From Muhajir to Mujahid, Politics of War through Aid: a Case Study of Afghan Refugees in NWFP

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Foreword Obscure Dimensions of the Afghan War: Fought at the climax of the Cold War, the battle between the Soviet-supported leftist and the US and Western supported political Islamists in Afghanistan was supposed to be the ‘mother of all ideological battle’. The whole world was led to believe by both sides that they were fighting to defend their lofty principles symbolized by the ‘revolutionaries’ and the ‘mujs’, an affectionate nickname given to Mujahideen by the by the western press at that time. Couched in very high-sounding ideological concepts, the powerful propaganda of the big powers dominated the minds of most of the people. It was only during the post-Cold War developments in international politics that some of the inlaid dimensions of the Afghan war have come to light, enabling many people to reconsider the history of the Afghan war in a more objective way. A huge body of literature has appeared in a various countries regarding the devastating armed conflict in Afghanistan in recent years, providing new insights about the actual objectives,

II motives, and strategic interests of different regional and international players in the conflict, beyond their official rhetoric. For example, there is hardly anything secret anymore about the formation and execution of the Soviet policy in Afghanistan, as most of the previously secret material has been declassified and published by various authors, including some of the senior military officers who had actually conducted the war. Minutes of the meeting of Political Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party, in which the decision to send the Red Army into Afghanistan was made, are not only published in Russian; their Pashto translation has also been available for quite some time. This is also the case with the US and other Western countries, where a number of publications have laid bare the actual chain of events that had remained behind the screen. Among others, books like Unholy Wars by John. K. Cooly, Charlie Wilson’s War by George Crile, and Ghost Wasrs by Steve Coll present a graphic pictures of the real motives and roles of different institutions and individuals not exactly corresponding with the pious noises that they had been making during the war. It is very interesting to note, however, that there is very little in terms of research about the role of Pakistan, which happened to be the most important regional player in the Afghan conflict. Some foreign authors have discussed the part played by Pakistan in the Afghan war, but there is not much available in terms of indigenous research on the subject. Apart from the wellknown book Taliban, by the reputed independent author Ahmad

III Rashid, most of the other books published on the subject represent the official version. By now it is quite well known that Pakistan’s Afghan policy has remained the sole domain of Pakistan Army and the country’s premier intelligence agency, Inter Service Intelligence (ISI), which played a fundamental role in shaping and executing the said policy; that is why it has remained by and large a clandestine affair. Even the country’s civilian Chief Executives in the 80s and 90s had no say in formulating our Afghan policy. The situation has not changed even today. Therefore, there has been no meaningful or informed public debate on the country’s policy towards Afghanistan. The experience of the last few years has decisively proved that Pakistan’s Afghan policy is fundamentally flawed and counterproductive, as it has turned the country into a hub of international terrorism, religious extremism, and the drug trade, and has filled Pakistan with dangerous weapons in private possession, apart from brining Pakistan on the wrong side of Afghan national sentiments. But how can any government reform the aforementioned policy and take corrective measures with out first critically analyzing it and holding a public debate on it? In this context, the publication of the present research work, From Muhajir to Mujahid by well-known scholar and Afghanologist Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, is a welcome development. This important work is expected to go a long way to shed light on some dimensions of Pakistan’s Afghan policy that

IV had so far remained obscure. The research methodology adopted by Dr. Marwat is impressive. He substantiates his thesis with reasonable proof, and authenticates his statements with credible documents and dependable sources. With a great deal of laborious and meticulous work, he pieces together bits of information into a tangible and coherent picture, exposing the deceptions fed to the public by the ruling circles of the country. Looking at the issues in question through the prism of the refugee problem, Dr. Marwat builds a very convincing and damning case against the manipulation of various regional and international players, in efforts the exploit the situation for promoting their own agendas at the cost of the hapless Afghan refugees. He has the unique advantage of having had a first hand experience in dealing with Afghan refugees, first as a government functionary working in Afghan Refugees Commissionerate, and later as research scholar continuously working on the Afghan problem. He has been personally a witness to the process of turning the ‘Muhajir (refugee) into the ‘Mujahid’ (the holy warrior), and the tactics which were used by intelligences for this purpose. Dr. Marwat has rightly pointed out that Afghan refugees were welcomed or even ‘pulled’ on the basis of religious faith which, along with the leverage of the material assistance, made their transformation into religious fighters easier. What he has failed to mention is the fact that since Pakistan is not signatory to either the 1951 Geneva Convention of Refugees or 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees, the then Government of Pakistan could prevent any

V scrutiny or monitoring of the refugee situation. Isn’t it high time that Pakistan accedes to the aforementioned international convention to prevent the repetition of the events that took place in 1980s? His information on the functioning of the secretive Afghan Cell and the Afghan Refugees Commissionerate is very valuable, as is his insight on the performance of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in collaboration with CIA and other western agencies. HE has referred to the massive corruption and misappropriations in billion of dollars, and the petro-dollars that were poured into Afghan Jehad from abroad. It was by siphoning off fabulous amounts of this money that General Zia-ul-Haq and General Akhtar Abdur Rahman could become billionaires in dollars. The corruption also had a trickle-down effect, and along with the drug trade and gunrunning, it led to the dramatic strength of the black economy that still plagues the country’s social and political life. The conclusion drawn by Dr. Marwat from his analyses of the whole situation is also very important. He is illuminating in tracing the present problems of religious extremism and militancy to the policies adopted by the country’s rulers during the Afghan war. He has convincingly and factually pointed out in detail the evolution of the relationships of militant organizations in the two countries. This insight is indispensable for any government in Pakistan if it is serious in adopting reforms or corrective measures to check the menace of terrorism in an effective manner.

VI Unfortunately, some powerful circles with influences on the governance of the country have demonstrated an amazing capacity to live in unreality. However, the country’s interest in the dramatically changing situation can hardly afford this myopia. It is high time that Pakistan adopts a brand new Afghan policy based on the ground reality; the Afghanistan is slowly but surely and steadily growing out of the post-conflict situation with the adoption of a constitution and the successful elections of the President. There is great potential for growth of cooperation between the two countries in almost every field. Pakistan has to grow out of ridiculous theories such as attaining ‘military depth’ in Afghanistan, or creating a client government in Kabul. The Government of Pakistan has to remove the discrepancy between its word and actions. This is a prerequisite for a fresh and successful start in regional cooperation.

(Afrasiab Khattak) University Town, Peshawar, October 24, 2004.

Acknowledgments This piece of research work grows out of almost two decades of scholarly interest in, as well as a personal fascination with, the land and people of Afghanistan. My experience as an officer in the Afghan Refugee Commissionarate (Peshawar), an acquaintance with almost all intellectual / literary figures of Afghanistan and close links with other people both inside and outside Afghanistan, have all been of great help in completing this work. I am extremely grateful to the selection committee of the Social Science Research Council (South Asia Regional Fellowship Program) for selecting me as fellow for the year 2003. I am also obliged and grateful to Ittay Abraham, Program Director; Malini Sur; and others for organizing South Asia Regional Fellow’s Workshop in Negombo, Sri Lanka (December 17-19, 2003). I personally gained much from the workshop and the chance for interaction with scholars in various fields, and this new experience helped me in reviewing this project. I am highly indebted to Dr. Parvez Khan Toru, Director Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar for granting me three months leave for my research project. I am also thankful to Dr. Azmat Hayat Khan, Director Area Study Centre (Central Asia, China, Russia & Afghanistan), University of Peshawar (Pakistan), who has been kind enough to accept my request for affiliation as fellow in his institution, and who provided me all available facilities in the Centre. I wish to record my sincere appreciation and thanks to Dr. Sarfraz Khan of Area Study Centre for his guidance, criticism and expert suggestions.

I am profoundly indebted to my old friend Mr. Salim Shah (serving in SDPI) for his generous help and guidance throughout my fellowship period. I am also thankful to Dr. Adil Zareef, Sar Muhqiq Zalmay Hewadmal (Minister Advisor of Cultural Affairs, Afghanistan), Professor Rasul Amin ( ex-Minister of Education, Afghanistan), Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai, Syed Fida Younas (exCouncil General of Pakistan in Afghanistan), Mr. Farmanullah Khan (Afghan Refugee Commissionrate, Peshawar), Mr. Ajmal Khattak, Mr. Afrasiyab Khattak, Dr. Wiqar Ali Shah Kaka Khel, Mr. Zahir Baburi and Dr. Abdul Karim Khan for interviews, discussions and dialogue. A thanks also goes to Dr. Pervez Khan Toru for editing and James Caron (Ph. D candidate, University of Pennsylvania, USA) for proofreading and formatting the manuscript. There are others, whose names cannot be named cannot be listed here, who provided me extremely valuable information and data. They know who they are, and I hope to repeat my gratitude to them in person. Opinions and any errors of fact or judgment are, of course, entirely my own responsibility. At the end, I would like to express my profound love and respect for my wife and kids, whose good wishes and passions have always been a constant source of inspiration for me during my research.

Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat

Chapter- 1 The Strategic Trap for the Afghan Refugees “Kabul Must Burn!” (General Akhtar Abdur Rahman)

Pakistan’s geopolitics, being borne out of the trauma of colonial India’s partition, has been instrumental in shaping a collective psyche: one where geopolitics overshadows Pakistan’s domestic politics. The geographical proximity of Pakistan to both the South Asian and Central Asian areas posed serious threats to its already fragile geo-strategic position, in the wake of revolutions, civil wars and turbulence in these regions. Since its inception, Pakistan had been bequeathed with both internal and external problems: geographical divergence, demographic inconsistencies, ideological enigma, constitutional dilemma, economic pitfalls, cultural and ethnic inconsistencies, and above all, political challenges to the well-entrenched status quo of imperial rule in the subcontinent. The story of migration of the Afghan refugees to areas now included under the name of Pakistan is as old as Afghanistan itself. However, the current study is focuses on those Afghan refugees who migrated from Afghanistan in the political upheaval which

started in 1978. Furthermore, the study of these refugees in Pakistan should be studied in the particular prism of Pak-Afghan relations, which is itself a tragic history of incompatibility arising from a colonial past, from dissimilarities of the two peoples’ approaches regarding regional and global issues, and from consistent denial of each other‘s view points which would be vital to a meaningful relationship between them. As such, pre-existing legal or logical principles fail to resolve these disputes the way they might have in the case of any other two nations. This being the case, Pakistanis and the Afghans have been living in a state of constant tension and suspicion since the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Despite the many commonalties between Pakistan and Afghanistan, i.e. the ties of a common border 2250 KM long, as well as those of religion, history, heroes, language(s), and culture, the political elite of both the respective countries, somehow failed to develop close and cordial relations with each other before the rise of Mujahideen government in Afghanistan. Some of the causes of their estrangement were deeply rooted: in the colonial era of the Anglo-Russian rivalry (the ‘Great Game’); in the Anglo-Afghan Wars; in humiliating treaties;1 in the Pashtunistan issue; and in the Cold War rivalry between the two superpowers.2

Afghan Revolution and the Influx of Refugees into Pakistan: In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan towards the end of 1979, the war clouds in the neighboring country might well have been a blessing for Islamabad. Pakistan was then relatively isolated internationally. Relation between Washington and Islamabad had reached their

lowest ebb due to number of factors, including Islamabad’s alleged nuclear program; the imposition of sanctions by Carter administration in 1978 and again in 1979; the execution of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (the fallen Prime Minister of Pakistan) in April 1979; and the ransacking of the US Embassy in Islamabad in November 1979, in reaction to the rumored American involvement in an attack on religious extremists in Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s economy was in a shamble, and its defense forces were armed with antiquated equipment. Thus Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was not less than a blessing in disguise for Zia-ul-Haq’s dictatorial regime, a chance of to extract itself from the quagmire of internal and external problems. The entire West, led by US, along with the Gulf countries, promptly reached out to rescue Pakistan with promises of renewed economic and military assistance, and this also quickly boosted Pakistan’s sagging prestige.3 The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December of 1979, for better or for worse, turned the recently non-aligned Pakistan into a frontline state to tackle with the Red menace creeping into the neighborhood. Within a few days of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, General Zia convened a meeting of senior officials in Islamabad to deliberate on Pakistan’s response. A draft policy statement had been prepared by Agha Shahi, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had hurriedly returned from an official visit to Tehran. The options available for Pakistan, according to Shahi, were only three. 1) To confront the Soviet Union directly by participating in the Afghan resistance 2) To acquiesce in the faith accompli imposed and its political implications.

3) To protest the Soviet action for its violation of accepted international norms in the international forums of the United Nations, the Islamic Conference and the Nonaligned Movement, but without aligning itself with one side or the other in the superpower’s tussle.4 The third (political) option was Pakistan’s overt choice; and indeed in its public statements throughout the 1980s, the Zia government rarely deviated from it. Simultaneously, however, Islamabad quietly chose to supplement the third option with a fourth one: covert support to Afghan guerrillas in armed struggle against both Kabul’s and Moscow’s forces in Afghanistan. The reasons for the momentous Pakistani decision to become involved on the side of the resistance, both overtly and covertly, in the Afghanistan war were multiple. Three reasons stand out in published analysis of this period: 1) To defend the integrity of Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan; 2) To mitigate the severity of the Soviet military and political threat to Pakistan;. 3) To increase Pakistan’s access to the political, military and economic benefits of alliance with the West.5 Well before the Soviet intervention, the Pakistan Army, in conformity with the fourth covert option, was training Afghan guerrillas. Indeed, there is evidence that Islamabad was facilitating a modest level of American covert assistance to the Afghan resistance movement fighting the PDPA regime in Afghanistan by late spring 1978, half year before the Soviet intervention took place.

The era of Soviet forces in Afghanistan was also a period of change and transition in Pakistan. However; it is interesting and worthy of note that in the midst of this tumultuous decade, Pakistan’s Afghan policy did not change, despite the changes in government and leaders.6 During the Zia regime, the key actors in policy making were the Chief Martial Law Administrator/Chief of the Army Staff and President (in September 1978, General Zia was sworn in as President of Pakistan); the Vice Chief of the Army Staff; the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee, the Finance and Foreign Ministers, the Martial Law Administrators/Governors of NWFP and Balochistan; the Foreign Secretary; CMLA’s Chief of Staff; and the Director- General of Inter services Intelligence (the ISI).7 The basic direction of foreign policy was guided by General Zia, who served as his own Foreign and Defense Minister, and he was personally very interested in overseeing the consolidation and implementation of Pakistan’s Afghan policy. There was a general impression in Pakistan and abroad that the Afghan policy was framed by the military at the behest of the US, and that the decision makers were puppets pulled by the American strings.8 The Afghan resistance movement and the influx of refugees into Pakistan made Zia game simpler. In this new ‘Great Game’, if the CIA and US inter alia were interested in punishing the Soviets in Afghanistan to avenge their own defeat in Vietnam, Pakistan wanted to gain maximum political, economic and strategic advantages by avenging its historical enmity and grievances over the Pashtunistan issue with Afghanistan. Islamabad’s political, economic, and military involvement in the new Afghan gambit was so well planned, organized, and

institutionalized that almost all Afghan refugees living in Pakistan were trapped in this scheme. The main thrust of Pakistan’s Afghan policy was basically aimed at the following three points: 1. Mobilizing international support against Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan; 2. Assisting the people of Afghanistan in the Jehad against the Soviet forces; and 3. Seeking a political-diplomatic solution of the crisis on the negotiating table.9 Though the official policy of Islamabad towards Afghanistan was based on the concept of Islamic brotherhood, neighborly relations, and humanitarianism; however, its role in the conflict was determined by its secret policy with the following objectives: · to oust the Russians from Afghanistan; · to topple the Pro-Soviet Kabul government; · to suppress and discourage Pashtun nationalism; · to gain ‘strategic depth’ vis- a -vis the larger adversary: India; · to destabilize Afghan state institutions; · to modernize its own army with the Western assistance; · to legitimize and prolong the rule of Zia on the pretext of Afghan Jehad; · to divert public attention from domestic politics to external threats; · and last but not the least, to reduce Afghanistan to the status of Pakistan’s protégé, or at least to let it be governed by her puppets.10 Brigadier (Retired) Mohammad Yousaf revealed in his two books Silent Soldier: The Man behind the Afghan Jehad and The

Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story that it was General Akhtar who “ urged Zia to take the military option” instead of diplomatic option for countering the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. His arguments for ‘military option’ were as follows: a: It would be a Jehad against the Communist infidels; b: it would be Pakistan’s first line of defense in the West; c: it would regain for him (Zia) some of the international esteem he lost as result of executing Z. A. Bhutto; and d: Pakistan would back the Jehad covertly. 11 But with the passage of time nothing left covert in dealing with the Afghan issue, as Zia-ul-Haq involved himself and his country in the Afghan affairs to the extent that he told General Akhtar “the water in Afghanistan must boil at the right temperature”.12 For implementation of this scheme, Islamabad systematically wove an administrative and ideological web for trapping the refugees, involving the following aspects: 1: the creation of the Afghan Cell, 2: the creation of the Afghan Refugees Commissionerate 3: the categorization of Afghan refugees into (a) Muhajireen or Refugees and (b) Mujahideen or freedom fighters. The government’s public stance was that only refugees were living in the settled areas of Pakistan while the Mujahideen were based in tribal areas. 4: the recognition of only Seven Tanzimat (parties) of Afghan Mujahideen, in order to co-opt the entire resistance of the Afghans.

5: The relegation of the refugee problem to legal and illegal NGOs. 6: The Islamists Jehadi culture was introduced, encouraged and sustained.

The Afghan Cell and Refugee: On the higher level, Pakistan created special Afghan Cell, for the Afghan affairs, over and above the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There were two power structures (the formal and the actual) in operation during the Zia era. The formal power structure incorporated the civil bureaucracy and the cabinet, while the real power structure which included ‘the Club’, actually called the shots in all policy decision making. The membership of this club was limited to the key Lieutenant Generals, including the governors of provinces, the Corps Commanders, the Director General of the ISI, and the VCOAS. The only civilian members of the club were the Finance Minister, and later the Chairman of the Senate, Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan; and the Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan. Every cabinet meeting was preceded, by a day or two, by a Club meeting, where the real decisions were taken, decisions which were then formalized in the cabinet. A Committee on Afghanistan used to meet every month to review the situation with the Club members in attendance, as well as the Governors of NWFP and Baluchistan.13 General Zia reconstituted the Afghan Cell. Its initial purpose was limited only to collect information on a day-to-day basis, keeping the government updated, and helping it formulate policies regarding Afghanistan. After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the scope of the Cell was widened and it included

nearly all the top brass of the civil and military bureaucracy. General Zia presided over its meetings, and its members included the VCOAS, the Foreign Minister; the MLAs of NWFP and Baluchistan, the Secretaries of SAFRON (State and Frontier Regions), Information, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Interior; Director Intelligence Bureau, Director Military Intelligence; and Director General Inter Services Intelligence. It was a broad body to deal with the Afghan crisis and to formulate policy. The Afghan Cell was composed of the same personnel as in the past, but during Benazir Bhutto’s first regime it become more assertive than it was during the Zia era. Both the President and Prime Minister presided over its meetings; the role of DG ISI was restored to that of an advisor, instead of its previous role as a part of the formal decision-making power structure; and the Foreign Office, Cabinet and Defense Co-ordination Committee became active input, conversion and output agencies of foreign policy making. Afghan Refugees Commissionerate (ARC): Pakistan from the outset sought to orchestrate much of the conduct of the Afghan war and expected to shape an Afghan peace of its own type. Islamabad authorities worked to control virtually every aspect of the Afghan presence in Pakistan. The activities of resident Afghans, as well as the armed efforts to their resistance fighters, were expected to accord with the perceived interests of Pakistan; nothing was to occur without the knowledge and approval of Pakistani authorities. This regularly involved close management of refugees and the direction and coordination of Afghan resistance parties based in Peshawar. 14

In the initial year i.e. 1978-1980, Pakistan managed the refugee problem on ad hoc basis through the Disaster Relief and Preparedness Cell of the Federal Government, and through the Home and Tribal Affairs Departments of NWFP and Baluchistan. With the mass exodus and the refugee problem becoming worse, a new organization headed by the Chief Commissioner for the Afghan Refugees (CCAR) was created in Islamabad under the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions. A comprehensive administrative hierarchy was established from village level upwards. In order to check and control the movements of the refugees, to establish refugees camps, to shift the scattered population of the refugees to these camps and provide them necessary relief assistance, and to handle the situation arising from their swelling concentration in this area, the Government of Pakistan established the Afghan Refugees Commissionerate (ARC) at Peshawar in April, 1980. However, according to Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai, the ARC was established on the First April, 1979 with only three officials; and later on the total personnel were 12000.15 The refugee organization was divided into various administrative tiers. At the lowest level was the Refugees Tentage Village (RTV), each comprising a maximum of 10,000 refugees or 1500 families. An RTV was placed under a village administrator, who is responsible for the day-to-day administration and welfare of the refugees of the RTV. The RTV was comprised of three main sections, namely, accounts, relief and security. The next tier of administration was the area under an Area Administrator. The area comprises up to 5 RTVs or a population of 50,000. Above the area, at the district/agency level was the District/Agency Administrator for overall coordination of refugee

management within the district or agency. There were 17 District/Agency Administrators in the NWFP. At the highest tier at the Provincial headquarters, there was the Provincial Refugees Commissioner who worked under the Home Department of the province. Finally, at the Federal Government level was the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CCAR), for overall coordination of relief assistance work under the States and Frontier Regions Division (SAFRON). The Ministry of States and Frontier Regions had overall responsibility for the Afghan Refugees in Pakistan. 16 Organization For Refugees Management in Pakistan

Voluntary Agencies

UNHCR/ WFP Other UN Agencies

Chief Secretary NWFP Refugees Commissioner, NWFP

Secretary States & Frontier Regions Division Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees

Northern Areas About 2000 Refugees

District/ Agency Administrators

Federal coordination Committee

Other government Departments

Chief Secretary Baluchistan Refugees Commissioner, Baluchistan

District Administrators

Area Administrators

Area Administrators

Refugees Village Administrators

Refugees Village Administrators

1

8

Registration Process of Refugees: All the incoming refugees were required to be registered on a form prescribed in the Registration of Foreigners Rules, against the form’s item relating to the nationality. They were to be described as “Afghan Refugee”. The Afghan Refugees were introduced to the Pakistani authorities through the representatives of the political parties or maliks of Afghan refugees, the “Peshawar Seven”, which had established their headquarters at Peshawar, NWFP. After proper verification, to the complete satisfaction of the authorities, the refugees were registered with the Government of Pakistan on a proforma and shifted to the Refugees Camps. After registration the family was given a “Refugee Pass Book” which contained the following information:1. Identification. 2. Details of family members. 3. Record of issue of relief items. 4. Record of issue of food items. 5. Record of disbursement of maintenance allowance. 6. Medical Record. 7. Record of arms, vehicles and animals. 17 This Pass Book was not an identity document, nor did it confer the right of nationality on the refugees. Officially all possible care was exercised to avoid double registration, and the members of each house were carefully checked to eliminate chances of exaggerated/inflated figures. But reports of malpractices and bribes were common in the refugee organization. In 1983, the total corruption cases registered in ARC were 1267. 18 No figures were very accurate, for various technical reasons, but according to UN sources, the highest number of cases of over-enumeration resulted

from bogus or multiple registration by those claiming dependents eligible for ration. But just as it served the individual refugee’s interest to exaggerate their numbers, Pakistani authorities were also motivated to raise the figures on which foreign aid was based. Larger numbers helped to dramatize the acuteness of the refugee problem. However, special registration was granted by the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees to the widow, dignitaries, and students.19 The more privileged Afghan national were granted special maintenance allowances at the discretion of the provincial government. They were categorized into three grades: A. grade included political figures and high ranking government officials etc. B. grade included civilian government officials. C. grade included civilian officials and recommended ones. 20 For the proper and correct assessment of the refugee population, the following documents were maintained at the Refugee Tentage Village level: · ·

Record of registration. Individual reference Card.

A Refugee Pass book was issued to each head of the family on the basis of registration. The refugee identity documents were: 1. Ration book 2. Shanakhti Pass (Identity Pass) 3. Vehicle identity card of those employed with NGOs. 4. Party Card.21 Almost all the Refugees Camps were located in NWFP and Baluchistan, and all possible efforts were made by the Government to restrict their movement to these two provinces. No refugee pass

book for the receipt of the relief and maintenance allowance was issued to those who slipped over to the provinces of Punjab, Sindh, and Azad Kashmir. However, later on the Government of Pakistan established a Refugee Camp in Mianwali District, Punjab. Demography: The north-eastern part of Pakistan and the south-eastern portion of Afghanistan have long history of extended family ties, and are knitted into ethnic, linguistic, cultural and tribal relations and affinities. Seasonal migration of the nomadic Pashtun tribes to and from the Indian (now Pakistani) plains ceased for about two years in 1961 when Pakistani government closed its border with Afghanistan.22 However, in the early 1970s, famine-stricken Afghan refugees were also accepted by Pakistan. Even a few hundred political dissidents took refuge in Pakistan following the coup of 1973. But the refugee influx of the staggering dimension actually started with the April Revolution of 1978, and the situation changed radically further when Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in December, 1979. Within a few days of the Soviet forces arrival, the refugee figure soared to almost 400,000. The exodus continued unabated after that. The figure in 1990 stands at 3.2 million registered refugees; while over 0.5 million were unregistered. Of this, 778,526 were males, 854,629 were females, and 1,657,808 were children. There were about 450,000 unregistered refugees not living in camps.23 The year-wise build up of the Afghan Refugee population is as follows:

Year-wise Buildup of Afghan Refugee Population Date / Event Numbers July 1973: Sardar Daud’s coup d’ ‘etat A Few Hundred only April 1978: revolution 109,900 December 1979: Soviet Intervention 402,100 July 1980 Over 1, 000,000 May 1981 Over 2, 000,000 January 1982 Over 2, 500,000 December 1982 Over 2, 800,000 December 1985 Over 3, 000,000 January 1990 Over 3, 200,000 Unregistered Over 500,000 Total 3.7 Million The refugees were lodged in some 342 Refugee Tentage Villages (RTVs) located at a safe distance from the border as required by international law. The RTVs were scattered in the 24 districts and agencies of the Frontier and Baluchistan provinces and Mianwali district of the Punjab. Of the 3.3 million registered refugees the largest number2,243,365 was sustained by NWFP alone, while 850,636 were lodged in the province of Baluchistan province. To relieve pressure on the meager resources of NWFP, about 179,526 refugees were shifted to Mianwali district of Punjab.24

Location of Camps in NWFP, and Pashtun Areas of Baluchistan Areas

No. of Camps

No. of Refugees

Peshawar (1 & 2)

60

549,000

34

347,936

25

198,691

24

183,507

18

171,987

14

186,276

11

105,100

14

168,982

18

182,495

1

232,285

1

179,526

Kurram Bajaur N. Waziristan Chagi Gulistan Loralai Pishin Abbotabad Kohat Kot Chanpwa

Refugges Camp in NWFP Refugee Camps in the NWFP Settled Districts Camps by Districts

Total Pop.

Male

Female

Abbottabad: 18

143,495

22049

32884

88562

23952

Children Families

Bannu:

7

73748

15997

19250

38502

10655

Chitral:

3

38269

8762

12201

17306

6578

Dir:

10

89350

25487

16682

47181

15691

D. I. Khan: 11

87618

17976

24246

45396

12923

Kohat:

18

232385

58592

66007

107786

32234

9

71792

9032

14232

48528

10810

106648

22386

28029

56233

17994

Peshawar-I: 31 284890

79057

73670

132163

58284

Peshawar-II: 29

227928

56170

541192

117566

42231

14027

2468

4155

7444

2530

1370150

317976

345508

706666

233782

Mansehra: Mardan: 17

Swat: Total:

2 155

Refugee Camps in Tribal Agencies Camps by Agency

Total Pop.

Male

Female

Childre n

Families

Bajaur:

25

198612

47096

58544

92972

Kurram:

34

347746

97000

99690

151056

50785

Malakand:

3

55197

7646

14436

33115

7942

Mohmand:

2

15589

3354

4127

8108

2588

N. Waziristan: 24

183531

48257

43997

91277

26130

Orakzai:

2

13418

2693

4943

5782

1983

S. Waziristan: 6

57884

11895

14220

31769

9170

Total:

871977

217941

239957

414079

127146

2242127

535917

585465

1120745 360928

Total NWFP: 251

96

28575

Legal status of the Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: It may be noted that Pakistan is not a party to several basic International Refugees/Statelessness/Human rights instruments, including the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as amended by the 1967 New York Protocol; the 1954

Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the two 1966 International Covenants on Human Rights.25 The entry, stay and movement of foreigners, including asylum seekers and refugees, in Pakistan were regulated by the Foreigners Act No. XXXI of 1946, the Official Handbook on Refugee Management in Pakistan (1981), and two additional circulars of 1997 and February 2001.26 The Official Handbook on Refugee Management in Pakistan issued by Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees states: 1. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has granted asylum to Afghan nationals fleeing their country in the wake of political repression and occupation by foreign troops. The asylum has been granted entirely on humanitarian grounds and for reasons of cultural, ethnical and religious affinity. 2. This action has been taken in accordance with universally accepted principles & practices, the 1951 UN Convention relating to Refugees, supplemented by the Protocol of 1967 as well as the relevant provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Following steps may be taken to control the activities of refugees:· ·

They should be encouraged to stay united in their tribal/sub-tribal groups. Rival factions/tribes may be kept at different places. Keeping in view the security and political interests, a code of conduct should be prescribed which should be binding over the refugees and its violation may result in discontinuance of relief assistance and/or their expulsion back to Afghanistan.

· ·

·

Provincial Governments may impose any reasonable restriction on movement of refugees in tribal areas/settled districts as demanded by dictates of security. Afghan Refugees in general and their leaders in particular are not allowed to hold any press conference, issue statements or meet national or foreign journalists without permission. Fraternization between Refugees and foreigners in Pakistan is to be discouraged.27

One additional circular in 1979 provides that · · ·

Provisions of the Foreigners Act and rules pertaining to foreigners residing in Pakistan do not apply to Afghan refugees. During temporary stay all laws for local citizens apply to Afghan refugees. Movement outside the camp is considered as legitimate.28

Most of these rules and regulations were violated both by refugees, refugee parties and the ARC authorities alike, in one way or another. All arriving refugees from Afghanistan were constrained to become affiliated with one of the Afghan political groups or ‘Peshawar Seven’, by the Pakistan government and, more accurately, allowed a bias in favor of those who could best organize the cams. By carrying out relief work of various kinds, these parties could cultivate support among the refugees. In the formative phase of the Afghan imbroglio, Jama’at-e-Islami Pakistan and its affiliated organizations and institutions also had good access to the camps. The party’s presence with Islamic ideological objectives, and government policy of Islamization, and

Jehad mania facilitated the growth of Islamist groups among the refugees in the camps. All secret agencies of Pakistan and the Refugees Commissionarate openly favored Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, and particularly during the Commissionership of Mr. Abdullah, an ideologue of the Jama’at-e-Islami of Pakistan, a close liaison was established between secret agencies, the Jamaat, and the Hezb. Many camp officials provided easier registration for, and earlier assistance to individuals identified with Hekmatyar’s party. Licenses for trucks owned by the Afghan refugees were facilitated for those who joined the Hezb.29 Even UN monitored funds were regularly diverted to the Hezb, enabling it to gain more than its fair share of rations, tents and other relief aid. To please the Hezb and other hard-line parties, and also to ensure that any Afghan nationalist ideas were kept to a minimum, Pakistani government gave the Islamists a stronger voice in the educational program in the camps, and later on in the cross border transfer of educational materials and establishment of schools inside the war zone. Overall control in each camp was put in the hands of officials of the ARC, but in actual practice even this was one with the approval of the most favored political groups of the refugees. The maliks, mullahs and party commanders were involved to get people on the ration list and to offer other favors. Expected to get along with the ARC authorities, the maliks were more the choice of Pakistani officials than the refugees. The traditional elders were replaced in the camps with mullah and maliks handpicked by the ‘Peshawar Seven’ with the consent of Pakistani authorities. In this vicious circle of vested interests, the clerics gained increased respect in their role as deputies to the Mujahideen leadership. Often serving as intermediaries, they participated in carrying

unifying message of Islam and Jehad, and inspiring and consoling refugees and resistance fighters. The Islamic Ideological status of the Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Various arguments and counter arguments were put forward by the refugee leaders, parties and their Pakistani supporters to interpret the ‘Push and Pull factors’ of the migration. Some of the ideological and religious causes for the massive refugee concentration in Pakistan and Iran can be summarized as below: Much of the contemporary literature stressed that hijrat or migration is a fundamental phenomenon in Islam. Jehad (holy war) and hijrat (migration) are two Islamic concepts, which became absolute obligations at any historic juncture of an Islamic society, particularly when it falls under aggression by a foreign and an infidel power. The Holy Quran in many places teaches migration and considers it as a supreme devotion and sacrifice. It says in LIX, 8: “And (it is) for the poor fugitives who have been driven out from their homes and their belongings, who seek bounty from Allah and help Allah and His messenger. They are the loyal”.30 The code of Islam necessitates succor circumstances. Sura Anfal lays down the law as:

under

“Those who believed and left their homes and strove for the cause of Allah, and those who took them in and helped them-these are the believers in truth. For them is pardon, and a bountiful provision”31

such

The verse ‘Yuhajiro Fi Sabilillah’ (Do migrate for the sake of God) is repeated many times in the Holy Quran. The Holy Prophet of Islam (PBUH) was forced by his enemies to migrate from Makkah to Madina where he was later joined by most of his followers. Being Muslims, the people of Afghanistan began to seek refuge parallel with the rise of the communist system in their homeland. The imposition of an alien Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Sovietization process, introduction of unpopular reforms and attempts to de-Afghanize some aspects of social, educational and political life and cultural institutions and political victimization of opponents and even neutral by the PDPA regime were some of the causes of the unprecedented migration of the Afghans. There was also an impression during those days that Moscow had embarked upon an open policy of forcing people to flee and depopulate the countryside. Louis Dupree, an eminent specialist, described this policy on Afghanistan as a “policy of migratory genocide”.32 This policy forced different segments of the Afghan population to seek refuge in neighboring countries. A constant process of desertion and defection and an increase in the human toll aggravated the situation further. The PDPA regime resorted to indiscriminate conscription of the youth for compulsory army service. The frustrated Afghan youth had no choice but to flee the country. In Pakistan, those refugees who arrived early on considered themselves to be ideologically superior and more dedicated Muslims than those who migrated later. Even the treatment of the refugee leaders and political parties towards the new refugees was discriminatory. The newcomers were labeled

with different accusations, for instance Khalqi, Parachmi, opportunists, secular etc. for this part the later arrivals, on the other hand, accused the leaders as agents of the secret agencies of Pakistan and the West. NGOs and the Afghan Refugee: The concept of non-governmental organizations got its roots in the NWFP during the Afghan crisis, and the influx of refugees which resulted. These Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) or NGOs together with International agencies were permitted by the Pakistani government to work among the refugees. The Official Handbook on Refugee Management in Pakistan (1980) describes the PVOs in chapter 11 as follows: 1.

2.

3.

Significant sources of relief assistance are the private voluntary organizations both within and outside Pakistan. Acceptance of such assistance is based purely on humanitarian grounds and must be devoid of any political, social or religious strings or conditions. International Voluntary organizations are forbidden to approach the provincial government directly with offers of aid. All such requests are to be made to the Federal Government (States & Frontier Regions Division) who would process such offers in the normal manner. Likewise provincial Government must also direct the PVOs to the Federal Government for acceptance or otherwise of relief assistance. It is the policy of the Government not to accept any expatriates to work in the Refugee Tentage Villages except

4.

5.

6.

7. a: b: c: d: e:

for essential administrative staff for coordination and overall control. The operation of PVOs is to be restricted to non-sensitive /settled areas of both the provinces and subject to any other conditions that the Federal Government may consider expedient to impose on such PVOs. Direct distribution of relief goods by representatives of PVOs to Afghan Refugees is forbidden. All such relief goods must be channeled through recognized government agencies. However, donors may be present at the time of distribution if they so desire. Supervision/monitoring of relief work by the expatriate donors in the sensitive areas of NWFP and Baluchistan may be undertaken only with permission of the government. Other factors affecting acceptance of offers from the PVOs are: They may operate only in the areas and to the extent agreed to by the Federal Government. Overall coordination amongst different PVOs is the responsibility of the Federal Government. Field visits of expatriate are to be undertaken strictly in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed to mutually between the government/PVOs. Recruitment of Pakistani staff for field work is to be done through the Federal/ Provincial Governments, as applicable. Procurement of relief goods available within the country must be done through local trade/industry. 33

It was in June, 1980 that Zia government restricted their activities especially in the tribal areas. However the International Rescue Committee was allowed to set-up a medical program in the refugee camps. Some religious parties and Arab associations in Pakistan were trying to convince government officials that Western volunteer organizations were engaged in Christian missionary activities or that they were communist.34 Foreigners faced long delays in obtaining official permission from Pakistani authorities to work for PVOs and many did so illegally on tourist visas. The officials in NWFP were more cooperative as compared to Islamabad. The Pakistani army, police and refugee administration, often in connivance with members of Afghan resistance parties were reported to be operating scams to sell relief supplies, weapons and favors.35 During 1980-83, Mr. Abdullah, the Afghan Refugees Commissioner (NWFP), was also discouraging foreign NGOs to work in the refugee camps. But for various reasons and due to internal and external pressure in 1983 round about seventeen PVOs were registered. By the end of decade, 75 foreign organizations (45 from Europe and 14 from North America) maintained offices in Pakistan and were engaged with the refugees. The UN-related projects and NGOs provided employment to 6000 local people.36 There were 51 unregistered Pakistani, Afghan and Arab NGOs alone, wile as many as 136 groups were working in Peshawar with different aims and objectives.37 Almost all refugee parties in Peshawar were patronized by the NGOs, who for their part employed party members and sympathizers in efforts either to find out their secrets or to carry out their own missions. Even the educated elite and liberal Afghans were employed by the NGOs, and for the time being this trend arrested for the brain drain from

Peshawar. Some of the NGOs were publishing anti-Soviet and anti-Communist literature in Pashtu, Dari, English, Urdu, Arabic and Russian. A very large number of anti-Communist books and articles were translated in Pashto and Dari for the Afghans in Pakistan. The US Information Centre (USIS) in Peshawar was in close liaison with almost all Afghan NGOs. Most of the Afghan NGOs had their own publications in local languages as well as in English. Some of the Afghan NGOs in Peshawar, for instance the Writers Union Free Afghanistan (WUFA),and, later on, the Afghanistan Study Centre (ASC) and Afghan Information Centre (AIC) Peshawar, produced some quality journals and newspapers in Pashto, Dari and English, and even produced to some extent unbiased literature on Afghanistan and Afghan problem and issue. The NGOs and PVOs of the Middle Eastern countries working in NWFP, under various names and in various fields, were all involved in creating a jehadi culture, Arabization, and spreading Wahabism among the refugees, and eventually these germs penetrated to different parts of Afghanistan. The Afghan Refugees Educational System: Initially ARC in collaboration with UNHCR, launched a comprehensive program for education (or in other words indoctrination) of the children of the Afghan refugees. An Educational Cell headed by the additional Commissioner of the Afghan Refugees was responsible for managing the education program. Besides UNHCR other NGOs involved in the education of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan were: Swiss Aid for Afghans Okenden International

14 schools 84 schools

IRC Secondary Education GTZ Schools IRC Home Schools IRC Female Schools Education Cell Afghan Institute for Learning GTZ Home School SAVE USA UNHCR

3 schools 49 schools 49 schools 30 schools 81 schools 5 schools 9 schools 48 schools 2000 schools38

There were four types of educational institutions for Afghan refugees: 1: Camp Schools & Madrasas (Religious Seminaries): These schools were run by the Education Cell of the ARC along with UNHCR. By December 1983, the total number of primary schools in this category for boys was 438. By May 2003, the total number schools for boys and girls were 102. The syllabus was introduced by Pakistan with more stress on religious indoctrination, and not with national aspirations of the Afghans. 2: Maktabs (schools) and Madrasas (seminaries) run by the Afghan Refugees Political Parties: These were of two types: (a) Modern schools with modern sciences and religion. (b) Shariat or religious schools. The Following were some of the religious institutions established by refugee parties:

1: Madrasa Hijrat aw Jehad (Seminary of Migration and Holy War) 2: Dawat wa Jehad Pohentoon (University of Islamic Propagation & Holy war) 3: Madrasa Abu Hanifa. 4: Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani School. 5: Darul Hufaz Madrasa (for memorization of Holy Quran). 6: Ahmad Shah Abdali Pohentoon. 7: Islami Pohentoon. 8: Uminatul Mumineen for females. 39 3: Pakistani Schools & Madrasas for Afghan Refugees: Special seats were reserved for Afghan Refugees in almost all educational institutions of NWFP. Some of the seats reserved in the professional colleges were as follow: Medical colleges : Engineering colleges: Other colleges : Other schools : Islamic University, Islamabad: Vocational training Centers for boys: Technicians in the Community Centers: Carpet weaving Centers :

51 31 146 340 78 5 150 13

seats seats seats seats seats seats seats seats

There was tremendous increase in the local Pakistani private schools with Islamic and Arabic names in the Peshawar District of NWFP. In 1976, the total Private registered schools in Peshawar district was only 45, while in 1978 the figure reached 73 and in 1980 the total was 97. But the unregimented private schools were in hundreds. Some of Islamic and Arabic names of the private

schools includes: the Hira Academy, the Safa Academy, Albadar Public School, Al-Falah Public School, Almaaz Public School, Alsafwaan Childern Centre, Iqra Childern Academy, Islamia School, Qurtaba Public School, Rauzatul Athfaal Academy, Seena Public School, Al-Asar Childern Academy etc.40 The Islamic nature of the Afghan resistance highlighted the close relationship of religion and politics and encouraged both local and refugees in the province by establishing approximately one thousand Islamic Madrasas and Dar-ul-Ulum with the aid of Middle Eastern countries to provide ideological base for the Afghan Jehad. The Frontier Post (Peshawar) reported on July 17, 1992 reported that Rs.15, 969 million had been distributed amongst the 42 Deeni Madaris alone, in the period from 1984-85 to 1990-91 out of the Provincial Auqaf Fund. Most of the Arab donors injected the sectarian ideologies in the refugees through these religious institutions only to gain their own ends. In all Pakistani educational institutions, Pakistan Studies and Islamiyat were introduced as compulsory subjects to make the young generation more Islamic and Pakistani and ‘to defend the ideological frontiers’ of Pakistan. 4:

Educational Institution Organizations:

established

by

Voluntary

The Idara Ahyah-ul–Ulum /Jama’at-e-Islami Pakistan Schools numbered 425. The Ahyah-ul–Ulum/Jaamat-e-Islami distributed 950,000 copies of the Holy Quran and other literature of the Ikwan al-Muslimin in the refugee camps.41 In general, three types of text books were published under the Afghan refugee Educational Curriculum:

1. Text books published by the fundamentalist parties, which were highest in number and distribution. 2. Text books published by the Afghan Refugees Commissionerate with the assistance of UNHCR. 3. Text books published by NGOs According to investigative reports for the Washington Post, over the past 20 years the US has spent million of dollars producing fanatical schoolbooks, which were then distributed in Afghanistan. These books were developed in the early 1980s under a USAID grant to University of Nebraska-Omaha and its Center for Afghanistan Studies. “The primers, which were filled with talk of Jehad and featured drawings of guns, bullets, soldiers and mines, have served since then as the Afghan school system’s core curriculum. Even the Taliban used the American-produced books, though the radical movement scratched out human faces in keeping with its strict fundamentalist code.” According to the Post, these violent Islamist schoolbooks, which “served...as the Afghan school system’s core curriculum” produced “unintended consequences.”42 The books had unnecessary material and were not written with the purpose of education in mind but rather were designed for ideological propaganda. At the primary level the material in the mathematics books was such: If out of 10 atheists, 5 were killed by 1 Muslim, 5 would be left. 5 guns + 5 guns = 10 guns 15 bullets - 10 bullets = 5 bullets, etc. Generally all these books were written with the purpose of keeping children away from normal life activity and developments.

The text books of Dari and Pashtu start with Hamd (poems in praise of God) and Naat (poems in praise of Prophet Muhammad SAW) and end with the Four orthodox Caliphs and their biographies, also mentioning Mujahid, guns, bullets, atheism, martyred and ghazi.43 Even the books of organic Chemistry and Zoology were more of the subjects of Islamic studies than they were toward science. Text books provided by NGOs were also much more suitable for Madrasas (religious schools) than normal schools. The text book of history for class three published by ARC mentioned in its chapter on world history, the story of the Ark of Hazrat Noah (A.S) and the story of Habil and Qabil and it recounted the history of Afghanistan as: Afghanistan is an Islamic country. The people of Afghanistan started believing in Islam about 1400 years back during the times of Hazrat Usman. And it is due to the blessings of Islam that the people of the country live peacefully since then. So in the light of Quran and the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) we must strive for the protection and development of our religion and country till the end days, and must follow it to the last of our lives.44 With the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan, new books were published with out pictures of living beings. The basic idea was that the picture of any living thing will ask for a spirit in the next world and photos/pictures of living beings are haram (forbidden). In the Dari books of the primary classes which again have been at the centre of these attacks, the letter “dal” (d) is explained with the word “dihqan” (peasant) and a picture of headless peasant working

in the field along with headless bull; the daughter brining food for his father was also headless.45 Ideological Literature of PDPA and Afghan Refugees: The PDPA regime in Afghanistan produced ideological propaganda literature in Pashto with notions of ‘class Struggle’, nationalism and internationalism. The novels and stories of Noor Muhammad Taraki (the head of new regime and an eminent Pashtu writer in his own right) were republished and distributed free on both sides of the Durand Line. The Kabul regime also tried to establish ‘Khalq’ party in the tribal area and made close contacts with the Mazadoor-Kissan (Worker and Peasant) Party of NWFP.46 Along with these links, the fact of the settlement of Afghan refugees in the Frontier also contributed a great deal to the Pashto literature and journalism. A major achievement was made in the field of common Pashto script. It was due to Afghan crisis that Pashto service was started from BBC and VOA. Besides few Pashto dailies, there were weeklies and numerous periodicals published by both local and refugees organizations. During these years more than 2500 books in Pashtu and Dari as well as a large number of anti-Soviet propaganda material, had been published by different organizations and institutions in Lower Pashtunkhwa i.e. the NWFP & Pashtun area of Baluchistan. 47 From calligraphy to art, and from handicrafts to Pashto music all improved and changed the style due to the arrival of Afghan artists, singers and musicians. With the arrival of refugees, the Pashto film industry and video-audio business increased many-fold. In short, if the Afghan war politically damaged the cause of Pashtun political nationalism in Pashtunkhwa for the time

being, it accelerated and regenerated the cultural nationalism, which will prove more effective than politics in future.

One Page from Jehadi Book

1

20

Some major characteristics of the Afghan Refugee Literature: · · ·

Most of the literature was ideological- Socialist or Islamic. Ideological polarization was at peak on both sides of the Durand line. Children were trained & indoctrinated in their narrow ideological parameters of Islamic fundamentalism & sectarianism and not Afghan/ Pashtun nationalism.

· · ·

Schools up to university level were opened which were devoted to the Jehad & resistance. Curriculum was war oriented, i.e. 2+2 = 4 Guns Kalashnikov & Heroin culture developed and given a boost.

There were other 11 independent organizations of the Afghans in Peshawar producing anti-Soviet literature and some translations from old history books etc. During this period, 129 books in Pashto were produced for Jehad and resistance containing themes of Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, Jehad, revolution and resistance.

Afghan Kids & Kalashnikovs

1

23

Children of War or War Generation: Inqilabi (revolutionary) and Jehadi (Holy Warriors): At the height of migration in the 1980s, children constituted nearly 50 percent 48 of the total Afghan refugee population in terms of numbers and it was estimated that 90 percent of the refugees were from rural areas. It was tragic and unfortunate that schools and all other educational institutions were used by both ideological regimes of Kabul and Islamabad in the 1980s and 1990s as bases for recruitment of youth for the war. In fact one of the reasons why youth and adults alike left Afghanistan was fear of conscription by any one of the groups, whether they were PDPA or Mujahideen. This had adverse effects on the minds of the youth, effects which pervades even to this day. All objectives related to the development of the individual were superseded by new objectives to wage war against each other. For instance, Hikmatyar’s Hezb-eIslami recruited members from where tribal structures have broken down or which were characterized by a mixture of groups from different tribes. The boys who grew up in refugee camps did not represent any existing social group inside Afghanistan. Thus refugee parties were depending on the revolutionary Islamic schools in refugee camps of Pakistan for their recruits. Among the ‘Peshawar Seven’ parties, the Hezb of Hikmatyar in particular gained access to these camps and built a network of schools with the aim of recruiting refugee youth for the front.49 On the other hand, the key source of recruitment within Afghanistan for troops to fight against Jehadis was the government tribal boarding schools in Kabul, which taught an official ideology different from that of the popular culture.

It is also very bizarre that both armies were funded by foreign sources running into billions of US dollars and Russian rubles and whatever the country could export at that time. The after-effect of these wars was that the education of the country (both of Afghanistan proper and that of the Afghan refugee) suffered not only in terms of destruction of educational institutions but also orchestration of social evils in the minds of the children, spiriting corruption and turning their attention to ‘Jehads’ for solving political problems. Education in the camps was directed at developing skills and attitudes needed to fight Jehad. The whole curriculum was directed at achieving these objectives which remain unchanged to date. This is a major flaw in the education of Afghan refugees, who could have otherwise have played a far more constructive role in bringing about positive changes in the curriculum of schools in the refugee camps. 50 Thus the two groups, one supported the Soviets and the other opposed their invasion, fell victim, through their struggles, to a catastrophic idealism: two types of fundamentalism i.e. Marxism/Leninism on the one hand and Islamic radicalism on the other. As a result, a large number of those who were fortunate to escape took the cause to the lands where they found refuge, while considerable number of anti-PDPA regime conservatives were killed and imprisoned. The progressive elements faced the same fate during the Mujahideen government. One could also see a similar phenomenon at work during the same periods in the refugee camps in Pakistan. Here schools in the refugee camps were used as centres to build up support to the cause of the resistance groups of the Mujahideen in the same way as the communists did inside Afghan schools to propagate their

ideology. The inclusion of the concept of Jehad in the school curriculum linked to the University of Nebraska, Omaha, USA is clear example of this trend. Both strategies combined to bring about a disaster, unprecedented in Afghan history, vis-à-vis the development of education in the country, aggravating the culture of war and resulting in avalanche of refugees. In this debacle, USA cannot absolve itself from the past sins of creating extremists, fundamentalists and Ben Ladens. 51 With the assistance of Pakistan Jehadi refugees parties had 250 schools with 43,000 students and a staff of 15,600 teachers and administrators. The graduates of these schools formed the core of Hekmatyar’s force. Most of the Hezb leadership was a product of modern education received from Afghan universities. It is very strange and pathetic to note that all these products of the education and schools of the Afghans fought each other to destroy their own nation.52 On the other hand, a number of private schools were established and the number seems to be multiplying quickly, especially in the cities of Peshawar, Quetta and Islamabad. Although Islamabad had no refugee camps, nearly 30 private schools were functioning for Afghan children in that city, which an indicator to the number of refugees living outside the camps. This is also a reflection of the quality of life of the refugees since they have to pay for the education of their children in these private schools. In addition, Afghans who were not in the refugee camps attended local Pakistani public and private schools. The daily Frontier Post, Peshawar, has revealed that the Afghan refugees have acquired a deep acumen in English reading, writing and speaking skills through a large numbers of English Learning Centres established in rented

houses. The Afghans were interested in learning English language for seeking employment in the NGOs or for going abroad; psychological reasons are also listed as a cause for this interest. Thus, both in the camps and outside the level of interest and participation of the students in education has been much higher than those inside Afghanistan.53 It is also of interest to note that children in schools inside Afghanistan were following the traditional forms of learning and that the number of schools decreased or in a situation of no growth in all regions, whether controlled by the PDPA regime or Mujahideen. But educational opportunities on modern lines for the refugee children increased and widened in NWFP. These included access to education in Computer Technology, English, Business Management and other skills-development education. Furthermore accessibility of education for both sexes at all levels was another advantage the refugees enjoyed, with both positive and negative impact on their attitudes. For many Afghan women, life in exile opened new horizons through contacts with people and things previously unknown in Afghanistan. 54 Life in Pakistan virtually opened up the world of knowledge to most of the refugees and now after the Bonn Conference, the Pakistani generation of the Afghans is playing a constructive role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 55 Even though all children of refugees may not (or cannot) avail of these opportunities, their awareness of the role of education, and an importance granted to education for both sexes has exerted a great-influence and motivation in developing positive attitudes for behavioral change amongst the adults.

Initially, funding for education from UNHCR was confined to the camps, and limited to the primary cycle. However, since 1999, UNHCR has provided nearly US $ 100,000 to the Afghan University, established in Peshawar. On the other hand, over the last few years funding for refugees, currently amounting to around US $ 700,000 (of which a particular large amount came from the government of Japan),56 has declined, affecting the education programs. Militant Camaraderie: To provide new recruits to the ‘Jehad’ fronts and for religious indoctrination ‘Pakistan ideology’ was reinterpreted by explaining the new role of Pakistan army: “The Army’s role is not only limited to defend Pakistan’s geographical boundaries but rather to defend ideological frontier of the country as well”. Ziaul Haq in his Islamization drive granted concessions to Madrassa and religious institutions by taking following steps: 1. The degrees and certificates of religious schools and seminaries were made equivalent to secular institutions. 2. Islamic studies and Pakistan studies were made compulsory and introduced at all level in schools and colleges. 3. The students of religious seminaries were given the same concessions in the tickets [for journey in buses] as for the other students of the secular institutions. 4. Mosque primary schools were opened. It should be noted that in such backward areas like Malakand there were 141 mosque schools and 50 Madrasas during 1981-91. In six Madrasas out of 900 students round about 300 were Afghan refugees.57

5. All government employees were bound to pray during office time. Zia’s Islamization drive did increase the Islamic content in all courses. In 1988, the Federal Ministry of Education (Pakistan) elicited the opinions of citizens about the changes to be made in educational policies. A large number of people suggested more Islamization and more inculcation of nationalism, and some advocated military training. Among the more radical views were: · ·

Music should not be taught in schools as a subject. Only Muslim teachers should be appointed at least up to secondary level. · Anti-Islamic teachers should be expelled from colleges. · Lady teachers should not be allowed to have their hair cut. · Islamic studies, Pakistan studies, economic, and military training should be compulsory subjects at college level. · The concept of ‘Jehad’ should be given more emphasis in books of Islamiyat. · Teachers should be disallowed to speak against Pakistan ideology in the classroom. 58 The overall effect of Zia dictatorial regime’s education and other policies was that: 1. they revived religious symbolism and lent legitimacy to religious groups; 2. they gave a new status to religious schools; which were allowed to award degrees; 3. and they provided funding to these schools. Thus, the religious groups made a transition from the periphery to the mainstream in education and politics. In short, an articulate

section of the middle class, probably brought up on ideological school courses supported an ideology which used religion to create Pakistani nationalism and militarism in the society. Though war is not ‘biological necessity’ as conceived by many, in the case of Afghanistan it became a necessity of many if not of all. Internal and external secret agencies created and propagated war mongering in the name of Inqilab (revolution), Jehad and even peace (in case of Taliban). In such a conducive Islamic religio-ideological atmosphere, life in Pakistan led to a militarization of children, particularly rural refugee children of the camps. Ideological training of the refugee children in schools and Madrasas created a new militant political culture among the refugees, one which was more suited to war than to peace. It was reported that “the Khudam-ud-Deen Madrasa is training students from Burma, Nepal, Chechnya, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Yemen, Mongolia and Kuwait. Out of 700 students at the Madrasa, 127 are foreigners”. Nearly half the student’s body at Darul Uloom Haqaniyah in Akora Khattak was from Afghanistan and some from Central Asia. It was reportedly expanding its capacity to house 500 foreign students.59 Apart from ‘refugee camp syndrome’ economic hardships, non-education culture, medical problems leading to psychological problems among the Afghan refugee children. Most of the Afghan kids have no idea about society or what their role in it is. They are only trained to fight and to kill. Commenting on the fallout of the Afghan war, the Afghan Youth Organization in Quetta reported: “The new generation is forgotten and their future is dark. Now the

two monsters of militarism and Mafia have opened their mouths to swallow them. They are forced to feed only by the means of war but the majority of the Afghan youth themselves wish to get education so that they should have a good standing in the new world order”.60

Qaumi Digest, Lahore, October, 1981: This portrait reflects the psyche of Pakistani press. 1

21

In this overall process, refugee children developed a war psyche. The following true story from a classroom in a refugee camp in Pakistan depicts the picture. The classroom was full of young Afghan boys armed with colored pencils and empty sheets of paper. They were told to draw

pictures about their future, so from their memories and dreams they began to depict the scenes they imagined. The expected images were revealed in form of airplane pilots, helicopter gunship pilots, Mujahideen with big guns etc. However, in the pile of papers, one had an image that was distinctly different from the others. It was a picture of bright flowers, some trees and a green garden. When the teacher began to talk with the children and looked through the pictures, he discovered that amid this room full of future fighters, mujahids, and pilots there was only one who would like to be a gardener. The question was asked. “How will you eat then and where will you get your food?” The answer came back; we have our rations.61 Rural populations have become somehow urbanized, in a sense, and urban populations had to give up a lot of advantages which they enjoyed in the cities, and accept restrictions enforced by the war. The future generation has been imposed with strange cultures and social life in the host countries and has adopted other’s cultures, languages and social aspects which they carried after repatriation and will carry to Afghanistan. This is another cause for further fragmentation in the future. A resolution which was adopted by an international hearing in Stockholm (1987) stated that “the children of Afghanistan are the forgotten ones in a war that has by and large been ignored. And yet, they are not only the principal victims, but also the future of the country…Their physical wounds may perhaps heal within a year or so, the emotional and psychological trauma of the war will remain with the Afghans for generations”.62

In a nutshell, the Afghan war brought about the decline of the traditional elite (the Pashtun aristocracy of tribal origin) and the rise of a new elite: Islamist intellectual, mullahs, and small warlords inside Afghanistan on the one hand, neo-fundamentalists ‘new intellectuals’ among the emigrants to Pakistan on the otherall people who owe their emergence to the war and who, in some instances, have become ‘war entrepreneurs’, living from and by the war.63 The goods that circulate-arms, subsidies, humanitarian aidcome from abroad or from the government and are allocated for political reasons. Thus this network originates with a state: either the local capital or foreign powers. The new powers were made more secure by the internationalization of the war and of the distribution network. References and Notes 1

Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, The Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan(1917-79): An Appraisal, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1997,P. 372. Another major problem emerged from the partition of the British India was the migration of round about five million non-Muslims from Pakistan to India and round about six million Muslims migrated to Pakistan from India. The Muhajir elite (emigrated elite) with their own biases in the higher policy making institutions played a negative role by creating Hindu phobia and India phobia in Pakistan. The resulting mistrust and misunderstanding culminated into three Indo-Pakistan wars. Indo-Pakistan rivalry deeply involved Super Powers in South Asia during the Cold War era and the last gift of

the Cold War was in the form of nuclear proliferation in the Indian sub-continent and neo-fundamentalism in the form of Taliban in Afghanistan. 2

See for the two humiliating Anglo-Afghan treaties- Treaty of Gandamak of 1879 and the Durand Agreement of 1893 appendixA of this book. 3

Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan’s Security under Zia, 1977-1988, Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd, London, 1991, P. 34. 4

Ibid. pp. 26, 27

5

Ibid.

6

General Zia remained in power till his death. Earlier in February, 1985, a gradual return to democracy had brought Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo to power in the non-party elections and martial law was lifted in December, 1985. Prime Minister Junejo shared power with General Zia but was dismissed by the former in May, 1988. After Zia’s death Ghulam Ishaq Khan (the then Chairman of the Senate) became the President and in the elections of 1988, Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was able to make a comeback and Benazir became the Prime Minister in December, 1988. There were three sets of decision-makers in this decade. The first set was during the Martial Law government’s time (1977-80) when the army was totally in control of policy making in all matters of state. The second set was during the era of controlled democracy (1985-88) when General Zia and Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo shared power in a diarchycal political set up. The third set was when the PPP returned to Power

(1988-90) and power was being shared by the political triad (the Prime Minister, the Chief of Army Staff and the President). 7

Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan’s Politics: The Zia Years, Progressive Publishers Lahore, 1990, PP 116,127 8

Ibid, P. 125

9

Ijaz Khan & Nasreen Ghufran, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Regional Perspective: A Critique, Conference Proceedings, Organized jointly by Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar & Hanns Seidel Foundation Islamabad, 1011 May 1999, P.75 10

Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, “Pakistan’s Strategic role in the Afghan Crisis”, Pakistan, Journal of Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1993, no, 27 & 28, P. 37. 11

See for details Brigadier (Retired) Mohammad Yousaf, Silent Soldier: The Man behind Afghan Jehad, Jang Publishers Lahore, P and The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story, Jang Publishers Lahore, 1992, Brigadier (Retd) discussion with the author in Baragali. 12

Ibid.

13

Hussain Opcit, quoted interview with Lt: General (Retd) Hameed Gul, pp. 125-7. 14

Frederic Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict: 1979-1985, Oxford University Press, 2003, P. 80 15

The three officers were: Sher Muhammad Khan, Sher Zaman Ghamzhan (later on Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai) and Syed Fida Yunis.

The office of ARC was in the Chief Minister office as there was no CM and it worked under Governor through Chief Secretary. Discussion with Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai in Pearl Castle Gust House, Peshawar, 18 August, 2004. 16

See Official Hand Book on Refugee Management in Pakistan 1981, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1981, pp.9-12; See also The daily Muslim, Islamabad, June 22, 1983. 17

Ibid. P.20.

18

Dilshad Khan, The Afghan Refugees in NWFP, Unpublished MA thesis, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1984, P.38 19

Marvin G. Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Resistance and Reconstruction, West view Press, Inc, USA, 1994, pp. 54-55. 20

Dilshad Khan Opcit, P. 29

21

Report of UNHCR, sub-office Peshawar, Protection Section, April, 14-18, 2003, P.6. 22

In 1961, Pak-Afghan relations deteriorated over infighting between Khan of Khar and Nawab of Dir, resulting in armed clashes between Afghan and Pakistan’s border forces. The result was the closure of the diplomatic Mission of Pakistan in Afghanistan in August 1961, followed by Kabul’s decision in September 1961 to sever diplomatic relations with Pakistan and closing the border to all traffic between the two countries. The border remained closed for almost two years to all traffic in both directions and diplomatic relations also remained severed. For more details cf. Marwat, Evolution, P. 296.

23

Defence Journal, Karachi, Vol. IX, 1983, P. 7.

24

Ibid. P. 7.

25

Christos Theodoropoulos, “The Development of Refugee Law in Pakistan”, International Human Rights Perspective, Vol. II, No. I, Human Rights Studies Centre, Faculty of Law, University of Peshawar, January, 2003, pp 43; See also Report of UNHCR, suboffice Peshawar, Protection Section, April,14-18, 2003, P.6. 26

Ibid, P.6 Pakistani government Circular of February, 2001 states that “all Afghan national, without refugee cards/refugee permits issued by UNHCR/ CAR or without visas on their passports are considered as illegal immigrants and treated as per the Foreigners Act and Laws applicable to foreigners. 27

Official Handbook on Refugee Management in Pakistan (1981) issued by Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1981, pp. 6-8. 28

UNHCR, Norwegian Refugee Council Training, sub-office Peshawar, Protection Section, April,14-18, 2003, P.6. 29

Weinbaum Opcit, P.57, quoted from John Fullerton, “A rift among Rebels”, Far Eastern Economic Review, October 29, 1982, P.20 30

Marmaduke Pickthall, The Meaning of The Glorious Quran, Taj Company Ltd, Karachi, 1984, LIX: 8. 31

Ibid, VIII, P. 74.

32

WUFA, Vol: 6, No: 2, Peshawar, March-April, 1991

33

Official Handbook Opcit, pp 45-46.

34

Some of the NGOs, for instance SERVE and Shelter International were reportedly involved in missionary activities and there were reports that it succeeded in converting some poor refugees to Christianity. 35

Weinbaum Opcit, P. 59 quoted from Christian Science Monitor, September 7, 1988. 36 37

The daily Dawn, Karachi, May 13, 1989. The Herald, Karachi, March, 1993, P.84.

38

Record of Educational Divisional Officer, EDO, and Peshawar; See also Dilshad Khan Opcit. 39

Prof. Dr. Mohammad Rahim Elham & Dr. Michael Hirth, A Report of Afghan Refugees Islamic Marassa in the Timergara Area NWFP, Pakistan (A Pilot Study), serial no II, Basic Education for Afghan Refugees, Peshawar, 1994, pp. 12-13. Therein are cited figures of some 19 to 26 Madrasas in the Timergara area with students from 70 to 500 each had three goals: 1: The students of particular ethnic groups had to be educated, 2: Supported for their fight for the liberation of Afghanistan, 3: Those missionaries that were preaching the true Islamic rules and principles needed to be facilitated. These Madrasas were funded by Saudi Red Crescent, Lajnat AlQatar (LQO) and Afghan political Tanzimat or parties. The LQO for Orphans was an Islamic charity organization which started program for Afghanistan in 1991-92. LQO supported orphanages in the following areas:

Jalalabad city Afghanistan: 750 orphans. Chawki District, Afghanistan:: 150 orphans Munda Refugees Camp, Peshawar Kacha Gari Refugees Camp, Peshawar. 40

Defence Journal, Karachi, V0l xv: no: 8, 1989, P.84; See also list of Educational institutions established by GTZ/BEFARe (Primary Schools): Primary schools for boys

: 190

Primary schools for girls

: 75

Mixed schools (Co-education): 55 Total male students

: 82489

Total female students

: 29754

Middle and Secondary Schools funded by ARC Middle school for boys

: 64

Middle school for boys

: 15

Secondary school for boys

: 21

Secondary school for girls

: 02

Total male students

: 7447

Total female students

: 543

41

According to Dr.Sher Zaman Taizai these copies of the Holy Quran were printed in Saudi Arabia and provided by the CIA to Zia government for distributing what they called “subversive literature” in Central Asian Muslim States. See also the monthly Qaumi Digest, Lahore, October, 1981, P.147; the years 1980-1990 saw tremendous increase in the annual Ijtima or gathering of Tablighi Jammat in Raiwind its headquarter in Lahore. Surprisingly, a majority of the participants were from NWFP, FATA and Pashtun belt of Baluchistan. The membership of Jammat-e-Islami Pakistan also increased in this period. If the Tablighi Jammat was nourishing the people through its simple teachings, the Jammat-e-Islami provided ground for the middle and intellectual class with justification of Jehad and militancy in the anti-Soviet Jehad. 42

Washington Post, 23 March 2002.

43

All such available text books were studies by the author; See also speech of Fauzia Jehanian in a seminar of refugee school teachers in Peshawar on 2nd. November, 2002. 44 45

Ibid. Ibid.

46

Interview with Ajmal Khattak, dated December 7, 1989, Peshawar and discussion with Afrasiyab Khattak, the eminent intellectual, writer, politician and human rights activist. 47

The nationalist forces, which were either pro-Kabul or neutral, were sidelined by Zia regime, and Islamic fundamentalist forces were encouraged to ally themselves with the Afghan Mujahideen

in the name of Islam and Islamic brotherhood. Pashtu dailies, weeklies, periodicals and books were started from various places of NWFP. The writings of Pashtun refugees were anti-Soviet antiCommunism and pro-Mujahideen while the local Pashto publications were also ideologically pasted. But ironically, the Pashto literature produced during this period was more diversified in form and contents that at any other time previously. Some of the nationalist Pashtun refugees writers like Azizur-Rahman Ulfat, Bahuddin Majrooh were assassinated in Peshawar by unknown assailants and many others were forced to leave Pakistan. Although the government tried to use its entire force for suppressing Pashtun nationalism on both sides of the Durand line with its calls of Islam and Jehad, the nationalist, leftist and democratic forces tried to resist politically and in the literary circles as well, the government policies against peaceful resolution of the Afghan crisis. But neither Islamabad, nor Afghan Mujahideen were ready for political and peaceful resolution of the Afghan crisis. Among the positive fallout of the Afghan crisis was the cultural, economic and ideological commingling of Afghan/Pashtun with other nationalities of Pakistan. Among the negative fallouts one could underline the growing tendencies of mullahism, Extremism, militancy, sectarianism and drug mafia and the spreading of Kalashnikov culture in the entire country. Zia wanted to tame ‘disloyal’ writers whom he declared as ‘equivalent to water logging and salinity’ through the Academy of Letters (1979-88), but he failed to buy the conscience of the writers and turning it into

a tool of the government. CF. Appendix- B’s short biography of Noor Muhammad Taraki. 48

Dr. S.B. Ekanayake, Education in Doldrums Afghan Tragedy, 2000, P. 142 49

Ibid. P.157

50

Ibid. P 158

51

Ibid. P 156

52

Ibid. P.157

53

The daily Frontier Post, Peshawar, February 9, 1999.

54

Interview with Palwasha, Peshawar, 12 June, 1999.

55

Ekanayake Opcit, P. 162; In the Post Bonn Afghanistan, the more skilled and active lot of the youngsters is from Pakistan. 56

Ibid. P .162

57

Zafar Ali, Deeni Madaris of Malakand Agency, Unpublished MA thesis, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 19992001, pp.104, 107, 110, 119, 132, 143. In November 1994, in Islamic Madrasa of Maulvi Noor Muhammad in Wana, South Waziristan Agency, there were more than three hundred Central Asian students. Interview with Dr. Syed Wiqar Ali Shah Kaka Khel, Associate Professor, Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University of Islamabad, Peshawar, May 2nd, 2004 58

Dr. Tariq Rahman, Language, Education and Culture, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999, pp. 81-83.

59

Jessica Stern, Pakistan Jehad Culture, December, 2000, P.4; " Between 1980 and 1981, Haqqaniyah expenditures increased by an astonishing 107 per cent, most of which came from the Provincial Zakat Council funds, and the number of enrolled Afghan students increased from 37 per cent to 60 per cent. This was about the time that ideology and history was consciously rewritten. 'Al Haq', the monthly periodical of the Haqqaniyah Madrasa, made barely any mention of Jehad prior to 1979. The majority of articles dealt with various aspects of religious practice, with the occasional diatribe against the Shias. Come the Afghan War, and the magazine became a war reporting journal. Articles abounded on the primacy and necessity of Jehad, and on the noble exploits of the Mujahideen, often making allusions to the victories of the early battles of Islam. It resurrected long forgotten heroes of the struggle against colonialism, tying their struggles with the Jehad in Afghanistan. See an article “The Jihad industry” in the daily News, Islamabad, 21-3-2004. 60

Afghanistan Study Centre monthly Bulletin on Human Rights Violation in Afghanistan, Vol, No: 1, March, 1999, Peshawar, P.5 61

Nassim Jawad, “Role of the International Community in Future Afghanistan”, Defence Journal, Karachi, monthly, Urdu Bazaar Karachi, vol: xvii, no: 9, 1991. 62 63

Bulletin on Human Rights Opcit., P. 5

Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, I.B Tauris, London, 1994, P. 164.

59

Chapter– II

The Illusory ‘Peshawar Seven’ Tanzimat (Parties) “Some embraced martyrdom for the honor of the homeland; Others erected palaces on the blood of the martyrs”. (Pashtu Tappa)1 The April 1978 Revolution in Afghanistan ousted the Musahiban, or Yahya Khel, family and the traditional elite from power, liquidated the old Pashtun monarchy, and revolutionary leaders invited the Soviets for the defense of their fatherland, their Marxist-Leninist ideology and, above all, their own regime in power. The traditional forces of power (khans, maliks, and mullahs) were pushed to the wall not just by virtue of being ousted from the

60

corridors of power; an official campaign was launched against them in the government-controlled media, and various decrees were issued which aimed at curtailing their power and prestige. Even the neutral circles among the educated elite were compelled either to join the PDPA or face persecution. Naturally all these disgruntled elements including khans, maliks and mullahs were in search of new positions of power. When there was no chance to absorb themselves in the ruling PDPA or to live peacefully as a neutral entities, they had no option but to flee from Afghanistan to join the religious or secular right in various countries. The result was open defiance and rebellion by the masses; resistance and jehad for fourteen long years, with the sacrifice of one and a half million human souls; and the migration of one-sixth of its population from the country. Among the two Islamic Republics neighboring of Afghanistan, Iran was itself in a post-revolutionary turmoil with tremendous problems of its own. Its anti-US stance and revolutionary dogmas also limited the scope for the Western world and the pro-US Gulf States to help the new Iranian government address even the limited number of Afghan refugees who fled to that country. While the Mujahideen who took refuge in Iran remained more or less neutral, this was not so for those who took the road to Pakistan, another neighbor of Afghanistan. For the latter, exile soon became the surest path to resistance. Pakistan offered them shelter and the means to continue the struggle. It soon learnt to use them for its own ends.2

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The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was already planning to dismantle the Moscow-Delhi-Kabul triangle of the Cold War, and the military junta under General Zia-ul-Haq discovered the weakness of the Kabul regime with Pakistan’s strategy to hijack the entire Afghan anti-Soviet resistance movement. Just after few weeks of the Afghan Revolution, Zia reportedly suggested to the US President Jimmy Carter that he would destabilize the communist government, but Carter apparently refused. 3 Even Zbigniew Brzezinski, former NSA head, confessed in an interview with Le Nouvel Observateur (France) confessed that it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention… The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War. Indeed, for almost ten years, Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable by the government, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire.4 In this new anti-Soviet and anti-Kabul alliance, the Zia regime was supported by the US and almost all-religious and almost all of the religious and secular right wing in Pakistan. Those anti-Daud Afghan elements which were working under the pay of Pakistan and had been living in Pakistan in relative obscurity since 19735 were reorganized by ISI. The local anti-Kabul resistance took the form of anti-Soviet jehad, with the religious elite at the forefront.

62

Their services were hired both by the Islamic East and the Secular / Christian West. The cry of "Islam in danger" was raised, and the movement of ghaza and jehad was carried to the extreme. Initially, about four dozen factions and groups, under various names old and new and boasting a variety of flags and programs sprang up among the refugees in Pakistan. They could be divided into the following main categories: 1: Twenty religious oriented groups, covering the spectrum from conservatives / traditionalists to revolutionary Islamists. 2: Five national-democratic groups. 3: Eleven non-Moscow communists of varying shades.6 The leading role among the Afghan refugees was played by the following elements: a) The mullahs and pirs, who preached the necessity and the holiness of jehad. b) The maliks and khans, and minor tribal chiefs who consolidated their power in the jehad and founded local and tribal organizations. c) The Jamiat and the Hezb-e-Islami, with their various respective factions. d) Moderate organizations.

63

e) Other rightist and leftist groups and parties including the Afghan Millat and Maoists. f) Teachers and intellectuals with various organizations inside and out side the country.7 According to Olivier Roy, in the post-revolutionary scenario three different patterns emerged, which had characterized the history of the resistance parties throughout the war: ·

A number of loosely structured parties, made up of local fronts, corresponding to the segmentation of Afghan society and indicative of the rivalries of potential leaders and their followers; these multiple groups joined in a loose coalition. They were the so-called moderate parties.

·

A dominant party, which had renounced its quintessential character to absorb peoples who were not ideologically committed from the very beginning: this was Jamiat.

·

A very homogeneous party, of the Leninist type in organization (though not in ideology): this was the Hezb of Hekmatyar. 8

Almost all party leaders of the Afghans refugees in Pakistan tried to present themselves to be the only true Muslims, patriotic, as proPakistani, and as the real leaders of the Afghans; and they maligned the others with all imaginable misdeeds and evils. Afghan intellectuals, poets and writers have persistently deplored this state of affairs, because these people did not find any party responsive to their advice. The majority of these people ended up being frustrated

64

to the extent that they had to leave Pakistan for other countries. This brain drain, unwisely encouraged by the anti-Soviet bloc, deprived the Afghans' leadership of right thinking and guidance.9 Genuine lovers of freedom and other anti-Soviet elements in Pakistan were stressing the need for unity among the refugee organizations for realization of their common cause, but did so in vain. The first attempt of an alliance was made in 1978, when the fresh wave of refugees poured into Pakistan, including some religious scholars and leaders. The religious leaders forced Hezb-eIslami (HIA) and Jamiat-e-Islami (JIA), the only two old parties at that time, to coalesce. These parties had grown from the Jawanan-eMusalman (Young Muslims), backed by Jama’at-e-Islami of Pakistan, and were still claiming to be upholding the cause of Islamic brotherhood. The alliance of these parties was forged in August 1978, under the name of Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami-e- Afghanistan (HIIA) and was chaired by Maulvi Sakhi Dad Faez of the JIA, which was later challenged by Eng. Gulbadin Hekmatyar who suggested a "third person" for the post. Consequently, Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, one of the promoters, was chosen to replace Faez. However, Maulvi Mohammadi and his group of religious followers failed to administer the two component parties of the alliance, and it ultimately fell apart in January 1979. And HIIA became a new party under the leadership of Maulvi Muhammad Mohammadi. In September of 1979, the Jamiat-e-Islami, the HIIA and newly formed Jabha-e- Nejat-e-Mill-Afghanistan (JNMA) of Sibghatullah Mujaddedi agreed to form an alliance known as Paiman-Ittehad-e-Islami (a pledge to Islamic unity). A joint council

65

was elected to run the alliance, but for all practical purposes it also proved to be a paper-alliance as each component party maintained its own office and implemented its own program.10 On 27th November, 1979, Jehad was declared jointly by the resistance parties in Peshawar but no further details are available about who proclaimed the jehad. It should be noted that even from Islamic perspective it was not justified to declare jehad against PDPA regime, because the Soviets forces intervened later on in December. However, despite the fact that this activity took place before the Soviet intervention, already by this time the armed resistance in its own self-understanding was a jehad, though initially the PDPA regime was not entirely unsuccessful in labeling the rebels as ashrar (sinful) and basmach (bandit).11 An interesting account is given by S. Fida Yunis, former Charge d’ Affairs, Pakistan Embassy, Kabul (1981-92), and once an officer on special duty in Afghan Refugees Commissionrate, Peshawar in one of his books Afghanistan volume-II: On December 9, 1978, at the behest of Pakistan’s Foreign affairs (ministry) a meeting of the following Afghan [elders/leaders] was arranged at the residence of the author (Fida Yunis), behind Jabar Flats, Tehkal Bala, and Peshawar: 1: S. Mujaddadi, 2: G. Hekmatyar, 3: Dr. Bashir Zakria (an Afghan holding US nationality),

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4: B. Rabbani, 5: S. A E Gilani, 6: Maulvi Ghulam Nabi Khan Aamer, 7: Qazi Muhammad Amin Waqad, 8: Maulvi Nasrullah Ahmadzai of Paktia, 9: Shafiullah Muhammad of Kama, 10: Abdul Qader Bayan Khel Mullagori. The participants appreciating the need for unity, and a struggle against the communist Kabul regime; however, soon the atmosphere became charged when differences developed over the leadership of a united front and in the discussion every one started to accuse the other. The meeting was called off lest the situation went out of control. The second meeting was scheduled for December 11, 1978 but cancelled by the Foreign Ministry.12 S. Fida Yunis further commented that it was perhaps under pressure from Jama’at-e-Islami Pakistan and the ISI that the Foreign Ministry changed the decision, due to fear of losing its favorite, Hekmatyar, in the future overall leadership of a united front. Even on 5th December, 1978, the young members of the Hekmatyar group attacked the office of Rabbani and proclaimed Hekmatyar as the sole leader of the Afghan refugees.13

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When the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan on 27th December 1979 with a serious challenge to refugees, the PaimanIttehad-e-Islami just faded in the face of the rising threat, and fresh efforts toward unity in the ranks and files of refugee’s parties. In January 1980, all the major six parties started negotiations on unification. Hekmatyar backed out after 18-day round of players due to a dispute over the number of representatives in the proposed council. Other parties which signed the document of the alliance were: JIA, HIA of Maulvi Mohammad Yunus Khalis, HIIA of Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, JNMA of Mujaddedi and Mahaz- e-Milli-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan (MMIA) of Pir Syed Ahmad Effendi Gilani. The alliance was called Ittehad-e-Islamie-Afghanistan (IIA). Abdul Rasul Sayaf was elected its leader. However, Sayaf later changed his name to Abdul Rab Rasul Sayaf due to his adherence to the doctrine of Wahabis of Akhwan alMuslimeen. Because of this doctrinal difference, other leaders denounced the alliance. On paper, however, it remained, with a few offices and a number of office holders from each party.14 It was believed that these parties had been forced by the ‘donor agencies’ for unification against the atheist force of Communism. To properly expedite the resistance movement inside Afghanistan properly in an organized manner, Islamabad used the Afghan political structures already existing on their territory since the mid1970s. Saudi Arabia, the leading donor, had established direct contact with the refugee parties and even they openly distributed money among the refugee’s camps in Peshawar.15

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In February 1981, the HIIA, the JNMA and the MMIA formally denounced the IIA, and declared that they were considering another alliance. The IIA was, thus, reduced from an alliance to a party led by Abdul Rab Rasul Sayaf. Commenting on the making and breaking of alliances, a contemporary Afghan writer Azizur Rahman Ulfat tried to expose the tactics of selfish elements “who are out to sell their country and the nation for a mess of pottage” by publishing in 1981 a Pashtu document along with English translation signed by S. Ahmad Gillani, Maulvi Y. Khalis, S. Mujaddadi and Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi in a booklet. Following is the English translation of the document: “For the reasons that Ittehad-e-Islami Burai-Azadi Afghanistan under the Presidentship of honorable Sayaf within a period of one year, and in accordance with the manifesto which we agreed upon, this union did not only benefit each constituent member on the basis of its share from foreign aid, but also as Sayaf himself admitted has violated the manifesto of the union, and now the time has come for a new party to be brought into existence under his guidance. Such happening would bring shame and disgrace from the outside world to us. For these reasons we announce the dissolution of previous union or Ittehad and make an effort to bring a real new unity which would have a united leadership for the member’s parties. Also we expect that Mr. Sayaf would refrain from dishonesty

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and stay with us as a brother and clean himself by his accountability that he owes”.16 Commenting on misappropriation in the foreign fund for refugee and the lust of the party leaders for money and power, Azizur Rahman stated: “Unfortunately, the aid and assistance given to this leadership by Islamic and western institutions and governments, especially the Arabs, has not been spent properly, not even upto 20 percent of the total, for the holy war and for the benefit of refugees…50 percent is swallowed for the cause of Islamization, 30 percent goes to the bank account of so-called leaders. Those who had no donkeys in Afghanistan are now seen driving big cars in Pakistan. The dinning tables that belong to these leaders are full of luxury food and gains at the cost of blood of martyrs and leaving the majority of Afghan refugees in the lurch who are dying of hunger… The country is ours, the Afghans are making sacrifices for it but the decisions are taken by foreigners”.17 In those days, about 200 religious leaders from Afghanistan formed a jirga to put pressure on the parties to take a united course of action. Their 4-month struggles culminated into a declaration on September 16, 1981, by the following parties, on formation of an alliance in the name of Ittehad-e-Islami Mujahideen Afghanistan (Islamic Unity of Mujahideen of Afghanistan- IIMA): the JIA, the

70

HIA (H), the HIA (K), the HIIA (Mohammadi), the JNMA, and the MMIA. However, the MMIA, one of the initiators, stepped out. But the names of HIIA (Mansoor) and IIA of Sayaf were also not included. The Main differences among these parties were over the leadership, representation, weapons and funds. It was finally resolved to form a High Council with 10 members from each component party, and to give every party the chance of leadership in rotation. The order of priority was, however, not defined. The parties changed position and eventually there came into existence two alliances: (a) a 7-party alliance or IIMA comprising the HIA (H), the HIA (K), the JIA, and the IIA (these four parties were officially recognized); as well as the HIIA (Mansoor), the HIIA (Moezin), and JNMA (Mohammad Mir) (which were not officially recognized as parties); (b) a 3-party alliance or IIMA, comprising HIIA (Mohammadi), the JNMA (Mujaddidi), and the MMIA (all officially recognized) The Afghan resistance movement can broadly be classified into three categories. (1) The Peshawar-Based Seven. (2) The Tehran Based Eight, and18 (3) Those without a base outside Afghanistan.

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The Peshawar-Based Seven: Of these parties, the most influential and organized groups of the refugees were based in Pakistan, particularly in Peshawar. They were made up of almost all sections of the Afghan society, and included religious leaders, feudal landlords, members of several nationalist groups and former bureaucrats, disenchanted members of the PDPA, and deserters of the Afghan army; members of all these demographics were either in one group or another or were serving in NGOs. To restrict the growing number of the resistance groups, the Government of Pakistan imposed restrictions on them in early 1981, and officially allowed only six parties to function. The Ittehad -e- Islami was later included, which brought the number of recognized parties to seven. Most of their offices were located in Peshawar, and were often referred to as the Peshawar “Seven" or Haftganah. or ‘Peshawar Seven’ were: 1. Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan of Gul Baddin Hekmatyar 2. Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan of Maulvi Younas Khalis 3. Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan of Prof. Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani 4. Ittehad-e-Islami Afghanistan of Abdul Rabb Rasool Sayyaf 5. Mahaz-e-Millie-e-Islami Afghanistan of Syed Ahmad Gillani 6. Jabha-de-Nijat-e-Milli-e-Afghanistan of Prof. Sibghatullah Mujaddidi

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7. Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Afghanistan of Maulvi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi These Seven parties were chosen by Islamabad to form the political nucleus of the resistance. Of these the first four were fundamentalists while the remaining three were Islamic nationalists.

The Origin of Fundamentalist Parties: As the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan grew in strength, the rival Islamic movement, which was set up at Kabul University and in other educational institutions in the capital during the sixties, started preparing itself for armed struggle. In 1972, what had been an informal grouping of like minded intellectuals with a radical student wing adopted a formal structure, a secret constitution, and the name Jamiat-e-Islami, the society of Islam. After Daud’s coup in 1973, the movement's president, Burhan-ud Din Rabbani, offered Daud the support of the Islamic movement provided he would break away from his Communist comrades. Daud refused and arrested many Islamists. Rabbani, Hekmatyar, Ahmad Shah Masud, and about a dozen other leading Islamic radicals fled to Pakistan. In Peshawar they were trained by Frontier Corps Commander Nasirullah Babur with the consent of the Federal government.19 In the summer of 1975, the armed insurrections took place in several Afghan provinces but fizzled out for lack of mass support.20 The failure of the Islamic uprisings provoked an open rift in the existing Islamic movement. Though Hezb-e-Islami was founded by

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Rabbani, Hekmatyar and Maulvi Younas Khalis in 1978, later on differences cropped up among them and Hekmatyar organized a separate party under the same name Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan. Three of the main Peshawar leaders (Rabbani, Hekmatyar, and Khalis) came to head their own parties in this way. In spite of these splits, the original members of the Islamic movement were wellplaced to win themselves a mass following after the civil war began in earnest. By the end of 1980, through in an attempt to simplify and control the situation, Pakistan quietly delivered an ultimatum to the independent chieftains either to merge with the main Peshawar based parties, or lose Pakistan's military and financial support.21 Of all the Afghan resistance groups, the most important, and organized, fundamentalist party was the Hezb-e-Islami led by Hekmatyar.22 The Hezb had a highly organized network with separate offices for defence, cultural, political, financial and judicial affairs as well as a potent propaganda department. It had borrowed western scientific rationalism while utterly rejecting the western values. As a result, the Hezb, in some ways the most active of the seven resistance organizations in Peshawar had set up the best medical hospitals and schools.23 It also established schools for girls in Peshawar and Karachi and it was trying to destroy the traditional structure of Afghan society in order to replace it with an entirely new Islamic order. The secret system of the Hezb was very strong and it had extensive intelligence networks and used terror tactics to silence and intimidate their opponents.24 The Hezb also had close links with the Jammat-e-Islami in Pakistan and was the

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most favored group of Pakistan's officials and the government, though it displayed virulent public anti-American stance.25 The manifesto of the party mentioned Quran and Sunnah as the supreme source of Law, and also opposed co-education in educational institutions; and stressing on compulsory military training in all educational institutions. Hekmatyar had close associations with the Ikhwan-ul-Muslemeen (Muslim Brotherhood) and he utilized its international repute, financial assistance, and organizational know-how. The Egypt-based leader of Muslim Brotherhood, Umar Salasani, who visited Peshawar during the month of October 1982, remained in close contact with Hekmatyar and held several discussions with him. They visited several refugee camps at Warsak and other places. Other rival groups accuse Jama’at-e-Islami of Pakistan of interference in refugee affairs and of financial assistance of Hekmatyar group.26 Hekmatyar was reportedly inspired by Imam Khomeini and desired a Khomeinistyle Islamic revolution in Afghanistan. He had developed biases towards the Islamic nationalist groups and Pashtun nationalist groups. Most of his party members were students of theology, Afghan army personnel, tribal chefs and ex-Afghan Generals. The organization operates on many fronts throughout Afghanistan and more effectively in Kunar, Laghman, Ningrahar, Qanduz, Kabul, Paghman, Parwan and Kapisa. The Khroti, Safi, Shinwari, Khogiani and other tribes have links with Hekmatyar. About twenty thousand armed Mujahideen of Hezb-e-Islami were reportedly engaged in fighting the Russians inside Afghanistan.

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The party claims to have thirty thousand men readily available for action anywhere in the field.27 The second most important resistance party was Jamiat-eIslami, headed by Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani, a Tajik and the only non-Pashtun among the resistance leaders. The Jamiat was committed to a radical restructuring of all aspects of life in Afghanistan i.e. political, judicial, social, economic and educational in accordance with the Islamic laws and principles. It was generally referred to in the west as fundamentalist. Though, fundamentalist in nature, but its leadership is more liberal as compared to Hekmatyar for the implementation of Islamic laws. Rabbani is an appropriate symbol of his party's more moderate style. The supporters of the Jamiat are mostly Dari speaking Tajiks and to a lesser extent the Uzbeks of northern Afghanistan.28 Rabbani came to Pakistan in 1978 and formed a party along with Khalis and Hekmatyar but later on he left them and organized his own party, the Jamiat-e-Islami. Some of the reputed commanders in its ranks were Ismail Khan, Zabih Ullah and Ahmad Shah Masud. Rabbani enjoyed support in Panjsher Valley (Kapisa Province), in Badakhshan, Takhar, and Parwan Provinces; and he also had some influence in Kunar, Paktia and few other Pashto speaking provinces of Afghanistan. The part’s fighting strength was about twelve to thirteen thousands. 29 The Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (Khalis Group) was another fundamentalist party of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Younis Khalis got his preliminary education at various religious institutions in Afghanistan. Later he moved to NWFP for further

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education in religious institutions at Ghurghushti and at Darul Ulum Akora Khattak, Nowshera District. During the premiership of Sardar Daud he formed an organization called Hezb Tawabin against obscenity in Ningrahar and Kabul. This organization later started a weekly called Gaheez in 1968. The weekly published material to popularize Islamic values, and received help from Abul Aala-al Maudoodi, the chief of Jama’at-e-Islami, Pakistan. Following his differences with Hekmatyar, Y. Khalis set up his own organization in 1979 with the name of Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (Khalis Group). Despite the fact that the party’s ideology was not that different from that of others, Khalis was the most charismatic resistance leader, who holding court in the party offices, seated in a broken armchair surrounded by his lieutenants.30 The party manifesto opposed exploitation on regional and linguistic grounds and favored Islamic laws and an elected representative government through general elections. It also advocated segregation of male and female workers and professed the idea that the only solution to the Afghan crisis was military and not political. The Khalis group was based mainly in the southeastern provinces of Ningrahar and Paktia. The Ittehad-e-Islami led by Professor Abdul Rabb Rasool Sayyaf, who came to Pakistan in January 1980, was also a fundamentalist party. When he came to Pakistan, he stressed forging unity among the resistance leaders, succeeded in forming an alliance named Ittehad-e-Islami Afghanistan, and he was elected its president. The alliance, however, fell apart after a year and its component parties got separated, though Sayyaf continued

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to lead a group under the name of Ittehad-e-Islami.31 At the Islamic Foreign Minister's Conference held in May, 1980 in Islamabad, Sayyaf represented the five party alliances. The majority of members of his party were Pashtun from Paghman, Ningrahar and Paktia province of Afghanistan.32 The party published its daily called Ittehad-e-Islami.33 He had some influence in Kabul, Ningrahar and Paktya provinces of Afghanistan.

The Origin of Islamic Nationalist Parties: Among the Islamic nationalist parties Mahaz-e-Milli-e-Islami Afghanistan led by Sayed Ahmad Gailani (Effandi Agha) accommodated comparatively liberal, Islamic, and nationalist elements in Peshawar. S.A Gailani is the son of late Sayed Hasan Gailani (aka Naqib Sahib), a well-known spiritual leader of Surkh Rud, Ningrahar province. The family later on permanently settled in Kabul. Sayed Ahmad Gailani migrated to Pakistan in 1978, and formed Mahaz-e-Milli-e-Islami Afghanistan ((National Islamic Front of Afghanistan) with a black flag as his party emblem. This party possessed Islamic as well as nationalist characteristics and had close association with Zahir Shah (ex-Afghan Monarch) and was considered as pro-western in outlook. Pir Gailani was known as a liberal and perhaps the most secular of the Peshawar based resistance leaders. The party had a sizeable following in Paktya, Ghazni, Paktika and Kandahar provinces and also had some following in Ghazni and Wardak provinces. Zadrans, Mangal, Jaji, Ahmadzai, Tareen and Kochis (Powindahs) and other Pashtun tribes were affiliated with this group. The party chief had reportedly more than 80 thousand followers in Afghanistan but due

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to lack of arms and ammunition they had only about twenty thousand fighters in Afghanistan.34 The second important part Jubah-e-Nijat-e-Milli Afghanistan (Afghanistan National Liberation Front) led by Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, a Syed of Naqshbandi order After his early education at Kabul he got his Master’s Degrees in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence from Al-Azhar University, Egypt, in 1953. He worked as lecturer at Higher Institute for teachers training and the Institute of Higher Islamic learning, Kabul but was arrested in 1955 on the charges of abetting a coup against the regime. He organised a movement of ‘ulama under the name of Ulama-eMuhammad in 1970. He was reportedly the one who mobilised public opinion in Kabul in favour of Pakistan during 1971 IndoPak war. He came to Pakistan in 1978, and established Jubah-eNijat-e-Milli at Peshawar. He is a spiritual leader and a descendant of Mullah Shore Bazaar. Most of his party members were his spiritual disciples and intellectual personalities and some tribal chiefs. Like the NIFA, the Jabhah succeeded in attracting farmers, officers, doctors and other educated Afghans. It was the smallest of the Peshawar seven parties, but Mujaddedi was effective in dealing with both western and Islamic audiences and leaders.35 The party believed that sincere and true application of Islamic principles was the only way for the salvation of the Afghan nation. Its aim was to establish a peaceful society based on Islamic brotherhood, social justice and democracy. The party manifesto mentioned that political power belongs to people; therefore the party stated that it would not tolerate any person or any party which would falsely

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claim to be the sole custodians of national will, and that it emphatically opposed the re-establishment of any dictatorship. Mujaddedi was deadly opposed to Hekmatyar. The party had reportedly about 14 to 18 thousand fighters in the field.36 The third important Peshawar based party of the refugees was the Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami led Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. Muhammadi was a religious scholar and a teacher in Madarassa-e-Qila-e-Abbas, a religious seminary in Logar, Afghanistan. In 1969, he was elected a member of the Ulsi Jirga (lower house of Parliament) from Logar Province. He reportedly started a campaign against the Khalq, a mouthpiece of Khalq faction of PDPA Party, and also organised a procession of Ulama in 1972 at Masjid-e-Pull-Khasti in Kabul to register protest against the activities of Communist groups and the Russian influence. He migrated to Pakistan after the April 1978 upheaval. He invited the Ulama, students, ex-Afghan army officers and intellectuals to organise a party under the name of Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami Afghanistan at Quetta (Pakistan). Later on Hekmatyar and Khalis invited him to Peshawar and got him elected as the President of their alliance, but the alliance could not work for more than six months and its constituent parties got separated. The Harkat represented much of the spirit of traditional Afghans. It was a moderate party, religious and nationalistic in character. Most of its members were ulama or taliban (students of seminaries), tribal maliks (Chiefs) and ex-army personnel. The Harkat's leaders were often local mullahs. It lacked the Sufi background of other traditionalist parties but its authority also remains religious rather

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than territorial or political. This party had a strong support among the Pashtuns.37 The party program was to liberate their homeland from Soviet occupation, after which Martial Law would be imposed for six months to normalize the situation in the country such that parliamentary elections could be held in order to hand over power to the elected members of the people. Their party manifesto contemplated formation of a broad-based Islamic alliance, friendly relations with the Islamic World, introduction of an interest free banking system, agricultural reforms and the establishment of a true Islamic society. The party was deadly opposed to Hezb-eIslami (Hekmatyar Group) but extended cooperation to the Rabbani Group at various fronts across the border. The party had sufficient following in Logar, Ghazni, Kabul and Heart Provinces and also had some following in Paktia, Kandahar and Hilmand Provinces. This party had also said to have close links with Maulana Fazalur Rehman's Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) of Pakistan.38 The Islamic Nationalist groups including the Mujaddidi Group, the Effandi Group and the Muhammad Nabi Group, formed and alliance under the name of Ittehad-e-Islami Mujahideen Afghanistan (Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen) towards the end of 1981. The alliance office was situated in Peshawar city where the representatives of the component parties worked as a single unit. The alliance also prepared a flag as the symbol of their unity and co-ordinated their activities inside Pakistan as well as across the border. The alliance was composed of the following

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committees: (1) Supreme Advisory Council (Majlis-e-Shura), (2) Board of Directors (composed of party leaders), (3) Executive Council, (4) Secretariat of the Supreme Council and the Executive Council, (5) Political Bureau, (6) Military Bureau, (7) Cultural and Press Bureau, (8) Finance Committee, (9) Refugee Bureau, (10) Invitation and Management Bureau, (11) Judicial Bureau, (12) Security and Intelligence Supervisory Bureau, (13) Education Training and Propagation Bureau, (14) Health Bureau,(15) Administrative Bureau, (16) Legislative Bureau. The alliance publishes a weekly, called Afghan Jehad and some other leaflets to project their activities across the border. The alliance was also engaged in publishing literature in Russian language emanating from various pro-Afghan and Islamic Organisations in the Western countries.39

The Strength of the Peshawar Based Parties: One point was projected and debated both within and outside Pakistan about the disunity among the resistance parties. But to the close observer, first, this was all well planned, with a high degree of sophistication, by the secret agencies for more and more control over the resistance; and secondly, this diversity in the rank and file of the parties broadened the scope for all segments of the Afghan society to join the party of one’s own choice. Roughly, the total organized strength of the major fighting parties as reportedly claimed was about 73,000 organized cadre and 151,000 total following: o Hezb-e- Islami: 30000 Fighters & 67,500 Followers.

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o Harkat: 10,000 Fighters & 25,000 Followers. o Jamiat -e-Islami: 11,000 Fighters & 21,000 Followers. o Jabaha-e-Nijat-e-Milli: Followers. o Mahaz-e-Milli-e-Islami: Followers.

9,000 8,000

Fighters Fighters

&

15,000

&

15,000

o Hezb (Khalis group): 5,000 Fighters & 7,500 Followers.40

The Role of “Peshawar Seven” in Pakistan’s Strategic Scheme: Zia forced refugee leaders to join the alliance of Seven Parties, and the Director General of the ISI, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, made it a fundamental part of his strategy for the prosecution of the war. “He attached top priority to working with, and through, the Alliance.”41 It was through the alliance of political parties that ISI controlled the campaign effort. Under Akhtar’s leadership, support for the Jehad was gradually stepped up so that by the mid-1980s tens of thousand of tens of arms and ammunition were moved by the ISI to the Mujahideen via their party warehouses. Similarly, it is no longer any secret that tens of thousands of guerrillas, with their commanders, came to Pakistan for training. From 1980 until 1987, Pakistani Army teams from the ISI went to Afghanistan to advise and assist the Mujahideen in their operations. All resistance commanders in the field inside Afghanistan

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were required to join one of the Peshawar-based ‘Seven Tanzimat’ of the Afghans as it was only through the Afghan Tanzimat (Parties) that arms were distributed. Failure to join meant no weapons, which in turn led to loss of power and prestige in the field. Even among the ‘Peshawar Seven’ some were closer to the Pakistan’s establishment. Some 70 percent of the logistic support was given to the fundamentalist parties in total, but no single Tanzim got more than 20 percent.42 In 1987 the broad percentages allocated to the Parties were: Hekmatyar 18-20 per cent, Rabbani 18-19 per cent, Sayaf 17-18 per cent, Khalis 13-15 per cent, Nabi 13-15 per cent, Gailani 10-11 per cent, and Mujaddadi trailing with 3-5 per cent. Certainly the ‘fundamentalists’ came out on top with 67-73 per cent, much to the CIA's chagrin, but using strictly military criteria it could never have been otherwise. In the words of Brigadier (retired) Yousaf, “My critics were taking into account political considerations and biases which, as a soldier, I was fortunately able to ignore.”43

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Most Afghan experts, refugee leaders, and even the US believed that this was done for political reasons and by design; Yousaf, however, confessed with following arguments that: “We allocated arms to the parties on a basis of operational effectiveness, but as our critics claimed (including the US and CIA) on the basis of Islamic fundamentalism… A party got weapons allocated not on the basis of size or religious fervor but purely on operational efficiency. Did the party have an efficient internal distribution system? Did its commanders cooperate with others? In the field, or were there too many instances of feuding? Did their commander operate against critical strategic targets, or were they confined to areas of little importance or activity? And, above all, were their operations successful; did they kill the enemy or destroy his vehicles, aircraft or infrastructure? These were the sort of questions Akhtar and his ISI staff asked.”44 For the first six months in the Afghan proxy war, Pakistan was alone in tackling the issue. The US, China, Saudi Arabia and others came later on with cash or weapons. The ISI created special cell, the Afghan Bureau, for handling the supply, training, and operations of tens of thousands of Mujahideen who were at that stage completely disorganized, ill-equipped, ill-trained, and lacking in any form of coordinated strategic direction. In plain words the fate of the entire Afghan nation and three million

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refugees was decided by the Afghan Bureau of ISI, whose director was a Brigadier in Pakistan army? The ISI took following initiative to coordinate one of the largest guerrilla campaigns in modern times, with a staff of sixty officers and 300 senior NCOs and men from the Pakistan Army: 1: Training and arming the Mujahideen, 2: Planning their operations inside Afghanistan, and 3: Formulating and implementing a military strategy to defeat the communist Afghan Army and the Soviets. 4: ISI duties were military but it was directly involved in political decision-making.45 For the achievements of predetermined goals, the ISI took the following steps: 1: At the start emphasis was placed on the need to strengthen the Mujahideen along with Durand Line (the Pak-Afghan border). 2: This was partly a necessity for the Mujahideen for the easy distribution of supplies, and partly for the security of the Pakistan frontier region, which was slowly built up into the guerrilla’s main base of supply area. 3: As the war progressed, and the logistic flow increased, so activities deeper inside Afghanistan were stepped up into active operations were being conducted in all 29 provinces.

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4: Mujahideen commanders who were operating around Kabul got priority with regard to both training and heavy weapons. 5: In practice this latter meant 107mm rocket launchers- at first, the Chinese multi barrel variety, and later, the single barrel type which was (a Pakistani) improvisation, manufactured by the Chinese, to reduce weight. 6: ISI tactics were to train as many commanders as possible in stand-off rocket attacks, brief them as to the targets in the city, supply the weapons, and give them their missions. 7: The aim was to the year. The particularly the lifeline to the ambushing.

keep up the pressure on Kabul throughout airfield, roads leading into the city, Salang highway which was the Soviets Amu Darya, was subjected to frequent

8: Inside the city military and communist government targets were selected for rocket attacks, while acts of sabotage or assassination were undertaken against installations and individuals. Kabul was at the centre of Akhtar's strategy, but he also kept a close eye on the tactics we used to implement it.46

Logistic Support to ‘Peshawar Seven’: 1: The ISI from its own ordnance depots (of army) provided to the Afghan resistance some discarded. 303 rifles,

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ammunition, old British anti-tank mines, and some Chinese manufactured shoulder-fired rocket launchers. 2: It established lines of communication, a 'pipeline' to get the supplies to those who needed to use the items in Afghanistan. 3: The Afghan Bureau within ISI at first used to transport the arms forward by night, even closing down completely during daytime in the early days. 4: Gradually more and more individual Mujahideen commanders and parties found their way onto the supply list, and the system got off the ground in a makeshift fashion. Such was the start of a 'pipeline' that was eventually to expand to a capacity of 1000 tons per week by 1986. 5: Above all, control over the supply of arms gave Pakistan its most direct opportunity to mastermind the course of the entire war.47 Although Islamabad permitted weapons to flow through Pakistan, it placed a quantitative and qualitative limit on the consignments. For example that it must not exceed a certain caliber (14.5 mm for machine-guns and 82 mm for mortars) and a ceiling was even imposed on the degree of technological sophistication, which barred missiles, and other forms of the most up-to-date weapons. On the political level, Islamabad was obsessed with the fear that the resistance might develop in the same way as the

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Palestinian groups had done, enjoying the support of millions of refugees. It seemed to them that the best protection against this risk was a divided resistance. The Pakistanis granted the same facilities to each of the six/seven groups, and closed their eyes to the activities of the minor groups, which they did not recognize. It was thus the Pakistanis who ensured the continuance of the major spilt in the movement, at least until 1984.48 Islamabad’s action was not, however, restricted to controlling the refugees or their parties alone; they also tried to monitor the resistance inside Afghanistan. The best instrument for a systematic, orderly, and proper coordination between the Peshawar Seven, refugees and the armed commanders in the fields, was weapon and money. The ISI’s first step was to bring unity to all refugees parties in the form of the ‘Peshawar Seven’, and to coordinating their actions through arms and ammunitions and, to a lesser extent, information via satellite, which the Americans communicated to them.49 It is very interesting that the cold attitude of the Western countries towards the refugee parties in Pakistan changed only in 1979 with the direct intervention of the Red forces in Afghanistan. Instead of being ignored, they became necessary links between the resistance inside Afghanistan and the outside world and were adjudged to be an important trump card to be played against Moscow on the international stage. Only two things counted: the war on the ground and diplomacy on the table. The West, which had a purely pragmatic attitude towards the parties, was not interested in their structure, their social bases or their ideology, and

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because of this their hopes failed to be realized on numerous occasions. It was not long before the decision to provide practical help for the resistance movement was taken in Washington, Cairo, and at Riyadh. Such outside assistance was cautious, and was provided through the intermediary of the Pakistan government, which was careful not to pour too many weapons into the country. On the diplomatic level, an Arafat was needed, or at least a PLO. The Western powers, therefore, sought to impose an alliance, even though an artificial one, using a recurring blackmail: if you want to receive aid, you must unite first.50 In the beginning Pakistan placed much less emphasis than did the West on the issues of weapons and union. Pakistan, whose new military government was not fully in control, could not afford to open an anti- Soviet front.51 The ISI’s covert operations included intelligence gathering and training camps for Mujahideen. More secret still was the dispatch by the ISI’s Afghan Bureau of Pakistani military personnel to accompany resistance fighters as advisors, even as combatants, on special missions. 52 Throughout the Afghan conflict, Islamabad refused to admit to providing arms or military training to the resistance, and denied that it was allowing other countries or organizations to do so either. Even President Ziaul-Haq denied in publicly in press conferences saying that only Afghan refugees are living in Pakistan while Mujahideen are in the tribal areas. It was perhaps the biggest lie of the 20th century. The author’s (Dr. .Marwat’s) personal

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observations of the Afghan war and, later on, Brigadier Yousaf confessions in his books unveiled the facts denied by Pakistani government. Yousaf stated that: This need for absolute anonymity stemmed from the official denial of the government that Pakistan was aiding the Mujahideen. No one in authority would admit that weapons, ammunition and equipment were being channeled through Pakistan, by Pakistanis, to the guerrillas. Even more taboo was the fact that the ISI was training the Mujahideen, planning their combat operations, and often accompanying them inside Afghanistan as advisers. Of course the arms supply was an open secret; everybody knew it was happening, but although the involvement of Pakistan in the field was guessed at, it was never, ever, publicly admitted.53 Yousaf further stated that “during my four years some 80,000 Mujahideen were trained; hundreds of thousands of arms and ammunition were distributed, several billion dollars were spent on this immense logistic exercise and ISI teams regularly entered Afghanistan alongside the Mujahideen.”54 All refugees in the camps were required to have the membership of the ‘Peshawar Seven’ Parties for getting an identity card and ration card from the Afghan Refugees Commissionrate. Naturally the refugees were compelled to join the parties willingly or unwillingly or not. These parties even came to known as ‘ration

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card parties’ political circles.55 In this entire process maliks and mullahs played a central role as middle man between the “Peshawar Seven Parties” and the Afghan Refugees Commissionrate. Corruption, favoritism, nepotism and bribes were some of the norms common in the registration process. The first Commissioner of the Afghan Refugees Commissionrate was retired Brigadier while second was Mr. Abdullah, a seasoned bureaucrat who reportedly had close links with the Jama’at-e-Islami of Pakistan. He was openly sympathetic to Islamist movements and Hezb of Hekmatyar in particular.56 Here it will be more relevant to mention that the author (Dr. Marwat), being Information and Research Officer in the Afghan Refugee Commissinarate at Peshawar in 1981-82, was an eyewitness to all these developments. On the very second day of my positing, Mr. Abdullah (Afghan Commissioner) told me that being an expert of Central Asian & Afghan affairs, I would not permitted to perform the official routine work of the office, but rather would translate into English from Pashto the maps and other related material of Hekmatyar’s Hezb. Representative of the Hezb used to come to my office for translation of various Hezb documents, in a private capacity upon the recommendation of Mr. Abdullah. Another important point which I noted was that most of the employs in the Refugees Commissinarate or other related NGOs were either the members or sympathizers of the Jama’at-eIslami.57 Under a carefully-planned mechanism, Pakistani authorities discriminated in dealing with the refugees parties. Radical Islamic

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resistance factions were favored to the extreme by granting military and other forms of assistance, and gained open cooperation in curtailing the activities of their more traditionalists, moderate competitors. The Shi‘ite factions, and the more secular/ liberal and nationalist parties were, in effect, excluded from the Peshawar alliance. Similarly, in an attempt to maintain fuller control, the ISI saw to it that the Peshawar parties, rather than the commanders in the field distributed weapons. The Hezb, headed by Hekmatyar was clearly the most favored of the religious parties based in Peshawar. As a man of more than superficial Islamic piety, Zia saw in the Hezb a group which, in its authoritarian, internationalist brand of Islam, shared with him an anti-communist zeal. Perhaps the preference was on the pragmatic grounds as well because Hezb was viewed as the best organized and most disciplined of the several Peshawar based resistance parties. The party quickly developed what one observer referred to as “relations of trust and confidence with the military”.58 US representative Wilson stated that Pakistanis were “ totally committed to Hekmatyar because Zia saw the world as a conflict between Muslims and Hindus, and he thought he could count on Hekmatyar to work for a Pan-Islamic entity that could stand up to India”. Wilson recalled a map that Zia had also shown to him, “in which overlays indicated the goal of a confederation embracing first Pakistan and Afghanistan and eventually Central Asia and Kashmir”59 Close ties with the conservative Jama’at-e-Islami of Pakistan, effectively a domestic ally of General Zia, smoothed the way for assistance to the Hekmatyar group. From the outset of the conflict, the Jama’at-eIslami figured strongly in the government’s efforts to mobilize

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public opinion, and had been made privy to the military’s Afghan policy.60

Pakistani Political Parties and Refugees Parties: The religio-political parties and groups of Pakistan openly supported the refugee’s parties and the Afghan Jehad. Among religious parties the Jamiat-e-Ulama Islam of Maulana Fazal Rehman and Samiul Haq had close and cordial relations with Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi and Younis Khalis. But for all practical purposes they failed to extend substantial material assistance to the refugees or their favorite groups because they did not fit as well into the agenda of Zia ul-Haq regime as comparison with the Jama’at-e-Islami. Naturally Jama’at-e-Islami emerged as the only relgio- political party in Pakistan which actively supported the Afghan resistance movement, and started a campaign to turn it into a Jehad. It was their leaders who had developed close and intimate relations with the fundamentalist’s parties in the alliance of ‘Peshawar Seven’. And among all the fundamentalists, Hezb of Hekmatyar was their favorite. They regularly held public meetings in various parts of the country in order to muster public opinion in Pakistan in favor of the Jehad. The former Director of ISI appreciated its role in the Afghan war.61 Almost all Pakistani regional-nationalist parties, particularly Khan Abdul Wali Khan’s Awami National Party (ANP) and Mahmud Khan Achakzai’s Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP), and all the leftist and communist parties, were pro-PDPA and supported April Revolution in Afghanistan. Most of them were

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against the fundamentalist parties of the Afghan refugees particularly Hekmatar’s Hezb, for one reason or the other. If the April Revolution supported the leftist elements in NWFP, the influx of Afghan refugees gave an opportunity to the Islamic forces to exploit them for their own political interest. Allama Arif Hussain of Parachinar rose to prominence and became the leader of the Shia community of Pakistan with the support of Iran. According to Nasirullah Babur, he was involved with some Pakistani generals in secretly transferring American missiles to Iran. Actually all these missiles and other ammunition were granted to the Afghan Mujahideen for anti-Soviet resistance.62 It was because of the Afghan war that leadership of Jamaat transferred from Karachi brand traditional leaders to Qazi Hussain Ahmad of NWFP. Qazi became the Amir of the Jama'at-e-Islami of Pakistan and even he relaxed the complicated procedures of the membership of the Jamaat. The Jamaat is predominantly an urban based party, though under government patronage it has strong pockets in Dir, Malakand and Chitral districts of the NWFP. Some of the leaders of the Jama’at-eIslami of Pakistan in the tribal areas were: 1: Abdur Rauf Shinwari and Haji Abdul Wadud in Khyber Agency. 2: Munsif Khan in Mohmand Agency. 3: Maulana Muhammad Sharif in Bajawar Agency. 4: Maulana Subhan in North Waziristan.63

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The Afghan crisis posed a direct threat to the traditional Pashtun nationalism, and its leadership in the Pashtun belt of Pakistan, because the Kabul regime presented a new concept of Afghan nationalism with a veneer of Afghan socialism. The counterrevolutionaries and the ‘Peshawar Seven’ interpreted their resistance in terms of Islamic nationalism and Jihad against Soviet occupation. Being a champion of Pashtun nationalism and anti-colonialism, the dilemma facing Khan Abdul Wali Khan and his party was whether to support the Kabul regime or the refugee's leaders based in Peshawar. The leftists, the radicals, and the students within a party supportive of Afghan Revolution of 1978 consequently pressurized their leaders to support the Afghan Revolution openly and publicly, for the reason that the refugees parties were reactionaries, conservative, proAmerican and linked with their arch rival- the Jama’at-e-Islami. As a result the ideological rift within the party came to the surface and some top leaders left the party and formed their own parties. The late Noor Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin even tried to form the Khalq party in the tribal areas and in the NWFP, and in this connection they made contacts with some leftist and nationalist leaders. But due to their short reign and national and international pressure the idea did not materialize.64 The grand plan of ISI and CIA worked well by transforming a national liberation struggle of the Afghans into an Islamic struggle. Since a believer should know no other fatherland than that where Sharia reigns, the Jehad was for Islam and for the Ummah or, in the words of an Afghan Islamist refugee in Peshawar: ‘The present

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Jehad is not for the watan (fatherland), but for Islam- the watan is only khak (soil, dust).’65 One other important Islamist refugee leader declared in Pakistan that “we will try to make Pakistan and Afghanistan one country with a new name of Islamistan, and if it was not possible, then we will make a confederation of the two countries.” In such a heat for Islamism another refugee leader boasted that “our Jehad is for the glorification of Allah’s will and our Jehad is not limited to the liberation of Afghanistan; we will liberate the Central Asian Muslims and will raise our flag on the Kremlin.”66

Rise of Mujahideen in Kabul: In May 1991 the UN Secretary General unveiled his five point peace plan for Afghanistan. The plan called for an independent, non-aligned, and Islamic State of Afghanistan; transition period agreed upon through an intra-Afghan dialogue during which an impartial mechanism would ensure ceasefire, and hold elections under the auspices of the UN; an end to arms supplies to all sides of the conflict; and financial and military assistance to rehabilitate, resettle the Afghan refugees, and reconstruct the war torn country.67 A decision was taken by the government of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to go along with UN plans for negotiated settlement in Afghanistan, in the meeting of Afghan Cell in July 1991. But there was strong resistance against the change in Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan. As a result Jama’at-e-

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Islami broke its alliance with the Islami Jamhuri Ittihad (IJI) government, and the ‘UN’ plan was also rejected outright by the Mujahideen factions of Khalis and Sayyaf first and later Hekmatyar as well. Hekmatyar asked the Pakistan government to workout a new formula for the solution of Afghan crisis which could be acceptable to the Mujahideen.68 However, Pakistan extended its unqualified support to the UN plan. The following were some of the important factors which compelled Pakistani authorities to adopt political modalities for the resolution of Afghan Crisis: 1: Pakistan seemed to be frustrated over the inability of the Mujahideen to defeat President Najibullah militarily and they thought it was useless to continue support for Mujahideen. 2: As the war in Afghanistan did not seem that it would end in the near future, the international opinion was changed; and Washington was no more interested in sponsoring the Afghan Mujahideen after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan which came as a result of Geneva Accords.69 Thus a major supporter of the Mujahideen openly blamed Pakistan for its support to Hekmatyar and other fundamentalist groups, and even pressured Islamabad to stop military aid to Mujahideen. The US authorities also made it clear to Pakistan that American aid to Pakistan would be stopped if there is no progress towards a political settlement. In September 1991, the US and USSR

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concluded on a mutual cut-off of aid to Afghan groups as of January 1992, and stress for a negotiated settlement.70 3: The position of Islamist groups among ‘Peshawar Seven’ during the Gulf war was against Saudi Arabia which alienated the Saudis. They were not enthusiastic to support the Mujahideen. They became selective in their aid to Mujahideen and favored only the Sayyaf party.71 4: With the disintegration of USSR and the emergence of Central Asian republics, Pakistan visualized a great economic opportunity for itself in the new region. Afghanistan’s political stability was not only a prerequisite to Pakistan gaining access to Central Asian markets but was also the only way to enhance Islamabad’s geopolitical standing with the West in shaping the future evolution of Central Asia. It was therefore necessary to ensure some form of control over the southern corridor to Central Asia. Pakistan advocated for an early end to the war by sponsoring negotiation. 5: One other reason for the change in emphasis in Pakistan’s policy was that there was also internal pressure on the Pakistani government from Pakistani political circles i.e. ANP and PPP.72 With the collapse of the Najibullah’s regime 73 in Kabul in 1992, Pakistan along with Peshawar Seven Tanzimat was perturbed over the fast-changing development in and around

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Afghanistan. It began striving its utmost to impose its own will through Afghan Tanzimat, in the new expected new set-up in Kabul. On April 20, it was reported that the official Pakistan efforts at achieving an accord had come to naught. The cynics saw this as a defeat for Pakistan fourteen years-long interventionist role to control the Afghan Jehad.74 At last, after initial fruitless discussions, Pakistani officials including Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif succeeded on April 24, 1992 in bringing the Afghan Mujahideen to sign Peshawar Accord creating the Mujahideen government in Kabul, in the fragmented state of Afghanistan.75 Pakistani authorities were also anxious to show their confidence in a new government under Mujaddadi. On April 29, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif flew to Kabul, along with army chief of staff General Asif Nawaz Janjuwa, ISI head General Javed Nasir and Saudi Prince Turki-Al-Faisal, to demonstrate Pakistan’s backing for the interim government.76 Nawaz Sharif met with President Mujaddedi and presented a 250 million rupees cheque.77 Perhaps the most pathetic and disgusting gesture that could ever be displayed by anyone on a foreign land was that of the head of ISI, Lt. General Javed Nasir, who soon after coming out of the Prime Minister aeroplane, shouted slogans of Alah-o-Akbar.78 This attitude on the part of Javed Nasir was aimed at pointing out that his ISI had conquered Afghanistan. A leading Afghan intellectual, Dr, Qaudir Amiryar, (a Professor in George Washington University) said that the present (as of 1992) chaos in Afghanistan was caused by an absence of

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alternative to Najib government, though that was precisely what was supposed to have been put in place by the parties of the Geneva convention. He alleged that obsession of Pakistan’s intelligence services for military victory paralyzed the process and, hence, led to the anarchy. 79 He pointed out that Pakistan encouraged the groups and parties preaching Islamization of Afghanistan, while discouraged the nationalist elite of Afghanistan to join the struggle. Pakistan systematically denied visas to nationalist, intelligentsia, and even to King Zahir Shah. It also rejected the composition of the government under Peshawar Accord. According to him that was not representative government, and had been imposed from outside.80 The Peshawar accord, and post-Peshawar Accord initiatives and efforts on the part of Pakistan did not produce the expected fruitful and positive results for ceasefire and reconciliation in Afghanistan. Once again, Pakistan along with Iran and Saudi Arabia brought Mujahideen leaders to Islamabad and succeeded in signing of the Islamabad Accord on March 7, 1993 for a power sharing plan.81 The Afghan signatories of the Accord backed out on one pretext or the other, but the dream of Akhtar Abdur Rahman that “Kabul Must burn” was realized by the ‘Peshawar Seven’ Tanzimat.

References and Notes 1

This Pashtu tappa was very popular on both side of the Durand Line particularly after the fall of Najib and the rise of Mujahideen in Kabul, and the subsequent civil war which ensued between different factions of holy warriors

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for their own petty gains. The tappa was frequently seen painted in or on buses, rickshaws, and other transportation vehicles. 2

Frederic Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict: 1979-1985, Oxford University Press, 2003, P.80 3

Interview with Niaz A Naik, Islamabad, Sunday, 8 August, 1993; quoted by Frederic Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict: 1979-1985, Oxford University Press, 2003, P.92 4

The following story appeared originally on the Indy Media site, Interview of Zbigniew Brzezinski Le Nouvel Observateur (France), January, 15-21, 1998, P. 76. 5

It is also noteworthy that the former Interior Minister of Pakistan, Retd. General Nasirullah Babur, confessed several times in press that it was he who, during Z.A Bhutto regime, trained and organized Afghan terrorists to use them against Daud Khan. A large number of supporters of the Seetmi-Milli, Shula-i-Jawaed, Hezbi-Islami, Jamiat-i-Islami and Harakat-i-Islami began crossing into Pakistan. 6

Asta Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, Curzen Press Ltd, St. John’s Studios, Church Road Richmond, Surrey TW9 2QA,1995, P. 274. To one extent or another, all of the resistance part leaders were cultivated by Pakistan and were propped up by either government or an external power. Although previously there had been round about 60 to 80 resistance groups operating in Peshawar, in 1982, Pakistani authorities forced them to coalesce into seven. Nearly all the party leaders had a following, often narrow, based on respect for their religious scholarships, religious status, and experience as dissidents. 7

Yousaf Elmi, Afghanistan: A Decade of Sovietisation, Afghan Jehad Works Centre, Peshawar, nd, P. 2 . 8

Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, 1986, P. 120

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9

Azizur Rahman Ulfat was assassinated by unknown assailants but mostly people suspected Hezb of Hekmatyar involvement in his murder. Aziz Rahman was the son of eminent Afghan Pashtu writer and poet Gul Pacha Ulfat from Ningrahar province of Afghanistan. Aziz Rahman openly criticized Pakistan government and the Jehadi leaders in his booklet “The Crisis of Leadership” published by the founder of the Islami Entiqam Party, 1981. In the same year (1981), another refugee Shuhrat Nangyal in his booklet “Afghanistan’s Political Parties” (Da Afghanistan Siasi Ahzab), Peshawar, pp. 47-48 wrote that “there are many groups and factions working on the name of ‘Islam’ or ‘Afghans’ (to the beginning or the end of their name); but otherwise every leader is (after free) ration and business. There are such leaders whose offices and parties are just in their pockets (i.e. the party exists o paper for the sole purpose of accumulating aid money). In this storm, there are horrible faces whose identity is (suspicious). The real leaders are hiding in the dust while only the businessmen are on the ground. Every Muhajir is thinking to become leader for the ration and not for nation. Most of them are leaders in Peshawar but having no courage to inter into Afghanistan”. 10

Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai, “Afghanistan: Confusion of fusion and diffusion” The daily Frontier Post, Peshawar, August 5 - 6, 1992. 11

Olesen opcit. P.276; Even in 1982, when the author (Dr. Marwat ) was on the way towards Kabul from Jalalabad, the bus he was travelling on was stopped by security guards near Sarobi. One of them was Central Asian Tajik speaking Persian (Tajiki), who was informing the passengers in the bus that all people should be aware of the Ashrars and Basmachis (referring to anti- Kabul elements). 12

S. Fida Yunas, Afghanistan (1979-1997), Volume II, 31- A Sector D-5, Phase1, Hayatabad, Peshawar, Pakistan, 1998, pp. 889-890. 13

Ibid; also Interview with S. Fida Yunas, Area Study Centre (Central Asia, Afghanistan, China & Russia), University of Peshawar, 2nd March 2004.

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14

An interesting feature of the 18-day parleys was the schedule of the summit meetings arranged at the office or residence of each leader in rotation. When it was arranged at the residence of Hekmatyar, he assigned his photographers to take photographs while he was in the chair, with the rest sitting around on the floor as in common practice. These photographs were released to the press with a story that all the Muhajireen (refugees) leaders accepted the leadership of Hekmatyar. It annoyed other leaders. See Taizai Opcit 15

In 1981, the author (Dr. Marwat) personally observed that some Arab nationals, along with local Afghans, distributing money among Afghan refugees in Tambowano market on road side near Peshawar Airport. 16

Aziz Rahman Ulfat, The Crisis of Leadership, published by the founder of the Islami Entiqam Party, Peshawar, 1981, P 11. 17

Ibid. pp. 3-9.

18

In 1987, in Mashhad (Iran) an alliance was formed of the following eight groups: (1) Nohzat-e-Islami, (2) Sazman-e-Pasdaran, (3) Jehad-e-Islami, (4) Jabha-eMotahed-e-Islami, (5) Sazman-e-Nasir, (6) Hezbullah, (7) Hezb-e-Dahwat-eIslami,(8) Harakat-e-Islami. The three Quetta based Shia groups of the Afghan refugees were: (1) Harakat-eIslami Afghanistan of Sheikh Asef Mohseni Kandahar, (2) Shura-e-Inqilab-eIttifaq-e-Afghanistan of Syed Behishti, and (3) Sazman-e-Nasir-e-Islami of was led by council. 19

In the 20th February, 2004 meeting of a weekly seminar in the Area Study Centre (Central Asia), University of Peshawar, General (retired) Naseerullah Babur in confessed that in 1973, Pakistani Prime Minister, the President, General Tikka Khan and Babur in a special meeting decided to use the Frontier Corps to train Afghans who had escaped from the Daud regime; he stated that this training was continued till July, 1977. Some of the Afghans trained during

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this period were: Habibur Rahman, Ahmad Shah Masud, Professor Rabbani, Hekmatyar, Younis Khalis, Mohammadi, Maulana Hadi, Gulab Ningrahari, Wakil Khan Shinwari, Younis Khogiani, even Dr. Najibullah requested for training but the army refused. 20

George Arney, Afghanistan, Machelin House, 81 Fulham Road, London, 1990, P.135 21

Ibid. P. 136

22

Far Eastern Economic Review, April, 23, 1987, P. 40

23

Robert Wirsing, Pakistan's Security under Zia 1977-1988, Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., London, 1991, P. 62. 24

Newsweek, February. 13, 1980, P. 9.

25

Wirsing Opcit, P.62; In his book, Hekmatyar states that in a meeting with Ghulam Ishaq Khan (Pakistani President) he proposed the appointment of General Hamid Gul as the new Chief of Pakistan’s army … G. I Khan smiled and told me: “You are right, but the Americans will be aggrieved by this action. They say that General Hamid Gul is fundamentalist”. Hekmatyar’s Pashtu book translated by Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai, Secret Plans, Open Faces, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 2004, P. 25. 26

Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat & S. Wiqar Ali Shah KakaKhel, Afghanistan and the Frontier, EMJAY Books International, Peshawar, Pakistan, 1993, P. 225. 27

Ibid. P. 229.

28

Ibid. P. 230.

29

John Fullerton, Afghanistan, Far Eastern Economic Review. Ltd., Hong Kong, 1983, P. 72 . 30

Ibid. P. 74 .

31

Marwat & Kakakhel Opcit. P 230.

105

32

Fullerton Opcit, P. 73.

33

David C. Isby, War in a Distant Country, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1989, P.99. 34

Roy Opcit, P. 119

35

Marwat & Kakakhel Opcit, P. 217

36

Ibid. P 217.

37

Roy Opcit, P. 123

38

Discussions with party members and followers in Afghan Refugee Commissionrate, Peshawar. Novmber-December, 1981. 39

The Supreme Council was the most powerful organization wherein the organizational and political activities of those Mujahideen affiliated to the organization were discussed. The Board of Directors, comprising leaders of the component parties, acted as Supreme Command of the alliance for military operations across the border. Financial assistance received by the component parties would be submitted to the Board of Directors, and then subsequently forwarded to the Finance Committee along with official documents. According to the Character of Organization, the Military Committee for which efforts were being made was responsible for disposing off arms and ammunition received by various component organizations. The alliance favored getting financial assistance from the Western countries in addition to the Muslim world. Letters in Russian language were published requesting Muslim Russian soldiers not to side with Russians in Afghanistan. The same letters also pressed upon the peoples of Muslim republic of Soviet Russia to start revolutions in their respective republics to achieve independence. Such materials were secretly distributed by their Mujahideen in Afghanistan, in those areas where the Russians were in control. See also Marwat & Kakakhel Opcit. pp. 220-222. 40

Tahir Amin, Afghanistan Crisis: Implications and options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, 1982, pp 102-103;

106

Henry S. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, Oxford university Press, Karachi, 1999, P. 207 quoted from other sources that in 198183 the Mujahideen were 45000, by 1986 they numbered 150,000; and in 1989 this numbered increased to 200000. 41

Between 1980 and 1983, the refugees were obliged to become members of one or other of these parties in order to obtain their share of aid. See also Frederic Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict: 1979-1985, Oxford University Press, 2003, P. 82. 42

Brigadier (Retd) Mohammad Yousaf, Silent Soldier: The Man behind Afghan Jehad, Jang Publishers, Lahore, pp. 14-15. 43

Mohammad Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story, Jang Publisher Lahore, 1992, P. 105; Muhammad Saddiq Kanju, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs stated in a 1993 interview, “These accusation are unfounded. Pakistan has no favourites among the Afghan groups. Pakistan could not unilaterally allocate assistance to the Mujahideen Tanzimat. There was a regularly procedure under which the donor countries were consulted and assistance was provided with their knowledge and approval”. General Hamid Gul, Director General ISI in 1993 argued: “The distribution system was…. fair and professionally justifiable on the basis of standard criteria: performance, organizational ability to assimilate, integrity etc. There were no favourites. No body received the lion’s share. It is mere propaganda”. See Defence Journal, Karachi, Vol: XVII, 1993, pp. 26, 29. 44 45

Yousaf, (Silent Soldier), pp. 11-12.

Pakistan tried to monitor all aspects of the Afghan presence in Pakistan, as well as the conduct of the war, with a view to making the military efforts of the Afghan resistance coincide with Pakistan’s interests. The resistance received training;; it was channelled and organized. The activities of the Mujahideen were curbed as well as encouraged. The ISI took up controlling and coordinating the resistance parties based in Peshawar, and tried to manipulate the Afghan political personalities.

107

46

Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin Opcit. pp .1-7; see also his book Silent Soldier.

47

Ibid. P. 98; Silent Soldier, pp. 6-9.

48

Roy Opcit, P.122.

49

Frederic Grare Opcit, P. 84.

50

Roy Opcit, pp.121-122.

51

Ibid. P. 122.

52

Marvin G. Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Resistance and Reconstruction, West view Press, INC, USA, 1994, P. 29; See also Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin Opcit. 53

Ibid. (Mohammad Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin) P. 3.

54

Ibid. P. 4

55

Field Report 1982-83 and 1990-91, Peshawar.

56

Frederic Grare Opcit, P. 83

57

Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat personal papers, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Pakistan. 58

Weinbaum Opcit, P. 34 quoted Mushahid Hussain from the Christian Science Monitor, October 3, 1989; Being an old friend of Pakistani establishment, Hekmatyar was opposed to the idea of an ethnic, secular state of Pashtunistan, the Loya Jirga, and Zhahir Shah, and was anti-India and ant-USSR. 59

Diego Cordovez & Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The inside story of the Soviet withdrawal, Oxford University Press, New York, P. 162. 60

Weinbaum Opcit,. P. 34.

61

Mohammad Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin Opcit, P. 40.

62

The Pashto monthly Leekwal, Peshawar, April 2004, pp. 16, 17.

108

63

Field Report of 1988-89, Peshawar, Kurram Agency and Bannu.

64

Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, The Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan (1917-79) An Appraisal, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1997, P 350; See for biography of Noor M. Taraki, H. Amin, cf. appendix –B of this book. 65

Olesen Opcit, P. 288.

66

Professor Rasul Amin, A Collection of Professor A. Rasul Amin’s Papers, (Pashtu) The Writers Union of Free Afghanistan (WUFA), Peshawar, 1995, P. 70. 67

Raziullah Azmi, ed. Pak-American Relations: The Recent past, Karachi, Royal Book Company, 1994, P. 42. 68

Rashid Ahmad Saddiqui, “Pakistan Afghan Policy after the Soviet withdrawal”, Unpublished M. Phil thesis, Institute of Pakistan Studies Quaid-iAzam University Islamabad, 1996, P. 17. 69

For details of Geneva Accord see Appendix-F; The Afghan venture had cost the Soviets over 13,000 dead, 35,000 wounded and 311 missing. Reportedly, it had required one million rubbles a day to keep the war going. In terms of cash, the price rose steeply as soon as they withdrew. Only the most massive logistic efforts could keep Najibullah’s men fighting, and the Soviets supplied. American officials estimated that Afghanistan received military supplies worth up to $300 million per month after February, 1989. In the six months following their withdrawal at least 3,800 aircraft flew in, carrying food, fuel, weapons and ammunition. Compare this with the US aid for 1988, valued at $600 million, and the imbalance is crystal clear. In 1988 over 1,000 armored vehicles were handed over by the departing Soviets. It is estimated that the first six months of 1989 saw the transfer of $ 1.5 billion of military support to the Kabul regime, including 500 Scud surface-to-surface missiles. The Afghan Army still had tremendous superiority in what I call the three ‘A’s: armor, artillery and aircraft. Mohammad Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin Opcit, pp.216, 227.

109

70

The daily Frontier Post, Peshawar, February 1992.

71

Charles H. Kennedy, ed. Pakistan-1992, Lahore, West Press Oxford Pak Book Cooperation, 1993, P. 129. 72

Ibid, P. 130.

73

For biography of Dr. Najibullah, cf. Appendix-C of this book.

74

Amera Saeed, “The Peshawar Accord and After”, See in Afghanistan’s Past, Present and future, Islamabad Regional Studies Islamabad, 1997, P. 422. 75

Intense rounds of talks started at Peshawar to arrange a transitional government for the transfer of power in Kabul. The talks began in Peshawar between the Pakistan government and the Mujahideen leaders. The Afghan leaders present were Pir Syed Ahmad Gilani, Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani, Engineer Qutabuddin Hilal, Commandar Musa and Qazi Amin Waqad, Ayatullah Muhsini, Javed and son of Subghatullah Mujaddidi. Four leaders were absent being represented only by their spokesmen, and Maulvi Yunas Khalis, in spite of their presence in and around Peshawar did not attend the meeting. This was a significant signal of their independence of action. For days it appeared that the fighting among parties would preclude any agreement despite the strong intercession of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the foreign Ministry officials. The Prime Minister was joined in Peshawar by Saudi Prince Turki-al-Faisal, King Fahd’s special envoy. At the same time, Mir Hamid Musavi, a former ambassador to Pakistan, was deputed from Tehran to ensure that the deal to form a new government incorporated Iranian interests. Unable to move the factions, frustrated Pakistani officials brought the Afghans together with the leaders of several of Pakistan’s religio-political parties, including Qazi Hussain Ahmed’s Jama’at-e-Islami of Pakistan, who were asked to use their influence with various Afghans groups to reach a consensus. In the end, the Peshawar based leaders agreed to a formula, mainly out of the fear, that if they delayed any further, the field commanders, notably Ahmad Shah Masud, would take matters

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into their hands and by pass the parties. For the text of Peshawar Accord see Appendix-D of this book. 76

The Peshawar Accord and Related Developments, Spotlight on Regional Affairs, Islamabad, Institute of Regional Studies, Vol. xii, No. 3, March 1993, P. 31. 77

The daily Frontier Post, Peshawar, April 30, 1992.

78

Ibid

79

Daily The Nation, June 07, 1992.

80

Ibid; Mohammad Sarwar (Pakistan Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington) rejected Amiryar’s assertions and allegations by saying. Pakistan was not interfering in Afghan internal affairs and was only trying to help for reconstruction and stabilization of war torn country… Pakistan has paid a heavy price for the Afghanistan liberation and still host to three million Afghan refugees. The seminar, which was sponsored by International forum of George Washington University on the theme “Afghan immigrants about Pakistan interventionist policy towards Afghanistan”. 81

The agreement was signed on March 7, in the presence of Nawaz Sharif, Saudi Prince Faisal and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister. On March 8, all the signatories of Islamabad Accord accompanied by Pakistan Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif flew to Saudi Arabia for a joint umera. Further consultations followed, which were rounded on by an agreement among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran, to act as guarantors of Islamabad accord. The Islamabad Accord was more substantive and balanced document than was the Peshawar Accord. For a text of the Islamabad Peace Accord, see Appendix-E of this book.

Chapter – III A Foreign Aid Bonanza for the Afghan Refugees “When money speaks, the truth keeps silent”

(Russian Proverb) Louis Dupree, an eminent American authority on Afghanistan used eight ‘R’s in his article to characterize the political process in Afghanistan since April 1978: revolution, repression, rhetoric, reforms, revolts, refugees, Russians and Reagan.1 I would add five Islamic and local ‘M’s- Muhammad, Madina (center of migration) Muslim, Muhajir, Mujahid, Masjid, Mullah, Malik, Masjid, Madrasa, Money, Moscow, Mortars, and now, Musharraf and MMA, in my study to present the case of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and how the common “Ms” between the Afghans and Pakistanis were exploited by both the states and by both superpowers. Pakistan saw an opportunity in Afghan turmoil to steer the resistance along religio-political lines that fit its short term and long-term goals of having a friendly, even subservient, government in Kabul. Pakistan’s old traditional foreign policy dictated by two major constraints: the Indian threat in the east, and the Pashtunistan problem in the west which re-surfaced with the April

Revolution and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Red tide was moving towards Khyber Pass. Pakistan had neither the power nor the ability to roll-back the Soviet juggernaut openly. A war by proxy or “undeclared war” as the PDPA regime called it was the only answer. The CIA and ISI prepared a grand plan to counter the Red menace in the region and to achieve its long cherished goals in the Afghanistan. Zia himself confessed in an interview with S.S Harrison shortly before his death that his goals, from the beginning of the war, “were to destroy the Communist infrastructure, install a client regime, and bring about a “strategic alignment” in South Asia. “We have earned the right to have a friendly regime there”, he declared. “We took risks as a frontline state, and we won’t permit it to be like it was before, with Indian and Soviet influence there and claim on our territory. It will be a real Islamic state, parts of a Pan-Islamic revival that will one day win over the Muslims in the Soviet Union, you will see”. 2 Akhtar A. Rahman, Director General Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), considered that if Zia was to covertly support the Afghan’ resistance in a massive guerrilla war, the Soviets could be halted, even rolled back. He believed that Afghanistan could be made into another Vietnam, with the Soviets in the shoes of the Americans. He urged Zia to take the military option.3 It would mean Pakistan secretly supporting the guerrillas with money, arms, ammunition, training, and operational advice. Most importantly it would entail offering the border areas of the NWFP and Baluchistan as a sanctuary for both refugees and guerrillas. In the entire anti- Kabul game of Pakistan, Quetta and Peshawar played an important central role. Quetta had branch offices of the Afghan Parties, warehouses, plus an ISI detachment, but they were on a

smaller scale than in Peshawar. For ISI Peshawar was more important because, a. it was the heart of the Afghan resistance movement in exile, b. Peshawar Seven Tanzimat offices were in Peshawar, c.

its bureaucracy was in Peshawar,

d. almost all its leaders were living in Peshawar, e. its arms warehouses were there, f. it was from here the majority of its supplies were carried forward to border dumps and thence into Afghanistan, g. all commanders and Mujahideen used to come for replenishment and news to Peshawar, h. Peshawar attracted the journalists and the spies as a magnet attracts metal, i.

Peshawar was the centre for the latest gossip, rumor, report or whisper.4

Why did Afghan refugees and resistance leaders mesh so well with the CIA and ISI plan of action, rather than planning a direct operation or some thing else of thee sort? The answer is simple; they (Afghan refugees) had all the basic attributes of successful guerrilla fighters- i.e. •

They believed passionately in their cause.

•

They were physically and mentally tough.

•

They knew their area of operations intimately well.

•

They were extremely courageous with an inbred affinity for weaponry.

•

They operated from mountainous areas which provided sanctuary and succor to them.

To defeat a superpower they needed four things: •

to sink their differences for the sake of the Jehad,

•

an unassailable base area, which President Zia provided in Pakistan,

•

adequate supplies of effective arms to wage the war and

•

Proper training and advice on how to conduct operations It was the responsibility of ISI to provide and coordinate the latter two.5

An ISI officer assessed the Afghan Mujahid from his own ideological and strategic perception by stating that from the military point of view the trained and indoctrinated Mujahid possessed substantially advantages as compared to the average Muhajir for the following reasons: 1. Physically he was better able to withstand the extremes of the terrain and climate than his much softer Soviet opponent or refugee in camps. 2. He was fighting for his faith, his freedom, and for his family, which gave him an enormous moral ascendancy. 3. In practical terms, the Mujahid could live off the land, or

rather from the villages, until the Soviet scorched earth policy became widespread. 4. The Mujahid could walk for days, even weeks, on the minimum of food; then, when the opportunity arrive, they would replenish themselves with huge quantities, stocking themselves up like camels for the next journey. 5. To him his rifle was a part of his body, a piece of clothing without which he feels uncomfortable. 6. A weapon to a Mujahid was like jewelry to a western woman. It is a symbol of manhood. 7. Afghans buy and sell weapons as Americans do cars. 8. In their life the gun was mightier than the pen.6 The ISI and other related agencies exploited the weakness of the Afghan commanders by offering training and better weapons to those who undertook specific operations inside Afghanistan. The Commander would receive instruction: •

On the tactics of where best to place the charges,

•

how to approach the pipeline,

•

how to distract or cover nearby enemy posts,

•

where to lay mines to catch any repair parties, and

•

on the likely Soviet reaction.

The net result was that this closeness to arms meant that the Mujahideen take readily to training on new weapons, and usually

obtain startlingly good results. Like the majority of military forces the Mujahideen had their political bosses, from whom their Commanders were supposed to get their instructions, and who supplied them with the means to fight - money and arms. Behind this primitive command structure was the ISI, and its Afghan Bureau in particular. The ISI task was to keep the refugee parties stocked with supplies, and somehow get all the different parties and hundreds of Commanders, scattered all over Afghanistan, to fight effectively. In the new grand plan, the CIA and ISI weaved a net with the golden threads of foreign aid and painted it with religious rhetoric to trap the innocent and desperate refugees in the Jehadi labyrinth and pushed them as a Mujahideen or holy warrior, into the quagmire of blood and death.

The Aid Invasion: The Soviet military "aid" and loans to Afghanistan up to 1979 amounted to $ 1.2 billion, almost as much as economic "aid" and loans. Meanwhile Afghanistan's debts from Moscow exceeded $ 4 billion. But once the Soviet forces moved in Afghanistan, their efforts were inevitably concentrated on the war and any thought of aid or development was put on the back burner.7 On the other hand, a country which was scarcely known until 1979 in the West became a major field of aid activity after the Soviet invasion. Pakistan became a chief player in the game, backed politically and financially by the US and China, with many other countries playing their part. Iran and the rich Gulf states had their own agendas in the Afghan imbroglio and their blatant interference within the refugee community as well as inside

Afghanistan is no longer any secret. It is well known that "humanitarian aid" goes hand in hand with the political games and even international aid is inextricably involved with politics, and the story of Afghanistan in the 1980s was not exception. Many people from different walks of life were mobilized to work for the Afghans: Western anti-communist organizations, the UN, multilateral and bilateral agencies, particularly Western and Islamic governments following the American call to "make the Soviet bleed in Afghanistan". But there were also people who knew Afghanistan before the war, who had worked or researched there and who were sympathetic to the Afghan cause and wanted to play their part. Varying aid agencies with different interests and mandates were involved in various projects with refugees as well as inside Afghanistan. Although military aid was the main target for most of the Western and Islamic countries, humanitarian aid was in many ways used as a political tool. Foreign Aid for the Afghan Refugees was of two types: (1) Humanitarian Aid and (2) Military Aid.

Humanitarian Aid: For nearly two years, from April 1978 to January 1980, the government of Pakistan bore the burden of the refugees care practically single handed. The UNHCR and WFP came in with their emergency program of assistance in January 1980, and later on joined by other UN agencies. During 1983-84 the total expenditure of the Pakistani government on the upkeep of 3 million refugees was $ 1.5 million a day. Some major external

sources of Humanitarian Aid relief/aid assistance both in cash and kind were: •

UNHCR, WFP, FAO, WHO, Red Cross & UNICEF paid 55 percent of the expenditure.

•

Private Voluntary Organizations: More than two dozen private voluntary organizations & NGOs were involved with refugees: PRCS, Pak. Medicos, ICRC, IRC, ARC, IAC, CWS, Idara Ahya-ul-Ulum,

•

Friendly Countries: The USA alone provided six billion dollars worth of humanitarian & military assistance to Afghan refugees and the resistance. Some of the other contributors were: Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UEA, Italy, Indonesia, Bangladesh, USA, Australia, France, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, Germany, Islamic Solidarity Fund and Islamic Development Bank. All these countries contributed more than $ 750 million to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan.

•

During these years 1980-87, USA granted 7.4 billion dollars to Pakistan.

•

Private Individuals: A number of individuals both within and outside Pakistan provided relief assistance for the Afghan refugees.8

Military Aid: The first official reaction of Pakistan on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (29th December, 1979) was amazingly mild. It described the entry of foreign troops into Afghanistan as “a serious

violation of the norms of peaceful co-existence and the sacrosanct principles of the sovereignty of states and non-intervention in their internal affairs, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations”.9 In addition, Pakistan denied any involvement in Afghan affairs, never officially admitting that Pakistan had given sanctuary to Afghan insurgents, nor that it had served as a conduit for arms from the West.10 The PDPA regime continuously and desperately charged the US and Pakistani governments for their blatant interference in Afghanistan. In national and international media against Kabul also complained that Pakistani territory has being used as a sanctuary for guerrilla forces and was the major conduit for the arms flow. The CIA was charged with organizing, arming, equipping and training Afghan counter-revolutionary gangs on the territory of Pakistan. As a matter of fact, one of the ring leaders of these bands was a US citizen of Afghan nationality, Zia Nassry. He visited Washington in March 1979 on the very eve of the wave of anti-government riots in Herat. He had long discussions with high- ranking officials of the US State Department, including R. Lorton, who was in charge of the Afghan desk. He also met the representatives of US Senators F. Church and J. Javits.11 Contrary to DRA and Soviet charges, there was no American involvement in supplying arms to the Mujahideen before the invasion, but immediately thereafter President Carter authorized a program of covert military assistance.12 That program continued and eventually expanded under President Reagan. Yet according to Zbigniew Brzezinski it was on July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the proSoviet regime in Kabul.13

Anthony Hyuman labels Carter's reaction to the Soviet invasion as one of "overreaction and bluff at the same time.”14 Carter accused the Soviets of a "blatant violation of the accepted rules of international behavior", which indeed the invasion was, and he went beyond this denunciation to call it the most serious crisis since the end of World War II, a premise belied by the less-than-dramatic steps the Administration actually did take. Expanding the President's tough State of the Union message to Congress on January 23 in the month following the Soviet thrust, special U.S. envoy Clark Clifford told reporters in New Delhi that "The Soviet Union must understand that if they move toward the Persian Gulf that means war”. The very same day, during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown sounded a more cautious note. “We can't assure you that we would win a war there ... But to cast doubt on our ability to deter or fight effectively is ... unnecessarily damaging to U.S. security”.15 In his ‘State of the Union’ speech of 31 January, 1980, Jimmy Carter asserted: “The destruction of the independence of Afghanistan government and the occupation by the Soviet Union has altered the strategic situation in that part of the world in a very ominous fashion. It has brought the Soviet Union within striking distance of the Indian Ocean and even the Persian Gulf. It has eliminated a buffer between the Soviet Union and Pakistan, and presented a new threat to Iran. These two countries are now far more vulnerable to Soviet political intimidation. If that intimidation were to prove

effective, the Soviet Union might well control an area of vital strategic and economic significance to the survival of Western Europe, the Far East and ultimately the United States. It is clear that the entire subcontinent of Asia and especially Pakistan is threatened”.16 A major concern was the Soviet threat to the Gulf, the reference and concern being of course the vulnerable oil lanes through which now pass several million barrels a day (MBD). Though down from the one time high of 18 MBD, the Gulf oil shipments will always be important. Significantly, Afghanistan's southern border is less than 300 miles (500 km) from Iran's port of Chah Bahar. From there the distance to the Strait of Hormuz, the so-called "choke point" through which all shipping must pass, is not great.17 Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi’s visit of the US in January 1980 was not so fruitful, and the Carter offer of 400 million dollars in assistance was rejected by Zia calling it “peanuts”18 Just two weeks after this offer, Zbigniew Brzezinski, US adviser of National Security led a high powered delegation to Islamabad and discussed in detail the consequences of Soviet threat to Pakistan, the region, and the world. 19 However, it was in May 1979 that Pakistan selected Mujahideen leaders for a meeting with a special CIA envoy in Peshawar.20 On 16 September 1981, the United States pledged a total of 3.25 billion dollars in aid to Pakistan, spread over a period of six years, half in the form of military assistance and half as economic aid. The 1.625 billion dollars of military aid and selling of forty F-16 fighters-bombers to Pakistan was sanctioned by US.

The second package negotiated in 1987 for a period of six years, amounted to 4 billon dollars.21 Throughout 1979-82 the resistance forces armed themselves by capturing caches from the Soviet-Afghan forces and received limited supplies from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China, the US and Egypt. Once the US-Pakistan axis became able after the delivery of the first US aid ($3.2 billion) package in 1982 then the Afghan resistance began receiving large quantities of weapons. China, Egypt, the United States, UK and Saudi Arabia were the major sources of weapons while Pakistan became a staging era for the guerilla operation.22 The resistance started receiving sophisticated weaponry (portable stingers surface-to-air missiles, surface-tosurface rockets, and artillery) only after 1986 when the tide had already turned in their favor and the Soviet forces were showing signs of war weariness.23 Zia-ul-Haq placed three absolute conditions for allowing shipment of the arms from Egypt, China and other points of origin, including the US, through Pakistan to the holy warriors fighting the Russians. First, the countries concerned-the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China and eventually Britain, France and even Israel, were to maintain absolute secrecy about the shipments. They would deny that they took place at all, repeatedly and whenever necessary. Second, arms and other war supplies were to be shipped to Pakistan by the fastest available means. Third, the shipments by air were to be limited to two planeloads per week.24

The CIA's tasks in the Afghan war were: 1. to purchase arms and equipment for the anti- Soviet resistance,

2. to arrange transportation of arms and equipment to Pakistan, 3. to provide funds for the purchase of vehicles and transportation inside Pakistan and Afghanistan, 4. to train Pakistani instructors on new weapons or equipment, 5. to provide satellite photographs and maps for ISI operational planning, 6. to provide radio equipment and training, 7. to advise on technical matters when requested by ISI.25 Thereafter, ISI controlled virtually all foreign military aid destined to reach the resistance through Pakistan, which was the main access because of Iran’s anti- Western attitude and its focus on its war with Iraq. The entire planning of the war, all types of training of the Mujahideen and the allocation and distribution of arms and supplies were the sole responsibility of the ISI, and operational office in particular. The richest military contribution of the CIA to the Afghan war was in the field of satellite intelligence through photographs. Nothing above ground was hidden from the all-seeing satellite. It made both the planning of operations and the briefing of the Mujahideen commanders a comparatively a simple business. It enabled the ISI to select priority targets for rocket attacks, choose alternative firing points and consider the various routes to and from the target. The CIA would then transfer all the details on to a map with a list of possible targets, a description of each, together with recommended approaches, enemy dispositions, likely reactions to

attack, and possible counter-attacks. This information, in conjunction with the local knowledge of the Afghan commanders, considerably enhanced the ability of ISI to conduct effective operations. The CIA also contributed substantially with the installation of wireless interception equipment. This was high-grade tactical information on the movement of units, and sometimes their intentions. Often the messages would be tense and dramatic, as when we heard operators under attack yelling their orders, or frantically calling for help. The ISI was in close contact with CIA for using its technical expertise in assessing how best to destroy a particular target, be it a bridge, a dam, a fuel dump or a pipeline in Afghanistan. The CIA would supply the photographs and a demolition expert would give ISI advice on the type of explosive, the amount required, the best method of detonation and the precise location at which to place the charges, together with the likely extent of the damage.26

POLITICAL-- MILITARY CONTROL 1984POLITICAL 1984-1987 Inter Services Intelligence Main HQ, Islamabad

Afghan Bureau, Rawalpindi

Baluchistan Quetta

NWFP Peshawar Seven Party Alliance Hikmatyar Khalis Rabbani Sayaf Nabi Gailani Mujaddadi

Party Representatives ISI

Fundamentalist Fundamentalist Fundamentalist Fundamentalist Moderate Moderate Moderate

Military Committee

ISI PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN

Commanders Comds Comds Comds Comds Comds Comds

Comds

Mujahideen Muj

Muj

Muj

Muj

Muj

Muj

Muj

1

12

The Arms Pipeline to the Mujahideen: Nevertheless, it was not the CIA's pipeline that provided weapons to the Mujahideen. As soon as the arms arrived in Pakistan the CIA's responsibility ended. From then on it was the ISI’s pipeline and organization, that moved, allocated, and distributed every bullet that the CIA procured. But even the ISI did not actually give the guns and ammunition to the Mujahideen who were to use them in battle. The last stretch of the line into and across Afghanistan was in the hands of the seven Parties and the Commanders in the field. The pipeline was divided into three distinct parts.

1. The first part belonged to the CIA, who bought the weapons and paid for their delivery to Pakistan; 2. the second stretch was the ISI's responsibility, getting everything carried across Pakistan, allocated to, and handed over to the Parties at their headquarter offices near Peshawar and Quetta; 3. the third and final leg of the journey belonged to the Afghans. The Parties allocated the weapons to their commanders, and distributed them inside Afghanistan. The larger parties owned up to 300 vehicles of all types. These were civilian-pattern trucks which blended with the normal crossborder traffic. The number-plates were that of the Afghan vehicles purchased in Kabul, which were used for the longer journeys by road. They were more numerous than ISI's transport as often these vehicles undertook journeys of several days or more, with no possibility of returning empty on the second day. The second method of arms transportation included camels, horses and mules provided by the CIA through ISI to the parties for commanders. They were quite separate from the contractors' own animals. Probably the most expensive leg of the journey was the last sector of the pipeline from the parties to the Mujahideen who would use the weapons. The arms transportation rate during those days was $15-20 per kilogram. This meant the cost of moving a mortar from the Pakistan border to the Mazar-i-Sharif area was approximately $1100, while just one bomb cost around $65. Little wonder, then, that the monthly expenditure by the parties on transportation and allied expenses was $1.5 million.27

In 1983 some 10,000 tons of arms and ammunition went through the pipeline to the Afghan resistance. By 1987 this amount had risen to 65,000 tons, all of it handled by 200 men from the Ministry of Defense Constabulary (MODC) with four fork-lift trucks, working seven days a week, month after month.28

The CIA Secret War Game in Pakistan: No one knows with certainty the number, nature, and origin of the arms that actually reached the Afghan resistance from outside sources except ISI, and even though its secrets were leaked when its former operational Director M. Yousaf published its two books. Even the official statements of Washington and Islamabad on the military aid to the Afghan resistance before the publications of Yousaf’s books were fabricated and concocted for obvious reasons but the refugee leaders in Pakistan were also falsely boasting in tune with their masters. In an interview in May 1984, Ishaq Gailani, an eminent refugee leader commented that the weapons with the Afghan resistance from internal sources constituted 80 percent of all arms, captured from DRA troops, desertions, or even barter.29 Deserting Soviet troops, particularly of Central Asian origin who shared languages, religion, and ethnicities with the Afghan resistance, found greater acceptance if they bring their weapons with them at the time of surrender. Numerous, though unverifiable, stories speak of troops bartering weapons and ammunition for hashish, heroin and even food. Most of the guerrilla leaders in Pakistan echo the same 80-20 ratio of weapons, although some guerrilla leaders such as General Ramatullah Safi have maintained that they received little or nothing in the way of foreign-supplied weapons.30 A similar assertion was

made by leaders of the Hezb-e-Islami.31 In addition, the Mujahideen have captured 82 mm (Soviet) mortars and 60 mm Type 63 (Chinese) mortars. British manufactured 2-inch mortars are presumably supplied from Gulf sources. Such light anti-aircraft weapons as the Chinese copy of the Soviet ZPU-2, a twin-barreled 14.5 mm heavy machine gun, also have been seen. According to Bob Woodward, the American journalist and author of The Secret Wars of CIA, “most crucial was President Zia’s willingness to allow the CIA to funnel growing amounts of paramilitary support to the Afghan resistance through Pakistan. The CIA and the Reagan administration all wanted Zia to stay in power and needed to know what was going on inside his government. The CIA station in Islamabad was the biggest in the world. CIA Director Casey, who used to visit Zia once or twice a year during the peak years of the civil war in Afghanistan, had the closest relationship with Zia of any member of the Reagan administration. Thus fully supported by Washington and protected by the world’s most powerful intelligence network, General Zia had been able to avoid return to democracy for eleven long years instead of the 90 days he had promised.32 The CIA had two officers on post in Pakistan in 1983 but these increased to five later on. They were anxious to set up their own operations office alongside the Director Operation of ISI at Rawalpindi but they were not permitted. There were other visitors and the countless paid agents of the CIA operating within the Mujahideen, the parties, the Military Committee, and even within ISI staff. Like any intelligence organization they were invariably devious in the way they went about things.33

Large number of other CIA-sponsored visitors, officials, experts, technicians and analysts, who all felt they could help win the war visited Pakistan with commendable regularity every two weeks from Washington. Another interesting activity of the CIA, and indeed of the Western intelligence organizations from the UK, France, West Germany and elsewhere, was their scramble to buy captured Soviet weapons or equipment. In 1985 the new AK-74 rifle was being used by Soviet troops. It was smaller and lighter than the old AK-47 and fired a 5.45mm bullet, which tended to tumble inside a body, thus giving extensive internal injuries and a large exit wound. The first one captured was sold to the CIA for $5,000. Then the rush started. Weapons, armor plating, avionics equipment (particularly from MI-24 gunship), cipher machines, tank tracks, even binoculars, all had a commercial value soon appreciated by the Mujahideen. Embassy staff cars used to go up to the tribal areas near the border on buying trips, until the DG of ISI protested to the embassies that this must stop and that they should channel their requests through ISI.34 However, from 1984 onwards the CIA tried through their agents, to get an Afghan pilot to defect with an MI-24 Hind helicopter gunship. They had made contacts in Kabul but failed to get one. In the end it was ISI plan that gave the CIA not one, but two, MI-24s.35 Some of the CIA experts in Pakistan were advising ISI personnel on fuel contamination inside Afghanistan. He was of the opinion that Mujahideen sympathizers working at workshops or airports in Afghanistan should be given this contaminant to mix with the fuel in vehicle or aircraft tanks.36 Until 1985 it was a firm policy that only communist bloc

weapons could be bought. This was part of pretense that the West and America in particular, were not backing the Mujahideen with material assistance. Until 1984 the bulk of all arms and ammunition was purchased from China, and they proved to be an excellent supplier, completely reliable, discreet and, at a later stage, even providing weapons as aid as well as for sale.

China: In January 1980, just days after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown, then visiting China, obtained an agreement with their government which permitted over flights of Chinese territory for planes carrying arms destined for the resistance. The People’s Republic of China would supply Sam-7s and RPG anti-tank rockets. In the event the PakistanAfghanistan border was sealed the agreement would even allow unloading equipment in China and would facilitate the difficult transshipment by overland personnel. A Chinese arms supply was thus assured. Yet, the P.R.C. did not agree to a joint operation but rather, as one participant in the discussion put it, to "do things in parallel"37 The Kabul’s regime reportedly alleged that the “Chinese agents have been particularly active in the northern provinces of Afghanistan. They have turned the 74 kilometers Chinese-Afghan border into a source of permanent tension and provocation against Afghanistan. Almost every day armed bandits accompanied by Chinese instructors cross the border, kill local people, loot their property, seize their cattle and so on”.38 However on January 30, 1985, Kabul regime expressed grave concern at Beijing's supplying the resistance with arms. In a letter addressed to its counterpart, the Chinese Communist party, the PDPA accused Beijing of what it

referred to as "terrorist activities". According to this letter, published in the official Afghan media, "training camps are set up in Xingjian province for counter-revolutionary bands”, as the Kabul regime styles the Mujahideen. Furthermore, it went on, "several hundred Chinese instructors are engaged in training Afghan bandits in the training centers inside Pakistani territory. It further alleged that the Chinese have supplied approximately 2,000 heavy machine guns, 1,000 anti-tank rockets and nearly half a million rounds of ammunition.39 Chinese weapons, particularly rockets and anti-aircraft guns, were available to the resistance leaders in sizable quantities. More effective than the heavier, costlier equipment from the West, Chinese arms effectively supplement the Soviet weapons captured by the resistance; and, in most cases, the parts and ammunition were interchangeable.40 The cost of the operation as late as 1983 was no more than $ 50 million, with the United States financing about half and Saudi Arabia most of the rest. By the late 1980, Washington alone was providing as much as $ 600 million in support. Through the decade, more than $ 2.5 billion was set aside by Washington for the Afghan resistance. The level of Saudi funds for its friends among the resistance grew to an estimated $ 400 to $ 500 million by 1990.41 During 1983 approximately 10,000 tons ammunition were received by ISI, rising to 65,000 tons in 1987, all of it handled by 200 men from the Ministry of Defense Constabulary (MODC) with four fork-lift trucks, working seven days a week, month after month. The type of weapons purchased ranged from small arms

through to anti-tank and anti-aircraft (AA) rocket launchers and guns. The great bulk came from China, Egypt, and later on from Israel.42 In 1985, Pakistani government received 10,000 RPGs along with 200,000 rockets, but CIA failed to take into account all the RPGs Pakistan had already received since 1980 (minus an annual wastage rate of 15 per cent). It had not occurred to them that Pakistan needed ammunition for them as well. Similarly with antiaircraft ammunition, the CIA lists were often woefully inadequate as no account was taken of the very high rate of fire of these weapons. So much time and effort could have been saved had the CIA given Pakistan a ceiling on funds, some idea of costs, and left ISI to prepare annual requirements taking into account existing stocks, operational needs and wastage.43 The CIA would arrange and pay for shipment to Karachi, notifying the ISI of arrival dates of shipments. Once the vessel docked, the ISI took over storage and distribution. It had often been stated in the world press that China supplied arms overland via the Karakoram highway, the old Silk Route but constantly denied by Islamabad. However, the mules for Mujahideen were brought from China via the Karakorum highway. 44 Some time CIA even embarrassed ISI by sending ammunition to Karachi early. It happened in the middle of 1984 when an enormous shipment of 100,000, 303 rifles arrived at Karachi. When ISI officials protested that they had not requested this amount, and that they had no storage space, the CIA advised that they represented the 1985 supply in advance, as well as those for the current year. When pressed as to storage space, CIA men told

in confidence that they had been bought at a rock-bottom price from India.45 In 1984, the Turkish authorities made an offer to supply weapons to Afghan resistance. Ankara supplied 60,000 rifles, 8,000 light machine guns, 10,000 pistols and over 100 million rounds of ammunition but most of the weapons were badly corroded or faulty and could not be given to the Mujahideen. In the mid-1984, the CIA came up with another offer of the Swissdesigned 20mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns. The ISI after certain queries declined the offer for technical reasons.46

Egypt: Anwar Sadat, President of Egypt who, according to some accounts, approached the American authorities almost immediately following the Soviet incursion, and the United States quickly and readily responded. Nasser confidant and Sadat critic Mohamed Hassanein Heikal asserts that in 1980, the year after the invasion, Egypt's President faced allegations of corrupt deals in high places. To counterattack, he sought to mobilize the Egyptian people to the cause of Afghanistan, a fellow Muslim nation. Such a diversionary tactic was, in Heikal's view, ineffectual, counterproductive, and probably dangerous.47 Egypt was a logical choice for the covert arms flow. It had a large supply of aging Soviet weaponry dating from the Nasser years that was increasingly less useful, as Sadat had boldly expelled the Soviet technicians from his country in 1972. These arms were being replaced by modern American equipment following the 1974 resumption of relations. Furthermore, Egypt, with the oldest and most experienced military establishment in the Arab world, was

beginning to manufacture spare parts and ammunition not only for its Soviet arsenal but also for export. Indeed, tons of replicated armaments have been manufactured on the outskirts of Cairo.48 On 3rd September 1981, Sadat in an interview with NBC on the: "Today" Program stated that Egypt's sending arms to the guerrillas in Afghanistan was due to the fact that “they are our Muslim brothers and in trouble.”49 President Anwar Sadat, shortly before his death on October 6, 1981, made known to a foreign correspondent and to the world that Egypt was funneling Soviet or Soviet-type light weapons by way of Pakistan to aid the Mujahideen in their struggle against the Soviet occupation. Coordinating and funding for this operation, he revealed, came from none other than the American Central Intelligence Agency.50 The disclosure of Egyptian arms aid to the Mujahideen and the CIA role in these shipments could only underscore the fact that Sadat only needed to restore his own legitimacy, to be gained through the helping of Afghan Mujahideen.51 Despite Sadat disclosures, the CIA started buying large quantities from Egypt. Some reports indicate the weapons arrived in Pakistan as air cargo in planes whose markings were continually altered. Which type of weapons they were, and in what quantities, were not always ascertainable? At the outset, the AK-47 Kalashnikov was the popular small gun. Although more sophisticated weapons, including a limited number of surfaces to air missiles, were being supplied, the weapons clearly remain in the small arms category. The quality of supply was not good because the rifles were rusted together, barrels were solid with dirt and corrosion, and some boxes were empty, while in others the contents were deficient. Even the Egyptian mortar were quality wise not good and the last

thing ISI needed was the added complication of a different caliber weapon with different ammunition, different training and more logistic. The Egyptians had cobbled together arms that had been lying exposed to the atmosphere for years in order to make a substantial amount of money. Though Peshawar was the principal conduit for Egyptian and almost all other external weapons sources, especially small arms and ammunition, some experts (off the record) indicated that the shipments were also being ferried by the CIA via Oman to the Baluchi coast. Such arms were going through Iran and Pakistan, probably without Pakistani permission. Baluchistan was run by its own Mullahs apart from the rest of Iran and it was not difficult therefore to carry something through.52 Perhaps the best example of politics and money overruling military judgment was with the British Blowpipe surface-to-air missile (SAM). The CIA was well aware that ISI’s overriding requirement was for an effective, man-portable, anti-aircraft weapon. Yet in mid-1985, CIA offered Blowpipe, but it was rejected on practical grounds by ISI. The same was the case of the Red Arrow, a Chinese anti-tank, wire-guided missile in late 1986. Once again the CIA was insisting that it would be effective, although they deliberately delayed sending the detailed characteristics of the weapon, urging ISI to take it on their assurances. By this time the Chinese had joined the CIA to get their weapon accepted. Tremendous political pressure built up from Washington for ISI not to reject this missile. The ISI conceded that a Chinese team could come and train Pakistani instructors and that, depending on the results; a final decision would be made after the course. The training lasted for eight weeks and was unique in that the Chinese brought an attractive young

woman as their weapon-training interpreter. Despite her charm and efforts the results, watched by the CIA, were poor. Red Arrow was not bought.53 It is very amazing that the US government had been, in a very small way, an arms supplier to a PDPA regime in Afghanistan. Michael T. Klare learned that between September 1976 and May 1979 the government of Afghanistan received for its police force use of 36,000 pistols and revolvers and 10,000 round of ammunition.54 Using data from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970-1979, he affirms that the government of Afghanistan received $ 478 million in arms, ammunition, and related equipment, excluding services and construction, $ 450 million of which was supplied by the Soviet Union while sources for the remainder are not indicated. Pakistan, by way of comparison, received $ 875 million during the same period at that time, principally from France followed by the United States.55 By 1984-85 the Soviet strategy achieved little more than a continuing stalemate. The war had cost the USSR about $ 12 billion with no substantial improvement in the politico-military situation in Afghanistan. 56 Yet throughout 1983-86 the SovietAfghan superiority remained absolute and the guerrillas were always vulnerable from the air. If much of the resistance controls 90 percent of the land, but the enemy controls 90 percent of the air.57 Nevertheless, wars have ultimately been won, history tells us, by the force controlling the land, not the air alone. Between 1982 and 86 Egyptian and Chinese SAM-7s (man portable anti aircraft missiles) and the British Blowpipes were used (without much effect) by the Afghan resistance. The resistance organizations had purchased some ancient SAM-7s from the Palestine Liberation Organization after it

was forced to withdraw from Lebanon. Priced at a hefty equivalent of 26,000 British pounds each, few worked and most were unserviceable.58 By September, 1986 the first batch of stingers were sent by the US through the ISI. Training was imparted by ISI and immediately they had a telling effect in the skies over Afghanistan. The stinger was a key factor in the war which gradually tilted the balance in favor of the resistance. The resistance began shooting down an average of at least one Soviet-Afghan aircraft per day.59 In early April, 1988, a few days prior to the Geneva Accord, ISI lost the entire stock of arms and ammunition meant for Afghan resistance at Ojhri Camp (Rawalpindi) followed by the US cutback of supplies to Pakistan for the Afghan resistance. But by February 1988, the ex-Soviet Union lost 13,310 soldiers in Afghanistan while 35,478 wounded and 311 reportedly missing.60

The ‘Peshawar Seven’ and Arms: As discussed previously in Chapter Two, the ‘Peshawar Seven’ parties were the most crucial link in the aid chain, in their role as intermediaries, both materially and ideologically speaking. It has been demonstrated how the refusal of the Pakistani services to deal with any unaffiliated individuals or organizations, along with the contacts enjoyed by the so-called ‘fundamentalist’ parties and their leaders (especially Hekmtayar) with the Pakistani establishment, led to their increase in importance at the expense of parties espousing other ideological orientations. Selig S. Harrison is of the opinion that the “lack of momentum in

the UN efforts during 1984 made it easier for the ISI to build resistance operations around the fundamentalist groups, discounting the more moderate elements identified with Zahir Shah, who wanted to test the possibilities for a negotiated settlement. The fundamentalists were closer to ISI than their rivals, partly because they had been working for Pakistani intelligence agencies against the Pashtun dominated Afghan monarchy and the Daud regime even before the Communist take over and the Soviet invasion”. More important, elements in the Pakistani military and the ISI high command shared their world view. General Akhtar (Director General ISI) like Zia, saw the Afghan crisis as a way to achieve a “strategic depth” in Afghanistan and a “strategic alignment” in which Afghanistan and Pakistan would be a part of an anti-Indian, Pan-Islamic regional bloc dominated by fundamentalist parties.61 According to US representative Wilson “apart from their ideological affinity, by channeling weapons aid through the fundamentalists the ISI consciously minimized support for local Pashtun tribal leaders, who were largely allied with nonfundamentalist groups. This anti-Pashtun bias was rooted in the historic Pakistani conflict with Kabul over Pashtun areas straddling the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. But the ISI rationalized its denial of aid to groups linked with the Pashtun tribal structure in military terms.62 Nobody knows exactly how much foreign aid both money and ammunition was received by the party leaders in Peshawar. By 1986 one thousand tons of weapons per week were shifted from Pakistan to Afghanistan. It means that in one year alone, 48 thousand tons of weapons were handed over to the Afghan resistance leaders and

commanders. A report published in September 1984 by an authority on arms use in Afghanistan found a NIFA camp equipped with the 123.7 DShK heavy machine gun or "Dasheka" which possessed Soviet factory markings, vintage 1966; Chinese versions were also known. Although these tripod-mounted guns were the backbone of the Afghan resistance air defense, a smaller number of single or twin 14.5 Zp-I "Ziqriats" and Chinese-made 23 mm's were also known.63 Many Pashtun tribesmen along the Durand Line were plying their traditional ‘double game’ to have a foot in both camps. Thousands participated in the Afghan ‘jehad’ and supported the Mujahideen, but they had also been getting benefits from the Kabul regime. Local tribal Maliks demanded that members of any other tribe or band passing through his area would pay a tribute, usually in cash or weapons –an old practice in the area. The US diplomats and intelligence officers on the scene acknowledged that sometimes the actual fighters were lucky if they got even 50 out of 100 guns sent to the Afghans, through the ISI, by CIA and its allies.64 The Afghan war provided to the local people other additional ways and means to make money. One of these was the smuggling of food into Afghanistan for sale to the garrisons of border posts. Pulses, flour, cooking oil, rice and items such - as petrol, diesel and kerosene for stoves or lamps were purchased by these isolated posts on a regular basis. They came to rely on this source of supply to survive. Even the concrete bunkers at some forts were constructed with cement and iron bars brought direct from Pakistan.

Dr. Marwat with Afghan Mujahideen, Pehwar Pass, Afghanistan, 1984.

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Misappropriation and Corruption: Regarding the allegations of corruption one thing was clear that from common Afghan Mujahid, to party commanders, to leaders of almost all secret agencies including ISI and the CIA, all were involved in corruption in one way or the other. The arms shipments had a very long journey and involving various persons, before they ultimately reached the fighter in the field. The arms pipeline, meanwhile, had problems of its own. A lot of money and ammunition was wasted in Afghan war. Some of it was undoubtedly due to corruption or mistakes in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but a larger proportion had disappeared into the

pockets of unscrupulous governments, arms dealers, politicians and CIA agents, who through incompetence or dishonesty bought or sold millions of dollars worth of worthless or inappropriate arms and ammunition. The party leaders and other commanders were blamed for selling the arms and other material meant for refugees. Commenting on misappropriation in the foreign fund for refugee and the lust of the party leaders for money and power, the contemporary writer Azizur Rahman Ulfat stated: “Under this leadership, usually the aid and reinforcements and other materials that were supplied for the holy war and the relief of refugees were misappropriated and used for personal comforts…(the) dignified, nobles, honest and sober (people) became poorer, (while) shameless opportunists and crooked (people) started roaring business (es) and bought houses and lands in Peshawar”.65 It should be noted that Azizur Rahman Ulfat was killed in by unknown assassin in Peshawar for his bold criticism on the refugee leadership. Apart from local news on the corruption charges in the refugee related institutions, the Washington Post of 8 May, 1987 appeared with headline: “Afghan Rebel Aid Enriches Generals”. The CIA has spent $3 billion on arms for Afghan rebels - half of it put up by the US taxpayers. Yet not a single American decides who gets the weapons”. 'We have found that the CIA's secret arms pipeline to the Mujahideen is riddled with opportunities for corruption. The losers are the poorly equipped guerrillas fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan,

and the American people whose congressional representatives have been betrayed by the CIA.'66 The US government also looked the other way when it received reports that elements of the Pakistan’s army and refugee administration were conniving with members of the Peshawar parties in the sale of weapons and relief supplies, as well as for other favors. As a matter of policy, the Pakistan military laid claim to a share of the weapons’ flow. Zia’s armed forces saw it as their right to appropriate weapons from CIA shipments, and the CIA in effect, condoned the theft as a sort of commission, as the way one does business with the government in Pakistan. It is believed that at least 20 percent of the arms and perhaps more than 30 percent were siphoned off from the supply pipelines.67 However, Brigadier Yousaf claimed that “although corruption is a way of life in Pakistan, the military is perhaps the only organization in which it is minimal”. He insists with arguments that the middle section of the pipe line was “virtually corruption free” and 'that the opportunities for diversion and corruption are far greater before the arms get to Karachi than after'.68 Replying to the charges that the ISI diverted arms to the Pakistan Army, Brigadier Yousaf states: “These were correct to the extent that some 200 14.5mm machine guns, RPG-7s and SA7s were given to the Army to be deployed in emergencies on the western border when the Soviet/Afghan forces stepped up their air and artillery violations into Pakistan. I can say with absolute authority that no other weapon was so diverted. It was foolish of us to do it without taking the CIA into our confidence, as I am sure

they would not have objected. As it was, they found out, so there was a flurry of accusations and denials which damaged our relationship unnecessarily”69 The British author and arms trade specialist James Adams, who studied the war’s progress, observed, “The mixture of Pakistani corruption and the Afghan aptitude for making money by any means produced an industry which had little to do with a holy war against the infidel Soviet invaders and a great deal to do with profiteering”. 70

Training Camps for Afghan resistance in Pakistan: The border areas of Pakistan had grown into a vast, sprawling administrative base for the anti-Kabul resistance. The Mujahideen came there for arms, they came to rest, they came to settle their families into the camps, they came for training and they came for medical attention. The main bases for military training were in Peshawar, Chitral, Bajuar, Miran Shah and Quetta. In Peshawar area the important training camps were reportedly in Jamrud, Warsak Dam, Landi Kotal and Chirat. In Landi Kotal and Jamrud, the camps specialized in subversive activities and sabotage with the use of bombs and mines, as well as a large stock of all sorts of weapons, ammunition and food stuffs.71 Some fifty-five border bases were located just inside Pakistan, mostly clustered around the main entry points near Parachinar and Chaman, to the north west of Quetta. Each camp had a staff of 2-3 officers, 6-8 JCOs and 10-12 NCOs, assisted by about ten soldiers for administrative and guard duties. Most of the instructors were Pashto speaking and in some cases Dari (Afghan Persian) and Uzbek translators were hired. 72

Close to the border, especially around Parachinar, Miram Shah and Chaman, everybody was involved in the war in some way or other. There were tens of thousands of refugees in their camps, the bases teemed with Mujahideen, hundreds of transport contractors milled around with their animals, and scores of trucks were being loaded for their final journey to the end of the supply pipeline. Every day of each month, winter permitting, arms and ammunition were on the move. These areas contained the main jump-off points from the Mujahideen's base of supply. The Durand Line was to the Mujahideen what the Amu River was to the Soviets. Here commanders came to collect their supplies, here the trucks from Peshawar and Quetta were off-loaded, and here the pack trains of animals assembled and loaded up. Like all other activities, the Afghan Bureau of ISI maintained complete secrecy in its war game. Pakistani public, the politicians, enemy agents, the Pakistan Army and Soviet spy satellites had to be kept in complete ignorance of the whereabouts of each training camp. The camps had to be within a night’s drive from Peshawar or Quetta, as all trainees were brought by truck during darkness so they would have no ink of their location. The camps were not located near Army base or exercise area and not close to public areas. The locations of the camps were frequently changing and for secrecy and security reasons the telephone or wireless sets were not in use. Later on CIA provided secure radio sets for communication.73

Training of the Afghan Refugees Youth

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Training of the Afghan Refugees: A Pakistani retired brigadier very innocently trying to convince the readers that the “men ISI sent into Afghanistan were not spies, they were soldiers from the Pakistan Army, serving with the Afghan Bureau of ISI”.74 The ISI sent Pakistani military personnel into Afghanistan from 1981 to 1986 on mission to accompany Afghan Mujahideen for special operations inside Afghanistan. Normally a team would consist of an officer (usually a major), a JCO and an NCO, one of whom had to be a Pashto speaker. These officers and NCOs had to live and fight as the Mujahideen, enduring the same privations and hardships. They had grown

beards, were dressed as Mujahideen, so that they were indistinguishable from their guerrilla companions. 75 They acted as advisers, assisting the Afghan Commanders in carrying out subversive activities. Usually two Pakistani teams in Afghanistan were operative throughout the period May to October, in the field from one to three months. No team had the knowledge of the other team. In 1984, no less than eleven such teams operated in Afghanistan, seven against Kabul, two against Bagram airfield and two around Jalalabad. 76 The CIA instructors were responsible to train Pakistani Army instructors in case of new weapons, particularly anti-aircraft weapons. After completion of training, the Pakistani instructors were responsible to train the Mujahideen. “At the end of 1983 we were operating two camps in Pakistan, each with a capacity of 200 trainees. By mid-1984 we were putting over 1000 a month through the system, and by 1987 we had seven camps operating simultaneously- four near Peshawar and three around Quetta.77 By the end of 1983 only 3,000 refugees had received any formal training at the two camps that had been established in Pakistan. This ratio was increased up to 1,000 Mujahideen in a month (in one year 12,000). Some time the ISI organized Mobile Training Team (MTT) along with a syllabus and training aids for various teams of guerrilla on the requests of party leaders. This crash program necessitated more staff and more money, both of which quickly provided by ISI, so the resultant statistics were startling. In 1984, 20,000 Mujahideen were trained, with 17,700 completing courses in 1985 and 19,400 in 1986; in total, by late

1987 at least 80,000 Mujahideen had received training in Pakistan over a four-year period, and many thousands more had done so in Afghanistan.78

Three features of the ISI strategy: First, there was a concerted effort on the part of the Director Operation of ISI to coordinate attacks aimed at cutting off Kabul from supplies or facilities coming from outside the city. This involved ambushes on convoys on roads leading to Kabul, the mining of dams that provided water, or cutting its power lines. Second, was sabotage and assassination from within. The latter included placing a bomb under the dining-room table of Kabul University in late 1983. The explosion, in the middle of their meal, killed nine Soviets, including a woman professor. Educational institutions were considered fair game, as the staff were all communists indoctrinating their students with Marxist dogma and turning them away from the true faith of Islam. Among other victims were the rector of the Kabul University and General Abdul Wadood, the commander of the Central Corps, who was killed in his office. The ISI reportedly even made numerous attempts to kill Dr. Najibullah, both when he was head of KhAD (Khidmat-eItlati-e-Daulat) and after he became President. The third way of hitting Kabul was by stand-off long-range rocket attacks. This was by far the most common method. Tens of thousands of rockets have fallen on the city and its environments during the war. ISI targets were always military or associated with the Communist government in some way but mostly the victims were innocent civilians or Mujahideen supporters. A revealing

comment on the unintentional killing of civilians was made to Mark Urban, the author of War in Afghanistan, by Abdul Haq, a Commander who operated against Kabul. He said, 'their [the Mujahideen] target is not the civilians ... but if I hit them I don't care.... If my family lived near the Soviet Embassy I would hit it. I wouldn't care about them. If I am prepared to die, my son has to die for it, and my wife has to die for it.' The ISI list of potential targets suitable for rocket attack in Kabul ran to over seventy. 79

The Petro -Dollar Invasion: The CIA supported the Afghan anti-Kabul resistance by spending the American taxpayer’s money, billions of dollars of it over the years, on buying arms, ammunition and equipment. A high proportion of the CIA aid was in the form of cash. For every dollar supplied by the US another was added by the Saudi Arabian government. The combined funds, running into several hundred million dollars a year, were transferred by the CIA to special accounts in Pakistan under the control of ISI. All this money was spent in Pakistan or Afghanistan, but the bulk of the CIA/ Saudi Arabia funds were spent outside these countries, on buying arms and ammunition. The type of weapons purchased ranged from small arms to anti-tank (AT) and anti- aircraft (AA) rocket launchers and guns. 80 The CIA was paying the rents of refugee party offices, construction and maintenance of warehouses, purchase of software (rations, clothes), subsistence allowance for leaders, salaries for party officials/employees, and transport. This latter included buying vehicles, and paying contractors to carry all supplies forward into Afghanistan, but not the purchase of mules from

China (or later of horses from Argentina) which the CIA did themselves. Normally every party had exhausted this source of money within 10-12 days. Without cash, supplies got stuck in the pipe, which meant in party warehouses at Peshawar or Quetta. Eighty per cent of all arms and ammunition was allocated to the parties for onward distribution. Commanders had to belong to a party in order to get weapons, the only exception being when they came for training for special operations, but, even though they were then given the weapons direct, they came from their Parties' allocation.81 Almost all Peshawar Seven parties employed permanent staff, often Western-educated men who were not satisfied with the meager $100 a month salary. They demanded, and got, three times this amount, plus free housing. There was an ever-present temptation to sell weapons they had been given at 100 per cent profit to make up cash shortfalls. 82 In 1987, certainly the fundamentalist parties got lion’s share from ISI round about 67-73 per cent. Parties and commanders did have other sources of finance. Until late 1984 local taxes were levied by commanders in their valleys in Afghanistan, but as the Soviets progressively pounded the villages, smashed the irrigation systems, burnt crops and drove survivors into refugee camps, these taxes became impossible to collect. Captured weapons were used, sold or bartered. According to Islamic law war booty must be divided so that a fifth goes to the state (Party).83 For every US dollar that was supplied by the Americans to the CIA’s arms buying fund, the Saudis equaled it. Other rich Arab individuals from all over the Middle East have also contributed

very substantial sums to particular parties. Prince Turkie, the then head of the Saudi intelligence service, was a frequent visitor to Islamabad, and his relations with the ISI Director General were excellent. Both believed fervently in the importance of “an Islamic brotherhood which ignored territorial frontiers”.84

THE MONEY FLOW USA

SAUDI ARABIA

ARABS

CIA ARMS PURCHASE CHINA EGYPT ISRAEL USA UK PAKISTAN

PAKISTAN

ISI

ISI

RAWALPINDI & QUETTA

ISLAMABAD

REFUGEES PARTIES MONEY ARMS & SOFTWARE

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Arab Money: Though CIA and ISI managed logistical framework tried to supply and pay the Afghan refugees and guerillas through each of the seven main political parties, in practice pay and logistics for fighters in the field often had to come directly from outside donors.

Arab journalists who visited Arab voluntaries in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1980-85 revealed that full-time fighters were getting $ 100 to $ 300 per month. The commanders and their deputies were getting more.85 It should be noted that being a lecturer during 80s my (Dr. Marwat) monthly salary was less than $ 200.86 It was largely Arab money that saved the entire anti-Kabul pyramid/web. The rich individuals and private organizations in the Arab world lavishly contributed to the Afghan refugees generally and particularly went to the four fundamentalist parties out of Peshawar Seven. Even among the fundamentalists, Sayaf was getting more because of his old personal contacts in Saudi Arabia. Naturally in the war-game as well as in political discourse the moderates were less affective, and were lagged behind their fundamentalist compatriots. Even the role of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), headed by Pakistani tycoon, Agha Hassan Abedi in the privatization of Jehad and its links with black money is no longer secret.87

Arab Afghans: During the late 1980s, new phenomenon which developed in and around Afghanistan was the arrival of Arab volunteers for the Afghan Jehad with their own motives. Barney Krispin, a military officer who worked for the CIA during Afghan war in an unpublished essay, summoned up the relationship between Afghan and non-Afghan fighters at that time in an unpublished essay: The relationship between the Afghans and the

Internationalists was like a varsity team to the scrubs. The Afghans fought their own war and outsiders of any stripe were kept on the sidelines. The Bin Ladin's of this Jehad could build and guard roads, dig ditches, and prepare fixed positions; however, this was an Afghan Jehad, fought by real Afghans, and eventually won by real Afghans.88 Milton Bearden, the former CIA station chief in Pakistan, was equally blunt, in writing: Despite what has often been written, the CIA never recruited, trained, or otherwise used the Arab volunteers who arrived in Pakistan. The idea that the Afghans somehow needed fighters from outside their culture was deeply flawed and ignored basic historical and cultural facts.89 Bearden continued to explain though that while the Afghan Arabs were "generally viewed as nuisances by Mujahidin commanders, some of whom viewed them as only slightly less bothersome than the Soviets," the work of Arab fundraisers was appreciated.90 The Saudi Arabia-based Islamic Coordination Council organized both the new recruits, and disbursement of assistance. In Pakistan, Arab volunteers staffed numerous Saudi Red Crescent offices near the Afghan frontier in Peshawar. The Arab volunteers also disproportionately gravitated to Sayyaf group. His party preached and propagated a strict Salafi version of Islam, critical of manifestations of both Sufism and tribalism in Afghanistan. Arab volunteers, and some Christian missionaries, rushed to open

their missions in the name of `humanitarian assistance' or `the holy war against the infidels', and tried their best to propagate their ideologies, creeds and beliefs. The Arab NGOs succeeded in conversion of a good number of orthodox Hanafites to Wahabism, separating their mosques and Madrassas in the refugee camps, and building grand mosques and Madrassas in some cities to educate and indoctrinate the Afghans. The Christian missionaries did not make any mentionable headway. Whatever belief, faith, code, and ethics the Afghans had in Afghanistan was shattered by gold and guns in Pakistan.91 Even without a central role in the Afghan resistance movement, though, the Arabs did establish a well-financed presence in Afghanistan and along Pak-Afghan border. Ahmed Rashid, eminent Pakistani journalist reported that between 1982 and 1992, some 35,000 Islamists would serve in Afghanistan. 92

Drug & War: One of the main and deleterious features of the Afghan War was the unchecked spread of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan along the Durand Line. In 1979, this region grew opium only for regional markets and produced no heroin. Within two years, however, the Pak-Afghan borderlands became the world's top heroin producer, supplying 60 percent of the U.S demand. A.W McCoy admitted in his book that: “American Cold warriors embraced a military anticommunist ideology. In their mind the entire world was locked in a Manichaean struggle between ‘godless communists’ and the ‘free world’. In this desperate struggle to save “Western civilization”,

any ally was welcome and any means was justified. The CIA became the vanguard of American’s anticommunist crusade and it dispatched small members of well-financed agents to every corner of the globe to mould the local political situation in a fashion compatible with American interests. He further states: During the 1980s the CIA’s two main covert operations became interwoven with the global narcotics trade. The Agency’s support for Afghan guerrillas through Pakistan coincided with the emergence of southern Asia as the major heroin supplier for European and American markets. Although the US maintained a substantial force of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents in Islamabad during the 1980s, the unit was restrained by US national security imperatives and did almost nothing to slow Pakistan’s booming heroin export to America.93 In September 1981, Dr. Najibullah, as Intelligence Chief of Afghanistan’s KhAD, offered facilities to tribal heroin-makers and smugglers inside Afghanistan, to launch what was then called "the heroin war" against Pakistan, USA and the West, which eventually showed signs of embarrassment in the target countries. In a statement, Dr. Najib had pleaded that if alcoholic beverages formed an industry in the western world, why should opiates not flourish as an industry in the eastern world?94 As the anti-Kabul Mujahideen guerrillas seized territory inside

Afghanistan, they ordered peasants to plant opium as a revolutionary tax. Across the border in Pakistan, the Afghan leaders and local syndicates under the protection of Pakistan authorities operated hundreds of heroin laboratories. During this decade of wide-open drug-dealing, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in Islamabad failed to instigate major seizures or arrests. In May 1990, as the CIA operation was winding down, The Washington Post published a report on the front-page charging that Gulbudin Hekmatar, the ClA's favored Afghan leader, was a major heroin manufacturer. The Post argued, in a manner similar to the San Jose Mercury News's later report about the contras, that U.S. officials had refused to investigate charges of heroin dealing by its Afghan allies "because U.S. narcotics policy in Afghanistan has been subordinated to the war against Soviet influence there." The article further states that the US had failed to take action against Pakistan’s heroin dealers, claiming that: US official had ignored Afghan complaints of heroin trafficking by Hekmatyar and ISI an allegation that at least one senior American official confirmed…Hekmatyar’s Commanders close to ISI run heroin laboratories in south west Pakistan. 95 The CIA and ISI along with Afghan Mujahideen were not only eager to finance the anti-Kabul and anti-Soviet war through drug money, they even succeeded to addict the Russian soldiers. One Mujahid was quoted as saying: We try to poison the Russian with it …the Mujahideen were selling opium and hashish mostly but now also heroin to the Russian soldiers in

exchange for guns and to poison their spirit”.96 A Soviet soldier from Estonia was quoted as saying, Often regular Afghan Army soldiers exchanged their Russian arms for food and drink from the peasants. So we did the same thing, because in the chaos of war to explain the loss of a weapon is easy.... We used to buy all kinds of food and drink, and even bread in exchange for our weapons....Some soldiers got hashish and other drugs. Our Asian soldiers were very often drug addicts because hash and other things grow on their land.97 The UN representative for Afghanistan Diego Cardoviez, while discussing the CIA efforts to demoralize the Communists, writes: “Moscow had its own growing worries about Afghanistan as illness and drug abuse spread in the ranks of Soviet forces…some reports indicated that half of the men in certain combat units were ill at any given time…In January 1987, out of six people in Moscow surveyed in a government sponsored opinion poll openly criticized the war, blaming it for widespread drug addiction and juvenile delinquency”.98 A UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP) survey claimed that in 1994 Afghanistan had produced 3270 tones of opium, thus displacing Myanmar (Burma) as the world's largest supplier. The "Golden Triangle" on the border of Burma, Thailand and Laos in South East Asia and now the "Golden Crescent" on the borders of

Afghanistan, NWFP and Baluchistan is emerging as major drug centre. The opium harvest of Afghanistan which used to be exported to Iran stopped altogether with the rise of Islamic Revolutionary government there. With the missing of Iranian market and political crisis in their own country, the Afghan Poppy grower along with tribal people began to set up heroin manufacturing laboratories in the tribal area along the Pak-Afghan border. In Pakistan, the heroin-addict population went from near zero in 1979 to 5,000 in 1981 and had risen past 3.0 million by year 2,000.99 In 1995, Charles Cogan, the former CIA director of the Afghan operation admitted the CIA had indeed sacrificed the drug war to fight the Cold War. "Our main mission was to do as much damage as possible to the Soviets. We didn't really have the resources or the time to devote to an investigation of the drug trade," he told an Australian television reporter. "I don't think that we need to apologize for this. Every situation has its fallout.... There was fallout in terms of drugs, yes. But the main objective was accomplished. The Soviets left Afghanistan."100 It is reported that besides other things heroin money has been spent in the election campaigns and horse trading in Pakistan's parliament. The heroin culture developed to such an extent in Pakistan and particularly in the tribal areas that it became a fashion to smuggle heroin. This heroin malignant money changed the over all socio-economic and political order in the tribal belt. Persons like Wali Khan Kuki Khel and Nadir Khan Zaka Khel-once the protagonist of Pakhtunistan movement were overshadowed by persons like Ayub Afridi with wealth and power. Even in Orakzai Agency Late Maj. General (retd) Jamaldar Khan was defeated by

an ordinary but wealthy contractor in the election.101 Interestingly in the formative phase the Taliban regime in Afghanistan legalized the opium production by imposing the usur tithe, with the result that in 1997, Afghanistan alone produced 2,800 tones of opium, half of it in Helmand, the seat of the Taliban. The Taliban needed hard cash to maintain its army. The lucrative trades in narcotics and Taliban’s hunger for arms have brought many criminal elements- the Russian mafia and the Asian drug lords - into the region. The opium trade is not only routed through Pakistan but finds ready market in Peshawar, Karachi and Lahore, Pakistan's main cities.102

Politico-Religious cobweb for Afghan Refugees Afghanistan

Migration

Mujahid Holy warrior

Muhajir Refugee

ISI

Mullah

Masjid

Afghan Refugees

Peshawar Seven

Madrasa

Maktab

ARC

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The Afghan Jehad and Religious Extremism: In this new politico-ideological Jehadi backdrop, new sociocultural trends and traits developed with extreme political or religious agendas in the name of religion, sect or ethnicity in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The unholy alliance of the CIA, ISI and Islamic fundamentalist parties with the three Asian actors- Deng Xiaoping, Sadat and Zia at the forefront opened the “Pandora’s Box” of extremism, fundamentalism, and drug trafficking in combating the menace of Soviet Communism. By financing and training the Afghan

Mujahideen, the United States created what it now regards as a major threat to its own security. "Sensing (an) its enormous opportunity, traders in guns and drugs became linked to the phenomenon, creating an informal but extraordinary cartel of vested interests in guns, gold, and god," Eqbal Ahmad wrote in 1999. "The Soviet forces left Afghanistan in 1989 . . . but the idea of Jehad--an armed struggle of Muslim believers that had all but died out by the twentieth century--had been fully resuscitated," the late Pakistani scholar Eqbal Ahmad explained.103 A month before his enforced seclusion, Dr. Najabullah had given one of his last interviews to a US reporter: We have common task-Afghanistan, the USA and the civilized world- to launch a joint struggle against fundamentalism. If fundamentalism comes to Afghanistan, war will continue for many years. Afghanistan will turn into a centre of world smuggling for narcotic drugs. Afghanistan will be turned into a centre for terrorism. 104 More than 100,000 Islamic militants were reportedly trained in Pakistan between 1986 and 1992, in camps overseen by the CIA and Britain's MI6, with the British SAS trained future al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in bomb-making and other black arts. Their leaders were trained at a CIA camp in Virginia. This was called Operation Cyclone and continued long after the Soviets had withdrawn in 1989.105 Selig Harrison, a leading US expert on South Asia said in a conference on "Terrorism and Regional Security: Managing the Challenges in Asia."

"I warned them that we were creating a monster…The CIA made a historic mistake in encouraging Islamic groups from all over the world to come to Afghanistan." The US provided $3 billion for building up these Islamic groups, and it accepted Pakistan's demand that they should decide how this money should be spent.106 Harrison also recalled a conversation he had with the late General Zia-ul Haq of Pakistan. "Gen Zia spoke to me about expanding Pakistan's sphere of influence to control Afghanistan, then Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and then Iran and Turkey," Harrison said. That design continues, he added. According to Harrison, Gen. Mohammed Aziz, who was involved in the Zia plan, has been elevated now to a key position by Chief Executive, General Parvez Musharraf. He further stated: "The Taliban are not just recruits from ‘madrasas’ but are on the payroll of the ISI". The Taliban are now "making a living out of terrorism… The creation of the Taliban was central to Pakistan's "pan-Islamic vision," Harrison said. The creation of the Taliban had been "actively encouraged by the ISI and the CIA," and "Pakistan has been building up Afghan collaborators who will sustain Pakistan," he stated.107 A Jehadi culture made a way into in the overall political and social structures of the Afghans and Pakistanis. Almost all political parties of the refugee as well as religio-political parties of Pakistan with varying names have their own militant armed wings. Jehad and smuggling of weapons has become big business fueled largely by anti- Indian struggle in Kashmir, anti-American resistance in

Afghanistan, Iraq and even in tribal areas of Pakistan. Sectarian terrorists have killed or injured thousands of Pakistanis over the last 10 years, even attempting to murder former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President General Parvez Musharraf.108 The armed groups, many of them with battlehardened Taliban (religious students), are in the vanguard of sectarian killings throughout Pakistan, which are on the increase; killings of members of rival sects, Sunnis against the Shia, Deobandi Sunnis against Barelvi Sunnis and so on. They have also begun to issue threats against the state itself and the society in Pakistan. Assassinations, machine-gun attacks on mosques and explosions have claimed 581 lives and over 1600 injured between 1990 and 1997.109 In addition, the Taliban Islamic Movement (TIM) austere militancy and its drive to consolidate power over Afghanistan provided the sectarian forces with a model to follow. For instance, the Tehrik-e-Taliban-Zargari (Taliban Movement of Zargari) of the religious students operated in the Orakzai Agency in tribal area of Pakistan. In December, 1998, the leaders of the movement established a Shariat court and ordered the execution of a group that it found guilty of criminal activity. The executions were carried out in public and the houses of the executed were raised to the ground.110 In January 1999, the Tehrik launched a movement on the Taliban model in Hangu district of NWFP against television, dish antennae, music and unveiled women. 111 Even Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (Movement for the enforcement of Islamic laws) of Sufi Muhammad in Malakand took its new form into a militant uprising under the shadow of

Taliban regime in neighboring Afghanistan. Sufi Muhammad declared Jehad against America and offered his services to Amir ul- Momaneen Mullah Umar. Sufi Muhammad and some of his followers were sentenced to three years imprisonment in November 2001 and his outfit (TNSM} and four other Jehadi organizations were banned by President Parvez Musharraf of Pakistan on January 12, 2002. Though legally TNSM is banned yet unofficially it is still active in Malakand. 112 Last but not the least, the CIA and ISI along with the Afghans won the war at large, but lost the peace in the region as well as in the world.

References and Notes 1

Louis Dupree, The Marxist Regimes and the Soviet Presence in Afghanistan: An Ages-old culture responds to late twentieth –century Aggression”. pp. 58-73; cf. also www. Institute for afghan-studies.org/economy / return. 2 Diego Cordovez & Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside story of the Soviet Withdrawal, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995, P. 92. 3 Mohammad Yousaf & Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story, Jang Publisher, Lahore, 1992, P.25; In General Ziaul Haq's government, it was widely believed that through the Afghan Mujahideen's victory, Pakistan would gain "strategic depth". Commenting on this plan of Pakistan Eqbal Ahmad (eminent Pakistani scholar) stated: “I first encountered this view in 1988, during a meeting with the late General Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan. I argued then, as I would now, that this is a skewed idea; we are after a shadow which would lead us into unrelieved darkness”. See his article “In Afghanistan, Cease Fire Please” in the daily Dawn, Karachi, 7th April, 1991. 4 Ibid, P. 38 5 Ibid, pp.37, 138. Our (ISI) interest in the camps was that they provided a safe refuge from the war for the families of the Mujahideen, who could fight in Afghanistan in the knowledge that their relatives were immune from reprisals.

They also acted as places to which the Mujahideen could return for a rest and to see their families without compromising themselves. Also, inside these camps was a huge reservoir of potential recruits for the Jehad. Thousands of young boys came to the camps as refugees, grew up, and then followed their fathers and brothers to the war”. 6 Ibid, P. 35 7 Nassim Jawad, Role of the International community in future Afghanistan, Defence Journal, Urdu Bazar Karachi, Vol: xvii, no: 9, 1991, P 25 ; Soviet military aid to Afghanistan in 1989 was $ 4 billion and in 1990 it reached to $ 6.4 billion. Izvestiya, 25th May, 1992. 8 See for details and the figures: Mr. Shah Zaman, Humanitarian Assistance Program for Afghan Refugees in North West Frontier Province Pakistan, Afghan Refugee Commissionerate, NWFP, Peshawar, December, 1985; Defence Journal, Karachi, Vol. IX, No. 12, 1983, pp.37-46 and the same journal of 1011, 1983. 9 Frederic Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict: 1979-1985, Oxford University Press, 2003, P. 45. 10 Ibid, P. 44 11 Edited Undeclared War, Armed intervention and other forms of interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Information Department DRA Ministry of Foreign affairs Kabul, 1980, P. 25; See also The Truth about Afghanistan: Documents, Facts, Eyewitness Reports, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1980 for US, Pakistan, China and Saudi Arabia’s blatant interference in Afghanistan. 12 Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective, ArnoldHeinemann publishers, India, 1987, P.118. 13 Indy Media site, Interview of Zbigniew Brzezinski Le Nouvel Observateur (France), January, 15-21, 1998, P.76. 14 Anthony Hyman (1982), pp 170-172; (1984), pp. 170-171, provides a useful summary from which the following summary is drawn. The analysis is mine. 15 Ibid. 16 Grare Opcit, P.56 17 Grant M. Farr & John G. Merrian, Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival, Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore, P.75 18 Grare Opcit, P. 57

19

Ibid, P. 57 Hennery S. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet intervention, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999, P. 183 21 Amin Saikal & W .Maley, The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Cambridge University Press, UK, 1989, 22 Brig (Retd) Mohammad Yousaf, The Silent Soldier, The Man Behind the Afghan Jehad, Jang Publisher, Lahore, P.34. 23 Ibid, p.16-17 24 John Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, London, Pluto Press, ,1999, P.54 25 Yousaf & Mark Adkin Opcit, PP 78-96. 26 Ibid, P. 94 27 Ibid, P. 106. The aforementioned was the London spokesman of Taliban’s government. 28 Ibid, P .98 29 John Fullerton, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Far Eastern Economic Review Ltd, Hong Kong, 1984, P. 197; Syed Ishaq Gailani though reportedly developed some differences with his uncle but he along with his wife was very active in social and political activities in Peshawar. Currently (2004) he is a presidential candidate in Afghanistan. 30 Grant M. Farr & John G. Merrian Opcit, P. 72; General R. Safi later on wrote books in Pashtu against the Northern Alliance and Ahmad Shah Masud. In his books, he tried to prove Ahmad Shah Masud as an agent of the KGB and Soviet Union. In the year 2000 he was the spokesman of Taliban’s government in London. 31 Ibid, P.98 32 Murtaza Malik, The Curtain Rises: Uncovered Conspiracies in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 2002, P.157 33 Yousaf & Mark Adkin Opcit, pp .91-92 34 Ibid, P. 92 35 Ibid, P. 92 36 Ibid, pp. 89-90 37 Grant M. Farr & John G. Merrian Opcit on P. 74 quoted Carl Bernstein, Arms for Afghanistan, The new Republic, July, 1981, pp. 8-10. 38 Undeclared War, Armed intervention and other forms of interference in the 20

internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Information Department DRA Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kabul,1980, P. 27 39 Grant M. Farr & John G. Merrian Opcit, P. 74 40 Ibid. P. 74 41 Marving G. Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance & Reconstruction, Pak. Book Corporation, Karachi, 1994, P.30. 42 Yousaf & Mark Adkin Opcit, P. 83. 43 Ibid, P.83 44 Ibid, P. 84 45 Ibid, P. 85 46 Ibid, pp. 87-88 47 Grant M. Farr & John G. Merrian Opcit, P.81 48 Judith Perera, “But does it have military muscle?”, The Middle East, February, 1984, PP 14-16.Carl Bernstein disagrees that Sadat was the initiator. He says that the US President affirmed a "moral obligation" to arm the Afghan resistance at a meeting of the National Security Council on hours after the Soviet incursion. See Carl Bernstein, “Arms for Afghanistan”, The New Republic, July 18, 1981, PP 8,9,10 49 Grant M. Farr & John G. Merrian Opcit, P. 72 50 Ibid. P.72 51 Interview with some Arabs in Peshawar, dated July 18, 1980 52 Yousaf & Mark Adkin Opcit, P. 85; Some references comes from an interview in Washington, D.C., on April 19, 1984. For a probably inaccurate and overblown account of CIA activities; See Time, June 11, 1984. 53 Yousaf & Mark Adkin Opcit, pp. 88-89. 54 T. Michael Klare, American arms supermarket, University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 1985, P 263. The source cited is Export Licenses issued to U.S. arms firms by the office of Munitions Control, U.S. Department of State. 55 Ibid, pp. 210-211, Using data from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures (1982). 56 The daily Frontier Post, Peshawar, 29th December, 1989. In 1980s the Soviet cost in Afghanistan was estimated $ 96 billion to $152 billion. Henry S. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, P. 252. Moscow lost 13833 personnel from armed forces, 572 from border guards and other KGB units, 28 official and 20 others (total 14453)

and 417 servicemen were missing. Bradsher Opcit. pp..251-259. Grant M. Farr & John G. Merrian Opcit, P. 86 58 Ibid. P.88 59 Strategic Survey 1988-89, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1989, P.140. 60 Yousaf,, Silent Soldier, pp. 9, 10, 21; See Yousaf & Mark Adkin Opcit, P.105 61 Diego Cordovez, & Selig S. Harrison, P.162. 62 Ibid., P.162. 63 Grant M. Farr & John G. Merrian Opcit, P.87 quoting from David Isby, Harassing the bear: New Afghan tactics stall Soviet victory, 1984. 64 John Cooley Opcit, P.55 65 Aziz Rahman Ulfat, The Crisis of Leadership, published by the founder of the Islami Entiqam Party, Peshawar, 1981, P. 5 66 The Washington Post, 8th May, 1987 67 Marving G. Weinbaum Opcit, P 31 68 Yousaf & Mark Adkin Opcit, PP. 90, 102 . 69 Ibid, P.102 70 John Cooley Opcit, P. 55 71 Interview with S. Hassan Pacha and Janan, Peshawar, 1985. 72 Yousaf & Mark Adkin Opcit, P .120 73 Ibid, P. 118 74 Ibid, P.113 75 Ibid, P. 114 76 Ibid, P 113. 77 Ibid, P 117 78 Ibid, pp. 116, 117; According to Pakistani source from 1980 to 1989 the total aerial violations of Pakistani territory by Afghan government causing 2362 casualties, including more than 550 killed. 79 Ibid. pp. 146-7; On page 64 of the same book Brigadier Yousaf proudly confessing by writing: “I was now cast [in ISI] in the role of overall guerrilla leader. I ran over in my mind the recognized criteria normally necessary for an armed resistance movement to succeed: “First, a loyal people who would support the effort at great risk to themselves, a local population, the majority of whom would supply shelter, food, recruits and information. The Afghan people in the thousands of rural villages met this 57

requirement.” Second, the need for the guerrilla to believe implicitly in his cause, for him to be willing to sacrifice himself completely to achieve victory. The Afghans had Islam. They fought a Jehad, they fought to protect their homes and families.” Third, favorable terrain. With over two-thirds of Afghanistan covered by inhospitable mountains known only to the local people, I had no doubts about this.” “Fourth, a safe haven - a secure base area to which the guerrilla could withdraw to refit and rest without fear of attack. Pakistan provided the Mujahideen with such a sanctuary.” “Fifth, and possibly most important of all, a resistance movement needs outside backers, who will not only represent his cause in international councils, but are a bountiful source of funds. The US and Saudi Arabia certainly fulfilled this role. General Akhtar had been right; the ingredients for military victory were all there. I needed to give careful thought to where, and how, to apply the thousand cuts to bring down the bear”. Yousaf proudly confessed that in 1984 we (ISI) instituted a series of successful attacks on Bagram Air Base (Kabul) during which some twenty aircraft were destroyed on the ground. The story of how one of them was carried out illustrates the system of training and tactics working in practice…Our biggest success was in 1984 when we succeeded in destroying eighty pylons in one night in the Sarubi-Kabul sector. Kabul was plunged into darkness. The operation was filmed by some American journalists and later shown on television under the title Operation Blackout. 80 Ibid, P .83; See also Brig (Retd) Mohammad Yousaf, The Silent Soldier, The Man Behind the Afghan Jehad, Jang Publisher, Lahore, P.42 81 Ibid, pp. 103-104 82 Yousaf & Mark Adkin Opcit, P.105 83 Ibid, pp. 105-106 84 Prince Turkie Al-Faisal was the official representative of the Saudi government on Afghan Jehad. He used to visit Pakistan secretly at least twice a year to discuss the Afghan situation with General Akhtar, Director General ISI and the Afghan refugee leaders. His education and experience in the West made him completely free of the common Arab prejudices towards the non Arabs. Prince Turkie and General Akhtar had developed a special liking for each other

and as a result, Saudi government provided full support to the Afghan cause. 85 Cooley Opcit, P.107 86 Dr. Marwat Personal observation in Kurram, Mohmand Agency and Kabul; and discussion with Afghan commanders in Peshawar in the years 1981, 1982, and 19 85. 87 Cooley Opcit, P .111 88 By Michael Rubin, adjunct scholar The Washington Institute for Near East Policy: Middle East Review of International Affairs, March, 2002 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Barnett Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995, pp. 223224. 92 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia. London and New York: I.B. Tauris and Company, 2000, pp. 85,130. According to another estimates the foreign Muslims were between 15000 and 35000. Many wanted a chance to participate in a Jehad but some were more interested in gaining military experience than in fighting Afghan or Soviet Communists. Even after the fall of Najibullah regime in 1992, Muslim radicals continued to arrive for military training in special Afghan camps. The US authorities alleged that Afghanistan was in 1993 “a breeding ground for terrorist activities around the world”. See for details New York Times of 28th March and 11th August, 1993, pp. 14 and A8; Interview of Warren Christopher, Secretary of State in CNN, 28th May, 1993. 93 Journal of Law and Society, Faculty of Law, University of Peshawar, Vol. XXIII, No: 36, July, 2000, P 87, quoted from A W McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Trade, New York: Harper & Row, 1972 and 1994, pp. 7 & 491. By 1971, 34 percent of all U.S. soldiers in South Vietnam were heroin addicts, according to a White House survey. There were more American heroin addicts in South Vietnam than in the entire United Stateslargely supplied from heroin laboratories operated by CIA allies, though the White House failed to acknowledge that unpleasant fact. Since there was no indigenous local market, Asian drug lords started shipping Golden Triangle heroin to the United States, where it soon won a significant share of the illicit market.

94

Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai, Life Sketch of Dr. Najibullah, (Unpublished), 19 May, 1986, See also Appendix-C of this book. 95 The Washington Post, Washington, May 13, 1990, P.1 96 Journal of Law and Society Opcit, P. 88 97 Yousaf & Mark Adkin Opcit, P. 56 98 Diego Cordovez & Selig S. Harrison Opcit, PP.151, 247; Abubaker Saddique in an article quoted figures from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes(UNDOC) that nearly 40 percent of drug users in Afghanistan began their habit in neighboring countries like Pakistan and Iran as refugee. See Friday Times, Lahore, April 23-29, 2004, P. 3 99 The daily Mashriq, Peshawar, January 14, 2001; In the 1990s, the official figure was between 3 to 5 million addicts, of these two million were heroin users in Pakistan. See Peter Blood, ed, Pakistan: A Country Study, Washington, Federal Research division, Library of Congress, 1995. On June 25, 2002, PTV put the figures of heroin addicts in Pakistan as four million. 100 Alfred McCoy Excerpted from “Drug Fallout”, Progressive Magazine, August 1997. The protracted civil war in Afghanistan boasted virtually no economic activity, so naturally drug and drug related industry was the only way to raise cash." See Ahmad Rashid, “Dangerous Liaisons”, The Far Eastern Economic Review, April 16; During my (Marwat) visit of Afghanistan in May, 2004, a taxi driver told me that “he was involved in drug trafficking during the reign of Mujahideen and Taliban. The Taliban authorities were very careless and unmindful of checking drugs in my car, while very particular about audio videos tapes in the vehicles”. Even as late as July, 2004 the major crop in the Ningrahar province of Afghanistan was poppy. 101 Muhammad Ramzan Bhettani allegedly used drug money in the constituency of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rahman, (a chief of JUI (F) and currently (2004) opposition leader in the National Assembly of Pakistan) in the election of 1992 with the aim only to defeat the Maulana. Akbar Khan Hoti, son of Abdul Ghaffur Khan Hoti, the then Governor of NWFP and Waris Khan Afridi, an exFederal Minister were sentenced for Drug trafficking and Amanullah Kundi, an ex-provincial minister has been arrested in Karachi for heroin smuggling in 90s. See for more details Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, “The Impact of Afghan Crisis on the North-West Frontier Province”, Emerging Central Asia and Pakistan, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, July, 24-28, 1992.

102

However, in the year 2000, Taliban regime banned opium production with strict actions against violators. But amazingly the IRIN special report on drugs and refugees in Pakistan ( April 7th.2003) revealed following picture: “Seventyyear-old, Maryam was sitting on a broken wooden bench in her mud hut at the Kababian Afghan refugee camp in Peshawar, the provincial capital of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP), looking dazed. "My son introduced me to opium. He used to take it, and offered it to me when I had a cold and cough. It helps me sleep," she told IRIN at the camp. With a total camp population of some 13,000, of whom around half are women, at least 35 percent are addicted to drugs. “The program was established following a survey carried out by Dost between February and June 2002 at 22 camps in the NWFP. "We found that 90 percent of women were using tobacco and tranquillizers. There was also a high proportion of residents consuming opium in Chitral and Dir in the NWFP due to poor health services and lack of availability of medicine," Muhammad Ayub, the project manager for Dost, told IRIN in Peshawar. “The medicinal use of opium has been common among Afghan refugees for years due to the non-availability of conventional medicine, coupled with high levels of stress associated with loss of family and displacement. "Children have told me that their parents take these drugs, and they often give it to them too," Wahida, the principal of the school at the camp, told IRIN. “The aid workers said the main supplier of drugs remained neighboring Afghanistan, which is the world's biggest opium producer, according to the latest UN drug report. It is believed that Afghan refugees who earlier left Pakistan are now returning bringing drugs with them across the porous border. Despite reports of a resurgence of poppy cultivation in the NWFP, after the country being declared almost poppy free, Aziz said the country was on the right track to beating the problem. In 2000, Pakistan sharply reduced poppy cultivation, dropping from 1,670 to 515 ha, a 67 percent decrease from 1999. However, the country, along with Iran and Tajikistan, remains a vital route for smuggling drugs.” 103 The daily Dawn, Karachi, 31 January, 1999. 104 Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan, London, Pluto Press, , 2001, P. 5 quoted from International Herald Tribune, 11 March, 1992.

105

John Pilger, The Guardian, September 20, 2003. Harrison, who has written five books on Asian affairs and US relations with Asia, has had extensive contact with the CIA and political leaders in South Asia. Harrison was a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace between 1974 and 1996. John Pilger, The Guardian, September 20, 2003; See also an article of Sanjay Suri “CIA worked with Pak to create Taliban”, India Abroad News Service, March 6, 2001. 107 Ibid 108 Pakistan's most wanted sectarian terrorist, Riaz Bazra has spent at least part of his time hiding out at an Afghan camp that trains Mujahideen for Kashmir, according to Pakistani officials. The sectarian terrorists arrested in connection with the plot to assassinate Nawaz Sharif had reportedly been trained at a camp at Khost, which the Jehadi group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen used to train Mujahideen for Kashmir. 109 The Economist, 10th May, 1997, P. 34; see also The Herald, Karachi, September, 1996, P. 78 ; Just in one incident, a five- day war between Sunni and Shia sects involving mortars, rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft missiles in Parachinar (Kurram Agency) in 1996, alone claimed hundreds of lives and many more injured. The monthly Newsline, Karachi, October, 1996, pp.71-72 110 The Herald, Karachi, February, 1999, P. 60 111 Christopher Jaffrelot, Pakistan: Nationalism without a nation?, MANOHAR Centre De Sciences Humaines, ZED Books Ltd, 2002, P.125 112 The TNSM organized a protest procession in Mingora (Swat) in September, 2001 for raising a ‘voluntary army’ for anti-US Jehad in Afghanistan. While addressing the rally the TNSM Chief Maulana Sufi Muhammad said that the US was the biggest terrorist country in the world that wanted to harm Islam on the pretext of Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban. On October 27 from Bajaur area about 10,000 armed cadres led by the TNSM chief, Sufi Mohammed, crossed the Pak-Afghan border followed by convoy comprising 300 vehicles. The TNSM had set up three FM radio stations in the Bajaur area bordering Afghanistan, to campaign for funds and volunteers to fight alongside the Taliban militia. These radio stations were also used to air TNSM leaders' addresses to pro-Taliban rallies. The daily News, Islamabad, April 23, 1995. Most of these Jehadis were either killed or arrested by anti-Taliban militias and detained in their own jails among these round about 82 Pakistanis and round about 80 106

Afghans supporters of Taliban are in the Guantanamo Prison. The Review Dawn, Karachi, July 29, August 4, 2004, P. 7.

Conclusion The Afghan upheaval of the of April Revolution in 1978 was a classic example of a ‘developing country revolution’, implemented by a radical left in military, and enforced by its educated elite, with typical radical ‘top-down’ reforms in all fields in a backward Afghanistan. The inward-looking Afghan society resented these reforms from ‘above’ for various reasons and the result was open defiance in rural areas and cracks in the ruling PDPA. This antagonism in the rural areas was exploited by both internal and external enemies of the revolution, and resulted in the direct Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. The PDPA regime in Kabul rashly changed all institutions to fit communist patterns, and substituted a traditional political vocabulary with socialist rhetoric; while in Pakistan, Zia, under state policy, Islamized all constitutional and institutional aspects of the government. In this fashion, both sides were indulging in extermination of the Afghan nation through an erosion of their language, culture, literature and history. Burning of books, selling of archaeological and historical artifacts, and destruction of museums were all included in his conflict’s chain of events. The personal interests of Zia and those of Islamists in Pakistan and Afghanistan converged with the long and short range objectives of the US in the region. Zia’s ‘carrot and stick’ policy toward the Afghan refugees, for all its rhetoric of peace, humanitarianism, Islamic brotherhood, and asylum and refuge in

Pakistan- Darul-Islam (abode of peace), was covert aimed at a premeditated destabilization of Afghan state- Darul Harb (abode of war) by creating the Mujahideen or holy warriors. During this period, Zia’s Islamization drive and ‘Jehad mania’ in Pakistan were nothing but sub-agenda of an overall plan of the CIA and ISI. For the implementation of their plan, these intelligence agencies, under the umbrella of Islam, created a number of objective and subjective conditions both inside and outside Afghanistan, and later, on the pretext of ‘ground realities’ justified their actions and reactions. The Afghan War had been posed as Jehad for the Islamists; and badal, or revenge for the common Afghan; but for the US, it was an anti-Soviet resistance and for Pakistan it was a golden chance to suppress Afghan / Pashtun nationalism and to create a ‘Pakistani generation’ (which had been a perennial source of domestic opposition within Pakistan, where demands for Pashtun national rights were often blended with critiques of powerful economic and landed interests). The entire administrative pyramid for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan was structured on an overall political bigotry, and a military strategy involving three organizations: ISI, the ‘Peshawar Seven’ Tanzimat, and the ARC. In this grand vicious pyramid another rectangle of mullah, masjid (mosque), madrasa (religious seminaries) and maktab (school) played its role of ideological indoctrination of the innocent refugees, to prepare them (both mentally and physically) for the holy war. The refugee camps were used for refuge and rest of the Mujahideen and their families; similarly the madrasas and maktabs (schools) were producing raw

material in the form of new recruits for Jehad. On both sides of the Durand Line, educated and intellectual Afghans were excluded from the mainstream of the social and political system. Less-educated and self-educated low paid employees were appointed governors in Afghanistan, and recruited as Mujahideen leaders and commanders in Pakistan. The traditional maliks and chiefs were forced to obey to their command. In this entire adventure, some of the gains and losses from Islamabad’s point of view were: First, through US aid, Pakistan equipped its armed forces with modern weapons, and despite US sanctions it developed a nuclear arsenal. Though the idea of ‘Strategic depth’ did not fully materialize, but it did avert a threat of Afghan aggression for the time being. Eventually, Pakistan succeeded in the fragmentation of the Afghan State and its entire constitutional and institutional fabric. Second, the threat of Afghan or Pashtun nationalism (real or imagined) and the Pashtunistan issue was diverted or suppressed by Pakistani authorities by propagating, encouraging and financing the notions of Islamic Umma and Muslim brotherhood. The net result of this was the legitimization and prolongation of Zia’s rule; the strengthening of Islamist groups (in particular the Jama’at-eIslami and JUI), the spreading of Tablighi Jamat, and the rise of MQM, a mushroom growth of sectarian groups and the weakening of political forces in Pakistan. Third, during this period the Western and Middle Eastern aid in the form of petro-dollars brought cosmetic economic prosperity and employment in Pakistan, which directly and indirectly

sustained the Afghan Jehad, and the Zia regime in power. Fourth, ISI officers openly confessed that “the CIA's contributions have played a vital role in the conduct of the Afghan Jehad. Without the backing of the US and Saudi Arabia, the Soviets would still [have been] entrenched in that country. Without the intelligence provided by the CIA many battles would have been lost, and without the CIA's training of Pakistani instructors the Mujahideen would have been fearfully ill-equipped and could not defeat a superpower”. Fifth, the Afghan Jehad ran counter to traditional Afghan or Pashtun nationalism, and the secret agencies of the West and Pakistan were able to coopt that contradiction into religious internationalism and tribalism. The political vacuum created by war between Kabul and Islamabad and its foreign allies, was filled by almost all radical Islamic fundamentalists in various institutions. Some other negative fallouts of the war include the fallowing: Born and bred in the Afghan Revolution and counterrevolution, the new Jehadi culture took inspiration from Islamic Revolution in Iran; “nurtured by US “Operation Cyclone”; nourished by the extremist views and money of the Middle Eastern Arabs led by Osama bin Laden; and came to fruition in the acts of the Taliban. Under Jehadi ambiance, Pakistan willingly or unwillingly allowed the proliferation of arms-culture in the entire country to support the Afghan resistance. The unholy alliance of the Islamic Jehadis, a military dictator, and a secular opportunist West against Soviet Communism by engaging in blind support for radical Islam as a Cold War tool not

only created problems for Pakistan but for the entire world. The CIA and ISI, in their all-out efforts against Moscow and Kabul, opened a Pandora’s Box of proliferation of weapons, poppy cultivation; drug trafficking, gun running, fundamentalism, extremism, sectarianism and terrorism in the entire region. De-secularization, de-liberalization Kalashnikovization and Talibanization slowly crept into Pakistani and Afghan society, and developed into a monster to be reckoned with. The religious seminaries, which had been places of learning and institutions of higher moral training in South and Central Asia, turned into training camps under the covert patronage of the national and international intelligence agencies. Even some students of the regular educational (secular) institutions of Pakistan participated in the Afghan war and lost their lives. Ironically, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces these militant bands shifted to other places of the region, and the holy war turned into sectarian violence. The madrasas developed into sanctuaries for religious zealots and political power in Pakistan. The factional religious leaders began to encourage some form of military training; therefore, Jehad was portrayed as a tool to achieve political power within a country or to gain material support from other countries. Thus, for motivation and mobilization, Jehad was put forth propounded as legitimate concept to wage war against all enemies not only the ‘infidels’. Pakistan provided shelter on its soil to all the key Afghan leaders, its fighting factions, and its foreign supporters. The hatred of the Middle Eastern Muslims against their own monarchical or dictatorial regimes, finding no other avenue for their political

ambitions or reaction, sighted an outlet in the form of Afghan Jehad as well as a safe heaven for training in Afghanistan, in the tribal areas, and even in Pakistan proper. The Afghan crisis and refugee problem never ended with the ousting of Soviet forces from Afghanistan or with the death of the ‘Evil Empire’; rather, intensified in a new form of fratricidal war. The off springs of war or Jehad were fighting for their own personal or party interests, and in this new infighting, Afghanistan was transformed turned into a collection of small fiefdoms. Everyone regarded themselves not as Afghans but as either Muhajir or Mujahid, because they were indoctrinated to remain Mujahideen and Muhajireen and/or trained to fight. Both warlords and their compatriots saw their future in changing loyalties and political intrigues. The Afghan refugees found themselves already sandwiched between regimented administrational systems of both Kabul and Islamabad. They were finally betrayed by their so-called leaders, and hosts in Pakistan. Most of their leaders were successively patronized and then disowned by the agencies, one after the other. In such a milieu and confrontational politics, they lost their true Afghan identity. The word ‘peace’ was lost in their vocabulary, and any bright future became an illusion. Disillusioned with the present and uncertain about their future, the Afghans seemed to be obsessed with their past. The regional powers and their local protégés with their own vested interests rooted variously in personal ambitions, profitmaking, ideology, and strategy assumptions, supported the logic of war. In Afghanistan's war culture, the guerrilla commanders

constituted new elite whose powers were threatened in case war terminated. All the Afghan warring factions had no other option but to fight. None of these leaders were ready to accept the leadership of other, and no one agreed to accept the democratic norms or Afghan traditional system of Jirga for power sharing or resolution of the political crisis. Due to the devastation of agricultural resources in Afghanistan, all agricultural related activities were shattered and nothing left for the ordinary Afghans or for internal refugee except to adapt their labor to the shifting economic situation in Afghanistan. That is to say that (a) Membership of a combatant group was much more profitable and secure activity; (b) it was close to echelons of power; (c) it was honorable from a religious as well as social point of view in tribal society; and (d) looting, raids, plunders of rival villages or factions or occupation of third party property in the name of Jehad, sect or revolution not only promised a material profit but spiritual glory in the next world. The Afghan war has produced a lucrative international trade – in drugs, arms, and other contraband – which enriches the few at the expense of the majority of Afghans and Pakistanis. The Drug Mafia and the resistance or in the words of Mr. Eqbal Ahmad "Jihad International Inc." saw their doom and destruction in the termination of war. It is “bizarre that these communities of gun and gold have found friends among men of God”. (Quoted source) New terms like ‘economy of violence’ have been added to the English lexicon. In fact ‘economy of violence’ focuses on a selfperpetuating system, in which violence itself emerges as a marketable good. From an economic point of view the immense number of combat groups which existed at least until the

appearance of the Taliban in 1994 can be regarded as “war enterprises” adapted to a ‘market of violence’. Pakistan lost the confidence of almost all Afghans and its leaders for obvious reasons despite its tall claims of support to the refugees and resistance. Anarchic tendencies based on millenarianisms are gaining ground in Pakistan without any regard for ‘state’ or tolerance in a society. The political vacuum created by political parties under the direct and indirect interference of army in all affairs of the state led to the capturing of pivotal space by religious conservatives.

Findings: The major contours of Pakistan’s Afghan policy during Afghan conflict were the fallowing: •

Zia the main architect of Pakistan's Afghan policy had opted for a disunited and decentralized Afghan state. The result was the recognition of only seven Parties.

•

The paramount aim of Pakistani policy makers was to make Afghanistan its client or at least subservient state.

•

The main objective was to insure that no government antagonistic to Pakistan would be able emerge in the future. Islamabad authorities virtually controlled every aspect of Afghan presence in Pakistan as well as the direction of the war. The activities of Afghan refugees and the objectives of their armed struggle were congruent with the perceived interests of Pakistan. The authorities in Islamabad were to

•

be the final arbiter of war management. The operation involved close management of refugees, and the direction and coordination of Afghan resistance parties based in Peshawar. •

Pakistani authorities never seriously inhibited either the free movement of resistance forces across the border nor the recruitment and training of fighters. The ISI was the main source of information for the US about the politics of the resistance groups. The CIA operatives and others came to depend heavily on Pakistan's military intelligence not only in reference to supplies and its relationships with resistance groups but also for strategic assessments. The CIA also relied heavily on often less than reliable Pakistani sources for information about the reception and use of arms across the border.

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The US overlooked the report that elements of the Pakistani army and refugee administration were cooperating with members of the Peshawar organization in the sale of weapons to parties outside the conflict. The US also condoned the regular siphoning of aid which was intended to pass across the border into Afghanistan, but which instead was utilized for the comfortable life styles of some of the resistance leaders in Peshawar. Above all, Hekmatyar's Hizb, an ideologically compatible Afghan party was expected to provide the geopolitical assurances that Pakistan was aiming at. It was also allowed to run its own security service, presumably to watch for Kabul trained infiltrators but in actual fact the force was

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designed more for the purpose of undermine competing Afghan resistance groups. •

Pakistan favored a fragmented future of Afghanistan, incapable to pose any threat to Pakistan. Thus, an alliance of the seven Peshawar-based parties provided for a rotating leadership. This arrangement assured that no Afghan leader including Hekmatyar, could grow in stature to become independent, and that the movement would therefore have to continue to look to Pakistan for guidance.

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The Cold War Mujahideen or holy warriors turned against their own master in the Post-Cold War and their offspring at times appeared in the form of Talibans, Osma bin Laden, and Neik Muhammad of Wana, South Waziristan.

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This unholy alliance of the military, mullah and mujahid created conditions for Talibanization of civil society both in Pakistan and Afghanistan by threatening democratic, liberal and pluralist values of peace and prosperity in the region.

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The net result of the war policies in the pre or post Cold War period was strengthening of military dictators either in the name of religion, reforms or war against terrorism in the developing countries. All such policies deprived the common people of their basic rights, and diminished the process of peace, pluralism and democracy.

Recommendations: The tragedy of 9/11 has been a manifestation of mishandling of

the Afghan imbroglio by CIA and ISI. Out of proportion military and financial aid and training to Afghan refugees not only prolonged the unabated Afghan war, but also created and nourished religious extremism, terrorism and Kalashnikov culture among the Afghan refugees, their foreign colleagues, and local population of Pakistan. The only lesson we should learn from the past blunders and experience of the Afghan conflict and refugees is that all local or regional issues and conflicts should be resolved through a political dialogue with the UN in very dedicated manner, and not through military options. The UN and world community should adopt means and methods to persuade all those countries to sign the refugee conventions and covenants. The fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan should be a lesson to all religio- political parties of Pakistan that the only way to gain political power is not through violence and the barrel of a gun but through democratic process and dialogue. Another important lesson of the 9/11 to all Jehadi and proJehadi elements is that the Cold War is over, and that no society can afford to engage in militancy or adventurism in the name of religion or extremism, or to cross the border for helping the coreligionist brethrens. There is a cry for Jehad from palace to public and from masjid (mosque) to mandir (temple) against particular creed, sect or religious groups, yet not Jehad against corruption, nepotism, favoritism, violence, terrorism and narcotics. It would be better for us to create a conducive environment for education and tolerance, because these are necessary for a credible political

system and for the development of civil society. Lastly, in Pakistan’s situation, globalisation has only led to the religious extremism and the marginalisation of state authority, as well as a failure of the international community to take concrete and meaningful steps in the direction of diverting its meagre resources toward the betterment of the developing nations.

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Foreword Obscure Dimensions of the Afghan War: Fought at the climax of the Cold War, the battle between the Soviet-supported leftist and the US and Western supported political Islamists in Afghanistan was supposed to be the ‘mother of all ideological battle’. The whole world was led to believe by both sides that they were fighting to defend their lofty principles symbolized by the ‘revolutionaries’ and the ‘mujs’, an affectionate nickname given to Mujahideen by the by the western press at that time. Couched in very high-sounding ideological concepts, the powerful propaganda of the big powers dominated the minds of most of the people. It was only during the post-Cold War developments in international politics that some of the inlaid dimensions of the Afghan war have come to light, enabling many people to reconsider the history of the Afghan war in a more objective way. A huge body of literature has appeared in a various countries regarding the devastating armed conflict in Afghanistan in recent years, providing new insights about the actual objectives,

II motives, and strategic interests of different regional and international players in the conflict, beyond their official rhetoric. For example, there is hardly anything secret anymore about the formation and execution of the Soviet policy in Afghanistan, as most of the previously secret material has been declassified and published by various authors, including some of the senior military officers who had actually conducted the war. Minutes of the meeting of Political Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party, in which the decision to send the Red Army into Afghanistan was made, are not only published in Russian; their Pashto translation has also been available for quite some time. This is also the case with the US and other Western countries, where a number of publications have laid bare the actual chain of events that had remained behind the screen. Among others, books like Unholy Wars by John. K. Cooly, Charlie Wilson’s War by George Crile, and Ghost Wasrs by Steve Coll present a graphic pictures of the real motives and roles of different institutions and individuals not exactly corresponding with the pious noises that they had been making during the war. It is very interesting to note, however, that there is very little in terms of research about the role of Pakistan, which happened to be the most important regional player in the Afghan conflict. Some foreign authors have discussed the part played by Pakistan in the Afghan war, but there is not much available in terms of indigenous research on the subject. Apart from the wellknown book Taliban, by the reputed independent author Ahmad

III Rashid, most of the other books published on the subject represent the official version. By now it is quite well known that Pakistan’s Afghan policy has remained the sole domain of Pakistan Army and the country’s premier intelligence agency, Inter Service Intelligence (ISI), which played a fundamental role in shaping and executing the said policy; that is why it has remained by and large a clandestine affair. Even the country’s civilian Chief Executives in the 80s and 90s had no say in formulating our Afghan policy. The situation has not changed even today. Therefore, there has been no meaningful or informed public debate on the country’s policy towards Afghanistan. The experience of the last few years has decisively proved that Pakistan’s Afghan policy is fundamentally flawed and counterproductive, as it has turned the country into a hub of international terrorism, religious extremism, and the drug trade, and has filled Pakistan with dangerous weapons in private possession, apart from brining Pakistan on the wrong side of Afghan national sentiments. But how can any government reform the aforementioned policy and take corrective measures with out first critically analyzing it and holding a public debate on it? In this context, the publication of the present research work, From Muhajir to Mujahid by well-known scholar and Afghanologist Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, is a welcome development. This important work is expected to go a long way to shed light on some dimensions of Pakistan’s Afghan policy that

IV had so far remained obscure. The research methodology adopted by Dr. Marwat is impressive. He substantiates his thesis with reasonable proof, and authenticates his statements with credible documents and dependable sources. With a great deal of laborious and meticulous work, he pieces together bits of information into a tangible and coherent picture, exposing the deceptions fed to the public by the ruling circles of the country. Looking at the issues in question through the prism of the refugee problem, Dr. Marwat builds a very convincing and damning case against the manipulation of various regional and international players, in efforts the exploit the situation for promoting their own agendas at the cost of the hapless Afghan refugees. He has the unique advantage of having had a first hand experience in dealing with Afghan refugees, first as a government functionary working in Afghan Refugees Commissionerate, and later as research scholar continuously working on the Afghan problem. He has been personally a witness to the process of turning the ‘Muhajir (refugee) into the ‘Mujahid’ (the holy warrior), and the tactics which were used by intelligences for this purpose. Dr. Marwat has rightly pointed out that Afghan refugees were welcomed or even ‘pulled’ on the basis of religious faith which, along with the leverage of the material assistance, made their transformation into religious fighters easier. What he has failed to mention is the fact that since Pakistan is not signatory to either the 1951 Geneva Convention of Refugees or 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees, the then Government of Pakistan could prevent any

V scrutiny or monitoring of the refugee situation. Isn’t it high time that Pakistan accedes to the aforementioned international convention to prevent the repetition of the events that took place in 1980s? His information on the functioning of the secretive Afghan Cell and the Afghan Refugees Commissionerate is very valuable, as is his insight on the performance of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in collaboration with CIA and other western agencies. HE has referred to the massive corruption and misappropriations in billion of dollars, and the petro-dollars that were poured into Afghan Jehad from abroad. It was by siphoning off fabulous amounts of this money that General Zia-ul-Haq and General Akhtar Abdur Rahman could become billionaires in dollars. The corruption also had a trickle-down effect, and along with the drug trade and gunrunning, it led to the dramatic strength of the black economy that still plagues the country’s social and political life. The conclusion drawn by Dr. Marwat from his analyses of the whole situation is also very important. He is illuminating in tracing the present problems of religious extremism and militancy to the policies adopted by the country’s rulers during the Afghan war. He has convincingly and factually pointed out in detail the evolution of the relationships of militant organizations in the two countries. This insight is indispensable for any government in Pakistan if it is serious in adopting reforms or corrective measures to check the menace of terrorism in an effective manner.

VI Unfortunately, some powerful circles with influences on the governance of the country have demonstrated an amazing capacity to live in unreality. However, the country’s interest in the dramatically changing situation can hardly afford this myopia. It is high time that Pakistan adopts a brand new Afghan policy based on the ground reality; the Afghanistan is slowly but surely and steadily growing out of the post-conflict situation with the adoption of a constitution and the successful elections of the President. There is great potential for growth of cooperation between the two countries in almost every field. Pakistan has to grow out of ridiculous theories such as attaining ‘military depth’ in Afghanistan, or creating a client government in Kabul. The Government of Pakistan has to remove the discrepancy between its word and actions. This is a prerequisite for a fresh and successful start in regional cooperation.

(Afrasiab Khattak) University Town, Peshawar, October 24, 2004.