From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination: The Challenge of Islam and the Re-emergence of Europe’s Nationalism 9780472132164, 9780472127207, 0472127209

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From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

Te efect of Islam on Western Europe has been profound. Alberto Spektorowski and Daphna Elfersy argue that it has transformed European democratic values by inspiring a discriminatory ultraliberalism, which is inclusive of a gender agenda while restrictive toward nonliberal cultural and religious minorities. Questions of what to do about Muslim immigration, how to deal with burqas, and how to deal with gender politics have all been infuenced by Western democracies’ grappling with ideas of inclusion and, most recently, exclusion. Tis book examines those forces and ultimately sees not an unbridgeable gap but a future in which Islam and European democracies are compatible, rich, and evolving. Diferent from multicultural theories of integration, this book suggests that integration of the Muslim minority depends on stressing Europe’s civic national identity and narratives rather than weakening them. Against all odds, the authors’ claim is that enhancing civic identities and demanding that cultural minorities integrate liberal and national values increase the chances of integrating those minorities in society and contributes to overcoming populist exclusionist Right ideology. Alberto Spektorowski is a professor of political science at Tel Aviv University. Daphna Elfersy was a PhD in political science at Tel Aviv University.

From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination Te Challenge of Islam and the Re-emergence of Europe’s Nationalism

Alberto Spektorowski and Daphna Elfersy

University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor

Copyright © 2020 by Alberto Spektorowski and Daphna Elfersy All rights reserved For questions or permissions, please contact [email protected] Published in the United States of America by the University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America Printed on acid-free paper First published December 2020 A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-0-472-13216-4 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-472-12720-7 (ebook)

Contents

Acknowledgments Introduction: Civic Ideals and Muslim Integration: Liberalism, Discriminatory Enlightenment, and Cultural Recognition

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1

Chapter 1

Neither Irreconcilable nor Recognizable: Old and New Fears: Te Roots of Mistrust

21

Chapter 2

United Kingdom: Te Quest for Britishness and State-Centered Multiculturalism

98

Chapter 3

Te Netherlands: From Religious Toleration to Fortifed Secularity

171

Chapter 4

France: Te End of French Republicanism? Vive la République!

235

Conclusion

308

Notes

325

Bibliography

411

Index

469

Digital materials related to this title can be found on the Fulcrum platform via the following citable URL https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.11608856

Acknowledgments

It is not usual to dedicate a book to a coauthor. But this is the case with this book. Almost two years before this book’s publication, my coauthor, Daphna Elfersy, tragically passed away in the plenitude of her beautiful and gracious life—a life full of challenges, of sorrow and joy, and of extreme productivity and brightness. With deep sorrow, I fnished this book alone. During her lifetime Daphna had the unconditional support of her beloved husband, Itzik Pinkus, who collaborated in all her academic projects and beyond. His help allowed Daphna to live and study in Paris, and her conversations with him allowed her to grow intellectually and personally. Many friends and colleagues collaborated with Daphna during her short life. Of special importance were Catherine Wihtol de Wenden and Astrid von Busekist, whose eforts permitted her to pursue doctoral studies at the Institut d’études politiques de Paris. Comments from Olivier Roy, Amikam Nachmani, Leyla Arslan, Salman Bashier, Stéphane Lacroix, and Margaret Schtten were always insightful and of great help in the development of Daphna’s way of thinking. Special mention also goes to Wahbie Long, who was her mentor while she pursued a PhD in psychology of religions at the University of Cape Town. Even though I did not have the opportunity to meet her family during her lifetime, I am grateful for her parents, Elizabeth and George; her brother; her two sisters; and her grandparents, whom she always mentioned with pride for inculcating in her a Protestant ethic. Her friends from all across the world, especially Dana Liram and the Levy Fishman family, who had been always in contact with her, as well as the colleagues

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Acknowledgments

from Tel Aviv University, will never forget her. Tis book is also dedicated to all of them. I also thank my wife, the artist Liliana Livneh. Her patience and tolerance allowed me to keep writing the book after Daphna passed away. Her paintings inspire me and give me hope that a better world is possible. I thank my sister, Marta, and her husband, Rudi, and their family for always standing with me during the writing of the book. Finally, I cannot forget the intellectual debates I had with Gideon Doron and Russell Hardin, who are not with us anymore. Teir comments on my ideas for the book were always helpful. Rogers Smith, Gallya Lahav, Randall Hansen, Yoav Peled, Michael Kochin, Mario Sznajder, Aviad Rubin, and the brilliant scholars composing the Radicalism and Violence research network of the Council for European Studies have also directly and indirectly contributed with their comments and criticism on this project. Special thanks go to the University of Michigan Press readers for this book, to senior editor Elizabeth Demers, and to Marcia LaBrenz and Rebecca Logan for all their help. Alberto Spektorowski

Introduction Civic Ideals and Muslim Integration: Liberalism, Discriminatory Enlightenment, and Cultural Recognition

Islam in Europe has dominated the headlines since the frst years of the twenty-frst century. Nowadays, anxiety about terrorism and the new wave of Middle Eastern immigration has rendered the question of Islam existential. For a growing number of Europeans, it has become impossible to disentangle three diferent but interconnected sources of anxiety: frst, the difculties of coexistence with Muslim citizens of Europe; second, the refugee crisis; and fnally, the sudden emergence of radical Islam, whether embodied by Al-Qaeda, ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), or others. Te idea that many of these terrorists lived, breathed, and socialized in Western society and appeared to be integrated into its social order has shocked Europeans. Many agree with Gallya Lahav and Anthony Messina’s claim that “immigrant-related issues have become increasingly salient and securitized since [the attacks of ] September 11.”1 We pose the following questions. Is Islam really a security issue in Europe? If it is not, what challenge does it represent, and why has it triggered such anxieties? Tis prompts the next question: Is exclusionist nationalism in Europe a reaction to Islam? Tis book attempts to address these questions from a novel direction. Without diminishing the importance of the securitization debate, we suggest that Islam presents not a question of security but an unmitigated cultural challenge for Europe. Although some pundits might see this cultural challenge as a liability, we consider it positive. Cultural challenges, especially when presented by

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From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

minorities, actually contribute to a democratic society. As John Stuart Mill observes, minorities exercising the right to free speech can shape the basis for rational debate against the force of majority opinion, contributing in this way to the advancement of democratic society through reviewing and questioning society’s convictions. In the best-case scenario, optimists might expect cultural challenges to encourage mutual transformation of cultural majorities and minorities involving are assessment of their relationship. Tis is the position maintained by liberal multiculturalists and left progressives in general. But a cultural challenge may also push majorities and minorities to fortify their own cultural structures. Tis is precisely what this book suggests is happening in liberal Europe. Te debate on the place of Islam in Europe has radicalized the cultural positions of majorities and minorities and has triggered a renewed debate on the political identity of Europe. Tis book challenges the widespread belief that European societies have only two choices: shift from tolerance to recognition, which would be defned by multiculturalists and liberals in general as the more democratic step toward acceptance of the other, or shift from tolerance to cultural exclusionism, as advocated by populist radical Right movements. Most works dealing with the European resistance to immigration and Islam endorse this second account—namely, that Europe is turning exclusionist and abandoning liberalism. Tis book does not disregard these apocalyptic theses, and heeds how the populist radical right shapes responses to the Muslim challenge and to a prodiversity liberal agenda, but we suggest that an overlooked and arguably old-style third way, which we defne as conditional inclusion, has begun to take shape. Conditional inclusion is reemerging at a time when concepts such as cultural assimilation into a national citizenship (which until not long ago was viewed as outdated) are making a comeback. Conditional inclusion is thus an integrationist approach, along the following lines: Although we welcome you to the club, you must adapt to our values, not the other way around. We do not discriminate with respect to admission into our club, in which fair and equal treatment for all citizens is guaranteed. We might even acknowledge our colonial guilt. Tis will not, however, infuence our treatment of newcomers and minorities. Our culture predetermines the values of the European club, which are expressed through the embrace of individual freedom, especially women’s rights. In short, rather than Islam in Europe being a liability, we suggest that the confrontation with Islam has galvanized an unfolding European social

Introduction

3

consensus that conditions inclusion of cultural and religious minorities on acceptance of a double agenda dominated by national cultures and ultraliberal values. How the Argument Unfolds: Building the Antidiscriminatory Discrimination Alternative

Te argument advanced throughout this book is that growing awareness of Islam throughout Europe has led to a plenitude of controversies over questions that Europeans believed they had previously resolved. New debates on the role of women, family law, religious rights, and the relationship of the state with—primarily but not exclusively—its Muslim minority have emerged, enriching society in general. At the end of the day, though, these debates lead to “the question that a liberal society does not want to confront. Is cultural coexistence [with Islam] possible—and if not, what is to be done?”2 In answering this question, we suggest that the challenge posed by Islam has unwittingly been a positive catalyst for bolstering two seemingly contradictory agendas, which are being embraced to diferent degrees and in diferent forms by a wide variety of European democrats concerned with the synthesis of national and liberal values. Te frst is an apparently nonliberal agenda based on eforts to reassert national identities. Although this agenda is, frst and foremost, a reaction to globalization and immigration, we cannot overlook the signifcant impact in shaping this nationalist reaction that Muslim demands for religious recognition have had. It is impossible to disentangle the current European opposition to immigration from increasing resistance to the challenge of a homegrown European Islam. Te second agenda is a liberal one that supplements the nonliberal approach. Here we see a sharp increase in support for liberal causes, expressed in the afrmation of gender equality. Again, although we believe that the genderization of Western European politics is an independent agenda, it is an integral part of the reconstruction of a liberal identity visà-vis the cultural challenge of minorities in general and Islam in particular. We characterize the synthesis of these agendas as a discriminatory type of enlightened antidiscrimination, which tests state neutrality on diferent conceptions of the good. Tis hardly implies rejecting Islam, but it does involve robust eforts to domesticate or nationalize it. Tis revamped enlightened

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From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

identity, even if it difers from racial exclusion, is undoubtedly still controversial. It has put liberals on alert worldwide as they try to reconcile the tensions between these volatile, overlapping, and confounding developments. Te question, then, is how do antidiscrimination measures in favor of women and homosexuals coexist with an agenda that can be seen as antiIslam, anti-immigration, and basically antimulticultural? Furthermore, how does liberal cultural discrimination difer from the ethno-national, racist variety? Is this new type of exclusionism reminiscent of a bygone era we would rather forget? Tis book does not minimize the importance of these questions. It takes note of the infuence of right-wing populists in moving the political center toward more nationalist positions on immigration and cultural and religious minorities. We wonder whether the political center, under pressure from the populist Right, will also move toward more restrictive positions on the rights of women, gays, and lesbians. Indeed, social movements such as the Protest for Everyone (la Manif pour Tous) taking to the streets of France to protest same-sex marriage and Christian activists in Germany mobilizing against gender mainstreaming are examples of how gender and sexuality are contentious issues in European political discourse. Yet two things have to be considered. Te gender agenda, despite counterpressure, continues to advance in Europe for two interconnected reasons. Despite resistance from right-wing leaders such as Matteo Salvini and Viktor Orbán, a signifcant number of populist right-wing parties are ambivalent about a gender agenda, not out of a sincere preoccupation with the rights of women but as a way of embarrassing Muslims and progressive parties who wish to appeal to them. Conversely, and to complete this picture, although left-wing parties are ready to consider the interests of their conservative Muslim constituencies, they are, as Rafaela Dancygier demonstrates, increasingly concerned that courting those who dismiss liberal social commitments to gender equality undermines their own ideological foundations.3 In short, there is good reason to assume that the outcome of this unusual political conjuncture, in which contrasting ideologies are enticed to support a gender agenda, will be a synthesis of a more liberal stance on gender equality and more nationalist views regarding the rights of cultural minorities (Muslims) that reject a gender agenda. In this formative consensus, national values would paradoxically be a guarantee for a progender progressive agenda while resisting cultural and religious minorities.

Introduction

5

Making Sense of the Colliding Paths of Western Democracy: The Advent of the New European

Two sets of questions emerge from our main thesis. Te frst focuses on the ultimate other (the Muslim) to which this liberal identity is a response. Is this development related to jihadists, to all Muslims, or to immigrants in general? Is Islam a cultural or a security challenge? And are these Muslims today a religious, conservative, and ghettoized people? Te second set of questions concerns the features of Europe’s refurbished and contested identity and its link to liberalism. Tis requires a look at current public policy in Europe to see the extent to which this national renaissance is inclusive or exclusive. In regard to the frst set of questions, this book focuses on the second generation of European-born Muslims, heirs of immigrant workers of the 1970s. Tis is a heterogeneous group of people composed of a wide variety of intellectuals, middle-class professionals, activists, and alienated youths whose main characteristic, is that the group has produced innovative, cosmopolitan, and self-critical reformulations of its own tradition. Rather than sticking to old traditions, young Muslims in the West, according to Peter Mandaville, often meet informally to discuss the Qur’an and other textual sources, attempting to read them anew and “without the intervention of centuries of Islamic scholarship.”4 In their interaction with the wider society, this new generation of European-born Muslims want to “afrm their Islamic identity within its Western context and through interaction with it, re(defning) and (re)constructing in the process what it means to [have a national identity] as well as to be Muslim.”5 As Ralph Grillo notes, the challenge of the second and third generation of European-born Muslims is “how to become wholly ‘here’ while preserving a tradition of orientation toward Islamic institutions located ‘over there.’”6 Tey endorse Islamic sources as a normative reference while also aligning with classical Western ideas of democratization, dignity, and freedom of religion, not least to legitimate and promote their worldview. Most of these European-born Muslims share an understanding that Western democratic societies subjectively justify discrimination against Islam and Muslims, and this normalized type of discrimination epitomizes the need for a reformulation of Europe’s approach toward its Muslim minority and religious minorities in general. In this, Muslims are asking for cultural recognition and respect for Islam, requiring dialogue between Western identities and Western Muslim populations whose result should

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From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

be a new Western identity in which Islam could be included.7 Tese assertive citizens support multiculturalism as a frst step toward cultural equality while seeking to create a space for themselves in the public sphere beyond the two options of assimilation and isolation. Tis leads to the second set of questions related to Western approaches to Muslim demands: pivotal issues raised by modern Muslims remain unaddressed and still others receive a negative response. Why do European political societies consider Muslim contributions to the political discourse on citizenship and equality a liability rather than a beneft? And why are they responding with nationalist revivalism and civic integration programs? Tere are a variety of explanations for the volatile and confounding developments around Muslim integration. To one group of scholars, the problem is mistrust of Muslims in general. Regardless of the fear of terrorism, and even ignoring it, several scholars consider the heart of Islam to be essentially illiberal because the faith was born in conquest and theocracy and cannot accommodate itself to pluralism without apostasy. For these thinkers, Western Muslims are a Trojan horse in Western societies. Tey use democratic discourse to defeat the West at its own ideological game.8 To others, the problem is exactly the other way around. Rising Islamophobia in Western societies, similarly to anti-Semitism and xenophobia, is founded on the deep historical roots of fear of the other.9 Such scholars argue that there are no fundamentally irresolvable schisms between Muslims and Western societies, only conjecture and misunderstandings.10 Rather than attempting to essentialize Islam, they examine the social and historical contexts in which diferent discourses about Islam are created.11 Furthermore, some of these scholars add that, when the West puts the accent on Islamist radicalization, in reality it conceals its own colonialism.12 Tis book is critical of both approaches. Indisputably, the Trojan horse theory is exaggerated and oversimplifed, and Muslims’ difculties with Western Europeans cannot be reduced to mere cultural misunderstandings or Islamophobia, difculties that could be resolved by a more positive attitude toward Islam and by the West ceasing to intervene in Asia and Africa. Furthermore, Muslim demands cannot be dismissed as merely a pedestrian debate about the place of Muslim rituals and the construction of mosques in European countries. To date, Bhikhu Parekh has made the best attempt to explain the Muslim challenge to Western democratic societies. Parekh suggests that the encounter between Western and Islamic cultures, and the subsequent

Introduction

7

Muslim demands for accommodation, have forced Western cultures to face their own “liberal” arbitrariness. According to Parekh, “In the liberal view, Muslims . . . threaten to reopen long-settled controversies. Tey reject not only the comprehensive secularisation of society but also its more limited political form, and introduce religion into political life at several levels. Tey make demands based on religion . . . [and] want the state to protect their religious beliefs and practices by restricting the freedom of expression and imposing unfair burdens on others. Tey reason about political matters in religious terms, debating whether the Qur’an allows loyalty to the state. . . . Muslims introduce a theological form of political reasoning in which others cannot participate but by whose outcome they are deeply afected. Tis rules out any form of shared public discourse, the sine qua non of common citizenship.”13 Muslims have also challenged the liberal debate on multiculturalism. Until the Salman Rushdie afair, the debate about multiculturalism had been led for the most part by members of the majority population; the role of minorities was mostly passive.14 Integration had been seen as the adjustment of minorities to the dominant society; after the afair, it was understood to be a mutual process that would also transform the majority population. Parekh rejects the ambiguous arguments surrounding the “clash of civilizations” dispute raised by Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis.15 But he also dismantles more optimistic arguments portraying the divergence between European Muslims and their host countries as bridgeable. For John Bowen, the questions arising from the Muslim minority in Europe cannot be confned to the dimensions of other migrations or religious minorities in Europe. Because of Islam’s legitimation of a global public space of normative reference and debate, it poses distinct questions unlike those arising in other transnational religious movements.16 Tariq Ramadan, for example, claims that “without taking into account the religious dimension, all discussions about aspects of Islam in Europe—social and political integration, economic progress or other matters—would be, if not futile, highly inadequate.”17 We agree that Muslim demands in Europe do not refect an inevitable “clash of civilizations” for which there is no compromise. Nevertheless, the new Muslim discourse on citizenship and political practice questions the foundational doctrines of Western European identities. It casts doubt on presumed understandings of the meaning of cultural integration, racism, and state-religion pacts. Tis book suggests that it is precisely this innovative and challenging

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From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

discourse on citizenship, rooted in a synthesis of Islamic sources and multicultural thought, that has prompted the amalgamation of a contested progressive European identity as a contrast to the Muslim demand for recognition. The Western Integrationist Response: An Illiberal Form of Ultraliberalism

What, then, is the nature of Western responses to the Muslim challenge? How liberal is the Western response to the Muslim demand for cultural recognition? What is to be done? Tariq Modood, for one, calls for an expansion of the liberal model to deal with the reality of racism. Te model must be stretched to include acceptance of religious values.18 Christian Joppke, in Is Multiculturalism Dead?, defends a “multiculturalism of the individual.” Liberalism in a pluralist society is, according to Joppke, what multiculturalism is all about.19 Tis optimistic position, although seriously damaged today, relied until not long ago on the widespread perception that Europe was ever more open to cultural and religious pluralism. Indeed, as several observers have noted, the old 1960s conviction that European secularization and modernity went hand in hand is now seen as inaccurate.20 Moreover, we can even assert that religion and modernization are actually tied to one another. Olivier Roy insightfully points out that the current revival of religiosity is the consequence of rather than the counterreaction to secularization.21 Other scholars see these developments as a sign of the emergence of a postsecular Europe, in which the role of religion is respected and deprivatized.22 As Michael Minkenberg has remarked, religion is still a living sociopolitical phenomenon, a power far from imminent disappearance.23 Te connection between religion and state is nothing new in Europe,24 and political scientists and theorists have a long lineage to draw on for the state’s role in this relationship. Alfred Stepan suggests that Western societies might need “twin toleration” of political and religious authorities.25 Tis conceptual evolution not only serves as more promising ground for religious believers in general but also specifcally points to the need for more tolerance of Islam in Europe. For critics of this persuasion, Europe’s accommodation of Muslims requires a reformulation of the ideals of integration, or a shift from color-blind human rights and liberal tolerance to

Introduction

9

a new approach that stresses human dignity, recognizing and respecting diference, especially religious diference. But are European democracies ready for this shift? In this book we suggest that the majorities in Europe are not. Indeed, we suspect that European societies are far from following Stepan’s recommendations, especially in relation to Islam, which is repeatedly perceived as a geopolitical issue.26 Moreover, it is implausible that, even with a new, tolerant approach toward religion in Europe, Islam will be recognized and granted the equal religious status that some European Muslims demand. John Madeley has observed that the national church model emphasizes freedom of religion but not religious equality, since not all religious groups are recognized as suitable partners in government.27 Tus, post-Christian Europe does not erase Christian traditions and identities but rather selectively reactivates chosen religious elements within a secular regime of power.28 In other words, Christianity and liberalism belong to the same cultural formation and are closely related. At this intersection we fnd the foundations of the Western national body politic and its successful experimentation with religious and social engineering. Te direct and indirect attempts of Muslims to challenge these arrangements sparked the tensions leading to what we identify as Europe’s backlash to this Muslim cultural and religious assertion. It is the claim of this book that Europe is embarked on a nostalgic trajectory, which relies on what scholars such as Corey Brettschneider see as the increasing tendency of liberal states to shift from cultural neutrality to a more combative type of liberalism, characterized by a non-neutral but still noncoercive state.29 Under this muscular liberalism, a diversity emerging from emancipation from gender roles receives slow but increasing approval, because it fts a Western Enlightenment type of neutrality and equality (equal and particularist). Te recognition of another locus of diversity, one manifested in Islamic religious expression (which demands exemptions), is increasingly rejected. Tese two trends are evident, for example, in the propagation of national civic integration programs, through which Western European governments aspire to indicate that they are by no means culture neutral. Programs of civic integration have been running in European countries since the end of the 1990s. Even before Islamic terrorism struck the Western world, many Western European countries had already become uneasy about the changing cultural character of their societies, despite a general growing openness toward ethnic diversity. Now more than ever, European

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From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

governments are eager to impose these programs that, though directed at new immigrants, implicitly send two messages to broader constituencies. Te frst message, to cultural and religious minorities, is that they must accept national values as hegemonic. Te second, to ethnic exclusionists, says, “We reject exclusion on a racial basis. We believe in national integration for newcomers and minorities—it is difcult but not impossible.” Civic integration programs include, as a condition for acquiring permanent residence permits, linguistic and social competence tests, pledges of loyalty to the state, and so on. More importantly, they deal with the status and rights of women and gays in Western societies. For example, Denmark requires anyone who takes Danish citizenship to shake hands at the naturalization ceremony. Switzerland and France cite lack of assimilation in rejecting the citizenship requests of foreigners who refuse to shake hands with members of the opposite sex. How should liberals see and evaluate these programs and practices? Sarah Goodman argues that it is “a novel situation that Western European states require immigrants to integrate civically—to be profcient participants in the community, with commitments to liberal-democratic principles as a condition for obtaining a secure legal status in citizenship or permanent residence.”30 Although it may seem that there is nothing wrong, and no departure from neutrality, in the application of these procedures, in fact they are clearly related to the Muslim minority in particular and religious minorities in general. Tis is why several pundits rightly wonder whether these programs of civic integration function as tools for national majorities to set up cultural barriers to minorities. Tey claim that, although ideas of civic integration and assimilation were appropriate categories in Émile Durkheim’s time, nowadays they are nostalgic formulations of racism.31 Following that thinking, some scholars believe the dividing line between radical-Right ideology and a principled assimilationist and anti-Muslim liberalism is almost nonexistent. As Mabel Berezin notes, across Europe, the denunciation of Islam—and not just its fundamentalist interpretations—has gained momentum to the extent that semirespectable political parties show overt antipathy toward it. In some cases, these parties adopt parts of the radical Right’s political agenda and even contribute to legitimating its discourse.32 Critics claim that, rather than advancing universal liberal rights or an overlapping consensus between diferent conceptions of the good, Western European democracies are fostering a putatively liberal identity that is out of kilter with a religiously and culturally diverse society.

Introduction

11

Although we agree with this last claim, we cannot interpret this move as a betrayal of liberal principles. Since the early 1990s, it is true, liberalism has been associated with postnational ideas of citizenship and multiculturalism, but liberals today are reconsidering the value of national citizenship. Te reason for this return of nationalism can be attributed frst and foremost to the challenge of Islam. Whereas for populist right-wing nationalists, Islam should be expelled from Europe, democratic civic integrationists think (maybe naïvely) that Islam could be domesticated. Te former waver between racism and ethno-pluralism, which is a code word for exclusion of the other, and civic nationalists still believe in a conditional integration into a democratic culture open to all. Muslim Mobilization and Institutional Change

Most works dealing with Islam in Europe focus on Muslim exceptionalism with regard to its adaptation to Western surroundings. Tey point to the importance of the social and political environment (including governmental policies concerning the practice of religion and the integration of immigrant ethnic minorities) in determining democratic incorporation.33 Other works provide a more dialectical approach and analyze how diferent types of Muslim groups interact with social and political segments of Western society. Te discussion is not limited to how Muslims are changed by their new environment but includes how they can also change and shape the European environment.34 Some of the works dealing with the interaction between Muslims and their host communities in Europe and their mutual infuence have stressed the history of church-state relations in diferent countries as a determining factor. Tese works assert that the types of religious demands that Muslims have made are reactions to fawed public policies adopted by states with regard to Islamic religious rights.35 Tis begs the question of whether we are dealing with something intrinsic to Islam that leads to greater demands for public accommodation or a natural reaction against socioeconomic deprivation, in which Muslims use religion, rather than their ethnicity, as a mobilizing myth.36 Several socioeconomic theories point to the entrenchment of minority Muslim communities in a socioeconomic underclass as the main reason for their alienation. Te marginalization of European Muslims from the mainstream labor force leaves them without a stake in the public sphere.

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From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

Justin Gest, who analyzes Muslim alienation at the individual level, suggests that the more one is oriented toward the majority society and wants to integrate, the more sensitive one will be to feelings of exclusion.37 Other works stress the incompatibility and inaccessibility of European political systems. Jytte Klausen, for example, notes that, although the ideological platforms of European political parties such as the Social Democrats and the Greens are receptive to immigrants and promote universal human rights as well as cultural rights, they are ill equipped to cope with Muslim religious demands.38 Te absence of opportunities to enter formal political organizations and the inability to organize centrally have laid the ground for either civic protest or radical transnationalism along Islamic lines. Tere is no doubt that the issue of transnationalism has resonance with the idea of the umma, the larger community, which has deep intellectual roots in Muslim political thought.39 Pnina Werbner argues that for Muslims instances of transnational mobilization, including the Rushdie afair and the Gulf War, have been “key moments in the development of an active citizenship.”40 Tis constitutes a new type of action organized outside institutionalized politics, which is, as James Scott suggests, the most important political tool for lower-status groups.41 Moreover, in contrast to those who claim that ethnic and religious mobilization produce segregation, some scholars suggest that they are good for civic and political engagement.42 Tis book is anchored in these theories of mobilization and the reactions to them. We emphasize that opportunities for mobilization depend in great measure on how states perceive their discourse of national identity and the policies that are implemented around it. We do not enter into debates on Islamic political theory. Rather, we focus on how the West perceives what it considers to be a challenge to its identity and how institutional design changes in response to that challenge. As Jocelyne Césari correctly suggests, Western self-defnition based on the concepts of progress, nation, rational individuality (à la Robinson Crusoe), and secularization are fundamentally opposed to the values of the Muslim world.43 On the basis of this opposition, then, our focus is on how the innovative discourse on citizenship of European Muslims has indirectly contributed to enhancing a new conversation about national identity and to an institutional reshaping that promotes the values of national citizenship together with a progressive progender agenda. To show this, we adopt a historical institutional approach. We take as our point of departure the

Introduction

13

belief that institutions are defned in terms of norms and values, as well as by implicit and explicit routines and practices. Te institutional approach, seen in historical perspective, provides insight into the way in which institutions are changing in response to challenges and demands. A historical institutionalist approach thus looks beyond the inertia of institutions and gives more attention to social changes and ideological inputs—both local and international—that permit institutional change.44 It accounts for the substantive content of ideas and the interactive process of discourse in the institutional context. Tis is what Vivien Schmidt defnes as “discursive institutionalism.”45 It is here that the impact of Muslim demands becomes important. Since 2000 there has been in Europe an “institutionally thick environment, [which] is a likely setting for the promotion of international norms.”46 Tis created the frame for the promotion of technical policies severed from democratic pressures that suited a liberal postnational public sphere.47 In this setting, Muslim discourses of citizenship have found a receptive audience. Mobilization of Muslims in diferent ways has been in line with the spirit of tolerance in this environment. According to Matthias Koenig, for example, Muslims were able to contest the legitimacy of politicized symbols of national identity that directly or indirectly exclude them. One example of contestation is a claim for tolerance of religious dress codes and ritual slaughter. Another is a demand for cultural autonomy, including subsidized private schools. Finally, Muslims were even able to think of demanding recognition in calling for a realignment of the central symbols of national identity—for example, by introducing new religious holidays, extending existing blasphemy laws, and introducing an Islamic interpretation of human rights.48 Tese demands, included in a new Muslim discourse of citizenship, were helped by a positive domestic and international environment.49 During the 1990s, thus, European and state institutions, which refected the advances of the new multicultural approach to sociocultural changes in Western societies, were receptive to cultural and religious demands. After the frst years of the 2000s, however, the spirit of accommodation reached a turning point. Te terrorism-security debate, added to cultural clashes with Islam throughout Western European countries, set the stage for a diferent mood. Nationalism, an old and forgotten factor, seemed to make a comeback and with it came new populist demands to nationalize citizenship. Te ensuing outcome was that Muslim mobilizations became less tolerated, concomitant with a new institutional discourse refecting

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From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

popular anti-immigrant trends. What Joppke once described as a “seismic” shift from the discourse of multiculturalism to the alternative discourse of civic integration50 is felt today more than ever. Several observers would claim that liberal institutions in Europe have partially resisted the nationalist backlash, yet as our case studies show, each country, at its own pace, refecting its own entrenched institutional and sociocultural experience, including reactions to such experience,51 is moving slowly but steadily toward tougher institutional settings for newcomers and minorities. More than a demand to stop immigration, which resonates most on the populist Right, the message among democrats in most countries of the European Union was that entrance to Europe is possible though conditional to adaptation to European national identities. In sum, the idea of a national identity, although disruptive, constitutes a decisive point of reference in setting the conditions of inclusion. Case Studies: Convergence Policies toward the Other

Our cases studies are France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, and a word is in order about why they were chosen. Two of these democracies, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, have generally been considered multicultural or at least countries predisposed toward diversity, and the third, France, has a republican, assimilationist approach. Tese countries are liberal democracies, and none could be considered ethno-nationalist. Although their histories and modern politics may include occasional episodes of racist thinking and neofascist agitation, they have not been through the traumatic German experience of nationalism. Tis creates a contradiction in which Germany constitutes the case study that might defne whether integration will or will not be successful in Europe, but it is not an example to emulate for the rest of Europe, where the idea of citizenship is still associated with a proud national identity. Nationalism in the countries we examine is, then, not necessarily a dirty word. Although in Germany liberals cannot engage with nationalism, in France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands it can still be associated with a democratic civic ideal. Te three countries we examine share a deep historical experience with colonialism in Muslim lands and with postcolonial immigration from these areas. Tese experiences have been a key determining factor in inclusion or exclusion of Islam. However, as we attempt to demonstrate, the colonial

Introduction

15

past has not resulted in a guilty state of mind as the Holocaust did for the Germans. Indeed, the colonialist trauma has not afected these countries’ predisposition to integrate minorities into a proud national identity. As a consequence of colonialism, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands received large numbers of Muslims from their old colonies. Pakistanis, Indians, Caribbeans, and Bangladeshis went to the United Kingdom; Algerians and Moroccans went to France; and more modest numbers migrated from Indonesia, the Moluccas, and Surinam to the Netherlands. Although most of these immigrants came as foreign workers, they difer from other immigrants since, as former colonial subjects, they were eligible for UK, French, or Dutch citizenship. Postcolonial immigrants to some extent knew the language of the country and were somewhat familiar with values, norms, and practices in that nation. Tere are of course important diferences in these countries’ postcolonial histories. France and the United Kingdom generally sought to create a cultural relationship between former colonies and Paris or London.52 However, in the Netherlands a new type of Muslim immigrant, with a very diferent background, has become prominent since the 1970s. Neither the Moroccans nor the Turks arriving in Amsterdam had been the subjects of Dutch colonization. Consequently, much of the Muslim community in the Netherlands arrived unfamiliar with local customs. As a result of the Dutch pillar system (discussed later), their cultural diferences were amplifed. Tese diferent perspectives on the integration process make for an interesting and comparative exploration of outcomes and challenges. Each country’s institutional approach has correlates in the profound matter of self-perception with respect to national identities. In this book we discuss a civic-integrationist accommodation of Islam in Europe in national frames. Tus, these three countries’ national cultures, a backbone for liberal values, make them complementary cases. Tey have common ground in their way of integrating the colonized other, not into a postnational citizenship but into an unapologetic civic national citizenship.53 Each case we analyze provides a distinctive institutional environment for public policies, modes of incorporation, patterns of organization, and social protest movements. Each also allows us to distinguish diferent constructions of national identity, whether in universalistic or particularistic terms. Te UK liberal model refrains from incorporating individual actors into a centralized project of rationalization. It recognizes the plurality of individ-

16

From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

ual religious orientations in the public sphere and accommodates voluntary religious association. Public religious policy is regarded less as a state afair and more as a decentralizing process of negotiation in civil society. Te republican model in France takes a diferent route. Te political confict between the republic and the Catholic Church in the nineteenth century resulted in the separation of church and state (1905), which is still refected in laïcité. In France laïcité is not merely a separation of church and state; it connotes development of secularity as a state religion upheld in the public sphere. Te Dutch model includes liberalism and pillarization. Te pillar model, which emerged in the nineteenth century as a way to allow tolerance for diferent religious groups (mainly Catholics and Protestants), was extended to accommodate cultural groups in the twentieth century. Under the pillar system, the people within each group remain largely segmented and have little contact, but their elites cooperate closely on the national level. Tis type of functional decentralization has been called “consociational democracy.”54 Te modern version permits societal subgroups to have their own state-sponsored and semiautonomous institutions for health care, social welfare, education, and other social services. Tis type of institutionalized diversity is far from the United Kingdom’s accommodative approach and France’s assimilative republicanism. As we shall see, however, both the UK and the Dutch models are moving toward a distinct type of national republicanism resembling France’s. Te three models are not static; they alter with new inputs and new debates on citizenship. We suggest that the three countries’ models of national identity inspired distinct forms of integration into the polity but nevertheless have some common features. Te starting point is thus to consider how under the current pressure of the new Muslim discourse of citizenship, and the reaction of the radical Right, diferent models of state incorporation such as (French) statist republicanism, a (UK) liberal model, and a (Dutch) pillar model evolve and intersect, setting the stage for a new institutional discourse based on nationalism and liberalism.55 We believe that the French model of assimilation and the UK and Dutch liberal models of openness to diversity best display how civic integration is being done today. In fact, the policies of integration in the United Kingdom and France resemble each other because they both passed through periods in which they promoted assimilation and others in which they paid tribute to diversity policies.56 In other words, despite the difer-

Introduction

17

ences that most scholars accentuate, they have more points of convergence than some might admit. As Rogers Brubaker notes, countries that once experimented with diferentialist policies have been moving back to assimilationism as a corrective to the excesses of multiculturalism.57 At the same time, once adamantly assimilationist nations, such as France, are becoming more fexible toward and accommodating of diversity. Tese changes, which are refected in the institutional realm, are the result of the impact of diverse social and cultural challenges. Europe’s institutional adaptation is proceeding according to the following analytic sequence: (1) multiculturalism, (2) Muslim assertiveness and a new discourse on citizenship, (3) the increasing role of the populist radical Right, and (4) a renewed synthesis between civic values and national citizenship as a response to the frst three stages. In some cases center-right and Far-Right parties have come to collaborate directly, but in others the whole political map co-opts some of the radical Right’s policy platforms and voter bases. As noted, for several scholars this indirect efectiveness of the radical Right, shown by the politicization of already existing anti-immigration attitudes and a rejection of multiculturalism, constitutes a blow to the substance and quality of democracy.58 Without dismissing this claim, we suggest that an evolution to a postmulticultural nationalist democracy hardly undermines democracy. It is precisely the resurgence of democratic nationalism and national civic integration policies, rather than multicultural liberalism, that constitutes the last barrier to increasing racism in Europe’s public sphere. Indeed, although national civic integrationists defne a clear, culturally constructed “us” and reject multiculturalism, they demand that the nation not be ethnically closed, unlike demands of the supporters of the radical Right.59 Te growing presence of Islam and the rise of the populist radical Right in these countries are convincing European political elites that if national integration is not advanced by liberal democrats, the way to power will be open to the radical Right’s exclusionist ideology. In light of this, we suggest that a fusion of these three countries’ diferent models of cultural and social integration, which are not static but in movement and overlapping, will allow us to grasp the ideal model that will shape Europe’s connection with its national identities and determine how it deals with integrating the other and how it relates to Islam. Tis is, then, a model that relies on nationalism or nationalization of citizenship and an enlightened discriminatory interpretation of diversity.

18

From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

The Structure of the Book

In Chapter 1, we posit Islam as a new cultural force in Europe that is dividing the intellectual sphere between those who see it as a Trojan horse in Western democracies and those who consider it to be compatible with the West. We analyze Europe’s determination to combat Islamic radicalism and consider why Europe’s democracies accept the view of Euro-Islam expressed by intellectuals such as Bassam Tibi rather than Tariq Ramadan. Te chapter gives a theoretical account of the terrain covered by the case studies in the book. Te case studies show, in a more empirical way, how policies and political debates have led to a reafrmation of European identities as secular, liberal, and prone to discriminate in favor of what Europeans consider to be Enlightenment values. Te subsequent three chapters each present the case study of a single country, examining the changing dynamic in national identity and consequent reafrmation of national civic values. Each chapter provides a brief review of the specifc nation’s concept of nationality and its struggles with Muslim migration. We show how these nations have attempted to regain control and infuence over their Muslim communities by enhancing state intervention in mosques and education. More than manifesting the presence of a local Muslim community, the establishment of mosques also represents the evolution of Islam from the private to the public sphere. Te mosque is in a way the architectural equivalent of the veil.60 Next, we demonstrate how Muslims have independently merged civil society and Islam, through an examination of their political and organizational mobility. Tis section of the case studies also includes a discussion of the public reaction in each nation to this emerging Euro-Islam. We analyze the new discourse of citizenship emerging in each country through diferent Muslim organizations. We note that at the organizational level Muslim associations have shifted from internally oriented organizations to pressure groups capable of operating under the prevailing social and political conditions.61 Each country, however, difers in how Muslims have organized and advanced their claims on the state. In the diferent circumstances of the French secular republican state, the UK liberal multicultural model, and the Netherlands’ pillar multiculturalism, Muslim demands have constituted a challenge and triggered complementary responses in the three countries. Tese responses grow out of the structural and cultural dispositions of the hosting nation with its unique history and institutions. After dealing with institutional design and the infuences on it, we

Introduction

19

focus on the intellectual debate in each society and explore what it means to domesticate Islam. A vital question on which we seek to shed light is whether Muslim grievances (emerging in key political crises, such as the Rushdie afair, reactions to terrorism, the Danish cartoons, and the foulard, or headscarf, debate in France) can be accepted by the European public as a Muslim contribution to democratization. In each chapter, we examine the debates and dynamic of events sparked by the new Muslim communitarian and intellectual leadership in that country. We show how the conservative and socialist leadership in Europe endorse national civic integration as a third way between Muslim demands and populist right-wing anti-immigrant exclusionism. We argue that Europe’s response to Muslim mobilization is a slow but steady move toward a civic integration formula that has diferent characteristics in each country. Te United Kingdom, for example, is moving from an ideological acceptance of multiculturalism to social cohesion based on a common idea of Britishness. Although Britishness as a national idea is compatible with a diverse society, the very idea of diversity should ft the primacy of secular society. France, meanwhile, is moving from a strong and outdated republicanism to one that is more open. Yet laïcité remains the fundamental value of this republicanism. Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, the Netherlands is transforming from a paradise of inclusive multiculturalism to a society that essentially says, “Although we believe in cultural diversity, a secular, modern national culture must be accepted as hegemonic.” Finally, the three countries we deal with are forerunners in including civic integration programs, and countries such as Denmark, Norway, and Germany are following.62 Most previous theories portray the Muslim challenge either as negative in itself (it produces terrorism and is a Trojan horse) or as stirring dormant European racism. Unlike them, this book argues that the challenge of Islam can trigger a debate among European democrats on national identity, cultural pluralism, and paths of integration. Our basic thesis is that the Muslim minority in Europe prompts necessary introspection concerning Europe’s cultural values. Although most observers are rightly concerned about the double challenge of Muslim radicalism and the resurgence of an anti-immigration, undemocratic national right-wing populism, we illustrate an additional factor: the necessary revival of a national democratic synthesis. We suggest that both in civil society and across party identifcations a new consensus

20

From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

is forming that is based on what we describe as conditional inclusion in a multiethnic but postmulticultural society. Giovanni Sartori suggests that ideas on liberal pluralism should be protected from the politics of multicultural recognition.63 Departing somewhat from Sartori, we conclude that a politics of cultural recognition can exist, albeit in a discriminatory way, in what we have called a discriminatory approach to antidiscrimination. Today more than ever, there is discrimination between identities—between those that can be included in the Enlightenment narrative and those of cultural groups that are rejected or at least subject to conditional inclusion. Finally, although we cannot guarantee that a conditional inclusion will be successful in integrating minorities, we suggest that we are already beyond the old-style debate on integration. In this age of social discord and bitter confrontation between a growing exclusionist populism, on the one hand, and minority religious assertiveness and liberal multiculturalists, on the other, liberal democrats may have just one path to follow: embracing nationalism and civic integration for newcomers and minorities.

Chapter 1

Neither Irreconcilable nor Recognizable Old and New Fears: Te Roots of Mistrust

Te growing and seemingly interminable tension between Europe and its Muslim citizens is rooted in a long history of confict between Europe and Islam. As a prominent culture and civilization, Islam has posed a challenge for Europe on numerous occasions. In the eighth century CE, the Iberian Peninsula, much of France, and even parts of Italy and Switzerland fell into the hands of invading armies from the Islamic Empire. During the ffteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire brought Islam into Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and to the gates of Vienna. Muslim communities, remnant of these incursions, can still be found in modernday Bosnia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Greece. Henri Pirenne’s claim that, “without Mohammed, Charlemagne would be inconceivable”1 captures the paradoxical relations of Europe and Islam. Te Islamic incursions from the seventh century contributed to the emergence of the Holy Roman Empire and the modern world as we know it. In modern times, Islam is again reshaping Europe’s identity and politics. As remarked by Amikam Nachmani, Europe’s readiness to coexist with its Muslim communities, neither excluding them from its culture nor forcibly Europeanizing or secularizing them, is repeatedly challenged.2 An immigration that is not part of any organized, hostile military force has sparked cultural confict and brought to the fore questions that Europeans believed belonged to the past. Te debate is not confned to national security and terrorism but is more specifcally focused on questions of cultural rights, integration, and national identity in the liberal European Union. Muslim immigrants in the 1960s and 1970s came as workers, most of 21

22

From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

them as individual guest workers, answering the demand for manual labor after World War II. Most of the newcomers did not, at least at the outset, think that their stay would be permanent. As time passed, little attention was paid to guest workers having become permanent residents after the 1970s because of family reunifcation laws.3 Tis intercultural encounter raised the complex issue of administration of the religious and cultural demands of a population experiencing difculties with or an unwillingness to assimilate to modern European secular society. During the last decades of the twentieth century, European governments wanted immigrants to preserve loyalty to their home countries in the hope that this would facilitate eventual repatriation. Following this line of thought, they gave the Diyanet, a Turkish state institution that promotes a conservative lifestyle in Turkey and abroad, and similar ministries in Algeria and the Levant a free hand in catering to the needs of their émigrés. Consequently, a church-state dynamic common in the Muslim world was created in Europe. Beginning in the 1990s, governments began to confront the reality that the Muslim newcomers were staying. Authorities began to domesticate Islam by severing its transnational ties and promoting a state-sanctioned type of Islamic identity. Tis approach radically intensifed after September 11, 2001. Yvonne Haddad, Tyler Golson, and Jonathan Laurence see this increased government intervention as coming at the direct expense of communal Muslim autonomy. In other words, even before the terrorist attacks of 2005 in London—and ironically at the time that Europe was becoming more tolerant of diversity—governments began to view the needs of Muslims through the lens of state security policies.4 Te political consequence of this outlook was the attempt to “nationalize” Islam by including it in existing structures, in the tradition of churchstate arrangements. European governments advanced policies to educate imams while requiring them to speak the vernacular and understand the local culture. Governments also facilitated construction of mosques and religious institutions with the expectation that it would reduce Arab state funding and infuence. Tey virtually shoehorned Muslim organizations into structures that corresponded to national criteria and objectives. While older members of the Muslim communities mostly accepted this arrangement, which legitimated a co-opted leadership, the young generation in particular felt that co-optation did not imply equality. Te second and third generations of European Muslims, equipped with the discourse of political and cultural rights, have rebelled against the

Neither Irreconcilable nor Recognizable

23

old arrangements. In this chapter we describe the second and third generations of European Muslims as proud European Muslims wavering between assimilation and segregation, trying to fnd their way in times of increasing tensions between the West and Islam as a result of the securitization of immigration and the threat of terrorism. Rather than seeking isolation, they perceive themselves as British, Dutch, or French citizens who have the right to contribute to, and critique the meaning of, for example, Britishness or Frenchness.5 Next, we examine the theoretical debates on the role of Islam in Europe. On the basis of this analysis we focus on Muslim eforts to justify their demands for religious equality by an appeal to democratic rights that apply to all citizens and not only to Muslims. A new Muslim leadership in Europe portrays the role of Islam as a contributor to modern, plural, postnational society. We briefy examine the writings of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb and how Qutb’s legacy lives on in the ideology of EuroIslamist thinkers such as Tariq Ramadan, and we consider whether and under what conditions Muslims could establish a social contract with secular societies. Finally, we explore Europe’s response to Muslims’ innovative civic discourse and explain why, rather than embracing it, political elites reformulate a liberal identity that, without disavowing universal egalitarian claims, leans more toward the national identity roots of liberalism. Some scholars defne reaction against Islam simply as Islamophobia— namely, rejection and discrimination against Muslim citizens in the West.6 Te reasons are contested; are Muslims rejected because of the color of their skin, their ethnic origin, their religion, or a mix of all these? Te theoretical debate consequently shifts to the question of whether we are dealing with a new form of cultural racism or with religious intolerance.7 Tis leads to pungent questions, addressed not specifcally to Muslims but to Europe’s secular societies and their relationship with liberalism and cultural pluralism. As we shall see, these questions open onto a wide-ranging theoretical debate on the tenets of a liberal state and its relationship to minorities. As Joseph Massad asserts, Islam is at the heart of liberalism, at the heart of Europe; it was there at the birth of liberalism and the birth of Europe. Islam is indeed one of the conditions of their emergence as the identities they lay claim to.8 In this book we claim that the cultural and ideological challenge of Islam contributes to redefning Europe’s liberal identity and its very claim of diference. Te fnal question we pose is whether the

24

From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

refurbished European will be a closed ethno-nationalist identity or a civic integrative one. Mobilization for the Common Good?

A broad literature on the Muslim presence in Europe has stressed that Muslim mobilization does not focus on the good of the Muslim community alone but on the common good.9 We believe that this is a crucial factor in this debate, because Muslims are often accused of self-ghettoization and defense of their particular religious rights. In this section we point to two interrelated facts. First, most research shows that Muslim activism has embraced democratic participation and some version of Western values.10 Second, Muslims have opened the metaphorical cultural ghetto and are seeking to contribute as Muslims to social change. As Iftikhar Malik puts it, in Muslim organizations in Europe, “the debate is no longer centred on rights; it has moved on to responsibilities in the broader context of Islamic altruism. . . . [Tey want to lead] Muslims towards ‘making history’ in a secularised context.”11 In contrast to the assimilationist and isolationist adherents, a new brand of Muslim intellectuals, communitarian activists, and professionals note a visible Islamic identity and put that identity in the context of a Western frame of reference. Tis is presumably an original Muslim identity that is neither reactionary in terms of its Western context nor uncritically accepting of it,12 as heard in voices demanding growing Muslim cultural fexibility to meet Western demands.13 Authors like Peter Mandaville see a new generation critical of Western society and its cultural point of origin, while they are highly skeptical of the ability of the ulama (guardians) to rearticulate Islamic tradition in the vernacular language. Te result is that youth associations are emerging as new places for transmitting and refecting on Islamic knowledge.14 Some analysts believe that this transition, which involves individualization of religious beliefs, is leading toward the liberalization of Islam. As Muslim minorities settled in the West, an individual Muslim emerged.15 As to whether this type of emerging Muslim individual is critical of his or her dogmatic bias, two opposing positions can be identifed. One position sees individualization coinciding with the fragmentation of religious authority and liberalization. On this view, individualization comes as a result of a “social adaptation process of Muslim minority groups [that]

Neither Irreconcilable nor Recognizable

25

has placed Islam within the three interrelated paradigms of secularization, individualization, and privatization, which have until recently been distinctive characteristics of Western societies.”16 Te second position argues that, despite individualization, the current situation is characterized by a relatively stable dogma and not by a liberalization of Islam. Te personal attitude of European Muslims is shifting from culture and tradition toward religion and conviction.17 As Olivier Roy suggests, we are witnessing a process in which the realm of “the religious” is disconnected from any system of political control.18 Te conundrum for Western liberals is that the liberation of religion from culture and political control also allows religious fundamentalism. Tus, rather than a refexive individualization appropriate to liberal democracies, an individually reformed Islam has little in common with secular individualism.19 Explanations pertaining to this religious transformation therefore also take into consideration historical reformist discourses in the Islamic world.20 As Mahmood Mamdani argues, “Islamic societies were able to secularize within Islam.”21 What are the implications of this religious transformation to Western society? Islam in the West is undergoing a constant process of renovation, something that coincides with a new social hybridity, a “syncretization” or even “creolization.”22 However, hybridity in Islam is connected to neither liberal individualism nor a separation between the private and public sphere. Muslims in this sense cannot follow the outward-looking strategic path of the Jewish community in the United States or the inward-looking, ghetto strategy traditionally adhered to by the U.S. Catholic Church.23 To several scholars, thus, the natural choice for Muslim reformers would be to stick to dogma, albeit expressed in a modern liberal language, and the ensuing question would be how Muslims can formulate traditional reasons in a liberal language. Yasemin Soysal, for example, notes that Muslims in Europe commonly justify their claims for exemptions on the basis of the “‘natural’ rights of individuals to their own cultures, rather than drawing on religious teachings.” Teir claims are not grounded simply in the particularities of religious or ethnic narratives. On the contrary, they appeal to the universalistic principles and dominant discourses of equality, emancipation, and individual rights.24 Against this, John Bowen claims that, to thrive in a European context, Muslims had to relate their modern situation to Islamic sources while preserving the status of these sources as a binding guide rather than using a justifcation based on general human rights.25 Combining these views, Andrew March argues that Muslims in Europe

26

From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

have fused religious justifcation with the language of natural rights, multiculturalism, and nondiscrimination.26 Ideological perspectives vary in regard to not only their interpretation of Islam but also how the West should deal with the ultimate Other.27 Te debate can be encapsulated in the following questions: Is current Islamist mobilization representative of Islam’s inherent incompatibility with Western democracy? Or, as anti-Orientalists claim, is it merely an understandable, natural reaction to colonialism and imperialism? We further ask: Should Islam be treated similarly to other religions that have accepted the hegemony of a secular public sphere? Or should it be treated diferently according to its needs? Are Islamic concepts incompatible with or complementary to Western concepts of justice and democracy? Should liberal democracies be tolerant of Islamic concepts of justice and even include sharia in their legal framework? The West Debates Islam: A Diffcult Accommodation

In his book What Went Wrong?, Bernard Lewis emphasizes a deep sense of frustration among Muslims. For centuries “the world view and self-view of Muslims seemed well grounded. Islam represented the greatest military power on earth . . . and then, suddenly, the relationship changed.”28 Te question of “what went wrong” is answered in diferent ways by diferent people. Islamic fundamentalists claim that the cause of Middle Eastern decline lies in the abandonment of authentic Islam. Western modernists argue that it is caused by the retention, not abandonment, of old ways, especially the dogmatic dominance of the Islamic clergy. Power rather than democracy, they argue, is the central organizing political concept in Islam. Islam “is the true religion—the religion of God—and its truth is manifested by its power. When Muslims believed, they were powerful.”29 Lewis’s work, alongside Samuel Huntington’s paradigm of the “clash of civilizations,” attracted particular attention after September 11, when a wide variety of scholars and political leaders became convinced that confict between the West and Islam was unresolvable. Critics of Bernard Lewis (including but not limited to Edward Said) have accused him of ignoring the impact of UK and French colonialism on the Muslim world. Tey argue that, to understand Islam’s current rage, the Western world must deal with the legacy of its own transgressions: colonialism and cultural imperialism.30

Neither Irreconcilable nor Recognizable

27

From a historical perspective, as Jonathan Laurence sees it, the current pathologies of European Islam can be explained by the shortsighted policies of the United Kingdom, which enhanced and supported the Arab revolt against the spiritual and political authority of the Ottomans. Te British were decisive in legitimating the alliance between Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an exiled preacher who decided to bring Islam back to the principles of the Salaf (Islam’s pious ancestors), and Muhammad ibn Saud, the leader of a small clan presiding over Dariyah, Saudi Arabia.31 Tis brought about an end to several decades in which the caliphate (a spiritual role that the Ottomans combined, until 1922, with the worldly rank of sultan) had a benign efect on global Islam and helped to bring Wahabismto prominence. Te question, then, is why the European powers did so much to break down the Ottoman caliphate and its benign role. For Laurence, it is precisely because the Ottoman caliphate was so attractive that the West had to undermine it.32 Since then, we have been witnessing an expansion of a Salafst and Wahabist version of Islam promoted by the Saudi kingdom’s fnancial assistance all over Europe and the West in general. Some observers contend that Western democracies were impotent to wield control over this development. Others believe there is much the West could have done to prevent the transformation of Wahabism into an attraction but showed great insensibility toward Islam. Te most sensitive and prescient work in trying to understand the Western state of mind is Edward Said’s Orientalism, a book that seeks to open a discussion about the grip a powerful West with its perspective of colonial superiority had on the Arab-Islamic world. As remarked by Adam Shatz, however, the current expression of Orientalism is not found in the liberal who measures freedom by the absence of certain concepts in the East. Instead, the liberal is a besieged white man standing his ground, defending himself against the invasion of barbarians.33 Roxanne Euben argues that Westerners should transcend the limits set by their rationalist paradigm and engage Islamist thought on its own terms, or as it is understood by Muslims themselves.34 More generally, theorists, discontent both with the Western misperception of Islam and especially with a one-dimensional view of Western civilization, claim that there are diferent versions of Islam and of Western civilization. According to Richard Bulliet, an “Islamo-Christian civilization” is no less improbable than a Judeo-Christian civilization—which Nietzsche harshly criticized. As Bulliet notes, Jewish-Christian relations in Europe were very bad for

28

From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

generations. If this relationship could be repaired after World War II, then so can the Islam-Christian relationship. Bulliet turns Lewis’s paternalistic question of “what went wrong?” into a more neutral “what went on?” In doing so he ofers Muslim societies a path for self-afrmation. Te core confict with the West can be reduced to a debate over a single concept. Whereas Westerners emphasize freedom, Middle Easterners stress the idea of justice.35 Tis sense of justice has historically resulted in strong resistance to dictatorial regimes in nations like Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, which were in large extent imported from the West.36 Muslims and Westerners defending democracy might therefore have a common demand for justice and a common desire to dismantle authoritarian regimes supported largely by Westerners because they were supposedly secular regimes. Tis leads to one of the central critiques of Western secular societies. To Western societies, the only hope for progress in the Muslim-West relationship lies in rediscovering a tolerant Islam that predates radicalism. Scholars have made great eforts to prove that there are no great gaps between Islamic and Western concepts of democracy, justice, and human rights. Noah Feldman, for example, suggests that Muslim thinkers such as Khaled Abou El Fadl and the Tunisian politician Rachid Ghannouchi advocate Western concepts of justice, human dignity, equality, and pluralism. All, however, are committed to Islam as the starting place and ultimate ground for evaluating democracy. Consider, for example, the question of social justice. Like several Western intellectuals, Sayyid Qutb, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, in his Social Justice in Islam (1949), considered poverty an economic problem that should be resolved according to political rights.37 Qutb advances a sense of social justice that does not difer from that defended by Western scholars. Consider also the issue of democracy. Is Islam inherently antidemocratic? Observers such as Fareed Zakaria suggest that there is a process of democratization in movements such as the Muslim Brothers. Tere are Islamic movements that have “reinvented themselves, emphasizing not revolutionary overthrow but peaceful change, not transnational ideology but national reform and support for honest politics.”38 A new type of Islamic democracy might emerge, and the question is whether it and Western democracy will be dissonant or harmonize. To address the question of Islam and democracy in a more theoretical way, Noah Feldman analyzes sharia. According to Feldman, the West needs sharia as “a canvas on which to project our ideas of the horrible,

Neither Irreconcilable nor Recognizable

29

and as a foil to make us look good.”39 To calm Western public opinion, Feldman stresses that sharia is not the word traditionally used in Arabic to refer to the processes of Islamic legal reasoning or the rulings produced through it: that word is fqh, meaning something similar to Islamic jurisprudence. Rather than a code of law, sharia is the equivalent of a constitution for Western liberals. For believing Muslims, it is something infused with moral and metaphysical purpose, which connotes a set of unchanging beliefs and principles that order life in accordance with God’s will. At its core, sharia represents the idea that all human beings—and all human governments—are subject to justice under the law. In fact, historically, it limited the power of the sultan.40 Tese last claims remind us that in the collective memory of the Muslim world, the classical Islamic state was a state governed by law.41 Tis may explain John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed’s fnding that in the present Muslim world, comprising Muslim countries and Muslims living in Western societies, moderates (83 percent) and political radicals (91 percent) alike want sharia as a source of law, although only the radicals want it as the only source of law.42 Muslim desire for sharia as at least one source of law could be perceived as a legitimate claim to freedom of religion according to dictates of conscience; this fts perfectly into the idea of liberal legal pluralism.43 Tus, it is quite plausible to maintain that Muslims might be defending precisely what liberal democracy proposes. Tis opens a debate about the relationship of Islam to human rights and whether Islam can be reformed. Some scholars stress the role of human agency and context in the interpretation of the Qur’an; although it is afrmed that God is the author of the wahy (revelation), the Prophet is the one who accomplished it within the context of culture, language, and his personality.44 What is needed, thus, is attention to adaptability of theological concepts rather than exaggerating the role of Islamic doctrine.45 Indeed, a number of authors argue that there is a great deal of fexibility in Islam when it comes to confict between human rights and Islamic tradition.46 At the same time, we have to bear in mind that what count as human rights may be diferent for Westerners and Muslims. Although a Western understanding of human rights could be interpreted by Muslims as a tool of the imperialist West, a defense of religious rights as part of the human rights repertoire could very well be mounted as part of a Muslim anticolonialist agenda.47 In this sense, issues that dominate the Muslim agenda such as rights of citizenship, actions against Islamophobia and xenophobia, the treatment of asylum seekers, and the role of European

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From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

states in the Middle East are themselves akin to the objects of human rights activism. Controversial demands to redefne the basis of human rights in order to immunize faith from criticism, rather than protecting individuals from faith groups, are important initiatives, coming from both Muslim countries and Western Muslims. Tese initiatives tend to complement the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam adopted by the Organization of Islamic Countries in 1990. Te basis of that declaration is the condemnation of blasphemy, considered to be the greatest ofense and caused by the improper depiction of religious persons. It can take the form of insult to God, the Prophet, or an important aspect of Islam (sabb), vilifcation of God (shatm), infdelity to God and rejection of his revelation (kufr), heresy (zandaqah), and at its worst, apostasy (riddah).48 How should Muslims respond in practice to blasphemy? What should Westerners learn from it? Muslims may rely on the eighty-six chapters, or suras, revealed in the Prophet Muhammad’s hometown of Mecca; they cover the noncompulsory side of religion. Muslims who face mockery of their faith by pagans were told to simply not sit with them. But the twentyeight suras revealed during Muhammad’s exile in Medina, where he exercised the role of supreme judge and military commander of a people facing stronger hostile forces, led to another approach. In those circumstances the revelation takes on a more militant, legalistic, and exclusive form. In that last phase, soldiers are exhorted to fght and kill unbelievers.49 Which of these approaches best expresses the relationship between the West and Islam in current times? Many liberal authors have emphasized the moderate face of Islam. In the view of these authors, the terrorist or radical face of political Islam may constitute an attack on Islam itself. Karen Armstrong goes even further, arguing that terrorists have kidnapped a peaceful Islam, and John Esposito describes Islam as involving personal pietism rather than activism.50 In his book Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, Esposito provides a concise account of the role of jihad and argues that Osama bin Laden was ignoring the constraints imposed by Islamic law on the waging of a just war.51 Esposito recognizes that international jihad has learned from other Muslim movements afected by globalization. Radical Islam, thus, is as threatening to Islam as it is to the West. In other words, Islam is not the cause of its extremism and terrorism any more than Christianity or Judaism are the causes of terrorism claiming to originate from them. In fact, Islam may be a powerful weapon for discrediting terrorists and limiting the growth of terrorism.52

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Crucial to this analysis is the understanding of the current uprising of Islam, or jihad, as being not an ofensive attack on the West as a whole but rather a defense, equivalent to an anti-imperialist struggle against a strong and hypocritical Western enemy. Scholars such as Olivier Roy point to a generational fracture in the international movement of jihad stretching from Saudi Arabia to Tunisia and into France. Rather than the radicalization of Islam, there is an Islamization of radicalism. Roy asserts that a systematic association with death is one of the keys to understanding today’s radicalization: the nihilist dimension is central. What seduces and fascinates is the idea of pure revolt. Violence is not a means. It is an end in itself.53 Tis radicalization ofers relief to a signifcant number of young Muslims. Te new message of Salafsts urges this new generation into rebellion against their parents’ submission to their new neighbors’ cultures in Western societies. Arun Kundnani notes that the Western world prefers to speak about religious ideology rather than address discrimination sufered by Muslims and the political grievances Muslims have against Western imperialism.54 Despite the determined eforts of scholars to sever the concept of jihad from religion, many Westerners remain unconvinced. Moreover, Westerners continue to distrust jihad and how it is applied, especially now when a new phase of Islamic militancy in Europe is erupting. Contrary to the understanding of jihad as a defensive anti-imperialist war against the West, the 2015 Paris attacks on a kosher supermarket and Charlie Hebdo convinced Westerners that Islamic terrorism cannot be explained just by geographic separation, job discrimination, and poor police treatment. In seeking an explanation, we should ask: What is a legitimate defense, and to what lengths should the West go to not ofend Islam? John Kelsay’s Arguing the Just War in Islam explains Islamic violence through Islamic jurisprudence’s legitimation of it.55 Inspired by the Prophet’s struggle against the pagan tribesmen of Mecca, the Quraysh, the soldiers of Islam have learned to associate sacrifce and the use of violence with the right to lead a life according to divine directives. Other works deal with the distinction between the interpretations given to jihad by Islamist radicals and mystical quietists. For radicals, it is the heart of a militant ideology. For mystical quietists, the “greater jihad” is a struggle against the “lower self ” of basic human impulses.56 In any case, no matter the limitations imposed on the conduct of war by the jurists, it would be wrong to regard the classical jihad as being purely defensive. In the words of Majid Khadduri, “Te universality of Islam pro-

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vided a unifying element for all believers . . . and its defensive ofensive character produced a permanent state of warfare against the outside world, the world of war. Tus, jihad may be regarded as Islam’s instrument for carrying out its ultimate objective by turning all peoples into believers.”57 In Te Legacy of Jihad Andrew Bostom and contributors to the book have gathered an impressive range of primary and secondary source documents relating to the theory and practice of jihad that provide an account of the concept of jihad and what it has meant to Muslims throughout history.58 Te contributors pay special attention to periods when Islam expanded its domain, not only by conquering new territory but also by transforming the cultures of those who fell under its rule.59 An account of Muslim thinkers from Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani in the tenth century to Abu Hamid al-Ghazali and Abd Ar Rahman bin Muhammed ibn Khaldun in the fourteenth century, to Sayyid Qutb in the twentieth century paints a clear picture: the historical institution of jihad promotes the violent struggle of the whole Muslim community against outsiders. It permits the expansion of dar al-Islam (Muslim countries) across the world. Terefore, according to Bostom and his collaborators’ evaluation, Muslims felt no need to change the meaning of the jihad. Te revival of jihad is the essence of radical Islam, and it should not be interpreted as a strategy in a traditional war between armies. Te objective is not winning in the Western sense of the word. Te objective is the destruction and dissolution of politics as we have come to understand it in the West, by creating the conditions that force the West either to give in to the jihadists’ demands or to descend into anarchy and chaos.60 In these theories it is wrong, then, to consider Islamic fanaticism as some sort of deviance or madness; it should be viewed according to its own religious logic. Muslims are induced to become martyrs for the larger community, the umma, uniting peoples separated by geographic boundaries and diferent cultures and heritages.61 Hans Küng, a liberal Christian theologian, claims that Islam is above all a religion of victory. Küng argues that, although the ground for intellectual change was laid by modernist reformers—such as Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) and Syed Ameer Ali (1848–1928) in India and Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), the infuential chief jurist of Egypt—the problem does not lie in the realm of theology. Te real problem, according to Küng, is that there are no political leaders adopting reformist ideas and applying them on a popular level.62

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Whether the problem is presented as relating to the substance and content of Islam or to the conjuncture with the West, a very negative view of Islam is being established in the Western mind. Tere is no trust in the possibility of reform in Islam and no trust in political or intellectual leaders who can direct the path of a Euro-Islam, one that could coexist with the West. Voices foregrounding the fexibility of Islam contrast with other claims that the dominant outlook of Islam today has shifted from the medieval school of thought of the Maturidis and the Matazilites (who advanced the idea of free will and the use of reason) to the Asharites, Hanbalis, and Salafsts, who believe in predestination by God and discredit human reason.63 Salafsm in general is perceived as a challenge to the substance of liberal society and as raising questions that go directly to the heart of that society. As explained by Salman Sayyid, Europe’s current apprehension of Islam is of that of ghosts who can “walk through walls. Boundaries cannot contain them. . . . Tey appear in . . . Bradford, Bosnia, in state schools and universities. . . . Teir presence marks out a space which seems irreconcilably diferent and which seems to resist easy absorption within the western enterprise.”64 In sum, there is a widespread debate about whether Muslims can cope with and ft in with Western secularism, with a liberal concept of women’s rights, and with individual freedom and freedom of speech. Tat is why to some observers the Islamic upheaval is a desire to rebut Western normativity in Western countries.65 More importantly, however, we focus on how Islam threatens Western ideas of modernity the target seems to be one of the most important Western creations, modern nationalism. Indeed, Islam’s transnational universality challenges nationalism that historically had been the bearer of the democratic predicament. Islam is not alone in challenging nationalism, however. After World War II, liberals across the board became critical of nationalism and claim that we are in a postnational stage. Yet there are diferences in the way nationalism is perceived. Liberals are suspicious of nationalism because of its tendency to undermine individual freedoms; conversely, for several Islamist ideologues, jeopardizing national identities is precisely the way to begin dismantling the liberal world. Te nation-state and the Westphalian concept of the international system contrast with the Islamic umma. Most Muslim philosophers have thus denounced nationalism for dividing and fragmenting the Muslim community, the umma.

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The National Question: Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and the Bonds of Belief versus Patriotism

In the works of medieval philosophers such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldun, we can already distinguish between an expansive conception of the righteous Islamic umma and the mere ties of blood and language that form the basis of ethnic nationalism. Tis vision of the umma was continued in much of Muslim and Arab thought well into the eighteenth century. Not all Muslim philosophers, however, advocated the umma from a religious perspective. Philosophers such as Abu Nasr al-Farabi (870–950), working from a rationalist and universalist perspective rather than from a specifcally Islamic one, promoted the idea of political associations larger than the city-state as a way to produce cooperation between nations.66 Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897) gave the frst serious and comprehensive response to European national imperialism from an Islamic perspective. His work lays the basis for a new debate in the Muslim world that focuses on how to ensure the political and cultural success of the Muslim community. Al-Afghani believes that reason is the father and mother of knowledge. In a similar vein to al-Farabi, al-Afghani, in his “Fawaid Falsafa” (Te benefts of philosophy), contends that revelation is a preparatory stage for the achievement of philosophy.67 For him, “the center of attention is no longer Islam as a religion, it is rather Islam as a civilization.”68 Te Qur’an thus puts the pre-Islamic Arabs into the philosophical traditions developed by modern civilized nations.69 Te problem for Islam as a civilization was that the religious and the rationalist views of a postnational umma had been challenged by modern nationalist ideologies emerging in Europe. Te modern ideologies could enter the Muslim sphere because of the apparent political and military weakness of the Islamic world vis-à-vis the new and dynamic European nation-states.70 Te question for al-Afghani was whether it was possible to diferentiate between modern Western science and technology and the theological and philosophical consequences emerging from their application in the Western context. Muslims should embrace the former and not the latter. Al-Afghani’s political program of pan-Islamism (ittihad-Islam) sought to mobilize Muslim nations to fght Western imperialism and gain military power through modern technology. Al-Afghani’s call for the independence

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of individual Muslim nations has been a key factor in the development of so-called Islamic nationalism. Still, Islamic nationalism seems a contradiction in terms. In the early decades of the twentieth century, there were Muslim reformists who did not see Arab nationalism contradicting an Islamic program.71 Others, however, strongly rejected any compatibility. Two reformist intellectuals, Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), despite tactical diferences in their grasp of nationalism, made the same criticism of Western nationalist imperialism and of corrupt regimes in the Arab world. Tey inspired Muslim rebels worldwide by enhancing the theoretical background for transnational resistance to Western nationalism. Al-Banna, however, did not resist the idea that a Muslim nationalism could play a positive role in the process of emancipating the Muslim world. Although he rejected Western nationalism, he viewed Muslim nationalism as a tool in the struggle against Western oppression. Nationalism in this sense would constitute a frst stage in the political process leading to the unifcation of all Muslim lands. Tis did not, however, mean that al-Banna accepted nationalism in general. For al-Banna, the most important principle remained the umma. Even Europe, according to al-Banna, had had its own sense of umma, acting with a single will until the Reformation destroyed it. National liberation for Muslims, according to al-Banna, was a tactical goal, a stepping-stone in the journey to a universal Islamic state. For a time, al-Banna apparently accepted that many Muslim Brothers would combine their allegiance to Islam with both an Egyptian and an Arab identity. Te relationship between these identities, however, would not be symmetrical. As al-Banna explained at the 1938 Congress of the Muslim Brotherhood, “Te Muslim Brothers honor their particular nationalism, considering it as their prime basis for the desired revival.”72 Although they supported Arab unity, they strove for Islamic unity, viewing it as a part of establishing the Islamic homeland. Tis perspective was challenged, if subtly, by Sayyid Qutb, one of the most salient intellectual fgures of Islamist political thought. Qutb was an activist in the Muslim Brotherhood, like al-Banna. Qutb’s objectives too were not limited to the Arab world. Like al-Banna, he had grown up and was socialized in a rural setting. Both had a secular education and became schoolteachers. Both met their end at the hands of the Egyptian government: al-Banna was assassinated in 1949 and Qutb was executed in 1966.73 However, although the two ideologues’ views and actions relating

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to Islam and nationalism have some similarities, they are in many respects profoundly diferent. From a political perspective, Qutb had to confront a secular revolutionary movement that was much more problematic than the illegitimate monarchy of al-Banna’s time. During the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Brotherhood’s vision for the Egyptian polity was rejected and banned. After some complicated political maneuvering and a failed attempt on Nasser’s life by the Muslim Brotherhood, the group was violently repressed. Qutb saw an unbridgeable gap between Islam and the secular regime of Nasser, or any secular regime at all. Tat is why he deviated from alBanna’s tactical fexibility. Te particular way in which Qutb describes secular nationalism is astonishing. For Qutb, the primary political division among human beings is between the Islamic umma and the world of anti-Islamic jahiliyya. Jahiliyya is literally translated as “ignorance” and was used by most Muslims to designate the pre-Islamic society of the Arabian Peninsula. However, in the contemporary era, jahiliyya is not related to a specifc period but rather to any period in which Muslims are corrupted by secularism.74 Te whole secular world, claims Qutb, is steeped in jahiliyya, which is based on rebellion against the sovereignty of God on earth. According to Qutb, “A Muslim has no nationality except his belief, which makes him a member of the Muslim community in Dar al-Islam.”75 Nothing better expresses this belief than Qutb’s response to the Egyptian state prosecutor’s accusation in the trial that culminated in his execution in 1966 that he lacked patriotism: “I believe that the bonds of ideology and belief are more sturdy than those of patriotism based upon region. Te false distinction among Muslims on a regional basis is but one consequence of crusading and Zionist imperialism which must be eradicated.”76 Al-Banna stressed the Islamic component of national identity. Qutb, by contrast, separated them entirely to shatter any possible bridges between “real” Muslims and secular nationalists. Qutb thus rejects nationalism even as an instrumental means of struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state. For Qutb, the completion of Muslim identity will cause the disappearance of all other forms of social identifcation. Without a doubt Qutb’s legacy inspires those Muslims who condemn the connection between nationalism and secularism in the Arab world. As noted by the Palestinian-Jordanian preacher Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, “Arab nationalism was conceived in sin and born in corruption and dissolution.”77 Te question, however, is whether Qutb’s idea of a Muslim identity

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surpassing all other identities can serve as a cornerstone to current debate on how Muslims should behave in non-Islamic lands. How and under what conditions could Muslims dwelling in non-Muslim lands become a revolutionary force against the imperialist West? Living in Non-Muslim Lands

Under what conditions can Muslims be loyal to non-Muslim regimes? Intellectuals such as Qutb and the Bosnian Salaf scholar Sujleman Topoljak regard any form of obedience to non-Muslim legislation, or subordination to non-Muslim political authority, as unbearable. In contrast to al-Banna’s and other, more modern views that understood the importance of tactical fexibility, in which obedience can be justifed as a temporary necessity, Qutb viewed Islamists as constituting an autonomous entity that was not part of secular society. Qutb believed that modern Muslims have tacitly rejected the teachings of the Prophet Muhammed, and he condemned Muslims who did not defend the sharia as apostates—an accusation known as takfr. In non-Muslim environments it will be more difcult to prevent the loss of religiosity in subsequent generations.78 Tis is a central issue that generated discord in the Muslim Brotherhood. In this line of thought, Muslims should not be subject to non-Muslim laws or authority and should not be put in a position of inferiority to non-Muslims. Moreover, Muslims should avoid helping non-Muslims increase their strength and are forbidden from forming bonds of friendship or solidarity with non-Muslims. Finally, they are required to avoid environments of sin or indecency. For a time, critics of Qutb took solace in the book Preachers, Not Judges, written in 1977 by Hassan al-Hudaybi, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. Te book was widely seen as the Brotherhood’s formal rejection of Qutb’s philosophy of takfr until a debate emerged regarding the veracity of the book’s authorship.79 Regardless of the internal debate, it is clear that for Muslims the issue of accommodation with Western societies was a weighty one, and it required a certain predisposition on the part of Western societies. It is not uncommon to fnd both classical and modern Islamic jurists arguing that it is acceptable to reside in a non-Muslim polity under certain conditions. If Muslims can safely practice their religion and establish their political authority while avoiding contributing to non-Muslim welfare or

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strength, it may be acceptable. According to Topoljak, if Muslims have no choice but to join non-Muslims in a battle, their intent should be only to bring benefts to Muslims.80 In the meantime, however, they should be committed to the cause of ultimate Islamization of the non-Muslim society. Again we must ask: What type of secular sovereignty and what type of citizenship may ft the interests of a Muslim diaspora? It is clear in such a frame that Muslims should avoid relationships with non-Muslims who advocate a broad conception of citizenship. Yusuf al-Qaradawi claims that “for Muslim societies, as Islam is a comprehensive system of worship (‘ibada) and legislation (sharia), the acceptance of secularism means abandonment of sharia, a denial of divine guidance and a rejection of God’s injunctions.”81 Tis means that Muslims should reject a comprehensive citizenship that confnes religion to the private sphere or promotes the nationalization of citizenship. Scholars such as the twentieth-century Syrian jurist and exegete Rashid Rida, however, distinguish between the loyalty that Muslims render to non-Muslim states in secular, mundane matters and the possibility of having to render such obedience, even in symbolic form, in religious or metaphysical matters. What is forbidden is anything that results in the defeat of religion or harm to Muslim people.82 Rida emphasizes that “seduction away from religion” is a good reason to demand that Muslims emigrate from non-Muslim states. However, migration is not required for those who are able to practice their religion and are not coerced to abandon their religion or prohibited from performing religious duties.83 Muslim jurists held that Muslims could accept life under non-Muslim authority only under a contractual guarantee of security known as the aman. Under the aman, Muslim communities would entail some form of communal autonomy with substate institutions of authority able to enforce Islamic family and commercial and certain criminal codes. According to Andrew March, the contemporary Mauritanian scholar Abd Allah Ibn Bayya expands on this point and considers that political secularism pays respect to diferent ideas of the good, is neutral between religions, protects individual and collective rights, and provides the right of access to courts to realize and enforce one’s rights.84 His interpretive understanding of liberal conceptions of citizenship is thus nearly identical to the liberal self-description. His approach opens the road to acceptance of contractual liberalism as a frame for coexistence. Indeed, a liberal justifcation of a social contract relies on the conviction that the rights the system grants to its citizens, especially minorities, bestow on those citizens reasons to be loyal to liberal

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institutions. Tis might be the theoretical foundation that allows Muslims in Europe to reprocess Islam as a guide to issues of social and personal status (such as marriage, divorce, or individual religious freedom) or economic matters rather than as a form of governance.85 It resolves the oftencited obligation for Muslims to avoid business or social relationships with non-Muslims and with non-Islamic forms of legal and political authority in favor of muwalah/wala’, or loyalty exclusively to Muslims.86 Te possibility of cultural and religiously surviving in a liberal contractual society thus opens many opportunities for Muslims. Tis frame of thought stimulates a wide and rich debate among activists belonging to the second and third generation of European-born Muslims on how Muslims might shape Europe’s identity and how Europe might shape Muslim identity. Several Muslim groups and intellectuals, in sharp opposition to Salaf groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir that vociferously reject inclusion in European life, support inclusion. Some of them demand dramatic changes in Muslim perceptions and ways of life in order to be included in Europe. Others reject that Muslims should change their doctrinaire claims, but they advocate a more fexible attitude toward asserting sharia-based demands.87 Te question here is how and whether the West should engage with this moderate brand of intellectual. What does this level of moderation imply? Uryia Shavit points to the problems the moderate approach poses for the Western mind. Te wasati (pragmatic or moderate) approach—a middle way that claims that Islam balances materialism with spirituality and progress with tradition—allows Muslim integration into society and politics and allows engagement in a country’s institutions such as the army and the police. Tis engagement could be mistakenly interpreted by Westerners as a symbolic form of civic integration, when in reality it is a step in the direction of the future triumph of Islam in the West. Tis last claim is confrmed by al-Qaradawi, who accepts that living in a non-Muslim land may bring great benefts to Islam, including its possible spread and the strengthening of Muslim communities. Te immigrant in this sense is a pioneer in the service of the Islamic nation. Muhammad al-Ghazali, the Egyptian intellectual, echoes the same spirit. Tousands of immigrants in non-Muslim lands “will not only keep their faith but will become pioneers in spreading it.” In short, simple worker immigrants together with intellectuals such as al-Qaradawi or al-Ghazali, disseminating the idea of a modern progressive Islam in the intellectual feld, are the forerunners of the Islamic advance in Europe.88 In this sense, both visions, the moderate

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and the Salaf, justify Muslim residence in the West because it allegedly promotes, in a modest or in a radical way, the Islamization of the West. Liberals are perceived as naïve in allowing greater space for the pursuit of Islamic aims. Perhaps one of the most prominent Muslim intellectuals denouncing both the radical and the pragmatic or moderate approach is Bassam Tibi, whose position is clarifed in his debate with Tariq Ramadan. Dar al-Shahada or Dar al-Da’wa?

Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan hold perhaps the most vividly contrasting opinions among Western Muslims with regard to how Islam should evolve in Europe. Ramadan promotes the wasati way; Tibi denounces it. To Tibi, the so-called moderate approach of Ramadan leads to radicalism.89 Grandson of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, the Swiss-born philosopher and public intellectual Ramadan studied French literature and philosophy as an undergraduate at the University of Geneva, but it was nineteenth-century reformist Islam that he chose as the subject of his doctoral thesis. In the early 1990s, Ramadan founded the Movement of Swiss Muslims to bring Islam to European youth. Between December 1998 and July 2002, Ramadan donated money to two charity organizations, the Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens and the Association de Secours Palestinien, that the U.S. Treasury designated as terrorist fund-raising organizations. Accused of supporting terrorism, he was denied entry into the United States under a provision of the Patriot Act. Some describe him as the most dangerous man in Europe, whereas others see him as Islam’s Martin Luther King Jr. Ramadan’s impact is felt throughout the Western Muslim world and especially among francophones. His pamphlets, books, and speeches sell in the tens of thousands and have contributed to advancing political Islam to the very top of the political agenda in France.90 Ramadan spearheads an independent Western Islam, anchored not in the traditions of Islamic countries but in the cultural reality of the West. He presents a vision of a new Muslim identity that rejects that Islam must be defned in opposition to the West. Simultaneously, Islamic principals are kept as the core of such an identity. His book To Be a European Muslim places Ramadan within the conservative Islamic legal and theological school. By paying attention to the book’s subtitle, A Study of Islamic

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Sources in the European Context, we can gain a clearer understanding of his thinking. Ramadan uses the language of political liberalism to address the survival of a political community in conditions of religious and moral diversity.91 He suggests that “contracts determine our status, fx our duties and rights and direct the nature and scope of our actions . . . and Muslims are, unilaterally, not allowed to breach a treaty.”92 Tis thesis, according to the political theorist Andrew March, evokes something akin to the idea of contract in political liberalism.93 In his Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, Ramadan distances himself from conservative rigidity in Islam. In direct opposition to the tendencies of the Salaf and other revivalists, Ramadan rejects presenting Islam as an antidote, by way of interdictions that protect the community from “an environment which is perceived as too permissive and even hostile.” For Ramadan, Islam is an essential part of modernity.94 He portrays the narrow rule-based Islamic morality as a reaction to Western permissive culture rather than as a product of a deep comprehension of Islamic strictures. However, the critique comes from an Islamic standpoint and calls for a more fexible Islam only because a “European Islam” can oppose “the process of acculturation within second or third generations.” During a televised debate with Nicolas Sarkozy before he became the president of France, Ramadan explicitly stated that stoning women for adultery should have a moratorium.95 Te idea, according to Ramadan, is that a call for a moratorium has a double advantage: immediate suspension of these practices and a beginning of a process of refection on how to apply sharia today. He stresses that evolution of thinking within Islam cannot occur without this debate. In other words, there is no direct condemnation of the law; the assumption is that the law is simply inapplicable, and there should be a debate within Islam to evolve from that primitive thinking. Regarding the question of the wearing of the Muslim veil in France, Ramadan advocates the right of French girls to wear headscarves at school and defends the right not to wear the scarf. He does not deny that the wearing of the headscarf is an obligation, but he contends that no one can be forced to wear it since “the headscarf is an act of faith.”96 Ramadan reminds us that the classical jurisprudential divisions of the world into dar al-Islam (abode of peace: Muslim countries) and dar alharb (abode of war: all other countries) are outdated and in need of urgent revision. Te West should, according to Ramadan, be defned as dar alshahada, or the “abode of proclamation or testimony,” a place where Muslims are free to practice and, more importantly, proclaim their religion to

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all. In this, Ramadan’s beliefs are similar to those of Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Faysal Mawlawi. Distinct from Salaf groups that see non-Muslim political authority as illegitimate and even Muslims’ political participation as prohibited in non-Muslim lands, Brotherhood scholars such as al-Qaradawi and Mawlawi have defned non-Muslim lands as the “abode of proselytizing” (dar al-da’wa). Tis term legitimates life in the West and allows limited integration. Te language of da’wa, however, runs the risk of calling for the conversion of non-Muslims and for the ultimate Islamization of the West. AlQaradawi, for example, claims that Muslims “will conquer Europe  .  .  . not through the sword but through da’wa”—in other words, by peaceful means.97 Although Ramadan often cites the da’wa arguments, he does not entirely agree with al-Qaradawi. Ramadan’s concept of dar al-shahada, the abode of testimony, presents a slightly diferent approach. According to Ramadan, although Muslims in the past have been skeptical about whether and how they could be accepted in Western societies, nowadays they have a duty to contribute to the welfare of all. Tat means to contribute, as Muslims, wherever they are. Muslims’ outlook must now change from the reality of “protection” alone to that of an authentic “contribution.”98 For Ramadan, Muslims in Europe should not consider themselves as a minority in alien territory but as leaders in the spiritual redemption of the West. Tey should commit themselves to “the spiritual life” and to “radical resistance” to Western attempts to assimilate Muslims. Accordingly, integration into Western society as it currently exists is not an option. Integrating the West into tawhid, faith in the unity of God, which is a universal value, is, however, a viable possibility. In this view, the West has to be integrated into this totality.99 In sum, Ramadan’s central idea is that Islam is an essential part of modernity. Te schism between Western and non-Western societies should be dissolved into a “European and American Islamic culture,” which would allow Muslims to live in the West without any sense of contradiction.100 More than any other intellectual, Ramadan touches a nerve of liberal and left-wing intellectuals while being largely ignored by the radical Right. Ramadan is in many ways a challenge to liberal and left-wing secular thinkers. He does not agree with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who argued that religious faith endangers political loyalty, but instead aligns with John Locke in his belief that deep religious conviction is compatible with—and perhaps even necessary to—the contract of national citizenship.101

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Several pundits of the Marxist left believe that, just as Marxists in the past have been sympathetic to liberation theology in Latin America, they should have a similar response to Ramadan, rather than relegating him to the camp of the fundamentalists.102 Other scholars have rebufed Ramadan. Probably the most radical critique of Tariq Ramadan’s position comes, as mentioned earlier, from fellow Muslim Bassam Tibi. Tibi is a Syrian-born, German-educated intellectual who has taught at several universities in Germany and the United States. He is especially known for his attempt to introduce Islam into the study of international confict and being the frst to use “Euro-Islam,” responding to Ramadan’s views on the role of Islam in Europe. In 1992 the French mainstream partially abandoned the illusion that assimilation of immigrants could be achieved. Te role of Islam in Europe draws on an integration conditional on acceptance of the civic values of the republic. It was in that context that Bassam Tibi presented his paper “Les conditions d’un Euro-Islam” at the Institut du Monde Arabe. According to Tibi, the paper represents his attempt to disassociate himself from Tariq Ramadan’s version of the role of Islam in Europe.103 Tibi distinguishes between Islam and Islamism. Te frst, he argues, constitutes a peaceful religion. Te second represents a totalitarian ideology that is a reaction to the secularization of modern society and the universalization of Western values. Euro-Islam flls the gap, and its fundamental goal is to bridge both cultural realities. In contrast to Ramadan, Tibi claims that “there can be no Europeanising of Islam unless Salafst concepts like Sharia and Jihad are abandoned through cultural-religious reforms, and this goes too for the vision of Islamisation through Da’awa and Hijra.”104 (Muslims consider the Da’awa the greatest bid among mankind for people to change their lives. Tat is why Muslims celebrate Hijra as a religious call to change their way of life, attitude, and character and to purify their souls and avoid repeating their mistakes.) When Ramadan calls Europe a dar al-shahada, he is doing no more “than applying the term Dar al-Islam/House of Islam to Europe as an Islamic territory.”105 Te implication seems clear; Europe becomes a part of dar al-Islam. According to Tibi, the world is witnessing a Salafst and Wahabi Islamic mobilization that confronts the secular authority of the Westphalian synthesis. Following the Peace of Westphalia, the modern world was composed of sovereign nation-states, and Muslims had to rethink their dichotomous worldview, split between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb.106 Te failure

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From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

of Islam to adapt to this reality has revived a jihad doctrine, though the revised version is known as jihadism. As Tibi writes, “Tose who reduce jihadism to a response to US unilateralism during the war against Iraq, or trace it back to al-Qaeda, lack knowledge about the historical background.  .  .  . Muslims are religiously obliged to disseminate the Islamic faith through jihad through the world.”107 Tis is not the classical jihadist doctrine in which, historically, jihad was the instrument of war for Islamic expansion. Te violent jihad as a war has “never been glorifed in Islam,” according to Tibi.108 Does this mean that the West can calm down? One of the clues to answering this question, according to Tibi, appears in Qutb’s booklet World Peace and Islam. Tis booklet is one of the most popular writings in the contemporary Islamic world and specifcally addresses the question of Islamic peace. Indeed, according to Qutb, war (not necessarily violent) is the permanent condition between Muslims and nonbelievers. According to Tibi’s interpretation, “Te real issue is a competition over the order of the world in the twentieth century. Our present world time is determined by a new age of politicization of religion, of religionization of politics and of the culturalization of confict.”109 Tis is the overall context in which secular Europe is challenged by the Islamic revival. Moreover, Tibi, like Bernard Lewis, believes that an Islamic Europe is looming. Whether we ultimately see an Islamicized Europe or a Europeanized Islam depends a great deal on the attitude of the Western world toward Muslims. Tibi assumes that only within a culturally revitalized Europe can Euro-Islam prosper as a bridging point between Europe and the Muslim world. His most important contribution to the current debate is the use of Ibn Khaldun’s understanding of asabyya (self-awareness) to make his case that Europe is losing its way. Te contrast between a weak European self-awareness, which denotes civilizational decay, and a strong self-assertive feeling on the part of Muslim newcomers will, he believes, develop into the Islamization of Europe.110 Tibi’s nightmare about how Europe will be defeated by a democratic, self-assertive Islam is bolstered by the growing number of Muslim intellectuals who have come to understand that Europe can be changed—not through terrorism but through the democratic means that fed the European sense of cultural superiority over the Islamic world. Bassam Tibi’s fears and Tariq Ramadan’s hopes are exemplifed by people such as Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, a leading Arab Shia scholar, who recommends that immigrants study their host cultures in order to

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infuence and change them. As concluded by Hamdi Hassan, a professor of communication at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, the Muslim presence on European soil is proof that the spread of the Islamic faith has graduated from the defensive stage of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to a new phase of dissemination.111 Tis new phase is represented by the intellectual and political presence of several young Muslims coming from Arab countries to Europe, seeking shelter from persecution, who became the frst wave of radicals on European soil. Te Syrian Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, also known as Abu Musab alSuri, is a case in point. Setmariam Nasar, along with other young idealists, was repulsed by the postcolonial order in the Arab world. After immigrating to the United Kingdom, he joined the war of the mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviets and become an ideological leader of AlQaeda.112 His 1,600-page book Te Global Islamic Resistance Call became a landmark in Muslim warfare. Nasar predicted that individual terrorist acts and small groups would carry out leaderless resistance. Nasar is considered a terrorist; however, several like him have made the same physical and intellectual journey and promote the cause of Islam through democratic means. Te idea is to fght for recognition. Te frst step is to establish the proper set of ideas for European Muslim communities and promulgate a widely accepted set of rules to govern the interaction of religious and political institutions. Next is persuading non-Muslims to accept the legitimacy of those rules governing Muslims in non-Muslim societies. Leading fgures in the European Council for Fatwa and Research, including al-Qaradawi, have established bodies that purport to have panEuropean sharia-based authority. Te Union of Islamic Organizations of France and the Federation of Islamic Organizations of Europe helped found the European Council for Fatwa and Research in 1997 in London.113 Te Federation of Islamic Organizations of Europe outlined in a charter of values the rights and responsibilities of European Muslims and articulated their expectations of European states.114 Importantly, for all these intellectuals and activists, there is no contradiction between integration into Western society, being critical of Muslim terrorism, and still being an activist Muslim promoting a peaceful democratic jihad. Tis is one of the central dilemmas that Western democratic societies are dealing with, how and whether a distinction should be drawn between radical Islam or political Islam and terrorism. What is certain is that the Islam of Averroes (an infuential twelfth-century religious philosopher who integrated Islamic traditions with ancient Greek thought) and Ibn

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Khaldun does not survive in current times. As Sam Cherribi remarks, the imams of Baghdad in the thirteenth century were more liberal and open than those of London and Amsterdam today.115 Tis encapsulates the problem of the Western democratic world and Islam in current times. The Double-Edged Sword: Fight the Radicals or Recruit the Moderates?

Te focus of today’s debate in Europe is not on terrorism itself but on the democratic jihad and whether there is a plausible connection between the two. Apart from arguments over how to defne terrorism, there are questions about what should be defned as radical or extreme. Is a nonterrorist, nonviolent democratic jihad acceptable, or should it be defned as extremist or radical? In other words, although there is a full consensus that terrorism should be combated, political theorists do not agree on what strategy should be followed. Jytte Klausen suggests that even if Islamic leaders are not sincere in their cooperation, Europeans should not worry because the core of the issue lies in the adaptation of European Islam to the values of individual liberalism and the democratic society.116 Tat is, her recommendation would be to let them mature within the democratic system. However, policy makers and security institutions in most Western countries are worried about more than the question of democracy. Tey focus on a new security dilemma; can nonviolent Islamists, even if they reject democratic values, be partners against violent radicalization? If they can, what are the long-term implications of this partnership? Some experts argue that only fellow Islamists have the power to sway violent radicals and that Western governments should harness this potential by partnering with nonviolent Islamists. Te question in more practical terms is how to treat people like Yusuf alQaradawi. Should he be ostracized, or should he be adopted and co-opted? Interestingly, al-Qaradawi is very critical of jihadism, precisely because he knows and believes in the tools conferred on him by Western democratic establishments.117 At the same time, he is clear in his remarks that Western Muslims cannot transform Islam. Critics of a policy of engagement with nonviolent Muslim radicals claim that although the latter can sway some young Muslims from committing acts of terrorism, these short-term gains in security would be ofset by the negative long-term efects of such a partnership on social cohesion and integration.

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Groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir, a creation of the Syrian-born cleric Sheik Omar Bakri, established in the United Kingdom after Bakri was expelled from Saudi Arabia, strives to create Islamic states in Europe through a new assertiveness. Hizb ut-Tahrir, which does not advocate terrorism but claims to understand its motives, has done remarkable work recruiting students across Europe.118 Other groups, such as the Turkish Millî Görüs, a religious-political movement; the Saudi Muslim World League; and the Indian and Pakistani Islamic Party Jamaat-e-Islami (partially composed of exiled Islamic radicals and nationalists), also reject the use of violence. Although rituals and Islamic law are important to them, they are not fundamentalists because they do not take a literal approach to the Qur’an and the Hadith. Groups like the Arab European League preach an agenda of nondiscrimination. Tese groups claim to share interests with other nonestablishment political rebels. At the same time, the Arab European League is quite selective in its support of nondiscrimination. For example, it does not give support to homosexuals. Te league is a clear expression of a new rebellious discourse that redefnes the subject of rebellion. It favors Muslim integration in Europe, although not with Western Judeo-Christian civilization, and does not accept the idea of a secularized democracy. Opinions are divided on how to deal with all kinds of nonviolent jihadists. Several observers claim that the great majority live in the outermost circle and are repelled by terrorism and extremism. Te innermost circle contains a relatively small number of activists, some bent on the West’s destruction. Te innermost circle is the most important one, and is the one that should be of greatest concern for European and Americans. Under certain circumstances, individuals in this circle, claims Zachary Shore, “could be persuaded to lend support for extremism and under a wise approach they could be as ready to support America.”119 Many analysts focusing on political organizations highlight the need to engage Islamic organizations even if they are radical. For these analysts, these organizations demonstrate Muslim integration rather than reluctance to integrate.120 Te problem today is not integration but how to deal with integrated Muslims who become radical. In other words, radicalization—even Islamic radicalization—and integration are not necessarily opposites. Part of the debate on Muslim extremism, and on how young people radicalize, is dominated by two French scholars, Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy. Programs of deradicalization being established in the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, and elsewhere, focus on preventing indi-

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viduals from adopting radical and proviolent ideas and, if possible, on disengaging existing radicals. Despite diferences among these programs, they have common tactics: governments look to communitarian leaders, teachers in schools, and so on, to notice odd behavior of students, which can go hand in hand with becoming more religious. In France reinsertion and citizenship centers in each region are accompanied by programs of deradicalization (especially in jail centers). One of the fundamental problems of these initiatives is how to diferentiate between deradicalization and disengagement. Disengagement is a process of dissuading individuals from entering into violent action. People who are radicalized, especially in religious frameworks, are not necessarily engaged in violent action, however. As is noted by Olivier Roy, violent action is not the consequence of religious radicalization. Rather, the young European jihadists are fascinated by pure revolt, a nihilistic type of rebellion that includes rejecting their parents’ geographic, religious, and linguistic communities.121 Te eforts to combat Salafsm through programs of deradicalization in jails and schools are thus misguided and misleading. Furthermore, these programs may lead to stigmatization of Muslim communities when they do not answer to an ofcial expectation of what it means to be an integrated and good Muslim. At some distance from Roy’s view, Gilles Kepel quotes Abu Musab al-Suri’s 2005 manifesto (Te Call to Global Islamic Resistance), which argues that conducting attacks on European soil, the “soft underbelly of the West,” would strengthen extreme Right politics there, allowing jihadists to convince European Muslims that there is no coexistence to be found on a racist, xenophobic continent. In that sense Kepel understands that Europe is confronted with a well-elaborated strategy of jihadism whose goal is not to sow terror in the hearts of the infdels but to incite hatred of Muslims by “the rest of society”—that is, from non-Muslims.122 Indeed, al-Suri, who was well aware of Western literature on guerrilla warfare, proposed a decentralized jihadi warfare for a post-9/11 security environment—an ideological logo through which unintegrated youngsters could express their rage.123 Kepel recognizes that racism, economic hardship, and international causes create the raw material for jihadism, so that it is not merely a depositary of nihilistic rage. But in addition to those intelligible political and economic factors, Kepel stresses the religious factor. Jihadism is an unequivocally religious radicalism that is usually propagated by Salafsts and embraced by unintegrated youngsters.

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If we take the radicalization of Islam seriously, as Kepel demands, then governments should pay attention to Islam itself, as well as to the supposed grievances of Muslims caused by Westerners. In that case, we should be paying attention to al-Suri’s book, which calls for a civil war in Europe fomented by unintegrated Muslim youth. Olivier Roy takes a diferent perspective. If, as Roy argues, the central issue is the Islamization of radicalism, then radicalism in general is the core problem and not Islam. More than Islam, the “systematic association with death is one of the keys to today’s radicalization: the nihilist dimension is central. What fascinates is pure revolt. . . . Violence is not a means. It is an end in itself.”124 In Roy’s view, a majority of ISIS devotees have come from moderate religious backgrounds and generally excelled in school. Tey do not represent the nonintegrated, religious, alienated youth. Furthermore, they should not be portrayed as victims, since most of them are professionals. Moreover, to explain why many Islamist intellectuals have a scientifc or technical education, he points out that the sciences for those Islamists refect the “the coherence of the whole, the rationality of the one [God].”125 Indeed, those who perpetrate attacks in Europe are not necessarily the poorest, or the most humiliated, or the least integrated; 25 percent of jihadists are converts who belong to a largely imaginary community construct.126 We seem handicapped by linear thinking in our understanding and response to terrorism and radicalization. Poverty does not lead to jihadism, and radicalism is not directly caused by Islam. Even combining Islam and marginalization as risk factors does not get us far. Te reason is that only a very few marginalized Muslims join jihadist groups. Despite Kepel’s and Roy’s claims possibly being complementary, there is still a difcult tension between them, a diference of interpretation that could lead to diferent sets of policies toward radicalized Muslims and toward the community itself. As a matter of fact, no European government has yet found a proper solution to this problem. As noted by Peter O’Brien, some security services have considered collaborating with antiWest groups, hoping to give them, the services, more street clout among actual and potential extremists.127 But after the Charlie Hebdo attack, most Western European governments prefer surveillance of and crackdown on religious radicals, even if they do not engage in violent action. Te change in tactics, we show, has much more to do with democratic electoral pressure than with cold strategic analysis. A case in point is Denmark. Te terrorist attack in the Krudttønden cultural center in Copenhagen, during the public event Art, Blasphemy and Freedom of Expres-

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sion, led Mette Frederiksen, the Danish minister of justice, to demand the banning of the religious fundamentalist group Hizb ut-Tahrir, even though it opposes terrorism. Te group regards integration as dangerous and instructs all Muslims to keep apart from nonbelievers. It accuses Muslims who believe in democracy as being kafr, or infdel. Government initiatives from the UK, Dutch, and French governments, among others, are meant to crackdown on radicals regardless of whether they have committed a crime. Weeks after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in 2015, France declared a state of emergency, and changes to the constitution to enhance police powers were proposed. Months later, the French National Assembly passed the Intelligence Bill, which allows monitoring suspects’ phones and emails without a judge’s prior approval. Te United Kingdom predated France in the war against terrorism and radicals. Te Terrorism Act of 2000 and the 2001 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act enhanced the government’s powers to detain suspects indefnitely without trial and, most controversially, derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights because of a “state of emergency threatening the life of the nation” (Section 30).128 In the Netherlands, the Municipalities Act of 2002 empowered mayors to declare “security risk zones” in which anyone can be subjected to a “preventive search.” Tis has naturally generated discussion about the correct balance between security and individual freedom and between giving freedom of speech to voices that we do not want to hear and preventing the actions of potential terrorists.129 Advocates for civil liberties warn about these measures, against terrorism and radicals, whose goal seems to be singling out innocent Muslims. Furthermore, advocates of civil liberties point out the discriminatory stance of Western governments vis-à-vis terrorism. As established by the Royal United Services Institute in its study of lone-actor terrorism, the extreme right wing accounted for as many attacks as Islamist extremists.130 Te dynamics of cumulative extremism thus leads to the question of whether a liberal state can clamp down on both types of extremists at the same time.131 What should one be more afraid of? Fighting in a discriminatory way against Muslim radicalism alienates Muslim citizens and could lead to sectarian violence. As Tamar Mitts has shown, anti-Muslim hostility is linked to radicalization and support for the Islamic state among Western Muslims.132 But privileging the fght against the populist radical Right rather than Muslim extremism might lead to a growing turnout for the extremeright-wing parties.

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Te political dynamic manifested by the electoral rise of radical rightwing parties is leading governments to a dual strategy against Muslims. In one strategy governments crackdown on both radicals and terrorists. In the other, they go deeply into questions of identity in community programs of deradicalization, including national civic integration, which connect deradicalization to a growing demand to the targeted population to understand and adopt national cultural values. Tis second strategy has no real connection to terrorism but is gaining traction. Not a few pundits see this double strategy as creating a problematic link between civic integration and deradicalization. Te debate is not restricted to those who are considered experts and is entangled with questions of politics and ideology. Why should governments pursue policies of civic integration when these are seen, by some scholars, as unfair to Muslims and when they have no points of connection with triggers of terrorism? Te answer is that parts of the European public are increasingly skeptical that the way to fght Salaf jihadism is to treat fairly those in whose name the Salafsts kill. Tese issues are pushed forward for political debate specifcally by the populist radical Right. Tis is clearly leading to a debate on values. We are witnessing increasing intervention by the state against not only potential terrorists but also those presenting cultural and religious challenges. Te fght against jihadism leads to redefning the role of antiterrorist activity and, beyond that, raises questions pertaining to national identity, democracy, and the integration of the Other. Resuming the Enlightenment? Neither Ethno-nationalism nor Multiculturalism

Tere are three viewpoints on the dilemmas of Western collective identities regarding whether and how to include the Other: that of populist radical right-wing movements, political liberals who support an overlapping consensus and multicultural recognition, and civic nationalists. We examine each later. We frst, however, briefy address why including the Other has become more contentious than ever. Since the end of World War II the issue of radical right-wing parties, along with everything related to the historical and philosophical roots of fascism, was relegated to the fringes of any debate on comparative politics and political philosophy. Any vestige of the fascism of World War II or of

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National Socialism was completely delegitimated, as was nationalism. Te apex of liberal triumphalism did not come until after the end of the Soviet world. Francis Fukuyama’s end of history thesis symbolized and popularized the state of mind of Western democracies, at a time when constructivist theories highlighted institutional change in the Europe of the 1990s.133 New theories of institutionalism adopted a more liberal and multicultural approach to sociocultural problems in Western societies and accepted a central assumption: the time of the historical nation-state was over.134 Te consensus relied on the idea that individuals possess multiple identities that become salient in diferent settings. As Jefrey T. Checkel argues, this “institutional environment is a more likely setting for the promotion of international norms.”135 Tis liberal democratic consensus that minority and human rights are in the front line of moral and political debate convinced Europe’s political elites that the power of the majority should be controlled. Tey had a liberal distrust of democratic demands for popular and national sovereignty, which were blamed for the disasters of World War II.136 But in the frst years of the 2000s, this consensus began to dwindle. Te threat of terrorism and the cultural challenge from religious identities and their transnational loyalties were not the only emergent destabilizing factors. A possible European Union constitution, controversies around enlargement of the European Union, and tensions produced by legal and illegal immigration set the stage for a resistance to what was defned as the “Americanization of Europe.”137 A new age of populism loomed on the horizon. To some scholars, the populist backlash drew its strength from the age of optimism and prosperity. As remarked by Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, the postmaterialist agenda that emerged during times of optimism opened the door to a backlash that brought a retrogression toward authoritarian and xenophobic societies.138 Te aftermath of the Great Recession following the 2008 fnancial crash, the immigration crisis, and fnally Brexit and Donald Trump’s election only confrmed and enhanced a process already in the making. But what is the character of the populist backlash? Does it always lean to the right or can it also be of the left? To several observers, political parties like Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, France Insoumise in France, or the Five Star Movement in Italy are left-wing populists canalizing support from downwardly mobile middle-class citizens who have been stripped of well-being and self-respect by globalization and fnance capitalism.139 We suggest, however, that the populist radical Right has been more successful

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in canalizing their support. Although all forms of populism involve exaltation of the people and are antielitist and all consider society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the idea of who the people are difers between right and left.140 Whereas left-wing populism may champion the general will, populists of the racial variety make reason and the general will mute and powerless.141 Because of the immigration crisis and because political elites adopted a multicultural, postnational worldview ostensibly open to diversity, the identity backlash became especially salient. As a result the racist type of populism became more prominent. Leaders of the populist radical Right were quick to understand that “globalization losers” are more interested in recognition than in material redistribution. Indeed, voters for radical Right parties are not especially strong supporters of redistribution. Tey are concerned about recognition, feeling that they have been pushed to the margins of society by economic and cultural forces.142 Right-wing populists thus boosted recognition through ethnic competition with migrants and through homogenization of ethnicity and a “[return] to traditional values.”143 Attacks on immigrants, however, were accompanied by accusations leveled against political, technocratic, and intellectual elites—the new meritocracy that had defended globalization, open borders, and a postnational, multicultural society. By contrast, today’s populist leadership promises to reestablish the national and ideological constraints that were removed by globalization. In short, what populists promise their voters is not competence but intimacy, not saving the people from globalization but staying with them.144 Tis intimacy between populist leaders and the casualties of modernization must fnd expression in a politics of identity. Whether we like it or not, what is debated today under the label of the populist threat to democracy in Western Europe is less about populism and far more about nationalism and nativism.145 How, then, is the question of identity translated and transmitted by the populist parties in each country? How does the debate about identity today difer from such debates in the past? Since we afrm that the debate on European identity is almost totally contaminated by the image of the Muslim Other, to the exclusion of concern with other identities, the question is whether the Muslim challenge enhances old racism or slays it. In other words, the question is whether the confrontation with what for many Europeans is defned as reactionary Islamism contributes to a freeing of the identitarian claims of the populist radical Right from their seemingly inherently racist roots.

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From Multiculturalism to Democratic Discrimination

Historically, fascist and radical right-wing ideologues thought that democracy and the Enlightenment portended the decay of the West, and they were particularly eager to destroy the democratic idea of an inclusive assimilative citizenship. In the early twentieth century, French thinkers such as Charles Maurras (1868–1952), Maurice Barrès (1862– 1923), and Édouard Drumont (1844–1917) considered the very idea of a democratic inclusive citizenship a symbol of social decay. After all, assimilation or integration, despite diferent approaches to it, is fundamentally rooted in a desire for a multiethnic society to become an integral part of a national culture. Have current radical right-wing movements abandoned this early twentieth-century posture against inclusion as a sign of decay? If so, in what way is a multiethnic society problematic with such parties? As Michael Freeden has noted, ideologies’ concepts can change over time, but certain core concepts without which they will be unrecognizable persist.146 Class confict in Marxism and freedom in liberalism are examples. For the radical Right, it is the idea of maintaining an ethnically closed society by discouraging the integration of aliens. Radical Right thinking in this sense coincides with the claim that liberalism is a philosophy that could work only in an ethno-homogeneous nation.147 Te question is whether newcomers willing to assimilate would be accepted. We suggest, diferently from democratic civic nationalists, who encourage and accept assimilation of the Other (the hidden part of the populist Right discourse), that no foreigners should be encouraged to integrate. Belonging to the nation is not a matter of will. Have present-day right-wing nationalist groups in Western Europe largely abandoned this philosophical outlook? Have they modernized their claims? Although they have generally been the strongest force in raising the issue of immigration and the changing face of European societies, most of Europe’s right-wing populist parties either have no roots in old-time totalitarian fascism or make a conscious and conspicuous efort to distance themselves from such antecedents.148 Yet, although we might accept that the new right-wing populism has no direct links to old fascism and National Socialism, most of these radical Right populist movements still fnd a resource in a nativist organic sense of identity, whose resonance in current times is that foreigners are not welcome because they will never be part of the national body. One of the pillars of radical-right-wing parties is, then, a populist nativism. Cas Mudde has advanced a generic defnition of a nativism that

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55

closely resembles a combination of xenophobia and nationalism.149 Te idea is that the state should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native (national) group. In this particular sense, when nationalism turns to nativism it defends, in certain ways, a form of exclusionary cultural pluralism. Nativists are reluctant to blur the idea of diference.150 Radical-right-wing movements in general favor the essentialization of diferent cultures and adopt a diferentialist ideology. Diferentialism of the Right, as defned by Pierre-Andre Taguief, difers from standard racism in that it does not promote a universal scale of values between races. However, it does divide the human race into closed cultural groupings.151 It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but insurmountable cultural diference.152 Te motto would be “We respect your diference and recognize that it prevents people like you from adopting my identity, which is this country’s identity.” Ironically, then, rather than overt racism, right-wing exclusionists may adopt a perverse version of diferentialism and promote ethno-pluralism. A clear representation of this version is the identitarian movement, a network with branches in most European countries. Te movement originated in France in 2003 and often uses a black and yellow fag with a symbol representing the Spartan shields at the battle of Termopylae (when Europeans resisted an invading Persian army). Teir main concerns are Muslim immigration and the corrupt authoritarianism of the EU. Several observers relate radical-Right identitarianism to nationalism and to anti-Europeanist postures. In reality identitarians do not endorse old-style nationalism but focus on what they see as the civilizational clash between Europe and other continents. Some would prioritize the consequences of out-of-control capitalism, but most would emphasize the consequences of immigration, especially of Muslims.153 Some of them would indeed claim that they defend a liberal Europe against the barbarians. Tey do not, however, agree about what liberalism is. Some see it as part of Europe’s identity, threatened by Muslims. Others see liberalism as the disease that made Muslim immigration easy in the frst place. So is nationalism the solution, or is it obsolete? Is nativism part of nationalism or alien to it? Nativists would accept that the age of nationalism, in which nationalist elites could try to homogenize society, is over. If nationalism is about imposing an education system for rationalizing the language, creating (or at least securing) an independent economy, and even assimilating minorities into the nation, we can say that identitar-

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ians are against that. Indeed, precisely because of the inability of old-style nationalism to impose values, the new nativism endorses a posture that abandons any aspiration to national integration and even encourages cultural diferences. Its adherents see the impossibility of integration of those designated as the Other as a beneft rather than a liability. Reversing the commitment of liberal multiculturalists to integration, right-wing identitarians recognize otherness in order to exclude. Nativists could be Europeanist, postnationalist, or ultranationalist. Tey could defend the French nation as does the French National Rally (previously the National Front), be ethno-regionalists, as are Nouvelle Droite and the Belgian Vlaams Belang, or both regionalist and nationalist as are the Lega Nord of Matteo Salvini. All presume the cultural incompatibility with the European nation of those taken to be the Other, in whatever way we might defne that nation.154 Tey accept in one way or another the thesis advanced by the French writer Renaud Camus in his 2011 book Le Grand Remplacement (Te great replacement), which argues that Western white identity is under threat from nonwhite immigration. Tis obviously exaggerates neutral sources marking the parameters of demographic change. For example, according to a 2017 Pew report, even if all migration into Europe were to immediately and permanently stop, the Muslim population of Europe is expected to rise from the 2016 level of 4.9 percent (25 million) to 7.4 percent by 2050. Right-wing activists set the stage for a politics of fear by adding the 1.6 million people who between 2010 and 2016 received refugee status and the 1.3 million Muslims who arrived in Europe between 2010 and 2016 as regular migrants.155 Eric Kaufmann, however, makes no special case for Muslims and thinks we should be very afraid of fundamentalists of all stripes.156 In any case, the results lead to the same hysteria; the Europe of the Enlightenment is ending. Yet two diferent paths of political action could be advanced to meet that challenge. Whereas democratic integrationists still advocate integration into national secular cultures, the populist Right holds the view that assimilation into a majority culture and cultural transformation are both impossibilities. Te Danish People’s Party, for example, considers the cultures, traditions, and languages of Arabs and Africans to be very diferent from those of Denmark, making it hard for them to integrate there.157 Te party also glosses Danishness as Christian. Similar views are advanced by the Dutch Party for Freedom. Te Party for Freedom has at times called for the banning of the Qur’an, but it also frequently claims to be defending Dutch liberal values (from Muslims).

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Te party has been eclipsed by another radical-Right party, the Forum for Democracy (Forum voor Democratie), whose leader Tierry Baudet is more directly following the ideas of ethnic separateness associated with the Nouvelle Droite and the work of the German historian Oswald Spengler. Te French National Rally also puts special emphasis on supposedly protecting France from Muslim and Roma migrants. By fusing cultural identity and welfare nationalism, the party presents the decline of social rights of French nationals as a consequence of immigration. Other parties, such as the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), before it adopted a more centrist position to compete with Fidesz, had a clear anti-Semitic and anti-Roma agenda. Te common cause of the party is frst and foremost the fght against “Gypsy crime,” a racist policy that includes elements that resemble leftist ideas: a strong and sovereign nation-state against global capitalist forces and European integration.158 Te party subscribed to the previously mentioned view: the impossibility and undesirability of assimilation. With a diferent emphasis, right-wing parties in government such as the Polish Law and Justice Party and Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary clearly stand for xenophobic populism. Nigel Farage presented a variant of this image while he led the UK Independence Party. He defned the party as civic nationalist in an attempt to imply a rejection of ethno-nationalism and encourage support from British of all ethnicities and religions. Although he rejects Islamophobia, Farage’s nationalist message still pits the fgure of a Muslim presence in the West as a ffth column, opposed to integration and wanting to change our sense of “us.” Extreme-right parties are strong when they couple their ultranationalist or racist messages with Islamophobia, especially in countries with a long tradition of Christianity. Still, that perspective does not capture the radical Right’s discourse, which could be described as a racist discourse against racism.159 Te great majority of the populist Right combine a democratic although antiliberal posture with an identitarian, diferentialist posture. Tis sophisticated multiculturalism of the right, opposing liberal and left types of multiculturalism, represents the new tone of the populist Right.160 It goes along with a legitimate nativism that does not insist on imposing homogeneity through assimilation. It respects cultural essentialism, a key for exclusion rather than integration. Paradoxically, rather than emphasize its rejection of multiculturalism that ultimately works better for it, the populist Right rejects liberal constitutionalism, cosmopolitanism, and civic integration.

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Opposed to this, as we shall see, is the challenge for democratic nationalists, of how to embrace a dominant national culture, open to any willing to be part of it, including Muslims? Whereas for democratic nationalists including aliens in the nation and transforming diversity into unity has been perceived as a virtue, for right-wing radicals and fascists, as noted by Montserrat Guibernau, mixing cultures or assimilating them is understood as a leveling down.161 As can be expected, this distinction between an assimilative democratic left and an exclusionary right comes under attack by liberal observers who see that the real gap between the populist Right and democratic nationalists is not that wide. Te problem for liberals seems to be twofold. First, identitarian language migrates from these fringe groups toward the political center. Second, as Mabel Berezin and Diane Sainsbury point out, the radical Right is quite successful at appropriating issues formerly and almost exclusively endorsed by the constituency of socialist and liberal parties.162 Trough this soft drift to the center, Europe’s extreme right was able to shake of its familiar stigma and attract new voter groups, groups that would have never considered supporting an old-style party of the Far Right, advocating biological racism and rejecting democracy.163 Socioeconomic inequality in advanced industrial societies, exemplifed by the reduction of national barriers for labor, the restructuring of economic markets, and the shrinkage of the welfare state, has also prepared the ground for the strengthening of the radical Right on its path. It has been successful in combining generous public spending and progressive gender rights with anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic rhetoric.164 Populist parties endorse welfare nationalism, and to this extent at least, they bridge the gap between themselves and the social democratic parties.165 In France, the National Front exploited French socialism’s neglect of worker unions and the working class by stealing the left’s economic rhetoric and won the most votes in the frst round of regional elections in December 2015. In Germany, the anti-immigrant Alternative for Germany is creeping up on the beleaguered Social Democrats. Issues such as national working-class interests, anti-European discourse, social solidarity, welfare chauvinism, and a slightly progressive agenda for the rights of women are increasingly being adopted by the populist radical Right.166 Indeed, some parties that have been historically apprehensive about issues such as feminism are making a dramatic change of course. In a clear attempt to inch toward liberal legitimacy, the French National Rally and the Belgian Vlaams Belang are now endorsing, although still with some

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reluctance, the causes of various gender groups. Under Marine Le Pen, the National Rally is timidly opening its gates to Jews and homosexuals, who are presented as victims of Muslim fundamentalists. Not surprisingly, several researchers have found that the electoral power of the French National Rally, the Dutch Party for Freedom, and the UK Independence Party is bolstered by Europe’s women, who are steadily deserting centrist parties.167 As noted by Eric Fassin, “We already suspected that the ‘native Frenchman’ was white; but what characterizes him today is ‘sexual blanchité’ [gendered whiteness].”168 Tis is not a clear-cut trend in all populist right-wing parties, however. Right-wing populist leaders, such as Salvini, Farage, and Orbán, and many party members of the French National Rally have shown great animosity toward a gender agenda. Especially striking is the Polish crusade against gender ideology that started in 2013 with a pastoral letter by the Bishops’ Conference of Poland and France’s protest marches in Paris and Lyon (la Manif pour Tous; the Protest for Everyone) in 2014 after same-sex marriage became legal during the Socialist government of François Hollande. At the same time, however, the Danish People’s Party labels itself an inheritor of the 1970s women’s liberation movement and a defender of gender equality, and the Dutch Party for Freedom developed an ideological coalition with progressive groups such as homosexuals and feminists against Islamism.169 Of course, populist right-wing movements have no intention of promoting the rights of women; they want to embarrass Muslims.170 Yet unlike the American and global Christian right, which works hard to promote anti-LGBTQ legislation, the European populist radical Right is at least ambivalent on the issue. Several scholars see this Islamophobic ideology that recruits the politics of gender and sexuality to its populism as extremely problematic. Tis is a key part of the invidious normalization of nativist nationalism by the Far Right.171 Ian Buruma describes it: “We are facing the rise of ‘enlightened fundamentalists.’”172 Te enlightened fundamentalism of the populist radical Right is manifested not only in support for women’s rights issues but also in the aggressive and often articulate support of free expression. Te National Rally in France, UK Independence Party, Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West movement and Alternative for Germany, and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands are all supporters of free speech. Te meaning of free speech to them obviously is freedom to antagonize Islam, but they refrain from using the language of hard-core racism. Despite this tactical approach, the populist radical Right cannot con-

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ceal its core ideology, which as noted by Roger Grifn, is to advance an ethnocratic liberalism in which democratic rights are granted only to a white majority, with ethnic minorities entitled only to second-class status.173 Tis ethnocratic liberalism is closer to a hard-core and traditional biological racism, with varying shades of white supremacism, than to ideas of integration or assimilation of a multiethnic society into a national culture, as advanced by civic integrationists. Ethnocratic white nationalists share with Islamists a nostalgic obsession with a purist form of identity: for one, a white nation unpolluted by immigrant blood; for the other, a medieval Islamic state. In this confrontational symmetry, the populist radical Right has found the perfect enemy, allowing it to garner sympathy from the majority. As Pnina Werbner notes, “Te Islamic Grand Inquisitor is not a disguised and assimilated threat as the Jew was; ‘he’ is not subservient and bestial like the black slave. He is upfront, morally superior, openly aggressive. . . . He is indeed a fgure constructed by fearful elites which may nevertheless legitimize far cruder forms of biological racism. . . . [Confrontation with Islam] has allowed the creation of an unholy alliance; an oppositional hegemonic bloc that includes intellectual elites and the consumerist masses, as well as ‘real’ violent racists.”174 Werbner’s position that liberals’ and socialists’ own interrogation of the fgures of Islamic fundamentalism might empower racist discourses seems credible. Furthermore, the claim that mainstream parties, under the contagion efect, react to the threat of the radical Right by adopting their positions (in particular those on immigration policy) should also be considered.175 Tat mainstream parties adopt the radical Right’s positions is understandable. Te challenge of Islam is precisely what could lead liberals who shun racism to embrace conditional integration, one based on a culture of individual rights rather than on an indefensible thesis of biological racism or white nationalism. Tis position constitutes the most signifcant diference between liberal nationalists or social democrats and right-wing populists and nativist nationalists. Tis, though, for some liberals and left progressives, is more of a problem than an advantage. It is true that even without the intervention of the populist Right, European populations have increasingly shifted toward more exclusionist postures.176 Attitudes toward mainstream parties and liberal democracy in general are becoming hostile. Mainstream parties are blamed for preventing an open discussion on immigration.177 At the same time, this is no reason for liberals or progressive leftists to

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abandon a moral posture. Whereas the normalization of the right implies the abandonment of cultural diversity as something positive, the reverse is true for liberals and progressives, for whom the struggle for minority rights is a moral obligation, along with the efort to fnd an overlapping consensus between diferent conceptions of the good; this, in their view, is what a liberal society should fght for. Are such commitments sustainable in current times? Will an Overlapping Consensus Work in Secularized National Societies?

As the radical Right reinvents itself in the politics of confrontation with Islam, liberals work hard, politically and philosophically, to reframe a politics of compromise, especially relating to the explosion of cultural diversity in Western societies. Since the 1990s political philosophers have debated whether there is a conception of political morality and justice that would be valid across cultures. Tis bears on how to accommodate Islam in Western liberal societies. A number of liberal scholars believe that a modus vivendi with Islam, as well as with other non-Western cultures, can be achieved by going beyond the types of national assimilation or integration familiar to Western democracies, by opening Western societies to diferent conceptions of the good—especially Islamic ones. Equipped with John Rawls’s ideas from Political Liberalism, they claim that threats to well-ordered societies originating in undemocratic or illiberal conceptions of the good (or “comprehensive doctrines”) cannot be resolved by imposing a given conception of the good. For example, such a conception might fail to entail respect for citizens holding communitarian religious values, which might be considered oppressive but which are still reasonable for purposes of liberal justifcation. Unlike most classical theorists of political justifcation, Rawls does not aim to realize a given conception of the good. His political liberalism is meant to be “freestanding” in relation to any single comprehensive doctrine and is limited to a commitment to the “reasonable” rather than the “fully true.” Tus, diferent doctrines may give support to liberal democracy from their own perspective and for their own reasons. Communists, radical right-wing movements, and religious fundamentalists may all advance their interests through the frame of liberal society as long as they play according to the rules of the democratic game. Some claim that this

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type of settlement brings a certain stability to a liberal society.178 According to Andrew March, such an overlapping consensus might lead to a moderate Islamic acceptance of partnership in Western society.179 Some scholars, however, consider that Rawls’s equation of the reasonable with a normative dimension is in need of a supplement. Jürgen Habermas’s communicative rationality attempts to provide this, going beyond the neutrality defended by Rawls. If a liberal state’s raison d’etre lies primarily in the protection of equal private rights, Habermas’s communicative rationality strives to guarantee an inclusivity in which free and equal citizens reach an understanding on which goals and norms lie in the equal interest of all.180 Habermas, thus, escapes the restrictions of the hypothetical situation created by Tomas Hobbes or Rawls and stresses what the actual, necessary presuppositions of communication are. However, the Rawlsian and Habermasian approaches can converge. Both ground authority and legitimacy on public reasoning that enjoys a normative dimension. Yet the Habermasian model of discourse ethics does not attempt to bound the scope of citizens’ contributions in advance of actual deliberation. Habermas’s supplement may be presented as more inclusive of disempowered communities—including racialized and, in some cases, cultural and religious minorities—by acknowledging an informal public sphere in addition to the formal public sphere of constitutional democratic politics.181 Te most important point, though, as Seyla Benhabib argues, is that no limits should be established on the scope and content of the deliberation. Participation in such deliberation should be governed by the norms of equality and symmetry, which ensure unconstrained public deliberation by all on matters of common concern.182 But critics have argued that this approach may set up obstacles to the political participation of some social groups. Te requirement that cultural identity and its preservation be treated as fully contestable in the context of deliberation relies on a concept of universalism, impartiality, and reciprocity that favors stronger actors. Tus, as noted by Melissa Williams, commitments to the deliberative virtues of impartiality and universalism, in reality “hamper marginalized group representatives’ capacity to conform to the standards of public discourse.”183 Te very attempt to divide private and public and to impose a rational consensus on the public sphere may undermine eforts to deepen democratic inclusion. Tis undermining can happen with secular, enlightened majorities in a liberal state. Tey hear minority voices in line with their democratic obligation, but consent to minority cultural demands is not guaranteed. A majority may perceive a minority challenge (especially if

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it comes from newcomers of diferent religious backgrounds) not as a stimulus to reafrm an overlapping consensus but as a trigger for reafrming its own authentic national type of liberalism, its own models of integration and historical patterns of state accommodation of religion. We suggest that this is what is happening in contemporary Europe. As we show, the current liberal European project is more than ever bound to secularity and by a supposed impartiality always biased in favor of religions that ft the Western European path to secularization. Tis manifests as a backlash, not necessarily expressed as an explicit return to Europe’s Christian identity, instead taking the form of a secular identity. Tis identity in the Western world developed along two main paths, laicism and a Judeo-Christian view of history. Laicism, which comes out of the Enlightenment’s critique of religion, is associated with attempts to force religion out of politics. Te Judeo-Christian version of secularism rests on the claim that the secular state is a unique Western achievement expressing the essence of Euro-American history.184 A teleological theory of religious development, explains Jose Casanova, somewhat explains why large parts of Europe’s population, including Christian churches, accept the basic premise of secularization theory; secularization is a result of modernity and the triumph of the Enlightenment over reaction.185 For Catholics the boundaries between the religious and the secular are maintained, leading to a polarization and radicalization of both paths, and a collaboration between the two trends may also lead to the institutionalization of secularity. Tis secularization of consciousness leads to a shift from religious imperatives to the pluralist situation.186 So although it is true that there is a revival of religiosity in Europe, in which we see religion increasingly deprivatized and respected, it remains the case that, as Charles Taylor has argued, belief is understood to be an option among many. In this sense religion has to coexist with the “presumption of unbelief,” which has become dominant in several milieux. It especially “has achieved hegemony in the academy and intellectual life.”187 Tis is the culmination of what Casanova calls the diferentiation and specialization of religion within its own sphere.188 However, the question is whether the privatization of religion can be seen as a springboard for building a national and rationalist public culture.189 Tis has already occurred in Europe, where the state assumes the historical functions of the medieval church, the most important of them being the creation of a common culture.190 Te French separation model of secularism; the concordat model of Italy, Germany, and Austria, in

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which the state grants privileges to majority religions; and the northern European national church model have diferences. Despite these diferences, the three types converge in how the state, to difering degrees, takes on the functions of the medieval church. Even in the United Kingdom, which endorses a fourth model, a principled pluralism of religion, the idea of the Christian nation enjoys much support among English evangelicals, and not only among Anglicans, who have a natural afnity for it with the established status of the Church of England. Although the Christian nation’s aim is to defend or restore its essentially Christian character, it is just as committed to the principle of individual religious liberty as is a more neutral and principled pluralism. Not a few observers admit that several features of the early-modern confessional state persist, partly as consequence and partly as cause of the surviving patterns of confessional majoritarianism in much of Europe. For example, according to the 1988 General Comment of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, diferent religious traditions can legitimately be accorded special recognition by states so long as this does not derogate from individual religious liberty: “Te fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or that it is established as ofcial or traditional or that its followers comprise the majority of the population, shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1976] . . . nor in any discrimination against adherents of other religions or non-believers.”191 According to this settlement, freedom of religion is ensured. Despite explicit rejections of discrimination, however, the liberal state in Europe distinguishes between adaptable and nonadaptable religions and between majority and minority religions. If we accept that secularism in the European state looks like a national religion, then we must accept Cristina Lafont’s claim that secularism is more than a refection of the neutrality of the state; it is an important ingredient of the majority culture.192 As authors such as Sara Silvestri have noted, the European Union has partially addressed the gradual emergence of religious sensitivities within the institutional setting of the EU.193 Ultimate defnition of the issue, however, falls to the state, which gives predilection to either a national religion or a secular public sphere rather than to claims of religious minorities. According to some scholars, this process exacerbates the two difculties Muslims fnd in European public spheres. First, national identities, along with how they are tied in with secularity or Western religions, are alien to

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Islam, which is profoundly antinational. Second, Muslims fnd it difcult to accept the independence of secular from sacred knowledge.194 Te fnal revelation of Islam rejects the cognitive and moral dualism that is the hallmark of Western Christianity. Furthermore, whereas Christian and Jewish reform evolved over centuries, in relatively organic and self-generated— albeit often bloody—fashion, Muslims have had less time to grapple with the revolutionary ideas of the Enlightenment and have done so from a position of weakness rather than strength.195 Tis weakness, from the perspective of Western identity, of Muslim political cultural and religious expression comes to light in European public spheres that, despite claims of cultural and religious neutrality, are far less neutral than they appear. Te protection of freedom of religion is being sustained in Europe, but our analysis of political and social developments allows us to cautiously forecast the beginning of a slow process of abolishing protections for religious minorities. From a ban on burqas in France, Belgium, and Denmark196 to the European Court of Justice allowing workplace bans on the hijab, to the proscription of ritual slaughter in Belgium, Muslim minorities fear that they are targets of bigotry under the guise of rallying cries against signs of subservience and debasement or violating animal rights. Te question, as Charles Taylor puts it, is whether the settlement coming out of the 1988 General Comment can cope with an increasingly pluralistic West made up of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, atheists, and agnostics. What was formerly common ground is being reshaped by these others who assert themselves as interested parties.197 A Free Public Sphere? Depends Who Is Asking

As Jürgen Habermas notes, the eighteenth century saw the development of a public sphere dominated by a rational-critical debate in which religion did not play a role. Nowadays, however, excluding religion from the public sphere undermines the public sphere’s solidarity and creativity.198 Undeniably, if we want more integration among citizens of diferent beliefs, we should accept a public discourse open to infuence from religious perspectives. Furthermore, the state should not only accept religious perspectives but also provide for equal treatment of majority and minority religions. Alan Patten, for example, suggests that under a policy of “neutrality of treatment,” a liberal state should grant minorities an equal

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footing with the majority.199 Political sociologists, such as Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz, and Yogendra Yadav, recommend that, to prevent developments harmful to minorities, “political leaders make use of the concept of ‘state nation’” rather than nation state.200 Tis implies a procedural state that abstains from moral judgment while preserving an equal distance from majority and minority cultures. However, to preserve neutrality and put minority cultures on an equal footing with majorities, the state, according to Patten, should “[extend] equal recognition to each culture.”201 Veit Bader goes a step further and demands relational neutrality, in which the state comes to the aid of religions that are at a disadvantage visà-vis majoritarian religions, which, under a “benign neglect” approach, are favored by the state.202 Other scholars believe the problem of the liberal state is related to the more central question of how to deal with religious citizens in general, as well as to majority or minority religion. Te principle of neutrality in itself is insufcient to guide fair treatment of religious citizens. Religions and religious citizens, according to Cecile Laborde, should enjoy special treatment and status, because religions are expressions of moral commitments that cannot be negotiated. What Laborde attempts to prove is that religion cannot be unproblematically analogized with, or extended to, other kinds of practices and beliefs. Analogizing religion with an equally vague category of “conceptions of the good” cannot adequately ground a sound normative theory of religious freedom.203 For that reason religious citizens should enjoy the privileges of those with health-related disabilities that require special accommodation. No treatment can be fully neutral if it fails to heed the sacred duties of religious groups.204 At this point, the neutrality debate may be turned on its head. Liberals such as Ronald Dworkin reject the direct comparison between healthrelated problems (a resource defciency) and religion, which they indeed see as a matter of individual preference and personal responsibility. In other words, Jews’ decision to choose Saturday instead of Sunday as their day of rest is a matter of personal preference, which should not be considered or compensated by the state. Other scholars such as Jean Cohen have gone even further and claim that the current freedom-of-religion discourse, which assumes that religion is special and unique, is misleading. In reality, accommodating religion and giving it immunity and blanket exemptions from civil law allows us to approve unjust discrimination by or within religious organizations against weaker individuals within the community.205 For this reason, legal pluralism might be invoked to

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defy the comprehensive jurisdiction of civil law and of a liberal constitutional state. Tis leads us to the next question: On what grounds may a liberal state justify intervention against a particular religious organization or religious expression? Dworkin, for example, rejects banning Muslim religious symbols in the name of an antireligious ideology. Rules or laws afecting a religious group may be enacted only under the premise of a public and common good and egalitarianism.206 Tat is, liberal governments should not involve themselves in debates on the truth or falsehood of any religion. Rather, they should protect freedom of religion in the name of neutral treatment and may intervene to the detriment of religious rights only to protect the general interest. But the question remains of how we should defne neutral treatment and the general interest. How, for example, can the right of abortion be advocated in the name of a neutral approach? What about prohibitions of religious signs on behalf of neutral secularity? Observers may wonder whether a secular neutral school, supposedly unbound by the claims of culture, is really as neutral as it claims to be. Te schools of the French republic embody an argument for the importance of the secularity of schools as crucial to the creation of an inclusive, nondiscriminatory, and neutral educational setting.207 But is this setting neutral? A law in Quebec to ban the burqa, passed in October 2017, is called the Act to Foster Adherence to State Religious Neutrality. Te law mandates that faces be uncovered while giving or receiving a provincial or municipal service. Despite the defenses of liberal neutrality, we have to admit that promoting it is a difcult enterprise in general and in Europe particularly so. Several scholars have therefore suggested that liberalism should give up the claim of liberal neutrality. Tey admit that liberalism cannot be neutral because it claims rationalism—in efect a civic religion—as a superior religion.208 In this case, even the separation of church and state is irrelevant.209 Some thinkers, among them Richard Rorty, are skeptical about the power of rationality as a civic religion and claim that only an ethnocentric liberalism would allow liberalism to achieve a greater solidarity than what can be expected from an abstract rationalist humanism.210 An ethnocentric liberalism not only dismisses liberal neutrality but promotes a public morality that discriminates between conceptions of the good. It enhances a liberal identity that might lead to a hegemonic and even nationalist public sphere.211 For Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, we are heading toward a government that is a handmaiden and governor of tolerant, democracy-friendly, legally

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supervised religion—in Europe and abroad.212 In this dispensation the state has a more direct role in monitoring and regulating religion and in taking a hard stance against religions that are not compatible with ethnocentric liberalism. Talal Asad correctly concludes that the modern liberal state (especially the European one) is not against religion but is against certain religions. Only religions that agree to enter into the public sphere for a rational debate and agree to the basic premises of liberalism are accepted.213 Under this framework it is acceptable to believe that, and therefore oppose, the presence of Islam in Europe threatens the preferential treatment and privileges that Christian denominations currently enjoy in European states.214 In short, the argument for neutrality may plausibly afect in a discriminatory manner citizens of Muslim faith who, to promote their religious values, are required to frame them in a way that can circumvent secular resistance. As Habermas argues, religious citizens must translate their religious language into secular terms when they advance their claims in the formal public sphere.215 Te question remains whether this approach is part of the problem rather than a solution. Is it fair and legitimate to accept this approach even if it is conceived to invite religion back into the public debate? Isn’t the translation demand an insult and a burden to religious people? Several critics cast doubt on the moral value of demanding that religious citizens use religious language to justify their political stances only within the frame of an informal public sphere. Bringing religion into the formal public sphere would make it clear that the accommodation of Muslim norms is subject to the ultimate regulation of national constitutional and legal systems rather than allowing them to operate as part of a separate legal system.216 Having a separate legal system drives minority religions to endorse and accept the proposals of multiculturalism to circumvent and dismantle liberal constraints. From Tolerance to Recognition and Back to Exclusion

Many scholars have proposed that ideas of neutrality and even equality are incomplete for highly diverse societies containing both national and immigrant minorities. Te concepts of equality and freedom are highly individualistic and do not properly include groups that are discriminated against.

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Te goal of multiculturalism, therefore, must be to overcome the diffculties inherent in the current conception of equality and to emancipate society by advancing a more substantial type of equality, one that respects a collectivist and asymmetrical approach to help weaker cultural groups. Te question is what should be emphasized: the group or the individual? For several scholars, there is a direct relationship between individual freedom and respect of the individual, on one hand, and multiculturalism, on the other. Multiculturalism, therefore, might be a necessity for a liberal society. Tis creates a dilemma for liberals. Since multiculturalism also advocates group rights, some might consider it to be problematic for individual rights. To defend the right of weaker minority communities to preserve their cultures, individual rights might be negatively afected. As a result of this dilemma, scholars have questioned the necessity of multiculturalism, especially in cosmopolitan societies. As Ulrich Beck suggests, cosmopolitan societies have passed through a process of globalization from within, which makes the provision of multicultural arrangements redundant.217 For others, however, multiculturalism is still a current concern, and they would put their best eforts into fnding theoretical and practical ways to advocate both individual and cultural rights. Scholars such as Will Kymlicka have argued that culture is an important part of the individual, which should be respected, and that the need for multicultural arrangements stems from the understanding that liberal democratic nationhood relies on nation-state-sponsored national identities. Tis link between nationhood and liberal democracy creates systemic risks for those who are perceived as not belonging to the nation. Such groups are indigenous people, substate nationalities, and immigrants. Granting rights to minorities compensates for this inherent link between nationhood and liberal democracy. In a claim that might seem initially contradictory, Kymlicka argues that cultural membership is valuable only to the degree that it fosters the autonomy of individuals. In other words, minority rights are defended only if they themselves are governed by liberal principles.218 Since internal protections to individuals who defy the communitarian law within these groups are nonexistent, there should be external protections. Several liberal scholars from diferent perspectives, whether multiculturalist or not, stress this conditionality. A liberal state should recognize or be sympathetic to cultural pluralism in order to accommodate minorities, but it also should condition cultural autonomy on respect for liberal rights and free association. Ayelet Shachar, for example, suggests that dif-

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ferent legal jurisdictions should preside over diferent identities, but special attention should be given to non-Christian communities who violate norms of human rights. Accordingly, a “transformative accommodation” of non-Christian religions would amount to a limited form of autonomy, especially for religious courts.219 Other scholars take heed of egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription, and freedom of exit and association.220 Te idea is that only by respecting both communitarian dignity and the rights of the individual can successful integration be achieved. Some are completely against the idea of integration. Chandran Kukathas, for example, rejects including integration in any type of ideological or societal core. He criticizes liberalism because it is a type of voluntary associationalism.”221 Liberalism in that sense is ill equipped to deal with problems of cultural diversity. Following this line, Iris Young and Melissa Williams among others have been critical of what they call the tyranny of a one-sided individualism and are pointed in their defense of diversity. James Tully goes a step further and acknowledges that an approach based on recognition of identities may sometimes mean questioning the foundations of democracy.222 Notwithstanding this criticism, multiculturalism, the only frame to protect weaker minorities, has to come frst. A third-generation norm of legitimacy—namely, respect for reasonable cultural diversity—must be considered on a par with the frst- and second-generation norms of freedom and equality and be able to modify policies of free and equal treatment accordingly.223 Te only way equal treatment could be possible is by allowing cultural minorities to enhance the value of group identity. Tey should be allowed to preserve their traditions and present their demands in their authentic language—for example, storytelling rather than rational articulation.224 Contrary to advocates of deliberative democracy, who treat all cultural identities, both majority and minority, as fully contestable in the context of deliberation, multiculturalists would protect minority cultures in the name of plurality of values, identities, and discourses.225 Bhikhu Parekh, Iris Young, Alex Honneth, and Charles Taylor, among others, would endorse from their diferent perspectives a sort of ontological holism for culture, which would lead to the adoption of a strict politics of recognition. Tey argue that it is necessary to move from individualized and equal recognition, which characterizes the modern age, to an “age of recognition,” or crossing the line of liberal tolerance.226 At least on a general level, all such theories consider liberal toleration as paternalistic, tailored to the powerful majority that exercises toleration toward a minor-

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ity. Liberal toleration is seen as stigmatizing certain cultures and religions in advance as ineligible for tolerance and as inducing minorities to adapt to the majority culture.227 Multiculturalism, conversely, aims not to blur diferences and not to ban the “detriment attached to . . . diference.”228 Parekh reminds us that no culture is a priori worthless, and all cultures deserve respect. If a young Muslim woman is unwilling to swim in a mixed-gender pool or to be examined by a male doctor or if a Sikh boy wants to go to school with a turban, they should be allowed. For this reason, Parekh promotes multicultural education in all schools, not only in those with a large number of students with non-Western backgrounds.229 Parekh proposes an intercommunal dialogue, which he defnes as pluralist universalism, aimed at evolving into a reasonable consensus.230 Is this achievable? Abandoning its colonialist posture would allow the West to move in that direction. Charles Taylor, for example, wants Western societies to rectify their conviction of Western moral supremacy. Others would consider circumventing the “individual-rights based approach” because it is culturally and contextually biased toward Anglo-Saxon culture and history and to Western identity.231 For Iris Young, a Western democracy should promote group representation of minorities (people of color, women, and homosexuals) in a decision-making process defned as “diferentiated citizenship.”232 We could summarize this theoretical debate by claiming that this progressive version of multiculturalism disarticulates the idea of liberal multicultural integration, even one promoting integration in a new togetherness or a new state identity.233 It circumvents liberal constraints, which are considered to be the remnants of colonialism. For some scholars, however, there is something more important than a theoretical and principled debate about multiculturalism. Instead of interrogating the remnants of an old colonialism and feeding further controversy, it might be better to focus on the reality of a multiculturalism now thriving in Europe. A new openness to cultural diversity might be achieved through not only the constitutional limitation of the power of the majority but also the established church-state regimes, which in Europe are very accommodating to religion. Such regimes, claims Christian Joppke, may constitute a receptive environment for minority religions—especially for Muslims.234 Ruud Koopmans, Ines Michalowski, and Stine Waibel cite the appearance of Muslim councils, separate Muslim sections in cemeteries, Islamic religious programs on radio and television, or a permit for ritual slaughter

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as evidence of indirect acceptance by European governments of Muslim cultural rights.235 All these developments seem to coincide with what European leaders have defned as intercultural dialogue. Te 2008 European Council White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue, “Living Together as Equals in Dignity,” attempts to manage Europe’s increasing cultural diversity in a democratic manner that would depart, however slightly, from group-rights multiculturalism.236 As noted by Ricard Zapata-Barrero, this new European agenda should be understood in the current postmulticultural context, in which the strengths of the multicultural policy paradigm in promoting equality, power sharing, and inclusion are recognized but limits to this recognition of diferences are set.237 Te main message of the aspiration to such an intercultural dialogue is that Europe is open to diversity and rejects assimilation, which is defned as enforced homogenization. At the same time and with the same energetic zeal, Europe expects cultural minorities to accept shared nonnegotiable core values such as the rights of gender. In short, while claiming impartiality, this approach understands certain universal or Western values to be binding on all members of a cohesive society. Can this intercultural synthesis be accepted by advocates of multiculturalism? In general terms, the latter are divided in regard to the intercultural dialogue strategy. Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, for example, suggest that there is nothing importantly new in this interculturalist dialogue, which basically fts the multicultural agenda. While advocates of interculturalism wish to emphasize its positive qualities of encouraging communication, recognizing dynamic identities, promoting unity, and challenging illiberality, each quality already features (and is on occasion foundational to) multiculturalism.238 Kymlicka, however, is critical of interculturalism. He rightly remarks that interculturalists rely on enhancing diversity through encounters at the local level and in civil society. Tey avoid difcult debates on core values, because entering a debate about nationhood from a multicultural perspective is (sadly) doomed to fail.239 But that avoidance leaves the feld open for populists to appropriate the discourse of nationalism. Liberals must, thus, fnd the proper strategy for fghting raising populist appropriation of nationalism. Is a staunch defense of multiculturalism the right approach? As Joppke notes, multiculturalism is necessary to correct illiberal tendencies within liberalism.240 Locke’s exclusion of Catholics and J. S. Mill’s omission of those not qualifying as enlightened demonstrate the early exclusionist tendencies of liberalism. To put in crudely, it

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seems that the liberal state has two options: tolerate illiberal practices or “turn to illiberal means in order to ‘liberate’ the illiberal.”241 Te essential question returns, though, and never more forcefully than today: Is more multiculturalism the necessary solution to illiberal liberalism? From Twin Toleration to Twin Naïveté

Tis strategic question of whether more multiculturalism is the solution is explicitly advanced by Kymlicka when he admits that liberal advocates of multiculturalism fnd it “very difcult to get support for multiculturalism policies, if the groups that are the main benefciaries of these policies are perceived as carriers of illiberal cultural practices that violate norms of human rights.” He illustrates the point: “If we put Western democracies on a continuum in terms of the proportion of immigrants who are Muslim, I think this would provide a good indicator of public opposition to multiculturalism.”242 Despite Kymlicka’s belief that multiculturalism has been more successful than expected, he cannot deny that dialogue with illiberal communities has triggered a backlash from those who might be illiberal themselves. Tariq Modood even claims that Kymlicka is “pushing Muslims away from multiculturalism,” which makes the case for group rights even more urgent.243 In other words, the only solution to the stigmatization of Muslims would be to advocate for the right to respect on a group level. For Muslims, then, the individualized form of respect symbolizes non recognition of their particularities. Here, though, is an important split. While Muslims need group rights and feel comfortable with the politics of identity, some liberal scholars and politicians have become aware that identity politics work against Muslim communities. As Nancy Fraser remarks, not all struggles for recognition produce respectful interactions in increasingly multicultural contexts; in fact they tend to encourage separatism, intolerance, chauvinism, and authoritarianism.244 Tis problem is growing in diferent ways and speeds, producing a synthesis of naïvetés that should be transcended. First, although European Muslims are fairly well protected by liberal constitutions, it is naïve to believe that this will satisfy Muslim religious and cultural demands. Indeed, a pragmatic acceptance of diversity is in most cases too individualistic, service oriented, and prone to co-optation to be enough for Muslims.

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A new politics of recognition in which all cultures are treated equally is the only road, Muslims believe, that would allow them to participate as equals in future deliberations about European identity. Second, it is naïve to believe that democratic majorities in Europe are open to such deliberation or that they will be open to group rights in the near or even distant future. In short, as Kymlicka understands, multiculturalism cannot in general win a political debate with national populists and nationalists when the question of Islam is involved. Te social backlash against Muslims has infuenced all issues, ranging from wearing the full veil to hate speech, blasphemy laws, the role of sharia courts, legal pluralism, and exemptions from common laws that do not heed Muslims’ particular needs. Tus, despite John Bowen’s optimistic views on sharia and the UK legal system, most European countries are guided by wholesale condemnation of the sharia, as indicated by the European Court of Human Rights in the Refah Partisi decision of February 2003.245 Tis state of mind is a clear response to public opinion that, since the frst years of the 2000s, has been increasingly against openness toward Muslim religious claims. Although this is not a radical rejection of social diversity in general, when it comes to Islam, rejection is on the increase. Most of the recent refugees to Europe are arriving from majority-Muslim nations, such as Syria and Iraq. Europeans’ perceptions of refugees are infuenced by negative attitudes toward Muslims already living in Europe. Fear that Muslims do not want to integrate and fear of terrorism dominate the perception of important segments of the European population.246 To quote Ibrahim Kalin, “Islam has become part of a public debate to determine how far multiculturalism will go.” Attacks on multiculturalism have become indirect attacks on Islam and Muslims. Indeed, multiculturalism is increasingly being perceived as the ideology that undermines “the secular-liberal ideals of the European Enlightenment.” Tese arguments come together as a single thesis.247 So the question that again commands attention is whether multiculturalism is failing and whether the Muslim factor has triggered this counterprocess to diversity. Opinions are varied and contradictory. It is plausible to say that, on the one hand, multiculturalism is doomed to fail. On the other hand, as some scholars note, multiculturalism is thriving at the social level and has just entered a phase of “refexive multiculturalism” in which the term has gone underground.248 Yet we might understand that if multiculturalism is going underground, it is for one reason alone, that it sparks an exclusionist backlash.

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We suggest that this exclusionist backlash is deeply rooted and gaining traction and that it is composed of two types. One type of exclusionism relies on the argument that the Other is unadaptable to European values. Te second type of rejection is based on the claim that the Other, such as Muslims, can adapt under certain conditions. Te frst type might lead to what most liberals fear, populist exclusion that stops immigration, retaliates against Muslim minorities, and strives to redefne identity in terms of ethno-national parameters. Te second type may also scare liberals who reject mandatory and conditional integration. Yet it difers from the frst type, at least in theoretical terms, insofar as it might allow that immigration in itself is a positive. It still demands, however, that a state’s national majority determine the conditions and valid paths of integration into a secular open society. Although this option of civic integration is not opposed to a multiethnic society, it rejects religious group rights. It could accept a “boutique multiculturalism,” or culture as a folkloric experience, but hardly more than that.249 More important than this is that the civic integration option also rejects intercultural dialogue, because it afects the national debate. Proponents of civic integration have absorbed what Randall Hansen has already remarked: Citizenship in a liberal democratic state can and does have more than a minimalist procedural content.250 Te underlying message is that, to preserve liberal constitutionalism, we need two things: frst, a nationalist spirit backing it and, second, minorities ready to integrate into what a national liberal culture expects. Nationalism Might Be Banal, but We Need It

Is there a nationalism that liberals could adopt? Are liberalism and nationalism opposites? Yael Tamir gives probably one of the most direct accounts of why nationalism is a permanent force and why liberal democracy needs nationalism.251 At one time nationalism carried democracy on its back and was the force behind movements of national liberation. Despite nationalism being associated with the twentieth century’s great wars, it can today again serve liberal ends. Tamir’s underlying claim is that nationalism should not be associated only with the exclusionist right. Tamir is not alone in her defense of national culture from a liberal perspective. Tose who advocate for a liberal national culture, such as Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, claim that societies have a right to

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self-determination and to protect their national culture and suggest that membership in a community is not a voluntary act; one cannot choose belonging.252 According to Arash Abizadeh, however, that is precisely the problem with liberal-nationalism theory: it is unable to provide the prepolitical ground required by its own account of legitimacy. Tis leads advocates of liberal nationalism to draw on an ethnic supplement. Despite the openness of Tamir and others to minority-culture claims, the danger for minorities, according to Abizadeh, is that an ethno-nationalist identity will deter their integration, notwithstanding its self-defnition as civic and liberal. A somewhat diferent possibility, however, would be a civic republican identity. Unlike a national culture, a civic republican culture also relates to a particular community, with shared political institutions, values, and sense of the patria, but at the same time does not rely on a shared national culture within a territorial homeland.253 Should we, then, regard a republican identity as diferent from a civic nationalist one? Critics claim that a supposedly nonnationalist republican modern democracy, which imagines the people to be prepolitically grounded, is also predisposed to nationalism.254 We might argue that national cultures, whether republican or not, complement each other. Teir diference lies in how they defne access to the polity. Te frst, civic liberal and nationalist, recognizes minority religions and cultures, provided that they accept and adapt to the dominance of a national liberal public sphere. Te second, a civic republican one, at least in theory, does not recognize minorities. Despite diferences, however, both versions have a similar trait; they are exclusionist, although in diferent senses. Although neither version considers membership in the community as obligatory and both are open to acceptance of the Other, both condition the integration of minorities on acceptance of a dominant national or republican culture. Te question is whether it is morally acceptable to draw a distinction between the conditional inclusion propounded by both liberal civic nationalists and democratic civic republicans, on the one side, and the unconditional exclusionism propounded by nonliberal ethno-nationalists, on the other. Russell Hardin, like Abizadeh, considers it a fallacy to diferentiate between a civic variant of nationalism, the republican or civic liberal, and ethno-nationalism, since both depend on identity and leave open the question of the fate of those who do not identify with the nation.255 Although Abizadeh’s and Hardin’s arguments are persuasive, we still suggest that the distinction between conditional inclusion and exclusion on a racial and ethnic basis is an important and compelling distinction.

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Conditional inclusion accepts ethnic diferences even though it promotes cultural adaptation. Exclusion on racial and ethnic basis does not allow even the will to cultural adaptation. A democratic nation, whether liberal or republican, should enjoy the right and exercise the duty of determining membership and belonging to the nation but not exclude on a racial or ethnic basis. Tis is an important distinction. As Patten notes, whereas genealogical transmission is primarily a biological relation between parents and children, sociological transmission works through social practices and institutions.256 We suggest that for a foreigner to become part of a nation’s social practices and institutions is difcult but still possible, depending on the will and predisposition of the receiver. Te racist nation, in contrast, relies on real or invented biological links, and no one can apply to enter it. A liberal civic nation is based on people sharing a common public culture that others can enter and that in some cases is “quite compatible with their belonging to a diversity of ethnic groups.”257 We think that liberal nationalists, although not practicing ethnic separation against newcomers, nevertheless set parameters that evaluate and control the quality and scope of cultural pluralism. Tis claim does not satisfy liberals, who understand that the claims of cultural nationalism—regardless of its exponents’ professed liberalism—confront the citizen with an occult source of power that is upheld precisely because it is occult.258 A civic republican approach, by contrast, does not have to hide behind a defense of pluralism and is less prone to accept diversity and demands integration into a homogeneous culture. It also creates a patriotic myth, national symbols, and a secular culture that citizens want to preserve for future generations. Yet, at least in theory, rather than demanding integration into a traditional religious or a particularist core culture, a republican identity demands that historically local cultures, as well as immigrants within its territory, accept the supremacy of an open, modern, inclusive, and secular identity constructed for all.259 To summarize, both civic nationalist and civic republican identities condition acceptance for inclusion into the polity frst and foremost on a willingness to be part of the republic and on acceptance of the dominance of a national narrative and national symbols in the public sphere. Undoubtedly, as noted, for a wide variety of liberals, these conditions for inclusion appear exclusionary and obviously discriminatory. Gal Gerson and Rubin Aviad, for example, claim that a national culture “conficts with the strong constitutionalist element in liberalism that protects individual rights and liberties.”260 With equal zeal, liberals would feel extremely

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uneasy with a communitarian version of republicanism, which strives to attain a homogeneous culture through a centralized majoritarian government.261 Indeed, individual freedom in a communitarian version of republicanism depends on public freedom, and the private person depends on existence in a public sphere. A republican citizenship, therefore, requires a civic commitment to the public interest.262 Might this type of republicanism reassure liberals? Certainly not. As Philip Pettit notes, in this type of republican political setting, a religious minority would have to depend on the goodwill of a majority for it not to be humiliated.263 Yet the question here is why, in light of these shortcomings, a modernized type of civic republicanism, or a liberal version of nationalism, should be considered necessary. Why are national identities and policies of national integration still important for the shaping of a public democratic culture? Why is a nationally sanctioned democratic public culture important? We suggest that, even taking into account the tremendously bad experience Europe has had with nationalism, it is still necessary. As several scholars have noted, because immigration is viewed negatively by large parts of the population, there is a need to facilitate integration of newcomers into a national public culture. Integrating newcomers would, according to David Miller, allow citizens to embrace and feel solidarity with the foreigner.264 Tat is why several scholars suggest that Europeans should consider the value of preserving the foundational myth and narratives of the democratic civic community, to which immigrants should adapt.265 According to Miller and Michael Walzer, among others, a hegemonic identity sanctioned by a national public culture is necessary for citizens to act on any basis other than strictly individualized strategic considerations.266 As Tamir explains, only citizens’ commitment to “mutual dependencies and responsibilities [embedded in a shared national identity] . . . invigorates the will to jointly pursue common ends.”267 Te challenge for defenders of liberalism and social democracy is thus not opposing nationalism but recovering its we-are-all-in-this-together sensibility. Most likely, these convictions are at the root of the nationalist turn of social democratic parties such as occurred in Denmark. Te 2019 parliamentary success of social democracy in Danish politics seems to suggest a Scandinavian center-left resurgence. Commentators on this success, however, remind us that the Danish Social Democrats’ strategic choice to endorse the Danish People’s Party’s anti-immigrant agenda prevented Social Democrat supporters from defecting to the People’s Party. In reality, instead of opposing immigration and immigrants, the Social Democrats

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proposed a conditional inclusion, which had been a long-standing tendency among Social Democrats. Even before the populist Right became a signifcant political factor, there had been a shift in social democratic parties from the proletarian cause to the national interest, from class solidarity to national solidarity, and from working-class parties to people’s parties, or a “people’s home.”268 National solidarity became one of the main features of social democracy, with the idea of national sovereignty setting a marker between insiders and outsiders. National solidarity seems necessary to us because of two basic and opposing challenges: the illiberal communitarianism of minorities and the ethno-nationalist exclusionism of the populist Right. We argue that, in postmodern times, with growing immigration and minority communitarianism in Western societies, we need republican nationalism as a way to lessen parochial divisions and to allow people to identify with a democratic collectivity that surpasses the immediate community. Nationalism might be a banal concept, but we suggest that it is necessary. We do not dispute Anthony Smith’s claims on the paradoxical persistence of nationalism.269 We accept his claim, but we go the other way around and accentuate that nationalism is necessary now more than ever. Critics might claim that creating a homogeneous national community, with public education and politics of integration, may not be necessary in current Western multicultural democracies. We disagree and maintain that, because of multiculturalism, renewed links between nationalism and democracy are more necessary than ever, not to destroy liberal democracy but defend it. Indeed, a republican coalition of majorities and cultural minorities is possible and necessary. Tis cannot be accomplished under multiculturalism but only under a common narrative. As Andreas Wimmer remarks, the way to repair the alienation of the white working class in Western societies is through economic incentives and the re-creation of an inclusive nationalism.270 We agree and suggest that there is an urgent need for liberals today to address nationalism and democracy, even if it makes them uncomfortable. Jonathan Haidt, in Te Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion, claims that conservatives have a more accurate understanding of human nature than do liberals. Conservatives understand that nationalism, like religion, binds people and helps us pursue moral ideals and defend sacred values.271 Liberals, however, need to win the battle and take back the nation. Tey have to rediscover their sense of community, without which they alienate an important part of the popula-

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tion and cannot mobilize supporters, especially in the fght against reactionary nationalism. Tis is why we suggest that current attempts to renationalize citizenship regimes, an act perceived as an antidote to the denationalizing logic of globalization,272 should not be denounced as ethno-exclusionist. National civic integration of the Other represents a defense against ethno-exclusionism. As Kwame Anthony Appiah notes, whites invented the Negroes to dominate them.273 Te question to be debated is whether the solution to this is the resurgence of black identity, Muslim identity, or Jewish identity in the frame of cosmopolitan society or of a color-blind national republicanism, in which a common national supraidentity is above color, ethnic, or cultural particularities. We suggest that national identity, either civic republican or liberal national, that surpasses liberal cosmopolitanism and constitutional patriotism is probably the best barrier against exclusionist ethno-nationalism. National Civic Integration as Conditional Inclusion

We cannot dismiss that scholars have wondered whether these programs of civic integration for newcomers are old-style assimilation under a diferent name and implemented to efectively purify newcomers. Brendan O’Leary accurately points out that integration is diferent from assimilation. Integration implies public homogenization, but it still allows the privatization of diference.274 Te Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France are forerunners in implementing civic integration programs, and others, such as Denmark, Norway, and Germany, are following.275 Many liberals attack the programs, claiming that liberal states should be culturally neutral and that tests of civic integration stigmatize newcomers and minorities. Such tests confrm public suspicion of immigrants, who are portrayed as uninterested in belonging. In addition, making these civic integration programs mandatory could be illegal and self-defeating.276 Liberal critiques have asked whether a liberal state can promote certain values and discourage or dismiss others and whether civic integration policies are discriminatory by nature. Regarding the frst question, Rogers Smith suggests that there is nothing new in a “government’s laws, policies, and institutions [requiring] persons to be socialized in a certain range of experiences along some or all of these dimensions, while inhibiting them from

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being socialized in others.”277 Governmental institutions may authorize or at least allow some forms of religious practice, aesthetic expression, economic pursuits, and marital and familial relationships and prohibit others. Yet, according to Smith, this civic ethos should not derogate from exemptions and accommodations—including religious groups; linguistic, cultural, ethnic, and racial minorities; and LGBTQ individuals. Te important point, notes Smith, is that accommodations should not depend on allegiance to the idea of a white Christian nation or even a republican entity that demands full loyalty.278 Despite Smith’s compelling claims, it seems that a very clear distinction should be drawn between allegiance to a white nation and allegiance to a republican secular democratic one. Te reason Western governments tend to accept a nonwhite but still republican ethos is that they are not neutral on the meaning of what Stephen Macedo defnes as civic liberalism. Civic liberalism relies on a civic morality, needed to preserve individual liberties. Moreover, a civic morality is required to “keep Sydney from becoming Sarajevo.”279 Tis implies the enhancing of some rights, the discouraging of others, and the creation of a non-culturally-neutral public sphere. Regarding the second question, about civic integration, Christian Joppke distinguishes between civic integration tests and interviews that try to determine the values or beliefs of an individual and those tests that prepare newcomers to master the language, learn the principles and procedures of liberal democracies, and introduce the key historical events of the receiving country.280 As Sara Goodman observes, civic integration policies vary. Tey may adopt a rigid assimilative approach or be more akin to a liberal or state civic-oriented multiculturalism. Some countries, such as Austria and Denmark, have developed a coercive and assimilative civic integration policy. Even Germany, whose humanitarian initiative in accepting more than a million refugees in 2016 has been widely praised, presented in that year a proposed law on integration that is particularly harsh in its demands on newcomers.281 Sweden and Finland have advanced a more voluntary and open civic integration policy. Falling between these two extremes are countries that present various forms and levels of civic integration along with multicultural policies. Several scholars have even noted that countries that have adopted multicultural arrangements have been successful in integrating newcomers.282 Yet this attempt to rescue multiculturalism as key for integrating policies does not help us understand the political and ideological backlash

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against diversity. Tat is, why, if diversity is so good, is it so bad? Te problem seems to be that the people who resent multiculturalism are the ones who fnd the success of multiculturalism worrying. An outcome of multiculturalism is that illiberal cultures feel able to challenge their national civic liberal culture, and some of the population fock to national populist parties. Rebalancing between diversity and the growing nationalist backlash leads political elites to an obvious conclusion. Either diversity will be nationally managed and a civic liberal encompassing culture reestablished or liberal society will, possibly, die. Tough policies of civic integration into a civic culture are a response to national majorities’ animosity toward newcomers. Politicization of immigration, as can be imagined, “did not produce more rights for aliens.”283 Critics of civic integration programs rightly claim that their timing coincides with Islamophobic campaigns and that their underlying goal is to restrict migration.284 We suggest that the new emphasis on nationalism, a non-culturally-neutral public sphere, and hard programs of civic integration clearly amount to a liberal discrimination particularly focused on Muslim citizens and Muslim newcomers. Civic Integration as Discriminatory Nondiscrimination: A New European Approach?

Regardless of their diferent views on multiculturalism, all liberals favor antidiscrimination laws, which they think should be defended at all costs. Te defnition and scope of antidiscrimination is what divides them. Te reason is that classical antidiscrimination relies on a formal understanding of equality that tends to enforce integration or assimilation.285 Some observers believe this withholds the protection of antidiscrimination laws from those weaker cultural or religious minorities wanting to preserve their particular identity. Valérie Amiraux and Virginie Guiraudon claim that cultural racism is on the rise and gaining legitimacy. Discrimination has come to be perceived as less problematic when motivated by culture.286 Tis is, at its root, why advocates of multiculturalism propose moving from formal equality to a substantive type of equality that will advance a collectivist, asymmetrical antidiscrimination in favor of disadvantaged groups.287 Multiculturalism, in this sense, represents a higher level of antidiscrimi-

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nation legislation. Other observers claim that the logic of antidiscrimination does not ft that of multiculturalism. For them, multiculturalism actually undermines antidiscrimination because antidiscrimination is individual oriented and apparently symmetrical, whereas multiculturalism is asymmetrical and collectivist. Antidiscrimination is universalist and aspires to render minority groups invisible and even eliminate them.288 Furthermore, and difering from that of multiculturalism, the logic of antidiscrimination moves from culture and identity into the mundane world of interests and confict over scarce resources. Despite recognition being also an instrument to overcome discrimination, the policies of antidiscrimination do not always involve recognition.289 Te question is whether Europe has reached a point where it is shifting from a classical understanding of antidiscrimination to a multicultural one. If so, who are the subjects to be protected from discrimination, and should antidiscrimination focus on race, culture, religion, or all of them? Tis is important to Europeans who are aware that, although old-style racism still exists in Western European democracies, the concept of racism should be adapted to new realities. European institutions are responding to these concerns. Tey emphasize religious nondiscrimination, something that fts well with Muslim interests. At the same time, however, we can see that when religious and individual rights and interests confict, gender equality trumps the dignity of religious minorities. Tis is clearly expressed in national and European legislation and fundamentally in programs of civic integration. A convergence of a genderized agenda, individual rights and freedom of speech (even freedom to insult Islam), and restrictions on the freedom of a religious way of life (e.g., wearing burqas) is becoming part of a Western understanding of how equality and nondiscrimination should be interpreted. Te preamble of Directive 2003/109/EC, establishing the conditions for acquiring long-term status in the European Union, stresses nondiscrimination on grounds of religion and belief. But integration functions as a measure and condition for the applicant to access rights and freedoms (quasiequality of treatment with citizens of the receiving member state in several socioeconomic areas). Article 5.2 of the directive specifes that “Member States may require third-country nationals to comply with integration conditions, in accordance with national law.”290 Tis means that civic integration programs emphasizing knowledge of national and liberal democratic values are determinant in the process of acquiring a permanent residence permit.

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Furthermore, citizenship tests in Europe increasingly ask about psychological attitudes and moral judgments. Tey try to fnd out what the applicants’ opinions are on homosexuality, nudism, how children will be educated, and so on. Most of these trends have been denounced as a shallow manipulation of anti-Islamic or anti-immigrant political agendas. Liberals are not convinced of the moral aspects of these measures. For them, the contemporary use of civic integration tests for citizenship is a new form of illiberalism that nation-states use to discipline and standardize the knowledge, feelings, and way of life that their “perfect citizen” must have to be recognized as a legitimate member of the national polity.291 Tis leads to questions about the real value of nondiscrimination. Who defnes antidiscrimination? What is its specifc goal? Many liberal scholars would categorize discrimination of these immigrants as racism. In making this charge, they argue that there is a need to remove from the idea of race its immutable characteristics and consider it as primarily a social construct and not a biological fact. Racism has a complex historical, sociocultural association with cultural minorities whose identities need protection. Advocates of race as a social construct have already pointed out some of the shortcomings in the current antidiscrimination laws, expressed in the EU Race Directives of June 2000, which require member states to prohibit discrimination only on racial or ethnic grounds.292 Although the Employment Equality Directive, which accompanied the EU Race Directives, prohibits discrimination according to religion or belief, disability, age, and sexual orientation, especially in employment, its directives are less clear, more contested, and of lower status than those related to racial discrimination. During the frst two decades of the twenty-frst century, there was good reason to believe that antidiscrimination policies were shifting from being based on race to culture and even to religion. Before the EU Race Directives, there were two types of antidiscrimination laws in Europe. One is the 1972 French Law against Racism, which tackles ideological and expressive racism and stresses intention in the act of discriminating. A second, very diferent type of antidiscrimination law is the UK Race Relations Act of 1965, modeled on American civil rights law. It targets “access racism” in diferent spheres of society, such as employment, education, or housing, and proceeds in terms of civil law. Te French law targets violations of individual human dignity, and the UK law targets group inequality. Both laws were accompanied by a pioneering attempt to constitutionalize aliens’ rights, appearing to accept an Anglo-American model of discrimination.293 However, the reality is that the EU Race Directives are still guided by

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considerations of race and ethnicity and both are treated as immutable traits.294 A group that can prove itself to be both an ethnic group and a religion might be protected from discrimination on an ethnic but not a religious basis. Jews, for example, are seen as an ethnic group that cannot be discriminated against. In the United Kingdom, however, the values expounded by religious education, especially in Haredi schools, can be scrutinized and have to be weighed alongside other values. A case in point is the demand made by the UK Ofce for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills of the Vishnitz Girls School in East London to respect the Equality Act of 2010, which makes it mandatory to educate students about a range of “protracted characteristics,” including age, disability, race, sex, and sexual orientation. At frst glance, this demand is logical and obeys the logic of antidiscrimination. At the same time, a religious community, whatever its afliation, might fnd requirements to teach about ways of life that its faith prohibits to be themselves discriminatory. Te state, however, did not accept that this imposition on Haredi schools constitutes ethnic discrimination, and it treats Muslim schools similarly. School inspectors in England, for example, debated whether donning a hijab in school “could be interpreted as sexualisation” of young girls.295 Te intervention in the Vishnitz Girls School and the school inspectors’ debate on the hijab in schools are signifcant examples that demonstrate that, when values confict, the liberal United Kingdom opts for some to the detriment of others, something that speaks volumes about how European antidiscrimination values have developed. Does this mean that cultural recognition of diferent identity groups is being undermined in Europe? Te answer depends on which minority group we are talking about. We can claim that there is increasing mass support for minority rights. Global attitudes toward homosexuality, for example, are changing rapidly. Tolerance of lesbian and gay relationships has arguably increased on every continent. Tolerance and more liberal attitudes among younger people are related to the pervasiveness of a nation’s mass media and to the freedom of the press.296 A Eurobarometer report of 2012 showed that Europeans having gay, lesbian, or bisexual friends or acquaintances plays a role in explaining a respondent’s comfort level on this issue.297 In the last two decades, Europe seems to be experiencing a liberal renaissance, epitomized by the sweeping assertion of laws that afrm and protect the rights of homosexuals. Western European nations approved same-sex marriage one after the other, starting with the Netherlands (2001) and con-

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tinuing with Belgium (2003), Spain (2005), Sweden and Norway (2009), Denmark (2012), and France (2013). Legislation approving joint adoption by same-sex couples took a similar path, again pioneered by the Netherlands (2001) and continuing with Sweden (2003), Spain and the United Kingdom (2005), Belgium (2006), and Denmark (2010). Additionally, beginning in the 1990s, tougher sentences for crimes with homophobic elements have been introduced by the Netherlands (1992), Belgium (2002), France and Sweden (2003), and Denmark and the United Kingdom (2004). If recognizing diference is to value it, then we are seeing a growing tendency to value the diference of gender and homosexuality. Such a recognition is not correction or even exemption but an aim to change a dominant group’s perspective on a minority.298 Does this same criterion apply, though, to minority cultures and to minority religions in general? Under Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, the Race Directive’s member states are requested to enact laws against “direct” and “indirect” discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin and also on the grounds of religion and religious beliefs. At the same time that freedom of religion is being upheld, however, that afrmation collapses when it is pitted against other liberal values.299 Although the right to freedom of religion may sometimes justify a restriction of the right to freedom of expression under European Convention on Human Rights Article 10, the article is also clear in afrming that “those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion . . . cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism. Tey must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith.”300 Freedom of speech, freedom to change religion, and so on, take precedence over accommodation of communities’ religious, moral, and ethical special interests, and neutrality toward religion is an exception to the state’s prior responsibility for public order.301 It is not strange that the European Court of Human Rights has held more than once that the secular principle of the state cannot be attacked in the name of freedom of religion.302 Furthermore, religious freedom does not have equal standing with homosexual rights.303 Te European Court of Human Rights, for example, ruled in 2013 that religious beliefs cannot justify discrimination against same-sex couples. Furthermore, the European Court of Justice, the chief interpreter of European law, ruled in March 2017 that private companies in EU member states can, in the interest of neutrality, enact policies barring employees from wearing religious, political, and philosophical signs.304

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From another perspective, what about religious organizations? Are they allowed to discriminate in favor of members of their own religious community, in employment, for example? A precedent-setting ruling of the European Court of Justice in 2018 gave a clear answer in ruling against religious organizations wanting to ensure for themselves a safe haven from pan-European norms of equality. It is now somewhat harder for faithafliated bodies, such as charities or colleges, to favor their own adherents, at least when hiring for jobs of a generally secular nature. Te ruling seems to cast doubt on Article 21 of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, which prohibits discrimination on grounds of gender, race, religion, or sexual orientation.305 Whether these rulings of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice outmaneuver European countries’ own laws on the relationship between religious beliefs and nondiscrimination is open to debate, especially in countries with a strong Catholic tradition. As we shall see, the European Court of Human Rights, for example, accepts the legality of moral claims if such claims are already defned by a majority. Te debate will not, however, be open to minority religion. Would Europe, for example, respect exemptions in the name of Islam? Te answer seems clear. Under an egalitarian Enlightenment-type of nondiscrimination, exemptions that deviate from general norms are limited. Tat does not mean that cultural pluralism is rejected. It is valued, but as Pnina Werbner suggests, it should be grounded in enlightened shared ethical convictions about the validity of cultural diferences.306 Homosexuality, Yes; Polygamy (Burqas), No

Programs of civic integration are related to the imposition of shared ethical convictions. Claims about the equality of women have been at the forefront of the European debate on face-veil bans. Most of these claims have been denounced as mere manipulation of anti-Islamic or anti-immigrant political agendas. Anna Korteweg and Gökçe Yurdakul argue that the headscarf debates are part of a larger debate on national narratives. National narratives are reafrmed and rearticulated in representations of the Other associated with Islam and migration.307 Other scholars invoke eros in discussing democracy and national cultures. As Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart have noted, the diferences between Muslim citizens and Western societies

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involve tolerance of sexual liberalization and women’s equality—elements that constitute a crucial aspect of the currently hegemonic democratic political culture.308 Tis tolerant approach is a connection between national narratives and “enlightened minorities,” such as homosexuals and lesbians and gender identity groups in general. Yet what we signal is that this inclusive and protective stance toward these enlightened minorities is indirectly pitted against religious minorities’ rights. Under these conditions, polygamy as a social phenomenon is diferent from same-sex marriage. Te former is associated with patriarchy and sexual abuse. It fourishes in segregated communities, such as the Mormon fundamentalist group in the United States and migrant Muslims in Europe. Same-sex marriage instead is associated with emancipation and equality. On a purely theoretical level, in an ongoing and open debate scholars such as Susan Okin suggest that the application of principles of justice should take little heed of the values and normative commitments of members of traditional cultures. Multiculturalism in this sense does not work well with feminism.309 Other theories argue that diversity does not necessarily go against women and denounce the manipulation and instrumentalization of gender equality by political parties, especially the right.310 Anne Norton, for example, remarks that the Western world’s condemnation of Islam’s treatment of women has united conservative Catholics, nostalgic Stalinists, neoliberals, and socialists.311 Anne Phillips observes that principles of gender equality are deployed as a way to demonize a minority cultural group.312 In the same vein, feminist scholars such as Judith Butler and Joan Scott are critical of Western feminists for their condemnation of the Muslim veil. French resistance to the veil, argues Scott, conceals current anxieties in French politics, which cannot resolve its own racism.313 More worrying for liberals is the banner of gender equality and sexual emancipation waved in the programs of right-wing populist parties, giving rise to a new “progressive” nationalism in which women’s rights and gayand-lesbian rights are deemed core civilizational values of the West, while migrant communities, particularly Muslims, are cast as menacing them. As Judith Butler notes, “Certain ideas of the progress of ‘freedom’ facilitate a political division between progressive sexual politics and the struggle against racism and the discrimination against religious minorities.”314 Tis adoption of the banner, or pinkwashing, relies on a new type of “homonationalism” (a product of the emotional legacy of homophobia).315 As noted by Shelina Janmohamed, the West’s secular (and generally

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afuent) feminists will have to acknowledge that for most Muslims, women’s empowerment has little to do with individualization, the demise of men and the family, or the replacement of God with work. Furthermore, as Fatema Mernissi points out, there is nothing in the Qur’an that justifes women’s subordination.316 In sum, theories of gender equality do not take (Muslim) women’s social condition seriously and do not understand the Qur’an, instead creating a strong ethnicization of sexism. Tese theories have become tools of imperialism, or colonial feminism.317 Even the notion that equality between the sexes is inherent to the logic of secularism is false, claims Joan Scott. It was not until the question of Islam arose in the late twentieth century that gender became important for secular thinkers. Secularism has most often been used to justify the claims of white, Western, and Christian racial and religious superiority, in the present as well as the past.318 We can say that most of these voices understand the secular version of democracy to be profoundly gender unequal as well as antireligious. Why, though, should Western democracies, which were male oriented in the past, not embrace a progressive policy toward women in the contemporary era? Although protests against Western secularism and liberalism with regard to women’s rights are correct, and protests against historically conservative Western sexism come from within the West, it is only within secular societies that the current feminist uprising is understandable. Only liberal secular societies appear to ofer hope for a Me Too campaign. Even if in some cases the populist Right endorses a gender agenda to challenge Islam, we agree with Randall Hansen, who claims that “some of the best public policies—social and health insurance for industrial workers—came from the worst motives ([Chancellor Otto von] Bismarck’s desire to crush the social democrats [of Germany]).”319 Tis is a practical and theoretical problem that has received no convincing response from critics of gender equality theory. A number of Muslim women’s organizations have adopted a gender agenda that challenges Islam. Te UK Safra Project, founded by and for lesbian, bisexual, and transgender Muslim women, demands state intervention against communitarianism.320 Te groups Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain (whose spokesperson is the Iranian-born Maryam Namazie), Fitnah, and One Law for All, and the network Women Living Under Muslim Laws and Secularism Is a Women’s Issue, both cofounded or led by the Algerian sociologist Marieme Hélie Lucas, also ft the new trend. Lamya Kaddora, a German professor of Islamic studies and founder of Liberal

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Islamic Association in Germany is a forerunner in a new type of Islam that defends interfaith marriages and a liberal approach toward homosexuals. But can this strategy be successful? Do Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Yasmin AlibhaiBrown, and Mona Eltahawy and those who defend a Western type of free will represent the voice of Muslim women in Europe? What is clear is that European institutions dealing with immigration, and with minorities in general, have a positive attitude toward a Western type of antidiscrimination and praise those women. In the realm of immigration and refugee policies, a complementary development is taking place. Asylum procedures for members of the LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) community have become far more accommodating, and the number of successful applications continues to rise.321 Following the 2013 EU court decision on the interpretation of the UN Refugee and Geneva Conventions, which recommended recognizing sexual orientation and gender identities as potential grounds for refugee status,322 the Dutch foreign minister invited gay Iraqis and Russians to apply for refugee status.323 Germany and France are heading in a similar direction. Several critics raise the point that authorities in the Netherlands are very inquisitorial regarding who qualifes as a gay refugee to be accepted in the Netherlands, but the process of approval has been made easier in recent years.324 Tese remarkable developments epitomize the new consensus: that groups historically discriminated against such as women and homosexuals should be protected by the state. However, as the previously mentioned critics of enlightened feminism argue, this desire to equate gender identity and sexual orientation with race and ethnicity, which protects these groups under antidiscrimination laws, correlates with the diminishing protection of believers who want safeguards against defamation of religion.325 As noted by Alec Stone Sweet and Clare Ryan, the European Court of Human Rights has for the most part expanded the protection of minority rights, including the rights of the Roma, homosexuals, and transsexuals. It has been less willing to protect religious minorities or to discipline state displays of Christian symbols.326 In the best-case scenario, minority religions can be tolerated, although their approval is conditional on their acceptance of the dominance of national and gender values. In the directives that regulate aspects of the conditions of entry into and residence of third-country nationals in the European Union, we can see these last tendencies in evidence. Article 4.4, for example, calls on the

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member states not to allow reunion with a spouse if the applicant does not comply with the values and principles of the member states, in particular with respect to the rights of women and of children.327 Tose rules complement additional rulings against women’s Muslim dress, buttressing the idea that wearing a burqa and niqab represents a violation of the rights of women as a whole. In 2003, Germany’s federal constitutional court determined that states can rule as they want with regard to the Muslim scarf. Half of Germany’s regions went on to ban teachers from wearing headscarves. In 2004, France’s national assembly voted for a law of laïcité, which bans religious symbols from schools, including scarves and Christian crosses. In 2010, a key committee in Belgium voted to implement the frst European ban on wearing the burqa and niqab in public. But the French government imposed the frst ban. In 2011, under a decree by the French prime minister, François Fillon, women were banned from wearing the niqab in any public place. Face veils are outlawed virtually anywhere outside women’s homes, except when praying in a religious place. In 2014, the European Court of Human Rights approved France’s burqa ban, saying that “living together” is the “legitimate aim” of the French authorities.328 In 2015, the Dutch cabinet approved a partial ban on wearing facecovering Islamic veils on public transport and in public areas. Te ban does not apply to the street. In 2016, the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, endorsed a partial ban on the burqa and the niqab. Austria’s ruling coalition in 2017 prohibited full-face veils such as the burqa and niqab in courts and schools. It also pledged to consider banning headscarves on women employed in public services. In the same year, the European Court of Justice ruled that workplace bans on the hijab are legal.329 To some liberals these rulings violate two liberal principles: freedom of religion in general and freedom of Muslim women to dress as they please in particular. Te question, as raised by Seyla Benhabib, is whether the individual will of Muslim women who stand for a more conservative view of social life is to be respected. Can their views be part of what is debated in a community of conversation, one that allows a constant process of inclusion?330 Supporters of the ruling against burqas would respond that, just when diversity is growing, the parameters determining inclusion in a community of conversation are predetermined by a worldview that considers the ideas of women’s liberation and an iconically modern way of life as universal values and as part of a national community of conversation. We claim that similar discrimination is exercised regarding freedom of speech.

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Freedom of Speech and Hate Speech

According to Talal Assad, modern Westerners do not feel bound by the restrictions imposed by blasphemy laws, but to protect their way of life they impose restrictions on others. Secularism is protected in less forthrightly religious terms.331 In other words, rather than defending free speech, Westerners are defending a Eurocentric understanding of free speech, a free speech that conforms to their communitarian national ideologies, which are concealed behind ostensibly universal criteria. Tese seemingly universal criteria function in such a way that allows insult to Muslims. Te frst question, therefore, is what constitutes blasphemy for the European courts. Te essence of blasphemy is insulting God or disrespecting anything considered sacred. Tis is not the same as insulting believers of a particular religion. Blasphemy laws are conceived to protect religious ideas, whereas laws against religious insult and religious hatred are conceived to protect persons holding religious beliefs. Te problem is that there is confusion over how courts frame the debate. Te rationale for blasphemy ofenses has shifted from preventing ofense to religion to preventing ofense to religious believers and sympathizers of a majority religion, with the goal of maintaining public order.332 Te criterion of hatred against religion, however, is perceived as more straightforward and defensible. Indeed, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 2007 and the Venice Commission in 2008 concluded that such ofenses are more suited to the law books than blasphemy or religious defamation legislation. Religious hatred is a stronger form of conduct that may or may not be accompanied by intention to promote discrimination or violence against members of a particular religion. In proving the existence of hatred against a religion itself, it is difcult to distinguish what hatred is, and the formulation of ofenses in diferent legal systems frequently blurs these lines in practice. What is certain, however, is that for some scholars the charges against the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in Denmark and France were not based in blasphemy (tajdīf) but on isā’ah—which means insult, harm, or injury. Furthermore, the cartoons were understood as eforts to inculcate disbelief. Islam, according to Talal Assad, opposes any eforts to coerce someone away from his or her belief. Doing that would be an attempt to break someone’s relation to a sustaining transcendence. It would mean breaking the bond with a particular way of

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life. Without that bond, life is untenable.333 Tis argument allows us to move from the realm of religion to social and political life. Muslims perceive that, through free speech, the West can harm their concept of the good. Tis idea is perfectly illustrated by the UK Muslim preacher Anjem Khoudary: “Contrary to popular misconception, Islam does not mean peace but rather means submission to the commands of Allah alone. Terefore, Muslims do not believe in the concept of ‘freedom of expression,’ because their speech and actions are determined by divine revelation and not based on people’s desires.”334 Contrary to the Western liberal conviction that freedom of expression protects minorities, the implication of Khoudary’s words is that Muslims should be protected from speech that ofends them. Te question, thus, is whether the right of speech should be limited to avoid ofending religion or Islam. Should there be a religious exemption for minorities? As we have noted, one of the basic liberal fears is that under a liberal antidiscrimination agenda, a hidden and sophisticated discrimination is being propounded. Tose fears are well based and felt particularly keenly after the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack in Paris. Te new path is evident in how anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are perceived. Despite both types of prejudice being supposedly treated by the establishment in the same way, in reality there are clear diferences. Hate speech laws, for example, were originally designed to protect against the kind of xenophobic and anti-Semitic propaganda that gave rise to the Holocaust, unrelated to blasphemy. Until quite recently, then, anti-Semitism tended to be regarded as racial rather than religious in motivation. A series of applications to the European Court of Human Rights from people convicted of racial hate speech or Holocaust denial, complaining of violations of the right of freedom of expression, have been declared inadmissible.335 In the frst two decades of the twenty-frst century, however, as a result of multiculturalism, we have seen an evolution in the scope of hate speech laws. Hate speech laws have been invoked to criminalize speech deemed insulting to religion or nationality. For example, Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires outlawing “any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.”336 In France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, people have been prosecuted for issuing hate speech against Islam.337 Yet the social and political consensus of these two decades has begun to

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erode, specifcally over how to determine what constitutes hate speech.338 Austria still has blasphemy laws, whereas the Netherlands, Norway, Iceland, and Malta have abolished them, following the United Kingdom, which did so in 2008.339 Te UN Human Rights Committee and the EU Guidelines on Freedom of Expression and Religion attempt to balance freedom of expression and freedom of religion to keep peace between minority and majority religions and cultures. Tat balance is difcult to sustain, especially after the Charlie Hebdo attack of 2015. Although there was indeed, as expected, overwhelming condemnation from all over the world of the terrorist attack against the Charlie Hebdo caricaturists, there was a more ambivalent response to the expression “Je suis Charlie.” Academics and journalists, among them from the New York Times and the UK Guardian, condemned the terrorist murders but raised arguments in favor of self-censorship around Islam and Muslims.340 Liberal observers commented that the same impulses that make racism and anti-Semitism culturally taboo can reasonably be extended to the racism-cum-Islamophobia allegedly at work in the Hebdo cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and related provocations. Tis claim has prompted a seemingly unending debate. Many liberals defne themselves as “not Charlie,” because they believe that democratic debates should not be ofensive to people, but others argue that possibly ofending someone is not a reason to limit free speech. To them, democratic debates and mockery of religion cannot be compared to ideologies and worldviews that are accountable for mass murder. If that were the case, there would have been a logic in censoring and even banning magazines like Charlie Hebdo or newspapers like the Danish Jyllands-Posten, which also published cartoons of Muhammad. However, it does not seem that Muslims are on the same footing with Jews in Europe in the 1930s. As Mohammed Hani remarks, “I don’t worry too much about the Muslims who face racial slurs in Europe and America. . . . At the end of their humiliating journeys they can expect privileges like running water, electricity and tainted promises of equality.”341 For several liberal observers, however, the recent history of fghting for freedom of speech has gone from being something noble—speaking out against the values leveraged by the powerful to maintain control—to being attacks on the weak and persecuted. Even if political incorrectness does not lead to Auschwitz, minorities are still in danger. Whether outlawing ofense is the right and most efective way to protect minorities, liberals will lose an efective moral weapon in the liberal

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arsenal deployed against the populist Right and be less able to defend minorities. As liberals such as Jonathan Chait, ex–senior editor at the New Republic, claims, “Te Muslim radical argues that the ban on blasphemy is morally right and should be followed; the Western liberal insists it is morally wrong but should be followed.”342 Tus, if multiculturalism can be defended, defense should not rely on a “multiculturalism of rights” but only a realistic “multiculturalism of fear.”343 Multiculturalism of Fear, or Nationalism of Fear?

Te aftermath of Charlie Hebdo leads us to refect on the importance of Jacob Levy’s thesis in Multiculturalism of Fear. On the basis of Judith Shklar’s famous Liberalism of Fear, Jacob Levy claims that a political theory of multiculturalism should be concerned neither with preserving ethnocultural identities nor with preventing their manifestation. Liberals should take diversity as an inevitable fact of life and try to mitigate the dangers of state violence toward cultural minorities.344 In some cases, though, a liberal state should allow wrong but still tolerable practices, because the price of banning them outweighs the price of tolerating them. Tis argument is reminiscent of John Locke’s advice to tolerate diferent religious beliefs because repression of religion leads to religious radicalism and violence. We could conclude that outlawing sharia courts could lead to worse outcomes than keeping them under the law of the land. Furthermore, we should assume that the very act of banning by law publication of cartoons of Muhammad could be wrong, but it might prevent worse harm. Te decision undertaken by the new Charlie Hebdo editorial board to decline to publish any more Muhammad cartoons is representative of this new approach. A fearful self-censorship has spread across the arts and journalism.345 One is deterred from ofending others out of fear rather than as a matter of principle. Te question, however, is whether a multiculturalism out of fear may work the other way around. In other words, should European democratic societies be afraid of ofending Muslims or of the rising power of a populist radical Right? One of the consequences of Brexit and Donald Trump’s election as president of the United States is the direct infuence of the populist radical Right in shaping the political discourse of the political center. It is quite clear that out of fear of Marine Le Pen and her ilk political leaders in France and other European countries are more likely to emulate the populists than to frmly resist them.

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Should liberals endorse ethno-nationalism or is there a sustainable middle ground, both courageous and moral?346 Te sociologist Paul Schefer, a member of the Dutch Labor Party, points to voices in liberal countries such as Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands being raised in favor of the reinvention of a new “moral middle ground.”347 Tis moral middle ground has emerged from both fear and conviction. Associated with this camp is the demographic makeup of the anti-Islam coalition. Unlike the United States, where there is clear divide between progressives who support immigration, multiculturalism, and a gender agenda and conservatives who reject all this tout court, Europe is the stage for a diferent type of divide. We would not see the courts of law of the most infuential Western democracies supporting the right of businesses and individuals to discriminate against gays because of sincerely held religious belief. We might, though, fnd businesses discriminating with impunity against women wearing the veil. Te coalition against Islam is no longer composed solely of reactionary rightwingers. It now contains some of the most progressive and liberal parts of European society, including feminists and homosexual-rights activists. A new moral consensus against the blind defense of minorities has been born of this conviction, and governments cannot ignore the requirement of the majority that their national culture be preserved. More than anything else, though, while liberal political elites might be loyal to Europe and in favor of immigration, they have had to fnd a way to deal with nationalism. European liberals have a dilemma: Isolate the radical Right? Co-opt it in government? Win back voters by adopting part of its discourse? France uses a cordon sanitaire against the populist Right, yet the political center adopts part of the right’s discourse in migration. In the Netherlands and United Kingdom, the conservative right has adopted parts of the radical Right discourse. In Austria and Italy, the populist Right has been part of the government. Political leaders such as Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, and Mark Rutte of the Netherlands, all champions of a liberal Europe, will not be willing to abandon the defense of a liberal identity to the populist Right. Teir liberal and open-minded approach will have to be combined with certain aspects of national mythology and national pride, if not because of what they believe, then at least out of fear of the continued rise of the populist radical Right. We suppose, then, that this fear turns Jacob Levy’s “multiculturalism of fear” upside down, refecting the current spirit in Europe regarding both the Muslim challenge and immigration. Te ideological outcome of this fear is the advance of a postmulticultural lib-

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eral nationalism, which is still far from the ethno-exclusionism of Orbán’s Hungary. Te motto “Nobody enters here, because non-Western (Muslim) foreigners can never be integrated” is replaced by a conditional inclusion, in which as Étienne Balibar remarks, ideas of normality and normativity are associated with ethnocentricity.348 Nothing could prove this more than the new portfolio of European Commissioner Vice President Margaritis Schinas: Promoting Our European Way of Life, whose title leaves little room for imagination. Tis ethnocentric republicanism defnes the feld of a liberal conversation, the confuence of four complementary trends. One trend is toward a non-neutral public sphere; a second, the enhancement of an identity-based rather than a universal liberalism; a third, the development of postmulticultural civic integration of minorities and immigrants; and a fourth, a strong emphasis on a discriminatory type of antidiscrimination with a focus on the rights of women, homosexuals, and lesbians preceding the rights of religious minorities. Tis does not amount to accommodation of Muslims. However, as we explain in the next chapters, it is the best Europe can ofer in current times.

Chapter 2

United Kingdom Te Quest for Britishness and State-Centered Multiculturalism

Has the United Kingdom reached the limits of its traditional cultural tolerance? For a growing segment of UK society, from political elites to the general public, the answer appears to be a resounding yes. Te results of the Brexit referendum marked concerns about immigration in general and perceptions of political and cultural elites suppressing the debate about immigration. Public concerns about immigration were accepted as legitimate by Justin Welby, the archbishop of Canterbury, who criticized as “outrageous” the labeling of those who are concerned with immigration as racist.1 Although the question of Islam’s cultural challenge was not the focus of the debate leading to Brexit, and was hardly an issue in the 2017 elections, it is still an unavoidable subject in any debate on immigration and cultural identity. Te reaction of at least half the British population against Europe and against immigration cannot be severed from the larger debate on the place of Islam in the United Kingdom, on UK elites’ long romance with multiculturalism, and on the question of how Islam and multiculturalism has triggered a debate on the meaning of Britishness. Te 2017 terrorist attacks in Manchester Arena and on London Bridge rattled the British spirit. Te increasing cultural visibility of Islam in the United Kingdom, which in its more orthodox forms is startling to even the most stoic of the British, leads many to question their steadfast commitment to multiculturalism. In this chapter, we demonstrate the shortcomings of the UK concept 98

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of multiculturalism vis-à-vis Muslims as a cultural challenge. We show that the UK vision of cultural diversity, understood as a way to preserve a hierarchical society, has created a generally tolerant environment for most ethnic and cultural minorities; however, it is unsatisfactory to many Muslims. Attempts to appease radicals to enlist the assistance of moderates to tackle terrorism have proved unsuccessful. As Melanie Phillips has remarked, “Under the noses of successive British governments, Britain’s capital had turned into ‘Londonistan’—a mocking play on the names of such state sponsors of terrorism as Afghanistan—and become the major European center for the promotion, recruitment and fnancing of Islamic terror and extremism.”2 For a decade, this policy did indeed work insofar as the United Kingdom experienced no violent attacks. But it also had a cost: it resulted in the spread of a radical and extremist discourse, regarded as lawful so long as it did not lead to violence. Following the July 2005 terrorist attacks in London, the United Kingdom’s long love afair with multiculturalism showed signs of reaching a bitter end. We suggest that this break-up could lead to the adoption of one of two opposing strategies: either an improvement in the multicultural system, resulting in deep cultural recognition, or a dampening of multiculturalism in favor of civic cohesion and a problematic attempt to defne the idea of Britishness. Te British seem to have chosen the latter, adopting policies that pursue the goal of national civic integration. However, the attempt to defne the parameters of a UK civic national identity, as distinguished from ethnic nationalism and from multiculturalism, looks to be problematic at least. Te cry against multiculturalism and in favor of social cohesion was accompanied by a debate on what the meaning of Britishness is. Te debate centered on whether citizens would feel more British and more attached to the symbols of the country if they were tolerant and open to the Other. Opinions are divided on what this means in the UK context. For the British sociologists Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, the United Kingdom is experiencing not the end of multiculturalism but the emergence of a new type of civic-centered multiculturalism.3 Despite the increasing public rejection of multiculturalism, evidence supports Neer and Modood’s position. Attempts in 2001, 2004, and 2007 to enact a Muslim-promoted bill against religious hate speech may suggest receptivity to demands for recognition by ethno-religious groups. Under both conservative and liberal governments, political multiculturalism can be seen in the delegation

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of state functions to free schools (which are nonproft, state-funded UK schools mostly independent of the local authority), faith groups, local communities, and businesses, as well as in the partial substitution of privately funded, locally run, and group-specifc schemes for publicly funded, egalitarian, universal-access public services.4 Yet, in slight contrast to Neer and Modood, we argue that more nation-centered perspective tends to what Christopher McCrudden defnes as a postmulticultural trend in UK public life.5 In this chapter, relying on a historical institutional approach, we analyze the process by which political elites reached this perspective. We start by tracing the theoretical difculty of defning the meaning of UK national identity while hinting as to why it became a political imperative for UK political leaders to redefne that concept vis-à-vis what we call the cultural challenge of Islam. Next, we briefy cover development of the Muslim community in the United Kingdom, highlighting the interaction between the community and the rest of UK society in two conficting areas, mosque building and education. How to run these institutions have become matters of confict especially since the frst years of the 2000s, when terrorism became a central issue of mistrust between the United Kingdom and its Muslim community. However, the tension started before the Islamic terrorist wave hit the United Kingdom beginning in 2005. Trough the Salman Rushdie afair and the debate on sharia begun by Rowan Williams, the archbishop of Canterbury, we trace the main issues of minority group multiculturalism and the changing perception in public policy of the role of race and religion in national life. Finally, we question whether UK political elites, from both the Conservative and the Labour Parties, understood the shortcomings of multiculturalism and their impotence in managing racism in the United Kingdom.6 We show that eforts of political elites to advance a “civic culture” are based on deferential but essentially consensual democratic values.7 Communitarian cohesion is implemented through policies and programs that insist on English-language profciency, an oath of allegiance, introduction of ID cards, disapproval of certain religious clothing in some public places, surveillance of foreign students, control over mosques and imams, and so on. Tis is accompanied by a European trend of afrmation on liberal values, best expressed in the declaration of gender equality and of homosexual and lesbian rights. More importantly, the term national-communitarian cohesion implies a mandate from a majority of political and social elites. In contrast to advocates of contact theories, who seek to substitute application of a vertical state-centered theory of integration for application

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of a horizontal social theory that would lead to equal mutual transformation of in-groups and out-groups, proponents of state-led cohesion seek to integrate the Other according to state-centered UK liberal values. Despite the United Kingdom being the country in Europe that is potentially the most open to sharia courts and Muslim religious demands, reaction in the United Kingdom against multiculturalism, we suggest, could be harsher than in France or the Netherlands. The Multicultural Empire: British Identity and Uneven Pluralism

As noted by Steven Vertovec, “In the 1950s and 1960s almost all immigrants came from colonies or Commonwealth countries (.  .  .  mostly in the Caribbean and South Asia), by the early 1970s most newcomers were arriving as dependants of the newly settled migrants. Te decades since then have seen fairly dramatic change.” People from . . . Commonwealth countries accounted for 30 per cent and 32 per cent of infow” of newcomers. “EU citizens represented 10 per cent of newcomers in 1971, rising to 17 per cent in 2002; however, those in a broad ‘Middle East and Other’ category have gone from 16 per cent in 1971 to 40 per cent in 2002.”8 Tis infow calls for Britain to not only manage diversity but manage super diversity. Does the United Kingdom have the tools for that? As Adrian Favell has noted, since the fowering of the empire, the UK philosophy of integration is that it preserves public order and stabilizes relations between majority and minority cultures, primarily by allowing ethnic cultures to mediate integration.9 Ira Katznelson points out that a key feature of colonial social control, indirect control through the brokering of native leadership, has been replicated in the mother country.10 What most political analysts observe, though, is that the British link promotion of cultural diversity with political control. Colonialism left a deep imprint on the United Kingdom’s sense of collective identity. One of its dramatic consequences is that it laid the groundwork for ethnic minorities to keep their status as UK subjects, albeit in a subordinated position in the hierarchy of Britishness.11 Under this “uneven multiculturalism,” groups have moved around in the hierarchy over time; however, a general tendency to racialize representation has persisted into the twenty-frst century.12 Newcomers, not necessarily from the British Commonwealth, now sufer from the same system of hierarchy. As Bernard Crick has aptly explained, any “discussion of the relationships and tensions of the post-war

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immigrants to British society must be set in . . . context . . . : that historically the United Kingdom emerged from the feudal Kingdom of England as a multi-national state.”13 Ethnic minorities were technically capable of being UK subjects; however, as subjects they remained subordinate in the hierarchy of Britishness,14 since they were imagined as both colonized and nonaristocratic. As a result, two contrasting attitudes coexisted in one conscience: racism and pluralism. Te United Kingdom could either become a successful multiracial and multiethnic society or fail at it.15 Te United Kingdom has historically leaned toward a pluralist, balanced, multiethnic society. Te reason, as Brian Barry explains, is that British identity became more a legal concept connected to “formal British citizenship rather than [a fxed identity] with signifcant afective, cognitive or behavioural connotations.”16 In the United Kingdom there is no expectation “that immigrants should ever become good Englishmen, Scotsmen or Welshmen, although they are expected to be loyal and law-abiding British citizens.” Te primary “concern is make sure that immigrants cause as little damage as possible to the ‘British way of life.’”17 Te British way of life thus is associated with good governance, which is more important than national self-determination. Even in the two different perspectives on the role of national identity ofered by Lord Acton (for whom the establishment of liberty could best be realized by a state that includes distinct nationalities—without oppressing them) and John Stuart Mill (for whom a necessary condition of free institutions was that the boundaries of governments should coincide with those of its nationalities), the desire to make good government precedes the idea of nationalism. It is believed that this conception would allow minorities to adopt a British identity. Te Institute for Public Policy Research, a think tank linked to the Labour Party, published research fnding that 51 percent of ethnic minorities in the United Kingdom describe themselves as British, compared with 29 percent of whites. In contrast, 52 percent of whites describe themselves as primarily belonging to one of the United Kingdom’s four constituent nations (England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, or Wales) compared with just 11 percent of blacks and Asians. Te report suggests that whereas minority groups perceive Englishness and Scottishness as primarily ethnic terms, Britain, and its fag and institutions, is perceived as a more neutral term. Te report fnds that the contrast is greatest in England and points to “a growing divide between those who prefer English or British national

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identity.”18 One possible conclusion is that skinheads who chanted “Tere ain’t no black in the Union Jack” would be very disappointed.19 Ethnic minorities have become the strongest proponents of Britishness. Te United Kingdom’s fexibility in defning a UK racial framework has served the nation well during most migration waves. However, a different kind of stranger, the Muslim, seems to present unique challenges to the classic conceptualization of race in the United Kingdom. Te UK experience with immigration has been seen as a legacy of the U.S. civil rights movement and black-power rhetoric. UK legislation relating to newcomers was based in an understanding of immigration through the lens of race.20 Although traditional civic antiracist activists once dismissed cultural diferences as a basis for public policy, today’s British-born Muslims contest the primacy of racial identities but contend that multicultural discourse is biased toward secular identities. To Muslims, the problem is not race but culture and religion: the Anglican Church’s connection to the state and advanced secularism in UK civil society. UK political elites were attentive to the claims of Muslims. As Ceri Peach claims, “Te discourse on racialized minorities has mutated from race in the 1960s and 1980s to ethnicity in the 1990s and religion in present times.”21 In legislation, UK antidiscrimination law was broadened beyond freedom from discrimination on grounds of race to include freedom from discrimination on grounds of religion. As we show, however, the expression discrimination on grounds of religion is interpreted diferently according to political context. Freedom of Religion but Nonequal

Te United Kingdom separated state and church in 1829 when it abolished the law that ensured the power of the Anglican Christians. Tis transformation was the result of a cumulative process of piecemeal legal reforms that gradually withdrew the privileges and constitutional safeguards of the Church of England. In 1824 the parliamentary grants for established church buildings were eliminated, and in 1891 the Religious Disabilities Removals Act was passed to allow freethinkers to take their place in the House of Commons without being required to take oaths to which they objected.22 Despite this long and steady process of disentangling church from

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state and despite growing social secularization among the British, there is no dominant secular religion in the United Kingdom as in France, and there is no clear separation of state and church as in the United States. In contrast to the United States, where the Constitution’s First Amendment ensures freedom of religion, the United Kingdom has no legal statute that calls for equality of all religions. Te absence of a constitutionally protected right to religious equality in the United Kingdom has enabled religious discrimination in certain spheres. Only the Anglican Church enjoys ofcial standing in England and Wales, and the Presbyterian Protestant Church enjoys ofcial standing in Scotland.23 Tis advantage is manifested by, for example, twentyfour of the Church of England’s bishops and its two archbishops sitting in the House of Lords. Additionally, the nation’s blasphemy laws, which remained in efect until 2008, protected only Christian doctrines.24 Te Act of Settlement of 1701, the Marriage Acts of 1949–1996, and the Prison Act of 1952 are widely believed to privilege Anglicans over other denominations and faiths. Certain customs related to civic religion, such as daily prayers at Westminster Abbey and various religious ceremonies, including memorial events and the coronation oath, exclude other religious groups. Despite the establishment of the Anglican Church after the Reformation, the United Kingdom has generally behaved liberally toward other religions. Te cycles of nineteenth-century migration from Ireland to London, Glasgow, and the north of England allowed the expansion of the Roman Catholic Church. During the twentieth century Jewish refugees arrived in England as well. Although both groups sufered from discrimination because of their religious afliation, with time they began to enjoy some of the same benefts granted by the state to the Anglican Church. Catholic schools were created alongside state churches, and after the Educational Act of 1944 they could opt in to the state sector and receive benefts provided to the established Anglican Church. Tis was also extended to Jewish schools. Almost half of England’s Jewish population is educated in state-funded denominational schools.25 Te country has a long tradition of legal exemptions for religious minorities, beginning with the Toleration Act (1689) and continuing to the Religious Exemption Act (1976), which exempted Sikhs from wearing motorcycle helmets. Tough religious freedom is not formally protected, the United Kingdom—like other Anglo-Saxon countries—has experi-

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enced relatively pluralistic modes of incorporation.26 However, this does not mean equality of religion, since tolerance toward the Other does not necessarily imply recognition. We could argue that this uneven recognition of religious diversity disproportionately afects Muslims, especially because they are the largest and most visible group whose primary identifcation is on the basis of religious belief.27 Eric Kaufmann looked at data collected in three UK studies on ethnic minorities in 1994–2003 and found that youngsters of Bangladeshi or Pakistani and Afro-Caribbean origin are many times more likely than the UK white population to express a religious afliation.28 Muslims are ambivalent about the UK settlement of state and church. Tey believe the Anglican Church does not ofer equality but still feel positive about their British identity. Modood and Meer recognize that the Anglican establishment does not afect Muslims negatively.29 Abdal Hakim Murad, secretary of the Muslim Academic Trust in London and director of the Sunna Project at the Center of Middle Eastern Studies at Cambridge University, claims that in contrast to “almost everywhere, . . . [only] in Europe was there a consistent policy of enforcing religious uniformity. . . . As part of the European world, . . . with Henry VIII’s Act of Supremacy, England cut itself of from formal submission to Vatican doctrines; and from that time a type of religious diversity has been . . . at least a possibility.”30 It seems that the British civic identity is well suited to nonwhite subjects of the former British Empire as well as to newcomers and to different religions. During the Napoleonic Wars, religion was replaced by nationalism. Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox forces fought France, with Admiral Horatio Nelson recommending that UK forces come to the aid of the pope. At that time, as Brian Barry has observed, British national identity became additive. Te 1829 Roman Catholic Relief Act incorporated Roman Catholics into the nation without requiring them to abandon their religion.31 Is emancipation that represents a policy of tolerance but not equality appropriate for British Muslims who seek equality rather than just tolerance under the supremacy of Anglicanism? Anglican supremacy or that England has a state church is not the problem. Te problem that makes Muslims worry is not Anglicanism but rather that, under Anglicanism, English society is secularizing at great speed. Te secularization process (it is argued) might undermine the quest for toleration of diversity.

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An increasing number of non-Muslim British turn the question around. How do they cope with Muslims demands for multicultural recognition without losing the long UK Anglican tradition? As Linda Colley notes, before World War II most British were Protestant, but now all the world’s religions are well represented in the United Kingdom. “Inevitably,” Colley writes, “this comes accompanied with new risks, tensions and uncertainties.”32 As the Muslim population grows and the Anglican population dwindles, the British question whether the social glue holding UK society together is a generic sense of multiculturalism, which leaves society vulnerable to the inevitable changes caused by changing demographics. Te probable response to such a dilemma and challenge, we believe, is secular afrmation and, increasingly, retreat from the faith of multiculturalism. Is Antiracism Enough for Muslims?

For centuries, UK relations with its Muslim communities have been ambivalent at best. For generations, the United Kingdom benefted from the immigration of its overseas colonies and did not worry about the consequences; however, as the nonwhite immigrant population became more visible, demagogic political actors stoked xenophobic sentiments to make political gains. Beginning in the 1950s, relaxed immigration laws and the limited supply of British labor fueled an infux of immigrants from the Caribbean and India. Most of these immigrants had planned to return to their homelands, but several factors led them to establish permanent homes in the United Kingdom. Te 1948 British Nationality Act facilitated this wave of immigration by ensuring that the civil rights of immigrants were equally protected.33 In 1962 the Commonwealth Immigration Act was adopted. Tis act was among the frst laws in Europe to restrict immigration. Such laws appeared in France in the 1970s but only as a result of economic pressures, specifcally unemployment. Te UK law was the product of racist and nationalist political rhetoric that exploited fears of colored immigration to undermine support for racial pluralism. Te 1962 law, as well as subsequent legislation, restricted citizenship to persons either born in the United Kingdom or holding a UK passport. Te Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968 introduced a more dramatic distinction—not all citizens would be deemed equal. Te law was an efort to exclude East African Asians who held UK passports. It distin-

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guished between individuals with a substantial connection to the United Kingdom through their parents and people without such a connection. Finally, the 1971 Immigration Act created categories of UK citizens and distinguished “patrials” from “non-patrials.”34 Tree years before passage of the law, Enoch Powell (a Conservative Party member of Parliament and ex–minister of health) had conceived the principles of a distinction between those who belonged to the United Kingdom and those who did not.35 However, hundreds of thousands of immigrants had already become citizens under the 1948 act, and the United Kingdom had made great strides toward becoming a multiracial nation. Under the act, new citizens enjoyed full civil rights that included the right of family reunifcation, which facilitated the immigration of thousands of families to Britain. As a result, the ethnic minority population in the United Kingdom rapidly increased during the 1970s. In 1968 it stood at one million, and by 1991 that number had tripled. Riots and demonstrations against nonwhite immigrants erupted. Enoch Powell’s anti-immigration rhetoric in his “rivers of blood” speech was fertile ground for other opportunistic politicians.36 Te conventional wisdom maintains that these politicians were reacting to racist currents in popular culture. At least one critic, Anthony Messina, has suggested the opposite— that the UK political establishment gradually persuaded ordinary citizens to oppose Commonwealth immigration.37 Tat is, in their zeal to forestall a multiracial society, UK political elites deliberately compromised the interest of business and the national economy. Te ofcial response has generally been characterized, then and now, as a twofold strategy: restricting entry to the United Kingdom and redefning UK nationality. In 1979 a Conservative government with a clear anti-immigration agenda imposed new immigration restrictions. Tose were followed in 1983 by the British Nationality Act, which cut the annual infux of New Commonwealth and Pakistani immigrants into the United Kingdom by half, to approximately twenty-four thousand per year. Te 1983 law, by diluting the principle of jus solis in favor of a greater emphasis on jus sanguinis, rationalized postwar UK nationality law and legitimated the 1962–1980 immigration restrictions.38 Tis trend continued even after the Labour Party took power in 1997. Ten the media attacked the UK asylum law, arguing that it was more liberal than comparable laws in Europe. Under growing public pressure, the Labour Party passed the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum law, making it easier to deport immigrants who were denied asylum or refugee requests.39

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Despite immigrant restrictions and the growing presence of the radical Right, progress has been made in fghting discrimination in the United Kingdom. It could be argued that, although Labour elites pay lip service to popular pressures to stop immigration, in reality they favor it and have made increasing eforts to stop racial discrimination. Among European nations, the United Kingdom led the way in criminalizing racial discrimination when the Parliament passed the Race Relations Act in 1976. Te act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity and created the Commission for Racial Equality. Tis law was a giant step forward for civil rights, but it did not ban discrimination on the basis of religion.40 In the United Kingdom’s anti-discriminatory laws, race is more than a biological marker; it is an identity one can disentangle from a domestic legacy of slavery. Blacks or other cultural identities do not have to be compensated through positive discrimination for past slavery or past colonialism. Te British do not support negative or positive discrimination. Tey distinguish between motives and ground causes of discrimination, and by ruling out motives from discrimination charges, they remain very much in favor of symmetry, which in certain ways contrasts with multiculturalism. Te question is whether symmetry would satisfy diferent cultural and religious groups, especially but not only Muslims. In 1997 the Runnymede Trust, a leading independent race equality think tank, requested the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia to draft a consultative document on the situation of Muslims in the United Kingdom. Te fnal report, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All, described the hostility and discrimination experienced by British Muslims in employment.41 Te report recommended that the Race Relations Act of 1976 include protection against discrimination by religious background. A complementary report on religious discrimination, the Derby Report of 1999, also recommended expanded legislation and confrmed the unequal treatment of Muslims in education, occupation, housing, legislation, and other governmental and municipal services.42 Under the leadership of Tony Blair, the Labour government made great eforts to accommodate the Muslim community through multicultural arrangements that were cemented by a tacit social consensus between leftwing working-class movements and the political elite.43 Labour political leaders relied on the claim by Roy Jenkins (Home secretary in 1966) that assimilation is wrong for societies as diverse as in the United Kingdom. Labour should follow policies that grant equal opportunity under a cultural diversity spirit. Tis cultural diversity prevailed from 1990 to 2010

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at least, and it was successful because it served Labour’s ideological and political interests.44 Labour believed the co-optation of community leaders to be a prime political necessity and that a more diverse society would fnd a political home in Labour rather than in the Conservative Party. Tat was why they implemented facilities for immigrants arriving in the United Kingdom. In its frst term in ofce in 1997, the new Labour even silently dropped the “primary purpose” clause in immigration laws. Tat clause prevented foreigners who married a British person from staying in the United Kingdom if they admit that the purpose of the marriage was a license to stay in the country. Tat Labour dropped that clause was applauded by South Asian communities.45 Furthermore, since the 1990s, the Judicial Studies Board has organized courses on diversity issues and produced the Equal Treatment Bench Book for magistrates and judges. Te most recent Bench Book includes sections on appropriate language, background information on minority faiths, and specifc suggestions, such as refraining from asking Sikhs, Jews, or Muslims to state their Christian names or remove their head coverings in court.46 Although Labour had moved forward in its commitment to accommodate Muslims in several areas, such as education and mosque building, Muslims still believed the United Kingdom’s devotion to multiculturalism is not sincere enough. Tey read well Labour’s policies of co-optation, which did not resolve what most afects Muslims—religious discrimination. Despite the recommendations of the Derby Report, until 2006 only incitement to hatred on racial grounds was considered an ofense under the British Nationality Act. Te problem was that, though the courts interpreted the law to include Jews and Sikhs as protected “races” and also included a Christian doctrine, they refused to include Muslims as a protected race.47 To make things even worse for Muslims, the UK blasphemy laws were conceived to protect only Anglicans. Te exclusion of Muslims from those that the law protects is evidence that the United Kingdom does not formally protect religious equality.48 Furthermore, despite the UK displays of religious and cultural toleration, protection against religious discrimination in the United Kingdom exists only in Northern Ireland and only as a method to mediate sectarian conficts between the established Protestant and Roman Catholic communities.49 Te government even rejected the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which would have prohibited religious discrimination outside Northern Ireland. Paradoxically, after 9/11, the government tried to use the Anti-

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terrorism, Crime and Security Bill to prevent religious harassment. Tis was the frst of three attempts by the government to grant the Muslim community the legal protection ofered to Jews and Sikhs, and all failed. Muslims were far from satisfed. Nine Muslim organizations rejected these laws because they attempted to protect religious rights within a framework of antiterrorist legislation.50 Muslims also felt tensions rising between antidiscriminatory speech legislation and the protection of free speech. When in early 2002 Eric Reginald Lubbock, Lord Avebury, introduced the Religious Ofenses Bill in the House of Lords, it was defeated because of concerns about freedom of speech. A second bill was introduced in 2004; however, the Conservative and Liberal Democrats Parties opposed it, and it failed. Te second bill, meant to improve the Serious Organized Crime and Police Bill, which did not protect against religiously motivated hate speech, was supported even by the Queen, who delivered a speech to the Parliament. Te government then introduced the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill. By the time the bill passed in 2006, little remained of the established protections for Islam. Verbal abuse and insult were eliminated from the bill; only very clear verbal threats against religious groups were prohibited. Satire about, criticism of, and jokes about Islam were all permitted. Diferent voices emerged for and against the law. Te comedian Rowan Atkinson, on behalf of the national Secular Society, expressed a view shared by a wide swath of UK liberals. “To criticize a person for their race is manifestly irrational and ridiculous but to criticize their religion, that is a right. Tat is a freedom. . . . Te freedom to criticize ideas, any ideas—even if they are sincerely held beliefs—is one of the fundamental freedoms of society.”51 Several Anglican bishops supported the law. Te Hindu Council UK also supported the bill. It is difcult to assess the repercussions of the amendment proposed by the government that indirectly allowed criticism of Islam. Te Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) recognized that the amendment merely perpetuated existing inequalities. Te MCB and most Muslims would generally recognize that Britain has been open to Muslim religious and social claims; it has ofered facilities for mosques and was willing to co-opt Muslim leaders. At the same time, it has been ambivalent toward sharia court rulings and Muslim private schools and has basically rejected equating religious criticism and religionbased discrimination with racism. Te Muslim community could demand recognition of Islam or just be pleased with tolerance. Although the Hanaf school of legal thought, the one most South Asian Muslims in Britain fol-

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low, would be satisfed with tolerance, the question is whether tolerance without recognition can work in daily life. From Cultural Neutrality to Intervention: The State’s Reentry into Islamic Mosques, Education, and Spiritual Life

Until 1945 there were only 10 mosques in the United Kingdom. After the war, thousands of Muslim workers arrived in Europe, and by 1989, there were 329 mosques in the United Kingdom. Tat number has continued to increase.52 Tere is no ofcial register or database of mosques, and so the number of mosques in the United Kingdom remains largely based on estimates.53 According to the Center for the Study of Islam in the UK, there are today an estimated 1,600 mosques in the United Kingdom, ranging from humble “house mosques” in residential areas to larger, purposely built mosques such as Regents Park Mosque in London.54 Even using the most conservative estimates there is approximately one mosque for every thousand Muslims. Until recently, building a mosque in the United Kingdom was not difcult and did not involve confict.55 Decisions about building mosques remain in the hands of local government. Denials of building rights are usually framed in terms of public order and transportation issues. Te delegation of power to local authorities is a positive development that has maintained—and even strengthened—social solidarity. Despite their status as a minority, Muslims have infuenced local politics, primarily because of their concentrated settlement in cities and towns.56 Tese circumstances have given Muslim communities more control over their cultural and spiritual lives. Since the beginning of Labour’s rule in 1997, however, the government became more involved with the activities of Muslim organizations and mosques. Two distinct but complementary factors were behind the government’s decision to allocate funds to faith groups. First, some analysts argue, faithbased initiatives are part of the restructuring of the welfare state and privatization of social services, which accelerated during former prime minister Tony Blair’s administration. Small organizations took responsibility for religious activities and directly pressured local authorities and school boards for changes in religious education and meal programs.57 Tis was part of the program of decentralizing and privatizing of social services promoted by the Labour Party under Blair.58 Second, the government believed that cooperating with faith groups was efective in isolating potential terror cells.

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Construction of new mosque has three hurdles: visibility of proposed mosques; location, especially when proposed on former Christian sites; and issues related to incitement to violence. For example, confict has surrounded the building in London’s East End of what was to be the biggest mosque in Europe that was intended to house more than forty thousand worshippers. Te megaproject was funded by Saudis, and it stoked anxiety among the British. More than the size, they were concerned about the ideology behind the construction, especially because Abdul Khaliq, a senior member of Tablighi Jamaat (“propagation of the faith”; a worldwide Islamic missionary group that preaches total separation from infdel society and is connected with terrorism), proposed that the mosque be the group’s new UK headquarters. Other conficts over mosque construction occurred when in 2004 Muslims tried to build a mosque in Swansea where St. Andrew’s United Reformed Church was once located and then in 2010 in Surrey when a local Bengali group planned to build a mosque next to the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.59 Te main reason for opposition to mosques, new or established, is that almost half are controlled by orthodox Islamic sects.60 Most imams in UK mosques are associated with the Barelvi Suf Brotherhood, a faction with a religious worldview at odds with European modernity. Others are followers of Tablighi Jamaat, a pietistic group founded in Delhi in 1927. One mosque in particular received public attention as a place of incitement to violence, the Finsbury Park Mosque, which frst made headlines in 2003 when its imam, Abu Hamza al-Masri, was arrested. Abu Hamza was extradited to the United States, where he is serving a life sentence after being convicted of kidnapping Western tourists in 1998 in Yemen and of establishing a militant training camp in Oregon so as to supply Al-Qaeda and the Taliban with fghters. Te terrorists in the London attacks of July 2005 in which bombs were detonated on three London Underground trains and on one bus in central London (Hasib Hussain, Germaine Lindsay, Mohammed Sidique Khan, and Shehzad Tanweer) were all students of Abu Hamza and attended the mosque. Te notorious Jihadi John also attended the Finsbury Park Mosque as a student of Abu Hamza. However, other mosques, such as the East London Mosque, have a record of working against radicalization. Te mosque was built by Bangladeshi and Pakistani families that settled in London’s East End during the 1960s and 1970s. It has become one of the country’s largest and most prominent Islamic institutions. Its congregation is as ethnically varied as

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the East End itself, and more than twenty thousand people attend prayers, family classes, lectures, and other events.61 But the negative examples are the ones that spark public concern that authorities cannot assuage. Tose public concerns were expressed in a 2005 Home Secretary paper that directly addressed public concerns about extremism originating in mosques. Te report highlighted the challenge of foreign money fnancing mosques, the political consequences of that, and how government should tackle the issue.62 In November 2006, Michael Gove, a Conservative Party member of Parliament, highlighted the unsuccessful eforts to regulate foreign funding and the role of Saudi money in fnancing extremism in the United Kingdom.63 Tis opened a debate on whether the state should train imams and what the state’s role should be in religious institutions and life. In 2007, the Department for Communities and Local Government created an advisory group to study the issue. Te group’s report recommended the creation of Muslim chaplaincy positions in public institutions such as hospitals, prisons, universities, and the military, and more importantly, it argued that attaining the profession of Muslim faith leader does not and should not include a requirement for training as imam. Instead, the profession requires pastoral and counseling skills and usually involves membership in multifaith teams and interaction with professionals of different religious backgrounds. Also women could and should occupy the role of faith leaders. Te report concluded that it was not the government’s role to train the ministers of any religion, but it should supervise them to ensure that the training serves the government’s goal of promoting a nationalized Islam.64 A Muslim Labour MP, Lord Nazir Ahmed, organized the frst national council of imams and mosques to fght radicalism and establish a common platform for every Islamic tradition in the United Kingdom. Tis coincided with the government vision of creating a British Islam that could help stamp out radicalism and even terrorism.65 Te idea was to transform the picture found by Lord Ahmed’s council: of two thousand imams, only three hundred were homegrown, sermons were often delivered in Arabic, and women were excluded from the mosque committees. Tat picture did not ft with what the British expected of the Muslim community. What worried UK political elites, however, was whether modern and nationalized imams are the solution to radicalism. Would modern imams who use the teachings of the Qur’an Hadith and Sunna as moral paradigms be less threatening to Western society?

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To answer these questions the UK political system started to consider how the state should be more involved in defning a British Islam. Tis started with increasing intervention in mosques but had a special emphasis on the role of education. Rather than a cross-cultural dialogue, UK liberal society is looking for a state-centered cultural liberalism. The Passing of the Democratic Torch: Education in Public Schools and the Beginning of the Cultural Clash

Public education became a critical source of confict between the Muslim community and the larger British population. Muslims understand that quality education will help their children become successful UK citizens, but many also believe that public education undermines basic Islamic values. Te subject was divisive also for UK liberals. Tey wanted to respect multiculturalism, but they perceived education as implanting some shared values. Te shift from accent on diversity to a nationalization of diversity is ongoing and slow but steady. In the United Kingdom, families had educated their children or sent them to schools supported by churches before passage of the 1870 Education Act, which led to a national educational system. Churches continued to provide education after the act. Te 1944 Education Act mandated cooperation between the state and churches in schooling and clarifed the system by defning categories of schools. Since then various state-maintained church schools have been established that receive some degree of funding. Parental educational choice is another factor increasing the internal diversity of the UK school system. UK governments, especially Labour governments, have adopted a pragmatic approach, granting schools great fexibility in designing a curriculum based on the local community’s ethnic, cultural, and religious composition. Muslims on city councils were able to take part in defning the local syllabus. Tat meant that, despite a national curriculum in 1988 paving the way to greater centralization, local authorities and schools could adapt the curriculum and other educational matters to local educational needs. Instructions from the Department of Education have recommended that local school ofcials take into account pupils’ backgrounds when designing acts of worship and religious education. Tis fexibility has been used to ease the integration of Muslims into a system that still has considerable Christian infuence, a centrality institutionalized in the United

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Kingdom in 1944. Te Education Act of 1944 made numerous major changes in the provision and governance of secondary schools in England and Wales. It authorized schools, for example, to begin the day with a public prayer and the 1988 Education Reform Act established that they be Christian prayers. Furthermore, the 1988 reforms required that syllabi refect the religious traditions of Christian Britain; however, they also had some accommodation for the needs of other religious groups. Another set of reforms passed in 1996 called for the local education authorities and the Standing Advisory Council for Religious Education to monitor these accommodations.66 Such laws encourage public schools to take into account the religious and cultural diversity of their constituents in their design of syllabi and prayers.67 Tis is an important point related to the question of whether diversity means religious diversity. Cultural diversity was encouraged especially during Labour’s rule beginning in 1997. Tis approach apparently ftted the new multicultural social realities. For example, “in England, the percentage of ethnic minority pupils in state-sector schooling makes up 20.6% of all children aged 4–11yrs (in primary education), and 16.8% of children aged 11–16yrs (in secondary schools). . . . Te largest ethnic minority group is Pakistani which accounts for 3.3% of pupils, followed by White Other pupils (2.6%) and Black African pupils (2.5%). At secondary school level the largest ethnic minority pupils are Pakistani (2.5%), followed by Indian (2.4%) and White Other (2.3%).”Te religious profles of these groups, notably, is disproportionately Islam; nearly 588,000 (5 percent) of the school population is from the entire Muslim population in the United Kingdom of 1.8 million (3 percent).68 Te diversity issue thus radically leans toward respect for religious identity. Labour political leaders were ideological advocates of multicultural education and promoted and facilitated a close relationship between local religious leaders and school ofcials that helped prevent conficts. Although supportive of multiculturalism, Labour political elites wondered whether a multicultural frame of education undermines a common sense of citizenship. Long before UK participation in the 2003 intervention in Iraq and long before society experienced terrorism, multicultural education entered public consciousness through two important and complementary reports, the Swann Report of 1985 and the Crick Report of 1998. Both reports are from Prime Minister Margaret Tatcher’s days in ofce but were endorsed by Labour political leaders.

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Te Swann Report, for example, started by accepting that a racism could be felt in public in schools. Its solution, accordingly, was to adopt an inclusive multiculturalism, but only to promote a common framework of values. Te report does not allow debate on this framework of values to be assimilated by all students. Te report recommends banning bilingual education and, more importantly, rejects the notion of separate “ethnic minority” schools, particularly “Islamic” schools. Despite acknowledging the long-standing presence of Anglican, Catholic, and Jewish schools, it views the prospect of Muslim schools as socially divisive.69 Te report discourages religious instruction in schools because education should not reinforce the identities that students bring from their homes. Bernard Crick headed the Advisory Group on Citizenship, which wrote the second report. Te group was to provide recommendations on how citizenship and democracy should be taught in schools. It grew out of the widespread conviction that young students should learn the virtues of a participatory democracy and its links with UK citizenship. Race and racism, either institutional or interpersonal, were almost not mentioned, let alone stressed. Te Crick Report demanded that “minorities must learn to respect the laws, codes and conventions as much as the majority.”70 Te English program of study, for example, expects individuals to challenge prejudice and discrimination but does not consider collective responses or address how to confront institutional racism. Like the aim of the Swann Report, one of the most important aims of the Crick Report was to foster or “restore a sense of common citizenship, including a national identity that is secure enough to fnd a place in the plurality of nations, cultures, ethnic identities and religions long found in the United Kingdom.”71 A reading between the lines of the report fnds an implicit demand that minorities make an efort in the process of assimilation or integration. Minorities, especially non-national ethnic minorities, need to change in order to realize a common citizenship; white British citizens need only learn to tolerate ethnic minorities.72 Te report was mostly concerned with enlisting students in political participation and the need for a sense of social cohesion or of belonging to a civic culture. Te obvious question is whether the need for personal commitment by individuals to shared identities that transcend ethnic, linguistic, or other group afliations could work in an already multicultural society. Te report fell short of what advocates of multiculturalism wanted to achieve, especially when social tensions in 2003 fared with UK interven-

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tion in Iraq. Te war became a central factor shaping the debate on racism, terrorism, and integration. Critics of the reports dismissed them as not refecting the changing face of UK society and as furthering securitization of Muslim minorities. Te appointment of David Blunkett (a pioneer in introducing antiterrorism measures, including detention without trial of suspect foreign nationals who could not be extradited or deported) as Home secretary in 2001 began a new era marked by the war on terrorism and its companion Islamic radicalization, which was attributed to the permissive politics of multiculturalism. Te new consensus was that the multicultural trend in public schools indirectly and unwittingly contributed to the parallel lives of minorities in ethnic ghettos who refused to integrate and to radicalization. Furthermore, radicalization and parallel lives became associated with religiosity. Te next step was to open a debate on Muslim visibility in the public space, UK values, and whether they ft diferent types of social behavior in school. In 2006, public schools seemed to take a harsher attitude toward Muslim conservative dress. Even Tony Blair, an advocate of multiculturalism, favored suspending a Muslim teacher at Headfeld Church of England Junior School in Dewsbury after students claimed they could not understand her through her niqab (face veil).73 In March 2007, the government announced that head teachers could ban the niqab in their schools on grounds of “safety, security, and teaching.”74 Not by chance, this new attitude coincided with new anti-terrorism programs spearheaded by the government, grouped as the Prevent Strategy. Starting with publication of “Preventing Violent Extremism— Winning Hearts and Minds” in 2007 and “Te Prevent Strategy” in 2008, the Prevent Strategy of 2011 and the Prevent Duty of 2015 aim to isolate, prevent, and defeat terrorism.75 One of the main ways is to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and supporting terrorism. Te Department for Communities and Local Government declared that this is not about “a clash of civilisations or a struggle between Islam and ‘the West.’ It is about standing up to a small fringe of terrorists and their extremist supporters. Indeed, the British Government is committed to work in partnership with the vast majority of Muslims who reject violence and who share core British values in doing this.”76 Although the thrust of the Prevent Strategy is that mutual understanding and mutual help against radicalization are needed, critics immediately claimed that the programs would stigmatize Islam. Te strategy causes distrust between students and

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teachers; teachers are enjoined to watch students whose patterns of dress change, indicating radicalization. Muslims began to feel discriminated against, and that led the MCB to consider how an intercultural dialogue should be run in the United Kingdom. In a February 2007 report, “Towards Greater Understanding: Meeting the Needs of Muslim Pupils in State Schools,” the MCB presented conclusions calling for the separation of boys and girls in schools; not scheduling swimming lessons during Ramadan; and ensuring that contact sports, including football, basketball, and dancing are always in single-gender groups. Te report also demanded that Muslim children should not have to draw other people during art classes, which is forbidden under some interpretations of sharia. Perhaps the most far-reaching recommendation was that British children be required to learn about Islam, while Muslims be allowed to withdraw from lessons about Christianity and other faiths. Te MCB’s recommendation for non-Muslim children was to address anti-Islamic sentiments in public schools.77 Tese proposals drew from a program in Birmingham where education authorities had agreed in 1975 on a multifaith religious education. In 1988 Birmingham was again a pioneer when it published “Revised Guidelines on Meeting the Religious and Cultural Needs of Muslim Pupils.”78 From a liberal multicultural perspective, the MCB proposals refect a logical desire to protect a minority culture. Tey probably would have had an efect during the 1990s diferent from that under the confrontational spirit of the early years of the 2000s. Te response from the Department for Education and Skills was direct and harsh: the MCB report had no binding power and was not endorsed by the government. Te Department for Education thus advocated and promoted the Prevent policies on the importance of monitoring radicals while advancing programs of deradicalization that imposed UK values (under the frame of respect for other faiths). What triggered the change of spirit that allowed the Prevent policies? A Trojan Horse in Birmingham

In the United Kingdom, wealthy areas tend to have the best schools. In an area with good schools, housing prices are high, in efect locking out the nonwealthy from the good schools and segregating schools. Birmingham

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has some of the most segregated schools. Te east side is predominantly Pakistani Muslim, and the south is white. In November 2013 a letter was sent to Birmingham City Council. Now known as the Trojan horse letter, it alleged that Islamic fundamentalists were plotting to infltrate and take over governors and councils running public schools in Birmingham.79 A report on the incident said, Te letter was incomplete, with no addressee and no signature. . . . Te letter states that: “‘Operation Trojan Horse’ has been very carefully thought through.” . . . A prime mover behind the plan was Tahir Alam, a well-known fgure in education circles in Birmingham and until very recently a director and chair of the Park View Educational Trust, which runs three academies in the city.  .  .  . Alam has “fne-tuned the ‘Trojan Horse’ [operation] so that it is totally invisible to the naked eye.”  .  .  . [Te plan] describes a fve-stage process to remove head teachers and take control of schools: “identify your schools; select a group of Salaf parents; put our own governor in; identify key staf to disrupt the school from within.”80 Uproar and investigations by various bodies ensued. In April 2014 Peter Clarke was appointed Education Commissioner for Birmingham and charged with investigating what had happened in the schools and making recommendations. Clarke concluded that a culture of fear and intimidation existed in Birmingham schools, especially the Park View Academy secondary school. Curricula of some institutions only briefy mentioned evolutionary theory and omitted study of reproduction in biology class. Tey segregated girls and boys in the classroom and during events. Te report found additional concerns about the general educational environment, arguing that the environment impaired the preparation of students for modern life and intimidated staf and students alike. How much of a plot was this? Te supposed plot has never been proved to be true. What is true is that the public schools in Birmingham had programs that responded to a growing Muslim attendance. Tose schools had had a rise in academic and disciplinary standards, which had a direct efect on exam results and employment opportunities. In the frst decade of the 2000s, in the spirit of multiculturalism, Bir-

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mingham had brought more Muslim staf into schools in Muslim-majority parts of the city. School authorities accepted and promoted regular prayer, and the Ramadan fast was kept. Even some segregation between the sexes was accepted. All this was done in the open, was not a plot, and ftted the rules of the game. But by the time of the letter, attitudes had changed. Te central concern was that these schools were spreading radical religious ideas that infringed on UK values, specifcally the status of women. Segregation of the sexes was not an issue before it started to preoccupy the media and became the focus of debates between Muslim and non-Muslim students. Te saga was an excuse for both Education Secretary Michael Gove and Prime Minister David Cameron to make a case for a common national curriculum that included women’s rights, interaction between the sexes, and respect for other views. Faced with this curriculum, Muslim parents consider sending their children to Muslim schools and demand public fnancing similar to that of other private and independent schools.81 Tey believe that, in the name of equality, the state should support Muslim private schools in the way it supports Christian schools. Tese demands present the state with a dilemma. Would Muslim schools endow values that are utterly opposed to liberal values? On the one hand, there are indications that public funding would increase state control and regulation of Islamic schools,82 so it might be in the government’s interest to fund these schools. On the other hand, public fnancing of Muslim private schools can be taken as the state supporting gender segregation and a only a minimal education on UK civic values. Islamic Denominational Schools and Schools with Muslim Majority: Withering Faith Schools?

For years, British Muslims have struggled for inclusion of their educational system in the United Kingdom’s long tradition of funding religious schools. Te Education Act of 1944 established public funding for Christian schools and created the alliance between church and state that extended the system to cover other religions such as Judaism. Te highest educational results in the United Kingdom are in Christian schools, which more than one-third of students attend.83 Te main criteria for receipt of public funds are that the institution teach the national curriculum and provide equal opportunity for both

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sexes.84 Although these criteria in themselves should not prevent singlesex schooling, UK governments have been reluctant to include Islamic schools in the same arrangement that Christian schools enjoy. Tis fed the popular Muslim perception that, despite its ofcial position of neutrality toward religions, the United Kingdom is in fact discriminatory. Parents in the Muslim community began creating private faith-based schools without state subsidies. Te number of Muslim independent schools is gradually increasing but still very low compared with other communities and religious denomination schools. According to the Department of Education and Skills, there are only about 126 Islamic schools in the United Kingdom, and only 8 are funded by the government.85 According to the Association of Muslim Schools, which represents more than 80 Islamic schools in the United Kingdom, about 3 percent of Muslim school-age children attend Muslim schools full time.86 Some of these schools provide formal training for imams and teachers in Islamic institutions. Tey teach Islamic religious education and Arabic courses in addition to the national curriculum. Te balance between religious studies and the national curriculum is determined by the schools themselves. Securing funding for these schools has been difcult, but two Islamic schools—the primary Islamia School in Barnet, North London, and the AlFurqan Primary School in Sparkhill, Birmingham—received public funding in 1998 from the minister of education, David Blunkett.87 Both schools were deemed to meet the requirements of balancing religious and national curriculum studies. Tey even added comparative religion to their curriculum. Furthermore, there are examples of well-run unregulated schools—for example, the Karimia Institute in Nottingham, which is a religious and cultural center and focuses on teaching a British Islamic culture. In all these schools, the uniform is traditional (girls wear a body-covering jilbab) but stress is placed on good interfaith relations and on honoring UK law. UK royal events are celebrated. Tese schools follow the Barelvi form of Islam, which is relatively moderate. Tis, paradoxically, makes it hard to fnd UK-educated staf because schools that follow a stricter Islam can hire graduates from more than twenty Deobandi seminaries. In contrast to the Karimia Institute in Nottingham, many nonregulated schools that have sprouted all around England are poorly run. Not only do many of them fail to meet educational standards, but several do not adhere to the national curriculum and teach unregulated or even unknown Islamic content. Several Muslim activists publicly support this divergence from the national curriculum as well as the teaching of a more conservative interpre-

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tation of Islam.88 Reports of renegade Islamic schools appear in the news at an alarming rate.89 According to a BBC report on radicalization in schools, anti-Semitic curricula were taught at some Muslim schools.90 Tis report led the Department for Education and the Ofce for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) to explore new monitoring systems for part-time schools. Te Islamic Education and Research Academy countered that the BBC’s claim was ill-informed and misguided.91 Muslims would like to avail themselves of the opportunities the UK educational system could provide. Te UK educational system praises religious education, and Muslim principals see a practical path for pursuing their ideals. Te government-promoted Academies Act 2010 represented an ideological cornerstone of the Conservative coalition’s agenda of educational reform, which aimed to increase support for religious schools. Te law encourages top schools to opt out of local government control and become independent and directly funded by the central government. Unlike faith schools, which are fnancially supported by the state and must follow a national curriculum, religious academies would be exempted from the national curriculum, specifcally regarding the teaching of creationism, sex, and reproduction.92 British in the secular population became concerned about Muslim private education under the Academies Act. Consider three independent, feecharging, single-sex schools serving girls ages eleven to eighteen: Madani Girls’ School in Tower Hamlets, East London; Jamea Al Kauthar in Lancaster; and Jameah Girls’ Academy in Leicester. All required girls as young as eleven to wear face-covering veils. At a fourth, Al Madinah in Derbyshire, contracts forced non-Muslim staf and pupils to wear the hijab and girls to sit in the back seats of classrooms.93 Some secular people raised concerns, such as that the four schools could become state-funded free schools under the law. Some of these concerns were realized when, one year after becoming a free school, the Al Madinah school was described by Ofsted inspectors as “dysfunctional,” rated inadequate in every category, and ordered to stop discriminating against female staf and pupils.94 Te debate over the Academy Act highlighted the ambivalence of the British, especially the Conservatives, toward private schools. As previously noted, religious schools are at the heart of the UK educational system. Yet, in light of what is perceived as radicalization in Muslim schools, the Conservative government claimed that Muslim schools hinder integration and create obstacles to the economic and social success of students.95 Conservatives did not want more religious schools and proposed closing them. Te

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fagship free-schools policy of Michael Gove, education secretary, came under fre. Many people object to promoting one religion over another. Indeed, a poll commissioned by the British Humanist Association shows that over two-thirds of the public is worried that the Academies Act would allow taxpayer money to promote religious interests.96 But more than attacking religious education in general, observers argue, UK secularists singled out Muslim schools in particular. Regardless of this last point, however, it is clear that the new critical spirit opens a Pandora’s box that touches not only Muslim education but other community education as well. A case in point is the Ofsted’s request to the Jewish Vishnitz Girls’ School to respect the Equality Act 2010, which makes it mandatory to educate on a range of “protected characteristics” such as homosexuality. Te Ofsted makes the point that values are comparative and that some detract from freedom of religion. Te Ofsted intervened again when Yesodey Hatorah Senior Girls’ School, a state-funded Orthodox Jewish girls’ school in North London, admitted that it censors textbooks that mention homosexuality and that give examples of women socializing with men. In this case, the Ofsted adduced in its own defense for intervening that it defends British values. Te decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom regarding the Jewish Free School, a publicly subsidized grammar school controlled by Orthodox Jews and a prestigious private school, is another example of the new tendency of the state to intervene in faith schools even when going against religious freedom. Te school was forced to accept a boy who converted to Judaism (by a Reform conversion). Te argument made in the decision of the Supreme Court was that the school had directly discriminated on grounds of the student’s ethnic origins in breach of the Race Relations Act of 1976. If the Supreme Court had ruled in the Jewish Free School’s favor, that probably would have allowed the school to exclude non-Jewish and nonpracticing Jews. Te ruling opened the path for students who are rejected at any religious school to sue the school for racial discrimination. Another proof of the state fnding discrimination is the court of appeal ruling in 2017 against the co-ed Muslim school Al-Hijrah in Birmingham, where boys and girls nine and older are strictly segregated by gender for all school activities including breaks, lunch, and educational trips. Disregarding freedom of religion, the court concluded that the school’s policy of gender segregation was discriminatory and in violation of the 2010 Equality Act. Te controversial ruling was applauded by the British Humanist Association.

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Tese rulings against Jewish and Muslim schools represent a general critical attitude toward religious schools. A growing proportion of the public is no longer willing to tolerate segregation between sexes and exemptions from the national curriculum.97 More importantly, a conviction is taking hold that extremism is associated with a Muslim pious worldview, whereas British values represent preparation for modern life and equality of the sexes. How should British Muslims, who identify with the United Kingdom but support a pious worldview, deal with a seeming strengthening of secular tendencies in the UK public sphere. Although it is true that UK authorities and Muslims might agree on the importance of an intercultural dialogue, they have quite diferent conceptions of that dialogue. Will the public sphere be a community of communities or a UK national community? In the next section, we analyze the intersection of both types of public sphere in the debate about how a British Muslim identity is being shaped and how it is mobilized. The Emerging Cosmopolitan Intellectual Islamic Elite and Labour

Te United Kingdom was home to more than 3 million Muslims in 2018, and historically, UK Muslims have the highest unemployment rate compared with other groups.98 Lower rates of educational achievement (more than onethird of adult Muslims are uneducated or lack professional qualifcations), combined with widespread unemployment, have resulted in a generally low quality of life. British Muslims of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin generally sufer the worst economic conditions among Muslims, with over 80 percent living in poverty and earning less than half the average UK wage.99 According to Eric Kaufmann, Muslims in the United Kingdom are predominantly young and have a higher fertility rate than the rest of the population, although the rate has fallen considerably since the 1970s. Tey are more devout than other groups and rarely marry outside their group, but they assimilate to national local norms of behavior.100 Rather than being contradictory, these fndings show that modernizing and accommodating a secular sphere does not preclude emphasizing the importance of their faith in their lives and the preservation of the community. More important than that, as Seán McLoughlin explains, there has been a shift from a local Muslim leadership, seeking accommodation within the host community, toward a national-level leadership articulating Muslim interests in the name of a common citizenship.101

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Te frst generation of traditional religious leadership ofered theological and legal, mystical and spiritual guidance on living as a good Muslim. A second generation, young Muslim scholars in the Deobandi tradition, such as Mahmood Chanida (in Bolton) and Ibrahim Mogra (in Leicester), combine the classical training of Al-Azhar University in Cairo with higher degrees from UK universities.102 Tis second generation of leaders began their careers as young antiracist or religious activists in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Once resources devoted to race relations and multiculturalism increased, these leaders moved into newly created, publicly funded positions within local councils. However, the central issue determining who would be the new leadership grew from antiracism to a more multicultural type of identity politics. Representation of and advocacy for community rights, especially fghting racism, became an implicit part of their job description.103 Tey became leaders of organizations such as the Union of Muslim Organizations, the Muslim Association of Britain, or the UK Action Committee on Islamic Afairs, an umbrella group of national, community, and local Islamic organizations, the MCB, and the Islamic Foundation.104 Tese organizations are multiethnic and varied in their religious interpretation and political agendas. Te most successful in terms of participating in UK social life is the MCB, which is very clear in its acceptance of democratic and pluralistic British values while promoting social participation, cooperation, and consensus and unity on Islamic issues in the United Kingdom. Tree years after its formation, the MCB became the most powerful Muslim organization in the United Kingdom, with more than 350 associated groups, mosques, schools, and professional bodies.105 Te MCB’s interaction with the Commission of Racial Equality, Greater London Authority, London Civic Forum, Islamophobia Commission, the Prince’s Trust, National Association against Racism, and other organizations demonstrates its steady advancement in civil society. Muslims associated with the MCB are increasingly recognized and honored for their participation in civil society. For example, Manazir Ahsan of the Islamic Foundation and Bashir Maan, Lord Provost of Glasgow, have been honored by the Queen. Together with Christians and Jews, the MCB has lobbied on moral issues.106 Participation in the World Congress of Faiths and in a dialogue between the Anglican Church and Islam’s greatest university, Al-Azhar in Cairo, has also increased the MCB’s national prestige. Even during conficts with the government over international policy, the MCB has emphasized public reason and participation in civil soci-

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ety. Its broad reach and difuse attention turns every issue into a Muslim issue.107 Tis is the approach often adopted by reformist Islam movements; it not only encourages adaptation to the modern world but also equips Muslims with the theoretical tools necessary to compete in the Western world.108 Te Islamic Foundation (IF) in Leicester, home of reformist Islamist intellectual activism in the United Kingdom,109 goes further and strives to promote a worldwide da’wa (conversion). Khurshid Ahmad, the founder of IF, emphasized the importance of dialogue with the West over rejection. While remaining critical of Western separation of the secular and the sacred, as well as of neocolonialism, Ahmad pioneered Muslim interfaith work. Today the IF focuses on research, publication, education, and training, especially in Muslim economics. Since its inception, the foundation has promoted academic research and intellectual rigor along with spiritual refection.110 Both Muslims and non-Muslims constitute its target audience. Te success of this organization is remarked by a Home Ofce report, “Community Cohesion” (2001), which demonstrates that IF courses promoted understanding in intercultural change.111 Similarly, Al-Mansoor, a group run by Pakistani Muslim women in Manchester, constitutes a case study of how action, initially motivated by a feeling of transnational diasporic activism in relation to events in Bosnia, created an impetus for civic action. Tese are clear examples of Islamic activism directed at the heart of the public sphere rather than limited to the internal politics of ghettoization. At the level of party politics, the great majority of Muslim communitarian activists support Labour. Indeed, until the end of the twentieth century the feeling of both socioeconomic and religious discrimination made the Muslim community prone to support Labour in national and local elections. Even after Labour endorsed George W. Bush’s war in Iraq, Muslims still voted Labour. In the 2005 general elections, four Muslim Labour candidates were voted into Parliament: Sadiq Khan (who later became mayor of London), Shahid Malik, Sarvar Mohammad, and Halid Mahmood. However, that relationship soon deteriorated. Labour’s support of the war in Iraq created a gap between the party and the Muslim community that became difcult to bridge, despite Labour having improved the social and economic conditions of the Muslim population in neighborhoods.112 Tis confict between Labour leadership and the Muslim community has worked in favor of George Galloway. Expelled from the Labour Party because of his denunciation of the war in Iraq and his criticism of Tony Blair, Galloway founded the Respect Party. Te victory of Galloway’s

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Respect Party in the Bradford West by-election of March 2012 could be described as a protest vote and a rejection of mainstream politics in general.113 Galloway beating Imran Hussain, a local Pakistani Labour apparatchik, in the Bradford West by-election may indicate that the politics of ethnicity or religion can be transcended in the name of interest politics. Muslims perceived Galloway as representing their ethno-religious interests better than Hussain.114 His victory forecasts a new left outside the mainstream that exploits the alienation of Muslim communities to cultivate constituencies for themselves.115 What is unclear is whether Muslims joining a nonmainstream left would stop the ongoing delegitimation of Muslim political mobilization, usually understood in the United Kingdom in particular and in Europe in general as radicalization. Radicals and Terrorists: Engage the Community? Engage the Radicals?

UK endorsement of Bush’s war on terrorism set the stage for the disarray in the relationships between Labour and the Muslim community and the UK state and its Muslims. If these relationships in the past had been difcult but still workable, the war in Iraq and the upsurge of terrorism, launched by British-born terrorists in their own country, contaminated the debate on multiculturalism and integration. Several questions worried the UK state and its security services. How does a young British-born Muslim become a terrorist? What sociological profle describes it, and what role do extremist ideas have in radicalization? What is the defnition of extremist ideas, and what distinguishes the legitimate right to hold extremist ideas from the process leading to violent action? Is a person who understands the motives of Islamic terrorism against the West undergoing radicalization? Results from polls of British Muslims worried the UK political establishment. At the institutional level, UK Islamic organizations, similar to U.S. Islamic organizations, condemned major terrorist attacks in the West. Te Islamic Society of Britain, the MCB, and the London Central Mosque unequivocally condemned them and called for distinctions between Islam and radicalism.116 At the social level, opinions regarding terrorism as a legitimate response to what is perceived as Western grievances against Islam are much more ambivalent. In answer to a question from the Pew Research Center in 2006

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on whether suicide attacks were a legitimate political tool, 14 percent of UK Muslims believed that Islamic terrorism is justifed. British Muslims, more than Muslims in any other country in Europe, believe conspiracy theories about the 9/11 attacks.117 A 2018 Ipsos MORI survey claims that two in fve (38 percent) think that Islamic terrorism in the West responds to Western foreign policy such as the invasion of Iraq. Still, most (71 percent) say they have no sympathy for young Muslims who leave the United Kingdom to join fghters in Syria, although one in twenty (5 percent) say they have “a lot of sympathy.” Regarding participation of the Muslim community in the struggle against terrorism, three-quarters of the public (75 percent) agree that Muslim communities need to do more in response to the threat of Islamic extremism, compared with only one in twenty (5 percent) who disagree.118 Another survey, by ComRes for the BBC Today program, claims that nine in ten Muslims (93 percent) agree that “Muslims in Britain should always obey British laws,” but 24 percent sympathize with violence organized by groups to protect their own religion. According to the poll, 43 percent “completely condemn it.”119 Tese fndings are not much diferent from those of a problematic and criticized Islamic Cultural Center survey. While only 4 percent sympathize with people who commit terrorist acts as a form of political protest, still 32 percent refuse to condemn those who take part in violence against those who mock the Prophet, and only 34 percent would inform the police if they thought somebody they knew was involved with people who support terrorism in Syria.120 Tus, for some UK Muslims, although terrorism is bad in itself, it should be considered a symptom of an underlying illness created by the West’s Middle East policy. Perceptions of the double standards in UK and American foreign policy toward the Middle East have been critical to the development of this tension.121 Even well-integrated Muslims considered Blair’s denial of any connection between the London attacks and the United Kingdom’s role in Iraq to be illogical.122 Tese fndings, although showing frustration about UK policies, still cannot explain why a young British Muslim becomes radicalized and whether the radicalized person is integrated or alienated. Justin Gest, in his anthropological work in Hamlet Towers, East London, has analyzed the alienation, social frustration, and “apartist” behavior of young Muslims.123 Although the research does not aim to explain radicalization, it gives us insight into the social behavior of alienated youngsters who could be targeted by Islamic movements. British Bangladeshi men in

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Hamlet Towers, explains Gest, might be politically active at mosques, or they might join antiestablishment Islamist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir.124 Tese young Muslims reject not only UK nationality, cultural norms, and values but also the fundamental components of Bangladeshi heritage and local Islam. Tey promote only a singular purist and revisionist identity.125 We may be tempted to attribute these youngsters’ frustration and apartist behavior to poverty and unemployment. But several observers cast doubt on the relationship between poverty, alienation, and terrorism. According to Hamid Nafees, radicalization is not due to poverty, and combining Islam and marginalization as risk factors does not get us far, because only a fraction of a percentage of marginalized Muslims join jihadist groups.126 Most young Muslims who become radicalized and engage in terrorist violence are integrated, educated, and even from middle-class families. Indeed, “one of the more striking aspects of radical Islamism in the West is the degree to which its proponents are often ensconced within the majority culture prior to their radicalization.”127 Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh was born to a well-of UK family of Pakistani descent and educated in the United Kingdom’s best schools, including the London School of Economics. He later spent time in a jihadist camp in Pakistan and then kidnapped British and American tourists in Indian Kashmir in 1994. Similarly, Jihadi John (Mohammed Emwazi) was a Kuwaiti-born Muslim and naturalized UK citizen from London and a graduate in computer science from the University of Westminster. Michael Adebolajo, one of the murderers of fusilier Lee Rigby in Woolwich in 2013, is of Nigerian descent and converted to Islam. He attended Marshall Parks school and studied sociology at the University of Greenwich, where he met Michael Adebowale, his partner in the murder. Adebowale and Adebolajo shared anger against the UK role in the Iraq War and even participated in activities with Al-Muhajiroun, a militant UK-based Salaf jihadist network. Teir alienation did not stem from economic scarcity. Tese are just a few examples of educated, middle-class young people who dismantle the links between lower-class, nonintegrated youngsters and terrorism. Te question of the Islamic factor remains. Kenan Malik claims that a 1960s radical was secularist and “challenged the power of the mosques.”128 Tat generation expressed its anger and disafection against the daily racist bashing of Pakistani youngsters in London streets. Malik explains, “I felt real fury at a society that would not embrace me as an equal, legitimate citizen. However, my fury towards Britain was not expressed through the prism of being ‘Muslim’ . . . few adopted ‘Muslim’ as a public identity.

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We thought of ourselves as ‘Asian’ or ‘black,’ but these were political, not ethnic or cultural, labels.”129 Islam is today perceived as connected to radicalization and Islamism. As Maajid Nawaz remarks, “Te leap from being an ordinary UK teenager to joining the Islamic State is huge. But it is a much smaller step for someone raised in a climate in which dreams of resurrecting a caliphate and enforcing a distorted form of Islam are normalized.”130 Te movements Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun, alongside groups like Al-Ghurabaa (the Strangers) and Islam4UK (proscribed by the government under the UK Terrorism Act of 2000), aim to revive the umma and liberate Muslims who live under kufr (systems of unbelief in Muslim or non-Muslim countries) by reestablishing the caliphate and Islamic state rule by sharia. By creating a transnational community to supplant the problematic local one, the umma facilitates claims to collective pride and loyalty, but also injury.131 Although they do not necessarily directly support terrorism, they understand its motives and accept it as a path of resistance. For example, Islam4UK describes itself as having been established to propagate the supreme Islamic ideology and sharia in the United Kingdom as an alternative to manmade law.132 Now a reformist activist group, Islam4UK is indeed far from radicalism and terrorism. Nonetheless, it is a challenger in the sense that it shifted the debate to the broader context of Islamic altruism, antiracism, and anti-Islamophobia.133 Some see a direct connection between jihadist ideology and terrorism, fostered by the loose policy of tolerance toward jihadist groups. Marc Sageman, for example, adopts a weak-structuralist approach, arguing that “social bonds play a more important role in the emergence of global Salaf Jihad than ideology.”134 Again, the question is how this happens and who allows it. Jihadist recruits tend to be indoctrinated after joining networks such as those in London, which became a European center of Islamic jihad because of tolerant laws that made it a sanctuary for mujahideen.135 Events confrming this thesis can be traced as far back as the 1980s, when Khaled al-Fawwaz came to London as Osama bin Laden’s representative. In 1994 a major international conference promoting the caliphate was held in London, gathering radical clerics from around the world. Most of its proceedings related to what the caliphate is and whether its existence is obligated by Islam.136 UK security services did not consider the conference a threat to public security. In the late 1990s, the UK Security Service, MI5, regarded Abu Hamza al-Masri, the imam of Finsbury Park Mosque, as “a harmless clown.”137

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In their judgment, Abu Hamza’s vitriolic views about Jews and infdels were ofensive but not a threat to UK security. Te United Kingdom underestimated extremist threats in other instances. London mayor Ken Livingstone made an attention-seeking decision to welcome Arabic-speaking ideologues, such as Abu Qatada al-Filastini (an Islamist activist suspected to be involved with Al-Qaeda), Abu Musab al-Suri (an Al-Qaeda activist who criticized bin Laden for the way he set up and ran Al-Qaeda), and Omar Bakri (leader of the North London Islamic group Al-Muhajiroun until it was disbanded in 2004).138 Emwazi and Adebolajo were on the radar of MI5 and were a recruitment target for the MI5. Khuram Butt, one of the attackers in the 2017 London bridge stabbing, was reported to the antiterror hotline in 2015 as an associate of Anjem Choudary and a follower of his banned group Al-Muhajiroun. He even starred in a documentary flm, Te Jihadis Next Door. Tis raises the question of the relationship between the UK Security Service and radical groups. As claimed by Mark Curtis, UK policy has been to collaborate with Islamist extremists as a matter of ad hoc opportunism. UK security services had been allegedly successful in thwarting several terrorist attacks with the help of informants. A short documentary, Muslim First, British Second, from the BBC broadcast in 2009 reveals that UK authorities tolerated and in many cases supported extremist organizations that opposed violence inside the United Kingdom.139 Tat is why the security services have generally said that radicals are not the target, and treating them as targets will be compromise public security.140 However, UK civil society, especially Tory voters, increasingly believes that the state should not distinguish between terrorists and radicals. A 2009 report issued by the independent think tank Policy Exchange gave expression to the new tone, rejecting co-optation of radicals in favor of expelling them from the United Kingdom if possible.141 Te United Kingdom’s decision to extradite fve Muslims (after the European Court of Human Rights declined their appeal against extradition) to the United States, where they are expected to stand trial on terrorism charges, is evidence of this tough stance. Deportation of Abu Qatada to Jordan was blocked “because he risks facing a trial [there] based on torture-tainted evidence.”142 Te real problem is that the United Kingdom does not want to try him because too much embarrassing information about MI5 and the Met police would come out in court. David Cameron’s government even foated the possibility of pulling out of the European Convention on Human Rights to avoid the possibility of trying him in the

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United Kingdom. Cameron dismissed human rights and the convention when he said, “It’s not just the European Union that needs sorting out— it’s the European Court of Human Rights.” When that court’s charter was written, in the aftermath of World War II, it set out the basic rights we should respect. “But since then,” Cameron said, “interpretations of that charter have led to a whole lot of things that are frankly wrong.”143 Te popular approval of this new mood is why the Counterterror and Extremism Bill, proposed by Home Secretary Teresa May of the Conservative Party and supported by Labour, was issued. Tis bill aimed to limit and even ban the activities of radical preachers, such as Anjem Choudary (an example of an extremist whose rhetoric was not considered a crime), and of groups that could not be outlawed under terrorism laws. Although the proposed bill did not provide a legally acceptable defnition of extremism and failed, its attempted passage showed that a change of attitude toward the challenge of Islam was cemented. Another step in that direction occurred when Teresa May, who became prime minister, took the unusual step of calling for a review of MI5 counterterrorism operations in her controversial speech “Enough Is Enough” after another terrorist attack, shortly before the 2017 elections. Te prime minister’s speech deepened the debate on UK human rights policies and on whether the security services are infuenced by multicultural thinking and the desire not to be portrayed as racist. Te speech marked the arrival of the time when not only terrorism but also “legitimate radicalism” would be criminalized. In 2016 the UK government had been ready to acknowledge that the “the vast majority of political Islamists are not engaged in violence” and therefore should be respected; now, Conservatives believed that radicalism should no longer be legitimated.144 What is radicalism? Are radicals religious Muslims, even those who do not support terrorism? Are those who do not collaborate with the state in its war against radicalism and terrorism betraying the nation? Is Muslim leadership afected by being portrayed as suspicious? Muslim Piety against Radicalism or Pietism as Radicalism?

Te discourse of reformist European- or British-Islam is emerging as a powerful response to radical Islam. Scholars like John Esposito argue that movements of Islamic revival can promote as well as militate against political participation by drawing on the “democratic resources” of the Islamic tradition.

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Muslims can radicalize politics in the name of Islamic sources. However, with the same zeal they can be part of a democratic process if it fts Islamic interests. “‘Political Islam’ is sometimes a program for religious democracy and not primarily an agenda for holy war or terrorism.”145 Along the same lines, Robert Lambert maintains that an alienated young Muslim recruited by an Al-Qaeda strategist is more likely to become a suicide bomber than his twin brother who is recruited by Hizb ut-Tahrir.146 Although critical of democracy, this strand of Muslim political thought still fnds channels for participation in informal or nongovernment groups that complement the civic eforts of the government. Tus, a legitimation of Hizb ut-Tahrir may play a role in the struggle against Al-Qaeda terrorism.147 Immediately after the September 11 attacks, Tony Blair, like George Bush, attempted to distinguish between the war on terrorism and the Islamic faith. In 2001, he stated that the campaign against terrorism should not be seen as “a struggle of Western countries versus Islam.”148 Other governmental ofcials warned racists against targeting Muslims.149 Te UK Labour government believed that it should engage the Muslim community in order to fght radicals and terrorists. Tis did not change even after the July 2005 terrorist attacks in London, when Blair announced that a tougher stance against individuals who encourage terrorism would be taken. At the same time that Blair made his announcement, the Labour government consulted with the Muslim community to work out recommendations for joint initiatives. One important initiative was the establishment of the Mosques and Imams’ National Advisory Board to reform Islamic teaching. Another initiative led to the creation of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights, which was created to fll a gap in race relations legislation by recognizing religious afliation as part of the defnition of an ethnic group. Its annual budget of £70 million made the commission Europe’s largest human rights body. However, the government rejected Muslims’ demands for an independent public inquiry into the events of July 2005. Tis refusal came on the heels of what Muslims viewed as Labour’s capitulation to unpopular U.S. foreign policies. Such inconsistency from the government has done little to abate the growing tide of mutual mistrust. Regardless of Muslims’ complaints, the UK government adopted what it perceived as the best strategy to tackle radicalism. It passed the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, which supplanted part 4 of the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act of 2001. Te Terrorism Bill contained measures designed to fght terrorism through intelligence gathering, with the assistance of the courts. It

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introduced new ofenses, such as acts preparatory to terrorism, terrorist training, and indirect incitement. Since then, a twelve-point plan has been elaborated that includes banning groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and its successor Al-Muhajiroun, Al-Ghurabaa, and Islam4UK. It outlawed the glorifcation of terrorism and authorized the government to close places of worship and to deport foreign nationals who foster hatred. Furthermore, Blair expressed a willingness to amend the Human Rights Act. Tis was followed by the Prevent Strategy during Gordon Brown’s administration. Te program, which at its origins had been supported by moderate British Muslim organizations, encourages local town councils to embrace Muslim organizations that counter radical activity. It was assumed that the arguments of violent extremists, which rely on creating a “them” and an “us,” are less likely to fnd traction in a cohesive society.150 Although what is meant by a cohesive society is unclear, some ideas appear in the incentives created by various programs adopted by UK government. Under the Prevent Strategy, the government fnancially supports organizations such as the London-based Quilliam Foundation, which is composed of former members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir organization. Tis group is the only deradicalization group in the United Kingdom run by former radicals and may be the only one of its kind in all Europe. Quilliam practices cult prevention. It trains police, parents, and teachers in methods to refute the rhetoric of radicals. Te foundation sends reformed members to schools and mosques to spread a message of tolerance and help imams counter radicalism among their congregants.151 Te Quilliam organization was broadly accepted; however, many critics thought that the government, in its eforts to combat terrorism, had gone too far in cooperating with Muslims who are far from liberal democracy in their position. Te Muslim community also accuses, but from a diferent perspective, Muslim collaborationists of helping the state to stigmatize the community. Ashfaq Siddique, a guiding spirit of the Al-Madina Mosque in the East London neighborhood of Barking, is a case in point. He is a former policeman of Scotland Yard and he now contributes to the Prevent program by reminding worshipers that it is a religious duty to report signs of radicalism to authorities. His actions are in confict with the community that accused the Prevent program of targeting them for domestic surveillance.152 Following the terrorist attacks in Manchester and on London Bridge in June 2017, Prime Minister Teresa May, facing elections, advanced a four-point plan to track and control terror suspects in the United Kingdom. Te plan restores some of the more restrictive measures introduced

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in 2005 to tag nonconvicted terrorists and require them to report to the police. Te plan implements new measures to make it easier to deport foreign terror suspects to their countries, and new legislation was proposed that gives more power to security services to track the digital life of suspects after issuance by the Home secretary of a warrant backed by judicial oversight.153 Teresa May was responding to public pressure, in contrast to her tenure as Home secretary, when she was criticized for not implementing many of her ideas on combating terrorism. Undoubtedly, the fght against radicalism permeated the campaign for British values with a new spirit of urgency, and the links between the antiterrorism campaign and the civic integration campaign deserve attention. The Debate on Identity and Cultural Toleration

Timothy Garton Ash writes, I have always thought that the very undemanding vagueness  .  .  . of Britishness was an advantage when it comes to making immigrants and their descendants feel at home here. After all, what have you traditionally required in order to be British? An ability to talk about the weather at inordinate length. . . . Te very idea of talking about ourselves as “citizens” has seemed to the British vaguely pretentious and foreign, more specifcally French—and therefore bad. But perhaps a more demanding civic-national identity, like that of the French Republic, has its advantages after all, giving a stronger sense of identity and belonging.154 Two political events seem particularly emblematic of the question of identity and cultural toleration: (1) the political and intellectual response to the publication of Te Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie in the late 1980s, and (2) the debate on sharia begun by the archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams. Te Rushdie afair and the sharia debate illuminate not only UK liberal values but also national identity. Te Rushdie afair was a seemingly trivial dispute that opened a Pandora’s box of fundamental issues.155 Tis was the frst event in which a Muslim political agenda manifested itself on British consciousness. Muslims did not seek support from other minorities, though they did seek the assistance of the UK establishment (publishers, the political class, the politicians, the law courts). As Tariq

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Modood notes, the Rushdie afair “shifted the focus of minority-majority relations from the Atlantic to ‘the orient’ and marked the beginning of the internationalisation of British minority-majority relations on a scale never achieved through pan-black or ‘global-south’ solidarities.”156 Under the guidance of Bhikhu Parekh, a former deputy chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality, a distinguished group of academic and public fgures gathered to consider the implications of the afair.157 One of the most notable participants was Shabbir Akhtar, who produced the frst book by a Muslim on the Rushdie afair. Akhtar’s central thesis is that the West’s response was a modern liberal inquisition. Tat is, the Rushdie afair was not a local debate but rather a battle between Western secularism and Islam. Akhtar argues that the key to the West’s response lies in its outrage at Muslims’ defance of Western cultural imperialism,158 in which he includes not only liberals but also third-world socialists. Te reason is that socialists are more secularly oriented and endorse a concept of revolution that leaves no room for cultural resistance, especially Islamic resistance. Teir radicalism, according to Akhtar, is insincere. To combat it, Akhtar endorses the political character of Islam and the promotion of religion within the public sphere. Akhtar ultimately rejected Khomeini’s fatwa, not because of its immorality but because it turned what he believed should have been a discussion on cultural recognition into a personal vendetta against Rushdie.159 In the best-case scenario, cultural confict may lead to accommodation of diferent cultural views—not violent confrontation.160 Since respect for the cultural and religious identity of individuals is essential for individual development, some argue that attacking beliefs is akin to assaulting them. Te logical extension of this argument is that the law of blasphemy includes Muslims. Liberals who hold these beliefs prioritize freedom of religion over freedom of speech.161 Te question, however, is whether the British fear a clash between freedom of religion and freedom of speech or whether they fear a clash between Islam and freedom of speech. Keith Ward, an ordained priest in the Church of England and Regius Professor of Divinity at the University of Oxford, reminds us that, in contrast with Islam, Christianity does not have a concept of treason to the community of faithful.162 At one time, the purpose of the common law of blasphemy was to uphold the truth of Christianity. Blasphemy against Christianity and against the Church of England in particular was sedition. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the interpretation of the law shifted from defending the truth of Christian-

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ity itself to protecting Christians from ofensive treatment. Following this shift, Christian beliefs could be attacked, and the blasphemy law would not apply.163 In general, Muslims are not inclined to accept the new interpretation of the law and its political role. Again, Shabbir Akhtar frames the debate in terms of its political implications. He believes constant blasphemy against the Christian faith has undermined it, and Muslims should not accept blasphemy against Islam to avoid the same experience.164 Liberals have three main responses to these claims. First, they argue that it is intellectually dishonest to compare Rushdie’s book with Mein Kampf.165 Second, freedom of religion is not afected by Te Satanic Verses. Tat is, Rushdie’s book does not prevent Muslims from practicing their faith. Finally, as Professor Albert Weale adds, in a society characterized by diverse beliefs, legal restrictions must be justifed by reference to a common ground that everyone can share.166 For Muslims like Akhtar, this argument is a sign of liberal fundamentalism—its own form of intolerance. Akhtar himself proposes that religious sensibilities may be legitimately protected via legislation prohibiting attacks on beliefs when such attacks may cause public disorder.167 Although most Muslims in the United Kingdom rejected Khomeini’s fatwa sentencing Rushdie to death, a widespread conviction remained that they should not abandon legitimate protest. Tey also felt that the Western concept of cultural tolerance was incomplete. Experts on minority rights seem to agree that the Rushdie controversy represented an attempt by Muslims, notably British Muslims, to obtain the legal capacity to limit the freedom of its members in order to preserve its traditional religious practices. For example, Charles Taylor, generally a proponent of minority rights, rejects the call to ban Te Satanic Verses. In his opinion, several founding freedoms (among these, the right to life, freedom of speech, freedom of religion) cannot be jeopardized in the name of protecting cultural minorities.168 Michael Walzer also defends Rushdie, arguing that immigrants’ cultural rights should be preserved, but arrival in a liberal society amounts to tacit acceptance of the liberal society’s basic philosophical mores, especially concerning freedom of expression.169 Liberal society sees cultural membership as an instrument to promote individual choice, not as a means to achieve shared ends. Muslims were not interested in protecting their culture in the context of choice and did not care that the ability to write and publish a book like Te Satanic Verses was instrumental to the development of individual

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autonomy. Instead, they were concerned with protecting the particular character of Islam by redefning the appropriate boundaries of legitimate free expression. Teir arguments were linked to an interpretation of Islam that is fundamentally constitutive in its own cultural identity. When seen in this light, issues of “internal restrictions” versus “external protections” or “apostasy” versus “blasphemy” become moot.170 At the very beginning of the confict, the UK Action Committee on Islamic Afairs described the ofense sufered by Muslims as apostasy. Realizing that this generated little sympathy among the political class, it soon switched to the more British term blasphemy. When this also failed to rally support, the committee spoke of “incitement to religious hatred,” echoing legislation for Northern Ireland over incitement to racial hatred in the United Kingdom.171 As Bhikhu Parekh notes, what is at stake is the sense of self-respect and integrity of Muslims.172 Or as Pir Mahroof Hussain succinctly put it, “Te laws of this country were made before the Muslim peoples arrived. . . . Now they [the laws] must adapt to us.”173 However, Muslims have failed to persuade the courts to interpret the existing statute on blasphemy to include ofenses beyond those committed against Christian beliefs. Tere have been some improvements, such as the condemnation of incitement to religious hatred, which has existed in Northern Ireland for many years. In a 2004 speech, the Queen condemned religious hatred. After this speech, a new approach toward religion was accepted. Anti-Muslim literature has been reduced and is treated in the way that anti-Jewish literature has been treated for decades. Nevertheless, there is little support for legislation. Te general feeling among comedians, intellectuals, and secularists of all sorts is that the right to engage in satire and criticism of religion should be preserved.174 A signifcant intervention occurred when the government fnally amended the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act to abolish the blasphemy laws altogether, which undermined the predisposition toward Muslim requests. Interestingly, the move to abolish the blasphemy laws occurred in November 2007 when the UK government protested Sudan’s arrest of a British-national schoolteacher accused of insulting Islam by letting her students name a class teddy bear “Muhammad.” After Gordon Brown formally protested, the view on religious laws changed. Te question, indeed, was not Sudan’s but the United Kingdom’s laws against blasphemy. Te House of Lords voted to abolish the laws altogether. Muslims were suspicious of this. In principle, they preferred to be included in and protected by the blasphemy law rather than see it abolished. UK conserva-

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tives opposed the repeal on the grounds that UK national multiculturalism rested on Christian values as the foundation for law and society. As Detta O’Cathain, a Conservative member of the House of Lords remarked, “As long as there has been a country called England, it has been a Christian country, publicly acknowledging the one true God.”175 Te Church of England responded with ambivalence: “Having signaled for more than 20 years that the blasphemy laws could, in the right context, be abolished, the church is not going to oppose abolition now, provided we can be assured that provisions are in place to aford the necessary protection to individuals and to society.”176 Secularists correctly understand that it will be impossible to restrict the blasphemy laws only to Christians. Secularists believe that the idea of a Christian multicultural nation needs to be transformed either along the American model of complete separation of church from state or (even better) into one in which secular ideology dominates the public sphere. As we demonstrate in the next section, these common feelings and actions are at the heart of the rejection of Rowan Williams’s initiative to include sharia in UK law, an initiative that provoked animosity among secularists and Christians alike. One Law for All or One Law per God?

Te archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, advocated the adoption of parts of sharia law in the United Kingdom. Although there was a silent acceptance of some type of sharia court, the “non-silent” intervention of Williams introduced a new dimension. He was motivated by a desire to support the right of faiths to run their own afairs and regulate the lives of their adherents. Critics contend that he is motivated by a desire to protect Anglican religious prerogatives against secularism. Further, the claim is probably shaped by Anglicanism’s disintegration, as noted by the American bishop Robert Duncan of Pittsburgh.177 In every democratic country, even secular ones, political authorities often must cope with the social reality of religious beliefs. All societies face dilemmas when believers demand to live according to their own laws and request (and often receive) exceptions to the governing laws. For example, Sikhs in British Columbia can ride motorcycles without helmets. Jews and Muslims slaughter animals in ways that others might consider cruel. Catholic doctors refuse to perform abortions or euthanasia. Apart from exceptions to existing laws, some reli-

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gious communities have established bodies that work very much like, and may be called, courts and enforce ancient rules that can be called laws. At the social and legal levels, we are witnessing the creation of a hybrid legal system. David Pearl and Werner Menski call this hybridization “angrezi shariat” (English sharia), or an English law that is the ofcial law in the United Kingdom with Muslim law as unofcial law.178 Examples of this hybridization are the systems of sharia-compliant lending—a quintessentially capitalist answer to an underserved (or unserved) market. Te MCB has stated that “British Muslims would wish to seek parity with other faiths, in particular the followers of the Jewish faith in the United Kingdom, in facilitating choices for those who wish, as Muslims, for their personal relationships to be governed by a Sharia civil code.”179 Advocates of the proposal make a compelling argument; after all, if Jews in the United Kingdom have such rights, on what grounds can they be denied to British Muslims? However, in the United Kingdom, the Jewish Beth Din courts adhere to the rule of the 1996 Arbitration Act, which sets forth general baseline parameters for binding extrajudicial arbitration. As an arbitration tribunal, the Beth Din is not recognized as a substitute legal court. Some Muslim sharia councils, however, are ambivalent regarding the recognition of the act because it symbolizes for them the state involvement in what they consider to be matters of religion.180 Islamic scholars have demanded that the UK Parliament create formal linkages between law courts and Islamic sharia councils; as of 2020 these councils have no binding legal authority. Still, opinions are divided on whether the state recognizes sharia courts. John Bowen argues that nowhere in Europe or North America is the legal system closer to recognizing Islamic judgments than in the United Kingdom.181 In September 2008, the London Times announced that Islamic law had been ofcially adopted in the United Kingdom, with sharia courts granted the power to rule on Muslim civil cases.182 Tis claim is corroborated by Erik Bleich, who notes sharia courts passing binding judgments beginning in 2007, signaling to Muslims that they are protected on a par with analogous groups.183 In March 2014, similar headlines declaring sharia law appeared after the Law Society of England and Wales issued guidelines for lawyers interested in forming wills in accordance with sharia heritage laws.184 Te nonproft organization Southall Black Sisters (created to defend the needs of black Asian and African Caribbean women) denounced the “increasing privatisation of justice and state adoption of a ‘faith based’ approach to

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address minority issues” as the wrong way. It has allowed fundamentalists and moderates alike to use “the vacuum created to infuence and shape law and social policy by reference to a regressive religious identity.”185 As noted by Sheikh Faiz-ul-Aqtab Siddiqi, who runs the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, despite some sharia courts not accepting the Arbitration Act of 1996, there is still much room for action within the frame of the law, because the Arbitration Act allows alternative dispute resolution, which for Muslims is what the sharia courts are for. He notes, “Because we follow the same process as any case of arbitration, our decisions are binding in English law. Unless our decisions are unreasonable, they are recognised by the High Court.” According to Mohammed Shafq, director of the Ramadhan Foundation, Muslims are not advocating to change UK law. Muslim women want to marry according to sharia law, but a divorcing couple can access the British legal system in questions related to maintenance, custody, or dividing assets.186 According to this interpretation of the law, rulings issued by a network of sharia courts in London, Birmingham, Bradford, and Manchester are enforceable with the full power of the judicial system through county courts or the High Court of Justice. However, it is not clear what the legal competences of the sharia courts are. Te UK Lawyers’ Secular Society, for example, afrms that sharia law courts have not been granted legal status especially regarding family law matters. Tis feld of law, they argue, cannot be the subject of contractually binding agreements. Tis point was confrmed by the minister of justice, Jack Straw, speaking to Parliament on November 24, 2008, when he said that arbitration is not a system of dispute resolution that can be used in family law cases. Terefore, no draft consent orders embodying the terms of an agreement reached by the use of a sharia council have been enforced within the meaning of the 1996 Arbitration Act in matrimonial proceedings.187 Diferent interpretations have resulted because the Arbitration Act distinguishes between mediation (a mediation decision cannot be imposed) and arbitration (a ruling through civil courts can enforce arbitration). Muslim courts are arbitrators. Because of confusion about the authority of such tribunals, as well as the Muslim community’s internal pressure to follow tribunal advice and rulings, UK sharia councils have potential power over certain individuals in the community. Even though rulings might not track British values or even laws, decisions are rarely contested in civil court because of internal pressure on the individual. One could argue that this arrangement compromises freedom and the concept of UK law.

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Such concerns had been on the mind of Rowan Williams. In 2008 a speech to the Royal Courts of Justice in London, Williams argued for a “plural jurisdiction” that would allow Muslims to choose to resolve disputes in either secular or sharia court. He called for a “constructive accommodation” in marriage disputes.188 Tis new measure, he claimed, would prohibit Muslims from having to choose between “the stark alternatives of cultural loyalty or state loyalty.”189 Te publicity from Williams’s intervention triggered the beginning of resistance to sharia courts. Williams was fercely attacked by the government, his own church, and other religions. A spokesman for the prime minister declared that UK law must be based on British values: “Sharia law cannot be used as a justifcation for committing breaches of English law, nor should the principles of Sharia be included in a civil court for resolving contractual disputes.” Te bishop of Rochester, Michael Nazir-Ali, who adheres to a school of thought that excludes Islam from democracy, expressed his disapproval: “English law is rooted in the Judaeo-Christian tradition and, in particular, our notions of human freedoms derive from that tradition” and are more than clear in this respect.190 Te central argument is that the gender-biased discrimination implicit in the sharia ruling is incompatible with UK law. Even if women consent to trial by sharia, they still are potentially denied justice by sharia rulings.191 For example, the United Kingdom (unlike France) allows people to bequeath their property to anybody they choose. If they choose to make a will on Islamic principles, that will should be interpreted, formally speaking, as a free exercise of this entitlement. A person who grows up deep inside a traditional Muslim subculture may feel overwhelming pressure to accept the adjudication of family afairs on Islamic principles. Several aspects of Islamic family law (for example, women receive half the inheritance amount that men do, and it is much easier for a man to initiate divorce) are intrinsically discriminatory; the problem lies in the rules, not in their unfair application.192 Te reactions among the Muslim community to Williams’s argument were a mix of fear, satisfaction, and doubt. Despite growing religious identifcation and cultural assertiveness, some in the new generation of European Muslims question the necessity and beneft of increasing the power of the sharia courts. Khalid Mahmood, a Muslim Labour parliamentarian, and Sheikh Ibrahim Mogra, a Leicester imam and expert in interfaith issues for the MCB, among others, opposed introducing sharia as a parallel system of law. Khalid Mahmood rejects that UK law forces Muslims to choose between their religion and their society.

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He said, “Tis will alienate people from other communities because they will think it is what Muslims want—and it is not.”193 An interesting view was advanced by Asim Siddiqui, the chairman and a founding trustee of the City Circle, a network of young British Muslim professionals established in 1999. In an article defending Williams, Siddiqui reminds us that “the UK is already amending its fnance laws to allow sharia-compliant products such as halal mortgages and Islamic bonds. Why? In part, to attract the billions of petrodollars foating in the cash-rich Gulf. Tat’s a law driven by the commercial global realities to keep London as a premier fnancial capital.”194 Regarding family law, Siddiqui adds that it is perfectly fne for consenting Muslim adults to resolve their disputes according to Islamic law. However, Siddiqui believes that wherever English law and Islamic law difer, Islamic law must give way under the important principle that we are all equal before one law. Without question legalization of sharia courts for family issues may resolve certain problems. A concern for some Muslims is that not all the Muslim marriage ceremonies (nikah) performed in the United Kingdom are registered under the Marriage Act.195 Unregistered wedding ceremonies are illegal under section 75(2)(ii) of the Marriage Act. Te consequence of these Muslim marriages not being registered is that the wife is, then, by law merely a cohabitant with few property rights.196 In those circumstances, a sharia tribunal may provide a woman with the only route she has to get justice from her unofcial husband, but the tribunal can exert only moral, not legal, pressure on him. Unregistered marriages appear to be a problem unique to the Muslim community. Sikh temples have willingly registered under the Marriage Act so as to ensure that their marriage ceremonies are legally valid. Similarly, rabbis, Catholic priests, and other religious ofcials all insist either that a marriage be legally registered at the time of the religious ceremony or that a civil marriage certifcate be produced before any religious ceremony can go ahead. Should the British accept religious exemptions or instead demand that Muslims comply with the Marriage Act? Although the frst strategy might be pragmatically compelling, as indirectly suggested by Rowan Williams, a large segment of British society disagrees. For them, this is not a matter of a pragmatic exemption but rather a matter of principle: British identity is harmonized with liberal values that take priority over freedom of religion. Beyond the civic principle, however, some research shows that Muslim women do not want sharia courts to receive legal status under UK law. Samia Bano found that Muslim women in the United Kingdom are

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concerned that privatized religious arbitration would give religious leaders greater power to dictate their behavior.197 Although sharia councils can grant divorces without the consent of the husband, women in Bano’s study said they had been coaxed, despite their reluctance, into participating in reconciliation sessions with their husbands. Muslim women in the United Kingdom have challenged traditional cultural and religious leaders; they do not want these bodies to be formalized. Such women are well aware of the need for state law to support them on issues concerning child custody and access and fnancial settlements. Arranged marriages are sanctioned by sharia courts in the United Kingdom and abroad. Arranged and coerced marriages occur especially among Muslims of Pakistani origin.198 Te difculty is distinguishing between forced and arranged marriages.199 In 2007 the Forced Marriage Civil Protection Act was passed to protect individuals from being forced to enter into marriage without their free and full consent. A crucial court decision is that “there are occasions when such a marriage cannot be recognized in England, for example where to do so would be repugnant to public policy.”200 Te government tends to criminalize forced marriages. Yet several voices cast doubts about the wisdom of that procedure. As laid out by Lord Lester of Herne Hill during the committee stage of the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act, criminalization is not appropriate because “people who deal with these cases daily tell me that often the victim does not want to dishonour her family by having a public and punitive hearing.”201 What is clear to all is that UK authorities tend to disavow UK and foreign sharia courts’ decisions on domestic and family matters. Consensus in the United Kingdom and Europe is building that recognition of sharia law is not a cure but a disease. Sharia undoubtedly clashes with the liberal notion that marriage is an individual right to choice and a matter of national law, which in certain cases may even ban a woman from deciding to be a man’s third wife. Some commented that the real impetus behind the archbishop’s proposal for a “plural jurisdiction” was to question the larger assumption that universal secular law should be the master law of civil society and that religious ideas of law are merely a nuisance that may or may not be tolerated.202 Williams’s expression of support for sharia, under this view, is part of a generalized belief that religious forms of corporate life are a key part of civil society and that their particular rules are therefore worthy of respect. Williams is actually advocating his own church and warning against the tendency to dismiss the church’s contribution to public life. His larger

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argument is that religious communities contribute to overall civic life and must be supported rather than undermined. Yet the question is why Williams’s claims have triggered such a furor. Tanks to the liberal church, British people felt fairly confdent that they belonged to a liberal society with a Christian basis. More recently, however, the old unity of religion and liberalism has come apart. Rowan Williams thus contributes to a larger debate about national identity in a rather problematic way. Rather than holding Christianity and liberalism together, he wants to oppose secular liberalism altogether by defending the right of all faith communities to resist it. Presenting the problem in such a clear way, generated backlash against him and against the alleged “union of religions” opposing secularism. Williams’s intervention helped most British intensify their defense of a collective identity based in one law for all. Tis is the background for the One Law for All campaign of the National Secular Society. Te campaign demands equality and respect for people, not for beliefs. It calls on the UK government to recognize that sharia law is arbitrary and discriminatory and for an end to sharia courts and all religious tribunals on the basis that they work against and not for equality and human rights. Te campaign also calls for amendment of the 1996 Arbitration Act to ban all religious tribunals from operating within or outside the legal system. Te One Law for All campaign promotes a solution of more secularism, not more religion. In October 2008, the House of Lords gave political expression to the National Secular Society’s demand by declaring that sharia is incompatible with human rights and that human rights should come ahead of religious freedom. Te campaign is the main force behind the Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill introduced in 2011 into the House of Lords by Baroness Caroline Fox (Independent). Te intention was to focus directly on the discrimination sufered by Muslim women within the sharia court system. Te proposed bill would have outlawed giving women’s testimony half the weight of men’s. Among its most important points were that “the bill required public bodies to inform women they have fewer legal rights if their marriage is unrecognised by English law”; legislation to state that arbitration tribunals may not deal with matters of family law (such as legally recognized divorce or custody of children) or criminal law (such as domestic violence); and explicitly stating on the face of legislation that a victim of domestic abuse is a witness to an ofense and therefore should be expressly protected from witness intimidation. Tus, the proposal’s intent was to show that equality under the law is a core value of UK justice.203

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Te bill did not pass, despite enjoying wide popular support. Te reservations the government had toward the bill were expressed in 2012 at the frst debate in the House of Lords. An objection was that the bill would undermine the Arbitration Act, which allows two parties to have their dispute arbitrated according to any religious principles they desire. Controversially, the act does not accept “communitarian pressures” to infuence especially family issues. Another objection was that most of what the bill addressed already existed in current legislation. Te Arbitration Act stipulates that tribunals must act fairly and impartially, and arbitration awards can be challenged in court if they do not. Te Arbitration Act includes binding arbitration of commercial disputes if a proper contract was drawn up in the presence of a lawyer. However, in family law, the area most people are concerned about, the state determines that marriages must be registered and divorce cannot be realized through private arbitration. Tey must involve the UK legal system. Te state thus retains interests in issues of marriage and divorce. Te questions for the future are how much power will sharia courts have under the Arbitration Act and will civil society tolerate the courts. The Dusk of Multiculturalism? UK Citizenship Should Be Earned

Academicians, public fgures, journalists, and others lend existential urgency to the discussion on multiculturism. Who are the British? Has the age of tolerance toward the Other ended? If yes, where is this posttolerance age leading? For Michael Nazir-Ali, the frst Asian bishop in the Church of England, it is a critical time, directly related to the United Kingdom’s relationship with its Muslim citizens. “Islamic extremists have turned parts of Britain into no-go areas for non-Muslims.”204 Although Muslims are blamed for extremism by a large number of British, British blame themselves for the failure of their own conviction. Indeed, the Royal United Service Institute went as far as to say that the United Kingdom’s lack of clear conviction about its national identity made it vulnerable to terrorism.205 Tese sorts of fears led political elites to enhance civic integration programs that, although directed toward newcomers, had been conceived for the United Kingdom’s own minorities, especially Muslims. As we point out, these programs had two problems. First is the questionable moral value of demanding that cultural minorities respect a hege-

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monic national culture—whatever that means. Second is how to defne a British national culture and how to relate it to the question of citizenship. Te United Kingdom historically had a thin sense of citizenship and no clear conviction about the connection between citizenship and a historical narrative. A great majority of British did not consider that gap between citizenship and nationalism as a problem until the 2010s, when many British began to wonder whether it is necessary to strengthen a national narrative. Te debate for or against this national narrative and what it should include gained importance at the turn of the millennium because of the challenge of Islam. Te Swann and the Crick Reports, of 1985 and 1998, respectively, brought to light questions of multiculturalism and on whether there was a need to establish a common sense of identity in the feld of education. Publication of the Parekh Report in 2000 culminated an inquiry of the Runnymede Trust begun in 1997.206 Te report raised the connection between UK identity and racism, especially at a time when Islamist and British values were perceived as colliding. Te Parekh Report picked up some of the points on racism already advanced by the Scarman Report of 1986, which had found that UK authorities’ repression of social protests by Afro-Caribbean youth in Bristol, Liverpool, and Brixton was fueled in part by racism, at a time when Islam was not in the mix.207 Te Parekh Report ignited a debate on the core of multiculturalism and racism when it presented a new question: Should discrimination against Muslims be placed on the same footing as racial discrimination? Te report identifed eight features of UK society that fuel the hatred of Islam, including the perception of Islam as a monolithic, political ideology. Criticism of the West by Muslims is rejected out of hand, whereas anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural and normal.208 Te report suggested that prevailing concepts of British identity have racial connotations and are white and imperialistic.209 Te report’s statement that “Britishness, as much as Englishness, has systematic, largely un-spoken, racial connotations.”210 Te Parekh Report recommended review of UK history to conceptualize a British identity as more “fexible, inclusive and cosmopolitan.”211 Tat recommendation garnered public criticism. Several British considered the report an attack on national pride, saying it was an “attempt to destroy our sense of nationhood,” and “our old culture.”212 Others wondered how the British could be racist if they were multicultural. An alternative view to the Parekh Report was the Cantle Report, written in 2001 by a team headed by Ted Cantle, chair of the Community

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Cohesion Institute. Whereas the Parekh Report recommended a shift from tolerance to recognition, the Cantle Report favored civic integration. Te Cantle Report noted that, since the northern England race riots of 2001, ethnic separatism had been allowed to grow under the mantle of multiculturalism. Te report, which echoed some of the conclusions arrived at by the Swann and Crick Reports, was especially critical of religious identities that foster “isolation and ignorance of other communities.” It introduced the concept of parallel lives—those of minorities who do not integrate.213 Te report contained inconsistencies, but it initiated a debate on the question of whether the multiculturalism of the past should be subsumed under the demands of community cohesion.214 Suddenly, “citizenship” and “cohesion” were the buzzwords of the day. Te important point is that citizenship should not be interpreted as just a right but as a fundamental moral obligation. Te old idea of naturalization as a tool of integration was replaced by the idea of naturalization as a prize, a reward for integration. Tat new idea started to take hold in the United Kingdom when David Blunkett, the Home secretary from 2001 to 2004, introduced in 2002 the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill to the House of Commons. In the 2002 white paper Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain, Blunkett claimed that if the British feel secure in their “sense of belonging and identity,” it would enable integration.215 Promoting citizenship for newcomers as valuable and strengthening, creating, or re-creating a British identity were overlapping, tied concepts. Whereas newcomers had to take practical steps before becoming citizens, the British had only to be assertive and proud of their identity. Citizenship tests for newcomers were urgently needed, but UK schools should emphasize British identity. Te bill introduced formal and standardized naturalization tests and made applications for citizenship more difcult. Te bill attempted to ensure that becoming a UK citizen was a signifcant life event.216 It contained a citizenship oath and a pledge that resembles that in U.S. citizenship ceremonies.217 In 2003, a commission led by Bernard Crick prepared naturalization tests, and the government began subsidizing preparation courses, along with a sample test to accompany the textbook Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship, which prepares applicants for the civic part of naturalization.218 When stipulating the contents of the civics section of the new naturalization test, the commission emphasized “practical knowledge.”219

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Up to this point there was no mention of specifc British cultural values. Te “contractualization” of citizenship was conceived only as a deal in which rights are granted in exchange for responsibilities and contributions to the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the Home Ofce’s “strategy to increase race equality and community cohesion,” adopted in 2005, already emphasized that a “greater sense of inclusive British citizenship” does not entail “assimilation of cultural diference.” In fact, it claimed that “no one set of cultural values,” including that of the majority, is to be “privileged more than another.”220 Te inherent contradictions in this strategy were immediately sensed. Tat “essential values of Britishness” are not negotiable is quite clear, and those values are hardly comparable with others. Tis approach to British values seemed to value individual values over group rights. Britishness thus inspired individuality, and that individuality is the basis of community cohesion. Accompanying the stress placed on citizenship oaths,221 in 2006, the government reorganized the Commission for Racial Equality. Tis reorganization challenged the Race Relations Amendment Act of 2000, which, under the auspices of promoting good relations between diferent racial groups, required social institutions such as the police, education, and health services systems to monitor social interactions. More emphasis was placed on equality and individual human rights than on ethnic and racial diversity. Tese changes were motivated by the release of a report written by Sir Keith Ajegbo that claimed there was not enough emphasis in the United Kingdom on identity and history and recommended that pupils should study free speech, the rule of law, mutual tolerance, and respect for equal rights.222 Te 2007 report of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, “Our Shared Future,” viewed cohesion as a process that must occur in all communities. Te Community Empowerment Action Plan of the Department of Communities and Local Government encouraged communities to participate in decision-making processes, especially with regard to interfaith coexistence. In reality, however, underneath the open dialogue, the government was on a road to impose a single cultural narrative.223 In the feld of employment, the Department of Trade and Industry has established new laws governing who may be employed. Although the 2003 Employment Equality Regulations for Religion and Belief contained stern antidiscriminatory rhetoric, solid legislative exemptions enable a wide range of interpretations, including some that might allow discrimination against religious people. Islamic dress codes, holy days, and halal tradition

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can lawfully be restricted if proved to be harmful to the business itself.224 Although the debate and the attempt to implement a valuable sense of citizenship peaked under Conservative government, it was the Labour Party that started the movement for the recentralization of common values. Already in August of 2005, just after the bombings in London, Tony Blair framed cultural conficts by focusing on essential values and cultural terms: “If [multiculturalism] means people living their separate cultures and never integrating at any point together, I think that’s actually certainly not what I mean by the word.”225 In 2006, he returned to this theme, reafrming “essential values” and need for a common identity based on a shared culture.226 Blair alluded to the Westphalian prerogatives of the nation-state to defne and mediate—coercively if necessary—public values and private consciousness, yet he acknowledged that contemporary circumstances make this difcult. Tese ideas stood at the heart of the strategy outlined in “Preventing Violent Extremism—Winning Hearts and Minds.” Its recommendations are to work together with the Muslim community in the promotion of “shared core British values.”227 Again the question is what are those values? Probably the best defnition of what Britishness means and what it contrasts with was ofered by Jack Straw. “British nationality is not about blood and soil, but about common civic values. You cannot transmit these ideas without stories. Tat means freedom through the narrative of the Magna Carta, the civil war, the Bill of Rights, through Adam Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment, the struggle for women’s and workers’ emancipation . . . and . . . the fght against unbridled terror.”228 Clearly marginalized in the story of the growth of civic values is Muslims’ struggle for religious equality and cultural recognition. Tis omission of cultural recognition is not accidental. Tis version of what could be defned as Britishness is opened enough to allow everybody be part of this contractual sense of nationality. However, the rules of the game are already established, and the majority are not ready to change them because it is assumed that they ft all. Te restrictive possibilities of this contractualization of citizenship became evident in the probationary citizenship that has become a reality in the 2009 Borders Citizenship and Immigration Act. Probationary citizenship symbolizes how a democratic majority shape the domain of citizenship. Together with enhancing democratic forms of rule, technical individual skills are accented. British values connect a liberal personality with technical knowledge that helps the individual have no need of an original religious or cultural community.

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A Home Ofce consultation paper, Earning the Right to Stay in Britain (October 2009), whose fndings have been incorporated into a law as of July 2010, suggested that there is a need for a “points test for citizenship” and stated that government ministers should penalize those who show “an active disregard for UK values” when applying for a UK passport. Te Home Ofce, however, declined to specify what might be covered by the phrase “active disregard.” Te policy introduces the new category of “probation citizen,” whereby a person remains in this new status for between twelve months and ten years, depending on the number of points earned by the applicant. Te bill denies full access to social benefts, including social housing, to those who have not completed a probationary citizenship of fve years. Te intention is to boost the concept of earned citizenship. Tose who want to settle permanently in the United Kingdom will have to earn the right to stay by learning English, paying taxes, and obeying the law. Te government said it will support migrants who play by the rules.229 Points will also be awarded for English-language ability, earnings potential, qualifcations, volunteering, special artistic or scientifc merit, and residence in specifc parts of the country, such as in Scotland.230 All these initiatives found ideological expression in the outlines on immigration and cultural cohesion formulated in the Labor Party Manifesto of 2010. Chapter 5 of the manifesto, “Crime and Immigration: Strengthening Our Communities, Securing Our Borders,” hints at this trend. “Te Tories talk tough but vote soft on issues from gun crime to DNA retention; they would cut police and [Police Community Support Ofcers] numbers; and favour political police chiefs over real reform. We [Labour] will control immigration with our new Australian-style pointsbased system—ensuring that as growth returns we see rising levels of employment and wages, not rising immigration, and requiring newcomers to earn citizenship and the entitlements it brings.”231 Although these guidelines are not specifcally aimed at Muslims, it is clear to all that immigration is connected to Islam or to what is perceived as a culture or religion that is difcult to integrate. Te Tories are catching up and endorsing the same anti-immigration policies. From 2010 to 2012 the Tories have made it much harder for foreign workers, and their family members, to enter and settle in the country.232 In 2013, newcomers started to be subjected to a test on English history that is based on the methodological overview of Education Secretary Michael Gove, which relies on memorization of facts before analysis or critique. Whereas two earlier editions of this overview of UK history

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acknowledge that any history is only “one interpretation,” this third edition contains no such warning. Copiously adorned with battle pictures and festooned with Union Jacks, it presents the United Kingdom’s long and illustrious history as an uncontestable truth. Tis proposed version of history defning Britishness slightly difers from what Jack Straw suggested. Te new version, for example, promotes the role of a patrician ruling class in granting British liberties. Movements such as the trade unions’ movement of the 1970s are portrayed as a problem.233 Prime Minister David Cameron, not surprisingly, included some of these ideas about the importance of British values in his Big Society program, which attempts to rebalance the relationship between state and citizens through the empowerment of communities and reform of the public service. An important element of the program is the National Citizen Service—a short period of voluntary, nonmilitary civic service in communities that is funded by diverted expenditures from the Preventing Terrorism Together program. Tis is a shift from a program based in counterterrorism to one of civic participation.234 New measures to control immigration began to be taken, such as checking the immigration status of children at school, preventing migrants from getting social housing, and restricting access of EU nationals to benefts and the National Health Service and stopping beneft tourism (migration to Britain for health service benefts). Home Secretary Teresa May advanced a bill on immigration that synthesizes all the previous guidelines that make the position of illegal immigrants much harder. It requires private landlords to check tenants’ immigration status and introduces the draconian “deport frst, appeal later” policy for thousands facing deportation.235 Te Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016 have decreased access to the welfare state and other aspects of everyday life for non-EU citizens. Tis includes the introduction of health care charges (despite already paying taxes) and in some cases charging for hospital care, as well as the requirement that Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency staf, banks, and landlords check immigration status. Te intent was to create a hostile environment for irregular immigration, which often ends up discriminating against those who might look or sound foreign. Tese reforms have had a signifcant impact. In 2014, naturalizations levels fell by a staggering 40 percent. Te Tory government supported revoking citizenship of anyone suspected of terror ofenses or acts of disloyalty.236 Citizenship could be stripped even when it renders the person stateless. More important than the antiradicalization measures is what could be

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called Michael Gove’s cultural war, in which honor crimes and forced marriages are presented as negative and at odd with British values. Te message is clear: acceptance of the hegemony of the national culture is the gateway to a British community. But must afrming the hegemony of a national culture repress other cultures? Te dubious connection between deradicalization and British values is only one problem of these initiatives. Tere is also the problematic link between British values and Christianity. Do British values include a British Christian heritage? Lord Carey of Clifton (archbishop of Canterbury from 1991 to 2002) claims, “Te real goal of the state is to make newcomers understand that they are coming into a country which values parliamentary democracy, which is built upon our Christian heritage.”237 We see in the proposed tests of civic integration special sections devoted to religion that do not rely on Christian dogma but nonetheless focus on Christmas and Easter and the traditions that accompany them.238 Tis is not in itself a rejection of diversity, but it is a hierarchy of values that advances certain groups, in some cases at the expense of others. During the 2010s, UK political elites pursued a more inclusive type of nationalism, one based on social cohesion and British values and promoted through a rhetoric of muscular liberalism, as the only road to integration of diversity.239 Opinions on where the road goes are diverse. As Ralph Grillo argues, critics of multiculturalism imagine it as a “strong” multiculturalism that overlooks practical accommodation on issues such as providing halal meals. Multiculturalism built on “conviviality” remains intact.240 Tariq Modood would agree and add that, although multiculturalism is in decay at the ideological level, in practice it is alive and expanding. As proof, Modood discusses the Race Relations Act of 1976 and its 2000 amendment, which pushed the state to integrate minorities into the labor market and other key areas of UK society.241 Modood’s conclusion is that “if multiculturalism is dead in Britain, then a funny thing has happened on the way to the funeral.”242 Multiculturalism is still a living experience in the United Kingdom Observers more skeptical remark that there are two competing types of multiculturalism: one, communitarian, in which strong ethnic or cultural identities can lead to a meaningful integration, and one in which consumption-based lifestyle identities are adopted in an atmosphere of conviviality.243 Te second type, as Kenan Malik suggests, separates multiculturalism as a political process leading to recognition of diferences from the idea of diversity as a living experience.244 Tis second version

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has made multiculturalism an ordinary feature of social life in the United Kingdom. But living in diversity is undermined when we play the game of recognition of diferences. We claim that classical pluralism remains, but the United Kingdom is becoming increasingly intolerant of “parallel lives” and of Muslims’ demand for recognition of religious expression.245 In a 2018 UK poll commissioned by the liberal Hope Not Hate group, “43% predicted relationships between diferent UK communities will deteriorate over the next few years compared to 14% who feel things will improve.” Another 40 percent believed that Enoch Powell’s “rivers of blood” warnings of 1968 had proved true.246 A majority, 59 percent, favor multiculturalism; still, the pessimistic views are worrisome for advocates of multiculturalism. Despite Brexit, we do not think there is a full nationalist turn against diversity, a rejection of freedom of religion, or wide support for white supremacy. We believe that a growing part of the population supports social cohesion and a common version of the meaning of Britishness.247 We suggest that this support includes a gender agenda that religious identities must respect. Te supremacy of that agenda is becoming the battle fag of the meaning of liberal rights and diversity. UK Values: Women’s Rights and Gender Equality versus Religious Sensibilities?

Te UK elites’ response to the accusation of a Trojan horse in Birmingham schools is an epic example of seizing an opportunity to advance a nationalist synthesis. Recall the Trojan horse letter, which raised concerns that intolerant religious and political beliefs were infltrating Birmingham schools. Te subsequent investigation by the Ofce for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills into Birmingham schools allowed Michael Gove, the Tory minister of education at the time, and Prime Minister Cameron to link radicalism and terrorism. Gove announced that the government would require all twenty thousand primary and secondary schools in the United Kingdom to “promote British values.” Cameron added that the reason extremism was fourishing in the United Kingdom was because the country had been too “bashful” in promoting its values, and that Muslim clerics who denounce free speech, equality, and democracy will be responded to with an even more “muscular” defense of “British values.”248 Tese values include the primacy of

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UK civil and criminal law, religious tolerance, and a sturdy opposition to gender segregation. Echoing Jack Straw, Cameron insisted that students should study the Magna Carta and “accept British laws.”249 New rules established by the Department for Education allow the education secretary to dismiss school governors suspected of undermining the fundamental British values of democracy. Tat means that whoever promotes gender segregation in educational activities is not only antiliberal but also anti-British. Te fallout of the Birmingham afair has made it clear that the governmental demand to uphold a “broad and balanced curriculum” requires education on sex, reproduction, and evolution.250 Gender segregation and sex education are recurrent topics in the British identity saga. Some of these cases had caused controversy, and they were resolved with pressure from secular feminist groups. For example, toward the end of 2012, the governing body of UK universities issued guidance that allowed some gender segregation in university spaces if an external speaker requested it. Legal action by the Southall Black Sisters argued that Universities UK violated the equality and nondiscrimination principles of the Public Sector Equality Duty created by the Equality Act. Te campaign resulted in the withdrawal of the Universities UK guidance condoning gender segregation. In addition, the Equalities and Human Rights Commission found that gender segregation is unlawful. Yet some universities, like the University of Glasgow, continue that unlawful practice. Southall Black Sisters and Inspire, another black women’s ethnic organization, intervened to block segregation policies at the Al-Hijrah school. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court ruled in 2017 against the school defense of separate but equal on the basis of the 2010 Equality Act. Jo Johnson, the minister for universities and science, proposed fning, suspending, or deregistering universities that block free speech with “no platforming” and “safe spaces” policies. Tey must meet a statutory duty to commit to free speech. In the last years of the Conservative government (2016–2018), whether the United Kingdom should follow France and Belgium in a general ban on niqabs in public was being debated. Health Minister Dan Poulter claimed face coverings could hinder communication between health care professionals and patients. Judge Peter Murphy of a UK criminal court ruled that Muslim women must remove the veil while giving evidence. Te judgment came the same day Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg asserted that it was inappropriate for students to wear a full-face veil in classrooms.251 Cameron’s Conservative government attempted to include the lib-

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eration of Muslim women in antiradicalization programs by demanding Muslim women to learn English. Cameron was accused of stigmatizing Muslim women and confating the poor English-language skills of some Muslim women and extremism and of appearing to threaten that migrants who fail to reach a particular standard of English may be expelled from the United Kingdom.252 Te UK government singles out religions and cultures it believes are against British values. In making that assertion, Cameron and other ofcials have stated that the nation is a Christian country and that the Bible gave the United Kingdom a set of values and morals that make the country what it is today. Trough the combination of Christianity, secularity, and liberal values, elites demand that the Muslim community modernize and nationalize Islam and accept women’s equality. Whether homosexuals and lesbians are included in the emerging synthesis of the liberal British identity is still a matter of debate. Te United Kingdom and other European countries have yet to resolve all the intricacies involved with the homosexuality debate. Over the decades, the United Kingdom has been strengthening its embrace of controversial gender groups. Homosexual activity was decriminalized in 1967 in England and Wales. In 1999 the House of Lords accepted that gays can constitute a family. In 2002 the Civic Partnership Bill was introduced in the House of Lords to secure the well-being of same-sex couples. Qualitative changes continue, with marriages between homosexuals being sanctioned at Westminster Abbey.253 Recognition of homosexual rights seems embedded in a shared European identity. A poll from Ipsos MORI in 2011 found that, of those who identify as Christian, “six in ten respondents (61%) agree that homosexuals should have the same legal rights in all aspects of their lives as heterosexuals, and those who disapprove of sexual relations between two adults of the same sex (29%) are greatly outnumbered by those who do not (46%).”254 In February 2013, the initiative to legalize same-sex marriages gained bipartisan support in the House of Commons, even though it was not part of parties’ political programs or any coalition agreement and despite opposition of the Anglican Church. David Cameron will go down in history as the frst Conservative Party leader to bring reform on LGBTQ rights, and he left a positive legacy on equality through the introduction of same-sex marriage. Tis agenda is bipartisan. In 2015 the Labour Party pledged to appoint an international LGBTQ rights envoy to promote respect for the human rights of LGBTQ people and work toward the “decriminalisation of homo-

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sexuality worldwide” while stressing the party’s support for refugees feeing persecution for their sexuality or gender identity.255 Te Tory Home Secretary Teresa May did her best to ensure that same-sex marriage made it onto the government agenda, and her successor, Maria Miller, shepherded a bill through Parliament. Civil partnerships were later allowed to be converted to marriages. Te courts joined the reform. A UK Supreme Court ruling upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales that the refusal of the defendants, who ran a small private hotel, to provide the claimants (a same-sex couple) with a double room for the night amounted to direct sexual orientation discrimination.256 Te court rejected the claim of the defendants that as Christians they could not promote sinful sexual behavior.257 Te European Court of Human Rights has mostly upheld these decisions of UK courts. Tere is a clear determination to show that homosexual rights trump the rights of Christians whose faith teaches them homosexuality is wrong. If this is the case for Christians, it is not a far stretch to apply the same thinking to a minority religion such as Islam. In February 2019, the Department for Education released new guidance on relationships and sex education for all UK schools that takes efect September 2020. It is LGBTQ inclusive, teaching primary school students about, for example, the existence of LGBTQ families. It obliges schools to increase the time they spend teaching students about menstrual health and informed consent. It also provides guidance on risks related to social media and the internet—for instance, sexting and revenge porn. Muslim conservatives’ complaints overlap with those of Christians, who are represented by Roger Kiska, a lawyer with the Christian Concern group, and have joined the Muslims’ plea against abortion and sex education in schools. Tolerance is not necessarily good. Labour, under Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership, had to balance freedom of religion and freedom from religion. Labour wants to entice both the gaylesbian community and the Muslim community. Attending to Muslim feelings may explain why proposals backed by the gay-lesbian community were not added to the party manifesto for the 2017 elections. Labour under Corbyn had to also court the progressive parts of its constituency, and its leadership promised to reform the 2010 Equality Act by making the protected characteristic gender identity rather than gender assignment, in order to protect transgender people. Tese initiatives were not put forth as a response to Islam, but the

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increasing willingness to support the goals of the LGBTQ community and the ongoing afrmation of a reformulated British identity that is more open to an LGBTQ agenda than to the religious reservations to it have a clear and specifc connection. Te UK state, then, must make a clear discrimination between values that ft into a Western, enlightened way of life and those that do not. And What Do British Muslims Really Want? Discrimination in Motion

Te fnal question thus is how Muslims feel about and how they accommodate to a growing discriminatory environment. Sayeeda Warsi, a successfully integrated Muslim who was a Conservative cabinet member and is a baroness, explains in her book Te Enemy Within how UK foreign policies and engagement in anti-radicalization programs alienated Muslims.258 Her unique perspective as a British Muslim of Pakistani heritage, intimately connected to her faith and her community, represents perfectly well the dilemma of a modern, articulate, and liberal Muslim woman for whom her Muslim identity is important. She is critical of her own Conservative government’s negative approach toward multiculturalism and the way it dealt with extremism, which resulted in stigmatization of the community. A 2004 survey by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, cited by Dominic Casciani, reported that eight of ten Muslims encounter discrimination frequently.259 In 2015 a survey by the Islamic Human Rights Commission found that six of ten Muslims in the United Kingdom had seen Islamophobia directed at someone else, up from four in ten when the survey was frst conducted in 2010. In 2010 the commission found that half the Muslims surveyed said they had not witnessed Islamophobia—a fgure that dropped to 18 percent in 2015. Te commission’s report took aim at the government’s Prevent program, whose goal is to stop the radicalization of young Muslims but whose outcomes according to Muslims seem to be demonization of Muslims.260 Polls show that despite their sense of being discriminated against, Muslims still identify with the United Kingdom and feel more confdence in its institutions than the ethnic British population. According to an ICM poll, a large majority of British Muslims feel a strong sense of belonging to the United Kingdom (86 percent). Tis is higher than the national average (83 percent). A large majority of British Muslims feel able to practice their religion freely (94 percent). British Muslims are more likely than the rest

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of the population to feel that they can infuence decisions afecting their country (33 percent versus 21 percent). And 88 percent of British Muslims think that the United Kingdom is a good place for Muslims to live.261 Figures in a 2009 report by Communities and Local Governments, “Preventing Violent Extremism,” were confrmed in the ICM poll. Most Muslims believed policies toward Muslims were wrong but nevertheless trusted the UK government and believed that UK institutions allow Muslims to voice their demands. Although employment levels for British Muslims were by 2009 only at 38 percent, they have a higher confdence in the judiciary than the general public. Muslims also are ready and willing to live in multifaith neighborhoods, whereas non-Muslims are not.262 As concluded by Maria Sobolewska, Muslims appear to be very well integrated by most indicators, such as support for democracy measures (trust and efcacy) and sense of belonging to the United Kingdom. Her research even cast doubt on whether less-integrated Muslims turn to religion as a source of an alternative identity.263 Tese fndings are corroborated by the previously mentioned ICM survey, which was commissioned by Channel 4 for the documentary What British Muslims Really Tink. Face-to-face, at-home interviews were conducted across the United Kingdom between April 25 and May 31, 2015, with a representative sample of 1,000 Muslims and phone interviews with a control sample of 1,008 Muslims. Along with the positive fndings, however, the same report revealed much more problematic Muslim opinions that did not coincide with general British public opinion. When asked about homosexuality, 18 percent said they agreed that it should be legal in the United Kingdom. Fifty-two percent did not think it should be legal, compared with 5 percent of the general public. Almost half (47 percent) said they disagreed that a gay person should become a teacher, compared with 14 percent of the general population. Nearly a quarter (23 percent) of British Muslims supported the introduction of sharia law in some areas of the United Kingdom, and 39 percent believe “wives should always obey their husbands,” compared with 5 percent of the country as a whole. Two-thirds (66 percent) said they completely condemned the stoning of adulterers, and a further 13 percent condemned them to some extent. Nearly a third (31 percent) thought it was acceptable for a British Muslim man to have more than one wife, compared with 8 percent of the wider population.264 Te social liberal Innes Bowen, a respected editor at the BBC, remarked with worry in her book Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent that seg-

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regation of the sexes is observed by virtually all British Muslim groups.265 Some have criticized the methodology used in the ICM survey. Shiraz Maher, lecturer in war studies at King’s College London, claims that because the sample included only Muslims living in areas where they constitute at least 20 percent of the population, who are likely to be less integrated with their non-Muslim neighbors, it was not representative.266 Shaista Gohir, the chair of the Muslim Women’s Network UK, cautions that Muslim attitudes are probably not much diferent from those of people in other religious groups, such as devout Jews and Christians. Furthermore, “that nearly 50 percent of Muslims did not think homosexuality should be illegal was a sign that attitudes were shifting.”267 Te evidence thus is that most British Muslims want to integrate and are in favor of social cohesion. How social cohesion is understood and projected among non-Muslim British and British Muslims, however, certainly difers. Non-Muslims are suspicious of the Muslim interpretation of cohesion. Whereas the Labour and Conservative Parties demonstrated ambivalence about the meaning of British identity, most Muslims have no ambivalence. For most Muslims, there cannot be cohesion without recognition of Islam as a legitimate shareholder in society, something that much of the UK public is reluctant to accept. Tus, precisely when a Muslim discourse on the “equality of diference” is emerging along with new demands for participation in the defnition of a common good, the response of the non-Muslim British public is ambivalence and in many cases decidedly negative on the politics of “equality of diference.”268 Both Muslim and non-Muslim British might reject parallel lives. Nonetheless, they difer in their understanding of togetherness.269 As we claim, this ambivalence in the understanding of togetherness has the British making robust eforts to reafrm the meaning of a British version of British identity and portraying Muslims as nonloyal to that British identity. Te YouGov survey of 2009 found that the number of non-Muslim British who believe that “a large proportion of British Muslims feel no sense of loyalty to this country and are prepared to condone or even carry out acts of terrorism” had nearly doubled from 10 percent after the July 7, 2005, bombings to 18 percent a year later. Only 36 percent of the general population believed that Muslims are loyal to the United Kingdom.270 Tese fndings are corroborated by the Searchlight Educational Trust report Fear and Hope, which studied UK attitudes about immigration, identity, and multiculturalism. Te proposition “Muslims create problems in the UK” received 52 percent agreement from the British. Te report

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also found that opposition comes from all races, not just white British.271 A poll by YouGov on the tenth anniversary of the July 7 bombings showed that 79 percent of British believed that terrorists will attack again in the United Kingdom. Even more striking is that “over a quarter of people (27%) said they saw Islam [in general, not fundamentalists or radical Islam] as a ‘major threat’ to Western liberal democracy, a jump from 19% who said the same in a YouGov poll conducted on the day after the 7/7 bombings. . . . More people—15%—now agree with the statement that ‘a large proportion of British Muslims feel no sense of loyalty to this country’ and are prepared to ‘condone or even carry out acts of terrorism.’ A decade ago, only 10% of people agreed with this statement.”272 Te fndings can be read as expressing a single message. Tere is a growing sense that Muslims constitute a cultural challenge and also a security threat. Te paradox is that although a British Social Attitudes survey found a dramatic decline in racist attitudes over 2000–2020, a consensus against multiculturalism is now being articulated.273 Some believe that the antimulticulturalist attitude in the United Kingdom represents another face of old-style racism. At this point we should examine the extent to which these anti-Muslim attitudes result from the radical Right’s discourse. How infuential is the radical Right in the United Kingdom on the political mainstream? The Radical Right: Electoral Disaster and Ideological Accomplishment, Liberal Discrimination

Te United Kingdom has historically been fertile ground for protest movements that ride on the discontent and mistrust associated with mainstream political institutions. Since the 1960s, signifcant parts of the UK population have opposed immigration. Nevertheless, as most observers agree, there is no connection between mass sentiment against immigration and voting with the radical Right. Indeed, despite deep cuts to public services, the threat of immigration, and the growing public mistrust of the main political parties, the most important party of the radical Right since the war, the British National Party (BNP), has failed to make electoral gains. Te reason for this is that the UK political system is not conducive to small parties gaining seats in the House of Commons. Some scholars see the lack of success of the BNP as owing to its poorly thought out relation to modernization and its failure

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to create a legitimate public image.274 But what do we mean by modernization, and what constitutes political success? We claim that the success of the radical Right is strongly related to the modernization of its discourse, which has helped legitimate an exclusionist agenda. Under John Tyndall (an old neo-Nazi), the BNP advocated racist ideas and in the early 1990s had 7–8 percent support nationally. It won local elections in London’s Isle of Dogs and, more importantly, became a factor determining public opinion.275 A doctrinal change, however, took place in 1999 when Nick Grifn, a Cambridge-educated lawyer, ousted the old-fashioned Tyndall and set about reshaping the party into an organization capable of waging mainstream politics without abandoning its core convictions. Even under Tyndall, the party had been through a certain limited evolution of policy. For example, it replaced the demand for compulsory repatriation of foreigners with voluntary repatriation. Griffn went further than Tyndall, though, and led the party toward more pragmatic tactical positions. He dismissed overt and familiar racism and anti-Semitism, understood to be illegitimate for the majority of British, while adopting Islamophobia, which could be popularly accepted. “Britain doesn’t have an Asian problem but a Muslim one,” claimed Grifn.276 Yet the party’s core conviction, in whatever incarnation, has always been a fairly straightforward “Britain for the British”: foreigners out, national sovereignty in. What was new was that the party began to abandon the antidemocratic fascistic trappings that once characterized it. Whereas under Tyndall the party had aspired to destroy the parliamentary system, under Grifn it defned itself as the most democratic in the United Kingdom, on the basis of its communitarian politics, defending citizens’ initiative referendums, and demanding an English parliament.277 Te idea thus was for “whites to defend their rights,” bolstered by “well-directed boots and fsts.”278 Te new anti-Muslim focus paid of. Te BNP gained traction when riots broke out in immigrant neighborhoods in Burnley, Oldham, and Bradford in May 2001 and the following months. In these riots Islam as an identity marker began to take hold, especially for young Pakistanis.279 During the 2001 general election following the riots, the BNP polled the highest in places where riots had occurred, as well as in Dudley, in the West Midlands, and the London borough of Barking and Dagenham. In Oldham it captured 16 percent of the votes. In the 2002 local elections the BNP gained four councillors, three of them in Burnley, where the party enjoyed the support of white British resentful of what they saw as

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disproportionately high levels of fnancial support granted to the Asiandominated Daneshouse ward. More importantly, between 2002 and 2006, as documented by Matthew Goodwin, 59 percent of BNP voters claimed that immigration was the greatest threat for the United Kingdom, but only 16 percent of the rest of the population agreed. By 2009, almost 50 percent of the general population would agree with the BNP claim.280 In the 2009 European elections, almost one-quarter of the vote, or 3.5 million citizens, supported the BNP and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), another erupting right-wing party.281 Although the BNP was still far from becoming a mass movement, it was having ideological success. Te anti-immigration and antirefugee message was adopted by other political formations, either the Conservative Party or other Far-Right outfts. Te BNP had its companions and competitors at its end of the spectrum of the radical Right. For almost a decade, the most signifcant right-wing movements competing with and surpassing the appeal of the BNP were the English Defence League (EDL) and Britain First, both social movements, and the UKIP. Te EDL is a street protest movement purporting to fght Islamism in the streets. Its rank and fle has substantial numbers of soccer hooligans and fans, often part of organized gangs known as “frms,” who travel to football grounds to stir up fghts and commit vandalism. Te EDL’s roots are in the dramatic scenes in Luton in March 2009, when a group of Muslims protested as the Royal Anglian Regiment paraded through the town on its return from Afghanistan. Within days, a video was foating around the internet showing the aftermath: calling themselves the United People of Luton, thousands of mostly young men took to the streets in a rowdy and chaotic show of anger, chanting “no surrender to the Taliban,” and “We are Luton.” A short time later, the EDL emerged from the United People of Luton. Within a little over a year since its founding, the group had become the largest street protest movement in the United Kingdom.282 Te group bills itself as a human rights organization that exists to protect the inalienable rights of all people to protest against radical Islam and as not being against Muslims in general.283 Joel Busher interviewed EDL members. All he spoke with insisted they were not extremist or racist. Tey wanted to distance themselves from the traditional Far Right.284 Its founder and frst leader, Tommy Robinson (whose real name is Stephen Yaxley-Lennon), explicitly said this. Although he had incited others against Muslims in violent rallies, sympathetic observers have portrayed

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him as a misunderstood liberal unafraid of trampling cultural sensitivities while speaking up for British values. Although it was established among the white working class, the EDL also formed an expanding number of cultural divisions—most notably, for Jews, Sikhs, women, and LGBTQ people. Te EDL goes to considerable pains to show that it cannot be accused of racism or anti-Semitism. In August 2011, the Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik claimed to be infuenced by the group. Te EDL strenuously denied any knowledge of Breivik and unreservedly condemned his acts of terror. Its condemnation did not prevent criticism, which included whether groups such as the EDL should be granted freedom of expression. Te EDL could not escape increasing delegitimation. Its decline did not, however, mean it was fading in infuence. Te counterjihad movement, led by street protest groups such as Britain First, takes inspiration from Tommy Robinson, and it has more than 109,000 followers on Twitter in 2020, and it is expanding rapidly. Te goal of the movement is to whip up hatred of Muslims and provoke a cultural civil war. Te clash with Muslims has been a central factor in all confgurations of the UK right, but it is not the only issue. Other concerns became central for an increasingly normalized UK right. Te appearance of UKIP is probably the culmination of xenophobia, Islamophobia, and the discourse against political elites becoming normalized. UKIP was formed as a political party in 1993 by Alan Sked, a historian at the London School of Economics, to frst and foremost oppose European integration and specifcally to prevent the ratifcation of the Treaty on European Union. Joel Busher and Jeanne Hanna note that the party began as a “movement party” and only gradually became a fully fedged political party. By the time of the referendum on Brexit, UKIP’s key organizers, and eventually the party’s very identity, were subsumed into a more pluralistic network of groups with a shared ambition for UK withdrawal from the EU. It seemed again to be confating the roles of political party and social movement.285 Yet the plurality of issues addressed by the UKIP was very well known already in 2010. It promoted a combination of anti-European, nationalist, xenophobic, and populist policies. It shared with the BNP a concern about immigration, demanding an end to it. Although the party has not made Islam a principal target, it is clear that like the BNP it builds on the increasing public fear of a Muslim presence. Peter Harris, a local politician in Dagenham in East London, is a case in point. He has made a career out of opposing the opening of Muslim prayer facilities in his borough.

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Dagenham has thus become a white British stronghold in a borough that has seen a demographic transformation, with many new Muslim residents arriving between 2000 and 2018.286 Te question is whether the UKIP can speak in the name of white people who say they feel threatened and whether it can transform the sense of anxiety about Muslims into a legitimate political issue. It seems that it can. Te UKIP’s appropriation of the identity issue has survived the accusations of racism made by Conservative and Labour pundits and even forced Labour leader Ed Miliband to address UKIP voters and express his understanding of their concerns. Tis is part of its success. A report by businessman, pollster, and Conservative Party supporter Lord Ashcroft, “Tey’re Tinking What We’re Tinking: Understanding the UKIP Temptation,” provides a comprehensive analysis of what drives support for the UKIP. Te report argues that the party addresses what are ordinary reactions to the predicament of integration. People resent that “schools cannot hold nativity plays or harvest festivals any more; you can’t fy a fag of St George any more; you can’t call Christmas Christmas any more; you won’t be promoted in the police force unless you’re from a minority.”287 Tis blaze of xenophobic outrage was portrayed as a winning card, since an important cross-party majority would endorse it. However, the xenophobic argument was accompanied by a more ambivalent attitude toward LGBTQ rights. Te party knowingly let homophobe racists such as Alan Craig run for election in 2015. At the same time, however, the party understood the political and discursive gains coming from defending an LGBTQ agenda. Terefore, despite insisting that they would not censor their candidates’ views on LGBT rights, the party manifesto for the 2017 elections strove to apply rigorous standards to immigrants with respect to equal rights for women and gays. “In Britain, we do not believe in treating women or gay people as second-class citizens, and we hold to a fundamental belief in democracy and free speech. UKIP’s points-based immigration system will . . . test the social attitudes of migration applicants to foster community cohesion and protect core British values.”288 In 2017 party leader Paul Nuttall professed frm support for gender equality, freedom of expression, and equality before the law, despite his long-standing opposition to LGBTQ antibullying lessons in schools. And in fact the UKIP manifesto empowers schools regulator Ofsted “to conduct snap inspections of schools when parents or pupils have raised concerns that . . . anti-equality views are being expressed by staf or governors.”289 UKIP says it will implement these commitments in every community in

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the country, implying it is the party to take a step forward in state penetration of communitarian life, but other parties also hold these positions. Tis marked an increasing tendency of the party under Gerard Batten’s leadership in 2018–2019 to endorse an anti-Muslim campaign. Tis development proved efective in increasing the number of activists. It is not so clear how to measure political success. Should we worry about the electoral potential of the radical Right, or should we heed its ideological impact, regardless of how it does at the polling booth? Robert Ford, for one, thinks that support for the radical Right today “could be 10 or 20 times higher” if the radical Right worked harder to get supporters.290 Tat it is not politically successful “has owed much to the way in which the territory to the right of the Conservatives has become increasingly fragmented.”291 A 2012 poll found that three-quarters of young adults between ages eighteen and twenty-four said they would vote for a party that promised to stop immigration.292 Another poll revealed that 48 percent would consider supporting a new Far-Right party if it shunned violence and fascist imagery.293 In short, there is a potential for a controlled, nonfascist type of extremism. When the radical Right engages in nonviolent politics and promotes an anti-Muslim discourse, it may increase its electoral turnout. Anti-Muslim discourse is electorally potent. What happens, though, when the mainstream parties endorse part of the political message of the Far Right? As shown in this chapter, the mainstream UK political parties have always been ambivalent about Europe and about immigration, but UKIP’s campaign has been successful in radicalizing the position of the Tories on both issues. Tis success should have ensured the party a bright future. Even before Brexit, UKIP was already showing clear electoral progress. Although in its early years it experienced more lows than highs, by February 2013 UKIP came in a close second to the Liberal Democrats in a by-election in the southeastern constituency of Eastleigh, dramatically exceeding expectations.294 In the 2013 local elections the party achieved an average 25 percent vote share across the 75 percent of seats where its candidates ran for ofce. It surpassed the Tories and Labour and became the most voted-for UK party in the European Parliament election in 2014, probably UKIP’s greatest electoral achievement. Te Brexit referendum result could also be considered a height for the party and its leader Nigel Farage, who fought doggedly for it.

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But then came the total political collapse of the UKIP. After the Brexit referendum of June 2016, UKIP in the 2017 elections was outfanked by Conservatives, who won votes in rural and working-class areas. Conservatives won overall control of Redditch, Basildon, and Peterborough, all areas that backed the vote to leave in 2016. What does this electoral tumble mean? Teresa May’s declaration that “if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere” expresses what the UKIP promotes.295 If this kind of thinking dominates, the ideals of the UKIP, and other FarRight advocates, remain strong but the party disappears politically. Te abandonment of Nigel Farage by the party and the reasons for that confrmed the line UK conservative nationalists are following. Tey focus on Brexit, which represents everything nationalism is about, while leaving aside Islamophobia. Farage warned in 2015 that the rising public concern about immigration is partly because people believe some Muslims want to form “a ffth column and kill us,” but still he was careful to portray himself as not an Islamophobe.296 Sticking to a nationalist, although an apparently non-Islamophobic, position, Farage joined the new Brexit Party, which targets pro-Leave voters from both the Tory and Labour Parties by providing a more radical vision for Brexit than either party ofered. Te strategy paid of, and the party won a major electoral success with the largest share of the national vote in the 2019 European Parliament election in the United Kingdom four months after the party’s founding. For many of the Tory and ex-UKIP members and voters who joined the Brexit Party, Islam is not an issue at this point. But national identity and control are prominent in their message: We British control diversity. Conclusion: Christian, Secularist, Multiculturalist?

Te French elections in 2017 were a political earthquake, fnally resulting in a strong liberal government, and the UK elections of 2017 produced similar turmoil, with the addition of an uncertain political outcome. Brexit and its consequences remain open, and questions about radicalism, immigration, and Britishness vis-à-vis Islam remain as contentious as before. Although the elections were not centered on Islam, after the terrorist attack on London Bridge, Islamic radicalization, British values, and multiculturalism invaded the electoral debate.

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Will the incremental consensus on a state-centered postmulticulturalism, in which British values and gender take priority over Muslim identity factors, endure? Muslims will not be exempted from complying with a modernist agenda, despite their religious reservations. A majority in the United Kingdom (74 percent) want religion to have less infuence in Parliament and bishops to lose their automatic seats in the House of Lords, according to an Ipsos MORI poll.297 As Tim Farron, leader of the Liberal Democrats and a committed Christian, said, in the past politicians could say that religion guided them, but it is politically impossible today for someone with Farron’s views to survive the barrage of questions on whether gay sex is a sin.298 People put more emphasis on individual rights than on religious rights in general and distinguish between religions that can accept secular positions and those that seem uncomfortable with them. Many Christians, for example, despite identifying as such, are secular with respect to gay rights and the role of religion in public life. A liberal consensus is thus forged around a sense of secular civic identity, which prevails over religious particularities. Tis, some would say, is a covert type of racism. Some pundits argue that the very idea of Britishness is in reality mainly about whiteness. We argue that it does not imply a nationalist organic and exclusivist type of nationalism and that Britishness is not about race but about values. Te Windrush case makes our argument. Tose claiming that the United Kingdom is back in the racist business with a vengeance are seemingly supported by the explosive Windrush case. Te so-called Windrush generation, often born as UK citizens, are descendants of immigrants from the Caribbean who came to the United Kingdom with the encouragement of the UK government. Te frst of these immigrants arrived on a ship called the Empire Windrush in 1948. Te Tory government, in an intentionally hostile environment to immigrants, in 2010 required employers, landlords, schools, and so on, to check people’s immigration status. Te frst group of people to sufer these policies was the Windrush generation. Te prime minister and members of the Conservative Party ultimately publicly regretted the resulting wave of denial of services and loss of jobs299 and considered the policy a fasco. Of all UK immigrant communities, the Afro-Caribbean is the most popular and accepted. Critics believe this failed policy was not an anomaly but an outcome of the United Kingdom’s historical attitude toward former colonies and dominions that supposedly

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make up its “family.” Tey sarcastically advised the Conservatives that “to make the government case more understandable to the wider public it should choose its minority victims more carefully in the future.”300 In light of the wide consensus, from those on the Labour front bench in Parliament to the readers of the Daily Mail, that the United Kingdom acted wrongly toward the Afro-Caribbean minority, we ask, will that defense extend to Muslims? It seems not. Afro-Caribbeans—despite being favorites—have seen decades of discrimination and hostility. But the discrimination is formulated as a question of race, allowing a broad consensus against it. Te Muslim debate is put in terms of cultural and religious identity unrelated to race and thus, as discussed in this chapter, is divisive. As we claim throughout this book, this view that condemns racism but not antimulticulturalism is due to a trifecta of forces: the challenge of Islam and immigration; the radical Right, although in itself not a major electoral contender, advances a modernized supposedly liberal discourse that challenges the political center; and a political center that is redefning and enforcing a discourse of national-democratic civic integration into a core concept of Britishness.301 Eric Kaufmann informs us that in the United Kingdom most nonChristians, apart from Jews, support the left.302 It is one thing for the Labour Party to support Hamas and Hezbollah in the Middle East, or to firt with anti-Zionism. It is a very diferent thing to stand up for Muslim religious rights, and favor immigration, in the current political climate overshadowed by Brexit. Yet the Labour Party leader Keir Starmer will have to consider the party’s conservative anti-immigrant constituency whether he likes it or not. We suggest that, although diversity in the United Kingdom is here to stay, and Muslims, among other communities, will thrive and develop, the state will be increasingly involved in monitoring diversity and will continue to discriminate in favor of those groups and values that ft into a British liberal identity. In the September 2018 National Conversation on Immigration survey, the great majority of British people showed that they are “balancers,” recognizing the rights of asylum seekers and the need for immigration. At the same time, they voice concerns about the impact immigrants have on localities in the short run and demand the obvious: immigrants should assimilate into the dominant culture, which many people still strongly identify with Britishness.303 Tis makes sense, and basically repeats what David Goodhart says in his widely disseminated

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2004 essay “Too Diverse?” Te traditional UK conservatives are “readier to share with, and sacrifce for, those with whom [the British] have shared histories and similar values.”304 Tis then represents the conditional inclusion we point to as the new consensus in the making. It is a necessary third way developing in Western European democracies and is the path that the United Kingdom has taken until now.

Chapter 3

The Netherlands From Religious Toleration to Fortifed Secularity

Pillarization and National Identity

No nation has taken multiculturalism further than the Netherlands, and ironically, no European nation seems to struggle more against recognizing Islam. Tis small nation, which has pinned its fag to the mast of freedom and has been a pioneer in humanitarian legislation and lenient migration policies, has experienced an outburst of public hostility toward Muslims to such a degree that the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance has expressed deep concerns regarding the mounting xenophobic discourse there.1 It is a mystery why a country like the Netherlands, known worldwide for its laid-back and agreeable nature, has embraced Islamophobia and extremist politicians. In a matter of a few years, the Dutch appear to have turned their back on historical characteristics that many people would have argued were what made the country quintessentially Dutch. Dutch social philosophy is shaped by two diferent, yet complementary, forces—one maintaining a tradition of religious diversity and another requiring conformity and cooperation. Te Dutch have built a social and political tradition of creating consensus by abstaining from extremist positions and promoting comprehensive intellectual debates on controversial issues. Tis tradition of civilized discussion, called the poldermodel, originated in medieval times, when the country’s extensive system of dikes made community cooperation a necessity if the country was not to be fooded out of existence. Te continuous struggle against the ferocious North Atlantic required unremitting dedication to the common goal of 171

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survival, a goal that took logical precedence over disputes related to religious and cultural diferences. Tis cultural relic has operated as a force toward convergence, and parties have grown accustomed to living up to their basic need for cooperation and common deliberation. Yet alongside this social convergence is a force of diferentiation, because in more modern times the Dutch custom of parallel coexistence manifested in a sophisticated intellectual sociopolitical structure called verzuiling, or the pillar system. Corresponding to this was a culture of permissiveness known as the gedoogcultuur.2 Te Netherlands’ unique pillar system was laid down in the 1917 Dutch constitution, establishing the right of individuals to organize publicly in support of their beliefs. In the midtwentieth century, the Netherlands could have been perceived as a consociational state in which governance was characterized by guarantees of group representation and an efort to build consensus on important political and social issues. Within this consociational system, the Dutch formalized four religious and ideological pillars: Catholicism, socialism, Calvinism, and liberalism. Tese pillars represented diferent ways of life, diferent philosophies, and almost diferent worlds. Te pillar system allowed vertical segregation of society, with individuals choosing voluntary association with those from their own pillar over a more heterogeneous mixing of groups. Te intellectual foundations of this pillar system derived from a generalized belief in the value of social, institutional, and governmental authority supporting individuals’ eforts to preserve and pursue their conscience by association with like-minded others, sometimes excluding everyone else. Tis system was an expression of the Dutch belief that tolerance is not a passive but an active process. Here, multiculturalism was taken to an extreme—historically, the state’s ideological involvement in the various pillar societies was virtually nonexistent, as Dutch citizens enjoyed wide latitude to formulate their social arrangements within the confnes of their own group. Tis state of existence, which was evident till the end of the 1960s, was formalized in legislation, explicit governmental support, and even subsidies for each pillar. Pillars were granted independent control of and funding for schools, health care, housing, unions, community organizations, political party broadcasting networks, and almost every other institution signifcant to social welfare and cultural fourishing.3 Te only interaction among these social islands occurred in the political arena, where conficting or correlating interests were debated in an open and frank manner by sophisticated leaders. Te pillars ultimately produced a national system with a distinc-

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tive political structure in which unity was not achieved by conforming to a uniform value system but, quite the contrary, by the fourishing of group-based identities. Te Netherlands’ moral code developed not as a preformulated set of rules but as an agreement to disagree on disputed issues while maintaining civic cooperation and a respectful public discourse. Remarkably, tolerance and rational public debate are prevailing characteristics of Dutch society, and organic and subcultural afliations have become insignifcant to national politics and are thought of, instead, as a mostly private and individual matter. Te Dutch social groups that constituted the social pillars did not last, and depillarization took place during the 1960s. American mass culture infuenced all groups and contributed to a homogenization of cultural values. Television broadcasts showed that other groups were not as different or as threatening as some might previously have imagined. Te automobile and increased physical mobility brought people from diferent pillars together. Also, the expansion of the welfare state contributed to the disintegration of the pillars because it provided fnancial support that freed people from dependency on churches, unions, and other pillar-based social support. Finally, the TROS public broadcasting organization, established in 1964, contributed greatly to social cohesion because it rapidly and successfully targeted the wider public unlike the single broadcasting channels that had employed largely education-oriented broadcasts. By the 1990s, identifcation with the ideological pillars had declined dramatically, particularly for religious ideologies. However, although the depillarization and deconfessionalization of Dutch society contributed to a decline of pillarized religious self-perception, identifcation with pillarized secular attitudes remained rather stable.4 Overall, the disassembling of the pillars was induced mainly by the secularization of Dutch society. Some even argue that the pillar system was a poor compromise adopted in the nineteenth century after the failure of liberalism to constitute a total secular, centralized state. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the Netherlands’ pluralized secularism entered a new era.5 Still, this vanguard historical model of state and church separation, or principled pluralism as some call it, had profound infuence on the political system and on the state’s commitment to cultural and religious equality.6 All groups were granted power to exist and thrive by obtaining state support for institutional and organizational facilitators. Tis forbearing temperament ultimately gave the Netherlands a tolerant, lenient, and liberal spirit regarding topics that many other nations treated with

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much more suspicion, including soft drugs, homosexuality, euthanasia, prostitution, and immigration. As Stephen Monsma and Christopher Soper point out, the Dutch model of governance rests on the assumption that healthy and fertile societies contain diversity and promote contesting forces within society, using governmental policies to promote this end. Unlike the French republican model of laïcité, the Dutch model does not rely on a state commitment or aspiration to neutrality. In fact, the Dutch model seems to question whether such neutrality could, or even should, exist. All institutions are perceived as extensions of ideological players and, therefore, legitimate participants in the struggle for power. Neutrality is achieved not by separation of state and ideology but through legitimation of all ideologies, religious or not, and through their regulation and facilitation in governmental institutions.7 It could be said that the Dutch have abandoned the idea of neutrality altogether out of respect for pluralism and follow an uncharted policy empowering all currents of thought within their society. Both structural pillarization and its ideological follower, multiculturalism, downplay the importance of organic afliations and civil and national values in favor of blind faith in the postmodern view of liberal democracies as facilitators of equal yet diferent narratives in society. Lacking a frm sense of national identity or the desire to invest in the formation of moral capital, a common phenomenon in liberal states,8 the Netherlands had limited ability to advocate for its national framework. In this crucial time of religious disenchantment followed by a multicultural glorifcation, Muslims began to speak out. Muslim immigration was accommodated under the 1960s changing notions of the pillar society and ideological and religious tolerance. Te verzuiling and poldermodel had left cultural and institutional relics that continued to thrive under the multicultural dogma and principled pluralism that came after, and religious communities could fourish in a highly secularized state. Whereas the secular multiculturalists’ national perception relied on a secular hegemony, the Muslim perception embraced the pillar model in a multicultural variation that did not necessarily accept a secular hegemony. Te meeting between the multiculturalists and their Muslim protégés turned Dutch acceptance to reluctant toleration. After the transformation of acceptance into toleration, principled pluralism and multiculturalism, two highly regarded Dutch national notions, were no longer complementary notions.

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Libertarian social values; overwhelming acceptance of homosexuality, sexuality, and social permissiveness; and ultraliberal values directly contrast with the values Muslims demand from multiculturalism. Tose who attempt to synthesize these competing interests furiously debate those who stress the incompatibilities between them. As we demonstrate, in the Dutch political scenario the incompatibility segment dominates. Breaking the Dutch Taboo of Tolerance

Te sociopolitical pillar system protected religious and cultural pluralism without undermining national unity. Diversity and collaboration, seemingly contrasting sociopolitical forces, had given birth to the system, but the early application of this pillar structure to Islamic minorities revealed its fragility and faws. Consequently, that vulnerability initiated a powerful identity crisis among the Dutch, followed by a tremendous amount of apprehension with respect to the so-called provoker. Te fading of tolerance and the realization that Dutchness left a vacuum waiting to be flled by assertive Muslims caused a great deal of tension. Indeed, the Netherlands’ brand of multiculturalism went so deep that there seemed no obvious roots to return to. Unlike the United Kingdom, which is able to resurrect Englishness, or France, which aspires to afrm its political secular republicanism, the Netherlands seems confused by its inability to revive any national tradition. Since Dutchness was mainly associated with religious pluralism, tolerance, and a multicultural approach, the abandonment of these characteristics and the lack of an ethno-racial social basis to return to left the nation stripped of identity. Te Dutch are searching for a missing identity, which may arise not by revival but creation of one. Since the nineteenth century, no landowning aristocracy has played any role in Dutch political life, and in general terms the Dutch did not have to deal with their organic ancestry. Although reactionary forces did emerge in the nineteenth century, they were divided among liberal, Catholic, and Calvinist parties. Te only Far-Right party today that is still rooted in this old reactionary background of the nineteenth century is the Reformed Political Party, or Reformed State Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij; SGP). Despite standing against universal sufrage, against women, and in favor of an organic ethnodemocracy, even this party is distinct from many of its European counterparts in not being a nationalist, racist, or xenophobic party.9 Dutch public opinion

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historically has been far from racist, and the extreme right has been historically weak and fragmented, with no strong ideological tradition. In 1977, a negligible racist and nationalist party that targeted poor urban areas with a high proportion of immigrants, the Dutch People’s Union (Nederlandse Volks Unie), failed to win a seat in parliamentary elections. Te real option for Dutch people worried about the preservation of their national culture was not the radical Right but the center of the political spectrum. Nationalists in the Netherlands who believed that the Dutch People’s Union had gone too far organized the Center Party (Centrumpartij), which entered parliament in 1982. Rejecting any extremism or anti-democratic actions, the party declared that its main purpose was the preservation of Dutch culture. Unlike the Dutch People’s Union, it did not favor an authoritarian regime but endorsed the strengthening of democratic institutions and the promotion of direct democracy initiatives. Despite eforts to maintain a center position, the Center Party was identifed with the extreme right. Its president, Hans Janmaat, was considered a fascist, or a wolf in sheep’s clothing. He was expelled from the party in October 1984, but a month later he founded a new party, the Center Democrats. In 1986 the Center Party was reorganized and renamed the Center Party 86 and became fnancially and ideologically dependent on the German National demokratische Partei (German National Democratic Party). Although it gained some marginal success in some urban areas such as Rotterdam, by 1994 it had still not won any seats in parliament.10 Tis has produced tensions between two types of racist elements in the party. Internal rivalries occurred among the Volksnationalisten (ethnonationalists), between the national-socialist wing and a more democratic ethnic, or popular-nationalist, wing, which, in line with the new trend in radical right-wing movements, did not promote racial superiority but advocated racial separation. Te prevalence of the racial superiority branch prompted the Dutch Supreme Court to declare the Center Party 86 a criminal organization. It was dismantled, and its leader, Stewart Mordaunt, was later convicted of promoting discrimination. Te rival of the Center Party 86, the Center Democrats, experienced ups and downs as well. Te Center Democrats promoted state nationalism as opposed to ethnic nationalism and demanded national solidarity including full assimilation of immigrants.11 At the same time, it strengthened its ethnocentric and xenophobic positions, stressing that foreigners received preferential treatment while authentic Dutch citizens were discriminated against. In general terms however, Dutch parties were hesitant to embrace

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ethnocentric platforms because racism and xenophobia continued to be severely condemned as being atrocious and due to ignorance.12 Despite the modernization of their ideological artillery, by the end of the 1990s right-wing extremism had little infuence in the political and social arenas in the Netherlands. Te short lifespan of nationalist and right-wing parties stands as proof of the absence of a Dutch nationalist tradition. Te Dutch working class and unemployed, who constitute the main potential electorate for right-wing parties and endorse the repressive tolerance of the Dutch state, have not centralized on ethno-racial perceptions of nationhood. Indeed, qualms about the Netherlands’ adventurous multicultural path were unfounded and therefore hardly ever voiced, as few were interested in challenging what had become, far more than a national pride, the soul of the nation itself. Te frst mainstream concerns about the government’s multicultural policy were articulated by Frederik (Frits) Bolkestein, the leader of the conservative liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie; VVD) during 1990–1998. In 1991, Bolkestein stated, “Our ofcial policy used to be: ‘Integration without prejudice to everyone’s own identity.’ It is now recognised that this slogan was a bit too easy. If everyone’s cultural identity is allowed to persist unimpaired, integration will sufer.”13 Bolkestein was one of the frst to question the future of the nation as a collective entity given the apparent social devotion to an absolute individualism. He was severely criticized for his attempt to moralize. During the 1990s, criticism intensifed as a new type of right erupted on the political scene. Cas Mudde and Joop van Holsteyn have argued that a right-wing politics, one that synthesizes economic liberalism and a progressive cultural agenda with regard to lesbians and homosexuals and antiMuslim xenophobia, has taken root in Dutch politics.14 Tis movement was initiated by Pim Fortuyn, who wrote a series of books containing sharp commentary about Dutch political and social history. Fortuyn’s books discussed the loss of Dutch tradition and the peril fragmentation posed to socio-national coherency, a fragmentation he argued was facilitated by the governing coalition of socialist and liberal parties (1994–2002).15 Fortuyn’s timing was exceptional, and his words found traction in a social climate that was dealing with an overloaded welfare system and a troubled native-born population that was disturbed by the growing number of foreign languages heard on the street. Te confrontational right-wing rhetoric succeeded chiefy because of decades-long ideological

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monotony. Center-right parties ofered frustrated voters limited options to choose from because stagnating centrist positions had dominated Dutch politics since their convergence in 1977.16 In August 2001, Fortuyn was quoted saying that he supported a “cold war against Islam” on the grounds of its hostile nature. Te dramatic image of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center collapsing a mere month later made Fortuyn’s words seem prophetic. His positions on Islam were an early sign of the complex discourse ahead that would defy any previously known political stance of the liberal, conservative, and national parties in a country with an already atypical political system. Fortuyn soon became the leader of the Livable Netherlands (Leefbaar Nederland) party and attracted much attention.17 In an interview in 2002 he said, “If I had control over the judicial system, there would be no Islamist entering [the country]. . . . I don’t hate Islam, but I fnd it a backward culture. . . . Wherever it rules the situation is horrifc. . . . Where can you fnd a politician of a major party who is openly gay? Tat’s fantastic that that’s possible [here]. Tat’s something to be proud of. I’d really like to keep it that way.”18 After this interview and the public turmoil that followed, Fortuyn was expelled from his party position. However, Fortuyn immediately founded the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn List), which challenged the stagnating centrist cartel by replacing the widespread elitist ideology with tangible goals for electors,19 gaining tremendous popularity owing to its blunt positions. Usually described as a populist right-wing politician, Fortuyn’s political stance was complex. When he was compared to France’s Jean-Marie Le Pen in a BBC interview, he fercely responded they had nothing in common. Whereas Le Pen advocated a right-wing position on race, Fortuyn advocated exactly the opposite because he wished to defend ultraliberalism and its positions regarding women’s rights and homosexuality.20 Islam had been a source of controversy already in the late 1980s as the Iranian revolution and the Salman Rushdie afair sparked public debate concerning the relationship of Islam to terrorism and violence.21 In 1998, about half the Dutch public reported they did not believe that Muslims respected other cultures. A similar number of people believed Muslims could not contribute to society and that the Muslim lifestyle was incompatible with Western culture. A staggering 90 percent believed they were domineering toward women.22 Political positions that expressed reservations about multiculturalism, such as those of Bolkestein and Fortuyn, resulted from the contextual challenge religious minorities posed in the domestic setting. If the state merely

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facilitates diverse narratives, how can it ensure solidarity and tolerance in the face of religious dogma with imperialistic aspirations that defy the ultraliberal virtues that enable the state’s existence in the frst place? Before the late 1990s, sociopolitical questions like these had been disregarded, because few were interested in disrupting national tranquility by raising such grim prospects. Tose who did share such worries generally preferred to let sleeping dogs lie. Tis seemingly tranquil picture was shattered when jets few into the World Trade Center. Te Dutch public was outraged by the sight of Dutch-born Moroccan Muslims in the Netherlands celebrating 9/11 and by Muslims’ understanding of the motives behind the attacks. Further dramatic events had made a social backlash almost inevitable. In 2001, the popular Imam Khalil el-Moumni caused public outrage when he called homosexuality a “contagious disease” and Europeans “lower than dogs and pigs” because of their recognition of gay marriages.23 After complaints by Dutch civil rights groups, el-Moumni was prosecuted under antidiscrimination laws but ultimately acquitted on the grounds that his ofensive statements were passages from religious scripture and thus protected under the Dutch constitutional right to freedom of religious expression. Fortuyn’s assassination on May 6, 2002, nine days before national elections, struck another blow to a society that had not seen a political assassination in centuries.24 Although the assassin was not a Muslim or an immigrant, the backlash was immediate and profound. Polls after these events showed support for deporting Muslims who were sympathetic to terrorism25 and banning the Qur’an,26 an open letter called on Dutch Muslims to avoid adopting a victimized posture and to renounce radical Islam,27 and press commentators announced the national failure of integration.28 Consequently, the coalition government’s decade-long rule ended in 2002 with the immense victory of the Christian Democrats and the Pim Fortuyn List, which established a conservative-right cabinet headed by Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende. Since 2002, adherence to multiculturalism has been perceived as political and social suicide. Calls to reset national norms and values are heard frequently,29 and the nation has gone on a quest to determine how to stop the disintegration of its national identity because “both migrants and their children as well as some autochtones [native Dutch] do not always feel at home in the Netherlands anymore.”30 Te Dutch’s sharp-tongued liberal discourse, which tends to rufe the feathers of all that is sacred and holy, was testing the limits of freedom of speech, targeting Muslims in the name of their own emancipation.

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Around this time, Teo van Gogh, a famboyant and provocative public fgure known for his controversial Holocaust and Vatican-related humor, published a satirical book, Allah weet het beter (Allah knows best). Van Gogh became the national voice for criticism of Islam by referring to Muslims by derogatory names such as geitenneukers (goatfuckers). Van Gogh simultaneously became a passionate supporter of the ex-Muslim Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who was famous for her renunciation of Islam and her bold attacks on her former religion. Hirsi Ali had become a feminist hero in recounting her gruesome genital mutilation and her international fight from an arranged marriage. In the eyes of the public, her frsthand experience legitimated her criticism and gave her credence to tell the “real” story of Islam.31 Hirsi Ali claims to represent the oppressed women of Islam, but the Muslim community—particularly Muslim women—have sternly rejected her and have repeatedly stated that she is promoting not dialogue but stereotypes. Hirsi Ali’s claims have caused ruptures in political and social alliances in the Netherlands, with some regarding the ex-Muslim secular feminist as the fulfllment of the liberal dream and others regarding her as a polarizing demagogue. Hirsi Ali has been calling for direct confrontation between the West and Islam and has viewed any form of appeasement as traitorous and spineless. Hirsi Ali alleges that those who do not stand against Islam must not have learned from Hitler’s rise. She continues her extreme rhetoric by calling the Prophet Muhammad a pedophile and tyrant and has referred to moderate Islam as a wolf in sheep’s clothing.32 In 2004, Hirsi Ali and van Gogh joined forces to make Submission (the English translation of the word “Islam”), a movie addressing the issue of abused Muslim women by showing naked bodies under a transparent veil that were covered with Qur’anic verses written on bare fesh. Muslims’ loud international protests to the movie were publicly pushed aside and interpreted as an unwillingness and inability to modernize and acknowledge freedom of speech. Although Hirsi Ali’s criticism has been compelling to many, some have found her extreme anti-Islamic stance grounds to disqualify her from any meaningful debate taking place within the Muslim community in the West. On November 2, 2004, radical Islam tilted this debate when Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutch-born Muslim, murdered Teo van Gogh. He left a fve-page note, pinned with a knife, declaring war on Western governments, Jews, and several politicians, including member of parliament Hirsi Ali. Te twenty-six-year-old Bouyeri had ties to the Hofstad Network

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(Hofstadgroep), which had been planning several terror attacks.33 Intense public outrage followed after it was revealed by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service that there were sixteen thousand ideological radicals in Amsterdam alone, of whom an estimated ffteen hundred posed a threat of violence.34 Te murder of van Gogh unleashed unprecedented enmity toward Muslims and removed all barriers in the Dutch public discourse, which became so intense that the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance requested authorities to intervene to calm the infamed rhetoric before the mounting racial attacks from both sides became physical.35 Te Anne Frank Institute, an organization that monitors hate crimes, documented 106 attacks on Muslims and mosques and 47 attacks by Muslims on native Dutch and churches in November 2004 alone. Two days after van Gogh’s murder, a bomb exploded at an Islamic school.36 Rotterdam’s alderwoman Marianne van den Anker claimed that Muslims were guilty of gang rapes of ethnic Dutch women. She added that Islam had seven plagues, including female genital mutilation, antihomosexual bias, and honor killings.37 She later suggested that mandatory abortions be performed on Antillean teenagers.38 In 2006 a moral code was proposed by the municipality, asking Muslims to abandon the preference for marrying virgins, to accept sexual activity of women before marriage, and to speak Dutch in public places. Politicians and public fgures repeatedly claim a relationship between Islam and radicalism, violence, primitivism, chauvinism, hypocrisy, and practically all that was considered unappealing to mainstream Dutch society. Te social fury also found political expression, because the four extremeright parties, the Dutch People’s Union, the New National Party (Nieuwe Nationale Partij), the National Alliance (Nationale Alliantie), and the New Right (Nieuw Rechts), gained power while balancing on the line of legality.39 Te sociopolitical climate in the Netherlands has become infused with a grassroots ideology of the right that manifests itself in street activism and a thinly veiled aggressive public discourse conducted under the auspices of freedom of speech.40 A rising chorus has also sought to pin the growing tension within Dutch society on the failure of multiculturalism itself. For example, Geert Wilders, Bolkestein’s mentee and an outspoken politician of rising prominence who combines Fortuyn’s social views with van Gogh’s jagged tone, said, “We are a country of consensus . . . a country of tolerance . . . when it comes to cultural relativism . . . [and] the negative aspects of our multicultural society. . . . We never really face up to problems . . . [but] those problems are there. . . . Look at the reality.”41 Wilders

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considers himself an iconoclastic libertarian. Wilders acknowledges the political paralysis with which cultural relativism endowed the Dutch, and he believes in the need to emphasize the Western, humanistic aspects of moral culture in order to shore up a national identity that is “not tolerant to the intolerant.”42 Te Netherlands has seen itself for decades as an international exemplar and role model on issues concerning human rights, cultural diversity, tolerance, and immigration. It has been historically successful in marginalizing its right-wing parties and voicing its moral protest even while its peers, such as France, Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom, displayed growing ethno-national tendencies.43 However, the self-congratulation turned to self-criticism when the multicultural society that had previously been a cause for celebration seemed to become afraid to speak out about the segregation a failed integration policy had brought about. Why did this small and peaceful nation renounce the values that constituted its identity, its social conduct, and its national pride so drastically? What had gone wrong? Muslim Immigration and the Changing Patterns of Integration

For the Dutch, that Muslims could disrupt their world-renowned open and tolerant disposition was proof of Islam’s antagonistic nature. Indeed, the Netherlands had a long and successful tradition of integration of other immigrant groups. Te small nation had almost seen it all. German seasonal workers arrived during the sixteenth century, Jews after 1619, and French Huguenots at the end of the seventeenth century and gypsies had been openly accepted for centuries.44 During the 1920s, Chinese workers settled in major cities such as Rotterdam and Amsterdam. By the 1950s, tens of thousands of Moluccans and some two hundred thousand Indonesians from former Dutch colonies had moved to the Netherlands. However, the desperate need for cheap labor during the 1970s sent immigration tallies to new heights as the government actively recruited workers from Morocco, Turkey, North Africa, and the Middle East. At the same time, Surinamese and Antilleans who migrated from Dutch colonies and refugees from Somalia, Sri Lanka, Iran, and Iraq were welcomed as well.45 As in most European nations discussed in this book, the early and accommodating immigration policies of the 1960s had been infuenced by Dutch need for manual labor. Te prevailing assumption at the time was

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that the immigrants’ stay would be temporary.46 Preservation of the workers’ culture and customs was, ironically, designed not for the immigrants’ integration but for their departure, and accordingly such migration regulations mainly concerned work and residency permits.47 Yet by the 1970s it had become clear that the guests were planning on staying and that their needs needed attention. During the 1980s, integrative and incorporative policies blossomed while cultural and ethnic-based institutions ofered help to the poor on a national and communal level. Politics were integrative; voting rights were granted to foreign residents in local elections, and more importantly, acquiring citizenship became easier under the modifed Dutch Nationality Code of 1986.48 Welcomed by lenient naturalization regulations of the 1980s, thousands of immigrants arrived as part of family-reunifcation and marriage migration. In the early 1990s, refugees and asylum seekers came ashore.49 By 2002, about 20 percent of the Dutch population were allochthones (of nonethnic-Dutch descent), and 10 percent of the total population belonged to ethnic minority groups, such as migrants and asylum seekers of non-Western descent.50 As of 2014, approximately one million Muslims were in the Netherlands, or 5 percent of the total population.51 Most Muslims living in the Netherlands come from Turkey and Morocco, followed by Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Unlike France and the United Kingdom and other colonial nations, the Netherlands received relatively few Muslim immigrants from its former colonies in Indonesia, the Moluccas, and Surinam.52 In the 1980s, governmental institutions addressed marginalization with comprehensive welfare programs aimed at empowering the diverse minorities in labor, housing, and education. Group-based emancipation suited the evolving multicultural institutions and the pillar model, and programs were executed with emphasis on equality. Tus, Islamic institutions were founded, and legal accommodations for Islamic rituals such as ritual slaughtering, dietary rules, call for prayers, mosque building, and even Islamic festivals took hold. However, the gap between immigrants and the native Dutch remains signifcant and has clear efect on income, unemployment, and crime levels.53 In 2015, a person with a non-Western background was three times more likely to be unemployed than a native Dutch.54 Te average annual income of people with a Dutch background (€26,600) is signifcantly higher than the income of people with a Turkish or Moroccan background

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(€18,200) or a Surinamese or Antillean background (€21,600). Women with a Turkish or Moroccan background have relatively low participation in the workforce.55 Around 13 percent of people with a non-Western background depend on social benefts, compared with a mere 2 percent of the native Dutch. Te International Labour Organization has noted that discrimination in the labor market is more common in the Netherlands than in any other European nation.56 Although educational levels and sociocultural elements might explain some of the diferences, more highly educated people with a non-Western background are still three times more often unemployed than highly educated native Dutch. Furthermore, since the early 2000s, unemployment among non-Western youths has increased more than among native Dutch young people; 22 percent of ffteen- to twenty-fveyear-olds with a non-Western background are unemployed, versus 9 percent of native Dutch youngsters. Te natural consequences of these glum statistics are the notorious ghettos.57 Individuals with Moroccan or Antillean backgrounds are almost six times more likely to be suspected of a crime than a native Dutch.58 Second-generation non-Western youths are more often suspects than the frst generation. One in ten young adults with a Moroccan background is registered as a suspect. One-third of all prisoners are non-Western immigrants. In juvenile correctional facilities, Muslims outnumber those of every other faith group.59 In light of this sober reality, stating that the future of the next generation of Dutch Muslims seems worrying would be an understatement. Te General Intelligence and Security Service has been publishing reports on the small number (an estimated 5 percent of the total Muslim population) of extremists and potentially harmful Dutch Muslims. Most of them are followers of the Salaf branch of Islam. Te agency also notes the growth of neoradicals who wish to overthrow democracy by politicization and who, in service of these goals, organize a professionalized da’wa among local and international communities.60 Tis information accelerated public concern about the future and prompted the government to rethink its liberal policies for minorities. Tere is little doubt that the vicious public discourse on Islam has contributed a great deal to society’s polarization and current standof. Nevertheless, it would be naïve to regard the antagonism between Muslims and natives as a mere outcome of political incorrectness. Social mayhem has had a multiplying efect, but one cannot deny the alienation that existed

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between the two well before the explicit invocation of Islam. Te failure of integration was sensed in ofces and paychecks, among schoolchildren and market crowds, but perhaps most of all, in the polite but distant looks people exchanged. Although the social surface seemed serene for decades, a few were sharp enough to notice that it was precisely this social distance that enabled the coexistence. It was estrangement that kept this marriage going. As these neighbors’ fences collapsed and as parallel lives merged, the diferences between them became clear and could no longer be overlooked. With a loose national identity and a lax integration policy, the ethnic Dutch were destined eventually to collide with a community that had little admiration for the nation’s liberal philosophies. All seemed to acknowledge that integration had to be promoted and not simply presumed; however, the question was how to integrate and, more importantly, integrate into what?61 In the next section, we explore the constitution of Islamic socio-spiritual life as presented by mosques and in Islamic educational systems to reveal the crisis of the Netherlands’ national identity and the contesting forces that wish to enroot their perception of the becoming national identity. Te encounter with the Islamic self-assured homegrown community, probably the most outspoken in Western Europe regarding its position on libertarian matters, has made the Dutch frantic. Legislators, politicians, and other governmental actors have been proposing contradictory and highly confusing solutions that have resulted in a somewhat schizophrenic integration policy and a polarized society. Te outcome of this back-and-forth integration policy is insecurity in Dutch Muslims, who, on the one hand, cling frmly to their ethnic, religious, and cultural roots and, on the other, are in the forefront with new notions on civility. From Accommodation to Formation: The Reentry of the State into Mosques, Education, and Islamic Spiritual Life

One manifestation of the Islamic revival that has caused turmoil in the Netherlands, as in other European nations, is the building of mosques. For many, these highly architecturally distinctive places of worship have come to symbolize the Dutch dilemma regarding the growth of Islamic culture within the Netherlands. Muslims have been successful in institutionalizing religious and cultural interests according to the multicultural legislative terms and opportunities. Te liberal multicultural discourse has paved

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the way for embedding Islamic establishments without simultaneously providing the psychosocial maturity necessary for a cultural equilibrium that is satisfactory to all, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Te founding of mosques symbolizes the right of freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom to explore one’s faith and identity. Simultaneously, such mosques are not necessarily obliged to integrate into civic society, promote public solidarity, or honor the separation of state and church. Tere are almost 500 mosques in the Netherlands. Te Dutch Institute for Multicultural Development declared that the Netherlands had 475 listed mosques: 242 mosques serve the Turkish community, 179 serve the Moroccans, 52 are for predominantly Surinamese Muslims, and another 2 are not linked explicitly to any one particular ethnic community.62 Whereas the number of mosques grows, the number of Protestant and Catholic churches steadily declines; a reported one-quarter of the 4,000 churches in existence are expected to close during the 2020s.63 Te 1983 Minderhedennota, or memorandum on governmental policy on minorities, stated that governmental policy aspired to a multicultural society in which all groups and individuals enjoy equal opportunities, emancipation, and participation. Te consequent policy states the need for recognition of cultural and religious identities of minority groups on the grounds that “religion fulflls a function in developing and enforcing the self-respect and hence the emancipation of many members of ethnic groups.”64 Te constitutional principle of religious freedom acknowledges, and the Bill of Public Manifestations of 1988 reafrmed, Muslims’ right to establish and exercise their religious values. Although these multicultural aspirations were formalized by laws and guidelines, they were carried out under the constitutional framework of church-state relations that altered their implementation. Te rising secular spirit of the 1970s and its historical legislative manifestations led to reduced governmental subsidies to religious establishments and a refocusing on equal rights of minorities and the right of freedom of religion. As a practical consequence, subsidy of religious facilities, and mosques in particular, had become taboo. Despite a lack of direct subsidies for mosques in the 1970s, Dutch institutions made considerable accommodations for the new Islamic presence under a multicultural theory of social development, which triumphed over conventional preferences to secular policies. In 1977 the government made specifc allowance for Islamic and Jewish ritual slaughters. In 1988 the Islamic call to prayer joined ringing church bells, and later Muslim dietary rules and festivals

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received formal recognition in public institutions such as prisons and national establishments. Still, the establishment of mosques remained a sensitive issue, possibly because of their uniquely religious—as opposed to cultural—nature. Te state did fund some cultural and communal activities and organizations so long as they had no connection to any apparent religious nature. However, such regulations were limited in time and funding and had all expired by 1984. In addition, although such policies provided some economic support for the communities’ initial mobilization, they had not provided substantial assistance to the actual building of mosques.65 Te 1980s were dominated by a rising secular discourse that led to repeated attempts to dismantle altogether governmental fnancial support for religious entities. Te Rotterdam municipality, for example, adopted a policy of separation of state and church and abstained from direct funding of religious institutions; however, subsidies remained available for renovation and renewal projects that allowed substantial improvement of Islamic houses of worship.66 Between 1976 and 1983, some public support was made available for Muslim communities’ spiritual needs under the remaining state-church legislation, which was seemingly permitted because of the state’s former belief in the temporary nature of its foreign workers.67 Tis was the background for two proposals to the lower house of parliament in 1984 and 1986 promoted by the Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid; PvdA) and the Freedom and Democracy Party (VVD). Tese proposals noted that “the task of the Government with regard to religion should be limited, whereby all emphasis should be lying on guaranteeing the freedom of a philosophy of life;” and “a selective policy to stimulate particular religious groups is unacceptable.”68 Te fnal attempt to continue the public funding of mosques was the formation of the Hirsch Ballin State Committee in 1988. In its conclusions, the committee strongly supported the creation of temporary regulations permitting public funding for houses of worship for minority groups, considering that they had not been able to enjoy the historical state support Christian establishments had.69 Yet equality and state-church separation eventually overruled the committee’s conclusions, because Dutch society felt that the state’s role in promoting religious freedom was to permit but not to actively support religious development.70 In the Netherlands, as in the United Kingdom, local authorities had much infuence in setting a fully multicultural policy and establishing religious facilities.71 Government committees, such as the 1983 Waarden-

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burg committee, had ordered local authorities to show greater fexibility toward the needs of Muslims. Such committees established nonfnancial accommodations for the community by creating greater access for Muslims to municipal lands and facilities or by showing a more accommodative approach to Muslims’ needs derived out of Qur’anic orthodoxy such as the ban on leasing land. Initially, there seemed to be a remarkable tendency on the part of local authorities to avoid any fundamental discussion on the place of Islam in the public sphere. Instead, they attempted to treat the issue as a bureaucratic one.72 Yet, beginning in the late 1990s, these bureaucratic structures that were formerly perceived as a celebration of cultural diversity turned, in the eyes of the public, into frameworks that enabled alienation.73 Visibility in the public sphere became synonymous with radicalism. As Marcel Maussen asserts, “Te loudest voices in current debates draw on feelings of fear to oppose the full inclusion of Islam . . . instead they ask Muslim Dutch populations to remain silent and invisible.”74 Mosques were also targets of populist attacks. An alderman of Rotterdam, Marco Pastors, proposed preventing minarets on mosques, and Hilbrand Nawijn, a right-wing politician, called for banning mosques entirely. A motion in Rotterdam was made to limit the maximum height for new religious buildings in the hope of diminishing the visibility of minarets.75 According to a large survey conducted by the TV program Netwerk and the newspaper the Nederlands Dagblad, 65 percent of Dutch either agree or completely agree that building of large mosques should halt.76 Te public became concerned about the role of mosques and imams in the cultivation of radicalization. Calls to look into the infuence and impact of foreign fnancial support on the ideological bent of the Dutch Muslim community were made. Several policies were laid on the table. In 2001, a mandatory civic integration program was adopted for immigrant imams. Te program applies to all immigrant clergy, but its prime motivation is reaching Muslim clerics. In addition to linguistic requirements, a course concerning religious diversity and socio-religious guidelines to ft clerics and sermons to Dutch norms are also required.77 In 2005 the Ministry of Education provided the Free University €1.5 million to provide such a course. Tese courses were seen as necessary and crucial to an integrationist agenda, since most of the imams came from Turkey and Morocco and seemed to have little understanding of Dutch society.78 In 2004 the PvdA proposed a ban on foreign imams entering the country; however, a report by the Advisory Committee on Alien Afairs rejected

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the ban because the constitutional right to freedom of religion would require that the ban apply to all foreign clergy, not just Muslim clerics.79 Simultaneously, the government committed itself to a plan of action for mosques in the Netherlands where “extremist sermons” had been delivered. “Interior Minister Johan Remkes . . . told Parliament that if the criminal law [could not] be used against these mosques, the government [would] consider withdrawing subsidies and residence permits for the Muslim clerics preaching at the mosques.”80 In 2007, the General Intelligence and Security Service announced it would explore the foreign funding granted to mosques in the Netherlands following the revelation that the Muslim Brotherhood, a conservative transnational Muslim political organization with many suspected ties to terrorism, had been connected to the establishment of a mosque in south Rotterdam.81 Te efcacy of these intervention initiatives is unclear.82 Many of the imams see themselves solely as representatives of religious afairs, and additionally, their infuence on the coming generation is questionable because youngsters seem to have been seeking other role models.83 Te Muslim community also seems to be apprehensive about such initiatives because they see them as having potential to compromise the independence of the religious clergy. “Palestinian-born Rotterdam Councillor Mohammed Abu Leil,” for example, argues, “Tis motion will make imams like the imams . . . in our countries. Tey are only a loudspeaker for the government.” Tariq Ramadan has been a key fgure in opposing the government’s involvement in imam training. He explains, “Te fear is that we go from dependency on the Middle East to dependency on European governments . . . and we do not want that. We want independence.”84 Te Dutch Muslim community as a whole has been resistant to the new regulations, especially since it believed it had developed an autonomic active religious community despite the government’s decades-long disregard.85 Dutch governments had been partially attentive to these demands. Te state has been acting fairly to accommodate Muslim religious necessities. Mosques have been receiving indirect aid since the 1980s (under the Law on Public Manifestations), and calls to prayer have been accepted similarly to church bells. Dutch television even broadcasts a musical program marking the end of Ramadan. Te question is to what extent the role of the state in controlling and determining the parameters of inclusion fts the Muslim community? Is it a strategy to control the community? Is this attempt at accommodation multicultural accommodation? Is that question politically important?

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The Passing of the Democratic Torch: Education in Public and Private Schools

In the 1980s and with its openness to diversity, Dutch authorities accepted the teaching of Islamic religious and cultural lessons, and some municipalities, such as Rotterdam and Ede, even incorporated information on the Islamic religion and culture in public school curricula.86 Because the public celebrated Islam as part of its pluralistic mosaic society, some initiatives went even further, enabling the use of foreign language in Dutch secular schools. Later eforts to incorporate Islam are more blunt and follow a strict national program aimed at the assimilation of Muslims into a monolinguistic secular culture. Islamic education in public schools was formalized in Articles 29–31 of the Education Act, in which parents could apply for Islamic lessons in Dutch. Tis type of public religious education is subsidized by the government and carried out by Dutch-speaking imams. Public primary schools can deliver an Islamic curriculum if all the parents request it.87 Still, Muslim pupils in public schools are facing formidable challenges. According to data from a 2008 education inspection, fghts and conficts are increasing in schools between immigrant and native students. In secondary schools, 40 percent encounter verbal or physical violence, a 10 percent increase compared with just two years before. Ethnic conficts occurred between students in almost 250 Dutch secondary schools, and fghting, discrimination, and problems with members of the Far-Right Lonsdale Youth movement occur more frequently in vocational and technical schools.88 Several antiracism campaigns have been launched, including the One Equal Treatment for Everyone program that is active in 150 schools across the country.89 Despite these eforts polarization grows, especially among youth. Schools with a high racial mix display considerably lower achievements than others.90 Tese circumstances have driven many Muslim parents to consider private Islamic schools. More than a third of Dutch parents of Turkish and Moroccan origin have stated they would send their children to an Islamic school if possible.91 To accommodate them, another 120 schools would be needed. Some parents of Turkish origin (25 percent) and parents of Moroccan origin (35 percent) report that they prefer Islamic schools to other forms of education.92 Article 23 of the Dutch constitution permits all religious groups to organize and form educational institutions.93 Faith-based schools enjoy

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governmental funding; however, they are obliged to follow a national curriculum that includes civic duty classes. Despite constitutional equality, groups do not operate under equal social conditions. Until the late 1980s, limited institutional availability gave the Muslim community in the Netherlands little choice in educating their children. Only within the last two decades has the community acquired organizational and fnancial strength to fulfll its pedagogical aspirations. Even with the constitutional protections, the founding of Islamic schools has met with continuing obstacles generated mainly, intentionally and unintentionally, by Dutch local authorities. Structured technical and bureaucratic obstacles, such as requirements that faith-based schools be part of a larger umbrella organization, hindered the development of denominational schools. Muslims lacked the structural resources to comply with such requirements.94 Whereas Christian schools seemed to have little difculty breaking ground, the opening of Islamic schools generated heated discussions regarding the advantages and disadvantages of the institutions. Te Dutch public resistance to Islamic faith-based schools surfaced in 1988 in a letter to the legislature’s lower chamber from education experts and public fgures. Te letter discussed primary schools based on Hindu or Islamic principles and denominational schools’ downsides. Its writers believed that private schooling increased a sense of isolation. Te letter warned that the formation of groups based on separate languages and nationalities would result in the pupils’ impaired knowledge of Dutch language and culture and, consequently, leave these students with fewer opportunities for socioeconomic integration. Representatives from Muslim umbrella organizations criticized the letter, and the state reafrmed its commitment to the basic idea of intercultural education: the living and learning together of children of diferent backgrounds.95 Despite these early public reservations, the state had limited ability to halt the growth of these schools, because regulations rooted in the pillar model allowed Islamic denominational schools. By the 1990s, the Muslim community’s organizational eforts had started to deliver results. Te frst Islamic primary school had opened in 1988. By 1992, the number had grown to twenty, mainly concentrated in large urban centers like Rotterdam, the Hague, Eindhoven, and Amsterdam.96 In 2010, there were forty-one Islamic schools, with a total of 9,318 pupils. By 2019, a total of 12,500 students were studying at ffty-three Islamic schools nationwide.97

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Te state’s interest in these Islamic educational institutions increased throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, as concerns and suspicions occasioned by global events such as the Rushdie afair increased. It became apparent that, to achieve integration, the state would have to monitor the delivery of Islam to young Dutch children. Diverse initiatives sought to incorporate Muslim children into Dutch institutions. For example, to create a more welcoming atmosphere for Muslim pupils in public schools, educational institutions and municipalities were advised to include Islamic instruction in public schools. However, such attempts were marginal and limited. More direct initiatives sought to enforce assimilation by preventing the establishment of Islamic schools in general, after charges were made that they were incompetent and caused radicalization. Beginning in 1989, the government initiated several investigations on the educational incompetence of Islamic schools.98 In the second half of the 1990s, educational materials provided by the Al-Aqsa group, afliated with Hamas and the Saudi Al-Waqf al-Islami group, sparked discussion about the growing infuence of foreign political actors on Islamic education in the Netherlands.99 Te General Intelligence and Security Service expected these organizations to gain power as a consequence of the socioeconomic malaise, marginalization, and exclusion of Muslim immigrants, resulting in polarization and disruption of integration. Fundamentally, all aspects of governmental policy during this period were aimed at halting the growth of an independent generation opposing integration. Radical speeches and writing from Muslim fgures such as Imam ElMoumni caused Dutch authorities to put Islamic institutions under even closer examination. Since 2003, the political arena has been dominated by right-wing demands regarding immigration and immigrants. Tis has resulted in the abolition of minority language and culture teaching (bilingual education for Turkish and Moroccan students), the cancellation of subsidies for immigrant organizations, and the provision of subsidies for Dutch-language courses for newly arrived immigrants.100 Following the van Gogh murder and the July 2005 London bombings, misuse of public funds and the inadequacy of institutions such as Islamic schools became a national security issue. Utrecht’s alderman of education suggested legislative options for closing poorly performing Islamic schools.101 In 2008, the state secretaries of education, Sharon Dijksma and Marjavan Bijsterveldt, announced that almost 90 percent of Islamic schools made fraudulent use of public subsidies. Education quality is weak to very weak in half the schools (compared with a mere tenth of normal and other

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faith-based schools).102 Te conviction among political elites is that Islamic schools are failing to meet educational and civic standards; however, the alternatives seemed to be even worse. Lacking the fnancial or regional ability to send children to Islamic schools, some parents compensate for the lack of Islamic education by having their children attend extracurricular educational activities in mosques. However, unlike denominational schools, mosques do not have state supervision of their materials. A study on the pedagogic activities of mosques in Rotterdam found that the mosques’ teaching materials were in either Arabic or Turkish, and educational activities focused almost entirely on shoring up the Islamic identity. Te secular nature of the state was totally ignored.103 Many of the mosques’ managers stated they were unsure what was being taught during lessons since most teachers spoke only Arabic or Turkish.104 In 2006, the government started developing new policies and regulations regarding Islamic pedagogy that would enable even greater state intervention in institutions and operations.105 Liberal conservative politicians have publicly stated that they wished to halt the creation of Islamic schools on the grounds that the disadvantaged students who attend these schools may be educated in anti-Western and antidemocratic ideology. In 2005, Maria van der Hoeven, minister of education, proposed a bill that would have required all members of Islamic school boards to be Dutch citizens. Te same bill proposed requiring that all schools state how they plan to promote Dutch norms and values and that no more than 80 percent of any student body be composed of students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds.106 Tis proposal was among the more moderate suggestions. More extreme examples abound. For example, secular and atheist public fgures demanded the abolishment of Article 23 of the Dutch constitution and, consequently, the termination of faith-based schools of all varieties. Te stand of Herman Philipse, a professor of philosophy at Utrecht University, on the constitutional provision was clear and simple: “In 1979 it might have looked like a nice idea, but now I think it’s a very bad idea. . . . I don’t think it’s the role of the state to pay for illusions. . . . You pay taxes for education of math, language, history and other branches of sciences . . . not illusions. . . . Te integration of non-Westerners will be hindered severely if we let them create their own schools; they already have their own satellite dishes. . . . Schools must have a function of integration, . . . everybody into the same school and let it be as mixed as possible, not a school for

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Turkish Muslims and Moroccan Muslims. Tat’s in my opinion a disaster for another forty years.”107 Fears for the future of ultraliberalism and pressures exerted by atheist groups kept the apprehension about faith-based schools high. Geert Driessen and Michael Merry found that “there are no legal obstacles to Islamic schools, yet there is growing criticism and resistance. . . . Islamic schools, though at one time very promising in the Netherlands, now face insurmountable challenges from the Minister of Education.”108 Nevertheless, in 2013 it was found that the forty-three recognized primary Islamic schools achieved a higher score in their fnal school-leaving exam than the national average.109 Indeed, many Muslims see the Dutch political pillar system as enabling them to practice their faith and build their communities. It therefore complements, not contradicts, their Muslim identities. Tariq Ramadan, pointing out this relationship between Muslim goals and freedoms aforded by liberal societies, has stated that he fnds countries such as the United Kingdom more Islamic than certain Arab nations, since “protection of religion, life, intellect, family, goods and dignity is much more a reality in the West than under the Arab Islamic countries. Nothing is ideal, but we have to acknowledge these facts.”110 Te problem, as we later demonstrate, is that the colliding interests within a multicultural state raise the difcult question of whether the state can ever remain neutral in light of intercultural conficts. Te Dutch answer, essentially, is that it cannot. The Muslim Identity and the Netherlands Not Going Dutch: The Islamic Civil Identity

Te Netherlands Institute for Social Research (Sociaalen Cultureel Planbureau; SCP) has studied the changing patterns of Islamic religious identity since the late 1990s. Muslims tend to be more devout if they are unemployed or uneducated; however, even among Muslims who have achieved higher education, one in four remains devout. For the young, being a religious Muslim does not mean merely attending mosque for prayers but, rather, constitutes a vigorous political identity that the SCP describes as an individualized Islam.111 First- and second-generation Moroccans and Turks are somewhat secularized, but their afliation with Islam has increased since the late 1990s. Whereas several studies reveal that a mere 40 percent of ethnic Dutch afliate with a religion, more than 95 percent of Moroccans and Turks describe themselves as Muslim.112 Te Islamic element,

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whether expressed by devout practice or not, is dominant and central to many Muslim’s concept of identity. First-generation Muslims tend to afliate with a formal, traditional, and institutionalized Islam, and the younger generation presents its own highly individual, subjective experience of faith, but both generations are highly alike in the importance they attach to their Islamic identity. Te afrmation of the Islamic identity has sociocultural implications that afect the nation’s polarization. Unsurprisingly, the more Islamic a person feels, the less probable it is that he or she has a job, speaks Dutch well, or has ethnic Dutch friends. Dutch Muslims are, in many cases, not taken with the Dutch’s liberated spirit and not in a hurry to adopt local mind-set. Te SCP’s research reveals that more than 90 percent of Moroccans and Turks marry within their own ethnicity, and about 60 percent of their partners were brought from their homelands for the marriage.113 Homosexuality, accepted in mainstream Dutch society, is strongly condemned in the Islamic communities.114 Over 50 percent of Dutch Moroccans and Turks oppose same-sex marriage, compared with 22 percent of the general population.115 One-third of Turks and half of Moroccans state that women should wear a headscarf outside the home; the same proportions consider the religious upbringing of their children to be of the utmost importance. Gauging devotion of Muslims by examining mosque attendance alone seems a fawed metric, because for many, Islam permeates all aspects of life.116 Islamic identity for younger generations has become their most dominant cultural afliation, overriding ethnic or national identities, but this identity is based on a subjective, modern, and highly individualized interpretation of Islam. As one young Muslim said when interviewed, “If I want to have a beer, I have one, . . . that’s between me and God.” Muslim girls explained that if they did not pray during the day, they “catch it up” at night. When asked why they did not wear a headscarf, they said, “I’m not there yet,” or “It isn’t written anywhere that I should wear it.” Even rules regarding sexual relationships have loosened, with many youngsters still objecting to premarital sex, reporting, however, that just being “boyfriend and girlfriend” is all right because it “doesn’t mean you aren’t a virgin anymore.”117 Young Muslims’ individual and subjective experience of Islam often has only remote ties to traditional and conservative practices. Although Islam dominates their life, only one out of fve Muslims wants to formally incorporate Islam as a political force in government.118 In groundbreaking research Martijn de Koning has shown precisely how the Islamic identity is formed vis-à-vis the secular democratic iden-

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tity of the Dutch. For example, in debates about the meaning of tolerance, Dutch atheists take an egalitarian stance—for them, everyone is equal regardless of race or religion. For Muslims, however, not being interested in Islam equates to not being interested in a person who is Muslim.119 For Muslims and even some Christians, an atheist is indiferent rather than tolerant. De Koning distinguishes four strands of identity politics in young Muslims that emerged in reaction to Dutch secular identity and Dutch claims against Islam. Te frst is held by youngsters who feel threatened because Islam is accused of being a violent culture. For these youngsters, Islam has no inherent characteristic that prevents peaceful interaction with other people. Violence, in their interpretation, is not permitted in Islam. Youngsters in a second, more activist group act assertively. Similar to London’s East End young Pakistanis, the activist strand can paradoxically take an isolationist form, represented by outward appearance such as wearing a beard. Some follow street political activism against so-called unjust treatment of Muslims, and a small number of them have moved so far from mainstream society that they even celebrated the assassination of van Gogh. A third group is composed of young people who defne themselves as Muslim but who do not really practice their religion and are generally not interested in politics. In most cases they defne themselves as Muslim as an act of solidarity and occasionally, rarely, they can even be mobilized on this basis. A fourth group has become disappointed with Islam, especially after the murder of van Gogh. It seems that outside pressure redefnes Islamic identity in Muslims. Tis is especially apparent in the second and third groups, which again raises the question of the meaning attributed by these groups to tolerance. For ethnic Dutch, tolerance should be demanded from the minority group. Tey fear that an intolerant minority will put limits on the open and tolerant Dutch way of life. Tis conviction is shared by orthodox Christians. However, young Moroccan Muslims like the idea that their intolerance is tolerated. Teir discourse has become a counterdiscourse to the cynical tolerance of the Dutch. Muslims, under the banner of tolerance, demand their own identity and criticize Dutch people for discrimination and failing to live up to Dutch standards.120 Te UK public debate is haunted by radicals, terrorism, and Islamism. Te Netherlands, despite encounters with the same issues, sees the central challenge posed by Islam as tolerance in a secular multicultural society. But the Dutch join the general European trend in their laws. Te Netherlands

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Municipalities Act of 2002, for example, empowers mayors to declare security risk zones in which anyone can be subjected to a preventive search. Te Crimes of Terrorism Act of 2004 criminalizes recruiting for jihad, and the Witness Identity Protection Act (2006) allows reports of the General Intelligence and Security Service to be entered into court proceedings as documentary evidence. Te central worries of the Dutch state go further than terrorism, and it focuses on how the Netherlands can be tolerant and strict while also maintaining a Dutch identity. Te tolerance embedded in Dutch identity might sound promising for Muslims, but it is ultimately disappointing because it is tolerance based on power and not on recognition. Individualized Islam and Secular Fortifcation

Like most European nations, the Netherlands needed more than two decades before its organizations fully recognized independent ethnic, national, or religious denominators. In the 1980s the Muslim community started to organize collectively with the assistance of ethnically based organizations and mosques that, with time, proved to be empowering facilitators of political participation and an inspiration to the entire community.121 Researchers from the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies at the University of Amsterdam, such as Jean Tillie and Anja van Heelsum, have been monitoring the changing patterns of Muslim votes. In 1998, the estimated national turnout among Turks was around 40 percent and among Moroccans around 28 percent.122 In the years that followed, these fgures soared. A series of events—the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Teo van Gogh, the aggressive rhetoric of Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Khalil El-Moumni—catalyzed a social awakening among Muslims. Te political drama started with Hirsi Ali admitting that she lied on her application for asylum. In May 2006, Immigration Minister Rita Verdonk in response suggested an examination of Hirsi Ali’s naturalization process.123 Tat led to Hirsi Ali relocating to the United States. Politicians, including from Hirsi Ali’s and Verdonk’s VVD party, demanded Verdonk’s immediate resignation because of her poor handling of the case, but Minister Verdonk refused to resign and received support from Prime Minister Balkenende. Te ensuing confict ultimately led to the collapse of Balkenende’s government. Hirsi Ali’s vocal attacks on Islam had left her with little support in the community,124 but

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the awareness surrounding immigration and Islam drove many Muslims to the ballot box. In the May 2006 general elections, voter turnout among Turks was an estimated 71.5 percent, and among Moroccans it was 69.1 percent.125 Te turnout in the 2006 municipal council election was 51 percent among those of Turkish background in Amsterdam and 56 percent in Rotterdam, and for Moroccans it was 37 percent in Amsterdam and 54 percent in Rotterdam.126 Research from 2002 revealed that Moroccan Muslims had lower voting rates than ethnic Dutch, and Turks had a higher turnout.127 Turkey’s fairly modern and democratic secular regime probably contributes to greater familiarity and participation among those of Turkish origin.128 Te noticeable diference between the two groups toward democratic institutions may be an indication of diferent attitudes toward the Dutch society and an emergence of two strands in Dutch Islam that dialectically difer but converge on many issues. Muslims have not just increased participation but also have experienced a convergence of political perspectives. In the 1998 elections, 55 percent of Moroccans voted for the Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij; SP), and 47 percent of Turks voted for the PvdA (Labor Party). By 2006, support for the PvdA had increased to an astonishing 87 percent among Turks and 77 percent among Moroccans. Similar trends were observed among Surinamese and Antillean communities. By contrast, only 35 percent of ethnic Dutch supported the PvdA in the 1998 and 2006 elections. In the heated atmosphere of the 2006 municipal elections, van Heelsum concludes, it became “clear that the negative political setting toward immigrants  .  .  . infuenced all aspects of immigrant voting that we studied.”129 Many ethnic Dutch began to see multiculturalism as naïve, and facing Islam’s “true” nature became seen as the brave thing to do. As Hirsi Ali explained before her departure to the United States, “Many illusions on the multicultural society have vanished for good: we have become much more realistic and open in the debate.”130 In the March 2010 elections, turnout remained high despite predictions for lower participation by Muslims.131 As the formerly liberal and tolerant discourse took on an exclusionary, stigmatizing, and vicious tone,132 immigrant voting patterns changed. Polls refected this shift in thought. In 1998, 45 percent of native Dutch reported believing that Muslims could contribute to Dutch society; by 2012 only 14 percent felt so. Similarly, the number of Dutch reporting a belief that Muslims respected Western culture declined, and beliefs about the fundamental incompatibility of Western and Islamic ways of

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living grew.133 Te Netherlands and Germany are the only two European nations in which polls show a majority of citizens holding unfavorable views of Islam.134 However, these changes in perception were not entirely due to changed awareness of past behavior. As Muslims’ organizing grew, the community had a stronger sense of self-reliance and less desire to conform to the customary ideal of integration. When the Dutch marginalized Muslims under multicultural policies, Muslims developed an unprecedented independent and self-reliant communal sphere. Tey had almost no desire to take part in the society that had been shunning them for decades. Tis separatist ideology is refected in polls showing that 58 percent of people of Turkish origin currently living in the Netherlands identify themselves solely as Turks, and only 12 percent consider themselves to be part of Dutch society. Moroccans have a slighter stronger bond with their Dutch identity. Tese numbers are considerably lower than they are in France. Resistance to integration shows that, although stronger Islamic identity may lead to greater political participation, that participation should not be regarded as evidence of integration. Dutch Islamic organizing seems to empower the community and motivate participation in the public sphere; however, this should not be confused with a desire to adopt the majority’s liberal value system. Te polarization of Dutch society is one of its most distinctive characteristics and is the worst observed in Western Europe; the long policy of enabling and even encouraging parallel lives has led to entrenchment of diferences and has left little will for parties to reconcile. After the 2003 elections, the lower house of parliament, the only directly elected and the most powerful parliamentary body, had at least 10 (out of a total of 150) members with a Muslim background.135 After the 2006 elections, at least fve members in the lower house were of Muslim background.136 On February 22, 2007, two individuals with Muslim backgrounds were appointed to the thirteen-member cabinet of Prime Minister Balkenende’s fourth coalition. Nebahat Albayrak became state secretary of justice, and Ahmed Aboutaleb was appointed state secretary of social afairs and employment. In the twelve provincial elections, 4 percent of all council members were of non-Western origin. Muslims gained more extensive political representation in the Dutch municipal elections in October 2008, when Rotterdam, the second-largest city in the Netherlands, elected Ahmed Aboutaleb, a member of the PvdA (Labor), as mayor.137 Aboutaleb’s remarkable story indicates what liberal Dutch might expect of newcomers. He was born in a small village in

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Morocco, the son of an imam. He immigrated to the Netherlands at age ffteen, a relatively late age. He learned Dutch and worked to suppress his Moroccan accent. He completed higher education, remaining a devoutly religious person in private. Aboutaleb was such a symbol of what Dutch society wanted an integrated Muslim to be that an anti-immigrant party (Leefbaar Rotterdam) had courted him in its search for ministerial appointees after its electoral success in 2002. Aboutaleb rejected the invitation, instead becoming a PvdA councillor in Amsterdam. His election in 2008 as mayor of Rotterdam came as a surprise, not only because he was the frst Muslim mayor of a major European city and the frst immigrant mayor in the Netherlands but also because, before 2008, he had spent his entire political career in Amsterdam, Rotterdam’s rival city. Te question here is what does Aboutaleb represent? Is he the new Dutch Muslim? Is he an example for others, contributing to a new Dutch acceptance of Muslims? On the day of Aboutaleb’s 2008 inauguration, Marco Pastors, leader of Livable Rotterdam, still an important force in the municipal government after the 2002 city elections, asked him to relinquish his dual citizenship and mail his Moroccan passport back to his homeland. Aboutaleb rejected the suggestion. Pastor had clearly shifted his position from racist animosity to acceptance of Aboutaleb as a good administrator. Even while Muslim individuals are successful, elected to public ofce, and applauded, the public’s favorable perception of Islam continues to decline. Te organized Muslim community is not similarly accepted and neither are its claims for religious rights. Jan Rath states, “Te fear [felt by ethnic Dutch] that existing traditions, arrangements and power positions, or newly acquired liberties, will be brought into jeopardy, works against the recognition of Muslim institutions.”138 Tere is clearly a vivid, autonomic, autodidact, and ambitious form of Islam in the Dutch Muslim community. Denying recognition of this growing entity would be contradictory to Dutch nature, or as Rath explains, “[Muslims] make use of common, hence universally valid, constitutional rights—including freedom of religion and the principle of equality—which rightly are held to be of the highest importance in the Netherlands. Anyone questioning these rights encroaches on the foundations of their own society.”139 Dutch Islam acquired organizational and sociocultural awareness while using Islamic identity as a tool for political empowerment. It consequently has, at the moment, little interest in or need for the infuence of state

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socio-moral initiatives. Te institutionalization and organization of Muslims has been the subject of recurring research.140 Te growth in formal group afliation has been marked. For example, in 2002, only 1 percent of Moroccans and 7 percent of Turks were members of Islamic organizations, but by 2004 an estimated one-quarter of all Turks and one-ffth of Moroccans had joined such organizations. Tese organizations mostly mobilize around education, mosques, and media portrayal of Muslims, and many are in constant contact with governmental ofces. Turkish organizations appear to be especially efcient because of their advanced grassroots organizational structures.141 Although Muslims have demonstrated a recognizable ability to participate in and integrate into municipal and governmental positions, these leaders have varying degrees of infuence within the community itself. Dutch authorities, as is the case in most Western European states, have had great interest in the facilitation of national Muslim organizations, which can articulate the community’s religious and cultural needs to national authorities. Dutch authorities’ desire to understand Muslims’ needs and execute policies make national representation crucial. Tis representation is very much in keeping with the basic philosophical European tradition that human spiritual life should develop out of the deliberation between the church and the state.142 Yet Dutch Muslims have had difculties developing national representative institutions. Commonly cited reasons are the relatively young status of the community and its organizations; the high national, ethnic, and religious diversity among Muslims; and the nonhierarchical and fragmented nature of Islam itself.143 Dutch authorities naturally look for a unifed Islamic entity to efciently design and apply antiradical and prointegration policies,144 but they fail to take into consideration that the profound efect of the Netherlands’ cultural pluralism is to induce variety rather than unity. Carolyn Warner and Madfred Wenner observe that, while European governments try to channel Muslims into representative peak organizations, the broader European context facilitates the multiplication of Islamic groups, rather than their consolidation or unifcation.145 Tis statement is especially applicable in the Dutch case. Ironically, although authorities were looking for organizational cooperation and moderate leadership, Dutch social values, after the 1970s, were imbued with individualism. Research on group demands of migrants in France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands followed the claims for recognition, exemption, and support in nations with variants of cultural pluralism and consequent integration policies. It found

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that many of the group rights accommodations made in the Netherlands were not even requested by Muslims.146 Dutch Islam indeed includes a wide variety of diferent perceptions regarding Islamic identity. Dutch Islam is represented in diverse individualized forms, with some following very strict orthodox Salaf branches, and others having adopted an almost hip, younger character. Te tacit social encouragement to establish a unique identity has fostered the growing involvement of lands of origin and ethnic identities, as well as spurred the birth of new, liberal interpretations of Islam. Foreign infuences on the Dutch Muslim community are most prevalent in religious matters; the Turkish and Moroccan governments have been subsidizing religious organizations and activities. Dutch governments have deplored this foreign infuence on the diaspora, especially after the murder of van Gogh, and have accordingly tried to lessen homeland intercession by relocating authority on spiritual matters to be within Dutch borders. Tis goal is refected in various domestic initiatives, such as the home training of imams. Te Dutch Consultation for Ethnic Minorities (Landelijk Overleg Minderheden) is the governmental facilitator of cooperative policy design between governmental authorities and ethnic groups. It is a collective of ethno-national-based organizations that discuss and advise governmental policies.147 Two organizations, the Contact Body Muslims and Government (Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid) and Islam Contact Group (Contact Groep Islam), the state accepts as national representatives of the Muslim community. Tey receive full public funding and discuss integration with authorities. Te Contact Body Muslims and Government represents four major Turkish organizations (including Millî Görüş, a religious-political movement, and the Diyanet, the governmental religious afairs department), the Union of Moroccan mosques, and the Surinam World Islamic Mission. Together, the Contact Body Muslims and Government and Islam Contact Group represent approximately half a million Dutch Sunni Muslims, or 80 percent of all Dutch Muslims. Te Contact Body Muslims and Government is an umbrella organization that presents a unifed position on matters concerning integration for the six national mosque federations. It gained state recognition in 2004. Te Islam Contact Group, established by Shiite and non-Sunni groups, represents about 15 percent of the Netherlands’ Muslims. It gained state recognition and funding in 2005.148 Tese umbrella organizations rarely agree on policies, in part because they speak for such diverse groups.

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Muslim organizations have a questionable ability to represent the younger generation, a troubling issue for authorities, because these identity-seeking youngsters could easily turn to fundamentalist or radical ideas ofered by foreign imams or even available on the internet. A generation gap has left many Moroccan organizations out of touch with their youngsters. Turkish organizations seem to have better connections to the young and greater capability to incorporate them.149 Tese organizations might have, in fact, an anti-integrative infuence on the community.150 Allegations of the organizations’ involvement in extremism are rare, however, and none of these organizations hesitate to condemn violence or even speech opposing integration.151 Organizations have developed a sophisticated democratic discourse that sees little contradiction between Islam and a modern lifestyle, and young Muslims indirectly supported by a state public philosophy of rebellion against stifing structures use their individualism to preserve the distinctiveness of their Islamic identity. Te emerging young Muslim leadership is a case in point. In the March 2010 elections, the municipality of the Hague added two Muslim parties to its council: Islam Democrats (Islam Democraten) and Party of Unity (Partij van de Eenheid).152 Te Islam Democrats party, led by Delikaya Dilaver, Makkor Majid, and Kucuk Hasan, presented an interesting platform that gives insight into the possible national policies that Muslims in the Netherlands would like to promote. It supports a multicultural society but true integration as well. It objects to radicals and extremists and asks for greater respect in society. Te platform calls for freedom of religion in education, creation of more faith-based schools and prayer houses, and extended help for elders and families with limited fnances. It wants to limit cannabis-selling cofee shops, illegal gambling, and street prostitution, especially near Muslim neighborhoods.153 Abderazaq Khoulani, who established the Party of Unity after his departure from Islam Democrats, does not talk of integration but of the preservation of the Islamic identity, and he promotes better social understanding with non-Muslims. Khoulani advocates returning to a society that respects religion along with freedom of speech, and more interestingly, welcoming Muslims, rather than current policies that push Muslims to conform to a preset standards of civility.154 Tese two political parties are battling for position with the Party for Freedom (Partijvoor de Vrijheid; PVV), which came in second in Te Hague council after the PvdA. Tese parties give a notion of the interesting political thought this community has, going against some of the Netherlands’ most visible ultraliberal features and pro-

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moting conservative values along with a multicultural notion of freedom in society. However, probably the most recent and striking disruptive political experience in Muslim identity politics in line with Khoulani’s ideas is represented by the appearance of the Muslim political party Tink (Denk), founded after two Turkish-born parliamentarians, Tunahan Kuzu and Selçuk Öztürk, were expelled from the PvdA at the end of 2014 for resisting civic integration for immigrants advanced by the PvdA deputy minister Lodewijk Asscher. Tink, thus, is a direct response to integrationist policies, even if well intentioned, but especially against nativist and isolationist positions promoted by Geert Wilders and his Freedom Party, which has been surging in the polls. Tink strives to change PvdA’s concept of integration to that of acceptance, and it promotes establishment of a racism register, in line with the Freedom Party’s, to track and condemn the use of hate speech against religion. At the symbolic level, the party aspires to build a Dutch slavery museum; abolish the black minstrel character Black Pete, which is displayed in Dutch winter holidays; and ban using in legislative debates allochtoon (immigrant), an insulting Dutch word used by whites against nonwhites in the Netherlands. Tink carries on the program advanced by the International Institute for Scientifc Research, based in the Hague, whose purpose is decolonizing the Western enlightened mind. Te contribution of Tink to the politics of identity in the Netherlands and in Europe is that it does not promote Muslim candidates as do most similar political parties in Europe. Te party is a representation of the ethnic voice itself and as such looks for the vote of communities of people of color. Te strategy has proved successful. At the 2017 elections, votes for Tink exceeded those of the PvdA and Wilders’s PVV in at least three big cities. In Rotterdam it got 7.1 percent and in Te Hague, 8.1 percent of votes. PvdA got 6.5 percent and 6.4 percent, respectively, in those cities. In the capital, Amsterdam, the party’s 7.5 percent of total votes exceeded Wilders’s Far-Right PVV’s 7.1 percent. Tink has created a problem for Muslim politicians who have made careers in center-left parties. People such as Ahmed Aboutaleb, who is Moroccan-born and belonged to the Labour Party, and Ahmed Marcouch, a member of parliament in the PvdA also born in Morocco and who has lived in the Netherlands since 1979, are as integrated as the Turks Tunahan Kuzu and Selçuk Öztürk. Tey difer however, in the way they understand integration and in the way they make use of their political opportuni-

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ties. Te founders of Tink represent a new type of proimmigrant, antiintegrationist populism rising up in Europe. Tey challenge the language of the Enlightenment and ask communitarian leaders to endorse it. Tis strategy fts better with the radicalization project of Wilders than the integrationist projects of the Labor party. At the intellectual and ideological level, Tink might be defning the politics of Muslim identity in the near future. The Debate on National Identity and Cultural Toleration: The Materialization of the Netherlands’ Invisible Nationalism

Te veil of political correctness has been brutally pulled of the Netherlands’ public discourse, leaving the world pondering the dramatic turn this formerly peaceful nation has taken. Dutch ultraliberalism has left this nation fghting for its soul, stripped of almost any recognizable virtue or tradition to cling to in its insecurity. Te Dutch have reached a crossroads that may portend the international struggle ahead; multiculturalist and relativist theories have left citizens of liberal democracies severely conficted on the appropriate manner of integrating and simultaneously facing quite rigid group identities. Despite receiving harsh criticism, some pioneers voiced their concerns early on. Te early 1990s had made clear to most parties that priority should be given to immigrants’ socioeconomic development over their cultural preservation.155 In 2000, almost two years before 9/11, Paul Schefer, a wellknown columnist for NRC Handelsblad, wrote about multiculturalism’s threat to national solidarity and in doing so reignited the public debate.156 Schefer expressed what many felt but few articulated: that there were too many immigrants.157 During the 1990s, when economic recession hit hard and immigrant crime made headlines, Dutch society began to change its perception of cultural diversity. Te Ministry for Immigration and Naturalization also started to reduce the number of citizens (1.8 million) who possessed double citizenship.158 As response to the infux of asylum seekers and the complex and prolonged process of review, the Aliens Act of 2000 was formalized, reducing asylum seekers to a mere quarter of the applicants of the late nineties. Indeed, what was once the most liberal asylum process in all Europe had become the harshest one.159 Tis retreat from multiculturalism was developing at the time that a self-aware, outspoken, and frm Islamic identity presented itself in the

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public debate with all the buoyancy and poise that the Dutch had not exhibited. Timid Dutch were left stuttering and mumbling as Muslims stood self-assured in their convictions on faith, conduct, morality, and social manners. After radical Islam’s arrival, the public discourse could no longer accept Islam’s presence with the empty slogans regarding tolerance and freedom and consequently began a national quest for a Dutch answer to the challenges. Indeed, nowadays one can see support for Dutch nationalism, atypical for the Dutch because nationalism was highly correlated in the national consciousness with the trauma of World War II’s ethnonationalism. Any form of ethnical, racial, or xenophobic bias was considered reprehensible, because of the Dutch severe collective guilty conscience about its failure to protect its Jewish community. Te Holocaust had transformed the Dutch to be overcautious with respect to these issues, despite the prewar authentic Dutch mentality having generally been one of tolerance and that could “distinguish itself for its preeminently matter-of-fact treatment of ethnic minorities.”160 However, the national minority debate of 1991, Schefer’s essay on “multiculturele drama” (multicultural drama), and the debate about the radical imam El-Moumni had all escalated the discourse on minorities to a “realistic” level.161 After the shattering of the taboo on ethno-related criticism, nostalgia for the past could be heard from both the left and the right, yet their object of desire still seemed ill defned. Prime Minister Balkenende, for example, mused that the nation might need to consider a return to its VOC mentality,162 referring to the highly unifed, morally corrupt, imperialistic Protestant spirit Dutch had in the seventeenth century. Others, such as Rita Verdonk, encouraged political parties to emphasize national pride, uncommon in the Netherlands’ usual political climate. Te PvdA’s spokesperson Lilianne Ploumen denounced the policies of refexive tolerance and encouraged an end to “the existence of parallel societies within our society.” She and others believed integration had failed because of “trouble-making, by men who refuse to shake hands with women, by burqas and separate courses for women on citizenship.”163 In June 2008, Ella Vogelaar, minister of integration and housing, said, “Dutch should defend their European characteristics better in front of Muslims. . . . Tey are frightened when criticized about homosexuality, for example, or naked women and other issues that we consider totally normal.”164 Although it is unclear what this common national feeling is, its deep national purchase is felt by many. For example, Paul Cliteur, a promi-

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nent professor of ethics, stated that seeing Pim Fortuyn’s funeral made him aware of an “invisible religion” that connects these plural Dutch faces into one consensus.165 Dutch society had become highly emotional after losing three national icons in a span of just three years. Te funerals of Fortuyn, Teo van Gogh (“the martyr for freedom of speech”), and the famous national singer André Hazes (“Saint Andre, martyr of the free Dutch soul”), were all accompanied by outpourings of solidarity and expressions of nostalgia.166 All three embodied diferent, yet signifcant faces of Dutch society. As time passed it became clear that it was not the roar of radical Islam that had evoked the Dutch’s search for romantic nationalism. Radical Islam posed no philosophical challenge, was not a real alternative, and for the vast majority of Muslims, also held little appeal. Te identity crisis of the Dutch has been evoked by something much closer to the heart, something that they sense to be an ideological stream that threatens to overturn current sociocultural beliefs. Te Dutch permissive cultural policies toward Muslims started to be rejected by the Dutch themselves. A homegrown Islam penetrated Dutch society, empowered by the political verzuiling skeleton and multicultural policies that had fostered group identities. Faith and civil life have become intertwined for Dutch Muslims, as religious demands are brought to the authorities’ table. Dutch administrators have encountered numerous requests for Islamic exceptions that have shaken the core values of this secular society. Te Dutch tax service rejected a halal mortgage, an interest-free mortgage for Muslims who are prohibited from paying interest on religious grounds.167 But other accommodations have been made. Artwork has been removed by at least one municipality, however, on the grounds that the women depicted ofended the sensibilities of local Muslim men, a removal not in character with mainstream society.168 Te legalization of a symbolic form of female genital mutilation has been proposed to stop Dutch Muslim girls from being circumcised abroad.169 Polygamous and forced weddings were carried out contrary to civil Dutch law.170 An increasing number of Dutch have become aware that these open-minded policies have to change. Following an exemption for a Muslim lawyer to remain sitting in court, Henk Kamp, a VVD member, stated in anger, “Tis is multicultural relativism for you. Tis can’t be allowed in a state with the rule of law. Everybody must simply rise for the judge, period.”171 Group-based claims also grew out of existing church-state relations and

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subsidies, leading Muslims to believe that equality could be obtained in society and law, even in a highly secularized society. As Islam’s name was slandered and the Dutch blasphemy law was invoked, Hirsch Ballin (of the center-right Christian Democratic Appeal; CDA), suggested including other non-Christian religions under the law since “it’s the duty of government to prevent sadness among citizens that turns into fear and powerlessness” and said antidiscrimination laws would be insufcient because they protect the person and not the person’s beliefs. However, the controversial blasphemy law had not been used since 1968 and was widely seen as a relic of older, darker times.172 Te PvdA (Labor), the Socialist Party, the VVD (Freedom and Democracy), the Democrats 66 (Partij Democraten 66; D66), and the Green Left (Groen Links; GL) opposed extension of the blasphemy law and suggested its total removal since the law granted extra protection to believers, but unbelievers could invoke only legislative protection in cases of speech that spread hatred or discrimination. After the motion to extend the law was dropped, Socialist Party member Jan de Wit stated, “Te law was already a dead letter, but it is . . . principally wrong that believers should have more protection than non-believers. . . . Tank goodness this has now come to an end. And anyway, who decides if God feels ofended or not?”173 Such altercations made Dutch society sense that the course of integration was severely of track. A sharp-edged, super-sophisticated atheist intellectual realm emerged, mainly presented by Herman Philipse and Paul Cliteur and their exMuslim adherents Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Afshin Ellian, a professor of law and former Iranian refugee. Startling to even some small Christian communities, atheists have been an overwhelmingly dominant voice in the public debate.174 In the sociopolitical nationalist discourse, Islam and Muslims were portrayed in an increasingly simplistic manner. As one commenter observed, “Te discussion has a distinctly one-sided and asymmetrical character: it is less a debate with Muslims than a debate among non-Muslim Dutch about Islam. Muslims are the objects of the debate rather than active subjects.”175 It was only by defning the Other, by polarizing parties and advocating oversimplifed positions such as right or wrong and good or evil, that the Dutch could reconstitute a clear national identity that had been vague for decades. Tese “new realists,” as Baukje Prins describes them, are mainly white men, “courageous” enough to state the politically incorrect truth for the sake of the “common man,” since an open mind, honesty, and realism

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are stereotypically Dutch characteristics. In short, being Dutch equals being frank, straightforward, and realistic.176 Te realists seek to undo the wrongs brought about by the ruling left political elites as a result of their unwillingness to allow free discourse on racism, fascism, and intolerance. Te new realists portray themselves as bearers of reason and truth and, moreover, as the emancipators and real advocates of Muslims, especially Muslim women.177 Teir Dutch intellectual discourse has a distinctly colonial tone. It stamps Islam as an inferior, primitive culture, homogeneous and coherent, opposed to, inter alia, state and church separation, women’s rights, the rule of law, and even free society itself.178 Te Qur’an is described as a strict scriptural text that, unlike the texts of Judaism or Christianity, has little fexibility or latitudinarianism and almost no room for reader interpretation. Herman Philipse, the prominent atheist professor and an adherent of Bernard Lewis’s philosophy, declared that Islam has tribal-like attributes that make it fundamentally incompatible with Western societies.179 Islam, Philipse claims, endorses a “groupness” among its followers that is irreconcilable with the individualized Western renaissance. Islam’s followers, he says, lack personal accountability or the option of freedom of conscience and rely solely on religious guidelines that relate more to irrational group honor, as exemplifed by the honor killings of young girls in the Netherlands. Cliteur expresses similar views, claiming that religion breeds hostility and that believers are more prone to violence in general.180 Furthermore, Muslims may difer by appearance and in their interpretation of Islam, and some manifest their beliefs in more lenient or liberal forms, but, these advocates argue, people should remain aware that a pure, hardcore scriptural Islam remains underneath that liberal practice and might ferociously erupt at any moment. Hirsi Ali has repeatedly asserted that liberal Islam does not exist and that those who portray themselves as liberal Muslims are therefore untrustworthy hypocrites.181 Ian Buruma is a journalist who values multiculturalism out fear. It is hard to say if Buruma is a principled defender of multiculturalism. He is, certainly, a sharp criticizer of Dutch liberal culture. Following the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga, Buruma claims that a Dutch existential condition is satisfaction. Te Dutch, according to Buruma, are a “satisfed” bourgeois people, characterized by complacency and smugness.182 Te Dutch consider themselves a self-contained people and moral examples. From colonial times when they were captains of trade to current times when they became mul-

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ticulturalists, the Dutch, says Buruma, were and are strong defenders of the European Union and guardians of an ofcial memory of World War II. Tis self-compliancy, however, is not enough to meet the challenge of the perfect Other. In his book Murder in Amsterdam, about the murder of Teo van Gogh, he analyzes the personality of the killer, Mohammed Bouyeri. Buruma describes Bouyeri’s upbringing in a poor family, one of the thousands of often illiterate Berbers from Morocco who had a difcult life in the Netherlands. Buruma hints at the sense of displacement and cultural alienation of Bouyeri, a life similar to other Muslim youngsters drawn to Islamic fundamentalism. Products of rigid tribal societies, these youngsters were burdened by the Dutch concept of freedom. Dutch freedom has often proved oppressive, and Buruma suggests that Islam might not be the main point. He was critical of the Somali-born writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who was subjected to death threats for voicing her views. Buruma, however, similar to those intellectuals who criticized Charlie Hebdo’s blunt and insulting secularism, declared, “[We Westerners] should weigh our words with care. We should distinguish carefully between diferent kinds of Islam, and not confuse violent revolutionary movements with mere religious orthodoxy.”183 Te problem is with “us,” not with “them,” and the solution to the confict should be more openness toward “their” demands. Buruma says, “If we antagonize Europe’s Muslims” too much, they might become even worse. In Murder in Amsterdam Buruma calls for an “accommodation with . . . Muslims”—for example, allowing “orthodox Muslims” to “consciously discriminate against their women.”184 Tis might ofend Westerners but is a measure they can accept, and it is worth doing to avoid worse consequences. Buruma’s conclusion is that our Enlightenment values should lead us to moderation. Instead, Europe seems to be transforming the Enlightenment into nationalism and Islamophobia. Te Enlightenment should be defended because its basic philosophical mores are important for humanity as a whole and not just because the Enlightenment is “ours.” Buruma is right that Europe is in a transformation process and that the Netherlands is a bellwether in using Muslim cultural challenge to reframe the Enlightenment as liberal identity. Te message coming from the Netherlands is that Enlightenment values are the best frame of ideas worldwide, and are ours,—namely, Western. Te question Buruma raises, however, is whether, by defending Enlightenment values in a dogmatic way, Europeans will undermine them.

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Muslim Multiculturalists versus Liberal Jihadists

In the 2010s, intellectuals, the public, and the media have successfully constructed a rigid Dutch national identity based on a “special type of liberal democracy, which they equate with the universal values of the Enlightenment.”185 In this framework, the public conduct of all cultural groups should be directed at the secular realm, where the atheist stratum is hegemonic. In this Dutch national identity, some intellectuals reject multiculturalism for its implied cultural relativism, which poses an intrinsic threat because of its legitimation of group claims that reject the very premise of a free society. Intellectuals, however, do not have to reject multiculturalism if they restrict its meaning. Essentially, social pluralism cannot survive and fourish unless the permitted range of cultural variance remains within the general boundaries set by Western values. Accordingly, the new Dutchness rejects its former pillar model and group-rights policy to avoid compromising virtues seen as enlightened. As former VVD leader Frits Bolkestein explains, “Some of you will perhaps say, ‘Isn’t it wrong to impose on others something that goes against their deepest convictions? And if there really are principles that, even in a dialogue with these others, are nonnegotiable, hasn’t this dialogue then become meaningless?’ I would like to deny this. . . . One cannot call these issues into question, because in doing so one calls the free society itself into question. One can ofer this free society as a home to newcomers only if we are prepared to defend these fundamental values.”186 Tis emerging national identity has created among Dutch nationals a psychosocial disposition that is characterized by boldness, forthrightness, and cultural pride—a disposition nothing like the former timid, unengaging, humble Dutch smile. Unsurprisingly, the quick and somewhat superfcial quest of the Dutch for their nation’s soul has had harsh consequences for immigrants and domestic-born Muslims. Communities that had received assistance for decades in preserving their faith and culture were suddenly besieged by policies and public expectations of conformity to an unclear national code.187 Te new national policies took two tacks. One sought to modernize Islam (in the supposition that it needed modernization) to reconcile it with its Western surroundings, and the other sought to bring about the general removal of God from society, using the Islamic example as ammunition.

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Tis latter attempt, which has little patience for religious sensitivities—or anything else reminiscent of what is seen as faith-related nonsense—has been triumphing over those who want to modernize Islam. Tose who hold out the hope of a modern Muslim adhere to the historical theory that—as happened in the case of Christianity—critique will catalyze the rejuvenation and transformation of the religion into a more humane and compatible form. Although reconstruction through critique might be an excellent path to cross-cultural value reconciliation, the current political and cultural environment creates little incentive for such spiritual growth. As Rudolph Peters suggests, unlike the former criticism of Christianity, criticism of Islam is mostly presented by an external—that is, non-Muslim—majority that holds the power and is hostile to belief in general. Tus, instead of holding interfaith debates, Muslims choose a defensive and introverted stance that is then publicly interpreted as Islam’s inability to face criticism.188 Intellectuals in the Netherlands have been advocating for the promotion of Western liberal and secular values among immigrants while fercely objecting to integrative policies that would allow coexistence with identities perceived as incompatible with Western societies. Philipse criticizes the government for its ambiguous policies toward immigrants. On the one hand, the government applauds those who have adopted Dutch culture. On the other hand, the state’s policies hint that there is no need to abandon prior identities to assimilate into Dutch society. Te state thus enables immigrants to gain from the benefts of belonging in a society while maintaining identities incompatible with a plural society.189 Opposing this split, Philipse argues that the state should actively promote cultural resocialization to Western enlightened values in public institutions such as elementary schools and in citizenship and immigration courses. Tis education, he believes, should promote the West’s main sources of pride—the autonomy of the individual; freedom of choice, conscience, and speech (including on issues of religion and faith); separation of state and church; and gender equality.190 Te discourse in the Netherlands asserting the supremacy of Western values has received extended social validation because the integration of Islam was reduced in the debate to a discussion over the mere willingness and unwillingness of parties to uphold freedom of speech. Indeed, after van Gogh’s murder, Prime Minister Balkenende framed the issue by claiming, “It is unacceptable that the cause of this brutal murder is freedom of expression. . . . We should all defend that.”191 All agreed that “the source

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of the West’s economic and scientifc development was enabled by its ability to learn from self-critique” and that “in tribal societies self-critique is correlated with honor and self-criticism is seen as a sign of weakness.”192 Criticizing Islam will, then, promote Muslims’ own emancipation. Following in Rushdie’s footsteps means for the Dutch that slandering Islam has become not merely an act permitted by freedom of expression but something essential to the preservation of this right. Showing sensitivity, as Philipse explains, is seen as counterproductive: “Most Muslims are hurt by any criticism of Islam, no matter how appropriate it might be. Instead of protecting Islamic oversensitivity, policies would be better of defending the cultural value of public debate. Only if public fgures own up to their function as role models and present Western values in word and deed, will non-Western youths be inspired to throw of the sufocating blanket of group control that has been holding them back from performing well in Dutch society.”193 Arguments presented by Dutch intellectuals are bolstered by the contributions of ex-Muslims, who are given even greater permission to voice anti-Islamic opinions because of their perceived expertise, as well as their putative status as victims of Islam. Afshin Ellian has been calling for even more overt condemnation: “Let no one say that we are in the grip of Islamophobia or racism. Believe me—they are very diferent. Luther was not a Catholicophobe. He was critical of the church. Voltaire was not a religiophobe. He was simply critical of the intolerant manifestations of religion. Should the Reformation have been warded of on the grounds that Luther must not be allowed to stigmatize Catholics? . . . Has the country where Pierre Bayle and John Locke published their books become a land of veiled opinions?”194 Tese views could have led to a constructive debate on faith and the role of religion in society and state, but in the current sociopolitical atmosphere they have become a spear targeting not the issue of belief but the very presence of Muslims in Dutch society. Te utterances of philosophers and intellectuals are mirrored, albeit in less sophisticated and sometimes less well-intentioned circles, in poor Dutch neighborhoods throughout the country. Intellectuals’ views on Islam give apparent license to nonintellectuals to criticize Islam without feeling any shame. Tis license represents a marked change in Dutch society, where ethno-racism has long been considered taboo and found only in uneducated slums. It is an essentially intellectual discourse, positioning itself as ideological in an efort to remove the taint of bio-racism, still deemed inappropriate, and is familiar to Jewish intellectuals who can trace

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a similar history with respect to criticism of their culture.195 In Dutch neighborhoods, however, the scholarly critique reveals its essentially racial connotations as right-wing supporters lift the veil of political correctness. Fortuyn was the frst to open the foodgates of xenophobic rhetoric when he voiced the anger and resentment of ordinary Dutch people about the favorable treatment foreigners received in housing and employment.196 Furthermore, politicians in the Netherlands have learned how to mask xenophobic and racial rhetoric with intellectual appropriateness, thereby enabling them to prolong the debate without publicly crossing accepted boundaries of racial civility. Geert Wilders is an example of a politician who exploits the cover provided by intellectual discourse to crusade against Islam. Wilders has embraced this policy to such an extent that it has earned him the nickname “the liberal jihadist.” He regularly refers to the Antilles as a “nest of thieves” and to Moroccan youths as “street terrorists.”197 Wilders’s attempts to defend his views on the grounds of freedom of speech have received mixed reactions. Following the release of his provocative short flm Fitna (2008), the government distanced itself from him as global and domestic complaints mounted.198 Te Organization of the Islamic Conference, with ffty-seven state members, declared, “‘Te flm was a deliberate act of discrimination against Muslims’ that aimed to ‘provoke unrest and intolerance’” while “[defaming] ‘the Holy Quran, causing insult to the sentiments of more than 1.3 billion Muslims in the world.’”199 Complaints about Wilders’s attacks on Islam piled up at the ofce of the Dutch attorney general (Openbaar Ministerie) yet were dismissed on the grounds that under freedom of expression the flm was entitled to “extra protection.” In recent years, the attorney general’s ofce has applied limitations to freedom of expression in attempts to protect right-leaning fgures who criticize multicultural policies from attacks by the Far Left. For example, in 2005 it ordered the removal of posters with a drawing of Minister of Integration and Immigration Rita Verdonk and bearing the caption “Travel Agency: Arrest, Deportation, Cremation—Adequate to the Bitter End,” mocking her claims that prison workers had responded adequately to a fatal fre at a complex imprisoning refugees.200 Te decision was later overturned by the court of appeal in Aarnem, which looked to European law on human rights in claiming that politicians are bound to be under greater scrutiny than private citizens, particularly with respect to controversial public issues.201

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In January 2009, the appeals court in Amsterdam decided to prosecute Wilders for hate speech and for inciting discrimination. It had decided, the year before, not to prosecute Wilders for calling the Qur’an a fascist book and comparing it to Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Te court expressed its understanding of claims by Islamic organizations against Wilders and stated that Wilders had “injure[d] Muslims in their religious dignity” and that his movie, Fitna, employed “one-sided, extremely generalising rhetoric to radical efect, using relentless repetition and increasing intensity.” Wilders called the decision “an attack on freedom of speech.”202 Te Wall Street Journal later wrote in defense of Wilders that “the successful integration of Muslims in Europe will require that immigrants adapt to Western norms, not vice versa. Limiting the Dutch debate of Islam to standards acceptable in, say, Saudi Arabia, will only shore up support for Mr. Wilders’s argument that Muslim immigration is eroding traditional Dutch liberties.”203 Eventually, Wilders was acquitted of hate speech charges and his infammatory comments were found to be protected by rules governing discourse in a free society.204 Amsterdam judge Marcel van Oosten, with respect to the diference between a racial uttering and criticism of religion, “accepted [that] the Freedom Party leader’s statements were directed at Islam and not at Muslim believers. Tey were . . . ‘acceptable within the context of public debate.’”205 Further charges were brought against Wilders when police received 6,400 complaints about remarks he made in March 2014 during a municipal election campaign in the Hague. Wilders sparked outrage after asking a crowd of supporters whether they wanted “more or fewer” Moroccans in the Netherlands. Te crowd responded with chants of “Fewer! Fewer!” to which Wilders replied, “Well then, we’ll take care of that.” On December 9, 2016, Wilders was convicted of inciting racial discrimination and for insulting Moroccans as a group. However, no penalty was imposed,206 and Wilders was acquitted of inciting racial hatred. For the 2017 elections his manifesto called for the de-Islamization of the Netherlands, including banning the Qur’an, outlawing the Islamic headscarf, and closing mosques and Islamic schools.207 Jan Rath, a professor and the director of the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies at the University of Amsterdam, has been tracing these powerful developments in Dutch politics with concern: “Worrisome . . . is that the number of supporters of such an extreme position seem to be growing rapidly.”208 Social polarization has been afecting not only the Muslim community but also ethnic Dutch. Ironically, Dutch people report that one of their chief national concerns is lack of respect and solidarity in their society.209

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Another example of right-wing radicalization can be seen in another competitor for the votes of the conservative right, Tierry Baudet’s new Forum for Democracy (Forum voor Democratie; FvD), which had an impressive turnout in the provincial elections on March 20, 2019. Te two-year-old FvD shocked the establishment, winning 14.5 percent of the vote and coming in frst in three out of twelve provinces. It received the most votes of any party nationwide, moving toward becoming the largest vote share in several provincial legislatures. However, the impact is not only electoral. Unlike Geert Wilders, Tierry Baudet campaigns among younger and better-educated voters, staging open forums on right-wing philosophy. In certain ways copying the metapolitical strategy of Alain de Benoist and La Nouvelle Droite of the 1970s, Baudet strives to become a sort of politicointellectual of the right. Like most radical-Right populists, Baudet condemns the political elite. Unlike most radical-Right populists, however, he does not condemn the concept of an elite itself and indeed portrays himself as an educated, cultured man. In some ways diferent from other right-wing populist parties that have seduced a poorly educated lower class, Baudet’s elitism appeals to educated conservatives who feel uneasy about supporting the populist right. Nothing could better represent Baudet’s intellectual and political claims than his admiration of the French author Michel Houellebecq, who disparaged Islam in an interview. Discussing Houellebecq’s last novel, Sérotonine, Baudet praises him for identifying the loss of “organic social intercourse and physical intimacy” that has come with successful liberation. Tis challenges the very fundamentals of both the contemporary “Left” and the “Right.” It challenges modern anthropology as such. Both the social-democratic and the liberal wing of the modern political spectrum (respectively advocating the welfare state and the free market) wish to maximize individual autonomy. Liberalism and socialism difer when it comes to the most efective way to achieve that objective, but they do not difer in the objective itself. Tey are both liberation movements; they both want the complete emancipation of the individual. And both base their vision of society on the (unfounded but supposedly “self-evident”) principle that every individual enjoys certain “inalienable rights.”210

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Te idea of liberalism, he critically admits, is that “all such institutions that the individual requires to fully actualize a meaningful existence—such as a family and a connection to generations past and future, a nation, a tradition, perhaps a church—will weaken and eventually disappear.”211 Under Baudet the FvD is “the most self-consciously elitist party in the Dutch political landscape.”212 Te party supports leaving the EU (“Nexit”) and makes climate-change skepticism acceptable on the right. Baudet’s apocalyptic speeches indict liberal elitist parties for undermining the Dutch sense of civilization. One of his books, Oikofobie: De angst voor het eigene (Oikophobia: Te fear of home),213 explicitly calls for the restoration of the nation’s power as a state. Although these claims hold little appeal for most Dutch people, the new discourse of the populist right might yet bring about a synthesis of the conservative right and the populists. Tis is a tendency that, as we have remarked throughout this book, appeals to a mass of concerned voters wishing to rediscover basic national instincts. Although they are critical of open immigration, these voters have avoided falling into populist bigotry. The New Right: Sexuality and Gender In, Muslims Out

Despite the widespread adoption of multicultural and tolerant national identities, we contend that, over the course of the twenty-frst century, most European nations will likely undergo processes akin to what the Dutch are now experiencing. Searches for lost identities will, in all probability, lead to a reemergence of European ethno-nationalism and tribalism.214 But the Dutch may yet choose a distinctive path because of their unique cultural history and characteristics. Tis is not to say that voices such as Pim Fortuyn’s, seeking to rekindle former Christian, organic, hierarchic, or imperialist tones in the Dutch national spirit; Wilders’s Islamophobic liberalism; or Baudet’s demand for an awakened nationalism will be disregarded. Although for most of the Dutch public such aspirations are not strange and might even be respected, the Dutch self-inficted national amnesia and inherent aversion to nation-states and ethno-nationalism might just, with the same zeal, crystallize as an interesting combination. National identity coalesces around a secular tradition and atheist thought. Although critics of liberalism have accused it of opening the path to multiculturalism, conviction

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grows that it is in the other direction; liberalism is becoming associated with antimulticulturalism. Liberal feminist theorists such as Susan Okin have suggested that liberalism, as a theory, opposes social hierarchies and supports individual freedom, which furnishes the tools for criticizing the still-prevailing substantial and systematic inequalities between men and women.215 Tis inequality is nowhere felt more than in religious societies. Other feminist approaches, in contrast, promote more fexible jurisdictions, presiding over diferent identities to allow individuals to move between them. Tis type of transformative accommodation is sought by Muslim and non-Muslim feminists who see the anti-Islamist principles displayed by Hirsi Ali as harmful to Muslims. Hirsi Ali and Fortuyn, however, understand their futures, as a feminist and homosexual, respectively, as needing them to exert their rights against religion, or at least against certain religions. In this sense, they have become a cornerstone for a new liberal-national coalition. Nationalist liberals take full advantage of the inherent contradictions of multiculturalism to gain ground against the social democratic and corporate-conservative establishment. Te liberal nationalists in the Netherlands are pulling three key electoral groups—feminists, homosexuals, and the blue-collar proletariat—into their coalition. Feminists were the frst to argue that Muslim values confict with the liberation of women as understood in the West. Homosexuals have begun moving in the same direction, because their fnancial self-interest pushes them toward economic neoliberalism and against the bureaucratic left. Add to this mix a dose of the economic individualism found in many working-class communities, and the particular fear of violence from Muslim fundamentalists, and one can begin to see the ingredients not only of Pim Fortuyn’s freemarket economics but of his message on law and order, too. Blue-collar workers are essentially economically hostile to liberal multiculturalism. It is mostly they who must compete with low-wage workers brought in by the immigration policies multiculturalists embrace and they who feel the most direct impact of rising crime rates in lower-class neighborhoods, a trend that they associate with immigrants. One has to wonder what the religious right might have thought of this new coalition. Would Pim Fortuyn’s kind of moral libertarianism have pushed the Catholic and Protestant pillars into solidarity with Muslims, for example? Tis would, of course, be a natural alliance, hostile not only to drug taking, euthanasia, and promiscuity but also to many essential liberal values. Te events of September 11, however, destroyed all possibility

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of this hypothetical coalition before it was even conceived. More recently, it seems that the Christian right, Jews, and blue-collar workers are indeed welcoming gays and feminists into “their” nation, to pit them against the ultimate Other. Te homosexual-protecting alliance did not originate in unfounded or wild speculation. Violence against homosexuals has been progressively on the rise, allegedly because of continuing conficts with Muslim youths. A report from a major Dutch education association fnds that homosexual teachers sufer harassment in schools that in many cases originates with students who are members of minority groups. Allochtonen (nonethnic Dutch) youth have difculty accepting homosexuality, and the greater the ethnic diversity in the class, the lesser the tolerance. Te report explains that “at home they hear only that [homosexuality is] bad, and there is no further talk on sexuality. . . . Tat’s why [students] have no idea how to deal with it in school.”216 As is well known in the Netherlands, Dutch Muslims have extremely negative perceptions of homosexuality, much higher than perceptions among non-Muslims. Te National Youth Council revealed that 82 percent of Christians and 83 percent of secular citizens support acceptance of homosexuality in schools, compared with a mere 34 percent of Muslims. Sixty percent of secular people and 70 percent of Christians agree with enforcing school regulations on behavior that protect homosexual students and teachers from discrimination, compared with a mere 43 percent of Muslims.217 Tese percentages of Muslims have been another key factor in ethnic Dutch fury. Te Netherlands perceives itself as the global pioneer of gay rights and has been working hard to prove it. Repeated attacks on the homosexual community and gender activists have brought about a sharp and clear reply: if gays are in confict with Muslims, gays will take precedence. Tus, the embrace of gays and gender activism groups has been marked. Since 2001, signifcant legislation, projects, and massive funding have been set forth on both the local and the national levels with the goal of empowering the LGBTQ communities. Favorable policies toward gays, such as the Homo-emancipatiebeleid (emancipation policies) legislation, were passed in 2001, 2005, and 2007.218 Te 2007 governmental policy, Gewoon homo zijn (Just being gay), continues to battle prejudice by promoting nationally funded activities aimed at making the gay scene more conspicuous than ever. Te Netherlands Institute for Social Research monitors attitudes toward LGBTQ people among minority and faith groups. It is devoted to keeping the Nether-

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lands one of the top three nations with favorable attitudes to LGBTQ people.219 But the government has gone even further by protecting and praising openly gay Muslims. Accordingly, many publicly funded organizations have been established to help young gay Muslims cope with their feelings and with their challenging environment. Te Habibi Ana organization raises awareness about gays and bisexuals in faith groups, Malaica (formerly the Yoesuf Foundation) provides education on social afairs and sexual diversity, the Stichting Nafar (Secret Garden) organization helps youths of North African origin cope with homosexual emotions, and Veilige Haven (Safe Haven) helps minority youths in Amsterdam with homosexual, bisexual, or transgender feelings. Tese are just a few organizations of a very visible, active, and cherished Dutch community.220 Still, certain leaders remain discontented. Right-wing leaders such as Wilders, in their embrace of homosexuals, have been attacking the authorities’ weak and forgiving response to attacks on the gay community.221 Clearly, the alliance of Christians, homosexuals, and feminists cannot but be a multicultural one, in the sense that each group recognizes itself as different from the others. However, they all understand that they belong to a common national identity and political philosophy that tolerates their existence while also allowing the others’. Wilders can easily be defned as a racist Far-Right politician, mainly because he increasingly targets ethnic markers, including Polish and Romanian migrant workers.222 But Fortuyn and Hirsi Ali have brought a new tension to the defnition of racism. Teir criticism of Islam illustrates that the new coalition’s aim is not to alienate Muslims altogether but to bring the right sort of Muslim into the coalition. Tis especially applies to feminist Muslims. A wide variety of Muslim women have appeared on the intellectual landscape. Te singer Rajae El Mouhandiz; Emely Nobis, assistant editor of Opzij, the frst and leading feminist magazine of the Netherlands; and Samira Abbos, a journalist and media fgure, have in diferent ways attempted to open the gates of the ghetto for Muslim women. Some of these fgures argue for an inclusive feminism rather than the paternalism evident in some strands of Western feminism. Samira Abbos, for example, struggles against the reductionism that limits all issues related to Muslim women to “emancipation from Islam.” Other Muslim feminist voices, such as Fatima Mernissi or Leila Ahmed, challenge the patriarchal interpretation of Muslim holy texts.223 Some of these Muslim feminists regard gender inequality in Islam as rooted in a misinterpretation of the scriptures. Mernissi, for example, discusses discriminatory Hadith

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(Qur’anic interpretations) and promotes a modernization of Islam,224 but Amina Wadud fnds no inequality at all in the sacred scriptures themselves.225 Others acknowledge an inherent discrimination of status in the Qur’an and call for the immediate rejection of some Islamic verses. Following this logic is Nahed Selim, a writer who describes herself as a Muslim but calls for the rejection of orthodoxy and for religion to accommodate universalism and gender equality.226 Some argue that Hirsi Ali’s condemnation of Islam’s abuse of women reinforces unproductive Orientalist stereotypes of Islam and Muslims. Muslim feminists such as Leila Ahmed promote an assessment of Islam that is historically grounded yet strategically combined with a critique of derogatory Western stereotypes of Muslims.227 Hirsi Ali sees herself as a successor of the Enlightenment, but she has little to ofer Muslim women who want to remain within their faith. What answers does she have for Souad, a twenty-seven-year-old gay Muslim whose convictions join liberalism with faith and who states, “Homosexuality is not a feeling, it’s a form of being—I am a lesbian. I can’t change my nature and Allah knows this too.”228 However, even an inclusive emancipation must frst and foremost free itself from the community if the community refuses to open itself. In this regard, other Muslims have followed the path of Hirsi Ali. In September 2007 Ehsan Jami and Loubna Berrada founded the Central Committee of Ex-Muslims with the help of Afshin Ellian, a professor and known critic of Shia.229 Islam views apostasy as a deadly sin,230 and the committee sought to help Muslims leave their faith if they wished to do so. However, the committee is mainly known for Jami’s extreme positions against Islam.231 Hirsi Ali led the way for these self-emancipating Muslims. Jytte Klausen argues that Hirsi Ali, as an elite Muslim politician, has proved that “it is possible for a Muslim to become a high-profle vote getter, in this case, curiously, by attracting the anti-Muslim vote,” and thus she is a tragic exemplar of failed integration.232 Meanwhile, Hirsi Ali, who might have embodied ultraliberalism’s dream, has been politically deserted. She has shown herself to be an advocate for secularity, individualism, and freedom of speech, but in so wholly rejecting any Islamic religious identity, she has isolated herself from the community to such an extent that it has been impossible for her to serve as a role model for those who remain. Furthermore, she was rejected on both the political right and the political left, and a mere three years after van Gogh’s murder, Hirsi Ali was, in sociopolitical terms, a complete outcast when less than a dozen of her colleagues

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voted to extend her state-subsidized personal protection during her time in the United States.233 In the autumn of 2007 the world watched with puzzlement the Dutch abandoning Hirsi Ali to defend herself at her own cost from death threats.234 Tis gave rise to an embarrassing line of commentary from Salman Rushdie, the Danish government, and others. To some, Hirsi Ali’s shunning was a mystery, and to some it was even a betrayal. Te Dutch, overall, more than agree with her remarks on Islam yet are reluctant to further polarize the debate. Te efectiveness of civic integration policies is, to a great extent, centered on the absence of formal targeting of Muslims and the consolidation of antidiscriminatory and unifying—within these restricted constituencies—intentions in the public discourse. It is not, thus, coincidence that while Hirsi Ali was being cold-shouldered by the Dutch government, civic integration kicked into high gear. Hirsi Ali strives to fnd common ground with Christians in defending Europe’s secularity. She sees atheism as too weak to confront the new intellectual Islam and hopes to form an alliance with moderate Christians who do not object to liberal core issues such as abortion and evolution. Tis common ground will introduce Jesus and Christianity, in her eyes an improvement on the Qur’an, to Muslims.235 Tis odd proposition has raised a few eyebrows and also afrmed skeptics’ concerns regarding her strong bias against Islam. Although speakers such as Wilders, Fortuyn, and Hirsi Ali are personally chastised or condemned for their infammatory discourse, which has disrupted the political order, their message has not been ignored and barely difers from that of Baudet. Teir ideological struggle to delegitimate the multicultural movement or to use multiculturalism to discriminate rather than include is making inroads into mainstream discourse. Te new message is not one of abandoning diversity but of distinguishing what parts of cultural diversity ft into the national model. Baudet’s party’s proposed Law in Defense of Dutch Values exemplifes this discriminatory antidiscrimination. Among other things, “the law would prohibit arranged marriages, demand that the Holocaust be taught in all schools, and ban any face-covering garments, including balaclavas and niqabs, from public spaces.”236 All in the name of a liberal society. Despite Baudet’s criticism of liberalism, his position represents what an increasing number of people, who do not identify as racists, defne as Dutch liberalism. Te idea in this, thus, is defending a non-neutral liberalism that discriminates between values.

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Civic Integration, Individual and Local Multiculturalism

Is the Netherlands heading toward assimilation? If it is, it would clash with its own principles of freedom and tolerance, according to Han Entzinger.237 Analysts such as Ellie Vasta even argue that the Dutch have never been especially tolerant and that the new path to assimilation merely symbolizes a new step toward racism.238 As far back as 1998 the Netherlands introduced policies like the Newcomer Integration Law (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers), which requires most non-EU newcomers to participate in a twelve-month integration course consisting of six hundred hours of Dutch language instruction, civic education, and preparation for the labor market. Renewal of residence is tied to passing an integration test, thereby linking the previously separate domains of migration control and immigrant integration. Te prevailing view across Europe had been that a secure legal status would enhance integration, but now failure to integrate is grounds for refusal of admission and residence. In September 2003, a new policy sought to resolve what had become an integration crisis. With Balkenende as prime minister and Rita Verdonk of the VVD as minister for integration and immigration, a new-style-integration policy letter expressed the need for a shared citizenship. According to Balkenende, an integrated group would have a good command of the Dutch language, participate proportionately in structural social domains, maintain interethnic contacts, and subscribe to basic Dutch norms. Tose policies have become even harsher after 2004, when integration policies were examined in a parliamentary commission that found that several of the policies had achieved some success, but the general impression was of failure.239 Te political arena had made up its mind, and the CDA party, the VVD, and the liberal left (Democraten 66) all demanded a more restrictive immigration process and a more selective naturalization process.240 In 2004, family reunifcation and formation regulations were tightened so that only people older than twenty-one could “import a wife” and even then only if they earned 120 percent of the minimum wage. Te new Compulsory Identifcation Act cracked down on illegal employment by requiring each employer to identify all employees. Under the Integration Abroad Act of 2005 (Wet Inburgering in het Buitenland), the government further restricted integration by introducing a test especially for nonWestern migrants that has to be passed before the migrant is allowed to enter the Netherlands.

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Te famboyant Rita Verdonk continually generated controversy because of her tough and restrictive policies toward immigration and integration, which earned her the infamous nickname “Iron Rita.” Verdonk received the full support of her VVD party in 2004 when she sought to expel twenty-six thousand asylum seekers whose applications had been denied. Filmmakers united to publicize that asylum seekers were now in fear of deportation,241 and her decision was widely criticized. In 2005, Verdonk wanted to coordinate information fows on ethnic minority integration to assess the social success and impact of integration programs. Accordingly, national statistics agencies joined forces to produce annual reports on integration.242 In 2005 integration indicators were added to the national “integration monitor.”243 In 2006, Verdonk added a requirement that immigrants view a videotape that explains some of the more controversial aspects of Dutch culture, such as homosexuality, promiscuity, prostitution, and drug use. Te video, which is compulsory for all who wish to immigrate, also informs viewers that customs such as female genital mutilation, violence, and honor killings are prohibited in the Netherlands. Akim, an immigrant interviewed in the video, cautions Muslim immigrants to think twice about becoming Dutch. His life, he says, is much diferent from how he had imagined it.244 In 2007, under the Wet Inburgering (Integration Act) an integration exam for migrants already residing in the Netherlands was introduced. All foreign nationals, with the exception of EU/European Economic Area citizens resident in the Netherlands, must pass the integration exam in the Netherlands within fve years of the law’s coming into force.245 Immigrants are required to pay for the preparation courses, and those who do not pass the exam are subject to a fne of up to €1,000 and become ineligible for permanent residence permits. Foreign nationals from Western countries are exempt from this exam. If that is not enough, proposals requesting a diferent justice system for immigrants that could expel criminals back to their homeland were advanced by the VVD in 2003.246 Tose proposals would have denied migration to terror suspects and revoked residency permits of criminal aliens in the nation.247 Te Dutch senate in 2017 passed a version of the VVD law giving the Justice and Security Ministry authority to strip suspects of their Dutch citizenship if they had ever joined terror organizations abroad.248 No court order is needed, and the person is informed after denaturalization. Although in practice the law is applicable only to dual nationals, echoing Wilders’s proposal on dual-national criminals,

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the law means dual nationals have unequal status. Te frst article of the Dutch constitution requires that all citizens be treated equally in equal circumstances. Te law targeted citizens who leave to fght in Syria—Syriëgangers in Dutch—but hostility toward dual nationals is deep seated and growing and has fueled xenophobia against Moroccan and Turkish nationals who hold Dutch citizenship. Tose make up more than half of the 1.3 million Dutch dual citizens, according to fgures from the Central Statistics Bureau.249 Targeting dual nationals has been a key interest of Wilders in his anti-Islam stance. Despite criticism, the bill was voted into law in 2017 by a coalition of the ruling VVD, the PVV, the CDA, and two fringe parties. Te Labor Party, part of the current coalition, supported it in the lower chamber of parliament but not in the senate. Tis desire to restrict migration and to enhance and monitor integration of its minorities resulted from several social trends. First and foremost, ethnic Dutch have realized that their hegemonic status in their homeland is being rapidly undermined. Te ethnic Dutch are aging, and white Dutch women have much lower fertility rates than those of Muslim women.250 Ironically, in the nations of origin of most immigrants, fertility rates have dropped more substantially than they have in the diaspora. With more than 40 percent of the non-Western population under age forty, twice as many compared with the nonimmigrant population, the Netherlands is expected to experience a distinctive and visible change in the ethnic makeup of the population.251 Europe’s future is seen in the streets of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and Te Hague, which all have more than 30 percent migrant residents.252 Anna Korteweg has discussed the reformation of the national identity with respect to immigrants in her report for the Scientifc Council for Government. Korteweg observes an apparent attempt to reafrm Dutch national identity via a tradition of civility and gender equality in the public sphere.253 Te state seems to recognize that the national government has an essential role to fll. It has to acknowledge now more than ever that it is a powerful source for identifcation.254 Te 2004 Blok report, “Bruggen Bouwen” (Building bridges), found that, compared with other EU countries, the Netherlands is much more inclusive for immigrants with regard to labor-market access, long-term residence, family reunion, and antidiscriminatory measures. Yet the report, which analyzed thirty years of integration policies, emphasized the positive role of minorities themselves in the process of integration.255

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Sometimes there is no direct coordination between declared policies or ideology and its implementation. Some observers detect a multicultural paternalism and demand a more efective multiculturalism. One author views assimilation as a new form of racism, since racism, or race-based discrimination, is a relationship of power in which social groups categorize other groups as diferent or inferior.256 Resistance to change, and even fearing the Other should be interpreted, in this line of thought, as a form of racism. What seemed to take place was a new form of racism, one based in diference rather than superiority.257 Te problem is not that the Dutch do not deal with discrimination, it is that the Dutch cannot even think of it. Racism is “taken out of the equation.”258 Te resulting pervasive everyday racism in the Netherlands likely leads to institutional racism.259 However, the biggest remaining question is whether and what kind of postmulticultural society the Dutch will become. If a multicultural society has to provide social equality and participation in addition to cultural recognition, a natural development we might see in the future is that cultural recognition gives way to tolerance and civic integration. Civic integration should lead to increasing social equality for Muslims who agree to integrate as individuals into a culturally preconditioned nation. For integration to occur, the participation of Muslims in the public sphere, their empowerment—in the sense of acquiring the language and the skills to perform in society—becomes imperative. In other words, civic integration implies inclusion of Muslim in the nation as productive individuals. For this to happen, the Dutch must be ready to recognize Islam, but precisely the opposite is the case. Local Soft Diversity and Radical Political Discourse: Complementary?

A notable feature of Dutch politics is the apparent gap between the national level’s discursive and political practices, or ideological tendencies, and the local level’s political practices of accommodation. As Frank de Zwart and Caelesta Poppelaars remark, policies of accommodation are being systematically pursued at the local level, but they are not defned as such.260 Cities need to resolve problems of social welfare every day. Despite hard talk about cultural sovereignty and civic integration at the national level, the boundaries of city politics are softer and more open. Interaction based on a pragmatic approach difers from rights-based multiculturalism.

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Amsterdam and Rotterdam take the pragmatic approach; however, these two major cities manage diversity in ways that are diferent from and even confict with the other’s. In Rotterdam in 2011, Aboutaleb’s mayoral administration, with the support of the Dutch government, set in motion the National Program for South Rotterdam. Te program combats rising levels of poverty in the southern part of the city, which has many Muslim immigrants. It addresses crime, jobs, and education, adding up to ten hours of schooling per week and vocational training in high schools. Evidence of Aboutaleb’s focus on cooperation and his stance above party politics came when he appointed Marco Pastors—his political rival, the right-wing anti-Muslim activist, and leader of Livable Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam)—as head of the program. Pastors began his political career in January 2002 under Pim Fortuyn and was active in the campaign against Muslim religious facilities. As striking as the appointment was, it can be explained by Aboutaleb’s advocacy of harsh policies against crime and his criticism of the misuse of social benefts. Aboutaleb has taken strong positions that are contrary to political correctness. Te statement “If you don’t like it here because some humorists you don’t like are putting outa newspaper, then, if I may say so, you can fuck of” was uttered not by the radical Right but by Aboutaleb on television after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris. Although the PvdA, Aboutaleb’s party, opposes the Far Right and maintains a balanced progressive position about Muslims, Aboutaleb’s statement and similar postures bridge diferences with the radical Right. Te radical Right supported Rotterdam’s welfare program in which the unemployed must clean streets and deliver food to the elderly before receiving social benefts. Tey helped pass the Rotterdam law preventing low-income newcomers from settling in Rotterdam’s deprived areas. Aboutaleb’s stance also sits well with Mark Rutte’s dramatic full-page advertisement during national elections warning immigrants to “be normal or be gone.” In an interview in the Dutch tabloid Algemeen Dagblad, Rutte, who won reelection as prime minister, proclaimed that people who come to the Netherlands for its freedoms but then “reject our values” should leave. In another interview with the same newspaper, Rutte criticized a court ruling against a bus company that did not hire an immigrant because he had refused to shake a woman’s hand. Like most liberal conservative leaders in Western Europe, Rutte was holding aloft values and sentiments shared by most citizens, that foreigners should not “abuse our freedom to spoil things . . . bothering gay men, harassing women in

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short skirts or just saying regular Dutch people are racists.”261 Te rhetoric of Rutte and Aboutaleb should be seen in their context of political campaigns, but it goes further than political campaigns. Teir style is a combination of harsh talk at the ideological level and pragmatic solutions at the social level. In Amsterdam too, the Dutch capital, liberals have been attempting to respond to the populist right’s steady rise since the 2010 elections. Amsterdam is a city that lives more comfortably with its diversity than does Rotterdam. Diversity is seen not as a problem but rather as an opportunity to entice sophisticated and creative people to the city. Job Cohen, the Jewish mayor of Amsterdam, has been praised for his handling of religious groups, Muslims in particular, and was appointed to lead the PvdA after Wouter Bos stepped down. Showcasing a thriving pluralist city led by a Jew committed to multiculturalism and the defense of Muslims was an interesting strategy for the PvdA; it soon discovered, though, that the national discourse required a more sophisticated answer to Wilders’s right-wing position. Although Aboutaleb was praised by Pastors for saying things that “the so-called Islamophobic people also say,” Cohen was labeled by Wilders as one who “cuddles multiculturalists” and is still stuck in the nineties.262 In reality Cohen’s multiculturalism targets ethnic groups in the name of efciency rather than in principle, and this characterizes Rotterdam too, whatever the diferences in tone. Initially, Amsterdam’s policies toward minorities adopted the same criteria as applied at the national level, which usually supported minority self-organization. In line with the 1983 Minderhedennota (memorandum on minorities), the frst ofcial policy on immigrant groups, local governments had established advisory councils for minority populations, composed of representatives of individual minority organizations, including political associations, mosques, cultural centers, and sport clubs. Te premise was that if minorities were allowed to retain their culture and manage their institutions, they would become better integrated. With time, though, the thinking changed, and the ethnic advisory councils were dismantled and replaced by advisory councils whose members were not necessarily from ethnic communities. For example, the previous ethnic council had included the Neighborhood Fathers, an organization established by Moroccan fathers in the western part of Amsterdam whose patrol groups increased community control of the city streets. Te new type of council includes Assadaakka, which takes care not to be an ethnic organization. It is an intercultural organiza-

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tion in Zeeburg and winner of the Diversity Prize in 2001 that claims to be open to everybody and “embraces all initiatives that help to solve problems in the neighborhood.”263 Te diversity policy of both organizations, as remarked by Justus Uitermark, Ugo Rossi and Henk Van Houtum, aims to address problems in a pragmatic way and to enhance all that is good about culture. Amsterdam could be defned as a city of many groups, a place where participation, of individuals as individuals or as part of groups, is encouraged.264 Tese examples show complementary sides of Dutch policies at the local level, where the Dutch are open-minded about diversity and diferent groups are accommodated. Cohen was as successful in Amsterdam as Aboutaleb was in Rotterdam. At the ideological and discursive level, however, the pendulum has swung to the nationalist right. As Nausicaa Marbe puts it, “Cohen’s multicultural perception doesn’t answer the question of how the Netherlands can stay open and tolerant while preventing enclaves in society created by imported intolerance and primitivism”265 Te Dutch want to hear how to safely achieve modernity and secularity, and the multicultural notion of common respect simply does not give a sufciently good answer. Although local experiences give cause for hope about confict resolution at the local level, the national level has a diferent character, and criticisms (e.g., claiming Cohen “cuddles multiculturalists”) have more bite. Public discourse is antimulticultural at the national level, but some types of diversity and cooperation can be supported at the local level. A report published by the Dutch Bar Association shows that 40 percent of the programs of Dutch political parties contain proposals in confict with the rule of law, fundamental human rights, and the right to due process. Te association pointed out that the campaigns of Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s liberal VVD, the PVV, and the CDA all made pledges at odds with Dutch law. Most of those pledges, if put into practice, would discriminate against Muslims. Tus, for example, the PVV, the party whose manifesto is openly anti-Muslim, wants to close all mosques and Islamic schools, ban the Qur’an and other Islamic expression, and denaturalize and deport criminals with dual nationality. Te last proposal is also advanced by the VVD, the only diference being terrorist suspects, not convicted criminals. Te CDA seeks to halt the fnancing of mosques and Islamic organizations from abroad, but the same measures are not proposed for other religions. Te question is whether the antimulticultural rhetoric and the initiatives of political parties at the national level will eventually prevail over

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local social initiatives and render them useless or whether local pragmatism will gain the upper hand and continue to shape the Netherlands’ particular diversity. Tis is a difcult question to answer. Our take on it is that both tracks will advance in parallel. Conclusion: Radical Discourse and Moderate Social Reality

Te Dutch debate on Islam is profoundly diferent from the debate in the United Kingdom and France, the other European nations discussed in this book. Whereas most European nations try to channel the emergence of a modern Islam according to enlightened values and norms or to address religious claims as customary outcomes of politics of identity while trying to counter ethno-racial claims, the Dutch remain stubborn in their desire to essentialize Islam as an alien religion and to not view Muslims as having a normal-migrant identity.266 Dutch society sees Islam not as a matter of an individual’s choice but instead as a fundamentally distinct culture that stands in opposition to the basic Western norms. Terefore, the Dutch understanding of the right to freedom is welcoming and protective of apostates of Islam yet wary about allocating this protection to those who wish to practice or advance their faith.267 Tis essentialization has manifested itself in an extreme public discourse that has divided society into “us” and “them.” All negotiation on comprehensive matters is made by the in-group on the out-group, thereby relating to Muslims as mere objects of the discourse rather than active partners in it. Some see this rigid discourse as a patronizing postcolonial interpretation of Islam that serves as a “diabolical dilemma” that can be resolved only by Muslims’ apostasy.268 Others, such as Martin Bruinessen and Baukje Prins, explore the new realism that, from their superior Western position, makes them speakers of the truth against the one, pure Islam.269 Tese dichotomist views have been fueling xenophobia and aiding opportunist politicians who have a relatively limited scope of social thought, but these views also pinpoint what maybe the most essential conundrum Islam has evoked in European societies and modern democracies in general—the fragile stalemate between liberalism and the modern liberal state. Te Dutch role as emancipator and resocializer of the traditional Other is criticized by many and labeled condescending postcolonialism or cultural ignorance. Tose who criticize the emancipator resist slotting Islam into known European schemes of integration of immigrants. Te acknowl-

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edgment of Islam’s distinct, divergent, and unparalleled environmentalpolitical nature is crucial for the emergence of a realistic and creative debate on integration. Former conceptions of integration of religious communities fail to meet the challenge set by the new, enlightened Islamic discourse. Tis religious entity has yet to meet its historical defeat against liberal forces. Tis persistence of Islam makes abundantly clear that liberalism’s unfnished conquest for rational dominance cannot be sustained or promoted in a culturally neutral state. Te rise of the atheist realm in the Dutch discourse is in this manner highly indicative because it is a levelheaded view of the future of both parties. Tis atheism could beget a cultural identity. In former times, the struggle for survival against the North Atlantic Ocean was the main determiner of the Netherlands sociopolitical structure. Tolerance and rational public discussions had become prevailing characteristics of Dutchness because organic and subcultural afliations were subsumed under the much larger concern for survival. Tere was a cultural agreement to disagree on disputed issues while maintaining a civilized public discourse. Te only real social conformity required was the willingness to engage and cooperate, forming a political sphere known for its mannered tolerant public discourse and not for any specifc stance for itself. In modern times, the Dutch have no need to cooperate to survive, and immigrants do not necessarily have a political background founded in an essentially cooperative history. Socio-evolutionary conditions created a tolerant Dutch rational discourse that aided survival, but ironically, that very discourse may revive irrationality in the ethnic Dutch. Te Netherlands faces difcult times because it is asked by circumstance to choose, consciously or not, between its nightmare and dream. It dangles between two extreme, growing nationalities: ethno-nationalism and semirepublican secular ultraliberalism. Te nightmare promises stability, security, and national survival; the dream seems capricious, volatile, and unstable. Resolution of this self-exploration will entail dramatic consequences, because a psychosocial transformation will be required. Either identity creates a cognitive dissonance that will force the Dutch to review their history and to alter notions that have been held for many decades. If the Dutch adopt a more ethno-organic national identity—unlikely—they might enjoy the union of a folklike nation and a coherent society. But the Dutch would need to look their German nightmare straight in the eye and acknowledge their racism and xenophobic demons, more easily done if the Other is demonized as threatening the very existence of Dutchness itself.

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Such an ethno-organic national identity would probably claim to be tolerant of minorities; however, it would continue to marginalize them and not make way for them as equal European partners. If the Dutch abandon racial and xenophobic national identities, they would naturally have greater latitude to negotiate with group demands while maintaining civil rights equality. Tis outlook might resemble France’s laïcité model; however, this prospect faces tremendous obstacles created by sociocultural gaps, a lack of shared colonial heritage, and a decades-long policy of encouraging parallel lives. Sadly, the Dutch would probably blame their renunciation on immigrants’ reluctance to assimilate. Te Dutch appear to be heading for civic integration. Civic integration would avoid the racist ideology of ethno-nationalism, not give way to culturally based demands that might damage liberalism itself, and maintain a seemingly moral high ground. Civic integration entails a trade-of between newcomers and traditional Dutch. Full equality of opportunity to newcomers depends on the success of the cultural hegemony of the secular nation. At the local level, this tough, ideologically centered discourse is accompanied by a pragmatic management of diversity. Multiculturalism is part of daily life; however, it is conditioned by a state-centered liberalism. Ethnically homogeneous organizations are co-opted to provide services, which follows a Dutch sense of confict management. In a public discourse moving rightward, we could certainly talk about co-optation of groups without group rights, but that reveals the weakness of communities in society. Dutch multiculturalism could bring about a national civism that owes more to a French type of republican civic integration than to a liberal multiculturalism. Te pillar system, which had been a structure for multicultural tolerance, has become the basis for multicultural exclusion. Civic integration thus should be inclusion in a national community that tolerates diference, but it is far from the cultural recognition promoted by the historical pillar system or more recent multicultural policies. Tis is the future challenge for the Netherlands, a shift toward civic nationalism that contrasts with its traditional recognition-exclusion formula embedded in Dutch collective identity. It has been intriguing to see the Dutch struggling to fnd their new identity. Te nation had a confused decade in the 2010s, during which it tried to reconcile being one society having one belief with its long historical tradition of being a free, plural society. To a great extent, this has been a semantic struggle in which the Dutch were asked to contrast what they

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perceive themselves to be with what they truly are. Muslims have catalyzed this process, undermining all Dutch self-assertions regarding tolerance and multiculturalism. Te historical notion of the multicultural society as situated in the pillars in the early twentieth century long ago gave way to the notion of a cohesive secular society. Te facets of this modern, urban, industrial, and consumerist society have, almost unnoticed, become one, as Western culture and secularity become pervasive and override diferences. Te Netherlands is now asked to name what it has become after its modern fusion and acknowledge that the validity of multicultural perceptions may challenge notions the Dutch still carry regarding the liberal state and society. In this self-exploration the Dutch can reafrm the pact of the liberal state with secularity and boldly address the issue of faith and state. Political developments in the 2017 elections confrmed this tie to secularity and antagonism to immigrants. Before election day Mark Rutte, who leads the VVD party, set the stage for expanding the anti-immigrant discourse. In addition to claiming that immigrants “don’t love the country,” he took advantage of a dispute with Turkey to show the Dutch people he was tough enough to confront the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Te election results showed that Rutte’s strategy of getting tough with foreigners and immigrants paid of. Wilders came in a poor second, winning just 13 percent of the vote and twenty seats—far behind the liberals, led by Rutte, who won 21 percent of the vote and thirty-three seats. To some, Rutte’s method of countering populism with nationalism is itself national populism. For example, the CDA’s leader, Sybrand Buma, is lobbying for the singing of “Wilhelmus” (the national anthem) to be compulsory in Dutch schools, and schools must take pupils at least once during their school years to visit parliament’s lower house and the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam, home to Rembrandt’s paintings and other Dutch art. What “Dutch norms and values” and “Dutch identity” are has been debated, and the four parties of the governmental coalition have reached an agreement. Tese developments and the tough posture on radicalism are clear signs that the political map as a whole is moving to the right. We might say these policies refect a clear tendency to ethnic and cultural exclusion. Or we might reach the conclusion that the Netherlands is making a steady attempt of democratic civic integration. Sam Cherribi, a former member of parliament in the Netherlands, believes it is a progressive country that found progressive solutions to drugs, prostitution, and other social problems but cannot overcome social exclusion.270

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Liberal observers are probably disappointed by this. For liberals, the only ray of hope is from the Green Left Party led by Jesse Klaver, son of an absentee Moroccan father and part-Indonesian mother, born in 1986, who led the party in 2017 to win fourteen seats in the parliament. Klaver preaches the virtues of an open, fair society, prorefugee and pro-European concepts that are under overt attack. In contrast, Wilders, representing the European radical Right, proposed the motto “Te Netherlands—Ours Again” and promised to stop the Islamization of the Netherlands by closing all mosques and Islamic schools, closing the border to all Muslim immigrants and asylum seekers, prohibiting the wearing of the headscarf in public, and banning the Qur’an.271 And then there is the national civic integration of Rutte. Te Dutch voted in 2017 for Rutte’s idea, which is the dominant trend in Europe and is the only one to block national populism. Although it is unknown whether Muslims would prefer a liberal nationalist society more than a multicultural one, there is basis to believe in the efectiveness of the civic integration program. A study by Evelyn Ersanilli and Ruud Koopmans on the social integration of Turkish immigrants in Germany, France, and the Netherlands lends credence to the promise of civic integration. Far from fnding that an emphasis on assimilation makes adaptation of a host culture difcult for immigrants, the research suggests the opposite. When the Netherlands assumed a clearer stance on integration, Dutch Turks, for example, began to show comparatively high levels of host country identifcation.272 Te Netherlands might be in the vanguard of the European quest for identities that embody liberalism, a plural and multiethnic society, and a revived notion of the secular state. Te abolishment in 2013 of the relics of its blasphemy law is a signifcant event in this regard. As a leader in the debate on Muslims in Europe, the Netherlands could also lead the entire debate on Islam, asking: Will Islam accept, and does Islam need to accept, the state as the sole rational sovereign? If the Dutch fail in integrating its Muslim citizens into a national culture, meaning that Muslims agree to limit religion to the private space, the result would be a terrible backlash against even the possibility of integration. In that case, Jerry Muller’s claim that liberalism is a philosophy for ethno-homogeneous nations only would be true.273 An ethnohomogeneous nation is closed to the Other, regardless of that Other’s willingness to integrate. Tat is precisely what the radical Right strives for. Failure to integrate into a national culture will come as a relief for the radical Right and a loss for democrats.

Chapter 4

France Te End of French Republicanism? Vive la République!

Crafting a New Republicanism: Multiethnicity in a Monoculture

Te January 2015 terrorist attacks on the satirical Charlie Hebdo magazine and the Jewish supermarket and the November 2015 attacks on the Bataclan concert hall, the Stade de France and Le Petit Cambodge, Café Bonne Bière, and other venues marked a turning point in French encounter with Islam. Te victims and sites of the terror attacks held a deep symbolic signifcance for the French people; they represented staples of a decidedly French, and even Parisian, way of life. Te assaults were a desecration of France’s most cherished values; free speech, irreverence toward religion, assimilation of minorities, and a liberal culture of leisure. Although jihadists had targeted and attacked several Western nations, they seem to pose a greater threat in France. Why is France such a frequent target? Some observers point to France’s foreign policy and active involvement in countering terrorism in Syria, Iraq, Mali, Libya, and the Sahel region of Africa.1 Others see it as a product of France’s failure to integrate its Muslim citizens and point to Muslims’ economically disadvantaged position. For many, however, the explanation is more encompassing. Even if we decline to link terrorism to French attitudes toward its Muslim minority, many observers claim that France, as a quintessential example of a secular republic, is inhospitable to groups seeking to protect their cultural and religious identities. Scholars such as Ahmet Kuru claim that, compared with other Western European countries, France’s policies toward Muslims are exceptionally restrictive. Only in France is a seem235

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ingly superfcial issue such as the wearing of headscarves (hijabs) at public schools viewed as a serious ofense against the state.2 As Michael Walzer and Gerard Noiriel note, separately, the irony of France is that, although populated with immigrants, it does not conceptualize itself as a pluralist society but rather as a monocultural society.3 For not a few observers this explains the particular sense of uneasiness that Muslims feel toward France, and this is especially true for the second generation of French-proud Muslims, who are much more demanding and critical of the republic than their parents were.4 For these observers, thus, French secular rigidity is the reason for the young Muslim rebellion against the republic in the last decade. In this chapter we advance a diferent set of explanations. We believe that the assertive Islam expressed by the second and third generations of Muslim French expanded in a time of a rising, confdent new-liberal France, which showed growing tolerance of religious expression in the public sphere. Social scientists such as Jean-Marie Woehrling explain that once the Catholic Church was no longer a threat, the state could become more tolerant of religion in the public sphere.5 However, the encounter between Muslim assertiveness, the rise of Islam as an identity marker, and a more liberal and tolerant but still secular republican France did not result in greater trust and understanding but the opposite. It set the nation on a path to secular backlash and the fortifying of a nationalist republican ideology that many had considered dead: a nationalist laïcité, a concept generally associated with projects of national cohesion that expanded its reach among citizens.6 In this chapter we explain how French political and ideological processes wavered between openness to diversity and a more staunch defense of laïcité as national identity. A national republican consensus was framed to contain both Muslims and the populist right and restrain their attempt to reform the laic consensus. We explain that France has been open to co-opted Muslim communitarian leaders’ religious requests, but it has launched an uncompromising war against Islamic terrorism and Muslim communitarianism.7 Instead of showing fexibility toward Muslims and liberal criticism, France has became a champion of a more assertive type of discriminatory liberalism that, we suggest, it is imprinting on the whole of Europe. France staunchly advocates free speech and stands frm in refusing to equate anti-Semitism to Islamophobia. If rejects religious exemptions, polygamy, blasphemy, apostasy laws, and sharia courts. In this chapter we explore frst the origins of republican laïcité and examine the role played by the enemies of the republic and their war

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against secular assimilation. Next, we analyze the interaction between Muslim organizations and the republic, looking at the building of mosques, roles of imam education, and wearing of headscarves. We distinguish and describe the Muslim mobilizations in France the Indigènes de la République (Natives of the Republic), the 2005 rebellion of the banlieues, and the women’s rights mobilization of Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores nor Doormats).Although the three mobilizations have contrasting ideals, their common ground is that they are a mix of Muslim-secular identity and an apparently authentic French republican protest. We explore how the republic addressed each and how it embraced one (Ni Putes Ni Soumises), accepted one (banlieue rebellion), and rejected another (Indigènes de la République).Tey led to a republican backlash in which identity is referred to basically as hard laïcité. We emphasize that a hard laïcité implies a national republican identity pitted not against Islam religiosity but against Islam as an identity marker. Last, we consider whether after the 2017 French national elections the double challenge of Muslim assertiveness, on the one hand, and the National Rally (until June 2018 known as the National Front) and the new populist movement France Insoumise, on the other, will shatter France’s republican consensus on laïcité. Secularism as National Identity?

As the historian Eugen Weber has noted, laïcité is a philosophical pillar of modern French national identity, along with the French language, culture, and national consciousness.8 Several political theorists have asked whether French identity conficts with notions of citizenship in an advanced democracy.9 Critics of French politics point out that a French democratic national identity associated with secular republicanism barely meets the needs of a modern multicultural society. Some argue that French democratic republicanism difers from classical liberalism in several signifcant ways. One of the most important diferences is that, whereas classical liberalism emphasizes a weak version of secularism, which requires the state to remain distant from divisive religious views, French republicanism and its laïcité actually undermine an authentic separation of church and state. Laïcité is the outcome of laicization, in which the domination of the Catholic Church, which legitimated the Old Regime, was overcome and

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fnally subordinated to the state. As remarked by the French historian Jean Bauberot, French laïcité cannot be properly understood without taking into account the struggle against clericalism—namely against the power of the church over society and individuals.10 In that struggle the republic waged a cultural war to create a large body of loyal republican citizens.11 Anticlerical sentiment became a major force in French political life in the eighteenth century, when philosophers attacked the Catholic Church as an enemy of the Enlightenment and a supporter of an oppressive monarchy. Te philosophers especially condemned religious attacks on the autonomy of women.12 Since then, French republicanism has been thought of as the epicenter of anticlericalism. Despite radical anticlericalism, French republicans maintained a special relationship with the church. In fact, the church had always been favored by the French state, an example being the Concordat of 1801, in which the government recognized Catholicism as the majority religion, conferring benefts unavailable to members of the other recognized religions—Protestantism and Judaism. During the Tird Republic’s inauguration in the 1870s, attitudes changed. Te dominant feeling among secular democrats was that Catholics did not accept the republic and believed a restoration of the monarchy was inevitable.13 Ruth Harris notes that “it was around this time that the concept of ‘laïcité’ gained strength as a militant form of secularism.”14 Supporters of secularism pressured the government to enact secular reforms, including the Law of Associations of 1901, which required all religious associations to have state authorization. In 1904, Prime Minister Emile Combes secured the passage of a more restrictive law that prevented religious communities from providing education of any kind. Even with restrictive laws against Catholics, the secular republicans were far from united about the meaning of secularism and the boundary between church and state. Opinions ranged from those who were completely anticlerical, to those, such as the socialists Aristide Briand and Jean Jaurès, who desired a stricter separation between state and church yet were open to religious freedom.15 Te ideas of Briand and Jaurès prevailed in the crafting of the 1905 Law of Separation between state and church. Te 1905 law places all religious groups at the same level. Te frst two articles ensure, respectively, freedom of conscience and free exercise of religion. Te second article neither recognizes nor supports a particular religion. Tese two articles established the liberal principle of separation of church and state that was ultimately enshrined in Article 1 of the 1946 constitution, which codifed equal treatment of all religions.

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At frst glance, the French separation of state and church is similar to that of the United States, in which the legal order rejects primacy of any religious establishment. However, the diferent historical context has created diferent perceptions. Te French law combatted the infuence of the Catholic Church in public afairs and was a major defeat of the church at the hands of the state.16 Tis victory of the state led to two apparently contradictory trends. In the frst, religious communitarianism was suspect to the state. In the second, after defeating the Catholic Church, the state now felt strong enough to allow some concessions to the church. A direct consequence of the confrontation between state and church was that the state was perceived as protecting the individual against the intrusion of a religious group. In the relationship between the individual, the religious group, and the state, the state in France is seen as the champion of individual freedom. Another, conficting consequence was that the state, in apparent violation of the principle of separation, tended to patronize or bureaucratize religion in general and Catholicism in particular. Te state took responsibility for the salaries of chaplains of any religion. Te idea was to enable prisoners in jail, sick people in hospitals, or soldiers to keep practicing their faith. In addition, although in theory public subsidies for religious institutions were forbidden, in practice the state provided public funding to private Catholic schools. Moreover, the church’s opposition to the Separation Law spurred certain concessions from republicans, such as allowing Catholics free use of state-owned churches. Tese concessions were motivated by the desire to promote social harmony. Since the passage of the 1905 Separation Law, the French central and local governments have funded the majority of the forty-fve thousand Catholic churches in the country, along with half the Protestant churches and a tenth of the synagogues. In addition, Catholic chaplains operate in approximately half of France’s public secondary schools. Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, and Jewish chaplains work in French hospitals and in the military. Presidents have also appointed bishops on the basis of recommendations by the pope. Certain regions have also been exempted from secular policies. For example, secularization laws were never imposed on Alsace-Moselle. Te state provided subventions to four recognized religions: Catholicism, Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Judaism. Tis region was a part of Germany from 1871 to 1919, the period in which the secularization laws were adopted. After the region was reincorporated into France, it was allowed to maintain its religious independence. Additionally, in French Guyana,

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Catholicism is the only recognized religion, and in the African collectivity of Mayotte, personal law is based on Islamic law.17 Tese examples seem clear proof that the French state has not completely excluded religion from the public sphere. Under laïcité, neutrality toward any religious symbol is imposed at the state level and in the political arena rather than in the public sphere. However, we must distinguish between the tolerance the state shows toward a religious order and the real goal promoted by the state, which is the agnostic character of the state. In other words, the state allows freedom of religion and worship as long as they are private and discreet, and it advances the idea that religion in general has no place in social life. Using the 1905 law, the French state attempted to substitute secular morality for religious morality. Such morality was ostensibly neutral, since it did not rely on lofty metaphysical claims but instead relied on a rational moral truth, which was supposed to be protected by the state and popular sovereignty. Tat is why, despite similarities between the French and the American concept of separation of state and church, laïcité is not the same as the American concept of secularism. In the United States the Constitution ensures that freedom of religion is placed beyond the reach of legislation by a negative phrasing: “Congress shall make no laws.” In France, laïcité is positively defned and associated with indivisibility, democracy, equality, and liberty of conscience.18 It epitomizes the desire for a collective identity to project itself, not against, but over religion and over any other diversity. It represents not a particular spiritual option but a national-communitarian founding principle specifed by law. Regis Debray has articulated this idea with precision: “Every man, every woman has a right to belong to a community. Republicans more than others, because they have a duty to create one. . . . Tey must subordinate the natural community, that of blood (la lignée), to a cultural community. . . . Laïcité must be a culture, or it will not be.”19 To achieve this republican community, the state must control the public sphere. Most importantly, this includes institutions of public socialization such as schools, which represent national laboratories to create the citizens of the future, in which the principles of equality, mutual respect, and national unity must be instilled. “Once the supporters of republican government had won majorities in both houses of Parliament in the 1880s, Jules Ferry, Minister of Education and President of the Council (akin to Prime Minister),” introduced “a series of educational reforms designed to establish a system of nationwide

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‘obligatory, free and laic’ primary schools.” Ferry declared that children should be taught the “Positivist principles of freedom of thought and universal morality. Since morality is a ‘social fact’ rather than a transcendent commandment for Positivism, it becomes a matter of ‘culture’ in the most general sense of the term.”20 In 1884, French law established free and compulsory primary education for boys and girls and a standard national curriculum. In the name of national unity, the equal right to education was construed as the right to an identical education, with few accommodations for diferent languages, cultures, religions, and even (remarkably for the time) genders. French schools promoted national civic values that cut across communities. Troughout the country, teachers became the proud agents of the republic’s civilizing mission, that of transforming both peasants and Catholics into “Frenchmen.”21 Tis shared public identity promoted by schools would not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity. Te frst section of the constitution adopted by the Fifth Republic in 1958 ensured the equality of French citizens with no discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, race, or religion. Under this system, religious groups were required to respect the law, renounce all claims to political power, and refrain from intervening in public debate in a partisan manner. In more ways than one, national identity and the tradition of enlightened humanism have been confated into a single category. Te main goal was to create a homogeneous culture through education.22 The Republican Nation and Its Rivals

As Alain Dieckhof has noted, the founders of the democratic Tird Republic could not conceive of a French citizen who could simultaneously maintain an original, primary identity, be it Basque, Breton, or Catalan. Local identities were denigrated as archaic regionalisms and relegated to the private sphere.23 Although regional minority identities and the majority Catholic religion resisted the republican war against diversity, the Protestant minority and discriminated ethnic and religious groups such as Jews became an integral part of the secularization and homogenization process of the republic. Te emancipation of Jews provided an early model for the individualistic mode of citizenship.24 In 1791, Jews were invited to take a civic oath and to renounce “all privileges and exceptions formerly introduced

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in their favor” as a religious minority. Tey were granted full citizenship as individuals, not on the basis of their group membership.25 As Dominique Schnapper has noted, “Not only were Jews the only true Austrians, but they were also the only true Italians, . . . remaining before all Piedmontese, Lombards, or Sicilians.”26 Ironically, although citizenship transformed nonauthentic French into nationals, the vrai pays (real country) subnational identities were repressed. All were assimilated into the secular, republican nation. Tis practice was not limited to the domestic realm. Republican ideology was dominated by the idea of assimilating immigrants and colonized nations into the French community. Te belief in the virtue of the French approach to immigration and integration was a source of republican pride.27 Tis pride allowed liberals and leftists to join a democratic secular nationalist project. Interestingly, at the end of the nineteenth century, the revolutionary left was the main depositary of nationalist fervor. In their minds, the nation was the natural site of social justice and economic redistribution. Étienne Balibar has correctly suggested that the new sphere of the social mind was constructed according to national criteria.28 Tis explains why large sections of the republican left also came to view the post-1945 welfare state as a constitutive element of French national identity.29 Te republican left also considered civic integration of newcomers into the polity as complementary to the welfare state. Communist organizations were the spearhead of integration into the polity. Te French Communist Party was an agent of integration and established institutions that were based on ethnic working-class identities.30 However, such communities usually dissolved after the second generation and never gained public recognition. What republicans failed to grasp was that integration into a new culture could be extremely painful. Indeed, because integration entails signifcant moral negotiation and compromise, other cultures become devalued: these identities are what immigrants must shed to be “promoted” or “elevated” to Frenchness, to be “as French as us.”31 Tough immigrants were welcomed into France, the idea of the French identity was already entrenched: immigrants could neither create nor adjust it.32 Because the republic elevated a single universal citizenship and common identity above cultural diferences, its early opponents emphasized antithetical ethnic, regional, and religious identities.33 Since the late nine-

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teenth century, however, a nationalism based on counter-Enlightenment philosophy has challenged the republican concept of nationalism. Tese ideas represented not a nationalist upheaval against liberalism but an ideological struggle against the republican concept of nationalism. As Balibar remarks, “Te elaboration of an ideology of the ‘French race,’ rooted in the past of ‘the soil and the dead,’ coincides with the beginning of mass immigration, the preparation for revenge against Germany and the founding of the colonial empire.”34 Tis integralist right, exemplifed by the writers Charles Maurras and Maurice Barrès, rejected the republican concept of nationalism because it transformed foreigners into nationals and destroyed what they viewed as the authentic inequalities and privileges of the ancien régime. For rightwing nationalists, the republican concept of assimilation ruined France’s authentic nationalism. Dressing up his philosophy as humanitarian, Barrès adds that it is inhuman to force “foreigners” to become part of the adoptive country. During the Dreyfus afair, Barrès argues, Dreyfus should not have been accused of betrayal. If “we were disinterested minds, instead of judging Dreyfus according to French morality and according to our justice, like a peer, we would recognize him as a representative of a diferent species.”35 Te extreme right’s nineteenth-century critique of the republic was a precursor to present-day criticism of the republic argued by advocates of multiculturalism. While in the United States and Canada, multiculturalism is associated with democratic politics, in France, as several French intellectuals stress, it is attacked for the alleged proximity with the ideology of the far right and with ideas of “Balkanization and Americanization.”36 We can grasp from Barrès’s perception of the Dreyfus afair that the real problem for the radical Right would be integrated or assimilated foreigners rather than foreigners’ self-exclusion. For the democratic left it would be precisely the opposite. As we shall see, what distinguishes the republican left from the exclusionist right is not the defense of liberal rights but rather the defense of a communitarian nation into which the foreigner can be included and assimilated. Paradoxically, this particularity of the republican left is what nowadays is scorned by multiculturalists and what is most criticized by Islamists. Te question is whether, despite criticism, the basic principle of integration in a secular republican nationalism is still alive. In the next section, we trace the challenges of incorporating Muslims using the republican mode of integration.

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Muslim Immigration, Colonial Heritage and Republican Incorporation

France has ancient ties to Islam that go back much further and deeper than most other comparable nations.37 Generally, the republic had a favorable view of Islam during the colonial period. Te Tird Republic tried to establish a strong French presence in the Islamic world; the building of the Grand Mosque of Paris was an early example of these eforts. Te government encouraged Muslims to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and even asked the Society of Pious Trusts and Islamic Holy Places in Algeria to create a Muslim institute in Paris. In addition, the French colonial experience in three North African countries afected French attitudes toward Muslims in France. Morocco and Tunisia were protectorates, and Algeria became a colony in 1830. Te Moroccan ruling class retained its power throughout and after French rule. Tis continuity enhanced political legitimation, since Moroccans continued to receive Islamic higher education and sent a disproportionate share of men to become imams in French mosques. Tunisia, in contrast, was hostile to political expression of Islam. Repression of Islamists led Muslim intellectuals to seek political asylum in France. Tere they provided the backbone for religious schools and associations and dominated the world of French Islamic education. Algeria was an integral part of France and was ruled by the French Ministry of the Interior, while Morocco and Tunisia were ruled from the Ministry of Foreign Afairs. Tis special status created contradictions within the French concept of citizenship. Whereas the French who colonized Algeria remained French citizens with unfettered access to the country’s political and social institutions, the colonized Muslims remained a separate, indigenous population with a distinct status. For example, the 1905 Separation Law was not applied to the Muslim population in Algeria. Family afairs of Muslims were judged according to a version of Islamic law. Te only way Muslim Algerians could apply for French citizenship was by renouncing the special privileges aforded to Muslims.38 Tis demonstrated that Muslims, as Muslims, could not obtain French citizenship and that allegiance to Islam was viewed as incompatible with allegiance to France. Te Algerian War of Independence shaped the French perception of Islam. Tis bloody civil war included systematic terror attacks on French civilians. Resentment toward North Africans emerged not only among ethnic French but also among ethnic Algerian and Harkis (the Algerians who fought alongside the French army during the Algerian War, from

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1954 to 1962). After the victory of the Algerian National Liberation Front (Front de Liberation Nationale) forces in 1962, French ofcials fed to France to escape retributive mass murders.39 Te legacy of these events became relevant when a second generation of Muslim national immigrants demanded cultural rights and a revision of French colonial history. Te frst massive migration of colonial Muslims into France occurred during World War I. Hundreds of thousands of Maghrebian and other Muslim groups were brought over to fll jobs in ammunition factories vacated by departing French soldiers. As a sign of gratitude to these Muslim workers, in 1926 the government built the Grand Mosque of Paris, which is still an important center for Algerian immigrants. (Although the mosque is independent, Algeria exercises an unwritten right to the nomination of its rector and fnances a third of its budget.) Because of worker shortages during the three decades after the war, French ofcials recruited workers from Islamic countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. North African immigrants were employed mainly in heavy industry and construction, and Turkish immigrants were concentrated in mining, construction, and forestry. By 1975, more than a million Muslim immigrants resided in the republic. Similar to other migrations, many of the frst-generation immigrants saw their residence in France as temporary. With this provisional mind-set, French Muslims practiced their religion in a hidden and humble manner, referred to as basement Islam, and that was the norm up until the mid1970s. Te state ofered the children of these immigrants instruction in the languages and cultures of their ancestry to facilitate their return home. Yet the integration process was hindered by global events. First, the Algerian War, which ended with independence in 1962, brought millions of French colonists and soldiers back to their homeland and feeling bitter over the defeat in Algeria. Second, the oil crisis of 1974 resulted in an economic recession, causing the government to stop hiring foreign workers and halt immigration. Algerian workers in France came to be viewed as former colonial subjects who were taking jobs away from French citizens. Tension increased as the immigrant population rapidly grew. President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing attempted to halt immigration by preventing reunifcation of families. In subsequent years, diferent governments toughened the criteria for naturalization to reduce immigration. In 1977, Immigration Minister Lionel Stoléru ofered monetary compensation to North African immigrants (10,000 francs) if they returned home; few took the ofer.

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Despite eforts to deport immigrants or pressure them to leave, France had become one of the most multiethnic nations in the world. Since 1975, the number of foreign-born citizens in France has stood at around 10 percent, or 6 million people. In 1999, the government’s statistics department reported that almost one out of fve French citizens is an immigrant or a second-generation immigrant.40 Te ofcial census does not inquire about religion; however, the Ministry of Internal Afairs estimates that there are about 5 million Muslims in France. Research conducted by Michèle Tribalat of the Institute for the Study of Demographics (Institute National d’Études Démographiques) challenges this number. She contends that there are only 3.7 million Muslims in France, or about 6.3 percent of the population.41 Most of France’s Muslims are of Maghrebian origin and are considered to be Arabs or Berbers; 70 percent of French Muslims have family roots in the former French colonies of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and some come from sub-Saharan African countries, such as Senegal and Mali. Estimates show that over one-third of Muslims are of Algerian origin and onequarter of Moroccan origin.42 Many in France refer to French Muslims indiscriminately as North Africans, but at least one-quarter have a Berber background, originating from the ethnic group in Algeria known as the Kabyle. Te Kabyle have a distinct culture and language, just as the Rif people of north Morocco do. Most of the Berbers practice Sunni Islam; however, few speak Arabic. In addition, Muslims from Mali or Nigeria, countries divided from the Maghreb by the Sahara desert, identify as black and not as Arab.43 Since Muslims make up 85 percent of France’s overall immigrant population, it was thought that statistics relevant to immigrant communities as a whole can generally be applied to the Muslim community in particular. However, there are salient diferences. French Muslims have faced enormous difculties as they tried to enter the workforce. According to 2005 data from France’s National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, unemployment among people of French origin is 9.2 percent, but for those with foreign backgrounds, the rate is 14 percent. Tese statistics have been adjusted for educational qualifcations. For workers whose parents are natives of Algeria or Morocco, the unemployment rate soars to approximately 40 percent.44 Of employed Muslims, 40 percent work in factories, compared with 21 percent of the workforce as a whole.45 Few dispute that one of the reasons for high unemployment among Muslims is discrimination. As noted by the High Council on Integra-

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tion (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration) in 1998, discriminatory practices exist in job ofers, which sometimes specify “white race” or add codes such as “BBR” (standing for blue, white, and red, the colors of the French fag), which is universally understood to mean that the employer wants applications from individuals who are not foreigners or children of immigrants. Usually, however, discrimination is a more subtle product of corporate culture and tracking by job placement agencies.46 Claire Adida, David Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort surveyed descendants of Senegalese migrants in France and fnd that, over multiple generations, Christian Senegalese immigrants fare better in economic outcomes than Muslim Senegalese. A Christian citizen of African heritage is two and a half times more likely to be called for job interviews than Muslim citizens with similar qualifcations and similar ethnic background. Rather than race, discrimination originates in religion.47 Muslims have faced greater barriers to economic integration in France than other non-Muslim immigrant groups of similar national and ethnic origins. Tat is why the main day-to-day concern of French Muslims has been for a long time unemployment, social inequality, education, and housing.48 Discrimination and anti-Islamic attitudes are present elsewhere.49 In the army, a symbol of egalitarian republicanism, we fnd a gap between the values of the republic and their implementation. Religion is seen as conficting with the secular ideals embedded in the republic’s army.50 Muslims faced early disadvantages in terms of housing, as well. According to Mobilité géographique et insertion sociale (MGIS; Geographic Mobilization and Social Insertion) data of 1992, around 25 percent of North African and Turkish immigrants and 32 percent of sub-Saharan African immigrants reported discrimination in their search for private and even public housing.51 Unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants are even displayed by the habitations à loyer modéré, public housing created by the government in the 1970s with the explicit goal of assisting disadvantaged people, including immigrants, in securing afordable housing. Despite most housing projects being built for immigrants, immigrant applicants report being discouraged from applying by the managing company. Te result is that the Muslim population has become concentrated in ghettos that have failing public schools and poor social services.52 Tese sociocultural ghettos are also referred to as France’s lost lands, where a young generation of French Beurs (the French slang for Arab written backward) began their experience with discrimination. We now look at how Muslims mobilized and how the republic reacted.

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Nationalized Islam, Cultural Tolerance, and Political Co-optation

Te organizational mobilization of French Muslims began in the 1970s when Algerian immigrants joined a communist trade union, the General Confederation of Labor. Te union welcomed Muslim workers as exploited victims of global capitalism and attempted to secure basic economic goods, such as afordable housing and socioeconomic and political inclusion. Between 1974 and 1979 there were several large strikes in housing complexes over increases in rent. Tese economic demands almost always were accompanied with demands for prayer rooms or places of worship. Interestingly, in those days the French government believed that tackling the identity issue was easier than addressing the social one. Yet, although the identity issue was important for Muslims, they were fghting for socioeconomic justice, as much as against racism. A new generation of young Muslims began their fght for their rights, specifcally socioeconomic rights, as early as 1983 when a dozen young men of North African origin marched from Marseille to Paris. Te nonviolent protest was against racist police intimidation and the killing of an Arab Muslim activist. When they arrived in Paris they were received by President François Mitterrand. Teir numbers now grown to 100,000, they demanded equality and a bigger role in democratic life. Tey hoped to gain the same opportunities won by their Polish and Italian predecessors.53 Tis march symbolized a generational break from the world of their parents, a break that the state had yet to notice.54 Informed and infuenced by developments in cultural pluralism, the Socialist government led by Mitterrand focused on racism and identity rather than on pure socioeconomic integration. Furthermore, the government’s misplaced focus was skewed by the way the issue of identity was addressed. Already in the 1980s immigrant workers were the leading actors in important—and victorious—labor struggles, in particular in the automobile sector. Te wave of strikes that hit Renault, Citroën, and Talbot automobile plants in several areas of France from the summer of 1981 to early 1983 were no longer just class struggle; they were also calls for cultural or religious recognition. Aware of this, worker unions started to pay attention to issues of identity. For example, a “mosque policy” was implemented by the General Confederation of Labor, authorizing Muslims to perform daily prayers in the workplace, or within company grounds.55 At the governmental level, Mitterrand also understood the importance

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of identity questions and approached the issue through recognition of organizations and through the co-optation of the Muslim communitarian leadership. To empower the community, the French government provided funding to create Islamic organizations.56 In addition, in 1981 foreign residents gained the right to establish social organizations, facilitating the creation of religious associations. Between 1981 and 1982, Muslim organizations grew from two to forty-two.57 Te new organizations included the Union of the Islamic Organizations of France (Union des Organisations Islamiques de France) and the National Union of the Muslims of France (Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France). Most of these organizations had close links to Muslim countries. Te National Union of the Muslims of France had close ties to Morocco, and the Union of the Islamic Organizations of France was linked to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian political party Ennahda, whose members practice a conservative form of Islam. Te Union of the Islamic Organizations, led by the Tunisian Ahmed Jaballah (associated with Ennahda), represents two hundred local associations, especially in Seine-Saint-Denis, the department in France with the most Muslims. Te organization invests in social welfare and in many annual cultural exhibitions in Bourget (in Seine-Saint-Denis) with the aim of supporting Muslim pride. Although the French government accepted these organizations, its main interest was creating a single representative Islamic organization capable of integrating French Muslims with one leader, such as Mohammed Bechari, the president of the French National Federation of Muslims, which had close ties to Morocco, or Dalil Boubakeur, the leader of the Grand Mosque of Paris, which was under Algerian infuence. Boubakeur gave his loyalty to the state in exchange for benefts to the community, such as facilities for the slaughter of halal meat or construction of mosques and cemeteries.58 In addition, the Ministry of the Interior convened the Working Council on Islam in France (Conseil de réfexion sur l’Islam de France), a commission of six imams who advised French Muslims and performed functions such as regulating the dates of Islamic rituals and other public practices. Te republic believed that co-opted leaders and organizations were necessary to contain the infuence of emerging transnational Muslim movements, such as the Salaf or Suf brotherhoods or the Tablighi Jamaat.59 Charles Pasqua, a conservative Gaullist and minister of interior, urged Boubakeur to draw up a charter of the Muslim faith in France.60 Te charter called Muslims to condemn extremism and bear witness to their

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attachment to the state that guaranteed freedom of religion.61 Both the ideological message of the charter and Boubakeur were rejected by the two major Islamic umbrella organizations in France, the National Union of the Muslims of France and the Union of the Islamic Organizations of France, which accused the Grand Mosque of Paris as being a branch of the state. Teir refusal to recognize the Grand Mosque leadership required more direct and tougher action from the government. Tis action came from the new minister of interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, in November 2002. He assembled the Islamic organizations in the town of Nainville-les-Roches and issued a two-day deadline for reaching an agreement on a single representative Muslim body. Te French Council of the Muslim Faith (Conseil français du culte musulman) resulted. In a January 2003 radio interview, Sarkozy suggested that, to combat the infuence of basement Islam (l’Islam des caves), which had become associated with global terrorism, a new “Islam of the mosques,” or an organized and state-controlled Islam, should be supported.62 New mosques would be created, and Sarkozy threatened to expel imams who did not support laïcité and close their mosques.63 Te government appointed Dalil Boubakeur as head of the French Council of the Muslim Faith.64 Te reason for this appointment was clear. He was rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris, and his publications promoted a lay public sphere while delineating an appropriate relationship of Muslims to secularism. His book L’Islam de France sera liberál (Islam of France will be liberal) is a continuation of his previous attempts to establish the subject position of the “secular Muslim.”65 As could be expected, the government’s appointment of Boubakeur was rejected by most Muslim organizations, undermining the government’s ability to win over the Muslim leadership during the inaugural elections of the Council of the Muslim Faith.66 In the frst April 2003 elections, the Grand Mosque of Paris failed miserably, winning only six representatives out of a total of forty. Tis turnout, however, did not convince the French government to stop trying to intervene in the communitarian afairs of Muslims. Fear of Islamization and desire to control communities motivated this government zeal to control and domesticate Muslims. France has a long history—dating back to the colonial era—of using racial and religious categories to govern indigenous communities. One of the hallmarks of colonial authority was the bureaucratization of religion. France’s concept of religious pluralism was largely limited to religions with a clear hierarchical structure and clergy.67 Although the French republic was infused with a new awareness of cultural and ethnic diferences after the colonial era,

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that did not translate to limiting state power in cultural afairs. Te French approach difers from that of many American social and political organizations, which associate democracy with the limiting of the power of the state. Te French method fts neatly into the principle of French corporatism. Associations are encouraged by the state to designate spokespersons who mediate between a group formed around common interests and public authorities.68 Te problem that arises is that, although the French state remains wedded to the old bureaucratic arrangements between state and church, the new generation of Muslims, which the Socialists themselves encouraged, began to challenge bureaucratic rule and promotes its own version of a national integrated Islam. Among this generation we fnd diferent attitudes toward the republic: rectors of mosques have their opinions, Muslim students at public schools defy the secular order, individualistic Muslims oppose any participation in cultural organizations, and grassroots movements are for or against stricter government intervention in religious matters. In the next section we describe and analyze the interaction between these new integrated French Muslims and the state. Te republic is reafrming its republican discourse vis-à-visa new type of Muslim mobilization, which includes social and identity Islamic concerns. We start with the debate around mosque building and the new Muslim leadership that is arising, co-opted by neither the state nor Muslim countries. French Islam: New Leadership, Individual Deculturalization, and the Grass Roots

Nationalizing Islam in France, a secular state, would seem to mean it would have the same status as Catholicism. Tis is not the case, because the secular and republican state gives precedence to Catholic churches over mosques. And because the 1905 Separation Law prohibited the state from directly fnancing religious activities, mosques cannot receive public funding. Public funds can, however, be used for the upkeep of Roman Catholic churches built before 1905. Tese churches have been taken over by local authorities. Since Catholic churches and cathedrals were mostly built before 1905, they receive direct public assistance. Mosques do not receive the exemptions that churches do. For mosques to qualify for public funding would mean changing the 1905 law—the cornerstone of France’s secular state—a change republican leaders would be unwilling to make.69

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Framing a mosque as a cultural center could make it a candidate for public funding under a 1901 law. Under that law an association or nonproft organization called an association culturelle can receive public funding for preserving a building. Te 1901 law thus accommodates some of the religious needs of Moslems. More important than the law itself, however, is local authorities’ pragmatic approach to Muslims. For example, construction of the Great Mosque of Lyon in 1994, was facilitated by the mayor of Lyon, Michel Noir, and a cordial dialogue with Muslim leadership. When local government helps create mosques, the republic is challenging its own precedent of withholding public funds and support from religious institutions. To protect the secular state, French authorities intervene in communitarian issues (helping nominate co-opted leaders) and religious matters (fnancially supporting mosque building). Te republic has also intervened in imam training. Te government supports and supervises the education of imams in order to guarantee that education in liberal values is part of the training. Tis is seen as necessary because the majority of imams are born abroad. Of the 1,200 registered imams in France, twothirds are not citizens, and one-third do not speak French. A 2004 initiative of the minister of interior, Dominique de Villepin, created a modern French-speaking generation of imams.70 Te initiative called for mandatory education for imams in citizenship, history, and law. In 2006 the Machelon Commission called for a state-funded institute of Islamic theology in Strasbourg, and in 2008 a government-sponsored secularization project for imams was promoted through the Catholic Institute of Paris and the Grand Mosque of Paris.71 Te project, Religions, Secularism, Interculturality, ofered four hundred hours of accredited instruction in four subject areas—general culture, legislative matters, social and political tolerance, and intercultural exchange. Te program included a history of republican values and the rights and duties of religious groups in France, after studying the French secular tradition and Enlightenment philosophy. But most projects of this sort had to satisfy two parts of French society. Public ofcials had to be attentive to popular worries about the visibility of Islam.72 And a young Muslim generation began distinguishing between a nationalized Islam and the co-opted republican version.73 A new type of leader rejects co-optation, whether by the state or Muslim countries, and promotes at the intellectual level a modern, integrated French Islam. Cultural centers and mosques, ranging from the Saint Denis Center Tawhid (the name refers to God’s unity) to the Vigneux and Ivry-sur-Seine,

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have these nationalized non-co-opted communitarian leaders. Mohamed Bajrafl, imam of the mosques of Vigneux and Ivry-sur-Seine, presents himself as an advocate of a tolerant twenty-frst-century Islam. Mammadou Dafé, another example, of the Mirail district in Toulouse leads evening prayers in the Al Houceine mosque. Dafé is a charismatic leader with tremendous infuence, especially among the younger generation. Although, like Bajrafl, he describes himself as a moderate and an advocate of a local Islam, he preaches religious resistance against the republic and advocates communitarian segregation.74 He is also a senior researcher in pharmacology. Probably the most challenging of all the new fgures in French Islam is Marwan Muhammad, executive director of the Collective against Islamophobia in France. Under his direction, the group has raised its profle, fling frequent lawsuits and publicizing episodes of what it sees as antiMuslim bias. His argument is based not on a rejection of French laws but on those laws having helped racists prosecute their case against Muslims. Te collective is critical of France for being locked into a colonialist mindset, unable to see Muslims as equals. Te arguments advanced by this new generation of leaders constitute a challenge to the republic, because they tackle the republic from within its own mind-set. Leaders in this mold understand the new necessities of a Muslim population in which Islam is an identity marker rather than a culture or a communitarian religion. Te combination of socioeconomic demands and respect for identity seems to be the basic demand brought forward by the new leadership. According to a 2006 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, 52 percent of French Muslims say that unemployment is their main concern. Extremism and radical Islam were a concern for only 30 percent. Disappearance of religion and growing secularization received a mere 21 percent of the total vote. Te infuence of Western, liberal and permissive, culture on community life worried only 15 percent of Muslims.75 More interestingly, a 2006 survey by the Conseils-SondagesAnalyses (CSA) polling agency in France found that 91 percent of Muslims supported equality between the sexes. According to the survey, 69 percent would accept a Muslim woman marrying a non-Muslim. Some 73 percent also said they agreed with the French separation of church and state.76 Tese fgures confrm that, rather than being centered on religiosity, the new French Islam is marked by identity and the demand for recognition within French secularism. Te Union of the Islamic Organizations of France and the Tablighi

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Jamaat, which work for the religious revival of fundamentalist Islam, hold little appeal for young Muslims.77 Te same goes for the Algerian-backed Grand Mosque of Paris, which though known for its moderate stance, focuses only on religious issues.78 However, the sanctioning of organized religion by the state is increasingly rejected by young Muslims, and Islam as a symbolic locus of identity formation, as a spiritual guide, and as a frame for rebellion is thriving and growing. Experts such as Olivier Roy point to a shift in the personal attitude of Muslims from culture and tradition to individual religiosity and conviction.79 A 2005 study conducted by Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po (Center of Political Research and Political Science) among Muslim immigrants from several generations showed that 80 percent of French Muslims fast during Ramadan and that this number is rising among the younger population. Eighty percent said they hoped to make a journey to Mecca.80 According to another study, published in the Catholic daily La Croix in 2004, 39 percent of Muslims surveyed by the polling group French Institute of Public Opinion (Institut français d’opinion publique; IFOP) said they observed Islam’s fve daily prayer sessions, a hefty increase from 31 percent in 1994.81 Consumption of alcohol among Muslims, which Islam forbids, has also declined to 34 percent from 39 percent in 1994, according to a survey of 537 people of Muslim origin. Te survey also polled Catholics and reported that weekly church attendance among Catholics was a mere 12 percent in 2008, and 57 percent of Catholics polled and 38 percent of Muslims polled called themselves “non-practicing believers.”82 Te comparative statistics suggest that secularization is higher among Catholics and Jews than among Muslims.83 “A French Islam Is Possible,” a report by Institut Montaigne, led by Hakim el Karoui, an ex-member of the cabinet of Prime Minister JeanPierre Rafarin, concludes that, although French Muslims as a whole are more religious than the national average, they can be broken down into three groups. Te frst, around 46 percent, endorses secular values and is totally integrated; the second group, 25 percent, pays respect to secularism but is eager to maintain its distinct religiosity within the secular world; the third group, 28 percent, is alienated young, who segregate themselves from society, in “apartism,” and are infuenced by radical versions of Islam.84 A 2006 Pew Research Center study also fnds that 48 percent of the French Muslim community defnes itself frst as Muslim and only second as French. A majority, 78 percent, of French Muslims said they would like to adopt French national customs.85

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Tese fndings seem to contradict that Islam as an identity marker is still strong and that the number of observant Muslims is increasing. Leyla Arslan, following Roy, argues that between the born-again Muslim and the few who leave the Muslim community is a signifcant new Islamic religiosity dismissive of religious institutions.86 Jocelyne Césari has reviewed how Islamic identity is adopted and explores its ability to facilitate empowerment. Césari describes an appropriation of Islam; some, rather than following all the Qur’an’s commands, view Islam as no more than a guide and inspiration.87 Religion is transformed into identity and a sense of belonging. Tis form of Islamic observance is especially popular among young Muslims who want to maintain their ties to Islam while participating in French secular society. Tese youngsters would endorse Islam as a moral, but not necessarily as a religious, compass and would be willing to be integrated into the national secular culture.88 Other movements such as Salaf Islam that stress religiosity are also becoming powerful infuencers.89 Abdel-Hâdî Dûdî, the imam of the AlSunna al-Kebira Mosque in Marseille, is the icon of the Salaf movement in France.90 His infuence spread rapidly when he endorsed Rabî’al-Madkhalî, the foremost authority in France in Shaykhiste Salafsm, an apolitical and nonviolent version of Islam. Shaykhiste Salafsm is fundamentalist in its doctrinal outlook and primarily concerned with the preservation of the Islamic faith and moral order in society.91 Salafsts play on the deculturalization of youth. Its born-again model does not promote a return to traditional Islamic customs but rather a reIslamization of individuals within a deterritorialized umma, disconnected from traditional cultures and societies. Rather than organizing the Muslim community into a model of citizenship devoted to fghting social exclusion and Islamophobia, Salafsm advocates the depoliticization of the religious, an approach that has resonated among the déclassé youth of the suburbs. In this depoliticization, a globalizing religion enjoys a discursive virtual space free of social and political constraints that allows young Muslims to break away from their parents’ culture and endorses their defance. How does an individualized Islam afect the links this young generation has with the republic, and should the republic do anything about it? For the young Muslim generation there is no contradiction between Islamic and national identities. But there is a diference between their defnition of the secular state and how it is interpreted by the majority of French citizens. In the next section we examine a confrontational dialogue around political practices, institutions, and the value of the secular state at difer-

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ent levels of social and political life to learn how Muslims and the French republic are redefning themselves. The Confrontation: Public Schools, the Hijab, and Gender Politics

Educational establishments adhering to laïcité have become the arena for a Muslim struggle for cultural and religious acknowledgment. For French political elites, the hijab has challenged the republican community.92 Jean Baubérot argues that the hijab controversy has revived the confict between respect for freedom of conscience and promotion of freedom of thought.93 Freedom of conscience is a constitutionally guaranteed protection in a neutral state. Freedom of thought is the right to independently examine beliefs received from family and social groups. It promotes selfdetermination and the emancipation of the human mind from religious beliefs and prejudices. It requires a secular state.94 Te hijab controversy seemed to privilege the secular state over religious belief and reafrmed the view that French national identity is rooted in secularism. Te wearing of headscarves was nothing new in the French school system. But 1989 was the same year the Rushdie afair blew up and the year the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut) was born. Fear of Islam gripped Europe, especially in France. When three high school girls of Moroccan and Tunisian origin were expelled after disobeying their principal’s request to remove their headscarves in class, the time was ripe for hysteria.95 Te event triggered a range of reactions. Le Nouvel Obervateur’s cover story on October 5 was “Fanaticism: Te Religious Menace.”96 Te Grand Mosque of Paris and the Vatican through its representative, Cardinal Jean Marie Lustinger, called for calm, but political fgures saw the issue as a matter of principle. Te public debate obscured the real meaning of the hijab and the experience of the girls. A study conducted by Francoise Gaspard and Farhad Khosrokhavar on Muslim girls’ reasons for wearing headscarves found two explanations. Some wear it to satisfy their parents, adopting it during middle school but then abandoning it during high school.97 Some wear headscarves as a conscious efort to freely construct a Muslim identity as they enter or leave high school. Tese girls distinguish their brand of Islam from that of their parents, and some even say it is because of their life in France that they became acquainted with Islam.98 Tese educated and self-aware young women attempt to project their religious identities into the public sphere.

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Te question is why the state did not embrace these women instead of forcing them to choose between secularism and a neopatriarchal society. Jean Baubérot points to the common ground found by an anti-immigration right and supporters of a robust secularism.99 Others, like Joan Scott, have framed the issue as a debate over the French colonial legacy in the contemporary French imagination.100 Both narratives attempt to explain why large majorities on both the left and the right supported the ban. We reject these interpretations and suggest that republicans have adopted a strict defnition of laïcité and see a slippery slope from liberal toleration and even multiculturalism to a populist right ethno-exclusionism. Te defnition of secularism was the battleground for this debate. Two open letters laid out the parameters for diferent visions of laïcité. Te prominent republican intellectuals Elisabeth Badinter, Régis Debray, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Alain Finkielkraut, and Catherine Kintzler published an open letter in Le Nouvel Observateur, urging the minister of education to ban headscarves. Tey claimed, “In our society, the school is the only institution that is devoted to the universal.”101 Groups such as the French Freemasonry (Maçonnerie française) mobilized behind any shift in the understanding of French secularism being a setback. Other liberal intellectuals, such as Christian Jelen and Tzvetan Todorov, defended republican thinking and emphasized that multiculturalism is an ideology of the conservative right.102 Tose who advocate a strict version of laïcité believe that allowing the hijab to be worn is a Trojan horse for the escalation of religious and cultural demands. In addition, some French feminists argue that the hijab is a tool to oppress women, as evidenced by the Islamic justifcation for it, that women, as sexual objects, should be hidden. A challenge to the Islamic justifcation came in the second open letter from Joëlle Kaufmann, a gynecologist who advocates for abortion rights; Harlem Désir, the head of SOS Racisme, an organization that fghts racism; and the social scientists René Dumont and Alain Touraine, among others. Teir letter, “Pour une laïcité ouverte” (For an open laïcité),appeared in the journal Politis. Tese intellectuals did not support scarves in schools, but they opposed expelling girls from school for noncompliance.103 Tey argued that the expulsion of the girls would not contribute to the liberalization and emancipation of Muslim women because they would be left isolated and uneducated. Te minister of education, Lionel Jospin, avoided taking sides in the debate, instead referring the issue to the Council of State (Conseil d’État), which advises the executive branch in legal matters and is the highest court

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of appeal for administrative justice. In its opinion of November 27, 1989, the council laid out general principles and guidelines, holding that the wearing of headscarves did not constitute a breach of laïcité. Religious freedom could be limited only when it directly undermined the statutory mission of state education, involved proselytism, or disturbed the order of the school. With these guidelines, the council delivered ruling that ultimately placed the fnal decision in the hands of school principals. When principals expelled students, though, the courts tended to rule against the principals. In 1992, for example, forty-nine such cases were fled, and in forty-one of them the council returned the expelled girl to school. As a result, a ban was not implemented during the premiership of Lionel Jospin (between 1997 and 2002). Tough no law was passed, opinion among political elites of both right and left tended to favor the headscarf ban. In 1994, Education Minister François Bayrou published more specifc instructions, banning all ostentatious religious signs in schools. Although this general regulation was neutralized (though not formally annulled) by the council, it inspired a new law. On April 3, 2003, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Rafarin prohibited headscarves in public schools. Te rationale, thus, was that fundamentalism fows from ambiguity. Tis was the background for the creation of the Stasi Commission.104 According to the commission investigation, Muslim students threatened Muslims girls who did not wear the scarf. To protect these girls, the committee recommended the headscarf ban. Te committee noted that after September 11 some girls started wearing the headscarf in schools, and many Muslim girls who did not wear it were met with insults and violence. Te Stasi Commission heard testimony from teachers and principals.105 Tis problematic trend among Muslim pupils was confrmed by the Obin Report of 2004. Te report, commissioned by the Ministry of Education, was based on inspections of over sixty middle and high schools in disadvantaged quartiers across France. Te report stated that girls were under constant surveillance by older brothers. In some places, wearing skirts or dresses was forbidden, even for female teachers. Te obsession with purity, extending to gender-separated swimming lessons and refusal to eat non-halal cafeteria food, meant that in some cases Muslim parents even forbade their children from reading religiously unacceptable authors such as Rousseau or Molière. Te fndings of the report were so disturbing that the government did not want to go public with it. Tese examples and others led to the conclusion that in many schools legal intervention was needed to allow girls to attend school without pressure to wear headscarves.106

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As Patrick Weil explains, when the Council of State decided in 1989 to allow veils in schools, it was composed of proreligion pluralists and multiculturalists or individualist liberals who argued that individuals should not be pressured by communitarian institutions. However, by 2004 the Stasi Commission, the Council of State, and the National Assembly were composed of mainly Catholaïques, who defended the religious status quo in favor of the Catholic church; assertive secularists; and liberals.107 Tis combination was the foundation for the changed attitude toward the veil. Te Stasi Commission’s report detailed the history of challenges to laïcité and recommended twenty-six measures to ensure freedom of belief, the legal equality of religious groups, and the neutrality of the state toward religion. Te report recommended a charter of laïcité, to be invoked during public rites, including the naturalization of immigrants. For the sake of balance, the report also recommended that Yom Kippur and Eid al-Adha be public holidays. It recommended increased time in the classroom on religious facts and on the history of slavery, colonization, decolonization, and immigration.108 Several measures were rejected by the government. Only a ban on ostentatious religious signs and dress in public schools was included in President Jacques Chirac’s proposed law and the deliberations of the National Assembly. After years of struggle, the afair was fnally settled in September 2004. It was decided that the nation would enforce strict laïcité and the hijab was consequently prohibited in public educational institutions. Te ban, however, did not apply to other markers of faith, such as the Jewish yarmulke and crosses on chains. Muslims felt unjustly targeted by the ban. On January 17, 2004, exactly one month after Chirac proposed the law, over twenty thousand French Muslims—mostly women wearing forms of hijabs—protested in Paris, Lille, Marseille, Mulhouse, and other cities. Teir message was clear: the headscarf was a universal—not a religious— right. Tey insisted that their decision to wear the hijab emerged from their own free will and was not a result of their subjugation by men. Women marching in Lille and Paris alternated between chants of “Chirac, Sarkozy, we chose the headscarf ” (Chirac, Sarkozy, le foulard on l’a choisi) and “Neither our fathers nor our husbands, we chose the headscarf ” (Ni père, ni mari, le foulard on l’a choisi). Despite these demonstrations, objections to the law were weaker than expected. Te law took efect in September 2004. Te day after its passage, only 240 girls showed up wearing the headscarf, and 170 of them chose to take it of to enter school.109 Critics have suggested that the law impinges on freedom of religion and

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freedom of conscience. Yet it can be argued that it protects these freedoms. More importantly, though, during those years France was beginning to elaborate a progressive response to what was perceived as a reactionary religious challenge to the secular republican school. Tis response was furthered in 2014 when François Hollande’s Socialist government introduced the ABCs of Equality program. Tis educational program, carried out in six hundred primary schools, combats sex discrimination by promoting gender equality. Several conservatives attacked the program, asserting that it advanced a gender theory that challenged the biological basis of sexual identity. An unusual alliance of fringe groups, including Muslims, Christians, and activists from the National Front, spearheaded a campaign against the new educational program.110 As part of the campaign Pull Students from School, Muslim novelist and former Marche des Beurs movement activist Farida Belghoul called on parents to keep their children out of public school. She did not have advice on where to send them instead. Are private schools an option? Te French government subsidizes up to 10 percent of private school budgets (mostly Catholic schools). Te Debré law of 1959 made public funding for private schools conditional on schools following the national curriculum and welcoming all children regardless of religious background.111 Te anomaly of state-funded private schools remains bizarrely undertheorized. From a theoretical and legal perspective, French Muslims are entitled to the same public funding for religious schools that Catholic and Jewish communities receive. According to the Debré law, to receive public funding, religious communities must demonstrate that (1) the educational institution has been active for at least fve years, (2) the teachers are competent, (3) the school has the specifed number of pupils, and (4) the school facilities meet health standards. However, not one Islamic school in France has met these criteria. Te government claims that these schools have many managerial problems, casting doubt on their competence. Yet observers attribute the absence of public funding for Muslim schools to the government’s disinterest in Muslim private education. According to this view, this disinterest is rooted in the political environment and a fear of undermining an assimilationist agenda.112 Even without public funding, Islamic private schools continue to operate, funded by tuition paid by the parents. Te Strasbourg Mosque, for example, runs a dormitory school that provides an education in French and Arabic and is funded solely by private tuition. Te private school of Montesquieu in the Joinville le Pont suburb of Paris provides a religious-

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oriented education to over 130 students without government funding. Private schools, although limited, are expanding. Because of the community’s success in foreign and domestic fund-raising, tuition is lower than in the United Kingdom. However, the Muslim community is deeply divided on the subject. A substantial portion of Muslims in France fear that separate education ghettoizes youngsters, further isolating them and damaging their ability to integrate into the workforce. Tey would rather send their children to public schools, but they are hindered because Muslims fnd the egalitarian approach, as defned by the republic, as discriminatory to their particular needs. Tis leads to two real and unquestionably negative results: poor education together with unemployment and poor housing seem to be the underlying causes of social rebellion. Should it follow, though, as Olivier Roy maintains, that Islam is bound to channel the rebellious spirit of French Muslims? As we see in what follows, the picture is much more complex. Islamist forces have undoubtedly been an important factor in enlisting the alienated spirit of young Muslims, especially in the banlieues. Nonetheless, the main forces in the struggle against social and economic discrimination were not necessarily driven by religious identity motives, and not all were against the Republic. Some social movement in the banlieues was directed against the Muslim community itself and against Islam as a social controller. We are therefore witness to diferent expressions of alienation, some of them canalized against the republic by both Islamic and non-Islamic forces and some of them even in favor of the republic and against Muslim communitarianism. The Banlieues: We Are Part of the Republic

During the 1980s the press was already reporting on riots in the French banlieues: among the most famous, Minguettes in 1981 and 1983, and Vaux-en-Velin (both suburbs of Lyon) in 1991. Tis unrest raised awareness among the French public of urban problems. For the French public, it was difcult to accept that French urban space could give rise to ethnic rebellion. Riva Kastoryano argues that the French public was surprised and shocked because the common view was that such riots could occur only in racially segregated American cities, not in republican France.113 But in one of the most interesting projects of the republic, the government-sponsored public housing, built in the 1950s, some riots erupted.

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For more than twenty years, immigrants of Portuguese origin had lived in government-sponsored housing. As the original dwellers moved into houses (pavillons), they were gradually replaced by newcomers from North Africa, Turkey, and sub-Saharan Africa. Tese demographic shifts created tension. Whereas the former residents had displayed a sense of working-class consciousness that ftted into the republican ideology, the new arrivals were not Europeans and lacked class consciousness. If Muslim eforts to live up to the integrationist ideal have failed, where similar eforts by prior generations of Portuguese immigrants succeeded, who is to be made accountable? Something might have been missing in execution of the ofcial republican race-neutral ideology of inclusion, especially if rejection of Muslims is on ethnic grounds.114 But republicans argue that the system of integration worked well for all regardless of ethnic origin and skin color, but not for Muslims. In that case, religion and culture are to blame. Te advocates of fawed execution argue that, although the lifestyle of second-generation immigrants in France may have little to do with the Arab or Algerian way of living, it is frequently depicted and stigmatized as such. In efect, these young people are victims of what several scholars have defned as the postcolonial syndrome, in which an Arab or Muslim background becomes an unavoidable symbol, replete with negative imagery built up over decades of colonialism. For the younger generations, this means that ethnicity primarily signifes an experience of diference and discrimination while also signifying the loss of cultural identity. It is an oversimplifcation to call this subcultural identity a proletarian or working-class identity with an Algerian accent. It is, rather, an identity blending social and economic frustration with the new concepts provided by a global, individualized, and radical Islam. Tis is a subaltern culture that will join forces with neither the French proletariat nor the French Socialist Party. Still, as we see next, public opinion in France was open to thinking about this uprising as a legitimate claim of socioeconomic discrimination. Te rebellion of October 27, 2005, erupted when two young Muslims were accidentally electrocuted as they ran from the police. Te two-month long riots that followed the incident were the worst riots France had seen since 1968. Te riots did not spread beyond the suburbs, nor did they extend to the universities, where many students similarly resented the system.115 Te uprisings in the banlieues in Paris could be seen as another stage in the long process of Islamic rebellion against the state, especially since many Muslim organizations saw the riots as an opportunity to promote religious agendas. But the spontaneity of the riots and the absence of

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radical religious leaders cast doubt on the media-propagated image of selfsegregating Islamic communities fueled by jihad. Indeed, to the general public the causes of the uprising were family problems, ethnic concentration, school failure, and high unemployment. Te basic problem was the republican failure to integrate marginalized populations. Islamic leaders and organizations being detached from the rioting mobs supports this theory. Although Islam was unquestionably embedded in the violent struggle, it had little control or infuence over it. Neither Islamist political organizations like the Union of the Islamic Organizations of France nor missionary Islamists, like the Tablighi Jamaat or the Salafs, managed to calm the rage of the youngsters. Immediately following the outbreak of the spontaneous riots, the leaders of the organization rushed in to try and defuse the crisis, expecting to demonstrate their infuence over second-generation migrants and in so doing win points with the French authorities and the public at large. Yet appeals for calm by the mosques on November 4 fell on deaf ears. More signifcantly, an antiriot fatwa issued on November 6 by the Union of the Islamic Organizations of France was ignored by the rioters. Rioters viewed the organization as collaborating with the state and consequently ignored it. Te inability of one of France’s largest Islamic groups to reduce tension and break the cycle of violence speaks volumes about the disconnect between political Islamist movements and the social groups they claim to represent. Te younger generation suspected that the Union of the Islamic Organizations of France had been co-opted by the government, and government authorities suspected several other youth organizations of having ties to North African Islamist militants. Te youths of the banlieues no longer felt represented by leaders they believed to be either co-opted by the government or too Islamist.116 Te real signifcance of the banlieue rebellion was that the rioters raised no religious complaints. Instead, they pushed a socioeconomic agenda and in doing so helped trigger public debate in the wake of the riots on national identity, citizenship, and the socioeconomic consequences of the French colonial heritage.117 From the time of the frst rebellions, French political and academic elites saw that the main problem to resolve was social urbanism. Te public response to these riots was to reinforce the politique de la ville (city policy). Tese policies were designed by national and local institutions to revitalize deteriorating urban projects. But investments in infrastructure did not lead to better unemployment fgures, which remained high, and delinquency worsened.118

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Riots in Clichy-sous-Bois and Trappes, in the suburbs of Paris, illustrate the problem. Both towns had great investment in new buildings and parks. Clichy, a town with half the population under age twenty-fve, has a 40 percent unemployment rate.119 Trappes is a working-class enclave whose poverty rate is almost twice the average of the Paris region, and it has a high rate of unemployment. Despite investments of about €350 million in new residential towers, private housing, and new roads, unemployment and crime are on the rise, and 42 percent of the population live in poverty.120 As Gilles Kepel remarks in his description of the Parisian neighborhood Quatre-vingt-treize, the cités (colossal concrete housing projects built during the postwar decades)—for decades a bastion of the old working class and the Communist Party—are nowadays occupied by Arabs and people of African origin who dwell there in poverty and social isolation.121 A prime example is Cité Gagarine, a huge housing project that once symbolized the success of the French Communist Party and now is being demolished. Situated in what was known as the red belt, dozens of working-class suburbs surrounding Paris, the cité was built by the Communist Party to provide housing to meet the demand of new workers focking to Paris as a result of industrialization and economic growth. In the 1980s, however, with the deindustrialization of Ivry-sur-Seine, the eastern Paris suburb of Cité Gagarin, population began to change. Laid-of workers moved away, and new immigrants, mostly from former French colonies in Africa, flled their place, and a new type of rebellious activism bypassed the Communist Party. Te Communist Party could not deal with the new equation in which France’s industrial workforce shrank to 36 percent of its former size and the immigrant population rose by one and a half million by 2007. Te question thus was what should be done to cope with this demographic and cultural change. In the absence of a viable left-wing revolutionary option, several alienated, uneducated, and unemployed Muslim youngsters went from criminality to jail and on to Islamic radicalism. From the Banlieues to Jail: Radicalization and Jihadism in Motion

If alienation in the banlieues is the starting point for radicalization, does life in jail continue it? Scholars and journalists point out that some of the twenty-frst-century terror attacks in France were committed by men who grew up in the banlieues, were radicalized behind bars, or both.

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Gilles Kepel reports in his books Banlieue de la République (Te suburb of the republic) and Passion française: Les voix des cités (French passion: Te voices of the cités) on Islam in the suburbs. Tese books look into daily life in Seine-Saint-Denis, especially the voice of rebellion. According to Kepel, this radicalization has a distinctly French character.122 It is about exclusion and the unhealed wounds of the French-Algerian War; but it is also about the Charlie Hebdo cartoons and the support of the republic for journalists’ right to insult the Prophet. Te journalists David Pujadas and Ahmed Salam analyzed a group of disafected youths, mainly of Algerian origin, to understand the motives of potential French-born terrorists.123 Tey found that these youths were largely unemployed, some were students, and most were frustrated Frenchborn Muslims without an ideological or religious background who were excited by the violence they watched on videos sent to them from Algeria. A high percentage of these potential French jihadists were detached from any given culture and motivated by a deterritorialized Islam that promises the uprooted Islamic diaspora a transnational Islamic identity expressed through an anti-imperialist discourse. Te colonialist argument and the religious one are a synthesis that is difcult to disentangle. After the Charlie Hebdo massacre—and after a third terrorist, Amedy Coulibaly, gunned down a black policewoman outside a Jewish school and four Jews at a kosher supermarket—there was widespread feeling, in France and elsewhere, that the killings were somehow related to the banlieues. Coulibaly was the French son of Malian parents and grew up in a cité south of Paris. After a career in armed robbery, he was in jail when he met a just-converted Islamist named Chérif Kouachi. Tey found a mentor in a veteran jihadist named Djamel Beghal, who had been born in Algeria and had brought radical Islamist views with him when he moved to France in 1987. From an isolation cell in prison, he managed to communicate with Coulibaly and Kouachi, both age twenty-three, while they were in prison at Fleury-Mérogis in 2005. In his book Radicalisation, Farhad Khosrokhavar (a member of the social science faculty at L’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales who did research for three days a week in French prisons for three years) develops a theory of inmate conversion. It happens in stages. Most of the recruits grow up without fathers and without any religious knowledge— only anger and alienation in the banlieues. As Khosrokhavar fnds, prisoners are “born again.” Converting hatred to jihadism sanctifes their rage and helps them overcome their unhappiness through adherence to a vision

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that makes them knights of the faith and others into infdels who do not deserve life. Tis existential metamorphosis completed, the self becomes pure, and the Other becomes impure. Radical Islam carries out a magic inversion, one that turns self-contempt into contempt of others and lack of dignity into self-sanctifcation at others’ expense.124 An extremist agenda can advance quickly in the isolation, boredom, and anger that a young man feels in jail; a captive Muslim population presents opportunities to a would-be radicalizer. Several notorious examples bear this out. Mohammed Merah became a Muslim radical during his frequent incarcerations for delinquency. Te same is true of Mehdi Nemmouche, who launched a deadly attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels in 2014. Kouachi had served time in prison for his part in a jihadi network seeking to fght abroad, and Coulibaly had been convicted of a plot to free a terrorist from prison. Tis theory does not hold for all cases, however. Not only the banlieues are prone to, or the jails contribute to, radicalization. For example, the Alpes-Maritimes, a department of the Côte d’Azur, is one of the most radicalized regions other than Paris. A charismatic local recruiter, Omar Omsen, has succeeded in sending at least ffty-fve residents in the Nice area to Syria, including eleven members of one family. Furthermore, the November 2015 attacks on the Bataclan concert hall and other venues were carried out by terrorists who had never been in prison. Tis prompts the question of whether Merah and Nemmouche and others like them would have radicalized had they never spent time in prison. Several scholars have tried to develop a sociopsychological profle of the French jihadist type. Virginie Andre and Shandon Harris-Hogan, for example, have traced the sociological process that led Merah to travel from hate to laïcité to neojihadism. Tey discuss the socioeconomic background in which Merah was raised and point out that while he was in prison neojihadism provided him with a new moral code and a new language of resistance.125 Farhad Khosrokhavar provides one of the most important explanations of the source of jihadism. Quand Al-Qäida parle: Témoignages derrière les barreaux (When Al-Qaeda talks: Testimonials from behind bars), continued by “Radicalization in Prison: Te French Case,” contains a large body of detail on the backgrounds, worldview, and motivations of those who pursue violent jihad in the name of Islam. Khosrokhavar’s interviews do not support the conventional image of Islamists as alienated, exotic Arabic speakers from the Middle East. On the contrary, the suspects are “Western,” or at least “nearly Western,” and speak fuent French.126 One of

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these interviews, in particular, illuminates the shortcomings of the republican concept of integration. Ousman, a French citizen born in Algeria, is accused of membership in Al-Qaeda and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). His account of a failed attempt at assimilation into French society can be described as a tale of unrequited love that is transformed into hate: “Earlier, France was my model—even if I also resented this. But my ideal was to be French, to act like the French: to have my wife, my kids, my car, my apartment. . . . [However,] they looked down on me, they treated me like I was nothing, they despised me.”127 For Ousman, Islam was his salvation; it was a source of dignity that claimed to be able to force the West to respect Islam, at least in a certain way. Tis testimony does not have to be taken at face value. Leaving aside the issue of its sincerity, strong evidence supports the claim that the problem with the French republican idea of integration is in its implementation, not in the idea itself. Tat is, if France would genuinely apply the principle of equality to all its citizens, such radicalized individuals, who profess a desire for inclusion, could be better integrated. Along with French Muslims’ image of themselves as an ostracized minority, we should add the increasing frustration felt when they compare themselves with the Jewish community. Young Muslims compare their failure to gain acceptance with the Jewish community’s relatively successful rate of acceptance and assimilation. Tis prompts some to choose anti-Jewish positions as a way to attack the republic.128 Tis terrorism and radicalization difers from the jihadism of the 1990s, when France was hit by blowback from the civil war in Algeria and sufered from a brand of gangster jihad before 2001. Te home terrorism of French Muslims had origins related to Algeria and was organized terrorism. Current radicalization and terrorism has more of an anarchist, individualist favor. Te state can track and fnd the leaders of organized terrorism, but fnding individual terrorists is harder. Te French state has taken a clear stand on how to tackle individualist rebellion. Like the United Kingdom, France addresses radicalization of youngsters and puts enormous efort into fnding ways to combat it. For example, the prisons at Osny and Fleury-Mérogis (Europe’s biggest prison) became the sites for experiments in combatting radicalization. In one initiative groups of sociologists, psychologists, and historians met with violent or potentially violent inmates and tried to infuence them away from radicalization. Inmates were provided resources such as theater workshops and all types of lessons in the prison school.129 How successful these programs are is difcult to measure.

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For example, how is terrorist defned? Who should be considered a radical? Does a radical necessarily become a terrorist, and at what stage of radicalization should be a person be detained? Several inmates in France are in jail because they visited extremist websites. Does that put them in the same category with those who went to Syria and Iraq to fght for jihad? Can neo-fundamentalists, youngsters who begin to endorse religiosity, be considered potential radicals and terrorists? What to do with someone like Mohamed Achamlane, leader of Forsane Alizza, a Salafst group (dismantled by the General Directorate for Internal Security (Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur)? Achamlane claims that Forsane urges provocation but stops at violence. “I’m in favor of discussion, not violence. I’m in favor of a ‘noble jihad,’ one that does not oppress and will not be oppressed.”130 Rejecting oppression means, among other things, promoting a Muslim police force that will come to the aid of Muslims harassed by the French police and intimidating Muslims who do not follow sharia laws. Tis cultural resistance, however, places the French state in an undesirable position in which it must deal with both terrorism and cultural democratic radicalization. European governments are sharing information and cracking down most terrorist cells. Te French Socialist government of Hollande, following the example of the Sarkozy government, proposed an antiterrorism law that allows authorities to prosecute citizens who attend militant Islamist training camps abroad. Te line between terrorism and a violent, nonterrorist resistance to the state is not a line, however. In a long process committed jihadists infuence people frst to pietism and then to Islamism and then to violence. It usually involves a gradual political alienation from the values of the state and a dulling of the ability to feel others’ pain. As Olivier Roy notes, Islam is used to canalize rage and appropriate rebellion. Rebellion and jihad, he says, have no religious basis. Gilles Kepel says, in contrast, that while rebellion has a socioeconomic background, religion should be blamed for jihad. Religious jihad is only the cause that gets noticed.131 Kepel’s analysis of the French commune of Lunel found that unemployment among Muslim youngsters, lack of access to civil service jobs, and increasing mass immigration are part of the story of radicalization. If these are added to the building of a large mosque and imams preaching radical views, radicalization follows. Experience of Islamophobia is one of the causes of radicalization, and Kepel correctly sees that experience used to excuse any action carried out in the name of Islam.132 What protest should be legitimate to the republic? Terrorism and

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Islamist radicalization are being combatted. We suggest that some of these other manifestations of protest, despite not being terrorism, could be a harder challenge for the republic than terrorism. As we shall see, the state does not suppress all these demonstrations of discontent. Te uprising in the banlieues in 2005 is evidence that the model of republican integration can be improved through socioeconomic integration without changing its basic secular precepts. Te second sign of protest, a petition from Indigènes de la République (Natives of the Republic), which advocates “the burqa as a mode of emancipation”133 and challenges the republic’s colonial history, is largely rejected. But Ni Putes Ni Soumises is supported and approved by the republic because it represents a rebellion against communitarianism Te question of whether a protest in favor of the burqa is legitimate is not disconnected from a further debate on the challenge of Islam to French national identity, whether we deal with violent Islam or with a peaceful but still challenging Islam. Between Legacy and Shame: From Anticolonialism to Anti-Semitism?

Separate from religion, the identity aspects of rebellion cannot escape the legacy of colonialism. Colonialism seems an impenetrable barrier between Muslim and non-Muslim French. Republicans continually reassert the validity of the French mission civilisatrice (civilizing mission): full cultural assimilation of immigrants would be proof of the continued grandeur of France. Te secular republican notion of assimilation is the prevention, not promotion, of racism. Assimilation, however, sparks debate regarding the historical legacy of the republic, especially with respect to its colonial policies. No less seminal a fgure than Alexis de Tocqueville argued in favor of colonialism in Algeria. Tocqueville, in contrast with many of his contemporaries, did not try to argue that the civilizing mission of colonization was of beneft to a country’s natives, though he did acknowledge that the French brought with them “good government.” Rather, he focused on the benefts of colonialism to France itself. Tocqueville insisted that the French colonies in Algeria would improve France’s power relative to its rivals (England). He was in favor of military rule, with the French entitled to settle in colonies and to import, to the extent possible, the cultural and political life of France. Whatever economic beneft the French way of life conferred on the colony would accrue to the settlers.134 In other words, Tocqueville emphasized specifcally the economic structure of the colonial

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condition and its implications for postcolonial France. Today, both the persistent economic gap and the lack of formal reconsideration of French colonial legacy mark a symbolic continuation of colonialism by France. Today’s immigrés, like their ancestors, the Français Musulmans of Algeria, are urged to assimilate and blend in. Noncompliance is blamed on their suspect culture of origin, which much be repressed as deviant and dangerous. However, for many Muslims, assimilation into a secular republican democratic identity should not have to be synonymous with acceptance of the colonial legacy. Rather, the colonial legacy must be deconstructed to reconstruct, out of its ashes, a viable, inclusive, secular republicanism. Te colonial legacy permeates republican discourse to such a degree that the reestablishment of republican order in the banlieues is likened to territorial conquest, violence is associated with ethnic confict, and the delinquent youths are portrayed as sauvageons (uncivilized natives). Since 2005, a growing debate has developed about colonialism, the colonial fracture, and the debt the French state owes to the people of its former colonies. Te roots of the debate were already present in the 1990s. For example, in 1999 the French National Assembly recognized for the frst time the Algerian War of Independence as a war. Tis was an important frst step in overcoming decades of denial regarding the massacres during the colonial period.135 At the same time, a double game was played by the French political and intellectual establishment. France accepted that it had committed colonial crimes, but this acceptance was accompanied by a demand for recognition of the “benefts” of colonialism. In February of 2005, with the Mekachera Act, France formally recognized the contribution of French repatriates from North Africa (pieds noirs). Te law triggered controversy, in particular because Article 4 of the law demanded history programs give “the place that it deserves” to “the positive role played by the French presence overseas, especially in North Africa.” A petition to abrogate the law was issued by some of the most eminent historians of France, such as Claude Liauzu, Gilbert Meynier, Gérard Noiriel, Frédéric Régent, Trinh Van Tao, and Lucette Valensi.136 Within three weeks, the petition received more than a thousand signatures, and many schools refused to apply Article 4. Te controversy led Algerian president Abdelaziz Boutefika to refuse to sign a treaty with France, and eventually Article 4 was removed.137 Tat decision brought dissent in France, with Jean Marie Le Pen and others criticizing Chirac’s rescission of Article 4. Critics in Chirac’s own center-right party (Union for a Popular Movement; Union pour un Mou-

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vement Populaire) claimed that whatever mistakes had been made, they did not include France enslaving its colonials. Tese critics drew a distinction between being a colonizer and a colonialist and argued that France was the former, still transmitting republican values to the leaders who rule in these countries today.138 To some French, recognizing positive aspects of colonialism means being aware, as Patrick Weil suggests, that colonialism was welcomed by some of the colonized because it liberated them from Islamic authorities.139 Now, the formerly colonized even have access to the French Civil Code that was denied to those who did not become naturalized French citizens under colonial law. Weil’s justifcations, however, as Ruth Mas has noted, tend to obscure that Muslims were segregated in the colonies, and a different type of segregation persists in the postcolonial situation. Mas sees the imposition of French nationality, which Weil considers a virtue, as an extension of colonial agency. Te imposition of nationality and secularism represents the continuation of the imperial France that considered itself “protector of Islam within its empire.”140 Te question for Muslims, especially the young Western-born generation, is how to deal with this colonial past. A great part of French Muslims’ reaction to colonialism and its vilifcation of Islam is characterized by an attempt to reform and modernize Islam and to remove ethnic and cultural associations.141 Te growth of secular Muslim movements refects a divergence from historical trends regarding the acceptance of the state’s project of assimilation and the eschewal of religious (Islamic) communitarianism. Some of these groups have reacted against the paternalistic and colonialist characteristics of the French state and its assimilationist project. Tey consider themselves victims of colonialism and ask for recognition and respect in their fght against discrimination. Tese groups represent practicing Muslims who accept the secular rules of the state. Tey fought for the establishment of a charter for secular action, which called for the institutional representation of religious Muslims and better accommodation of their social needs. Tey do not view these rules as antithetical to Islam.142 Other groups, slightly diferent in their focus, have emphasized state intervention against discrimination within the community.143 From a secular perspective, within the Muslim community there are various understandings of the links between secularism, of the French colonial past, and the implications to individual Muslims. Te Muslim organization Indigènes de la République began with a petition, “L’Appel des Indigènes,” signed by three thousand Muslims,

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declaring, “We are the natives of the republic.” Te petition organizers recruited a wide variety of Muslim voices, predominantly atheist but also some with more traditionalist Muslim associations, such as the Collectif des Musulmans de France (French Muslim Collective) and other small, diverse Islamist groups.144 In May 2005 Indigènes de la République organized a march in Paris, La Marche des Indigènes, to mark the day as symbolic of “the colonial yoke exercised in the name of the republic.” It was chosen to coincide with France’s celebration of its defeat of Nazism, which occurred at the same time as its army was carrying out the massacre of Algerians in Sétif and Guelma. Te petitioners strategically and defantly embraced the negative stereotypes that had been assigned to them: children of the colonies and immigrants or children of immigrants, who could not assimilate. Tey embraced the racist names they had been called and self-identifed as “savages that could not be assimilated.” Tey were calling for the recognition of their particular identities and memories. Teir claims for recognition of the legacy of slavery and colonialism within an allegedly postcolonial society were interconnected with the denunciation of current-day discrimination.145 Te petitioners reunited under the banner of anticolonialism to demonstrate the logic of the postcolonial situation. We are “the descendants of slaves, of deported Africans, sons and daughters of those colonized and of immigrants. We are French and non-French living in France, militants in the battle against . . . discriminations produced by the post-colonial Republic.” Te problem of colonialism was brought to bear on the social exclusion of people from former and present colonies and of postcolonial immigrants who, “independently of their origins . . . are nativized and relegated to the margins of society.”146 More importantly, the petition marks a tendency after September 11 for Arabs and Maghrebi immigrants to be labeled, indiscriminately, Muslim, a move that has enabled a “respectable racism.” Houria Bouteldja, spokeswoman for the movement, afrmed that the “indigenous” in its name was chosen because of the persistence of the postcolonial reality. Tat postcolonial reality is expressed through current attempts by the state to shape the organizational life of Muslims. For example, the colonial mechanisms of the administration of Islam can be perceived in the constitution of the French Council of the Muslim Faith, which, according to Bouteldja, represents part of a continuing efort by the state to domesticate its Muslims. In an interview with Saïd Mekki, Bouteldja claimed, “We are the children of an illusion that consisted in believing that the independence of our

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countries signifed the end of colonization.” In reality, decolonization has not yet occurred. She further explained that the group rejects the notion of integration because, “to integrate yourself, you have to deny the fundamentals of your culture and adopt what is the common representation of the ideal citizen.”147 In more ways than one, the petition represented what could be called a “secular” Muslim response to the 2004 law on laïcité, which surpassed a mere separation between state and church and actually imposed a secular religion on the state. What answer to secularism does the Indigènes de la République promote? Its organizational strategy has been to advocate a real separation between state and church, which was manifested previous to the 2004 law and which explicitly fghts the communitarianism and inequality that the headscarf has come to represent in France. Te 2004 law depicts the headscarf as a sign of female subjugation and communitarianism, which is particularly threatening to the implicit mission of schooling—the formation of future citizens. Although the Indigènes de la République does not uncompromisingly defend the veil, it directs its attack at the paternalistic colonialist imposition of the state on the free will of students who choose to wear the veil. Te government project, according to Indigènes de la République, pits Islam against France. Tis means once again returning to the theme of the irreconcilability of civilizations in the language of confict between the republic and communitarianism. Te central claim is that the critique of Islam as a backward religion is facilitating the transformation of nonaccepted racism into an accepted, generalized Islamophobia. Trough this critique we see secular Muslims pointing to the need to overcome the postcolonial paternalism. Journalists like Rokhaya Diallo, activists like Houria Bouteldja, and the Afro-feminist collective Mwasi, among other intellectuals and political groups, have been vocal about the need to tear down the myth of colorblindness in France. All are critical of what can be called the universalist patriotic secular antiracism of French republicans, which is unlikely to embrace an anticolonialist racism and strives to abolish whiteness. An anticolonialist frame, for example, would help Islamic feminists who wish to come to terms with their identity afliations and fght multiple forms of oppression that bind them to postcolonial and antiracist movements. According to Zahra Ali (the leading Islamic feminist theoretician in France), Muslim feminists using their knowledge of Islam to access and facilitate their legitimacy in Muslim communities could construct

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afliations and obtain political resources for fghting racism in society at large.148 Te striking point unfolding from this postcolonialist feminism is the connections among a staunch defense of the veil, a critique of white elite Islamophobia, and what Muslim feminists defne as “state philosemitism.”149 It appears that the antiracism promoted by Muslims contrasts in purpose with the antiracism displayed by the republic. For Houria Bouteldja, the philosemitism of the republic is compatible with the support of homosexuality, which she defnes as an “imperialist mode of life.” Indigènes de la République perceives the liberal white republic as a Jewish Enlightened republic. Te path to a new French Muslim anti-Semitism seems to be opened though a total critique of the discriminatory republic. As remarked by left-wing intellectuals such as Tomas Guénolé, a member of la France Insoumise (the left populist party led by Jean-Luc Melenchon), Houria Bouteldja could perfectly ft the defnition of a racist anti-Semitic.150 Advocates of Boutledja, however, reject Guénolé’s accusation and suggest that she is indicted today in the same way Frantz Fanon was accused by Jean-Paul Sartre. If Fanon’s negritude is antiracist racism, then Bouteldja’s claims are also a reinversed racism. In that reinversed racism, thus, Jews and homosexuals represent the republican modernity, and Muslims should advance the voice of rebellion on behalf of identity. In a reinversed racism, as we shall see, the right of free speech is also a weapon for racists. Grassroots Gender Muslim Republicanism: Ni Putes Ni Soumises

Separating the debate over the genderization of politics and the dress codes of Muslim women from the debate over hate speech and communitarianism is impossible. Indigènes de la République promotes an Islamic feminism within Islam and advocate a communitarian posture against the colonial “Jewish” republic, but they resist government intervention in protection of women. Tat governmental protection, accordingly, feeds into the marginalizing and demonizing of Muslims and undermining of critical voices within the community. Te group Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores nor Doormats), in contrast, appeared at just the right moment. Its argument is diferent from that of Indigènes de la République and in line with the republican ideology of a state guaranteeing support and protection of individual rights from communitarianism. Fadela Amara was France’s junior minister for urban policy. She has

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been one of the most important images of France’s republicanism and was a favorite of Sarkozy. Her popularity stems from her fulflling exactly the role expected from a republican Muslim shanty town woman who is neither a co-opted communitarian leader nor a functionaire of the government. Unlike Rama Yade (a Senegal-born French politician who served in the government from 2007 to 2010) and Rachida Dati (minister of justice in Sarkozy’s government in 2007), Fadela Amara built her career not through meritocracy from French public service but through her activism in Muslim associations. After participating in the Marche des Beurs, she joined SOS Racisme and in 2000 became the president of the Federation Nationale des Maisons des Potes (National Federation of Friends’ Houses).151 Te organization promotes an antiracism agenda and a feminist agenda. Her experience in the struggle for immigrant women’s rights led to the founding of the association Ni Putes Ni Soumises in January 2002. Ni Putes Ni Soumises declare the quartiers sensibles (deprived neighborhoods) to be male-dominated spaces that have deteriorated since the 1980s, and they campaign against the abuse of women, particularly sexual violence. Around the same time, Amara organized the Etats généraux des flles des quartiers (General States of Neighborhood Girls), which gathered three hundred young women to discuss violence against women, especially arranged marriages and rape. Under Amara, this association organized the 2003 Marche des femmes contre le ghetto et pour l’égalité (Women’s march against the ghetto and for equality). Te march lasted fve weeks and made stops in twenty-three cities, beginning with Cité Balzac in Vitry-sur-Seine, where a Muslim woman, Sohane Benziane, had been assassinated in October 2002. Later on, the group also took up the case of Rayhana, a French Algerian playwright and actress. Rayhana had been attacked in front of a theater in Paris where she was performing her provocative play At My Age, I Still Hide My Smoking.152 Ni Putes Ni Soumises organized a protest to support Rayhana on January 16, 2010.153 Sihem Habchi, president of Ni Putes Ni Soumises, proclaimed, “It is her job to be in the theater and our job to be in the streets.” Fittingly, the movement was labeled a féminisme d’urgence (emergency feminism) by Nicole Fayard and Yvette Rocheron.154 However, it is more than feminism; it is Muslim feminism. Amara is an observant Muslim. Tat said, she believes that Islam is being instrumentalized in many deprived urban areas to keep Muslims in an inferior social status. In her appearances before the Stasi Commission and the senate, she denounced the control older brothers in Muslim fami-

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lies have over their sisters and the violence they use. Part of the violence is the demand to wear the veil and in some cases the burqa. In her struggle against family violence, Amara endorsed the controversial initiative of President Sarkozy to forbid the wearing of burqas because they symbolized women’s oppression. On January 25, 2009, Ni Putes Ni Soumises activists donned black burqas and stood silently in front of the gates of the Socialist Party’s ofces in Paris with pink placards denouncing the burqa. Sihem Habchi left a burqa, a letter, and a rose on the sidewalk in front of the gates and declared to the press that Ni Putes Ni Soumises came to tell the progressive forces of France not to abandon women to the violence of the fundamentalists. Te group is unequivocal in its repudiation of both the burqa and the niqabas barbaric patriarchal cultural traditions that have absolutely nothing to do with Islam. What Amara proposes and what Indigènes de la République represents have substantive diferences, despite both defending and representing a secular Muslim civil society. Amara claims that she “can’t stand” the Indigènes de la République because it endorses the discourse of the defense of minorities in a country like France, where minorities enjoy the democratic right to protest and vote. Te real struggle, according to Amara, is the struggle for women’s rights—especially for women oppressed in Muslim communities.155 A republican secular education is the key to survival because their real slavery originates in the banlieues and in religion. Amara’s passionate feminism has been highly criticized. Some accuse her of shielding an anti-Muslim republican ideology. Her transformation from Socialist Party member to member of the conservative Sarkozy-Fillon government received a barrage of criticism.156 Critics of Amara claim that she cannot grasp the ongoing efect of the French colonial mentality on its Muslim citizens. Both Ni Putes Ni Soumises and Indigènes de la République are the product of the interaction of the republic with its Other. But each one’s expression of French Muslim secularity and inclusion contrasts with the other one’s. Te Muslims represented by Indigènes de la République believe their tenuous position and allotment of power and privilege depend on their ability to become “French.”157 Of many preconditions for social inclusion, the most important one is the ability to display the accepted norms of Frenchness that are valued in France. Tese values are transmitted through schools and consecrated socially by passing high-stakes national exams. What Indigènes de la République demands, however, is inclusion through

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mutual change by the colonizer and the colonized. Te frst step would be a mutual recognition of the colonial history of France and a shift to a postcolonial redefnition of identity that would allow a proud recognition of Muslim identity. Te republic itself logically chooses to promote Amara and her Ni Putes Ni Soumises as an exemplar. Tus, the republic discriminates among demands for inclusion, especially if demands are based in an ideological background of religion and anticolonialism. With the same zeal, it attempts to promote civic ideals based in a republican concept of antidiscrimination. The Republic Punches Back: Civic Integration and Discrimination through the Logic of Equality

One of the most signifcant creations in French social policies since the last decades of the twentieth century has been an ambitious antidiscrimination framework that introduces civic integration policies to newcomers. However, unlike Anglo-Saxon countries, France to even admit that ethnic identities should be considered creates a bureaucratic nightmare. In France, data about ethnic origin cannot be analyzed because immigrants have not been asked to specify their religion or ethnic origin. A 1978 law prohibits the collection of data on the racial, religious, or ethnic identity of citizens,158 making it impossible to distinguish the children of Algerian migrants in France from the children of the pieds noirs, those of European ancestry who left after Algerian independence of 1962.159 Several organizations, such as the Representative Council of Black Associations (Conseil Représentatif des Association Noires), that promote afrmative action, have demanded lifting the ban on collecting ethnic statistics. However, other organizations support the ban, proving once more that the idea of color-blind integration persists in the French imagination.160 Te French commitment to this idea is so persistent that the government asked for a reservation (a note that there are difering interpretations of ) on Article 27 on minority rights of the International Covenant on Civic and Political Rights.161 Moreover, in 1999 the Constitutional Council declared that the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (signed in Strasbourg in 1992) was not compatible with the French constitution. Tis riddle settles nondiscrimination. Nondiscrimination in France is not the same as recognition; it is equal dignity. Nondiscrimination in France also explains France’s rejection of the

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legitimacy of group rights. Individual rights such as freedom of religion, speech, association, and so forth, from the French perspective are sufcient to ensure that individuals are free to practice their religion and express their cultural identities in the private sphere. Nonetheless, it is also true that since the late 1980s French political elites have become aware that France, like other developed countries, must integrate newcomers, and to do so it must address their cultural and ethnic backgrounds. In other words, despite antidiscrimination theoretically negating minority recognition, it is necessary to fnd a middle ground to deal with new challenges. Tis could have been through afrmative action or, as France chose to do it, recognition of geographic and socioeconomic proxies, which France has long resorted to in its aversion to ethnic and racial categorization.162 More important than that is the recognition that the old issue of assimilation should be adapted to new times. Te establishment of the Higher Council for Integration (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration; HCI) in 1989 symbolized the broad political consensus in regard to the concept of integration. Its 1991 report, “Te French model of integration,” attempted to distinguish integration from assimilation. Assimilation, it argues, “highlights the unity of the national community,” integration refers to “the choice and participation of new members,” and insertion is “the defense of particularisms of origins.” Integration does not ignore diferences; however, it is reluctant to exalt them, since “it is on the resemblances and the convergences that an integration policy lays stress.” Te report of the HCI emphasized the “conviction that the French conception of integration must obey the logic of equality and not the logic of minorities.”163 Te general idea was that foreigners could become French if they wanted. However, the vision of Frenchness changed slightly in the 1990s with the return of the Socialists, led by Lionel Jospin. New academic debates, economic growth, a decline in unemployment, and a slight decline in the political strength of the National Front set the stage for a new perspective on minorities that was infuenced by the British perspective on diversity. A consensus emerged that more should be done to integrate through tolerance. A 1998 HCI report refected this more tolerant view.164 Patrick Weil, an important member of the council, recommended the creation of a public body similar to the 1976 British Commission for Racial Equality, to recommend antidiscrimination policies.165 However, these policies did not produce real results until more concrete political action began. Te turning point came when President Chirac was reelected in 2002 and legislative initiatives promoted a signifcant antidiscrimination policy.

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Te new initiatives ultimately led to the High Authority of Struggle against Discrimination and for Equality (Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Egalité).Tis was a continuation of old socialist initiatives and was successful. Te change in French politics was also infuenced by Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, which mandated that countries combat discrimination based on sex, race, or ethnic origin.166 Article 13 was backed by French political elites and implemented in a Council of Ministers of Social Afairs directive that was adopted in June 2000.167 Te directive created a framework for an antidiscrimination policy that was accepted by the French parliament and ratifed as law in November 2001. Te law made discrimination a civil ofense, which under French law places the burden of proof on the defending party.168 Te law extended indirect discrimination to cover a much wider domain.169 Under the law indirect discrimination covered all felds of discrimination, including health, social protection, social advantages, education, access to goods and services, afliation with a trade union or a professional organization, and access to employment. However, because the prohibition discussed earlier, statistical data on ethnicity or race that would have made it possible to build cases on the basis of disparate impact could not be collected. Te riots of 2005 also sparked a new awareness regarding diversity.170 Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, elected in 2005, developed numerous programs for combating discrimination and facilitating diversity in the workplace. Tese programs included tripling the number of scholarships given to suburbs, creating professional training for low-skilled workers, and developing sanctions to fght discrimination in the private sector. Moreover, to provide opportunities for the young Muslim population, France increased funding to educational systems and organizations providing social services in high-need areas. Despite its ostensible rejection of multiculturalism, the government did not prevent policies aimed at schools and neighborhoods designated as high-priority urban zones (Zones Urbaines Prioritaires; ZUP) and highpriority education zones (Zones d’Education Prioritaires; ZEP). As noted by Riva Kastoryano, the idea behind the zones was that social handicaps should be corrected by the republican society.171 Te ZEP program thus became a key to civic national integration.172 ZEP conventions ofered a special admission process to Sciences Po to students from disadvantaged areas. Tese measures faced strong opposition including lawsuits alleging unequal treatment; however, they have been successful and have been copied by several of the grandes écoles of France.173

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Afrmative action programs help a few students from disadvantaged districts, but conditions for the majority still need improvement. Article 9 of Law no. 2005-380 of April 23, 2005 (Guidance and Curriculum Planning), defnes the need to guarantee pupils the “necessary means to acquiring a common grounding composed of a range of knowledge and skills that must be mastered in order to complete their [compulsory] schooling successfully, continue training, build a personal and vocational future and succeed in society.” Te intention was to reduce the highly elitist bias of the French educational system. Law no. 2013-660 of July 22, 2013 (Higher Education and Research), requires schools to evaluate students according to what they have learned and give positive reinforcement, rather than by judging them by what they have not learned. Te challenge for France is how to include these policies—which seem to embrace an Anglo-Saxon concept of antidiscrimination—in a national republican repertoire. In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon interpretations, the republicans believe that ethnic diferences should be tactically used to reduce cultural diferences in the private sphere. If goals of national republicanism include preventing racism and ethnic diferentiation and improving socioeconomic inclusion, then the republic should enact afrmative action policies that eliminate institutional, cultural, and social obstacles to fair incorporation of minorities.174 However, that cannot happen in the presence of the two basic pillars of French policies of integration; although conceived for newcomers, they single out cultural minorities, especially Muslims. French civic integration policies take two tacks. Te frst is a campaign against the symbols of women’s repression and socioeconomic backwardness such as the burqa or the hijab. Te second is a campaign to garner public support for obligatory laws of civic integration. One of the French domestic precursors of civic integration was the voluntary half-day schooling provided for some categories of newcomers, which was advanced by Jospin and his socialist government as early as 1981. In 2003, the Gaullist government of Rafarin advanced a more ambitious program: Contrat d’accueil et d’intégration (Contract of welcome and integration),based on a Dutch program and consists of one day of civics instruction, followed by fve hundred hours of French-language instruction. Despite the long-standing French refusal to classify people according to their origin, the moment of accueil (reception) constitutes the only moment in the entire integration process when “the targeted groups can be easily designated without creating a legitimacy problem for public action.”175 By admitting that some sort of ethnic labeling could be used

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for afrmative action policies, the French national model of immigrant integration became part of the mainstream of European civic integration. Te contrat d’accueil shares intellectual ties with philosophy’s social contract in the sense that it is supposed to be an implicit agreement among the members of a society to cooperate for social benefts. However, it did not take long before for the coercive side of integration became evident. One of the frst indicators was a law enacted in November 2003, which drastically restricted access to legal permanent residence. Te immigration laws of 2003, followed by those of 2006 and 2007, moved policies away from family migrations, away from what has been called immigration subie (endured or imposed migration) to immigration choisie (selective in France’s economic interests).176 Most importantly, family members of migrants who had been previously granted ten-year residence cards or an equivalent residence status could now receive only a temporary one-year card. Later on they would be eligible to apply for the ten-year card, subject to the republican integration requirements. Similar to the Dutch model of residency eligibility, the 2003 law entered the private sphere in the struggle against endogamy. According to Sarkozy, the idea was to encourage those who wished to join family members already in France to learn French and to integrate into society.177 Since 2005 the new law on immigration, Loi sur la cohésion sociale (Law regarding social cohesion) has required a contrat d’accueil for newly arrived immigrants who wish to settle in France for more than a year. Te contract was made compulsory in 2006, adding language classes and a test on French history. Te policies of national cohesion also had an important impact at the organizational level, as new civic organizations were created and old ones were transformed. Te tendency was to keep providing funds to immigrant community organizations, contingent on showing achievements in integration.178 Nationalization of newcomers was accompanied by a growing emphasis on the value of Frenchness to those who wished to integrate. One symbolic debate on the meaning of Frenchness took place in 2009 and was initiated by Sarkozy and his minister of immigration, integration, and national identity, Éric Besson. Besson, born in Morocco to a Lebanese mother and a French father, was asked whether the government was promoting the integration of immigrants on traditional Franco-French values. Besson responded that there is no such thing as a Franco-French. Indeed, there is no French race. As he claimed, there is a “shared set of values, . . . a political construction: a people who decides to afrm its sovereignty” and

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most of all secularism.179 Although the debate did not last long and was criticized by many, it succeeded in gathering political support for legislative initiatives that would set a new contract of citizenship in which duties and rights would be specifed. New steps have been taken to promote a clear sense of what it means to be French and what connection that identity has with liberal rights. Schools are required to embrace symbols of the nation, including regular singing of the national anthem and displaying the tricolor fag. Furthermore, “the declaration of the rights of man,” symbolizing the values of the French revolution must be posted at the entrance of each classroom.180 Laïcité in this ideological renationalization thus becomes a national symbol and national practice. As we see next, laïcité was invoked in a more systematic and ambitious form than it was in 2006 with the drafting of a charter of laicité by the HCI. Te charter was to be posted in all public service institutions, such as government ofces and hospitals. It had strict rules for dealing with religious diferences when providing public services.181 A section of the charter, “Receiving the New French,” revised the naturalization ceremony for newcomers to stress the message that acquiring French citizenship is not merely an administrative act. Tis is what Miriam Feldblum has identifed as the nationalist politics of citizenship.182 The Battlefeld of Daily Life: The Burqa and the Debate over Gender Identity

Many scholars have remarked that the debate on laïcité has taken a dramatic turn in this century, especially in response to Islam. Some scholars emphasize the population growth from immigration. Others emphasize the cultural factor. After the Charlie Hebdo murders, the cultural and ideological cleavages we have been discussing grew deeper, in security policies but even more so in daily life, where laïcité takes on new meaning and involves dress and diet and freedom of speech and discrimination. Until 2004, the requirement for neutrality was applied only to public institutions and those working in them. After 2004, laïcité invaded the private sphere. For example, it has been invoked to justify policies such as barring mothers who wear headscarves from volunteering on school feld trips.183 Laïcité has also been used at diferent intensities (mixed with security reasons) to ban burqas and burqinis. It can be argued that today, when liberal cultural pluralism is under severe attack in the Western world,

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France is establishing republican liberalism more as a national idea than as a universal principle. France has been rebuilding its national republicanism in the clash with Muslim religious symbols. Its message is that, beyond the separation of state and church, the state acts as an agent of secularization.184 A combative laïcité was elaborated in two important reports. Te frst, “For a new laïcité,” was overseen by Prime Minister Jean Pierre Rafarin and written by François Baroin.185 Te second, the Stasi Commission report, added points in favor of state respect of Muslim holidays and institutions.186 Both reports go beyond the spirit of the 1905 Law of Separation of state and church. Tey are directed less against clericalism and more against communitarianism, especially religious communitarian tendencies. Liberals are very critical of this radical version of laïcité, which singles out Muslim communitarianism as problematic and considers itself the best arbiter of the values of sexual liberty and equality while insinuating that gender inequality derives almost exclusively from the Muslim population.187 Tis radical version of laïcité was advanced by the Socialist government of François Hollande in particular. Vincent Peillon, the minister of education, presented in 2013 the charter of laicité, which bans pupils from boycotting classes for religious or political reasons and promotes “total respect for freedom of conscience.” Article 9 states, “Secularism implies the rejection of all violence and all discrimination, guarantees equality between girls and boys, and is based on a culture of respect.” Article 12 states, “Lessons are secular. . . . No student can invoke their political or religious convictions, in order to dispute a teacher’s right to address a question on the syllabus.” Te charter reafrms France’s 2004 law banning pupils in state schools from wearing any “ostentatious religious symbols.” “Nobody can cite their religious appearance to refuse to obey rules applicable in our schools,” states Article 13. Socialists and conservatives are promoting the idea that only a secular enlightened society based on the autonomy of the individual can ensure diversity.188 Te French nation is thus not about ethnicity but an enlightened laïcité.189 Te insistence that citizenship be based on socialization into a national culture explains the republican rejection of postnational proposals for the separation of nationality and citizenship.190 For some observers, the battle over the ban on religious symbols was related to politics rather than principles. According to this theory, the underlying reason for these initiatives was Sarkozy’s hope that they would help slow the increasing political power of the National Front. He admitted that he had no intention of leaving the question of national identity

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for the radical Right to monopolize. Te initial response from the left was that Sarkozy’s initiative was political manipulation. Tey were quick to announce that the very idea of the nation was created by the left; it should not be surrendered to the manipulations of conservatives or the Far Right. Te question, however, is how the national narrative is related to debates over the values of the French republic and to debates over the burqa. In short, how is a republican national identity re-created vis-à-vis Islam? Te burqa debate is over the legislative ban of a symbol. Despite a burqa ban afecting only a few thousand women, many in France view it as a threat to the core ideas of the republic. Te controversy is largely due to several liberals saying the ban exceeds the meaning of the 2004 law on laïcité. Rather than simply preserving the neutrality of its secular state by forbidding pupils from wearing religious symbols in schools, the burqa ban potentially undermines fundamental liberal rights, such as the freedoms of religion and expression. However, as we suggest, the case against the burqa was built on other republican concepts such as fraternity, equality, republican integration, and the state duty to ensure human dignity. Te whole controversy started when André Gerin, a Communist member of parliament and the mayor of Venissieux, a small town near Lyon with a non-French majority, brought up the burqa in parliament. Several dozen women wore the burqa in Venissieux, prompting Gerin to propose the creation of an ad hoc parliamentary committee to assess the extent of the practice and recommend responses. Te committee was charged with assessing whether wearing the full-face veil was compatible “with the principles of the French republic, in particular, those of women’s freedom and dignity.”191 Te burqa commission could not agree on an absolute prohibition and recommended a partial ban for spaces such as hospitals and public transportation. Te parliament as a whole condemned the burqa, but several MPs opposed the legislation on the grounds that it could cause a backlash.192 What was clear, though, was that a ban had to be based on a negation of the existence of the Other, because it might be applied to or claimed by a group of French citizens, and be based in support of a republican society rather than in religious discrimination.193 Te reason was simple. As lawyers participating in the commission argued, the veil does not afect laïcité, human dignity, or public order. Moreover, the main argument against a law banning the burqa was that it would violate fundamental human rights protected in liberal democracies. Te political philosopher Martha Nussbaum has elaborated on this specifc point. She refutes arguments jus-

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tifying the burqa ban in the name of liberal rights. In her mind, these arguments are discriminatory and fail to treat all citizens with equal respect. For Nussbaum, two arguments are especially open to negation. Te frst is the argument that the burqa is a symbol of female subjugation, and the second is the argument that women are coerced into wearing burqas. Nussbaum dismisses these arguments, invoking empirical evidence demonstrating that women choose to wear the burqa.194 In the view of pious French Muslim women, the goals of self-development and self-respect are congruent with submission to God, to the extent that following religious authority is considered to be the “means to the self ’s cultivation and realization.”195 Although the arguments of Nussbaum and other critics are compelling, the republic did not justify the ban by appealing to the principle of individual freedom. Te main justifcation for the law referred to a nonmaterial attribute of society—public order—and to the idea that individual dignity and equality of the sexes should be protected and enhanced by the state. Laïcité indeed appears to be the best arrangement for promoting sexual liberty and equality.196 Bernard Henry Lévy, an advocate of the ban, rephrases the idea of republican freedom. It is not important whether Muslim women freely decided to wear the burqa. It is still a symbol of the subservience and slavish status of women. Voluntary servitude is an unconvincing justifcation.197 Éric Besson, minister of immigration, defended the ban using a similar logic: “Public authority is founded on protecting the dignity of the person, if necessary against the person herself.”198 A general antiburqa legal case can be built on the basis of human dignity as an element of public order, which the state is mandated to protect, via the public morality angle. Finally, we stress that the ideas of dignity and equality of the sexes supported by the state are directly connected to fraternity and the concept of civic integration. Te argument of the government is that a republican social order is “lived with the face uncovered,” showing that the ban on the burqa comes from the desire to live together and refuse separatism. Tis thesis was confrmed by the National Assembly, which fatly stated that the veil is not a religious symbol. Te ban prevents Islam from appearing to be an “archaic religion” and gives the republic the ability of “reafrming [its] solidarity with all Muslims who sufer from discrimination.”199 Legal restrictions and the goal of integration could complement, rather than contradict, each other. Arguments for or against the burqa may be advanced in the name of liberal rights, but the defnitive argument against the burqa is that France, for good or bad, is not a culturally neutral state.

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France is a republic that defends values, where all are welcome and where nobody should be excluded. Tat does not mean, however, that all cultural practices are accepted. Probably none of these arguments would have appeared if politics had not gotten involved. Te challenge from a growing radical Right, which emphasized questions of national identity, provided the background for the government decision to push for a ban. Sarkozy raised the issue again in March 2010, when regional elections were to take place. It was a clear signal from Sarkozy to the voters of the National Front that the centerright Union for a Popular Movement would stay frm in support of a bill banning the burqa, even if that contradicted the Council of State and the European Convention on Human Rights.200 In a confrontation between a legal system relying on liberal values and the republican state, the state and its project would come frst. Risk taking, political courage, and political responsibility became the discourse of the leadership of the Union for a Popular Movement, which declared the defense of religious liberties by the Council of State an error. Te French parliament approved the law in September 2010. Te language of the law sent by the government for parliamentary approval echoed Bernard Henry Lévy’s argument: “Given the damage it produces on those rules which allow the life in community, ensure the dignity of the person and equality between sexes, this practice, even if it is voluntary, cannot be tolerated in any public place.”201 Te French government further proposed using the immigration and nationality law as a means to inform potential immigrants, families hoping to reunite, or individuals hoping to obtain permanent settlement permits (carte dix ans) of the goals of the republic. In short, immigrants who failed to recognize equality of the sexes and the principle of laïcité would be turned away. Tese measures were announced by immigration minister Éric Besson, and by way of administrative decree, they become the law of the land. At the same time, in line with the Stasi Commission report of 2003, the ideology of the measures dictated the need to accept Islamic holidays as a part of social diversity. Tus, the antiburqa crusade was complemented by moves in favor of a French-integrated Islam. Te republic would show its solidarity with Muslims and its commitment to fghting discrimination. But this applied only to integrated Muslims who respected the values of the republic: equality of the sexes and the republican understanding of human dignity. Polls showed that more than half the French people supported the law.202

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French republicans were afraid that the law would not be accepted by European institutions, but the European Court of Human Rights upheld France’s ban of the burqa. Te Strasbourg-based court ruled that the law’s bid to promote harmony in a diverse population is legitimate and does not breach the European Convention on Human Rights. Te court confrmed that the ban is a “choice of society,” and with this decision it accepted the government’s attempt to connect the ban on the burqa with the issue of civic integration. Te “choice of society” argument was not used, however, in the burqini afair of 2016. When approximately ffteen towns in France issued bans against the full-body swimsuits worn by some Muslim women, the argument used was that ostentatious display of religious afliation at a time when France was the target of terrorism was likely to spark public disorder. Yet the question again is whether the ban was for security reasons. We think not. Once again the Muslim challenge has served the republic in its enduring goal of showing that France is not culture neutral. Indeed, French liberalism is buttressed by a clearly discriminatory type of antidiscrimination. Te burqini and the burqa supposedly represent enslavement of women, the bikini represents liberation. Tis patronizing stance is unacceptable to liberals worldwide. And yet it is through this confrontation that France is unwittingly redefning liberalism for a postmulticultural Europe. Nothing could better illustrate this discriminatory nondiscriminatory approach than the campaign for LGBTQ rights. After the settlement of the burqa afair, the LGBTQ agenda emerged. As promoted by the Socialist Party and accepted by parts of the Republican Party, the LGBTQ agenda hints at the connection between the burqa afair and agendas of sexual emancipation. Te antiburqa campaign, supported by more than 50 percent of French people, was the prelude to a campaign in favor of the ABCs of Equality program in schools and to the Marriage for All law, legalizing same-sex marriages. Te Marriage for All law was followed by a proposal to allow gay and lesbian couples to adopt children. But although opposition to the burqa was shared by all republicans and the populist right, LGBTQ rights divided them. Te Socialists saw that gays and lesbians composed up to 6.5 percent of the electorate, compared with practicing Catholics at 4.5 percent. Moreover, polls showed that 63 percent of French people are in favor of same-sex marriages and 56 percent support gay adoption.203 Despite these numbers in favor, observers were struck by the vocal opposition to the same-sex marriage law and the adoption proposal, which became law in France.

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La Manif pour Tous (the Protest for Everyone) is a French-version Tea Party that emerged outside the structure of the traditional French political parties. Tis party refects a growing part of public opinion that, although rejecting same-sex marriage, accepted France’s civil-union law.204 Manif pour Tous aspires to block the legalization of sperm banking for lesbians and others, along with gestational surrogacy, and strongly rejects the supposed attempt to impose gender theory as a countrywide curriculum. Although Manif lost its primary political struggle when Attorney General Christiane Taubira allowed a law legalizing same-sex marriage and adoption, it injected new energy into a conservative right eager to regain the Catholic conservative vote. Same-sex marriage and adoption also had intellectual roots in the Saint-Simon Foundation, which attempted to defne a new-old republicanism through a critique of communitarisme and through a redefnition of the realm of the public and private. Some of the foundation’s reports from the mid-1990s already dealt with the limits of privacy in the context of sexuality. Te sociologist Fréderic Martél, for example, is critical of gay communitarianism. In the same vein is Irene Téry, who focuses on the Contrat d’union sociale, which preceded the civil-union law, and argues that heterosexuality should be associated with the public domain and homosexuality with privacy.205 Tere is an opposition between un droit de principe (a law of principal) and un droit du modele (a law of models) laid down in the 1804 Civic Code, which privileged the traditional family composed of father, mother, and children as the backbone of society. In dealing with the homosexual question, as noted by the philosopher Elisabeth Badinter, who supported the bill of the Contrat d’union sociale, the republican ethos can be preserved if we include all kinds of unions within the law and do not make a special case for homosexuals. France thus granted homosexuals the right to indiference, which avoids the ghettoization associated with the right to diference. In other words, as notes Badinter, “attributing rights based on diference instead of sameness would reduce the nation to a motley collection of tribes.”206 Tis opened a new line of debate among republicans, who wavered between a hard republicanism—in which all communitarian rights, religions, and homosexuals are privatized, a discriminatory republicanism in which the rights of certain groups come frst and should be respected and others do not—and a critical and open republicanism, which addresses the shortcomings of ofcial republicanism. As Cécile Laborde frames it, a critical republicanism interprets the idea of freedom as nondomination and is suited to the idea

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of freedom in the presence of the diference and inequality that characterize current French society.207 Liberals advocating for an open laïcité may hope for a more egalitarian perspective, heeding both gender and minority religious rights. In reality, however, the underlying tendency of socialists, conservatives, and the Far Right is to be discriminatory. Tey all understand that an enlightened republican logic means endorsing an antiburqa campaign. Although they agree on this, they are divided with respect to a progender and prohomosexual policy. Tis is an open and ongoing debate that leans toward a diferentiation of diference, or a discriminatory tendency in favor of an agenda of individual rights and gender, rather than toward religious dignity. Furthermore, as we shall see, the republic does not limit itself to discriminating between a gender agenda and one of religious dignity, the former coming out of the logic of equality. In its intense attempt to mark out what should be defned as positive discrimination, the republic never hides the distinction between racist anti-Semitism, which should be banned, and the mocking of religion, which could be criticized but still allowed. When Manuel Valls, the Socialist prime minister, declared that secularism was now “the only issue that matters,” he also implied that the republic will never tolerate anti-Semitism.208 Te question is, what about Islamophobia? Freedom of Speech: Charlie Hebdo, Dieudonné, and the Discriminatory Republic

French life underwent an important change in 2015, when what remained of a semitolerant and equalitarian republic was caught in an avalanche. From January to November 2015, Paris sufered three bloody and symbolic terrorist acts. If September 11 was an Islamic show of rage against the symbols of American capitalism and power, the terrorist attacks against Charlie Hebdo and the kosher supermarket in January and the coordinated Parisian attacks in November 2015 against people in restaurants and concert halls were attacks on the three most important pillars of the republic: freedom of speech and freedom to mock religion, the idea of the successful integration of Jews, and the sense of a bourgeois good life. Until then, it could be claimed that despite France, despite the republic’s harsh posture on religion, laws of hate speech had been used with severity against those ofending Islam. For example, the editor in chief of

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Charlie Hebdo was sued in 2006, after the magazine republished the Danish Muhammad cartoons, and again in 2007. In 2010 the writer Michel Houellebecq was accused in court of saying that Islam is a “stupid” religion. Although he was acquitted, it was not on the grounds of free speech. In 2011, judicial sentences were handed down against the polemicist Éric Zemmour, and Pierre Cassen, the founder of the website Riposte Laïque, has faced an overwhelming number of lawsuits since 2007.209 Te most dramatic case in the theoretical dilemma for the French republican approach to freedom of speech was, however, the Georges Bensoussan afair. Te Comité Contre l’Islamophobie en France (Committee against Islamophobia in France) accused the Jewish historian Georges Bensoussan, a leading editor at the Shoah Memorial in Paris, of racism. Bensoussan had become famous after editing, under the pseudonym Emmanuel Brenner, Les Territoires Perdus de la République (Te republic’s lost territories, published in 2002), in which he claimed that youngsters whose cultural roots are in North African Muslim countries display anti-Semitism, sexism, and racism from their very early childhood.210 Bensoussan was particularly condemned for his statement that Muslims “suckled . . . anti-Semitism . . . along with mother’s milk,” making Muslim anti-Semitism biological.211 Tis argument triggered a debate on how to defne racism and whether fascism and Islamophobia coincide. Te debate about Islamophobia as racism took a diferent turn after the three shocking attacks in 2015. Charlie Hebdo was the most symbolic of France of the three attacks, and its attack was a watershed moment. Liberal rights lost importance, and security and afrmation of republican education gained importance. Security developments were easy to forecast. Te Socialist government of Hollande became a national security hawk and preached safety over civil rights. Hollande aspired to enshrine in the constitution the state of emergency by including a measure for keeping suspects in detention without prior approval from a judge. Te debate was also about the ideological and cultural domain. Te French were most struck by the aftermath. National unity expanded, manifested in a march with the motto Je suis Charlie, but French republicans understood that not all French identifed with Charlie and not all liberals worldwide endorsed the French response to the murders. Republicans from right and left could not accept challenges against their narratives. But their narratives were challenged at the street level in the banlieues and at the intellectual level, especially abroad. In Seine-Saint-Denis, for example, many young people refused to comply with a state-mandated

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minute of silence for the murdered journalists, whom they regarded as having ofended Islam. Te Hollande government’s response, in addition to the security measures advanced by Manuel Valls, was to announce a vast civic integration program that included training for students and teachers and symbolic acts. As remarked by Mark Lilla, “Tere are few other countries where public ofcials would have thought it necessary to introduce an education program as an antiterrorist measure.” But the modern French have always treated education as a projection screen for their anxieties and uncertainties.212 Te minister of education Najat Vallaud-Belkacem required schools to ofer classes in comparative religions and introduce students to critical analysis. Learning the French language, including for parents, was emphasized. School establishments had to be much more active in teaching democratic secular values and anti-Semitism. Te central idea was that an educational reform should be considered crucial for national security. At the intellectual level, nothing seemed to be more disturbing to French republicans than the protest launched by six writers (among them Peter Carey, Michael Ondaatje, Francine Prose, and Rachel Kushner), who were joined by twenty-six others, including Pulitzer Prize and National Book Award winners, rejecting an award to Charlie Hebdo from PEN America. Teir argument was that they supported free speech but could not go so far as to reward ofensive speech. Any authority fgure was fair game to Charlie Hebdo cartoonists. But, Jason Stanley wrote, “there surely is a diference, in France, between mocking the pope and mocking the Prophet Muhammad. Te pope is the representative of the dominant traditional religion of the majority of French citizens. Te Prophet Muhammad is the revered fgure of an oppressed minority.”213 Te French intellectual Emmanuel Todd, in Who Is Charlie?, which appeared just days after the terrorist attacks, expands on this point: underneath the battle for laïcite, France is promoting a secularized zombie Catholicism whose goal is to sow hatred against Muslims. Charlie Hebdo was about social power and defending the right to ofend the religion of the weak. In that sense, to be French implied the right to blaspheme and even the duty to do so.214 Responses were not long in coming, adding more bricks to the reconstruction of republican discourse. Te idea that Charlie Hebdo and other champions of laïcité had brought the tragedy on themselves was unacceptable to most French republicans. Not a few pundits and political authorities called for reviewing existing laws of antidiscrimi-

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nation and adapting them to times of terrorism and Islamic radicalization. It could be claimed that the Charlie Hebdo afair has brought a fresh perspective to debates about freedom of speech and egalitarianism. Several critics add that the only racism existing in France is Muslim racism against Jews, which gets a green light from authorities. As is noted by Guy Milliére, each time an anti-Semitic crime is committed by a Muslim on French territory, French politicians and journalists try to hide who the criminal is or what the motivations were. Often, they explain that the criminal is also a “victim.”215 Although this argument is compelling, if we heed the theoretical debate on anti-Semitism and Islamophobia and analyze its implications for the political debate, a more balanced picture unfolds. Te republic discriminates between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, as evidenced by “l’afaire Dieudonné,” as it is known in France. Born in the western suburbs of Paris to a Cameroonian accountant and a white French sociologist, Dieudonné M’bala M’bala began his comedy career with a Jewish colleague, Élie Semoun, humorously exploding racial stereotypes. In his early days as a comedian, he campaigned against racism, especially rejecting the National Front. In 2003, however, he depicted a Jewish settler as a Nazi. Since then, his comedy has started to firt with anti-Semitism, something that the French establishment cannot accept. He claimed Jews were the biggest crooks on the planet, denounced the Jewish lobby, and more disturbing, he claimed that the Holocaust and its consequences have become a “dominant religion.” He became even more famous for inventing the quenelle, a gesture in which one hand lies on the opposite shoulder, whose arm points down with the hand out fat. Critics (almost unanimously) saw the perfect inversion of the Nazi salute. Authorities attempted to ban the gesture after numerous incidents in which citizens all around the world were photographed making the gesture near Holocaust memorials, Jewish schools, and elsewhere. Te footballer Nicolas Anelka use the quenelle at an English Premier League game. Dieudonné was arrested more than thirty times for abusing French hate laws. He became a very popular fgure to disafected youth in the banlieues.216 What most disturbed the French was that, the evening after Paris marched in solidarity with the murdered journalists and cartoonists of Charlie Hebdo, Dieudonné posted on his Facebook page his feeling of being Charlie Coulibaly, combining the Charlie of Charlie Hebdo with the name of one of the terrorists who took hostages in a kosher supermarket

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soon after the Charlie Hebdo attack. Tis provocative gesture, defying the establishment, led Dieudonné to new ideological companions and opened questions about how apparently contrasting cultural and ideological projects can fnd common ground. Dieudonné invited the famous Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson onto the stage. More striking is his rapprochement with Jean-Marie Le Pen and Alain Soral, an ex-member of the Communist Party in the 1990s, who moved his allegiance to the National Front and endorses anti-Semitism and antirepublicanism. Praising Islamic resistance against Jewish dominance of France, Soral found in Dieudonné the most representative individual fgure of what the republic most hates. Te question for republicans is whether Dieudonné should enjoy free speech, whether Dieudonné should have the same right to insult or mock the Other that Charlie Hebdo does. But “France’s commitment to ‘free speech’ has never been absolute,”217 and that is what earns furious criticism from Muslims. “Te Fabius-Gayssot law of July 13, 1990, makes it a crime to ‘contest’ the ‘crimes against humanity’ as defned by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal of 1945–46. Tis one-sided law  .  .  . is applied selectively only to expressions of skepticism about real or alleged atrocities committed by” the Nazis and collaborators against Jews.218 Te law coincides with the republic state of mind, best expressed in January 2011 when the minister of culture Frédéric Mitterrand said he would withdraw from public commemorations and events the name of LouisFerdinand Céline, the well-known and magnifcent writer who was also a declared anti-Semitic. France thus bans Holocaust denial, hate speech, and since November 2015, incitement to terrorism. Article 421-2-5 of the French Criminal Code says that to “directly provoke acts of terrorism” is an ofense. Dieudonné was charged under this article. In some cases, harsh criticism of Israel is also criminalized. Te Lellouche law, passed in 2003, extended antiracist laws to target specifc nations for discriminatory treatment. Te law was used to fght the growing BDS movement (boycott, divestment, and sanctions) against Israel. Te law aimed to curb a rise in racist incidents, including anti-Semitic attacks, which coincided with a surge in support for the Far- Right and anti-immigrant National Front. Yet the law became a formidable tool to prosecute anti-Israeli groups. France today more than ever is trapped between growing anti-Semitism and what Muslims claim is an Islamophobic state after the Charlie Hebdo attack. As the sociologist Michel Wieviorka points out, the resurrection of anti-Semitism joins new forms of racism against blacks and Muslims.

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French racism is displayed in the republic’s inability to accept both difference and similarity.219 Does mocking Muhammad lead to mocking the Holocaust? Are all forms of prejudice similar, and must they be combated all at once? Or do some prejudices suit the republic and others not? Is Dieudonné’s and the Indigènes de la République’s claim for a postcolonial type of freedom of speech acceptable? Tese are incendiary questions. Te republic seems to advance an infexible claim contrary to the postcolonial discourse. It distinguishes between discrimination by virtue of race and discrimination of ideas. Te moment we admit that ideas are sacred and are immune to criticism or satire, we destroy freedom of thought. Te Dieudonné afair speaks volumes about France’s advocacy of a nondiscriminatory discrimination. It is emblematic of France as a state that is not culture neutral, and it is proud to be so. Te French state, skeptical observers suggest, ignores Muslim antiSemitism in order to not be portrayed as Islamophobic. But ofcially the republic is clear in what it bans (anti-Semitism and the burqa), what it accepts (the socioeconomic rebellion of the banlieues), and what it promotes (the Muslim women’s rebellion against communitarianism, Ni Putes Ni Soumises, and women’s rights).Tese priorities expose the meaning of equality for the French republic and why that equality is for Muslims discrimination against their values. Tis approach by the republic moves conditioned inclusion toward plain exclusion, a move related to the growing political impact of the populist right across Europe. At a practical level, Jews see the republic as yielding to Islam because of political correctness. Te reality is much more complicated. Te French republic’s constant balancing act—between respect for the Other and civic integration, between the communitarianism of Islam and the populist right—has sufered setbacks but has certainly not failed. Normalizing the Populist Right through Islam

Te republic’s tradition is to try to integrate the Other. Te radical Right conventionally holds that the Other should be discouraged from integrating. Tere is an ongoing debate about whether the republic’s approach to its Muslim population legitimates the discourse of the populist right. Socialists and conservatives both being infexible in their positions against the burqa could lead to that conclusion. Te idea of assimilation entrenched

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in the republican left was historically targeted by the radical Right, which for its part wanted organic diferentialism, although for tactical reasons the National Front endorsed a fake idea of assimilation. As noted by Michel Wieviorka, the populist right advances the old-new racist essentialism, which has gone from biological racism to cultural diferentialism. Racists of the new brand consider the Other to be irreducibly diferent because of cultural attributes.220 Te radical Right during the 1980s recommended that migrants of Arab origin who settled in Europe should focus on cultivating an Islamic identity. Tey hoped that this would keep Europe’s culture and ethnicity free from a dreaded hybridity. New Resistance (Nouvelle Résistance) and the New Right (Nouvelle Droite) supported Muslim girls who wanted to wear the hijab. On the basis of “cultural recognition-exclusion,” or diferentialism, the New Right promoted a sophisticated ideology of exclusion.221 Marcel Gauchet, editor of the journal Le Débat, analyzes this point in La Religion dans la démocratie. He accounts for the emergence of radical communitarianism as an efect of democracy. Te National Front, renamed National Rally in 2018, should thus be seen as an expression of the rise of national populism, underpinned by the philosophy of the droit á la diference.222 Te right-wing Alain Soral, an ex-member of the National Front, paradoxically and counterintuitively adheres to diferentialism as evidenced by his association with Dieudonné. Furthermore, in the 1980s and 1990s, the radical Right saw Islam as an ally against liberal cosmopolitanism and its sibling the French republican tradition. As Hans-Georg Betz has noted, the strategy of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front was to redefne political confict as a struggle between nations and globalization. Holding this view, Le Pen supported Iraq against the American invasion. He also considered the National Front to be the last bastion of national culture against cosmopolitanism, which mixes cultures and peoples.223 Te French nation, according to Le Pen, should be seen as “diferent,” not superior. France is a European nation rooted in traditions from “three great European cultures”: Celtic, Germanic, and Greco-Latin, which were all shaped by Christianity.224 Le Pen’s strategy was to pit Islam against a radicalized ethnic France. Echoing Alain de Benoist’s Nouvelle Droite, the idea is that France could contribute to Muslims’ struggle against globalization in their own environments, such as Iraq or Syria. An ethnic France should, however, be free of Muslims. In short, the formula of respect for diference was one of separation, not integration or assimilation. In the 1980s, Le Pen published three books in which he

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invoked a popular fascist idea: only national rebirth by a mass movement could invigorate France.225 Resurrection meant national preference and control of immigration. Te very idea of national preferences is based on our prioritizing, frst, our family, then our country, and fnally, foreigners. Are we then talking about a republican family open to those who want to integrate or about an organic closed family? How does one become a citizen? Is it possible for a foreigner to become French? Jean-Marie Le Pen paid lip service to the tradition of assimilation. He ofered two options: assimilation or emigration. Te democratic assimilation or integration upheld by democratic conservatives and socialists has important diferences from the assimilation of the radical Right. In democratic assimilation, although assimilation to the democratic republic is conditional and might be difcult to uphold, assimilation is open to the Other, depending the will to assimilate. Democratic republican nationalists would even accept that immigration on such terms could be good for the state. Assimilation in Le Pen’s ethnic republic, however, is impossible. Citizenship would be reserved for the authentically ethnic French. Tis criterion would prevent even Sarkozy from becoming a legitimate political participant, not to mention Jews. Foreigners would be discriminated against and repatriated, and family subsidies, social security, and employment would be reserved for only French nationals. Le Pen’s ideology is clearly entrenched in the intellectual background established by Charles Maurras and Maurice Barrès. Moreover, as Le Pen himself admits, “Until 1945, I retained my admiration for Marshall Petain . . . and I never renounced the authors of my youth . . . like Maurras or . . . Robert Brasillach.”226 Le Pen’s nationalist ideology is not confned to immigration. Le Pen’s National Front, from the early 1980s on, had an appeal for the working class. As the euphoria produced by Mitterrand’s victory in 1981 began to fade, Le Pen was able to capitalize on the resentment felt by many as a result of the government’s austerity measures and on the failure of the parliament to provide a reasonable alternative to what was becoming a central preoccupation for the French: immigration. Te Socialist Party was increasingly perceived as having abandoned the working class in favor of wealthy bureaucrats, bourgeois bohemians, and minorities. Didier Eribon’s novel Returning to Reims is a magnifcent introspection on why people such as his parents, who religiously voted Communist, could support the populist National Front. His adopted tribe, the left, he points out, has contributed to the alienation of people like his parents, even to the point of waging “an implacable war” against blue-collar interests.227

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For the general public, the National Front’s préférence nationale was appealing. Te party increasingly dealt with issues that mainstream parties were either ignoring or designating as low priority.228 A good performance in the 1983 municipal elections was followed the next year by Le Pen’s list receiving 11 percent of the vote in the European Parliament elections.229 In 1991 the National Front published “50 Measures,” a document expounding its theses on race and immigration, which led to the highest approval ratings Le Pen had ever received (38 percent).230 Le Pen exploited other issues to advance extreme policy ideas. Crime, for example, became critical to voters, as brutal and violent crime spread in Paris’s poor suburbs.231 Le Pen called for the deportation of Muslim immigrants.232 Te National Front made great advances in the 1997 legislative elections and the 1998 regional elections.233 Tis slow but steady electoral success led to Le Pen’s major success in the 2002 presidential elections, in which he took second place in the frst round of voting. When Le Pen succeeded in grabbing 0.68 percent more votes than Jospin, the second round became a race between the incumbent, Chirac, and the extreme right. Le Pen had been widely viewed as a fringe candidate with little mainstream signifcance. Tis turn of events was shocking and had a profound impact on the mainstream political class. Te conservatives of the Union for a Popular Movement understood that the only way to block Le Pen’s rising electoral path was by addressing immigration, welfare, and national identity. Tis provided a contrast to the socialists’ attempt to embrace so-called minorities and the radical Right’s negative stance toward immigrants in general and Muslims in particular. As rightly remarked by Pierre Rosanvallon, Barrès at the end of the nineteenth century was already forecasting the synthesis of economic nationalism and racism. In the manifesto Contre les étrangers (Against foreigners) issued during 1883 elections, Barrès afrmed that equality goes hand in hand with xenophobia, which was linked to national protectionism. Barrès predated Le Pen as an ardent defender of protectionism for workers reliably seen as French.234 He also indirectly anticipated the confrontation between the nationalist periphery and the cosmopolitan center. Nowadays, particularly after the rebellion of the Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests),we can perceive the Barrèsian spirit. Although the price of fuel triggered the Yellow Vest movement, it certainly was not the root cause. Te new division between a globalized metropolis, seen as the new citadels of the twenty-frst century, home to the intellectual and political elites, and the excluded lower-middle classes led to the expansion of the peripheral

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cities phenomenon. Tis is not the old antirepublican conservative regionalism, à la Barrès, but a new structure that contrasts the logic of the large cities, with their dual dynamic of gentrifcation and immigration, with a relegated working class forced out to the periphery. Christophe Guilluy, the author of La France périphérique (Peripheral France) and Le crépuscle de la France d’en haut (Twilight of the elites), has studied the efects of globalization on the country’s smaller towns and communities. He claims that we are witnessing a confrontation between the old France d’en-haut, represented by prosperous cities and the young generation, and la France d’en-bas, the provincial deindustrialized regions, rural areas, and small- and medium-size towns, which are less dynamic and reject Emmanuel Macron’s economic model.235 For the frst time, workers no longer live in areas where employment is created, giving rise to growing frustration and culture shock, which are increasingly used by the populist National Front. Tis is, though, the classical part of the adaptation of the Barrèsian organic nationalist formula, pitting the nationalist periphery against the cosmopolitan elites, who are universally minded, socialist, pro–human rights, and proimmigration. Le Pen eventually ceded leadership of the National Front to his daughter, Marine. Under her leadership, the National Front reevaluated its strategy and message, changed its name to Rassemblement National (National Rally), and began formulating messages for a new era. Te new leadership has two aims: solidify the contestatory role of the party as the voice of those, especially working-class people, who were abandoned by socialist globalized elites. At the identity level, Marine Le Pen hopes to normalize the party. She understands that the racist and anti-Semitic discourse of her father has to be rejected in order to engage with sectors of the population that would not dare vote for the National Front.236 Tis new strategy represents a clear attempt to disentangle racism (associated with Jews) from antimulticulturalism and anti-immigration (associated with Muslims). Tis approach crystallized in a propitious cultural climate, favoring a shift to a diferent type of argument for exclusion, one with greater legitimacy. Tere is no need for old ethno-biological arguments against Muslims. Alignment with France’s universalist understanding of nationhood, which adheres to a civic territorial conception, is enough. Tis alignment makes Muslim life even more difcult than does racism. In this context Islamic religious practices have become identity markers politicized by the Far Right.237 In the frst round of the 2012 elections, this synthesis of the economic

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and the identity message paid of. Marine Le Pen grabbed 18 percent of the votes with a message of preservation of national identity, anti-immigration policies, and greater socioeconomic equality.238 With this message of social justice and national identity, Marine Le Pen challenged both Sarkozy’s defense of national identity without social justice and Hollande’s defense of social justice without a clear stance on national identity. How the populist right has challenged the conservative right’s view of the primacy of the economy and the Socialists’ ambivalent approach toward it is illustrated by the marketing of halal food, which developed into “pork nationalism.” A controversy over halal meat began when the restaurant chain Quick in Roubaix, a city in northern France with a large Muslim population, decided in 2010 to ofer its clients halal food and drop pork hamburgers from its popular menu. Tis was a purely economic decision, in response to an expanding market of Muslims. René Vandierendonck, the Socialist mayor of Roubaix, strongly criticized Quick restaurants’ decision, on grounds of discrimination against the non-Muslim public. His group’s motto was “Yes to diversity, no to exclusion.”239 Te National Front profted from the controversy by taking the lead in transforming a peripheral market issue into an identity debate, which neither conservatives nor socialists could avoid. Marine Le Pen immediately claimed that all meat in the Paris region is halal meat and was not labeled as such, thus deceiving consumers. Te issue was divisive for the Socialist Party because in the 2012 elections it was courting the Muslim vote. It became even more divisive for conservatives, who oppose halal food because of identity, but the supply of halal was a feature of the free-market economy that conservatives defend. Te National Front took advantage of this point. A free-market ideology determining the French diet ftted well into the overwhelming critique raised by the populist right against the free-market economy, against immigration, and against Muslims in particular. Indeed, following the National Front’s great success in the 2014 local elections, Marine Le Pen swiftly announced that school cafeterias would no longer serve a pork substitute to children living in towns won by National Front candidates.240 Te next line of attack on the conservative right was through the question of French identity. Te tradition the French populist right belongs to is the integralist one, which relies either on race or national Catholicism. In either version, it rebuts French democratic republicanism and civic integration. Marine Le Pen’s attack on Muslim communitarianism relies on a national exclusionist tradition based on superiority and an ethnic or reli-

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gious understanding of French citizenship.241 Accordingly, Islamic proselytism should be disallowed. Catholicism is part of French identity, Islam is not. Implicit in this claim is that Muslim communitarianism, and this alone, constitutes a threat to Christians, Jews, and homosexuals. “Dans certains quartiers, il ne fait pas bon être femme, ni homosexuel, ni juif, ni même français ou blanc” (In certain neighborhoods it is not good to be a woman, a homosexual, a Jew, or even white French).242 Tis phrase indicates that the “white French,” Jews, and homosexuals are part of the national organic community that must be protected from Islam. Furthermore, the enhancement of national identity should be directly accompanied by a revisionist approach to the problematic French past, both in World War II and in colonialist policies. Breaking with twenty years of state policy that recognized French responsibility for the Vel d’Hiv roundup, a French collaboration with the Nazis, Marine Le Pen declined French responsibility for it in the 2017 electoral campaign. She received strong criticism by politicians of the right, left, and center, and especially by Jewish groups, all of whom heard an echo of her party’s anti-Semitic roots.243 Despite eforts to legitimate the voice of the Front National as another republican party, the diferences are clear. Whereas republican parties can be critical of the colonial past and the dark side of French history, the populist right cannot. Le Pen places herself and the party in opposition to repentance and criticism of French colonial history. Tis opens old wounds from the history of French colonialism in Algeria and also brings to mind the collaborationist past with the Nazis. Marine Le Pen’s position cannot be understood without taking into account the radicalization of the center-right Gaullist Republicans (les Républicains, formed May 30, 2015, by renaming the Union for a Popular Movement). Under the leadership of Laurent Wauquiez, the party knew that center-right voters wanted a conservative Catholic response to questions of national identity. Wauquiez embraced the claim made by a leader of the previous incarnation of the Republicans, François Fillon (prime minister 2007–2012) that the Christian tradition of secular France was eroding. Moreover, Wauquiez also championed the idea that it is wrong to admit culpability for pastcolonization. Like Marine Le Pen, Wauquiez aims to decolonize the discourse of decolonization and stands for a strict defense of an unblemished French national narrative at all costs.244 Tis yearning for a French national identity is accompanied by a much more contested and ambivalent approach with respect to feminism and gay rights. Indeed, whereas the Gaullist right is clear about their rejection

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of gay rights, the populist right is paradoxically divided on this point. Te National Front seems to emulate the Dutch Far Right in embracing individual rights and women’s rights. Tis is more apparent than real. Te traditionalist Catholic rank and fle of the party is still strong, represented by people like Bruno Gollnisch and Marie-Christine Arnautu (deputy leader of the party), and even by Marine Le Pen’s niece Marion Maréchal–Le Pen (who is widely seen as more socially conservative than her aunt). All reject gay marriage as well as abortion. Maréchal–Le Pen, a potential future leader, attacks “a global economy that turns foreign workers into slaves and throws domestic workers out of jobs” and “extol[s] the virtues of tradition.”245 At the same time, though, we perceive clear demonstrations of gay support for the National Front, something not seen before. Te magazine Tetu’s Mister Gay 2015 revealed that he is a member of the National Front, and in general the “homosexual lobby” is respected by this part of the Far Right. From a tactical perspective, Marine Le Pen wants to modernize the political discourse of the party by including homosexuals. However, she does not want to lose the Catholic conservative voters of the National Front to the conservative right represented by the Républicains. In a speech in Fréjus in September 2017, Marine Le Pen set out her worldview in clear terms. Her vision is of a Gallic France, defned in ethnic terms and by her version of a secularity privileging Christianity. In her mind, Gallic and Christian France is in a struggle against liberalism, the latter expressed in multiculturalism and in European institutions. Te question, thus, is whether a true republicanism can stand its ground against the march of the “true” ethnic French, represented by the National Front and nowadays also by parts of the Gaulliste conservative right of les Républicaines. Can supporters of laïcité as a national identity reestablish a national republican worldview that is neither Christian nor multicultural while being inclusive toward nonwhite France? Traditionally, republican conservatives and socialists, despite their political rift, had a common belief in national integration and assimilation. Both thought that Muslims could integrate into the secular republic.246 Both condemned denigration of the French Muslim community by associating it with the madness of terrorism. Te French left and right mainstreams have been clear that the status of Islam was not in question if it accommodated the values of a secular democratic society.247 Tis consensus shows signs of crumbling. Activists of the Far Right and part of the conservative right today fault the secular republic for submission to Islam. But a wide variety of liberals and socialists criticize the

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republic for not being open enough to Muslims. Both camps, from their diferent perspectives, see in France an uninterrupted path of national decay and ask if a refurbished republicanism can be reconstructed. Conclusion: A Post-laïcité Republican Contract?

Te republic is collapsing. Tis pessimistic view has been almost ubiquitous in France since 2000, and heated discussion on the nature of French republican identity and the question of decadence has dominated French political debate. In 2010, the historian Pierre Nora suggested that France was experiencing “shrinking horizons, the atomization of the life of the mind, and national provincialism.”248 Éric Zemmour, a television debater and polemicist, also forecast the collapse of France’s postwar political order in his 2014 Le suicide français, (Te French suicide), and Alain Finkielkraut confrms the long process of France’s decay in his 2013 L’identité malheureuse (Te unhappy identity). France would either be defeated by Islam or be overtaken by the populist radical Right. As if that were not enough, Michel Onfray’s best-selling Decadence: Te Life and Death of the JudeoChristian Tradition, marks the stages of Western decline. It goes through early Christian history, the French Revolution, then the Holocaust, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 1989 fatwa against Salman Rushdie, which Onfray says “prefgured the 2015 attacks at the French satirical journal Charlie Hebdo.”249 Perhaps the most dramatic picture of the future is provided by Michel Houellebecq’s Submission (2015), a novel published on the morning of the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, and his subsequent Serotonin, which captures the new moment of the Yellow Vest rebellion.250 In Submission, Houellebecq, hardly an Islamophobe but certainly a Francophobe, created a plot in which an Islamist president is elected in France, against a backdrop of a general collapse of Enlightenment values. Te Islamization of France appears to be the necessary conclusion of republican decadence. From a very diferent perspective, Emmanuel Todd took aim at the discriminatory republic, suggesting that there are no diferences between the racism of the populist right and the discriminatory character of leftist French republicanism. Like other liberals across the world, he claims that France, through the law of laïcité, discriminates directly against Muslims, thus creating resentment.251 We show in this chapter, however, that France is really not collapsing

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or surrendering to Islam. France’s uncompromising laïcité, defned as a national identity and believing in full integration of the Other into its national narrative, has been much more inclusive than supposed by its critics. As Olivier Roy (a wholehearted critic of republican laïcité) points out, most Muslims are well integrated. It is, for instance, an unassailable fact that in France far more Muslims are enrolled in the police and security forces than are involved in the jihad.252 At least until the beginning of the second decade of this century, French republicanism has been relatively successful in integrating Muslim citizens if we take into consideration that France has the highest number of Muslims in Europe and that its laws of secularism could be considered inhospitable to Muslims. Although in some ways this view of the laws is accurate, still the full picture is much more ambivalent. A poll by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project in 2011 determined that 64 percent of the French population had a favorable opinion of Muslims—the same rate as in the United Kingdom. Another poll found that about two-thirds of non-Muslim French people (66 percent) say they would accept a Muslim in their family, compared with just over half of British people (53 percent). Furthermore, if even we acknowledge the tremendous tension between France and its Muslim citizens over France’s secular identity, an IFOP poll in 2016 found that just under 30 percent of France’s 3 million to 4 million Muslims reject the country’s secular laws, which means that 70 percent at least accept them.253 Tese fndings were corroborated by a more recent study conducted by David Jacobson and Natalie D. Deckard in 2014. Tey surveyed 2,810 Muslims in diferent parts of the world. After evaluating 800 responses in France and the United Kingdom, we see that there is a larger pattern of negative feelings against their country and against the West among British Muslims than among French Muslims. According to the report, the conditional republican model of assimilation seems to be the most efective for integrating Muslim minorities.254 Finally, although a great part of the French non-Muslim population casts suspicion on the Muslim capacity to integrate, France is the country with the largest percentage who believe Muslims want to adopt national customs: 45 percent think French Muslims want to embrace the French way of life, while 72 percent of Germans and 69 percent of Spaniards see Muslims as wanting to be distinct from society.255 Furthermore, according to the annual report of the Collectif contre l’islamophobie (Collective against Islamophobia) in France, Islamophobia peaked in 2015 and

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decreased by 35 percent, as measured by Islamophobic acts, in 2016.256 Tis decrease continued in 2017. However, the fndings that show that a large part of France believes in Muslims’ integration into French society, mostly as individuals, contrasts with the fndings of an IFOP survey for Le Journal du Dimanche, which found that 61 percent of the French believe there is no compatibility between Islam and French values and that 78 percent of the respondents believe that French secularism is threatened by Muslims. With almost half the French population thinking that Muslims can be integrated and adopt French culture but still more than half of French believing that Islam is not compatible with French values, a frst conclusion would be that many French people accept Muslims as individuals but fnd it hard to accept Islam as a religious practice. But it should be noted that these numbers are distributed unevenly between political camps. Indeed, France has a political divide. Sixty-three percent of les Républicain sympathizers and 62 percent of National Front sympathizers considered the values of Islam incompatible with France’s national values. Seventy-three percent of the Socialist Party and 58 percent of la République en Marche, founded in 2016 by Macron, presented the opposite picture.257 Is integration actually succeeding against all odds? Are the parameters of what integration means shared by French Muslims and the rest of the French population? Can Muslims be separated from their religious practice? Related questions are: What are the values of French society, and how can a Muslim be integrated into them? Should the accent be placed on economic integration? Could a more open and tolerant appraisal of laïcité help integration? Even supporters of civic integration policies, such as Dominique Schnapper, understand that it is important to distinguish between integration as a process that depends on social conditions and integration as a requirement to conform to existing standards.258 People who do not participate in social life for economic reasons would reject civic integration. Tis relates to the three central issues of the 2010s that were prominent during the 2017 electoral campaign. Te frst is the transformation of the job market in France (which, indirectly, could make jobs available to the unemployed youngsters of the banlieues). Te second is Islam as a political ideology, and the third is laïcité as a national identity. Te three issues are interconnected and related to how France can integrate the Other. Te frst issue arose in the confrontation between Macron and Marine Le Pen in the second round of the 2017 French elections. Macron’s suc-

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cess in the second round symbolized a victory for a pro-European, proglobal agenda, as well as a triumph of liberal economics. Whether this new agenda can resist a backlash from la France d’en-bas, still dependent on the old republican socioeconomic model, is unknown. Te problem is that “the ‘modèle français,’ based on [a regulated economy and] an interventionist state oriented towards . . . social cohesion,”259 might be unsustainable for a postindustrial society and for the integration of the banlieues’ immigrant population into society. As some authors wryly conclude, to promote a social republic open to the socioeconomic inclusion of French Muslims, the best formula for France would be to shift from a centralized economy to a pre-Trump open U.S. economy.260 From an ideological and political perspective, what does this lead to? Have France’s old debates of the postwar era that featured confrontation between supporters of the Soviet bloc opposing capitalism and workers against their employers become irrelevant today?261 Te ideological confrontation may be over, but the social confrontation is not. It takes a more complicated form, as was expressed by the neither right nor left rebellion of the Yellow Vests. No Muslims from the banlieues were included in the rebellion of France’s periphery. Observers may rightly question whether this is a “Le Pen-ization” of the white working class. Two novels, Houellebecq’s Serotonin and Didier Eribon’s Return to Reims, and the sociological study of geographer Christophe Guilluy, La France périphérique, give a picture of the possible earthquake ahead. Te implications of such an earthquake are far reaching. Te radical Right would become the champion of a national working class and of French identity, against liberal globalizers, technocrats, and immigrants. Te problem for globalizers like Macron is not only socioeconomic but also cultural. Can a new republicanism be created out of the high-tech bourgeoisie, fnancial capitalists, and immigrants? Can a new democratic identity, neither multicultural nor ethno-organic, be established through this socioeconomic alignment? Te political fate of French republicanism will likely be decided in the practical resolution of this question. Macron’s government seeks to recast France’s secular, republican model into one in which minorities, especially citizens of Arab and Muslim descent, would feel more at ease. Macron, infuenced by his mentor Paul Ricoeur, endorses the idea of an open laïcité, which separates state and church without denying the role of religion in enriching the public debate. Furthermore, Macron recognizes the clear maladies of French colonialist history. Macron may open the gates for a new dialogue with the Muslim community and open

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economic opportunities for the banlieues. But pressure from the populist right is pushing him to endorse nationalist postures. Macron has a tough attitude toward immigration. He has doubled the incarceration time for those arriving without papers, accepts fewer refugees, implemented measures for deportation of radicals, and put in place a strong response to terrorism, radicals, and terrorist suspects.262 An antiterrorist law giving the security services extensive power to raid, detain, and question terrorist suspects, and even shut down mosques, has been voted in. To prove he is serious, Macron expelled from France the Muslim preacher Hadi Doudi, France’s leading proponent of fundamentalist Islam. Te message is clear: a moderate, co-opted, and nationalized Islam is acceptable, and Salafsm, regardless if it leads to terrorism, will be relentlessly pursued. In a Montpellier speech before the 2017 elections, Macron said French Muslims should always be more proud of being French than of being Muslim. Whereas for Catholics, Protestants, or Jews this statement may not create discomfort, for Muslims who consider themselves members of a global community, it might be too much to ask and impossible to fulfll.263 Macron aspires to reshape Islam in France and make it compatible with French republican ideals. France has no reason to be in confict with Islam, insists the president. Is this possible? Would a domesticated Islam represent the interests of the Muslim silent majority? Liberal critics have accused the president of adopting right-wing policies that afect French Muslims, whereas the Far Right sees this new approach as shortsighted. If we heed how the contrasting political forces of Macron, the Yellow Vests, and the left-wing Luc Melenchon’s Insoumises refect on immigration and national identity, we might assume that a basic consensus still stands on these issues. A deeper look into the Yellow Vest protests, for example, shows that, even without a unifying ideological line, they have advanced some proposals regarding immigration and integration that ftted with those of the president. Te Yellow Vests demand that “a real integration policy be implemented. Living in France means becoming French (French language course, History of France course and civic education course with certifcation at the end of the course).”264 Tat position does not difer from Luc Melenchon’s Insoumisses. Tis consensus is based on an uncompromising struggle against universal racism but also against multiculturalism and Muslim religious or cultural rights. Because it understands the problem of immigration from an electoral perspective, progressive politics is doomed

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if it exists only to promote the interests of the middle classes. Macron remarks that “the middle classes are not bothered by [immigration]. . . . Te working classes have to live with it.”265 Macron is insinuating what has been became clear to all—there is a clash between the interests of the working class and immigrants, and progressive politics must address the question of immigration. Te liberal and Europeanist Macron is beginning to understand that room to maneuver in France is very limited with respect to the economy and identity. His liberal approach probably represents the furthest a French republican can go on integration of newcomers in general and on Islam in particular.

Conclusion

Tis book has two aims. Te frst is to explain and demystify the debate about Islam in Europe. Te second is to trace the ideological and institutional developments that, we suggest, are a response to the ideological and cultural challenges posed by the new generation of Europeanized Muslims. Our historical and institutional analysis focuses on the interaction between the state and its Muslim citizens in the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands and attempts to dismantle the two central theses that have until now dominated the European conversation about Islam. Te frst thesis claims that there is an unbridgeable gap between a nonassimilable Islam and liberal democratic societies. Tis thesis sees civic integration of Muslims as unfeasible, regardless of the state’s eforts. Consequently, its followers seek an end to immigration and endorse the populist radical Right’s demand that Muslims be banished from Europe.1 Te second thesis opposes the frst, suggesting that the only real impediment to the integration of Muslims in Europe has been the failure of Western understanding. Te West has failed to live up to its multicultural commitments to cultural recognition and to remain free of bias and prejudice. Tis impediment is mainly due to fears of terrorism and of cultural change. Tis second thesis does not assume that particular problems exist between Islam and Western democracies. Te new generation of Westernborn Muslims, who have already embarked on a process of religious reform, should be looked on as partners with, not challengers to, Western societies. Consequently, as several commentators argue, Western liberal societies, especially European ones, should shift from a comprehensive or principled liberalism to a more culturally open liberalism, laying the groundwork for an overlapping consensus of diferent conceptions of the good. 308

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Tose who stress the incompatibility of Islam and the West are convinced that Europe either will be Islamized or will deteriorate into a civil war for which it is not prepared. Tose who hold a positive view of Islam suggest that Western democracies are not doing enough to prevent this clash. Tey argue that, whether because of colonial-like wars such as those being waged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine or because of intolerance of cultural diferences in general and the Islamic religion in particular, Western societies in Europe have chosen a path of collision with the most signifcant minority in Europe. Te frst thesis blames Western societies for adopting multiculturalism, which embodies a relativist perception of Western values. Te second thesis suggests that a comprehensive liberalism cannot provide the answers to religious diversity, especially in the case of Islam. In Ian Buruma’s view, which echoes the thinking of a wide variety of liberals worldwide, functioning democracies should not promote shared values or get involved in theological afairs.2 Democracies promoting common liberal and national values for all, and demanding that religious minorities such as Muslims accept them as dominant, would certainly lead to a cultural clash. To Emanuel Adler, one of the most difcult questions currently facing Europe is whether Western society can integrate the Muslim Other in its midst as “self ” without ceasing to be itself.3 How Europe can integrate its Muslim citizens without losing its historical cultural identity is one of the urgent problems of our time. Anchored in this dilemma, this book accepts the premise that Europe can integrate Muslims without losing its cultural identity. Our frst thesis is that despite current tensions, there is no inherent clash between Muslims and Western societies. Yet the interconnection between an assertive Islamic identity and liberal multiculturalism leads us to the second thesis, which claims that Islam has merely exposed the preexisting fragility of multiculturalism. In contrast to both Ian Buruma’s theory of integration and Christian Joppke’s demand for the need of a multiculturalism of the individual,4 we suggest that demanding that newcomers and religious minorities accept the supremacy of a liberal and national public sphere that enhances a national, liberal, and pro-LGBTQ agenda is morally and strategically compelling. If liberal elites stick to the multicultural rights of religious minorities, sustained by unelected institutions like constitutional courts, independent bureaucratic institutions, or international organizations—turning their countries into places where individual rights are upheld but the views of the people are ignored5—then the resurgence of the populist right cannot be avoided.

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Indeed, mainstream politicians across Europe are having to come to terms with the rise of radical anti-immigration parties, which are gaining ground throughout the Continent and the United Kingdom. What is to be done? Te answer seems to be that “a strong emphasis on cultural assimilation is justifed. . . . Tis will make liberals squeamish. But ignoring the warnings sent by the rising far right would be far more dangerous.”6 Tis assertion might be considered populist since it seems to say that liberals must endorse the discourse of the populist right to survive politically. We suggest, however, that ignoring the right’s warnings is much more problematic. Most populist right-wing movements do not believe in democratic integration. Tey indirectly might favor multiculturalism, but that is because they believe it ultimately works for exclusion rather than inclusion. For reasons that strongly contrast with those of right-wing populists, we are in favor of, and believe in, cultural integration and ethnic equality under a dominant national-cultural ethos. Even more important than success in integration is that the defense by liberals of a national-cultural ethos constitutes a last-ditch efort to combat growth of the right-wing presence in the public sphere. Tere is, though, much more to this defense than fear of the populist right. We give our moral support to the state’s active role in promoting a liberal conception of the good and in linking it to a national narrative. We endorse this civic integration for two additional reasons. Te frst is that integration can never work if the host society does not feel secure about its own national identity. Precisely because identities are social constructions and modern citizens have multiple identities, a synthesis between nationalism and a principled liberalism (a synthesis that some scholars might consider illiberal) is needed to allow diferent cultural groups to participate in the political community. Adopting nationalism must seem backward; however, as we have outlined in this book, modern European national identities are the product of a long journey of struggles and political compromises that fnally led to the privatization of religion, the end of political authoritarianism, and the achievement of liberal rights. Today, a diverse majority of Europeans understand national identity as underwriting of liberal rights, which are also of vital importance for newcomers. Te second reason for favoring civic integration, embedded in the frst, is that, although nationalism was rightly discredited in the aftermath of World War II, today it constitutes a barrier against burgeoning racism. Looking to nationalism as a solution might seem problematic in the current political climate. Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the

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increasing electoral power of several national populist movements across Europe are proof to some that there is no liberal nationalism; there is only an exclusionist, even fascistic, nationalism. Tat a bad nationalism can be distinguished from and combated by a good nationalism might sound bizarre. It might be too late, but this is the only path left to follow, as we suggest in this book. Taking this path is not only politically viable but also morally compelling. Indeed, we show in our analysis that precisely this conditional inclusion makes possible the incorporation of the great majority of the European Muslim population. As we have seen, the three countries examined are steadily shifting from a liberalism that promotes procedural tolerance to a liberalism that prescribes autonomy and reason over faith and that is intimately related to a benign type of nationalism. We emphasize that these two versions of liberalism are not mutually exclusive. Although the United Kingdom since the Brexit referendum may contradict this spirit of liberal tolerance, and a growing intolerance of immigration may suggest that we are moving toward a more nativist nationalism, we still suggest that a postmulticultural consensus does not in fact amount to nativist nationalism. A color-blind, postmulticultural integration is the formula to block nativist nationalism. In short, we suggest that the intense and incessant debate about what Islam really is and whether it is compatible with European democracy is misguided. Tat Muslims experience Islam as an intrinsically public matter and place their religious identity above national identities does not make Muslims intrinsically antidemocratic. It does, though, without a doubt, transform Muslims into a challenging Other. Te response to this challenge has been the reassertion of what has been the dominant trend for years in Europe, the requirement that religion be placed out of the public sphere. Indeed, as Brian Barry explains, the political model of religion in Europe was “developed in response to the wars of religion that made much of Europe a living hell in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. If it could bring those conficts to an end—and on the whole it did—it is not at all apparent why it should not be up to the task of coping with religious and cultural diferences now.”7 Religion or Identity? The Muslim Quest for Cultural Recognition

Should Western democracies deal with Muslims as an exceptional case? Should the West distinguish between assimilable and Westernized Mus-

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lims, with whom a dialogue is possible, and nonassimilable Muslims? Many Muslims in Europe undoubtedly feel on the defensive. Te question is whether there is another course of action for Western democracies other than national civic integration. Expert scholars of Islamic political thought argue that Muslim membership in any non-Muslim polity is usually problematic. Life under a strict secular regime is unacceptable to many. Te concept of fqh al aqaliyyat (minority jurisprudence), or rules for the daily life of Muslims in the West, gives a glimpse into the basic provisions. Muslims must live under a particular frame of law that has to be accepted or at least tolerated by Western societies.8 Although the example of Rowan Williams, the archbishop of Canterbury who proposed giving a legal framework to sharia courts, may give some hope to Muslims, in reality the prevailing forces are against Williams’s proposals. Tis reality may confrm Sayyid Qutb’s claim that “it is . . . too naïve to think that Muslims and other religious groups in the West can ever join forces to support religion in general against unbelievers and atheists,”9 especially since religious people in Western countries will most likely join secularists and atheists in their struggle against Islam.10 Tis account predicts a clash between Westerners and Muslims in Europe because of an inherent confict over the role and centrality of religion in the public sphere. Religion is a central theme separating Muslims from the rest of Europeans. However, sociological fndings about the new generation of young Western Muslims and their mobilization paints a diferent picture regarding the centrality of religion. Te Muslim public has an understanding of Islam that is not theological but is novel, individualized, and de-ethnicized.11 Tis does not necessarily mean that young European Muslims have a liberal concept of individualism or that they are on a path to secularization. Euro-Muslims are fully Muslim in religion and fully Western in culture.12 In this understanding of Islam, Muslims in Europe do not live under a parallel system but work for the incorporation of Islamic ethics into the existing system and advance recognition rather than toleration. Although these young Muslims are rattling the gates of the cultural ghetto with a self-perception as equal partners in Western societies, they are not ready to accept Western secular society as it is presented to them. Are Western European democracies ready to accept this challenge? As we have remarked, most Europeans (with the exception of voters from the radical Right), even those willing to show cultural tolerance toward Islam, do not believe that Islamic ethics could contribute to the current system of individual rights. Tus, the question reduces to whether Western societies

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should recognize Islam as a shareholder in their countries and what political ramifcations this entails. Two arguments are invoked in promoting recognition of Islam. In the normative argument, an overlapping consensus of diferent concepts of the good and a shift from liberal tolerance to cultural recognition of the Other are the basis for a more just democracy. Citizenship in this sense should not be a monistic transcendent identity that is completely separate from other identities important to citizens. Moreover, a shift to cultural recognition would open an interesting debate on colonialism and lead to fairer compensation for Europe’s cultural imperialism. In this continuous struggle, the losers demand restitution for the aggression and theft perpetrated by the winners. Intellectuals and scholars such as Tariq Ramadan, Bhikhu Parekh, and Tariq Modood would add that recognition of Islam may contribute to social and cultural peace. Some scholars even suggest that this is not an extreme demand on Western societies, since most of them are hybrids of earlier constructions, and so interaction with Islam is merely a continuation of their evolution. Justin Gest recommends that European states be more accepting, explaining that the identity crisis in the West cannot be resolved by clinging to a pristine national culture and identity.13 Te fear of catastrophic developments in societies as a result of their denying their distinctiveness as multicultural societies is the second argument. As Jacob Levy’s book title suggests, even if we do not endorse multiculturalism of convictions, we should endorse “multiculturalism of fear.”14 However, Europe tends to endorse civic national integration out of conviction and also (in opposition to Levy’s formula) out of fear of the advancement of radical populist nationalism. What Is at Stake?

Danger lies ahead. More Islamist terrorist attacks will come. Demands for collective punishment will lead to the undermining of civil liberties. Te left, opposing racism and supporting compassion for refugees, will demand more open-minded policies and more multiculturalism, so as not to play into the hands of jihadists who want civil war. Tis will help the populist, xenophobic right, which will continue to surge. Or would the opposite occur? Might a shift in policies from multiculturalism to civic integration mitigate the popular tendency against immigration and toward the radical Right?

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We do not have a clear answer—and to a certain extent civic integration may legitimate the right—but we maintain that extreme nationalism can be contained only through another type of nationalism, a democratic one that synthesizes security methods and a strong claim for integration of minorities into a national culture. Te three countries discussed in this book seem to share this nationalist premise that is based in belief that cultural tolerance can be accepted but cultural recognition should be dismissed. European political elites are facing three political options with respect to the challenge of the Muslim Other. Te frst option is to remain devoted to a liberal policy that ensures rights and accommodates the Other under a thin and fragile concept of citizenship. Te second option, contrasting with the frst, is to endorse exclusionist indigenous ethnic identities. Right-wing populist movements, despite their tactical endorsement of civic integration, favor this second choice, which promotes recognition and exclusion of the Other. Te third option is all-inclusive, disregarding race or religion, but has cohesive conditions and obligations. Te national narrative defended by most European liberal political elites focuses on the civic, liberal, and social rights achieved in the long struggle to relegate religion to the private sphere and in the struggle against fascism. Tese struggles, which stretched from the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, laid the foundation for modern liberal society and formed the basis of the Enlightenment. Despite individual diferences, most European countries have arrived at a middle ground in which their national characteristics constitute local versions of a universal idiom of liberal democracy.15 Tis middle ground is a shared culture that nurtures the twin developments of democracy and social justice.16 One of the direct implications of a national public culture is that the state will not be culturally neutral. Its role is to make social citizens. As stated by Herman van Gunsteren, one consequence of the debate on integration has been a shift from understanding civility as a political concept to understanding it as a social concept, a trend encouraged by increased state involvement.17 Tis depolarization of civility asserts that individuals have to be integrated into society and local culture before they can present themselves in the political arena. A liberal system thus “places special weight on those values that are characteristically liberal: individual liberty, toleration and so forth.”18 Te republican community serves as a guarantee for a liberal pluralist vision that encourages personal autonomy. Reasonably enough, the virtues of this national republican trend are

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questioned. A wide variety of liberals criticize it. Even some who advocate a community of communities framed by liberal principles suggest that those values should not include personal autonomy because of the inherently sectarian nature of such a belief.19 A principled liberalism might harm cultural or religious groups that should be protected by the liberal state even if they themselves are nonliberal communities.20 We contend that opposition to enlightened liberal autonomy stems not only from multicultural or reformist liberals but also from conservative communitarians. Te latter suggest that a national community needs a substantial conception of the good, which is lacking in a liberal society. Ethnic nationalism, or a shared ethno-national culture, may provide such a substantial conception of the good. At the same time, an ethno-national identity could result in the closing of the community to foreigners. For ethno-nationalists, assimilating or culturally integrating the Other makes no sense, because the Other is nonassimilable. For radical right-wing parties, culture is an essence that cannot be transformed and cannot interact with other cultures in the same sociopolitical environment. Tey do not believe in assimilation, despite using the concept for political reasons. Whereas for national civic integrationists, cultural accommodation is feasible and not always a provision for inclusion. Tey believe in cultural integration or assimilation of minority cultures into the national culture of the majority. We argue that the position of national civic integrationists is morally acceptable and strategically compelling. Does the civic nationalist spirit springing up widely in the population mean that societies are becoming racist or at least exclusionist? Empirically, most European nations practicing particular universalism do not exclude all those who are the Other. In fact, thousands of immigrants from diferent ethnic backgrounds have been integrated into Europe since the 1970s. Most Western European countries are multiethnic societies, and the very idea of peoplehood includes ethnic variety, a general tolerance for cultural diference, and an openness to freedom of religion. However, when the two normative frameworks collide—freedom of religion with autonomy of the individual—the European state defends individual autonomy. Although criticisms raised by multiculturalists are compelling, we argue that only a republican democratic nationalism can stand frm against racism Civic integration presents the most cogent choice. Indeed, civic integration into a nationalist narrative is the alternative to the clash between the populist majority and the coalition of minorities promoted simultane-

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ously by populists and progressives.21 Even those who do not accept civic integration on purely moral grounds might want to accept it out of fear of the alternative. From a political perspective, although its success is not a given, civic integration is the only possible path of action to avert the potential clash between ethno-nationalists (right-wing movements) and cultural minorities (Muslims). Tis two-front challenge led to the unavoidable decisions made by several liberals from both the left and the right of the political spectrum. One decision was to refuse to let the radical Right appropriate the idea of nationalism. Individualism, Nationalism, and the Western Path to Secularity

Is Islam exceptional? Most cultural communities and ethnic groups have been integrated into Western European societies despite initial problems and economic pitfalls. However, as we have already noted, the current type of state-church separation in Europe does not promise an easy integration for Muslims. Te difculties for Muslims are complex and extensive.22 Liberalism’s stalemate with the church has forced religion into a submissive position with respect to nations, and the result has been a fourishing of democratic concepts of freedom. Tis stalemate, although not constitutionalized, is seen as essential for the present form of Western Europe’s rationality. To be more exact, Europe is not antireligious, and as we have argued, religion plays an ascendant role in European politics. As Alfred Stepan claims, at the state level virtually no Western democracy now has a rigid or hostile separation of church and state. Conficts about the place of religion were dealt with using public arguments and negotiations between communities and the state. Tis continues to be true. As we have shown, a constant dialogue between governments and Muslim communities is being held in Europe. Tis is clearly expressed in Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty, which ensures that EU members enjoy the full range of religious options, from strict secularity as in France to state churches such as those in England, Denmark, and Greece.23 However, by afrming that policies that regulate religious manifestations in public institutions are allowed, the European Court of Human Rights elevates state secularity over religious freedom. Tus, states may be allowed to limit religious signs (among other things) in public employment as well.24 Most European countries are on a gradient between what Stepan’s typology defnes

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as “secular but friendly to religion” and “unfriendly secularism legislated by majority.”25 In summarizing how the two types work together, we might say that the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are friendly to religion in general but are increasingly unfriendly toward certain manifestations of Muslim culture and religion. France, despite becoming more open to the needs of religious groups, is still basically unfriendly to religion or, more precisely, unfriendly to religious ostentation in the public sphere. In other words, we see an increasing reluctance from Europeans to accept Muslim voices and Muslim symbols in the public sphere and an increasing number of Europeans decidedly not ready to limit freedom of speech in order to prevent criticism of Islam. Although the idea of religious freedom is preserved, the dominant idea is that religious communities should bend to European society and live according to hegemonic cultural values. Religious communities should not expect societies to engage in a dialogue of mutual change regarding spiritual or religious institutional accommodation. Tis means that Islam will become increasingly centralized, localized, and independent of foreign infuence (especially of foreign imams). As Yvonne Haddad and Tyler Golson astutely note, the goal of the state with regard to Muslims is the same as it was previously with Catholics and Jews: to ensure that these communities have an ultimate allegiance to the nation and its secular law and to separate the individual’s private identity and obligations from his or her public civic identity.26 Tus, despite diferences in the three countries examined, we identify in all of them a clear attempt to enact a “strategy of privatization” of religion. Tis approach of “relegating religion to the private sphere . . . fails to accommodate all those whose beliefs include the notion that religion ought to have public expression.”27 Privatization of religion and of liberal rights are both ideas embedded in current European democratic national identities that have been crafted through struggles that aim to restrict religion to the private sphere. Does this include Islam? As we have noted throughout, this is not impossible. However, Islam lacks some important developments that place it at odds with the Western conception of justice: the experience of nationalism as a bearer of democratic values, the placement of secular reason in the political arena as superior to religion, and the acceptance of the independence of secular from sacred knowledge. Tese missing milestones contribute to the challenge of integrating Muslims into liberal democratic societies. Consequently, observers may argue that civic integration policies

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make the lives of Muslims even harder in these societies. In what promises to be a difcult process, civic integration policies now try to reproduce the absent foundational experiences we have identifed in order to inform Muslims’ understanding of liberal democracies. Spinning History and Culture into a National Fabric

Civic integration does not replicate the harsh cultural assimilation à la française, which is indiferent to the individual. In contrast to the compulsory nature of the old assimilation, civic integration includes a notion of choice, in which the individual is encouraged but not required to adjust to social conventions through state policies that provide incentives. Most importantly, civic integration and the current twenty-frstcentury democratic revival of nationalism occur in the historical context of pluralist and individualized societies. French, British, and Dutch citizenships cannot be based on narrow and highly contested ethnic and religious self-defnitions; rather, they are based on liberal defnitions, which impose obligations that most cultures can accept. In diferent ways and by diferent paths, the three very distinct societies we have examined are moving toward similar goals. Muslim organizations are being included, mosques and imam training are being provided or regulated by the state, and national curricula are being implemented in all public and private schools.Te instruments of nationalization or domestication require Muslim organizations to show respect for the rule of law. Tis is largely accomplished through the establishment of technical working groups, which include Muslims of diferent afliations and state representatives, and through the nomination of a representative council that can serve as an interlocutor in state-church afairs.28 Te French Council of the Muslim Faith (Conseil français du culte musulman) and the Muslim Council of Britain are examples of such organizations. In the Netherlands, the task of Islamic nationalization has generally been relegated to the municipal level.In essence, the new model dictates that, to preserve a multiethnic society, some shared cultural bonds must be strengthened. As we suggest, synthesis of the three countries’ models clearly leads to the French idea of republican integration. Some liberals, including the authors of the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index, believe naturalization of immigrants would harm integration. However, in France—the country where the process of naturalizing immigrants is most

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strict—sociocultural integration on the individual level and identifcation of immigrants with the country is greatest.29 One might be surprised to hear that where civic integration policies are strongest, Muslims feel most integrated into the national ideal. Muslims themselves can best explain the inclusive nature of civic integration policies. Ironically, as this book shows, the French secular republic is doing better in proving that Islam and Western democracies are not incompatible. Despite its shortcomings, we suggest that the French republican model and institutions are the best suited to maintaining an equilibrium between nationalism and diversity. Muslims as Jews?

Some hold that Muslims are sufering the same kind of discrimination suffered by Jews in the past. Some argue that the discussion regarding the discrimination and racism against Jews that ultimately led to the Holocaust can be resurrected to shed light on the present-day situation of Muslims in Europe. Tis is a compelling claim that deserves attention. Are the two cases comparable? Raymond Taras suggests that Islamophobia “becomes a cryptic articulation of race and racism.”30 Islamophobia is racism even if on the surface it appears to be prejudice against religion. It could be argued that we are confronting a new racism without a genetic basis. Tere is an overlap between older and newer forms: “Some—though not all—of the mechanisms that trigger antipathy towards Jews underlie today’s hostility towards Muslims.”31 Te forms difer also in terms of results. For several scholars, Islamophobia should be perceived as a type of diferentialist or refective racism. In the words of Michel Wieviorka, racism relates to “the incapacity of some people to manage diference, but also with their incapacity to cope with the resemblance with the Other, the foreigner and, also, women.”32 Tis claim draws on Frantz Fanon’s observation that the colonizer and the colonized cannot escape each other. Teir subjectivities mirror each other’s hates and fears. Te perception of radical diference transmutes into a dialectical mirroring of violence, inhumanity, and self-denial. Talal Asad suggests that the essence of Europe’s “civilizational identity” has been constructed by destabilizing Islam (in an ongoing efort to “restructure the lives of non-European peoples . . . compell[ing] them to abandon old practices and turn to new ones”), rendering it as a completely diferent

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civilization from Europe’s.33 Te important point is that liberal Europeans believe that they can integrate Islam, as Jews have been integrated. Islam must thus be de-essentialized and secularized because it threatens Western civilization by evoking its own past. Islam brings into question “metanarratives of Western modernity.”34 Wendy Brown and Gil Anidjar suggest that the European attempt to strip Islam of its essence places Islam in a position similar to that of Judaism. Islam and Judaism have a common history of exclusion, assimilation, and subjection to state policies of exemption in the face of emergencies and political enemies. Whereas Islam is presented as an external enemy, Jews were presented as an internal enemy. Tey were presented as polarized enemies of each other and common enemies of Europe.35 To shore up the connection between the theological and the political, Europe needs an enemy that has not been harmonized into or accepted as part of Europe’s theological heritage. Islam provided this enemy. Tere was an inherent European need to maintain Islam as an enemy and to continue detheologization. Islam is thus constructed as devoid of theology. It is denied ontological grounding in the theological, and without that grounding, it cannot progress fully into the political. As a result, it is not only the political enemy but also the enemy of the political.36 According to Wendy Brown, Jews experienced a similar process. Tey were frst detheologized and then assimilated. Te process was emancipation, assimilation, and decorporatization as Jews and then reincorporation into the nation-state as citizens, although they were still identifed as diferent.37 Te process started with stripping Jews of their religion and ended with their racialization. Tat is, because they had assimilated and looked like most gentiles, it was necessary to racialize them to maintain diference. Te discourse of race enabled Jews to retain a Jewish identity.38 Some say that Muslims have undergone a similar transformation. In the “creeping shariʽa” scaremongering, we can perceive the same forces that promoted classical anti-Semitism.39 Te secular Muslim subject emerges when Muslims use secularism to varying degrees to protect themselves from the European stigmas of ethnicity and religion. Te challenges from Jews and Muslims to European national identities manifest in very diferent ways. Emancipation, assimilation, and decorporatization as Jews in the new Western democracies were welcomed by the great majority of Jews, who found in modernity a way to open the gates of the cultural and religious ghetto. And although assimilated or emanci-

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pated Jews were rejected by organic nationalists and the neofascist antidemocratic right, they were accepted and integrated by liberal democrats and socialists. Muslims, by contrast, while similarly rejected by right-wing racists, have in addition presented a challenge to liberals and socialists. Integrating the Jew was taken to be one of the most important, and successful, tasks of enlightened democrats dating back to the eighteenth century. Te democratic nationalism emanating from the French Revolution and the privatization of religion were totally accepted by the enlightened Jew, for whom the opening up of the ghetto was a blessing rather than a burden. Te Jew appeared to be the authentic and quintessential citizen of the national democratic republic. As Dominique Schnapper notes, cosmopolitan “Jews became the real . . . French.”40 Although not every European country followed the path of the French Revolution and its idea of national citizenship, the debate between democratic republicans and racists in France demonstrates the diferent ideological attitudes toward Jews that were once prevalent in Europe. In a broad sense, democrats felt that the inclusion of Jews ftted the ideal of a democratic nation. Enemies of the democratic state, including integral Catholics, organic nationalists, and racists, in several cases attacked democracy by attacking the Jews. Racism served as a weapon against the worst of all democratic inventions: assimilation of the Jew. Since assimilation was associated with the democratic integration of Jews, the enemies of the republic used racism as a weapon against it. Racist nationalists despised the national democratic revolution because they saw it as repressing authentic cultural traditions in order to grant rights to assimilated Jews. Tese nationalists hated Jews precisely because they represented a personality able to adapt itself to the nation. Racist nationalists despised the idea of democratic assimilation, and so they despised the assimilated Jew. Conversely, Jews were defended by democratic republicans. Tey considered Jews not only part of the democratic nation but an example of what the democratic nation could do with people against whom there was a history of discrimination. However, one has to distinguish between racism against Jews and racism against other ethnic or religious groups. Te image of Jews by the end of the nineteenth century was one of a money-grubbing, cunning, and intelligent people constantly engaged in conspiracies. Tis image is radically diferent from the racially motivated depiction of blacks from European colonies as libidinous, lazy, and primitive. Tis distinction became popular not only among intellectual elites but also the

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widespread public. It was the result of two diferent developments. One was the history of European development and colonialism and the other was the millennial tradition of Christian persecution of a deicidal minority. Until the end of World War II, anti-Semitism was experienced with greater psychic intensity, anxiety, and fear than was racism toward other groups because the Jew was an intelligent, entrenched insider. Blacks, by contrast, were painted as exotic, distant, and externally “primitive.” In his postwar notes in Glossarium, Carl Schmitt observes, “Jews remain Jews . . . while Communists can improve themselves and change.  .  .  . Te real enemy is the assimilated Jew.  .  .  . Better Hitler’s enmity than the friendship of these returning émigrés and humanitarians.”41 With this crude language, Schmitt accurately summarizes the heart of the problem. Te assimilated Jew is the representation of the humanitarian, democratic, and liberal side of the nation. Assimilation thus corrupts the nation, which could then be saved only by an organic National Socialist revolution. Te prejudices toward Jews and Muslims, respectively, displayed by Western societies triggered two distinct political processes. Jews are positioned as dangerous cosmopolitans and conspirators, but blacks and Muslims are depicted as a demographic danger. Te war against the Jews, as we have seen, empowered Nazi racism. Te challenge of Islam has triggered a diferent type of reaction. Ann Norton, among others, claims that “the Jewish question was fundamental for politics and philosophy in the Enlightenment,” but in our post-Enlightenment times, “the Muslim question has taken its place.”42 In this book, we have argued that the Muslim question is reinventing the Enlightenment and bringing it back to the fore. Tis is an enlightenment that is neither wholly inclusive nor wholly exclusive but is open to a conditional inclusion. Islam is providing the impetus for a redefnition of Europe and is laying the ground work for a second democratic renaissance in Europe.43 As noted, this national democratic renaissance is discriminatory in the sense that it enhances homosexual rights and conditions religious minorities’ integration to limit their objections to a LGTBQ agenda. At the same time, a conditioned inclusion does not imply rejection. While the populist radical Right amplifes the challenge of Islam with familiar arguments—the inassimilable self and the impossibility of Muslim integration in Western societies—a new democratic center uses the same challenge to reconstruct an inclusive democratic national identity and promote civic integration. Muslims, like any other culture and religion, can, despite difculties, be integrated. Islam is leading Europeans

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to renewed introspection—on their cultural heritage—and to a new selfawareness about their liberal and national values. We are aware that this claim can be depicted as a new form of postcolonial racism. Te attempt to de-essentialize Islam or construct the image of an assimilated Muslim is portrayed in such terms. We reject that argument and are in favor of integration in a society in which biology does not determine culture. As this book shows, this is a time for national civic integration. Although a backlash against multiculturalism, this national civic integration is not necessarily radically antidiversity. It is a response to a new discourse by Muslim intellectuals on citizenship and cultural recognition but is not against Muslims themselves. Although it is a response to the radical Right’s racism, it is not against nationalism but embraces it in a democratic form. From a strategic perspective, we frmly believe that democratic nationalism and integration into national identities is the only way to resist racist exclusionist ideologies, which as we maintain, are nourished by multicultural ideology.

Notes

Introduction 1. Gallya Lahav and Anthony Messina, “Te Limits of a European Immigration Policy: Elite Opinion and Agendas within the European Parliament,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 43, no. 4 (2005): 851. On the securitization thesis, see Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 30. According to the Copenhagen School of International Relations, there are no security issues in themselves. Tere are issues that are “securitized”—that is, they are constructed through securitization “speech acts.” See Rogers Brubaker, “Categories of Analysis and Categories of Practice: A Note on the Study of Muslims in Countries of Immigration,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 1 (2013): 3. 2. Will Hutton, “After Cologne, the Uneasy Question: Is Cultural Coexistence Still Possible?,” Te Guardian, January 10, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/ jan/10/after-cologne-attacks-british-politicians-show-share-merkel-values. 3. Rafaela Dancygier, Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018). 4. Peter Mandaville, Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma (London: Routledge, 2001), 134. See also Robert Leiken, Europe’s Angry Muslims (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 5. Yasmin Moll, “‘Beyond Beards, Scarves and Halal Meat’: Mediated Constructions of British Muslim Identity,” Journal of Religion and Popular Culture 15 (2007): 1. 6. Ralph Grillo, “Transnational Migration and Multiculturalism in Europe,” Transnational Communities Program Working Paper WPTC-01-08, April 2001, http://www.trans comm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/WPTC-01-08%20Grillo.pdf. 7. At the 1998 Berkeley symposium “Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe,” one of the main questions was whether Islam embodies a special case of citizenship. Center for Middle Eastern Studies and Center for West European Studies symposium “Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe: Culture, Politics, and Citizenship in an Era of Globalization,” University of California at Berkeley, October 15–17, 1998. As noted in a report on the symposium, conviction is widespread that “many Muslims resist Euro-American post-industrial culture on moral grounds.” However, “they often thrive in the infrastructure of globalization, which is the product of capitalism.” Laurence Michalak and Renate Holub, “Report on a

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Symposium: ‘Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe,’” ISIM Newsletter, February 1999, p. 43, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/17155/ISIM_2_Report_ on_a_Symposium_Islam_and_the_Changing_Identity_of_Europe.pdf?sequence=1. 8. Bassam Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: Democratic Peace and EuroIslam versus Global Jihad (New York: Routledge, 2008); Martin Kramer, “Fundamentalist Islam at Large: Te Drive for Power,” Middle East Quarterly, June 1996, pp. 37–49; Lee Harris, Te Suicide of Reason: Radical Islam’s Treat to the Enlightenment (New York: Basic Books, 2007); Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Infdel (New York: Free Press, 2008); John Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Gilles Kepel, Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); Gilles Kepel, Te War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Zachary Shore, Breeding Bin Ladens: American Islam and the Future of Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 9. John L. Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin, Islamophobia: Te Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), xxiii. On the individual basis of islamophobia, see Marc Helbling, ed., Islamophobia in the West: Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes (London: Routledge, 2012). See also Erik Bleich, “What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is Tere? Teorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept,” American Behavioral Scientist 55, no. 12 (2011): 1582. 10. Jytte Klausen, Te Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Jocelyne Césari, “Mosque Conficts in European Cities: Introduction,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 6 (2005): 1015–1024; Jocelyne Césari, L’Islam à l’épreuve de l’Occident (Paris: La Découverte, 2004); Jocelyne Césari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States (New York: Palgrave, 2004); Jocelyne Césari, “Muslim Minorities in Europe: Te Silent Revolution,” in Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and in Europe, ed. John L. Esposito and Francois Burgat (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003); John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Million Muslims Really Tink (New York: Gallup Press, 2007); Richard Bulliet, Te Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Alison Pargeter, Te New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 11. Jocelyne Césari, “Islam in the West: From Immigration to Global Islam,” Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 8 (2009): 147–175. 12. Arun Kundnani, Te Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism and the Domestic War on Terror (New York: Verso, 2014). 13. Bhikhu Parekh, “European Liberalism and ‘the Muslim Question,’” ISIM Paper 9, 2008, p. 21, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/12641/paper_Parekh. pdf?sequence=1. 14 . Te Rushdie afair was the heated and violent reaction of Muslims to the publication of Salman Rushdie’s novel Te Satanic Verses, published in the United Kingdom in 1988 and inspired in part by the life of Muhammad. Te fatwa declared by the Iranian ayatolah Ruholla Khomeini calling on Muslims to murder Rushdie opened a debate on the limits of free speech. Indirectly, it also highlighted the question of whether integration into Western societies should heed what minorities feel and demand. 15. Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Samuel Huntington, Te Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 16. John R. Bowen, “Beyond Migration: Islam as a Transnational Public Space,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30, no. 5 (2004): 880.

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17. Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim (Leicester, UK: Islamic Foundation, 2002), 207. Tariq Ramadan argues that “Islam, as a religious belief system, is frst a foremost a divinely revealed religion with belief in its own universal validity, which is both a way of life and a concept of life and death” (207–208). Tat condition, according to Ramadan, determines Muslims’ demands for democratic equality. See also Paul Statham, Ruud Koopmans, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy, “Resilient or Adaptable Islam?,” Ethnicities 5, no. 4 (2005): 427–459. 18. Tariq Modood, “Muslims and the Politics of Diference,” Political Quarterly 74, no. 1 (2004): 109. 19. Christian Joppke, Is Multiculturalism Dead? (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2017), 161. 20. Peter Berger, “Epistemological Modesty: An Interview with Peter Berger,” Christian Century, October 29, 1997, pp. 972–978; Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein, eds., Religion in an Expanding Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 21. Olivier Roy, La Santa Ignorancia: El Tiempo de la Religion sin Cultura (Barcelona: Peninsula, 2010), 19. See also José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Michael Minkenberg, “Religious Path Dependency? A Comparative Analysis of Patterns of Religion and Democracy and of Policies of Integration in Western Societies,” paper presented at American Political Sciences Association conference “Te Challenge of Religious Pluralism in Europe,” Chicago, August 29–September 1, 2013, p. 2. 22. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World. 23. Minkenberg, “Religious Path Dependency?,” 2. 24. Christian Joppke, “A Christian Identity for the Liberal State?,” British Journal of Sociology 64, no. 4 (2013): 597. 25. See Alfred Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Tolerations,’” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4 (2000): 37–57. 26. See Bérengère Massignon, “Islam in the European Commission’s System of Regulation of Religion,” in Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity, and Infuence, ed. Aziz Al Azmeh and Efe Fokas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 138. 27. John T. S. Madeley, “Unequally Yoked: Te Antinomies of Church-State Separation in Europe and the USA,” European Political Science 8, no. 3 (2009): 7. 28. Armando Salvatore, “Islam and the Quest for a European Identity: From Sovereignty through Solidarity to Immunity,” Politics, Religion and Ideology 14, no. 2 (2013): 254. 29. See Corey Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? How Democracies Can Protect Expression and Promote Equality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); Liav Orgad, “Illiberal Liberalism Cultural Restrictions on Migration and Access to Citizenship in Europe,” American Journal of Comparative Law 58, no. 1 (2010): 53–105; and Karl Loewenstein, “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights,” American Political Science Review 31, no. 3 (1937): 417–432. 30. Sara Goodman, “Fortifying Citizenship Policy Strategies for Civic Integration in Western Europe,” World Politics 64, no. 4 (2012): 659. 31. Jerry Muller suggests that strong communal identifcation along religious lines produces an ethno-nationalist response. Jerry Muller, “Us and Tem: Te Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” Foreign Afairs, March–April 2008, pp. 32–33. See also Michel Wieviorka, “A Critique of Integration Identities,” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 21, no. 6 (2014): 636. Raymond Taras argues that Islam has been culturalized and racialized by adherents and antagonists alike. Raymond Taras, “Islamophobia Never Stands Still: Race, Religion and Culture,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 3 (2013): 417–433. See also Pnina Werbner, “Folk Devils and Racist Imaginaries in a Global Prism,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 3 (2013): 467. 32. Mabel Berezin, “Te Normalization of the Right in Post-security Europe,” in Politics

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in the Age of Austerity, ed. Armin Schafer and Wolfgang Streeck (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2013). See also Berger, “Epistemological Modesty”; Byrnes and Katzenstein, Religion in an Expanding Europe. 33. See Frank J. Buijs and Jan Rath, “Muslims in Europe: Te State of Research,” IMISCOE Working Paper, October 2006, https://pure.uva.nl/ws/fles/4364118/68548_Muslim sinEurope_Testateofresearch.pdf; Jan Rath, Rinus Penninx, Kees Groenendijk, and Astrid Meyer, Western Europe and Its Islam: Te Social Reaction to the Institutionalization of “New Religion” in the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2001); Jeroen Feirabend and Jan Rath, “Making a Place for Islam in Politics: Local Authorities Dealing with Islamic Associations,” in Muslims in the Margin: Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in Western Europe, ed. Wasif A. R. Shadid and Sjoerd P. van Koningsveld (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1996), 243–258; Bernard Lewis and Dominique Schnapper, eds., Muslims in Europe (London: Pinter, 1994); and Wasif A. R. Shadid and Sjoerd P. van Koningsveld, eds., Religious Freedom and the Position of Islam in Western Europe: Opportunities and Obstacles in the Acquisition of Equal Rights (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1995). 34. Césari, “Muslim Minorities in Europe”; Césari, L’Islam à l’épreuve de l’Occident; Césari, When Islam and Democracy Meet; Steven Vertovec and Ceri Peach, eds., Islam in Europe: Te Politics of Religion and Community (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1997); Steven Vertovec and Alisdair Rogers, eds., Muslim European Youth: Reproducing Ethnicity, Religion Culture (London: Ashgate, 1998). 35. Joel S. Fetzer and Christopher J. Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 16. 36. Paul Statham has two working hypotheses explaining Muslim mobilization in Europe. Te frst argues that there is something intrinsic to Islam that leads to greater demands being made for public accommodation. Te second hypothesis sees mobilization as a reaction to discrimination and socioeconomic deprivation. Paul Statham, “New Conficts about Integration and Cultural Diversity in Britain,” in Te Challenge of Diversity: European Social Democracy Facing Migration, Integration, and Multiculturalism, ed. Rene Cuperus, Karl Dufek, and Johannes Kandel (Innsbruck, Austria: Studien Verlag, 2003), 126–149. 37. Justin Gest, Apart: Alienated and Engaged Muslims in the West (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 11. Gest cites Marieke Slootman and Jean Tillie, “Processes of Radicalisation: Why Some Amsterdam Muslims Become Radicals,” Institute of Migration and Ethnic Studies, October 2006, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305000725_Pro cesses_of_Radicalisation_Why_some_Amsterdam_Muslims_become_radicals. 38. Similarly, conservative and Christian democratic parties that tend to defend religious institutions also feel uncomfortable with, or even at times hostile to, Islam. See Klausen, Te Islamic Challenge. 39. See Sami Zubaida, “Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions,” Nations and Nationalism 10, no. 4 (2004): 407, cited in Edward Mortimer, Faith and Power: Te Politics of Islam (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), 271. 40. Pnina Werbner, “Divided Loyalties, Empowered Citizenship? Muslims in Britain,” Citizenship Studies 4, no. 3 (2000): 309. 41. James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985). 42. Studies of young Muslim women show how religious discourse plays an important role in negotiating and resisting parental and community restrictions. Similarly, research among young Muslim men fnds that Muslim identity provides a positive role model and an alternative to their parents’ unemployment and to the street and drug cultures in their neighborhoods. See Tufyal Choudhury, dir., Te Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation (London: OSI UK Muslim Research Project, 2007).

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43. Jocelyne Césari, “Countering the Islam vs. the West Paradigm,” Georgetown Journal of International Afairs, December 4, 2015, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/ countering-the-islam-vs-the-west-paradigm. 44. Erik Bleich, “From International Ideas to Domestic Policies: Educational Multiculturalism in England and France,” Comparative Politics 31, no. 1 (1998): 81–100. 45. Vivien Schmidt, “Taking Ideas and Discursive Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth New Institutionalism,” European Political Science Review 2 (2010): 1–25. 46. Jefrey T. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999): 93. See also Jefrey T. Checkel, “‘Going Native’ in Europe? Teorizing Social Interaction in European Institutions,” Arena Working Papers WP 01/23, 2001, https://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arenaworking-papers/2001-2010/2001/wp01_23.htm. 47. Vivien Schmidt, “Te EU and Its Member-States: From Bottom Up to Top Down,” paper presented at University Association for Contemporary European Studies conference “Refections on European Integration: 50 Years of the Treaty of Rome,” London, March 23– 24, 2007, p. 12. 48. Matthias Koenig, “Incorporating Muslim Migrants in Western Nation States—a Comparison of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany,” Journal of International Migration and Integration 6, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 226. 49. See Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). Krasner notes that globalization and state activity have moved in tandem. See also Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 50. Christian Joppke, “Te Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Teory and Policy,” British Journal of Sociology 55, no. 2 (2004): 249. See also Ralph Grillo, “Backlash against Diversity? Identity and Cultural Politics in European Cities,” Center of Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper No. 14, 2005, https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/ uploads/WP-2005-014-Grillo_Diversity_European_Cities.pdf. Nothing demonstrates this trend better than German chancellor Angela Merkel’s declaration regarding the death of multiculturalism in Germany and UK prime minister David Cameron’s devastating criticism of thirty years of multiculturalism in the United Kingdom. Oliver Wright and Jerome Taylor, “Cameron: My War on Multiculturalism,” Te Independent, February 5, 2011, https://www. independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cameron-my-war-on-multiculturalism-2205074.html. 51. Per Mouritsen, “Te Resilience of Citizenship Traditions: Civic Integration in Germany, Great Britain, and Denmark,” paper presented at European Commission Research conference “A European Approach to Multicultural Citizenship: Legal, Political and Educational Challenges,” Berlin, September 24–25, 2009. A slightly diferent position is presented in Christian Joppke, “Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe,” West European Politics 30, no. 1 (2007): 1–2. 52. On UK and French colonial experiences in comparative perspective, see Erik Bleich, “Te Legacies of History? Colonization and Immigrant Integration in Britain and France,” Teory and Society 34 (2005): 171–195. 53. Terefore, despite Germany being the world’s focus to see how it deals with the current refugee crisis and despite Germany being the leading economic force in Europe, it cannot have a leading ideological role in this book because of the synthesis of liberalism and nationalism we want to test. 54. See Arend Lijphart, Te Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 212.

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55. Tere are other models, like the German corporatist state and Scandinavian social corporatist models. See Koenig, “Incorporating Muslim Migrants.” 56. Tey difer in that France emphasizes the universal side of integration through assimilation, and the United Kingdom sees integration as management of public order. See Adrian Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain (London: Macmillan, 1998). See also Bleich, “Te Legacies of History?” 57. Rogers Brubaker, “Te Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, no. 4 (2001): 531–548. On the stability of nationalism, see Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). 58. Martin Schain, “Te Extreme Right and Immigration Policy-Making: Measuring Direct and Indirect Efects,” West European Politics 29, no. 2 (2016): 270–289; Michael Minkenberg, “Te Populist and Radical Right: Challenges to Democracy,” paper presented at the “Comparative Politics” seminar, Columbia University, October 2, 2019, p. 8. 59. See Richard Rorty, “Solidarity or Objectivity,” in Post-analytic Philosophy, ed. John Rajchman and Cornel West (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 13. 60. Césari, “Mosque Conficts in European Cities,” 1018. 61. Frank J. Buijs and Jan C. Rath, “Muslims in Europe: Te State of Research,” IMISCOE Working Paper, 2006, p. 16, https://pure.uva.nl/ws/fles/4364118/68548_Muslimsi nEurope_Testateofresearch.pdf. 62. See Juan Diez Medrano, “Te Public Sphere and the European Union’s Political Identity,” in European Identity, ed. Jefrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 82. 63. Giovanni Sartori, Pluralismo, Multiculturalismo e Estranei, Saggio Sulla Società Multietnica (Milan: Rizzoli, 2000). As Sartori explains, liberal democratic pluralism rests on an open society grounded in tolerance and consensus, wherein the domains of religion and politics are separated. Diferences are resolved by majority rule. In line with my interpretation, Christian Joppke notes that, according to Sartori, “‘pluralism’ in the political realm—next to diferenceblind laws and institutions  .  .  .—is emphatically not multiculturalism.” Christian Joppke, “Te Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State,” Russell Sage Foundation Working Paper 203, January 2003, https://www.russellsage.org/sites/all/fles/u4/Joppke_Retreat%20 of%20Multiculturalism%20in%20the%20Liberal%20State.pdf.

Chapter 1 1. Henri Pirenne, Mahomet et Charlemagne (1939; repr., Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970, 175, cited in Christian Joppke, Te Secular State under Siege: Religion and Politics in Europe and America (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2015), 134. 2. Amikam Nachmani, Haunted Presents: Europeans, Muslim Immigrants and the Onus of European Jewish Histories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), viii. 3. Carolyn M. Warner and Manfred W. Wenner, “Religion and the Political Organization of Muslims in Europe,” Perspectives on Politics, September 2006, p. 471; Bernard Lewis, Te Muslim Discovery of Europe (New York: Norton, 1982); Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Marshall G. S. Hodgson, Te Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); William Miller, Te Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801–1927 (New York: Octagon Books, 1966). 4. Jonathan Laurence, “Managing Transnational Islam: Muslims and the State in West-

Notes to 23–25

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ern Europe,” in Immigration and the Transformation of Europe, ed. Craig Parsons and Timothy M. Smeeding (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Jonathan Laurence, Te Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: Te State’s Role in Minority Integration (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); Yvonne Y. Haddad and Tyler Golson, “Overhauling Islam: Representation, Construction, and Cooption of ‘Moderate Islam’ in Western Europe,” Journal of State and Church, Summer 2007, 487–515. 5. Justin Gest, Apart: Alienated and Engaged Muslims in the West (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 55. 6. C. Allen, “Islamophobia: Contested Concept in the Public Space” (PhD diss., University of Birmingham, 2006). 7. Tariq Modood, “‘Diference,’ Cultural Racism and Anti-racism,” in Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multicultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-racism, ed. Pnina Werbner and Tariq Modood (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1997), 154–172. 8. Joseph Massad, Islam in Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 1. 9. See Jocelyne Césari, “Muslim Minorities in Europe: Te Silent Revolution,” in Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and in Europe, ed. John L. Esposito and Francois Burgat (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 251– 269; Philip Lewis, “Beyond Victimhood: From the Global to the Local, a British Case Study,” in European Muslims and the Secular State in a Comparative Perspective, ed. Jocelyne Césari (Brussels: European Commission DG Research, 2003), 82. 10. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, “Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destination,” Political Studies 60 (2012): 230. 11. Iftikhar H. Malik, Islam and Modernity: Muslims in Europe and the United States (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 107, 108. See also Robert J. Pauly Jr., Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalisation? (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004). 12. Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim (Leicester, UK: Islamic Foundation, 2002), 186. 13. Kenan Malik and other Muslim intellectuals maintain that the equality they demand means Muslims should be changing their lifestyles and family practices. Tis will occur not through legislation but through an emancipatory process. See Kenan Malik, “Race, Pluralism and the Meaning of ‘Diference,’” Redline, November 20, 2013, https://rdln.wordpress. com/2013/11/20/race-pluralism-and-the-meaning-of-diference/. 14. Peter Mandaville, Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma (London: Routledge, 2001), 121. 15. Césari, “Muslim Minorities in Europe.” 16. Césari, 260. 17. Kadir Canatan, “Turkse Islam: Perspectieven op organisatievorming en leiderschap in Nederland Turkish Islam” [Turkish Islam: Perspectives on organization and leadership in the Netherlands] (PhD diss., University of Rotterdam, 2001). See also Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 18. Olivier Roy, La Santa Ignorancia: El Tiempo de la Religion sin Cultura (Barcelona: Peninsula, 2010), 25. 19. Jorgen S. Nielsen, Toward a European Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 75. 20. Schirin Amir-Moazami and Armando Salvatore, “Gender, Generation, and the Reform of Tradition: From Muslim Majority Societies to Western Europe,” in Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe, ed. Stefano Allievi and Jorgen Nielsen (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2003), 52–77. 21. Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 47.

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22. Krishan Kumar, “Te Nation-State, the European Union and Transnational Identities,” in Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization, ed. Nezar Al Sayyad and Manuel Castells (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 60. Te hybridity of diaspora identity is also defended by Stuart Hall, “Te Question of Cultural Identity,” in Modernity and Its Futures, ed. Stuart Hall, David Held, and Tony McGrew (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 273–326. 23. Peter J. Katzenstein, “Multiple Modernities as Limits to Secular Europeanization?,” in Byrnes and Katzenstein, Religion in an Expanding Europe, 13. 24. Yasemin N. Soysal, “Citizenship and Identity: Living in Diasporas in Postwar Europe?,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23, no. 1 (2000): 8. 25. John R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 307. See also John R. Bowen, “Beyond Migration: Islam as a Transnational Public Space,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30, no. 5 (2004): 879–894. 26. Andrew March, “Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in Non-Muslim Liberal Democracies,” American Political Science Review 110, no. 2 (May 2007): 235–252. 27. As maintained by Bryan Turner, the Orientalist discourse is ultimately about the origins of the West, not the origins of the East. Since Max Weber’s defnition of Islam as a religion incarnating a “warrior ethic,” which is “inherently contemptuous of bourgeoiscommercial utilitarianism,” Islam has been a constituent of every past discourse on Western identity. Bryan S. Turner, “Orientalism and the Problem of Civil Society in Islam,” in Orientalism, Islam, and Islamists, ed. Asaf Hussain, Robert Olson, and Jamil Qureshi (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1984), 34. 28. See Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong: Te Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 6, 7. In Te Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years (New York: Scribner, 1996), for example, Bernard Lewis notes that the Qur’an professes the fnality and perfection of the Muslim revelation. Although a legislative creation beyond the strict word of the Qur’an is possible, as Lewis argues, there is little space for legislative councils or assemblies such as the ones that led to development of European democracy. 29. Martin Kramer, “Fundamentalist Islam at Large: Te Drive for Power,” Middle East Quarterly, June 1996, https://www.meforum.org/304/fundamentalist-islam-at-large-thedrive-for-power. See also Samuel Huntington, Te Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York Touchstone, 1996). 30. See Michael Hirsh, “Bernard Lewis Revisited,” Washington Monthly, November 1, 2004, https://washingtonmonthly.com/2004/11/01/bernard-lewis-revisited. 31. Te alliance in 1744 brought violence, with Wahhabi fanatics storming the walls of Karbala; killing thousands of Shiites; destroying the tombs of Ali ibn Abi Talib (cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad), Al-Husayn ibn Ali ibn Abi Talib (grandson of Muhammad, son of Ali ibn Abi Talib and Muhammad’s daughter Fatimah), and other imams; and conquering Mecca and Medina. 32. Jonathan Laurence, “Europe Risks Repeating Past Mistakes on Islam,” Brookings, July 21, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/2016/07/21/europe-risks-repeating-past-mis takes-on-islam/. 33. Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); Adam Shatz, “‘Orientalism,’ Ten and Now,” New York Review of Books, May 20, 2019, https://www.nybooks. com/daily/2019/05/20/orientalism-then-and-now. 34. Roxanne L. Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 154–155.

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35. Richard Bulliet, Te Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 36. Bernard Lewis, Europe and Islam (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2007), 19. 37. Sayyid Qutb, Social Justice and Islam, trans. John Hardie (Washington, DC: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953). See also Ann Norton, On the Muslim Question (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 114–115. 38. Fareed Zakaria, “Islam and Power,” Newsweek, February 13, 2006, p. 12. 39. Noah Feldman, “Why Shariah,” New York Times Magazine, March 16, 2008, https:// www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16Shariah-t.html. 40. John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Million Muslims Really Tink (New York: Gallup Press, 2007), 36. 41. Feldman, “Why Shariah.” See also Noah Feldman, Te Fall and Rise of the Islamic State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 20–21. 42. Esposito and Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam? 43. Joppke, Te Secular State, 173. 44. Some of the scholars stressing the role of human agency and context in the interpretation of the Qur’an afrm that God is the author of the wahy. However, the idea of prophecy means that God speaks to a human agent; God speaks to humanity through chosen individuals and reveals himself in human language. Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, “Te Qur’an, Islam and Muhammad,” Reset Dialogues on Civilizations, August 4, 2012, https://www.resetdoc.org/ story/the-quran-islam-and-muhammad/. 45. Jocelyn Césari, “Islam in the West: From Immigration to Global Islam,” Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 8 (2009): 159. 46. Jocelyne Césari, Alexandre Caeiro, and Dilwar Hussain, “Islam and Fundamental Rights in Europe: Final Report,” European Commission, October 2004, pp. 15–16, http:// fle.setav.org/Files/Pdf/islam-and-fundemental-rights-gsrl-2004.pdf. 47. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Benjamin MacQueen, “Framing the Debate on Human Rights,” in Islam and Human Rights in Practice: Perspectives across the Ummah, ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Benjamin MacQueen (London: Routledge, 2008), 2–4. 48. Ron E. Hassner, “Blasphemy and Violence,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 1 (2011): 19. See also Qur’an 4:140, 5:73, 6:108, 9:74, 28:55, 39:8, and 39:33; and Carl W. Ernst, “Blasphemy: Islamic Concept,” in Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Lindsay Jones (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 2:974–977. 49. Max Rodenbeck, “How She Wants to Modify Muslims,” New York Review of Books, December 3, 2015, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/12/03/ayaan-hirsi-ali-wantsmodify-muslims/. 50. See Karen Armstrong, Te Battle for God (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001); John L. Esposito, Te Islamic Treat: Myth or Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 51. While bin Laden did not care if civilians were harmed, Islam promotes retribution in a proportionate way. See John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 52. Esposito and Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam?, 161. 53. Olivier Roy, “Who Are the New Jihadists?,” Te Guardian, April 13, 2017, https:// www.theguardian.com/news/2017/apr/13/who-are-the-new-jihadis; Olivier Roy, Le Djihad et la mort (Paris: Le Seuil, 2016). 54. Arun Kundnani, Te Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism and the Domestic War on Terror (New York: Verso, 2014). Arun Kundnani suggests that we pay attention to the role of the discriminatory state to understand why young Muslims radicalize.

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55. Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). Yet Islamic jurisprudence’s legitimation of war is always up for interpretation. Indeed, sharia appears to be more of an ideal than a formally constituted body of law. Whereas interpreting the law was once the province of the trained clerical class of ulama, any consensus governing its correct interpretation has broken down under pressure of regional conficts and the infuence of religious autodidacts whose vision of Islam was formed outside the received scholarly tradition. None of the three most infuential theorists behind Sunni militancy— Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi (1903–1979), Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966)—received a traditional religious training. See Malise Ruthven, “How to Understand Islam,” New York Review of Books, November 8, 2007, https://www.nybooks.com/arti cles/2007/11/08/how-to-understand-islam/. 56. Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 12. 57. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955), 63–64. 58. Andrew G. Bostom, ed., Te Legacy of Jihad: Te Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005). 59. Lee Harris, “Jihad Ten and Now,” review of Te Legacy of Jihad, ed. Andrew Bostom, Policy Review, October 1, 2006, https://www.hoover.org/research/jihad-then-and-now. 60. Harris, “Jihad Ten and Now.” 61. Lee Harris, Te Suicide of Reason: Radical Islam’s Treat to the Enlightenment (New York: Basic Books, 2007). See also Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Infdel (New York: Free Press, 2008). 62. Hans Küng, Islam: Past, Present and Future, trans. John Bowden (Oxford, UK: Oneworld, 2007). 63. Mustafa Akyiol, “Islam’s Tragic Fatalism,” New York Times, September 23, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/24/opinion/islams-tragic-fatalism.html. 64. Salman Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism (London: Zed Books, 2015), 2. 65. Shiraz Maher, “Te Mutating Terror Treat: What Do the Charlie Hebdo Attacks Mean for Britain?,” New Statesman, January 22, 2015, https://www.newstatesman.com/poli tics/2015/01/mutating-terror-threat-what-do-charlie-hebdo-attacks-mean-britain. 66. Alexander Orwin, “Can Humankind Deliberate on a Global Scale? Alfarabi and the Politics of the Inhabited World,” American Political Science Review 108, no. 4 (2014): 830. 67. Farzin Vahdat, “Critical Teory and the Islamic Encounter with Modernity,” in Islam and the West: Critical Perspectives on Modernity, ed. Michael J. Tompson (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefeld, 2003), 123–138. 68. Albert Hourani, Arabic Tought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 114. 69. Farzin Vahdat, God and Juggernaut: Iran’s Intellectual Encounter with Modernity (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 58. 70. Paul Brykczynski, “Radical Islam and the Nation: Te Relationship between Religion and Nationalism in the Political Tought of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb,” History of Intellectual Culture 5, no. 1 (2005): 4. 71. Sami Zubaida, “Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions,” Nations and Nationalism 10, no. 4 (2004): 407. 72. Israel Gershoni, “Te Emergence of Pan-Arab Nationalism in Egypt: Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism in the 1930s,” Asian and African Studies 16 (1982): 95. 73. In the 1940s, under al-Banna’s leadership, the Muslim Brotherhood formed a powerful mass movement in Egypt calling for an Islamic order in the country. Following the Free

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Ofcers’ 1952 coup d’etat led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the military junta banned the activities of the Muslim Brothers. Qutb, who belonged to the nationalist Egyptian Wafd Party, soon became disillusioned with the party’s leadership. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1951, two years after al-Banna was assassinated by government agents. 74. James L. Nolan Jr., What Tey Saw in America: Alexis de Tocqueville, Max Weber, G. K. Chesterton, and Sayyid Qutb (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 169. 75. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Indianapolis, IN: American Trust, 1990), 103. 76. See Zubaida, “Islam and Nationalism,” 407. 77. Emmanuel Sivan, “Arab Nationalism in the Age of Islamic Resurgence,” in Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, ed. James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 211. 78. Andrew March, “Liberal Citizenship and the Search for an Overlapping Consensus: Te Case of Muslim Minorities,” Philosophy and Public Afairs 34, no. 4 (2006): 373–421. 79. Te book articulated what would become the organization’s more nuanced approach to Islamist thought: to guide adherents toward righteousness instead of judging or condemning those who had strayed from the correct path. According to Barbara Zollner, director of Islamic Studies at Birbeck College, University of London, however, the book was not written by Hassan al-Hudaybi and was not written as a response to Sayyid Qutb. See Barbara H. E. Zollner, Te Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2009). 80. Andrew F. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship: Te Search for an Overlapping Consensus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 122. 81. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Al-Hulul al-Mustawrada Wa-Kayfa Janat ‘ala Ummatina (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1993), 113–114, cited in Andrew March, “Are Secularism and Neutrality Attractive to Religious Minorities? Islamic Discussions of Western Secularism in the ‘Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities’ (Fiqh Al-Aqalliyyat) Discourse,” Cardozo Law Review 30, no. 6 (2009): 2828. 82. Cited in March, “Islamic Foundations,” 250. 83. Cited in March, “Islamic Foundations,” 243. 84. Abd Allah Ibn Bayya, Sina’at Al Fatwa Wa-Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat (Beirut: Dar-al-Shuruk, 2007), cited in March, “Are Secularism and Neutrality,” 2845. 85. Césari, Caeiro, and Hussain, “Islam and Fundamental Rights in Europe,” 15. 86. Qur’an 3:28, 3:118, 4:139, 4:144, 5:51, 5:80–81, 60:1. “Qur’anic exegetes in the classical and modern period have interpreted these verses to cover a range of relationships.” March, “Are Secularism and Neutrality,” 2843. 87. Even moderate Brotherhood-style talk about a “new Ijtihad” (independent scriptural interpretation) or the pragmatic balancing of various Islamic goals (for example, Yusuf alQaradawi’s “Fiqh al-muwazanat,” which involves balancing the objectives of realizing beneft and avoiding evil) does not call into question the rectitude of traditional Islamic legal rulings in criminal, family, and public law. See Andrew March, “Reading Tariq Ramadan: Political Liberalism, Islam, and ‘Overlapping Consensus,’” Ethics and International Afairs 21, no. 4 (2007): 406. 88. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Fi Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat al-Muslima (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2001), 33–34, cited in March, “Islamic Foundations,” 242; Muhammad al-Ghazali, Te Future of Islam outside Its Lands: How Shall We Tink of It? (Amman: Orient Public Relations, Publishing, and Translation, 1984), 154. See also Uryia Shavit, Shari‘a and Muslim Minorities: Te Wasati and Salaf Approaches to Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat al Muslima (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 89. See Bassam Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-

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Islam versus Global Jihad (New York: Routledge, 2008); Bassam Tibi, Te Challenge of Fundamentalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Bassam Tibi, Islam between Culture and Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2005); and Bassam Tibi, Islam’s Predicament with Modernity: Religious Reform and Cultural Change (New York: Routledge, 2009). 90. Time magazine named Tariq Ramadan one of the one hundred most important innovators of the twenty-frst century. Bruce Crumley, “Tariq Ramadan,” Time, April 26, 2004, http:// content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1970858_1970909_1971700,00.html. 91. Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim. 92. Ibid., 162. 93. March, “Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract,” 235–252. 94. Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3. 95. For the television debate, see “Clash Nicolas Sarkozy vs Tariq Ramadan,” YouTube, December 3, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PrufAs3VTI. See also Tariq Ramadan, “We Must Not Accept Tis Repression,” Te Guardian, March 29, 2005, https://www. theguardian.com/world/2005/mar/30/religion.uk. 96. Quoted in Caroline Fourest, Brother Tariq: Te Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan (New York: Encounter Books, 2008), 141. 97. Investigative Project on Terrorism, “Profle: Yusuf al-Qaradawi,” https://www.inves tigativeproject.org/profle/167/yusuf-al-qaradawi#_ftn2 (accessed May 6, 2020); see also Andrew C. McCarthy, “Obama Recruits Qaradawi,” National Review, December 31, 2011, https://www.nationalreview.com/2011/12/obama-recruits-qaradawi-andrew-c-mccarthy/. 98. Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 150. On Ramadan’s views, see Ian Buruma, “Tariq Ramadan Has an Identity Issue,” New York Times Magazine, February 4, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/04/ magazine/04ramadan.t.html; Paul Berman, “Who’s Afraid of Tariq Ramadan? Te Islamist, the Journalist, and the Defense of Liberalism,” New Republic, June 4, 2007, pp. 37–63; and March, “Reading Tariq Ramadan.” 99. Andrew Hussey, “NS Profle—Tariq Ramadan,” New Statesman, June 21, 2004, https://www.newstatesman.com/node/160014. Tis vision is similar to the one promoted by Ismail Al-Faruqi, a Muslim American scholar who says Muslims arriving in the West should develop a sense of mission to create a “new Medina.” See Ismail Al-Faruqi, “Islamic Ideals in North America,” in Te Muslim Community in North America, ed. Earle H. Waugh, Abu Laban Baha, and Regula B. Qureshi (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1983), 269. See also Jonathan Laurence, “Te Prophet of Moderation: Tariq Ramadan’s Quest to Reclaim Islam,” book review, Foreign Afairs, May–June 2007, https://www.foreignafairs. com/reviews/review-essay/2007-05-01/prophet-moderation-tariq-ramadans-quest-reclaimislam; and Tariq Ramadan, In the Footsteps of the Prophet: Lessons from the Life of Muhammad (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 100. Tariq Ramadan. “Te Cultural Alternative,” August 29, 2017, https://tariqramadan. com/english/the-cultural-alternative/. 101. Alex Callinicos, “Marxists, Muslims and Religion: Anglo-French Attitudes,” Historical Materialism 16, no. 2 (2008): 143–166. 102. Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics, 190. 103. Bassam Tibi, “Europeanisation, Not Islamisation,” Sign and Sight, March 22, 2007, http://www.signandsight.com/features/1258.html. Ramadan asks for a renewed understanding of the text. He is in good company with other authorities on the Qur’an such as the Egyptian Nasr Hamid Abu Zeid and the Iranian Abdolkarim Sorush, proponents of using hermeneutics to understand the Qur’an.

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104. Tibi, “Europeanisation, Not Islamisation.” 105. Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics, 46. 106. Tibi, 46. 107. Tibi, 47. 108. Tibi, 163. 109. Tibi, 167. 110. Hamdi Hassan, “Te Role of Information Activities in Supporting the Image of Islam and Muslims in Europe,” in Te Muslims in Europe (Cairo: Dar al-Bayan, 2002), 312, cited in Uriya Shavit, “Old Fears, New Treats: What European Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism Have in Common and What Tey Don’t,” Azure, November 14, 2007, http://azure.org.il/ article.php?id=441. 111. Te success of the populist Islamic Shia revolution in Iran, combined with eforts in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to promote Sunni Islam, including backing the mujahideen in Afghanistan, gave young people new hopes and aspirations. See Alison Pargeter, Te New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 16. 112. Mustafa Setmariam Nasar was born in Aleppo, Syria, in 1958. Under the pen name Umar Abd al-Hakim, he published “Te Islamic Jihadi Revolution in Syria,” a treatise that formed an important part of the intellectual foundation for al-Qaeda and the jihadist movement of the 1990s. Nasar’s works, some published under his other pen name, Abu Mus‘ab alSuri, are considered relevant not only on an ideological level but also for operational purposes. Al-Suri’s works are posted in jihadi web forums’ political sections, where most jihadi literature circulates, as well as in the specialized sections dedicated to discussions of jihad training, preparation, weapons, and the like. See Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: Te Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Musʻab Al-Suri (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 23. 113. A 1999 fatwa of the European Council for Fatwa and Research permitted Muslims to get interest-bearing mortgages in the West. Alexandre Caeiro examined the production of this fatwa within the council, the debates surrounding the fatwa, and its reception in European Muslim communities. See Alexandre Caeiro, “Te Social Construction of Sharia: Bank Interest, Home Purchase, and Islamic Norms in the West,” Die Welt des Islams 44, no. 3 (2004): 351–375. 114. Te Federation of Islamic Organizations of Europe claims that four hundred Muslim organizations from twenty-eight states signed the charter when it was presented at the Parliament of the European Union in January 2008. 115. Sam Cherribi, In the House of War: Dutch Islam Observed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 21. 116. Jytte Klausen, Te Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 209. 117. See “Te Battle for a Religion’s Heart,” Te Economist, August, 6, 2009, https://www. economist.com/international/2009/08/06/the-battle-for-a-religions-heart. 118. Bakri said after the London bombings that bin Laden found that he could use British Muslims “to harm you. He does not have to bring people all the way from Medina.” Quoted in Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “Te Dangers of Tolerance,” New Republic, August 8, 2005, https://peterbergen.com/militant-london-clerics/. 119. Zachary Shore, “Can the West Win Muslim Hearts and Minds,” Orbis 49, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 480. 120. Engaging Islamic organizations is based on a group pluralist model. See Rinus Penninx and Marlou Schrover, “Bastion of bindmiddel? Organisaties van immigranten in historisch perspectief,” in Nederland Multicultureel en Pluriform? Een Aantal Conceptuale Studies, ed. Jan Lucassen and Ariede Ruijter (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2002), 279–322.

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121. Olivier Roy, Jihad and Death: Te Global Appeal of Islamic State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). 122. Gilles Kepel, Tamara Cofman Wittes, and Matthew Levitt, “Te Rise of Jihad in Europe: Views from France,” May 19, 2017, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/the-rise-of-jihad-in-europe-views-from-france. 123. See Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: Te Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Musʻab Al-Suri (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 124. Roy, Jihad and Death, 5. 125. Olivier Roy, “Les nouveaux intellectuels islamistes: Essai d’approche philosophique,” in Intellectuels et militants de l’Islam contemporain, ed. Kepel Gilles and Yann Richard (Paris: Seuil, 1990), 271, cited in Diego Gambetta and Stefen Hertog, “Why Are Tere So Many Engineers among Islamic Radicals?” European Journal of Sociology 50, no. 2 (2009): 221, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/91ED8BEFD E3793834667750B31575422/S0003975609990129a.pdf/why_are_there_so_many_engineers_among_islamic_radicals.pdf. See also Olivier Roy, “Who Are the New Jihadists,” Te Guardian, April 13, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/apr/13/who-are-thenew-jihadis. 126. Roy, Jihad and Death. 127. Peter O’Brien, “Counter-terrorism in Europe: Controversies and Contradictions,” paper presented at Council of European Studies Conference, Philadelphia, April 2016. See also Peter O’Brien, Te Muslim Question in Europe: Political Controversies and Public Philosophies (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2016). 128. O’Brien, “Counter-terrorism in Europe.” 129. Steven Erlanger and Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, “As France and Belgium Strengthen Security, a Classic Debate Arises,” New York Times, November 19, 2015, https://www. nytimes.com/2015/11/20/world/europe/as-france-and-belgium-strengthen-security-a-clas sic-debate-arises.html. 130. Royal United Services Institute, “European Governments Neglecting the Treat of Extreme Right Lone Actors,” February 29, 2016, https://rusi.org/rusi-news/new-study-euro pean-governments-neglecting-threat-extreme-right-lone-actor-terrorists. 131. Roger Eatwell, “Community Cohesion and Cumulative Extremism in Contemporary Britain,” Political Quarterly 77 (2006): 204–216. 132. Tamar Mitts, “From Isolation to Radicalization: Anti-Muslim Hostility and Support for ISIS in the West,” American Political Science Review 113, no. 1 (2019): 173. 133. Francis Fukuyama, Te End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 134. Institutionalists claim that institutions are built and accepted only if they respect a nonabstract cultural environment. See Hartmut Kaelble, “Identifcation and Politicization of the EU,” in European Identity, ed. Jefrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 208. 135. Jefrey T. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999): 93. See also Daniel N. Posner, “Te Institutional Origins of Ethnic Voting,” paper presented at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, September 3–6, 1998, p. 4; and Jefrey T. Checkel, “‘Going Native’ in Europe? Teorizing Social Interaction in European Institutions,” Arena Working Papers WP 01/23, 2001, https://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arenaworking-papers/2001-2010/2001/wp01_23.htm. 136. Jan Werner Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in 20th Century Europe (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 128. 137. See Adrian Favell, “Immigration, Migration and Free Movement in the Making of Europe,” in Checkel and Katzenstein, European Identity, 168.

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138. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: Te Silent Revolution in Reverse,” Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 2 (2017): 444. Ronald Inglehart, “Te Silent Revolution in Europe,” American Political Science Review 65, no. 4 (1971): 991–1017. 139. Philippe Schmitter, “Te Vices and Virtues of ‘Populisms,’” Sociologica 13, no. 1 (2019), https://sociologica.unibo.it/article/view/9391/9197. 140. M. Canovan, Populism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981); Cas Mudde, “Te Populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition 39, no. 4 (2004): 541–563. 141. Nadia Urbinati, “Unpolitical Democracy,” Political Teory 38, no. 1 (2010): 78. 142. Noam Gidron and Peter A. Hall, ““Populism as a Problem of Social Integration,” Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 7 (2020): 1047. 143. Jens Rydgren, “Te Sociology of the Radical Right,” Annual Review of Sociology 33 (2007): 242. Also see Meindert Fennema, “Populist Parties of the Right,” ASSR Working Paper 04/01, February 2004, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9533/6b047f912dee472a5c3 7ecade20b1a02358.pdf. 144. See I. Krastev, After Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017). 145. Benjamin Moft, “Te Populist/Anti-populist Divide in Western Europe,” Democratic Teory 4, no. 2 (2018): 2. 146. See Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Teory: A Conceptual Approach (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 147. Jerry Z. Muller, “Us and Tem: Te Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” Foreign Afairs, March–April 2008, p. 31. 148. R. Eatwell and M. Goodwin, National Populism: Te Revolt against Liberal Democracy (London: Pelican Books, 2018), introduction. 149. Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 18. 150. Walter Benn Michaels, Our America: Nativism, Modernism and Pluralism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 69. 151. See Pierre-Andre Taguief, La force du prejuge: Essai sur le racismes es doublés (Paris: La Découverte, 1988). See also Alberto Spektorowski, “Te French New Right: Multiculturalism of the Right and the Recognition-Exclusionism Syndrome,” Journal of Global Ethics 8, no. 1 (2012): 41–61. 152. Verena Stolcke, “New Rhetoric of Exclusion in Europe,” Social Science Journal 159 (March 1999): 30; Étienne Balibar, “Is Tere a Neo-racism?,” in Race, Nation, Class, ed. Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Walerstein (London: Verso, 1991), 21. 153. Jose Pedro Zuquete, Te Identitarians: Te Movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe (Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 2018), 4. 154. D. Albertazzi and D. McDonnell, Populists in Power (London: Routledge, 2015), 5. 155. Pew Research Center, “Europe’s Growing Muslim Population,” November 29, 2017, pp. 16, 27, https://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/. Europe is defned here as the twenty-eight nations of the EU plus Norway and Switzerland. 156. Eric Kaufmann, Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? Demography and Politics in the 21st Century (London: Profle Books, 2010); Eric Kaufmann, Whiteshift (London: Allen Lane, 2018). 157. Sertan Akbaba, “Nationalist or Nativist Politics? Case Study of the Danish People’s Party,” Marmara Journal of European Studies 24, no. 2 (2016): 33–57. 158. Katalin Halasz, “Te Rise of the Radical Right in Europe and the Case of Hungary: ‘Gypsy Crime’ Defnes National Identity?,” Development 52, no. 4 (2009): 490–494. 159. Michael Minkenberg, “From Pariah to Policy-Maker? Te Radical Right in Europe, West and East: Between Margin and Mainstream,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 21, no. 1 (2013): 11.

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160. See Spektorowski, “Te French New Right.” 161. Montserrat Guibernau, Te Identity of Nations (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007), 153. 162. Mabel Berezin, “Te Normalization of the Right in Post-security Europe,” in Politics in the Age of Austerity, ed. Armin Schafer and Wolfgang Streeck (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2013); Diane Sainsbury, Welfare States and Immigrant Rights: Te Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 163. Jens Rydgren, “Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family,” European Journal of Political Research 44, no. 3 (2005): 416. 164. Pippa Norris, “Te ‘New Cleavage’ Tesis and the Social Basis of Radical Right Support,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 3, 2004, Chicago, p. 4. 165. Susi Meret and Birte Siim, “Multiculturalism, Right-Wing Populism and the Crisis of Social Democracy,” in Te Crisis of Social Democracy in Europe, ed. Michael Keating and David McCrone (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 138. 166. Berezin, “Te Normalization of the Right”; Sainsbury, Welfare States and Immigrant Rights. 167. Although, historically, female voters were less attracted to extreme-right parties, in recent years European women are increasingly favoring these parties (at times coming close to the percentage of male support for such parties). See Nonna Mayer, “From Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: Electoral Change on the Far Right,” Parliamentary Afairs 66, no. 1 (2013): 160–178; Inti Landauro, “Marine Le Pen Attracts More Women Voters,” Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2012, https://blogs.wsj.com/eurocrisis/2012/04/24/marine-le-pen-attracts-morewomen-voters; Peter Kellner, “How UKIP Voters Compare,” YouGov, March 5, 2013, https:// yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2013/03/05/analysis-ukip-voters; and Maurice De Hond, “De Stemming van 16 februari 2014,” Peil.nl, 2014, https://www.noties.nl/v/get. php?a=peil.nl&s=weekpoll&f=2014-02-16.pdf. 168. Eric Fassin, “Pourquoi Marine Le Pen défend les femmes, les gays, les juifs . . . ,” Liberation, December 20, 2010, https://www.liberation.fr/france/2010/12/20/pourquoi-marinele-pen-defend-les-femmes-les-gays-les-juifs_701823. 169. Cas Mudde and Joop van Holsteyn, “Te Netherlands: Explaining the Limited Success of the Extreme Right,” in Te Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream, ed. Paul Hainsworth (London: Pinter, 2000), 164–165. 170. In the United Kingdom a racist use of women’s rights is burgeoning especially in more extreme right-wing movements. For example, supporters of Britain First invaded a mosque in south Crayford to demand the removal of signs they deemed sexist that marked the separate entrances for men and women. 171. Ulrike M. Vieten and Scott Poynting, “Contemporary Far-Right Racist Populism in Europe,” Journal of Intercultural Studies 37, no. 6 (2016): 539. 172. Ian Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam: Liberal Europe, Islam and the Limits of Tolerance (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 94–95. 173. Roger Grifn, “Afterword: Last Rights?,” in Te Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1999), 308. 174. Pnina Werbner, “Islamophobia: Incitement to Religious Hatred—Legislating for a New Fear?,” Anthropology Today 21, no. 1 (2005): 8. 175. Minkenberg, “From Pariah to Policy-Maker?”; J. van Spanje, “Contagious Parties: Anti-immigration Parties and Teir Impact on Other Parties’ Immigration Stances in Contemporary Western Europe,” Party Politics 16, no. 5 (2010): 563–586; M. Schain, “Te

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Impact of the French National Front on the French Political System,” in Shadows over Europe: Te Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe, ed. M. Schain, A. Zolberg, and P. Hossay (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 223–244. 176. Cas Mudde, “Tree Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe,” European Journal of Political Research 52 (2013): 7. 177. See Eatwell and Goodwin, National Populism. 178. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). See also J. Habermas, “Tree Normative Models of Democracy,” in Democracy and Diference, ed. S. Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 29. 179. Islamic legal and political traditions have historically claimed that submission to nonMuslim political authority and bonds of loyalty and solidarity with non-Muslim societies are to be avoided. See March, “Islamic Foundations,” 235. See also March, “Liberal Citizenship and the Search for an Overlapping Consensus.” 180. See Habermas, “Tree Normative Models of Democracy,” 22. 181. Monique Deveaux, “Deliberative Democracy and Multiculturalism,” in Te Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy, ed. A. Bachtinger et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 2. 182. S. Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” in Democracy and Diference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 77. 183. Melissa Williams, Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 144. 184. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Te Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 23. 185. Tese more or less stable patterns of the religious establishment or privilege continue in present times. See Jose Casanova, “Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration,” in Byrnes and Katzenstein, Religion in an Expanding Europe, 65–92. 186. Peter Berger, Te Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Teory of Religion (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1967), 135. 187. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 13. See also Roy, La Santa Ignorancia, 19; José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Minkenberg, “Religious Path Dependency?,” 2; and José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 188. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, 19–20. 189. Adrian Hastings, Te Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 190. J. Q. Whitman, “Separating Church and State: Te Atlantic Divide,” Historical Refections 34, no. 3 (2008): 86–104, cited in Christian Joppke, Te Secular State under Siege: Religion and Politics in Europe and America (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2015). 191. Ofce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “General Comment No. 22: Te Right to Freedom of Tought, Conscience and Religion (Art. 18),” 1993, https://www. equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/general%20comment%2022.pdf. 192. Cristina Lafont, “Religious Pluralism in a Deliberative Democracy,” in Democracy, Law and Religious Pluralism in Europe, ed. F. Requejo and C. Ungureanu (London: Routledge, 2014), 47. 193. Sara Silvestri, “Islam and Religion in the EU Political System,” West European Politics 32, no. 6 (2009): 1214. 194. Jürgen Habermas, Te Divided West, ed. and trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006), 14.

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195. Max Rodenbeck, “Islam Confronts Its Demons,” New York Review of Books, April 29, 2004, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2004/04/29/islam-confronts-its-demons/. 196. “Western Governments Are Telling Muslim Women Not to Cover Up,” Te Economist, July 10, 2019, https://www.economist.com/erasmus/2019/07/10/western-govern ments-are-telling-muslim-women-not-to-cover-up. 197. Charles Taylor, “Modes of Secularism,” in Secularism and Its Critics, ed. Rajeev Bhargava (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 33. 198. Craig Calhoun, “Afterword: Religion’s Many Powers,” in Te Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, ed. Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 126. 199. Alan Patten, Equal Recognition: Te Moral Foundations of Minority Rights (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 152–153. 200. Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, and Yogendra J. Yadav, “‘Nation State’ or ‘State Nation’? Conceptual Refections and Some Spanish, Belgian and Indian Data,” United Nations Development Program Human Development Report Ofce Occasional Paper, 2004, p. 3, http:// hdr.undp.org/en/content/%E2%80%9Cnation-state%E2%80%9D-or-%E2%80%9Cstatenation%E2%80%9D. 201. Patten, Equal Recognition, 27. 202. Veit Bader, Secularism or Democracy? Associational Governance of Religious Diversity (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), 68. 203. Cecile Laborde, “Protecting Freedom of Religion in the Secular Age,” in Politics of Religious Politics of Religious Freedom, ed. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). See also Cecile Laborde, “Dworkin’s Freedom of Religion without God,” Boston University Law Review 94 (2014): 1257; Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New York: Basic Books, 2008); and Sophia Moureau, “What Is Discrimination?,” Philosophy and Public Afairs 38, no. 2 (2010): 156. 204. Laborde, “Dworkin,” 1263. 205. Jean Cohen, “Freedom of Religion, Inc.: Whose Sovereignty?,” Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 44, no. 3 (2015): 169–210. See also Stuart White, “Religious Exemptions: An Egalitarian Demand?,” Law and Ethics of Human Rights 6, no. 1 (2012): 101; and Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 206. See Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2001), 40–62. 207. Laborde, “Dworkin,” 1264. 208. Stephen L. Carter, “Evolutionism, Creationism and Treating Religion as a Hobby,” Duke Law Journal 36, no. 6 (1987): 978. See also Stephen Carter, Te Culture of Disbelief (New York: Basic Books, 1993). 209. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 52. 210. Judd Owen, Religion and the Demise of Liberal Rationalism: Te Foundational Crisis of Separation of Church and State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 71. 211. See Charles Taylor, “Te Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Charles Taylor et al. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 43; and Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Teory (London: Macmillan, 2000), 179. 212. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom: Te New Global Politics of Religion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).

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213. Talal Asad, Te Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 183. 214. Lafont, “Religious Pluralism,” 48. 215. Jürgen Habermas, “Notes on a Post-secular Society,” Sign and Sight, June 18, 2008, http://www.signandsight.com/features/1714.html. 216. See Maleiha Malik, “Muslim Legal Norms and the Integration of European Muslims,” European University Institute Working Paper, RSCAS 2009/29, http://hdl.handle. net/1814/11653. 217. Ulrich Beck, “Critical Teory of World Risk Society: A Cosmopolitan Vision,” Constellations 16, no. 1 (2009): 1–22. 218. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Teory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 153. See also Andrea Cassatella, “Multicultural Justice: Will Kymlicka and Cultural Recognition,” Ratio Juris 19, no. 1 (2006): 83. 219. Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Diferences and Women’s Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 125–126; Ayelet Shachar, “Entangled: Family, Religion and Human Rights,” in Human Rights: Te Hard Questions, ed. Cindy Holder and David Reidy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 220. See Seyla Benhabib, Te Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). 221. Chandran Kukathas, “Are Tere Any Cultural Rights,” Political Teory 20, no. 1 (1992): 116. 222. James Tully, “Cultural Demands for Constitutional Recognition,” Journal of Political Philosophy 3, no. 2 (1995): 111–132. 223. See James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and James Tully, “Te Illiberal Liberal,” in Multiculturalism Reconsidered, ed. P. Kelly (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2002). 224. Williams, Voice, Trust, and Memory, 148. See also Monique Deveaux, Gender and Justice in Multicultural Liberal States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Iris M. Young, “Polity and Group Diference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship,” Ethics 99, no. 2 (1989): 272–273; Iris M. Young, “Inclusive Political Communication: Greetings Rhetoric and Storytelling in the Context of Political Argument,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of American Political Sciences Association, Boston, 1998, pp. 6–7; and Gad Barzilai, Communities and Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005). 225. Deveaux, “Deliberative Democracy and Multiculturalism,” 7. 226. According to Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth there are three distinct phases of recognition. Te frst, premodern, phase is that of honor in which recognition was granted without raising any confict. Tis was a group-based and nonegalitarian phase. Te second, modern, phase is individualized and equal recognition. Te third phase is the new age of recognition. See Axel Honneth, Te Struggle for Recognition: Te Grammar of Social Conficts (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1995); Charles Taylor, “Te Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Charles Taylor et al. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25–73. 227. Mahama Tawat, “Two Tales of Viking Diversity: A Comparative Study of the Immigrant Integration Policies of Denmark and Sweden, 1960–2006” (PhD diss., University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, 2011), 48; Anna E. Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 98; Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 7. 228. Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 13.

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229. Parekh believes that minorities should not feel that they are only tolerated and that they should decline assimilation. Assimilated people are never quite sure when they have become assimilated. Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism; Bhikhu Parekh, A New Politics of Identity (New York: Macmillan, 2008), 84. 230. Bhikhu Parekh, “Minority Practices and Principles of Toleration,” International Migration Review 30, no. 1 (1996): 251–284. 231. Avigail Eisenberg, “Diversity and Equality: Tree Approaches to Cultural and Sexual Diference,” Journal of Political Philosophy 11, no. 1 (2003): 45. Also see Menny Mautner, “From ‘Honor’ to ‘Dignity’: How Should a Liberal State Treat Non-liberal Cultural Groups?,” Teoretical Inquiries in Law 9, no. 2 (2008): 609. 232. Iris Marion Young, “Polity and Group Diference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship,” Ethics 99, no. 2 (1989): 251. 233. Sarah Goodman, Immigration and Membership Politics in Western Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 2. 234. Joppke, Is Multiculturalism Dead?, 104, 161; Will Kymlicka, “Te Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism: New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodations in Diverse Societies,” in Te Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices, ed. Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf (London: Routledge, 2004), 35. 235. Ruud Koopmans, Ines Michalowski, and Stine Waibel, “Citizenship Rights for Immigrants: National Political Processes and Cross National Convergence in Western Europe, 1980–2008,” American Journal of Sociology 117, no. 4 (2012): 1202–1245. 236. Council of Europe, “Living Together as Equals in Dignity,” June 2008, https://www. coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper_fnal_revised_en.pdf. 237. Ricard Zapata-Barrero, “Interculturalism in the Post-multicultural Debate: A Defence,” Comparative Migration Studies, September 7, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1186/ s40878-017-0057-z. 238. Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, “How Does Interculturalism Contrast with Multiculturalism?,” Journal of Intercultural Studies 33, no. 2 (2012): 192. 239. Will Kymlicka, “Defending Diversity in an Era of Pluralism: Multiculturalism and Interculturalism Compared,” in Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Debating the Dividing Lines, ed. Nasar Meer, Tariq Modood, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2016). 240. Joppke, Is Multiculturalism Dead?, 161. 241. Liav Orgad, “Illiberal Liberalism: Cultural Restrictions on Migration and Access to Citizenship in Europe,” American Journal of Comparative Law 58 (2010): 92; Stanley Fish, “Boutique Multiculturalism, or Why Liberals Are Incapable of Tinking about Hate Speech,” Critical Inquiry 23, no. 2 (1997): 378–395. 242. Will Kymlicka, “Te Uncertain Futures of Multiculturalism,” Canadian Diversity 4, no. 1 (2005): 83. 243. Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2007), 27. See also Joppke, Is Multiculturalism Dead?, 16. 244. Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking Recognition,” New Left Review, May–June 2000, p. 108. 245. Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, and 41344/98 (European Court of Human Rights, February 13, 2003), https:// www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CLIN_2003_02_50_ENG_815402.pdf. Te Refah Partisi political party governed in Turkey until 1998. It was dissolved in that year by the decision of the Constitutional Court of Turkey for its alleged involvement in activities contrary to the principles of secularism. Te European Court approved the dissolution, ruling it was compatible with the freedom-of-association guarantees under the European Convention on Human Rights. Refah

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Partisi had promoted plurality of legal systems for Turkey, a policy that would have instituted discrimination based on religion, according to the Turkey court, including sharia rule. Te judgment stresses, “As to the application of sharia within the context of such a plurality of systems, explicitly proposed in certain of the statements referred to, the Court accepted the Constitutional Court’s conclusion that these statements formed a whole and gave a clear picture of a model proposed by Refah of a state and society organised according to religious rules; however, sharia is incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy” (28). 246. Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, and Katie Simmons, “Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs,” Pew Research Center, July 16, 2016, https:// www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-moreterrorism-fewer-jobs/. 247. Ibrahim Kalin, “Islamophobia and the Limits of Multiculturalism,” in Islamophobia: Te Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century, ed. John L. Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3, 5. 248. Anna Korteweg and Triadaflus Triadaflopoulos, “Is Multiculturalism Dead? Groups, Governments and the ‘Real Work of Integration,’” Ethnic and Racial Studies 38, no. 5 (2015): 663, 680. See also Derek McGee, Te End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Integration, and Human Rights (Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press, 2008), 145; Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, “Cosmopolitanism and Integrationism: Is British Multiculturalism a ‘Zombie Category’?,” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 21, no. 6 (2014): 659. 249. Fish, “Boutique Multiculturalism.” 250. Randall Hansen, “Te Poverty of Post-nationalism: Citizenship, Immigration, and the New Europe,” Teory and Society 38, no. 1 (2009): 21. 251. Yael Tamir, Why Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019). 252. Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, “Liberalism and the Right to Culture,” Social Research 71, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 529–548. 253. See Arash Abizadeh, “Does Liberal Democracy Presuppose a Cultural Nation? Four Arguments,” American Political Science Review 96, no. 3 (September 2002): 496–497. 254. Abizadeh, “Does Liberal Democracy Presuppose a Cultural Nation?,” 499; Arash Abizadeh, “On the Demos and Its Kin: Nationalism, Democracy, and the Boundary Problem,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 4 (November 2012): 873; Gal Ariely, “Constitutional Patriotism, Liberal Nationalism and Membership in the Nation: An Empirical Assessment,” Acta Politica 46, no. 3 (2011): 313. 255. Russell Hardin, “Fallacies of Nationalism,” in Designing Democratic Institutions, ed. Ian Shapiro and S. Macedo (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 197. 256. Alan Patten, “Rethinking Culture: Te Social Lineage Account,” American Political Science Review 105 (November 2011): 744. 257. David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 25. 258. Gal Gerson and Rubin Aviad, “Cultural Nationalism and Liberal Values: An Elusive Synthesis,” International Political Science Review 36, no. 2 (2015): 208. 259. Laura Andronache, “A National Identity Republicanism?,” European Journal of Political Teory 5, no. 4 (2006): 410. 260. Gal Gerson and Rubin Aviad, “Cultural Nationalism and Liberal Values: An Elusive Synthesis,” International Political Science Review 36, no. 2 (2015): 211. 261. M. Lilla, “Europe through a Glass Darkly,” Daedalus 123, no. 2 (1994): 153. 262. Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Teory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 14. See also Q. Skinner, “Te Republican Ideal of Liberty,” in Machiavelli and Republicanism, ed. Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 293–309.

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263. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Teory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 2. 264. David Miller, Market State and Community: Teoretical Foundations of Market Socialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 265. See Jean-Marc Ferry, “Te New European Question: Te Problem of Post-national Integration,” in Revisiting Nationalism: Teories and Processes, ed. Alain Dieckhof and Christian Jafrelot (London: C. Hurst, 2005), 231. See also Cecile Laborde, “From Constitutional to Civic Patriotism,” British Journal of Political Science 32, no. 2 (2002): 607; Gerard Noiriel, Le creuset francais (Paris: Seuil, 1988); Dominique Schnapper, La France de l’integration, sociologie de la nation en 1990 (Paris: Gallimard, 1991); and Emmanuel Todd, Le Destin des Immigrés: Assimilation et segregation dans les démocraties occidentales (Paris: Seuil, 1994). 266. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1983), 62; Miller, Market State and Community. 267. Tamir, Why Nationalism, 60. 268. “People’s home” was used in a formative speech by Per Albin Hansson, the leader of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, in the Swedish parliament on January 18, 1928. It became a leading vision of the party and, to a large extent, of other Scandinavian socialdemocratic parties. See Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 8; and Sheri Berman, Te Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 200. 269. Anthony Smith, “Te Resurgence of Nationalism?” British Journal of Sociology 47, no. 4 (1996): 583. 270. Andreas Wimmer, “Why Nationalism Works and Why It Isn’t Going Away,” Foreign Afairs, March–April 2019, p. 34. 271. Jonathan Haidt, Te Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (New York: Vintage Books, 2013). 272. See Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), chap. 3; and Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 7. On postnational citizenship, see Arjun Appadurai, “Sovereignty without Territoriality: Notes for a Post-national Geography,” in Te Geography of Identity, ed. Patricia Yeager (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 57; Yasemin N. Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-national Membership in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 4; Yasemin N. Soysal, “Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-Making: Organized Islam in European Public Spheres,” in “Recasting Citizenship,” special issue, Teory and Society 26, no. 4 (1997): 509–527; and Dario Castiglione, “Political Identity in a Community of Strangers,” in Checkel and Katzenstein, European Identity, 29. Other works claim that Europeans know what they are not and what they do not want to be. Nonetheless, they became very confused when asked to defne what their Europeanness is. Nezar Al Sayyad and Manuel Castells, “Introduction: Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe,” in Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization, ed. Nezar Al Sayyad and Manuel Castells (New York: Lexington Books, 2002), 4. 273. Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 274. Brendan O’Leary, “Governments and God(s): A Provisional Taxonomy,” in Politics of Religion and Nationalism, ed. Ferran Requejo and Klaus-Jurgen Nagel (Abingdon, UK: Routledge Press, 2015), 12–35. 275. Tis shift from multiculturalism to national republicanism is confrmed by data col-

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lected from seven European countries from 1990 to 2002. Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, “Te Transformation of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres: A Research Outline,” February 18, 2002, https://europub.wzb.eu/Data/reports/ Proposal.pdf. Findings point to the European public leaning toward republicanism rather than cultural diversity. See Juan Diez Medrano, “Te Public Sphere and the European Union’s Political Identity,” in European Identity, ed. Jefrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 82. 276. Will Kymlicka, “Solidarity in Diverse Societies: Beyond Neoliberal Multiculturalism and Welfare Chauvinism,” paper presented at IMISCOE conference “Mobility in Crisis,” European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy, January 2015. 277. Rogers Smith, “Te Principle of Constituted Identities and the Obligation to Include,” Ethics and Global Politics 1, no. 3 (2008): 141. 278. Rogers Smith, “Must Hate Trump Love? Multiculturalism and National Identities in the 21st Century,” draft paper for Tel Aviv University Political Science Department seminar, June 5, 2017. 279. Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in Multicultural Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 26. 280. An example of a civic integration interview is the Gesprächsleitfaden (interview guidelines) issued by the government of Baden-Württemberg in 2005 to aid its naturalization ofcers. Te professed purpose of the guidelines is to check whether a citizenship applicant’s written “declaration of loyalty” (Bekenntnis) to the constitution, which has been a component of the German naturalization procedure since 2000, corresponds to the applicant’s actual beliefs, or “inner disposition.” See Christian Joppke, “How Liberal Are Citizenship Tests?,” in How Liberal Are Citizenship Tests?, ed. Rainer Baubock and Christian Joppke (Fiesole, Italy: European University Institute, 2010), 1–4. 281. Sara Goodman, “Integration Requirements for Integration’s Sake? Identifying, Categorising and Comparing Civic Integration Policies,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, no. 5 (2010): 753–772. Te integration law treats the concept as more or less synonymous with a language level sufcient to access low- to middle-skilled jobs and fnancial selfsufciency. People displaying exemplary integration will be able to apply for a permanent residency two years earlier than those who do not. On top of that, the integration law also introduces the vaguely defned integration refusal and fnancial sanctions for those deemed uncooperative. 282. Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, “Is Tere Really a Backlash against Multiculturalism Policies? New Evidence from the Multiculturalism Policy Index,” Working Paper Series No. 14, Autumn 2012, p. 5, https://repositori.upf.edu/bitstream/handle/10230/17066/GRI TIM%2814%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. See also Keith Banting et al., “Do Multiculturalism Policies Erode the Welfare State?,” in Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies, ed. Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); and Vertovec and Wessendorf, Multiculturalism Backlash. Other studies such as Christel Kesler and Irene Bloemraad’s cross-national study of diversity and social capital prove that multiculturalism policies have a positive impact on political participation and social capital. Christel Kesler and Irene Bloemraad, “Does Immigration Erode Social Capital? Te Conditional Efects of Immigration-Generated Diversity on Trust, Membership, and Participation across 19 Countries, 1981–2000,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 43, no. 2 (2010): 319–347. See also Will Kymlicka, “Testing the Liberal Multiculturalist Hypothesis: Normative Teories and Social Science Evidence,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 43, no. 2 (June 2010): 257–271. Tese theories rebut Robert Putnam’s fndings that ethnic diversity produces lower levels of civic associational life and of

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interpersonal trust. Robert Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century,” Scandinavian Political Studies 30, no. 2 (2007): 137–174. 283. Virginie Guiraudon, “Citizenship Rights for Non-citizens: France, Germany, and the Netherlands,” in Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States, ed. Christian Joppke and Virginie Guiraudon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 293–294. 284. Dora Kostakopoulou, “What Liberalism Is Committed to and Why Current Citizenship Policies Fail Tis Test,” in How Liberal Are Citizenship Tests?, ed. Rainer Baubock and Christian Joppke (Fiesole, Italy: European University Institute, 2010); Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild, “Are Integration Tests Liberal? Te ‘Universalistic Liberal Democratic Principles’ as Illiberal Exceptionalism,” in Baubock and Joppke, How Liberal Are Citizenship Tests?, 29–34. 285. See Kenji Yoshino, “Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: Te Visibility Presumption and the Case of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’” Yale Law Journal 108, no. 3 (1998): 504. 286. Valérie Amiraux and Virginie Guiraudon, “Discrimination in Comparative Perspective: Policies and Practices,” American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 12 (2010): 1707. 287. Mark Bell, Racism and Equality in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 34. 288. Christian Joppke, “Minority Rights for Immigrants? Multiculturalism vs. Antidiscrimination,” Israel Law Review 43, no. 1 (2010): 54. 289. See Estelle Ferrarese, “Does Anti-discrimination Require Recognition?,” in European Anti-discrimination and the Politics of Citizenship: Britain and France, ed. Christophe Bertossi (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 290. European Union, “Directive 2003/109/EC,” November 25, 2003, https://easo.euro pa.eu/sites/default/fles/public/Longtermresidency-EN.pdf. 291. Carrera and Guild, “Are Integration Tests Liberal?,” 29. 292. European Commission, “Te Race Equality Directive,” June 27, 2007, https:// ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_07_257. 293. See Christian Joppke, “Transformation of Immigrant Integration: Civic Integration and Antidiscrimination in the Netherlands, France, and Germany,” World Politics 59, no. 2 (2007): 257–258. 294. Isabelle Chopin and Catharina Germaine, A Comparative Analysis of Nondiscrimination Law in the European Union (Brussels: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission, 2016), 10. 295. Richard Adams, “Inspectors to Question Primary School Girls Who Wear Hijab,” Te Guardian, November 19, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2017/nov/19/ school-inspectors-to-question-primary-school-girls-who-wear-hijab. 296. Phillip M. Ayoub and Jeremiah Garretson, “Getting the Message Out: Media Context and Global Changes in Attitudes toward Homosexuality,” paper presented at Western Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Las Vegas, April 3, 2015. 297. European Commission, “Discrimination in the EU in 2012,” November 2012, p. 42, https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontofce/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_393_en.pdf. 298. Ferrarese, “Does Anti-discrimination Require Recognition?,” 66. 299. Te 2000 Race Directive and the 2003 Directive on third-state permanent legal residents concern racial antidiscrimination. In November 2004 the Council of the European Union agreed on common basic principles for immigrant integration policy in the European Union. Tough nonbinding, this agreement is likely to further harmonize integration policies across Europe. 300. Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria, no. 13470/87 (European Court of Human

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Rights, September 20, 1994), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001 -57897%22]}. 301. Webb Keane, “What Is Religious Freedom Supposed to Free?,” in Politics of Religious Freedom, ed. W. F. Sullivan et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 59; Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild, “Are Integration Tests Liberal? Te Universalistic Liberal Democratic Principles as Illiberal Exceptionalism,” in Baubock and Joppke, How Liberal Are Citizenship Tests?, 21. 302. See Joppke, “A Christian Identity for the Liberal State,” 602. 303. See Jessica A. Clarke, “Against Immutability,” Yale Law Journal 125, no. 1 (2015), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/against-immutability. 304. Editorial Board, “Legalizing Discrimination in Europe,” New York Times, March 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/opinion/legalizing-discrimination-in-europe. html. 305. “A Court Ruling Makes It Harder for Faith-Based Employers to Discriminate,” Te Economist, April 26, 2018, https://www.economist.com/erasmus/2018/04/26/a-court-rulingmakes-it-harder-for-faith-based-employers-to-discriminate. 306. Werbner, “Islamophobia,” 9. 307. Anna Korteweg and Gökçe Yurdakul, Te Headscarf Debates: Conficts of National Belonging (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 10. 308. Norris and Inglehart, “Muslim Integration into Western Cultures,” 247. 309. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 310. B. Casalini, “Immigrazione, Islamofobia e manipolazione política della questione di genere,” Cosmopolis 5, no. 2 (2010): 141–156; N. Benelli et al., “De l’afaire du voile à l’imbrication du sexisme et du racism,” Nouvelles Questions Féministes 25, no. 1 (2006): 4–11. See also Monique Deveaux, “Political Morality and Culture: What Diference Do Diferences Make?, Social Teory and Practice 28, no. 3 (2002): 503–518; Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: Te Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions. 311. Norton, On the Muslim Question, 45. 312. Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 2. 313. Judith Butler, “Sexual Politics, Torture, and Secular Time,” British Journal of Sociology 59, no. 1 (2008): 1–23; Joan W. Scott, Te Politics of the Veil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). See also Lauren E. Bohn, “Islam and Gender,” Cairo Review of Global Afairs, Spring 2011, https://www.thecairoreview.com/midan/islam-and-gender/. 314. Butler, “Sexual Politics” 3. See also Sara R. Farris, “Femonationalism and the ‘Regular’ Army of Labor Called Migrant Women,” History of the Present 2, no. 2 (2012): 184–199. 315. Jasbir K. Puar, “Rethinking Homonationalism,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 45 (2013): 336–339. 316. Shelina Janmohamed, “British Muslim Women Don’t Need the West’s Version of Feminism, OK?,” Te Telegraph, March 17, 2014, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/ womens-life/10702454/Islam-and-feminism-British-Muslim-women-dont-need-the-Westsversion-of-feminism-OK.html; Fatima Mernissi, Te Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam (Abingdon, UK: Perseus Books, 1991); Fatima Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society, rev. ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). “Tell the believing men to lower their gaze and be modest. Tat is purer for them. Lo! Allah is aware of what they do. And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and be modest.” Qur’an 24:30–31.

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317. Dolores Morondo Taramundi, “Between Islamophobia and Post-feminist Agency: Intersectional Trouble in the European Face-Veil Bans,” Feminist Review 110, no. 1 (2015): 55–67; Gayatri Spivak, “Feminism and Critical Teory,” Women’s Studies International Quarterly 1, no. 3 (1978): 241–246; Christine Delphy, Separate and Dominate: Feminism and Racism after the War on Terror (London: Verso, 2015); Dorit Geva, “On Bellicist and Feminist French Conscription, Total War, and the Gender Contradictions of the State,” Politics and Society 42, no. 2 (2014): 139; Casalini, “Immigrazione, Islamofobia e Manipolazione Politica Della Questione Digenere”; Benelli et al., “De l’afaire du voile.” 318. Joan Scott, Sex and Secularism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017). Sarah Song goes even further and claims that a liberal right to choose means the state must accept polygamy if women have freely chosen to remain in polygamous marriages. Sarah Song, Justice, Gender and the Politics of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 22. 319. Randall Hansen, “Citizenship Tests: An Unapologetic Defense,” in Baubock and Joppke, How Liberal Are Citizenship Tests?, 26. 320. Tamsila Tauqir, the director of the Safra Project, has also served as chair of the Charity Interfaith Alliance UK and steering committee member of the Muslim Women’s Network UK. 321. Te grounds for refugee status provided by asylum seekers are not made public, and frm fgures on LGBT refugees are elusive. However, research by academics and nongovernmental organizations presents reliable estimates. See Sabine Jansen and Tomas Spijkerboer, “Fleeing Homophobia: Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Europe,” COC Nederland and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, September 2011, https://www. refworld.org/docid/4ebba7852.html. 322. Court of Justice of the European Union, “Press Release No. 145/13: Judgment in Case C-199/12, C-200/12, C-201/12,” November 7, 2013, https://ec.europa.eu/commis sion/presscorner/detail/en/CJE_13_145. 323. Philippus Zandstra, “Russische homo’s kunnenasielkrijgen in Nederland,” NRC Handelsblad, November 5, 2013, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/05/russische-homoskunnen-asiel-krijgen-in-nederland-a1430054. 324. Following the EU court decision, LGBT nongovernmental organizations actually expressed disappointment about the decision, since it conditioned achieving refugee status on the existence of serious grievances. See Sabine Jansen, “Dutch LGBT Asylum Policy,” Migrazine, February 2010, http://www.migrazine.at/artikel/dutch-lgbt-asylum-policy-english. 325. Tis afects not only Muslims. Referring to the abolishment of the Dutch blasphemy law in 2013, the leader of the Dutch orthodox Protestant Calvinist political party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij; SGP), Kees van der Staaij, said angrily, “Why should that provision die? Why, in these times of crisis, is precious parliamentary energy put into deleting this law?” Kees van der Staaij, “Afschafen verbod godslastering is een verdrietig signaal,” Volkskrant, March 20, 2013, https://www.volkskrant.nl/mensen/kees-van-der-staaij-afschafen-verbodgodslastering-is-een-verdrietig-signaal~be808773/. 326. Alec Stone Sweet and Clare Ryan, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Kant, Constitutional Justice, and the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 103–108. 327. Sergio Carrera and Joanna Parkin, “Te Place of Religion in European Union Law and Policy: Competing Approaches and Actors inside the European Commission,” Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2010, https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/placereligion-european-union-law-and-policy-competing-approaches-and-actors-inside/. 328. Kim Willsher, “France’s Burqa Ban Upheld by Human Rights Court,” Te Guardian,

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July 1, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/01/france-burqa-ban-upheldhuman-rights-court. 329. Te advocate general of the European Court of Justice concluded that private companies have the right to prevent employees from wearing the Muslim headscarf if that ban is consistent with general policies on all displays of religious or ideological afliation. Te court upheld the right of an employer to impose a dress code. Te governments of the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium as well as the European Commission had all sent the court opinions on the case. France noted that EU treaties allow countries to maintain their “national identities” and distinctive approaches to religion. Erasmus, “Why America May Provide More Muslim-Friendly Work-Places than Europe,” Te Economist, June 3, 2016, https://www.economist.com/erasmus/2016/06/03/why-america-may-provide-more-muslimfriendly-workplaces-than-europe. 330. Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism: Hospitality, Sovereignty, and Democratic Iterations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 331. Talal Assad, “Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism,” in Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury and Free Speech, ed. Talal Assad et al. (Berkeley: Townsend Center for the Humanities, University of California, 2009), 20–64. 332. Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 366–368. 333. Judith Butler, “Te Sensibility of Critique: Response to Asad and Mahmood,” in Asad et al., Is Critique Secular?, 117. 334. Anjem Choudary, “People Know the Consequences: Opposing View,” USA Today, January 8, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/01/07/islam-allah-mus lims-shariah-anjem-choudary-editorials-debates/21417461/. 335. Ian Leigh, “Damned If Tey Do, Damned If Tey Don’t: Te European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Religion from Attack,” Res Publica 17, no. 1 (2011): 55–73.” 336. Nazila Ghanea, “Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred in Accordance with International Human Rights,” February 2011, p. 3, https://www2.ohchr. org/english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/docs/CRP5Ghanea.pdf. From a broad perspective, the movement to circumscribe the bounds of free expression has its roots in three instruments of international law—the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Discrimination, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 337. Te most prominent hate speech case as of 2009 was that of Geert Wilders, who was indicted by the public prosecutor in 2009 for his public comments about Muslims and Islam and his release of a short flm documenting infammatory passages in the Qur’an. In France in 2002, four Muslim organizations fled a complaint against author Michel Houellebecq for stating that Islam was “stupid” and “dangerous” in an interview. Brefni O’Rourke, “France: Reference to Islam as ‘Most Stupid’ Religion Lands Author in Court,” Radio Free Europe, September 20, 2002, https://www.rferl.org/a/1100847.html. Although the court acquitted Houellebecq, it refrained from doing so on free speech grounds. In 2005, the politician JeanMarie Le Pen, runner-up in the 2002 presidential election, was convicted of inciting racial hatred for comments made to Le Monde in 2003 about the consequences of Muslim immigration in France. 338. Erik Bleich, “Free Speech or Hate Speech? Te Danish Controversy in the European Legal Context,” in Global Migration: Challenges in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Kavita R. Khory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 339. Te Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional

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matters, issued a report titled “Te Issue of Regulation and Prosecution of Blasphemy, Religious Insult, and Incitement to Religious Hatred.” Te report noted that blasphemy is an ofense in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, and San Marino. In addition, religious insult is a criminal ofense in Andorra, Cyprus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and Switzerland. Te United Kingdom, for example, abolished the common law ofenses of blasphemy and blasphemous libel in England and Wales in 2008. But in 2006 it enacted the Racial and Religious Hatred Act, which made intentionally stirring up religious hatred a crime. See Soeren Kern, “Muslims Pressing for Blasphemy Laws in Europe,” Gatestone Institute, November 2012, https://www.gatestonein stitute.org/3474/blasphemy-laws-europe. 340. See Daniel Schneiderman, “What Lessons Have We Learned about Speech in the Aftermath of the Paris Attacks,” in After the Paris Attacks: Responses in Canada, Europe and Around the Globe, ed. Edward Iacobucci and Stephen Toope (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2015), 159–166. 341. Mohammed Hani, “I Worry about Muslims,” New York Times, December 17, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/opinion/i-worry-about-muslims.html. 342. Jonathan Chait, “Charlie Hebdo and the Right to Commit Blasphemy,” Intelligencer, January 7, 2015, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2015/01/charlie-hebdo-and-the-right-tocommit-blasphemy.html. 343. Jacob Levy, Te Multiculturalism of Fear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 344. Levy, Te Multiculturalism of Fear, 12–13. 345. Nick Cohen, “After Paris, Europe May Never Feel as Free Again,” Te Guardian, November 14, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/14/after-parisattacks-europe-never-same-terrorism. 346. Alan Patten, “Te Republican Critique of Liberalism,” British Journal of Political Science 26, no. 1 (1996): 25–44. 347. Sylvie Kaufmann, “What’s a European Liberal to Do?,” New York Times, April 13, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/opinion/international/whats-a-european-liber al-to-do.html. 348. Étienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 75.

Chapter 2 1. Rowena Mason, “Downing Street Back Archbishop over Immigration Comments,” Te Guardian, March 11, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/11/ downing-street-backs-archbishop-over-immigration-comments. 2. Melanie Phillips, Londonistan (New York: Encounter Books, 2006), x–xi. 3. Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, “Te Multicultural State We’re In: Muslims, ‘Multiculture’ and the Civic Re-balancing of British Multiculturalism,” paper presented at Political Studies conference, Swansea, UK, April 1–3, 2008. 4. Cecile Laborde, “Which ‘Multiculturalism’ Has Failed, David Cameron?,” Open Democracy, February 14, 2011, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/ which-multiculturalism-has-failed-david-cameron/. 5. Christopher McCrudden, “Multiculturalism, Freedom of Religion, Equality, and the British Constitution: Te JFS Case Considered,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 9, no. 1 (2011): 200–229.

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6. Roger Eatwell claims that extremist right-wing activists have openly admired Islamic extremism, especially after the 9/11 attacks. Roger Eatwell, “Community Cohesion and Cumulative Extremism in Contemporary Britain,” Political Quarterly 67, no. 2 (2006): 204– 216. Also see Roger Eatwell, “Te Extreme Right and British Exceptionalism: Te Primacy of Politics,” in Hainsworth, Te Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream, ed. Paul Hainsworth (London: Pinter, 2000), 187. 7. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, Te Civic Culture (Boston: Little Brown, 1963). See also Malik Kenan, “Assimilation’s Failure, Terrorism Rise,” New York Times, July 6, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/07/opinion/07malik.html. 8. Steven Vertovec, “Super Diversity and Its Implications,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, no. 6 (2007): 1029. 9. Adrian Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain (London: Macmillan, 1998), 3–4. 10. Ira Katznelson, Black Man, White Cities: Race, Politics and Migration in the United States, 1900–30, and Britain, 1948–68 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 176– 177. 11. See Gail Lewis, “Race,” Gender, Social Welfare: Encounters in a Postcolonial Society (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000). 12. Mary J. Hickman, “Ruling an Empire, Governing a Multinational State: Te Impact of Britain’s Historical Legacy on the Contemporary Ethno-racial Regime,” in Ethnicity, Social Mobility, and Public Policy: Comparing the US and UK, ed. Glenn Loury, Tariq Modood, and Steven M. Teles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 23. 13. Bernard Crick, “Te Sense of Identity of the Indigenous British,” in “British National Identity in a European Context,” special issue, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 21, no. 2 (1995): 167. 14. See Lewis, “Race,” Gender, Social Welfare. 15. Mike O’Donnell, Race and Ethnicity (New York: Longman, 1991), 39. 16. Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2001), 83. 17. Umberto Melotti, “International Migration in Europe: Social Projects and Political Cultures,” in Te Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community, ed. Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner (London: Zed Books, 1997), 79. 18. Lucy Stone and Rick Muir, “Who Are We? Identities in Britain, 2007,” Institute for Public Policy Research, February 2007, p. 11, https://www.ippr.org/fles/images/media/fles/ publication/2013/04/who%20are%20we_1563.pdf. In April 2013 a report by Lord Ashcroft reached similar conclusions after examining the attitudes towards multiculturalism. Treequarters of UK ethnic minorities said that having people from a wide variety of backgrounds had strengthened British culture, though only just over half of the general population agreed. Lord Ashcroft, “45 Years On, Do Ethnic Minorities Remember ‘Rivers of Blood’?” Lord Ashcroft Polls, April 19, 2013, https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2013/04/45-years-on-do-ethnicminorities-remember-rivers-of-blood. 19. Tere is logic in this: “‘English,’ like Welsh or Scottish, is an ethnic as well as a cultural identity, whereas ‘British’ is by defnition multi-ethnic and multinational.” Randall Hansen, “British Citizenship after Empire: A Defense,” Political Quarterly 71, no. 1 (2000): 47. 20. Tariq Modood, “Muslims and the Politics of Diference,” Political Quarterly 74, no. 1 (2004): 102. 21. Ceri Peach, “Muslims in the UK,” in Muslim Britain: Communities under Pressure, ed. Tahir Abbas (London: Zed Books, 2005), 18.

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22. John T. S. Madeley, “Unequally Yoked: Te Antinomies of Church-State Separation in Europe and the USA,” European Political Science 8, no. 3 (2009): 9. 23. Te Anglican Church’s involvement in state institutions may not be intense; however, its attachment to the political system since the sixteenth century has left a residue still noticeable today that provides Christianity with a legal and political advantage. 24. Attempts to reform the House of Lords were made in 2000 by the Royal Commission headed by Lord Wakeham. Te commission recommended that there be twenty-six places for members representing UK Christian denominations—sixteen for the Church of England and fve for Christian denominations in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. In addition, it recommended that there be at least fve places for representatives from non-Christian faiths. Te proposal was not enacted. See Joel S. Fetzer and Christopher J. Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 34, 59. 25. Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, “Religious Pluralism in the United Sates and Britain: Its Implications for Muslims and Nationhood,” Social Compass 62, no. 4 (2015): 526–540. 26. Matthias Koenig, “Incorporating Muslim Migrants in Western Nation States—a Comparison of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany,” Journal of International Migration and Integration 6, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 224. 27. Te Muslim community is the largest religious minority in the United Kingdom. Other religious minorities such as Jews and Hindus are less than a half million, numbers that shape a unique political and social interaction. According to a national survey conducted in 2001, one-third of British Muslims are under age sixteen. Only one-ffth of the Christian community is under that same age. See Roger Penn and Paul Lambert, “Attitudes towards Ideal Family Size of Diferent Ethnic/Nationality Groups in Great Britain, France and Germany,” Population Trends 108 (2002): 49–58. 28. Eric Kaufmann, “Te Demography of Islam in Europe,” http://www.sneps.net/RD/ uploads/1-Te%20Demography%20of%20Islam%20in%20Europe.pdf (accessed March 1, 2020). See also Frank van Tubergen, “Religious Afliation and Attendance among Immigrants in Eight Western Countries: Individual and Contextual Efects,” Journal for the Scientifc Study of Religion 45, no. 1 (2006): 1–22; and Eric Kaufmann, Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities (London: Allen Lane, 2018). 29. Meer and Modood, “Te Multicultural State We’re In.” 30. Abdal Hakim Murad, “British and Muslim?” Khalid Zaheer (blog), April 28, 2019, http://www.khalidzaheer.com/british-and-muslim. A British convert to Islam, Abdal Hakim Murad was born in 1960 in London. He was educated at Cambridge University and attended Sunni Islam’s highest seat of learning, Al-Azhar University in Egypt. 31. Brian Barry argues that British identity was characterized by its additive type of assimilation, enhancing the value of equality defned in terms of individualism and the right to assimilate to the majority in the public sphere, with toleration of “diference” in the private sphere. Te UK model of additive assimilation difers from an absorptive-type assimilation because it defnes more relaxed criteria for membership in the nation. See Barry, Culture and Equality, 84–85. 32. Linda Colley, “British Values, Whatever Tey Are Won’t Hold Us Together,” Te Guardian, May 17, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/may/18/com ment.britishidentity. See also Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992). 33. By this legislation natives of UK colonies were considered citizens in all senses. By the 1940s, some 800 million individuals were UK subjects, and they all enjoyed, in principle at least, full rights in the United Kingdom. In 1948 the Labour government, sensitive to demands in the Dominions for separate citizenships, enacted legislation creating two classes

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of citizenship: citizenship of the United Kingdom and colonies and citizenship of independent Commonwealth countries (for Canada, Australia, etc.). See Randall, “British Citizenship after Empire,” 43. 34. Hickman, “Ruling an Empire,” 43. 35. As Bhikhu Parekh notes, Powell’s concept of British identity has four essential components, ranging from a parliamentary sovereignty that personifes the people of the United Kingdom to individualism as the inherent component of Britishness, to the ethnic unity of a mythical prepolitical British entity (a “homogeneous we”). Bhikhu Parekh, “Defning British National Identity,” Political Quarterly 71, no. 1 (2000): 9. 36. To many, Powell’s “rivers of blood” speech expressed a popular reaction to the mismanagement of liberal immigration policies. Tese policies were conceived to allow white colonial subjects to gain automatic citizenship when returning to Britain. Coming after race riots that erupted in the 1950s and 1960s, Powell’s “rivers of blood” speech made a tremendous impact. Although he was expelled from the Conservative cabinet, the salience of his speech put the race issue on the political agenda, leading UK governments to implant restrictions to immigration. See Glenn Loury, Tariq Modood, and Steven M. Teles, Ethnicity, Social Mobility and Public Policy: Comparing the USA and UK (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 9. 37. Anthony M. Messina, Te Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 111–112. See also Kathleen Paul, Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997). 38. Messina, Te Logics and Politics, 114. 39. Te bill passed with an overwhelming majority, backed by the slide of UK public opinion and governments from right to left and back to anti-immigration policies. See Sarah Lyall, “When Asylum Seekers Knock, Europe Is Deaf,” New York Times, June 20, 2002, p. A3. 40. Eileen Barker, “Te British Right to Discriminate,” in Church-State Relations: Tensions and Transitions, ed. Tomas Robbins and Roland Robertson (Oxford, UK: Transaction, 1987), 269–280. 41. Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All (London: Runnymede Trust, 1997). 42. Paul Weller, Alice Feldman, and Kingsley Pudman, Religious Discrimination in England and Wales (London: Home Ofce, 2001). 43. Labour Party liberals would occasionally take important national posts, such as Roy Jenkins as Home Ofce minister in the late 1960s and Shirley Williams as education minister in the late 1970s, and use their positions to inject multicultural ideas into national policy making. See Erik Bleich, “From International Ideas to Domestic Policies: Educational Multiculturalism in England and France,” Comparative Politics 31, no. 1 (1998): 95. 44. For example, in the Guardian, out of 894 articles including the term multiculturalism between 2000 and 2006, close to 40 percent also contain Muslim. See Stella Etcheparre, “Le multiculturalisme britannique à L’épreuve des évènements de 2001 à 2005,” in Communautés, Communautarisme, Multiculturalisme, ed. Luciene Germain and Didier Lasalle (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2008), 16. See also Ambalavaner Sivanandan, “Attacks on Multiculturalism in Britain Pave the Way for Enforced Assimilation,” Revista de Prensa, September 13, 2006, https://www.almendron.com/tribuna/attacks-on-multicultural-britain-pave-theway-for-enforced-assimilation/; and Sunny Hundal, “Tis System of Self-Appointed Leaders Can Hurt Tose It Should Be Protecting,” Te Guardian, November 19, 2006, https://www. theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/nov/20/comment.race. 45. Les Back, Michael Keith, Azra Khan, Kalbir Shukra, and John Solomos, “New

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Labour’s White Heart: Politics, Multiculturalism, and the Return of Assimilation,” Political Quarterly 73, no. 4 (2002): 446. 46. Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 77. 47. In 1983, the House of Lords (in Mandla v. Dowell Lee, 2 AC 548 [1983]) held that the Sikh community could be described as having an “ethnic origin” under section 3(1) of the Race Relations Act of 1976. Te Jewish community has the same protection. Te House of Lords, in seeking a meaning for “ethnic origin,” relied on a New Zealand decision on the same point under similar legislation, concerning a pamphlet published with the intent to incite ill will against Jews (King-Ansell v. Police, 2 NZLR 531 [1979]). Since then gypsies (the Court of Appeal used gypsies interchangeably with travelers and Romanians) have obtained a similar status (Commission for Racial Equality v. Dutton, 1 All ER 306 [1989]). 48. Te UK’s 1998 Human Rights Act aimed to incorporate into UK law the rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights. Tese laws ensure on a theoretical level protection against discrimination made by the state; however, because no legislation applies to individuals, people are not truly protected from discrimination. 49. Te Fair Employment and Treatment Order of 1998 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religious belief. Regarding higher education and provision of goods, the Northern Ireland Act of 1998 forbids discrimination on grounds of religious belief. 50. Te rejection letter was signed by Zaki Badawi (the Muslim College), Yousuf Bhailok (Muslim Council of Britain), Yousif al-Khoei (Al-Khoei Foundation), Yusuf Islam (Association of Muslim Schools), Mohammed Abdul Aziz (Forum against Islamophobia and Racism, UK), Sarah Sherif (Muslim Women’s Helpline), Ghayasuddin Siddiqui (the Muslim Parliament), Fuad Nahdi (Centre for Muslim Policy Research), and Syed Aziz Pasha (Union of Muslim Organizations). 51. “Atkinson’s Religious Hate Worry,” BBC News, December 7, 2004, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4073997.stm. 52. Foreign and Commonwealth Ofce, “Muslims in Britain,” cited in Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, 47. 53. A 2017 report puts the number close to 2,000. However, this might be an overcount, since it includes prayer rooms in institutions that are not primarily mosques and mosques that have closed down, merged with others, or moved in recent years. Mehmood Naqshbandi, “UK Mosque Statistics/Masjid Statistics,” September 16, 2017, http://www.muslimsinbrit ain.org/resources/masjid_report.pdf. 54. Center for the Study of Islam in the UK, “Mosques,” https://sites.cardif.ac.uk/isl amukcentre/rera/online-teaching-resources/muslims-in-britain-online-course/module-1/ basic-beliefs/mosques/ (accessed May 14, 2020). 55. Felice Dassetto, “Te New European Islam,” in Islam and European Legal Systems, ed. Silvio Ferrari and Anthony Bradney (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), 31–34. See also Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, 47. 56. According to a report from the Muslim Council of Britain, Muslims composed 12.4 percent of London’s population, with an increase of 405,000 people, or 35 percent, from 2001 to 2011. Te greatest concentration of Muslims is in Bradford, where they make up 24.7 percent of the population. Tirty-fve Local Authority Districts (LADs), of the 348 LADs in England and Wales, have a Muslim population of 10 percent or more. LADs with the highest percentage of Muslims can be found in Tower Hamlets (34.5 percent), where the Muslim population increased from 71,000 in 2001 to 88,000 in 2011, and Newham (32.0 percent). Tey are followed by Blackburn and Darwen, with Muslim populations of 27.0 percent. About seventy wards (electoral districts represented by one or more councilors) of the

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8,570 wards in England and Wales have a Muslim population of 40 percent or more. Wards with more than 70 percent are Blackburn (Bastwell and Shear Brow), Birmingham (Washwood Heath, Bordesley Green, and Sparkbrook), Burnley (Daneshouse with Stoneyholme), and Bradford (Toller, Manningham, and Bradford Moor). Muslim Council of Britain, “British Muslims in Numbers,” January 2015, p. 26, http://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2015/02/MCBCensusReport_2015.pdf. 57. Casanova, “Religion, European Secular Identities and European Integration,” in Byrnes and Katzenstein, Religion in an Expanding Europe, 75. 58. Amos Zehavi, “Te Faith-Based Initiative in Comparative Perspective: Making Use of Religious Providers in Britain and the United States,” Comparative Politics, April 2008, p. 334. 59. Te Surrey mosque, which has not been built, was supposed to have a large dome and two one-hundred-foot-tall minarets, just four hundred yards from the parade ground. Te plans, which involve demolishing a Victorian school, were approved by Surrey Heath Borough Council’s planning committee. Tose who opposed demolishing vestiges of Victorian times claimed that they were defending British heritage. Te communities secretary, John Denham, could intervene if a planned building causes controversy or has national signifcance. See Christopher Hope, “John Denham Could Intervene in the Battle over Mosque Next to Sandhurst,” Te Telegraph, March 10, 2010, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/poli tics/7406718/John-Denham-could-intervene-in-the-battle-over-mosque-next-to-Sandhurstin-Surrey.html. 60. Te Deobandi ultraconservative movement, which gave birth to the Taliban in Afghanistan, now runs more than 600 of the 1,350 mosques in the United Kingdom. Riyadhul Haq, the spiritual leader of the Deobandi sect there, “loathes Western values and has called on Muslims to ‘shed blood’ for Allah. . . . [Ul Haq] supports armed jihad and preaches contempt for Jews, Christians and Hindus.” See Andrew Norfolk, “Hardline Takeover of British Mosques,” Te Times (London), September 7, 2007, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ hardline-takeover-of-british-mosques-khdjz2cjpnc. 61. Jerome Taylor, “Te Radical Worshippers Who Harm Liberal Mosque,” Te Independent, December 29, 2009, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/the-radicalworshippers-who-harm-liberal-mosque-1852093.html. 62. Te report proposes enabling the police to issue a requirement order to any individual or organization that is infuenced by or afliated with the mosque if they participate in terrorist activities, such as supporting or funding “proscribed organizations” (as stated in the Terrorism Act of 2000) or calling for violent resistance to any occupying power (Terrorism Bill 2005). See Shane Brighton, “British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy: ‘Integration’ and ‘Cohesion’ in and beyond the State,” International Afairs 83, no. 1 (2007): 1–17. 63. House of Commons debate, November 27, 2006, Hansard 453, no. 7 (2006), https:// publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm061127/debindx/61127-x.htm. 64. Mohamed Mukadam and Alison Scott-Baumann with Ashfaque Chowdhary and Sariya Contractor, Te Training and Development of Muslim Faith Leaders: Current Practice and Future Possibilities (London: Communities and Local Government, 2010), 10, 18. 65. Alan Travis, “British Imams to Tackle Radicals in Mosques,” Te Guardian, September 22, 2005, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/sep/23/politics.terrorism. 66. See the 1996 Education Act, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukp ga/1996/56/contents. 67. An analysis of textbooks done by Sabine Mannitz and Werner Schifauer, for example, shows that UK understanding of multiculturalism places diversity at the center of self-

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defnition. Sabine Mannitz and Werner Schifauer, “Taxonomies of Cultural Diference: Constructions of Otherness,” in Civil Enculturation: Nation State, School and Ethnic Diference in the Netherlands, Britain Germany and France, ed. Werner Schifauer, Gerd Baumann, Riva Kastoryano, and Steven Vertovec (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 61. 68. Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, “Te Political and Policy Responses to Migration Related Diversity in Britain’s Education System: A European Approach to Multicultural Citizenship; Legal Political and Educational Challenges,” 2008, p. 3, https://www.researchgate. net/publication/253479415. 69. Committee of Inquiry into the Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups, Education for All (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Ofce, 1985), 499–500. See also Tariq Modood and Stephen May, “Multiculturalism and Education in Britain: An Internally Contested Debate,” International Journal of Educational Research 35 (2001): 307. 70. Advisory Group on Citizenship, Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools (London: Qualifcations and Curriculum Authority, 1998), 17. 71. Advisory Group on Citizenship, Education for Citizenship, 17. 72. Advisory Group on Citizenship, Education for Citizenship; Audrey Osler and Hugh Starkey, “Citizenship Education and National Identities in France and England: Inclusive or Exclusive,” Oxford Review of Education 27, no. 2 (2001): 293; Alice Miles, “Citizenship: A British Farce,” Te Times (London), March 12, 2008, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ citizenship-a-british-farce-9z2r6bzc52v. 73. “Veil Row Teacher Sacked,” Te Guardian, November 24, 2006, https://www.the guardian.com/education/2006/nov/24/schools.uk. Tis saga followed one started by a Muslim student who wore a more conservative form of Islamic dress than was permitted. After two years in which school ofcials tried to compromise with the student, her parents, and religious leaders, she was expelled. Te student’s fnal appeal to the Supreme Court was unsuccessful because, according to the ruling, the school had made the utmost efort to create an acceptable agreement. “School Wins Muslim Dress Appeal,” BBC News, March 22, 2006, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4832072.stm. 74. “Schools Allowed to Ban Face Veils,” BBC News, March 20, 2007, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/6466221.stm. 75. Te Prevent Strategy has three specifc strategic objectives: (1) respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat from those who promote it, (2) prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support, and (3) work with sectors and institutions in which there are risks of radicalization. It was signed by Hazel Blears, secretary of state for communities and local government; Jacqui Smith, Home secretary; Ed Balls, secretary of state for children, schools, and families; John Denham, secretary of state for innovation, universities and skills; Andy Burnham, secretary of state for culture, media and sport; and Jack Straw, MP, Lord Chancellor, and secretary of state for justice. See UK Government, “Te Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England,” May 2008, https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121004145409/https:// www.education.gov.uk/publications/eOrderingDownload/Prevent_Strategy.pdf; Communities and Local Government, “Preventing Violent Extremism—Winning Hearts and Minds,” April 2007, https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070506201536/http://www.com munities.gov.uk/pub/401/PreventingviolentextremismWinningheartsandminds_id1509401. pdf; and UK Government, “Prevent Strategy,” June 2011, https://assets.publishing.service. gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fle/97976/prevent-strategyreview.pdf. Te Counter-terrorism and Security Act of 2015 contains a duty on specifed authorities to give due regard to preventing people from being drawn into terrorism. Tis is also known as the Prevent Duty. In March 2015, Parliament approved guidance, issued under

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section 29 of the act, about how specifed education authorities are to comply with the Prevent Duty by preventing radicalization and promoting British values of tolerance at schools. Department for Education, “Te Prevent Duty: Departmental Advice for Schools and Childcare Providers,” June 2015, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys tem/uploads/attachment_data/fle/439598/prevent-duty-departmental-advice-v6.pdf. 76. Communities and Local Government, “Preventing Violent Extremism,” 4. 77. Muslim Council of Britain, “Towards Greater Understanding: Meeting the Needs of Muslim Pupils in State Schools,” February 2007, https://tandis.odihr.pl/han dle/20.500.12389/20475. 78. City of Birmingham Education Department, “Revised Guidelines on Meeting the Religious and Cultural Needs of Muslim Pupils,” 1988, https://tandis.odihr.pl/han dle/20.500.12389/20476. 79. Stephen Castle and Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, “Rift Deepens in Britain over Claims of School Infltration Plot by Islamic Extremists,” New York Times, June 8, 2014, https://www. nytimes.com/2014/06/09/world/europe/rift-deepens-over-claims-of-infltration-by-islamicextremists-in-british-schools.html. 80. Peter Clarke, “Report into Allegations concerning Birmingham Schools Arising from the ‘Trojan Horse’ Letter,” July 2014, p. 5, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/govern ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fle/340526/HC_576_accessible_-.pdf. 81. “Muslim Identities and the School System in France and Britain: Te Impact of the Political and Institutional Confgurations on Islam-Related Education Policies,” paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Pisa, September 2007. 82. Geofrey Walford concluded that state funding has considerable positive efect on curriculum, stafng, admissions criteria, inspection, and governance. See Geofrey Walford, “Funding for Religious Schools in England and the Netherlands: Can the Piper Call the Tune?,” Research Papers in Education 16, no. 4 (2001): 359–380. 83. See Statistics of Education, “Schools in England,” in Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, 44. 84. “Government Agrees to Fund Muslim Schools,” BBC News, January 9, 1998, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/46069.stm. 85. “Q&A: Muslim Schools,” BBC News, February 7, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ uk_news/education/6338219.stm. 86. Peter Mandaville, “Education in Britain Approaches to Religious Knowledge in a Pluralistic Society,” in Schooling Islam: Te Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education, ed. Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zama (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 230. 87. Te fnancing did not come easily because public debate and massive pressure surrounded it. Te Islamia School opened its doors in 1983 and had requested funding since 1986, without success. It charged £2,000 a year, much more than most families could aford. Te public funding lifts a huge weight of parents. See “Government Agrees to Fund Muslim Schools.” 88. Sally Weale, “Some Islamic Schools in England Still Segregating Children,” Te Guardian, November 7, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2017/nov/07/someislamic-schools-in-england-still-segregating-children. 89. Extremists have exploited the regulatory void to spread fundamentalist ideas. One example is a school in Mark Cross, East Sussex. Set on ffty-four acres and with a hundred rooms, the school had only nine students in attendance. An investigation discovered it was involved with extremists and even connected to terrorism. “Profle: Jameah Islameah School,” BBC News, September 2, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5308626.stm.

360

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90. “UK Panorama Finds Anti-Semitic Texts in Schools,” BBC News, November 22, 2010, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-11808658/panorama-fnds-anti-semitic-texts-inschools. 91. Islamic Education and Research Academy, “IERA Responds to the ‘British Schools, Islamic Rules’ Panorama Programme,” November 23, 2010, https://www.reddit.com/r/islam/ comments/eb486/iera_responds_to_the_british_schools_islamic/. 92. Te Equality Act of 2010 (which prohibits discrimination against individuals) does not extend to school curricula or whether faith schools use homophobic material. 93. Hayley Dixon, “Non-Muslim Teachers ‘Forced to Wear Veil’ at Faith School,” Te Telegraph, September 20, 2013, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/education news/10322872/Non-Muslim-teachers-forced-to-wear-veil-at-faith-school.html. 94. “Al-Madinah Free School in Derby Labelled ‘Dysfunctional’ by Ofsted,” BBC News, October 17, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-derbyshire-24548690. 95. Sean Coughlan, “Should Tere Be More Muslim State Schools?” BBC News, October 6, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/education-37484358. 96. Sixty-seven percent of respondents thought faith academies should be required to teach other beliefs, including nonreligious beliefs (23 percent did not, and 11 percent of respondents were not sure). About 70 percent had concerns about the possible promotion of a particular faith by the use of public funds. Te survey asked, “If an academy were set up by a religious organization, would you be very, quite, not very, or not at all concerned that public money may be used to promote a particular religion or belief?”; 35 percent reported that they were “very concerned,” 36 percent “quite concerned,” 16 percent “not very concerned,” 5 percent “not at all concerned,” and 7 percent were unsure. Humanists UK, “Poll—Over Two Tirds Concerned Tat Academies Bill Will Use Public Money to Promote Religion,” July 14, 2010, https://humanism.org.uk/2010/07/14/news-599/. 97. As claimed by Toby Helm and Mark Townsend, public opinion surveys by Opinium show that 58 percent of British voters believe that faith schools should not be funded by the state; 60 percent believe such schools promote segregation. Toby Helm and Mark Townsend, “Taxpayers’ Cash Should Not Be Used to Fund Faith Schools, Say Voters,” Te Guardian, June 14, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/jun/14/taxpayers-should-notfund-faith-schools. 98. Ofce for National Statistics, “Muslim Population in the UK,” August 2, 2018, https://www.ons.gov.uk/aboutus/transparencyandgovernance/freedomofinformationfoi/ muslimpopulationintheuk; Tariq Modood et al., Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and Disadvantage (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1997). According to Modood and colleagues, one-third of UK Muslims live in social housing, a number considerably higher than other minority groups. 99. Although Muslims share one faith, their homeland, ethnic origin, and even specifc patterns of religious practice create enormous diversity within the community that cannot be underestimated. See Trades Union Congress, “Poverty, Exclusion and British People of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Origin,” 2006, https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/fles/extras/ poverty.pdf. 100. Eric Kaufmann, Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? (London: Profle Books, 2010); Kaufmann, “Te Demography of Islam in Europe.” 101. See Seán McLoughlin, “Te State, New Muslim Leadership and Islam as a Resource for Public Engagement in Britain,” in European Muslims and the Secular State, ed. Jocelyne Césari and Seán McLoughlin (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005). 102. McLoughlin, “Te State, New Muslim Leadership,” 58. 103. See Yunas Samad, “Muslim Youth in Britain: Ethnic to Religious Identity,” paper

Notes to 125–127

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presented at the conference “Muslim Youth in Europe,” Turin, June 11, 2004. 104. Te Muslim Association of Britain was established in 1997 by Muslim Arabs who felt forgotten because of the dominance of Asian Muslims in the United Kingdom. Tis organization gathered two million protesters in a demonstration against the Iraq War in February 2003, in contrast to the MCB, which protested the war by creating a lobby behind closed doors, recruiting young Arab Muslims, and fomenting a loud public debate against the war. See Samad, “Muslim Youth in Britain.” 105. Samad, “Muslim Youth in Britain.” 106. Sean McLoughlin, “Islam, Citizenship and Civil Society: ‘New’ Muslim Leadership in the UK,” in European Muslims and the Secular State in a Comparative Perspective, ed. Jocelyne Césari (n.p.: Network of Comparative Research on Islam and Muslims in Europe, 2003), 100–124. 107. McLoughlin, “Islam, Citizenship and Civil Society,” 117. 108. Critics, however, claim that from MCB’s early origins there were groups within the organization that were sympathetic to the late Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, a highly infuential Pakistani proponent of a sharia-based government. 109. Te Islamic Foundation was founded in 1973 by Khurshid Ahmad. As deputy emir of Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, Ahmad began his life in the party as a highly politicized student activist before going on to make his name in developing the feld of Islamic economics. He also became a member, although ultimately short-lived and critical, of the military government (1977–1988) of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. 110. Abdul Ghafar Don et al., “Da’wah in the West: An Analysis of the Role of the Islamic Foundation (IF) in Promoting the True Image of Islam,” Advances in Natural and Applied Sciences 6, no. 4 (2012): 544, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335060719_ORIG INAL_ARTICLE_Da’wah_in_the_West_an_Analysis_of_the_Role_of_the_Islamic_Foun dation_If_in_Promoting_the_True_Image_of_Islam. 111. Violent riots in Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley in 2001 placed community tensions and divisions at the center of government policy. A ministerial group led by John Denham looked into issues of public order and how to minimize the risk of further disorders. Ted Cantle chaired the team making the resulting report. Ted Cantle, “Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team,” December 11, 2001, http://tedcantle.co.uk/pdf/ communitycohesion%20cantlereport.pdf. 112. Kingsley Purdam, “Democracy in Practice: Muslims and the Labour Party at the Local Level,” Politics 21, no. 3 (2001): 147–157. Tis deterioration took a toll; about 10 percent of Muslims left Labour for the Liberal Democrats party. 113. Te party won 55 percent of the votes. Ratna Lachman and Kieron Merchandani Cooper, “George Galloway’s Victory: Two Views from a Bradford Household,” Te Guardian, April 2, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/the-northerner/2012/apr/02/georgegallo way-bradfordwest-byelection-respect-students-bradri-twitter-facebook. 114. A letter, written in Urdu without any ofcial logo, contained allegations that the Labour candidate was not a true Muslim. Tey were unfounded; however, they were accepted by the Muslim Public Afairs Committee, which urged voters in Bradford to vote for the Respect Party and not Labour. 115. “George Galloway Wins Bradford West by Election,” Te Telegraph, March 30, 2012, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9175133/George-Galloway-wins-Bradford-Westby-election.html. 116. Te MCB, for example, said, “British Muslims, along with everyone else, are watching events in America with shock and horror. Whoever is responsible for these dreadful, wanton attacks, we condemn them utterly.” See Muslim Council of Britain, “MCB Expresses Total

362

Notes to 128–129

Condemnation of Terrorist Attack,” September 11, 2001, https://mcb.org.uk/press-releases/ mcb-expresses-total-condemnation-of-terrorist-attacks/. See also Condemning Terrorism: Statements from Muslim Leaders (Amman, Jordan: Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Tought, 2012), 60, https://rissc.jo/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Condemning_TerrorismEN.pdf; and Kate Goldberg, “Islam ‘Hijacked’ by Terror,” BBC News, October 11, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1591024.stm. 117. Pew Research Center, “Te Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other,” June 22, 2006, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2006/06/22/the-great-dividehow-westerners-and-muslims-view-each-other/. 118. Ipsos MORI, “A Review of Survey Research on Muslims in Britain,” February 2018, pp. 69–74, https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/fles/ct/publication/documents/2018-03/areview-of-survey-research-on-muslims-in-great-britain-ipsos-mori_0.pdf. 119. ComRes poll, cited in Ipsos MORI, “A Review of Survey Research on Muslims in Britain,” 69. 120. Channel 4, “C4 Survey and Documentary Reveals What British Muslims Really Tink,” April 11, 2016, https://www.channel4.com/press/news/c4-survey-and-documentaryreveals-what-british-muslims-really-think. See also ICM Unlimited, “C4 Muslims Survey: Sampling Approach,” 2016, https://www.icmunlimited.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ Survey-of-Muslims_Sampling-approach.pdf. 121. Brendan O’Dufy, “Radical Atmosphere: Explaining Jihadist Radicalization in the UK,” PS: Political Science and Politics 41, no. 1 (2008): 39. A UK government’s study of the causes of the July 7, 2005, London bombings also concluded that foreign policy in the Middle East is linked to the growth of terror cells. Mark Townsend, “Ofcial: Iraq War Led to July Bombings,” Te Guardian, April 1, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/apr/02/ politics.july7. 122. Te UK cabinet’s Joint Intelligence Committee’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Center issued “International Terrorism: War with Iraq” in February 2003. Te report highlighted growing Muslim unease regarding UK participation in Iraq. It determined that “Al Qaida and associated groups will continue to represent by far the greatest terrorist threat to Western interests, and that threat will be heightened by military action against Iraq. Te broader threat from Islamist terrorists will also increase in the event of war, refecting intensifed anti-US/ anti-Western sentiment in the Muslim world, including among Muslim communities in the West.” Jon Shwarz, “British Intelligence Warned Tony Blair of Manchester-Like Terrorism If the West Invaded Iraq,” Te Intercept, May 23, 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/05/23/ british-intelligence-warned-tony-blair-of-manchester-like-terrorism-if-the-west-invadediraq/ (emphasis added). See also Brighton, “British Muslims, Multiculturalism,” 2. 123. Justin Gest, Apart: Alienated and Engaged Muslims in the West (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 40–50. 124. Gest, Apart, 85. 125. Gest, 121–122. 126. Nafees Hamid, “What Makes a Terrorist?,” New York Review of Books, August 23, 2017, https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/08/23/what-makes-a-terrorist/. 127. Much of the biographical detail about the July 2005 London bombers, apart from Germaine Lindsay, is unexceptional. Akil N. Awan, “Antecedents of Islamic Political Radicalism among Muslim Communities in Europe,” PS: Political Science and Politics 41, no. 1 (2008): 15. 128. Kenan Malik, “Born in Bradford,” Prospect Magazine, October 22, 2005, cited in Alison Pargeter, Te New Frontiers of Jihad Radical Islam in Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 145. See also Delwar Hussain, “Bangladeshis in East London:

Notes to 130–131

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From Secular Politics to Islam,” Open Democracy, July 7, 2006, cited in Pargeter, Te New Frontiers of Jihad, 145. 129. Kenan Malik, “How Did the Left Radicalism of My Manchester Youth Give Way to Islamism?,” Te Guardian, May 28, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentis free/2017/may/28/islamism-separation-other-peoples-even-muslims. 130. Maajid Nawaz, “Te Education of ‘Jihadi John,’” New York Times, March 3, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/opinion/the-education-of-jihadi-john.html. 131. Gest, Apart, 107. 132. Islam4UK became famous in January 2010 when it announced plans for a protest march through Wootton Bassett, a town that had held an informal public mourning to honor servicemen killed in Afghanistan. Te march was supposed to carry empty cofns to represent the Muslims who had died in Afghanistan. Once news of it became public, a Facebook petition calling for the march to be banned gathered more than four hundred thousand signatures. Te intensity of the internet campaign forced the government to act, and ultimately the march was banned. Ian Drury, “Top Ofcer Says Muslim Hate Preacher ‘DOES Have Right to March’ as 400,000 Join Facebook Group against Wootton Bassett Protest,” Daily Mail, January 10, 2010, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1240318/Wootton-Bassett-pro test-Top-ofcer-says-Anjem-Choudary-DOES-right-march.html. 133. See Malik, Islam and Modernity: Muslims in Europe and the United States (London: Pluto Press, 2004); Lucy Michael, “Leadership in Transition? Issues of Representation and Youth in British Muslim Communities,” Economic and Social Research Council Working Paper 12, 2004, p. 18, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228963731_Leadership_ in_Transition_Issues_of_Representation_and_Youth_in_British_Muslim_Communities. 134. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 178. 135. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 144–145. 136. Shiraz Maher, “From Bin Laden to Isis: Why the Roots of Jihadi Ideology Run Deep in Britain,” New Statesman, September 4, 2014, https://www.newstatesman.com/2014/08/ bin-laden-s-fnal-triumph. 137. Sean O’Neill, “Analysis: Terror Camp Convictions Mark End of the Hamza Network,” Te Times (London), February 26, 2008, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/analysisterror-camp-convictions-mark-end-of-the-hamza-network-z6cn7x683qd. 138. When Bakri left London for a visit to Beirut, the UK government banned him from returning. Al-Suri established his own terrorist training camp to put into practice his vision of jihad, which was as an individual jihad. In 2004, he published online the 1,600-page “Te Global Islamic Resistance Call,” which laid the foundation for the current generation of followers of Al-Qaeda in the West who would be willing to engage in jihadi activities without leaving their home countries and with little or no contact with the organization. His book outlines steps for launching a jihad without attending a training camp. He was one of the frst to grasp the internet’s potential for replacing the training camp. 139. Te documentary shows that organizations and individuals who preached that democracy is incompatible with Islam or who expressed negative views on homosexuals, women, and non-Muslims that most UK citizens would deem unacceptable received public funding. 140. Mark Curtis, Secret Afairs: Britain’s Collusion with Radical Islam (London: Profle Books, 2018). 141. Shiraz Maher and Martyn Frampton, “Choosing Our Friends Wisely: Criteria for Engagement with Muslim Groups,” Policy Exchange, 2009, https://policyexchange.org.uk/ wp-content/uploads/2016/09/choosing-our-friends-wisely-mar-09.pdf.

364

Notes to 131–135

142. Richard Norton-Taylor, “Why Abu Qatada Can’t Be Tried in the UK,” Te Guardian, January 17, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/jan/17/why-abu-qatada-cant-betried-here. 143. Owen Bowcott, “Cameron’s Pledge to Scrap Human Rights Act Angers Civil Rights Groups,” Te Guardian, October 1, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/ oct/01/cameron-pledge-scrap-human-rights-act-civil-rights-groups. 144. House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee, “Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009–10,” March 30, 2010, https://publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65.pdf. 145. John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 7; John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, “Islam and Democracy,” Humanities 22, no. 6 (2001), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/807a/651c5883140a27086f80adc534 20fcbfe1ba.pdf. 146. Robert Lambert, “Empowering Salafs and Islamists against al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study,” PS: Political Science and Politics 41, no. 1 (2008): 34. 147. Arguments against the collaboration with radicals, however, can be registered in the last “terror camp convictions” that marked an end of the Hamza network. Muhammad Hamid and Attila Ahmet embarked on the same outdoor activities designed to test and bond their tutees that Abu Hamza had prescribed for his followers. Te Jameah Islameah School had also been one of his haunts. Te signifcance of the arrest of the pair in 2006 can be measured by the noticeable lull in Al-Qaeda’s activity in the United Kingdom that followed. Sean O’Neill, “Analysis: Terror Camp Convictions Mark End of the Hamza Network,” Te Times (London), February 26, 2008, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/analysis-terror-camp-con victions-mark-end-of-the-hamza-network-z6cn7x683qd. 148. “Blair Completes Middle East Mission,” BBC News, October 12, 2001, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1593314.stm. 149. On September 29, John Denham declared, “We are making it abundantly clear that nothing in the events of 11 September provide any justifcation for racists in this country to attack, or discriminate against, or abuse Muslims. . . . Islamophobia was wrong before 11 September and is wrong today. . . . Te real Islam is a religion of peace, tolerance and understanding.” “Pledge to Wipe Out Islamophobia,” BBC News, September 29, 2001, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1570106.stm. 150. UK Government, “Prevent Strategy,” 8. 151. Ishtiaq Hussain, a former member of Hizbut-Tahrir, says that the only way to turn Muslims away from extremism is by showing that radical Islamist interpretations of the Qur’an are incorrect. 152. David Kirkpatrick, “In Brexit-Era London, a Mosque Sits between Two Types of Hate,” New York Times, November 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/09/world/ europe/uk-brexit-london-muslims.html. 153. Te 2005 control orders were replaced in 2011 by the weaker restrictions of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act. 154. Timothy Garton Ash states, “French Muslims identify with France more than their British counterparts do with Britain. We need to understand why.” Timothy Garton Ash, “What Young British Muslims Say Can Be Shocking—Some of It Is Also True,” Te Guardian, August 10, 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/aug/10/comment.race. 155. Salman Rushdie’s fourth novel, Te Satanic Verses (London: Viking, 1988), was considered extremely ofensive by Muslims. Te Rushdie afair began when Muslims protested violently in several countries, and Rushdie faced death threats and a fatwa issued by Ayatollah R. Khomeini, the supreme leader of Iran in 1989.

Notes to 136–139

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156. Tariq Modood, “Multiculturalism, Britishness, and Muslims,” Open Democracy, January 27, 2011, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/multiculturalism-britishness-andmuslims/. 157. Bhikhu Parekh, “Introduction,” in Law, Blasphemy, and Multi-faith Society (London: Commission for Racial Equality and the Inter Faith Network for the United Kingdom, 1990), 1–39; Bhikhu Parekh, ed., Free Speech: Seminar Report (London: Commission for Racial Equality, 1990); Bhikhu Parekh, ed., Britain: A Plural Society (London: Commission for Racial Equality, 1990). See an analysis of the Rushdie afair in Peter Jones, “Rushdie, Race and Religion,” Political Studies 38 (1990): 604–687. 158. Shabbir Akhtar, Be Careful with Muhammad! Te Salman Rushdie Afair (London: Bellew, 1989), 131. 159. Muslim writers who contributed to the debate seemed to want—implicitly at least— to convince people in the West that Rushdie’s book was harmful to Muslims. Ali Mazrui, for example, compared the Satanic Verses to Hitler’s Mein Kampf. See Ali M. Mazrui, “Te Satanic Verses or a Satanic Novel? Moral Dilemmas of the Rushdie Afair,” in Parekh, Free Speech, 79–103. 160. Susan Mendus agrees; the classical multicultural assessment is that freedom of speech should be defended at the same time that it should be limited by the promotion of mutual understanding between diferent communities of believers. Susan Mendus, “Te Tigers of Wrath and the Horses of Instruction,” in Parekh, Free Speech, 3–17. 161. See Alberto Weale, “Freedom of Speech vs. Freedom of Religion,” in Parekh, Free Speech, 55–58. 162. Similarly, the ofce of the Triratna Buddhist Order argues that suppressing attacks on their beliefs would be un-Buddhist. Keith Ward, “Tird Introductory Paper,” in Parekh, Free Speech, 30–39. 163. Peter Jones, “Respecting Beliefs and Rebuking Rushdie,” British Journal of Political Science 20, no. 4 (1990): 420. On the history of the English law of blasphemy, see George D. Nokes, A History of the Crime of Blasphemy (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1928). 164. Shabbir Akhtar, “Whose Light? Whose Darkness?,” Te Guardian, February 27, 1989, cited in Jones, “Respecting Beliefs,” 417. 165. Mazrui, “Te Satanic Verses or a Satanic Novel?” 166. Weale, “Freedom of Speech vs. Freedom of Religion.” 167. Shabbir Akhtar, “Is Freedom Holy to Liberals,” in Parekh, Free Speech, 24; Akhtar, Be Careful with Muhammad!, 120. 168. Charles Taylor, “Te Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25–73. 169. Michael Walzer, “Te Sins of Salman,” New Republic, April 10, 1989, pp. 13–15. 170. Daniel I. O’Neill, “Multicultural Liberals and the Rushdie Afair: A Critique of Kymlicka, Taylor and Walzer,” Review of Politics 61, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 237. 171. Modood, “Multiculturalism, Britishness, and Muslims.” 172. Bhikhu Parekh, “Between Holy Text and Moral Void,” New Statesman and Society, March 24, 1989, p. 33. 173. Pir Mahroof Hussain, quoted in Jones, “Respecting Beliefs,” 422. 174. See Tariq Modood, “Muslims, Religious Equality and Secularism,” in Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship, ed. Geofrey Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 164–185. 175. See Kim Murphy, “Britain’s Blasphemy Law No Longer Sacred,” Los Angeles Times, March 6, 2008, https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-blasphemy6mar06-story.html.

366

Notes to 139–142

176. Alan Travis, “Archbishops Question Timing of Plans to Abolish Blasphemy Laws,” Te Guardian, March 4, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/04/religion. constitution. Te two archbishops, Rowan Williams and John Sentamu, make it clear that they will not oppose the abolition of blasphemy but say the government needs to be clear as to precisely why the ofense is being scrapped. 177. See “Anglicanism: Te Gathering Storm,” Te Economist, February 14, 2008, p. 40. 178. See David Pearl and Werner Menski, Muslim Family Law, 3rd ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1998), 75. See also Samia Bano, “Islamic Family Arbitration, Justice and Human Rights in Britain,” Law, Social Justice and Global Development Journal 1 (2007): 2–26. 179. Muslim Council of Britain, “We Need a Toughtful Discourse, Not Hysterical Discord,” February 8, 2008, https://mcb.org.uk/press-releases/we-need-a-thoughtful-discoursenot-hysterical-discord/. 180. Elaine Sciolino, “Britain Grapples with Role for Islamic Justice,” New York Times, November 18, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/world/europe/19shariah.html. 181. John Bowen, “How Could English Courts Recognize Shariah?,” University of St Tomas Law Journal 7, no. 3 (2010): 411–435. 182. Abul Taher, “Revealed: UK’s First Ofcial Sharia Courts,” Immigration Watch Canada, September 14, 2008, https://immigrationwatchcanada.org/2008/09/14/revealed-uksfrst-ofcial-sharia-courts/. 183. Erik Bleich, “Faith and State: British Policy Responses to ‘Islamist’ Extremism,” in Te New Extremism in 21st Century Britain, ed. Roger Eatwell and Matthew J. Goodwin (London: Routledge, 2010), 79. 184. John Bingham, “Sharia Law in the UK: Calls for Parliamentary Inquiry,” Te Telegraph, March 23, 2014, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/10717575/Sharia-lawin-UK-calls-for-Parliamentary-inquiry.html. 185. Pragna Patel, “‘Shariafcation by Stealth’ in the UK,” Open Democracy, October 17, 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/shariafcation-by-stealth-in-uk/. 186. Innes Bowen, “Te End of One Law for All?” BBC News, November 28, 2006, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/6190080.stm; “Sharia Councils—Discrimination against Women? Baroness Cox vs Mohammed Shafq,” You Tube, November 1, 2016, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8VVAbCjJTc. 187. UK Parliament, “Legal Systems: Islam,” November 24, 2008, https://publications.par liament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm081124/text/81124w0012.htm#08112421000016. On the status of sharia and Muslim arbitration tribunals, see Lawyers’ Secular Society, “Key Issues,” https://lawyerssecularsociety.wordpress.com/key-issues/ (accessed July 14, 2020). 188. Emphasizing that there was no place for “extreme punishments” and discrimination against women, Williams spoke of making all communities “part of the public process” in order to limit oppression. See Ruth Gledhill and Philip Webster, “Archbishop of Canterbury Argues for Islamic Law in Britain,” Te Times (London), February 8, 2008, https://www.the times.co.uk/article/archbishop-of-canterbury-argues-for-islamic-law-in-britain-3pjrxnxc3nc. 189. Riazat Butt, “Archbishop Backs Sharia Law for British Muslims,” Te Guardian, February 7, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/feb/07/religion.world. 190. Ruth Gledhill, “Has the Archbishop Gone Bonkers?,” New English Review, February 7, 2008, https://2005-09.newenglishreview.org/blog_direct_link.cfm?blog_id=12857&Ruth %2DGledhill%2D%2D%2DHas%2Dthe%2DArchbishop%2Dgone%2Dbonkers. 191. William, “An Unjust Doctrine,” 45. 192. Erasmus, “Being Christian Needn’t Make a Leader Hostile in Her View of Islam,” Te Economist, July 17, 2016, https://www.economist.com/erasmus/2016/07/17/being-christianneednt-make-a-leader-hostile-in-her-view-of-islam.

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193. Quoted in Steve Doughty and Michael Seamark, “Sharia Law Row: Archbishop Is in Shock as He Faces Demands to Quit and Criticism from Lord Carey,” Daily Mail, February 9, 2008, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-512876/Sharia-law-row-Archbishop-shockfaces-demands-quit-criticism-Lord-Carey.html. However, some young Muslims hold diferent views. Of UK Muslims between ages sixteen and twenty-four, 37 percent said they would prefer to live under sharia law, compared with only 17 percent of those over ffty-fve. Munira Mirza, Abi Senthilkumaran, and Zein Ja’far, Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism (London: Policy Exchange, 2007), 5, https://policyexchange.org. uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/living-apart-together-jan-07.pdf. See also Stephen Bates, “More Young Muslims Back Sharia Says Poll,” Te Guardian, January 29, 2007, https://www. theguardian.com/uk/2007/jan/29/thinktanks.religion. 194. Asim Siddiqui, “Reinventing Sharia,” Te Guardian, February 8, 2008, https://www. theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/feb/08/reinventingsharia. 195. According to unofcial estimates given to Neil Addison, only about one-third of the nikah are registered under the act. Neil Addison, “Sharia Is Not the Problem Here,” Te Guardian, July 8, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/jul/08/ religion-sharia-marriage-registration-islam. 196. Addison, “Sharia Is Not the Problem Here.” 197. Samia Bano, “In Pursuit of Religious and Legal Diversity: A Response to the Archbishop of Canterbury and the ‘Sharia Debate’ in Britain,” Ecclesiastical Law Journal 10, no. 3 (2008): 283–309. 198. A study by the JAN Trust found that out of nearly 1,000 Pakistani women, 85 percent said that a forced marriage had occurred in their family or they knew someone who had been forced into a marriage and that the marriages were unhappy. Sajda Mughal, “Forced Marriage in the UK: Hidden from View,” Open Democracy, November 29, 2011, https:// www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/forced-marriage-in-uk-hidden-from-view/. 199. In Islam the Hadith condemns forced marriages and states that consent should be present. Te Qur’an clearly says, “O you who have believed, it is not lawful for you to inherit women by compulsion” (4:19). A report issued by a Home Afairs committee diferentiates between a forced marriage and an arranged marriage, because, “while families may be involved in choosing the marriage partner, both parties probably, on the whole, enter freely” into arranged marriages. House of Commons Home Afairs Committee, “Forced Marriage: Eighth Report of Session 2010–12,” May 10, 2011, p. 3, https://publications.parliament.uk/ pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaf/880/880.pdf. 200. Mark Townsend, “Top Judges in Key Ruling on Sharia Marriage,” Te Observer, February 10, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/10/religion.law2. An example of this difculty can be seen in the court of appeal decision in the case of a marriage between a twenty-six-year-old British Muslim man and a woman in Bangladesh. Te September 2006 marriage was arranged by the man’s father and deemed lawful under sharia law. Te ceremony took place in Bangladesh, with the bridegroom in London participating by speakerphone. “Justice Wood said that the true test into the validity of the marriage was ‘whether the marriage is so ofensive to the conscience of the English court that it should refuse to recognise and give efect to the proper foreign law.’” Townsend, “Top Judges in Key Ruling on Sharia Marriage.” 201. House of Commons Home Afairs Committee, “Domestic Violence, Forced Marriage and ‘Honour’-Based Violence: Sixth Report of Session 2007–08,” June 13, 2008, p. 129, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhaf/263/263i.pdf. 202. Teo Hobson, “Rowan Williams: Sharia Furore, Anglican Future,” Open Democracy, February 13, 2008, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/rowan_williams_sharia_furore_ anglican_future.

368

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203. Karen McVeigh and Amelia Hill, “Bill Limiting Sharia Law Is Motivated by ‘Concern for Muslim Women,’” Te Guardian, June 8, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/ jun/08/sharia-bill-lords-muslim-women. 204. Steve Doughty, “Islamic Extremism Creating ‘No-Go’ Areas for Non-Muslims in Britain, Says Bishop of Rochester,” Daily Mail, January 7, 2008, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/ news/article-506419/Islamic-extremism-creating-areas-non-Muslims-Britain-says-BishopRochester.html. See also Shiraz Maher, “Muslim Britain Is Becoming One Big No-Go Area,” Sunday Times (London), January 13, 2008, http://web.archive.org/web/20080516103339/ http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article3176455.ece. 205. Te institute’s study concluded that the United Kingdom “was leaving itself open to the recruitment of Islamist terrorists by its failure to instill a confdent, graspable sense of what this nation believes and stands for, and of what exactly it means to belong here.” Janet Daley, “We Don’t Need to Defne Britishness,” Te Telegraph, February 18, 2008, https://www.tele graph.co.uk/comment/columnists/janetdaley/3555154/We-dont-need-to-defne-Britishness. html. 206. For the Crick Report, see Advisory Group on Citizenship, Education for Citizenship; for the Swann report, see Committee of Inquiry into the Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups, Education for All. See also Bhikhu Parekh, Te Future of Multi-ethnic Britain: Te Parekh Report (London: Profle Books, 2000). 207. Leslie George Scarman, Te Scarman Report (London: Penguin Books, 1986). 208. Runnymede Trust, “Te Nature of Islamophobia,” in Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All (London: Runnymede Trust, 1997), 5–15. 209. Anne-Marie Fortier, “Pride, Politics, and Multiculturalist Citizenship,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, no. 3 (2005): 559–561. 210. Parekh, Te Future of Multi-ethnic Britain, 38. 211. Parekh, 15. 212. Fortier, “Pride, Politics, and Multiculturalist Citizenship,” 575. 213. Cantle, “Community Cohesion,” esp. 18–45. 214. According to community cohesion, Islamic schools are dangerous breeding grounds for separatism. A similar view is advanced regarding the role of imams in UK prisons. Tey were seen in the past as an efective way of bringing back into the community convicted young Muslims, yet now these Muslims are perceived as dangerous ideologists. See Arun Kundnani, “From Oldham to Bradford: Te Violence of the Violated,” Race and Class 43, no. 2 (2001): 41–60. 215. Home Ofce, “Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain,” 2002, p. 1, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/secure-borders-safe-hav en-integration-with-diversity-in-modern-britain. 216. Te Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Group was set up to advise the government on the best way of implementing the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002, which requires prospective citizens to demonstrate knowledge of English, Welsh, or Scottish Gaelic and of life in the United Kingdom. See “Life in the United Kingdom Test,” Wikipedia, June 14, 2020, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life_in_the_Unit ed_Kingdom_test. 217. See Christian Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010), 58. 218. Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration, 58. See also Bernard Crick et al., Te New and the Old (London: Home Ofce Social Policy Unit, 2003), 11. 219. Te civic course preparing for the naturalization test included six components in descending order of importance. Te titles and sequence of the frst section, “British National

Notes to 149–151

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Institutions,” an overview of UK government structures, and the second, “Britain as a Multicultural Society,” suggest a contrast between old and new cultural and ethnic communities. Te remaining components were on technical issues such as “knowing the law,” “how to get employment,” “sources of help and information,” and “everyday needs helping newcomers to get by.” Crick et al., Te New and the Old, 13–14. 220. Home Ofce, “Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society” January 2005, p. 42, https://dera.ioe.ac.uk/6827/8/152393_Redacted.pdf. 221. Not only liberals criticized these initiatives. Several conservatives objected to these citizenship ceremonials. For example, Tom Utley describes civic integration as an alien republican ideal. In the Daily Telegraph, he argues that afrmations of citizenship are good only for “insecure countries riven by revolution, or for nations . . . with a long history of authoritarian rule.” Tom Utley, “Free-Born Britons Don’t Need an Oath to Make Tem Feel Tey Belong,” Te Telegraph, January 21, 2005, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personalview/3614341/Free-born-Britons-dont-need-an-oath-to-make-them-feel-they-belong.html. Other conservatives opposed the afrmation of a common national project. For example, A. N. Wilson, a literary editor of the London Evening Standard and a novelist, suggests that it is better to be a subject of the Crown, which involves only a minimal form of fealty, than to be an active patriotic citizen of a French- or American-style republic. Glyn Morgan, “Te Bikini and the Burqa: Freedom, ‘Islam,’ and Mandatory Civic Integration,” 2012, https://numerons. fles.wordpress.com/2012/04/6_the-bikini-and-the-burqa-freedom.pdf. 222. Keith Ajegbo, Diversity and Citizenship: Curriculum Review (London: Diversity and Citizenship Curriculum Group, Department for Education and Skills, 2007). 223. Commission on Integration and Cohesion, “Our Shared Future,” 2007, http:// image.guardian.co.uk/sys-fles/Education/documents/2007/06/14/oursharedfuture.pdf. A statistical analysis of the 2005 UK Citizenship Survey found that ethnic diversity is in most cases positively associated with community cohesion. James Laurence and Anthony Heath, Predictors of Community Cohesion: Multi-level Modeling of the 2005 Citizenship Survey (London: Department of Communities and Local Government, 2008). See also Natalia Letki, “Does Diversity Erode Social Cohesion? Social Capital and Race in British Neighborhoods,” Political Studies 56 (2008): 99–126. 224. In addition, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, largely funded by the Department for Business Innovation and Skills, published a guide for employers and employees to clarify workplace regulation. Again, despite an ostensibly antidiscriminatory nature and intent, it illustrates how and why religion can become a legitimate basis for rejecting applicants. Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, “Annual Report and Accounts 2011/12,” July 13, 2012, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys tem/uploads/attachment_data/fle/246967/0409.pdf. 225. Tony Blair, August 5, 2005, quoted in Ralph Grillo, “An Excess of Alterity? Debating Diference in a Multicultural Society,” in Anthropology of Migration and Multiculturalism: New Directions, ed. Steven Vertovec (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010), 24. 226. Tony Blair, “Te Duty to Integrate: Shared British Values,” speech delivered at 10 Downing Street, London, December 8, 2006, http://englischlehrer.de/texts/blair.php. 227. Communities and Local Government, “Preventing Violent Extremism,” 4. 228. Jack Straw, “We Need a British Story,” Sunday Times (London), April 29, 2007, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/we-need-a-british-story-3zq9jjlr3lm. 229. On the debate preceding this report, see Richard Ford, “Immigrants Must Learn English to Qualify for a British Passport,” Te Times (London), December 4, 2008, https:// www.thetimes.co.uk/article/immigrants-must-learn-english-to-qualify-for-a-british-passportdvw9qp3gm72.

370

Notes to 151–154

230. Alan Travis, “New Migrants to Britain Face ‘Points Test for Citizenship,’” Te Guardian, August 3, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/aug/03/immigration-ministerphil-woolas. 231. Labour Party, “A Future Fair for All,” 2010, http://www.cpa.org.uk/cpa_documents/ TeLabourPartyManifesto-2010.pdf. 232. “Te Tories’ Barmiest Policy,” Te Economist, October 20, 2012, https://www.econo mist.com/leaders/2012/10/20/the-tories-barmiest-policy. 233. David Edgar, “Te British History New Citizens Must Learn: No Radicals, No Homosexuals, No Holocaust,” Te Guardian, March 11, 2013, https://www.theguardian. com/commentisfree/2013/mar/11/battle-britain-history-new-uk-citizens. 234. Communities and Local Government Committee, “Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009–2010,” 8. 235. Alan Travis, “Immigration Bill Will Require Identity Checks for All, Home Secretary Is Warned,” Te Guardian, October 10, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/ oct/10/immigration-bill-would-mean-identity-checks-for-all. 236. Te United Kingdom is one of the few countries that revoke citizenship of dual nationals. Cameron’s government attempted to expand the practice to naturalized citizens who have no other nationality and would be rendered stateless. See Katrin Bennhold, “Britain Increasingly Invokes Power to Disown Its Citizens,” New York Times, April 9, 2014, https:// www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/world/europe/britains-power-to-disown-its-citizens-raisesquestions.html. 237. Ruth Gledhill, “Lord Carey Calls for ‘Reasonable Limit’ on Migration,” Te Times (London), January 7, 2010, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/lord-carey-calls-for-reason able-limit-on-migration-tnshqqs6jw9. 238. Eva-Maria Asari, Daphne Halikiopoulou, and Steven Mock, “British National Identity and the Dilemmas of Multiculturalism,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 14 (2008): 21. 239. Cameron made a speech in Munich in 2011 that indicated an escalation in the long process of singling out Muslims and an attempt to fatter the radical Right. Te speech was delivered on the same day that three thousand supporters of the English Defense League, an anti-Muslim group, marched through Luton, UK, chanting anti-Islamic slogans. Still, the speech did not substantially difer from proposals by Jack Straw on the foundations of an inclusive nationalism. 240. Ralph Grillo, “Refections on British Multiculturalism, 1967–2014,” in Living with Diference: Essays on Transnationalism and Multiculturalism (Lewes, DE: B and RG Books, 2015), chap. 13; Ralph Grillo, “British and Others: From ‘Race’ to ‘Faith,’” in Te Multiculturalism Backlash European Discourses, Policies and Practices, ed. Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf (London: Routledge, 2010), 64. See also Tariq Modood, “We Need a Multiculturalism of Hope,” Te Guardian, September 24, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/com mentisfree/belief/2010/sep/24/multiculturism-hope-secularism-religion. 241. Modood, “We Need a Multiculturalism of Hope.” 242. Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, “Cosmopolitanism and Integrationism: Is British Multiculturalism a ‘Zombie Category’?,” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 21, no. 6 (2014): 2. 243. Meer and Modood, “Te Multicultural State We’re In,” 20. 244. Kenan Malik, “I Am Still a Critic of Multiculturalism, Honest,” Pandaemonium, February 10, 2011, https://kenanmalik.com/2011/02/10/still-a-critic-of-multiculturalism. 245. Commission on Integration and Cohesion, “Our Shared Future.” 246. Mark Townsend, “Multiculturalism Has Failed, Believe Substantial Minority of Britons,” Te Guardian, April 14, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/14/

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multiculturalism-failed-substantial-minority-britons-integration-rivers-blood-enoch-powell. 247. Kalbir Shukra, et al., “Race, Social Cohesion and the Changing Politics of Citizenship,” London Review of Education 2, no. 3 (2004): 187–195. 248. Simon Walters, “Be More British Cameron Tells UK Muslims: PM Issues Powerful New Pledge to Combat Extremism,” Daily Mail, June 14, 2014, https://www.dailymail. co.uk/news/article-2658033/Be-British-Cameron-tells-UK-Muslims-PM-issues-powerfulnew-pledge-combat-extremism.html. See also ETHNOS Research and Consultancy, “Citizenship and Belonging: What Is Britishness?,” Commission for Racial Equality, November 2005, http://www.ethnos.co.uk/pdfs/9_what_is_britishness_CRE.pdf. 249. Richard Adams, “Trojan Horse Damned in Ofsted Report,” Te Guardian, June 6, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/jun/06/trojan-horse-school-ofstedreport-park-view. 250. Imram Mogra, “Te ‘Trojan Horse’ Afair and Radicalisation: An Analysis of Ofsted Reports,” Educational Review 68, no. 4 (2016): 462. 251. See Maleiha Malik, “Full-Face Veils Aren’t Barbaric—but Our Response Can Be,” Te Guardian, September 17, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/17/ full-face-veil-not-barbaric-debate-muslim-women. 252. Laura Bates, “David Cameron Will Support Muslim Women—but Only When It Suits Its Scaremongering Narrative,” Te Guardian, January 21, 2016, https://www.theguard ian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/jan/21/davids-cameron-will-support-muslim-women-but-onlywhen-it-suits-his-scaremongering-narrative. 253. John Eekelaar, “Perceptions of Equality: Te Road to Same-Sex Marriage in England and Wales,” International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 28, no. 1 (2014): 1. 254. Ipsos MORI, “Religious and Social Attitudes of UK Christians in 2011,” February 13, 2012, https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/religious-and-social-attitudes-uk-chris tians-2011. “Ipsos MORI interviewed a representative sample of 2,107 adults aged 15+ across the United Kingdom. From this sample, a total of 1,136 adults defned themselves as Christians. Interviews were conducted face-to-face over the period 1st April to 7th April, 2011.” 255. Labour Party, “Te Labour Party Manifesto 2015,” 2015, http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/ wmatrix/ukmanifestos2015/text/Labour.txt. 256. Isabelle Chopin and Catharina Germaine, A Comparative Analysis of Nondiscrimination Law in the European Union (Brussels: Directorate General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission, 2016), 32. 257. In a similar case, Lillian Ladele, who spent sixteen years as a marriage registrar, asked for an exemption from registering homosexual marriages. Her plea was rejected by UK courts. 258. Sayeeda Warsi, Te Enemy Within: A Tale of Muslim Britain (London: Penguin, 2017). 259. Dominic Casciani, “‘Rise’ in Muslim Discrimination,” BBC News, December 16, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4102389.stm. 260. Saied Reza Ameli and Arzu Merali, Environment of Hate: Te New Normal for Muslims in the UK (Wembley, UK: Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2015). 261. However, a fringe minority of 4 percent claimed to sympathize with people who take part in suicide bombing to fght injustice. See Channel 4, “C4 Survey.” 262. YouGov surveys in 2009 found that 77 percent of Muslims in the United Kingdom identify very strongly as British, and 82 percent declare themselves loyal to the United Kingdom. Moreover, 67 percent want to live in a neighborhood that has a mix of people of diferent ethnic and religious backgrounds, compared with 58 percent of the general UK public. Communities and Local Governments, “Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009–2010,” 126.

372

Notes to 159–162

263. Maria Sobolewska, “Religious Extremism in Britain and British Muslims,” in Eatwell and Goodwin, Te New Extremism, 57. 264. Channel 4, “C4 Survey.” 265. Innes Bowen, Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam (London: C. Hurst, 2014). 266. Tom Brooks-Pollock, “What British Muslims Really Tink about Poll Tat Asked: ‘What Do British Muslims Really Tink?’” Te Independent, April 12, 2016, https://www. independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/the-big-problem-with-that-poll-of-british-muslimsa6980411.html. 267. Frances Parraudin, “Half of All British Muslims Tink Homosexuality Should Be Illegal, Poll Finds,” Te Guardian, April 11, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/ apr/11/british-muslims-strong-sense-of-belonging-poll-homosexuality-sharia-law. 268. Nezar Al Sayyad, “Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: On the Discourses of Identity and Culture,” in Al Sayyad and Castells, Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam, 24. 269. “Te use of the term ‘self-segregation’ within the context of racialised political and media discourses implies that ethnic minorities are choosing to opt out of British society. . . . Interviews and focus group discussions with British Muslim people in Bradford allow us to challenge this myth.” Deborah Phillips, “Parallel Lives? Challenging Discourses of British Muslim Self-Segregation,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 24 (2006): 34. See also C. Dwyer, “Negotiating Diasporic Identities: Young British South Asian Muslim Women,” Women’s Studies International Forum 23 (2000): 475–486. 270. Communities and Local Governments, “Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009–2010.” 271. Te report found that 43 percent of Asian British, 63 percent of white British, and 17 percent of black British agreed that, “on the whole, immigration into Britain has been a bad thing for the country.” Tirty-four percent said immigration should be stopped permanently or until the economy improved. Surveying fve thousand people, the report was the largest of its kind ever conducted. Nick Lowles and Anthony Painter, Fear and Hope: Te New Politics of Identity Project (London: Searchlight Educational Trust, 2011). See also Nick Lowles, “What Britons Really Tink about Immigration,” Te Guardian, February 26, 2011, https://www. theguardian.com/uk/2011/feb/26/britons-immigration-multiculturalism-study. 272. Jack Sommers, “7/7 Bombings Anniversary Poll Shows More than Half of Britons See Muslims as a Treat,” Hufngton Post, July 3, 2015, https://www.hufngtonpost. co.uk/2015/07/03/77-bombings-muslims-islam-britain-poll_n_7694452. 273. Robert Ford, “Is Racial Prejudice Declining in Britain?,” British Journal of Sociology 59, no. 4 (2008): 609–639. 274. See Matthew Goodwin, “Te Extreme Right in Britain: Still an ‘Ugly Duckling’ but for How Long?,” Political Quarterly 78, no. 2 (2007): 241–250. 275. Goodwin, “Te Extreme Right in Britain,” 241. See also Eatwell, “Te Extreme Right and British Exceptionalism,” 172. 276. Quoted in Sean McLoughlin, “Recognising Muslims: Religion, Ethnicity and Identity Politics in Britain,” Cahiers d’etudes sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien 33, no. 1 (2002): 53. 277. Eatwell and Goodwin, Te New Extremism in 21st Century Britain, 11. 278. Richard Edwards, “European Elections 2009: BNP Leader Nick Grifn BNP Profle,” Daily Telegraph, June 8, 2009, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ eu/5478224/European-elections-2009-BNP-leader-Nick-Grifn-BNP-profle.html. 279. Yasmin Hussain and Paul Bagguley, “Citizenship, Ethnicity and Identity: British Pakistanis after the 2001 ‘Riots,’” Sociology 39, no. 3 (2005): 416.

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280. Matthew J. Goodwin, New British Fascism: Rise of the British National Party (London: Routledge, 2011), 110. 281. Matthew Goodwin and Jocelyn Evans, “From Voting to Violence? Far Right Extremism in Britain,” 2012, https://www.channel4.com/media/c4-news/images/voting-to-vio lence%20(7).pdf. One report questioned more than two thousand supporters of radicalright and far-right groups (people who self-identifed as supporters of the British National Party, the UKIP, or the English Defence League) and found that many endorsed violence, with a “hostile inner core” apparently willing to plan for and prepare for attacks. Matthew Goodwin and Jocelyn Evans, “From Voting to Violence? Exploring Far Right Extremists in Modern Britain,” 2012, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/fles/public/Meetings/ Meeting%20Transcripts/080312goodwin_presentation.pdf. See also Eatwell, “Community Cohesion.” 282. Using Facebook, the league forged connections with a Birmingham-based group called British Citizens against Muslim Extremists and quickly found potential for a national organization. See Dominic Casciani, “Who Are the English Defence League?,” BBC News, September 11, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8250017.stm. 283. Lauren Collins, “Letter from Luton: England, Teir England,” New Yorker, June 27, 2011, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/07/04/england-their-england. 284. Joel Busher, Te Making of an Anti-Muslim Protest (London: Routledge, 2016), 3, 5. 285. Jeanne Hanna and Joel Busher, “UKIP and the UK’s Radical Right: A Tale of Movement Party Success?,” in Radical Right Movement Parties in Europe, ed. Manuela Caiani and Ondřej Císař (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2019), 14. 286. Kirkpatrick, “In Brexit-Era London.” 287. Lord Ashcroft Polls, “Tey’re Tinking What We’re Tinking: Understanding the UKIP Temptation,” December 2012, p. 20, https://lordashcroftpolls.com/wp-content/ uploads/2012/12/THEYRE-THINKING-WHAT-WERE-THINKING.pdf. 288. UKIP, “Britain Together: UKIP 2017 Manifesto,” 2017, http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/ wmatrix/ukmanifestos2017/text/UKIP.txt. 289. Nick Dufy, “UKIP Wants to Introduce LGBT Right Tests for Migrants, but Not for UKIP Candidates,” PINK News, May 27, 2017, http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2017/05/25/ ukip-want-to-introduce-lgbt-rights-tests-for-migrants-but-not-their-own-candidates/. 290. Robert Ford, “Who Might Vote for the BNP? Survey Evidence on the Electoral Potential of the Extreme Right in Britain,” in Eatwell and Goodwin, Te New Extremism in 21st Century Britain, 161. 291. Goodwin and Evans, “From Voting to Violence? Far Right Extremism in Britain.” 292. House of Commons Home Afairs Committee, “Roots of Violent Radicalisation: Nineteenth Report of Session 2010–12,” February 2012, https://publications.parliament.uk/ pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaf/1446/1446.pdf. Te survey was administered by YouGov on 1,725 UK adults in the aftermath of the Olympics. 293. Lowles and Painter, Fear and Hope. 294. R. Ford and M. Goodwin, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain (London: Routledge, 2014), 20–106. 295. “League of Nationalists,” Te Economist, November 19, 2016. 296. Rowena Mason, “Nigel Farage: British Muslim ‘Fifth Column’ Fuels Fear of Immigration,” Te Guardian, March 12, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/ mar/12/nigel-farage-british-muslim-ffth-column-fuels-immigration-fear-ukip. 297. “Christians Don’t Want Religion to ‘Infuence Public Life,’” Te Telegraph, February 14, 2012, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/9081215/Christians-dont-wantreligion-to-infuence-public-life.html.

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Notes to 168–175

298. Kate Mccann, “Tim Farron Resigns and Admits It Would Be ‘Impossible’ for Him to Be Liberal Democrat Leader and ‘Remain Faithful to Christ,’” Te Telegraph, June 14, 2017, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/14/breaking-tim-farron-resigns-liberaldemocrat-leader/. 299. “Te UK’s Windrush Generation: What’s the Scandal About?,” Al-Jazeera News, April 18, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/uk-windrush-generation-scan dal-180418074648878.html. 300. Matthew Norman, “Te Windrush Generation Are the ‘Right Kind’ of Immigrants, Otherwise We Wouldn’t Care,” Te Independent, April 29, 2018, https://www.independent. co.uk/voices/windrush-generation-scandal-racism-muslims-pakistanis-theresa-may-amberrudd-a8328141.html. 301. McCrudden, “Multiculturalism.” 302. Eric Kaufmann, “London: A Rising Island of Religion in a Secular Sea,” Hufngton Post, December 21, 2012, https://www.hufngtonpost.co.uk/eric-kaufmann/london-arising-island-of-religion_b_2336699.html. 303. Roger Eatwell, “Te Rising Tide of National Populism: We Need to Talk Seriously about Immigration,” Open Democracy, November 3, 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ en/opendemocracyuk/rising-tide-of-national-populism-we-need-to-talk-about-immigration. 304. David Goodhart, “Too Diverse?,” Prospect Magazine, February 20, 2004, cited in Grillo, “Backlash against Diversity?” See also David Goodhart, Te British Dream: Successes and Failures of Post-war Immigration (London: Atlantic Books, 2013).

Chapter 3 1. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, “Tird Report on the Netherlands,” February 12, 2008, https://rm.coe.int/third-report-on-the-netherlands/16808b595e. 2. Arend Lijphart, Te Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). 3. Froukje Demant, Marcel Maussen, and Jan Rath, “Muslims in the EU: Cities Report; Te Netherlands,” Open Society Institute, 2007, p. 42, https://www.researchgate.net/publi cation/254917497_Muslims_in_the_EU_Cities_Report_Te_Netherlands. 4. Te churches’ fnancial and social decline in power during the 1960s had a prominent efect on Dutch policy and legislation and was translated into ofcial and institutional changes such as the 1983 constitutional reform that ended the government’s fnancial support of the churches. See Paul Dekker and Peter Ester, “Depillarization, Deconfessionalization, and De-ideologization: Empirical Trends in Dutch Society, 1958–1992,” Review of Religious Research 37, no. 4 (1996): 335–341. 5. Sophie C. van Bijsterveld, “State and Church in the Netherlands,” in State and Church in the European Union, ed. Gerhard Robbers (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2005), 367–390. 6. Stephen V. Monsma and Christopher J. Soper, Te Challenge of Pluralism: Church and State in Five Democracies (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefeld, 1997). 7. Monsma and Soper, Te Challenge of Pluralism, 80. 8. Pierre Manent, Modern Liberty and Its Discontents, trans. and ed. Daniel J. Mahoney and Paul Seaton (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefeld, 1998). 9. Paul Lucardie, “Right-Wing Extremism in the Netherlands: Why It Is Still a Marginal Phenomenon,” paper presented at the Hanns Seidel Foundation symposium “RightWing Extremism in Europe,” Berlin, November 3–5, 2000, https://core.ac.uk/download/ pdf/12869122.pdf.

Notes to 176–179

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10. During this period the party continued to maintain a platform that incorporated French and Belgian Flanders within the greater Dutch state and promoted the exclusion of “foreigners.” Te ofcial party position was that “one becomes a Dutchmen by birth and not by some administrative measure.” Lucardie, “Right-Wing Extremism in the Netherlands,” 4. 11. Similar to Center Party voters, Center Democrats voters were concentrated in urban areas that had experienced an infux of immigrants, where many nonimmigrant residents felt they were competing with immigrants for housing, welfare, and jobs. Tese foundations, combined with problematic leadership, led to a decline in power after the economic recovery of 1994. 12. Martin van Bruinessen, “After Van Gogh: Roots of Anti-Muslim Rage,” paper presented at the Seventh Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence, Italy, March 22–26, 2006. 13. Frits Bolkestein, “On the Collapse of the Soviet Union,” address at Liberal International “World Federation of Liberalism” conference, Lucerne, Switzerland, September 6, 1991, http://www.republiekallochtonie.nl/userfles/fles/Bolkestein%201991.pdf. 14. Cas Mudde and Joop van Holsteyn, “Te Netherlands: Explaining the Limited Success of the Extreme Right,” in Te Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream, ed. Paul Hainsworth (London: Pinter, 2000), 144–171. 15. Pim Fortuyn, De verweesdesamenleving: eenreligieus-sociologischtraktaat (Rotterdam: Karakter Uitgevers and Speakers Academy, 2002); Pim Fortuyn, De verweesdesamenleving: Een religieus-sociologisch traktaat (Rotterdam: Karakter Uitgevers and Speakers Academy, 2002); Pim Fortuyn, De Islamisering van onze cultuur (Rotterdam: Karakter Uitgevers and Speakers Academy, 2001). 16. George Rabinowitz, Stuart Elaine Macdonald, and Ola Listhaug, “New Players in an Old Game: Party Strategy in Multiparty Systems,” Comparative Political Studies 24, no. 2 (1991): 147–185. 17. Bruinessen, “After Van Gogh.” 18. “Fortuyn: Grens dicht voor Islamiet,” De Volksrant, February 9, 2002, https://www. volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/fortuyn-grens-dicht-voor-islamiet~b1867f23/?referer=htt ps%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F. See also Frank Poorthuis and Hans Wansink, “De Islam is een achterlijke cultuur,” De Volkskrant, February 9, 2002, https://www.volkskrant.nl/ nieuws-achtergrond/de-islam-is-een-achterlijke-cultuur~b937fe131/. 19. Paul Pennings and Hans Keman, “Te Dutch Parliamentary Elections of 2002: Fortuyn versus the Establishment,” Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Working Papers Political Science No. 01/2002, August 2002, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/af1b/e2b43260ab0907f32b7a32db0479f31842f2.pdf. 20. “At Home with ‘Professor Pim,’” BBC News, May 4, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/1966979.stm. 21. Bart Top, “Moslims en media-efecten: Internationale confictsituaties en de binnenlandse gevolgen,” NVJ Bureau Media en Migranten, 2002, p. 3, http://www.miramedia.nl/ media/fles/moslims_media.pdf. 22. Tese percentages worsened in 2004 and 2006. Vera van den Maagdenberg, ed., “Jaarrapport Integratie 2004,” Instituut voor Sociologisch-Economisch Onderzoek, 2004, http://www.prime95.nl/oldpr/parlementdoc/BLG3239.pdf; Jaco Dagevos and Merove Gijsberts, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2007,” Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, November 2007, https://cdn.atria.nl/epublications/2007/Jaarrapport_Integratie_2007.pdf. Te Netherlands Institute for Social Research (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau) is a government agency studying governmental policy. 23. Baukje Prins, “Te Nerve to Break Taboos: New Realism in the Dutch Discourse on Multiculturalism,” Journal of International Migration and Integration 3, nos. 3–4 (2002): 373,

376

Notes to 179–181

375. See also Johan Meuleman, “Headscarves, Homosexuals, and Imams in the Netherlands,” ISIM Newsletter, September 8, 2001, p. 33; and Gert Hekma, “Imams and Homosexuality: A Post-gay Debate the Netherlands,” Sexualities 5, no. 2 (2002): 237–248. 24. Te perpetrator, Volkert van der Graaf, a white Dutch environmental and animal rights activist, declared that he had an obligation to protect the weaker groups in society, and he compared Fortuyn to Hitler. Te bizarre murder was condemned by all, even by many ethnic groups. In the elections, Fortuyn’s party, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn List) won 26 seats out of 150, a striking 17 percent. In the 2006 elections the party had vanished completely, mainly because of the parliamentary turmoil its members caused. 25. European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, “Anti-Islamic Reactions in the EU after the Terrorist Acts against the USA,” November 29, 2001, p. 49, https://fra. europa.eu/sites/default/fles/fra_uploads/216-Nat-Report-291101.pdf. 26. Top, “Moslims en media-efecten.” 27. Sylvain Ephimenco, Open brief aan de moslims van Nederland: Na de aanslagen van 11 september 2001 (Utrecht, Netherlands: Het Spectrum, 2001). 28. Meindert Fennema, “Het Publieke Debatna 11 September,” De Gids 165, no. 3 (2002): 229–244. 29. Prins, “Te Nerve to Break Taboos.” 30. Quoted in Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, “Identifcatie met Nederland,” September 2007, p. 11, https://www.wrr.nl/publicaties/rapporten/2007/09/24/ identifcatie-met-nederland. 31. Marc De Leeuw and Sonja van Wichelen, “‘Please, Go Wake Up!’ Submission, Hirsi Ali, and the ‘War on Terror’ in the Netherlands,” Feminist Media Studies 5, no. 3 (2005): 325–340. 32. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, “Confrontatie, geen verzoening,” De Volkskrant, April 8, 2006, https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/confrontatie-geen-verzoening~bdb769a7/?re ferer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F. 33. Te Hofstadgroep is a codename given by the Dutch security services and commonly used in the media. Te group was connected to Samir Azzouz, who was arrested in October 2005 for planning terror attacks and convicted in late 2006 along with three other militants. 34. Koninklijk Instituut voor Ingenieurs, “Verslag van het D66 debat ‘Het Kaf en het Koren’ over de terroristischedreiging in Nederland,” April 11, 2005. 35. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, “Tird Report on the Netherlands.” See also Ian Traynor, “Dutch Liberalism Stares into a Troubled Future as AntiMuslim Backlash Grows,” Te Guardian, November 13, 2004, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2004/nov/13/flmnews.flm. 36. Jaap van Donselaar and Peter R. Rodriguez, “Ontwikkelingen na de moord op Van Gogh,” Anne Frank Stichting, Universiteit Leiden, December 2004, https://annefrank.global. ssl.fastly.net/media/imagevault/wZEMyoj61MX4f-cPsNHF.pdf; “Dutch Muslim School Hit by Bomb,” BBC News, November 8, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3991547.stm. 37. Cited in Demant, Maussen, and Rath, “Muslims in the EU,” 40. 38. “Commotie in Rotterdam over verplichte abortus,” De Volkskrant, February 16, 2006, https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/commotie-in-rotterdam-over-verplic hte-abortus~b491bf7f/. 39. Te New National Party (Nieuwe Nationale Partij) excelled in seeming to distance its ideology from violence, and the National Alliance (Nationale Alliantie) made use of ambiguous language regarding violence. More extreme movements followed—for example, the Lonsdale Youth (Lonsdale Jongeren), a right-wing youth movement became known for vandalism, arson, threats, and attacks in major cities across the nation. See Van Donselaar and Rodriguez, “Ontwikkelingen na de moord op Van Gogh.”

Notes to 181–184

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40. Maarten Hajer and Marcel Maussen, “Na de moord op Teo van Gogh— Betekenisgevingaan de moord, een reconstructie,” Socialismeen Democratie 61, no. 12 (2004): 10–18. 41. Geert Wilders, “Hardtalk: Geert Wilders,” interview by Stephen Sackur, BBC News, August 19, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/7570380.stm. 42. Wilders, “Hardtalk.” 43. Marcel J. Maussen and Boris Slijper, “Pays-Bas: Le retour du refoulé,” Revue relations 711 (2006): 28–29. 44. Paul M. Sneiderman and Louk Hagendoorn, When Ways of Life Collide (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 45. Sneiderman and Hagendoorn, When Ways of Life Collide. 46. Han Entzinger, “Te Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism: Te Case of the Netherlands,” in Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States, ed. Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave, 2003), 59–86. 47. See Jeroen Doomernik and Michael Jandl, “Introduction,” in Modes of Migration Regulation and Control in Europe, ed. Jeroen Doomernik and Michael Jandl (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), 19–26, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46mt2r.6?refr eqid=excelsior%3A6d54557a4975cef4b79f37162e742d9e&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_con tents; Jeroen Doomernik, “Te State of Multiculturalism in the Netherlands,” Canadian Diversity 4, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 32–35. 48. Maria Bruquetas-Callejo, Blanca Garces-Mascarenas, Rinus Penninx, and Peter Scholten, “Policymaking Related to Immigration and Integration: Te Dutch Case,” International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion Working Paper 15, 2007, https://www. researchgate.net/publication/241883861_Policymaking_related_to_immigration_and_inte gration_Te_Dutch_Case_Country_Report_on_the_Netherlands. 49. Dagevos and Gijsberts, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2007.” 50. Te Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek; CBS) monitors ethnic and religious afliations in the Netherlands. See its website, at https:// www.cbs.nl. 51. Hans Schmeets, “De Religieuze Kaart van Nederland, 2010–2013,” Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS), September 2014, p. 4, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/achter grond/2014/40/de-religieuze-kaart-van-nederland-2010-2013; Hans Schmeets and Carly van Mensvoort, “De Religieuze Betrokkenheid van Bevolkingsgroepen, 2010–2014,” CBS, September 2015, p. 4, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/achtergrond/2015/20/religieuze-betrokken heid-van-bevolkingsgroepen-2010-2014; Demant, Maussen, and Rath, “Muslims in the EU,” 9–10. 52. Our focus is Dutch Muslims of Moroccan and Turkish origin because of their numeric and cultural dominance. About 397,000 people of Turkish origin are in the Netherlands and 386,000 of Moroccan origin. About 70,000 Muslims from Surinam, or 7.9 percent of the population, arrived around the time of Surinam’s independence in 1975. About 44,000 Muslims are from Iraq, 37,000 from Afghanistan, 29,000 from Iran, and 22,000 from Somalia. About 10,000 ethnic Dutch converted to Islam. See Demant, Maussen, and Rath, “Muslims in the EU”; CBS, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2016,” 2016, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/publica tie/2016/47/jaarrapport-integratie-2016. 53. CBS, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2016.” 54. CBS, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2016”; CBS, “Sociaaleconomische Trends,” vol. 2, 2007; Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP), “Jaarrapport Integratie 2006,” 2006. 55. SCP and CBS, “Emancipatiemonitor 2008,” 2009, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieu ws/2009/08/emancipatiemonitor-2008.

378

Notes to 184–187

56. Enrico Allasino, Emilio Reyneri, Alessandra Venturini, and Giovanna Zincone, “Documenting Discrimination against Migrant Workers in the Labor Market,” International Labour Ofce International Migration Papers no. 67, January 2004, https://www.research gate.net/publication/242493353_Labour_Market_Discrimination_Against_Migrant_Work ers_in_Italy. 57. Mérove Gijsberts and Jaco Dagevos, “Uit elkaars buurt: De invloed van etnische concentratie op integratie en beeldvorming,” June 2005, https://www.researchgate.net/publi cation/306359860_Uit_elkaars_buurt_De_invloed_van_etnische_concentratie_op_integra tie_en_beeldvorming; Jacky W. Nieuwboer, “National Analytical Study on Housing,” RAXEN Focal Point for the Netherlands, Dutch Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, October 2003, https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/fles/fra_uploads/252-NL_Housing.pdf. 58. CBS, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2016”; SCP and CBS, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2005,” 2005, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/publicatie/2005/38/jaarrapport-integratie-2005. 59. Leo Spruit, Ton Bernts, and Clara Woldringh, “Geestelijke verzorging in justitiële inrichtingen,” KASKI Report no. 502, September 2003, http://docplayer.nl/51635812Geestelijke-verzorging-in-justitiele-inrichtingen.html. 60. Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, “Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 43: Terrorismebestrijding,” November 2016, https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/ j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vk98havx5xzg; Algemene Inlichtingenen Veiligheidsdienst, “Radicale dawa in Verandering: De opkomst van Islamitisch Neoradicalisme in Nederland,” October 2007, https://www.aivd.nl/documenten/publicaties/2007/10/09/aivd-rapport%E2%80%98radicale-dawa-in-verandering-de-opkomst-van-islamitisch-neoradicalisme-innederland%E2%80%99. 61. In 2005 Prime Minister Balkenende stated, “Integration is to acknowledge and to be acknowledged. Tis requires participation of all, it won’t occur by itself.” See Government of the Netherlands, “Integratiegaatnietvanzelf gaat,” June 9, 2005. See also “Balkenede prijst praktische plannen Comissie PaVEM en ‘cultuur om de hoek,’” Nederlands Juridisch Dagblad, June 9, 2005. 62. Institute for Multicultural Afairs, “Fact Book: Te Position of Muslims in the Netherlands; Facts and Figures,” 2010, p. 37, https://www.eukn.eu/fleadmin/Lib/fles/ EUKN/2010/0_linkclick.pdf. 63. “Kerkgebouwen verdwijnen,” De Telegraaf, January 17, 2008. 64. Wasif A. R. Shadid and Sjoerd P. van Koningsveld, “Institutionalization and Integration of Islam in the Netherlands,” in Te Integration of Islam and Hinduism in Western Europe, ed. Wasif A. R. Shadid and Sjoerd P. van Koningsveld (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1991), 92. 65. A 1962 regulation, with an expiration date of 1981, following the abolition of the Bill of Subsidies for the building of churches enabled religious communities of one thousand to thirty thousand members to ask the government for 30 percent of the funds to build a prayer hall. It was abolished in 1975, and the 1976 “softening” law was enacted instead. Te 1962 law refected Dutch society’s regard for the state-church separation. Simultaneously, the government recognized the need for prayer halls in Muslim communities that had not received the historical subsidies because the communities had not existed. A temporary regulation was issued in 1981, expiration date 1984, enabling similar subsidies to Muslim foreign workers (excluding Surinamese). Te two limited regulations had provided subsidies for one hundred prayer halls in total. For more information, see Shadid and van Koningsveld, “Institutionalization and Integration of Islam in the Netherlands.” 66. Marcel Maussen, “Policy Discourses on Mosques in the Netherlands, 1980–2002: Contested Constructions,” Ethical Teory and Moral Practice 7, no. 2 (2004): 147–162.

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67. Demant, Maussen, and Rath, “Muslims in the EU,” 44. 68. Shadid and van Koningsveld, “Institutionalization and Integration of Islam,” 93. 69. Hirsch Ballin, “Overheid, godsdienst en levensovertuiging: Eindrapport criteria voor steunverlening aan kerkgenootschappen en andere genootschappen op geestelijke grondslag,” Ministry of Internal Afairs, 1988. 70. Muslim communities of Turkish and Moroccan origin received the short end of the stick because former Dutch East Indies soldiers who were temporarily brought to the Netherlands still received funding during the highly secularized eighties. Te Moluccan Christian and Muslim communities, which were supposed to return home after the rise of the free Republic of South Maluku, received full subsidies, most likely because of their temporary status, that enabled the creation of two formal mosques in 1984 and 1990, despite the nation’s strict moral code regarding church and state separation. 71. Jan Rath et al., Western Europe and Its Islam: Te Social Reaction to the Institutionalization of “New Religion” in the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2001). 72. Nico Landman and Wendy Wessels, “Te Visibility of Mosques in Dutch Towns,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 6 (2005): 1125. 73. Maussen, “Policy Discourses on Mosques in the Netherlands.” 74. Maussen, 161. 75. Gemeente Rotterdam, “Overlegdocumentt.b.v. Raad Commissie: Het voorstel m.b.t. ruimtelijkgebedhuizenbeleid,” November 29, 2005, cited in Ruud (Rudolph) Peters, “‘A Dangerous Book’: Dutch Public Intellectuals and the Koran” European University Institute Working Paper No. 2006/39, December 2006, https://www.academia.edu/392968/_A_Dangerous_Book_._Dutch_Public_Intellectuals_and_the_Koran._RSCAS_Working_Paper_ No._2006_39. 76. “Twee derdewil stop op grotemoskeeën,” Nederlands Dagblad, June 5, 2008, https:// www.nd.nl/nieuws/varia/727222/twee-derde-wil-stop-op-grote-moskeeen. According to a 2016 poll, one out of fve support closing all mosques entirely. See Aaldrik Adrie van der Veen, “Politieke Peiling I&O Research, September 2016,” Issuu, September 16, 2016, https://issuu. com/aaldrikadrievanderveen/docs/i_o_20research_20politieke_20peilin; and “One in Five Dutch People for Closing Mosques,” Euro–Islam.info, October 17, 2016, http://www.euroislam.info/2016/10/17/one-fve-dutch-people-closing-mosques/. 77. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, “Inburgering van geestelijke bedienaren. Een handleiding voor gemeenten,” December 2001. 78. Geraldine Coughlan, “Muslims Anger at Dutch Imam Plan,” BBC News, February 3, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4232495.stm. 79. Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, “Toelating en verblijf voor religieuze doeleinden,” Advies 2005/16, July 2005, Toelating_en_verblijf_religieuze_doeleinden_ ACVZ_beleidsadvies_20050913.pdf. See also International Center for Migration Policy Development, “Comparative Study on the Admission of Clergy,” January 2005, http:// research.icmpd.org/fleadmin/Research-Website/Publications/Comparative_Study_on_the_ Admission_of_Clergy.pdf. 80. “Cabinet to Act against ‘Extremist Mosques,’” Expatica, December 9, 2004, https:// www.expatica.com/nl/uncategorized/cabinet-to-act-against-extremist-mosques-39133/. 81. “Kamer: Onderzoek Buitelandse Invloed op Moskeeën,” NRC Handelsblad, November 27, 2007. 82. Some small studies have been tracing the promotion of common values by imams. See “Dutch Imams Promoting ‘Shared’ Values,” Expatica, May 28, 2008, https://www.expat ica.com/nl/uncategorized/dutch-imams-promoting-shared-values-31910/.

380

Notes to 189–192

83. Welmoet Boender, “Imams in the Netherlands: Expectations and Realities,” ISIM Review 21 (Spring 2008): 22–23, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/han dle/1887/13326/review_21.pdf?sequence=1. 84. Tim Whewell, “State Training for Europe’s Imams,” BBC News, June 17, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/crossing_continents/3815053.stm. 85. Idris el-Boujouf, deputy secretary general of the Muslim Council of the Netherlands, claims, “[Immigration Minister Rita] Verdonk’s interference in Muslims’ afairs violates the secular nature of the Western countries, particularly the Netherlands.” Nasreddine Djebbi, “Dutch Muslims Counter Govt. Plans to Train Imams,” MilitantIslamMonitor.org, March 25, 2005, https://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/1320. See also Karen Phalet and Carlo van Praag, “Moslim in Nederland: Een Onderzoek naar de Religieuze Betrokkenheid van Turken en Marokkanen,” SCP research report 2004/9, June 2004, https://zoek.ofciele bekendmakingen.nl/kst-29203-12-b1.pdf; and SCP and CBS, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2005.” 86. Shadid and van Koningsveld, “Institutionalization and Integration of Islam.” 87. Te method was developed by the Foundation for Teaching Methods and the Board of Islamic Schools Organization, an umbrella organization of forty-two Muslim schools in the Netherlands. Since 2007, all forty-two Islamic schools, as well as four other Islamic primary schools, started teaching about Islam from an ofcial curriculum. See “Dutch Launch Curriculum on Islam,” Expatica, September 11, 2007, https://www.expatica.com/nl/uncategorized/ dutch-launch-curriculum-on-islam-33894/. 88. “Blanke en Gekleurde Scholier Vaker op de Vuist,” Algemeen Dagblad, June 6, 2008. 89. Te project, Scholenproject: [Een] gelijke behandeling, is an initiative of the Art. 1 organization. See the project’s website, at https://www.coc.nl/geloof-cultuur/start-scholen project-een-gelijke-behandeling. 90. Merove Gijsberts and Lex Herweijer, “Allochtone leerlingen in het onderwijs,” in SCP, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2007,” 124–125, https://www.researchgate.net/publica tion/306360342_Jaarrapport_Integratie_2007. 91. Nico van Kessel, “Zorg om 120 extra moslim scholen,” Algemeen Dagblad, March 6, 2004. 92. Phalet and van Praag, “Moslim in Nederland.” 93. “Fact Book: Te Position of Muslims in the Netherlands,” 22. 94. Shadid and van Koningsveld, “Institutionalization and Integration of Islam.” 95. Wasif A. R. Shadid and Sjoerd P. van Koningsveld, “Islamic Primary Schools,” in Islam in Dutch Society: Current Developments and Future Prospects, ed. Wasif A. R. Shadid and Sjoerd P. van Koningsveld (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1992), 107–110. 96. Shadid and van Koningsveld, “Islamic Primary Schools,” 107–123. 97. Michael S. Merry and Geert Driessen, “On the Right Track: Islamic Schools in the Netherlands after an Era of Turmoil,” Race Ethnicity and Education, December 17, 2014, https:// www.researchgate.net/publication/269987337_On_the_Right_Track_Islamic_schools_in_ the_Netherlands_after_an_era_of_turmoil; Abdullah Asiran, “Islamic Schools in Netherlands among the Best Performing,” Anadolu Agency, February 21, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/ europe/islamic-schools-in-netherlands-among-best-performing-/1399325. In addition, two new Islamic universities were operating privately in Rotterdam and Schiedam but actively seeking state recognition. See Demant, Maussen, and Rath, “Muslims in the EU,” 20. 98. Geert Driessen and Michael S. Merry, “Islamic Schools in the Netherlands: Expansion or Marginalization?,” Interchange 37, no. 3 (2006): 201–223. 99. Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, “De Democratische Rechtsorde en Islamitisch Onderwijs,” February 2002, democratische_rechtsorde_en_islamitisch_onderwijs_2-02.pdf.pdf.

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100. Driessen and Merry, “Islamic Schools in the Netherlands,” 210. 101. “Steden willen zwakke school weren,” NRC Handelsblad, March 30, 2009, https:// www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2009/03/30/steden-willen-zwakke-school-weren-11705470-a322817. 102. “Fraud at 86 Percent of Islamic Schools,” NIS News, November 14, 2008, https:// www.meforum.org/islamist-watch/27581/fraud-at-86-percent-of-islamic-schools. 103. Trees Pels, Fadoua Lahri, and Halim El Madkouri, “Pedagogiek in moskee Al Wahda,” paper presented at Verwey-Jonker Instituut/Forum, Utrecht, August 2006, https:// www.verwey-jonker.nl/doc/jeugd/D7972526_AlWahda_def.pdf; Trees Pels, Gülşen Doğan, and Halim El Madkouri, “Pedagogiek in moskee Ayasofya,” paper presented at VerweyJonker Instituut/Forum, Utrecht, August 2006, https://www.verwey-jonker.nl/doc/jeugd/ D7932526_Ayasofa_def.pdf; Trees Pels, Fadoua Lahri, and Halim El Madkouri, “Pedagogiek in moskee Othman,” paper presented at Verwey-Jonker Instituut/Forum, Utrecht, August 2006, https://www.verwey-jonker.nl/doc/jeugd/D7922526_Othman_def.pdf. 104. Driessen and Merry “Islamic Schools in the Netherlands.” 105. Wasif A. R. Shadid and Sjoerd P. van Koningsveld, “Islamic Religious Education in the Netherlands,” European Education 38, no. 2 (2006): 76–88. 106. Driessen and Merry, “Islamic Schools in the Netherlands,” 215–216. 107. “Herman Philipse (4/5),” YouTube, November 16, 2008, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=1Ry8hR9fO0. 108. Driessen and Merry, “Islamic Schools in the Netherlands,” 217–216. 109. “Islamitische scholen scoren bovengemiddeld op Cito-toets,” RTL Nieuws, September 15, 2013, https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/artikel/2387406/islamitische-scholen-scorenbovengemiddeld-op-cito-toets. 110. Ehsan Masood, “Tariq Ramadan,” Prospect, July 22, 2006, https://www.prospect magazine.co.uk/magazine/tariqramadan. 111. Phalet and van Praag, “Moslim in Nederland.” 112. Phalet and van Praag. 113. SCP and CBS, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2005.” 114. Saskia Keuzenkamp, David Bos, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Gert Hekma, “Gewoon doen: Acceptatie van homoseksualiteit in Nederland,” SCP publication 2006/15, September 2006, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/278697633_Gewoon_doen_Acceptatie_ van_homoseksualiteit_in_Nederland. 115. Keuzenkamp et al. “Gewoon doen.” 116. Phalet and van Praag, “Moslim in Nederland.” 117. Susan Ketner, “Jongeren beschouwt zich meer Moslim dan Marokkaan,” NRC Handelsblad, September 27, 2008. 118. Phalet and van Praag, “Moslim in Nederland.” 119. Martijn de Koning, “Dreaming in Dutch: Tolerance and Confict in Dutch Society,” paper presented at “Islam European Societies and the Carriers of National Identities” workshop, Frankfurt-Oder University, February 24–25, 2006, p. 16. 120. De Koning, “Dreaming in Dutch,” 16–17. 121. Sylvia Dominguez Martinez, Sandra M. Groeneveld, and Edwin W. Kruisbergen, Integratiemonitor 2002 (Rotterdam: Instituut voor Sociologisch-Economisch Onderzoek, 2002). 122. Van Heelsum’s research followed voting patterns of minorities in Amsterdam and Rotterdam from 1998 to 2006. Anja van Heelsum, “Turn Out and Party Choice in the Local Elections in the Netherlands,” paper presented at Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies conference, Lisbon, October 2–6, 2006. 123. Hirsi Ali’s story was broadcast by the investigative television program Zembla. “De

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Heilige Ayaan,” Zembla, May 11, 2006, https://www.bnnvara.nl/zembla/artikelen/de-heiligeayaan. 124. “Hirsi Ali Bedreiged na Kritiek op Islam,” NRC Handelsblad, September 18, 2002, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2002/09/18/hirsi-ali-bedreigd-na-kritiek-op-islam7606217-a309949. 125. Laure Michon, Jean Tillie, and Anja van Heelsum, “Political Participation of Migrants in the Netherlands since 1986,” Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, 2007, https:// ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/68c929ab-dec5-4f37-98f7-a2f480746024.pdf. 126. SCP, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2007.” 127. Martinez, Groeneveld, and Kruisbergen, Integratiemonitor 2002. 128. Group diferences with respect to confdence in political institutions are signifcant, with 60 percent of Turks reporting confdence in the system compared with a mere 40 percent among Moroccans. Furthermore, only 5 percent of Turks advocate the establishment of an Islamic court compared with 18 percent of Moroccans. See Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie, “Civic Community, Political Participation and Political Trust of Ethnic Groups,” Connections 24, no. 1 (2000): 26–41; Phalet and van Praag, “Moslim in Nederland.” 129. Michon, Tillie, and van Heelsum, “Political Participation of Migrants in the Netherlands.” 130. “Verdrietig en opgelucht ga ok Verder,” NRC Handelsblad, May 16, 2006, https:// www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2006/05/16/verdrietig-en-opgelucht-ga-ik-verder-ik-ga-weg-maar11130082-a1079826. 131. “Minder Amsterdamse allochtonen stemmen PvdA,” Het Parool, March 3, 2010, https://www.parool.nl/nieuws/minder-amsterdamse-allochtonen-stemmen-pvda~bfea1817. 132. Veit Bader, “Dutch Nightmare? Te End of Multiculturalism?,” Canadian Diversity 4, no. 1 (2005): 9–12. 133. Maurice de Hond, “Reactie op Islam in Nederland,” Peil.nl., 2012, https://www.pvv. nl/images/stories/Reactie_op_Islam_in_Nederland.pdf; SCP, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2007.” 134. Pew Research Center, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics,” July 14, 2005, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2005/07/14/islamicextremism-common-concern-for-muslim-and-western-publics/. 135. Nebahat Albayrak (PvdA), Coskun Çörüz (CDA), Fatma Koser Kaya (D66), and Fadime Örgü are of Turkish background. Khadija Arib (PvdA), Naima Azough, and Ali Lazrak (GL) are of Moroccan ancestry. Also in the legislature were Farah Karimi (GL) and Nirmala Rambocus (CDA). 136. Coskun Çörüz, Khadija Arib, and Naima Azough were incumbents, and two new members with Turkish backgrounds entered the lower house: Tofk Dibi (GL) and Sadet Karabulut (SP). 137. “Moroccan Muslim Nominated as Mayor of Holland’s Rotterdam,” World Bulletin, October 17, 2008, https://www.worldbulletin.net/archive/moroccan-muslim-nominated-asmayor-of-hollands-rotterdam-h29907.html. 138. Jan Rath, “Against the Current: Te Establishment of Islam in the Netherlands,” Canadian Diversity 4, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 34. 139. Rath, “Against the Current,” 34. 140. Jeroen Feirabend and Jan Rath, “Making a Place for Islam in Politics: Local Authorities Dealing with Islamic Associations,” in Muslims in the Margin: Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in Western Europe, ed. Wasif A. R. Shadid and Sjoerd P. van Koningsveld (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1996), 243–258. 141. Phalet and van Praag, “Moslim in Nederland.” 142. Silvio Ferrari, “Te Secularity of the State and the Shaping of Muslim Representative

Notes to 201–206

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Organizations in Western Europe,” in European Muslims and the Secular State, ed. Jocelyne Césari and Sean McLoughlin (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005). 143. See Carolyn M. Warner and Manfred W. Wenner, “Religion and the Political Organization of Muslims in Europe,” Perspectives on Politics, September 2006, pp. 457–479. 144. Rath, “Against the Current.” 145. Warner and Wenner, “Religion and the Political Organization,” 472. 146. Paul Statham, Ruud Koopmans, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy, “Resilient or Adaptable Islam?,” Ethnicities 5, no. 4 (2005): 427–459. 147. Among these are organizations for the Chinese, southern Europeans, AfroCaribbeans, Surinamese, refugees, Moroccans, and Turks. 148. Ministry of Security and Justice, “CGI Recognized as Umbrella Organisation for Negotiations with the Dutch Government,” January 13, 2005. 149. Contact Groep Islam represents 150,000 Sunni, Shia, Alevite, and Lahore and Ahmadiya members. See “Cablegate: Key Muslim Organizations in the Netherlands,” Scoop Independent News, December 16, 2005, https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0512/S01403/ cablegate-key-muslim-organizations-in-the-netherlands.htm. 150. Tijl Sunier, Islam in beweging, Turkse jongeren en Islamitische organisaties (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1996); Kadir Canatan, “Turkse Islam: Perspectieven op organisatievorming en leiderschap in Nederland” [Turkish Islam: Perspectives on organization and leadership in the Netherlands] (PhD diss., University of Rotterdam, 2001). Organizational empowerment and association should not be interpreted as necessarily conveying a greater sense of belonging, because the average Turk feels substantially less a part of Dutch society than does the average Moroccan, despite the advanced organization of the Turkish community. See SCP, “Jaarrapport integratie 2007.” 151. A Rotterdam councillor claimed that the Fethullah Gulen movement (a socially conscious movement inspired by the ideas of Fethullah Gulen, who is considered a terrorist by the Turkish government) is radical by nature and strives for the Islamization of society and that “this infuence raises barriers against integration, freedom, education and security.” “Gulenbeweging wel Islamitisch-Fundamentalistisch,” Trouw, January 16, 2009. 152. Each party received one chair out of the total forty-fve in the Hague’s council. 153. See the party’s website, at https://islam-democraten.nl. 154. See Partij van de Eenheid, “Missie and Visie,” http://partijvandeeenheid.nl/missievisie/ (accessed January 31, 2020). 155. Alfons Fermin, Nederlandse Politieke Partijen over Minderhedenbeleid 1977–1995 (Amsterdam: Tesis, 1997). 156. Paul Schefer, “Het multiculturele drama,” NRC Handelsblad, January 29, 2000, https://retro.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Multicultureel/schefer.html. 157. Gerbert van Loenen, “Hoeveel immigratie willen we?,” Trouw, March 25, 2000, https://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/hoeveel-immigratie-willen-we~bd6ac38d/; Jafe Vink, Brief aanmijndochter: Een tocht door het pandemonium van sex en geweld (Amsterdam: Meulenhof, 2001); Gerry van der List, “Emancipeer de allochtonen,” Elsevier Weekblad, February 19, 2000. 158. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties Immigratie en Naturalisatiedienst, “Dubble nationaliteit: Mag dat?,” November 7, 2006. 159. For more information, see Human Rights Watch, “Te Netherlands: Fleeting Refugee; Te Triumph of Efciency over Protection in Dutch Asylum Policy,” April 2003, https:// books.google.com/books?id=2TD8uDyBq1wC. 160. Herman Vuijsje, Vermoordeonschuld: Etnisch verschil als Hollands taboe (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1986), 7.

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161. Prins, “Te Nerve to Break Taboos,” 366. 162. VOC stands for Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, the Dutch East India Company, which was established in 1602 to trade with Dutch colonies in Asia and later colonized the Indonesian Archipelago. It was the frst quasi-governmental multinational corporation and highly associated with Christian imperialism and colonial slavery. See Egbert Kalse, “Trotse premier mijdt politieke vragen,” NRC Handelsblad, September 28, 2006, https://www.nrc.nl/ nieuws/2006/09/28/trotse-premier-mijdt-politieke-vragen-bos-gaat-in-11201670-a870028. 163. John Vinocur, “From the Left, a Call to End the Current Dutch Notion of Tolerance,” New York Times, November 29, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/29/world/ europe/29iht-politicus.3.18978881.html. 164. “Niet te snel zwichten for Moslimkritiek,” Brabants Dagblad, June 28, 2008. 165. Tis religion is based in freedom of expression and tolerance but may also include earthly law, such as the international declaration of human rights. Paul Cliteur, quoted in Bruinissen, “After Van Gogh,” 6. See also Ahmed Aboutaleb and Peter Dekkers, eds., Nederland na Fortuyn, vol. 21, From the Trouw dossier (Amsterdam: Rainbow Pocketboeken, 2002), 113–118. 166. Bruinessen, “After Van Gogh.” 167. Te proposal was backed by the Islamic fnancial institute Bilaa-Riba. See “Halalhypotheek Afgekeurd,” Bouw en Wonen, July 24, 2008, https://www.bouwenwonen.net/ artikel/Halal-hypotheek-afgekeurd/19725. 168. Ellen De Visser, “Huizen Verhangt Kunst na Klachten Moslims,” De Volkskrant, May 23, 2008, https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/huizen-verhangt-kunst-naklachten-moslims~b3940ac2/. 169. Jannes H. Mulder, “Een Drupeltje Bloed,” Medisch Contact 63, no. 21 (2008): 912– 913. 170. Arjan Schuiling, “Informele Islamitische Huwelijken Niet Bestrafen,” Wereldjournalisten, April 17, 2008. 171. “Moslim hoeft niet op the staan voor rechtbank,” Trouw, September 5, 2008, https:// www.trouw.nl/nieuws/moslim-hoeft-niet-op-te-staan-voor-rechtbank~bbd85491/. 172. Te law was cited in 1968 by the Hooge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court) when it acquitted Gerard Reve. Reve was accused of blasphemy after he described in his traveling journal how he had intercourse with God by having sex with a donkey. “Hirsch Ballin: Blasfemi strafbaar,” NRC Handelsblad, May 3, 2008. 173. “Netherlands Scraps Anti-blasphemy Law,” UPI, November 3, 2008, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/11/03/Netherlands-scraps-anti-blasphemylaw/38521225735766/?ur3=1. 174. Bruinessen, “After Van Gogh.” 175. Peters, “A Dangerous Book,” 5. 176. Prins, “Te Nerve to Break Taboos,” 369. 177. Baukje Prins, Voorbij de onschuld: Het debat over de multiculturele samenleving (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 2000), 35–36. 178. Peters, “A Dangerous Book.” 179. Herman Philipse, “Stop de tribalisering van Nederland,” NRC Handelsblad, September 27, 2003, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2003/09/27/stop-de-tribalisering-van-nederland7655794-a759645. 180. Paul Cliteur, “De Band tussen godsdienst en moraal moet worden doorgeknipt,” Trouw, January 13, 2003. See also Jos de Beus et al., Op gespannen voet: Politieke opinies over de multiculturele samenleving (Utrecht, Netherlands: Institute for Multicultural Development, 2002), 47–55.

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181. Bruinessen, “After Van Gogh.” 182. Christopher Caldwell, “Faith and Death,” New York Times, September 10, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/10/books/review/faith-and-death.html. 183. Roger Kimball, “Ian Buruma and Multiculturalism,” New Criterion, April 29, 2007, https://newcriterion.com/blogs/dispatch/ian-buruma-and-multiculturalism. 184. Ian Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam: Te Death of Teo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 245, 246. 185. Peters, “A Dangerous Book,” 6. 186. Frits Bolkestein, “Niet marchanderen met de verlichting,” NRC Handelsblad, May 20, 2000, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2000/05/20/niet-marchanderen-met-de-verlichting7495456-a600350. 187. Most governmental and private studies illuminate how to further aid the emancipation of these minority communities. Baukje Prins, “Te Standpoint in Question: Situated Knowledges and the Dutch Minorities Discourse” (PhD diss., University of Utrecht, 1997). 188. Peters, “A Dangerous Book,” 5. 189. Philipse claims, “Tat’s why I am also so against the verzuiling [pillarization], an old solution that worked long ago. . . . We should not assume that, for a big Muslim immigration, this will still work, and I believe it is totally counterproductive.” “Herman Philipse (1/5),” YouTube, November 16, 2008, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bf7MAO7oFHY. See also “Herman Philipse (2/5),” YouTube, November 16, 2008, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=krj8-URDGwg. 190. He states, “Muslims need a good economic integration into the employment market by granting a good basic education and endowment of personal responsibilities and no religious whining. . . . Directing society by God’s law is a drama, . . . look at Iran. . . . If you want to bash a religion’s name, that’s what you should do [make it political]. . . . I think it’s dumb and short-sighted.” “Herman Philipse (3/5),” YouTube, November 16, 2008, https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=sADivG0W-1w. 191. “Reacties na fatale aanslag op Van Gogh,” NRC Handelsblad, November 2, 2004, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2004/11/02/reacties-na-fatale-aanslag-op-van-gogh7708893-a549974. 192. Philipse, “Stop de tribalisering van Nederland.” 193. Ibid. 194. Afshin Ellian, “Stop Capitulating to Treats—a Manifesto,” Afshin Ellian (blog), January 21, 2006, http://afshinellian.blogspot.com/2006/01/. 195. Bruinessen, “After Van Gogh.” 196. Bruinessen. 197. Derk Stokmans and Herman Staal, “Liberaal Jihadist,” NRC Handelsblad, March 29, 2008, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2008/03/29/liberaal-jihadist-11512261-a614220. 198. Te movie shows excerpts from suras of the Qur’an that supposedly encourage violent and anti-Western acts interspersed with media and newspaper clips depicting acts of violence by Muslims. For the Dutch government’s response to the flm, see Ministry of General Afairs, “Government’s Reaction to Wilders’ Film,” March 27, 2008, https://web.archive. org/web/20080404045120/http://www.minaz.nl/english/News/Press_releases_and_news_ items/2008/Maart/Government_s_reaction_to_Wilders_flm. 199. “Muslims Condemn Dutch Lawmaker’s Film,” CNN, March 28, 2008, https://edi tion.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/03/28/islam.flm/. 200. “Rita Verdonk,” Wikipedia, December 29, 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Rita_Verdonk. 201. Te court held that freedom of expression in a democratic society could be limited

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Notes to 215–219

only in the case of a real consequent social danger and that even then remedies should be applied in a proportional manner. Despite the Aarnem court decision, in January 2008 youths carrying pictures of Wilders with the slogan “Extremist: causes you and your family harm” were arrested. One day later the ofce of the Dutch attorney general (Openbaar Ministerie) backtracked, declaring that “Mr. Wilders is a nationally known politician. It can be expected that reactions will follow his positions. Tese posters fall under freedom of expression.” Wilders himself objected to the arrests and remained consistent in his support for freedom of expression by stating that protestors “should say what they want.” Derk Stokmans and Folkert Jensma, “Recht te kwetsen valt binnen meningsvrijheid,” NRC Handelsblad, January 15, 2008, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2008/01/15/recht-te-kwetsen-valt-binnen-meningsvri jheid-11468986-a180053. 202. “Geert Wilders Prosecuted for Hate Speech,” Politiken, January 22, 2009, https:// politiken.dk/newsinenglish/art4782559/Wilders-prosecuted-for-hate-speech. 203. “Silencing Islam’s Critics,” Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2009, https://www.wsj. com/articles/SB123257047606303395. 204. David Jolly, “Dutch Court Acquits Anti-Islam Politician,” New York Times, June 23, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/world/europe/24dutch.html. 205. “Geert Wilders Cleared of Hate Charges by Dutch Court,” BBC News, June 23, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13883331. 206. Nina Siegal, “Geert Wilders, Dutch Far-Right Leader, Is Convicted of Inciting Discrimination,” New York Times, December 9, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/ world/europe/geert-wilders-netherlands-trial.html. 207. Partij Voor de Vrijheid, “Verkiezingsprogramma PVV 2017–2021,” https://www.pvv. nl/visie.html (accessed August 4, 2020). 208. Rath, “Against the Current,” 34. 209. SCP, “Nederlanders meest bezorgd over gebrek aan respect en solidariteit in de samenleving,” Continu Onderzoek Burgerperspectieven, Kwartaalbericht 2008/1, June 18, 2008. 210. Tierry Baudet, “Houellebecq’s Unfnished Critique of Liberal Modernity,” American Afairs 3, no. 2 (2019), https://americanafairsjournal.org/2019/05/houellebecqs-unfnishedcritique-of-liberal-modernity/ (emphasis in original). 211. Baudet, “Houellebecq’s Unfnished Critique.” 212. Ben Marguiles, “Why Europe Should Worry about Rising Dutch Populist Tierry Baudet,” New Statesman, May 22, 2019, https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2019/05/ why-europe-should-worry-about-rising-dutch-populist-thierry. 213. Tierry Baudet, Oikofobie: De angst voor het eigene (Amsterdam: Prometheus/Bert Bakker, 2013). 214. Christopher Meyer, “A Return to 1815 Is the Way Forward for Europe,” Te Times (London), September 2, 2008, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/a-return-to-1815-is-theway-forward-for-europe-2bkwhrwzdsh. 215. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 216. Leoni Bleumers, “Persoonlijk getint getreiter treft homoleraar,” Onderwijsblad 17, no. 3 (2003), https://www.onderwijsblad.nl/article.asp?ArtikelID=3253. 217. In Nationale Jeugdraad, “Seksualiteit en tolerantie: Homo-emancipatie op school,” July 2006, https://www.edudivers.nl/doc/onderzoek/NL%202006%20NJR%20Seksualit eit%20en%20tolerantie.%20Homo-emancipatie%20op%20school.pdf. 218. See, for example, the policy guidelines set in 2011: Brief van den Ministerie van Onderwijs, CultuurenWetenschap, “Hoofdlijnenemancipatiebeleid: Vrouwen-en homo-emancipatie 2015,” April 8, 2011, https://zoek.ofcielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27017-74.html.

Notes to 220–222

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219. See, for example, Lisette Kupyer, “Summary: LGBT Monitor 2016,” SCP, October 2017, https://english.scp.nl/publications/publications/2016/05/12/lgbt-monitor-2016. 220. Literature on LGBT Muslims is abundant. Some of the most prominent works are Omar Nahas, “Homo en moslim: Hoe gaat dat samen? 1001 vragen over Islam en homoseksualiteit,” Institute for Multicultural Development, 2005; Omar Nahas, Islam en homoseksualiteit (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bulaaq, 2001); and Imad El Kaka and Hatice Kursun, Mijn geloof en mijn geluk: Islamitische meiden en jongens over hun homoseksuele gevoelens (Amsterdam: Mets en Schild Uitgevers, 2002). 221. Partij Voor de Vrijheid, “PVV: Plasterk blijft wegkijken voor moslim-geweld tegen homo’s,” November 9, 2007, https://www.pvv.nl/in-de-media/interviews/421-pvv-plasterkblijft-wegkijken-voor-moslim-geweld-tegen-homos.html. 222. In March 2014 Wilders was flmed promising an excited crowd that he would make sure that there would be “fewer Moroccans in the Netherlands.” See “Dutch Politician Geert Wilders Takes Aim at Moroccans and Sparks Outrage,” Te Guardian, March 20, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/20/dutch-politician-geert-wilders-moroc cans-outrage-pvv-party-anti-islam. See also Daphna Elfersy, “Te Extreme Right in the Netherlands: From the Treat of Islam to the Treat of Poland,” paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research conference “Reshaping the Arena of Civic Integration: Te Post-multicultural Moment and the Challenge of the Populist Right,” European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy, June 19–23, 2012. 223. Malise Ruthven, “How to Understand Islam,” New York Review of Books, November 8, 2007, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2007/11/08/how-to-understand-islam/. 224. Fatima Mernissi, Achter de sluier: De Islam en de Strijd tussen de Seksen (Breda, Netherlands: De Geus, 2004). 225. Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Women: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 226. Nahed Selim, Allah houdt niet van Vrouwen (Antwerp: Houtekiet, 2007). 227. Iveta Jusová, “Hirsi Ali and van Gogh’s Submission: Reinforcing the Islam vs. Women Binary,” Women’s Studies International Forum 31, no. 2 (2008): 148–155. 228. El Kaka and Kursun, Mijn geloof en mijn geluk, 93. 229. “Young Muslims Begin Dangerous Fight for the Right to Abandon Faith,” Te Times (London), September 11, 2007, http://theroadtoemmaus.org/RdLb/33Rlg/Islm/MslmApostFitBk.htm. 230. Qur’an 4:88–89: “Whosoever turns back from his belief, openly or secretly, take him and kill him.” 231. Ehsan Jami has compared Muhammad to Hitler and cooperated with Geert Wilders. In a controversial flm, he interviews an actor dressed as Muhammad, and the Prophet expresses sorrow about primitive practices extant in his time, such as his marriage to a sixyear-old, sex with a nine-year-old, nonconsensual sex, and the killing of infdels, Jews, and Christians. See Pieter van Os, “De Profeet heet nu Mo,” NRC Handelsblad, December 10, 2008, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2008/12/10/de-profeet-heet-nu-mo-11652127-a148064; and “Yet Another Dutch Politician Presents a Film about Islam,” Religion News Blog, December 10, 2008, https://www.religionnewsblog.com/23035/ehsan-jami-movie. 232. Jytte Klausen, Te Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 27. 233. “Hirsi Ali gaat, Bouyeri blijft,” Vlaams Belang, May 17, 2006, https://www.vlaamsbe lang.org/hirsi-ali-gaat-bouyeri-blijft/. 234. Anne Applebaum, “A Dutch Retreat on Speech?” American Enterprise Institute, October 8, 2007, https://www.aei.org/articles/a-dutch-retreat-on-speech/. 235. Bart Jan Spruyt, “Christelijke God beter voor Moslims,” De Volkskrant, March 19, 2010, https://www.volkskrant.nl/mensen/christelijke-god-beter-voor-moslims~bd7c5d19/.

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Notes to 222–225

236. Sebastiaan Faber, “Is Dutch Bad Boy Tierry Baudet the New Face of the European Alt-Right?,” Te Nation, April 5, 2018, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/is-dutchbad-boy-thierry-baudet-the-new-face-of-the-european-alt-right/. 237. Entzinger, “Te Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism,” 80. 238. Ellie Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy: Multiculturalism and the Shift to Assimilationism in the Netherlands,” Racial and Ethnic Studies 30, no. 5 (2007): 734. 239. Stef Blok, “Bruggen Bouwen,” Tijdelijke Commissie Onderzoek Integratiebeleid, January 2004, https://www.parlement.com/9291000/d/rapportcieblok.pdf. 240. International Center for Migration Policy Development, “Integration Agreements and Voluntary Measures,” May 2005, http://research.icmpd.org/fleadmin/Research-Website/ Publications/Final_INTI_Report_electronic_version.pdf. 241. 26000 Faces is an organization, formed in 2004, that seeks acceptance for asylum seekers in the Netherlands. Its flms on asylum seekers were aired in 2006 on the Nederland 3 channel. 242. Te resulting reports are Rapportage Minderheden (by SCP), Allochtonen in Nederland (by CBS), and the Integratiemonitor (by the Instituut voor Sociologisch-Economisch Onderzoek, ISEO). 243. Rob V. Bijl et al., “Te Integration Monitor 2005: Te Social Integration of Migrants Monitored over Time; Trend and Cohort Analyses,” CBS and Wetenschappelijk Onderzoeken Documentatiecentrum, 2005, https://core.ac.uk/reader/56779635. 244. “Dutch Immigrants Must Watch Racy Film,” Fox News, March 16, 2006, https:// www.foxnews.com/story/dutch-immigrants-must-watch-racy-flm. 245. A number of exceptions have, however, been introduced in the Civic Integration Act (Wet Inburgering) for foreign residents holding certain diplomas and certifcates or who have medical problems. Te text of the act is available at https://wetten.overheid.nl/ BWBR0020611/2007-11-26/1. 246. Robin van Stokrom, “Netherlands: Anti-immigration and the Road to Intolerance,” Institute of Race Relations, December 2, 2003, http://www.irr.org.uk/news/netherlands-antiimmigration-and-the-road-to-intolerance/. 247. Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, “Openbare Orde en Verblijfsbeëindiging,” April 2005, Openbare_orde_en_verblijfsbeeindiging_ACVZ_beleidsadvies_20050930.pdf. 248. Government of the Netherlands, “Senate Has Adopted Laws from the Integral Approach Jihadism Action Programme,” February 7, 2017, https://www.government.nl/lat est/news/2017/02/07/senate-has-adopted-laws-from-the-integral-approach-jihadism-actionprogramme. 249. Central Statistics Bureau, “1.3 Million People in the Netherlands Hold Dual Citizenship,” August 6, 2015, https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2015/32/1-3-million-people-in-thenetherlands-hold-dual-citizenship. 250. Te total fertility rate of ethnic Dutch women is 1.7 children. Rates of Moroccan women have declined but stabilized at 3.3. Turkish women have shown a more dramatic decline in childbearing and have stabilized at 2.3. Mila van Huis and Petra Visser, “Regionale Verschillen in de Vruchtbaarheid van Autochtonen en Allochtonen,” CBS, 2005, https:// www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/achtergrond/2006/01/regionale-verschillen-in-de-vruchtbaarheid-vanautochtonen-en-allochtonen. 251. Dutch women have their frst child on average at age 29.8 and are the oldest mothers in the world. Huis and Visser, “Regionale Verschillen.” 252. Phalet and van Praag, “Moslim in Nederland.” 253. Anna C. Korteweg, “National Identity: Formation and the Integration of Muslim

Notes to 225–234

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Immigrants in the Netherlands,” paper presented at Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 2008, Boston. 254. Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, “Identifcatie met Nederland.” 255. Blok, “Bruggen Bouwen.” Te Blok Committee was a parliamentary investigation committee on immigrant policy, set up right after the Fortuyn landslide victory in 2002, when the dominant mood was that integration policy had completely failed. See Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities.” 256. Stephen Castles, “Te Racism of Globalisation,” in Te Teeth Are Smiling: Te Persistence of Racism in Multicultural Australia, ed. Ellie Vasta and Stephen Castles (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996), 36. 257. Étienne Balibar, “Racism and Crisis,” in Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, ed. Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London: Verso, 1991), 217–228. 258. Vasta, “From Ethnic Minorities,” 732. 259. See Philomena Essed, Understanding Everyday Racism: An Interdisciplinary Teory (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991). 260. Frank de Zwart and Caelesta Poppelaars, “Redistribution and Ethnic Diversity in the Netherlands,” Acta Sociologica 50, no. 4 (2007): 387–399. 261. Senay Boztas, David Chazan, and Peter Foster, “Dutch Prime Minister Warns Migrants to ‘Be Normal or Be Gone,’ as He Fends Of Populist Geert Wilders in Bitter Election Fight,” Te Telegraph, January 23, 2017, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/23/ dutch-prime-minister-warns-migrants-normal-gone-fends-populist/. 262. James Watkins, “Te Muslim Mayor Uniting Rotterdam,” Ozy, March 13, 2017, https://www.ozy.com/news-and-politics/the-muslim-mayor-uniting-rotterdam/75593/; “Wilders: Cohen is een ‘multicultiknufelaar,’” Partij Voor de Vrijheid, March 31, 2010, https://www.pvv.nl/in-de-media/interviews/2641-wilders-cohen-is-multicultiknufelaar-. html. See also Russell Shorto, “Te Integrationist,” New York Times Magazine, May 28, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/magazine/30Mayor-t.html. 263. Justus Uitermark, Ugo Rossi, and Henk van Houtum, “Reinventing Multiculturalism: Urban Citizenship and the Negotiation of Ethnic Diversity in Amsterdam,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 29, no. 3 (2005): 632. 264. Uitermark, Rossi, and van Houtum, “Reinventing Multiculturalism,” 626. 265. Nausicaa Marbe, “Waar staat Job Cohen voor?,” Volkskrant, March 19, 2010, https:// www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/waar-staat-job-cohen-voor~bc6bf230/. 266. Armando Salvatore, “Making Public Space: Opportunities and Limits of Collective Action among Muslims in Europe,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30, no. 5 (2004): 1013–1031. 267. Daphna Elfersy, “‘Got Faith?’ Te Integration of Muslims in the Netherlands,” Araucaria 16, no. 31 (2014): 173. 268. Peters, “A Dangerous Book,” 12. 269. Bruinessen, “After Van Gogh”; Prins, “Te Nerve to Break Taboos.” 270. Sam Cherribi, In the House of War: Dutch Islam Observed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 224. 271. Partij Voor de Vrijheid, “Verkiezingsprogramma PVV 2017–2021.” 272. Evelyn Ersanilli and Ruud Koopmans, “Do Immigrant Integration Policies Matter? A Tree-Country Comparison among Turkish Immigrants,” West European Politics 34, no. 2 (2011): 208–234. 273. Jerry Z. Muller, “Us and Tem: Te Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” Foreign Afairs, March–April 2008, https://www.foreignafairs.com/articles/europe/2008-03-02/usand-them.

390

Notes to 235–239

Chapter 4 1. Alec G. Hargreaves, “French Muslims and the Middle East,” Contemporary French Civilization 40, no. 2 (2015): 235–254. 2. Ahmet T. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: Te United States, France and Turkey (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 104–105. 3. Gerard Noiriel, Le Creuset Français: Histoire de l’immigration XIXe-XXe siècle (Paris: Seuil, 1988); Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 38, cited in Jeremy Jennings, “Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France,” British Journal of Political Science 30 (2000): 575–598. See also Danielle Trica Keaton, “Muslim Girls and the ‘Other France’: An Examination of Identity Construction,” Social Identities 5, no. 1 (1999): 49. 4. John Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 5. Jean-Marie Woehrling, “Réfexions sur la principe de la neutralité de l’état en matiére religioeuse et sa mise en ouvre en droite francaise,” Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 101 (1998): 31–52. 6. Jeremy Ahearne, “Laïcité: A Parallel French Cultural Policy,” French Cultural Studies 25, nos. 3–4 (2014): 320–329. 7. Trough the Ministry of the Interior’s Central Bureau of Religions, the state has helped Muslim leaders provide halal food and secure supplies of fresh-killed meat on a major feast day. John Bowen, “France after Charlie Hebdo,” Boston Review, March 3, 2015, http:// bostonreview.net/forum/john-bowen-france-after-charlie-hebdo. 8. Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: Te Modernization of Rural France, 1870– 1914 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976). 9. Fernando Savater, “Sobre la identidad democrática,” El Pais, December 29, 2009, https://elpais.com/diario/2009/12/29/opinion/1262041204_850215.html. 10. Jean Bauberot, “Laïcité et sécularisation dans la crise de la modernité de l’Europe,” Cahiers Français, no. 273 (1995): 29–30. 11. Gilbert Chaitin, “Introduction,” in Culture Wars and Literature in the French Tird Republic (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars, 2008). 12. Denis Diderot’s La Religieuse (Te nun) of 1796 describes a young innocent, Suzanne, who was pressed into donning the veil while being sexually abused and subjected to the moral perfdy of her superiors. In the 1845 polemic Du prêtre, de la femme et de la famille [Of the priest, the woman and the family], the nineteenth-century historian Jules Michelet argues that priests, and especially Jesuits, divided husbands and wives to direct women away from the emancipation that republicanism ofered. 13. Stathis N. Kalyvas, Te Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), 139. 14. Ruth Harris, “How the Dreyfus Afair Explains Sarkozy’s Burqa Ban,” Foreign Policy, May 10, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/12/how-the-dreyfus-afair-explains-sar kozys-burqa-ban/. 15. Patrick Weil, “Why the French Laïcité Is Liberal,” Cardozo Law Review 30, no. 6 (2009): 2704. 16. Te Catholic Church accepted its defeat in stages. In 1892, the church reluctantly accepted the republic’s supremacy, but not until after the Nazi defeat in 1945 did the Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops of France publicly accept laïcité and the autonomy of the state. Although the majority of French bishops approved the 1905 law, the newly elected conservative Pope Pius X condemned it, forcing the French Catholic Church to fght the law.

Notes to 240–242

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Not until the 1964 Vatican II did the Roman Catholic Church renounce its ambition of a confessional state. See Weil, “Why the French.” 17. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies, 111. 18. Article 1 of the 1958 constitution states, “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.” See also Phillip E. Hammond, David W. Machacek, and Eric Michael Mazur, Religion on Trial: How Supreme Court Trends Treaten Freedom of Conscience in America (Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira, 2004), 11. 19. Regis Debray, Ce que la voile nous voile: La République et le sacré (Paris: Folio/Gallimard, 2004), 37–43, cited in Cecile Laborde, Critical Republicanism: Te Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 172 (ellipses and emphasis in original). 20. Chaitin, “Introduction,” 4–5 21. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen. 22. Mark Lilla, “Te Other Velvet Revolution: Continental Liberalism and Its Discontents,” Daedalus 123, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 153. However, authors such as Liah Greenfeld have observed that a French identity has existed through the centuries, even before it was reinterpreted into a government-centered national identity. A Frankish political identity predated the formation of France—the domain of the French kings—by several centuries, and the relationship between the two was not one of straightforward continuity. See Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 23. Alain Dieckhof, “Beyond Conventional Wisdom: Cultural and Political Nationalism Revisited,” in Revisiting Nationalism: Teories and Processes, ed. Alain Dieckhof and Christian Jafrelot (London: C. Hurst, 2005), 69. 24. In the famous words of Stanislas Marie Adélaide, Compte du Deputy ClermontTonnerre, at the National Assembly in 1789, “Jews must be refused everything qua nation, and granted everything qua individuals. . . . Tey acquire citizenship individually.” Quoted in Danièle Lochak, “Les minorités et le droit public français: Du refus des diférences à la gestion des diférences,” in Les minorités et leurs droits depuis 1789, ed. Alain Ferret and Gérard Soulier (Paris: Harmattan, 1989), 111–112. 25. Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 38. 26. Dominique Schnapper, Community of Citizens: On the Modern Idea of Nationality (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1998), 142. 27. Gerard Noiriel, La tyrannie du national: La droit d’asile en Europe, 1793–1993 (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1991). 28. Étienne Balibar, “Racisme et nationalisme: Un elogique de l’excès,” in Race, nation, classe: Les identités ambiguës, ed. Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (Paris: La Découverte, 1988), 54–92. See also Étienne Balibar, “Propositions sur la citoyenneté,” in La citoyenneté et les changements de strucures sociale et nationale de la population française, ed. Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (Paris: Edilig-Fondation Diderot, 1988), 223–234. 29. Marc Lazar, “La République à l’épreuve du social,” in La démocratie en France, vol. 2, ed. Marc Sadoun (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 358. 30. Martin A. Schain, “Politics, Immigration and Multiculturalism in France and the United States,” paper presented at French-American Foundation conference “Te Making and Managing of Diferences French and American Perspectives,” Paris, September 30–October 1, 2002; Martin A. Schain, “Te Politics of Multiculturalism in France and the United States,” paper presented at CERI “Conference on Transatlantic Tensions: From Conficts of Interests to Confict of Values?,” Paris, February 2–3, 2004, pp. 7–8; Martin A. Schain, “Minorities and Immigrant Incorporation in France: Te State and the Dynamics of Multiculturalism,” in

392

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Multicultural Questions, ed. Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 205. 31. Françoise Lorcerie, “Les habits neufs de l’assimilation en France,” in Migrations Internationales et Relations Interethniques, ed. Ida Simon-Barouch and Véronique De Rudder (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997), 304. See also Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, “Afaiblissement du lien social, enfermement dans les particularismes et intégrationdans la cité,” 1997, p. 66, https:// www.vie-publique.fr/sites/default/fles/rapport/pdf/984000262.pdf. 32. Tis is not to say that subcultures never existed. For example, Polish and Portuguese immigrants to France re-created community-based networks of solidarity to protect themselves from xenophobia. Donald L. Horowitz, “Immigration and Group Relations in France and America,” in Immigrants in Two Democracies: French and American Experience, ed. Donald L. Horowitz and Gérard Noiriel (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 8–9. 33. See Pierre Birnbaum, “Catholic Identity, Universal Sufrage and ‘Doctrines of Hatred,’” in Te Intellectual Revolt against Liberal Democracy, 1870–1945, ed. Zeev Sternhell (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1996), 233–251. 34. Etienne Balibar, “Racism and Nationalism,” in Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, ed. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (New York: Verso, 1991), 53. 35. Maurice Barrès, Scènes et doctrines du nationalism, vol. 1 (1902; repr., Paris: PlonNourrit, 1925), 167. See also Charles Maurras, “Te Dreyfus Afair: An Afair of State,” trans. Mitchell Abidor, Marxists.org, 2007, https://www.marxists.org/history/france/dreyfus-afair/ maurras.htm. 36. Jennings, “Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism,” 587. See also Christian Jelen, “La régression multiculturaliste,” Le Débat 97 (1997): 138; Tzvetan Todorov, “Du culte de la diférence a la sacralization de la victime,” Esprit 212 (1996): 90–102; and Alain Finkielkraut, La Défait de la pensée (Paris: Gallimard, 1987). 37. As early as 716 BCE, a group of North African soldiers crossed the border of presentday France and founded an Islamic state with a large central mosque in Narvon. In the Middle Ages and early modern times, numerous failed Muslim invasions into southern France left behind a few mosques and Muslims. 38. Vincent Geisser, La nouvelle islamophobie (Paris: La Découverte, 2003), 87. 39. Joel S. Fetzer and Christopher J. Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 63–64. 40. Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 66–65. 41. Michèle Tribalat, “Counting France’s Numbers—Defating the Numbers Infation,” Social Contract Journal 14, no. 2 (2003–2004), https://www.thesocialcontract.com/artman2/ publish/tsc1402/article_1210.shtml. 42. France’s Ministry of Internal Afairs adds to these fgures. France estimates that 1.5 million Muslims come from Algeria, 1 million from Morocco, 350,000 from Tunisia, 315,000 from Turkey, 250,000 from the Sub Sahara, and 100,000 from Asia and 140,000 are from a country other than these or are converts. More than a third of French Muslims are part of the second generation. Most Muslims reside in the Paris metropolis or in regions such as Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur and Rhône-Alpes. Two-thirds of Muslim immigrants are settled in poor suburbs of Paris, Lyon, Lille, and Marseille. Chouki El Hamel, “Muslim Diaspora in Western Europe: Te Islamic Headscarf (Hijab), the Media and Muslims’ Integration in France,” Citizenship Studies 6, no. 3 (2002): 294. 43. Martin Walker, “Europe’s Mosque Hysteria,” Wilson Quarterly 30, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 2. 44. Jorgen S. Nielsen et al., eds., Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 3. Lieden, Netherlands: Brill, 2011), 201; National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, “Les immigrés en France,” 2005, p. 130, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/1371777.

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45. Alberto Lopez and Tomas Gwenaëlle, “L’insertion des jeunes sur le marché du travail: Le poids des origins socio culturelles,” Données sociales, 2006, pp. 293–305, http:// www.fractale-formation.net/dmdocuments/Linsertion-des-jeunes-sur-la-march%C3%A9du-travail-et-origine-socioculturelle.pdf. 46. Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, “Lutte contre les discriminations: Faire respecter le principe d’égalité,” December 1998, https://www.vie-publique.fr/sites/default/fles/rapport/ pdf/994000073.pdf. See also Philippe Bataille, Le racisme au travail (Paris: La Découverte, 1997). 47. Claire Adida, David Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort, Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016). 48. Stephanie Giry states that only 1.2 million Muslims out of the total 5 million vote. Analysis of the 2004 election found that the Muslims do not vote as a bloc and there seems no correlation between parties and ethnicity or homeland origin. Te French Left gets support mainly because of its promotion of issues such as equality in employment and social exclusion. Stephanie Giry, “France and Its Muslims,” Foreign Afairs 85, no. 5 (2006): 87. 49. See Catherine Wihtol de Wenden and Elyamine Settoul, “Islam in the French Army,” paper presented at the CNRS, CERI, Sciences Po conference “New Post 911 Racial/Ethnic Confgurations: Te Problem and Practical Efects of Islamophobia,” Paris, June 2–3, 2006, pp. 9–10. 50. Patrick Weil, Politiques de la laïcité au XXe siècle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007), 632. 51. Patrick Simon, “La discrimination: Contexteinstitutionnelet perception par les immigrés,” Hommes et Migrations, no. 1211 (1998): 49–67. 52. Walker, “Europe’s Mosque Hysteria,” 6. 53. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves, 67. 54. Gilles Kepel, Terreur dans l’Hexagone: Genèse du jihad français [Terror in the hexagon: Te genesis of French jihadism] (Paris: Gallimard, 2015). 55. Gilles Kepel, Les Banlieues de l’islam: Naissance d’une religion en France (Paris: Seuil, 1987), 131–136, 156. 56. See Franck Frégosi, “Les contours fuctuants d’une regulation étatique de l’islam,” Hommes et Migrations, no. 1220 (1999): 14–29. 57. Carolyn M. Warner and Manfred W. Wenner, “Religion and the Political Organization of Muslims in Europe,” Perspectives on Politics, September 2006, pp. 468–469. 58. Islamic leadership is principally at the local district or town level. Until recently parochial leaders were usually frst-generation migrants who founded mosques or prayer rooms for neighbors of their country or region of origin. Jocelyne Césari, “Mosques in French Cities: Toward the End of a Confict?,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 6 (2005): 1031. 59. Césari, “Mosques in French Cities.” 60. In 1993 Pasqua, not satisfed with its performance, dismantled the Working Council on Islam in France. See Jean-Yves Camus, “Islam in France,” International Institute for Counter-terrorism and IDC Herzliya, May 10, 2004, https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/ Islam%20in%20France.pdf. 61. See Paul Silverstein, “Headscarves and the French Tricolor,” Middle East Research and Information Project, January 30, 2004, https://merip.org/2004/01/headscarves-and-thefrench-tricolor; Mayanthi Fernando, “Te Republic’s ‘Second Religion’: Recognizing Islam in France,” Middle East Report 235 (Summer 2005): 12–17. 62. Silverstein, “Headscarves and the French Tricolor.” 63. Warner and Wenner, “Religion and the Political Organization,” 471. 64. Te French Council of the Muslim Faith decided that there would be twenty-fve

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councils in the provinces (conseils régionaux du culte musulman) whose members would be elected. In the April 2003 regional elections, the moderate Algerian organization the Grand Mosque of Paris sufered a setback. Although the Grand Mosque has long been a favorite of the French government, which selected its rector, Dalil Boubakeur, to lead the council, it placed second or third in the voting, often behind its main rival the more fundamentalist Union of Islamic Organizations of France. In the second elections, held in June 2005, the moderates regained some power. “Moderates Win French Muslim Poll,” BBC News, June 20, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4111648.stm. 65. Dalil Boubakeur and Nathalie Dollé, L’Islam de France sera liberal: Entretiens (Paris: Alias, 2003). 66. Representatives from 995 mosques in France, or 87 percent, formed the French Council of the Muslim Faith in elections held in April 2003. 67. Danièle Hervieu-Léger, La religion en miettes, ou la question des sectes (Paris: CalmannLévy, 2001), 25. In Algeria, for example, the French colonial administration bureaucratized the indigenous Islamic justice system, bringing previously autonomous judges (qadis) and legal scholars (ulama) under the control of the state. 68. Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 103. 69. During the government of President Jacques Chirac, Sarkozy proposed changing the law. Chirac rejected the proposal. 70. According to a 2003 King Baudouin Foundation survey of approximately a thousand imams, just over half are permanent residents, less than half receive regular salaries, and a third speak little or no French. Attempts to rectify these issues were unsuccessful. Te poor training and low salaries of imams possibly contribute to an extremist subculture among Muslims in France. Jennifer A. Selby, “France,” in Te Oxford Handbook of European Islam, ed. Jocelyne Cesari (Oxford University Press, 2014), 38. Te European Institute for Human Sciences in Saint-Leger-de-Fougeret in Burgundy was one of the institutes that attempted to remedy this situation. France, however, does not trust such institutions and prefers creating a new generation of Muslim preachers whose language and loyalties are primarily French. Since 2004 the task of teaching the French language, law, and culture to foreign-born imams has fallen to French universities. See Caroline Wyatt, “French Classes for Europe’s Imams,” BBC News, December 24, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4109125.stm. 71. In 2004 Nicolas Sarkozy controversially suggested in his book La Republique, les religions, l’esperance (Te republic, religions, hope) that “some change be made” to the 1905 law. To support his points, he commissioned two reports. Te frst, by the Machelon Commission (chaired by law professor Jean-Pierre Machelon), suggested some legislative modifcations that would allow places of worship to be fnanced by communes. It proposed two ways of doing this: either by revising “minor articles” of the 1905 law or by including in the General Code of the Regional Authorities the authorization to fnance places of worship “under strictly defned conditions.” Judith Waintraub, “Interior Minister Wants ‘Taboo-Free’ Debate on Secularism,” FigaroVox, September 21, 2006, https://www.lefgaro.fr/debats/2006/09/22/0100520060922ARTWWW90296-interior_minister_wants_taboo_free_debate_on_secularism. php. 72. One worry concerned the construction of minarets on mosques. After the 2009 Swiss referendum banning the construction of new minarets, whether to allow minarets in France was debated by the public. In a poll conducted by Le Figaro, forty-nine thousand readers favored a ban on new minarets in France, or 73 percent of respondents. In a similar poll conducted by L’Express, twenty-four thousand readers (86 percent) were in favor. Daniel Pipes, “Swiss Ban on Minarets Possible Turning Point,” Sullivan-County.com, November 30, 2009,

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http://www.sullivan-county.com/immigration/minarets.htm. See also Ivan Rioufol, “Blocnotes: Hommage á la resistance du people Suisse,” Le Figaro, December 4, 2009, https://blog. lefgaro.fr/rioufol/2009/12/bloc-notes-hommage-a-la-resist.html. 73. Te nationalized version of Islam sees the Muslim population as French, and therefore, Muslims should try to change France from the inside. In the co-opted republican version, leaders submit to republican values, which they cannot infuence. 74. Daniel Bernard, “Que faire avec un imam qui prêche l’apartheid,” Marianne, May 28, 2015, p. 61. 75. Pew Research Center, “Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity,” July 6, 2006, https://www.pewresearch.org/glob al/2006/07/06/muslims-in-europe-economic-worries-top-concerns-about-religious-and-cul tural-identity/. 76. “Poll on French Muslims Blasts Popular Clichés,” Expatica, September 20, 2006, https://www.expatica.com/fr/uncategorized/poll-on-french-muslims-blasts-popular-cli ches-114476/. 77. See, for example, the Tabligh Dar es Salaam website, at https://www.dartabligh.org. 78. See the Grande Mosquée de Paris website, at https://www.mosqueedeparis.net. Te Grand Mosque in Paris receives funding from Algeria, the National Union of the Muslims of France receives Morocco’s fnancial aid, and the Union of the Islamic Organizations of France receives funding from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. 79. Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 80. Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj, “Français comme les autres? Enquête sur les citoyens d’origine maghrébine, africaine et turque,” Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po, November–December 2005, https://www.cairn.info/francais-comme-lesautres--9782724609844.htm#. 81. Mosque attendance for Friday prayers rose to 23 percent in 2007, up from 16 percent in 1994, while Ramadan observance has reached 70 percent compared with 60 percent in 1994. See Tom Heneghan, “French Muslims Becoming More Observant,” Reuters, January 17, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-muslims/french-muslims-becoming-moreobservant-idUSL176050220080117. See also IFOP, “1989–2007: Enquête sur l’évolution de l’Islam de France,” January 2008, https://www.ifop.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ evolutionislam.pdf. 82. See Heneghan, “French Muslims Becoming More Observant.” 83. A poll by the Institute for the Study of Demographics reports that by the end of the 1990s only 23 percent of Muslims in France joined in public prayer at least fve times a year, but that number was higher than Catholic attendance at seasonal high services (Christmas, Easter, All Saints Day), which was at 20 percent. See Michel Gurfnkiel, “Islam in France: Te French Way of Life Is in Danger,” Middle East Quarterly 4, no. 1 (1997): 24. 84. Hakim el Karoui, “A French Islam Is Possible,” Institut Montaigne, September 2016, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/publications/french-islam-possible. 85. Pew Research Center, “Muslims in Europe.” 86. Leyla Arslan, Enfants d’Islam et de Marianne: Des banlieues à l’université (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2010). 87. Jocelyne Césari, “Islam in France: Te Shaping of a Religious Minority,” in Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, ed. Yvonne Haddad-Yazbek (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 36–51. 88. Gilles Kepel, Beyond Terror and Martyrdom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 182.

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89. Contemporary Salafs advocate a new purely Islamic religiosity of salvation, moral values, and self-realization. Before the 1990s, Salafsm was primarily a pietistic and apolitical movement that did not pose a threat to Arab regimes. Saudi Arabia even used Salaf conservatism to counter more political Islamist movements. In the 1990s, there was a “clear split between reformist or academic Salafsm (Salafyyah al-ilmiyyah) and the fghting, or ‘Jihadi’ Salafsm (Salafyyah al Jihadiyyah). Te origin of the split was the Gulf War. Saudi Arabia . . . invit[ed] U.S. troops onto its soil. Tis decision . . . help[ed] radicalize the most important sect of Saudi Islamism (al Ahwa al Islamiyya), whose most prominent representatives, Salman al-Awda and Safar al-Hawali, targeted [for criticism and violent resistance] . . . liberal intellectuals, . . . the State and its institutions.” See Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Infuence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe,” MERIA Journal 10, no. 3 (2006): 3. 90. A graduate of Al-Azhar University in Egypt and a mentor of Ali Benhadj, a former high school teacher known for his militant views of the role of political Islam, Abdel-Hâdî Dûdî belonged to the Algerian Salaf movement that helped create the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut) in 1989. Condemned to death by the Algerian regime for his involvement in Mustafa Bouyali’s Armed Islamic Movement, he took refuge in France with the tacit approval of the Algerian authorities. Abdel-Hâdî Dûdî’s teachings birthed and fermented the Salaf movement in Marseille. See International Crisis Group, “La France face à ses musulmans: Émeutes, Jihadisme et dépolitisation,” European Report no. 172, March 9, 2006, https://www.fles.ethz.ch/isn/16113/172_la_france_face_a_ses_musulmans_ emeutes__jihadisme. . . . pdf. 91. See Anouar Boukhars, “Islam, Jihadism and Depolitization in the French Banlieues,” Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 18 (2006), https://jamestown.org/program/islam-jihadism-anddepolitization-in-the-french-banlieues/. Te movement was nonviolent because it was infuenced by the teachings of Sheikh Rabî’al-Madkhalî and two of his contemporaries—Ahmed Ramdanî al-Jaza’ irî and Sâlih al-Fawzen. All three condemn political Islam as a perversion of religion and preach an apolitical, puritanical, and backward-looking form of fundamentalism. Te conversion of Abdel-Hâdî Dûdî into an apolitical Shaykhiste Salaf fts the transformation of the Salaf movement in the second half of the 1990s, following the return of French students from Saudi Arabia. 92. Sophie Heine, “Te Hijab Controversy and French Republicanism: Critical Analysis and Normative Propositions,” French Politics 7, no. 2 (2009): 167–193. 93. Jean Baubérot, “La laïcité commepacte laïque,” in La laïcité, valeur d’aujour d’hui? Contestations et renégotiations du modèle français, ed. Jean Baudouin and Philippe Portier (Rennes, France: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2001), 39–50; Jean Baubérot, La morale laïque contre l’ordre moral (Paris: Seuil, 1997), 305–314. 94. Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 78–79. 95. Te principle, Ernest Chenrière from Creil, north Paris, prohibited the hijab because it was, in his opinion, a violation of laïcité. See El Hamel, “Muslim Diaspora in Western Europe,” 297. After several rounds of negotiations, school administration, the girls’ parents, and local associations, especially the Association of Tunisians, compromised by agreeing that the hijab would be removed in classrooms. However, human rights organizations and the Catholic cardinal of Paris, among others, reignited debate about the highly publicized incident. Te girls breached the agreement and were expelled again. At this point, the local dispute became a national one. 96. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves, 84. 97. See Francoise Gaspard and Farhad Khosrokhavar, Le foulard et la République (Paris: La Découverte, 1995).

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98. Nancy Venel, Musulmanes francaises: Des pratiquantes voilées á l’université (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999), 71. 99. Jean Baubérot, Laïcité 1905–2005: Entre passion et raison (Paris: Seuil, 2004), 189. 100. See Joan Wallach Scott, Te Politics of the Veil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 101. Elisabeth Badinter et al., “Foulard islamique: Profs, ne capitulons pas!,” Le Nouvel Observateur, November 2, 1989, https://www.snalc.fr/national/article/1634/. 102. See Jelen, “La régression multiculturaliste,” 143; Todorov, “Du culte de la diférence.” 212; Finkielkraut, La Défait de la pensée. 103. “Pour unelaïcitéouverte,” Politis 79 (1989): 9–15. 104. Weil, “Why the French Laïcité Is Liberal.” On April 29, François Baroin, a member of parliament, voiced his concerned that in public schools, “haze and ambiguity are actually the loyal allies of fundamentalists” (2700). Tis rationale guided Rafarin and the members of the Stasi Commission to end ambiguities regarding the meaning of secularism. Te commission comprised twenty intellectuals and was headed by former minister Bernard Stasi. Te only person with sensitivity toward the Muslim case was Jean Baubérot. Te rest, including Alain Touraine, believed that secularism had the fnal word. 105. Weil, “Why the French Laïcité Is Liberal.” 106. Guy Millière, “Jihad in France Just Beginning,” Gatestone Institute, April 2, 2012, https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2985/jihad-in-france; Olivier Guitta, “Te Islamization of French Schools,” Washington Examiner, May 9, 2005, https://www.washingtonexaminer. com/weekly-standard/the-islamization-of-french-schools. 107. Weil, “Why the French Laïcité Is Liberal,” 2708–2709. 108. Silverstein, “Headscarves and the French Tricolor.” 109. According to the minister of education, François Fillon, at the end of the frst semester only forty-eight students were expelled under the new law. In September 2005 he reported that a mere twenty-fve students showed up wearing religious items in the frst week of class. See Luc Bronner and Xavier Ternisien, “Les signes religieux ostensible ont pratiquement disparu des écoles,” Le Monde, September 29, 2005, https://www.lemonde. fr/societe/article/2005/09/29/les-signes-religieux-ostensibles-ont-pratiquement-disparu-desecoles_694106_3224.html. 110. Joseph Bamat, “French Parents Boycott Schools over ‘Gender Teory’ Scare,” France 24, January 29, 2014, http://www.france24.com/en/20140129-france-sex-education-genderdiscrimination-protest-school. 111. Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, 85. 112. Tere is one Islamic school in the French republic that has received public funding; it is far from Europe on the island of Réunion, east of Madagascar. It follows France’s national curriculum but funds its own separate Islamic lessons. Teachers and students are allowed to wear the hijab. See Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, 86, 84. 113. Riva Kastoryano, “Territories of Identities in France,” Social Science Research Council, June 11, 2006, https://items.ssrc.org/riots-in-france/territories-of-identities-in-france/. 114. Jocelyne Césari, “Ethnicity, Islam, and Les Banlieues: Confusing the Issues,” Social Science Research Council, November 30, 2005, https://items.ssrc.org/riots-in-france/ethnicityislam-and-les-banlieues-confusing-the-issues/. 115. Olivier Roy, “Te Nature of the French Riots,” Social Science Research Council, November 18, 2005, https://items.ssrc.org/riots-in-france/the-nature-of-the-french-riots/. 116. International Crisis Group, “France and Its Muslims: Riots, Jihadism and Depoliticisation,” March 9, 2006, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/france/france-and-its-muslims-riots-jihadism-and-depoliticisation.

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117. See Geofroy de Laforcade, “‘Foreigners,’ Nationalism and the ‘Colonial Fracture,’” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 47, nos. 3–4 (2006): 217–233. 118. P. Estèbe and J. Donzelot, L’usage des quartiers: Action publique et géographie dans la politique de la ville (1982–1999) (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004). 119. Steven Erlanger, “France’s Ideals, Forged in Revolution, Face a Modern Test,” New York Times, February 2, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/03/world/frances-idealsforged-in-revolution-face-a-modern-test.html. 120. Jacques Barou, “Integration of Immigrants in France: A Historical Perspective,” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 21, no. 6 (2014): 653. 121. See Gilles Kepel, Quatre-vingt-treize (Paris: Gallimard, 2012). 122. Gilles Kepel, Passion française: Les voix des cités (Paris: Gallimard, 2014); Gilles Kepel, Banlieue de la République: Société, politique et religion à Clichy-sous-Bois et Montfermeil (Paris: Gallimard, 2012); Kepel, Banlieues de l’islam. 123. David Pujadas and Ahmed Salam, La tentation du Jihad: L’Islam Radical en France (Paris: Lattès, 1995), 175–186. 124. Farhad Khosrokhavar, Radicalisation (Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 2014); Farhad Khosrokhavar, “Te New European Jihad,” translated by Cadenza Academic Translations, Cairn.info, October 7, 2017, https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_ RDM_049_0031--the-new-european-jihad.htm?contenu=article. 125. Virginie Andre and Shandon Harris-Hogan, “Mohamed Merah: From Petty Criminal to Neojihadist,” Politics, Religion and Ideology 14, no. 2 (2013): 317. 126. John Rosenthal, “Te French Path to Jihad,” Policy Review, October 1, 2006, https:// www.hoover.org/research/french-path-jihad. 127. Farhad Khosrokhavar, Quand Al-Qäida parle: Témoignages derrière les barreaux (Paris: Grasset, 2006), 136–137. See also Farhad Khosrokhavar, “Radicalization in Prison: Te French Case,” Politics, Religion and Ideology 14, no. 2 (2013): 284–306. 128. According to Khosrokhavar, the new actors of anti-Semitism are male French citizens of North African descent who mostly live in the poor suburbs, more or less segregated from the rest of the society. Teir resentment has two sources. Te frst one is their image of Jews as people who are economically and culturally integrated into the French society, whereas the “Arabs” (North Africans living in France, most having French citizenship) do not beneft from the same privileges. Te second one is that Jews are seen as holding to their religion and culture and still being seen as French, whereas Arabs are rejected because of their religion (Islam) and their culture (the Arabic one). Michel Wieviorka, Te Lure of Anti-Semitism: Hatred of Jews in Present-Day France, trans. Kristin Couper Lobel and Anna Declerck (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2007), 142. 129. Christopher de Bellaigue, “Are French Prisons ‘Finishing Schools’ for Terrorism?,” Te Guardian, March 17, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/17/arefrench-prisons-fnishing-schools-for-terrorism. 130. “Le chef du grupuscule Forsane Alizza nie tout,” Le Parisien, June 10, 2015, http://www. leparisien.fr/archives/le-chef-du-groupuscule-forsane-alizza-nie-tout-10-06-2015-4848173. php. 131. Gilles Kepel, Terreur et Martyre (Paris: Flammarion, 2008), 189–190, cited in Andre and Harris-Hogan, “Mohamed Merah,” 316. 132. Kepel, Terreur dans l’Hexagone. 133. Perrine Cherchève, “Ils excusent tout, c’est même à ça qu’on les reconnaît,” Marianne, May 22, 2015, https://www.marianne.net/societe/ils-excusent-tout-cest-meme-caquon-les-reconnait. 134. In his Second Letter in Algeria, he recognized the possibility of an “amalgamation”

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of the races; however, he generally depicted the colonial world as one of permanent opposition between settler and native, to the ultimate economic beneft of the settlers. Alexis de Tocqueville, Writings on Empire and Slavery, ed. and trans. Jennifer Pitts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 25. 135. See Benjamin Stora, Le Transfert d’une mémoire: De l’Algérie française au racisme antiarabe (Paris: La Découverte, 1999), 17. 136. See “La loi du 23 février 2005: Texte et reactions,” Cahiers d’histoire 94–95 (2005), https://journals.openedition.org/chrhc/1077#tocto1n2. 137. See Romain Bertrand, Mémoires d’empire: La controverseautour du “fait colonial” (Paris: Du Croquant, 2006). 138. Ruth Mas, “Compelling the Muslim Subject: Memory as Post-colonial Violence and the Public Performativity of ‘Secular and Cultural Islam,’” Muslim World 96, no. 4 (2006): 591. As noted by Ruth Mas, the violence of the colonizing missions in Algeria—the dispossession of land, forced labor, and the extremes of the “Code de l’indigénat,” which, until 1946, restricted native populations’ freedom to assemble, circulate, and speak and deprived them of their political rights—was obscured. 139. See Patrick Weil, “Lifting the Veil,” French Politics: Culture and Society 22, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 145. 140. Mas, “Compelling the Muslim Subject,” 592. 141. Neil MacMaster, Colonial Migrants and Racism: Algerians in France, 1900–1962 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 105, 108–109, cited in Mas, “Compelling the Muslim Subject,” 594. 142. Tese groups include the Tunisian Federation for Citizenship on Both Sides (Fédération des Tunisiens pour une citoyenneté des deux rives), Association of Maghreb Workers in France (l’Association des travailleurs maghrébins en France), SOS Racism (SOS Racisme), and Movement against Racism and for Friendship between Peoples (Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entreles peoples). Associations such as Union of Tunisian Immigrant Workers (l’Union des travailleurs immigrés tunisiens) have contributed to political debates regarding the place of Islam in French society. See Franck Frégosi, “Les Musulmans laïques en France: Une mouvance plurielle et paradoxale,” Maghreb Machrek 183 (Spring 2005): 35. 143. Among these are the Coordination of Democratic Muslims (Coordination des musulmans democrats), Movement of Secular Maghrebs in France (Mouvement des Maghrébins Laïques de France), Elsewhere or Here but Together (Ailleurs ou d’Ici Mais Ensemble), and the Independent Secular Movement (Mouvement laïque independent). Te more visible associations include the Secular Convention for Egalitarian Rights and for Participation of French Muslims (Convention laïque pour l’égalité des droits et la participation de musulmans de France), the Secular Movement of French Muslims (Mouvement laïque des musulmans de France), and the French Council of Secular Muslims (Conseil français des musulmans laïques). Te last was composed of Franco-Maghreb elites known for their promotion of integration in the 1980s and for their continued eforts to denounce the fundamentalist presence of Muslim communitarianism in France. Among their highest-profle members is Malek Boutih, president of SOS Racisme. 144. See Jérémy Robine, “Les ‘indigènes de la République’: Nation et question postcoloniale; Territores des enfants de l’immigration et rivalité de pouvoir,” Hérodote 120 (2006): 124, 140. 145. See Sadri Khiari, Pour une politique de la racaille: Immigré-e-s, indigènes et jeunes de banlieues (Paris: Textuel, 2005). 146. Mas, “Compelling the Muslim Subject,” 600. 147. Saïd Mekki, “Te Decolonizing Struggle in France: An Interview with Houria

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Bouteldja,” trans. Roberto Hernandez, Parti des Indigenes de la Republique, November 2, 2009, http://indigenes-republique.fr/the-decolonizing-struggle-in-france-an-interview-withhouria-bouteldja/. 148. Zahra Ali, Féminismes islamiques (Paris: La Fabrique, 2012). See also Amélie Le Renard, “Lectures et usages féministes de l’Islam,” La Vie des idées, January 31, 2013, https:// laviedesidees.fr/Lectures-et-usages-feministes-de-l.html. 149. Isabel Frey, “Te Price of Living Together,” Jewish Currents, June 26, 2019, https:// jewishcurrents.org/the-price-of-living-together/. 150. Bruno Rieth, “Indigènes de la République: Tomas Guénolé démontre le racisme, la misogynie et l’homophobie de Houria Bouteldja,” Marianne, March 21, 2016, https://www. marianne.net/politique/indigenes-de-la-republique-thomas-guenole-demontre-le-racisme-lamisogynie-et-lhomophobie. 151. On Fadela Amara’s career, see “Fadela Amara—Parti Socialiste,” Le Point, https:// www.lepoint.fr/tags/fadela-amara (accessed June 20, 2020). 152. Te two men who attacked Rayhana grabbed her from behind, forced her to the ground, and poured gasoline over her head and in her face, momentarily blinding her, and then attempted to set her on fre by throwing a lit cigarette on top of her head. 153. A huge crowd assembled in front of the theater, la Maison des Métallos, where Rayhana was performing her play. Te crowd included women’s rights activists, government ofcials, and representatives from a variety of France’s political parties. 154. “Cinq cent personnes rassemblées en soutien à la comédienne Rayhana, agressée à Paris,” France-Amérique, January 16, 2010, https://france-amerique.com/en/cinq-cent-per sonnes-rassemblees-en-soutien-a-la-comedienne-rayhana-agressee-a-paris/; Nicole Fayard and Yvette Rocheron, “Ni Putes Ni Soumises: A Republican Feminism from the Quartiers Sensibles,” Modern and Contemporary France 17, no. 1 (2009): 1. 155. She is an active and efective opponent of discrimination against visible minorities. In 2005 she became a member of the Haute Autorité de lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’égalité. Eloi Laurent, “Fadela Amara,” French Politics, August 3, 2007, https://artgold hammer.blogspot.com/2007/08/fadela-amara-guest-post-eloi-laurent.html. See also “Fadela Amara—Parti Socialiste.” 156. In 2001 she was elected under the name of Fatiha Amara and as a Socialist Party member to the municipal council in her hometown of Clermont-Ferrand. To justify her move to the right, she accused the left of having lost its soul as it deserted its sufering ghettos. A blog post by some members of the Ni Putes Ni Soumises, “Ni Putes Ni Soumises en cólere,” expresses anger about Amara’s nomination as minister in the right-wing government of Nicolas Sarkozy. See “Communiqué de ‘Ni putes ni soumises en colère’ sur l’entrée dans le gouvernement Sarkozy de Fadela Amara,” June 25, 2007, http://www.gauchemip.org/spip. php?article3444. However, the leadership of the movement praised her. Mohammed Abdi, general secretary of the movement who became special adviser to Amara, could be heard justifying her move to the right in a rather chaotic edition of the Radio France program Du Grain à Moudre (in which he also accuses opponents of “islamo-gauchisme”). Mohammed Abdi, “‘Ni putes ni soumises,’ mais toujours de gauche?” Du Grain à Moudre, July 16, 2007, https:// www.franceculture.fr/emissions/du-grain-moudre/ni-putes-ni-soumises-mais-toujours-degauche. 157. Pierre Bourdieu, Te State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 117. 158. Article 8 of the French Data Protection and Liberties Act (Loi informatique et libertés) of 1978, created the National Commission for Information Technology and Civil Liberties (Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés). An independent administrative

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state authority, it ensures that “personal data revealing directly or indirectly the racial or ethnic origin of individuals” cannot be processed by any government agency or its subcontractor, other than the national statistics agency, without consent. Claire Adida, David Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort, “Integration into Europe: Identifying a Muslim Efect,” paper presented at the Working Group on African Political Economy meeting, Berkeley, CA, December 11– 12, 2009, http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous_fles/wgape/17_Adida.PDF. 159. See Adida, Laitin, and Valfort, “Integration into Europe.” 160. Organizations such as the Representative Council of French Jewish Organizations in France (Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France) favor collecting such statistics; however, Muslim religious leaders such as Dalil Boubakeur do not and consider it nonproductive. In the name of equality and nondiscrimination, several academics and association leaders have called for keeping the ban. Large and infuential French associations specializing in minority rights, which have been divided over many other signifcant issues, have united in opposition to the collection of ofcial ethnic data. Tese include the International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism (Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l’Anti-Sémitisme), Movement against Racism and for Friendship among Peoples (Mouvement Contre le Racisme et pour l’Amitié entre les Peuples), and Human Rights League (Ligue des Droits de l’Homme). Romain Garbaye, “Crossing Paths? Te British and French Experiences with Racial and Ethnic Diversity since 9/11,” paper presented at the Center to Advance Research and Teaching in the Social Sciences conference “Multiculturalism and Its Discontents,” Boulder, CO, April 23–25, 2007. 161. Cecile Laborde, “Secular Philosophy and Muslim Headscarves in Schools,” Journal of Political Philosophy 13, no. 3 (2005): 313. 162. Christian Joppke, “Minority Rights for Immigrants? Multiculturalism vs. Antidiscrimination,” Israel Law Review 43, no. 1 (2010): 62. 163. Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, “Pour un modèle français d’intégration: Premier rapport annuel,” 1991, pp. 18–19, https://www.vie-publique.fr/sites/default/fles/rapport/ pdf/124000544.pdf (emphasis in original). 164. Virginie Guiraudon, “Diferent Nation, Same Nationhood,” in Changing France: Te Politics Tat Markets Make, ed. Pepper D. Culpepper, Peter A. Hall, and Bruno Palier (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2006), 142. 165. Diferent groups were created to further this goal. For example, Minister of the Interior Jean-Pierre Chevènement proposed a Departmental Commission of Access to Citizenship (Commission Départementale d’Accès à la Citoyenneté) to investigate individuals’ complaints about discrimination at the local level. Te Group of Study and Struggle against Discrimination (Groupe d’Etudes et de Luttes Contre les Discriminations), supported by some academics, studied the realities of discrimination in various policy sectors. 166. Virginie Guiraudon, “Construire une Politique Européenne de Lutte Contre les Discriminations: L’Histoire de la Directive Race,” Sociétés Contemporaines, no. 53 (2004): 14. 167. Guiraudon, “Construire une Politique,” 14. 168. Erik Bleich, “Histoire des Politiques Françaises Antidiscrimination: Du Déni à la Lutte,” Hommes et Migrations, no. 1245 (2003): 15. 169. Tis November 2001 law applied to hate speech law. Section 24 criminalizes incitement to racial discrimination, hatred, or violence on the basis of origin or membership (or nonmembership) in an ethic, national, racial, or religious group. 170. Te Representative Council of Black Associations (Conseil Représentatif des Association Noires), for example, is composed of 120 organizations and was created just after the riots. 171. Kastoryano, “Territories of Identities in France.”

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172. Te ZEP program improved funding, increased personnel, and built facilities for schools where at least one-third of the students were of immigrant origin. It channels additional resources to schools in disadvantaged areas and encourages the development of new teaching projects. 173. Valérie Sala Pala and Patrick Simon, “Public and Political Debates on Multicultural Crises in France,” Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 2009, http://www. eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/en/2008/05/france_report_multicultural_discoures_fnal. pdf. 174. Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 230. 175. Christian Joppke, “Transformation of Immigrant Integration: Civic Integration and Antidiscrimination in the Netherlands, France, and Germany,” World Politics 59, no. 2 (2007): 252. 176. Eleonore Kofman, Madalina Rogoz, and Florence Lévy, “Family Migration Policies in France,” International Center for Migration Policy Development, January 2010, p. 6, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/family-migration-policies-infrance. 177. Danièle Lochak, “L’intégration, alibi de la précarisation,” Plein Droit, nos. 59–60 (2004): 4, cited in Joppke, “Transformation,” 252. 178. An example of an immigrant community organization is the Fund for Action and Support for Integration and the Support against Discrimination (Fonds d’Action pour le Soutien, l’Intégration et la Lutte Contre les Discriminations; FASILD), which for decades has provided funds to immigrant community organizations. It changed its name in 2006 to Agency for Social Cohesion and Equality of Opportunities (Agence pour la Cohésion Sociale et l’Egalité des Chances; ACSE). See Virginie Guiraudon, “L’Intégration des Immigrés ou la Politique de l’Esquive, Réformer Sans Changer de Modèle,” in La France en mutation: 1980– 2005, ed. Pepper D. Culpepper, Peter A. Hall, and Bruno Palier (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2006), cited in Garbaye, “Crossing Paths?, 293. 179. Steven Erlanger, “France Debates Its Identity, but Some Question Why,” New York Times, November 28, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/29/world/europe/29identity. html. 180. Antonio Jimenez Barca, “Un contrato para ser francés,” El Pais, February 8, 2010, https://elpais.com/internacional/2010/02/08/actualidad/1265583612_850215.html. 181. For example, it addressed situations such as how to treat female patients who wanted treatment only from female doctors because of religious convictions. 182. Miriam Feldblum, Reconstructing Citizenship: Te Politics of Nationality Reform and Immigration in Contemporary France (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 56. 183. Amélie Barras, “Contemporary Laïcité: Te Crafting of a New ‘Invented Tradition’?,” Migration and Citizenship Newsletter 3, no. 2 (2015): 26. 184. Ines Valdez, “Non-domination or Practices of Freedom? French Muslim Women, Foucault and the Full Veil Ban,” American Political Science Review 110, no. 1 (2016): 18–30; Barras, “Contemporary Laïcité,” 27. 185. François Baroin, “Pour une nouvelle laïcité,” Voltairenet.org, June 2003, https://www. voltairenet.org/rubrique506.html?lang=fr. 186 . Robert O’Brien and Bernard Stasi, Te Stasi Report: Te Report of the Committee of Refection on the Application of the Principle of Secularity in the Republic (Bufalo, NY: Hein, 2005). 187. Mayanthi Fernando, Te Republic Unsettled: Muslim French and the Contradictions of Secularism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 209.

Notes to 283–288

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188. Henry Samuel, “France Unveils Controversial ‘Secularism Charter,’” Te Telegraph, September 9, 2013, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/10296500/ France-unveils-controversial-secularism-charter.html. 189. Even in 2013 the French demanded fve-year residence and a minimum level of linguistic profciency for naturalization. Schnapper, La France de l’intégration, 56. 190. Te 1988 report of the Commission de la Nationalité had similarly insisted that the French conception of citizenship was not one of integral jus soli but rather one that granted nationality on the prerequisites of education and socialization. See Dominique Schnapper, “Citoyenneté européenne et démocratie providentielle,” in La République ou l’Europe?, ed. Patrick Savidan (Paris: Livre de Poche, 2004), 337–360. 191. See section 45 on the use of the full-face veil on national territory in Assemblée Nationale, “Rapport d’information au nom de la mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire national,” January 26, 2010, p. 87, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i2262.asp. 192. Even Sarkozy pretended to be undecided about supporting the law, claiming to favor a nonbinding resolution declaring the burqa to be contrary to French values but not a punishable ofense. 193. Kayvan Farzaneh, “Europe’s Burqa Wars,” Foreign Policy, May 11, 2010, https://for eignpolicy.com/2010/05/11/europes-burqa-wars/. 194. See Martha Nussbaum, “Veiled Treats?,” New York Times, July 11, 2010, https:// opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/veiled-threats/. 195. Mayanthi L. Fernando, “Reconfguring Freedom: Muslim Piety and the Limits of Secular Law and Public Discourse in France,” American Ethnologist 37, no. 1 (2010): 20. See also Open Society Foundations, “Unveiling the Truth: Why 32 Muslim Women Wear the Full-Face Veil in France,” 2011, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/ unveiling-truth-why-32-muslim-women-wear-full-face-veil-france. 196. Mayanthi L. Fernando, Te Republic Unsettled, 209. 197. Bernard-Henri Lévy, “Why I Support a Ban on Burqas,” Hufngton Post, April 17, 2010, https://www.hufpost.com/entry/why-i-support-a-ban-on-bu_b_463192. 198. Christian Joppke, “Limits of Restricting Islam: Te French Burqa Law of 2010,” 2011, https://www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/socio/fles/6414/0533/6129/chapter.bur ka2010.pdf. 199. Assembleé Nationale, quoted in Christian Joppke and John Torpey, Legal Integration of Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 44, 40–41. 200. On Sarkozy’s appropriation of the discourse of the radical Right in the 2007 elections, see Aurelien Mondon, “Nicolas Sarkozy’s Legitimation of the Front National: Background and Perspectives,” Patterns of Prejudice 47, no. 1 (2013): 22–40. 201. “French Senate Approves Burqa Ban,” CNN, September 15, 2010, https://edition. cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/09/14/france.burqa.ban/index.html. 202. Te Ipsos poll for Le Point magazine found that 57 percent of the French favored the ban. “France Moves Closer to Ban on Burqas,” CNN, January 25, 2010, https://edition.cnn. com/2010/WORLD/europe/01/25/france.burqa/index.html. 203. “Poll Shows 63 Percent of French Back Gay Marriage,” Reuters, January 26, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-marriage-poll/poll-shows-63-percent-of-frenchback-gay-marriage-idUSBRE90P0HL20130126. 204. Alexander Stille, “An Anti-Gay-Marriage Tea Party, French Style?,” New Yorker, March 18, 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/an-anti-gay-marriage-teaparty-french-style. 205. Fréderic Martél, Te Pink and the Black: Homosexuals in France since 1968 (Stanford,

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Notes to 288–295

CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), xix; Irene Téry, Le Démariage: Justice et vie privée (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1993). 206. Robert Zaretsky, “Égalité Meets Gay Marriage,” New York Times, February 8, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/opinion/global/the-gay-marriage-debate-in-france. html. 207. Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 16–18. 208. Angelique Chrisafs, “Pork or Nothing: How School Dinners Are Dividing France,” Te Guardian, October 13, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/13/porkschool-dinners-france-secularism-children-religious-intolerance. 209. Guy Millière, “France: Toward Total Submission to Islam, Destruction of Free Speech,” Document, March, 25, 2018, https://www.document.no/2018/03/25/francetoward-total-submission-to-islam-destruction-of-free-speech/. 210. Emmanuel Brenner, ed., Les Territoires Perdus de la République (Paris: Hachette Pluriel Reference, 2002). 211. “Provocation à la haine: L’historien Georges Bensoussan relaxé,” Le Monde, March 7, 2017, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2017/03/07/provocation-a-la-haine-l-histo rien-georges-bensoussan-relaxe_5090621_3224.html. 212. Mark Lilla, “France on Fire,” New York Review of Books, March 5, 2015, https://www. nybooks.com/articles/2015/03/05/france-on-fre/?pagination=false&printpage=. 213. Jason Stanley, “A Postcard from Paris,” New York Times, January 8, 2015, https:// opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/author/jason-stanley/. 214. Emmanuel Todd, Who Is Charlie? Xenophobia and the New Middle Class (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015). 215. Guy Milliére, “France, Soon with No Jews?,” Gatestone Institute, April 7, 2018, https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/12121/france-no-jews. 216. Laurence Dodds, “Who Is Dieudonne, the French Comedian on Trial for Condoning the Charlie Hebdo Attacks?,” Te Telegraph, March 18, 2015, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/europe/france/11387219/Who-is-Dieudonne-the-French-comedian-ontrial-for-condoning-the-Charlie-Hebdo-attacks.html. 217. Dodds, “Who Is Dieudonne?” 218. Mark Weber, “French Courts Punish Holocaust Apostasy,” Institute for Historical Review, March 22, 1998, http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v17/v17n2p14_Weber.html. 219. Michel Wieviorka, ed., La France raciste: L’Epreuve des faits (Paris: Seuil, 1992). 220. Michel Wieviorka, “Racism and Diasporas,” Tesis Eleven 52 (1998): 70–71. 221. Roger Grifn, “Plus ça change! Te Fascist Legacy in the Metapolitics of the Nouvelle Droite,” paper presented at the conference “Te Extreme Right in France: 1880 to the Present,” Dublin, Ireland, March 26–28, 1998; Alberto Spektorowski, “Te French New Right: Diferentialism and the Idea of Ethnophilian Exclusionism,” Polity 33, no. 2 (2000): 283–304; Pierre-Andre Taguief, Sur la Nouvelle Droite: Jalons d’une analyse critique (Paris: Descartes and Cia, 1994); Anne-Marie Crabol Duranton, Visages de la Nouvelle Droite: La GRECE et son histoire (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1988); Tamir Bar On, “Te Ambiguities of the Nouvelle Droite 1968–1999,” European Legacy 6, no. 3 (2001): 333–351. 222. Marcel Gauchet, La Religion dans la démocratie: Parcour de la laicite (Paris: Gallimard, 1993). See also Paul Yonnet, Voyage au centre du malaise francaise: L’ Antiracisme et le roman national (Paris: Gallimard, 1993). 223. Hans-Georg Betz, “Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary Populism in Western Europe,” in Fascisms: Critical Concepts in Political Science, ed. Roger Grifn and Matthew Feldman (London: Routledge, 2004), 5:54–56.

Notes to 295–300

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224. Mabel Berezin, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times: Culture Security and Populism in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 56. 225. Jean-Marie Le Pen, Les Français d’abord (Paris: Carrère-Lafon, 1984); Jean-Marie Le Pen, La France est de retour (Paris: Carrère-Lafon, 1985); Jean-Marie Le Pen, L’Espoir (Paris: Albatros, 1989). See also Berezin, Illiberal Politics, 69. 226. Harvey G. Simmons, Te French National Front: Te Extremist Challenge to Democracy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), 12. 227. Didier Eribon, Retour á Reims (Paris: Fayard, 2009); Didier Eribon, Returning to Reims (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext, 2013), 119. 228. James G. Shields, Te Extreme Right in France: From Pétain to Le Pen (London: Routledge, 2007), 200. 229. In the 1984 European Parliament election the National Front received 11 percent of the vote and gained ten members of the European Parliament, up from less than 1 percent of the vote in previous elections. Tis was followed by extremely successful legislative and regional elections in 1986, in which the National Front won thirty-fve deputies. 230. Tat high approval is obvious if we remember that immigration, unemployment, and European integration had become urgent to the public. See Berezin, Illiberal Politics, 124. 231. Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State, 66–67. 232. Matthew Kaminski, “Te Weekend Interview with Jean-Marie Le Pen: Back in Business,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2005, p. 3. 233. In the 1997 elections, the National Front won approximately 15 percent of the vote. Te socialist and left-wing coalition had only one clear win out of twenty-two regions. 234. Pierre Rosanvallon, “A Refection on Populism,” Books and Ideas, November 10, 2011, https://booksandideas.net/A-Refection-on-Populism.html. 235. Christophe Guilluy, La France périphérique: Comment on a sacrifé les classes populaires (Paris: Flammarion, 2014); Christophe Guilluy, Le crépuscule de la France d’en haut (Paris: Flammarion, 2016). Christophe Guilluy, Twilight of the Elites: Prosperity, the Periphery and the Future of France, trans. Malcolm Debevoise (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019). 236. Jean-Marie Le Pen had made controversial statements on the Holocaust (seemingly in an efort to attract voters from the political center and left). In Marine Le Pen’s revised party, Francois Chatelain was suspended from the party after making anti-Semitic remarks. Chatelain was running for the National Front in the 2013 municipal elections in Neuville-enFerrain, near Lille. Still, Marine Le Pen cannot hide her extreme Right leanings. For example, she attended an annual ball organized by Austrian right-wing extremists in Vienna on Holocaust commemoration day, possibly revealing her real views regarding Jews. 237. Caterina Froio, “Race, Religion, or Culture? Framing Islam between Racism and Neo-racism in the Online Network of the French Far Right,” Perspectives on Politics 16, no. 3 (2018): 700. 238. Marine Le Pen has attracted working-class voters in rural areas, many frst time voters. She did well in the Calais region and topped the poll in the southern department of the Gard, specifcally in the small towns around Nimes, which is characterized by tension with North Africans. 239. Bruce Crumley, “Halal Burgers? Another French Brouhaha over Islam,” Time, February 24, 2010, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1967299,00.html. 240. Halla Mohieddeen, “Eat Pork or Go Hungry: Schoolchildren Feel the Efects of the Rise of the National Front,” France 24, April 7, 2014, https://www.france24.com/ en/20140404-2014-04-04-2046-media-watch-0. 241. Caroline Fourest and Fiammetta Venner, Marine Le Pen démasquée (Paris: Ed Grasset and Fasquelle, 2011), 329.

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Notes to 300–304

242. Eric Fassin, “Pourquoi Marine Le Pen défend les femmes, les gays, les juifs,” Libération, December 20, 2010, https://www.liberation.fr/france/2010/12/20/pourquoi-marine-lepen-defend-les-femmes-les-gays-les-juifs_701823. 243. In the Vel d’Hiv roundup in Paris, thirteen thousand Jews were arrested by the French police July 16–17, 1942. Le Pen denied French responsibility despite having worked hard to guide the National Front away from Vichy nostalgia and Holocaust denial. 244. Te former leader Fillon was a Catholic conservative who was antiabortion and antisame-sex marriage but open to liberal integration and advocated integration in Europe and liberal economics. Te new leader Wauquiez is anti–European Union and anti-immigration. 245. Mark Lilla, “Two Roads for the New French Right,” New York Review of Books, November 2018, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/12/20/two-roads-for-the-new-french-right/. 246. Socialist Party politicians Didier Motchane and Manuel Valls agree with conservatives that Islam, like other religions, could be nationalized and integrated by the French state. Other leftists, such as Alain Gresh (adjunct chief editor of Le Monde) and Francoise Burgat, yearn to include Muslims within the group of the oppressed in need of emancipation. See Alain Gresh, ed., Un Peril Islamiste? (Paris: Complexe, 1994). 247. Marie-Laetitia Bonavita, “Jean Pierre le Gof: ‘Savoir ce que l’on veut transmettre,” Le Figaro, April 6, 2012, https://www.lefgaro.fr/mon-fgaro/2012/04/06/1000120120406ARTFIG00630-jean-pierre-le-gof-savoir-ce-que-l-on-veut-transmettre.php. 248. Pierre Nora, “Continuer le débat,” Le Débat, no. 160 (2010): 3. 249. Rachel Donadio, “France’s Obsession with Decline Is a Booming Industry,” New York Times, February 3, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/books/france-michelonfray-decadence.html. For more on the debate on French attention to the issue of decay, see Sudhir Hazareesingh, How the French Tink: An Afectionate Portrait of an Intellectual People (New York: Basic Books, 2015). 250 . “French Literary Rebel Houellebecq Releases ‘Serotonin,’ a Novel Tat Echoes ‘Yellow Vest’ Protests,” France 24, January 4, 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20190104french-literary-rebel-michel-houellebecq-releases-novel-serotonin-yellow-vest-protests. 251. Emmanuel Todd, Who Is Charlie? Xenophobia and the New Middle Class (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015). 252. See Olivier Roy, Jihad and Death: Te Global Appeal of Islamic State (New York: Oxford, 2017). 253. Pew Research Center, “Muslim-Western Tensions Persist,” July 21, 2011, https:// www.pewresearch.org/global/2011/07/21/muslim-western-tensions-persist/; Neha Sahgal and Besheer Mohamed, “In the U.S. and Western Europe, People Say Tey Accept Muslims, but Opinions Are Divided on Islam,” Pew Research Center, October 8, 2019, https:// www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/08/in-the-u-s-and-western-europe-people-saythey-accept-muslims-but-opinions-are-divided-on-islam/; “Just under 30 Percent of French Muslims Reject Secular Laws: Poll,” Reuters, September 18, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-france-muslims/just-under-30-percent-of-french-muslims-reject-secular-laws-pollidUSKCN11O0ET. 254. David Jacobson and Natalie D. Deckard, “Surveying the Landscape of Integration: Muslim Immigrants in the United Kingdom and France,” Democracy and Security 10, no. 2 (2014): 114. 255. Pew Research Center, “Muslim-Western Tensions Persist.” 256. Frantz Durupt, “En 2016, le CCIF a constate un net recul des actes islamophobes,” Liberation, January 31, 2017, https://www.liberation.fr/france/2017/01/31/en-2016-le-ccifa-constate-un-net-recul-des-actes-islamophobes_1545285. 257. Hervé Gattegno, “Sondage: Face à l’islam, les Français s’inquiètent,” Le Journal du

Notes to 304–312

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Dimanche, October 26, 2019, https://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/sondage-face-a-lislam-les-fran cais-sinquietent-3927720. 258. Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 210. See also Dominique Schnapper, “Intégration nationale et integration des migrants: Un enjeu européen,” Questions d’Europe, February 25, 2008, https://www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-90-fr.pdf. 259. Daniel Béland and Randall Hansen, “Reforming the French Welfare State: Solidarity, Social Exclusion and the Tree Crises of Citizenship,” West European Politics 23, no. 1 (2000): 59–60. 260. See Randall Hansen, “Te Free Economy and the Jacobin State,” in Debating Immigration, ed. Carol M. Swain (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 364–380. 261. Michel Wieviorka, “Sur le multiculturalisme: Précisions,” Le Débat 1, no. 98 (1998): 192. 262. “Discourse du Président de la Republique, Emmanuel Macron, aux Préfets le 5 septembre 2017,” Élysée, September 5, 2107, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuelmacron/2017/09/05/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-auxprefets-le-5-septembre-2017. 263. “Emmanuel Macron Has a History Buf’s View of Islam and Religious Strife,” Te Economist, May 9, 2017, https://www.economist.com/erasmus/2017/05/09/emmanuelmacron-has-a-history-bufs-view-of-islam-and-religious-strife. 264. “Demands of France’s Yellow Vests as Uploaded by France Bleu, November 29,” Open Democracy, December 7, 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/ demands-of-frances-yellow-vests-as-uploaded-by-france-bleu-november-29/. 265. Christophe Guilluy, “How Macron Discovered the Soft Power of the Working Class,” Te Guardian, October 15, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/ oct/15/macron-soft-power-working-class-france.

Conclusion 1. Te Danish People’s Party has proposed cash incentives to entice immigrants to return to their homeland. Allan Hall, “Denmark to Pay Immigrants £12,000 to Go Home If Tey ‘Can’t or Won’t’ Assimilate,” Daily Mail, November 10, 2009, https://www.dailymail. co.uk/news/article-1226698/Denmark-pay-immigrants-12-000-home-wont-assimilate.html. 2. See Ian Buruma, Taming the Gods: Religion and Democracy on Tree Continents (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). 3. See Emanuel Adler, “Europe as a Civilizational Community of Practice,” in Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Routledge, 2009), 67–90. 4. Buruma, Taming the Gods; Christian Joppke, Is Multiculturalism Dead? Crisis and Persistence in the Constitutional State (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2017). 5. Yascha Mounk, “Te West Can Have Burkinis or Democracy, but Not Both,” Foreign Afairs, August 27, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/27/the-west-can-have-burkinisor-democracy-but-not-both/. 6. “Europe’s Backlash against Immigrants,” Financial Times, April 4, 2010, https:// www.ft.com/content/49091be8-4006-11df-8d23-00144feabdc0. 7. Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2001), 21. 8. Perceptions of the West by the theologians of the Muslim Brotherhood have gradually shifted from it being dar al-kufr (the land of unbelief ) or dar al-harb (the land of war) to

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Notes to 312–318

being dar al-da’wa (land of proselytizing), in which Muslims have the right to live under sharia law in non-Islamic lands. 9. Andrew March, “Are Secularism and Neutrality Attractive to Religious Minorities? Islamic Discussions of Western Secularism in the ‘Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities’ (Fiqh Al-Aqalliyyat) Discourse,” Cardozo Law Review 30, no. 6 (2009): 2829–2830. 10. Sayyid Qutb, In the Shade of the Qur’an, cited in March, “Are Secularism and Neutrality.” 11. See Olivier Roy, Holy Ignorance: When Religion and Culture Part Ways (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 12. Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 43. 13. Justin Gest, Apart: Alienated and Engaged Muslims in the West (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 229. 14. Jacob T. Levy, Te Multiculturalism of Fear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 15. See Christian Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010), chap. 4. 16. Dominique Schnapper, La Communauté des citoyens: Sur l’idée moderne de nation (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 41. 17. Herman van Gunsteren, “Stop het normaliseren van de burger,” De Volkskrant, March 19, 2010, https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/stop-het-normaliseren-vande-burger~bf0505c6/. 18. George Crowder, “Value Pluralism and Communitarianism,” Contemporary Political Teory 5, no. 4 (2006): 414. 19. William Galston, Liberal Pluralism: Te Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Teory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 25–26. 20. Te state enforcement of the right of exit from the state is an intervention espoused by liberal democrats as a way to sustain a commitment to individualism. Sigal Ben Porat, “Exit Rights and Entrance Paths: Accommodating Cultural Diversity in Liberal Democracy,” Perspectives in Politics 8, no. 4 (2010): 1030. 21. Andreas Wimmer, “Why Nationalism Works,” Foreign Afairs, March–April 2019, p. 34. 22. Jan Rath, Rinus Penninx, Kees Groenendijk, and Astrid Meyer, “Te Politics of Recognizing Diversity in Europe: Social Reactions to the Institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands, Belgium and Great Britain,” Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences 35, no. 1 (1999): 53–68. 23. Alfred Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 222. See also B. C., “Te EU and Faith: A Religious Policy by Stealth,” Te Economist, June 3, 2013, https://www.economist.com/erasmus/2013/07/03/a-religious-policy-bystealth. 24. Steven Pfaf and Anthony J. Gill, “Will a Million Muslims March? Muslim Interest Organizations and Public Integration in Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 7 (2006): 806. 25. Alfred Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Tolerations,’” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4 (2000): 42. 26. Yvonne Y. Haddad and Tyler Golson, “Overhauling Islam: Representation, Construction, and Cooption of ‘Moderate Islam’ in Western Europe,” Journal of State and Church, Summer 2007, p. 496. 27. Barry, Culture and Equality, 19, 25–26. 28. See Jonathan Laurence, “Managing Transnational Islam: Muslims and the State in Western Europe,” in Immigration and the Transformation of Europe, ed. Craig Parsons and Timothy M. Smeeding (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 271.

Notes to 319–322

409

29. Evelyn Ersanilli and Ruud Koopmans, “Rewarding Integration? Citizenship Regulations and the Socio-cultural Integration of Immigration in the Netherlands, France and Germany,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, no. 5 (2010): 773–791. 30. Raymond Taras, “Islamophobia Never Stands Still: Race, Religion and Culture,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 3 (2013): 421. 31. Taras, “Islamophobia Never Stands Still,” 425. 32. Michel Wieviorka, Te Arena of Racism (London: Sage, 1995), 23. 33. Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 229. See also Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). 34. Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 286. 35. Gil Anidjar, Te Jew, the Arab: A History of the Enemy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), xxv; Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 36. Anidjar, Te Jew, the Arab, 49. 37. Wendy Brown, “Tolerance and/or Equality? Te ‘Woman Question’ and the ‘Jewish Question,’” Diferences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 15, no. 2 (2004): 5. 38. Brown, “Tolerance and/or Equality?,” 8. 39. Arun Kundnani, Te Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror (London: Verso, 2014), 242. 40. Dominique Schnapper, Community of Citizens: On the Modern Idea of Nationality (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1998), 142. 41. Carl Schmitt, Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947–1951, ed. Eberhard Freiherr Von Medem (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1991), 18. 42. Anne Norton, On the Muslim Question (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 1. 43. Timothy Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,” Washington Quarterly, Summer 2004, p. 47.

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Index

Abbos, Samira, 220 Abduh, Muhammad, 32 Abizadeh, Arash, 76 Aboutaleb, Ahmed, 199–200, 204, 227– 229 Academies Act (2010, UK), 122–123 Achamlane, Mohamed, 268 Acton, Lord, 102 Adebolajo, Michael, 129, 131 Adida, Claire, 247 Afghanistan, 45, 309 Ahmad, Kurshid, 126 Ahmed, Leila, 220 Ahmed, Nazir, 113 Ahsan, Manazir, 125 Ajegbo, Keith, 149 Akhtar, Shabbir, 136–137 al-Afghani, Jamal Al-Din, 34 Alam, Tahir, 119 Al-Aqsa group, 192 Albania, 21 al-Banna, Hassan, 23, 35–37 Albayrak, Nebahat, 199 al-Farabi, Abu Nasr, 34 al-Fawwaz, Khaled, 130 al-Filastini, Abu Qatada, 131 Algeria, 244–246 French colonialism and, 269–270, 272 Algerian War of Independence, 244–245 al-Ghazali, Muhammad, 32, 39 Al-Ghurabaa, 130, 134 Al-Hijrah school, 123, 155

al-Hudaybi, Hassan, 37 Ali, Syed Ameer, 32 Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin, 90 Aliens Act (2000, Netherlands), 205 Al-Madina Mosque, 134 al-Madkhalî, Rabî, 255 Al-Mansoor, 126 al-Masri, Abu Hamza, 112, 130–131 Al-Muhajiroun, 129–131, 134 Al-Qaeda, 1, 44–45, 112, 131, 133, 267 al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, 38–39, 42, 45–46 al-Suri, Abu Masab, 45, 48–49, 131 Alternative for Germany, 58–59 al-Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Abd, 27 Amara, Fadela, 274–277 Amiraux, Valérie, 82 Amsterdam, 228–229 Anelka, Nicolas, 292 Anglican church, 64, 103–106 Anidjar, Gil, 320 Anker, Marianne van den, 181 Anne Frank Institute, 181 antidiscrimination laws, 4, 82–84, 90, 103, 179, 208 Anglo-Saxon concept of, 280 in France, 277–280 homosexuality and, 85–86 in Netherlands, 179 Treaty of Amsterdam and, 279 in UK, 85, 108–109, 149–150, 155, 157 antimulticulturalism, 4, 161, 169, 218, 229, 298 469

470

Index

anti-Semitism, 6, 57, 93–94, 274, 320– 323 in France, 290, 292–294, 300 Islam contrasted with Judaism, 319–322 antiterrorist legislation, 109–110, 117 in France, 268, 306 in UK, 132, 133–135 Appiah, Kwame Anthony, 80 Arab European League, 47 Arbitration Act (1996, UK), 140–141, 145–146 Armstrong, Karen, 30 Arnautu, Marie-Christine, 301 arranged marriages, 134 Arslan, Leyla, 255 Asad, Talal, 68, 319 Ash, Timothy Garton, 135 Assadaakka, 228 Asscher, Lodewijk, 204 assimilation, 22, 54, 310 civic integration and, 80–81, 318 conditional inclusion and, 2 contrasting Islam with Judaism, 267, 320–321 in France, 14, 16–17, 43, 235, 242– 243, 269–271, 278, 296, 301, 303 in Netherlands, 176, 190, 192, 212, 223, 232, 234 racism and, 10, 223, 226, 269, 272 resistance to, 42 Right-wing parties and, 54, 56–58, 294–296, 310, 315 in United Kingdom, 108, 116, 124, 149, 169 atheism, 231 Atkinson, Rowan, 110 Austria, 63–64, 81, 96 Averroes, 45 Aviad, Rubin, 77 Azzam, Abdullah Yusuf, 36 Bader, Veit, 66 Badinter, Elisabeth, 257, 288 Bajrafl, Mohamed, 253 Bakri, Omar, 47, 131 Balibar, Étienne, 97, 242–243 Balkenende, Jan Peter, 179, 197, 199, 206, 212, 223

Ballin, Hirsch, 208 banlieue riots, 237, 261–264, 279 Bano, Samia, 143–144 Barelvi Suf Brotherhood, 112 Barres, Maurice, 54, 293, 296–298 Barry, Brian, 102, 105, 311 basement Islam, 245, 250 Batten, Gerard, 166 Baubérot, Jean, 238, 256–257 Baudet, Tierry, 57, 216–217, 222 Bayrou, François, 258 Bayya, Abd Allah Ibn, 38 Bechari, Mohammed, 249 Beck, Ulrich, 69 Beghal, Djamel, 265 Belghoul, Farida, 260 Belgium, 86 Benhabib, Seyla, 62, 91 Bensoussan, Georges, 290 Benziane, Sohane, 275 Berezin, Mabel, 10, 58 Berrada, Loubna, 221 Besson, Éric, 281, 285–286 Beth Din courts, 140 Betz, Hand-Georg, 295 Bijsterveldt, Marjavan, 192 bin Laden, Osama, 30, 130, 131–132 Blair, Tony, 17, 108, 111, 150 antiterrorist legislation and, 133–134 blasphemy laws, 13, 30, 92–95 contrasted with hate speech laws, 93–94 in Netherlands, 208, 234 Rushdie afair and, 135–138 in UK, 104, 109, 136–139 See also hate speech laws Bleich, Eric, 140 Blunkett, David, 117, 121, 148 Bolkestein, Frederick (Frits), 177, 178, 181, 211 Borders Citizenship and Immigration Act (UK), 150 Bos, Wouter, 228 Bosnia, 21 Bostom, Andrew, 32 Boubakeur, Dalil, 249–250 Boutefika, Abdelaziz, 236, 270 Bouteldja, Houria, 272–274 Bouyeri, Mohammed, 180–181, 210

Index Bowen, Innes, 159–160 Bowen, John, 7, 25, 74, 140 Breivik, Anders, 164 Brettschneider, Corey, 9 Brexit Party, 167 Brexit referendum, 98, 154, 167 Briand, Aristide, 238 British Nationality Act, 106–107, 109 British National Party (BNP), 161–164 Britishness, 19, 23, 99, 101–103, 135, 147, 149–150, 152, 154, 167–169 racism and, 147 Brown, Gordon, 134, 138 Brown, Wendy, 320 Brubaker, Rogers, 17 Bruinessen, Martin, 230 Bulgaria, 21 Bulliet, Richard, 27–28 Buma, Sybrand, 233 burqa/niqab/hijab/headscarf bans, 91, 117, 155–156 in France, 91, 256–259, 276, 282–289 Right-wing parties and, 295 Buruma, Ian, 59, 209–210, 309 Busher, Joe, 163–164 Butler, Judith, 88 Butt, Khuram, 131 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 30 Cameron, David, 120, 131–132, 152, 154–156 Camus, Renaud, 56 Canada, 67 Cantle, Ted, 147–148 Cantle Report, 147–148 Casanova, José, 63 Cassen, Pierre, 290 Central Committee of Ex-Muslims, 221 Césari, Jocelyne, 12, 255 Chait, Jonathan, 95 Charlie Hebdo attacks, 31, 93–94, 227, 235, 289–292 cultural impact of, 282, 290–291 government response to, 49–50 Checkel, Jefrey T., 52 Cherribi, Sam, 46, 233 Chirac, Jacques, 259, 270, 278, 297

471

Choudary, Anjem, 131–132 church/state separation, 8, 16, 67, 120, 237–238, 253, 316 citizenship, 7–8, 23, 313 citizenship tests, 84, 148 civic integration and, 83–84, 308, 317–318 diferentiated citizenship, 71 dual citizenship, 225 liberalism and, 11 Muslim discourses of, 12–13 populism and, 54 probationary citizenship, 151 republican citizenship, 78 Right-wing parties and, 296 secular authority and, 38 in UK, 146–154 citizenship tests, 84, 148 City Circle, 143 civic integration, 6, 9–11, 15, 19–20, 75, 80–83, 310, 312–316, 318–319, 322–323 assimilation and, 80–81, 318 citizenship and, 83–84, 308, 317–318 coercive side of, 80, 281 contrasted with ethno-nationalism, 60 criticism of, 80–82 deradicalization and, 51 in France, 242–243, 277, 280–281, 285, 287, 291, 294, 299, 303–304, 306 gender politics and, 83 multiculturalism and, 14, 75, 81–82, 97, 313, 323 in Netherlands, 16, 188, 204, 222, 226, 232–234 racism and, 10, 17 Right-wing parties and, 57, 314 in UK, 99, 135, 146, 148, 153, 169 civic liberalism, 81 Civic Partnership Bill (UK), 156 Clarke, Peter, 119 Clegg, Nick, 155 Cliteur, Paul, 206–209 Cohen, Jean, 66 Cohen, Job, 228–229 Collectif des Musulmans de France (French Muslim Collective), 272

472

Index

Collective against Islamophobia (France), 253, 303 Colley, Linda, 106 colonialism, 14–15, 26, 71, 313, 322 antidiscrimination laws and, 108 feminism and, 89 legacy of Dutch, 183, 209 legacy of French, 243–248, 250, 253, 257, 262–263, 269–274, 276–277, 294, 300, 305 neocolonialism, 126 Orientalism and, 26–27 Combes, Emile, 238 Commission for Equality and Human Rights (UK), 133 Commission for Racial Equality (UK), 149, 278 Commonwealth Immigration Act (UK), 106 Compulsory Identifcation Act (Netherlands), 223 Concordat of 1801 (France), 238 conditional inclusion, 2–3, 20, 76–77, 79, 97, 170, 311, 322 Contact Body Muslims and Government (Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid), 202 Coulibaly, Amedy, 265–266, 292 Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain, 89 counterjihad movement, 164 Counterterror and Extremism Bill (UK), 132 Crick, Bernard, 101–102, 116, 148 Crick Report, 115–116, 147–148 cultural diversity, 19, 61, 70–72 in Netherlands, 182, 188, 205, 222 in United Kingdom, 99, 101, 108–109, 115 cultural essentialism, 57 cultural exclusionism, 2, 10, 233 cultural integration, 7, 71, 310–311, 315, 319 cultural recognition, 5, 8, 20, 85, 99 cultural relativism, 181–182, 207, 211 cultural toleration, 109, 135–139 Curtis, Mark, 131

dar-al-Islam, 41–43 Dati, Rachida, 275 da’wa arguments, 42 de Benoist, Alain, 216, 295 Debray, Regis, 240, 257 Debré law (France), 260 Deckard, Natalie D., 303 decolonization, 259, 273, 300 de Fontenay, Elisabeth, 257 democratic nationalism, 17, 58, 315, 317, 321 Denmark, 10, 78–79 antidiscrimination legislation in, 86 civic integration in, 80–81 People’s Party, 56, 59, 78 terrorist attacks in, 49–50 Deobandi tradition (of Islam), 125 deradicalization, 47–48, 51, 152–153 Derby Report, 108–109 Désir, Harlem, 257 d’Estaing, Valéry Giscard, 245 de Villepin, Dominique, 252, 279 de Zwart, Frank, 226 Diallo, Rokhaya, 273 Dieckhof, Alain, 241 Dieudonné M’bala M’bala, 292–295 diferentialism, 55, 295 diferentiated citizenship, 71 Dijksma, Sharon, 192 Dilaver, Delikaya, 203 Diyanet, 22, 202 Doudi, Hadi, 306 Dreyfus afair, 243 Driessen, Geert, 194 Drumont, Édouard, 54 Dudî, Abdel-Hâdî, 255 Dumont, René, 257 Duncan, Robert, 139 Durkheim, Émile, 10 Dutch Consultation for Ethnic Minorities (Landelijk Overleg Minderheden), 202 Dutch Nationality Code (1986), 183 Dutchness, 175, 211, 231 Dutch People’s Union, 181 Dworkin, Ronald, 66–67

Dafé, Mammadou, 253

East London Mosque, 112–113

Index Education Act (1944, UK), 114–115, 120 Education Act (Netherlands), 190 Education Reform Act (1988, UK), 115 Egypt, 35–36 el Karoui, Hakim, 254 Ellian, Afshin, 208, 213, 221 El Mouhandiz, Rajae, 220 El-Moumni, Khalil, 179, 192, 197, 206 Eltahawy, Mona, 90 Emwazi, Mohammed, 129, 131 English Defense League (EDL), 163–164 Englishness, 102, 147, 175 Ennahda party, 249 Entzinger, Han, 223 Equality Act (UK, 2010), 85, 155, 157 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, 233 Eribon, Didier, 296, 305 Ersanilli, Evelyn, 234 Esposito, John, 29–30, 132 Etats généraux des flles des quartiers (General States of Neighborhood Girls), 275 ethno-exclusionism, 80, 97, 257 ethno-nationalism, 57, 60, 75–76, 79–80, 96, 182, 217, 315–316 in Netherlands, 202, 206, 231–232 Euben, Roxanne, 27 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 277 European Council for Fatwa and Research, 45 European Council White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue, 72 European Court of Human Rights, 74, 86–87, 90–91, 93, 131–132, 157, 287, 316 European Court of Justice, 66, 86–87, 91 Fabius-Gayssot law (France), 293 Fadl, Khaled Abou El, 28 Fadlallah, Muhammad Hussein, 44–45 Fanon, Frantz, 274, 319 Farage, Nigel, 57, 59, 166–167 fascism, 51–52, 54 Fassin, Eric, 59 Faurisson, Robert, 293 Favell, Adrian, 101 Fayard, Nicole, 275

473

Federation Nationale des Maisons des Potes (National Federation of Friends’ Houses), 275 Federation of Islamic Organizations of Europe, 45 Feldman, Noah, 28–29 female genital mutilation, 181, 207, 224 feminism. See women’s rights Ferry Jules, 240–241 Fidesz, 57 Finkielkraut, Alain, 257, 302 Finland, 81 Finsbury Park Mosque, 112 fqh, 29 Fitna (Wilders, 2008), 214–215 Forced Marriage Civil Protection Act (UK), 144 forced weddings, 027 Ford, Robert, 166 Forsane Alizza, 268 Fortuyn, Pim, 177–179, 181, 197, 207, 214, 217–218, 220, 222, 227 Forum for Democracy (Forum voor Democratie), 57, 216–217 Fox, Caroline, 146 France, 14–16, 19, 235–307 antidiscrimination legislation in, 84, 86 assimilation in, 14, 16–17, 43, 235, 242–243, 269–271, 278, 296, 301, 303 attitudes of French Muslims, 253–254, 303 attitudes toward Islam in, 244, 247, 303 banlieue riots in, 237, 261–264, 269, 279 civic integration in, 80, 242–243, 277, 280–281, 285, 287, 291, 294, 299, 303–304, 306 colonial legacy of, 14–15, 243–248, 250, 253, 257, 262–263, 269–274, 276–277, 294, 300, 305 deradicalization in, 48 education in, 241, 256–261, 279–280, 291 ethnic demographics of, 246 freedom of speech and, 235–236, 278, 282, 289–294 Frenchness, 23, 242, 276, 278, 281

474

Index

France (continued) hate speech laws in, 93 history of secularism in, 238–241 immigration to, 15, 90, 245, 281 integration of Muslims in, 303–304 Islamic organizations in, 249–250, 263, 271–272 jihad and, 31 jihadism in, 266–267 laïcité as national identity, 19, 236, 283, 301, 303–304 monoculturalism of, 236, 241–242 Muslim history in, 21 Muslim political activism in, 248–251 national identity of, 237–238, 281–282, 283–284, 299–300 nationalism of Islam in, 251–254 nativism in, 56–59 perceived collapse of, 302–303 populism in, 52 prison radicalization in, 264–266, 268 religious symbols and, 91, 235–236, 256–259, 282–289 republicanism in, 19 secularism in, 63, 67, 235, 317 terrorist attacks in, 31, 49–50, 265– 269, 289–290 unemployment in, 246–247 France Insoumise, 52, 237, 274 Fraser, Nancy, 73 Frederiksen, Mette, 50 Freeden, Michael, 54 freedom of speech, 2, 83, 86, 92–95 blasphemy and, 136 Charlie Hebdo and, 291–292, 294 in France, 235–236, 278, 282, 289–294 hate speech laws, 93–94, 99, 289–290, 293 in Netherlands, 179–181, 203, 212, 214–215 postcolonialism and, 294 Right wing parties and, 59, 181, 214– 215, 274 Rushdie afair and, 135–138 supposed incompatability with Islam, 33, 93, 136, 154, 180, 317 in UK, 110, 136, 149, 155, 165 See also blasphemy laws

Freedom Party (Netherlands), 204, 215 freedom vs. justice debate, 28 French Council of the Muslim Faith, 250, 318 French National Federation of Muslims, 249 Frenchness, 23, 242, 276, 278, 281 Fukuyama, Francis, 52 Galloway, George, 126–127 Gaspard, Francoise, 256 Gauchet, Marcel, 295 Gaullist Republicans (les Républicains), 300–301 gender politics, 3–4, 72, 83, 86–90, 88– 89, 212 in France, 241, 260, 288–289 Islam and, 142, 220–221, 283 liberalism and, 9, 100 Muslim schools and, 120, 123, 155, 258 in Netherlands, 219, 225 Right-wing parties and, 58–59, 88–89 in UK, 154–155, 157, 165, 168 See also homosexuality/LGBTQ rights; women’s rights Georges Bensoussan afair, 290 Gerin, André, 284 Germany attitudes toward Islam in, 199 civic integration in, 80–81 concordat model of, 63–64 immigration to, 90 religious symbols and, 91 Right-wing parties in, 58–59 Gerson, Gal, 77 Gest, Justin, 128–129, 313 Ghannouchi, Rachid, 28 globalization, 53, 295, 298 Gohir, Shaista, 160 Gollnisch, Bruno, 301 Golson, Tyler, 22, 317 Goodhart, David, 169–170 Goodman, Sarah, 10, 81 Goodwin, Matthew, 163 Gove, Michael, 113, 120, 151, 153–154 Grand Mosque of Paris, 244–245, 249– 250, 254 headscarf band and, 256

Index Greece, 21, 52 Green Party (Netherlands), 234 Grifn, Nick, 162 Grifn, Roger, 60 Grillo, Rakph, 5, 153 Guénolé, Tomas, 274 Guilluy, Christophe, 298, 305 Guiraudon, Virginie, 82 Habchi, Sihem, 275–276 Habermas, Jürgen, 62, 65, 68 Habibi Ana organization, 220 Haddad, Yvonne, 22, 317 Haidt, Jonathan, 79 halal meat controversy, 299 Halbertal, Moshe, 75–76 Hanaf school of thought, 110–111 Hani, Mohammed, 94 Hanna, Jeanne, 164 Hansen, Randall, 75, 89 Hardin, Russell, 76 Harris, Peter, 164 Harris, Ruth, 238 Hasan, Kucuk, 203 Hassan, Hamdi, 45 hate speech laws, 93–94, 99, 289–290, 293. See also blasphemy laws Hazes, André, 207 High Authority of Struggle against Discrimination and for Equality (Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’Egalité), 279 Higher Council for Integration (Haut Conseil a l’Intégration; HCI), 278, 282 hijabs. See burqa/niqab/hijab bans Hirsi Ali, Ayaan, 90, 180, 197–198, 208– 210, 218, 220–222 Hizb ut-Tahrir, 39, 47, 50, 129–130, 133–134 Hobbes, Tomas, 62 Hollande, François, 59, 260, 268, 283, 290–291, 299 Holocaust, 206 Holocaust denial, 93, 292–294 Holsteyn, Joop van, 177 homosexuality/LGBTQ rights, 3, 81, 309 in France, 287–289, 300–301

475

liberal nationalism and, 218 Muslim attitudes towards, 159–160, 179, 221 in Netherlands, 218–219 Right-wing parties and, 59, 164–165, 220, 300–301 in UK, 156–158, 165 See also same-sex marriage Honneth, Axel, 70 Houellebecq, Michel, 216, 290, 302, 305 Hungary, 57, 97 Huntington, Samuel, 7, 26 Hurd, Elizabeth Shakman, 67 Hussain, Hasib, 112 Hussain, Imran, 127 Hussain, Pir Mahroof, 138 identitarian movement, 53, 55–58 immigration in 20th century, 21–22 Afro-Carribean immigrants, 169 assimilation of immigrants (See assimilation) Brexit and, 98 citizenship and, 151–152 civic integration and (See civic integration) colonialism and, 15 dual citizenship and, 225 into France, 245–247, 281, 307–308 French colonialism and, 269–274 integration and, 75, 78 labor movement and, 248 laws regarding, 106–107, 109 LGBTQ community and, 90 naturalization of immigrants, 148, 152, 183, 223, 245, 259, 282, 318 negative attitudes towards Muslims and, 74 into Netherlands, 182–185, 205, 212, 223–225, 228 non-Muslim political authority and, 39 Right-wing populism and, 53, 56 second-generation Muslims and, 5, 70, 125, 194, 236, 242, 245–246, 262–263 social integration of immigrants, 17, 234

476

Index

immigration (continued) into UK, 101–103, 106–108, 151–152, 168–169 unemployment and, 183–184, 246–247 Windrush generation and, 168–169 Immigration Act (1971, UK), 107, 138 Immigration Act (2014, UK), 152 imperialism, 31, 34–36, 89 cultural imperialism, 26, 136, 313 Independence Party (UKIP), 57, 59, 163 Indigenes de la République (Natives of the Republic), 237, 269, 271–274, 276, 294 individualization of Islam, 24–25, 73, 89, 194–195, 197–198, 202, 255, 312 individualized Islam, 73, 194–195, 202, 255, 262, 312 Inglehart, Ronald, 52, 87 institutional adaptation, 17 integration. See civic integration Integration Abroad Act (Netherlands), 223–224 integration tests, 81, 84, 223 Intelligence Bill (France), 50 International Covenant on Civic and Political Rights, 64, 93, 277 Iraq, 74, 183 Iraq war, 116–117, 309 ISIS (Islamic State), 1, 49 Islam, 5–7, 26, 312–313 alienation of Muslims, 11–12, 127–129, 261, 264–265 antimulticulturalism and, 229 anti-Semitism and, 290 banlieue riots and, 263 blasphemy and, 92–93 Brexit and, 98 building of mosques and, 111–113 burqa/niqab/hijab/headscarf bans, 91, 117, 155–156, 256–259, 282–289 citizenship and, 12–13, 38 civic integration and, 312, 318 contrasted with Islamism, 43 contrasted with Judaism, 319–322 criticism of, 213–215 as cultural challenge, 1–3, 98–100, 161, 210, 308 cultural recognition of, 5, 8, 20

democracy and, 28–29 Deobandi tradition of, 125 economic discrimination against Muslims, 247 European history and, 21 exceptionalism of, 316–317 freedom of expression and, 33, 93, 136, 154, 180, 317 French national identity and, 300, 306 homosexuality/LGBTQ rights and, 157, 159–160, 219–221 human rights and, 29–30 identity politics and, 73, 253–255 individualized Islam, 73, 194–195, 202, 255, 262, 312 Islamic morality, 41 Islamic organizations, 45, 47, 125, 127, 201–202, 215, 229, 249–250, 263 jihad and, 31–32 jihad and, 268 legal protections of in UK, 109–110 Middle Eastern decline and, 26 modernization of, 124, 156, 211–212, 221, 271 multiculturalism and, 73, 175 nationalism and, 35–36, 317 negative view of, 33 non-Muslim political authority and, 37–40 politics of gender and sexuality and, 59, 87–91, 155–158 private Muslim schools and, 120–124, 260–261 public schools and, 114–120, 154, 190– 194, 256–260 radicalization of, 49 second-generation Muslims, 5, 23, 70, 125, 194, 236, 242, 245–246, 262–263 secularism and, 65, 271 sharia and, 29–30 sharia law (See sharia law) social backlash against, 74 social justice and, 28 terrorism and, 30–31, 45, 133 transnationalism of, 33 tribal-like attributes of, 209

Index Trojan horse theory and, 6, 18–19, 119, 257 umma and, 12, 32–36, 130, 255 violence and, 31 Wahabism, 27 women’s rights and, 87–91, 180, 218, 220–221, 253, 257, 273–277 Islam4UK, 130, 134 Islam Contact Group (Contact Groep Islam), 202 Islam Democrats (Islam Democraten), 203 Islamic Foundation (IF), 125–126 Islamic organizations, 45, 47, 125, 127, 201–203, 215, 229, 249–250, 318 banlieue riots and, 263 colonial legacies and, 271–272 Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut), 256 Islamism, 43 Islamophobia, 23 anti-Semitism and, 6, 236, 292–294 Charlie Hebdo cartoons and, 94, 293– 294 in France, 303–304 French terrorist attacks and, 290 human rights and, 29–30 as racism, 19, 23, 53, 94, 129–130, 272–273, 290, 319 radicalization and, 268 Right-wing parties and, 57, 164 in UK, 108, 158, 164 Italy, 21, 63–64, 96 Jaballah, Ahmed, 249 Jacobson, David, 303 jahiliyya, 36 Jamaat-e- Islami, 47 Jamea Al Kauthar, 122 Jamea Girls’ Academy, 122 Jami, Ehsan, 221 Janmohamed, Shelina, 88–89 Jaures, Jean, 238 Jelen, Christian, 257 Jenkins, Roy, 108 Jewish schools, 123–124 jihadism, 31–32, 44, 268 background of jihadists, 49 eforts to combat, 50–51

477

in France, 235, 266–267 prisons and, 265–266 terrorism and, 46–48, 130 Johnson, Jo, 155 Joppke, Christian, 8, 14, 71–72, 81, 309 Jospin, Lionel, 257–258, 278, 280, 297 Judicial Studies Board, 109 Jyllands-Posten, 94 Kabyle ethnic group, 246 Kaddora, Lamya, 89–90 Kalin, Ibrahim, 74 Kamp, Henk, 207 Karimia Institute, 121 Kastoryano, Riva, 261, 279 Katznelson, Ira, 101 Kaufmann, Joëlle, 257 Kaufmann, Eric, 56, 105, 124, 169 Kelsay, John, 31 Kepel, Giles, 47–49, 264–265, 268 Khadduri, Majid, 31–32 Khaldun, Ibn, 34, 44, 46 Khaliq, Abdul, 112 Khan, Sadiq, 126 Khan, Sayyid Ahmad, 32 Khosrokhavar, Farhad, 256, 265–266 Khoudary, Anjem, 93 Khoulani, Abderazaq, 203–204 Kintzler, Catherine, 257 Kiska, Roger, 157 Klausen, Jytte, 12, 46, 221 Klaver, Jesse, 234 Korteweg, Anna, 87, 225 Kouach, Chérif, 265–266 Kukathas, Chandran, 70 Kundnani, Arun, 31 Küng, Hans, 32 Kuru, Ahmet, 235 Kuzu, Tunahan, 204 Kymlicka, Will, 69, 72–74 Laborde, Cecile, 66, 288 Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid; PvdA), 187, 188, 198–200, 203–204, 206, 208, 227–228 Lafont, Cristina, 64 Lahav, Gallya, 1

478

Index

laïcité, 16, 19, 91, 236–238, 240, 259, 282, 289, 291 as French national identity, 19, 236, 240, 283, 301, 303–304 hard laïcité, 237 Islam and, 250, 273, 302 open laïcité, 257, 289, 305 radical version of, 282–283 religious symbols and, 257–259, 282– 283 in schools, 256 See also secularism Laitin, David, 247 Lambert, Robert, 133 Laurence, Jonathan, 22, 27 Law against Racism (France), 84 Law in Defense of Dutch Values, 222 Law of Associations (1901, France), 238 Law of Separation (France, 1905), 238– 240, 244, 251, 283 Lega Nord, 56 Leil, Mohammed Abu, 189 Lellouche law (France), 293 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 178, 270, 293, 295– 298 Le Pen, Marine, 59, 95, 298–301, 304 Lévy, Bernard Henry, 285–286 Levy, Jacob, 95–96, 313 Lewis, Bernard, 7, 26, 28, 44, 209 Liauzu, Claude, 270 liberal autonomy, 315 Liberal Islamic Association in Germany, 90 liberalism, 23–24, 75–77 antimulticulturalism and, 218 citizenship and, 11 civic liberalism, 81 cultural diversity and, 70 discrimination and, 93 ethanol-homogeneity and, 234 feminism and, 218 gender politics and, 3 liberal autonomy, 315 liberal triumphalism, 52 nationalism and, 75–76, 311 nationhood and, 69 in Netherlands, 222 the Other and, 314 perceived failures of, 309

racism and, 4, 8, 17, 60, 222 Radical Right and, 54 Rawls and, 61–62 secularism and, 63, 67, 168 liberal pluralism, 20, 314 liberal tolerance, 8–9, 70–71, 257, 311, 313 Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn List), 178–179 Linz, Juan, 66 Lisbon Treaty, 316 Livable Netherlands (Leefbaar Nederland) party, 178 Livable Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam), 200, 227 Livingstone, Ken, 131 Locke, John, 42, 72, 95, 213 London Bridge terrorist attack, 98 London terrorist attacks (2005), 22, 99, 112, 133 Lonsdale Youth movement, 190 Lubbock, Eric Reginald, 110 Lucas, Marieme Hélie, 89 Maan, Bashir, 125 Macedo, Stephen, 81 Machelon Commission, 252 Macron, Emmanuel, 96, 298, 304– 307 Madani Girls’ School, 122 Madeley, John, 9 Mahmood, Halid, 126 Mahmood, Khalid, 142–143 Mahrer, Shiraz, 160 Majid, Makkor, 203 Malaica, 220 Mali, 246 Malik, Iftikhar, 24 Malik, Kenan, 129, 153–154 Malik, Shahid, 126 Mamdani, Mahmood, 25 Manchester Arena terrorist attack, 98 Mandaville, Peter, 5, 24 Marbe, Nausicaa, 229 March, Andrew, 25–26, 38 Marcouch, Ahmed, 204 Maréchal–Le Pen, Marion, 301 Margalit, Avishai, 75–76

Index Marriage Act (UK), 143 Marriage for All law (France), 287 Martél, Fréderic, 288 Mas, Ruth, 271 Massad, Joseph, 23 Maurras, Charles, 54, 243, 293, 296 Maussen, Marcel, 188 Mawlawi, Faysal, 42 May, Teresa, 132, 134–135, 152, 267 McCrudden, Christopher, 100 McLoughlin, Sean, 124 Meer, Nasar, 72, 99, 105 Mekachera Act (France), 270 Menski, Werner, 140 Merah, Mohammed, 266 Mercaz London mosque, 112 Merkel, Angela, 91 Mernissi, Fatema, 89, 220 Merry, Michael, 194 Messina, Anthony, 1, 107 Meynier, Gilbert, 270 Mill, John Stuart, 2, 72, 102 Miller, David, 78 Miller, Maria, 157 Milliére, Guy, 292 Millî Görüs, 47, 202 Minkernberg, Michael, 8 Mitterand, François, 248, 296 Mitts, Tamar, 50 Modood, Tariq, 8, 72–73, 99–100, 105, 136, 153, 313 Mogahed, Dalia, 29 Mohammad, Sarvar, 126 Monsma, Stephen, 174 moral middle ground, 96 Morocco, 183, 202–203, 225, 244–246 mosque building, 100, 111–113, 183, 251–252 Mosques and Imams’ National Advisory Board, 133 Movement for a Better Hungary, 57 Movement of Swiss Muslims, 40 Mudde, Cas, 54–55, 177 Muhammad, Marwan, 253 Muller, Jerry, 234 multiculturalism, 69–74, 153–154 antidiscrimination and, 82–83 anti-Islamic sentiment and, 73–74

479

antimulticulturalism, 4, 161, 169, 218, 229, 298 civic-centered, 99 civic integration and, 14, 81–82, 313, 323 cultural relativism and, 211 ethnic separation and, 148 exclusionist backlash to, 64–65 feminism and, 88 in France, 306 freedom of expression and, 93 immigrant voting patterns and, 198 institutional adaptation and, 17 integration and, 308 liberal pluralism and, 20 multicultural education in UK, 114– 118 multiculturalism of fear, 95–96, 313 nationalism and, 218 in Netherlands, 171–172, 174–175, 179, 181, 205, 226, 228–229, 232– 233 perceived failures of, 308–309 post multiculturalism, 17, 72, 96–97, 100, 168, 226, 287, 311 racism and, 147 Right-wing parties and, 57, 310 terrorism and, 127 tolerance and, 95 in UK, 98–101, 109, 147, 153–154, 158 Murad, Abdal Hakim, 105 Murphy, Peter, 155 Muslim Association of Britain, 125 Muslim Brotherhood, 28, 37, 189, 249 umma and, 35 Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), 110, 118, 125, 126–127, 318 sharia law and, 140 Muslim World League, 47 Mwasi collective, 273 Nachmani, Amikam, 21 Nafees, Hamid, 129 Namazie, Maryam, 89 Nasar, Mustafa Setmariam, 45 Nasser, Gamel Abdel, 36

480

Index

National Alliance (Nationale Alliantie), 181 National Citizen Service (UK), 152 national-communitarian cohesion, 100 National Front (France), 56, 278, 283, 286, 292–293, 295–301, 304 nationalism, 310–311, 314 citizenship and, 147 democratic nationalism, 17, 58, 315, 317, 321 ethno-nationalism, 57, 75–76, 79–80, 96, 182, 217, 315–316 in France, 243 Islamic transnationalism, 33 liberalism and, 75–76 nativism and, 55–56 in Netherlands, 206–207 racism and, 315 women’s rights and, 88 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill (UK), 148 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum law (UK), 107 National Rally (Rassemblement National), 56–59, 237, 295, 298 National Secular Society (UK), 145 National Union of the Muslims of France (Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France), 249–250 nativism, 53–57, 59–60, 204, 311 naturalization denaturalization, 224, 229 in France, 245, 259, 282 integration and, 148, 318 in Netherlands, 183, 223 in United Kingdom, 148, 152 Nawaz, Maajid, 130 Nawijn, Hilbrand, 188 Nazir-Ali, Michael, 142, 146 Nelson, Horatio, 105 Nemmouche, Medhi, 266 neocolonialism, 126 Netherlands, 14–16, 171–234 antidiscrimination legislation in, 85–86 anti-terrorism legislation in, 50 assimilation in, 176, 190, 192, 212, 223, 232, 234 atheism in, 232

attitudes toward Islam in, 178–179, 181, 184, 188, 198–200, 207, 213– 214, 229–230, 234, 317 building of mosques in, 185–186, 188–189 civic integration in, 16, 80, 188, 204, 222, 223, 226, 232–234 colonial legacy of, 14–15, 183, 209 cultural diversity in, 182, 188, 205, 222 dual citizenship and, 225 Dutchness, 175, 211, 231 education in, 190–194 ethnic makeup of, 225 ethnic/religious violence in, 180–181 freedom of speech in, 179–181, 203, 212, 214–215 hate speech laws in, 93–94 homosexuality/LGBTQ rights in, 219– 220 immigration to, 15, 90, 182–185, 212 Islamic civil identity in, 194–197, 202– 203, 205–206 Islamic private schools in, 191–194 liberal culture of, 209–210, 222, 224 Muslim political participation in, 197– 205 national identity of, 171–176, 179, 211, 225, 231–233 nativism in, 56, 59, 203 pillar system in, 15–16, 172–173, 175, 194, 232 religious symbols and, 91 right-wing discourse in, 96 secularism in, 317 Newcomer Integration Law (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers), 223 New National Party (Nieuwe Nationale Partij), 181 New Right (Nieuw Rechts), 181 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 27–28 Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores nor Doormats), 237, 269, 274–277, 294 niqabs. See burqa/niqab/hijab bans Nobis, Emely, 220 Noir, Michel, 252 Noiriel, Gerard, 236, 270 Nora, Pierre, 302

Index Norris, Pippa, 52, 87 Norton, Anne, 88, 322 Norway, 80, 86 Nouvelle Droite, 56–57, 216, 295 Nussbaum, Martha, 284–285 Nuttall, Paul, 165 Obin Report, 258 O’Brien, Peter, 49 O’Cathain, Detta, 139 Ofce for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted), 122–123, 165 Okin, Susan, 88, 218 Omsen, Omar, 266 One Law for All campaign, 89, 145 Onfray, Michel, 302 Orbán, Viktor, 4, 57, 59, 97 Orientalism (Said), 27 Ottoman Empire, 21, 27 Öztürk, Selçuk, 204 Parekh, Bhikhu, 6–7, 70–71, 136, 138, 313 Parekh Report, 147 Park View Academy, 119–120 Party for Freedom (Netherlands), 56, 59, 203 Party of Unity (Partij van de Eenheid), 203 Pasqua, Charles, 249–250 Pastors, Marco, 188, 200, 227–228 Patten, Alan, 65–66, 77 Peach, Ceri, 103 Pearl, David, 140 Peillon, Vincent, 283 People’s Party (Denmark), 56, 59, 78 People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie; VVD), 177, 187, 197, 207–208, 223–225, 229, 233 Peters, Rudolph, 212 Pettit, Philip, 78 Philipse, Herman, 193, 208–209, 212– 213 Phillips, Anne, 88 Phillips, Melanie, 99 pillar system (Netherlands), 15–16, 172–

481

173, 175, 194, 232 depillarization, 173 Pirenne, Henri, 21 Podemos, 52 poldermodel, 171, 174 Policy Exchange, 131 polygamy, 88, 207, 236 Poppelaars, Caelesta, 226 populism, right wing, 50–54, 56–60, 308 civic integration and, 314 in France, 295–299 racism and, 53 See also Right-wing parties post-multiculturalism, 17, 72, 96–97, 100, 168, 226, 287, 311 Poulter, Dan, 155 Powell, Enoch, 107, 154 Prevention of Terrorism Bill (UK), 133– 134 “Prevent” strategy (UK), 117–118, 134, 152 principled pluralism, 64, 173–174 Prins, Baujke, 208, 230 privatization of religion, 317 Protest for Everyone (la Manif pour Tous), 4, 59, 288 Pujadas, David, 265 Pull Students from School campaign (France), 260 quenelle gesture, 292 Quilliam Foundation, 134 Qutb, Sayyid, 23, 28, 32, 35–37, 44, 312 Race Relations Act of 1965 (UK), 84 Race Relations Act of 1976 (UK), 108, 153 Race Relations Amendment Act (UK), 149 racism, 60, 82–84, 255, 315 antiracism, 125, 130, 190, 253, 273, 275 anti-Semitism as, 290, 292–293, 319 assimilation and, 10, 223, 226, 269, 272 civic integration and, 10–11, 17, 232 eforts to combat, 84, 100, 106, 204, 257, 273–275, 293, 306, 313, 323

482

Index

racism (continued) in France, 248, 272–274, 293–295 Islamophobia as, 19, 23, 53, 94, 129– 130, 272–273, 290, 319 liberalism and, 4, 8, 17, 60, 222 multiculturalism and, 147, 161, 169 in Netherlands, 213, 220, 228, 231 populism and, 53 Right-wing parties and, 53, 55, 57–58, 162–165, 176–177, 323 in schools, 110, 116 in UK, 100, 102, 116–117, 147, 161– 162, 168 Radical and Religious Hatred Bill (UK), 110 radicalization, 129 eforts to counter, 267–268 Islamophobia and, 268 prison and, 264–266 Rafarin, Jean-Pierre, 254, 258, 280, 283 Ramadan, Tariq, 7, 18, 23, 40–44, 189, 194, 313 Rath, Jan, 200, 215 Rawls, John, 61–62 Rayhana, 275 Refah Partisi, 74 Régent, Frédéric, 236, 270 Religions, Secularism, Interculturality, project, 252 Religious Disabilities Removals Act (UK), 103 Religious Exemption Act (1976, UK), 104 religious neutrality, 64–68, 86, 121, 174, 240, 259, 284 Remkes, Johan, 189 Representative Council of Black Associations (Conseil Représentatif des Association Noires), 277 République en Marche party (France), 304 Respect Party (UK), 126–127 Ricoeur, Paul, 305 Rida, Rashid, 38 Right-wing parties, 56–59 assimilation and, 54, 56–58, 294–296, 310, 315 burqa bans and, 286 civic integration and, 57, 314 cultural exclusion and, 2

culture and, 315 in France, 56–59, 216, 237, 283–284, 294–302, 295 freedom of speech and, 59, 181, 214– 215, 274 gender politics and, 58–59, 88–89 nationalism and, 316 in Netherlands, 177–178, 181, 215– 217, 234 protected by free speech laws, 214–216 racism and, 53, 55, 57–58, 162–165, 176–177, 323 in UK, 161–167 Robinson, Tommy, 163–164 Rocherson, Yvette, 275 Roman Catholic Relief Act (1829, UK), 105 Rorty, Richard, 67 Rosanvallon, Pierre, 297 Rossi, Ugo, 229 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 42 Roy, Olivier, 8, 25, 31, 47–49, 254–255, 261, 268, 303 Runnymede Trust, 108, 147 Rushdie, Salman, 135–138, 213, 222. See also Salman Rushdie afair Rutte, Mark, 96, 227–229, 233 Ryan, Clare, 90 Safra Project, 89 Sageman, Marc, 130 Said, Edward, 26–27 Sainsbury, Diane, 58 Saint-Simon Foundation, 288 Salafsm, 33, 184, 202, 255 banlieue riots and, 263 deradicalization and, 48 eforts to combat, 50–51, 306 Shaykhiste Salafsm, 255 Salam, Ahmed, 265 Salman Rushdie afair, 100, 135–138, 178 Salvini, Matteo, 4, 56, 59 same-sex marriage, 55, 59, 85–86, 157 contrasted with polygamy, 88 in France, 287–288 Islamic attitudes towards, 195 protests against, 4, 59

Index in UK, 156–157 See also homosexuality/LGBTQ rights Sarkozy, Nicolas, 41, 250, 259, 268, 276, 281, 283–284, 286, 296, 299 Sartori, Giovanni, 20 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 274 Saud, Muhammad ibn, 27 Sayyid, Salman, 33 Scarman Report, 147 Schefer, Paul, 96, 205–206 Schinas, Margaritis, 97 Schmitt, Carl, 322 Schnapper, Dominique, 242, 304, 321 Scott, James, 12 Scott, Joan, 88–89, 257 second-generation Muslims, 5, 23, 70, 125, 194, 236, 242, 245–246, 262– 263 secularism, 63 church/state separation, 16, 67, 120, 237–238, 253, 316 in France, 237–239, 283 headscarf bans and, 257 Islamic organizations and, 273 liberalism and, 168 Lisbon Treaty and, 316 as national religion of Europe, 64 in Netherlands, 187 prohibition of religious signs, 67 in United Kingdom, 103–106 women’s rights and, 89 See also laïcité Selim, Najed, 221 Semoun, Élie, 292 Senegal, 246–247 Shachar, Ayelet, 69–70 Shafq, Mohammed, 141 sharia law, 26, 28–29 consequences of outlawing, 95 European condemnation of, 74 international organizations and, 45 Ramadan on, 41 in UK, 135, 139–146, 312 Shatz, Adam, 27 Shavit, Uryia, 39 Shaykhiste Salafsm, 255 Sheikh, Ahmed Omar Saeed, 129 Shklar, Judith, 95

483

Shore, Zachary, 47 Siddiqi, Faiz-ul- Aqtab, 141 Siddique, Ashfaq, 134 Siddiqui, Asim, 143 Sikhs, 104 Silvestri, Sara, 64 Sked, Alan, 164 Smith, Anthony, 79 Smith, Rogers, 80–81 Sobolewska, Maria, 159 Social Democratic Party (Denmark), 78–79 social integration, 17, 234 Somalia, 183 Soper, Christopher, 174 Soral, Alain, 293, 295 Southall Black Sisters, 140–141, 155 Soviet Union, 45 Soysal, Yasemin, 25 Spain, 21, 52, 86 Spengler, Oswald, 57 Stanley, Jason, 291 Stasi Commission (France), 258–259, 275, 283, 286 Stepan, Alfred, 8–9, 66, 316–317 Stichting Nafar (Secret Garden) organization, 220 Straw, Jack, 141, 150, 152 Submission (Houellebecq, 2015), 302 Submission (movie, Ali/van Gogh, 2004), 180 Sudan, 138 Swann Report, 115–116, 147–148 Sweden, 81, 86 Sweet, Alec Stone, 90 Syria, 74 Syriza, 52 Tablighi Jamaat, 112, 249, 263 Taguief, Pierre-Andre, 55 takfr, 37 Tamir, Yael, 75–76, 78 Taras, Raymondy, 319 Taylor, Charles, 63, 65, 70–71, 137 Taymiyyah, Ibn, 34 terrorism, 1, 30–31, 127–132 Al-Qaeda, 1, 44–45, 112, 131, 133, 267 anti-terrorism legislation, 50

484

Index

terrorism (continued) antiterrorist legislation and, 109–110, 117, 268 defnition of terrorist, 268 in Denmark, 49–50 in France, 49–50, 235, 265–269, 289– 290 jihad and, 46–48 as leaderless resistance, 45 Muslim attitudes towards, 128 terrorism-security debate, 13 in UK, 22, 98–100 See also Charlie Hebdo attacks Terrorism Act (United Kingdom), 50 Tink (Denk) party, 204–205 Tibi, Bassam, 18, 40, 43–44 Tillie, Jean, 197 Tocqueville, Alexis, 269 Todd, Emmanuel, 291, 302 Todorov, Tzvetan, 257 Toleration Act (1689, UK), 104 Topoljak, Sujleman, 37–38 Touraine, Alain, 257 transformative accommodation, 70, 218 Treaty of Amsterdam, 86, 279 Tribalat, Michele, 246 Trojan horse letter, 119–120, 154 Trojan horse theory, 6, 18–19, 119, 257 Trump, Donald, 95 Tully, James, 70 Tunisia, 31, 244–246 Turkey, 183, 202–203, 225, 234, 245 Uitermark, Justus, 229 umma, 12, 32–36, 130, 255 Union for a Popular Movement (France), 270–271, 286, 297, 300 Union of Muslim Organizations, 125 Union of the Islamic Organizations of France (Union des Organisations Islamiques de France), 249–250, 253–254, 263 United Kingdom, 14–16, 98–170 antidiscrimination laws in, 84–85 antidiscrimination legislation in, 86 anti-terrorism legislation in, 50, 109– 110, 117 assimilation in, 108, 116, 124, 149, 169

attitudes towards Muslims in, 160–161, 169, 303, 317 blasphemy laws in, 104, 109, 136–139 Britishness and, 19, 23, 99, 101–103, 135, 147, 149–150, 152, 154, 167– 169 citizenship in, 146–154 civic integration in, 80, 99, 135, 146, 148, 153, 158, 160, 169 colonial legacy of, 14–15 cultural diversity in, 99, 101, 108–109, 115 cultural toleration in, 135–139 education in, 114–124, 154–155 Englishness and, 102, 147, 175 free speech debates in, 110, 136, 149, 155, 165 hate speech laws in, 93–94 homosexuality/LGBTQ laws in, 156– 158 immigration laws in, 106–107, 109, 168–169 mosque-building in, 111–113 Muslim living standards in, 124–125, 158–159 Muslim organizations in, 110, 118, 125–126, 134 Muslim radicalism in, 131–135 Muslim religious identifcation in, 105–106 national identity in, 100 nativism in, 57, 59 Ottoman Empire and, 27 radical Right in, 161–167 religious pluralism in, 64, 103–106 right-wing discourse in, 96 secularism in, 317 sharia law and, 135, 139–146 terrorism and, 22, 99, 112, 127–132, 133 women’s rights/gender equality in, 155–158 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 163–167 United People of Luton, 163 United States, 96, 104, 133, 239–240 Valensi, Lucette, 236, 270

Index Valfort, Marie-Anne, 247 Vallaud-Belkacem, Najat, 291 Valls, Mauel, 289, 291 van der Hoeven, Maria, 193 Vandierendonck, René, 299 van Gogh, Teo, 180–181, 192, 196–197, 202, 207, 210, 212, 221 van Gunsteren, Herman, 314 van Heelsum, Anja, 197–198 Van Houtum, Henk, 229 van Oosten, Marcel, 215 Van Tao, Trinh, 236, 270 Vasta, Elle, 223 Veilige Haven (Safe Haven), 220 Verdonk, Rita, 197, 206, 214, 223–224 Vertovec Steven, 101 Vishnitz Girls School, 85 Vlaams Belang, 56, 58 Vogelaar, Ella, 206 Wadud, Amina, 221 Wahabism, 27 Walzer, Michael, 78, 137, 236 Ward, Keith, 136 Warner, Carolyn, 201 Warsi, Sayeeda, 158 Wauquiez, Laurent, 300 Weale, Albert, 137 Weber, Eugen, 237 Weil, Patrick, 259, 271, 278 Welby, Justin, 98 Werbner, Pnina, 12, 60, 87

485

Wieviorka, Michel, 293, 295, 319 Wilders, Geert, 181–182, 204–205, 214–217, 220, 222, 224–225, 228, 233–234 Williams, Melissa, 62, 70 Williams, Rowan, 100, 135, 139, 142– 145, 312 Wimmer, Andreas, 79 Windrush case, 168–169 Woehrling, Jean-Marie, 236 women’s rights, 87–91 in France, 260, 273–277 liberalism and, 2–3 liberal nationalism and, 218 postcolonialist feminism, 89, 274 Right-wing parties and, 301 in UK, 154–158 See also gender politics Working Council on Islam in France, 249 Yadav, Yogendra, 66 Yade, Rama, 275 Yellow Vest (Gilets Jaunes) movement, 297, 302, 305–306 Young, Iris, 70–71 Yurdakul, Gökçe, 87 Zahra Ali, 274 Zakaria, Fareed, 28 Zapata-Barrero, Richard, 72 Zemmour, Éric, 290, 302