Freedom and Orthodoxy: Islam and Difference in the Post-Andalusian Age 9781503624733

Citation preview

FREEDOM AND ORTHODOXY

I

FREEDOM AND ORTHODOXY Islam and Difference in the Post-Andalusian Age

Anouar Majid

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS STANFORD, CALIFORNIA

2004

Stanford University Press Stanford, California ©2004 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. Part of this book was previously published as "Birth of an Arab Nation" in Edebiydt I7, no.

I

(1996):115-26. Permission to reproduce

it here has been granted by the publisher, Taylor and Francis, http://www.tand£co.uk. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Majid, Anouar, I96oFreedom and orthodoxy : Islam and difference in a post-Andalusian age I Anouar Majid. p. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN o-8047-4980-9 (alk. paper) ISBN o-8047-498I-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) r. Orientalism.

2. East and West.

3· Islam-2oth

I. Title.

century.

DS61.85 .M35 2004 306' .09I7' 67-DC22 2003022051 Typeset by Tim Roberts in 10lr3.5 Adobe Garamond Original Printing 2004 Last figure below indicates year of this printing: IJ

12

11

10

09

o8

07

o6

05

04

Contents

Preface I Disorienting Theories

Vll

I

2 Other Worlds, New Muslims

2I

3 Empire of Liberty

53

4 Liberties Undone

105

5 Perils of Empire

I5I

6 Provincialisms Now

I94

Notes

225

Index

26I

Preface

This book is an attempt to explore the rise and effects of European universalist and messianic ideologies after the defeat of Islam in Spain and how such ideologies have inspired the various forms of extremism that have erupted regularly in the course of modern history since 1492, or what might be better termed the post-Andalusian period. The focus will be on the reconfiguration of Islam in this new global order, both the ways Islam came to be perceived by Western imperial societies and the way Muslims have redefined themselves in the process of defending their identities. Building on the argument I advanced in Unveiling Traditions: Postcolonial Islam in a Polycentric World (2000), I want to argue, by examining crucial periods in a long span of history, that we are living under the dark cloud not of an ominous clash of civilizations, but of a world order racing headlong toward a global wasteland, an apocalyptic landscape that will ultimately engulf winners and losers alike. It is not the clash of civilizations that threatens world peace and harmony, but the failure of our one and only human civilization to capitalize on its tremendously rich cultural resources to establish a more humane global order. This civilization, made up of multiple and diverse components, succumbs to further injury when these components resort to violence and conquest to resolve differences, for if only the annihilation of Others, those who are intractably different, those who are attached to their ancestral ways, guarantees peace and security, then even total victory will turn out to be a catastrophic defeat for all. A monochrome world of clones is not the pinnacle of human achievement, but an index of our inability to transcend atavistic instincts in order to live up to our noblest ideals. Thus, the urgency of preserving the world's cultures and religions is not necessarily driven by religious faith, patriotic sentiments, or ethnic solidarity, but by the basic will to survive and, in the very best of circumstances, the hope to forge a new philosophy of rapprochement among and within nations. Only if we become aware of the

vm

Preface

impact of our deeply rooted narratives of self-righteousness and our own (barely discernible) convictions can we begin to address the world's global crisis. To be sure, our own fundamentalist attitudes may not be the reflection of ill will or malice and may very well be the expression of a noble quest for human solidarity and oneness. Still, paradoxically, it is this drive to save the world that is constantly endangering it. I begin in 1492, the year when the world was called upon to adhere to the Euro-American vision of human salvation or risk ostracism, defeat, and even, in some cases, annihilation. To talk about a Euro-American (or, more broadly, Western) vision is not to imply that citizens of European and American societies are not passionately divided over policies and missions or that nations within the West are not at odds over issues of power and global peace. Indeed, as I am writing this (spring 2003), the West seems to be splitting into camps, leading to further polarizations and rearrangements in the global political structure. There may be several explanations for these cracks in the Western body politic, but the perennial and dramatic U.S.-French contretemps (to take the two major players in this episode of discord) is not merely a contingent affair that stems from geopolitical maneuvering, but is the expression of an enduring clash of two powerful universal ideologies, for both nations, as I explain in the introductory chapter, inaugurated the most far-reaching revolutions in modern human history, each with its own separate concepts of liberty and justice, although both eventually found themselves mired in imperial ventures that did little to globalize the great ideals they espoused. 1 I find it useful to keep this historical perspective in mind when trying to make sense of global events after 9/n and during the crisis over Iraq. Much has been said about the motives of neoconservative hawks and the oil bonanza that would accrue to well-connected U.S. companies in the aftermath of the war, but such analyses, no matter how important, leave out the longue durie of American history and how U.S. intervention is also part of an impulse (one that has admittedly mutated over time) that goes back to the beginning of European settlement in America. After he was sworn in as president of the United States on 20 January 2001, George W. Bush saw himself as part of an unfolding American plan to bring light to the world. Except for the modern idiom of the text, his speech could have easily been made by a Puritan preacher or a Founding Father. For the new president, America's story is that "of a new world that became a friend and liberator of the old," while America's "democratic faith" is, in fact, "the in-

Preface

1x

born hope of our humanity, an ideal we carry but do not own, a trust we bear and pass along." As in the much older prophetic traditions, America is entrusted with the awesome burden ofleading the world to freedom and confounding evil designs on the purity of its mission. Even during that relatively quiet moment in world history, a concern for security permeated the president's speech: Not only should America be strong to dissuade potential rivals from catching up with the country's military might (a prospect, given the vastly advanced arsenal of the United States, that has become, for the first time in history, virtually impossible to achieve in the foreseeable future), but it must also "confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century is spared new horrors." Two years later, as the world was bracing for a military confrontation in Iraq, and many were suspicious of the administration's designs, the American president delivered his annual State of the Union Address repeating his assertion that the role of his nation is simply to emancipate all humanity into freedom. ''Americans," President Bush stated confidently, "are a free people, who know that freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation. The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity." Indeed, the language of religious salvation, upon which the country was founded, and that of the Revolution, which brought the new secular nation into being, were merged into an indistinguishable ideology. "We Americans," Bush assured his fellow citizens and the rest of the world, "have faith in ourselves but not in ourselves alone. We do not claim to know all the ways of Providence, yet we can trust in them, placing our confidence in the loving God behind all of life, and all of history." A little more than two months later, after his forces had defeated the Ba'ath regime, the president thanked his troops on the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and reminded them that theirs is a war for the security of their country and the freedom of the world's people. He then concluded by quoting the prophet lsaiah. 2 Again, one could read all sorts of motives into Bush's message, as many critics later did when he launched a war against the bloodthirsty regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, but it would be rather simplistic to reduce this discourse of freedom to a mere smokescreen for an elaborate plot to profit from Iraqi oiP To me, it appeared as the manifestation of a strain that is part of a larger and complex history, one that not only began with the American Revolution (to which the president alludes in his inaugural address), but goes back further in time to the early colonial set-

x

Preface

tiers and even to the Spanish conquistadors before them in other parts of the Americas. What unites the Iberian conquests of the New World, the British settlements in North America, and the American Revolution is not only a quest for freedom, but also a messianic will to (re-)Christianize or remake the world anew. (Hence, the agenda of reshaping the Middle East is perfectly consistent with this enduring pattern.) These three moments in history forged a fundamentalist view of the world, a multigenerational social imaginary that I prefer to call post-Andalusianism-nowadays encoded in the economic system of capitalism-that is almost unbendingly universal in outlook and that tolerates no alternatives in the management of human affairs. Yet the world is complex and made up of hundreds of different cultural heritages, each relying on a set of memories and myths that have nothing to do with the European "discovery" of America, Europe's religious wars, the Puritans' dream of a Christian utopia, or the philosophies of the Enlightenment. Aren't non-Western people entitled to build on their heritages and live within systems that don't do violence to their memories? Wouldn't they feel freer if they could worship their own gods without being pressured to subscribe to what is often known as the "neoliberal" dogma? Indeed, I will argue that to encourage cultural independence could potentially reduce pressure on the world system by making it easier for people to live within their means. It is, in fact, the Euro-American insistence on only one model, a one-size-fits-all approach to human freedom, that ultimately breeds the extremisms that haunt the world's imagination and threaten human civilization with unforeseen perils. If the West doesn't examine its own fundamentalism, as Hubert Vedrine, France's former minister of foreign affairs suggested in February 2003, the future of cultural dialogue and the prospect for innovative Islamic thinking look even grimmer: Because the West's population is expected to be a mere ro percent of the world's population by 2025 (down from a third in 1900, the heyday of imperialism), the West will have no option but to further militarize its borders against waves of desperate immigrants and refugees seeking survival, and intervening in dysfunctional spots to protect the vast majority of poor nations' resources under its control. How will the West build better relations with the Chinese or Muslims, who, together, already encompass "70 percent of oil reserves and nearly two-thirds of the global population"? 4 These are the questions that animate this project and inform the context through which I make sense of the crisis in Western-Muslim relations.

Preface

x1

This book, therefore, is not interested in short-term political conflicts or in defending one religion, culture, or nation at the expense of another. (Ethnic, economic, racial, religious, and political fundamentalisms are all premised on exclusionary outlooks that ultimately undermine the quest for an international modus vivendi.) Under the shadow of the West's supremacy, Islam-with its strong cultural heritage and large number of adherents (about of one-fifth of humanity) occupying significant portions of the globe-has become the absolute image of Otherness in the West's popular imagination not only because of many Muslims' chronic inability to work out the tensions between religious obligation and the pressures of a Western-dictated modernity, but also because much of the Euro-American identity and worldview were born out of a strong crusading spirit motivated by the eventual defeat oflslam. The transfer of Granada to King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella in 1492 opened a new chapter in world history, although not a radically new one, since it builds on even older hostilities. From that fateful moment, as Spain's subsequent history in the New World shows, anyone who didn't fully embrace Western religious and cultural precepts became unholy, a dangerous alien to be hastily reformed or summarily executed. The cultural options that had marked the history of nations and that allowed for a fragile, but still workable structure of coexistence in al-Andalus-Muslim Spain-gave way to a series of uniform, inflexible, and intolerant philosophies. (Much like the Inquisition, whose ultimate purpose was the saving of souls and the purification of the faith, the modern secular Euro-American worldview rejects the possibility of multiple paths to the "pursuit of happiness.") The fury and zeal of theReconquista, the Christian reconquest of Spain from the Moors, fell on all forms of difference, making American Indians and Muslims interchangeable in the Iberian-and later, Western-imaginary. Indeed, all difference since then has been construed in the image of Muslims, since it was the ideology of the Reconqusita that, in many ways, created the ideological foundations of the modern world. With the triumph of the nascent West over non-European Christians, Muslims and Native Americans went through several cycles of resistance and defeat, and Islam has been plunging ever since into an abyss of orthodox obscurantism, forever embellishing a past that has been as messy and bloody as any other international civilization that has gone through a similar historical cycle. But in the face of several defeats, Muslim orthodoxy became more virulent and now seems to erupt with frightening via-

xu

Preface

lence, not only against Westerners, but also against other Muslims. (The moralizing language of the righteous cuts across all cultures and nations. Didn't Pascal, the seventeenth-century French essayist, warn that those who aspire to being angels ultimately turn into beasts?) Although not directly linked to it, the current wave of religious extremism cannot be dissociated from the failure of globalization, presented as an indispensable part of a packet of democratic reforms, to address fundamental human needs around the globe. As long as the current system remains in place, the West's ideological certainties will continue to be resisted (partly because globalization promises what it cannot deliver), even as many Western remedies are being adopted in a desperate attempt to catch up with the West and to match its powers. Much like the rest of the world's poor, the Muslims' Sisyphean quest for an unattainable prosperity and power aggravates the sense of frustration that fuels violent reactions. Given the failure of universalist ideologies in the last five hundred years to build structures of peace and dialogue and the bleak prospects awaiting human civilization, a strategic imperative for enlightened communities and the world's political leaders should be the long-term health of the planet and its cultures, not the short-term victory of one nation, religion, or tradition over another. To achieve this goal, we need to have a more accurate sense of the dangers confronting us, measure the limits of our knowledge, and realize that we are all provincial, trapped in social imaginaries that do not allow us to think about what is best for others without projecting or forcing our values onto them. Whether we speak in the name of a god, liberty, or free markets, the time has come to resist the temptation to theorize about or dictate what's good for the whole world, without, of course, relinquishing the common bonds that tie all humans, and, in fact, the whole natural world together. Allowing other nations to live within their means and produce their own food and industries may reduce the profit margins of multinational corporations, but only small-scale, locally based economies, sustained by the ascetic demands of religious cultures and precapitalist traditions, could allow people to live with less without feeling left out or humiliated. By reclaiming their native traditions, people's lives could become richer in more ways than one. Besides, what other options do we have? The planet simply cannot endow the whole world with the levels of affluence enjoyed in the United States, regardless of the political systems in place. In talking about the effects of Western power on others and how

Preface

xu1

such power produces violent reactions, I do not want the reader to understand that I am accusing Westerners of the evils of history or exculpating others from responsibility. Those who do so accept quite a simplistic view of human motives and assign extraordinary agency to people who are often constricted by their cultural environments and trying to do their best to survive in what they see as an unsafe world. If Western culture has arrogated to itself the global responsibility of converting others to its ways, that does not mean, as I stated earlier, that those who equate their provincial beliefs with a universal human good are necessarily guilty of bad intentions. On the contrary, the globalizing impulse, despite its arrogant connotations, is an implicit admission of the West's connectedness to its Others, an ironic affirmation of the West's deeply held belief that all human history is part of a global plan, although it is one in which the West occupies a privileged place. But there is no denying the fact that Western civilization in the last few centuries has forever changed human destiny. Even those extremists who fight the West in the name of an undiluted Islam rely on a vocabulary that was forged in the West's own (violent) quest for freedom. The only question left, I suppose, is how to rescue the great Western cultural heritage from the forces that undermine it, such as economic systems driven by very short-term and anticommunal interests, and how to convince Muslim extremists that cultural borrowings and cosmopolitanism is the essence of the Qur'anic tradition, one that has been usurped by ethnic and patriarchal chauvinism. After all, no culture or religion is an island unto itself. I am alluding to issues that will be more fully elaborated in the course of the book. As the quest for freedom continues, Westerners and Muslims are called upon to make a valiant effort to resist the temptation to convert Others, to see Others as needing salvation or death. Those who blame Islam for being conservative need to understand how their own assumptions have fed that conservatism. Muslims must be lured out of their defensive orthodoxy by allowing them, as Fran 65. 37· Quoted in Gray, The Two Faces of Liberalism, 82. 38. Ibid., 107, 122, 137. 39· Stanley Fish, "Postmodern Warfare," Harper's, July 2002, 33-40. Daniel Pipes, in a different context, and speaking from a very different position, made a similar point by arguing that the attempt to whitewash the concept of "jihad" in liberal academic circles takes away from the historicity and real meaning of the term. See his "Jihad and the Professors," Commentary (November 2002): 17-21. 40. Keith Windschutt!e, "The Ethnocentrism of Clifford Geertz," New Criterion, October 2002, 5-12. 41. Douglass Rushkoff, "Don't Judge Judaism by the Numbers," New York Times, 20 November 2002. By November 30, the long-awaited and by now controversial report on the number of]ews in the United States was still not being released. See New York Times, "Delay of Report on U.S. Jews Touches Off Fight," New York Times, 30 November 2002. 42. Salman Rushdie, "No More Fanaticism as Usual," New York Times, 27 November 2002; Thomas L. Friedman, "Defusing the Holy Bomb," New York Times, 27 November 2002. 43· See Against Islamic Extremism: The Writings of Muhammad Sa'id al-'Ashmawy, ed. Carloyn Flueher-Lobban (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998). 46. Ibid., 55-66. 44· Ibid., 37, 55· 45· Ibid., r8, 51-57. 47· Ibid., 68-69, 71, 73-78. 48. Ibid., 72, 78, 6. In an interview, Khaled Abou El Fad!, a professor oflaw at

UCLA, reiterated al- Ashmawy's claim that the Qur'an contains very few legal injunctions to serve as a thorough guide for an Islamic law. "The Koran is not a detailed code of law," wrote El Fad!. Actually, "it has very little law compared to the Old Testament" and mostly limits itself to "very general moral exhortations that would not qualifY as a code of law by any stretch of the imagination." See Abou El Fad!, "A Dissident's Look at Islam and the Muslim World," Chronicle of Higher Education, 4 October 2002, Bq 49· Against Islamic Extremism, 79, 90. 50. Ibid., 86, 127, 123. 51. Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture ofIslam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, vol. 3, The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 384.

Notes

257

52. Noreena Hertz, The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 2001), 199, 12. For a good article on the effect of what the billionaire trader George Soros called "market fundamentalism," see William Finnegan, "The Economics of Empire," Harper's, May 2003, 41-54. 53· See Bruce Lawrence, Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998). 54· Ibid., 3, 35, 38, 25, 49· Avishai Margalit, "The Wrong War," New York Review ofBooks, 13 February 2003, 5· 55. Ibid., 18. 56. On Iran and Malaysia, see Lawrence, Shattering the Myth, roo-101, 160-71. Lawrence sheds an interesting light on the power struggles taking place in Iran. There, both the elected majlis (parliament) and the appointed Council of Guardians are members of the middle class and represent three factions within that class, with the conservative council more inclined to protect capitalist interests than the radical or even centrist-pragmatist faction. In Malaysia, meanwhile, Mahathir's widely discussed "Vision 2020," supported by the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia or IKIM, seeks to find a synthesis between Islam and corporate culture. 57· Saeed Razavi-Faqih and Ian Urbina, "The Fight for Iran's Democratic Ideals," New York Times, IO December 2002; Susan Sachs, "Cleric Calls for Pluralistic Government in Iraq," New York Times, 25 May 2003; Neil MacFarquhar and Richard A. Oppel, Jr., "Car Bomb in Iraq Kills 95 at Shiite Mosque," New York Times, 30 August 2003. 58. Thomas L. Friedman, "Defusing the Holy Bomb,"; "9/u Lesson Plan," New York Times, 4 September 2002. 59· Paul Krugman, "For Richer," New York Times Magazine, 20 October 2002. 6o. Frank Bruni, "Perilous Immigrant Crossings Frustrate Italy," New York Times, 3 December 2002. 6r. Susan Dunn, Sister Revolutions: French Lightning, American Light (New York: Faber and Faber, 1999), T59-6r, 198-99, 201-202, 208; Kevin Phillips, Wealth and Democracy: A Political History of the American Rich (New York: Broadway Books, 2002), 417-22. 62. Jose Saramago, "De la justice ala democratie, en passant par les cloches," Le Monde diplomatique, March 2002, 3· 63. Claudia Dreifus, "Adjusting Attitudes on Energy to Keep Our Favorite Things," New York Times, 20 August 2002. 64. Brennan, Globalization and its Terrors, 154-68. 65. See Warren Hoge, ''Archbishop of Canterbury Enthroned," New York Times, 28 March 2003. 66. Hertz, The Silent Takeover, u6, 124, 143. 67. David Bollier, "Reclaiming the Commons," Boston Review 27 (summer 2002): 4-11.

Notes

258

68. See Frank Bruni, ""Bidding Emotional Goodbye, Pope Ends Visit to His Past," New York Times, 20 August 2002. 69. For the text of Mbeki's full speech, see http://www.un.org/events/wssd/ statements/openingsaE. h tm. 70. Von Laue, The Global Revolution a/Westernization, 366. 71. Hodgson, The Venture ofIslam, 3: 433-38. 72. Quoted in John C. Mohawk, Utopian Legacies: A History of Conquest and Oppression in the Western World (Santa Fe, N. Mex.: Clear Lights Publishers, 2000), 9·

n

Ibid., 264-66.

74· Quoted in ibid., 40-41. 75· Lawrence, Shattering the Myth, 175-78, 183-84. 76. See Roger Lesgards, "Resister par Ia creation culturelle," Le Monde diplomatique, 28 December 2001; Constantin von Barloewen, "La culture, facteur de Ia Realpolitik," Le Monde diplomatique, November 2001, 22-23; Jacques Robin, "Cette grande implosion de !'an 2002," Le Monde diplomatque, March 2002, 26. 77· Jean Baudrillard, "La violence de Ia mondialisation," Le Monde diplomatique, November 2002, 18-19. 78. Alain Finkielkraut, In the Name of Humanity: Reflections on the lwentieth Century, trans. Judith Friedlander (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000),

66, !05. 79· Geoffrey H. Hartman, The Fateful Question of Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), r8o. 8o. Jean Amery, Par-dela le crime et le chatiment: t.assais pour surmonter l'insurmontable (Paris: Acres Sud, 1995), 88; quoted in Finkielkraut, In the Name of Humanity, 103. Sr. Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifisto (1969; Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 27, 179, 188, q8, 185, 224,195; Jonathan Sacks, The Dignity ofDiffirence: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations (New York: Continuum, 2002), r89. 82. Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifisto (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). I am grateful to Steven Salaita for bringing this book to my attention. 83. Braude!, A History of Civilizations, 23. 84. In a lyrical defense of the Sabbath, Judith Shulevitz, a columnist for the New York Times Book Review, explains that among the personal and social benefits of the Sabbath is that it "provides two things essential to anyone who wishes to lifr himself out of the banality of mercantile culture: time to contemplate and distance from everyday demands." Judith Shulevitz, "Bring Back the Sabbath," New York Times Magazine, 2 March 2003, 5o-53.

Notes

259

8s. Sacks, The Dignity of Difference, 21, 201-2, 175, 6o, 51, 65, 58-59, n7-r8, 167-68, II, q, chap. 8, 205-6, 2-3, 83-84. 86. Ibid., 5· 87. Zygmunt Bauman, "Global Solidarity," Tikkun, January-February 2002, 12-13. 88. Anthony Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives (New York: Routledge, 2000).

Index

Achebe, Chinua, 134, 139-40 Adams, John, 6o, 66, 75-76, 155 Maya, Noureddine, 145 Africa: European colonialism, 53-57, 185-86; slaves from, 33, 57-59, 63, 65, 68-84, 88, 91-92, roo. See also Mrican Americans; Barbary states; Egypt Mrican Americans, 160, 220, 226m; slaves, 33, 57-59, 63, 65, 68-84, 88 Afrocentrism, vs. Eurocentrism, 192 agriculture, ro6, rn, 189, 229n4 Algiers, 57, 134-35; American captives, 59, 82-83, 84-100, 237m9; U.S. shipping wars, 65-66, 89, 94, 155 Allison, Robert, 6o, 64, 65, 66, 83, 100 American colonies, 56-69. See also American Revolution American Indians, xi, 22-23, 168, 2371119; barbarians, 43, 44, 45, 47, 54, 56; Deloria, 194, 220, 221; European conquests, 30-51, 121-25, 185, 229n4; genocide, 42, 106, 122, 124, 131, 154, 184-85, 218; Mexico, 32-41, 46-47, 49, 121-23, 133-34; Muslims equated with, 44-49· 54· 56, 66, 120-21, 135-36; Other, 77, 120-21, 123-24, 185; slaves, 37, 39, 42, 43; U.S. and, 37-38, 59, 67, 72, 77, ro6, 123-28, 185; white men and, 121-34, 221 American Revolution, ix-x, 8, 17-18, 61-69, 253n88; Christianity and, 24, 61, 62, 67-75; Declaration ofindependence, 15, 74, 81-82; dismissed as

local dispute, 15, 17, 177, 253n88; failed ideals, 213-15; freedom concept, 67-83, 87-89, 102-4; vs. Islam, 6o, 64-68; universalism, 68, 72, 81, 103-5, III-12; worldview change after, 68-83, 87-88. See also Constitution, U.S. Americas: Mrican slaves, 33, 57-59, 63, 65, 68-84, 88; European colonialism, x, xi, 29-51, 55-69, 121-25, 185, 229n4; named, 33-34- See also American Indians; Latin America; United States al-Andalus (Muslim Spain), xi, 22-26, 47-48, 87-88, 184 Appleby, Joyce, 68, 72, 73> 83 Arabs: Arab Renaissance, 145-46, 148-49; backwardness, r6, 146; British view, 56; Gulf states, 149; nationalism, 17, 192, 228-29n41; Orientalism by and toward, 2-3, 5-6; slavery by, 185. See also Barbary states; Egypt; Iraq; Palestine; Saudi Arabia architecture, 118, II9, 230l1IO, 233n58 Arendt, Hannah, 181, 186 aristocracy, 68-69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 115, 116 art, 36, 50, 63, rr8. See also architecture al-'Ashmawy, Muhammad Sa'id, 148, 209-II, 256n48 Ataturk, Kemal, 147, 179 Aztecs, 32-33, 35-36, 39-41, 46-47, 49 Baepler, Paul, 83, 100, 236-37nr9 al-Banna, Hassan, 147, 148 barbarians, 8, 54, 62, 190-92, 196, 208;

262

Index

American Indians, 43, 44, 45, 47, 54, 56; Muslims, 44, 54, 56-57 Barbary states: African slaves, roo; American captives, 59, 66, 82-ro3, 237nr9; pirates, 59, ro3, n8, 155-56; Tunisia, 66, 88, 148, 184; U.S. shipping wars, 65-67, 89, 94, 155-56; women, 94, 114, !17, 120, 243n33. See also Algiers; Morocco Berlin, Isaiah, 197, 206, 217 Bessis, Sophie, 172, 183-84, r86, 187, !89-92 Bin Laden, Osama, I)I-)2, 212, 245n3 blacks. See Africa Braude!, Fernand, xviii, 105, 195, 221 Britain: American republicanism and, 67, 68, 77, 79-80; colonialism, x, 6-7, 15, 17, 19-20, 34, 53-69, 109; and Crusades, 22; and India, 15, q, 19-20, ro9; Industrial Revolution, 14-15; private property concept, 40-41; Saudis and, 136-37 Bush, George W, viii-ix, 22, r64, 213-14, 22)n2, 2)In62 Canary Islands, 29, 31 capitalism, 31, 34, 107, 208, 252n70; and American Indian, 125-26; American Revolution undermined by, 213-14; barbaric, 196; children's lives under, r62; China, 158-59; consumerism, III, 149-50, 189-90, 200, 215-16; and culture, 203-5, 219; dual revolution and, 14, 15; Euro-American imaginary, ro-13, 199, 228m9; extremisms produced by, 157-58, 203, 214; freedom and, 18, ro4, 164, 25m6r; fundamentalist, x, 163-64, m, 216; global, IO)-II, 140-44, 157-58, 163-77, 193, 198-205, 2IT, 218; Islamic reform and, 212-13, 257n56; Islamism and, 149-50, 152-53, r83; in Marxism, ro-13, 164-65; Muslim difference and, 154;

and Orientalism, ros; religion and, 198, 203, 215-16, 219, 222; Russia, 158-59, 247n27; secular, 203, 223-24; social breakdown from, 197-98; universalist, 8, r8, 20, 165, 171, r87 captivity narratives, 55, 59, 6r, 66, 82-ro3, 237nr9. See also slaves/slavery Castoriadis, Cornelius, ro-r2, 190 Catholics, 26, 40, 87, ro8, 195; popes, 25, 66, 2!6; Spain, 39-47 China, x, 14, 29, no, 158-59 Chraibi, Driss, The Butts, 134-35 Christians, 44, 184, 194, 207, 209, 210, 220; African American, 8r; American colonists, 59-62; American Indians and, 42-47, 57, 59, 124-25; American Revolution and, 24, 6r, 62, 67-75; and al-Andalus, 22, 23-26; and Barbary states, 55, 59, 66-67, 84-103, n8; and capitalism, 203-5; captivity narratives, 55, 59, 6r, 66, 84-103; consumerism and, 215-16; conversions attempted/forced by, ix-xi, 8-9, 23, 29-30,41-48,54, 57· 67-68,72,106, II2, 2JI1122; conversions to Islam, 54-55, 93; Crusades, 21-22, 24, 43, 49-50, 230nr9; after dual revolutions, 17; entitlement to Orient, n2-13; Inquisition, xi, 26-28, 30, 46; Muslim defeat in Spain (Granada, 1492), xi, 24-29, 51-52, 184, 23II122; Muslim slaves vs., 58; Muslims under rule of (Mudejar), 24-29, 23onro, 23I111122,23,24,26; and New World conquest, 37, 39-51, 57, r85; racialized Christianity, 27-30, 184-85; Reconquista, xi, 24-25, 47, 49, 50, 51; religious tolerance/intolerance, 24, 25-30, 40, 47; universalist, 9, 20, 40, IO), 225n2. See also Catholics; Protestants CIA, 153, 159, r67 class, 106-8, 158-59, 195. See also aristocracy; middle class; working class

Index Clifford, James, 3-4, 6, 227n2 Clinton, Bill, xiii-xiv, I62 coexistence, 225n2; convivencia, 23, 24, 41, 206, 229n6. See also multiculturalism; pluralism; tolerance/intolerance colonialism, 17, 105-10, 156, r86. See also American colonies; European colonialism; imperialism Columbus, Christopher, 28-34, 38-42, 50, 232n4I, 23Jn62 communism, no, 153, r86, 204, 237-38n29; collapse, 158, 249n5o; Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels), 105, 204; health care, I58-59 Constitution, U.S., 77, 8I-82, I77, 213-I4, 237n29, 253n88 consumerism, III, I49-50, 189-90, 200, 215-16 convivmcia, 23, 24, 41, 206, 229n6 corporations, multinational, I)I, I63-64, r68, 216 covenantal relationships, 61, 222 Crusades, Christian, 21-22, 24, 43, 49-50, 2JOni9 culture, 30-3I, 62-63, 219-21; capitalism and, 203-5, 219; cultural independence, x, 220-21; cultural revolution, m; etymology, 202; and globalization, 169, 199-205, 219-20; Muslim refinement, 21-23, 23onro. See also art; modernity; multiculturalism; Other; pluralism; social imaginary democracy, viii-ix, xii, I6, I8, 64, 154; capitalism vs., 198; corporations and, 163-64; imperialism and, ro8; Islamic reform and, 212-13; Mexico and, I34; U.S., 70, 72-75, 8r, I69-70, I82, 2!4-I5 deterritorialization, I99-202 difference. See Other; social imaginary disease. See health threats dual revolution (1789-1848), 8, I4-I9;

263

French Revolution, 8, I)-16, 17, 64, ro6, I46, I77, 214; Industrial Revolution, I4-15, 106 Dunn, Susan, 8, 17, 214, 215, 253n88 Eagleton, Terry, 197, 202-3 economics, III, I23-24, 158-59; consumerism, III, 149-50, 189-90, 200, 2I)-I6; corporations, I)I, 163-64, 168, 216; oil, I89; Russia, r6, 158-59· 187-88, 247n27, 249n5o; sexual exploitation, I24, 158, 159, 162; underground, 159-60, 164; U.S., 71, 73, 76, I24, r68, 214-15, 25on6o; Western hegemony, 109, I87, 189-90, 198, 226n4. See also capitalism; poverty education, 104, 108, 125-28, 17I-72, 2511161 Egypt, 5-6, 15, 16, 145-48, 185; Nasser, 147, 179; religions, 209, 2IO Eisenhower, Dwight, I8, 6I-62, 237-38n29 Engels, F., I31, I64-65; Communist Manifesto, 105, 204 Enlightenment, 14, 174, 181, 202, 220; American, 62-65, 69, 76, I98-99; failure of, 182, r86, I96-97; universalist, I8, 20, 62-64, 105, I8), I98, 205. See also modernity equality/inequality, 14, 73, 185, 187, 2I4; American Indians and, 43, 44, 45, I85; American republican views, 69-70, 72-80; blacks and, 59, 75, 81-82, I85; globalization, 164-68, 246nii; Islamic reform and, 213. See also class; freedom; gender hierarchies; racism Euber, Roxanne, 146, 181-83 Euro-American imaginary, viii-xiii, 18-19, 6I, 104, I8J, I90; capitalism, 10-13, 199, 228m9; Christianization, ix-xi, 8-9, 29-30, 41-48, 54; European vs. American vision, xiii-xiv, 188, 226n4, 254m02, 255nr5. See also

Americas; dual revolution; Eurocentrism; Europe; Orientalism; universalism; West Eurocentrism, 10, 13, 14, no, 200, 202, 252n7o; Afrocentrism vs., 192; Enlightenment, 63, 185; Islamic reform and, 212; Islamism and, 178, 180, 182-83; Marx and Las Casas, 177, 185, 2521176; Mexico, 121; Sayyid definition, 180; secularism, 221; sovereignty, 173-74; Western progressive, 17o--72, 177; Wharton, II5. See also Westernization Europe, 30-31, 109-10; Eastern, 159, 187-88; Muslims as Other, 29, 120-21; Renaissance, 173, 194-95. See also Britain; Euro-American imaginary; Eurocentrism; European colonialism; France; Germans; Spain European Children's Trust, "The Silent Crisis," 159 European colonialism, xviii, 14-15, 108-9, 2281119; Africa, 53-57, 185-86; Americas, x, xi, 29-51, 55-69, 121-25, 185, 229n4; Arab Renaissance and, 145-46, 148-49; British, x, 6-7, 15, 17, 19-20, 34, 53-69, 109; Christianizing, ix-xi, 8-9, 29-30, 41-48, 54; and Crusades, 22, 43, 49-50; French, 18, 57, IIJ-20, 184, 243n33; motives, 34-35; Muslims, 14, 17, 57, II3-20, 243n33; Orientalist, 5-8; universalist, 37, 38-39, 40, 51-52, II7, 120, 184, 187 extremisms, x, xiii, 18, 157, 190, 218; capitalism producing, 157-58, 203, 214; Christians in Spain, 26-28; globalization producing, xii, 157-58, 165. See also fundamentalisms; terrorism feminism, 74, 108 Fish, Stanley, 206-8 Foss, John, 83, 84-88 France: Christianity after dual revolu-

tions, 17; colonialism, 18, 57, II3-20, 184, 243n33; Communist party, 186; culture etymology, 202; entitlement to Orient, 7; honorary citizenships, 15-16; Reign ofTerror, 8; U.S. vs., viii, 77, 157; vision of freedom, viii. See also French Revolution Franklin, Benjamin, 17, 63-64, 69, 9o--91, 155, 238n32; Autobiography, 71, 239n53 freedom, 18, 31, 175-77, 193, 195, 207, 252n73; American Barbary state captives and, 86-89, 93-94, 95, 101-3; American Revolution and, 67-83, 87-89, 102-4; British and, 77, 79-80; capitalism and, 18, 104, 164, 25m61; dual revolution and, 14-15, 17; EuroAmerican imaginary, viii-x, 18, 104; Islamic reform and, 213; Oricntalism and, 5-6, 103-4; religion necessary for, 182; universalism and, 103, 187; U.S. slaves, 70, navy and, 155-56; 72-83, 92; Western conquest as, 6, 53-104. See aLso democracy French Revolution, 8, 15-16, 17, 64, 106, 146, 177, 214 Fuchs, Barbara, 48-49 fundamentalisms, viii, xi, 205, 211, 221-22, 223; capitalism provoking, 203; capitalist, x, 163-64, 2II, 216. See also Islamism (Islamic fundamentalism/salafism)

u.s.

gender hierarchies, 67, 71, 72, 93, 111; patriarchy, 68, 69, 93, n4, 118. See also white men; women genocide, 148, 232-33n43, 252n7o; Africa, 185-86; American Indians, 42, 106, 122, 124, 131, 154, 184-85, 218; Canary Islands, 29, 31 Germans, 36, 64, 202; Nazism, 186, 196-97· 2!8 globalization, xiii-xiv, 188-89, 219-20,

Index

246nu; capitalist, ros-n, 140-44· ISY-58, 163-yy, 193, 198-205, 2II, 218; Enlightenment, 62-63, r85; extremisms produced by, xii, rsy-58, r65; religion and, 153, 2n-r6; Western resistance of, 192-93. See also universalism glocalization, 201 Gray, John, 165, I9Y-99, 201, 205-6, 255lliO, 256n35 Hardt, Michael, Empire, ryo-y8, r82, 183, 195, 213 health threats: colonialism, 30-31, 33, 123; Westernization, 158-63 Hobsbawm, Eric, 8, 14-1y, ro6, roy, no, 124, 158, ryy, r86, 188, 253n88 holy war: Christian Crusades, 21-22, 24, 43, 49-50, 230m9; jihad, 148, 152, 218, 256n39; New England, 56 humanism, 31, ry3, r8r, 182, r8y, 194-95, 228my

Humanity in Algiers: Or, the Story of Azem, 9y-98 Hussein, Saddam, ix, 164, 212 Hussein, Taha, 146, I4Y imperialism, 105-12, r68, ryo-77, r8y, 222; capitalism and, ros-n, ryo-y6, 198. See also colonialism; Westernization Incas, 33, 36, 3Y India, 15, ry, 19-20, y2, 109 indigenous cultures: Canary Islands, 29, 31. See also American Indians Industrial Revolution, 14-15, ro6 Inquisition, xi, 26-28, 30, 46 Iran, ry9; reformers, 212-13, 25yn56; Revolution (19y8), 65, 155, ryr, ry4, 18o-8r Iraq: Islamic reform, 213; U.S. intervention, viii, ix, rsy, 164, 212, 246mo, 254lll02 Islam. See Muslims

265

lslamism (Islamic fundamentalism/ salafism), 145-53, 189-92, 212-13, 2r6; vs. American popular culture, 169-yo; and modernity, I4Y· 148, 158, 174, 177-83; and 9/n, 151-53, 206-y; Other defined by, 15y; Turkey, 246mo Israel, 149, 191. See also Jerusalem Jackson, Andrew, 3y-38, y2, 124 Japan, ro6, r88, 24yn23 Jefferson, Thomas, 18, 6y, yr, y2, y5, y8, 214, 215; and American Indians, 3y-38, 66, 6y, 185; Declaration oflndependence, 1y; "empire ofliberty," 77; and Muslims/Barbary pirates, 6o, 66, 155. 156 Jerusalem, 21-22, 29, 41 Jews: anti-Semitism, 28, 29-30, 54; appropriated, 191; with Columbus, 29; culture, 22; Diaspora, 220; Judaism, 208-9, 210, 221-22; Muslims and, 24, 85, 191, 23omo, 23rn23; Other, 29, r84, 191; Sacks, 220, 221-23; Spain, 24, 26, 29-30, 184, 23omo, 23Inll23,26; U.S. population, 208, 256n41. See also Israel jihad, 148, 152, 218, 256n39 Kemalism, 14y, 153-54, ry9 Key, Francis Scott, 6y, 238n48 labor, 69, yo, y5, r6r, ry5, ry6-77, r88. See also slaves/ slavery; working class language, 50-51; Algerine, 85; Arabic, 55, s8; Spanish colonialist, }I, 41 Las Casas, Bartolome de, 35-36, 44-46, 48, 51, r8s, 252ny6, 256n35 Latin America, 48, r68, r86-8y, 192. See also Mexico law, Islamic, 20, 42, 44, 51, 136, 2n, 216-ry, 256n48 Lawrence, Bruce, 105, 211-12, 218, 25Yn56 Lewis, Bernard, 3, 8, 23, 152-53, 154

266

Index

Lincoln, Abraham, 18, 102, 24mn2 localism, 173, 201 Lopez y Fuentes, Gregorio, El Indio, 12!-23 Lyautey, Louis-Hubert, 115-16, 117, uS marriage, 54, 74, 92-93, 94 Marx, Karl, 41, 107, 153, 164-65, 177, 198, 200, 234n91; American Indians and, 131; Capital, 21; capitalism, 10-13, 164-65; on civil society, 173, 252n73; Communist Manifosto, 105, 204; Eurocentric, 177, 2)2!176; on freedom and slavery, 252n73; Grundrisse, 199; on Orient, 6-7, 8, 9, 20; on religion, 17; social imaginary, 10-13 Marxism, no, 165, 186, 202, 204, 218. See also communism; Marx, Karl Matar, Nabil, 53-54, 56, 57 Mather, Cotton, 53, 59, 6o, 77, 237m9 Maya, 36-37, 39 men. See gender hierarchies; marriage; patriarchy; white men Mexico: American Indians, 32-41, 46-47, 49, 121-23, 133-34; revolution, 109, 121, 123, 133-34; Spanish conquest, 32-42, 49, 121-22; white men, 121-23, 133-34 middle class, 14-15, 16-17, 18, 71, 106-8, 152, 198, 245n3 modernity, 150, 165, 187, 194-96, 207, 252n7o; Arabs/Muslims, xi, xiii, 3, n7, 136, 145-48, 154, 158, 174, 177-83, 2n-13, 247023; beginnings, 173, 184, 195; crisis, 181, 252-53n82. See also Enlightenment; Westernization Mohawk, John C., 21, 33, 43, 127, 217-18, 222 Momaday, N. Scott, 128, 133 Morocco, 55, 6o, 66, 134-35, 190; American captives, 59, 100-103; French colonialism, n3-20, 243n33; personal ads, 2-3

multiculturalism, 150, 201, 204, 208; alAndalus, 22, 24; education, 171-72; New World, 37, 47; postcolonial, 193; Renaissance humanism and, 194. See also coexistence; pluralism Munif, Abdelrahman, 136-4 5 Muslims, 17, 44-45, 46, 105, n6-17, 208-10, 229-3on8; American colonists/Revolution/republicanism and, 56, 57, 59-61, 64-68, 8}-89; American Indians equated with, 44-49, 54, 56, 66, no-21, 135-36; alAndalus, xi, 22-26, 47-48, 87-88, 184; backward/archaic, 16, 146, 154-55; barbarians, 44, 54, s6-57; British and, 53-57; captivity narratives about, 55, 59, 61, 66, 83-103, 237!119; Christian converts to Islam, 54-55, 93; Christian missionaries to, 23, 72; Crusades vs., 21-22, 24, 43, 49-50, 230m9; dual revolution and, 14, 15, q, 18-19; European colonialism, 14, q, 57, IIJ-20, 243n33; expansion phase, ro6, 210; and globalization, 153, 2n-15; governmental systems, 20, 6o-61, 210-n; Islamic law, 20, 42, 44, 51, 136, 2n, 216-q, 256n48; Islamic reform, 210-19, 223, 257n56; and Jews, 24, 8s, 191, 230!110, 231n23; jihad, 148, 152, 218, 256n39; Kemalist, 147, 153-54, 179; liberalism, 145-46; Mudejar (under Christian rule in Spain), 24-29, 23onro, 231!1n22,23,24,26; Muslim Renaissance, 145-46, 148-49; vs. Muslims, xi-xii; 9/n aftereffects, 151-56, 206-9, 245n3; Other, xi, 28, 29, 49, 100, 120-21, 135, 157, 172, 182, 191-92; pirates, 54, 57, 59, 103, II8, 155-56; progressive, 192; refined culture, 21-23, 230n10; religious tolerance/intolerance, 24, 86, 207, 223; slaves, 57-59, 83, 91-92; Spain defeating (Granada, 1492), xi, 24-29, 51-52, 184,

Index 231n22; universalism refused by, 178-8r, 225n2; universalist, 9, 191, 193, 209-10; U.S. population, 236m4; and Westernization, xi-xii, r6, II), 134-47, 2II-IJ; world population and oil percentage, x. See also lslamism (Islamic fundamentalism/salafism); Qur'an NAFTA, 121, 133-34, r88 Nash, Gary, 8o-8r, 83 nationalism, 51-52, 54, 64, 108, 174; American, 64, 75, 84, 155-56; Arab, 17, 192, 228-29n4r; Enlightenment and, 62, 64, 197; Spanish, 26, 28 nation-states, 16, 31, 49, 63, 107, 174-76, 195 Native Americans. See American Indians nativism, xii, 37, 133, 157, 220-21. See also indigenous cultures nature, 5, 31, 215, 219; environmental damage, 167, 189 Nazism, r86, 196-97, 218 Negri, Antonio, Empire, 170-78, 182, !83, 195> 213 New York Times, 22, 152-69 passim, 209 9/n, viii, 21-22, 23, 65, 136, 165-69; aftereffects, 151-56, 206-9, 245113 oil, viii, ix, x, r89 Onitositah, 37, 47 Orientalism, 1-9, 172, 200; American, 6r, 64-65, 67, 83, 102, n2-I7, 120; freedom and, 5-6, 103-4; Islamism and, 147; Jews and, 191; 9/n and, 152; representation, 3-5, 9, 227n2; Said and, 1-8, 9, 13, 14, 19, 20, 105, 178, 226n2 Other, vii, xiii, xiv, 20, 49, 145-46, r86, 190, 204, 220, 252n7o; American Indian, 77, 120-2r, 123-24, 185; British colonialism and, 56-57; decolonization and, r86; Jews, 29, 184, 191; Muslim, xi, 28, 29, 49, 100, 120-21, 135,

267

157, 172, 182, 191-92; nationalism vs., 197; pasts of, 154-55, 191-92; Spanish conquest and, 28-30, 38, 40, 47, 185; West as, 148-49; Western domination toward, 4-6, 135, r87. See also racism Ottomans, 19, 54, 61. See also Turkey Palestine, 56, 149 patriarchy: American colonies, 68, 69; Barbary states, 93, II4, n8 Phillips, Kevin, 151, 214-15 piracy, r6o; Muslim, 54, 57, 59, 103, n8, 155-56. See also captivity narratives pluralism, 197, 201, 206-9, 217-19. See also multiculturalism population: American Indians, 32, 33, 42, 124, 127; Chinese and Muslim percentage of world, x; dual revolution and, r6; Europeans leaving continent, r86; Muslim slaves in New World, 58; U.S. Jews, 208, 256n41; U.S. Muslims, 236m4; U.S. prison, 160, 197; U.S. violent death, r6r; Western percentage of world, x, 187 post-Andalusian period, vii, xi, 3, 9, 13, 24-29, 51-)2, 184, 2}In22 postmodernism, r68, 174-77, r8o-8r, r82, 205, zo6 poverty, 147, 153, r66, r88; American Indian, 127; European children, 159; Latin America, r68; slavery and, 70, 78; U.S., 162, r82; world, 25rn62 private property, 40-41, 44, 6r progress, 106, 107, 108, 117, 158 progressives: Muslims, 192; Western, 170-72, 177, r86-87 Protestants, 26, 40, 87, III-12, 207; American, 17, 24, 61, 68, 69, 71, 74-75, 77, 89-90; revivalism, 17, 74-75> 77 provincialism, xii, xiii, xiv, r8, 180, 192-224

268

Index

al-Qa'cda, 152, 207, 253n98 Qur'an, xii, 58, 60, 209-10, 216, 223, 256n48 Qutb, Sayyid, 147, 148, 181, 182, 253n98 race. See Africa; Arabs; Europe; genocide; indigenous cultures; Jews; racism; white men racism, 1-2, 44, 74, 108, 183, 185; antiSemitism, 28, 29-30, 54; Arabs toward blacks, 185; Communist, 186; Enlightenment, 63, 185; imperialism and, 107-8; limpieza de sangre, 27-28, 184-85; nationalism and, 28; Nazism, 186; Orientalism and, 1-3, 7, 67, II3-14; Spain's Christianity, 27-30, 184-85; universalism and, 52; U.S. abolitionist, 81; Wharton, II3-14, n6 rationalism, 31, 63, ro8, 146, 181, 184, 194-96 Reid, John, 78, So Rejeb, Ben, 82, 83, 100 religion, ix, xiii, 16-17, 190, 218, 221-23; Aztec, 40, 46; capitalism and, 198, 203, 215-16, 219, 222; vs. colonialism, 17, ro8; Enlightenment and, 63, 185; freedom needing, 182; globalization and, 153, 2u-16; Judaism, 208-9, 210, 221-22; Manicheanism, 103-4, 148; monotheist, 40, 57, 208; political separation from, 210-u; Shintoism, 106; tolerance/intolerance, 23, 24, 25-30, 40, 41, 47· 86, 207, 210, 213, 222, 223; U.S. American Indian, 126-27. See also Christians; holy war; Muslims Renaissance: Arab/Muslim, 145-46, 148-49; European, 173, 194-95 republicanism, 65-80, 84, 175-77 revivalism, U.S., 17, 74-75, 77 revolutions, 6-7, uo, ur, 186-87, 214; Industrial, 14-15, 106; Iran, 65, 155, 171, 174, 180-81; Mexico, 109, 121, 123,

133-34. See also American Revolution; French Revolution Riley, James, 82-83, 100-103, 24Inii2 Russia: Bolsheviks, r8; economy, 16, 158-59, 187-88, 247n27, 249n5o; revolution, 109; Westernization, no, 199 Said, Edward, 170-71, 176, 202, 2281117; and Orientalism, 1-8, 9, 13, 14, 19, 20, 105, 178, 226n2 salafism. See Islamism (Islamic fundamentalism/ salafism) Sale, Kirkpatrick, 30, 31-32, 34 Saudi Arabia, 17, 136-45, 189 Sayyid, Bobby, 178-81, r82 sciences, 14, 31, 106, roS, 146, 195, 230n10 secularization, 153, 182, 194, 221; capitalist, 203, 223-24; Islamism and, 148-49, 207; Kemalist, 147, 153-54, 179; of masses, 16-17, 108 September II, 2001. See 9/n sexuality: exploitation industries, 124, 158, 159· 162; Muslim, 56, 61, II4; puritanical, 196 Silko, Leslie Marmon: Almanac ofthe Dead, 131-32, 133; Ceremony, 129-31, !58 Slaves in Barbary (drama), 88-89, 103 slaves/slavery, 252n73; African, 33, 57-59, 63, 65, 68-84, 88, 91-92, roo; American abolitionism, 63, 70, 72-83, 92, 24mn2; American captives in Barbary states, 84-89, 92-103; American colonies/Revolution/republicanism and, 63, 65, 68, 69-70, 72-89; American Indian, 37, 39, 42, 43; chattel, 78, 8o, 185 social imaginary, 9-13. See also EuroAmerican imaginary socialism, 17, 64, 108, 204, 218. See also commumsm sovereignty, 173-74

Index Spain: Inquisition, xi, 26-28, 30, 46; Jews, 24, 29-30, 184, 230n1o, 23Inn23,26; Mudejar (Muslims under Christian rule), 24-29, 230mo, 23mn22,23,24,26; Muslim (al-Andalus), xi, 22-26, 47-48, 87-88, 184; Muslim fall at Granada (1492), xi, 24-29, 51-52, 184, 23m22; in New World, x, xi, 29-51, 57-58, 121-22, 185; Reconquista, xi, 24-25, 47, 49, 50, 51; religious tolerance/intolerance, 24, 25-30, 40, 47 Stannard, David, 22, 30-31, 33, 40-41 technology, 107, IIO-II, 177, 199-200 terrorism, 153, 155-57, 160-61, 212, 219; by children, 162; globalization producing, xii, 157-58, 165; Muslims associated with, 151-56. See also 9/H Todorov, Tzvetan, The Conquest of America, 28-29, 38-42, 44, 47 tolerance/intolerance, 197, 218, 220; religious, 23, 24, 25-30, 40, 41, 47, 86, 207, 210, 213, 222, 223. See also coexistence; multiculturalism; Other Tomlinson, John, 199-203, 213 Tripoli, 66, 155 Tunisia, 66, 88, 148, 184 Turkey, 16, 212; Islamism, 246mo; secularization/Kemalism, 147, 153-54, 179. See also Ottomans Tyler, Royall, 74, 95-96; The Algerine Captive, 84, 89-97, 241m07 United States: Barbary state shipping wars, 65-67, 89, 94, 155-56; Constitution, 77, 81-82, 177, 213-14, 237n29, 253n88; democracy, 70, 72-75, 81, 169-70, 182, 214-15; economics, 71, 73, 76, 124, 168, 214-15, 25on6o; Enlightenment, 63-65, 69, 76, 198-99; European vision vs., xiii-xiv, 188, 226n4, 254m02, 255m5; Founding Fa-

269

thers, viii, 15, q, 18, 37-38, 6o, 66-72, 78, 214-15; vs. France, viii, 77, 157; global hegemony, 109, 136, 226n4, 25m61; imperialism, 105-12; interventionism, viii-x, 157, 164, 212, 246mo, 254m02; Islamist view, 149; manifest destiny, 8, 61, 64, 76, I12-13, 185; national anthem, 67, 238n48; nationalism, 64, 75, 84, 155-56; national motto, 237-38n29; 9/II aftereffects, 151-56; republicanism, 65-80, 84; social breakdown, 197-98; violence in society, 71, 161, 197, 214; white men, 69, 71, 123-33. See also African Americans; American colonies; American Indians; American Revolution; Americas; Christians; Euro-American imaginary; population; slaves/slavery universalism, xiii-xiv, 6-8, 15, 154-55, 183, 190-96, 207-8, 217-22; American Revolutionary, 68, 72, 81, 103-5, II1-12; capitalist, 8, 18, 20, 165, 171, 187; Christian, 9, 20, 40, 105, 225n2; colonialist, 37, 38-39, 40, 51-52, H7, 120, 184, 187; cultural independence vs., 220; Enlightenment, 18, 20, 62-64, 105, 185, 198, 205; humanist, 194-95, 228nq; Islamic, 9, 191, 193, 209-10; Muslim refusal of, q8-81, 225n2; pluralism and, 201, 206-8, 217; Western progressive, 170-72. See also globalization Vietnam, 17-18, 156 violence, viii-x, xiii, 184, 186, 219, 252n7o; European culture, 23, 28, 30-31; global, 160-61; globalization producing, 168, 220; Islamist, 148; Islam presented as, 6o; pluralism as way out of, 197, 217; reactions to West, xii-xiii, 157, 183; religion in political realm, 210; Spanish conquest, 35, 36, 42-43; U.S. society, 71, 161, 197, 214;

270

Index

Westernization, 134-36. See also genocide; holy war; revolutions; terrorism Washington, George, 15, 17, 18, 71, 78, 81, 25m61 West, x, 198, 254nr02; conquest as freedom, 6, 53-104; consumerism, III, 149-50, 189-90; economic dependencies of other countries on, r6; global hegemony, 109, 136, 187-92, 198, 226n4, 25m6r; progressives, 170-72, 177, 186-87; superiority of, 152, 154, 184, 186, 190, 207-8; violent reactions to, xii-xiii, 157, 183. See also EuroAmerican imaginary; Westernization Westernization: globalization and, 106, 108-ro, 188, 246nr1; health threats, 158-63; Muslims and, xi-xii, 16, n5, 134-47, 2n-13; 9/n and, 152-55; resistance to, xi-xii, 109-IO, 120-21, 135-36, 145-49, q8-83; Russia, no, 199. See also capitalism; modernity

Wharton, Edith, n3-20, 243n34 white men, 108, 158; American Indians and, 121-34, 221; Mexico, 121-23, 133-34; rampage killers, 161; U.S., 69, 71, 123-33. See also Europe women: American Indian, 124; Barbary states, 94, n4, rq, 120, 243n33; beauty perceptions, 169; Eastern European, 159; European protection from Muslims and Jews, 231n26; feminism, 74, 108; Islamist control of bodies of, 178; prostitution, 124, 158, 159, 162; U.S. literacy, 73; U.S. republican pedestal, 71; U.S. rights, 69, 74· See also gender hierarchies; marriage Wood, Gordon, 68-70, 72, 83, 239n53 working class, 71, 107, r86. See also labor World War II, 186, 196 Zizek, Slavoj, 203-5