recognised. Our dedication to the dialogue process, within the framework of the UN, kept the interest of the international community alive as the possibility of achieving a solution through the contribution of the UN was there for all to see. Any attempt by Ankara to implement her policies stumbled on the insistence of international bodies and other countries to see the negotiating procedure strengthened, making it 8

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 9

First Period: February 1988 to August 1988

possible for a solution of the Cyprus issue to be reached. On the contrary, during periods of stagnation and stalemate, when there is no movement on the issue, international support consists only in offering advice and in exerting pressure for the dialogue to restart, since everybody (including us of course) excludes the use of military means for the solution of the problem. 3 We tried to convey to the Turkish Cypriots the message that the continuing division of Cyprus was of no use to anyone, least of all to themselves. We achieved this by projecting consistently the need for a solution on the basis of the highlevel agreements of 1977 and 1979, that is, a solution within a federal frame that would deal creatively with everybody’s concerns about the common interest. An important element in our entire effort in this direction was our endeavour to open lines of communication with the Turkish Cypriots and increase the number of contacts among various social and professional groups (such as journalists, physicians, businessmen and so on). We tried, through this process, to create conditions for bringing all the citizens of the Cyprus Republic closer together and increase the understanding of each other, thus laying the foundations for their future life in common. 4 We tried to convey to the Turkish political leadership and Turkish public opinion the message that confrontation was not our choice, but was something that had been imposed on us. This was a crucial element of our policy. We, on the contrary, were keen on cooperating in order to achieve a fair solution of the Cyprus issue to benefit all Cypriots (Greek and Turkish Cypriots), as well as Greece, Turkey and the area as a whole. This was achieved through an unprecedented effort to appeal to Turkish public opinion through interviews given to Turkish media, as well as through speeches delivered at international forums. The struggle to restart and pursue the intercommunal dialogue in view of finding a solution to the Cyprus issue, the UN efforts in that direction, the response and the role played by the international community, the attitude of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots from 1988 until the end of 1992 can be – as mentioned before – divided into five separate periods.

Preparation of the new initiative by the Secretary-General: Beginning of the dialogue This period starts with my inaugural speech on 28 February 1988 to the House of Representatives. This speech outlines the new policy that must be followed for finding a solution to the Cyprus issue. The principle of preconditions was abandoned as it served only the interests of Mr Denktash and Turkey, by allowing them to consolidate 9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 10

From the President’s Office

the status quo without incurring any pressure to change their policies. Everybody knows the entrenched view of the UN and the international community that you cannot dictate conditions for starting negotiations. It becomes much worse when you attempt – as we did – to do so after many years of having pursued negotiations which, at some stage, we interrupted unilaterally. I also noted at the same time: We are in favour of resolving peacefully the Cyprus problem but the negotiating process cannot be an end in itself. Its object must be the solution of the Cyprus problem as a whole, as provided by the Resolutions of the United Nations, especially Resolution 550 of the Security Council. It is inconceivable for a negotiating process not to deal first and foremost with the basic issues of the occupation troops and the settlers, the basic freedoms and the guarantees. For this reason I believe it is necessary to have as soon as possible a personal meeting with the prime minister of Turkey, Mr Őzal, at a place and date of his choice. I did not, of course, nourish any illusions about the chances of ever holding such a meeting with the Turkish prime minister, Turgut Őzal. I expected him to refuse. Such an answer, though, would remind the international community that Turkey was not only responsible for the invasion and the continuing occupation, but also that she was not prepared to engage in any substantial negotiations. This proposal drew comments on a wide scale. Of some interest are, in this context, the statements by the American ambassador, Vernon Walters, who – as reported by the Turkish newspaper Cumhűrriet – qualified as positive an eventual meeting between the Turkish prime minister and me, stressing that any contact and exchange of views is helpful. Almost immediately after my inauguration, at the beginning of March, I went to Athens on an official visit. Almost a month and a half had elapsed since the meeting between Andreas Papandreou and Mr Őzal at Davos and my main aim, except for making Papandreou’s acquaintance, was to be briefed at depth and exchange views about this Davos meeting that signalled the emergence of a new climate in Greek– Turkish relations. After the escalation of tensions in the Aegean in 1987, the Papandreou government recognised the need for a dialogue with Turkey, abandoning the precondition, valid until then, that Turkish troops had first to be withdrawn from Cyprus. As the Greek prime minister put it: Whenever there is a problem, any problem, before you opt for confrontation you must engage in some kind of dialogue. I thus came to the conclusion that Turkey managed better her public relations and became more acceptable. Especially with Őzal and other Turks calling on Greece to engage in dialogue, this opinion was gradually created about a deadlock that was there affecting negatively both us and Cyprus. I therefore decided to go and I did. 10

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 11

First Period: February 1988 to August 1988

Such statements and the Davos meeting signalled the end of the policy of preconditions that President Kyprianou had adhered to for years. The Greek government had believed until then that it was easier to follow a hard-line policy on Turkey and thus remain free to focus only on issues of internal policy. At some stage, however, things changed and the prime minister, as mentioned above, realised that a dialogue had become necessary. Thus Greece adopted a new policy in her relations with Turkey which, we hoped, would create new perspectives for the resumption, in Cyprus, of a substantial intercommunal dialogue. As expected, a section of the Greek and the Greek-Cypriot press, as well as some political leaders, wanted to create the impression that the Greek prime minister in his talks with the Turkish prime minister at Davos and later in Brussels had sidelined the Cyprus issue. My view, confirmed by the Greek prime minister, was that such a thing would be unthinkable. Cyprus was always the first priority for Greece, I said, while the communiqué that was issued focused exclusively on the need to build better relations between the two countries. It is useful to note in this context that, according to press reports, the Davos meeting was warmly welcomed by the majority of the Cypriot people. There was a justified expectation that the relations between Greece and Turkey would have a positive impact on developments in the Cyprus issue. During the talks I had in Athens, the Greek prime minister in his address delivered on 14 June 1988 mentioned: It is indeed true that at Davos, and later in Brussels, a new approach to the relations between the two countries was attempted. A huge effort was undertaken to make the logic of peace and the peaceful resolution of any issues prevail – something that is anyway totally in line with the generally peace-oriented policy of Greece. At the meeting with the Greek prime minister we exchanged views both on current affairs and on the future handling of the Cyprus issue. We agreed, among other things, that special emphasis should be given to promote public relations, an area that had been neglected in the past. Mr Papandreou stressed specifically the necessity to take all necessary steps in order to win over international public opinion on the substance of the issue. We also agreed to be in constant contact and to exchange views on the common assessment of developments so as to avoid ever taking each other by surprise. In a press interview on 16 March 1988, I said about my meeting with Mr Papandreou: Besides a discussion in general we dealt, naturally, with the spirit of Davos as a whole and I must stress that there is complete understanding and full concord between us. Everybody agrees that the Davos spirit is the one we have always longed for. What is it that we Greek Cypriots and Greeks always wanted? We wanted to reach a solution of our problem by peaceful 11

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 12

From the President’s Office

means. I was asked today by a newspaper: Is there a change of policy since the time when Greece used to say that she would not discuss with Turkey for as long as Turkish troops were not withdrawn from the island? I replied that I do not see any change of policy because the essence of the matter has always been that the Turkish troops must go. Unfortunately Turkey did not withdraw her troops in spite of numerous UN Resolutions and international pressures to that effect. The insistence for the troops to be removed was correct and if the price to pay for this is to have a dialogue, let us have a dialogue not just once but a thousand times. Provided, that is, that the troops are withdrawn. It is up to Turkey to show that she can do what she has to do and thus prove that she can behave as a modern country today, i.e. a country that does not keep occupation troops in a foreign country and tries to solve peacefully any outstanding differences.

Re-establishment of the National Council The National Council was founded by Archbishop Makarios, of blessed memory, after the Turkish invasion of 1974. The first session of the National Council took place on 21 January 1975 with the participation of all the parties that held seats in the House of Representatives. After the demise of Makarios, the National Council continued to function under the chairmanship of the then President of the Republic, the late Spyros Kyprianou. During the second mandate of President Kyprianou, however, the role of the National Council was severely downgraded because of the confrontation between the two large parties AKEL and DISY. The conflict came to a head at the end of 1984 (beginning of 1985) because of the line followed by President Kyprianou, who, at the High Level Meeting under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General in January 1985, allowed Mr Denktash to win the day. Faced with such a confrontation, President Kyprianou decided to abolish the National Council instead of trying to create the right climate of cooperation for the common good. My view was exactly the opposite. I believed that the existence and smooth functioning of the National Council was necessary for the creation of a climate of cooperation among the parties and the government and for projecting, internationally, the image of a Cyprus being at one on the national issue. That is why, as soon as I was elected and after intensive consultations with the country’s political leaders, the decision was taken to re-establish the National Council. The first session of the Council took place on 21 March 1988. After my return from Athens the second session took place on 29 March. Its main subject was my impending meeting with the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, in London. After the session I made the following statements which, unfortunately, proved to have been overoptimistic (the parties, especially of the opposition, never allowed the Council to function as a think-tank, but without it the political climate would have been much tenser): 12

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 13

First Period: February 1988 to August 1988

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Answering a question as to whether the decisions were unanimous and whether a 20 common line was agreed on the issue of my meeting with Mrs Thatcher, as well as 21 22 on other questions, I said: 23 24 Without doubt, I believe we all agreed on what should be said to Mrs 25 Thatcher. I would like, however, to repeat that there is no distinction 26 between crucial and less crucial sessions of the National Council. The rate 27 at which they will be issued and the content of the announcements to be 28 made will be decided by the National Council and not by the questions of 29 journalists. At this moment what takes priority is the national interest and 30 not who will write more or less on an issue. We value the role of 31 journalists but I would like you to understand that the National Council 32 must function and when it reaches decisions that it wants to be made 33 public it will announce them. This should be for you the most important 34 news item, namely that the political leadership of this country moves 35 ahead and is united in examining on a par all the issues at hand. 36 37 38 ‘Solution yesterday’ 39 In order to change the negative image of Cyprus and to push for the resumption of 40 talks, it was necessary to mobilise the international community and especially Britain and the USA. It was in this context that on 31 March I had my first, more than All the members of the National Council authorised me to tell you that this meeting had as its main target the exchange of ideas and opinions in view of my impending meeting with the British Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher. This was agreed in a constructive spirit and we reached a number of conclusions about what I should say. I would like, at this juncture, to clarify the position of the National Council and of all the political leaders. The National Council is a working body that will convene regularly for the exchange of views and the examination of issues. For this reason, it would be best for all – and especially for our national issue – not to make a big fuss about its sessions every time that Parliament meets. When we do reach decisions that must be made public, then, undoubtedly and depending on the decision, the session can be treated as a major event. Until such time though, it would be helpful for everybody and especially for our national issue to give, for the good of our country, the National Council and the political leaders a chance to discuss and reflect calmly upon the issues. In this way one can avoid idle speculation about what was said by whom and why, something which, instead of helping, can harm our national issue.

13

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 14

From the President’s Office

two-hours long, meeting with the prime minister, Mrs Thatcher. The basic aim of the meeting was to convince her about the necessity of launching a dialogue on the substance of the Cyprus issue as this was the only way to break the deadlock. I also presented to the British prime minister the basic priorities and issues that would have to be dealt with in order to reach a solution. My visit to the United Kingdom took place one month before the scheduled visit by Mrs Thatcher to Ankara and her talks with the Turkish prime minister, Mr Őzal, which might touch on the Cyprus issue. This was commented upon at some length by the British press. In an interview with the Financial Times, published on 23 March 1988, I had expressed my conviction that Mrs Thatcher would convey to Mr Őzal our strong wish to find a solution for Cyprus and my proposal to meet him for this purpose. In our talks, emphasis was given to the opportunities that existed then for a dialogue aiming at solving the Cyprus issue, especially after the Greek–Turkish rapprochement at Davos and in Brussels. The need for Őzal to respond positively to the demilitarisation of the island was also emphasised.3 This, as was underlined by the Cypriot side, would set free the procedure of solving the Cyprus issue. From the British side, Mrs Thatcher confirmed that both she and her government considered as utterly unthinkable the partition of the island and would never recognise the Denktash regime. On the contrary, it was stressed, Britain was in favour of a unified Cyprus, in favour of a state with a federal structure. The British prime minister was also categorically in favour of safeguarding human rights and democratic freedoms in the whole of Cyprus. She also insisted on the need for a well-prepared meeting of the representatives of the two communities to discuss all the items on the agenda. It was of primary importance for us that both Mrs Thatcher and the foreign secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe should agree that the three basic freedoms must apply and take effect in the whole of Cyprus and that we should aim at the withdrawal of foreign troops. According to the official communiqué issued by the British prime minister: The Prime Minister and President Vassiliou met for some two hours over a working lunch today. They agreed on the need to work for a solution of the Cyprus problem which will guarantee the unified state of Cyprus with a federal structure. They also agreed that this should be achieved by negotiations between representatives of the people of Cyprus under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General. They believe that the improved relations between Greece and Turkey, the election of the new President in Cyprus and the growing desire to see problems settled by negotiations combine to create a new opportunity to make progress in resolving the Cyprus problem. They agreed to characterise the outcome of their talks as quietly hopeful. 14

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 15

First Period: February 1988 to August 1988

During my visit to London I had a meeting with the leader of the Labour Party Neil Kinnock, with whom we discussed the Cyprus issue at some length. On 31 March 1988, I gave my first press conference to the British media. The climate was cold to begin with but changed for the better at the end. It is during that press conference that I said in response to a rather hostile question by a journalist as to whether we really did wish a solution, that ‘we want a solution yesterday’. This became a slogan that was recorded and is still being used today to illustrate our strong political will in favour of a solution. The results of my visit to London were welcomed by the Greek government. Mr Papandreou wrote in a letter he sent me on 19 April 1988: ‘I followed your visit to London and I congratulate you for the skilful and decisive way you dealt with your British interlocutors and especially with Mrs Thatcher.’ Certain media tried to convey the impression that I had not adhered to what we had agreed in the National Council, an allegation that was denied by its members. After the session of the Council, during the common press conference, Mr Lyssaridis, president of EDEK and Mr Constantinou, representative of AKEL, responded to questions: [Question:] According to reports published, during his talks in London the President exceeded somehow the terms of reference that he was given by the National Council. [Lyssaridis:] These are journalistic pieces of information. [Constantinou:] These are reports that do not correspond to reality. [Question:] According to the briefing given to you and the evidence you have, are you convinced that President Vassiliou really emphasised the priority to be given to the basic aspects of the Cyprus issue? [Lyssaridis:] President Vassiliou put the issues as they had been decided upon in the National Council. What one can expect of Great Britain depends on how one assesses British policy. Anyway, Mr Vassiliou went there to put the issues to Mrs Thatcher and did as had been decided... [Constantinou:] ...unanimously. Former President Kyprianou, on his part, replying to a question by a journalist on whether there is something that other members of the National Council wished to say about its session, said: ‘President Vassiliou briefed us about the conversation he had in London with Mrs Thatcher and, as was correctly pointed out, he handled the issues there as he had said he would before going to London.’ During the session of the National Council which dealt with the measures of rapprochement, the following message from the Greek government was read: The Foreign Minister of Cyprus Mr Iacovou briefed the prime minister and the Foreign Minister about the thoughts of President Vassiliou on certain possible initiatives – measures of goodwill – that could be 15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 16

From the President’s Office

proposed to the Turkish Cypriots and about the reactions of members of the National Council. According to information provided by Mr Iacovou, the ideas have been shaped in such a way as to make any discussion about them dependent on the start of talks on matters of substance. Mr Iacovou pointed out three categories of issues: 1 Recognition of property rights to Greek Cypriots by the appointment of a UN Commissioner responsible for the management of GreekCypriot assets and opening of the city of Varosha-Famagusta in exchange for the lifting of barriers to trade between Turkish Cypriots and foreign countries 2 Acceptance by the Turkish Cypriots of the free movement of Greek Cypriots in exchange for lifting the prohibition of entry into the occupied areas for tourists who enter Cyprus through legitimate harbours or airports 3 Various measures of goodwill in the fields of sports, health, social security etc. View of the Greek government Positive, in principle, regarding the ideas of President Vassiliou. The Greek government is ready to contribute with specific proposals as soon as the Cypriot side works out more fully and clarifies the ideas that it will submit to us. We ask of you to be so kind as to give a copy of this telegram to the Ministers Messrs Iacovou and Papoulias. After the message was read, the National Council discussed the measures of rapprochement, the spirit of Davos and the proposal of going to Athens. Messrs Clerides, Galanos and Dimitriou adopted in principle a positive stance with regard to the measures. Mr Kyprianou raised the issue of the National Council going to Athens for a discussion of all the aspects of the Cyprus issue, a proposal supported also by Mr Lyssaridis. Mr Clerides, as well as myself, disagreed about the National Council going to Athens for the discussion of such measures. He even stressed that it would be a mistake if the National Council moved to Athens to discuss the Davos meeting so soon after this had taken place.

Agreement to restart the dialogue The effort to restart the dialogue was soon vindicated. On 20 May 1988, Mr Oscar Camilion, former Foreign Minister of Argentine, who had been appointed by the UN Secretary-General as his representative in Cyprus, conveyed to me the procedural 16

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 17

First Period: February 1988 to August 1988

proposals of the Secretary-General for the resumption of the intercommunal dialogue whose aim would be to reach an overall solution of the Cyprus issue. I had expressed the willingness, in principle, of the Greek-Cypriot side to engage in dialogue, without, however, giving a specific response to the Secretary-General. The approach of AKEL and DISY was also positive, while DHKO and EDEK expressed reservations. Mr Kyprianou, in particular, continued to promote the preconditions that would have to be satisfied before any talks could resume. At the session of the National Council on 24 May, I briefed its members on the issue as a whole and we had an exchange of views in depth with the Greek prime minister. The position of the Greek government – in spite of the dissenting views of Mr Stoforopoulos, the Greek ambassador in Cyprus – was that we had no option but to proceed with the necessary dialogue. Summing up my own position to the body, I said: I am in favour of the dialogue but, as I said to the UN representatives, the negotiations must deal with the substance of the issue and lead to a solution. That is why I had asked for the setting of the timetable to be speeded up and an agreement to be reached within 1988. Mr Clerides said that the time schedule proposed was not excessive and mentioned the difficulties that would emerge. Mr Kyprianou insisted on the preconditions and said he had many reservations regarding the proposal of the UN Secretary-General. Mr Clerides then intervened and said: This recommendation would be a terrible mistake in handling the issue. This is exactly what happened with the last document of de Cuéllar which made the previous document worse. The reason is that when someone engages in a dialogue and starts discussing, he can not only take but must also be prepared to give. He thus tends to narrow the field before entering into negotiations. We did indeed distinguish and focus on three basic issues but this was done two years ago and we remained stationary ever since while events change to our detriment. In his interview, Mr Christofias said: ‘The resumption of the dialogue between the two communities on the right basis is something we should strive for, something necessary. Stagnation on the Cyprus issue creates for us more and more problems.’ Mr Takis Hadjidimitriou, speaking on behalf of EDEK, expressed doubts about the dialogue. Answering my question about whether he thought that international interest in the issue would diminish if the dialogue were to restart, Mr Hadjidimitriou said: This depends on whether there will be a dialogue that would undoubtedly outline a solution of the Cyprus issue. The feeling we get at this moment is that the initiatives that are taken aim at strangulating the Cyprus issue. 17

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 18

From the President’s Office

A few days later I paid my first visit to the UN, making use of the convocation for a special meeting of the General Assembly on disarmament. I addressed the session on 2 June 1988 and submitted substantial proposals for the demilitarisation of Cyprus. I said: The Cyprus government undertakes the obligation to use the resources that demilitarisation will make available for the development of the areas falling behind in this respect and for public works which will mainly benefit the Turkish Cypriots. Part of the money thus saved could also be used to finance the international peace-keeping force that will have to be installed. I also proposed dismantling the military forces of the Republic of Cyprus if all Turkish troops were withdrawn from Cyprus, as well as the settlers, and if the armed bands these settlers had set up were disbanded. Part of the proposal concerned the establishment of an international peace-keeping force under the auspices of the UN, whose composition and terms of reference would be agreed upon and adopted by the Security Council. Naturally I nurtured no illusions. I knew that Turkey would not accept demilitarisation. I was also certain, however, that the proposal would be welcomed internationally and would contribute to create a favourable climate for us. At my first meeting with the UN Secretary-General, we discussed all the aspects of the Cyprus issue. We exchanged views regarding the possibility of resuming the dialogue which was deemed necessary. The need to implement the Resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council was stressed. We also discussed the matter of the missing persons and the living conditions of the ‘trapped ones’, that is, the Greek Cypriots living in the occupied territories. We then exchanged views on the Secretary-General’s procedural proposals. During our meeting with Mr Pérez de Cuéllar, I articulated as best I could my views as expressed in the National Council and I tried to seek clarification as to the extent that the documents of March 1986 were still on the negotiating table. When the Secretary-General replied that these were also on his table, I made it clear that our side insisted that the March documents were not part of any agreement. In spite of the persistent efforts by Mr Denktash to turn these documents into some kind of framework of principles for the resumption of dialogue, this was not accepted by the UN. It is worth noting that the Foreign Minister of Turkey visited the Occupied Territories without making any kind of reference to the March 1986 documents, stressing that other documents and agreements would constitute the basis of the Vassiliou–Denktash talks. Later, Mr Denktash, in spite of having responded positively to the invitation by the Secretary-General for engaging in talks, tried again to put pressure on him to include in these talks the documents of 29 March 1986. This was rejected by me and the issue was closed. 18

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 19

First Period: February 1988 to August 1988

During my stay in New York I had a series of talks with state leaders and gave a number of interviews to international TV networks, such as CNN, and other media aimed at mobilising the international community and presenting the Greek-Cypriot positions. Of especial importance was my meeting with the British foreign minister Geoffrey Howe, the foreign minister of the German Federal Republic Mr Genscher and the foreign minister of the Soviet Union Mr Eduard Shevardnadze who, in a statement he issued after our meeting, declared himself in favour of the SecretaryGeneral’s initiative for the resumption of the intercommunal dialogue. The result of all this activity was that the ice was broken and a certain degree of mobility was generated. In his report on the activities of the peace-keeping force in Cyprus covering the period 1 December 1987 until 31 May 1988, the UN SecretaryGeneral estimated that: ‘Present circumstances create the hope of breaking the deadlock and resuming the talks.’ After my return to Cyprus, I convened the National Council so that we could decide our position regarding the proposal by the Secretary-General to restart the dialogue. To begin with, I briefed the Council about the talks I had at the seat of the UN and about the Papandreou–Őzal dialogue. The Greek prime minister informed me that during his meeting with Őzal, who had visited Athens on 13 June 1988, the Cyprus issue was discussed at some length. Mr Papandreou put it clearly to Mr Őzal that the Cyprus issue was the key to any progress in the talks between the two countries. Mr Őzal made no specific promise, but seemed displeased by the fact that certain economic protocols that had been prepared were not signed. It was made clear to Mr Őzal that no protocol would be signed unless there was progress on the Cyprus issue. After extensive discussion it was decided that I should respond positively and accept the proposals by the Secretary-General as they were. Those agreeing with this decision were DISY and AKEL, while DHKO and EDEK rejected it. The discussion confirmed the gap existing between DHKO and EDEK on one side and DISY plus AKEL on the other on how we should deal with our national issue. The Greek government spokesman Mr Yannis Roubatis, commenting on the statements made on 17 June 1988 by the former President of Cyprus, Spyros Kyprianou, who had proposed a special conference with all the Greek-Cypriot and Greek political leaders, said: The assessments of Mr. Kyprianou are wrong. His worries are not justified, as our position on the Cyprus problem have been consistently the same. The Prime Minister has always briefed and continues to brief regularly the President of Cyprus, who, in his turn, briefs the National Council of Cyprus in which all the Parliamentary parties are represented. Mr Tassos Papadopoulos – who was later to become the President of the Republic – writing under the pseudonym ‘Dimocritos’ in an article published on 19 June 19

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 20

From the President’s Office

1988 in the newspaper Kirykas, expressed his opposition to the resumption of the dialogue and the abandonment of the preconditions. In his article, Mr Papadopoulos argued: Is it not true that a discussion on the constitutional aspects of the Cyprus issue and related subjects – while none of the preconditions have been satisfied – will be time-consuming and result in deadlock on issues of secondary importance to boot, thus perpetuating today’s status quo of a de facto partition while the Turkish troops remain in Cyprus? Is there anyone – whether in favour of concessions or rejectionist – who can accept a ‘solution’ of the Cyprus issue without a prior satisfactory solution of the issues included in the preconditions policy? Isn’t it clear to everybody that without such a prior satisfactory solution of the preconditions issue, today’s dismemberment of Cyprus will be perpetuated and legitimised while the stay of the Turkish troops in Cyprus will also become permanent and legitimate? Only now before the spurious dialogue on the Cyprus issue begins, only now when Turkey could be pressurised to display a spirit of conciliation in order to obtain a ‘good conduct’ certificate could it have been possible to coerce or tow Turkey into some kind of commitment on the preconditions issue. Perhaps now this chance has already been lost – perhaps even for ever. It is now perhaps too late for anything to be achieved, in the aftermath of the visit of Mr Őzal to Athens whence he left without having to face the dilemma of either showing a spirit of conciliation on the Cyprus issue or else sign the death certificate of the spirit of Davos. This abandonment of the preconditions without getting anything in return, this acceptance of talks ‘unconditionally’ will cost us a very high price. The views of Mr Lyssaridis as he expressed them on 18 June 1988 in his statement after the session of the National Council were as follows: Conditions now exist for the deadlock to be broken so that we can be led to a solution because Turkey tries to normalise her relations with Europe. We must confront Őzal with the dilemma: Europe or Turkish occupation of Cyprus. He will choose the first option. If the dialogue starts now, this will provide Turkey with an alibi as she will claim that the two communities have started to discuss – and so time will be wasted. This then is the moment to intensify pressures on Turkey. With the dialogue, Denktash will keep rejecting the withdrawal of the occupation troops and the settlers, as well as the restitution of basic freedoms. 20

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 21

First Period: February 1988 to August 1988

A well-argued response to the above positions was given by both Mr Christofias and 1 Mr Clerides after the session of the National Council. Mr Christofias answered 2 3 questions from journalists: 4 5 [Question:] On what grounds did you give a positive answer to the 6 proposal of the UN Secretary-General? 7 [Answer:] Contrary to different assessments, which we fully respect, in our 8 view the policy we have been following so far has not only failed to 9 generate any mobility on the Cyprus issue but, on the contrary, has set us 10 back. I refer, at least, to the ‘faits accomplis’. For two years now we have 11 been abiding by the policy of the preconditions without talks. The result 12 has been that the faits accomplis have been consolidated, the number of 13 settlers is growing while Turkey strengthens her hold over the occupied 14 territories. Moreover, on the international front we have had – in our view 15 – no encouragement from any country, or any quarter to persist in our 16 position, no evidence whatsoever that we were gaining ground. The 17 encouragement we did get was: Discuss. Discuss with the other side to 18 find a solution to your problem. 19 [Question:] Mr Christofias, let us make things clear. Are we entering into 20 an intercommunal dialogue – exclusively on the constitutional aspect of 21 the issue – while continuing to press for a meeting with Mr Őzal or into 22 an international conference? Is this what the de Cuéllar document is 23 about? 24 [Answer:] We are entering into a dialogue on the Cyprus issue as a whole. 25 At the same time, however, we continue to press for a meeting with Mr 26 Őzal and an international conference. This is how our party sees things. 27 [Question:] What is today’s decision of the National Council? 28 [Answer:] The National Council decided to accept the procedural 29 document of Mr de Cuéllar. 30 [Question:] ...which provides discussion of the Cyprus issue as a whole, 31 including the external aspect, the constitutional and the international 32 aspect as you mentioned before. 33 [Answer:] It provides discussion of the Cyprus issue as a whole. 34 Justifying the position of his party, the president of DISY Mr Clerides said that the 35 European countries advised Cyprus to accept the proposal for launching the 36 intercommunal dialogue. The same held true for the socialist and the non-aligned 37 countries. In Greece, the government, but also the opposition – New Democracy 38 and KKE, the communist party – recommended that we accept. Any continuation 39 of the stalemate was not in the interests of the Greek Cypriots added Mr Clerides. 40 It only perpetuated the situation and gave Turkey the chance to consummate the faits accomplis. 21

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 22

From the President’s Office

Answering another question as to whether the three basic aspects of the preconditions were being abandoned, he said that these aspects would be discussed and had therefore not been abandoned. On 20 June 1988, the acceptance by the Cypriot government of the proposals by the UN Secretary-General was officially announced. As expected, the Turkish side used all possible means to delay the launching of the dialogue process. By putting forward all kinds of procedural demands and accusations, by using dilatory tactics and introducing obstacles, Turkey hoped to torpedo the resumption of the dialogue. The attempt, however, failed. As a result of the very positive climate that was created – and in spite of the negative public statements by Mr Denktash – the UN succeeded in securing an agreement. It was announced that the two sides, represented by the President of the Republic and the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mr Denktash, had decided to accept the proposal to meet in Geneva on 24 August 1988 under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, Mr Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.

Preparing the dialogue by continuing the internationalisation of the Cyprus issue Personally I had no doubts that, for the dialogue to succeed, it was necessary for us to secure international support especially by the ‘great powers’. That is why I tried and succeeded to get an invitation from the White House. Thus, at the end of July 1988, I went to the USA and on 1 August, I met with President Reagan and Vice-President Bush. The US president agreed with the principle that foreign troops should not be allowed and that human rights should be in force for all the inhabitants of Cyprus as in every country. The meeting with the president was preceded by a meeting with the foreign secretary, Mr Shultz, with whom we discussed all the aspects of the Cyprus problem and agreed on the need to see it solved. As a result of my visit to the USA and my contacts there, a Resolution was adopted by the American Congress which expressed support for the UN initiative. In an interview for the newspaper Avriani, published on 10 August 1988, in answer to the question ‘Did you meet with understanding during these contacts?’, I said ‘Yes’, then commented: I believe that as a result of my contacts and discussions with the American foreign secretary Mr Shultz, his deputy Mr Whitehead, the responsible under-secretaries of the same ministry for Cyprus Messrs Wilkinson and Ridgeway, as well as other officials, our positions have become much better understood than they were in the past. I also found that there was a degree of mobility on the Cyprus issue within the Reagan administration. 22

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 23

First Period: February 1988 to August 1988

At the same time, Vice-President Bush told me clearly that he did not want to see a more dynamic policy being followed, something that is of major importance to us. On 24 August 1988 a meeting took place in Geneva with the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mr Denktash under the auspices of the Secretary-General, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar.4 The leaders of the four parliamentary parties accompanied me to Geneva and a meeting with the Secretary-General was arranged. After the August 1988 meeting, the Cyprus issue took off from the state of dangerous stalemate and international indifference by entering the procedure of direct dialogue. An article by a well-known Greek journalist, Yannis Cartalis, in the Greek newspaper To Vima, published on the eve of the first meeting in Geneva on 14 August 1988, provides an objective picture of the situation that prevailed at the time.5 The meeting in Geneva marked the end of the policy of preconditions, but this did not mean that the supporters of this policy in Cyprus and Greece had changed their stand. In this context, the Resolution adopted by the Pan-Cypriot conference of the ‘Centre Union’ on 19 June 1988 is quite revealing as it shows how extreme and unrealistic the positions supported by these people really were.6 The meeting was welcomed with great satisfaction by a number of countries and international media. Not only did the Greek political leadership support it wholeheartedly and enthusiastically, but also the Turkish prime minister, Mr Őzal, called the Geneva meeting in his radio broadcast ‘a good start’, adding that he nourished good hopes for a solution of the Cyprus problem that needed, he stressed, patience, courage and realism. Mr Őzal referred to the briefing he had from Mr Denktash, who told him that his impressions were very good. ‘From this,’ the Turkish prime minister added, ‘I conclude that President Vassiliou differs, as a personality, from previous Greek-Cypriot leaders.’ There was also unanimous support by the Cypriot political leaders who had come with me to Geneva. A news item published on 26 August 1988 in the Cypriot newspaper Phileleftheros reads as follows: The Cypriot political leadership held a meeting on 25/08/1988 with the UN Secretary-General, Mr de Cuéllar in Geneva. The leaders presented a unanimous front and all agreed that the talks should start dealing with the basics first. Mr Kyprianou said that: ‘In spite of my disagreement as to how the new dialogue started, I nevertheless am of the opinion that differences on the basic aspects must be cleared up as soon as possible so that we know where we stand. The Greek newspaper Kathimerini mentions on 12 August 1988 the comment by the Turkish journalist Sedat Ergin in the newspaper Hűrriet, as follows: 23

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 24

From the President’s Office

The language that the President of the Republic uses is very similar to the language used by the Turkish premier Mr Őzal especially when promoting the advantages of dialogue. The Turkish journalist calls the President Vassiliou a man ‘...who can convince anybody... He is very persuasive, brings in a fresh impetus, especially after Mr Kyprianou, and is decisive in wanting to see the Cyprus issue solved’. The Turkish journalist describes President Vassiliou as a man who brings a message of peace, a man who, unlike his predecessor, when referring to the Turkish Cypriots uses friendly terms such as ‘... our Turkish-Cypriot brothers’. The day after the meeting, Kathimerini wrote: The ‘first message’ is pleasing if not positive. The Geneva meeting offered a ray of light in a closed horizon. The President of the Republic of Cyprus Mr George Vassiliou and the representative of the Turkish Cypriots Mr Raouf Denktash agreed to start the dialogue on 15 September, in Nicosia... . The horizon of the Cyprus issue was closed for a long time. The intransigence of the Turkish side blocked all developments quashing all goodwill initiatives right from the start. Various new moves led nowhere. It is not yet possible to build up any optimism on a factual basis but the meeting in Geneva ‘under the auspices of the UN’ constitutes a heady, first step that makes it possible to see the problem in a new light. We come to this meeting with all possible goodwill’ said Mr G. Vassiliou. ‘I hope that this will be the beginning of a fruitful and successful negotiation’. It was precisely the new President of the Cyprus Republic who brought in a new spirit in facing the problem with his personality and his assessments of the situation by promoting initiatives serving his realistic approach. It is of major importance that the Cypriot President went to Geneva with the leaders of the four large political parties of Cyprus who also met the UN Secretary-General, Mr de Cuéllar. This ‘united front’ manner of dealing with the new way of handling the issue had originated in Nicosia when the President and the party leaders had agreed on a common framework even if there were differing assessments on specific matters. There was thus already a national unanimity being forged in practice that strengthened the hand of today’s Cypriot leadership and increased its chances of moving forward decisively. The projection of the issue on the international scene gave the opportunity for a variety of comments in the Geek press. Here is a characteristic one by the newspaper Acropolis, published the day after the meeting: 24

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 25

First Period: February 1988 to August 1988

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

A number of people kept saying both before and after his election that: ‘Vassiliou is not a politician. He is a businessman’. Perhaps they were right. Just imagine, however: A very rich Cypriot businessman who has lived many years of his life in Hungary and refused a ministerial portfolio offered to him by Makarios, managed in minimal time to achieve things that ‘politicians’ can’t. He saw Ronald Reagan in the White House and sat at the same table with Denktash. All indications are that he will achieve much. I say: Could it be that such a ‘non-politician’ as Mr George Vassiliou can now prove more successful? And if we paraphrase somewhat Winston Churchill of 1940 should we perhaps say that ‘negotiations are too important to leave in the hands of political negotiators’? Could it be perhaps that such ‘non-politicians’ as Mr Vassiliou, more technocratic, more ‘business-like’ in the way they think are more effective in dealing with an unsolved crisis? In all humility I am saying: Could it be? The fact anyway remains that Mr Vassiliou proved worthy and very much a ‘politician’. Perhaps because his technocratic past allowed him to put more effectively to good use his political gifts.

25

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 26

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 27

chapter two

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989 Intercommunal dialogue The intercommunal dialogue lasted essentially one year, from August 1988 until June 1989, and was carried out in three phases: • First phase: September to November 1988. • Second phase: January to April 1989. • Third phase: May to July 1989. All aspects of the Cyprus issue were discussed during the dialogue. However, what was characteristic of the whole process was the refusal by Mr Denktash to discuss or even to take a position on matters of substance, his effort to curtail the time allocated for discussion and his persistence to focus on secondary issues in order to waste time. Thus, while it was agreed after the first meetings that there was no need for written proposals, Mr Denktash insisted he had to submit written proposals. We responded not by submitting views on specific questions, but by presenting an overall strategic frame dealing with the issue as a whole. These were the National Council’s unanimous proposals of January 1989. Those proposals were greeted by the international community as an important step in the effort to find a solution. They consisted of a decisive attempt to make good use of the high-level agreements and to meet both the Turkish and the Greek concerns by presenting solutions to issues that had been pending for a long time. The reply of the Turkish side continued to be negative and despite all the efforts of the Secretary-General no progress was made. The Greek-Cypriot side insisted that a framework within which the negotiations were to be carried out had to be fixed since it was obvious that the positions presented

27

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 28

From the President’s Office

by the Turkish side in the various documents that it had been submitting from time to time were totally outside the spirit of the high-level agreements. What they wanted, essentially, was the creation of two independent states, as well as the continuation and legalisation of the status quo. In this way, the target date that had been fixed for reaching a solution was getting near while no essential progress was made. It was in this climate, and after the insistence of the Greek-Cypriot side that something had to be done, that the Secretary-General decided to submit in June 1989 his ideas dubbed ‘food for thought’. These were based on the proposals submitted by the two sides and on various ideas that had emerged during the intercommunal dialogue. The Turkish response, both of Mr Denktash and of Ankara, was totally negative. Unfortunately, equally negative was the response that came from the Greek-Cypriot parties DHKO and EDEK. Fortunately, however, the majority of the National Council decided to accept the Secretary-General’s ideas as a basis for discussion.

First phase: September to November 1988 The first phase began on 15 September at the Hotel Ledra Palace and continued with meetings at Mr Camilion’s residence. During the inaugural meeting it was decided that no statements would be made to journalists other than the one by the special representative of the Secretary-General of the UN, Mr Camilion. In his inaugural address Mr Camilion said the following: Excellencies, On behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, I welcome you to this meeting on which you agreed last month in Geneva. The task before us is to try to achieve a negotiated settlement of all aspects of the Cyprus problem. This task is as difficult as it is important for Cyprus. Your personal involvement in the talks underlines this fact. At the same time, it strengthens the hopes for a positive outcome, eagerly expected by the international community. The circumstances surrounding our meeting are favourable. The climate of international relations is much milder than it has been for a long time, and this year significant progress towards the resolution of long-standing regional conflicts has been achieved. The United Nations was able to contribute to these welcome developments. In the present case, those who take an interest in the Cyprus problem wish you to succeed and have undertaken to support this endeavour. As for the United Nations, I wish to state simply that the Secretary-General and all of us who work with him on this subject will do everything we can to help bring these talks to their successful conclusion. 28

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 29

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

There followed my statement: Today we are turning a new page in the book of the turbulent history of Cyprus. Let us hope that better days will dawn. All of us, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike, have a duty to make the best possible use of this opportunity for the benefit of generations to come. I do not underestimate the difficulties we have to face and we should not create unwarranted expectations for a quick and easy solution of the Cyprus problem. We must, however, try harder than ever and our efforts should not aim at scoring points against each other but at how we can create together a new Cyprus where all those residing in it will live and work in peace and prosperity. If we are to save Cyprus at this difficult hour we must forget the bitter memories of the past. We must honestly admit that no one is infallible. We must remove from our thoughts and hearts any negative mood and look to the future with renewed confidence. Tolerance, sincerity, understanding, trust and a lot of goodwill are the means that we will use to repair the structure of our country. Our meeting takes place at a time when the improved international climate favours the resolution of local problems. We are living through a ‘peace epidemic’. Let us hope that Cyprus will benefit. I have no other ambition but to do everything possible to help Cyprus at its hour of maximum need when the contribution of all of us is necessary so that we can emerge from the darkness that surrounds us and proceed towards a new dawn for our country. The unprepared statement made on the spot by Mr Denktash ran as follows: A positive climate was created in Geneva and we hope it will continue in the same way in the future as well. I hope that our work here will lead us to a satisfactory and balanced solution and to happier days in Cyprus, allowing the two sides to establish the relations they need in the name of peace which we did not have for the last 25 years. When we speak about the past we do not do this in order to create hatred or animosity against the Greek Cypriots, but in order to build a future that will not allow the repetition of past mistakes. Let us proceed with goodwill and try to understand each other’s fears and concerns. Let us make Cyprus a country of two peoples who differ in their religion, language, national identity and culture, but have one and the same loyalty to Cyprus that gave them birth and bred them for centuries. Let us work towards a final peace. 29

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 30

From the President’s Office

The resumption of the dialogue after an interruption that had lasted for years had enormous importance. In order to pursue such a dialogue successfully, a thorough preparation and a continuous follow-up and study of the various documents and proposals was necessary. For this reason the ‘Bureau of Studies on the Cyprus Issue’ was set up again under the direction of Mrs Stella Souliotis. Regular members of the Bureau of Studies were Professor Claire Paley, the Attorney General Michalis Triantafyllidis and Ambassador Michalis Attalidis. Depending on the issue at hand the cooperation was secured of specialists who had worked for years on the Cyprus problem such as legal expert George Stavrinakis and Ambassador Andreas Mavrommatis. Once the Bureau of Studies was re-established I moved on to create the Working Group, a flexible body which kept up to date with the various meetings between state representatives as well as with the negotiations with Mr Denktash. Those participating in this group were the Foreign Minister, the advisers of the president, Mrs Stella Souliotis, Michalis Triantafyllidis and Michalis Attalidis, as well as the government spokesman Akis Fantis. When issues were brought up that came under the jurisdiction of other ministries and services, the competent ministers and officials were called in together with Professor Claire Paley. The National Council worked equally hard during that time. Immediately after the agreement with the UN Secretary-General in August 1988 regarding the resumption of the negotiations, preparations started in earnest. We began by studying all the material accumulated during the negotiations that had taken place in Nicosia, Vienna and New York from December 1974 until March 1986, when the Secretary-General, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar, submitted his proposals for a solution of the Cyprus issue. Following this, we discussed in minute detail every single aspect of the Cyprus question, starting with territory and moving on to the constitution, the return of the refugees, the guarantees, the withdrawal of foreign troops and so on. We examined as many solutions as possible. As a result of all this work we were properly prepared for the meetings with Mr Denktash and the UN. I had no doubt, personally, that Turkey and Mr Denktash had no particular wish to see the Cyprus question solved and preferred a thousand times the continuation of the status quo. I also knew, however, that beyond Cyprus, Turkey had many other interests and had therefore to display a certain flexibility so as to retain at least the tolerance of the superpowers. For this reason, the strategy that was decided upon was based on the following principles: 1 We aimed at reaching a solution based on the high-level agreements as soon as possible because we believed that the continuation of the status quo had to be avoided, being fully conscious of the fact that, unfortunately, time was working against us. 2 We expected the negotiations with Mr Denktash to prove difficult since his aim was to waste time and avoid any discussion on substance. It was therefore 30

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 31

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

up to me to be very well prepared, patient and to avoid skilfully his provocations. I never forgot that he was continuously looking for a pretext to stop the dialogue. 3 The only way to promote a solution was to internationalise the Cyprus question to the maximum possible level and secure first and foremost the support and assistance of the Security Council and its permanent members. The EEC could also play an important part and so could the leading non-aligned countries. Turkey, however, would only ever change her policies if the superpowers exerted maximum pressure and at some point – if need be – move on to take measures against her. 4 This struggle would be very demanding and therefore needed securing the greatest possible unity within the country and the genuine support of the Greek government in power as well as that of the political forces as a whole. The main requirement, however, was for us to remain firm and stick to our positions. 5 We had to convince first the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey but also the international community that the solution was to benefit everybody. Today, almost 30 years later, our country remains divided and the goal of a fair solution remains remote. The situation could have been different if our policies had had the necessary consistency and continuity over time, if our strict credibility and the diplomatic and moral ascendancy that we had secured during the five-year period 1988–93 had not met with fanatical rejection by the parties of DHKO, EDEK, Centre Union and various other politicians, as well as by a large section of the Church and the mass media. The non-stop war and the continuous, by all possible means, promotion of the view that the negotiations are harmful to us created confusion and worries. Slogans such as those of the preconditions, the calling of a nationwide conference against the Federation and against the high-level agreements, although put forward by a minority in Cyprus and an even smaller section of opinion in Greece, caused great harm because they allowed Mr Denktash and Turkey to hope that it would have been possible for us to abandon our policy under pressure from assorted nationalists and rejectionists. So it was worth their while to cause delay. This behaviour of Turkey and Mr Denktash was unfortunately vindicated because after the marginal prevalence of the DISY and DHKO parties at the presidential elections in 1993 our policy was abandoned. Four years later, Mr Clerides, having become aware of the hard facts, did revert to the policy that he had previously supported during my term in office, but by then things had become much more difficult and the faits accomplis even more adverse. Most of the Cypriot press welcomed the launch of the talks, but right from the start differences did emerge between two basic positions on the Cyprus issue and the efforts to solve it. The supporters of the preconditions tried to downgrade the importance of the whole procedure. The Cypriot paper Elephtherotypia,7 in its issue 31

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 32

From the President’s Office

of 16 September 1988, qualified the launch of the talks as a ‘hullabaloo’ on all matters. At the same time they used as an opportunity to create a problem our agreement with Mr Camilion that we would take part in our meetings as leaders of the two communities, and so I would be driving there without the flag of the Republic being displayed on my car. This was considered ‘as an utter downgrading from my post as President of the Republic of Cyprus, the only internationally recognised state and government in Cyprus, as I would thus share an equal rank with the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mr Denktash’. The issue of the flag had already been raised by Mr Denktash when the talks were agreed upon. Mr Denktash was hoping that I would insist on driving with the flag of the Republic of Cyprus on my car, in which case he would also use the ‘flag’ of his pseudo-state and would thus gain a certain upgrading. In case of our refusal to allow him to use his flag he would succeed in his plans of making us responsible for the suspension of negotiations. Not for a moment did it cross my mind to fall into his trap, because it had always been accepted that the negotiations were taking place between the communities and not between the Cypriot government and the Turkish community. As far as the worries about the prestige of the Republic of Cyprus were concerned, these were clearly humbug. Everybody could see that it was precisely because of our prudent policy and the international exposure of the Cyprus issue and its links with various other world problems that our prestige was clearly being upgraded. It was obvious that those who used such arguments aimed at harming the very idea of negotiations and indirectly the historical compromise of Archbishop Makarios concerning the bi-zonal, bi-communal, federation. The negotiations started on 16 September 1988 and continued at an intensive pace until the end of the month (altogether four meetings were held from 16 to 27 September). Unfortunately the negative stance of Mr Denktash became obvious right from the start: he had no wish to engage in any substantial negotiations. He was forced to agree to them after being told to do so by the Turkish President Mr Evren and his Prime Minister Mr Őzal, but he refused to commit himself on anything. If we had depended on the goodwill of Mr Denktash no progress could have been expected. This message ought to be conveyed to the international community. That is why I considered it necessary to take advantage of every opportunity of international exposure and contact with various leaders of states and governments, a fact which imposed on me an intensive and exhausting schedule of visits abroad. The first such opportunity was given to me when I addressed the General Assembly of the UN on 4 October 1988. On my way to New York I had a new encounter with the British prime minister Mrs Thatcher, whom I briefed on the attitude of Mr Denktash during the September meetings. In New York I had the opportunity to put pressure on Turkey by explaining our position to the world’s media. To the question whether matters of substance had started to be discussed with Mr Denktash, I answered: ‘Yes from the very first moment.’ 32

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 33

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

I clarified that matters of substance ‘are the so-called priority issues of the preconditions such as the freedoms and the Human Rights, the troops, et al.’ And I concluded: ‘These are the basics being discussed for the first time ever since the creation of the Cypriot problem.’ Answering another question I said: ‘I do not see any reason why we could not reach an agreement by June 1989 if there is goodwill on the other side, but I cannot guarantee that an agreement will be possible.’ From New York I went directly to Paris on 10 October 1988, where I had my first meeting with President Mitterrand, the French prime minister, Michel Rocard, and other officials. After our meeting with the President of the French Republic, Mr François Mitterrand issued a statement in which he said that the European factor and the tendency towards European unification should have a beneficial impact on the problems that exist in the geographic area of Cyprus. He also said that France, in spite of the problems that the community faced in view of the European unification of 1992, would show great understanding in examining a Cypriot application for accession to the EEC. At the meeting with the French prime minister, Mr Rocard expressed the wish that France would play an active and creative role in promoting a solution of the Cypriot issue. At the dinner that followed, Mr Rocard said: We can see that Cyprus, which finds itself in an area torn by conflict, managed to build up a peaceful and exemplary state of affairs. We can see that in the family of nations Cyprus encourages the voice of moderation and logic to be heard, a fact that ensures for her an increasing influence in international affairs. France cannot ignore the tragedy that your country has been experiencing for the last 14 years. The position of France concerning the Cypriot problem is clear and firm. It is based on the values of justice that have their source in our national tradition while being consistent with the human rights and the principles included in the United Nations Charter which we have always implemented in similar circumstances. As France is interested in seeing the two basic communities of the island reach an understanding that will guarantee the peace and the unity of the country, she is particularly happy to see that under the auspices of the General Secretary of the United Nations you have started, Mr President, a round of direct and personal talks with the leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community on the problems concerning the unification of the island. We fervently hope that you will be able to determine together the conditions for a solution that will be just, durable, acceptable to both communities and in conformity with the internationally recognised principles. 33

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 34

From the President’s Office

In my response I mentioned: As you know, in order to break the deadlock, I started recently new negotiations with the representative of the Turkish-Cypriot community so that we could reach a fair and viable solution of the problem, according to the principles and the resolutions of the UN. We want to live together with the Turkish Cypriots, who also have Cyprus as their homeland, in a unified country, under a federal system which will guarantee the human rights and will respect the basic freedoms and especially the freedom of movement, the freedom of establishment and the freedom of owning property for all the citizens of the Republic without any distinction. The Cypriot government, in order to facilitate an agreement and responding to security concerns, has proclaimed that it is ready to disband its army and demilitarise the state. The condition for this to happen is the parallel withdrawal of all the settlers and all the Turkish soldiers. We are grateful to the President of the Republic [of France], to you, to the members of your government, as well as to the French people for the steady support that you have been offering the Cypriot people, especially since our 1974 tragedy, until today. The mention of Cyprus in the recent speech of Mr François Mitterrand to the General Assembly of the UN, as well as the support he gave to the negotiations that have just started, show the real interest France has for the respect of justice in Cyprus, as well as in all other regional conflicts.

Continuation of the first round of talks and the explosion of internal dissent The talks continued from 17 October 1988 until 1 November, when the first phase was completed. This first round, in spite of the fact that there were 19 meetings, lasting altogether 39 hours, did not lead to any positive results. In order to rescue the procedure, the General Secretary invited us to meet in New York for a review of the work done and for determining the approach and the programme for the second round of the intercommunal dialogue. During October, Mr Papandreou, prime minister of Greece, the country that was then chairing the EEC, visited Great Britain. Upon his return he phoned me and told me that the British prime minister, Mrs Thatcher, expressed her admiration for me, saying it was very pleasant to have conversed with me. She also mentioned Mr Denktash’s view about the Turkish-held area, namely that he wanted to turn the north into a fortress, a fact which, as she stressed, was contrary to the conditions created within the EEC. Mr Papandreou agreed with Mrs Thatcher and they then exchanged views on how to avoid this outcome. Mr Papandreou told Mrs Thatcher 34

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 35

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 The dialogue should not become time consuming, but neither should it be 13 denounced or abandoned at the first difficulties encountered as certain 14 people recommend, because in that case we would play into the hands of 15 Denktash who, obviously on purpose, will put forward absurd claims in 16 order to push us to break off the talks and thus consolidated the faits 17 accomplis. His ‘prime minister’ Dervish Eroglou states unashamedly that 18 the present situation suits the chauvinistic Turkish-Cypriot leadership – 19 not the average Turkish-Cypriot, as he falsely claims. The opposition in 20 the occupied lands denounces that the leading class in Northern Cyprus, 21 its party (National Unity) and various organisations it controls do not 22 want a federal solution. They fight it in every possible way. Therefore, it is 23 our duty to make Denktash reveal his intransigence at the negotiating 24 table in front of the UN representative so that we can afterwards turn to 25 our friends abroad and give them the proper information with which to 26 exert their influence. The aim is to make the Turkish side relent and 27 conform to the principles of justice and the UN resolutions. 28 The war against the dialogue was in full swing at that time. Here is an excerpt from 29 30 the newspaper Epikairi of 5 January 1988: 31 32 Stop the intercommunal talks. The immediate break of the 33 intercommunal dialogue, the denunciation of the Turkish intransigence 34 and the launch – on behalf of Hellenism – of another strongly militant 35 strategy were proposed yesterday in their separate public statements in 36 Nicosia and Athens by Messrs Michalis Dountas and Ephthimios 37 Stoforopoulos, who have resigned from their ambassadorial posts. 38 39 Mr Dountas mentioned, in his 4 November 1988 speech, the following: 40

that ‘President Vassiliou has the full support of Greece but Britain too must use her considerable influence to help’. Moreover, he asked Mrs Thatcher to discuss the Cypriot issue with President Bush during her forthcoming visit to Washington, something to which Mrs Thatcher fully agreed. For the meeting in New York, which was to take place by the end of November, I invited the leaders of the four parliamentary parties, members of the National Council, to accompany me. While the leadership of AKEL and DISY agreed to go to New York, EDEK and DHKO refused as they considered that, essentially, the dialogue was not useful. These views were refuted by the General Secretary of AKEL Mr Dimitris Christofias in his speech of 1 November 1988, in which he stressed:

The dialogue, as it is now carried out, cannot lead to any improvement. The President of the Republic managed at least to create an impression of 35

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 36

From the President’s Office

goodwill with his general attitude. He was charming, convincing, he is a pleasant interlocutor, he conquered his audience and he was given a certificate of good faith and goodwill. As long as this radiance lasted he decided to declare that he is not prepared to proceed if he finds that Denktash’s intransigence persists in the next meetings and that he plans to denounce Turkey as intransigent. Mr Tassos Papadopoulos, in an article published in the newspaper Kirykas (Herald) on 6 November 1988 under the pseudonym ‘Dimocritos’, wrote: Such perspectives are the natural outcome of the superficial and erroneous choice of president Vassiliou in May 1988 to accept ‘unconditionally’ the resumption of the intercommunal dialogue abandoning the principle of the ‘Preconditions’. In the quagmire that his superficial choice led us [sic] in May 1988 only one possible choice can be allowed: • To stop the dialogue • In conjunction with a public and formal declaration issued by Mr President that he is ready to return to the dialogue if, and when the Turkish side declares its readiness to accept a reasonable solution of the preconditions issues • Or, if the Secretary-General of the UN certifies seriously and responsibly that the Turkish side will accept a satisfactory settlement of the preconditions issues. A few days later there were reactions to the visit by four Turkish-Cypriot ‘MPs’: Messrs Talat, Osgur, Vertin and Dourdouran, who had been invited by the then vice-president of DISY Mr Yiannakis Matsis and to the acceptance, by me, of the invitation by Mr Matsis to visit his home in order to meet the Turkish-Cypriot politicians. An answer to these attacks was given by Phileleftheros (Liberal) in its article of 11 November 1988: The following thoughts are put forward on the occasion of the question addressed to the government’s spokesman as to why President Vassiliou had to go to the home of Mr Matsis in order to meet the four TurkishCypriot politicians who visited us these days [sic]. The question is asked in order to express the concern whether Mr Vassiliou downgraded, with this action, his position as President of the Republic. Similar criticisms were also directed against the President, because during his meeting with Mr Denktash at the Ledra Palace he naturally drove there in the presidential car but without hosting the flag of the Republic of Cyprus. 36

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 37

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

All these criticisms are not put forward because of any concern about our state’s identity. They simply aim to undermine any effort of achieving an understanding between the two communities. As far as we are concerned we repeat that we remain fanatical supporters of our state and our state’s identity but we do not believe that there should be insistence on certain formalities at the expense of the substance of the issues. By going to the home of Mr Matsis and driving to the meeting with Mr Denktash without the flag of the Republic on his car Mr Vassiliou did not jeopardise the identity of our internationally recognised state. If by these actions he had done so then yes, we would be right to criticise him and do anything possible to remove him from his post. When will some of us realise that in order to reach a mutually acceptable solution of the Cyprus issue, mutual concessions must also be made and when will we be able to understand something else? Namely that whoever ‘burns the mattress because of a flea is a looser’. Fortunately, all this dialogue procedure and the talks had the full support of the Greek government, as expressed by the statements of the then foreign minister and later president of the Greek Republic, Mr Carolos Papoulias (Agon, 13 November 1988): ‘We toil precisely in order to emerge from the quagmire and today’s deadlock. We support absolutely every effort and all the initiatives of Mr Vassiliou and I think that the Cypriot issue is moving forward.’ The climate prevailing in Athens was apparent in the speech of one of the most outstanding Greek diplomats in the post-war period, Ambassador E. Lagakos in Athens, 10 November 1988 (see Appendix 1).

New visits to Paris, Italy, Brussels (EEC) At the beginning of November, I again visited Paris to participate at the ceremony of the transfer of the remains of Jean Monnet to the Pantheon. In its comment, Agon wrote on 11 November 1988: We applaud the action of the French President Mr Mitterrand to invite also the President of the Cypriot Republic to the ceremonies for the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Jean Monnet, the inspirer of the European idea. The fact acquires a major significance because President Vassiliou is the only head of state of a non-member of the EEC who has been invited. The action of Mr Mitterrand is really a symbolic gesture in favour of Cyprus, and proof of the esteem in which the French President holds Mr Vassiliou as well as proof of his interest in Cyprus, the rights of which he has been supporting with consistency. 37

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 38

From the President’s Office

Moreover, the gesture by the French President is a reminder that the future of Cyprus lies in Europe, with whom it is now linked with the customs union, and in the full accession, of our Island, one day, to the great EEC Family. Taking advantage of my presence at the ceremony, I had meetings with the leaders of the EEC, whom I briefed on the course of the talks. Afterwards, I went immediately for an official visit to Italy, where I had meetings with the president and the whole political leadership. I want to stress particularly my visit to the Vatican and my meeting with Pope John Paul II. This was the first time that a Cypriot president had met the spiritual leader of the world’s Catholics and spoke to him about the Cyprus issue, the missing persons, and the destruction and devastation of hundreds of churches. After Italy, I went to Brussels, where I had meetings aiming to activate the community on the Cyprus issue and to explore the possibilities of applying for accession to the EEC. This issue had acquired special significance in Cyprus after the letter sent by the Greek Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr T. Pangalos. At the official meeting with the Commission that followed and especially at the meeting with Mr Delors, I stressed the fact that we see Cyprus as a member of Europe, but Mr Delors made it quite clear that the community was not in a position to discuss the issue and had not even decided if it was going to be enlarged or what form this enlargement might take. He did agree, however, that Cyprus had its place in Europe and most specifically in the frame of an enlarged Europe, and that, when the EEC decided to enlarge, there would be a place for Cyprus as well. In its characteristic report from Brussels, the newspaper Epikairi (News Line) wrote the following: Cyprus is historically, geographically, socially and culturally a European country. This is crystal clear as much as the fact that the choice facing the Cypriot government is not between whether it will or not [sic] submit an application for full membership but when it will do so, in order to achieve the best possible results. Keen not to allow even a trace of a doubt to remain on this issue, Mr Vassiliou did not hesitate to interrupt – politely – the European commissioner Mr Claude Cheysson when during a press conference they gave together, the latter used the expression: ‘if the Cypriot Republic submits an application for accession...’. The Cypriot President corrected him: ‘When, not if... . When’. In a joint press conference Mr Cheysson said: ‘Cyprus should not submit an application for membership to the EEC.’ To my question on why he supports this position, he replied: Being a friend of Cyprus and knowing that at this moment the Community is not in a position to study new applications, I believe it will 38

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 39

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

not help Cyprus one little bit if she applied now. She would be better off to strengthen the bonds that already exist and examine the issue of accession later. Phileleftheros reported on 19 November 1988 that the international press gave great publicity to my talks and statements in Brussels. Newspapers such as the New York Times, the Financial Times, the International Herald Tribune and the Guardian published my statements, revealing: Cyprus plans to submit an application to become a member of the European community but the precise time of the submission of this application depends on the applications that Austria and Malta are expected to submit next year. The New York Times gave special prominence to my statement that the Cypriot government does not wish to submit an application just for the sake of it, but is prepared to wait until the conditions are right. ‘The European community’, the newspaper writes, ‘is on Greece’s side against Turkey on the issue of the divided Island and has signalled that the solution of the Cypriot issue is a necessary precondition for the acceptance of the Turkish application to become a member of the EEC’. The Times also published the statement by Cheysson that ‘we cannot accept the illegal presence of Turkish troupes in the Northern part of Cyprus’.

Meeting in New York with the UN Secretary-General – Continuation of the ‘war’ in Cyprus The next meeting between Mr Denktash and the UN Secretary-General, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar, had been scheduled for the end of November 1988. On this trip I was finally accompanied only by Messrs Clerides and Christofias, while Messrs Kyprianou and Lyssaridis remained in Cyprus because of their objections. After that first meeting with the Secretary-General and Raouf Denktash, there followed a second one, but no progress was achieved because of the intransigent stance of the Turkish side. In its effort to keep the process open and to make some progress the Secretary-General proposed that the second round of the talks be devoted, without any prior commitment of each side, to the exploration and development of a large range of choices for each of the issues that constitute the Cyprus problem. He also proposed the evaluation of these choices in the light of the interests and concerns of both sides. It was also agreed that the second round of the talks should begin on 19 December and that we should meet again with the Secretary-General in March 1989. 39

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 40

From the President’s Office

On my way back from New York I met once again with Mrs Thatcher and briefed her on the negotiations in New York and on the reasons why no progress was made. Following our meeting, Mrs Thatcher sent a very positive, for us, message to the Turkish prime minister, Mr Őzal8 (as is made clear from the note that was prepared on the visit by the British high commissioner Mr Maude in my office on the 6 December 1988). The fact that Mrs Thatcher mentions in her message to Mr Őzal the issue of the guarantees is worth pointing out. This was the first time that the UK expressed the wish to discuss with the other guarantor powers (Greece and Turkey) the issue of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. I then went to Athens where I met Mr Papandreou and other political leaders. Mr Papandreou agreed to raise the Cyprus issue at the Summit Meeting of the EEC the next month in Rhodes. He also let it be understood that he would attempt to meet with the Turkish prime minister Mr Őzal, especially on the Cyprus issue, and tell him that: ‘The moment has really come for the Cyprus issue to be solved and this is a worldwide feeling at a time when many local differences are being settled.’ In spite of the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks, the international community, having concluded that there is no other way, engaged in a conscious effort to help and strengthen the dialogue. Thus, during the EEC Summit Meeting that took place in Rhodes on 3 December 1988 the community leaders expressed their satisfaction for the resumption of the dialogue and stressed the need for progress. A few days later, the recently elected US President, Mr Bush, telephoned me late in the evening on Monday 21 November 1988 about his initiative and repeated to me his support for the efforts that were being done through the intraCypriot dialogue for the solution of the Cyprus issue. The telephone contact was warm and sincere. I explained to Mr Bush the difficulties that existed, the whole attitude of Mr Denktash and asked him to exert his influence on Ankara so that there could be some progress in the dialogue. This position I also transmitted to the US Permanent Representative of the UN, Vernon Walters. In spite of the significant international mobilisation, however, the supporters of the preconditions in Cyprus and Greece intensified their attacks against the dialogue.9 Answering those attacks, the newspaper Charavgi (Early Dawn) noted in its editorial of 18 November 1988: Unfortunately, however, just on the eve of the meeting of Vassiliou– Denktash with the UN Secretary-General, there have emerged orchestrated attacks against the dialogue. The main movers in these attacks are Messrs M. Dountas and E. Stoforopoulos who press us, no less, to break off the dialogue, to denounce the Federation and to adopt an attitude of wait and see. Their guiding line is the following: As long as the Cyprus issue is pending this is to our advantage. Our strength lies 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 41

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 In his interview with the newspaper Agon of 4 December 1988, Mr Clerides stresses: 18 19 20 The climate that prevailed at the start was somewhat tense on our side 21 and on the side of President Vassiliou. This was due to the fact that Mr 22 Denktash submitted a document which was deemed as aiming at 23 creating impressions and not at facing the problem. This climate 24 however, did not last long thanks to the efforts of the Secretary-General. 25 The document submitted by Mr Denktash tried to create the impression 26 abroad that the Turkish stance had stopped being negative. This proves 27 that the Turks are alarmed by the fact that our position has been 28 deemed as constructive by Westerners, Easterners, and the non-aligned 29 alike, and this in spite of the fact that we did not give way on any of the 30 basic issues that we went to discuss. This is to our advantage. We appear 31 internationally as people of goodwill while, at the same time, keeping 32 firm on our positions so that the impression is created that the Turkish 33 side is responsible for the lack of progress. This is a substantial 34 achievement which should not be underestimated. There is a school of 35 thought which says that we should have broken off the dialogue. Fine, if 36 we did that, what kind of pressure would be brought to bear on Turkey? 37 Everybody would tell us that ‘You broke off the talks.’ And something 38 else: if we broke off the dialogue, the pressure would be on us to start 39 again and not on the other side to make concessions. We would be 40 urged to return to the negotiating table. That is why I believe that to continue talking on the same issues now under discussion was the right decision. in this limbo. Both these promoters of this ‘heroic waiting and stagnation’ attitude are supported from within Cyprus. There are political forces and a section of the press who endorse these pessimistic and defeatist positions thus creating confusion and undermining the struggle. The leitmotif of these forces is that we should break off the talks, their main argument being that in this procedure it is our side that will have to make unacceptable concessions. Without substantiating their view why we will necessarily have to make unacceptable concessions, they build up whole theories that practically perpetuate the deadlock. Such time-consuming tactics consolidate the de facto partition and the ‘faits accomplis’; they make it difficult to find a fair solution to the Cyprus issue and leave the Cypriot people victims to the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, with the foolish and vain hope that something will change by itself in our favour. The AKEL party and more generally the Left are opposed to such time-consuming tactics.

41

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 42

From the President’s Office

Answering the question how he judged the decision of the two party leaders not to go to New York, Mr Clerides replied: I believe it was a mistake because a serious matter did emerge. When the issue is procedural one can’t say: ‘I won’t deal with it as I must go back to confer.’ And I wonder why Mr Kyprianou used to go and handle all by himself both matters of procedure and issues of substance. When Mr Vassiliou was elected we put on the agenda the issue that he would not take decisions on his own. When he invites us to go with him so that he does not take decisions on his own we say we are not going. This is a contradiction. The international mobilisation started creating problems for Turkey. The Turkish newspaper Gunaydin, quoting circles of the Turkish foreign ministry, reported that there was friction between Mr Denktash and the Turkish prime minister, Mr Őzal, on the Cyprus issue. According to a report by the Greek newspaper Kathimerini of 8 December 1988, the Turkish-Cypriot columnist Aydin Bilgin, in an article in the newspaper Birlik that supports Raouf Denktash, wrote: We have never seen Mr Denktash so pessimistic. The reason is that as the Cypriot issue is being presented as an obstacle to Turkey’s efforts to become a member of the EEC, Turkey has abandoned her support for us. A climate of the sort: ‘Let’s settle the matter’ has started to prevail. For the same reasons and in order not to displease the EEC and the USA, the campaign to recognise the Turkish-Cypriot state has been frozen. As a result Mr Denktash gives the impression of being under pressure. It is more likely for Cyprus than for Turkey to be accepted in the EEC. A few days later, on 8 December 1988, the Greek newspaper Kathimerini wrote: The Turkish Foreign Ministry never ceases to express its annoyance for the way that the international community faces the Cypriot issue. More specifically the Turkish Foreign Ministry, while having said recently how sorry it was for the references to the Cypriot issue made during the meeting of the European Council in Rhodes, noted yesterday its intense discomfort for the references to the Cypriot issue that are contained in a document distributed at the United Nations by the Soviet delegation. The text that was distributed to the international press and the delegations of the UN member states on the occasion of the visit to New York by the Soviet leader Michael Gorbachev takes a historical retrospective look on the Cyprus issue which refutes the Turkish allegations and repeats the standing Soviet positions on the issue. 42

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 43

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

The above publications, but mainly the positions taken by the leaders of states and governments, of the kind ‘You did very well to start the dialogue’, ‘We are sorry for the negative stance of Mr Denktash’ and ‘We will try to convince Turkey’ show that the policy we followed was the right one. Unfortunately, however, Mr Denktash wanted to strengthen the status quo by every means and that is why he proceeded to issue ‘property titles’ for the Greek-Cypriot assets that he had taken possession of by force. This was an illegal act that could not possibly be recognised internationally. At the same time, however, he underlined the need for a quick resolution of the Cyprus issue. Today, 30 years later – and after the opportunity for a solution was lost in 1993 – it is even more difficult to reverse the situation.

Second phase of the talks: January to March 1989 The second phase of the negotiations started with the meeting of 19 December 1988, during which Mr Camilion appealed to both parties not to submit any proposals in writing. The negotiations started after the holidays on 9 January and lasted until March 1989. We had 40 hours of talks and then held a common meeting with the SecretaryGeneral in New York on 6 April 1989. At that time, the target according to the UN Secretary-General was to develop, without any commitment, a large range of options for every single one of the issues that constitute the Cyprus question. Unfortunately, however, the target was missed because the aim of Mr Denktash was to avoid any discussion on issues of substance by constantly referring to secondary matters and various stories from the period 1963–4, his sole objective being to ensure the success of his filibustering tactics. It was obvious that, although he had signed the Makarios – Denktash and Kyprianou – Denktash agreements, his only objective was to strengthen the faits accomplis and to avoid the creation of a real Federation. He tried continuously to push us to break off the dialogue and create new faits accomplis. Unfortunately, however, this was also the position taken by forces inimical to the dialogue and the perspective of a federal solution within the GreekCypriot community itself. In spite of the appeal by Mr Camilion not to submit proposals, I was convinced that Mr Denktash would ignore Mr Camilion’s suggestion, hoping that he would create for us a serious problem which would allow him to break off the talks. Precisely for this reason, I considered it necessary to put to good use the available time for preparing our own proposals. This was in no way an easy task given the huge differences between DHKO–EDEK–EK on the one side and AKEL–DISY on the other. I believe, however, that I did not have any other option and that we should try. We thus toiled hard within the working group with the representatives of the parties in order to prepare a draft containing the proposals which we had discussed in general, thus creating the appropriate climate during the meetings of the National Council. 43

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 44

From the President’s Office

All in all, there were five day-long sessions on 28, 29 and 30 December 1988, as well as on 2 and 3 January 1989. During the first morning session Mr Kyprianou proposed that the Cypriot parties go to Athens to discuss the situation with the Greek government and that an all-national conference should be called. This was a slogan that sounded good but, first, was impossible to realise and, second, could lead to nothing positive. It is well known that the full responsibility for determining foreign policy lay in the hands of the prime minister and the government in power, while I was in constant contact with Mr Papandreou with whom we had agreed absolutely on all the moves. To the various members of the opposition in Cyprus and Greece, the answer was given by Mr Papandreou in his speech to the meeting of the central committee of PASOK, which took place on 29 December 1988. He said: The steps taken by the Cypriot political leadership are excellent, inspired and express both the wishes and the expectation of the Cypriot people, while at the same time taking into consideration all the possibilities that exist. I want to keep hoping and I want to believe that there will be progress but one must realise that the Turkish-Cypriot side remains a difficult interlocutor. The workings of the National Council continued smoothly after the rejection of the proposal by Mr Kyprianou. During the meeting all the aspects of the Cypriot issue were studied in depth. As a result of these discussions unanimity was achieved concerning the substance of the Cyprus issue, the concerns, the aims and the expectations of both sides. The role of Greece and Turkey was assessed as well as that of the international factor, and a common view emerged concerning how to put all this to good use. There was also discussion on issues of strategy and immediate tactics. Proposals were shaped unanimously and these were submitted by our side at the end of January 1989. DHKO and EDEK were not happy with the term ‘unanimously’ but finally accepted it, adding, however, that they would ‘stick to their views’. On 9 January 1989 there followed a second meeting during which, as I had expected, Mr Denktash, in spite of the appeal by Mr Camilion that proposals should not be submitted in writing during this round of talks, insisted on submitting written proposals. After this was done we studied the final text of our own positions and at its session of 27 January 1989 the National Council adopted unanimously the ‘Outline proposals for the establishment of a Federal Republic and for the solution of the Cyprus problem’ (Appendix 2). Naturally we had no illusions that these proposals would be accepted by the other side, but we believed that any agreement could only be realised if it covered all the points in a satisfactory way. The proposals were submitted during the meeting with Mr Denktash on 30 January 1989 and they were welcomed by the international community as very positive, as an important step ahead. In fact, they implemented the high-level 44

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 45

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

agreements of 1977 and 1979, took into account both the Turkish and the Greek concerns, and proposed solutions on various issues that had been pending for a long time. Characteristic in this sense were the statements by Mr Talat, made on 1 February 1989 and published in the newspaper Phileleftheros the next day: The leaders who met on the 30th January submitted their proposals. Mr Denktash completed his task by submitting proposals on the constitutional issue. Mr Vassiliou submitted his proposals in one document. As you remember the Turkish side, both the government and the opposition, was constantly calling for Mr Vassiliou to submit his proposals. The proposals by Mr Vassiliou are comprehensive and can help the talks go deeper. These proposals contained the positions of the GreekCypriot side on all the important matters as well as the approach to them. The Vassiliou proposals respond on certain basic issues to the expectations of the Turkish-Cypriot side. They also reveal that on other basic issues there continues to be a difference of opinion and of policy. As the RTK party we believe that the proposals of both sides should not be either accepted or rejected in toto. Both sides must, these days, try to control their reactions. They must avoid responses that could endanger the future of the talks. There is now ground for more concrete talks. Both sides must begin serious talks that will lead to a mutually acceptable result. These statements by Mr Talat confirm the view of the American ambassador, Bill Perrin, that high-level Turkish officials viewed positively our proposals and disagreed with the views promoted by Mr Denktash. Unfortunately, Mr Denktash’s response was utterly negative. Just after the GreekCypriot proposals were submitted, the Turkish-Cypriot leader hastened to declare that his first impression was that these proposals created disappointment and confusion. He qualified the document as imprecise and stressed that it did not make clear whether its aim was to create a federation or not. Generally speaking the whole behaviour and attitude of Mr Denktash worried me very much and so, at the beginning of February, I took advantage of the trip by Mr Camilion to New York to send a personal letter to Mr Pérez de Cuéllar. Because of its importance I quote it here in full: Strictly personal and confidential Nicosia, 6th February 1989 I had [sic] wished to communicate with you for some time now in an absolutely personal and confidential manner, and it is only now that the opportunity presents itself with Oscar Camilion’s trip. The object of my letter is to let you know that I am extremely worried about the lack of progress up to now and about future prospects. 45

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 46

From the President’s Office

As you are aware I have used the maximum of self-restraint and all the goodwill in the world. Unfortunately Mr Denktash has not responded and has avoided any meaningful negotiation. This policy of delays and postponements became apparent already by mid-October. You remember his behaviour in New York so that no further comments about it are necessary. On his return to Cyprus he first tried to create new faits accomplis with his plan for the issuing of land titles and, when this failed, he came up with the submission of his Papers for the second time which he announced to the world press just one hour before our meeting of the 9th January. Thus he succeeded in diverting the course of the dialogue from the procedure agreed in New York which was reconfirmed in your personal message to us of 9th January. As a result I was obliged to proceed also with the preparation and presentation of proposals. Despite the fact that Mr Denktash’s Papers, which are entirely incompatible with the agreed basis of the present negotiations, represented a very substantial hardening of positions in comparison to those expressed up to 1984, in some cases reverting to proposals made by his side prior to the 1977 agreement, I did not react in the same manner. I am gratified that our proposals, which were approved by all our political parties, were favourably received by the international community. However, the danger is that Mr Denktash will again avoid to negotiate [sic] and will not proceed with the elaboration of a wide range of options as agreed. He is already indicating to diplomats that our agreed March meeting should be postponed, and that June 1 is not a serious target. I am afraid his plan is to delay and avoid real negotiations while, through public statements and comments, which he and his political friends continue making, he provides arguments to those Greek Cypriots who are opposed to the current negotiating process. The intention is to oblige me to walk out of the negotiations as a result of despair at the lack of a real and meaningful dialogue and because of the building up of internal political pressures against it. If he fails to achieve this he may himself find an excuse to walk away and then go around the world asking for recognition, claiming he cannot see any possibility of agreement with me. My fears were unfortunately strengthened at today’s meeting when he evaded any meaningful discussion and after an hour he suggested a postponement until next week on the grounds that he wishes to get new instructions from his ‘parliament’. Judging from past experience, I am afraid that this development could lead to an even more intransigent stand in the negotiations. 46

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 47

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

Your help and active intervention, my dear friend, is the only way to save the negotiations process. Mr Denktash will decide to negotiate seriously only when he is convinced that his policy of preserving the status-quo and seeking recognition for it, will fail. To avert this, a clear message both from you, and with your help, from the permanent members of the Security Council is urgently needed. On my part I want to assure you that despite my fears and frustration I will continue to press for negotiations in a spirit of goodwill and to cooperate closely with you and Oscar Camilion in order to bring to a successful conclusion our extremely difficult task. Finally, I would like to thank you once more for your support and continuous interest and efforts. With my very best regards and wishes, George Vassiliou His Excellency Mr Javier Perez de Cueliar,[sic] The Secretary-General of the United Nations Organisation, New York. At the same time I invited to Nicosia, one by one, the ambassadors of the permanent members of the Security Council, gave them our proposals and explained that we had consciously altered the positions we held – until December 1984 – and had submitted proposals based on the high-level agreements in a conciliatory spirit. This choice was not easy and we were fully conscious of the risk of having to face new pressures for further concessions. We wanted, however, to convince both the Turkish side and the international community that we were considering the whole procedure with seriousness and a sense of responsibility. Naturally we would never and under any circumstance abandon our positions of principle. We knew, however, that for the negotiations to succeed we ought to be ready for a compromise. Obviously though, the success of the negotiations depended on the readiness of Mr Denktash to behave in the same way.10 Unfortunately, after our meeting of 6 January we had to invite again all the ambassadors and denounce the behaviour of Mr Denktash, who was trying to create new faits accomplis using his ‘pseudo-parliament’ for this purpose. I stressed that if they wanted progress to be made they should give him a clear message that the status quo was not acceptable. Unfortunately, the negative attitude of Mr Denktash was accompanied by the equally negative attitude of a section of the Greek-Cypriot press. In the newspaper Kirykas of 5 February 1989, Demokritos wrote the following concerning the proposals of the National Council: With its [the National Council’s] recent proposals President Vassiliou has abandoned and ‘sold out’ the issue of the preconditions without getting anything in return. We accepted passively and silently the sell-out of our 47

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 48

From the President’s Office

rights and the principles of the preconditions by President Vassiliou. As a result we accepted passively, crazily and welcomed naively the submission of the proposals of President Vassiliou for the solution of the Cyprus issue. • Tomorrow, when it will be too late, we will understand how painful a concession we have accepted. • Tomorrow, it will be too late for us to resist the sell-out of our rights that President Vassiliou has methodically carried out. The above views of Demokritos and Kirykas were in total opposition to all the political forces in Cyprus that had approved unanimously our proposals. It should be stressed, nonetheless, that the way the two large parties and the majority of the media viewed the negotiations was very positive. During the session of its central committee, AKEL examined on 24 February 1989 most thoroughly all the developments and issued a statement in which it expressed its assessment of the resumption of the dialogue in which it ‘praised the handling and the spirit of goodwill that President Vassiliou displays at the dialogue’. As for the president of DISY Mr Glafkos Clerides, in his interview to the newspaper Alitheia (Truth) of 22 January 1989, he goes so far as to state that the policy followed is his and that the president had just been carrying it out. In relation to the whole procedure of the dialogue and the proposals we submitted, this interview by former President Clerides is very interesting, as shown in the following passage: The answer is simple. If a politician alters his policy according to the criticisms that are addressed against him then he has no policy. If Mr Vassiliou follows a policy which was also the policy of the Democratic Rally it would be ludicrous for me to pretend that I am not supporting it in order to avoid being criticised. If, of course, we disagree on the policy followed on the national issue we will criticise him. As long, however, as he follows the procedure of talks on the Cyprus issue which has always been the position of the Democratic Rally, as long as he follows the views of the National Council, then for someone to oppose him on the national issue is not the result of political thought but of political foolishness. If President Vassiliou agrees with our policy and as I said the policy he follows is the one supported by the Democratic Rally would it make sense for the Democratic Rally to attack it only because it is Vassiliou who carries it out? No. If I was President, this is the policy I would follow but now that Mr Vassiliou holds this post it would be criminal of me to oppose him instead of helping him to promote it in the best interests of the country. 48

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 49

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

New campaign to promote our proposals As soon as our proposals were submitted, there followed a campaign to promote them as widely as possible through various contacts abroad. On the occasion of my attendance at Emperor Hirohito’s funeral in Tokyo, I met, among others, the German Foreign Minister Mr Genscher and the Vice-President of the Supreme Soviet, Mr Loukianof. I also had a few words with the US President Mr Bush and the Turkish prime minister, Mr Őzal. My encounter with Őzal was interesting. We met on the stairs, outside the hall where the new emperor was accepting condolences for the death of Hirohito. Mr Őzal was going down while I was going up. Somewhere half-way on the stairs we faced each other, I greeted him and went on. As soon as he saw me, he stopped, came back and faced me. We exchanged a few words. I told him how happy I was to meet him at last and also that we should definitely arrange an appointment to discuss the various aspects of the Cyprus issue. He said he agreed and expressed the view that it would be a good idea to arrange for a four-party discussion among Turkey, Greece and the two communities of Cyprus. I told him that such an international conference could not take place in the way he described it, but that it would be a good idea to try and make progress for everybody’s benefit. From Tokyo I went directly to London where I met the prime minister, Mrs Thatcher, and the foreign secretary, Geoffrey Howe, and gave a talk at the Institute of International Affairs, presenting and analysing our proposals. In an exclusive interview to the newspaper Cyprus Weekly of 24 February 1989, Sir Geoffrey Howe described our proposals as a sincere effort to satisfy a number of the basic concerns of the Turkish-Cypriot side. In answer to a question about which aspects of British policy on Cyprus Britain would like to make more clearly understood by the Cypriots, Mr Howe replied: Just one thing. People sometimes complain that Britain is not doing enough. In fact, we are very active behind the scenes in supporting the tireless efforts of the UN Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Mr Oscar Camilion. Mr Camilion came to London this week. President Vassiliou will be here next week – his fourth visit since he became President last year. The Prime Minister and I will both be seeing him. We are also in touch with Mr Denktash and the other guarantor powers, among others. So you can see that there is no lack of action on our part. But in the end it is only the leaders of the two communities themselves who can achieve a settlement. We hope their current efforts will bear fruit. The UN wished for a dialogue on substance to be pursued that could lead to results. Thus, Mr Camilion went to New York on 7 February 1989, after the proposals of 49

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 50

From the President’s Office

the two sides were submitted, in order to discuss the whole issue with the SecretaryGeneral. He came back from New York on the 12th of the month and immediately after his return he had a meeting with us. This led to the following declaration of the UN: The two leaders agreed today (13 February) to accept the SecretaryGeneral’s invitation to meet with him in New York on 5 and 6 April 1989. It was also agreed that on 27 February they will begin a more intensive schedule of meetings for in-depth analysis of all issues. Today’s meeting was held from 1700 to 1900 hours at the residence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr Oscar Camilion. Mr Camilion will go to New York at the end of this week to continue his consultations with the Secretary-General. In his message Mr Pérez de Cuéllar called on the two sides to return to the agreed procedure and to make a more intensive effort by meeting more frequently so as to cover the lost ground and keep on track the target of reaching an overall agreement by 1 June 1989. This was a polite way to put pressure on Mr Denktash to discuss substance, something he had absolutely no wish to do. The talks continued at an intensive pace, but no progress was achieved. Unfortunately, Mr Denktash only wanted the legalisation of the occupied lands and the creation of a ‘Turkish-Cypriot state’. In spite of the fact that he had signed the high-level agreements, he was opposed to the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. He thus tried hard to avoid, in any way he could, entering into discussion on the substantial issues. Meanwhile, pressure from within to break off the dialogue was growing. In his speech of 20 March 1989 to a conference of DHKO officials in Paphos, the former president, Mr Kyprianou, pointed out: We must intensify our efforts to call for an international conference. We must go back to the policy of preconditions so as to make the international community start dealing again with the substance of the Cyprus issue and not just with how a procedure that suits everybody can go on even if it does not yield any results. We must move quickly to avert worse developments. Unfortunately, former President Kyprianou, as well as many others, believed that since Turkey had committed a crime by invading Cyprus, this was reason enough for the international community to oblige her to withdraw its troops from the island. They did not and could not understand that however great the injustice committed, the UN and the superpowers would insist on negotiations as a method of reaching a solution. They were prepared to influence developments positively or even to put 50

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 51

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

pressure in various ways on Turkey if her behaviour was deemed to affect the negotiations in a negative way. However, if we committed the tragic error of going back to the policy of the preconditions and break off the negotiations, they would overlook the injustice of the invasion and would simply put pressure on us to return to the negotiating table. Fortunately for the Cyprus cause, we remained firm on the policy of the dialogue that we had promoted as we pursued the peace and goodwill offensive. This policy proved so effective that even Mr Denktash started to become annoyed. In an exclusive interview for the newspaper Giunez on 24 March 1989, he mentioned that he was constantly suffering from attempts at intimidation and was under constant pressure on the Cyprus issue, but added that he would never give in. ‘Vassiliou,’ he said, ‘pleases the Soviet Union and its friends; Britain is crazy about him; and the French say you will never find anyone like him. Vassiliou has many gifts but also a strong propaganda power. Our job is difficult with him but not impossible.’

Women’s movement – March 1989 It was only natural that the resumption of the talks and the increased international interest in the Cyprus issue would raise the people’s morale and lead to their intensive mobilisation. It was thus that the movement ‘Women Return’, aimed at attracting international attention and increasing pressure on Turkey through peaceful marches, decided to organise a demonstration on 19 March. They marched towards Achna and Lybia in a totally peaceful way. The women made no attempt to cross over to the occupied territories as this would rather serve the Turks, whose purpose was to create tension and thwart the negotiation process. The march was a great success and sent the right messages to the world without giving Mr Denktash any pretext to create trouble. On 19 March the government spokesman included the following passage in the statement he made: The women of Cyprus displayed once more their patriotism, their fighting spirit and their maturity by keeping their march within the right boundaries. The government congratulates warmly the Cypriot women. We feel proud for their uniquely peaceful demonstration and we honour and admire their most worthy leadership. At the same time we express our gratitude to the many women who came from all over the world to march side-by-side with the heroic Cypriot women for the triumph of peace, freedom and justice. All these women together managed to convey to the world the right messages that support and strengthen our struggle.

51

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 52

From the President’s Office

Visit to Athens and New York After the end of the second phase in the negotiations, by the end of March, I visited Athens once again for consultations both with the government and with the entire political leadership of Greece. When our meeting with the prime minister came to an end, Mr Papandreou declared: We had the opportunity for a thorough, I would say, exchange of views on the development of the Cyprus issue. What is of major importance, however, is the fact that we agreed on the course to be followed from now on and on the co-ordination of our two countries’ actions on the international level. When my turn came I made the following statement: We had yesterday a five-hour long meeting of the National Council in Cyprus during which a full briefing on the developments of the Cyprus issue was given. After an exchange of views we agreed on the tactics to be followed in New York where I will once again be accompanied by all the political leaders of Cyprus. We will thus convey to everybody the message that in Cyprus the people and its leaders are united over the national issue. It was very important for us today to co-ordinate and to decide on what we must do and how to do it. During my brief stay in Athens, the Law School of Athens University granted me an honorary doctorate. I took the opportunity to examine, in my speech, the Cyprus issue on the whole over the twentieth century and to present our proposals for the re-unification of the island: The use made by the junta of the slogan of Enosis [union with Greece] will remain for us as a historic memory, a constant reminder that to proclaim national intentions when these are in conflict with the logic of international facts does not constitute an act of patriotism but can well lead to an unavoidable national disaster. If we remain prisoners to the old perceptions and the traditional ideologies, then our problem will remain unresolved. It will not remain insoluble because there are no insoluble problems. It will simply be solved in a worse way. An undesirable solution will be imposed which will be the perpetuation of the status quo which – as it is not a solution based on principles – will become a permanent source of trouble.

52

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 53

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

The result of this visit, as underlined by the Greek press, was that a complete unanimity amongst the entire political leadership was achieved, both on the targets set and on the tactics adopted. Dissident voices were not, of course, silenced, even though they were isolated. Thus, the former Greek ambassador in Cyprus, Michalis Dountas, in an interview published in the Athens newspaper Elephtherotypia on 31 March 1989, called the trip to New York a trap and referred to my policy in these terms: It is imperative that he should now break off the dialogue so as to exploit all the signs of good faith that he so generously gave. He should express his rightful anger and not conceal the crisis because it is only in a climate of crisis that it could be possible to redefine the issue in the Security Council as one of occupation. Also a result of the Athens visit was the decision by Mr Papandreou to address Mr Őzal. In his reply, Mr Őzal had to re-confirm his attachment to the bi-zonal, bicommunal federation and to mention that he had asked Mr Denktash to cooperate (Appendix 3). At the same time Mrs Thatcher also sent a letter to Mr Őzal, while the USA, according to Mr Denktash, averted the recognition of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ by countries other than Turkey. As the newspaper Eleptheria tis Gnomis (Freedom of Opinion) put it on 18 March: The Turkish prime minister Őzal, talking to officials in Germany where he went on 16 March 1989 to watch the match between the Turkish football team ‘Galata Serai’ [sic] with [sic] the team of Monaco, spoke in a most flattering way about Mr Vassiliou. He mentioned, among other things, the encounter he had with Mr Vassiliou in Japan and said that he had formed the impression that ‘he is a good politician and that they could solve the Cyprus issue provided that mentalities on both sides could change’.

New York – Meeting with the Secretary-General of the UN On 6 April 1989 we had a new meeting with Raouf Denktash and the SecretaryGeneral of the UN in New York. In the face of the negative attitude of Mr Denktash, who tried hard to bring about the decay of the dialogue, and in spite of the lack of progress, the Secretary-General tried to both salvage the procedure and make it productive by pushing it towards dealing with matters of substance. It was thus agreed that the talks would continue, with the help of the Secretary-General’s assistants, aiming at the completion of a draft with the solution of the problem by 53

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 54

From the President’s Office

June 1989. The inaugural address by Mr Pérez de Cuéllar at our common meeting in New York on 6 April 1989 was both interesting and revealing: During your talks, and particularly in March, you have discussed the issues that make up the Cyprus problem. It has been said by some that there has been no breakthrough, that nothing has been achieved, that the talks are not leading anywhere. It is true that we cannot point to an agreement on this or that issue. However, our aim during this phase has been to develop a common understanding of the issues and of the range of possible options to prepare the ground for a solution. Toward this end your discussions have been useful. You have shown a readiness to listen to each other’s concerns and to explore possible ways to reconcile the legitimate interests of both communities. In this process interesting ideas have been exchanged which have revealed areas of potential commonality that should make progress possible. I therefore believe that we have now reached the point where we can proceed with our effort in a more concrete manner. The questions we need to address are what can we realistically achieve by June 1989 and what procedure should be followed. It is not my intention to prepare a text on my own. There will be no surprises. The mandate given to me by the Security Council is to help the two sides find a solution – to serve as a catalyst. I am therefore asking you to work with me and my colleagues to achieve a tangible result by June 1989. In my view, a reasonable objective is to prepare over the next two months, as an integrated whole, a draft outline of an overall agreement in which the goals to be achieved for each of the elements of the outline would be described. The procedure I suggest we follow would enable you to participate throughout the drafting process without having to commit yourselves. This exercise would, of course, be carried out in strictest confidence and in keeping with the non-committal nature of the exercise. No papers would be exchanged during this round. The talks would be divided into two parts. The first phase would take place in Nicosia until the end of May. During this period, I suggest that Mr Camilion assisted by Mr Feissel meet with you, separately and jointly, to prepare as far as possible the draft outline. The methodology that I envisage is as follows: First, on the basis of the headings and topics discussed during the second round of talks which has just ended, the elements of an agreement would be outlined for review and revision with you. 54

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 55

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 In June I would meet with you again to endeavour, if necessary, to 10 complete the outline, to consider its status and to agree on how to 11 proceed from there. 12 I wish to repeat that throughout this process you would not be expected 13 to accept or reject any part of the outline. As I have just said, the status of 14 the outline would be considered when we meet in June. 15 The success of your discussions depends very much on the overall 16 atmosphere. It is important to reduce the distrust between the two 17 communities that has deepened over the years and to begin building 18 bridges between them. Yet, while serious efforts are underway to achieve 19 political reconciliation, campaigns of mutual recrimination continue 20 unabated. In addition, the buffer zone is not respected while it is not used 21 as an area of contact between the two communities. There is an urgent 22 need for greater consistency between the effort that is underway and the 23 public message that is being conveyed. If our ultimate goal is to be 24 achieved, the time has come for both sides to send each other, in words 25 and in action, a message of tolerance and reconciliation. 26 After our meeting in common, I stressed that the basic result it led to remains the 27 28 need to pursue our efforts to reach a solution by 1 June. I added: 29 30 The Secretary-General, seeing that there was a great gap between the 31 positions of the two sides, preferred to let the discussion take a procedural 32 character rather than trying to focus on the differences of opinion between 33 the two sides. The procedure that will be followed until June does not 34 differ from that followed so far, the goal being to reach a solution on all 35 the issues as a unified whole. 36 The statement issued by Mr Denktash in Brussels a few days after his meeting with 37 38 the Secretary-General is of some interest: 39 40 As long as the world does not change its attitude towards the Greek Cypriots, who are deemed to be the legal power-holders in Cyprus, there is not going to be a solution of [sic] the Cyprus problem. Second, based on the views contained in the papers presented by you and the discussions since last September, the description of the goals to be achieved for each of the elements of the draft outline would be prepared with your active participation. Practical difficulties which lie in the way of a solution would have to be taken into account. This process would be repeated as many times as necessary to the end of May taking into account your comments.

55

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 56

From the President’s Office

President Vassiliou promised to solve the Cyprus problem and if a solution is not found with President Vassiliou it is never going to be found with anyone else. Mr Vassiliou, however, works under a disadvantage that reduces the hopes that a solution can be found. This disadvantage is the existence of the National Council to which President Vassiliou is accountable. It is obvious that under pressure Mr Denktash tries to make use of the disagreements within the National Council, mainly in order to discredit our policy and dispute that it could ever be implemented.

Third phase: May to June 1989 On 5 May the third phase of the talks started. A series of very intensive efforts and thorough discussions were launched, with the objective of exploring the ideas that could be included in a general agreement. The UN officials, that is, the special representative, Mr Camilion, and the newly arrived director of the office of the Secretary-General, Mr Gustave Feissel, went back and forth from one side to the other, while common meetings were also arranged from time to time. At the same time, international interest and efforts to promote a solution were intensified. According to the Turkish newspaper Milliet, America conveyed to the Turkish prime minister, Mr Őzal, the concerns and suggestions of the American government. Washington adopted the position that the stance of Mr Denktash during the dialogue was negative and expressed the hope that Ankara would manage to convince Mr Denktash to improve his general attitude during the new round of intercommunal talks. The Turkish-Cypriot newspaper Kibris Postasi wrote on this subject: ‘The Bush government and the Congress ask Turkey to put pressure on the “Turkish-Cypriot Republic of Northern Cyprus” and more especially on Denktash.’ (As re-published in Phileleftheros on 16 May 1989.) These pressures obliged Mr Őzal to appear conciliatory. In an interview for the Athenian magazine Agora, the Turkish prime minister, Mr Őzal, made the following declaration on the subject of the Cyprus issue: ‘I think a solution is possible but courage is needed from both sides for a compromise and for the difficult decisions that need to be taken.’ Referring to the talks between Vassiliou and Denktash, he said: I hope that in the coming months there will be good progress in these talks. I believe, first of all, that the two communities must come to an agreement. If they do not, if they are obliged to come to an agreement with some foreigners, I believe they will face problems in the future. For a solution to be found, the two communities should come to terms with one another because it is they who are going to live together side by side. 56

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 57

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

The Secretary-General also worked hard to break the deadlock that Mr Denktash 1 was creating with his attitude. In his report for the period December 1988 to May 2 3 1989 he mentions: 4 5 Building upon their exchange of views on major issues and concerns, and 6 their exploration of a range of possible options for dealing with each issue, 7 the two leaders have, over the past month, been engaged in an exercise to 8 prepare an outline of an overall agreement. The objective is to define the 9 solutions for the issues that make up the Cyprus problem, and to set out 10 the principles and procedures for translating the outline into an overall 11 agreement. The discussions have brought out a number of specific ideas 12 that could go a long way in resolving major issues. I hope that this trend 13 will continue so that I shall be able to report to the Council positive 14 results after my meeting with the two leaders at the end of June. 15 16 17 18 The disengagement issue in Nicosia 19 A basic element in our policy was the relaxation of tensions along the dividing line 20 so as to limit the possibilities for unwanted incidents to happen. We worked hard 21 to this effect, considering the negotiations an ideal opportunity to obtain results in 22 this field. We thus finally reached an agreement for partial disengagement. According 23 to the agreement the dangerous confrontation in the areas near Ledra Palace, the 24 Paphou Gate and Saint Kassianos would come to an end by leaving 24 outposts 25 unmanned, 12 on each side. This development was welcomed by the Cypriot 26 27 government, the UN Peacekeeping Force and the Greek government. The news was greeted with satisfaction by the majority of public opinion with the 28 29 exception of the parties DHKO and EDEK. 30 A declaration by DHKO (15 May 1989) ran as follows: 31 32 The government’s eagerness to implement the unmanning of the outposts 33 along the dividing line is incomprehensible. The whole handling of the 34 issue by the government shows at least a lack of understanding of the real 35 dangers generated by the Turkish occupation and the threat against our 36 free territories that is being displayed daily. 37 38 Declaration by EDEK (18 May 1989): 39 40 It is a pity that a government which appears ready to come to an understanding with the political forces of the land on various other issues dismissed openly all contrary opinions on such a serious matter that has to 57

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 58

From the President’s Office

do with the defence of the realm. It thus remains captive of its own makeshift and hasty decisions. Unless, of course, this rush to disengage really signals a different mentality in facing the Cyprus issue, consisting in a reluctance to confront the conqueror. Commenting on the subject of disengagement, the newspaper Haravgi wrote on 21 May 1989: Those who always oppose any measure that contributes to the rapprochement of the two sides and to the relaxation of tensions in Cyprus have these days once again turned their fire against the disengagement. They call this first step towards demilitarisation ‘a monstrosity that emerged from the head of Denktash’, while another pundit passes the judgment that: ‘Substance now takes second place’. Disengagement was welcomed openly by the representatives of the US and the USSR who expressed the hope that there will be further such progressive steps. The agreement on disengagement was negotiated by the responsible military leadership of the National Guard. Denktash tried to torpedo it while Ankara, according to reliable information, made him face a ‘fait accompli’. Our own super-patriots, however, are not convinced, no matter what. They consider disengagement ‘a firework and a trap’. They do not trust Mr Bitlis. These people want the Cyprus problem solved here and now! They forget, however, that the improvement in the China–USA relations started with a table tennis tournament! They forget that military confrontation has not solved any problem for years. On the contrary we had a series of tragic incidents that increased tensions, aggravated the intercommunal relations and clouded the good climate of the dialogue and the resumption of contacts. Meanwhile, the UN increased the pressure and their efforts to achieve not just the continuation of the talks, but also that they should make some progress. Thus, the Security Council, with its Resolution 634 of 9 June, renewed for another six months the mandate of the peacekeeping force, while its chairman made at the same time the following statement: The members of the Security Council welcome and reaffirm their support for the direct talks launched in August 1988 under the auspices of the Secretary-General in the context of his mission of good offices in Cyprus. They express appreciation to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for the untiring efforts to achieve progress. The members of the Council note that 25 years have elapsed since the establishment of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. 58

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 59

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

They regret that, in that time, it has not been possible to achieve a negotiated settlement of all aspects of the Cyprus problem. The members of the Council taking into account the importance of the current stage of the talks, urge both parties to redouble their efforts, be flexible and lend the fullest support and cooperation to the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus towards achieving a negotiated, just and lasting settlement. The members of the Council also warmly welcome the unmanning of military positions which has recently taken place, and urge the two parties to consider further steps in cooperation with United Nations authorities aimed at reducing tension, avoiding incidents and creating a climate of goodwill, as well as maintaining an atmosphere conducive to a settlement. The members of the Council take note of the Secretary-General’s intention to meet with the two parties at the end of June, and share the Secretary-General’s hope that the meeting will bear positive results. They appeal to the parties concerned to cooperate with the Secretary-General in order to achieve substantial progress in the direction of an overall settlement.

Need to pursue the dialogue At the same time and after the expiry of the date that had been set for the solution of the Cyprus problem (1 June 1989), the General Secretary of EDEK Mr Takis Hadjidimitriou, and the president of DHKO Mr Kyprianou, asked me by telegram to convene the National Council for a thorough briefing on the results of the talks and the immediate lodging of an appeal to the UN. They wanted, at all costs, the policy of a dialogue without preconditions to be abandoned forthwith. The session that DHKO and EDEK asked for took place on 13 June. Not only did it not decide to break off the dialogue but, on the contrary, all four political leaders agreed to accompany me to New York for a new meeting with the UN Secretary-General. It was thus proved that all the ‘patriotic’ and ‘rejectionist’ sloganeering had been aimed mainly at creating impressions. In his statement after the session of the National Council, the government spokesman said: The government is very satisfied by the discussions that took place within the National Council on 14/06/1989 and more specifically that the country’s entire political leadership will accompany President Vassiliou to New York. Full and detailed information is given to the National Council, the responsible body that represents all the people as decisions will of course never be taken behind the backs of the people. Anyway, the 59

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 60

From the President’s Office

government has made it officially clear that if and when we reach an acceptable plan for solving the Cyprus problem this will become the subject of a referendum. As for the slogan of Messrs Kyprianou and Lyssaridis concerning the convocation of an ‘All-National Conference’ in Athens, I answered this in my speech at the official lunch organised by the Lemessos Bar Association in the following terms: My own position both before and after the elections has always been that I have nothing against an ‘All-National Conference’ but I do not think this is a practical project – and everyone who is aware of the present situation in Greece can see this. What has a huge importance is an ‘AllNational Policy’. That has been my goal all along and I believe I have succeeded in achieving it. Naturally, I must say that all the political leaders contributed to make this happen. During that period, the threats by Mr Denktash to settle Varosha with Bulgarian Muslims were taken seriously. We reacted in a variety of ways and because of the positive climate that had been created concerning our policy we had the interventions not only of the Security Council but also of Mr Mitterrand and Mrs Thatcher. According to a report in the newspaper Phileleftheros (21 June 1989): at least two national leaders, President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Thatcher contacted Mr Őzal personally expressing their strong opposition and displeasure concerning the statements by Denktash about the settlement of the city of Famagousta [sic] by Muslims from Bulgaria. This information, namely the intervention of the Security Council, was later confirmed by statements made by Mr Vassiliou himself. At the end of June, I left for New York where a meeting had been arranged with the UN Secretary-General for 28 and 29 June. In New York we were able to confirm once again how much more positive the climate had become. The Security Council, thanks to the flexible policy of the Greek-Cypriot side, had started to get more and more involved in the procedure. Indicative of this change of attitude was the fact that as soon as we reached New York I was visited separately by representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council, who wished to be briefed on the progress of the talks. On 28 and 29 June we had a meeting with Mr Denktash and the SecretaryGeneral, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar, at the UN headquarters. In his opening statement the Secretary-General referred briefly to the talks from the day these had started, and went on presenting the general principles which, in his view, ought to be the subject of negotiations aiming to reach an agreement. He also pointed out that according 60

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 61

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

to his terms of reference it was expected of him to play an active role and contribute to the progress of the negotiations. The basic point of his statement was that he announced the preparation of a draft agreement. Mr Denktash was very displeased by the content of these declarations by Mr Pérez de Cuéllar and that is why he avoided any discussion, saying that he had to consult his associates. The same day, in the afternoon, we held a meeting of the working group at the UN Plaza Hotel that enabled me to brief the party leaders and discuss with them the way we would proceed. In spite of his displeasure, Mr Denktash was obliged to agree that the dialogue would continue and had to give his consent to the UN Secretariat to issue the following statement: The leaders of the two sides in Cyprus met with the Secretary-General at United Nations Headquarters on 28 and 29 June 1989 to consider the current situation in the light of the discussions that took place in Nicosia in May and early June, and to agree on the completion of the third round. The Secretary-General noted that the effort made by the two leaders since August 1988 had made it possible, as never before, to tackle the issues that must be resolved if a solution to the Cyprus problem is to be found. He recalled that pursuant to his mandate, he was expected to play an active role to bring the parties within effective negotiating range and that the Security Council had recently again called upon the two sides to cooperate with the Secretary-General in this regard. The outline being prepared would provide the basis for the negotiation of an overall agreement. The Secretary-General summarized the ideas that could be included, as an integrated whole, in the outline of an overall agreement which his colleagues had explored on a non-committal basis with the two leaders. These ideas, he believed, offered a real possibility of bridging the positions of the two sides and made a just and lasting agreement possible. He was convinced that this effort could be brought to an early and successful conclusion. The Secretary-General asked both leaders to seize this opportunity and to cooperate together with him to complete the task underway. Toward this end, he informed them that he had asked Mr Camilion, assisted by Mr Feissel, to continue their talks with both leaders and bring them together to consider the full outline and to complete this phase of the work. The Secretary-General invited the two leaders to meet with him again in September to consider the completed outline and to launch the negotiation of an overall agreement. The two leaders pledged their cooperation in completing the task at hand and accepted his invitation to meet with him in September. 61

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 62

From the President’s Office

The next day I went to London where I met the foreign secretary Mr Geoffrey Howe. I must mention here that the representatives of the Secretary-General, Messrs Camilion and Feissel, at a meeting I had with them in Cyprus, had shown me the text that they had prepared – following instructions of the Secretary-General and according to his statement of 6 April in New York – in which I spotted certain differences from the inaugural statement made by the Secretary-General. At my meeting with Sir Geoffrey Howe I pointed out the discrepancies between the inaugural statement and the ‘draft outline of an agreement’. I explained to the Minister that the change, as it was done, was not helpful and made it difficult to work out a solution. I asked of Britain, as one of the guarantor powers, to make sure that there would be no change on the issue of security. It was obvious that the British had no idea about this change and they promised to look into the matter. They agreed that the basis should be the ‘draft outline of an agreement’ and agreed with the clarifications that our side was seeking (namely the meaning of terms such as ‘ground’ and ‘ceiling’). I then went to West Germany where I had talks with the president, Mr Richard von Weiszeker, the Chancellor, Mr Helmut Kohl, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Hans Dietrich Genscher, and other officials. The Germans had already been informed that the ‘draft outline of an agreement’ responded to the basic concerns of the Turks and they stressed that they would do their utmost in order to influence Turkey to accept the initiative of the Secretary-General. Both I and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr George Iacovou, explained to the Germans that the inaugural statement is a tactic adopted by the Secretary-General to secure the continuation of the procedure, as well as that the basis remains the draft outline of an agreement that had to be approved. In my speech of 4 July 1989, during the official dinner, I stressed the following: Our hopes for a peaceful solution of our problem were, in effect, strengthened after the tangible improvement of the international climate. As you know, last January we prepared and submitted proposals that take account of the interests and the security concerns of the Turkish Cypriots and safeguard equal rights for all citizens in a future Federal Republic of Cyprus. Our side has proven in many ways its wish for a quick, fair and viable solution to be found that would be based on the principles and the Resolutions of the UN. To this purpose we have been working closely together with the representatives of the Secretary-General during the third phase of the intercommunal dialogue in order to prepare a ‘draft outline of an agreement’. In spite of our goodwill and our cooperation, the Secretary General was not in a position to present this outline during our meeting last week in New York. We will pursue our efforts and hope that it will be possible 62

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 63

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

that, with the help of the Secretary-General, we will be able to reach such an agreed outline before our meeting in September. There are many obstacles in our way, Mr Chancellor, but we will pursue our policy aiming at the re-unification of the island because we feel that we have a duty to our people to create a homeland that will offer equal opportunities of prosperity and happiness to all, Greeks and Turks. In all our efforts we rely on the continuing interest of Europe – to which Cyprus belongs since times immemorial – and especially to the Federal Republic of Germany which can, thanks to its international prestige and its close relations with all the interested parties, play an important role in the urgent quest for a fair and viable solution of our problem. During our talks with the German government we discussed in depth the course of the intercommunal dialogue in search of a solution to the Cyprus problem. At a press conference after my official contacts in Bonn, I said that West Germany wished to see a solution of the problem as soon as possible, convinced as she was that such an outcome would be to the best interests of all concerned and that she supported in every way the initiative of the UN Secretary-General. As for the accession of Cyprus to the EEC, I stressed that this would have a huge political impact and added that West Germany and the EEC were in favour of it. I ended up saying that when the EEC decided to enlarge we would like to be among the first to join. Leaving Bonn I went back to London, where I had yet another meeting with the British prime minister Mrs Thatcher. The meeting and the discussion were of great value, so I quote here verbatim a passage referring to them from the briefing I gave to the session of the National Council on 18 July 1989: The discussion started with me explaining to Mrs Thatcher that the inaugural address does not satisfy us and that what is necessary is for the ‘draft outline of an agreement’ to be submitted, as was discussed here, in order to serve as the basis for Ankara and Denktash to commit themselves to it. Only then would we be able to make progress. I warned them that Denktash is against any progress because he does not want a solution. Since he does not want the problem to be solved it is natural that he will put forward all kinds of obstacles and will search for [a] thousand and one pretexts. According to our information – I told them – Denktash will reject the ‘draft outline of an agreement’, and the talks. Mrs Thatcher agreed that pressure should be exerted on Turkey and asked if the ‘draft outline of an agreement’ does really exist. For your information I must add that when the Turks received the letter of the American Secretary of State Mr Baker before the meeting in New York, they wondered, unofficially of course, which document they were expected to accept since 63

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 64

From the President’s Office

no document of any kind did exist. This was something Mrs Thatcher knew about. I answered Mrs Thatcher’s question saying that such a document not only existed but that as Mr Camilion had told us the Turks had even dictated their comments on it. However, as it had not been formally submitted it could not be called a document thus allowing the Turks to play with words. Mrs Thatcher then said that in that case this document should be secured before any contact with Turkey was made – and gave instructions to that effect. I then had two meetings with the British Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs Mrs Choker during which we discussed various aspects of the Cyprus issue. Mrs Choker told me that, as per instructions of Mrs Thatcher, it was decided that she should go to Ankara to make contact with the whole Turkish leadership in an effort to convince them to accept the ‘draft outline of an agreement’ and to make progress on the Cyprus issue. As I was informed today by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Iacovou, this visit has been fixed for the 23 July. Mrs Choker told me very clearly that they had now decided to involve themselves much more actively in the issue and to do their utmost so as to bring about real progress. During the discussion I pointed out that the ‘draft outline of an agreement’ had both positive and negative elements, but that the important thing was the meaning ascribed to certain terms. When for instance we speak of ‘a considerable number of refugees’ we certainly do not mean twenty or thirty thousand but eighty or [a] hundred thousand, which assumes a land share of around 25 per cent. This, of course, marks a concession on our part as the Turkish Cypriots are 18 per cent of the population but we are not talking of 29 per cent and more as Denktash says. Also when we speak of a clear majority, we mean 55, 60, 65 per cent and not 75, 80 or 90 per cent. The opposite, of course, of a clear majority is the ceiling. They must therefore understand that that these two things are totally linked and it is only within this frame that we can look positively at the ‘draft outline of an agreement’. I stressed that it was inconceivable for us that a solution would not entail the right of return for all the refugees. Mrs Choker agreed that all this was reasonable and promised to do her best in Turkey so as to make progress in that direction. Having received an honorary personal invitation from President Mitterrand, I flew from London to Paris to take part in the celebrations marking the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution. It is useful to note that according to the Turkish newspaper Milliyet there was disappointment in Ankara because neither President Evren nor Prime Minister Őzal were invited to participate at the celebrations, while France had invited me and the 64

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 65

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

President of the Hellenic Republic, Mr Sartzetakis. The reaction of Raouf Denktash was also strong, especially after the meeting I had in Paris with Mr Pérez de Cuéllar and the US President Mr Bush.11 As shown in the briefing to the National Council of 18 July 1989, the discussions continued in Paris. I also met Mrs Thatcher there, who told me that she had secured the draft outline of an agreement, had studied it, thought it was very good and agreed we should push it through. I also met President Bush and told him it was eminently possible to solve the Cyprus problem provided the USA decided to put pressure on Turkey. I added that the only time when there had been progress was when President Reagan had written to general Evren and that this was the way to act again because Mr Őzal can do nothing on his own even if he wanted to. I added that Mr Denktash is certainly not interested in a solution. The next day, Mrs Thatcher – thus displaying her interest in the matter – asked me while we were proceeding to the area of the military parade held in honour of the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution whether I had been informed of the bad news from Nicosia, and told me that she had got a message from one of her people that Mr Denktash had rejected the draft outline of an agreement as well as any future meeting, insisting that we should start afresh from square one. He wanted an agreement between the two of us with the UN acting simply as witnesses. She was very upset, saying that this was meaningless, that no purpose was being served if we started everything from scratch, and so on. I told her that this behaviour of Mr Denktash does not surprise me, that I had warned her about it and that it was one more reason for her to realise that the UK should start exerting pressure on Turkey in this direction. Meanwhile, the previous day, I had a special meeting with the Secretary-General – this was outside his schedule of formal meetings – during which I submitted my complaints about his inaugural statement, mentioning that it had many weak points; that it did not constitute a fair summary of the main document; and that it contained more points that served the Turks than those serving us in relation to the draft outline of an agreement that we had discussed. Mr Pérez de Cuéllar said that this did not matter, adding that one does not judge a book by its prologue. I said if that was the case then let us forget it. I would consider the matter as pure tactics as long as we relied on the document prepared in Nicosia to move forward to the main content of the book, ignoring the prologue. Next day, after the exchange with Mrs Thatcher, I discussed again the issue with Mr Pérez de Cuéllar, who was very upset. After the parade we had a special meeting – Mrs Thatcher, Mr Bush, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar, Mr Rocard and myself – during which there was general agreement that measures ought to be taken at all costs to convince Turkey that the ‘draft outline’ was the only solution. Mr Rocard confirmed that France would help to the best of its ability. This meeting – a kind of ‘mini-summit’ – on the Cyprus issue the prime minister was the first and, unfortunately, the last in the history of the Cyprus issue. All agreed that there should be co-ordinated efforts to put pressure on Turkey for a solution 65

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 66

From the President’s Office

in Cyprus. Mrs Thatcher suggested to President Bush that he should be the first to send a letter to the President of Turkey Mr Evren, while the others would follow. Mr Rocard said that it should be made clear to Turkey that no road towards the EEC would ever open for her unless she first solved the Cyprus problem. At the behest of President Bush, I also had a long talk with the US Secretary of State, James Baker, who was aware of our positions in general. He agreed that Turkey had not moved at all on the issue and that according to his information Mr Denktash was totally negative. He did not commit himself on sending a letter to Evren, but said that he would discuss the issue with the president and that they would co-ordinate their actions with Mr Pérez de Cuéllar – and then take all the steps deemed necessary. In the person-to-person contact I had with President Bush, I stressed that the solution of the Cyprus problem was in his hands. Answering a question from Mr Bush as to whether I really meant that and if so what he must do, I said that America must convince the Turks to accept the draft outline of an agreement of the SecretaryGeneral. He answered: ‘I feel comfortable supporting a document that was prepared by the Secretary-General.’ In his statement to the reporter of RIK (the Cypriot Broadcasting Corporation), who covered the celebrations in Paris, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar said that from what he had gathered the Greek-Cypriot side was prepared to discuss the issue on the basis of the draft outline of an agreement, but that he had heard nothing from the Turkish-Cypriot side. He also mentioned that the talks between me and Mr Denktash on the outline of a solution were scheduled to start on 24 July, while a further meeting was planned to be held at the end of August. I further reported to the National Council that soon after my return from Paris on Monday 17 July, I saw first Mr Camilion12 and then the ambassadors of the Soviet Union and the USA: Mr Camilion was very angry with the statements made by Denktash and said he was not willing just to be present at the talks. President Vassiliou said that he had stressed to Mr Camilion that, in his view, the only way that progress could be made would be if, at their meeting of 26 July, he submitted the draft outline of an agreement so that this would cease to be an informal document. ‘I do not have his commitment that he would do so,’ President Vassiliou said, ‘as he simply agreed that this should be done. However, for him to do it he must first receive instructions from the Secretary-General. That is the point where we find ourselves today’. At this point, the president of the Democratic Party, Mr Kyprianou, asked to be informed by the President of the Republic about the letter of the UN SecretaryGeneral which had been mentioned in the press. I accepted with pleasure to brief the members of the National Council on the Secretary-General’s letter, dated 30 June 1989, and read it to them in full: 66

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 67

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

I am pleased to have had the opportunity of meeting again with you and Mr Denktash. Each of our meetings since last August has helped us to move forward in our effort, and I believe that our talks this week have been particularly helpful in giving impetus to the current phase of our work. As I said yesterday, the ideas which my colleagues explored with you, and which I briefly summarized, offer a real possibility for bridging the positions of the two sides and making possible a just and lasting agreement. I am therefore encouraged that you agreed to seize this opportunity by cooperating with me to complete the outline of an overall agreement and working with my colleagues in preparation of our next meeting. It is, of course, important to maintain the momentum and that we send a common message to the people of both communities in Cyprus and to the international community of our mutual desire to proceed with a sense of urgency. With this in mind, I propose that Mr Camilion and Mr Feissel resume their work with both of you in Nicosia, in the first instance for one week beginning on 24 July and then again as from 30 August. I for my part look forward to meeting with you again in early autumn to consider the completed outline and to launch the negotiations of an overall agreement. In the meantime, may I stress again how important it is that we ensure that any public statements are consistent with the spirit of what we are trying to achieve and the special opportunity at hand. With kind personal regards, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. Having read the letter by the Secretary-General, the President of the Republic disclosed that at a meeting he had had the day before with the Soviet ambassador, Mr Fokin – who had come to the presidential palace to bid him goodbye – he was informed that this letter was considered an improvement on the inaugural address. As well as that, Mr Denktash had told Mr Fokin that he was very angry with this letter because it imposed on him a ‘draft outline on an agreement’ when he does not accept such a thing.

March under the banner ‘The Women Return’ and incidents at Ayios Kassianos On 20 July 1989, the eve of the anniversary of the invasion, a new ‘women’s march’ was organised, this time by a group of women under instruction from the parties of DHKO and EDEK. This gave the demonstration a purely nationalistic character. The preceding marches under the banner ‘The Women Return’ had as their main aim to project the illegality of the occupation and had influenced positively the decision by the European Court in the lawsuit of Titina Loizidou. This new march towards Ayios Kassianos tried to break through the Attila line and led to violent 67

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 68

From the President’s Office

incidents. Without doubt the time chosen for this demonstration was the worst possible. Mr Denktash tried by all means to break off the talks or at least to delay them substantially. This was also the stance of the demonstrators at Ayios Kassianos: everybody knew that DHKO and EDEK, as well as other groups, were against the dialogue. The two large parties, however, and the majority of the Cypriot people were in favour of the dialogue and saw that for the first time since the invasion Turkey was in a difficult position. That is why Mr Denktash was against any dialogue. That was the harsh reality. For me, however, it was inconceivable to stand against the women’s march because if I did, the opposition would have profited from it, as we had all witnessed the negative attitude of both Turkey and Mr Denktash. Thus the march took place and, as I expected, Mr Denktash made the most of it. Unfortunately the UN also condemned the demonstration, as can be seen from the following statement by the UN Secretary-General and the statement of the President of the Security Council: In the evening of 19 July 1989, some 1000 Greek-Cypriot demonstrators assaulted simultaneously two locations of the United Nations buffer zone in the Ayios Kassianos area. The fence erected by United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to delineate its southern limit was deliberately crashed through by a bus carrying demonstrators. In addition, the United Nations observation post in the vicinity and the United Nations flag flying on it were deliberately destroyed. The crowd pushed back the line formed by UNFICYP soldiers. UNFICYP regrouped and succeeded in keeping the demonstrators within the United Nations buffer zone. Some 30 minutes later, several hundred Turkish-Cypriot security force and police elements entered the United Nations buffer zone, broke through the UNFICYP line and forcibly apprehended some 110 Greek-Cypriot demonstrators, mostly women, and took them into the Turkish-Cypriot controlled area. As of the present moment, the persons apprehended are still being held in the north. It is a matter of grave concern that despite assurances by Greek-Cypriot authorities that whatever necessary would be done to respect the status quo of the buffer zone, events marked by violence and the destruction of United Nations property were allowed to take place. It is also unacceptable that the Turkish-Cypriot side crossed the Turkish Force cease-fire line and forcibly took demonstrators back to their area. The growing numbers of such incidents which disregard the integrity of the United Nations buffer zone undermine the very essence of peacekeeping. It is vital that all concerned keep in mind the purpose of the United Nations buffer zone as well as their responsibility to ensure that this area is not violated. This is essential if UNFICYP is to carry out the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council. 68

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 69

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

I request the Turkish-Cypriot authorities to release without delay the persons that were apprehended. Finally, I appeal to both sides to ensure that such incidents do not recur and that the functions of UNFICYP are respected and fully supported. The following announcement was issued in New York on 24 July 1989 by the office of the President of the UN Security Council, Ambassador Dragoslav Pejic (Yugoslavia): Following informal consultations of the Security Council held today on recent developments in Cyprus, the President of the Council, on behalf of its members, conveyed to the representatives of directly involved and interested parties their deep concern over the tense situation in Cyprus created by the incident that occurred on 19 July. The President of the Security Council also stressed the need for strict respect of the United Nations buffer zone by all concerned. He appealed for the immediate release of all persons still detained. The President further informed them of the support expressed by the members of the Council for the statement by the Secretary-General of 21 July on the situation in Cyprus. Finally, he asked all parties concerned to show maximum restraint and to take urgent steps that would bring about relaxation of tension and lead to the creation of an atmosphere that would be suitable for the forthcoming negotiations between the two sides under the auspices of the Secretary-General. It is very important to note that this demonstration was not welcomed in Greece either. Mr Charilaos Florakis, President of the Coalition of the Left and one of the heroic figures of the ELAS struggle against the Nazi occupants in Greece and also of the Democratic Army later (known by his ‘nom de guerre’, Capetan Yiotis), said on the occasion of his meeting with Mr Clerides in Athens: I was fully briefed by Mr Clerides on the course of the efforts undertaken by the Cypriot people, the government and especially President Vassiliou for a fair solution of the Cyprus problem. It is redundant for me to repeat that the forces of the Left are fully backing this struggle. What I would like to add is that we agree with the policy of dialogue pursued by President Vassiliou. I took this occasion to convey to Mr Clerides certain thoughts of mine concerning recent events. I let him know, namely, that these worried us very much and that in our opinion such actions are not in harmony with the efforts being made for a fair and viable solution of the Cyprus issue. On the contrary, we believe that they create obstacles and difficulties and I dare say that they are dangerous. 69

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 70

From the President’s Office

As far as I was concerned, since the demonstrations were peaceful and the Turks responded violently, I tried to focus the attention of the international community on the mass arrest and detention of women and priests. In my speech on the anniversary of the coup and the invasion, I said: The Cypriot people proclaim, through numerous demonstrations that are taking place these days, their decision not to accept faits accomplis, nor the partition of Cyprus. It is in this spirit that a few hundred women together with priests decided to go to the crumbling school of Saint Kassianos and to the chapel of Saint George. It is well known that their demonstration was peaceful. While they were there and expressed their wish to be able to enjoy their right to return to their homes, while they expressed their support to the relatives of the missing persons and prayed in the ruined chapel of Saint George, they became victims of the savage and unprovoked attack by the Turks. Specially chosen groups of armed soldiers entered the dead zone, attacked the defenceless women and the priests, hit them brutally, molested them, arrested them, or should I really say kidnapped them. They arrested 100 women, the Metropolitan Kitiou, two priests and foreign journalists. There were 111 arrests all in all. We denounced immediately this brutal and unprovoked act to the [sic] international public opinion and the UN. We asked and still ask for the prisoners’ immediate release and the withdrawal of the Turks from the neutral zone. Our people displayed as one person their solidarity with the arrested men and women with decisiveness but also with wisdom and selfcontrol. In the area of Saint Kassianos, impressive solidarity demonstrations are taking place. We salute the hundreds of women who sit there, cool-headed and decisive in front of the armed Turks demonstrating their solidarity with their arrested sisters. The government and all the political leaders are at one in facing the situation. We keep our heads because we know that on no account must we allow incidents to happen. Our people have already displayed their maturity and self-control because they know that any incident can only bring trouble and serve as a pretext for those who want to harm Cyprus. One is entitled to ask, however, why did this brutal aggression take place? As this was a peaceful demonstration why was it attacked? Did the defenceless women and the priests threaten anybody? Were they a menace for the Turkish Cypriots? Certainly not. Was there perhaps a danger of a conflict that had to be averted? Again not. Had perhaps the demonstrators entered the occupied territories? No, because we know that they were in the neutral zone and that it is this neutral zone that the armed Turks entered. Why then this act, why this brutal behaviour? It happened, fellow Cypriots, in order to provoke us so that they can promote the 70

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 71

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

continuation of today’s situation, so that they can preserve and promote that which is called the status quo. It is well known that while negotiations within the frame of the intra-Cypriot dialogue were getting on, numerous statements and speeches were made in which they always stressed that for them the status quo must be preserved and that we must accept this existing situation as a solution to the problem. We say no. A thousand times no. Because the continuation of this situation means that Attila will stay, that partition will stay, that our refugees will loose not only their right but any hope of ever returning to their homes. This means that we will lose for good our assets that the cultural face of Cyprus will change; that the demographic structure will change with the influx of the settlers; that the tens of thousands of the occupying troops will stay forever; it means that we will continue to live in a state of insecurity. The status quo is no solution for us but it is no solution for the Turkish Cypriots either. Because it means insecurity for them as well; it means economic hardship; it means that the demography will change and that they will be obliged to emigrate because of the settlers. This situation cannot go on this way. There will either be a fair and viable solution or we will be led to a crisis; a crisis for us, a crisis for the whole region. The events of the last month showed exactly the dangers that do exist. We must not forget their statement to the effect that they would give our homes to Muslims from Bulgaria. We were able, thanks to our initiatives and the international support we got for them, to avert this danger, but dangers always loom. And they will continue to loom as long as there is no solution. The women’s demonstration created a very difficult situation which required coolheadedness and patience in order to be successfully dealt with. The first consequence was, as long as the Turks continued to hold the women and the priests, to stop all political or social contact with them.13 All our actions towards the UN, the EEC, the President of the USA and so on aimed only at securing the liberation of the arrested persons. The Security Council sprung into action and asked Turkey to make sure that the hostages be freed so that the climate could be restored for the resumption of the talks. This was achieved a few days later. All the prisoners returned in high spirits and the Metropolitan Kitiou, Mr Chrysostomos, conveyed the message that the Turkish Cypriots too wanted peace – for which we had to fight. Finally, we came out victorious from this trial. Mr Denktash and Turkey tried to trap us into creating serious tension and incidents, so as to postpone indefinitely the talks which were a great nuisance to them. They failed, however, because we kept our cool. Characteristic in this sense is the following report published in the Cypriot newspaper Haravgi of 26 July: 71

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 72

From the President’s Office

We destroyed Cyprus once with the coup and we will not allow this to happen again because of irresponsibility. The deadly danger that adventurisms and irresponsible acts would constitute for our homeland was stressed by the President of the Republic Mr G. Vassiliou who underlined the decisiveness of the government not to allow something like this to happen. During a conversation he had with citizens in the early hours of yesterday, as he was leaving the police headquarters where he had welcomed the eighty-two released women, a bystander was heard saying that ‘it is only through war that the Turkish occupation armies will leave Cyprus’. Mr Vassiliou responded in a severe tone of voice: ‘We destroyed Cyprus once with the treasonable coup. We will not destroy it for a second time with irresponsibility.’ Answering the view expressed by another bystander that ‘the course of the talks on the Cyprus issue has not brought any results’ President Vassiliou said: ‘...and what, pray is the right course? Will we perhaps achieve anything without talks? This is exactly what Denktash wants who created all this trouble only to find pretexts to abandon the talks.’ One of the bystanders repeated the view, shared by some, on the need for the Greek-Cypriot side to leave the talks. The talks, stressed Mr Vassiliou in his reply, had been approved by the people and the National Council. And the President of the Republic added: ‘We must not forget that the dialogue aims to achieve exactly that which the women want to achieve, that is, the reunification of Cyprus, so that we can live together again in peace, wherever each of us wishes, under conditions of security for everybody, in friendship, Greeks and Turks. We must not allow this incident to divert us from our basic goal which is the peaceful solution of the Cyprus issue, because only then will we feel safe in this island.’ Meanwhile, Mr Camilion continued to work so that we could make progress towards negotiations on substance. His aim was to submit the document with the basic points that needed to be contained in an agreement between the two sides. A serious problem that he was facing was the fact that Mr Denktash wanted at all costs to avert the submission of proposals and threatened to leave the talks. At a meeting that Mr Camilion had with Mr Denktash, the latter tried hard to convince Mr Camilion not to submit the document. Mr Camilion insisted that the document should certainly be submitted because: • it was not possible to have talks without documents; • there was a commitment to that effect to the Secretary-General. 72

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 73

Second Period: September 1988 to July 1989

Mr Denktash then made the mistake of telling him: ‘If you submit it then I must know what it is that you are going to submit.’ The next day, I had another meeting with Mr Camilion. I was convinced that there should be no meeting between me and Mr Denktash for as long as the prisoners were not released, but, on the other hand, I didn’t want to appear as if it was our side that was asking for a postponement. That is why I suggested to Mr Camilion that he submit his ideas with an accompanying letter, in which he would ask us first to study these ideas so that Mr Denktash and I could have a meeting afterwards. Mr Camilion agreed with this view and even said that he had a good reason to do so, since it was Mr Denktash himself who had told him he wanted to see the document before it was submitted. By having his request satisfied, Mr Denktash could not implement his threat to leave the talks in case a document was submitted. During the summer of 1989, before the proposals and/or thoughts of the Secretary-General were submitted, I presented to the working group a thorough reevaluation of the whole situation. The conclusions we reached were the following: • Denktash showed, from the first moment, what exactly were his intentions, with the obstacles he had introduced in accepting the proposal of the UN Secretary-General. After this, he exhausted all limits in dealing with past issues, thus poisoning the climate of the dialogue, wasting time and trying hard to lead to a deviation from the original aim of the talks. From time to time, he becomes ‘softer’ and more ‘conciliatory’, even moving away on certain points from his previous positions, but always firm on his goal of promoting the project of a confederation. • It is generally accepted that for a solution to be found it is necessary for (without using diplomatic language) substantial pressure to be brought to bear on Turkey. Such pressure could be exerted by Greece, Europe and the two superpowers the USA and the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, however, in order to achieve this aim, there is need for much work, persistence and patience. • A probable failure of the dialogue will have serious consequences both in the way the Cyprus issue is viewed by foreigners and within the country as well. • On an international level, a new deadlock risks qualifying the Cyprus problem as insoluble because: 1 All the setbacks, so far, were attributed up to a point to the policy of President Kyprianou. Many foreigners believed that with goodwill, since both communities wanted to live side by side, a solution was possible, but stumbled on the inadequacies of the leaders of both sides. 2 The impressive goodwill that we [had] showed until now, during the new effort, convinced everybody about our intentions. However, a possible failure of the dialogue could be interpreted as an indication that the Turkish73

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 74

From the President’s Office

Cypriot community does not wish a federal solution and, since one of the two communities prefers to live separately, it is not possible to impose on it a different solution. 3 This logic is strengthened by those Greek Cypriots who expressed this view even recently, on the occasion of the women’s march through the newspapers who belong to this political camp (Shmerinh, Elephtherotypia etc). This strengthens the argument of Denktash and will make it more convincing. • Within the country, the extremist feelings will be strengthened, which will mean, politically, that the nationalistic movement will be strengthened. On 25 July 1989, Mr Camilion submitted the document of the Secretary-General with the accompanying letter (Appendix 4). Mr Denktash reacted strongly and insisted that the document should not have been submitted, but, having no choice, accepted it. The submission of the proposals by the Secretary-General which he himself described as ‘food for thought’ marks in essence the end of this period and the beginning of a new critical era of negotiations, with the Secretary-General playing now a more significant role in them.

74

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 75

chapter three

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990 An effort to put the ‘Ideas’ to good use and save the dialogue: Resolution 649 and the Gulf Crisis The proposals ‘Food for Thought’ of the UN Secretary-General On 25 July 1989, the Secretary-General of the UN conveyed through his special representative in Cyprus a document with ideas that he called ‘food for thought’, aimed at giving a specific direction to the whole procedure. The Secretary-General was very cautious in submitting his proposals so that these should not be seen as containing a solution. As he stressed in his accompanying letter: The set of Ideas are not presented as a formal proposal nor, of course, on a take it or leave it basis. Rather, these ideas are offered to help your task by providing food for thought and structure to your discussions. Immediately after, on the 26 July, I briefed the working group as to how we had ended up with this document being issued, as well as on the discussion that followed between Camilion and Denktash. After that, we studied in depth the document and pinpointed the differences between the ‘Ideas’ which were discussed and those which were submitted. By studying the differences we reached the conclusion that Turkey had tried, to begin with, to avert the preparation of any such text and when she failed in this task she tried to bring about various substantial changes. Small changes – as is clear from the comparison – were indeed introduced, but it was obvious that Ankara had failed to bring about substantial alterations so that the essence of the document remains indeed unchanged. We could, therefore, accept the Ideas as a basis for discussion. Before 75

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 76

From the President’s Office

discussing the views of the UN Secretary-General within the National Council, I thought it necessary to go to Athens for a two-day visit to discuss the document that had been submitted to us. On the first day of my arrival, on 27 July 1989, I had a meeting with the prime minister, Mr Tzannis Tzannetakis, and later with Mr Mitsotakis, president of New Democracy, as well as with the president of the ‘Coalition’, Mr C. Florakis, and Mr G. Farakos, General Secretary of the Communist party. The prime minister, Mr Tzannetakis, made the following statement after our meeting: It was my great pleasure to make the acquaintance of the President of Cyprus, Mr Vassiliou. We discussed various issues that preoccupy Cyprus. Greece wants to help in any way she can the Greeks of Cyprus and we will do everything possible for the dialogue to move on and reach satisfactory results and a good solution of [sic] the Cyprus problem. I said that we spoke the same language and found ourselves on the same wavelength. We discussed with the prime minister the best way of co-ordinating our efforts on all fronts, as well as on the issue of the liberation of the arrested Greek Cypriots in the pseudo-state of Denktash. After our meeting, Mr Mitsotakis stated: We spoke more generally on the perspectives of the Cyprus issue. And I must tell you that I belong to the optimists. I will also tell you that I am happy for the national unanimity that exists in Greece, for the first time during the recent decades concerning our policy towards Cyprus. And my Cypriot brothers will allow me to express the hope that such unanimity on this line, which I think is the right line that President Vassiliou is following, must also be achieved in Cyprus. In any case, the problems must be faced in a calm climate, in a reasonable manner and through dialogue. What we have succeeded in [doing in] Greece I hope that our Cypriot brothers will also achieve in the island. And I want also to tell you that I believe hopes do exist for this to happen... . To abandon the dialogue would be a criminal thought. I believe the way it is being handled is the correct one. At this hour what we have succeeded [in] as Greeks in general (because the Greeks of Greece and the Greeks of Cyprus are one and the same) is to have gained the support of international public opinion. This is a great gain which we must put to good use. We are at a critical stage. What is needed is decisiveness, reasonableness, wisdom which I believe that at this hour the Cypriot leadership is displaying, and most of all what we need is the unity of Hellenism, which I consider being our major capital that will support our efforts. 76

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 77

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

After our meeting, Mr Farakos made the following statement: The President of the Cypriot Republic G. Vassiliou known from old times and dear friend gave us a full and very vivid briefing that completed our knowledge of the situation. We feel the need to repeat that the support of the political leadership as a whole – especially on the tactics and the handling of the issue by President Vassiliou – is given and should be fully taken for granted. I believe that to underline this is of special significance today when certain events, which I wouldn’t call totally accidental but anyway far from pleasant, that can often lead to a crisis are fortunately being overcome. We also expressed our support for all the developments, on which we were briefed by the President, leading in a direction that allows us to hope that there will be a solution. We believe that this will be important not just for the crucial Cyprus problem but also for the issue of peace in general, given that the Cyprus problem is part of all the regional issues that need to be resolved. Mr Florakis, who was present at the meeting I had with Mr Farakos, did not want to make a statement because, as he said, he agreed with what Mr Farakos had said. I also had a meeting with the president of PASOK, Mr Andreas Papandreou, on 27 July 1989. In his statement, Mr Papandreou mentioned the following: I had the opportunity to be briefed on the developments on the Cyprus issue and there is no doubt that a national course that was established sometime ago both in Greece and in Cyprus has indeed started to yield fruits in spite of the difficulties, the problems and the dangers. There is no doubt that every day the international community becomes more and more convinced about the rights of the Cypriot people and the reasonable and firm course followed by the Cypriot Republic under President Vassiliou who has indeed opened a new chapter in the history of the Cyprus issue. There is no doubt that all of us, irrespective of partisan allegiance, the people of Greece as a whole, are on your side in your great struggle for a fair and permanent solution of the Cyprus problem. We are on your side and will stay on your side. At the press conference I gave in Athens after my visit was over, certain journalists tried to raise the issue of the difference of opinion in the parties DHKO and EDEK. I answered decisively, saying that ‘I will not destroy Cyprus for the sake of unanimity’. I am here quoting a passage from the Greek newspaper Apogevmatini, of 29 July 1989: President Vassiliou admitted that there are objections to the policy he follows on the national issue but said that ‘we will not lead Cyprus to destruction for the sake of unanimity’. 77

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 78

From the President’s Office

More specifically, responding to an observation that there is unanimity in Greece but not in Cyprus where certain objections are raised – and how he responds to such objections – Mr Vassiliou said: I am convinced that the continuation of the dialogue is indispensable. It is inconceivable for the dialogue to break off. I am glad there is total unanimity of the Greek political leadership. The Greek government and the Greek political parties agreed to support the proposals of the Secretary-General aiming at achieving an outline of the solution. No doubt there are objections in Cyprus. I will do my outmost within the frame of the discussions in the National Council for unanimity to be reached. But we will not lead Cyprus to destruction for the sake of unanimity. This means that if someone wants us to do something which we believe is against the interests of the Cypriot people and of Hellenism as a whole, we will simply grant him the right to disagree and we will do what we think is the right thing to do. However, as I strongly believe in the need to secure the largest possible unity, I avoid answering the attacks that take place, not because of any lack of arguments but because to act in this way our struggle and my efforts for a common front would not be served. The submission of the Ideas of the Secretary-General launched a vivid discussion in Cyprus between the parties and caused an angry response by Mr Denktash. It must be stressed that in Turkey there were voices who disagreed absolutely with the rejectionist views of Denktash. The whole behaviour of Denktash was no surprise for us, as it was our permanent preoccupation. Of some interest was the briefing that the Foreign Minister Mr Iacovou made to the working group on 10 August 1989 about the meeting between Nelson Letsky and Mr Denktash: Mr Letsky described the meeting he had with Mr Denktash as one of the most difficult he had ever had with him. Denktash was very nervous, insecure and did not know what he was saying. According to Mr Letsky, Denktash will return to the talks in September after first trying to patch things up with the Secretary-General and his representatives. Regarding the document he has not as yet made up his mind what to do about it. Mr Letsky tried to convince Denktash that the document constitutes the basis for the talks but Denktash was very angry. From the discussion that they had, Mr Letsky diagnosed three difficulties:

78

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 79

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

1 On the issue of the return of the refugees and their properties, Denktash holds the view that no Turkish-Cypriot is going to go back to the South and that therefore the Greek Cypriots will take the properties of the Turkish Cypriots in the South and return to take hold of their own properties in the North. This means that they will be in full control of the South and of a percentage in the North. 2 The issue of security. Mr Denktash said to Mr Letsky that, as things stand now, the Turkish Cypriots feel very safe and can therefore not go back to the doubtful state of the 1960 guarantees – especially as there will now be the involvement of the Security Council and article 52. 3 The document. The concept of bi-zonality, as explained in the document, differs totally from what the Turks understand by this term. According to the Turks, bi-zonality creates totally different conditions which the document of the Secretary-General ignores. Mr Letsky drew the conclusion that Mr Denktash will come to the talks and will submit his own proposals. ‘We must therefore face this situation,’ Mr Letsky continued, ‘and we can convince him to accept a solution but we need time.’ He went on to explain that those who can convince Denktash to accept a solution are three: 1 Ankara 2 the Turkish Cypriots, most of whom are in favour of a solution 3 international public opinion. For this reason our only choice is to keep the procedure alive. We must persevere in our efforts; we must stick to the procedure. And not only that, but we must salvage as large a piece of the procedure as we possibly can. The Secretary-General must come out into the open and support his document more energetically. In spite of the above assessments of Mr Letsky, Mr Denktash, on 23 August, adopted a negative stance and disputed the right of the Secretary-General to contribute to the procedure of the talks, by submitting his own ‘Ideas’. Mr Denktash referred the issue of the Ideas of the Secretary-General to the so-called Assembly in the Turkish occupied part of Cyprus. The Assembly adopted a resolution which, in essence, suspended the participation of the Turkish-Cypriot side in the intercommunal dialogue and attacked the UN Secretary-General and the procedure proposed by

79

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 80

From the President’s Office

him. The resolution was passed with the votes of the Denktash party and those of the Turkish settlers. The other Turkish-Cypriot parties which genuinely represented the majority of the Turkish Cypriots voted against it. The resolution introduced new conditions for the continuation of the dialogue, asking, among other things, that the document submitted by the Secretary-General be withdrawn from the negotiating table. It also asked that the occupied part of Cyprus be recognised as a separate state, and that the Turkish Cypriots be granted separately the ‘right of selfdetermination’. All these conditions were in flagrant contradiction of the UN Resolutions and the high-level agreements. The British Foreign Office expressed its disapproval of the resolution taken by this Assembly in the Occupied Territories on the issue regarding the pursuit of the dialogue. In the statement issued by the Foreign Office, it is mentioned that: We have received reports of the Resolution of the ‘Turkish-Cypriot Assembly’ on 22 August. We regard the introduction of preconditions for the conduct of the intercommunal dialogue as unhelpful. We continue to support the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to promote a settlement and deplore any action which complicates a resumption of the talks. We do not accept that the Turkish-Cypriot complaints about the UN document are justified. In putting the paper forward as ‘food for thought’, the UN were, in our view, acting in accordance with the terms of reference agreed by both sides. We hope that the talks will be resumed shortly on the basis previously agreed between the Secretary-General and the leaders of the two communities, President Vassiliou and Mr Denktash. 26th August, 1989. The Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr Yilmaz, conscious of the critical stance that the Security Council was adopting against Denktash and Turkey, tried to avoid it by stating that only intercommunal negotiations were needed. He also tried to take advantage of the events related to the women’s march, as is obvious from his statements made to the radio station of the Athens municipality and reproduced by the Greek-Cypriot newspaper Phileleftheros of 30 August 1989: ‘The events,’ continued Mr Yilmaz, ‘that took place on the Green Line last July had a nasty impact on the Turkish-Cypriot community and if a common state is to be created this must be decided by both sides.’ In its two long sessions on 31 July and 31 August, the National Council discussed extensively the principles underlying the document of the Secretary-General. The discussions showed clearly the differences of opinion between DHKO and EDEK and the majority of the National Council. The Study Bureau had prepared a 80

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 81

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 The common meeting scheduled to be held in New York in September 11 between myself, President Vassiliou and the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mr 12 Denktash is now out of the question... The fact that the ideas were 13 submitted in writing does not mean that they constitute proposals. 14 (Phileleftheros, 2 September 1989) 15 In the speech I gave in Pelendri on 6 August 1989, I described the situation as it 16 had developed and spoke about the terrible danger of partition if things stayed as 17 18 they were: 19 20 The Cyprus issue has come out of the doldrums. Time has ceased to flow 21 passively. Serious mobility on the problem has begun. We have changed 22 the international understanding about what the Cyprus issue means. 23 While previously the general view was that it was us who allegedly were 24 not interested in a solution and created difficulties, today this image has 25 been completely reversed. Everybody knows that those who create 26 difficulties, those who do not wish for a solution to be found are the 27 Turks, not us. 28 We brought the Cyprus issue to the fore internationally and have 29 succeeded to turn it today into one among the international problems that 30 the international community is concerned with. The Cyprus issue is today 31 on the agenda of both super-powers. It has become a regional problem – 32 as it always was – and this is the way that foreigners now see it. Today the 33 international press does indeed deal with the Cyprus issue. 34 Everybody recognises that we contributed in enhancing the prestige of 35 the Cyprus Republic by visiting various countries and by being invited as 36 guests of honour to various international events such as the celebration of 37 200th anniversary of the French Revolution. Moreover, concerning the 38 role that Cyprus has played and is playing in the UN suffice it to mention 39 just one example that has to do with the initiative undertaken by Cyprus 40 to combat the plague of famine. I am referring to an international initiative named after Cyprus because of the special role that we played and continue to play in this project.

comparison between the ideas contained in the Food for Thought document of the Secretary-General, with our own proposals of 1989 as well as with the preceding document of the Secretary-General of 1985. The comparison showed clearly the correctness of our decision to accept them as a basis for discussion. The decision was therefore taken that the Greek-Cypriot side accepts the Ideas of the SecretaryGeneral as a basis for discussion. At this phase, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar broke his silence and criticised the TurkishCypriot leader. In his statement to the Reuters agency, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar said:

81

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 82

From the President’s Office

Now with the submission of the ideas by the UN Secretary-General, the same claim is made. We face a peculiar situation. There are daily press reports by a group of people from the other (the Turkish) side accusing the Secretary-General. They maintain that a conspiracy is at work. They say that his ideas must be rejected and that the dialogue must cease. This position does not surprise us because all these people have one and only goal. To keep the situation as it is. What is surprising is that we hear the same views from our side... The fear of dialogue leads nowhere. They tell us that if we continue with the dialogue we may end up with a partitionlike solution. How exactly do we risk ending up with a partition-like solution? With the dialogue or without it? This is the basic question to which every Cypriot must give an answer today. We know very well that a solution will come either through war or through a dialogue. There is, however, a third way: Not to engage in dialogue, make patriotic speeches, repeat that we stay on the ramparts and let time pass without doing anything. The theory is also being mooted that it is better to let partition just happen instead of legalising it by our signature. The truth is that we, unfortunately, do not possess even this weapon because if our signature were really necessary for the legalisation of the faits accomplis then we would have a serious weapon in our hands namely that without our signature there would be no further development. All political leaders say they do not sign. After many years, however, nobody will know who those political leaders were. What the world will know is that for 20 or 30 or 40 years there was a de facto situation, Cyprus will be partitioned, partition will be accepted and after a certain time it will be recognised. This is the harsh reality. That is why we will never accept the perpetuation of the present situation. We will not accept it as a solution. It is not a sign of patriotism for someone to say that he does not want dialogue. Patriotism is for someone to have the courage to hold and defend the right stand, to fight bravely in order to reach a fair and viable solution. Nonetheless, the reaction to the ‘de Cuéllar Ideas’ and to the efforts to find a solution on the basis of our proposals became stronger. This perhaps happened because those responsible for it became more and more conscious of the fact that our policy enjoyed the universal support of the Greek political leadership as a whole, as well as that of the majority of the Cypriot people. A leading article by the Greek-Cypriot newspaper Epikairi, published on 29 July 1989, is characteristic of this attitude: All Rejectionists must now go to Athens What did President Vassiliou go to Athens for? The answer, for those who have an elementary knowledge of what is happening, has nothing to do 82

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 83

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 Stavros Aggelidis, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Phileleftheros, in an article 38 refuting these extremist nationalistic positions, started by quoting a saying of Alphonse 39 40 de Chateaubriand: ‘Crimes can sometimes remain unpunished. Errors never.’ The policy we pursued was warmly supported by Mr Clerides. In an interview he gave to the newspaper Agon on 17 September 1989, he expressed his agreement with with all the misleading sloganeering trumpeted by the state RIK (Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation) and the representatives of President Vassiliou. The President went to Athens to bring once again on board the so-called Greek ‘consensus’ regarding the Clerides sell-out policies that he pursues regarding the Cyprus issue. He went to Athens in order to set the majority of the Cypriot people who object to his policy against a policy that is allegedly supported and applauded on an all-national level by all the Athenian party leaders. The truth, however, is different. The decadent Athenian state of the multiple deadlocks is not displaying a policy of consensus but of indifference with which it regards the policy on the Cyprus issue. They are very comfortable believing that the Cyprus issue will be closed with the shenanigans worked out by de Cuéllar with Vassiliou and Denktash. This comfort, however, is destined to turn into a boomerang ... because what it means precisely is the surrender to Turkish expansionism, to the aggression from the eastern neighbour. The next victims of this boomerang are known already: The Aegean and Greek Thrace. So now that Mr Vassiliou will be coming back from Athens those who should go there immediately are the leaders of the so-called Rejectionist Front: The President of DHKO Mr Kyprianou, the President of EDEK Mr Lyssaridis, Archbishop Chrysostomos and Mr Tassos Papadopoulos. They should remind those in charge in Greece of their responsibilities not only concerning Cyprus but also concerning the Aegean and Thrace. The visitors to Athens should take with them the prisoner of Attila about to be freed namely Bishop of Kition Chrysostomos, the man who had led in Athens the demonstration against the visit there – as a guest of Mr Papandreou – of the prime minister of the country that continues its Attila occupation of Cyprus, Turgut Őzal. They should all go to Athens not in order to confine themselves to backstage talks in political offices but to denounce publicly to the Greek people as a whole the attempted sell out on Cyprus. By commonly held press conferences they must at long last demand that Greece adopts an allnational strategy of national liberation. This must happen now and not the day after to-morrow because the man in charge of the Vassiliou– Clerides–AKEL axis is already preparing the mantle of an ‘All-national Conference’ to cover the sell-out of our national liberation cause with the signing of the de Cuéllar solution.

83

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 84

From the President’s Office

the way we handled the Cyprus issue. He disagreed with those who supported the policy of the preconditions, and expressed the opinion that the policy pursued during the last two years before the presidential elections of 1988 had led us to an impasse and to an increase in the influx of settlers from Turkey. He said: It is a fact that the new policy introduced by President Vassiliou after the Presidential elections – which is supported by the majority in the National Council – changed the unfavourable, for us, international image and led to the conclusion that it is our side that wants a solution of the Cyprus problem while the Turkish side is negative as far as the solution of this problem is concerned. Mr Denktash was greatly displeased by the submission of the (Food for Thought) proposals of the Secretary-General and used the Women’s March to postpone the talks. As he stressed to Mr Camilion, he was absolutely opposed to any idea of submitting proposals or views to the Secretary-General. He much preferred direct talks between the leaders without any written texts being issued by the UN side. The submission of the Ideas by the Secretary-General had changed the situation and so he asked for a postponement of the meetings because of the tension that had been created, and also, as he said, to get instructions regarding the Ideas from the ‘Authorities’. After the refusal of the Turkish side to accept the ‘Set of Ideas’ that the SecretaryGeneral had submitted, the international community – and especially the USA and the UK – developed an initiative aiming at resolving the impasse. Visits to Ankara were made by the special co-ordinator on the Cyprus issue in the US State Department, Mr Letsky, as well as by the under-secretary of the UK Foreign Office Mrs Linda Choker, acting as the personal envoy of the prime minister, Mrs Thatcher. During the discussions, the Turks felt uncomfortable and even suggested themselves that the document be used as a basis for discussion. Mrs Choker insisted that this, in itself, was not enough, but that they should, as she said, ‘commit themselves to agree to negotiate on the basis of this document that did contain the elements of an agreement’. Unfortunately all such visits to Ankara remained fruitless, a fact that proved to the international community that the Turkish side did not wish a solution. In Cyprus, I had a series of meetings with the ambassadors of the superpowers and stressed to them the need for strengthening the role of the Secretary-General. They all agreed and promised to give the Secretary-General all the support he needed. There follow the notes on these meetings: Meeting with the French ambassador Mr Daniel Ousseau: Mr Ambassador expressed his concern about the decision of the pseudo84

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 85

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

parliament and warned Mr Vassiliou about the aim of Denktash to turn the whole issue into one of procedure and not of substance. (That is to discuss whether there should or should not be a document and not on the substance of the issue as a whole.) Mr Ambassador briefed the President on the report sent by the French ambassador in Ankara, Mr Rouleau, which portrays the situation within Turkey as far as the Cyprus issue is concerned. It is obvious both from the report and from information obtained by our side that there are differences between the Turkish government on the one hand and the opposition on the other. Meeting with British High Commissioner Mr Maude: Mr Maude was well briefed because he had already met Mr Camilion. The British representative at the UN had also met the Secretary-General who had assured him that: • On no account will he agree to withdraw his ideas. • He is not going to invite the two sides to start discussing on the basis of his inaugural statement. Mr Maude also briefed the President about the discussion that the British Ambassador in Ankara had had with the Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Ozceri which was, as he reported, one of the worst meetings he ever had with him. As Mr Maude said, Mr Ozceri launched a vicious attack against the United Nations which, as he explained to the British ambassador, have compromised the Turks with the statement they made – concerning the neutral zone – and have, generally speaking, deceived and entrapped them. They feel they are in a very disadvantageous position after the statements and the submission of the thoughts of the Secretary-General. Mr Maude concluded that the Turks proved by their stance that they are not interested in the substance of the proposals and ideas of the Secretary-General but only in procedure and similar matters. Meeting with the Ambassador of West Germany Mr Tilo Redger: Mr Redger briefed the President on the meeting he had with Mr Denktash during which he became aware of the Turkish-Cypriot leader’s rage against the United Nations in general and Mr Feissel in particular who had become, as he said, the focus of his attention. Meeting with the Attaché of the US Embassy Mr John Nix: Mr Nix believes that the dialogue hurts Denktash. Given that Denktash 85

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 86

From the President’s Office

tries to find a way for the dialogue to be broken off, our side, he believes, must do all it can to keep the dialogue going because if it stops this can only serve Denktash. He went on to say that since it was President Vassiliou who succeeded in restarting the dialogue and since everybody knows that it was he who has pushed Denktash into a corner placing him in a very difficult position indeed, it was up to Mr Vassiliou to find a way for the dialogue to resume. Mr Vassiliou answered that it is not the dialogue per se that interests him but the dialogue on matters of substance and that is why there must be firmness in pursuing the line of supporting the Secretary-General. Mr Nix agreed on this and on the fact that Denktash does not want a solution. He then suggested that the Secretary-General would do well to include in his report to the Security Council on Cyprus the need for his role to be strengthened. The President pointed out that what should be done now was for a session of the Security Council to be called that would confirm the role of the Secretary-General and the whole procedure as well as congratulate him for his efforts. Mr Nix admitted that he had discussed the role of the Secretary-General with the British High Commissioner who stressed to him that from the very first day when the Secretary-General began to play this role of offering his good services it was assumed that this includes proposals and ideas being issued by him. Mr Nix agreed with Mr Maude that there is no question of contesting this role. Mr Nix went on to point out that this was the first time in the history of the Cyprus issue that there was some controversy among the TurkishCypriot parties. In his view, Mr Denktash does not enjoy any popular support and failed to secure the cooperation of other parties. The fact that the session in the Turkish-Cypriot pseudo-parliament lasted for so long is an indication that there is dissension, a fact, according to Mr Nix, which is a very positive development. Meeting with the Soviet Ambassador Mr Fokin: Mr Fokin had no contact with Mr Denktash and had therefore no suggestions to make. He said, however, that they were not at all surprised by the decision of the pseudo-parliament which they had been expecting. The situation as a whole demanded that the international efforts had to be intensified if we wanted to secure the active support of the superpowers and of the international community. The campaign started with my visit to Belgrade from 4 until 6 September 1989 to take part in the ninth conference of the heads of state and government of the Non-Aligned movement. During my stay in Belgrade, I had an almost hour-long meeting with the UN Secretary-General, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar. The 86

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 87

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

Secretary-General expressed his strong displeasure at the conduct of Mr Denktash, stressing that ‘now is the time for pressures to be brought to bear on Turkey’. I agreed and upheld the opinion that ‘he should try to secure a clarification of his role by the Security Council and also to secure the support of President Bush’. The Secretary-General committed himself to work for the resumption of negotiations on substance. As a result of our intervention, the conference of the leaders of the movement of the Non-Aligned adopted a resolution in which it expressed its concern about the obstacles that are being raised in the procedure of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem and asked for the immediate withdrawal of the Turkish troops and the settlers. After that, on 3–5 October, I visited once again the USA. I addressed the General Assembly of the UN and referred to Turkey’s responsibilities for the impasse. At lunch time I gave a summary presentation of our proposals, I analysed the advantages of a solution for all – especially the Turkish Cypriots – and unmasked the negative stance of Turkey. Present at the lunch was the President of the Security Council, as well as of the Non-Aligned movement and the representative of Greece. I mentioned especially the pro-Turkish intervention of the representative of Malaysia, who was also present and who pointed out that it is impossible for Greeks and Turks to live together in Cyprus. I remarked that it was odd to hear such talk from the representative of Malaysia, which is a model multinational state. I added that if one separated the Chinese from the Malaysians, one would increase much more the probabilities of a conflict between them than if one allowed them to live peacefully side by side, even if the majority of each community lived in different neighbourhoods. In the end, the Malaysian representative admitted that I was right. The new meeting I had with the US President George Bush proved important. The meeting was attended by the US Secretary of State Mr Baker, the counsellor of the president on questions of National Security Mr Scowcroft and the co-ordinator on the Cyprus issue, Mr Letsky. In statements he made, President Bush said that the Cyprus issue ought to have been settled long ago and that he was keen to help promote a solution that would not consider the status quo as a solution. Proof that this meeting had positive effects was that it led to a phone call by President Bush to the President of Turkey, General Evren. According to the report by Stavros Aggelidis, published in the newspaper Phileleftheros on 15 October 1989, President Bush telephoned Evren about Cyprus in the first such call about the Cyprus issue by an American to a Turkish president since 1964. The report contains the following: A telephone conversation dealing exclusively with the Cyprus issue took place when the American President Bush called the President of Turkey General Evren. This action by Bush was the result of his meeting with President Vassiliou and was deemed by political and diplomatic sources in Washington and Ankara as ‘highly important’ because it is very rare for an 87

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 88

From the President’s Office

American President to contact directly the leader of another country – especially on a subject that has to do with a third country. According to reports it was the first time after 1964 that any American President telephoned the President of Turkey in order to convey to him orally his views on the Cyprus issue. In 1964 the then President Lyndon Johnson had telephoned the prime minister Ismet Inonu to warn him that the USA would not intervene in favour of Turkey in case the Soviet Union intervened in favour of Cyprus. (There had been a previous warning by Khrushchev to Ankara.) Johnson had phoned Inonu because at that time in Turkey all power was in the hands of the government and especially the prime minister, while the President was simply a constitutional figurehead without any real powers. Today, however, after the last coup, the President has in fact a greater say than the prime minister given also that he presides over the national Security Council. According to our valid information, President Bush expressed to General Evren his own personal strong interest as well as that of his government, in the achievement of progress on the Cyprus issue and suggested that Turkey is in a position to help substantially a move in such a direction. He further pointed out that a solution in Cyprus will contribute to the improvement of the relations between Turkey and Greece, an issue that Washington considers as very important. He also believed it was important for the image of Turkey to be improved in a modern world that wants peaceful solutions of international problems and opposes the occupation of foreign territories. The phone call by Bush was seen in both capitals as the strongest evidence yet of the activated American interest in the Cyprus issue brought to its highest point in many years. This interest is expected to continue as was also proved by the statements made by Bush the day before yesterday to the Archbishop of America, Iakovos. The American stance creates problems for the Ankara government as is shown in many published comments by Turkish columnists. These comments mention foreign policy successes for Cyprus, especially in having convinced all governments that it genuinely seeks a solution of the Cyprus issue, as well as corresponding failures of the Turkish policy on Cyprus and also in other fields such as the inability of Turkey to overcome the obstacles in her course towards the EEC, the increasing criticisms voiced against her for human rights violations, the Kurdish issue, her dispute with Bulgaria about the Bulgarian Moslems – and now the raising of the Armenian question in the American Congress. Many commentators suggest the need for the country’s foreign policy to be reconsidered if Turkey is ever to be accepted in the community of modern and developed countries. 88

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 89

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

The Bush phone call was judged by political and diplomatic circles in Washington as being of especial importance. As is made clear in the comments of many Turkish commentators, the American stance created a number of problems in Ankara. These comments referred frequently to the success of the foreign policy of Cyprus, especially to the fact that it genuinely seeks a solution to the Cyprus problem. At a press conference held after the meeting, I stressed: I am very happy to have the support of President Bush who gave his fullest possible backing to the Secretary-General and made it clear that the US government will never accept the status quo as a solution and also that it wants to see a dialogue on substance being launched. It is indicative that in the announcement of the White House it is clearly stated that the USA want dialogue, a dialogue on substance and not just talks for the sake of talks. This is our policy, this is our goal and I can assure you that as far as we are concerned we have all the goodwill in the world to make this dialogue productive. [Question:] The Turkish-Cypriot leader Mr Denktash will resume the talks only if the ideas of the Secretary-General about a solution of the Cyprus problem are withdrawn. Can you tell us what it is in those ideas that Mr Denktash rejects or dislikes? [Answer:] It is not easy for me to make comments on behalf of Mr Denktash. It is of course possible – and I hope he will accept this – to resume the talks without the ideas being withdrawn. I cannot speak on behalf of the Secretary-General but I do not believe that the Secretary-General has any intention of withdrawing his ideas since he said, when submitting them, that these are not presented on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis and that ‘these are simply ideas to help you in the negotiating procedure’. He described them as ‘food for thought’ and said: ‘You can comment on them and work on them.’ That is how he put things. As for the reason why Mr Denktash does not want talks, I will not even try to provide a possible explanation. Judging from statements that have been made by various people both in Turkey and in the occupied territories, one can say that basically what they want is the continuation of the status quo. This is something we will never accept and – as I said before – I am happy that this is a position adopted by the whole world as well as by the American government. [Question:] After your meeting with Mr Bush you appeared quite enthusiastic. Is this due to the fact that Mr Bush gave you a specific promise that can lead to a settlement of the Cyprus issue or is it just wishful thinking, and a reaffirmation of the goodwill and the known positions of the USA? [Answer:] Any objective observer will confirm that the American government displays today a greater interest about Cyprus than it did, say, 89

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 90

From the President’s Office

two or more years ago. The fact that a special co-ordinator on Cyprus, Mr Letsky, has been appointed is in itself proof of this interest. Also, if you will, the fact that President Bush received me only months after being elected while we had met only last year – and in Paris as well at the celebrations of the 200 years from the French Revolution – and also if you take into account that at this meeting the Secretary of State Mr Baker, General Scowcroft, Mr Sununu and others were also present, this shows his personal interest in the matter. The whole government was there and the personal interest shown by the president was obvious. I can tell you that he is well informed on the Cyprus problem, fully aware of its aspects and that he showed a vivid interest for real progress. I believe this is very important and in this respect there is change, very positive change. But I did not ask him what he plans to do and it is not up to me to tell the US President what he should do if he wants to implement an idea. This is the prerogative of the USA government. [Question:] How far away is a solution of the Cyprus problem? [Answer:] Before I left Cyprus someone asked me: ‘How do you judge the situation taking into account that negotiations stopped because of the Turkish stance?’ It was evening and I answered him: ‘What you see outside is darkness but you should know that soon there will be light.’ That is how I feel. It may be dark now but I feel sure that light will come. From New York, I flew to Malaysia to take part at the Commonwealth Summit in Kuala Lumpur (from 18 until 23 October 1989). In my speech I denounced Turkey for wanting to impose on Cyprus an apartheid system. On the margins of the conference I had talks with the British prime minister Mrs Thatcher, who agreed with me on the need to hold negotiations on substance. The resolution of the Conference contained the Commonwealth’s support of the independence and unity of Cyprus. A result of the huge effort we had undertaken – and which led to the increasing involvement of the permanent members of the Security Council – was that meetings were scheduled in New York with my participation, as well as that of the SecretaryGeneral and Mr Denktash. A summary note of the permanent Cypriot delegation to the UN on the meeting with the Secretary-General contains the following: The conversation was long, lasting 80 minutes. During the meeting all the developments that had taken place were reviewed and it was repeated that for a new meeting to be arranged the right conditions for its success must first be secured. President Vassiliou stressed that the July document must be discussed. President Vassiliou countered the stubborn views of Raouf Denktash that the Secretary-General is allegedly unauthorised to submit written proposals on the Cyprus issue. The President said that it is not 90

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 91

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

possible to differentiate between oral and written ideas adding that the oral ones are virtually useless. He also called upon the Secretary-General to go public on the conditions and the restrictions that Denktash wants to impose on the UN’s contribution, especially concerning the submission of ideas. The whole discussion revolved on the eventuality of realising a new Vassiliou–Denktash meeting in New York in the light of the unacceptable demands by Denktash. The Secretary-General, prompted by UN officials, mentioned the possibility of a common statement by the two sides before their meeting, something that President Vassiliou rejected asserting that there would never be a common statement that might directly or indirectly confer status to the pseudo-state or to the unilateral declaration of its independence. Joint statements, the President underlined, can only be made after an agreement at the end of a tripartite meeting. It was decided at the meeting that if the Secretary-General was going to schedule a meeting for January or February of 1990 he would do this without any reference to what would be discussed and that the relevant announcement would be restricted to facts. The Secretary-General presented a note containing the headings of the items to be discussed at the high-level meeting. Amongst them was the return of the refugees and confidence building measures. There was a discussion on the confidence building measures and President Vassiliou said that the Cyprus government supports any measure that can lead to the rapprochement of the two communities, but added emphatically that the government will not accept any meeting that could be misconstrued as a recognition of the pseudo-state. I then took part at a working lunch given by the Secretary-General, also attended by the five permanent members of the Security Council. The meeting was the result of the huge effort that we had undertaken and which had led to the increasingly active involvement of the permanent members of the Security Council. With reference to the luncheon given in my honour in New York, the following note was sent to the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Ambassador of Greece at the UN, Mr Zepos: The luncheon given in honour of President Vassiliou in New York was attended by eight members of the Security Council. Pérez de Cuéllar, a UN official with many years’ involvement in the Cyprus issue said, among other things, that after the Middle East issue, the Cyprus one is the oldest pending problem. He added that the recent past saw for the first time serious talks between the two sides that have devoted at least 100 working hours to this end. He expressed the hope that there will be a genuine dedication of the interested parties in reaching an agreed solution. 91

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 92

From the President’s Office

The note of the Greek ambassador also mentions: President Vassiliou went on to develop at some length his position in a way that, as can be said with total objectivity, was clear, with his arguments logically structured and a pragmatic approach to the subject. Summarising my speech, Mr Zepos mentioned the following: Concerning the intercommunal dialogue, the recent document (July 1989) is not a draft agreement but a draft outline reflecting the progress that has been registered and the negotiating positions of the two sides. In this form the document is a necessary element for the continuation of the dialogue and President Vassiliou added that he is keen to respond to the invitation of the Secretary-General for the continuation of the talks with Mr Denktash if there is serious expectation of substantial progress. Questions were asked of the Cypriot President by representatives of the USA, the Soviet Union, Britain and Colombia. After that, the discussion moved on to issues having to do with the confidence building measures. President Vassiliou said that the restitution of Varosha to the United Nations, according to the Security Council Resolution 550, the return of its legal residents to the area and the development of its port that would benefit mostly the Turkish-Cypriot community would be a major confidence building measure. Mr Zepos also mentions in his note: The President also answered most sincerely questions related to the economic and social differences between the Greek- and the TurkishCypriot community. He displayed the cogency of a leader armed with the special knowledge that allows him to face with generosity and wisdom this aspect of the Cypriot problem. He ended by quoting the following statement of mine: If Turkey does not aim at conquering the whole of Cyprus, the safest development – for her – is the confirmation of the independence of Cyprus instead of extending, through her intransigence, the GrecoTurkish borderline by 140 miles on the soil of Cyprus. The meeting of the Secretary-General with Denktash came once again to nothing. The Turkish-Cypriot leader insisted on his permanent positions and submitted further conditions for the continuation of the talks that amounted essentially to the recognition of his pseudo-state. 92

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 93

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

At the beginning of December 1989, I visited once again Athens to meet the new Greek prime minister, Mr X. Zolotas, the President of the Republic and the political leadership. The leader of PASOK, Mr Papandreou, expressing the general feeling that dominated all my meetings, said in his statement: ‘I can stress that there is full agreement, common perception and joint assessment of developments concerning the policy and tactics that we must follow.’ There followed the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council regarding the mission of good offices. In his report the Secretary-General described the course of the talks from 1988 onwards. He referred to the stance of Mr Denktash, who contested the agreed procedure for the talks and raised obstacles to its continuation. The report was followed in mid-December by a statement by the President of the Security Council, on behalf of the members of the Council, in which they expressed their full support to the efforts of the Secretary-General while at the same time sharing his disappointment for the non-achievement, until then, of any specific results. The Council members also expressed the hope that talks on substance would begin speedily the next year. This declaration is an indirect but clear criticism of the Turkish stance. Meanwhile, the leaders of the European Community at their Summit Meeting in Strasbourg expressed their concern at the tragic division of Cyprus in spite of the efforts of the UN.

1990 – Efforts continue for talks on substance Trying to rescue the procedure, the USA sent Mr Letsky to Cyprus, where he had meetings lasting many hours both with me and with Mr Denktash. During these meetings, as I reported in my briefing to the working group on 2 January 1990, I made it clear that our side was ready to go to the UN any time, but only if matters of substance were going to be discussed there based on the ideas of the SecretaryGeneral that would allow us to proceed to a draft outline of an agreement. I emphasised the need that pressures should be brought to bear on Turkey by America and Britain because, without such pressures, there was absolutely no hope that Denktash would ever comply and behave in a constructive way. Mr Letsky agreed and promised that America would do all it could to press for things to move in that direction. I then underlined the need to allocate responsibilities in case of failure of the dialogue. Mr Letsky agreed but avoided committing himself to this view. In the course of our discussions, Mr Letsky tried to put out feelers as to whether I would be ready to have some kind of contact with Mr Denktash before the meeting with the Secretary-General so that we could both sign a ‘joint communiqué’, which was something that Denktash was seeking. I made it clear that ‘I [would] not sign any statement no matter how innocent it may look because in this way we [would] move away from the substance of the dialogue and on to secondary matters’. I also 93

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 94

From the President’s Office

stressed to Mr Letsky that as far as the relations between the two communities were concerned these would be secured through a solution and not through any kind of manifesto. Concerning the matter of measures needed to achieve a rapprochement, I made it clear to Mr Letsky that our side had nothing against such measures but that we would not allow such discussions to alter the agenda of the talks. ‘In other words,’ I said, ‘we do not want to give the impression that it is possible for such secondary issues to change the substance of the matter and that anyway we cannot accept measures which give – even indirectly – the right to Denktash to speak of equalisation of status or recognition.’ More specifically on the suggestion of creating a bi-communal university on the Green Line, I made it clear to Mr Letsky that such a proposal could not be accepted because we would thus immediately recognise the existence of a dividing line and that this was inconceivable. ‘We could, of course,’ I went on, ‘create such a university in Varosha, but only after you open it first.’ Finally, after much discussion and insistence, I clarified that we were not against any measure of rapprochement, but what this could realistically lead to would be at a maximum for Varosha to be re-opened and at a minimum that talks would restart. Mr Letsky understood, thanks to the preparatory work he had done on the subject, that the whole discussion about measures of rapprochement would not lead anywhere in spite of the fact that he was not overly happy about the outcome. Meanwhile, in his bi-monthly report to Congress, President Bush mentioned that the USA did not consider the perpetuation of the status quo in Cyprus a solution – which was obviously the aim of Turkey – and supported the resumption of intercommunal talks on substance under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. This was the result of the persuasiveness of the Greek-Cypriot positions as explained by me to President Bush. On 11 January 1990, the Secretary-General sent out invitations for talks to start in New York on 12 February and to last probably for 15 days. The starting date was later moved to 26 February. I must note here that at the meeting I had with Mr Camilion on 16 January 1990, he told me that Mr Denktash was trying to find ways to postpone the dialogue until autumn. He said many times that he felt cornered and that everybody was putting pressure on him to start the talks. Camilion made it clear that such a long postponement was out of the question for the UN. Mr Camilion stressed the decisiveness of the Secretary-General on this issue. He even said that the Secretary-General would raise this matter at his prospective meeting on 22 January with Mr Őzal, during which he would point out to him the importance of the dialogue that would start on 12 February which, as he said, ‘must be a dialogue on substance’. I stressed to Mr Camilion the following: When the Secretary-General meets Mr Őzal he must make it clear to him that it is not enough to convince Mr Denktash to come to the dialogue 94

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 95

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

but also make him realise that if he comes he must commit himself to work for the preparation of a draft outline of an agreement. For the meeting in New York to be successful the Secretary-General must insist on the following terms: 1 Any statement to the press during this fortnightly procedure is forbidden. Whoever makes statements or allows any leaks to occur will be considered responsible for breaking off the dialogue. 2 A schedule must be agreed containing the issues to be covered during the first 5 or 6 days allowing for 3 or 4 days for negotiations. 3 The dialogue must take a practical not a theoretical form. The Secretary-General must be firm on this and bring back to order anyone who tries to do otherwise. On 24 January 1990, I met the Attaché of the American Embassy Mr Nix, who told me that ‘last Tuesday the USA made the strongest yet demand to Ankara and Nicosia’. According to Mr Nix this covered ten points. Among other things they asked Turkey to respond positively to the Secretary-General about the resumption of the dialogue and to remind Denktash that the Secretary-General will submit a report on 1 March which, they hoped, would be positive. At the beginning of February, I went, as every year, to the meeting at Davos. Unfortunately, neither before nor after my presidency did the presidents of Cyprus put to good use the opportunities offered by the economic conference at Davos. I met there prime ministers and foreign ministers and found how strongly conscious they had become of the rise of nationalism, and also how they now linked the Cyprus problem much more to the solution of other European problems. I had an interesting encounter with the vice-president of the Turkish government, Mr Ali Bozer. I asked him when they would at long last finally decide to solve the Cyprus problem. He replied that they were in favour of a solution. I answered that they neither wanted a solution nor did they ever show that they wanted one. He asked me if we accepted a federation. I answered, asking him whether he really thought we did or not. He asked me again if we accepted a bi-zonal federation. I answered that it had been some time since we had accepted it. Then he asked me why we do not discuss it with Mr Denktash, and I asked him if he really thinks that one can discuss it with Mr Denktash and if Denktash has the will to solve the problem. He answered that I might be right. Then I added that they must realise that the line followed by the Turkish Foreign Ministry to lead them into Europe with the Cyprus problem pending is no longer valid. They should therefore make up their minds to solve the Cyprus problem and that to do this a dialogue on substance must be carried out. This, however, depended on them because Mr Denktash does not want to make a move in this direction. 95

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 96

From the President’s Office

Upon my return to Cyprus, I received on 8 February 1990 an important message from Mr Letsky concerning the meeting of President Bush with President Őzal. Because of its significance I am quoting it here in full: As the letter from President Bush makes clear, Cyprus was an important discussion topic with President Őzal. After a lengthy discussion of East– West and Middle Eastern issues, President Bush raised Cyprus as the first of a series of bilateral matters, saying that we supported the efforts of the Secretary-General to resume the negotiating process and hoped that President Őzal would do the same, and then do what he could to keep the talks going in a meaningful way. Secretary Baker strongly underscored these points. President Őzal engaged in a typical historical discourse, but expressed strong Turkish support for the dialogue. • The paper on Varosha which you sent to me could serve as the basis for a series of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). I suggest that you develop the ideas further and transmit individual proposals to the UN, keeping our Embassy informed. • Following our last conversation in December, I was surprised at the tone and content of your New Year’s message. Statements of this type, in our opinion, tend to reinforce the Turkish-Cypriot predisposition to view the present government of Cyprus as no improvement over past regimes. We know that this is not true, and therefore believe it is important, prior to the resumption of intercommunal negotiations, for you to clarify your vision of a future Cyprus in terms which will be meaningful and appealing to your Turkish-Cypriot countrymen. • As a suggestion, during your preparations for the New York meetings, it might be useful for you to determine which elements in the first two sections (‘Assumptions’ and ‘Principles’) of the UNSYG’s [UN Secretary-General’s] July 1989 paper you can accept; which parts could be elaborated to meet Mr Denktash’s need for more clarity on bizonality, equal political rights and a referendum on the (eventual) federation agreement; and which elements in the UNSYG’s draft need to be changed substantially to meet your requirements. I foresee that a fairly specific negotiating position will be needed if progress is to be made. Before the start of the talks we had two day-long sessions of the National Council, during which, after a thorough discussion, we decided on the policy that we would follow in New York. I invited the political leaders to accompany me and they accepted in spite of the objections voiced at first by Mr Kyprianou. Next day, on 19 February, I published in the International Herald Tribune an article which ended as follows: 96

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 97

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

The Cyprus problem is essentially one of the occupation of the sovereign territory of a state by the armed forces of another – in this case Turkey – which invaded and occupied over one-third of the Republic in 1974 using a coup staged by the Greek junta against the Cypriot government as a pretext. Turkish forces continue to hold that territory today, forcibly segregating the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities across a virtually impermeable military line which divides Cyprus in two. In High Level agreements signed in 1977 and 1979 between TurkishCypriot leader Raouf Denktash and Presidents Makarios and Kyprianou respectively, it was decided in principle that Cyprus should be reunited under a federal system of government. The relevant accords have remained a dead letter however. Although paying lip-service to United Nations efforts to bring about a negotiated federal settlement for Cyprus, the Turkish side has pursued a policy of trying to legitimize the status quo, claiming separate self-determination for the Turkish Cypriots. The United Nations Secretary-General has now called a new meeting between the two sides in New York to complete a draft framework plan for a federal Cyprus settlement. We will go to the meeting in good faith and with goodwill, and hope that Mr. Denktash will do the same. More than the future of the Cypriots will be at stake. What stands to be decided in Cyprus is whether states made up of more than one ethnic group can survive as unified entities within secure borders, or whether they must fragment, with each community claiming the right to secede on the grounds that this is the only way to safeguard its interests. The latter formula would spell the end of Europe and of the world as we know it – and that end would not come peacefully. The partition of Cyprus would set a precedent which the international community cannot afford. The high-level talks began in New York on 26 February 1990. The UN SecretaryGeneral made an inaugural announcement which, in general terms, laid as a basis for the start of the talks on substance the principles contained in the document that the Secretary-General had submitted to both sides in July 1989. The SecretaryGeneral clarified at the same time that the object of the meeting was the preparation of a draft outline of an agreement. He also asked both sides to avoid making statements in public during the talks, a request that Mr Denktash did not abide by. Right from the beginning it became obvious that Mr Denktash had no intention whatsoever of engaging in serious talks. In an outbreak of intransigence and revealing most clearly his aim, which was the perpetuation and legalisation of the divisive status quo, he presented as a condition for the continuation of the talks the recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot community as a ‘people’ with a separate ‘right to self-determination’. The Secretary-General responded immediately with his statement of 2 March, in which 97

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 98

From the President’s Office

he recognised the existence of an impasse created by the stance of Mr Denktash. After that, the Secretary-General declared that the talks had crumbled and held Mr Denktash responsible for undermining the very basis of the talks, which were the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, and the terms of reference given by the Security Council to him when he had appealed to the Security Council for guidance. At the press conference which followed I gave a short – but substantial – description of what had happened, which can be found in Appendix 5. Meanwhile, the Turkish-Cypriot opposition openly accused Mr Denktash for the break-up of the talks, while there was serious reaction in Turkey as well. The wellknown journalist Cengiz Candar, in an article in the newspaper Gunesh on 7 March, wrote: The meeting in New York did not benefit Turkey or Denktash, as the future holds nasty developments in store for us. Immediately before the luncheon with Denktash, the coordinator on the Cyprus issue in the American State Department Mr Nelson Letsky met once again with Denktash and gave some indications about what was going to happen: 1 The Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar in his report to the Security Council will put the blame on Denktash for the failure of the talks. 2 The Security Council will strengthen the hand of the Secretary-General and move beyond ‘the good services [sic] mission’ by recognising him as competent to submit proposals for a solution. What this means is that the trio USA/Soviets/British will take over and will submit their proposals with the signature of Pérez de Cuéllar. And these proposals will push the Turkish side and Turkey into a corner. The Turkish side believes that the world can be convinced by propaganda and that the status quo can be preserved. In the meantime ground is lost continuously. The initiative in the Cyprus problem now belongs to the Greek Cypriots and if Turkey finds itself suddenly in a dire position of weakness there is nothing that can possibly be done by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Candar ends his piece as follows: Not a step can be taken in today’s changing world if we live in the 1960s and if we are unable to keep what we have in hand... We must stop deluding ourselves and our circles. We must show and understand realities, however bitter these can be. Our policy on Cyprus must be revised from the bottom up. 98

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 99

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

Resolution 649 – Rejection of the Turkish conditions On 13 March the Security Council of the UN adopted Resolution 649 (1990) (Appendix 6) after a report by the Secretary-General concerning the course of the talks. The resolution reconfirmed the terms of reference of the Secretary-General including his right to submit proposals, a right that Mr Denktash had called into question; rejected the claims of the Turkish-Cypriot leader about separate ‘selfdetermination’; and adopted the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979 as a basis for a solution. The Cypriot government welcomed the resolution adopted by the Security Council. With reference to the shipwreck of the talks, the positions taken by the SecretaryGeneral and the resolution of the Security Council, Mr Clerides pointed out the following in a statement: We were expecting the shipwreck but we exposed the culprit. During the last two years before 1988 we followed the wrong policy. That is why we found ourselves isolated internationally. By our attitude we gave the impression of lacking sincerity... We had to go to New York because we were invited by the Secretary-General and we had to reveal the true face of Denktash, drag him out of his shell, which is what happened, so as to show with full clarity to world public opinion which side is the intransigent, the insincere one, which side does not want the Cyprus problem to be solved... I firmly believe that the positions of de Cuéllar and the resolution of the Security Council favour our positions on most points. There are one or two negative points but one could not expect the Secretary-General to issue proposals favouring entirely one side. In a statement that was published in the newspaper Agon on 16 March 1990, Mr Clerides, responding to the views of DHKO against the resolution, stressed: The recent resolution of the Security Council approved the position of the Secretary-General that the issue of a separate self-determination of the Turkish Cypriots that was raised by Mr Denktash, as well as the issue of the recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot state were outside his terms of reference, and that a solution of the Cypriot problem had to be sought within the frame of a Bi-zonal Federation which should exclude any form of partition or secession and that the Secretary-General can make suggestions to facilitate the talks, something that Mr Denktash rejected. The contention, therefore, that the positions of Ankara–Denktash gained ground and that the Security Council adopted parity on everything not only clashes with reality but creates the wrong impressions both about the Secretary-General and the Security Council. 99

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 100

From the President’s Office

After the failure of the efforts in New York because of the Turkish stance, there followed a series of statements of support from, among others, Mrs Lalumière, General Secretary of the European Council, the European parliament, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Congress and others. The British prime minister Mrs Thatcher sent a strong message to Mr Őzal. Meanwhile, Denktash and a large section of the Turkish and the Turkish-Cypriot media tried to justify the handling of the affair by Mr Denktash. To answer this propaganda I gave an interview on 18 March 1990 to the Turkish programme ‘Actualitè’ of RIK. Unfortunately, from our side, on the occasion of the 25 March celebrations of the anniversary of the day the Greek war of independence against the Ottoman Empire was launched in 1821, the opposition, with the leadership of the DHKO playing the main role, tried to inflame the situation. They wanted to organise a march of the young to the roadblock of Ledra Palace, but the police stopped them from doing so. The march took another course, while slogans of the type ‘No to the bi-zonal!’ were given prominence. Under a huge heading, the Greek newspaper Elephtherotypia wrote on 26 March 1990: The government stopped the schoolchildren from going ‘en masse’ to the roadblock. Vassiliou was booed. On the other hand the students gave a warm welcome to the former President of the Republic Mr Spyros Kyprianou and the Speaker of the parliament Mr Vassos Lyssaridis. On 20, 22 and 27 March, long sessions of the National Council took place to examine the situation as it was shaping after New York. Both Mr Kyprianou and Mr Papadopoulos used the opportunity to insist we should reject the de Cuéllar document. Responding to such positions, Mr Clerides said: After the discussions we had then, the President told both the SecretaryGeneral and the members of the Security Council that we accept the document as a basis for discussion. What is it exactly that you are suggesting now? To renege on our word and say that we do not accept it? This would surely be a very serious mistake. Mr Clerides judged superfluous a new debate on the document which had been thoroughly discussed and found by all to contain some negative points. During the session I briefed the body that we were preparing an application to join the EEC, a move that was approved by all with the exception of AKEL.14 At the beginning of April, the 83rd conference of the Inter-parliamentary Union convened in Cyprus. A great number of MPs came to Cyprus from almost every corner of the world. I made good use of the opportunity to present to them the Cyprus issue and to brief them on the latest developments in New York. 100

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 101

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

‘I did my best,’ I told the parliamentary delegations: I was polite, good natured, relaxed and cool but Mr Denktash becomes every time more and more intransigent. He does not want a solution and we all know that to find a solution both sides must want it. From now on it is up to international forces – and especially Europe – to help the solution of the Cyprus problem. Answering the question what we were doing through diplomatic channels, I said we try to convey to the outside world the message that the existing situation in Cyprus is not in anybody’s interest, not even Turkey’s. Turkey is spending millions every year to support the 35,000 troops she keeps in Cyprus while, politically speaking, she stumbles on the Cyprus problem that she finds blocking her way on many occasions. To the question about what we hope will happen in the near future, I answered referring to the recent talks in New York, which had never really started because of the negative and aggressive behaviour of Mr Denktash, which obliged the SecretaryGeneral to ask the Security Council to reconfirm its decision on the need to pursue the procedure to find a solution that will secure the sovereignty and the independence of a united Cyprus. I added: As far as we are concerned, we went to New York with all the goodwill in the world to find a solution. Unfortunately, however, Turkey had a different opinion. In spite of all the promises by America that she would use her influence to secure a successful outcome of the talks, they finally did nothing of the sort. The breakdown of the talks in New York created the need for a yet more intensive internationalisation of the Cyprus issue and for securing the greatest possible support from every direction. Thus, a few days after my return, I went to Yugoslavia, which was then presiding over the Non-Aligned Movement. I met there many chiefs of state and foreign ministers and briefed them directly about what had happened in New York. I was given many promises of support. At the end of April, I took part in New York in the special UN session on economic cooperation. In my address on 29 April 1990, I stressed: The political and economic future of Cyprus can be secured on a long-term basis only through a fair and viable solution of a problem created by the continuing occupation of more than one-third of our country by the Turkish troops. It is for this reason that our side does its utmost to assist the UN Secretary-General in his efforts to achieve the reunification of Cyprus under a federal system of governance. Unfortunately these efforts have so far stumbled on the intransigence of the Turkish side. In spite of 101

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 102

From the President’s Office

this we will persist in our policy, in the firm belief that both the security and the economic prosperity of all Cypriots can be safeguarded only through the reunification of Cyprus as a Federal Republic without foreign troops, unilateral rights of intervention, settlers and dividing lines imposed by violence. Such an arrangement would benefit specifically the Turkish Cypriots whose living standards in the occupied territories have fallen during the last 16 years well below that of their Greek-Cypriot compatriots. In New York, I had the opportunity to speak at an event organised by the Cypriot Federation of America and to exchange views with the ‘Committee of the Cyprus Struggle’ on the best possible organisation and planning of our compatriot’s efforts. We discussed with Mr Pérez de Cuéllar how to make the best possible use of Resolution 469. I also met Mr Letsky. In Chicago, during a great event organised by the President of the Greek-American Federation Andrew Athens, attended by Mr Bush’s Minister of National Defence, Mr Dervinsky, I stressed: We ask of President Bush to take another step forward beyond the declaration that the USA does not accept the status quo in Cyprus and to make clear which are the principles that must be implemented in the Cyprus issue. These principles are the withdrawal of the foreign troops, the ending of the separation of the two communities and the respect of human rights and freedoms. While the USA insisted emphatically on the withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan, Cambodia and Angola they have not done so in the case of Cyprus. If this happens it will mark the beginning of the end. Let us all join efforts so that this becomes a reality. From the USA I went to Canada, where I had important talks with the prime minister, Mr Mulroney, and spoke about the Cyprus issue to the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, which is perhaps the most important ‘think tank’ in Canada on international matters.

Submission of the membership application to the EEC On the whole, the behaviour of Mr Denktash after the submission of the Pérez de Cuéllar proposals in August 1989, as well as the failure of the New York talks at the beginning of the year, indicated that it would be a long time before negotiations could resume. In the meantime, as we could not afford simply to wait, we took the most important initiative to submit our application to join the EEC. I considered the moment opportune because the behaviour of Mr Denktash in New York made it possible to submit the application, as such a move could not possibly be considered to have negative consequences on the Cyprus issue.15 102

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 103

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

Immediately after the application was submitted on 4 July 1990, Turkey reacted much more strongly than expected. A great effort was undertaken by them to convince the world that our application had to be withdrawn or, short of that, rejected by the EEC. Mr Denktash wrote to the Secretary-General in the same spirit. In his statements to the Turkish-Cypriot newspaper Birlik, he said: ‘I will not sit next at the table with the person who did this. I will not allow any expert to sit either.’ Neither of Turkey’s aims found any support. This was mainly due to our policy on the Cyprus issue that had convinced the leaders of the community that Turkey had no reason to complain. Her main argument, that the dialogue would allegedly be broken off, had no basis since the dialogue had already been broken off – and with the full responsibility of the Turkish side to boot. On the contrary, if indeed they wanted to help the solution of the Cyprus problem, they should ensure the success of our application, thus helping Turkey realise that she would have to face the Cyprus issue within a fixed deadline. Italy, holding at the time the presidency of the EEC, and Germany played a major part in the whole project of pushing our application forward. My trip to Germany in July, as a guest of the Foreign Minister Mr Genscher, had given me the opportunity to explain to him our position in every detail. Mr Genscher took it upon himself to discuss the whole issue with the British, who were the only ones at that time to seek some kind of formula that would satisfy the Turks. The formula, as it was finally shaped, was not negative but, on the contrary, positive for us. Turkey considered that the formula was against her and insisted that the phrasing be changed. The most negative aspect of it, according to the Turks, was the fact that the Republic was recognised as representing the whole of Cyprus and all the Cypriots, and also the mention not only of Resolution 649 but all the UN resolutions. Unfortunately for them, they failed dismally because of the positive climate that we had created.

The UN efforts continue After a brief period of thought and recollection, the efforts of the UN started afresh. In June 1990 the representatives of the UN Secretary-General began having talks on the Cyprus issue in New York with representatives of the Turkish government. It was the first time that Turkey had to discuss directly the Cyprus issue with the UN. Almost at the same time, on 5 June, the Cyprus issue was discussed by the presidents of the USA, Mr Bush, and of the Soviet Union, Mr Gorbachev, at their summit meeting in Washington. Also in mid-June the Greek prime minister, Mr Mitsotakis, went to New York where he had long talks with the Secretary-General. According to a report sent to us by our ambassador, Mr Mavrommatis, on 12 June 1990: At the meeting, the Secretary-General referred to the responsibility of Denktash for the failure of last February’s meeting, condemned the 103

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 104

From the President’s Office

actions of Denktash as differing greatly from his own positions and the positions of the Security Council. However – and this is a most important part of the whole conversation – he referred to the Resolution 649 that recommends avoidance of any actions that can harm the dialogue. He went on mentioning the travels of president Vassiliou whose success, as proved by intensive Turkish protests and representations, have worried the Turks very much. It seems that the Secretary-General was not simply conveying the feelings of the Turks but was expressing his own innermost request that such visits be restricted, which is a worrying thing. Something very important raised by Prime Minister Mr Mitsotakis (we have the impression that he must have done so after consultation with President Vassiliou) is that it is not enough for the Turks to accept Resolution 649 and abandon completely the notion of separate selfdetermination but also that what is needed from them is a gesture of goodwill that will create the suitable climate for a successful outcome of the dialogue on Cyprus when it resumes. Such a gesture could be the immediate withdrawal of half of the Turkish troops from Cyprus, the return of Famagousta [sic] to the United Nations and the re-establishment of its inhabitants there. The Prime Minister made it clear that this would not be in exchange for anything within the framework of a solution but a gesture that would create a climate favouring a solution and that it did not alter in any way our position on the occupation issue. On 26 June the leaders of the member-states of the European Community meeting in Dublin expressed their deep anxiety about the situation in Cyprus, reaffirmed that the Cyprus problem affects the relations between Turkey and the EEC, and asked for all obstacles to the continuation of the intercommunal dialogue to be lifted according to Resolution 649. This declaration was of great importance for us as it showed the very positive climate reigning amongst the members of the EEC, a development most crucial as we were to submit a few days later our application for membership to the EEC. In Cyprus, however, certain circles reacted most negatively to the positions of the EEC. In his article in the newspaper Kirykas (1 July 1990), Mr Tassos Papadopoulos, as unbelievable as it may sound today, declared that the president neither commits nor expresses the people of his country. Because of its importance we quote here the article in full: We the Rejectionists do not welcome but on the contrary feel sad about the political declaration of the leaders of the EEC member-states on the Cyprus issue:

104

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 105

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

• because we consider that this declaration amounts in essence to a sellout of the property rights and the rights of return of the displaced persons who come from the occupied territories • because we Rejectionists do not accept that a ‘fair and viable solution of the Cyprus problem’ will be one which will not allow any displaced persons to return to their homes and properties thus obliging them to transfer ownership of their assets to Turkish Cypriots or settlers so that the Turkish community can acquire a majority in land ownership. We know that this ‘principle’ has already been accepted by President Vassiliou. We Rejectionists will fight against this principle that President Vassiliou has accepted ... if indeed he has done so. We will never accept it and we will reject it no matter what ... the price. Given that the decision by the leaders of the EEC member-states does not ensure the displaced persons’ rights to land ownership and property this decision neither impresses us nor does it commit us. Both President Vassiliou and the Greek prime minister Mr Mitsotakis would be well advised to take very seriously the political will of the persons displaced from the occupied territories and think again before accepting a ‘solution’ of the Cyprus problem suggested by the US President Mr Bush... Because, at the end of the day, it is true that those who disagree with the Bush plan amount to 50 per cent of the voters and the GreekCypriot population that resides in the half-occupied areas of Cyprus. Mr Mitsotakis you must listen and act accordingly: • Mr Vassiliou neither represents nor speaks on behalf of the totality of Cypriot Hellenism that was displaced as a result of the Turkish invasion. • Remember this Mr Mitsotakis. And act accordingly. (Kirykas, 1 July 1990) In the same spirit as the declaration of the 12 leaders of the EEC Member States came the six-monthly report of the Secretary-General, describing the developments that led to the shipwreck of the talks and holding Mr Denktash responsible for this in an indirect but clear way. The report mentioned the adoption of Resolution 649 as well as the Action Plan that provided for separate talks of the Secretary-General’s representatives with each side, in order to prepare for a high-level meeting. It was obvious that our efforts to ensure international support and increase the pressure on Turkey had brought results. It was generally accepted that Mr Denktash does not want a solution, that he wants to preserve the status quo and that he wilfully sabotaged the New York meeting. As the Turkish newspaper Gunesh put it: ‘One of the reasons for which the EEC accepted the resolution linking the Cyprus issue with the EEC is that it is by now convinced that Turkey does not want a solution.’ 105

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 106

From the President’s Office

Our position at that time was that the Secretary-General should not have called for a meeting which, without a change in Turkey’s position, was doomed to failure. In spite of this view of ours we would, of course, respond positively to the SecretaryGeneral if, after all, he did call a meeting, even though we would protest. If we did not do this, there was a danger we might lose all our gains until then, as we would not be able to convince foreigners about the reasons for our abstention. My view was that in order to keep international interest alive and in order to ensure that some kind of pressure would be exerted on Turkey, we had to be ‘in the good books of Europe and the Great Powers’ and consolidate their belief that we really wanted a solution. If the impression was given that we were unreasonable, that for some reason we were no longer keen to work towards a solution, then the result would be that they would shift their attention away from the Cyprus issue. It is thanks to this policy that we succeeded in obtaining the EEC declaration on the Cyprus issue. In the meetings I had with all the EEC countries, I tried to convince my interlocutors about the logic of our position and the unreasonableness of Turkey. That is how the Cyprus issue became an object of discussion among the superpowers after a huge campaign to explain its intricacies and promote its solution. It is well known that the Americans had changed their position during autumn and had said they were ready to examine the problem if it was raised by the Soviets, but otherwise they did not want to discuss it. During the last trip of Mr Letsky to Athens, it became clear that he was against discussing it, saying that they ‘had nothing in common with the Russians’. After this confirmation by Mr Letsky, I immediately sent a message to presidents Bush and Gorbachev (Appendix 7). In the end, we reached the point at which the two leaders not only discussed the issue but charged their foreign ministers, Messrs Baker and Shevardnadze, with the task of following the matter closely and pushing it forward. A passage from my interview with the Greek-Cypriot newspaper Proti (13 June 1990) makes this point.16 A crucial part of our argument was that the Cyprus issue does not concern only Cyprus but the world. Problems of nationalities exist everywhere. If, wherever there is such a problem, we allow states to split into statelets, Europe will become a jungle. This argument had an impact and it is characteristic that President Gorbachev in a letter to me admits that: ‘It is true that the problem of combating chauvinism and nationalism is the greatest problem that our countries have to face. What is needed is patience and persistence.’ It is in this spirit that, during my discussions with Mr Letsky, I underlined the danger that exists and the harm that will be done to the world if the nationalists gain the upper hand. I thus underlined the great importance that the issue of Cyprus has, and therefore the obligation of the Americans to help, because by doing so they are really helping humanity as a whole. To my great surprise Mr Letsky agreed with me and told me: ‘You are absolutely right, we can see this very clearly. The goal of American policy is to contribute in 106

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 107

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

combating the extreme nationalism and that is why we are interested in promoting a solution of the Cyprus problem.’ Discussing the matter further with Mr Letsky, he told me that during the discussions he had had in Ankara he found that Turkey is on the defensive and that there is indeed a great change of climate. According to his perception they try to launch a peace and friendship campaign, but this remains more verbal than substantial. Their efforts, he said, aim at gaining time and are not an indication that there is any change in their line. This was also the conclusion of the British prime minister after a meeting she had with Mr Őzal in April, during which the Turkish prime minister surprised her by saying: It is true that we are to blame for the failure in February and Denktash did make mistakes. You can’t of course compare Vassiliou, who is a future-oriented modern businessman, with Mr Denktash who is an old hat and looks to the past. Unfortunately, this is the situation. We also agreed with prime pinister Mr Mitsotakis that we ought to increase the pressure on Turkey through further internationalising the issue. Using all available means, the Cyprus problem had to be kept in the forefront internationally, but we should at the same time keep telling Turkey that we are ready for a solution and that the door is always open for one.

Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq: International attention focuses on the Gulf The mobilisation of the EEC and the UN for the resumption of the talks was interrupted because of the crisis created by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. When this happened I was on an official visit to China. I immediately cancelled my visit and returned to Cyprus to be present here during those crucial days. The attention of the world focused immediately on this new hot conflict. During the Gulf crisis the Cyprus government expressed its full support for the efforts of the allies to make the Iraqi troops withdraw from Kuwait and implemented fully the provisions of Resolution 661 of the Security Council, declaring an embargo on Iraq as well as all the other decisions of the UN. During this period we received information about a probable colonisation of Famagusta. We reacted immediately with démarches both in Cyprus and in the various capitals, which proved effective. On 19 June the President of the Security Council made a statement adopting the report by the Secretary-General and his Action Plan, calling upon the two sides to avoid any move that might worsen the situation.17 107

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 108

From the President’s Office

To shape this statement into its final form, a lot of work needed to be done both here in Cyprus and by our permanent representative in New York, Mr Andreas Mavrommatis. There was special mention in the statement, of paragraph 5 of Resolution 550 (1984), in which any attempt to colonise Famagusta was considered unacceptable. Moreover, both the USA and the UK made strong representations to Turkey to avert the colonisation of Famagusta. Around mid-July the Secretary-General’s report was submitted to the Security Council. At a meeting I had on Monday 16 July with Oscar Camilion, I told him that although the report by the Secretary-General tried to present the situation objectively as to what had happened in New York and the difficulties that had to be faced, the contents of paragraph 4 might be exploited by Denktash in a negative way: I feel obliged to protest formally because this part of the report was not written on the basis of what was understood during the meetings with Oscar Camilion and Gus Feissel. During those meetings I had pointed out that although we agree that the relations between the two communities are not subject to the majority-minority principle, the aim of this paragraph was to make clear to the other side that Cyprus is one state constituted by two communities. In the knowledge that Mr Denktash distorts facts and exploits positions such as those included in those paragraphs, the report ought to have included a paragraph in which the Secretary-General states clearly that political equality is not a numerical concept clarifying that the political equality of the communities should not be established at the expense of the political equality of citizens. Mr Camilion said that he took note of my statement which he would convey immediately to New York. He agreed with me that there is always the danger of Mr Denktash distorting facts – and that therefore he considered my comments useful. We then discussed the whole procedure of future talks and he confirmed once again that there was no intention of calling for talks right away. I further pointed out that at this stage it would serve no useful purpose for the Secretary-General to propose chapter headlines on the basis of which proximity talks would be launched. At this point, I said, what is of prime importance is to focus on the essentials which, in my view, start with a clear statement by Turkey and Mr Denktash that they have abandoned their goal of dismembering the Island. After that, and if the SecretaryGeneral obtains such assurances, the next step is to make clear whether they are in favour of a reasonable territorial compromise because this would provide a significant indication as to whether Turkey really wants to help find a solution. Mr Camilion replied that he agreed absolutely with me and that he did not want to be hemmed into any detailed discussion of various constitutions and other such aspects of the problem, but preferred to focus on the basic issues. 108

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 109

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

After the report was submitted, the whole issue was discussed by the Security Council in conjunction with the decision to renew the mandate of the peace force in Cyprus. There were positive points for us included in the declaration of the President of the Security Council – something that displeased the Turks, who insisted and exerted pressure for a change in the wording. The most negative points for them were the recognition of the Republic as representing the whole of Cyprus and all the Cypriots, as well as the reference not only to Resolution 649 but to all the resolutions of the UN.

Acceptance by the EEC of the accession application At the end of the day, all the fuss raised by Turkey – and her insistence that the application by Cyprus to join the EEC be either withdrawn or rejected – came to nothing. On 17 September 1990 our application was accepted for consideration by the Commission without any difficulty. We thus scored a first victory over Turkey. I must report here that the countries which helped us right from the beginning to the very end were Germany, France, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal. Denmark, Holland and Britain followed a more reserved policy. In the end they all agreed and we can say that this acceptance and the positive climate created with regard to our application exceeded all our expectations. Italy played a more diplomatic game. The Italian Foreign Minister Mr De Michelis tried to secure some concessions from Greece on the Yugoslav issue in order to be able to say that he had gained something in exchange for the help he had given us. The UN had accepted in principle our application, but their Secretary-General made, through his representative, that much-reported statement, obviously under pressure from Turkey and mainly in order to preserve his negotiating status with them.18 The Americans, even though they believed that the application should not have been submitted because this would annoy Turkey, nonetheless, never considered this a justification for Turkey to implement various faits accomplis – and even helped decisively to avert the threatened colonisation of Famagusta. I personally believe that, all in all, the stance we took versus the West when Iraq invaded Kuwait was taken into account seriously. Let me add that immediately following the invasion I had a telephone conversation with Mrs Thatcher and President Bush, assuring them both of the support of Cyprus and expressing our will to help in every possible way the implementation of the Security Council resolutions.

New visit to the USA In September, I went once again to the USA on the occasion of the 45th session of the General Assembly of the UN. In my speech I linked the invasion and occupation 109

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 110

From the President’s Office

of Kuwait with the situation prevailing in Cyprus and the need to implement all, without exception, the UN resolutions. During my stay in New York, I met various state leaders, the President of the Security Council and the UN Secretary-General, with whom we exchanged views on the continuing intransigence of Mr Denktash. I came back via London and again met Mrs Thatcher, whom I briefed on the situation as it was developing. The need to promote the Republic of Cyprus and strengthen its image was obvious. That is why we decided to celebrate on 1 October 1990 the 30th anniversary of the birth of the Republic of Cyprus and promote the need for negotiations to reunify the island. The celebrations were most successful. A number of political leaders from all over the world took part in them and thus contributed in further consolidating our identity as a state, and making more widely known the responsible and moderate way by which we tried to reach a solution. President Bush, in his bi-monthly report to Congress, quoted a passage of my speech to the Cypriot parliament on the occasion of the 30th anniversary presenting my views in full and me as a moderate and conciliatory person. Here is a passage of the Bush Report: The Secretary-General is concerned by the continued deterioration of the situation in Cyprus due to developments in past months and the lack of progress in the negotiating process. This trend must be reversed. He therefore hopes that it will be possible to implement his plan of action without delay. On September 25, during Turkish President Őzal’s meeting with me, we discussed ways of supporting the UN Secretary-General in his attempts to promote reconciliation on the island. Secretary of State Baker also had several such conversations with Greek Foreign Minster Samaras in the same period. On September 25, Under-Secretary of State Kimmitt met with Cypriot President Vassiliou in New York to stress continuing US support for UN sponsored efforts in Cyprus. President Vassiliou, in turn, recalled his speech earlier that day before the UNGA in which he insisted that ‘a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem necessitates that negotiations are entered into in good faith and are result-oriented. We have, time and time again, displayed our commitment as well as our goodwill during the course of negotiations. We have presented proposals to the Turkish-Cypriot side going far beyond the protection of cultural, religious and linguistic identity, aiming at creating a federation consisting of two regions, one to be administered by the Turkish-Cypriot community and the other by the Greek-Cypriot.’ President Vassiliou returned to Cyprus several days later and, in a speech before a special session of his House of Representatives marking the 110

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 111

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

island’s 30th anniversary of its independence, he included the following notable passage: ‘Naturally foremost in our hearts and our minds is the national problem which is directly connected with our survival and on whose solution much else depends. We carry 30 years of experience as well as many wounds from which all of us, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots should learn. Mistakes and omissions were made by both sides in the past. However, history and our present situation have convinced us that all these, as well as foreign interventions, do not serve the interest of any Cypriot. Our destiny was and remains common. Consequently, with goodwill, tolerance, mutual respect for our differences and views, we can find a solution acceptable to all. We can and we must pinpoint the points which unite us and serve us all and build on them. The future cannot be secured with separatist trends and sterile confrontation. Through contact and the exchange of views on all levels, a climate of mutual trust and understanding can be created, which will eliminate the mistrust created and maintained by isolation. That is why we work for rapprochement.’ Within Cyprus, however, we had to face all kinds of pressures. Archbishop Chrysostomos called on the refugees to create a separate political movement, while Messrs Kyprianou, Lyssaridis and Papadopoulos supported such moves and at the same time insisted on the need to lodge an appeal with the UN. I was totally against this view, which could possibly prove harmful and certainly never useful.19 The UN Secretary-General agreed absolutely with me, pointing out that at that moment the attention of the Security Council and the UN was focused on the Gulf crisis. In a discussion of the issue, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar asked me why we wanted to play Denktash’s game, giving him the pretext to escape all pressures put on him to make progress and why we should allow him to persist undisturbed in this position of his. Such views were expressed with great insistence by Mr Clerides too. Here is a passage from the Greek-Cypriot newspaper Agon of 20 October 1990: Speaking at a press conference (19 October 1990) during which he presented the third volume of his work ‘My Testimony’, Mr Clerides underlined that if we do not change mentality, if we do not recognise all the mistakes made in the past and absorb the lessons they hold for us, we will be led to partition. Mr Clerides also observed that Mr Vassiliou had managed to convince the international community about our own conciliatory stance and the intransigence of Turkey. During the press conference, Mr Clerides referred to Mr Vassiliou in the following terms:

111

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 112

From the President’s Office

Although he did not know the Cyprus issue in depth, he showed during his presidency that he possesses both good judgment and maturity. This is made obvious by the fact that he has grasped that the continuation of the present situation will lead to the perpetuation of the separation and in order to avert this he does all he can to get things moving. He has also understood that the right kind of internationalisation should not aim at the collection of resolutions but at influencing Turkey. Of some interest, in this instance, is the impression formed by the Secretariat of the UN. In a briefing he gave me after his return from Ankara at the beginning of November, Mr Camilion told me: ‘From the extensive discussions I had with Mr Yilmaz, I concluded that Turkey is mainly concerned about her security and will never tolerate a Cyprus strategically identified with Greece.’ Moreover, Camilion got the impression that the point on which Turkey wanted reassurance was that as a Federation we should not ever become able to change the situation in such a way as to take a stand against Turkey. In further discussions, Mr Yilmaz complained that I was more negative than Mr Kyprianou. When Mr Camilion prompted him to clarify what he meant by this he replied: ‘Vassiliou takes a different stand on aspects that Mr Kyprianou had accepted such as, for instance, the weighted vote in the Legislative Body.’ Camilion replied that: ‘The difference is that Vassiliou negotiates in all seriousness about the creation of a Federation while Mr Kyprianou never took this concept seriously and as he never planned to stay true to it had no reason to insist on details. You must see things in this way.’ At the beginning of November, I took part at the summit meeting of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Paris. In his speech to the Conference, the UN Secretary-General referred to Cyprus and called upon all the members of the CSCE to help in the solution of the problem. During my talks, on the margins of the Conference, with various leaders – and specifically with Mr Bush, Mr Mitterrand and Mr Gorbachev – I stressed that the impasse the dialogue on the Cyprus issue had reached in spite of our efforts to avert it was due to Turkey’s intransigence. I also pointed out the need for influence to be exerted on Turkey so that she could move from her positions and allow for a dialogue on substance to take place. My interlocutors recognised the need for progress on the Cyprus issue, but stated that at that time the Gulf crisis had priority. Upon my return to Cyprus on 30 November 1990, I sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General attaching texts from statements made by Mr Denktash and other members of the administration of the occupied territories, which showed clearly the great wave of intransigence they had created and their efforts to undermine the agreed basis of the talks by their insistence on positions favouring partition to the point of open provocation. In my letter, I informed the Secretary-General about these statements and asked him to exert his influence and make the necessary moves 112

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 113

Third Period: August 1989 to December 1990

for the decisions of the Security Council and for the agreed basis for the talks to be respected. I also stressed that the time had come for the Security Council to play a more active part in the Cyprus issue by promoting the decisions relative to it and by contributing more effectively to the efforts of the Secretary-General. On 5 December 1990, I visited Athens together with the Foreign Minister, the Defence Minister and the government spokesman. The purpose of this visit was for us to assess in common the international developments that had to do with the CSCE, what was happening in Eastern Europe, the Gulf crisis and the impact of all these developments on the Cyprus issue. There was discussion of the best ways to co-ordinate action on the international level aimed at bending the Turkish intransigence and make good use of every possibility on the international level, as well as in the field of bilateral relations. All this mobility and all these contacts may well have created a negative climate for Turkey, but did not, unfortunately, bring about the result we had hoped for. In his report to the Security Council (December 1990), the Secretary-General stressed: ‘the negative climate which I referred to in my previous report continues’. The international community, however, did not abandon the efforts for the talks to be resumed within the spirit of Resolution 649. In the review, in March 1991, of what had been achieved during 1990, I stressed: Three are the basic elements that emerge as far as the promotion of our positions is concerned: 1 The necessity for the Cyprus problem to be solved has been consolidated. 2 All, without any exception whatsoever, accept that the responsibility for the impasse lies with the Turkish side. 3 The international decision-making centres have been thoroughly informed and know in detail much better than before the various aspects of our problem. It is characteristic, from this point of view that during this period the President of the Republic met with all the leaders of the permanent members of the Security Council, essentially with leaders of all the European – and other – countries, while he gave more than 100 interviews to the foreign press and 33 press conferences as well as briefings to mass media on an international level.

113

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 114

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 115

chapter four

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991 Efforts to convene an international conference on the Cyprus issue and increase of the pressure on Turkey – Rejection of the Turkish terms and involvement of the Security Council – Resolution 750 The year 1991 was the last one of Mr Pérez de Cuéllar’s mandate. Unfortunately during all this time, up till the beginning of 1991, Mr Denktash was totally negative. The UN Secretary-General, in spite of the lack of progress, did not abandon the task and, during 1991, the last year in his post, he intensified his efforts. Because of the negative attitude of Mr Denktash, however, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar had reached the conclusion during the last two years that a basis for an agreement ought to be secured first through indirect talks with Turkey, and only then should an international conference be convened for the completion and the signing of an agreement. We agreed with this basic assessment and that is why we deemed necessary that pressure on Turkey should be increased. During my meeting with Mr Camilion at the beginning of February, I expressed my disappointment at the lack of progress on the Cyprus issue as a result of the continuing negative stance taken by Turkey: Turkish officials and Turkish-Cypriot leaders persist in making statements about a Confederation, about two peoples etc, something that proves the continuing intransigence of Turkey. On the basis of these facts I consider it inconceivable that the Secretary-General could even think of inviting us for a new round of intercommunal talks which would certainly fail since Ankara has not moved one inch from its positions. 115

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 116

From the President’s Office

While the government tried its best to create the conditions for a resumption of the dialogue, the DHKO/EDEK opposition, with its constant statements and various actions, made our task difficult. In an article in the newspaper Kirykas, Mr Tassos Papadopoulos (Democritos) considered as ‘national suicide the resumption of the dialogue and the implementation of the UN resolutions’.20 The victory of the allied forces in the Gulf War, with the liberation of Kuwait, allowed the UN and the international community to refocus their attention on the various pending issues and especially on the Cyprus problem. As a result of our policy, President Bush was attaching increasing importance to the need for progress on Cyprus. Speaking to journalists on 30 January 1991, after a meeting with the Greek Foreign Minister Mr Samaras, he stressed that he was keen to see the Cyprus problem being solved within the frame of the UN resolutions. A little later, presidents Bush and Mitterrand referred, in a common declaration, to the Cyprus problem and the need for it to be resolved. The US government also declared on many occasions that it considered the status quo in Cyprus as unacceptable and that it was willing to act as a catalyst to facilitate an arrangement through a negotiated settlement under the auspices of the UN. As every year, I went at the beginning of February to the Davos meeting, where I had a number of talks with state leaders, ministers and other personalities in the economic and political field. The most important, perhaps, was the meeting with the foreign ministers of Germany and Italy, Messrs Genscher and De Michelis, as I discussed with them the stagnation on the Cyprus issue on account of the negative stance by Turkey and Mr Denktash, as well as the application by Cyprus to become a member of the EEC. The study for the preparation of the Commission’s ‘Opinion’ on the issue had already started and the creation of a favourable climate was of prime importance. During that time the efforts of the UN were intensified, with Mr Feissel being sent once again on a mission to the area. At a meeting with him, Mr Feissel told me that he had already met four times the director of political affairs of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Mr Korkmaz Hactanir. The first such meeting took place in October in Cyprus, the second in December in New York, the third in January in Istanbul and the fourth in February in New York. As Mr Feissel said, only the two of them took part in all those meetings. Mr Hactanir declared himself ready to discuss all the issues, while Mr Feissel suggested that they discuss the basis of the June 1989 ideas. Mr Feissel let it be understood that Turkey’s policy had changed because, while Turkey in June was reluctant to discuss the basis of the Ideas, she was now ready to proceed, but warned that in case this was leaked from the UN then the Turks would deny it. Moreover, Mr Feissel said that Turkey was no longer pushing the issue of ‘self-determination’ and tried, generally speaking, to convey the impression that she was ready to get down to business, deal with all the issues and avoid generalities. He even said that the Turks would be ready to accept ‘a resolution of the Security Council that could clarify a number of issues such as, for instance, the exclusion of the self-determination of peoples’. He tried to convince me that Turkey wants really 116

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 117

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991

to show ‘flexibility’, but voiced the opinion that it was too early for us to say that progress was made. From our side we tried to make sure that the right messages would reach the Bush–Őzal meeting. To this end, Mr Iacovou saw Mr Baker and told him that the basic points that must be conveyed to Mr Őzal were the territorial question and the right of refugees to return to their homes. As I was informed by Mr Camilion, Mr Baker did indeed put these two points clearly and bluntly, insisting : There must be a change of policy on the territorial question and the refugees. The Cyprus problem must be solved. It was in the same spirit also that the British Foreign Secretary Mr Hurd spoke to the Turks. During the Őzal/Bush meeting at Camp David, President Bush presented this issue as a matter of principle even using the phrase: ‘America cannot help Turkey if Turkey does not change its line and does not solve the Cyprus problem.’ That is why you must solve it. Őzal’s reply was ‘of course we want to solve it’ and he went on talking about generalities. At one point Mr Őzal asked for a meeting to be held between Mr Denktash and the Americans. Mr Baker said: ‘A handshake with him does not bother me but I will tell him that I will never recognise him.’ In spite of all our protests and the intense efforts we made to have that meeting cancelled, Mr Baker replied that unfortunately he had given his word to Mr Őzal, that he had thus committed himself and was therefore unable to call the meeting off. He added, however, that this should not worry us because the aim of the meeting would be to put pressure on Mr Denktash to move towards a solution of the Cyprus problem and make concessions on the territorial issue and the refugees. He stressed also that they were going to make it quite clear to Denktash that they would not recognise him. To create the right impression they promised that the Foreign Ministry would issue a communiqué that the USA recognise only President Vassiliou as President of the Republic of Cyprus and that they wished to help in the search for a solution of the Cyprus problem. We were reliably informed that Mr Baker had sent a letter to Mr Őzal in which he stressed the necessity for a solution of the Cyprus problem to be reached; that the American government does not accept the Turkish proposals; that it would never recognise the ‘state’ of Mr Denktash; and that the Turks must make concessions on the territorial issue and the issue of the refugees. Characteristically, Mr Letsky, invoking a certain conjunction of circumstances, expressed the view that the Cyprus problem could be solved within 1991. These circumstances, according to Mr Letsky, were the following: • First, President Bush and the American government have decided to act as catalysts and work hard to support the efforts of the United Nations as they do not accept the status quo in the Cyprus issue. 117

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 118

From the President’s Office

• Second, the decisiveness displayed by the UN Secretary-General. • Third, the willingness of the government in Ankara to cooperate for the first time with the United Nations and Washington on a solution of the Cyprus problem. • Fourth, the personality of the Cypriot President Vassiliou that contributes to reaching a solution to the Cyprus problem. From the actions taken, one could conclude that the Americans really wanted to help solve the Cyprus problem. I tried, personally, to convince them that in comparison with the Iraqi or the Palestinian one, this was, perhaps, the only problem on which they could make progress. Moreover, it had become apparent that Mr Őzal wanted to move towards a solution or, at least, to appear to be moving in such a direction, by submitting proposals that the Americans would consider reasonable – and if we rejected them then the blame would be on us and the matter could be considered closed for Ankara. Turkey made various moves, as was apparent from the Feissel–Hactanir discussions in Ankara that displeased Mr Denktash. The Soviet ambassador, Mr Boris Zenkov, told me at a meeting we had on 20 February that, at a lunch that Mr Denktash had invited him to, the Turkish-Cypriot leader was accompanied, quite unexpectedly, by the Turkish ‘ambassador’ Mr Atakol. The Soviet ambassador said that to his great astonishment he observed that, while relations between Mr Denktash and the Turkish ‘ambassador’ had been good before, there was now tension between the two as Mr Denktash even went so far as to criticise the policy of Mr Őzal. I stressed to Zenkov: The aim of Denktash is to reverse the negative image that was created in New York but without making any concession on substance. He also wants the contacts between Turkey and the UN General Secretariat to fail so that he can escape from any new initiative to be taken. At the same time, however, he wants to create favourable impressions, hence his proposals about messages and meetings. His efforts to muddy the waters and damage the efforts of the Secretary-General are obvious. My goal is not to jeopardise the procedure. I would not accept to meet Denktash outside this procedure and simply discuss with him for five or six months until such time as the procedure promoted by the SecretaryGeneral is de-activated. The reason is that if we abandon this procedure it will be very difficult to set it up again. What must be done is to help the Secretary-General pursue his efforts because the solution lies with Turkey. I believe the game must be played by the Secretary-General and the contacts that the Secretariat will have with Turkey. If there is no progress, the Secretary-General must report this to the Security Council quoting at the same time the three or four things that impeded progress. In this way, 118

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 119

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991

and if these points are made clear, there will be a basis from which to exert pressure on Turkey. Of some interest in this regard is the report from the Washington Post of the wellknown Turkish journalist Uluk Guldemis.21

The Secretary-General submits his report By mid-March we were informed that the Secretary-General was planning to submit his report to the Security Council. Immediately, Mr Iacovou and I tried hard to avert this from happening, judging that at this stage the submission of a written report would be premature and harmful. As a first step I spoke with all the members of the Security Council and with the Secretary-General himself, who told me, word for word, the following: ‘My dear friend, you are preaching to the converted. I agree there should not be a written report and that is why I decided to make a concise oral report in camera.’ Finally, the Secretary-General submitted orally, on 27 March, a brief report which, unfortunately, was not what we had expected. In his presentation, the Secretary-General mentioned the contacts that the director and responsible for the Cyprus issue in his office had with a high official of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. He clarified the basis of his mandate to offer his good services, as well as elements of the procedure for which the interested parties had renewed their support, but whose usefulness had been undermined by the way that some of them had been interpreted. The goal of the Secretary-General, according to his statement, was for the two sides to come, through this procedure, within range of an agreement on all the issues that make up the Cyprus problem so that an outline of a settlement could emerge within the next few months. I sent immediately the Secretary-General a letter of protest for the content of the report and we launched serious efforts to correct the situation through a statement by the President of the Security Council. The Draft Statement mentioned that ‘the members of the Council reaffirm the Security Council Resolution 649 of 12 March. This resolution will continue to constitute the basis for an effort of the SecretaryGeneral to reach an agreed outline.’ This statement was unacceptable to us because it meant that all the previous resolutions were being ignored. After hard work, with the help of the Secretariat and the British, the paragraph in question of the statement by the President of the Security Council was changed to the following: The members of the Council reaffirm Resolution 649 (1990) and the mandate for the Secretary-General’s mission of good offices, as set out in Resolution 367 (1975); and recall that Resolution 649 (1990) reaffirmed 119

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 120

From the President’s Office

in particular Security Council Resolution 367 (1975) as well as the Council’s support for the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the leaders of the two communities. This should continue to serve as the basis for the Secretary-General’s effort to arrive at an agreed outline. (Statement by the President of the Security Council, 28 March 1991) The response of DHKO to the report of the Secretary-General was beside the point and provocative. The Central Committee of DHKO, in its decision taken at its extraordinary session and published in the newspaper Kirykas of 6 April, contained, among others, the following: The latest de Cuéllar report and the unanimous statement by the Security Council mark a crucial turn of the Cyprus problem towards a catastrophic solution. If these documents are not immediately denounced internationally as well as by the government of the Republic of Cyprus, this alone will have irreparably adverse consequences on the further course of the Cyprus issue. Immediately after the oral statement by the Secretary-General, I contacted by phone all the political leaders. I told Mr Kyprianou that to convene right away the National Council, as he had asked, would serve no useful purpose. All the other political party leaders agreed with this view. The extreme positions of DHKO were given an answer by a statement issued by DISY on 16 April, warning that the times were unpropitious either for political demagogy or negative approaches. DISY also drew the attention of the people on the terrible damage that would befall the Cyprus issue if the suggestion made by DHKO were adopted by the Greek side – adding: If, however, the thesis that the resolutions of the Security Council are binding for everybody is correct – and it is correct – and if Mr Kyprianou disagrees, he should say so publicly. How does the leadership of DHKO dare suggest that Cyprus should not be bound by Resolution 649? And if Cyprus has the right to proclaim that she is not bound by 649 then what is it that will stop the invader, Turkey, to say that she too is not bound by Resolutions 367 or 365 or 3,212? Addressing Mr Kyprianou personally, the statement then stresses the following: It is really worrying that a man who governed this country for 11 long years suggests a tactic which, if accepted, will blow to pieces the very foundation of the charges against Turkey namely that the latter, contravening the UN Charter, refuses to implement the resolutions of the Security Council. 120

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 121

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 The sloganeering approach to the Cyprus issue, the distrust towards the 8 United Nations and the rejection of the option to solve the problem through 9 the procedure included in the initiative of the UN Secretary-General, 10 without, at the same time, proposing a different path that might give us a 11 chance to reach a fair solution, were characteristic of all the arguments used 12 by the President and the Vice-President of DHKO Messrs Kyprianou and 13 Galanos as well as by the press secretary of the party, Mr Ch. Kyriakidis at 14 yesterday’s press conference. While on internal political matters the answers 15 given displayed a sterile opposition stance and a prejudice against every move 16 by the President of the Republic Mr Vassiliou, on the Cyprus issue Mr 17 Kyprianou, although invoking the unanimous decisions of the National 18 Council, criticised the handling of the issue by the President of the Republic 19 disregarding the fact that this was based on these decisions. 20 He criticised strongly the UN Secretary-General Mr Pérez de Cuéllar and 21 more specifically the initiative taken by Mr de Cuéllar within the frame of 22 the UN resolutions. He said he was not against dialogue as long as there is 23 change in the Turkish position so that a dialogue on substance can be held. 24 How, though, is this to be achieved? To this question Mr Kyprianou 25 has nothing to add beyond what the government, based on the decisions 26 of the National Council, is already doing – promoting the 27 internationalisation of the issue and more specifically calling for an 28 International Conference on the Cyprus issue to be held – in cooperation 29 with the political leaders of our country and the Greek government. 30 Mr Kyprianou asked for a new policy line to be drawn with regard to 31 the Greek government adding that the policy of his party is based on 32 Europe. However, when a journalist pointed out that the EEC initiative 33 supports that of the UN Secretary-General, the President of DHKO had 34 nothing to reply and simply added that one EEC foreign minister whom 35 he did not name, had told the UN Secretary-General not to move too far 36 ahead with his initiative. 37 I too answered these positions with various speeches and interviews, such as the one 38 I gave to the distinguished Greek journalist Yannis Kartalis, published in the Vima 39 newspaper on 31 March 1991, and also a fairly long one I gave later on Greek TV. 40 Mr Kyprianou and the leadership of DHKO launched an unprecedented attack against the effort to reach an agreed solution through the UN procedure. The aim

DISY ends by stressing that this is no time for politics of irresponsibility, but for focusing with all our forces on the task of reversing the de facto situation that the invasion has created. The position of AKEL was expressed through its newspaper Haravgi on 13 March 1991:

121

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 122

From the President’s Office

of this fanatical attack against Resolution 649 and the efforts of the SecretaryGeneral was, essentially, to keep in place the status quo instead of a solution involving the creation of a Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation. Indicative in this respect is the speech delivered by Mr Kyprianou to a meeting of DHKO officials that was published in the newspaper Simerini on 26 April 1991: President Kyprianou referred also to the recent statement made on Greek Television by President Vassiliou in which he said that the greatest defeat is to preserve the status quo – and having said that the status quo is indeed very bad, he underlined the following: ‘It is very bad if things remain as they are. But things could get worse. If we get rid of the present situation and accept a solution of the Cyprus problem along the lines specified in the de Cuéllar proposals we will have accepted and signed a worse settlement which will hold for ever and which we will not be able to improve on. Such a development will certainly be worse and much more dangerous than the status quo.’ Dr Lyssaridis also declared his opposition to the efforts of the UN Secretary-General. In an interview with Simerini on 17 May 1991, he said: I am no longer in favour of the talks and have said so in no uncertain terms. We fight these elections under the opposite slogan: namely that here we have two options. We will either go back to a doomed procedure of intercommunal dialogue in the full knowledge that this is not going to lead us anywhere and will only offer Turkey an alibi or we will point out, at long last, that this procedure that has been tried for 17 long years has failed and that we will therefore ask for a new procedure. That is of course why we went to New York last time. A new procedure means the implementation of the UN Resolutions. Now we are told that this means either war or dialogue. Such a contention is utterly unreal. Because what we are saying is let us have dialogue. We say yes to a dialogue with Turkey. Turkey is the opposite side. We are in favour of a dialogue with that country which is in a position to solve the Cyprus problem. In spite of such fanatical opposition we pursued without fail the struggle to search for a solution, fortunately with the full support of the Greek governments alternating in power.

International mobilisation strengthened By the end of May 1991, I visited the USA to meet the leadership of the country as well as Mr Pérez de Cuéllar. I took part in a luncheon given by the Senate Foreign 122

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 123

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991

Relations Committee and also met the leader of the Republicans in the Senate, Mr 1 2 Dowl. Welcoming me in the House of Representatives, Mr Feighan said: 3 4 But today we have with us one person who – more than any other – has 5 given us cause for optimism. President Vassiliou has dedicated himself to 6 finding a solution that addresses the problems of all Cypriots – the Greeks 7 and the Turks. Around the world, intractable regional conflicts remain 8 intractable when leaders are unwilling or unable to take risks for peace. 9 President Vassiliou has shown that he is willing and determined to take 10 the steps necessary to reach out to the other side. He remains committed 11 to a peaceful settlement that guarantees a unified, federal republic, with 12 respect for the human rights of all the Cypriot people. 13 My meeting with US President Bush was scheduled for 30 May. Speaking to 14 journalists before the meeting, President Bush thanked the Cypriot people for their 15 support in the operation of removing Iraq from Kuwait and stressed his special 16 interest in the Cyprus problem, which, he said, was a matter of priority for the USA. 17 As I said after the meeting with President Bush, we discussed various elements of 18 a solution. I explained to the American President the need for progress on two basic 19 aspects: the territorial and the problem of the displaced persons. I also pointed out 20 that a federal Cyprus must be a country where all the Cypriots will be free to enjoy 21 their human rights, free to move about and settle wherever they wish. In 22 Washington, I also had a separate meeting with the US Secretary of State Mr James 23 24 Baker. Speaking to the press after our meeting, Mr Baker said: 25 26 Let me simply say how pleased I am to have the opportunity to visit today 27 with the President and the Foreign Minister. I would agree that we’ve had 28 very full, complete and, hopefully, very useful discussion of this very 29 difficult question of Cyprus. We support and continue to support the 30 efforts and activities of the United Nations Secretary-General in an effort 31 to find a solution to this issue and will continue to work to that end. 32 I took advantage of my visit to Washington and spoke to the National Press Club. 33 Answering a question about the role that the UN could play in solving the Cyprus 34 35 problem, I said that the UN represents the collective will of humanity: 36 37 We cannot criticise the United Nations and at the same time praise our 38 own governments. The United Nations can be as effective as the 39 governments of this world can make it and particularly as the permanent 40 members of the Security Council can make it. But what is more important, I think, is that with the end of the Cold War we have seen that the United Nations is taking a completely new role. There is more 123

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 124

From the President’s Office

cooperation between the superpowers. And there is obviously an appreciation by everybody that the United Nations is the best vehicle to use in order to address various problems. Thus the Gulf crisis has helped to highlight the significance of the United Nations and the importance of its resolutions. The whole world was ready to go to war and be mobilised to implement the UN resolutions. When Iraq came up with its proposal to accept the first UN resolution, President Bush stressed that accepting one resolution is not enough and that Iraq must accept all the resolutions of the United Nations. There are numerous UN resolutions on Cyprus as well but to be able to implement them. As I said, the collective will of its members is needed, and although we have not been able to make progress until now it would be a mistake to give up hope. We have to keep trying and keep believing that in the end we will succeed. June 1991 was a month of substantial developments. The internationalisation as well as the active interest of the USA and President Bush seemed to start having an effect. American pressure became obvious as the New York Times and the Washington Post insisted in their coverage of the issue that Ankara should make concessions so that the island could be reunified. At the beginning of June the Greek prime minister, Mr Constantine Mitsotakis, came to Cyprus on an official visit, accompanied by the foreign minister, Mr Samaras. The visit took place at a time of great mobility over the Cyprus problem and we were thus given an opportunity to discuss the national issue in depth during an extraordinary session of the National Council. This was the only time in the history of the Cyprus Republic that such a session took place in the presence of a Greek prime minister. The introductory speech that I made to the Common Session of the National Council can be found in Appendix 8. During the discussion, there was full unanimity. After the departure of Prime Minister Mitsotakis, I had a phone conversation with the UN Secretary-General and explained to him the decisions of the National Council, specifying the rationale behind the proposal to hold an international multilateral conference on the Cyprus problem. Mr Pérez de Cuéllar was also briefed on the proposal for a multilateral conference by his special representative in Cyprus, Mr Oscar Camilion, whom I had met. To help promote our proposal I wrote to the Secretary-General. Sometime later, the President of the Security Council, in a statement issued on 28 June 1991, gave further support to our proposals, mentioning the following: The members of the Security Council have considered the SecretaryGeneral’s report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus. They are unanimous in reiterating their full support of his current efforts. The members of the Council recall that they had urged all concerned to cooperate with the Secretary-General and to continue the discussions with 124

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 125

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991

a view to resolving without delay the outstanding issues. They regret that, despite the Secretary-General’s effort, the necessary progress has not yet been made on these outstanding issues. The members of the Council endorse the Secretary-General’s view that a high-level international meeting, if properly prepared and of adequate duration, could give his effort the necessary impetus and achieve an agreed outline of an overall settlement. They agree with the Secretary-General’s judgement that before such a meeting could be held the two sides should be within agreement range on all the issues. They urgently appeal to all concerned to spare no efforts to achieve this goal. The members of the Council further endorse the Secretary-General’s intention to have his aids meet with all concerned during the months of July and August to try to work out a set of ideas that would bring the two sides within agreement range on each of the eight headings of the outline. The members of the Council request the Secretary-General to pursue these consultations urgently and to assist this process by making suggestions. The members of the Council request the Secretary-General to provide a full report to the Council by the end of August on the substance of the ideas that were discussed and the responses of all concerned, and to provide his assessment of the situation, particularly with regard to whether the conditions are conducive to a successful outcome of a high-level international meeting. On 27 June, Mr Camilion handed me a statement by the Secretary-General (Appendix 9) in which the latter stated that he wished to make the best possible use of the time interval until the 30 August, when he was due to submit his next report to the Security Council. To this purpose, he proposed a series of meetings during July by his special representative in Cyprus, Mr Camilion, and the high official of the UN Secretariat Mr Feissel, and as long as the results of these meetings appeared to be encouraging, these could continue into August. In his letter, the Secretary-General also underlined that, before moving towards a conference on the Cyprus problem, it was important to prepare the ground in such a way so as to give a chance for such a conference to be successful. The reply of the Cypriot government to the letter of the Secretary-General was positive. I underlined, though, in my statement after the session of the National Council, that progress now depended entirely on the Turkish side, which up till then confined itself to oral declarations by Őzal about his wish for a solution, but produced nothing concrete that could convince someone that he really meant it. Both the UN and the USA intensified their activity. It was thus that on 6 July the UN Secretary-General paid an official visit to Ankara where he met the Turkish President Mr Őzal, with whom he raised the Cyprus problem and the need for progress to be made in resolving it. On 18 July the US President visited Greece and Turkey, with the Cyprus problem amongst the basic issues on the agenda. 125

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 126

From the President’s Office

Before leaving Washington, he answered questions put to him at the press conference he gave at the White House: Mr President, my questions will kind of follow up my Greek colleague’s question with a Cyprus angle now there are hopeful signs for a settlement on the issue. Do you think your visit to the region will help speed up this process? Do you expect an agreement soon, and what do you think the obstacles are? [President Bush:] One, I’ve been told there are hopeful signs. Two, our position is well known and that is continuing to support the initiative of the Secretary-General. And we don’t go there with some bold new plan that we would throw before Mr Mitsotakis, Mr Őzal or Mr Vassiliou. We aren’t going there in that mode. But if in the talks we have, the US again can have a catalyst role in this age-old question, so much the better. Again, I don’t want to raise expectations – Bush is coming to solve the Cyprus question. That would be unfair to the people on the Island; it would be unfair to Greek interest and Turkish interest. But I keep coming back to this: There are two reasonable, strong-willed leaders. They have a reasonable relationship. This thing’s gone on too long. And you’ve got a man in Cyprus, President Vassiliou who’s extraordinary in my view. And let’s hope we can be helpful. Moreover, in an interview he gave on Greek Television, Mr Bush said that a solution of the Cyprus problem was in the interest of the USA. He said: We support whole-heartedly the initiative of the Secretary-General. In my opinion there is no other way. It is important for us to support the Secretary-General in his efforts to implement the UN resolutions. I do not think that the USA can move a magic wand and solve the Cyprus problem although we have tried this in the past with the help of able ambassadors, and at this moment we do have a most able Special Ambassador. Nonetheless we do support the United Nations and their Secretary-General. In spite of all this one could say that America finds itself in a unique position. We have a friendly relationship with Turkey. We have a long-standing relationship with Greece. So these countries count on us, as a power that is geographically at a distance but which is interested in peace in the area, to do something more. I am totally prepared to do something more, if I can understand exactly what I can do. In the meantime we will continue to support the SecretaryGeneral. I have discussed this issue in depth with president Őzal of Turkey. A little while ago we had here the president of Cyprus Mr Vassiliou. I also had the opportunity to discuss matters with Mr 126

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 127

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991

Mitsotakis in the past. If I see a role for the USA to do something more or to fulfil the aims of the Secretary-General then we want to do this. In the meantime we will continue to support his initiative. And he added: I cannot tell you what we will propose but I can tell you that it is definitely in the interests of our country that this problem be solved and that we should put to good use, in the context of the UN, our role as a permanent member of the Security Council in order to facilitate what it is we want to end up with. But I do not want to prejudge. President Bush insisted on the necessity to push for a solution and told the Turks that progress should be made on the territorial issue and that of the displaced persons so that an international conference could be convened. In Athens, the US President called the status quo in Cyprus unacceptable. In a phone conversation I had with the Secretary-General he told me that the talks had been intensified and that he tried to obtain clarification on various remaining issues. On 2 August, President Bush declared that the leaders of Greece and Turkey had agreed to take part in a conference on the Cyprus problem, which would take place as long as there was progress on all the basic issues that constituted this problem. This statement was made after a meeting that Mr Letsky, the American coordinator on the Cyprus problem, had with the Turkish foreign minister, Mr Safa Giray, in Ankara on 1 August. The statement by Mr Bush was handed to me by the US ambassador, Mr Lamb, who visited me in my office. Mr Bush said in no uncertain terms: This meeting will be well prepared and both convened and chaired by the United Nations Secretary-General under his Security Council mandate. Greek and Turkish leaders will work in support of the Secretary-General’s efforts in advance of the meeting planned for September in the United States, provided that adequate progress is made in narrowing differences before then. On 7 August the Soviet Union expressed its support for calling an international conference on the Cyprus issue and sent Mr Fokin to Cyprus. It appears that President Bush was encouraged by the Turkish response when he put it to President Őzal that the partitioning status quo in Cyprus was unacceptable and that a solution of the problem was necessary. At that time President Bush laid special emphasis on two issues: the territorial one, mentioning the Gobbi line as a reasonable, possible settlement of the issue; as well as securing the right of return for the displaced persons (Mr Hugo Gobbi was the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Mr Kurt Waldheim, resident in Cyprus. According to a report in Haravgi on 7 August 127

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 128

From the President’s Office

1991, Ankara had given clear assurances to the American coordinator Mr Letsky of having moved from the positions it had held until then on these issues, especially on the territorial one. There was even mention that the basis on the territorial issue could be the previous ‘Gobbi map’. There was still a large gap, though, concerning the displaced persons, the constitutional issue and the one concerning the number of refugees that would return to live under a Turkish-Cypriot administration. Mr Letsky met me as well as the other political leaders. After his meeting with the General Secretary of AKEL, Mr Christofias made the following statement: AKEL waits calmly, and with interest the second round of consultations by the representatives of the UN Secretary-General so that we can, taking into account the principles decided together in the National Council and fully aware of our responsibilities, assess whether the expected progress has indeed taken place or not. I would like to add on this occasion that the voices heard denigrating the Federation as a possible solution of the Cyprus problem are not serving our national interest. The announcement that an international conference on the Cyprus problem might in all probability be called created a feeling of euphoria internationally. In Cyprus, however, we had a new outbreak of protests by those who were essentially opposed to the compromises contained in the high-level agreements. They got worried that the announcement about an international conference meant such a conference was imminent and so they objected fiercely and intensified their attacks against the negotiations. The ‘no-solution’ theoretician, former Greek ambassador to Cyprus, Michael Dountas, hastened to publish on 10 August an article in the Greek newspaper Nea, in which he stressed: It is now crystal clear that a ‘solution’ of the Cyprus problem is being promoted at the fastest possible pace. In view of this reality two schools of thought have been developed: the ‘militant’ and the ‘realistic’. The militant view can be summarised as follows: Under the existing imbalance in military and diplomatic strength between Greece and Turkey it is utopian for anyone to expect that Ankara would ever agree to make concessions to the Greeks. In Cyprus, Turkey achieved its major geo-strategic goal. It will not abandon it unless we could oppose it by using force. Instead of cultivating fantasies and making constant concessions to Turkey we should, to begin with, adopt a conservative policy of no more concessions and strengthening every possible foothold of resistance. There is much that could be done in this field. What is both important and urgent, though, is to break out of the constraining procedures now being developed, so that the foundations for both an immediate and a more remote policy of salvation can be laid in a clear-headed way. 128

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 129

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991

The ‘realistic’ position, on the other hand, is in favour of a quick, however bad, solution because according to the dictums of Messrs Vassiliou and Mitsotakis the prolongation of the present situation with the issue pending is worse than even a bad solution... The fate of Cyprus will be judged this August. Naturally, Mr Dountas bases all the foregoing views on his own groundless hypotheses as to what might be the constitutive elements of a solution. Archbishop Chrysostomos added his voice to the well-known positions of Messrs Kyprianou, Papadopoulos and Lyssaridis. In an exclusive interview the Archbishop attacked violently both me and the president of DISY Mr Clerides, maintaining that we were distorting the positions of Makarios at the high-level agreement. He alleged that the term ‘bi-zonal’ was invented by Mr Clerides and that Makarios had not accepted the Bi-zonal Federation. Mr Clerides replied immediately to the statement by the Archbishop. Here is the statement by Mr Clerides as it was published in the newspaper Alitheia (Truth) on 26 August 1991: It is doubly sad for a man of the cloth who persists in getting involved in politics, to ignore basic agreements on the Cyprus issue made by his predecessor and, in addition, to use unacceptable smear-words against those who enlighten the people correctly and do not mislead them. I will further present – Mr Clerides continues – the minutes of the session of the National Council of 9 March 1977 chaired by Makarios himself after he had agreed with Denktash on the guiding lines concerning the solution of the Cyprus problem, including his recommendation that we should submit proposals with a map, based on the Bi-zonal Federation. Tassos Papadopoulos and Ezekias Papaioannou kept the minutes which, once read, were signed while each single page was initialled. These minutes read as follows: A ‘multi-zonal solution’ is not less dangerous than a bi-zonal one, in leading possibly to partition. The reason is that as the Turkish-Cypriot side demands (and as we have by our proposals of 1976 accepted) that there will be a single, unified and quite large zone in the north, the multi-zonal solution that has been proposed is essentially very similar, to a large extent, to a ‘bi-zonal one’. Essentially, what happens here is that a number of cantons not exceeding 3 per cent are simply added to the South which means that some Greek villages that are today free will be included in these cantons. On the other hand such cantons are today being presented as a kind of ghetto which creates a bad impression. It is of course understood that both in the case of a ‘multizonal’ as well as in the case of a ‘bi-zonal’ solution the aforementioned 129

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 130

From the President’s Office

basic principles must be respected absolutely. During my talks with Mr Denktash we agreed that the practical difficulties for the TurkishCypriot side caused by the implementation of these basic principles will be further discussed. I don’t think that there will be serious practical difficulties because I do not believe that there will be any large number of Greek Cypriots who will wish to return to their homes under Turkish-Cypriot administration. The reason is that they would feel insecure either because of actions taken by irresponsible Turkish-Cypriot citizens or because of the policies of the Turkish-Cypriot administration. The Greek-Cypriot displaced persons must by all means have the right to choose either to return or to be compensated if they choose not to exercise their right of return. In this sense I am no longer in favour of the ‘multi-zonal’ solution but in favour of the ‘bi-zonal’ one. As far as the powers of the central government are concerned, in my opinion these powers will be satisfactory if the unity of the state is ensured – and I avoid using the terms ‘strong or weak central government’. I know that any compromise contains elements of unpopularity and I am certain that a solution within the aforementioned frame will be unpopular. We must, however, examine the issue with a sense of responsibility and not by using popularity as the criterion. I am not optimistic that there will be rapid movement towards a solution. On the other hand, in case the Turkish-Cypriot side moves to declare its independence as a state I do not wish to give cause for being accused that this was due to the bad handling of the issue on our side. There is of course a way to avoid taking painful decisions and escape unfavourable reactions by not taking up any position or decision and just play the waiting game. At some point though, we will be obliged to assume our responsibilities and that is why I propose that we take decisions and shape events now rather than wait passively for events to develop. It is thus that a number of questions do emerge on which I wish to have your contribution. I therefore ask you to dwell on the following: • Is a multi-zonal solution any longer either achievable or desirable or should, the ‘bi-zonal’ solution be deemed preferable under the circumstances? • If the answer is yes to the ‘bi-zonal’, where should the area under Turkish-Cypriot administration be located and could we possibly submit a map designating this area? Under the circumstances I prefer the ‘bi-zonal’ solution and recommend the submission of a map on behalf of the Greek-Cypriot side. 130

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 131

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991

I believe that having read the above excerpt from the minutes of the National Council, the Archbishop who wants to present himself as the uncompromising defender of the truth must publicly retract his statement that qualified as utterly false the fact that Makarios had accepted the bi-zonal federation. The reactions by DHKO–EDEK–Papadopoulos and the Archbishop certainly did create confusion within the country and encouraged Denktash to persist in his negative stance, but the government was obliged to intensify its efforts. At a rally that was organised in Deryneia on the 17th anniversary of the seizure of the town of Famagusta, I expressed my satisfaction of the international interest generated by the proposal of President Bush for holding an international conference and by the visit of Soviet officials during that week. I mentioned the concerns expressed by some people about the mobility observed on the issue, as well as on the fears that potential pressures might be exerted on us, and added: The greatest pressure we are experiencing is when there is no movement, when the status quo continues; when we see Famagusta from afar; when the drama of the refugees, the trapped persons and the relatives of the missing persons continues; when the Turkish soldiers and settlers stay where they are; when the insecurity about the future persists; and when the faits accomplis become entrenched. There is one and only one solution that Archbishop Makarios fixed at the high-level agreements and it concerns the creation of a federation of two constituent parts. I also stressed that whoever tries to undermine the high-level agreements or promote the concept of ‘no solution’ puts the future of this people into deadly jeopardy, no matter how good his intentions may be. The reason is that the only thing that such a policy can achieve is to stabilise partition and perpetuate the occupation and the uncertainty about tomorrow. At the session of the National Council of 29 August, I gave a full briefing of the developments until that time. Here is an excerpt from the minutes: President Vassiliou briefed the members of the National Council on his meeting with Camilion and Feissel who had visited Ankara. The UN officials, he said, had met with a positive response, with understanding and a spirit of cooperation in Ankara. They expressed their conviction that Ankara has decided to solve the Cyprus problem. On territory, the Turks say they agree on a solution giving them around 27 per cent while Morphou can be handed over to the Greek-Cypriot area. The Turks are preoccupied about Lefka and the waterways that flow from Morphou to the Turkish-Cypriot sector. 131

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 132

From the President’s Office

The president mentioned various other aspects of the issue concerning the status of Louroutzina and Karpasia, for which special provision is suggested. Another point made by Messrs Camilion and Feissel was that Ankara agrees that Cyprus can go on to become a member of the EEC while Denktash is totally against this. ‘In other words Denktash appears to be more Turkish than the Turks’. On issues of security they insist on keeping in force the Zürich Agreements. They also now accept setting up machinery for solving deadlocks something that Denktash was previously rejecting. They also accept the seven to three proportion proposed for the ministries and also for those ministries – both of primary and secondary importance – to alternate. The cabinet decisions will be taken by majority but the vote will be weighted. We were in constant contact with Messrs Camilion and Feissel. Shortly before the meeting between Mitsotakis and Yilmaz in Paris, I went to Athens for a last contact with the Greek political leadership. After a short statement by the prime minister, Mr Mitsotakis, we answered questions by journalists: [Question:] Mr President until now the policy was that Cyprus decides and Athens supports. Yesterday, however, there were different views expressed from your side. Has this line changed? [Vassiliou:] No it has not changed. What I tried to do yesterday was to clarify this issue so as to avoid misunderstandings. If Cyprus simply decided, as some of your colleagues interpret this, and Greece simply supported there would be no reason for me to come to Athens and discuss for hours on end with Mr Mitsotakis or Mr Papandreou or Mrs Damanaki – or various other political leaders. And I have been doing this all the time since I became president. At that time Mr Papandreou was the prime minister and we discussed things with him and the then leader of the opposition Mr Mitsotakis. Afterwards things changed, but the government of Cyprus always held the view that for us the Cyprus problem goes beyond party politics; it is something we discuss, an issue on which we try to shape a common line. It is in this spirit that I keep insisting that, yes, it is we who decide but this does not mean that we take our decisions while ignoring Greece. This would be a national crime – to avoid using a different word. We try to agree on a common line and once this is shaped, it is indeed Cyprus that decides and Greece that supports us to the hilt – precisely because we share a common line. I think there is no room for a misunderstanding here. [Mitsotakis:] Cyprus is an independent state and we are the first to honour and respect the independence of Cyprus. The Cypriot people will 132

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:38

Page 133

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991

have the final word in a referendum if we do reach a solution while there will of course be no referendum in Greece. However, Greece too has a say on the problem of Cyprus which is our major national issue. That is why consultations do take place, why we decide matters together, why we undertake responsibilities in common. Greece will not refuse to bear her own responsibilities – she will certainly do so – if, as one can hope, the issue of Cyprus reaches its conclusion. In this sense the discussion that was prompted on this subject has no meaning. We repeat what we have always been saying. There has been no change of policy. On 6 September the UN officials, Messrs Camilion and Feissel, launched a third round of negotiations in Nicosia in an effort to reduce the differences between the two sides so that an international conference of the Cyprus problem could be convened. Meanwhile, the Cypriot people, disregarding the raucous shouts and outcries, supported the procedure and were anxious to see it succeed. According to an opinion poll published in the newspaper Alitheia on 1 September 1991, as many as 81 per cent of the population declared themselves in favour of efforts to be undertaken for a resumption of the intercommunal talks, while 89 per cent were concerned about the delay in reaching a solution on the Cyprus issue; 57 per cent declared themselves satisfied by the recent handling of the issue by the government, while 67 per cent said they agreed, in general, with the work done by the Vassiliou government in the field of national policy.

Paris meeting and retraction by Turkey On 11 September the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey, Messrs Constantine Mitsotakis and Mesut Yilmaz, met in Paris. The day before, we had spoken on the phone with Mr Mitsotakis who was going to Paris expecting that Mr Yilmaz would confirm the new Turkish policy. Instead of this he found himself facing a Yilmaz who spoke like Mr Denktash. Without any scruples whatsoever, Yilmaz ignored all the previous commitments and promises given by the Turks to President Bush and the UN Secretary-General. It is significant that in the statements he made after the meeting he did not hide the change which, as was natural, led to the evaporation of all hopes by the international community about the Cyprus problem being solved soon. He also let it be understood that the Turks had become afraid Mr Denktash would accuse them publicly of having betrayed the Turkish Cypriots – something that would have a negative effect on the upcoming Turkish elections. Immediately after the inglorious end of this meeting, Mr Mitsotakis briefed me on what had happened. He told me that Yilmaz was in a difficult position and tried to convince everybody that in spite of their ‘necessary’ change of tack they continued 133

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 134

From the President’s Office

to wish for a solution and would continue their efforts in this vein after the elections. After this nasty development for us, the choice was simple: • Either we could continue the efforts to reach a solution, making full use of the favourable for us climate that had been created internationally. • Or we could abandon the policy of dialogue and adopt an aggressive verbosity going back to the policy of preconditions and the maintenance of the status quo, as advised by Mr Dountas. For me such a change of policy would be easy and would give me the possibility of appearing more of a ‘patriot’ than anyone else. The problem with such a course of action would be that in this way my popularity may have indeed been increased, but also that it would lead us nowhere. It is well known that the international powers and the UN may be displeased by recantations such as Turkey’s, but they would still pursue their policies. In our case they would agree that we had very good reasons to be displeased by this resurgence of Turkish intransigence, but they would insist that we continue our efforts for a dialogue. This is the only way that international problems can be solved. Had we persisted in refusing the dialogue and pursuing the policy of preconditions this would certainly be harmful for us: it would give the Turkish side the possibility to justify the perpetuation of the status quo and would isolate us internationally. It was obvious that we had one option only: we had to continue on the road that we had chosen and intensify our efforts if we wanted to reach the end of the occupation and avoid partition. We needed anyway to maximise pressure on Turkey. This was also the view of the international community. Moreover, both the UN Secretary-General and the five permanent members of the Security Council had no option but to attempt to keep the procedure alive, hoping that the Turkish side would change its stance after the elections. Turkey also tried to encourage this climate. Our Permanent Representative at the UN, Mr Andreas Mavrommatis, refers in his message to the views of the representative of the Permanent Delegation of the UK to the UN: If the present effort fails, the aim should be to maintain of the procedure in force until the Turkish elections are over, at which time Denktash will no longer be able to use these elections as leverage to put pressure on the Turkish government. He is not sure, he said, as to the extent that Turkish pressure on Denktash can reach, but anyway one could not expect the eve of the elections to be the best time for it to reach the point it could attain under normal circumstances. To conclude, I would like to report that after our conversation with the British official I was approached by the Deputy Permanent Representative of Turkey Mr Korutürk who, referring to the recent development, said 134

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 135

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991

that ‘things have now become more difficult because the contacts no longer concern the outline of an agreement, that was easier to achieve, but the very solution itself’. This allegation of the Deputy Permanent Representative of Turkey shows, in our opinion, the probable direction towards which the Turks will possibly turn to in order to justify their stance that prevents the achievement of any progress. US diplomacy was working as well towards salvaging the procedure. In another of his messages, Mr Mavrommatis reports the following after a meeting he had with Mr Feissel: Mr Feissel said he knows that at this moment there is intense activity behind the scenes to make the Turkish side clear the problems that they had created regarding the project of the Secretary-General. Concerning this project, Mr Feissel said that President Bush had sent a letter to Messrs Őzal and Yilmaz whose tone, as he said, was very firm. He added characteristically: ‘Only President Bush could get away with such a stern letter’. At a meeting I had in mid-September with the American ambassador, Mr Lamb told me: The negative statements that were made after the Mitsotakis–Yilmaz meeting are misleading. The procedure is still alive and every effort should be made for mobility to continue. The Cyprus problem is a difficult one and it is natural that negotiations for its solution have their ups and downs. This means that a lot of work is as yet necessary for its solution. The sooner such a solution is achieved the better because as time passes this becomes increasingly difficult. The American ambassador added that ‘this is an opportunity that all should take advantage of. Naturally, calling such a conference presupposes that progress has been achieved. The timing of the Conference as well as its form will be decided by the Secretary-General.’ At about the same period we witnessed the talks between Mitsotakis and John Major in London, while the newspaper Kathimerini published, on 15 September 91, the targets of Greece’s diplomacy: Athens has, on its side, been developing as of the day before yesterday (Friday) an intense diplomatic activity at the United Nations aiming to have a serious impact on developments regarding the Cyprus problem and by extension the Greek–Turkish relations. This happens as the Greek 135

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 136

From the President’s Office

attitude in Paris will essentially be assessed by the UN Secretariat and mainly by de Cuéllar. More specifically, Greek activity is directed towards ensuring that the Secretary-General will include in his report on the Cyprus problem to the UN General Assembly all relevant information about the intransigence and the recantations of Turkey that led once again the Cyprus issue to an impasse, at least temporarily. If there is no clear mention of this, one way or the other, in this official report this would mean that the UN Secretariat essentially accept the Yilmaz grievances and that the high UN officials who carried out the consultations did not manage to convey the real views of each side to the other. At the same time, once this failure in the mediatory role of the UN officials is acknowledged, even indirectly, the way will be opened for a more direct intervention by Washington on the Cyprus issue and the Greek–Turkish relations. It is in this spirit that I decided to inform our people fully with a TV speech on 17 September 1991. The opposition under the leadership of Messrs Kyprianou, Papadopoulos and Lyssaridis decided that this was an opportunity for a change of policy. It is interesting, however, that after the full briefing that I gave the National Council on 19 September 1991 their positions became milder, perhaps because they deemed that a solution had become more remote. After the session, Mr Clerides, answering a question by a reporter asking him whether he agreed with the way President Vassiliou had handled the Cyprus issue, made the following statement: I do not disagree with the way the recent consultations with the UN representatives were conducted. This had to be done from the moment that the American interest in the issue was made public and President Bush started cooperating on it with the UN Secretary-General. It would be an error of gigantic proportions had we refused to follow this procedure. We have not gone back on our positions of 1989 which form the basis of the proposals we have made. Replying to a question by a reporter that ‘the people suspect machinations are being concocted against them’, Mr Clerides replied: ‘I wouldn’t say that. There are persons who are suspicious and who incite the people to become suspicious. If we become embroiled in such a situation we will destroy the Cyprus issue.’ Mr Christofias, from his side, said that our first step should be to address ourselves to the Secretary-General and insist that he must allocate responsibilities. Considering the impasse, Mr Christofias said: In my opinion we are indeed in a situation of impasse. The full description of this impasse must, I believe, appear in the report of the 136

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 137

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991

Secretary-General who has the duty, as we said, to address the Security Council, explain his views and ask the Security Council to express its opinion. We do hope he will mention the Turkish intransigence. Mr Kyprianou, having admitted that he had not identified any retreat from the agreed positions, said that our 1989 proposals are not all negotiable. He said we should bring forth once again the preconditions that form the essence of the Cyprus issue, added that an all-national conference must be called and went on to say: We must reassess the situation and launch international initiatives both within the UN General Assembly and the Security Council if we decide this to be in our interest. We must ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations to tell the truth to the international community concerning the impasse. We must make better use of Europe as well as of all the international forums, all the international bodies. We must rekindle interest, as I said, on the substance of the Cyprus issue.

Debate in Parliament – 26 September 1991 Because of the importance of the developments, a debate was held in parliament. In his speech, Mr Clerides said: In the beginning, Makarios did not accept a federal solution. Later he did accept a multi-zonal one and in 1977, after his agreement with Denktash, he proposed to the National Council the acceptance of the bi-zonal federation. Let me remind you also that Mr Kyprianou re-confirmed the Makarios–Denktash summit agreement when he was President in 1979 at a meeting he had with the Turkish-Cypriot leader in the presence of the UN Secretary-General. As of 1977, all talks and consultations and all the proposals that have been submitted have always been based on the bi-zonal federation. Following this, the president of DISY reminded parliament of three, out of many, cases when the Security Council had refused to take measures against Turkey and had recommended that the two sides engage in talks. He did this to prove that there had not been any negligence or carelessness on our part, but that this was due to the reluctance of the Security Council and the General Assembly to take measures against Turkey. He then developed the positions of DISY to the effect that we were not convincing on the international scene when we insisted the Cyprus issue was only a question of invasion and occupation; that the voices against a federation affect 137

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 138

From the President’s Office

the Cyprus issue in a negative way; and, finally, that time was not working in our favour. Mr Clerides further stressed that the Cyprus problem remained insoluble because of the Turkish intransigence, in spite of the fact that international interest on the issue had increased and that America was, for the first time, involved in it at the presidential level no less. The president of DISY underlined that we had handled correctly the new initiative by de Cuéllar and that we would have made a mistake if we had displayed any reluctance to participate in the consultations. He went on: We would have made a mistake if we had denounced the summit agreements instead of negotiating. We would have committed a tactical error if we had made public the issues that are not negotiable for us because the other side would then have done exactly the same. We would have made an equally serious mistake of substance if we had made concessions that went beyond the unanimous decisions of the National Council. We would have committed one more tactical error if we had taken a decision, and made it public, to appeal to the General Assembly of the United Nations after the commotion provoked by recent international developments. In his speech, the parliamentary spokesman of DHKO, Mr Tassos Papadopoulos, stressed that his party felt disappointed, sad and fearful after the deadlocks that the Cyprus issue had come to following the recent initiative of the UN Secretary-General: We are afraid that there will be a revival of the old demands by Turkey after the elections and that we will be faced with a dilemma either to go to a conference on the Cyprus issue that will not entail any progress or to be accused of complicity in the creation of the impasse. Mr Papadopoulos continued, stressing: that none of the conditions we put forward for convening such a conference on the Cyprus issue has been met so there is a danger we might participate at a four-party meeting out of which President Vassiliou will emerge as the leader of a community and the Turkish-Cypriot leader as a head of his pseudo-state.22 He further pointed out that the USA did not put pressure on Turkey but restricted itself to friendly admonitions, and said that what the UN officials had conveyed to our side were not Turkey’s positions but our own proposals for a framework within which the Cyprus problem could be solved. ‘Our utmost limits from which we cannot retreat,’ stressed finally Mr Papadopoulos, ‘are the proposals approved by the National Council in 1989.’ 138

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 139

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991

In his speech, the General Secretary of AKEL, Mr Christofias, said: The federation as a solution has been accepted both within and without the National Council from all the political parties and political forces. The federal solution has been approved by the people as well during a number of electoral contests both presidential and parliamentary. The federal solution has been accepted as necessary with the Makarios–Denktash agreement after the misfortunes that were brought upon this country by the double crime of 1974, the coup by the junta and EOKA B, as well as by the Turkish invasion and occupation. A federal solution is certainly not an ideal one. But it is the only one available for a peaceful reunification of Cyprus and its people. Mr Christofias concluded with these words: Our further steps must be discussed and decided by all of us together, collectively and responsibly in the National Council. In determining our further course, the National Council must take into account and assess the factors that constitute today’s international conjuncture. Within this framework the National Council must examine seriously the matter of recourse to the UN General Assembly as well as to other international and regional bodies. We must reach, through a thorough dialogue, decisions in common on how to handle the situation. That is what the Cypriot people expect of their political leadership. Mr Lyssaridis, after having stressed that the session was dramatic on account of the issue under discussion, said that we were on the eve of a settlement of the Cyprus issue and pointed out that Parliament was examining it belatedly. Mr Lyssaridis insisted that we had not made good use of the new climate created by the Gulf Crisis; that the USA were interested in seeing the Cyprus problem solved, but not in how this would be done; that the Turkish proposals were not satisfactory; and that we found ourselves with a maelstrom of concessions by our side. Finally, Mr Lyssaridis said that we must re-focus the Cyprus issue and appeal to the UN and the EEC. He also asked that parliament should decide that the talks be based on our 1989 proposals. It is really interesting to note that DHKO and EDEK, while having voiced a thousand and one objections against the 1989 proposals and while they did not even want them to be considered as having been unanimously approved, had in the end not only accepted them, but even tried to give the impression that they were fighting for them. On 23 September 1991, President Őzal recognised for the first time publicly that the occupation of part of Cyprus by Turkish troops was a heavy burden on Turkey’s 139

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 140

From the President’s Office

economy. He said: ‘A solution must by all means be found. This problem that Turkey is facing constitutes one amongst many other serious obstacles to its development. I told Denktash about this, without any hesitation.’ He also pointed out that ‘Cyprus costs us 200 million dollars a year and we must find a way to settle this matter’. On 27 September, I addressed the 46th Session of the UN Assembly and informed the international community of the new turn that the Cyprus issue had taken. I also had separate meetings with the American Secretary of State, Mr Baker, and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr Giray. In a statement he made, Mr Baker made an appeal for the mobility on the issue thus far to bear fruits. It was of particular significance that, as a result of our efforts, the Cyprus problem was discussed at the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Permanent Members of the Security Council with the UN Secretary-General, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar. The Cypriot government welcomed the discussion of the Cyprus issue by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, calling it ‘a substantial, very important and very positive development’ for the following reasons: first, because it provided practical evidence of the scope and the new forms of internationalisation that our problem had acquired; second, because it proved that the intense international interest in the Cyprus issue, especially by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and the EEC does not simply remain alive but deepens; third, because it expressed the wish and the will of the international community not to accept the failure of the efforts that had been made to reach a solution, not to yield to stagnation and to work actively for the solution of the Cyprus problem. Proof of the international appeal that the Cyprus issue had gained was the message sent to me by President Bush on the anniversary of independence: On behalf of the people of the United States of America, I want to convey to you and to all of the people of Cyprus, our best wishes on Cyprus Independence Day. Please be assured that, despite the temporary delay in the SecretaryGeneral’s efforts toward a fair and equitable settlement of the Cyprus issue, the United States continues to be ready to offer whatever assistance the Secretary-General deems appropriate to ensure the success of the process. A great deal of work has already been done, and many of the issues have already been brought within negotiating range. I still believe that, with a good faith effort by all of the parties, a high-level meeting can be held before the end of this year. The benefits to all the people of Cyprus of a settlement are obvious. I want to once again assure you of the continued friendship and sincere best wishes of the people of the United States. In his report to the Security Council, submitted on 8 October, concerning his mission to offer his good offices (Appendix 10), the UN Secretary-General accused 140

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 141

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991

the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mr Denktash of creating obstacles for him in the fulfilment of his mission. Mr Denktash had in fact disputed both the basis and the framework of the negotiations, wanting essentially to retain the right to secede. In his book Pilgrimage for Peace, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar writes: I informed the Security Council on October 8, 1991, that the concept introduced by Denktash would fundamentally alter the nature of the solution that the Council had consistently foreseen. I indicated that I was asking my representatives to resume their discussions with the two sides in Cyprus and with the Greek and Turkish governments. If the discussions were productive, I was confident that it would be possible to convene the high-level meeting before the end of the year. However, while I did not say so to the Council, it was quite clear to me that Denktash had no interest in returning to these basic principles. I knew quite well that I would not have the satisfaction of seeing the Cyprus problem settled during my tenure. The best proof of how negative the report was for Turkey is also given and confirmed in the long declaration issued by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, which qualifies as a ‘sad mistake’ the fact that the report does not ascribe the title of ‘President of the Republic’ to the Turkish-Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash and argues that ‘the mistake is so great that unless corrected the schedule for a solution of the Cyprus problem cannot proceed’. The declaration also mentions Turkey’s annoyance that the Secretary-General’s report rejects the Turkish claims for recognition of separate sovereignty for the Turkish Cypriots. Finally, the Turkish declaration expresses regrets because the Turkish-Cypriot proposals have been ‘overlooked’ and because no separate, person-to-person, meeting between President George Vassiliou and the Turkish-Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash took place. On 11 October the Security Council adopted Resolution 716, which warned, indirectly, the Turkish side not to raise obstacles during the procedure of finding a solution for the Cyprus problem. The resolution reconfirmed the principles of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus that Turkey tried to dispute. It also rejected the basic thesis of the Turkish side for separate sovereignty and redrew clearly the framework of the negotiations for reaching a solution. The resolution was welcomed as positive by the Greek government which, in a statement it issued, stressed the following: This resolution adopts in its entirety the well-known recent report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, reconfirms all the former resolutions on the Cyprus issue by the Security Council and expresses once again its support to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus as a single entity. 141

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 142

From the President’s Office

The unanimously adopted resolution of the Security Council with its unambiguous provisions excludes all possible bad faith interpretations concerning the fundamental principles that govern the efforts to solve the Cyprus problem. It provides for the continuation of the well-known initiative by the Secretary-General of the United Nations aiming to see it being completed so that a settlement can be achieved. In an article of his, in the newspaper Milliyet, the well-known journalist Sami Cohen writes: There could not have been a more humiliating report and resolution for the Turkish side than this recent one. What is really annoying and does create worries and fears is the fact that for the first time Resolution 716 creates a confrontation between the Turkish side and the UN, as the latter intends to refer the issue to the Security Council. It thus puts heavy pressure on Turkey, a country which nobody knows what kind of government she may end up with. Cohen comments further that the new initiative by the assistants of the SecretaryGeneral will begin on 2 November: These contacts will take place within the framework of the report and the resolution that clash with the views of the Turkish side. In other words they will try to bring the Turkish side closer to the stance adopted openly by Mr de Cuéllar and the Security Council. If this is achieved, everything will be fine, there will be a four-party conference and we will most probably move on towards a solution. Otherwise the Security Council itself will deal with the issue and exert more pressure. Sami Cohen concludes by stressing that conflicts and contradictions must be sorted out before any talks start in November. ‘If Ankara and Denktash continue to speak in a different tone of voice,’ the Milliyet columnist concludes, ‘the negative content of Resolution 716 may appear insignificant compared to what will happen next.’ Immediately after the adoption of Resolution 716 by the Security Council, there followed a period of stagnation in the expectation of the Turkish elections and the formation of the next Turkish government, while the mandate of Mr Pérez de Cuéllar would come to an end by the end of 1991. It was Mr Boutros Boutros-Gali who was elected as the new UN Secretary-General and he would take over on 1 January 1992. On 21 October 1991 the Commonwealth heads of state, at their conference in Harare, adopted a resolution asking for all obstacles to be lifted in the procedure of finding a solution for the Cyprus problem. At the same time they decided to hold 142

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 143

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991

their next summit in Cyprus. This decision marked a significant diplomatic success for Cyprus as it strengthened in more ways than one its state identity and the efforts to solve the Cyprus problem. At the end of October, I went on an official visit to the Soviet Union. I wanted to express the high regard in which all Cypriots held the USSR for the increased interest it showed in their problem and for the help it has given us so far. I had long discussions with President Gorbachev, who was due to go to Madrid immediately after my visit, where he would meet President Bush, with whom he would also discuss – among other matters – the Cyprus problem. Before my visit to New York on 3 December 1991 to meet the departing UN Secretary-General as well as his successor, I sent a letter to President Bush asking him to make the best possible use of the election of the new Turkish government.23 On 19 December the UN Secretary-General, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar, in his last report on the Cyprus problem, expressed his disappointment because of the insecurity and uncertainty that reigned in Cyprus, and described as unacceptable the status quo. He remarked: As I am about to conclude my functions as Secretary-General, I cannot hide my disappointment that the Cyprus question, with which I have been personally involved since 1975, has not been resolved and that the shadow of uncertainty and insecurity continues to hang over the island. At the same time, I remain encouraged by the conviction that the two communities will inevitably recognize that a mutually acceptable solution is in their respective self-interest. I am also heartened by the fact that the Security Council, despite the passage of time, remains determined that a just and lasting solution should be achieved in Cyprus. There is indeed ample proof that the status quo in Cyprus is not an option and that the disturbing current situation must be solved. The expectations raised earlier this year that a high-level international meeting would take place to conclude an overall framework agreement must not be lost. The mission entrusted to the Secretary-General by the Security Council is firmly centred on the future. Continued recriminations about the past or the present will not help this effort. It is important that both sides focus their attention on the establishment of a federal republic and bring to this effort the necessary flexibility and realism. A solution is within reach if all concerned are willing to make their contribution to a compromise solution that will safeguard the legitimate interests and concerns of both communities. I call on the leaders of the two communities and of Greece and Turkey to devote their full energies to this task so that the long overdue solution can be reached and the two communities can together live in Cyprus in harmony, security and prosperity. 143

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 144

From the President’s Office

A few years later, as a private individual, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar expresses in Pilgrimage for Peace his sadness for having failed to contribute to the solution of the Cyprus problem. He stresses that as of 1975, when he was appointed by the then UN SecretaryGeneral Curt Waldheim as his special representative in Cyprus, and during the ten years that he served as UN Secretary-General after that, he did his utmost to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement. He did play an important role in the achievement of the high-level Makarios–Denktash agreements in 1977. As he stresses in his book: I was convinced that Archbishop Makarios had realized, partly as a result of the earlier forceful overthrow of his government, that a settlement with the Turkish community was necessary for the future of the island. But, the archbishop’s sudden death left a void that has never been filled. He believes that in January 1985 sufficient progress had been made for an agreement to have been achieved in principle. Unfortunately, at the last moment, President Kyprianou refused to accept it while Mr Denktash did: When the summit meeting was convened in New York, Raouf Denktash accepted the documentation as a basis for agreement. However, even though the documentation was known to both sides in advance, President Kyprianou declared that it was unacceptable in its current form. He could agree to it only as a basis for further negotiation. To all intents and purposes, the President scuttled the meeting. Thus the first direct highlevel meeting in five years collapsed. I believe that Kyprianou declined to proceed with serious negotiations at this critical point because of domestic considerations in Cyprus. Unlike Denktash, he was never a free agent. Kyprianou, who by nature was not inclined toward flexibility or adventure, was always constrained by pressures from within his government and from the opposition. Being politically vulnerable, he found it necessary to protect himself from accusations of conceding to the other side. His successor, George Vassiliou, who enjoyed a stronger political base, was more flexible. But by that time Denktash was moving to a position that was hardly subject to compromise. He concludes the relevant chapter in the following words: UNFICYP has now been deployed for more than 30 years and has become the longest-lasting peacekeeping mission in history. There remains a near-unanimous feeling in the Security Council that withdrawing UNFICYP would seriously risk renewed conflict between the two communities. The Turkish troops and the Turkish settlers also remain, with the latter having become by now permanent residents. 144

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 145

Fourth Period: January 1991 to December 1991

In my opinion, there are two basic reasons why a settlement has not been reached. The Turkish-Cypriot side, especially its leader, Raouf Denktash, has more to lose than to gain from integration into a reunited Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots would have to surrender a substantial portion of the land they control, part of which is choice agricultural land. They would lose the satisfaction of living in a territory totally under Turkish-Cypriot control. The leaders who function as president and cabinet ministers enjoy a status and freedom of action they could not hope to have in a united Cyprus. The major attraction of a settlement would be the possibility of sharing in the prosperity of the Greek-Cypriot portion of the island, which now has one of the highest growth rates in the world. Besides that, some in the Turkish community might prefer to see the Turkish troops depart, even though their cost appears to be borne mainly by Turkey. But undoubtedly more see the Turkish troops as protectors from the more numerous Greek Cypriots, which is reason enough to tolerate their presence. For the Greek Cypriots, the attraction of unification is not sufficient to cause them to accept a settlement that would acknowledge a right of the Turkish Cypriots to self-determination. In their perspective, this would deny the main purpose of a settlement. While they could expect to gain additional land, their economic growth is more than satisfactory without it. The greatest pressure for a settlement has come from the refugees and displaced persons from the north, who long hoped to regain their property. By the 1980s, however, few actually would have returned. The generation that was removed from their homes and businesses in the north is dying out. Any Cypriot government, no matter what its leadership, is likely to lose politically if it enters into a settlement entailing concessions on the central principles of unified sovereignty and unified identity for the island. In the last direct conversation I had with George Vassiliou, he – not surprisingly – contended that the Turks had never wanted, and had not expected, to see a Cyprus settlement. Under strong pressure from the United States they had to appear cooperative, knowing that they could depend on Denktash to prevent an agreement. This view is perhaps too cynical. My sense is that no Turkish government is prepared to face the domestic political backlash that would result if it forced Denktash to accept an agreement that he would portray as endangering the TurkishCypriot community. Thus Turkish governments, which are fragile in their composition, really are not in a position to control Denktash. Barring some outbreak of violence that UNFICYP is unable to control, the present status quo in Cyprus is likely to endure at least until there is a change in the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and quite probably into the next century. 145

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 146

From the President’s Office

At a press conference on 3 March 1992 reviewing developments until the end of 1991, I concluded that in spite of the frustrated expectations for progress in the efforts to solve the Cyprus problem, first there was progress concerning the commitment of the international community in its involvement in the Cyprus issue; second there was clear condemnation of the positions of Turkey and Mr Denktash by the UN; and third we had made progress in moving forward our application to join the EEC, based on the international credibility of our positions and our intensive diplomatic effort.

146

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 147

chapter five

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993 Intensification of the efforts to reach a solution – Unprecedented involvement of the Security Council – ‘Set of ideas by Gali’ – Resolutions 750, 774 and 789 In 1992 the efforts to find a solution reached a peak. The new UN Secretary-General, Mr Boutros Boutros-Gali, gave first priority to the issue and secured the full support and active involvement of the Security Council. Indicative of this is the fact that the Security Council approved three resolutions on the Cyprus problem (750, 774 and 789) within eight months from April to November, something unheard of in the history of the UN. The superpowers – especially Britain and the EEC – went to great lengths to obtain a change of attitude by Turkey and to support the procedure. At the same time in Cyprus, 1992 was a year of very strong confrontations. DHKO and EDEK, as well as all those who were afraid of a solution along the lines of the high-level agreements, raised their tone and exerted pressure in every possible way. They were especially annoyed because of the support given not only by the Greek government and the Greek political leaders, but also by the superpowers and the international community. They thus tried to promote in every possible way the story that everybody was against us and all were conspiring to impose a quick solution of their choice. They maintained that the dialogue meant we had already capitulated and they constantly spread rumours to the effect that we had already agreed in advance on a ‘solution’ that had been on the cards all along. It is in this spirit that they launched an unprecedented attack against the UN and the SecretaryGeneral, Pérez de Cuéllar, on the occasion of his report in December 1991 and the declaration of the Security Council that followed it. 147

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 148

From the President’s Office

To contribute in toning down the controversy and face the climate of tension that they had tried to create, I convened the National Council, aiming at an objective assessment of the situation so that we could agree on shaping our tactical moves for the coming months. Two sessions, each lasting many hours, took place on 8 and 11 January 1992. In my introduction I stressed the following: We would certainly have preferred a report that would show clearly the responsibilities of Turkey and Denktash; a report dealing with the various issues in greater detail, especially the issues that have priority for us. In spite of this, in our public declaration we emphasised only the positive elements in the report: the fact that it shows clearly the negative role played by Turkey, stressing that it was because of her that no progress had been made since the previous report had been submitted. Also the report stresses that it is expected of Turkey to get involved so that the dialogue could continue from the point it had been stopped by Ankara. Another positive element in the report is its insistence on the necessity of finding a solution, that the status quo is not an option and that the situation existing today is worrying. In relation to this the President of the Security Council mentions in his statement issued on 23/12/91: ‘...The members of the Council subscribed unanimously to the report and the remarks made by the Secretary-General. They fully share his view that the solution of the Cyprus problem is being delayed by many. The simple maintenance of the status quo does not constitute a solution.’ Mr Papadopoulos qualified the report as the most unfavourable to date for the Hellenism of Cyprus, submitted by the Secretary-General, because in his opinion the statement by the Secretary-General was undermining the concept of sovereignty. As mentioned in the statement: The agreement will result in the establishment of a bicommunal and bizonal federation, one State comprising two politically equal communities in which sovereignty will be equally shared but indivisible, that will safeguard the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and nonalignment of Cyprus and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession. In spite of the fact that it would be unconceivable for a UN Secretary-General to want to undermine the concept of sovereignty that has always been one of the basic UN principles, we asked the opinion of our consultant Mrs Paley. Mrs Paley, Professor of Constitutional Law at Oxford University, prepared a most detailed study which showed that there was no reason whatsoever to worry about this definition. It was therefore obvious that the statements were made to create impressions, while 148

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 149

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

the study by Mrs Paley was confidential and was given only to the members of the National Council. After the two sessions of the National Council, I made the following statement on 11 January 1992, commenting on the positions taken by the two parties DHKO and EDEK: Instead of trying to paint the devil on the wall, i.e. trying to suggest that some bad solution is in the making, it would be best and proper if we did everything possible to promote our positions for a solution which, even if it did not correspond exactly to our proposals of January 1989 could be as near to them as possible. Such a solution must be of a kind that can be considered acceptable by our people. The issue of pushing forward our application to join the EEC was also discussed at the session of the National Council. There was agreement on the tactics followed by the government but preposterous things were also heard, showing total ignorance of what the EEC is and how it functions. Here is a passage from the minutes: Referring to the EEC Mr T. Papadopoulos said: I take it that we have the right and Greece has the obligation to tell its EEC partners that it will not allow any other country to join the EEC if Cyprus is not admitted at the same time... Greece cannot say on the one hand that the Cyprus problem is its major issue and on the other hand give priority to other needs and claims that Greece has with regard to the EEC. We must insist in asking Greece to make it clear to her EEC partners that she will use the institutional powers at her disposal to avert discussion on the application of any other country unless this application runs parallel with the examination of Cyprus’s application. Mr Clerides reacted as follows: ‘What position should Greece take? Because Turkey committed the crime of invading Cyprus must she say that Austria or Malta will not be accepted as members?’ We need to say no more on this issue because it is well known how it developed and where it led to. It shows nonetheless the characteristic tendency of some people to put forward totally groundless claims in order to create an impression of ‘militancy’, while the effort of finding a solution is undermined.

New efforts for the resumption of the talks After the failure of the meeting in Paris on account of the recantation by Turkey in September 1991, there followed a period during which Turkey tried to distance 149

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 150

From the President’s Office

herself from the issue, alleging it was a matter for the two communities to solve. In practice, this meant that she left Denktash free to try and gain time in order to strengthen the status quo, while at the same time the Turks tried to avoid any discussion of the Cyprus problem during the Turkish elections. This attitude found no support either in the UN or with the international community as a whole. At the beginning of January, President Bush stressed in repeated statements his commitment to finding a solution. At the same time the new Secretary-General, as soon as he assumed his functions, sent us on 9 January 1992 the following letter: 9 January 1992 Excellency, Upon assuming the functions of Secretary-General I am writing to you, Mr Denktash and the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey to underline the importance I attach to finding an early settlement to the Cyprus question. In line with the request of the Security Council, it is vital that we proceed expeditiously to complete work on the set of ideas on an overall framework agreement that emerged from the talks in Ankara in August 1991 and which was discussed with the two sides in Cyprus. As you know, at its meeting of 23 December 1991, the Security Council requested me to report by April 1992 inter alia whether sufficient progress has been made to convene the high-level international meeting. After reviewing the developments of the past year I share the view of my predecessor and of the Security Council that progress has been made. I therefore believe it should be possible to complete the work on the set of ideas on an overall framework agreement before my next report to the Security Council. To this end, I propose to send my representatives to resume discussions the last week of January in Turkey and Greece and then with the two sides in Cyprus. I trust that I can count on your personal support in completing on an urgent basis the work that remains to be done. With kind personal regards, and warmest greetings, Yours sincerely, Boutros Boutros-Ghali In order to assist the Secretary-General in his effort, President Bush decided to send to the area Mr Letsky, his special coordinator on the Cyprus issue. Mr Letsky began having talks on the Cyprus problem in Ankara and then visited Nicosia and Athens. During his visit to Ankara, Mr Letsky handed over a copy of the letter by the US Secretary of State Mr Baker to Mr Cetin, his opposite number in Ankara, which was also addressed to the prime minister of Turkey, Mr Demirel. In his letter, Mr Baker stressed America’s wish for a resumption of the procedure to find a solution of the Cyprus problem and asked Turkey to play an important part in this by putting 150

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 151

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

pressure on Mr Denktash to make progress in this direction. The letter also expressed America’s wish for Turkey to participate in an international conference on the issue once the ground had been properly prepared. The Turks responded positively to the American wishes, but their answer to the question whether they did remain true to what had been discussed in August was not all that clear. My personal view, in spite of the fact that Mr Letsky wanted to give us the impression that the Turks had remained true to what had been discussed, was that they were simply trying to play for time. During a press conference at Ledra Palace, after the completion of his talks in Nicosia, Athens and Ankara, Mr Letsky declared that he had come to our area bearing instructions of the President and the Secretary of State to find out whether the USA would be able to help a resumption of the intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General. ‘Washington,’ he added, ‘believes that the talks must resume and at long last lead speedily to a draft agreement on the issue.’ Mr Letsky said he had found that there was interest and decisiveness in restarting the talks under the auspices of the UN, as well as a will to make all possible efforts leading to their successful outcome. He also stressed that the Turkish government had agreed that the talks could start from the point where they had been broken off in August/September of the year before and insisted that the climate in Turkey was favourable to a solution. On 20 January 1992, I had my first official meeting with Mr Boutros-Gali, who met Mr Denktash the next day. In his report on this meeting, the permanent representative of Cyprus in New York, Mr Mavrommatis, mentions: Mr Denktash agreed to the resumption of the procedure with Mr Feissel who went to Cyprus on 3 February. According to our interlocutor, even though Mr Denktash kept repeating his well-known positions he nevertheless assured the SecretaryGeneral that he was ready, as he said, to ‘get down to business’. On his side, the Secretary-General, as he made clear to Mr Denktash, did not want to elaborate on the issue and confined himself to listening and stressing to Mr Denktash his intention to pursue the procedure without fail. ‘Mr Denktash,’ Mr Kavanagh said, ‘must have realised that the Secretary-General knows well the area and its problems.’ In spite of all the assurances by Mr Denktash, Turkey persisted in trying to disengage from the procedure. Thus on 21 January the refusal by Turkey to receive the representatives of the Secretary-General was made public. That is why after my return I saw, one by one, all the EEC plus the US ambassadors and discussed with them the need for pressure to be put on Turkey to make her cooperate with the UN, stressing also the need for a positive response to our application for EEC membership. 151

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 152

From the President’s Office

Davos – 1992 During the weekend 31 January to 2 February, I went to Davos, where Mr Mitsotakis had also gone. In Davos, I tried systematically to promote our application to join the EEC. The basic argument I used was: Cyprus has the right and must become a member of the EEC. At this juncture there is unfortunately the complication caused by the continuing occupation of part of Cyprus by Turkey. If this were a reason not to accept Cyprus’s application to join the EEC, this would be unfair because it would mean that the victim is being punished for something done by the perpetrator of the crime. It is interesting to note that in Cyprus the opposition tried to give the impression that we were not pushing our application with due diligence and decisiveness. They even went so far, as I mentioned above, as to ask that we should demand of Greece using her veto as a threat for the EEC. I rejected categorically this approach. It was ridiculous to even think of using threats. We should, on the contrary, be convincing by using logic in our arguments, display moderation and our wish to achieve a common understanding. What we are asking for, I said during my various talks, is for the EEC: • to begin considering Cyprus’s application in parallel with the applications of other countries; • to move forward with the study by technocrats and prepare the required ‘Opinion’ which, however, should not cover fully the political aspect of the application that should be left to be examined later by the Commission and the Council. I knew that many EEC countries did not want Cyprus to become a member before the resolution of the Cyprus problem and so I wanted to avoid by all means a negative Opinion. That is why I insisted that on no account should a negative Opinion be issued by the Commission or the Council for political reasons. If, against all hope, there was no unanimity for a positive Opinion, then the issue should remain open so that pressure on Turkey could continue to be exerted. I also stressed that a positive Opinion by the EEC would facilitate the task of pushing for a solution because it would increase the pressure on Turkey. This position was being readily accepted by everybody. Characteristically, the British Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan pointed out to me that this was precisely how his support for our application would be framed. He also told me that the Council had been discussing informally the issue and that most of its members were in favour of such an approach. 152

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 153

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

This tactic, in conjunction with our international credibility and our obvious political will for a solution of the Cyprus problem, ensured that a study was indeed carried out to provide the basis for the Opinion that was finally approved by the Commission. If, however, I had listened to the various pieces of advice I was given and insisted that the EEC members had an obligation to accept us, or even worse, if we had tried to use blackmail to make this happen, we would have stirred up hostility and ended up – most probably – with a negative Opinion. On the margins of the conference, on 1 February, the Greek prime minister met first with Mr Demirel and then with me. In the statements I made afterwards, I said that there could not possibly be a Friendship Treaty between Greece and Turkey unless the Cyprus problem was first solved. The Greek prime minister agreed with this position and underlined ‘that the effort to ameliorate Greek–Turkish relations contributes to the promotion of a solution’. From Davos, I went for a brief visit to Paris to meet President Mitterrand, Foreign Minister Dumas and other personalities. My aim was twofold: on the one hand to secure France’s support for a dialogue on substance leading to a solution – knowing full well that France could put pressure on Turkey in a variety of ways – and on the other hand to obtain a positive response to our application for membership to the EEC, knowing again full well the decisive role that France played in these decisions.

Resumption of contacts by the representatives of the Secretary-General On 4 February the representatives of the UN Secretary-General began a new series of talks in Nicosia. Mr Denktash, using various pretexts and in spite of the promise he had given the UN Secretary-General, avoided meeting his representatives. Because of the refusal by Mr Denktash to discuss with the negotiating team of the UN, Messrs Camilion, Feissel and Kavanagh, and because of his attempt to postpone the whole talks procedure, I considered it necessary to push for stronger pressure to be exerted on Turkey by the USA and President Bush in view of his official forthcoming meeting with Mr Demirel. That is why I sent the following letter to Mr Bush (a similar letter having been sent, as I knew, by Mr Mitsotakis): Nicosia, 8 February 1992. His Excellency Mr George Bush, President of the United States of America, The White House, Washington, D.C. Dear President Bush, Knowing your personal interest for the solution of the Cyprus problem and in view of your meeting with the prime minister of Turkey, Mr Suleiman Demirel, I would like to share certain thoughts with you. 153

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 154

From the President’s Office

We are all grateful for your efforts on the Cyprus issue and for stating publicly that the status quo is not acceptable and cannot be the basis for a solution. This status quo has been the everyday reality for all Cypriots for more than 17 years now. Unfortunately, despite the promises given to you by the President of Turkey Mr Őzal last year, there has been no sign of any willingness on the part of Turkey to end it. As you certainly recall, during your visit to Ankara in July 1991 you raised with President Őzal and Prime Minister Yilmaz two specific issues of the Cyprus problem which are crucial to a solution, namely – a. the amount of territory to be allocated to the Turkish-Cypriot Community upon a solution of the Cyprus problem, and b. the preservation of the rights of displaced persons. We remain grateful to you for that intervention. Subsequently, in August 1991, specific promises were given on all issues to the State Department Coordinator and the UN Negotiating Team. Particularly on the question of territory, it was stated that Ankara was prepared to accept an arrangement on the basis of the ‘Gobbi line’. These positions were, however, negated by the prime minister of Turkey, Mr Yilmaz, during his meeting with the prime minister of Greece, Mr Mitsotakis, in Paris in September 1991. We have been waiting for several months for Mr Demirel to indicate whether the Turkish side was prepared to recommence negotiations from the point they were terminated last September. Unfortunately, however, Turkey has delayed receiving the UN Negotiating Team, which is embarking on a new round of negotiations, whilst the Turkish-Cypriot side, during the UN Team’s visit to Cyprus this week, in effect refused to cooperate, particularly on the above two major issues. In view of this, your meeting with Mr Demirel affords a unique opportunity to get the negotiating process on the move again as the solution of the Cyprus problem is long overdue. This would imply Mr Demirel’s reconfirmation of Mr Őzal’s promises to you and the commitment to contribute to progress with the aim of convening an international meeting by April. Yours sincerely, George Vassiliou Handing over the letter to Mr Lamb on 8 February 1992, I said that this was perhaps what Mr Demirel was after, in order to try and appear as a ‘good boy’ and say that he will do what he can to convince Denktash. ‘The basis of American policy,’ I stressed, ‘must be that the person responsible is not Denktash but Demirel, who must realise that it is up to him to work for a solution of the problem.’ 154

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 155

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

Mr Lamb agreed with me and deemed absolutely right sending a letter to President Bush both by me and the prime minister of Greece, Mr Mitsotakis. These efforts seemed to have had some positive effect. After their two-hour meeting, presidents Bush and Demirel expressed their support for the procedure of the Secretary-General. Meanwhile, in Cyprus, instead of the emergence of a united front aiming at the resumption of the talks, reactions became intense, while the initiative of the Secretary-General came essentially under attack. Here are some revealing excerpts from an interview given by the president of DHKO, Mr Kyprianou, to the newspaper Simerini on 17 February: The fact, for instance, that the well-known ‘Cuéllar ideas’ were accepted – even as a basis for dialogue – is something we disagree with President Vassiliou, with DISY and also with AKEL. The impression is thus given that our side is ready to give way on matters of substance just so that the Cyprus issue can come to a close. The reason is that these ‘ideas’, which were turned into proposals, adopt to a large extent the Turkish positions on the Cyprus issue concerning the troops and the settlers as well as the return of the refugees and human rights. The whole philosophy of these proposals adopts to a large extent the Turkish positions. This continues today. Those who are interested to close the Cyprus issue are keen to make Turkey give something on the territorial issue in exchange for various concessions on our part. We are at a very dangerous phase and that is why we also expressed our concern about the last paragraph of the Security Council Resolution 716. This provision enables the Security Council to adopt a framework for the solution of the Cyprus problem. With everything that is at present on the table in the political game that is now being played we will find ourselves facing a terrible dilemma. We will have to choose between confronting the Security Council or accepting an unacceptable framework for the solution of the Cyprus issue as it is outlined in the well-known Cuéllar proposals. This outcome must be prevented. We have radical objections in general. That is why we will try to elect somebody who can guarantee a new, correct policy and course. We will try to ensure the election of a new president who will have the prerequisites for implementing the right policy. Answering the question of a journalist as to the extent that President Vassiliou had harmed the Cyprus issue, Mr Kyprianou said: ‘Mr Vassiliou may have created some good impressions but I think he harmed the Cyprus issue because in terms of its substance things have got worse. There is a general tendency to search for a solution but not for the right solution.’ Mr Kyprianou’s statements ran against what we had been trying to achieve for decades, namely the more active involvement of the UN Security Council. They 155

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 156

From the President’s Office

were also against the solution of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. The ‘damage’ I had done to the Cyprus issue was that we had promoted firmly the negotiations along the lines of securing a federal solution. His sentence ‘There is a general tendency to search for a solution but not for the right solution’ implies just that. They have always used the terms ‘closing the Cyprus issue’ to mean the implementation of the high-level agreements. As regards the ‘right solution’, they have never said what they mean by it. This was why they were up in arms against every proposal by the UN. This position was expressed more clearly and without demur by Archbishop Chrysostomos. It suffices to read the conclusion of his interview to the newspaper Phileleftheros of 2 February 1992 to see how fanciful his thoughts are and also to realise the terrible damage they caused Cyprus: [Question:] Your Grace, the President of the Republic replying indirectly to your position on federation stressed that to abandon the policy of creating a federal Cyprus would create a deadly danger for our survival in this country and would also endanger Hellenism as a whole. What are your comments? [Answer:] It is true that given the eagerness we displayed for accepting a federation, to abandon this position now will create a degree of confusion and also some adverse comments against us. It is up to us, though, to clear the confusion and neutralise the comments by re-basing the whole problem on internationally acceptable principles. First and foremost should be our aim to put an end to the invasion unconditionally, basing it on the principles of freedom and justice, the principles of human rights and the principles of unconstrained freedom of establishment and movement. The reason is that, as we know, pan-Turkism is not satisfied with half-measures. These, it seeks at this moment, in order precisely to gain legitimacy. Once this is done, they will start pushing us into the next stage and contest sovereignty over the whole of Cyprus. The whole story will then be repeated until Cyprus is incorporated in the much soughtafter Great Turkey. It is really surprising that Archbishop Chrysostomos dared accuse, in essence, Ethnarch Makarios of surrendering to Turkish demands. The Archbishop’s views were in total conflict with the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979 and the unanimous proposals by the National Council of 1989. Unfortunately, the constant rejection of every UN proposal by DHKO, EDEK, the Archbishop and others, as well as the denunciations against any Greek government in power, created confusion and achieved exactly the opposite of the declared aim. Such actions strengthened the position of Mr Denktash and the status quo, bringing us ever closer to partition.24 Unfortunately, these people were selling fanciful dreams that nevertheless sounded ‘patriotic’. In a speech he made to a demonstration in Thessaloniki, organised by 156

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 157

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

the movement ‘Anagennissi’ (Revival) on 28 February, Mr Papadopoulos presented the view that with the negotiations for a federal solution, the goal of Turkey to remain in charge of the occupied territories and also become an equal partner in the South – a most sought-after Turkish aim – would finally be achieved. He contended that the occupied territory (minus 1 per cent or 2 per cent that would be given back) would remain an area with a purely Turkish population, where not a single GreekCypriot would have the right to own land or establish himself permanently – and went on to propose (Elephtherotypia, 8 March 1992) that: ‘The spurious slogan “we ask for a resumption of the dialogue from where it broke off in September 1991” must be abandoned forthwith. This is a mortally dangerous slogan.’

Slogan for an ‘all-national conference’ by Clerides and Kyprianou It is in this climate, decisive for the future of Cyprus, that a change of policy by DISY started to emerge. While from the very first day of the presidency until the end of 1991, Mr Clerides supported fanatically the government policy on the national issue, he started, as of the beginning of 1992, to indicate in a variety of ways that he would like to walk the path trodden by DHKO. In an interview he gave to the newspaper Agonas on 22 March 1992, he displays his intentions clearly, while also trying to give the impression that he agreed with DHKO on other issues as well. It was thus that on 3 March, in a letter signed in common with Mr Kyprianou, both leaders asked for an ‘all-national’ conference to be convened. This was done even though Mr Clerides knew full well that such a conference could not be convened and even if it could that it would have served no purpose whatsoever. It could prove harmful and certainly not useful. In his statement on this issue the Greek prime minister, Mr Mitsotakis, said: The situation right now is so confused that it would be the worst possible time to convene an all-national conference. We could possibly envisage such a conference once we have a clear picture in front of us not now when the boiler is simmering and we don’t know what it will produce. Unfortunately, for purely demagogic reasons, the parties DISY, DHKO and EDEK then decided to take a stand in favour of an all-national conference. The statement made by the leader of DHKO, Mr Kyprianou, is indicative: The all-national conference is today more than ever imperative for national reasons. I do not agree with Greece’s Prime Minister Mr Mitsotakis that such a conference would only be needed once we are close to, or in front of, a solution of the Cyprus problem. On the contrary, 157

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 158

From the President’s Office

such all-national conference is now needed more than ever in order to confront Turkish expansionism and to promote the right kind of solution for the Cyprus problem. What we must do is to set the international community thinking, especially the USA and Europe; to make them realise their responsibilities so that they decide at long last to exert their influence on Turkey and make her abandon her expansionist projects and her unacceptable demands. According to Phileleftheros (27 February 1992), Mr Clerides, after meeting Mr Kyprianou, declared that the main responsibility for the impasse fell on the Turkish side, in spite of the fact that the Cyprus government was also responsible. They repeated that ‘now, more than ever, it is imperative to call for an all-national conference to be held’. On 5 March 1992, Mr Clerides expressed on the RIK programme Dialogue Cyprus his clear disagreement with the prime minister of Greece regarding the position the latter took on the subject of the all-national conference. In a letter to Vassiliou and Mitsotakis, Glafkos Clerides asks for such conference to be convened so that: the nation can think about the problem – after the breakdown of the dialogue on the Cyprus problem – and work out a new strategy that will take us out of the impasse. The all-national conference, Mr Clerides pointed out, does not hurt but strengthens the independence of Cyprus since this is its goal. Mr Mitsotakis said in his new statement: I have never refused the all-national conference in principle. What I did stress, however, and what I do repeat categorically now is that the present conjuncture is not favourable for such a conference. In my judgement if it were called at this time it would do only harm – and that was the reason I was against holding it at this particular moment. If conditions make it necessary to call such a conference in the future, I am of course ready to re-examine the case, naturally in consultation with the political parties of Greece and Cyprus. Clearly when – in my judgement – the time has come for such a conference I must ask for the opinion of the parties that will be called upon to participate in it. From these statements it becomes obvious how demagogic and unreal these views actually were. It is sad that Messrs Clerides and Kyprianou promoted this viewpoint, knowing that such an all-national conference was never called in the past nor could it have been called. And if there was even the slightest probability for something like 158

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 159

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

that to succeed, why was it then that they never promoted such an idea while they were in power? This slogan was repeated from time to time because it sounded patriotic even to those who knew that it was impossible to be implemented. It is not by accident that no Greek government either then or later ever adopted it.

Pursuing the efforts for negotiations on substance In spite of the demagogy, we had to continue and intensify our efforts to promote our cause and insist on the necessity of reaching a solution. We thus organised a big demonstration by women. Tens of thousands of women formed a human chain from Pyrgos of Tylliria to Paralimni. All the Cypriot parties greeted the demonstration. I made the following statement: ‘This demonstration provides an answer to the intransigence and the negative stance of Turkey on the Cyprus issue.’ I also pointed out that ‘the women’s chain reveals the strong feeling of our people that the situation such as it is today cannot go on for long. The artificial partition of Cyprus is contrary to the spirit of our times.’ At the beginning of March, I paid a visit to Germany aimed at securing support for the accession of Cyprus to the EEC, as well as for our efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue and reunify our country. I met the German president Mr Weiszecker, Chancellor Kohl, the foreign minister Mr Genscher and members of the German parliament. The chancellor showed full understanding of our demand that membership of the EEC be granted to Cyprus as a whole. He mentioned to me that this had also been the policy of West Germany when East Germany was still in existence and that is why he understood perfectly what we were asking for. He also assured me that not only did they support the efforts by the Secretary-General, but they would also take the initiatives they deemed right. According to a report by the Athens daily, Elephtherotypia, of 13 March 1992, we were witnessing ‘an important turning point in Germany’s policy on the Cyprus issue’, which was: on the horizon, after the talks that the president of Cyprus George Vassiliou had in Bonn. During these talks, the German political leadership responded positively to the major demand of supporting Cyprus’s application to join the Community. During yesterday’s meeting with Chancellor Kohl and also during the meeting and dinner he had the evening before yesterday with the German Foreign Minister Mr Hanz Dietrich Genscher, the Cypriot president insisted especially on Turkey’s recantations and the intransigent stance that led again to an impasse. He asked Germany to support Cyprus’s application to join the EEC – a support that has been given so far by France and Spain... 159

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 160

From the President’s Office

The German Chancellor himself described in a statement to the Cypriot TV the situation in Cyprus as ‘unnatural’ and referring to the de facto partition of the island since 1974 added cryptically that ‘borders that divide do not last for long’. A new round of talks by Mr Letsky, the special US State Department coordinator on the Cyprus issue, was launched on 17 March. On 24 March the envoy of the British government Mr Madden came to Cyprus, while the British prime minister Mr Major sent a letter to the Turkish foreign minister Mr Cetin on the Cyprus issue. The opposition, instead of welcoming the increased interest and the new initiative by the USA, tried to create a climate of rejection and give the impression of collusion with Turkey. DHKO pointed out in an announcement it made public that the American coordinator Mr Letsky aimed to provide an alibi to the Turkish side and press for more concessions from our side: The Democratic Party considers the efforts of the special US coordinator on the Cyprus issue Mr Nelson Letsky to create a climate of optimism and to suggest that there are hopes for progress on the Cyprus issue, without any change in Turkish policy on the issue, as aiming to grant an alibi to Ankara and Denktash and to drag our side into making more concessions that will prove fatal for Cypriot Hellenism. (Elephtherotypia, 25 March 1992) A climate was thus created that encouraged a group of youngsters to burn an effigy of Letsky outside the presidential mansion on 25 March.25 The truth is that the overall stance by Turkey displeased the Security Council. In a report he sent, the permanent representative Mr Mavrommatis refers to a meeting he had with the person entrusted by the British foreign minister to deal with the Cyprus issue: Our interlocutor referred to the recent contacts Messrs Camilion and Feissel had in the area and stressed that they consider the attitude of the Turkish side during these talks to have been disappointing. ‘Even though the Turks now maintain that there has been a misunderstanding and that their views/positions have been misinterpreted, the Council members themselves believe that the Turkish allegations are wrong and that it is not even possible to give them the benefit of the doubt.’ According to our interlocutor, the way things are at the moment, the forthcoming report by the Secretary-General must deal with substance and not be enfeebled as before. ‘The issue must be presented clearly to the Security Council which must show more interest in the matter than it did in the past and not 160

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 161

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

confine itself, as before, to a simple expression of support of the efforts of the Secretary-General.’ He stressed characteristically that ... at the end of the day this is an international problem needing the active involvement of the Security Council. On 25 March, I left for New York on an invitation by the Secretary-General of the UN. I went to the USA, where I would meet President Bush, fully prepared to stress the need for more active involvement both by the UN and the US so that some progress could be made. Upon my arrival on 26 March, I had the first meeting with the Secretary-General to whom I explained my concern about the lack of progress. I told him : This situation cannot go on for ever. Our impression is that the Turkish side uses the procedure as a pretext for the preservation of the status quo and that this is done at the detriment of all concerned. This is harmful, not only for the stability in the area but it also runs against the interests of the UN at this moment because just now the UN work in order to help resolve problems not simply to preserve situations unaltered. To a question whether the basic obstacle is the issue of sovereignty, I replied: ‘The basic obstacle is not the issue of sovereignty but the lack of a desire to make progress. In my opinion the sovereignty issue is only a pretext.’ I asked of Mr Gali that the side responsible for the impasse be mentioned by name and that pressure be exerted on it to show a more conciliatory attitude. I stressed the need for a more active involvement of the UN. Next day I had a meeting with the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council, at their request. In my briefing I mentioned: I hope that this meeting will help the solution of the Cyprus problem. You know very well the situation prevailing in Cyprus. In spite of all the efforts undertaken during the last two years, in spite of the two resolutions unanimously taken by the Security Council (649 and 716), in spite of the eight statements made by the president of the Security Council no progress has been made towards the solution of the problem. The reason is, of course, the total refusal by Turkey to cooperate. They refused to negotiate, even to talk to the representatives of the UN. A year ago, in March 1991, the Secretary-General of the UN pointed out in his report the need for progress on the territorial and the refugee issues expressing his hope that such progress would be forthcoming. President Bush showed a personal interest in the Cyprus problem and was given promises from the Turkish side. In spite of all this, however, Turkey took back all her promises, refused to discuss the territorial issue and that of the refugees 161

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 162

From the President’s Office

and raised instead the issue of sovereignty, something that the Security Council rejects. During the Secretary-General’s representatives Messrs Camilion and Feissel recent visit to Ankara, the Turks threatened that under no circumstances would they discuss the territorial issue or any such matter unless the sovereignty of Mr Denktash is first recognised. For progress to be made, however, the Turkish side must talk within the framework of the decisions of the Security Council. Thus, for instance, it must be made clear to them that the issue of sovereignty that they put forward is simply not on. Are we talking of one Cyprus or of two of them? If we are indeed talking about one Cyprus there is no question of sovereignty. All this noise about the Constitution aims at the creation of two states. I have repeatedly stressed that we accept any constitutional expert who will prepare a Constitution for a federal country with a single sovereignty, a single international personality and all the basic features of unity that a state must possess. How can there be a federation without having first settled the territorial issue? In Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have always lived side by side. There have never been separate areas for Turks and separate areas for Greeks. In spite of this we have accepted that there should be one area where the Turkish Cypriots will live. The percentage of this area, however, cannot be the 40 per cent of the island that is now occupied by the Turkish troops. In spite of the fact that the Turkish Cypriots do not exceed 18 per cent of the population we have accepted for them a percentage between 25 per cent and 27 per cent as is made clear in the decisions of the Security Council. The Denktash theory is that there should be separate areas for Turkish Cypriots and separate ones for Greek Cypriots to live. How can you have one state and forbid the inhabitants of that state to live wherever they chose? Just imagine if there were in America separate areas where only black people or only Greeks or only Mexicans would be allowed to live and which other nationalities would be forbidden even to visit. This would certainly be a recipe for civil war. And while for all other areas this is deemed to be an absurd situation, in Cyprus you accept it or at least you listen to it and do not condemn it. If you really want to help so that progress is made on the Cyprus problem, you must ascribe responsibility to the side that holds up progress. You should not be vague. We have often declared ourselves ready to cooperate on the basis of the recent resolutions of the UN, 649 and 716. If Turkey is the one who refuses to negotiate, it is Turkey that must be blamed. On 30 March the Secretary-General met Mr Denktash, who met next day the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council. According 162

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 163

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Mr George Bush repeated yesterday his personal commitment to finding a 15 solution of the Cyprus problem. To a question put by us to the President 16 in person he replied: 17 ‘I will remain involved in this issue. The elections will not have a 18 negative effect on our efforts, as far as my commitment to spend the time 19 necessary to achieve this is concerned. I will do whatever is necessary, 20 whatever needs to be done – and I am giving this promise at this moment’ 21 said Bush turning towards the Cypriot president sitting on his right side 22 just before the start of the talks. 23 ‘Secondly,’ added Mr Bush, ‘no political disagreements on this issue 24 between Americans exist as happens with other matters ... and we want to 25 see in what way we can help find a solution to the problem.’ 26 Before that, Mr Bush had said that the United States feel that the 27 United Nations have now an important role to play in the Cyprus issue 28 and he expressed the hope that the interested parties would, as a whole, 29 help this effort to succeed. 30 ‘Sometimes they take steps forward and then they slide back,’ said Mr 31 Bush, referring indirectly but clearly to the breach of the Turkish 32 promises. 33 The newspaper Eleptheria tis Gnomis (Freedom of opinion) covered on 31 March the 34 meeting in a report under the title ‘Responsibilities fall on Turkey for the Impasse’: 35 36 37 The US President George Bush held, for the first time in public, Turkey 38 responsible for the impasse on the Cyprus issue and declared himself 39 committed to continue his efforts for the solution of the problem. 40 President Bush referred to the responsibilities of Turkey in a statement he made yesterday just before meeting President Vassiliou at the White House. to the report by our permanent representative, the US permanent representative Mr Pickering spoke in a very stern tone. Mr Denktash made a very bad impression generally and as one of the five permanent members put it: ‘Denktash shocked those who did not know him.’ In New York, Denktash opposed openly the active involvement of the Security Council and repeated his offer to meet me. This proposal was only made in order to create impressions and my reply was: ‘Let us meet by all means but within the frame of the United Nations, not outside it.’ Concerning the activation of the Security Council, the answer was given within days by Resolution 750. On 30 March, I had a meeting with President Bush which was very successful. Characteristically, the Athenian newspaper Elephtherotypia wrote on 31 March in reporting the event:

163

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 164

From the President’s Office

In reply to a question whether a solution of the Cyprus problem was possible this year the American president said he thought it could have been solved last year and added: ‘We tried. We visited Greece and Turkey and where we stumbled we could have helped to move a step forward. We will continue to work on this.’ The American president repeated that Turkey was responsible for the impasse on the Cyprus issue during his meeting with President Vassiliou. At this meeting between the two heads of state president Bush accepted that, for the deadlock to be broken, the American government must work on two levels regarding Turkey namely both on the UN level and on the bilateral level. During the meeting the President promised me in effect that he would send a letter to Demirel and that he would follow closely developments on the Cyprus issue. Regarding the meeting, the newspaper Simerini reported on 5 April 1992 that Andrew Athens, the president of the United National Greek-American Congress, said that the attention President Bush brings to the Cyprus issue is unprecedented: ‘The decision by President Bush to meet the President of the Cyprus Republic Mr G. Vassiliou last Monday to discuss Turkish intransigence concerning the solution of the Cyprus problem sent a strong message to the Turkish prime minister Mr Demirel,’ said Mr Athens. He argued that the meeting revealed where the USA stood with regard to the deadlock on the Cyprus issue. Mr Athens stressed that during his term in office Mr Bush met four times with President Vassiliou in the White House, while his predecessors had met only once the President of the Republic of Cyprus during their term in office. ‘It is unprecedented for today’s American administration to see President Bush involving himself personally in issues that concern Cyprus and Greece against the unanimous opinion and momentum created by the bureaucracy,’ said Mr Athens, adding that if this approach had been used in 1974 the tragedy in Cyprus could have been averted.26 President Bush had indeed decided to contribute to the solution of the Cyprus problem. The basic question, however, was to what extent was he prepared to exert pressure on Turkey. Ever since the Cold War, Turkey had acquired serious access to the State Department as well as to the Congress, and it was not easy for American policy to change in spite of the change in the international situation. Our task was exceedingly difficult. We had to convince that pressure to lead to a solution of the Cyprus problem would serve not just the interests of the USA, but also the genuine long-term interests of Turkey (keeping in mind that as long as the status quo remained in place in Cyprus, the road to the EEC would remain blocked for Turkey). For this 164

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 165

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

reason we had to develop relations with all sectors of public life, gaining support and 1 2 sympathy for our cause. Upon my return from the USA, I made on 2 April 1992 the following statement: 3 4 5 My visit to the USA and the contacts I had with the Secretary-General 6 and the permanent members of the Security Council and President Bush 7 show clearly to all of us that we are entering a new period of intensive 8 consultations aiming at breaking the impasse and reaching a fair and 9 viable solution of the Cyprus problem. 10 The Secretary-General of the UN has decided to launch a new intensive 11 effort but this time his hand will be strengthened by the full support of 12 the Security Council and the USA. This is the new element in the 13 situation that is now taking shape. In this way, while a few weeks ago it 14 seemed that because of the Turkish intransigence we would be entering a 15 period of stagnation on the Cyprus issue – which would have served the 16 Turkish aims – now, as a result of the steps we have taken, we are 17 entering a period of much more intensive activity which we can look 18 forward to with hope. We assured the Secretary-General of our full 19 cooperation. 20 [Question:] Mister President, the procedure was interrupted because the 21 Turkish side put forward certain conditions. In order to continue with the 22 procedure must not these conditions be withdrawn? Have they, by any 23 chance, been withdrawn? 24 [Answer:] As you know Mr Denktash has already tried to convince people 25 that it is all a misunderstanding as he tries to produce various explanations 26 about the whole subject of sovereignty etc. During the meeting I had with 27 the permanent members of the Security Council I nonetheless made it 28 clear that the procedure could not advance because the Turkish side 29 disregarded the conditions that the Security Council had fixed for the talks 30 to be carried out. The Security Council agreed with me on this issue. 31 According to reliable information this was also made clear to Mr 32 Denktash. What we are expecting, however, is for the Turkish side to 33 cooperate within the framework as fixed by the Security Council. 34 On 2 April the ministerial committee of the Council of Europe decided to make 35 public the report of the Council’s Human Rights commission concerning the 36 Human Rights violations by Turkey in Cyprus, a document that had remained 37 confidential since 1983. The decision by the Council to make this report public was 38 a hard blow against Turkey, which had managed for all these years to keep it under 39 wraps. The publication of the report was the result both of the activity of the Cypriot 40 government as well as of the negative stance by Turkey, and served as leverage to exert pressure on the Turkish government to make progress on the issue. 165

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 166

From the President’s Office

Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council and Resolution 750 On 3 April 1992 the UN Secretary-General, fulfilling his commitment, submitted his report to the Security Council on Cyprus. Following this, I made the following statement to the media: A characteristic feature of the report by the Secretary-General was his decision to undertake a new effort but also to make sure that in this new endeavour to break the impasse he would not be alone but would be strongly supported by the Security Council. The obvious aim of the Report is to bring an end to Turkish obstructionism. This pervades the whole report as the Secretary-General keeps insisting that the Turkish side must at long last respond to the basic issues such as the territorial and the one concerning the refugees. It must stop misinterpreting the decisions by the Security Council and thus waste valuable time. The report also repeats a series of the Secretary-General’s ideas and views all of which had, in essence, been included in previous reports and approved by the Security Council. There is not a single new element from this point of view. I also underlined: When and unless the Turkish side responds positively on matters of substance so that we can engage a substantial dialogue, then we too, will of course express our views on the various specific aspects of the problem and fight for a solution that will be within the spirit of the UN decisions and the high-level agreements. We can now, after this report was submitted, look forward to a positive decision by the Security Council and to the invitation by the SecretaryGeneral for the new effort to begin unfolding. The responses of the political parties to the report were similar to the one on the proposals by Pérez de Cuéllar in his ‘Food for Thought’ document. DHKO and EDEK rejected it outright. In contrast, DISY and AKEL accepted it but with reservations. This was also the response of the government. We expressed our willingness to discuss it, but we mentioned that the report contained points that needed changing and we insisted throughout on the need for Turkey to change its attitude. I must point out, however, that the reaction of DHKO became increasingly aggressive. In the offensive telegram he sent to the Secretary-General, Mr Kyprianou even goes so far as to say that he speaks on behalf of the overwhelming majority of the Cypriot people:

166

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 167

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

Telegram by Spyros Kyprianou to the Secretary-General (Agon 11/04/1992): We also inform you that we, in the Democratic Party, expressing the will of the overwhelming majority of the Cypriot people, will fight with all our forces and with all the means at our disposal to avert any attempt to impose on us a solution along the ‘Set of Ideas’ lines or any such frame based on the kind of philosophy pervading the Report of the Secretary-General Mr Gali to the Security Council. We believe that this violates brutally all the principles of the United Nations, the human rights and the terms of reference that the Secretary-General was given. It was amazing to witness the gall of the DHKO as it accused the UN SecretaryGeneral of violating the UN principles. Mr Papadopoulos, parliamentary spokesman of this party, called it a sad day for Cyprus in an interview he gave to the first programme of RIK on 8 April 1992 during the broadcast Apomesimero (Afternoon). He said: ‘We believe that panic should spread among Cypriot Hellenes because of the submission of the report by the new Secretary-General which adopts, in essence, all the views of Mr de Cuéllar.’ Soon after the report was submitted and after numerous talks were made with governments and heads of state, the Secretary-General and the members of the Security Council, Resolution 750 was adopted by the Security Council. The text was finalised after intensive work behind the scenes between us and the permanent members. The Resolution constituted a landmark in the relationship between the UN and the Cyprus issue as it provided for a stronger than ever involvement of the Security Council and especially of its five permanent members in the effort to solve the Cyprus problem, as becomes clear in paragraph 7: ‘The Security Council decides to remain seized of the Cyprus question on an ongoing and direct basis in support of the effort to complete the set of ideas referred to in paragraph 4 above and to conclude an overall framework agreement.’ Of especial importance was also paragraph 2 of the resolution, which made it clear in the best possible way that the solution of the Cyprus problem ‘must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded’. Resolution 750 (1992) stressed that the ideas contained in the report of the Secretary-General were to be considered as a basis for negotiation, aiming to produce a frame for an overall agreement. It was especially significant that the resolution of the Security Council underlined clearly and forcefully the need for the territorial and the refugee issues to be settled, considering the solution of these two aspects of the problem as a condition for and an integral part of any package to be agreed between the two sides.

167

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 168

From the President’s Office

The Resolution expressed once again and most emphatically the displeasure of the Council for the lack of progress on the Cyprus issue, a fact that was attributed to the negative attitude of the Turkish side regarding the efforts of the international organisation to overcome the deadlock and help initiate substantial negotiations. It further calls on the two sides ‘to adhere fully to these principles and to negotiate without introducing concepts that are at variance with them’, thus excluding the continuation of the tactics by the Turkish side to delay the procedure and to avoid any discussion on the substance of the issue. The Resolution illustrated in an obvious way the annoyance of the international community with the dilatory tactics that the Turkish side was consciously promoting. One could say without hesitation that the Resolution presented the Turkish side with a dilemma: either to abandon its negative stance until then or to incur the wrath of an international community keen to see the Cyprus problem solved. We were informed that during the closed session of the Security Council that approved the Resolution, the American representative Mr Pickering made a stern speech expressing essentially the annoyance of his government at the delay in the effort to promote a solution of the Cyprus problem. He said, word for word: ‘This process will not be allowed to go on for ever,’ meaning he had accepted our position with regard to the Turkish method of inventing one interpretation and producing one proposal after another to delay the procedure. This is, of course, the full meaning of paragraph 3 of the Resolution, which ‘calls again upon the parties to adhere fully to these principles and to negotiate without introducing concepts that are at variance with them’, referring to the beginning of paragraph 2 and especially to ‘one sovereignty’, discouraging the Turkish side from introducing concepts such as selfdetermination, two peoples and separate sovereignty, as it had attempted to do in the past. Resolution 750 may have referred many times positively to our positions and opened the way to serious negotiations, but it did create at the same time serious confrontations within Cyprus. It is surprising that, instead of welcoming unanimously Resolution 750 and expressing immediately our decisiveness to put to good use this new international climate in order to promote a solution to our problem, there were strong criticisms voiced from our side, with some even trying to give the impression that this was a catastrophic Resolution, as Mr Kyprianou mentioned in his telegram to the Secretary-General. Responding to this sterile negative criticism, I made the following speech in Larnaka (15 April 1992): It is inconceivable for us, after having placed from day one and continuing to do so all our hopes for avoiding the faits accomplis on the assistance of the international community and the active involvement of the Security Council, to turn now against the UN just when as a result of our correct policy and tactics we have at long last succeeded in stirring such a strong 168

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 169

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

international interest in our cause. The result of this would surely be catastrophic for our country. Why? Because the choice we have is very simple. We either keep the dialogue alive, ensure the solidarity of the international community and fight to bend the Turkish intransigence in order to move towards a solution or we let the dialogue die and the Cyprus issue sink into a new impasse in which case we promote the partition of the island by perpetuating the so-called status quo. The other aspect has to do with our application for Cyprus to become a member of the European Community. It is well known that when we did submit our application we gave assurances to the community that we will continue in parallel the efforts for a solution of the Cyprus issue, that we are doing everything we can in this direction, but could not wait forever on account of the negative stance of the Turkish side. We thus asked the European Community – and our request was granted – to move on with examining our application while we would pursue the efforts for a solution of the Cyprus issue. We also argued at the same time that in case the negative stance of Turkey were to continue, the EU should not punish our side by ignoring our application, but should on the contrary respond to it in a positive way and exert increased pressure on the Turkish side to change its position and help reach a solution of the Cyprus issue. It is obvious that the moment the EU would form the opinion that it is our side that is responsible, or at least shares responsibility, for the lack of progress, it would stop being as positive as it is today. As far as our side is concerned it would be inconceivable to even think of rejecting Resolution 750 or any UN resolution, when up till now our policy as a whole has been based on the respect of the resolutions and the principles of the UN. It is also well known that you cannot pick and choose the UN resolutions that you will abide by and those that you will not.

Indications of a change in the Turkish stance The international interest in the Cyprus issue, Resolution 750, the very clear position taken by President Bush, the acceptance of our application to join the EEC, could not but affect Turkey at some point. This was pointed out by Elephtherotypia in its report from Istanbul on 4 April 1992, which reads as follows: Őzal–Demirel agreed on a solution of the Cyprus problem. The President of Turkey Turgut Őzal and the prime minister Suleiman Demirel have agreed on the immediate solution of the Cyprus problem and the display of flexibility. This is what the Turkish newspaper Hurriet claimed yesterday. For some days now commentators in the Turkish press have been preparing Turkish public opinion for a number of ‘moves’ on 169

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 170

From the President’s Office

this issue. Meanwhile the statement made the day before yesterday by the Turkish-Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash to the effect that he did not stand for sovereignty but for common sovereignty with the Greek-Cypriots did create an impression. Hurriet, in its yesterday’s issue, claims that ‘Messrs Őzal and Demirel have agreed that Turkey must show some flexibility on the Cyprus issue’. Őzal was already convinced of this, according to the report, adding that the Turkish President believes the Cyprus problem must be solved before Washington decides on a solution of the Iraq problem because at present Turkey has some advantages with regard to her relations with the USA. All these international developments and the news from Turkey did influence the National Council which, after three intensive sessions on 8, 20 and 21 April 1992, reached unanimously the following decision: 1 The National Council reaffirms its position that the Cyprus problem can and must be solved on the basis of the decisions and proposals of January 1989 based on the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979 as well as on the resolutions of the United Nations on the Cyprus issue. 2 The National Council, after the requisite briefing, reckoned that there had been no commitment by the President of the Republic as to the ideas included in the report by the Secretary-General, Mr Gali. 3 The National Council decided that we should respond positively to the invitation by the Secretary-General for consultations with him and his representatives, as well as with the Security Council, aimed at promoting the solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of our proposals. Answering a question by a journalist on the session of the National Council, I clarified: that the government, enjoying the support not of all the parties but of the two larger parties, is ready to negotiate on the basis of the Ideas which, let me repeat one more time, are simply a basis for negotiation not for a solution. As is well known the Democratic Rally and AKEL agree with this line while DHKO and EDEK disagree as far as the Ideas are concerned but all agree on the negotiating aims. The Ideas of the Secretary-General have not been agreed upon. The only thing that was agreed in the document by the Secretary-General is paragraph 18.27 Anyway he says so clearly himself. Had we disagreed with this paragraph or had it contained anything differing from our proposals, then there would be a problem. We believe that paragraph 18 is in full harmony with our proposals and is a very important element. Everything else in the Ideas is subject to discussion. 170

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 171

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

When the question was put to me whether the Ideas of the Secretary-General do 1 2 contain elements that are unacceptable, I replied: 3 4 What I want to say is that it would not be right and would not help our case 5 to begin negotiating amongst ourselves. Negotiations must, after all, be 6 carried out with the Turkish side. These Ideas contain undoubtedly elements 7 with which we agree and also elements with which we disagree. What has 8 priority at this moment is for the Turkish side to respond – as asked for in 9 Resolution 750 – to the pending issues regarding territory and the refugees so 10 as to unblock the road for a substantial dialogue on all the other issues. 11 While we had these discussions in Cyprus, the international mobility on the Cyprus 12 issue intensified. By the end of April, Őzal made an astounding statement that was 13 given wide publicity in the Turkish press. Reproducing this statement, the 14 newspaper Agon of 30 April wrote: ‘As a stone blocking Turkey’s path every time 15 she makes a move was how Turgut Őzal described the Cyprus issue saying word for 16 word: “Cyprus is a stone for Turkey. We stumble on it at every move we make”.’ 17 The Turkish press published details of the conversation Mr Őzal had with Turkish 18 journalists in the USA and reported the following statement made by the Turkish 19 President: 20 21 I don’t know by whom and how it is going to be done but the Cyprus 22 issue must at last be settled. Turkey has acquired a very wide field of 23 action today from Central Asia to the Balkans. Every time she makes a 24 move she stumbles on a stone that is called Cyprus. There is now a 25 situation that favours a solution. Let us not forget the following: Too 26 much greed can cause damage. Look at recent developments. Which one 27 of the three Security Council resolutions 649, 715 or 750 is the best? 28 29 And Mr Őzal added: ‘You can see that when great greed is given free rein we lose 30 ground. Resolutions such as these (716 and 750) could have been worse.’ This was 31 the first admission of its kind concerning the problems that the Cyprus issue, as well 32 as our diplomacy and policies, were creating for Turkey. 33 My comments on these news items were very restrained as I said: 34 ‘I hope that Mr Őzal will succeed in convincing the Turkish side to decide at long 35 last to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the UN.’ 36 The admission by Őzal was one more confirmation that our policy line was the 37 correct one. Presenting this policy to an all-community meeting at Yeri on Sunday 38 12 April 1992, I said: 39 40 We did not waste our efforts in sloganeering and promoting the basic aspects of the Cyprus issue within the country, but we gave special emphasis in promoting them internationally. 171

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 172

From the President’s Office

Today, more than ever, we are witnessing the greatest international mobility on the Cyprus problem. The international community is preoccupied with this in spite of the fact that there are many other pending international problems. The greatest danger that Cyprus could face today would be for this international interest to evaporate, something that can happen very easily if we allow it to happen. If we showed indifference and did not display a will to negotiate, then international interest would automatically wane, thus increasing the danger that the faits accomplis might be legitimised. What stopped Turkey from proceeding with her plans to gain recognition for the so-called Turkish-Cypriot state has been the international mobility and the right policy of the government consisting in conveying the message that we are really interested in securing a fair and viable solution of the Cyprus problem. Our side has always cooperated and will continue to cooperate with the UN as opposed to the Turkish side which displays intransigence. One of the greatest dangers we face is the continuation of the present situation which is the worst possible solution that can exist for the Cyprus problem and which has never stopped being the objective of the Turkish side. Stagnation and postponement serve best the interests of Turkey. It suffices for us to abandon the tragic compromise over a federation that President Makarios was obliged to make for any significant interest on Cyprus to evaporate even in Greece. However, in spite of the obvious progress of our case internationally and in spite of the decision by the National Council, the opposition became more and more aggressive. They mobilised many known and unknown refugee organisations, with the Archbishop at their head, and launched vicious attacks against everybody: Vassiliou, the government, the Secretary-General, the UN, the Security Council et al; they organised a mass rally on 21 May at Ledra Palace. The Archbishop went so far as to send a letter to Karamanlis accusing us of treason. The response, issued by the government spokesman, was stern: I express the government’s deepest distress because his Holiness resorted to gross language and name-calling that is totally unfounded and offensive to our people and the political leadership, in order to promote his political views. Unfortunately, the recent history of Cyprus is replete with such painful experiences when verbal ‘patriotism’ and unrestrained sloganeering led our country into terrible disasters. We are very much afraid that if, once again, the ‘patriotic’ outbursts replace mature political thought the only outcome will be to create confusion and dissent within the people, something that at this crucial juncture is harmful to our national interests. Such tactics 172

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 173

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

can only offer arguments to the Turkish side to perpetuate the occupation by 35,000 Turkish soldiers and the status of the refugees. The truth was that as a result of the judicious government policy, the Cyprus problem climbed up to the peaks of international decision-making centres from the White House to the Kremlin. All the basic aspects of the Cyprus issue, such as the question of the removal of the Turkish occupying troops and the settlers, the implementation of the right of the refugees to return to their ancestral homes, the question of the guarantees, the territorial issue and the abolition of the unacceptable status quo, were being discussed and examined in the above-mentioned centres, which we had convinced of the necessity for the Cyprus problem to be solved. Nonetheless, within Cyprus, DHKO and EDEK, pursuing their no-holds-barred polemics, insisted that the Cyprus issue and the Resolution be debated in Parliament. AKEL and DISY disagreed, but were obliged to accept the proposal. During the discussion, Messrs Clerides and Christofias repeated the already approved decision of the National Council to the effect that we must respond positively to the invitation by the Secretary-General and stressed the dangers if we refused to do so. The positions of EDEK and DHKO were well known. It is interesting nonetheless to give here excerpts from the speech by the parliamentary spokesman of DHKO, Mr Papadopoulos (Haravgi, 7 May 1992): The ‘Set of Ideas’ outlines a solution of the Cyprus problem that is unacceptable and catastrophic for the Hellenism of Cyprus... We consider catastrophic, both in terms of tactics and in terms of substance, the view that we have to accept participation in talks with the UN SecretaryGeneral and to present there our disagreements with the provisions included in the ‘Set of Ideas’... The first thing that must be done is to declare clearly and in the loudest possible voice from the official podium of this Parliament that all political parties will decisively, irrespective of any consequences and disregarding all sacrifices, refuse to ever accept a solution like the one prescribed by the ‘Set of Ideas’. The second thing we must do is to declare clearly and convincingly that we reject the ‘Set of Ideas’ as an acceptable or even tolerable basis for carrying out negotiations. Finishing his speech, he repeated the slogan about: a visit to Greece so that an all-national policy and course can be traced in common. A policy that will include a common conception of the responsibilities involved and which will display our common decisiveness to resist by all means and incur, as the nation of Hellenes, any sacrifice, in order to avert the catastrophe that is outlined by the ‘Set of Ideas’. 173

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 174

From the President’s Office

He was saying this in the full knowledge that the political leadership in Greece supported unanimously the line we were following and the negotiations. The answer was given by Mr N. Rolandis of the Liberals: ‘If we reject this opportunity, which is not catastrophic, not suicidal, which does not mean the Turkification of Cyprus but – in spite of certain points that we must correct – leads to a federation, I am afraid the pseudo-state will be recognised.’ All the attacks by the opposition were demagogic in character without offering a single substantial proposal. The parliamentary spokesman of AKEL, Mr Nikos Katsouridis, had this to say about the issue: The entire case made by EDEK ended up with one final proposal as our ultimate way out and recourse: An appeal to be lodged with the General Assembly of the UN! However this proposal is neither novel nor does it overcome the fear by EDEK and others of a Turkish-controlled UN Security Council. As it happens, while we express our lack of trust in the Security Council we do, at the same time, seek refuge in its arms. Quite sincerely I fail to understand what exactly it is that we want. If we believe that the members of the Security Council are all against us, or even have a prior commitment to be against us as Mr Tassos Papadopoulos (parliamentary spokesman for DHKO) mentioned, then I wonder what chances we do have in the General Assembly as well. Unless, that is, we believe that in today’s American order of things, the majority of the members of the General Assembly will essentially oppose the positions of the Security Council members even if the non-permanent members are unanimous on the issue. In the end, the marathon three-day session of parliament finished on a flat note. The dissension among the parties was finalised and it was not possible to pass a resolution because of these differences.

New rounds of talks: First round – May to June On 5 May the Secretary-General, Mr Boutros-Gali, sent identical letters to Messrs Mitsotakis, Őzal, Denktash and me, in which he said: At the request of members of the Council, my representatives met earlier today with the President and the Ambassadors of the permanent members of the Council. They reiterated to Messrs. Camilion and Feissel the importance they attached to fulfilling the objectives set out in Resolution 750 (1992) and their resolve to assist in bringing this about. In this connection, they asked that during the forthcoming talks, my 174

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 175

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

representatives keep them fully informed through their ambassadors in the area. As a first step, I have asked my representatives to resume their talks in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey during the first half of May in line with paragraphs 4 and 8 of resolution 750 (1992). At the conclusion of these discussions, I intend to review the situation with members of the Council and decide how to proceed in June. With the adoption of resolution 750 (1992), we have entered a critical phase of the Cyprus question. I hope that I can count on the full support of both sides in Cyprus and of Greece and Turkey in making real progress during the coming two months. Immediately after, Messrs Camilion, Feissel and Kavanagh returned to Cyprus. During a meeting they had in New York with the permanent representative of Cyprus before leaving for the island, Mr Camilion pointed out that in his opinion this was the first time that such a well-organised initiative on the Cyprus issue was being launched and he also stressed that this was the first time when they felt they had so much ‘ammunition’ in their hands to promote the procedure. After his first meeting with me, Mr Camilion declared: We begin this round of talks in an optimistic mood about its outcome. We are convinced that we have a good instrument in our hands, the recent resolution of the Security Council and we know we can count on the support and the interest of the Security Council which follows developments very closely. I believe we must rely on the goodwill of both sides and try to help everybody to follow the right path. We are full of expectations and hopes. It so happened that the bi-monthly Bush report was also made public at that time. In this document the US President clearly blamed the Turkish side for shipwrecking all the efforts that had been made during the months of January and February: The Secretary-General’s Cyprus negotiators returned to Ankara on February 17. After meeting with representatives of the government of Turkey, they expressed concern that Turkey appeared to be placing conditions on the continuation of the negotiation along lines put forward earlier by the Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, these conditions seemed to go beyond the mandate conferred on the Secretary-General by the UN Security Council as reaffirmed in UN Security Council Resolutions 649 (1990) and 716 (1991). Commenting on the report, I said: ‘This shows that the Turkish side can no longer continue with its present tactics of non-cooperation. The patience of the international 175

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 176

From the President’s Office

community is wearing thin as the need to see, at long last, progress being made becomes overwhelming.’ In the meantime the ‘rejectionists’ kept on as before. At the rally that took place at the Ledra Palace barricade, the well-known slogans of DHKO and EDEK were once again repeated, as well as the positions of the Archbishop against the Federation. This entire policy of denial pleased Mr Denktash, but had a limited impact in Cyprus and none whatever in Greece. This was made clear during the talks I had in Athens on 21 and 22 May, where I went to address a conference organised by the Herald Tribune. As always, I met the leaders of all the parliamentary parties. The most important one was the one I had with the president of PASOK, Mr Papandreou, who had previously criticised Resolution 750. During the meeting, also attended by our foreign minister, Mr Iacovou, we presented things as they really were. Characteristically, Mr Papandreou had no argument against and agreed, on the contrary, that the only procedure available to us was to accept the invitation by the UN and join the talks. In spite of this, in his public statements, probably because he had committed himself too strongly with his outspoken criticism against Resolution 750, he expressed some misgivings. Generally speaking, however, the attitude he adopted was such as to take the edge off the impressions that had been created as a result of his previous statements. The crowning of my visit was the meeting I had with the president of the Hellenic Republic, Mr Karamanlis. This was a particularly warm and cordial occasion from the moment he took me by the hand to guide me to his office until such time as we took leave of each other. Having explained to Mr Karamanlis the Gali’s Ideas, he agreed with me that it would be a tragic mistake to reject them and stressed that I should proceed with the consultations decisively. He also said that if I could secure the Gobbi line on the territorial issue, I should accept it because we could not hope for a better solution on this matter. Mr Karamanlis advised me also to ignore the various extremists and spoke in a very negative way of the letter sent by the Archbishop and the contestation of the very concept of Federation after such a long time. Generally speaking, President Karamanlis gave me his full support, spoke very positively to the journalists and said jokingly that I was a gourlis (luck-bringer) and that this was the reason I was the first person he chose to see after his return from London, where he had gone for medical checks. A few days later, the Secretary-General invited us to go to New York for talks. In his letter he proposed the following procedure: I propose to adopt the following procedure: After separate introductory meetings with each leader on Thursday, 18 June, the following days would be devoted to proximity talks on the set of ideas covering with equal clarity all eight headings to ascertain the possibility of reaching an 176

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 177

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

agreement as an integrated whole. In line with Resolution 750, initial attention will be focused on the outstanding issues, in particular territorial adjustments and displaced persons. If the two leaders are within agreement range on all headings, I propose that these talks be followed immediately by a joint meeting to complete the work. A successful joint meeting would enable the convening of a high-level international meeting envisaged by the Security Council to conclude an overall framework agreement. As requested in paragraph 8 of resolution 750, the members of the Security Council have been briefed of my plans for the meetings beginning in mid-June and they have been assured that I will keep them informed of developments on a day-to-day basis during the course of these talks. I propose that Mr Camilion and Mr Feissel meet with both leaders in Cyprus as well as with senior officials in Ankara and Athens during the week of 8 June to brief them fully on the forthcoming meetings. I look forward to our meetings and to your cooperation and that of Mr Denktash at this critical stage of our effort to achieve a solution to the Cyprus question. At the same time, the Secretary-General, wanting to ensure as much as possible the chances of success for the meeting in New York, wrote to President Bush informing him of the preparations he had made and the invitations he had sent, asking him to appoint a Special Representative for the duration of the negotiations (see Appendix 11). After the invitation by the Secretary-General, we focused on preparing for the talks in New York. We needed to examine all the issues, both ourselves and also with the parties, discuss them at length in every detail as well as shape our arguments, so as to be able to face all possible eventualities. On 4 June, I gave a long interview to Turkish television. It was the first time that a Cypriot politician was given the opportunity to communicate directly with the Turkish people (see Appendix 12) and that is why I tried to explain that the solution of a federation and the ‘Gali Ideas’ serve the legitimate interests of all Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish, as well as of Turkey. In line with the preparation for the negotiations, I called for a session of the National Council that took place on Saturday 6 June. I started with a full briefing about the developments until the beginning of June. My main points were the following: We said with Messrs Camilion and Feissel that we would negotiate on the basis of Resolution 750 which was the launch-pad from which the Secretary-General had started his new effort. We stressed that we did not agree with the Ideas or with various points that they contained but that we did not plan to start discussing our disagreements on various such points before the negotiation as a whole gets under way. We also stressed 177

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 178

From the President’s Office

that as we agreed that negotiations be held on the basis of Resolution 750. This means that the UN must uphold Resolution 750 and ask the Turkish side to respond in a clear and unambiguous way on the territorial issue as well as that concerning the refugees so that we can all know whether it is worth getting on with the procedure or not. By the way – as I had said also during the special meetings I had with the parties – even the Archbishop agreed with me that this is the right tactic, namely that we should not start discussing issues unless the Turks showed goodwill. The UN respected this provision to the letter, I would say, as they discussed with Denktash only the territorial and the refugee issues while they did not ask to discuss anything with us. They simply briefed us about what was happening. Specifically on the territorial issue they showed Denktash a map they had themselves prepared which was more or less along the Gobbi line. The essence of this map is the fact that from here to Famagousta [sic] all the main Greek villages, Morphou, Zodia, Gerolakkos etc., are included in the area coming under Greek-Cypriot control, thus implementing, as I said, the Gobbi line. I do not know precisely whether this represents 27 per cent or 27.1 per cent or 26.8 per cent of the island’s territory as we do not have a copy of the map. Denktash, who in the autumn was refusing even to see the map, accepted this time to look at it and even photographed it from all sides. He made no positive comment, did not reject it during the discussions, did not say he did not accept it, neither did he say that he accepted it. This, as far as the territorial issue is concerned. As for the refugees his initial position was that he insisted on the socalled zero base. You all know what this means, yet to avoid any misunderstanding I wish to repeat that Denktash, as is well-known, refuses to recognise the properties of the refugees – he considers them as belonging to him – and holds the view that any refugee who wants to return should buy land and if he is allowed to do so then he can come back. This is roughly speaking the philosophy of Denktash which, it goes without saying, the UN did not accept. They rejected it telling him that he cannot say on the one hand that he accepts Resolution 750 and insist at the same time that he does not recognise the right of the refugees to return to their homes. After a long discussion that lasted three days and obviously after having received instructions from Ankara, Denktash said he accepted to discuss the issue of the return of the refugees. I have personally my doubts as to what Denktash means behaving like this. If he really means it, this will show. This was, in essence, the exchange of views here in Cyprus. In Ankara, what the UN found was a total change of climate as compared to the situation prevailing when they had last been there in February. This time they were welcomed formally as important 178

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 179

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

personalities, and were received by Demirel, Cetin and others. Demirel told them clearly that Turkey had decided to solve the Cyprus problem because it is in its interest to do so. While Turkey’s interests, he explained, were extending both northwards and eastwards from the Caucasus to Central Asia, the Cyprus issue was seen as an obstacle which they wanted to get rid of so as to be able to implement their plans. But – as I feel I have to repeat – Demirel did not discuss with them the various practical aspects of the issue. In other words they did not discuss with him the details such as to what extent, for instance, he accepts the Gobbi line or anything else. Speaking generally, however, he told them that the Turks were ready to solve any problem. During their talks with others such as the Turkish Foreign Minister and the civil servants of the Foreign Ministry, the same line was repeated, namely that they wanted the Cyprus problem to be solved implying that they accept the Gobbi line and the right of the refugees to return to their homes. There is of course nothing tangible to that effect, no commitment only certain indications. We agreed with the Americans, having been asked by them for our opinion, that it would be a good idea for them to send Mr Letsky to convince the Turks that they should go to New York with a specific position both on the territorial and the refugee issue. This is also the position that I push from the day that Mr Camilion returned from Ankara in my contacts with him and also with other foreign officials. I keep telling everybody that if the UN does not insist on getting a positive response by Denktash on the territorial and the refugees issues they should not move on to discuss the package as a whole because this would be a recipe for failure. Denktash named the following criteria during the discussions: The Turkish area should at some point touch Dekeleia (not making clear whether he means Dekeleia itself or St Nicholas-Dekeleia as the UN did not clarify this point with me) claiming that land productivity and the water-rich strata at Morphou must be preserved. Denktash holds the theory that the only water resource that exists in the Turkish-held area consists in Morphou’s water-rich strata, a view that our own studies have rejected as untrue. While the Turks were at one time arguing for military reasons in favour of a straight line, whatever this would be, they are now saying they accept a zigzag line so as to make sure that most of the Greek villages be included in the Greek area and most of the Turkish ones in the Turkish area. I discussed this issue with the UN and from what I gather informally from Mr Camilion – and this is a very confidential piece of information that I managed to get hold of – they are not prepared to enter a discussion on criteria, because they simply refuse to discuss criteria as such. The UN will 179

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 180

From the President’s Office

simply take into account these criteria, if they have not already done so, in their proposals or ideas given that their ideas can very easily turn into proposals at any given moment. For the time being they have not committed themselves one way or another. We will go to New York and insist that there must be progress before any proximity talks can take place. That is why, for tactical reasons, I believe that at this stage no one but myself and the foreign minister should go to New York. If there is enough progress to enable us to enter into negotiations on substance, on a package for solving the Cyprus problem, then I would very much wish for the political leaders to come to New York as well. I will let you know about this and will invite you if it comes to that. I think, however, it would be a tactical error if we now announced that we would all go because we would thus give the impression that in our opinion progress had been made and that we go there for an agreement while I believe that we have only a fifty-fifty chance of progress having been made. One cannot exclude the fact that no progress has been made. This, then, is the situation concerning consultations with the UN. I also explained what we had done to convince all interested parties that they should unquestionably reject two basic Turkish positions namely their refusal to recognise the right of refugees to their properties and also the one about the alternating presidency. Among the many arguments I used for the latter Turkish claim – speaking with the Russians, the Americans and the Canadian lady who is Foreign Minister of her country – is that in Croatia where they are supposedly seeking a settlement, the only solution is for them either to allow Milosevic to take over the areas and build a Greater Serbia – something that they will never accept – or to grant some autonomy to the Serb areas within Croatia. Just think what would happen if the Serbs made it a condition that for this to happen every ten years the president of Croatia would have to be a Serb from Krajina or Slavonia. I used the same argument for Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia: namely that the Azeris would at best accept the creation of a federation or of an autonomous region. Would it ever be possible for Azerbaijan to accept that every 10 or 20 years its president would be Armenian not because he would be elected to the post but because he would be imposed on them? Up till now I met with understanding on this issue for which we have been preparing ourselves even though the UN has not formally put it to us. The permanent members of the Security Council continued their preparations as they wanted to become substantially involved in the issue. The Soviet Union sent a special representative, while Britain declared it would step in actively by sending an envoy to the separate meetings between Boutros-Gali, Vassiliou and Mr Denktash. 180

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 181

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

A few days later, Nelson Letsky came to the area for a new round of talks both in Ankara and in Cyprus. We met many times with Mr Letsky, as well as with Messrs Camilion and Feissel, aiming to prepare the ground for the crucial meeting of 18 June. In the meantime, the opposition tried in every possible way to belittle the significance of the negotiations, repeating that everything had been agreed in advance. From time to time there were reports that a fully blown plan was already in existence, which was simply untrue. They hoped, though, that in this way they could create confusion and raise suspicions. The party newspaper of DHKO reported constantly news items such as the following, published on 10 June 1992: ‘The aim of the Letsky mission, according to more recent information from Washington and foreign diplomatic circles, is to ensure that President Vassiliou will show flexibility during the consultations in New York and accept the alternating presidency.’ On my way to Rio for the UN conference on the environment, I stopped at Athens where I met the prime minister, Mr Mitsotakis. After the meeting, I made the following statement to refute these tendentious reports: Given that many items have appeared in the press recently about allegedly pre-packaged solution plans I want to state in the most categorical way that no plan for a solution does exist. We will go to New York to insist decisively that it is time for a solution. Whether there will be progress or not I cannot say at this moment because everything depends on the stance adopted by the Turkish side, especially at the beginning of the consultations. The reason is, as you know, that according to Resolution 750 there must first be progress on the issues dealing with territory and the refugees so that the Secretary-General can then begin discussing all the aspects of a possible solution aiming at the final total agreement. To conclude, I would like to point out that the interest displayed on the Cyprus problem by the Secretary-General and the five permanent members of the Security Council is unprecedented in the history of the problem. Such an involvement of the Security Council and the active interest shown by everybody is what keeps us hoping. Nonetheless, I do repeat that one should not say that we go to New York feeling either optimistic or pessimistic. What matters is that we go there prepared to fight for our rights, to defend our fair demands and achieve a solution that will be in the best interests of everybody, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus and by extension Greece and Turkey as well as in the best interests of our area in general. The Greek prime minister made the following statement: What is certain is that the Cyprus issue enters a crucial and decisive phase which may be its last. I share entirely the view of my friend Mr Vassiliou the President of Cyprus that we are neither optimistic nor pessimistic. 181

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 182

From the President’s Office

We are simply firm in our decision to do, each of us, our best, as expected, in order to achieve a fair and viable solution of the problem for which there are now hopes precisely because the issue has matured in the minds of the world community. I also hope that it has matured in the conscience of the interested parties. I hope that the Turkish side has, by now, reached the conclusion – which is realistic as it responds to the existing situation – that a solution of the Cyprus problem will be in the interests of all the parties involved, i.e. Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the area as a whole. In Rio de Janeiro, I was given the opportunity to discuss on the margins of the UN conference, with heads of state, prime ministers and other international personalities, the developments and the negotiations that were due to begin in a few days in New York. The most important of these meetings was the one with President Bush, who assured me of the firm support by the USA during the entire procedure that was about to begin. On 12 June, at the official opening of the conference, I had a brief conversation with the Turkish prime minister Mr Demirel and the foreign minister Mr Cetin. I stressed to both of them the need for progress on the Cyprus issue and also that the continuation of the present situation was not in the interests of Turkey. Both Mr Demirel and Mr Cetin agreed with me, but stressed that the solution must be found by me and Mr Denktash. I replied that I am ready to work for a solution, but the problem is that Mr Denktash does not seem to want a solution. Messrs Demirel and Cetin agreed with me that progress on the Cyprus issue is in the interests of Turkey, especially in the spirit of this new age, but the discussion did not touch at all on any of the specific issues. Meanwhile, upon my arrival in New York, I found that the Secretariat of the UN was developing ideas not only on the territorial and the refugee issues, but on eight other ones as well, which, the journalist Mr Angelidis informed me, they planned to submit during the negotiations. During the dinner that followed with Messrs Feissel and Camilion, I raised the issue and confirmed that this was indeed their intention because, as they said, they could thus convince Mr Denktash to cooperate. I reacted very strongly and told them that if they went ahead with such a scheme I would quit the talks because such a course is contrary to Resolution 750. The atmosphere created became very tense, reaching, perhaps, its worst since talks with Camilion and Feissel had begun. I then invited Letsky for consultations and later the British High Commissioner Mr David Dane. Camilion and Feissel both came back in the afternoon and the discussion went on for some time. I tried to change their minds, explaining the reasons why this action should not be taken. Besides all other objections, such a move would harm me personally and would surely strengthen the tendency of Mr Denktash to be negative. The result of such an initiative would be to damage the case, not to help it succeed. 182

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 183

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

I used various arguments to convince them that on no account should a new Idea be submitted unless there is first progress on the territorial and the refugee issues, because this would offer Mr Denktash a pretext to avoid taking a stance on these vital, for us, aspects of the problem. Messrs Letsky and Dane agreed with me, but Messrs Camilion and Feissel remained unconvinced to the very end. It was obvious that they had promised Denktash something. Finally, Camilion and Feissel met again with Letsky and Dane, discussed the whole matter, and the next morning, at the breakfast I had with the American ambassador, Mr Edwards, and Mr Letsky, the latter assured me that they had almost convinced the UN representatives that no new documents should be submitted unless progress was made. The issue came to its close when Mr Boutros-Gali, during the personal meeting I had with him on Thursday 18 June 1992, assured me that he would not accept the submission of any other documents unless there was progress on the territorial and the refugee issues, and that if Mr Denktash refused to cooperate they would put pressure on him but would not move to other issues. Another matter that was discussed thoroughly and in all its details during Wednesday and Thursday morning was the issue of the ‘alternating presidency’. I tried my best to make them forget this idea because this was something the Cypriots would never accept and also because such a scheme simply cannot work. I thought I had managed to convince the Americans, while the British still had a number of misgivings as they wanted to find a way to satisfy the Turkish side. Camilion continued to consider it a good idea even though he could see the problems that such an arrangement would generate. Another issue on which I briefed the National Council after my return from New York, and which the Secretary-General had mentioned during our personal meeting we had on Thursday before the formal one, was whether I would agree to participate at a lunch with Mr Denktash. The idea had already made the rounds in New York before the dialogue had even begun. This was an initiative of the Secretary-General, but my response was that something like this would serve no purpose unless some progress had first been achieved. The Secretary-General accepted my view and said that we would respond to events as they developed. The next item for discussion was whether the Secretary-General would or would not submit a map on Friday. The Turks insisted that he should not; we, that he should. Finally, it was, once again, our view that prevailed. What was happening in New York was that we went to the UN for one hour every day, but the bulk of the work was not done during that hour. Some work was done there of course, but most of it took place during our separate meetings with the Secretariat, that is, Messrs Camilion and Feissel, or with Messrs Letsky, Dane and Richardson, who had come from Britain – Mr Letsky came with Mr Ramson and on one occasion Mrs Hall was also present – as well as with the Russians and the French representatives. Once or twice we saw the Chinese, who most of the time only listened. There was thus much ado behind the scenes to shape the line that was to be followed the next day. Naturally, the Turks were active behind the scenes too. 183

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 184

From the President’s Office

In the end the map was submitted, but Mr Denktash reacted to it with such intensity and begged so much for it not to be revealed that when I met the SecretaryGeneral in the afternoon, he did not want to show me the map. He had in front of him a map with the Gobbi line and spoke in general terms. I asked him if we could have a glance at the map. The Secretary-General said that of course we could see it. I realised that this did not please Mr Feissel at all as he refused at first but finally produced the map, unwrapped it and showed it to us. They did not allow us to take notes and when I asked them why such secrecy on this issue, they said that they had embarrassed the Turks so much by submitting the map that the Turks had begged them not to give it to the Greek side, which would exploit it in order to present new demands and thus weaken the arguments of the Turkish side. I then described the map that the Secretary-General had shown me according to which the percentage of territory that would come under Turkish–Cypriot administration would be around 27.5 per cent. The leaders of the parties decided unanimously not to refer to the map during their briefings to the political bureaus and the committees of their parties since there was no concrete evidence about it. Continuing my briefing to the National Council I said: When they showed me the map, I did not display any enthusiasm. I said on the contrary that our position had always been that the territory occupied by the Turkish Cypriots should be around 25 per cent and no more. I added, however, that we are ready to discuss in good faith within the frame of what is called the Gobbi line, but that the whole issue is directly linked with the discussion on securing property rights. I noted particularly the fact that they had left Louroudzina to the Greek side thus proving that the position of Denktash about ‘zeroing of properties’ was totally unacceptable and silly, because what does it really mean? Does it mean that we will go to Louroudzina and Pergamos and tell the Turks there that from that moment they no longer owned any property and that their houses belonged to us from now on? Nobody on our side could even think of such an outcome. This was, basically, the subject of discussion on Friday. The next day the issue that was covered had to do with the refugees and that marked the first major conflict with Denktash. To begin with, Denktash protested because the communiqué that was issued gave priority to the refugee issue. However, the Secretary-General said that it was his decision to do so and did not allow him to go on. Then Denktash started to complain again about the map and was asking whether it would be sent to the Security Council and what the Security Council could do about it. To this, the Secretary-General replied that the Security Council does as it thinks fit and that he would not be the person to dictate to them. At this point Denktash came back asking again to be informed what the Security 184

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 185

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

Council could do. The Secretary-General gave the same answer and after that they moved on to discuss the territorial issue. At the briefing, the representatives of the Secretary-General told me that Denktash mentions indemnifications and said that this was essentially his position on the subject. I presented our positions on the right of return and the right to property but on the subject of indemnifications I explained to the Secretary-General certain aspects of the Cyprus problem. I told him that when Denktash speaks about indemnifications he means indemnifications with our money. It is as if the seller pays the buyer for what the latter is buying instead of being paid by him. In other words Denktash wants to keep the Greek properties and make the Greeks pay for the properties that he will appropriate. The issue has a double edge. For us it is unacceptable to present the issue in this way. We insist on the right of return, meaning of course right of return to specific properties, but also the right of those who will not return to hold their properties. We naturally do not deny the right of those who choose not to return to sell their properties but this cannot be made obligatory for anyone. The various proposals by Denktash on a number of constitutional aspects were in fact not submitted because Denktash was not really interested in these matters. His goal had always been the creation of two independent states in Cyprus that would somehow cooperate with one another. This position by Denktash had already been rejected with Resolution 750 which refers to a single sovereignty, a single international personality and citizenship so that when such items come to be discussed, the UN must abide by this line which of course excludes the notion of the alternating presidency. Another issue I raised with the Secretary-General during my introductory speech on Thursday, but also on Monday, concerned the settlers. I linked this item with the demographic character, the security of the Turkish Cypriots and their very identity, given that the settlers are a foreign element on our land. I wish to repeat that at no point has the discussion with the Secretary-General acquired the form of a negotiation, either with him or through him with the other side. What happened was that he let us know what they had been telling Mr Denktash, we presented them with some general ideas, but he, knowing that he would leave soon, did not want to enter into any detailed discussion of particular aspects of the problem. I simply took advantage of the opportunity to present our basic positions and to explain to him the importance of issues such as the right of return and the right to property. I must say that the Secretary-General stressed to me at some point that the UN do indeed support these rights and insist that they be secured. Two other issues were also discussed at length: The first was whether, since there would be no lunch, there could be a reception instead. I insisted that such a TV-covered 185

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 186

From the President’s Office

event should not take place because it would give the wrong signal to the public that something important had actually been achieved. There was also a very intense discussion with the Americans and the British about the date of the resumption of the talks and about my trip to Helsinki. I insisted that I had to go to Helsinki and that the date when the talks would resume should be fixed after Helsinki; the Americans and the British insisted that I should not go to Helsinki and that we should meet earlier, but in the meantime the Secretary-General had agreed with me and so our position was once again vindicated. In conclusion, I would like to stress at this point that Mr Denktash accepted a discussion of the map, did not leave the talks, did not agree with the views contained in the map, but did not categorically reject it either. It was obvious that he had been given clear instructions not to create a crisis as he had done last time. This time the line followed by Mr Denktash was crystal clear and differed substantially from that of February 1990. He tried to impose his views but could not leave the dialogue. I wish to stress the active involvement, during the whole procedure, of the five permanent members of the Security Council, especially the British and the Americans, who were in constant contact with the Secretariat and the SecretaryGeneral. Every day, after the end of our talks, Messrs Camilion, Feissel and Cavanagh briefed the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council. During all this time I had excellent cooperation with the Greek ambassador, Mr Papoulias, who had various meetings with Messrs Camilion and Feissel, as well as with various British and Americans, during which he tried to convince them that the idea of an alternating presidency had better be forgotten. The talks lasted only five days, from 18 till 23 June, when they had to be interrupted because of prior engagements of the Secretary-General, who had to go to Africa. The talks would resume on 15 July.

Developments in Cyprus – Preparation for the second round As I pointed out in the briefing I gave to the session of the National Council immediately after my return from New York, it was clear that Turkey was under considerable pressure to pursue a solution, and also that Mr Denktash continued to be as intransigent as ever. It was obvious, though, that Turkey had forbidden him to withdraw from the talks. Having analysed all the facts, I concluded: We can be satisfied for what happened in New York partly because of the successful presentation of our positions. We have also won certain ‘battles’ with the British and the Americans. These were perhaps ‘experiments of will’ as for instance the Helsinki issue on which they were obliged to agree with us after a long discussion even though they knew that the SecretaryGeneral had agreed right from the start that I should go to Helsinki. 186

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 187

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

Later on, after the full briefing on what happened during the first round, we moved 1 on to agree on the talks to be held during the second round that would restart on 2 3 15 July: 4 5 We have agreed that the discussion will begin once again on the territorial 6 and the refugee issues but it is obvious that at some point the scope of the 7 discussion must be widened to include all issues. As you have seen in their 8 report to the Security Council, the UN representatives are keen to discuss 9 specifically this time the various issues on which they expect the sides to 10 present their positions. In the personal meeting I had with the five 11 permanent members of the Security Council I said that we never had any 12 problem in specifying our positions. We have always been clear on what 13 our positions are. We also have made a number of concessions in the past 14 to help progress being made. When they mentioned to me the issue of 15 concessions in general, I reminded them that our side had indeed made 16 concessions as for instance on the constitutional issue on which we 17 accepted the creation of two Parliaments, more rights to be given to the 18 Turks and also that all this be included in our proposals so that they were 19 not entitled to ask more of us. I also said that the rights we had 20 recognised for the two communities had not been deemed acceptable in 21 other countries facing similar problems. OK so we gave what we gave and 22 the time had come for them to understand that concessions should be 23 made from the other side as well. 24 Concerning the alternating presidency and the properties issue I believe 25 we have won our case if not entirely, at least at 80 per cent. What then 26 should now be our aim going back there? Obviously our first aim is to 27 reach a solution. If, however, this cannot be achieved, given that Denktash 28 is what he has always been, we must then make sure that he be blamed for 29 his stance. In other words I think we must go to New York in pursuit of a 30 solution as our main aim and short of this make sure that the blame falls 31 on Denktash, something that will clear the way for a solution at a later 32 stage. We want blame to fall on him by the Security Council and also by 33 the General Assembly. The greatest danger for us, if the Turks succeed to 34 avoid being blamed for the failure, is that not only will there be no 35 progress but also that nobody will be held responsible for this. 36 This would be a bad result because the impression might be thus 37 created that the Cyprus problem is insoluble – this was made very clear to 38 us by the Secretary-General – and as the pressure on the Security Council 39 and the Secretary-General is huge they cannot possibly deal forever with one 40 single issue. They are now making this great effort to solve the Cyprus problem but if they become convinced that no progress on this is possible, then there is a danger that – without making things sound too tragic – their 187

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 188

From the President’s Office

active interest in this problem might simply evaporate. From that moment on, it is as if we are condemned to the perpetuation of today’s state of affairs. The aims of Denktash are exactly the opposite. He will, if possible, try to avoid any progress being made and to avoid, of course, being blamed for this. He has already said in one of his statements here that ‘of course it will not be tragic if there is no progress when the talks resume’ even though the international community does want progress. For us, this is indeed tragic and we must do our utmost to achieve our main or at least our secondary target. This will not be an easy task and that is why I believe that the presence of the political leadership is needed as we will have to discuss at various stages the way to handle different aspects of the problem. I would thus welcome a cooperative exchange of views because in this way our job can be done better. I also consider it necessary that we project an image of being of one mind because of the quandary that our national cause is going through today. I believe that, without exaggeration, this phase is very decisive. Everything hinges, of course, on the Turkish stance which is difficult to fathom. Demirel in his personal meeting with Mr Mitsotakis tried to convince him that he wants the Cyprus problem solved at all costs. Yilmaz told Mr Mitsotakis that he will not use the Cyprus problem as an issue on which to oppose the Demirel-Inonu government. The same thing was told to Mr Mitsotakis by Mr Őzal who said that the Cyprus problem needs to be resolved. Demirel, in the talk he had with Mr Mitsotakis, said it was inconceivable for him not to want the Cyprus problem solved since by remaining open, as it is now, the costs of keeping occupation troops in Cyprus are considerable while this money could be better spent elsewhere. They also need, he said, to support the Denktash regime economically in spite of the great problems they face themselves, given that this regime has not been and will not be recognised. It is therefore in the interests of Turkey to settle the Cyprus issue. He also said that anyway Turkey’s strategic targets had changed from what they were before. All this is just babble. Denktash certainly wants no solution. For a solution to be found it is not Denktash who must want it but Turkey that must impose it on him. Whether Turkey will indeed impose a solution on Denktash is something that we will have to wait and see happening there. From a tactical point of view I do not expect Denktash to start making concessions as soon as he goes back. He will try to defend his line and if indeed there is any progress he will finally be obliged to say that he is giving in but that this is a result of pressures exerted on him from various quarters to avert the Turkish side being blamed for the failure. This is the 188

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 189

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

situation as I see it. The UN were happy this time with Turkey’s role in New York as Mr Ulucevik, the person responsible for the Cyprus problem in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, is said to have played a positive role while, on the contrary, Soysal played a negative role. I underlined the Soysal issue because it raises the theory about concessions. Mr Denktash was saying that they were not willing to make any great concessions on the territorial issue to which I responded, in talking to the SecretaryGeneral, that before we start talking about it we must clarify what the term concession means. Concessions are made by someone who has in his possession something he owns and decides to give you a piece of it. Denktash owns nothing and Turkey, even if we accept that she came allegedly as a guarantor country, should have come to Cyprus to restore the constitutional order, not to conquer Cyprus. Soysal, however, wrote some time ago an article in a newspaper in which he argued that Turkey had conquered lands belonging to her. This then contradicts totally the Turkish claim that they came on the basis of their ‘rights’ as ‘guarantors’. Completing my briefing and to conclude the debate I mentioned: I accept the existence of the well-known disagreements about the procedure and the Gali ideas. I do hope, however, that there will be no disagreements or criticisms on the basis of what I told you – which is all true – concerning the pursuit of our goals or the stance that the Foreign Minister and I took in New York, on the various issues with reference to the promotion of our positions and the procedure followed. Mr Papadopoulos said that ‘nobody held such an opinion but there was the belief that we would be towed to other directions’. Within this spirit of approving our handling of the issue and in spite of their initial reactions, they all thus finally agreed that they had to come to New York for the next instalment. They also agreed to issue a laconic announcement to that effect. Mr Clerides said: the item under discussion in Cyprus was whether the Gali [sic] ideas were of the ‘take it or leave it’ variety or whether they could become subjects for discussion and thus improved. We decided that we must go and discuss them so that they can be improved. We have not, however, as yet entered this discussion in detail because we are still at the very first step, namely the territorial issue on which there is, as yet, no agreement. After the successful completion of the briefing and the generally accepted view that with the foreign minister we had promoted and defended very well our positions, 189

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 190

From the President’s Office

there was an attempt to question whether the Boutros-Gali ideas should in fact serve as the basis for discussion. Mr Matsis raised the matter of the letter I addressed to the Secretary-General and the extent to which this reflected the positions of the National Council members. After everybody reminded Mr Matsis that the final text was for the president to decide, I read out to the members of the National Council the following text of the letter I sent to the Secretary-General: Nicosia, 29 April 1992 Dear Mr Secretary-General, I write to thank you for the opportunity you offered me last month to discuss with you all aspects of the Cyprus problem. I thank you also for all your efforts on behalf of Cyprus. Following the adoption of Resolution 750 (1992), I confirm the GreekCypriot side’s readiness to continue cooperating with you and the Security Council, as always, towards an overall framework agreement. As I was able to explain to the National Council, the set of Ideas is not a framework agreement in itself, but a basis for continuing the negotiations in order to reach a fair agreement, which will cover all issues as an integrated whole and in which no element can be binding until all elements are agreed. I know you share my belief that the overall framework agreement to be reached must conform with the United Nations Charter, the United Nations Resolutions and International Law and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all citizens and that all provisions of the framework must accord with the principles. Our views on the set of ideas will be expressed to your representatives and to you at the appropriate time. With my best regards, George Vassiliou The members of the National Council unanimously agreed that the letter contained the expressed views of the parties and mentioned the basic points concerning human rights and whatever else had been suggested during the debate.

Summit conference of the CSCE in Helsinki On 9 July, I left for the summit meeting of the CSCE in Helsinki. The same day marked the end of the meeting of the seven most powerful countries in the world. The chairman of the meeting made the following statement on the Cyprus problem: We appeal to all parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General, to exploit the present opportunity and negotiate a settlement of this tragic problem that has been pending for a long time, according to the provisions of Resolution 750 of the Security Council. 190

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 191

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

In Helsinki, both Mr Mitsotakis and I had many meetings. In statements he made during a press conference he gave in Helsinki, Prime Minister Demirel said that the Cyprus problem was an obstacle that had to be removed. He also confirmed the existence of the Baker letter to Cetin in which the US Secretary of State called upon him to encourage Raouf Denktash to help find a solution to the Cyprus problem because, as he put it, ‘we must not close our eyes to the attempts to obstruct a solution’. As the press agencies reported from Finland’s capital, the confirmation by Mr Demirel of the existence of Baker’s letter – which took place during a publicly held press conference – was interpreted by diplomatic circles in Helsinki as a confirmation of Ankara’s will to put pressure on the Turkish-Cypriot leader to make him appear conciliatory in view of the second round of talks about to begin in New York.28 Mr Demirel himself, for that matter, said during the above-mentioned press conference that: ‘We wish for a solution of the Cyprus problem and we support the efforts by the United Nations because Cyprus must cease to be a problem in the relations between Turkey and the United States as well as with Greece.’ There was also a meeting in Helsinki between Mitsotakis and Demirel on which the Greek News Agency APE sent the following report: Early yesterday afternoon the fourth meeting between the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey took place in Helsinki this time. Mr Mitsotakis, in view of the talks that will restart on 15 July, urged his Turkish opposite number to deal with the intransigence displayed by Denktash. He also made it clear to the Turkish prime minister that the course that the Cyprus issue takes does have an impact on the Greek– Turkish relations and that no peace treaty between the two countries can be signed without a ‘fair, viable and functional’ solution of the Cyprus problem. It is worth noticing that Mr Mitsotakis underlined the term ‘functional’. According to a report by Phileleftheros, during a special meeting between Messrs Mitsotakis and Bush on 10 July 92, the US President assured the Greek prime minister that he would spare no effort during this critical phase that the Cyprus problem is going through. I met in Helsinki Mr Jacques Delors, who assured me that the EEC door was wide open for us and that the examination of our application and the preparation of the necessary Opinion would not be linked to that of Turkey. On my way to New York, I made a stop in London, where I had a long meeting with the prime minister, Mr Major, and the foreign minister, Mr Douglas Hurd. After the meeting I made the following statement (communiqué of the presidency press office, 14 July 1992): 191

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 192

From the President’s Office

It is obvious that the prime minister and the Foreign Minister want these talks to be successful and they assured me that they will do whatever is possible on their side to make this happen. [Question:] Are they optimistic Mister President? [Answer:] Nobody spoke in terms of being optimistic or pessimistic. They simply all agree that the Cyprus problem must be resolved, that we must give an example. The point on which the prime minister agreed with me is that a solution of the Cyprus problem would have today a huge impact on Europe quite unrelated to the importance of Cyprus as such. In an announcement that was issued from the prime minister’s residence it is mentioned that the British premier welcomed the constructive contribution of the Cypriot president and urged him to continue with his endeavours together with all the other sides to reach a settlement when the talks resume on 15 July. It has been mentioned that the application of Cyprus to become a member of the EC was also discussed. We are expecting, concludes the statement, the Opinion of the EC Commission and we support the strengthening of relations between Cyprus and the EC along the lines agreed in Lisbon. I arrived in New York the evening of 14 July. The next day I had my first meeting with Mr Boutros-Gali. The situation in Cyprus, however, was far from pleasant. The change in the behaviour of Mr Clerides was obvious as he paved the way for joining ranks with DHKO. Together with other officials of DISY, he was asking for Cyprus’s membership of the EEC to coincide with a solution of the problem. According to a report in Phileleftheros of 12 July 1992, the president of DISY Mr Clerides declared on 8 July 1992 that: ‘Part of the solution must be the accession of Cyprus to Europe because this is the only way that the future of Cypriot Hellenism can be secured from any further Turkish expansionary intentions.’ At the same time the deputy president of the party Mr Matsis said on 9 July that: ‘The Lisbon decision signifies the burial of Cyprus’s application to become a member of the European Community’; while the general secretary of DISY, Mr Markidis, said that: ‘Any solution must be linked to the simultaneous accession of Cyprus to the European Community.’ The trouble was that the declarations by Mr Clerides, as well as those by Messrs Matsis and Markidis, made sure that a solution would not be reached. Mr Clerides knew full well that Cyprus could not possibly dictate conditions to the EEC as to the rate by which its enlargement would take place. He was simply making an opening to DHKO and EDEK. He was even promising them that the Gali Ideas had no longer any significance. So, even if by a miracle Turkey and Mr Denktash were to accept all our proposals, a solution would still be excluded given that there was no way that we could become members of the EEC at the same time. 192

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 193

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

Second round of talks: 13 July to 14 August 1992 The negotiations by proxy started on 15 July at an intensive pace. The SecretaryGeneral felt he had an especially strong hand in these negotiations, having secured a very clear statement by the president of the Security Council that was published on 13 July 1992.29 The leaders of the four parties, as well as Michalis Papapetrou of ADHSOK and Mr Rolandis of the Liberals, came to New York. The permanent members of the Security Council, in addition to their daily meetings with both sides, were in continuous contact with the Secretary-General and the other UN officials. From my side, on top of my constant meetings with the Secretary-General, Messrs Camilion, Feissel and other UN officials, I was in close contact with the office of President Bush, the deputy Secretary of State Mr Eagleburger, Mr Mitsotakis, the foreign minister of Britain Mr Douglas Hurd and others. We also discussed developments daily with the working group and the political leaders. The negotiations by proxy that started on the basis of Resolution 750 dealt exclusively with the territorial and the refugee issues. This effort was greatly helped by the fact that at our insistence the Secretary-General submitted, without giving us any copies, his ‘Set of Ideas’ and the map. In my discussion with him I stressed: The submission of the map is a step forward. It is obvious, though, that the proposal granting the Turkish Cypriots 28 per cent of the territory is not justified either on the basis of their share of the population or of the percentages of their land ownership. Moreover, taking account of the productivity criterion, the map is also against the interests of the Greek Cypriots as 54 per cent of the shores are given to the Turkish Cypriots. Irrespective of the above I would like to point out that a number of villages that are only metres away from the dividing line and those which were 100 per cent Greek should be given back by applying the same principle that was implemented for certain Turkish-Cypriot villages. This will allow a number of refugees to return to their homes under GreekCypriot administration. In the case of Famagusta it must also be made clear where exactly does the dividing line start. In this case too if we move the dividing line some hundreds of metres we will again allow a significant number of refugees to return to their homes. I want to underline, I said, that the acceptance of the map has nothing to do with the commitment to implement the agreement of the third conference in Vienna which guarantees the stay of 15,000–20,000 Greek Cypriots in the Karpasia area. The territorial issue is undoubtedly one aspect of the problem. The right of return and the right to property must also be secured because they too are integral to a solution of the problem. This does not mean that we 193

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 194

From the President’s Office

expect everybody to go back to their homes but that we insist that the right of return be secured. Concerning the right to property alternative choices must be given: • The right to retain the titles to the property or • The right to indemnification on the basis of the 1974 prices plus inflation or • In case the property has been put to use, the owner will have the right to a long lease under conditions that will be negotiated. The long lease will also allow the development of economic bonds and the creation of common enterprises. I also disagreed with the ideas contained in the working document concerning the limitations based on the introduction of a time schedule for the refugees to exercise their right of return, as well as granting the Turkish Cypriots the right of first choice whether they would abandon or not the house they occupy: ‘This will create more problems, especially taking into account the proposal – with which I disagree – that they must decide within six months.’ At the meeting of 20 July, I said, regarding the Morphou area, that the return of this area to the Greek Cypriots will affect some 12,000 Turkish Cypriots, but that only a small number of them will then be engaged in agriculture and these can be established in the area of Lefka. For the rest, employment opportunities could be created in tourist areas or in urban centres. I mentioned specifically that the areas close to Zefyros and Davlos, among others, could be developed into tourist centres so that jobs and a higher standard of living could be secured for those now living in the Morphou area: ‘It should also be noted that a number of some 4000 among them are settlers and must be assisted financially to leave.’ I finished by pointing out that the provision included in the ‘ideas’ to refuse giving to certain individuals the right to return to their homes, because of them being allegedly involved in subversive activities, cannot be accepted because it would create legal problems and other complications. It should also be made clear that all those who will be re-established will enjoy the right to education and security. From the first meeting of the Secretary-General with Mr Denktash it was made clear that a very difficult negotiation was ahead. At noon of 22 July, I had a meeting with the Secretary-General during which he told me that he had been very stern with Mr Denktash, but did not know what results this would bring. I stressed that Mr Denktash is not affected by such criticisms and that the only way to make progress was to invite the five permanent members of the Security Council and ask them to intervene. I told him that after the meeting I had with them on Monday they had all promised that they were ready for action, provided they would be asked by the Secretary-General to do so and that there should therefore be a meeting with them. He replied that he planned to invite them next day and this did indeed take place. 194

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 195

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

I also told him that the tactic adopted by Mr Denktash is to cause the procedure to deteriorate, to refuse to give answers, to waste time, and to speak in generalities until a point is reached when nobody is any longer interested. The status quo is thus consolidated. The Secretary-General agreed with me and said he would do all he could to change this situation. We talked the same day over the phone with Mr Douglas Hurd, who, to begin with, told me that he agreed with me not to hold a separate meeting with Mr Denktash. I explained to him that this view of mine was not due to the fact that I wanted to limit the number of meetings with Mr Denktash, but because I was certain that such a meeting would not be productive and might do harm rather than good. He said that he shared my opinion and had decided not to see him but send him a note instead, to the effect that his behaviour was unacceptable and urging him to change it. We then talked about what needed to be done. I stressed to him that the whole effort of the Secretary-General would be in vain if Turkey did not realise that failure would have consequences. He agreed with me that Mr Denktash had every reason to look forward to a failure of the talks so that the status quo could remain intact. That is why Turkey must realise that a failure of the talks would not result in the continuation of the status quo. He said that he understood this and that Britain must certainly put pressure on Turkey. He went on, saying that if they put all necessary pressure on Turkey so that concessions were made on the territorial and the refugee issues, it would then be my turn to show flexibility on the other issues. I answered that, as he well knew, I was indeed flexible, but the implementation of the ‘alternating presidency’ that the Turks were pushing for was unacceptable because the federation would not be able to work that way. I stressed that I placed my hopes for a successful functioning of the federation on the economic aspect because I felt certain that the economic advantages for both communities would be huge. He agreed with me and wished me patience, promising he would do all that was necessary. He also said that Mr Denktash did not grasp the economic advantages that would accrue once a solution was agreed upon. I concluded by telling him that the stance adopted by Mr Denktash clashed with the desiderata of the ordinary people who saw the need for a solution. The talks in New York had already generated an international interest, as proven by the attention brought by the international media on the issue. Among other such instances, CNN covered the issue for the first time. In my interview for this channel on 17 July, in answer to the question ‘More than hope though, anything extra?’, I said: [Answer:] Well, more than hope comes from the fact that the SecretaryGeneral and the whole apparatus of the United Nations is determined to make progress. The Security Council as a whole and particularly the five permanent members are following with great attention and have made clear to everybody that they expect progress because they think that the Cyprus problem is a problem that can be solved and needs to be solved. 195

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 196

From the President’s Office

[Question:] Nobody denies the importance of American involvement. After 18 or more years of little or no interest of the United States, they suddenly have a great deal of interest; Clear determination that the Cyprus problem must be settled. Why now? [Answer:] Well, rather than say why now in comparison to the past, let us say why now in relation to what the Cyprus problem means compared to other problems. You see what is happening in Bosnia today. You see what is happening in Nagorno-Karabakh. The scenes that the American viewers see on television every night of Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabakh are the scenes that we had seen in life a few years ago, back in 1974, when the invasion took place. So we lived through this, when force was used to throw innocent people out of their homes and so on and create what they say ‘faits accomplis’ by force. Everybody sees today that if one permits this kind of behaviour, then that will more or less lead to the end of the world, not the end of history. Therefore, because of that, they feel that this kind of policy has to be addressed and at the same time, in the case of Cyprus. A solution of the Cyprus problem will be the best example that can be shown to everybody that communities can live in peace together and can prosper, which is certain that will happen in our case. [Question:] Judging from your public statements, recent and past statements, and those of Mr Mitsotakis, the Greek Prime Minister, you are absolutely determined that the Cyprus problem must be settled. You have made your position very clear. These things were said in New York. Unfortunately, however, in Cyprus various circles, with the Parliamentary Spokesman of DHKO Mr Papadopoulos at their head, wanted to create the impression that we were ready to betray our country, no less. On the occasion of the black anniversaries Mr Papadopoulos said the following in his speech, as reported by Elephtherotypia on 17 July 1992: There is no space either in the small strip of our sacred land or in the wide horizons of our national conscience for even an inch of national land to be granted to the Turkish invader and thus confirm partition with our own signature. We who lived through the light of the liberation struggle will not accept the darkness and the shame of selling out our country and our ancestral land. Maybe all these things that are heard in parliament will convince only a few, but the select ones, that it is unacceptable to proudly use as our banner in our struggle the humiliating compromise of seeking a solution of any kind so that we may, allegedly, save, however, much or little has remained in the hands...of the few. Because this is unfortunately the slogan with which the promoters of capitulation infect the atmosphere of Cyprus. 196

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 197

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

The Secretary-General made superhuman efforts to achieve progress and convince Mr Denktash. That is why he wanted to be in a position to give satisfactory answers to all the questions that Mr Denktash might conceivably raise. One such basic question concerned the Turkish Cypriots in Morphou. In a private conversation at his home he asked me how we could solve the problem of the re-establishment of the Turkish Cypriots, especially those in Morphou. I explained to him that the problem could be dealt with. One must not forget, I told him, that a refugee is someone who leaves his home and not someone who moves from one house to another. Although agreeing with the idea, he wanted nonetheless to clarify the issue because Mr Denktash had expressed the fear that we will make promises today which we would not keep tomorrow. My reply was that something like this was inconceivable because there was this provision stipulating that only after the re-establishment of the Turkish Cypriots had been completed would our own refugees start to be resettled. It is thus obvious that we would be in favour of this procedure being completed as soon as possible: ‘For this reason it is imperative that any agreement should provide that the areas which will be returned – and not just the Famagusta area – must all come under the administration of the UN.’ He replied that he agreed totally and that this is what should be done. We then exchanged views on the situation as a whole and he conveyed to me his pessimism caused by the fact that Mr Denktash is a man who understands nothing about economic arguments, is unable to see the realities and who persists in thinking that he has the support of Turkey. He expressed his fears that Turkey, in spite of the promises that she gives, will, in the end, not do what it takes for progress to be made. I told him that this was precisely why he should continue to be very strict, to contact Turkey and make sure that the five permanent members of the Security Council – and especially Mr Baker – will do so as well. He promised me he would phone him, perhaps even the next day, to ask him to talk to the Turks since he detects that Turkey is not going to put the necessary pressure on Mr Denktash. The Secretary-General also expressed to me his concern that the whole thing might after all not work, so that after the solution we might be led to a ‘divorce’ because Mr Denktash was never really in favour of reunification and a federation. I answered that if that was the decision of Turkey then we were indeed running that risk, but I said to him that I placed my hopes on the fact that such would be the economic benefits for the Turkish Cypriots that they would not allow a divorce of this kind to take place. I insisted that progress could be made if he remained firm and if he asked the Anglo-Americans to use their power because as a Secretary-General he had already a very successful record, something that gave him a considerable room for manoeuvre. He thought this comment of mine was right on target and said that he did not feel beholden to anybody as he anyway did not seek to be re-elected for a second term; something that gave him the possibility and the time to do his job as he saw fit. 197

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 198

From the President’s Office

On Wednesday 29 July, during a meeting of the political leaders and the working group, I said that according to my information Mr Denktash persisted in his positions and that was the reason why the Secretary-General would have a meeting, in the afternoon, with the five permanent members of the Security Council. The five would also hold on the following day, 30 July, a meeting with the UN Secretariat. I tried to convince the five to call for a session of the Security Council. I met, for that purpose, the Russians, the Americans and the British, underlining the need for a date to be fixed when the Security Council would meet. If a date could indeed be fixed, there was hope that the Turks, who knew that such a session would not be to their advantage, might try to convince Mr Denktash to make concessions. I also spoke on the phone to Mrs Jane Hall, security consultant in the White House, who informed me that the Americans had decided that on top of the letter that Baker had sent to his Turkish opposite number Mr Cetin, Mr Bush would himself contact the prime minister, Mr Demirel. The next day I spoke again over the phone with Mrs Hall, who informed me that President Bush had indeed had a phone conversation with Mr Demirel. According to Mrs Hall: The conversation went very well and Mr Bush stressed to Mr Demirel that the solution of the Cyprus problem should be based on the resolutions and the documents of the United Nations. President Bush is of the opinion that Turkey tries to wriggle out of any commitment to these documents. President Bush reminded Mr Demirel that the United States have a great interest to see the Cyprus problem solved on the basis of the documents and the resolutions of the United Nations and he asked the prime minister to cooperate along this line. Mr Demirel replied that he did not want this effort to fail and promised he would cooperate. To my remark that this procedure cannot continue, given that Mr Denktash does not accept anything, not even the map, and that he has not moved from his notion of two ‘cleansed’ areas, Mrs Hall replied that on no account would the USA ever support a solution on the basis of ethnically cleansed areas and that their position was that the right of the refugees to return and the right to their properties should be recognised. Also, in a telephone conversation I had with Mr Letsky on 3 August, he assured me that the Americans would support a ‘resolution with teeth’ as he called it. I had special meetings with Mr Camilion during dinner on 31 July and lunch on 3 August. Mr Camilion expressed the opinion that Mr Denktash would not change his line and that a solution could be reached only after a decision is adopted by the Security Council that would condemn Turkey and announce measures against her. In the afternoon of Monday 3 August, I met the UN representatives Messrs Camilion, Feissel and Cavanagh. They briefed me on the meeting they had with Mr Denktash in the morning. During that meeting the issue of the re-establishment of 198

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 199

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

the Turks who would leave from the areas to be given back to their Greek owners was discussed. The same issue was also discussed during my meeting with the UN Secretariat. I explained the position of the Greek-Cypriot side, which appeared to satisfy the Secretariat. The return of the properties to their rightful owners was also discussed. I explained to the UN representatives that the only way that this issue could be settled was to return all the properties to their owners, who would then have the right to use them as their residence, to sell them or to hold on to them until they had decided what to do with them. I had to face not just the negative attitude of Mr Denktash, but also the position by Messrs Kyprianou, Lyssaridis and their supporters in Cyprus. They were totally opposed to the ‘Set of Ideas’ and demanded that these should be ignored by the UN, something that was of course impossible. I hereby present some excerpts from our discussions during our meetings with the political leaders, which show precisely this problem: Monday 9 August 1992 The assessment of the president is that Denktash will not move and that therefore the Secretary-General will be obliged to break off the procedure and prepare a report to the Security Council for the adoption of a resolution. Mr Kyprianou pointed out that this resolution must not endorse the recent document of the Secretary-General which he and his party reject categorically as they consider it terribly damaging and catastrophic in case it ever becomes the basis for a solution of the Cyprus problem. He also added that he considers it dangerous to even say that this document should be embraced. Mr Papapetrou, hurt by the last sentence of Mr Kyprianou, said that he is fully conscious of saying exactly what he believes. I can argue about what I say, he made clear. I do not call other people’s views as either dangerous or non-dangerous but I always express my opinion. I believe that this document is the best document that we ever had in front of us. Mr Christofias intervened to say that we are now entering a discussion that should not be taking place at this moment. We came here, he said, on the basis of the UN Resolution 750 which adopted the previous report and the previous ideas of the Secretary-General. On the basis of these ideas and allowing for some differences, we adopted, irrespective of anyone’s particular views, a document for discussion. This document containing a map is the basis for the negotiations. This document has been deemed unacceptable by some of us here. The basis of this document, however, is a map that has not been qualified as unacceptable because it gives us the possibility of a serious discussion on the territorial issue. It is on the basis of this document that the return of the refugees is 199

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 200

From the President’s Office

being discussed. So we have a basis from which we will continue to struggle for the improvement of the document until we reach a solution that will be as close as possible to our positions. I therefore believe that at this stage we must fight for a good resolution of the Security Council which will, in practice, condemn Denktash. I believe we have the opportunity for further creative discussion amongst ourselves but also most importantly with the Secretary-General and the United Nations so that Denktash can be convinced to accept first of all the general principles. The president observed that from the contacts he had with the Secretary-General and his representatives he came to the conclusion that they do not consider this document as representing a solution of the Cyprus problem. They are aware that there will be modifications which will be brought about after consultations. Mr Nicos Rolandis said that he shares the opinion of Mr Papapetrou as far as the substance of the matter is concerned, but added that it would be a mistake to start discussing the document at this moment. I believe, he said, that at this moment we must try to ensure that the Security Council issues a resolution that will be as favourable as possible for us. Mr Clerides said that it would be a mistake to start at this moment discussing the document and expressed concern because such a discussion has started to take place in Cyprus. If we get involved in such a discussion, he said, there is a danger that there will be no resolution by the Security Council. The views of every one of us are well-known and we do not need to repeat them all the time. We must agree to say that in view of the forthcoming discussion we are not taking positions. Mr Kyprianou said that he could not be bound by such a decision. Mr Lyssaridis said that there are three philosophies concerning the document. The first one, adopted by DHKO and EDEK is that the document cannot constitute a basis for discussion and that there should be a wider agenda. The second one is the philosophy adopted by AKEL and DISY – who do not coincide on absolutely every point – that the document is unsuitable for solving the Cyprus problem but that it should be accepted as a basis for discussion in the hope that during the procedure certain provisions that are totally unacceptable could be removed. The third philosophy holds that the document as it is can be the basis for a solution of the Cyprus problem because of the dire need for such an outcome. These views exist and will continue to exist after our return to Cyprus. In the National Council the majority had decided that we must go forward on the basis of Resolution 750 of the Security Council. Mr Kyprianou and myself came here in spite of the fact that we disagree with this whole philosophy, in the belief that we could contribute in achieving something that would come as close as possible to our philosophy. Mr Lyssaridis 200

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 201

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

argued that a discussion over the details in the document should be avoided and that this should take place in the National Council after the Security Council adopts its resolution. With reference to the targets that had been set, the first was for the Cyprus problem to be solved on a basis that the majority would at least consider as being fair and if that proved impossible we would aim at a condemnation of Turkey. The first target is out of reach and what remains is the effort to be made by all of us, both those who agree and those who disagree, to focus on achieving the best possible resolution. The second attempt concerns the steps that need to be taken. The third issue is that the parties DHKO and EDEK would on no account want this document to be adopted even as a working paper because should this happen it would then be very difficult to change the philosophy that pervades it. Our position was and is that this document marks a negative development in the course of seeking a solution to the Cyprus problem. Mr Papapetrou argued that whether the resolution will be stronglyworded or not depends on whether we will accept the document or not. He will, nonetheless, respect the view of the majority and agrees totally with the concluding remarks of Mr Lyssaridis. Mr Kyprianou agreed with what Mr Lyssaridis had said but added that there is a difficulty with developing the arguments during the meeting with the five permanent members of the Security Council especially if the matter of the adoption of the document by the Security Council is raised. The president remarked: ‘From the moment that we ask for Denktash to be condemned we cannot possibly be against the acceptance of the document as a working document. Because if Denktash is condemned it will be precisely for his refusal to accept the document and the map as working documents.’ The talks by proxy were being led to an impasse. Unfortunately, in spite of the efforts to secure the involvement of the superpowers and the Security Council, progress with Mr Denktash was minimal. The man was incredibly negative, he lectured continuously on past matters, he let it be understood one day that he would agree on one thing, only to withdraw the agreement he had hinted at the day after. In this kind of climate we expected the Secretary-General to stop the talks and secure a condemnatory resolution from the Security Council. The manifest wish of the members of the Security Council, however, was for the talks to be pursued. The meeting with Mr David Dane, the British High Commissioner in Cyprus, on 4 August, about discussing the resolution that the Security Council was to approve, was characteristic in this respect. We were surprised by the way he reacted to the possibility that the talks might be broken off. His basic concern was how we could get on with them. He told us: ‘It was a major achievement to gather all of you here 201

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 202

From the President’s Office

and since Mr Denktash is also here our efforts may succeed. If he abandons us how could we ever bring him back?’ It seems that this line did strike a chord with the other permanent members of the Security Council. From the information I had, the Security Council aimed at the launch of direct talks because the five permanent members believed this was the only way to break the deadlock. To this purpose, the office of the Secretary-General had prepared a communiqué to be issued, asking for direct talks to start. As soon as I got this piece of information, I asked to meet Mr Dane and the US ambassador in Cyprus, Mr Robert Lamb. I held them responsible for the turn that the talks were taking. I stressed that I could not accept the text of the communiqué as it stood, unless they and the UN confirmed with some statement of theirs that by the sentence ‘territorial adjustments’ they meant the General Secretary’s map. I insisted that the Americans and the British should confirm that, in the event that they moved on to suggest that direct talks be held, these would be limited to the territorial and the refugee issues until such time as it would be made clear that Mr Denktash had really changed his attitude and accepted the right of return for the refugees. In case there was no progress because of the continuing intransigence of Mr Denktash, I asked the British and the Americans to stop every effort in that direction and commit themselves to help in drafting a resolution by the Security Council. I insisted that I would not take any decision on the communiqué unless all the procedures were completed. I also had a phone conversation with the Greek prime minister, Mr Mitsotakis, who told me he had information from Western sources that the ‘Turks will yield territory at the end not at the beginning’ and that for this reason he considered it a mistake to break off the talks on a purely procedural issue, as this would in future be used against us. At the meeting of the political leaders and the working group, on Saturday 8 August, the foreign minister Mr Iacovou reported that Mr Feissel had said to the Cypriot chargè d’affaires in New York, Mr Eftychiou, that in case he was asked, he would publicly clarify that by the expression ‘territorial arrangements’ they mean the map prepared by the Secretary-General. The same statement could be made by Mr Juliani, the representative of the Secretary-General. At the same meeting of 8 August, we dealt extensively with the course the talks were taking: The session started with a briefing on the meetings I had with the permanent representatives of Britain and the USA at the Security Council. Both assured me that they were ready to support the position of the GreekCypriot side and added that there had not been any change in the decisive stand of their governments in favour of a solution or if not that those responsible for the failure, meaning in this case Turkey should she persist in her intransigence, to be blamed for it. However, they were of the opinion that since the Secretary-General said he could no longer ask for a resolution after Denktash had changed his position on the refugee issue 202

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 203

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

there was no alternative but to move forward with the talks. They assured him that they continued to be firm in supporting the map as well as in rejecting the ‘ethnic cleansing of the two zones’ that the Turks wanted. They also agreed that direct talks be launched on the territorial and the refugee issues and if the Secretary-General is not happy with the progress on the refugee issue then it is up to him as Secretary-General to break off the talks and go to the Security Council where they promised to act according to the suggestions made by the Secretary-General. With regard to the territorial issue, the representatives of the two countries estimated that the Turks would hand over Morphou not at the beginning but at the end. Concerning the communiqué, the president spoke also with the UN Secretary-General who promised him that he would start with the territorial and the refugee issues and if he is not satisfied with the answers he will get from the Turks, especially on the refugee issue, he will not proceed to discuss any other issue but will break off the talks and go to the Security Council. The president said he had no reason whatsoever to doubt the word of the Secretary-General but a new development had taken place when the Secretary-General met with the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mr Denktash. The latter told him that the territorial and the refugee issues had been discussed at length and that it was now time to move on to other issues. The Secretary-General told the Turkish-Cypriot leader that this was up to him to decide. The Turkish-Cypriot leader accepted that in exchange for accepting to begin on Wednesday the discussion on the territorial and the refugee issues there should be a preliminary exploration of our views on the other aspects of the document during the preceding contacts with Messrs Camilion and Feissel. The Secretary-General rejected the proposal by Denktash and then the Turkish-Cypriot leader started saying to him: ‘My dear friends what do you have to lose?’ It seems that the Secretary-General is willing to make things easy for Denktash in order to commit him to the procedure of direct talks. The question that emerges now is how do we proceed and whether on Monday and Tuesday, before the direct talks start, we will, during the meetings we will have with Messrs Camilion and Feissel, develop our views on other issues as well. [Clerides:] In other words the position of Denktash that the discussion on these issues is over and that we must now move on to others has been accepted. [President:] No, because he thinks – or rather he says so and commits himself to this – that the direct talks will begin with the territorial and the refugee issues and if he is not satisfied then he will stop the dialogue. [Clerides:] After he has examined our positions on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, Mr President. 203

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 204

From the President’s Office

[President:] Not at the direct talks. Wednesday is the day when the direct talks will start with the territorial and the refugee issue and if there is no progress on these issues then the Secretary-General will stop the dialogue. So we have nothing to do until Wednesday. And because we have nothing to do, the Secretary-General promised the Turks that he will include in his schedule the contacts you will have, not at the United Nations but here in our office, with Messrs Camilion and Feissel where you can examine the other aspects. [Kyprianou:] This means that Mr Clerides is right because the talks on Wednesday may be direct but talks do begin on all the other issues indirectly. These will start on Monday because the UN representatives will not only talk with you they will be talking to Denktash too as they promised him they would. [President:] We were talking indirectly on these issues as of last year. It is in August that we talked. We have always been talking, in the sense that we expressed our opinions. [Kyprianou:] Yes, but we are now facing a new situation. Following this and while it seemed that we were ready to accept the proposal of the Security Council to hold direct talks on the 12th, 13th and 14th of the month and have an informal discussion on the 10th and 11th (Monday and Tuesday) with Messrs Camilion and Feissel on the constitution, Mr Clerides raised an issue that risked upsetting everything. He questioned the credibility of the procedure and of the UN because Mr Denktash had not committed himself to accept as a basis for the talks the ideas of the Secretary-General, including the map: [Mr Clerides:] I declare that if the Turks say that they accept both documents as the basis for discussion, I say we should get on immediately. But I do not agree to discuss this document. If you want to discuss it by all means do so but I am not coming with you, I am leaving and I am making it clear once again that I refuse to enter into a discussion with Denktash having one foot in the document and one foot out. I simply cannot accept this. I answered: Denktash is formally committed to discuss on the basis of the UN declaration. Beyond this, the essential thing is, in my view, the commitment of the Secretary-General to the project of starting the direct negotiations with the territorial and the refugee issues which will continue only if there is progress on these two issues that we have named as being of first priority. As I said, ‘the price we have to pay for 204

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 205

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

this is the promise that the General Secretary gave Cetin on Monday that we will express some views to the Camilion–Feissel duo’. We may not like this. When the Secretary-General told me this I did not like it at all, but the question is whether it is worth breaking up with the Secretary-General on this matter. If I am going to break up with him let it be on matters of substance. And how would this sound to the world? Was I afraid to express my opinion on other issues? Why was it difficult for me to do so? The discussion that followed became very intense. Mr Clerides insisted on his views and Messrs Lyssaridis and Kyprianou agreed with him. I, on the other hand, was not prepared to let everything crumble in spite of the fact that I too thought that the behaviour of Mr Denktash was unacceptable. I went on to stress: I see the situation as it is. Personally, I believe it would perhaps be in my interest to say now that I do not agree that I do not accept this and leave for Cyprus. I too could ‘play the game of the pigheaded’ but I believe this would harm our cause one hundred per cent. To break off on a procedural issue, especially while I have the commitment of the SecretaryGeneral would mean that I dispense with the Cyprus problem. It is a case of, as the French say, ‘Après moi le deluge.’ That is what it would look like. This is the first time when the existence of a disagreement becomes obvious. Criticise me if you want. I accept criticism. I accept responsibility but I ask of you and repeat to you once again, let us not destroy everything because of this. Blame me, say you disagree, say it even on record that you are against mentioning our views on these aspects on Monday and Tuesday but help me fight on matters of substance not of procedure. This is essentially how the situation looks at this moment. Personally, I have no difficulty telling the Cypriot people how things stand. I am telling you I will take full responsibility. I have no problem saying that under these circumstances I had no difficulty to go on with the discussion. Do not accept any responsibility as far as you are concerned. Let us not forget something. Suppose there is no solution or no condemnation who will be the loser? We will be the losers. In spite of all these arguments Mr Clerides insisted on his views. I too insisted that we did not have the luxury to abandon our project.30 It was finally proven that the discussions with the representatives of the SecretaryGeneral on the 10th and 11th of the month caused no harm whatsoever. The pursuit of the procedure helped bring to the fore the intransigence of Mr Denktash. The Secretary-General moved on to his condemnatory report and we secured Resolution 774. 205

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 206

From the President’s Office

Talks by proxy on 10 and 11 August Fulfilling my promise to the Secretary-General, we had talks by proxy with Messrs Camilion and Feissel on the 10th and 11th of the month on various aspects of the constitutional issue. The first day, 10 August, we had a crucial meeting because, although the intransigence of Mr Denktash was obvious, we had to defend our positions and win over the UN at the same time. Mr Camilion briefed me about the meeting he previously had with Mr Denktash and asked for my views on the following three positions that the latter had put to him: 1 With relation to sovereignty, Denktash favoured an arrangement along the Swiss model, where the cantons are sovereign over the territory they cover. 2 For Cyprus to join any organisations to which neither Greece nor Turkey belong, there must be separate referendums held in the two communities. 3 Mr Denktash did not insist too much on the issue of the alternating presidency and did not mention the word ‘veto’, but insisted that the decisions by the Cabinet be taken unanimously. Responding to these positions, I said that it was time for the game Mr Denktash was playing on sovereignty to stop. The Security Council has already approved a series of Resolutions (649, 716 and 750) and that was that, the matter was closed: Denktash cannot quote the Swiss constitution selectively. Since he likes so much to use the Swiss constitution, I formally declare that I am ready to abandon everything we have in front of us for discussion if we accept the Swiss constitution in its entirety. I realise that we are here to discuss the ‘Set of Ideas’ that was handed over to us on 15 July together with the map. It is expected that each side will aim for some changes, always within the frame of the Set of Ideas. The only way we can have constructive talks is to stay close to the spirit of the document otherwise we have no place here. We must certainly make suggestions that will strengthen the document, to clarify certain points, to secure human rights, to make the agreement more functional and create the conditions for Cyprus to become an EEC member. Regarding the second issue, I said that every international agreement contains a serious political decision and must be covered by the provisions included in the unanimous decisions on issues of foreign policy. What I did not see was why there should be a condition for Greece and Turkey to participate in such agreements. There was further discussion about the powers and the functions of the two constituent federated states: ‘From the very beginning we stressed that we [were] talking about one state, not two, and this must be made crystal clear to Mr Denktash. On no account [would] we ever accept separate sovereignties.’ 206

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 207

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

Concerning the provision on the basis of which the two constituent states must decide in common on the transfer of powers and functions to the central government, I stressed that the federal government must have a say on such decisions. Mr Camilion agreed with my position on this issue: Generally speaking, in the new document the powers of the constituent states seem to have been strengthened and this is a development that comes closer to the views of the Turkish Cypriots. In spite of this we are ready to accept the Ideas as a basis for negotiation. The position taken by Denktash about unanimous Cabinet decisions is tantamount, in substance, to the abolition of the Cabinet altogether. We are practically talking about a veto on everything. Obviously Mr Denktash reverts to his initial position of two independent states somehow cooperating with one another. On Tuesday the 11th I had my first meeting with the US officials, Messrs Letsky, Lamb and Yukitch, and later two meetings with the representatives of the UN. My aim in meeting the American officials was to express in the strongest possible terms my displeasure at the way Mr Denktash and Turkey were being treated. I stressed to them that both the USA and the Security Council tolerate the arrogant behaviour of Mr Denktash and that on top of that Boutros-Gali had informed me that after a talk he had with the Turkish foreign minister, Mr Cetin, and with Mr Denktash, he had agreed to bring back the constitutional issue for discussion during the proximity talks on Monday and Tuesday. The Secretary-General committed himself to focus the negotiations on Wednesday on the displaced persons and the territorial issue. The discussion on the territorial issue would be based on the map that was submitted by the Secretary-General and considered as an integral part of the talks on the displaced persons: ‘I also pointed out to Mr Letsky that it is in accordance with the line and the commitment by the Secretary-General to accept that the map exists and is on the negotiating table.’ Mr Letsky showed understanding with regard to our positions and agreed that the UN and the Security Council have committed themselves to the view that the map is an integral part of the Set of Ideas. Addressing the Americans and later the UN representatives, I said that we were prepared to cooperate on the understanding that the Secretary-General will remain true to his commitments. Also: I personally believe that Mr Denktash is under pressure and has been instructed by Ankara not to abandon the talks. If he tries to escape from the talks while you display fear and compliance, he will simply have humiliated the UN and reduced you to the rank of messenger-boys. Mr Letsky informed me that, as he had been told for the first time, Larry Eagleburger had spoken to the Secretary-General, whom he had thanked for all his efforts, making 207

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 208

From the President’s Office

it clear at the same time that the talks should not fail. Mr Letsky reported to Mr Eagleburger that in the opinion of the Secretary-General the Turks negotiate in bad faith and do not show any signs of goodwill. Mr Eagleburger promised he would do everything possible for the negotiations to continue and not end up shipwrecked. I told Mr Letsky that I disagreed with the idea of pursuing the talks just for the sake of pursuing the talks, only because the UN Organisation was not yet ready to issue a resolution: I consider this unacceptable. I happen to be here with a clear mandate from all my colleagues in Cyprus to hold negotiations aiming at a solution and if the Turks behave in this way, that there must then be a suitable resolution. I will not go back to Cyprus without a solution and without a resolution. That is why I ask for an immediate meeting with Mr Eagleburger. There was indeed an immediate response and a contact by phone with Mr Eagleburger was arranged immediately. I had a long discussion with him and briefed him extensively on the situation. I also reminded him of the promise by the UN that if Denktash did not cooperate there would be consequences: We started the talks and Mr Denktash rejected the map which was the essence of the talks. Unfortunately, Mr Denktash was once again allowed to play his game leading to the deterioration of the whole procedure and to the examination, in the end, of the possibility of a respite. I agreed to discuss the constitutional issue in spite of the fact that there had not been any progress on the other basic issues that we had agreed to discuss, simply in order to help the whole procedure to move ahead and now instead of having talks on substance there is the threat of an ‘recess’ which, in my opinion, will be catastrophic. Mr Eagleburger informed me that on Saturday he had a meeting with President Bush, during which they discussed the Cyprus issue and also had a conversation on the subject with the Secretary-General. Mr Eagleburger said that the US President told him in no uncertain terms that he believed there was now an opportunity to solve the problem and that he had decided to solve it. To this end he had even prepared a strongly-worded message to be sent to Mr Cetin. I put my view to Mr Eagleburger: In my view the message of President Bush must be sent right away to the Turks, while the Secretary-General must be alerted at once and be told that President Bush will support him in his efforts to find a solution. It must be stressed to him that in case the procedure fails and the Turks prove uncooperative, there will be a resolution and the USA will firmly support such a resolution. 208

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 209

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

Mr Eagleburger told me that he had already talked with Mr Letsky, who promised to convey the position of the USA to the Secretary-General. After the conversation with Mr Eagleburger, I had a long meeting with Sir David Hunt during which I developed the same arguments. I told him that according to my information Britain was in favour of a temporary break of the talks, a position I considered unacceptable. He replied that this impression seemed to have been given by Mr Dane and that Britain’s position was for the talks to continue without any interruption. I accepted Mr Hunt’s explanations and asked him to brief the SecretaryGeneral on Britain’s position. He let me know that in case a resolution was to be issued if the talks were broken off, he would want to consult his government. I replied to Mr Hunt that: ‘In case you encounter any difficulties I would like to phone directly your Prime Minister. I want to know Britain’s final position.’ I later received a phone call from Mr Dane, who tried to tell me that he was not in favour of a temporary interruption of the talks. ‘We simply adopted a neutral position,’ he told me. I replied in a stern tone of voice: I cannot fathom this neutral stance of yours when Turkey tried right from the beginning of the negotiations to let the whole procedure degenerate. This is 100 per cent contrary to what we strive to achieve and to what you had said to me all these days. I consider this unacceptable. You must take a clear position and leave neutrality by the side. On the contrary you must insist that the talks be pursued and if the Turks refuse to cooperate they must face the consequences. Mr Dane replied he would come back to me in a few minutes. In about ten minutes he did indeed phone me to tell me that he had contacted Mr Feissel and informed him that Britain supported the procedure of the talks without any temporary break. During the meeting I had later with Messrs Camilion and Feissel, I briefed them on the discussions I had with Mr Letsky. Mr Camilion conveyed to us the thoughts of Mr Denktash: • Mr Denktash said that since he had accepted the three freedoms, there was a need for a moratorium to be agreed, allowing for the return of the refugees three years after the re-establishment of the Turkish Cypriots. Mr Camilion confirmed that Denktash had abandoned the idea of ‘zeroing of properties’. • Mr Denktash expressed his suspicion about the reference to the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Mr Camilion advised him to contact Turkey that had already accepted participating in the OSCE. Mr Camilion revealed also that during his talks with him, Mr Denktash had started to discuss somewhat seriously the issue of the re-establishment of the refugees. He also said that they had a long and constructive discussion on economic matters. With 209

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 210

From the President’s Office

reference to the transitional period, he got the impression that there would be intensive discussions on the subject because – as he found – the positions of Mr Denktash differed from those of Soysal. Commenting on the position of Mr Denktash, I said that he insisted very much on the issue of the transitional period, an attitude that conflicted with the spirit of the Set of Ideas: It is crystal clear that he insists on separate sovereignty, on the right of unilateral intervention by Turkey, on the cabinet taking decisions unanimously and on the abolition of the Republic of Cyprus during the transitional period. His behaviour as a whole is based on the assumption that a pre-existing ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, is now recognised and has decided to participate in the creation of a federal state. Generally speaking the position of Denktash runs counter to the principles of the Set of Ideas a view with which Mr Camilion agreed. On the international level the talks in New York had created a vivid interest, while the decision-making centres in Europe followed them closely. Of great importance in this sense was a leader in the London Times, published on 12 August 1992.31 Also important was an article of the German magazine Der Spiegel, published on 10 August 1992, which appeared in Phileleftheros (14 August 1992). The article comments on the intransigent stance of Mr Denktash under the heading ‘A very expensive lodger’. The political reporter of the magazine puts it this way: Ever since mid-July, the Turkish-Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash finds [sic] himself under severe pressure by the UN and the West. Together with president Vassiliou he must accept a plan by the Secretary-General Boutros-Gali which could put an end to the Cyprus dispute 18 years after the invasion of the island by the Turkish troops. The United Nations Organisation wants to reunify the two communities of Cyprus into one federal state consisting of two states under a single central government. In this project, the obstacle is Denktash who, during many rounds of negotiations under the auspices of four different Secretaries General, has been obstructing any progress that might endanger his regime. The writer further expresses their opinion: Now Ankara too seems to lose patience with Denktash. The Turkish politicians begin to realise that the reluctance of Denktash to compromise, harms the interests of the Mother Country. 210

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 211

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

After the invasion, in the summer of 1974, the Turks took over 40 per cent of the territory and 70 per cent of the wealth-producing resources of Cyprus. However, the ‘state’ of Denktash proved to be a very expensive lodger for Ankara which is obliged to foot the bill for the subsistence of 30,000 Turkish soldiers and for other expenses as well. The political cost that Ankara has to pay is also very high since Greece obstructs Turkey’s association agreement with the EEC. The writer then presents developments in the relations between Turkey and the EEC and mentions the commitment of the US President, George Bush, to the Cyprus issue. Having stressed that there is both in Athens and in Ankara a will to put aside the Greco-Turkish differences, the journalist reminds his readers that the friendship treaty between Greece and Turkey depends on a ‘fair and functional solution of the Cyprus problem’: This, however, may be delayed for a long time since Denktash does not accept the proposal of the Secretary-General on the territorial issue. The UN Secretary-General is extremely keen for the talks not to fail. If need be, Denktash and the Turks will be compelled to come to their senses with a resolution of the UN Security Council. The article ends with a reference to a report of the Turkish newspaper Sabah: ‘What Denktash is doing now may have an enormous political cost for Turkey in the diplomatic field.’

Direct negotiations At the first meeting of the direct negotiations on 12 August 1992, I was accompanied by Messrs Mavrommatis and Eftychiou, while Mr Denktash was in the company of Messrs Atakol and Erturk. Besides the Secretary-General, Messrs Camilion, Feissel and Cavanagh were also in attendance. In his introductory speech the Secretary-General said: After five weeks of proximity talks we are now starting the direct talks based on the Set of Ideas and the suggestions of the Secretary-General for territorial arrangements and the displaced persons. Taking into consideration the views of both sides I decided we should begin with the issue of the displaced persons. Concerning, first, what has been agreed so far by the two sides on the territorial issue it seems that, with the exception of small changes, they have serious differences concerning the dividing line between Nicosia and Famagusta while on the issue of the line from Nicosia extending to the bay of Morphou there has been no agreement at all. Second, both sides agree in principle that the 211

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 212

From the President’s Office

displaced persons be allowed to return to their homes and that they do possess rights to their property, even though the Turkish Cypriots have raised some difficulties of a practical nature. The Turkish-Cypriot side has proposed practical solutions to the problem. Both sides must prepare a plan for the re-establishment of the Turkish Cypriots who will be affected by the territorial arrangements. Third, both sides have discussed the constitutional issue and the whole subject needs to be discussed further. If you agree with the summary that I have just presented we can proceed to the details so that we can have a full picture in writing. With reference to the return of the displaced persons, the Secretary-General mentioned the idea of a long-term lease as a way of facing the problem so that the permanent residents of Cyprus can choose the way of returning to their homes: I, personally, as well as the two leaders do recognise the existence of some practical difficulties that may emerge. Concerning the number of individuals who will return, this must be determined as well as the specific number of years for the return to be completed. On this particular issue, the Secretary-General also referred to the persons who would prefer to stay in the homes they have already in their possession and to the indemnity to be given to the owners, as well as on the interdiction for individuals connected with acts of violence to return. Mr Denktash, reacting to the address of the Secretary-General, said that ‘he understood nothing either about what the Secretary-General wanted or about what he meant’. I did not respond to the analysis by the Secretary-General, but expressed a wish to present my opinions on the practical difficulties mentioned by him with regard to the return of the displaced Greek Cypriots. The Secretary-General explained to Denktash that he had tried to summarise the work done during the last five weeks covering the agreements and the disagreements, which were to be included in an informal document. Denktash reacted again, saying he was afraid of informal documents because, to begin with, he was given an ‘informal map’ that ended up becoming ‘the map’. He went on asking that constitutional matters be included in the report and insisting that, as there had not been any negotiations between the two sides, he did not know what had and what had not been accepted. The Secretary-General, obviously annoyed by the attitude of Mr Denktash, answered that he will give him the text and that if Denktash wanted to disagree he was free do so. ‘I repeat,’ stressed the Secretary-General, ‘that this is but a summary of what has been discussed as well as the positions of the two sides on all the issues covered by the set of ideas.’ 212

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 213

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

The Secretary-General was infuriated by the quarrelsome attitude of Mr Denktash when the latter asked to go back to the issue of the displaced persons so that he could be clear as to the point they had reached and how they would proceed on this issue. The Secretary-General answered that he would proceed with the talks as he had started, meaning he would move from the displaced persons to the territorial and then to the constitutional issue. That is how the first meeting on 12 August came to an end. The next day, 13 August, Mrs Souliotou was also present at the talks. The Secretary-General proposed to begin with the issue of the displaced persons, and once this had been dealt with to move on to the territorial and then to the constitutional issue. He asked the two sides to give a short summary of their position on the issue of the displaced persons. Reading from a prepared text, Mr Denktash said that the first priority in this issue was the re-establishment of the Turkish Cypriots who would find themselves under Greek-Cypriot administration. He also made clear that the issue of the right to property for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots could be dealt with by keeping in mind the practical difficulties that the Turkish-Cypriot community was going to face. I then took the stand and stressed that right from the start the aim of these meetings was to negotiate on the basis of the Set of Ideas including, the map: The two issues, the territorial and the one concerning the displaced persons, are the two sides of the same coin and cannot be separated. Thus, for instance, in order to discuss the displaced persons issue we must know the size of the problem and how many people will be affected. This, however, is part and parcel of the territorial issue. The philosophy behind the submitted map aims precisely at the return of the refugees. Listening to the presentation of Mr Denktash I gathered the impression that he is insisting on his notion concerning the ‘zeroing of properties’. Certain basic elements do emerge from the submitted map and these cannot be disputed. The clear conclusion is that the problem cannot be solved if the right to property is not recognised. Those who want to be indemnified could, for instance, transfer the titles to their property to an ‘Agency’ and those who want to hold on to their titles could also do so if they wish. Commenting on the document of Mr Denktash I stressed that most of what is included does not come under the label of practical difficulties. It is simply an attempt to hoodwink people by linking the issue of reestablishment with unacceptable conditions. Moreover when we speak of the right to property we are not just talking about real estate but about assets of any kind. Mr Denktash started once again to refer to the past and to the chasing of Turkish Cypriots away from their villages and concluded that in 1977 an agreement was 213

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 214

From the President’s Office

reached with Makarios in which the practical difficulties faced by the TurkishCypriot community were faced: In order, specifically, to face these difficulties we were obliged to grant ownership titles to the Turkish Cypriots so that they could be motivated to keep their properties while at the same time relinquishing to the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ the titles of their properties that they had left behind. We do not deny the right of property as long as this does not create problems for human beings and does not undermine bizonality. Who can possibly tell the Turkish Cypriots that they must once again abandon their homes? There is a legal procedure that must be followed. Our legal system must be respected. I cannot expel them by law. You may not recognise our laws but we do respect them. Denktash continued to talk in the same spirit and when he started reading an article, the Secretary-General interrupted him, telling him that we had heard all this before, but Denktash continued nonetheless unperturbed. After this long reading session by Mr Denktash, I took the stand and said: We did not come here to discuss historical facts. I could have followed the same tactic but I will not do so. We are here to find a way out. Instead of this we heard today positions based on the laws of an entity that is not recognised by the UN and is even considered illegal. If Mr Denktash insists that his laws are part of the practical difficulties and that his ‘state’ is legal then it is clear that we cannot go on. At this point Mr Camilion intervened, saying: if the problem is presented as a conflict between the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots, then we are at an impasse. It is not an issue, here, about who recognises whose legal order. The Set of Ideas attempts to deal with the issue of the conflict of human rights on the one side and interests on the other. If we follow the Set of Ideas then we can solve the problem, otherwise there will be conflict. Mr Denktash started once again to repeat the same song about the protection of the people and about the legal obligations that he has, as a state, towards his people. I responded, saying that ‘unfortunately we find ourselves here under false pretences’. Mr Denktash said that he wanted a solution to be found, obviously because he had strict instructions from Ankara to say this, but, in reality, this was debatable because, while he was participating at the talks, he did everything he could to make them fail and for the status quo to remain intact. 214

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 215

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

On 14 August the Secretary-General broke off the talks. He said he needed time 1 to ponder and to discuss matters with the Security Council. He would naturally 2 3 want to show that something had been achieved. So he summarised, saying: 4 5 Some progress has taken place given that we had a few direct talks while 6 the Set of Ideas was accepted as a basis for the negotiations. On the 7 territorial issue, in spite of maps being submitted, we did not reach an 8 agreement. We did agree, however, on the general idea of territorial 9 arrangements and on the issue of the displaced persons in spite of the 10 limitations that Mr Denktash was pushing for and which constituted an 11 obstacle in the implementation of the principles pertaining to these two 12 issues. We will now have a break in order to take stock and decide on a 13 new round of direct talks. To this purpose I will have a meeting with the 14 Security Council and I hope to convince them that it will benefit the talks 15 if we have this brief respite. 16 The Secretary-General said that the relevant declaration would be made after the 17 meeting he would have with the Security Council, while the relevant report would 18 19 be ready within 7–10 days. During the whole time that the second round in New York lasted, I had with me 20 all the political leaders. We met every day both for briefing and for exchanging views. 21 Their presence helped them understand better the prevailing conditions and accept 22 certain compromises if and when these were made necessary. The basis for all this, 23 however, was the wish to find a solution based on the high-level agreements, 24 25 something that not everybody was taking for granted. After the end of the second round, on Friday 14 August, I came back to my hotel 26 and briefed them on the day’s developments. I then asked them to express their 27 opinions on the way the entire negotiations had been carried out and on my way of 28 handling them. I hereby summarise the various positions taken in the order they 29 30 were expressed: 31 32 [Christofias:] I believe that the president handled the whole procedure – 33 but also the substance – on the basis of the principles that we have all 34 decided in common as National Council. The president did not yield an 35 inch, so that none of us can accuse him of retreating on the territorial 36 issue, that of the refugees or on human rights. He has not given way to 37 any of the issues concerning the basic aspects of the Cyprus problem. On 38 the contrary he sent the message that we are ready for a solution while at 39 the same time firmly defending the principles on which the solution of the 40 Cyprus problem must be built. [Lyssaridis:] We are leaving this place without a solution of the Cyprus problem and I am afraid that we are leaving without any sanctions, most 215

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 216

From the President’s Office

probably without even a condemnation, of the other side. We are not going to be judged either by the frustration we experienced staying in our hotel rooms or by the hard work done by some during all this time. [Rolandis:] Cyprus has been partitioned. In the occupied area everything has been Turkified [sic] and one day, if there is return, we will have a huge problem to implant the Greek-Cypriot element in the northern Cyprus environment. I believe that the documents that have been submitted as well as Resolution 750 invert this course to a large extent – both on the international and the local level – as far as the Cyprus problem is concerned. To be objective, I personally think this development should be credited to the government. My own assessment is that productive work has been done here, the best that could be expected under the circumstances. The president, the government and all those who were present here and tried to produce results must be given credit for this. [Kyprianou:] There may have been a good atmosphere, a good climate as things developed, as well as constructive discussion but there has also been dissension. Beyond the basic dissension on Gali’s ‘ideas’ there has been dissension on the inclusion of the constitutional issue in the way the Secretary-General did this. The result proves that these talks should not have been held in New York. I do not deny that the president and his collaborators worked within the frame of what they deemed right and proper. I do not deny that on basic issues the right arguments were developed. New talks must certainly not be decided. I return to the idea of an all-national conference whose paternity Glafkos can claim as of right. [Clerides:] We could not have failed to respond to the invitation of the Secretary-General for talks in New York. In Cyprus we were given a promise that you would do your utmost so that we could stay essentially within the bounds of what the National Council had unanimously decided. In assessing the degree to which you kept your promise I must say that yes, you did keep it. My worry is the following: whether or not the unacceptable positions by Denktash have been gaining any support. I do believe, to be fair, that a battle has been waged which did not make our position worse. For those who had hoped that an effort would be undertaken to improve ideas, there may have not been any improvement as far as Denktash is concerned. I believe, however, there has been progress on the international level which we see reflected in Der Spiegel and in The Times. [Papapetrou:] The president, with the help of his collaborators and all the political leaders – who in spite of their disagreements on certain matters must be credited for their positive and constructive role – managed, thanks to his well-aimed and judicious handling, to avoid falling into the 216

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 217

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

traps set by Denktash. He managed to avoid all the difficult points with the result that it was Denktash who took the blame. [Triantafyllidis:] In New York, irrespective of disagreements on particular points, two things were achieved. On the one hand our own constructive endeavour for a solution of the Cyprus problem was made clear while the intransigence and irrationality of Denktash were also displayed for all to see. It would be a mistake not to praise the stamina of the president who promoted our rights as we all see them. [Souliotou:] I believe that we are leaving this place with some gain and this is that for the first time there is a UN map that puts on the table a suggestion about the territorial issue. Also the Gali Ideas contain a number of more positive elements than all the previous ideas. [Mavrommatis:] Thanks to the good handling by the president we managed to win the battle of impressions in the international community and especially within the Security Council. [Iacovou:] I believe that all the battles that had to be fought were indeed fought. Those who have not been party to the specific consultations with the permanent members cannot know how tense the climate was and how hard was the struggle that was going on. We are leaving New York with a map. Let us not forget that the Gali map had never been presented officially. It has now been put to use and bears the stamp of the United Nations. Irrespective of any future developments, the map will be there and will be put to good use. Also Turkey, perhaps for purely procedural reasons and in order to facilitate its manoeuvres, has accepted the principle of the return of the refugees and the right to property. [Vassiliou:] It would be a mistake to underestimate what we have achieved. In a procedure like this nothing can be taken for granted. In the morning you have something and in the afternoon you have nothing. You must be continuously on guard, able to respond to what is happening. What are the achievements? The map; the support on basic positions; the fact that, as many have said, now that everything is crumbling they support a solution on the basis of a federation in Cyprus; the international esteem that we gained; the retreat that Denktash was obliged to make on matters of principle in spite of the fact that, being fully aware of what his positions are, we know he wants to violate his commitments. Nonetheless once he has accepted a principle, our negotiating position is hugely strengthened and so is the ability of the great powers to put pressure on him. The battle we now have to wage is clear. We must secure the best possible report and the best possible resolution. [Lyssaridis:] If we were not in New York we would not have the opportunity to live through developments as they happened, we would not 217

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 218

From the President’s Office

have known the arguments used and the battle waged. We would judge only by results and there would certainly be statements issued that Denktash would take advantage of. [Vassiliou:] To conclude, I would like to express to you my gratitude for the fact that you came and stayed in New York. I believe we sent a message to our people and to foreigners that differences of opinion are bound to exist since we live in a democracy but it is a fact that above all there is unity of aims and purpose which is of huge significance. The basic aim of Denktash was to split us. The fact that we were able to respond and not yield to temptations is to our credit, something I do respect and value. I would also, by the same token, thank the working committee which did a terrific job and assisted me to a great extent. After the second round was completed, the UN Secretary-General declared that the meetings in common would be reconvened on 16 October 1992, without mentioning anything about an impasse or the talks having been broken off and without holding anyone responsible for this. The political leaders had already returned to Nicosia while I stayed in New York, trying to make sure that in the report to be submitted by Mr Boutros-Gali, responsibility be allocated to Mr Denktash for the failure to achieve any substantial progress on the Cyprus issue. In my statement to RIK (the Cyprus Broadcasting Station), I stressed: ‘This recess was also our request so that when the talks are resumed we can discuss on a common basis. Answering relevant questions, I said the following: During the talks in New York we waged a successful battle and we moved the solution of the Cyprus problem one step ahead. The positive elements of the New York talks are the following: • Mr Gali [sic] dealt extensively with the Cyprus problem and came to know well the two sides and their positions. • The talks took place on the basis of the most comprehensive document that has ever been submitted until now for the solution of the Cyprus problem. • For the first time in the history of the Cyprus problem there has been a specific proposal for the solution of the territorial issue on the basis of the Gali map and with the provision for the right of return and the right to property. • Denktash was obliged to recognise the right of return and ownership even though he presents practical difficulties regarding their implementation. 218

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 219

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

In an interview I gave to the Athens newspaper Mesimvrini, published on 18 August, 1 2 I described as follows the results of the talks: 3 4 [Question:] If you were a neutral observer, who would you say came out 5 as the winner from this round of talks? 6 [Answer:] In the sense that the status quo remains unaltered this 7 undoubtedly serves the interests and the wishes of Mr Denktash. 8 However, in the sense that the negotiation made clear, on the 9 international level, the need for the Cyprus problem to be solved, that it 10 showed clearly how negative the Turkish stance continues to be to the 11 extent of making the Security Council declare the continuation of the 12 status quo as unacceptable and help push forward the procedure both in 13 the realm of ideas and on the map, I believe that it is our side that has 14 benefited. 15 [Question:] So the benefits are shared. 16 [Answer:] No, the result for the other side is negative. The advantage of 17 the Turkish side lies in what it possesses and the only way it can take leave 18 of its possessions is through a solution. Thus one cannot say that it has 19 won something which it did not have before. It simply managed to retain 20 for a given time and under an increasing international pressure what is 21 already in its possession. Thus one cannot say that this is to the advantage 22 of Mr Denktash. 23 On the occasion of the completion of the second round of talks in New York (15 24 July 1992–14 August 1992), the presidents of the ‘World Federation of Cypriots 25 Abroad’ (POMAK) and of the ‘World Coordination Committee of the Cyprus 26 Struggle’ (PSEKA), Messrs Homer Hapipis and Philip Cristopher, issued the 27 28 following common declaration: 29 30 POMAK and PSEKA believe that for the first time the Cyprus problem is 31 really prominent on the world scene and very high on the agenda of 32 problems that the international community is seriously dealing with. Both 33 the United Nations through their Secretary-General and the members of 34 the Security Council worked hard during the past month so that the 35 Cyprus problem could be led towards its solution. Of especial importance 36 is the fact that the American government through the personal 37 intervention by President Bush and also with the personal letters sent by 38 the Secretary of State Mr Baker, tries to convince Turkey to put similar 39 pressure on Denktash for progress to be made. The American interest in a 40 solution of the Cyprus problem is also apparent as the Cyprus problem figures in the programmes of both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. 219

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 220

From the President’s Office

Recess between the first and the second meeting in New York After my return on 20 August, Phileleftheros published an important article by Andreas Ziartidis, which in my opinion offers an excellent and objective view of the negotiations.32 At the same time I must mention that the unrealistic and dangerous positions against the historical compromise by Ethnarch Makarios increased in number and stridency. The Conference of 28 Cypriot Unions and Organisations of Cypriots living abroad was held on 19 August in Filoxenia, with Loukis Loukidis, Assistant General Prosecutor, as the main speaker, who analysed the Gali ideas and the relevant document as well as the solution of the Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation. After the conference ended, a separate resolution was voted, addressed to the President of the Republic and the political leaders, as well as to the UN Secretary-General and the permanent members of the Security Council. Among other things the resolution asked for Cyprus to be released from a solution based on the Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation and for the Cyprus problem to be re-positioned on its ‘right basis’. The problem with all these grandiloquent declarations was that they did not involve the submission of any specific proposal, while in essence they ensured the continuation of the occupation and the status quo – without any costs for Turkey to boot. On 21 August the Secretary-General presented his report about what had been done during the talks (Appendix 13). After this, the Security Council adopted Resolution 774, approving the report of the Secretary-General together with his ideas and suggestions. The submission and unanimous adoption by the Security Council of the report by the Secretary-General, which included the Set of Ideas, was a major development and was bound to provoke intense confrontations. At a press conference on 28 August, I analysed the resolution and answered reporters’ questions, thus covering the whole gamut of the various aspects of the Cyprus question. In my introductory statement at this press conference, I said: The talks in New York, as you all know, were a very important turningpoint in our struggle for a solution of the Cyprus problem. This was not a chance meeting nor did it happen on its own. It was the result of a very hard endeavour, a very intense struggle that began with the meeting in Geneva in the summer of 1988 aiming at revitalising the international interest in the Cyprus issue, the creation of conditions which would lead this interest to be directed towards the Turkish side so that we may reach as soon as possible the end of the present situation – i.e. the partition and the occupation of Cyprus – and succeed in reunifying Cyprus. We had no illusions going to New York. We all knew that Mr Denktash had not as yet decided in favour of a solution of the Cyprus 220

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 221

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

problem. This was obvious from his frequent statements. We nonetheless went to New York in the knowledge that by going there and participating in the effort to find a solution we had nothing to lose but, on the contrary, much to gain. And we did gain because we played our cards right. Naturally our wish was for a solution to be reached, but it was not up to us to achieve this. This depended on the stance adopted by the other side. The important thing was for us to present our positions in the proper way, be convincing about the rightness of our cause, the strength of our arguments and about the fact that the time had come at last for a solution to be found. The international interest in our cause during this time was stronger than ever. I don’t think there has ever been another case in which the effort to solve a problem has generated such a direct and persistent interest by the Security Council. Every day, after the end of the contacts and the meetings, the five permanent members were being briefed by the Secretariat General and expressed their opinions. That is how things proceeded. At the same time, over and above what was happening in New York, the Foreign Ministries of the five permanent members pursued various other activities such as writing letters, sending messages, making phone calls and contacts with the Turkish government that always aimed at achieving progress in the negotiations. In New York, as you know, I was not on my own. I was accompanied by all the political leaders of the country and by the working committee on the Cyprus problem. I would like to stress once again that our cooperation was not just good, it was excellent and harmonious. It is also important to note that the various positions we put forward on the territorial issue and the issue concerning the refugees had always the unanimous approval of the political leadership. I let them know what I would support, they expressed their opinions and we proceeded on the basis of this procedure. Naturally, the presence of the political leadership gave a clear message to the international community that irrespective of our well-known differences on specific issues of tactics we are all united on the goals and all striving for a solution. The elements for such a solution are well-known, based as they are on the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979 that provide, amongst other things, the creation of a Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation. This realisation sent undoubtedly the right message to the international community and I believe it did help the struggle that we are waging. In the end, as you well know, there was no solution because Mr Denktash was not ready for it. Mr Denktash started by raising objections on the territorial issue and continued in the same vein on the issue of the refugees. Near the middle of the procedure, the impression was given that everything had come to an end and that we were moving towards a 221

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 222

From the President’s Office

resolution but then, as a result of the intervention by Ankara, there was a spectacular turn-around with the recognition, by the Turkish side, of the right of return and the right to property. This turn-around led to direct talks during which, however, it emerged that the Turkish side was giving something with one hand and then tried to retrieve it with the other. This compelled the Secretary-General to reach the conclusion that a recess was necessary so that he could prepare his report to the Security Council and continue his endeavours, strengthened by the Resolution he was expecting to get from the Security Council. During the whole procedure in New York it was made clear that the fears expressed by some people that there was already a fully prepared, ‘concocted solution’ of the Cyprus problem, proved unfounded. Our people must know that nothing is being done behind their back. An effort is currently under way and this effort is unfolding in broad day-light in front of everybody. It is for us a hard task to reach an agreed solution on the basis of the outline that was shaped by the UN. As is well-known, whoever plays the role of the mediator creates an outline which is then given to the two sides. This is the only way for such a procedure to make progress. Now, how do we assess the report of the UN Secretary-General Mr Boutros-Gali? I don’t want to repeat what was said by the government spokesman but it is obvious that the report by Mr Gali is an objective presentation of what was done which does not assign responsibilities directly but which shows – to anyone who knows how to read and is conversant with international issues – most clearly that progress has not been achieved because on the territorial issue the Turkish side refused to cooperate on the basis of the ideas of the Secretary-General and his proposals submitted in the form of a map. The UN do not consider that this map is the result of a line being drawn at random. This map is the result of serious study and aims to provide the basis for a compromise offering what the UN consider a solution satisfying to a certain degree – not absolutely – both sides. This, of course, is the basis for any negotiation. We thus had a presentation and explanation of both our own positions as well as the Turkish ones. It was made clear that we did not consider the map as offering the ideal solution or even a really fair proposal because it is unfair, for instance, that 50 per cent of the shores should come under the control of the Turkish state and that 28 per cent of the territory should come under the control of 18 per cent of the population. We said, nonetheless, that we are ready to discuss on the basis of that map. The same thing happened with the issue of the refugees. There is in fact recognition of their right of return and their right to property, something 222

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 223

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

of the greatest importance for us, but at the same time we now have the refusal of Mr Denktash to allow these rights to be implemented because of the various conditions attached to them that he presented. The SecretaryGeneral considers these conditions to be essentially unacceptable. At the same time the report shows how cogently we put and presented such matters having to do with human rights which are among the issues that the UN are by their very nature meant to pursue and ensure their implementation under any circumstance. It was also made clear that, in spite of the noise Denktash makes about the constitutional issue, in the end, all the positions he promotes, lie outside the framework of the Set of Ideas that the Secretary-General has submitted. Therefore it is we who have nothing to be afraid of by discussing the constitutional issue because by basing ourselves on the Set of Ideas we are in fact aiming at creating a federal state that can be made really functional in every respect. On the contrary, Mr Denktash has always been arguing in favour of two independent states, something that the international community has been rejecting all along. On this issue I would like to stress something that is of great importance for everybody. In spite of what happens in Eastern Europe, in the Balkans and in various other areas, the international community is united in supporting the proposal for the reunification of Cyprus, wants to see a unified Cyprus with a single international personality, a single citizenship, a single sovereignty, an independent country with its territorial integrity secured. This is of the essence for us, it is a huge gain for our people, because under different circumstances it would have been very easy to say that ‘what is done is done, let us forget it’. The Secretary-General told us in no uncertain terms that he considers the status quo, the present situation, as unfair and that it should not be allowed to continue. On the other hand, during the meeting the five permanent members of the Security Council had with Mr Denktash on 24 July they told him clearly that should the present effort fail he should not expect the status quo to be maintained. They stressed to him that they consider the present territorial split in Cyprus to be unfair and that it should not be perpetuated. These are things that had I been uttering them some years ago, most would reply that ‘it is a good thing to hope, perchance to dream but difficult, if not impossible to achieve these things’. Well, finally they came true. The interest of the international community was also expressed through the Resolution. I don’t want to repeat the basic tenets of the Resolution but its meaning couldn’t be clearer. ‘We are displeased that there has not been any progress until today. We insist that the Cyprus problem can and must be solved and that a serious negotiation must take place on the basis of the Set of Ideas and the map’. The Security 223

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 224

From the President’s Office

Council adopted the Gali map in spite of all the protests by Mr Denktash who during our last meeting with the Secretary-General stated clearly: ‘If the map is approved I will not be coming back’. In spite of all these reactions by Mr Denktash, the map was approved and adopted by the Security Council. At the same time, because of the well-known views that are expressed from time to time by the Turkish side, the Resolution reconfirms the positions about a single state. The Resolution mainly stresses the decisiveness of the Security Council – thus committing the Security Council – that unless there is progress and in spite of the fact that much may happen until the 26th of October, the Secretary-General must report the reasons for which no progress was made and then submit proposals for further steps to be taken. It expresses, of course, the hope that there will be a solution within 1992, but I repeat that whether there will be a solution or not will depend mainly on the stance taken by the Turkish side. This Resolution and this report map out the road to the future. What we have to do is to make the maximum possible use of these provisions of the Resolution and the report of the UN Secretary-General by promoting them at every opportunity at every possible forum. This is what I intend to do in Jakarta during the contacts that I will have there with a large number of third world leaders and others as well. The same will be done during all the contacts that politicians and the Foreign Minister will have during this period. At the press conference I also mentioned the conclusions of a study which compares the Set of Ideas with all the previous UN proposals and shows to what extent it is better than the de Cuéllar ideas that had been submitted in 1991. Concerning especially these de Cuéllar ideas, which had preceded the Set of Ideas, we prepared a small comparative study showing the extent to which they were superseded by Gali’s document. This was the result of very intense consultations we had with both Mr Pérez de Cuéllar and Mr Boutros-Gali later. I feel obliged to point out that although this book covers only the five years of my presidency, it is generally accepted that concerning its framework and philosophy, the Set of Ideas is definitely superior to the Annan plan.

Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned and visit to Athens By the end of August, almost immediately after my return from New York, I had to go to Jakarta for the Tenth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned. The importance of the Movement was no longer the same as during the Cold War, but it still represented the majority of the UN members and it was necessary for us to maintain the good relations we had built with them during all these years. I had special meetings there with the UN Secretary-General and with a great number of leaders, especially from the Middle East. We secured a good resolution 224

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 225

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

that asked for the removal of the foreign troops and the solution of the Cyprus problem within the framework of the procedure that had been started by the Security Council under the auspices of the Secretary-General. The resolution was so positive that, as had happened with Resolution 774, it too provoked reactions by Mr Denktash and the Turkish foreign ministry. From Jakarta, I went to Athens, where I had my first, after New York, personal meeting with the Greek prime minister and the other political leaders. President Karamanlis advised me to place the emphasis on the territorial issue, as well as on that concerning the future security of the state. I discussed with him the issue of the all-national conference and he said that he considered this idea impossible to implement. An all-national conference, he said, would only have meaning if its success could be assured and if all participants agreed on the issues. He believed, though, that in the political climate prevailing at that time in Greece the possibility of forging a common front between Papandreou and Mitsotakis was non-existent. We had a long meeting with Mr Papandreou that lasted two-and-a-half hours. We discussed in all detail all the aspects of the problem; I explained the entire tactic we followed in New York, and I can say that he did not disagree with the positions we supported nor with the line we had followed. It was obvious, however, that because of the position he had taken publicly he was not prepared to make any statement that differed from it. It was also obvious that his confrontation with Prime Minister Mitsotakis was very intense. Before leaving Athens, I gave a long press conference. Answering a question on the disagreements expressed by the Greek and the Cypriot opposition on the Gali outline and how I dealt with such criticisms, I answered: I believe it is true, and I am saying this openly and clearly, that I have always been sincere and straightforward. If there is a politician or a person who thinks he can change a unanimously adopted Resolution of the Security Council – which now also happens to be supported by a resolution of the Non-aligned Movement also taken unanimously – then this person must live on another planet. What I mean is that we have no option but to negotiate within the framework of the Set of Ideas and of the map of the Secretary-General. This is what the Security Council has decided and this is the basis on which we will negotiate. Meanwhile, in Cyprus, Mr Clerides prepared the ground for the talks not to be resumed in October, or if they were, that he should not participate. It was thus that at the beginning of September, Messrs Clerides and Kyprianou met at the DHKO offices and agreed to insist that the talks due to begin on 26 October had to be postponed, even though they knew that this was impossible. They also agreed to call for an all-national conference even though they knew as well that this was but an empty gesture. The call for an all-national conference – which no Greek government 225

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 226

From the President’s Office

ever adopted – was aimed at inciting and exploiting nationalistic feelings and attitudes. It had been launched by Mr Clerides, who knew that it appealed to a section of the people. For the same reason this slogan had been adopted by Messrs Kyprianou and Lyssaridis. It is interesting to note, and this shows how demagogic this slogan was, that when they became presidents later, neither Mr Kyprianou nor Mr Clerides ever tried to make it happen. Mr Lyssaridis moved along the same lines, as shown by the following announcement that was issued after a meeting he had with Mr Kyprianou: At a meeting that Messrs Lyssaridis and Kyprianou had at the offices of DHKO, they agreed to invite the president to suggest to the UN Secretary-General to cancel the talks of 26 October 1992 unless really propitious conditions for the solution of the Cyprus problem do emerge before that date. The two leaders also agreed that it is urgent for an allnational conference to be called on the issue before the 26 October 1992. Replying to questions by a reporter, Mr Lyssaridis rejected the possibility of a common front to be created with the participation of EDEK, DHKO and DISY because, as he said, there are differences in the positions held by these parties on the Cyprus problem. As for the position that AKEL took on the New York meeting, Haravgi published, on 3 September, the following: ‘It would be a political slip with visibly unfavourable consequences for the Greek-Cypriot side if president Vassiliou refuses to accept the invitation of the Secretary-General to continue the talks on 26 October 1992.’ In his statement, the parliamentary representative of AKEL, Andreas Christou, said: Our position is that since the Secretary-General, who is today in the forefront of the effort of shaping a framework for an agreement on the Cyprus issue, estimates in principle that the negotiation must resume on the 26th of October, we do not see any valid reason in discussing now the probability of not going. We say yes. Since the Secretary-General is inviting us we must go. After that, on 18 September, before my departure for the General Assembly of the UN, we held a day-long session of the National Council. In my briefing, I said: The Secretary-General fixed the 26th of October as the date for the resumption of the dialogue. Both Mr Eagleburger and I put pressure on him to transfer the date in September or early October but the SecretaryGeneral said that this was impossible. My personal assessment is that the report is more honest than other previous reports by Secretaries General and I must tell you that certain 226

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 227

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 The issue of the EEC was also discussed at the National Council. I told them that 30 31 there was no question of any delay in the issuing of an Opinion: 32 33 Next Wednesday I am meeting Mr Delors, provided the French vote ‘yes’ 34 at the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty because if they vote ‘no’ I 35 believe Mr Delors will postpone the meeting. There is a serious danger for 36 the Opinion to be delayed. I will do my best, without being able to 37 promise anything, to avert any such delay, to make sure that our case is not 38 treated separately from that of Malta and for it to be a success of course. 39 Mr Kyprianou asked the following question: ‘Let us suppose that the Cyprus 40 problem is not solved for some years to come. Will it then be a lost case to expect Cyprus, on the basis of existing indications, to become a member of the EEC?’ passages of the report that ascribe responsibility to Mr Denktash show that the Secretary-General himself had been personally involved in producing it. Naturally, considering that the aim was for the procedure to get on, he pushed things as far as, in his opinion, they could be pushed and no further. The report helped the adoption of the Resolution which, in spite of the disagreements that exist on the issue of the Set of Ideas, we must recognise adopts basic positions of ours and contains a clear warning addressed to the Turkish side. I must say that all the leaders whom I met believed that the continuation of the procedure is the only way open to us. In connection with this, I wish to refer specifically to the prime minister of India whom I asked on purpose if, in view of the negative attitude of the Turkish side, it would be better for us to break off the procedure and do something else or have recourse to the General Assembly. His reply was clear, namely that we have no option but to pursue the procedure of the UN, the cooperation with the Secretary-General and that only the Turkish side would benefit from such a breakdown of the talks while we have nothing to fear. I am leaving for New York on Monday morning, I will address the General Assembly on Tuesday, I will meet four permanent members of the Security Council – I met the Chinese in Jakarta – as well as the Secretary-General and various others. During these meetings I will try first to stress the Turkish intransigence, develop arguments and ask my interlocutors to increase pressure on Turkey but also to promise me, in case there is no progress on 26 October that they will move on with a Resolution. I will also insist with the Secretary-General that he should not allow the procedure to degenerate but must keep it on track so that we do not waste time. If there is progress, fine, if not we move on immediately to a Resolution.

227

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 228

From the President’s Office

I replied that: Up till two or three years ago when I put this question, people in Europe thought that I was joking or had taken leave of my senses. At some point they became convinced – and I believe we have achieved this – not to close the door on us. This did not mean they were ready to accept us without a solution of the Cyprus problem and everybody has been until today saying that they thought it unrealistic for Cyprus to become a member of the EEC without the Cyprus problem having been solved. The only time I succeeded to bring about a change of view on this was when I went to Germany in March where, during my discussions with the Foreign Minister Mr Genscher, Chancellor Kohl as well as President Weiszeker, I stressed that we are not responsible for the lack of cooperation displayed by Turkey and should therefore not be punished for ever... It is important that during all this time the EEC must remain convinced that we are in the right – as far as procedure is concerned – and Turkey is in the wrong. I have therefore no doubt that if we broke off the procedure or if we were held responsible by the UN for breaking off the talks, the accession procedure would stop and the EEC would put the issue of our membership on ice.

New York – Seville – Brussels (September to October 1992) I had to go to New York to speak to the UN General Assembly and also to meet the Secretary-General and the foreign ministers of important countries in view of the October negotiations. In the UN General Assembly that began its session on 22 September, the results of the work we had done throughout the year became apparent and a good climate regarding Cyprus in general did prevail. President Bush referred to the Cyprus problem and so did the representative of the Non-aligned Movement, the foreign minister of Zimbabwe. I had a series of meetings with the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the Security Council. My speech to the General Assembly naturally covered the current situation, which I linked with the Cyprus problem. I stressed: The end of the Cold-War confrontation opened the way for increased cooperation. The triumph of Democracy and the cooperation of the great powers created possibilities for solving conflicts which stemmed from, or were kept alive by, the previous confrontation between East and West. Expectations of a world free of the shackles of insecurity were thus justifiably created amongst all... . Eighteen years have passed since Cyprus suffered the catastrophic consequences of the ‘ethnic cleansing’ that followed the Turkish invasion 228

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 229

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 I went afterwards to Brussels where I had substantial talks with the president of the 38 Commission of the European Community Mr Jacques Delors, who expressed the 39 view that by the end of the year the Commission would have completed its Opinion 40 on the application by Cyprus to become a full member of the community, adding that this was everybody’s political wish. of 1974 and we are once again witnessing similar tragedies being repeated in other parts of the world. In 1974, Turkey, a powerful neighbour of tiny Cyprus, invaded and conquered 37 per cent of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. One third of the Greek-Cypriot population were expelled from their ancestral homes and properties thus allowing for ethnically cleansed areas to be created. Weak and defenceless Cyprus turned to the UN, the selfsame UN that the largest part of humanity does turn to for getting help today. Such requests have grown in number and tend to increase. The fact that the UN are now free of the constraints imposed on them by the antagonism of the superpowers during the cold war does strengthen their hand... . In the case of Cyprus, and despite the lack of results due to the negative stance of the Turkish side during the long negotiations aiming at finding a solution, the Secretary-General Mr Boutros Boutros-Gali rightly took advantage of the opportunity offered and launched a new intensive effort to this effect. The Security Council which was already part of the procedure threw its weight in favour of this endeavour and got deeply involved in it in an unprecedented way... . Unfortunately the Turkish side remains intransigent in its goals, aiming at the perpetuation of the division of Cyprus into two ‘ethnically cleansed’ areas in blatant disregard of human rights and of the basic rules of international law. Even today we hear voices coming from Turkey against the Federation alleging that since there are two different communities living in Cyprus, the island must be dismembered. Just imagine what the world would look like if this principle were applied universally. If in spite of the efforts by the Secretary-General, our own goodwill and the involvement of the Security Council, the talks in October prove to be a repetition of the nasty summer experience, we feel certain that the Security Council and this Body will move on to ensure that progress can be made. It would be tragic if the effort to solve the Cyprus problem were further delayed or even stopped. The Cyprus people, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots alike want to forget the past and move on to a better future. The reunification of Cyprus will mark the dawn of a new era of prosperity and progress that will benefit all Cypriots, especially the Turkish Cypriots and our area as a whole.

229

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 230

From the President’s Office

Characteristic of the prevailing climate was the report published on 1 October in the Athens newspaper Avghi, which mentioned: Mr Vassiliou, after his meeting with Mr Delors, which lasted much longer than originally planned, said yesterday at noon, answering questions by reporters, that he believes the Community should not only be enlarged northwards and eastwards but also towards its Mediterranean south in order to retain its balance. He stressed that he saw no reason why the Commission should delay issuing its ‘Opinion’ beyond 1992 and that the competent services in Cyprus were ready to cooperate with their counterparts in the Commission and provide them with all the data (statistical, economic etc.) necessary for them to prepare their ‘Opinion’ well in time. Leaving Brussels, I made the following statement: Irrespective of a solution to the Cyprus problem, which we certainly look forward to and seek to achieve, we are moving on to the EU. We do not link the accession of Cyprus to the EU with the prior solution of the Cyprus problem. Turkey’s intransigence should not become an obstacle in our course towards Europe. At the beginning of October the new American special coordinator on the Cyprus issue, Ambassador John Maresca, came to Cyprus, replacing Mr Nelson Letsky, who retired. After his visit to Cyprus and the talks we had, Mr Maresca made the following statement: ‘I believe that conditions, both here and internationally, suggest that now is the right time to undertake the task of settling the problem.’ Answering another question, Mr Maresca said he did not believe that the elections in America would affect the procedure of the talks: I believe – and this has been made obvious – that all these years the American governments, whether in the hands of the Democratic or the Republican Party, have been consistently stressing the need for a settlement of the problem and I believe that this will continue to be so. On 12 October we convened a new session of the National Council to discuss the Set of Ideas, as adopted by the Security Council. Introducing the discussion, I also suggested that the views and observations of everyone could be expressed in writing and exchanged among the members of the National Council, so as to make the discussion easier. We should certainly avoid saying what our side does or does not accept because this might be leaked and thus damage our negotiating capacity. 230

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 231

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

Here then is an extract from the minutes of the session of the National Council 1 that took place on 12 October 1992. The parliamentary spokesman of DHKO, Mr 2 3 Tassos Papadopoulos, expressed the following opinion: 4 5 I start from the premise that our aim is to extricate ourselves from the 6 document. I suggest that on the basis of paragraph 8 of the Resolution 7 dealing with the preparation of the talks, and within the frame of this 8 preparation, the president should hand to the representatives of the 9 Secretary-General a document that will avoid all references to issues that 10 in his and the National Council’s judgement are totally unacceptable even 11 for discussion. 12 President Vassiliou replied: This is outside the whole procedure and 13 that there was no question of submitting documents. The United Nations 14 do not want – the Secretary-General has stated this clearly – any 15 documents to be submitted because they believe that this could only do 16 harm and because of this, I for one, believe it would be a serious mistake 17 for our side to act in this way. It would convey the impression that we 18 intend to sabotage the procedure and I am not prepared to do this. 19 Mr Papadopoulos said he did not see the difference between the 20 submission of a document and the oral presentation of a case. I corrected 21 him pointing out that the difference lay in respecting the procedure. 22 Mr Matsis pointed out that if we aim to extricate ourselves from this 23 situation, then the method suggested by Mr Papadopoulos is very suitable. 24 I interrupted his speech stressing that I had no intention to extricate 25 myself from the UN procedure. 26 The General Secretary of AKEL, Mr Dimitris Christofias said that he 27 was under the impression that this issue had been debated in the past and 28 that there had been a general consensus – with certain disagreements of 29 course – that the procedure would be allowed to go on and that the 30 president would defend our principles on the spot. 31 T. Papadopoulos: My view is – and I want to underline this – that each 32 and every one of the provisions of the Set of Ideas is contrary to each and 33 every one of the chapters in the proposals of 1989. 34 The President reminded the body that the issue had repeatedly been 35 discussed, that Mr Papadopoulos had sent his views in writing to New 36 York and that there had also been a debate in Parliament. 37 Mr Papadopoulos, on the other hand, wished to remind the body that 38 the president himself had said at a press conference, and on various other 39 occasions as well, that ‘the document is not too far away from our 40 proposals of 1989’. ‘I want to repeat that the Gali document is totally against each and every one of our own proposals of 1989’ insisted Mr Papadopoulos. 231

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 232

From the President’s Office

I corrected him saying that I had never said that ‘it was not too far away from our proposals of 1989’. What I did say was that it was not impossible for me to carry on a discussion, based on our proposals, within the framework of this plan. Mr Clerides said, that for the sake of objectivity one must admit that this issue had been the subject of discussion before. He even remembered that there had been a discussion about sending a document to the Secretary-General and that the majority decision that had been taken then by the National Council was to send a letter – which was indeed sent – but also that we would go to New York to discuss and reject the negative things. This was our position. Mr Papadopoulos said that he was not concealing his opinion: ‘I said that I start from the principle that the document with the Gali Ideas is totally unacceptable even as a basis for discussion and that, therefore, what I am saying is that the decision on substance that the National Council is going to take should mark the unhooking from this document.’ Mr Christofias said that he could not agree with what Mr Papadopoulos had just said because they had discussed the issue and his views on it had not changed. Mr Lyssaridis: ‘I thought and I continue to think that the aim of our session today would be to examine the document in question paragraph by paragraph to make clear on which provisions we all agree and which are to be rejected. This could be of help to the president so that he could know that there are provisions in this document that no group deems acceptable.’ Mr Kyprianou observed that there were two issues involved and that the one did not exclude the other: ‘The issue raised by Mr Papadopoulos is something that does not negate the discussions we had as to what is to be done now.’ The president interrupted saying that it rendered these discussions useless and explained that if what Mr Papadopoulos had raised was accepted no further discussion would be necessary because a decision of becoming unhooked from the document would render it useless. ‘You know my views on the subject. What I do see is that the 26th of October is real. We will go to New York and once we are there, a discussion on the points we want to be improved upon – provided the other side is willing to cooperate seriously – is both useful and helpful. However, a discussion aiming at totally rejecting the procedure and the document would lead nowhere and would not help us achieve what we aim for.’ Mr Kyprianou returned to the subject saying that his party’s line is indeed to get unhooked from the document, but the idea at this stage is to 232

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 233

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

point out to the UN Secretary-General the issues of principle that are unacceptable. The view of DHKO about the necessity of becoming unhooked from the document remained valid. I pointed out that what Mr Papadopoulos meant was that all these actions ought to allow us to become unhooked from the Gali document. Mr Papadopoulos said that the matter could be put in the following way: All efforts should be made to achieve an improvement of the document that would be such as to unhook us from the document as it now stands. I commented that this was not what Mr Papadopoulos really wanted but that he simply considered the document as being unacceptable and that therefore the procedure should be stopped. Mr Papadopoulos agreed. I went on saying that: This is not under discussion because there is a decision by the Security Council and it would be ludicrous to think that we could go against the Security Council. At that point I proposed to proceed to a short briefing which, in my opinion, would help the members of the National Council judge certain things that were the subjects of the ongoing debate... In general, I explained, as in every case discussed at the UN, I would start by stressing that we want progress, are grateful for all the help given but that we can also see that the Turkish side, judging from its various statements, continues to be negative. I would then ask how the impasse could be broken. Everybody would then agree that in spite of the negative positions and statements by the Turks, it was necessary for the UN procedure and the meeting of 26th October to proceed as scheduled because it was only through this procedure that pressure could be exerted on Turkey. They had all planned to meet Cetin to convey to him the message that progress had to be made during the dialogue of 26th October, something they could not possibly have done had there not been a perspective for such a dialogue... Anyway what emerges from the positions taken by all is the fact that they all believe the Cyprus problem should have been solved and that the reason this has not been done is the obstinate attitude of Turkey. There is thus a general recognition of Turkey’s responsibility in the matter. The excuse of Cetin about Turkey wanting a solution but that Denktash is the one to blame for everything in spite of the pressure they put on him, may have sounded credible to some in the past. However, such excuses had started to sound lame by now because there has not been any essential change in the situation and because they consider that 233

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 234

From the President’s Office

Turkey has greater powers of persuasion over Denktash than what it had shown to begin with... The international community insists on the need for progress and wants to put pressure on the Security Council. Thus any attempt by any side either to refuse going to New York or to try to unhook itself from the procedure will be judged very negatively... As you know the procedure entails direct talks from the very first day as there will not be talks by proxy or anything else of that kind... The SecretaryGeneral promised that, without fail, if the negative stance by Denktash continues, he at least will draw his conclusions and submit the apposite report to the Security Council.

The EEC issue Irrespective of all this, I discussed with all the ministers of the memberstates and officials of the European Community the issue of the accession of Cyprus to the EEC. I asked them not to object to a positive Opinion (Avis in French) stressing that a negative one would be tantamount to rewarding the Turkish side for the intransigence it displays on the Cyprus problem, a sort of punishment of the victim instead of the perpetrator. The position I presented was very clear. We have proven our goodwill for a solution and if there is no progress this is not our fault. It is therefore neither fair nor in any way justified that we should be refused the ‘green light’ for Cyprus to become a member of the EEC on account of the Cyprus problem remaining unresolved. I must tell you that the climate prevailing within the Community and the Commission a month and a half ago was rather negative on this... . I did put the issue quite crudely to everybody, especially to Delors, who, I must admit, surprised me by his deep knowledge of the Cyprus problem. He follows the issue very closely, knows really what happened in New York and is conversant with the essence of the procedure. Delors agreed with me, at our personal meeting, that the only way that the EEC can really help is to issue a positive Opinion (Avis) which naturally – and I am saying this to avoid any misunderstandings – does not mean accession of Cyprus in 1993 or even 1995... . I can say that I convinced Delors because as a result of our talk he gave orders for the procedure to move ahead. Naturally I don’t want to make promises about what the Opinion (Avis) will be like, I prefer to see it produced first so that we can assess it instead of being triumphant about it before it actually appears. In any case the omens seem to be good on this issue... While Mr Delors was giving instructions to get on with preparing an Opinion that will open the way to substantial negotiations, Mr Matutes said at one point: ‘Does this mean that an Opinion saying Cyprus is OK and will certainly become a member when the Cyprus 234

01-Presidents Office_001-298

27/11/09

15:31

Page 235

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 At the end of the session I said: 19 20 As for the meeting in New York, after an initial exchange of views, it was 21 agreed that the parties will submit their thoughts in writing on the 22 possibilities of improving various points in the Ideas which they will 23 prepare until the end of the week. We will then discuss them next 24 Monday, and keep them in mind during the meeting in New York. 25 26 27 Visit to Russia – Agreement on Krasnodar On 15 October 1992, I went for 12 hours to Moscow to sign an agreement of 28 economic cooperation with Russia and had a long meeting with the president of 29 Russia, Boris Yeltsin. The one-day visit proved very successful. In the statement 30 31 President Yeltsin made, he said: 32 33 The most important subject of our talks was the discussion of two 34 documents, the memorandum and the agreement. The whole discussion 35 dealt with these documents and the grant of loan credits by Cyprus. 36 37 a) Cyprus is for us a trusted collaborator and a friend in the political, 38 humanitarian and social field. 39 We talked about the support on the Cyprus problem that the Russian 40 Federation offers through the UN Security Council and through the good services of the UN Secretary-General Mr Boutros-Ghali. Our positions on this issue are firm. problem is solved, is a good one?’ When I asked if he was making fun of us, as something like this would give Turkey the right to keep the Cyprus problem unresolved etc – let me not repeat the arguments in detail – Mr Delors, to his credit, replied saying that one should not ignore this aspect of the issue... What I mean is that the Community supports to the hilt – as Delors told me in so many words – the initiative of the SecretaryGeneral as well as the discussion on the basis of the Set of Ideas (that Delors had actually read), insisting that for any progress to be achieved, Turkey must cooperate. If we give the impression that we are abandoning this procedure, you can rest assured that the Opinion will be negative. I have no doubt that it will stop in its tracks. The reason for which they are cooperating with us is because they are convinced that we have done the right thing to push this issue forward. They realise the importance that a solution of the Cyprus problem has and they are upset by the negative stance of Turkey and her insistence on things that they consider unacceptable.

235

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 236

From the President’s Office

b) We fully support president Vassiliou and his side and we consider important the influence that we can exert on this problem – which has remained unresolved for far too long – given our country’s position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. I support the positions of president Vassiliou on the Cyprus problem, as he approaches its solution very flexibly and reasonably. His positions are not hard but flexible and that is why we support him. Meanwhile according to an Athens News Agency report, diplomatic observers in Moscow point out that the visit of president Vassiliou took place at a particularly crucial moment for the Cyprus problem in view not only of the impending talks in New York but also before the visit of Boris Yeltsin to Ankara. Of especial significance was also the agreement that was signed making Cyprus a telecommunications centre for Russia, connecting it with a large part of the world. This gave huge advantages to Cyprus – in comparison with other countries – and opened up great possibilities to Cypriot businessmen and professionals in all fields. Among other things, President Yeltsin gave the ‘green light’ for the purchase of all kinds of arms from Russia. The extent of the visit’s success can be seen from the leading article in the Agon of 17 October, a newspaper that, as is well known, supported the opposition: Antonis Samaras had said that on the basis of the new data that shape international reality and international relations, the economy is henceforth fully linked with how foreign policy is being carried out. President Vassiliou replies: ‘This has always been the case. What happens now is simply an upgrading of the economy in the way that foreign policy of various countries is being shaped and carried out.’ For the first time can we see so clearly today this direct link being forged between the economy and politics. We see it happening not only in the general frame of the international political and economic relations of our small country but also in the realm of securing a stronger international support for our national cause. The important agreements that president Vassiliou signed in Moscow are indicative of such a dynamic policy being implemented a development which must be credited to the president. The model agreement for exploiting the area Krasnodar on the Black Sea, as well as the agreement on making Cyprus a centre through which Russia will carry out its telecommunications with large parts of the world, are both important achievements that will not only yield economic benefits to Cyprus but will generally upgrade its importance as a country. 236

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 237

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

This upgrading of the importance of Cyprus is absolutely necessary during these difficult times for her. There are of course also other things of importance. There are the political gains that go beyond the strengthening of relations with Russia, a country which although facing serious problems has never stopped and will never stop playing a most important role on the international scene and therefore in the Cyprus problem. Turkey does occasionally stumble on small Cyprus. She finds, for instance, Cyprus to be present in one of the most important areas of the Black Sea. She feels her dynamic presence – political as well as economic – in Russia. This should certainly make her feel uncomfortable. The repercussions of such a dynamic presence of and activity by Cyprus are multidimensional. They must be assessed properly disregarding any expediency of any nature, petty political, or other. Upon my return, I had a new meeting on 17 October with Messrs Camilion and Feissel before their departure for New York. On Monday 19 October the last session of the National Council took place to prepare our side for the talks in New York. The parties submitted their positions in writing, and after that a very useful discussion of the various aspects of the Set of Ideas took place. As I said in my statement after the session: A wide range of agreement has been reached with regard to our aims at the negotiations. What is obvious is that we go to New York to fight a very hard battle aiming to promote our positions in trying to reach a solution that has of course to be accepted by all Cypriots, Greek and Turkish alike. So, as we are preparing for this difficult struggle I appealed to the political leaders to accompany me because I do believe that their presence there during the negotiations will be useful and helpful to face the difficult task lying ahead of us. Regarding the trip to New York, the three parties – DISY, DHKO and EDEK – had decided not to go, even though they avoided speaking about this. Mr Christofias said : if going to New York in July was number five on the need scale it is now ten. This is because there will now be direct talks and on the basis of the experiences we have had since August, the necessity for psychological support of the president and for discussions on the great issues, make it, I believe, absolutely necessary for the political leaders to accompany the President of the Republic right from the start. Contrary to my own appeal and the views of the General Secretary of AKEL, Messrs Clerides, Kyprianou and Lyssaridis deemed it unnecessary to go to New York. 237

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 238

From the President’s Office

Mr Clerides said that the presence of the leaders in New York was not needed: ‘You will have the documents and the views of all the parties in writing but if the need arises and if decisions need to be taken we will go to New York without saying that we do so because there is progress.’ Mr Kyprianou said that they did not need to go to New York: ‘On the contrary, if we go, the impression might be created that, irrespective of what is being said, there is something important happening that compels us to be present.’ Mr Lyssaridis said that ‘we cannot go to New York right from the start. If something does emerge, this must not be presented as progress but as needing decision-making and, then the issue could be re-examined.’

Third round of talks: October to November 1992 Going to New York for the last round of talks before the elections, I was for the first time accompanied only by Messrs Christofias, Rolandis and Papapetrou, since Mr Clerides, in cooperation with Messrs Kyprianou and Lyssaridis, had decided to stay behind. As Mr Christofias put it characteristically in his speech delivered on 23 October: In spite of the fact that during the first round of talks in New York we all agreed unanimously that the presence of political leaders was necessary, constructive and very positive, today some assess the matter differently. With all due respect to every party’s right to make up its mind about what it considers just and proper, I must say that the reason for which these three political parties refuse to accompany the president to New York has to do with the impending presidential elections. The talks were scheduled to begin in the afternoon on Monday 26 October 1992. It so happened though that Mr Denktash did not go to the appointment that had been arranged with the Secretary-General at 4 p.m. He did not go because the bulletin of the international organisation containing the daily meetings of the Secretary-General mentioned Vassiliou as President of Cyprus, while Mr Denktash was called leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community. In the statement he issued, Mr Denktash said that, had he gone, this would mean that he too recognised Vassiliou as President of the Cyprus Republic. By doing this, Mr Denktash sent everybody the message loud and clear that he would do his utmost to make the talks fail. Two days were thus lost and the meetings began on Wednesday 28 October. We held ten meetings altogether up till 10 November. It was apparent from the very beginning that Mr Denktash was not prepared for any serious discussion. In spite of the efforts of the SecretaryGeneral and his collaborators, there was no progress whatsoever. In order to increase 238

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 239

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

the pressure on the Turkish side, the Secretary-General prepared the so-called ‘triptych’, containing in summary the positions of the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots and the UN side-by-side. In this way it was made obvious for all to see how unacceptable the Turkish positions were as compared to those of the UN (Appendix 14). In relation to this triptych, or the ‘codification’ as it was dubbed in Cyprus, the opposition tried to generate a feeling of panic. Mr Kyprianou, in his statement to the Athenian newspaper Elephtherotypia on 3 November 1992, said: Things took a very bad turn. There is talk about codification. This means that the positions of Denktash will also be codified among others. They will thus become part of the whole procedure while, otherwise, certain things could have been ignored. Now they will be codified and put on the negotiating table. We don’t know what will be codified on Mr Vassiliou’s side. This is a bad development...what happens in New York is of no use to the national cause of Cyprus, this meeting should never have taken place. Mr Lyssaridis said: I honestly cannot fathom how this dialogue is being pursued since it is a fiasco that insults our dignity and if allowed to continue will have even more tragic consequences. We must at long last recover our dignity, find our backbone and stop behaving like obedient children who change even their place in front of the camera in order not to give Denktash reason to protest. As for Mr Clerides, he drew the conclusion that with the talks we simply gave Mr Denktash the opportunity to go back on his word. They were all deliberately ignoring the harm we would have caused to our case had we rejected the invitation by the Secretary-General at a time when the international community had invested so much in this procedure. Our critics ignored that it was precisely through this dialogue, under the auspices of the UN, that the intransigence of Mr Denktash was revealed not just to us but to the world at large. Because the triptych, by ‘codifying’ our positions, also ‘codified’ Turkish intransigence in an official UN document, this was a success for our side. In this way, all the members of the Security Council and those responsible for the issue in various foreign ministries all around the world saw clearly that the positions of the Turkish-Cypriot side were clashing openly with the Resolutions of the Security Council. The best proof of how much the triptych had damaged their side was the Turks’ attempt first to obstruct its preparation and then, when it became finally available, to downgrade it. They failed on both counts. After 239

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 240

From the President’s Office

my meeting with the Secretary-General on 12 November, I made the following statement: The Secretary-General gave me a document containing the summary of the positions of the Turkish side, our side and the UN positions. This is a document that shows clearly that the Turkish positions lie basically outside those adopted by the UN. As a result there is no longer any point in comparing the positions of one side with those of the other. One should only compare each with the objective positions of the UN as these are expressed in the various Resolutions and decisions of the Security Council. In answer to an observation made by Mr Denktash that the UN positions that were handed over to him were but an informal document, I replied that he was free to call it what he wished. ‘What I do know,’ I said, ‘is that this is a document that was given to me officially by the Secretary-General, and that it contains the positions of the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot side as well as the positions of the UN.’ A few days later, the Secretary-General prepared his ‘very outspoken’ report to the Security Council (Appendix 15) in which he stressed: On the basic issues Denktash supports positions which are outside the framework of the Set of Ideas. In essence Mr Denktash wishes the creation of two ‘ethnically cleansed’ statelets which will in some way cooperate with one another. He does not allow the return of the Greek Cypriots to their properties in the future Turkish-Cypriot state and he even asks for indemnities to be paid to them by the Greek Cypriots and from the disposal of the former Turkish-Cypriot properties to the Greek-Cypriot state. He asks this knowing full well that the percentage of land that the Turkish Cypriots possessed is much smaller than that of the Greek Cypriots. He wishes that even the activities of the federal government be carried out by the federated parts and asks for alternation in the holding of the posts of the president and the vice-president. He does not accept the Gali Map. On paragraph 47 he even states clearly that ‘I have found that the positions of the Turkish-Cypriot side are fundamentally at variance with the Set of Ideas under three broad headings: (a) the concept of the federation; (b) displaced persons; and (c) territorial adjustments.’ As for what needed to be done, the UN Secretary-General had this to say: 59. The intensive effort made during these past weeks has failed to produce an overall agreement. The lack of political will mentioned in my 240

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 241

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

Report of 21 August (S/24472) continues to block the conclusion of an agreement that is otherwise within reach. 60. In resolution 774 [1992], the Security Council indicated that the current effort could not continue indefinitely, and requested, should an agreement not be reached, that I recommend alternative courses of action to resolve the Cyprus problem. The Security Council has affirmed that the present status quo on the island is unacceptable. It is appropriate therefore to examine the modalities of the current effort as well as the potential for enhancing its prospects for success through measures that each side could take on the ground. 61. First and foremost, it is essential that the Turkish-Cypriot side adjust its positions in particular on the concept of the federation, Displaced Persons and Territorial Adjustments, when the joint meetings resume in March 1993, in order to bring those positions within the scope of the Set of Ideas. 62. The two leaders have agreed to continue the negotiating process in the early part of March 1993. In this connection, I believe that the time may have come to give fuller form to the decision of the Security Council reflected in its resolution 750 (1992) of 10 April 1992 to be seized of this matter ‘on an ongoing and more direct basis’. The report was undoubtedly a very important document. For the first time the Secretary-General condemned unreservedly the Turkish positions. He proved how useful the talks in New York had been for our side and how wrong Messrs Clerides, Kyprianou and Lyssaridis were when they declared that the talks were useless and dangerous for us. In the statement I made in New York after the end of the talks on 13 November, I concluded: The value of the talks lies in the fact that the opportunity was given to clarify once and for all the positions of each side and the fact that our side is willing to cooperate so that a solution can be reached that will be in accordance with international law and the human rights principles, that it will be functional and advantageous to both communities. Unfortunately it proved impossible to reach an agreement because of the positions of Mr Denktash, fully supported by Ankara, which were outside the realm of the basic principles contained in the Set of Ideas and thus make it possible for the problem to be solved. Immediately after the submission of the report by the Secretary-General, the Security Council convened and approved Resolution 789, which was undoubtedly the most important Resolution that had ever been issued on Cyprus. Because of its importance we quote it here in its entirety: 241

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 242

From the President’s Office

Resolution 789 (1992) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3140th meeting, on 25 November 1992 The Security Council, Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 19 November 1992 on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, Noting with satisfaction that the two leaders discussed all the issues in the Set of Ideas with the result that there were areas of agreement as noted in the report, Welcoming the agreement by the two sides to meet again with the Secretary-General in early March 1993 to complete the work on an agreed Set of Ideas: 1. Reaffirms all its previous resolutions on Cyprus, including resolutions 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 541 (1983), 550 (1984) and 774 (1992); 2. Endorses the report of the Secretary-General and commends him for his efforts; 3. Reaffirms also its endorsement of the Set of Ideas including the territorial adjustments reflected in the map contained in the annex to the report of the Secretary-General of 21 August 1992 as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement; 4. Reaffirms further its position that the present status quo is not acceptable and that an overall agreement in line with the set of ideas should be achieved without further delay; 5. Notes that the recent joint meetings did not achieve their intended goal, in particular because certain positions adopted by the TurkishCypriot side were fundamentally at variance with the Set of Ideas; 6. Calls upon the Turkish-Cypriot side to adopt positions that are consistent with the set of ideas on those issues identified by the Secretary-General in his report, and for all concerned to be prepared in the next round of talks to make decisions that will bring about a speedy agreement; 7. Recognizes that the completion of this process in March 1993 would be greatly facilitated by the implementation by each side of measures designed to promote mutual confidence; 8. Urges all concerned to commit themselves to the confidence-building measures set out below: (a) That, as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces envisaged in the Set of Ideas, the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus undergo a significant reduction and that a reduction of defence spending be effected in the Republic of Cyprus; 242

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 243

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

(b) That the military authorities on each side cooperate with the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus in order to extend the unmanning agreement of 1989 to all areas of the United Nations-controlled buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other; (c) That, with a view to the implementation of resolution 550 (1984), the area at present under the control of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus be extended to include Varosha; (d) That each side take active measures to promote people-to-people contact between the two communities by reducing restrictions to the movement of persons across the buffer zone; (e) That restrictions imposed on foreign visitors crossing the buffer zone be reduced; (f) That each side propose bi-communal projects, for possible financing by lending and donor governments as well as international institutions; (g) That both sides commit themselves to the holding of a Cypruswide census under the auspices of the United Nations; (h) That both sides cooperate to enable the United Nations to undertake, in the relevant locations, feasibility studies (i) in connection with the resettlement and rehabilitation of persons who would be affected by the territorial adjustments as part of the overall agreement, and (ii) in connection with the programme of economic development that would, as part of the overall agreement, benefit those persons who would resettle in the area under Turkish-Cypriot administration; 9. Requests the Secretary-General to follow up on the implementation of the above confidence-building measures and to keep the Security Council informed as appropriate; 10. Also requests the Secretary-General to maintain such preparatory contacts as he considers appropriate before the resumption of the joint meetings in March 1993, and to propose for the Security Council’s consideration revisions in the negotiating format to make it more effective; 11. Further requests the Secretary-General, during the March 1993 joint meetings, to assess developments on a regular basis with the Council with a view to considering what further action may be needed by the Council; 12. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a full report after the conclusion of the joint meetings that will resume in March 1993. 243

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 244

From the President’s Office

With reference to the Resolution, the Permanent Representative of Cyprus at the UN, Mr A. Iakovidis, sent us the following message: Please be informed that during its meeting this afternoon, the Security Council approved unanimously the draft resolution that had been adopted at the informal consultations yesterday afternoon as ‘Security Council Resolution 789’ (1992). (Note that in paragraph 8a instead of ‘on the island’ the term used is ‘in the Republic of Cyprus’.) As had been agreed by the members of the Council and other delegations, the Resolution that was adopted dealt very much with substance and was favourable to the Greek-Cypriot side and the Cyprus government. More specifically the reconfirmation, in its recommendations, of all the preceding Security Council Resolutions – including the 541 and 550; the reassessment in paragraph 4 that the present status quo is unacceptable and the fact that responsibility is clearly attributed to the Turkish-Cypriot side as well as the call addressed to it to comply with the Set of Ideas (paragraphs 5 and 6); the confidence building measures in paragraph 8 and especially the reference to Famagusta as in Resolution 550 and to the census (as is well known the President of the Republic announced officially to the Secretary general our acceptance of all these measures); the request to the Secretary-General to ensure the follow-up regarding the implementation of these measures (paragraph 9); constitute certainly important and positive elements. These positions that were finalised after discussions went through various stages one after the other, on which we kept you informed, were contrary to the Turkish positions on many points but, in spite of the Turkish efforts against them, the members of the Security Council did not give in. Worthy of attention is also paragraph 10 (of American origin) that offers the Secretary-General the possibility of strengthening the negotiating framework so that it can become more effective. This may mean the activation of the five permanent members or of the guarantor powers or any other way. The report by the Secretary-General and Resolution 789 can be considered, without exaggeration, the justification and the crowning achievement of our endeavours during all these years. Thanks to this Resolution, all the UN Resolutions on the Cyprus problem that we were afraid might have been forgotten were brought back to life and included in the agenda. All became convinced of Turkey’s intransigence and more especially of Turkey’s responsibility for the lack of any progress. The withdrawal of the Turkish troops with, as a first step, their drastic reduction in 244

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 245

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

numbers is now on the agenda, as is the return of Famagusta to the UN, the census of the population aiming to determine the exact number of settlers, as well as the demand that the Turkish side should abandon its intransigent positions and accept the Set of Ideas, including the map, as a basis for negotiations. As a result of all these developments, we now have essentially a breach in Turkey and also a public debate among journalists and politicians that has led President Őzal to say that Turkey will have many problems to face because of her policy on Cyprus and the prime minister, Mr Demirel, to say that there is a change of line and that Turkey is ready to withdraw her troops.

The change of policy by Mr Clerides During the whole time that my presidency lasted, from the very beginning until, essentially, the summer of 1992, Mr Clerides supported the policy we were following. As shown by the records of what happened during this period, he had repeatedly said that I ‘was following the Clerides policy’. He was also very caustic in his criticism of Mr Kyprianou, Mr Papadopoulos and Mr Lyssaridis. Thus for instance in his interview for Agon on 13 September 1991, he had stressed: I honestly believe that we have handled the new initiative correctly. We had to convince that we are prepared, with goodwill, to spare no effort for the solution of the Cyprus problem and that we are neither rejectionists nor negative. At this point I would like to stress that the uproar created both in Cyprus and in Greece because of an alleged tendency to make compromises that would mean an unacceptable solution of the Cyprus problem transgressing the safety limits agreed by the National Council, that this is not only baseless but also dangerous to the nation. The reason is that it provides arguments that can readily be accepted abroad which might create the impression that both sides lack the will to solve the Cyprus problem on the basis of a Bi-zonal Federation. In 1992 he started to project the idea of cooperation between DISY and DHKO, while at the same time holding a position that would allow him to exploit any possible progress during the talks. In an interview on 22 March for Agon, answering a question by a journalist as to whether he believed that President Vassiliou had handled correctly the Cyprus issue or whether there had been failures and mistakes, he answered: On the Cyprus issue I am saying this: We find ourselves today, and not for the first time, in a very difficult deadlock. However, one could at least say that this time no one can deny the fact that the deadlock is due to the Turkish intransigence. There have been cases in the past when the international community believed that we too were to blame for the lack of progress in the resolution of the Cyprus problem. However, this time, 245

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 246

From the President’s Office

having talked with foreign diplomats, state and party leaders, I believe all readily accept the view that responsibility lies with the Turkish side. This is a substantial advantage for us. In the meantime, having already announced his candidature, he stressed: We will not oppose Vassiliou on the Cyprus issue because if we did that, we would provide justification to the other side...It is political romanticism to believe that if we do engage in confrontation with the Security Council we can convince them to take measures against Turkey. (Simerini, 16 April 1992) As soon as the ‘Gali ideas’ were published, they were well received by DISY. Mr Clerides, in his statements to Elephtherotypia on 8 April 1992, noted that there are some positive and negative elements in the report: Among the new elements there is this reference to an alternative course of action that has to be undertaken if the new effort by Boutros-Gali fails and there is also reference to UNFICYP. At the end of the report there are some new elements, such as the warning by the Secretary-General that should a solution not be found, a decision should then be made about the measures to be taken. This is a warning that he would no longer be able to provide his good services and that the Security Council should thereafter decide about what needs to be done. This is a new element that did not exist in any previous report. He also clarifies much better than in any previous report the issue of sovereignty, stating that there will be one legal personality, one sovereignty and one citizenship. It is also important that he mentions clearly the need for the Turkish area to be reduced so that a significant number of refugees can return and live under Greek-Cypriot administration while at the same time referring to the issue of the other refugees that needs to be settled. These are new elements. I don’t mean to say that there are not also negative elements. Of course there are and, as I said, the political bureau will study them before the party finalises its position. Moreover, in his interview to the eminently partisan newspaper Alitheia on 31 May 1992, Mr Ierodiakonou – one of the top brass of DISY – replied on questions dealing with the Set of Ideas: [Question:] If we are not close to a solution, as you are saying, what is the reason for all this uproar that was created in Cyprus recently and has divided the people? 246

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 247

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 So Mr Clerides went to New York for the August talks. At the same time, however, 27 he raised the level of sloganeering to new heights so as to make it compatible with 28 the promises he had given DHKO. A report in Alitheia on 10 April 1992 is indicative 29 30 of this approach: 31 32 We will not accept any solution that others may have prepared and want 33 to impose on us, but only a solution that will ensure the withdrawal of the 34 occupying troops, the abolition of the right of unilateral intervention, the 35 return of the refugees to their homes with the simultaneous guarantee of 36 the freedom of movement, establishment and possession of property, a 37 functional constitution and the accession of Cyprus to Europe. Because 38 only with Cyprus safely in Europe – underlined Mr Clerides – will its 39 future be secure from further Turkish expansionist intentions. 40 [Ierodiakonou:] There are certain political forces that mobilise people against the Federation. These forces have been using the Gali document to launch and expand an intense debate on this. [Question:] Aiming at? [Ierodiakonou:] Strengthening as much as possible their opposition to the Federation. [Question:] To what degree do you think this situation affects developments on the Cyprus issue? [Ierodiakonou:] It affects them in the following sense: if it is made obvious that a large section of Cypriot Hellenism does not want a solution through dialogue, those powers which have displayed an interest in the Cyprus problem and have made moves towards its solution will be discouraged. [Question:] How do you assess the report as a whole? [Ierodiakonou:] The Gali report is more or less in the same league as the former documents that we have accepted, especially the unified document of 1985. [Question:] DHKO says, however, that although it had accepted the unified document it later declared it was no longer committed to it. [Ierodiakonou:] The fact is that there is such a document signed by the President of the Republic. For us to come afterwards and say that we have changed our mind and are no longer committed by it, is not only extremely naive but also displays a dangerous mentality. To what exactly are we no longer committed? How can we expect the outsiders whose help we are seeking to solve the Cyprus problem to trust us when we are not even honouring our own signature?’

Seeing the very negative stance by Mr Denktash and estimating that the possibility of an agreement was remote, Mr Clerides believed he could safely change his line. 247

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 248

From the President’s Office

One must not forget that were those within his party who were in total agreement with the ‘rejectionist’ line of DHKO and the Archbishop. So he refused to go to New York for the talks in November 1992. After the November meeting in New York and Resolution 789, he not only avoided welcoming the many positive points in this Resolution, but declared that there are supposedly no grounds for negotiation because I had supposedly accepted ideas not just for discussion but as parts of a solution. (He knew of course that all this was irrelevant, but he wanted to create an impression that he disagreed with me.) Mr Clerides drew a line of rapprochement with DHKO, proclaiming as his target the cooperation of the ‘national-thinking’ forces against the Left, thus bringing to life anti-communist sentiments. The newspaper Machi published on 29 November 1992, under the title ‘Clerides: Sooner or later cooperation with DHKO. It is time to say no to AKEL’, the following report: ‘The time has come to tell AKEL, a party of 30 per cent of the electorate, to stop governing us.’ That is what the president of the Democratic Rally Mr Glafkos Clerides stressed on Friday night speaking to a reception organised by the Famagusta branch of DISY that took place in a hotel in Protaras. The forces that are beyond the space occupied by the Left and which constitute the overwhelming majority of Cypriot Hellenism can provide a government because they are no longer fanatically divided. They can provide a government that will respond to the modern developments of our era. It is inconceivable for me – and I believe for all of us – that in a period when the ‘fortresses’ of communism have crumbled to see in Cyprus a force that is contrary to the prevailing current of our era providing the government for this land. It is because we of the Democratic Rally have grasped this situation that we came to the conclusion that we should seek to cooperate with another party and chose DHKO because it is a party belonging to the same school of political philosophy but also to the same national school of thought. I believe that, the way things develop, these two parties have no alternative but to cooperate at the elections either on the first or on the second Sunday – this is of no importance. What is important is that these parties will cooperate because this is the wish of their members. We have absorbed and digested the fact that we have to cooperate with DHKO. From the numerous contacts I had with many officials of DHKO I believe that they too have come to the same conclusion namely that the future of both parties, if they want to govern this country, depends on their coming together and their cooperation...’ 248

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 249

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 The Democratic Rally does not accept the Gali Ideas as a basis for the 16 solution of the Cyprus problem. Raouf Denktash, whom I know better 17 than anyone else, will not even approach the procedure of solving the 18 Cyprus problem and will firmly stay put where he is now. 19 He even went further, stressing that his aim was to extricate himself from the 20 21 Vassiliou policy. In an interview on 30 November to the same paper: 22 23 [Question:] Mr president, in your speech the day before yesterday in 24 Larnaka you said that the noose of Set of Ideas in which Mr Vassiliou has 25 put us in, is tightening. If you are elected president will you extricate 26 yourself from this noose? Is it possible to get rid of it? 27 [Answer:] A different president can get rid of it. The reason is that if the 28 president who is elected is the same one who put us in the noose, it will 29 be very difficult for him to free himself. A new president, on the other 30 hand, has a greater chance to do so. 31 [Question:] Will Vassiliou’s commitments become yours too? 32 [Answer:] The problem is not whether I, or whoever is elected president, 33 will be bound by these commitments. The problem is whether the Greek 34 side has been bound by them at this stage – and I believe it has. It is 35 because he (Vassiliou) is the one responsible for this, that it will be very 36 difficult for him to extricate himself from these commitments. 37 [Question:] While you can? 38 [Answer:] I believe so. 39 [Question:] Without paying the price? 40 [Answer:] I believe that a new president will have greater possibilities to free himself from such commitments without cost. If it is the same president he will have a huge price to pay. The worst that can happen to

It is of course well-known that the differences between DISY and DHKO were never ideological. They had nothing whatsoever to do with Right versus Left. They were exclusively linked to the national issue. Mr Clerides and DISY supported the negotiations and the Federation, while Mr Kyprianou and DHKO were supporters of the preconditions and, essentially, of a return to the Zurich constitution. During the whole term of my presidency Mr Clerides insisted that I was only following the DISY policy. In view of the elections, however, he discovered ‘communism’ and adopted the DHKO policy on the national issue. When DHKO expressed its readiness to support Mr Clerides, Elephtherotypia attempted to create a positive climate. It even wrote on 28 November that ‘Clerides continues to flirt with DHKO. He does not accept the Gali Ideas as a basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem.’ The paper continued with an excerpt from his speech:

249

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 250

From the President’s Office

you if you deal with international issues is to lose your credibility. A new president can declare that he respects what his predecessor has accepted but also point out that there are disagreements on a series of issues. By doing this his credibility is not destroyed. Where, however, it was made crystal clear how contradictory the positions by Mr Clerides really were was the way he dealt with the issue of gaining the support of the Liberals. While he was accusing me of having accepted the Gali Ideas as a basis for achieving a solution, he adopted unreservedly the decision of the central council of the Liberal party that included the following: ‘The Gali Ideas and the annexed map constitute the basis for negotiating a solution of the Cyprus problem.’ Mr Clerides replied in writing to the decision of the Liberals: ‘I have read the content of the decision by the high central council of the Liberal party and agree with it totally.’ These conflicting views of Mr Clerides annoyed the DHKO/EDEK to such a degree that they issued the following declaration: He must at long last decide to what he is really committed. Is he bound by his pre-electoral position as recently presented to Cyprus Hellenism or by his novel commitment to Mr Rolandis? This is a valid question because the positions of Mr Rolandis on the national issue are well known, as is the fact that they are very far from the policies that Mr Clerides now promotes, at least in view of the elections. It does seem that, in the end, the quest for power did manage to reconcile the irreconcilable, while the need to stay true to one’s positions could be set aside. The important thing for the rejectionists was that Mr Clerides had sent them the message that if they supported him in the elections he would abandon the Set of Ideas.

Electoral period: December 1992 to February 1993 With the conclusion of the third round of the negotiations in New York, the submission of the report by the Secretary-General and the adoption of Security Council Resolution 789 by the end of November, the phase of re-examination of the Cyprus problem and promotion of its solution that had started immediately after the elections in 1988 came to its completion. There followed necessarily an interval for the presidential elections. The effort to maintain and strengthen the momentum that had been created with Resolution 789 and the pressure on Turkey should continue. That is why even during the electoral period I pursued my talks with the UN and the foreign ministers of various countries. At the beginning of January, I went to Paris for a new meeting with the SecretaryGeneral, Mr Boutros-Gali, to discuss the implementation of Resolution 789 and the promotion of the confidence-building measures. After a number of talks, we secured 250

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 251

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

a resolution by the European Parliament in Strasbourg which adopted the positions of the Security Council and called upon the Turkish side to join the talks in March 1993. It also asked for the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation troops from Cyprus and urged Turkey to accept the confidence-building measures included in Resolution 789. The attitude of Turkey disappointed everybody and even within Turkey there were serious questions being asked. President Őzal saw clearly the need for a solution of the Cyprus problem, while the papers gave prominence to a speech by Mr Őzal, who said that the existence of two separate states in Cyprus was not in Turkey’s interests: Őzal, speaking to the association of Ankara’s entrepreneurs, accused once again Yilmaz as being responsible for the failure to set up a four-party conference and said: ‘If a four-party conference were convened a great step towards a solution would have been taken. In the meantime we could have settled the problem, one way or another...’ This affair must end with a reasonable solution. Turkey has not said, at this moment, that two states must be established. Therefore the solution will be a Federation. In these matters it is not right to say that ‘well, now that we found a solution we can relax’. For as long as the Cyprus problem is in front of us, it is not possible for Turkey to deal with issues other than those of internal politics. The Cyprus problem is in front of us like a stone on which we keep stumbling. The Cyprus problem must be resolved in a reasonable way. The point that we insist on, that has to do with the territorial concessions is not that important. What we must insist on is the alternating presidency. The Őzal statements were presented by the Turkish-Cypriot papers under the following headings: • Vatan: ‘Őzal hit us in the heart.’ • Kibris Postaci: ‘Őzal said that it is not possible for two separate states to be set up and the solution is a Federation.’ The newspaper writes in its leading article: ‘Fortunately the president of Turkey has no right to give Cyprus as a gift to the Greek Cypriots.’ • Birlik: ‘Őzal wants to say to us: Let us give Cyprus to the Greeks and relax, but he does not quite say it.’ • Yeni Duzen: ‘New shock revelations by Őzal. The solution is not the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus but the Federation.’ • Ortam: ‘The only solution is the Federation. Őzal analysed the issue boldly.’ Őzal had been obliged to accept the idea of a Federation because he saw that the solution of the Cyprus problem was necessary. Sedat Sertoglou writes the following in Sabah (2 December 1992): 251

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 252

From the President’s Office

1993, A Nightmare For Turkey If the recent statements by Demirel and Cetin on the Cyprus issue have not been made for internal consumption, then 1993 will be a nightmarish year for Turkey in the international field. These statements lead Turkey to quarrel with the United Nations, especially at a period when Turkey wants to throw its weight around in the Balkans and the Middle-East. Sertoglou suggests that no state can start a row with the United Nations whatever its strength. He goes on to remind us that the cost of the occupied territories for Turkey is 200 million dollars a year and refers to the damage suffered by the Turkish armed forces because of the embargo. Do those who share this money amongst them really want the problem to be solved? The Turks who go to Cyprus (meaning the settlers) become miserable, second class citizens. They are even called ‘black-beards’. I became convinced by serious indications from many sides that, if the elections were not lost in 1993, the Cyprus problem might have been led to its solution during the first rather than the second half of the year. We had already succeeded in bringing about serious modifications to the original draft and we had every possibility of achieving even more substantial ones. It was obvious that we had gained international sympathy and especially the offer to help us given by the USA, who had decided that further delay was not justified. It was made clear to all that a federal Cyprus, member of the EU, would become a stabilising factor for the area as a whole; would contribute substantially to the creation of an axis of friendship and cooperation among Greece – Turkey – Cyprus and thus, by extension, promote the peaceful development of the Balkans and the Middle-East. In the meantime, however, the popular mandate had to be renewed so that we could complete the task. There were three candidates for the presidential elections: 1 Paschalis Paschalidis, supported by DHKO, EDEK and the Archbishop. 2 Glafkos Clerides, supported by DISY and the liberals. 3 George Vassiliou, supported by AKEL, ADHSOK and the so-called Vassiliou movement. DHKO and EDEK, as well as the Archbishop, were totally opposed to the Gali ideas. As put by the parliamentary representative of DHKO, Mr Papadopoulos, during the debate on the Cyprus problem in Parliament: ‘For us it is not just a solution, as outlined by the Set of Ideas, which is unacceptable. It is the Set of Ideas itself that is unacceptable and abhorrent even as a basis for negotiations.’ In the same spirit, Mr Kyprianou declared: ‘The Gali Ideas foreclose a Turkish solution. Unfortunately, however strongly he tries to deny it, the truth is that the 252

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 253

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

departing president does not reject but has accepted these ideas as a basis for the solution of our problem.’ As for Archbishop Chrysostomos, he presented himself as the father figure of the rejectionist camp. In an interview to the then assistant prosecutor general Mr Loukis Loukidis, that was published in Agon on 22 November, he asserted: Cypriot Hellenism is today threatened not just as a nation but also in its religion. This is because the invader is not just of a different race but also of a different religion [...]. We must confess that we are far from being satisfied with the course that our national issue is taking as far as the procedures and the positions expressed by our own side in search of a solution are concerned. The problem is not to find just any solution or a solution that will last a few years but how we will find a solution that will ensure the permanent survival of Hellenism and Orthodoxy on this island. All that the ideas and plans by the former UN Secretary-General Mr de Cuéllar as well as those of the present Secretary-General Mr Gali have ever been seeking is to satisfy the Turkish side. This happens because we always show our willingness to accept positions that do not lead to justice being done but ‘realistic’ ones so that we can appear conciliatory, even if such an attitude can lead us to catastrophe. Do we really have such an elastic – not to say depraved – frame of mind that allows us to write off Keryneia, Kythrea, Lefkoniko, Karpasia and almost all our occupied villages without feeling any shame? It is our belief that if we are all united and firm in claiming these back we can recover them. It is really sad for one to read such statements even many years after they were made. It is sad to see the UN, on which we placed all our hopes, being portrayed as serving the interests of the Turks. It is sad to see everybody being accused, and first of all Ethnarch Makarios, for lack of patriotism, since it was he who decided that there was unfortunately no other solution than that of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. The tragedy for Cyprus was that Archbishop Makarios did not have the time to complete his task, while the new Archbishop abandoned completely his predecessor’s policy of the achievable, that is, of the Federation. With empty sloganeering, allegedly in defence of ‘faith and country’, the new Archbishop opposed any policy of the reunification of Cyprus within the framework of a Federation. It is also tragic that these people ignored completely the views of Greece, the mother country. President Karamanlis and all the political parties without exception (New Democracy, PASOK, the Communist Party, and the Coalition of the Left) supported the policy of a federation and considered Resolution 789 to be a significant achievement. The rejectionists based their arguments mainly on the negative stance of Mr Denktash and the Turkish military, which was precisely what we wanted to expose 253

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 254

From the President’s Office

and quash. At the elections of February 1993, the Cypriot people rejected decisively the views of this camp. At the first round, Mr Paschalidis got 18.64 per cent of the votes, that is, one-third less than the 31 per cent that these parties had obtained the year before. The Financial Times commented as follows: President George Vassiliou of Cyprus yesterday appeared well placed to win re-election after Greek-Cypriot voters gave him a substantial lead in the first of two presidential ballots. The strong support for Mr Vassiliou suggests his more flexible approach to United Nations’ efforts to reunite the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus is gaining ground among Greek Cypriots. Talks resume next month on a UN ‘set of ideas’ for setting up a federal state in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots will live in separate zones. The percentage of 44.2 per cent that I got was much higher than expected by all observers and that is why victory at the second round was considered certain. Such certainty was perhaps the reason why I finally lost the elections by a few hundred votes. There was complacency on our part to such an extent that we did not even deem it necessary to bring our student supporters from abroad to vote.33 On the contrary, in the camp of Mr Clerides and DHKO there was feverish activity and fanaticism. They were scared that a victory by me would lead to a solution on the basis of the UN proposals, something they wanted at all costs to avoid. It is interesting that Mr Clerides, after his marginal victory, declared that he had no intention of bringing to an end the efforts of the Secretary-General, while adding that he would spare no effort to extricate himself from the negative elements of the Gali Set of Ideas. The hope, on the international level, was that the effort would go on. As Kathimerini wrote on 18 February 1993: Britain favours the continuation of the talks for a solution of the Cyprus problem. Prime Minister John Major in his telegram of congratulations to Glafkos Clerides expresses the hope that the Cypriot president will be successful in achieving unanimity in support of a fair and permanent solution of the Cyprus problem while stressing that it would now be important to push forward with the negotiating process so that a successful outcome can be reached. The new American president, Mr Bill Clinton, in his bimonthly report to Congress on 30 April 1993, continued to express his decisive support in favour of a solution: I would like to take the opportunity of my first letter on the Cyprus dispute to reiterate my strong commitment to press hard for a lasting 254

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 255

Fifth Period: January 1992 to February 1993

solution to the tragedy of Cyprus. I intend to give that goal a high priority in my administration. The UN Set of Ideas for a bizonal and bicommunal federation with a single national sovereignty and identity continues to offer the best chance for a peaceful resolution of this dispute. I urge both President Clerides, in his new capacity as the leader of the Greek-Cypriot community, and Mr Denktash, the leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community, to continue their participation in the UN sponsored negotiations and to be ready when the talks resume to make the political decisions necessary to resolve this long-standing dispute in a way that is acceptable and beneficial to all Cypriots. Every indication pointed to the fact that the culmination of the international pressures on the Turkish side would lead to a positive result. President Őzal had fully grasped that he had no more room for manoeuvre. Indicative, in this context, were the statements made by the then Turkish prime minister, Mr Demirel, to Turkish-Cypriot ‘deputies’ who visited him in Ankara: ‘We failed on the Cyprus issue. We cannot both keep an army in Cyprus and talk of a solution.’ They all agreed that it would be best for Turkey and for everybody to find a solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of the proposals of the Secretary-General. Unfortunately, this effort was abandoned after the election of Mr Clerides because of his alliance with DHKO. President Clerides kept his promises to Mr Kyprianou and Mr Papadopoulos to extricate himself from the procedure, even though he knew full well that this would mean the burial of the UN initiative. Perceiving the danger that a unique opportunity might thus be lost, I warned about the damages of abandoning the policy we had been pursuing until then. In a written declaration published on 12 March 1993, a few days before they went to New York, I warned: The lack of reference to Resolution 789 reduces the pressure on Turkey and allows her at the same time to avoid or at least postpone the implementation of the confidence building measures especially those relating to handing over Famagusta to the UN and the reduction of the occupation troops. The postponement until May of the talks on substance may create the impression that a solution of the Cyprus problem is not as urgent as suggested by the Security Council resolutions. On the other hand the statements by Mr Denktash that he is going to New York as a former negotiator and that he does not agree to talk on the basis of the Gali Ideas and the map, show that the aim of the Turkish policy is to downgrade the whole procedure and to avoid any pressures on Turkey as a result of the provisions of Resolution 789. At the meeting in New York the continuity of the dialogue procedure must be ensured as provided by the Security 255

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 256

From the President’s Office

Council resolutions and more especially Resolution 774 and 789 with the content of which the Turkish side must comply to begin with. In case Mr Denktash refuses to accept that the talks be pursued on the basis of these resolutions, the Gali Ideas and the map, the Security Council must be asked to take the necessary measures. Nonetheless, at the meeting of March 1993, Mr Clerides abandoned the commitment to a solution after negotiations on the basis of the Gali Ideas and thus gave Denktash the opportunity to extricate himself from the procedure without suffering any damage. A reward for their intransigence, such as the abandonment of Resolution 789, the Turks could never have dreamed of. Characteristically, at a press conference on 31 March 1993, president Clerides declared: My approach to the whole issue is that we should not be committed to the ‘Sets of Ideas’ but to have many ideas so that we may have the possibility of breaking all sorts of deadlocks that may occur. If we all enter into one matrix, we will never be able to get out of it. What I mean is that a great many ideas must be put on the table of the negotiations, including those known by the name of Gali Ideas. Everything must be put on the table of the negotiations. In my interview for the newspaper Haravgi, published on 4 July 1993, I stressed: In spite of the danger of sounding tiresome and repetitive, I want to express my deepest anxiety about the negative developments in our national issue as these are now becoming obvious to all. I believe it was a tragic mistake of our side to abandon not just in words but in practice Resolution 789 and not just to accept but to initiate at the March meeting in New York the drafting of that communiqué which I believe is the root of all the evils that will follow. I mean that the Set of Ideas will be used but will not be the basis for the negotiations. This gave Turkey, who was until then isolated, the opportunity to get out of the difficult position she was in and to stop being in a state of confrontation with the Security Council. The result of this communiqué was not an improvement of the Set of Ideas but an increase in the intransigence of Turkey and Mr Denktash. Four years later and shortly before the presidential elections of 1998, president Clerides returned to the policy of dialogue aimed at shaping a draft solution within the UN framework at the meeting in Troutbeck. Unfortunately, however, the momentum that had been created during the five-year period 1988–93 had forever been lost. 256

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 257

Epilogue

On 1 March 1993 my five-year term as President of the Republic of Cyprus came to an end. During these five years a lot of work was done – a fraction of which is presented in this book – that would, under different circumstances, probably have needed much more time to be accomplished. When I was elected president in February 1988, the image of Cyprus internationally was not a good one. This was basically the result of faulty moves and decisions by President Kyprianou, because of which Cyprus had lost the international sympathy and backing that she needed. Many indeed were those who believed that we were not really interested in a solution, or rather that the solution that we were interested in was utterly unattainable. A huge effort was thus undertaken that included several meetings with all the main leaders of the world: Bush, Thatcher, Mitterrand, Gorbachev, Delors and many others. I literally ploughed the world participating in various international conferences and visiting tens of countries, as is shown in the chronology of my travels that follows. As a result, the image of Cyprus was radically altered. The international community and the superpowers became convinced that Turkey and her plant in Cyprus, Mr Denktash, were exclusively responsible for the persisting deadlock. The result was that the attitude of the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council changed, as shown in the reports and the resolutions that we succeeded in getting one after the other. Having started from a neutral position, they went on to the indirect and finally to the open blame. With Resolution 789 the Security Council went one important step further. It asked for the withdrawal of the occupation troops and the adoption of a series of measures of goodwill, culminating in the return of Varosha to the UN. In case all this did not materialise and no progress was made during the meeting of March 1993, there would be measures to follow. Unfortunately, nothing happened in the end. 257

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 258

From the President’s Office

What gives me great pain is not so much that the elections were lost by a few hundred votes, but that the opportunity and the momentum towards a solution for the reunification of Cyprus evaporated. The climate that had been created internationally, the decisiveness shown by the superpowers, the wish of Messrs Pérez de Cuéllar and Boutros Boutros-Gali to achieve a solution of the Cyprus problem, the active involvement of the USA and the superpowers, including the EU, were finally not taken advantage of. Neither was the fact that Turkey began to realise that the continuing occupation was against her interests and that it would serve these interests better to solve the Cyprus problem rather than continuing the occupation. The overthrow of our policy as a result of the cooperation of DISY/DHKO, and all the other rejectionist forces when Mr Clerides was elected, gave the signal, internationally, that there was no substantial majority behind the policy that we were following. This impression was strengthened with the abandonment of the Set of Ideas at a moment when these ideas had to be promoted and pushed forward in every possible way. The opportunity was thus given to Turkey to emerge from the impasse and gain valuable time. When, four years later, president Clerides returned to the policy he had supported during my term of office, the previous, advantageous position had been lost. After five years of negotiations we were led to the Annan Plan, which undoubtedly fell short of the Gali Set of Ideas. It must also be stressed that, during my term of the presidency, the opposition – mainly by DHKO, the Centre Union before it joined DHKO again and the group supporting the Archbishop – displayed an unusual, for the political climate of Cyprus, acrimony. This happened despite the enormous pains I took to create a climate of unity and keep everybody informed on every single move I made. As is well known, one of the first steps I took was to re-establish the National Council. This move was designed to promote, both on the national and the international level, the concept of collective decision-making and national unity of purpose. I wanted each and every Cypriot to know that nothing was happening behind his back. A full and complete briefing was always provided for every contact, made either with the UN or with the leaders of various countries. In spite of the public attacks by the opposition and the criticisms of alleged concessions, all the members in the National Council accepted that I was behaving impeccably within the framework of the unanimous proposals of 1989. In spite of this, however, they insisted in public that the policy of negotiations was leading Cyprus to catastrophe and lost no opportunity in supporting the view that the talks should cease. Every time that an idea or a plan was suggested by the UN they portrayed this as a national disaster, even when, through the various studies that we submitted to the National Council, it was made clear that the UN plans did satisfy positions that we were promoting based on the unanimous proposals of the National Council on which we were committed to negotiate. They kept repeating they wanted a functional solution without ever disclosing its contents. 258

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 259

Epilogue

The opposition they pursued was not merely hard. I doubt if there has ever been an opposition of such intensity and tone, either before or after my presidency. This panic of the Rejectionists, generated by the probability of obtaining a federal solution, was not due, in my opinion, to the fact that they were dreaming of something better. I believe that in essence they had accepted the theory of the former Greek ambassador in Cyprus, Mr Michalis Dountas, that the maintenance of the status quo was in the interests of Cyprus and Greece and not of Turkey. As becomes apparent from the note Mr Dountas sent to the Greek prime minister on 1 April 1983, this view was very simple and clear. He starts his note as follows: The way the Cyprus issue has been handled after the invasion has harmed the Greek side. The Greek Cypriots and we have both been waylaid in seeking a solution. It was impossible, historically, politically and diplomatically to achieve anything that could constitute a real improvement of the status quo in favour of the Greek Cypriots. This status quo, namely the de facto partition, they later called the ‘second best solution’. The key position of Mr Dountas was that ‘any agreement would mean nothing more than the legalisation of the occupation and the transformation of the President of the Republic into a community leader’. As they kept insisting and as the later president Papadopoulos repeated to a rally of the youth section of DHKO in Thessaloniki on 28 February 1992, an agreement would make the Turks sovereign in the North and partners in the South: I do believe that the strategic aims of Turkey have not only been advanced but I dare say that during the last two years the Turkish side has made great leaps forward towards achieving its basic strategic aims that I summarise in the epigrammatic sentence: ‘Turkey is to become the ruler in the occupied territories but at the same time – and this is more important for Turkey – an equal partner in the South.’ Unfortunately, of course, it is precisely the opposite that is happening. It is thanks to the non-existence of an agreement that the Turks are the absolute, uncontrollable rulers in the North, while with the passage of time they have every opportunity to become partners in the South. This position that Mr Papadopoulos repeated in his address before the referendum is one more proof of his opposition to a federal solution. The following facts that I reveal here for the first time are characteristic of his stance. On Thursday 21 August 2003, President Papadopoulos invited me to the presidential palace and asked me to plead with Brussels so that the impending report of the Commission would not contain gaps and would be positive, so that the accession of Cyprus could be readily approved by the various parliaments and governments of the EU. 259

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 260

From the President’s Office

I readily accepted this task, mainly because I believed firmly that Cyprus ought to become a member of the EU. It was, of course, assumed that Papadopoulos’s commitment in The Hague to the Annan Plan, in spite of its weaknesses, was still valid, because he knew full well that if this were not the case there would be absolutely no hope of securing Cyprus’s accession before a solution was agreed. He simply hoped, without saying so, that Mr Denktash would always be there to reject any plan. I did not, however, hesitate to ask the president to what extent the Annan Plan that he was now supporting was so much better than the Gali Ideas which he had fanatically fought against. His reply surprised me and took my breath away at the same time: ‘Who said anything like this? The Gali Ideas were much better than the Annan Plan that we have in front of us. And this is better than any future plan for a solution.’ I felt personally satisfied and justified by his answer about the policy that I had pursued. I was not worried, however – events proved that I should have been – because it was inconceivable for me to think that he was bamboozling us all when he said that he supported the Annan Plan. Dramatic questions emerge for the country. What better days and what better solution was Papadopoulos looking forward to when he rejected both the Set of Ideas and the Annan Plan? Or was our goal really the ‘second best solution’, that is, the maintenance of the de facto partition? During my term of office almost none of the political leaders dared speak against the historical compromise of Ethnarch Makarios, namely the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal Federation. It is also ironic that those who are fanatically rejecting the Federation and supporting the regime that existed before, namely the one shaped by the Zurich and London treaties, had fought bitterly against these treaties and accused everybody involved in shaping them – with prime minister Karamanlis first in line – as betraying the nation. The national tragedy of Cyprus is unfortunately due to the fact that many of its political leaders have never accepted or recognised reality and the need, for instance, to abandon early on the concept of Enosis and embrace the treaties of Zurich and London; to accept – after the numerous mistakes and crimes associated with the coup and the invasion – the compromise that Makarios was obliged, as things developed, to subscribe to in accepting the Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation. These people did not realise the need for such a compromise so that we can build a new Cyprus, a unified Cyprus which will not be a problem within a united Europe, but a credible and active partner. ‘Compromise does not mean cowardice’ said John Kennedy. ‘Indeed it is frequently the compromisers and conciliators who are faced with the severest tests of political courage as they oppose the extremist views of their constituents.’ Compromise, in other words, requires a vision for the future. Only such a vision can heal the wounds of the past, inspire society and at the same time mobilise the international community. It is only in this way that we can avert partition and reunify our homeland. 260

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 261

Chronology of Events

First period: February 1988 to August 1988 Preparation of the Secretary-General’s new initiative Secretary-General – Beginning of dialogue 28 February 1988: I launch an active diplomatic policy on the Cyprus issue with my speech in Parliament and I invite the Turkish prime minister, Turgut Őzal, to a person-to-person meeting aimed at solving the Cyprus problem. 29 February 1988: Oscar Camilion assumes his duties as special representative of the UN Secretary-General in Cyprus. 14 March 1988: My first official visit to Athens. I hold long discussions with Greece’s prime minister, Andreas Papandreou, and all the political leaders, covering the whole range of issues that constitute the Cyprus problem, as well as matters of strategy and tactics. 21 March 1988: Following intensive consultations with the political leadership, I move to re-establish the National Council, thus fulfilling my electoral promise. Those taking part in the National Council are the President of the Republic, the former presidents and two representatives from each parliamentary party, while the foreign minister is also attending. The National Council have regularly been briefed on developments and discusses the tactics and the strategy concerning the Cyprus issue. 31 March 1988: I travel to Britain for a meeting with the prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. The main issue discussed at the meeting was the need for a dialogue to start on the Cyprus issue as the only way to break the deadlock. I also had a meeting with the General Secretary of the Commonwealth, Shridath Ramphal. 16 May 1988: I visit Finland in view of the Reagan–Gorbachev summit meeting at Helsinki, in order to push for the Cyprus problem to be included in the agenda of the summit meeting and to meet President Koivisto. Returning from Helsinki, 261

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 262

From the President’s Office

I had a long meeting with the Dutch foreign minister and briefed him on our positions on the Cyprus problem. 20 May 1988: A resolution by the European Parliament, based on the report by Alfred Coste-Floret, asks for the restoration of the state of law in Cyprus. 20 May 1988: Mr Camilion conveys to me the procedural proposals of the UN Secretary-General for the resumption of the intercommunal dialogue. 28 May 1988: I meet Mr Papandreou and I brief him extensively on the tactics of our side as to the resumption of the dialogue, the aims and the perspectives of my trip to New York. 31 May 1988: I meet the UN Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, with whom we discuss all the issues relevant to the Cyprus problem and the procedural proposals for the resumption of the dialogue. 31 May 1988: The UN Secretary-General submits to the Security Council his report on the activities of the Peace Force in Cyprus and expresses the opinion that present conditions do create hopes for breaking the deadlock and the resumption of the talks. 2 June 1988: I address the Special Session of the General Assembly on disarmament. In my speech, referring to the Cyprus problem, I introduced a new element with my proposal for the demilitarisation of Cyprus. I also had a series of talks with the UN Secretary-General, heads of states and other officials aimed at activating the international community and the promotion of the positions of the Greek-Cypriot side. 18 June 1988: The National Council decides that I should respond positively to the proposals of the UN Secretary-General. The DISY and AKEL parties are in favour of the decision, while the DHKO and EDEK oppose it. On 20 June the government announces that it accepts the procedural proposal of the UN SecretaryGeneral. 22 July 1988: The Turkish side tries to delay the launching of the dialogue procedure at all costs. Finally, agreement is reached and it is announced that the two sides accept the proposal to meet in Geneva on 24 August 1988. 29 July 1988: I begin my visit to the USA, aimed at mobilising the USA in the effort to resolve the Cyprus problem. I meet President Reagan and Vice-President Bush and present them with the views of the Cypriot government on the Cyprus issue. I also had a meeting that lasted many hours with the US Secretary of State, George Shultz, as well as with leading members of the Congress and members of the Foreign Relations Committee. 9 August 1988: As a result of my visit and my talks in the USA, Congress adopts a resolution that expresses support for the initiative undertaken by the UN. 21 August 1988: On my way to Geneva to meet Raouf Denktash under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, I have contact with the foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans Dietrich Genscher, with whom I discuss the impending meeting with Mr Denktash. 262

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 263

Chronology of Events

24 August 1988: I meet Mr Denktash in Geneva under the auspices of the UN 1 Secretary-General. It was decided that the talks aimed at resolving the Cyprus 2 3 problem would continue until 1 June 1989. 4 5 6 Second period: September 1988 to July 1989 7 8 Intercommunal dialogue 5 September 1988: The conference of the foreign ministers of the Non-aligned 9 Movement starts in Cyprus. I have intensive talks with the foreign ministers on the 10 11 Cyprus issue. 12 15 September 1988: I meet Mr Denktash in the presence of Mr Camilion. 16 September 1988: The intercommunal talks resume and continue on 21, 26 13 14 and 27 September. 4 October 1988: Before going to New York, I meet Mrs Thatcher and brief her 15 16 on the course of the dialogue and the attitude of Mr Denktash. 6 October 1988: I address the General Assembly of the UN with reference to the 17 18 Cyprus problem and the efforts by the Greek-Cypriot side to reach a solution. 10 October 1988: During my meeting with the French president, François 19 Mitterrand, we discuss at length the Cyprus problem and the relations between 20 Cyprus and the EEC. On 11 October, I meet the prime minister, Michel Rocard, 21 the president of the French National Assembly, Laurent Fabius, and the foreign 22 minister, Roland Dumas, and discuss with them the Cyprus problem and the 23 24 strengthening of relations between Cyprus and the EEC. 17 October 1988: The dialogue continues, with a new meeting between Mr 25 26 Denktash and me. Meetings continue on 18, 24 and 25 October. 26 October 1988: At a meeting with James Wilkinson, the special coordinator 27 on the Cyprus issue at the US Department of State, we discuss recent developments. 28 29 31 October 1988: A new meeting is held between Mr Denktash and me. 1 November 1988: After my talks with Mr Denktash the announcement is made 30 that we will meet Mr Pérez de Cuéllar on 22–23 November to review what happened 31 32 during the first round of talks. 9 November 1988: I participate as a guest of the French government at the 33 ceremony of the transfer of the remains of Jean Monet to the Pantheon. I have the 34 opportunity to hold a series of meetings with the leaders of the European 35 36 Community who are present at the ceremony. 10 November 1988: I visit Italy to exchange views with the Italian prime minister 37 38 on the ways in which the Italian government could help the UN initiative. 14 November 1988: I visit Brussels to try to convince the community to become 39 active on the Cyprus issue and to explore the possibilities for Cyprus to submit an 40 application for membership to the EEC. There I meet the president of the Commission, Jacques Delors. The next day I visit Luxembourg and meet Jacques 263

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 264

From the President’s Office

Santer and the Parliament of the country. The next day I went to Belgium and talked with the prime minister, Wilfried Martens, on the Cyprus issue and the EEC. 21 November 1988: At a special meeting with the UN Secretary-General in New York, we discuss developments on the Cyprus issue. 22–23 November 1988: Meetings are held in common with the Secretary-General and Mr Denktash. During these meetings there is no progress because of the intransigent stance taken by Mr Denktash. The Secretary-General suggests that the second round of talks be dedicated to the exploration of the positions of each side without any previous commitment. It was decided that the second round of talks should begin on 19 December. 25 November 1988: During my visit to London, I brief the prime minister, Mrs Thatcher, on the results of the meeting in New York and on the reasons for which it was not possible to register any progress. 26 November 1988: I visit Athens to brief and assess the situation in common with the Greek political leadership. Together, we shape the position we would hold in common on the national issue as it developed. 3 December 1988: A declaration of the EEC summit meeting that took place in Rhodes, hosted by Mr Papandreou, expresses the satisfaction of the leaders of the community at the resumption of the dialogue. 15 December 1988: The president of the Security Council expresses, in a declaration he issued, the support given by the members of the council to the Secretary-General for his effort to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. 19 December 1988: The first meeting of the second round of talks. Mr Camilion asks that written proposals should not be submitted. 26 December 1988: The French foreign minister expresses, in a written declaration, France’s support for the intercommunal dialogue. 9 January 1989: The second meeting of the second round of talks. Mr Denktash, in spite of the appeal by Mr Camilion against written proposals during this round of talks, does submit written proposals that promote, in essence, the partition of Cyprus. 27 January 1989: The National Council studies, in session, and approves the text of the proposals of the Greek-Cypriot side that will be submitted during the meeting of President Vassiliou with Mr Denktash. 30 January 1989: A meeting is held with Mr Denktash within the framework of the dialogue. At this meeting I submit an ‘Outline of Proposals’ for the establishment of a federal republic and for the resolution of the Cyprus problem. 6 February 1989: A new meeting is held with Mr Denktash as part of the dialogue procedure. 13 February 1989: Agreement is reached with Mr Denktash to start intensive talks on discussing all aspects of the Cyprus issue in depth. The next day Mr Denktash comments on the proposals of the Greek-Cypriot side in an extremely negative spirit. 264

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 265

Chronology of Events

24 February 1989: I attend the funeral of Hirohito, the Emperor of Japan. I have the opportunity to meet the US president, George Bush, as well as Mr Őzal, with whom I have a few minutes’ discussion. I also have a meeting with the Greek president, Christos Sartzetakis, as well as officials from other countries. 24 February 1989: Mr Gerasimov visits Cyprus and declares that the USSR is ready to launch the procedure for an international conference on the Cyprus problem. 28 February 1989: I visit London, where I have meetings with the prime minister, Mrs Thatcher, and the foreign minister, Geoffrey Howe. I present and explain the philosophy of the proposals submitted by our side. 6 March 1989: A new round of intensive talks starts in preparation for the meeting in New York, with talks to be held on 7, 9, 12, 18, 21, 23 and 27 March 1989. 28 March 1989: A meeting with Mr Denktash. After the meeting it is announced that Mr Denktash and I will have separate meetings with Mr Pérez de Cuéllar. On 6 and 7 April we will have a common meeting with the Secretary-General in order to evaluate the second round of talks. 30 March 1989: I visit Athens for consultations with the government and the whole political leadership of Greece. We agree on the course to follow and on the coordinated actions that need to be taken by both countries on the international level. 6 April 1989: A meeting of Mr Denktash and me with the Secretary-General in New York. The Secretary-General tries to save the procedure, while at the same time making it substantial and productive. There is thus agreement that the talks should continue with the help of the assistants of the Secretary-General, aiming at producing a draft outline of a settlement of the problem by June 1989. 11 April 1989: I go to India on an official visit, where I have talks with the president, Ramaswamy Venkataraman, the prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, and other state officials. I brief them on the developments in the Cyprus issue. 19 April 1989: It is announced by the UN that the deadline that had been symbolically set for the solution of the Cyprus problem is being extended by four weeks. 5 May 1989: The start of the third round of talks. The new element in this round is that, thanks to the contribution by the assistants of the Secretary-General, an effort will be undertaken to codify the points on which agreement have been reached. 21 May 1989: I travel on an official visit to Hungary, where I have a series of talks with the president and other state officials. 10 June 1989: The last meeting of the third round takes place in the presence of Messrs Camilion and Feissel, aiming to prepare the meetings in common with the UN Secretary-General scheduled for 28 and 29 June. 13 June 1989: The National Council is convened and concludes the discussion on the missing persons. It then proceeds to review the recent developments in the 265

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 266

From the President’s Office

dialogue. The Council continues its session on 14 June, at which it is decided that the party leaders will accompany me to the meeting in New York. 26 June 1989: In Athens, I meet the leaders of the three large Greek political parties and brief them on the talks. 27 June 1989: The EEC summit meeting in Madrid expresses, in its conclusions, concern for the lack of a solution of the Cyprus problem, support for the unity of the Cypriot state, and insists on the need for progress in the talks. 28–29 June 1989: Meetings are held in New York by Mr Denktash and me with the UN Secretary-General, who tries to overcome the negative stance of Mr Denktash and turn the sterile (until then) dialogue into a procedure with some substance. 29 June 1989: The representative of the Secretary-General, in an announcement he made after the end of the meetings, asks Messrs Camilion and Feissel to pursue their talks with the two leaders and call them to a meeting, in order to examine the final outline of what will emerge as a result of the dialogue. The Secretary-General also invites the two leaders to meet him again in September in order to examine the completed outline and begin negotiating the terms of a full agreement. 30 June 1989: After New York, I visit London and brief Sir Geoffrey Howe on the results of the New York meeting. 4 July 1989: I go on an official visit to the Federal Republic of Germany. During my meetings with the president, the chancellor and the foreign minister, I brief them on the inaugural address of the UN Secretary-General and on developments of the Cyprus issue. 10 July 1989: At my meeting with Mrs Thatcher, we exchange views on the course of the Cyprus issue. At my meeting with the foreign under-secretary, Linda Choker, I brief her, in view of her visit to Ankara, on the basic parameters for a solution of the Cyprus problem, with special emphasis on the territorial issue. 12 July 1989: I participate in the celebrations commemorating the French Revolution in Paris. I grab the opportunity to discuss the latest developments on the Cyprus issue with President Bush, the UN Secretary-General, Mrs Thatcher and Mr Rocard, who were all present at this event. 25 July 1989: The UN Secretary-General conveys through the special representative in Cyprus his text of ideas under the title ‘Food for Thought’, aimed at providing some sense of direction to the whole procedure. 28 July 1989: I meet in Athens the prime minister, Tzannis Tzannetakis, and the leaders of the three large parties, with whom we discuss the developments on the Cyprus issue. 29 July 1989: During a session of the National Council, I hand over to the members of the body the ‘Document of Ideas’ of the UN Secretary-General. On 31 June the National Council discusses in depth the principles underlying the document. The Greek-Cypriot side accepts the Ideas as a basis for discussion.

266

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 267

Chronology of Events

Third period: August 1989 to December 1990 Promoting the Ideas and salvaging the dialogue – Resolution 649 and the Gulf Crisis 23 August 1989: Mr Denktash adopts a negative attitude and disputes the right of the Secretary-General to contribute to the procedure of the talks by submitting his Ideas. There is an international outcry against this attitude. 4 September 1989: I take part at the Ninth Conference of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-aligned Movement in Belgrade. I have the opportunity to meet heads of state and brief them on developments on the Cyprus issue. In a resolution, the conference expresses its concern about the obstacles introduced in the procedure of reaching a solution of the Cyprus problem and asks for the immediate withdrawal of the Turkish troops and settlers. 3 October 1989: I meet in New York the Secretary-General, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar, and thereafter the US Secretary of State James Baker, as well as the special representative, Nelson Letsky. 4 October 1989: In my address to the General Assembly of the UN, I refer at some length to the Cyprus problem and the responsibilities of Turkey for the deadlock. 4 October 1989: I meet President Bush, who expresses his decisiveness to help resolve the Cyprus problem, deeming the status quo unacceptable. 17 October 1989: I take part in the Summit Conference of the Commonwealth held in Kuala Lumpur. On the margins of the conference I have talks with Mrs Thatcher and other Commonwealth leaders. In its resolution, the conference expresses its support for the independence and unity of Cyprus. 20 November 1989: I pay an official visit to Egypt. Besides my talks with Hosni Mubarak, I have talks with the Alexandria Patriarch and representatives of the Greek community living there. 24 November 1989: The Soviet Union promises to try and include the Cyprus issue on the agenda of the summit meeting in Malta between presidents Bush and Gorbachev. 28 November 1989: During my visit to London I have a meeting with Sir Douglas Hurd, with whom I discussed at length the developments on the Cyprus issue. 29 November 1989: After meeting the UN Secretary-General, I take part in a working lunch offered by the Secretary-General, with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This is the first meeting of its kind and marks the increasingly active involvement of the permanent members of the Security Council in the Cyprus issue. 3 December 1989: There has been no change of programme for Mr Denktash. During these talks he continues to submit further conditions for the continuation of the talks that amount, essentially, to a claim for recognition of his pseudo-state.

267

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 268

From the President’s Office

7 December 1989: In a report of the Secretary-General, reference is made to the attitude of Mr Denktash, which disputes the agreed dialogue procedure and raises obstacles to its continuation. 8 December 1989: The leaders of the European Community express, at the summit meeting in Strasbourg, their concern about the continuing division of Cyprus. 12 December 1989: The Secretary-General invites both sides to a new meeting for talks at the beginning of 1990, to last two weeks. 13 December 1989: I visit Athens for consultations with the entire political leadership of Greece on the Cyprus issue. 14 December 1989: The president of the Security Council, in a declaration made on behalf of the members of the Council, expresses full support for the effort of the Secretary-General, while at the same time sharing his disappointment that no concrete results have been achieved to date. 19 December 1989: The foreign minister of the Soviet Union, Eduard Shevardnadze, declares in Brussels that the Cyprus issue will be one of the issues that will be discussed between him and his US counterpart Mr Baker in January. 2 January 1990: In his bi-monthly report to the Congress, Mr Bush states that the USA does not consider the continuation of the status quo in Cyprus to be a solution to the Cyprus problem and supports the resumption of substantial intercommunal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. 11 January 1990: The Secretary-General sends me an invitation for talks in New York scheduled to start on 12 February 1990, with a possible duration of 15 days. The starting date was later moved to 26 February 1991. 30 January 1990: On my way to Brussels, I meet, in Paris, President Mitterrand and the foreign minister, Mr Dumas. I brief them both on the developments on the Cyprus issue. 31 January 1990: I deliver a speech to the plenary session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. I have a meeting with the president of the assembly, Mr Bjorck, and the general secretary of the Council, Mrs Lalumière. 1 February 1990: I participate at the annual economic conference in Davos, where I organised a special presentation of the Cyprus issue. Within the frame of the conference, I hold personal meetings with heads of state and governments, briefing them on the developments on the Cyprus issue and the need for progress in the dialogue. 22 February 1990: The UN Security Council meets in closed session to examine developments on the Cyprus issue. The Council calls for both sides to display the necessary goodwill during the forthcoming talks due to begin on 26 February. 23 February 1990: I visit Athens to meet the political leadership of the country and I also meet President Sartzetakis. 26 February 1990: High-level talks start in New York. I am accompanied by the party leaders. The Secretary-General decides that the target of the talks is to prepare a draft outline of an agreement. 268

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 269

Chronology of Events

1 March 1990: Mr Denktash, in a new outburst of negativity and clearly revealing his aims, makes the continuation of the talks conditional upon the recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot community as a ‘people’ possessing a separate ‘right of selfdetermination’. The Secretary-General recognises that an impasse has been reached because of this stance of Mr Denktash. 2 March 1990: The talks crumble. The Secretary-General in his declaration holds Mr Denktash responsible for undermining the very basis of the talks. 4 March 1990: I pay a visit to Washington, where I have a meeting with members of the Congress and Mr Letsky. We discuss developments on the Cyprus issue and the attitude of Mr Denktash. 6 March 1990: The Turkish-Cypriot opposition accuses Mr Denktash of wrecking the talks. 7–9 March 1990: I meet the British prime minister and brief her on the breakdown of the talks and on the real reasons for this breakdown, which are none other than the fixation of Mr Denktash on the partition of Cyprus. 13 March 1990: The Security Council of the UN adopts Resolution 649 after a report by the Secretary-General on the course of the talks. 13 March 1990: I visit Athens, where I have talks with all the political leaders on the developments on the Cyprus issue and on Resolution 649 of the Security Council. The Greek political leaders are unanimous in approving the way our side handled matters and our policy in general. 13 March 1990: The General Secretary of the Council of Europe, Mrs Lalumière, issues a statement expressing her sadness at the breakdown of the talks. 15 March 1990: A resolution of the European Parliament condemns the shenanigans of Mr Denktash in New York and calls on the Turkish government to display goodwill. 27 March 1990: The Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives adopts a resolution which points out the negative stance by Mr Denktash during the New York talks. 1 April 1990: The Italian prime minister, Giulio Andreotti, declares during his visit to Cyprus that his country will support the accession of Cyprus to the EEC. 7 April 1990: With its resolution, the Inter-parliamentary Union that convened in Cyprus asks for the withdrawal of the occupying forces from the island. I reported on the recent developments on the Cyprus issue. 9 April 1990: In his bi-monthly report to Congress, President Bush declares that the USA is against the partition of Cyprus. 9 April 1990: I pay an official visit to Yugoslavia, where I have talks with the political leadership of the country. 25 April 1990: I meet the UN Secretary-General in New York for talks. 26 April 1990: I address the 18th Special Session of the UN General Assembly for international economic cooperation. 269

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 270

From the President’s Office

28 April 1990: I pay an official visit to Canada, where I have talks with the country’s political leadership and meetings with representatives of organisations of citizens of Greek and Greek-Cypriot descent. 10 May 1990: I begin a tour of the European capitals starting with Brussels. The aim of the talks is to prepare the ground for the submission of Cyprus’s application to join the EC. In Brussels, I have talks with the president of the Commission of the EC, Mr Delors, and the foreign minister of Belgium, Mr Eyskens. 14 May 1990: I visit Athens to meet Greece’s political leadership. I brief all the political leaders about recent developments on the Cyprus issue, the general perspectives in view of international developments and in particular concerning developments in Europe. 15–20 May 1990: I pay an official visit to Kuwait and Qatar, where I meet the political leadership. 27 May 1990: I pay an official visit to Portugal. This visit is part of the preparation for Cyprus to submit its application to join the EEC. 1 June 1990: The representatives of the UN Secretary-General begin their contacts in New York with representatives of the Turkish government on the Cyprus issue. This is the first time that Turkey has been obliged to discuss the Cyprus issue directly with the UN. 5 June 1990: The Cyprus issue is the subject of discussion by President Bush and President Gorbachev at their summit meeting in Washington. 6 June 1990: The special coordinator of the US Department of State on the Cyprus issue, Mr Letsky, arrives in Cyprus for talks with Mr Denktash and me. 12 June 1990: I pay an official visit to Holland as part of the effort to prepare the submission of Cyprus’s application to join the EEC. 21 June 1990: On my way to Denmark, I had talks with the Greek prime minister, Constantine Mitsotakis, aimed at coordinating the activities of the governments of Cyprus and Greece in view of the participation of the Greek prime minister at the EEC summit. 21 June 1990: I pay a working visit to Denmark as part of my tour of European countries. During my visit I have talks with the prime minister, Mr Slooter, and the foreign minister, Mr Eleman-Jensen, as well as with members of parliament. 26 June 1990: The leaders of the member states of the EEC meeting in Dublin express their deep concern about the situation in Cyprus, confirm once again that the Cyprus problem affects Turkey–EEC relations and call for the obstacles to a continuation of the dialogue to be lifted in accordance with Resolution 649. 30 June 1990: I pay an official visit to Syria and meet President Al-Assad, with whom I discuss the Cyprus issue amongst other things. 4 July 1990: The Republic of Cyprus submits its membership application to the European Community. Mr Denktash threatens to take measures. 9–11 July 1990: I pay an official visit to Austria where I have talks with the political leadership of the country. During my talks with the president, Mr Waldheim, we cover the Cyprus issue in extenso. 270

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 271

Chronology of Events

12 July 1990: The Secretary-General submits a report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus and refers to the developments that led to a breakdown of the talks. 12 July 1990: The European Parliament adopts a resolution condemning the continuing violation of human rights in Cyprus by Turkey. 16 July 1990: The UN, the USA and the UK make strong representations to Turkey to avert the colonisation of Famagusta. The European Community rejects the Turkish objections to Cyprus’s membership application. 19 July 1990: The President of the Security Council declares that the Council adopts the report by the Secretary-General, as well as his action plan, and calls on the sides to avoid any move that would worsen the situation. 23 July 1990: I visit Germany in response to the invitation by the German foreign minister, Mr Genscher, with whom I have talks covering developments on the Cyprus issue, on Cyprus’s application for membership to the EEC and bilateral matters. 27 July 1990: I pay an official visit to China. I meet the president, Mr Shangkun, and the prime minister, Mr Li Peng, as well as other officials. 7 August 1990: Security Council Resolution 661, imposing an economic embargo on Iraq, is implemented by the Republic of Cyprus. 17 September 1990: The Council of Ministers of the European Community refers the membership application of Cyprus to the commission according to procedure. 25 September 1990: I address the 45th Session of the General Assembly of the UN. In my speech I link the invasion and occupation of Kuwait with the situation prevailing in Cyprus and the need for implementation of all the resolutions of the UN. During my visit to New York, I have meetings with the UN Secretary-General, the President of the Security Council and state leaders. 27 September 1990: Returning from New York, I meet Mrs Thatcher and brief her on developments on the Cyprus issue. 15 October 1990: The special coordinator on the Cyprus issue for the US Department of State, Mr Letsky, comes to Cyprus for talks. 7 November 1990: The Secretary-General describes in a report on his good offices mission his efforts to promote a solution, carried out in a persistently negative atmosphere. 8 November 1990: The President of the Security Council adopts the report of the Secretary-General and asks him to report to the Security Council by 15 February on the result of his efforts. 10 November 1990: I visit Japan for the enthronement of Emperor Akihito. I have the opportunity to meet several heads of state, as well as the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Mr Loukianov, the prime minister of Japan, the Greek prime minister, Mr Mitsotakis, and others. 19 November 1990: I participate at the summit meeting of the CSCE in Paris. On the margins of the conference I have personal meetings and talks with President Bush, President Mitterrand and other leaders taking part at the conference. 271

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 272

From the President’s Office

30 November 1990: The US president praises, in his bimonthly report to Congress on the Cyprus problem, my efforts for the resolution of this problem. 5 December 1990: I visit Athens, where I have talks with the prime minister, Mr Mitsotakis, and President Karamanlis, as well as with the leader of PASOK, Mr Papandreou, and brief them on developments on the Cyprus issue.

Fourth period: January 1991 to December 1991 Efforts to convene an international conference on Cyprus and to increase pressure on Turkey – Rejection of the Turkish conditions, involvement of the Security Council and Resolution 750 31 January 1991: President Bush declares, after meeting the Greek foreign minister, Mr Samaras, that he wishes to see a solution of the Cyprus problem according to the UN resolutions. 1 February 1991: In his bimonthly report to Congress, the US president notes that his country is willing to act as a ‘catalyst’ in the effort to solve the Cyprus problem. 1 February 1991: I participate in the International Economic Conference in Davos, where I have the opportunity to meet heads of state and other political leaders. I also have a personal meeting with the Greek prime minister for mutual briefing and exchange of views regarding developments in the Gulf. 5 February 1991: The foreign minister of Luxembourg and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the European Community announces the Community’s initiative to promote the resolution of the Cyprus problem. 4 March 1991: The Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Mr Camilion, and Mr Feissel met with me, thus inaugurating a new round of talks on the Cyprus issue. 14 March 1991: In a common statement, presidents Bush and Mitterrand refer to the Cyprus problem and to the necessity for it to be resolved. 14 March 1991: The European Parliament adopts unanimously a resolution calling for the Council of the European Community to become actively involved and take the necessary measures to ensure immediate compliance with the UN resolutions on the Cyprus issue. 23 March 1991: A meeting between President Bush and President Őzal, during which the US president raises the issue about the need for progress to be made on the Cyprus issue. 27 March 1991: The UN Secretary-General reports to the UN Security Council about developments on the Cyprus issue. 28 March 1991: The President of the Security Council says, in a statement, that the Council adopts the report by the Secretary-General and re-confirms the basis for the talks and the mission of the UN Secretary-General. 272

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 273

Chronology of Events

8 April 1991: The European Council, in an extraordinary session, deals with the Cyprus issue. It expresses its support for the efforts of the Secretary-General so that Cyprus may recover its unity and sovereignty. It also expresses the wish that the efforts to resolve the problem will lead to results in the following months. 11 April 1991: I meet the British prime minister, John Major, and discuss with him all the aspects of the Cyprus issue, with special emphasis on the displaced persons and the territorial issues. 17 April 1991: A hearing is held at the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Cyprus, during which the need to implement the state of law in Cyprus is being referred to. 17 April 1991: I visit Athens for talks with the Greek government and Greece’s political leaders in order to determine a common line and tactics that must be followed during the next stages in the development of the Cyprus issue. 25 April 1991: A report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the role of Europe in a future ‘new order of things’ mentions the Cyprus problem and appeals for action to be taken for its solution. 4 May 1991: The USA promise their support to facilitate the procedure of finding a solution for the Cyprus problem. President Bush stresses in his bi-monthly report to Congress on the Cyprus issue. 9 May 1991: At a meeting with the US Secretary of State and the UN SecretaryGeneral, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar, we discuss the Cyprus issue. 17 May 1991: The European Council, in its resolution on security in the Mediterranean, calls upon Turkey to abide by the resolutions of the UN. 23 May 1991: I visit the USA, where I have a meeting with Mr Pérez de Cuéllar. We stress the need to continue efforts to achieve progress on the Cyprus issue. In Washington I meet the leader of the Republicans in the Senate, Mr Dowl, as well as the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and discuss with them the Cyprus issue. 30 May 1991: I meet President Bush. Speaking to reporters before the meeting, President Bush expresses his thanks to the Cypriot people for supporting the operation of removing Iraq from Kuwait and underlines his special interest in the Cyprus issue, which, he says, is a matter of great priority for the USA. 7 June 1991: The prime minister of Greece, Mr Mitsotakis, visits Cyprus. 7 June 1991: The UN Secretary-General meets the Turkish prime minister, Mesut Yilmaz. There follows a meeting with President Őzal. 8 June 1991: I co-chair, with Mr Mitsotakis, a session of the National Council, during which the course that our national issue has taken is thoroughly discussed and assessed. 10 June 1991: The special coordinator on the Cyprus issue of the American State Department, Mr Letsky, has talks on the Cyprus issue in Ankara. 13 June 1991: Mr Letsky comes to Cyprus and declares that the USA welcomes the idea of a conference on the Cyprus issue, adding that the US government wants 273

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 274

From the President’s Office

to contribute to the effort of the Secretary-General in the framework of the mission entrusted to him by the Security Council to find a solution to the Cyprus issue. 14 June 1991: Mr Letsky completes his talks on the Cyprus issue in Athens. 26 June 1991: I visit Italy to meet the Italian prime minister, Mr Andreotti. The relations of Cyprus with the European Community and the Cyprus issue are the main subjects of our discussions. 27 June 1991: The Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council, expresses his support for a high-level international meeting on the Cyprus problem as part of his effort to find a solution for it. 28 June 1991: I pay a visit to Malta, during which I meet the president and the prime minister. 28 June 1991: The President of the Security Council issues a statement supporting the actions of the Secretary-General. 5 July 1991: The Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus hands over to me a letter by the Secretary-General. In his letter the Secretary-General proposes a series of meetings to be held with Messrs Camilion and Feissel and the leaders of the two communities. On the assumption that the results of these meetings will be encouraging, the meetings will continue well into August. 6 July 1991: The Secretary-General pays a visit to Ankara. At his meeting with the Turkish president, he raises the Cyprus question and the need for progress on it. 18–21 July 1991: President Bush visits Greece and Turkey, with Cyprus one of the main issues on his agenda. 29 July 1991: After intensive consultations with the Secretariat of the UN and the five permanent members of the Security Council, President Őzal’s proposal for a four-party conference is bypassed and all efforts are focused on convening an international conference. 2 August 1991: President Bush announces that the leaders of Greece and Turkey will take part in a conference on the Cyprus issue provided there is substantial progress. 5 August 1991: Mr Letsky arrives in Cyprus for three days of talks with the Cyprus government and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. 7 August 1991: The USSR expresses its support for an international conference on the Cyprus issue. Yuri Fokin is sent to Cyprus. 26 August 1991: The UN officials Messrs Camilion and Feissel come to Cyprus after a new round of talks in Greece and Turkey. They discuss in depth the various aspects of the Cyprus problem. 31 August 1991: I visit Greece for talks with the Greek government and talks with Greece’s political leaders. There is an in-depth discussion of developments on the Cyprus problem, an assessment in common of the situation, the possibilities and the perspectives, as well as the shaping of a common tactical approach. 6 September 1991: Messrs Camilion and Feissel begin a third round of negotiations in Nicosia, in an attempt to reduce the differences between the two sides so as to make it possible to convene an international conference on the Cyprus issue. 274

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 275

Chronology of Events

11 September 1991: The prime ministers of Greece and Turkey, Messrs Mitsotakis and Yilmaz, meet in Paris. Hopes for convening an international conference evaporate on account of the negative stance adopted by the Turkish prime minister. Mr Mitsotakis declares that the Turkish government has reneged on its previous commitments and the promises it gave President Bush. 12 September 1991: The European Parliament, in a resolution, calls upon the European Council and the Council of Ministers to display an active interest in the efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem. 21 September 1991: President Őzal, in a statement he issued, recognises for the first time that the occupation of part of Cyprus by Turkish troops weighs heavily upon the Turkish economy. 24 September 1991: The Cyprus problem is discussed at the plenary session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 25 September 1991: I meet in New York the UN Secretary-General, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar, and Mr Letsky. After that I meet the five permanent members of the Security Council. 26 September 1991: I meet in New York, among others, the foreign ministers of Britain, Greece, France and Holland. 27 September 1991: I address the 46th Session of the UN Assembly and brief the international community on the new shift in the course of the Cyprus issue. After separate meetings of the American Secretary of State, Mr Baker, with me and the Turkish foreign minister, Mr Giray, Mr Baker issues an appeal for the recent progress on the problem to yield fruits. 28 September 1991: The Cyprus government welcomes the discussion of the Cyprus issue by the five permanent members of the Security Council, qualifying them as ‘a substantial, very important and very positive development’. 30 September 1991: On my way back from the UN, I meet the Greek prime minister, whom I brief on the discussions and talks I had at the UN. 2 October 1991: In a common statement the 12 member states of the EEC reaffirm the position that relations between Turkey and the EEC include the Cyprus issue. 8 October 1991: In his report to the Security Council on his mission of good offices, the Secretary-General of the United Nations blames the Turkish-Cypriot leader for raising obstacles during his mission. 11 October 1991: The Security Council adopts Resolution 716, which warns indirectly the Turkish side not to raise obstacles to the procedure of finding a solution for the Cyprus problem. The Resolution reaffirms the principles of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. 17 October 1991: I participate at the Commonwealth Conference in Harare, where I have a series of talks with heads of state. Quite important is my meeting with Mr Major, with whom I discuss the recent developments on the Cyprus issue. The Commonwealth heads of state in this conference adopt a resolution asking for 275

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 276

From the President’s Office

all obstacles to the procedure of finding a solution of the Cyprus issue to be lifted. They also decide to hold the next summit conference in Cyprus. 27 October 1991: I pay a visit to the Soviet Union in response to an invitation by President Gorbachev. He promises to raise the Cyprus issue at the summit conference that he will have with his US counterpart in Madrid. 17 November 1991: The special coordinator of the US Department of State, Mr Letsky, declares that a pacifying conference on the Cyprus issue will probably be convened in New York, either in December 1991 or in January 1992. 3 February 1991: I go to New York to meet the departing UN Secretary-General and his successor Mr Boutros-Gali. 8 December 1991: I pay an official visit to Singapore. On my way there I meet the Greek prime minister and brief him on the developments on the Cyprus issue. 11 December 1991: I pay an official visit to Australia. Besides my meeting with the prime minister, Mr Hawk, I had a series of talks with other government officials and parliamentary representatives. 13 December 1991: The French under-secretary of foreign affairs, Mr Vivien, in a statement he issued, holds Mr Denktash responsible for the lack of progress on the Cyprus issue. 19 December 1991: In his last report on the Cyprus issue to the Security Council, the UN Secretary-General, Mr Pérez de Cuéllar, expresses his disappointment for the uncertainty and the insecurity that reigns in Cyprus and qualifies the status quo as unacceptable. 23 December 1991: The UN Security Council adopts the report of the SecretaryGeneral and calls upon all the interested parties to cooperate fully with the successor of the Secretary-General for the solution of the Cyprus problem.

Fifth period: January 1992 to March 1993 New negotiations and Gali’s Set of Ideas – Resolutions 774 and 789 31 January 1992: I meet the Secretary-General of the UN, together with Mr Letsky. 7 January 1992: The special coordinator of the US Department of State begins his talks on the Cyprus issue in Ankara. 13 January 1992: Mr Letsky pursues his talks on the Cyprus issue in Nicosia. 16 January 1992: Mr Letsky visits Athens for talks with Greece’s leaders. 17 January 1992: I visit Athens for talks with Greece’s political leaders and for the inauguration of the exhibition ‘Cyprus Week in Greece’. 20 January 1992: I meet in New York the UN Secretary-General and the permanent representatives of the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France and China. 20 January 1992: The debate begins in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the Cuco report on Turkish settlements in the occupied part of Cyprus.

276

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 277

Chronology of Events

21 January 1992: Meeting of Mr Denktash with the UN Secretary-General and Mr Letsky. 31 January 1992: I participate at the symposium in Davos, where I had a series of talks with presidents and political leaders of many countries. 1 February 1992: The Greek prime minister, Mr Mitsotakis, meets Mr Demirel. There follows my meeting with Mr Mitsotakis. 3 February 1992: I meet President Mitterrand, the foreign minister, Mr Dumas, and other officials in order to secure the support of France in a new effort to solve the Cyprus problem. 7 February 1992: Mr Denktash cancels his scheduled meeting with representatives of the Secretary-General on the pretext that he fell ill. 9 February 1992: A new refusal by Mr Denktash to meet the representatives of the Secretary-General. 10 February 1992: The EEC decides to create an inter-service committee to prepare the Opinion on the accession of Cyprus to the EEC. 10 February 1992: The Turkish prime minister, Mr Demirel, visits the USA, where he meets President Bush, the UN Secretary-General and Mr Letsky. The Cyprus issue is on the agenda of all these meetings. 18 February 1992: The representatives of the Secretary-General start their talks in Ankara. Mr Demirel refuses to see them. 25 February 1992: The representatives of the Secretary-General begin their talks in Nicosia. 28 February 1992: The Greek foreign minister, Mr Samaras, meets the representatives of the Secretary-General in Athens. 7 March 1992: On my way to Germany, I visit Athens, where I have a meeting with Mr Mitsotakis. Briefing and discussion on the Cyprus issue. 10 March 1992: I pay a visit to Germany, where I have meetings with the German president, Mr Weizcäcker, Chancellor Kohl, the foreign minister, Mr Genscher, and members of the German Parliament. We discuss the Cyprus issue and the promotion of Cyprus’s application to join the EEC. 17 March 1992: Mr Letsky starts his scheduled talks in Nicosia. 19 March 1992: I visit Athens, where I have consultations with all the political leaders on the Cyprus issue. 24 March 1992: The envoy of the British government, Mr Madden, arrives in Cyprus for talks. 26 March 1992: I meet the UN Secretary-General in New York, as well as the five permanent members of the Security Council. 27 March 1992: Mr Major sends a letter to the Turkish foreign minister, Mr Cetin, concerning the Cyprus issue. 30 March 1992: I pay a visit to Washington, where I meet the US president and members of the US government and Congress.

277

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 278

From the President’s Office

30 March 1992: The UN Secretary-General meets Mr Denktash, who is scheduled to meet the next day the representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council. 2 April 1992: The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decides to publicise the report of the Human Rights Committee on the violations of human rights in Cyprus by Turkey, which had remained confidential since 1983. 3 April 1992: In his report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary-General includes a set of ideas as a basis for negotiation, while re-confirming categorically the principles on which a solution of the Cyprus problem should be based. 10 April 1992: The Security Council adopts Resolution 750, which emphasises once again the displeasure of that body for the lack of progress on the Cyprus issue, due to the negative stance of the Turkish side. It also asks the Secretary-General to undertake intensive efforts within the fixed two-month timetable of May to June 1992 in order to find a solution. 14 April 1992: The Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopts the Cuco report, which documents the massive influx into Cyprus of settlers from Turkey. 21 May 1992: I visit Athens to take part, as a speaker, at a conference organised by the Herald Tribune. I take the opportunity to meet Mr Mitsotakis, as well as the political leaders of the country. I brief my interlocutors on developments on the Cyprus issue, the procedure that is going to be followed and the unprecedented involvement of the Security Council. 28 May 1992: I pay a visit to Bulgaria, where I meet the political leadership of the country. The object of our talks is the Cyprus issue and, especially, Resolution 750. 1 June 1992: I meet the foreign minister of Canada, Mrs De Dugal, and brief her on the recent developments on the Cyprus issue. 3 June 1992: I receive a letter, as does Mr Denktash, from the UN SecretaryGeneral, inviting us to hold talks on 18 June in New York in separate meetings. He also asks us to be prepared for ‘proximity talks’ without excluding the convocation of an international conference according to Resolution 750. 6 June 1992: In its session the National Council repeats its position that I should accept a meeting with the UN Secretary-General. 9 June 1992: I meet in my office the General Secretary of the Council of Europe, Mrs Lalumière, whom I brief on the latest developments on the Cyprus issue. 10 June 1992: I have meetings with Mr Letsky and the representatives of the Secretary-General, Messrs Camilion, Feissel and Cavanagh, on the subject of the forthcoming talks in New York. 12 June 1992: I participate at the UN conference in Rio de Janeiro on environment and development. I thus have the opportunity to meet many heads of state and discuss with them the Cyprus issue and the forthcoming negotiations in New York. President Bush, it must be noted, assures me of the support by the USA. 278

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 279

Chronology of Events

17 June 1992: I have separate meetings in New York with representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council to discuss the forthcoming proximity talks. 18 June 1992: Start of the proximity talks in New York under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Gali. The talks focus on Resolution 750 and the ideas that the UN Secretary-General has prepared, as well as on the map concerning the eventual agreement on the territorial issue. The talks are interrupted for about two weeks because of the absence of the Secretary-General from New York. It is decided they should resume on 15 July 1992. 22 June 1992: After a separate meeting with the UN Secretary-General, Mr Boutros-Gali, I have meetings with Mr Letsky, David Ransom and Mrs Jane Hall (of the National Security Council of the USA) and brief them on the course of the consultations. 2 July 1992: In a written message to President Bush, I underline the need for measures to be taken that would help curb the Turkish intransigence. 8 July 1992: I leave for Helsinki to take part at the summit meeting of CSCE. At the conference, Mr Mitsotakis meets President Bush and stresses the important role that the USA must play if a fair and viable solution of the Cyprus problem is ever to be reached. President Bush declares that he will be working in that direction. 8 July 1992: The ‘group of seven’, at the summit conference on international problems in Munich, declares, via its president, that it strongly supports Mr BoutrosGali over a speedy solution of the Cyprus problem during the talks to be held in New York. 14 July 1992: The President of the Security Council, Mr Luis Jesus, announces his approval of the Set of Ideas, considering it as a basis for reaching a general framework of an agreement and calls upon both sides to cooperate with the UN Secretary-General for the success of the talks. 15 July 1992: President Bush tries his best, with the UN Secretary-General, to promote a solution of the Cyprus problem, based on Resolution 750 of the Security Council. 2 August 1992: President Bush, in a telephone conversation with the Turkish prime minister, Mr Demirel, asks him to exert pressure on Mr Denktash to accept the Gali Map. 7 August 1992: There is a shift by Mr Denktash on the refugees as he accepts in principle their right of return and ownership of property. 8 August 1992: Unofficial deliberations by Mr Boutros-Gali with members of the Security Council. The UN Secretary-General meets Mr Denktash and me. 9 August 1992: I meet the candidate for the US presidency Bill Clinton, whom I brief on the recent developments on the Cyprus issue. 13 August 1992: Direct talks start with Mr Denktash in the presence of the UN Secretary-General. The talks break off on 14 August and at the same time the UN Secretary-General announces the re-convocation of meetings in common for 16 October 1992. 279

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 280

From the President’s Office

21 August 1992: In his report, the UN Secretary-General refers to the efforts he made for the solution of the Cyprus problem from 10 April until 21 August 1992. The report contains as an appendix the Set of Ideas and stresses that the status quo is unacceptable. 26 August 1992: The Security Council, with its Resolution 774, approves the report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the results of his endeavours to solve the Cyprus problem, as foreseen in Resolution 750. 1 September 1992: I participate at the summit conference of the Non-aligned in Jakarta. There is an intensive campaign of enlightenment through meetings, with tens of heads of state and the UN Secretary-General. A resolution approved by the heads of state and government asks for the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, while support for the sovereignty, independence, integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus is re-confirmed. 7 September 1992: On my way back from the conference of the Non-aligned in Jakarta, I have meetings with the prime minister, Mr Mitsotakis, and the President of the Hellenic Republic, Mr Karamanlis, as well as with the leaders of the other Greek parties. 8 September 1992: In Athens, I co-chair with Mr Mitsotakis a meeting on the Cyprus issue. The aim is to make sure that the conditions are ripe for talks that will bring results and for our accession to the EEC. 17 September 1992: I meet in my office the Speaker of the Indian Parliament, Mr Patik, whom I brief on the Cyprus issue. 18 September 1992: At a session of the National Council, only Dimitris Christofias, Nicos Rolandis and Michalis Papapetrou respond positively to my invitation to accompany me to New York. 22 September 1992: I address the plenary of the 47th General Assembly of the UN. In my speech I refer at length to the Cyprus issue and to the efforts by the Secretary-General to find a solution, with special mention of his recent report. In the framework of my visit I have meetings with the foreign ministers of the USA, Britain, Greece, Russia, Germany and Israel. 23 September 1992: The House of Representatives discusses developments on the Cyprus issue. The opposition parties (DISY, DHKO, EDEK) disagree with the resumption of talks on 26 October and ask that an effort be made to have them postponed. 25 September 1992: The Bush report covering the period May to June 1992 is made public. There is mention of the meetings held by President Bush with the prime minister of Turkey, Mr Demirel, and me at the conference in Rio. 28 September 1992: After my visit to Seville for the inauguration of the World Fair EXPO’ 92, I meet the prime minister of Spain, Mr Felipe Gonzales, in Madrid. During the talks with him, besides the Cyprus issue, the application of Cyprus for accession to the EEC is also discussed.

280

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 281

Chronology of Events

29 September 1992: After Madrid, I visit Brussels for a series of talks with officials of the European Community, aimed at the publication of a positive opinion on Cyprus’s application to become a member of the EEC. 7 October 1992: The Cuco report is adopted by the plenary session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The resolution constitutes the first international condemnation of the Turkish settlement policy in Cyprus. 16 October 1992: I pay a one-day visit to Moscow for talks with the president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin. 20 October 1992: In his bi-monthly report to Congress on the Cyprus issue for the period July to August 1992, the US president refers to the course of the talks and supports fully the positions contained in Resolution 774 of the Security Council. 21 October 1992: On my way to Norway, I have a meeting with the Greek prime minister, during which we assess the situation as it developed a few days before the beginning of the new dialogue in New York. 21 October 1992: I pay an official visit to Norway, where I meet the prime minister, Mrs Brown, have meetings with the Speaker of the Parliament, King Harald, and other officials. 26 October 1992: In New York, I meet Mr Boutros-Gali to discuss the forthcoming talks. 27 October 1992: Mr Boutros-Gali meets Mr Denktash to discuss the forthcoming talks. 28 October 1992: Resumption of the proximity talks between Mr Denktash and me under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary-General. 9 November 1992: Mr Boutros-Gali meets both Mr Denktash and me in the framework of the talks that take place in New York and hands us over the positions of the UN on every chapter of the Set of Ideas. He also announces that he plans to invite us for a new round of talks at the beginning of March 1993. 10 November 1992: During a meeting in common with the Secretary-General, both I and Mr Denktash give him our comments on the document in question. 10 November 1992: In its resolution, the European Parliament refers to the Cyprus issue as an obstacle to the upgrading of the relations between Turkey and the European Community. It calls upon Turkey to take the necessary steps for the solution of the Cyprus issue and considers the status quo unacceptable. 12 November 1992: I meet the permanent representatives of Britain, Russia and China at the UN. 19 November 1992: The UN Secretary-General describes with great objectivity in his report the course of the talks in New York. The intransigence of the Turkish side is underlined. 25 November 1992: The Security Council adopts Resolution 789, considered the strongest resolution ever adopted by the Security Council on the Cyprus issue.

281

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 282

From the President’s Office

25 November 1992: I go to Athens for talks with the President of the Republic and the prime minister of the Greek government, as well as with the country’s political leaders. 14 January 1993: I meet the UN Secretary-General in Paris. The object of our discussion was the Security Council Resolution 789 and more specifically the confidence-building measures. 20 November 1993: The European Parliament adopts, in a resolution, the positions of the Security Council. 21 November 1993: I receive Mr Camilion in my office, with whom I discuss Resolution 789, the confidence-building measures and the resolution of the European Parliament. 27 January 1993: The Cyprus issue is the object of debate at an extraordinary session of the House of Representatives in Cyprus. The parties of the opposition take a stance against Resolution 789 and reject the confidence-building measures as unacceptable.

282

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 283

Notes

Introduction 1 The policy of ‘preconditions’, that was followed by the Cypriot and Greek governments during the 1980s, implied that, before the start of negotiations between the representatives of the two Cypriot communities, there should be complete withdrawal of all Turkish troops and settlers, international guarantees and implementation of the three fundamental freedoms. 2 It is indicative of this policy that when, shortly after my election, at a press conference in London, a journalist said ‘But we understand, Mr President, that you are not interested in a solution,’ my reply (which has since become a catchphrase) was ‘My dear friend, we want a solution yesterday,’ and then I explained the reasons for our approach.

Chapter One 3 In trying to arrange a meeting with Mr Őzal, I used every possible opportunity offered to me. I thus asked the Greek Minister of Culture, Mrs Melina Mercouri, who had visited Turkey, to broach the issue. In a letter she wrote to me upon her return, she said that she had conveyed the message to Mr Őzal and discussed it with the then foreign minister Mr Yilmaz. They both tried to excuse themselves, saying that as far as they were concerned they were trying to do something about the Cyprus issue, but they could not say anything at the moment. Mr Yilmaz added that the contribution of the governments of Greece and Turkey could only manifest itself after the two communities began their consultations. 283

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 284

From the President’s Office

4 Statement by the Secretary-General: In the course of the discussions both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements and recalled the Secretary-General’s opening statement of 1980, the evaluation document of 1981 and the Vienna Working Points of 1984 and accordingly expressed their readiness to seek a negotiated solution through the efforts of the Secretary-General. They acknowledged that this would require a determined and sustained effort by both sides, as well as the creation of an atmosphere of mutual confidence. They recognized the need to show respect for each other’s concerns and to discuss with goodwill how these concerns could be met. The two leaders expressed their willingness to meet without any preconditions and to attempt to achieve by 1 June 1989 a negotiated settlement of all aspects of the Cyprus problem. Both confirmed their desire to cooperate with the Secretary-General in the mission of good offices entrusted to him by the Security Council and welcomed his intention to launch talks without delay. The two leaders agreed with the Secretary-General that the talks would start at 11 a.m. on 15 September at the Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia. They accepted the invitation of the Secretary-General to meet him in New York after the first rounds of meetings in Nicosia to review the progress achieved during this initial stage. 5 Extract from the article by Yannis Cartalis in To Vima: Without illusions and with the measured optimism that the new mobility on the Cyprus issue generates, one more new round of intercommunal summit talks will begin in Geneva on 24 August. This happens after three years during which there was no contact between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It is therefore natural to wonder whether this new round of negotiations will lead to the solution of the problem and whether the conditions do exist for such an outcome. Many believe that these conditions do not exist and that the only beneficiaries of this new dialogue will be the Turks. Last week, publicity was given to a report by the Greek ambassador in Moscow (and a specialist on Cyprus) Mr Dountas arguing that it is better to stick to the existing situation rather than work towards a solution that is bound to be worse. This, however, is not the position of Mr G. Vassiliou. The new President of Cyprus, who has created extremely good impressions during his international contacts, believes, on the contrary, that today’s international climate allows the quest for a solution which would perhaps have been impossible in the past. The important thing is that he has managed to convince of the rightness of his views all the Cypriot party leaders that will accompany him to Geneva and meet with the UN Secretary-General themselves. One more important element is the fact that Mr Vassiliou managed, during his recent visit to Washington, to inspire trust in his person and in his intentions. This is believed to influence decisively the shaping of American policy on the Cyprus issue. Irrespective of what the 284

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 285

Americans will do in the end, they have at least grasped well enough that the 1 2 key to a solution in Cyprus lies in Ankara’s hands. 3 6 Resolution of the ‘Centre Union’ conference. 4 The Conference of the Centre Union: 5 1. Expresses its concern about your decision to abandon the principle of the 6 ‘Preconditions’ by accepting to resume the Inter-communal Talks allegedly 7 unconditionally. You have thus abandoned a principle that was 8 unanimously decided upon in Athens by all the Greek parliamentary parties 9 and the Greek government without having ensured that the De Cuellar [sic] 10 document of 1986 is permanently withdrawn and no longer constitutes the 11 basis or a reference document for the bi-communal talks whose resumption 12 you have accepted ‘without conditions’ and without any acceptance by the 13 14 Turkish side of the above minimal guarantees. 2. Once you made the mistake of accepting such a kind of Inter-communal 15 Talks and in order to reduce the unfavourable impact that your erroneous 16 decision will have on the national issue we recommend that: You insist on 17 the ‘Preconditions’ and declare as of now to Mr De Cuellar [sic] that if there 18 is no satisfactory solution of the ‘Precondition’ issues or – at least – no 19 satisfactory progress towards the solution of the ‘Preconditions’ issues, you 20 will withdraw from the talks. Also that in such a case the UN Secretary- 21 General will justify your withdrawal. You must ask for a commitment in 22 writing by Mr De Cuellar [sic] that the March 1986 document is already 23 ‘dead and buried’ and that the Secretary-General will not put it on the 24 negotiating table as the ‘basis’ or even as the ‘object’ of negotiations. Also 25 that if Mr Denktash tries to resuscitate this document, or to make it the 26 basis or the object of the talks, you will then be justified in withdrawing 27 from the talks and that Mr De Cuellar [sic] will publicly and clearly hold 28 Mr Denktash responsible for wrecking the talks by attempting to introduce 29 30 an unacceptable basis for them. 3. We ask for the correct and democratic composition of the National Council 31 with the inclusion of the Centre Union as of right in it, and we call upon 32 you to respect your electoral statements concerning the composition of the 33 National Council with the participation of all parties and other personalities. 34 4. We ask you to eliminate from your close government environment persons 35 who have by word or deed insulted the memory and the work of Ethnarch 36 Makarios as well as persons who are now, or have been in the past, opposed 37 to the promotion of the national Greek character of the Greek Cypriots in 38 Cyprus and have denied the necessity for Cypriot Hellenism to remain 39 dedicated to its national roots. We ask of you not to reward such denigrators 40 with salaries and other benefits from the state budget.

285

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 286

From the President’s Office

Chapter Two 7 Elephtherotypia was the party paper of DHKO. 8 Meeting with the British High Commissioner, Mr Maude, Tuesday 6 December 1988: The High Commissioner visited me and showed me the copy of the message sent by Mrs Thatcher to the Turkish prime minister, Mr Őzal which, according to the High Commissioner, was handed over to him the previous day by the ambassador of the UK in Ankara. The message, which I read, covered a full page and consisted in three paragraphs. In the first paragraph the British Prime Minister mentioned the document that Mr Denktash had submitted in New York and welcomed the fact that Turkey was willing to withdraw part of her troops before the establishment of a transitional government. She was positive about the new ideas concerning the balance that would be set up. She also considered as positive the fact that Mr Denktash had decided to accept in the Constitution of a Federal Cyprus the inclusion of the three basic freedoms. In the second paragraph, which is the longer one, she mentions that the three basic freedoms must be secured for any democratic society to function. She refers to the points that I had developed on this issue and to the points on which Mr Denktash’s positions were unacceptable. She then referred to the proposal by Mr Denktash for an 18-year moratorium and calls it a proposal that leaves one breathless. She states that she hopes Turkey will understand the need for serious moderation in her attitude so that a solution can be found. In the third paragraph she refers positively to the idea of Turkey discussing once again the issue of guarantees adding that she herself is ready to discuss it whenever Greece and Turkey are also ready for it. When we finished the discussion of the letter, the High Commissioner told me that according to information he had received from high-level sources in the Occupied Territories, Mr Denktash was very upset because of his failure to provoke me in New York and thus win the game of creating impressions. He had decided to sabotage the negotiations and provoke me into abandoning them. When I told him that I would show patience, the Turkish-Cypriot leader understood that he had failed and therefore, decided to issue titles of property to the Turkish Cypriots who had taken over Greek-Cypriot assets in the North. By this action he wished to weaken my position amongst the Greek Cypriots and render any talks impossible. I replied that powers such as Britain, the US and the European community must make it clear to Turkey that they were not prepared to accept such behaviour. His reply was: OK, but you see that Mrs Thatcher’s position is very strong on this issue. I told him: Yes, but this is not enough. Their position was also 286

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 287

Notes

very strong on the unilateral declaration of independence but this did not stop Denktash from declaring it because he believed that he was able to do so without meeting with any serious reaction. Similarly, this time, I added, there must be serious opposition, there must be a condemnation of Turkey and not just of Denktash from the Security Council and Mrs Thatcher must make it clear to Turkey that such behaviour would constitute a serious provocation. He agreed with me and left. While he was about to leave I asked him if I could use the information he gave me in the National Council. He replied: ‘If my information is correct it will become known to public opinion.’ The fact is that we too had been informed from other sources, that Mr Denktash planned to take such a decision at the meeting of his ministerial council of 7 November. 9 Here are excerpts from an article by Democritos (Tasos Papadopoulos) in Kirykas (Herald) of 27 November 1988: What then will be our position if we abandon this last bastion of our resistance, namely the three issues of principle of the ‘Preconditions’? We will then remain totally deprived of the moral basis of our claims since our ‘struggle’ will have been humiliatingly reduced from a fight for ‘principle’ on issues of invasion and occupation to the cheap issue of a commercial land transaction as the ‘price’ that… the Turks will pay for abandoning the issues of ‘principle’. We thus went to New York for a ‘Review Meeting’ in order to expose there the Turks’ intransigence to respect the schedule, to avoid getting embroiled in a time-consuming dialogue procedure that can only serve Turkey. We failed to expose the Turkish side for its intransigence. On the contrary the Greek side was pushed into a corner and is now committed and obliged to present ‘alternative’ proposals that can only be given if we abandon the last of our ‘principle’. The only future perspectives still open to us are that we either abandon the last three remaining positions of ‘principle’, and surrender to the demands of the Turkish side or pursue a fruitless and time-consuming procedure so that we are not accused of … intransigence. Meanwhile Prime Minister Mr A. Papandreou and President Vassiliou let us know, after their meeting yesterday in Athens, that: ‘the time has come to solve the Cyprus issue, the time has come, here and now’. Do they mean that the time has come for us to abandon the inalienable rights of the Cypriot people, for a sell out of the positions of principle and the unconditional surrender to the Turkish invader? Is this what they mean but know not what they are saying or do they lack the courage to say clearly what they mean? 10 My notes after my meeting with the US ambassador, similar to all those prepared after the meetings of all the ambassadors of the Security Council, show how positive was his and their response. 287

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 288

From the President’s Office

Meeting with the US ambassador, Mr Perrin, 30 January 1989 At my meeting with the US ambassador Mr Bill Perrin I handed him over a note with our proposals as well as copies in summary and copies in full of the proposals of Mr Denktash together with the analysis of the documents prepared by Mr Denktash himself. I explained to the ambassador our position and our alternative choices, i.e. either to abandon all our positions submitted until September 1984, as did Mr Denktash – who in certain cases went as far back as 1975 – or to submit serious proposals based on the agreements made at various times that aimed at finding a solution to the problem. We have opted for the second choice, I explained to Mr Perrin, being fully aware of the danger that we might possibly come under further pressure to make more concessions. I also underlined that the proposals enjoy unanimous support from all the political leaders. The general attitude of the ambassador was very positive. He expressed his satisfaction for our realistic and positive approach and on my side I promised I would do whatever possible to promote the negotiations. I made it clear that the success of the negotiations will depend on whether Mr Denktash will be willing to continue the dialogue. The ambassador expressed the hope, although I had my doubts, that Mr Denktash would be ready to begin negotiations as of next Monday. 11 Commenting on my numerous activities and contacts in Paris, the French newspaper Le Point, in a laudatory article written by Olivier Webber (24 July 1989), called me ‘Marathon Man’, which was also the headline of the article. 12 During my meeting with Mr Camilion, he gave me a study by a Turkish lawyer on the issue of the properties. Its purpose was to stress the huge importance that this issue had acquired and the complications that had arisen because of the large fortunes that had been created by the exploitation of those assets. He also told me that he had stressed to Mr Denktash the following: • It is impossible to reach a solution without the guarantee of Turkey – and this the Greeks had to contend with. • It is impossible to reach a solution if the Greeks are denied the right to return to their homes – and this the Turks had to contend with. 13 At our next meeting, Mr Camilion briefed me on the discussion that Mr Feissel had with the Turkish ambassador Mr Ertegun. Let me mention here that Mr Ertegun invited Mr Camilion to dinner at his home, who briefed me, however, before accepting the invitation. I reacted strongly and said that while the Turks hold the women and others as prisoner Mr Camilion should not be dining with the Turks. Finally, Mr Camilion did not accept the invitation but Mr Feissel did. Mr Feissel expressed the opinion that a document should be submitted that would constitute the basis for the continuation of the dialogue. This Mr Ertegun did not like at all, insisting that nothing be submitted. Seeing the insistence of Mr Feissel to have the document submitted, Mr Ertegun tried to 288

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 289

Notes

convince Mr Feissel, saying ‘at least delay for a while the submission of the 1 document so that it should not seem that this was the result of Mr Vassiliou’s 2 3 mobility and his trips to various countries’. 4 5 6 Chapter Three 7 14 It is sad that DHKO as well as DHSY, falsifying the facts, tried to give the 8 impression that because of AKEL’s opposition we had difficulty in submitting 9 the application – something totally untrue. There was no delay and no difficulty 10 at all in the submission of the application, as I explain in the chapter on the 11 EEC in another book I wrote on the subject Cyprus – European Union: From 12 13 the first steps to the accession (Kastaniotis, Athens 2004). 15 A detailed description of the preparation and the submission of the membership 14 application to the EEC can be found in the special book I wrote on the subject. 15 16 (See note 14) 16 [Question:] These last few days there has been intensive diplomatic activity on 17 the Cyprus issue which was discussed at the Bush–Gorbachev meeting, the 18 Mitsotakis–Baker meeting and the meeting of the UN Secretary-General with 19 Messrs Bush and Baker. Are there any new developments creating well-grounded 20 hopes that the Cypriot problem enters a new phase that will lead to its solution? 21 [Reply:] The upgrading of the Cyprus problem into an international dispute 22 that preoccupies seriously the leaders of the USA and the Soviet Union is 23 perhaps the most important development in recent years. We hope that the 24 discussion of the Cyprus problem by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev will 25 inaugurate the launch of a series of talks and actions aiming at its fair and viable 26 solution. The increased interest of the two superpowers also sends a message 27 to Turkey that the Cyprus problem cannot remain a sad exception in the 28 change of the international climate in favour of the peaceful resolution of 29 conflicts, détente and cooperation. We should not relax, however, but continue 30 31 to work hard to make the most of these new developments. [Question:] How does the Cypriot government plan to make the most of this 32 movement on the Cyprus issue that can be observed on the international scene? 33 34 What will be its next moves? [Reply:] The Cypriot government will pursue its intensive efforts for the effective 35 internationalisation of the Cyprus problem making good use of all the 36 international forums including those of the UN, the Council of Europe and the 37 European Community in close cooperation with the Greek government. It will 38 also continue to be in close contact with the governments of all the other countries 39 that are in a position to help promote a solution of this problem. The Turkish 40 side must realise that the Cyprus problem will remain alive and will continue to embarrass Turkey internationally as long as it remains unsolved. At the same time 289

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 290

From the President’s Office

we sent Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots the message that the solution of the Cyprus problem will benefit us all, as well as the wider area we live in. 17 Statement by the President of the Security Council: In line with resolution 649 (1990), they request the Secretary-General to make suggestions, as necessary, to assist the two communities in arriving at an agreed outline. The members of the Council again call on the parties concerned to refrain, especially at this sensitive stage of the process, from any action or statement that could aggravate the situation. They express their concern over any action which contravenes paragraph 5 of resolution 550 (1984) and paragraph 5 of resolution 649 (1990). They call upon both communities to concentrate their efforts on promoting mutual confidence and reconciliation. 18 Statement by the press secretary of the UN Secretary-General, 11 September 1990: ‘The overall agreement to be negotiated by the two leaders must cover all the issues that make up the Cyprus question. It is envisaged that matters related to the membership of Cyprus in the European Community will be discussed in this connection.’ 19 The absurdity of this insistence consists in the fact that they ought to know there was no hope of success without the support of the great countries. Even if we could obtain a resolution, this would in no way be any different from the others, which they did not like anyway as they recommended negotiations for the implementation of the high-level agreements for a Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation. This goal they essentially rejected. The attack by Mr Papadopoulos against Mr Pérez de Cuéllar in his speech of 20 July 1990 was the best proof of this kind of mentality.

Chapter Four 20 Here is an excerpt from the article by Papadopoulos in the newspaper Kirykas (20 January 1991): Each and all of the UN resolutions have as their main axis and basic provision the holding of intercommunal talks. So when we ask for the resolutions to be implemented what we are really pressing for is the resumption of the dialogue exactly as this dialogue has being carried out until now. There is certainly nothing wrong in carrying out a dialogue … but when we talk about the implementation of the UN resolutions everybody must realise that the maximum of what we are really asking for, is the resumption of the intercommunal dialogue with Mr Denktash insisting as before, without making any concessions, on the self-same positions on the whole, with the same proposals, the same procedure, exactly as happened until now before the talks broke off in February 1990… This is what we are asking for, and this is ‘national suicide’. 290

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 291

Notes

21 The article was published in Cumhurriet. 22 It is interesting that President Papadopoulos used the selfsame argument during the referendum on the Annan plan in April 2004, stressing the danger that the President of the Cyprus Republic might be downgraded to a leader of a community. 23 Nicosia, 28 November 1991 Dear President Bush, It is with pleasure that I communicate once more with you in order to thank you for your sincere and active interest in the UN’ search of an early and just solution to the Cyprus problem. Following our experience of this summer and now that a new government has been formed in Turkey, it is, I believe, necessary that the new Turkish government be convinced to agree and work within the spirit of resolution 716 (1991), sponsored by the USA and unanimously adopted by the Security Council. Knowing your personal interest, I am certain that you will exert your influence on the new Turkish government, in order to convince it to move in this direction. Building on what has been already achieved, we could open the way for substantial progress and the convening of an international meeting on Cyprus. With my very best wishes to you and your family for a pleasant and happy Thanksgiving Day, George Vassiliou His Excellency Mr George Bush, President of the USA, The White House, Washington DC

Chapter Five 24 The following passage from an article published on 20 February by Mr Katsampas, then editor-in-chief of Phileleftheros, is indicative of the climate prevailing at the time: ‘With this tactic of silence and inactivity, with our constant display of “adaptability” we can see how the Cyprus issue has degenerated.’ This is how yesterday’s first page article of Simerini – under the heading ‘Defenders of Letsky’ – concludes. Simerini attributes our present plight to the tactics of silence and inactivity. No, gentlemen. The exact opposite is the case. We never remained silent and we never remained inactive. On the contrary we have been most vocal and acted like a superpower. And it is exactly this tactic that we have been following for many years that led us to the present tragedy. In a climate of pseudo-national 291

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 292

From the President’s Office

euphoria there was no chance for a second opinion to be heard, however wrong it may have been. Democracy was absent. And all those who dared articulate a view that was contrary to the official opinion held by the leadership (and we are talking here about all these years since the 50s) secured the stigma of the traitor and some paid a high price for their temerity to disagree even if subsequent developments proved them right. We are not the apologists of Vassiliou’s policy but we are aware of the conditions under which today’s president undertook to govern the country and promote a solution of the Cyprus problem. What facility did he find available when trying to solve the Cyprus problem? What was for him an easy thing to do that in spite of being easy he failed to do? He was called upon to pay the price for the sins of a policy that Simerini supports today: the policy of outbursts and intemperate language that exaggerates our powers and possibilities and has no counterpart in any reality; a policy that downgrades the forces at the disposal of our opponents and operates outside the real world; a policy that has destroyed Cyprus and which, unless we abandon it, will lead us to a full blown catastrophe. 25 In an article on this deplorable act, Mr Sofronis Sofroniou wrote the following in Alitheia, on 27 March 1992: In the first place, this despicable act shows that what we do is not commensurate with the direction or even the general outlook of our goals. Those who think that they can promote our cause by such acts succeed in doing exactly the opposite, unless of course (and this is very probable) foreigners have long stopped taking us altogether seriously. Burning Letsky’s effigy and its inevitable promotion by certain media shows that the perpetrators (and even perhaps their willing advertisers) make a very erroneous assessment of our present situation. First they seem to believe that it is the Americans who are responsible for the lack of progress in our problem. Then they seem to believe that it is the foreigners – and more specifically the Americans – who are under obligation not just to find a solution to our problem but also one that will meet with our full satisfaction. 26 In Washington, I also met Mr Foley, president of the House of Representatives, Mr Mitchell, president of the Republican minority, and the well-known senator Richard Lugar. I also had meetings with the committees on foreign affairs of the House of Representatives and on foreign relations of the Senate. A communiqué of the president’s press office of 1 April 1992 mentions: Both congressman Hamilton and senator Pell as well as all the members of the two Committees agreed fully with the assessments of President Vassiliou concerning the lack of progress on the Cyprus issue and assured the Cypriot delegation that they will actively support the efforts undertaken by the UN and the other interested parties to move forward the Cyprus issue from the dead point that it finds itself now because of the Turkish stance. On Capitol Hill 292

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 293

Notes

there is not the slightest doubt as to who is responsible for the impasse and as to what direction the efforts of all interested parties must take so that progress can be achieved. 27 ‘As I have already been reminding the two leaders in my report of 2 March 1990, in the key paragraph of resolution 367 (1975), the Security Council invited all the interested states and parties to avoid any action that might harm the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as any effort to dismember the island or to bring about its union with any other state. In determining the terms of reference for the Secretary-General in his mission to offer his good offices in Cyprus, the Security Council has thus outlined a solution based on the existence of one state in Cyprus composed of two communities.’ 28 The Baker letter runs as follows: As you know the talks on Cyprus have reached their final stage. The Turkish side has the right to political equality, guarantees, participation in the executive power and its own governance. Against this, the Turkish side must accept the settlement of the territorial issue. It would be useful if both sides acted, in the frame of the talks, with the utmost and best possible flexibility. Mr Denktash has made some statements before his arrival in New York and at his departure. These negative messages have created for us the impression that he does not himself support the solution of the problem. Naturally Mr Denktash has every right to negotiate this issue. In spite of this, however, he cannot constitute an opposing current. He should therefore not be supported in his efforts to thwart a solution of the problem. We hope that due sensitivity will be displayed by your side. 29 Statement by the President of the Security Council, issued on 13 July 1992: The Security Council recalls the oral report presented on 24 June 1992 on the Secretary-General’s mission of good offices in Cyprus. It welcomes the separate meetings which the Secretary-General had with the leaders of the two communities from 18 to 23 June. It notes with satisfaction that the discussions focused on the issues of territorial adjustments and displaced persons and that the other six issues that make up the Set of Ideas on an overall framework agreement were also reviewed, it is unanimous in expressing its full support of the procedure adopted by the Secretary-General for implementing resolution 750 (1992). The Council reaffirms its endorsement of the set of ideas as an appropriate basis for reaching an overall framework agreement as mentioned in paragraph 4 of resolution 750 (1992). The Council notes with satisfaction the acceptance by the leaders of the two communities to resume on 15 July their meetings with the Secretary-General and to remain for such reasonable duration as may be necessary to complete the work. 293

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 294

From the President’s Office

The Council considers that the forthcoming meetings represent a determining phase in the Secretary-General’s effort and calls on both leaders to be ready to take the necessary decisions to reach agreement on each of the issues as dealt with in the set of ideas as an integrated whole on an overall framework agreement. The Council endorses the Secretary-General’s intention to invite the two leaders to a joint meeting as soon as the proximity talks reveal that the two sides are within agreement range on the set of ideas, and, subject to the successful completion of the work at the joint meeting, to convene an international highlevel meeting to conclude the Overall Framework Agreement. The Council calls upon all concerned to fulfil their responsibilities and cooperate fully with the Secretary-General to ensure the success of these meetings. The Council reaffirms its decision to remain seized of the Cyprus question on an on-going and direct basis in support of the effort to complete the set of ideas and to conclude an overall framework agreement. The Council requests that the Secretary-General provide it with an on-going assessment of the progress being made at the meetings beginning on 15 July so as to enable the Council to determine, as the talks unfold, how it might best lend its full and direct support. The Council looks forward to receiving at the conclusion of these meetings a full report from the Secretary-General as requested in operative paragraph 10 of resolution 750 (1992). 30 An interview I gave on Cyprus TV on 13 August clarifies the basic questions raised about the negotiations: [Question:] Mr President how did we end up with the direct talks? Has there really been any progress so that we could move to this stage? [Answer:] Essentially, what convinced the Secretary-General to move on to direct talks was the change, the 180 degrees turn, I would say, of the Turkish side on the refugee issue. As we all know during all these years Mr Denktash promoted the saying: Nobody is to return, we will live separately. He also promoted the well-known position of a zero-based exchange of properties, meaning, to put it simply that whatever exists in the Turkish federated state belongs to the Turkish Cypriots in exchange of the properties that the Turkish Cypriots will lose in the southern part of Cyprus. This meant, in essence, that the Greek Cypriots would lose all the properties they had in the Occupied Territories. The same would apply for the Turkish Cypriots in the free areas. Now Denktash comes and says: I recognise the right of return and the right to property but there are practical difficulties. There is no doubt that Mr Denktash will present a great many practical difficulties and in this sense negotiations will be difficult, if he really means it that he recognises the above two rights. For us, however, the 294

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 295

Notes

recognition of this principle and the abandonment on his part of the slogan about nullifying the properties i.e. of equalising them on a zero basis is of huge importance. Such a claim is unacceptable for us. It is absurd because the GreekCypriot properties within the Turkish-Cypriot federated-state-to-be in a future federation will be more than double the size of the Turkish-Cypriot ones within the Greek-Cypriot federated state. The difference in 1974 prices is even greater. Anyway, this is now for us a basic human rights issue for which we have fought hard. Therefore the fact that at this moment the Turkish side has come to recognise these principles is undoubtedly something important. [Question:] Were you or the UN given the opportunity to confirm the sincerity of the Turkish side concerning this turn in their policy? [Answer:] No. That is exactly why we enter into direct talks. Because they say that they recognise the principle but we must find out what lies behind this. We were given a cheque, if you want, and we must find whether it is genuine or whether it will bounce. [Question:] Over these two days did you discuss with the UN the constitutional aspect? What point have you reached? [Answer:] Reaching a point was never on the cards. We basically presented our views and so did Mr Denktash. But we can say that on this issue too there seems to be a substantial difference between our position and that of Mr Denktash. As you know we have made our historical compromise and have accepted that Cyprus should become a federation. It will thus be a federal state but one that will function as all federations all over the world. Mr Denktash continues to have his own ideas about separate sovereignty, a powerless central government etc. What is important, is the fact that not only were we convincing in displaying our goodwill and our seriousness, but also that what we want to achieve on the basis of the ‘Set of Ideas’ is a federal state that will ensure human rights and basic freedoms for its citizens; a state that will be functional and will have a single international personality. 31 The Times (12 August 1992): While the world’s attention has been focused on the horrors of Yugoslavia, negotiations have quietly been going on at the UN this summer to resolve another bitter ethnic dispute – Cyprus. In over two months of talks, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN SecretaryGeneral, has succeeded in bringing the leaders of the Greek- and TurkishCypriot communities to within sight of agreement on the two key issues that have condemned the divided island to stalemate for 18 years: the amount of territory controlled by each side and the return of refugees forced out of their homes by the last round of fighting in 1974. The prospect of agreement is tantalisingly close. But what is lacking is political will on the Turkish-Cypriot side. 295

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 296

From the President’s Office

Over the years the Greek Cypriots have been pushed into accepting that Cyprus cannot return to a unitary state, but must become a federation of two separate regions; the Turks in the north and the Greeks in the south. But they insist, and the Turkish Cypriots concede, that the Green Line, marking the limit of the Turkish army advance, gives the Turks more land than is merited by their population, about 20 per cent of the island. In years of frustrating negotiations the UN has therefore concentrated on a different map. Raouf Denktash, a wily lawyer who is president of the self-styled Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, unrecognised by all except Turkey, has for years been playing for time. He has no real interest in a settlement that would effectively mean the end of his breakaway republic. But the rest of the world has lost patience with this dispute, which has consumed a vast amount of UN time, including that of the busy Secretary-General, cost millions of pounds in UN peacekeeping forces and poisoned the relations between two NATO allies. And last weekend, after he and George Vassiliou, the Greek-Cypriot president, had spent three weeks in daily indirect negotiations, the question was put to him: would he, or would he not accept the map as the basis for the next stage face-to-face talks on the wider constitutional issues? Mr Denktash fudged. He conceded the other main point generously – the return of the refugees. In practice this is more likely to mean the mutual paying of compensation, as there is too little confidence for either displaced Greeks or Turks to return as minorities to their old homes. But he balks at details of the UN map. However, he is loath to leave New York, sabotaging the negotiations and attracting the strong censure of the permanent five on the Security Council who have been receiving daily briefings on the interminable talks and have plenty else to do. He therefore says he has agreed the territorial issue and will continue talking this week. Mr Denktash is in a weak position. Turkey, his main protector, has bigger fish to fry. Cyprus is an irritant in relations with the West especially the European Community. It is still an inflammatory issue for Turkish public opinion. The pressure must now be brutal, and Ankara must be mobilised in the effort. President Vassiliou faces elections next year, and already his critics say the Turks cannot be trusted: a breakdown in New York would seem to prove them right. The Greek-Cypriot side has moved a long way from its earlier intransigence. A return to entrenched positions would be tragic. Cyprus has become a classic example of a stubborn problem allowed to fester simply because the island is so small and no one is being killed. President Bush called last year for new initiatives. The world wants this squalid quarrel off its back. Neither Mr Denktash nor Mr Vassiliou should be allowed to leave New York until they have shaken hands, face to face, over an agreement to live together in peace. 296

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 297

Notes

32 ‘Boasting is not Justified’ by A. Ziartidis: The decision of the UN Secretary to suspend the talks in New York and to ask for a recess until the 26th of October prompted some to start boasting that their forecasts of failure and of a new deadlock had been justified. Let us see then if their boasts are justified. Neither the president nor anyone among those who supported the acceptance of the invitation by the UN Secretary-General to carry out talks said that they would return with an outline of a solution in their luggage. Therefore any boasts, about the alleged confirmation of such forecasts are out of place while any such ‘confirmation’ of their forecasts will not gain any applause. The Gali map The other thing I want to say is that those who boast about their forecasts having been confirmed did not foresee a number of things that happened during the last 30 days and which are of prime importance. They did not foresee, for instance, that our representatives would return to Nicosia holding a map with only around 28 per cent allocated to the Turkish Cypriots, with Varoshi [sic] under Greek-Cypriot administration, with Morphou under Greek-Cypriot administration and the possibility of some 80,000 refugees being allowed back under Greek-Cypriot administration. They did not foresee this and I must confess that what we see here is a great weakness in their forecasting ability. Some might say: ‘But Denktash did not accept the map.’ True, Denktash rejected it, but the fact that the map is now a document of the UN SecretaryGeneral that has been accepted by the five permanent members of the Security Council, a map which has the support of the Americans and the British and the Russians who followed the talks closely means nothing to them? Would we have such a map if we had listened to some Cassandras and refused to enter into talks? What they did not foresee There are also other things that those boasting of their forecasts having been confirmed did not foresee. They did not foresee a number of letters that were sent to Turkey by the British foreign minister. They did not foresee the letter sent by G. Baker to Cetin. They did not foresee the phone call by Bush to Demirel. These messages did not convey greetings from their senders to the Turkish leaders. Neither did Bush phone in order to be informed about the good health of the Turkish prime minister. The letters and the phone call exerted a certain degree of pressure in connection with our problem. Isn’t this what we have been seeking for years now? Someone might tell me: ‘Yes, but the pressure exerted was not sufficient!’ True it proved insufficient. It is however a precedent which we should not play down. Whether this pressure increases in the future, this will depend on how judicious the handling of our case will be. If, for instance, we tell on 26 October the UN Secretary-General ‘we are not coming, we are not pursuing the matter’ why should pressures on the Turks increase? 297

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

01-Presidents Office_001-298

26/11/09

12:39

Page 298

From the President’s Office

There is also something else that has not been foreseen for 18 years – not to say 30 years – by those who boast of making ‘correct’ forecasts. This is the change of attitude of the press. They did not predict the London Times leader, which is worth more than the patriotic sloganeering during ten consecutive years by some of us here and some over there in Greece. 33 I made the mistake, during a press conference held in the interval between the first and the second Sunday, of answering a question by a reporter as to what I would have done if I was in Mr Clerides’ position by saying that ‘I would have withdrawn’.

298

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 299

Appendices

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 300

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 301

appendix one Speech by Ambassador E. Lagakos in Athens on 10 November 1988

As of March 1966 and until a few months ago, the Cyprus issue was in a dangerous impasse that favoured one-sided actions as happened in 1983 with the unilateral declaration of independence of the so-called Turkish-Cypriot statelet after the failure of the ‘Indices’ of De Cuéllar. It was obvious that diplomatic immobility entailed the danger that third countries might be encouraged to recognise this statelet, something that would mean the definitive partition of the Cyprus territory. These dangers were diagnosed by President Vassiliou who, as soon as he was elected, moved decisively to break the deadlock something which he finally achieved with the new proposals by the Secretary-General. According to these proposals the two sides were called upon to start talks without any provisos or preconditions at the level of the leaders of the two communities. This meant, among other things, the sidelining of the 1986 Plan from which the Turkish-Cypriot leadership had not budged for nearly two years. These proposals – which he had himself elicited as it happens – Mr Vassiliou has accepted, with the approval of the two largest Cypriot parties i.e. the Democratic Rally of Mr Glafkos Clerides and AKEL. The line of the Cypriot president was also supported by all the political parties in Greece. At this point I would like to point out a probably unique phenomenon in the history of the Cyprus issue, namely that all the Greek political leaders agreed on a given line and adopted the terms in which our national issue is defined today. This consensus of all the parties in Greece is certainly a welcome and positive development that we all hope will continue. The achievement of this unanimity was greatly helped by the personality of Mr Vassiliou and also by the fact that the main opposition party in Greece did not judge it right to seek any partisan gains by exploiting our national issue at this critical juncture. This stance must be assessed in conjunction with the fact that the Cyprus president belongs to a different part of the political spectrum. 301

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 302

From The President’s Office

All these good and pleasant things do not mean, unfortunately, that we are now moving steadily ahead towards a reasonable solution of the Cyprus problem. The difficulties still remain as they were and that is why only a very restrained optimism could be somewhat justified. These difficulties, except for the Turkish greed that always existed, emerged after the Turkish invasion and consist mainly in the two partitions, the one regarding population and the territorial one, that were imposed by the occupying army. These arbitrary partitions have obviously changed radically the substance of the problem and the procedure of the negotiations. Today, as during the last fifteen years, negotiating with the Turkish Cypriots and with Ankara that stands behind them is carried out on very unequal terms to begin with. The presence of the Turkish army and the two partitions constitute decisive factors leading to a loose, bi-zonal Federation if not to the consolidation of two separate states. In spite of this, the effort undertaken at present by president Vassiliou was, we believe, necessary not just in order to by-pass the 1986 De Cuéllar document but in order to try and see once again whether an agreement is possible with reasonable guarantees for the security of both communities and with a constitution that will not contain, right from the start, the seeds of its own destruction. This attempt is supported by the large majority of Greek Cypriots obviously because they do not believe in the fatalistic adage that ‘as time goes by, we will get back what is ours’. Anyway, we do not believe that the effort that is being undertaken now in Nicosia will harm the Greek-Cypriot side provided, of course, that it will not end up in a new De Cuéllar document similar to the previous ones. If one studies carefully and objectively all the phases that the Cyprus issue has gone through during the period 1950–1974 one will reach the conclusion that we on the Greek and the Greek-Cypriot side have both made mistakes, big and small. I do not think that for every calamity that befalls us we must search for the ‘foreign finger’. Not only foreigners are to blame for the course that the Cyprus issue has taken. We are to blame as well. So let us examine, but without blaming each other, what we did wrong and which were our weaknesses. We should follow the counsel of the great Greek historian Constantinos Paparrigopoulos who wrote that: ‘For as long as we keep asserting that all the others are to blame and that only we are sinless, it is difficult for us to stop sinning’. Looking back we have to acknowledge the continuous and uninterrupted downward course of the Cyprus issue. The struggle for ‘Enosis’ ends up in the Independence of 1960. The phase of the independence ends up in the, however small, de facto partition of 1963–64. This partitioned state with the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves ends up in the Turkish invasion that creates an incomparably wider and worse partition. I believe that at the heart of the problem, is the way that the Greek people responded when taken by surprise by the naked and undisguised cynicism of friends and foes, just a few years after the last world war. The declarations of our allies were 302

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 303

Appendix One

still fresh in the memory of Hellenism. The principles of freedom, independence and democracy had inspired Greeks during the dark years of the war and the occupation. We then believed that after the victory, the colonial regimes would be readily disbanded. It was to be expected that Greeks would react with uncontrolled anger and passion when the efforts of the Greek governments stumbled on the arrogant and less than generous attitude by London. The streets and the stadiums were then filled by demonstrators who demanded our immediate recourse to the UN. The prestige of that international body was as yet intact and we Greeks believed, with romantic naivety that its decisions were not only impartial but also respected by all, great and small. Our Church leaders, Makarios in Nicosia and Archbishop Spyridon in Athens, as well as professors, students and workers all put continuous pressure on the government to disregard the powers-that-be and move on to open struggle using all means. Our political leaders were not able to contain this great pressure by public opinion due to the wrath of our people against the injustice done by the Powers and channel it towards a sober assessment of the capabilities of the nation. Patriotic passion was so heightened at the time, that many were those who were scared of being blamed as selling out the national issue and thus commit political suicide. However, not only were unrealistic assessments responsible for leading the Cyprus issue downhill. There were the disagreements, open or unmentionable, regarding the aims of the struggle and the necessary operations during its various phases. Time at our disposal does not allow us to analyse all the special cases of lack of understanding and coordination between the two centres. Nor does it allow us to mention all the cases of initiatives taken by surprise by one or the other without prior consultation or even worse serious action taken in spite of the explicit opposition of one of the two sides. We will thus necessarily restrict ourselves to only some of the more important and damaging cases. One of those was the case of the 13 points presented by Makarios in November 1963 by means of which the Cypriot Ethnarch raised the issue of revising the Zürich constitution. The Greek government had radically opposed this action that proved immediately to have been taken untimely and be plainly wrong. Many months before, Constantine Karamanlis had even sent a message to Makarios that: ‘The Cyprus problem will sooner or later be resolved and Cyprus will unite with Greece. However, everything depends on good handling and timely action. For the time being the international conditions are as yet unfavourable’. Also Mr Evangelos Averof, the Foreign Minister had written in April 1963 to the Cypriot Ethnarch, the following: ‘It is our firm decision to help you but also to differentiate publicly our line if there is a move to abolish unilaterally the Agreements or parts of them.’ At the same time, Ankara threatened that any attempt to revise the Treaties would meet with its immediate response. The results of the 13 points are well-known: Bloody conflicts between elements of the two co-existing communities during Christmas 1963, intervention by the 303

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 304

From The President’s Office

Turkish military contingent and finally the de facto partition with the creation of the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves. We left for the end the examination of the period 1967–74 because it bears no resemblance to any previous one. Whatever horrible and improbable things happened then are still fresh in our memory. The hatred, the fanaticism and the political animosity reached their highest point and led to murders, beatings, abductions and other terrorist acts that became almost daily events in Cyprus. The camp of Grivas and the three bishops accused Makarios of being against ‘Enosis’ and a traitor because he followed the so-called policy of the ‘achievable’ in negotiating with the Turkish Cypriots a solution based on the independence of Cyprus. The military government of Athens while on the one hand proclaiming that ‘Enosis’ was not possible and pressing to an intolerable degree the Cyprus government to make concessions to the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand supported and assisted the ‘Enosis’ camp and its terrorist activities. This contradictory, fickle and two-faced policy of the dictatorial regime could not but lead, with the fatality of outcome in an ancient Greek tragedy, to a national disaster. This was the coup of 15 July 1974, the Turkish invasion and a few days later to the two partitions that followed. This brief historical flashback is, I think, very useful: First because it points to the basic causes that led, finally, to the very unfavourable situation of today; second because it brings back to our memory the unacceptable situations and the painful events that must never be repeated in the future. From this flashback we reached a number of conclusions of which some, such as the following, are especially important: It is necessary for us to assess with cold objectivity all the parameters of our national issues before taking decisions. It is necessary to weigh the probable effects of every move that may have decisive consequences. It is necessary and our imperative duty to try and avoid, at least in dealing with our national problems, even the slightest personal or partisan prejudice in shaping and crystallising our views and positions. It is necessary for us not to rush into serious acts and important decisions in an impulsive manner. The haste, during the first years of the struggle, for ‘Enosis’ to be achieved ‘within a fixed and plausible time-limit’ harmed our national issue. So did the rush to alter the Agreements in 1963. It is also necessary for the two centres in charge of the struggle to avoid initiatives, as happened many times, without first a sincere and thorough consultation between themselves. It is always necessary for the two governments in Athens and Nicosia, to keep in mind that their decisions may seriously affect Hellenism as a whole and not just one or other of its parts. Its is also necessary not to take decisions, as in the case of the internationalisation of the Cyprus issue in 1954, as a result of pressures that are not strictly controlled 304

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 305

Appendix One

by the discipline of logic. The flashback showed something else as well: Under what a heavy, and difficult to bear, weight of past sins on his shoulders the president strives today to find some kind of outlet for our national issue. It is at least a consolation that the agonising effort of the Cypriot leadership is today supported by all the Greek political parties.

305

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 306

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 307

appendix two Outline Proposals for the Establishment of a Federal Republic and for the Solution of the Cyprus Problem Contents I

II III IV V VI

VII

General Approach 1. Evaluation of the two communities’ concerns 2. Objectives of the current proposals Demilitarization and Security The Protection of Human Rights Including ‘The Three Freedoms’ Guarantees The Territorial Aspect Constitutional Arrangements 1. General 2. The provinces 3. The federal executive 4. The federal legislature 5. Powers and functions of the federal organs and of the provinces 6. The federal judiciary Economic Issues

I General Approach Convinced that agreement on a just and viable solution, of the Cyprus problem is of the uttermost urgency and that the suffering and uncertainty of the people of Cyprus must not be prolonged, the Greek-Cypriot side is submitting outline proposals for the solution of the Cyprus problem. The Greek-Cypriot side’s proposals for the establishment of a Federal Republic and for a solution to the Cyprus problem are in accord with the UN Charter and 307

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 308

From The President’s Office

the UN Resolutions and Decisions on Cyprus. They are also within the scope of the High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 to which the two sides reaffirmed their commitment at the beginning of the negotiations on 24 August 1988. The proposals conform fully to the spirit of the new round of Talks and take into account the interests and concerns of both sides, as was undertaken at the meeting with the Secretary-General of the UN in New York on 22 and 23 November 1988.

1. Evaluation of the Two Communities’ Concerns In presenting these Proposals the Greek-Cypriot side has taken into account the concerns expressed during the first round of the Talks. (a) Turkish-Cypriot concerns (i) Community concerns: Desire to preserve Community identity and Community cultural traditions and to secure Community self-government in view of the fact that Turkish Cypriots compose one-fifth of the population of Cyprus and Greek Cypriots four-fifths. (ii) Security concerns: Turkish Cypriots express fears of attempts at domination either by the federal governmental power or by the Greek-Cypriot Province or Community. These fears include an alleged danger of erosion of their political power. (b) Greek Cypriot concerns (i) Community concerns: The Greek-Cypriot Community fears that the Greek-Cypriot refugees will be prevented from returning to their homes and properties and that, due to the colonization of northern Cyprus by settlers from Turkey, the Greek Cypriots will be gradually squeezed out of Cyprus. (ii) Security concerns: These concerns arise from the invasion and occupation of 37 per cent of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and the expulsion from their homes and properties of 40 per cent of the Greek-Cypriot population. There is also the added fear that one day Turkey, with its overwhelming military superiority and rapidly increasing population of 55 million, will use northern Cyprus as a springboard for further expansionism. In this connection Greek Cypriots fear that power exercisable by Turkish Cypriots under the Federal constitution may be used to frustrate the functioning of the State and that the resultant impasse will provide a pretext for a further invasion by Turkey at a tactically convenient time.

308

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 309

Appendix Two

2. Objectives of the Current Proposals The proposals of the Greek-Cypriot side aim to further the attempt to reach by 1 June 1989, a negotiated settlement of all aspects of the Cyprus problem, while conforming to the agreed basis of the negotiations, and taking into account the interests and concerns of both sides and so to achieve the following: (a) The unity of the country, so that all Cypriots can live and cooperate together in peace in an independent State. (b) A working federal system based on equitable territorial arrangements, capable of functioning effectively so that the interests of all can be nurtured and progress for all can be facilitated, thus giving confidence to both sides and generating loyalty to the institutions of the State. (c) Security for both Communities in the context of a demilitarized Federal Republic so that all citizens can have trust in the future and know that their persons property and all other rights are safe. (d) Implementation of bi-communality, with both Communities participating in all the constitutional organs of the federal republic. (e) Individual equality of all Cypriots, an absence of discrimination in all spheres, and protection of human rights throughout Cyprus, as a democratic country. (f ) Preservation of the identity of Cyprus, its demographic structure, and of the culture and the traditions of each Community. (g) Fostering economic development with particular emphasis on redressing regional imbalances. (h) The aim of the solution would be to establish an independent, sovereign, territorially integral, non-aligned Federal Republic which aims at promoting world peace and cooperation among the peoples of the world, peace and stability in the region and at friendly relations and cooperation with all its neighbours.

II Demilitarisation and Security 1. The Greek-Cypriot side believes that the way to remove both external and internal threats is the complete demilitarization of the Republic. This involves: (a) withdrawal from the territory of the Republic of all non-Cypriot military forces and elements including settlers; and (b) the complete disbanding of all Cypriot military forces. 2. A time-table for the demilitarization of the Republic and the withdrawal of the settlers must be drawn up and implemented before the establishment of the Federal government or any transitional arrangement. To enhance the feeling of 309

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 310

From The President’s Office

security of both Communities, international supervision of demilitarization should be provided for. 3. Provision should be made for a UN-controlled international force to assist in the maintenance of internal security both on the Federal and on the Provincial level for as long as necessary. The risks of physical conflict will be dissipated if there is demilitarization, with no military forces in Cyprus other than UN personnel. 4. The Greek-Cypriot side is particularly concerned about the withdrawal of Turkish settlers, whose presence is altering the demographic structure of the country, and who present a security risk for the whole island.

III The Protection of Human Rights, Including ‘The Three Freedoms’ It is essential to ensure that all citizens should, without discrimination of any kind, have equal civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and, also, that all should have equal opportunities to share in the benefits of progress and development. In the Federal Republic, and throughout its territory, the fundamental rights and liberties safeguarded by Part II of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus of 1960, by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols, and by the UN International Covenants on Human Rights shall continue to apply, including freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and the right to property. The freedoms of movement and settlement and the right to property were accepted by both sides in Guideline 3 of the Makarios–Denktash high-level agreement, which was reaffirmed in the Kyprianou–Denktash Agreement and should be enshrined in the Federal Constitution. Any regulation that is deemed necessary should be by Federal Law. The Greek-Cypriot side of course accepts that there is a question of ‘practical difficulties’ to be taken into account in the initial implementation of the three freedoms. The Greek-Cypriot side is ready to discuss various options in meeting the practical difficulties but whatever the arrangements made they must not be such as to frustrate or negate the principles involved, either overtly, indirectly or in spirit.

IV Guarantees 1. The Federal Republic of Cyprus, as a Sovereign Independent State and Member of the UN Organisation, can only have guarantees which will be in accordance with the Charter of the UN. 310

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 311

Appendix Two

2. Any guarantees given should be multilateral. In the view of the Greek-Cypriot side the best guarantee would be one by the Security Council. 3. No guarantor should have unilateral rights of intervention. 4. The scope of any guarantees should be the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and constitutional order of the Federal Republic. 5. The guarantees should continue in force for as long as either community considers necessary their continuation.

V The Territorial Aspect The Greek-Cypriot side is convinced that a proper investigation of the territorial issue is vital to reaching overall agreement. Should agreement be forthcoming on this, it will facilitate agreement on many other issues. This view was brought out in the Secretary-General's Territorial Guidelines attached to the 18 November 1981 Evaluation and was emphasized in his Vienna Working Points of 6 August 1984. The greater the number of Greek Cypriot refugees who can be resettled in their homes under Greek Cypriot administration, the less the extent of any practical difficulties to be overcome as a consequence of Greek Cypriot refugees resettling in the Turkish-Cypriot Province. There is one other aspect of the territorial issue which requires immediate consideration. It is the question of resettlement of Varosha, which was made a priority issue by Point 5 of the 19 May 1979 high-level agreement and was reiterated in Security Council Resolution 550 (1984). That Agreement was reaffirmed at the inception of the current Talks.

VI Constitutional Arrangements The constitutional package of political, social and economic arrangements considered to be most suitable for meeting the interests and concerns of both communities is the following

1. General (a) The Republic will be federally organised, with substantial powers being reserved to the constituent Provinces, including the welfare of their inhabitants, ensuring that matters of religion, personal status, education and culture will be matters for each Community. (b) The Federal Constitution will be the Supreme Law of the Republic and will only be amended with the concurrence of both Communities. (c) The Federal Republic of Cyprus will be composed of two regions, hereinafter called Provinces. 311

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 312

From The President’s Office

(d) A significant characteristic of the Federation will be that at the Federal level there will be equitable bicommunal participation in all governmental organs, legislative, executive, administrative and judicial. (e) The Greek-Cypriot side proposes a composition of and representation in the organs which, while assuring adequate and effective participation, also permits the machinery of government to continue operating and not to be paralysed in the event of disagreement between Community political representatives. (f ) Effective deadlock-resolving machinery must be provided for. (g) In all symbolic and cultural aspects of concern to the Federal Republic of Cyprus (such as determination of the flag, the anthem, and national holidays) there will be equal say by the two Communities, with each Community's traditions and culture being respected. (h) The Federal Republic will have two official languages: Greek and Turkish. (i) There will be a constitutional prohibition of the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other country or of separatist independence or secession.

2. The provinces (a) Each Community will administer a Province, which will have equal status visa-vis the other Province. The two component parts of the Federation, that is, the two Provincial governments, will be equal to each other and co-ordinate with the Federal government. (b) The territorial arrangements of the Federal Republic should be equitably drawn, in a way which would enable a considerable proportion of Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their homes under Greek Cypriot administration. In such a case, provided that most Turkish Cypriots choose to reside in the Turkish-Cypriot administered Province, the Turkish Cypriots will constitute a majority there, even if all Greek Cypriot refugees were to return to that Province. (c) The powers and functions constitutionally allocated to Federal and Provincial governments respectively will be such that Provincial governments will have extensive legislative, administrative and judicial competence to provide for the development of the Province, the welfare of the Province's population, its education, and the preservation of its culture. (d) There will be no possibility of Federal encroachment on the powers and functions of the Provinces. The latter will be constitutionally entrenched, the initial allocation having been agreed by the two sides. (e) Matters may be entrusted to the Provinces by Federal Law, though not expressly enumerated in the Provincial Powers. Consideration could also be given to having a Concurrent List of powers to be exercised in accordance with arrangements to be agreed.

312

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 313

Appendix Two

3. The federal executive (a) President and Vice-President: (i) There will be a President and Vice-President, one of whom will be a Greek Cypriot and the other a Turkish Cypriot. (ii) On the manner of the election of the President and the Vice-President, the Greek-Cypriot side is willing to consider two options: Option A The President will be elected by voters of the Greek Cypriot Community and the Vice-President by voters of the Turkish-Cypriot Community. Option B The President will be elected by universal suffrage on a common roll and by an absolute majority of votes. Any citizen of the Republic can be a candidate for election. If the elected President is a Greek Cypriot, the Vice-Presidential candidates will all be Turkish-Cypriot. Greek Cypriots will vote in the election of the vice-president, the Greek Cypriot votes however being weighted so that they form the same percentage of the total vote as the Turkish-Cypriot voters in the election of the President. Though it cannot be foreseen that voters will vote independently of Community membership at the beginning, this cross-voting across Community lines will ensure that any Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate must seriously take into account both Communities’ interests and concerns. In the future, it is hoped that the President will be elected independently of Community membership, so that nothing will bar a Turkish-Cypriot from becoming President of the Republic. (iii)The Vice-President will replace the President in case of the latter’s absence or incapacity. (iv) The Vice-president will be vested with powers and functions which will be commonly agreed. (v) The President and the Vice-president would in effect have co-extensive power in designating the members of their Community who will hold high executive office or in promulgating jointly laws and decisions. (b) Council of Ministers: (i) The Council of Ministers will be composed of the President, the VicePresident and 10 Ministers, 7 of whom will be Greek Cypriots and 3 Turkish Cypriots. The President and Vice-President will each select the Ministers of his own Community but the instrument of appointment for all Ministers will be signed by both. (ii) An important Ministry will be allocated to a Turkish-Cypriot. (iii)The President and the Vice-president, by using the powers of recourse and reference to an impartial Federal Supreme Court in which the judicial power 313

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 314

From The President’s Office

is Go-equally exercised in all federal matters and constitutional cases, will ensure that there is no discrimination against either Community and no unconstitutional action.

4. The federal legislature (a) There will be a bi-cameral Federal Legislature. (b) The Lower House will reflect in its composition the equality of citizens and will legislate on all Federal matters. (c) The Upper House will reflect in its composition the equal Status of the Provinces, and will have competence in major Federal matters. (d) Should deadlock arise between the two Houses there will be machinery to ensure continued functioning of the government. (e) The Greek-Cypriot side is ready to consider appropriate mechanisms to ensure that no significant measure affecting particularly the Turkish-Cypriot Community can be passed without Turkish-Cypriot Parliamentary support. (f ) Reinforced majorities ensuring the assent of legislators of both Communities would be provided for Constitutional amendment.

5. Powers and functions of the federal organs and of the provinces The Greek-Cypriot side considers that the Powers and Functions of the Federal Organs should secure the unity of the country, promote cooperation throughout the Republic, maintain the single international personality of the Republic, promote the unity of the internal market and the economy of Cyprus and in general contribute to the harmonization of Federal and Provincial organs, measures and Laws. In the Greek-Cypriot side’s view the Provinces should have such Powers and Functions as to enhance the feeling of security of the citizens, providing for Provincial justice and policing, secure the development of the Province, safeguard the traditions and provide for the cultural development of the inhabitants of the Province and promote cooperation with the other Province and with the Federal government. For the specific allocation of Powers and Functions the Greek-Cypriot side is willing to consider two options: Option A – There could be two Lists of Powers and Functions, one Federal and one Provincial, with detailed definition. Should there be litigation as to whether a topic was within competence, the Federal Supreme Court would be instructed by the Constitution to settle the matter by applying a rule of interpretation that disputed functions are vested in the governmental level whose Listed Powers are ejusdem generis. Option B – Consideration could be given to according concurrent power to the Federal and Provincial governments. In this case there would be three Lists of Powers and Functions: The Federal List, The Provincial List and the Concurrent List.

314

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 315

Appendix Two

6. Federal judiciary (a) In all constitutional cases and when deciding any federal matter the Federal Supreme Court will be equally composed on a bicommunal basis. (b) Each Province will have its own administration of justice system. The Communities would therefore have equal participation in the sphere of administration of justice.

VII Economic Issues A solution to the Cyprus problem will result in an increase in welfare for the entire Island’s population, and will be especially advantageous to the Turkish Cypriots. The present artificial division of the economy into two has negative effects on the economy of the whole Island, but these have been more pronounced on the smaller and economically weaker Turkish-Cypriot Community. As a result of this artificial division, the level of prosperity of the Turkish Cypriots is substantially lower than that of the Greek Cypriots and the gap is growing. A contributing factor to the economic problems of the Turkish Cypriots has been their integration with the Turkish economy, with the subsequent ‘importation’ of the problems that characterize that economy (high inflation rates, constant devaluation and distortions) to the detriment of the Turkish Cypriots. In addition to facilitating economic equalization, the resolution of the Cyprus problem will release resources presently obstructed by the artificial divide, and will enable Cyprus to develop its full economic potential. The increase in confidence will intensify economic activity and greatly boost investment, trade, tourism and the economy in general. 1. The Greek-Cypriot side proposes that the prospects for equalization and development that will be created by the integration of the economy should be reinforced by overt government action at federal and provincial level, guided by the following objectives: (a) The establishment of conditions allowing all Cypriots to have equal opportunities for economic attainment and prosperity. (b) The promotion of economic development for the purpose of reducing disparities in opportunities and in welfare. (c) The provision of adequate public and social services to all citizens. 2. To attain the overall objective that everyone should have equal opportunity to share in the overall prosperity that will follow a solution to the Cyprus problem, the Greek-Cypriot side proposes the following: (a) There will be a clear separation of economic powers between the central and the provincial governments. 315

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 316

From The President’s Office

(b) The provincial governments will have adequate resources and powers for the promotion of the welfare and further development of their province. (c) Machinery will be established, through the creation of a central development fund, for ensuring balanced development of all areas of Cyprus and equal opportunities for all Cypriots. (d) There will be one currency managed by the Central Bank. (e) The Provincial governments will have adequate tax revenues. (f ) The imposition of Customs duties will be the exclusive responsibility of the Federal government. (g) The commercial interests and rights of Turkish-Cypriot businessmen will be adequately taken into account. (h) A reintegrated growing economy will make the creative solution of the problem of Turkish-Cypriot and Greek Cypriot unemployed university graduates easier through the growth potential that can be realized by a reintegrated economy. (i) Transitional economic arrangements, to apply after the establishment of a Federal Republic will be discussed with a view to facilitating the reintegration of the economy. 3. Cyprus is an associate member of the EEC, and has entered into a Customs Union as part of the second phase of the Association Agreement, and will increasingly develop closer links with the EEC. This could have beneficial effects on the welfare of all Cypriots and help in promoting balanced regional development. The Federal government should have responsibility for the common external EEC tariff, but resources should be equitably distributed. Nicosia, 30 January 1989

316

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 317

appendix three Exchange of Letters between the Prime ˝ Ministers Messrs A. Papandreou and T. Ozal

Letter by Andreas Papandreou to the Prime Minister of Turkey Mr Őzal: Prime Minister of Greece Athens, 4 April 1989 Mr Turgut Őzal, Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic Ankara Dear Prime Minister I deem it necessary to write to you on the eve of the meeting between the President of the Republic of Cyprus Mr G. Vassiliou and the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mr R. Denktash that will take place in New York in the presence of the Secretary-General of the UN Mr De Cuéllar. I fully understand that you share our deep interest in a fair and viable solution of the long-standing Cyprus problem in view of the time limit set by the SecretaryGeneral Mr De Cuéllar for its solution. As you may recall, Mr Prime Minister, during our talks in Davos and in Brussels as well as in Athens, we had both expressed our common belief that a solution of the Cyprus problem would have a positive impact not only on the Greek-Turkish relations but also on our wider area. In this frame I am sorry to have to point out that the stance and the positions that Mr Denktash has so far adopted are less than encouraging for all those who follow closely the present dialogue taking place in Cyprus. Certain statements to that effect, made by Mr Denktash when he was leaving for New York, confirmed his increasingly intransigent attitude. I trust you will use all the means at your disposal so as to avert a possible impasse in New York, which is certain to endanger the course of the dialogue. I feel certain – and 317

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 318

From The President’s Office

I express the feelings of the Greek government and the Greek political leadership in this – that you will give the above thoughts that I presented to you, your immediate and careful consideration. Yours truly Andreas G. Papandreou Letter by the Turkish prime minister, Turgut Őzal to Mr A. Papandreou: Ankara, 7 April 1989 Dear Prime Minister I would like to make the following remarks in answer to your letter dated 7 April 1989 with regard to the meeting that the Secretary-General of the UN will have these days with the leaders of the two sides in Cyprus in order to assess the course of the intercommunal talks. Turkey has supported, actively and sincerely, right from the beginning the efforts by the Secretary-General of the UN to help, within the purview of his good offices mission, the two sides in Cyprus to reach a negotiated settlement of this twenty-six year old intercommunal conflict. This persistent and constructive policy by Turkey remains unchanged. We continue to support the creation of a Bi-communal and Bi-zonal Federation based on the political equality of the two sides and the efforts that are being done in good faith in this direction. We have urged in the past the Turkish-Cypriot side – whose legitimate security concerns we fully understand – to be conciliatory within this framework. You can rest assured, Mr Prime Minister that I will continue to encourage president Denktash to maintain his positive, forward-looking, attitude until the proposed target-date by the Secretary-General of the UN and beyond that. I am certain that you will agree with me that first and foremost it is up to the two communities in Cyprus to reach an agreement. I am, however, sorry to say that we have not seen so far the well-meaning attitude that should be expected from the Greek Cypriots. In this sense, I would hope that you too would judge it worthwhile to use your influence on Mr Vassiliou. In conclusion I would like to repeat my sincere conviction that the progress, which I hope we will be able to make in the framework of the Davos procedure, will contribute positively to the climate of the intercommunal talks in Cyprus. Yours truly Turgut Őzal His Excellency Andreas Papandreou Prime Minister of Greece Athens 318

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 319

appendix four De Cuellar’s Set of Ideas – Food for Thought

United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General 25 July 1989 Excellency, On behalf of the Secretary-General, I am pleased to write to you and Mr Denktash concerning the round of talks that is about to begin. In line with the outcome of the 29 June meeting, the goal is for you and Mr Denktash to agree on an outline of an overall agreement on Cyprus in time for your next meeting with the Secretary-General. During our talks in May and early June, ideas were discussed on a non-committal basis with both leaders. They address each of the issues that must be resolved as an integrated whole if a solution of the Cyprus problem is to be found. The set of ideas which the Secretary-General summarized in his opening statement of 29 June and which I am pleased to send you herewith has as its purpose to facilitate the direct talks that will now begin. They are not presented as a formal proposal nor, of course, on a take it or leave it basis. Rather, these ideas are offered to help your task by providing food for thought and structure to your discussions. I and Mr Feissel look forward to assisting you in the completion of this phase of your work. In line with our discussion of yesterday, I propose that our next meeting take place at my residence on Monday, 31 July at 10.00 a.m. As the Secretary-General has stressed on several occasions, it is important that we proceed on a strictly confidential basis. With kind personal regards, Oscar Camilion

319

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 320

From The President’s Office

His Excellency Mr George Vassiliou President of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia

Set of Ideas Overall objectives The overall agreement to be negotiated as an integrated whole by the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities and approved by both communities in separate referenda will establish a federal republic that is bicommunal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects. The overall agreement will be based on the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements and the guiding principles set out below, and will: • safeguard the independence, territorial integrity, unity, bi-communality, bi-zonality, security, and non-alignment of the federal republic of Cyprus; • safeguard the identity, integrity and security of each community; and • safeguard all human rights, including political, economic, social and cultural rights.

Guiding principles Federalism The federal republic will be composed of two politically equal federated states. The two federated states will have identical powers and functions. Security and the administration of justice in its territory will be the responsibility of each federated state. Unity The federal republic will be one territory comprised of two federated states. It will have one international personality and sovereignty. The federal republic will have one citizenship. All citizens will be equal under the law. The union in whole or in part of the federal republic with any other country or secession will be prohibited. Such attempts will be a federal criminal offence punishable by law. 320

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 321

Appendix Four

The structure and arrangements of the federal government will be such as to ensure its effective and harmonious functioning.

Bi-communality The federal republic will be established by the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. The federal constitution will come into force after its approval by the two communities in separate referenda and can only be amended with the similar approval of both communities. The federal structure and arrangements will be such as to ensure the effective participation of both communities in all organs of the federal government.

Bi-zonality Each federated state will be administered by one community. The people of that community will have a clear majority of the population and of the land ownership in that federated state. The federal government cannot encroach upon the powers and functions of the two federated states.

Constitutional aspects of the federation a) Powers and functions to be vested in the federal government The federal government will have the powers and functions listed below. All matters not placed under the jurisdiction of the federal government will be under the jurisdiction of the two federated states. They may decide jointly to confer additional powers and functions to the federal government. Each federated state will decide on its own governmental arrangements. The federal government will have the following powers and functions: • foreign affairs (The federated states may enter into agreements with foreign governments in their areas of competence in a manner consistent with the federal constitution and the policies of the federal government.) • monetary affairs and central bank • international trade and customs • federal budget and federal taxation • immigration and citizenship • national defence • federal judiciary and federal police 321

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 322

From The President’s Office

• • • • • •

international ports and airports postal and telecommunications services patents and trademarks appointment of federal officials and civil servants establishment of a Cypriot university set standards for public health, environment, use and preservation of natural resources, weights and measures, and transportation • provide co-ordination for tourism and industrial policy

b) Structure, composition and functioning of the federal government (i) The legislature The legislature will be composed of a lower house and an upper house. The presidents of the lower house and of the upper house cannot come from the same community. All laws must be approved by both houses. The lower house will have a 70:30 Greek-Cypriot/Turkish-Cypriot representation. The upper house will have a 50:50 representation from the two federated states. All laws will be adopted by majority in each house. Separate Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot majorities will be required to constitute a quorum in each house. A majority of the Greek-Cypriot or Turkish-Cypriot representatives in the lower house may decide, on matters they consider to be of vital interest to their community, that the adoption of a law in the lower house will require separate majorities of the representatives of both communities. It is understood that this right will be exercised in a reasonable manner. Measures will be devised to enable the two houses, if they fail to adopt a concurrent bill, to initiate consentience proceedings, while ensuring the continued functioning of the federal government. (ii) The executive The executive will consist of a president and a vice-president. The president and vice-president cannot come from the same community. The president will be elected by universal suffrage. The vice-president will be elected by separate rolls. The president and the vice-president will jointly appoint a council of ministers composed of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on a 7:3 ratio. One of the following three ministries, that is foreign affairs, finance and defence, will be allocated to a Turkish-Cypriot minister. These three positions will rotate among members of the two communities. During the first term of the first president, the foreign minister will not come from the same community as the president. The president and the vice-president will discuss the preparation of the agenda of the council of ministers and each can include items in the agenda. 322

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 323

Appendix Four

Decisions of the council of ministers concerning foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship will be taken by weighted voting. The conduct and implementation of foreign policy will be a matter of special agreement. The president and the vice-president will, separately or conjointly, have the right to veto any law or decision of the legislature and the Council of Ministers concerning foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship. The president and vice-president will have the right, separately or conjointly, to return any law or decision of the legislature or any decision of the council of ministers for reconsideration. (iii) The judiciary The federal judiciary will consist of a supreme court composed of an equal number of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot judges appointed jointly by the president and vice-president with the consent of the upper house. The supreme court will be the highest court of the federation and will be the ultimate resort for deciding on the constitutionality of measures adopted by the federal and federated states’ governments. Lower federal courts will be established in each federated state. Each federated state will have its own judiciary to deal with matters not attributed to the federal judiciary. c) Three freedoms The freedom of movement and of settlement and the right to property will be recognized in the federal constitution. The implementation of these rights will take into account the high-level agreement of 1977 and the guiding principles set out above. The federated states will regulate these rights in a manner to be agreed upon consistent with the federal constitution. Persons who are known to have been actively involved in acts of violence against persons of the other community may, subject to due process of law, be prevented from going to the federated state administered by the other community. The arrangements set out below for the implementation of these rights assume the satisfactory solution of the displaced persons question. The freedom of movement will be exercised without any restrictions as soon as the federal republic is established, subject only to non-discriminatory normal police functions. This will include the right to be employed throughout the federal republic. The right of settlement and of property will be implemented taking into account the ceilings to be agreed upon concerning the number of persons from one community who may reside in the area administered by the other and the amount of property which persons of one community may own in the federated state administered by the other. In the first instance, the displaced persons will be given the opportunity to exercise these rights in accordance with the relevant agreed arrangements. Others may do so after the arrangements concerning the displaced persons have been completed. The president and vice-president will review jointly at agreed intervals the ceilings mentioned above. 323

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 324

From The President’s Office

Security The security of the federal republic and of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities will be safeguarded. The demilitarization of the federal republic of Cyprus remains an objective. A numerical balance of Greek and Greek Cypriot troops and equipment on the one hand and of Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot troops and equipment on the other hand, will be achieved by the beginning of the transitional arrangements. The overall agreement will include a timetable for the further reduction to an agreed level of the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot units and for the withdrawal of all non-Cypriot forces not provided for under the Treaty of Alliance. This timetable will be fully implemented prior to the establishment of the federal republic. As long as the Greek and Turkish contingents provided for under the Treaty of Alliance are stationed in Cyprus, the federal republic will maintain a federal force consisting of a Greek-Cypriot and a Turkish-Cypriot unit of equal size, under the joint overall command of the president and the vice-president. The UN Security Council will be requested by the interested parties to consider the future role of UNFICYP, including the supervision of the reduction of GreekCypriot and Turkish-Cypriot forces to the agreed level as well as the withdrawal of the non-Cypriot forces within the agreed timetable and the adherence by all concerned to the relevant parts of the agreement. Each federated state and the federal republic will have a police force. All paramilitary activities and the ownership of weapons other than those licensed for hunting will be outlawed throughout the federal republic and any infraction will be a federal offence. The importation or transit of weapons and other military equipment other than that duly approved by the federal government will be prohibited. Matters related to the demographic structure of the federal republic will be considered in the context of the preparation of the overall agreement.

Guarantee The 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance will be updated. The Treaty of Guarantee will ensure the unity and independence of the federal republic of Cyprus against union in whole or in part with any other country, secession, and any change in the federal constitution not agreed to by both communities. Any exercise of the Treaty of Guarantee shall be consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the UN, and shall not impair the human rights of the citizens of the federal republic of Cyprus. At the appropriate time during the preparation of the overall agreement, the parties to the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance will request the Secretary-General of the UN to convene a meeting to be chaired by him and attended by representatives 324

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 325

Appendix Four

of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities and of the governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The parties will, as part of the overall agreement, update the Treaty of Guarantee, as well as the Treaty of Alliance which will provide for the stationing in the federal republic of Greek and Turkish contingents of reasonable and equal size. In updating the Treaty of Guarantee, the parties will consider the relevance of article 52 of the UN Charter and the merits of relating this Treaty to it. The parties to the Treaties shall request the Secretary-General to reconvene the meeting periodically to review the Treaties, including the stationing of Greek and Turkish contingents in Cyprus. In the reconvened meetings, the federal republic will be represented by the president and the vice-president.

Territorial adjustments The territorial adjustments will be in line with the 1977 high-level agreement and will take into account the 1984 Vienna working points. The territorial adjustments to be decided upon will enable a substantial number of Greek Cypriot displaced persons to return under Greek Cypriot administration. Arrangements for the return of Greek Cypriot displaced persons to this area will take into account the satisfactory relocation of and support for the Turkish-Cypriot displaced persons living there. The area to be transferred to the Greek Cypriot administration will be placed under UN administration during the transitional arrangements. It is recognized that there is a correlation between the size of the territory that will revert to Greek Cypriot administration and the number of Greek Cypriot displaced persons who can return to that area on the one hand, and the ceiling concerning the number of Greek Cypriots who may reside in the federated state under Turkish-Cypriot administration on the other hand.

Displaced persons The rights of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot displaced persons are recognized. These rights will be implemented in line with the arrangements set out below. In resolving the question of displaced persons, first priority will be given to those returning to the area that will come under Greek Cypriot administration and to the satisfactory relocation of and support for Turkish-Cypriot displaced persons living there. Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot families whose residence in 1974 was located in the federated state to be administered by the other community will be given the option to decide, within a specific timeframe, whether they wish to return. Those deciding not to return will be compensated fairly for their properties. The resettlement of those returning to the area that will come under Greek Cypriot administration will have to be essentially completed before arrangements are implemented for those who decide to return to other areas. These arrangements will be in keeping with the provisions concerning the three freedoms and will take into 325

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 326

From The President’s Office

account practical difficulties such as the situation of the persons now living on the properties concerned. If the current residents are displaced persons, priority will be given to addressing their interests. Persons who are known to have been actively involved in acts of violence against persons of the other community may, subject to due process of law, be prevented from returning to the federated state administered by the other community. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who did not have their residence on their property located in the federated state administered by the other community will be compensated fairly for their properties. In resolving the question of properties located in the federated state administered by the other community, serious consideration will be given to the option of longterm leasing. A tripartite committee, composed equally of representatives of each community and of the Secretary-General, will be established as part of the transitional arrangements to prepare the criteria and procedures for dealing with these matters, including compensation and long-term leasing. These arrangements will be implemented by the federal government through a bi-communal body. The federal government will establish a special fund to facilitate the resolution of the displaced persons question. Foreign governments and international organizations will be invited to contribute to this fund.

Economic development An urgent objective of the federal republic of Cyprus will be the development of a balanced economy that will benefit equally both federated states. As a first step in that direction, a major programme of action will be established to correct the existing economic imbalance between the two communities through special measures to promote the development of the federated state to be administered by the TurkishCypriot community. The federal government will establish a special fund for this purpose. Foreign governments and international organizations will be invited to contribute to this fund. Special measures will be adopted to avoid undesirable economic side-effects resulting from the establishment of the federal republic, for example, as a result of the adoption of one currency and the establishment of one customs frontier. These measures will be in harmony with the existing customs union with the European Community and the goal to become a full member of the EC. A bi-communal committee of experts will be established as part of the transitional arrangements to prepare the special programmes and measures envisaged in the above paragraphs. The committee will also consider appropriate steps that could be taken to promote the full membership of the federal republic of Cyprus in the European Community. The UN Development Programme will be requested to provide the committee with the necessary support.

326

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 327

appendix five Press Conference by the President of the Republic, Mr George Vassiliou, at the UN Headquarters, Friday 2 March 1990 Opening Statement I was hoping that it would have been a happier opportunity today. I was hoping that at the end of the talks I would have had the opportunity and the pleasure to announce to you that we have made substantial progress. The Security Council in its recent statement have asked us to prepare a draft outline agreement and that is what, to that extent, the world, the international community, expected from us. It is indeed a tragedy to see that today when the whole world is changing, when we see that ex-adversaries are now cooperating, that the Berlin wall belongs to history, that so much progress is made in every conflict that exists in the world, that in a few days we will be celebrating the independence of Namibia and so on, the Cyprus issue, a problem that would have been easy to solve, no progress has been possible. Unfortunately, as you journalists have realised, the talks did not produce anything; as a matter of fact, there have been no talks. There has been no negotiation. There have been simply a number of meetings which could not lead to anything because of the preconditions posed by the other side. The Secretary-General, myself, we made every effort to overcome this. We failed, so the Secretary-General was obliged on Wednesday afternoon to say that he wants to think over the situation. He thought it over on Thursday with his colleagues and this morning he had separate meetings with Mr Denktash and myself later and he told me that he could not see any possibility for making progress, because of these preconditions. And this afternoon when we met, the Secretary-General read his statement, the essence of which is that unfortunately Mr Denktash has been making a number of preconditions which go against the Secretary General’s mandate and because of that he thinks that he has no power to continue and therefore this effort has not been able to produce any results.

327

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 327

appendix five Press Conference by the President of the Republic, Mr George Vassiliou, at the UN Headquarters, Friday 2 March 1990 Opening Statement I was hoping that it would have been a happier opportunity today. I was hoping that at the end of the talks I would have had the opportunity and the pleasure to announce to you that we have made substantial progress. The Security Council in its recent statement have asked us to prepare a draft outline agreement and that is what, to that extent, the world, the international community, expected from us. It is indeed a tragedy to see that today when the whole world is changing, when we see that ex-adversaries are now cooperating, that the Berlin wall belongs to history, that so much progress is made in every conflict that exists in the world, that in a few days we will be celebrating the independence of Namibia and so on, the Cyprus issue, a problem that would have been easy to solve, no progress has been possible. Unfortunately, as you journalists have realised, the talks did not produce anything; as a matter of fact, there have been no talks. There has been no negotiation. There have been simply a number of meetings which could not lead to anything because of the preconditions posed by the other side. The Secretary-General, myself, we made every effort to overcome this. We failed, so the Secretary-General was obliged on Wednesday afternoon to say that he wants to think over the situation. He thought it over on Thursday with his colleagues and this morning he had separate meetings with Mr Denktash and myself later and he told me that he could not see any possibility for making progress, because of these preconditions. And this afternoon when we met, the Secretary-General read his statement, the essence of which is that unfortunately Mr Denktash has been making a number of preconditions which go against the Secretary General’s mandate and because of that he thinks that he has no power to continue and therefore this effort has not been able to produce any results.

327

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 328

From The President’s Office

It is disappointing because we came prepared to achieve progress. I do know that the Secretary-General and the Secretariat, particularly his Special Representative on Cyprus Mr Camilion, have made a very concerted effort, they have worked very hard, they have prepared themselves and they were ready to go on. Unfortunately, as I said, we couldn’t. But, I would like to take this opportunity and publicly express my gratitude and thanks to the Secretary-General and the Secretariat for their continuous efforts to make this meeting a success. If they did not succeed it was not in any way their fault. I will answer questions and I will be very happy to give you any information I feel I can give you. But I simply want to state at this stage that there were really no talks at all during these meetings. The first day, immediately after the opening statement by the Secretary-General was read, Mr Denktash attacked it, attacked the Secretary-General and the statement and asked for a recess – insisted on a recess – so in essence we could not hold discussions. On the next day, the first moment, he raised an issue of changing the mandate of calling the communities peoples. You could think that this is simply a legalistic word that doesn’t matter. But that’s not the point. It was not a legalistic word as far as he was concerned. He was insisting on being given the right of self-determination. This was a condition introduced for the first time in the talks. It was a precondition, it had nothing to do with the basis on which the negotiations take place and, as a matter of fact, as you will see in the statement of the Secretary-General, the insistence of Mr Denktash on this point was not simply words. I’m quoting: ‘In the context of the intercommunal talks, the introduction of terminology that is different from that used by the Security Council, has thus posed more than a semantic problem’. It was challenging the mandate of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General has no right to change the mandate. From thereon it is up to the Security Council. So the Secretary-General will be reporting to the Security Council. This is in a nutshell what happened. You know that during these days I have been very reticent. I have been reluctant to make any statements because I tried to respect the request by the Secretary-General, in his opening statement, that we should be making no statements and saying nothing about the talks. This was not always respected by Mr Denktash. We are committed to making these efforts successful, given that the continuous partition of the island is not only anachronistic but it is against the interest of all Cypriots, whether Greeks or Turks. And it is against the interest also of all neighbouring countries, against the interests of Turkey and Greece, the whole world. We are disappointed that this happened but we are not giving up. We are going to continue in our efforts. We will insist in promoting the reunion of Cyprus through a federation, which will enable both communities to live in peace, security and prosperity. And I would like, now that I am finishing these opening remarks, to use this opportunity to send once more a message of friendship to our Turkish-Cypriot compatriots and tell them that although the talks were not productive, we will continue our efforts, we will continue stretching our hand of friendship and we hope that as a result of the will of Cypriots, of all Cypriots – Greeks 328

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 329

Appendix Five

and Turks – with the help of the UN, the Secretary-General and his people, and with the support of the international community and taking advantage of the new climate in the world, we will at last be able to make progress. I sincerely hope that the next time I will be giving a press conference here, it will be on a happier note.

Answers to questions [Question:] Mr President, what specifically were the obstacles, was it the demand of the Turkish-Cypriot side for self-determination, was this a prime factor? [Answer:] That was one of the factors. Essentially, you see, when you are in a negotiation process the minimum you should do is to stick to the rules of the process and not to introduce new elements. And in actual fact, what happened is that from the first moment Mr Denktash introduced new ideas, preconditions, as I said. We had agreed that these talks would take place without preconditions. Mr Denktash came and insisted on imposing preconditions, insisted on being recognized that he had the right to self-determination, insisted essentially on legalising the partition of the island and the so-called ‘Turkish-Cypriot Republic of the North’ and so on, which he knows very well that it is not possible and it was against the whole concept of the talks. So it was not really a discussion most of the time between me and him, it was a continuous discussion between Mr Denktash and the Secretariat, the Secretariat explaining that they have a mandate – and once you have a mandate you cannot change the terms of that mandate – and Mr Denktash insisting that he wants to give his own interpretation to the mandate. And he didn’t even accept when he was told to leave this aside, no, he insisted. That’s why the Secretary-General felt he had no option but to stop, because there had been no progress, there had been no meaningful negotiation on any subject. [Question:] Is it correct that, as Mr Denktash pointed out, the SecretaryGeneral in his opening statement said that the Cyprus problem is not a problem of minority and majority. Is that word by word correct? [Answer:] The Secretary-General made an opening statement. As you know, an opening statement is intended to facilitate the discussion. And it is interesting that as soon as Mr Pérez de Cuéllar finished his statement, Mr Denktash started to criticize him, why he said that and insisting that it should not be acceptable, it should not be obligatory and so on. Then he came out and he quoted out of context parts of the statement. I have said it repeatedly that we do not look at the two communities in Cyprus as a majority and a minority. The fact that one is bigger than the other in this context, is not really the important thing. I will read to you, how the Secretary-General made this point in his Opening Statement. ‘Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot community and the 329

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 330

From The President’s Office

Turkish-Cypriot community. Their relationship is not one of majority and minority but one of two communities in the state of Cyprus’. This is an absolute fact. ‘The mandate given to me by the Security Council makes it clear that my mission of good offices is with the two communities’. In today’s closing statement he states very clearly that the Security Council has posited that ‘a solution should be based on the existence of one state of Cyprus, comprising two communities’. This is the UN position. Of course, in the relationship between the two communities and in trying to find a solution, one should not think in terms of majority and minority but one should try to think that the two communities will establish a federation. And this is something we have always accepted, and personally I have never, and I repeat it, never used the terms majority or minority. I have always said Turkish-Cypriot and Greek Cypriot community, we respect the communities, we respect also the human rights of all Cypriots. [Question:] Will you be meeting with President Bush? [Answer:] I don't know whether I will be meeting President Bush. I cannot foresee what will happen and on this short notice I do not know whether it would be possible to have a meeting, but if it is possible, I would very much like to have a meeting. In this sense, what I want to say is that at my latest meeting with him, President Bush was very candid, as you know he usually is, and he said very clearly and openly that the U.S.A. does not and will not recognize the status quo. That means the U.S.A. does not recognize the partition of the island but recognizes the Republic of Cyprus and wants to promote a solution through negotiations for the establishment of a federation. In that sense what I will ask him is to help us to bring forward a solution. [Question:] Do you intend to go to the UN Security Council? If you do what do you expect? [Answer:] The Secretary-General has the obligation to report to the Security Council, because the latest resolution on Cyprus in December has asked the Secretary-General to make sure that this meeting takes place and immediately afterwards report to them. In the latest statement by the chairman of the Security Council it was made clear that he has to report to the Security Council as soon as possible after the talks. Therefore the initiative is with the Secretary-General. [Question:] Mr Denktash said that with no self-determination there will be no federation? [Answer:] Well, whenever one tries to impose conditions this creates problems, and it is an agreed concept in international talks that with preconditions you achieve nothing. So I hope that there will be a modification to the statement by Mr Denktash. [Question:] What are you expecting from the Security Council? 330

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 331

Appendix Five

[Answer:] I think the Security Council will have to consider seriously what has happened and then see how it can strengthen the Secretary-General in his efforts to seek a solution to the problem. Essentially it is not up to me to say to the Security Council what it should do. But I can say that I hope the Security Council will reconfirm the mandate of the Secretary-General and will strengthen him in his effort and work. [Question:] Do the Turkish Cypriots have the right for self-determination, and how do you see this right exercised in Cyprus as a whole? [Answer:] Neither the Turkish Cypriots nor the Greek Cypriots have the right for self-determination. In no country in the world communities or groups have rights to self-determination. If the world community were to adopt this principle, the world as we know it would collapse, the UN would not be the UN of 160 countries but probably 16,000 or even more. We would go back to the middle ages. There is no right of selfdetermination for any community anywhere in the world. This right is only for countries. And by the way, when it was raised in this country where we are guests now, the answer of the U.S. Government was that we Americans have fought a war not in order to give this right to a group of people in this country – the famous civil war. What every citizen and every community has a right to do is, to express its own free political will because self-determination has only one meaning and that is the meaning of establishing a sovereign state and it is referred to only in the case of colonies, countries which seek independence. The people of Cyprus have exercised their right to self determination when they agreed to have an independent republic, the Republic of Cyprus. In Cyprus we have two communities. We accept that, we respect that. These two communities today want to establish a federation. We respect that. We say that we have negotiations and we say that these two communities – when we agree a new basis for the solution – should have the will and the freedom to exert their democratic right to say whether they accept the agreement we have reached. They may accept it in a separate referendum, they may accept it or they may reject it. This is the basic democratic right of any group of people, of any community. And this is what we want to happen in Cyprus. But to play with words is dangerous. This has nothing to do with self-determination. Self-determination leads only to partition, to killings, to disaster. Mr Denktash is playing with words. His objective is not simply to exercise the right to vote for an agreement because if that were the case, there would be no problem. So why is he insisting? Because he wants something else. And that something else is partition. It is recognition of the so-called state he has and that the international community is not prepared to accept for the reasons we all know. 331

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 332

From The President’s Office

[Question:] Now there appears to be a deadlock. What specific concrete measures do you envision in order to change the situation? [Answer:] I want to assure you that we are not despairing. We will not give up our efforts. We will continue to send a message of goodwill to the Turkish Cypriots and we will develop new ways by which we can have more contacts with the Turkish Cypriots and more access to each other. I have already announced a number of measures in this respect. I have said that Turkish Cypriots are free to visit, and talk to us, to meet colleagues, have meetings on a professional or human basis. We said, and we repeat, that our health services are at their disposal and we are thinking of various other measures that we could take. But this is only in order to strengthen relations on the human level. From there on, a political solution can come only when the decision for such a solution is taken. And of course we expect in that sense that Turkey has a role to play because we must not forget that Cyprus is partitioned. Because there are 35,000 Turkish troops in Cyprus, which keep the island partitioned and which do not allow the free movement of people. Therefore the solution of the Cyprus problem is also related to a decision by Turkey to withdraw her troops. I think the Turkish government must realise that it should follow the example of all other countries and take the Turkish troops back to Turkey.

332

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 333

appendix six Resolution 649 (1990)

Adopted by the Security Council on 12 March 1990 The Security Council, Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 8 March 1990 (S/21183) on the recent meeting between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus and on his assessment of the current situation, Recalling its relevant resolutions on Cyprus, Recalling the statement of the President of the Security Council of 22 February 1990 (S/21160) calling upon the leaders of the two communities to demonstrate the necessary goodwill and flexibility and to cooperate with the Secretary-General so that the talks will result in a major step forward toward the resolution of the Cyprus problem, Concerned that at the recent meeting in New York it has not been possible to achieve results in arriving at an agreed outline of an overall agreement, 1. Reaffirms in particular its resolution 367 (1975) as well as its support for the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the leaders of the two communities in which they pledged themselves to establish a bi-communal Federal Republic of Cyprus that will safeguard its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment, and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession; 2. Expresses its full support for the current effort of the Secretary-General in carrying out his mission of good offices concerning Cyprus; 3. Calls upon the leaders of the two communities to pursue their efforts to reach freely a mutually acceptable solution providing for the establishment of a federation that will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and 333

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 334

From The President’s Office

bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects in line with the present resolution and their 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, and to cooperate, on an equal footing, with the Secretary-General in completing, in the first instance and on an urgent basis, an outline of an overall agreement, as agreed in June 1989; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices in order to achieve the earliest possible progress and, towards this end, to assist the two communities by making suggestions to facilitate the discussions; 5. Calls on the parties concerned to refrain from any action that could aggravate the situation; 6. Decides to remain actively seized of this situation and the current effort; 7. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council in his report due by 31 May 1990 of the progress made in resuming the intensive talks and in developing an agreed outline of an overall agreement in line with the present resolution. Adopted unanimously at the 2909th meeting.

334

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 335

appendix seven Letters by President Vassiliou to President Bush and President Gorbachev and Reply by President Bush

Nicosia, 5th June, 1990. Dear President Bush, Please accept the deepest thanks of the Cyprus government and myself for taking the time to include the Cyprus issue in the very crowded agenda of your recent talks with President Gorbachev. We were particularly gratified to hear Secretary Baker’s statement that the subject was discussed by the two leaders in full. We earnestly hope that the interest which you have been kind enough to show so far in the Cyprus problem will be sustained in your future contacts with President Gorbachev. It is our sure belief that this constitutes the most effective signal to Turkey that Cyprus cannot any longer remain the sad exception to the new world climate of peace and cooperation catalysed by the historic rapprochement between the USA and the Soviet Union furthered under your capable leadership. With my best wishes Sincerely Yours, George Vassiliou His Excellency Mr George Bush, President of the USA of America, The White House, Washington D.C.

335

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 336

From The President’s Office

Nicosia, 17th May, 1990. Dear President Bush, Please accept the best wishes of my government and myself for the success of the forthcoming summit meeting with President Gorbachev in the USA. The regular and cordial exchange of views between the two key superpowers greatly reinforces the prospects for global peace and prosperity. I would also like to thank you for the active interest which you have taken in the Cyprus problem. While noting your reluctance to include the issue in the previous summit talks at Malta, which in any case were burdened with a very crowded agenda, allow me to venture to express our earnest hope that Cyprus will figure in the forthcoming discussions with President Gorbachev, as a regional conflict with farreaching global implications. Even the most brief of references in the talks and the resulting communiqué could exercise a catalytic effect on the current impasse in the efforts to achieve a Cyprus settlement based on human rights and democracy, the ideals for which the USA is the beacon throughout the world. With warm personal regards, George Vassiliou His Excellency Mr George Bush, President of the USA of America, The White House, Washington D.C.

Nicosia, 17th May, 1990, Dear President Gorbachev, I would like to convey my very best wishes for the success of your forthcoming summit talks with President Bush in the USA. The prospects for peace and prosperity in the world are greatly enhanced by the regular exchange of views in a spirit of friendship and cooperation between the two key superpowers. We are most grateful for the Soviet Union's help so far in raising the issue of Cyprus, a regional problem with far-reaching global implications, in discussions with the USA. As you are aware, what lies at the heart of the Cyprus problem is the question of the survival of states comprising more than one ethnic community within secure borders. The alternative is their fragmentation on sectarian lines, a development which would negate all the recent gains in the direction of international peace and cooperation and set the international political order back not years but centuries. 336

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 337

Appendix Seven

It is thus our earnest hope that Cyprus will be included in the agenda of the forthcoming talks. We are convinced that even with a very brief reference to Cyprus the resulting communiqué could prove invaluable in resolving the present impasse in the peace efforts for the island, to the benefit not only of all Cypriots but also of peace and stability in our region. With warm personal regards, George Vassiliou His Excellency Mr Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, President of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow

Nicosia, 5th June, 1990. Dear President Gorbachev, I would like to thank you most warmly on behalf of both the Cyprus government and myself for taking the time, despite a very crowded agenda, to discuss the Cyprus issue in full in your recent talks with President Bush. The Soviet Union has been instrumental in raising the Cyprus problem to the status of a regional conflict meriting discussion by the superpowers at summit level. We fully believe that this interest, which we hope will be sustained in your future contacts with President Bush, constitutes the most effective means of conveying the message to the international community and Turkey in particular that Cyprus cannot remain the exception to the current world-wide changes in the direction of peace and cooperation, catalysed by the historic rapprochement between the USSR and the USA which has taken place under your visionary and able leadership. With my very best wishes, George Vassiliou His Excellency Mr Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, President of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow

August 21, 1990 Dear Mr President: Thank you for your letters of May 17 and June 5. I am glad you found the discussion President Gorbachev and I had on the Cyprus issue useful. It is my hope that this 337

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 338

From The President’s Office

evidence of our mutual strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s Good Offices Mission will help in some indirect way to assist the intercommunal negotiating process. Recent developments on Cyprus remain a source of concern. As you may know, the USA has made clear our opposition to changes in and around the city of Varosha. These efforts will continue. As you know, the USA worked actively behind the scenes to develop a Security Council statement on July 19 which could provide a vehicle for the UN SecretaryGeneral to implement the ‘plan of action’ which he laid down in his report to the Security Council on July 12. Thus a path has been opened, which we hope both communities on Cyprus will follow, for a resumption of the intercommunal dialogue which alone provides a basis for reaching a just and lasting Cyprus settlement. Finally, I must note my strong conviction that the key to a lasting solution is the promotion of a spirit of reconciliation on the island. This requires persistence, determination and sensitivity, qualities you have shown in great abundance. Our efforts, in the final analysis, can only support but never replace your own. May I convey again assurances of every possible support to your efforts in the months ahead. With best wishes, Sincerely, George Bush His Excellency George Vassiliou President of the Republic of Cyprus Nicosia, Cyprus

338

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 339

appendix eight Introductory Speech of President Vassiliou to the Common Session of the National Council, under the Chairmanship of the President of Cyprus, Mr Vassiliou, and the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr Mitsotakis Saturday 8 June 1991 Dear friends I would like to start by expressing our great joy, and I am sure that I speak for all of you on this, for the fact that this meeting is actually happening and that we have with us here today the Prime Minister of Greece Mr Mitsotakis and the Foreign Minister Mr Samaras. I am sure that their presence amongst us is not merely symbolic. I am sure it will help us in determining the right line and tactics and that it will help promote our cause. This session in common is of special significance because we go through a period during which, as we all know, there is great mobility on the Cyprus issue and it is natural for our people to have great expectations. That is why I nourish the hope that our discussion will be fruitful and that the communiqué that will be issued will send the right message to the people, not forgetting that the audience for this session is a large one as it is not just the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots who are interested in what we will have to say but also Hellenism in general, Turkey and international public opinion as well. I would like to propose that our discussion be focussed on the present stage of the Cyprus issue, its perspectives and the tactics we ought to follow. There is, of course, the issue of the missing persons, which I would propose to be the subject of a separate discussion – provided of course you agree – once the scheduled discussion on the issue that I have chosen is over. We would be well-advised to exchange views on what we can do to deal with this humanitarian issue of the missing persons in any way we can. I will now start from the positions that we have discussed extensively and on which we all agree. We all agree that the Cyprus problem is mainly an issue of invasion and 339

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 340

From The President’s Office

occupation which, however, gets complicated by the history of the intra-communal differences. Turkey did not come here in a spirit of altruism to help the Turkish Cypriots but in order to promote her own strategic interests. We all agree that she will leave only when she is convinced that the cost of her staying here exceeds any possible benefits. We all do agree on these views. I also believe that we all agree on the means at our disposal to put pressure on Turkey in order to achieve our goals. These are first of all our own unity, decisiveness and fighting spirit, our close cooperation with the government and the political leadership of Greece, the maximum possible internationalisation of the Cyprus issue, the strengthening of our defences and the promotion of our relations with the Turkish Cypriots by opening up channels of communication with them in what we call a policy of rapprochement. I believe we all agree on all this. There exist of course differences especially on points of tactics, basically on ways to internationalise the issue and the forms of struggle here in Cyprus. We will continue later with the tactics that we must follow, but I believe that in order to reach the right conclusions we must first assess the situation as it is being shaped now. I would like to refer to the international situation, the situation in Turkey and in Cyprus, in that order. I will begin with the international situation. The basic characteristic of the international situation to day is the omnipotence of the USA of America. It is now a fact, especially after the Gulf crisis, that the USA is essentially the only superpower. The Soviet Union may have retained its military power and thus continue to be considered a superpower but on account of the internal crisis that exists today in the USSR both in the field of the economy and in the field of the relations between the various nationalities in that country, the Soviet Union obviously subjects its foreign policy to what it considers its national interest. We can thus say that there is an essential, a qualitative change in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as compared to what it was a few years ago. In those days its policy was to serve the interests of the coalition of Socialist countries, the idea of strengthening socialism in the whole world and the weakening of capitalism and of NATO. Today, it aims at serving the interests of the Soviet Union meaning of course its security but also its economic development and the maintenance of the USSR intact within its present borders. For this reason the USA no longer fears cooperating with the Soviet Union on international issues, on the contrary they seek it because it serves them. That is why we witnessed the cooperation on the issue of Angola that came to a successful end, on the Gulf crisis and now on the Palestinian problem as America itself took the initiative to establish a co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union and the USA. Also on the issue of Cyprus we now see a total reversal of the policy pursued by the Americans as they welcomed the proposal by the Soviets. As you know, there has already been a meeting between Letsky and Pushkin in Bonn during which an exchange of views on the Cyprus issue did take place. The second essential international factor is the EEC which is undoubtedly much stronger today than it was some years ago even if after the Gulf crisis it is somehow 340

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 341

Appendix Eight

weakened. In the long run and certainly within the next five to ten years the EEC will perhaps be the only substantial counterweight to the USA. For the time being, however, it cooperates closely with the USA especially on issues of foreign policy. Concerning especially the Cyprus issue there is no indication – on the contrary there are indications to the opposite – of the EEC wanting to follow a policy that would be independent or would clash with that of the USA. The traditional ally of Cyprus in the UN was the Non-aligned Movement. Without exaggerating we can say today that this movement is in a state of liquidation not only because the basic conditions that led to the strengthening of the movement have changed but mainly because the key countries of the Movement are facing, each for its own reasons, a very serious crisis. I refer to Yugoslavia which, as everybody knows, is on the verge of civil war; to Algeria where we are also witnessing a very serious internal crisis risking to turn this socialist country into an Islamic fundamentalist one; to Cuba which, as you know has always been our firm ally and goes through a terrible crisis making it uncertain what the position of its government will be after a year or a year and a half; to India, this other important ally of ours, which is also undergoing a serious political crisis of unknown outcome. As far as the other countries are concerned I would say they may remain in the Movement, they may express the wish to cooperate but the behaviour of each one of them will always be shaped by the stance of the USA. One could thus say that most of the other countries are part of and gravitate within the constellation of the USA. We come to Turkey whose role has certainly changed. From being the lance against the Soviet Union it has turned into an important US ally in the area. Whether and to what extent it has been upgraded is of secondary importance. What is significant is the fact that Turkey is and will remain an important power and what interests us specifically – and what we must evaluate – is how Turkey develops in relation to Greece. Here we must accept and recognise the fact that during the last ten years the balance has changed in favour of Turkey not of Greece. This has to do with developments in the military, the economic and the demographic field as well as with the political prestige of the country. Today Turkey is in a better position in relation to Greece than it was during the 1980s in all these fields. Its economy does have inflationary tendencies and faces all kinds of pressures but at the same time we should not forget that it makes rapid progress as its GDP is increasing at a much faster rate than that of Greece while – and this is important – the country attracts huge investments of foreign capital to the tune of one million dollars a year. Turkey does have political problems as well, such as the issue of the Kurds and the Islamists, the balance of internal forces but if we want to be realistic we must conclude that at the very best the perspectives for Hellenism at the end of the 1990s and the balance of forces between Turkey and Greece will remain as they are today. In order to achieve this, Greece must grow at a very rapid pace. I am afraid, however, that if we want to be realistic we must envisage that the balance between Turkey and Greece will change even more at our expense as Turkey becomes economically, militarily and in 341

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 342

From The President’s Office

terms of its political presence in the world, stronger than Greece in comparison to what it is today. We must also stress that for Turkey, its first national priority is the EEC perspective, the ‘European’ dimension. And now we come to Cyprus. It is a fact that we have had during these last years a significant economic growth and political stability which has enhanced the international prestige of the Cyprus Republic. We must not forget, however, that the status quo which we all reject should not itself be taken for granted. The perspectives are negative even in the best of cases for us. I will now refer to the basic factors that determine this. The demographic developments will be such as to increase the number of settlers who will grow progressively deeper roots in Cyprus. And we must not forget something very important. As years go by, the settlers will not only increase in numbers but the passage of time will alter qualitatively the essence of the problem because you can speak of illegal immigrants and settlers for some years but for people having lived in a country for 20–30 years where they have been born and bred, it is very difficult to use the same language as in the beginning. With reference to economic developments one can say that the economy of the Occupied Lands went through various phases. While to begin with things were bad, it is characteristic that in the period 1984 until 1990 their rates of growth were similar to the ones in our economy. Now, after 1990, they face once again serious difficulties, but it would be a mistake for us to think that these will last forever. The reason is that these difficulties are in part due to steps taken by the Turkish government itself and to the weaknesses of the Turkish economy. Any strengthening of the Turkish economy will lead to the strengthening of the Turkish-Cypriot economy as well. Their GDP is approximately 11 per cent of ours but it is nonetheless much higher than it was a few years ago and as time goes by so it grows. This will lead to a stabilisation, both economic and social. The most important element from this point of view is that without any change by all the countries of the world towards the pseudo-state, there will nonetheless be a creeping recognition of it. It is not by accident that in various maps all over the world the occupied territories are beginning to be marked differently and that in various directories the occupied area is mentioned separately in spite of our protests and recriminations. We must realise that as time goes by the area will progressively stop being ignored as an occupied area. This will create all the time new ‘faits accomplis’. I must mention here that the military danger is always hanging over us as is the worsening of the situation on account of Turkey’s huge supremacy in firepower no matter what we do in the field of strengthening our defences. The conclusion of all this is that the passage of time does not serve us and that the status quo – which we reject – must not, I repeat, not, ever been taken itself for granted. We now come to the issue of the tactics and strategy to achieve our aims. What is it that we want? We want a solution as quickly as possible based on the UN resolutions and the high-level agreements as well as on the unanimous proposals 342

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 343

Appendix Eight

made by the National Council in January 1989. There is unanimity on this but it would be good if we could clarify and confirm it once again. Our opinion is that with the policy we followed during all this time we succeeded in raising the international interest in and make more manifest the support of our positions especially in the EEC, the Congress, the European Parliament, and the Council of Europe. We have achieved a mobility that has reached its crux at this moment with the announcement of the two phone contacts between Bush and Őzal on the Cyprus issue two days ago. We consider this mobility positive because it is only in this way that psychological pressure can be exerted on Turkey as we can all see today. So what should we do now? I believe we are in a peculiar period determined by the fact that in one and a half months from today the President of the USA will visit Greece and Turkey. This summer is therefore, I would say, a period during which there will be increased mobility. It is therefore highly important for us to do whatever possible to maintain the pressure on Turkey, keep the ball close to the Turkish goalpost and thus increase the probabilities of opening the way to a solution by making full use of the American factor in order to achieve, hopefully, some substantial concessions from Turkey. As to the degree that this is possible let us best not discuss it. In my opinion, the important thing is that we must do our best to promote this goal. This should therefore be our basic aim for the next two months. What we will do if by the end of the summer Turkey still remains intransigent, in spite of the trip of Mr Bush, is something which I do not believe we can decide now. The possibility of recourse to the Security Council and the General Assembly is, of course, always open and we must not forget that in order to have a chance of success in the new international climate that is emerging it is necessary to have the support of the Secretary-General. In order, however, to be able to maximise pressure on Turkey we have to respond to the proposal of Őzal about a four-party conference which tends to create impressions and score points in the new climate. I refer, incidentally, to the fact that the Soviet ambassador discussing with other ambassadors, stressed that we were wrong to reject the four-party conference or at least to reject it without convincing arguments. That is why I believe that a basic conclusion that I would like to propose be included in the statement that will be made by today’s session of the National Council should totally revert the climate that was close to being created by Őzal’s proposals. I believe we should propose that we support the proposals of the Secretary-General but that it is obvious the role of the Secretary-General needs strengthening. To achieve this and move forward it would be a good idea if he could set up a conference under his chairmanship with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council, Greece, Turkey, as well as the Republic of Cyprus and the representative of the Turkish-Cypriot community from the Cypriot. Provided we agree on this idea, this statement should be followed by a widely publicised campaign during 343

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 344

From The President’s Office

which, for example, one political leader accompanied by a government representative could visit the capitals of the Permanent Members of the Security Council and hand over our proposal officially under the glare of the world’s media. This will put Turkey and Őzal in a difficult position and it will certainly show the world that we really want a solution. I would say further that we must continuously send a message of peace and friendship to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots and intensify our efforts towards rapprochement. We must also promote and continue unabated our efforts in the direction of Europe never forgetting that the accession of Cyprus to the EEC will solve essential problems in the field of security and others as well. The EEC is today our most valued ally after Greece so that whatever we do, we must at the same time make use of the possibilities offered by the EEC, the initiatives taken by the Community etc.

344

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 345

appendix nine Statement by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus

Thursday, 27 June 1991 1. Pursuant to your statement of 28 March 1991 (S/22415), I wish to report to you on my efforts to arrive at an agreed outline of an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem. 2. In my statement to the Council on 27 March 1991, I reported on the discussions we had during the previous few months with the leaders of the two communities and with a senior official of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During these discussions, ideas were explored that could bring the two sides within agreement range on each of the headings and sub-headings of an outline I had set out in my report of 8 March 1990 (S/21183). 3. I pointed out that the issues of particular importance to the Turkish-Cypriot side related to the overall objectives of the agreement, guiding principles of the federation, constitutional aspects of the federation, and security and guarantee. I noted that the issues of particular importance to the Greek-Cypriot side related to territorial adjustments, displaced persons, constitutional aspects of the federation, including the three freedoms, and security and guarantee. 4. I expressed the view that the clarifications that had emerged from these discussions should make it possible to advance on a number of the headings of the outline, notably, overall objectives of the agreement, guiding principles of the federation, and security and guarantee. At the sane time, I underlined that several headings remained to be dealt with before the two sides could be brought within agreement range, notably territorial adjustments and displaced persons. I concluded that if it were possible to move forward on all the headings, including on the outstanding issues to which I have just referred, an agreed outline that will safeguard the interests of both communities will be feasible. This remains my assessment. 345

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 346

From The President’s Office

5. In its statement of 28 March 1991 (S/22415), the Council urged all concerned to continue the discussions that had taken place over the previous few months in order to resolve without delay the outstanding issues. The members of the Council also stated that, in the light of the report I would submit by early July, they would decide on any further measures for proceeding that may be necessary. 6. Following the deliberations of the Council at the end of March, my objective was to continue the talks in line with the statement of the Council (S/22415) by focusing in the first instance on the issues that remained to be dealt with, in particular territory and displaced persons. In mid May, I received a letter from Mr Denktash conveying his views on the situation at that time and the continuation of the talks envisaged by the Security Council. He stressed that the informal discussions that had taken place with his side should lead to formal talks with both parties in Cyprus. 7. Informal talks were held in May with Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish officials during which they mentioned ideas on territorial adjustments and displaced persons. However, these discussions did not contribute to bringing the two sides closer on these two issues. The Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish officials reiterated that these talks should take place with both sides and that the discussions should deal with all eight headings. They also expressed their doubts as to whether the Greek Cypriot position on overall objectives of the agreement, guiding principles of the federation and security and guarantee were indeed within agreement range as I had suggested in my statement on 27 March and asked that the Greek-Cypriot side give assurance that this was in fact the case. 8. At the end of May I had a telephone conversation with President Őzal about my current effort on Cyprus. President Ozal stated that after reviewing the status of the recent talks he felt that quadripartite talks, under my aegis, at a high political level involving the leaders of the two communities, Turkey and Greece, could give my efforts a new and strong impetus and help the two sides reach agreement on the eight headings of the outline. 9. During a visit to Cyprus by Prime Minister Mitsotakis in early June it was proposed that an international conference be convened under my chairmanship to give new impetus to my effort. It was suggested that the conference be attended by the five permanent members of the Security Council, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, and the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. Subsequently, I received letters from President Vassiliou and Prime Minister Mitsotakis on the subject of an international conference. 10. On 21 June 1991, I wrote to the leaders of the two communities and to President Őzal and Prime Minister Mitsotakis about the recent suggestions for an international meeting and informed them that I would seek the Security Council’s guidance on convening such a meeting, its composition, preparation, and how the Council would wish to be kept apprised of developments. 11. I would like to share with you my views on this matter in the light of the current situation of my effort. 346

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 347

Appendix Nine

12. As you know, my objective for some time has been to invite the leaders of the two communities to meet with me to agree on the outline of an overall settlement. However, as I have explained, it has still, not been possible to prepare the ground on all the headings of the outline to ensure its success. I would therefore be attracted by the idea of convening a high-level international meeting if it could result in the achievement of an agreed outline. The great expectations which such a meeting would raise makes it all the more important that it achieve the intended results. 13. The preparatory arrangements and format of the meeting will be crucial. First, it is vital that such a meeting be thoroughly prepared so that its discussions are based on a set of ideas that are within agreement range of the two sides on each of the eight headings of the outline. Second, there should be a clear commitment to reach agreement on an outline and adequate time should be set aside for this meeting to attain this end. 14. I have underlined on a number of occasions, notably in my report of 8 March 1990 and annex (S/21183) and in my statement of 27 March 1991 to the Security Council, that the outline must provide satisfactory solutions to all the issues of the Cyprus problem. In preparation for an international meeting, the two sides should be ready to indicate their concurrence with the elements of the overall objectives of the agreement, including the understandings and the description of political equality I had suggested in my report of 8 March 1990 and annex, as well as with the guiding principles of the federation related to federal union, bi-communality and bi-zonality which have been discussed with the two sides. As I mentioned in my statement of 27 March 1991, it should also be possible to work out an arrangement that will guarantee the security of both communities and of Cyprus. In my report of 8 March 1990, I noted that such an arrangement should include the following: in line with the 1979 high-level agreement, the demilitarization of the federation will remain an objective; the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance will remain a valid framework and will be updated in keeping with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN; and the presence of Greek and Turkish contingents of reasonable and equal size will be an essential feature of security in Cyprus. 15. I must again stress that progress is urgently necessary on the issues of territorial adjustments and displaced persons. As the members of the Council will recall, the main questions arising from these issues concern the area that will come under Greek Cypriot administration that would enable a substantial number of Greek Cypriot displaced persons to return to that area, and the number of Creek Cypriots who may reside in the area, to be administered by the Turkish-Cypriot community. These two issues will have to be brought within agreement range before a high-level meeting takes place. 16. As concerns the participants in such a meeting, the Council may wish to reflect on this matter. I shall in due course revert to you for guidance on this question. 17. If you agree with the approach I have suggested, I would propose that during the months of July and August Mr Camilion and Mr Feissel meet with all concerned 347

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 348

From The President’s Office

to try to work out a set of ideas on each of the eight headings of the outline. In line with operative paragraph 4 of resolution 649 (1990), I intend to assist this process by making suggestions. 18. As I mentioned earlier, it is indispensable that the two sides are within agreement range before the beginning of such a meeting. I therefore propose to review the situation at the end of August with particular reference to whether the conditions are ripe to proceed with a high-level international meeting and to consult with the Council accordingly. 27 June, 1991

348

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 349

appendix ten Extract from the Report of the SecretaryGeneral on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus

8 October 1991 During the first round, my representatives met with senior Turkish and Greek officials at Ankara from 23 to 26 July and at Athens on 27 and 28 July, respectively, and separately with the two leaders at Nicosia from 29 July to 3 August. They presented ideas for each of the headings (except transitional arrangements), taking into account the above-mentioned previous discussions and attempting to respond to the legitimate interests and reasonable concerns of both parties. In areas where during the previous discussions the two sides appeared to be relatively close, the ideas were elaborated fully. This was particularly the case for the overall objectives of an agreement, the guiding principles of the federation, the powers and functions of the federal government, the federal legislature, the federal judiciary, and security and guarantee. In areas that had not yet been adequately discussed, a variety of options were presented to stimulate discussion. I am referring in particular to displaced persons, the federal executive and territorial adjustments. During the first round, the complete text of the ideas was discussed fully at Ankara, Athens and separately with the two sides in Cyprus. In Nicosia, my representatives also informed the two sides of their respective reactions to the various ideas. The objective of that process was not to obtain their approval but to seek their reactions and suggestions on the basis of which those ideas would be further elaborated and amended for the second round of talks. During the first half of August, the ideas were revised in the light of the previous discussions. Concrete ideas were elaborated in the areas that had previously contained options (displaced persons, territorial adjustments and the federal executive). In addition, ideas on transitional arrangements and goodwill measures that would be implemented during the transitional period were also prepared. 349

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 350

From The President’s Office

The objective of the second round of talks was to seek broad agreement of the two sides to a set of ideas that would bring them within agreement range and thereby make possible a high-level international meeting. My representatives began the second round of talks on 17 August at Athens, where they reviewed the outcome of the July talks and the most recent text of ideas with Foreign Minister Samaras and other senior officials of the Ministry. The Minister indicated that he was encouraged with the way the talks were proceeding and expressed the hope that the high-level meeting could be held in September as tentatively planned. They then had meetings at Ankara from 21 to 24 August. In addition to reviewing the situation with Foreign Minister Giray, they had intensive discussions with senior Foreign Ministry officials during which they considered in detail the text of the ideas covering each of the eight headings, of the agreement. The Turkish officials reiterated their desire to work in support of my effort and their wish that the high-level meeting take place in September. These discussions proved most helpful in refining the text of the ideas. At the conclusion of the talks, it was apparent that, although the two sides in Cyprus remained apart on some issues and the territorial adjustments still had to be further defined, the revised text of ideas that had emerged from the talks at Ankara represented an important step forward which should provide the basis on which an agreement could be worked out. On 26 August, my representatives stopped over at Athens to meet Prime Minister Mitsotakis, with whom they reviewed the ideas that would be discussed with the two sides in Cyprus. The Prime Minister conveyed his full support of my effort. My representatives had separate meetings with the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus from 26 to 29 August and again from 7 to 14 September, during which they presented to the two leaders the full text of the ideas on each of the eight headings and accompanying goodwill measures and elicited their views. Both leaders agreed that in view of the comprehensive manner in which the ideas had been elaborated it would be possible to omit the preparation of an outline of an agreement and to proceed directly to completing an overall framework agreement. In addition, it was agreed that the preparation of the agreement should be essentially completed to the satisfaction of both sides before convening the high-level meeting. These understandings had also been endorsed by Greece and Turkey. President Vassiliou’s reaction to the ideas revealed that although differences remained to be resolved on a number of issues, the set of ideas as a whole provided the basis for working out an overall framework agreement. In the course of the discussions with His Excellency Mr Denktash, he stated that each side possessed sovereignty which it would retain after the establishment of a federation, including the right of secession, and sought extensive changes in the text of the ideas that were discussed.

350

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 351

Appendix Ten

Observations As I had reminded the two leaders in my statement of 2 March 1990 (see S/21183, annex II), in paragraph 1 of resolution 367 (1975) the Security Council had called upon all States and the parties concerned to refrain from any action that might prejudice the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as from any attempt at partition of the island or its unification with any other country. In drawing up the mandate of the Secretary-General’s mission of good offices on Cyprus, the Security Council thus posited a solution based on the existence of one State of Cyprus comprising two communities. Consequently, the introduction of the concept referred to in paragraph 17 would in this context fundamentally alter the nature of the solution provided for in the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements and which the Security Council has consistently foreseen, most recently in resolution 649 (1990). Deriving from the position of the Security Council, which it has reiterated in successive resolutions, the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the two parties in Cyprus and the understandings accepted by both sides (see S/21393, para. 12), the objective of my mission of good offices has been to preserve the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the State of Cyprus and to establish a new constitutional arrangement for the State of Cyprus that would regulate the relations of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities on a federal, bi-communal and bi-zonal basis. Each community has been participating in this process on an equal footing and will have the opportunity to express separately its consent to the arrangements reached. The developments of the past few months had raised justifiable expectations that significant progress would be made and that a high-level meeting would take place in September to conclude an overall framework agreement. The set of ideas that my representatives brought to Cyprus at the end of August represent an important step forward which must be preserved and used as the basis for completing the overall framework agreement. It is important that the expectations that were raised over the past few months not be lost. This requires that we proceed without delay to conclude the preparatory work and to convene the high-level meeting. I will therefore request my representatives to resume in early November their discussions with the two sides in Cyprus and Greece and Turkey to finalize the set of ideas. If this effort can proceed in keeping with the basic principles adopted by the Security Council and accepted by the two sides in the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, I am confident that it will be possible to convene the high-level meeting before the end of this year. At the same time, I must again appeal to both sides to refrain from making statements or taking actions that are counter-productive and only make our effort to find a solution more difficult.

351

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 352

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 353

appendix eleven Letter of the Secretary-General of the UN, Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to H.E. the President of the USA, Mr George Bush

1 June 1992 Dear Mr President, I thought it important to write to you at this critical phase of our effort to achieve a solution to the Cyprus question. As you know, the Security Council has requested me to pursue my intensive efforts during May and June to complete the set of ideas. As a first step, my representatives had talks in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey from 8 to 15 May where they focused mainly on the outstanding issues, in particular territorial adjustments and displaced persons. These discussions were helpful. I have therefore invited President Vassiliou and H.E. Mr Denktash to meet with me at UN Headquarters beginning on Thursday, 18 June for such reasonable duration as may be necessary to reach agreement on the set of ideas of an overall framework agreement. On the basis of the recent discussions and Security Council resolution 750, it should now be possible for the two leaders to consider a set of ideas covering all eight headings with equal clarity that responds to the legitimate interests and reasonable concerns of both sides. Given the necessary goodwill, it should be possible to a high-level international meeting to conclude an overall framework agreement. I continue to believe that if the Turkish Cypriots are willing to accept a reasonable arrangement on territory and on displaced persons, an overall framework agreement can be achieved that provides for a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation that will ensure their political equality and security. I propose to devote the initial days of my meetings with the two leaders to proximity talks to ascertain the possibility of reaching an agreement on the set of ideas. In line with resolution 750, initial attention will be focused on the outstanding issues, in particular territorial adjustments and displaced persons. If the two leaders are within 353

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 354

From The President’s Office

agreement range on all the issues I intend to convene immediately a joint meeting to complete the work. A successful joint meeting would make it possible to convene a high-level international meeting to conclude an overall framework agreement. I have written to Prime Ministers Demirel and Mitsotakis about my plans and have asked them, given the crucial nature of these meetings, to designate a senior official to be present in New York throughout the talks in support of my effort. It would be most helpful if you could also designate a senior official to be in New York to follow closely developments for the duration of the meetings. In preparation of these meetings, I have asked my representatives to meet with both leaders in Cyprus as well as with senior officials in Ankara and Athens during the week of 8 June to brief them fully on the approach I intend to follow and the objective I hope to achieve. May I say how much I appreciate your personal interest and support which has been most helpful to my effort to bring the two sides within agreement range. At this critical stage, I hope that I can count on your continued personal involvement in bringing this effort to a positive conclusion. With kind personal regards, Yours sincerely, Boutros Boutros-Ghali

354

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 355

appendix twelve Interview Given by the President of the Republic, Mr George Vassiliou, to Turkish Television on 4 June 1992

[Question:] Your Excellency Mr Vassiliou, I would first like to thank you on behalf of the Turkish Radio and Television (TBT) for the time you granted us. Your Excellency how has the report of the UN Secretary-General and the resolution 750 of the Security Council that followed it, advanced the solution of the Cyprus problem? [Answer:] To begin with I would also like to express, in my turn, my pleasure for the fact that I am given the opportunity, to address the Turkish people through Turkish Television. I believe it is hugely important that the Turkish people be well informed on our positions on the Cyprus problem because our sincere wish is to reach a solution of this problem the soonest possible and to have the friendliest possible relations with the Turkish people and with Turkey. Now, as for the question you asked concerning the report of the Secretary-General Mr Gali and the recent resolution 750 of the Security Council our position is very clear. We hope that the Gali Report and resolution 750 will bring the Cyprus problem closer to its solution mainly because the active involvement of the international community, and especially of the Security Council and its five permanent members, is now made crystal clear. We hope that as a result of this international mobility progress may, at long last, be made on resolving the Cyprus problem. [Question:] Your Excellency Mr Vassiliou, the Gali report mentions that the relationship between the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot peoples is not one ruled by the concept of majority versus minority. Mr Gali says that within the Cypriot state the relationship is between two

355

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 356

From The President’s Office

communities and that he has the duty to mediate between them. Looking at it from this angle do you accept the political equality of the two communities? If you do, have you thought or are you thinking of discussing it if Mr Denktash brings the issue to the agenda? [Answer:] To begin with I would like to stress that what Mr Gali says in his report, which is the same as what Mr De Cuéllar had mentioned two years ago in his so-called inaugural address, is not something new. The reason is that the London–Zurich agreements were based on the concept of a Cypriot state constituted by two constitutionally equal communities and it was on this concept that various provisions of the Constitution were based. We have therefore always been in favour of this position. It is also obvious that from the first moment that the Secretary-General started offering his good offices he was offering them to both communities. Now, concerning the concept of political equality this can always be misinterpreted or be given a different dimension according to how one wants to use it. It is for that reason that I have always insisted with Mr Denktash that instead of playing with words, which can easily lead to misunderstandings, it would be better to agree specifically what it is that we want on an issue and move on from there. I want, however, to stress that what Mr Gali said about Cyprus being a homeland composed of two communities whose relations with one another are not ruled by majorityminority considerations, that this is a position which we do accept. It does not mean, of course, that in tomorrow’s Cyprus there will not be equality for all its citizens but this is a different matter. Now, as far as the meeting with Mr Denktash is concerned, I have been striving, as you know, for such a meeting for almost a year and a half. We had many meetings during which we discussed a variety of issues. I am always ready to meet Mr Denktash but only when the Secretary-General – who regulates the progress of dialogue – decides that it will be useful. Today, the SecretaryGeneral does not consider something like this to be useful and believes that it is better that he should hold himself separate meetings with Mr Denktash and with me. If and when, as we hope, the answers that Mr Denktash will give are positive, especially on the two issues mentioned in resolution 750 namely the territorial one and the one concerning the refugees, then I sincerely hope the way will open for the next stage of proximity talks which will complete the whole procedure. [Question:] In a talk you gave in Athens you said that you do not accept the alternating presidency. Why do you not accept it? Taking into account the equality of the two communities, how do you explain this refusal of yours? [Answer:] I would like first of all to stress that there should not be confusion between the concept of ‘the equality of the two communities’ 356

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 357

Appendix Twelve

and the concept of ‘the functioning of the state’. The reason is that the equality of the communities is expressed, among other things, by the fact that Cyprus will become a federal state and that each of the two communities will be responsible for governing one of its two constituent states. There are many other provisions that ensure equality in this sense. But we are discussing the creation of a federal Cyprus and on this issue resolution 750 is quite clear as it speaks of one federation with one sovereignty, one international personality and one citizenship. All this means that we are talking about a country which will, of course, be a democratic country. As far as I know there is no country in the world where it is pre-determined which community the future president will belong to. In the USA, for instance, nobody questions the equality between blacks and whites. There is no provision, however, that every few years or so a black president should be elected because this would be contrary to the concept of democracy. There were religious divisions in America in the past and it was traditional that the President would be a protestant. As time went by and with the progress of society and the system we witnessed the election of a catholic president. This means that what at first appeared impossible, because the people did not seem to allow it to happen, ended up by becoming possible thanks to the development of democracy and the strengthening of social ties. I would thus like to stress that we did not exclude the election of a TurkishCypriot to the presidency. On the contrary we stress – and this is an essential element in the proposals that we have submitted – that the Constitution should not determine that the president should come from the larger Greek-Cypriot community, and the vice-president from the Turkish-Cypriot one as the Zurich constitution provided for. Both the president and the vice-president should be elected by the people, but if the president comes from one community, the vice-president should then come from the other. We are not saying from which community the president should come from but, you might say, to begin with he is likely to be a Greek. This is probable. But as time goes by, we hope that with political parties competing for power in the framework of a unified state, the determining factor will be the ideological positioning and the personality of an individual, not his ethnic origin or the community to which he belongs. On this basis, anyone can be elected to the presidency of the Republic. However, it is not within the rules of the democratic game or the rules of democracy to predetermine the community to which the president will belong and to say that at one time you can elect someone only from this community and next time only from the other. [Question:] There are rumours that you are under pressure from the USA and the UN to make concessions on the constitutional issue regarding the 357

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 358

From The President’s Office

future Cypriot state while Mr Denktash is under pressure to make concessions on the territorial issue. Is this true? [Answer:] I can tell you this. I had a great many contacts with the US leadership, as you know, and of course with the UN which never took the shape of pressures. What we did discuss and what I kept stressing is that the time has come for the Cyprus problem to be solved and that up till now the required progress has not been made. They all saw the reasons for it and realised that progress was necessary for the Cyprus problem to be solved. This should, of course, be done on the basis of the UN resolutions and the principles of international law because no problem whose solution is sought by the UN can be solved outside the international law. These were and are my positions and I can assure you that no effort was ever undertaken by anyone to make me stray from them. [Question:] So there was no pressure on you? [Answer:] No. I simply said I was asking for a solution on the basis of the UN resolutions. [Question:] It is being said sometimes that on the Cyprus problem there has been a retreat. Is this true? If yes on which points has there been a retreat? [Answer:] Mr Gali obviously referred, essentially, to the period of last year’s autumn and this year’s winter. During this year there has indeed been a retreat because while during the summer – after the visit by president Bush in the area – there was a hope for progress to be made, there was afterwards a change of line and there followed the meeting between Mr Yilmaz and Mr Mitsotakis in Paris. Also, as you recall, Mr Denktash raised the issue of a separate sovereignty. This was considered by the UN to be contrary to the whole spirit of the talks and resolution 716 was adopted stressing that Cyprus has a single sovereignty only. The Turkish side continued to maintain this negative attitude even when the representatives of the Secretary-General visited – after the new Turkish government took over – both Ankara and Nicosia. The representatives of the UN ascertained that there was still this attachment to the notion of separate sovereignty so that no progress was possible. It is exactly because of this lack of any perspective that the Secretary-General referred to the lack of progress and on certain points even a retreat. However, after the resolution 750 that clarifies the issue once and for all, rejecting the notion of two sovereignties – because with two sovereignties we will have two states not one – and stresses that Cyprus is one state with one sovereignty I sincerely hope that, as I said before, the matter is closed since the statements made by both Mr Denktash and the Turkish government indicate that they accept the resolution. If they do, this means that they have abandoned the claim for 358

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 359

Appendix Twelve

separate sovereignty and allow us to hope that the way for progress is open. [Question:] If the two communities unite, will this benefit their economy especially regarding the Turkish Cypriots? Looking at the relations between the two communities today we witness an economic embargo against the Turkish Cypriots. If we look specifically at the village named Pyla where Turkish and Greek Cypriots live together we see that if Greek Cypriots – or even foreigners – trade with Turkish Cypriots they get punished. So there is an economic embargo against the Turkish Cypriots. However, for the two communities to live together there must be mutual trust. Is trust not harmed by what happens in Pyla? Should not the embargo come to an end at least there? [Answer:] You have asked two questions and I will answer both of them. It is well known that there has been frequent reference to the term ‘embargo’, which we never accepted. The truth, as we see it, is exactly the opposite. After the invasion when the Turkish troops occupied 37 per cent of the Cypriot territory, they isolated it and do not allow, to this day, any communication between the inhabitants in the two areas. Moreover they took possession of the assets, the industrial plants, the hotels belonging to Greeks and do not even recognise their rights of ownership, something that contravenes all the laws of the international order. Such a thing has never happened anywhere else in the world before. It is therefore natural, as long as these conditions prevail, that ordinary trading relations cannot be established. Also for instance, it is not possible for a port or an airport to belong to an entity that nobody recognises internationally, as happens with the so-called Turkish-Cypriot state. These are the causes for the lack of economic relations both between Cypriots within Cyprus and between Cyprus and abroad. It is also characteristic that the Turkish-Cypriot ‘authorities’ forbid Turkish Cypriots to even come for a meeting with Greek Cypriots. So it is no wonder that complaints are heard about an embargo being imposed. This is in some way a situation imposed by the Turkish-Cypriot ‘authorities’ themselves. We have many times offered ways to change this situation. Anyway I am totally convinced that a solution of the Cyprus problem, besides all the other benefits, will also bring important economic benefits for the Greek Cypriots but much more so for the Turkish Cypriots. The living standards of the Turkish Cypriots today are much lower than those of the Greek Cypriots and in no time, after a solution is reached, will they rise to become equal with those of the Greek Cypriots. From then on both communities will progress together much more quickly. We are talking here about a radical change in the living conditions in Cyprus to the benefit of all who live there. 359

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 360

From The President’s Office

Concerning the issue of Pyla, there is a tendency to present it as more serious than it actually is. Let us see what it is all about. There is no country in the world, either in Europe or in America where the illegal import of products is allowed without payment of customs duties by all concerned, without exception. That is what is happening in Pyla. A number of goods are imported from abroad without payment of customs duties or with very special rates for such duties which are not those decided by the Republic of Cyprus. There is then an attempt to sell these goods to foreigners or to Cypriot buyers. It is obvious that this must stop. I don’t know if there is one country in the world that would allow such a thing to happen or if Turkey itself would ever allow someone to open a shop and sell goods without having paid customs duties for them. This is of the essence and of course we, I repeat once again, want the Cyprus problem to be solved in the firm belief that the economic benefit will be huge. [Question:] You have started trying to make Cyprus a member of the European Community. There is however, an article in the 1960 constitution stipulating that Cyprus cannot be a member of any organisation which does not also count among its members the guarantor powers Greece and Turkey. Is there such a stipulation? Will you pursue your efforts to become a member of the European Community even if Turkey is not yet a member? In this case will not the Turkish Cypriots fall even further behind? [Answer:] First of all I would like to stress that the wish of a European country to become a member of the Community is perfectly natural. It is not by accident, for instance, that Turkey expressed the wish to become a full member of the European Community. Secondly, in our opinion, there is no provision in the constitution which forbids the accession of Cyprus to the European Community. What the constitution states concerns specifically military coalitions or coalitions that could in one way or another turn against one of the two countries either Greece or Turkey. Nobody can say that the European Community will ever turn against Greece or Turkey. No matter how one may interpret this, on the issue of equal treatment, Turkey has had for many years a treaty of association with the European Community and there is no problem concerning equality of treatment for Turkish goods as compared to any others. We therefore believe that there is no problem in this field. Naturally we wish Cyprus as a whole to become a member of the Community and as is well-known we submitted the membership application but insisted at the same time that we pursue our efforts for the solution of the Cyprus problem. We consider the two procedures as running in parallel. Given that to become a member of the Community takes many years, at least 3–4 at 360

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 361

Appendix Twelve

best, while the Cyprus problem can be solved much sooner, we have always hoped that it would be solved before our accession to the Community. In case, however, the Cyprus problem is not solved because Turkey has been responsible for not helping to find a solution it would naturally be unfair for the Community to come and say that Cyprus cannot become a member in spite of not being to blame for the lack of a solution. This was and continues to be our position. However, I want to believe that things are more optimistic. I want to emphasise that the perspectives for a solution of the Cyprus problem are very good provided the right spirit prevails on the Turkish side. We can very easily solve the Cyprus problem before we enter the Community. That is why we want the matter of membership to be cleared as of now and not to be an issue for discussion after the solution. It is well-known that I insisted on this and that Mr Denktash, did not present any objections to start with. He simply said that he wanted to be also present at the negotiations and I told him: Let us solve the Cyprus problem and then you will naturally participate at the negotiations. We want to have an agreement with the Turkish-Cypriot side on this issue now so that after the solution of the Cyprus problem we can enter the Community to everybody’s content. We hope that Turkey will be able, thanks to the progress of its economy and its social system become a member of the Community. This will be decided by the Community not by us. To the extent, however, that this depends on us, once the Cyprus problem is solved, we will be in favour of Turkey’s membership and we will try our best to help bring this about. [Question:] On the basis of the agreements of 1977 and 1979 serious consideration must be given to the productivity of various areas when it comes to an agreement on the territorial issue. This has not been done so far. Is there a possibility that this issue too can be discussed? [Answer:] With regard to the territorial issue there have been a great many arrangements that started almost as early as 1975. There has been an effort to discuss all the aspects that you are referring to. I would even say that there have been too many discussions on these issues. The truth is that, generally speaking, there are no significant differences between the different areas of Cyprus as far as the productivity of the soil is concerned and if this did exist many years ago, we can safely say that with today’s technological progress such differences have become minimal. Moreover, the concept of productivity changes over time. Today, if you ask anyone, he will tell you that the important thing is the profit you can make from a given area: as is well-known beaches are much more productive than plains in the sense that they attract tourism etc. It is a fact that the Cyprus problem has gone on for far too long and that it is time for an agreement to emerge, for a solution based on certain basic 361

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 362

From The President’s Office

elements of justice that can of course not diverge from the structure of the relations between the two communities which is well-known and should not be exaggerated. We have already accepted that in an agreement on the territorial issue the proportion allocated to the Turkish-Cypriot side would be greater, but not too much greater, from the percentage of the population representing the percentage of the properties it owned. We believe the time has come, as the Secretary-General stresses in his report, for an agreement to be fixed on a map, because otherwise the discussions can go on inconclusively for years and years. It is easy, if you do not want to reach a conclusion, to find pretexts to keep discussing the issue forever. [Question:] Mr Vassiliou has an issue been raised for the establishment in your area of any Turkish-Cypriot ‘refugees’? It does not seem very possible today for Turks who own such properties to come back. Have you established refugees in these properties? Or do you plan to do so? [Answer:] Our position has always been very simple. There will be a solution, there will be a Federation and all Cypriots, Greeks and Turks must choose where they want to live. Do they want to go where they have been born, where their homes are? Do they want to stay where they are today? This, as is right and proper in every democratic society, is a decision that every citizen will have to take for himself. Now if we suppose that someone does not want to go back but wants to stay where he is now, while retaining at the same time the property he owns and does not want to sell it, we insist that the right to property which we all know is sacred and inviolable, must be safeguarded. This means practically that those Greek Cypriots who do not want to return and want to sell their properties are free to do so while those who do not want to sell their properties are also free to do so. Concerning the Turkish Cypriots, all those amongst them who do not want to return and wish to sell their properties can also do so. There may be some body to be created by the federal government that will deal with such matters but all those who want to keep their properties must be free to retain them and develop them within the legal framework of the state. [Question:] Mr Vassiliou, what do you think about issues of internal policy? [Answer:] Cyprus, as you know, is a democratic country with many parties and many ideas. It is natural that there should be different opinions on many issues. This applies to the Cyprus problem as well. There are various views regarding its handling and the tactics used. However, as far as the aims are concerned, the overwhelming majority, not to say the totality, of the Cypriot people want the Cyprus problem to be solved within the frame of a Federation. In other words the Cypriots accept the high level agreements and look forward to the day when the Greeks and Turks of 362

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 363

Appendix Twelve

Cyprus will be able to live in peace and cooperate as they did in the old days. This is the hope of all of us and it is worthwhile fighting for the welfare of Cyprus and the area as a whole. [Question:] Is there something else you might wish to say in Turkish? [Answer:] With pleasure. ‘I wish all the best to your listeners.’

363

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 364

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 365

appendix thirteen Set of Ideas on an Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus

21 August 1992 1. The leader of the Greek Cypriot community and the leader of the TurkishCypriot community have negotiated on an equal footing, under the auspices of the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General, the following overall framework agreement on Cyprus which constitutes a major step towards a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question. The overall framework agreement will be submitted to the two communities in separate referendums within 30 days of its completion by the two leaders at a high-level international meeting.

I Overall Objectives 2. The overall framework agreement is an integrated whole which, when it is approved by both communities in separate referendums and the provisions contained in the transitional arrangements have been implemented, will result in a new partnership and a new constitution for Cyprus that will govern the relations of the two communities on a federal basis that is bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects. The overall framework agreement is based on the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, relevant UN resolutions, in particular Security Council resolutions 367 (1975), 649 (1990), 716 (1991) and 750 (1992), and the guiding principles set out below. 3. The overall framework agreement recognizes that Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish-Cypriot community and that their relationship is not one of majority and minority but one of two communities in the federal republic of Cyprus. It safeguards the cultural, religious, political, social and linguistic identity of each community. 365

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 366

From The President’s Office

4. The overall framework agreement ensures that the Cyprus settlement is based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as defined in paragraph 11 of the Secretary-General's report of 3 April 1992 (S/23780) in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that the settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession. 5. The overall framework agreement acknowledges and ensures the political equality of the two communities. While political equality does not mean equal numerical participation in all branches and administration of the federal government, it will be reflected in the fact that the approval and amendment of the federal constitution will require the approval of both communities; in the effective participation of both communities in all organs and decisions of the federal government; in safeguards to ensure that the federal government will not be empowered to adopt any measures against the interests of one community; and in the equality and identical powers and functions of the two federated states. 6. The overall framework agreement provides for functions and powers of the federal government, including its structure, composition and functioning of its three branches that will ensure the effective participation of the two communities and the effective functioning of the federal government, which will require an appropriate deadlock-resolving machinery. 7. The two communities acknowledge each other’s identity and integrity, and commit themselves to work actively to achieve a new relationship based on mutual respect, friendship and cooperation. Toward this end, the two communities agree to change all practices incompatible with this commitment and to refrain from any action that would impair the efforts for a negotiated settlement. They pledge to launch immediately a programme of action to promote goodwill and closer relations between them (see Appendix).

II Guiding Principles 8. The bi-communal and bi-zonal federation will be established freely by the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. All powers not vested by them in the federal government will rest with the two federated states. 9. The federal constitution will come into force after its approval by the two communities in separate referendums and can only be amended with the approval of both federated states. 10. The federal republic will be one territory composed of two politically equal federated states. 11. The federal republic will have one sovereignty, which is indivisible and which emanates equally from the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. One 366

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 367

Appendix Thirteen

community cannot claim sovereignty over the other community. The federal republic will have one international personality and one citizenship regulated by federal law in accordance with the federal constitution. 12. The federal constitution will safeguard the identity, integrity and security of each community as well as their political, economic, social, cultural, linguistic and religious rights. All citizens will be equal under the law. 13. The federal republic will be secular. Religious functionaries will be prohibited from holding elected or appointed political office in the federal government or in the federated states. 14. The federal republic will maintain special ties of friendship with Greece and Turkey and will accord most favoured nation treatment to Greece and Turkey in connection with all agreements whatever their nature. The federal republic will continue the membership in the Commonwealth. 15. The official languages of the federal republic will be Greek and Turkish. The English language may also be used. 16. The federal republic will have its own flag to be agreed upon. The federal flag will be flown on federal buildings and federal locations to the exclusion of all other flags. Each federated state will have its own flag. 17. The holidays to be observed by the federal government will be agreed upon and embodied in the federal constitution. Each federated state will observe the federal holidays as well as those established by it. 18. The two federated states will have identical powers and functions. 19. Each federated state will be administered by one community. 20. Each federated state will decide on its own governmental arrangement in a manner consistent with the federal constitution. 21. The federal government cannot encroach upon the powers and functions of the two federated states. 22. Security, law and order and the administration of justice in its territory will be the responsibility of each federated state in a manner consistent with the federal constitution. 23. The two federated states will cooperate in the preservation and/or use of historical sites and religious shrines of both faiths to be agreed to during the transitional period.

III Constitutional Aspects of the Federation 24. The powers, functions and structure of the federal government will be in conformity with the overall objectives and guiding principles set out above.

A. Powers and functions to be vested in the federal government 25. The federal government will have the powers and functions listed below. All powers and functions not vested in the federal government will rest with the two 367

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 368

From The President’s Office

federated states. The federated states may decide jointly to confer additional powers and functions to the federal government or to transfer powers and functions from the federal government to the federated states. 26. The federal government will have the following powers and functions: (a) Foreign affairs (the federated states may enter into agreements with foreign governments and international organizations in their areas of competence. The representation in foreign affairs will reflect the bi-communal nature of the federal republic); (b) Central bank functions (including the issuance of currency); (c) Customs and the coordination of international trade; (d) Airports and ports as concerns international matters; (e) Federal budget and federal taxation; (f ) Immigration and citizenship; (g) Defence (to be discussed also in connection with the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance); (h) Federal judiciary and federal police; (i) Federal postal and telecommunications services; (j) Patents and trademarks; (k) Appointment of federal officials and civil servants (on a 70:30 Greek Cypriot/Turkish-Cypriot ratio); (l) Standard setting for public health, environment, use and preservation of natural resources, and weights and measures; (m) Coordination of tourism and industrial activities. 27. The federal powers and functions will be executed by the federal government or, in accordance with agreements, through delegation to the federated states.

B. Structure, composition and functioning of the federal government 1. The Legislature 28. The legislature will be composed of a lower house and an upper house. The presidents of the lower house and of the upper house cannot come from the same community. The president and vice-president of each house will not come from the same community. 29. All laws must be approved by both houses. 30. The lower house will be bi-communal with a 70:30 Greek Cypriot/TurkishCypriot ratio. 31. The upper house will have a 50:50 ratio representing the two federated states. 32. All laws will be adopted by majority in each house. A majority of the Greek Cypriot or Turkish-Cypriot representatives in the lower house may decide, on matters related to foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship, that the adoption of a law in the lower house will require separate majorities of the representatives of both communities. 368

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 369

Appendix Thirteen

33. Separate Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot majorities will be required to constitute a quorum in each house. If a quorum is not attained in either house on two consecutive meetings because of the absence of a majority of one or both communities, the president of the relevant house will call a meeting in no less than 5 days and no more than 10 days. At that meeting, a majority of the upper house will constitute a quorum. In the lower house, 30 per cent of the total membership will constitute a quorum. 34. If the two houses fail to adopt a bill or decision, they will initiate proceedings to obtain a consensus while ensuring the continued functioning of the federal government. To this end, a conference committee will be established. The conference committee will be composed of two persons each selected by the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot groups equally from among the members of the two houses of the federal legislature. The text of the legislation or decision agreed to by the conference committee will be submitted to both houses for approval. 35. In the event the federal budget is not adopted in one or both houses and until an agreement is reached by the conference committee and is adopted by both houses, the provisions of the most recent federal budget plus inflation shall remain in effect. 2. The executive 36. The federal executive will consist of a federal president, a federal vicepresident, and a federal council of ministers. The president and the vice president will symbolize the unity of the country and the political equality of the two communities. [On the question of the election of the president and vice-president, the two sides have expressed different positions. The Greek-Cypriot side prefers a system under which the president is elected by popular universal suffrage. The Turkish-Cypriot side prefers a system under which the president rotates between the two communities.] 37. To facilitate the effective launching of the federal government and for the initial eight years, the president and vice-president will also be the heads of their respective federated states. 38. There will be a council of ministers composed of Greek-Cypriot and TurkishCypriot ministers on a 7:3 ratio. The president and vice-president will designate the ministers from their respective communities who will appoint them by an instrument signed by them both. One of the following three ministries, that is foreign affairs, finance, or defence, will be allocated to a Turkish-Cypriot minister. The president and the foreign minister will not come from the same community. 39. The president and the vice-president will discuss the preparation of the agenda of the council of ministers and each can include items in the agenda. 40. Decisions of the council of ministers will be taken by majority vote. However, decisions of the Council of ministers concerning foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship will require the concurrence of both the president and the vice-president. 369

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 370

From The President’s Office

41. Arrangements related to the implementation of foreign policy and the composition of the foreign service will be set out in the federal constitution. 42. The president and the vice-president will, separately or conjointly, have the right to veto any law or decision of the legislature concerning foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship. The president and vicepresident will have the right, separately or conjointly, to return any law or decision of the legislature or any decision of the council of ministers for reconsideration. 3. The judiciary 43. The federal judiciary will consist of a supreme court composed of an equal number of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot judges appointed jointly by the president and vice-president with the consent of the upper house. The Supreme Court will sit as the federal constitutional court and the highest court of the federation. Its presidency will rotate between the senior Greek-Cypriot and TurkishCypriot members of the Supreme Court. Lower federal courts may be established in each federated state. 44. The Supreme Court will deal with matters arising under the federal constitution and federal laws, and will be empowered to fulfil other judiciary functions related to federal matters attributed to it by the federal constitution or federal legislation. 45. Each federated state will have its own judiciary to deal with matters not attributed to the federal judiciary by the federal constitution. 46. The federal constitution will establish the procedure for ascertaining the constitutionality of federal laws and executive acts, as well as adequate machinery of judicial review to ensure the compliance of legislative, executive, and judicial acts of the federated states with the federal constitution.

C. Fundamental rights, including the three freedoms, and political, economic, social and cultural rights 47. All universally recognized fundamental rights and freedoms will be included in the federal constitution. 48. The freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the right to property will be safeguarded in the federal constitution. The implementation of these rights will take into account the 1977 high-level agreement and the guiding principles set out above. 49. The freedom of movement will be exercised without any restrictions as soon as the federal republic is established, subject only to non-discriminatory normal police functions. 50. The freedom of settlement and the right to property will be implemented after the resettlement process arising from the territorial adjustments has been completed. The federated states will regulate these rights in a manner to be agreed upon during the transitional period consistent with the federal constitution. 370

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 371

Appendix Thirteen

51. Persons who are known to have been or are actively involved in acts of violence or in incitement to violence and/or hatred against persons of the other community may, subject to due process of law, be prevented from going to the federated state administered by the other community.

IV Security and Guarantee 52. The security of the federal republic and of the Greek-Cypriot and TurkishCypriot federated states will be guaranteed. 53. The demilitarization of the federal republic remains an objective. 54. The 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance continue in force and will be supplemented in a document to be appended as set out below. 55. The Treaty of Guarantee will ensure the independence and territorial integrity of the federal republic and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession; ensure the security of the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot federated states; and ensure against the unilateral change of the new constitutional order of the federal republic by either community. 56. A numerical balance of Greek and Greek Cypriot troops and equipment on the one hand and of Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot troops and equipment on the other hand will be achieved within ……. months after the overall framework agreement has been approved by the two communities in separate referenda. 57. A timetable will be established for the further reduction to an agreed level of the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot units and for the withdrawal of all nonCypriot forces not provided for under the Treaty of Alliance. This timetable will be fully implemented prior to the establishment of the federal republic and in phases parallel to the implementation of the programme of action set out in the appendix. 58. The Treaty of Alliance will provide for the stationing in Cyprus of Greek and Turkish contingents of equal size and equipment not exceeding …… persons each. The Greek contingent will be stationed in the federated state administered by the Greek Cypriot community and cannot enter the federated state administered by the Turkish-Cypriot community. The Turkish contingent will be stationed in the federated state administered by the Turkish-Cypriot community and cannot enter the federated state administered by the Greek Cypriot community. 59. The federal republic will maintain a federal force consisting of a GreekCypriot and a Turkish-Cypriot unit of equal size and equipment not exceeding the size of the Greek and Turkish contingents, under the joint overall command of the president and the vice-president. The Greek Cypriot unit will be stationed in the federated state administered by the Greek Cypriot community. The Turkish-Cypriot unit will be stationed in the federated state administered by the Turkish-Cypriot community. The president and the vice-president will jointly decide on the locations of the units. 371

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 372

From The President’s Office

60. There will not be any reserve force and any military or paramilitary training of civilian groups. 61. The Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot units will promote mutual respect, friendship and closer relations between the two communities and foster their welfare by carrying out joint social service activities throughout the federal republic. 62. Each federated state and the federal republic will have a police force. All paramilitary activities and the ownership of weapons other than those licensed for hunting will be outlawed throughout the federal republic and any infraction will be a federal offense. The importation or transit of weapons and other military equipment other than that duly approved by the federal government will be prohibited. 63. Immediately after the approval of the overall framework agreement by the two communities in separate referenda, an interim monitoring committee will be established composed of the three guarantor powers, the two communities and the UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which will be responsible for: (a) Monitoring the achievement of the agreed numerical balance of Greek and Greek Cypriot troops and equipment on the one hand and Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot troops and equipment on the other hand to be implemented within …… months after the overall framework agreement has been approved by the two communities in separate referendums; (b) Monitoring the achievement of the agreed timetable for the further reduction to the agreed level of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot units and the withdrawal of all non-Cypriot forces not provided for in the Treaty of Alliance prior to the establishment of the federal republic. 64. The Treaty of Guarantee, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with which the federal republic will affirm its commitment, will provide for a supervision and verification committee comprising representatives of the guarantor Powers and of the federal president and federal vice-president. The UN will provide the support personnel to assist the supervision and verification committee in carrying out its functions. 65. The supervision and verification committee will be responsible for investigating any development which in the view of either the federal president or federal vice-president or any guarantor Power is a threat to the security of either community or of the federal republic through on-site inspection and other methods the supervision and verification committee deems necessary. The supervision and verification committee will make recommendations for rectifying any situation it has established to be in contravention of the arrangements covered by the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance. The parties will be obligated to implement these recommendations promptly and in goodwill. 372

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 373

Appendix Thirteen

66. The UN Security Council will be requested to revise the mandate of UNFICYP, including support of the supervision and verification committee.

V Territorial Adjustments 67. The Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities agree on the territories of the federated states administered by each, taking into account the 1977 high-level agreement. 68. The map attached hereto sets out the territories of the two federated states. The territorial agreement shall be respected and will be included in the federal constitution. 69. Persons affected by the territorial adjustments will have the option of remaining, in the area concerned or relocating to the federated state administered by their own community. 70. All necessary arrangements for the relocation of persons affected by territorial adjustments will be satisfactorily implemented before resettlements are carried out. The fund to be established related to displaced persons will be available for this purpose. 71. The territorial adjustment will not affect the water resources available to each federated state. The water resources available throughout the federation will be allocated to the two federated states at a proportion at least equal to their respective current demand.

VI Displaced Persons 72. The property claims of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot displaced persons are recognized and will be dealt with fairly on the basis of a time-frame and practical regulations based on the 1977 high-level agreement, on the need to ensure social peace and harmony, and on the arrangements set out below.

A. Areas that will come under Greek-Cypriot administration 73. The first priority will be given to the satisfactory relocation of and support for Turkish Cypriots living in the area that will come under Greek Cypriot administration and to displaced persons returning to that area. 74. Turkish Cypriots who in 1974 resided in the area that will come under Greek Cypriot administration will have the option to remain in their property or to request to receive a comparable residence in the area that will come under Turkish-Cypriot administration. Turkish-Cypriot displaced persons currently residing in the area that will come under Greek Cypriot administration will have the option to receive comparable residence in that area, to return to their former residence, or to receive 373

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 374

From The President’s Office

a comparable residence in the area that will come under Turkish-Cypriot administration. 75. A bi-communal committee will be established immediately after the overall framework agreement has been approved in the referendums to arrange for suitable housing for all persons affected by the territorial adjustments.

B. Other areas under Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot administration 76. Each community will establish an agency to deal with all matters related to displaced persons. 77. The ownership of the property of displaced persons, in respect of which those persons seek compensation, will be transferred to the ownership of the community in which the property is located. To this end, all titles of properties will be exchanged on a global communal basis between the two agencies at the 1974 value plus inflation. Displaced persons will be compensated by the agency of their community from funds obtained from the sale of the properties transferred to the agency, or through the exchange of property. The shortfall in funds necessary for compensation will be covered by the federal government from a compensation fund obtained from various possible sources such as windfall taxes on the increased value of transferred properties following the overall agreement, and savings from defence spending. Governments and international organizations will also be invited to contribute to the compensation fund. In this connection, the option of long-term leasing and other commercial arrangements may also be considered. 78. Persons from both communities who in 1974 resided and/or owned property in the federated state administered by the other community or their heirs will be able to file compensation claims. Persons belonging to the Turkish-Cypriot community who were displaced after December 1963 or their heirs may also file claims. 79. Current permanent residents of Cyprus who at the time of displacement owned their permanent residence in the federated state administered by the other community and who wish to resume their permanent residence at that location may also select the option to return. 80. Current permanent residents of Cyprus who at the time of displacement rented their permanent residence in the federated state administered by the other community and who wish to resume their permanent residence in that area will be given priority under the freedom of settlement arrangements. 81. All claims must be filed within six months after the approval of the overall framework agreement. 82. ...thousand displaced persons who elect to return to their former permanent residence will be processed by the federated state concerned each year for … years. In addition, Maronites who in 1974 had their permanent residence in the federated state under the administration of the Turkish-Cypriot community may elect to return to their properties. The two federated states will review the situation at the conclusion of the above mentioned period in the light of the experience gained. 374

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 375

Appendix Thirteen

83. This period will begin after the resettlement and rehabilitation process arising from territorial adjustments are essentially completed. 84. The settlement of those who select to return will take place after the persons who will be affected have been satisfactorily relocated. If the current occupant is also a displaced person and wishes to remain, or if the property has been substantially altered or has been converted to public use, the former permanent resident will be compensated or will be provided an accommodation of similar value. 85. Persons who are known to have been actively or are actively involved in acts of violence or incitement to violence and/or hatred against persons of the other community may, subject to due process of law, be prevented from returning to the federated state administered by the other community.

VII Economic Development and Safeguards 86. A priority objective of the federal republic will be the development of a balanced economy that will benefit equally both federated states. A major programme of action will be established to correct the economic imbalance and ensure economic equilibrium between the two communities through special measures to promote the development of the federated state administered by the Turkish-Cypriot community. A special fund will be established for this purpose. Foreign governments and international organizations will be invited by the Security Council to contribute to this fund. 87. To help promote a balanced economy, persons may be employed throughout the federal republic at equal pay. 88. To protect in particular the federated state administered by the Turkish-Cypriot community, special measures and safeguards will be adopted to avoid adverse economic effects resulting from the establishment of the federal republic, for example as a result of the adoption of one currency and the establishment of one customs frontier. 89. Each federated state may, in addition to federal taxation, establish and administer its own tax regime and determine tax rates in line with its economic objectives and needs. 90. In line with annex F, part II, of the Treaty of Establishment, the federal republic will accord most favoured nation treatment to Greece and Turkey in connection with all agreements whatever their nature. 91. A bi-communal committee will be established as part of the transitional arrangements to prepare the special programmes and measures envisaged above prior to the establishment of the federal republic. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) will provide the committee with support. The committee may request other expert assistance as required. 92. Matters related to the membership of the federal republic in the European Economic Community will be discussed and agreed to, and will be submitted for 375

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 376

From The President’s Office

the approval of the two communities in separate referendums. [This paragraph relates exclusively to arrangements that might be put in place in Cyprus and in no way impinges upon the prerogatives of the European Community and its member States in matters concerning membership in the Community.]

VIII Transitional Arrangements 93. Immediately after the approval in separate referendums of the overall framework agreement on Cyprus, the following transitional arrangements will be carried out to implement the overall framework agreement, including the preparation and putting into force of the federal constitution. All transitional arrangements will be fully implemented in an 18-month period. 94. In line with this overall framework agreement, bi-communal committees will be established immediately to implement the provisions related to the preparation and putting into force of the federal constitution and electoral law, the establishment of the federal civil service, property settlement claims, economic development and safeguards, arrangements related to the territorial adjustments to take effect at the time the federal republic is established, and the programme of action set out in the appendix. Furthermore, a committee composed of the representatives of the guarantor powers and the two communities will be established to supplement the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance. The UN will assist each committee in fulfilling its functions. Each side may employ foreign experts. 95. In addition, a committee composed of the leaders of the two communities and a representative of the Secretary-General of the UN will be established immediately to work out the transitional arrangements procedures foreseen herein and to ensure that the functions of the above mentioned committees are implemented in an effective and timely manner. Furthermore, the committee will, within 30 days of its completion by the two leaders at a high-level international meeting, organize separate referendums to approve the overall framework agreement, and, at the appropriate time during the transitional period, organize separate referendums to approve the federal constitution and the elections of federal officials with the assistance of and verification by the UN. 96. During the transitional period, the current arrangements for the administration of the day-to-day internal affairs of each side will continue, unless modified by the provisions of the overall framework agreement. In matters affecting Cyprus as a whole, such as international trade and tourism, the same principle shall apply on the understanding that these matters will be administered on an interim basis in the common interest. To this end, interim procedures will be agreed to by the two communities. 97. During the transitional period, external affairs shall be conducted in a manner which accords with the principles contained in the overall framework agreement and 376

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 377

Appendix Thirteen

in consensus with the leaders of the two communities. Arrangements shall be made for joint delegations, in particular to international meetings. 98. The statutes, laws, regulations, rules, contracts currently in effect on both sides shall be considered valid to the extent they are not inconsistent with the overall framework agreement. The federal government may review prior international agreements to determine whether any action should be taken in respect thereto. 99. Each community will prepare its federated state constitution and electoral law in line with the federal constitution and electoral law, and will organize its federated state governmental arrangements which shall both come into being at the same time that the federal republic is established. 100. The date of entry into force of the federal constitution will be specified therein and will be the date on which the federal republic comes into being.

IX Notification to the United Nations 101. As soon as the overall framework agreement has been approved in separate referendums by each community, the leaders of the two communities will address a letter to the Secretary-General of the UN transmitting to him the text of the Overall Framework Agreement with the request that he submits the letter and the overall framework agreement to the Security Council so that the Council may take note of the decision of the two communities to establish a federal republic in the manner described in the overall framework agreement.

Appendix As soon as the overall framework agreement has been approved by the two communities in separate referendums the following programme of action to promote goodwill and close relations between the two communities will be implemented. 1. The flow of persons and goods, services, capital, communication, and international assistance from and/or to Cyprus will take place on an equal basis throughout Cyprus and any restrictions to the contrary will be lifted. 2. All restrictions on travel by members of the Turkish-Cypriot community will be lifted. The two communities will agree on interim procedures. 3. The restrictions on the movement of tourists will be lifted. 4. Objections to the participation in international sport and cultural activities will be lifted. 5. The freedom of movement will be facilitated subject, by way of agreement between the two communities, only to minimal procedures. 377

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 378

From The President’s Office

6. Pending the establishment of the federal republic, Varosha will be placed under UN administration and a programme of action for its restoration will be prepared and implemented. 7. All military modernization programmes and strengthening of positions will cease. The two sides will cooperate with the UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in extending the unmanning of positions along the buffer zone to all areas where the troops of both sides remain in close proximity to each other. The freedom of movement of UNFICYP throughout Cyprus will be ensured. 8. A bi-communal committee will be established to review the textbooks used in schools on each side and make recommendations for the removal of material that is contrary to the promotion of goodwill and close relations between the two communities. The committee may also recommend positive measures to promote that objective. 9. Both communities will promote goodwill and close relations between them and friendly relations with Greece and Turkey. 10. Both communities will, within the limits of their authority, terminate all current or pending recourse before an international body against the other community or Greece or Turkey. 11. A bi-communal committee will be established to survey the water situation in Cyprus and to make recommendations on ways of meeting the water needs of Cyprus, including from external sources. The committee may request expert assistance as required. 12. A bi-communal committee will be established to prepare and launch a programme of action for the restoration of historical and religious sites throughout Cyprus. The committee may request expert assistance as required. 13. A bi-communal committee will be established to undertake a population census of both communities. The committee may request expert assistance as required. 14. The two communities undertake to support the efforts of the Committee on Missing Persons to reach early conclusions wherever possible on the fate of the missing persons. To this end, the Committee is requested to undertake without delay the investigation of all cases of missing persons and, to this end, to reassess the criteria for arriving at conclusions on the fate of the missing.

378

0

0

10

Nicosia

10

20 miles

20 kilometres

Lamaca

Famagusta Varosha

12:41

Limassol

Morphou

Kyrenia

Sea

Mediterranean

26/11/09

Paphos

Cyprus

02_Presidents Office_299-416 Page 379

Appendix Thirteen

379

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 380

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 381

appendix fourteen Summary of the Current Positions of the Two Sides in Relation to the Set of Ideas (S/24472)

11 November 1992: Introductory note: Preamble Table A1: Positions on the Set of Ideas Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

1. The Turkish-Cypriot side is basically in agreement with 91 out of the 100 paragraphs of the Set of Ideas, taking them as a basis for discussion and therefore as being open to possible variations and additions along the lines as suggested below within the basically agreed context.

1. The Greek-Cypriot side in its opening statement stated that it accepts the Set of Ideas and the map as a basis for reaching an overall framework agreement and that it would negotiate in good faith in order to reach such an agreement, which will be in conformity with international law, human rights norms, as well as the functionality of the State, to the benefit of both communities. However, as the Turkish-Cypriot side did not accept basic principles of the Set of Ideas and the map, it was not possible to discuss all aspects of the Set of Ideas.

SCR 774/92 Endorses the Set of Ideas including suggested territorial adjustments reflected in the Map contained in the Annex to the SecretaryGeneral's report (S/24472) of 21 August 1992 as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement.

2. The differences under the remaining 9 paragraphs stem from the well-known Turkish-Cypriot position on the following 7 outstanding issues which, in the view of the Turkish-Cypriot side, have not as yet been ‘mutually agreed’:

e. The participation of the federation in international organizations in which Turkey and Greece are not both members; f. The modalities of the implication of the principle of ‘one sovereignty’ for both communities, which may be best expressed by the following formula:

381

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 382

From The President’s Office

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

a. The executive: the principle of the rotation of the President and the VicePresident and their mode of election;

2. The Greek-Cypriot side looks forward to carrying out and completing the above task on the resumption of the intercommunal talks.

‘The federated states are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the sovereignty of the federal State’;

b. The numerical composition of the council of ministers, the rotation of the Ministries and the principle of consensus;

g. The issue of ‘Displaced persons’, as explained in the position paper presented at talks on 6 August 1992. 3. The Turkish-Cypriot position on territorial adjustments has been fully set out and explained during the talks.

c. The transitional arrangements, with particular reference to the establishment of a Transitional government; d. The elimination of economic disparities.

Overall Objectives/Guiding Principles Table A2: Summary of discussions of 4–5 November 1992 Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

1. The result of the overall framework agreement will be the establishment of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic by two politically equal corporate bodies from which the sovereignty of the federal republic shall emanate.

1. The provisions of the Set of Ideas under these headings are accepted in principle subject to any improvements for the benefit of both communities.

SCR 774/92 Endorses the Set of Ideas including suggested territorial adjustments reflected in the map contained in the annex to the Secretary-General's report (S/24472) of 21 August 1992 as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement. SCR 774/92 Reaffirms all previous resolutions of the Council.

2. The two equal federated states will each freely agree to devolve a portion of their respective sovereign

382

2. The bi-communal and bi-zonal federation will be established freely by the Greek-Cypriot community and the Turkish-Cypriot community, which together

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 383

Appendix Fourteen

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

powers to the federal government.

constitute the people of Cyprus.

SCR 750/774 Reaffirms that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as defined in paragraph 11 of the Secretary-General’s report (S/23780 of 3 April 1992) in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or cessation. [See also, 367, 649, 716, 750]

3. The Turkish-Cypriot side declares that the essence of its position is that ‘The federated states are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the sovereignty of the federal state’. 4. The Turkish-Cypriot side is basically in agreement with paras.: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (for para. 8 see para. 3 above); 9, 10 (should be reformulated to conform with the wording of the 1977 high-level agreement as follows ‘The Federal Republic will have territorial integrity and its territory will be composed of the respective territories of the two politically equal federated states’); 12 (agreed with the addition ‘but this equality shall not be interpreted or used as a pretext to the detriment of the communal identity, political equality and integrity of either community’); 13, 14, 15 (agreed with the addition of ‘The official language of The TurkishCypriot Federated State will be Turkish and the official language of the GreekCypriot Federated State will

SCR 541/83 Deplores the declaration of the TurkishCypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus. Considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal. [See also SCR 550/84] Set of Ideas * See paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16. * The paragraph numbers refer to the paragraph numbers of the Set of Ideas contained in Annex to the

383

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 384

From The President’s Office

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

be Greek’); 16 (agreed with the addition ‘the federated states will have the right to fly, together with their own flag, either the Turkish or Greek flag at the same time’); 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.

UN position Secretary-General's report of 21 August 1992 (S/24472). The paragraphs of the Set of Ideas reproduced herein are those which relate directly to the points raised by either side.

Constitutional Aspects of the Federation A. Powers and functions to be vested in the federal government Table A3: Summary of discussions of 2 November 1992 Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

1. The federated states may enter into agreements with foreign governments within their areas of competence, without approval from the federal government. However, such agreements should be in conformity with the foreign policy of the federal government.

1. The provisions in the relevant part of the Set of Ideas are accepted in principle subject to any improvements for the benefit of both communities.

SCR 774/92 Endorses the Set of Ideas including suggested territorial adjustments reflected in the map contained in the annex to the Secretary-General's report (S/24472) of 21 August 1992 as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement. GAR 3212 Considers that the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus concerns the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot communities.

2. The federal government should set rules and procedures and these should be implemented by the federated states in respect of: (d) Airports and ports as concerns international matters; (f ) Immigration and Citizenship.

384

2. The powers and functions of the federal government, because of their very nature, especially those concerning key matters such as inter-alia immigration and citizenship, have to be executed and implemented by the federal government. 3. Any agreement into which a federated state may wish to enter within the

Set of Ideas Paragraphs 25, 26, 27.

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 385

Appendix Fourteen

Turkish-Cypriot position

3. The federal government should coordinate the procedures relating to patents and trademarks. 4. Concerning public health, environment, use and preservation of natural resources, and weights and measures, the federal government should set minimum standards. 5. Federal powers and functions should be executed by federal officers belonging to the community of the federated state in which they serve or, in accordance with agreements, through delegation to the federated states. 6. The Turkish-Cypriot side is basically in agreement with paras.: 24, 25, 26 (a); (b) with the addition of ‘the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Central Bank will not come from the same community’; (c), (e), (g), (h), (i), (k), (l), (m);

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

area of its competence, with a foreign state, should be concluded through the federal foreign ministry and if it affects the international relations of the federation, or entails a financial burden for it, should be approved by the federal government. 4. Provision should be made for federal government powers and functions in the setting of federal economic policy. 5. Commercial law and company law should be uniform throughout the federation. 6. Federal officers, regardless of their community of origin, have to be able to serve throughout the territory of the federation. 7. The locus of the residual powers does not in anyway affect the single indivisible sovereignty of the state of Cyprus.

For paras. 26(d), (f ), (j) see paras. 2 and 3 above, 27 (see para 5 above).

385

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 386

From The President’s Office

B. Structure, composition and functioning of the federal government Table A4: Summary of discussions of 3 November 1992 Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

Legislature 1. The provisions in the relevant part of the Set of Ideas are acceptable.

Legislature 1. The provisions in the relevant part of the Set of Ideas are accepted in principle subject to any improvements to the benefit of both communities

Legislature Set of Ideas Paragraphs 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35.

2. The Turkish-Cypriot side is basically in agreement with paras. 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35. The Executive 1. The president and vicepresident symbolize the bicommunal nature of the federation and the political equality of the two communities. Therefore, representatives of each community should rotate in the presidency. 2. The rotation of representation of the federation at official occasions overseas -would reflect internationally the bi-communal nature of the federation. 3. Election by common electoral roll would negate the historical rights of each community and would be contrary to the bicommunal character of the federation. 4. Each community must separately elect through

386

2. The electoral system for both Houses of the Legislature should be uniform throughout the federation. 3. It has been agreed that 50 per cent of the members of the Upper House will constitute a quorum. 4. In view of the composition of the Upper House the provision for separate majorities are not really necessary. 5. It is advisable to improve the deadlock resolving machinery. The Executive 1. The provisions in the relevant part of the Set of Ideas are accepted in principle subject to any improvements for the benefit of both communities.

The Executive SCR 774/92 Endorses the Set of Ideas including suggested territorial adjustments reflected in the map contained in the annex to the Secretary-General's report (S/24472) of 21 August 1992 as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement. Set of Ideas Paragraphs 36, 38, 40. Judiciary Set of Ideas paragraph 43,

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 387

Appendix Fourteen

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

universal suffrage its own representative to fill the office of federal president or vice-president. Such elections ensure that federal office holders embody the will of the community they represent and reflect the vested right of each community to elect its own representatives in the central government, drawing from the 1960 Constitution and going back to the Ottoman period.

2. The federal president and vice-president symbolize the unity of the country and should have a universal mandate. They must therefore be elected by federation-wide and weighted universal suffrage. Such federation-wide elections would foster intercommunal harmony. For all these reasons rotation is not an acceptable option.

5. The council of ministers should be composed of an equal number of TurkishCypriot and Greek-Cypriot federal ministers, to reflect the political equality of the two communities. 6. The council of ministers should function on the basis of consensus. 7. The Turkish-Cypriot side is basically in agreement with paras.: 36 (for the mode of the elections see paras. 1–4 above), 39, 41, 42. Judiciary 1. The provisions in the relevant part of the Set of Ideas are acceptable. 2. The Turkish-Cypriot side is basically in agreement with paras.: 43, 44, 45, 46.

UN position

3. The composition of the council of ministers suggested in the Set of Ideas is acceptable (i.e., 7:3 Greek Cypriot/TurkishCypriot ratio). 4. As regards decisionmaking in the council of ministers, para. 40 of the Set of Ideas is accepted. 5. ‘The Greek-Cypriot position is that it is to the benefit of both communities if one of the following three ministries, that is foreign affairs, finance or defence is allocated to a TurkishCypriot Minister on a rotational basis. The nearpermanent allocation of any Ministry to one or other community will be counterproductive’.

387

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 388

From The President’s Office

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

Judiciary 1. The provisions in the relevant part of the Set of Ideas are acceptable in view of the agreement that the President of the Supreme Court will have a casting vote in case of deadlock.

C. Fundamental rights, including the three freedoms, and political, economic, social and cultural, rights Table A5: Summary of discussions of 6 November 1992 Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

1. The exercise of freedom of movement without any restriction as soon as the federal republic is established is accepted, provided that by that stage arrangements for settling property claims will have been agreed.

1. The provisions in the relevant part of the Set of Ideas are accepted in principle subject to any improvement for the benefit of both communities.

SCR 774/92 Endorses the Set of Ideas including suggested territorial adjustments reflected in the map contained in the annex to the Secretary-General's report (S/24472) of 21 August 1992 as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement.

2. The freedom of settlement and the right to property will be regulated by the federated states in a manner to be agreed upon consistent with the federal constitution and which preserves the bi-communal nature of the federation. 3. The freedom of settlement and the right to property will be implemented gradually and in phases after the resettlement process arising

388

2. The unity of the federal state requires uniform application of the individual rights and freedoms of all Cypriots throughout the federation. These rights and freedoms must be entrenched in the federal constitution and safeguarded by the federation. Their application may be regulated by the federated states, but limitations on those rights contrary to international law and human rights instruments are not acceptable.

Set of Ideas Paragraphs 47, 49, 50, 51.

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 389

Appendix Fourteen

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

from the territorial adjustments has been completed and following a moratorium for confidencebuilding.

3. A blanket prevention from returning to the federated state administered by the other community of persons for alleged acts of violence committed in 1974 or before may entail violations of human rights and for this reason the due process of law should be federal.

4. The federated states, in regulating these rights, will give due regard to the bicommunality and bizonality of the federation, the need to prevent intercommunal conflict, their economic interests and the preservation of their communal identity, special arrangements will be made for Maronites who in 1974 had their permanent residence in the territory of the Turkish-Cypriot federated state.

UN position

5. The Turkish-Cypriot side is basically in agreement with paras.: 47, 48, 49 (see also paras. 1 and 4 above), 50 (see also paras. 2, 3 and 4 above), 51.

Security and Guarantee Discussed on 6 November 1992 Table A6: Positions on Security Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

1. The provisions of the Set of Ideas under this heading are accepted.

1. The provisions in the relevant part of the Set of Ideas are accepted in principle subject to any

SCR 774/92 Endorses the Set of Ideas, including suggested territorial adjustments reflected in the

389

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 390

From The President’s Office

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

2. The 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance are in force and must not be diluted in any way.

improvements for the benefit of both communities.

Map contained in the annex to the SecretaryGeneral's report (S/24472 of 21 August 1992) as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement. GAR 3212 Urges the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs.

3. A reference to CSCE is out of context under this heading and may be made under the Guiding Principles. 4. The Turkish-Cypriot side is basically in agreement with paras.: 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57 (with the change made in the second sentence as follows ‘this time table will be fully implemented by the date of the establishment of the federal republic and in phases parallel to the implementation of the transitional arrangements’); 58, 59, 60, 61, 62 (with the addition of the following sentence after the first sentence ‘the federation will have a police force composed of TurkishCypriot and Greek-Cypriot components of equal size’); 63 (provided that the establishment of the interim monitoring committee will be limited to the duration of the transitional period); 64 (see para. 3 above), 65, 66.

390

2. The provision in para 59 for the stationing of the Greek-Cypriot and TurkishCypriot units of the federal force exclusively in their respective federated states does not promote the unity of the country and therefore agreement should be sought for its modification. 3. The Greek-Cypriot side has an interpretation of the Treaty of Guarantee different from that of the Turkish-Cypriot side, in that the Greek-Cypriot side considers that Turkey, or the other guarantor powers, did not have and cannot have a unilateral right of military intervention, because this would be contrary to the UN Charter. In any event the Greek-Cypriot side is ready to refer this matter, and any other basic legal issue, to the International Court of Justice.

[See also SCR 353/74, 360/74, 365/74] Set of Ideas Paragraphs 54, 57, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65.

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 391

Appendix Fourteen

Territorial Adjustments Discussed on 5 November 1992 Table A7: Positions on territorial adjustments Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

1. While accepting the need for territorial adjustments as part of an overall framework agreement, the Map attached to the Set of Ideas would uproot 37,433 Turkish Cypriots and is unacceptable as a basis for discussion.

1. The Map included in the Set of Ideas is acceptable as a basis for reaching an overall framework agreement. Marginal changes should be made in the Map to make it more equitable.

SCR 774/92 Endorses the Set of Ideas, including suggested territorial adjustments reflected in the Map contained in the annex to the SecretaryGeneral's report (S/24472 of 21 August 1992) as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement.

2. The criteria contained in the 1977 high-level agreement as elaborated during the talks, should be the basis for territorial adjustment. 3. The Turkish-Cypriot side is willing to envisage, in the context of an integrated whole approach, a TurkishCypriot federated state the territory of which will comprise 29+ per cent of the territory of the federation. 4. The Map can be drawn only when the constitutional aspects of the federation are mutually agreed upon and it becomes evident that the GreekCypriot side has agreed to power-sharing under a federal structure.

2. Agreement should be reached as regards the status of the special areas as indicatively shown in the Map and the rights of their inhabitants in both federated states with a view in particular to safeguarding the rights of the Greek Cypriots in the Karpass area under the III Vienna Agreement.

Set of Ideas Paragraphs 68, 69, 70.

3. Agree with the suggestion of the SecretaryGeneral that a Cyprus-wide census conducted now by independent international personnel drawn from any country. Its purpose should be to establish inter alia: (a) how many people live in all areas of Cyprus, (b) of these, how many do/do not live in Cyprus on the basis of the Annex D of the 1960 Treaty of Establishment,

391

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 392

From The President’s Office

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

5. The Turkish-Cypriot side is basically in agreement with paras.: 67, 68 (subject to the agreement on the Map), 69, 70.

(c) the provenance of all persons now living in Cyprus who were not born there.

UN position

Displaced Persons A. Areas that will come under Greek-Cypriot administration as a result of the territorial adjustment Table A8: Summary of discussions of 28 October 1992 Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

1. Turkish Cypriots to be resettled will be compensated at current value for the property they possess in the affected area at the time of resettlement.

1. The provisions in this part of the Set of Ideas are accepted in principle subject to any improvements to the benefit of both communities.

SCR 774/92 Endorses the Set of Ideas including suggested territorial adjustments reflected in the map contained in the annex to the Secretary-General's report (S/24472) of 21 August 1992 as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement.

2. The Greek-Cypriot side has prepared and is ready to support the implementation of a satisfactory resettlement programme under which Turkish Cypriots who do not wish to return to their original properties and wish to be resettled in the TurkishCypriot federated state will receive a comparable residence and a resettlement allowance for a limited period of time; and if they are unemployed, unemployment benefits at the same rate and subject to

392

Set of Ideas Paragraph 74.

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 393

Appendix Fourteen

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

conditions applicable to Greek Cypriots. 3. Turkish Cypriots who will be resettled will benefit from a programme of economic rehabilitation funded by the federal government and elaborated as part of the overall framework agreement. 4. Turkish Cypriots to be resettled in the TurkishCypriot federated state may opt for compensation at 1974 value plus inflation for property in the GreekCypriot area which they owned in 1974. 5. The Greek-Cypriot side is ready to negotiate regarding compensation to Turkish Cypriots for any substantial capital investments in GreekCypriot properties in which they resided in the affected area. 6. The Turkish-Cypriot position on this matter is unacceptable because it would extend to Turkish Cypriots – whether or not they owned any property in 1974 – compensation for Greek-Cypriot properties illegally allocated to them by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities.

393

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 394

From The President’s Office

B. Other areas under Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot administration Table A9: Summary of discussions of 29–30 October 1992

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

1. As the Turkish Cypriots could not be kept in legal and political limbo indefinitely, all GreekCypriot properties in the Turkish-Cypriot side had to be legally taken over by the Turkish-Cypriot administration in order to provide adequate housing and compensation to the thousands of displaced persons who had lost everything in the south.

1. The provisions in this part of the Set of Ideas are accepted in principle subject to any improvements to the benefit of both communities.

SCR 774/92 Endorses the Set of Ideas including suggested territorial adjustments reflected in the map contained in the annex to the Secretary-General’s report (S/24472) of 21 August 1992 as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement.

2. Most Greek-Cypriot properties on the TurkishCypriot side have been allocated to Turkish Cypriots. These allocations created legally valid title deeds. 3. Most of the GreekCypriot property currently being used by the Turkish armed forces has been allocated to Vakfs. 4. Any Greek-Cypriot displaced person whose property on the TurkishCypriot side has been allocated will be fully compensated. 5. Greek Cypriots who owned property in the

394

2. The right of return and the right to property having been accepted should be implemented subject only to suitable arrangements to meet any practical difficulties. 3. Displaced persons from both communities now residing in Cyprus or abroad, who in 1974 resided in and or owned property in the area administered by the other community may opt to return to their homes and properties or, if they do not wish to do so, may opt to claim compensation, at 1974 value plus inflation or choose to retain their titles and enter into leasing arrangements if necessary. Persons who were displaced after December 1963 or their heirs may similarly file claims for compensation. The implementation of the above will be subject to agreed practical difficulties.

SCR 361/74 Expresses its grave concern at the plight of the refugees and other persons displaced as a result of the situation in Cyprus and urges the parties concerned in conjunction with the Secretary-General to search for peaceful solutions of the problems of the refugees and take appropriate measures to provide for their relief and welfare and permit persons who wish to do so to return to their homes in safety. (See also GAR 3212/74 SCR 365/74) Set of Ideas Paragraphs 77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 84, 85.

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 395

Appendix Fourteen

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

Turkish-Cypriot area will be compensated from funds obtained, inter alia, from the sale of Turkish-Cypriot properties on the GreekCypriot side. At current value, the Turkish-Cypriot property left in the south roughly corresponds to the Greek-Cypriot property left in the north.

4. The misappropriation of Greek-Cypriot properties by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities is null and void.

6. The calculation of global compensation between the two sides will, in addition to the properties owned by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the area administered by the other community, take into account losses and deprivation they have suffered as a result of the events, including funds which were provided by Turkey for the TurkishCypriot community, in the period from 1963 onward. 7. The option of return will be exercised after a mutually agreed moratorium. The settlement of those who select to return will take place after the persons who will be affected have been satisfactorily relocated. A review mechanism will be established in each federated state in a mutually agreed manner to determine, upon recourse by the present owner and/or occupant,

UN position

5. Current Turkish-Cypriot residents cannot claim compensation for the Greek-Cypriot properties of which they were given possession since 1974. Turkish Cypriots who will be relocated will be indemnified in other ways. 6. The value of the TurkishCypriot properties in the Greek-Cypriot area is considerably less than the value of the Greek-Cypriot properties that would remain in the TurkishCypriot federated state (about 11.5 to 1 at 1974 value). Therefore, the Turkish-Cypriot offer of compensation through an overall exchange of properties is not acceptable as being neither just nor possible. 7. Turkish Cypriots who owned property in the Greek-Cypriot area in 1974 may elect to return or be compensated at 1974 value plus inflation or choose to retain their titles and enter into leasing arrangements if necessary. 8. There should be no additional moratorium

395

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 396

From The President’s Office

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

whether there are circumstances which preclude relocation in that particular case. In that event, or if the current owner and/or occupant, is also a displaced person or a bona fide purchaser or heir or if the residence has been substantially altered; or has been converted to public use or allocated to public service institutions, Vakfs (Religious trusts), etc.; or is being occupied by the present owner and/or occupant under a scheme for rehabilitation of homeless people; or if the present owner and/or occupant is a war veteran or is an heir or descendant of a martyr or of a war veteran; or if the residence is situated in areas which are known to have been the scene of massive intercommunal violence or located in areas designated by the respective federated states for security considerations, the former permanent owner will be compensated.

beyond the period necessary for the resettlement and rehabilitation process arising from the territorial adjustment.

8. Settlement of Greek Cypriots in the area that will be under TurkishCypriot administration, where Greek Cypriots, Maronites and other ethnic groups already live, shall be subject to moratorium and the agreed ceiling in order

396

9. A blanket prevention from returning to the federated state administered by the other community of persons for alleged acts of violence committed in 1974 or before may entail a violation of human rights and for this reason the due process of law should be federal. 10. Settlers should return to their countries of origin and should be facilitated in doing so.

UN position

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 397

Appendix Fourteen

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

to preserve the bicommunal and bi-zonal character of the federal state. 9. The exceptions to the right of return listed in the set of ideas (paragraph 84 of the annex to the Secretary-General's report of 21 August 1992 (S/24472)) are not comprehensive. There are additional specific and general exceptions. 10. Disagreements on the content of the exceptions can be taken to judicial instances established in the Turkish-Cypriot federated state on the basis of procedures mutually agreed upon. These judicial instances will function on the basis of mutually agreed upon procedures and will take decisions based on mutually agreed upon criteria. 11. In conformity with paragraph 85 of the set of ideas (S/24472), persons who are known to have been, or are actively involved in acts of violence or incitement to violence and/or hatred against persons from the other community may, subject to due process of law, be prevented from returning to

397

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 398

From The President’s Office

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

the federated state administered by the other community. ‘Subject to due process of law’ refers to judicial procedures providing normal judicial guarantee.

Economic Development and Safeguards Discussed on 6 November 1992 Table A10: Positions on economic development Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

1. In order to ensure parity between the special ties of friendship of both communities with their respective motherlands and to exclude the possibility of either motherland securing a more favourable position in Cyprus than the other, the federation can only become a member of, or participate in, any international organization or other body, if – (i) both Turkey and Greece are members of, or participate in, such organization or other body; and (ii) such membership or participation is approved by the two federated states in separate referenda.

1. The provisions of the Set of Ideas under this heading are acceptable, with the proviso that the separate referenda referred to in para. 92 on matters related to the membership of the federal republic in the European Community should form part of, and be conducted at the same time, as the separate referenda on the overall framework agreement and any relevant provisions of the Set of Ideas should be interpreted with this objective in mind.

SCR 774/92 Endorses the Set of Ideas, including suggested territorial adjustments reflected in the Map contained in the annex to the SecretaryGeneral's report (S/24472 of 21 August 1992) as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement.

398

Set of Ideas Paragraphs 90, 92.

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 399

Appendix Fourteen

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

2. The Turkish-Cypriot position is based on the 1960 settlement which provided for special relations between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece and Turkey (see Point 8 of the Zurich and London Agreements, Article 50.1(a) of the 1960 Constitution and Article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960) 3. The entry of the federal republic into the EC would also require that the economy of the TurkishCypriot federated state will be brought to the level of the Greek-Cypriot state, mainly through the allocation of federal revenues to be agreed and set out in the constitution. 4. For purposes of foreign trade and agencies the two federated states shall be considered as separate units. Private and public firms in the two federated states will have the right to conduct freely foreign trade and to establish agencies for foreign firms. 5. The federation will provide on a reciprocal basis market access and related facilities to Turkey and Greece in all fields of economy including trade, investments, financial flows, transfer of technology,

399

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 400

From The President’s Office

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

manpower, banking and tourism. This will exclude the possibility of either motherland, namely Turkey and Greece, securing a more favourable economic position in Cyprus than the other. 6. The Turkish-Cypriot side is basically in agreement with paras.: 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92 (see para. 1 above).

Transitional Arrangements Discussed on 6 November 1992 Table A11: Positions on transitional arrangements Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

UN position

1. The provisions of the Set of Ideas under this heading are acceptable subject to establishing a transitional government between the two sides after the approval of the overall framework agreement in separate referenda as otherwise legal chaos will result with unforeseen consequences.

1. The provisions of the Set of Ideas under this heading are accepted in principle but need to be discussed fully after the Turkish-Cypriot side has accepted the relevant basic concepts.

SCR 774/92 Endorses the Set of Ideas, including suggested territorial adjustments reflected in the Map contained in the annex to the SecretaryGeneral's report (S/24472 of 21 August 1992) as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement.

2. This transitional government functioning under the joint supervision of the heads of the two federated states on agreed transitional functions will be responsible for the transitional arrangements,

400

2. Any demand for recognition of the ‘TRNC’ is unacceptable. Such recognition would be contrary to resolutions of the Security Council, and is incompatible with the UN position for a new constitutional arrangement for the state of Cyprus as expressed in para. 20 of the

Set of Ideas Paragraphs 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100.

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 401

Appendix Fourteen

Turkish-Cypriot position

Greek-Cypriot position

inter alia, through the formation of committees which will be in charge of the various tasks set out in the overall framework agreement.

Secretary-General report of 8.10.91 (S/13121). 3. The suggestion by the Secretary-General that the referenda on the overall framework agreement be conducted by the UN is acceptable.

3. The Turkish-Cypriot community and its federated republic will not be bound by the effects of any international agreement entered into by the GreekCypriot side after December 1963 unless approved by the TurkishCypriot legislature.

UN position

4. The Turkish-Cypriot side is basically in agreement with paras.: 93 (subject to para. 1 above), 94, 95, 96, 97 (see para. 3 above), 98, 99, 100.

Appendix The Greek-Cypriot side requires that the utmost priority be given to the ascertainment of the fate of all missing persons to the satisfaction of their relatives. That should be done during the early part of the transitional period.

401

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 402

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 403

appendix fifteen Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus

November 1992 1. The present report on my good offices mission in Cyprus is being provided pursuant to operative paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 774 (1992) of 26 August, 1992, by which the Council requested me to submit, prior to the end of 1992, a full report on the face-to-face talks between the leaders of the two communities that were scheduled to resume at UN Headquarters in late October. In paragraph 10 of the same resolution the Security Council called on me, in the event that an agreement did not emerge from these talks, to identify the reasons for the failure and to recommend to the Council alternative courses of action to resolve the Cyprus problem. 2. In my most recent report on this question (S/24472 of 21 August 1992), I recounted the effort that had been made since April of this year to complete the work on the Set of Ideas of an overall framework agreement. In particular, I described the proximity talks which I had conducted with the two leaders at UN Headquarters from 18 to 23 June and from 15 July to 11 August. I went on to describe the joint meetings between the two leaders under my chairmanship which had begun on 12 August with the purpose of negotiating an agreement on the basis of the Set of Ideas including my suggestions on territorial adjustments and displaced persons, and which had adjourned on 14 August. I appended to my report the entire Set of Ideas. 3. In my report of 21 August, I indicated that for the first time, substantive discussions had taken place on territorial adjustments, but that the Turkish-Cypriot side needed to show the necessary willingness to foresee an adjustment more or less in line with the suggestions embodied in the Set of Ideas, if the delicately crafted balance of the remainder of the Set of Ideas was to be maintained. Concerning displaced persons, I welcomed the acceptance by Mr Denktash of the principle of 403

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 404

From The President’s Office

the right of return and the right to property. At the same time, while expressing understanding for the practical difficulties involved in resolving the issue of displaced persons, I stated that the manner in which these difficulties were addressed must not by itself deny the principle of the right of return and the right to property. I stated my view that, with all eight headings of the Set of Ideas having now been brought to the same level of clarity, the two sides should be in a position to reach an early agreement. I concluded my report by stating the belief that, since the continuation of the status quo in respect of Cyprus was not a viable option, should an agreement not emerge from the talks that were to reconvene in October, it would be necessary for the Security Council to give serious consideration to alternative courses of action for resolving the Cyprus problem. 4. In its resolution 774 (1992), the Security Council, having reaffirmed all of its previous resolutions on Cyprus, inter-alia, endorsed the Set of Ideas including suggested territorial adjustments reflected in the map contained in the annex to my report (S/24472) as the basis for reaching an overall framework agreement. The Council agreed with my view that the Set of Ideas as an integrated whole had been sufficiently developed to enable the two sides to reach an agreement and it urged the two sides to pursue, as from the resumption of joint meetings in late October, uninterrupted negotiations until an overall framework agreement was reached on the basis of the entire Set of Ideas. The Council expressed the expectation that such an agreement would be concluded in 1992 and reaffirmed its conviction that the present status quo was not acceptable. 5. Following the adoption of resolution 774 (1992), my representatives maintained close contact with all concerned. From 9 to 22 October they visited the area and conferred with both sides in Cyprus and with the governments of Greece and Turkey in preparation for the resumption of joint meetings between the two leaders in New York.

I The Resumed Joint Meetings, 28 October to 11 November 1992 6. The joint meetings between the two leaders under my chairmanship which had begun in the period from 12 to 14 August, resumed on 28 October 1992 at UN Headquarters. Both leaders accepted my proposal that the headings of the Set of Ideas be taken up in the sequence: Displaced Persons, Constitutional Aspects and Territorial Adjustments, to be followed by the remaining headings, namely overall Objectives, Guiding Principles, Security and Guarantee, Economic Development and Safeguards, and Transitional Arrangements. 7. During the course of ten joint meetings with duration of over sixteen hours, I took a careful record of the positions taken by each side. A non-paper was prepared by me, setting out the essential elements of their positions, together with the relevant 404

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 405

Appendix Fifteen

parts of the Set of Ideas and UN resolutions. Both sides confirmed that the nonpaper reflected accurately their respective positions. 8. In general terms, the Turkish-Cypriot side affirmed that it was in ‘basic agreement with 91 out of the 100 paragraphs’ of the Set of Ideas, adding that the differences under the remaining nine paragraphs stemmed from the lack of agreement on seven issues which the Turkish-Cypriot side considered to be key and outstanding, viz.: (a) the executive: the principle of the rotation of the president and the vice-president and their mode of election; (b) the numerical composition of the federal council of ministers, the rotation of the ministries and the principle of consensus; (c) the transitional arrangements, with particular reference to the establishment of a Transitional government; (d) the elimination of economic disparities; (e) the participation of the federation in international organizations in which Turkey and Greece are not both members; (f ) the modalities of the implication of the principle of ‘one sovereignty’ for both communities, which may be best expressed by the following formula: ‘The federated states are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the sovereignty of the federal state’; and (g) the issue of ‘Displaced persons’, as explained in the position paper presented at talks on 6 August 1992. Additionally, the Turkish-Cypriot side held to its position on territorial adjustments, refusing to accept the Map endorsed by the Security Council as the basis for reaching an agreement. 9. The Greek-Cypriot side stated that it accepted the Set of Ideas and the Map as a basis for reaching an overall framework agreement, subject to ‘any improvements for the benefit of both communities’. The Greek-Cypriot side undertook to negotiate in good faith to reach such an agreement, which would be in conformity with international law, human rights norms, as well as the functionality of the state, to the benefit of both communities. 10. In the section that follows, I shall describe the positions expressed by each side under the eight main headings of the Set of Ideas.

Displaced Persons (a) Area that will come under Greek-Cypriot administration – the affected area (paragraphs 73, 74 and 75 of the Set of Ideas) (Annexe to S/24472). 11. The main substantive point made by the Turkish-Cypriot side under part (a) above is that Turkish Cypriots to be resettled from the affected area should be compensated at current value for the property they occupy in the affected area at the time of resettlement. 12. In regard to the right to property of the Turkish-Cypriot displaced persons living in the affected area, the Greek-Cypriot side’s position is that they cannot be compensated for property which they did not own in 1974. The Greek-Cypriot side adds that Turkish Cypriots to be resettled from the affected area to the future TurkishCypriot federated state may opt to return to the properties that they owned in the south in 1974, or to be compensated for them, at 1974 value plus inflation. 405

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 406

From The President’s Office

13. In addition, the Greek-Cypriot side proposes that all Turkish Cypriots who opt to be re-settled in the north, regardless of whether or not they owned property in 1974, will be provided with comparable residence, a re-settlement allowance of limited duration and, where indicated, unemployment benefits at the same rate and subject to the same conditions applicable to Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots to be re-settled would also benefit from an economic re-facilitation programme, funded by the federal government, and elaborated as part of the overall framework agreement. 14. The Greek-Cypriot side is ready to negotiate regarding compensation to Turkish Cypriots for any substantial capital investments in Greek-Cypriot properties in which they resided in the affected area. (b) Other areas under Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot administration paragraph 76-55 of the Set of Ideas. 15. The Turkish-Cypriot position is that after 1974 it was necessary, with a view to avoiding prolonged uncertainty in the Turkish-Cypriot community, for the Turkish-Cypriot administration to take over all Greek-Cypriot properties on the Turkish-Cypriot side in order to provide adequate housing and compensation to those Turkish Cypriots who had been displaced from the south. The Turkish-Cypriot side states that in this way most Greek-Cypriot properties on the Turkish-Cypriot side have been allocated to Turkish Cypriots, with the creation of legally valid title deeds and furthermore that most properties of Greek Cypriots currently being used by the Turkish armed forces have been allocated to VAKFS. 16. The Turkish-Cypriot side states that the displaced Greek Cypriots will be unable to return to the property they owned in 1974 and will be compensated from the sale of Turkish-Cypriot property left in the south. In the view of the TurkishCypriot side, at current value, the Turkish-Cypriot property left in the south roughly corresponds to the Greek-Cypriot property left in the north. The Turkish-Cypriot side adds that the calculation of global compensation will also need to take account of losses and deprivation suffered from 1963 onwards, as well as of funds provided by Turkey to the Turkish-Cypriot community in that period. 17. The position of the Turkish-Cypriot side is that: the option of return will be exercised after a mutually agreed moratorium. The settlement of those who select to return will take place after the persons who will be affected have been satisfactorily relocated. A review mechanism will be established in each federated state in a mutually agreed manner to determine, upon recourse by the present owner and/or occupant, whether there are circumstances which preclude relocation in that particular case. In that event, or if the current owner and/or occupant, is also a displaced person or a bona fide purchaser or heir or if the residence has been substantially altered; or has been converted to public use or allocated to public service institutions, VAKFS (religious trusts) etc; or is being occupied by the present owner and/or occupant under a scheme for rehabilitation of homeless people; or if the 406

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 407

Appendix Fifteen

present owner and/or occupant is a war veteran or is an heir or descendant of a war veteran; or if the residence is situated in areas which are known to have been the scene of massive intercommunal violence or located in areas designated by the respective federated states for security considerations, the former permanent owner will not be able to return and will be compensated. Settlement of Greek Cypriots in the area that will be under Turkish-Cypriot administration shall be subject to a moratorium and the agreed ceiling in order to preserve the bi-communal and bizonal character of the federal state. 18. The position of the Greek-Cypriot side is that the right of return and the right to property having been accepted should be implemented subject only to suitable arrangements to meet any practical difficulties. Displaced persons from both communities now residing in Cyprus or abroad, who in 1974 resided in and or owned property in the area administered by the other community may opt to return to their homes and properties, or may opt to claim compensation, at 1974 value plus inflation, or choose to retain their titles and enter into leasing arrangements if necessary. Persons who were displaced after December 1963 or their heirs may similarly file claims for compensation. The implementation of the above will be subject to agreed practical difficulties. 19. It is also the position of the Greek-Cypriot side that the misappropriation of Greek-Cypriot properties by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities is null and void. Current Turkish-Cypriot residents cannot claim compensation for the GreekCypriot properties of which they were given possession since 1974. Turkish Cypriots who will be relocated will be indemnified in other ways. The value of the TurkishCypriot properties in the Greek-Cypriot area is considerably less than the value of the Greek-Cypriot properties that would remain in the Turkish-Cypriot federated state, taking account of the territorial adjustment shown in the Set of Ideas (about 11.5 to 1 at 1974 value). Therefore, the Turkish-Cypriot offer of compensation through an overall exchange of properties is not acceptable as being either just or possible. 20. It is the Greek-Cypriot position furthermore that there should be no additional moratorium beyond the period necessary for the resettlement and rehabilitation process arising from the territorial adjustment. A blanket prevention from returning to the federated state administered by the other community of persons for alleged acts of violence committed in 1974 or before may entail a violation of human rights and for this reason the due process of law should be at the federal level. 21. In addition to matters contained in the Set of Ideas, the Greek-Cypriot side raised the question of Turkish immigrants who settled in the northern part of Cyprus since 1974. The Greek-Cypriot side stated that these persons should return to their country of origin and that they should be facilitated in doing so.

407

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 408

From The President’s Office

Overall Objectives/Guiding Principles (paragraphs 2–23 of the Set of Ideas) 22. The Turkish-Cypriot side declares the essence of its position to be that each federated state is sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the sovereignty of the federation. Accordingly, the result of the overall framework agreement will, in the view of the Turkish-Cypriot side, be the establishment of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic by two politically equal corporate bodies from which the sovereignty of the federal republic will emanate. The two equal federated states will each freely agree to devolve a portion of their respective sovereign powers to the federal government. Additionally, the Turkish-Cypriot side holds that the federal republic will have territorial integrity and its territory will be composed of the respective territories of the two politically equal federated states; that the equality of all citizens before the law shall not be interpreted or used as a pretext to the detriment of the communal identity, political equality and integrity of either community; and that the official language of the Turkish-Cypriot federated state will be Turkish and the official language of the Greek-Cypriot federated state will be Greek. 23. The Greek-Cypriot side declares that the bi-communal and bi-zonal federation will be established freely by the Greek-Cypriot community and by the TurkishCypriot Community, which together constitute the people of Cyprus.

Constitutional Aspects of the Federation (a) Powers and functions to be vested in the federal government (paragraphs 24–27 of the Set of Ideas) 24. The Turkish-Cypriot side declares itself to be basically in agreement with these provisions, with the following provisos concerning the list of powers and functions of the federal government: the federated states may enter into agreements with foreign governments within their area of competence, without approval from the federal government, although such agreements should be in conformity with the foreign policy of the federal government; the federal government should be confined to setting rules and procedures and these should be implemented by the federated states in respect of airports and ports as concerns international matters and immigration and citizenship; the federal government should be limited to coordinating procedures relating to patents and trademarks; and the federal government should simply set minimum standards concerning public health, environment, the use and preservation of natural resources and weights and measures. The Turkish-Cypriot side holds that federal powers and functions should be executed by federal officers belonging to the community of the federated state in which they serve or, in accordance with agreements, through delegation to the federated states. 25. The Greek-Cypriot side states; that the federal government should be able to execute and implement its powers and functions, especially those concerning key 408

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 409

Appendix Fifteen

matters such as inter-alia immigration and citizenship; that agreements which a federated state may wish to enter with foreign governments and international organizations within the area of its competence should be concluded through the foreign ministry, and should be approved by the federal government if such agreement were to affect the international relations of the federation or entailed a financial burden for it; the provisions for powers and functions of the federal government should, include the setting of federal economic policy; and there should be a single commercial law and uniform company law throughout the federation. The Greek-Cypriot side also states that the locus of residual powers does not affect in any way the single indivisible sovereignty of the state of Cyprus. (b) Structure, composition and functions of the federal, government (i) Legislature (paragraphs 28–35 of the Set of Ideas) 26. The Turkish-Cypriot side accepts the provisions in the relevant part of the Set of Ideas. 27. The Greek-Cypriot side accepts in principle the relevant provisions of the Set of Ideas, subject to any improvements for the benefit of both communities and with the following considerations: the electoral system for both houses of the federal legislature should be uniform throughout the federation; the provision in the Set of Ideas for separate majorities is not necessary in view of the composition of the Upper House; and the deadlock resolving machinery needs to be improved. (ii) Executive (paragraphs 36–42 of the Set of Ideas) 28. The Turkish-Cypriot side maintains that the posts of president and vicepresident symbolize the bi-communal nature of the federation. Therefore, representatives of each community should rotate in the presidency and in representing the federation at official occasions overseas. 29. It is the position of the Turkish-Cypriot side that each community must separately elect through universal suffrage its own representative to fill the office of federal president or vice-president. Such elections ensure that federal office holders embody the will of the community they represent and reflect the vested right of each community to elect its own representatives in the central government, drawing from the 1960 Constitution and going back to the Ottoman period. The council of ministers should be composed of an equal number of Turkish-Cypriot and GreekCypriot federal ministers and should function on the basis of consensus to reflect the political equality of the two communities, to reflect the political equality of the two communities. The council of ministers should function on the basis of consensus. 30. The Greek-Cypriot side holds that since the federal president and vice president represent the unity of the country, they should have a universal mandate, through election on the basis of federation-wide weighted universal suffrage. The composition of the council of ministers contained in the Set of Ideas (i.e., a 7:3 409

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 410

From The President’s Office

Greek Cypriot/Turkish-Cypriot ratio) is acceptable to the Greek-Cypriot side, as are the provisions dealing with the decision-making process in the council of ministers. The Greek-Cypriot side believes that it is to the benefit of both communities if one of the following three ministries, that is foreign affairs, finance, or defence is allocated to a Turkish-Cypriot minister on a rotational basis, but that the near-permanent allocation of any ministry to one or other community will be counter-productive. (iii) Judiciary (paragraphs 43–46 of the Set of Ideas) 31. Both sides accept the relevant parts of the Set of Ideas. (c) Fundamental rights, including the three freedoms and political, economic, social and cultural rights (paragraphs 47–51 of the Set of Ideas) 32. The Turkish-Cypriot side agrees that the freedom of movement will be exercised without restriction upon the establishment of the federal republic, but provided that by that stage arrangements for settling property claims will have been agreed. The Turkish-Cypriot side holds that regulation by the federated states of the freedom of settlement and the right to property will need to preserve the bicommunal nature of the federation and will take account of the need to prevent intercommunal conflict as well as of the economic interests and communal identity of the federated states. The freedom of settlement and the right to property will be implemented after the completion of the resettlement process arising from the territorial adjustments, but gradually and in phases and following a moratorium for confidence building. Special arrangements will be made for Maronites who in 1974 had their permanent residence in the territory of the Turkish-Cypriot federated state. 33. The Greek-Cypriot side emphasizes that the unity of the federal state requires the uniform application of individual rights and freedoms of all Cypriots throughout the federation. These rights and freedoms must be entrenched in the federal constitution and safeguarded by the federation. Their regulation by the federated states is accepted, but any limitations contrary to international law and human rights instruments are not acceptable. A blanket prevention on the return to the federated state administered by the other community of persons alleged to have committed acts of violence in 1974 or before may, in the Greek-Cypriot view, entail violations of human rights and for this reason the due process of law should be federal. Territorial Adjustments (paragraphs 67–71 of the Set of Ideas) 34. While accepting the need for territorial adjustments as part of an overall framework agreement, the Turkish-Cypriot side affirms that the Map included in the Set of Ideas would uproot 37,433 Turkish Cypriots and is unacceptable as a basis for discussion. In the opinion of the Turkish-Cypriot side, criteria in the 1977 high-level agreement as elaborated during the talks should be the basis of the territorial adjustments. The latter could provide for a Turkish-Cypriot federated state comprising 29+ per cent of the territory of the federation. Furthermore, the Turkish-Cypriot side maintains that a map may be drawn only following agreement on the constitutional 410

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 411

Appendix Fifteen

aspects of the federation and only when it is evident, in the view of the Turkish-Cypriot side, that the Greek-Cypriot side has agreed to power-sharing under a federal structure. 35. The Greek-Cypriot side accepts the map included in the Set of Ideas, subject to marginal changes aimed at making the map more equitable. Agreement should be reached as regards the status of the special areas shown in the map and the rights of their inhabitants in both federated states with a view, in particular, to safeguarding the rights of the Greek Cypriots in the Karpass area under the 1975 Vienna III Agreement. The Greek-Cypriot side agrees with the need for a Cyprus-wide census, implemented under international auspices.

Security And Guarantee (paragraphs 52–66 of the Set of Ideas) 36. The Turkish-Cypriot side accepts the provisions of the Set of Ideas under this heading and adds that: the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance are in force and must not be diluted; that a reference to CSCE would be more appropriately placed under the heading ‘Guiding Principles’; that the time table for the reduction to an agreed level of GreekCypriot and Turkish-Cypriot units and for the withdrawal of all forces not provided under the Treaty of Alliance will be fully implemented ‘by the date’ of the establishment of the federal republic. 37. The Greek-Cypriot side states that its interpretation of the Treaty of Guarantee is different from that of the Turkish-Cypriot side, in that the Greek-Cypriot side considers that Turkey, or the other guarantor powers, did not have and cannot have a unilateral right of military intervention, because this would be contrary to the UN Charter. The Greek-Cypriot side is ready to refer this matter, and any other basic legal issue, to the International Court of Justice. 38. It is also the position of the Greek-Cypriot side that stationing exclusively of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot units of the federal force in their respective federated state does not promote the unity of the country.

Economic Development and Safeguards (paragraphs 86–92 of the Set of Ideas) 39. The Turkish-Cypriot side states that the two federated states should be considered as separate units for the purposes of foreign trade and agencies and that the federation should provide to Turkey and Greece, on a reciprocal basis, market access and related facilities in all economic fields. This would exclude the possibility of either motherland securing a more favourable economic position in Cyprus than the other. 40. The Turkish-Cypriot side goes on to state that in the interest of ensuring parity in the special ties between the respective motherlands, Greece and Turkey, and Cyprus, the federation can only become a member of, or participate in, any international organization or other body, if - (a) both Turkey and Greece are members of, or participate in such organization or body; and (b) such membership or participation is approved by the two federated states in separate referenda. 411

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 412

From The President’s Office

41. The Greek-Cypriot side accepts the related provisions with the proviso that the separate referenda on matters related to EC membership should be part of and conducted at the same time as, the separate referenda on the overall framework agreement.

Transitional Arrangements (paragraphs 93–100 of the Set of Ideas) 42. The Turkish-Cypriot side states that it accepts the relevant provisions of the Set of Ideas, subject to the establishment of a transitional government comprising the two sides after the approval of the overall framework agreement in separate referenda. The latter condition is explained as a way to avoid legal chaos that would have unforeseen consequences. Such transitional government would function under the joint supervision of the heads of the two federated states. The Turkish-Cypriot side also states that its federated state would not be bound by the effects of any international agreement entered into by the Greek-Cypriot side after December 1963 unless approved by the Turkish-Cypriot legislature. 43. The Greek-Cypriot side states that the provisions related to transitional arrangements would need to be discussed fully after the Turkish-Cypriot side had accepted the relevant basic concepts. The Greek-Cypriot side also rules out any recognition of the ‘TRNC’ as contrary to Security Council resolutions, and accepts that the separate referenda on the overall framework agreement could be conducted by the UN.

II Observations 44. The outcome of the joint meetings that were held in the period 28 October to 11 November has not met expectations. It is true that the meetings were useful to the extent that they brought the two leaders together in extended face-to-face discussion and that they clarified directly to each other in an unprecedented manner their respective positions on the Set of Ideas which has been approved by the Security Council as the basis for an overall framework agreement. It is positive also that both leaders agreed to continue the process. Nevertheless, the objectives set by the Security Council in resolution 774 (1992) were not achieved. An overall framework agreement did not materialize. 45. The discussions demonstrated that differences remain between the positions of each side and the Set of Ideas. Some of the positions taken by each side are variations of the provisions of the Set of Ideas, and should therefore be amenable to harmonization during the forthcoming joint meetings. However, some of the positions voiced by the Turkish-Cypriot side are, in a fundamental way, outside the framework of the Set of Ideas. I believe that such positions need to be reviewed by the Turkish-Cypriot side and brought within the framework of the Set of Ideas, by the resumption of the meetings in March 1993. 412

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 413

Appendix Fifteen

46. It is important to recall that the Set of Ideas emerged from a sustained effort during the past several years, in the course of which the text was successively refined to take account of legitimate concerns and interests expressed by each side. This process received a particular impetus from discussions which UN Representatives had with senior officials of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey in 1990 and 1991. The result of the process has been a Set of Ideas that provides the basis for a fair solution; a compromise, but one that safeguards the basic interests of each side. 47. I have found that the positions of the Turkish-Cypriot side are fundamentally at variance with the Set of Ideas under three broad headings: (a) the concept of the federation; (b) Displaced Persons; and (c) Territorial Adjustments. 48. With regard to the concept of the federation, the thrust of the position of the Turkish-Cypriot side is based on the premise that there exist at present two sovereign states with equal rights and that they will remain effectively sovereign in a future federation. This thread runs through its stance on the headings entitled: Overall objectives and Guiding Principles, in particular on the question of sovereignty; through its position that the properties of Greek Cypriots in the north have been allocated to Turkish Cypriots under valid and binding legislation; through its ideas on how to set up a transitional government; through its position on the two federated states as separate trading units in the international market-place; and through certain of its stated preferences in the constitutional area, concerning the implementation of such federal government functions as those related to citizenship and immigration, airports and ports and the federal civil service. In this connection, it must be recalled that the resolutions of the Security Council concerning Cyprus have, from 1964 onwards, sought to preserve the territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus. Resolution 750 (1992) reaffirms that ‘a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and International personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded…’ 49. Concerning Displaced Persons, in my most recent report to the Security Council (S/24472) of 21 August 1992, I indicated that Mr Denktash had accepted the principle of the right to return and the right of property, provided that the practical difficulties of the Turkish-Cypriot side were taken into account. 50. The exceptions set by the Turkish-Cypriot side [see paragraph 17] would in effect preclude the possibility that any Greek-Cypriot displaced persons would be able to return. 51. In fact, Mr Denktash's position is that all Greek-Cypriot properties in the north have been taken over by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities and that practically all of these properties have been subsequently allocated either: (i) to Turkish-Cypriot displaced persons, as a compensation for the property that they left behind in the south; or (ii) to other persons – either Turkish Cypriots, or immigrants from Turkey who have ‘acquired citizenship’ since 1974. 52. It is the position of Mr Denktash that displaced Greek Cypriots cannot have the right to return to such properties that are ‘owned’ by Turkish Cypriots (born in 413

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 414

From The President’s Office

Cyprus or abroad) as they now hold ‘legal title’ on the properties concerned. Therefore, those Greek-Cypriot displaced persons, in the view of Mr Denktash, can only be compensated for the property they owned in 1974. 53. The contention by the Turkish-Cypriot side that a de facto takeover of properties carries with it the acquisition of rights of ownership in respect of such property is carried through to the Turkish-Cypriot demand that any Turkish-Cypriot who relocates from the area to be affected by the territorial adjustment [in addition to being provided with alternative comparable housing, etc. as envisaged in the Set of Ideas] must also be compensated for the lands/houses which he possesses in the affected area, without regard to whether or not he was a property owner, or even lived in Cyprus in 1974. Turkish Cypriots who were not resident in the affected area in 1974 would thus be compensated for the property of someone else. 54. Furthermore, with regard to compensation, while Mr Denktash accepts that individual displaced Greek Cypriots have a right to compensation in respect of the property that they owned in 1974, his view is that the global exchange between the two communities of the titles of properties of displaced persons for which the owners claim compensation, will essentially be sufficient to settle all claims. He asserts that on the basis of current values, the value of properties of Greek-Cypriot displaced persons in the north corresponds roughly to the value of the properties of TurkishCypriot displaced persons in the south. However, all available information suggests that the value of the properties of Greek-Cypriot displaced persons in the north is many times the value of properties of Turkish-Cypriot displaced persons in the south. 55. The objective of Mr Denktash's position is to have the two communities living separately, as practically homogeneous ethnic groups. The solution sought by Mr Denktash is incompatible with the Set of Ideas, which seeks to take account of practical difficulties, but not in a manner that would negate the right of return and the right to property, as well as with accepted international standards and practices. 56. Concerning Territorial Adjustments, Mr Denktash refuses to accept the map included in the Set of Ideas, even as a basis for discussion. Despite the call made in my report of 21 August, and echoed by the Council in its resolution 774 (1992), he has not shown a willingness to foresee an adjustment more or less in line with the suggestions in the Set of Ideas – which is necessary, given the delicate balance of the Set of Ideas. 57. As I stated in paragraph 45, there are other points of difference between the two sides, which however are within the framework of the Set of Ideas. This is the case, for example, in respect of some of their differences over the powers and functions of the federal government, and the federal executive. 58. I noted that the Greek-Cypriot side declared that it accepted provisions of the Set of Ideas. However, such declarations were frequently accompanied by provisos. These questions should be cleared up at the forthcoming joint meetings in a manner that does not deviate from the Set of Ideas. 59. The intensive effort made during these past weeks has failed to produce an 414

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 415

Appendix Fifteen

overall agreement. The lack of political will mentioned in my Report of 21 August (S/24472) continues to block the conclusion of an agreement that is otherwise within reach. 60. In resolution 774 (1992), the Security Council indicated that the current effort could not continue indefinitely, and requested, should an agreement not be reached, that I recommend alternative courses of action to resolve the Cyprus problem. The Security Council has affirmed that the present status quo on the island is unacceptable. It is appropriate therefore to examine the modalities of the current effort as well as the potential for enhancing its prospects for success through measures that each side could take on the ground. 61. First and foremost, it is essential that the Turkish-Cypriot side adjust its positions in particular on the concept of the federation, Displaced Persons and Territorial Adjustments, when the joint meetings resume in March 1993, in order to bring those positions within the scope of the Set of Ideas. 62. The two leaders have agreed to continue the negotiating process in the early part of March 1993. In this connection, I believe that the time may have come to give fuller form to the decision of the Security Council reflected in its resolution 750 (1992) of 10 April 1992 to be seized of this matter ‘on an ongoing and more direct basis.’ 63. It appears from the recent joint meetings that there is a deep crisis of confidence between the two sides. It is difficult to envisage any successful outcome to the talks for as long as this situation prevails. There can be no doubt but that the prospects for progress would be greatly enhanced if a number of confidence building measures were adopted by each side. The purpose of such measures, taken in good faith by each side, would be to advance the goal of the forthcoming joint meetings – that is to conclude an overall agreement on the basis of the entire Set of Ideas endorsed by the Security Council. The following measures would help to create a new climate of confidence which will contribute to the success of the negotiating process. First, the level of armed forces and armaments in Cyprus is already too high and yet continues to grow. As a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot troops envisaged in the Set of Ideas, the Turkish Forces on the island should be reduced to their level of a decade ago and this should be reciprocated by a suspension of weapons acquisition programmes on the Greek-Cypriot side. The implementation of these steps, together with those in the second indent immediately following, would be most timely in view of the imminent sizeable reductions in the personnel and resources of UNFICYP. Second, the unmanning agreement which UNFICYP concluded in 1989 with the military on each side, and by which both sides unmanned their positions and ceased their patrols in certain sensitive locations in Nicosia, should be extended to cover all areas of the UN-controlled Buffer Zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other. I intend to instruct the UNFICYP Force Commander to initiate discussions with the two sides to achieve this objective without delay. 415

02_Presidents Office_299-416

26/11/09

12:41

Page 416

From The President’s Office

Third, bearing in mind the waste of valuable property and infrastructure that has occurred in Varosha for over eighteen years, the area under the control of UNFICYP should, in line with Security Council resolution 550 (1984), be extended immediately to include Varosha. Fourth, the promotion of people-to-people contact between the two communities would contribute much to breaking down barriers of mistrust. To this end, travel restrictions across the buffer zone should be reduced. Fifth, similarly, the restrictions imposed on foreign visitors crossing the green line should be reduced. Sixth, each side should propose bi-communal projects, and lending and donor nations, as well as international institutions should give preference and incentive to projects, especially in the private sector, which stimulate intercommunal cooperation. Seventh, the two sides should commit themselves to a Cyprus-wide census, undertaken under the auspices of the UN. Eighth, the two sides should cooperate to enable the UN to undertake feasibility studies in connection with the resettlement and rehabilitation of those Turkish Cypriots who would be affected by the territorial adjustment as part of the overall agreement. 64. The implementation of the above proposals would be a good measure of the political will of all concerned to work actively towards a solution of the Cyprus problem. 65. Pending the continuation of the process in March 1993, there will no doubt be keen interest on the part of the Security Council, and indeed, the broad membership of the UN, including those Members that contribute to UNFICYP, in the reaction of each side to these proposals. 66. If the proposals put forward above are embraced by the two sides, the resumed joint meetings in March will take place in a more propitious atmosphere. 67. I would urge the Council to keep developments under close review, including during the March joint meetings, in order to consider any additional action that should be taken to achieve a speedy solution to the Cyprus problem.

416

03_Presidents Office_417-422

26/11/09

12:42

Page 417

Index

Acropolis (newspaper) 24 Action Plan 105, 107 Aggelidis, Stavros 83, 87 Agonas (newspaper) 157 Agon (newspaper) 41, 83, 99, 111, 171 Agora (magazine) 56 AKEL see Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) Alitheia (newspaper) 129, 133, 246, 292 All-National Conference 60, 83, 137, 225 Greek government and 44 slogan for 157–9 alternating presidency 180, 181, 183, 185, 186, 187, 195, 206, 251, 356 American policy 106, 154, 164, 284 ‘Anagennissi’ movement 157 Anan Plan 4 Anatolia 2 APE (Greek News Agency) 191 Apogevmatini (newspaper) 77 Apomesimero 167 Athens, Andrew 102 Athens News Agency 236 Averof, Evangelos 303 Avghi (newspaper) 230 Avriani (newspaper) 22 Ayios Kassianos, incidents at 67–74 Baker, James 123 bi-communal committee 326, 374, 375, 376, 378 Bi-communal Federation 2, 7, 32, 50, 122, 156, 220, 221, 253, 260

Bilgin, Aydin 42 Birlik (newspaper) 42, 103 Bi-zonal Federation 95, 99, 129, 131, 137, 245, 302, 318, 353, 366 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 3, 150, 174, 183, 279 letter to President of USA, Mr George Bush 353–4 Bozer, Ali 95 British Foreign Office 80 Brittan, Sir Leon 152 Bureau of Studies on the Cyprus Issue 30 Bush–Gorbachev meeting 289 Bush, President George 87, 96, 110, 116, 123, 198, 265 commitment to finding solution on Cyprus issue 150, 163 letter from Boutros Boutros-Ghali 353–4 Camilion, Oscar 108 Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security 102 Candar, Cengiz 98 Cartalis, Yannis 23, 284 ‘Centre Union’ 7, 23 conference 285 Charavgi (newspaper) 40 Choker, Linda 84, 266 Christofias, Dimitris 4, 35, 231, 280 Chronology of events, on Cyprus issue first period: February 1988 to August 1988 261–3

417

03_Presidents Office_417-422

26/11/09

12:42

Page 418

From The President’s Office Chronology of events, on Cyprus issue (contd ) second period: September 1988 to July 1989 263–6 third period: August 1989 to December 1990 267–72 fourth period: January 1991 to December 1991 272–6 fifth period: January 1992 to March 1993 276–82 Chrysostomos, Archbishop 111, 129, 156, 253 Churchill, Winston 25 Clerides, Glafkos 48 Clinton, Bill 254, 279 Cohen, Sami 142 Cold War 123, 164, 228 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 112 Committee of the Cyprus Struggle 102 Commonwealth Summit, in Kuala Lumpur 90 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 372 Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) 96 Council of Europe 165, 343 CSCE in Helsinki, summit meeting of 190 Cuco report, on Turkish settlements 276, 281 Cuéllar, Javier Pérez de 2, 7, 23, 30, 50, 54, 65, 86, 115, 122 Cumhurriet (newspaper) 291 Cypriot Broadcasting Corporation 66 Cypriot Federation of America 102 Cyprus 1 artificial partition of 159 Attila occupation of 83 conditions to become EEC member 206 constitutional aspects of 321–3 continuation of ‘war’ in 39–43 delegation to UN 90 demilitarization of 324 developments for preparation for second round of talks 186–90 EU initiated negotiations 4 failures of Turkish policy on 88 grant of loan credits by 235 human rights and democratic freedoms in 14 human rights violation by Turkey in 278 independence of 132 as member of Europe 38 opportunities offered by economic conference 95 political decision and foreign policy 206 political leadership 44 political parties of 158

418

proposals for demilitarisation of 18 report of Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in 349–50, 403–4 joint meetings 404–12 observations 351, 412–16 set of ideas on agreement on constitutional aspects of federation 367–71 displaced persons 373–5 economic development and safeguards 375–6 guiding principles 366–7 notification to United Nations 377 objectives 365–6 security and guarantee 371–3 territorial adjustments 373 transitional arrangements 376–7 settlement based on human rights and democracy 336 statement by Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in 345–8 Turkish settlement policy in 281 unification with federal structure 14 United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in 243 UN resolutions and decisions on 124, 308 Cyprus Britain, British policy on 49 Cyprus issue American policy on 284 chronology of events on see Chronology of events, on Cyprus issue consequences of failure of dialogue on 73 direct negotiations on 12 August 1992 211 draft outline of agreement on 63, 64 EEC declaration on 106 general approach for solving 307–8 evaluation of two communities’ concerns 308 objectives of current proposals 309 German positions on 63 international conference on 115–19, 127, 265 internationalisation of 340 international public opinion on 70 involvement of international community in 146 involvement of superpowers 201 ‘mini-summit’ on 65 proposals for establishment of federal republic and for solution of constitutional arrangements 311–14 demilitarisation and security 309–10 economic issues 314–16 general approach 307–9 guarantees 310–11 protection of human rights 310

03_Presidents Office_417-422

26/11/09

12:42

Page 419

Index Soviet positions on 42 ‘Women Return’ movement on 51, 67 ‘Cyprus Week in Greece’ exhibition 276 Davos 11, 95, 104, 152–3 ‘de Cuéllar Ideas’ 82 Delors, Jacques 191, 229 Democratic Rally 48 Denktash, Raouf 2, 42, 65, 141, 170, 191, 296 ‘Dimocritos’ 19, 36 diplomatic campaign 3 Douglas Hurd 191 Eagleburger, Larry 207, 208, 209 EDEK see Movement of Social Democrats (EDEK) EEC issue 234 EEC Summit Meeting 40, 266 Elephtherotypia (newspaper) 31, 53, 100, 159, 163, 196 Eleptheria tis Gnomis (newspaper) 163 EOKA B 2, 139 Epikairi (newspaper) 35, 82 Ergin, Sedat 23 ethnic cleansing 203, 228 ethnic community 336 European Parliament 343 exchange of letters 317–18 Famagusta, colonisation of 107 Feissel, Gustave 56 Financial Times 14, 39, 254 Florakis, Charilaos 69 ‘Food for Thought’ 4, 74, 75, 80, 84, 266 France role in promoting solution of Cypriot issue 33 support for dialogue on Cypriot issue 153 French Revolution 65, 81, 90 Friendship Treaty, between Greece and Turkey 153 ‘Gali ideas’ 8, 147, 216, 217, 246, 249, 250, 276–82 Gandhi, Rajiv 265 General Assembly of United Nations 138 Genscher, Messrs 116 Germany efforts for negotiations on Cyprus issue 159 policy on Cyprus issue 159 role in searching solution to Cyprus problem 63

support for Cyprus’s application to join EEC 159 Giray, Safa 127 Giunez (newspaper) 51 ‘Gobbi line’ 154, 178, 184 ‘Gobbi map’ 128 Gorbachev, Michael 42, 106, 143 Greece friendship treaty with Turkey 153 political leadership 82, 264, 270 political parties of 158 strategy of national liberation 83 war of independence against Ottoman Empire 100 Greek-American Federation 102 Greek Cypriots 1 conference with Greek political leaders 19 recognition of property rights to 16 Greek–Turkish rapprochement, at Davos 14 Greek–Turkish relations 10, 135 after Papandreou–Ozal meeting at Davos 8 Guarantee, Treaty of 40, 372, 373 Guardian (newspaper) 39 Guldemis, Uluk 119 Gulf crisis 75, 112, 267, 340 Gunaydin (newspaper) 42 Gunesh (newspaper) 98, 105 Hactanir, Korkmaz 116 Hadjidimitriou, Takis 17 Hall, Jane 198 Haravgi (newspaper) 58, 71, 121, 127, 226 Hellenic Republic 176 Herald Tribune 176, 278 Howe, Sir Geoffrey 14, 19, 49, 62, 265 Hurriet (newspaper) 23, 169, 170 Human Rights 33, 190 violation by Turkey 88, 278 Human Rights Committee 278 Hunt, David 209 Hurd, Douglas 195 Hurriet (newspaper) 169, 170 Iacovou, George 62 illegal immigrants 342 Inonu, Ismet 88 intercommunal dialogue on Cyprus issue first period: February 1988 to August 1988 agreement to restart dialogue 16–22 preparing dialogue and internationalisation of Cyprus issue 22–5 solution of yesterday 13–16

419

03_Presidents Office_417-422

26/11/09

12:42

Page 420

From The President’s Office intercommunal dialogue on Cyprus issue (contd ) second period: September 1988 to July 1989 campaign to promote proposals 49–51 disengagement issue in Nicosia 57–9 first phase: September to November 1988 28–34 first round of talks and internal dissent 34–7 incidents at Ayios Kassianos 67–74 intercommunal dialogue 27–8 meeting with Secretary-General of UN at New York 39–43, 53–6 need for dialogue 59–67 second phase of talks: January to March 1989 43–8 third phase: May to June 1989 56–7 visits to Paris, Italy, Brussels (EEC) 37–9 visit to Athens and New York 52–3 women’s movement 51 third period: August 1989 to December 1990 acceptance by EEC of accession application 109 efforts for talks on substance 93–8 efforts of UN 103–7 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq 107–9 new visit to USA 109–13 Resolution 649 and Gulf Crisis 75–93 Resolution 649 and rejection of Turkish conditions 99–102 submission of membership application to EEC 102–3 fourth period: January 1991 to December 1991 debate in Parliament 137–46 international conference on Cyprus issue 115–19 international mobilisation 122–33 Paris meeting and retraction by Turkey 133–7 report of Secretary-General 119–22 fifth period: January 1992 to February 1993 Davos 1992 152–3 efforts for negotiations on substance 159–65 efforts for resumption of talks 149–51 first round of talks 174–92 indications of change in Turkish stance 169–74 intensification of efforts to reach solution 147–9 report by Secretary-General to Security Council and Resolution 750 166–9

420

resumption of contacts by representatives of Secretary-General 153–7 second round of talks: 13 July to 14 August 1992 193–238 slogan for ‘all-national conference’ by Clerides and Kyprianou 157–9 third round of talks: October to November 1992 238–56 intercommunal relations 58 international community 19, 172, 217 International Economic Conference 272 International Herald Tribune 39, 96 international public opinion, on Greek–Cyprus issue 11 Jesus, Luis 279 Johnson, President Lyndon 88 Kartalis, Yannis 121 Kassianos, Ayios 68 Kathimerini (newspaper) 23, 24, 42 Katsouridis, Nikos 174 Kennedy, John 1, 260 Kibris Postasi (newspaper) 56 Kirykas (newspaper) 20, 36, 47, 104, 116, 120, 290 Kohl, Helmut 62 Kuwait invasion 107–9, 110 liberation of 116 Kyprianou–Denktash Agreement 310 Kyprianou, President Spyros 2, 7, 12, 15, 19, 66, 73, 167 Lagakos, E. 301–5 Lemessos Bar Association 60 Le Point (newspaper) 288 Letsky, Nelson 78, 181 Machi (newspaper) 248 Major, John 273 Makarios, Archbishop 1, 12, 156 Makarios–Denktash summit agreement 2, 137, 139, 144 Makarios, Ethnarch 220, 285 ‘Marathon Man’ 288 Maresca, John 230 Mesimvrini (newspaper) 219 Michelis, De 116 Milliet (newspaper) 56 Mitsotakis, Constantine 124, 155, 158 Mitterrand, François President 33, 34, 116 Movement of Social Democrats (EDEK) 7, 17

03_Presidents Office_417-422

26/11/09

12:42

Page 421

Index National Council 15, 17, 20, 44, 48, 121, 125, 131, 170 re-establishment of 12–13 National Press Club 123 NATO 296, 340 New York Times (newspaper) 39, 124 Nicosia 24, 30, 35, 45, 47, 54, 57–9, 61, 65 Non-Aligned movement 87, 101, 225, 228, 267, 341 Occupied Territories 2, 18, 21, 51, 70, 80, 89, 102, 105, 112, 157, 252, 259, 286 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 209 Ottoman Empire 100 Ousseau, Daniel 84 Őzal, Turgut 8, 10, 40, 83, 107, 125, 169, 171, 261, 318 Pan-Cypriot conference, of ‘Centre Union’ 23 Papadopoulos, Tassos 4, 11, 19, 36, 104, 138, 174, 231 Papandreou, Andreas 10, 77 Papapetrou, Michalis 193 Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe 276 Pejic, Dragoslav 69 Peng, Li 271 Perrin, Bill 288 Phileleftheros (newspaper) 23, 36, 39, 45, 80, 191 Pilgrimage for Peace (Cuéllar) 141, 144 political leadership 38, 77 ‘Preconditions’ policy of 7 principle of 285, 287 presidential elections 252 Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) 1, 4, 12, 100, 226 Proti (newspaper) 106 Ramphal, Shridath 261 Reagan–Gorbachev summit meeting 261 Reagan, President Ronald 25, 65 Redger, Tilo 85 ‘Review Meeting’ 287 RIK (Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation) 83, 218 Apomesimero (Afternoon) 167 Dialogue programme 158 Turkish programme ‘Actualitè’ of 100 Rocard, Michel 33, 263 Rolandis, N. 174

Rolandis, Nicos 200 Roubatis, Yannis 19 Sabah (newspaper) 211 Samaras, Antonis 236 Security Council 47 permanent members of 134, 228 Resolution 367 of 119, 120 Resolution 634 of 58 Resolution 649 of 104, 113, 119, 122, 175, 267, 333–4 Resolution 661 of 107 Resolution 716 of 142 Resolution 750 of 115, 147, 166–9, 178, 182, 185, 200 Resolution 774 of 147 Resolution 789 of 244, 255, 281 statement by Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus 345–8 Sertoglou, Sedat 251 Shevardnadze, Eduard 19 Simerini (newspaper) 164 Sofroniou, Sofronis 292 Souliotis, Stella 30 Soviet Union 143, 180 international conference on Cyprus issue 127, 265, 274 intervention in favour of Cyprus 88 positions on Cyprus issue 42 Summit Conference of Non-Aligned 224 Talat, Mehmet Ali 4 territorial arrangements 202 Thatcher, Margaret 12, 13, 32, 40, 90, 261 To Vima (newspaper) 23 TRNC see Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) Turkey concessions on territorial and refugee issues 195 excuse for invading Cyprus 2 friendship treaty with Greece 153 human rights violations 88, 278 influx of settlers from 84 international mobilisation on Cyprus issue 42 invasion of 1974 12 periods for intercommunal dialogue on Cyprus issue first period: February 1988 to August 1988 9–25 second period: September 1988 to July 1989 27–74 settlement policy in Cyprus 281

421

03_Presidents Office_417-422

26/11/09

12:42

Page 422

From The President’s Office Turkish-Cypriot Assembly 80 Turkish Cypriots 1, 2 administration 128, 184 categories of issues related to 16 community 4, 33, 34, 74, 110, 214, 269, 312 complaints about UN document 80 human rights 34 integration into EU 4 leadership 35, 145 pseudo-parliament 86 right of self-determination 80, 97 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 2, 210 Tzannetakis, Tzannis 76, 266 UN-controlled Buffer Zone 415 UN Development Programme (UNDP) 375 UNFICYP see UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) UN General Assembly 136, 137, 139, 228 UN International Covenants on Human Rights 310 united front 24, 155 United Nations Charter 190 on human rights 33 United Nations Force in Cyprus see UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) United Nations Peace-Keeping Force 243, 296 United States, involvement in Cyprus issue 196 UN Peacekeeping Force 57, 58 UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 68, 246, 372, 378, 415, 416 UN Secretary-General meeting in New York with 39–43 proposals of 17 US Permanent Representative of UN 40 USSR see Soviet Union Vassiliou–Denktash meeting in New York 91

422

Vassiliou–Denktash talks 18 Vassiliou, George 25, 144, 154, 296 interview given to Turkish television 355–63 introductory speech to common session of National Council 339–44 letter to President Bush and President Gorbachev 335–8 letter to UN, 25 July 1989 319–26 constitutional aspects of federation 321–3 displaced persons 325–6 economic development 326 guarantee 324–5 guiding principles 320–1 overall objectives 320 security of federal republic 324 territorial adjustments 325 press conference at UN headquarters 327–32 support for Greece 35 Venkataraman, Ramaswamy 265 Vienna Working Points of 1984 284 Waldheim, General Curt 144 Waldheim, Kurt 2 Walters, Vernon 10, 40 Washington Post 119, 124 Webber, Olivier 288 Weiszeker, Richard von 62 Wilkinson, James 263 ‘Women Return’ movement, on Cyprus issue 51, 67–74 Women’s March 84 Working Group, on Cyprus issue 30 World Coordination Committee of the Cyprus Struggle (PSEKA) 219 World Federation of Cypriots Abroad (POMAK) 219 Yeltsin, Boris 281 Zenkov, Boris 118 Zürich Agreements 132