Framing Welfare Recipients in Political Discourse: Political Farming through Material Need Assistance 3030635783, 9783030635787

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Framing Welfare Recipients in Political Discourse Political Farming through Material Need Assistance

Lenka Kissová

Framing Welfare Recipients in Political Discourse

Lenka Kissová

Framing Welfare Recipients in Political Discourse Political Farming through Material Need Assistance

Lenka Kissová Faculty of Education Masaryk University Brno, Czech Republic

ISBN 978-3-030-63578-7    ISBN 978-3-030-63579-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63579-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Abstract Aerial Art/gettyimages This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To Peter. And to all the brave women and men who struggle with and fight everyday inequality.

Preface

We have been through so much development as societies over the past years. It’s been about six years that I’ve spent time on this study, including the process of inspiration and figuring it out. These years have been marked with rapid developments in technology and medicine; people with AIDS have been cured, and genetically modified babies have been born. The climate screams: ‘Enough!’ thanks to human activity, and species are dying out. The gap between the poorest and the richest is growing rapidly, and the COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare these inequalities in their clearest form. Worldwide, we are witnessing massive backlash against injustice, racism, and oppression. Many lives have been lost in Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Myanmar, Somalia, Eritrea, Egypt, Mali, and elsewhere. Hundreds of thousands of people are on move due to climate change, war, or poverty. Thousands of people die or suffer from violence during these journeys. Terrorist attacks are committed all around the world. Journalists and human rights activists are being imprisoned or murdered. Europe is facing the rise of radical right movements and their public support. The Union is confronted with disintegration due to an increase in anti-systemic parties, BREXIT, and the call for greater sovereignty in Visegrad countries. People in Europe and in other corners of the world witness new waves of anti-Semitism, racism, and homophobia. Development in Central Europe has been scarred by fences against vulnerable fleeing people, the criminalisation of help to refugees, anti-abortion laws, loss of media and judicial independence, corruption, and the rise of anti-democratic, authoritarian forms of government. In Slovakia, in the vii

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PREFACE

past years, we’ve observed the refusal of non-Christian refugees, a referendum on the ‘traditional family’, a police attack on people in a Roma settlement, attacks on Muslims or people of colour, the segregation of children at school, corruption, a far-right party reaching the parliament, and an increase in support for disinformation media and violence against journalists. Political representatives are members of the social elite, and have an essential impact on people’s existence. They hold power in their hands and can execute it over our everyday lives. They ‘farm’ the land of our mental representations. They produce and reproduce ‘crops’ in forms of how we perceive the world. They plant seeds of ideas, perceptions, and opinions in our minds. They water and fertilise them so they grow exactly the way they, as political farmers, need so they can profit. They are often good marketers too. Even if the initial seed, or the final product, is rotten, through good marketing, they can sell the idea anyway. The book you are holding in your hands is about this farming process. It is about ideas political representatives present, work to cultivate, and sell in order to achieve their political gains. However, the ideas analysed in this study might be rotten too. They easily lead to discrimination, deepen inequalities, and increase poverty among vulnerable groups of people. Unfortunately, the farmers in my book are good marketers too, able to sell these products despite their potential negative impact. All these developments spin the wheel of hatred and negative reactions. They feed hate speech, hate crimes, abuse, and a decrease in solidarity. The polarisation of society is so vivid. In this atmosphere, good social scientific research, which unpacks current events and their potential impact, and explains our findings to a wider public, is so crucial. At the same time, support for fundamental human rights and the protection of nature are necessary as never before. As a sociologist and as a human being who adores nature and people strong enough to fight for their or others’ rights, I feel I’d like to contribute at least a small step towards understanding the contemporary world and its impact on everyday life. I’m rather a small fish in the ocean. But even small fish add to the balance of the entire ecosystem. Happy International Roma Day! Brno, Czech Republic 8 April 2020

Lenka Kissová

Acknowledgements

This dissertation project represents a long ride. During this journey, I have met many inspiring and supportive people and I am grateful to every single one of them because without their support this thesis would have never made it to this day. From the depth of my heart, I would like to thank you, Peter, for being so supportive since the beginning. You helped me to go through all the dilemmas I faced when I was hesitant about my choices. Thank you for supporting my idea to spend a significant amount of time in Toronto to work on my research even if it was difficult and it complicated our life together. You are my soulmate and that means the world to me. During our journey, I have grown a lot as a person and for this I give much credit to you. Thank you for all your love. And also, thank you for the inspiring idea of political ‘farming’. I know it started as a joke. But in the end, it was a good one! Very special thanks go to you, Bernadette Nadya Jaworsky. Thank you for taking me under your wing, with almost no hesitation. You are the best motivator I have worked with. Also, you and your texts are intellectually very stimulating. And your feedback helps a lot! It is motivating, to the point, and helps to make the work better. Without you, this book might have never emerged. By the way, I want to see your time-turner. You must have one; otherwise, I do not know how you manage to work so much and still be so effective and give such thorough feedback. Thank you for being the best supervisor and intellectual guide I could ever have imagined. You are gold to all of your students. ix

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank you, Michal Vašečka, for supporting my ideas, even those silly ones. You know very well how to motivate students. My discussions with you helped me to form my own world view. Thank you for standing up for me. Dear Professor Petr Mareš, thank you very much for guiding me through nearly the entire journey. Your expertise and feedback influenced my decision-making and the creative process of my research. I am grateful also for your ‘warning signs’ because they speeded up my work flow and progress significantly. Thanks also to you, my dear former colleagues from Milan Šimečka Foundation, Laco Oravec and Ester Lomová, for being at the beginning of this journey. Without you, I might have never been sitting in the office of the State Secretary and thinking about what was going on with material need social support. I also want to thank you, Peter Drál,̌ for writing an inspiring thesis that made me reflect upon relevant aspects that I had not considered before. Thank you, Steve Saxonberg, for contacting me in the fall of 2015. It was right on time. Thanks to your suggestions, I found the way out of the social theory labyrinth. I was literally lost in all the theoretical frameworks I could frame my study with. You lit the guiding light. Special thanks go also to you, Barbara Falk. You were the pioneer in reading my outcomes. Thank you and your beloved husband for the intellectual guidance, all your time spent correcting my writing and discussing relevant topics with me. Thanks to you, my motivation had sky-rocketed back then, and I came back from Toronto with over 100 pages of text. Your support means a lot. Zuzana Kusá, thank you for your intellectual navigation. You have shared so much relevant information and so many important insights into the topic I am focusing on in this study. You showed me perspectives that I had not taken into consideration. I am thankful for your professional and personal wisdom. Robert Austin, I cannot express what it means to have met you and how grateful I am for what you and Georgina Steinsky have done for me. Thank you for your continuous support. Without you, I would probably not have finished my doctoral studies. And thank you for all those one-­ word emails—loved them! Last but not least, I would like to thank my family for their restless question: ‘When will you finish your PhD?’ It was annoying but

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supportive at the same time. In the language my parents understand, I would like to say: Ď akujem, mami, oci. Za všetku podporu, ktorú som od vás dostala. Za to, že ste ma nechali íst ̌ vlastnou cestou. Ale aj za to, že ste ma na začiatku vychovali tak, že mi urážlivé vtipy o Rómoch, Maďaroch či Židoch nikdy neprišli vtipné. Aj vďaka tomu som tam, kde som a taká, aká som. Aj vďaka vám vidím problém v nerovnostiach v spoločnosti, o ktorých dnes kriticky píšem. A Ali, aj vďaka tebe o nich zas viem viac a trochu viac im rozumiem. Ď akujem za všetko. Thank you, pán predseda Jaryngo, for always believing in me. Huge hug to you! The moment I met you was probably one of the most formative ones in my entire life. Also, thank you my dear colleagues and friends from the sociology department at Masaryk University. It has been a fight. But sharing our experiences, feelings and dilemmas meant a lot! Knowing I was not alone in this helped to survive it all. Special thanks to you, my closest co-fighters Zuzana Botiková, Runya Qiaoan, Ivana Rapošová, Alica Rétiová, and Katarína Slezáková. This study was actualised also with great support from the Department of Sociology at Masaryk University. I am grateful for several scholarships that made this research possible. Thanks to the student research projects ‘Migration in a Globalized World: Cultural Sociological Perspectives’, project num. MUNI/A/0937/2017, and ‘Migration and Social Inequality: Cultural Sociological Perspectives’, project num. MUNI/A/1068/2018, and ‘Migration and Mobility: Cultural Sociological Perspectives’, project num. MUNI/A/1378/2020, I was able to attend international conferences to present and discuss my research. I also spent a brief time in Canada, where I could get feedback on my findings and dilemmas, and debate them with scholars and former consultants. I am grateful for the generous financial support from the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy (University of Toronto), which helped me to conduct the research and consult with excellent scholars about it. I am also grateful to the Specific Research Project at Masaryk University, project num. MUNI/A/1505/2018. Thanks to the financial support, I was able to finalise my research and to write the thesis. Special thanks for the support of the Faculty of Education at Masaryk University, without whom I could not have completed this book. In this regard, I can’t thank the director Karel Pančocha enough, along with my colleagues at the Institute for Research in Inclusive Education and Professor Tomáš Janík. With your support, I was able to make this book even better than I had planned.

Contents

1 My Intellectual Journey  1 2 Workfare in Welfare 11 3 Methodology and Method 35 4 The Poor, the Offenders, and the ‘Unadaptable’: Categories Policy-­makers Use When Talking About Material Need Recipients 61 5 Topics Addressed in Parliamentary Debates 81 6 Justification of Workfare: The Arguments Policymakers Use 99 7 Welfare as a Security Issue121 8 Population Control Through Security Discourses145 9 Ethnicity Plays Its Part157 10 Lessons Learnt and the Analysis of Political Farming in Welfare183

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Epilogue197 References201 Index203

About the Author

Lenka  Kissová is a junior researcher at the Institute for Research in Inclusive Education at Masaryk University in the Czech Republic. She received her doctoral degree in Sociology from Masaryk University (MU), and also has degrees in Political Science and Social and Cultural Anthropology. Her professional interests include migration, minorities, political discourses, securitisation, social justice, and human rights. She specialises in qualitative research on Central Europe, especially utilising critical discourse analysis. Outside of academia, she has worked for one of the most prominent Slovak NGOs Milan Šimečka Foundation, concerning the topics of human rights, advocacy, and research targeting the Romani minority and public policies. She was also a funded fellow at the Center for the Cultural Sociology of Migration at Masaryk University from 2017 to 2019. Currently, she leads the research project ‘Barriers in Inclusion and Their Overcoming’ at the Institute for Research in Inclusive Education (Faculty of Education, MU), funded by the Technological Agency of the Czech Republic. Until the end of 2019 she was also involved in the international project ‘Inclusive Education and Social Support to Tackle Inequalities in Society’, part of the Horizon 2020 programme supported by the European Union. In this project, she was responsible for research focused on inter-agency coordination in the field of family social support. She participates in comparative research on children’s experiences with inclusion and education, as well as in developing an ICT-based educational platform enhancing multilingualism in ethnically mixed schools. Moreover, she is a field researcher for the project on illiberalism xv

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in East Central Europe at the Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto. This book is based on the dissertation she successfully defended in June 2019 at the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University in Brno.

Abbreviations

ATCS CDA CDS CEE CSC EU HZDS

Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia Critical Discourse Analysis Critical Discourse Studies Central and Eastern Europe Critical Security Studies European Union Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) KDH Krestǎ nsko-demokratické hnutie (Christian Democratic Movement) MoI Ministry of Interior MoLSAF Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family Most-Híd Most-Híd (Bridge) MP Member of Parliament OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ̌ OĽ ANO Obyčajní ludia a nezávislé osobnosti (Ordinary People and Independent Personalities) PDA Political Discourse Analysis SaS Sloboda a solidarita (Freedom and Solidarity) SDKÚ-DS Slovenská demokraticko-krestǎ nská únia—demokra tická strana (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union—Democratic Party) SMER-SD Smer—sociálna demokracia (Direction—Social Democracy)

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List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 10.1

Coding tree Analytical tool explaining the dynamics of workfare legitimation

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CHAPTER 1

My Intellectual Journey

Yet, in some ways we seem to be moving ever closer to a society with no solidarity whatsoever, one in which a lot of people can expect the short end of the stick. To reconcile this trend with good old Christian values, such as care for sick and poor, may seem hopeless. But one common strategy is to point the finger at the victims. If the poor can be blamed for being poor, everyone else is off the hook (De Waal 2011: 5). My journey started in 2013, while I was sitting in the office of the Slovak State Secretary for Labour, Social Affairs, and the Family in Bratislava. The State Secretary was sitting right next to the Minister of Labour, Social Affairs, and the Family in an office with air conditioning and a view of the rooftops of Bratislava, the capital city of Slovakia. He welcomed me and my colleagues from different Slovak human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs). After he sat behind the table, leaning his elbows on the top of it and putting his hands together, he thanked us for coming. The metal cufflinks with his monograms were shiny and visible immediately. My colleagues and I, along with other renowned experts in the field, were sitting in that particular ministry office at that particular time because we wanted to debate the proposed legal changes to material need assistance, intended to introduce workfare into social assistance. We wanted to present the problematic aspects of such legal measures and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kissová, Framing Welfare Recipients in Political Discourse, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63579-4_1

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thus we wanted to advocate for people who already were in a vulnerable position, often threatened with poverty. We came prepared. We had conducted our research and analysis, we had summed up the existing data, and we had prepared our arguments. The State Secretary knew why we were coming and started to speak right away. In an explanatory but still quite defensive way, he was explaining to us that it was not possible to offer basic social support for free and that we needed to ask for something back from material need recipients. He continued with generic stories from Slovak villages where beneficiaries abuse the current welfare system. When we addressed our concerns about the unconstitutionality of the proposed changes to the Material Need Assistance Act and the introduction of forced labour in form of workfare or obligatory ‘activation’, he disagreed. In his view, there was nothing wrong with asking for something in return from people who receive support from the state. As a human rights NGO employee, I was concerned. Hearing about the need for conditioning help and refusing to guarantee assistance for people who find themselves in material need made me feel anxious—mostly because it was coming from the lips of a social democratic government representative. It simply did not fit my conception of ‘social democracy’. As a sociologist, this episode triggered my interest. I was curious how political elites, members of the legislative body who propose and adopt policies and laws, think about welfare, and especially, about the people in material need who require support. Further, I wanted to know and understand how they justify the workfare they claim is necessary. Even though I discovered back then that the introduction of forced activation of beneficiaries was not a novelty—it still has been an integral part of neoliberal welfare retrenchments all over the world for decades—Slovakia has the history of a socialist and communist state, one that would ostensibly support its citizens. Moreover, since 2006, with the exception of a short break in 2010, when a centre-right government was in charge for over a year, the workfare proposal being debated originated from the office of the only existing ‘social democratic’ party. This fact piqued my curiosity even further. I decided to put the political debates on workfare under scrutiny and to look into the political discourse and related documents on the subject. I searched for parliamentary debates in which compulsory activation was debated and strategic documents that might have influenced adoption of the measure. First, I struggled with my inner dilemmas. On the one side, I was a human rights activist, trying to explain to the State Secretary that obligatory workfare for people in material need violates the Slovak Constitution

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and several other international agreements. On the other, I was a researcher who had been steeped in rhetoric about objectivity in research for years. I am not proposing to talk about whether social research is, is not, can or cannot be objective. It is not my purpose here. Luckily, I came across Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), in particular, through a book on discourse and power by Van Dijk (2008), in which he argues that the critical analysis of discourses in essence cannot be neutral. His work is a study in the discursive reproduction of power, power asymmetries among different groups in society, a study in dominance, social problems, and inequalities. In CDS, power relations are examined from the perspective of the dominated group. I do not question objectivity in research; however, I am fully aware of my own positions and values, which I have been reflecting upon throughout the entire research process. But frankly, I agree that looking at political discourse from a critical point of view cannot be detached from the values and wider contexts within which problematic representations are produced. Pointing out the negative implications of discourses presupposes critical insight. Simply put, in critical analysis, we must identify their potential problematic aspects and deconstruct them so we can discover and understand the hidden meanings that represent single pieces of a more complex puzzle. And whether we wish for it or not, this process occurs with our personal values and beliefs somewhere in the background. We just need to be aware and reflect upon them. As I engaged in the first reading of the transcripts of parliamentary debates on workfare, as well as the strategic documents presenting proposals for solving the problems of marginalised groups prepared by the Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia (ATCS), I noticed that boundaries had been constructed between particular groups (Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska 2012). I also noticed the securitisation of material need beneficiaries and ethnicisation in these materials. Consequently, the main questions driving my research curiosity emerged: 1. What are the main themes and categories framing the image of material need assistance beneficiaries within Slovak political discourse? 2. How do politicians justify the need for workfare in material need provision? 3. What do these elements and discursive strategies tell us about the construction of the symbolic boundary between material need claimants and non-claimants and therefore, about the ways of governing the behaviour of different groups through welfare?

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In the second phase, I identified and examined the categories policy-­ makers used to describe recipients, the topics they associated with these categories, the arguments they put forth to justify their ideas or opinions, and the images they invoked in order to illustrate their arguments. In the third phase of the analysis, I sought to understand the relations among these elements and to place them into the broader context of social relations, policies, and their (potential) implications. Further, I examined whether and how security shows up in political debates about welfare and what purpose it might fulfil. As a result, I have discovered that security serves as legitimation for restrictive, control-oriented measures, legitimation of the regulation of society, foremost among the groups defined as undeserving or somehow problematic. I thus can offer a contribution to understanding how discursive political practices work and what their implications might be. Focusing in particular on how policy-makers construct the bridge between security and material need recipients helps us understand workfare, and, more generally, politician-public relations and inter-ethnic relations. In the following multi-disciplinary study, I work with a larger analytical framework which combines features from the areas of: (1) Critical Discourse Studies, referring primarily to the work of Van Dijk for understanding the roles and dynamics of elite discourses; (2) Critical Security Studies, and, more specifically, securitisation, which offers insight into whether and how a topic becomes a political and, later, also a security issue; and (3) governmentality, which, together with (4) boundary-­ making, offers potential explanations for why material need assistance beneficiaries are framed in a particular way. Even though some of these approaches are not so commonly used in the field of sociology, I argue they (should) have their place in this area of study. They offer valuable analytical frameworks that help us to understand the relations between and among policies, interests, discourses, and different actors. Finally, the study examines (5) the dynamics of ethnic relations, as ethnicity is part of the boundary-making process of workfare adoption. Political discourses provide space for the presentation and (re)conceptualisation of meanings. Portraying a group as ‘risky’ or threatening may have an impact on the social dynamics between members of these groups and other members of society. Governing societies (majority or minority) through security and moral claims redefines relationships between members of different groups, potentially leading to violence, and institutionalisation of the security elements in political agendas and discourses.

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Furthermore, it may result in various forms of symbolic or substantive exclusion from the political, cultural, and economic arenas or deprivation of fundamental rights. It is essential and highly relevant to examine why and how a certain group is characterised in terms of security and risk or as morally failed, what categories are used to frame the group in these terms, how they are constructed, and for what purpose. In this study, I show that the categories policy-makers bring up in the debates about workfare are primarily interlinked with negative images and negative perceptions of people, events, and phenomena. The poor, disadvantaged, and socio-economically vulnerable are often depicted as people committing criminal activities, unable to obtain full-time employment, people who demoralise ‘working men’. Some of the above-mentioned categories are used interchangeably, forming a cognitive link among criminals, poor people, and welfare provision. Material need beneficiaries are interlinked with law-breaking, pathologies, or even extremism. They are associated with topics related to crime, the need for behavioural adjustment, social system abuse, the convenience of welfare, and the protection of public order and interests. I also point out shifts in the framing of welfare recipients. For a long time, welfare-dependency theories have been prevalent in scrutinising political approaches to welfare claimants. In the Slovak political discourse, however, ‘lazy’ material need beneficiaries are now presented as voluntarily inactive, speculative individuals. The idea of claimant dependency on welfare provision is still very much alive. However, it seems to be complemented and slowly overruled by the idea of the rationally thinking person aware of the advantages of welfare. As presented in the Slovak Parliament, the representation of a rationally and speculatively thinking material need assistance recipient, usually of Romani origin, has found its place in the cultural-symbolic repertoire of meanings about welfare. Throughout this book, I make clear that policy-makers create meanings around workfare measures through the criminalisation of beneficiaries, the biologisation of human activity, and risk individualisation, all anchored in a moral claim and the idea of fairness. Such a perspective moves away from the theory of a moral underclass in which poverty is matter of culture, and beneficiaries—criminals, the unemployable and single mothers—are framed as morally failed individuals. Even though Slovak political representatives also depict beneficiaries as delinquents and failed individuals, the boundary is constructed using a strong social and moral appeal towards the rest of society, which expects to obtain something back from people

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considered inactive and failed freeloaders. These moral boundaries are based on work ethics and solidarity; however, both of these factors, including general consideration for other human beings in a positive sense, are missing from the discourse. Instead, they are flipped and presented to a large extent in a negative way, through blame and victimisation. What is also almost entirely missing in the political discourse is the perspective of fundamental human rights and the structural causes of poverty among welfare recipients. I show that boundary-making concerning material need assistance in Slovakia assumes an ethnic dimension. Through stories, anecdotes, and collocations, ethnicity is hidden in the debated proposal, even if it is neutral in its legal wording. What is problematic is the lack of reflection over the structural causes of the low qualifications, low education, poverty, and disadvantage among Roma and constructive debate about the elimination of inequalities. The entire workfare measure is presented as a motivational tool for the beneficiaries to obtain skills, even though numerous studies have shown that workfare keeps beneficiaries in low-qualified activities, that it does not help them to gain useful skills for their future employment, and that it also stigmatises them. I highlight that welfare has become one of the key topics worth analysing through the lens of securitisation. Material need beneficiaries are repeatedly presented as those who represent a particular form of threat to the public order and public interests. They are depicted as a threat to the moral values embodied by hard-working individuals that deserve help from the public coffers. Again, the boundary between deserving hard workers and undeserving, free-loading speculators is constructed through images of security and threat. In terms of theory, I problematise two main aspects of securitisation process theory—the importance of the audience in order to make security work and the characteristics of an ‘extraordinary measure’. First, I argue that even though the audience is an important element in the securitisation mechanism, under certain circumstances, it is not essential in making securitisation successful. For instance, when public attitudes are negative in long run, associating certain group(s) with adverse characteristics, it is easier for political actors to pass legislation unfavourable towards such group(s) and there is no need for further public agreement. I also discuss the thin line between politicised and securitised measures, arguing that workfare in the Slovak context is indeed an ‘extraordinary measure’ as defined by classical securitisation theory.

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I start this book by presenting the field of social assistance in Slovakia in order to provide the national context in which the Material Need Assistance Act was adopted. In this study, I focus on material need assistance, which is only one part of the entire welfare system. I present two important moments in material need assistance policy—the 2004 reform and the 2014 changes to the Act. I also contextualise material need assistance in Slovakia within the Central European region. The four Visegrad countries, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, share common histories and similar policy developments in particular areas. I do not fully detail the historical developments of the region but I sketch out the social assistance contexts of these neighbouring states to provide a broader picture. In addition, I situate workfare measures in the wider European and global context and sum up the critiques of such measures. In Chap. 3, I elaborate the meaning of Critical Discourse Studies to make clear why this study is situated primarily within this framework. I focus on the forms, specificities, and roles of political discourses and the relations between discourse and power. I follow with a section on methodology and method, explaining what type of data I collected and how I analysed them. The analytical part of the study is the broadest. In Chaps. 4, 5, and 6, I identify and discuss the main categories political actors use to frame material need assistance claimants, the topics they address in the discourse and associate with these categories, and the arguments and images they use to justify their ideas and opinions. Chapter 7 focuses on security framing in welfare. I present securitisation theory and its relevance to sociology, and I address security as part of the parliamentary debates. Chapter 8 problematises the presence of ethnicity in the political discourse. First, I elaborate on the theoretical framework of boundary work as it is relevant to this study. Second, I bring the reader closer to the general portrayal of Roma in public and political discourses. Third, I show the hidden forms of ethnicity in political debates as well as how political representatives interlink Roma with topics such as crime. In Chap. 9, I focus on how governmentality can add to understanding the findings regarding Slovak welfare discourse. At the end of the study, I not only come back to where I started my journey, but underline the social relevance of the study, and, in conclusion, I present the analytical tool through which I make sense of my findings and the analytical framework I adopted. I also find it important to situate the study in the wider human rights context, discussing what might be problematic about workfare from the perspective of fundamental human rights.

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Although I elaborate Critical Discourse Studies in a separate theoretical chapter, the premises of the remaining theories—securitisation, governmentality, and boundary work—are elaborated in the analytical chapters. The reason for this arrangement is the multi-modality of the study. Because I merge several different frameworks into one larger framework, it makes sense to provide theoretical insights within each analytical chapter. In this way, I am able to provide a clearer understanding of the relevance and the links among the approaches and how they can be employed to address the analysed problem. Finally, why political farming? Throughout the study, I use this metaphor when I talk about the relations among political actors, discourses, audiences, and welfare. In my opinion, the metaphor captures the essence of these connections. Farming is about production of crops and secondary products, their reproduction, which includes also crossbreeding improvements, altering their characteristics in order to get better results, their cultivation, and their presentation on the market. Well-presented products have higher chance to be sold. Last but not least, farmers not only react to the demand of their customers, but they create it as well. They do so through the production of existing, well-sustained products and by altering their features so that customer response is positive. The relationship analysed in this study is analogical. My political ‘farmers’ produce, reproduce, and cultivate existing social and cultural representations well established in Slovak society. They also ‘crossbreed’ them with others based on the political outcome they want to achieve. And they too not only react to media, political, or public demands, but they also help formulate such demands by setting certain agendas and issues into motion. Consequently, these must be presented and justified well, so the audiences ‘buy’ them. At this point in my journey, I see De Waal’s words that opened this chapter mirrored not only in political discourses but in society. Frans de Waal (2011) refers to research on chimpanzees, in which two chimpanzees are given a vastly different reward for the same task, and the one getting the short stick refuses to perform; they consider the distribution unfair. These lessons from the animal kingdom can tell us a lot about ourselves. I cherish De Waal’s work. It has been a great inspiration and motivation for my current studies and research endeavours. We, as humans, point at the victims without reflecting upon our own share of social problems. If someone else can be blamed for it, everyone else is off the hook. In this study, I engage with a critical sociology perspective. Even though I do not do so directly, using the theoretical and analytical instruments

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Boltanski and Thévenot (1999) propose, I scrutinise social orders and try to uncover the ‘modes of domination’ (Boltanski 2011: 3) present in these orders. I adopt a critical stance in this book, exploring how political actors contribute to the construction of a social reality in which domination and power relations are at the forefront. After deconstructing political discourses into categories, topics, and arguments, I reconstruct the justifications and interpretations of disputes, positioning them within the wider social context. In order to highlight these processes, I use the political farming metaphor. I hope you will enjoy reading this book. Even though it is a scientific study, I believe it contains valuable perspectives on how to look at the world around us, on what we hear or say. I wish that at the end of your reading you will think of the hidden scenes behind what you hear, what political actors, the media, and the people around you present to you. Just look around, listen, and reflect. If you are attentive and reflective enough, you may identify hidden forms of racism, or ethnic or other social boundary-­making around you.

References Boltanski, L. 2011. On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation. Cambridge: Polity Press. Boltanski, L., and L. Thévenot. 1999. The Sociology of Critical Capacity. European Journal of Social Theory 2 (3): 359–377. De Waal, F. 2011. The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society. London: Souvenir Press. Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska. 2012. Návrh opatrení sekcie sociálnych vecí ̌ Rady ZMOS na riešenie problematiky marginalizovaných skupín obyvatelov. Žilina: Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska. (The Council of the Association of Towns and Cities of Slovakia: Proposal of measures for Solving the Problematics of the Marginalised Groups of Inhabitants by the Social Affairs Section of the Council of Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia). Žilina: ZMOS. van Dijk, T.A. 2008. Discourse and Power. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 2

Workfare in Welfare

Social policy is an umbrella term encompassing measures taken in areas like education, family, retirement, health, housing, social security, (un) employment, or social assistance. These measures aim, or at least we expect them to aim, at providing support to public in the respective fields. Social assistance is only part of the whole complex of public social policies. Minas et al. (2018: 488) introduce social assistance quite well, saying, ‘Countries’ social protection systems can be visualized as multi-tiered safety nets, with nations differing in, inter alia, the number of layers that exist and how they are governed.’ In different states, we can identify different areas of protection, with varying levels and conditions applicants must fulfil in reaching for the public safety net. These ‘multi-tiered safety nets’ can be designed in forms of either financial provisions or social services. Again, they can be fashioned differently and can have differing effects on the security and lives of recipients, depending on particular local and national arrangements of the financial and institutional settings. Different assistance patterns have different degrees and outcomes ‘depending on the institutional framework, local cultures and circumstances—social definitions as well as resources, opportunities as well as constraints’ (Saraceno 2002: 3). Nevertheless, if set well, the public provision in form of services, monetary transfers, and benefits is a social investment generating welfare, social inclusion, jobs, and decreasing potential future social risks vulnerable groups might face (Martinelli et al. 2017). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kissová, Framing Welfare Recipients in Political Discourse, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63579-4_2

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Social policies around the world have many specificities; they vary in form, amount, and social assistance targets. However, in the last decades, there have been common, traceable trends in welfare development. One of these shared elements is the conditionality introduced in many Western countries.1 Even though my focus is on the political discourse accompanying workfare policy, I find it important to make clear what I mean by workfare as a neoliberal conditionality trend. By definition, workfare means programmes or schemes requiring people to work in order to obtain social assistance (Lødemel and Trickey 2001). According to Lødemel and Trickey (2001: 7, emphases in original), ‘the definition has three elements—that workfare is compulsory, that workfare is primarily about work, and that workfare is essentially about policies tied to the lowest tier of public income support’. In the global context, the introduction of welfare activation strategies and workfare is not a novel approach. Governments have been adopting these measures within broader projects through which the primacy of work and restrictions in the provision of welfare are advocated (Brodkin and Larsen 2013); thus, ‘workfarism is becoming the typical form of adjustment of labour market policy in the face of global pressures to reduce labour costs and “flexibilise” the labour market’ (Gray 2004: 18). Brodkin and Larsen (2013) trace the potential origins of welfare activation to 1940s Sweden, where such labour market policies were designed to increase economic growth, social cohesion, and flexibility in the labour market. These labour discipline maintenance measures have been typical for the United States, the United Kingdom’s New Deal Programme, Germany, Italy, and Spain since the mid-1990s (Gray 2004; Levitas 2005; López-Santana 2015). According to Quaid (2002), it was the rhetoric of public accountability and efficiency, both part of the 1980s ideological background, that precipitated the emergence of workfare. France and Belgium, thanks to strong unions, joined the ‘welfare policing’ club only after 2000, through policies of activation or job-search testing of claimants. The shift from entitlement to conditionality has also been introduced in countries such as the Netherlands or Denmark. The ‘tough love’ policy, as President Clinton labelled ‘welfare to work’ measures, has been spreading globally (Gray 2004). In Denmark, the ‘flexicurity’ ideal

1  Including, among others, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, France, and Hungary.

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(Brodkin and Larsen 2013: 42) consists of requirements for an individual’s adjustment to dynamic labour market needs. As Brodkin and Larsen (2013: 40) suggest, in Europe, workfare is aimed at ‘building and sustaining the well-being of an active workforce’. As a result of these active labour market policies, activation has served not only as enhancement of employment chances for the unemployed but also as a new requirement for social support. The authors contrast Europe with the United States, where ‘workfare was originally conceived as a largely regulatory strategy directed at recipients of cash welfare. It was first introduced in 1970s in California, where adults receiving family cash assistance benefits could be required to perform unpaid work duties’ (ibid.: 41). Later, this unpaid job condition spread throughout the entire United States, becoming the part of national welfare policy, and it has been revised under the term ‘welfare-to-work’. Workfare policies have been gaining more political and public support around the world over the past few decades (Lødemel and Trickey 2001; Quaid 2002). As they do have an impact on people, beneficiaries and non-­ beneficiaries, as well as on the further development of welfare and related rhetoric, it is important to put such measures under scrutiny from different perspectives, such as content, implementation processes, local, national, or global economic and social impact, and the role of discourses. Welfare policies are good examples of politicised boundary-making. Political actors draw lines between various groups, associating them with certain characteristics (Van Dijk 2008). These associations and discursively constructed pictures are further bases for policies and legal measures. Boundary construction is present in political debates, and the one discussing material need assistance in Slovakia is no exception. In the following section, I present briefly the broader regional context of workfare policies, in which Slovakia is only one of many countries in which social assistance has been regulated through workfare.

Workfare Policies and Central Europe Welfare policies and their restructuring are influenced significantly by historical settings, both structural and institutional. Social policies and their features are fluid; they react to social and historical developments, and, thus, they may change over time. Considering historical events, particularly the collapse of the communist regime, the fluidity of welfare measures is even more relevant for the Central European region. The regime change

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drove restructuralisation in a number of essential areas in terms of politics, laws, and institutions. We can observe a shift towards decentralisation, a transfer to a market economy, and the introduction of a welfare capitalism model (Romano 2014). The four Visegrad countries—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia—share common macro-level histories; nevertheless, specific, national historical events prevent universalisation. When focusing on social policy characteristics, in the case of Central European states, the welfare system depends on ‘socioeconomic cleavages where the battles of different national elites took place’ as well as on various international actors (Cerami and Vanhuysse 2009: 6). International institutions such as the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) often served as promoters of social policy ideas at the time of regime change. After the Velvet Revolution in 1989, the ideas of and attempts at reforms included decentralisation, the privatisation of health care, elderly care, and pensions, and policies on the social inclusion of disadvantaged groups. Although these players were not present in the Central European political arena during the communist regime, we can trace welfare policies to this period. From the late 1960s onwards, a universalist set of welfare policies introduced the obligation to work. It was guaranteed at the constitutional level, the allocation of the working force was centralised, and every unemployed individual was persecuted. Cash benefits, such as pension or sick leave, were directly linked to employment and income (ibid.). One of the tools of welfare policy included a system of price subsidies for basic consumer goods and services aimed at strengthening consumer purchasing power, supporting less efficient businesses, and balancing inequalities. Another set of benefits was provided by factories: accommodations, kindergartens, cultural facilities, and health-care institutions (Szikra and Tomka 2009). However, both systems of assistance were more accessible to wealthier populations, rather than to the less privileged. In Czechoslovakia, social security was controlled directly by the state apparatus. As Szikra and Tomka (2009) point out, the significant difference between Western European countries and the former communist Central European states existed in the areas of control and organisation: democratic governance and control over state administration were both absent in Central Europe. Because the welfare system and spending were both directly linked to the economic system, the fall of the communist regime

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endangered their survival and continuation. Thus, the organisation of welfare in the succession states depended strongly on ‘the success of transforming resources associated with the old system into a welfare system compatible with market economy’ (ibid.: 27). Nevertheless, as Inglot (2009) points out, many of the pre-existing institutional infrastructure, ideas, and practices were preserved in the newly transforming political and economic systems, creating thus an adaptive hybrid regime. In the Czech Republic, soon after the split of Czechoslovakia, the neoliberal claim for self-responsibility found its place in political rhetoric about social assistance and the redistribution system itself. Beginning with changes to legislation in 1990, citizens, and ultimately, their families, were considered responsible for their own quality of life. Individuals and families became the primary social unit expected to provide care and assistance, while public social assistance was meant to secure only the basic needs of people in serious material deprivation who were unable to secure these for themselves (Krebs et  al. 2010). Instruments designed to cope with demands of the labour market included active labour market policies, unemployment protection, and social assistance, which, however, was still quite generous (Sirovátka 2016). Similar to other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, universal allowances were eliminated and new conditions, such as the level of income, were introduced into assistance eligibility. The aim, as in the rest of the Visegrad countries, was to prevent the risk of poverty through more targeted social support. Workfare policies started to emerge quite late in the Czech Republic, as Sirovátka (2016) has pointed out. It was only after 2006 that the ideal conditions for activation policies converged. The 2006 reforms aimed at providing minimum subsistence guarantees and, at the same time, at providing increasing incentives to make people become more effective in their search for a job, in developing their skills, or just to be more active. One of the common denominators of the reforms included restricted access to social benefits. For instance, when evaluating eligibility criteria, according to the new legal norms, adult children and parents who lived together were counted as one household, which, as a consequence, excluded individuals, mainly unemployed youth, from benefits. Moreover, employment offices were required to offer individual plans to unemployed youth under 25; beneficiaries were required to have a plan for their activation and motivation (ibid.). In 2009, social assistance benefits were cut again, and this time, the recipients could receive only the subsistence minimum and not the living

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minimum. Only claimants who became involved within the public service institute were allowed to receive benefits at the level of the living minimum, along with a supplement to this benefit. However, ‘being active’ in public service meant the claimants had to work for 20–30 hours per month. Sirovátka (2016: 89) concludes, ‘The reform of SA [social assistance] also aimed to differentiate SA recipients between deserving (and provide them full rights to the SA scheme, that is, the living minimum) and undeserving/inactive (provided at most with only restricted SA scheme rights; this was the existence minimum but dependent on the discretionary decision by front-line staff).’ This aligns with subsequent developments, within which forced activation was introduced in 2011. Within this radical activation reform, ‘all unemployed (regardless of whether they were SA recipients or unemployment benefit recipients) were obliged after two months of unemployment to participate in public service for up to 20 hours per week (which in fact corresponds to a part-time job). Refusal could result in exclusion from all entitlements to unemployment or SA benefits’ (ibid.: 90). Similarly, in 1995, the Hungarian social-liberal government enacted restrictive welfare reform, cutting or cancelling the previous universal allowance, in particular, family and childcare benefits. According to Romano (2014: 118), ‘it was the virtual exclusion of the middle classes from the maternalist Hungarian welfare state that created dissention’. She further states that reform measures were rejected ‘when an attempt was made to make these allowances explicitly targeted at low-income families. Families who had been benefiting from this form of social support for decades regardless of their economic conditions fiercely opposed the idea of losing their right to a guaranteed allowance’ (ibid.: 118–119). Public work as part of the Hungarian social support system for the long-term unemployed was introduced in 2009. The change manifested in the newly required participation of social aid claimants in public communal work. The national ‘Road to Work’ programme adopted by the socialist government conditioned the regular social assistance benefit upon involvement in the public social services provided by local governments. Refusing to participate in such activities resulted in exclusion from the social support system for one year and in not receiving any form of regular social assistance (Szo ̋ke 2015). According to Szőke (ibid.: 735), ‘the programme aims to tackle “welfare dependency” by compelling the long-­ term unemployed to take up work instead on “relying on benefits”, and is seen as a major solution for the “social integration” of the unemployed

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poor’. And so, in a context of high levels of long-term unemployment in the country, the Hungarian government has been adopting more means-­ tested and eligibility-limiting measures. The social reform programme in Hungary was problematic not only because it deepened the socio-­ economic boundary between working men and women and the unemployed. It also deepened regional inequalities, locking the unemployed in their localities, strengthening inequality and discrimination along ethnic lines and disadvantaging unemployed claimants of Romani origin (Szőke 2015; Csoba 2010; Szalai 2009). In Poland, the unemployment rate had been increasing since 1990, culminating at 20 percent in 2003, emigration rates were sky-rocketing after the country joined the European Union, and wages, as well as unemployment benefits were low (Rek-Wózniak, Wózniak 2017). Even though Poland’s average share of social transfers in household income increased in the 1990s, it was mainly due to the growing number of retirees (Szulc 2012). In terms of social support programmes, Poland joined the other CEE countries in introducing targeted social assistance policies. Furthermore, it supplemented the family social assistance benefit with income-tested family support and restricted eligibility by lowering the maximum age of recipients. The aim was to improve their effectiveness and to help the unemployed (Romano 2014). Social assistance became conditioned upon merit linked to activity and employment. As in Hungary and Slovakia, local actors, such as governments, or in the case of Poland, social workers, wielded significant discretionary power in regulating assistance to potential recipients. Action plans from the 2000s stressed the Polish government’s aim to make income from labour more advantageous than income from social assistance benefits (Rek-Wózniak and Wózniak 2017). Based on the widespread neoliberal rhetoric, self-investment and empowerment through learning and activity were accentuated in strategic documents. Moreover, the Polish government aimed at increasing the levels of the self-employed and encouraged the entrepreneurial spirit, especially among youth. As the authors argue (ibid.: 357), ‘[t]he reforms of employment services, as well as limiting access to benefits was grounded in the conviction about individual responsibility for “success” in the labour market, while the main task for the state was to ensure “equal opportunities” (understood vaguely, mostly in terms of gender, disability and age, clearly under the influence of EU recommendations)’.

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Material Need Assistance Reforms in Slovakia Particular social assistance measures and the content of Slovakia’s Material Need Assistance Act are not the focal point of this study as such. Evaluation of the changes proposed in the Act is not my primary goal for the analysis. Rather, I study how political elites construct material need recipients through their parliamentary discourse. We can think of social assistance recipients as a mirror for society. According to Saraceno (2002: 3, emphasis in original), social assistance recipients are ‘a good social indicator of the reliability and effectiveness of a given welfare state as a whole’ and also ‘of the degree to which labour market, employment policies and other social security and family policy schemes fail to offer adequate provision. They are also an indicator of what kind of “failures” are acknowledged as being entitled to receive support and under what conditions.’ I would also add that recipients mirror the failures of our societies to address ethnic and racial discrimination. Even though the CEE countries diverged in their particular development trajectory after the fall of the communist regime, as regards the provision of social assistance, they followed similar trends. In this study, I focus on Slovakia, where, in the course of its independent governments— both centre-right and socialist—the country pursued restrictive conditioning of social assistance policies, even those targeting people in material need. In order to provide some context for the analysis, I briefly present developments in policies that have resulted in the adoption of workfare measures in material need assistance provision. Because welfare policies are dynamic, they undergo various changes in the face of different trends, regimes, and governments. Current welfare measures cannot be detached from their historical context; therefore, I provide some important background information. After the split of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic, Slovakia inherited a set of already developed welfare policies. Inglot (2009: 88) has identified two main phases in the welfare pathway of the newly independent country. First, in the period between 1993 and 2000, the nationalist government of Vladimír Mečiar set up an approach based on a ‘specific version of a social-democratic ideology of “social solidarity” with a strong preference for corporatist governance’.2 The aim of the so-called third-way approach 2  Marián Leško (Gális and Leško 2017) argues that Mečiar had not established the HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) Party on an ideological basis. According to Leško,

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was to convert the original social-democratic elements into a ‘national Slovak welfare ideology which now emphasized both traditional social insurance (pensions) and the reorganized family benefits and public assistance for the poor’ (Inglot 2009: 89). Second, the turn of the twenty-first century led to a change in welfare ideology. The more pro-EU oriented cabinets of Mikuláš Dzurinda were characteristic of the increased focus on privatisation and simultaneous retrenchment in the area of social welfare. As Kusá (2008; 2011–2013) has argued, social assistance in the last few decades in Slovakia has undergone a shift away from universalistic, humanrights oriented approaches to significant reductions in social assistance. Currently, social assistance in Slovakia represents one part of the Slovak social security system. Within this particular social sub-field, financial and material allowances are provided to citizens. At the institutional level, two ministries oversee the organisation of these allowances—the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and the Family (MoLSAF), together with the related Labour Offices. Local municipal governments share in the implementation, while the funds are primarily national. State institutions provide benefits to individuals in material need and to disabled persons (Karpiš et al. 2006). The welfare system consists of four major parts: (1) health care (administered by the Ministry of Health), (2) a social insurance system (under the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family), (3) state social support (social payments primarily to families; also under the MoLSAF, and in the case of the tax bonus, the Ministry of Finance), and (4) social assistance (overseen by the MoLSAF and the Ministry of Health) (ibid.). As I show in the following sections, Slovak social assistance policies do not necessarily aim at providing benefits directly to individuals and families in need. Instead, their goal is to encourage and enable various individual choices and behaviours. They seek to stimulate individual engagement in paid work, motivate people to provide for themselves, and encourage the provision of family care at the same time. Thus, they redirect attention to issues of legitimation and moral values (Taylor-Gooby 2004: 10). Thus, in Slovakia, measures seeking to engender motivation and individual stimulation have become trendy in the past decades.

Mečiar was leftist, rightist, or centrist based on the given situation. What was important to Mečiar was a flexible operational area in which he could manoeuvre as he needed.

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The 2004 ‘New Social Policy’ Reform Berghman (2014: 24) defines social security as a set of political tools established in order to compensate for the financial consequences of unfavourable events in people’s lives. He states: ‘Social security is no longer defined by the social risks it should cover, but rather, by the range of instruments employed to achieve a certain goal.’ Karpiš et al. (2006) go even further and describe the social assistance system as a set of wide-­ ranging redistributive schemes and legal tools enabling social policy aim(s) that seek to protect individuals from material need. Section 5 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic (The Slovak National Council 2011) guarantees everyone the right to work, to have satisfactory and fair work conditions, and to strike, also guaranteeing the independence of trade unions and extensive health and social protection at work for women, minors, and disabled persons, as well as the provision of adequate material security in old age.3 The document further guarantees ‘material welfare to those who cannot enjoy this right without their fault’ (Article 35) and states that ‘[a]ny person suffering material need shall have the right to such kind of assistance that is necessary to secure his or her basic standard of life’ (Article 39).4 However, as Kusá (2018) stresses, the last time politicians formulated the subsistence minimum as an important condition for social inclusion was in the late 1990s. From then on, the individualisation of social risk has been accented much more and social assistance recipients are ostensibly responsible to provide for themselves. In 2003, Labour Minister Ľ udovít Kaník (SDKÚ-DS political party) signed a Joint Inclusion Memorandum aiming at the integration of inclusive policies in order to increase, eliminate, or prevent social exclusion and poverty. The National Action Plan on Social Inclusion 2004–2006 (MoLSAF 2004: 13) formulated the following aims: to increase employment levels and the employability of vulnerable groups; to decrease the risk of poverty in families with dependent children; to overcome educational disadvantage; and to promote the integration of Romani 3  Fair conditions are defined by the Constitution (Article 36) as follows: (a) the right to wages for the work performed, sufficient to secure a dignified standard of life, (b) protection from arbitrary dismissal and discrimination at work, (c) the protection of safety and health at work, (d) the setting of maximum working hours, (e) appropriate rest time after work, (f) the minimum admissible length of paid vacations, and (g) the right to collective negotiations. 4  Slovakia is also bound by international conventions and agreements, as well as by the European Social Charter.

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communities. Consequently, the key objectives identified by the Slovak government were: to facilitate participation in employment and access to resources, rights, goods, and services for all; to prevent the risks of exclusion; to help the most vulnerable; and to mobilise all relevant bodies (ibid.: 14). These goals seem to have considerable potential to offer families experiencing socio-economic difficulties a boost. Furthermore, together with the promotion of integration for the most disadvantaged ethnic group in the country (Roma), the action plan sounded promising in moving the country towards actual inclusion. Action plans are one thing and the actual measures through which political actors are willing to reach their goals might easily be a different story. The centre-right government started to redefine and re-frame social assistance, material need, its related content, definitions, and conditions. The 2004 document titled Nová sociálna politika (The New Social Policy), along with further legislative measures, redefined material need, as well as the subsistence minimum. Material need was defined as ‘a condition in which the income of a citizen and jointly considered individuals does not reach the subsistence minimum and the citizens or jointly considered individuals cannot secure or increase the income by their own activity’ (Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi 2003/Material Need Act 2003: 5741), while the subsistence minimum was understood as ‘a socially acknowledged minimal level of income below which the condition of material need occurs’ (Zákon o životnom minime 2003/Subsistence Minimum Act 2003: 5733).5 Two significant novelties were introduced by the policy. First, the reform had reorganised provisions in such a way that it established one basic social benefit complemented by four different additional allowances. The four additional allowances included a health care allowance, a housing allowance, a security allowance, and an activation allowance. Second, the reform interlinked material need and the subsistence minimum, considering dependence on material need as based on the income of the entire household and family members. Thus, it was not only individuals considered in the calculation but the entire family. The law stated that if the sum of the incomes of all household members surpasses the subsistence minimum, the individual is not in a situation of material need and thus, ineligible for social provision. With this joint consideration of the incomes of all family members, it was easy to exceed the level of the subsistence minimum. As Drál ̌ (2006: 51) has argued, ‘[t]he receipt of some 5

 Both quoted Acts were adopted in 2003 and came into force on 1 January 2004.

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allowances designed as compensatory mechanisms was determined in such a way that they were inaccessible for many claimants’. Thus, the second, and very significant, change was conditioning allowances upon eligibility for the basic benefit. As presented in the reform document, one of the main aims was to increase the motivation of unemployed people and people in need to work. The so-called activation allowance was designed as an instrument for regaining or maintaining work habits in order to increase the employability of participating individuals on the labour market (Nová sociálna politika 2004). In order to obtain this activation allowance, a person must have been registered as unemployed and must have been a material need assistance recipient. In the case of long-term unemployed participants registered at the local Labour Office for at least 12 months, the contract is established with this Office. Such contract may last up to 18 months within the unemployment period. In the case of unemployed persons, they are contracted by the municipality and the 18-month activation period must be ‘interrupted by a six-month break, but the unemployed can then re-enrol in Activation Works (provided that a place is made available)’ (Mýtna Kureková et al. 2013: 24). As in other CEE countries in which activation or workfare were introduced, substantial discretionary power was left in the hands of local governments or local Labour Offices. In Slovakia too, the final decision about entering into a contract and participating in activation services relied on the municipality or the local Labour Office. This allowance was granted to those who participated in small community services or voluntary work, and also to individuals participating in re-qualification programmes. Thus, the activation works were local programmes organised for long-term unemployed individuals and those who were defined as ‘socially dependent’.6 6  As Mýtna Kureková et  al. (2013: 23) point out, ‘Activation Works are implemented under two parallel laws: Law 5/2004 on Employment Services, which sets the basis for Activation Works based on a contract between the worker and the Labor Office and Law 369/1990 on Local Self-Government, which legislates Activation Works contracted between the worker and the municipality. […] Parallel stipulation of the design and implementation of Activation Works in two key legal norms (labor market and social policy norm) suggests that while the declared objective of the measure relates to increasing employability by preserving work habits, the objectives of Activation Works go beyond this narrower interpretation as an Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) tool and can be viewed as a social policy tool, too.’

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The 2014 Material Need Assistance Upgrade Another round of substantial changes to material need assistance and conditions for claimants was proposed and adopted during the government of the SMER-SD political party, which frames itself as social democratic. In the fall of 2013, the Slovak Parliament approved the changes to the Material Need Assistance Act.7 The new legislation, passing without any long-lasting discussions, has restricted material need provision by introducing mandatory activation—workfare. The material need benefit is intended to deal with the problem of long-­ term unemployment and to secure basic living conditions, including one warm meal per day, necessary clothing, and housing. The previous 2004 reform had split the total aid into one basic benefit guaranteed unconditionally and an additional package of available allowances. The major change in the Act coming into force in January 2014 was the conditionality of the basic material need benefit. Thus, none of the benefits was now granted automatically to people in unfavourable material and financial conditions.8 Instead, if the local government or Labour Office offers any activity to an adult, that person is obliged to work for a minimum of 32 hours per month on contract in order to obtain the basic benefit. According to paragraph 10 of the Act, the total amount of the benefit in material need for a given type of household ‘is reduced by €61.6 for each adult who doesn’t take part in small community services for a municipality/self-governed region, voluntary work, or work related to the prevention and elimination of the consequences of natural disasters and other emergency situations (in the amount of 32 hours per month)’ (Gerbery 2015: 7). In case the municipality is not able to offer enough work for benefits, the reduction is not applied. The National Social Report of the Slovak Republic 2014 states: ‘We must also emphasize that in order to qualify for entitlement to the full benefit in material need, such activity must be offered to these people’ (MoLSAF 2014: 9). Thus, if a person

7  The Act on Assistance in Material Need No. 417/2013. Assistance in material need consists of a benefit for material need and allowances such as a protection allowance, an activation allowance, a dependent child allowance and a housing allowance. 8  The obligation to work in order to obtain the benefit does not apply (1) to individuals who are unable to work due to their age, disability, or health conditions, or to those caring for small children and (2) to individuals receiving the activation allowance for participation in voluntary or small community services.

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refuses the offer to take part in these services, that individual is deprived of any benefits or/and additional allowances tied to this basic benefit. The National Social Report of the Slovak Republic 2014 (MoLSAF 2014: 8–9) states that ‘[t]he aim of such measure is to enable the Office [Office of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family] to control the purposefulness of the provided assistance in material need’ and that ‘[the] measure is particularly aimed at those people in material need who do not take advantage of the possibilities for active participation in employment services programmes or in activation work and who have remained passive for a long time while receiving the benefit in material need without any effort to find work’. Yet, the conditions for entitlement to this activation allowance have become more restrictive and specific. Also, as I present in the following section, such arrangements are not flawless and create blank spots, resulting in many problems. Criticism based on analyses of activation and workfare in the CEE countries is oriented towards the problematic design, implementation, and actual results with subsequent consequences of the conditionality on institutions and claimants.

Critiques of Workfare Workfare policies sometimes fail. Sirovátka (2016) analyses the Czech case of social assistance reforms, which proceeded from earlier phases aiming at preventing poverty and social unrest. The development continued through policies restricting access to social assistance by imposing conditionality and repressive sanctions on beneficiaries, including an activation requirement, and, in the end, resulted in measures relying on the strong enforcement of workfare principles. According to Sirovátka (ibid.: 97), the ‘“moral failure” of the target group became a key argument when discussing broader welfare state reforms that aimed to cut public spending, as well as the workfare reforms’. He concludes that what he calls a ‘compost model’ of policy-making, aiming at ‘decomposing’ the current system, has necessarily led to significant failures in the design and implementation of the workfare measures and restrictive social policies. Consequently, these failures ‘have become a strong argument for their refusal later in time’ (ibid.: 98). Keeping people in low-paid and low-skilled jobs as a supply of cheap labour can be listed as examples of such failures (Szőke 2015; Gerbery 2015). Brodkin and Larsen (2013: 40) point out that in active workfare policies, ‘[w]hat was once almost entirely an “enabling” strategy, in some European

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countries, now includes “regulatory” elements’. The benefit in material need serves also as a punishing tool. The benefit might be reduced in case an individual obtaining the assistance violates the public order. For instance, in Slovakia, such penalisation has been initiated primarily at the local level. Since 2011, mayors from Slovakia have mobilised within the movement ̌ sa! (Let’s wake up!), which I mention also in Chap. 3. The moveZobudme ment calls for penalising individuals (including material need beneficiaries) for violating the public order (Združenie miest a obcí Slovenska 2011; Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska 2012). According to previous legislation, it is not possible to deny or confiscate the benefit in material need. The initiative, however, stressed that such impunity encourages beneficiaries to break the peace and worsens the quality of life for other inhabitants.9 Also, if the family participates in the representative payee programme, it is possible to confiscate the dependent child allowance.10 As Gerbery (2007) states, activation aiming at increasing employability through conditioned social assistance has a more regulative and sanctioning character than measures based upon active labour market policies. Moreover, the stress on activation in the Slovak social policy has not been accompanied by the objective of providing a ‘dignified life’ for beneficiaries, as stipulated in the constitution. Furthermore, workfare opens a Pandora’s box of inequalities policy-makers do not deal with on the structural level. The Slovak regime strongly stresses the elements of work habit maintenance and skills upgrading in order to improve a person’s effectiveness and flexibility. However, as Gerbery (2015) argues, activation work amplifies the inactivity trap and does not improve participant skills. Rather, the process keeps people in local low-skilled jobs. Other aspects have been criticised with respect to the adopted legislation. Firstly, according to Mýtna Kureková and her colleagues (2013), the activation work has no clear objectives as its ‘work habits’ preservation’ goal is too general and does not contain any explicit skill upgrading and/or training element. Moreover, ‘working habits’ are difficult to measure without explicit state objectives. According to the study, participants are engaged mainly in cleaning jobs, grounds keeping, or snow removal in the winter and only sporadically into building upkeep and construction performed by the more manually skilled  Moreover, as the European Roma Rights Centre report (2012: 8) states, this movement also ‘targets the demolition of Romani settlements under environmental law by defining them as waste dumps’. 10  The representative payee programme is for beneficiaries incapable of managing their social security in accordance with the objective of the benefit/allowance. 9

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workers. Furthermore, although the aim of the activation should be an increase of the employability of vulnerable groups, the accomplishment of this goal is limited. As Szőke (2015) argues, such work programmes reproduce the long-standing exclusion of participants; they maintain and reproduce the structures preventing the less skilled from leaving the benefit system and obtaining permanent employment, and they assist in the reproduction of the political-economic structures relying on workfare programmes in order to preserve the availability of a cheap labour force, instead of creating long-term, sustainable job positions.11 Secondly, mandatory activation is difficult at the level of implementation, especially in municipalities where the number of unemployed people and social assistance beneficiaries is high. Even with an increase in personnel at the implementation level, the organisation of a large number of people in activation work and now also in work for the basic benefit is difficult. Mýtna Kureková et al. (2013) call attention to regional differences in the implementation practice of activation work. The size of the municipality and the number of participants to be activated significantly affect the process. According to their report (2013: 11), ‘In larger municipalities (cities), activation workers were often integrated into municipal enterprises (technical services/technické služby) where they could perform more meaningful tasks and at times progress into regular employment. In small municipalities with large number of people who could be activated, mayors typically had difficulties to organize such large number of people in meaningful way.’ Moreover, in many cases, the municipalities themselves were responsible for covering the costs of the implementation process. In the Czech Republic, the public service institute within which claimants were asked to work 20–30 hours per month in order to achieve a higher benefit, was highly criticised. As Sirovátka (2016: 90) states, ‘[t]he new institute of public service (a workfare condition for the entitlement of being provided a living minimum) was criticized by the Ombudsman because only few municipalities offered sufficient opportunities to SA [social assistance] recipients to participate in the programmes for public service job’.12

11  Szőke (2015) analyses public work programmes in rural Hungary and their effects on social citizenship. She compares two localities where these programmes have developed into an extreme form of workfare due to the lack of other employment possibilities. 12  ‘Ombudsman’ refers to the Czech Public Defender of Rights.

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Thirdly, there is no systematic evaluation of the ‘working for basic benefits’ approach. As Gerbery (2015) explains, the OECD has already warned the Slovak government that there is a risk that such an approach could further contribute to regional disparities by increasing poverty for people who do not accept the offer, and thus eliminate eligibility for the benefit in material need. Further, for cases in which the local Labour Office is responsible, a high level of discretion shapes the actual execution of the forced activation. As Sirovátka (2016: 90–91) points out, the Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs had planned to increase participation of the long-term unemployed in public services. However, ‘although in practice the measure was applied mainly to the long-term unemployed, discretion was given to employment offices to punish even those short-­ term unemployed who were entitled to unemployment benefits based on social insurance rights. This penetration of the workfare principle into the social insurance scheme is a unique feature of the Czech version of workfare reform.’ Among the most important messages speaking out against this forced activation was a 2012 Constitutional Court decision ordering the abandonment of punishment for not taking part in compulsory activity in public service (ibid.). One positive change introduced by the Material Need Assistance Act in Slovakia is the extension of the possibility to obtain the activation allowance. Those family members who work for the minimum income are eligible for this allowance for an unlimited period of time. Further, the eligibility for the housing allowance has been broadened and applies to people living in social housing facilities (Kusá 2013). However, there is a limitation to eligibility for the housing allowance. People living in provisional shelters or undocumented settlements are not eligible. This is often the case among Roma in Slovakia, who live in settlements without a house number or in an undocumented shelter. I found it important to introduce the context of Slovak social assistance, more particularly, the material need assistance and the workfare built upon activation policies. Of course, what I have presented are not the only significant moments in Slovakia’s existence and its journey of welfare implementation. My intention was not to delve into too much detail; nor do I purport to present the overall historical picture of the country’s political and economic development. At the same time, I tried not to be too selective in the information I decided to present. I hope I was able to sketch out a portrait of the significant steps leading to workfare in Slovakia

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after its independence. This context should prove useful in understanding the political discursive framework central to this book. As I describe in Chaps. 7, 8 and 9, there is a relation between material need recipients, non-recipients, and political actors. Policy-makers create boundaries between and among them, controlling those who are framed as undeserving through images of crime and (un)fairness. Therefore, in my opinion, research on political discourses that articulate and legitimate welfare reforms and laws is highly relevant. As I make clear later in this study, elite discourses are one of the crucial arenas in which boundary-­ making emerges. Policy-makers construct and (re)produce social and political knowledge, which is, in turn, reproduced by the public or the media. Political representatives determine who will be eligible for material need benefits. They construct mental representations of deserving and undeserving groups of people and, in general, differentiate between people in need and the rest of the society. Political, media, and public discourses are interrelated assemblages that interact with each other. Constructed boundaries are reproduced by the public too, leading to negative perceptions about the poor. According to Lamont and Duvoux (2014: 63), ‘the number of those who think that the poor receive too many resources from the state rose from 25 percent in 1992 to 54 percent in 2012’. In Slovakia, according to a 2014 survey, 25 percent of people think state allocates 2.1–5 percent of the state budget on material need assistance and another 23 percent of respondents think it is even more, 5.1–10 percent of the budget (Milan Šimečka Foundation 2014). The reality is rather different; according to an Institute of Economic and Social Studies report (2014), material need assistance, including all forms of allowances, represents less than one percent of all public spending. With regard to the amount of public money allocated to a four-­ member family, 26 percent think the assistance is 201–400 EUR per family and another 26 percent are convinced that such families receive 401–600 EUR in welfare assistance (Milan Šimečka Foundation 2014). The amount they receive is actually 160.4 EUR (INESS 2014a, b). * * * Central Europe is an important actor in the European political field. Despite the different shades of workfare policies, they share a communist historical background that has prepared the ground for the future of social assistance. Moreover, the four Visegrad countries are united by similar

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developments after the fall of the communist regime. They faced a transition to a market economy, while deciding to follow the neoliberal scripts dominating in the West. Political farmers started to ‘plant’ new policies, often based on the former ‘lands’ in the form of institutions. The marketing strategies they employed accentuated primarily the need for self-­ development and self-responsibility. They marketed these new policies through pictures of good and deserving citizens based on their merits and activity. Consequently, workfare policies built on ‘activation’, ‘motivation’, and self-responsibility have their dark side. They create boundaries and substantial inequalities, and they often create more risk than they prevent. In this ever-changing ‘farming’ framework, the focus has been shifting from economic debates related to the cost of welfare, through its (dis) advantages, to the improvement of recipient skills and employability. As Lødemel and Trickey (2001) argue, social exclusion and dependency are the two concepts used to justify the introduction of ‘workfare’, defined by the authors as a measure requiring people to work in return for social assistance. In the Slovak political discourse, even though the character of a ‘welfare dependent’ is present, the key justifications are rather different. In the following study, I argue that (1) in order to legitimate workfare, policy-makers, stressing recipients’ self-responsibility and self-sufficiency, rely on topics of deservingness interlinked with images of security and crime; and (2) recipients are presented as rationally thinking and calculating individuals voluntarily choosing welfare over regular employment rather than depending on welfare. Perceptions of existing threats to Slovak society and to fairness towards taxpayers and non-recipients serve to form a boundary not only between people deserving and not deserving material need assistance, but also between wealthier and poorer people. In such discourse, the character of a ‘(criminal) risky other’ is constructed, legitimating the adoption of measures restricting social benefits, controlling, regulating, and punishing beneficiaries, and, consequently, excluding people in need from solidarity. Moreover, in the case of Slovakia, such boundary-making and securitisation assume an ethnic dimension. In the wider context of the Material Need Assistance Act (2014), taking into consideration the general discourse, or the so-called The Right Way (Roma Reform), Roma may have become targets of governmental control through welfare restrictions and the introduction of the workfare condition. Therefore, following my political farming metaphor, policy-makers ‘pick’ different images (dependency,

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crime, threat, abuse, self-responsibility, Roma, rationally calculating individuals) and ‘crossbreed’ them into a picture of an undeserving material need beneficiary, which is further ‘cultivated’ in the discourse.

References Berghman, J. 2014. The Invisible Social Security. In Invisible Social Security Revisited: Essays in Honour of Jos Berghman, ed. W. van Oorschot, H. Peeters, and K. Boos, 23–48. Leuven: LannooCapmus Publishers. Brodkin, E.Z., and F.  Larsen. 2013. Changing Boundaries: The Politics of Workfare in the U.S. and Europe. Poverty & Public Policy 5 (1): 37–47. Cerami, A., and P.  Vanhuysse, eds. 2009. Post-Communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing Social Policy Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Csoba, J. 2010. A közfoglalkoztatás régi/új rendszere. Esély: Tárdsadalom és szociálpolitikai folyóirat 21 (1): 4–25. van Dijk, A.T. 2008. Discourse and Power. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Drál,̌ P. 2006. Ethnicized Laziness: Roma in the Slovak Social Policy Discourse. Diploma thesis, Central European University, Budapest. ̌ Gális, T., and M. Leško. 2017. Chudák každý, c ̌o po nich tú káru bude t ̌ahat ̌ dalej. Bratislava: Premedia. Gerbery, D. 2007. Princíp aktivácie v sociálnej politike a jeho vzťah k zmierňovaniu chudoby a sociálneho vylúčenia. Slovak Sociological Review 5: 383–408. ———. 2015. ESPN Thematic Report on Integrated Support for the Long-Term Unemployed: Slovak Republic 2015. Brussels: European Commission. Gray, A. 2004. Unsocial Europe: Social Protection or Flexploitation? London: Pluto Press. Inglot, T. 2009. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia: Adaptation and Reform of the Post-communist ‘Emergency Welfare States’. In Post-Communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing Social Policy Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. A. Cerami and P. Vanhuysse, 73–95. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ̌ Institute of Economic and Social Studies (INESS). 2014a. Rómsky mýtus: Kolko nás stoja rómske rodiny naozaj (Trend) [online]. Bratislava: INESS [cit. 15.7.2020]. https://www.iness.sk/sk/stranka/10057-­Romsky-­mytus-­Kolko-­ nas-­stoja-­romske-­rodiny-­naozaj-­Trend. ̌ nás stoja rómske rodiny naozaj (Trend) ———. 2014b. Rómsky mýtus: Kolko [online]. Bratislava: INESS [cit. 15.7.2020]. http://www.iness.sk/sk/ stranka/10057-­Romsky-­mytus-­Kolko-­nas-­stoja-­romske-­rodiny-­naozaj-­Trend. Karpiš, J., R. Ď urana, R. Ď urana, and M. Jelenčiak. 2006. Analýza sociálneho systému SR. Bratislava: INESS—Institute of Economic and Social Studies.

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Krebs, V., et al. 2010. Sociální politika, 5. pr ̌epracované a aktualizované výdání. Praha: Wolters Kluwer Č R. Kusá, Z. 2008. Diskurz a zmeny sociálneho štátu. Sociológia 40 (1): 5–34. ———. 2011–2013. Premeny chápania sociálnej spravodlivosti v programových vyhláseniach vlád SR.  In VEGA 2/0119/11 Využitie súc ̌asných sociologických teórií pri analýze sociálnych problémov na Slovensku. Bratislava: Slovak Academy of Science. ———. 2013. Tieňová správa o chudobe a sociálnom vylúc ̌ení v Slovenskej republike za rok 2013. Bratislava: IRIS. ———. 2018. Za ostrou hranicou: Všetci zodpovedáme len sami za seba, a už takmer nevieme, čo si počať so slovom ‘spoločnosť’. Krásno nad Kysucou: Absynt-Kalligram. Lamont, M., and N.  Duvoux. 2014. How Neo-liberalism Has Transformed France’s Symbolic Boundaries? French Politics. Culture & Society 32 (2): 58–75. Levitas, R. 2005. The Inclusive Society? Social Exclusion and New Labour. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Lødemel, I., and H. Trickey, eds. 2001. An Offer You Can’t Refuse. Workfare in International Perspective. Bristol: The Policy Press. López-Santana, M. 2015. The New Governance of Welfare States in the United States and Europe: Between Decentralization and Centralization in the Activation Era. Albany: State University New York Press. Martinelli, F., A. Anttonen, and M. Mätzke, eds. 2017. Social Services Disrupted: Changes, Challenges and Policy Implications for Europe in Times of Austerity. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Milan Šimečka Foundation. 2014. Social Cohesion, Participation and Identity of Residents of Košice (Slovakia): Research Outcomes. NMŠ within Open Society Foundation Project Roma in European Cities. Minas, R., V.  Jakobsen, T.  Kauppinen, T.  Korpi, and T.  Lorentzen. 2018. The Governance of Poverty: Welfare Reform, Activation Policies, and Social Assistance Benefits and Caseloads in Nordic Countries. Journal of European Social Policy 28 (5): 487–500. Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic. 2004. National Action Plan on Social Inclusion 2004–2006. Bratislava. Ministry of Labour Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic. 2004. Nová Sociálna Politika. Hmotná núdza [New Social Policy. Material Need]. Bratislava. Mýtna Kureková, L., A.  Salner, and M.  Farenzenová. 2013. Implementation of Activation Works in Slovakia. [online]. Bratislava: Slovak Governance Institute [cit. 20.7.2020]. http://stary-­web.governance.sk/assets/files/publikacie/ ACTIVATION_WORKS_REPORT_SGI.pdf. Quaid, M. 2002. Workfare: Why Good Social Policy Ideas Go Bad. Toronto: Toronto University Press, Scholarly Publishing Division.

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Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska. 2012. Návrh opatrení sekcie sociálnych vecí ̌ [The Rady ZMOS na riešenie problematiky marginalizovaných skupín obyvatelov Council of the Association of Towns and Cities of Slovakia: The Proposal of Measures for Solving the Problematics of Marginalised Groups of Inhabitants]. Žilina: ZMOS. Rek-Wózniak, M., and W. Wózniak. 2017. From the Cradle of ‘Solidarity’ to the Land of Cheap Labour and the Home of Precarious. Strategic Discourse on Labour Arrangements in Post-socialist Poland. Social Policy and Administration 51 (2): 348–366. Romano, S. 2014. The Political and Social Construction of Poverty. Central and Eastern European Countries in Transition. Bristol: Policy Press. Saraceno, Ch., ed. 2002. Social Assistance Dynamics in Europe: National and Local Poverty Regimes. Bristol: The Policy Press. Sirovátka, T. 2016. When Workfare Fails: Post-crisis Activation Reform in the Czech Republic. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 36 (1–2): 86–101. Szalai, J. 2009. Fórum—A romák integrációja. Fundamentum 13 (2): 39–43. Szikra, D., and B.  Tomka. 2009. Social Policy in East Central Europe: Major Trends in the Twentieth Century. In Post-communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing Social Policy Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. A. Cerami and P. Vanhuysse, 17–34. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Szőke, A. 2015. A ‘Road to Work’? The Reworking of Deservedness, Social Citizenship and Public Work Programmes in Rural Hungary. Citizenship Studies 19 (6–7): 734–750. Szulc, A. 2012. Social Policy and Poverty: Checking the Efficiency of the Social Assistance System in Poland. Eastern European Economics 50 (5): 66–92. Taylor-Gooby, P., ed. 2004. New Risks, New Welfare: The Transformation of the European Welfare State. New York: Oxford University Press. The Slovak National Council. 2011. Constitution of the Slovak Republic [online]. Bratislava: Slovenská národná rada [cit. 23.11.2016]. https://www.prezident. sk/upload-­files/46422.pdf. Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi a o zmene dopnení niektorých zákonov v znení zákona c ̌. 183/2014 Z.z. a zákona c ̌. 308/2014 Z.z. (Act on Assistance in Material No. 417/2013 Coll. and on Amendments of Act No. 183/2014 Coll. And Anct No. 308/2014 Coll.) [online] [cit. 10.10.2015]. http://www.ozinfodom.info/files/spaw/files/2013-­z417.pdf. Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi a o zmene dopnení niektorých zákonov v znení zákona c ̌. 599/2003 Z.z. (Act on Assistance in Material No. 599/2003 Coll. and on Amendments) [online] [cit. 10.10.2015]. https://www.slov-­lex.sk/ pravne-­predpisy/SK/ZZ/2003/599/20070901.html.

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Zákon o životnom minime a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov c ̌. 601/2003 Z. z. (Act on Subsistance Minimum No. 601/2003 Coll. And on some ­amendments) [online] [cit. 11.10.2015]. https://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2003-­601. Združenie miest a obcí Slovenska. 2011. Sociálne: ZMOS podporuje iniciativu žiarskeho primátora Zobuďme sa! [online] [cit. 13.1.2019]. https://www. zmos.sk/socialne-­zmos-­podporuje-­iniciativu-­ziarskeho-­primatora-­zobudme-­ sa-­.phtml?id3=26594&module_action__141462__id_art=17936.

CHAPTER 3

Methodology and Method

Indeed, human beings can’t live by competition alone. Perspective-taking and cooperation are also crucial for a society’s well-functioning (De Waal 2011). However, when we define those with whom we want to cooperate and with whom we identify, inevitably, the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy appears. In society, a variety of representations circulate, affecting the social construction of reality, social practices, and the transformation of social structures (Van Dijk 2008). Policy-makers often act like the magicians De Waal refers to above. They have the power to perform ‘magic’ and to pull ideas, including stereotypes and prejudices, out of a hat and ascribe to them a natural character. For instance, we encounter far too often a picture of Roma as having laziness and speculation biologically encoded in their DNA or ‘in their blood’. It is a trick that elites perform when they want the public to believe them, to accept and agree with what they claim, when they want blessings for the policies they propose. Representations of how we frame ourselves and ‘others’ are constructed and reconstructed through different channels, through various forms of social discourses. For the term ‘social representation’, I borrow Van Dijk’s (1996: 9) perspective of something referring to ‘organised “contents” of such socially shared systems of knowledge, attitudes and ideologies of group members’. He also offers a useful metaphor for understanding social representations (Van Dijk 1996: 9):

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kissová, Framing Welfare Recipients in Political Discourse, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63579-4_3

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[T]he social mind is like a computer network of which each individual computer has specific, unique information in its memory stores (as a result of its interaction with other individual users), but which can also communicate with other individual computers because of the same operating system, identical programs, similar communication protocols, and shared information. In this metaphorical sense, then, ideologies are the basic socio-­cognitive “programs” that monitor and coordinate the social practices of group members. Each group member has a copy of that program in his/her mind, but depending on different contextual constraints will make different use of it.

This metaphor makes clear how we share knowledge, how we produce and reproduce particular information. Further, elites control these basic socio-­ cognitive programmes in their political farming strategies. They pick what fits their plans and what is easily marketable to the public, to the metaphoric ‘customers’. Thanks to these programmes, they are able to control information and the qualities attributed to various phenomena and groups. Through these channels, they aim at desired outcomes. The terms we use to identify certain people or groups of people, and the characteristics and topics we associate with them, are important. They are part of a larger social and cultural picture. Culturally shared political representations are part of ideological frames and undergo processes of reproduction among members of a society. The systematic study of the structures, strategies, and processes which act as conductors of representations is thus necessary (ibid.). It is essential to employ a critical perspective, as power plays an equally essential role in structuring social relations, discourses, and acts. In this chapter, I provide insight into why I consider the study of political discourse important. Further, I familiarise you with my data and the analytical processes I applied in this study. I create a mosaic of discourse relevance, bringing together the literature of Critical Discourse Studies, with a special accent on work of Van Dijk, who focuses on elite discourses and their cognitive aspects. It is also political discourses within which boundary-making occurs. Ideas and opinions, including the above-­ mentioned ‘tricks’, are presented, argued, and legitimated in this arena, and ways of governing people are negotiated here.

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Discursive Framework Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) is fitting for the analyses and understanding of the processes and strategies different groups use in order to (re)produce ideas and categories about other people. This area of studies cannot be understood as a method in the sense that it does not stand alone. It is a complex network of complementary or individualised approaches to research. These approaches have their specific attributes and requirements, and they ask different questions; further, the character of the data, and the aims of the study may vary, looking thus at problems from potentially different angles (Van Dijk 2008; Wodak 2014; Reisigl and Wodak 2009). As Van Dijk (2008) argues, the analysis of discourse is not a method itself; rather, it is a domain of scientific practice which is inter- and multi-disciplinary. These critical approaches in discourse studies, according to Wodak (2014: 3), ‘consider meaning as a product of social practices’. And thus, researchers look at how the ‘social order is constructed in discursive practice’ (ibid.). Social structures, social practices, and the agency of the actors involved in them are among the factors shaping texts and speeches that appear in discourses (Fairclough 2014). The effects of texts and speeches might be essential as they have ‘causal effects upon, and contribute to changes in, persons (beliefs, attitudes etc.), actions, social relations, and the material world’ (ibid.: 382). The production of public discourse is in fact essential, and speeches and texts both have an impact upon opinion formation. Based on speeches and texts, people formulate or adopt their own opinions, interpreting their content and meanings. Consequently, this is the source of the mental models within which they further act and behave (Van Dijk 2008). It is the reason Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a much-needed diagnostic tool of political dominance (ibid.). Also, as CDA takes into account context, ideology, and power relations, it is useful for revealing forms of hidden racism, cultural criteria, group interests, and power asymmetries. Discourses are multi-layered and have different dimensions. For instance, Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) place primary attention on the practical dimensions of discourse, especially on argumentation. Besides looking at the role of narratives, representations, and explanations, they look at representations as inherently interlinked with agency, both human and political. When we think of political argumentation, we realise that narratives are a key component. When we go further, we will realise also

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that narratives serve as reason for political decision-making. For the study I present in this book, these understandings are important to keep in mind. In European- and national-level politics, speakers invoke different narratives and explanations in their political argumentation. These narrative and argumentative processes are one of the means through which political farming occurs, and thus, how political actions, including the adoption of more restrictive welfare measures such as workfare come to life. As I have already mentioned in the previous chapter, discursive practices mediate boundary construction. Van Dijk (1997: 39) explains that actors in general, but also political actors, ‘use various direct and less direct ways to say negative things about minorities, immigrants or refugees, and hence may contribute to reproduction of racism in society’. Undeniably, discourse is deeply embedded in society and culture. Representations, images we use to describe the world, are culturally framed and they also have functions. In particular, the negative images speakers attribute to certain categories serve the political function of marginalising, expelling, and keeping out undesired groups. It is crucial to underscore that images cultivated and cross-bred through cultural and political frameworks are closely related to all forms of power, including the abuse of power, and to social inequality. Van Dijk (2007) argues that ethnic prejudices and ideologies are constructed and reproduced by the political and media discourse of elites on a daily basis. Their key feature is that they contribute to the reproduction of racism, as well as xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and sexism, having control over mental representation and knowledge. Discourses provide the ground for or limitations on how we perceive and explain the world. In this regard, they inform the ways in which we conceptualise risks in people’s lives. As Lupton (2013) stresses, discourse analysis helps to explain the shifting meanings of ‘others’ and the struggle over these meanings. For this reason, we must understand discourses as complex networks of narratives, arguments, practices, and strategies of normalisation, inclusion, or exclusion based on the categories of nationality, gender, ethnicity, class, and religion, among others. Speakers have certain tools and strategies at their disposal when they need to construct a narrative and/or a boundary between groups. Wodak (2014: 403) argues that the construction based on the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy is the foundation of prejudiced and racist perceptions. When political elites wish to legitimate arguments, they use tools such as allusions, wordplay, presuppositions, the denial of racism, and more complex strategies such as

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positive self-representation, negative other-representation, mitigation, and disclaimers in discourses. In Central Europe, it is often members of ethnic, religious, or sexual minorities who stand at the centre of boundary-making strategies. In modern Slovak history, it has been the Jewish, the Hungarian and the Romani minorities whose image political actors have cultivated as misfits. Slovak identity has been constructed in political discourse through narratives, representations, practices, and historical and mythical argumentation, along with nation-building policies that actively depict the state in ethnic terms (Chudžíková 2011a, b). Such policies correspond to the widely accepted foundational myth of a state of ethnic Slovaks who share a common culture, history, language, past, present, and future and who have managed to establish their own state (Gallová Kriglerová et al. 2009). According to Jaworsky (2013), culture represents an autonomous dimension in boundary negotiation. In case of Slovak political discourse, the most important criteria for boundary construction are language and religion. The dominant position of the in-group and the imposition of particular requirements and attributes on out-groups, such as compulsory use of the in-group’s language or beliefs, clearly enforces membership or exclusion from this membership based on the desirability and undesirability of particular groups (Chudžíková 2011a). And as I discuss in Chap. 8, ethnicity is another important feature in boundary construction. Parliamentary debates are social events in which actors practice discourses. They have standard dynamics, even though some topics might be more controversial than others, raising more emotions. However, we still can expect, for instance, discussion between and among governing and opposition political representatives. This was also the case in the debates I examined. The Minister of Labour, Social Affairs, and the Family proposed mandatory activation, claiming to increase the employability of material need beneficiaries, and opposition politicians agreed with general idea of workfare and offered some comments to the proponent. In my study, I do not examine the political process as such. I am interested in how politicians talk about material need recipients, how they justify workfare, and what purpose boundary-making has within welfare talk. It is important to keep in mind that discourse is a complex and interconnected network of verbal and non-verbal practices. Nevertheless, in my analysis, I focus primarily on text and therefore, on verbal discursive practices. Even though I work with textual material in the first place, as I explain later, I do not neglect the importance of non-verbal or expressive

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aspects of the discourse. The analysis of relations among the categories policy-makers use, the topics they associate with them, the arguments they formulate to justify their ideas, and the tools they utilise to legitimate workfare and related measures, provides an understanding of the meanings constituting the social practice resulting from parliamentary debates. Accordingly, reconceptualising and interpreting this ‘crossbreeding’ process reveals how political representatives manage welfare, not only in order to control and regulate information and knowledge about certain groups and topics, but also to control and regulate the behaviour of the groups they frame as undeserving. Discourse and Power Written and spoken discourse, including texts, must be studied in social, cultural, and historical contexts. The relevant socio-political issues figure into the analysis, as these capture the ways in which dominant groups abuse their power, leading to social inequalities. The analysis of the relevant socio-political, cultural, and historical contexts reveals power relations, expressions, and the enactment and legitimation of inequalities (Van Dijk 1993b). As Angermuller, Maingueneau, and Wodak (2014: 362) state, discursive practices may have significant ideological effects: ‘[T]hey can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between, for instance, social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people.’ This notion is crucial for my study. The ways in which political representatives portray material need recipients positions them within the matrix of (power) relations, having also ideological ramifications in the framing of welfare, the boundaries between beneficiaries and the rest of society, and, as I will discuss, also in defining inter-ethnic relations. Power, power relations, and ideology are crucial concepts analysed within CDA approaches. We can look at power as the ability to enforce one’s will over others. In this perspective, it is the power to control the frame of mutual agency, to design, determine, or change this frame itself (Wolf 2001). In this study, I refer to power as to a complex strategic situation in which mobile power relations are articulated and negotiated, as an integral part of imbalanced social processes and knowledge. Ideologies are part of these frames. Fairclough (2014: 383) defines ideology as a ‘primarily representation of aspects of the world which can be shown to

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contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation’. The way welfare is defined and structured contains this primary representation of certain social aspects of the world. In particular, it defines the overall idea of how solidarity is framed, in what proportion it is available to people, to whom it is available, and under what circumstances. Thus, ideology, including ‘welfare ideology’, is a tool of power relations; it establishes and frames these relations and it defines the organisation of power in society. However, we must keep in mind that political explanations and argumentation are based on particular ideological conceptions, and thus the social and political facts political actors present and promote can shift perceptions and power relations. In my study, Van Dijk’s work is one of the main analytical sources upon which I rely. He approaches the complexity of power relations and discourse in a critical way. I acknowledge the great work of other critical discourse analysts that scrutinise relevant social issues, such as Krzyżanowski (2009, 2011), Krzyżanowski and Galasińska (2009), Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2011), Reisigl and Wodak (2001), Rehindorf and Wodak (2018), Wodak (2015), and others. However, for my study, I find Van Dijk’s cognitive account useful in terms of both theory and method. Together with Van Leeuwen’s (2008) taxonomy of legitimation strategies, it offers a simple, but still complex enough, tool for answering my research questions. In one of his accounts, Van Dijk (1993b: 97, emphasis added) summarises the logic of racial and ethnic minority vis-à-vis majority relationships and the reproduction of racism: 1. The white dominant group is able to reproduce its abuse of power only through an integrated system of discriminatory practices and sustaining ideologies and other social cognitions. 2. Part of the discriminatory practices are directly enacted by text and talk directed against minority groups, for example, by derogation, intimidation, inferiorisation, and exclusion in everyday conversations, institutional dialogues, letters, evaluative reports, laws, and many other forms of institutional text and talk directed to minority groups and their members. Given the official norm against discrimination and racism, whites1 will not normally admit such d ­ iscriminatory practices to other whites, at least not in official contexts of inquiry. 1

 In the context of this study, I refer to the non-Romani white majority.

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3. At the same time, however, the social cognitions of white group members about minorities are developed, changed, or confirmed as to maintain the overall social cognitive framework that supports discriminatory actions in the first place. Whereas discriminatory acts may be verbal or nonverbal, influencing the social minds of white group members is mainly discursive: Majority group members often speak and write about minorities, and thus persuasively formulate and communicate personal and socially shared opinions, attitudes, and ideologies.2 Power is executed through political measures which emerge from, but, at the same time, also constitute general ideologies. ‘Welfare ideology’, representations of the organisation of solidarity, might easily produce discriminatory actions, as Van Dijk concludes. Welfare policies in particular provide solid ground for boundary work and the creation of a social cognitive framework of deservingness. Again, the fashion in which politicians talk about material need beneficiaries influences the social mind of society. Words do matter indeed, as Kusá (2018) argues. In my study, I reveal that material need and workfare discourses involve majority-minority relations. Even though not legally stated in the Material Need Assistance Act, the debates and strategic documents themselves communicate ethnic information, ideas, opinions, or experiences related to Romani material need recipients, influencing thus the hearts and minds of society members and creating a potentially discriminatory environment. As made clear in the above-mentioned model of the reproduction of racism, institutional texts, including legislation, may include hidden forms of ethnocentrism, racism, or other forms of resulting inequalities. The dominant group thus articulates power relations in order to maintain or deepen the inequality, for example, through the limitation or restriction of access to resources. In this regard, it is important to examine how power and its abuse might be implemented through discourse (Van Dijk 1993b: 101): ‘The direct discursive racism is involved when majority actors feel entitled to thus control minorities with directive speech acts only because of their dominant group membership.’ By blurring or withholding relevant information, by providing wrong information, or by repeating biased images (such as ‘lazy’, ‘dirty’, or 2  Van Dijk is referring here to the broader theory of social group dominance based on discourse.

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‘unadaptable’), elites holding power (re)produce categories and associated characteristics. They cultivate these freshly mixed metaphorical discursive seedlings. As a result, recipients of the discourse tend to adopt these representations, generalise them, and, consequently, reproduce these biased and socially shared images, including ethnic prejudices. The adoption and spread of such mental representations retroactively serve to control the perceptions, beliefs, opinions, and attitudes of majority group members, as well as their ideologies. As Van Dijk (ibid.: 101) concludes, ‘the discursive control of ethnic attitudes—and, indirectly, of discrimination—is a prominent component in the overall system of the enactment and reproduction of racism’. At the same time, as the governmentality perspective might suggest, welfare (and workfare) discourses do serve as tools of control and regulation and public attitudes—whether of the majority (non-­ beneficiaries) or the minority (beneficiaries). Power cannot be understood only in terms of material resources here. Symbolic power plays an essential role in the context of preferential access to discourse control (Van Dijk 2008). Among symbolic elites, just to name few, we can find journalists, academics, and directors, as well as politicians. They are actors who have at their disposal the content of discourses, norms, and values and their (re)production. They are symbolic elites playing an important part in the ideological construction of power relations in a society. Groups controlling communication resources and knowledge are usually groups with a good amount of all or some of the forms of capital (economic, social, political, and symbolic). Control over discourse means control over the thinking and behaviour of groups. The poor or, usually, members of minorities, often remain at the lower levels of the socio-economic hierarchy, and, thus, they have less access to resources, information, knowledge, education, decision-making, media, and discourses in general (ibid.). Consequently, this insufficient capital and limited socio-economic and symbolic resources result in exclusion and marginalisation. Analysis of Political Discourse Political discourse analysis (PDA) is about political discourse, and, at the same time, it is also a critical project. Within the broader field of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), PDA focuses on the discursive conditions and consequences of social and political practices and inequalities resulting from power relations and domination (Van Dijk 1997). Discourse and its

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features are part of the strategic dimension of political processes. It is built upon layers of ideas, images, words, and other structures constructed in such a way that they inform and persuade.3 Therefore, language might follow the official decorum but it can also engage topics and rhetorical figures in order to emphasise, manipulate, constitute, or legitimate opinion or political power. Legitimation is one of the key political acts. It is a complex social act or process established not only via speech acts but also by denials, counter-acts, assertions, and complex discursive and interactional strategies. Actors use various strategies (based on mental models and representations) in organising discourse structures, for instance, by stressing a particular agent first or omitting others (in emphasising the negative actions of outgroups or the positive actions of an in-group) (ibid.). For instance, a lack of signs of respect and politeness might indicate the derogation or inferiority of the minority (Van Dijk 1993b). The analysis of political discourse requires defined borderlines of what to include in the analysis. Firstly, politicians (as actors being paid for their professional political activities) are important, because they are actors appointed or elected as central players in a polity. However, the construction of political discourse includes various other actors—institutional, legal, union, social movement, or non-governmental actors—as well as recipients (people, the public, citizens, or other groups). The analysis might be delimited also by the character of the action and practice—to include actors who participate in political actions such as governing, ruling, legislating, protesting, or voting (Van Dijk 1997). Thus, not only governing officials, administrations, bureaucracy, or legislation are part of the political-discursive process, but also the broader field of politics, including campaigns, media interviews, propaganda, or other actions aimed at influencing opinions and conduct. I take this network of actors into consideration. For instance, I mention repeatedly the role of mayors, the Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia, executive officials such as ministers, and non-governmental actors, particularly when it comes to critical responses to the workfare measure. However, in my study, I focus primarily on the ideas and arguments

3  According to Van Dijk’s account (1997), dimensions of discourse structure include topics, textual ‘schemata’ (superstructures/overall schematic forms, including argumentation), local semantics, lexicon, syntax, rhetoric, and expression structures, as well as action, speech acts, and interaction.

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presented by parliamentary members (MPs). In parliamentary debates, except for the labour minister, it was only MPs presenting their speeches. Political discourse analysis should reveal forms of hidden racism, group interests, and power relations, and how they function in a particular context. Actors (including politicians) ‘use various direct and less direct ways to say negative things about minorities, immigrants or refugees, and hence may contribute to reproduction of racism in society’ (ibid.: 39).4 Discourse is profoundly embedded in society and culture, and it is closely related to all forms of power, including the abuse of power, and to social inequality. Ethnic prejudices and ideologies are constructed and reproduced by the political and media discourse of elites on a daily basis, contributing to the reproduction of racism, as well as xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and sexism. Elites are those who have access to control of the major means of public communication such as propaganda, campaigns, mass media, scholarly outcomes, or even textbooks (Van Dijk 2007). Because restrictive policies and forms of derogation of minorities must be legitimated, elites rely on strategies of denial, positive self-­representation, defence, trivialisation, and justifications. Positive self-presentation might involve forms of nationalist self-glorification, elevating the country and the ‘nation’, the denial of racism, denial, and reproach, including attacks against anti-racists and reversals based on accusing anti-racists of being responsible for existing racism (Van Dijk 1993a). Usually, general social and legal norms formally forbid discrimination and minority derogation. Van Dijk (ibid: 180) argues that political elites commonly do not want to be considered ‘racists’; consequently, when they want to express something negative about minorities, they tend to deploy ‘denials, disclaimers or other forms that are intended to avoid a negative impression with their listeners of readers’. These strategies function as inhibitors in seeing elites or ‘our’ group in a negative light. For instance, denials can assume several forms, including accusation of others, reproach, suspicion, or attacks against moral or cultural integrity.5 What is important about denials is their social implications and aims, such as saving the face of the in-group. 4  Van Dijk mentions the formation of the ‘economic refugee’ category, with pictures of invasions, floods, and waves of refugees that embody the political function of marginalising, expelling, and keeping out this group of people. 5  For instance, using the strategy of defence includes denying the act as such, but also prejudiced or biased intentions, purposes, or consequences, which may diminish responsibility and negative attitudes towards elites. As Van Dijk (1993a) argues, such a strategy is used typically in the denial of discrimination.

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These strategies ‘mark social boundaries and re-affirm social and ethnic identities, and self-attribute moral superiority to their own group’ (ibid.: 181). They play a key role in constructing and legitimating the ethnic consensus and the supremacy of the in-group. At the same time, they have a cultural function. They produce representations based on contrasting the values of one group to those of another group. Such is the case in defining ‘our’ culture, values, and norms in a positive light and the ‘other’ as the opposite (tolerant/intolerant, free/unfree, good/bad). Again, these images serve to legitimate dominance and hence also forms and practices of social inequality. Besides important surface structures of discourse, such as chosen words or intonation and its syntactical structure (the order of chosen words or topics), revealing the less visible underlying structures is crucial in order to examine racism or ethnocentrism from the actor’s perspective. I return to surface and deep structures in the next sub-section. However, for now, I simply wish to highlight that these are the complex semantic structures signalling perspectives, opinions, and contexts. For the study of ethnic and racial dominance, perspective, implications, presuppositions, coherence, topics, level of description, and degree of completeness are the relevant meaning properties (Van Dijk 1993b: 109–113, emphases in original). Perspective is a point of view from which events are seen, or the social/political position of the actor. The implications are important as they help to convey meanings not expressed directly in the text or speech (they might play a strategic role in positive self-presentation/negative other-presentation); presupposition is a particular kind of implication. Coherence between sentences and subsequent propositions (local coherence) is defined by the relationship between knowledge, actors, and their attitudes (traceable, for instance, in explanations of ethnic relations). The level of description and the degree of completeness refers to information (amount, character) provided to audience. Topics (macrostructures defining what is the text about) are important in the production of discourse; they are the information influencing the audience (ibid.). Therefore, in discourse analysis about dominant-subordinate, socio-economic, or ethnic relations it is important to examine the topics indicated by elites as relevant or important, the prominent categories, how are they presented, and how the argumentation is organised. For the purposes of this study, I frame the political discourse on the Material Need Assistance Act through the parliamentary debates held on it in 2013. Because political actions, including decision-making and

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adopting laws and regulations, are discursive in nature, the analysis focuses on two parliamentary debates and two related strategic documents. I am aware that the legislative process is much more complex than just the discussions in the National Council. Other strategic actors play their parts in this process—employees of different ministries and ministerial departments, activists, non-governmental organisations, other professionals, and mayors and their associations (Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska 2012). An act’s adoption is thus not limited only to two days of debates. Many actors provide comments, notes, suggestions, support documents, and other forms of expertise or feedback. Nevertheless, political decisionmakers, namely MPs, remain crucial in the conceptualisation and construction of social realities, how they frame topics, how they justify their importance, and, therefore, what kind of knowledge they (re)produce and allow to diffuse outside the Parliament. In the following section, I introduce the details of my qualitative study methods. I describe the data I worked with and how I proceeded with my analysis. At the end of the chapter, I discuss some of the difficulties I faced during my research.

Data Collection and Data Analysis Questions, Data, Processes As I have already mentioned, putting political discourse under scrutiny is a critical project, requiring an investigation into the content and form of the discourse, as well as into the power relations it (re)produces. According to Humphries (1997 in Henn, Weinstein, Foard 2006: 28), the responsibility of critical social research is to ‘generate knowledge that aims to challenge and transform unequal power relationships’. Thus, critical researchers ask critical questions, keeping in mind there is someone out there holding the shorter end of the stick because of structural (power) asymmetries. In the following section, I go into considerable detail when it comes to the data collection and analytical processes. However, I find it important to say something substantive about how I thought about theories and data and what they could offer to the analysis. I elaborate the path along which I arrived at the codes that helped me to grasp the texts and their structures, starting with the questions that emerged at the beginning of my journey. The main questions driving my research interests in this study can be articulated as follows:

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1. What are the main themes and categories framing the image of material need assistance beneficiaries within Slovak political discourse? 2. How do politicians justify the need for workfare in material need provision? 3. What do these elements and discursive strategies tell us about the construction of the symbolic boundary between claimant and non-­ claimant society members and therefore, about the ways of governing the behaviour of different groups through welfare? One of the crucial tools of security and risk, and their policy arrangements, is law. Law is a governmental instrument used to structure social life, including interactions or belonging. Even though I do not analyse the content of the legislation discussed in these parliamentary debates, it is important to note that law is used to create and regulate the social order. According to Balzacq et al. (2010: 9), it ‘identifies those to be dealt with as social problems, in need of regulation, surveillance, and policing. […] It does so by designating (legal) identities, such as citizens and non-­ citizens, and producing (legal) borders and spaces for the application of specific laws, such as anti-terrorism laws, migration laws, or the scope of application for constitutional rights.’ Thus, analysing these discursive practices helps us to understand how law defines and constructs social structures, boundaries, and differentiations between different groups. Policy-makers present ideas and different arguments during speeches, debates, presentations, and interviews, producing certain immediate surface manifestations of these. However, behind these immediate and often misleading surface manifestations, lie deep structures which result in social and symbolic inequalities. As Henn, Weinstein, and Foard (2006: 29) assert: ‘Critical social researchers argue that the purpose of social research ought to be to uncover the fundamental nature of social reality by revealing these underlying mechanisms and structures.’ Hence, it is one of the aims of this study to examine how elites produce inequalities (social or symbolic) through discourses while creating a negative image of an ‘unadaptable’ material need beneficiary, who must be controlled and regulated for the sake of societal well-being. Analytically speaking, discourse itself is structured analogically. Discourse structures are also divided into surface structures (forms of language use, sounds, intonations, gestures, words), syntactical structures (word order) and deep/underlying structures associated with meanings,

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(inter)actions, mental representations, or strategies of production and understanding (Van Dijk 1993b, emphasis in original). Even though I do not ignore the importance of surface structures, which help elucidate the discourse and to potentially reveal its psychological dimensions such as emotions or ‘true intentions’ (loudness, face work, hesitation), in my study, I focus primarily on the underlying structures of the analytical material I collected for this study. The order of chosen words and information may signal the importance assigned by actors and show how they interpret an event. Finally, meaning structures are directly linked with ideologies, opinions, and ethnic knowledge reproduced in society (ibid.). First, I build my study primarily upon the analysis of transcripts of parliamentary debates, namely the first and the second reading of the Material Need Assistance Act discussed in the Slovak Parliament in 2013.6 Even though videos are available online since 2018, back in 2015–2017, when I was first analysing the data, I relied mainly on transcripts. According to Ezzy (2002), the interpretative process is an ongoing cycle in which existing interpretations frame how people give meanings to their experiences. Political discourse analysis is an interpretative process too, and, thus, it was important to me to access my data easily and to be able to browse through the texts, searching by keywords. In 2018, I watched the videos with the intent to look at visual and emotional utterances that might potentially enrich or alter my findings and interpretations. Except for some moments of applause and irony in speakers’ voices, no facial or vocal expressions suggested dramatic changes to my findings and they did not have any significant impact on my interpretations.7 6  Videos and transcripts are now available online at the public archive of the Slovak National Council: http://tv.nrsr.sk/ (Media Portal 2013a, b). 7  Most of the moments containing irony in the voices of speakers occurred in moments of disagreement, which most of the time took place between the opposition and the coalition, more particularly in the responses of the opposition MPs to the proposed Act. Moments of applause occurred: (1) when the Chair of National Council welcomed the guests from the Women’s Union and the Seniors’ Union from the city of Humenné sitting in the balcony; (2) when the very same chair reacted to a whistle that occurred while the SDKÚ-DS MP was talking about the negative aspects of the proposed act, giving credit to his SDKÚ-DS party colleague (whistle [from another MP], who reacted by saying, ‘What I miss in the solutions of this Act is … (whistle in the hall)’ (SDKÚ-DS, 23rd SNC hearing,) and, in turn, the chair asked to ‘save such methods that you’ve introduced here in the Parliament for home! Whistle at folk festivals, not here!’ (SMER-SD, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/ schodza/6/23?id=107454) when the Minister entered the debate for the second time in both readings, reacting to previous discussions. These expressive moments did not have any

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The first reading of the proposed legislation was discussed in Parliament on 4 September 2013 (The 23rd hearing of the Slovak National Council); after the second and third readings held between 23 and 26 October 2013 (The 25th hearing of the Slovak National Council), the Act was adopted.8 Speakers in these debates are exclusively Parliamentary Members (MPs) belonging to the coalition party SMER-SD (a party claiming to be social democratic) proposing the Act amendment and the opposition centre-­ right parties KDH (Christian Democratic Movement), Most-Híd, OĽ ANO (Ordinary People and Independent Personalities), SaS (Freedom and Solidarity), and SDKÚ-DS (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union— Democratic Party).9 In addition, I included two strategic documents in my dataset. The Proposal of measures for solving the problematics of marginalised groups of inhabitants (2012), prepared by the social affairs section of the Council of the Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia (ATCS) is the outcome of previous mobilising actions initiated by several mayors coming together in the ‘Let’s wake up!’ initiative (2011).10 It was later signed by several hundred mayors of Slovak municipalities. The document is the outcome of the municipalities’ call for more governmental action in social impact on my findings and I did not find them integral to my interpretations. Nevertheless, I do not neglect their potential relevance, for instance, in answering a different set of research questions. 8  On 27 November 2013, an amendment to the Child Allowance Act was also discussed. The two Acts are complementary, as they both cover similar topics and the intertextuality is traceable here. Further, the Child Allowance Act is interconnected with the strategic document entitled The Right Way (Roma Reform) (Kaliňák et al. 2013a, b). Both the Material Need Assistance Act (Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi 2003, 2014) and The Right Way (Roma Reform) interlink education, parental responsibility, and social assistance. Social assistance is used as a punitive tool for ‘irresponsible’ parents or their children. Even though I had previously included the debate on the Child Allowance Act in my dataset, I later decided to focus more on workfare and its legitimation. Therefore, the transcript is no longer part of my analysed dataset. 9  In the analytical chapters, I use direct quotes from transcribed hearings to support or illustrate my arguments. The quotes referenced include the following information: party affiliation of the speaker, number of the Slovak National Council hearing, link to the transcript. I label the 23rd and the 25th hearing of the Slovak National Council as 23rd SNC hearing and 25th SNC hearing respectively (Media Portal 2013a, b). 10  Združenie miest a obcí Slovenska. 2011. Sociálne: ZMOS podporuje iniciativu žiarskeho ̌ sa! [online] [cit. 13. 1. 2019]. Available from: https://www.zmos.sk/ primátora Zobudme socialne-zmos-podporuje-iniciativu-ziarskeho-primatora-zobudme-sa-. phtml?id3=26594&module_action__141462__id_art=17936.

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assistance regulation. It contains elaborated claims and suggestions in the areas of: criminal law, criminal delinquency, and law enforcement; delinquency prevention and parental obligation reinforcement; social assistance; education; and housing—all directly or indirectly interlinked with the Material Need Assistance Act. Moreover, mayors in Slovakia have significant power in national agenda-setting. The ATCS is an advisory body for legislative and executive organs at national level. Mayors use their personal experiences from their own praxis and from citizens as the main legitimation tools for the restrictive claims present in the analysed document. The Right Way (Roma Reform) (2013), prepared by the office of the Plenipotentiary for Romani Communities (Ministry of the Interior), deals with the following topics: education, law enforcement, housing, the social system, employment, and support policies. It is a strategic document, a collective outcome prepared by the Ministry of the Interior, the Office of the Plenipotentiary for Romani Communities (Ministry of the Interior) and the OĽ ANO party (a centre-right opposition party). It was presented as a key reform in the issue of the so-called Romani problematics. I find the document relevant for the main points it claims to be dealing with, including law enforcement and social assistance, which are both interlinked. Moreover, speakers, including the plenipotentiary himself, refer to the document in the parliamentary debates. The parliamentary transcripts and the two documents totalled 160 pages.11 As it might be clear from Chap. 1, my overall research project started very inductively, while sitting in the office of the state secretary. I was listening attentively to what he was saying about the necessity to introduce workfare into social assistance, mentioning abuse, ‘unadaptable’ citizens, and responsible parenting. I sensed some individualising, let’s say neoliberal, features in the state secretary’s calm tone. After a couple of months of discussions with my colleagues and other scholars, and delving into the securitisation literature that I knew from my previous field research, I started to explore the literature on risk framing. Departing from cultural approaches to risk, I arrived at the perspective of governmentality, explaining how actors regulate behaviour through risk. Both perspectives seemed to be addressing what I had heard some months before. From there, the 11  For the purpose of the study, I looked at the Act itself and into the explanatory report (27 pages); however, these do not serve as primary data for my study because of their predominantly technical and legal character.

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deductive process of establishing the codes had started and I derived some of my codes from relevant theories such as governmentality, critical political discourse analysis, and securitisation. Therefore, the codes extracted from the existing literature referred mainly to risk and security, governmentality, and the political discourse strategies I describe in my analysis (in Fig.  3.1, they are indicated in green). Next, during the first analytical phase, in which I was going through my dataset, I included open inductive coding in the process and started to identify some common themes (Henn et al. 2006). In short, I first identified potentially relevant codes deductively from the literature (indicated in green), and second, going through the transcripts and documents, I induced other codes relevant to my study (codes indicated in blue and orange). In the end, the coding tree, including the names of the political actors and the character of the political dialogue (indicated in black) was formed as shown in Fig. 3.1. In my analysis, I followed the writings of van Dijk (1993a, b, 2008) and Van Leeuwen (2008), who suggest some relevant strategies for political discourse analysis. Being influenced by the CDA literature, I pursued semi-open coding. First, using the qualitative analytical software Atlas.ti, I identified the categories speakers used to name or describe material need beneficiaries. I included nouns as well as adjectives; both serve as characterisations articulated by actors. Second, I was looking for concrete topics or more general themes policy-makers associated with these categories.

Fig. 3.1  Coding tree

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Scrutinising these interlinkages, I began the analysis of political meaningmaking. Third, I identified the arguments speakers articulated in order to support their ideas and, to a large extent, the interlinkages from the metaanalysis. I found it important to focus not only on arguments as such but also on the images accompanying these arguments. Pictures, images, and stories are inseparable from arguments, as speakers used them to illustrate and support their ideas (the code ‘supporting images’ is indicated in orange because I started to identify these images only during the inductive coding). In addition to the above-mentioned codes of categories, topics, arguments, and images, I employed also Van Dijk’s (2008) categorisation of discursive strategies used by elites, such as positive self-representation or negative other-representation, denial, and disclaimer, as well as Van Leeuwen’s (2008) framework of legitimation tools—authorisation, moral evaluation, and mythopoesis. According to Van Leeuwen (2008: 6), ‘[a]s discourses are social cognitions, socially specific ways of knowing social practices, they can be, and are, used as resources for representing social practices in text. This means that it is possible to reconstruct discourses from the texts that draw on them.’ My theory thus provided me with other codes I predefined prior to analysis. Among these, I added to the coding tree governmentality and security as codes deriving from the theory with which I framed my study. During the first data reading and pre-coding process, I found it relevant to add ethnicity, (un)deservingness and (un)constitutionality to the coding tree, as they were highly relevant in the discourse (in Fig. 3.1, they are indicated in orange). The codes further branched out into a more complex matrix. For instance, I divided the discursive strategies into the different types proposed by Van Dijk (1996, 1997, 2008) (such as negative other-­ representation, positive self-representation, denial, and disclaimer) and the legitimation tools following Van Leeuwen’s (2008) categorisation (authorisation, moral evaluation, and mythopoesis). I further added a sub-­ code of legitimation tools referring to the form politicians applied to legitimate their claims (these are legislation/lawyers, experiences, or stories). Later, this sub-code became a code directly interlinked with the ‘images’ code as, for example, personal stories or references to experiences, were often included directly in the images speakers provided in order to support their arguments. In other words, within the complex images actors constructed about different categories and topics related to material need or

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workfare, particular tools such as references to legal explanations, personal stories, or experiences were an integral part. After finishing the coding, the meta-analysis, and taking into consideration the speakers’ political backgrounds, I identified the links and relations between and among codes. Because intertextuality is an important part of the analysis of discourse, as I analysed the transcripts and additional documents I mentioned above, I elaborated the links also across different texts. When I returned to my coding tree again, and when I already saw the potential key outcomes, I engaged in a process of selective or theoretical coding (Ezzy 2002), focusing on the central aspects of the story my analysis had identified: arguments, discursive strategies, categories, (un)constitutionality, ethnicity, governmentality, images, legitimation tools, security, and (un)deservingness. Following the network views built within and between these codes, I interpreted the relations between the categories formulated by actors, the ideas presented, and the arguments and tools used to legitimate the Act. I present these in the next three chapters. I structure these chapters following the logic of the main codes I highlighted above. I found this method appropriate for grasping the entire story I am reconstructing here. Methodological Difficulties More complex qualitative analysis requires thorough reflection and repeated evaluation of the data. The analytical process takes time. Therefore, it is not surprising I came across number of puzzles I needed to deal with. Before proceeding to the main part of the study, I would like to share some of the key dilemmas I faced during my research. I find it useful to share them here, in this particular section, as all of them were relevant precisely to the analytical process. First, it was difficult to separate the topics, arguments, images, and categories which were the main aspects I was identifying in the texts. Analytically, it was not difficult to distinguish them, having each of them defined. For instance, I knew what I meant by a category or by a topic. Thus, I was able to identify these in the data and sort them accordingly. Synthesis in writing the text was a different story, though. Very soon in the process of writing, I realised that they are often inseparable, complementary, and interlinked either directly or indirectly. The fact they are overlapping did not make the analysis itself difficult, but rather the writing, systemising the findings and clarity in presenting them. It was difficult to

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remain coherent and not repetitive. First, I made clear to myself what I meant by category, theme, argument, or image based on common sense and existing definitions (for instance, I defined an argument). At the same time, category, theme, argument, and image represented also my codes. Making clear how I understood categories, themes/topics, arguments, and images made their identification in the data clearer. Plus, if I had already discussed one aspect, let’s say a particular topic, I tried not to repeat myself in the arguments and to grasp it either from a different perspective or to be clear in explaining the overlap. Second, I faced a problem related to the quotes I highlighted in my data as important and as useful illustrations of my findings. However, to a large extent, these interesting and important quotes often came from the same MPs. Therefore, it might seem I was analysing speeches only of a very limited numbers of speakers. This is not the case, however. In the debates, MPs from all relevant political parties, representing both coalition and opposition, presented their opinions. And despite the fact almost all speakers agreed on the necessity of the workfare measure, some MPs were more moderate than others. Some were more expressive and radical in their speeches. Accordingly, it was sometimes problematic to reflect a wider range of speakers and their ideas. Of course, I did not want it to be the analysis of only some of the MPs present at the debate. On the other hand, the speeches of the more radical and expressive speakers were indeed analytically compelling and they provided good support material for my arguments. Moreover, it is usually these exact expressive phrases, figures, and metaphors that become stuck in the minds of the audience. The problem is that the most interesting and analytically rich quotes were uttered by a group of actors from different parties, usually members of the parliamentary opposition. Frankly, it was not as compelling to write about the phrase ‘The system as set up currently is not working’, as it was to analyse and parse the phrase: ‘This system is a cancer on society and it deforms and decomposes it.’ Hidden deep meanings presented through metaphors or speech figures are important because they are associations of ideas. They are representational choices that play an essential role in texts and speeches. As Van Leeuwen (2008: 56) says about the example of the ‘Race Odyssey’, ‘[t]hey [metaphorical representational choices] form part of a particular kind of racist discourse, a discourse based on fear—fear of loss of livelihood and loss of cultural identity, fear of the unknown and unknowable “other”’. As I will show in the following chapters, such an idea is in line with the interpretations in my story. In the end, I decided

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not to worry about coming back to some more limited number of speakers repeatedly if their presentation was fruitful and illustrative. On the contrary, I find it very important to highlight these data and come back to them whenever it is relevant. Ultimately, discourse as a social practice, including literal forms, is what I study here and it is speakers themselves who have decided to use certain words and metaphors and not others. But even though they can tell us a lot, I keep in mind the limitation I have just shared. The third puzzle I tried to solve concerns the matter of context. Discourse analysis consists of a very robust account of the context, considered very important if we want to interpret social practices such as discourse. Historical context (Wodak and Meyer 2001), the political context of a specific time and space, or the context of a particular speech act (Van Dijk 2008) are important for better understanding and more accurate interpretations. I am aware that I do not go into much detail with the description of the actual process of parliamentary debates, and I do not describe too deeply the historical development or environment in which the Act was prepared and adopted. However, I have tried to be concise but still detailed as possible so that my interpretations are not misleading. In Chap. 2, I have sketched the historical development of the social assistance policies relevant to this study, I have presented the political parties in the National Council back then, and I have highlighted the moments relevant to the issue of workfare adoption. The last key dilemma I encountered has to do with my previous experiences in ethnographic qualitative research. I was repeatedly asking myself, ‘Do I have to interview speakers from the debates and actors who prepared documents I was analysing?’ First, I looked for answers in the methodological literature. Partly, I found some indirect answers, for instance, in Van Dijk (2008) or Wodak and Meyer (2001). Even though I was thinking of in-depth interviews as good complementary data in which speakers could have explained to me how they meant what they had said, in the end, I decided not to conduct interviews within this particular study. When taking a critical perspective on discourse as a social practice, we must bear in mind that what has already been said publicly lives its own life. The representations presented in documents and in speeches are those that matter. They have already been sent into the world, leaving people themselves to cope with them. Words do matter. If I had interviewed the relevant speakers, it would have not changed what the audience had already gleaned from their political speeches. I might have provided good

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complementary explanations, but that is not what Critical Discourse Analysis necessarily needs. In the following chapters, I present my findings, how I interpret them, and what implications they might have. Step by step, I answer my research questions and contextualise the answers sociologically. At the end of the study, I reflect further upon the implications of my findings in the context of human rights, which, I admit, is a ‘shadow perspective’ that has motivated my study.

References Balzacq, T., T. Basaran, D. Bigo, E.P. Guittet, and Ch. Olsson. 2010. Security Practices. In International Studies Encyclopedia Online, ed. R.A. Denemark. Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Reference [online] [cit. 18. 3. 2010]. Available from: http://www.isacompendium.com/subscriber/tocnode?id=g97814443 36597_chunk_g978144433659718_ss1-2. Chudžíková, A. 2011a. National Identity in the Political Discourse in Slovakia. Sociologie Românească 9 (1): 10–127. ———. 2011b. Vnímanie menšín v politickom diskurze. In Menšiny v politickom diskurze, ed. J.  Lajčáková, A.  Chudžíková, and T.  Gažovičová, 23–37. Bratislava: CVEK. De Waal, F. 2011. The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society. London: Souvenir Press. Ezzy, D. 2002. Qualitative Research: Practice and Innovation. London: Routledge. Fairclough, N. 2014. A Critical Agenda for Education. In The Discourse Studies Reader: Main Currents in Theory and Analysis, ed. J.  Angermuller, D.  Maingueneau, and R.  Wodak, 378–387. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Fairclough, I., and N. Fairclough. 2012. Political Discourse Analysis. A Method for Advanced Students. New York: Routledge. Gallová Kriglerová, E., J.  Kadlečíková, and J.  Lajčáková. 2009. Migranti: Nový ̌ na staré problémy. Bratislava: CVEK. pohlad Henn, M., M.  Weinstein, and N.  Foard. 2006. A Short Introduction to Social Research. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. Err. Humphries, B. 1997. From Critical Thought to Emancipatory Action: Contradictory Research Goals? Sociological Research Online [online] 2 (1) [cit. 14. 1. 2019]. https://www.socresonline.org.uk/2/1/3. Jaworsky, B.N. 2013. Immigrants, Aliens and Americans: Mapping out the Boundaries of Belonging in a New Immigrant Gateway. American Journal of Cultural Sociology 2: 221–253.

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Kaliňák, R., Pollák, P., and Saloň, M. 2013a. Správna cesta (Rómska reforma): Vzdelávanie [The Roma Reform (The Right Way): Education]. [online] [cit. 27. 6. 2016]. http://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/mvsr/romsky_splnomocnenec/Romska_reforma_vzdelavanie.pdf. ̌ ———. 2013b. Správna cesta (Rómska reforma): Vymožitelnost ̌ práva [The Roma Reform (The Right Way): Law Enforcement]. [online] [cit. 29. 6. 2016]. http://www.minv.sk/?pravo_rr. Krzyżanowski, M. 2009. Europe in Crisis? Journalism Studies 10 (1): 18–35. ———. 2011. Political Communication, Institutional Cultures and Linearities of Organisational Practice: A Discourse-Ethnographic Approach to Institutional Change in the European Union. Critical Discourse Studies 8 (4): 281–296. Krzyżanowski, M., and A. Galasińska, eds. 2009. Discourse and Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Krzyżanowski, M., and R. Wodak. 2011. Political Strategies and Language Policies: The European Union Lisbon Strategy and Its Implications for the EU’s Language and Multilingualism Policy. Language Policy 10: 115–136. Kusá, Z. 2018. Za ostrou hranicou: Všetci zodpovedáme len sami za seba, a už takmer nevieme, c ̌o si poc ̌at ̌ so slovom ‘spoloc ̌nost ̌’. Krásno nad Kysucou: Absynt-Kalligram. Lupton, D. 2013. Risk. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. Media Portal. National Council of the Slovak Republic. 2013a. The 23rd hearing [online] [cit. 6. 3. 2021]. https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23? ———. 2013b. The 25th hearing. [online] [cit. 6. 3. 2021]. https://tv.nrsr.sk/ archiv/schodza/6/25? Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska. 2012. Návrh opatrení sekcie sociálnych vecí ̌ (The Rady ZMOS na riešenie problematiky marginalizovaných skupín obyvatelov Council of the Association of Towns and Cities of Slovakia: The Proposal of Measures for Solving the Problematics of Marginalised Groups of Inhabitants). Žilina: ZMOS. Rehindorf, M., and R.  Wodak. 2018. Borders, Fences, and Limits—Protecting Austria from Refugees: Metadiscursive Negotiation of Meaning in the Current Refugee Crisis. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 16 (1–2): 15–38. Reisigl, M., and R.  Wodak. 2001. Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism. London: Routledge. ———, eds. 2009. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. van Dijk, A.T. 1993a. Denying Racism: Elite, Discourse and Racism. In Racism and Migration in Western Europe, ed. J.  Solomos and J.  Wrench, 179–193. Oxford: Berg. ———. 1993b. Analyzing Racism Through Discourse Analysis. Some Methodological Reflections. In Race and Ethnicity in Research Methods, ed. J. Stanfield, 92–134. London: Sage.

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———. 1996. Discourse, Racism and Ideology. La Laguna: RCEI Ediciones. ———. 1997. What is Political Discourse Analysis. In Political Linguistics, ed. J. Blommaert and C. Bulcaen, 11–52. Amsterdam: Benjamins. ———. 2007. Editor’s Introduction: The Study of Discourse: An Introduction. In Discourse Studies, ed. A.T. van Dijk, vol. 5, xix–xii. London: Sage. ———. 2008. Discourse and Power. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. van Leeuwen, T. 2008. Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Practical Discourse Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wodak, R. 2014. Discourses of Exclusion: Xenophobia, Racism and Anti-Semitism. In The Discourse Studies Reader: Main Currents in Theory and Analysis, ed. J. Angermuller, D. Maingueneau, and R. Wodak, 400–410. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. ———. 2015. The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. Wodak, R., and M. Meyer. 2001. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. Wolf, E. 2001. Facing Power. Old Insights—New Questions. In Pathways of Power: Building an Anthropology of the Modern World, ed. E. Wolf, S. Silverman, and A. Yengoyan. Berkeley: University of California Press. Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi a o zmene dopnení niektorých zákonov v znení zákona č. 183/2014 Z.z. a zákona č. 308/2014 Z.z. Act on Assistance in Material No. 417/2013 Coll. and on amendments of Act No. 183/2014 Coll. and Anct No. 308/2014 Coll. [online] [cit. 10. 10. 2015]. http://www.ozinfodom.info/files/spaw/files/2013-­z417.pdf. Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi a o zmene dopnení niektorých zákonov v znení zákona č. 599/2003 Z.z. Act on Assistance in Material No. 599/2003 Coll. and on amendments [online] [cit. 10. 10. 2015]. https://www.slov-­lex.sk/ pravne-­predpisy/SK/ZZ/2003/599/20070901.html. Združenie miest a obcí Slovenska. 2011. Sociálne: ZMOS podporuje iniciativu ̌ sa! [online] [cit. 13. 1. 2019]. https://www. žiarskeho primátora Zobudme zmos.sk/socialne-­zmos-­podporuje-­iniciativu-­ziarskeho-­primatora-­zobudme-­ sa-­.phtml?id3=26594&module_action__141462__id_art=17936.

CHAPTER 4

The Poor, the Offenders, and the ‘Unadaptable’: Categories Policy-­ makers Use When Talking About Material Need Recipients

When you think about professional sports, you may envision the various categories of fields it is played in. Also, when organising your wardrobe, you might sort your clothing into categories such as colour, season, type, or length of sleeves. In restaurants, your meal and drink options are sorted into categories. Our lives revolve around categories; they are everywhere, and they shape our everyday lives. They help us to tidy up and organise our thoughts and perspectives. Categories offer a certain sense of security as they provide order. We use them so that we can make sense of our lives. It is important though to bear in mind that it is we who constructs these classifications. We engage in the division of our everyday lives based on our experiences, on what we see or hear. Then, in processing this information, we sort them according to a certain logic. Discourses are essential in this cognitive process of sense-making. They offer hints, ideas, and explanations about why we classify things according to a particular logic. They provide world views that we can either adopt or dismiss based on our preconceptions. Nevertheless, our minds remain plastic in the sense that they can take in on new perceptions while leaving others behind. In this sense, the role of opinion-makers around us is key. It might be our parents, peers, teachers, scientists, religious leaders, or politicians. If we consider particular people trustworthy, we are prone to take seriously what have to say. As a consequence, we adopt their opinions, ideas, and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kissová, Framing Welfare Recipients in Political Discourse, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63579-4_4

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explanations, reproducing them as we pass them on to other people. These ‘significant others’ thus have certain power over the ideas and opinions we implement in our lives, and discourses are essentially social practices in which power relations are negotiated. In these negotiation processes, we construct boundaries between ideas and different frameworks, creating the categories according to which we sort out our world. In public, or in particular, political discourses, one of the ways in which this sorting process occurs is through the construction of dividing lines between different groups, using strategies such as negative other-­ representation and positive self-representation. How politicians describe themselves, through what images, symbols, words, and how they depict ‘others’, are important to scrutinise. Political debates about material need, the conditions for providing it, and, therefore, about the eligibility of different people indeed offer a space to construct these boundaries. Through the words politicians use, and the characteristics and topics they associate with them, we can reconstruct meanings, the deeper structures behind discourses. At the broader national level, it is political representatives who take the characteristics they associate with particular groups and match them with their political aims. They crossbreed them in order to increase the chances their final product will succeed among the public. The aim is to cultivate a product people will ‘buy’ and adopt it in their own perspectives and world views. Categories and themes are the basis of the political constructive crossbreeding process because they are at the front line of potential success. In this study, I take under scrutiny a group comprised of the members of the Slovak Parliament. They are the dominant group holding power in their hands. They represent symbolic power holders, having an impact on knowledge production. They are substantial power holders, having the mandate to adopt policies that consequently influence the lives of members of society. Policy-makers in the National Council (Parliament) not only set up the agenda, producing or reproducing images about people and issues on this agenda, but also propose, discuss, and adopt legislation having wider social impacts. In this very first analytical chapter, I focus on the categories these elites, the National Council policy-makers and decision-makers, produce or reproduce in reference to the material need claimants and beneficiaries representing the Material Need Assistance Act’s target (Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi 2003, 2014; Media Portal 2013a, b). In addition, I analyse the two strategic documents prepared by other political actors (Rada

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Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska 2012; Kaliňák et al. 2013a, b). In the documents and transcripts, I identify the words speakers use in the discourse when they refer to material need claimants. I reconstruct the meanings of these words within the context, and I look at types of people and characteristics (individual or collective) associated with the categories policy-­makers use in their speeches. The terms MPs use the most when they talk about material need beneficiaries or claimants are: long-term unemployed, low-skilled, poor, marginalised groups, socially dependent, offenders, Roma, unadaptable, and persons from disadvantaged environments. This information might not be so striking if just summed up. Without any sophisticated analytical skills, we can already induce that people who claim material need assistance are poor, perhaps because of their lower education, maybe because they have limited skills, there are insufficient job positions in the region, or they simply face difficult life situations. Further, it might not be surprising to any reader that it often occurs that claimants, because of their socio-economic status, face different disadvantages, multiple inequalities, discrimination, and, perhaps, marginalisation. What is, however, important when we look in-depth and reconstruct the relations among these categories, we find that the interlinkages among them are not random but serve political purposes having wider social impacts. In this chapter, I present the key linkages between socio-economic status, crime, and ethnicity. Identifying the categories political elites use in order to label or describe the Act’s target groups not only identifies the general atmosphere of the proposal and the measures to be argued for, but, analytically, also helps us to deconstruct the discourse into smaller pieces so we can see beyond it, into the more hidden meanings and connotations of the proposed in the Act. In other words, it is the first piece of a puzzle that society has started to put together workfare in order to reach particular aim(s).

Poor, Disadvantaged, and Criminal Parliamentary debates are a rich source of ideas and claims that construct boundaries between different topics or groups of people, especially when it comes to social or socio-economic issues, for instance, the boundaries between solidarity and social responsibility or between those who are considered deserving or those undeserving of assistance. In case of the Material Need Assistance Act, the most repeated categories emerging in the two parliamentary debates and documents are long-term unemployed,

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low-­skilled, poor, marginalised groups, socially dependent, offenders, Roma, unadaptable, and persons from disadvantaged environments. From the onset, I find it important to point out that even though the categories policy-makers bring into the debate may sound neutral if I just name them, as I do above, together with the associated characteristics, topics, arguments, and images, they present negative perceptions of people, events, and phenomena. All these blended together can be understood as political ‘marketing’ of their final product—conditioned material need assistance. In the following sections I break down these categories and make sense of the often-hidden mental linkages speakers make. The Poverty-Crime Link In the parliamentary debates, the poor, disadvantaged, and socially dependent are often depicted as people engaging in criminal activities, unable to hold full-time employment, and as people who demoralise hard-working individuals. Some of the above-mentioned categories are used interchangeably or are tied together in one sentence. One of these links connects criminals, poor people, and welfare provision. In this association, the category of an offender is explicitly tied to social disadvantage, and poverty is linked to crime. In the opening presentation of the Act proposal, the SMER-SD MP, back then the Minister of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family (MoLSAF) argues, while presenting the idea of sanctioning some petty crimes: ‘[Criminal] offenders are mainly persons from a disadvantaged environment, whose income consists of social insurance benefits, benefits in material need or social allowances and parental allowances.’1 In the statement, offering an explanation and producing knowledge about criminal activities, crime is directly interlinked to the poor and, consequently, to welfare provision, while differentiation of and reflection about different groups of poor people and different causes as well as impacts of poverty are completely missing. After such a statement, the minister does not elaborate the causes of poverty, the causes of crime. He does not provide any supporting evidence for his claim that material need recipients commit a significant proportion of crimes. The moral aspect is also present in the debate. Morality tends to be an integral issue in welfare debates and it often serves as the borderline between deserving and undeserving or between assistance recipients and 1

 SMER-SD, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?id=107315

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the rest of society. In the case of their research in France, Lamont and Duvoux (2014: 63) conclude that ‘moral boundaries toward the poor have hardened significantly and rapidly: the poor have been asked by politicians, policy makers, and the public to demonstrate more autonomy and self-reliance’. For instance, as I illustrate, the following suggestion frames one of the most discussed problems of the current welfare system—welfare being more lucrative than regular employment: I would have one brief remark to the way we want to pull in people in material need, so they wouldn’t demoralise others, who take up employment, go to work every day, and for minimum wage. And their income from work is maybe not higher than that of the one who doesn’t go to work and simply gets provisions from the state.2

Social assistance in the case of material need is to a large extent built around the employment boundary. As I make clear later, employed people are indirectly considered morally higher in contrast to the long-term unemployed. The dividing line in this case is built upon two key elements: fairness and convenience. Employed people are presented as those who try (enormously) hard; in contrast, beneficiaries are perceived as inactive citizens freeloading on assistance from public sources. While neglecting the systemic reasons for long-term unemployment, symbolic distance is created between the two groups. The moral element articulated in the debate, depicting material need assistance as unfair to hard-working men and women and, at the same time, exploited by the recipients who are aware of its convenience, creates the image of an undeserving material need claimant. One particular group within or beyond the long-term unemployed is parents. By ‘within or beyond’ I mean that, in particular, parents are, for instance, intensively discussed in the two strategic documents I analysed. On one side, among the unemployed, we can find parents too. At the same time, however, parents are especially highlighted in these documents; they are presented as irresponsible if their children do not attend school and as embodying negative examples for their children. Further, they should be held responsible for their children’s aberrances. Thus,  KDH, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?page=60 In the following analytical chapters, I illustrate my interpretations with speakers’ direct quotes. In some, I italicise certain words or passages. These emphases are my own and I use them when I want to highlight the words they use and to make my interpretations clearer. 2

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policy-­makers, including members of the ATCS, put under moral scrutiny parents who are material need claimants. According to parliamentary members and mayors, parents are considered responsible not only for their children’s education but also for their criminal activity. Through words such as ‘irresponsible’, if they do not meet the above-mentioned criteria, and if ‘beneficiary’ and ‘crime’ are used together in one sentence, parents are depicted as not deserving assistance in case they or their children do not behave as required. Furthermore, policy-makers are not far from criminalising parents when they stress the call for punishment for parents who do not behave as required or when their children commit crimes or drop out school. In this context, children thus become an object of discussion within themes such as scholarships and crime, as already mentioned above. According to policy-makers, talented children, capable children from disadvantaged environments and children in a bad social position, should be awarded with some form of motivational scholarship. The boundary between deserving and undeserving pupils is clearly drawn in the discussion. According to one MP (SDKÚ-DS), scholarships awarded for grades have become part of the family income thanks to the system ‘deformation’ under the first government of then-Prime Minister Robert Fico. In his opinion, because the scholarships for good grades were granted to every child, it disadvantaged ‘normal kids’ from ‘normal schools’, where it is more difficult to get good grades. This is a reference to the so-called special schools in which children with mental, physical, or sensory disadvantages are placed. Let’s dwell for a while on the dichotomy of ‘normal’ versus ‘not-­ normal’ schools, practical or ‘special’ schools. In many European countries, Romani children are overrepresented in special schools; for instance, in Slovakia, around 60 percent of pupils in special elementary and secondary education are of Romani origin (ERRC 2012). According to a report from the Fundamental Rights Agency (2014), the overrepresentation of Romani pupils in special education in post-communist countries is in many cases unjustified and thus leads to discrimination based on ethnicity. Because of reduced and modified curricula, these pupils have lower chances to obtain higher education. The MP sees the situation as disadvantageous for children in ‘normal’ schools. According to him, there was ‘pressure from parents to send kids from regular to special schools because the criteria in special schools are significantly lower than in ordinary schools, and

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so, better grades are received much more easily, which was sick’.3 And even though he claims these pupils belong in regular schools and not ­special schools, at the same time, he argues against scholarships for everyone and against rewards based on a family’s (poor) socio-economic situation because it disadvantages others. A division based on merit, deservingness and undeservingness is present in this logic. From the perspective of Van Leeuwen’s taxonomies (2008), legitimation shifts slightly away from simple moral evaluation and judgement based on cultural and moral values. And it is not only an authorisation legitimation strategy, even though the legitimation is determined institutionally and through legislation. Here, we need another legitimation strategy, merging these two together and adding a more expressive variation of the negative other-representation strategy (as presented, for example, by Van Dijk 2008). This kind of legitimation provides policy-makers with a very strong and dangerous tool for control and regulation of the population. Such discourse shifts the perception of material need recipients to a space in which the causes of socially and structurally created disadvantages are omitted and those who face inequalities and disadvantages are framed as criminals. Therefore, from the critical security studies perspective, criminalisation comes hand in hand with securitisation. Producing this character of the ‘dangerous’ beneficiary not only creates a boundary between beneficiaries and people in regular employment, but also provides an impetus for restrictive extraordinary measures such as workfare. Public opinion is a good mirror for political and media discourses. And even though it is not the purpose of this book, it is important to note that representations migrate and reproduce through political, media, and public discourses. Moreover, when it comes to political discourse and policy-­ making, we must keep in mind that often these discourses do not stay solely at the level of a mental representation locked somewhere in our minds, but they are translated into particular behaviours and actual policies having a direct impact on actual people. The Ethnicity-Crime Link As I have pointed out in the previous section, it is often ethnic, racial, sexual, or other minorities who become the focal point of boundary work. 3  SDKÚ-DS, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?MeetingDat e=24102013&DisplayChairman=false

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In the parliamentary debates I analysed, another significant example of the connections among categories resonates—the direct collocation of Roma-­ marginalisation-­disadvantage. In Slovak political and media discourses, the terms ‘marginalised communities’ or ‘socially disadvantaged communities’ have become (in)direct representations of Roma. When marginalisation or social disadvantage is mentioned, it is automatically associated with Romani communities. The representation has even been institutionalised, becoming one of the horizontal priorities within the EU structural funds dedicated to ‘marginalised Roma communities’. And so, there has already been a ground prepared for the discussed mental link. The category of an ‘unadaptable’ person is significant in Slovak political discourse. As in the case of ‘marginalised communities’, if a citizen is characterised as ‘unadaptable’, in the Slovak context, it collocates with people of Romani origin, supporting thus the link between ‘unadaptability’ and ethnicity. For instance, the set of proposals by the ATCS analysed for this study repeatedly links the category of an unadaptable inhabitant to the category of marginalised Romani communities, and to criminals and offenders. Also, in the parliamentary debates, the category of unadaptable person is directly connected to the category of marginalised Romani communities, and these are explicitly associated with extremism, social pathology, and a critical problem.4 Among legitimation strategies, negative other-representation (Van Dijk 1993a, b, 2008) is the one applied the most. The associated word problem is used either by members of the proposing coalition or by the reacting opposition. The Minister proposes the Act to address the problem and the opposition members agree. As the former vice president of the SDKÚ-DS party states in the first reading, The Material Need Assistance Act is not rightest or leftist; you are right, Mr. Minister. The fact that the SDKÚ-DS was repeatedly, at each meeting, proposing solutions in the Parliament, solutions which resolve the problem of marginalised groups, of people who are long-term unemployed, low quali-

4  Neither in the debate transcripts nor in the strategic documents is the term ‘unadaptable’ in quotation marks. Therefore, when I refer to exact wording from the analysed texts, I do not use quotation marks, as I do when I provide explanations or interpretations. In the latter, I use quotation marks to highlight the fact that I refer to the word ‘unadaptable’ as a constructed and problematic social representation creating social and symbolic boundaries.

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fied, in poorer regions where the level of unemployment is high, shows that the problem bothers us in the same way as it bothers you.5

Among the different categories and images policy-makers choose to describe material need recipients in Slovakia, images of illegality, criminality, and the category of an offender are the most salient. Directly or indirectly, material need beneficiaries are interlinked with law-breaking, pathologies, or even extremism. Construction of the beneficiary persona is thus fulfilled almost entirely in very negative terms, creating the ground for reproduction of these negative representations. In his opening speech, the Minister states: ‘To a large extent, “offenders” are often persons from socially disadvantaged environments, whose income is social insurance assistance, material need assistance, allowances to material need allowance and parental allowance.’ By merging material need recipients and other allowance recipients with crime, he, as a political authority, sends an essential message to the audience. At the same time, poverty and socio-economic disadvantage are directly linked to criminal activities and offenses, clearly stating that these are the people involved in criminal activities. Crime implies sanctions or punishment, whatever the form is. And so, state authorities imply that material need recipients as criminal elements must be controlled and punished. This phenomenon is further mirrored and elaborated in the topic of the so-called delinquency immunity.6 In the materials I analysed, the generally accepted negative attitude towards the delinquency immunity is based upon the idea that material need recipients can commit certain sorts of crime and still get their benefits. This measure is viewed negatively because of the perception that it is impossible to punish the petty crimes of socially dependent people. One of the parliamentary members claims in the second reading: [The cancellation of the delinquency immunity] might solve one petty crime but as soon as there will be another one, there will not be any resources from which to remove [the fines]. So, we are right where we were. All other petty crimes will be non-punishable and the delinquent can commit them further  SDKÚ-DS, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?id=107402  The delinquency immunity means immunity from paying fines. It is regulated by law and can apply to politicians, judges, police officers, or other groups of people. In the context of material need, it applies to social assistance claimants who do not have the finances to cover fines for petty crimes. 5 6

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with impunity. And so, because he will be in a situation with even less resources than before, it means he will be in an even worse financial situation, and probably, he will commit even more crimes.7

This quote implies that the cancellation of the delinquency immunity is a dead end. Further, he claims that a good motive is not enough; many times, it leads us to hell. And so, the really good solution is not only to push these people into a corner—and you know how a person pushed into a corner without any other option behaves— but to simply use what is possible, use work as a punishment for reparation of damages or fines for the delinquency.8

The MP openly claims workfare should be a form of punishment for the crimes of beneficiaries. The threat of cutting assistance is the right pressure to exert on people, according to the MP. The restrictive measure pressures people’s willingness to rather perform small community services as a form of punishment than to do nothing. Thus, workfare becomes easily a tool of threat to material need recipients. Adam Kahane (2017: 21) explains the perceived purpose of the use of force: ‘The opportunity of forcing is that it accords with a way of thinking that for many people is natural and habitual. They believe that in most situations, forcing is the best—perhaps even the only realistic—way to effect change; that in principle it is right to use force for a just cause, and that not to do so would be wrong and cowardly.’ In the discourse I analysed, there is general agreement with workfare as a useful step in the development of welfare in Slovakia. This agreement is interwoven with ideas and suggestions which draw a thick line between non-beneficiaries and people who are in the material need assistance programme. More strikingly, the boundary is constructed around images of welfare recipients’ criminal activities and the threat they represent to the society. In the strategic document prepared by the ATCS, the association bringing together mayors and municipalities, we can find the reasoning for the claimed malfunctioning of law enforcement, stating that the loose attitude of the authorities towards clarifying criminal acts committed by ‘unadaptable’ offenders demoralises society and supports the emergence of social 7  SDKÚ-DS, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?MeetingDat e=24102013&DisplayChairman=false 8  Ibid.

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pathologies. In the section ‘Law, criminal law, and law enforcement’, the document states: The absent investigation or the lax approach of competent authorities to clarifying crimes perpetrated by unadaptable offenders demoralises society. This encourages the development of social pathology in some areas. The right to a safe environment and public order, or enforceability of law, is becoming a theoretical concept in some municipalities.

Further in the document, the mayors agree with workfare as a form of punishment for recipients and they also suggest alternative sanctions in case the person refuses to do the mandatory work. We cannot overlook the intertextuality, or the potential mutual references between different political actors. Inter-discursivity relates different articulations of categories and relationships within and among different texts, speeches, or practices. There are relations between different discourses and their constitutive elements. Further, the same argument may be used by different actors and social groups, we can hear them within different geographical spaces, and we can hear them repeated and diffused in different contexts (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). In this particular study, the mayors’ strategic document, The Right Way (Roma Reform) and the parliamentary debates are related. To a large extent, they articulate and try to address similar problems, such as the necessary conditionality for social assistance, the call for the cancellation of the delinquency immunity or the request to punish parents for their children’s misbehaviour. They also share elements, referring mainly to the content itself and to the actors’ argumentation. For instance, immorality and pathologies are denominated as problematic and are also used as justification for restrictive measures. Moreover, to a significant extent, they cover the so-called Roma problem, linking the above-mentioned calls and requests to ethnicity. The ethnic dimension is an important bridge uniting all texts. Intertextuality is essential at least for one reason—the symbolic and practical power of the meanings policy-makers communicate. A wider network of the Act’s proponents from different influential spheres provides the public a certain message about the problem addressed, conveying the gravity of the issue, and leading to easier public acceptance of the measure.

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Accepted Shared Representations of the ‘Unadaptable’ and the Marginalised I would like to make a quick contextual stop and talk about the particular categories used to describe material need beneficiaries—‘unadaptable’ citizens or inhabitants of ‘marginalised communities’. Both are essential to mention for several reasons. First, they have already been established in the wider Slovak discourse and thus, they have both become accepted shared mental representations. Second, they serve to connote racial or ethnic divides in the society. In Central Europe, they create the ‘us’ and ‘them’ boundary along racial or ethnic lines as they are representations usually associated with Roma. Third, understanding the use of these categories helps to better see the wider picture I discuss in the chapter on boundary work. Metaphorically speaking, representations of ‘unadaptable’ (citizens or Roma) and ‘marginalised (Romani) communities’ have already been cultivated by power holders for some time. They have become part of the political marketing in all sorts of elections and campaigns. And so, they have become an important component in the political discursive crossbreeding process as they are produced and reproduced in different political and public events, usually before local, regional, or national elections. ‘Unadaptable’ inhabitants, families, or persons is the term primarily used in the strategic document prepared by the mayors’ association. Nowhere in the document is it specified who belongs in this category. The authors do not define these ‘unadaptable inhabitants’ and what they should adapt to. Further, in the ATCS document, this category is directly linked to illegal and criminal activities when the authors claim it is the ‘unadaptable inhabitants’ who engage in crime the most. But again, it is still not exactly specified who belongs within this black box of citizens. I find it important to stress that beneficiaries are interlinked with negative themes such as extremism, pathological behaviour, and crime, and thus, are subjected to the security threats associated with the negatively perceived phenomena of extremism and social pathology. Finally, in the document, ‘unadaptability’ is also directly linked to marginalised Romani communities and this category further directly connected with term ‘the most serious problem’, creating thus a mental link between an ethnic group, unadaptability. and a problem nominated as the most serious. Policy-makers tend to elaborate their thoughts on ‘problems’, often including an ethnic dimension. In the context of general agreement with

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the policy and legislation proposal, one MP (OĽ ANO) states that ‘the proposal will help all socially dependent people in Slovakia, including the inhabitants of poor Romani communities, and the whole society in our country will feel changes’.9 The ATCS strategic document repeatedly mentions the so-called MRK term (MRK stands for marginalizované rómske komunity/marginalised Roma communities). It is a generally, politically, medially, and publicly accepted acronym used to denominate members of the Romani minority and, as I have already mentioned, it has also been institutionally anchored in political and economic structures. Moreover, as Kusá (2018: 52) points out, ‘[t]he fantastic term unadaptable is already becoming also an established administrative term. At the City Hall they have a department of family and unadaptable citizens.’10 These negative categories and images are repeatedly interlinked with the Romani ethnic minority, which is problematic because it creates a mental bridge for the public on how to think about the country’s minority members. Do you remember the very beginning of this chapter, which speaks about categorisation? In this process, an ethnic minority takes on particular attributes according to which we further sort things out in our minds. Based on these characteristics we hear or see in news reports, whether true or not, we sort the information out and make order out of our ideas about different groups. And so, it might happen that we put Roma together in one box with the adopted characteristics of ‘unadaptability’, crime and problem. As I have noted, mental representations serve as guiding lines in our understanding of the world. They help us understand and explain the events and people we encounter. Consequently, if we meet a person that we evaluate might be Romani, our behaviour would probably be influenced by characteristics we have attributed to them in our mental box. Other categories—disabled people, elderly people, and caregivers—the policy-makers bring into the discussion represent only a small proportion of those I identified in the debates and strategic documents. These categories are mentioned mainly in context of exceptions to the workfare measure. Policy-makers identify these groups as people who should not to be obliged to work for the material need benefit.

9

 OĽ ANO, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111846  Poprad is a Slovak city in the Eastern part of the country.

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The Story of a Cancer This [social assistance as income] is not normal, it is not rational, it deforms the entire system, it deforms the behaviour of the society, of bigger groups of inhabitants, it generates poverty, it produces motives for an increase in poverty either in the sense of numbers or the habit to live this way of life [on social assistance]. And society should do everything in order to leave this system, to stop supporting this way of life, because such a lifestyle is a cancer on the society that will overgrow it, step by step, and in the end, it will kill it [society] because it won’t be possible to finance and negative phenomena connected to such a way of life will overgrow the bearable degree and will become unbearable.11

The most complex idea concerning beneficiaries’ lives was proposed by one of the opposition MPs (SDKÚ-DS), the former Minister of Labour, Social Affairs, and the Family.12 During the entire period of the debates, he repeatedly presented the idea of material need claimants rationally choosing benefits over being employed. Even though he did not present any supporting evidence for this claim, according to him, a preference for obtaining income from benefits over regular employment is a serious problem ‘deforming’ the entire society. In his view, such a functioning social system is a ‘cancer’ on the society. Let’s step back and look at how he constructs such a dramatic picture. During this constructive and argumentative process, he builds upon the dichotomy between the attractiveness of employment versus the attractiveness of the social system. The general idea of the employment-welfare binary is used as a basic motif in his argumentation as a legitimation tool. In a critique of the current government, he creates the image of a problematic system which opens doors to people who are wise and rational. These people, beneficiaries, have realised that the social system is more advantageous and convenient compared to regular employment; therefore, it is more attractive. The MP argues that it is a known fact that social benefits and allowances give altogether a similar amount, if not higher, than the average income from regular employment. In his speech, if the amount of benefits is comparable to the income from employment, people, as rationally thinking beings, choose the income from the social  SDKÚ-DS, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?id=107419  He was the minister between 2002 and 2005. From 2010 to 2015, he was the Parliamentary Member for the Christian-democratic political party SDKÚ-DS. 11 12

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system. The rationality of people and of their decision-making is used as an image supporting the key argument. He concludes his argument with the words: ‘And it is not normal. It is not good.’ He creates an image of normality in which he tries to frame what is and what is not normal. According to him, normality is connected to income from regular work. He links normality to an idea of a ‘social contract’, based on which, society has agreed on the general rule of income from work. Thus, having an income based on a job is declared as normal. Therefore, on the opposite side, the MP positions beneficiaries, mainly those perceived as voluntarily choosing this ‘benefit living strategy’ as those who deviate from the norm. He argues that ‘in a normal society, it has been, and must be, the rule that one’s livelihood must be provided through honest work’. In this logic, he considers employment more convenient and more advantageous than social benefits. As mentioned before, rational thinking is an integral part of this picture, in which recipients choose to stay on welfare voluntarily. The idea of this voluntary choice is, however, shifted further and linked to the idea of rational speculation about social support or employment. According to the MP, ‘[e]veryone understands money’. Accordingly, in such a system, in which welfare pays off more than employment, he gives space to speculators who through rational thinking can easily abuse the welfare system. In conclusion, such a strategy ‘deforms’ the entire welfare system, it ‘deforms’ the behaviour of the members of society, of its inhabitants, and it generates poverty. The MP compares such a rational life strategy to a ‘cancer’ on society ‘because it won’t be possible to finance and negative phenomena connected to such a way of life will overgrow the bearable degree and will become unbearable’. The picture of cancer implies a threat to society, to the normal way of life, the social contract, a threat to behaviour, to public finances. Implicitly, material need assistance becomes a security issue. An important parliamentary figure, a former minister of social affairs who introduced conditionality in the form of activation into the welfare system, interlinks material need recipients with pictures of threat. He describes the system and people within it as a ‘huge problem’, something that ‘destroys the social system’ and ‘destroys the situation in the country’, ‘produces pathological behaviour’ which ‘concerns a huge part of the society’. The MP proposes certain steps to solve the ‘huge social problem we grow here, that really exists here and which has been produced by the social system approved by MPs and which destroys the social system, the

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situation in this country and produces pathological behaviour in a huge part of society’. According to him, social provisions must be less attractive. In this context, the MP embeds the theme of beneficiary motivation into this constructive process. The support for recipient motivation is, however, framed in the form of sanctions and making the social system more inconvenient. Therefore, negative motivation prevails over the positive motivation to engage in employment. Portraying the welfare system and its recipients in a negative manner, as a ‘huge problem’, as speculators, rationally thinking system abusers, as a threat to society, assists policy-makers in the legitimation of restrictive measures. This scenario may be traced also in the negative presentation of a necessary increase in beneficiaries’ motivation in form of sanctioning them by making the system less advantageous, convenient, and attractive. This brief episode is an illustration of a more complex legitimation strategy, which in its principle operates through what Van Leeuwen (2008) labels in his taxonomy the strategy of authorisation and the strategy of moral evaluation. The constructive process involves reference to an authority, in this case, the authority of a social contract which, according to the MP, should be the leading principle for people when it comes to the source of their income. It is the form of a custom generally adopted and agreed upon by society’s members. Therefore, if violated, punishment is legitimate. In his speech, moral principles and the value system are presented as important in beneficiary behaviour, important in context of the system’s fairness. What I must add here, however, is the securitisation legitimation strategy. Van Leeuwen’s taxonomy (2008) is very helpful in political discourse analysis. It assists in identification of the main ways political representatives try to justify their ideas and proposals. It categorises the main characteristics of political strategies aiming at the legitimation of policies policy-­ makers pursue. The dimension of security and threat is, however, an important one in the Slovak political discourse on material need assistance. By the security dimension, I mean the articulation of a certain group, in this case, welfare recipients, in terms of a threat, with the aim to adopt restrictive legislative measures. For policy-makers, in order for a request for more sanctions and punitive policies to succeed, the audience, other parliamentary members and the public too, must accept such a picture and its urgency. Therefore, images of risk, problems, crime, and unfairness serve this purpose.

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At the end of this brief episode, I would like to discuss the above-­ described negative picture and its potential implications. In his speech, the MP does not provide a complex picture of material need recipients. Firstly, in his explanations and arguments, he does not take into consideration the structural aspects of employment and social support, such as employment conditions, levels of education or discrimination—ethnic, gender, or spatial. In such a portrayal, important aspects of structurally disadvantaged groups of people, due to their education, ethnicity, previous long-term unemployment, or missing opportunities or resources for hiring caregivers, are omitted entirely. The idea of benefits paying off more than regular work is not depicted in its complexity. For instance, as Gerbery (2015) and Mýtna Kureková et  al. (2013) argue, people working in activation systems with longer material need assistance histories are stigmatised and remain in low-skilled jobs; therefore, they have more difficulty in obtaining regular long-term employment. Secondly, the MP neither differentiates between different groups of beneficiaries (the disabled, the elderly, single mothers, single men, long-term unemployed, graduates etc.), nor does he take into consideration the variety of reasons different people happen to enter the welfare system. Except for those who ‘try enormously’, all beneficiaries are presented as ‘rationally thinking people who want to easily get money for no big effort and who will just wait for the benefit’. Third, he claims that it is a generally known fact that people understand money and thus rather choose welfare over employment. He does not provide any evidence supporting his claims. From what he says, it sounds like the majority if not all the material need beneficiaries stay on state assistance voluntarily. Nevertheless, he does not bring in any convincing data. * * * I hope I was able to trigger your interest in the puzzle I am assembling here. This chapter represents only a beginning, but it is a rather important one. Identifying categories in political discourse on material need assistance and workfare, reconstructing their meanings, and reflecting upon their impacts is essential in study of asymmetrical power distribution. To answer one of my research questions, political representatives at local and at national level construct the material need assistance picture through categories such as long-term unemployed, low-skilled, poor, marginalised groups, socially dependent, offenders, Roma, unadaptable, and persons from disadvantaged environments. These categories serve as basis for the

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metaphorical crossbreeding process, as features potentially useful to reach political aims. Through such pictures, they start their ‘marketing’ process, providing the public with particular hints of how to think about the material need assistance and its recipients. We usually think of policy-makers as professionals who are (or should be) experts in their fields. And thus, even without convincing evidence, we can adopt their ideas. Political elites are significant opinion-makers whom we, the public, tend to believe. Interlinking the abovementioned terms and attributes therefore assists to build a clearer picture of the presented reality so that customers—the public—are more likely to accept and give the product a ‘thumbs up’, not to mention that images such as problem, cancer, or something not normal signal an alert in our minds. Therefore, we might be more prone to listen to what these experts say. Nonetheless, links between socio-economic status, crime, and ethnicity create a mental bridge which suggests there are relations between these categories. For further legitimation of restrictive measures tied to material need in front of the public, this bridge provides the ground for the reproduction and acceptance of mental representations, which, in response, give a pass to such policies and which might have negative effects on inter-ethnic relations, relations between and among people with different socio-economic backgrounds, and consequently, on solidarity in society.

References van Dijk, A.T. 1993a. Denying Racism: Elite, Discourse and Racism. In Racism and Migration in Western Europe, ed. J.  Solomos and J.  Wrench, 179–193. Oxford: Berg. ———. 1993b. Analyzing Racism Through Discourse Analysis. Some Methodological Reflections. In Race and Ethnicity in Research Methods, ed. J. Stanfield, 92–134. London: Sage. ———. 2008. Discourse and Power. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. ERRC. 2012. Slovakia: A Report by the European Roma Rights Centre. Country Profile 2011–2012. Budapest: ERRC. FRA—European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2014. Education: The Situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States. Roma Survey—Data in Focus. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Gerbery, D. 2015. ESPN Thematic Report on Integrated Support for the Long-Term Unemployed: Slovak Republic 2015. Brussels: European Commission. Kahane, A. 2017. Collaborating with the Enemy: How to Work with People You Don’t Agree with, or Like or Trust. Oakland: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc.

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Kaliňák, R., P.  Pollák, and Saloň. 2013a. Správna cesta (Rómska reforma): Vzdelávanie (The Roma Reform (The Right Way): Education) [online] [cit. 27.6.2016]. http://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/mvsr/romsky_splnomocnenec/Romska_reforma_vzdelavanie.pdf. ̌ ———. 2013b. Správna cesta (Rómska reforma): Vymožitelnost ̌ práva (The Roma Reform (The Right Way): Law Enforcement) [online] [cit. 29.6.2016]. http://www.minv.sk/?pravo_rr. Kusá, Z. 2018. Za ostrou hranicou: Všetci zodpovedáme len sami za seba, a už takmer nevieme, c ̌o si poc ̌at ̌ so slovom ‘spoloc ̌nost ̌’. Krásno nad Kysucou: Absynt-Kalligram. Lamont, M., and N.  Duvoux. 2014. How Neo-Liberalism Has Transformed France’s Symbolic Boundaries? French Politics. Culture & Society 32 (2): 58–75. van Leeuwen, T. 2008. Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Practical Discourse Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Media Portal. National Council of the Slovak Republic. 2013a. The 23rd Hearing. [online] [cit. 6.3.2021]. https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?. ———. 2013b. The 25th Hearing. [online] [cit. 6.3.2021]. https://tv.nrsr.sk/ archiv/schodza/6/25?. Mýtna Kureková, L., A.  Salner, M.  Farenzenová. 2013. Implementation of Activation Works in Slovakia. [online]. Bratislava: Slovak Governance Institute [cit. 20.3.2016]. http://stary-­web.governance.sk/assets/files/publikacie/ ACTIVATION_WORKS_REPORT_SGI.pdf. Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska. 2012. Návrh opatrení sekcie sociálnych ̌ vecí Rady ZMOS na riešenie problematiky marginalizovaných skupín obyvatelov (The Council of the Association of Towns and Cities of Slovakia: The Proposal of Measures for Solving the Problematics of Marginalised Groups of Inhabitants). Žilina: ZMOS. Reisigl, M., and R.  Wodak, eds. 2009. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi a o zmene dopnení niektorých zákonov v znení zákona c ̌. 183/2014 Z.z. a zákona c ̌. 308/2014 Z.z. (Act on Assistance in Material No. 417/2013 Coll. and on Amendments of Act No. 183/2014 Coll. And Anct No. 308/2014 Coll.) [online] [cit. 10.10.2015]. http://www.ozinfodom.info/files/spaw/files/2013-­z417.pdf. Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi a o zmene dopnení niektorých zákonov v znení zákona c ̌. 599/2003 Z.z.. (Act on Assistance in Material No. 599/2003 Coll. and on Amendments) [online] [cit. 10.10.2015]. https://www.slov-­lex.sk/ pravne-­predpisy/SK/ZZ/2003/599/20070901.html.

CHAPTER 5

Topics Addressed in Parliamentary Debates

Identifying and scrutinising the categories policy-makers use when talking about material need beneficiaries and the importance of restrictive workfare policy is important, as it can uncover the meanings they associate with particular groups. These categories, however, hardly stand alone in the discourse. Different characteristics and themes are attached to them, providing more information for the analysis of the deeper meanings behind these mental representations. In this chapter, I present and discuss the topics policy-makers highlight as important in connection with the introduction of workfare into Slovak material need assistance, as well as the themes they associate with the categories I presented in the previous chapter. Looking behind these links fosters a deeper understanding of the relations between the proposed measure and the target groups influenced by it. As I was analysing my data, different themes related to workfare and material need claimants appeared in the parliamentary debates and strategic documents (Zákon o pomoci v hmotnejnúdzi 2003, 2014; Media Portal 2013a, b; Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska 2012; Kaliňák et al. 2013a, b). In general, I have organised these themes into two larger groups based on common features—(1) the content of the proposal(s) and (2) the proposals’ character. The content can be further sub-divided into topics aiming at or covering (1a) evaluation of the current welfare system, (1b) problems the proposed measures should tackle, (1c) proposed measures, and (1d) positive and negative aspects of proposed measures. To these overarching topics, the themes of crime, work versus social assistance, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kissová, Framing Welfare Recipients in Political Discourse, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63579-4_5

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and the just system are associated. Of course, they do not stand alone and are interconnected with several other partial, but still essential, topics such as motivation, punishment, deservingness, responsibility individualisation, and public well-being. The three primary themes (crime, work versus social assistance, and the just system) are the most repeated and discussed. We can find them throughout the data I analysed. More importantly, I consider them essential to explain how workfare serves elites in power to regulate and control people’s behaviour. I divide the chapter into three parts, in which I discuss how actors evaluate the current social assistance system, how they frame the dichotomy of employment versus material need assistance, and how they associate the redistribution mechanism with (un)fairness towards employed non-beneficiaries. Because I cover crime more thoroughly in a separate chapter, I focus on two of the three primary themes—work versus social assistance and the just system.

Evaluating the Social Assistance System Texts, the key source in my dataset, and the context in which they were born, define each other. For instance, ‘a session of parliament is precisely such only when elected politicians are debating (talking, arguing, etc.) in parliament buildings in an official capacity (as MPs), and during the official (officially opened) session of parliament’ (van Dijk 1997: 14). Parliamentary debates are a complex of series of acts connected in one larger process, in which ministerial bodies and local governments also play their parts. Lobbying and advisory groups, such as associations of local political bodies, affect policy-making processes. The texts they produce are indeed relevant for political discourse analysis. However, as van Dijk (ibid.: 18) highlights, parliamentary debate is highly important because it is ‘functional within the process of legislation, and a meeting of a group of dissidents part of the process of opposition or resistance’. When talking about parliamentary sessions, besides their settings and functionality, they have their defined order. Who opens a session and how, who speaks next, or how long MPs can react are all standardised processes. The legislative process in Slovakia starts after preparation of a legislative text which is annotated by the public and other ministries. Such proposition of an Act or amendment, taking into consideration these comments, continues with adding it to the hearing agenda in case the chair of the governmental legislative council agrees that all necessary conditions have been met. During the first reading, legislation is presented by the

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proponent and then discussed. The first reading focuses on the legislation’s’ basic idea. Afterwards, proponents include comments and re-elaborate the proposal; it is then presented at the second reading, in which MPs can suggest changes too. During the third reading, no more suggestions can be proposed. For the legislation’s adoption, a working majority of the present MPs must agree; a working majority of all members must be present at the session and a working majority of those present must agree. After adoption, the legislation is sent to the president to sign. He or she can refuse and send the proposed Act back to the parliament a maximum of two times. In his opening speech, the Minister of Labour, whose team had proposed the legislation for the session, summarises the aims of the Act amendment his cabinet proposes. He presents to the plenary the main ideas, the problems identified, and the measures he proposes in order to solve them. He does so at the beginning of the first as well as the second reading. Among the aims or solutions he presents there are: (a) a change to legal relations in material need assistance and other provisions, (b) an increase in personal activity for dealing with one’s own material need, (c) an increase in motivation to gain the skills needed for employment, and (d) a decrease in the risk of poverty. In his opening, the Minister is very impersonal and formal, he uses the passive voice, he calls beneficiaries ‘natural persons’ perhaps due to the fact he reads excerpts directly from the proposed legislation text. This, however, changes during the discussion and the Minister, together with the MPs, gives these ‘natural persons’ different names and different categorisations, as already presented in the previous chapter. As I outlined at the beginning of this section, the evaluation of the current welfare system is one of significant themes brought up in both the parliamentary readings and the mayors’ strategic document. First, the ATCS proposal is basically a reaction to problems practitioners in regions identify. One of the main problems associated with social assistance, according to the document, is the issue of the system’s (mal)functioning. The critique is directed mainly towards the government and state bodies dealing with crime, unlawful acts, and sanction enforcement. Among others, these bodies have ‘a loose attitude toward solving crimes committed by unadaptable citizens’, for instance, in cases of usury, sexual abuse, or moral threat to youth; these bodies do not react to ‘chronic unlawful activity’, including the activity of material need recipients; and the

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enforcement of sanctions is viewed as inefficient.1 The authors of the ATCS proposal argue that all these problems consequently destabilise the legal state, lead to social pathologies and the violation of public order, creating an unsafe environment. The MPs in the parliament identify very similar topics connected to the ‘malfunctioning’ system. According to one MP, the current social system must be adjusted because it has ‘taught many people to resign and be inactive’.2 He is referencing the supposedly negative effect of material need assistance universally provided to people without taking into consideration their responsibility and attitude. Thus, according to him, it is the social support system and the unconditional guarantee of a particular amount of money leading to a person’s inactivity and resignation. Another of the MPs (SDKÚ-DS) summarises the main elements of the ‘malfunctioning’ current system, formulating thus a representative synopsis of the main critical points. According to him, a well-functioning system and the solution to problems with marginalised groups should operate on three pillars: laws must apply to all people equally; work must pay better than social provisions; and there must be work for low-qualified people. Without even knowing it, he sketches precisely the cluster of main topics I identified and analysed in the texts—crime, work versus social assistance and the just system. They relate to evaluation of the social assistance system, associated problems, and potential solutions.

‘There Are No Cakes Without Work’ This proverb represents the most distinct aspect of the political discussions on work. As I already presented in Chap. 4, material need assistance is viewed as too convenient and thus it discourages people from looking for regular employment. Beneficiaries are presented as rationally thinking beings who speculate about the convenience of social assistance versus employment. I want to underline that work in sense of employment on the one hand, and activation or participation in community services on the other, are often used interchangeably. One explanation might be that the term práca in the Slovak language means work and employment at the same time. There is also a specific term for employment which is 1  All quotes in this section where I refer to the texts, are direct quotes from the documents and transcripts. 2  OĽ ANO, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111846.

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zamestnanie. However, in spoken language, these are often not differentiated. Nevertheless, in the debates, activation and small community services, which are supposed to be the condition for material need assistance, are in many cases used interchangeably with work in terms of employment. Even though activation is not regular employment, policy-makers see it as the first step towards regaining work habits. According to them, it is an important condition for regular employment in case of the long-­ term unemployed. On the other hand, such ideas might be interpreted also as a distorted approach to the role of activation or participation in small community services. More specifically, even though these are only measures aiming at an increase in motivation and skills, activation tends to become a long-­ term ‘job’ for many people. As Szőke (2015) argues, activation and workfare measures produce structures that prevent low-skilled and low-educated participants from getting permanent employment, creating a reserve of cheap labour and reproducing social exclusion and stigma that are in their essence problematic. Thus, policy-makers require activity and stress importance of employment while ignoring the obstacles long-term unemployed face. And often, these obstacles are created structurally within an unequal society, and sometimes precisely by policies such as workfare. Among other topics connected to work, the practical aspects of the workfare measure are discussed in a very lively fashion in both readings. As proposed, mayors and labour offices would offer participation in small community services or in the form of voluntary activities in the amount of 32 hours monthly per each material need claimant. The problem policy-­ makers identify is the lack of positions and activities recipients could be involved in. Notwithstanding other reasons, in this context, they argue that the measure will not function without providing enough activities for material need recipients. Different MPs offer very similar suggestions for employment—the involvement of state enterprises such as Forests of Slovakia or Water Management Construction, or assistance to firefighters during events such as flooding.3 One MP (KDH) proposes that people could ‘work’ in the areas of rivers, forestry, cutting grass at cemeteries, or

3  One MP argues that ‘we need options to employ these people [material need claimants] also elsewhere than in towns and in cities’ (KDH, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/ archiv/schodza/6/23?id=107333). Again, employment is interchangeable with activation or small community services.

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drainage channels. According to him, they are areas ‘where these people would have chance to work off their social benefits, activation allowance’. What is striking is that all these activities the Minister and parliamentary members propose, including street cleaning, would provide only activities not requiring any special higher skills. Therefore, as Gerbery (2015) argues, activation may not lead to skills improvement (as several MPs claim) and instead may easily deepen the inactivity trap. The theme of the practical realisation of workfare is rather an important one but it does not tackle the structural problems of long-term unemployment. Proposed solutions such as workfare seem to either ignore key research findings or purposefully contain constructive crossbreeding of elements such as the good intentions of politicians to help the long-term unemployed, criminal and speculative claimants, individual responsibility for a recipient’s own life, an obligation towards society and (un)fairness towards hard-working employed individuals, in order to legitimate the act as part of the wider political ideological game. Policy-makers do not reflect the social scientific critique that the goal of work habit preservation or improvement (Mýtna Kureková et  al. 2013; Gerbery 2015), as presented already by the Minister in his opening speech, as well as the goal of an increase in employability (Szőke 2015), are not ensured through activation or workfare. So, even though these goals may seem like the systemic consideration of structural causes of unemployment among welfare recipients, essential scientific evidence is ignored entirely and parliamentary members do not actually address such problems at all. On the contrary, by adopting the regulative and sanctioning measures discussed in the Parliament, the problems emphasised by scholars and practitioners may deepen even further. Because material need recipients are often seen as lacking the motivation and willingness to contribute to society’s well-being, the proposed measures should lead to an increase in motivation as well as to individuals’ own contribution to solving their own poor socio-economic situation. As the Minister (SMER-SD) states: For the purpose of a citizen’s own contribution to solving [his/her] material need, the proposal states the conditions for the active participation of adult citizens capable of work, while the amount of material need provision will be

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dependent also on the citizen’s activity in small community services or in form of voluntary activities.4

Motivation is a big issue in the debates. I identify it as an element attached to the theme of work that I discuss here. Motivation as these political actors talk about it, however, is not framed in a positive light. Their representations are not based upon the idea that material need claimants would have structural and personal support in search of permanent employment. Instead, motivation is connected to deservingness and to restrictions. The (un)deservingness is mostly tied to working people who live in poverty, the disabled, the elderly, or people who put much effort into job searching. Moreover, according to one MP (KDH), the main aim should be to motivate people who have been dependent on material need provision for years to accept also a low-paid job. At this point, the boundary of (un)deservingness is drawn, again, around the willingness to work. However, the aspect of one’s own contribution is hidden in this boundary construction, supporting thus what the Minister presents in the quote above. He (MP KDH) says: So, in this legislation there are finally things which can help at least those who want to work, because I am aware that there are many of those, just dependent on help of the others, who, however, themselves do not want to contribute in making their own situation better, so for them, these measures will not work.5

The MP differentiates between people who want to work and those who voluntarily do not want to ‘make their own situation better’. Again, structural disadvantages or obstacles for claimants on the labour market are not taken into consideration and claimants are rather victimised as inactive and thus to be blamed for their own unpleasant situation; their unemployment is rather tied to their inactivity, unwillingness, and rational choice, and thus, it is individualised. Activation for citizens in material need is framed as a legitimate goal. The Minister explains: ‘So, what is it for; what is motivation based on? First of all, we want to motivate those who work 32 hours for the basic provision and who prove that they can work and are interested in 4 5

 SMER-SD, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?id=107315.  KDH, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=112315.

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working.’ From this statement, we can abduct that the government needs some sort of ‘proof’ in order to provide social assistance. The government needs to see work in exchange for the metaphorical cake. So, besides hard work, motivation adds to the picture of the deservingness boundary. Only if the claimant works thirty-two hours is the real interest and legitimacy proven, therefore allowing for assistance. This condition is based on their ability (‘they can’) and commitment (‘are interested’) to work. There is one moment when the term ‘forced labour’ is directly used by one of the presenters, this time by the Minister himself. In the second reading, he first warns that fines for recipients’ criminal activity cannot be paid through material need assistance without their consent. He does not disagree with such proposed measure (cancellation of the so-called delinquency immunity), he just remarks upon this potential problem. Second, he warns against the involvement of businesses. According to him, if the activity was performed for a for-profit entity, it would violate the International Labour Organization (ILO) agreements on forced labour as this person would not be paid by this entity but by the state. Forced labour in the context of human rights is not a consideration, only worries about the ILO regulations. The Minister denies the critique by disclaiming: I would be the last one willing to punish the poor for their poverty. But I repeat again, there is a demand in society and my interest is to face this directly with no regard to preferences, how beneficial or negative it will be. Simply, it solves the problem.6

The discursive tools of a disclaimer (‘I would be the last one willing to’ … ‘but there is a demand’) and positive self-representation in form of (self-)defence are clearly evident in this statement (he does it for society’s and his best interest). He presents himself as unwilling to punish the poor. However, immediately after, he gives a reason for why this seems to be inevitable. Political elites usually do not want to be seen in a negative light, in this case, as someone who would punish impoverished people. However, the Minister wants to communicate something negative—a problem and its unpleasant solution. He defends his proposal and the restrictive measure(s) with the ‘demand in society’. In his defence, he is only reacting to this demand and wants to face the problem directly, repeating several times that he is just reacting to a social demand. He even concludes with 6

 SMER-SD, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=112296.

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a repetition of the statement. According to van Dijk (1993), these strategies (1) play an essential role in constructing and legitimating supremacy of the in-group; (2) function culturally as they contrast values of different groups, legitimating thus dominance, and forms and practices of social inequality; (3) diminish the responsibility of elites; and (4) are used mainly in the denial of discrimination. Public demand and public well-being are the shadow themes running through the entire analysed material. They have two significant functions. First, they serve as strong legitimating tools when it comes to public policies. Public demand legitimates policies presented by policy-makers as actors representing the vox populi. Demand for particular solutions among society’s members provides political representatives with a powerful arm in negotiations as it implies a willingness to address what people see as problematic. Second, they contain a moral claim aiming at welfare recipients who cannot expect assistance without any counter-service. The activities requested from claimants will be ‘activities for public wellness’ (Minister, SMER-SD). This moral claim is one of the discursive legitimation strategies justifying the proposed measures.

‘Heads Must Roll’ New York Times op-ed columnist Maureen Dowd (2008) criticises the ‘greedy financial aristocracy’ in the United States. She refers to the massive corporation fraud and to voices requesting these ‘junketeers’ pay back the funds in order not to jeopardise taxpayers’ money. She ends her column with the words, ‘Heads must roll’, referring to a certain sense of fairness towards the taxpayers whose finances have been plundered thanks to these corporations. The metaphor caught my attention as it describes what the actors in my study communicate to their audience when it comes to material need recipients. However, in my study, it is these claimants who seem to be Dowd’s greedy characters in the story. People have some sort of a fairness ‘warning light’ when their contribution is at stake. In the parliamentary debates, political representatives assume the role of the guardians of this fairness. For different reasons, in different ways, and with different outcomes, they try to point at imbalances. However, this negotiation of fairness inherently includes boundary-­ making processes, which might involve defining the stakeholders in these processes (contributors, recipients), the conditions for both, and the consequences for violation of this justice. It often builds upon moral

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evaluation as well. As Lamont and Fournier (1992) state, moral boundaries are essential in meaning-making. Such boundaries are based on ethics, honesty, personal integrity, and general consideration for other beings, even though the perception of these factors might be subjective to a significant extent. One MP states: ‘I am convinced that a socially dependent person committing petty crimes cannot get the same social assistance as person who did not commit petty crimes.’7 The speaker evaluates claimants’ behaviour through a moral framework built upon the binary of ‘wellbehaving’ versus ‘misbehaving’ individuals. Fairness and moral claims are important elements of political justification as they evoke essential emotional reactions. In their article, Lamont and Duvoux (2014) argue that moral language is often used to mark boundaries between various groups. Political actors endow these groups with different characteristics and categories, as I have already made clear. Through this systematic boundary work process, differences are constructed. Some of these groups are pictured as immoral and failing in being solidary (Lamont and Duvoux 2014). However, such boundaries do not linger only in the form of ideas and images. Importantly, when we are speaking about the arena of the parliament, they assume practical implications. They are translated into binding rules, policies, and legislation. What is even more important is that these categories, differences, and boundaries are part of exclusion processes and inequalities, structuring interactions between different people and groups (Lamont and Fournier 1992; Sklenářová 2012). Moreover, symbolic and social boundaries resulting in social exclusion, segregation, discrimination, and marginalisation often touch people with lower socio-economic statuses (Lamont and Molnár 2002; Lamont and Fournier 1992), consequently deepening inequalities even further. Restrictive political or austerity measures are a good example of how political actors try to win public acceptance by appealing to negative emotions. According to Autto and Törrönen (2019: 91), the ‘political discourse of austerity links emotions to collective and national obligations to feel or not to feel in a certain way about the measures proposed’. Through discourses, political actors suggest how to feel about the measures to be adopted. They have the power to say who is good and who is to blame, whether to feel angry or accepting. They also call upon morality, using arguments to justify restrictions as part of responsible policy. Moral 7

 OĽ ANO, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111846.

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arguments appeal also to ‘collective solidarity by emphasising austerity as a joint effort along the lines of “we are in this together”’ (ibid.: 80). In this Central European story, the construction of collective solidarity is rather illusive; it is not universal. Speakers create deserving and undeserving groups of citizens, pointing out whom to blame for austerity measures and who must be punished. Collective solidarity is thus ‘collective’ only with regard to certain members of society. Austerity measures are not presented as part of a joint effort for a better future. Cuts in material need are addressed as a pragmatic necessity, the only possible helper (Autto and Törrönen 2019), rather than a means for reaching the collective objective of saving the country or its citizens from financial troubles. As I show later in the text, it is a way to deal with ‘welfare crime’ and to assure fairness towards deserving citizens. In my story, or more accurately, in the political actors’ story, the heads which must roll belong to the people they present as abusing the system, who commit fraud related to welfare, and children and parents who do not take responsibility over their (or their children’s) behaviour and education. They draw a boundary between people who deserve and those who do not deserve help from the state and from society as a result of this perceived fairness imbalance. The most salient lines are demarcated between people who ‘try enormously’ and ‘speculators’, between responsible and irresponsible people, between motivated and passive claimants. In all cases, boundaries are constructed around the topics of laziness, loose attitudes, dependency, and speculation, leading to pictures in which social support recipients rationally choose the strategy of claiming material need and other allowances while not trying to find a regular job. As one of the MPs states, I’m convinced that we can’t give money for free to anyone; nothing can be granted for free in this country. It harms, of course, not only the state itself but it harms also the socially dependent person who is dependent on the provision in material need. If we teach him to be lazy and inactive, of course, after a while, it might result in the resignation of this person to search for a job.8

Standing in opposition to these individuals are working people, especially working men and women with children, and formerly working 8

 OĽ ANO, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111846.

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people who ended up in a difficult financial situation through no fault of their own. These latter groups are identified as decent, deserving of assistance and even higher wages. Thus, the themes around which the line of (un)deservingness is drawn in this case, added to hard work and motivation, are the (un)willingness to work and the source of the difficult financial situation. I must repeat that structural causes of poverty and inequalities are only minimally presented in the debates and the documents. Even though, as I have mentioned above, criticism of the currently (mal)functioning welfare system is one of the leading themes discussed, the critique implicitly refers mainly to cracks letting beneficiaries go unpunished for their nefarious activities. Therefore, the source of the difficult financial and social situation is individualised. Individuals, or families, are blamed for their own inactivity and, consequently, for their poor socio-economic situation. I dedicate a separate chapter to the individualisation of welfare; however, we are already assembling bits and pieces of neoliberal trends, including stress on self-­ responsibility, self-control, and individual efforts in one’s life-management. Family issues and the individualised responsibility of children and their parents represent another major theme discussed in the debates and at the same time connected to the overarching topic of (un)deservingness. In this case, boundaries are drawn around school attendance, grades, and responsibility for behaviour. According to policy-makers, there must be a different approach to children attending school regularly and having good grades, and those children who do the opposite. The same, however, applies to parents too. According to the ATCS document, the system is unfair to parents who care about their children; or as an MP states, ‘[The] social support from the state must be different for parents who send their child to school than for parents whose child does not go to school.’9 In short, political representatives demand responsibility for the unlawful conduct of children from their parents. The responsibility is directly linked to social assistance. What is problematic about such claims is, first, that they indirectly suggest that material need recipients do not care about their children. It is not stated directly, however. If you recall the process of construction of mental links, it becomes clear that such a linkage can easily be used as a short-cut to conclude that either assistance recipients are bad parents or their children are 9

 OĽ ANO, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111846.

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automatically bad learners. Second, this claimed responsibility does not have a positive connotation. On the contrary, it is linked to discipline. Discipline is explicitly mentioned in relation to the amount of social provision. Thus, the reward is conditioned by discipline and good behaviour. Again, as a sign of the neoliberal developments in the approach to society’s members, on the one hand, people are required to behave themselves and be responsible, but on the other, there are external tools and measures such as ‘education’ and ‘changing’ the behaviour of recipients through discipline and sanctions such as cutting or withdrawal of benefits. And so, the heads that must roll are not of corporations but of welfare recipients who must contribute to society’s well-being and reciprocate for what they get from society. The last topic I would like to discuss in the context of the ‘just system’ theme is the proposed cancellation of the so-called delinquency immunity. It should be already clear that crime plays an important role in the political construction of reality in the case of material need assistance. As I have already demonstrated, policy-makers link welfare recipients with criminal activities such as fraud, system abuse, shoplifting, and others. Categories like offender, delinquent, criminal, or speculator assist as foundation for legitimation strategies based upon the securitisation of material need beneficiaries. One of these related topics is penalties and sanctions. Policy-makers and ATCS members request more restrictive penalties for recipients who do not follow the rules and add to the injustice of the system. The delinquency immunity is presented as a privilege which keeps recipients from paying fines for their crimes and offenses. This particular proposed measure is evaluated positively among MPs in the discussion because they have identified this issue as a long-term problem. An MP, at that time, the Plenipotentiary for Romani Communities, simply wants every Slovak living in the country, everyone to be punished if they commit a crime. He states that the workfare measure helps people: Today, I stand here in front of you and I fully believe that this proposal will not hurt responsible Roma or responsible, socially dependent people in Slovakia, and it will show the irresponsible people in this country, including Roma, the way, the right way in their lives.10

 OĽ ANO, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111846.

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Responsibility for people’s lives and behaviour returns in form of this claim. Because responsibility is directly connected to social assistance through discipline, it is in the same way attached to crime through the lens of punishment. Among other topics related to crimes committed by welfare recipients, adjustment of behaviour, the obligation to participate in activation, community services or voluntary work, social system abuse, the convenience of welfare, and the protection of public order and fairness are the ones repeatedly emerging in the debates. * * * The topics political actors bring up in political discourse do matter. Usually, they do not stand alone but they are attached to other topics and different categories. They carry particular meanings and serve particular purposes which we must look at in the wider context of the discourse. In this chapter, I have continued assembling the puzzle of workfare, deservingness, and control over behaviour. After elaborating the context and the categories politicians utilise in material need assistance discourse, I have examined the topics they consider important in terms of the proposed legislation and its presented purpose. In general, the debates and the strategic documents focus on (1) the content of proposal(s), further covering topics such as (1a) evaluation of the current welfare system, (1b) the problems the proposed measures should tackle, (1c) proposed measures, (1d) the positive and negative aspects of the proposed measures; and (2) the proposals’ character. As the largest part of my dataset consists of transcripts of parliamentary sessions in which the important part of the legislative process occurs, these topics might not be surprising. However, these are accompanied by actors discussing and evaluating the current social assistance system, framing the identified problem as a dichotomy of employment and material need assistance, and associating the redistribution mechanism with (un)fairness towards employed non-beneficiaries and the rest of society. Interestingly, the primary themes of crime, work versus social assistance, and the just system, interlinked with other themes such as motivation, punishment, deservingness, responsibility individualisation, and public well-­ being already show the potential meanings behind the discourse and the measure itself. More importantly, I consider them essential to explain how workfare serves elites in power to regulate and control people’s behaviour. It is also why I focus on them in this chapter. I dedicate to the ‘crime’ issue

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one separate chapter as I find it essential to my study. The ‘just system’ theme is key too as it draws symbolic and social boundaries between different groups in society. It is tied more specifically to the issue of (solidarity) deservingness and undeservingness. According to the political actors, the ones who deserve social assistance are claimants who ‘try hard’, who are willing to be active, who are motivated to be active, and who take responsibility for their own lives and for lives of their families. Policy-makers see injustice also in the existence of the delinquency immunity for social assistance recipients as their benefits cannot be used to pay for criminal fines. Thus, they call for its cancellation and for punishment of recipients who do not follow the norms. Hence, justice, deservingness, and discipline are tightly interlinked in the political crossbreeding process. Coming back to the questions I ask in this study, depicting material need beneficiaries as offenders and speculators associated with topics such as justice to hard-working members of the society, call for punishment of people who are passive, unmotivated, and irresponsible—all for society’s and beneficiaries’ sake—bridges politically constructed images and their acts. The construction of these boundaries between material need recipients and the rest of society has a greater impact on the structural conditions for assistance claimants. They serve as a bedrock for the legitimation and adoption of policies. In crossbreeding, marketing is thus important too. Producers do not profit without good marketing and without selling their products. Here, the way they justify their claims, requests, and proposals has a decisive effect on whether the public and other actors, in the political farming metaphor, the customers, accept them or not. For this reason, in the next chapter I present and discuss the arguments, images, and stories present in the workfare measure construction process. I already presented bits and pieces of what single elements the political actors use for crossbreeding and now I present how they construct the whole story and how they justify workfare.

References Autto, J., and J. Törrönen. 2019. ‘Yes, But All Responsible Finns Want to Stop Living on Credit’: Feeling Rules in the Finnish Politics of Austerity. Citizenship Studies 23 (1): 78–95. van Dijk, A.T. 1993. Denying Racism: Elite, Discourse and Racism. In Racism and Migration in Western Europe, ed. J.  Solomos and J.  Wrench, 179–193. Oxford: Berg.

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———. 1997. What Is Political Discourse Analysis. In Political Linguistics, ed. J. Blommaert and Ch. Bulcaen, 11–52. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Dowd, M. 2008. After W., Le Deluge. The New  York Times [online] [cit. 20.8.2018]. www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/opinion/19dowd.html. Gerbery, D. 2015. ESPN Thematic Report on Integrated Support for the Long-Term Unemployed: Slovak Republic 2015. Brussels: European Commission. Kaliňák, R., P.  Pollák, and Saloň. 2013a. Správna cesta (Rómska reforma): Vzdelávanie (The Roma Reform (The Right Way): Education) [online] [cit. 27.6.2016]. http://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/mvsr/romsky_splnomocnenec/Romska_reforma_vzdelavanie.pdf. ̌ ———. 2013b. Správna cesta (Rómska reforma): Vymožitelnost ̌ práva (The Roma Reform (The Right Way): Law Enforcement) [online] [cit. 29.6.2016]. http://www.minv.sk/?pravo_rr. Lamont, M., and N.  Duvoux. 2014. How Neo-Liberalism Has Transformed France’s Symbolic Boundaries? French Politics. Culture & Society 32 (2): 58–75. Lamont, M., and M.  Fournier, eds. 1992. Cultivating Differences: Symbolic Boundaries and the Making of Inequality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lamont, M., and V. Molnár. 2002. The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences. Annual Review of Sociology 28: 167–195. van Leeuwen, T. 2008. Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Practical Discourse Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Media Portal. National Council of the Slovak Republic. 2013a. The 23rd Hearing [online] [cit. 6.3.2021]. https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?. ———. 2013b. The 25th Hearing [online] [cit. 6.3.2021]. https://tv.nrsr.sk/ archiv/schodza/6/25?. Mýtna Kureková, L., A.  Salner, and M.  Farenzenová 2013. Implementation of Activation Works in Slovakia. [online]. Bratislava: Slovak Governance Institute [cit. 20.3.2016]. http://stary-­web.governance.sk/assets/files/publikacie/ ACTIVATION_WORKS_REPORT_SGI.pdf. Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska. 2012. Návrh opatrení sekcie sociálnych vecí ̌ (The Rady ZMOS na riešenie problematiky marginalizovaných skupín obyvatelov Council of the Association of Towns and Cities of Slovakia: The Proposal of Measures for Solving the Problematics of Marginalised Groups of Inhabitants). Žilina: ZMOS. Sklenářová, J. 2012. Symbolické hranice mezi sociálními světy. Sociální studia 4: 27–44. Szőke, A. 2015. A ‘Road to Work’? The Reworking of Deservedness, Social Citizenship and Public Work Programmes in Rural Hungary. Citizenship Studies 19 (6–7): 734–750. Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi a o zmene dopnení niektorých zákonov v znení zákona č. 183/2014 Z.z. a zákona č. 308/2014 Z.z. (Act on Assistance in

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Material No. 417/2013 Coll. and on amendments of Act No. 183/2014 Coll. And Anct No. 308/2014 Coll.) [online] [cit. 10.10.2015]. http://www.ozinfodom.info/files/spaw/files/2013-­z417.pdf. Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi a o zmene dopnení niektorých zákonov v znení zákona č. 599/2003 Z.z.. (Act on Assistance in Material No. 599/2003 Coll. and on Amendments) [online] [cit. 10.10.2015]. https://www.slov-­lex.sk/ pravne-­predpisy/SK/ZZ/2003/599/20070901.html.

CHAPTER 6

Justification of Workfare: The Arguments Policy-makers Use

Van Dijk (1997: 21) states correctly, ‘Once spoken, [such] speech will be recorded, corrected, printed and possibly published or otherwise made public, and will count as the intervention and position of a member of parliament or of a party on the issue or topic at hand.’ This notion adds to the ‘marketing agenda’ of political farming. Once the theme is set and particular characteristics are associated with it, political producers must convince the audience about the accuracy and necessity of the product they offer. How they do it matters. In this chapter, I look how the political actors in my study justify workfare and its importance. I examine the arguments they use in this ‘marketing’ process and through what images they interlink categories, topics, and justifications for material need assistance conditioning. I find analysing arguments key for understanding the deeper meanings of political proposals and their underlying objectives. Arguments and supporting images are the final partial piece in the puzzle I am assembling about workfare in material need assistance discourse in Slovakia (Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi 2003, 2014; Media Portal 2013a, b; Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska 2012; Kaliňák et al. 2013a, b). Not all types of discourses necessarily have an argumentative objective. Even if they might not contain explicit elements of persuasion, they can encompass the intention to convince, or win over: ‘[S]peech that does not aim at persuasion still strives to influence, by shaping the way people see and think’ (Amossy 2014: 298). Political debates do not fall into this category; they are fundamentally argumentative (Fairclough and Fairclough © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kissová, Framing Welfare Recipients in Political Discourse, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63579-4_6

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2012). They stand somewhere in between two argumentative modes structuring persuasion—negotiation and polemics. In argumentation-­ based negotiation, actors with different perspectives try to come to a common solution to the problem. In the process, they try to reach a compromise. In the latter, polemical argumentative mode, ‘characterized by a violent confrontation of antagonistic theses: two agents, who totally disagree with one another, try to persuade either the opponent or a third party, by challenging the opposing thesis’ (Amossy 2014: 301). These modes are complementary, and they are both present in the content of my dataset. In the case of the debates I analysed, indeed, political argumentation stands halfway between the two. The debate occurs between the governmental coalition and the opposition, representing, by definition, the opposing voice to the ruling party. There are many moments in the discussions when single MPs do not agree with one another, when they apply negative other-representation or positive self-representation discursive strategies in order to discredit or to take down others’ perceptions. However, the main change proposed in the debates, workfare, meets with general agreement among the entire plenary, and so, the discussion is more about negotiating a compromise to establish such a measure rather than about antagonistic confrontation. It is often difficult to identify what is an argument and what is only a statement evaluating the state of some event, situation, or group. Following the definition that argumentation is ‘a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984: 53), here, I am identifying primarily the propositions with a clear aim to persuade, to increase or decrease the acceptability of workfare and the related legislative and practical proposals. However, analysing argumentation means also looking at how practical and emotion-­ oriented words, figures, and images (Amossy 2014; Fairclough and Fairclough 2012) are blended together in order to justify the proposed ideas. As Cox (2001 in Béland 2007) states, policy and legislation proponents in the political arena rely on strategies they choose very wisely in order to persuade others about the importance of the reform. In this case, the political process of the construction of a particular social reality includes the creation of a frame which potentially changes the collective understanding of the welfare state. Even though political representatives, whether national or local, do not consider the Act a reform per se and there is a general agreement with its main ideas and the workfare it introduces, there

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are still other actors to be convinced—non-governmental organisations, other state institutions, European institutions, and the public. I structure the chapter, the assemblage of arguments, according to the topics they cover. During the analysis of all the identified arguments, I started to see certain patterns in the themes actors argue for or against. Taking into consideration these patterns, I categorise the arguments thematically into three clusters. More particularly, in the following chapter, I discuss: (1) arguments tackling the (welfare) system in the context of recipient behaviour; (2) arguments related to fairness, responsibility, and crime; and (3) arguments related to workfare in theory and in practice.

‘A Crooked System Leads to Crooked Behaviour’ First, arguments related to topics about the material need assistance system, its functioning, and the impacts it has on people’s behaviour, decision-­ making, and life situation, are significant in the justification of the Act and the workfare it introduces. Throughout the previous chapters, I have reconstructed the main ideas parliamentary members connect to particular groups of people whom they identify as actors on the reception side. These perceptions, ideas, and pictures are translated into argumentative figures, through which the decision-makers present and try to persuade the rest of the MPs, and consequently also the media and the public, that there is something wrong with welfare recipients’ behaviour. I have already presented the constructed image of a dysfunctional material need redistribution system in Slovakia. Now, I would like to discuss what forms and content the political persuasion assumes in this regard. Based on my analysis of the data, political representatives claim the welfare system results in certain behaviour among its beneficiaries, influencing individual or group decision-making and the life strategies beneficiaries adopt. For example, one MP argues: I’m convinced that we cannot give money for free to anyone, nothing can be granted for free in this country. It harms, of course, not only the state itself but it harms also the socially dependent person who is dependent on the provision in material need. If we teach him to be lazy and inactive, of course, after a while it might result in resignation of this person to search for a job.1

1

 OĽ ANO, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111846.

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The argument is built almost entirely on images causing negative feelings or evoking unpleasant situations. The first part of the argument introduces the idea of not granting people in Slovakia anything for free. It implies two things—conditioning the assistance and a stress on individual involvement in self-sustainability. The middle part is concerned with effects of granting money for nothing in return. The verb to harm is used repeatedly, stressing the urgency of the implications. Granting social support ‘for free’ is perceived negatively as causing dependency on the system; it harms the state (in first position) and also socially dependent people (in second position). The final part of the argument elaborates the impacts of this form of generosity, referring to material need recipients. It is directly linked to beneficiary characteristics such as ‘laziness’ and ‘inactivity’, resulting in giving up on the search for regular employment. The claim might be, again, understood as a form of disclaimer. The MP to some extent admits responsibility (of government or politicians) for the recipient’s inactivity. He also admits it is harmful to the person. However, a restrictive proposition is on the other side of the disclaimer, forcing people to take part in community services in return for financial assistance. According to one MP, ‘the social system is crooked and leads to negative motivations and, as a consequence, to very pathological phenomena’; ‘if the amount of benefits is comparable to income from employment, people, as rationally thinking beings will choose income from the social system’.2 Another MP highlights the consequences of ‘inactivity’: ‘The current social system has taught many people to resign. It has taught them to be inactive. It would be enough to wait a month and at the given date go to the post office to take the benefit. The current welfare set up has caused also the fact, or the increase in tensions between working and socially dependent people.’3 Essentially, the critique of the ‘deformed’ social system is in its most significant part directly interlinked with recipient actions. Both arguments come from the speeches of opposition representatives—the former Minister of Labour, and at that time, the Plenipotentiary for Romani Communities. Both arguments reflect the topics discussed before—malfunctioning social redistribution, the existence of pathologies, and inactivity among material need recipients. Consequently, following such logic, the defective welfare system has an impact on people’s motivation, namely, on the motivation to work. This 2 3

 SDKÚ-DS, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111837.  Ibid.

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motivation, according to a number of political representatives, is missing, and one of the reasons is precisely the welfare system. According to one MP, the former Minister of Labour, ‘Such a strategy [choosing welfare over a regular job] generates motivations for an increase in poverty and it makes such a way of life a habit’ and ‘such a strategy deforms the whole system, the behaviour of society, of large groups, of their inhabitants; it generates poverty’.4 The picture of a malfunctioning system is constructed through its impacts on beneficiaries and, therefore, through their resulting actions. According to the speakers criticising welfare practices, the way the system is set up and the way it works influences significantly recipient decision-­making and life strategies. Thus, the malfunctioning system has a direct impact on beneficiary motivation. According to the former Minister of Labour, The system is set well when the connection is made [between] the way it conveys help to people who need it, and at the same time, it doesn’t liquidate the motivation to work, to care for oneself, stand on one’s own feet, develop oneself, one’s family, surroundings. The danger of good intentions in this area, the area of social legal acts, is that even with good intentions to help, it might result in liquidation of the human natural givenness to take care of oneself.5

Both political actors from the opposition are important in the discussions because of their former or present institutional affiliation. The status of the former Minister of Labour, Social Affairs, and the Family gives him and his words significant authority as he might be considered an expert with a certain amount of important experience in the field. Further, he was the one initiating and adopting the major welfare reform in 2003 (for details, see Chap. 2). This factor might boost his position with a certain credibility among the public, the media and, potentially, professionals from different sectors. The Plenipotentiary for Romani Communities, on the other hand, is the head of an ‘unpopular’ agenda at the Ministry of Interior. Moreover, he deals with the target group repeatedly mentioned in the parliamentary debates analysed for this study. He works under the Ministry of Interior, he claims he talks to mayors, to the community, and other social workers, and he claims that he personally visits Romani 4 5

 SDKÚ-DS, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?id=10741.  SDKÚ-DS, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111837.

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communities. His authoritative position, institutional and discursive, together with a very authoritative strategic document (The Right Way [Roma Reform]) he co-created, and the fact he is the authority talking to actors in the field and to members of communities, provide his argumentation with significant strength. All these quotes communicate a negative message built upon images of ‘deformation’, ‘danger’, and ‘liquidation’. Even though these words are not the only ones, they catch people’s attention and resonate in the message politicians communicate. Thus, the persuasion, the argumentative process, contains negative pictures and threats that the justification leans on. If you recall, in Chap. 4, political actors described beneficiaries through words such as danger or cancer, again, images evoking negative unpleasant emotions. The negative message functions as kind of a warning, which, in reaction, raises awareness and puts the issue into the spotlight. Moreover, the negative message indicates directly the problem speakers want to address, and at the same time, it raises (potentially) negative emotions among the audience. Threat is one of the concepts around which the dichotomy of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ is organised, giving rise to (re)action (van Dijk 1996). Consequently, the constructed frame is complemented with practical argumentation, problem-solution argumentation (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012), and (re)action.

Workfare Is Just a Just Measure Besides motivation and rationality, policy-makers consider responsibility an important component of recipient behaviour. First, society members are expected to take responsibility over their own lives. Second, parents are expected to be responsible for their children and their behaviour. According to one MP (OĽ ANO), ‘[s]ocial support from the state must be different for a parent who sends his or her kid to school than for parents whose kid doesn’t attend school’. Parents whose children do not visit school regularly are perceived as undeserving of social assistance. This argument builds upon the notion of unfairness towards responsible parents who send their children to school and take of their education and well-being. (Un)fairness is a strong resonator when it comes to social issues and argumentation. As Kluegel and Mason (2004: 814) claim, ‘people are [also] concerned with how others are doing, even if it has no direct impact on their own welfare, or that of the country as a whole’. Economic fairness

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is an important factor in popular support for the political system and political measures in post-communist states (Kluegel and Mason 2004). This notion is important in social and political ‘marketing’ and politicians are aware that public perceptions of fairness have an essential impact on trust in policies and politicians and that it influences voting behaviour (ibid.). In this light, it is not surprising or irrational to rely on fairness arguments when lobbying for changes to social assistance distribution. Consequently, withdrawal of the benefit is presented as a necessary step towards fairness. Such punishment of ‘irresponsible’ parents/beneficiaries is viewed as motivation for parents to be more accountable. Material need (un)deservingness and responsibility are also interlinked with criminal activities. As one MP (OĽ ANO) argues, people must bear responsibility for their ‘bad decisions leading them to commit petty crimes’.6 In his argumentation, the fact that people commit crimes is framed as a bad decision. Consequently, people (committing offenses) must bear responsibility for their acts. This assertion might not sound like something problematic; a person’s own responsibility for criminal acts is considered a norm in most of the Western hemisphere. What might, however, be disputable is, again, interlinking crime with social assistance. It is material need recipients who are directly interlinked with delinquency and fraud. Such a discursive linkage is based on the construction of mental representations in which beneficiaries feature as criminals. As a consequence, this idea might easily support the MP’s, and not only his, perspective that people committing (petty) crimes cannot get the same amount of social support as those who do not. Therefore, according to the speakers, social assistance must differ in these cases and workfare is proposed as one of the measures to rectify this situation, together with cancellation of the delinquency immunity. Both situations stress fairness and personal accountability for individual acts as an essential condition for social support. The MP quoted above concludes, ‘Today, we are creating a modern, just, and motivating social system, whose elements are not unknown, neither in Europe nor around the world.’7 The legitimacy of this argument is provided by the legacy of such welfare measures elsewhere in the world. Such measures have been adopted in other countries, responding to the needs of the modern world. What is even more important for the argument, the MP’s and also mine, 6 7

 OĽ ANO, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111846.  Ibid.

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is that policy-makers present workfare measures and welfare cut-backs to be ‘just’ and ‘motivating’; it is, however, again a negative form of motivation, as I have discussed in Chap. 5. It is motivation through punishment. Another MP (SDKÚ-DS) goes even further. According to him, ‘people must be pushed into a corner’. He argues: So, again, as I’ve already mentioned several times, a good motive is not enough; many times, it leads us to hell. And so, the really good solution is not only to push these people into a corner; and you know how a person pushed into the corner without any other option behaves; but simply use what is possible, use work as a punishment for reparation of damages or fines for the caused delinquency.8

Here, workfare openly features as punishment. Even if in most of the debates, workfare is presented as a form of motivation to increase a person’s skills and involvement, suddenly, it is openly introduced as a form of compensation for the damages caused by delinquent material need beneficiaries. Such punishment, workfare or, implicitly, withdrawal of the benefit, should also push these people into a corner. Again, all this is presented as a motivational measure for people to behave accordingly and to be eligible for material need assistance. And again, it is the open negative pressure that policy-makers perceive as motivational, He (MP) further claims: ‘The threat of withdrawal of income from social provisions would create pressure so he himself would be willing and ready to rather complete the punishment through small community services.’ Paraphrased, for welfare beneficiaries pushed into a corner, the idea that they would lose eligibility for benefits would be threatening enough to cause rethinking their decisions. As a result, they would prefer to fulfil the punishment through workfare instead of losing the social assistance. Thus, openly, small community services are presented as a form of punishment rather than a positive form of motivation or support. So, workfare not only keeps people in unqualified jobs and causes a long-lasting stigma, but even becomes a threatening tool and a form of punishment. To large extent, in political perception, fairness is linked to the wider society that material need recipients are part of. The political actors in my study construct several binaries between people who do receive material

8

 SDKÚ-DS, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111837.

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need social assistance and those who do not. Among such binaries, the following are the most repeated: Beneficiaries Speculating beneficiaries Lazy beneficiaries Inactive beneficiaries Irresponsible beneficiaries Non-contributing beneficiaries

Non-beneficiaries; Regularly employed people; People who try hard; Active people; (Self) responsible people; Taxpayers

The set of arguments emerging repeatedly in my data refers to society’s demand to ask for some countervalue from material need beneficiaries and thus to create a sense of reciprocity towards the groups of people on the right side in the list of binaries above. In other words, public demand is one of the significant aspects of the arguments policy-makers use to justify workfare. In many moments of the parliamentary debates and in the strategic documents, actors refer to the strong ‘demand in society’ for changing the flawed redistribution system and asking something in return for providing social assistance. For instance, the ‘popular will’ to condition welfare is strongly represented also in the ATCS document. Starting with the ‘Let’s wake up!’ initiative, the document builds upon the mayors’ claim to introduce and enforce a more restrictive material need redistribution system, including cancellation of the delinquency immunity. The document justifies the request to sanction delinquents with compulsory work: The persistent factual delinquency immunity of the recipients of material need benefits and the ineffectiveness of imposing a sanction destabilises the rule of law; the underlying offenses are an obstacle to potential employment. Sanctions for offenses imposed on recipients of benefits have lost their main functions, especially educational, preventive, and protective.

Society’s expectation and certain forms of exchange are an important part of the actors’ claims and argumentation for restrictions. To bring an example from the parliamentary debates, one MP argues, ‘If society secures these basic needs expecting nothing in return, it might happen that the normal, natural, healthy motivation to provide these needs by one’s own activity would be eliminated.’9 In the argumentation,  SDKÚ-DS, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111837.

9

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the request for some form of reciprocity is visible. The focal point of the argument, however, is the normalisation and biologisation of the human motivation to provide for one’s own needs. The MP implies that the normal human condition is when a person is motivated to be active and to work. The construction of a ‘naturally’ given biological human motivation is highly problematic as it easily leads to neglecting the structurally caused inequalities formed by economic, political, and social developments and to blaming individuals for their difficult life situation. Therefore, the fulfilment of one’s needs is entirely individualised. Required reciprocity complements the presentation of workfare as a just measure. It is presented as not only helping material need recipients but also meeting society’s expectations. This assemblage of arguments provides a strong legitimation tool for authorising politicians to adopt restrictive measures such as workfare or cancellation of the delinquency immunity. Moreover, normalisation and biologisation of people’s (in) active behaviour adds a particular shade to the government’s legitimation of political acts regulating the behaviour of certain groups of people they identify in the discourse. This is thus a potentially effective blend of political ‘marketing’ for workfare but, indeed, a problematic one.

Workfare in Theory and in Practice In the parliamentary debates, I identified arguments justifying the proposal for the Act and its measures and the perceptions of their application in theory and in practice. First, in theory, the proposed measures, including workfare, are discussed also from the perspective of their constitutionality. Policy-makers discuss whether withdrawing basic material need is or is not in accordance with the Slovak Constitution or with international agreements.10 In general, the proposed legislation is not perceived as unconstitutional. And even if policy-makers, including the Labour Minister, admit there might be some problematic aspects in this respect, they justify workfare mainly through social demand. In this sense, the proposal is framed as a response to a widespread claim among the public in Slovakia which, of course, gives workfare significant legitimation. As presented above, workfare is in theory represented also as a form of ‘help’ as it is supposed to increase people’s motivation, activity, and responsibility. 10  I discuss the critique and topic of (un)lawfulness of the legislation further in the Epilogue.

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Second, they look at the measure also through the lens of practice and the actual implementation of workfare. They consider the involvement of mayors and other potential actors engaging material need beneficiaries. I start this section with how political actors argue for workfare and justify the theory behind it. As it should be clear now, parliamentary members frame the proposed Act, particularly the workfare measure, as a tool which should benefit material need recipients. As one MP argues, ‘I am convinced that if we don’t go this way [conditioning material need assistance], we harm. We harm foremost those people whom such laws should help, and we lock them up in the poverty trap, in a system in which they conform to the reality of life in poverty.’11 We are back again to the theme of the failing social system—the one causing poverty and accommodating people in it. The MP seems to be blaming the system for people’s poverty and difficult social situation, implicitly presenting the ‘people whom these laws should help’ as victims of the system which ‘harms them’, ‘locks them in the poverty trap’, and allows these people to ‘pass such patterns to following generations’. Repeating the term ‘harm’ adds a certain urgency to his conviction. It is a word that embodies a highly negative meaning. We can understand this statement also in terms of discursive strategies as a disclaimer. The MP presents his idea in a positive light as goodwill intended to help people in the poverty trap. Nevertheless, workfare is in its essence a restrictive policy conditioning basic material need assistance with (mandatory) activity. In this semantic turn, the speaker (the ‘us’ group) tries to be seen in a positive light and tries to create an excuse for the negative message, measure, or blame of ‘them’ (van Dijk 1996). This positive light is based on construction of the idea of a ‘helper’, of political elites’ good intentions to reform the system in such a way that it helps beneficiaries and the poor. The picture is framed in terms of assistance to gain skills and responsibility. However, this very same MP is the one arguing for the necessity to push recipients into a corner and creating a mental bridge between material need and crime. Therefore, the image of a ‘helper’ clashes with the call for punishment of people who need assistance. It is essential to analyse political discourses contextually. Concerning the topics of welfare reform, fairness, or preferential approaches to control over public discourse, the power of political elites is also important to bear in mind. Discursive, but also wider, social structures, can be observed, experienced, and interpreted subjectively through individual or collective  SDKÚ-DS, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111837.

11

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mental models and representations (van Dijk 2008). It is crucial to study how specific groups construct and control definitions. In this study, policy-­ makers, as actors holding symbolic and substantial power, are this particular group. They co-construct, reproduce, and control mental representations, behaviour, and common sense, as well as emotions. They do the same with ideologies, norms, and values (ibid.). Therefore, it is essential to look at their claims critically and deconstruct the upper layers of what they say in order to look beyond the superficial structures. To be very concrete, I consider it necessary to look for instance at the self-­ proclaimed ‘helper’ position, or at why to consider welfare system dangerous. It is important to consequently put such ideas into a wider picture and question the real-life social consequences of such ideas and claims. As Amossy (2014) states, it is not enough to reconstruct patterns of reasoning; rather, we must examine arguments in their cultural context and their verbal realisation in a particular discursive situation. The particular discursive situation in this case is the parliamentary debate on the Material Need Assistance Act, with its own situational settings and particular actors. Other relevant actors, the ones not necessarily present at the debates, are part of the context too. Mayors, labour offices, and other subjects are some of the actors who also appear in the debates with regard to the main practical issues discussed. The practical problem policy-makers address is the number of employment activities these subjects are able to offer to material need claimants. According to many MPs, providing jobs to all claimants will be difficult. As one MP argues, practical implementation will be problematic, ‘Mayors won’t be able to provide jobs to 500–800–1000 unemployed; there won’t be enough activities to do, so, these applicants will have to get the full benefit because they showed the willingness to work.’ As he further argues, the ‘practice will be formal’.12 There is general agreement about involving more institutions in offering activities (such as state and private businesses) so the probability to have enough work to offer to claimants is higher. On the part of political actors, this is a question of assuring that the measure will not be only formally written on paper but will be applicable even in villages where the number of claimants in higher. According to critiques, the lack of activities to be offered to claimants, gives space to discretion and favouritism of particular claimants (Szőke 2015; Lajčáková 2013).  SDKÚ-DS, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111891.

12

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What is, however, more interesting regarding the discussion about mayors, includes again the topics of responsibility and fairness. This time, responsibility concerns mayors who are expected to be accountable for offering activities to claimants. According to one MP, ‘[i]f they [municipalities, mayors] are responsible and if they use coordinators, such cooperation will pay off’.13 In this argument, the positive message of workfare ‘paying off’ is communicated. It is, however, conditioned with mayors’ responsible approach to the implementation of the Act. Another MP (KDH) explains there will be some mayors who will not offer work to material need claimants. In his explanation, such a measure will make mayors unpopular because there will not be enough activity opportunities to offer. According to the MP, this will cause conflicts and will result in a decrease of votes. Through this logic, we get to the fairness issue. Many MPs evaluated the implementation of the Act negatively with regard to the power mayors gain thanks to workfare measure. One of them argues: Unfortunately, instead of changing this dysfunctional system, for what you would acquire position in the history [text books] of active labour market measures, you do everything to not to change this sad activation work picture. On the contrary, you go so far that according to your proposal, mayors who are already failing in activation organisation, will be even more powerful because in reality they will literally decide upon death and life. They will determine if someone gets 120 EUR from the state, the basic material need benefit plus activation allowance, or if they get nothing. […] Your proposal is nothing more than a marketing move. You want to be the nice guys. Mister Fico needs to win presidential elections and you want to be the nice guys.14

The application of the Act in practice is thus evaluated negatively, especially the fact that the state leaves the organisation of the activation measure up to mayors, in the responsibility of local governments whom the MP already criticises for ‘dysfunctional’ work organisation. She supports the argument above about mayors losing votes and she further explains that the success of such a measure is highly dependent upon the character of the mayor. She argues, ‘It would function in some other developed country where there are capable, smart and decent mayors, and I know in  SMER-SD, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111860.  SaS, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111894.

13 14

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Slovakia there are some too, but unfortunately, we are not able to clone them.’15 In her argumentation, she uses several negative other-­ representation discursive strategies. She accuses mayors of buying election votes through workfare organisation, and she accuses the government of doing the same. Her seemingly supportive speech and arguments (beneficiaries are the powerless, they are in an inferior position, prone to abuse from mayors; their lives and death are decided upon) are, however, complemented with images of crime and suggestions of even more severe forms of workfare organisation. She is one of the supporters of stricter measures for material need claimants. First, despite her critique, she still understands the Minister’s initiative. She states: Mr. Minister, the social demand is there, I know. I know there are very anti-­ Roma moods and I know it is easy to come with this unconstitutional proposal. But you must realise that the risk of meeting this social request by bringing in an unconstitutional proposal, and you know it is unconstitutional, is a great risk and I warn you about it.16

Again, she might seem to be advocating for Roma or for beneficiaries in general. However, she continues her talk with suggestions about how to make simple revisions so the measure would not violate the constitution. Thus, she still agrees with the workfare measure as such. Second, she argues that organising activation and offering employment activities to claimants should be mandatory for all mayors. According to her, ‘[i]n the application practice, if there is the word can [emphasis in original], it doesn’t work’.17 She implies that if activation is not mandatory also for mayors, it can easily be abused and the application of the measure would be simply formal. This perspective supports what Szőke (2015) presents in her study. Among other essential findings, she notes that this form of measure and the power of mayors provides essential space for discretion and preferential treatment which can lead to buying votes. Third, the MP is concerned with the activation workers who are not physically present in the village. In her example, she uses stories from mayors or labour office

 Ibid.  SaS, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=112305. 17  SaS, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111894. 15 16

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workers in order to illustrate another problematic implication of the potential future workfare practice. She says: And then you find out by accident that the citizen [material need claimant] was arrested in Austria, in Germany or he was stealing, worked illegally; or you find out through the information system that he works in another European country and in Slovakia, he takes material need provisions and the activation allowance.18

Through this example, she implies that there are more levels of potential practical implementation problems and that there are beneficiaries who take advantage of the system. Here, I am not judging the accuracy of her claims nor the real-life situation of Slovaks working abroad illegally and claiming social assistance at home. I am deconstructing the discourse and the ideas being presented in it. In this regard, it is important to say, again, that the policy-maker interlinks material need with images of crime, illegality, and abuse, creating thus a mental bridge between them. First, she is building her argumentation for workfare on the previously discussed topics of a flawed redistribution system, (in)justice towards responsible members of society, and speculative material need assistance claimants. In the end, this opposition MP adds another negative picture of speculative and abusive material need claimants to the political act of marketing for the workfare product. In this ‘political marketing’ process, pictures and stories, as illustrative tools, play an important role. They make the arguments come alive and easy to imagine. In a sense, they visualise what the speaker wants to communicate to the audience. The following section offers a brief excursion into the illustrative images justifying actors’ arguments.

Justifying Illustrations Argumentation does not need to be explicit; it can rather appear in the choice of words or in the stories and narrations actors use to persuade others about the validity of their perspective (Amossy 2014). According to Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), political discourse involves primarily practical argumentation, or problem-solution arguments. As they state (ibid.: 3), ‘the study of narratives, explanations or imaginaries is pointless  Ibid.

18

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unless we see them as embedded within practical arguments, as feeding into and influencing processes of decision-making, briefly, as premises in arguments for action’. Narratives and images are essential because they have particular roles in political discourse; they illustrate and support arguments, serving thus as legitimation tools for decision-makers. However, they themselves cannot influence hearts and minds if they do not contain the message influencing our acts (ibid.). In this chapter, I have been examining practical arguments and showing how Slovak policy-makers try to respond to problems, what they do discursively, and what images and mental representations they use in reasoning. One of the overarching problems policy-makers identify is the malfunctioning material need assistance system. Parliamentary members build their arguments upon messages of threat, danger, or ‘deformation’. Another problem they identify is the unfairness of the system. Here, working people are perceived as those receiving the shorter end of the stick. According to one MP, These are responsible people who work for low income—and often, they even have to worry not to lose it—they work and try to earn money for their families so they can sustain them. On the other side, they see these thousands of fellow citizens who get these social benefits every month, housing allowances, family allowances and their income is higher than that among those who strive to work. Something isn´t right.19

The speaker assumes there is a group of people to whom the system is unfair and even groups who abuse it. As the MP states, these people, recipients have ‘quickly gotten used to it [welfare]’. He reproduces the stereotypical picture of beneficiaries earning enormous amounts of money, having even higher incomes than regularly employed people. He places stress on this message, using the words ‘thousands of fellow citizens’, evoking the idea of large numbers of beneficiaries. Such exaggeration provides power to this argumentative tool. Besides the comparison of system abusers and ‘striving’ working people in which figures, numbers, and negative images are used as justifying tools, references to quotes and proverbs also appear in the argumentation. Among these, the proverb ‘There’s no money without work’, used by the Plenipotentiary for Romani Communities (OĽ ANO) and by another MP  KDH, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111851.

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(KDH), stands out, as does a reference to the Bible and St. Paul saying, ‘He who does not want to work, neither shall he eat’ (MP KDH).20 They are tools used in order to justify the problem-solution arguments aimed at persuading the audience about the necessity to set up a system in which employment pays off more than welfare benefits. A certain moral claim is one of the messages communicated in these proverbs—a person cannot get a reward without working for it. Also, they have deeper cultural meanings anchored in collective knowledge as they are based on either shared religious or pagan traditions. Personal stories have shown to be an important supporting tool when it comes to justification. By personal stories, I mean anecdotal examples speakers provide based on their own experiences or something they saw or heard. Stories and anecdotes can serve as argumentation in which they are perceived as an indisputable fact (van Dijk 1996). One of the stories goes as follows: During the election campaign, I was going by car to a local city council, having stickers with the slogan ‘It starts with work’ on my car. My old familiar Roma—he is a very responsible person—was standing on a ladder, repairing a light. He once worked in my state enterprise; today, he works as an activation work coordinator. He was standing on the ladder, repairing the light and he says: ‘You wrote it wrong’, referring to the slogan ‘It starts with work’. And I replied: ‘So, what were we suppose to write?’ He says: ‘It starts with social provisions’. And so, we both laughed because it was, of course, humorous, sarcastic, but he [as a Roma] knows the thinking of his fellows, also his subordinates, cause he’s a coordinator [of activation work]. He knows that a large number of citizens has learned that work doesn’t pay off if you have income from provisions, housing allowance, child allowance.21

In this story, the MP (KDH) supports his argument about the necessity to improve the system in such a manner that employment pays more than welfare with a narration based on his personal experience. He refers to a person he knows, who also used to work for him in his state enterprise. By stressing the fact this person is his well-known acquaintance, he gives credibility to this anecdote. The fact this person is of Romani origin is important in the story. Through this vignette, he depicts the image of citizens, 20   KDH, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111851, OĽ ANO, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111846. 21  KDH, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111851.

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Roma, who remain in the welfare system for its greater convenience. Through this narrative, he connects ethnicity with abuse of the system, to such a way of life and to a ‘certain group’s thinking’. Even though he mentions that this person is responsible, this information is only in the second position of his narration; the first information we get is his ethnicity, which is followed by ideas about the speculative and conscious aim of earning money from welfare. Using the Romani person as the ‘one who knows their way of thinking’ [the thinking of his fellows and of his subordinates] he legitimises his claim. He presents this principal character as a member of this group of people [ethnic group], as one of them, as the one who works with them. This picture suggests he knows the processes occurring within these groups and thus, he knows what he is talking about. In another example, the very same MP says: Two weeks ago, the commercial TV channel from our region [Prešov] broadcast an interview in a commentary with two concrete businessmen and two Roma. These businessmen offered jobs for 500 EUR to them [the Roma] and they found out, these Roma, it is not profitable for them to enter this job even if they wanted, because they would lose more in social benefits. They would earn less money than if they continued taking provisions.22

In this vignette, Roma as an ethnic group and the welfare beneficiaries as a social group are merged together, constructing thus an interconnection between them. These actors are presented as rationally calculating people refusing the generally accepted social norm—employment. This image plays into the SDKÚ-DS MP’s hands, who has been repeatedly presenting the idea of rationally thinking human beings realising the advantage of social benefits and voluntarily choosing this path as a life strategy. These kinds of stories, creating a negative image, are used as legitimising tools for policy-makers. Through these, they support their arguments, and they show their relevance and validity to the audience. They are an argumentative crutch. Besides potential persuasion, they have other important impacts. First, these images help in formulating a better understanding, or at least a more accurate imagination, of the identified problem. They might facilitate the audience’s vision of this issue and make persuasion easier. Second, through such tools, political elites construct negative mental representations about certain groups, in this case, about 22  Ibid.; Prešov is one of the Slovak counties in the eastern part of the country where a significant Romani minority lives. Also, it is the name of the city the county is named after.

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the Romani minority (van Dijk 2008). Consequently, through discourses and through the symbolic power they hold in their hands, these representations reach the audience, other political actors, the media, or the public, where they reproduce easily. * * * To sum up, I have presented three arrays of arguments the political actors in my study use to justify restrictive measures tied to material need assistance. Based on the analysis, the primary and repeated arguments refer to: (1) the current (material need assistance) system in the context of recipient behaviour; (2) fairness, responsibility, crime, and society’s demand for countervalue; and (3) workfare in theory and in practice. The articulated problem of the current material need assistance system that makes people inactive and allows them to speculate over their life strategies provides solid ground for the political marketing of workfare and cancellation of the so-called delinquency immunity. To these, arguments referring to public demand for restrictions, together with stories and experiences of relevant actors, are attached. Together, they offer an assemblage of categories, topics, arguments, and images catching audience attention and providing sources for legitimation of the proposed measures. Clearly, material need recipient behaviour is an important component of political representatives’ justifications for the proposed legislation. As I have outlined before, the decision-makers evaluate the current material need redistribution system rather negatively. Besides the concern about the poverty generated by welfare, recipient actions are mostly presented in a negative light; for instance, political actors highlight acts such as: remaining voluntarily in the material need assistance system; not searching for regular employment; being inactive; losing the motivation to work and to improve one’s own skills or life situation; and speculating over social assistance. As you might recall, the deliberate choice of welfare over employment, indicated as an essential problem the system causes but also one it must deal with, is compared to a cancer on society ‘because it will be impossible to finance it and because the negative phenomena connected to such a strategy will overgrow the bearable level and will become unbearable’.23 This argument contains a picture of a serious disease with abnormal cell growth and an invasion into body parts which in many cases is incurable, as well as a picture of something ‘unbearable’, thus not only implying a  SDKÚ-DS, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?id=107419.

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link between material need and security threats, but also justifying proposed assistance conditioning and workfare through images and words evoking fear and other negative emotions. Emotions thus become an integral part of the argumentation and, in essential topics, they cannot be separated from each other. Furthermore, it is also the problem-solution arguments that are complemented or built upon images evoking negative emotions along with arguments constructed around themes of fairness and unfairness or the related social demand for reciprocity and a just system. Last but not least, the normalisation and biologisation of human activity and willingness to contribute and be active, add to the overall workfare marketing. Thus, the blend of ingredients I have presented step by step in Chaps. 4, 5 and 6 provides the fodder for political farming in the case of the workfare ‘product’. Highlighting the malfunctioning character of the redistribution system, interlinking beneficiaries with negative images of fraud, crime, and rational calculative speculation, and crossbreeding it with the public demand for fairness and justice provides a solid marketing strategy for political actors to ‘sell’ restrictive products in material need assistance. In the following chapters, I make sense of these partial puzzle pieces, framing them with theoretical concepts I find useful in understanding the workfare ‘marketing’ strategy at the core of this study. One after another, I frame the understanding of workfare through the prisms of securitisation, boundary work, and governmentality, demonstrating how these approaches add to understanding workfare as a political measure. I do my best to not isolate them. On the contrary, I show that they are complementary and together provide a complex tool for analysing and understanding political discourses and the political marketing of restrictive measures.

References Amossy, R. 2014. Argumentation and Discourse Analysis. In The Discourse Studies Reader: Main Currents in Theory and Analysis, ed. J.  Angermuller, D.  Maingueneau, and R.  Wodak, 297–304. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Béland, D. 2007. The Social Exclusion Discourse: Ideas and Policy Change. Policy & Politics 35 (1): 123–139. Cox, R.H. 2001. The Social Construction of an Imperative: Why Welfare Reform Happened in Denmark and the Netherlands But Not in Germany. World Politics 53 (3): 463–498.

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van Dijk, A.T. 1996. Discourse, Racism and Ideology. La Laguna: RCEI Ediciones. ———. 1997. What Is Political Discourse Analysis. In Political Linguistics, ed. J. Blommaert and Ch. Bulcaen, 11–52. Amsterdam: Benjamins. ———. 2008. Discourse and Power. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. van Eemeren, F.H., and R.  Grootendorst. 1984. Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions: A Theoretical Model for the Analysis of Discussions Directed towards Solving Conflicts of Opinion. Dordrecht: Foris Publications. Fairclough, I., and N. Fairclough. 2012. Political Discourse Analysis. A Method for Advanced Students. New York: Routledge. Kaliňák, R., P.  Pollák, and Saloň. 2013a. Správna cesta (Rómska reforma): Vzdelávanie (The Roma Reform (The Right Way): Education) [online] [cit. 27.6.2016]. http://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/mvsr/romsky_splnomocnenec/Romska_reforma_vzdelavanie.pdf. ̌ ———. 2013b. Správna cesta (Rómska reforma): Vymožitelnost ̌ práva (The Roma Reform (The Right Way): Law Enforcement) [online] [cit. 29.6.2016]. http://www.minv.sk/?pravo_rr. Kluegel, J.R., and D.S. Mason. 2004. Fairness Matters: Social Justice and Political Legitimacy in Post-Communist Europe. Europe-Asia Studies 56 (6): 813–834. Lajčáková, J. 2013. Menšinová politika. Bratislava: CVEK. Media Portal. National Council of the Slovak Republic. 2013a. The 23rd Hearing [online] [cit. 6.3.2021]. https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?. ———. 2013b. The 25th Hearing [online] [cit. 6.3.2021]. https://tv.nrsr.sk/ archiv/schodza/6/25? Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska. 2012. Návrh opatrení sekcie sociálnych vecí ̌ (The Rady ZMOS na riešenie problematiky marginalizovaných skupín obyvatelov Council of the Association of Towns and Cities of Slovakia: The Proposal of Measures for Solving the Problematics of Marginalised Groups of Inhabitants). Žilina: ZMOS. Szőke, A. 2015. A ‘Road to Work’? The Reworking of Deservedness, Social Citizenship and Public Work Programmes in Rural Hungary. Citizenship Studies 19 (6–7): 734–750. Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi a o zmene dopnení niektorých zákonov v znení zákona č. 183/2014 Z.z. a zákona č. 308/2014 Z.z. (Act on Assistance in Material No. 417/2013 Coll. and on amendments of Act No. 183/2014 Coll. And Anct No. 308/2014 Coll.) [online] [cit. 10.10.2015]. http://www.ozinfodom.info/files/spaw/files/2013-­z417.pdf. Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi a o zmene dopnení niektorých zákonov v znení zákona č. 599/2003 Z.z.. (Act on Assistance in Material No. 599/2003 Coll. and on amendments) [online] [cit. 10.10.2015]. https://www.slov-­lex.sk/ pravne-­predpisy/SK/ZZ/2003/599/20070901.html.

CHAPTER 7

Welfare as a Security Issue

As van Dijk (1997: 22) states, ‘[P]olitical discourse will be based on a number of structural criteria for such texts and contexts: Roles and goals of speakers, inain topics, special conditions and circumstances and especially the functionality of such discourse, for instance in view of influencing the political position of MPs or members of Congress, and hence as part of the political process of decision and policy making.’ Parliamentary members, including coalition members as well as opposition members, set particular goals within their parties’ more general ideology. As I have shown in previous chapters, following these goals, the policy-makers in my story construct workfare through different categories, associated characteristics, and illustrative images and themes. Keeping in mind the functionality of political discourse, we may say that they articulate arguments to justify their ideas—and all this occurs within the processes of decision-­ making and policy-making. The words, justifications, and strategies politicians use are not random. Beyond these, certain meanings and aims are hidden. In the following chapters, I bring the puzzle pieces together, explaining how workfare and images of material need beneficiaries serve the goal of political control and regulation through securitisation and (ethnic) boundary work. I start with the role of crime and security in the political discourse, as these are highly present and functional in the debates as well as in the strategic documents. In this chapter, I guide you through the concept of securitisation, its epistemology, and sociological perspectives on how a security issue is © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kissová, Framing Welfare Recipients in Political Discourse, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63579-4_7

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constructed around a topic, which I analyse in the final section using the case of material need assistance and workfare. Further, I point to some aspects of securitisation theory which I consider problematic or worth rethinking, adding to existing discussions about the weaknesses of classical approaches to security, insecurity, and securitisation. I comment critically on the conceptualised importance of the existential threat and the importance of the instant approval of the audience. I argue that (1) in case of policy-making and political decision-making, public approval is not so essential for each and every measure, as is claimed in classic securitisation theory; and (2) in the case of the welfare-workfare discourse, there is not necessarily a need for construction of an existential threat in order to securitise welfare and material need assistance.

The Social Construction of Security Every democratic and legal state protects internal order and security as important attributes of organised society-building, in which unlawfulness is replaced with obeying the laws and where citizens’ lives, health, property, rights, and freedoms are protected. (Združenie miest a obcí Slovenska 2012/ Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia 2012: 5)

The mayors’ document refers to the 2012 Government Programme Declaration claiming that ‘the government will do the maximum for the security and protection of citizens and their families, for calm life in villages and cities’ (ATCS 2012: 5). In the proposal for measures solving the problematics of the ‘marginalised groups of inhabitants’, the mayors are reminding the government of their commitments.1 Security and protection are central issues in the proposed measures, representing a focal theme in workfare discussions. Because security is one of the topics framing welfare and workfare legitimation, the analytical framework of critical approaches to security and security studies might be of assistance here in order to better understand the construction of the material need assistance picture. There are different schools and approaches contributing to the development of securitisation theory.2 Even though the securitisation debate is 1  As a reminder, in Slovakia, marginalised groups of inhabitants is an adapted, socially, politically, and institutionally embedded term for Roma. 2  For instance, Balzacq et  al. (2016) differentiate between the Copenhagen School, the Paris School, and the Aberystwyth School.

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a dynamic ongoing process, the constructive character of security issues is to a large extent accepted and widely agreed upon among securitisation scholars. Of course, different scholars focus on different dimensions, apply different methods and perspectives. They look at language, speech acts, practices, and securitisation processes, including their potential implications. However, what seems to be a common tone connecting these various approaches and perspectives is the notion that what becomes the domain of security or insecurity is not predetermined or predefined but rather ‘results from a time- and context- specific intersubjective agreement that something poses a vital threat to community’ (Balzacq et  al. 2016: 496).3 As I demonstrate in this book, the constructivist elaboration of governing through risk and security is usually connected to particular groups of people and occurs also through discursive formulation and legitimation within political discourse. Constructivism is an approach that considers the actions, ideas, beliefs, and interests of actors in the wider context, allowing for an understanding of the world created by those actors and the impacts of the constructed social reality. Critical approaches to security deal with ‘the social construction of security’ (Errikson 1999: 318  in Mutimer 2010: 86). Securitisation and constructivism go hand in hand, mainly when the role of language, practice, and political arguments are examined (Balzacq et al. 2016). Constructivism is also the epistemological point of departure for this study. It already should be clear that ideas about workfare and beneficiaries are constructed, as well as what is ‘normal’ and what is not. Social constructivism has become the major approach in the field of security studies, working with key concepts such as identity, norms, beliefs, knowledge, culture, and collective ideas to understand how things are put together in order to see how certain types of political behaviour and outcomes come into being. From the ontological perspective, as Agius (2010: 51) suggests, there are three main positions of constructivism. Firstly, ideational structures matter, even more than most material factors. Secondly, identities are essential as they influence the actions social actors take. Thus, 3  Among securitisation scholars, there are ongoing discussions on different aspects of the theory, including intersubjectivity, ontology, epistemology, definition and role of the audience, empirical evidence, and method/methodology. For this book, I do not consider it necessary to go into too much detail regarding all these dimensions. Even though securitisation scholarship is still quite young, it is vital and complex. I focus on the features that add to the understanding of the adoption of workfare measures.

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understanding these identities helps explain actors’ actions and interests. Thirdly, there is a mutual relationship between structures and agents: ‘This attention to how actors shape the world and how the world shapes actors mean that human relations are inherently social and we create the world we live in and it influences us as well.’ Identity reveals the nature of the actors, what interests and preferences they have, and how these lead to and allow particular actions (ibid.). Adler (1997: 324) defines the importance of identities in relation to political actors as follows: ‘[T]he identities, interests and behaviour of political agents are socially constructed by collective meanings, interpretations and assumptions about the world.’4 Moreover, the collective understanding and acceptance of the meaning of any phenomenon contributes to the construction of these identities. We can understand the actions, the nature, and the purpose of governmental practices in seeking these intersubjective meanings. These are the meanings and ideas that are commonly shared and formed in interactions; they do not objectively exist outside of actors and their interactions. The concepts of beliefs and collectively shared ideas are essential elements which explain how identities and actions are constructed, how individuals and members of communities understand the world, what phenomena are more important than others, why, and what implications they have. At the same time, culture is a lens through which individuals see security, and it illuminates how is security perceived and understood within a society. According to Geertz (1973: 89), culture is ‘a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life’. These patterns of meaning are transmitted over the course of history, but at the same time, they might be redefined and reconstructed in different interactions or situations, in different times and spaces, thus in different contexts. Culture is essential for constructing values, which are, as I have discussed previously, important in structuring behaviour. As Agius (2010: 56) concludes:

4  The concept of norms is central to the constructivist approach. Norms are essential for identity formation; they carry particular meanings for actors and provide a certain behavioural guide within the social world. They are produced by shared knowledge and practices, constructed by ‘actors who have strong ideas about appropriate or desirable behaviour’ (Agius 2010: 56).

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Culture can have an impact on how states see security, but it is also crucial in terms of constructing the values and rules that inform identity. Whether it be fear of immigrants and refugees as a ‘threat’ to security, or fear of cultures of others that are drastically different from our own, culture can be an important underlying reason when defining security problems that affect the state and other agents. That human rights are considered an important issue to individual and societal security also has cultural influences, because culture refers to standards that we set as acceptable to us.

Thus, identity, beliefs, values, norms, knowledge, and culture constitute an important set of factors influencing people’s ideas, interests, behaviours, and actions. All these enter the process of the construction of social reality but also affect the governmental practices used to govern this social reality and people themselves. The above-mentioned factors also have an impact on what meanings various actors assign to risk and security and how these are used to create and articulate reality. As Emmers (2010: 140) suggests, ‘[w]hat constitutes an existential threat is regarded as a subjective matter. It very much depends on a shared understanding of what constitutes a danger to security.’ Therefore, the message must be communicated in such a way that it will be collectively accepted, or at least accepted by relevant audiences. The discourse must be comprised of elements such as images, claims, symbols, and language understandable to the public. From Non-politicised to Securitised Looking at the founding school of securitisation theory gives us an idea about how scholars have begun to rethink security in the context of international relations. Today, we are further along with our knowledge and there is no doubt that security, insecurity, and securitisation are no longer a matter only for international relations. Also, since the 1980s, the research and debates on securitisation have diverged, or as Balzacq et  al. (2016: 497) put it, there are different ways in which ‘strands of securitization have cross-fertilized over the years’. Nevertheless, I think it is important to examine how the various scholarly ideas on securitisation originated. The securitisation model described by the Copenhagen School is a two-­ stage process in which a non-politicised issue can become politicised or securitised. The difference between these stages is based upon the extent to which the issue is present in public and political debate and to which it

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becomes a part of the political agenda (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al. 2005). Copenhagen scholars define a non-politicised issue as one which is not a relevant matter for governmental action and not even present in public discourse. In contrast, if an issue becomes a part of a public debate and is also framed by public policy requiring political decision-making, it reaches the level of politicisation. The last stage is accomplished when the issue is framed as one requiring ‘emergency actions beyond the state’s standard political procedures’ (Emmers 2010: 139). At this stage, an already politicised matter is articulated as an existential threat to a subject, such as ideology, cultural homogeneity, language, welfare, or particular groups of people. Such existential threats require, according to securitisation actors, the adoption of extraordinary measures going beyond established norms. As Balzacq and his colleagues (2016) point out, the Copenhagen School was not the only group of scholars covering topics of security construction. The authors refer to philosophical and sociological approaches that have proven to be beneficial for understanding the construction of issues under the flag of security. Namely, the account of Bourdieu on concepts of field and habitus, as well as Foucault’s dispositif, both add to our knowledge of how social categories such as abnormality, delinquency, undeservingness, and undesirability are constructed and what purposes they serve (ibid.; Bigo 2002; Foucault 2007). As I show and discuss later, Foucault’s theory of governmentality is a complementary framework to securitisation theory as it provides frames for how different mentalities are constructed and governed through rationalities, tools, and technologies. Nevertheless, state actors have a certain advantage when it comes to seeking support for their ideas (Collins 2005). In a democratic system, these actors take advantage of the fact they have been elected, providing the government with an advantageous position in convincing the public about the necessity of the response to the threat. The securitisation process is successfully completed when the audience is convinced about the ostensible threat and about the necessity of extraordinary measures. The relevant audience might be, for instance, the public, the media, corporations, politicians, or other elites. Politicians may decide to use security language in their communication with the public in order to gain or increase their popularity as well as to raise their chances to be re-elected. Thus, securitisation may be a tool to directly foster and stoke populist discourse on public policy issues or debates. According to the founding school, the speech act is the crucial element in the process described above, defined as ‘the discursive representation of

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a certain issue’ (Emmers 2010: 139). Most recent accounts widen this perspective and stress the intersubjective character of the securitisation process or act, as well as its practical dimension. Thus, the current trend seems to be moving away from taking into consideration exclusively the speech act as being the crucial tool or arena in which security issues are produced. Nevertheless, it is also the speech act in which the constructive process of reality starts and it is the language and practice through which this threat is articulated, communicating it to audiences through pictures and symbols. The audience has significant power in the process. The public may send the message, and it also may have the last word; it can reject the speech act and consider the purported security threat to be irrelevant or illegitimate. Security in the Sociological Perspective Balzacq et al. (2010: 2) define security as a ‘kaleidoscope of practices’ that cannot be reduced to ‘a core meaning of/and a linguistic formulation’. In their view, security is a slogan used by the dominant group to justify and impose a political programme by determining ‘who needs to be protected and who can be sacrificed’. Thus, securitisation is not exclusively about discourses, and also, not exclusively an international relations agenda. What matters is also the performativity of the narratives and the everyday life and practices of social agents. Therefore, sociology has much to say how security is often hijacked, misunderstood, and/or used to frame discourses and practices. Even though the authors (ibid.) suggest a focus on security practices, I consider the discursive aspects of security and securitisation as important as non-discursive practices. Still, how opinion-makers talk about issues shapes ideas among the public and embeds meanings about the world. On the other hand, political ideas are often transformed into practical tools and acts in which the prepared (in)security ground shapes actions. One sociological approach treats security as an outcome of the securitisation process, as a dispositif emerging mainly within the field of professionals. A dispositif is a heterogeneous system of relations and tools comprised of discourses, institutions, laws, scientific statements, and administrative and regulatory measures, connecting agents to the tools they use (Aradau et al. 2015). For a sociological analysis of both discursive and non-discursive security and risk practices, these tools are crucial. The study of these security tools, including legislation or political strategic

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documents, involves analysing the social devices through which securitisation actors think about threat. These are the instruments embodying a specific risk and security image though which public action is set up to address a security issue (Balzacq 2008). Although the tools of securitisation are fundamentally political in the sense that their selection and effects depend on political factors and require political mobilisation, there are also symbolic attributes. Political actors share the ideas of threat with the population and tell the public what the collective perception of a problem should be (De Bruijn and Hufen 1998). Thus, the focus on both the political and the symbolic aspects of security instruments allows for a more vigorous conceptualisation of how ‘the intention of policy could be translated into operational activities’ (De Bruijn and Hufen 1998: 12 in Balzacq et al. 2010: 8). Moreover, because political actors possess symbolic power, political and symbolic securitisation components cannot be disentangled. In parliamentary debates, policy-­makers introduce and discuss the perceived ‘problem’. Through argumentative and legitimation tools, they justify their perspectives and persuade others about the righteousness of their ideas. If enough support is mobilised, policies can be translated into actual practical measures. From the sociological and anthropological perspective, we cannot omit the symbolic dimension of security in discourse and practice. Securitisation in political practice cannot be reduced to merely a technical, problem-­ solving process. It contains deeper meanings that must be contextualised, deconstructed, and further reflected. Thus, besides the technical and also the essential political dimension, the symbolic meaning of security and insecurity is an integral component of the research aims (Balzacq et  al. 2010). They are translated into tools that shape public problems, perceptions, and practices. The above-mentioned concepts of field, habitus, dispositif, and governmentality have worked to develop securitisation theory. In general, the ‘development of a more sociological (or practice-oriented) variant of securitization has contributed to the consolidation of a contextual view of securitization, which highlights how differences in the way securitizing moves are presented and/or received depend on the wider social environment’ (Balzacq et al. 2016: 504). The aim is to examine different contexts in greater detail to reveal the ways in which the variability in contexts promotes, supports, and limits particular outcomes (ibid.). In this book, I explore the adoption of workfare measures in the Slovak Parliament. In my study, the ‘wider social environment’ includes the historical, economic,

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political, and social aspects of how rationalities and social (mental) representations are established in Slovak society. Such an environment is characterised by relations (and boundaries) between different groups that form a complex society, while these relations as well as boundaries are constructed along socio-economic, political, religious, gender, and/or ethnic or racial lines. Security in Parliamentary Debates As I pointed out at the very beginning of this chapter, insecurities and threats must be understood as products of social and political practices, including discourses and policy-making (Aradau et al. 2015). The framework of critical approaches to security thus seems helpful in putting another piece of the puzzle into the broader picture of the workfare legitimation process. However, as Emmers (2010) argues, the classical Copenhagen framework is more theoretical than empirical. To address such a gap, I examine the empirical case of Slovak material need assistance, to which I apply the securitisation framework and make sense of the political meaning-making surrounding workfare. The welfare-workfare discourse is a political practice in which politicians and local political actors make sense of security (also) through the criminalisation of material need recipients. They construct the meaning of threat in welfare, resulting in the legitimation of a repressive workfare measure. I contribute to the understanding of how these social and political practices work and what their implications might be. I focus in particular on how policy-makers construct the bridge between security and material need recipients to help understand the legitimation of workfare in material need, and more generally, how material need policy has been framed by policy-makers. I show that welfare has become one of the key topics worth analysing through the lens of securitisation. As I have already made clear in Chaps. 4 and 5, policy-makers talk about material need beneficiaries as offenders and criminals. They interlink them directly with criminal activities, with fraud, saying that ‘offenders are often persons from socially disadvantaged environments, whose income is social insurance assistance, material need assistance’ (Minister of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family [LSAF]).5 Political actors present the recipients in terms of the threat they represent to a fair welfare system, calling  SMER-SD, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?id=107315.

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for ‘legislation that will be positive and just’.6 They depict material need claimants as speculative rationally thinking persons or as irresponsible beings who represent a threat to the wider public well-being. The way local and national representatives portray claimants does not necessarily evoke any existential threat; however, using images of a ‘cancer’ or an ‘unbearable’ problem suggest the presence of security in the discursive construction of material need. The criminalisation of welfare recipients is not necessarily a new phenomenon. In her in-depth analysis of British political discourse and policies, Ruth Levitas (2005) identifies three ideal types of political discourses which help to describe the changes and shifts in meanings of social inclusion and exclusion, and how these are consequently mirrored in social support policies. One of the ideal types is the ‘moral underclass discourse’ in which welfare recipients are seen as morally and behaviourally failed individuals. Central here are categories of criminals, the unemployable, and irresponsible single mothers (Levitas 2005), who policy-makers see as failed and requiring re-adjustment. Poverty is seen here as a matter of culture while its economic and political aspects are overlooked. We can identify similar features in this study. Economic and political structural causes are almost entirely missing from the discourse and from the political argumentation. Even though none of the parliamentary speakers connects poverty or material need assistance with culture explicitly, they imply some habitual aspects of both. They argue that people become accustomed to receiving social assistance to such an extent that they choose it as their living strategy. The main propagator of this idea, the MP, says that ‘we can’t even blame these people who choose such a way [staying in the assistance system voluntarily] for doing so because they act rationally’.7 He does not interlink the choice directly with culture. According to the MPs, it is a matter of the malfunctioning system which makes beneficiaries inactive and allows them to choose such a way of life. Besides the malfunctioning and unjust system, the key is that welfare beneficiaries are systematically framed as criminals and delinquents, as I have already highlighted. In the ‘Story of a cancer’, in Chap. 4, I reconstructed the image of a social support system considered damaged as a result of allowing beneficiaries to abuse it easily, and leading thus to pathological behaviour among  SMER-SD, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?id=107504.  SDKÚ-DS, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111837.

6 7

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its recipients. Framing of the situation as ‘unbearable’, a ‘huge social problem’ and through the metaphor of ‘cancer’, receiving social support in form of material need becomes a security issue. Identifying a topic through the image of a disease, involving abnormal cell growth and killing a significant number of people around the world, implies the seriousness of the threat to group’s security and well-being. Political elites associate terms evoking negative emotions with welfare and with its recipients. If we look deeper into what Balzacq et al. (2010: 2) might have meant by ‘kaleidoscope of practices’ when talking about securitisation, we must make sense of the meanings these words carry. They are not mere words. They are representations of particular meanings. Through these meanings, political elites justify their political will, stating that (1) material need recipients as well as non-recipients must be protected from the dysfunctional system, (2) non-recipients must be protected from misbehaving claimants, and (3) misbehaving speculative claimants must be sacrificed for the sake of society and fairness. These narratives matter in the meaning-making of workfare. As Emmers (2010) reminds us, political discourse is comprised of elements such as images, claims, symbols, and language that are understandable to the public. People easily understand concepts such as unfairness, threat, fraud, or a problem, and they can mirror a problem’s consequences for their own lives. Through images evoking negative representations, dominant elites impose their political programmes (van Dijk 1997; Balzacq et al. 2010) and gain legitimation for restrictive measures. As I have already shown, the delinquency immunity is a major issue in the discussion about material need recipients. Mayors as well as parliamentary members point out that granting immunity to the poor is problematic because it allows them to commit petty offenses for which they need not pay fines as they do not have financial resources to do so (Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi 2003, 2014; Media Portal 2013a, b; Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska 2012; Kaliňák et  al. 2013a, b). For instance, the ATCS document says: ‘The continuing factual delinquency immunity of material need beneficiaries and the inefficiency of imposing a sanction destabilises the rule of law.’ Through the image of destabilisation and violation of the rule of law, the document evokes negative emotions connected to the idea of instability and potential danger to the justice system. The threat not only to fairness but also to the very basis of the legal system again adds to the support of restrictive measures that are implicitly claimed to secure the system and sanction those who (potentially) cause this instability.

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According to the proposal being debated, petty offenders in material need would now pay their fines from the benefits they receive, thus eliminating the delinquency immunity. One of the MPs (SDKÚ-DS) claims that such measure is ‘very harsh, very severe looking and sounding’ but at the same time, ‘it has some limitations’. He explains these limitations further; according to him, the problem is that ‘it is not possible to take all the money coming through social provisions’.8 The way I put the statements together suggests that the problem the MP identifies is the fact that people in material need would need to pay fines from their social provisions and, as a result, having even less money for their everyday lives. What he claims to be a problem is that there are legal, and not moral, obstacles to taking beneficiaries’ entire provision. The fundamental human right to social support seems to be missing. At this point, the image assumes a very negative tenor. The MP continues, stating that if petty offenders refuse to work off the fine, there should be the option to take their entire provision. What the MP sees as highly problematic is that one crime resulting in one fine can be subtracted from the social provision but if the person commits another crime, it would not be possible any more. He states: ‘All other petty crimes would be unpunishable and the delinquent can commit them further with impunity. And so, as he will be in a situation in which he has even less resources than before, it means, he is in an even worse income situation, probably, he will commit even more petty crimes.’9 The speaker not only reproduces or co-­ constructs this mental bridge between material need and crime, but even strengthens it by implying that recipients would commit more crime than they can pay for, adding to the seriousness of the problem. With this unsupported claim and criminalisation of the beneficiaries, the urgency for restrictive welfare measures increases easily. The criminalisation and securitisation of a certain group redefines relationships among members of a society and it can result in different forms of exclusion and deprivation of rights. In constructing the meanings of workfare, unconditional solidarity and human rights are not part of the norms essential for identity formation. They are not part of the message the public receives and identifies with. As I have pointed out, such norms carry certain meanings to actors, providing a behavioural guide to society. And thus, we can identify unfairness, crime, the call for activity, 8 9

 Ibid.  Ibid.

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responsibility, and justice through punishment as these norms and ‘strong ideas about appropriate or desirable behaviour’ (Agius 2010: 56). All these, together with images of instability and destabilisation of the rule of law, provide a strong blend of negative images, causing negative emotions that might be useful in legitimating restrictive measures. It is these restrictive measures that are depicted as having solved the identified problems and securing safety, fairness, and stability. According to Bigo (2002) and Balzacq et al. (2010: 10), securitisation does not require the adoption of exceptional laws or extraordinary legal procedures. Instead, security and risk practices are formulated also through ordinary law, the common procedure establishing legal identities. The othering, construction of boundaries between identities, cultures, and actual spaces, lead to the legal legitimisation of these constructive and intersubjective practices. As I show in this study, there is no need for extraordinary measures for a group or topic to be put under security scrutiny. Moreover, there is a fine line between what is an exceptional measure and what is not. Political measures must be considered contextually. In Slovakia, the historical context and the current system, not based exclusively on market-­ driven mechanisms (for example in education, health care, pensions, social support), must be taken into consideration. Even though the 2004 welfare reform was introduced by the political party oriented more towards the right side of the political spectrum, the 2013 proposal was the product of the leading party, supposedly social-democratic. Although there have been more restrictive welfare measures adopted step-by-step over the decades, the adoption of mandatory workfare is an extraordinary measure in the context of the international human rights treaties and declarations Slovakia has ratified. In claims assuring non-recipients’ security, political actors, who, according to the classic Critical Security Studies analytical frameworks, assume the roles of securitisation actors, mobilise various themes in order to convince the audience about the necessity of the measure, including different identity-based mobilisers (Roe 2010). In the empirical case examined for the purpose of this study, material need assistance and its beneficiaries are framed as an emerging threat that requires control and regulation measures. This framing occurs through images of crime, illegal activities, fraud, unfairness, and instability, all provoking rather negative ideas and emotions. The political response to the identified problems is workfare.

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As I have shown, political representatives argue to ensure fairness, and increase motivation, activity, and self-responsibility. Besides mandatory activation, cancellation of the delinquency immunity and sanctions is another response. Delinquent social assistance recipients not paying their fines and speculating over the convenience of employment are perceived as a threat to the ‘just’ system and thus, to the well-being of society. Not only restrictions in the use of language, the control of education, and the regulation of religious signs in public (ibid.), but also workfare and other restrictions on claiming assistance even in situations of substantial material need are among the tools addressing emerging threat(s) to society.

Implications for Securitisation Theory I would argue that there is no flawless theory on social issues. But such is the aim of scholars, even if it shouldn’t be. Developments in our societies are dynamic and so our theories must be as well. We have starting points, but then dialogues begin. We explore new ideas, new contexts, add new variables; in other words, we experiment with our thoughts while trying to explain the world around us. We experience reactions; we are challenged with new perspectives and different possible explanations. The theories we articulate evolve and that is a good thing. It means we are reflective and perhaps curious too. According to Emmers (2010), the major weakness of the securitisation model provided by the classics of the Copenhagen School is its lack of empirical research to back its key assertions. First, the framework is primarily theoretical and insufficiently understood at the empirical level. Since the 1980s and 1990s, a number of empirical studies have been conducted on how security issues are constructed within different contexts. Scholars have largely widened the knowledge we possess now. Questions that must be examined in more detail include, for instance: the nature of the issues articulated as a threat; the reasons for public acceptance or refusal of these claims; what makes some of these claims fail and what makes others successful (ibid.); who are the different audiences, and what power and role they have. As I show in this study, welfare is indeed one of the issues articulated as a threat and thus it can be added to the list of securitised topics. I have not come across any study examining welfare through lens of securitisation even though I would argue that it is important to study welfare from this perspective as it assists policy-makers and decision-makers in the adoption

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of restrictive measures and assistance cut-backs. There is a practical dimension of (restrictive) law as it has an impact on actual people, in this case, those who are threatened by poverty and multiple disadvantages. Moreover, depicting material need recipients as a ‘problem’ threatening society and the system establishes a negative image of claimants among the public, among non-beneficiaries. The problem is that this negative image and proclaimed threat potentially impacts relations among people. It might cause tensions—political, socio-economic, ethnic, or racial. Therefore, looking at welfare through the perspective of security issue construction, and at workfare as a governmental rationality or tool for dealing with a threat that should be dealt with, is relevant and beneficial. It helps to better understand developments in policies and in the social relations of contemporary societies. Of course, to study policies and the social relations they impact, there are many potentially sociologically interesting perspectives to apply. However, I consider looking at social assistance, and, in particular, at workfare, as a response, highly relevant. Framing material need claimants in terms of crime, fraud, unfairness, and irresponsibility, using associations such as ‘cancer’ or a huge or ‘unbearable’ problem, brings doubt and suspicion into the perception of social assistance. It results in a call for fixing these problems and securing society’s well-being. The criminalisation and securitisation of material need recipients thus provides a resonating image, and as a result, a fitting legitimation framework for restrictive measures aiming at regulating people’s behaviour. Another aspect of classic securitisation theory I would point at is the role of the audience. There has been a lively discussion about the role and impact of audiences in the securitisation act and the securitisation process. Despite the intersubjective character of securitisation theory and the dependence of its success on audience approval, the concept of the audience has not been studied and developed in much detail (Balzacq et al. 2016; Côté 2016; Williams 2010). As Côté (2016: 543) states, there is a contradiction in the theory. On the one hand, the process is intersubjective in its character but, at the same time, the audience seems to be rather a passive agent. On the one hand, audiences are claimed to be important for securitisation outcomes, but on the other, the ability of audiences to engage actively in the process is nearly non-­ existent within securitization theory. This not only analytically prevents the audience from having any significant effect on the nature and outcome of

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securitization processes but also dilutes the intersubjective disposition of securitization theory, producing a linear and rigid view of the securitization process that conflicts with the empirical literature regarding security threat construction.

By the audience, we might mean whomever the message is dedicated to. We must be clear about the multiplicity of audiences (Balzacq et al. 2016); there is no single audience the speech or practice is dedicated to. Of course, different audiences might assume different roles based on their position within the social relations structure and based on what political actors expect to receive from diverse audiences. In political discourse, there are clusters of audiences, such as other politicians, practitioners, local governments, media, interest groups, voters, and more. Even these can be divided into smaller subgroups based on political affiliation, socio-­ economic status, interest, age, gender, ethnicity, or region. There has been a call for reconceptualising the role of audiences in securitisation theory. This reconceptualisation should be based on different contexts as ‘each setting is characterized by a specific type of audience with particular expectations’ (Balzacq et al. 2016: 500). In this study, the above-mentioned variety of audiences is relevant for the legitimation of restrictive policy. Primarily, in the parliamentary debates, speakers address their arguments to other politicians. Though, their ideas and arguments are often built upon ideas they have heard from other actors, such as local governments, media, or various interest groups, who are thus audiences too. At the same time, they want to send a message to the public, to people who live in regions where ‘public demand’ originates. They indirectly send messages also to beneficiaries themselves. Nevertheless, the last of these audiences is not necessarily the one from which political actors need and expect approval. Frankly, they do not aim at getting support for restrictive policy from the group they frame as a threat, fraudulent, and ‘unadaptable’ and that they seek to control and regulate. Even though the audience is an important element in the securitisation process, in my research, I find that under certain circumstances it is not the essential element in making the securitisation process successful. There are at least two levels to such a statement. One has already been discussed by scholars—what we consider a ‘successful’ result of securitisation. In my study, it is the adoption and enforcement of restrictive workfare measure together with cancellation of the so-called delinquency immunity which

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allows for subtracting fines from the material need benefit. In the long term, and with a special focus on the Slovak context, we can consider ‘success’ also the discipline and punishment imposed on Romani welfare beneficiaries. One of the conditions for ‘success’ of securitisation, besides the threat identification and the act that follows this identification, is also justification of the Act with reference to this declared threat that must follow (Floyd 2016). In our case, the threat has been defined, a legal proposal has been written and debated, and it has been justified and even adopted. Let’s return to what I stated about the audience and about its approval not being essential within particular settings. According to Floyd (ibid.: 691), ‘there simply is no conclusive relationship between audience acceptance and the “success” of securitization. Sometimes the audience’s response to the securitizing move matters; sometimes it does not. This inconclusiveness means that a sanctioning audience cannot and thus ought not play a decisive role in the “existence” and consequently the “success” of securitization, and any corresponding securitization theory.’ Of course, we must bear in mind the multiplicity of relevant audiences. In my argument, however, I am thinking of a particular audience—the public.10 The public is important because political ‘marketers’ try to sell their ideas to people. These people represent the vox populi but they also possess power; they are potential voters and ‘customers’. What I mean to say is that when it comes to the themes I have discussed in relation to material need recipients, the situational persuasion of the public is not difficult and thus politicians need not wait for the approval of a particular measure. The cases I identify include the negative representation of the identified problem that has already been accepted by the public in the past. When public attitudes towards a group, topic, or perceived problem are negative in the long run and certain group(s) have already been associated with adverse characteristics, it is easier for political actors to pass legislation unfavourable towards such group(s) even without waiting for consensual public approval of the particular legislation. Using images of cancer and danger, using the arguments referring to fairness and the ‘just’ system, together with the ‘public demand’ I discussed in Chap. 6, politicians do not necessarily need public approval of restrictive workfare measures. In the context of long-lasting negative representations of social assistance 10  Here, I am talking mainly about the public in terms of inhabitants of the country, voters but also non-voters, youth, seniors, men, women, business owners or workers, simply, people as a whole. Here, I do not differentiate between different subgroups of this audience.

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beneficiaries cultivated in society, the legitimation of restrictive measures might occur much more easily. The ‘crossbreeding’ of images of laziness, inactivity, speculation, and crime with public demand for fairness provides a useful blend for smooth persuasion and acceptance. Moreover, as I show in Chap. 9, in Slovakia, restrictive measures in welfare may be publicly supported as they usually target the Romani minority, especially Roma who live in segregated areas and already face poverty and multiple disadvantages. For centuries, members of Romani communities have been framed almost exclusively through negative unpleasant images and characteristics. Therefore, in Slovak society, negative mental representations of Roma have fuelled ongoing discrimination and social tensions, and as a consequence, have given politicians a metaphorical permanent pass for restrictive, disciplining, controlling, and regulatory measures against Roma. Another weakness of securitisation theory is that the difference between politicised and securitised issues is blurred (Emmers 2010). It is thus difficult to identify the line between an act of securitisation and an act of politicisation. Furthermore, issues articulated in terms of security may remain within the political domain and are addressed through standard political procedures (ibid.). According to Floyd (2016: 691), it does not matter to securitisation ‘success’ whether the threat is existential or the response to it is extraordinary, ‘but rather that practitioners believe the danger or harm a threat to their security (however defined), and regard what they do in response to the threat they themselves identified to be an implemented security policy’. Here, I would suggest to change the word ‘believe’ for the word ‘present’ or ‘claim’. It might not be clear from the political debates, as they are essentially performative, but securitisation actors, political actors, and practitioners do not need to believe in the danger they are constructing in their discourses. What matters is what they claim, how they present it, and what implications it has. The line between standard and exceptional measures might be blurred also in the case analysed here. Political discussions over material need assistance as a politicised issue and the consequent legislation adoption are one of the political domains. It is part of the policy-making and decision-­ making process in which problems are identified and proposed solutions are discussed. What might be blurred here, however, is the boundary between standard and exceptional measures. Is workfare a standard measure posing only some additional restrictions for material need claimants? Or is it already a measure outside of the standard track of social assistance policies? Is such a binary even necessary here? I argue that, if we strictly

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want to follow the proposed dichotomy, workfare introduction within the Slovak material need assistance framework is indeed an extraordinary political measure, based on the wider context of which parties initiated such policies and the international framework for fundamental human rights. First, Slovakia is one of the successors of the communist regime within which socialism, along with a formal attempt to obscure socio-economic or ethnic differences, was the overarching ideology. Accordingly, one might expect a certain echo of this heritage nowadays. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the history of ethnic nationalism in Central Europe. This environment thus suggests it is important to examine the adoption of neoliberal ideas taking into consideration ‘historical criteria for belonging and social inclusion’ (Mijs et al. 2016: 1). The spread of neoliberal ideals at the global level is important to follow. However, context matters, and thus regional and local cultural criteria cannot be omitted as they too set conditions for boundary work between and among groups. Even though the construction of the path towards the adoption of workfare started much sooner (at the end of 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s), the first sketches and the final look of the 2013 workfare proposal come from the laboratory of parties anchored in social conservative and populist ideologies—HZDS and SMER-SD. As Kusá (2008) argues, the transformation of social assistance was at play even before the major social reforms of Dzurinda’s second administration were initiated between 2002 and 2006. The principles for further development in social assistance had already been formulated, including the cancellation of a secured level of minimum wage or the conditioning of social assistance (ibid.). Already in the 1996 Conception of the Social Sphere transformation, ‘declared social justice meets the stress on the personal responsibility of citizens’ (Kusá 2008: 23). Thus, it was already since the 1990s that an emphasis on individual and household responsibility started to come to life in political strategies (Kusá 2011–2013). Of course, populism as a concept has been transforming. Even though the literature on populism has tended to focus on right-wing populist parties, March (2007) argues that the decline of Marxism’s dominance across the left has opened up a new path for leftist parties in which populism has become an intrinsic component. For example, despite its social-democratic attribute, the party proposing the restrictive measures discussed in this study (SMER-SD) pursues xenophobia and anti-Roma discourses and policies, it is against accepting Muslim refugees from Syria but not

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Christians, and it initiated a referendum about marriage being the exclusive bond between a man and a woman. Second, I consider workfare an exceptional measure also in the context of the internationally accepted fundamental human rights framework. According to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 22 (United Nations 1948), ‘[e]veryone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality’. Moreover, there are international legal frameworks from the International Labour Office and the European Social Charter (Council of Europe 2015) guaranteeing ‘a broad range of everyday human rights related to employment, housing, health, education, social protection and welfare’. Also, as I show in the Conclusion, critiques of workfare argue that the measure introduces features of forced labour as claimants must accept the offered employment activity if they want to get the assistance. Therefore, in the context of international law, in which forced labour if prohibited, obligatory workfare indeed seems to be an extraordinary measure. * * * Issues other than the traditional ones that have formulated securitisation theory are worth noting. The themes which policy-makers address as security issues must be one of the topics worthy of empirical investigation. In this study, I take the issue of welfare under scrutiny, filling in some of the gaps in securitisation theory, while relying on empirical analysis. I have argued that looking at welfare through the perspective of security issue construction, and at workfare as a governmental rationality or tool for dealing with a threat, is relevant and beneficial as it helps to better understand developments in policies and in the social relations of contemporary societies. I have shown how security shows up in political debates about welfare and what purpose it might fulfil. I have explained that images of threat to the system, to society, and to beneficiaries themselves show up in material need assistance political discourse. Further, links between claimants and crime or images of disease and an ‘unbearable’ problem add to construction of a threatening picture associated with material need recipients. I have shown that such a framework serves as the legitimation of

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restrictive control-oriented measures and as the legitimation of the regulation of society, foremost, concerning the groups which are defined as undeserving or problematic. Security thus becomes one of the ways through which the boundary between beneficiary and non-beneficiary is created, and workfare is the tool regulating these relationships. The threat to a ‘just’ system, and the irresponsibility and calculation of beneficiaries, serve as boundary lines between those who deserve assistance and those who do not. I have also added to discussion on securitisation theory, agreeing with the scholars who assert that the concept of the audience must be examined within particular settings. I argue that under certain circumstances, the audience, even if very generalised at this particular moment, does not need to be an active part of the securitisation process. This occurs, for instance, when the threat declared by political actors refers to a group of people who have already been framed with negative, unpleasant images for long period of time. To material need beneficiaries, this has been occurring since the economic transition after the fall of the communist regime. With regard to Roma, this negative framing has been around for centuries and it is still going on in most places where Romani communities live, especially those who face poverty and exclusion. In Slovakia, the identities of material need beneficiaries and of Roma often overlap, creating thus a metaphoric ‘monster image’ of people representing threat and who therefore must be controlled and regulated. As the practical dimension is an important component of modern securitisation theory, it would be worth examining how the securitisation of material need recipients and the enforcement of workfare actually operate in practice. Nevertheless, if looking at securitisation from the perspective of the severity of the measures and acts pursued, workfare is indeed an extraordinary measure, at least from the point of view of human rights and social inclusion. It imposes actual punishments on people and directly aims at controlling and regulating beneficiary behaviour.

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Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi a o zmene dopnení niektorých zákonov v znení zákona č. 183/2014 Z.z. a zákona č. 308/2014 Z.z. (Act on Assistance in Material No. 417/2013 Coll. and on amendments of Act No. 183/2014 Coll. And Anct No. 308/2014 Coll.) [online] [cit. 10.10.2015]. http://www.ozinfodom.info/files/spaw/files/2013-­z417.pdf. Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi a o zmene dopnení niektorých zákonov v znení zákona č. 599/2003 Z.z. (Act on Assistance in Material No. 599/2003 Coll. and on amendments) [online] [cit. 10.10.2015]. https://www.slov-­lex.sk/ pravne-­predpisy/SK/ZZ/2003/599/20070901.html.

CHAPTER 8

Population Control Through Security Discourses

I ended the previous chapter with a kind of cliff-hanger, saying that workfare measures represent actual punishments of people and directly aim at controlling and regulating peoples’ behaviour. Moreover, at several points in this study, I have already claimed that policy-makers use workfare legitimation as approval for the control and regulation of not only knowledge but also behaviour and relations between groups. In this chapter, I bring in another concept I find relevant for understanding and explaining what occurs in welfare and workfare discourses. I already served the governmentality appetizer in the previous chapter when I was discussing recent developments in securitisation theory. Here, I further elaborate on what ‘governmentality’ means and how it may be of help in understanding the legal introduction of restrictive welfare measures. I start to assemble all the pieces of the puzzle—political discourse, securitisation, boundary-making, and governmentality—making sense of the case study of Slovak material need assistance. I argue that welfare and workfare are not only governmental rationalities framing particular governmental actions such as the adoption of legal measures, but also tools through which power, control, and regulation as governmental actions are executed. In depicting material need beneficiaries as naturally and rationally thinking beings speculating over social assistance, political actors complement the picture of a welfare dependent, introducing the discourse of neoliberal self-responsibility into social assistance provision. Accompanied with images of crime, unfairness, or © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kissová, Framing Welfare Recipients in Political Discourse, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63579-4_8

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unadaptability, policy-makers and other relevant political actors seek to legitimate restrictive measures in social assistance.

Behaviour Control and Regulation The approach of governments to individuals or groups in the welfare system can be spotlighted from various perspectives. Beck (1992), for example, identifies a change in the structure of the labour market resulting from the decrease in mass industrial employment, the increase in income inequalities, and new political pressures in societies as the key factors behind the erosion of solidarity within ‘old’ welfare systems. This list has not lost its legitimacy over the years; however, the most popular way to justify welfare cut-backs in recent times appears to be a shift towards stressing individual attitudes and their ‘adjustment’ in order to make them responsible for their own lives and well-being (Levitas 2005). To explain the individualisation connected to people’s conduct, Foucault (2007) introduces the concept of governmentality—the ‘mentality’ or rationality of government to govern and control people through knowledge, enabling individuals to conduct and govern themselves. Governmentality has several aspects. Firstly, it is the ensemble formed by institutions, processes, reflections, calculations, and tactics, allowing the exercise of complex power over a population. This execution is based on apparatuses of security which are the key technical instruments in population management. Foucault (1978) identifies another aspect of governmentality in this context, and it is the political economy. In his view, it is not only a new field of science, but also a characteristic form of governmental intervention in the field of economy and population, multiple relationships between population, territory, wealth, and government. Secondly, governmentality might be viewed as the tactics of government that allow the continual definition of what should or should not be a part of the state’s domain, what does and what does not fall within state’s competence (Foucault 1978: 108–109). For this study, the following notion is important—government and control occur via an ensemble of tactics, institutions, processes, and tools, allowing the exercise of complex power over a population, one of which is the political discourse on welfare and workfare. Governmentality theories seek to explain the growing risk awareness in different societies and how risks shift the ways in which these societies are governed. The analysis thus focuses on the ‘construction of realities

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through practice and sense-making, encompassing the multitude of societal organisations and institutions producing social realities’ (Taylor-­ Gooby and Zinn 2006: 43). Therefore, the focus is on how governmental rationalities, or governmental mentalities, produce and define ‘reality’. Governmental rationalities are systematically organised sets of categories, problematics, and discourses of how to govern well (Zinn 2008). Furthermore, the nature and forms of these rationalities are tightly connected to governmental technologies as these reflect particular visions of government. The picture of reality and the idea of how to manage and govern society are transformed into technologies of government, or the techniques, practices, and instruments with the aim to achieve these visions, images, and ideas. Power relations contain a complex net of strategies, objectives, tactics, and calculations which are immanent to relations between population, territory, wealth, and government. As there is no power existing without any objective and end, Foucault assumes that power relations are intentional, and so, they are formulated through goal-directed calculations. Thus, the power rationality is characterised by the existence and formulation of tactics and strategies that must be analysed (Foucault 1978). These strategies include multiple discursive elements that assume an important role. Discourse is a milieu in which power and knowledge are joined together. Discursive strategies are complex; accordingly, it is important to analyse who produces discourse, what position this person assumes within power relations, and what is the context of the discourse and its relations. All these aspects may have an impact on the discursive outcomes. One specific type of power Foucault discusses is bio-power. He defines it as ‘the set of mechanisms of power through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power’ (Foucault 2007: 1). Bio-power is a complex set of tactics, strategies, and mechanisms used to regulate and control the population, in other words, the technology of power to manage people. Bio-power is different from discipline even though they are complementary. Power cannot be simply reduced to discipline as it is a multiplicity of relations. Bio-power differs from discipline in sense that it not only compels individuals to obey but also provides the ability to manage entire populations. The policy-makers in this case study present material need beneficiary activity and the willingness to be active as natural biological features. One MP argues:

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The system is set up well if the interconnection is made to really offer help to people who need it and at the same time, not to liquidate motivation, the natural human motivation to work, care for himself, stand on his own feet, self-develop, advance his own family and neighbourhood.1

Actors objectify the ‘natural willingness to be active’ and use it as a rationality for measures they want to enforce. In the case of workfare, a certain form of bio-power is thus interconnected with discipline. Those who do not fit this constructed human feature of ‘normality’ must be ‘adjusted’ and sanctioned if they refuse. Security is an important aspect of bio-power. Security is the exercise of power over a territory, over individual bodies, and over an entire population (Foucault 2007). It must be studied as the strategic effect of specific power relations and knowledge within specific discourses. Balzacq et al. (2016) suggest that we need to study power relations because they form ways of thinking, behaving, and shape also the way subjects and issues will be formulated. It is the spaces of security in which significant calculations come into play. A space of security refers to a series of possible events, temporal and uncertain, which must be inserted within a given space. The construction of spaces of security ‘is simply a matter of maximizing the positive elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation [of capital, goods, and people], and of minimizing what is risky and inconvenient, like theft and disease, while knowing that they will be completely suppressed’ (Foucault 2007: 19). Looking at ways of governing and the rationalities behind them, ‘ensures that securitization theory also considers the condition under which regimes of practices emerge and are reformed or dismantled’ (Balzacq et al. 2016: 497, emphasis in original). Securitisation and governmentality frameworks are complementary; they assist each other in better understanding rationalities behind particular political measures. As Balzacq et al. (ibid.) put it, securitisation theory is the one which explores security rationalities through the analytics of government, and at the same time pays attention to what speech act theories have to say in this. As I explained in Chap. 7, material need assistance is one of these spaces in which security is debated and practised. With particular political goals on the agenda, (political) actors construct narratives around workfare and the delinquency immunity. These narratives are framed through images of 1

 SDKÚ-DS, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111837.

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crime, fraud, or unfairness. The power relations between actors who have access to national discourses and people who become subjects of these narratives are asymmetrical, providing thus stronger positions for political calculation and marketing for restrictive measures towards groups that must be regulated. Because social policy, including welfare, is a form of governmental rationality, according to Foucault (2008), and a form of governmental action, it is necessary to examine the strategies and technologies behind these policies and proposed measures, the discourse rationalities, and the actors involved in the formation of power relations related to tactics for the management of society. In this study, I argue precisely that welfare and workfare are not only governmental rationalities which frame particular governmental actions but also tools through which power, control, and regulation are executed.

Regulating Behaviour Through Material Need Assistance According to Dean (1998: 26), the focus in the study of governmentality must be on practices through which diverse social, communal, and political actors and authorities ‘attempt to direct the actions of individuals and populations in the name of ethical ideals, political ends, economic necessity, and social goals’. Further, security, as well as welfare, are practice-­ oriented domains; they are not only a rhetorical performance, but also designed through technical, operational, and practical modalities (Balzacq et al. 2016). According to the actors in my study, the proclaimed political, social, and ethical aims of compulsory activation or cancellation of the delinquency immunity are an increase in motivation and activity of recipients, the prevention of fraud, an increase in self-responsibility, and securing a just system for taxpayers and hard-working, employed persons. All these aims are presented as complementary and necessary in order to secure a well-functioning assistance system. Accordingly, the political practice of a parliamentary debate in which an MP (SDKÚ-DS) states that ‘poverty grows and it costs society more and more money’, ‘every financial transaction must be conditioned with a certain way of behaving oneself’, or ‘[the system should] ask for something in return if it gives something to its members’ leads us to Dean’s theoretical trajectory about the attempt to direct the actions of individuals and

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populations (Dean 1998, 2010).2 These rationalities are not, however, randomly existing sets of thoughts. On the contrary, governmental rationalities are systematically organised sets of categories, strategies, defined problematics, and discourses of how to govern (Zinn 2008). The nature and forms of such rationalities reflect a government’s visions and thus are connected to governmental technologies—tools through which political actors bring their interests and goals into effect. In Slovak (welfare) policy, individualisation has taken place already for some time. According to Kusá (2011–2013), the decrease in solidarity indicated by value surveys corresponds to an increase in self-responsibility and a meritocratic understanding of justice in Slovak political documents. In the Slovak Government Programme Statements (SGPS), the question of responsibility had already been present since 1990. As stated already in the 1990 federal document, the market economy required an awareness of the responsibility of all citizens for their own destiny (ibid.). Moreover, the 1992 Mečiar government shifted the discourse, indicating that lack of personal responsibility is the cause of problems related to increased unemployment. In the 1994 government, the strengthening of personal responsibility in citizens’ ‘social destiny’ became the ‘fundamental strategic governmental aim’ (SGPS 1994  in Kusá 2011–2013: 9). This outlook corresponds with what I have stated in Chap. 7—that the pathway towards neoliberal attitudes about social assistance had already been constructed prior to the 2003–2004 reform. The trend built upon individualisation and restricting assistance provisions only continued, providing the ideological and political space for the adoption of mandatory activation. Based on my open coding of the parliamentary debates and the strategic documents, several codes appear as keywords. Around these, political ‘farmers’ cultivate the idea of the necessity to regulate the behaviour of material need beneficiaries. These ‘buzzwords’ are (1) skills, (2) motivation, (3) (in)activity, and (4) responsibility. They might not seem so innovative in the context of the neoliberal framing of individualised risk and welfare retrenchment developments in recent decades. In the Slovak political discourse, however, some of these labels are filled with rather different, not so straightforward, meanings. As I have already highlighted in different parts of the analysis, political actors attribute different roles to the state. According to the mayors’ document, the state is perceived as the protector of internal order and security,  Ibid.

2

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the builder of an orderly society, the enforcer of the law, and the guardian of health, property, and freedoms. It is also viewed as the mediator of the behaviour of society’s members. With regard to material need assistance, cancelling beneficiaries’ delinquency immunity and dealing with sanctions for their petty crimes seem to be important aspects of moralisation, criminalisation, and boundary-making between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ beneficiaries, or between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Besides being a topic of discussion, it is also an intermediator for governmental intervention in the name of a ‘stable and orderly society’ (ATCS strategic document). There is another role the state assumes. It is expected to be the educator. According to the ATCS members, ‘[s]ocial welfare tools fulfil only one of their roles, the redistributive one. Their mission to positively influence recipient behaviour, or the strengthening of socially desirable behaviour, is not met.’ Further, ‘[s]anctions placed on beneficiaries have lost their main functions a long time ago, mainly the educative, preventive, and securing ones’. So, the state and the system, even though both are abstract categories, are endowed with the requirement to become educators. In a less abstract fashion, national policy-makers, as holders of substantial and symbolic power, are expected to adopt such measures that will lead to material need beneficiaries behaving in a ‘socially desirable’ way—concretely, through workfare. According to one MP, the Act has ‘really huge importance’ for the area of social benefits in general but also for the ‘way it influences the behaviour of these groups’.3 Thus, policy-makers seek to influence recipient behaviour through making material need assistance less attractive. They expect people will ‘adjust’ their behaviour according to the attractiveness of the employment of social welfare and the respective life strategy they choose to follow (Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi 2003, 2014; Media Portal 2013a, b; Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska 2012; Kaliňák et al. 2013a, b). One of the governmental rationalities of neoliberal attitudes towards welfare is the increase in skills and self-improvement believed to help to increase employability. As I have already discussed, this rationality and its outcomes are misleading, according to studies which show that activation and workfare do not increase employability. On the contrary, they deepen stigma and keep people in low-paid and low-skilled jobs. Another crucial rationality in this regard is motivation and ‘activity in inactivity’. Political representatives, when presenting welfare cut-backs, highlight the very idea of an increase in one’s motivation for self-improvement or 3

 SDKÚ-DS, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?id=107419.

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self-development. They seek to stimulate individuals’ engagement in paid work, motivate people to provide for themselves, and encourage the provision of family care at the same time. According to Taylor-Gooby (2004), they direct attention to the issues of legitimation and moral values. Morality is covered under ideas about ‘pathological behaviour’, ‘socially desired behaviour’, ‘abnormal behaviour’, and ‘fairness’, as well as in views such as the necessity to give something back to society. ‘If society secures these basic needs without expecting anything in return, it might happen that the normal, natural, healthy motivation to provide these needs by one’s own activity would be eliminated’, an MP explains (SDKÚ-DS). The assistance system works well only if it motivates individuals to take care of themselves and their families. Further, the motivation to work and take care of oneself are perceived as ‘naturally’ given to human beings. Up to this point, there is not any significant divergence from the neoliberal requirements for welfare and human behaviour. However, as I have already sketched out in several instances, motivation is upended, having very negative contours. Politicians do not suggest to motivate material need beneficiaries in a positive way through positive intentions but rather through punishment and discipline. According to one MP, ‘The goal of the Act is to produce pressure on beneficiaries’, who are expected to alter their ‘pathological’ behaviour.4 First, motivation works in the binary of ‘natural healthy motivation’ to work versus the voluntary motivation to remain on welfare. Second, in turn, negative motivations to make the system unattractive, to pose sanctions to delinquents and to parents, are derived. Motivation is inseparably interlinked with discipline. Some opposition and coalition MPs agreed that the benefit drawback serves as a motivating tool. In the end, punishment functions as a motivating tool. (Self-)responsibility is the fourth major keyword political actors operate with when framing material need beneficiaries. It is directly linked to recipients’ (in)activity. On the one hand, beneficiaries are expected to be active, willing to enhance their skills. On the other, persons lacking responsibility are viewed as those who have resigned or will resign on self-­ improvement and self-activation soon. More importantly, what policy-makers underline is the idea that recipients are responsible for their own decisions and activities. According to the Minister (SMER-SD), responsibility for delinquency should be subjective and no one can bear responsibility for others, for ‘offenders’. 4

 Ibid.

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As Lamont and Fournier (1992) states, the moral element in meaning-­ making, in this case, the blame for resignation and the lack of self-­ responsibility, is part of (moral) boundary construction. Policy-makers assign meaning to the workfare measures through criminalisation on the one hand and risk individualisation on the other, while both are anchored in a moral claim. However, it seems rather different from what Levitas (2005) has described as the ‘moral underclass’, in which poverty is matter of culture, and beneficiaries—criminals, the unemployable, and single mothers—are framed as morally failed individuals. To be sure, Slovak political representatives also depict beneficiaries as delinquents and resigned individuals. However, the boundary is constructed around the strong social and moral appeal of fairness towards the rest of society, which expects to get something back from people who are considered inactive and resigned freeloaders. These moral boundaries are based on work ethics and solidarity, as Lamont and Fournier (1992) says; however, both, including a general consideration for other human beings in a positive sense, are rather missing from the discourse. Instead, they are presented to a large extent in a negative way through blame and victimisation.

Material Need Recipients’ Rationality as a Form of Governmental Rationality I have already addressed the topic of rationality in terms of beneficiaries’ speculation over welfare and employment. Even though this picture is presented and propagated mostly by one of the MPs and thus, it might not seem dominant, I consider it a good example of the discursive contents politicians use to market the restrictive policy product within a neoliberal market-oriented environment. Moreover, I find the narrative important as it is crossbred by the former Minister of Labour, Social Affairs, and the Family, one of the persons initiating the 2003–2004 welfare reform. He states: The danger of good intentions in this area [material need assistance], in the area of social laws, is that even with the well-intentioned effort to help, it is precisely the natural nature of a person to take care of himself. Because man is a thinking creature, a creature who seeks rational solutions to his situation, and the basic, essential, essential life situation that man always solves is to make a living, secure basic living needs, and then comes the rest. If a company provides a critical mass of resources to ensure these basic needs, with-

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out anything else, it may be that the normal, natural, healthy motivation to secure these resources by his own activity can be disposed. It’s totally logical and I think it’s easy to understand. If the amount that can be obtained by work is similar to or equal to the amount that can be obtained without work, only on the basis of other criteria, such as the size of the household or other matter, one naturally chooses the easier way. Nor can it be blamed on those people who choose to do so because they are rational.5

We can identify many significant moments in this brief paragraph. First, we see biologisation—of the human ‘natural nature’ to engage in self-care and self-responsibility. This strong claim poses pressure on beneficiaries as it depicts self-responsibility as ‘normal’, even biologically encoded. Material need policies and legislation become mechanisms of power through which these claimed biological features are objectified, becoming thus means for strategies of political marketing. Biologisation, together with criminalisation and securitisation, not only creates artificial symbolic boundaries between different groups, but via the legitimation of restrictive measures that reinforce these boundaries, social boundaries and inequalities deepen as well. Therefore, the discursive crossbreeding of the biological ‘nature’ of human beings, danger, and morality in form of (un) fairness towards the in-group provide power holders a strategic tool to achieve political goals, and consequently, to regulate the behaviour of a population. The second interesting feature is the concept of human rationality. Even though in this excerpt, rationality might seem to be presented as a general characteristic of humanity, if we look more deeply into the text and take into consideration the context, it is clear that rationality in these debates is associated with material need assistance claimants. Despite the disclaimer ‘nor can it be blamed on those people’, later in the text, rationality is directly connected to fraud and speculation over welfare and employment. Therefore, rationality is complemented not only with the idea of a ‘welfare dependent’ but also with a request for discipline. In this brief excerpt, bio-power and discipline come together and form an assemblage of tactics and strategies to control and manage people. * * *

 SDKÚ-DS, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111837.

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In this chapter, I have elaborated the key themes around which political farmers cultivate the idea of the necessity for restrictive material need assistance measures that regulate the behaviour of material need beneficiaries: (1) skills, (2) motivation, (3) (in)activity, and (4) responsibility. All four are features that come with neoliberal rhetoric and are thus common across neoliberal discourses on welfare retrenchment. Further, they are accompanied by a certain moral claim towards the part of society that we can understand as an in-group (in the sense of the binaries I presented in Chap. 6). Such representations complement the images of threat and danger presented in the previous chapter. Governmental rationalities interplay with the construction of (in)security in society. (In)security then assists in constructing and legitimating these (control-oriented) rationalities. To conclude, I have provided an extended example in which governmentality is clearly demonstrated. In this illustration, the biologisation of ‘natural’ human rationality and self-responsibility merge, creating a strong political strategy for the legitimation of restrictive welfare measures. Biologisation, moralisation, and criminalisation, together with securitisation, as presented in this case study, are significant governmental tools allowing the exercise of complex power over a population. They thus become key technical and discursive instruments in population management.

References Balzacq, T., Léonard, S., Ruzicka, J. 2016. “‘Securitization’ revisited: theory and cases.” International Relations 30 (4): 494–531. Beck, U. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage. Dean, M. 1998. Risk, Calculable and Incalculable. Soziale Welt 49 (1): 25–42. ———. 2010. Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. Foucault, M. 1978. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. Volume I. New York: Random House, Inc. ———. 2007. Security, Territory, Population. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2008. The Birth of Biopolitics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kaliňák, R., P.  Pollák, and Saloň. 2013a. Správna cesta (Rómska reforma): Vzdelávanie (The Roma Reform (The Right Way): Education) [online] [cit. 27.6.2016]. http://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/mvsr/romsky_splnomocnenec/Romska_reforma_vzdelavanie.pdf. ̌ ———. 2013b. Správna cesta (Rómska reforma): Vymožitelnost ̌ práva (The Roma Reform (The Right Way): Law Enforcement) [online] [cit. 29.6.2016]. Available from: http://www.minv.sk/?pravo_rr.

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Kusá, Z. 2011–2013. Premeny chápania sociálnej spravodlivosti v programových vyhláseniach vlád SR.  In VEGA 2/0119/11 Využitie súc ̌asných sociologických teórií pri analýze sociálnych problémov na Slovensku. Bratislava: Slovak Academy of Science. Lamont, M., and M.  Fournier, eds. 1992. Cultivating Differences: Symbolic Boundaries and the Making of Inequality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Levitas, R. 2005. The Inclusive Society? Social exclusion and New Labour. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Media Portal. National Council of the Slovak Republic. 2013a. The 23rd hearing [online] [cit. 6.3.2021]. https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?. ———. 2013b. The 25th hearing [online] [cit. 6.3.2021]. https://tv.nrsr.sk/ archiv/schodza/6/25?. Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska. 2012. Návrh opatrení sekcie sociálnych vecí ̌ (The Rady ZMOS na riešenie problematiky marginalizovaných skupín obyvatelov Council of the Association of Towns and Cities of Slovakia: The Proposal of measures for solving the problematics of marginalised groups of inhabitants). Žilina: ZMOS. Taylor-Gooby, P., ed. 2004. New Risks, New Welfare: The Transformation of the European Welfare State. New York: Oxford University Press. Taylor-Gooby, P., and J. Zinn, eds. 2006. Risk in Social Science. New York: Oxford University Press. Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi a o zmene dopnení niektorých zákonov v znení zákona c ̌. 183/2014 Z.z. a zákona c ̌. 308/2014 Z.z. (Act on Assistance in Material No. 417/2013 Coll. and on Amendments of Act No. 183/2014 Coll. And Anct No. 308/2014 Coll.) [online] [cit. 10.10.2015]. http://www.ozinfodom.info/files/spaw/files/2013-­z417.pdf. Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi a o zmene dopnení niektorých zákonov v znení zákona c ̌. 599/2003 Z.z.. (Act on Assistance in Material No. 599/2003 Coll. and on Amendments) [online] [cit. 10.10.2015]. https://www.slov-­lex.sk/pravne-­ predpisy/SK/ZZ/2003/599/20070901.html. Zinn, J.O. 2008. Social Theories of Risk and Uncertainty: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

CHAPTER 9

Ethnicity Plays Its Part

I have already made sense of the categories, themes, arguments, and images in play during the construction of the idea of workfare. The securitisation of material need and its beneficiaries, and the biologisation of self-responsibility, together with a moral claim towards society, interplay in the construction of workfare rationalities, while serving as a political/governmental tool to control and regulate the behaviour of particular groups of people. In this final analytical chapter, I add one last piece to this complex puzzle. In the processes I have already outlined, various boundaries are constructed between people. In Slovakia, the question of who must be sacrificed, controlled, adapted, disciplined, and separated from others assumes an ethnic dimension. Ethnicity, often intertwined with lower socio-economic status, cannot be ignored; it is an integral part of welfare policy-making. You might recall that in Chap. 4, I presented and discussed the various categories politicians use when they talk and write about material need social assistance and workfare. I also discussed the characteristics they associate with these categories. Among these, the most frequent are long-­ term unemployed, low-skilled, poor, marginalised groups, socially dependent, offenders, Roma, unadaptable, and persons from disadvantaged environments. I highlighted the significant interlinkages policy-makers create among some of these categories. The links are important as they construct mental representations of certain topics or characteristics and the groups associated with them. These links are further communicated to society and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kissová, Framing Welfare Recipients in Political Discourse, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63579-4_9

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if accepted, they may easily reproduce. With politicised themes, such acceptance and reproduction assist the legitimation of the measures elite representatives pursue in dealing with them. This study is not about Roma as such and was never intended to be. Even though some of the activists I met in 2013 talked about the Act and workfare as an ‘anti-Roma’ measure, as a researcher, I did not want to fall into the trap of simply searching for Roma and ethnicity everywhere in the discourse. However, very soon in the analysis, I realised it would be inevitable to look at the role of ethnicity. Ethnicity, of Roma in particular, is not the bearing wall of the discourse on workfare and the Material Need Assistance Act. Nevertheless, it repeatedly appears in this discourse. And with the larger context in mind, referring to the history of Roma in Central Europe, to the negative socio-economic situation of many of them, and to the long-term negative perceptions of non-Roma towards Roma, exploring the role of ethnicity in political discourse and workfare legitimation has become unavoidable. Examining the documents and the political debates in the National Council (Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi 2003, 2014; Media Portal 2013a, b; Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska 2012; Kaliňák et al. 2013a, b), I found that even though policy-makers claim the Act is ethnically neutral, they often mention Roma in relation to material need, linking them to terms such as problem, crime, offenses, and poverty. They also bring in stories and images in which Roma play leading roles. In this chapter, I would like to continue to discuss the boundary-making processes occurring in or through welfare-workfare discourses. I consider boundary work an important aspect of such political practices as it not only draws a line between different groups, but also establishes who is considered worth protecting and who, on the contrary, can be sacrificed (Balzacq et  al. 2010). Consequently, more complex relations are constructed among the society. The production and acceptance of the boundary between deserving and undeserving material need claimants may lead to a decrease in solidarity, agreement with restrictive measures, and a public call for the control and regulation of those labelled as problematic. As Mijs et al. (2016) assert, the way citizens define symbolic boundaries along ethnic, racial, and religious dimensions and moral deservingness does have an impact on the degree of neoliberal tenets accepted among society’s members, including the idea of individual responsibility: ‘[W]e must study boundary work of the socioeconomically dominant “natives” in Europe vis-à-vis the ethnoracial and religious “other” and the marginalized poor, respectively’ (ibid.: 1, emphasis in original). Ethnicity emerges as one of the topics policy-makers must make sense of in relation to

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material need assistance. Therefore, I find it essential to examine the meanings elites assign to the link between ethnicity and social assistance as it might play role in construction of symbolic boundaries and, consequently, the deepening of inequalities. In this chapter, I refer to the previous chapters that discussed how material need beneficiaries are presented as a threat, and thus worth controlling, and discuss these interlinkages through the perspective of boundary work. I argue that ethnicity is one of the features of the material need assistance discussions through which actors construct boundaries but also (in)security. It is one of the elements through which control-oriented regulations and measures are legitimated. After a brief theoretical introduction to boundary work, I show how my data are in line with what Sohoni and Sohoni (2013) point out, namely, that existing prejudices in ethnically and racially heterogeneous societies can create conditions for conflating crime with out-groups and vice versa.

Boundary-making in Social Assistance Discourse Welfare policies are important to examine if we want to understand certain measures and the relations they impact. The general trend in social assistance provision is to target benefits. According to Romano (2014: 17–18), ‘the argument in favour of targeting is very simple: the fewer financial resources available for social policy programmes, the greater the imperative that they should be allocated to the most deserving cases’. She further argues that selectivity occurs through a two-fold process. First, it is categorical, which means it is only addressed to particular categories of the population, and, second, it is income-tested, meaning that it is addressed to low-income individuals or households. Analysing social policies and how they come to life help in understanding how the cultural paradigms within which these are constructed give rise to these special categories (ibid.). These special categories of the population are socially constructed and, consequently, treated in different ways. In society, marginalised and stigmatised social groups are often denominated as ‘risky others’ (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Douglas 1992; O’Malley 2004). The dominant majority group pictures these ‘other’ groups as a reason for fear; they are seen as disrupting the group boundaries. As Melucci (1996: 101) asserts: ‘encountering another always entails putting into question something of ourselves and of our uniqueness and venturing into an unknown land only to discover what we lack’. Encounters

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with ‘others’ contain an essence of the unknown and thus they may threaten one’s identity, reveal one’s limits (Douglas 1992). The social order is usually considered to be threatened by strangers crossing the groups’ physical borders as well as more invisible and negotiable symbolic boundaries. They disrupt the boundaries and bring discomfort into the majority group’s life. As Barth (1969: 15) implies, ethnic boundaries constitute social processes of membership settlement and, as a result, exclusion too. He argues, ‘If a group maintains its identity when members interact with others, this entails criteria for determining membership and ways of signalling membership and exclusion.’ In boundary work, culture is an essential component. As Douglas (1992: 58) states, ‘[t]he upshot of much anthropological research on cultural bias suggests that individuals do not try to make independent choices, especially about big political issues. When faced with estimating probability and credibility, they come already primed with culturally learned assumptions and weightings.’ In this regard, the construction of mental representations is crucial. It is the process through which an organised set of ideas and schemas about how the world around us is formed. Based on these, we assign meanings to the world around us, and we act and behave accordingly. According to Lupton and Tulloch (2003), giving meaning to risk and danger in a group is part of everyday sense-making and the establishment of symbols. Individuals construct identities and assign meaning to them (also) in social discourses. Risk perception is thus not provided inherently by the organisation of the particular group but is formulated in social discourses and through identity construction. However, as Zinn (2008) concludes, the major weakness of this latter perspective lies in the negligence of the importance of institutions or norms in the symbolic production of meaning. Moreover, the exclusive focus on everyday life obstructs the possible formulation of a more complex theoretical framework (ibid.). Nevertheless, through symbolic boundary work, differences and categories are constructed. Even if these boundaries are not necessarily physical, they, however, do not remain only in the dimension of images and ideas. On the contrary, they have practical implications anchored in normative rules, including policies and legislation, and they are an integral part of the processes leading to inequality and exclusion (Lamont and Fournier 1992). If socially constructed symbolic boundaries gain enough public support, they can easily limit or structure interactions between different individuals or groups (Sklenár ̌ová 2012). If this occurs, social and

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symbolic boundaries result in substantial social exclusion, segregation, discrimination, or marginalisation of individuals with lower social status (Lamont and Molnár 2002; Lamont and Fournier 1992). While Lamont and Molnár (2002) define symbolic boundaries as intersubjectively constructed by social actors to organise and categorise, social boundaries are considered objectified forms of such differences structuring the interaction among groups of individuals (ibid.). Jaworsky (2016: 46) takes the emphasis on culture even further, discussing the importance of the ‘relative autonomy of culture’. In addition to ethnic or racial boundaries, examining moral and legal boundaries is essential if we want to understand the ‘boundaries of belonging’. Furthermore, we need to take under scrutiny the deep structures of meanings (ibid.) if we want to identify and understand cultural boundaries of who belongs to particular social groups and who does not. In these social and cultural frameworks, identities are constructed and ascribed. They have a further impact on who will have access to resources and capital, whether physical, social, or symbolic. For Lamont and Fournier (1992), moral boundaries are important to meaning-­making processes. They are based on moral character, work ethics, honesty, solidarity, personal integrity, and general consideration for other human beings. According to Lamont and Duvoux (2014), moral language is often used to draw boundaries between different groups of people. Some groups are framed as immoral, as failing in solidarity and integrity. In the debates I analysed, moral argument is directly connected to the wider society. By constructing the idea of the speculator and the criminal, beneficiaries are pictured as immoral in opposition to the hardworking poor or the rest of society. According to the MPs, their immoral behaviour must be changed. And workfare is suggested as a way to curb this behaviour and heal the ‘cancer’ on society. In the past decades, we have witnessed a significant set of changes in society. According to Lamont and Duvoux (2014: 58), ‘the spread of neoliberalism has encouraged an increase in individualization, an increase of economic inequalities and a decline in social solidarity which challenge these prevailing boundary patterns’. These developments have resulted in ‘stronger boundaries toward the poor, while growing economic competition and other political and demographic shifts have also made ethno-­ racial boundaries more salient, leading to what many saw as a more divided society’ (ibid.). The privatisation of risks, together with neoliberal developments, have placed significant stress on self-responsibility, self-control,

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and individual efforts in one’s life management. In this environment, socio-economically disadvantaged people find themselves in an even more precarious situation compared to people with access to resources. The penetration of neoliberal ideals into different local contexts is linked to the adoption of ‘forms of administrative controls and the transformation of shared evaluative schemas routinely mobilized to assess the value of people’, which comes hand-in-hand with the transformation of symbolic boundaries between and among different groups and thus with the construction of ‘undesirable others’ (Mijs et al. 2016: 2). As Sohoni and Sohoni (2013) argue, pursuing and adopting legislation that increases the policing of immigrant communities can be understood as attempt to transform symbolic boundaries into social boundaries. This is not only the case of immigrant communities. As I show in this study, in Slovak welfare policy-making, we can identify advocacy for such legislative measures. Within the Slovak discourse, the attempt to establish symbolic boundaries occurs through discourses and practices, but it further leads to the creation of social boundaries by means of legislation increasing regulation and control over the activity and behaviour of material need beneficiaries, and/or of ‘unadaptable’ Roma. Even though Brettell and Nibbs (2010) focus their research on boundary-­ making towards immigrants within American discourse, the arguments they present are equally relevant for the social assistance claimants in my story. The presentation of material need recipients as criminals and as unlawful elements in society ‘becomes an exclusionary tool to further separate the target population as “other,” immoral, and out of control’ (ibid.: 17). It is important to bear in mind that the discursive construction of a group committing crime is used to boost the relationship between crime and this group. Moreover, adding threat to such a frame, together with ethnicity, blurs the distinctions among groups, in this case, among offenders, Roma, and material need beneficiaries, and it can ‘heighten the perceived threat’ (Sohoni and Sohoni 2013: 65), which in consequence, can have a negative impact on public perceptions and on the group framed as such. According to Benford and Snow (2000: 613), actors, in the case of this study, policy-makers, are ‘signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meanings for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers’. They too are active in the production of mobilising meanings and representations. In this study, I show how a criminal, irresponsible, and speculative beneficiary is used as a frame to

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problematise material need assistance and to mobilise support for restrictive measures such as workfare or the cancellation of the delinquency immunity. In their discursive boundary-making, including the parliamentary debates on material need assistance and workfare, political actors (re)produce systematically organised sets of categories such as long-term unemployed, low-skilled, offenders, Roma, socially dependent, marginalised communities, and persons from disadvantaged environments. These categories, their legitimation, and governing tools cannot be detached from culture and the cultural-symbolic repertoires constructed within a society (Lamont and Fournier 1992). As Sklenářová (2012) argues, not only material conditions must be studied while analysing the formation and reproduction of inequalities; the construction of meanings must also be taken into account. Political discourses provide space for the presentation and (re)conceptualisation of these meanings. ‘Lazy’ material need beneficiaries are now presented as voluntarily inactive speculative individuals. The meaning of welfare-dependency politicians previously used in their arguments is still alive. However, it seems to be complemented and slowly pushed off onto a side track through the idea of a rationally thinking person aware of the advantages of welfare. As presented in the parliament, to large extent, the idea of a rational and speculative (Romani) material need assistance recipient has found its place in the cultural-symbolic repertoire of meanings of welfare and is complemented with frames of (in)security and the need for behaviour regulation.

Securitisation and Boundary Work And how does securitisation fit in? Buzan (1991) introduces the societal dimension as one of the security sectors in which identity is threatened. Identities are elements upon which symbolic boundaries are easily constructed. If different identities are perceived as conflicting, dichotomies such as ‘us’ and ‘them’ arise. According to Roe (2010: 204), ‘[s]tates can be made insecure through threats to their societies. But state security can also be brought into question by a high level of societal cohesion.’ This situation occurs when a nation constructed around a more homogeneous group comes into conflict with the identity of its minority group(s). Thus, ethnic, ethno-national, or religious identities often become political mobilisers when it comes to securitisation (ibid.), and consequently, securitisation can be a tool for (symbolic) boundary making. Identities thus

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become features along which symbolic boundaries, and potentially social boundaries too, are constructed and established through discourses of threat or security. In order to secure a group’s survival, securitisation actors mobilise their followers using ethno-national, religious, or other identity-based representations, claiming the emergence of threats caused by such groups, creating boundaries between those indicated as threatening and those identified as threatened. Furthermore, to preserve identity, restrictive, control, and regulation measures are often adopted. As Roe (2010: 208) states, ‘[i]n the political sector, threats to societies are most likely to come from their own government, usually in the form of the suppression of minorities’. Thus, the introduction of certain legislation claiming to protect societal identity might be both the mitigating factor and the beginning of the securitisation process. In the materials analysed here, identity is not said to be threatened directly; instead, it occurs through various other images and hidden meanings. Thus, identity protection inherently contains two elements: (1) boundary-making and (2) control of (non-)members’ behaviour. Among the Visegrad countries, Slovakia is one of the most heterogeneous when it comes to minorities living on the territory. Thirteen national and ethnic minorities live in the country. According to the population census from 2011, 8.5 percent of the overall population (458,467) claim Hungarian nationality and 2 percent (105,738) claim to be members of the Romani minority (Sčítanie obyvateľov, domov a bytov 2011). The number of people claiming Romani nationality in the census does not necessarily correspond to the actual number of Roma in Slovakia. According to the Atlas of Roma Communities in Slovakia (Mušinka et al. 2014), the estimated number of Roma in the country is 402,741, out of which 46.5 percent are living integrated, together with the majority population; 23.6 percent are living in the marginal areas of towns and cities; 18.4 percent are living in segregated areas outside of the municipalities; and the lowest number of the population lives in the so-called Roma settlements inside of the municipalities (11.5 percent).1 1  It is important to distinguish between the self-identification of individuals (in the census) and the identity ascribed by other individuals (in the Atlas). The Atlas uses the estimations based on the perceptions of people—inhabitants of municipalities. Nevertheless, the Atlas is the only document mapping the socio-demographic data on the Romani population in Slovakia. On the other hand, and that is the problem of the data provided by the census, a significant number of Roma does not declare in the questionnaire ‘Roma nationality’ for

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According to reports from the Council of Europe (2010), European Parliament (2010), the EU Commission (2004) and the EU Commisioner for Human Rights (2012), Roma are the most marginalised community in the European Union. Roma face multiple disadvantages and unfavourable situations such as poverty caused by unemployment, insufficient or lacking education, demographic conditions, and multi-level discrimination. They are suffering from discrimination, poverty, social exclusion, and lack of access to basic socio-economic provisions, health care, employment, and education. Amnesty International (2010: 4) underlines the negative effect of the widespread discrimination of Roma and concludes: They [Roma] have lower incomes, worse health, poorer housing, lower literacy rates and higher levels of unemployment than the rest of the population. These are not the inevitable consequences of poverty. They are the result of widespread, often systemic, human rights violations. They are particularly the result of prejudice—centuries of societal, institutional, and individual acts of discrimination, which have pushed the great majority of Roma to society’s very margins—and keep them there.

As I show in the next section, minorities, the Romani minority in particular, have been depicted in a negative manner for decades, if not centuries. In establishing such an unpleasant image, elites and governments play an indispensable role. They produce and reproduce prejudiced and stereotyped linkages, reinforcing the negative ideas and attitudes within the society. These interconnections, however, do not manifest only in orally spread discourses but they are transcribed into practice and enforced in policies and legislation. As Jaworsky (2016: 233) states, all boundary work ‘has potential implications. It may have political outcomes such as legislative reform or executive actions’. What I am analysing here is boundary work too. Political actors (re)formulate the boundaries between material need recipients and non-beneficiaries. Moreover, as I show in this chapter, this boundary-making assumes an ethnic dimension. I do not refer to the description of the Romani minority by accident. They are indeed the most excluded and discriminated minority in Slovakia. And even though political representatives claim the opposite, in the end, they use images and examples in which Roma play a part to justify restrictive welfare measures. In the political discourse, Roma are interlinked with various reasons (a matter of self-identification, fear, shame etc.). These are minorities based on self-identification.

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the topics of crime, fraud, and irresponsibility, and they are used as examples of rational speculation over benefits and employment. In this chapter, I want to show that boundary-making through the securitisation of welfare recipients assumes an ethnic dimension. Even though the Act itself is worded neutrally, hidden forms of ‘anti-Roma’ discourse are present. Policy-makers not only mention Roma directly but also reference them through metaphors and culturally embedded connotations. For example, they mention the names of villages in which the majority of Roma live or regions in which the highest number of unemployed are of Romani ethnicity. Before I invite you again into the parliamentary debates on material need assistance, I would like you to have a closer look at the context of the Romani minority in Slovakia. It will not be an exhausting historical excursion but rather a condensed contextual overview of moments and information I find important in order to provide a broader picture of how the Roma are perceived and treated. I believe it will help make sense out of what I am presenting in this book. It will offer some understanding of the categories political actors use and further crossbreed for the sake of legitimating restrictive measures.

Picture(s) We Receive About Roma Encountering the other is to expose oneself to the abyss of difference…difference which attracts us precisely because of the richness it contains, but which is also fraught with risk and instant danger. (Melucci 1996: 101)

It is clear that what Melucci says applies to ethnic minorities such as Roma. They may attract our attention because of little nuances in habits, traditions, and ways of thinking about the world. At the same time, the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is often accompanied with pictures of danger and threat (Douglas 1992). Roma appear in the parliamentary debates and in the documents I analysed as categories, as examples and characters in stories political representatives narrate. Therefore, I find it important to reflect upon this issue. A Human Rights Commission report (2012: 39–40) states that anti-Gypsy stereotypes that are prevalent throughout Europe such as the idea that Roma or Travelers are disproportionately reliant on welfare, or are

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the exclusive perpetrators of various kinds of crimes pose significant obstacles to overcoming negative attitudes towards these persons.

When elites call minority members names in public space, such behaviour might not only violate the law, but also signal legitimation and tolerance of discriminatory acts towards Roma. As I mentioned earlier, Roma are among the ethnic group(s) who face more inequalities and discrimination than any other ethnic minority in Europe.2 The actual story of Roma in Slovakia starts in the fourteenth century. For the purpose of this book I do not consider it necessary to go so far back in history, although I would like to highlight some events and images of Roma from the past in order to provide a broader frame for understanding the current social representations in Slovak society, including criminal, threat, fraud, speculator, or lazy. It is important to note and understand that the negative image of Roma is not the outcome of the past few decades. On the contrary, it has been systematically constructed and cultivated over centuries. Negative perceptions have even been institutionalised, produced, and further reproduced throughout different regimes and political ideologies. As Ian Hancock (2002) summarises, already during the existence of the first Czechoslovak Republic, Roma were perceived as criminal elements caused by an alleged genetic predisposition. Step by step, from the 1920s onwards in the twentieth century, the Roma were banned from entering parks and public spaces; unemployed Roma were forced to work in work camps for reasons of national security; and finally, they were obliged to carry identification cards with their fingerprints. Later, with the Nuremberg Race Laws, the Roma became the second category of citizens along with the Jews targeted for discrimination and later for extermination. Belonging to the ‘Gypsy’ race was considered an inherited disease, one that was possible to eradicate only by extermination (ibid.). Thus, one of the images that the Roma assumed in European history was one of disease, as the quoted MP says, ‘a societal cancer’ that required elimination.3 Another picture commonly spread is one associated with dirt. As Bhopal and Myers (2008: 79) state, Roma children are called names, and in the English context, are referred to as ‘dirty gyppo’ or ‘dirty pikey’. Ascribing to Roma 2  Of course, I am aware that in different contexts and regions, different minorities are disadvantaged. Further, there are not necessarily significant numbers of Roma in every European country. 3  SDKÚ-DS, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?id=107419.

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attributes such as dirtiness or laziness has become common and symptomatic of the image-framing process within non-Romani society. This attribution occurs without paying any attention to the actual personal stories and lifestyles of individual Roma. Moreover, the acceptance of such imagery and description legitimates the exclusion of Roma from social, economic, and political life, dehumanisation, and the inevitable denial of human dignity. According to media analysis of the period between 1990 and 1995, at the time, the Romani minority was not a dominant topic covered by the mass media. Media rather dedicated space to political issues such as the split of Czechoslovakia and the question of Slovak-Hungarian relations. Articles discussing topics and issues involving Roma or intergroup relations with non-Roma, were covered mainly by Czech media (Ondrejovič 2003). However, for instance, in 1994, the mayors of the Slovak towns of Spišské Podhradie and Kežmarok ordered police to control for ‘suspicious’ Roma, ask for their identification documents, sanction them, or even expel them from the town. In 1996, the parliamentary member Roman Hofbauer accused Roma of minacious criminality against non-­ Roma which, according to him, no longer had the character of social desperation, but one of radical reckless theft (ibid.: 146).4 Other examples include the statements of political actors Ján Slota and Víťazoslav Móric, also parliamentary members, suggesting that 70 percent of Roma exhibit criminal elements; and that it is necessary to cut social assistance and benefits to Roma (ibid.: 146). The same MP, Móric, suggested in 2000 that there was a need to establish a reservation for the Roma, stating that ‘[m]entally retarded people are born primarily in Gypsy communities. What is human about allowing an imbecile to bear another imbecile, and so the let the number of imbeciles grow in our nation’ (Majchrák 2002: 287).5 4  The original quotation published in the daily The Slovak Republic: ‘Našich občanov znepokojuje hrozivá kriminalita Rómov proti Nerómom, ktorá už dávno-pradávno stratila charakter sociálneho zúfalstva a ocitla sa v oblasti rasového lúpežníctva z roztopaše’. (The daily Sme. 1996. Výrok R. Hofbauera o ‘rasovom lúpežníctve z roztopaše’ pobúril rómsku inteligenciu. Published 3 July 1996 [retrieved 10 March 2016]. Available online: https://www. sme.sk/c/2084147/vyrok-r-hofbauera-o-rasovom-lupeznictve-z-roztopase-poburil-­ romsku-inteligenciu.html#ixzz43SlPoGdB. ̌ 5  The original quotation reads: ‘Mentálne retardovaní ludia sa rodia predovšetkým v cigánskych komunitách. Č o je humánne na tom, ak sa umožní, aby debil splodil debila a aby rástlo zastúpenie debilov a magorov v našom národe.’

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Thus, in the public and political imagination, these ascribed characteristics, connected to being a burden, parasitism, or criminality are ‘recycled’. Even attempts to present positive images about the members of this minority are stereotyped, presenting working Roma in the sense of a miracle, as something highly unusual (Ondrejovič 2003) or through romanticised images of great, talented musicians. The term ‘Roma criminality’ has even become an integral part of the public, media, and political discourse in Slovakia (Chudžíková 2011). It has been established in the discourse and crossbred with other (re)produced negative connotations. Such a construction is also presented as an existing indisputable fact in political debates about welfare. One of the multiple problems concerning this terminology and imagery is its collective dimension—wherein responsibility is ethnicised and is attributed to the entire group. Another image has been established in Slovak society—‘Roma laziness’. Picturing Roma as lazy serves as one of the tools for welfare retrenchment ̌ (2006: 6) analysis shows, ‘the dislegitimation. For instance, as Drál’s course of the social policy reform’ in 2003–2004 that I mentioned in Chap. 2 was ‘based on the exploitation of the ethno-cultural stereotype of “Roma laziness”, which was effectively re-constructed from the existing repertoire of social meanings.’ Such a presumption of essential laziness which, in the case of Slovakia, is strongly ethnicised, has situated Roma in the position of undeserving poor, creating thus a ‘shared evaluative schema’ (Mijs et al. 2016: 2) used for the mobilisation of audiences. So, the (un)deservingness boundary line must be broken down into smaller bits as it is part of the transformation of symbolic boundaries between and among different groups. As I show below, ‘inhabitants of poor Roma communities’ is one of the categories through which policy-makers address material need recipients in the 2013 parliamentary debates. As one MP argues, ‘[t]he proposal will help all socially dependent people in Slovakia, including the inhabitants of poor Roma communities, and the whole society in our country will feel the changes.’6 This category is directly interlinked with socially dependent but also with marginalised groups, long-term unemployed and unemployed who would rather receive provisions. All these categories are directly and explicitly linked with the word ‘problem’ (e.g. the problem present in the country or the problem connected to the malfunctioning system). In his utterance, the MP explicitly labels the Roma community as 6

 OĽ ANO, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111846.

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a problem. The deservingness boundary has been drawn around these ‘problematic’ groups, defined as undeserving. However, where there is an undeserving group, there must be a deserving one as well. I have already discussed the deserving people who work and ‘try enormously hard’. The story here unfolds in a similar way. According to the MP, the ‘working poor’, especially the ‘poor working families with children’ are those contrasted with the undeserving categories, and therefore, they are ‘the most deserving’.7 As Van Baar (2011: 206) underlines correctly, we need to question this trend of minority problematisation and look at how ‘existence of Romani groups in various countries in Europe actually develop into a question and transform into a specific set of European “problems” to which various policies, tools, interventions, and processes attempt to give an answer’. Laziness and criminality seem to be presented as the essence of the ethnic group, which leads to preservation of static negative perceptions of Roma (Chudžíková 2011). As these representations are common in political discourse, together with the overall trend of minority problematisation, a certain kind of multi-dimensional legitimation occurs. Firstly, the ethnicisation and racialisation is approved symbolically, and repressive restrictive policies are legitimated substantially. Moreover, such social representations are attached to the interpretations of events or situations, serving as filters for the interpretations of further, maybe similar, events. Boundary-making thus has its cultural consequences. These established symbolic structures echo throughout society and lead to shifts or deeper embedding of public opinions. However, as I show in this study, these symbolic cultural structures are consequently translated also into legislative and executive actions which, in return, (may) reinforce these symbolic boundaries and lead to the formation of social boundaries. A Closer Look Behind the Roma-Criminal Picture He does not understand anything about the division of labour and doesn’t care about it. From his point of view each citizen can claim the title of Frenchman, not because he co-operates, in his place or in his occupation, with others in the economic, social and cultural life of the nation, but because he has, in the same way as everybody else, an imprescriptible and inborn right to the invisible totality of the country. (Sartre 1944: 20) 7

 SDKÚ-DS, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111891.

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In Sartre’s words, equality-seeking by a xenophobe has nothing in common with the equality inscribed in the creed of democracies. Xenophobia is based on the division between people who ‘really’ belong to the ‘real’ nation based on blood and land, and those who do not fit this defined authenticity. Xenophobia assumes multiple functions. One of these is a narrative function used to frame particular groups as a threat to a certain lifestyle or values, through images at the economic, political, social, and/or cultural levels (Sánchez 2011). The use of criminalisation, securitisation, and nationalism as key aspects of xenophobia and boundary making leads to the justification of the discriminatory narratives and politics mediated through policies, laws, and bureaucracy. In Chap. 2, I introduced you to two moments important for the changes in material need provision in Slovakia. The 2003–2004 reform restructured the provision system, leading to some dramatic events, including protests against the reform. Although the protests were, for the most part, peaceful and ethnically mixed, the government decided to deploy the military to the Eastern part of Slovakia, inviting thus an ethnicised security dimension into the events. As Drál ̌ (2006: 66, emphasis in original) states: The main objective [of the political decision to send the military to the East] was officially announced as securing or re-establishing public order and protecting public and private property. The whole issue thus was effectively re-­ keyed from a social issue to a security problem based on the ethnicized nature of Roma. Troops, including special forces, were moved to suppress ‘Roma riots’.

Through this act, political representatives legitimated a perception of the Roma as ‘criminal elements’ and the promulgation of an ethnic dimension in the security measures.8 Moreover, as Drál ̌ (2006: 66) concludes, the presumptions of ‘Roma criminality were confirmed by the highest 8  Examples of governmental responses included: ‘There is no reason to speculate if the situation is serious or not-so-serious. Well, we all see, that the Roma problem has now gained new features and that something occurred which has never before: Roma unrest’ (Daily News, TV TA3, Feb. 24 in Drál ̌ 2006); the Minister of Labour stated: ‘For thirty years, there has not been enough courage to deeply think about the question of why those who do not work and only speculate about how to abuse social welfare earn more than those who work. Perhaps, for this reason, such a moment had to come’ (TV Joj, Feb. 21; TV Markíza, Feb. 22 in Drál ̌ 2006).

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e­ xecutive officials of the country’, despite the fact that these premises were based on false claims that ‘the Roma have been living in a 30-year-long dependency’. Crime is imbued with ethnic characteristics in the transcripts and strategic documents I analysed. Political actors associate negative images tied to criminality, illegality, or fraud with ‘unadaptable inhabitants’, members of ‘marginalised communities’ or people from ‘socially disadvantaged environments’. For instance, in the ATCS document, it is required by mayors that the state procurator discuss the experiences of the procurator’s cooperation with ATCS representatives ‘in resolving some criminal acts committed by unadaptable citizens’. As I have explained, ‘unadaptable citizens’ is an established schema shared and used as a mobiliser for (political) actors. ‘Unadaptable citizen’ is a mental link that has already assumed an ethnic dimension. In numerous places in the dataset, this link is further connected to crime or some kind of threat (to motivation, to society, to hard-working people, to fairness). Also, in many moments, it is directly linked to material need recipients. Thus, the presentation of material need recipients as criminals and as unlawful elements is used as an exclusionary political tool to create a symbolic boundary between the target population, described as immoral and out of control, and the rest of society, which deserves a ‘just system’ (Brettell and Nibbs 2010). Kanioková (2015) argues that the construction of Roma in terms of a threat is directly interconnected with a decrease in social solidarity in Slovakia. Dangers associated with Roma are connected to perceptions of their life in a supposedly non-stimulating environment, with a high number of children, the incapacity to plan, an unwillingness to take responsibility for their own life, and/or an incapability to act fairly. Symbolic and social boundaries thus do have impact on solidarity among members of the society. As Lamont and Duvoux (2014: 58) claim, neoliberalism in society has increased economic and social inequalities and fostered ‘a decline in social solidarity,’ resulting in ‘stronger boundaries toward the poor, while growing economic competition and other political and demographic shifts have also made ethno-racial boundaries more salient, leading to what many saw as a more divided society’. According to Chudžíková (2011: 111), ‘Slovakia has been actively adopting nation-building policies, thus continuing the construction of the state in ethnic terms. Such policies are in line with the widely accepted foundational myth of a state of ethnic Slovaks who share common culture, history, language, past, present and future and who were finally able to

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establish their own state, after centuries of subjugation from other nations.’ Moreover, the nation’s representation of itself as a threatened entity is used in order to unify individuals, citizen Slovaks, stimulating greater emotional attachment to an in-group collectivity that needs protection against a common enemy. One of the recent representations Roma have assumed in the Slovak political discourse is based on the concepts of individualism, individual responsibility, and merit. In this scenario, poverty and unemployment are an individual’s own responsibility and thus social assistance should be based on individual merit. In the case of Roma in Slovakia, poverty is perceived and often explained through a simplistic, generalised, and essentialised presumption of laziness, or as I have shown, speculation and fraud. Any structural causes of poverty and deeper explanations have no place in the discourse. Instead, (un)deservingness (because of high criminality, security claims, and laziness) and individual responsibility have become the most central tools in the discursive construction and formulation of welfare policy.

Roma in the Discursive Hide-and-Seek In discourses, especially political discourses, messages are not necessarily explicitly articulated. Often, they are hidden behind metaphors, indirectly related representations or stories speakers narrate. It is therefore necessary to look closely at these rhetorical images and identify the deeper meanings of social representations they carry. In his final speech, the Minister of Labour states: It means, once again, a non-repressive, mainly educative [aim of the Act], also in the area tackling… I don’t like these labels around the Roma… but the Roma reform too; we solve problematics of the Act for materially reliant citizens, and of course, within this, also for citizens of Roma nationality.9

Even though the Minister offers a disclaimer (‘I don’t like these labels around the Roma’), Roma are one of the frequently appearing categories in my analysis. The Act adopted in 2013 is ethnically neutral in its legal wording. Some of the MPs even claim it is not about Roma at all. However, based on the analysis of the two parliamentary debates discussing the 9

 SMER-SD, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?id=107502.

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legislation and the strategic documents, the theme of Romani beneficiaries is present in each of them. Moreover, the reference to the Roma Reform strategic document and the Act envoy in the form of the ATCS strategic document, suggest an interconnectedness between this ethnic group and social assistance measures such as compulsory activation and the cancellation of the delinquency immunity. In the materials I analysed, policy-makers associate, directly or indirectly, various categories with Roma. The collective category of Roma is used directly and openly in context of welfare beneficiaries—Roma are considered the primary social assistance recipients. In the parliamentary debates, the category is, however, used also indirectly through terms such as ‘people from a disadvantaged environment’ or ‘marginalised groups’ that are, in general, discursively used in order to determine or characterise this ethnic group. Both labels are widely used in Slovak society. In Mijs, Bakhtiari, and Lamont’s (2016: 2) terms, they are ‘shared evaluative schemas’. They have been established as a mental bridge between an ethnic minority and certain characteristics ascribed to it. In the data, speakers describe members of such groups as those who are long-term unemployed, low skilled, and low educated. At times, it seems that an awareness of structural inequality is present in the discourse. However, when policy-­ makers talk about Roma in connection with these attributes, the structural causes of poverty and disadvantage are not reflected upon. In Chap. 6, I elaborated some of the images political actors used in order to illustrate and justify their arguments about workfare, highlighting the role of ethnicity. For example, in one narrative, the MP’s Roma acquaintance tells him that he knows how his fellow Roma think about benefits paying off more than a regular job. The story goes: During the election campaign, I was going by car to a local city council, having stickers with the slogan ‘It starts with work’ on my car. My old familiar Roma—he is a very responsible person—was standing on a ladder, repairing a light. He once worked in my state enterprise; today, he works as an activation work coordinator. He was standing on the ladder, repairing the light and he says: ‘You wrote it wrong’, referring to the slogan ‘It starts with work’. And I replied: ‘So, what were we suppose to write?’ He says: ‘It starts with social provisions’. And so, we both laughed because it was, of course, humorous, sarcastic, but he [the Roma] knows the thinking of his fellows, also his subordinates, cause he’s a coordinator [of activation work]. He

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knows that a large number of citizens has learned that work doesn’t pay off if you have income from provisions, housing allowance, child allowance.10

In another narration, the anecdote goes as follows: On the commercial TV channel, there was an interview broadcast—with two [apparently non-­ Romani] business owners and two Roma. The business owners offered jobs for 500 EUR to the Roma, who refused the job offer because they found out they would earn less money than if they continued taking provisions. First, the MP (KDH) does not reflect on the potential bias of stories reported on private television stations. Privately owned TV channels often reduce or misinterpret the context of the stories they broadcast. Second, Roma are the main actors in these explanatory vignettes. However, they are depicted as negative characters, speculators who turn down potentially well-paid jobs because they do not pay as much as social provisions. I have already discussed the implications of such negative mental representations. Here, I wish to underline the ethnic element of these representations brought up in these seemingly innocuous stories. The category ‘Roma’ is discursively hidden also in the use of examples of regions, villages, and municipalities such as the Slovak Jarovnice, Sac ̌urovo, Prešovský kraj, Košický kraj, Rimavská Sobota municipality, and Rožňava municipality—areas with the highest rates of unemployment and with the highest numbers of the Romani minority. For example, Jarovnice, which according to the Atlas of Roma Communities (2013) has over 80 percent Roma inhabitants, is labelled as an ‘extreme case’ (MP KDH) in terms of the number of material need claimants. Or as another MP argues, in some regions such as Sobrance, Medzilaborce, and Gelnica, it will be difficult for employers to offer even the minimum wage to people who are low-qualified, have not completed elementary school, and who are often of Romani origin.11 We can identify direct and indirect meaning-making on an ethnic basis in these examples. Roma do, in fact, lack higher qualifications. What is problematic, however, is the missing reflection over the structural causes of their low qualifications and low education, and constructive debate about the elimination of inequalities in employment or education. Thus, this minority problematisation aims primarily at cultivation of the already existing negative image of the Romani ethnic group(s) in order to sell the  KDH, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111851.  SDKÚ-DS, 25th SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/25?id=111891.

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restrictive punitive measure. The entire workfare measure is presented as a motivational tool for the beneficiaries to obtain skills. But I must stress again two important factors. First, beneficiaries participate in low-­ qualification activities within activation services, so it may easily occur that they do not gain useful skills for future employment. Moreover, they will be stuck with a stigmatising label of activation workers, potentially disqualifying them from regular labour market. Second, the motivation is often presented as negative—based on pressure, punishment, and making welfare less attractive. Although the Act is not directly interconnected with The Right Way (Roma Reform)—the initiative to restrict and condition material need in neoliberal terms started much earlier, already in the early 2000s—some MPs identify the legislation as a tool aiming at the Romani minority. An MP concludes his brief speech with the words: If we made a chart of the things which would burden this country in the following twenty years, it would be exactly the Roma large lump which simply cannot be bypassed. It has to be rolled away. And I think today you [the Plenipotentiary for Romani Communities] are taking the first step, which will even be noticed by the history of Slovak parliamentarism as a moment of not bypassing the rock but rolling it away.12

The Roma are denominated as a burden in this statement. In the Slovak language, a ‘lump’, a rock or a boulder, when used as the description of a situation or an issue, means ‘burden’. Thus, the metaphor of a lump or a rock indicates the seriousness of the identified problem. Such tough labels strengthen the boundary not only between beneficiaries and the rest of society but also between the ethnic majority and the minority, presented as a serious burden which cannot be bypassed anymore. Therefore, even though seemingly ethnically neutral, the material need assistance and workfare debates in Slovakia interject neoliberal individualisation, deservingness, and crime with ethnicity, resulting in the potential strengthening of symbolic boundaries as well as the deepening of social boundaries and inequalities based on ethnic grounds. * * *  OĽ ANO, 23rd SNC hearing, https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/6/23?id=107369.

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Ethno-cultural diversity has been managed in Western countries for some time. The debates have crossed national borders, with political discourses and legislation managing minority rights and ethno-cultural diversity reaching the global arena. As Kymlicka (2007: 384) states, ‘in recent international debates, a number of different categories have been identified as the potential beneficiaries of targeted minority rights, including national minorities, the Roma, indigenous peoples and migrants’. Even though Kymlicka refers to the consequences of the political perception of the Romani non-territoriality characteristic as a national minority, the claim is relevant in the much broader sense of social inequality and multi-­ layered disadvantages. Although the above-mentioned categories might be culturally and socially specific, they can also assume many similarities across histories, cultures, and spaces (e.g. African Americans in the United States; First Nations in Canada; aboriginal people in Australia). ‘Others’ are ‘culturally designated as potentially dealt with using exclusionary tactics that seek to locate them as far as possible, both symbolically and literally, from self’ (Lupton 2013: 189). For example, in the case of Roma, the category of ‘other’ might be constructed on the basis of skin colour or images of dirtiness, laziness, lying, cheating, not paying taxes, or mistreating animals. Or as I argue in this study, the ‘other’ is constructed around images of crime, speculation, fraud, unfairness, inactivity, or ‘unadaptability’. Further, these negatively framed pictures are complemented by stories and images bringing in ethnicity, creating a solid assemblage of representations that draw symbolic boundaries. As Jaworsky (2013, 2016) asserts, it is not only these ethnic boundaries but also moral and legal boundaries which are important for understanding the boundaries of belonging. In the case I analyse, such boundary work has not only cultural implications in the form of the construction and cultivation of established representations of Roma or material need beneficiaries. It does indeed have also legal and practical implications in form of legislation and measures enforcing these established schemas and structures within symbolic and social boundaries. It is this negative ascription of the Romani ethnicity that ‘underpins their dire socioeconomic and political situation as the group is stigmatized collectively’ and it is ‘[d]ue to existing relations and structures of power’ (McGarry and Drake 2013: 77–78) that Roma are constructed as ethnic ‘others’ who do not belong to society, the nation state or the community. Such an ascribed negative group identity is highly relevant as Roma are further perceived and treated as a non-deserving and marginalised group.

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In Slovakia, Roma experience institutional discrimination together with cultural, political, spatial, and socio-economic inequalities and exclusion on a much larger scale than other minorities in the country. As Lajčáková (2010: 172) states, ‘the Roma are routinely excluded from participation in the decision-making processes at both the local and the national level’. In general, policy-makers tend to approach the Romani community as an objectively existing ‘problem’ or a ‘large boulder’ necessary to roll away, formulating public policies according to such perceptions. In Slovak political, media, and public discourses, the so-called Roma problematic/Roma problem has become a regularly used collocation. Such an approach is clearly traceable also in the political debates on welfare presented in this study. In the process of category formation, including political discourse, a positive self-representation and negative other-presentation are present. Various actors who take part in political processes characterise themselves as good, using positive descriptions, properties, and associations, while the ‘others’ are described in negative terms, using negative associations. The important message I wish to stress in this book is that all the above-­ mentioned images, discursive legitimation strategies, together with pictures of crime, irresponsibility, and speculation, draw thicker symbolic boundaries between groups. And together with (in)security construction and activity biologisation, they legitimate restrictive measures such as workfare or cancellation of the delinquency immunity, and consequently, strengthen social boundaries too. In the Slovak case, this process occurs through welfare discourses, and along with fairness, trying hard, and the ‘natural’ willingness to be active, ethnicity is a symbolic boundary-making and dividing feature. It is hidden and presented not necessarily directly but through various images, tools, and labels such as the names of villages, marginalised communities, or people from disadvantaged environments.

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CHAPTER 10

Lessons Learnt and the Analysis of Political Farming in Welfare

I recall sitting in the office of the Slovak State Secretary for Labour, Social Affairs and the Family in the fall of 2013. I remember how his decisive tone with traces of paternalism in it, together with his various forms of reasoning, resonated in my head. The way he was explaining and justifying the necessity to restrict social assistance to people in material need caught my interest immediately. I realised this situation was worth looking into in more detail. Today, it is seven years later and I still feel like it was only yesterday. People still talk negatively about Roma, and stereotypes circulate. Even though, for a while between 2015 and 2016, migrants dominated the domains of (in)security, the need for control, and symbolic social divides, negative representations about Roma did not disappear. Today, the anti-LGBTQI and the strong pro-life themes dominate political discourse in Slovakia. But even so, Roma are discriminated against, many of them are still low-educated, unqualified, living in squalid conditions without basic infrastructure. They remain in low-qualified stigmatising jobs, face existential poverty and multiple disadvantages, and still do not have access to equal opportunities as other non-Romani citizens do. They are human beings but it often does not appear so. I find studying discourse important. Discourses are complex spaces in and through which we construct our world views. To a large extent, discourses determine our understanding of the world. Through them, we make sense of what is going on around us. As individuals, we must be reflexive about what we hear and see. As researchers, we must examine © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kissová, Framing Welfare Recipients in Political Discourse, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63579-4_10

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political discourses in particular. Elites, including local, regional, national, or international political representatives, hold power in their hands. They possess symbolic power because they are believed to be experts, elected to lead the public, to come up with solutions to public problems. They are important opinion-makers. And they also have access to discourses and the knowledge that circulates among the public. Further, they have substantial power in their hands because they are responsible for policy-making and decision-making. Political representatives, along with other relevant actors, prepare, discuss, and decide upon strategic documents, policies, and legal acts that if adopted have a substantial impact on people in their everyday lives. Both discursive and wider social structures can be observed, experienced, and interpreted subjectively through individual or collective mental models and representations. It is crucial thus to study how power holders construct and control definitions as well as symbolic boundaries between different groups of people. Those in power co-construct, reproduce, and control mental representations, behaviour, and common sense, as well as emotions and values. In this study, I argue that material need assistance is a tool through which policy-makers construct symbolic and social boundaries between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, between the deserving and the undeserving. I have shown that policy-makers construct these boundaries via negative images of beneficiaries, associating them with threat, crime, fraud, unfairness, irresponsibility, and ‘unadaptability’. Through the biologisation of the ‘natural’ human nature to be active and self-responsible, and through the criminalisation and securitisation of material need recipients, they construct the image of a rationally thinking speculator who voluntarily chooses welfare over employment, who commits fraud and petty crime, who is resigned and inactive. Adding a moral claim towards society, taxpayers, and hard-working citizens, policy-makers construct a solid symbolic boundary between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. They crossbreed different categories of people, themes, arguments, and illustrations in order to produce a successful marketing strategy for the product they want to sell. In this case, workfare and related restrictive measures are the product. In this study, I have put under the spotlight the political discourse on measures restricting material need assistance in Slovakia. In particular, I examined the 2013 parliamentary debates in which workfare, or compulsory activation, and cancellation of the so-called delinquency immunity

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were adopted and, in 2014, implemented. In addition, I analysed two strategic documents, the first prepared by the government’s influential advisory body, the Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia, proposing measures for solving the difficult situation of marginalised communities in Slovakia, and the second, The Right Way (Roma Reform), prepared primarily by the Ministry of the Interior. I found these materials relevant and important as they raised similar concerns to the parliamentary debates and proposed restrictive measures in order to deal with the problems they identified. I was interested in how political representatives and policy-makers talk about material need recipients, what characteristics and themes they associate with them, how they argue for or against proposed restrictive measures, and what arguments and supportive illustrations they use in order to justify workfare. Putting together all these single pieces, I sought to understand and explain the discursive jigsaw puzzle within which symbolic boundaries are being drawn and people’s behaviour is being managed. I wanted to understand how (in)security construction, boundaries, and governmental rationalities interact in order to justify workfare. After the introduction to the events that inspired me to undertake this study, in Chap. 2, I described two important moments in the introduction of workfare in Slovakia: the 2003–2004 welfare reform dividing the material need benefit into two parts and introducing activation into social assistance and the 2013 change to the Material Need Assistance Act that made activation compulsory, conditioning the basic amount of the benefit with 32 hours of work. In this chapter, I placed workfare into within the wider context, taking a Central European, European, and global perspective and explaining how is workfare defined and implemented around the world. In the third chapter, I introduced the methodological framework for the study. I delved into the importance and characteristics of critical political discourse analysis, explaining why, along with other theorists, I find the study of elite political discourses essential. I presented how I analysed my dataset, and how I came to an understanding of the networks between and among the codes appearing in my data. Finally, I also shared some of the dilemmas and difficulties I faced in the research process. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 represent the first set of findings within the analytical section of this study. In these chapters, I reflected on and answered the following questions: (1) What are the main themes and categories framing the image of material need assistance beneficiaries within Slovak political

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discourse? (2) How do politicians justify the need for workfare in material need provision? First, I asserted that identifying the categories political elites use to label or describe the Act’s target groups indicates the general atmosphere of the proposal and its proposed measures, helping us to examine the hidden meanings and connotations of the workfare proposed in the Act. In this regard, I presented the terms that MPs used the most when they talked about material need beneficiaries: long-term unemployed, low-skilled, poor, marginalised groups, socially dependent, offenders, Roma, unadaptable, and persons from disadvantaged environments. I also showed that it is important to look deeper, beyond these single categories, and reconstruct the relations among them, as this allows for a better understanding of how such interlinkages serve political purposes. Single categories do not necessarily say much about their deeper meanings. But as soon as we contextualise them, and examine the other categories, themes, and arguments they are connected to, they reveal much more. In the material I analysed, political actors construct links among the socio-economic status of claimants, crime, and ethnicity, creating thus a mental bridge connecting the poor, material need beneficiaries, criminals, threats, speculators, and Roma. I argued that interlinking these categories suggests relations among them and creates a negative image of material need recipients, further serving political purposes. Second, I examined the themes political actors associate with these categories, adding thus another piece of the puzzle into the workfare legitimation jigsaw. I offered a closer look at how the themes of crime, work versus social assistance, and the just system are interlinked with other themes such as motivation, punishment, deservingness, responsibility individualisation, and public well-being. The ‘crime’ and ‘just system’ themes are both key, as they help draw symbolic and social boundaries between different groups in society. Both are tied to the issue of (solidary) deservingness and undeservingness. According to the political actors, individuals who deserve social assistance are claimants who ‘try enormously hard’, who are willing to be active, who are motivated to be active, and who take responsibility for their own lives and for lives of their families. Third, I examined the arguments actors use to justify the restrictive measures proposed in the strategic documents and in the Act. I also explored what supportive material or images they present to illustrate and back their arguments. In Chap. 6, I discussed the most salient clusters of arguments. These were arguments tackling the (welfare) system in the

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context of recipient behaviour; arguments related to fairness, responsibility, and crime; and arguments related to workfare in theory and in practice. The articulated problem of the current material need assistance system that, according to the political actors, makes people inactive and allows them to speculate over their life strategies provides solid ground for the political marketing of workfare and cancellation of the delinquency immunity. To these, arguments referring to the public demand for restrictions, together with the stories and experiences of relevant actors are attached. Together, they offer an assemblage of categories, topics, arguments, and images capturing audience attention and providing sources of legitimation for the proposed measures. Metaphorically speaking, the single puzzle pieces I presented in Chaps. 4, 5, and 6 provide the fodder for political farming in the case of the workfare ‘product’. I argued that highlighting the malfunctioning character of the redistribution system, interlinking beneficiaries with negative images of fraud, crime, threat and rational calculative speculation, and crossbreeding it all with the argument of public demand for fairness and justice, provide a solid marketing strategy for political actors to ‘sell’ restrictive products in material need assistance, and thus to regulate people’s behaviour through restricting the access to material need benefit. In Chaps. 7, 8, and 9, I tried to make sense of the partial puzzle pieces from Chaps. 4, 5, and 6, framing them with the theoretical concepts of securitisation, governmentality, and boundary work. I found these concepts useful in understanding the workfare ‘marketing’ strategy at the core of this study. In these chapters, I answered the research question: What do these elements [categories, themes, and arguments] and discursive strategies tell us about the construction of the symbolic boundary between material need beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries and therefore, about the ways of governing the behaviour of different groups through welfare? In this multi-disciplinary study, I worked with three different analytical frameworks which I found valuable in understanding the potential role of the discursive framing of restrictive measures in material need assistance. I am aware that concepts such as securitisation or governmentality are developed primarily within other social scientific fields. However, in this investigation, I tried to show their potential use in sociological research. I brought together concepts within the fields of (1) Critical Discourse Studies, referring primarily to the work of van Dijk for understanding the roles and dynamics of elite discourses presented in Chap. 3; (2) critical approaches to Security Studies, and, more specifically, securitisation, which

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offers insight into how a topic becomes a security issue, and what it can say about reaching political aims; (3) governmentality, which, together with (4) boundary-making, offers potential explanations for why material need assistance beneficiaries are framed in a particular way and what implications symbolic and social boundaries between different groups of people might hold. In the final chapter, I examined also (5) the dynamics of ethnic relations, as ethnicity was an important part of the boundary-making process of workfare adoption. As social scientists, but also as citizens, we must question political actions. Security construction, portraying a group as ‘risky’, ‘criminal’, or as a ‘threat’, may have an impact on members of such a group, other members of the community, or public opinion. Use of negative other-­ representation or of disclaimers is a strategic choice for politicians and other political actors. It assists in delineating boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, between deserving and undeserving or between material need beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. It helps to affirm who should be the object of policies and why. In the study, I argued that governing societies through security, biologisation, and the normalisation of self-responsibility, and through moral claims, redefines relationships among members of different groups, potentially leading to violence, institutionalisation of the security agenda, or restrictive measures such as workfare or cancellation of the delinquency immunity. Moreover, it can result in various forms of symbolic or substantive exclusion at different levels: from political, cultural, economic, and community life to the deprivation of rights. It is precisely because of the boundary construction between welfare beneficiaries and the rest of society (or among beneficiaries themselves) and because of the symbolic and social impact of these boundaries that it is essential to examine why and how a certain group is characterised in terms of security and risk or depicted as morally failed, what categories are used to frame the group in these terms, how they are constructed, and for what purpose. I have examined whether and how security shows up in political debates about welfare, striving to show that it serves as legitimation for restrictive, control-oriented measures; legitimation of the regulation of society, foremost among the groups which relevant actors define as undeserving or problematic. The study you have just read is not an exhaustive account of the findings on workfare within the welfare literature. My intent is to provide a portrait of the Central European context, including the underlying

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historical developments, so you, the reader, can get an idea of the social orders shaping policy-making and welfare measures in this region. I have argued that political actors construct symbolic boundaries between claimants and employed people through the characteristics of inactivity, irresponsibility, non-normality, speculation, abuse, crime, and unfairness associated with material need recipients. All these carry a disturbing message and negative meanings if used in opposition to ‘decent’ people. This matrix of categories associated with themes and images evoking negative emotions and building up the symbolic boundary between constructed groups serves its political goal as a tool for legitimating restrictive measures and thus controlling and regulating the behaviour of these groups. With this study, I add to the knowledge about how particular social and political (discursive) practices work and what their implications might be. In particular, I enrich existing theory with a complex analytical tool (Fig. 10.1) that assists in understanding how the political discursive presentation of identified problems, the groups it tackles, and the solutions it proposes serve the goal of population management. Specifically, in this study, I configure the analytical model explaining how the Material Need Assistance Act serves to create boundaries between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In the left part of Fig. 10.1, there stands the group policy-makers associate with characteristics such as hard work or self-responsibility, those who ‘try enormously hard’. Political actors depict them as those who produce the demand for restrictive measures because they feel the injustice in the current social support system that provides benefits for free, even to inactive and speculative claimants often committing offenses—thus, as those deserving (assistance, justice, satisfaction). On the right, there stands the opposing group of material need assistance beneficiaries, whom actors associate with the negative characteristics I have named above, creating the image of a rationally thinking speculator abusing the support system— thus, the undeserving group. The group of ‘them’ (on the right) is depicted in terms of security, crime, and unfairness in relation to the group of ‘us’ (on the left). In reaction, the group of ‘us’ is said to ask for self-­ responsibility from the group of ‘them’. However, we cannot say where the process starts. Policy-makers claim there ‘is demand in society’ for restrictive measures. But at the same time, politicians as power-holders set up the agenda, create knowledge, and (re)produce mental representations. Through creating a boundary between the groups based on the above-mentioned strategies, they legitimate restrictive political measures.

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Fig. 10.1  Analytical tool explaining the dynamics of workfare legitimation

All this boundary work serves political aims. One of these aims is the control and regulation of the behaviour of different groups. Through control and regulation, political actors may also guide and affect voting behaviour, public opinion, and moods among different parts of society. Policy-makers construct various binaries between groups of people, such as beneficiaries/non-beneficiaries, rationally thinking speculators taking advantage of welfare/hard-working and enormously trying people (employed and entrepreneurs), responsible/irresponsible, motivated and active beneficiaries/failed and inactive freeloaders, ‘unadaptable’ (Roma) beneficiaries/active and hardworking people, or criminal (Roma) beneficiaries/decent (non)beneficiaries. The depiction of material need beneficiaries as problematic, as criminals committing offenses and fraud, as

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rationally thinking speculators who choose welfare as their life strategy, is one of the main ingredients in the political cross-breeding process. The second involves raising a moral claim against material need recipients, calling for a just system that is fair to hard-working people, taxpayers, and the rest of society, which is put into opposition with people claiming assistance. The third ingredient is the biologisation or normalisation of one’s willingness to be active and self-responsible. Claiming it is in human nature to be responsible for ourselves and our families derives from neoliberal governmental rationality. Political farmers and marketers blend these features together, creating thus a solid marketing tool for the workfare product they want to ‘sell’. Even though I do not explicitly employ the theoretical and analytical concepts of critical or pragmatic sociology, this study nevertheless engages with this field. In its very essence, it is ‘critical’. My research speaks to the sociology of domination as I critically approach and analyse the practices of political elites. The critical frameworks I use complement rather than contradict critical sociology perspectives. I bring under scrutiny the dynamic social orders and look deeper into how domination reveals itself within these orders. I demonstrate how political actors contribute to the construction of social reality and how they build upon domination and power in order to justify austerity. I reconstruct these justifications and interpretations of the disputes while keeping the relevant social context in mind. In this way, I find the political farming metaphor very useful as it helps to understand the processes underlying power and domination. I add to the understanding of classic securitisation theory as well. I posit that it is crucial to re-think two aspects of the theory. First, I argue that the line between an ordinary and an extraordinary political measure is thin, representing difficulty in determining where an ordinary political measure ends and an extraordinary measure begins. Nevertheless, I suggest that restrictive measures such as workfare are extraordinary measures due to the context in which they are adopted. The amendment to the Act which is the focus of this study was proposed by members of the governing party claiming to be social democratic. Further, in the context of international law, compulsory activation in a situation of material need is, according to human rights activists and others, a form of forced labour. Second, I argue that under certain circumstances, instantaneous acceptance by particular audience(s) is not essential for securitisation to be successful. I do not consider audiences to be inactive passive agents in the securitisation process. But within certain settings, policy-makers do not

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need the public’s instant approval for measures. In case the out-group has been depicted through negative characteristics for a long time and, thus, the negative picture has already been established and accepted by members of society, there is no need for regaining acceptance of the restrictive measure. In the end, all political farming serves the purpose of governing society by setting the political agenda and framing the important issues in a particular way. Also, using particular discursive tools serves to govern (over) particular groups, whether it is material need assistance recipients or the Romani minority. In the Slovak case, material need assistance beneficiary regulation through boundary-making assumes an ethnic dimension. Even though the Act is ethnically neutral in its legal wording, the images, examples, and stories political actors use in their justification refer directly or indirectly to Roma. In the discourse, Roma are associated with poverty, crime, unadaptability, inactivity, and irresponsibility. In the political argumentation, reflection over the structural causes of their low qualifications, low levels of education, and poverty and constructive debate about the elimination of inequalities in these areas are entirely missing. Even though the workfare measure is presented as a motivational tool for beneficiaries to obtain skills and to be active, according to studies, beneficiaries remain in low-­ qualified and stigmatising activities within activation. Moreover, motivation is often presented negatively—as one based on pressure, discipline, punishment, and making welfare less attractive in contrast to regular employment. I find studying discourses on measures that directly influence the lives of people suffering in poverty highly relevant and important. Political discourses provide space for the presentation and (re)conceptualisation of meanings, for example, when previously ‘lazy’ material need beneficiaries are presented as voluntarily inactive, speculative individuals. Thus, the meaning of welfare dependency now seems to be complemented or maybe even replaced by the idea of the rationally thinking person being aware of the advantages of welfare, representing a ‘cancer’ on society. As presented in the parliament, the character of a ‘rationally and speculatively thinking (Romani) material need assistance recipient’ has found its place in the cultural-symbolic repertoire of meanings within welfarerelated discourse. It is important, though, to stress that these meanings do not only shape our thinking. They also influence our acts and decision-making, providing support for political measures that have a direct impact on

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particular groups of people. Reproducing the idea of a criminal, speculative, and inactive welfare claimant asking for support within a system that is unfair towards taxpayers and hard-working people provides legitimation for restrictive measures controlling and regulating the behaviour of the poor, of people who are in material need. Further, criminalising and ethnicising material need beneficiaries can easily contribute to discrimination and an increase in inequalities and further decrease in solidarity. In practice, restricting material need provision and not granting benefits unconditionally may lead to the worsening of the socio-economic situation of people in need, to multiple disadvantages, and to different forms of exclusion. Even though I neither analysed the content of the documents as such, nor did I examine the implementation and practical effects on target groups, it would be worth doing so in the future. Welfare policies are dynamic spaces in which discourses, ideologies, political tools, legal texts, and practical implications blend into a complex matrix. Of course, we can study certain aspects of material need assistance separately and from different perspectives, but in the end, we should be aware that it is a structured network of actors, ideas, strategies, knowledge, tools, decisions, (cultural) meanings, and symbolic and practical acts. For instance, if we identify that the discourse on a certain topic, in this case, the legitimation of workfare, is ethnicised, we must examine the discourse and practices further. We also should investigate the implementation of policies and how restrictions influence the lives of people in need. In the case of the Romani minority and welfare, we must ask: how Roma are portrayed in discourses at the national and the local levels; how discursive strategies are used to construct the categories in these portrayals; and what is the social function and effect in the ‘real life’ of these ‘farmed’ pictures on groups. It would also be interesting to look at how the meanings presented in this study are reproduced within the public, the media, and other audiences, where else these cultural meanings happen to appear, into what other areas they are translated, how and with what implications. As I asserted already in the introduction, besides others, farming is about the (re)production of crops and secondary products, which includes crossbreeding improvements, or the alteration of crop characteristics in order to get better results. The process thus involves their cultivation and presentation on the market. Well-presented products have a higher chance to be sold. Last but not least, farmers not only react to the demand of their

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customers but create it as well. The political ‘farmers’ in my study produce, reproduce, and cultivate existing social and cultural representations and market them within Slovak society. Restrictive measures in social assistance are one of the products marketed to the customers. Political actors thus ‘crossbreed’ negative images of material need assistance with the unfairness of the current system, the request for self-responsibility among individuals, and the securitisation and criminalisation of recipients in order to sell the workfare ‘product’. The better the marketing strategy, the better the outcome, the bigger the number of interested supporters, and the higher the profit. Even though I capture one particular case in this study—the case of one Central European country, one specific part of the social support system, and one exact change to material need assistance, I believe this work has a wider and more general applicability. First, political farming has the potential to be used as a universal concept. The crossbreeding and cultivation of images, ideas, and related qualities, as well as marketing of the final political ‘product’, appear in situations of political agenda-setting, policy-­ making, and negotiation over power-relations. It is a complex process leading towards the achievement of political goals. In different regimes, different strategies might be applied. The farming process as I have described it in this book can be applied to democratic regimes where role of the ‘audiences’ or ‘customers’ is still important. Second, what I have elaborated here captures the trends common to market-oriented economies where social support is conditioned and risk is individualised, requiring one’s own activity, motivation, and self-­ responsibility. I have demonstrated that part of these trends involves constructing strong boundaries between social support beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. This boundary construction builds mostly upon negative images, securitisation, criminalisation, and the biologisation of a person’s willingness to be active. It might be indicative of a more global trend corresponding also to the rise of populism and far-right parties with policies echoing these tendencies. Of course, this was not an exhaustive study. Each of its parts—workfare, boundary-making, governmentality, securitisation, ethnicity—could be an entirely separate account. For each of these, further exploration and more in-depth analysis would be needed. To be certain, multi-disciplinary research has great potential. It can help us to understand political farming, as it is a complex concept covering multiple social domains. The material need matrix interlinks the fields of sociology, anthropology, political

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science, public policy, economics, comparative studies, and the history of law. Thinking big in this direction could provide a valuable multi-faceted study of welfare development and its impacts on different levels. In the study you have just read, I add one piece to the complex puzzle of how material need assistance is framed in one Central European country. It has been an interesting journey and I hope for it ‘to be continued’. I genuinely believe there is much to study in order to understand the current social developments in the areas of inequalities and solidarity in the societies within which we live.



Epilogue

When I became employed by the Milan Šimečka Foundation, I started my doctoral studies at the same time. My research proposal I presented with my application was completely different from what I researched in the end. The experience with which I opened this book was the impetus for this study. Thanks to that experience, I talked to my supervisor and asked for permission to change my research topic. I really felt I needed to explore this urge to condition material need assistance, which represents the basic financial support for people experiencing existential problems. First, I looked at the legal proposal itself and at the written comments prepared by different institutions, especially non-profits. What I started to be the most curious about was why politicians think it is necessary to condition the basic benefit. This directed me to parliamentary debates in which MPs debated the amendment. It was about that time when I found out that also other actors, such as the mayors’ association or the Ministry of Interior, influence what happens with welfare policies. I decided to explore the declared reasons, arguments, and justifications actors use when they justify the necessity to introduce workfare. In the process, I saw they choose particular terms when they talked about material need claimants. I also observed how they associate particular

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characteristics with them. It all started to form a complex picture in my head. This is the picture I have depicted for you in this book. In this study, I have mentioned several times that politicians omit almost entirely the human rights perspective in their discussions about the Material Need Assistance Act. When talking about the Act’s unconstitutionality, they do not seem to give much attention to the fundamental rights of people (in need). Moreover, they do not pay attention to deeper structural causes of poverty and exclusion. In the debates, at least, they do not seem to reflect upon well-known structural obstacles facing many individuals trying to obtain a job or proper education. When they speak about rationally speculating beneficiaries, even if such a claim were true, they do not give enough thought to why people are forced to ‘speculate’ about their life strategies. They do not seem to be willing to look behind this black-and-white picture they present. They feed the audiences with simplistic representations of complex social problems. And this I find highly problematic. I remember the talks with my colleagues from Slovak NGOs and academia. Many of them were rather critical of the developments in social assistance. As they state, activation works, including workfare, have a dehumanising effect, lead to job substitution, and do not contribute to sustainable employment. A number of organisations from the non-profit sector warned the government against international law violations, immorality, superficiality, and the lack of a professional approach to the legislation. Activists emphasised that, in reality, such legislation does not tackle the problems it intends to and is not a complex solution to long-term unemployment, especially in regions where the possibilities for employment are very limited. Rather, such an approach opens up space for harassment due to the selection of potential participants to whom such option will be offered, for usury, and for local conflicts (Lajčáková 2013a, b). Moreover, the law violates the state’s constitutional obligation to protect human dignity. Cutbacks to the basic benefit would, according to Kusá (2013), have a negative effect on the living conditions of individual beneficiaries as well as their families, including children. Broadening the activation principle even to a basic benefit in material need, and threatening people in already difficult situations with withdrawing assistance, would force individuals to participate in the work activities they are offered. Thus, individuals cannot choose freely, because, if they refuse to participate, they might also risk existential difficulties due to the sanctions. As Kusá (2013) argues, individual decision-making under such

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pressure cannot be considered a free choice. Moreover, the Act calls for participation in small community services or voluntary services. However, signing the contract with the municipality or the Labour Office would not correspond with the definition of ‘voluntarism’ defined by the Act on Volunteering adopted in 2011. As a result, based on the conditional and sanctioning nature of the work for benefit, these critiques refute its supposedly voluntary character and argue that such work is both forced and involuntary. Therefore, the Act does not respect human dignity and introduces elements of forced labour into the social system, violating Article 29 of the ILO Forced Labour Convention as well as Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights about the prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Lajčáková 2013b). According to the amendments to the Act, treatment is not equal, as some individuals might or might not be offered the opportunity to work for the benefit. Similarly, it might be unfair to provide opportunities for activation work to some people (who therefore do not need to work for the basic benefit and are eligible also for the activation allowance) and to some other people only the opportunity to work for the basic benefit (and not for the activation allowance). Such an arrangement leaves power and space for discretion in the hands of mayors and Labour Offices in choosing who will be offered activation work and who will not. And even though the Slovak Constitutional Court has decided the opposite—that the Act does not violate the Slovak Constitution—the involuntary character of the measure as well as the differentiation and ambiguous conditions provide space for the abuse of power over the poor. In my opinion, the sociological examination of laws, policies, and political discourses is very important, as all of them may easily involve and cultivate power asymmetries and result in multi-layered inequalities among particular groups. Critical scrutiny helps us to identify, better understand, and point at both. Such analysis is important because laws, policies, and political discourses result in practical measures influencing the actual lives of actual people. Just as a farmer’s product may have an impact on consumer health, for instance, by using pesticides, the products of political farmers have an impact on society’s health. They have the resources to not only intoxicate the mood of the public but also damage one’s everyday existence. In the end, they can distort essential democratic and human rights principles. Political products at the level of mental representations can affect the wider public, and their collective knowledge or cultural understandings of the world around them. They may either ameliorate or

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poison these representations and social relations among different people in the society. Products at the level of legal acts influence the people who are objects of these regulations. I can’t help myself; I genuinely believe that human dignity should come first, and should come universally, not looking at skin colour, political preferences, beliefs, or wealth. None of us has chosen to come into this world. But we’re here and we shouldn’t abuse the power we have; we should respect our fellow travellers, their being, wishes, and desires, and appreciate the diversity of the world in which we live.

References General Assembly UN. 1965. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. http://www.ohchr.org/ Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cerd.pdf. General Assembly UN. 1966. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf. General Assembly UN. 1966. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Professional Interest/ccpr.pdf. Lajčáková, J. 2013a. Civil Society Monitoring Report on the Implementation of the National Roma Integration Strategy and Decade Action Plan in 2012. Budapest [online] [cit. 19.3.2016]. http://www. romadecade.org/cms/upload/file/9270_file14_sk_civil-societymonitoring-report_en.pdf Lajčáková, J. 2013b. Menšinová politika. Bratislava: CVEK. Kusá, Z. 2013. Tieňová správa o chudobe a sociálnom vylúc ̌ení v Slovenskej republike za rok 2013. Bratislava: IRIS. The Slovak National Council. 2011. Constitution of the Slovak Republic [online]. Bratislava: Slovenská národná rada [cit. 23.11.2016]. https:// www.prezident.sk/upload-­files/46422.pdf. ̌ vybraných rozhodnutí Ústavný súd Slovenskej republiky. 2015. Prehlad Ústavného súdu Sovenskej republiky za obdobie júl 2015. PL. ÚS 8/2014 [online] [cit. 12.3.2019]. https://www.ustavnysud.sk/documents/10182/992300/Prehlad+2015-­07+PL.pdf/1f278118-­54ab­44a1-­acf5-­01ff2e3a3b0d.



Appendix: Speakers Present at Debates

SMER-SD 1st reading: Muňko Dušan, Podmanický Ján, Richter Ján, Šedivcová Viera, Vaľová Jana 2nd reading: Blanár Juraj, Bublavý Dušan, Podmanický Ján, Richter Ján, Šedivcová Viera

KDH 1st reading: Brocka Július, Gibalová Monika, Zajac Pavol 2nd reading: Brocka Július, Zajac Pavol

Most-Híd 2nd reading: Chmel Rudolf

OĽANO 1st reading: Matoviš Igor, Mičovský Ján, Pollák Peter 2nd reading: Fecko Martin, Jurinová Erika, Mezenská Helena, Pollák Peter

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SaS 1st reading: Galko Ľubomír, Mihál Ján, Nicholsonová Lucia, Poliačik Martin 2nd reading: Mihál Ján, Nicholsonová Lucia, Poliačik Martin, Sulík Richard

SDKÚ-DS 1st reading: Kaník Ľudovít, Novotný Viliam, Žitňanská Lucia 2nd reading: Kaník Ľudovít, Novotný Viliam

Index1

A Adler, E., 126 Agius, Ch., 125, 126, 126n4, 135 Amnesty International, 167 Amossy, R., 101, 102, 112, 115 Angermuller, J., 40 Anttonen, A., 11 Aradau, C., 129, 131 Argument, 2, 4, 7, 9, 24, 38, 40, 44, 48, 50n9, 53–55, 66, 73, 77, 79, 92, 93, 97, 101–120, 123, 125, 138, 139, 159, 161, 163–165, 176, 186–189, 199 Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia (ATCS), 3, 44, 50, 51, 68, 70, 72, 74, 75, 85, 86, 94, 95, 109, 124, 133, 153, 174, 176, 187 ATCS, see Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia

B Bakhtiari, E., 141, 176 Balzacq, T., 48, 124n2, 125, 127–130, 133, 135, 137, 138, 150, 151, 160 Barth, F., 162 Basaran, T., 48 Beck, U., 148 Béland, D., 102 Benefit, 11, 13–17, 19, 21–29, 23n7, 23n8, 25n10, 66, 75–77, 79, 88, 95, 97, 104, 107–109, 111–113, 116–118, 134, 139, 153, 154, 161, 168, 170, 176, 187, 189, 191, 195, 199–201 Benford, D. R., 164 Berghman, J., 20 Bhopal, K., 169 Bigo, D., 128, 135

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

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Boundary, 3, 5–8, 13, 17, 28, 29, 38–40, 42, 46, 48, 64, 65, 67–69, 70n4, 72, 74, 89, 90, 92–94, 97, 123, 131, 135, 140, 141, 143, 155, 156, 159–168, 171–174, 178–180, 186–192, 196 Brettell, B. C., 164, 174 Brodkin, E. Z., 12, 13, 24 Buzan, B., 128, 165 C Category/categories, 4, 5, 7, 9, 37, 38, 40, 43, 45n4, 46, 52–55, 63–66, 70, 71, 73–75, 79, 80, 83, 92, 95, 96, 101, 119, 123, 128, 132, 149, 152, 153, 159, 161, 162, 165, 168, 169, 171, 172, 175–177, 179, 180, 186–191 CDA, see Critical Discourse Analysis CEE, see Central and Eastern Europe Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 15, 17, 18, 22, 24 Central Europe, 13–17, 28, 39, 74, 141, 160 Cerami, A., 14 Chudžíková, A., 39, 171, 174 Collins, A., 128 Côté, A., 137 Council of Europe, 142, 167 Cox, R. H., 102 Critical discourse, 41 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 37, 40, 43, 52, 57 Csoba, J., 17 D De Bruijn, A., 130 De Waal, F., 8, 35 De Wilde, J., 126

Dean, M., 151 Deservingness, 29, 42, 69, 84, 90, 96, 97, 160, 172, 178, 188 Disadvantage, 6, 20, 65, 66, 68–71, 89, 137, 140, 167, 176, 179, 185 Discourse, 3, 4, 6–8, 13, 18, 28–30, 36–49, 44n3, 53, 55, 56, 63–65, 69, 70, 72–74, 83, 92, 96, 101, 110, 115, 119, 123, 124, 127–130, 132, 140, 141, 147–157, 160–168, 171, 175, 176, 180, 185, 186, 189, 194, 195 Discourse analysis, 38 Douglas, M., 161, 162, 168 Dowd, M., 91 Drake, H., 179 Drál,̌ P., 21, 171, 173 Ď urana, R., 19, 20 Duvoux, N., 28, 67, 92, 163, 174 Dzurinda, Mikuláš, 19, 141 E Emmers, R., 127–129, 131, 133, 136, 140 ERRC, 68 Errikson, J., 125 Ethnicity, 4, 7, 38, 39, 53, 65, 68–73, 79, 80, 118, 138, 159–180, 188, 190, 196 EU, see European Union European Union (EU), 14, 17, 70, 167 Exclusion, 5, 16, 20, 21, 29, 38, 39, 41, 43, 87, 92, 132, 134, 143, 162, 163, 167, 170, 190, 195, 200 Ezzy, D., 49, 54 F Fairclough, I., 37, 101, 102, 106, 115 Fairclough, N., 37, 40, 102, 115

 INDEX 

Fairness, 5, 29, 67, 78, 91–93, 96, 106–108, 111, 113, 119, 120, 133, 135, 136, 139, 140, 154, 155, 174, 180, 189 Farenzenová, M., 22, 22n6, 25, 26, 77, 86 Fico, Robert, 68, 113 Floyd, R., 139, 140 Foucault, M., 128, 148–151 Fournier, M., 92, 153, 160–162 Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), 66 G Galasińska, A., 41 Gális, T., 18n2 Gallová Kriglerová, E., 39 Gažovičová, T., 39, 169, 170, 172 Geertz, C., 126 Gerbery, D., 23–25, 27, 79, 88 Governmentality, 4, 7, 8, 43, 51–54, 120, 128, 130, 147, 148, 150, 151, 157, 189, 190, 196 Gray, A., 12 Guittet, E. P., 48, 122n2, 123, 125–128, 131, 133, 135, 136, 148, 149, 158 H Hancock, I., 169 Henn, M., 47, 48, 52 Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (HZDS, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia), 18n2, 141 Hufen, J. A. M., 130 Human rights, 1, 2, 6, 7, 19, 57, 90, 127, 134, 135, 141–143, 167, 193, 200, 201 Humphries, B., 47 Hurrie, J., 164

205

Huysmans, J., 127, 129 HZDS, see Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) I Inclusion, 11, 14, 20, 21, 38, 132, 141, 143 Individualisation, 5, 20, 82, 92, 94, 146, 150, 153, 176, 186 INESS, 28 Inglo, T., 15, 18, 19 J Jakobsen, V., 11 Jaworsky, B. N., 39, 163, 167, 179 Jelenčiak, M., 19, 20 K Kadlečíková, 39 Kahane, A., 72 Kaník, Ľ udovít, 20 Kanioková, M., 174 Karpiš, J., 19, 20 Kauppinen, T., 11 KDH, see Krestǎ nsko-demokratická únia (Christian Democratic Movement) Kling, J., 164 Kluegel, J. R., 106, 107 Korpi, T., 11 Krebs, V., 15 Krestǎ nsko-demokratická únia (KDH, Christian Democratic Movement), 50, 87, 87n3, 89, 113, 117, 177 Krzyżanowski, M., 41 Kusá, Z., 19, 20, 27, 42, 75, 141, 152, 200 Kymlicka, W., 179

206 

INDEX

L Lajčáková, J., 112, 180, 200, 201 Lamont, M., 28, 67, 92, 141, 155, 162, 163, 165, 174, 176 Larsen, F., 12, 13, 24 Legitimation/legitimating, 4, 19, 29, 40, 41, 44, 46, 50n8, 51, 53, 54, 69, 70, 76, 78, 80, 91, 95, 97, 110, 111, 116, 124, 125, 131, 133, 135, 137, 140, 142, 143, 147, 154, 156, 157, 160, 165, 168, 169, 172, 180, 188–192, 195 Léonard, S., 127 Leško, M., 18n2 Levitas, R., 12, 132, 148, 155 Lødemel, I., 12, 13, 29 López-Santana, M., 12 Lorentzen, T., 11 Lupton, D., 38, 162, 179 M Maingueneau, D., 40 Majchrák, J., 170 March, L., 141 Marginalised, 3, 65, 66, 74–75, 79, 86, 159–161, 167, 171, 176, 179, 188 Martinelli, F., 11 Mason, D.S., 106, 107 Material need, 1, 2, 4–7, 13, 18–25, 27–29, 39, 40, 42, 53, 63–80, 83–91, 93–97, 101, 103, 104, 107–116, 119, 120, 124, 131–135, 137, 139–143, 147, 150–157, 159–161, 164, 165, 167, 168, 171, 173, 174, 177, 178, 185–191, 193–196, 199, 200 Material need beneficiaries, 3, 5, 6, 25, 30, 39, 42, 48, 52, 65, 74, 79, 83, 95, 97, 108, 109, 123, 133, 143, 147, 149, 152–154, 157, 161, 164, 165, 179, 188–190, 192, 194, 195

Matlovičová, K., 164 Mätzke, M., 11 McGarry, A., 179 Mečiar, Vladimír, 18, 18–19n2, 152 Melucci, A., 161, 168 Member of Parliament (MP), 49n7, 68, 72, 75–79, 86, 87, 87n3, 89, 92, 94, 95, 103–118, 132, 134, 149, 151, 153, 154, 169–172, 177, 178 Mental representation, 28, 38, 43, 69, 74, 75, 83, 112, 116, 118, 140, 159, 162, 177, 186, 191, 201 Meyer, M., 56 Mijs, J.J.B., 141, 160, 164, 171, 176 Milan Šimečka Foundation, 28, 199 Minas, R., 11 Ministry of Interior (MOI), 105, 199 Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic, 24 Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family (MoLSAF), 19, 20, 23, 24, 66 MOI, see Ministry of Interior Molnár, V., 92, 163 MoLSAF, see Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family Most-Híd, 50 MP, see Member of Parliament Mušinka, A., 166 Mutimer, D., 125 Myers, M., 169 Mýtna Kureková, L., 22, 22n6, 25, 26, 79, 88 N Neal, A., 127, 129 Neoliberal, 2, 12, 15, 17, 29, 51, 94, 95, 141, 147, 152–155, 157, 160, 163, 164, 178, 193 Nibbs, G.F., 164, 174

 INDEX 

O ̌ Obyčajní ludia a nezávislé osobnosti (Ordinary People and Independent Personalities) (OĽ ANO), 50, 51, 75, 106, 107, 116 OECD, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ̌ OĽ ANO, see Obyčajní ludia a nezávislé osobnosti (Ordinary People and Independent Personalities) Olsson, Ch., 48, 122n2, 123, 125–128, 131, 133, 135, 136, 148, 149, 158 O’Malley, P., 161 Ondrejovič, S., 170, 171 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 14, 27 P Parliamentary debates, 2, 3, 39, 40, 45, 46, 48, 51, 56, 65, 66, 70, 73, 83–97, 109, 110, 112, 130–136, 138, 151, 152, 165, 168, 171, 175, 176, 186, 187, 199 Political discourse, 2–9, 12, 29, 36, 39, 43–47, 49, 52, 64, 69, 78, 79, 92, 96, 111, 115, 116, 120, 123, 132, 138, 142, 147, 148, 152, 160, 167, 171, 172, 175, 179, 180, 186, 187, 194, 201 Political farming, 8, 29, 36, 38, 97, 120, 185–197 Pollák, P., 50n8, 63, 81, 99, 131, 151, 158 Poverty, 2, 5, 6, 15, 20, 24, 27, 66, 71, 76, 77, 85, 89, 90, 94, 105, 111, 119, 132, 137, 140, 143, 151, 155, 160, 167, 175, 176, 185, 194, 200

207

Power, 3, 7, 9, 14, 17, 22, 35–38, 40–45, 47, 51, 64, 73, 74, 79, 84, 92, 96, 111–114, 116, 129, 136, 139, 148–151, 156, 157, 179, 186, 193, 201, 202 Q Quaid, M., 12, 13 R Rada Združenia miest a obcí Slovenska, 3, 25, 47, 63, 81, 99, 131, 151, 158 Rehindorf, M., 41 Reisigl, M., 41, 73 Rek-Wózniak, M., 17 Risk, 4, 5, 11, 15, 20, 21, 27, 29, 38, 48, 51, 52, 76, 83, 112, 123, 125, 127, 128, 133, 146, 150, 153, 160, 161, 166, 188, 194, 198 Roe, P., 133, 163, 164 Roma, 6, 21, 35, 63, 93, 112, 122n1, 157, 183 Romano, S., 14, 16, 17, 159 Rómska reforma/ Roma reform, 29, 50n8, 51, 71, 104, 173, 174, 176, 185 Ruzicka, J., 48, 122n2, 123, 125–128, 131, 133, 135, 136, 148, 149, 158 S Salner, A., 22, 22n6, 25, 26, 77, 86 Sánchez, R., 173 Saraceno, Ch., 11, 18 Sartre, J.P., 172, 173 SaS, see Sloboda a solidarita (Freedom and Solidarity)

208 

INDEX

SDKÚ-DS, see Slovenská demokraticko-krestǎ nská únia– demokra-tická strana (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union–Democratic Party) Securitisation, 3, 4, 6, 7, 29, 51, 52, 69, 78, 120, 123–125, 125n3, 127–131, 133–143, 147, 150, 156, 157, 159, 165–168, 173, 186, 189, 193, 196 Security, 4–7, 11, 14, 18–21, 25n10, 29, 48, 52–54, 63, 74, 77, 78, 120, 123–143, 147–157, 165, 166, 169, 173, 175, 190, 191 Self-responsibility, 15, 29, 30, 94, 136, 147, 151, 152, 155–157, 159, 163, 190, 191, 196 Sirovátka, T., 15, 16, 24, 26, 27 Sklenár ̌ová, J., 92, 162, 165 Škobla, D., 164 Sloboda a solidarita (Freedom and Solidarity) (SaS), 50 Slovakia, 1, 6, 7, 13, 17–25, 20n4, 27–29, 51, 68, 71, 72, 75, 84, 95, 101, 103, 104, 110, 114, 115, 135, 140, 141, 143, 159, 166–169, 166n1, 171, 173–175, 178, 180, 185–187 The Slovak National Council, 50 Slovenská demokraticko-kresťanská únia–demokra-tická strana (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union– Democratic Party) (SDKÚ-DS), 20, 49n7, 50, 68, 70, 76, 86, 108, 118, 134, 151, 154 SMER-SD, see Smer–sociálna demokracia (Direction–Social Democracy) Smer–sociálna demokracia (Direction– Social Democracy) (SMER-SD), 23, 49n7, 50, 66, 88, 91, 141, 154

Snow, A. D., 162 Social boundaries, 46, 92, 156, 163, 164, 166, 172, 174, 178–180, 186, 188, 190 Sohoni, D., 161, 164 Sohoni, T.W.P., 161, 164 Symbolic boundaries, 70n4, 156, 160–166, 171, 172, 178–180, 186, 187, 189, 191 Symbolic power, 43, 64, 119, 130, 153, 186 Szalai, J., 17 Szikra, D., 14 Szőke, A., 16, 17, 24, 26, 26n11, 87, 88, 112, 114 Szulc, A., 17 T Taylor-Gooby, P., 19, 149, 154 Threat, 6, 29, 30, 72, 74, 77, 78, 85, 106, 108, 116, 120, 124, 125, 127–133, 135–140, 142, 143, 157, 161, 164–166, 168, 169, 173, 174, 186, 188–190 Tomka, B., 14 Trickey, H., 12, 13, 29 Tulloch, J., 162 U UN, see United Nations Unadaptable, 43, 48, 51, 63–80, 85, 138, 164, 174, 188, 192 Undeserving, 4, 6, 16, 28, 30, 40, 66–68, 93, 106, 143, 160, 171, 172, 186, 190, 191 Unfair, 67, 94, 116, 195, 201 United Nations (UN), 142

 INDEX 

209

V Van Baar, H., 172 Van Dijk, T. A., 3, 4, 13, 35–38, 40–46, 42n2, 44n3, 45n4, 45n5, 49, 52, 53, 56, 69, 70, 84, 91, 101, 106, 111, 112, 117, 119, 123, 133, 189 Van Eemeren, F. H., 102 Vanhuysse, P., 14 Van Leeuwen, T., 41, 52, 53, 55, 69, 78 Van Nispen, F.K.M., 130 Voelkner, N., 127, 129

Wildavsky, A., 161 Wodak, R., 37, 38, 40, 41, 56, 73 Wolf, E., 40 Workfare, 1–7, 11–30, 38–40, 42–44, 50n8, 51, 54–56, 65, 69, 72, 73, 75, 79, 83, 84, 87, 88, 95–97, 101–120, 123–125, 125n3, 130, 131, 133–143, 147, 148, 150, 151, 153, 155, 159, 160, 163, 165, 176, 178, 180, 186–190, 192–196, 199, 200 Wózniak, W., 17

W Wæver, O., 126 Weinstein, M., 47, 48 Welfare, 2, 4–7, 11–30, 38–42, 66, 67, 72, 77–79, 83, 88, 91, 93–96, 102–109, 111, 112, 116–119, 123–143, 147, 148, 151–157, 159, 161, 164, 165, 167, 168, 171, 173n8, 175, 176, 178, 180, 185–197, 199

Z Zákon o pomoci v hmotnej núdzi, 2, 7, 18, 20, 23, 27, 29, 42, 46, 49–51, 50n8, 62, 63, 68, 99, 110, 131, 151, 158, 185, 189, 198 Zákon o životnom minime, 21 ZMOS, 25, 50n10, 122 Zinn, J., 149, 152, 162 Zobuďme sa!, 25