Framing the Threat: How Politicians justify their Policies 9783110626056, 9783110622140

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Imke Köhler Framing the Threat

Imke Köhler

Framing the Threat

How Politicians justify their Policies

ISBN 978-3-11-062214-0 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-062605-6 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-062235-5 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018965032 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Cover image: SeanShot / iStock / Getty Images Plus Typesetting: Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd. Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

With words minds are changed, votes acquired, enemies labeled, alliances secured . . . Through words some of the most potent forces of modern politics are wheeled into motion. (Rodgers 1987: 4) Every government policy begins with a story; the choices made by policymakers depend on the stories they tell themselves and others. Their stories have immense power. They create the narrative framework within which U.S. policy is enacted, explained, rationalized, and justified. (Chernus 2006: ix)

With Thankfulness In putting down these lines, a challenging and protracted project reaches its final stage. Writing this thesis proved a great effort and has involved a tremendous work load over the years. Like every other researcher, I experienced the demands of painstaking research. But as much as this presented a challenge, it was a personal gain. After all, without this study too many intriguing thoughts would have passed me by unnoticed, things that needed to be considered. There truly is merit in digging deeper. I am very grateful to all who encouraged me in this endeavor. Due to my professional life, this thesis was a long time coming. I would like to cordially thank my dear friend Dr. Laurenz Görres for his companionship and support. Thank you for your technical assistance and for all the salads, soups, and smoothies that kept my brain running! And I am also very grateful to Inge, Illa, and my friends from church. Many thanks to you all. Your support and prayers kept me going!

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110626056-201

Contents With Thankfulness List of Tables

VII

XII

List of Abbreviations

XIII

Part I

Research Design

1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4

Introduction 3 The Research Question 3 The Theory and Method of Analysis 6 The Contribution to the Social Sciences The Structure of the Book 8

7

Part II Theoretical Framework and Methodology 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8

Constructivism 15 The Constructivist Turn 15 Structure and Agent 18 Materialism versus Idealism 19 Causality in Moderate Constructivism 21 The Role of Language in Constructivism 23 Constituting Meaning in Radical Constructivism Austin’s Speech Act Theory 29 Summary 31

3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

Discourse Theory 33 What is Discourse? 33 CDA: Reality is More than Discourse Intertextuality, Context, and Change The Power of Discourse 38 Summary 41

4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5

Security Discourse 42 What is Security? 42 The Concept of Securitization 43 The Copenhagen School and its Critics 49 Constructing Self and Other in Security Discourse Summary 61

26

35 36

58

X

5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6

Contents

Mode of Conduct 63 The Method 64 Who Acts? 64 What is Said and Done? 68 In Which Context Does it Take Place? Data Selection 72 Limits of Study 74

71

Part III Empiricism 6 6.1 6.1.1 6.1.2 6.1.3 6.1.4 6.1.5 6.1.6 6.2 6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.2.4 6.2.5 6.3 6.3.1 6.3.2 6.4 6.5 6.5.1 6.5.2 6.6 6.6.1 6.6.2 6.6.3 6.6.4 6.7

Bush’s Security Discourse and Policies 79 Constructing the Self 80 America, the Innocent 80 America, the Great Nation 82 America, the United and Resolved 86 America, Freedom’s Defender 90 America, the Called and the Victorious 95 America’s Cause is Just 99 Constructing the Other 103 The Evil Other 104 The Barbaric Other 105 The Fanatic Other 106 The Outcast Other 107 The Bestial Other 109 Constructing the Threat and Proper Threat Defense 110 The (Un-)Certainty About Future Attacks 111 The Imperative to Gather Information 115 Summary of Identity and Threat Formation 118 Bush’s Detention and Interrogation Policy 121 Redefining the Rules 122 Pre-emptive Interrogation 126 Audience 129 The Public and the Media 130 Congress 136 The Apparatus: Government, Military, Secret Services 140 The Supreme Court 143 Summary of Policies and the Audiences’ Positions 144

7 7.1 7.1.1 7.1.2

Obama’s Security Discourse and Policies Constructing the Self 151 America, the Innocent? 152 America: Greatness Must be Earned

150

153

Contents

America, Determined but Disunited 155 America: We Went off Course 158 America: That is Who We Are! 161 Constructing the Other 168 The Terrorist Other 169 The Barbaric Other 169 The Fanatic Other 170 The Outcast Other 171 The Bestial (Cancerous) Other 172 Constructing the Threat and Proper Threat Defense 173 The Threatening Other 173 The Endangering Self 175 The Alienated Partners 180 Summary of Identity and Threat Formation 184 Obama’s Detention and Interrogation Policy 186 Reestablishing the Rule of Law 187 Challenges and Shortfalls 190 Audience 192 The Public and the Media 193 Congress 201 The Apparatus: Government, Military, Secret Services 204 Summary of Policies and the Audiences’ Positions 207

7.1.3 7.1.4 7.1.5 7.2 7.2.1 7.2.2 7.2.3 7.2.4 7.2.5 7.3 7.3.1 7.3.2 7.3.3 7.4 7.5 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.6 7.6.1 7.6.2 7.6.3 7.7

Part IV Conclusion 8 8.1 8.2 8.3

Findings and Implications 213 Summary of the Book 213 The Bottom Line 217 Topics of Further Research 221

References

224

XI

List of Tables Table 5.1 Levels and Units of the Present Securitization Analysis

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69

List of Abbreviations AI AP AUMF CCLE CDA CNN CS CSRT DOD DOJ DOS DTA HRW ICRC IIP IPS IR MCA NPR OLC POW UNHR VFW

Amnesty International Associated Press Authorization for Use of Military Force Center for Cognitive Liberty & Ethics Critical Discourse Analysis Cable News Network Copenhagen School Combatant Status Review Tribunal U.S. Department of Defense U.S. Department of Justice U.S. Department of State Detainee Treatment Act Human Rights Watch International Committee of the Red Cross State Department’s Bureau of International Information Programs Institute for Policy Studies International Relations (Academic Field) Military Commissions Act National Public Radio Office of Legal Counsel (Justice Department) Prisoner of War United Nations Human Rights Veterans of Foreign Wars

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110626056-203

Part I Research Design

1 Introduction The aim of this book is to investigate the relationship between language and security and to examine how discourse creates the scope of possibility for political action. In particular, the study scrutinizes how the language use of the U.S. presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama created political latitude. Their security discourses are analyzed in order to show how their framings of identity, i.e., of the American ‘self’ and the enemy ‘other’ facilitated a certain threat construction that shaped the presidents’ detention and interrogation policies during the ‘War on Terror’.1 By defining what was necessary in the name of national security, Bush’s discourse justified the operation of the detention center at Guantanamo Bay and rendered the mistreatment of detainees possible, which otherwise would have been prohibited. This book argues that Bush’s securitization enabled legal limits to be pushed and the violation of rules to appear legitimate. President Obama, in contrast, constructed a threat scenario that required an end to rule violations, and the closure of Guantanamo for security reasons. According to Obama’s narrative, a return to the rule of law was imperative to keeping the American people safe. Juxtaposing the presidents’ security narratives in this study allows for a direct comparison and thus illustrates in how far Obama altered framings and arguments, and in part, the policies of his predecessor.

1.1 The Research Question The ‘War on Terror’ that was launched after the attacks of September 11, 2001 led to the implementation of security measures that were unprecedented in the history of the United States. “The great ideological struggle of our time” (Bush 2008/01/13) – as former U.S. President George W. Bush later called it – would be based on political and military action “unlike any other we have ever seen” (Bush 2001/09/20).2 Part of this action was an unparalleled detention policy that included the practice of illegal rendition. ‘Rendition’ refers to the capture of suspects from any place in the world “without the knowledge or participation of the host government and without

1 There is scholarly debate about the phrase ‘War on Terror’ as it is an ideological term that was constructed by the Bush administration to legitimate its actions. Taking note of this, this book nevertheless uses the term as it represents the more or less official label of U.S. policies after 9/11 and is referred to throughout the IR-literature. As will be noted in chapter 7, however, President Obama deliberately avoided the term and rather spoke of a ‘fight against terrorism’. 2 In this book, in some cases the capitalization of quotes has been changed if this better integrated them into the paragraph. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110626056-001

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1 Introduction

any judicial process” (Margulies 2006: 3; cf. Steiger 2007).3 The detainees were then brought to secret CIA prisons, jails run by third countries, or to the detention facility located at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It is estimated that until 2009 between 150,000 and 200,000 people were affected by this policy of the Bush administration, and that it led to over 100 deaths (Bassiouni 2010: xi). Guantanamo is certainly the most visible and enduring embodiment of this policy. Captives brought there were completely deprived of their rights and left at the mercy of their interrogators. Since its installation in January 2002, Guantanamo has come to epitomize U.S. arbitrariness and human rights violations.4 The detention center’s beginnings were marked by the installation of a prison camp as an extra-territorial site at which U.S. legal code did not apply; at the same time, foreign and international jurisdiction was suspended by military order.5 As part of legal practice, military commissions were installed that resulted in the deprivation of the rights of detainees (Lutz 2011: 304). Hence, prisoners were kept indefinitely without charge and had no possibility of contesting their detention before a court, because even the writ of habeas corpus – the right guaranteed by the U.S. constitution to have the legality of imprisonment reviewed – had been suspended. In fact, detainees at Guantanamo did not even have the chance to seek legal advice. Moreover, although President Bush conceptualized the attacks of 9/11 and the countermeasures by the United States in terms of war, he referred to it as a ‘new kind of war’ – a war in which the Geneva Conventions were no longer applicable. Consequently, detainees were not given the status of ‘prisoners of war’ (POW) but instead were categorized as ‘illegal’ or ‘unlawful’ ‘enemy combatants’. As such, they were excluded from protection under the 1949 Geneva Conventions. At the same time, the denotation of ‘enemy combatant’ remained legally undefined until 2006, which left the detainees’ status, disposition and treatment open to the decisions of the

3 The policy of rendition was not invented by the Bush administration but was new in its quality and dimension. In principle, the United States has pursued renditions since 1995 when President Bill Clinton brought them in as a reaction to the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. However, as Steiger (2007: 13) points out, these renditions were confined to cases where a warrant had already been issued or where the person targeted had been convicted in absentia. Generally, these practices did not include torture. See on this matter also Parry (2013: 179). 4 The first prisoners sent to Guantanamo Bay in January 2002 were housed in ‘Camp X-Ray’. A few months later they were moved to the new ‘Camp Delta’, which consists of several smaller camps and provides higher security standards. Since all these camps are located at the U.S. naval station Guantanamo Bay, ‘Guantanamo’ is the most common umbrella term used by academics and in public discourse; therefore, it will be used throughout this book. 5 It was assumed that U.S. legislation was not applicable to Guantanamo, but to make absolutely sure that this was the case, the suspension of the application of U.S. law was pronounced by military order in November 2001. It was not until years later, that this was judicially overruled. At this point, U.S. law was interpreted as indeed applying, since the United States factually exercised control and sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay.

1.1 The Research Question

5

president and his administration (Lutz 2011: 142; cf. Olshansky 2007: 86f).6 Finally, the ban on torture was abandoned by suspending particular laws, declaring international law as invalid in this particular case, or by redefining torture to make the course of action fit U.S. law. As a result, detainees were exposed to ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ that included torture such as ‘waterboarding’ and other inhumane treatment. Overall, the U.S. was anxious to isolate the captives in a lawless zone. This constitutes an exceptional attempt to gain ultimate authority over the detainees by suspending, circumventing and/or violating the U.S. constitution as well as international treaties and rules of customary international law on human rights, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Geneva Conventions, and the United Nations Charter (Olshansky 2007; Paust 2007; Ginbar 2008; Hucke 2008; Christol 2009; Bassiouni 2010; Lutz 2011). In 2008, U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama embedded a different approach to the detention and interrogation policies employed in Guantanamo in his election campaign. He became the voice of a security discourse that advocated the reversal of existing policy, and argued for the closure of the detention center. In fact, immediately after his inauguration in January 2009 President Obama signed an executive order closing the facility. He prohibited ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ and restored human and legal rights to detainees who were henceforth protected under the Geneva Conventions. Nevertheless, in sum, Obama’s administration failed to fully comply with human rights law: Guantanamo has yet to be closed, indefinite detention continues, as do trials before military commissions. Whereas the Bush administration managed to gain acceptance for a political course that dramatically deviated from established practices, the Obama administration has been unable to fully reverse this course and reestablish what would have been considered ‘normal’ proceedings before 9/11. This is remarkable in a country so proud of its basis in freedom and democracy in which “the concept of the universal rule of law is firmly rooted” (Christol 2009: 6). Since the U.S. is bound by international human rights law that has become “more detailed, more sophisticated and (at least rhetorically) more accepted on a normative basis” (de Londras 2011: 3) than ever before, this development may initially seem surprising. This book sets out to address the developments as depicted above and does so by reconstructing the constitutive relationship between language use and policy enactment. The study focuses on these questions: First, how was it possible that the United States – a nation that understands itself as ideal in terms of human rights – could install the detention center at Guantanamo and implement policies that included

6 Besides the term ‘enemy combatant’ neither the location of seizure nor of imprisonment were specified so that all these measures as put forth in the military order of November 2001 were viewed as valid worldwide (Lutz 2011: 147f).

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1 Introduction

torture? Second, and this is linked to the former: What did the policy reversal, or, more precisely, the attempt at policy reversal, look like? How was the need for a return to the rule of law communicated and why was it not possible for President Obama to fully reach this aim? In approaching an answer to these questions, this study suggests that the issue revolves around the framing of ‘self’, ‘other’ and ‘threat’, and of the acceptance of these framings.7 Analytically, these questions will be addressed by examining the constitution of identity and threat as put forth in the presidents’ security narratives. However, although these framings bear the chance of providing legitimacy for particular actions, they have to be largely approved of if they are to unfold political power. Therefore, this book also examines what kind of resonance these narratives provoked from their audience(s) and whether they were able to dominate public discourse.

1.2 The Theory and Method of Analysis With regard to the theoretical foundation of analyzing security narratives, this book builds on the insights provided by the Copenhagen School (CS). The CS conceptualizes security as a speech act and thus as discursive practice. This is not to say that threats are generally not real, but this view suggests that politicians can frame people and phenomena in a way that constructs them as a security issue. This kind of framing is understood as a political choice since alternative framings are possible. However, by securitizing a matter or person, the topic is easily shifted into the realm of survival and this empowers the state to do whatever is necessary to avert a perceived threat. Consequently, the Copenhagen School argues that ‘speaking security’ is probably the most powerful tool of legitimizing politics (Wæver 1995; Buzan 1997; Buzan/Wæver 1997; Buzan et al. 1998). It enables actors to break free of the rules and renders actions possible that normally would be forbidden. However, as this book suggests with regard to Obama’s security narrative, securitization can also be used to do the opposite, that is, to argue in favor of a return to the rules and compliance with the law. By examining security discourse, the Copenhagen School provides an expedient theoretical device. It opens up the possibility of demonstrating that Bush’s and Obama’s constitution of ‘self’, ‘other’ and ‘threat’ was a deliberate act of framing, employed to enforce and legitimate certain policies. Analytically, the study leans on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), an approach rooted in a constructivist paradigm. Constructivism assumes that the meaning of subjects and objects is not given but socially constructed. In this sense, subjects

7 With regard to IR-terminology, one could argue that the kind of danger America faced was a risk rather than a threat (cf. Daase/Kessler 2007). However, since Bush’s framing left little room for uncertainties, he did not present it as such. In fact, both presidents mainly spoke about ‘threats’ which is why this book refers to the construction of ‘threats’.

1.3 The Contribution to the Social Sciences

7

and objects are the product of social processes and are situated in a specific historical context. Following this view, there is no inherent truth to meanings. Rather, what appears to be true has been established as such, namely, as this book argues, through language, i.e., through dominant discourses and the meanings they purport. It is thus discursive constructions that position the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ in the social world and make willful action meaningful. CDA lends itself to the analysis of these constructions as it sheds light on how framings create leverage and legitimacy for political action. In addition, CDA fits well with the Copenhagen School’s approach in challenging these very constructions and thus the policies that rely on them. This approach de-naturalizes what is deemed normal or plausible in terms of common sense or social objectivity. CDA and CS share the goal of arousing critical language awareness. Framings are not inevitable in nature; however, if they become dominant in discourse they can become effective in their consequences, since they shape who we are, what we do and how we do it. In that sense, powerful discourses constitute what they speak of (Onuf 1989; Fairclough 1992; Zehfuß 1998, Zehfuss 2001, 2006; Howarth/Stavrakakis 2000; Fierke/Jørgensen 2001; Mills 2004; Howarth 2005; Torfing 2005).

1.3 The Contribution to the Social Sciences By analyzing the security narratives of President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama in the context of their policies on detention and interrogation, this book hopes to be of value in two ways. Firstly, it aims to contribute to the IR8 literature on the relationship between identity and foreign policy. The latter has been of great concern to IR scholars since the constructivist current placed identity in the center of debate in this field (Wendt 1992a, 1994, 1996; Katzenstein 1996a). Since then, this relationship has been the object of numerous studies. However, ‘moderate’ constructivism is strongly affected by the presuppositions of traditional IR theory. It still tends to treat identities and interests as pre-social, ranks agency over structure and adheres to a causal epistemology. Moreover, it neglects the role of language as a core constitutive in the formation of identity and interest. By applying an approach that analyzes discourse, this book opts for a different paradigm and suggests an alternative conceptualization by focusing on how meaning is produced in the first place. The approach analyzes identities and interests as discursive constructions that enable, yet simultaneously constrain, the possibilities for political action according to their perceived legitimacy. Therefore, this is an amenable manner

8 According to the usual convention, written in capital letters, the term ‘International Relations’ (and the abbreviation ‘IR’, respectively) denotes the academic field, in lower case the matter of international relations itself.

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1 Introduction

in which to investigate the genesis of political action, and it also offers a critical stance as it acknowledges that ‘things could be different’. Adopting this approach should provide confirmation of the general insights into the constitutive power of (political) discourse (Onuf 1989; van Dijk 1997b; Zehfuß 1998, Zehfuss 2001; Howarth/Stavrakakis 2000; Fierke/Jørgensen 2001; Torfing 2005). Secondly, this book seeks to complement the scholarly debate on Guantanamo and the related detention and interrogation policies of the U.S. administrations under the George W. Bush and Barack Obama presidencies. Doubtless, the existing body of literature on the ‘War on Terror’ and adjacent topics is vast. However, most studies that analyze discourse in this field focus on Bush’s framings and on the ‘War on Terror’ in a more general sense.9 As far as studies effectively address the phenomenon of Guantanamo, the main body of literature scrutinizes the legal position of the Bush administration. In this sense, studies by political scholars and legal professionals continue to examine the extent to which detention policy in general and the practices in Guantanamo in particular violated U.S. and international law (Sands 2005; Margulies 2006; Pious 2006; Cohn 2007; Ghoshray 2007; Paust 2007; Feldman 2008; Hucke 2008; Linnan 2008; Christol 2009; Lutz 2011). Other publications focus on the history of the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay concerning U.S. sovereignty and imperial ambitions (Lievesley 2006; Schwab 2009; Strauss 2009; Hansen 2011a), or on the personal tales of woe as told by former detainees (Begg 2006; Sassi 2006; Falkoff 2007; Kurnaz 2007). The focus of this book, however, is different, and it hopes to fill an academic void by juxtaposing Bush’s and Obama’s security narrative regarding Guantanamo with the United States’ detention and interrogation policy. The book’s approach enables a direct comparison of framings to be made and this shows both continuities and divergences in the way in which ‘self’, ‘other’ and ‘threat’ as well as ‘imperatives’ are constructed in the name of security. This study thus seeks to add to the body of literature by shedding light on the question of how torture became at all possible and how Obama tried to return to the rule of law.

1.4 The Structure of the Book This book’s leading question is in how far language use, more precisely, ‘speaking security’, paves the way for particular political action. This issue is investigated using the security narratives of the U.S. presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama with regard to their detention and interrogation policies. As noted, the corresponding

9 See, among others, Collins/Glover (2002), Silberstein (2002), Discourse & Society Special Issue (2004), Domke (2004), Jackson (2005), Beyer (2006), Chernus (2006), Łazuka (2006), Hodges/Nilep (2007), and Kellner (2007). Part of this wider field is, of course, the war in Iraq. On this topic see also Miller (2004), Journal of Language and Politics Special Issue (2005), Cap (2008), El-Hussari (2008), and Dunmire (2011).

1.4 The Structure of the Book

9

political process was first marked by the denial of human rights and later by their partial restoration; however, President Obama failed to fully implement his vision. For a theoretically informed analysis of the relations between the presidents’ framings and their policies, this book proceeds in the following manner: The first part of the book sets out the theoretical and methodological framework of the study. Chapter 2 starts with an overview of constructivism, the fundamental paradigm on which this book relies. It provides an abstract of the development of a constructivist understanding of ‘reality’ and political action in delineation from traditional IR-approaches. A critical reflection on ‘moderate’ constructivism exposes the foundational understanding of the world as socially constructed, yet it also reveals the inconsistencies of this approach. One of its main omissions regards the constitutive role of language in a ‘world of our making’ (Onuf 1989). Hence, the chapter discusses why it is vital to consider language, and to this end introduces John Austin’s speech act theory, which points to the reality-making power of language. In so doing, this book leans towards ‘radical’ constructivism as it treats language as constitutive of meaning. The chapter continues by outlining the significance of this paradigm and its divergence from the ‘moderate’ perspective in terms of ontological and epistemological assumptions, as well as suggesting appropriate methods for conducting research. Having outlined the central role of language in constituting the social world, Chapter 3 turns to larger theorizing on discourse and provides a brief overview of the genealogy of discourse theory. It thereby outlines the difference between constructivist and postmodern approaches, which helps to position both the Copenhagen School (CS) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in the field. Whereas CS partly leans towards postmodern thinking, CDA clearly dissociates itself from it but nevertheless integrates some postmodern perspectives upon discourse into its approach. This also exposes discourse theory as being situated in the triangle of the social sciences, linguistics and philosophy. Insights into discourse’s nature include that of intertextuality and historicity. Texts always refer to and build on other texts and they rework them according to the current context. This, however, can also be used as a powerful rhetorical device to shift meaning and substantiate a statement. Overall, discourses are instruments of power as not everybody can contribute to them, let alone dominate them. Rather, they constrain who is authorized to do so, and this narrows the view of the issues to which they refer. Discourses are thus constructions of exclusion – a characteristic that is certainly true of security discourses. In line with this, Chapter 4 expounds what security is and how it is conceptualized by the Copenhagen School as securitization. In a nutshell, the concept of securitization states that framing a matter in dramatic security terms enables the deployment of extraordinary measures if this framing is accepted by the audience(s). Security is thus understood as a speech act by which normal political proceedings are suspended. This insight has led the securitization model to have a great impact on IR studies, yet it has also been challenged in various ways. As the discussion will show,

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1 Introduction

the Copenhagen School’s model struggles with theoretical inconsistencies as it includes understandings from ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ constructivism but also touches on postmodern notions. Moreover, the way in which speech acts are conceptualized is viewed as too narrow to completely encompass the topic of ‘security’. The greatest debate, however, was sparked by discussions of the role of the audience in securitizing processes. Whereas the Copenhagen School declares the audience as vital to the success of securitizations, the role of the audience remains undertheorized in the concept and is often neglected in actual research. This chapter addresses the main points of this critique, before discussing a typical characteristic of securitization: ‘Othering’. Securitizations generally include radical forms of identity representations in terms of a threatening ‘other’. These discursive constructions constitute an antagonism between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and if this is linked to a representation of a lethal imminent threat, coercion may be permitted up to the point of annihilation. Against this theoretical background, Chapter 5 provides the analytical framework for the research topic of this book and describes the mode of conduct. The chapter presents CDA and its guiding questions which can be used for textual analysis, and it defines and describes the motivation behind the selection of data. The body of primary texts that are analyzed in the study consists mainly of presidential speeches and encompasses the speeches that each president made during one year. In Bush’s case, this begins with the period after 9/11: September 2001 to September 2002; in Obama’s case, it covers the entire first year of his presidency between January and December 2009. The restriction of focus on Bush and Obama is justified because U.S. presidents have great discursive power, particularly in the realm of foreign policy where the president functions as “Communicator-in-Chief” (Rozell 1995: 85). Moreover, limiting the actors under investigation enables an indepth analysis to be conducted and this strengthens the validity of the study’s findings. The coding of Bush’s and Obama’s security narratives led to three main categories: the American ‘self’, the enemy ‘other’, and the ‘threat’ constituted in line with them. These particular framings are analyzed in detail and then related to both the presidents’ actual detention and interrogation policies and the stance of their audiences. The latter will be split into three to four groups: first, the public and the media, second, U.S. Congress, and third, the operating apparatus which incorporates the government itself as well as the military and the secret services; in addition, in Bush’s case, the audience also includes, fourth, the Supreme Court, which went on to reverse some of Bush’s rulings. The second part of the book turns to the empirical study. Chapter 6 examines Bush’s case. It starts with an analysis of Bush’s identity framings and shows how he constituted ‘self’ and ‘other’ in binary opposition. The sections of the chapter demonstrate in detail how Bush reproduced the sense of America’s exceptionalism and constituted the nation as ‘freedom’s defender’. The ‘other’, in contrast, was viewed as pure evil and even lacked humanity, at least in most of Bush’s representations. In Bush’s religiously imbued language, this clash of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ was one of ‘good’

1.4 The Structure of the Book

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versus ‘evil’. The threat posed by the ‘other’ was imminent and global, and would be devastating if it were to materialize. It was aggravated by Bush’s claim that the enemy sought weapons of mass destruction. However, while it was said to be certain that the ‘evil-doers’ were waiting to strike, there was great uncertainty about when, where, and how they would do so. Consequently, the only way in which certain information could be gathered about future attacks was to interrogate terrorist suspects held in U. S. custody and to do so in a way that would make them ‘spill the beans’. The ‘other’ was constituted as indeed having knowledge about future attacks. In sum, this chapter argues that Bush’s securitization paved the way for extraordinary measures. As outlined above, Bush and his administration denied terrorist suspects the protections granted to them by the Geneva Conventions and other treaties of international law, and also denied them habeas corpus and legal advice. At the same time, ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ appeared legitimate, because they were presented as a means of acquiring life-saving intelligence; after all, such measures reflected both the inhumanness of the ‘other’ and the ultimate security needs of America and the ‘civilized world’. As will be demonstrated, this logic strongly resonated with the audiences. The media reproduced Bush’s framing extensively; Congress agreed to it by granting the president far-reaching war powers, and by refraining from controlling his course in the long run. Within the apparatus, concerns and disaffirmation were voiced by members of the military; however, these trailed off and did not lead to political changes. Finally, as far as the review of secondary sources suggests, the courts were rather slow to examine the lawfulness of Bush’s actions. It took years before the Supreme Court reversed some of Bush’s rulings. In terms of the Copenhagen School’s model of securitization, this chapter concludes that Bush’s security narrative was indeed sweeping and rendered emergency measures possible – including the violations of law that occurred in Guantanamo. Similar to the structure of Chapter 6, Chapter 7 focuses on Obama’s security narrative. Again, the chapter starts by reconstructing the formation of the American ‘self’. It thereby becomes apparent that Obama’s framing differed from Bush’s. Although Obama did constitute America as intrinsically exceptional, he also presented the nation as having lost its bearing. The American people were said to be no longer living up to their values and had to recapture the moral high ground. At the same time, in framing the ‘other’, Obama largely refrained from ‘(e)vilification’ (Lazar/Lazar 2004) and dehumanization, even though the enemy was constituted as highly dangerous and ruthless. In line with these framings, Obama’s ‘threat’ scenario was complex. It included the ‘other’, who posed the original threat, but in contrast to Bush’s framing, it also involved the ‘self’. According to Obama’s narrative, America was endangering itself by breaking rules; the mistreatment of detainees in Guantanamo and elsewhere was seen as a recruiting tool for terrorists and as alienating international partners that America needed in the fight against terrorism. Thus, for security reasons the United States had to revert to the rule of law and terminate coercive detention and interrogation. In sum, this chapter argues that

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1 Introduction

Obama securitized America’s violation of law; yet, this was not done – as the Copenhagen School suggests – to break free of the rules, but to return to them. As noticed above, Obama in fact ended ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ and in part restored human and legal rights to the detainees. He sought to prosecute terrorist suspects in line with the rule of law and ordered the closure of Guantanamo. With regard to Obama’s shortfalls, the investigation of the audiences indicates that he was unable to establish his narrative as the dominant logic in public discourse. His view that a reversal of America’s detention and interrogation policies was imperative to keep the nation safe was not extensively reproduced. In fact, on all levels considered in this study, i.e., the public and the media, Congress, and the apparatus, Obama faced rejection. In contrast, Bush’s framings continued to be expressed and reproduced in 2009. They proved to be lasting and this book suggests that this hampered the full implementation of the policy changes that Obama had announced. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the book’s argument and the conclusions that can be drawn from the comparison of the presidents’ security narratives. The synopsis points to the power of securitizations but also substantiates the essential role of the audience. In liberal democracies at least, it is clear that securitizations might remain unsuccessful if the securitizer lacks the acceptance of relevant audiences. In summarizing the study, this chapter also points to areas of further research.

Part II Theoretical Framework and Methodology

2 Constructivism The paradigm on which this study is based needs to be defined at the outset. The first step in this part, therefore, is outlining the ontology, epistemology and methodology on which the subsequent analysis relies. This involves defining the assumptions that are made about what constitutes reality, how we know about reality and how we can best proceed to learn about it with regard to particular research questions. It is crucial to define these assumptions because, as Alexander Wendt puts it, “how we answer ‘what causes what?’ will depend in important part on how we first answer ‘what is there?’ and ‘how should we study it?’” (Wendt 1999: 5). Following this line, this chapter sets out the theoretical and epistemological foundations of this book. In particular, it briefly summarizes the two main strands of constructivism: ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ constructivism. It highlights their different views about reality and the logic under which they operate, namely, causality and constitution. As this indicates, it also challenges the very notion of causality, as understood by Wendt. Moreover, this chapter highlights the reason why language needs to be considered in the field of International Relations. This lays down the initial point for the discourse theory that is subsequently discussed and for the discourse analysis conducted in the empirical part of this book.

2.1 The Constructivist Turn In order to explain political action, researchers in the field of International Relations (henceforth IR) have traditionally focused on the interests of states. In terms of ontology, the identity and interests of states were regarded as pre-social, that is, they were interpreted as ‘given’; this established a causal relationship between these factors and political developments. With the so-called ‘constructivist turn’ in the 1980s, this understanding began to change (Wendt 1987, 1992a, 1992b, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000; Onuf 1989; Kratochwil 1993; Finnemore 1996; Katzenstein 1996a; Lapid/Kratochwil 1996; Weldes 1996; Adler 1997; Checkel 1998, 1999; Price/ReusSmit 1998).10 This resulted in the view that ideas and norms played an essential role

10 Constructivism is of great prominence in various disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities. Thus, meta-theoretical debates and insights shift across disciplines and this also influences constructivism in International Relations. Besides these current impacts, the ‘constructivist turn’ in IR is indebted to philosophical and sociological theory (Berger/Luckmann 1966; Giddens 1984; Luhmann 1984, 1997) and is also called ‘social constructivism’. While remaining aware of these influences and legacies, this section focuses on constructivism only in its relevance to IR today and, for practical reasons, mainly uses the shorter term ‘constructivism’. In IR, the term was introduced by Nicholas Onuf (1989). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110626056-002

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in the formation of interests. The identities and interests of actors were thus no longer viewed as preset but as socially constructed entities. This theoretical approach went on to break new ground in terms of worldviews. Today, constructivism is applied in various studies at all kinds of (political) levels, but much of the primary theorizing in International Relations traces back to Alexander Wendt, who investigated the determining entities in the international system. He is, in fact, the most prominent representative of ‘moderate’ constructivism – the first generation of the approach that later gave way to more ‘radical’ concepts. Since Wendt’s writings are essential for the constructivist debate, his positions are discussed in some detail.11 The term constructivism reflects the view that “the entire world is continuously ‘under construction’” (Kubálková et al. 1998: x). In contrast to traditional IR-theories and their static assumptions about the world, constructivism emphasizes the social constitution of reality and the inherent possibility for change.12 The constructivist view gained momentum among IR-scholars especially after the end of the Cold War, because traditional theories had not only failed to predict this dramatic transformation, they also had difficulties explaining it.13 Constructivism thus led to a theoretical renewal of IR. Implemented as a backlash to neo-realism and neo-liberalism, constructivism is defined against a range of traditional ‘isms’: rationalism, materialism, positivism and empiricism.14 This delineation of constructivism from other premises

11 These labels – ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ constructivism – are used in order to make the discussion manageable. Due to tremendous differentiation on the subject, there are many descriptions of more or less ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ approaches. In a direct comparison of the two camps, for example, there are notions such as: ‘conventional’, ‘modern’, ‘moderate’, ‘mainstream’, ‘rationalist’, ‘positivist’ vs. ‘critical’, ‘postmodern’, ‘radical’, ‘consistent’, ‘reflectivist’ and ‘interpretive’ constructivism. Other classifications, such as the one made by Michael Barnett (2008: 162), encompass ‘neoclassical’, ‘modernist’, ‘post-modern’, ‘naturalistic’, ‘thick’, ‘thin’, ‘linguistic’, ‘narrative’, ‘weak’, ‘strong’, ‘systemic’ and ‘holistic’ constructivism. The diversity of nomenclature also demonstrates the wide range of tonalities especially among the post-positivist approaches, and labeling varies according to ontological and epistemological (and subsequently methodological) premises. A change in content also accompanies this shift. The focus moves from a rather state-centric form of research to the study of non-state actors like transnational organizations or social movements as well as to the study of ethnic- or gender-related aspects. On ontological and epistemological premises, see Smith (1995: 24–26), Baylis/Smith (1997: ch. 9), Hopf (1998: 181–185), Fearon/Wendt (2002: 56–58), Ulbert (2003), Wiener (2003: 259f), Fierke (2007a: 172–177), and Baylis et al. (2008: ch. 9 and 10). 12 As Stefano Guzzini points out, recognition of the social nature of the international system is not completely new. In his view, however, constructivism lifted the debate to a meta-theoretical level and combined “many old hats with a willingness to challenge the scientific project of Mainstream International Relations” (2000: 156). 13 There is plenty of literature on this shortcoming of neo-realist theory. See, for example, Walker (1987), Ruggie (1989), Grunberg/Risse-Kappen (1992), Gaddis (1992/93), Kratochwil (1993), Koslowski/ Kratochwil (1994), and Lebow (1994). 14 For a good summary of the historical rise of empiricism and positivism see Morrison (1995: ch. 1) and Smith (1996). Among IR-scholars it is a matter of dispute which of the ‘isms’ exactly opposes constructivism. In Wendt’s view, constructivism implies both claims, i.e., “that the fundamental

2.1 The Constructivist Turn

17

was quite symptomatic, as it was often easier to define what constructivism was not than what it was. Although there is consensus that constructivism is not a fullfledged theory of international politics such as realism or liberalism, disagreement remains among IR scholars whether it represents “an alternative ontology” (Kubálková et al. 1998: xii), a social theory (Wendt 1999), a meta-theory (Guzzini 2000: 155f; Jørgensen 2001: 42–46; Ulbert 2005: 10), or just a new method (Checkel 1998).15 In contrast to realism and liberalism, which provide “specific claims and hypotheses about patterns in world politics” (Barnett 2008: 162), constructivism does not “by itself, tell us anything, whatsoever, about international events, developments or any other international phenomena” (Jørgensen 2001: 48); it does not provide universally valid explanations for state action or system change that would enable forecasting to be undertaken. Rather, it investigates how issues and practices are constructed in a specific social situation and in how far this enables particular developments to take place. Accordingly, the nature of systems, relations, and actions in the political field are not considered to be the outcome of immutable structures but of social practices. In this respect, we do not live in a predetermined setup, but in a ‘world of our making’ (Onuf 1989). By analyzing the social construction of the world, constructivism does not center exclusively on any distinct level of analysis, which again differentiates it from traditional IR-theories.16 Instead, in order to answer puzzles in (international) politics, constructivists often have to work across levels.

structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material (a claim that opposes materialism), and that these structures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just their behavior (a claim that opposes rationalism)” (1995: 71f). In contrast, Ian Hurd (2008) suggests that materialism is the real counterpart to constructivism; Michael Barnett (2008) sees rationalism as the opposite. James Fearon and Alexander Wendt (2002), however, view the paradigmatic divide between rationalism and constructivism as less severe than is often assumed. Even rationalist theories acknowledge the relevance of ideas and norms. According to rationalist understanding, however, they are mainly regulative; i.e. they have a confining effect on actors’ behavior rather than constitutive power (see for example Goldstein/Keohane 1993). 15 Classification varies according to what exactly is considered as constructed, whether it is mainly our knowledge about reality (and thus a question of epistemology) or whether it is reality itself (and hence a question of ontology). In the latter case, the question arises to what extent reality is constructed, by what, and in how far reality and knowledge are mutually constitutive. In general, the categorization of constructivism remains fuzzy. To mention just two positions out of many: according to Jackson/Sørensen (2007: 164) “constructivism is both a social theory and a number of different substantive theories of IR.” Jørgensen (2001: 42–46) on the other hand claims that constructivism is moving towards meta-theory, but that this meta-theoretical level is in effect only one out of four which represent constructivism. 16 For a good account of the levels of analysis as an analytical concept for studying international politics, see Buzan (1995), as well as Hollis/Smith (1990: 97–101). They point to the implications of the classification conducted by the leading contemporary neorealist Kenneth Waltz (1979).

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2.2 Structure and Agent According to constructivist assumptions, the social world and what is perceived as reality consists of ideas. Ideas in this sense are not individual beliefs but intersubjectively shared understandings that constitute “webs of meaning” (Hopf 1998: 199).17 These ideas establish norms and structures; and they institutionalize and provide the framework for social action.18 Structures, thereby, have a dual quality: they have both regulative and constitutive power. They are regulative in that they set up “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors” (Katzenstein 1996b: 5, 1997: 3; cf. Finnemore/Sikkink 1998: 891; Checkel 1999: 83), and as such, they guide agents’ practices by limiting what is perceived as the appropriate scope of action. James March and Johan Olsen called this the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March/Olsen 1989: 22–26, 160f, 1998). In contrast to the rationalist belief that identities and interests are exogenously given and that humans as self-interested utility-maximizers follow an instrumentalist ‘logic of consequentialism’ (seeking useful consequences in view of anticipated costs and benefits), constructivism emanates from a normative ‘logic of appropriateness’ (the desire to act in the right way). According to the latter, humans are not purely rational but are concerned about the legitimacy of their actions and behave in a manner that complies with intersubjectively constituted norms. They are therefore rule-guided.19 Besides their regulative characteristics, structures are also constitutive. They socialize and define the agent and thereby determine an agent’s conception of ‘self’ (who the agent is and what she or he wants). In so doing, structures constitute the identity of actors and thus the interests that steer their actions (Wendt 1992a: 398; Risse et al. 1999; Risse 2000: 5). At the same time, however, agents (re-)produce or transform structures through their actions. Structure and agent are thus not given, but entities in the making. They are both a condition for and an effect of one another, therefore, “the ontology is one of mutual constitution” (Checkel 1998: 326; cf. Wendt 1987: 337–340; Adler 2002).20

17 According to constructivist understandings, ideas are not the product of individual minds, nor are they solely mental. As Jeffrey Legro (2007: 6) puts it, ideas have an organizational impact: “They are embedded not only in human brains but also in the ‘collective memories’, government procedures, educational systems, and the rhetoric of statecraft.” 18 Following Emile Durkheim (1982 [1895]: 54–56) some scholars have adverted to the fact that shared norms do not necessarily have to be collective. Roughly speaking, the difference is made between norms that are commonly held and those that are (also) institutionalized in formal rules and laws. However, “the process by which shared knowledge becomes a collective norm remains underspecified” (Kowert/Legro 1996: 475). On this issue, see also Taylor (1971: 30f), Jepperson/Swidler (1994: 365–368), and Jepperson et al. (1996: 54f, fn. 69). 19 There is a dissent among scholars on how far there is another constructivist logic underlying human action, i.e., communicative action (Habermas 1984). While Harald Müller (1994, 2004) subsumes it in his later work under the ‘logic of appropriateness’, Risse (2000) sees it as an independent logic. 20 The assumption of the mutual constitution of agent and structure largely relies on the work of Anthony Giddens (1984) and his theory of structuration.

2.3 Materialism versus Idealism

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Consequently, with regard to international relations, constructivists claim that the “actions of states contribute to making the institutions and norms of international life, and these institutions and norms contribute to defining, socializing, and influencing states” (Hurd 2008: 304). It is this process of social production and reproduction that offers the possibility for political change and system transformation (Koslowski/ Kratochwil 1994; Tannenwald 2005).21 According to the constructivist understanding outlined above, identities and interests are endogenous. When Alexander Wendt (1992a) in his famous article claims that Anarchy is what states make of it, he refers to the constructivist view that in a ‘world of our making’ even the international system is socially constructed and might, in principal, change. After all, it is shaped by state identities and interests which are “constituted by collective meanings that are always in process” (Wendt 1992a: 407, cf. 1987). Although this view has become a central part of constructivist studies, Wendt’s particular approach has remained contested. In fact, the great debates in IR were and still are about the relationship of structure and agent and, thus, as will be discussed below, about causality and constitution. The origin of these debates is the fact that Alexander Wendt and other representatives of ‘moderate’ constructivism still rely on the assumptions of traditional IR-theory, whereas those who belong to the more ‘radical’ constructivist understanding claim that this is incongruous with the intrinsic constructivist framework. These assumptions, which bear ontological, epistemological and methodological implications, are discussed in the following sections.

2.3 Materialism versus Idealism Controversy persists among constructivists about whether the social world is indeed nothing but a construction or whether there is still something else ‘out there’ that shapes our reality. As part of this dispute, the question arises as to whether it is possible to distinguish between the ideal and the material world. Whereas ‘radical’ constructivists reject this possibility, ‘moderate’ constructivists place ideal and material factors in a causal relationship (see sections 2.4 and 2.6). Evidently, the conceptualization of materialism and idealism also has an impact on the relationship between structure and agent, and this corresponds to the debate among researchers that emanated from what Wendt (1987) called the agent-structure problem. Despite the basic assumption of the mutual constitution of structure and agent, debate arose over

21 Change does not necessarily mean change for the better. Martha Finnemore (1996: 32) pointed to the fact that norms are not inherently ‘good’ and that they can also mean intolerance and violence. The debate about the quality of change also affects the self-conception of constructivist scholars and their role in doing research. For Kubálková/Onuf/Kowert constructivism is only normative “in the sense that it takes normative phenomena – rules – as the foundation of society” (Kubálková et al. 1998: 19); others, in contrast, view constructivism as mandating emancipatory change (Neufeld 1993: 58).

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the question of ontological primacy: what determines what, and “whether structures determine individual behavior, or individuals are capable of acting as agents to change structures” (Fierke 2001: 123).22 In his 1996 essay Identity and Structural Change in International Politics, Wendt presented the constitution of structure and agent as a more agentic approach and as one with ontologically intrinsic qualities. In place of true reciprocity, “my view today is less symmetric,” he stated. In fact, he regarded the constitution of structure and agent as only mutual in part (Wendt 1996: 48f). Wendt restricted the scope and impact of intersubjectively shared meanings and defined identity as less dependent on structure. He viewed identity as also consisting of pre-social elements and conceptualized it as both constructed and ‘given’. Correspondingly, he claimed that “interests are not ideas all the way down” (Wendt 1999: 132, emphasis in original). With regard to individuals, he believed that interests “must ultimately hook on to a material ground, human nature” (1999: 130) from which the need for nourishment, social contact and so forth arise (1999: 131f; 136). While there seem to be good reasons to argue that the will to survive and to meet basic needs is a natural characteristic of individual human beings, this becomes more problematic with regard to states.23 For Wendt, however, some interests are “intrinsic to states” (Wendt 1999: 234), and are universally valid and thus independent of social structures and context; these include physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem (Wendt 1999: 233–237). As Smith (2000: 155) notes with regard to Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics, “in some places, the most plausible reading is that the material, via his conception of human nature and his definition of the causal nature of material forces, does indeed do most of the work.” With this account of the ‘essential’ properties of states, Wendt assumes that a priori reality exists and he thus retains “rump materialism” within his theories (Wendt 1999: 96, 109–113, 130–135). Reality, then, is not only made of ideas but also by mindindependent and – as will be discussed below – extra-linguistic parameters. In line with this, Wendt tends to treat states as prior to social context, which leads him to take an agent-centered perspective. In fact, he points out that states have to be chosen as units of analysis “before we can be constructivist about anything” (Wendt 1999: 7; cf. Zehfuss 2006: 113). On this point ‘radical’ constructivists, and post-structuralists in particular, criticize Wendt for treating states as given, self-dependent units that act with rational willpower. Doing so, they argue, ignores the question of how their agency became possible and how the meanings they act upon were constituted (Inayatullah/ Blaney 1996: 71–74; Pasic 1996: 86–90; Campbell 1998: 219; Smith 2000: 161f; Fierke 2001: 117; Zehfuss 2006: 109). Moreover, as critics remark, problematic in this respect is

22 For an early review of the structure-agent debate, see Gould (1998). 23 Wendt (1999: 224–230) distinguished four kinds of identity, of which ‘corporate (state) identity’ is said to have a material base. He concluded that states “can have only one such identity” (1999: 225), and that states are “ontologically prior to the states system” just as individuals are prior to society (1999: 244). For a critique of this view of ‘corporate identity’, see Cederman/Daase (2006) and Zehfuss (2006).

2.4 Causality in Moderate Constructivism

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also the view of identity as consistent rather than contingent. Wendt treats states as having both a relatively stable and unitary identity that corresponds to a “single set of interests” (Weldes 1996: 280). Such a view, common among neorealists, has difficulties explaining how a state with its cultural and historical background can have different foreign policies (Wæver 2002: 22). Zehfuss (2006) convincingly exposed this problem by taking the example of the Federal Republic of Germany and the redefinition of its role in international politics after the end of the Cold War. With the help of her case study, she demonstrated that identity is neither unitary nor does it lead to a single set of interests. Instead, competing or contradictory identity-based narratives might exist that do not provide for a priori predictions about the kind of policy that will be applied. Zehfuss concluded that conceptualizing identity and interest is impossible without taking the role of language into account since “identities depend on concrete articulations for their existence” (Zehfuss 2006: 95, cf. 2001: 69f, Zehfuß 1998: 125). This vital aspect of constructivist theory is referred to in section 2.5. Before that, the epistemological consequences of Wendt’s conceptualization of identity and interest are discussed.

2.4 Causality in Moderate Constructivism ‘Moderate’ constructivists claim that they provide evidence for their findings. This is possible, according to their reasoning, because the world is made of ideal and material factors which can be treated as distinct entities. It is this “ontological realism” (Adler 1997: 323) that gives way to a causal epistemology, the more so, as ideal factors are viewed as relatively stable. However, this means, as critics note, that the causal logic of traditional IR-theories “is simply supplanted by a new causal logic that begins with ideas” (Fierke 2001: 117; cf. Campbell 1998: 217f) and uses norms and identity as variables. Despite the fact that their ontology is (partly) ideational, investigation into the origin of ideas and norms as well as identity and interests, is neglected; instead, ‘moderate’ constructivism focuses on how these aspects function (Kratochwil 1989: 5; Finnemore 1996: 14–28; Jepperson et al. 1996: 52–65; Flynn/ Farrell 1999: 510f; Wiener 2003: 265f). In fact, Wendt treats ideas as both constitutive and causal (Wendt 1998, 1999: ch. 3), and identity as the cause of interests (Wendt 1998: 107, 1999: 93, 144, 229; cf. Zehfuss 2006: 114).24 While “not carved in stone” (Wendt 1999: 21), identities are considered as solid and hard to change; and since “interests are dependent on identities” (Wendt 1994: 385), this leads to predictable patterns of behavior in international relations (Wendt 1992a: 396–407, 410f, 1992b: 183, 1998, 1999: 144; cf. Hopf 1998: 180–183, 199f). As this account provides for generalizations, ‘moderate’ constructivists engage in claims to truth, and hypothesis testing. They remain committed to a positivist epistemology

24 Zehfuss (2006) provides a detailed critique with these and further references to Wendt’s writings.

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where identity is treated as a “causal category which helps explain international politics” (Zehfuss 2006: 114; cf. Campbell 1998: 217f; Smith 2000: 156–158). Accepting identity as the cause of things, however, means ontologically prioritizing it over interests. This stance, as critics emphasize, is incompatible with the conception of the mutual constitution of agent and structure, and it anticipates inertia rather than change. As Koslowski and Kratochwil point out: “What constructivism, and for that matter any theory of social action, is unable to deliver is a consistent and coherent reduction of action to some ultimate foundation that supposedly causes everything else” (Koslowski/ Kratochwil 1994: 225). In sum, ‘moderate’ constructivism still includes presuppositions that are reminiscent of more traditional ‘isms’. In its attempt to take the ‘constructivist turn’ without abandoning the “commitment to science” (Wendt 1999: 47) – which refers to the idea of scientific explanation in terms of traditional IR – ‘moderate’ constructivism adheres to ‘rump materialism’. While Wendt admits that he has “idealist ontological commitments,” epistemologically, he holds onto scientific realism and openly concedes that “I am a ‘positivist’” (Wendt 1999: 39). What shines through here is the traditional belief that only positivist methods provide reliable results. Wendt’s adherence to positivist reports may best be demonstrated by his statement: “I am suggesting that ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ accounts are both relevant to a naturalistic social science” (Wendt 1991: 391, emphasis in original, cf. 1987: 354f, 1999: 77f; Jepperson et al. 1996: 67; Checkel 1998). The aim is to find principles that underlie reality and thus represent ‘the’ truth (Meyers 1990, 1994: 128; Smith 1996: 15f; Nabers 2005: 20). Constructivism in Wendt’s conception is therefore inclined to ask why questions, that is, why something came about. It attempts to explain the world rather than understand it, although the alleged truths that are obtained are not viewed as absolute truths across time and space.25 While retaining a positivist epistemology helped ‘moderate’ constructivism to gain acceptance in the social sciences, its amalgamation of concepts has been criticized as inconsistent.26 There is, after all,

25 The difference between explaining (causal explanation) and understanding (interpretive explanation) goes back to Max Weber’s theory of social action and his method of Verstehen (Weber 1956: 1–11). In the course of the Methodenstreit, Weber emphasized the differences between the natural and the social sciences by comparing their subject matters (external world phenomena vs. the inner nature of actors), the kind of knowledge that was sought (law-like regularities vs. interpretative understanding of social action), and the way to derive these findings (observation vs. interpretation). Weber concluded that the task of the social sciences is the interpretation of social action. Verstehen then means to go beyond observation and to reconstruct outward events by uncovering how individuals attach social meanings to behavior, that is, how they act on their understandings of the acts of others. Because of this dependence on understanding, Weber considered the methods of the natural sciences to be inadequate for the analysis of society. See also Hollis/Smith (1990: 78–82), Morrison (1995: 273–282), as well as Taylor (1971). 26 Wendt fiercely rejected this: “I do not think an idealist ontology implies a post-positivist epistemology” (Wendt 1999: 40, see also ch. 2). Instead, he advocated methodological pluralism

2.5 The Role of Language in Constructivism

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as Richard Handler (1994: 29) remarks, an obvious tension “between the notion that identity is essential, fundamental, unitary, and unchanging, and the notion that identities are constructed and reconstructed through historical action.” With his conceptualization of constructivism, Wendt (1999: ch. 2) tried to find a via media or, as Adler (1997) noted, to seize the middle ground.27 Wendt seeks to provide a middle position that reconciles and combines the presumptions of traditional IR-theories with interpretative approaches. Although Wendt’s contribution to IR-theorizing is viewed as outstanding, critics disavow that his approach represents a truly successful bridge-building exercise between the rationalist and reflectivist sides of social science (Smith 1997: 183–187, 2000; Kratochwil 2000, 2006; Fierke 2001: 116–118; Behnke 2006b; Cederman/Daase 2006; Zehfuss 2006). As pointed out above, the causal logic that ‘moderate’ constructivists subscribe to is contested for being incongruous with the intrinsic framework of constructivism: in social construction, nothing is inevitable. And if – as posited – structure and agent are mutually constitutive, they cannot be classified as independent or dependent variables since there is no “monological relationship by which one element clearly impacts on another” (Fierke 2001: 117). ‘Radical’ constructivism and the discourse theoretical approach applied in this book depart from Wendt’s ontological realism by questioning norms, identities and interests themselves, by emphasizing their emergence and contingency and by investigating the conditions for their change. As will become clear from the following three sections, language is pivotal to this theoretical approach.

2.5 The Role of Language in Constructivism The question about the role of language in the constitution of the world is essential as it embodies one of the great debates in constructivist IR. In fact, the different assessments of the role of language have been viewed as “the fundamental fissure in constructivism and the deepest source of its incoherence” (Onuf 2001: 245). The underlying question

(Wendt 2000). In his view, there is “no fundamental epistemological difference between the natural and social sciences” and therefore, “Explanation and Understanding both, are, and should be, practised in both domains” (Wendt 1998: 102, emphasis in original). In general, Wendt argues that post-positivists focus too much on epistemology, when it is ontology that counts. Therefore, he stresses that the aim must not be method- but problem-driven research and in doing the latter he considers a “cross-paradigmatic exchange” (Fearon/Wendt 2002: 53; cf. Wendt 1991: 392) most fruitful. For a vivid discussion of the question of whether ontology or epistemology is of prior concern, see the exchange of Hollis/Smith (1991, 1994, 1996) with Wendt (1991), Carlsnaes (1992), and Jabri/Chan (1996). 27 Wendt’s ‘middle ground’ fueled the so-called ‘Third Debate’ in IR. The question was whether positivist and post-positivist approaches can be merged or whether rationalist and constructivist/ reflectivist models are entirely incompatible in their epistemological standpoints. A different approach to a via media is proposed by Vincent Pouliot (2007). He claims that meanings objectify through their interpretation. Subjectivism and objectivism thus merge at this point, which he calls ‘sobjectivism’.

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behind the debate is how meaning is constituted. Why does everything in our world – as we perceive it – bear meaning? Whereas ‘radical’ constructivists see language as the primary constitutive, ‘moderate’ constructivists do not – they remain rather silent on the role of language. Since this debate has consequences for the understanding of ontology, epistemology and appropriate methodological approaches, this section briefly outlines the different positions. In Alexander Wendt’s account of constructivism “social structures are real and objective, not ‘just talk’” (Wendt 1995: 74). With respect to the question of how ‘webs of meaning’ and hence identities and interests are created, language is at best a minor concern.28 In fact, in his early publications, and particularly his article Anarchy is what states make of it, Wendt refers solely to thoughts and physical deeds when examining social interaction. Although it is somewhat obvious that the process of thinking relies on language, Wendt is not responsive to this point. Moreover, he does not consider that physical actions also rest upon underlying meanings that must have been established first. In a similar way, large parts of Anglo-American constructivist IR views social reality as somewhat independent of language. ‘Radical’ constructivists essentially criticize the disregard of language in ‘moderate’ constructivist studies (Zehfuß 1998, Zehfuss 2001; Kratochwil 2000: 89; Onuf 2001: 245–248).29 With respect to Wendt, who is the critics’ main benchmark, Zehfuss (Zehfuß 1998: 125, Zehfuss 2001: 69f, 2002: 48f) elaborates on the ‘voicelessness’ of his alien actors ego and alter. In fact, in investigating Wendt’s understanding of structures and identity formation, his narrative on ego and alter is telling (Wendt 1992a: 404f, 1999: 328–335). Ego and alter are two actors who come across one another for the first time. They are unable to verbally communicate so that their interaction is confined to observable behavior in terms of primal gestures and physical reactions. They engage therefore in a “process of signaling and interpreting” (Wendt 1992a: 405). What shapes and possibly changes their identity and interests is simply the behavior of the ‘other’ towards the ‘self’ while this behavior must “be grasped without a linguistic context” (Zehfuss 2002: 49, cf. 2006; Wendt 1999: 317).30 In Wendt’s words: “through practice agents are continuously producing and reproducing identities and interests” (Wendt 1992a: 411). The propositions of this set up are problematic for several reasons. To start with, verbal

28 As far as language is mentioned in Wendt’s work during the early to mid-nineties, it is done so marginally, either in passing or in footnotes. See Wendt (1994: 391, 1996: 57f) and Jepperson et al. (1996: 64, fn. 98). 29 For the role of language in international relations, see also Müller (1994, 1995). 30 Zehfuss (2006: 104) points out that Wendt’s distinction between ‘identity’ and ‘behavior’ remains unclear. Wendt emphasizes that social interaction not only changes behavior but identity, yet, if identity is solely expressed through particular forms of behavior, it is difficult to see that difference.

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communication is certainly the most cardinal means of human interaction. While there may be cases where linguistic exchange is difficult, it appears dubious to take such cases as a model for theorizing about social interaction and identity formation. What is more fundamental, however, is the question of how the gestures of ego and alter bear meaning without language. How can the actions of ‘others’ be interpreted if no ‘web of meaning’ is available that enables them to be judged as amiable or hostile? Again, Wendt neither considered the language-based process of thinking nor the establishment of meaning that makes physical deeds meaningful. Instead, ego and alter act on some kind of pre-social rationale. However, as Fierke remarks “a priori meanings, rather than a priori rationality, provide the backdrop of action” since even rationality “must be embedded in a context” (Fierke 2001: 123f; cf. Zehfuss 2001). Wendt’s statement that “people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them” (Wendt 1992a: 396f) is theoretically dubious if the role of language is not considered. Moreover, in the absence of language, the protagonists are devoid of identity. Who are the actors in Wendt’s account? How are ego and alter constructed in the first place? Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney are correct in criticizing that alter and ego are conceptualized as if the answer to this question were unclear to themselves. Although one expects them to have an idea about the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ – which would emanate from meanings that already existed – they are largely blank, and their identities are without history (Inayatullah/Blaney 1996; cf. Weldes 1996: 280; Smith 2000: 160). ‘Radical’ constructivists challenge the claim that states’ identities and interests are constructed from the outside (exogenously to the ‘self’) through the physical behavior of other states, and criticize the fact that the initial development of consciousness and knowledge through language is left void. Interestingly, in his later work (such as his 1999 Social Theory of International Politics), Wendt does consider language. Examining the impact of cultural structures, he states that “the structure of shared beliefs is ultimately a linguistic phenomenon” (Wendt 1999: 175) and he concedes that “most human communication takes place discursively” (Wendt 1999: 346). Wendt (1999: 135) even prompts his colleagues to consider the constitutive power of discourse by noting: “When confronted by ostensibly ‘material’ explanations, always inquire into the discursive conditions which make them work.” With this proposition, Wendt comes closer to the understanding of ‘radical’ constructivism; however, he never really develops it into a theoretical argument. Instead, as Guzzini and Leander remark, he develops “a curious type of constructivism where language is very much out of the picture, despite his repeated reference to its centrality” (Guzzini/Leander 2006b: 86). All in all, the charge is that Wendt’s omission of the role of language leaves “blind spots” in his analysis of the social world that lead to “methodological commitments strangely at odds with constructivism” (Kratochwil 2000: 89, cf. 2006: 36).

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2.6 Constituting Meaning in Radical Constructivism ‘Radical’ constructivists take the centrality of language into account and view language as the original force of meaning and identity formation. This perspective is rooted in and indebted to the ‘linguistic turn’.31 It draws on a perspective according to which language is not the mirror of an objective reality that it simply reflects and describes, but constitutive of social reality (Fierke/Jørgensen 2001: 7; cf. Taylor 1971: 24; Rabinow/ Sullivan 1987b; Weldes 1996: 304; Kratochwil 2001: 19f; Milliken 2001: 145). According to this understanding, it is language that constitutes meaning, and makes intersubjectivity – like the encounter between ego and alter – meaningful at all; moreover, it provides for identity and interest formation that shapes and is shaped by (political) interaction. Whereas Wendt, as noted, treats identities and interests either as pre-social or as products of what actors do (how they behave towards one another), ‘radical’ constructivists believe that identities and interests are first and foremost constituted by what actors say. Identity is thus a narrative about the ‘self’ that relates to the structures it creates and draws on (McSweeney 1999: 165). This process is endogenous, and this view helps provide an understanding of what a state identifies with, that is, what the ‘self’ is, what national interests are, and how a state interprets the structures of international politics that it acts upon (Ringmar 1996). Instead of taking identity as a somewhat independent variable that causes political behavior, ‘radical’ constructivists view identity and political action as constituted and ontologically interlinked through discourse. From this perspective, identities are both the foundation and the product of (foreign) policy: the discursive formation of identity enables certain policies to be formed, and these policies (re-)produce the identity narrative (Hansen 2006: ch. 2). However, this concept of mutual constitution excludes the possibility of causality. What has been said above about identity is true in general: For ‘radical’ constructivists, language constitutes reality and vice versa, that is, words and the world are mutually constitutive (Onuf 1989: 94). In contrast to Wendt, who claims that “meaning is also regulated by a mind-independent, extra-linguistic world” (Wendt 1999: 57), ‘radical’ constructivists claim that phenomena cannot constitute themselves as “objects of knowledge independently of discursive practices” (Guzzini 2000: 159). For this stance, ‘radical’ constructivists have been accused of taking up an idealist position where the world is nothing but a creation of the mind (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 37–47); this suggests that ‘radical’ constructivists deny the pre-existence of the world altogether, including material substance. This proposition has been repudiated numerous times, however. ‘Radical’ constructivists do not deny the existence of the material 31 The ‘linguistic turn’ refers to Ludwig Wittgenstein and his works Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (first published in 1921, in a revised version again in 1922) and Philosophical Investigations (1953, published posthumously). Wittgenstein demonstrated the importance of language and claimed in his later work its constitutive role; this provided new insight to scholars of philosophy and the social sciences and sparked new theory. For more information, see Peter Hacker (1996).

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world, but the possibility of language-independent observation. They argue that “material structures [. . .] are given meaning only by the social context through which they are interpreted” (Checkel 1998: 326; cf. Foucault 1984 [1971]: 127; Onuf 1989: 40; Campbell 1998: 6; Guzzini 2000: 159f; Kratochwil 2000: 91). The impacts that this has on our view of the world and what we consider to be real is demonstrated by Laclau and Mouffe: An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. (Laclau/Mouffe 2001 [1985]: 108)

According to this understanding, the only access we have to reality is through discursive structures since they determine our thinking, cognition, and knowledge and thus how we perceive what is real (Mills 2004: 45).32 This understanding of ‘radical’ constructivism has epistemological consequences. If both, the world (subject matter), and knowledge about it (the theories with which inferences are drawn from data) are discursive constructions, the “interpretivist moment is double” (Pouliot 2007: 365, emphasis in original). Under these terms there is no neutral ground for neutral judgments. Scholars of traditional IR therefore criticize this approach for operating in hermeneutical circles.33 In this ‘radical’ constructivist understanding, ontology and epistemology are inextricably linked. We cannot, as Karin Fierke puts it, “get behind our language to compare it with that which it describes” (Fierke 2001: 118; cf. Taylor 1971; Pouliot 2007: 363); or, to use Nicholas Onuf’s more figurative wording: “We are always within our constructions, even as we choose to stand apart from them, condemn them, reconstruct them” (Onuf 1989: 43). Certainly, this changes the grasp of knowledge that can be generated through science. If all knowledge of reality is an interpretive construction of a socially constructed world, truth claims and hypothesis testing are impossible, since there is no objective standard against which the interpretation could be tested. This clearly shows the difference between ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ constructivism. While Alexander Wendt believes that theories can be tested “against evidence” (Wendt 1995: 75), ‘radical’ constructivism acts on the assumption that theories are always tested against other theories or interpretations (Neufeld 1993: 48; Klotz/Lynch 2007: 106); it claims to provide theoretical coherence by turning to a post-positivist epistemology. Accordingly, knowledge cannot be attained as warranted truth, but as a mode of

32 At the same time, however, Wendt is correct in pointing to the fact that the material world limits the possibilities of reality; after all, it is true that “pigs can’t fly” (Wendt 1999: 56, emphasis in original) – no matter what our ideas about them are. 33 This refers to the sociologist Anthony Giddens’ insight into what he called a ‘double hermeneutic’. He defined it as “a mutual interpretative interplay between social science and those whose activities compose its subject matter” (Giddens 1984: xxxii).

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consensus based on findings that are intersubjectively traceable. The aim of this research is to understand the social world and to find plausible answers as to how something is possible. With language playing such a vital role, in terms of research methods, ‘radical’ constructivists draw on discourse analysis for their studies. Due to the traditional quest for causality in the social sciences, ‘radical’ constructivists have faced much criticism. Critics point out that this path inevitably leads to relativism since in the absence of objectivity and truth the most essential points of reference are missing. They reject the renunciation of established scientific beliefs, and fear that arbitrariness will find its way into science or that it will all end in nihilism (Butler 1993: 31; cf. Angermüller et al. 2001: 23). ‘Radical’ constructivists reject the charge of arbitrariness since interpretive studies are still obliged to meet scientific standards with regard to plausibility, and provide reliable insights into social developments. Although ‘radical’ constructivists accept the critique of relativism, they counter it by contesting the value of alleged truths derived from an ontological position that – in their view – is unsustainable from the outset. If there is no ultimate truth for us to possess, they argue, there is no point in being anxious about losing it. It is fair to mention, though, that the notion of relativism falls back on ‘radical’ constructivism itself. If insights are only relatively true this must also apply to the theoretical assumptions of ‘radical’ constructivism. While posed as truth, the premise that truth is not certain but relative is itself not certain but relative. In other words, there is no absolute certainty whatsoever neither in terms of the premises reality is approached with, nor in terms of constructivism’s findings. In closing this section, it is worth mentioning that there are also critics who contest the assumption that it is scientifically required or even expedient to ensure that approaches are strictly separated in terms of epistemology, that is, to strive for a pure form and force concepts into either-or-categories. They point out that the terms understanding and explaining and thus the questions of how and why, need not be regarded as automatically opposed to each other, but as somewhat complementary (Hopf 2002: xi; Torfing 2005: 18–21; Checkel 2008: 126; cf. Pouliot 2007). They advance the view that hybrid forms have their own eligibility. This stance resonates with Wendt’s demand for methodological pluralism and a “cross-paradigmatic exchange” (Fearon/Wendt 2002: 53; cf. Wendt 1999: 40, ch. 2, 2000; see also fn. 26). In line with this, there is a perceptible effort to argue in favor of constructivism’s explanatory power, which again opens up the discussion about causality. With ideas, norms and discourses being so crucial in constituting the social world, Milja Kurki (2006, 2008) pleads for treating them “as ‘constraining and enabling’ conditioning causes of social action” (Kurki 2008: 12). In her view, “interpretive and discursive approaches should be recognised as playing an important role in world political causal explanation” (Kurki 2008: 11). However, Kurki defines causality more broadly than has traditionally been the case and deviates from a mechanical understanding. In a similar way, Norman Fairclough, whose theoretical assumptions in analyzing discourse will be outlined in the next chapter (see section 3.2), speaks about causes

2.7 Austin’s Speech Act Theory

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and effects. According to Fairclough (2003: 8), language does have causal effects, but these are neither brought about automatically nor on a regular basis. Truth claims, if posed, are therefore viewed as “epistemic gain” rather than eternal law; they are understood as one of several “competing accounts” of social practices “which can be assessed against each other as truth claims through argumentation in the public sphere” (Chouliaraki/Fairclough 2007: 34). Consequently, some ‘radical’ constructivists advance the positions of ‘moderate’ constructivists. As mentioned earlier, there is a whole spectrum ranging between these poles. Some scientists who ascribe constitutive power to language are nevertheless called (or consider themselves as) ‘moderate’ constructivists – as is the case with Norman Fairclough, for example. In general, this might be a concession to ontological presumptions and causal reasoning, but often seems to be based on the will to draw a line between their own position and that of post-structuralism, in which the performativity of discourse overrides actors’ agency. The insight, however, that language has a reality-making power, is central to ‘radical’ constructivism and it also embodies the theoretical foundation of this book. In the following, Austin’s speech act theory is outlined, as it constitutes one of the fundaments of this form of theoretically based analysis.

2.7 Austin’s Speech Act Theory Alongside the insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922 [1921], 1953), speech act theory has also been of great influence to ‘radical’ constructivism and the development of discourse theory. Speech act theory was developed by John L. Austin (1962) and later refined by his student John R. Searle (1969, 1972).34 Austin aimed to break with the assumption that to say something is never more than to state something. He demonstrated the performative power of language: that statements not only describe ‘given’ state of affairs, they are part of creating them. Speech in this sense is more than a series of utterances. It is a particular form of social action that cannot be judged as true or false. This deployment of language designates the shift from semantics to pragmatics and focuses on how to act with words within a system of rules. In general, Austin viewed utterances, or speech acts, as performative. To speak is to act, or as Onuf (1989: 82) puts it, people “can use words, and words alone, to perform deeds.” Austin distinguished three kinds of acts. The first, the locutionary act, is the basis of a speech act, in other words, an utterance. It refers to the fact that a statement has a

34 Speech act theory also influenced the German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas who developed a theory of communicative action on the basis of which he later generated his discourse theory of ethics; see Habermas (1984).

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certain grammar to it, which makes the statement comprehensible.35 Second, locutionary acts are illocutionary in that they constitute a meaning and thus reveal the speaker’s intention, who, for example, might be welcoming somebody or requesting something. In this case, in saying something, something is done – this is the performative quality of an utterance. The speech act designates a particular action and fulfills it at the same time; this can easily be seen by adding ‘hereby’ to certain statements: ‘I hereby apologize,’ ‘I hereby congratulate you,’ or ‘I hereby promise you’ and so forth (Habermas 1984: 289). It is this characteristic that literally embodies the concept of a speech act.36 Third, speech acts are often perlocutionary: they bring about a reaction. They “produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them” (Austin 1962: 101). The perlocutionary act thus refers to what is done by saying something and this effect can be intentional. Jürgen Habermas summarizes the acts of locution, illocution and perlocution in the phrase: “to say something, to act in saying something, to bring about something through acting in saying something” (Habermas 1984: 289, emphasis in original). In order to be performative, speech acts must follow particular rules and meet certain conditions that pertain to the situational context. Besides the fact that there must be a propositional logic to what is said, illocutions are bound to certain conventions. They encompass, for example, the point that certain people utter certain words in certain circumstances and that this is done with a particular attitude and sincerity (Balzacq 2011b: 5). Outside of these conventions, utterances ‘misfire’ (Austin 1962: 16) and remain linguistic attempts. In cases where they work, the perlocutionary effect of what is said will vary according to the illocution and the context in which the speech act is embedded (Austin 1962: 14f; Habermas 1984: 288–292; van Dijk 1997a: 14f). To make his point, Austin used the example of a wedding. It is obvious that it is not possible to get married by confirming ‘I do’ anywhere at any time; rather, this speech act must meet certain conventions. It has to take place in front of a priest or registrar as part of a wedding ceremony and therefore within a certain normative context. Moreover, the bride and groom must be unmarried at this point in time. Another prerequisite for a successful speech act is the status of the official: only the priest or registrar possesses the required authority to declare the bride and groom man and wife. If all of these conditions have been fulfilled, the speech act will show effect and the perlocution will become apparent: it is displayed by the stance of the audience (the public) who treats the couple as man and wife with all of the rights and duties that rest with married couples. In doing so, the audience accepts and reproduces the institutionalized norms of marriage as well as the authority and legitimacy of the priest or 35 The word ‘grammar’ can be understood as the term indicates: a system of rules. In language philosophy, however, ‘grammar’ has the connotation of ‘logic’ which is also true here. 36 In contrast to Austin, Searle later disclaimed the meaningful separation of locutionary and illocutionary acts; see Searle (1968).

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registrar in this context. What this simple example shows is that saying the words ‘I do’ in a conventional procedure creates something: it brings the marriage into being. In sum, speech act theory demonstrates that speaking is rule-guided action that possesses reality-making (and legitimizing) power. On the basis of this theory, the Copenhagen School developed its concept of securitization; this will be dealt with in section 4.1.

2.8 Summary This chapter set out the development and advancement of constructivism. It pointed to the new perspectives that the ‘constructivist turn’ brought to IR, but it also exposed great divides within the constructivist camp. As demonstrated, ‘moderate’ constructivism differs from traditional IR-theories on questions of ontology, but not epistemology; ‘radical’ constructivism, in contrast, assumes that this is inconsistent and thus deviates from mainstream theories on both ontological and epistemological grounds. With regard to ontology, the intersection of ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ constructivism is that the social world is (in part) constructed and that change, in principle, is possible. Differences beyond this notion are also apparent, and three main aspects were discussed. The first is the view of and relation between materialism and idealism. Can they be treated as distinct entities or is the former only comprehensible through the latter? Are structure and agent in part ‘given’ or are they mutually constitutive? This divide points to the second contentious issue: causality and constitution. Is it possible from a constructivist perspective to establish a causal relationship that provides for general explanation, or is the social world a construction that we have to reconstruct, case by case, in order to understand it? It has been demonstrated that the answers to these questions differ between ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ constructivists, and that the latter link their understandings to the constitutive role of language. In fact, the (dis-)regard of language is the third, and as Onuf noted, probably the greatest difference between constructivist approaches as the other disputes somehow relate to it. In the end, both forms of constructivism have strengths and weaknesses. In fact, by working from a constructivist point of view there is no indisputable way of investigating the world. Whereas the ‘moderate’ approach is criticized as lacking coherence, the ‘radical’ one provides coherence at the expense of perpetual validity. Despite its imperfections, however, there are forceful reasons to purport that constructivism contributes strongly to our understanding of the social world. This book largely sides with the ‘radical’ understanding of constructivism. After all, it is conclusive that language plays a vital role in the making of social reality. It makes objects and actions meaningful, and it is largely through language that the normative context in which we live is produced. Consequently, it has a great stake in shaping who we are, what we want and how we see the world. From this position, it is clear that IR should focus on the impact of language, and this will be done in the empirical part of this book. This study emanates from the position that structure and

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agent are mutually constitutive and have the same ontological status. Agents shape ideas, norms and discourses and are shaped by them in their attitudes towards particular issues and actions. This approach therefore takes into account both the performative power of language and the agency of actors. In line with this, agents can be viewed as acting intentionally. They can shape discourses strategically and use them with political purpose, and this means that they can also be held responsible for their actions. Following this stance, it is obvious that language is not neutral; talk is not cheap. It matters who speaks, what we say and how we say it. Since speech always implies assessments and embodies claims to truth and knowledge, it can have considerable consequences (Kratochwil 1989: 229). Under these premises, it is rational to study politics by analyzing discourse.

3 Discourse Theory The previous chapters focused on the theoretical assumptions regarding the social construction of the world. The constructivist perspective, including theorizing by Austin and Searle, provided important groundwork for discourse theory to evolve under a new perspective. Today, the role of discourse in constituting the social world is so widely acknowledged in the social sciences that some scholars speak of a ‘discursive turn’ in reference to the ‘linguistic turn’ that set the path towards the ‘radical’ constructivist paradigm. The background to discourse theory, however, is broader and there are also other influences that led to the development of its theoretical approaches. Therefore, this chapter outlines how ‘discourse’ is understood and dealt with in discourse theory, and introduces insights that are relevant to the study at hand. In doing so, it explains the position of Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which is used as a guideline for the discourse analysis in the empirical part of this book.

3.1 What is Discourse? The concept of discourse is defined in highly diverse manners. These differences arise from its heterogeneous background, which encompasses disciplines such as linguistics, philosophy, sociology and cognitive anthropology with their specific understandings and research traditions.37 It is therefore not surprising that ‘discourse’ is not consistently defined. In fact, the term has been broadened and differentiated during the last decades, and is used differently and filled with partly overlapping, partly contradictory concepts (Mills 2004; Keller 2007: ch. 2).38 The quest for a definition begins with the question of whether discourse is analyzed in a narrow linguistic sense – which is a rather descriptive enterprise – or in the broader sense as a social practice. Torfing (2005: 5–9), for example, distinguishes three generations of discourse theory, whereby the definition of discourse expands with each generation. According to this categorization, the first generation very much sticks to a linguistic perspective: it is mainly interested in semantics and defines discourse rather straightforwardly as spoken and/or written text that (mis-)represents reality. The second generation extends the definition of discourse and views it as both language use and social practice/interaction. Discourse is considered constitutive of a broad range of practices and part of the whole. A prominent representative of the second generation

37 For a brief review of the independent scientific strands that led to contemporary discourse analysis, see van Dijk (1985a). 38 Mills (2004) provides a good survey of the struggle over definitions and conceptualizations of ‘discourse’. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110626056-003

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is the linguist Norman Fairclough (1992, 2013) who developed Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).39 This approach analyzes semiotic systems and elements, including images and gestures, which are used to produce and interpret meaning. CDA mainly focuses on politics in terms of “semiotic dimensions of power, injustice, abuse, and political-economic or cultural change in society” (Fairclough et al. 2011: 357). The third generation broadens the concept of discourse even further. Whereas CDA views social questions as “in part questions about discourse” (Chouliaraki/Fairclough 2007: vii, my emphasis), the third generation subordinates them totally to discourse. From this post-structuralist position, as held by Jacques Derrida (1976) as well as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001 [1985], 1987), everything is discourse.40 Post-structuralists do not believe in the existence of any kind of extra-discursive ‘given’ essence, be it nature, reason or humanity that assists in structuring our being or social life (Torfing 2005: 13; cf. Derrida 1978: 279–281). The assumption that everything is discursive and permanently modified through actual practice leads to the postulate of ultimate contingency. This, however, leads post-structuralists to be criticized for denying “the possibility of any foundations for knowledge altogether” (Donnelly 2013: 19; cf. Onuf 1989: 40, 2001: 246; Chouliaraki/Fairclough 1999: 125; Jørgensen/Phillips 2002: 54). Whereas the second (constructivist), and the third (post-structuralist) generation are divided on the question as to what extent reality and truth are internal to discourse, these generations also share commonalities. It is (largely) through language that the identities assigned to subjects and objects are constructed and bear meaning. Moreover, what becomes accepted as normal or legitimate is constituted in and through discourse and in turn this conditions our behavior and political action. Analyzing discourse therefore means exploring the constitutive link between language use and social practice, that is, between textual characteristics and political action, the (re-)production or transformation of knowledge and the perception of reality. Discourse analysis thus links linguistics, hermeneutics and social theory by relating the internal structures of discourses to larger social structures (van Dijk 1985c, 1997a; Torfing 2005). However, in a similar vein to what has been said about constructivism, discourse analysis does not aim to provide general theory for particular fields or topics. Rather, it addresses various social puzzles to help understand how the situation under investigation came about, and it often does so in combination with other theories that are relevant to the particular research question (Torfing 2005: 22). Furthermore, the second and third generations of discourse theory also

39 Although CDA stands for Critical Discourse Analysis, it is one approach of many within the broader field of ‘critical discourse analysis’. With regard to CDA, other prominent representatives besides Fairclough include Ruth Wodak and Teun van Dijk. For a good overview of the diversity of theoretical approaches in CDA, see Fairclough/Wodak (1997). 40 Other prominent post-structuralists include Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, Jacques Lacan, and Michel Foucault.

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share a critical approach. They view discourses as a means of (re-)producing unequal power relations between social/societal groups (Jørgensen/Phillips 2002: 63; cf. Fairclough/Wodak 1997: 258).41 In this case, ‘critical’ indicates that these power relations are analyzed from a normative perspective that provides for critique and aims to produce positive social change. Moreover, while Torfing attests the three generations of discourse theory a “gradual development towards a more inclusive and quasi-transcendental notion of discourse” (Torfing 2005: 9), he also holds that in practice the differences between the second and the third generation are small when actually carrying out analytical work.

3.2 CDA: Reality is More than Discourse Similar to the discussion among constructivists about the role of language, there is dispute among discourse theorists about ontological and epistemological positions and hence the significance of discourse as the kernel of scientific research. Is ultimately everything determined through discourse or are there other parameters to reality? Many scholars do not agree with Derrida’s famous position that “there is nothing outside of the text” (Derrida 1976: 158). In their view, the post-structuralist perspective overstates the constitutive power of discourse. A major aspect of this controversy is represented by the question of whether the non-discursive exists.42 As mentioned above, for representatives of the third generation, there is indeed nothing outside discourse. All non-discursive actions and perceived phenomena are based one way or another on sedimented discourses – and are thus still discursive. In this understanding, discourse constitutes the social completely: discourse is the social (Laclau 1981: 176; Foucault 1984 [1971]: 127). In line with this assumption, individuals and identity are in their entirety the effect of their continued constitution (Butler 1993). Critics reject this stance since it indicates that the subject is ‘dead’. Norman Fairclough and his CDA disclaim the foregrounding of discursive performativity to the level where agents are merely interpreted as products of discursive structures. While Fairclough does acknowledge the constitutive power of language, he still emphasizes actors’ agency and intentionality. Actors “position themselves” 41 In critical discourse analysis, the effect of (re-)producing unequal power relations is understood as an ideological effect of discursive practices (Jørgensen/Phillips 2002: 63; Fairclough/Wodak 1997: 258). 42 The struggle with this position is already exemplified in Michel Foucault’s work. While he contrasts discursive and non-discursive practices on the one hand, he sees no distinction between them on the other. Foucault seeks to conflate these positions with the conception of the dispositif. In his view, discourses can materialize; reality thus consists of discourses and their (material) ‘effects’ (Foucault 1978: 119–125). See also Waldenfels (1991: 291), Bublitz (1999: 90, 104), Jäger (2001: 89–93), Torfing (2005: 7), and Kammler et al. (2008: 235). In general, the distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive is more spelled out in Foucault’s earlier, ‘archaeological’ writings than in his later ‘genealogical’ writings.

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inside discourses and deploy rhetoric self-consciously up to the point of normalization where people come “to ‘own’ discourses” (Fairclough 2003: 208). In this respect, CDA claims a truly mutual constitution of structure and agent and thus views individuals as both discursive products and producers of discourses (Fairclough 1992: 45).43 In general, Fairclough sees social life as produced by more ‘mechanisms’ (generative powers) than just discourse.44 In his understanding, to state that language is not a reducible component of social life is “not a matter of reducing social life to language, saying that everything is discourse – it isn’t” (Fairclough 2003: 2, cf. 1992: 66). Researchers who use CDA define their approach to be both interpretive and explanatory at the same time (Fairclough/Wodak 1997: 278f). As mentioned earlier, according to Fairclough, texts have causal effects and can therefore explain changes in the social and material world. The kind of causality involved here, however, is not a mechanical one. There is nothing inevitable about its effects. It is not that particular “texts automatically bring about particular changes in people’s knowledge or behaviour” (Fairclough 2003: 8). In the end, the effect a text will have is determined by the interplay of the various factors that make up the context; the impact of a discourse “depends upon how it interacts with the preconstituted reality” (Fairclough 1992: 60, cf. 2003: 8f; see also section 3.3 below). Here, Fairclough assumes that a form of inertia exists within meanings that have already been established. According to him, constructivism becomes problematic “where it disregards the relative solidity and permanence of social entities, and their resistance to change” (Fairclough 2003: 209). In sum, CDA shows intersections with the ‘moderate’ positions of Alexander Wendt, yet strongly accepts the constitutive power of discourse and the possibility of its enactment and materialization. What is important for the study at hand is CDA’s acknowledgement of the mutual constitution of actors and discourses. In this sense, CDA is truly constructivist and thus apt for the discourse analysis conducted in this book.

3.3 Intertextuality, Context, and Change As discussed in Chapter 2, constructivists point to the possibility of change. Whereas ‘moderate’ constructivists believe in more inertia than their ‘radical’ colleagues: ideas and norms, identities and interests are considered (at least in part) as constituted and thus subject to change. In the view of ‘radical’ constructivists, these transformations largely take place through discourse: “changes in discourse are a 43 For a profound comparison of Laclau/Mouffe’s discourse theory and Critical Discourse Analysis, see Jørgensen/Phillips (2002). The section above partly draws on that book. 44 On the complex interplay of the mechanisms or “generative powers” of life, as understood by Fairclough, see also Chouliaraki/Fairclough (2007: 19).

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means by which the social world is changed” (Jørgensen/Phillips 2002: 9, emphasis in original; cf. Foucault 1972 [1969]: ch. IV/5: 166–177; Fairclough 1992: 5, 97, ch. 3, 2003: 8; Wodak 1996: 15; Fairclough/Wodak 1997: 264f). With regard to how these changes come about, they draw on what Julia Kristeva (1986: 37) terms ‘intertextuality’. This refers to the interdependency of texts and discourses that are defined by their relation to other texts and discourses and “can only be understood on the basis of others” (Wodak 1996: 14). According to this view, texts always draw on other texts, reproduce and transform them. After all, as Bakhtin (1986: 69) nicely puts it, no matter who is speaking, the speaker is not “the one who disturbs the eternal silence of the universe.” Rather, we build on former utterances, reactualize them and adapt their inherent evaluation (Bakhtin 1986: 69, 89; cf. Foucault 1972 [1969]: 98). This is the realm where change takes place. Intertextuality, as Fairclough (1992: 96) notes, “builds creativity in as an option.”45 Discourses provide the space for linguistic innovation, which enables new things to be stated by combining discursive elements in a new way or by introducing them into new situations and contexts. In short, rearticulation and recontextualization provides for shifts in meaning. Whereas changes like these might first occur in single discursive events, they can accumulate to finally change agents and structures on all levels from the individual to the (inter-) national (Fairclough 1992; Jørgensen/Phillips 2002: 7, 17). Researchers agree that change through rearticulation and recontextualization happens to some extent unconsciously. In CDA and other ‘second generation’ approaches to discourse theory, however, this is also a power that can be seized by actors (Viehöver 2001: 178). Agency lies in the ability to deliberately shift meanings in order to bring about change in social structure. There is no automatism to this process, however, and the chances for change are limited. Just as Austin’s speech act theory demonstrated that single utterances have to meet certain conditions in certain contexts in order to have an effect, in a broader sense, this is also true for discourses. The ability to successfully contest or alter certain issues in discourse is a question of the larger context: People are active – agents – to the extent that they are capable of pursuing collective or individual strategies in their discourse. But whether articulatory shifts in discourse constitute substantive shifts in identity [. . .] depends [. . .] on how the moment of discourse is inserted within the social process overall. (Chouliaraki/Fairclough 2007: 14)

45 With regard to the innovative character of linguistic composition, Fairclough (1992: 104) distinguishes intertextuality from interdiscursivity, a term he coined. According to this distinction, intertexuality is a more general term used when texts refer to and draw on former texts in a rather conventionalized way (for example a letter in a series of letters). Interdiscursivity, in contrast, combines elements and thus generates novel types of discourse by mixing genres and styles (like articles that are both information and advertisement).

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In this light, the possibility for change is a matter of the particular situation with its sum of particular features and influences. The overall political or socio-cultural environment plays a role, as well as the meta-narrative in which the discourse is embedded. Agents might give the impetus for change, but the context establishes “the rationality of the situation” and provides “the framework for processes of deliberation, interpretation, and argumentation” (Zehfuss 2001: 68). Part and parcel of the context is the characteristics of structures, the degree of inertia underlying the established meanings and identities, as well as the discourses’ relation to society (van Dijk 1997a, 1997b). Moreover, as Fairclough (1992: 102f) points out, the possibility for change can also be constrained by social power relations (see section 3.4). In general, text, including talk, is always “text in context” (van Dijk 1997a: 3) and thus historically and culturally embedded. By drawing on former texts and discourses, the new ones are nourished by this storied background while they transform past conventions into those of the present (Fairclough 1992: 85). This conditioning implies “the insertion of history (society) into a text and of this text into history” (Kristeva 1986: 39). Intertextuality thus includes historicity and suggests interpreting something in terms of a larger historical whole. Besides that, it points to the fact that discourses are constituted as part of a continuous process; consequently, there is no clear beginning and no clear end to it. Discourses have histories but they are also components of the present and the future.

3.4 The Power of Discourse So far, it has been stated that language and thus discourse shapes our cognition and perception, identity and interest. Language thus has constitutive power with regard to who we are and how we see the world. However, there is more to say about the power of discourse, as the French philosopher Michel Foucault found out. In fact, his insights proved to be highly influential for the development of discourse theory.46 Most contemporary approaches to critical discourse analysis build one way or another on his work. Foucault’s reasoning emanates from the assumption that discourse as social practice is integral to societal power relations and is therefore not reducible to speech (Foucault 1972 [1969]: 49). In contrast to Austin and Searle, who focused mainly on the force and performative power of individual utterances, Foucault

46 Most important in this context is The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972 [1969]) and The Order of Discourse (1984 [1971]). Other works that are referred to in this outline include Discipline and Punish (1995 [1975]) and The Will to Knowledge (1998 [1976]). It is important to mention, however, that Foucault’s ideas are vast and partly contentious, and the philosopher did not say much about how to analyze discourse. It was left to other scholars in subsequent years to transmit Foucault’s rather abstract findings and put them to work.

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investigated the collectivity of conditions that are inherent to discourses.47 He focused on the internal rules of discourse that govern the production of statements and practices (Torfing 2005: 7). He was interested in “the law of existence of statements, that which rendered them possible” (Foucault 1991a [1968]: 59, emphasis in original). These systems of rules govern the production of speech acts in two ways: first, they constrain what can be said; and second, they constrain by whom it can be said. Discourses make it possible or impossible for certain statements to occur in particular contexts. In this sense, discourses are “sets of sanctioned statements” (Mills 2004: 55; cf. Fairclough 1992: 40). Due to this characteristic, they narrow one’s field of vision as they “exclude a wide range of phenomena from being considered as real or as worthy of attention, or as even existing” (Mills 2004: 46). Certain perspectives towards a topic – including alternative interpretations that might have set other guidelines for social action – remain unexpressed. In a similar way, discourses set boundaries on who can participate in a particular discourse, that is, who is regarded as authoritative enough to contribute to it. Not all discourses are accessible to everyone: “None shall enter the order of discourse if he does not satisfy certain requirements or if he is not, from the outset, qualified to do so” (Foucault 1984 [1971]: 120; cf. Milliken 1999: 229).48 So, in terms of authority and legitimacy, discourses direct who has the right to speak on a particular occasion. As discourses constrain the range of possible statements as well as the people who can voice them, they are constructions of exclusion. This effect can be amplified by either the institutionalization of discourses – the more discourses are institutionally embedded the more they succumb to the specific rules and norms the institution demands – and/or by the sheer dominance of the discourse by which alternative discourses are marginalized or suppressed. As Fairclough points out for the latter case, “the seemingly limitless possibilities of creativity in discursive practice [. . .] are in practice limited and constrained by the state of hegemonic relations and hegemonic struggle” (Fairclough 1993: 137, cf. 2013: 95). This view also led Foucault to postulate the power-knowledge nexus. In other words, he analyzed discourses on the basis of power-knowledge relationships.49

47 Put shortly, the way Foucault used the term ‘discourse’ covers three meanings, (a) a collective term for the realm of statements as a whole; (b) a group of statements that constitutes a specific discourse; and (c) a system of rules. 48 More than Foucault, the Marxist linguist Michel Pecheux (1982 [1975]) was concerned with the conditions for access to discourse. He pointed to societal disparities with regard to resources such as information, education, the media and the like. Groups with easy access to these resources were said to be better off in participating in discourses than others. This instance thus corroborates the asymmetrical dispersion of power in society. 49 As Fairclough (1992: ch. 2) points out, this reveals a shift in Foucault’s reasoning: whereas in his ‘archaeological’ work (The Archaeology of Knowledge, 1972 [1969]) he focuses on the constitutive role of discourse, in his ‘genealogical’ studies (Discipline and Punish, 1995 [1975], and The Will to Knowledge, 1998 [1976]) power is at the center of reasoning.

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As indicated above, discourses constitute our knowledge about the world and transport it. Consequently, knowledge is neither a neutral reflection of reality nor a simple expression of ideas. It is a discursively constituted awareness of the real. This form of knowledge production, however, is shaped by the power relations pervading the social world as they influence who can be heard, and who can dominate and control a discourse. In turn, the kind of knowledge that is produced and the way it is institutionalized constrains the range of actors who can participate in a discourse and what can be voiced within it. This contributes to the structure and practices of power relations in society (Jäger/Jäger 2007: 20; Dunn 2008: 80). Put simply, if the powerful express their belief systems through discourses, the knowledge generated will correspond to their world view. This in turn stabilizes their own power position while excluding contradicting or alternative meanings from discourse. Therefore, Foucault declares knowledge and power to be mutually constitutive, with knowledge emanating from power struggles. As a consequence, Foucault views truth – or, more correctly, the perception of it – as shaped by power relations whereas ongoing battles are not “in favour” of truth but “about the status of truth” and its political role (Foucault 2006 [1979]: 46f). It is the dominant, socially accepted discourses that shape our understanding and knowledge of the world. If statements belong to the sayable and are socially accepted or even dominant within a certain context, they are amenable to consistent repetition. Certain ‘truths’ or perspectives, thereby, become naturalized, which further strengthens their durability. This stabilizes and legitimates systems and practices which then become accepted as social objectivity. Thus, for Foucault, discourses are instruments of power, which also means that there is an ongoing struggle to dominate them. There are power struggles within discourse and power struggles over discourse, or, as Foucault puts it: “Discourse [. . .] is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized” (Foucault 1984 [1971]: 110).50 In sum, discourse is both a means of power and an effect of it (Foucault 1998 [1976]: 101). This very characteristic embodies the political nature of discourse. Critical discourse analysis often tries to unfold and examine the power relations inherent in discourse, which means the constraints on the acceptable, what can be said and what is silenced. It is an investigation of how meanings are established as truths – with all the consequences that follow from them.

50 In Foucault’s own understanding, power does not solely belong to the state, nor is it seen as invariably repressive. Rather, it is conceptualized as a force largely dispersed across society, displayed in diverse relationships (man/wife, teacher/pupils, parents/children, doctor/patient, employer/ employee and so forth) and operating in changing intensities; however, it always conditions the production of discourse (Fontana/Pasquino 1978: 34f; cf. Kammler et al. 2008: 127f).

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3.5 Summary This chapter briefly introduced different approaches to discourse theory. Following Torfing (2005: 5–9), the field can be structured into three ‘generations’, which can be classified as linguistic, constructivist, and post-structuralist. The second and third generations define discourse as constituting social reality. The discussion outlined that Norman Fairclough positions CDA in the field with a clear constructivist stance. While this approach was the main interest, the chapter also shed light on important insights into the way discourse is defined in third generation discourse theory. The discussion also focused on in how far discourses are sources of change. Discourses are continuous processes that build on one another and thus link past, present, and future. Due to their intertextuality, they are platforms for rearticulation and recontextualization, and this provides for shifts in meaning and – as understood here – engaging in this realm can involve deliberate agency. Nevertheless, the rewording of things does not automatically lead to transformations in meanings and actions since this is also a matter of the larger social context. Moreover, the discussion demonstrated that discourses reflect power relations and the knowledge (re-)produced by and in them substantiate these power relations. Discourses confine the range of contributors and only permit certain positions to be voiced, while others are ignored or rejected as illegitimate. In this sense, discourses are exclusive constructions of power. Having said that, analyzing discourse involves reconstructing the (historical) conditions under which particular discourses developed, that is, how ideas and identities, power and policies have been constituted and legitimized. The focus is on texts and the actions they enable – on what is said by whom and what is done within the political latitude that these discourses created. This also includes investigating the kind of effect that this has on society or the international level. The aim of this book is to lay open the way in which conditions of possibility are constructed; this means demonstrating how discourse generates room for maneuver and makes particular policies reasonable or apparently inevitable – including those, that otherwise would have been discarded. This is discussed in the following chapter.

4 Security Discourse One of the most important and powerful discourses that shapes our lives is that of security. Security has always been a priority-defining category, and, as will be argued in this chapter, it provides politicians with a strong rationale for the enforcement of exceptional policies and for breaking rules. In this respect, the concept of securitization51 developed by the Copenhagen School (CS) points to the impact of speech acts. It claims that threats come into being when issues and people are framed as such and that this paves the way for legitimizing emergency action that deviates from and violates established rules. This chapter begins by pointing to the emergence of a new conceptualization of security in order to present the concept of securitization in some detail. It then goes on to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this concept. The last part of the chapter focuses on how security discourse contributes to the constitution of identity in the form of the ‘self’, which is perceived as endangered, and an ‘other’, perceived as posing a ‘threat’. These representations are closely interlinked with policies that appear necessary and legitimate and that can be used to justify the exclusion of the ‘other’.

4.1 What is Security? As noted above, constructivism gained momentum after the Cold War era when new methods of analysis seemed to provide more appropriate ways of understanding international politics than those delivered by traditional approaches. At the same time, years of scholarly debate had led to a broadening of the concept of security. Whereas security studies had hitherto largely been bound to the military sector, it now increasingly included other aspects of life that it had previously neglected, such as economy, society, poverty, human and minority rights, environmental and climate change.52 The Copenhagen School gained great prominence within this new realm of constructivist security studies. The School’s approach, which centers on the works of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, provided an innovative framework for the analysis of security (Wæver et al. 1993; Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan/ Wæver 2003, 2009). The aim was to broaden the concept of security while ensuring that it did not lose its inner logic, as this would have rendered the concept meaningless. Although the Copenhagen School developed three central concepts, its

51 ‘Securitization’ is spelled in two different ways in the literature. In this book ‘securitization’ is used; however, in citations the form ‘securitisation’ might also occur. 52 An overview of the changes and extension of the conception of security since the 1960s, is provided by Daase (2010). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110626056-004

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most influential conceptual apparatus is that of ‘securitization’.53 This concept focuses on the question of how security issues become what they are: how and by whom they are constructed and how security invests actors with the power to take exceptional political action. The concept of securitization sparked a tremendous amount of security studies research in IR, and the vigor of this approach is demonstrated by the scope of publications in which the concept has been applied. Securitization lent a new dynamic to a field that had otherwise been regarded as rather reactionary. The importance and innovative character of the concept, however, also called for scrutiny, and in turn triggered vibrant debates about theoretical assumptions in security studies. This led the leading figures of the Copenhagen School, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, to acknowledge “that there are many ways to understand security” and that their approach had merits and drawbacks just like any other (Buzan/Wæver 1997: 249f). The following outlines the concept of securitization and mainly draws on the Copenhagen School’s central work, the 1998 book Security: A New Framework for Analysis, which sets out the most systematic formulation of the model.

4.2 The Concept of Securitization In his scholarly piece from 1995 entitled Securitization and Desecuritization, Ole Wæver expressed his discontent with the basic premises of the traditional approach to security studies that argued, “security is a reality prior to language, is out there” (Wæver 1995: 46). After all, if language constitutes the social world, this must be true for security as well. Wæver’s criticism hints towards the cornerstone of the securitization approach: security is understood as a social, and in this sense primarily verbal, construction rather than an objective condition. Threats are not regarded as ‘given’ but as constructed by being labeled as such. The concept of security is thus viewed as discursive in character, and the Copenhagen School investigates both the rules of ‘speaking security’ and how the power of ‘spoken security’ unfolds. In other words, the focus is on how security issues are constructed and how they are put into practice in terms of extraordinary measures. The CS believes that there is a “specific rhetorical structure” (Buzan et al. 1998: 26) to security speech acts which gives security politics a characteristic pattern. Moreover, this approach highlights that the way people and issues are framed is vital if an environment of approval for certain policies is to develop.

53 The Copenhagen School’s three organizing concepts for studying security are (a) securitization, (b) sectors, which refers to existential threats in different areas and thus differentiate between political, economic, environmental, military and societal security – and religious security, which was added later; and (c) security complexes, which focuses on the regional level in security analysis. See among others Buzan (1983), Buzan et al. (1998), Laustsen/Wæver (2000), Buzan/Wæver (2003), and Wæver (2003, 2004).

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In its analysis of how security threats are constructed, the Copenhagen School relies on Austin’s speech act theory (see section 2.7). As demonstrated above, the main insight provided by speech act theory is that speaking is rule-guided action that possesses reality-making power. Words do things. This performativity of speech is what the Copenhagen School refers to when accentuating the constitutive role of security language. What the authors focus on and claim that is special in this realm of speech acts is that “security is about survival” (Buzan et al. 1998: 21; Wæver 2003: 9). Security thus means presenting an issue “as posing an existential threat” (Buzan et al. 1998: 21) to a designated object – such as the sovereignty of a state, the identity of a societal group or the natural environment – and “by saying the words, something is done” (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). It is important to note that what the Copenhagen School points to is the linguistic representation of the threat, rather than its ‘real’ existence. In this understanding, “the utterance is the primary reality,” and this cannot be judged as true or false; it does not have to refer to “something more real” (Wæver 1995: 55, cf. 2003: 10; Buzan/Wæver 1997: 246), although speech acts can be fortified by ‘facilitating conditions’ (see below). Through the representation of an issue as an existential threat, a shift of assessment takes place. The internal urgency of securitizations “takes politics beyond the established rules of the game” (Buzan et al. 1998: 21; cf. Wæver 2003: 10). Whereas politicized issues are viewed as the body of everyday politics with debates and decision-making processes according to common rules, a securitized issue is regarded as “above normal politics” (Wæver 2003: 10; cf. Buzan et al. 1998: 26) as it justifies actions beyond the usual limits of political procedures (Buzan et al. 1998: 23f, 29). By ‘speaking security’, a securitizing actor “moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it” (Wæver 1995: 55). The invocation of security is thus key to legitimizing the breaking of rules and the use of force (Buzan et al. 1998: 21, 25).54 As this indicates, securitizations have political consequences. By turning an issue into a matter of existential threat, it is impossible not to deal with it; instead, the issue is granted precedence. Since security problems are threatening in “a particularly rapid or dramatic fashion” (Wæver 1995: 54), immediate action by top leaders is

54 Several authors point to the closeness of the securitization model to the work of the German theorist Carl Schmitt, whose concept of ‘the political’ considers the distinction between friend and enemy as the defining parameter of politics (Schmitt 2005 [1922]). In this sense, the focus on staterelated exception, existential threat, and emergency measures strongly resonates with Schmitt’s perspective. In his concept, the sovereign designates the threatening ‘other’ and decides upon the abandonment of established political rules: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt 2005 [1922]: 5) whereat the ‘exception’ is the political space beyond the law. This is what the Copenhagen School terms as ‘above politics’ and breaking free of rules. For this and other intersections of Schmitt’s and the Copenhagen School’s theorizing, see Huysmans (1998a), Williams (2003: 516), Aradau (2004b), Behnke (2006a), Fierke (2007b: 108f), McDonald (2008a: 577–580), Neal (2010), and Kahn (2011: 87).

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imperative, otherwise it will be too late and everything else will seem irrelevant (Wæver 1995: 53; Buzan et al. 1998: 26). Securitizations thus claim an “unavailability of choice” (Wæver 2003: 25) as they pose the necessity to act. In turn, this leads the majority of everyday political options, such as negotiation and diplomacy, to be left out. In the face of an allegedly lethal threat, the range of possible options is restricted to the most severe actions. Such scenarios are usually presented in dramatic fashion and are overstated. However, when “master signifiers” (Buzan/Wæver 2009: 267) are used, like ‘terrorism’, for example, or ‘war’, or other issues from the military sector, audiences understand without elaboration that the matter referred to implies danger, urgency and the need to combat it (Buzan et al. 1998: 26–29; Buzan/Wæver 2009: 267). Securitizations are regarded as successful when the verbal construction of an existential threat leads (at least) to deliberation about emergency action that affects ‘others’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). In order to expose the Copenhagen School’s focus on “who can securitize what under what conditions and with what effects” (Wæver 2000: 252; cf. Buzan et al. 1998: vii), the following discusses the views of the School’s most influential theorists in detail. – Securitizing Actor: A securitizing actor is an enunciator who “performs the security speech act” (Buzan et al. 1998: 40), that is, who attempts to securitize an issue by declaring something – a referent object – as existentially threatened (Buzan et al. 1998: 36). Initially, the securitizing actor makes a ‘securitizing move’. Whether this turns out to be successful depends on the audience and on contextual factors (see below). In principle, the concept is open to securitizing actors of all kinds, however, the possibility is limited by the supposition that the securitizer has institutional authority (Wæver 1995: 57; Buzan et al. 1998: 32f) and that the referent object in security discourses is first and foremost the state (see below). In other words, securitizers do not have to be a member of the political elite, but they usually are. As the Copenhagen School’s authors put it, “common players in this role are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups” (Buzan et al. 1998: 40). These securitizers can act as individuals or as groups. As they are representatives of public institutions, they are not viewed as private individuals but as authorized agents of the collectivity for which they speak (Buzan et al. 1998: 40f). Securitizing actors and referent objects can also correspond, such as when states are concerned. In these cases, “the referent object will in a sense speak for itself through its authorized representatives” (Buzan et al. 1998: 42). – Referent Object: The referent object is that which is said to be under existential threat and, since it has “a legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan et al. 1998: 36), in need of protection. In theory, this could be anything; effectively, however, it is primarily a state or nation, where state security means defending sovereignty and national/societal security to preserve identity (Wæver et al. 1993: ch. 2; Wæver 1995: 47–49; Buzan/Wæver 1997: 245; Buzan et al.

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1998: 36–40).55 Although securitizations can occur on the individual and the system level, the Copenhagen School argues that in practice neither the micro nor the macro but “the middle scale of limited collectivities” is most accessible for securitization (Buzan et al. 1998: 36; cf. Buzan/Wæver 2009). The reason for this is the strong collective feeling within a state or nation that shares the same values and principles and thus “forms an interpretative community” (Buzan et al. 1998: 37). Just as classical security studies traditionally attributed a projecting role to the state, here, too, it often appears in the form of the referent object. In its subsequent theory, the Copenhagen School focused more on the macro level, though, and introduced macrosecuritizations to its model of overarching conflicts. Macrosecuritizations work in the same way as securitizations, but are more complex in structure (they bind together securitizations from lower levels) and are more universal in their claims. Macrosecuritizations refer to the principles of a ‘higher order’ that potentially refers to the whole of humanity, such as ‘civilization’ or ‘freedom’, and are apt for mobilizing other actors on the international level (Buzan/Wæver 2009). Audience: The audience is the group of people that the securitizing actor addresses, such as parliament or the public. The role of the audience is decisive as it defines the success of a securitization. It is only if an audience accepts that something poses an existential threat to a shared principle or value, that securitization can be successful (Buzan et al. 1998: 31; Wæver 2000: 251). If this does not occur, the securitizer’s endeavors remain just a ‘securitizing move’.56 The acceptance of a securitizing move is thereby not necessarily embodied by the actual implementation of emergency measures but by the debate “from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures” (Buzan et al. 1998: 25; cf. Wæver 2003: 11). Although the Copenhagen School does concede that there could be pressure on the audience during the decisionmaking process, it believes that the acceptance of a securitizing move cannot be reached by force. As the CS notes, “securitization can never only be imposed, there is some need to argue one’s case” (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). This also underscores securitization as an intersubjective process. Facilitating conditions: As stated above, the audience is crucial for the success or failure of a securitizing move, but acceptance is also influenced by what are known as facilitating conditions. The Copenhagen School acknowledges that successful securitizations are more likely under certain circumstances (Buzan

55 In his 1995 essay, Wæver’s analysis referred mainly to the state. In the 1998 adaption of the securitization approach in Security: A New Framework for Analysis the state is still dominant but it is no longer the only parameter of reference. 56 The term ‘securitizing move’ is hardly reproduced in IR-literature. Instead, scholars simply classify securitizations as successful or unsuccessful.

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et al. 1998: 57). While the nature of the concept is in principle unlimited, the structure of securitization limits the scope of possibilities. In this respect, the Copenhagen School distinguishes two categories. The first category, the “internal, linguistic-grammatical” (Buzan et al. 1998: 32) refers to the form of the speech act that must be presented in a comprehensive and convincing way. In line with Austin’s speech act theory, the speech act must follow “accepted conventional procedures” (Buzan et al. 1998: 32). Moreover, the illocutionary act has to follow a certain dramaturgy, that is, the “grammar of security” which means, “construct[ing] a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out” (Buzan et al. 1998: 33; cf. Wæver 2000: 252, 2003: 14). The second category, the “external, contextual and social” (Buzan et al. 1998: 32) refers to the particular people and circumstances involved. The securitizer must be in a position of authority. In principle, the maxim holds true that the greater the authority of the enunciator, the greater the prospects for successful securitization. Wæver, in particular, emphasizes the decisive role played by elites: “By definition, something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so” (Wæver 1995: 54), or elsewhere, “a problem would become a security issue whenever so defined by the power holders” (Wæver 1995: 56, emphasis in original). Consequently, although everyone can become involved in an issue, less powerful actors have fewer chances of successfully securitizing it (Buzan et al. 1998: 31). Besides the status of the securitizer, the circumstances surrounding the threat scenario also influence the prospects of success. Even if no ‘real’ danger has to be present, it is useful when something is ‘out there’ that corroborates the assertion that a situation is perilous. As such, if a securitizing move is enacted within a context of “conditions historically associated with a threat” such as “tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted waters” (Wæver 2000: 253, cf. 2003: 15; cf. Buzan et al. 1998: 33), it is more likely to be successful. Taken together, whether securitizing moves are successful depends on conditions and context. Facilitating conditions can heighten their chances of success. However, these conditions also pose constraints that limit the scope of possible securitizations by confining who can act as a securitizing actor and which referent objects can be considered feasible. The Copenhagen School concludes that this predestines collectivities to be treated as units on behalf of which security action is taken (Buzan et al. 1998: 36). Although much emphasis has been placed on the securitization concept, the Copenhagen School actually advocates the opposite: desecuritization (Wæver 1995, 2000: 253; cf. Buzan et al. 1998: 4, 207–209). The main aim of CS is to keep issues in the realm of ‘normal’ politics and to forestall securitizations in order to prevent escalation and security dilemmas that lead to violence (Wæver 2000: 251–254, 2003: 23). Therefore, security is not appraised as an outright positive value that should be maximized, because when doing so actors “eliminate other, potentially more useful

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ways of conceptualizing the problems being addressed” (Wæver 1995: 57). The reasoning is that securitizations, as discussed in section 3.4, are constructions of exclusion. They alter the political decision-making process in a way that certain options and remedies become excluded from the discourse. This, however, could worsen rather than solve a security problem. At the same time, securitizations confine who is authorized to speak. They are therefore considered anti-democratic as well as susceptible to manipulation and abuse, as they “silence opposition” and have “given power holders many opportunities [. . .] to handle something with less democratic control and constraint” (Buzan et al. 1998: 29; cf. Wæver 1995: 55, 2003: 12). As a consequence, securitizations are seen negatively “as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics” (Wæver 2003: 12; cf. Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Desecuritization, on the other hand, is perceived as “ideal” (Wæver 2000: 251) and “the optimal long-range option” (Wæver 2003: 12; cf. Buzan et al. 1998: 29) because it moves an issue out of the logic of threat/ defense and restores the possibility of dealing with the situation through normal political procedures. Desecuritizing and thus shifting a topic out of the emergency mode works by abandoning specific vocabulary: “Transcending a security problem by politicizing it cannot happen through thematization in security terms, only away from such terms” (Wæver 1995: 56, emphasis in original). It is obvious that the Copenhagen School is normative in its approach. In order to circumvent securitization and strengthen politicization, the CS aspires to raise actors’ awareness of their responsibility for their actions. Those involved in securitization should not believe that it represents “an innocent reflection of the issue being a security threat” (Buzan et al. 1998: 29, emphasis in original). As speech acts generally include the option to say things differently, securitizations are always political choices (Buzan/Wæver 1997: 246; Buzan et al. 1998: 29; Wæver 2003: 24). The Copenhagen School considers them as intentional, strategic actions aimed at giving a discourse a specific direction. Uplifting an issue to a level above ‘normal’ politics is regarded as the very reason behind securitizing moves conducted by political leaders who seek justification and legitimation for projected emergency action (Wæver 1995: 63, 2000: 251; cf. Buzan et al. 1998: 21). If securitization embodies a choice for deliberate proceedings, actors can be made responsible for their conduct. Similarly, the Copenhagen School points to audiences and their responsibility for accepting and reproducing securitizations. Instead of doing so, however, the CS calls for securitizations – the framing of a situation as a lethal threat and the imperative to enact emergency measures – to be challenged (Buzan et al. 1998: 29; Wæver 2003: 24f). Finally, with regard to responsibility, the Copenhagen School also addresses the role of scholars. By conducting research, academics can increase the risk of furthering securitization, because “even when talking security in order to achieve de-securitization, it is possible that one contributes to securitization by the very fact of producing more security talk” (Wæver 2000: 252, cf. 2003: 29). Critical awareness, therefore, is also required from researchers, even if it is impossible to avoid this problem.

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4.3 The Copenhagen School and its Critics Although the concept of securitization was praised in IR for its significance to the field of security studies, it was also placed under scrutiny. The engaged and often sophisticated debate about various aspects of securitization has led to a great body of work, embossed with critical discussion as well as the attempt to amend the framework of analysis.57 A main point of criticism is that the approach is still too traditional in its conceptualization of security as it strongly focuses on states and their representatives. This model has been criticized for treating threats as external to the state and thus taking the state as the relevant unit; for emphasizing the role of political elites and their defining power in designating threats, and for interpreting emergency measures primarily as national military action (McDonald 2008a: 579). In more general terms, most critics view security as a much broader social construction, and securitization as a more dynamic and complex process than the Copenhagen School’s perspective indicates (Trombetta 2011: 136). Many points of criticism thus refer to aspects of discourse theory, especially in terms of contextual features, and power relations – aspects that have been neglected by speech act theory, the basis of the concept of securitization. The following discusses some of these main points. The model developed by the Copenhagen School is regarded as ontologically inconsistent. Although the authors claim to be social constructivists “all the way down” (Buzan/Wæver 1997: 243, fn. 6), critics have highlighted objectivist positions in the School’s reasoning. McSweeney (1996, 1999), for example, leveled a widely noticed critique at the Copenhagen School by pointing to its conception of societal identity. He argued that the School composed both society and identity in a “nearpositivist” manner as preexistent “objective realities”, something which runs contrary to the notion of social construction (McSweeney 1996: 83, cf. 1999: ch. 4). In line with this, societal identity would be viewed as unitary, but this would disregard its multiplicity and fluidity.58 This exposed the Copenhagen School to a debate similar to that discussed in the previous chapter over ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ constructivism. The reason for this is that the CS includes both forms of constructivism in its model. Whereas Wæver (2003: 15) rejects resorting to “rump materialism”, when referent

57 Concerning this matter, see for example McSweeney (1996, 1999), Doty (1998/1999), Huysmans (1998b, 2006), Neumann (1998), Williams (1998b, 2003), Eriksson (1999a, 1999b), Bigo (2000), Hansen (2000), Knudsen (2001), Aradau (2004b), Guzzini/Jung (2004), Abrahamsen (2005), Balzacq (2005, 2011b), Booth (2005, 2007), Nabers (2005), Stritzel (2007), Wilkinson (2007), McDonald (2008a, 2008b), Roe (2008), Salter (2008), and Vuori (2008, 2010). Within this body of literature, Thierry Balzacq and Holger Stritzel are referred to as the ‘second generation’ of securitization theory. 58 With regard to treating society or the state as a unitary actor, Williams (2003: 519) supports the Copenhagen School by pointing to the fact that the construction of an existential threat induces a unification of the ‘self’. This is an integral part of the politics of amity and enmity, inclusion and exclusion.

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objects are considered, the CS is in part close to Alexander Wendt’s position. In response to McSweeney’s critique, the Copenhagen School pointed out that it viewed identities as socially constructed, yet that identities “petrify and become relatively constant elements to be reckoned with” (Buzan/Wæver 1997: 243, fn. 6; cf. Wæver 2003: 28; Buzan et al. 1998: 35). These sedimented identities are thus stable enough to become referent objects for security. However, “this does not imply that identities do not change, only that we should not expect everything to change all the time” (Buzan/Wæver 1997: 243). Despite this ‘moderate’ constructivist stance, the Copenhagen School openly acknowledges a ‘radical’ constructivist view with regard to security speech acts (Buzan/Wæver 1997: 246). In this view, a security problem does not exist in and of itself but must be communicated as such. On this point, in works that Wæver (1995, 2000, 2003) has written by himself, the stance is even closer to a post-structuralist position as Wæver’s analysis is similar to Derrida’s famous claim that ‘there is nothing outside of the text’.59 In joint works with Buzan and other authors, however, this position is replaced by a more comprehensive view of security that adds audiences and ‘facilitating conditions’ as external parameters to the speech act (Stritzel 2007: 361f; McDonald 2008a, 2008b; Williams 2011b: 215). A related point of criticism is that the Copenhagen School considers the logic of security, its surrounding conditions and patterns, as relatively fixed (Balzacq 2005). With its “specific rhetorical structure” and the characteristic triad of “survival, priority of action and urgency” (Wæver 2003: 10; cf. Buzan et al. 1998: 26), securitizations, it is argued, would become predictable. In fact, the Copenhagen School bases its call for desecuritization and for dealing with issues in the realm of ‘normal’ politics on the assumption of foreseeability. Critical security theorists and the second generation of critics (Balzacq 2005, 2011b; Stritzel 2007), however, challenge the timelessness and fixed character of the logic of security. They emphasize that the character of security can change in particular contexts and that this means that security discourses can differ in form and in the manner in which they shape politics. According to Balzacq (2005: 172), there is no universal principle that works in every setting, and because of that, the analysis of context is vital. The point here is that by regarding the social, political, and historical context in which securitizations are embedded one can better understand how they become possible. The reason is that it is only in relation to these contexts that the securitizing actor has authority and his/her speech acts have performative power (Stritzel 2007: 360). This also includes the reaction of the audience and its potential acceptance of the securitizing move as this, too, will vary according to the context.

59 For a brief outline of Derrida’s impact on the Copenhagen School’s reasoning, see Balzacq (2011b: 20f). For a more detailed discussion of postmodern elements in Buzan’s and Wæver’s writings, see Hansen (2011b).

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Critics acknowledge that – technically – the Copenhagen School considers contextual features as ‘facilitating conditions’, yet they point to the fact that this part of the model is undertheorized. Possibly, the silence on this point is another expression of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical indeterminacy. With Wæver’s inclination towards the post-structuralist notion that ‘there is nothing outside of the text,’ it is problematic to consider external contextual features and to frame them – as the Copenhagen School does – as ‘conditions’. In fact, Wæver acknowledges that “dealing with conditions is highly sensitive” as it could lead to an introduction of causality and (even more) objectivism into securitization (Wæver 2000: 252, cf. 2003: 14). He emphasizes, therefore, that securitizations are socially constructed and not reducible to causal factors; ‘conditions’ merely have a facilitating influence but cannot replace political interaction (Wæver 2000: 252, 2003: 14; Buzan/Wæver 2003: 71f). On this point, Balzacq (2005, 2011b) believes that the Copenhagen School over-emphasizes security as a discursive product fairly independent of what is ‘out there’ and suggests that the CS pays greater attention to how external extra-linguistic contexts affect securitizations.60 Sweeping calls are being made for a refinement of the Copenhagen School’s concept. They imply that securitization should be viewed “as a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances;” these circumstances are viewed as belonging to the “external context, the psycho-cultural orientation of the audience, and [. . .] the differential power between the speaker and the listener” (Balzacq 2005: 172, 174). However, such an interpretation would shift securitization towards a sociological process (Balzacq 2005, 2011b). Thought further, this would also mean examining how political communities themselves are constituted and how narratives of national identity become dominant; and it would mean investigating how these communities handle security issues. Moreover, this approach would demand that alternative discursive framings of security be recognized, framings that are either overruled (and if so, why?), or that have been delegitimized (and if so, how and by whom?) (McDonald 2008a: 568). It is obvious that such an approach leads to a great refinement of the Copenhagen School’s model, the more so as it takes diverse actors, audiences and social factors into account (Salter 2011: 117f). Although there are good arguments for this approach as it permits more precision, it either tremendously broadens the complexity of study, or forces scholars into tiny niches of research. In addition to the fixed character of the security logic, the Copenhagen School has been criticized for only considering a particular point in time when looking at securitizations. Some reviewers see the developing character of securitization as

60 Balzacq links causality with Foucault’s dispositif. With regard to causality, Balzacq states: “Since it is tricky to identify a precise causal link as the exclusive source of a securitized issue, investigating congruence between, for instance, the strategies of the securitizing actor, the frame of reference of the audience, the immediate context, and the work of the dispositif, may yield more credible results” (2011b: 18, emphasis in original).

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undermined by the speech act concept. In their view, although securitizations actually embody the culmination of a (long-term) process that generated meaning over time, the Copenhagen School focuses on a particular moment of intervention in which a fixed meaning is applied to an issue or person. There is a history to securitizations, it is argued, and therefore, there is no sudden shift from the realms of ‘normal’ politics to that of ‘panic’ politics. Rather, this is seen as a sliding scale where an issue or person gradually shifts into the realm of security. Moreover, this need not end in “reaching the category of existential threat” (Abrahamsen 2005: 59; cf. Williams 2003: 521; Stritzel 2007: 366). Consequently, critics challenge the idea of an either-or-concept that views issues as either politicized, and thus in the realm of ‘normal’ politics, or as securitized and located in the realm of ‘panic’ politics and emergency action. Rather, politicization and securitization can co-exist (Neumann 1998; Williams 2003; Abrahamsen 2005; cf. Bigo 2000, 2001, 2002b). Moreover, as Donnelly (2013) explains, securitizations might not involve breaking free of the rules as assumed by the Copenhagen School. Instead, in the course of securitizations rules can be changed and redefined. The Copenhagen School has taken note of some of these points, such as on time spans of development and the possibility of gradation. Although the School uses the terms ‘act’ and ‘process’ interchangeably (Stritzel 2007: 364) – and this could qualify the statement – the CS does point out that securitization is understood as “processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat” (Buzan et al. 1998: 26, my emphasis). With regard to the framing of certain topics, there is a spectrum ranging from the non-politicized to the politicized to the securitized, and “depending on circumstances, any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum” (Buzan 1997: 14; cf. Wæver 2003: 10). This is also implied by (de-)securitizing moves that end up somewhere in between these poles. In line with the traditional imprint of securitization, the Copenhagen School has also been criticized for clinging to a narrow – and beyond that, negative – concept of security. In so doing, the approach reifies the traditional security concept, critics say, and neglects other perspectives like human security (Doty 1998/99).61 In this realm, the debate also turns to the normative implications of retaining classical security logic. For example, only considering elites as securitizing actors could further strengthen dominant voices while silencing social groups that have already been marginalized. Critics therefore stress the risk of cementing power relations that this approach brings with it (Hansen 2000; Huysmans 2002; McDonald 2008a: 573–581; cf. Milliken 1999: 244f). It is fair to say, though, that the Copenhagen School demonstrates critical awareness of this point. Even without referring particularly to the

61 Human security, as understood here, does not refer to individual security but to the well-being of collectives, which requires more than bare survival. It calls for the end of ‘othering’ and for “radical pluralism” (Doty 1998/99: 82).

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voiceless, the CS does address the researcher’s responsibility, and, as outlined above, expounds the problem of furthering securitization by studying it (Wæver 2000: 252). Besides that, one of the reasons why the CS prefers desecuritization is that securitization is prone to instrumentalization by the powerful and thus tends to be undemocratic. Yet, for some critics, this normative position is also problematic. Proponents of Critical Security Studies and the Welsh School claim that the logic of security need not be negative per se. On the contrary, under certain conditions securitizations could be morally right, if they provide underprivileged groups with a voice and help to improve their circumstances. Used this way, securitization could further progressive and emancipatory change (Doty 1998/99; Williams 2005: 144; Booth 2007: ch. 3; McDonald 2008a: 580, 2008b: 71).62 The question therefore is not simply who has the power to securitize and convince the audience, but rather who gets the power to do so.63 The call on researchers, therefore, is not to promote this bias but to give a voice to the powerless (Milliken 1999: 244f). Wæver also acknowledges the possibility of meeting progressive ends through securitization but nevertheless advocates desecuritization (Wæver 2000: 285).64 Many of the shortcomings discussed so far relate to the point that the Copenhagen School is too selective in its approach and that it does not embrace the complex and multilayered process of securitization. In this regard, further debate has taken place about the ‘act’ of securitization, what it is and whether it comprehends more than just speech. This has led much to be written about the impact of images on security discourse. Today, it is argued, political communication is increasingly being transmitted by electronic media and thus, especially with regard to televisual coverage, through images (Williams 2003; cf. Hansen 2000: 300f). The 9/11 attacks provide strong examples of this: first, when the planes crashed into the World Trade Center in New York, and second, when the towers collapsed. These pictures were shown on television in endless repetition and

62 On ethics and securitization, see among others, Aradau (2004b, 2006), Alker (2006), Behnke (2006a), Huysmans (2006), Taureck (2006), and Floyd (2007, 2011). In a broader sense, with regard to critical security studies, see Wyn Jones (1999). 63 Linked to the question of who can speak security is the critique that the Copenhagen School’s approach focuses too much on the West and its liberal democracies due to the School’s presumption of the existence of free speech. In other parts of the world, however, it might not be possible to express one’s voice. This Western view, critics say, is also purported by the assumption of ‘normal’ politics as based on democratic institutions. The application of the securitization model outside the Western world would therefore be difficult. See for example Wilkinson (2007) and McDonald (2008a: 581, 2008b: 69f). Vuori (2008) however shows how the concept can be applied in non-democratic contexts. 64 There is a dispute among scholars whether science should be normative. Although normativity is rejected by some, others claim that scientific neutrality is an assertion from the outset rather than a possibility since “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox 1986: 207, emphasis in original; cf. Zehfuß 1998: 127, Zehfuss 2001: 71).

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powerfully corroborated shock and fear. Other authors point to the significance of photos (Möller 2007) and cartoons (Hansen 2007), universalized via the internet, as influences on perceptions of threat. These visual representations convey meaning and account for the assessment and potential acceptance of political action. The recommendation, therefore, is to integrate them into the Copenhagen School’s concept as non-verbal aspects of securitization, even if, as Vuori (2010; cf. Hansen 2007) points out, they might not bring about securitizations themselves. Rather, they unfold their impact within a previously established securitization. The inclusion of images in securitization, however, might be more problematic than it appears. The reason for this is that images are ambiguous in meaning (McDonald 2008a: 569f; cf. Möller 2007: 180; Vuori 2010). This means that it could be difficult to assess their effect and whether they were deployed strategically. In a more general sense, this would also call for an investigation into the role of journalists and in how far media professionals deliberately participate in securitizing moves. According to this view, a greater consideration of institutional media structures and their linkages to the political realm would be needed as part of analyses of securitization. Other authors suggest considering the role of non-verbal practices in securitization processes. Neumann (1998), for example, recommends that the Copenhagen School directly refers to the outbreak of war and includes violence as actions with “a material character” (Neumann 1998: 19) into the model. He proposes extending Buzan’s continuum to include four steps: non-politicized, politicized, securitized, and violized. Wilkinson (2007: 12) points to the impact of censorship by the powerful or protest actions by the powerless. Huysmans (2011: 377; cf. Bigo 2002b: 73) even suggests that today securitization is more ‘act’ than ‘speech’ as discursive dramatization is displaced by technological surveillance, profiling, and data collection, which turns objects of everyday life into security objects. Similar to what has been discussed above, in this respect securitization is understood as a creeping process rather than urgent crisis management and rule breaking; however, this approach focuses on securitization of a different kind, its characteristic changes here. It is an investigation into the role of institutional environments in producing and managing threats. Huysmans’ interest in study is thereby close to that of Bigo’s (2000, 2001, 2002b) and the Paris School, which works on the institutionalization of security and how this leads to securitizations.65 The Paris School examines the security apparatus and the impact of its professional and bureaucratic actors, and in particular “the systems of meaning they generate and the productive power of their practices” (c.a.s. e collective 2006: 458; cf. Huysmans 2006: 153–155). In short, whereas the

65 Both, Huysmans (2000, 2002, 2006) and Bigo (2000, 2001, 2002b) put a strong focus on migration in their studies. Huysmans (2002: 44) focuses on the “integrative capacity” of security language that binds together different features such as migration, drugs, and Islamic fundamentalism to a security field with particular institutional processes. In a similar way, Bigo investigates how internal and external security merges on the operational level.

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Copenhagen School focuses on the rhetorical structure of securitizations, Huysmans and the Paris School conceptualize securitization as a technocratic practice that is effective on a transnational level to an increasing degree. These studies illustrate two points. First, bureaucratic actors are privileged in the securitization of issues since their routinized practices construct and communicate meanings of security. Second, these securitizations form a permanent technique of governance that promotes a political environment in which the ‘state of exception’ is less dramatic than in the Copenhagen School’s concept, but becomes the norm (Fierke 2007b: 112; cf. Huysmans 2002: 57; Wæver 2003: 30; McDonald 2008a: 570–576). In this realm, Balzacq (2008: 76) points out, securitizations can occur and produce “social and political consequences without the explicit assent of an audience.” Moreover, this form of the institutionalization of security poses a problem for the Copenhagen School’s concept of desecuritization. As Donnelly (2013: 49) correctly remarks, if security is internalized by people to such a degree that it no longer has to be stated, then ‘rewording’ the matter becomes problematic. In this case, desecuritization would have to start by raising critical awareness of the institutionalization itself, and, respectively, of that which is treated in security terms. Finally, a large debate also developed around the role of the audience in securitization. The concept of the audience has been criticized for its vagueness and lack of definition (Balzacq 2005, 2011b; Stritzel 2007; McDonald 2008a; Roe 2008; Salter 2008; Vuori 2008; Léonard/Kaunert 2011). Much of the contestation has centered on the question in how far securitization is truly conceptualized as an intersubjective process. Initially, as McDonald (2008a: 566) points out, the performativity of speech acts was emphasized more strongly in the concept of securitization. Although the decisive role of the audience was later incorporated into the concept, as laid out in Security: A New Framework for Analysis in 1998, it stayed “so undertheorized as to ultimately remain outside the framework itself” (McDonald 2008a: 564). The discursive exchange and negotiation between the speaker and the audience remains neglected and the emphasis remains instead on the speech act of the securitizing actor. Balzacq (2005, 2011b) sees the reason for this problem in the Copenhagen School’s dependence on Austin’s speech act theory with its focus on illocution. As he notes, the Copenhagen School conceptualizes securitization as illocution while neglecting the perlocutionary aspect and thus the effect on the audience.66 For Balzacq, perlocution is not an inherent quality of speech acts. In his view, it is only in relation to external reality, including “brute threats” and “external objective developments,” that the securitizer manages to convince an audience (Balzacq

66 Balzacq (2005: 177, 2011b: 19–21) challenges the Copenhagen School on this point. He states that security is either viewed as a self-referential practice (i.e., an illocutionary act) which makes the acceptance of an audience and thus the perlocutionary effect unnecessary, or, that security speech acts are viewed as needing the acceptance of the audience, which means, however, that they are not self-referential.

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2005: 181f). As mentioned above, in order to include perlocution, he therefore suggests reconceptualizing securitization and viewing it as a ‘strategic practice’ rather than a ‘speech act’. He criticizes the Copenhagen School for emphasizing the performativity of speech by which security becomes a self-referential practice (Balzacq 2005: 177, cf. 2011b: 19f). This in fact is stated precisely by Wæver (2003: 11), and it once again demonstrates that the Copenhagen School’s model leads to direct contradictions. On the one hand, the Copenhagen School points out that the process of securitization is intersubjective (Buzan et al. 1998: 30; Wæver 2000: 252, 2003: 12) and that it is only through audience acceptance that a securitizing move becomes a successful securitization. On the other hand, it also claims that “it is the actor [. . .] who decides whether something is to be handled as an existential threat” (Buzan et al. 1998: 34). As mentioned earlier, Wæver was very clear on this point when stating that “a problem would become a security issue whenever so defined by the power holders” (Wæver 1995: 56, emphasis in original). If the latter is true, the characterization of securitization as an intersubjective process is blurred. The Copenhagen School is clearly aware of this problem as Wæver and Buzan have pointed to the danger “that too much focus can be placed on the acting side, thus privileging the powerful while marginalizing those who are the audience and judge of the act” (Buzan et al. 1998: 41). Again, the problem with dissolving this tension might be rooted in contending theoretical understandings. The Copenhagen School also acknowledges that the ‘audience’ needs “better definition and probably differentiation” (Wæver 2003: 26). However, despite its vital role, it remains unclear who “the relevant audience” (Wæver 2000: 251) is. Who has to be convinced? Whose acceptance of proposed actions is required? The main audience could be the parliament, the public, the media, or special societal or interest groups; however, it could also be an intersection of these groupings, and, in the case of macrosecuritization, it could even include several audiences on various levels across countries. Thus, in order to define the success of securitizations, it might be necessary to consider multiple audiences (Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007; Roe 2008; Salter 2008; Vuori 2008). Salter (2008: 322), for example, distinguishes between four types of audiences: popular, elite, technocratic, and scientific. These audiences alter the particular setting and influence the form and content of securitizing speech acts and their prospects of success; as mentioned earlier, threat representations resonate in different ways with different audiences (Williams 2011b: 213). Although Wæver (2003: 12) concedes that the audience will vary “according to the political system and the nature of the issue,” the Copenhagen School provides no clear criteria with which to identify target groups; nor does it set out how to evaluate the respective relevance of particular audiences whose actual capacity to influence policymaking may differ. As Balzacq (2005) and Roe (2008) indicate, in securitization processes the ‘formal support’ of policy makers (such as cabinets or parliaments) might be more important for the application of emergency measures

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than the ‘moral support’ of the public. The likeliness of a successful securitization rises, however, when both audiences grant their support (Balzacq 2005: 184). The analysis of ‘formal support’ touches on another difficulty in determining the relevant audience – an aspect that is hardly discussed in the literature: if securitization is understood as an intersubjective – in a constructivist sense, mutually constitutive – process, the repercussions of security discourse on the securitizing actor also needs consideration. If securitization is a discursive process and if there is debate – as one always needs “to argue one’s case” (Buzan et al. 1998: 25) – the securitizing actor and its apparatus itself become part of the audience. In the end, a clear division between securitizing actor and audience is impossible as both sides speak and listen to one another and influence each other. In the face of the topic’s complexity, one cannot, as Stritzel (2007: 363) remarks, “always figure out clearly which audience is when and why most relevant, what implications it has if there are several audiences and when exactly an audience is ‘persuaded.’” The latter points to another lack of definition, that is, even if ‘the relevant’ audience could be determined, how could the acceptance of a securitizing move by the audience be assessed? How is the success of securitizing moves exactly defined? The Copenhagen School does not say much about this besides that there would have to be “enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible [otherwise]” (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). It is, however, exactly this resonance, “this politics of consent that must be unpacked further” (Salter 2008: 324). What is clear, though, is that audiences also bear responsibility for their contributions to discourses. They might face challenges in evaluating the framings the securitizer puts forth, yet even under these circumstances, the acceptance of securitizations is a political choice (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). In the realm of institutionalized security in particular, where “constant drama” is not required (Buzan et al. 1998: 27), the role of the audience becomes even more problematic. Since in these cases the government has a particular degree of legitimacy “to act without the consent of the general public and/or other securitizing audiences,” the role of the latter is “at best marginalized or at worst excluded” (Roe 2008: 618). In a similar way, intersubjectivity is hampered when the security topic is deliberately insulated from public debate and dealt with in secret. If operations are kept secret to prevent information leaking to an enemy or for other reasons, the acceptance of the audience is at least postponed. This is not to say that the audience does not play a role as politicians in democratic systems will probably have to justify their positions to the public at some point. However, and despite what the Copenhagen School suggests, there might not always be a straight sequence leading from securitization to acceptance by the audience and the implementation of emergency action. These aspects remain underdetermined in the Copenhagen School’s concept (Williams 2003; McDonald 2008b; Roe 2008).

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4.4 Constructing Self and Other in Security Discourse Securitization is largely a discourse of identity.67 Although also circumstances like climate change or economic crashes can be securitized, in the majority of cases the alleged threat in securitizations is posed by humans in terms of groups, peoples or (state) leaders/representatives. Therefore, in principle, the threat scenario is a constellation of ‘self’ and ‘other’ where the latter is an (external) enemy that endangers the state sovereignty and/or (national) identity of the ‘self’. However, in security discourses of this kind, the framing of the ‘other’ is not only decisive in defining which policies are an appropriate means of confronting the threat the ‘other’ allegedly poses, it is also constitutive of the ‘self’. By framing the ‘other’ in a certain way, the securitizing actor defines the ‘self’ in relation to it. Identity formation is thus a kernel of security discourse and foreign policy. The following section outlines this relation and demonstrates the extent to which certain characteristics of language use contribute to contrasting ‘self’ and ‘other’. As outlined above, identity formation is considered largely a matter of language; how then is identity formed? In approaching this question, a certain feature of language gains importance, namely, its structure of binary opposition. Across disciplines, scholars recognize that language is based on difference and that, therefore, we think, speak and structure our world in dichotomies. This finding was prominently put forward by the structural linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1974), as well as the communication theorist Kenneth Burke (1969 [1945]) and the philosopher Jacques Derrida (1981 [1972]). According to their insights, meanings depend on opposites: if one thing is good, the other must be bad; if one stance is right, the other must be wrong (Fourie 2007: 249; cf. Llorente 2002: 39). Binary thinking is the “placement of one thought or thing in terms of its opposite” (Burke 1969 [1945]: 403). This finding is also viewed as applying to subjects and thus identities. ‘Self’ and ‘other’ are mutually dependent since the ‘self’ is that which the ‘other’ is not. Consequently, the constitution of identity is a relational process in which the collectively shared image of the ‘self’ is constituted against the image of the ‘other’, that is, in difference to the ‘other’, and vice versa (Derrida 1978; Connolly 1991; Harle 2000: ch. 1).68 With regard to international politics, a discursive differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is a normal procedure as the relation to and demarcation from other

67 The constructivist (and post-structuralist) assumption that identities are constructed and contingent led the relation of identity formation and foreign/security policy to become a prominent research subject. See among others Wæver/Kelstrup (1993), Wæver et al. (1993), Wæver (2002, 2005) as well as Campbell (1996, 1998), Weldes (1999), and Hansen (2006). 68 For the philosophical background and further analysis on binary oppositions and the politics of difference see the works of Iris M. Young, Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, as well as those of the French post-structuralists Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jean-Franҫois Lyotard, and Julia Kristeva. For a discussion of the issue, see Chueh (2004: ch. 3).

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nations and cultures is constitutive of national identity (Hall 1991a: 20–22, 1991b; Torfing 2005: 14; de Fina 2011: 271). As Geis (2006: 154) points out, “it is inherent in modern statehood and sovereignty that ‘others’ are permanently and inevitably constituted.” The question, however, is how this is done as “the naming and framing of one’s counterpart very much shape the potential options in dealing with him” (Geis 2006: 154; cf. Doty 1996; Howarth/Stavrakakis 2000: 3f). In fact, thinking and speaking in binary oppositions easily becomes precarious as it is prone to political instrumentalization, especially in security discourse. Often, ‘othering’ implies a hierarchy, since the ‘other’ is not simply viewed as different but inferior (Connolly 1991: 40, 45–48, 64; Todorov 1992: 42, 146–167; Riggins 1997: 9f; Campbell 1998: 73f; van Dijk 2001: 362). As Derrida (1981 [1972]: 41) points out, there is no “peaceful coexistence” between these binary oppositions but a “violent hierarchy” in which “one of the two terms governs the other [. . .] or has the upper hand.” Whereas the positive attributes remain with the ‘self’, the negative ones are ascribed to the ‘other’ who is devalued.69 Consequently, the ‘self’ claims predominance. There can be various degrees of ‘othering’ up to detrimental opposition where the ‘other’ is constituted as “absolutely-not-self” (Abdel-Nour 2004: 430–433) and less than human.70 This constellation easily permits double standards and suggests the legitimacy of humiliation, exploitation, and violence. In general, it paves the way for doing unto ‘them’ what should not be done unto ‘us’. The alleged legitimacy of the use of force rises further when otherness is constructed as threatening; this marks the pivot of securitization processes. In these cases, securitizations can intensify these dichotomies towards antagonisms. In its most severe form, the ‘other’ is constructed in such a demoniac manner that – according to the purported security logic – it must be eradicated. Commonly, this constitutes a strong politics of fear as the ‘self’ is constructed as civilized and good, whereas the ‘other’ is represented as pure evil and ready to strike. The reasoning put forth in such cases is simple: because the ‘other’ is evil, it commits evil.71 Because of that, the implementation of extreme measures is appropriate in order to satisfy one’s own security needs. Above that, force against the ‘other’ is not only justified but a noble if not holy act as it means fighting for God and the good (Sluka 2009: 145; cf. Harle 2000: 12). The dichotomy of ‘self’ and ‘other’ comes along with a homogenization of the respective identity (Hall 1994: 142). The confrontation of a good ‘self’ and an evil ‘other’ leads to a generalized classification of in-group and out-group and impedes

69 For an argument against the privileging of the ‘self’, see Carr/Zanetti (1999). 70 De facto, however, the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ must share a common identity, otherwise a division does not make sense. Contrasting Americans to baseball hats, for example, would not be meaningful (McSweeney 1999: 157). 71 For a genealogy of the term ‘evil’ and an approach towards a definition, see Casebeer (2004). For a reflection on the overstraining of ‘evil talk’, see Bernstein (2005).

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the consideration of internal difference and individual characteristics; consequently, the regard for individual bearing, guilt or innocence, is lost. In line with this politics of inclusion and exclusion, all who belong to the ‘self’ are part of a “legitimate community” whereas all who belong to the ‘other’ are identified as “enemies of the state” (Hajjar 2002: 120). Part of this homogenization is also the tendency to imaginatively invigorate the ‘other’ by constructing it as monolithic, that is, as an internally united enemy whose acts are well coordinated – a circumstance that further intensifies the alleged dangerousness of the ‘other’ and the perception of threat (Jervis 1983: 173f). It is therefore apparent that “the issue of identity – [. . .] what makes us believe we are the same and them different – is inseparable from security” (Booth 1997: 88, emphasis in original). Identity and foreign/security policy are mutually constitutive. Identity “shapes how ‘security’ is understood” and security practices shape the understanding of identity (Lock 2008: 68). Faced with an evil ‘other’, one’s own interests can be clearly defined and particular policies can be legitimized as necessary and in line with national interests (Finlay et al. 1967; Jervis 1976; Edelman 1988: 76; Kristol 1990: 16; Hansen 2006: xvi).72 Understood in this manner, foreign policy is a discourse of danger and fear that constitutes the ‘self’. David Campbell (1996, 1998) convincingly demonstrated this with regard to the United States where the representation of external evil ‘others’ is shown as constitutive of America’s identity and interests. In fact, even in liberal democracies ‘othering’ is a well-known element of securitization. As democratic peace theory has shown, democratic states are not inherently peaceful. These countries also consider force and war as options, in particular towards their non-democratic counterparts (Daase 2006). Although the Copenhagen School has been criticized for having tailored its concept too narrowly to Western democracies, scholarly work confirms that this is still a vivid field of study. There are manifold reasons why ‘othering’ is ubiquitous. As mentioned above, it helps to shape and unite the ‘self’, and it increases patriotism and strengthens the social acceptance of one’s own values and belief systems; it thus enhances the chances for corporate and effective action against opponents. Positively speaking, it increases the population’s loyalty towards its leadership, but there is also a great potential for repression as people can be forced to consent or else face stigmatization “as saboteurs and traitors of the fatherland” (Fiebig-von Hase 1997: 32). Enemy imagery can also be used as diversionary maneuvers to shift the public focus from internal problems to an outward enemy. Moreover, the antagonism of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ simplifies complex situations and helps to legitimize proposed actions that are framed in terms of self-defense (Finlay et al. 1967: ch. 1; Jervis 1976, 1983; Ostermann/Nicklas 1982; Lippert/Wachtler 1988; Flohr 1991: ch. 4; Fiebig-von Hase 1997; Weller 2000: 85–93; Geis 2006). This includes, as

72 This, again, is close to Carl Schmitt’s concept according to which ‘the political’ “thrives on conflict” (Bernstein 2005: 89).

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the Copenhagen School describes, actions that would otherwise be impossible. Hence, one of the central characteristics of enemy constructions and the politics of fear is that it empowers the political elite.73 ‘Othering’ often builds on established concepts of the ‘other’ that have been reinforced over time. Reviving and adapting enemy images and other stereotypes is thus a matter of historicity and intertextuality. One of the most consolidated binaries noticeable in Western discourse with regard to international security politics is that of the ‘West and the Rest’ (Hall 1994; cf. Karim 1997). It is in comparison and demarcation to ‘the rest’ (the Muslim world), that the West developed its awareness and image of superiority. The alleged inferiority of Arabs, who were seen as primitive and irrational also led to a deep mistrust towards them (Said 1978; Abu-Lughod 2002; Parry 2013: 9). In general, ‘othering’ takes place in discourses of exclusion, and Orientalism certainly can be seen, as outlined above, as exemplary of a discourse where power relations have produced a particular kind of knowledge and truth. This is also a case in point for the perpetuation of enemy images. Due to its historical grounding, Orientalist discourse with its particular representations of, and feelings about, the ‘other’, can easily be invoked by Western securitizers. New information can be filtered and organized in a way that fits into and confirms the pattern (Fiebig-von Hase 1997: 7f). In other words, through recontextualization the enemy’s image can be adapted to an ongoing situation, and can thereby be instrumentalized in political processes. As mentioned above, this happens by homogenizing both the ingroup and the out-group. The Western ‘self’ is thereby consistently constituted as good, modern, democratic, and peace loving, whereas the Arabic ‘other’ is defined as barbaric, primitive, despotic, and violent (Volpp 2002: 572). This antipodal understanding was certainly reinforced by the security discourse that developed in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001; this is analyzed in the book’s empirical part below.

4.5 Summary This chapter presented the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization whereby security is defined as a speech act. According to this model, issues and people are turned into security problems when framed as such and when this framing is accepted by the audience(s). When this occurs, the political leadership can break free of the rules and apply extraordinary measures that

73 See on this also Bostdorff (1994). In general, the construction of enemy images is assumed to reveal more about the inner status of the ‘self’ than of the characteristics of the ‘other’ (Weller 2000: 90f).

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would otherwise be illegal under national and international laws or treaties. The School’s assumption is not that threat constructions and enemy images never correspond with what is ‘out there’. On the contrary, if something threatening does exist, then there are greater chances that a securitizing move will be successful. However, the School points out that this correspondence is not an indispensable prerequisite for securitizations. Rather, threats can be constituted or intensified through the way things are presented in discourse. Securitizations can thus carry a matter beyond the status quo. In line with this, securitizations constrain the range of possible action, since ‘normal politics’ no longer appears appropriate and instead, emergency action seems to be imperative. As discussed above, there are theoretical shortcomings to this approach. These include inconsistencies in its ontological assumptions, the narrowness of the model with its wide disregard for contextual features and for the processual character of securitizations, the institutionalization of securitizations, which in fact alters their logic, and the lack of definition and theoretical consideration of what constitutes a ‘relevant’ audience. It has been pointed out that the audience – despite its alleged centrality to the model – slips somewhat out of sight and that this questions the intersubjective quality of securitizations. While this book takes the criticism leveled against the Copenhagen School into account, the School’s model of securitization still proves a valuable approach to understanding how political developments and deviations from ‘normal politics’ can come about. It thus provides a theoretical orientation for a broad variety of security studies as it promises insights into the designation of threats and the shaping of foreign policies. As mentioned above, a central part of securitizations is ‘othering’ – the construction of an evil ‘other’ who threatens the ‘self’ in terms of sovereignty or identity. These enemy images are a powerful tool with which to legitimize emergency measures. Analyzing these identity and threat constructions thus makes it possible to retrace how force comes to appear necessary and justified. Therefore, the relevance of the Copenhagen School’s concept also rests with its ability to heighten people’s awareness of the power of security language, which in turn imposes responsibility on securitizing actors and their audiences. The CS underscores the point that talk is not innocent because it constructs circumstances that might lead to violence or even the declaration of war. Although the securitization concept does not portray the whole picture and security is more complex than the model represents, it still captures a vital aspect of the issue at hand. After all, discourse is the most common mode of political practice. Therefore, securitization is a useful framework for the discourse analysis conducted in this book.

5 Mode of Conduct Whereas the discussion above set out the theoretical foundations of this book, this chapter presents the mode of conduct applied in the analysis undertaken in Chapter 6 and 7. As noted above, language is an essential constitutive of reality as “talking is undoubtedly the most important way that we go about making the world what it is” (Onuf 1998: 59). Language is not neutral in its deployment since it (re-)produces reality in a certain way and thus produces certain preconditions and provides latitude for particular actions. Therefore, discourse analysis is the appropriate approach for investigation due to its focus on the connection between language use and political action. Although the attacks of September 11, 2001 were ‘real’ in that they ‘really’ did happen, the attacks did not speak for themselves as acts of war and they did not inevitably determine the ensuing security policies of the Bush administration and its successor. Rather, as is argued in this book, what was conceptualized as an appropriate, necessary (re-)action to keep America safe was put forth by the presidents in their security discourses. Therefore, in the empirical part of this book, the speeches of former President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama are analyzed with regard to their construction of threat scenarios. This includes both state security and societal security, i.e., security in terms of sovereignty and integrity, and identity and way of life. The analysis is conducted with the aim of finding answers to how the violation of human rights at the detention center in Guantanamo Bay became possible, and how President Obama sought to change course by constructing the renunciation of these violations as a security necessity. To this end, the analysis demonstrates how the discursive construction of ‘self’, ‘other’, and ‘threat’ was interwoven in an argument that provided latitude for the presidents’ political courses. It makes apparent how the framing of identity in a certain context shapes policies and makes particular actions appear reasonable, including breaking rules. The analysis also reveals in how far this latitude varied for Bush and Obama due to the acceptance – or, respectively, rejection – of framings by important audiences. As the theoretical approach indicates, this is not an attempt to demonstrate a cause-effect model or a form of determinism. Nevertheless, discourse is defined as a powerful constitutive that creates political possibilities. Accordingly, the analysis demonstrates what the presidents’ discourses constituted as true, necessary and legitimate and what these framings rendered possible in terms of policies and the powers exercised at Guantanamo Bay. The findings thereby retrace the divergence of Bush’s und Obama’s political courses. In sum, the overall question is this: How was the threat scenario constituted by President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama, and how was it put into practice?

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5.1 The Method Interpretative approaches have often been criticized for proceeding in an unstructured manner that impedes traceability and scientific record. Therefore, in order to structure the analysis, the qualitative method of discourse analysis uses established techniques of content analysis in defining categories and searching for particular elements in the text (Behnke et al. 2010: 351–353; cf. Trültzsch 2009: 159f). Nevertheless, discourse analysis is not a method with a fixed set of rules. Rather, it is a problem-driven approach and its application must be tailored to a particular research question and a study’s aim (Wodak/Meyer 2010). Mostly, though, the tools of discourse analysis “do not exhaust the concept of discourse theory itself” (Howarth 2005: 318). In accordance with this, and the study at hand, CDA, as presented in section 3.2, provides an appropriate model for several reasons. First, CDA is an established model in constructivist IR for analyzing language use in social interaction and for retracing the connections between text and political structure. Second, it conforms to the research design presented here as it considers both the performativity of discourse and the ability of agents to act strategically. This fits well with the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization, which takes into account the constitutive power of language while viewing securitizers as self-conscious actors who can be held responsible for their actions. A third reason for applying CDA is that it is critical. CDA seeks to make people aware of how discursive strategies work and how they affect our lives. After all, most people are influenced by framings that establish environments of fear, as security discourses often do. Similar to the Copenhagen School, CDA challenges these framings. It discloses what is purported as truth in discourse – or likewise what is purported as inherently necessary or reasonable action – and points to other possible interpretations or alternative measures that have been excluded from debate. Since political discourses shape our social reality, CDA provides a means with which to contribute to the reactivation of critical awareness within these narratives. This also underlines the relevance of this book’s topic in critically investigating how the violation of established rules such as international human rights law was rendered possible. In saying that, it should be clear that this book takes a normative approach. The aim is to contribute towards sharpening the consciousness of discursive power (in politics) and the responsibility that comes with this due to its effects on social life. Again, this is in line with the Copenhagen School’s intentions presented above. The following briefly outlines the analytical framework that is applied in the empirical part of this book. The structure of the analysis draws on Balzacq (2011c: 35f) and Titscher et al. (2000: ch. 3).

5.2 Who Acts? To begin with, it is essential that the actors which the analysis will focus on are specified and that this choice is explained. In line with the Copenhagen School’s

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concept, there are two important groups of agents in securitization processes: securitizing actors, and audiences. The first constitute the security issue whereas the latter either accept and reproduce it, or foster alternative framings. For the study at hand, the securitizing actors under scrutiny are George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, the former and the current president of the United States, respectively. The definition of ‘the relevant’ audience is more problematic as the target group proves to be diverse. Therefore, three to four groups were chosen. The following sets out the reasoning behind this selection. – The Presidents: The aim of analyzing the speech acts of former President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama is to investigate how they constructed a security narrative that permitted, or, respectively, required the termination of, particular emergency measures. Capitalizing on the presidents’ speeches conforms to the Copenhagen School’s approach since it means focusing on the state and its authoritative elites. However, this also means that the approach used in this book could face similar critique to that aimed at the Copenhagen School. As discussed previously, instead of preserving a narrow view of security and developing further representations of the powerful, discourse theory generally abandons the predominance of the state (Hansen 2000; Mills 2004: 140; Neumann 2008: 66). Nevertheless, there are good reasons to analyze the presidents’ speeches and proceed as described. After all, with regard to U.S. foreign policy, considerable discursive power rests with the presidents who possess the legitimacy to speak and act on behalf of the people. Their discursive power is generated by their democratically legitimated status which increases both their defining power in conceptualizing and framing issues and their ability to achieve social acceptance for their interpretations and the meanings they constitute. Consequently, they are in a position to control and dominate a discourse from the beginning. This development is enhanced by a president’s easy access to mass media and permanent media presence as a natural consequence of the office he or she holds. Intensive media coverage grants high dispersion and circulation of presidential interpretations. Therefore, if politics is largely embodied by the struggle for defining power and the implementation of what is defined as desirable or necessary, political elites in general and presidents in particular are equipped with good prerequisites (Lazar/Lazar 2004: 224; Domke et al. 2006: 292; Keller et al. 2011: 9). This is even more so in times of crisis when the president is expected to reassure the people and to develop appropriate responses. The president, therefore, is a key figure in security policy. Moreover, as Leroy Dorsey (2002: 5) has observed, the “modern presidency has shifted from a largely administrator-based to a more rhetoric-based institution.” Obviously, today the president is not only the commander-in-chief but

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also the “Communicator-in-Chief” (Rozell 1995: 85) and as such the “Interpreter-in-Chief” (Stuckey 1991) who constitutes national identity and shapes the perception of the political environment and its requirement for particular policies (Hart 1987: 45; Campbell/Jamieson 1990, 2008; Neustadt 1990; Stuckey 1991, 2004; Bostdorff 1994; Dorsey 2002; Zarefsky 2004a, 2004b; Coe 2007: 377). In addition, the realm of security is exemplary of what has been discussed above: security is a field of highly exclusive discourses in which the number of authorized, legitimate speakers is significantly limited. The president’s influence on discourse in this case is magnified because it is the president who has access to expert knowledge, information about and from the secret services and strategic reasoning that might remain concealed from the public. In addition, the public, in turn, often has little means to instantly verify statements made about security/foreign policy issues (Manheim 1994: 127). Therefore, in the realm of foreign affairs and security politics, presidents have special powers to dominate a discourse, which, for example, is demonstrable from the Bush administration’s framing of 9/11 as an act of war. However, the U.S. president as commander-in-chief also has the institutional power to wage war; this of course has actual effects at the national and international level (Winkler 2006: 4f; Edwards 2009: 457). Having said that, it is clear that George W. Bush and Barack Obama are not of interest as private individuals, but as representatives and heads of a government that determines the political course. In fact, as additional readings show, the speeches of, for example, National Security Advisors or the Secretaries of the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice largely confirm the presidents’ contents and linguistic constructions. That these speeches are only rarely included in the analysis is due to operational reasons: first, additional data did not seem to be required to further substantiate the analysis; and second, the corpus had to be restricted to a manageable size. In this sense, feasibility led to a focus on the text production of the most powerful agent of the U.S. government: the president. With regard to his power to define issues, recontextualize them and thus lead to changes in meanings and social structures, the president is out on a limb. It is reasonable therefore to constrain the analysis by and large to the president’s speeches. It should be clear by now, that the approach applied here assumes a president’s agency in terms of shaping discourse. Nevertheless, the question remains whether text production is always strategic and used to accomplish certain objectives. As has been mentioned in the chapter on securitization, the Copenhagen School holds people responsible for the way they talk. By calling politicians to account for the way they frame things, intentionality is ascribed to their actions. This position is adopted in this book although it is recognized that there are limits to intentionality. There are points of normalization in language use where we lose our awareness of particularly recognizing something in the way it is framed (van Dijk 1997b: 7–9). Hence, in analyzing discourse, there is no way of finally proving

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that an author is in control of every single word and that every utterance is strategically employed with regard to the aspired consequences. Nevertheless, discourse can be seen as mostly intentional. If new framings occur repetitively they obviously cannot be classified as verbal accidents. This is even truer with respect to writing, since it is less spontaneous and thus more controlled than spoken text. In the political realm, where actors are trained in rhetoric and presentation techniques, it is self-evident that language is mostly used purposefully. Language is aimed at changing opinions and achieving certain goals, although there is no guarantee that a speaker’s utterance will indeed influence the listener as intended and alter his/her attitude. Understood in this way, political language is a “calculated design” that aims to increase the chances of success in particular political struggles (Fairclough/Wodak 1997: 259; cf. Gronbeck 1998: 50; Wodak/Reisigl 2001: 386; Jackson 2005: 2; Coe 2007: 383; Edwards 2009: 458). In consequence, it should be possible to assume that George W. Bush and Barack Obama spoke deliberately and purposefully, even if most presidents do not prepare their speeches by themselves and are therefore not the sole originators of their talk (Wodak 2009: 2). Presidents, however, do know about the importance of their speeches and it is very likely that they cooperate with speechwriters or at least edit speeches and thereby authorize them. Above all, presidents can be held responsible for what they say due to the numerous repetitions of the same constructions and contents in their speeches. These iterations would certainly not occur if the presidents did not mean to say what they say. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the presidents apply certain discursive strategies in their speeches. – The Audience: According to the Copenhagen School’s concept, the audience should also be considered. It is the audience that marks securitizations as intersubjective processes, and the reproduction of certain framings by the audience helps particular meanings become dominant. However, although the audience is vital in securitization, the discussion above highlighted how difficult it is to determine which audience is relevant. Besides that, different audiences are important for the research question at hand, and this introduces a complexity to the topic that can only be dealt with in a rudimentary manner in this study. Although Guantanamo-related policies are part of the ‘War on Terror’ and thus of a macrosecuritization, international audiences are not taken into account in this study. Nonetheless, even by restricting the analysis to domestic audiences, an in-depth analysis of all major groups’ reactions to the presidents’ framings is still beyond the scope of this book. This also applies to an investigation into their societal positions of power and relative impact on security discourse. Nevertheless, the analysis sets out to provide an overview of the responses to the security conceptions of President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. Four specific societal groups were chosen for the analysis.

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The first group consists of the public and the media. This group is the most comprehensive and represents the main recipient of governmental statements. However, in this regard, the media function in different ways. They are multiplicators of presidential positions as well as a voice of the people, or, at best, they are independent and critical observers and commentators. The second group is much more specific but potentially even more important for the presidents and the implementation of the presidents’ political courses: Congress. It is therefore important to investigate how the representatives and senators in the Capitol respond to a president’s security discourse, the more so, as Congress has the power and duty to keep the government in check. The third group is delicate as it is the operating apparatus itself, which is headed by the president and commander-in-chief. It comprises the government with its departments and offices as well as the military and secret services. As mentioned earlier, securitizing actors are also part of the audience and this marks the process as truly reciprocal. Although presidents put forth particular framings and interpretations, there is reaction within the apparatus towards these conceptualizations, including clear support but also rejection. Since the people within the apparatus are important for the operationalization of the president’s policies, their positions on presidential framings are also important. Finally, in the case of Bush’s security discourse – but not that of Obama – the position of the Supreme Court is also regarded. This is certainly a special yet highly influential audience as it can determine the legal scope for political action. The Supreme Court rendered critical judgments on Bush’s detention and interrogation policies after 9/11, which is why it is incorporated in this study.

5.3 What is Said and Done? The discussion above defined the actors under analysis; this section, in contrast, turns to the kind of action that will be examined. First of all, the analysis looks at the security narratives of George W. Bush and Barack Obama and investigates their framings of identity and threat. Moreover, in line with the Copenhagen School’s concept, the policies related to securitizations that were announced and/or enacted are investigated, as well as audiences’ positions toward these proceedings. For an overview of the analytical steps involved, see Table 5.1. This triad of securitization, political action and the audiences’ role represents the link between language use and political practice as presented by the Copenhagen School. In a first step, the study details what President Bush and President Obama said, that is, the kind of threat scenarios they constructed. With regard to the topics and arguments that made up the scenarios, coding the corpus resulted in three main categories: the American ‘self’ (see sections 6.1 and 7.1); the terrorist ‘other’ (see sections 6.2 and 7.2); and the nature of the ‘threat’ to America’s national security (see sections 6.3 and 7.3). These categories structure the discourse analysis

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Table 5.1: Levels and units of the present securitization analysis. Discourse Analysis

President George W. Bush

President Barack Obama

Securitizing move

Discursive Construction – of Identity: – of the American ‘self’ – of the Terrorist ‘other’ – of Threat to America’s National Security

Discursive Construction – of Identity: – of the American ‘self’ – of the Terrorist ‘other’ – of Threat to America’s National Security

Audiences

Reactions of/within: – The Public/the Media – Congress – The Operating Apparatus – The Supreme Court

Reactions of/within: – The Public/the Media – Congress – The Operating Apparatus

Foreign Policies

Enactment of Guantanamo-related Detention and Interrogation Policies

Change/Termination of Guantanamo-related Detention and Interrogation Policies

and are examined in the context of speeches made by both presidents; they also provide for a comparison of the discursive constructions constituting the speeches. This includes an analysis of what is said, how it is said and which implications come with what is said, that is, the political actions that seem necessary or legitimate due to these constructions. The examination of these framings and of the argumentative structure of the text reveals how issues are presented as objective facts and how proposed (re-)actions were portrayed as rational. Since rhetoric potentially enhances the persuasive power of arguments, the use of presentation techniques will also be taken into account. To this end, the content is analyzed with regard to the choice of wording (including rhetoric and stylistic devices such as imagery, alliteration, and repetition), as well as text cohesion and principles of reasoning. The analysis is guided by the following questions (Fairclough 1992: ch. 3, 2003; Keller et al. 2001: 148, 155; Wodak/Reisigl 2001: 385): – How are the identities of ‘self’ and ‘other’ named and referred to linguistically? – What kind of characteristics, traits, qualities and features are attributed to ‘self’ and ‘other’? How does this position them to each other? – How does the conceptualization of ‘self’, ‘other’, and ‘threat’ relate to history and/or to other discourses? – What is stressed and reiterated? What is silently implied or concealed? – What kind of argumentation scheme is used by President Bush and President Obama when referring to the ‘threat’ posed to America’s national security? In what way is this based on the framing of ‘self’ and ‘other’? – In how far does this make relevant political action look reasonable, necessary and justified?

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In carving out these features and thus the interplay of identity and threat construction, the analysis exposes the logic that informed the presidents’ operations to satisfy security interests. It thus provides plausible answers to the questions of how the violation of national and international rules became possible and in how far Bush constituted the establishment of Guantanamo and the application of ‘harsh interrogation techniques’ as a justified means of providing security to the American people. In addition, the analysis demonstrates how Obama, in contrast, argued for Guantanamo’s closure and the termination of the harsh interrogations. Through the juxtaposition of Bush’s and Obama’s conceptualization of ‘self’, ‘other’ and ‘threat’, it becomes clear in how far Obama altered the security narrative and thus enabled a transformation of political action to take place. Following the inspection of the presidents’ framing of ‘self’, ‘other’, and ‘threat’, the analysis moves on to develop an understanding of how these representations tied in with the presidents’ narratives on the rule of law (see sections 6.5 and 7.5). It sets out how President Bush tried to redefine established laws in order to raise the limit for detention and interrogation, and it illustrates how President Obama demanded a return to the rule of law. All these features shaped the scope of what was constructed as appropriate political action. Consequently, the discussion also outlines which political actions were indeed taken. In surveying this matter, the following questions are addressed: – What kind of detention and interrogation policies were implemented or, respectively, terminated by President Bush and President Obama? – How do these actions and policies relate to their framings as put forth in their security discourses? In this sense, this book takes a ‘practical turn’ in line with the ‘linguistic turn’ (Neumann 2002). Whereas many studies fall short of examining “the operationalization of discursive categories in the activities of governments” (Milliken 2001: 150), the empirical part of this book seeks to contribute to this examination. In so doing, it demonstrates whether and, if so, how discursively created latitude was used to enact concrete political action. As outlined earlier, however, the audience takes on a vital role in securitizations. Therefore, in a further step, the study focuses on the audiences’ stances and investigates in how far they supported the presidents’ political courses (see sections 6.6 and 7.6). As mentioned above, three to four groups of audiences are looked at, including the public and the media, Congress, the operating apparatus and, in the section on George W. Bush, the Supreme Court. In relation to the questions set out above, the guiding questions for this part of the analysis are: – How do the audiences react to the presidents’ framings of ‘self’, ‘other’, and ‘threat’? Are these framings accepted and reproduced, or are they contested?

5.4 In Which Context Does it Take Place?

– – –

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How do audiences react to the redefinition of laws or, respectively, the demand for a return to the rule of law? How is the topic of torture debated? Do the audiences participate actively in security discourse, or are they passive? Do they remain silent on the subject?

This analysis illustrates in how far the audiences gave way to the political courses of the presidents. In addition, it sheds light on the question of how a particular mode of reasoning as presented in security discourse becomes dominant – or fails to do so. Since the analysis of the audiences will cover larger time spans than other sections of the analysis and includes law and verdicts passed with hindsight, it is placed at the end of the respective empirical chapters.

5.4 In Which Context Does it Take Place? Since text is never isolated but embedded in contexts which enable and constrain it, the context needs to be considered. Although this book does not investigate contextual features in great detail, they do form part of the analysis in various ways. This begins on a micro level by examining wordings and arguments and their immediate “text-internal co[n]text” (Wodak/Reisigl 2001: 385), that is, their surrounding field of repetitions, similar utterances, intensifying attributes, implications and so forth. Moreover, the intertextual relationships of statements are also considered. These aspects of historicity and intertextuality are particularly relevant to the American founding myth and the Second World War; both presidents referred to these in their narratives. Last but not least, the speeches are viewed in the political context as effective at the time of their presentation. In practice, in the case of President George W. Bush, this was the (immediate) aftermath of 9/11, a period characterized by shock and fear. The predominant meta-narrative of the ‘War on Terror’ was constructed in the weeks and months after these attacks, and it clearly reached into Obama’s term. Although at the beginning of Obama’s first presidency, the financial and real estate crisis in the United States was the stronger topic in public, the discourse of the ‘War on Terror’ continued, and supposedly hampered Obama’s ability to close Guantanamo. While there are obviously different levels of context, the analysis is not divided into these levels. Rather, this outline is simply meant to provide an overview of what is considered. In general, focusing on the context is important since it reduces ambiguity by limiting the spectrum of possible readings of a text. Consequently, it increases the probability that meanings and interpretations correspond and lends plausibility to the inferences that are drawn from the analysis (Fairclough/Wodak 1997: 279; Wodak/Reisigl 2001: 385).

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5.5 Data Selection With regard to the analysis of the securitizing actors George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the corpus of texts consists of public speeches and official statements delivered by them within a year-long period of their presidencies. In Bush’s case the time span begins on the day of the terror attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001. This point was chosen because it constitutes the fierce ignition of the ‘War on Terror’-narrative in the course of which a detention center for ‘enemy combatants’ was established at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay. The time span from September 11, 2001 to September 11, 2002 therefore impressively shows both how President Bush constructed the ‘other’, and how Guantanamo and the inhuman treatment of the captives held there was conceptualized as justified and necessary to ensure the security of the American people. In the case of President Obama, the time span of investigation begins shortly before his first inauguration and hence covers the whole of 2009. The dispute about the need for and justification of the detention center at Guantanamo Bay was an important topic during his presidential election campaign and remained fairly strong during his first year of his presidency. The text selection was carried out in terms of relevancy and to ensure dispersion of the texts. Thus, the corpus consists mainly of speeches that were covered by the mass media, including inaugural addresses, addresses to the nation, state of the union speeches, radio addresses, interviews, press conferences, keynote speeches during travels abroad, and other official statements and announcements that were made, for example, at societal events. In order to extract the final sample, a few hundred texts were scanned.74 In general, data mining was undertaken in the rubrics of foreign affairs, security policy, and defense policy. However, since there is no archive that specifically provides Guantanamo-related texts, the research was also undertaken with the help of key words such as ‘Guantanamo’, ‘Cuba’, ‘terror’, ‘torture’, ‘detention’, ‘interrogation’, ‘combatant’ and ‘waterboarding’. The transcripts of speeches were used for the analysis, most of which were published on the official websites http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov and https:// www.whitehouse.gov. Other main sources were http://www.presidentialrhetoric. com/speeches/bushpresidency.html as well as http://www.obamaspeeches.com, and http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu. Although the analysis of the presidents’ narratives is based on speeches and statements that they gave within one year, the view provided of the enactment of policies and especially of audience reaction is broader. There are two main reasons for this. First, the presidents’ discourses were examined in great depth in order to

74 The exact number of texts that were analyzed is unclear, because during keyword searches single texts can show up several times. Therefore, some may have been counted more than once.

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closely reconstruct the kind of threat scenario and logic the presidents were trying to establish; this, however, could not be done for the other empirical parts. Thus, in contrast to the analysis of the presidents’ speeches, which draws almost solely on primary sources, the material used in the other parts includes secondary sources that focus on larger time spans. Second, reactions by the audiences, especially in terms of law-making and court verdicts were often delayed. In order to consider them, the period of investigation had to be expanded. In sum, for the investigation of Guantanamo-related policies and the role played by the audiences, the analysis is based on scientific literature that addresses public opinion on the matter, legislative processes in Congress, disputes within the apparatus about the right course, and the conduct of the courts. In addition, statements and reports in the media are used from TV channels like ABC, NBC, CNN and Fox News and from newspaper and journal articles from the Washington Post, The New York Times, Newsweek, The New Yorker, The Atlantic and others. Opinion polls conducted by Gallup or the media have also been included. It is obvious that the role played by the audiences will need further and more detailed investigation, but this goes beyond the reach of this study. With regard to the presidents’ construction of identity and threat, however, this book affirms that the text corpus under consideration is representative of the time span that is used for the analysis. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, discourses are always under construction, and are embedded in a web of discursive relationships with no clear beginning or end. Thus, the material analyzed embodies a part of a larger whole. It is evident that discourses on security needs, terrorist threats, conceptions of ‘self’ and ‘other’, human rights and related topics have a longer history in the United States and are more intertwined with current discourses than will be covered in this book. It would always be possible to take a step backwards or in a different direction. Furthermore, even within the boundaries drawn for data selection in this study, there will always be texts that have been missed or left out. Nonetheless, according to scientific standards, research can be considered complete if new texts provide no further information. The sheer number of findings and the countless reiterations of similar identity and threat formations suggest that the core lines of argumentation have been captured. In fact, even more reiterations of the same kind exist than are listed in the empirical section, since texts are only provided with one reference even if particular wordings and phrases were repeated many times in the same text. Therefore, the sources drawn upon are deemed to show the logic on which George W. Bush, Barack Obama and their administrations acted. Consequently, this substantial material should be considered adequate for the provision of scientifically valid, reliable inferences (Holsti 1969: 142f; Milliken 1999: 234f, 2001: 144; Jørgensen/ Phillips 2002: 172, 207; Blatter et al. 2007: 36; Dunn 2008: 92; Matt 2008: 585f). Nevertheless, as discussed above, by applying an interpretative approach, the validity of scientific findings is not definite since other interpretations might be possible. After all, analyzing discourse means interpreting it on the basis of knowledge that is

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rooted in discourse itself. There can therefore be no claim to truth. In an attempt to warrant validity, however, this study provides traceability in the usage of sources and interpretations; it accords with the premises of the chosen discourse-theoretical approach, and it develops plausible, logically coherent answers; this raises the hope that they will also be convincing to others.

5.6 Limits of Study In view of the complex construction of reality, there are limits to this study that need mentioning. First of all, having outlined the theoretical principles of ‘radical’ constructivism in previous chapters, the question arises where to start. A world of mutual constitution provides no clear starting point, neither do discourses. In fact, to begin at one point and to look for what follows from it might appear as if the starting point were taken as given, and as if reasoning were linear and close to traditional causality (Hurd 2008: 306). This is the more so as requirements of operationalization meant that the complexity of the approach had to be reduced. As a consequence, it can only shed light on one of many intertwined parts of the construction of reality. This makes it important to emphasize once again that the world is mutually constituted by structure and agent even if the study of the presidents’ speeches might seem to give prevalence to the agentic side. The implemented policies have retroactive effects just as the (re-)actions of the audiences. In terms of limits, it has already been acknowledged that the study falls short of an in-depth analysis of the diverse audiences that could be considered as relevant with their reproduction or rejection of the presidents’ discursive constructions. The focus instead has been placed on developing a profound exploration of how President Bush and President Obama spoke security and thereby enabled and constrained particular actions. Moreover, it is assumed that the effects of the presidents’ discourses on policy-making are far-reaching and are far more complex than can be analyzed in this book. In the case of President Bush, this was apparent, for example, in the restraints placed on the liberties of U.S. citizens and immigrants in the course of the U.S. Patriot Act; in the case of President Obama, it became noticeable in the redrawing of foreign policies towards Muslim countries. Similarly, by looking at U.S. foreign policy in terms of detention and interrogation, Guantanamo is just one of several U.S. confinement facilities that could be of interest. There are, however, good reasons to focus on Guantanamo. First, soon after its establishment Guantanamo became an object of contestation and led to international reactions in terms of discussions, protests, and, as the argument goes, terrorist recruitment; second, because of this and the fact that Guantanamo was visible and present to the public, it was more frequently referred to in security discourse than other remote detention centers, not to mention those that were kept secret. Third, in terms of detention and interrogation techniques, Guantanamo became a model that was copied by other

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centers such as the one in Abu Ghraib; and fourth, as is encountered at the time of writing, the detention center at Guantanamo has become a lasting issue of U.S. foreign policy. In contrast, although the level of outrage over Abu Ghraib was tremendous in 2004, this scandal now belongs to the past; Guantanamo is still operating. Last but not least, this study does not aim to discover the true inner motives behind the presidents’ conduct nor does it elucidate whether the presidents always believed in what they purported.75 The focus is simply on what they said and in how far this seems to have had an effect.

75 For a disquisition on why Bush might have framed the circumstances in the way he did, see for example Chernus (2006).

Part III Empiricism

6 Bush’s Security Discourse and Policies This part of the book sets out to investigate how the establishment of the detention center at Guantanamo Bay and the application of torture became possible. To this end, the following provides an analysis of George W. Bush’s security narrative as put forth in his speeches and statements between September 11, 2001 and September 11, 2002. It focuses on how the president constructed the threat scenario faced by the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 under the heading of war. The ‘War on Terror’ started out with words, that is, by being labeled as such. Much of the stage that enabled subsequent actions to be taken was set by the definition of the 9/11 attacks as ‘acts of war’ – which was a deliberate discursive construction (Silberstein 2002; Jackson 2005: ch. 2; Croft 2006; Krebs/Lobasz 2007; Holland 2009, 2013; Jackson/ McDonald 2009: 18). However, the label ‘War on Terror’ would not have been effective without the security discourse that carried it. Therefore, in a first step, this section analyzes how Bush constructed identities of ‘self’ (see section 6.1) and ‘other’ (see section 6.2). It demonstrates how Bush reproduced the image of American exceptionalism and how he presented it in terms of an absolute opposition to the enemy. Subsequently, the analysis focuses on Bush’s conceptualization of the ‘threat’ emanating from the ‘other’ (see section 6.3). The findings of sections 6.1 to 6.3 are then summarized in section 6.4. In a second step, this chapter analyzes the forms of political action that took place. As the framings of ‘self’, ‘other’, and ‘threat’ were set out previously, section 6.5 continues by focusing on the administration’s actions and enactments and examines in how far they were made possible by the logic communicated through Bush’s security narrative. The aim is to show how this narrative made particular actions appear reasonable, if not imperative, for security. Since the Copenhagen School stresses that successful securitization involves a ‘relevant’ audience accepting the framing of an issue in terms of security, section 6.6 moves on to investigate the audiences’ role in this case. This analysis encompasses the public and the media, Congress, and the operating apparatus, that is, the government, military, and secret services. Although it should be clear that the apparatus itself is the main securitizer, in terms of mutual constitution, it also forms part of the audience. Moreover, the media seem to have actively contributed towards securitization rather than merely reproducing Bush’s security discourse. At the same time, Congress refrained from controlling the president or at least remained silent on vital issues. Finally, the Supreme Court’s stance is also taken into account, since Bush’s detention and interrogation policies led to lawsuits concerned with questions of fundamental jurisdiction. As mentioned above, the analysis of the audience is more of an overview than an in-depth analysis, but it also covers a larger time span than other sections due to the use of secondary sources.

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6.1 Constructing the Self The following sections examine how George W. Bush constructed American identity through his security narrative. This undertaking does not imply that only one American identity exists; rather, that the dominant conception of national character is (re-)produced by and displayed within the president’s speeches. Therefore, studying them should demonstrate how Bush constructed the ‘self’ as thoroughly exceptional and America’s cause as just. As section 6.2 shows, Bush contrasted the exceptionalism of the ‘self’ against a ruthless, evil ‘other’. The analysis of the construction of ‘self’ is thus the first step in examining Bush’s moral absolutism; this was a constitutive part of his securitization discourse.

6.1.1 America, the Innocent After the 9/11 attacks, President Bush conceptualized the United States not only as a victim that had experienced “a national tragedy” (Bush 2001/09/11a), but as an ‘innocent’ victim. Numerous instances emphasize this point. In remarks he made on September 16, 2001, for example, Bush spoke of barbaric enemies that “would fly airplanes into buildings full of innocent people,” and that he, the president, was “concerned about the lives of innocent Americans” (Bush 2001/09/16). On other occasions Bush referred to “acts of violence against innocents” (Bush 2001/09/17b, cf. 2001/10/25), the “deliberate murder of the innocent” (Bush 2001/11/10b, cf. 2001/ 11/10a, 2002/03/11, 2002/03/15) and “crimes against innocent people” (Bush 2001/ 09/19a, cf. 2001/11/08); he talked about “killers of innocents” (Bush 2001/10/07, cf. 2001/10/06, 2001/10/11a, 2001/11/06, 2002/03/15) and people who “destroy innocent folks” (Bush 2001/10/08); he spoke about an enemy “targeting innocent civilians for murder” (Bush 2002/06/01) and an enemy that had “declared war on innocent people” (Bush 2001/09/26b, cf. 2002/02/13). As a consequence, the president underlined the duty to protect “the innocent against violence” (Bush 2001/11/29). Although ‘innocence’ already has strong positive connotations, Bush strengthened this aspect by ascribing it to a certain group of people. Here, “the innocent Americans” were: innocent moms and dads, the people who yearn for freedom and normalcy in their life. (Bush 2002/01/25)76

76 For this and all subsequent citations in this empirical part of the book, the following applies: Bold type was not in the original text but added by me for demonstrative purposes; the same is true of paragraphs which have been added to point to rhetorical devices such as parallelisms; bracket terms which indicated ‘applause’ or ‘laughter’ are omitted; forms with and without apostrophes – such as ‘we’re’ and ‘we are’ – are used interchangeably. Moreover, the documents are referenced according to the day when the speech was held, whereas manuscripts often bear the date of their publication on

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The use of ‘moms’ and ‘dads’ was certainly meant to emotionalize the matter. After all, moms and dads care for the little ones, and babies constitute the ultimate embodiment of innocence. The use of terms such as ‘innocent Americans’ helped to reaffirm an unsettled ‘self’, which, in the aftermath of 9/11, was tormented by the question as to why these atrocities had been committed. Reiterating America’s innocence did more, however, than stabilize an insecure ‘self’; it absolved the ‘self’ of guilt and avoided critical engagement. It became no longer necessary for the American people to ask ‘why do they hate us’ or ‘what have we done to deserve this’, as it provided the answer. It reassured the ‘self’ by affirming that ‘we are innocent; the atrocities were unprovoked; the attackers acted out of pure evil and because they hate our freedom’ (see section 6.1.4). More precisely, claiming that “the victims of September 11th were innocent” (Bush 2001/10/17b) circumvented the need to question whether the people in the World Trade Center had actually been attacked vicariously as agents of an oppressive economic system that fueled hate in the world. In the same way, it remained silent about the fact that the workers at the Pentagon represented the dominant military might of the United States. Rather, general terms such as ‘innocent Americans’ or ‘the innocent’ helped to generalize the matter and constituted the U.S. as innocent. At the same time, it posited the American people as a whole as victims, and attributed the atrocities solely to the evil of the terrorists. As this was stated as fact, there was no need for the administration in Washington to elaborate on this point, and much less to accept any form of responsibility (Jackson 2005: 83–85). Instead, the impression of victimhood was strengthened by statements such as “we did not seek this conflict” (Bush 2001/09/29) or, in reference to the ‘War on Terror’, “we did not ask for this mission” (Bush 2001/10/07, cf. 2001/11/10b). This becomes even more clear through the use of the passive in statements such as “war has been waged against us” (Bush 2001/09/14). Bush argued that the United States had been attacked for its goodness, for what made it exceptional. Consequently, it was clear that the ‘other’ was an evil aggressor targeting an innocent ‘self’. After all, the ‘other’ was driven by its lust to kill (see section 6.2.1). Bush argued that the terrorists “murder innocent people for the sake of murder” (Bush 2002/02/16) and in doing so, the enemy “prey[ed] on innocent” and “unsuspecting people” (Bush 2001/09/12c, cf. 2001/10/26). Statements like these manifested the enemy’s dastardly nature and at the same time concealed the inability of America’s intelligence apparatus to prevent the 9/11 attacks. In general, the emphasis on American innocence combined with the notion of “great suffering and sorrow” (Bush 2001/10/11b) aggravated the crimes of 9/ 11 and made them even more condemnable. It maximized the differences between the victims, who were represented as inculpable and ingenuous, and the perpetrators,

the internet. And finally, the quotes used in this study are taken, as noticed above, from speeches and interviews and this explains why they contain non-standard structures and spellings.

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who were portrayed as perfidious individuals with base motives who had committed an “unimaginable horror” (Bush 2001/11/08). Moreover, victimhood also implied the right to choose an answer to these attacks. Therefore, Bush’s framing not only relieved America of the burdening question of what had caused the atrocities, but also of any moral responsibility for the use of force in reaction to them (Jackson 2005). Moreover, defining the attacks as “acts of war” (Bush 2001/09/12c, cf. 2001/09/15, 2001/09/17a, 2001/09/19b, 2001/09/20, 2001/09/25) widened the latitude for severe military retaliation. Bush’s framing reproduced the strong sense of innocence that has traditionally represented an inherent aspect of the American conception of ‘self’. The myth of the ‘innocent nation’ is one of the most powerful among a range of myths that have defined American life and constituted the American self-image throughout the country’s history. The ‘innocent nation’ thereby builds on other foundational myths such as ‘nature’s nation’ – according to which America is in a natural state of being, unaffected by history’s burden and thus spotless. Furthermore, it makes reference to America as the ‘chosen nation’, chosen by God as a blessing to the world (Hughes 2003: 6–8; cf. Tuveson 1968; Stephanson 1995: xii; Morone 2003; Webb 2004; Esch 2010). Clearly, the belief in purity and the representing of a ‘Christian nation’ chosen by God easily corresponds with the idea of innocence, and this position was particularly strengthened during the twentieth century by the country’s experience of World War II. America’s encounter with Nazism was viewed as a battle against evil, this enabled the American ‘self’ to be conceptualized as the very opposite of it: the ‘self’ was good, righteous – and innocent. ‘Innocence’ is thereby one of the many ideographs used by Bush that furthered binary oppositions. When Bush spoke of the innocent ‘self’, it already signified that the ‘other’ was guilty, even if this remained unsaid. Moreover, since Bush spoke in absolute terms, the ‘other’s’ guilt was absolute. Such representations demonstrate that the brighter the constructed image of the ‘self’, the darker that of the ‘other’, and vice versa. The following sections highlight further features of this dichotomy.

6.1.2 America, the Great Nation In his speeches after 9/11, President George W. Bush made great effort to emphasize the goodness of the American people. Therefore, he frequently used a grammar consisting of a binary structure to more strongly contrast the ‘self’ (that was good and caused good) with the ‘other’ (that was evil and caused suffering and death): Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we responded with the best of America – with the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring for strangers and neighbors who came to give blood and help in any way they could. (Bush 2001/09/11b)

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Great tragedy has come to us, and we are meeting it with the best that is in our country, with courage and concern for others. Because this is America. This is who we are. (Bush 2001/09/15) We are fighting evil with good. (Bush 2001/10/25) This good nation understands that in order to fight evil, you do so with acts of kindness and goodness. (Bush 2002/01/25)

These statements portrayed the reaction of the American people as noble, even when the country was facing malice. Bush reported that America was “renewing and reclaiming” its strong values through the tragedy (Bush 2001/11/08). In times of tragedy and crisis, he argued, the country looked into the mirror and saw its better ‘self’ (Bush 2002/01/29). Overall, Bush claimed exceptionalism for his ‘great nation’. Courage and concern for others were said to characterize American identity, and this was proof of greatness. In gathering positive attributes, Bush referred to ordinary people who were “working their hearts out” (Bush 2001/09/12b) and to rescuers who had worked “past exhaustion” (Bush 2001/09/14, cf. 2001/09/15, 2001/09/20, 2001/10/15) in order to serve others. He defined the American people as “generous” (Bush 2001/09/14, cf. 2001/10/06, 2001/10/07, 2001/10/13, 2001/10/15, 2001/10/17a, 2001/10/29, 2001/11/21; 2002/ 01/25, 2002/01/29), and “kind”, as caring for those in need (Bush 2001/09/14, cf. 2001/09/12b, 2001/10/17b, 2001/10/23, 2001/11/08, 2002/01/25, 2002/01/29, 2002/ 02/16, 2002/03/15); they were said to have shown “love and their willingness to help” (Bush 2001/09/12b), “sympathy” (Bush 2001/09/14, cf. 2001/09/20) and “compassion” for one another (Bush 2001/09/16, cf. 2001/09/26a, 2001/09/27, 2001/10/04, 2001/10/08, 2001/10/09, 2001/10/17a, 2001/10/17b, 2001/10/23, 2001/10/25, 2001/11/08, 2002/01/25, 2002/01/29, 2002/02/16, 2002/09/11), as well as a profound “love for the country” (Bush 2001/09/14, cf. 2001/09/19b, 2001/09/26a, 2001/10/04, 2001/10/15, 2001/10/17a, 2001/12/04) and the “decency of a loving and giving people” (Bush 2001/09/20, cf. 2001/09/12b, 2001/09/16, 2001/09/26a, 2001/10/17b, 2001/10/25, 2001/11/08, 2002/01/25, 2002/01/29, 2002/ 02/16). Bush condensed all of these qualities of American identity by telling emotional stories of selfless deeds. A strong example of this was the speech he gave for the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance on September 14, 2001 in the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C.: In this trial, we have been reminded, and the world has seen, that our fellow Americans are generous and kind, resourceful and brave. We see our national character in rescuers working past exhaustion; in long lines of blood donors; in thousands of citizens who have asked to work and serve in any way possible. And we have seen our national character in eloquent acts of sacrifice. Inside the World Trade Center, one man who could have saved himself stayed until the end at the side of his quadriplegic friend. A beloved priest died giving the last rites to a firefighter. Two office workers, finding a disabled stranger, carried her down sixty-eight floors to safety [. . .]. In these acts, and in many others, Americans showed a deep commitment to one another, and an abiding love for our country. (Bush 2001/09/14)

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These personal stories were taken as symbolic of American greatness. The enumeration of efforts undertaken to save or assist victims of the 9/11 attacks illustrated the irreconcilable distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. As Bush emphasized, “more than anything else, this separates us from the enemy we fight,” and he continued, “we value every life, our enemies value none – not even the innocent, not even their own” (Bush 2002/09/11, cf. 2001/10/29, 2001/11/06, 2001/11/08). While “the true nature of these terrorists” was clear from “the nature of their attacks” (Bush 2001/11/06) – “the true nature of America” (Bush 2001/10/11b) was illustrated by stories like the one above, stories that highlighted love and kindness, selflessness, and willingness to make sacrifices. These characteristics, it was said, meant America was a “fabulous country” (Bush 2001/09/16, cf. 2001/09/27, 2001/10/17a, 2001/10/24, 2001/12/04) based on “fabulous values” (Bush 2001/09/27); “a compassionate nation” (Bush 2001/10/04, 2001/10/09, 2001/10/17a, 2001/10/23), “a tolerant nation” (Bush 2001/ 10/17a), “a wonderful nation” (Bush 2001/11/08), “a great nation” (Bush 2001/09/ 11b, 2001/09/12b, 2001/09/16, 2001/09/19a, 2001/09/19b, 2001/09/25, 2001/09/27, 2001/10/04, 2001/10/15, 2001/10/17a, 2001/10/17b, 2001/10/24, 2001/11/08, 2001/11/ 21, 2002/02/13, 2002/03/15), and therefore, overall, the “greatest nation on the face of the Earth” (Bush 2001/10/17a, cf. 2001/10/17b, 2002/01/14, 2002/01/25, 2002/02/16). “The true strength of our country,” Bush reasoned, “is much greater than our military. The true strength of America are the hearts and souls of loving American citizens” (Bush 2002/03/15, cf. 2002/02/16). The way in which the American people manifested the “exceptional character of the nation” led Bush – although it was him who evoked and constituted these qualities discursively – to affirm that he had “never felt more certain about America’s goodness” (Bush 2001/10/15). The president stressed this by deploying adverbs and adjectives expressing moral superlative. While the nation was ‘fabulous’, ‘wonderful’ and ‘great’, Bush emphasized that he was not even able to describe “how fantastically” he felt “about the people of this country” (Bush 2002/02/16) as they had responded so “magnificently” (Bush 2001/11/ 08, 2002/01/29) to the tragedy. In this context, the American people was not only constructed as warm-hearted, giving and courageous, but as the soil for heroism (Bush 2001/09/16, 2001/10/04, 2001/10/15, 2001/10/17a, 2002/01/29, 2002/03/11). In his Address to the Nation on November 8, 2001, Bush stated: We have gained new heroes: Those who ran into burning buildings to save others, our police and our firefighters. Those who battled their own fears to keep children calm and safe – America’s teachers. Those who voluntarily placed themselves in harm’s way to defend our freedom – the men and women of the Armed Forces. (Bush 2001/11/08)

Again, in this framing, Americans were people who saved the lives that terrorists wanted to destroy, and who defended the freedom terrorists hated. These examples helped to illustrate the exceptional character of the American people. It is not surprising that Bush referred to the police and the firefighters in his statement, since they are first on duty in cases of (national) emergency; at the same time, the

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notion of the ‘armed forces’ and, as quoted below, the ‘men and women in uniform’ underlined the state of war. Attributing heroic characteristics to these groups was rather easy77; however, the description of teachers, as well as, in other statements, medics, and civilian government employees as heroes, demonstrates Bush’s attempt to broaden the attribution of heroism to greater sections of the population. Moreover, as was the case with ‘innocence’, there were instances where Bush used a grammar that implied generalization: The American people have responded magnificently, with courage and compassion, strength and resolve. As I have met the heroes, hugged the families, and looked into the tired faces of rescuers, I have stood in awe of the American people. (Bush 2002/01/29)

In this statement, the brave people whose actions might indeed have been heroic stood pars pro toto for all Americans. Claiming heroism was thereby a powerful strategy. First, it gave meaning to what had happened, comforted the bereaved and honored the victims who had perished; second, it created unity among the people, and strengthened national identity while distancing the ‘self’ from the cowardly ‘other’ (Jackson 2005: 80f). Bush substantiated the claim of American heroism and thus the ‘truth’ of his statements by referring to the way in which he assumed the forefathers would interpret the actions of the American people. Again, their verdict was presented as definite: Our forefathers would be proud, really proud of what they see in America today. They would be proud of the selfless duty of the fire fighters and police officers [. . .] and the men and women who wear the uniform of the United States of America. Our forefathers would salute the modern day sacrifice of the brave passengers on Flight 93 [. . .]. Our forefathers would know and recognize the spirit of unity and patriotism everywhere in our country, and they would say, well done, America. (Bush 2001/10/17a)

There could hardly be a witness imbued with more historical significance than the forefathers since they are the great reference in America’s founding myth. As will be shown below, Bush made regular reference to them and did so in various ways as a useful means of constructing the ‘self’. All in all, Bush nurtured America’s selfunderstanding of representing a special nation, while constructing American goodness as irrevocable.

77 The administration’s decision to award the Purple Heart to those “members of the armed forces that were killed or injured in the September 11th attack on the Pentagon and on the World Trade Center towers” (Rumsfeld 2001/09/27) added to the sense of their heroism. This also further strengthened the view of 9/11 as an act of war.

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6.1.3 America, the United and Resolved The diversity of the United States has led the call for unity to become part of the country’s history. Yet, Bush addressed the issue of unity in a particular manner after 9/11, and emphasized America’s unity in diversity in various ways: This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. (Bush 2001/09/11b) People of all faiths, all religions, all areas of our country are united in the common effort to stamp out evil where we find it. It is the right thing to do. (Bush 2001/10/10) For all of us, an American is an American, no matter where we live, no matter what our race, no matter how we pray. The people of New York and Washington are our neighbors and when terrorists attack them, they attack us all. And the terrorists are hearing from us all. (Bush 2001/10/17a) Beyond all differences of race or creed, we are one country, mourning together and facing danger together. (Bush 2002/01/29)

Despite inherent diversity in terms of race, religion and social position, the American people were constructed as united in their grievance and victimhood as well as in their resolve to respond to threats. In his remarks on September 14, 2001, Bush underlined this position with historicity: Today, we feel what Franklin Roosevelt called the warm courage of national unity. This is a unity for every faith, and every background. (Bush 2001/09/14)

Although the claim of unity might have served to prevent social unrest against American Muslims who came under general suspicion in the aftermath of 9/11, this rhetoric also had a greater impact. If the ‘we’ was so inclusive as to encompass ‘all Americans’ of ‘all faiths’ and ‘all areas of the country’, opposing the administration’s policy would have meant isolating oneself from the community. Moreover, as the reference to the former U.S. President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, indicated, these were times of war. Accordingly, mentioning Roosevelt defined the political situation and underscored the necessity for unity. Hence, this language worked to commit the American people to supporting Bush’s political course; anyone who did not do so would corrupt unity and endanger the nation’s security by acting unpatriotically in critical times. In this respect, framing the enemy in terms of ‘evil’ had an effect. This representation was a powerful ideograph, as most people agree that it is right to ‘stamp out evil’ – at least as long as ‘evil’ remains undefined and the means with which it should be combated remains unstated. The people’s approval was therefore gained through speaking in broad terms. In its unity America was constituted as strong. Despite the nation’s suffering, Bush emphasized its resolve: America is united. We are united. We are united in bringing justice to those folks who did the evil deed on September 11th. We’re not only united, we’re determined. We’re determined to

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find those terrorists who tried to affect our way of life. We’re determined to find them, and to bring them to justice. And we will. But our determination goes beyond the immediate and the short-term. This is a nation that’s determined to defend freedom from any terrorist, anyplace in the world. This is a determined nation, and we’re a strong nation. (Bush 2001/09/27)

While this passage is extraordinarily dense, in general, Bush repeated many statements and phrases over and over again, often verbatim, so as to instill the message in his audience. This is, as this analysis shows, true within texts and across texts. In the days and weeks after 9/11, the president consistently argued that the United States was impregnable: “It is a clear statement to anybody who would want to harm us that instead of weakening America, they have strengthened America” (Bush 2001/10/29). Bush summoned the strength of the United States by using metaphors of power and might. He proclaimed that the terrorists had “awoken a mighty nation” (Bush 2001/09/25), or even more strongly, “roused a mighty giant” (Bush 2001/09/16, cf. 2001/10/08) and that the nation was “fierce when stirred to anger” (Bush 2001/09/14). Although the acts of terror shattered steel, “they cannot dent the steel of American resolve” (Bush 2001/09/11b). Bush accentuated that point that the “country is strong” (Bush 2001/09/11b, 2001/10/23, 2002/09/11), that this great nation “can’t be cowed by evil-doers” (Bush 2001/09/16, cf. 2001/10/17b) and that it “will never be intimidated” (Bush 2001/11/08, cf. 2001/09/27). Defining the American ‘self’ in terms of a “remarkable spirit and remarkable resolve” (Bush 2001/10/24, cf. 2001/09/27), Bush frequently used the inclusive ‘we’, which suggests a speaker is speaking on behalf of everyone; it “reduces hierarchy and distance by implying that all of ‘us’ are in the same boat” (Fairclough 2003: 76). This not only united the audience and strengthened patriotism; it provided legitimization to particular actions that opposed the ‘other’. Bush stressed the ‘we’ in rapid succession, often in a staccato fashion resembling a battle cry: We are determined. We are patient. We are steadfast. We are resolved. We will not tire and we will not fail. (Bush 2001/10/17b) We are tough, we are determined, we are relentless. We will stay until the mission is done. (Bush 2002/04/17)

Because of statements like these, Bush scored high on verbal certainty (Hart/Childers 2004). The repetitions of plain ‘we are’-sentences were sweeping in declaring as true – and possibly creating it as such – what was perceived as desirable at this time. Another strategy that constituted identity was the claim that the ‘self’ was stronger than expected: The folks who conducted to act on our country on September 11th made a big mistake. They underestimated America. They underestimated our resolve, our determination, our love for freedom [. . .]. They misunderestimated the compassion of our country. I think they misunderestimated the will and determination of the Commander-in-Chief, too. (Bush 2001/09/26a)

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While the neologism ‘misunderestimated’ was an error by the president and embodied a so-called ‘Bushism’, Bush left no doubt for the audience that the enemy had dramatically miscalculated the attitude of the United States. The content of his statement was reinforced by parallelism – a rhetorical device Bush regularly employed to underscore his intentions. With regard to the construction of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, Bush also used a more immediate dichotomy that contrasted the ‘true’ nature of the ‘self’ and the delusion of it as allegedly put forth by the ‘other’. To this end, Bush initially set out the assumptions the terrorists were viewed as having about Americans in order to demonstrate and ridicule their falsity: I believe the evildoers miscalculated when they struck America. They thought we would shy away. They thought their threats could hold this nation hostage. They must have felt like they could diminish our soul. But quite the opposite has taken place. They’ve strengthened the spirit of America [. . .]. They have awoken a mighty nation that understands that freedom is under assault; a mighty nation that will not rest until those who think they can take freedom away from any citizen in the world are brought to justice. (Bush 2001/09/25) Our enemies [. . .] believe that free societies are weak societies. But we’re going to prove them wrong. Just as we were 60 years ago, in a time of war, this nation will be patient, we’ll be determined, and we will be relentless in the pursuit of freedom. (Bush 2001/12/07) They must have been watching too much TV [. . .]. They were watching some of those shows, that one can get the wrong impression about how materialistic we might be, how selfish we might be as a people. But that’s not the way we are. (Bush 2002/01/25, cf. 2002/01/14) Our enemies believed America was weak and materialistic, that we would splinter in fear and selfishness. They were as wrong as they are evil. The American people have responded magnificently, with courage and compassion, strength and resolve. (Bush 2002/01/29) They thought we were so materialistic that we didn’t understand sacrifice and honor and duty. They must have been watching some lousy movies. They didn’t know that this great nation would rise up in unison to send a clear message that we will do whatever it takes to defend our freedoms [. . .]. (Bush 2002/02/16) The terrorists [. . .] must have thought we were soft. They must have thought we were so materialistic that we wouldn’t fight for values that we love. They must have thought that we were so self-absorbed, that the word sacrifice had left the American vocabulary. And, my, were they wrong. (Bush 2002/03/15)

In these dualisms, the ‘other’ is clearly presented as ignorant and as so senseless as to be misled by lousy TV shows. What is more important, however, is that the binary structure was a powerful means with which to construct the ‘self’, that is, how Americans ‘really’ are – and it thereby explicitly demonstrates how Bush wanted

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them to be. Again, this kind of language invoked a strong and determined ‘self’ while committing the nation to Bush’s political course. The president sought to establish an understanding among Americans that they could not shy away from making sacrifices and that they had to be willing to make them; they had to refuse to rest until the evil-doers had been brought to justice while remaining determined and relentless in the fight for freedom. In these terms, the American people had to accept that “this great nation will do what it takes to win” (Bush 2001/10/17b). The expectations that Bush placed on the American people are also clear from another kind of dichotomy. Here, Bush no longer constructed the ‘self’ in mere opposition to the terrorists; instead, he compared the United States to its allies in the ‘War on Terror’: This coalition will exist to achieve the mission, and I can assure you our mission will not change to fit any coalition’s. America will stand strong. Others will tire and weary; I understand that. But not our nation [. . .]. Others will second-guess, but not our nation. Others will become impatient, but not this great nation. We will stand firm, and stand strong until we’ve achieved our mission [. . .]. We’re marching on. We’re marching on to do what’s right. (Bush 2001/09/27)

This framing illustrates that America outweighed others in terms of strength, determination and endurance even when compared with its allies. Although Bush indirectly alluded to all kinds of possible weaknesses, he denied they existed as part of the ‘great nation’. Instead, he reproduced not only America’s image of superiority but exceptionalism. These passages also demonstrate that Bush almost always used declarative sentences. Although he was only uttering things that he hoped would occur, he did not represent them as hopes, projections or guesses; he reiterated them as facts. Yet, as if to dispel any final doubts the audience might have, Bush used a set phrase that was characteristic of his speeches: ‘make no mistake about it’. This was a means of confirming what he had constructed as truth and cautioning against misjudgment. Depending on the audience, it could be understood as both a promise to the American people and as a warning to the terrorists: Make no mistake about it: we will win. (Bush 2001/09/12c) Make no mistake about it: we are determined. (Bush 2001/09/16) Make no mistake about it, justice will be done. (Bush 2001/10/24) Make no mistake about it; this great nation will do what it takes to win. (Bush 2001/10/17b)

Finally, Bush underpinned his statements as facts by once again consulting a witness. Having already invoked the authority of the forefathers to substantiate America’s heroic conduct after 9/11, in this case he called upon an all-embracing witness: the world. The world served to attest America’s goodness and determination:

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The evildoers [. . .] have stirred a mighty nation to action, and the world is seeing what we’re made out of. The world sees our resolves and is willing to follow. The world sees our commitment to freedom, as it impressed. The world sees our compassion toward one another [. . .]. The world sees a nation at prayer [. . .]. The world is beginning to see the best of this great land. The world is beginning to understand why we all treasure America so much – our values, our freedom and the strength of the American character. No, they thought they attacked America and hurt us. We are stronger than ever, and we will prove it to the world. (Bush 2001/09/27)

Since the world can only see something that is there, these repetitions worked to confirm Bush’s framing as incontrovertible truth. As noted above, his statements were enhanced by anaphora and parallelism that enabled him to underscore the exceptional character of the American people. In general, Bush’s narrative illustrated America’s strength, and his rhetoric of certainty and confidence carried the impression of a president who was in control of the situation.

6.1.4 America, Freedom’s Defender As part of the traditional founding myth of the nation, ‘freedom’ constitutes an integral part of the American imagination and embodies the core behind the ‘city on the hill’-narrative. All U.S. presidents have employed this powerful symbol in their speeches to the American people to underpin ‘who we are’, ‘what we stand for’, and ‘what we need to fight’ in order to protect the values that emboss the American way of life (Foner 1998, 2014; Domke 2004: ch. 4; Coe 2007). Therefore, when Bush spoke of the matter he continued to use the language of his predecessors who had defined America as the country that defended freedom.78 On the evening of the attacks on September 11, 2001, President Bush began his address to the nation with the statement that “today [. . .] our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts” (Bush 2001/09/11b).79 As Bush purported in this speech, the very reason for the atrocities was America’s liberty: America was “targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom [. . .] in the world” (Bush 2001/09/11b). In Bush’s interpretation, the attack had been directed at America’s core value since “freedom itself is under attack” (Bush 2001/09/20, cf. 2001/09/12c, 2002/02/16). The president left no doubt that the terrorists were

78 In fact, President Bush drew more heavily on the term ‘freedom’ than other presidents, but in general, it is not a Bush-specific reference. Coe (2007) analyzed sixty-four State of the Union addresses over a period of more than 70 years and found similar narratives. 79 At this point in time, the atrocities were regarded as ‘terrorist acts’. The framing of them as ‘acts of war’ was a deliberate reinterpretation undertaken by the Bush administration afterwards.

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“enemies of freedom” (Bush 2001/09/20) who “hate freedom, and [. . .] freedomloving people” (Bush 2001/09/19a), and who destroyed American lives “because we embrace freedom” (Bush 2001/09/12b). As Bush put it, the enemies “target freedom” because “they can’t stand what America stands for” (Bush 2001/11/29, cf. 2001/ 09/16), and they kill “to disrupt and end a way of life” (Bush 2001/09/20). According to this framing, the terrorists chose the World Trade Center in New York as their target because it was “a symbol of America’s freedom” (Bush 2001/10/11a). In general, Bush utilized ‘freedom’ for the dichotomy of ‘us’ and ‘them’. As ‘freedom’ is the core constituting concept of the American ‘self’, Bush made it clear that ‘we’ “value freedom” while ‘they’ “hate freedom” (Bush 2001/11/29, cf. 2001/09/17a, 2001/ 09/19a, 2001/09/20). By depicting ‘freedom’ as the target and the ‘hate for freedom’ as the motive behind the attacks on 9/11, these statements worked to confirm America’s innocence (see section 6.1.1). There were no issues here in need of consideration; America was simply hated for its liberty. In fact, Bush stated this explicitly when he pointed out that “we face enemies that hate not our policies, but our existence; the tolerance of openness and creative culture that defines us” (Bush 2001/11/10b). As an identity-constructing term, ‘freedom’ was the narrative pivot in Bush’s speeches. This ideograph was used to reproduce the American ‘self’ in absolute delineation from the ‘other’ as well as to define the issue in terms of security. The United States as “the great bastion of freedom” (Bush 2001/09/17a) faced an enemy that had started a “war against freedom” (Bush 2001/09/27). This justified the ‘War on Terror’ as an obligation “to defend our freedom and our way of life” (Bush 2001/09/25, cf. 2001/09/26a, 2001/ 09/27, 2001/10/04, 2001/10/07, 2001/11/08, 2002/02/21). On this point, once again, Bush spoke unambiguously and represented the U.S. approach in the same manner: America is a nation built upon freedom, and the principles of freedom, the values of freedom. And this is a nation that will not – will not – blink from the fight. This is a nation that will stand strong for the great values that have made us unique. (Bush 2001/09/25) Ours is the cause of freedom. We’ve defeated freedom’s enemies before, and we will defeat them again. (Bush 2001/11/08)

These examples show that Bush used ‘freedom’ as a rationale to justify his course. As noted above, ‘freedom’ is a key word used to justify American foreign policy. It implies defending American values, interests, and might, and it is used to unite the people behind particular political goals. In fact, throughout American history it has functioned as a rallying cry and an argument for war (Coe 2007: 375–378; cf. Foner 1994: 436, 1998: ch. 10, 2014). What has been said about ideographs before is true here as well. It is easy for the American people to agree on the pursuit of ‘freedom’ since this term is imbued with positive connotations to which Americans are collectively committed; it readily resonates with the audience. The impact of the word lies in its characteristic portentousness and ambiguity. ‘Freedom’ can thus be adapted to any

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situation: “The speaker can fill it in with whatever particular quality (or behavior, or nation, or person) he wants to oppose, for whatever reason [and] promote virtually any policy in the name of freedom” (Chernus 2006: 166f; cf. Collins/Glover 2002: 3f; Lakoff 2006: 229). This can include confining civil liberties, waging war, and, as this book argues, the violation of rules in terms of detention and interrogation policy. In fact, although Bush regularly used the term ‘freedom’ in his speeches, he generally avoided defining what it meant.80 After all, definitions could have raised questions about discrepancies between, for example, speaking of the “dignity of every life” (Bush 2002/01/29) and the procedures at Guantanamo Bay. In general, defining such abstract terms brings with it the danger of revealing contradictions between rhetorically invoked values and the way in which they are (un-)reflected in specific forms of action (Ivie 2005: 156f). Consequently, Bush rarely chose to define ‘freedom’; when he did, he defined it in terms of democratic principles or human rights (Bush 2001/ 09/17b, 2001/09/20, 2002/01/29, 2002/02/16) which implied that the United States aimed to promote them. Addresses of this kind were used by Bush to appeal to the American people. In his speech for Human Rights Day and Bill of Rights Week on December 9, 2001, for example, Bush closed by pointing to America’s historical obligations: I call upon the people of the United States to honor the legacy of human rights passed down to us from previous generations and to resolve that such liberties will prevail in our nation and throughout the world as we move into the 21st century. (Bush 2001/12/09)

This statement distinguished Bush’s course as in accordance with the fundamental values cherished by the United States. In line with this, he described the U.S. as the last best hope and construed a condition that made American action indispensable since “the advance of human freedom – the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time – now depends on us” (Bush 2001/09/20). These words masked the president’s responsibility for waging war and framed the political environment as leaving no other choice. In claiming this role of unique responsibility, i.e., America’s “duty to defend freedom” (Bush 2002/04/17, cf. 2001/12/09), Bush used the ‘legacy of previous generations’ as a mandatory reference. This logic of duty, constructed as a historic covenant, was employed in a number of variations, one of which referred to America’s founding myth. The choice for ‘freedom’, as Bush emphasized, had been made by America “long ago, on the day of our founding” (Bush 2002/01/29) and this legacy had to be sustained. As noted above, the forefathers were already said to be proud of America’s sacrifice, unity, and patriotism; now they were to be honored by America’s defense of freedom. The argument in the following statement was similar:

80 As Coe (2007: 394) notes, Republican U.S. presidents were generally more hesitant to define the term than Democratic U.S. presidents.

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In every generation, the world has produced enemies of human freedom. They have attacked America, because we are freedom’s home and defender. And the commitment of our fathers is now the calling of our time. (Bush 2001/09/14, cf. 2001/11/21)

By identifying America as ‘freedom’s home and defender’ Bush’s declarative statement indicated an exclusive position that generated responsibilities. In this framing, the nation was indebted to the achievements of its ‘fathers’, and the perceived obligation to take action was based on them; however, the choice of what constituted appropriate action rested with the current administration. In this sense, reproducing the image of ‘freedom’s defender’ was used as a rhetorical device to unite the people behind the administration’s course. If metaphors have indeed the potential to “structure the ‘discourse’ of foreign policy in the deepest sense” (Chilton/Lakoff 1995: 37), and if they truly “influence the formation of beliefs and guides to action” (Sarbin 2003: 149), this one is powerful, as it alludes to America’s founding myth and core of selfconception. At the same time, by speaking of the ‘commitment of our fathers’, Bush referred to the Second World War and thus invoked the legend of the ‘good war’ and America’s triumphant victory. History is always categorized in some way, and the Second World War is particularly idealized in America’s collective memory. The dominant interpretations of this historic event underline America’s uniqueness. Besides this, however, references to the Second World War demonstrate the magnitude of the menace and the criticality of decisive U.S.-leadership. These factors also form part of the collective American memory. Speaking at the Pentagon Memorial, Bush reminded his audience that the construction of the Pentagon had begun on September 11, 1941: America was just then awakening to another menace: The Nazi terror in Europe. And on that very night, President Franklin Roosevelt spoke to the nation. The danger, he warned, has long ceased to be a mere possibility. The danger is here now [. . .] from an enemy of all law, all liberty, all morality, all religion. For us too, in the year 2001, an enemy has emerged that rejects every limit of law, morality, and religion. (Bush 2001/10/11a)

Once again, Bush was explaining the present in terms of the past. By alluding to the Nazi terror, he interpreted his current course in light of America’s history. In fact, with regard to the perceived duty to defend freedom, “no experience in American history appears to substantiate this claim more completely, more cinematically, and with fewer visible contradictions than World War II” (Noon 2004: 357). It is therefore unsurprising that historicity was used to conjure up this memory in many texts.81 As the example above shows, in comparing the situation surrounding the Second World War to that of the ‘War on Terror’ (Bush 2001/10/06, 2001/10/08, 2001/10/11a, 2001/11/10b, 2001/11/19b, 2001/12/07, 2002/04/17), Bush specifically referred to Franklin D. Roosevelt, the U.S. president during World War II (Bush 2001/09/14, 2001/10/11a, 2001/11/19b, 2002/01/25). By invoking President Roosevelt’s aura, Bush

81 Bush also paraphrased Roosevelt (Noon 2004: 353).

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rhetorically assumed the authority of his predecessor and his ability to cope with adversaries. Moreover, by putting 9/11 on a level with World War II, Bush made the public ready to accept an expansion of his powers (Winkler 2006: 168). In addition, by referring to the war, Bush’s historical references implied that his strategy would be victorious. Overall, it was a notion with many positive and supportive connotations. A similar historical link was provided by Pearl Harbor (Bush 2001/10/24, 2001/12/07, 2001/12/11, 2002/06/01). This analogy suggested that just as the attacks on Pearl Harbor had imposed the ‘mission of defending freedom’ on the United States, so did the attacks on 9/11 (Bostdorff 2003: 304f). Pearl Harbor thereby implied the innocence of Americans who had been attacked unexpectedly, and the imperative to strike back and enter war. The soldiers who faced this task were addressed by Bush as “the children and grandchildren of the generation that fought and won the Second World War” (Bush 2001/12/07). Bush commemorated the faith and liability of this generation – commonly evoked as the ‘greatest generation’ – and summoned young Americans to live up to their heritage. Furthermore, indirect references to World War II can be found in the form of ‘we have seen this enemy before’, ‘we have defeated enemies of freedom before’, and ‘we have seen this type of hate before’ (Bush 2001/ 09/20, 2001/11/08, 2001/11/21, 2001/12/07). In some cases these points were clearly combined with references to fascism, totalitarianism and Nazism (Bush 2001/09/20, 2001/11/06, 2001/11/21, 2001/12/07, 2002/06/01). Finally, Bush alluded to General George C. Marshall in his speeches and the accomplishments of the Marshall Plan to demonstrate that America was doing good, and that it made the world a better place (Bush 2001/12/11, 2002/04/17, 2002/06/01). Although Bush’s advisors, as well as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, cautioned him that a ‘war against terror’ could not be won in a classical sense and that he might disappoint people’s expectations by using this term – especially via the connotations of the Second World War – Bush continued to use these very analogies (Chernus 2006: 143f). In contrast, references to the Cold War, which would have implied the enemy’s containment rather than annihilation, were far less frequent in Bush’s speeches; however, this was also probably due to the fact that the Cold War lacks the romanticized brightness of American perceptions of World War II. In sum, it can be asserted that historical references were used by Bush to underscore the self-conception of America as ‘freedom’s defender’. The inherent quality of these analogies suggested that his propositions were right and that they would bring about a better future. Recourses to World War II helped Bush exemplify the gravity of the situation, the urgency to act and the magnitude of the struggle that lay ahead. Therefore, calling upon these collective memories represented a strategic means of validating his course and legitimating his foreign policies.82

82 On the rhetorics of the past and the (re-)production of collective memories, see among others, Rice (1992), Gronbeck (1998), Hasian/Frank (1999), and Parry-Giles/Parry-Giles (2000).

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6.1.5 America, the Called and the Victorious Closely interlinked with America’s self-conception of ‘freedom’s defender’ is the understanding of the U.S. as a ‘nation that has been called upon’. This notion of ‘special American providence’ (Mead 2003; Webb 2004; Esch 2010) ties in with the American founding myth of being appointed by God to spread freedom and of being a blessing to the world (see section 6.1.1). This quasi-religious understanding is a core element of American identity; it signifies America as having been chosen to play a “redeeming role on the stage of world history” (Hughes 2003: 6; cf. Stephanson 1995; Junker 2003: 171). Accordingly, in Bush’s framing, duty and destiny went hand in hand as America had been “called to defend freedom” (Bush 2001/09/20, my emphasis, cf. 2002/02/21, 2002/04/17). In his attempt to justify his ‘War on Terror’, Bush construed it as a mission that America could not avoid. By reminding the nation of its status as ‘freedom’s defender’, Bush strongly instilled a sense of mission in the American people: This is our calling. This is the calling of the United States of America, the most free nation in the world. A nation built on fundamental values that rejects hate, rejects violence, rejects murderers, rejects evil. (Bush 2001/10/10) History has called our nation into action. History has placed a great challenge before us: Will America – with our unique position and power – blink in the face of terror, or will we lead to a freer, more civilized world? There’s only one answer: This great country will lead the world to safety, security, peace and freedom. (Bush 2002/06/06)

In many ways, Bush accentuated America’s “responsibility to history” (Bush 2001/ 09/14) and that the country had now “been called to history” (Bush 2002/02/21). In this narrative, it was “the calling of the 21st century” (Bush 2001/11/29), a “great calling” (Bush 2001/12/07), and since there was “honor in history’s call” (Bush 2001/ 11/10b), the current generation that “heard history’s call” (Bush 2002/09/11) would answer it. In an even more active phrase “history has [. . .] issued its call” (Bush 2002/ 06/01) to the younger generation and therefore every man and woman in uniform had been “commissioned by history to face freedom’s enemies” (Bush 2001/12/07). Here, Bush transformed the “responsibility for waging war into one of destiny and honour” (Scraton 2002b: 229). On the first anniversary of 9/11, Bush went so far as to state that he believed there was “a reason that history has matched this nation with this time” (Bush 2002/09/11) – once again constructing ‘history’ as a willful actor that understood America’s preparedness to meet the challenge. As such, Bush used ‘history’ as a synonym for ‘God’ (Noon 2004: 356). History’s call was God calling upon America; this was conveyed in statements such as this: The attack on our nation was also attack on the ideals that make us a nation. Our deepest national conviction is that every life is precious, because every life is the gift of a Creator who intended us to live in liberty and equality [. . .]. We do know that God had placed us together

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in this moment [. . .]. And the duty we have been given – defending America and our freedom – is also a privilege we share. (Bush 2002/09/11)

Here, liberty is constructed as God’s gift to mankind.83 By declaring how God (the creator) had intended human life to be, Bush linked the godly to his administration’s course; this represented his policies as the execution of God’s will. The task then was to secure the freedom of the American people and to liberate other peoples – an argument that served as justification for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In line with this religiously imbued logic, Bush emphasized that America was going to keep its “sacred promise” in pursuing justice and in starting a fight designed to “extend the blessings of freedom” (Bush 2002/09/11). What this framing implied was the constitution of American citizens “as part of a special, sacred community” (Bostdorff 2003: 301). Besides the reference to the obligatory legacy of the (fore-)fathers and the lessons learned from World War II, godly appointment constituted an even stronger basis for America’s duty to take action. This enabled Bush to frame the issue in terms of moral absolutism; and it demonstrated his Manichean worldview. He constructed the scene as one of “us versus them, and evil versus good” with “no in between” (Bush 2002/ 02/16). Ultimately, in his biblically-informed understanding, this issue represented the irrevocable antagonism between God and the devil. In this sense, Bush’s discourse confirmed that “moral commitments and policy options derived from religious beliefs [. . .] are associated with the absolute and ultimate” (Daase 2006: 85). Whereas America was one nation “under God” (Bush 2001/10/30) and stood for virtue and truth, the enemy was totally evil. This logic portrayed the issue very clearly in terms of ‘either-or’ and black-and-white, and, needless to say, placed the United States on the side of the good. While this approach oversimplified the political environment, it was a plain way of thinking and speaking and, at the same time, forced the audience out of its indeterminacy (Hart/Childers 2004: 531f). Bush’s statement that “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush 2001/09/20, cf. 2001/10/06, 2002/02/ 16, 2002/03/15, 2002/04/17) was totalistic in its demand and compelled the American people as well as its friends and allies to unity behind the administration’s course. The wording was thereby outright religious and reminiscent of Christ’s demands on mankind as stated in Matthew 12:30. With this demand for total commitment, Bush’s framing displayed a typical characteristic of presidential war rhetoric (Campbell/ Jamieson 2008: 221). It impeded if not completely silenced openly contradictory positions on the matter since ‘either-or’ constructions leave no room for ambivalence, and times of war no room for disagreement. The appeal to the highest power and the claim of being called upon also helped legitimize political intentions. According to Bush, it was not just “a war between good 83 In an interview with Bob Woodward, Bush stated forthright that “Freedom is God’s gift to everybody in the world” (Woodward 2004: 88f).

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and evil” (Bush 2001/10/04, my emphasis, cf. 2001/09/12c, 2001/09/19a, 2002/02/16, 2002/06/01) but “our war” (Bush 2001/10/10, my emphasis, cf. 2001/09/26b, 2001/ 09/27, 2001/10/17b, 2001/10/25, 2001/11/06, 2001/11/07). The United States fought for the good, and by composing this fight as a “crusade” (Bush 2001/09/16, cf. 2002/ 02/16),84 Bush transformed political action into a mission undertaken for the sake of God. Hence, wiping out evil was a moral, God-given imperative.85 Bush pursued, as Robert Ivie (2005: 160) puts it, “a politics of coercion represented as a sacred mission” and did so “in the name of a higher order.” Since the evil-doers wanted to “rid the world of freedom” (Bush 2001/09/26a), America’s mission was to “rid the world of evil” (Bush 2001/09/14, cf. 2001/09/16). This indicated the tremendous dimension of the mission; according to Bush’s announcement, America had set out to “defend freedom from any terrorist, anyplace in the world” (Bush 2001/09/27, cf. 2001/09/12c, 2001/09/25). Consequently, the U.S. president described this in terms of a “monumental” (Bush 2001/09/12c) and “titanic” (Bush 2002/06/06) struggle. Once again, however, he displayed his confidence that the United States would succeed: “Across the world and across the years, we will fight these evil ones, and we will win” (Bush 2001/11/21). Overall, this construction implied two assumptions: First, God was on America’s side; and second, this meant that America would prevail. Whereas through analogies with the Second World War victory was suggested, now, with reference to God, it was constructed as inevitable. “Freedom and fear,” Bush pointed out, “have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them” (Bush 2001/09/20, cf. 2001/11/10b, 2002/03/30a, 2002/06/06). Therefore, while the course of the conflict was unknown, “its outcome is certain,” and the Bush administration was “confident of the victories to come” (Bush 2001/09/20, cf. 2001/09/29). In an even more declarative manner, Bush pointed out that America’s “ultimate victory is assured” (Bush 2001/11/08). This prediction, which was presented as destiny, strengthened the impression of Bush’s certitude of victory and was a useful means of increasing the American people’s willingness to support his course (Bostdorff 2003: 307; cf. Lipset 1996: 20). There were other instances where Bush also deployed biblical phrases and thus buttressed America’s exceptionalism.86 A typical theme included variations of ‘out of 84 Bush abandoned the term ‘crusade’ after having been informed that it might be offensive to Muslims as it refers to military expeditions made by European Christians in the 11th century who were attempting to reclaim the Holy Land from Mohammad’s followers (Safire 2001). 85 For more on Bush’s religiously imbued language, see Medhurst (2004) and Chernus (2006). Chernus points out how this rhetoric particularly activated Bush’s piously coined supporters who believe in this kind of world view. 86 In general, however, Bush was careful not to exclude believers of other religions through his biblical wordings. In his speech on September 14, 2001, the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance, Bush referred in closing to the scripture of Romans 8, verses 38 and 39, by stating, “As we have been assured, neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present nor things

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evil will come good’ (Bush 2001/10/04, 2001/10/17a, 2001/10/17b, 2001/10/24, 2001/ 11/08, 2001/11/21, 2001/12/04, 2002/01/25, 2002/01/29). According to the Bible, God has the power to turn evil into good or to bring good out of evil.87 In reference to scripture such as Romans 8: 28, which states “we know that all things work together for good to those who love God, to those who are the called according to His purpose,”88 Bush declared: Not only will our nation seek justice, but out of the evil will come incredible goodness. Out of the evil will become America more resolved [. . .] to defend freedom, more resolved to sacrifice [. . .], resolved to show the world our true strength, which is the compassionate, decent heart of the American people. (Bush 2002/02/16)

This was another version of the self-conception that claimed the American people were being ‘called’ and acting magnificently – and it postulated that they had the power to overcome evil. This position was also illustrated by the binary of light and darkness. In referencing scripture that refers to this dualism and to the predominance of light, Bush stated: Ours is the cause of human dignity; freedom guided by conscience and guarded by peace. This ideal of America is the hope of all mankind [. . .]. That hope still lights our way. And the light shines in the darkness. And the darkness will not overcome it. (Bush 2002/09/11)

Whereas in the Gospel of John (8: 12) Jesus is the light of the world and the hope of all mankind, in Bush’s construction America had adopted this role. In an even more active usage he stated: “We have a chance to write the story of our times, a story of courage defeating cruelty and light overcoming darkness” (Bush 2001/11/10b). It is with this religiously inspired language that Bush reproduced and reinforced the mythically based concept of God-given American exceptionalism. In this respect, it is logical to claim that “this country will define our times, not be defined by them” (Bush 2001/09/20). In acting this out, America was safely positioned on the side of the good, irrespective of the country’s course of action: “Precisely because Americans are fighting for God and good, they can do violence without losing their innate goodness” (Chernus 2006: 132).

to come, nor height nor depth, can separate us from God’s love” (Bush 2001/09/14). What Bush left out was the identification of God. Quoted entirely, verse 39 states “[. . .] from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord” (The Bible, New King James Version). This was probably omitted for reasons of inclusion, in order to avoid divisions between faiths. Similar, when meeting Muslim leaders a few days later, Bush spoke of the “universal God” (Bush 2001/09/26b). 87 See, for example, Genesis (50: 20): “But as for you, you meant evil against me; but God meant it for good” (The Bible, New King James Version, emphasis in original). 88 See the Bible, New King James Version, emphasis in original.

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6.1.6 America’s Cause is Just The construction of the ‘self’ as innocent, righteous and pure in motive – and above all, as having been ‘called’ upon by history and God – determined the assessment of American action. “We go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world” (Bush 2001/09/11b), Bush declared, and while speaking of great values such as freedom, peace, security, tolerance, and justice, he stated, “when we defend America, this is what we defend” (Bush 2001/10/17a). As this indicates, America was posed as acting in line with universal values and God’s will. This rhetoric certainly helped to nurture the assurance of moral virtue and unburdened the United States of the possibility of committing unmoral or unjustified acts. Even so, Bush repeated that “our cause is just” (Bush 2001/10/11a, 2001/10/17a, 2001/11/08, 2001/12/11, 2002/ 01/29, 2002/02/16) and that it was “right” (Bush 2001/10/10, 2001/10/17a), “necessary” (Bush 2001/12/11), and “noble” (Bush 2001/10/04, 2002/02/16, 2002/03/11). After all, he emphasized, it was “the enemy” who had “declared war on us” (Bush 2001/11/29, cf. 2001/09/16, 2001/09/17a, 2001/09/25). In framing the United States as an innocent victim, reactions naturally appeared as defensive rather than offensive, and hence just.89 Nevertheless, as if to forestall views critical of his reasoning, Bush pointed out that “ours is a nation that does not seek revenge, but we do seek justice” (Bush 2001/09/25). Hence, with regard to the terrorists, he declared that the United States would “bring them to justice” (Bush 2001/09/11b, cf. 2001/09/16, 2001/09/19a, 2001/09/20, 2001/09/25, 2001/09/26a, 2001/09/26b, 2001/09/27, 2001/10/04, 2001/10/07, 2001/10/08, 2001/10/09, 2001/ 10/10, 2001/10/17b, 2001/10/23, 2001/10/24, 2001/10/29, 2001/11/08, 2001/11/10b, 2001/11/19b, 2001/11/21, 2001/11/29, 2001/12/04, 2001/12/21, 2002/01/14, 2002/01/ 25, 2002/01/29, 2002/02/16, 2002/03/08, 2002/03/15). Bush showed confidence that “their hour of justice will come” (Bush 2001/11/10b), since the United States would surround the “terrorists and their sponsors in a tightening net of justice” (Bush 2001/ 10/17a). In this framing the outcome was clear: “Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done” (Bush 2001/09/20, cf. 2001/10/17a, 2001/10/24). This statement suggested that irrespective of the specific military or judicial option, the operations that were to be undertaken would be legitimate and legal. This perception was also due to the inherent quality of the word ‘justice’. Like ‘freedom’ and ‘evil’, ‘justice’ is a powerful ideograph; as such, when policies are spelled out under this heading they appear reasonable. Hence, in the name of a just cause, even violence can be justified.90 However, Bush reassured

89 In sum, Bush’s framing fit the pattern of what George Lakoff (1992: 466f) calls the ‘just war’ narrative. 90 Following this understanding of justice, the U.S. military operation that is known today as Enduring Freedom was first called Operation Infinite Justice. Religious groups, however, intervened as they believe only God can dispense ‘infinite justice’. This led the operation to be renamed.

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his audience that the decisions America and its allies were making were “in the best interest of freedom and humankind” (Bush 2001/10/09). All in all, this construction made it difficult to challenge the president’s course of action. As mentioned, part of this strategy was emphasizing the protection of universal values. Bush rarely spoke about defending America but of defending ‘freedom’ and ‘civilization’; this broadened the matter and supported the argument for international cooperation with the United States. A good example of this was Bush’s State of the Union Address held on January 29, 2002, where he announced: “America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere” (Bush 2002/01/29). This also implied that the United States would take action for the benefit of others since it would “not rest until those who think they can take freedom away from any citizen in the world are brought to justice” (Bush 2001/09/25). In order to be an American ally, however, one had to stand on the right side of this “moral and ideological divide” (Bush 2001/12/11) – and it was the United States that defined what was right. In Bush’s perspective, there was “no neutral ground” (Bush 2001/10/07, cf. 2002/04/17). He reverted once again to dualisms when postulating that “there can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent and the guilty [. . .] between good and evil” (Bush 2002/06/01). As discussed in the previous section, Bush was categorical in pointing to the options available for the rest of the world: “Either you are with us or you are against us. Either you stand for freedom, or you stand with tyranny” (Bush 2002/02/16, cf. 2001/09/20, 2001/10/ 06, 2002/03/15, 2002/04/17). Again, this rhetorical device forced the audience to position itself on the ‘right’ side. Avoiding a decision or going against the U.S. was hardly possible if a state did not want to be considered a hostile power. There was a clear division between friends and foes, and friends were those who shared the values of ‘freedom’ and ‘civilization’ and accepted America’s course. “This enemy attacked not just our people, but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world” (Bush/2001/09/12c), Bush proclaimed, and now, “the civilized world is rallying to America’s side” (Bush 2001/09/20). With this wording, the president implied two things: First, the civilized world agreed that America’s actions were right and hence it cooperated with the United States. As Bush declared, “allies from Europe to Asia, and Africa to Latin America” were at the side of the U.S. and even “old rivalries” were being resolved meaning that the U.S. government was now “working with Russia and China and India, in ways we have never before” (Bush 2002/01/29). Second, the civilized world as a whole was under attack and in need of defense. Therefore, “the free world” (Bush 2001/09/19a) and “freedom-loving people” (Bush 2001/09/12c, 2001/09/17a, 2001/09/19a, 2001/ 10/09, 2002/02/16) were now forming “a broad, broad coalition [. . .] including nations from the Islamic world” (Bush 2001/10/17a). With this notion, Bush tried to further strengthen the ‘us’ by closing ranks. Just as the civilized world was said to side with the United States, so were the representatives of the great world religions: “We’re going to lead the world to fight for freedom, and we’ll have Muslim and Jew

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and Christian side-by-side with us” (Bush 2001/09/19b). This notion substantiated the warrant of his political course, the more so as Bush concluded that “we are supported by the conscience of the world” (Bush 2001/10/17a). This led U.S. policies to be embodied with virtue and truth; as such, they seemed to be enacted on the principles of the moral high ground. In fact, Bush stressed that America would “always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity” and defined those demands, inter alia, as “the rule of law” and “limits on the power of the state” (Bush 2002/01/29). He pointed out that the core of the American self-conception was the importance of living by and standing up for the “essential rights” (Bush 2001/ 12/09) codified in the constitution’s Bill of Rights. Bush enumerated these maxims in his speech during Human Rights Week on December 9, 2001. He argued that Americans loved “democracy, justice, and individual liberty”; that they “value individual human rights” and respected “human dignity”; moreover, they were “committed to upholding these principles” and “defending international human rights” in coalition with other “civilized people” (Bush 2001/12/09). In this sense, Bush suggested that even in the minatory situation experienced by the United States on 9/11, the government acted in an exemplary manner, and that with regard to the prosecution and treatment of terrorist suspects, America’s cause was just. Bush emphasized that suspects were being treated “with ultimate respect,” that America was “mindful of the need to respect people’s rights,” and that captives within the U.S. as well as in Guantanamo were being “treated incredibly humanely” (Bush 2002/02/13). In fact, Bush stressed that “people are getting fantastic health care, much better health care today in Guantanamo Bay than they were getting in Afghanistan, I can assure you” (Bush 2002/02/13). In order to appease critics and reassure his audience that the United States was acting appropriately, Bush resorted to the utmost of repetitions. After a meeting with Hamid Karzai, leader of the Afghan Interim Authority, on January 28, 2002, Bush – referring to the captives in Guantanamo – repeated within just a few minutes: They will be treated humanely [. . .]. They will be treated well [. . .]. They are receiving very good medical care [. . .]. We are giving them medical care, they are being well-treated [. . .]. I make my decision, these detainees will be well-treated [. . .]. The prisoners, detainees, will be well-treated [. . .]. This administration has made the decision they will be well-treated. (Bush 2002/01/28)

This was an attempt to cultivate the image of America’s goodness. Bush conveyed the impression that despite the state of emergency the United States was just and soberminded, and acting with righteousness rather than revenge. Repeatedly, Bush stated that the ‘War on Terror’ would be executed “within the confines of our Constitution” (Bush 2001/09/26a, cf. 2001/10/29, 2001/11/19b, 2001/12/04, 2002/02/13) and that

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“constitutional rights” (Bush 2001/10/26) would be protected. The president assured the American people that “we will not let the terrorists cause decay of the fundamental rights that make our nation unique” (Bush 2001/10/10). In even stronger words, he announced: There is nothing more important for me and the federal government to do everything within the Constitution of the United States – and I emphasize we will not let the terrorists tear down our Constitution – we will do everything within the Constitution to protect the innocent Americans. (Bush 2002/01/25)

While these statements partly referred to the laws brought about by the controversial Patriot Act, there were instances where Bush spoke in more general terms. In some cases, he changed from speaking about terrorist suspects held within the United States to those kept in Guantanamo; sometimes this made it difficult to know about which group he was referring to (Bush 2001/12/04, 2002/02/13). He stressed that the suspects held in the United States were “entitled to a lawyer” and “entitled to make phone calls” (Bush 2001/12/04). However, this might have given the audience the impression that these rights also applied to the detainees in Guantanamo. It is important to note, though, that Bush did adumbrate a restriction of constitutional rights. As he argued, wars had their own rules; this was all the more true for a ‘new kind of war’. Interpreting the 9/11 attacks as a declaration of war was taken by the U.S. president as granting him permission to depart from the norm and apply extraordinary means, after all, the nation was in a state of emergency: Ours is a land that values the constitutional rights of every citizen. And we will honor those rights, of course. But we’re at war. (Bush 2001/09/25) Ours is a great land, and we’ll always value freedom. We’re an open society. But we’re at war. (Bush 2001/11/29) We’re doing everything we can, everything we can, to protect the American people. We honor our Constitution, but we are on alert. (Bush 2002/03/15)

Here, Bush argued somewhat openly in favor of making exceptions to the rules and that doing so was justified due to the perilous circumstances. In line with this, he pointed out that the rights and values of America and the ‘civilized world’ must not be granted to the enemy, nor should the enemy be allowed to misuse them: We will not allow those who plot against our country to abuse our freedoms and our protections. (Bush 2001/11/08) We must not let foreign enemies use the forums of liberty to destroy liberty, itself. Foreign terrorists and agents must never again be allowed to use our freedoms against us. (Bush 2001/11/29)

Bush’s decision on how to try terrorist suspects represented a deviation from the rules. He argued for military tribunals to be held for the captives at Guantanamo and

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insisted this was an issue of national security (see section 6.5.1). Although critics viewed this approach as contravening existing laws and abandoning American values, Bush countered this with a further historical comparison: These are extraordinary times. And I would remind those who don’t understand the decision I made that Franklin Roosevelt made the same decision in World War II. Those were extraordinary times, as well. (Bush 2001/11/19b)

Again, history served as evidence to demonstrate the correctness of Bush’s course. By comparing the ‘War on Terror’ to World War II, Bush sought to ‘prove’ that his position was right. Abstaining from details that would have displayed fundamental differences between the two wars and rendered the analogy unfit, Bush validated his decision by purporting to act in the spirit of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Once again, Bush placed himself in the same line as the “exemplary president” (Abbott 1990). He used rhetoric to instrumentalize Roosevelt as an “authorizing figure” (Rice 1992) for his own purposes.91 This also meant making use of a time in history when “American moral certitude was unchallenged” (Coe et al. 2004: 237; cf. Noon 2004: 347).

6.2 Constructing the Other Having outlined Bush’s (re-)production of an exceptional ‘self’, this chapter turns to the construction of the enemy ‘other’ that is said to pose the ‘threat’. As mentioned earlier, the formation of ‘self’ and ‘other’ is closely interlinked as these identities operate in delineation to one another: the ‘self’ is what the ‘other’ is not. In fact, coincidental with hailing an exceptional ‘self’, George W. Bush constructed an abhorrent ‘other’. In doing so, he once again deployed intertextual and historical features as he drew on established discourses of enmity and on America’s collective memory. In principal, Bush strongly engaged in ‘othering’ and built his political arguments on the dichotomy of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. In part, Bush’s ‘othering’ was conflated in terms of external and internal enemies. In some of his speeches, it was not exactly clear to whom he was referring, as he addressed terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and within the United States. Yet, as will be shown, in all these cases the enemy was constituted as the evil ‘other’. This chapter analyzes this framing in detail. After doing so, section 6.3 demonstrates how the claim of pure evilness matched the dimension of ‘threat’ that was construed from this representation of ‘other’.

91 On the use of presidential exemplars, see also Noon (2004), Brown (2007), and Edwards (2009).

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6.2.1 The Evil Other In the days and weeks after 9/11, George W. Bush enduringly referred to the enemy as ‘evil’ and strongly engaged in “(e)vilification” (Lazar/Lazar 2004). By demonizing the ‘other’, he constituted it as “absolutely-not-self” (Abdel-Nour 2004). In Bush’s framing, the terrorists “represent evil” (Bush 2001/09/17b); they are “flat evil,” and “all they can think about, is evil” (Bush 2001/09/25). They were “so evil and so dark and so negative” (Bush 2001/10/24) that they verified “that evil is real” (Bush 2001/ 10/08). Consequently, in speeches and statements, Bush addressed the terrorists as “evil ones” (Bush 2001/10/09, 2001/10/10, 2001/10/17a, 2001/10/17b, 2001/10/23, 2001/ 10/26, 2001/10/29, 2001/11/21, 2001/11/29, 2001/12/04, 2002/01/14) and “evil-doers”92 (Bush 2001/09/16, 2001/09/17a, 2001/09/19b, 2001/09/25, 2001/09/26a, 2001/09/27, 2001/10/04, 2001/10/08, 2001/10/09, 2001/10/10, 2001/10/11a, 2001/10/17a, 2001/10/ 17b, 2001/10/23, 2001/10/24). The ‘other’ was understood as the personification of evil or at least as the “willing servant” of evil (Bush 2001/10/11a, cf. 2001/10/17b). In Bush’s narrative, the terrorists were stripped of their humanity, of all history and values and even of religious motives (see section 6.2.4). The driving force that was left constituted “a cult of evil” (Bush 2001/10/11a). It is obvious that Bush treated evil as “an innate human characteristic that was a cause rather than an effect” (Bostdorff 2003: 303). This meant that it was unnecessary to consider the circumstances or conditions that might have led the terrorists to conduct acts of evil, because, put simply, these individuals were evil. In general, the American people are familiar with this kind of ‘evil talk’. What has been discussed with regard to Bush’s use of ‘freedom’ is also true for ‘evil’: the term is commonly used by the White House to vindicate certain policies. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the range and frequency with which Bush employed it surpassed that of all other U.S. presidents from the recent past (Bostdorff 2003: 303; Singer 2004: 2). Since the dualism of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ had been used in the United States during previous wars, it is easy for American presidents to revive it. Doing so places people who oppose ‘evil’ on the good side of history, if not on God’s side. As mentioned earlier, ‘evil’ invokes strong religious connotations. The dichotomy of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ has a theological origin and stems from a deeply rooted Christian-religious discourse. However, in Bush’s case, the ideograph of ‘evil’ was not only powerful to distance the ‘self’ from the ‘other’, but was also helpful in addressing an enemy that was neither a particular state nor a regime and thus difficult to grasp. The term ‘evil’ simply worked to homogenize a largely unspecified out-group. In order to stress the extent of the enemy’s evilness and the tremendous gap between ‘us’ and ‘them’, Bush remarked that Americans “cannot fully understand the designs and power of evil” (Bush 2001/10/11a) and that it was hard to imagine how evil these

92 “Evil-doers” and “evildoers” appear in the transcripts, the references refer to both.

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people were (Bush 2001/10/23, cf. 2001/10/25). In contrast to the loving and caring character of the American people, the evil-doers were “motivated by hate” (Bush 2001/10/17b) and “defined by their hatred” (Bush 2001/12/11). Overall, Bush emphasized that the United States was “facing a new kind of enemy” (Bush 2001/09/16, cf. 2001/09/12c, 2001/09/17a, 2001/09/27) and thereby “a new kind of evil” (Bush 2001/ 09/16). He constructed the struggle as representing a new dimension in which the United States faced a new degree of combined evilness and determination, one that “we’ve never seen [. . .] before” (Bush 2001/09/16). In this framing, the terrorists’ ambition was said to be total: they aimed to “kill all Americans, kill all Jews, and kill all Christians” (Bush 2001/11/08). By using this hyperbole Bush clearly dramatized the situation – as grave as it was – and escalated the threat scenario.

6.2.2 The Barbaric Other In Bush’s framing, the ‘other’ was the epitome of barbarism. In conjunction with attempts to demonize the enemy, Bush also stripped it of its civilization. Although the enemy was human, it represented “the very worst of human nature” (Bush 2001/ 09/11b). The terrorists were merciless “killers” (Bush 2002/01/28, cf. 2002/02/21, 2002/03/08, 2002/03/15, 2002/03/30b, 2002/04/17), and “barbaric” (Bush 2001/09/16, 2001/09/17a, 2001/10/07). Bush pointed to the terrorists’ “cult of evil” that “thrives on human suffering,” and reasoned that “theirs is the worst kind of cruelty, the cruelty that is fed, not weakened, by tears” (Bush 2001/10/11a). This cruelty was also displayed by tactics: “Our enemy prefers to attack the helpless” (Bush 2001/10/13) and “preys on [. . .] unsuspecting people” (Bush 2001/09/12c). In sum, the terrorists were constituted as unimaginably ruthless, and as showing “no respect for human life” (Bush 2001/11/19b) or “human rights” (Bush 2001/12/09) as they had “no conscience,” “no mercy” (Bush 2001/11/21), and “recognize no barrier of morality” (Bush 2001/10/26). Whereas America valued life, the terrorists “celebrate death, making a mission of murder and a sacrament of suicide” (Bush 2001/12/07, cf. 2002/01/29). This is another strong example of the power of Bush’s rhetoric and the extent to which he used and combined rhetorical devices. ‘Mission of murder’ and ‘sacrament of suicide’ are not only alliterations but strong metaphors expressed in religious terms. ‘Mission’ and ‘sacrament’ usually denote something holy, but the enemy had now turned these into the very opposite. These metaphors were yet another means of presenting America’s cause as just. As Robert Ivie (1990b: 119) asserts, “Americans traditionally have exonerated themselves of any guilt for war, hot or cold, by decivilizing the image of their adversaries.” Again, in this narrative, the ‘other’ is all that the ‘self’ is not; the barbaric enemy is the total opposite of the American ‘self’ that Bush constructed. This fundamental dualism was termed as the “great divide [. . .] between civilization and barbarism” (Bush 2001/12/07). Bush’s demand to “stand with the civilized world, or stand with

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the terrorists” (Bush 2001/10/06) made it unmistakable how the terrorists should be interpreted. The terrorists had attacked “civilization itself” (Bush 2001/12/09), and they made “war against civilization” (Bush 2002/09/11). Through their being and bearing they had “divorced themselves from the values that define civilization” (Bush 2001/10/20). They were unmasked by their actions since they “murder innocent people for the sake of murder” (Bush 2002/02/16). The attacks of 9/11, Bush pointed out, had shown the “true nature” of the terrorists: “they kill thousands of innocent people and then rejoice about it. They kill fellow Muslims [. . .] and then they gloat” (Bush 2001/11/06, cf. 2001/11/08, 2002/01/29, 2002/03/11). These “murderers” (Bush 2001/09/20) killed all victims, “including Muslims [. . .] with equal indifference and equal satisfaction” (Bush 2001/11/10b) and afterwards “they laugh about the loss of innocent life” (Bush 2002/01/29). The fact that Muslims were also mentioned here, constructed the ‘other’ as belonging to this same group, but as having betrayed Muslims and Islam. It made the enemy appear even more down-and-dirty, as it was even ready to turn against its own – and this helped Bush argue that Muslims in general would side with the United States (see section 6.2.4). As discussed before, ‘othering’ leads to a homogenization of the out-group. There were instances, though, where Bush sought to differentiate between the leader and other members of the group in order to picture the leadership as even more barbaric. This led him to present terrorist leaders as inhumane strategists who exploited their own people. They were prepared to send other people to die, whereas they would “run into caves to save their own hides” (Bush 2001/12/07, cf. 2002/01/14, 2002/01/ 25, 2002/02/16). More sharply, Bush stated that terrorist leaders “send other people’s children” on suicide missions to sacrifice these children’s lives while “running for their own” (Bush 2002/01/29). This wording further aggravated the impression of the leaders’ dastardly behavior. In March 2002, while resolutely arguing in favor of the military mission in Afghanistan, Bush resorted to sarcasm to demonstrate the ‘other’s’ cowardice and depravity: “You know, they have got these leaders that are so bold that they are willing to send youngsters to their suicide while they try to hide in deep caves” (Bush 2002/03/15, cf. 2001/12/07, 2002/03/08). In addition to the enemy’s evilness, its other main characteristics were barbarism and cowardice. Immediately after the attacks of 9/11, Bush called the terrorists “faceless cowards” (Bush 2001/09/12a). This tied in with both the depersonalization of the enemy and the images of terrorists hiding and operating in the dark (Bush 2001/09/20, cf. 2001/ 09/27). Hence, this statement underscored the ‘other’s’ furtiveness and its bestial characteristics (see section 6.2.5).

6.2.3 The Fanatic Other Bush ascribed a further feature to the enemy: the ruthless ‘other’ was also unreckonable. In line with this, the terrorists were not only “bands of murderers”

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(Bush 2001/12/11, cf. 2001/10/17b), but “history’s latest gang of fanatics” (Bush 2002/09/11, cf. 2001/11/21). In this framing, Bush clearly attributed a form of irrationality to the terrorists. If the ‘other’ had been viewed as a rational actor with self-serving interests, the United States would have had to answer questions about its own foreign policy. Declaring the ‘other’ as irrational, however, bypassed the need for such critical self-inspection (Chernus 2006: 2). Ostensibly, in contrast to other human beings, terrorists did not base their actions on rationality. Moreover, “they recognize no barrier of morality,” “they have no conscience,” and therefore, “terrorists cannot be reasoned with” (Bush 2001/10/26). At the same time, these people were “the most committed, the most dangerous, the least likely so surrender” (Bush 2002/03/11, cf. 2002/03/15). Their aim was “to murder their way to power” (Bush 2002/09/11), “to dominate” (Bush 2001/ 11/10b), and “to dictate how to think” (Bush 2001/11/08). Their goal was universal as they were portrayed as wanting to impose their “radical beliefs on people everywhere” (Bush 2001/09/20) and “to force every life into grim and joyless conformity” (Bush 2001/12/07). In a nutshell, they wanted to “rid the world of freedom” (Bush 2001/09/26a). Bush underscored this claim by pointing to the past, thereby addressing America’s collective memory about previous (hot and cold) wars. As “heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century,” he declared, “they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism” (Bush 2001/09/20) and “have the same will to power, the same disdain for the individual, the same mad global ambitions” (Bush 2001/12/07, cf. 2001/11/06). In sum, the ‘other’ was constructed as a fanatical enemy with which one could not argue. Therefore, in an expression of this logic, Bush stated that “the terrorists cannot be appeased; they must be defeated” (Bush 2001/12/07, cf. 2001/11/08, 2001/11/10b).

6.2.4 The Outcast Other Bush constructed the terrorists as an isolated group totally outside of society. He argued that they did not “represent a legitimate political group of people” (Bush 2001/09/25) nor did they belong to “a known military” (Bush 2002/01/28). In negating all of the rules of society, despising “every limit of law, morality, and religion,” the terrorists “have no true home in any country, or culture, or faith” but “dwell in dark corners of earth” (Bush 2001/10/11a, cf. 2001/11/10b, 2002/03/11). The uncivilized, barbaric evil-doers were homeless; they had been suspended from the global social community: People of all cultures wish to live in safety and dignity. The hope of justice and mercy and better lives are common to all humanity. Our enemies reject these values – and by doing so, they set themselves not against the West, but against the entire world. (Bush 2001/12/07)

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The ‘other’ was conceptualized as standing alone in its extremism and hatred, whereas the civilized world rallied to the side of the United States. This was another way in which Bush constituted America’s strength and righteousness. However, the terrorists were not only constructed as isolated and homeless, but as godless: “Terrorists have no home in any faith,” and “evil has no holy days” (Bush 2001/11/ 19a). Depicted as thoroughly evil, it was inherent to Bush’s logic that God could not be with the ‘other’, although the enemy dared to “claim the authority of God” (Bush 2001/10/11a). Although the enemy was clearly associated with Islam, rhetorically, Bush denied the terrorists access to true faith and to the comfort and hope of religious belief. Instead, he argued that they instrumentalized Islam for their own vicious interests. He accused them of “distorting and betraying a great religion” (Bush 2001/ 10/17a, cf. 2001/10/10) and of trying “to hijack a peaceful religion” (Bush 2001/11/21, cf. 2001/10/17b, 2002/02/16) in order to justify their murder. In similar statements, Bush maintained that the ‘evil-doers’ would “profane a great religion by committing murder in its name” (Bush 2001/10/07) and that they were ready “to hide behind a peaceful faith” (Bush 2001/11/08, cf. 2001/11/10b). At this point, probably due to his Christian beliefs, Bush even spoke about dogmatics in a categorical modality: The terrorists are violating the tenets of every religion, including the one they invoke [. . .]. The terrorists call their cause holy, yet, they fund it with drug dealing; they encourage murder and suicide in the name of a great faith that forbids both. They dare to ask God’s blessing as they set out to kill innocent men, women and children. But the God of Isaac and Ishmael would never answer such a prayer. And a murderer is not a martyr; he is just a murderer. (Bush 2001/11/10b)

Bush denied the terrorists any reward for their actions, including the supposed heavenly reward they had believed in, that is, their future status as a martyr. Rather, he emphasized that “they died in vain” (Bush 2001/10/11a, cf. 2001/10/17b). In his statements, the ‘evil ones’ simply “defiled” (Bush 2002/03/11) their own religion. These statements enabled Bush to define authentic Islam. In his remarks at the Islamic Center in Washington, Bush explained that the “acts of violence against innocents violate the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith” (Bush 2001/09/17b). He continued by quoting from the Koran: “In the long run, evil in the extreme will be the end of those who do evil. For that they rejected the signs of Allah and held them up to ridicule” (Bush 2001/09/17b). Here, Bush attempted to demonstrate that even Islam supported his war against ‘evil’. Again, the abstract term of ‘evil’ was a helpful means of generalizing, and it supported Bush’s argumentation. In corroborating his interpretation, Bush declared that the attackers’ extremism had “been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics” as a “fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam” (Bush 2001/09/20). Moreover, Bush emphasized the consensus of the great world religions and conceptualized their believers as a valuesharing community that excluded the terrorists. In the United States, Bush stated, “Christian, Jew and Muslim, alike” were praying to “an almighty and merciful God”

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(Bush 2001/09/27). He pointed to the commonality that “helping people in great need is a central part of the Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions” (Bush 2001/10/06, cf. 2001/11/08). In this line, he claimed that the terrorists confronted these religions, because terrorists “hate progress, and freedom, and choice, and culture, and music, and laughter, and women, and Christians, and Jews, and all Muslims who reject their distorted doctrines” (Bush 2001/12/11). As Ira Chernus notes, this “ecumenical rhetoric” enabled Bush “to place the enemy, who spoke the language of Islam and presented themselves as pious defenders of the faith, outside the pale of true faith and religion” (Chernus 2006: 126). The bottom line of these statements was always the same: it signified that ‘all that is God’ was on the side of America and its allies, whereas the terrorists lacked any religious authority or good spiritual succor. The terrorists were external to religion’s virtue and to the community of believers and civilized people: they were constructed as isolated and as facing total exclusion.

6.2.5 The Bestial Other Besides demonizing and decivilizing the ‘other’, Bush dehumanized it. Whereas in the case of the barbaric and fanatic ‘other’ the enemy was still human – albeit ‘the very worst kind of human’ – even this status was doubtful with regard to the ‘other’ viewed as the personification of evil. By constituting the enemy as a beast, however, Bush completely denied its humanness. Bush generally used strong metaphors, and he also did so in this context. He directly called the ‘other’ a “parasite” (Bush 2001/10/17a, cf. 2001/11/10b, 2002/01/28) – a word with a highly negative connotation. In an increased diction, he also used the term “terrorist parasite” (Bush 2002/01/29, cf. 2002/03/11). These ‘terrorist parasites’ were said to engross countries, “weaken them, and eventually consume them” (Bush 2001/11/10b). In this case, the ‘other’ was constructed as a vermin that posed a fundamental existential threat. As Bush made clear, this was a vermin that not only impaired its host, but the whole system, as the terrorists “threaten their own countries and peace of the world” (Bush 2002/03/11). The second way in which Bush deprived the ‘other’ of human characteristics was by placing it even more directly in the realm of wildlife. As mentioned earlier, shortly after the attacks of 9/11 he spoke of the ‘other’ as an enemy that “preys on innocent and unsuspecting people” (Bush 2001/09/12c). However, Bush used this metaphor in two ways. If in the citation above the enemy had been represented as the hunter, it now became the hunted prey. Its low status was thereby communicated through the fact that terrorists “burrow” (Bush 2001/09/17a, 2001/09/26b); they “burrow [. . .] into caves” (Bush 2001/10/07) where they try to hide (Bush 2001/09/16, 2001/09/17a, 2001/11/06, 2001/11/07). This image was evocative of animals digging dens and tunnels beneath the ground. It complements the picture of terrorists as “shadowy, entrenched” (Bush 2001/12/11) figures who “operate in the shadows” (Bush 2001/ 10/10). They literally lived in the underground (Ferrari 2007: 393). Hence, the

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United States was going to “rout them out” (Bush 2002/01/25, cf. 2002/02/21) and “smoke them out” (Bush 2001/09/17a, cf. 2001/09/19a, 2001/09/25) of “their holes” (Bush 2001/09/16). The reasoning was clear: “Once we get them running we have got a good chance of getting them” (Bush 2001/09/17a). This prospect gave the impression of a more aggressive form of a hunt, that is, of a battue. It was supported by the word pair ‘run and hide’ (Bush 2001/11/19b, 2001/11/29, 2001/12/04). The terrorists ran and hid with America “in pursuit” (Bush 2001/11/19b). As Bush stated, “now we are on the hunt. And we are chasing” (Bush 2001/12/21). In typical declarative sentences, Bush once again conveyed certainty about the end of this task when he announced that America would “hunt them down” (Bush 2001/09/16, cf. 2001/09/ 17a, 2001/09/25, 2001/11/19b, 2001/11/21, 2002/01/14, 2002/01/25, 2002/03/15, 2002/ 04/17). This phrase was used over and over again within and across texts. Exemplary for Bush’s strong inclination to repetition was the speech he held on November 8, 2001, when he delivered four variants of the phrase within a few moments: I have called our military into action to hunt down the members of the al Qaeda organization who murdered innocent Americans [. . .]. We are deliberately and systematically hunting down these murderers [. . .]. Our great nation – national challenge is to hunt down the terrorists [. . .]. Our government has a responsibility to hunt down our enemies – and we will. (Bush 2001/11/08)

Finally, there were also instances where Bush combined the different features he ascribed to the ‘other’; for example, he decried the “barbaric behavior” of the terrorists before shortly afterwards announcing his intentions to “smoke them out” (Bush 2001/09/17a).

6.3 Constructing the Threat and Proper Threat Defense The previous chapter exposed how George W. Bush conceptualized the enemy ‘other’ as evil and barbaric, fanatic and unhuman. This chapter outlines the kind of ‘threat’ the ‘other’ was allegedly posing. In the aftermath of 9/11, shock and fear and the perception of existential threat were certainly part of a normal and somewhat inevitable reaction by the American people; however, Bush’s framing did much to aggravate this perception. This was done by affirming the ‘other’s’ evilness and the impending danger in ultimate terms. Bush underscored the task of the U.S. government as guaranteeing the country’s survival by thwarting further attacks. Essential in this respect was the function attributed to the ‘other’, namely, its role as an accessory. Until now, the analysis has demonstrated what the ‘other’ was said to be in terms of innate or internalized characteristics, but in Bush’s framing, the ‘other’ was also constructed as holding a particular knowledge. The people who had been caught and brought to Guantanamo Bay and other detention centers were constructed as secret

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carriers of information with decisive insights about future attacks – an attribution that suggested the need for specific action. The following sections outline Bush’s construction of the threat and proper threat defense in some detail.

6.3.1 The (Un-)Certainty About Future Attacks In the body of texts under investigation, there are only a very few instances where Bush spoke of future attacks as a possibility, as something that could happen. In his remarks to employees at FBI Headquarters on September 25, 2001, he stated that “the people who did this act on America [. . .] may be planning further acts” and that the FBI was preparing “to disrupt any action that may be being planned” (Bush 2001/ 09/25, my emphasis). Similarly, on October 29, 2001, Bush described the government’s job as to “disrupt anybody who might have designs on [. . .] further hurting Americans” (Bush 2001/10/29, my emphasis, cf. 2001/12/04). This statement, however, could also be understood as an announcement of pre-emptive action. Be that as it may, on nearly all other occasions, Bush treated the risk of further attacks not as a possibility but as a certainty. Accordingly, the first priority was to protect the country from “another”/“further”/“future” attack (Bush 2001/09/11b, cf. 2001/11/08, 2001/ 12/04, 2001/12/21, 2002/01/25, 2002/01/29, 2002/03/11, 2002/06/06) since “our enemies seek every chance and every means to do harm to our country” (Bush 2001/12/ 11, cf. 2002/06/01). Due to the “continuing threat” (Bush 2001/09/20, cf. 2001/11/08) posed by “evil folks” who “still lurk out there” (Bush 2001/09/16), “hoping to strike again” (Bush 2002/03/11, cf. 2002/03/15), the U.S. administration was “on alert” (Bush 2001/09/19b, cf. 2001/09/16, 2001/10/29, 2002/01/25). The terrorists with their “evil plans” (Bush 2001/10/07, cf. 2001/09/29), had “threatened other acts of terror” (Bush 2001/11/08) and were “plotting further destruction” (Bush 2002/09/11). They were “active” (Bush 2001/10/29) and were “planning more murder” (Bush 2001/ 11/10b, cf. 2001/11/21). As Bush stated in his declarative manner, “they have killed thousands of our citizens, and seek to kill many more” (Bush 2001/11/21). This illustrates that the constituted context within which political actions were embedded was one of imminent danger: America was said to be “still under attack as we speak” (Bush 2001/10/24) and “still under threat” (Bush 2002/02/13). Although these statements were already representing the possibility of an attack as a certainty, there were some notions that still more strongly emphasized the certainty of the terrorists’ intentions: “There is no question that evildoers are continuing to try to harm America and Americans” (Bush 2001/10/23) or, in a more personal fashion that underlined the notion with presidential knowledge and authority, “I do know the enemy wants to hit us again” (Bush 2002/02/16, my emphasis, cf. 2002/01/25). Bush also used the inclusive ‘we’ to establish a broader base for his propositions in phrases like “we now know that thousands of trained killers are plotting to attack us” (Bush 2002/06/06). This rhetoric was clearly capable of arousing fear since it strongly

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conveyed urgency. When stressing that “America is not waiting for terrorists to try to strike us again” (Bush 2001/11/21, cf. 2001/11/06) the impression of imminence became palpable. Overall, the American people were confronted with a situation constructed in terms of peril and assault. This “new”, “dark” threat (Bush 2001/09/20, 2001/10/07, 2001/11/21, 2002/06/01) was “like no other our nation has ever faced” (Bush 2001/ 10/26). Furthermore, this threat was not only framed as endangering the United States; rather, “every other country is a potential target” (Bush 2001/11/10b). In this perspective, every city in the world represented a “potential killing field” (Bush 2001/11/10b) since the “enemy knows no border” (Bush 2001/09/17a, cf. 2001/09/19a, 2001/10/17b). The ‘evil-ones’ were viewed as widespread and prepared to threaten the United States “from anywhere in the world” (Bush 2002/03/11) and Americans and other citizens “anywhere in the world” (Bush 2002/03/15). Thus, the threat was omnipresent. The construction of the terrorists as enemies with a vast ambition who wanted to “remake” the world “in their own brutal images” (Bush 2001/12/07, cf. 2001/09/20, 2001/11/06) corresponds well with the framing of a “threat of global terrorism” (Bush 2002/02/16, cf. 2002/02/21, 2002/03/15, 2002/04/17). Nevertheless, the dimension of the threat was actually constructed in even greater terms. The ‘ruthless enemies’ were not only lurking everywhere but “determined to expand the scale and scope of their murder” (Bush 2002/03/11). The construction of threat was tremendously aggravated by the notion that the terrorists would strive for weapons of mass destruction (Bush 2001/11/06, 2001/11/10b, 2001/ 11/21, 2001/12/11, 2002/01/29, 2002/03/15, 2002/06/01, 2002/09/11) and hence for the “ultimate instruments of death” (Bush 2002/03/11). According to Bush, the terrorists were pursuing this aim, after all “they have been caught seeking these terrible weapons” (Bush 2002/06/01).93 For the president, the “gravest danger to freedom” lay “at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology” (Bush 2002/06/01). Certainly, this line of argumentation was geared towards the Iraq War that the Bush administration started in spring 2003; nevertheless these formulations often addressed ‘the terrorists’ in a manner that Bush began using after 9/11.94 If the terrorists were to succeed in getting hold of these weapons, Bush reasoned, this would “multiply their murders” and enable them “to kill on a scale equal to their hatred” (Bush 2001/12/11). Again, the president demonstrated absolute certainty about the terrorists’ aim by stating, “we know they have this mad intent” (Bush 2001/12/11). Yet, at the same time, uncertainty was displayed about how the terrorists

93 This position was underpinned by the CIA. See on this, for example, the testimonies of CIA Director George Tenet before Congressional committees (Tenet 2002/02/06, 2002/06/18, 2003/02/11). According to Tenet, Al Qaeda leader Bin Laden viewed acquiring chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons as a “religious obligation” and therefore the terrorists kept trying to access these materials (Tenet 2004/02/24). 94 This framing shifted over time towards ‘states’ and ‘regimes’ that ‘sponsor’ terrorists.

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would exactly strike, and because there were so many opportunities, the United States had to “prepare for every possibility” (Bush 2001/12/11). In this setting, the task was not just to prevent a further attack but “mass terror” (Bush 2001/12/11). The prospect was “terror on a catastrophic scale” (Bush 2002/03/11, cf. 2002/03/15) or, as Bush also put it in even more horrific terms, another holocaust: All the world faces the most horrifying prospect of all: These same terrorists are searching for weapons of mass destruction, the tools to turn their hatred into holocaust. They can be expected to use chemical, biological and nuclear weapons the moment they are capable of doing so. No hint of conscience would prevent it [. . .]. This threat cannot be appeased. (Bush 2001/11/10b)

Bush’s deployment of historicity framed the situation in highly dramatic terms: it is hardly possible to use more dramatic language than the meanings associated with the holocaust. The term describes mass murder and the highest disrespect for human dignity; from the position of the victim, it implies being confronted by a thoroughly vicious power. On another occasion, Bush precisely described how he assumed atrocities might occur. In his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, he specified the threat faced by the American people. It is therefore worth quoting at length: The civilized world faces unprecedented dangers [. . .]. We have found diagrams of American nuclear power plants and public water facilities, detailed instructions for making chemical weapons, surveillance maps of American cities, and thorough description of landmarks in America and throughout the world. What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning. Most of the 19 men who hijacked planes on September the 11th were trained in Afghanistan’s camps, and so were tens of thousands of others. Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder [. . .] are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning [. . .]. Tens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large. These enemies view the entire world as a battlefield. (Bush 2002/01/29)

This section clearly demonstrates that Bush presented himself as possessing authoritative knowledge about the scope and characteristics of the threat being posed. In terms of relevant security information, the president was above the audience and thus privileged to define the situation and the appropriate reaction to it. Since the audience could not verify the president’s information, Bush’s explanations were apt to corroborate the fear that 9/11 had caused.95 The reference to nuclear power plants and the ‘tens of thousands of trained terrorists’ certainly worked in this manner.

95 In part, this fear also originated from the anthrax attacks within the United States which had started shortly after 9/11 and already embodied a confrontation with biological weapons.

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Moreover, the metaphor of the ‘ticking time bomb’ was extraordinarily powerful. It indicated that time was running out for the American and other ‘civilized’ people and that it was only a matter of time before the next catastrophe happened.96 Again, this scenario was escalated to the utmost as the threat was constructed as worldwide and omnipresent, yet unseizable in terms of place or time. This imagery matched the framing of “modern terrorists” (Bush 2001/10/26). While Bush mostly constructed the ‘evil-ones’ as uncivilized, irrational and hiding in caves, there were instances when he portrayed a different image. These ‘modern terrorists’ were “very sophisticated” (Bush 2001/09/25) and were operating “by highly sophisticated methods and technologies” (Bush 2001/10/26). As pointed out earlier, the homogenization of an outgroup often leads to an inflation of the ‘other’s’ strength. This can be seen by constructing the enemy as “resourceful” (Bush 2001/11/29, 2002/06/01), “united”, “determined” (Bush 2001/10/08), and as “well-organized” (Bush 2001/09/26b). All of these ostensibly positive attributes further increased the perception of being at risk from the ‘other’. Overall, the threat was presented as an absolute, impending danger. Bush spoke with great certainty about the ‘fact’ of an enduring threat; however, great uncertainty remained about the way the terrorists would strike.97 Yet, it was constructed as certain that if the threat materialized it would bring about new horror – a prospect which increased the sense of America’s vulnerability to the audience. Moreover, in this conceptualization, the terrorists were able to attack anybody in any location from wherever they chose; and the prospect of the terrorists having access to nuclear, biological or chemical weapons conferred the threat with an apocalyptical character. Accordingly, “the stakes could not be higher” (Bush 2001/11/08). In fact, what was at risk was nothing less than “the future of the world” (Bush 2001/10/17b) and “the peace of the planet” (Bush 2002/06/01). Bush proclaimed that “this is the world’s fight” (Bush 2001/09/20) but he also emphasized that this approach only belonged to ‘freedom-loving’ nations when adding that “this is civilization’s fight” (Bush 2001/ 09/20, cf. 2001/12/07, 2002/04/17). The task was to “save the world” (Bush 2001/ 10/04) – which meant to “save civilization, itself” (Bush 2001/11/08, cf. 2001/10/20, 2001/11/06, 2001/11/10b, 2002/02/21) and thus “our way of life” (Bush 2001/09/20, cf. 2001/10/23). On another occasion, Bush spoke of “our lives, our way of life, and our every hope for the world” (Bush 2001/12/11). In Bush’s perspective this included

96 For an analysis of the premises behind and consequences of ‘ticking time bomb’ scenarios in general terms, see Pfiffner (2010: ch. 4). He shows how the logic of the argument breaks down when put under scrutiny. 97 This topic of uncertainty was carried to its extremes by Bush’s Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in his remarks about ‘known unknowns’ (Seely 2003: 8). As mentioned in the introduction of this book, the ‘threat’ America faced was actually a ‘risk’, which is particularly characterized by the state of uncertainty (Daase 2002a, 2002b, 2005: 267, 2010); however, it has the same constitutive power in foreign policy (Daase/Kessler 2007).

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economic recovery and wealth (Bush 2001/12/04, 2002/01/14), “progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom” (Bush 2001/09/20), “creative societies and individual choice” (Bush 2001/12/07), “individual rights” (Bush 2001/12/09), “international human rights” (Bush 2001/12/09) and the “common security” (Bush 2002/03/11) of the civilized nations. Sometimes, when Bush addressed the American people, his speeches carried a stronger emotional note: he referred to “your children and grandchildren” (Bush 2002/01/14) or, he included himself by referring to “our children” (Bush 2001/10/08, cf. 2001/12/07, 2001/12/11). Speaking of future generations, Bush called upon the nation to preserve a “peaceful and hopeful world” (Bush 2002/01/14) and to “save our children from a future of fear” (Bush 2001/12/11, cf. 2001/11/10b, 2001/11/21). At the same time, he emphasized that “the only path to safety is the path of action” (Bush 2002/06/01) and consequently, “inaction is not an option” (Bush 2002/03/15). In this conceptualization, as terrorists were seeking weapons of mass destruction, “there is no margin for error” and “no chance to learn from any mistake” (Bush 2002/03/15). This makes it clear that Bush constructed the situation as a matter of urgency and survival. Moreover, it is interesting to note that he attested knowledge to the audience that it probably did not have: according to the president, the American people ‘knew’ that the terrorists still had “more money and more men and more plans” (Bush 2002/ 06/01) to attack the United States. This claim enabled Bush to substantiate his argument and forestall approval. In his narrative, there was no alternative to waging war and no choice but to “win this battle against global terrorism” (Bush 2001/09/27).

6.3.2 The Imperative to Gather Information President Bush left no doubt that he would meet the challenge of taking care of the nation. In terms of commitment and preference, he assured that his “most important job of all is to protect the American people from further attack” (Bush 2001/12/21, cf. 2001/12/04, 2002/01/14, 2002/02/13). Furthermore, he maintained that he was acting with discernment: Protecting the innocent against violence is a solemn duty of this country. It is our most important responsibility now. And all of us in this room accept that responsibility. And we will tell the American people plainly, we will fulfill that responsibility. (Bush 2001/11/29)

In Bush’s words, this “awesome responsibility” meant “to do whatever we can to protect the American people” (Bush 2001/12/21). In fact, the president consistently affirmed that he would do everything possible to protect the United States: America will do whatever it takes to strengthen our security here at home. (Bush 2001/10/17a) We will do whatever it takes to protect our country, protect the good American families. (Bush 2001/10/17a)

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Our government is doing everything we possibly can to protect the lives of our citizens – everything. (Bush 2001/10/23) We have got to do everything we can to prevent the enemy from hitting us again. (Bush 2001/12/04) I want to assure you we will do, within our power [. . .] what it takes to defend the American people. (Bush 2002/02/13) We will do whatever it takes to defend our freedoms [. . .] The United States will do what it takes to defend our freedom. Make no mistake about it. (Bush 2002/02/16) We will do everything in our power to defend freedom and the universal values that are so important to our nation [. . .]. (Bush 2002/02/21) Whatever it takes to defend the liberty of America, this administration will do. (Bush 2002/03/15)

This promise appeared to have no limits. ‘Everything’ and ‘whatever it takes’ are allinclusive; it was the government’s responsibility to employ whichever means could be portrayed as necessary in order to protect America’s security. Obviously, Bush constructed the logic that “when faced with evil, [. . .] we are allowed to use any possible means to help us prevail, including methods that would otherwise be forbidden” (Holmes 2006: 132). Therefore, if the torture of Guantanamo detainees were perceived as necessary in order to gather information, this rhetoric permitted torture as well.98 In fact, on several occasions Bush pointed out how important the work of the CIA was in gathering information that made America safe (Bush 2001/09/26a, cf. 2001/10/ 08, 2001/10/26, 2001/12/11). Information gathering had now moved to the center stage, as “in the war on terror, knowledge is power” (Bush 2001/10/08). Bush pointed out that “our security will require the best intelligence” (Bush 2002/06/01). Consequently, it was essential to question enemy detainees. The captives in Guantanamo and in similar detention facilities elsewhere were constituted as terrorist confidants and carriers of secret information, and were therefore viewed as possessing crucial data. Hence, interrogation was vital “to figure out [. . .] their intentions” (Bush 2001/11/29). They had to be incarcerated in order “to question them, to find out what’s in their mind and what their future activities may be” (Bush 2001/10/04). Speaking of his morning intelligence briefings, Bush stated: A President needs real and current knowledge and analysis of the plans, intentions, and capabilities of our enemies [. . .]. The more we know, the more terrorist plans we can prevent and disrupt, and the better we’ll be able to protect the American people. (Bush 2001/12/11)

The task was as simple as it was crucial: the administration had “to know the plans of terrorists before they act” (Bush 2001/09/20), and Bush stressed that “we are in the

98 However, even in times of war, certain rules must be kept. On the ius in bello see, among others, Münkler (2002: 114f).

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business now of gathering as much information as we possibly can gather, and we are acting on that information” (Bush 2001/12/04). He left no doubt that the security of the United States was dependent on this data. In commenting on the arrest of eight terrorists in Spain, he said: “Hopefully they’ll give us some information [. . .] to keep us all safe” (Bush 2001/11/29). Bush expressed his arguments in quite dense terms in a speech in 2006, and it is cited in the following as it complements the body of texts under investigation. Arguing for the creation of military commissions to try suspected terrorists, he stated: In this new war, the most important source of information on where the terrorists are hiding and what they are planning is the terrorists, themselves. Captured terrorists have unique knowledge about how terrorist networks operate. They have knowledge of where their operatives are deployed, and knowledge about what plots are underway. This intelligence – this is intelligence that cannot be found any other place. And our security depends on getting this kind of information [. . .]. The security of our nation and the lives of our citizens depend on our ability to learn what these terrorists know. (Bush 2006/09/06)

Over the years, Bush reiterated the imperative of gathering information through interrogation – and he implied that this process was effective. This was also suggested by declaring that some victories would “be won outside of public view, in tragedies avoided and threats eliminated” (Bush 2001/09/29). More immediately, the effectiveness of interrogation was confirmed by disclosing that one al Qaeda detainee had apparently revealed that “attacks were planned against financial institutions” (Bush 2002/06/06); in the same speech Bush referred to al Qaeda’s presumed chief of operations, Abu Zabedah, who had been arrested: From him, and from hundreds of others, we are learning more about how the terrorists plan and operate; information crucial in anticipating and preventing future attacks. (Bush 2002/06/06)

Today, it is known that Abu Zabedah, among others, was tortured. However, in Bush’s framing, the end justified the means. If information gathering was an indispensable means of protecting the American people from catastrophe, the deployment of a suitable means to reach this goal appeared self-evident. In line with this argument, detention facilities like Guantanamo were presented as part of the American success story in the ‘War on Terror’: He [Abu Zabedah] was spending a lot of time as one of the top operating officials of al Qaeda, plotting and planning murder. He’s not plotting and he’s not planning anymore. He’s under lock and key, and we’re going to give him some company. (Bush 2002/04/17) A few months ago, al Qaeda and the terrorists occupied Afghanistan. Now some of them are in cells in Guantanamo Bay. (Bush 2002/02/21)

These statements provoked applause by the audience. Making the captives divulge their secrets was presented as a life-saving undertaking, and this was also the bottom

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line in Bush’s argumentation for the use of military tribunals at Guantanamo. “In a court of law,” he pointed out, “there would be all kinds of questions that might compromise our ability to gather incredibly important intelligence to prevent the next attack from happening to America” (Bush 2001/12/04). Therefore, Bush was authoritative on the question of whether this extraordinary means was necessary. As he made clear: “It’s our national security interests we have a military tribunal available” (Bush 2001/11/19b, cf. 2001/12/04).

6.4 Summary of Identity and Threat Formation Bush’s security discourse impressively constituted the identities of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in ultimate terms. In conceptualizing the ‘self’, he reproduced the narrative of American exceptionalism, which was magnified in comparison to an enemy ‘other’ construed as evil and subhuman. By using the dichotomies of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’, ‘freedom’ versus ‘fear’, and ‘light’ versus ‘darkness’, Bush enduringly engaged in polarization, and he did so by constructing identity in terms of the antipode of ‘civilization’ versus ‘barbarism’; this constituted the threat posed to America as of a global dimension. Certainly, Bush’s regular use of the abstract terms ‘freedom’, ‘evil’ and ‘justice’ was strategic. The power of these ideographs rests with their suitability to justify political action and to generate approval since they invite the speaker to argue “at the expense of more complete and considered deliberation” (Coe 2007: 377). With regard to the rhetoric of ‘evil’, this expression judged the situation in moral terms, weakened respect for the ‘other’, and mobilized the ‘self’ for counteraction (Casebeer 2004: 447–449). As is generally true in identity formation, there was a history behind the image portrayed of the enemy. It is noticeable that in terms of intertextuality Bush avoided forthright references to the ‘Muslim other’ and rather reinvoked remembrance of the ‘Nazi other’. Nevertheless, by stressing the total opposition of the civilized world compared to the barbaric rest – and that the ‘other’ clearly belonged to the latter – Bush reproduced negative stereotypes from Orientalist discourse. Collectively, terror was given a face and this face was Arab (Merskin 2004: 157). The mistrust and resentment that was activated is illustrated by both the profiling of Muslims and the hatred against Muslim Americans that accumulated within the United States after the 9/11 attacks. The ‘other’ was identified as an enemy of freedom, of the United States and the civilized world, of humanity itself and, above all, of God. In contrast, the ‘self’ was portrayed as the world’s beacon and ‘freedom’s defender’, whereby Bush strongly substantiated the foundational principle of American identity. He stressed America’s mythical assumption of having been ‘called’ upon and suggested he was implementing God’s providence. With the view of the world as a battlefield between the forces of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, fighting the ‘other’ was presented as a “religiously sanctioned moral duty” (Sluka 2009: 145; cf. Edelman 1988: 76), and Bush nurtured this missionary

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fervor as a driving force behind his foreign policy. Under this heading, policies were said to “serve the cause of freedom” (Bush 2002/06/01) and were passed off as America’s duty to save the nation and the good in the world. This led Bush to assert that his course was just. The quasi-religious status of ‘freedom’ and other ‘universal values’ that Bush was claiming to defend, turned them into “powerful instruments in the quest for legitimacy” (Daase 2006: 85). Moreover, America’s purported status as the innocent victim of 9/11 implied that the United States had the right to choose the answer, and the framing of impending danger on a mass scale required rapid and decisive emergency action. As pointed out in the theoretical part of this book (see section 4.2), a central constituent of securitizations is the framing of situations as a matter of survival. It is obvious that Bush used this framing as part of his security narrative. In his conception, not only the United States and the American way of life were at stake but civilization and the future of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction and embodying ‘ticking time bombs’ that might explode anytime, anywhere in the world, the enemy was constructed as posing a massive imminent threat, and casualties were to be expected on a mass scale if the threat were to materialize. Bush’s security narrative carried the impression of ‘either we act now and do so decisively with all possible means, or it will be too late and we will cease to exist.’ This clearly embodies the ‘grammar of security’ referred to by the Copenhagen School. This framing, however, was a political choice as the attacks of 9/11 did not speak in this way for themselves. This is not to say that the dangerousness of terrorism was solely a discursive construction by the president. It was not. As the world witnessed on September 11, 2001, terrorism is perilous and deadly, and this is not being called into question here. However, it is apparent that Bush escalated the matter. Although the attacks of 9/11 were naturally a matter of security, and were given top priority by the U.S. government, Bush’s framing led to a dramatic expansion of the threat scenario. By assuming that the greater the threat the more comprehensive the admissible countermeasures, Bush’s framing indeed enabled exceptional political and military action to be deployed that would have otherwise not been possible (see section 6.5). Bush framed the threat in a way that reflects the concept of securitization, although there were other ways of doing so. Bush could have continued using the interpretation of the 9/11 attacks as “despicable acts of terror” (Bush 2001/09/11b) rather than reframing them as ‘acts of war’. Whereas the former would have led to criminal prosecution,99 the latter paved the way for the ‘War on Terror’ and tremendously altered the latitude for political action (Zarefsky 2004b; Jackson 2005; Parry 2013: 173). Similarly, Bush could have confined his conceptualization to issues

99 There are suggestions that this crime could have been dealt with within the legal category of ‘crimes against humanity’ (Roberts 2002: 8; cf. Howard 2002: 9; Feldman 2008).

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directly related to the attacks of 9/11, that is, America’s centers of power had been attacked rather than the ‘world’ or ‘civilization itself’. Instead, Bush engaged in what the Copenhagen School calls a macrosecuritization. Speaking of ‘civilization’ and ‘freedom’ as universal values that were at risk, he constructed a threat that referred to large parts of humankind and at the same time invoked America’s duty to respond to it. This was a powerful means of demonstrating leadership and calling for international cooperation; yet, it was not a cogent interpretation of the 9/11 attacks (Buzan/Wæver 2009: 268, 272f). Moreover, Bush could have referred to the attackers as a particular group of criminals or terrorists, rather than inflating the power of a fanatic ‘other’ that was assumed to be dispersed throughout the world, ready to strike at any time in various ways.100 In so doing, Bush scaled up the perception of threat by placing 9/11 at the beginning of a series of future attacks with rising degrees of atrocity (Ferrari 2007: 390). Interrelated with this, Bush had the option of treating the attackers as offenders with political or ideological motives, rather than defining them as pure evil. This, however, would have implied looking for motives other than their alleged ‘hate of freedom’, and it would have questioned the exceptionalism of the ‘self’. Instead, defining the ‘other’ as evil put America’s conduct above reproach. Finally, the president could have identified his speculations as such and indicated their hypothetical character rather than presenting them as facts. By persistently speaking in a declarative manner and by demonstrating absolute conviction, he put forth his conception in countless reiterations and established his ‘truth’ on the matter and this helped justify his course. Bush’s conceptualization widened the scope of possibilities and permitted diverse policies to be enacted; the focus of this book is that it also rendered the violation of human rights law possible, as the treatment of the captives in Guantanamo shows. Bush’s construction of the evil ‘other’ was an essential way of enabling this treatment, as it bestowed legitimacy on his policies. Bush’s construction was completely negative and communicated danger in all its facets, however, it was not congruent in form. On the one hand, the enemy was viewed as irrational in its bearing; on the other hand, it was sophisticated in planning murder. Similar, the enemy was constituted as subhuman, but also as a secret carrier of information. Bush interchanged these characteristics as he saw fit. It is important to note that in most images the enemy had no claim to human rights or dignity, neither as personified evil, as a parasite, or an animal-like creature, nor as a fanatic killer who despised the very value of life. Therefore, in moral terms, the ‘other’ did not deserve sympathy, and in legal terms, the ‘other’ hardly qualified for protection as guaranteed by human 100 As Winkler (2006: 191f) notes, this kind of inflation is typical for U.S. administrations when the offense is conducted by foreign terrorists. In contrast, if the attacker is American, the administration generally tries to constitute the action as one of a lone operator. Moreover, as Llorente (2002: 45) found out, atrocious acts by Westeners are not called ‘barbaric’.

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rights law (Nabers 2005: 157f; cf. Jackson 2005). In this setting, the abandonment of established rules became rather easy. “If the enemy,” Phil Scraton notes, “is beneath contempt, the war against it can be unconditional” (2002a: 2). The only time the ‘other’ was referred to as rational human was in the conception of its planning, i.e., the terrorist as a secret carrier of information who had knowledge about future attacks. In this case, however, America’s security needs trumped the human rights of the ‘other’. Bush argued that in order to prevent further attacks and to secure the American people, it was imperative that these secrets were uncovered. Therefore, terrorist suspects had to be made to talk. According to this logic, extracting information from captives was a question of survival, and breaking human rights law in terms of ‘harsh interrogation techniques’ was reason of state. Torture, hence, became justified and legitimate as a means of protecting the American people. This embodies the link between Bush’s discursive identity formation and his detention and interrogation policy as the former created the latitude and rationale for the latter. It determined the appropriateness of certain political actions, and as the subsequent sections will show, the dominance of Bush’s security discourse increased his power to enact measures that would have otherwise been inacceptable.

6.5 Bush’s Detention and Interrogation Policy In 2002, The Washington Post noted that in the ‘War on Terror’, “one of the most opaque – yet vital – fronts is the detention and interrogation of terrorism suspects” (Priest/Gellman 2002). As this book argues, Bush’s construction of ‘self’, ‘other’, and ‘threat’ set the stage for these policies. His representations of impending terrorist attacks produced urgency and increased the perceived necessity to gather information. Learning about the terrorists’ plots was imperative; it constituted a means of survival. As has been pointed out above, according to Bush’s framing, the captives possessed crucial knowledge as they were conceptualized as secret carriers of information. Securitization, therefore, was a strong tool used to legitimize the application of ‘harsh interrogation techniques’ as a matter of self-defense, and these measures were more readily accepted because the terrorist suspects were constituted as evil and subhuman. Based on the assumption that words ‘do’ something and that framings are able to initiate, rationalize and legitimate policies, the following sections look at the security policies that were enacted by the Bush administration with regard to the detention center at Guantanamo and the captives who were incarcerated there. It begins with an outline of how Bush, in accordance with his security narrative, shifted the rules for political action; and it continues with an overview of the interrogatory measures that were applied. The subsequent step highlights in how far the audiences reproduced Bush’s discourse and thus approved his political course.

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6.5.1 Redefining the Rules In line with Bush’s conceptualization of ‘self’, ‘other’, and ‘threat’, the administration redefined the rules. As pointed out above, Bush claimed that the terrorist attacks of 9/ 11 embodied a declaration of war. Yet, Bush also stressed that America was faced by a ‘new’ kind of enemy and a ‘new’ and ‘different’ kind of war (Bush 2001/09/15, 2001/ 09/16, 2001/09/19a, 2001/09/25, 2001/09/29, 2001/10/09, 2002/03/08) that required “new thinking in the law of war” (Bush 2002/02/07). In addition, Bush strongly reproduced the belief in America’s righteousness – and this belief was independent of the means used to tackle terrorism. As David Forsythe points out, “this exceptionalism led to exemptionalism, in that the United States was seen as too virtuous to be bound like ordinary nations under international law” (Forsythe 2011: 42f; cf. Ruggie 2006; Esch 2010). In this sense, America’s claimed goodness and its perception of having been ‘called’ by history and God, rendered it invulnerable in the fight against ‘evil’. In the context of this framing, the Bush administration abandoned or bypassed conventional statutory and constitutional protections such as the Geneva Conventions, habeas corpus rights, and the UN Convention Against Torture. Based on the claim that this was a ‘new war’ and that the enemy was an ‘outcast other’ who was neither part of a state’s army nor a society, the Bush administration declared its captives to be ‘illegal’ or ‘unlawful enemy combatants’ (Bush 2001/11/29, 2002/01/28). This term does not exist in “any written international law or code” (Greenberg 2008: x).101 By labeling them in this manner, Bush declared the captives to be “more than criminal suspects” (Bush 2001/11/29); however, at the same time, they were “less than soldiers” (Feldman 2008: xix), which placed them in a legal loophole. Doing so enabled the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions, according to which captives would have had to be granted the status of ‘prisoners of war’ (POW), to be abandoned. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration decided that in the ‘new kind of war’ customary rules of war no longer applied. It argued that the laws of war only applied to state parties and that neither Afghanistan’s Taliban – defined as a militia of a ‘failed state’ – nor al Qaeda – identified as non-state actors – met this characteristic (DOJ 2002/01/09, 2002/ 01/22). Moreover, Bush explicitly repeated his framing of the ‘other’ set out above. When journalists asked why the detainees at Guantanamo were not being treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, Bush justified this by identifying the suspects as ‘killers’ who had occupied countries “like a parasite” (Bush 2002/01/28). Consequently, on February 7, 2002 Bush signed a memorandum stating that Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions – an article that sets out the 101 In fact, Bush’s Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, stated shortly after the attacks that the United States had “to fashion a new vocabulary” (Rumsfeld 2001/09/20). He repeated this in an interview a few days later. According to Rumsfeld, this was “a totally different war” and, because of that, “we need a new vocabulary” (Rumsfeld 2001/10/10).

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standards for treating detainees and prohibits the abuse of prisoners – did not apply to the Taliban or al Qaeda.102 This led the U.S. to suspend its implementation of a treaty that has historically guarded the rights of detained combatants. As Karen Greenberg puts it: “With one fell swoop, the administration [. . .] extricated the United States from the international obligations that have governed the treatment of prisoners in armed conflict since the middle of the nineteenth century” (Greenberg 2008: xi). At the same time, U.S. courts were said to have no jurisdiction over the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay and thus no possibility of reviewing the treatment of the captives held there. Obviously, Guantanamo Bay was chosen due to the possibilities it provided of circumventing judicial oversight.103 On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an order to set up military commissions to try non-Americans charged with terrorist crimes. “If I determine,” he said a few days later, “that it is in the national security interest of our great land to try by military commission those who make war on America, then we will do so” (Bush 2001/11/29). This statement is evocative of the Copenhagen School’s early theorizing according to which the elite decide when exceptions can be made. Bush’s military order excluded the possibility of a judicial review of the prisoner’s seizure, detention and status and banned captives from filing a case at any regular court, that is, “(i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal” (Bush 2001/11/13). The stated reasoning behind this decision, as mentioned above, was the imperative to extract information from alleged carriers of secret information. As Bush argued, trying suspects in regular courts of law would have hampered the ability of the United States “to gather incredibly important intelligence to prevent the next attack from happening to America” (Bush 2001/ 12/04).104 Due to the global scope of the ‘War on Terror’, the order not only applied to people captured on the battlefields in Afghanistan but also to people who had been arrested elsewhere in the world and who had then been sent to Guantanamo (Cole 2003: 42). There was no presumption of innocence for captives at Guantanamo. Therefore, these individuals were not treated as suspects, but as killers who were “devoted”, as Vice President Cheney stressed, “to killing millions of Americans, innocent Americans” (Seelye 2002; cf. Lelyveld 2002: 62). As there was no possibility 102 Among the critics of this memorandum was Secretary of State, Colin Powell. He believed that the Geneva Conventions applied in this situation, but was not able to topple Bush’s decision; see DOS (2002/01/26). 103 In this respect, one important document is the Memorandum for William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department of Defense (DOJ 2001/12/28). This memo from the Justice Department, issued on December 28, 2001, dealt with “possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba”. 104 There are suggestions that another purpose for establishing military commissions was to make it easier to convict the defendants. Commissions operate with different sets of rules and might, for example, accept information that was gathered by abuse or based on hearsay (Forsythe 2011: 180).

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to challenge the circumstances in which they were held, most of the detainees faced unlimited detention, the more so as in contrast to other wars, which have a discernible endpoint, the ‘War on Terror’ is characterized by indefiniteness. Moreover, captives in Guantanamo were held without charge, were not subject to trial, and had no right to legal representation. Contact to relatives was also prohibited (Cole 2003: ch. 2; Barry/Hirsh/Isikoff 2004; Lewis 2004, 2005; Paust 2007; Forsythe 2011; Donnelly 2013). Obviously, in the face of such a grave threat as constituted by Bush, compliance with the law and due process could easily be considered an impediment to America’s national security.105 At the same time, establishing military commissions put America truly in the position of ‘doing justice’ as it now acted as judge, jury and executioner all at once (Zarefsky 2004b: 145). Overall, President Bush authorized an aggressive detention and interrogation policy which included forced disappearances and extraordinary renditions, i.e. kidnapping people anywhere in the world and transferring them to CIA prisons or countries known for torturous interrogation; the operation of so-called ‘black sites’, which were secret CIA prisons; the establishment of Guantanamo, Bagram and other confinement facilities controlled by the U.S. military that stood outside of U.S. legal jurisdiction; and the employment of coercive interrogation techniques that could amount to lethal abuse (Dratel 2008: xiv; Bassiouni 2010; Forsythe 2011). Although the Bush administration did not publicly affirm torture, it twisted its words with regard to the treatment of detainees in order to shift and narrow the definition of torture. Pursuant to the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Part I, Article 2, Clause 2, states “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture” (UNHR 1984). This description appears to leave open no room for interpretation, and this also seems to be the case with the definition of torture. In the same document, Part 1, Article 1, Clause 1, torture is specified as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession” (UNHR 1984). The U.S. is a party to this convention, which it ratified in 1994, albeit with reservations. After 9/11, the Bush administration’s lawyers engaged in legal sophistry that led to a narrow definition of both the intentionality of causing pain and of what could be called ‘severe pain’. The government’s key legal papers said that torture only occurred when there was specific intent on the part of the interrogator to inflict severe mental and physical pain, “not when it occurred as a by-product of seeking 105 This lasting attitude was displayed, for example, by the 2005 National Defense Strategy which stated that “our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism” (DOD 2005: 5; cf. Greenberg 2008: xi).

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information” (Forsythe 2011: 65; cf. Pious 2006: 182f).106 Moreover, the mistreatment of captives had to be more or less lethal in order to be considered torturous. One of these key legal papers prepared by the Justice Department was a memorandum that later came to be known as the ‘torture memo’. It was written on August 1, 2002 for the White House by Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee who was head of the department’s Office of Legal Counsel at the time. His memo states that for physical pain to be classified as torture it “must be of an intensity akin to that which accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ failure” (DOJ 2002/08/01). Moreover, the definition of torture was made contingent on lasting and visible signs of physical damage. Therefore, officials were able to argue that techniques such as waterboarding did not constitute torture because they did not cause serious (external) injuries (Correa 2007: 21). Although these interpretations clearly deviated from the spirit of the UN Convention Against Torture, they enabled the Bush administration to keep up appearances and assert that the United States did not undertake torture. Through this redefinition, the administration tried to shift proscribed practices into the realm of permissible emergency actions that were said to be indispensable for gathering life-saving intelligence. The wording that was used to do so was hallmarked by euphemisms.107 The measures that were being applied were known as ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, ‘counter-resistance strategies’, and ‘professional interrogation techniques’ with three grades of hardness (Lelyveld 2005). Later, Bush also spoke of “an alternative set of procedures” (Bush 2006/09/06). These technical terms sounded rather neutral and certainly appeared far less abusive than ‘torture’ would have. This also underpinned the assertion of legality and the claim that America’s cause was just.108 The Bush administration’s attempt to break free of the rules was accompanied by an expansion of its executive power (Daase 2002b: 132f). Bush’s officials claimed that the commander-in-chief was unconstrained by law as the presidential powers to wage war overrode international treaties and domestic laws. To defend their argument, some of Bush’s top legal advisors pointed to the past and asserted that during wars, U.S. presidents had always expanded their powers “without much attention to legal restraints” (Pfiffner 2010: 39; cf. Yoo 2005). As noted above, Bush’s repeated 106 The exegesis referred to the U.S. Code where the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is implemented with a slightly changed wording, that is, with torture defined as an act “under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering [. . .] upon another person” (U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113c, Section 2340, my emphasis). 107 For the attempts by Bush officials to avoid the word ‘torture’ and to use euphemisms for certain techniques such as ‘sleep management’ or ‘stress positions,’ see Hochschild (2004). 108 In terms of wording, Bush was careful not to speak of ‘torture’, even after the deaths of captives, and when the practice of waterboarding and the scandal of Abu Ghraib had become public. In an interview in 2009 he emphasized once again, “I firmly reject the word ‘torture’” (Fox News 2009/01/11).

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references to war President Franklin D. Roosevelt is in line with this argumentation. The intent of empowering the president to sidestep the law and permit ‘harsh interrogation techniques’ was clearly displayed in a Department of Justice memo, submitted on January 9, 2002. This document stated that it would be “constitutionally dubious” if Congress were to undertake the step of “restricting the President’s plenary power over military operations (including the treatment of prisoners).”109 This position was hardened later that year with the OLC memorandum by Jay S. Bybee in August 2002 mentioned above. The document emphasized the constitutional authority of the president as commander-in-chief to order interrogations since: the information gained from interrogations may prevent future attacks by foreign enemies. Any effort to apply Section 2340A [i.e. the UN Torture Convention implemented in U.S. criminal law against torture] in a manner that interferes with the President’s direction of such core war matters as the detention and interrogation of enemy combatants thus would be unconstitutional. (DOJ 2002/08/01)

This view was further fleshed out in a memorandum by the Defense Department (DOD) in spring 2003, which incorporated verbatim a large part of the Bybee memo. This DOD working group report on interrogations stated that “any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of unlawful combatants would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the President” (DOD 2003/ 03/06, 2003/04/04).110 This attitude not only implied the suspension of the Geneva Conventions and other treaties governing humanitarian law, but bypassing Congress as well. Moreover, with regard to jurisdiction, both documents detailed how to avoid torture charges or, respectively, how to proceed if lawsuits were filed; and they “provided interrogators with the authority to act with maximum impunity” (Luban 2007: 37). According to this reasoning, torture was viewed as a matter of national defense (Lewis 2004, 2005; Pious 2006: ch. 9; Luban 2007; Forsythe 2011; Donnelly 2013: 114–119; Parry 2013: ch. 7).

6.5.2 Pre-emptive Interrogation Following Bush’s security narrative, uncertainty about future attacks had to be reduced and new atrocities prevented, and countering this risk required pre-emptive action. With regard to America’s proceeding, it is certainly true what Daase (2010: 34)

109 The memo stemmed from the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, John Yoo and the Special Counsel Robert J. Delahunty. For the citation see page 47 of that document (DOJ 2002/01/09: 47). 110 The memorandum is called Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations. The draft is dated March 6, 2003, the final version April 4, 2003; for the citation see pages 259 and 306, respectively (DOD 2003/03/06: 259 and DOD 2003/04/04: 306).

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notes that “all proactive strategies to reduce international risks are much more active and offensive than traditional security policies aimed at averting threats or mitigating vulnerabilities.” Early on, U.S. officials mistreated detainees in the ‘War on Terror’, as witnessed, for example, by a Guantanamo prisoner in April 2002 (Jaffer/Singh 2007: A-228). Many captives experienced what Cofer Black, the head of the CIA Counterterrorist Center at the time, acknowledged at a joint hearing of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on September 26, 2002, that is, that “after 9/11 the gloves came off” (Bowden 2003: 56). Officially approved in December 2002, and April 2003, ‘harsh interrogation techniques’ exceeded army regulations, and they provided a long list of possible methods. In sum, U.S. personnel – military and CIA – were allowed to apply the following means in various combinations and intensities: deprivation of food and sleep, deprivation of light for more than 30 days, hooding for days at a time, forced nakedness, isolation, naked isolation in the cold, subjection to extreme noises/lights/temperatures for hours, kept standing for hours, threatened by dogs; the exploitation of detainee phobias, stress positions, sexual humiliation, prolonged shackling, slamming against a wall, beating, electric shocks, being held in a coffin-like box, mock execution, and waterboarding. In Guantanamo, a 72–point matrix specified coercion measures and their levels of escalation, and this included the application of physically and psychologically aggressive techniques (Barry/ Hirsh/Isikoff 2004: 32; Danner 2004; Olshansky 2007: 100–105; AI 2011; Parry 2013: 179). Interrogations could last for 20 hours a day. They certainly embodied Bush’s announcement that “there would be hell to pay for attacking America” (Bush 2001/12/04), and the International Committee of the Red Cross assessed these measures as “tantamount to torture.”111 Yet in the framework of Bush’s securitization, these routines were justified and necessary, and although the Bush administration did not openly advocate torture, it became largely viewed as a legitimate part of Bush’s policies (see section 6.6). Moreover, the portrayal of the ‘other’ as pure evil enabled doubts and mental stress to be avoided when applying torture; psychologically, it relieved those who approved and committed torture since “stereotypes that dehumanize out-groups alleviate guilt by legitimizing destructive and inhumane acts against them” (Janis 1982: 257). In the end, those who conducted torture were made to believe they were acting out of a patriotic duty to aid America’s security. This perception was underpinned by exempting interrogators who had tortured from criminal proceedings. Consequently, the opinion gained influence – here voiced by an U.S. official – that “if you don’t violate someone’s human rights some of the time, you probably aren’t doing your job” (Priest/Gellman 2002).

111 This assessment was reported by The New York Times as part of a confidential ICRC report to U.S. officials. See The New York Times (2004/11/30).

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The construction of the ‘other’ as a ‘ticking time bomb’ facilitated the use of torture, as did the label of ‘illegal combatant’. The former underpinned the urgency of action, whereas the latter removed the protection of captives and the legal constraints placed on interrogators. Moreover, as demonstrated, Bush depersonalized, decivilized, demonized, and dehumanized the ‘other’. In this respect, the detention and interrogation policies of the Bush administration exemplified “the ease with which morality can be disengaged by the tactic of dehumanizing a potential victim” (Zimbardo 2008: 17). Dehumanization works in two ways: it permits torture to take place, and it “is confirmed through torture” (Hajjar 2002: 120, emphasis in original). In other words, those who are not human do not deserve to be treated humanely, and the fact that they can be treated inhumanely proves that they are not human. However, even beyond the torture cells, the non-humanness of the ‘other’ became somewhat visible in Guantanamo. Pictures of the prisoners held there seemed to demonstrate that Bush’s construction of the enemy had materialized. In accordance with the animal-like nature of the ‘other’, captives were kept in chain-link cages. They were prevented from seeing with blacked-out goggles; their mouths were covered with surgical masks, their ears with earmuffs, their heads with caps, their hands with gloves – despite the heat they were exposed to. They were bound and shackled, forced to kneel and thus totally immobilized. These measures utterly reduced their senses and left them with very little of their humanity. Moreover, this outward appearance emblematized the homogenization of the ‘other’, and this was strengthened by the uniform orange suits they were forced to wear. The detainees were thus stripped of any individual features, the more so, as they were kept nameless – the Bush administration refused to disclose the captives’ names. At the same time, however, it was clear that they were Muslims and detailed instructions existed in Guantanamo on how to respect the detainee’s religious practices (Parry 2013: 210). Therefore, even if Bush was careful not to verbally attack Islam, the enemy was nevertheless homogenized as the ‘Muslim other’, and this revived images from Orientalist discourse. In sum, the image constructed of the Guantanamo captives was that of evil Muslims with unitary identities that were now under the strict control of the U.S. forces. Pictures of captives kneeling before U.S. soldiers were powerful images as they publicized the punishment, and restored the self-conception of American superiority. The enemy could no longer harm the United States but it could be subjected to interrogation. Guantanamo was just the beginning. The approval of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ paved the way for systematic abuse. What might have been intended as a limited exception actually escalated (Greenberg/Dratel 2005; Bassiouni 2010: 121–128; Pfiffner 2010; Forsythe 2011).112 U.S. forces “adopted a policy of physical

112 One reason for the expansion of abuse might have been the competitiveness between the Defense Department and CIA. As Pfiffner (2010: 103) points out, “each organization wanted to take credit for breakthroughs in the war on terror.”

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coercion that applie[d] to large numbers of detainees who almost certainly lack[ed] specific knowledge of future attacks” (Parry 2004: 159). It is reasonable to suggest that the treatment of captives in other confinement facilities was similar if not worse to that in Guantanamo Bay. In the latter, torture took place even though the International Committee of the Red Cross was occasionally able to monitor the treatment and condition of the detainees (HRW 2002).113 In other U.S. detention facilities, this was impossible, and much less so in CIA ‘black sites’, that is, in overseas secret detention centers that had been established on a secret order made by President Bush soon after 9/11. In Guantanamo, as well as in these other sites, fatal abuses certainly took place. In August 2003, the Guantanamo commandant Major General Geoffrey D. Miller was sent to the Abu Ghraib detention center in Iraq to “Gitmo-ize” the site to make the interrogations more effective and the detainees talk.114 After Miller’s visit “a training team from Guantanamo spent two months there” (Parry 2013: 189). This transfer of personnel happened on a larger scale. In 2004, while investigating Bush’s detention policy, an independent panel concluded that “interrogators and lists of techniques circulated from Guantanamo and Afghanistan to Iraq” (The Schlesinger Report 2004: 911, 925). What happened in Iraq afterwards is well-known due to the photo scandal that occurred in 2004. As the Abu Ghraib prison guard SPC Sabrina Harman declared, her job, while handling the detainees, was to make their life “hell so they would talk” (Thomas 2004: 27).

6.6 Audience In line with the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization, assessing the success of Bush’s securitizing moves requires consideration of the audience, that is, whether and in how far the audience accepted and reproduced Bush’s framings of identity and threat. In general, one can suggest that the more Bush’s threat scenario was reproduced, the more his conceptualization came to be seen as reasonable; and the more it was perceived as reasonable, the more the political action it enabled appeared legitimate. As has been pointed out earlier, however, the role of the audience is complex and its analytical integration is challenging. Although this problem starts 113 A handbook about the ‘standard operating procedure’ in Guantanamo included information on how to proceed during visits by the Red Cross and how to hide prisoners from the organization. As was discovered later, Guantanamo also had a ‘black site’, a location for secret detention (Forsythe 2011: 109, cf. Horton 2010). 114 The quotation stems from Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, a former 800th MP Brigade commander, responsible for Abu Ghraib at that time, cited in Barry/Hosenball/Dehghanpisheh (2004: 33). On this, see also Thomas (2005), Luban (2007: 40), and Parry (2013: 189), as well as The Fay-Jones Report (2004). The latter discovered that the import of Guantanamo operations “introduced another layer of complexity into an already stressed Abu Ghraib interrogation operations environment” (The FayJones Report 2004: 1046).

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with the determination of exactly who ‘the relevant’ audience is, a clear delimitation between securitizing actor and audience is impossible since the processes associated with meaning production and political action are reciprocal. Nevertheless, this chapter addresses the audience and thereby indicates that there are several target groups rather than one. Even though an in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this book, this chapter provides an outline of the position of four groups. The chapter begins with the public and the role of the media, and continues with the stance of Congress. It then moves on to look at the operating apparatus, that is, the government, its departments and legal offices, the military and the secret services. Including the apparatus underscores the fact that the securitizing actor is also part of the audience – just as audiences become securitizers when they reproduce Bush’s framings. Finally, the last section outlines the role of the Supreme Court, since the court has rejected core elements of Bush’s detention and interrogation policies over the years.

6.6.1 The Public and the Media There is a general tendency among the American media to echo the government’s official statements, and in times of war and terrorism journalists heavily rely on the information provided by the executive and regularly repeat it.115 Yet, the Bush administration also managed to perform as a fairly “unified front” and gave the media and other political actors “little to discuss beyond the key themes” it presented (Domke et al. 2006: 306; cf. Domke 2004: 166). In fact, the media intensely and closely reproduced Bush’s framings in the post-9/11 era (Billeaudeaux et al. 2003; Coe et al. 2004; Domke 2004; Entman 2004; Hutcheson et al. 2004; Jackson 2005; Croft 2006: ch. 3; Domke et al. 2006; King 2014: 8). They picked up Bush’s binaries of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and ‘good’ versus ‘evil’; evidently, these dichotomies were very attractive to the press as they manifested conflict and drama, carried much emotion and thus offered ‘big stories’ (Coe et al. 2004; Domke 2004: 36f, 165; Bennett 2012: 46f, cf. Paletz/Entman 1981: 17). These ‘stories’ largely displaced critical inquiry but rather extended the crisis. In so doing, the media “created tremendous fear in the population, which made the public look anxiously to the government for protection, rendering the population malleable to manipulation” (Kellner 2007: 627; cf. Domke 2004: 164; Der Derian 2009: 229). In sum, the media contributed to the construction of ‘self’, ‘other’, and ‘threat’ and helped to mobilize support for Bush’s course.

115 While initially this might have been a rally-around-the-flag reflex, it also seems to have been the consequence of a lack of resources for foreign news reporting (Winkler 2006: 5–7; cf. Manheim 1994: 127f).

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As the above indicates, criticism was rare. If, however, journalists did set out to challenge Bush’s security narrative and to present an alternative framing, they were likely to be silenced. A prominent example of this was the ABC television program Politically Incorrect. On September 17, 2001, the program’s host, Bill Maher, questioned whether the terrorists of 9/11 could truly be called ‘cowards’ as President Bush had done so. Afterwards, the White House press secretary Ari Fleischer publicly and harshly criticized Maher and prompted all Americans ‘to watch what they say’. Since several companies had stopped advertising with the ABC show and local TV stations had stopped broadcasting it, Maher came under pressure to apologize (Domke et al. 2006: 309, fn. 2). Taking instances like the above into account, the dominance that Bush’s discourse was able to develop might have been a consequence of both its attractiveness and the fact that alternative framings and narratives were suppressed. In this sense, Richard Bernstein’s observation seems to be correct when stating that after 9/11 ‘evil talk’ proved in a distressing way “its rigidity and popular appeal” (Bernstein 2005: 10, cf. viii). Objections to Bush’s interpretation or his announcements on the ‘War on Terror’ were denounced as unpatriotic, hazardous, and as siding with the terrorists. This demonstrates the inherent power of the rhetoric of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Opposing arguments can easily be dismissed by this logic that declares the ‘we’ as the “forces of goodness”, because this “legitimates any action undertaken in the name of good, no matter how destructive, on the grounds that it is attacking ‘evil’” (Kellner 2007: 628). Consequently, there were no serious challenges to Bush’s framings and no real impediments to his securitizing moves. Obviously, “the American public largely shared the government’s anxieties on 9/11” (Goldsmith 2007: 187), and with regard to the tremendous dimension of danger as purported by Bush’s narrative, many Americans were willing to accept the implementation of any means that countered the menace and kept the nation safe. In this respect, it is also important to note that the phrase ‘War on Terror’ was strongly absorbed and reproduced by the American people. As stated in The New Yorker one year after 9/11, the phrase ‘War on Terror’ “framed the way people think about how the United States is reacting to the September 11th attacks so completely, that the idea that declaring and waging war on terror was not the sole, inevitable, logical consequence of the attacks just isn’t in circulation” (Lemann 2002: 36). This framing had established an interpretation that was now accepted – or at least was not being contested – by the main audiences. As would be expected, critical defenders of constitutional and human rights did raise their voices. Kenneth Roth, for example, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, criticized the Bush administration. Although “terrorists believe that anything goes in the name of their cause,” he stated, “the fight against terror must not buy into that logic. Human rights principles must not be compromised in the name of any cause” (Scraton 2002b: 226). Similarly, Irene Khan, the secretary general of Amnesty International, maintained that measures that would have been unacceptable before 9/11 were now “becoming almost the norm”, and that Washington was promoting “a new doctrine of human rights à la carte” (Solomon 2005: 76). Although critique was

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expressed, alternative discourses generally remained rather faint. As David Cole observed, the “indefinite incommunicado detention of over 650 foreign nationals in Guantánamo Bay has sparked substantial criticism from abroad, but not at home” (Cole 2003: 40). It seems that large sections of the public accepted Bush’s conception including the government’s approach on prisoner treatment. Only a few weeks after the attacks, journalists noted that torture was “already a topic of discussion in bars, on commuter trains, and at dinner tables” and that this was understood in terms of “suspects and detainees who have refused to talk could have information that could save thousands of lives” (Rutenberg 2001). This in fact was a close reproduction of Bush’s securitization – and perhaps that of the media. Reports and statements by journalists, scientists and other reputable personalities in the media did indeed contribute to and echo Bush’s security discourse. As Jim Rutenberg noted in The New York Times at the beginning of November, 2001: On Thursday night, on the Fox News Channel, the anchor Shepard Smith introduced a segment asking, “Should law enforcement be allowed to do anything, even terrible things, to make suspects spill the beans? Jon DuPre reports. You decide.” One week earlier, on CNN’s “Crossfire,” the conservative commentator Tucker Carlson said: “Torture is bad.” But he added: “Keep in mind, some things are worse. And under certain circumstances, it may be the lesser of two evils.” [. . .]. The legitimacy of torture as an investigative tool is the latest in a progression of disturbing and horrific topics the news media is now presenting to its audience. (Rutenberg 2001)

Apparently, the media substantiated Bush’s framing, including the argument that abandoning the rules might be necessary for security reasons. The CNN example shows that the media produced the moral view of the ‘lesser evil’, which, in the end, justified torture. According to this view, the suffering of (a few of) the barbaric ‘other’ is justified if it produces the safety of (many of) the innocent ‘self’. By listing several contributions to the torture debate, Rutenberg (2001) observed “a growing number of voices in the mainstream news media raising [. . .] the idea of torturing terrorism suspects or detainees who refuse to talk.” Among these contributions was the 2001 Newsweek article “Time to Think About Torture” by Jonathan Alter who claimed that pre-9/11 law enforcement was now outdated, and that survival could well require the application of torture and that the United States would even have “to think about transferring some suspects to our less squeamish allies,” which meant countries known to commit torture during interrogations (Alter 2001: 45). Alter reported later that he had expected a flood of (protest) emails after the publication of his article but instead even obtained agreement from liberals (Rutenberg 2001). In a cover story for The Atlantic entitled “The dark art of interrogation,” Mark Bowden (2003) argued that if America were to pay for the silence of terrorists in blood, this could be one of the strongest arguments for the use of torture. Although he described torturous techniques as repulsive and devilish, he reasoned that they could “save thousands of lives” (Bowden 2003: 53). He thus advised the Bush administration to practice a double

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standard: “It is wise of the President to reiterate U.S. support for international agreements banning torture, and it is wise for American interrogators to employ whatever coercive methods work” (Bowden 2003: 76).116 Evidently, many people became entangled in this kind of logic. As Harvard Law School professor Alan Dershowitz, one of the most well-known American lawyers and political commentators in the United States, remarked in 2002: During numerous public appearances since September 11, 2001, I have asked audiences for a show of hands as to how many would support the use of nonlethal torture in a ticking bomb case. Virtually every hand is raised. (Dershowitz 2002b: 150)

Dershowitz probably contributed to this position by suggesting the institutionalization of torture in terms of judicial warrants for its legitimation. His newspaper editorial on this matter in November 2001 was widely discussed (Dershowitz 2001, 2002a, 2002b: 157–161).117 As Mark Danner (2009a: 76) notes in retrospect, the public debate reflected “an unvoiced acceptance [. . .] of the centrality of the mythical ‘ticking-bomb scenario’.” Particularly during Bush’s first term, critique and alternative framings were not extensively reproduced in the media, and the application of abusive interrogation techniques was downplayed (Greenberg 2005: xviii; Forsythe 2011: 221). In March 2003, The Nation commented on the “silence” of the media where “no follow-up investigations and few editorials had appeared – not even in the New York Times” (Press 2003).118 It is interesting to note that after 9/11 torture became a part of popular TV programs. In fact, there was “a dramatic rise in torture scenes in television shows and movies” (Phillips 2010: 104). The popular television program 24, for example, showed them on a weekly basis. The program demonstrated how an intrepid terror fighter was able to save innocent Americans by resorting to torturous measures. The protagonist was presented as a patriotic hero who had succeeded in foiling atrocities, albeit with extreme means, and just in the nick of time. The then-Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, provided the authority of his office to 24 by visiting the actors while they were in Washington filming another episode of the TV show (Pfiffner 2010: 85). This instance is a good example of how different agents can interact and influence one another in securitizing processes. This also means that an in-depth

116 As Bowden stated earlier in that article (2003: 54), ‘coercion’ was defined as ‘torture lite’. 117 On the call for the institutionalization of torture see also Krauthammer (2005); for a broader debate on torture see Levinson (2004a). 118 This is not to say that there was no coverage at all. For the pros and cons that were expressed in the torture debate, including reports that posed questions rather than giving answers or arguing for a clear position, see for example Chapman (2001), CNN (2001/11/07), Lithwick (2001), Solomon (2001), Sorensen (2001), Williams (2001), CBSNews (2002/01/17), Hoffman (2002), Posner (2002), Maass (2003).

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investigation of the audience would have to examine the mutual influence of the administration and the media, whereas, as mentioned above, the media might have taken up a strong securitizing role themselves rather than just reproducing Bush’s framing. In the present case, this would mean analyzing in how far Bush’s discourse contributed to the display of torture on TV by rendering it acceptable, and in how far these shows and movies in turn impacted on the audience, including the administration. Obviously, these torture scenes did have an influence on the audience as politicians, judges and interrogators referred to the program to either justify torture or use the scenes as models for interrogation techniques (Phillips 2010: 108). Perhaps even more than others, soldiers were impressed by the message carried by 24. As Pfiffner notes: The show is so compelling that the dean of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, went to see its creators in California to ask them to tone things down a bit. Military cadets were so enamored of the show that it was difficult to get them to accept the professional military doctrine on the rule of law and the laws of war. Finnegan said: “I’d like them to stop. They should do a show where torture backfires.” (Pfiffner 2010: 85)

Instead, the show seemed to confirm what the Bush administration purported: that torture was effective. Moreover, officials claimed that coercive measures, if correctly applied, would indeed produce life-saving information.119 Although this assumption could have been challenged by the public or Congress, it hardly ever was. Besides validating the asserted effectiveness of torture, 24 and other TV dramas that presented torturing heroes and ‘ticking time bomb’ scenarios had another influence as they appealed to powerful emotions. As Mark Danner suggests, they fueled both “the felt need in the face of vulnerability to assert power” and “the desire for retribution” (Danner 2009b: 54). In fact, the presumed hunger of the nation for retribution was also emphasized in the news media. A Newsweek article, for example, published shortly after 9/11, stated that “Americans want vengeance now”, that their “numbness [had] turned to rage”, and that President Bush clearly had to “retaliate forcefully” (Hirsh/Barry 2001). It is possible, therefore, that in addition to the feeling of the need to gather actionable intelligence, torture was understood as an equivalent response to the vicious attacks of 9/11 and was thus indeed a matter of revenge (Holmes 2006: 130; Ferrari 2007: 390). In the perception of some Americans, this might have restored power to the affected ‘self’ by demonstrating dominance in terms of ‘we can do these things to you.’ All of these discursive features – with the administration’s role lending a special authority to them – are probably part of the answer why large parts of the American

119 See on this, among others, Guantanamo Provides Valuable Intelligence Information (DOD 2005/ 06/12) and the Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2006) as well as Thomas (2005) and Parry (2013: 202, 271, fn. 201).

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people came to believe that torture was both justified and effective. Opinion polls seemed to reflect this. Despite America’s legal tradition and commitment to human rights law, in a survey in October 2001, 45 percent of those sampled said they were in favor of the U.S. government torturing terrorists if these had information about future attacks against the United States.120 Although one would suspect that this figure reflected the initial shock and fear caused by the attacks of 9/11, diverse opinion polls undertaken in 2005 produced similar outcomes (Gronke et al. 2010). This is remarkable, as in 2004, due to the Abu Ghraib scandal, a wealth of reports and photos had been published documenting the abuse of detainees. However, the public response was “at best apathetic” (Greenberg 2006b: 1) and the outright approval of torture remained fairly high. David Luban commented on this, stating that “American abhorrence to torture now appears to have extraordinarily shallow roots” (Luban 2006: 35).121 The reason for these fairly high approval rates might in part be subliminal. Besides the assumed need to gather information and the belief that torture was an effective means of reaching this aim, it is self-evident that Bush’s framing of a demonic, dehumanized ‘other’ fostered willingness to accept the deployment of abusive measures. As Robert Ivie (1990a: 72) notes, when we begin to treat certain terms “as virtual identities, as if one were the other,” we move “from a perception of speaking metaphorically to a perception of speaking literally.” Bush’s discourse worked this way, and with the enemy constituted as unhuman and totally evil, the idea of cruelty was manifest. The ‘other’ neither had human dignity in need of preservation nor a claim for human rights. Even though this representation was incorrect, subconsciously, in the mindset of the American people, it probably nurtured the view that this form of treatment was appropriate; or at least that the captives did not deserve anything better. In this respect, it is very likely that the long-standing Orientalist discourse had an influence on this view – the discourse with its deeply rooted interpretation of the West as culturally and politically superior to a backward, uncivilized, aggressive and dangerous Arab world. For a large section of the U.S. population, the attacks on 9/11 and the subsequent security discourse certainly corroborated their perceptions, and terrorism “became equated with the

120 This survey was conducted by Gallup/CNN/USA Today; it is listed in Gronke et al. (2010: 439). In general, the questions asked by such opinion polls reflected the ‘ticking time bomb’ scenario. They particularly focused on whether torture was acceptable ‘if the captives knew details about future terrorist attacks in the U.S.’ 121 Although the overall approval rates during Bush’s presidency are too broad to enable inferences to be made regarding his detention and interrogation policies, it is nevertheless worth mentioning that Bush’s actions received high levels of acceptance. According to an opinion poll conducted by CNN/USA Today/Gallup, ten days after the attacks of 9/11 George W. Bush reached a job approval rating of 90 percent which embodied the highest ranking in six decades. Although this was clearly due to the rallying effect in times of crisis, Bush’s approval ratings remained high and reached an average of 62 percent during his first term (Gallup 2001b, cf. 2001a, 2009a).

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Muslim world” (Parry 2013: 9). This equation enabled abuses to occur, since the American public was “prepared to accept any conceivable treatment of Arabs, including the torture of innocents unto death” (Holmes 2006: 129) as long as it was presented as a reaction to the 9/11 attacks. Although the government tried to enact its ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ in secret, investigative journalists had disclosed these proceedings to the public within a few months. As the journalists reported, the national security officials they interviewed for their article not only “defended the use of violence against captives as just and necessary” but “expressed confidence that the American public would back their view” (Priest/Gellmann 2002). Since this claim was correct to some extent, this indicates the mutual influence of securitizer and audience. Jacob Weisberg (2009: 37) attests the American people a “collective complicity” with the Bush administration. He argues that despite information about the infliction of torture, neither Congress nor the public raised an objection, and concludes that “prosecuting Bush and his men won’t absolve the rest of us for what we let them do” (Weisberg 2009: 37). Similarly, the journalist Andrew Sullivan remarks: Were we naïve in believing that characterizing complex conflicts [. . .] as a single simple war against “evil” might not filter down and lead to decisions that could dehumanize the enemy and lead to abuse? Did our conviction of our own rightness in this struggle make it hard for us to acknowledge when that good cause had become endangered? I fear the answer to each of these questions is yes. (Sullivan 2005: 11)

In sum, Bush’s framings were sweeping and they were constantly reiterated by the public and the media. In this sense, it is safe to conclude that Bush’s securitization was successful. For quite some time, his discourse impacted on the public as imperturbable statements of truth rather than deliberation about the best course of action. Therefore, the notion seems to be correct that ‘othering’ in terms of ‘evil talk’ is a powerful political tool that can be used to simplify complex issues, but also “to block genuine thinking, and to stifle public discussion and debate” (Bernstein 2005: viii; cf. Rediehs 2002) in terms of alternative, contesting framings.

6.6.2 Congress The shock caused by the unprecedented dimension of atrocities on U.S. soil that occurred on 9/11 prompted Congress to rapid action. Only three days after 9/11, it passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), and did so nearly unanimously; this provided Bush with the almost unlimited capacity to authorize the use of force in the ‘War on Terror’ and to take action without seeking prior Congressional approval.122

122 President Bush signed the AUMF on September 18, 2001.

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As Daase (2006: 79) notes, with AUMF “Congress effectively suspended [. . .] its duty to control the executive”, and the executive emphasized this. The attorneys of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel stressed that the AUMF had to be read as “Congress’s acceptance of the President’s unilateral war powers in an emergency situation” (DOJ 2001/09/25: 20f). This embodied the first powerful instance of a situation in which it was possible to break free of the rules and thus represented a seminal success for Bush’s securitization. After all, defining the 9/11 attacks as ‘acts of war’ had been a deliberate decision by the administration. Now, this interpretation, which claimed the need for actions beyond the law and legal boundaries, began to gain momentum. In the period that followed, the AUMF enabled the Bush administration to launch great parts of its detention and interrogation policy (Forsythe 2011: 89). It also permitted the administration to discuss and make decisions on vital aspects of contested policies in secret. This meant that a broader public debate and possible objections from a critical audience could be circumvented for the time being at least. Hence, with regard to the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization, one of the first steps in breaking free of the rules can consist of excluding the audience and withholding information about decisions that are inconsistent with established laws and legal understandings. Evidently, this has an impact on the concept of the CS as it further complicates an investigation of the audience’s role. However, in the present case, two aspects disrupted the administration’s secrecy. First, journalists had reported the fact that terrorist suspects were being tortured in U.S. custody. Second, as will be discussed below, leading members of Congress were informed about the harsh manner in which captives were being treated. These circumstances could have led to an investigation into Bush’s detention and interrogation policies; however, this did not occur. In fact, the lack of Congressional control was not just a matter of inability. As Ornstein and Mann (2006) impressively register, especially with regard to foreign and security policy, Congress displayed lethargy during the first six years of Bush’s presidency, and the extent to which it did so is historically striking. As the authors suggest, this might have been partly due to the executive’s inclination to operate in secrecy and thus to deny Congress access to meaningful information. This point certainly has some explanatory power. As the former Assistant Attorney General and head of the OLC, Jack Goldsmith, confirmed, the Bush administration “eschewed genuine consultation with Congress, both formal and informal, with members of the President’s own party as well as members of the opposition” (Goldsmith 2007: 206). Nevertheless, this point leads to the question as to why this attitude did not provoke Congressional investigation. Even if one accepts that the AUMF was approved at a time during which many people were in a state of shock and it was this that led to the limitations on Congressional powers, this cannot explain the lethargy that characterized the actions of Congress on this issue for many years. Congress could have ordered inspections to be undertaken of the treatment of detainees and ensured that information that had been kept secret was now disclosed. Yet, it declined to do so and refrained from using the measures it wielded to check and provide oversight over the

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administration’s policies. It is therefore very likely that Congress willingly adopted its position of support and did so for a long time. David Zarefsky suggests that Bush’s security narrative and war metaphor was so widely accepted that it forestalled “debate and criticism as luxuries” that had to “await the return of more tranquil times” (2004b: 140). Even a dramatic front-page story by The Washington Post in December 2002123 about the alleged brutal treatment of thousands of suspects who had been captured since 9/11 seemed to trail off. Consequently, Human Rights Watch Executive Director Ken Roth complained about the “painful silence” in Washington, D.C.: “I haven’t heard anyone in Congress call for hearings or even speak out publicly” (Press 2003). It seems plausible that Congressional inaction, at least in part, resulted from the dominance of Bush’s security discourse. There was a silent accord between the executive and the legislative that everything possible had to be done in order to keep America safe. Actually, this was more than the Republican majority in Congress lining up with its president, since many Democrats also supported the course being taken by the Bush administration. This leads to the conclusion that Congress believed in and supported Bush’s narrative. This support was probably enhanced by Bush’s endless reiterations as they constantly reproduced the climate of fear. Those who did criticize the Bush administration’s approval of the harsh interrogation of detainees were rebutted by references to the president’s powers as commander-in-chief and his responsibility to keep America safe by preventing further terrorist attacks.124 This led to a failure on the part of Congress to investigate, to ask tough questions and to meet its obligation in terms of executing Congressional oversight. As a consequence, Congress was dismissed by those officials it actually wanted to question (Ornstein/ Mann 2006; Jaffer/Singh 2007; Bassiouni 2010: 184–189; Forsythe 2011: 89–92). By September 2002, at least some members of Congress must have known about waterboarding.125 As Warrick and Eggen (2007) report, a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders, including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi from the Democrats, was informed about the ‘harsh interrogation techniques’ being applied by the CIA to make detainees talk. As two U.S. officials who were present at this meeting later recalled, no objections were expressed to these techniques, instead “at least two lawmakers in the room asked the CIA to push harder” and some questioned whether “the methods were tough enough” (Warrick/Eggen 2007). Before waterboarding became an issue of public debate, senior members of the intelligence committees had already been informed about this method of interrogation. About 30 briefings occurred in which the CIA informed legislative officials about the techniques being applied, and according to participants the reaction of the listeners was “mostly quiet 123 See on this Priest/Gellman (2002). 124 Lelyveld (2005) describes the general mood – national and Congressional – with regard to interrogation policy. See also Forsythe (2011: 89–92 and fn. 85). 125 Waterboarding is a form of torture that causes the captive to experience a sensation of drowning.

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acquiescence, if not outright support,” or, as the then-Chair of the House Intelligence Committee Porter Goss put it, there was “not just approval, but encouragement” (Warrick/Eggen 2007). Similarly, one U.S. official summarized the attitude as, “we don’t care what you do to those guys as long as you get the information you need to protect the American people” (Warrick/Eggen 2007). This provided clear support for Bush’s policies. When public debate later arose about the illegality of torturous interrogation techniques, officials from the Bush administration pointed to the fact that members of Congress had been well informed and had supported these same abusive techniques (Warrick/Eggen 2007). This suggests that influential members of Congress approved the ‘harsh interrogation techniques’ and that they also accepted the reasoning underlying these proceedings. It seems that Bush’s framing showed effect in at least two ways. First, it was assumed that the captives held secret information about future attacks and that torture would be an effective means to extract it; this, however, was rarely the case. As a report on Guantanamo detainees based on documents issued by the U.S. government concluded, only about eight percent of the prisoners could be characterized as al Qaeda fighters and fifty-five percent had committed no hostile acts against the United States or its allies (Denbeaux/Denbeaux 2006).126 Second, by assuming that the detainees carried vital information, U.S. security needs overrode the human rights of the ‘evildoers’ who, in any case, were deemed as undeserving of protection. Again, this exhibits the moral view of ‘the lesser evil’, an attitude which continued for years. As Lelyveld (2005) remarks, even the disturbing Abu Ghraib revelations in 2004 did not lead Congress to start a determined investigation; moreover, the ICRC continued to observe coercive treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo that was “tantamount to torture” at this time.127 Even two years later, in 2006, detainees in Guantanamo were probably still being tortured to death (Horton 2010).128 In sum, the appraisal of Congressional lethargy seems to be correct. During Bush’s second term, circumstances started to change, yet this was a tough process. In 2005 and 2006, Congress approved the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) and the Military Commissions Act (MCA). The DTA prohibited the military and the CIA from undertaking most of the torturous interrogation techniques – although the restrictions only applied to the CIA when operating within military facilities and not outside of them. However, the DTA also sought to prevent habeas cases as permitted by the Supreme Court (see section 6.6.4) and instead created a “limited form of review [. . .]

126 With regard to the war in Iraq, the figures were even more alarming. According to a report by the International Committee of the Red Cross “coalition military intelligence officials estimated that 70 to 90 percent of prisoners detained in Iraq since the beginning of the war ‘had been arrested by mistake’” (Jaffer/Singh 2007: 35). 127 See The New York Times (2004/11/30), and footnote 111 in this book. 128 Officially, the death of a detainee was declared as suicide, yet later investigation suggested that such deaths had actually been caused by fatal abuse.

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for prisoners at Guantanamo and people convicted by military commissions” (Parry 2013: 196). In other words, the DTA limited judicial oversight of the Bush administration’s actions. The new Military Commissions Act divested the courts of habeas jurisdiction despite the fact that the Supreme Court had found that the courts did have jurisdiction over Guantanamo, and the act also sanctioned the operation of military commissions as proposed by the Bush administration. Moreover, although the MCA stated that evidence obtained through torture was not permissible in cases taking place before military commissions, “evidence obtained coercively”, could be used, “if the government disputes that the coercive methods were ‘torture’” (Luban 2007: 39). In part, this enabled the ‘harsh interrogation techniques’ to continue (Luban 2007: 39–40; cf. Pfiffner 2010: 126, 141). Although the DTA and the MCA confined the scope of action, it is clear that Congress did not truly rebut Bush’s detention and interrogation policies. Instead, it “removed humiliating treatment as a war crime in US law” (Forsythe 2011: 89) and granted ex post legal immunity to U.S. interrogators. On this point, the DTA stated, “it shall be a defense that such officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent did not know that the practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and understanding would not know the practices were unlawful.”129 Therefore, as long as U.S. officials could assure that they had undertaken interrogations in “good faith”, their actions were legal and they could not be prosecuted. It was not until the midterm elections in late 2006, when the Republicans lost their majority in both houses to the Democrats, that Bush’s policies came under harsher scrutiny and Congressional oversight intensified (Lelyveld 2005; Ginbar 2008: ch. 15; Forsythe 2011: 89–92).

6.6.3 The Apparatus: Government, Military, Secret Services Speaking of the operating apparatus, focuses on the ‘internal’ impact of Bush’s narrative, that is, internal to the body that partly represents the securitizing actor. Here, the focus is on the administration itself, on departments, members of staff and legal advisors as well as on the intelligence services, the security agencies and the military. As a whole, this body also constituted a relevant audience. Although this ‘internal’ discourse is certainly not completely accessible, an in-depth investigation of the audience would have to examine it as far as possible, because the apparatus comprises the persons in charge who approved and/or implemented the emergency measures – assuming this was done. Here, the bottom line seems to be that parts of the apparatus – especially White House officials as well as leading personnel belonging to the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense – strongly confirmed

129 For the citation see Title X, section 1004(a) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, included in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006.

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and (re-)produced Bush’s threat scenario. In this sense, it is not only important to examine what was said, but also what was excluded from the discourse. Although the United States had experienced instances of terrorism before and had dealt with them as criminal acts, after 9/11 this approach was hardly discussed. As John Parry remarks, none of the administration’s memoranda issued referring to action against al Qaeda members “suggested that the model of criminal investigation and prosecution should dominate or be a presumptive response” (Parry 2013: 173). Rather, the interpretation as ‘acts of war’ became the driving force for policy-making.130 As demonstrated above, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and its head, John Yoo, played an important role in enabling the president to do what he wanted (Forsythe 2011: 77; cf. Goldsmith 2007). In general, it appears that Bush and his legal advisors mutually confirmed the threat scenario. An example of this is provided by White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales’ memorandum to the president from January 25, 2002. As Gonzales pointed out: the war against terrorism is a new kind of war [. . .]. The nature of the new war places a high premium on [. . .] the ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities against American civilians [. . .]. This new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions. (The White House 2002/01/25; cf. Greenberg/Dratel 2005: 119)

This memo repeated Bush’s identification of the ‘other’ as a carrier of secret information. Against the background of impending danger, the urgency of information gathering permitted the rules to be broken. In this scenario, terrorists who were alleged to possess (high value) information had to be made to talk, as doing so would save numerous American lives. This view was firmly established, as is clear, for example, from a 2003 DOD report on detainee interrogation. It stated: Due to the unique nature of the war on terrorism in which the enemy covertly attacks innocent civilian populations without warning, and further due to the critical nature of the information believed to be known by certain of the al Qaeda and Taliban detainees regarding future terrorist attacks, it may be appropriate [. . .] to authorize as a military necessity the interrogation of such unlawful combatants in a manner beyond that which may be applied to a prisoner of war who is subject to the protections of the Geneva Conventions. (DOD 2003/04/04: 287)

This text precisely reproduces Bush’s constructions of ‘self’, ‘other’, and ‘threat’: the enemy preyed on innocent victims; it was not a legitimate fighter and thus could not be held as a prisoner of war or receive the legal protection that this status granted; moreover, the enemy carried secrets, and gathering information from it was a matter

130 This book does not attempt to investigate the Bush administration’s motives for doing so, but it is presumed that the United States sought to extend and consolidate its worldwide supremacy and that this could not have been done by dealing with the attacks as criminal acts. On this topic, see for example Hippler (2002: 180f).

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of survival. By following this reasoning, the application of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ constituted necessary pre-emptive action, and torture was, henceforth, justifiable. In the end, the report represented the implementation of Bush’s promise to the nation: to do everything possible and to apply all means at his disposal to safeguard the American people.131 Over the following years, President Bush continued to emphasize the framing laid out in this chapter and reproduced a national climate of fear. The need for security in the face of an existential threat overruled the need for compliance with (humanitarian) law. Bush fought for the implementation of abusive interrogation techniques until the end of his administration. In summer 2005, when the DTA finally prohibited cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment during interrogations, Bush attached a signing statement to the law indicating that it would violate his powers as commander-in-chief and that he therefore might bypass it (Bush 2005/12/30). Bush also vetoed a bill on March 8, 2008 that would have restricted the CIA from using these techniques (Bush 2008/03/08a, 2008/03/08b). With regard to the effectiveness of harsh interrogations, Bush continued to emphasize that these techniques were “invaluable” to the United States; in Bush’s reasoning, they led to the disclosure of “information about terrorist plans we couldn’t get anywhere else, this program has saved innocent lives. In other words, it’s vital” (Bush 2006/09/15, cf. 2008/03/08a). Moreover, the president rewarded and promoted people who administered and authorized detainee abuse, and he refrained from calling for a profound inspection of detainee policy in military facilities, despite the Abu Ghraib scandal (Sullivan 2005: 11; Forsythe 2011: 45–47). At the same time, however, objections were expressed to Bush’s position within the apparatus. These objections became particularly strong when the military operation in Afghanistan led to large numbers of prisoners. This situation caused “an extensive debate within the administration about what to do with these people” (Parry 2013: 171). However, contestation was not restricted to the government. Prior to changes made by the Bush administration, the army’s manual had been based on the Geneva Conventions. Now, military officials feared a corruption of the uniformed

131 Vice President Cheney had already announced this in candid words on September 16, 2001 when he said in an interview that the administration would have to work “the dark side” (Cheney 2001). Some scholars even view the recourse to torture as a strategic move to demonstrate America’s decisiveness: “Because it violates an absolute prohibition, torture sends a message that there is nothing the United States is not willing to do” (Holmes 2006: 129f). In addition, the reasoning of Jack Goldsmith (2007), who was head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel from fall 2003 to summer 2004, is certainly compelling. He suggests that the grave fear of not doing enough to prevent another attack on American soil was the driving force that led the Bush administration to break free of the rules. In a similar way, David Cole, speaking about Bush’s detention and interrogation policy, remarked that “there is an inescapable realpolitik to this: Attorney General Ashcroft and President Bush know full well that they will take a far bigger ‘hit’ politically if there is another terrorist attack than if they lock up innocent Arabs or intrude on foreign nationals’ rights” (Cole 2003: 228).

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services and believed that traditional values such as military honor and proper conduct during war were in jeopardy. These critics were supported by members of the FBI and, notably, by four-star general and then-Secretary of State Colin Powell and his legal advisor William H. Taft (Lewis 2004: 6; Isikoff 2005; Jaffer/Singh 2007: 10–18; Danner 2009a: 76; Parry 2013: 184). As Powell pointed out in a memorandum on January 26, 2002, Bush’s course would “reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice” and endanger American troops (DOS 2002/01/26: 123). Clearly, there were advocates and opponents of coercive measures on various levels of the command structure (Thomas 2005; Phillips 2010; Pfiffner 2010: ch. 6). On the one hand, there were frustrated interrogators who had thought about applying ‘harsh interrogation techniques’ in the weeks after 9/11 (CCLE 2001), on the other hand, there were members of the military who disputed Bush’s position – mostly in terms of its legality but also with regard to security and morality. In a memorandum on October 25, 2002, General James Hill of the U.S. Southern Command cast doubt as to whether “all the techniques in the third category are legal under US law” (DOD 2002/10/25: 223). Moreover, several prosecutors resigned from the Guantanamo Military Commission because they believed that the proceedings violated the defendants’ rights to due process. One of these prosecutors, Morris Davis, demanded that any kind of evidence obtained through torture be banned from America’s systems of justice (Davis 2008; Pfiffner 2010: 137–140). Overall, the discussion among those involved centered on two aspects: first, whether the Geneva Conventions could be suspended; and second, in how far ‘harsh interrogation techniques’ would violate the law and established proceedings. In the end, the critical voices did not manage to avert Bush’s course as his threat scenario proved more effective. As The Schlesinger Report declared in 2004, “most cases for permitting harsh treatment of detainees on moral grounds begin with variants of the ‘ticking time bomb’ scenario” (The Schlesinger Report 2004: 974). In this sense, Bush’s framings paved the way for extraordinary means (Jaffer/Singh 2007; Ginbar 2008: ch. 15; Pfiffner 2010; Kahn 2011).

6.6.4 The Supreme Court Right after 9/11, the Bush administration began redefining and reinterpreting laws and treaties in favor of its detention and interrogation policies; however, U.S. courts refrained from challenging these practices for a long time. Possibly, 9/11 and Bush’s threat construction altered the sense of what was an acceptable means of guaranteeing security. In addition, during this period, the administration’s lawyers worked to circumvent the courts and claimed that the confinement facilities at Guantanamo Bay were not covered by U.S. jurisdiction. It was not until years after 9/11 that the Supreme Court ruled otherwise, and even after it had done so, the judges’ majority on issues such as these was often quite narrow. However, in a series of civil cases that

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took place between 2004 and 2008, the Supreme Court began to restore essential rights to Guantanamo detainees and to invoke the responsibility of Congress. In 2004 (Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld), the Supreme Court ruled that Guantanamo de facto fell under U.S. jurisdiction and that the prisoners held there were covered by habeas corpus, that is, that they had the right to contest their detention.132 However, this could only be done before the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) that had to be established in Guantanamo in the wake of the Rasul and Hamdi cases. Moreover, by the time the Supreme Court decided that Guantanamo detainees did have basic rights to due process, the Bush administration had already started diverting detainee flows to other U.S. detention centers like the one in Bagram, Afghanistan (Golden/Schmitt 2006). In 2006, (during the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld case) the Supreme Court ruled that the 1949 Geneva Convention’s Common Article 3 did apply to Guantanamo captives. This ruling confirmed and strengthened habeas corpus for Guantanamo prisoners by holding that Congress could not legally remove these rights – as it had done so a year before with the new Detainee Treatment Act. The Supreme Court also declared that the military commissions, as set up by the executive to prosecute Guantanamo captives, were unlawful, since they were not legally constituted and did not meet the minimum standards of law applicable in armed conflicts. In passing the Military Commissions Act (MCA) in 2006, Congress thus stipulated new structures for military commissions. However, with the new MCA, Congress once again denied Guantanamo detainees habeas rights. Finally, in 2008 (Boumediene v. Bush) the Supreme Court ruled that detainees had a constitutional right to access U.S. federal courts to challenge their incarceration. Despite these findings, the Supreme Court was criticized for having “pursued a practice of judicial minimalism” (Kahn 2011: 191, fn. 12, cf. 74). In a manner similar to Congress, the court appeared to be reluctant to intervene in Bush’s course, including his detention and interrogation policies (Drumbl 2007; Ginbar 2008: ch. 15; Greenberg/ Dratel 2008; Pitzke 2008; Pfiffner 2010: ch. 5; Forsythe 2011: 115, 171–174, 184; Kahn 2011: ch. 3).

6.7 Summary of Policies and the Audiences’ Positions The chapter demonstrated how President George W. Bush enabled unprecedented detention and interrogation policies and how the audiences positioned themselves and aligned themselves to Bush’s security discourse. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Bush redefined the rules that would have otherwise limited his scope of

132 The Hamdi v. Rumsfeld case was of special interest since Hamdi was a U.S. citizen and the question had to be settled as to whether an American citizen could be deprived of his or her constitutional rights. A similar case was that of José Padilla, also an American citizen, although he was not held in Guantanamo, but in a military prison in South Carolina, in the United States.

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action. With regard to the 9/11 attacks, the government abandoned the possibility of criminal prosecution, although this option would have been available (Parry 2013: 166). Instead, the attacks were defined as ‘acts of war’. Although this interpretation would normally have led detainees to be treated as ‘prisoners of war’ (POW) according to the Geneva Conventions, Bush declared that this convention did not apply and thus rejected established humanitarian law and provisions. The executive circumvented these treaties by asserting that the situation represented a ‘new kind of war’ and by establishing the neologism of the ‘illegal combatant’. Accordingly, U.S. courts were denied jurisdiction over these combatants, and were kept from practicing judicial oversight which could have secured the captives’ rights; instead, military commissions were established. The reasoning for this was that terrorist suspects were said to have knowledge about future attacks against the United States. Since collecting this information was presented as imperative to guaranteeing the security of the American people, intelligence gathering was not to be hampered by due process. The security needs of the United States clearly trumped the captives’ human rights. Bush’s security narrative implied that in order to prevent serious threats from materializing, the president had to be in the position to use all kinds of measures, and to this end, he claimed extraordinary powers in times of war. This was an attempt to circumvent possible objections and to operate with “clandestine means to reach alleged national security goals” (Daase 2006: 80). Bush used his war powers to enact the policies he saw fit. In terms of a critical discourse analysis and the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization, it is important to note that Bush’s framing enabled both an expansion of his powers and extraordinary actions. Although much of the responsibility for this rests with the president, the audiences played their parts. These audiences could have contested Bush’s framings, but instead they reproduced them. This clearly demonstrates how vital critical language awareness is as proposed by CDA and the CS. Speaking security in the way he did, Bush made the treatment of Guantanamo detainees seem reasonable and justified, and this includes the use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’. The application of torturous measures increased after Guantanamo became a role model for other detention centers. This book holds that Bush’s security discourse paved the way for this development. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Bush’s narrative strongly purported the view of the ‘other’ as a plotting and planning terrorist. In addition, the ‘other’ was presented as evil and subhuman, and features that might have given the ‘other’ a human appearance were concealed. Against this background, torture appeared legitimate – and this was certainly substantiated by amendments that protected interrogators who had committed torture. As Parry notes, “the idea of necessity, where security and fear outweigh the harm to people already believed to have information or at least to be enemies, drives the formation of policy” (Parry 2013: 178, my emphasis). The latter part of the sentence implies grave consequences. After all, although the captives were said to have valuable knowledge, even if

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they did not, they were still enemies – and according to Bush’s framing, enemies of the worst kind. If this status as such was reason enough to resort to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, it certainly contributed to the escalation of violence in U.S. detention centers. An interesting point to mention is that Bush’s framing rendered torture possible despite the fact that the administration continued to publicly deny it was practicing it. After all, outright acknowledgement of it would have contradicted the country’s conception of ‘self’. Instead, Bush and his administration tried to veil breaking the rules by redefining torture and by shifting limits up to a point where the term stood for nothing less than organ failure and death. This enabled the administration to deny that it was resorting to torture. However, despite the administration’s strategic move, large parts of the audiences were informed that proceedings were occurring that qualified as torture and other violations of law. Yet, Bush’s framing put people’s conscience at ease. It proved that the ‘ticking time bomb’ scenarios were powerful, which are “often invoked to support security-justified torture, [and] can separate people from deeply held ethical values” (Opotow 2007: 457). In this respect, Bush’s narrative not only reduced the levels of inhibition among U.S. officials to mistreat their captives, it also led to silent accord if not outright approval on the part of the audiences who by and large accepted Bush’s detention and interrogation policies. Bush’s endless repetitions of the enemy’s ruthlessness and of imminent lethal danger generated fear and certainly led (public) audiences to accept extraordinary measures in order to ensure their own survival. This framing also assured that any kind of responsibility was transferred to the enemy since U.S. action was just a reaction to the danger posed by the ‘other’. Moreover, in Guantanamo, the ‘inhumanness’ of the ‘other’ became visible to the American people. Through the way in which detainees were held in terms of space, surveillance, and appearance, they were indeed dehumanized – which, as noted, ‘confirmed’ their inhumanness. Most probably, these images had an impact on Bush’s narrative and on how his representations were accepted by the audience. With regard to torture, the public probably assumed that it was necessary, permissible, and effective, and as long as Bush’s strategies were considered an appropriate manner of preventing future attacks, all means were valid. Bush’s representation indeed implied that ‘harsh interrogation techniques’ were effective and that these methods were providing essential information; this, of course, could have been contested. Beyond morality, critics generally emphasize that torture should be rejected because it leads to all kinds of ‘confessions’. People who are subjected to torture, the argument goes, admit to anything to stop the pain. From what is known, however, this argument was not taken seriously by Bush’s officials; neither was the question of how to ensure that only those detainees who were most likely to possess useful information were subjected to harsh interrogations. As noted above, numerous captives were detained by mistake. Moreover, the documents under investigation suggest that there was no noticeable debate on alternatives. The question whether any conventional means of interrogation could have provided the same

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information did not constitute part of Bush’s discourse, and apparently, it was hardly discussed by the public either. It is reasonable to suggest that psychologically difficult times might make it easier to influence audiences. If it is true that the public expects a presidential “rhetoric of reassurance” (Gregg II 2004: 96; cf. Zarefsky 2004b: 137) during crises, then it is likely that an audience will also be open to the president’s wording and willing to adopt it. Against this background, it is not even surprising that Bush and his advisors “got their interpretations widely accepted as ‘knowledge’” and thus as the “dominant frame within which nearly all stories about 9/11 and the war on terrorism would be told and heard” (Chernus 2006: 3f). Moreover, the rhetoric of ‘evil’ strongly limited the audiences’ options. After all, opposition to evil appears to be right and thus the cause the United States was fighting for was constructed as “a higher moral imperative” (Sluka 2009: 145). Consequently, Bush’s discourse excluded critics from the outset as questioning the president’s course was construed as illegitimate or – even worse – as an alignment with the enemy. Without doubt, the media played a part in these developments. The media strongly reproduced Bush’s narrative and in doing so, engaged in securitization and the production of fear. This probably made the public even more willing to accept Bush’s politics that promised to safeguard security. In addition, the reproduction of Bush’s framings in the media created the impression that his was the appropriate and ‘correct’ view of the matter. Several journalists showed considerable openness towards the application of torture, and TV dramas presented it in outright positive terms, albeit as the last resort for American heroes. In contrast, critical approaches to torture remained rather faint. Criticism and alternative framings were seldom stated; and where they were voiced, they were hardly reproduced in the media. Congress, on the other hand, deployed very little effort in attempts to investigate and constrain the Bush administration’s actions. It largely refrained from controlling the executive and did so for a long time. In part, this might indeed have been the outcome of the executive’s secrecy and its attempt to circumvent Congress and withhold essential data from it. Yet, as noted, although Congress lacked information, this is not enough to explain the institution’s inaction on such a large scale. Rather, this inaction must be read as a sign of silent approval. After all, this is certainly clear from the measures authorized by Congress in 2005 and 2006. Even then, years after reports about torture had been published and the Abu Ghraib scandal had shocked the world, Congress only partly reversed Bush’s policies through the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act. Apparently, at that point in time, most members of Congress still supported Bush’s course and even promoted it, despite the fact that the Supreme Court had demanded change. The case at hand leads to further questions with regard to the role of the audience. Within the framework of the Copenhagen School’s concept, discussion needs to take place about whether the primal success of a securitizing move – especially in the realm of national security – represents the termination of transparency that excludes main

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audiences such as Congress from the political process, at least to some extent. Obviously, the lack of debate in Congress also constitutes an indicator of securitization. Second, and in line with the former, the role of the apparatus certainly needs further investigation. The members of the apparatus who were securitizing but also implementing and executing particular policies were at least as relevant an audience as the public and Congress. This is the case, because, initially, vital aspects of detention and interrogation policies were enacted in secret or at least without Congressional approval. In this respect, the internal debate within the apparatus is certainly important. If no other part of the democratic body was participating in decisions on renditions and interrogation techniques, the apparatus was the only realm that was left in which alternative framings and approaches could be presented. Therefore, considering the fact that decisions were brought about in secret, an in-depth examination of the audience should be expanded to include these inner circles. This would also more fully reveal the reciprocity between the production and impact of security discourse. Third, in this context, it would be useful to clarify whether audiences truly need to know everything in order to approve a particular policy and if these details have to be officially set out by the government. In the case of ‘harsh interrogation techniques’, the current study suggests that torture was made possible through Bush’s security discourse as a whole – without him publicly advocating or admitting torture. In fact, although President Bush did not openly recommend torture, it took place, and the audiences were well aware of this; moreover, they let it continue. In a nutshell, the Bush administration attempted to redefine and circumvent existing laws with regard to the rules of war and historical safeguards concerning detainees. For years, Bush’s discursive constructions – the logic he purported, and the actions he took in line with it – were not seriously challenged, neither by the judiciary, the legislative powers or the public and the media. Bush’s rhetoric of war and an evil ‘other’ that threatened the United States and ‘civilization itself’, forestalled deliberation. Bush developed a framing that implied his was the only possible interpretation of the situation, and the audiences accepted and in part heavily reproduced this narrative. It can thus be concluded that, overall, they supported Bush’s course of action and enabled extraordinary means – even if official approval was not sought or only granted with hindsight. However, especially during Bush’s second term, a contesting discourse began to gain strength that questioned Bush’s counterterrorism strategy. Besides the Abu Ghraib scandal, the reasons for this were the accumulating reports about detainee mistreatment in U.S. detention facilities, the public emergence of Bybee’s ‘torture memo’, growing mistrust of Bush’s extensive presidential powers and, related to these issues, his waning popularity. This competing discourse – favored by national and international human rights activists, legal researchers, and after 2006, by a Democratic controlled Congress – forcefully denied the legitimacy of Bush’s detention and interrogation policy and demanded revision. Moreover, it challenged the imperative of abusive detainee treatment and the deprivation of rights on the basis of Bush’s constituted threat scenario. Parts of Bush’s

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securitizations and the extraordinary means they had justified began to be rebutted. The Abu Ghraib scandal and several court decisions that restored rights to Guantanamo’s inmates challenged Bush’s conceptualizations and furthered a process in which his course of action lost legitimacy. In addition, it became clear that most captives at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib were of little, if any, intelligence value and that many of them had no connections to terrorist activities at all. This situation led Bush to consider closing Guantanamo; however, he did not make any serious preparations to do so or accelerate the matter. In terms of prosecution, between January 2002 and 2009 less than thirty Guantanamo captives were charged with crimes; only a couple of them were convicted (Pfiffner 2010: 162). This provided the background and initial context to Barack Obama’s security discourse. The next chapter will investigate how Bush’s successor spoke security.

7 Obama’s Security Discourse and Policies This chapter examines how President Barack Obama tried to discursively pave the way to end torture and close the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. The following sections analyze Obama’s security narrative as communicated during 2009, his first year in office. Similar to the examination of Bush’s narrative, this chapter investigates how Obama constructed the security threat and in how far this enabled and legitimated his policies. The analysis starts by focusing on Obama’s framing of identities, that is, on the American ‘self’ (see section 7.1) and the enemy ‘other’ (see section 7.2). The aim is to demonstrate the ways in which these framings show similarities to those constructed by Bush and in how far they differ from them. It will be seen that Obama reproduced the image of an exceptional ‘self’, albeit with reservations. In his framing, America had not been living up to its values and this was having grave effects on America’s security. This will be clearly revealed by his ‘threat’ scenario (see section 7.3) which constructs the American people as partly responsible for the danger they faced due to their conduct during the ‘War on Terror’, and particularly due to their approval of torture and mistreatment. A summary of Obama’s representation of identity and threat will be provided in section 7.4, and his political actions are then investigated in section 7.5. The latter outlines Obama’s enactments that in part rebutted the Bush era’s detention and interrogation policies, while displaying how Obama’s narrative made this political course seem reasonable. However, with regard to the audiences, the following section (see section 7.6) demonstrates that in many respects Obama’s view failed to achieve acceptance. A brief overview of the role of the public and the media, Congress, and the operating apparatus in this security discourse suggests that Obama faced permanent resistance to his politics of change. At the same time, Bush’s politics of fear, which had been established and substantiated during a period of many years, showed lasting effects, and the audiences continued to reproduce Bush’s security framing even when he was no longer president. Moreover, the context in 2009 was clearly different from that of 2001 and 2002. Whereas after 9/11 the security narrative became the all-encompassing discourse in the United States, in 2009 the dominant discourse was that of the real estate and economy crisis due to the crash of the Lehman brothers’ investment bank. The context was one in which the public was strongly occupied with financial, housing and employment issues. Nevertheless, the security discourse remained vital, and the nation was particularly divided on the question of what should be permitted to occur as part of the ‘War on Terror’ – which had been relabeled by Obama as the ‘fight against terrorism’. That Obama abandoned the catchphrase ‘War on Terror’, which had been “burned into U.S. lexicon” (AP 2009; cf. Maher 2009) just hours after the 9/11 attacks, was certainly a starting point for a change in words and politics. The following investigates this in greater detail and focuses on the question: how did Obama speak security? https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110626056-007

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7.1 Constructing the Self Like Bush, Obama emphasized America’s strength, and he attempted to comfort the nation and boost its self-esteem. However, as mentioned above, the context was certainly different. Whereas in Bush’s case this rhetoric was totally related to 9/11, in Obama’s case it was mainly a matter of providing encouragement to the people during a severe recession. It is interesting to note, however, that Obama’s wording resembled that of Bush’s in appearance when describing the situation or attempting to strengthen the American people. This is interesting precisely because the crises they faced were very different in nature. Just as Bush declared that ‘evil is real’ and everywhere, Obama stated that the ‘recession was real and everywhere’ (Obama 2009/02/24); whereas Bush argued that the task was ‘to save our children from a future of fear’, Obama believed the task was to ‘save our children from a future of debt’ (Obama 2009/02/24); finally, whereas Bush claimed that the United States was the ‘beacon for freedom’, Obama viewed the U.S. as the ‘beacon’ of prosperity and security (Obama 2009/04/29b). Obviously, a certain type of rhetoric exists that can be used for encouragement and stirring determination and this was used by both presidents notwithstanding the different circumstances. This can also be seen in Obama’s February 24, 2009 address to the joint session of Congress. His remarks conveyed a tone that is also known from Bush’s speeches: We will rebuild, we will recover, and the United States of America will emerge stronger than before [. . .]. The weight of this crisis will not determine the destiny of this nation [. . .]. What is required now is for this country to pull together, confront boldly the challenges we face, and take responsibility for our future once more [. . .]. As we stand at this crossroads of history, the eyes of all people in all nations are once again upon us – watching to see what we do with this moment; waiting for us to lead. Those of us gathered here tonight have been called to govern extraordinary times. It is a tremendous burden, but also a great privilege – one that has been entrusted to few generations of Americans. For in our hands lies the ability to shape our world for good or for ill. (Obama 2009/02/24)

This is just one example that shows that in terms of constructing the ‘self’, there were clear similarities between Obama’s and Bush’s wording. Both presidents emphasized the determination and strength of the United States, its mythical status of having being ‘called’ upon, as well as the country’s responsibility for the future of the world and its duty to lead. Yet, and this is the point to make here, in Obama’s speeches this was often done as part of a different discourse that dealt with economic recovery rather than the fight against terrorism. Although the former was doubtless a case of ‘security’, it had no direct relevance for the U.S. government’s detention and interrogation policy. Therefore, although this kind of reassurance and reproduction of America’s exceptional ‘self’ did take place, it is not further investigated. Instead, the following sections focus on the framings that formed part of Obama’s security

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narrative with regard to the ‘War on Terror’, and the respective policies of Obama’s predecessor George W. Bush. As will be seen, in this respect Obama did not constitute America’s exceptionalism as simply being ‘there’. Rather, he summoned the American people to demonstrate it once again.

7.1.1 America, the Innocent? An aspect noticeable in Bush’s framing was also used by President Obama: Obama spoke of ‘innocents’ when referring to the victims of the 9/11 attacks. He emphasized that he would be continuing “the effort to prevent bombs going off or planes going into buildings that would kill innocents” (Obama 2009/04/07). He too pointed out that the victims “were just going about their business, going to work” (Obama 2009/ 04/03, cf. 2009/03/27). This image of ordinary everyday life enhanced the impression of innocence since these were people who had obviously “done nothing to harm anybody” (Obama 2009/06/04). At the same time, the terrorists were identified as those who had sought “to advance their aims by [. . .] slaughtering innocents” (Obama 2009/01/20) or who would “willingly and gladly kill innocents” (Obama 2009/04/20); this further highlighted the contrast between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Similar to Bush’s framing, the victims were treated as private individuals rather than agents of a disputable system or power; the possible reasons behind the attacks were not addressed. In line with this conception of innocence, Obama also stressed that “the United States of America did not choose to fight a war” (Obama 2009/03/27, 2009/ 04/03) but that America and its allies had been “compelled” to fight it (Obama 2009/ 12/01). Furthermore, and this was also quite close to Bush’s rhetoric, Obama emphasized that “we did not ask for this fight” (Obama 2009/12/01), and that “we did not go by choice; we went because of necessity” (Obama 2009/06/04). This clearly continued Bush’s framing which pointed to an imposition of duty and underpinned the image of innocence. In mentioning the casualties of the 9/11 attacks, Obama designated the victims as “innocent men, women and children from America and many other nations” (Obama 2009/06/04). When speaking to international audiences such as during the speeches he gave at Strasbourg town hall, at the Turkish parliament, or the United Nations General Assembly, Obama generally alluded to the “innocent people” (Obama 2009/ 04/03, cf. 2009/04/07) or the “innocent men, women, and children” (Obama 2009/ 12/01, cf. 2009/02/09, 2009/04/06, 2009/06/04, 2009/09/23) who fell victim to terrorists wherever they strike. The repeated mentioning of ‘children’ provided an emotional touch, which was similar to Bush’s reference to ‘moms and dads’. Overall, ‘innocence’ was broadly conceptualized and ascribed to all victims of terrorism. Obama did not speak of ‘innocent Americans’, though, as if to avoid the assertion that Americans in general were innocent. He did not use this term with regard to the nation, or when referring to America’s status in the conduct of war. This points to

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what will be set out below (see sections 7.1.4 and 7.1.5) that Obama did not approve of Bush’s detention and interrogation policies but viewed them as a maculation on America’s innocence.

7.1.2 America: Greatness Must be Earned As mentioned earlier, nurturing the impression of America as a great nation is common in American presidential history. In this sense, Obama’s rhetoric was not an exception. In a similar manner to Bush, he conjured up the beauty of the American character that allegedly becomes particularly apparent in times of hardship. Speaking in general terms, Obama declared: Even in the most trying times, amid the most difficult circumstances, there is a generosity, a resilience, a decency, and a determination that perseveres; a willingness to take responsibility for our future and for posterity. (Obama 2009/02/24)

The president left no doubt that an inner goodness characterized the American mindset, and that it represented a virtuous strength of the American people. If required, the nation would demonstrate its dedication: “There is nothing [. . .] so defining of our character than giving our all to a difficult task” (Obama 2009/01/20). In pointing to the burden the fight against terrorism had brought with it, Obama complimented the American people and did so both in general terms as well as with regard to particular groups. He recognized the “great sacrifices” (Obama 2009/03/27) that civilians had made; he praised the intelligence community and the members of the Joint Terrorism Task Force for “working tirelessly” and “courageously”, and he honored them for the sacrifices they were “making on a daily basis” (Obama 2009/10/ 20, cf. 2009/04/16). He extolled the virtues of the troops who had fought “capably” (Obama 2009/05/06) and “bravely” against a “ruthless enemy” (Obama 2009/03/27) – a juxtaposition that raised the soldiers’ honorable spiritedness und clearly separated the ‘us’ from ‘them’. Having borne this burden, the soldiers and their families were said to “embody the example of selfless sacrifice” (Obama 2009/03/27). Obama declared that the nation would “honor them” for their “spirit of service” and their “willingness to find meaning in something greater than themselves” (Obama 2009/01/20). In this depiction, as is particularly common in the United States, sacrifices for the supposed good were constituted as heroism. A fallen soldier was honored as a “fallen hero” (Obama 2009/03/22), and the actions of the passengers, who had caused their airplane to crash before it could hit its alleged target in Washington, D.C., on 9/11, were called “heroic” (Obama 2009/12/01). Overall, it can be said that Obama reproduced the image of America’s greatness – and this was also done, as mentioned, as part of a parallel discourse of recovery after recession. Nevertheless, in comparison with President Bush, who reiterated American exceptionalism in a direct and hammering manner that was congenial to

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erase any doubt about its accurateness, Obama was more reserved. In Obama’s speeches, the greatness of the nation was often presented indirectly by stressing values that the people were not living up to. It was obvious that in Obama’s point of view America had failed to fully meet its concept of the exceptional ‘self’. Speaking of his presidential campaign, he remarked, “we know we live in the greatest country on Earth, but, gosh, we also knew that there was this big gap between what was possible and where we were” (Obama 2009/10/15). This attitude of critical distance had also been apparent in Obama’s inaugural address when he reminded the people to strive for the moral high ground: In reaffirming the greatness of our nation we understand that greatness is never a given. It must be earned. (Obama 2009/01/20)

In his narrative, Obama tied America’s greatness irreversibly to adherence to its values and laws, and he kept reiterating that the country had fallen short of complying with them (see sections 7.1.4 and 7.1.5). However, he also declared that America’s strength was its capacity to address its own faults. He attested that “our national greatness is embedded in America’s ability to right its course in concert with our core values” (Obama 2009/04/16, cf. 2009/04/21). This issue also formed part of a speech to members of the CIA: We’ve made some mistakes [. . .]. But the fact that we are willing to acknowledge them and then move forward, that is precisely why I am proud to be President of the United States. (Obama 2009/04/20)

Obama called for honesty and common sense in approaching problems, because this embodied “the unique genius of America” that made the United States “different as a nation” (Obama 2009/05/21). Like Bush, Obama used references to history, namely, to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, to demonstrate America’s greatness. Whereas Obama admitted that America was “perhaps not as innocent as we were when Roosevelt was President” (Obama 2009/12/01), he suggested that the past decades still displayed America’s inimitable position: Since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, and the service and sacrifice of our grandparents and great-grandparents, our country has borne a special burden in global affairs [. . .]. We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and we have at times made mistakes. But more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global security for over six decades [. . .]. What we have fought for – what we continue to fight for – is a better future for our children and grandchildren. (Obama 2009/12/01)

Again, this statement shows similarities to Bush’s line of argumentation. Although Obama omitted the metaphor of ‘freedom’s defender’, he stressed the American people’s readiness to make sacrifices in order to defend security and American values. He acknowledged that the United States had made mistakes, yet these flaws faded against the background of the task that the nation had successfully

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tackled. In this sense, Obama drew a time line from the great-grandparents of the American people to their grandchildren, a stylistic device to illustrate that in principle and across generations, the United States had stood for, and continues to stand for, the good.

7.1.3 America, Determined but Disunited With regard to fighting terrorism, Obama claimed that America was determined and that the country had resolve. Like Bush, he did so in a declarative manner, stating it as a fact on behalf of the people. As has been shown in detail in Chapter 6, Bush spoke of the ‘extraordinary times’ faced by the United States; he declared ‘we didn’t ask for this war’, but expressed his conviction that the American people were ‘determined’ and were the right kind of people to answer the ‘call’ upon America. Obama largely reproduced this rhetoric. In a town hall speech in Missouri he said: We’re living through extraordinary times. We didn’t ask for all the challenges that we face, but we’re determined to answer the call to meet them. That’s that spirit I see everywhere I go. That’s the spirit we need to sustain, because the answer to our problems will ultimately be found in the character of the American people. (Obama 2009/04/29a)

In a more direct manner, Obama demonstrated America’s determinism by contrasting the United States with the enemy in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’. He directly addressed the adversary and substantiated America’s resolve by using the inclusive ‘we’: We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense. And for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken – you cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you. (Obama 2009/01/20, cf. 2009/03/27)

This rhetoric was especially powerful as it avoided the third person and bluntly confronted the ‘other’ with the threat of annihilation. On other occasions, Obama emphasized that “we are decisive” (Obama 2009/01/26) and that the United States was “vigorously” (Obama 2009/02/09) going after the terrorists and would “relentlessly confront” (Obama 2009/06/04) them. He underlined that “we will not be deterred” and that America’s resolve was “unwavering” (Obama 2009/12/01). In a declarative manner, he stated that the United States made “a lasting commitment to defeat al Qaeda” (Obama 2009/05/06) and that this “commitment will not weaken” (Obama 2009/06/04). In linguistic terms, one of his strongest statements was that of “I do know with certainty that we can defeat al Qaeda” (Obama 2009/05/21, my emphasis). In this sentence, there is a great accentuation of certainty. While the ‘I-form’ already adds presidential authority to the statement, Obama did not leave it with ‘I know’ or the emphasis of ‘I do know’ but further added ‘I do know with certainty’. It is interesting to note, though, that he combined this with the modal verb

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‘can’ which actually lessened the impression of certainty again. In contrast, Bush would have probably stated: ‘I do know with certainty that we will defeat al Qaeda’. Overall, in comparison to his predecessor, Obama’s declarative rhetoric was less frequent and less ‘thick’ in its presentation. Although the lower frequency of this form of language was certainly related to the change of context and the temporal distance to 9/11, Obama’s wording sometimes lacked unrestrained passion and vigor and this limited the power of its impact. He used fewer sentences that conveyed absolute certainty. Instead, his statements sometimes seemed to embody an appeal. Stating that it was “ultimately the faith and determination of the American people upon which this nation relies” (Obama 2009/01/20) appeared to be a sober mention of a prerequisite rather than a rousing proposition. Similar, Obama’s statements were often presented as future goals rather than facts. With regard to the fight against terrorism, he stated that “we have a clear and focused goal” (Obama 2009/03/27, cf. 2009/09/23), an “overarching goal” (Obama 2009/12/01), a “common goal” (Obama 2009/05/06) with other nations, a “core mission” (Obama 2009/10/20) to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda” (Obama 2009/03/27, cf. 2009/04/06, 2009/04/29a, 2009/05/06, 2009/05/21, 2009/06/26a, 2009/09/23, 2009/10/20, 2009/12/01). The repeated alliteration of ‘disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda’ was certainly meant to increase the insistence of the intent to destroy the enemy and its network.133 Nevertheless, it is obvious that the statement ‘we will defeat al Qaeda’ would have had greater force than the announcement that the United States and its allies had the goal of doing so. Overall, Obama’s statements were more apt to communicate the prospect of a political endeavor than the certainty of success. After eight years of counter-terrorism measures, and with no end to the fight against terrorism in sight, Obama formulated his statements more prudently than Bush had done after 9/11. Although Obama was clear in stating America’s determinism to confront terrorism, he could not claim that his approach was based on national unity. In fact, by the time Obama had taken office, the nation was deeply divided on the ‘War on Terror’, and the ‘we’ – in terms of the American collective – had been shattered. Obama addressed this issue several times. In his inaugural address, he stated that the American people had voted for “unity of purpose over conflict and discord” (Obama 2009/01/20). While this was stated in positive terms, it actually referred to the fact that unity had been lost in important respects. Bush’s detention and interrogation policies and the operations at the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay was a focus of this disunity. On the day the OLC Memos were released – memos dealing with the interrogation techniques that had been applied to terrorist suspects during 2002 and 2005 – Obama commented on the “strong views and emotions that these issues evoke” and spoke of a “disturbing

133 While one could read the triad as synonymous, Obama possibly used it as climax, since at one point he spoke of “disrupting and dismantling and ultimately defeating al Qaeda” (Obama 2009/10/ 20, my emphasis) which seems so underline the goal-character of this statement.

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disunity” (Obama 2009/04/16). He urged the American people to look forward instead of backward, which included refraining from prosecuting those of the Bush administration who had approved and applied these interrogation techniques (see section 7.5.2). The reasoning behind this position was certainly multilayered; yet, avoiding further national divisions probably played a role in this decision. In Obama’s framing, unity was a constitutive aspect of his attempt to seize the future and enshrine American exceptionalism. Thus, he stressed that “we must resist the forces that divide us, and instead come together on behalf of our common future” (Obama 2009/04/16). However, reuniting the American people was difficult because, as Obama noted, “when it comes to actions of the last eight years, passions are high” (Obama 2009/05/21). In another instance, he bewailed that years of debate “have left our unity on national security issues in tatters” (Obama 2009/12/01). He pointed to the difficulty that came with a highly polarized political environment, and continued: It’s easy to forget that when this war began, we were united – bound together by the fresh memory of a horrific attack, and by the determination to defend our homeland and the values we hold dear. I refuse to accept the notion that we cannot summon that unity again. (Obama 2009/12/01)

Obama took on an even stronger position during this speech. Speaking about the ability of Americans to “come together behind a common purpose”, he stressed that he believed in this skill “with every fiber of my being” (Obama 2009/12/01). This is a strong metaphor and there is no way of increasing its strength; it is total. Obama was encouraging the American people to reconcile their differences by stating that he absolutely believed in the possibility of unity. Moreover, he was arguing that American “values” had the power to unite the American people; these values were said to constitute a “creed that calls us together”, and this creed had already proven its power as it had carried the American people through “the darkest of storms as one nation” (Obama 2009/12/01). Although Obama constituted the American people as united in honoring the service and sacrifice of U.S. soldiers, the secret services, and counterterrorism task forces (Obama 2009/01/20, 2009/02/24, 2009/03/27, 2009/04/20, 2009/10/20), he also pointed to the discord prevailing on the measures taken during the ‘War on Terror’. In his remarks on national security on May 21, 2009 he stated: We see that, above all [. . .] how the recent debate has obscured the truth and sends people into opposite and absolutist ends. On the one side of the spectrum, there are those who make little allowance for the unique challenges posed by terrorism, and would almost never put national security over transparency. And on the other end of the spectrum, there are those who embrace a view that can be summarized in two words: “Anything goes.” Their arguments suggest that the ends of fighting terrorism can be used to justify any means, and that the President should have blanket authority to do whatever he wants – provided it is a President with whom they agree. (Obama 2009/05/21)

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Obama was very clear in his assessment of this strong divide. The discord was not only uncomfortable and causing administrative problems, but affected the security of the United States. In exposing personal motives for seeking presidency, he stated: I ran for President because I believe that we cannot solve the challenges of our time unless we solve them together. We will not be safe if we see national security as a wedge that divides America – it can and must be a cause that unites us as one people and as one nation. (Obama 2009/05/21)

Obama pointed to the way in which America’s unity and security were interlinked. According to the president’s framing, America’s unity had been lost and its security hampered because the nation had gone astray (see section 7.3.2). Before these aspects of security are discussed in greater detail, the next section investigates Obama’s representation of an America that had lost its way. This is followed by an analysis of Obama’s framing in terms of how America could restore its ‘self’.

7.1.4 America: We Went off Course During 2009, there were only a very few instances where Obama emphasized that America’s cause in fighting terrorism was just. If he said so in declarative terms, he rationalized his proposition. One example of this was his speech on March 27, 2009, in which he presented a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The goal of the United States, Obama said, was: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That’s the goal that must be achieved. That is a cause that could not be more just. (Obama 2009/03/27)

This claim was more confined than those made by President Bush who had asserted in much broader terms that America’s cause was just (see section 6.1.6). Besides that, some of Obama’s statements once again resembled more of an appeal than a declaration: America – we are passing through a time of great trial. And the message that we send in the midst of these storms must be clear: that our cause is just, our resolve unwavering. (Obama 2009/12/01)

The fact that Obama only rarely spoke of America’s ‘just cause’ is surely associated with his views on Bush’s policies. Evidently, and this was particularly the case with detention and interrogation, Obama did not consider America’s cause to be just. In his inaugural address, he had already stressed that “our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please” (Obama 2009/01/20). Consequently, immediately after taking office, he signed the order to close the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay in order to:

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restore the standards of due process and the core constitutional values that have made this country great even in the midst of war, even in dealing with terrorism. (CNN 2009/01/22)

Obama did not seek to justify the application of ‘harsh interrogation techniques’; instead, he called this aspect of America’s detention policy a “mistake” (Obama 2009/04/20, 2009/04/21, 2009/04/29b, 2009/05/21) and “a misguided experiment” (Obama 2009/05/21). Even on the international level and in front of Muslim audiences like a student roundtable in Istanbul, Obama showed readiness to criticize the United States and to admit that America “has made mistakes and has its flaws” (Obama 2009/04/07, cf. 2009/01/26, 2009/12/10). This selfcriticism was probably a strategic move aimed at reconciling the United States with the international community and rebuilding cooperation. However, Obama was even more critical when addressing the American people. In so doing, he potentially increased his credibility and thus furthered the perception of strong leadership. Speaking of the interrogation techniques at Guantanamo Bay, he admitted: What I’ve said – and I will repeat – is that waterboarding violates our ideals and our values. I do believe that it is torture [. . .]. I believe that waterboarding was torture. And I think that [. . .] whatever legal rationales were used, it was a mistake. (Obama 2009/04/29b)

In line with this assessment, Obama spoke of a “difficult chapter” (Obama 2009/04/21) and of a “dark and painful chapter in our history” (Obama 2009/04/16). In mentioning the memorandums of interrogation methods, he said: The OLC memos [. . .] reflected, in my view, us losing our moral bearings. That’s why I’ve discontinued those enhanced interrogation programs. (Obama 2009/04/21)

This was to say that Bush’s policies had violated America’s constitutive ideals and that this had affected the American ‘self’; in Obama’s framing, torture embodied the opposite of what America stood for. With regard to the techniques used in Guantanamo, he bluntly remarked: We must leave these methods where they belong – in the past. They are not who we are, and they are not America. (Obama 2009/05/21) I’ve been very clear that Guantanamo is to be closed, that some of the practices of enhanced interrogation techniques I think ran counter to American values and American traditions. So I’ve put an end to these policies. (Obama 2009/04/15) Torture violates United States and international law as well as human dignity. Torture is contrary to the founding documents of our country, and the fundamental values of our people. (Obama 2009/06/26b)

Obama cautioned the American people about becoming what they actually stood against: lawless and cruel. Overall, he spoke with great determination on the matter

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of values. Nevertheless, like Bush, he also sought to strengthen his appraisal by appealing to others as witnesses. He maintained that his view of torture was not only a personal assessment but “the opinion of many who’ve examined the topic” (Obama 2009/04/29b). In addressing the Guantanamo-related policies of the Bush administration, Obama suggested that there would not be “a lot of thoughtful thinkers, liberal or conservative” who considered this approach to be right (Obama 2009/03/22). Whereas Bush had invoked God and ‘the world’ to underpin the justness of his course, Obama sought support from experts and intellectuals. However, he referred to yet another instance to make his argument: He underlined that the decision to end the contested interrogation techniques was shared by the majority of American voters “who nominated candidates for President [. . .] who [. . .] called for a new approach – one that rejected torture” (Obama 2009/05/21). In this case, Obama was referring to his challenger, John McCain, the Republican candidate he had run against in the 2008 presidential campaign. So in order to substantiate his view that the nation had gone astray, Obama pointed to his political opponent. “Although John McCain and I had a lot of differences on a lot of issues, this is one where we didn’t have a difference” (Obama 2009/01/11). This was a skillful strategy to back his argument by engrossing not only the opinion of experts but also of Republicans to strengthen his position. In fact, Obama spelled out that “the arguments against these techniques did not originate from my administration” (Obama 2009/05/21). Rather, he mentioned prominent Republican politicians and officials “including a Secretary of State, other senior officials, and many in the military and intelligence community” (Obama 2009/05/21) who seemed to know better than George W. Bush and who opposed permitting torture. Certainly, pointing to political opponents who – despite antithetic positions on many other issues – had agreed to end torture in Guantanamo was an attempt to profoundly strengthen the president’s position and to convince the audience of the correctness of his course. This was also the case with the claim that the ‘majority of Americans’ wanted this new approach. A notion of great centrality to Obama’s argument was that prohibiting ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ was not a matter of usefulness, but of loyalty towards the ‘self’. He asserted that he was “absolutely convinced” that it was right to end these practices: not because there might not have been information that was yielded by these various detainees who were subjected to this treatment, but because we could have gotten this information in other ways, in ways that were consistent with our values, in ways that were consistent with who we are. (Obama 2009/04/29b)

Obama’s clearest possible confession of a flaw at the governmental or even national level was uttered in a speech on national security on May 21, 2009, when he accused the Bush administration of having trimmed facts and of having been guided by fear. He commented:

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Instead of strategically applying our power and our principles, too often we set those principles aside as luxuries that we could no longer afford [. . .]. In other words, we went off course. (Obama 2009/05/21)

This statement was clearly aimed at Bush’s detention and interrogation policies. According to Obama, the Bush administration had taken an “ad hoc legal approach” that was “neither effective nor sustainable” in order to fight terrorism. The balance drawn by Obama in this speech was harsh. He made it clear that this policy had caused a “flood of legal challenges” and that his administration had been left to clean up the “mess”. In Obama’s words, Bush’s approach embodied a concept that: failed to rely on our legal traditions and time-tested institutions, and that failed to use our values as a compass [. . .]. Instead of building a durable framework for the struggle against al Qaeda that drew upon our deeply held values and traditions, our government was defending positions that undermined the rule of law. (Obama 2009/05/21)

It is interesting to note that Obama did not attempt to strengthen his argument by referring to human rights; instead, he invoked American values and strongly linked his argumentation to ‘our legal traditions’ and ‘our deeply held values’.134 Although American values were understood as universally valid and as embodying human rights, evoking the American myth was certainly the more compelling rhetoric for American audiences.

7.1.5 America: That is Who We Are! In defining America’s identity, Obama put great emphasis on the role of principles and values. Whereas Bush spoke about ‘freedom’, Obama spoke about the ‘rule of law’. One could say that, rhetorically, Bush defended freedom whereas Obama defended the basis for it. Although Obama’s discourse comprised remarkably less religious or ‘God talk’ than Bush’s, Obama treated the rules, as spelled out in the U.S. constitution, as “sacred principles” (Obama 2009/05/21). He not only assigned highest value to the constitution, but also to a God-given validity: the principles the constitution represented were presented as true and, in their truth, everlasting. Since these values were treated as constitutive of American identity, compliance with them defined whether Americans were being true to themselves and in a position to further America’s strength. Obama had foregrounded the essentiality of laws and ideals during his inaugural address:

134 In this respect, Etzioni (2011: 97) points to Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech. In that speech, Obama mentioned human rights several times but did so largely by pointing to U.S. history and America’s achievements.

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Our Founding Fathers [. . .], faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man – a charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience sake. (Obama 2009/01/20)

The similarity to Bush’s wording is clear. However, whereas Bush highlighted the role of freedom, Obama inserted historicity to emphasize the impact of the rule of law. The ultimate worth of American ideals and the rule of law was underpinned by mentioning the ‘Founding Fathers’, who had drafted the founding principles despite being faced with the severest circumstances. These principles were so valuable that the ‘blood of generations’ had been shed to secure them and this implied that the United States had a duty to act in accordance with them (see also Obama 2009/04/03). Hence, although these values and laws could stand for themselves, Obama clarified their importance by supplying further reasons to preserve, honor, and uphold them. He confirmed that these principles continuously demonstrated their immovable validity by noting that ‘these ideals still light the world’, and he added a statement that imparted absolute certainty: the United States will not give up these principles for they are more momentous than political convenience. In line with this conception, when Obama ordered the closure of the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, he stated: This is me following through on not just a commitment I made during the campaign, but an understanding that dates back to our Founding Fathers, that we are willing to observe core standards of conduct not just when it’s easy, but also when it’s hard. (IIP 2009/01/22)

It is interesting to note how Obama committed the American people to his own course: although it was him, the president, who was technically following through with his commitment, it was the whole nation, the ‘us’, that was willing to observe it. This will to adhere to these principles was inextricably linked to American identity. In terms of policy, these ‘core standards of conduct’ meant respecting the ‘other’s’ rights even if the ‘other’ did not respect America’s rights. This stance had to be substantiated in trying times: What makes America special in my view is [. . .] that we are willing to uphold our ideals even when they’re hard. (Obama 2009/04/21) What makes us, I think, still a beacon to the world, is that we are willing to hold true to our ideals even when it’s hard, not just when it’s easy. (Obama 2009/04/29b)

On another occasion, Obama said that the U.S. was willing to uphold its ideals “especially when it’s hard” (Obama 2009/06/01a, my emphasis). This notion is remarkable since it claimed a vital characteristic of the American ‘self’ that – at least at that point in time – was absent. It is clear that in Obama’s view the nation had been misled und thus had failed to uphold its own ideals. Thus, these statements essentially voiced how Obama wanted the American people to be. Clearly, he tried to stir up their willingness for reversion and to revive the ideal self-conception by

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highlighting that compliance with these values was part of American identity. This rhetoric was aimed at reassuring the nation of what was right and also possible. In this perspective, America’s heritage was a creed and an obligation: Where terrorists offer only the injustice of disorder and destruction, America must demonstrate that our values and our institutions are more resilient than a hateful ideology. (Obama 2009/05/21)

This appeal urged the American people to comply with the rule of law. Obama also prompted the intelligence agencies to adhere to these principles (Obama 2009/04/20, 2009/10/28). He announced reform of the American institutions in order to better deal with the terrorist threat, but he insisted that: we must do so with an abiding confidence in the rule of law and due process; in checks and balances and accountability. (Obama 2009/05/21)

Speaking to CIA employees who were in charge of protecting the American people but who were also required to follow the rule of law, Obama said: I’m sure that sometimes it seems as if that means we’re operating with one hand tied behind our back, or that those who would argue for a higher standard are naïve. I understand that [. . .]. What makes the United States special, and what makes you special, is precisely the fact that we are willing to uphold our values and our ideals even when it’s hard, not just when it’s easy; even when we are afraid and under threat, not just when it’s expedient to do so. That’s what makes us different. So, yes, you’ve got a harder job. And so do I. And that’s okay, because that’s why we can take such extraordinary pride in being Americans. (Obama 2009/04/20)

This appraisal matched Obama’s declaration that ‘greatness must be earned’ (see section 7.1.2). Obama further strengthened his message by addressing the CIA’s employees directly and constituting them as ‘special’ because of their alleged willingness to uphold America’s values – in fact, this was a rhetorical strategy designed to oblige them to do so. Moreover, the president put himself on a par with these employees by noting that ‘you’ve got a harder job. And so do I’. He showed sympathy that to be bound by law in the fight against terrorism was arduous if the enemy acted beyond any law. But in Obama’s framing, upholding these principles was exactly what set America apart and constituted the consciousness of a great ‘self’. If this “unshakeable commitment to our ideals” (Obama 2009/04/16) was lost, the consequences would be ruinous. Obama warned the American people that once they abandoned this commitment, they would lose their identity: “When you start sacrificing your values [. . .] you lose yourself” (Obama 2009/04/03, cf. 2009/12/10). Torture, in this framing, undermined the value-based substance and concept of America’s ‘self’. Generally, torture is used to destroy the dignity, identity and normative world of the tortured subject, but in applying it, it also calls into question the “defining characteristic” of the community that does so (Parry 2013: 212f). In this

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sense, Obama suggested that the very practice of torture could destroy the constitutional identity of the torturer and thus, in the end, the American ‘self’. In order to underpin this stance, Obama used a historical recourse and referred to World War II. As noted earlier, this is one of the most powerful historical references in American collective memory and serves as a screen with which to illustrate and contrast right from wrong. Obama presented evidence for his argument by pointing to Winston Churchill; and as such, used the “great historical stature” (Riccards 1986: 213), personality and leadership of the former British prime minister as a role model for his own course of action: I was struck by an article that I was reading the other day, talking about the fact that the British during World War II, when London was being bombed to smithereens, had 200 or so detainees. And Churchill said, we don’t torture – when the entire British – all of the British people were being subjected to unimaginable risk and threat. And the reason was that Churchill understood you start taking shortcuts, and over time that corrodes what’s best in a people. It corrodes the character of a country. (Obama 2009/04/29b)

With this story, Obama constructed a claim to truth. He did not state that Churchill ‘believed’ or ‘suspected’ that the abandonment of principles would corrode the people’s character – rather, the British prime minister ‘understood’ that this was the case. Obama used this wording to attest wisdom and insight to Churchill and thus stipulated his action as the ideal. Churchill rejected torture despite the fact that ‘London was being bombed to smithereens’ and ‘the British people were being subjected to unimaginable risk and threat’. The conclusion that should be drawn from this analogy was that no matter what the circumstances – and this included the most terrifying situations – it was wrong to torture. If this was the case, then Obama’s own decision to end torture was absolutely right. By employing this form of historicity, Obama did what many U.S. presidents had done before him: he used Churchill as a “legend whose determination was a guide for their conduct” (Riccards 1986: 213; cf. Toye 2008). With the Churchill-analogy, Obama pointed to both the governmental level of decision-making, and the widespread consequences of torture, which he viewed as endangering the character of the nation. Obviously, Obama agreed that “what begins with clean and tidy utilitarian references to the public interest and the greater good” ends in unregulated action and thus undermines both the core principles of the ‘self’ and the legitimacy of the state (Morgan 2000: 192). Obama’s narrative vehemently foregrounded the point that America’s values distinguished the nation from its enemies more than anything else. It was America’s values that enabled the country to draw “a sharp, moral contrast with our adversaries” (Obama 2009/05/21). Compliance with core principles was thus imperative, since otherwise the nation would dilute the lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Consequently, when chasing terrorists, the nation was “going to do so respecting the rule of law that I think makes America great” (Obama 2009/01/26). Since this aspect was so vital,

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Obama continued to emphasize the importance of adhering to these values even in the face of threat: In dealing with terrorism, we can’t lose sight of our values and who we are. (Obama 2009/ 04/03) Just as America can never tolerate violence by extremists, we must never alter or forget our principles. (Obama 2009/06/04) The United States is a nation of laws. My Administration will always act in accordance with those laws [. . .]. (Obama 2009/04/16) The United States is a nation of laws and so we must abide by these rulings. (Obama 2009/ 05/21)

Obama maintained that this was true even during the vigorous fight against terrorists. He asserted that his government would: make sure that the manner in which we operate currently is consistent with our values and our traditions. (Obama 2009/04/15) My administration is going to operate in a way that leaves no doubt that we do not torture, and that we abide by the Geneva Conventions, and that we observe our traditions of rule of law and due process. (Obama 2009/02/09)

As brought up above, Obama accentuated America’s greatness in terms of the country’s willingness and ability to admit its mistakes and change its behavior: “When we do make mistakes, then we are willing to go back and correct those mistakes” (Obama 2009/04/21, cf. 2009/04/16) and in so doing, “we [. . .] keep our eye on those ideals and values that have been passed on generation to generation” (Obama 2009/04/21). There was at least one instance where it seems as if Obama was pulling out all the stops to underscore the importance of his message. In his speech on national security, held at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., he even bound his political future to compliance with core values: We will vigorously protect our people [. . .] while abiding by the rule of law. Make no mistake: If we fail to turn the page on the approach that was taken over the past several years, then I will not be able to say that as President. And if we cannot stand for our core values, then we are not keeping faith with the documents that are enshrined in this hall. (Obama 2009/ 05/21)

Consequently, Obama closely tied compliance with American values to a specific policy, namely, to the prohibition of torture and the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention center: Our moral authority is derived from the fact that generations of our citizens have fought and bled to uphold these values in our nations and others. That’s why we can never sacrifice them for expedience’s sake. That’s why I’ve ordered the closing of the detention center in Guantanamo Bay.

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That’s why I can stand here today and say without equivocation or exception that the United States of America does not and will not torture. (Obama 2009/04/03) In dealing with terrorism, we can’t lose sight of our values and who we are. That’s why I closed Guantanamo.135 That’s why I made very clear that we will not engage in certain interrogation practices. (Obama 2009/04/03) We must draw on the strength of our values – for the challenges that we face may have changed, but the things that we believe in must not. That’s why we must promote our values by living them at home – which is why I have prohibited torture and will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay. (Obama 2009/12/01) Even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war. That is what makes us different from those whom we fight. That is a source of our strength. That is why I prohibited torture. That is why I ordered the prison at Guantanamo Bay closed. And that is why I have reaffirmed America’s commitment to abide by the Geneva Conventions. (Obama 2009/12/10)

Clearly, certain actions had to be taken because these reflected America’s identity. Obama repeatedly combined the presentation of the ‘self’ with the ensuing conditional link ‘that’s why. . .that’s why’ which linguistically enhanced the impact of his argument and added rationality to his policies. These anaphors and parallelisms provided reasons for why certain things had to be done or had already been done. American values meant that changes had to be made to America’s detention policy. It is apparent, and elsewhere Obama stated this directly, that he wanted the United States to “serve as a good role model” (Obama 2009/06/01a). In this sense, it is striking that in exposing the American ‘self’, Obama’s statements often took on the form of an appeal. Instead of stating what the United States was, he used modal verbs to underline what ‘we’, the American people, ‘must be’ or ‘must do’, ‘must never do’, ‘can never do’ or ‘will do’ in the future. This indicates that although Obama verbally strengthened the sense of ‘who we are’, he did not believe that the nation was upholding these ideals. This led him to further justify the necessity of acting within the rules: I am convinced that adhering to standards, international standards, strengthens those who do, and isolates and weakens those who don’t. (Obama 2009/12/10) America is stronger than any enemy – and we always have been – precisely because we do what’s right. (Obama 2009/04/29a)

135 As is known, to this date, the detention facility in Guantanamo is not closed. What Obama referred to here was the fact that he had ordered its closure.

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Obama’s view that America’s values generated the nation’s identity, strength, and – as will be discussed below – security, led him to emphasize that the nation had to change its course in order to restore its moral authority: America’s moral example must be the bedrock and the beacon of our global leadership. (IIP 2009/01/23a)

In line with this notion, Obama reiterated that he could confirm “without exception or equivocation” that the United States would not torture (Obama 2009/02/24, cf. 2009/04/03, 2009/04/06, 2009/05/21, 2009/07/07, 2009/09/23). With regard to content, this alliteration was absolute, and it constituted a promise to abandon all kinds of torturous measures. Moreover, it represented a further attempt to seize the moral high ground: I ordered the prison at Guantanamo Bay closed, and we are doing the hard work of forging a framework to combat extremism within the rule of law. Every nation must know: America will live its values, and we will lead by example. (Obama 2009/09/23) We’re going to close Guantanamo. And we are going to ban torture. And we are going to once again achieve the kind of moral primacy that America had previously been known for. (Obama 2009/10/15) There is no force in the world more powerful than the example of America. That is why I have ordered the closing of the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. (Obama 2009/02/24)

Obama was attempting to invoke the deeply rooted self-conception of Americans who consider themselves “morally sound, if not superior to other nations in their commitment to liberty and human rights” (Pfiffner 2010: 2). However, as already mentioned, regaining moral primacy was not an end in itself, or a mere question of morality. As will be elaborated below (see section 7.3.2), it was closely interlinked to America’s security and the country’s aim to shape world affairs. In this sense, America had to be a role model by living according to values that were understood as universal. As common in American interpretations, Obama presented American values as ultimate and therefore as generally effective. As noted earlier, he (Obama 2009/05/21, 2009/ 01/20) constituted American principles as ‘sacred’ and as embodying truth, and they were equated with human rights: Democracy, rule of law, freedom of speech, freedom of religion – those are not simply principles of the West [. . .] but [. . .] universal principles [. . .]. (Obama 2009/06/01a) These are not just American ideas; they are human rights. (Obama 2009/06/04) I don’t think these are American ideals and I don’t think they are the monopoly of one country. They’re universal values. They’re human rights. (Obama 2009/07/07)

Consequently, Obama pointed out that America’s catalogue of values constituted the origin of the world as it should be; a world that “promotes dignity and opportunity

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and justice for all who stand with us” (Obama 2009/10/20). He stressed America’s “commitment” to these values and its “promise” to “support them everywhere” (Obama 2009/07/07). However, if these values were to be promoted by the United States in other regions of the world (Obama 2009/03/27, 2009/06/01a, 2009/ 06/01b, 2009/09/23, 2009/12/01, 2009/12/10), they also had to be observed at home. Again, Obama wanted the United States to function as an example. Therefore, he appealed to the American people to do so and to live up to the nation’s ideals. Clearly, this also had to be demonstrated with the case of Guantanamo and at other sites of injustice: We must promote our values by living them at home – which is why I have prohibited torture and will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay. And we must make it clear to every man, woman and child around the world who lives under the dark cloud of tyranny that America will speak out on behalf of their human rights, and tend to the light of freedom and justice and opportunity and respect for the dignity of all peoples. That is who we are. That is the source, the moral source, of America’s authority. (Obama 2009/12/01)

By juxtaposing the strong metaphors of a ‘dark cloud of tyranny’ and ‘the light of freedom and justice’, Obama put forth another variation of the contrast between ‘us’ and ‘them’, albeit in a more general form. He called for a mobilization “of our might and moral suasion” to cope with the challenges (Obama 2009/12/01). The main challenge Obama was referring to here, was posed by terrorism and the members of al Qaeda. The next chapter outlines how Obama framed this ‘other’.

7.2 Constructing the Other Like Bush, Obama constructed the ‘self’ in strong opposition to the ‘other’. Although he rarely used dichotomies to directly contrast ‘us’ and ‘them’, something that Bush frequently did, the characteristics that Obama ascribed to the ‘other’ spoke for themselves: they clearly delineated the enemy from the American ‘self’. As the following sections show, Obama used a similar framing to Bush’s with regard to the discursively constituted features of the ‘other’. However, he did so with two main exceptions: first, Obama did not deploy much of Bush’s ‘evil talk’; he largely abstained from a religious superstructure built on a Manichean world view that capitalized on the ‘evilness’ of the enemy. Second, and in line with the former, Obama did little engage in dehumanizing the ‘other’. However, with regard to nearly all other aspects, Obama continued the framing that had been established in Bush’s narrative. These points will be outlined below in some detail, before section 7.3 analyzes the ‘threat’ that Obama constructed in line with his identity formations.

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7.2.1 The Terrorist Other Obama did not speak in dichotomies of ‘good versus evil’ and therefore did not use the abstract terms of ‘evil-ones’ or ‘evil-doers’. There were only a few instances where he alluded to a “vicious adversary” (Obama 2009/12/10) or mentioned that the American people had been “viciously attacked” (Obama 2009/12/01, cf. 2009/04/ 03). Although Obama clearly addressed the dangerousness of these “violent extremists” (Obama 2009/03/27, 2009/06/04) he was less willing to attribute a special status to them because of their ‘evilness’. On the contrary, Obama stated that once captured these terrorists were “similar to criminals who have engaged in violence of other types” (Obama 2009/03/12). His view seems close to that of Douglas Kellner on al Qaeda’s leader, bin Laden, in suggesting that demonizing the ‘other’ elevates its “status in the Arab world” and thus stimulates the support of “those who feel anger toward the West” (Kellner 2007: 628). When Obama spoke about the attackers of 9/11 or others who posed a threat to the United States, he usually used rather neutral technical terms like “al Qaeda and its allies” (Obama 2009/03/27, 2009/05/06, 2009/06/26a, 2009/12/01), “al Qaeda and its extremist allies” (Obama 2009/03/27, 2009/05/06, 2009/09/23, 2009/10/20, 2009/10/28, 2009/12/01) or “al Qaeda and its affiliates” (Obama 2009/05/21). Often he simply spoke of “extremism” or “violent extremism” (Obama 2009/02/24, 2009/ 03/27, 2009/04/06, 2009/04/07, 2009/05/06, 2009/06/04, 2009/06/26a, 2009/09/23, 2009/10/20, 2009/12/01). This was an attempt to confine America’s enmity to specific extremist groups and to avoid the impression that the fight against terrorism was a fight against Islam or Muslims in general. Those who were addressed, however, were constituted as truly dangerous. They were “resourceful” and “resilient” (Obama 2009/10/20), yet they had nothing to offer, nothing “but hatred and destruction” (Obama 2009/09/23), “violence and despair” (Obama 2009/05/06), and “the injustice of disorder” (Obama 2009/05/21). In line with this, when using the term ‘war’ in reference to the fight against terrorism, Obama spoke of America being “at war with al Qaeda and its affiliates” (Obama 2009/05/21) or, more complicated, of being “at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred” (Obama 2009/01/20).

7.2.2 The Barbaric Other Although Obama often referred to America’s adversaries in a rather neutral tone and simply spoke of ‘al Qaeda’, there were instances where he attributed sheer barbarism to them. The ‘other’ was a “ruthless” (Obama 2009/03/27, cf. 2009/06/04) and “unscrupulous” (Obama 2009/04/29b, cf. 2009/04/20, 2009/04/21) enemy who was known to “blow up” people and buildings (Obama 2009/01/11, 2009/03/27, 2009/04/07, 2009/09/23). The great brutality of the terrorists was demonstrated by

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the fact that they did not simply kill, but they were prepared to “kill innocents” (Obama 2009/12/01), or even worse, they “slaughtered” them (Obama 2009/01/20, 2009/04/03, 2009/12/01). This image of massacre certainly increased the impression of the enemy’s bloodiness. Repeatedly, Obama spoke about the “innocent men, women and children” (Obama 2009/02/09, 2009/06/04, 2009/09/23, 2009/12/01) who had fallen victim to terrorists, and in referring to 9/11 he pointed out that the victims were just going to work and had not suspected that they would be attacked (Obama 2009/ 04/03). Consequently, 9/11 had been an even more “vicious, evil act” (Obama 2009/ 04/03). These statements helped illustrate the furtiveness and cruel perfidy of the ‘other’ and maximized the gap between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Like Bush, Obama ascribed the terrorists a lust to kill. In this framing, the terrorists were viewed as killing innocents not only “willingly” but “gladly” (Obama 2009/04/20). This also implied that they rejoiced about these brutal and “senseless” (Obama 2009/12/10) deeds. With al Qaeda came “death and destruction” (Obama 2009/10/20), since the organization was – as John Brennan, Obama’s Assistant for Counterterrorism put it – nothing but a “death cult” (Brennan 2009/08/06).

7.2.3 The Fanatic Other Obama’s statements suggested that leading terrorists were so fierce in their determination that they could not be convinced by negotiations. In this sense, the ‘other’ was constructed as fanatical, even though Obama did not directly describe it as such. Instead, it was John Brennan once again who spoke of the “fanatical few” (Brennan 2009/08/06). However, Obama’s conception became clear when he pointed to the “uncompromising core” of the Taliban in Afghanistan who “must be met with force” and “must be defeated” (Obama 2009/03/27). According to this view, there were no other options to deal with this enemy. Obama’s view of al Qaeda was similar, and he highlighted his construction of the ‘other’ with a historic comparison: Evil does exist in the world. A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda’s leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism – it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason. (Obama 2009/12/10)

In this statement, Obama puts al Qaeda’s leaders on a par with Hitler’s armies. He equates them in terms of the impossibility of convincing either through argumentation and explains this point as a matter of reason, or more clearly, of the limits of reason. In other words, these people were not human beings that could be reasoned with. However, as noticed before, Obama and his staff tended to limit their assessments. The ‘other’ was not an ‘evil-doer’ but a member of al Qaeda, and not all of the terrorists were fanatics but only a small proportion of them, that is, the ‘core’,

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a ‘few’ or the ‘leaders’ of al Qaeda. In contrast to Bush, Obama tended to avoid speaking in broad and all-inclusive terms. Nevertheless, in presenting his statement as ‘a recognition’ of history, Obama postulated a claim to truth by explaining the present through the categorized past. Hence, the leaders of al Qaeda were presented as just as irrational and determined as Hitler’s armies had been. With the direct comparison between Hitler’s armies and al Qaeda, Obama’s rhetoric was close to that of Bush’s, who had called the terrorists the heirs of “fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism” (Bush 2001/09/20) and concluded that these people could not be appeased but had to be defeated (Bush 2001/12/07). Obama shared this conceptualization and it was expressed through the assumption that unlike “World War II, we can’t count on a surrender ceremony to bring this journey to an end” (Obama 2009/05/21). Moreover, he suggested that even if the United States were to change its policies and show more respect to the Muslim world, the terrorist organizations would continue to threaten America (Obama 2009/04/03). The reason for this was their ideological dazzlement: “These organizations are willing to kill innocent people because of a twisted, distorted ideology” (Obama 2009/04/03). Interestingly, in one instance Obama did acknowledge that there might be other motives for terrorist action. Speaking to students in Istanbul, he mentioned the “political cause” of terrorists, yet he did not elaborate on it and immediately rejected “blowing up innocent people for a political cause” (Obama 2009/04/07).

7.2.4 The Outcast Other As was the case with Bush, Obama constituted the ‘other’ as an outcast enemy. It belonged to a minority that was lawless, “stateless” (Obama 2009/04/20) and boundless and “heeds no borders or laws of war” (Obama 2009/03/27). In contrast to communities within civilized societies, al Qaeda was “not constrained by a constitution” or the “rule of law” (Obama 2009/04/20, cf. 2009/04/21); in fact, it was “not bound by any rules” (Obama 2009/06/01b, cf. 2009/12/10). In addition, Bush’s and Obama’s framing showed conformity in denying the enemy true religiosity and access to Islam. Obama accused the ‘other’ of having instrumentalized Islam and of having turned it into a lethal ideology. The terrorists “have distorted and defiled the great religion of Islam” and now “religion is used to justify the murder of innocents” (Obama 2009/12/10, cf. 2009/12/01). This was a powerful statement since Obama is known for having had first-hand experience of Islam. His position of being a Christian but also being familiar with Islam enabled him to emphasize that this violent approach was one “that people of all faiths reject” (Obama 2009/04/06, 2009/06/04). The terrorists were thus excluded from the community of believers, and because of their adherence to a ‘distorted ideology’, they were said to “have discredited and isolated themselves” (Obama 2009/09/23). The actions of the terrorists were not only “irreconcilable with

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the rights of human beings” but with Islam itself: “The Holy Koran teaches that whoever kills an innocent [. . .] it is as if he has killed all mankind” (Obama 2009/ 06/04). Here, like Bush, Obama was attempting to hoist the terrorists with their own petard. He constituted the terrorists as wrong and as acting against the Koran they pretended to rely on. After having repeatedly emphasized that the terrorists killed innocents, Obama incriminated the ‘other’ by equating these murders with the murder of all mankind. Moreover, Obama contrasted the “enduring faith of over a billion” Muslims to the “narrow hatred of a few” (Obama 2009/06/04). They “kill in the name of God”, but their cause was neither just nor compatible “with the very purpose of faith” (Obama 2009/12/10). Obama disassociated al Qaeda from the faith of many and described the organization instead as a misled minority driven by hate.

7.2.5 The Bestial (Cancerous) Other There are not many occasions where Obama spoke metaphorically in terms of the bestial ‘other’. As pointed out above, he mostly used the wording ‘al Qaeda and its allies’, and set out his aim with the phrase to ‘disrupt, dismantle and defeat’ al Qaeda. However, every now and then Obama referred to a vocabulary associated with wild animals and declared his intention to “root out the terrorists” (Obama 2009/03/27, 2009/04/03, cf. 2009/02/09), or he adjured the need to “hunt them down” (Obama 2009/01/26, cf. 2009/06/01a). In line with this, the ‘other’ was constituted as somewhat intangible. The enemy was “diffuse” (Obama 2009/12/01), operated from the shadows (Obama 2009/10/20) and was part of a “shadowy” (Obama 2009/12/01) “farreaching network” (Obama 2009/01/20). More noticeable in this respect is the use of a different, very powerful metaphor, that is, the metaphor of cancer. In presenting his administration’s strategy about how to proceed in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the fight against terrorism, Obama declared that “al Qaeda and its extremist allies are a cancer” which could kill “Pakistan from within” (Obama 2009/03/27). In another speech, Obama pointed to the risk of al Qaeda spreading through Afghanistan (Obama 2009/12/01). Since Obama emphasized the notion that the security of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States were linked – an instance he stressed in his speeches as a “fundamental truth” (Obama 2009/05/06) – the message was clear: if the cancer were to spread, it would affect and endanger the United States as well. This rhetorical device was probably the strongest used by Obama since ‘cancer’ evokes a deeply rooted fear, namely, of something that grows (unnoticed) until it is too late. As Susan Sontag (1978: 14) noted in her work on Illness as Metaphor, ‘cancer’ works “insidiously” and is “terminal”. Even if a diagnosis of cancer no longer represents an automatic death sentence, death is always present as part of the disease. Therefore, in the audience’s collective perception, the malignancy of cancer is still deadly and this underlines the sense of grave danger.

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7.3 Constructing the Threat and Proper Threat Defense In line with the construction of ‘self’ and ‘other’, Obama’s ‘threat’ scenario consisted of diverse aspects. Whereas in Bush’s framing the threat emanated solely from the evil ‘other’ who strove for the elimination of freedom, in Obama’s security discourse it emanated from both the ‘other’ and the ‘self’. As will be seen, Obama’s conceptualization of danger included the ‘self’ not only as a reactive victim but also as an active agent. According to Obama’s narrative, America’s violation of norms and rules had undermined its national security. The abandonment of critical values had destroyed the unity of the nation and derogated its strength. The visible outcome of this violation of the rules was conspicuous in Guantanamo Bay and was used by the terrorists as a recruiting tool and thus empowered the enemy. Furthermore, America’s conduct had diminished its authority and credibility in the world and alienated international allies that the United States needed in the fight against terrorism. Therefore, in Obama’s security narrative, the ‘self’ was part of the problem and bore some of the responsibility for the danger it faced, even though the ‘other’ was still viewed as a dangerous adversary that had to be defeated. The following sections outline Obama’s threat scenario in greater detail.

7.3.1 The Threatening Other Obama was very clear about that the American people lived in “dangerous times” (Obama 2009/04/20) and remained “a target” (Obama 2009/12/01); he left no doubt that “we have very real enemies” (Obama 2009/04/21) and “very real security threats out there” (Obama 2009/04/15). Speaking of 9/11, he showed conviction that “the organization that planned those attacks intends to carry out further attacks” (Obama 2009/06/01b); and when Obama justified the continuing effort to “prevent bombs going off or planes going into buildings” he implied that al Qaeda indeed aimed to commit further atrocities of this sort. Obama thus stressed that the United States could not allow al Qaeda to “kill another 3,000 Americans or more” (Obama 2009/04/29a). The open scale of ‘three thousands or more’ fits with Obama’s concept since the extremists were said to be “determined to kill as many Americans as they possibly can” (Obama 2009/06/04, cf. 2009/03/27). It even seemed to be their only purpose since the main characteristic mentioned about al Qaeda was that it was “an organization that is out to kill Americans” (Obama 2009/06/01b). To cut down on counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan would therefore “create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks” (Obama 2009/12/01). In terms of numbers, however, Obama’s narrative was less dramatic than that of his predecessor: the Bush administration had argued that the enemy was seeking to kill ‘all Americans’ or ‘millions’ of them. In Obama’s narrative, al Qaeda posed the “greatest threat to our people” (Obama 2009/03/27) and “the single most direct threat to our national security interests”

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(Obama 2009/04/29a). The organization was presented as an enemy “on the offensive” (Obama 2009/05/06) and as one that was “actively planning attacks on the United States homeland” (Obama 2009/03/27). Although Obama did not always speak in a declarative manner, he did so on this issue. Instead of claiming a possibility, he spoke with absolute certainty, and often conveyed a tone of urgency: “We know that al Qaeda is actively planning to attack us again” (Obama 2009/05/21). On another occasion the president spelled out the enemy’s strength about which “we all know” (Obama 2009/ 10/20). Here, he used the inclusive ‘we’ to constitute his notion as common knowledge and thus mark it as fact. According to Obama, the terrorists were “determined”, “resourceful” and “resilient”; he first described them as powerful and subsequently stated that they were “still plotting” (Obama 2009/10/20). All this demonstrated the need to act. The immediateness of the menace was further highlighted by statements like “right now [. . .] there are people plotting to take American lives” (Obama 2009/05/ 21, my emphasis) or “as I speak” in training camps “new attacks are being plotted” (Obama 2009/12/01, my emphasis). Even worse, ‘they’, the terrorists, were said to be among ‘us’. Obama emphasized that the threat was not hypothetical but real and underscored this by mentioning that during the last few months “we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here [. . .] to commit new acts of terror” (Obama 2009/12/01). The effect of this notion was to provide the impression that a threat was imminent, an impression that was aggravated by the remark that “no one can ever promise that there won’t be another attack on America’s soil” (Obama 2009/ 10/20). Consequently, Obama thanked the members of the FBI for “guarding against future attacks” (Obama 2009/10/20) and reminded CIA staff that there was “no margin for error” (Obama 2009/04/20). All these statements pointed to impending danger. As could be expected, the threat was not merely constituted in terms of the national level: like Bush, Obama constructed the threat as global. The terrorists threatened “the United States, our friends and our allies” including “the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Obama 2009/03/27). In even broader statements Obama declared that al Qaeda presented “an enormous threat not just to the United States but to the world” (Obama 2009/04/07), which also meant that the organization was not only plotting against the American people but “people around the world” (Obama 2009/05/06). Consequently, Obama stated that the resorts of al Qaeda at the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan represented “an international security challenge of the highest order” because “the safety of people around the world is at stake” (Obama 2009/ 03/27). Obama underscored this claim by enumerating terrorist attacks in London, Bali, Islamabad, Kabul, North Africa and the Middle East, and speculated about al Qaeda attacks in Asian, European and African cities (Obama 2009/03/27). Therefore, although Obama did not refer to ‘civilization itself’ as his predecessor had done by speaking in dichotomies, he still presented terrorism as a threat with a global reach. As with Bush’s discourse, the severity of threat was dramatically increased with the reference to nuclear weapons. Obama also spoke about this issue with great certainty and garnered his presidential authority by using the ‘we’-form when declaring:

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“We know that al Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that they would use them” (Obama 2009/12/01). Stated as such, it was clear that the caveat also had to be absolute: “We must never allow a single nuclear device to fall into the hands of a violent extremist,” Obama reasoned, because if the enemy were to gain access to these weapons, it would lead to “acts of terror on a scale that we can hardly imagine” (Obama 2009/09/23). On another occasion he spoke of a “risk of catastrophe” and the murder of innocents “on a horrific scale” (Obama 2009/ 12/10). Nuclear weapons, therefore, had to be secured and kept out of the hands of the terrorists (Obama 2009/12/01). Again, Obama emphasized that the global nature of the threat meant that this was a matter of shared international security and responsibility. In a dramatic manner he stressed that “the theft of nuclear material could lead to the extermination of any city on the planet” (Obama 2009/04/03). Therefore, the message was clear: it was imperative that this technology did not get into the hands of “a few small men with outsized rage” (Obama 2009/12/10). Hence, Obama spoke on behalf of non-proliferation “to deny the world’s most dangerous people access to the world’s deadliest weapons” (Obama 2009/05/21). Overall, Obama constituted the threat in terms that were similar to those put forward by Bush with regard to content and presentation, with the exception that Obama did not compare the threat to the holocaust. Speaking of a worldwide threat, Obama reminded that “Muslim communities” were “also threatened” (Obama 2009/06/04). Although the threat emanated from Muslim countries, they were also in danger and had to react. The president used the metaphor of the “safe haven” over and over again in this context (Obama 2009/02/09, 2009/02/24, 2009/03/22, 2009/03/27, 2009/04/06, 2009/04/29a, 2009/05/06, 2009/ 06/01b, 2009/09/23, 2009/11/18a, 2009/12/01). His references to a ‘safe haven’ were used to either place pressure on the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Muslim countries to act more decisively against terrorists, or to justify American foreign policy with regard to its counterterrorism measures. It was thus used as an alternative to Bush’s emphasis on those ‘who harbor terrorists’. Obama’s statements were aimed at making it clear that the U.S. could not allow these ‘safe havens’ to exist because they enabled terrorists to plot against the United States. Consequently, and here Obama mixed metaphors, America had “to root out those safe havens” (Obama 2009/02/09).

7.3.2 The Endangering Self While it is obvious that the ‘other’ posed a severe ‘threat’, in Obama’s security narrative, the ‘self’ also contributed to the hazards that America faced. In Obama’s framing, the source of the threat was twofold: it emanated from the (largely external) ‘other’, but it had also been produced by America’s violation of its own core principles. As has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, compliance with core values was central to America’s identity in Obama’s discourse, but this compliance was just as much a matter of staying safe:

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It is precisely our ideals that give us the strength and the moral high ground to be able to effectively deal with the unthinking violence that we see emanating from the terrorist organizations around the world. (IIP 2009/01/22)

In Obama’s framing, the pursuit of American values determined America’s national security. Following the rule of law was of ultimate importance since it was the key to prevailing: “To overcome extremism, we must also be vigilant in upholding the values our troops defend” (Obama 2009/02/24); if America did so, Obama was confident that “we will defeat our enemies, because we’re on the better side of history” (Obama 2009/04/20). However, Obama viewed America’s national security as having been hampered by a deviation from its core principles, a situation that had also divided the nation (see section 7.1.3). He explicitly stated that American values were linked to American security and that adhering to the rule of law was not only desirable but a prerequisite to America’s safety: I will do whatever is required to keep the American people safe, but I am absolutely convinced that the best way I can do that is to make sure that we are not taking shortcuts that undermine who we are. (Obama 2009/04/29b) I believe with every fiber of my being that in the long run we also cannot keep this country safe unless we enlist the power of our most fundamental values [. . .]. Together we have a responsibility to enlist our values in the effort to secure our people, and to leave behind the legacy that makes it easier for future Presidents to keep this country safe. (Obama 2009/05/21)

As was the case with the topic of unity, Obama used the metaphor ‘with every fiber of my being’. This metaphor was powerful because it lent certainty to his statement: after all, it was the president – the leader of the nation with all his insight and authority – who was convinced of it. Moreover, and this is related to the former, this metaphor most probably caught people’s attention because Obama used it very rarely and this further accentuated his statement. In the same speech, he pointed out that “time and again, our values have been our best national security asset” (Obama 2009/05/21). These statements were a clear call to refrain from torture, to abide by the rule of law, the constitution, and the Geneva Conventions, and to demonstrate once again that “we have the moral high ground” (Obama 2009/01/07). This clear demonstration, Obama declared, would “make us safer” (Obama 2009/01/07). On numerous occasions, he reiterated that “living our values doesn’t make us weaker, it makes us safer and it makes us stronger” (Obama 2009/02/24, cf. 2009/01/07, 2009/04/16, 2009/04/20, 2009/04/29b, 2009/05/21, 2009/06/01b, 2009/06/04). However, due to Bush’s detention and interrogation policies during the ‘War on Terror’, America’s moral authority had been diminished and the consequences in terms of security loss were manifold: These interrogation techniques [. . .] undermine our moral authority and do not make us safer. (Obama 2009/04/16) There is also no question that Guantanamo set back the moral authority that is America’s strongest currency in the world. (Obama 2009/05/21)

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Torture [. . .] diminishes the security of those who carry it out, and surrenders the moral authority that must form the basis for just leadership. (Obama 2009/06/26b)

Obviously, noncompliance with America’s core values entailed a high price for the United States. Therefore, the message was that America had to seize the moral high ground again in order to regain and strengthen its reputation and power, as well as its unchallenged leadership position (see section 7.3.3). These clearly defined aspects of America’s security were presented as having been tarnished. In sum, these notions expressed what Obama stated elsewhere in a brief three-word-formula: “right makes might” (Obama 2009/12/01). It is telling that Obama spoke at great length about American values in a speech on national security. In his remarks on May 21, 2009, he elaborated on the profound impact that fidelity to American values could have and enumerated the positive effects that these values have led to throughout American history: Fidelity to our values is the reason why the United States of America grew [. . .] to the strongest nation in the world. It’s the reason why enemy soldiers have surrendered to us in battle [. . .]. It’s the reason why America has benefitted from strong alliances that amplified our power [. . .]. It’s the reason why we’ve been able to overpower the iron fist of fascism and outlast the iron curtain of communism [. . .]. (Obama 2009/05/21)

Again, Obama constructed the link between values and security with the catchy sequence of conditional ‘cause and effect’-sentences, presented in the form of parallelisms. This rhetorical device powerfully demonstrated the positive effects that adherence to the nation’s fundamental values would have on American and world affairs. With regards to content, Obama touched on the glory of the American nation in its most trying times, especially during World War II but also the Cold War, to prove the power of American values. According to this logic, these values were vital for strength, in establishing resilient alliances and making enemies and hostile systems surrender. This also implied that renunciating these values entailed negative effects – and very much so in terms of national security. With regard to national security and world affairs, Obama also addressed another aspect. He stated the following in front of an international audience during his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo: America – in fact, no nation – can insist that others follow the rules of the road if we refuse to follow them ourselves. For when we don’t, our actions appear arbitrary. (Obama 2009/12/10)

The self-criticism Obama displayed here points to the ‘normative costs’ (Daase 2005) that come with violations of the law: deviation from the established rules, especially by a superpower, severely weakens accepted norms and thus produces new security problems. Obama referred to the international consequences that America’s conduct in the ‘War on Terror’ could have. If other states were to infringe humanitarian and

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international law, America could hardly confront them for their wrongdoing. Even worse, these countries could point to the action of the United States to justify the fact that they too deviate from the rules. As Obama put it, if America fell short of its ideals, this “can be an excuse for others” (Obama 2009/07/07). In the end, such a process could erode international law on a larger basis and in turn threaten the American people in various ways. For all of these reasons, Obama decisively turned against an ‘either-or’ position on values and security: We need not sacrifice our security for our values, nor sacrifice our values for our security, so long as we approach difficult questions with honesty and care and a dose of common sense. That, after all, is the unique genius of America. (Obama 2009/05/21)

Obama often spoke in an absolute manner and with urgency on this matter. He announced that America “must reject the false choice between our security and our ideals” (Obama 2009/04/16, cf. 2009/01/20, 2009/04/29a, 2009/04/29b; IIP 2009/ 01/22). It is indicative that he and his administration did not merely consider the choice to be false; rather, the judgment was delivered that it was false. As Obama made clear, problems occurred the other way round: “When you start sacrificing your values [. . .] then over the long term that will make you less secure” (Obama 2009/ 04/03). Therefore, the United States did not only have a “moral” interest in binding itself to particular rules of conduct but a “strategic interest” (Obama 2009/12/10) because “our security emanates from the justness of our cause” (Obama 2009/01/20). What Obama indicated here was that America was in danger because its cause was unjust; the U.S. was endangered by its own conduct, that is, its violation of law. According to Obama’s logic, America’s values and security were interdependent, but the nation had stopped living up to this ‘truth’. This issue certainly constituted one of Obama’s major objections to the policy of his predecessor, since, in Obama’s view, the Bush administration had played off one part of this ‘truth’ against the other. In this respect, Obama accused Dick Cheney, the former vice president under George W. Bush, of having led a movement that believed that it was impossible to reconcile security interests with American values. According to Obama, Cheney had drawn “the [. . .] wrong lesson from history” (Obama 2009/03/22). Obama strongly disagreed with the claim made by the former administration that ‘harsh interrogation techniques’ were an indispensable means of extracting information about future attacks and keeping America safe. Instead, he believed that information could have been gathered legally, even if doing so might have been more difficult (Obama 2009/05/21). In line with this framing, Obama argued that the violation of rules as observed in Guantanamo had diminished America’s security. One aspect of this reasoning was certainly that the mistreatment of captives “impeded the US effort to win the hearts and minds of the Arab-Islamic world and isolate the jihadists” (Forsythe 2011: 96). This alone lowered the prospects of winning the fight against terrorism as it impaired the willingness of Muslim countries to cooperate and turn in terrorists. What was even more

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momentous, however, was that according to Obama Guantanamo was a tool with which fighters were actively recruited. This further jeopardized the United States. Obama provided an authoritative statement on the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. He argued that the detention center’s effect on America’s security had been ruinous: [It] hasn’t made us safer. What it has been is a great advertisement for anti-American sentiment. Which means that there is constant effective recruitment of Arab fighters and Muslim fighters against U.S. interests all around the world. (Obama 2009/03/22) Instead of serving as a tool to counter terrorism, Guantanamo became a symbol that helped al Qaeda recruit terrorists to its cause. Indeed, the existence of Guantanamo likely created more terrorists around the world than it ever detained. So the record is clear: Rather than keeping us safer, the prison at Guantanamo has weakened American national security. It is a rallying cry for our enemies. (Obama 2009/05/21)

From this perspective, Guantanamo – established by President Bush to make the United States safer – had done the contrary and instead had multiplied the number of America’s adversaries.136 Guantanamo had accelerated the growth of antiAmericanism in the Islamic world and thus diminished America’s safety. White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs underscored this assessment with numbers by pointing out that al Qaeda’s leader had used the example of the Guantanamo Bay detention center to recruit extremists from around the world a total of four times in 2009 and thirty-two times since 2001, including in videos (Gibbs 2009). It is evident that in contrast to President Bush, who solely framed the ‘other’ as the cause of America’s threat, Obama also pointed to the involvement and responsibility of the ‘self’. Although the ‘other’ was still constituted as ruthless and highly dangerous in Obama’s narrative, the ‘self’ had also diminished America’s security because American detention and interrogation policy had led the ‘self’ to depart from its core principles. The ‘threat’ Obama constructed not only referred to the sheer number of (new) terrorists but also to their determination, and to their character in battle. Speaking of the contested interrogation techniques as applied in Guantanamo, he stated: They serve as a recruitment tool for terrorists, and increase the will of our enemies to fight us [. . .]. They risk the lives of our troops by making it less likely that others will surrender to them in battle, and more likely that Americans will be mistreated if they are captured. In short, they did not advance our war and counterterrorism efforts – they undermined them, and that is why I ended them once and for all. (Obama 2009/05/21)

In following this logic, ending torture and mistreatment would pay off in at least three ways: it would undermine a recruiting tool used by the enemy, it would decrease the enemy’s determination to attack the United States, and it would increase the chances of

136 According to figures published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C., in May 2004, al Qaeda’s recruitment efforts had reached a point where “eighteen thousand militants were prepared to attack the United States and its closest European allies” (Winkler 2006: 157).

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survival for captured American soldiers. In making his point, Obama also referred to Abu Ghraib, the Iraqi detention facility that had been at the center of international outrage in 2004 after photos were published showing the humiliating treatment of prisoners: When we saw what happened in Abu Ghraib, that wasn’t good for our security – that was a recruitment tool for terrorism. Humiliating people is never a good strategy to battle terrorism. (Obama 2009/04/03)

Obama’s conclusion was that Abu Ghraib had aggravated the hate against the United States, and so had Guantanamo. The latter had become “a critical recruitment tool that al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have used to try to demonize the United States and justify the killing of civilians” (Obama 2009/04/29b). Since recruitment was said to be a ‘constant’ and ‘effective’ process, it was also a cumulative process. In order to demonstrate this, Obama presented a thought game and put forth a hypothetical argument: Let’s assume that we didn’t change these practices. How [. . .] long are we going to go? Are we going to just keep on going until [. . .] the entire Muslim world and Arab world despises us? Do we think that’s really going to make us safer? (Obama 2009/03/22)

Clearly, this was a leading question in which the implied answer was that a continuation of these practices would severely undermine America’s security. In an interview, Obama agreed with the host that “a demonization of America” was occurring and that this was “like a new religion” with “new converts” (Obama 2009/01/26). In Obama’s security discourse torture was said to backfire; consequently, ending it would bring about positive results. Therefore, it was imperative for security reasons that Guantanamo would be closed. Another reason for this was that the events at the detention center had alienated America’s allies and thus reduced their willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in the fight against terrorism. This aspect will be examined in the next section.

7.3.3 The Alienated Partners Like Bush, Obama actively stressed the necessity to work together with the international community to fight against terrorism. In his statements, the ‘we’ in “we have a goal” mostly stood for international cooperation and alliances rather than solely for the American people. In contrast to Bush, however, who had simply expected ‘civilized’ people to support America’s ‘just cause’ and had verbally forced procrastinators to do so by his compelling dualism of ‘you are either for us or against us’, Obama made clear that international cooperation was not a given. Rather, he pointed to the unwillingness of other states to cooperate and constituted this as yet another characteristic of the threat faced by America. The threat was posed by the actual or assumed difficulty of building alliances against terrorism, and this difficulty was

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based on the alienation of (potential) partners due to America’s conduct in the ‘War on Terror’. According to Obama’s narrative, this was another instance where America’s detention and interrogation policies, which had gone beyond what the law permits, had produced ‘political costs’ (Daase 2005) that affected the security of the United States. Obama emphasized that the events at Guantanamo had done “incredible damage to our image and position in the world” (Obama 2009/03/22). He argued that America’s moral force had been corrupted, and he stated that America was now viewed with “skepticism and distrust” (Obama 2009/09/23). He spelled out that Guantanamo had become “a symbol for many around the world of us not sticking to our ideals and our traditions and rule of law” (Obama 2009/06/05, cf. 2009/ 06/26a). Allies and friends were said to have been bewildered by America’s cause of action and they were not convinced that it was just. As Obama put forth, this had weakened security since it prevented other countries from assisting the United States in the fight against terrorism. Obama stressed that the U.S. needed alliances in order to be successful in this fight, but that the will to cooperate had been lost. “We know,” he said, “that America cannot meet the threats of this century alone” (Obama 2009/ 02/24, cf. 2009/04/03, 2009/04/06, 2009/06/26a, 2009/12/01, 2009/12/10). However, he left no doubt that cooperation would be hard to achieve if the United States maintained its detention and interrogation policies. Obama reiterated that America’s course of action “sets back the willingness of our allies to work with us in fighting an enemy that operates in scores of countries” (Obama 2009/05/21). He asserted that the interrogation techniques “alienate us in the world”, and that they “increase the will of our enemies to fight us, while decreasing the will of others to work with America” (Obama 2009/05/21). This aspect was viewed as even more dangerous because the new threats demanded “even greater effort, even greater cooperation and understanding between nations” (Obama 2009/01/20). Here, Obama described a situation that David Cole (2003: 207f) had predicted in 2003: “When the government relies so heavily on double standards to strike the balance between liberty and security, its loss of legitimacy among [. . .] nations potentially our partners in the struggle against terrorism has its own substantial security costs.” In pointing this out, Obama justified the abandonment of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ and argued that doing so “puts us in a much stronger position to work with our allies in the kind of international coordinated intelligence activity that can shut down these [terrorist] networks” (Obama 2009/04/29b). Again, the key to maintaining or rebuilding strong partnerships against terrorism and thus to ensuring national security was that America upheld its own values: The terrorists can only succeed if they swell their ranks and alienate America from our allies, and they will never be able to do that if we stay true to who we are, if we forge tough and durable approaches to fighting terrorism that are anchored in our timeless ideals. (Obama 2009/05/21)

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Here, the audience was once again confronted with the conditional: security can only be created ‘if we stay true to who we are’. As noted above, Obama admitted mistakes on behalf of the U.S. government, tried to reconcile the United States with those who felt bewildered, and worked to bring about consensus. In his framing, refraining from measures that alienated America’s allies would help the nation to stay safe by maintaining international partnerships. Closing Guantanamo was aimed at restoring the legitimacy of America’s pursuit of national security, which by itself, was declared as “very legitimate” (Obama 2009/06/26a). Therefore, this undertaking was intended to provide “a legacy” for future presidents “that protects the American people and enjoys a broad legitimacy at home and abroad” (Obama 2009/05/21). Obama viewed compliance with humanitarian law as a mechanism for America to regain its reputation and achieve foreign policy goals (Zartner/Ramos 2011). This became particularly clear when he faced international audiences. As the following quote suggests, it was the restoration of America’s legitimacy that would force the international community to cooperate. Before an audience in Strasbourg, Obama stated: So we are going to conduct our operations in a way that reflect our best selves and make sure that we are proud. And that, in turn, will allow the Europeans, I think, to feel good about our joint efforts, and also not to have excuses not to participate in those joint efforts. (Obama 2009/04/03)

With this announcement, Obama was attempting to renew alliances by compelling other countries to participate in the fight against terrorism. On another instance, he requested their cooperation by pointing out that “those who used to chastise America for acting alone in the world cannot now stand by and wait for America to solve the world’s problems alone” (Obama 2009/09/23). In his inaugural speech, Obama had pointed out that America had overcome fascism and communism not just through its own military might but through “sturdy alliances” (Obama 2009/ 01/20). In this context, there is an interesting difference between Bush and Obama in the usage of the set-phrase ‘make no mistake’. Whereas Bush used it to affirm American strength in absolute terms – ‘make no mistake: we will win’, ‘make no mistake: we are determined’, or ‘make no mistake: justice will be done’ – Obama used it as an admonition that U.S. leadership and international cooperation in fighting terror was vital: Make no mistake: al Qaeda and its extremist allies are a cancer that risks killing Pakistan from within. It’s important for the American people to understand that Pakistan needs our help in going after al Qaeda. (Obama 2009/03/27) Make no mistake [. . .]: Iraq, Turkey, and the United States face a common threat from terrorism. (Obama 2009/04/06) Make no mistake: This cannot solely be America’s endeavor. (Obama 2009/09/23)

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Although these statements were declarative in character, they did not convey a promise of strength and victory but rather a warning of failure. It was a means employed by Obama to force the audience to support his course of action and to engage in an international coalition led by the United States. At the same time, it was apt to demonstrate to the American people that the willingness of other countries to cooperate was imperative. When speaking at the Turkish Parliament, Obama declared that the strength of the two countries’ alliance meant that “the world is more secure” (Obama 2009/04/06). Obama often reiterated the commonalities between the United States and other countries in order to stress common ground for partnership. In fact, regardless of whether he spoke before audiences in Europe, the Arab world or before American journalists after a meeting with the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Obama heavily stressed what they all had in ‘common’ and what needed to be done ‘together’. Again and again he pointed out that people had a “shared interest” (Obama 2009/04/07, 2009/06/05, cf. 2009/06/04), “common hopes” (Obama 2009/01/26, 2009/04/06, 2009/04/07), “common dreams” (Obama 2009/01/26, 2009/04/06, 2009/04/07) and “common values” (Obama 2009/04/03, 2009/04/06). Above all, they had “common humanity” (Obama 2009/01/20, 2009/04/03, 2009/04/07, 2009/06/04). They faced a “common threat” (Obama 2009/04/06), and came together on behalf of a “common security” (Obama 2009/03/27, 2009/04/03, 2009/04/06, 2009/12/01); they should cooperate due to their “common goal” (Obama 2009/04/06, 2009/05/06) to find “common solutions” to “common problems” (Obama 2009/04/03) and to enjoy a better life in a “common future” (Obama 2009/09/23). Obama underlined mutual dependence since terrorism was a matter of common threat and security. Especially in Europe, Obama used historicity to accentuate the meaning of alliances. Speaking in the town hall of Strasbourg, he repeatedly referred to World War II and the Cold War: This is a mission that tests whether nations can come together in common purpose on behalf of our common security. That’s what we did together in the 20th century. And now we need an alliance that is even stronger than when it brought down a mighty wall in Berlin [. . .]. As it was in the darkest days after World War II, when a continent lay in ruins and an atomic cloud had settled over the world, we must make the journey together. (Obama 2009/ 04/03)

These references to collective memory were supposed to instruct the audience. As noted before, historical analogies of this kind “offer commentary on the present and generate expectations that the future will rise [. . .] to the level of the past” (Noon 2004: 342). So this was a means of underlining the need for international cooperation. At the same time, in order to renew the partnership with the Muslim world, Obama announced a change in tone towards Muslim countries and a language of respect (Obama 2009/01/26, cf. 2009/04/03). This was probably one of the reasons why his administration abandoned the term ‘War on Terror’, as it was perceived by many Muslims as anti-Arab and Anti-Islam (AP 2009). Like an act of conciliation, Obama

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acknowledged that he was “deeply committed to rebuilding a relationship between the United States and the people of the Muslim world – one that’s grounded in mutual interest and mutual respect” (Obama 2009/04/07, cf. 2009/01/20, 2009/01/26, 2009/ 04/06, 2009/05/06, 2009/06/04, 2009/09/23, 2009/12/01). Among his first interviews as president, he spoke to an Arab network and assured that “Americans are not your enemy” (AP 2009). Obama was aware that the reputation of America largely lay in ruins in the Arab world. Parallel to the Orientalist discourse in the West, there was a ‘Western’ discourse in the Orient that reproduced a disastrous image of America. The mistreatment of captives in U.S. detention had “fuelled the deep resentment of US double standards prevalent within Muslim nations and communities” (Scraton 2002b: 226; cf. Chernus 2006: 1f). Thus, reconciliation was vital as the United States needed a partnership with these countries for security reasons. Accordingly, Obama declared: America will defend itself, respectful of the sovereignty of nations and the rule of law. And we will do so in partnership with Muslim communities which are also threatened. The sooner the extremists are isolated and unwelcome in Muslim communities, the sooner we will all be safer. (Obama 2009/06/04)

In this statement the ‘partnership with Muslim communities’ linked the announcement that the United States was reverting to international and humanitarian law with the role of the Arab world in the fight against terrorism. The last sentences clearly imply the demand for the latter to take action itself and possibly to close the ‘safe havens’. Whether with regard to Arab, European or other countries, Obama’s security discourse clearly constituted the need to rebuild an alliance with these countries and these parts of the world: The United States was in need of international cooperation. This was a matter of America’s national security and because of that the country had to change course.

7.4 Summary of Identity and Threat Formation The sections above have laid out how President Obama constructed the identities of ‘self’ and ‘other’ and how this identity framing correlated with his ‘threat’ construction. Needless to say, the ‘other’ was constituted as the original source of threat. In many respects, Obama’s framing was similar to that of George W. Bush’s. Like his predecessor, Obama constituted the ‘other’ as an actively ‘plotting and planning’ enemy who sought to strike on a large scale. This enemy ‘slaughtered’ its victims, was fanatical in its approach and willing to kill innocents on the basis of a murderous ideology. It therefore embodied a grave and imminent threat not only to the American people but to people around the world. However, despite these similarities, Obama’s framing appeared less compelling than Bush’s. There are several reasons for this. One of them certainly was the change of wording and the deliberate renunciation of

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particular rhetorical devices. It is apparent that Obama largely refrained from faithbased talk and from conceptualizing the situation in Manichean extremes of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’. Obama abstained from ‘(e)vilification’ (Lazar/Lazar 2004) and from contrasting a demonized ‘other’ with an exceptional ‘self’ that was said to be implementing God’s mission. These dichotomies, by which Bush had bolstered the nation’s commitment to his political course, were used far less frequently by Obama and where they were used they were less dazzling than in Bush’s framing. In Obama’s representation, the ‘other’ was not the personified evil, but a member of al Qaeda and as such a dangerous enemy. Obama mostly spoke of ‘al Qaeda and its allies’ instead of using other terms. This was one issue on which he tried to override the framing that Bush’s narrative had established. The fact that Obama’s discursive construction of the ‘other’ differed from that of Bush’s, demonstrates that alternatives were available and that framing is a political choice. In Obama’s discourse, the ‘other’ was still constituted as barbaric, but it was at least human. As such, Obama generally avoided dehumanizing the ‘other’. This was in line with the changes he announced to America’s detention and interrogation policies (see section 7.5). In order to restore humane treatment and human rights to Guantanamo captives, the captives first had to be conceptualized as human, which meant no longer constituting them as subhuman evil creatures that did not qualify for protection. With regard to the ‘self’, Obama reproduced the image of America’s greatness, albeit with reservations. Although he constituted the brilliance of the American ‘self’, he did so by pointing to its current weaknesses. In his framing, the true nature of the American people was exceptional, but the nation had failed to live up to its values. Under Bush’s detention and interrogation policies, which had included the mistreatment and torture of detainees, the nation had deviated from its core principles. For Obama, the conclusion was clear: this had corroded America’s identity and threatened its national security interests. Although Bush had promised to make the world a “better” and a “safer place” (Bush 2002/02/16, cf. 2001/10/04), in Obama’s view, this had not materialized, neither in a global perspective nor with regard to America’s national security. In fact, according to Obama, the opposite was true. Consequently, he reiterated the necessity to revert to the rule of law and due process. The nation had to change its course in order to find its way back to national unity and moral authority; this in turn would substantiate America’s strength. In advocating this, Obama only rarely directly alluded to human rights. When he did so, he referred to human rights in terms of America’s founding principles and emphasized that compliance with rights meant living up to ‘who we are’. This framing was certainly more compelling to the American people than calling for customary international law to be upheld. Overall, in Obama’s threat scenario, two of its three main components were related to the ‘self’ and its violation of law. Besides the threat posed by the hostile ‘other’, Obama forcefully claimed that Bush’s policies had endangered America’s security, and he provided the following reasons for this: First, America’s conduct in

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the fight against terrorism had aggravated the threat faced by America because it had boosted the enemy’s power. Guantanamo, Obama argued, had become an iconic symbol for America’s arbitrariness and was being used as a propaganda tool to recruit terrorists. He claimed that far more terrorists had been influenced by the operation of Guantanamo than had ever been detained there. Allowing the ‘self’ to mistreat and torture the ‘other’ had fueled hate and thus helped the enemy to proliferate. Second, America’s conduct in the ‘War on Terror’ had caused tremendous damage to America’s image in the world and led to a loss of moral authority; this had had far-reaching consequences. In terms of security, one of the most important consequences was that it had alienated the international partners that the U.S. relied upon to successfully fight terrorism. Obama stressed that America could not master the task by itself but needed these alliances. Taken together, Obama vigorously pointed to what Christopher Daase (2005) calls the problem of ‘unintended consequences in the fight against terrorism’. In this respect, Bush’s policies had provoked ‘political and normative costs’ (Daase 2005) by generating new hazards for the American people. Changes to America’s detention and interrogation policies were thus necessary to dispel a recruiting tool for terrorists and to revive the willingness of the international community – including the Arab world – to cooperate in the fight against terrorism; and, America had to seize the moral high ground again to claim the moral authority for taking the lead in this mission. It is obvious in what way Obama’s framing prepared the audience(s) for his intended policy changes. As set forth by the president, it was America’s own responsibility to reduce the threat it faced by rebutting the course carried over from the Bush era. America’s exceptional role in defending freedom had thus to be played out under the rule of law. What at first might appear as a matter of morality, was foremost one of security. Obama argued for compliance with the rules in order to keep the American people safe. The next section focuses on Obama’s attempt to revert to the rule of law and details his approach towards changing America’s detention and interrogation policies.

7.5 Obama’s Detention and Interrogation Policy Obama emphasized America’s moral and legal obligations in his security narrative and strongly engaged in identity politics with its inextricable link to America’s national security. Obama suggested that there was no contradiction between the living of ideals and keeping the American people safe (Obama 2009/02/09, 2009/04/03, 2009/04/21), and consequently, he included the concomitance of both as the guiding principles behind America’s foreign policy. In line with this, he aimed to reestablish the rule of law in America’s detention and interrogation policy. In his framing, the closure of Guantanamo and the humane treatment of captives were imperative for security reasons. These changes in conduct were expected to provide the benefit of

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relinquishing a recruiting tool used by the terrorists and help rebuild international alliances against terrorism. Both aspects were constituted as vital in order to protect the American people. The following sections investigate how Obama worked towards this end by examining his attempts to change American detention and interrogation policies. They outline the enterprises and enactments by which Obama sought to revert to the rule of law, adhere to international humanitarian standards, and prepare for the announced closure of Guantanamo. As will become obvious, in doing so Obama grappled with great obstacles and failed to succeed on a number of main issues. As this book suggests, this was due to the fact that his security narrative was constantly contested and unable to dominate public discourse. In contrast to Bush, Obama lacked the support of his main audiences and this impeded the enforcement of his policies.

7.5.1 Reestablishing the Rule of Law When President Obama took office in January 2009, he promptly started reversing the interrogation and detention policies that had been implemented by the Bush administration. Within forty-eight hours of being president, Obama had issued an executive order entitled “Ensuring Lawful Interrogations” (Obama 2009/01/22c). This order was to “ensure compliance with the treaty obligations of the United States, including the Geneva Conventions” and declared the standards of Common Article 3 a “minimum baseline” for the treatment of detainees. It stated that people held in U.S. custody: shall in all circumstances be treated humanely and shall not be subjected to violence to life and person (including murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture), nor to outrages upon personal dignity (including humiliating and degrading treatment). (Obama 2009/ 01/22c)

In the case of interrogation techniques, the order prohibited prisoners from being subjected to any techniques or treatment that was not authorized by the U.S. Army Field Manual, which banned the use of torturous measures by army personnel; this was “effective immediately”. The order continued by stating that “from this day forward”, no interrogator could “rely upon any interpretation of the law governing interrogation” that had been “issued by the Department of Justice between September 11, 2001 and January 20, 2009” (Obama 2009/01/22c), the latter being President Bush’s last day in office. The order thus overturned the various legal memos that had been published by the Bush administration on the status and treatment of prisoners and which had shaped detention and interrogation policy in the years after 9/11. In even broader terms Obama’s order stipulated that:

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all executive directives, orders, and regulations [. . .] including but not limited to those issued to or by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from September 11, 2001 to January 20, 2009, concerning detention or the interrogation of detained individuals, are revoked to the extent of their inconsistency with this order. (Obama 2009/01/22c)

Obama used this order to abrogate ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ and end the concept of ‘unlawful enemy combatants’. Whereas President Bush had denied the Guantanamo detainees any protection under the Geneva Conventions, Obama granted them the protection of ‘unprivileged combatants’. As a consequence, detainees were not classified as prisoners of war according to Geneva Convention 3 but as armed civilians under Geneva Convention 4, which at least provided them with coverage by international humanitarian law (Forsythe 2011: 67f). In addition, President Obama ruled that the International Committee of the Red Cross had to be granted “timely access” to “any individual detained in any armed conflict” held in U.S. custody or who was under the control of U.S. personnel (Obama 2009/01/22c). The order also established a task force to oversee interrogations and guarantee that detainees were not being transferred to other countries “to face torture” or for any other reason that would undermine or circumvent “the commitments or obligations of the United States” (Obama 2009/01/22c). This amounted to the total prohibition of torture and the cruel treatment of detainees, and was an attempt to reestablish legal process and, with it, moral authority. According to Obama, compliance with the law and international treaties was an essential means of protecting the American people. To this end, Obama also announced the closure of confinement facilities. In the same order, he declared that “the CIA shall close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that it currently operates and shall not operate any such detention facility in the future.” This meant that the CIA had to close black sites that were being used for rendition and the forced disappearances of their suspects (Pfiffner 2010: 163; Forsythe 2011: 67f, 199f).137 In a separate order made on the same day, Obama authorized the closure of the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, which had to be executed “as soon as practicable” (Obama 2009/01/22b). Between 2002 and 2009 approximately 800 individuals had been detained at the Guantanamo Bay detention center, some of them had been held there since the beginning of its operation. Obama’s second order explicitly stated that the closure was not only “consistent with” but actually reflected U.S. security interests: In view of the significant concerns raised by these detentions, both within the United States and internationally, prompt and appropriate disposition of the individuals currently detained at Guantánamo and closure of the facilities in which they are detained would further the

137 Parts of this order were mainly symbolic. Due to court rulings and public disapproval Bush had already suspended some of these practices during his presidency.

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national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice. (Obama 2009/01/22b)

The order pointed to the “unusual circumstances associated with detentions at Guantánamo” and stated that they would require a comprehensive, prompt and thorough review of both the lawfulness of detention, including possible transfers and releases of detainees, and the prospects of prosecution. In signing this executive order, Obama reiterated that is was “our ideals” that “give us the strength and moral high ground” in the fight against terrorism and that “we are going to win it on our own terms” (Shane et al. 2009). During the implementing of this order, the Obama administration tried to release as many detainees as possible. The administration intensified its efforts to resettle cleared detainees and to find agreement with foreign countries on where to house detainees who could not return to their country of origin. In order to close Guantanamo, the remaining detainees were to be transferred to the United States. In 2009, this led the Obama administration to plan a high-security prison in the state of Illinois. This plan envisaged the purchase and conversion of the Thomson Correctional Center, a prison in Thomson, a town about 130 miles west of Chicago. The plan, however, was thwarted by Congress (see section 7.6.2). With regard to prosecution, the military commissions in Guantanamo were suspended in order to review the procedures they were following and to assess whether and how the commissions should be continued. By the time Obama entered office, these commissions had only convicted a couple of prisoners (Forsythe 2011: 181; cf. Shane et al. 2009; Elsea 2014). President Obama’s intention was to hold trials in civil courts. He believed that the United States judiciary, with its constitution and federal courts, was well-equipped to deal with cases of terrorism. In fact, he stressed that America had to break “this fearful notion that somehow our justice system can’t handle these guys” (Obama 2009/ 11/18b). After all, past cases such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing or the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing had proven the suitability of America’s judicial system. However, the plans to try terrorist suspects on U.S. soil were also rejected by Congress (see section 7.6.2). During these early weeks of Obama’s presidency, the circumstances in Guantanamo seemed to improve. A U.S. military team reporting from Guantanamo in February 2009 concluded that “the conditions of confinement, in Guantanamo, are in conformity with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions” (Walsh 2009; cf. Forsythe 2011: 116). This assessment was also confirmed by the media. The Obama administration also induced changes to U.S. detention in Afghanistan and sought to hand over control to Afghan officials and the Afghan court system. Imprisonment conditions were improved as were the possibilities of detainees challenging their custody. In addition, detainees in Afghanistan were kept in a new detention center in Parwan, which had been opened in 2009 to replace the notorious detention facility in Bagram. The latter was associated with lethal abuse and American officials

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considered it to provide “breeding grounds for Qaeda fighters” (Schmitt 2009; cf. The New York Times 2009/09/20; Rubin 2010; Forsythe 2011: 179).

7.5.2 Challenges and Shortfalls In its attempt to revert to ‘normal’ proceedings, Obama’s administration soon began to struggle with a complicated dialectic. Although Obama emphasized that restoring the rule of law was necessary to meet America’s security interests, trying terrorist suspects in federal courts was highly problematic due to the use of tainted evidence. In contrast to military commissions at Guantanamo, federal court judges did not permit the use of evidence obtained through coercion. Conviction of the accused was thus hampered by the mistreatment they had undergone during their detention. In this sense, the legacy of the Bush administration posed serious judicial problems. However, even in cases where abuse had not been committed, the work of the intelligence services was considered too sensitive to be laid open in court since doing so would have clearly demonstrated how the security services operate. Furthermore, another problem was posed by the fact that not every Guantanamo detainee had a file.138 This was an indication, as some believed, that the Bush administration had never intended to prosecute those held at Guantanamo (Mayer 2010). These circumstances led some charges to be dropped, at least in part. Thus, accepting due process implied the potential release of detainees who could not be convicted but who were believed to have been guilty of plotting or even committing terrorist acts, or who were considered dangerous and inclined to (re-)turn to hostilities against the United States as soon as they could. Some detainees did return to the battlefield on release, and this posed new security concerns (Hess 2009; Rosenberg 2012). In sum, the deployment of torture and inhumane treatment during the Bush years undercut the ability of the Obama administration to deal with the accused through the U.S. criminal justice system. This was one of the reasons why advocates of a tougher stance demanded the retention of military commissions, and eventually, the Obama administration also came to view them as a necessity in order to keep the American people safe (Forsythe 2011: 184–188, 213). Moreover, Republicans were applying political pressure as they wanted the military commissions to be used as much as possible. As will be discussed below (see sections 7.6.1 and 7.6.2), large parts of Congress and the public opposed trying terrorist suspects in civil courts.

138 As far as files had been generated, the assessment of detainees from various offices and officials involved in the detention and interrogation process were often contradictory. This instance stalled the whole review process and contributed to the delay of Guantanamo’s projected closure (Rosenberg 2012).

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As a result, the Obama administration did not end the military commissions; instead, it merely reformed them. The Military Commissions Act of 2009, which was enacted by Congress, provided additional procedural safeguards to detainees, now called ‘alien unprivileged enemy belligerents’. This reduced the permissible use of hearsay and statements made under coercion as evidence, granted the detainees access to experienced defense lawyers in capital cases, extended the defendants’ access to witnesses and evidence presented against them, and permitted the defense to appoint its own witnesses. While this was acknowledged as an improvement to the judicial system that had been set up by the Bush administration, it was still criticized as substandard. Moreover, the difficulty in trying the detainees was one of the main reasons why the detention center at Guantanamo Bay remained open, and with it the policy of indefinite detention, at least for suspects who could not be tried. As noted above, it was assumed that these fighters would return to hostilities against the United States on release. Unsurprisingly, the shortfalls in Obama’s course of action proved a great disappointment to liberals and human rights organizations (AI 2009; HRW 2009; Richey 2009; Baker 2010; Forsythe 2011: 184, 213; Elsea 2014). At the same time, it was often difficult to transfer detainees from Guantanamo to other places, even if they had been cleared of the charges made against them. This was due to the fact that either their home countries were politically unstable and considered to be breeding grounds for terrorists, or because the repatriates were likely to be mistreated by their own government, which prohibited a deportation to these countries in the first place. However, despite persistent negotiation, there was very little willingness among third countries around the world to house former Guantanamo inmates. The remaining option – transferring these individuals to the United States – was, as noted before, prohibited by Congress (see section 7.6.2). This situation posed difficult considerations for the Obama administration and contributed to a policy that deviated from what had been announced. The continued existence of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay certainly was and still is one of the most obvious shortfalls of the Obama administration in this context; and the retention of military commissions and indefinite detentions has certainly continued to impair the image of the United States. However, Obama has also been criticized for dismissing a judicial reworking of the past (Johnston/Savage 2009; Greenwald 2012; Shane 2012) – a critique that arose again in December 2014 when the Senate Intelligence Committee published a report on torture under the Bush administration. From the beginning of his presidency, Obama rejected holding the individuals who had been responsible for the violations of laws after 9/11 to account, even though the UN Convention Against Torture foresaw their prosecution. Although Obama deemed ‘harsh interrogation methods’ to be illegal, he still refrained from prosecuting Bush and his officials despite the fact that they had approved and authorized them. Certainly, there was political strategy at play here. Obama did not want to jeopardize Republican support in Congress, and the Republicans openly rejected an ex post criminalization of the Bush administration. As Newsweek put it,

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investigations would have plunged “Washington into a new round of partisan warfare” (Klaidman 2009: 35; cf. Broder 2009). Moreover, prosecuting Bush and his officials could have further split the nation, and the public strongly disapproved of prosecution in this realm (Friedman 2009; Oliphant 2014). Against this background, the outrage was even greater when in summer 2009 Attorney General Eric Holder declared that an investigation would be conducted into detainee abuse. In the end, however, this undertaking was abandoned (see section 7.6.3). In sum, the change of course implemented by Obama was not as comprehensive as expected. Critics complained about the difference between Candidate Obama’s promises and President Obama’s policies. Furthermore, Obama continued to claim that special authority had been granted to the president after 9/11. This specifically meant that the president still had the power to detain individuals (indefinitely) on the basis of the AUMF (the Congressional Authorization to Use Military Force, from 2001).139 In fact, Obama also continued renditions.140 However, he did reverse parts of Bush’s detention and interrogation policies and reformed others. He altered the conditions of enforcement and thus tried to move towards human rights and humanitarian law (Forsythe 2011: 176, 200f; cf. Finn 2009; Johnston 2009; Alexander 2010; Koh 2010; Lewis 2011; Lennard 2013). To some extent, the judicial obstacles Obama faced certainly contributed to his political shortfalls. However, as will be discussed below, Obama also lacked the support of large parts of his audiences; and he would have needed their support to fully implement his proposed course. This point will be outlined in the following sections.

7.6 Audience In a similar way to the chapter on Bush’s discourse, the following investigates if and to what extent Obama’s narrative was accepted by relevant audiences. As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that an extensive reproduction of the president’s narrative indicates that it has been accepted as reasonable and appropriate. As will be seen, this kind of wide-spread reproduction did not take place. Although this book cannot provide an in-depth analysis of the audiences, it is evident that Obama’s security 139 As the Obama administration emphasized, this authorization was granted by Congress and not on the basis of the commander-in-chief status on which President Bush had relied (Koh 2010; Finn 2009). 140 As a presidential candidate, Obama had announced an end to rendition. Although human rights organizations appreciated Obama’s steps towards humane detainee treatment, his decision as president to continue renditions was criticized. As Johnston (2009) laid out, “some human rights advocates said they thought the Obama administration was maintaining the rendition program out of fear that its elimination would force the government to accept additional detainees on American soil and threaten Mr. Obama’s pledge to close the detention center at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, by January.”

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narrative was continually challenged and that this hampered his political enterprise. The overview begins with the stance taken by the public and the media. It is followed by outlining the role of Congress, and the harsh resistance that Obama faced there. Finally, the debates within the government will be looked at in order to show in how far Obama’s plans were supported or contested by the apparatus.

7.6.1 The Public and the Media When Obama took office, public discourse strongly illustrated the divisions within the American nation on topics of detention, interrogation, and torture. The New York Times reporter Peter Baker put it in a nutshell when stating that President Obama had inherited two struggles: one with Al Qaeda and its ideological allies, and another that divides his own country over issues like torture, prosecutions, security and what it means to be an American. The first has proved to be complicated and daunting. The second makes the first look easy. (Baker 2010)

As expected, advocates of the rule of law such as human rights organizations approved of Obama’s change of course. After the president had signed the executive orders on lawful interrogation and the closure of Guantanamo, they spoke of “a giant leap forward” (Shane et al. 2009). Other groups like The National Religious Campaign Against Torture, a coalition comprising 240 religious groups, applauded Obama as he “allowed the United States to again find its moral bearing” (Shane et al. 2009). However, critique was also strong. The Veterans of Foreign Wars, for example, claimed that Guantanamo was “a valuable tool” in the ‘War on Terror’ as it provided “useful intelligence information” and kept “our enemies off the battlefield” (VFW 2009). This was a clear reproduction of Bush’s security logic. Obama’s plans to close Guantanamo were therefore viewed as “not prudent”, even less so as the detention center was regarded as “well kept, professionally run, and respectful of human rights” (VFW 2009). The national commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S., Glen Gardner, reminded the audience: We must never forget that the only reason 3,000 innocent civilians died on a quiet September morning in 2001 was because this new enemy didn’t have the means to kill 30,000 or 300,000 or 3 million people. (VFW 2009)

Although these views expressed by human rights organizations and the veterans’ association respectively certainly embodied opposite poles and provided strongly diverging assessments of Obama’s political action, this sharp divide was not only represented by special interest groups, it ran throughout American society. In general, one of the main problems faced by President Obama was that Bush’s security narrative remained strong during 2009. Former Bush’s officials continued to advocate their positions and strengthen this narrative by restating the necessity and

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usefulness of ‘harsh interrogation techniques’ for America’s security. By doing so they may have also sought to justify their actions and thus forestall their prosecution. Besides that, it certainly was an attempt to save their legacy as an administration that had kept America safe, but it also enabled them to attack their political successor who was allegedly putting the nation’s security at risk. Whatever the reasons behind their statements, Bush’s security narrative remained present among the American public and with it a reasoning that had moved the limits of acceptable action. Over a period of many years, this narrative had instilled fear in the American people and the continuation of this discourse kept their sense of fear alive. Already during his election campaign Obama had directly addressed Bush’s ‘politics of fear’ and he continued to do so by pointing to Bush’s attempts to promote a feeling of threat. Obama alluded to the “fear-mongering” and the discursive contributions that were “calculated to scare people” rather than inform them (Obama 2009/05/21). It was obvious that this posed a problem for his administration as it meant arguing against a powerful emotion: Bush’s narrative had produced psychological effects that could not be quickly overturned. Until the end of his second term, Bush had continued to justify his detention and interrogation policies. During his last days in office, he was asked about the consequences of abolishing ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, and replied: “I feel like it would be a problem because these are tools that we have in place,” and he promptly professed that “everything this administration did [. . .] had a legal basis to it, otherwise we would not have done it” (Fox News 2009/01/11). After Bush had left office, other voices maintained his narrative, as did the departing chief of the CIA Michael Hayden who vigorously defended ‘enhanced interrogation’. During interviews, Hayden argued that “the use of these techniques against these terrorists made us safer” (Baker 2009a) and reiterated elsewhere that “these techniques worked [. . .]. Do not allow others to say it didn’t work [. . .]. It worked” (Miller 2009). However, former Vice President Dick Cheney was the strongest voice in the continued reproduction of Bush’s logic, and Cheney made great efforts to communicate his position. He went to great lengths to ensure that there was no doubt that Bush’s course had been correct. In an interview in February 2009, for example, Cheney stated: If it hadn’t been for what we did – with respect to the terrorist surveillance program, or enhanced interrogation techniques for high-value detainees [. . .] – then we would have been attacked again [. . .]. Those policies we put in place, in my opinion, were absolutely crucial to getting us through the last seven-plus years without a major-casualty attack on the U.S. (Harris et al. 2009)

Cheney maintained that terrorists were more likely to succeed under the Obama administration. He also made it very clear that Obama’s approach to terrorism was naïve and too soft, and that consequently, the new administration was making the United States more vulnerable to attacks. After all, “half-measures keep you half exposed” (Cheney 2009a). Cheney also continued to refer to the horrific scenario that

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Bush had called a ‘holocaust’, that is, an attack on the United States with nuclear or biological weapons: I think there’s a high probability of such an attempt. Whether or not they can pull it off depends whether or not we keep in place policies that have allowed us to defeat all further attempts, since 9/11, to launch mass-casualty attacks against the United States. (Harris et al. 2009)

On May 21, 2009, the very day that Obama spoke about national security, Cheney set out his objections to the course that had been adopted by the Obama administration. During a speech on the logic behind the Bush administration’s security policies, Cheney strongly justified the detention and interrogation policies that they had employed: I was and remain a strong proponent of our enhanced interrogation program [. . .]. They were legal, essential, justified, successful, and the right thing to do. The intelligence officers who questioned the terrorists can be proud of their work and proud of the results, because they prevented the violent death of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of innocent people [. . .]. You don’t want to call them enemy combatants? Fine. Call them what you want – just don’t bring them into the United States. Tired of calling it a war? Use any term you prefer. Just remember it is a serious step to begin unraveling some of the very policies that have kept our people safe since 9/11. (Cheney 2009a)

In Cheney’s narrative, the detention and interrogation policies of the Bush administration had produced “phenomenal results”, and he asserted that “a great many Americans are alive today because we did all that” (Cheney 2009c). Strong opposition to Obama’s course of action also came from Keep America Safe – an organization founded in 2009 by two nationalist hardliners, notably Elizabeth Cheney – Dick Cheney’s daughter, and William Kristol, the editor of the (neo-)conservative journal Weekly Standard. A third board member was Debra Burlingame, a former Court TV producer and sister of one of the pilots who had died on 9/11. The group’s name implied what the members believed: that the Obama administration would not keep America safe. In fact, the political advocacy group fueled fear about Obama’s alleged foreign policy strategies. It attacked Obama’s national security policy and continued to support the policies adopted by the former Bush administration (Mayer 2010; IPS 2013). The group fostered the neoconservative discourse that emphasized America’s state of war and claimed that Obama’s administration was “weakening the nation” (IPS 2013). Moreover, this venture was supported by prominent strategists and donors and its activities included: raising money to run ads criticizing the Obama administration and Democratic members of Congress, and disseminating petitions, including a “Save Gitmo” petition in early 2010 that called for keeping the Guantanamo Bay detention facility open because it is purportedly “a safe, secure, and humane facility where the United States can and should detain terrorists.” (IPS 2013)

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According to this line of argumentation, Guantanamo was safe and America was safe because of it; moreover, torture was successful and America’s defense was successful because of it. Contributions of this kind to the national security discourse continually forced Obama onto the defensive and made it more difficult to convince the relevant audiences to support his approach. As opinion polls indicate, Bush’s narrative was still accepted by large parts of the public and Obama’s framing was not compelling enough to topple it. According to a survey in May 2009, 40 percent of the American people believed that the detention center at Guantanamo Bay did indeed strengthen U.S. national security while only 18 percent thought it weakened it; 37 percent believed that Guantanamo had little effect either way. The majority of the American people were thus either in favor of or at least undecided towards the detention center as far U.S. security was concerned (Gallup 2014b). Evidently, Obama had been unable to instill his ‘truth’ onto the American people that the closure of Guantanamo was imperative for America’s national security. Related to the figures above were those collected on the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to the United States in order to close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. As mentioned, the Obama administration was preparing to purchase and reconstruct a prison in the state of Illinois, a venture that was eventually thwarted by Congress (see section 7.6.2). Concerning the imprisonment of Guantanamo detainees on U.S. soil, Congress acted in accordance with public opinion. When asked in spring 2009 whether the United States should – or should not – close Guantanamo and move some prisoners to U.S. prisons, only 32 percent approved the closure whereas 65 percent rejected it (Gallup 2009b, 2014a). An even higher number, 74 percent of the respondents, opposed the movement of detainees to their state (Gallup 2014b). During the summer and fall of 2009 these figures almost remained constant.141 Up until the point of writing, the majority of the American public has never been in favor of closing Guantanamo.142 During the course of 2009, Obama faced growing criticism for his approach to fighting terrorism. Although his first actions in office, i.e. the prohibition of torture and the order to close Guantanamo, had been acknowledged by the press, harsh reviews were published about his counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan.143 Whereas journalists considered Obama to be indecisive, conservatives attacked him outright as a ditherer. This media coverage weakened his standing and culminated in the allegation

141 In November 2009, another Gallup opinion poll resulted in 30% in favor and 64% against, see Gallup (2009b, 2014a, 2014b). Similar figures were produced by a Fox News survey conducted in June 2009, see Fox News (2009/12/15). 142 This includes opinion polls published by Gallup until Summer 2014, see Gallup (2014a, 2014b). It should be noted, though, that in these polls the question whether Guantanamo should be closed was always linked to the inference that, if so, the detainees kept there would be transferred to the United States. Alternative options were not polled. 143 For an impressive demonstration of negative reports in the media see King (2014: ch. 3). Some of the following media statements are also listed there.

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that Obama was not truly committed to fighting terrorism (King 2014: ch. 3). The question of whether the president was “enough of a warrior for the fight against Islamic terrorism” (Baker 2010) was also linked to Obama’s abandonment of the term ‘War on Terror’. The debate further intensified in early November 2009 when the deadliest massacre on U.S. soil since 9/11 took place. Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Muslim and army psychiatrist killed thirteen people and injured 31 during a rampage at the U.S. army base Ford Hood in Texas. As this instance seemed to prove the enduring threat constituted by the evil ‘other’, it increased the nation’s fear and further strengthened Bush’s security narrative. In an op-ed in The Washington Post, for example, the author and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Bing West described the offender as an “evil murderer” who had been part of an “evil minority” of Muslims and who had hijacked their faith for cruel ends (The Washington Post 2009/11/08). Similarly, on the O’Reilly Factor show, Fox News strategic analyst Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters said: What happened yesterday at Fort Hood was the worst terrorist attack on American soil since 9/11. It was committed by a Muslim fanatic, who shouted ‘Allah is great’ and gunned down 44 unarmed innocent soldiers and civilians. And our president tells us not to rush to judgment, to wait until all the facts are in. What facts are we waiting for? This was an Islamist terrorist act [. . .]. And Bill [the host], I believe your viewers understand that this was an act of Islamist terror, and the media is not going to fool them. And President Obama’s not going to fool them. (Fox News 2009/11/09)

During another TV show, former senior Bush advisor Karl Rove spoke of a “coldblooded murder” committed by someone with a “jihadist philosophy [. . .] an alien ideology that hates our freedoms and hates what is at the core of being an American” (King 2014: 100). This meant that the attacker hated ‘freedom’, and was an ‘evil’, ‘fanatic’ murderer, whereas the victims were ‘innocent’ – this wording strongly resembled Bush’s framing. Republican Representative Pete Hoekstra, former chair of the House Intelligence Committee, also criticized Obama for not calling the rampage what it allegedly was, a case of Islamic terrorism. Hoekstra accused the administration of being unable to “define the threat” and declared that this had led to a policy, “where they want to read Miranda Rights to the people that we capture in Afghanistan and then want to prosecute CIA agents for the things that the previous president in Congress asked our CIA people to do” (Fox News 2009/11/10). Although CIA personnel were not prosecuted (see section 7.6.3), the message was clear: Obama’s administration had missed the point and it was setting the wrong priorities in the fight against terrorism. This was clearly an awkward context in which to gain acceptance to try terrorist suspects on U.S. soil. Yet, it was only a few days later, in mid-November 2009, that the Obama administration announced that the alleged mastermind behind 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and some other Guantanamo detainees would be tried in a civil court in New York. This sparked fierce resistance in Congress (see section 7.6.2) and in

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the public debate. Attorney General Eric Holder was verbally harassed and sworn at by protesters. Among the critics, as The New Yorker reported, was former Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney Andrew McCarthy, who had led the prosecution of the 1993 World Trade Center attacks. He declared that Holder had not understood what the rule of law meant in wartime. “It’s military commissions,” he said, “it’s not to wrap our enemies in our Bill of Rights” (Mayer 2010). It is interesting to note that McCarthy had gained firsthand experience of the 1993 case and knew that it had been treated as a criminal act; however, he was now repeating Bush’s conception of war. This further demonstrates how powerful Bush’s framing had been and how deep it had sunk into people’s consciousness. After the Guantanamo captives had been dehumanized for years and adjudged to be ruthless and blatantly evil, there was very little willingness to grant them any kind of rights or to bear additional costs that would aid these suspects. Rudolph Giuliani, for example, who had been mayor of New York at the time of 9/11, resolutely rejected this plan in a series of interviews with the TV channels CNN, ABC and Fox. He pointed not only to the financial burden of the proposed trials but reiterated that they would give “an unnecessary advantage to the terrorists” and increase “the possibility of acquittal” (Berger 2009; cf. King 2009). The top adviser to President Obama, David Axelrod, however, pointed out “that since 2001, 195 cases of terrorism have been prosecuted in civilian courts and 91 percent of them have resulted in convictions,” but his statement seems to have gone unnoticed (Berger 2009). Using historicity to stress his point, Giuliani stated that “we wouldn’t have tried the people who attacked Pearl Harbor in a civilian court in Hawaii” (Berger 2009). Moreover, he pointed to the most prestigious presidents of American history and declared that military tribunals had been “good enough for Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt in many, many cases” (King 2009). Giuliani attacked Obama for treating the issue “like an ordinary murder” (Berger 2009) and concluded that this was “part of Barack Obama deciding that we’re not at war on terrorism any more” (Millar 2009, cf. Berger 2009, Fox News 2009/11/15, King 2009). Needless to say, this issue was also debated by members of Congress on television. A discussion between Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, a Democrat who headed the Armed Services Committee, and the Republican Pete Hoekstra, former chair of the House Intelligence Committee, might be exemplary of these debates. Whereas the former praised the administration’s decision to try suspected terrorists in civilian courtrooms, the latter claimed that the terrorists would try “to use it as a platform to push their ideology” (Schieffer 2009). This argument, in fact, was heard often on Fox News (King 2014: 102). Moreover, Hoekstra strongly opposed giving terrorist suspects “all of the extraordinary protections that you and I have as American citizens” (Schieffer 2009). The accusation that came along with this perspective, as stated by Rudolph Giuliani (Fox News 2009/11/15) and Elisabeth Cheney (King 2014: 102), was that Obama’s administration had returned to a pre-9/11 approach to handling terrorism. Former U.S. ambassador to the UN John Bolton also complained that

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Obama’s “weakness and indecisiveness” in several areas would generate the impression that the president has “got a problem making hard decisions” (van Susteren 2009). In this heated debate, opposition to trying Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in a federal court was apparently one of the main issues that catapulted Scott Brown, a Republican from Massachusetts, into the Senate. The seat had been held by the Democrats before but became vacant after the death of Edward Kennedy in summer 2009. Brown strongly opposed Obama’s course. He claimed that he was “scared at some of the policies” and stated in a television ad, “some people believe our Constitution exists to grant rights to terrorists who want to harm us. I disagree” (Mayer 2010). This debate was flanked by real hardliners like the former Assistant Attorney General in the Bush administration, Jack Goldsmith. He asserted in The New York Times that: prosecution in either criminal court or a tribunal is the wrong approach. The administration should instead embrace what has been the main mechanism for terrorist incapacitation since 9/11: military detention without charge or trial. (Goldsmith 2010)

Many of these claims challenged if not overrode Obama’s narrative. At the very least, they prevented Obama’s security narrative from dominating public discourse. As a public opinion poll in November 2009 showed, many Americans disapproved of the plans to try terror suspects as civilian criminals. In the case of the alleged mastermind behind 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a majority of the American public opposed attempts to bring him to New York and wanted him to be put on trial somewhere else; 59 percent of the respondents favored a trial in a military court (Gallup 2014b). In the end, pressure from the public and Congress grew to such an extent that the government dropped these plans completely. As the above indicates, Obama’s attempt to repoliticize the treatment of terrorist suspects was continually contested, and this was particularly the case after December 25, 2009. On Christmas Day, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian airline passenger, attempted to blow up a plane during its approach to Detroit. When Attorney General Holder ordered that Abdulmutallab be treated as a civilian criminal – like previous terrorist suspects who had been arrested in the United States – reactions, again, were fierce: On “Inside Washington,” Charles Krauthammer declared that it was “almost criminal” that Holder had allowed Abdulmutallab access to an attorney. Rudy Giuliani, the former mayor of New York, appeared on ABC, saying, “Why in God’s name would you stop questioning a terrorist?” (Mayer 2010)

Giuliani was referring to the need to read the Miranda Rights to civilian criminals. On this matter, Jospeh Lieberman, chair of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee criticized the Obama administration and urged it to reverse this ‘error’:

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The decision to treat Abdulmutallab as a criminal rather than a UEB [unprivileged enemy belligerent] almost certainly prevented the military and the intelligence community from obtaining information that would have been critical to learning more about how our enemy operates and to preventing future attacks against our homeland and Americans and our allies throughout the world. (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2010)

In line with this reasoning, Lieberman – an independent senator – urged the administration to treat Abdulmutallab as an enemy combatant, to interrogate him, and to try him before a military commission. A similar demand was made by Peter King, the leading Republican on the House Homeland Security Committee, who said it was a mistake to treat Abdulmutallab as a common criminal (NBC Today 2009). Bush’s framing had clearly been absorbed by many, and it proved to be lasting. In this framing the ‘other’ was a secret carrier of valuable information – and gathering this information was more important than complying with the rule of law. In addition to the comments cited above, demands were made that Abdulmutallab be transferred directly to Guantanamo. Legal experts emphasized that this was unconstitutional; however, during the Bush presidency the American people had seen that this could be done anyway.144 In the course of this development, Attorney General Holder was not only criticized by Republicans but also by Democrats. However, Republicans also called for his resignation. At the end of January 2010, top-ranking senate Republican Lamar Alexander suggested on Fox News that Holder should “step down” because he was “not making a distinction between enemy combatants and terrorists flying into Detroit trying to blow up planes and American citizens who are committing a crime” (Jacoby 2010). With this development, Obama’s security policy came under even more pressure. Whereas Obama was once again accused of not grasping the true nature of the threat, he was also condemned for his wording. As Fox News anchor Jim Angle put it: he calls them violent extremists. A guy who shoots an abortion doctor is a violent extremist. The nature of the threat that we’re facing is jihadism [. . .], that’s the threat. It is a word he dare not use. (King 2014: 103)

These examples suggest that the circumstances made it difficult for Obama’s security narrative to gain prevalence. Instead, Obama’s narrative remained contested and Bush’s narrative continued to be reproduced. In addition, the incidents at Ford Hood and the Detroit airliner further fanned a climate of fear. This led to “much impassioned media commentary,” and in the end “bad news was simply outpacing the positive” (King 2014: 79). At least during Obama’s early presidency, his security

144 When two terror suspects, José Padilla and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, were arrested on U.S. main land, Bush declared them to be ‘unlawful combatants’ who could be interrogated and detained without trial.

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narrative hardly ever gained preponderance in the public’s view. What The New York Times reporter Richard Stevenson stated in more general terms, seems also to be true for Obama’s security discourse, that “a year into his presidency, Mr. Obama has lost control of his political narrative, his ability to define the story of his presidency on his own terms” (Stevenson 2010). Many aspects of the proposed changes to detention and interrogation policy were opposed by large sections of the American people. As already mentioned, this was true for the projected closure of Guantanamo and the prosecution of terrorist suspects in U.S. civil courts, but also for the release of the OLC memos that provided details about the Bush administration’s rationale for enhanced interrogation techniques. A survey conducted by NBC and the Wall Street Journal from April 2009 found that 53 percent of Americans were against publishing these documents. Moreover, even though a majority of those sampled believed that the United States had committed torture during the Bush era, 61 percent opposed the conduction of a criminal investigation into Bush’s officials.145 As the Los Angeles Times commented, these results “showed that Cheney’s arguments have support and that the shadow of Sept. 11 looms larger in the public mind than Obama might have initially realized” (Wallsten/ Miller 2009). It is possible that Obama truly underestimated what Mark Danner noted, that “for many in the United States, torture still stands as a marker of political commitment – of a willingness to ‘do anything to protect the American people’” and to “do what needs to be done” (Danner 2009b: 48). In this context, Obama’s approach to confronting terrorism with the rule of law would have been considered rather weak.

7.6.2 Congress The implementation of Obama’s security policies was largely thwarted by Congress. Many steps aimed at revoking the detention and interrogation policies that had been established under the Bush administration were blocked by the legislative. Even the Democrats in Congress turned down Obama’s plans. In his remarks on national security, Obama was quite blunt in stating: Now, as our efforts to close Guantanamo move forward, I know that the politics in Congress will be difficult. These are issues that are fodder for 30-second commercials. You can almost picture the direct mail pieces that emerge from any vote on this issue – designed to frighten the population. I get it. (Obama 2009/05/21)

Obama saw himself urged to repeat that he was “not going to release individuals who endanger the American people” (Obama 2009/05/21). After all, as The New York

145 See NBC News/Wall Street Journal (2009).

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Times noted, the announcement to close Guantanamo had “sparked a revolt in Congress, even among Democrats” (Baker 2010). At the same time, in May 2009, a project of resettlement demonstrated how tense the atmosphere really was with regard to detention issues. As Republicans began to realize that the Obama administration aimed to resettle some Chinese Uighurs to the United States – Guantanamo captives who had been cleared for release – their reaction was prompt and categorical.146 In Congress, the Republicans declared “their opposition to bringing any detainees to the U.S.” (Mayer 2010, emphasis in original). Shortly thereafter, it became clear that the Democrats were siding with the Republicans. Within days, the Senate voted 90 to 6 to strip the War Supplemental Bill of 80 million dollars – money that had originally been scheduled for the closure of Guantanamo (Bash/ Barrett 2009; Herszenhorn 2009). At that point in time, Obama had not published a plan stating to where he wanted to transfer the captives held at Guantanamo – an omission the Republicans capitalized on. They described Obama as “reckless” and they “launched a high-profile campaign” against the ‘premature’ closure of Guantanamo – a campaign that included the question: “Meet your new neighbor, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad?” (Bash/Barrett 2009). Resistance continued to grow in Congress during the following months. One reason for this was the indication that a considerable proportion of released detainees had taken up the fight against the United States (Bergen/Tiedemann 2009; Landers 2010; Savage 2010a; Forsythe 2011: 107). This information, reported to Congress, strengthened the logic of Bush’s security narrative. The enemy seemed to be eternally evil, and Guantanamo provided the opportunity to keep the suspects off the battlefield and to prevent them from turning into ‘ticking time bombs’. In general, the political debate on detention policy proved problematic for the Obama administration. Harold H. Koh, a legal adviser in the State Department, openly pointed to the “difficult and divided political environment” in Washington where it was very difficult to get enough votes for “such thorny carryover issues” as “closing Guantanamo” (Koh 2010). Carl Levin, a Democratic senator from Michigan and chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee argued that there was “a lot of inertia” against shutting down Guantanamo (Savage 2010c). This was also reflected in opposition that was sparked by the administration’s intent to try terrorist suspects in the United States (Landers 2010; Rosenberg 2012). Between 2009 and 2010 Congress continued to block several of the administration’s projects by using Congressional authority to control government spending. It used a bipartisan majority to reject the transfer of Guantanamo captives to the United States. In 2009, an exemption existed to this ban – detainees could be transferred to the U.S. for trial; however, even this exemption was overturned in 2010 (Landers 2010). Congress argued that it was too dangerous and too costly to try suspects in the

146 Reports vary on the exact numbers of Uighurs. Mayer (2010) speaks of two, Baker (2010) of seventeen.

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United States. In a letter to Obama, the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Dianne Feinstein, thus opposed scheduled trials in New York City (Mayer 2010). The administration was forbidden from spending any money to transfer detainees to the U.S. or on their trials in the United States. Legislation approved by the House of Representatives in December 2010, for example, read like this: None of the funds made available in this or any prior Act may be used to transfer, release, or assist in the transfer or release to or within the United States, its territories, or possessions Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or any other detainee who (1) is not a United States citizen or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States; and (2) is or was held on or after June 24, 2009, at the United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense.147

The imposition of these strict limits undoubtedly embodied a setback for President Obama. Effectively, it made prosecution before civil courts in the United States impossible and confirmed the necessity of military commissions in Guantanamo. Moreover, it strengthened the probability of continued military detention without trial (Savage 2010d). The bill was approved a few weeks after the first trial of a Guantanamo detainee in a civilian court in the United States. For many, the outcome of this case against Ahmed Ghailani had been alarming as the defendant had been found guilty of only one charge, and acquitted of the other 284 charges made against him. Moreover, the judge denied the prosecution from calling a witness who it had learned about after Ghailani had been subjected to torture in a CIA prison. Despite the fact that the defendant faced a life sentence – not for 9/11, though, but for attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 – critics viewed the case as confirmation that Guantanamo detainees had to be tried by military commissions rather than civilian courts (Landers 2010; The Washington Post 2010/11/19). In line with its prohibition of civil trials, Congress also outlawed preparations for a ‘Guantanamo North’. The Obama administration had planned to purchase and renovate the Thomson Correctional Center in the state of Illinois to house Guantanamo captives there once the detention center in Cuba had been closed. Yet, Republicans in Congress asserted that Obama’s plan would weaken America’s security (Fox News 2009/12/15). As Republican Senator Mitch McConnell claimed, Obama’s administration had “failed to explain how transferring terrorists to Gitmo North will make Americans safer than keeping these terrorists off of our shores in the secure facility in Cuba” (Fox News 2009/12/15). The case at hand demonstrates that this statement was not true; rather, Obama had continually explained why the closure of Guantanamo was important for America’s national security. However, McConnell’s assertion seems to indicate that Obama’s framing never reached the point of dominating public discourse. Thus, plans for ‘Guantanamo North’ were also

147 For the citation, see U.S. House of Representatives, House Report 111-675, Section 1116, published on December 21, 2010.

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blocked by Congress by denying it the required funding. As stated in the House Report: None of the funds provided to the Department of Justice in this or any prior Act shall be available for the acquisition of any facility that is to be used wholly or in part for the incarceration or detention of any individual detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of June 24, 2009.148

In addition, the Armed Services Committees of the House and the Senate restricted transfers from Guantanamo to other countries – “including, in the Senate version, a bar on Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia” (Savage 2010c). At that point in time, 181 detainees were being held in Guantanamo; about 130 stemmed from these countries (Savage 2010c). Taken together, it is obvious that Congress seriously hampered the implementation of Obama’s plans, and it made closing Guantanamo nearly impossible. Observers and human rights groups commented on the conduct of Congress, stating that “much of its intransigence” was “driven by the politics of fear” (Rosenberg 2012) and that the president had “to lead the American people away from fear” (Mayer 2010). Although Republicans in Congress doubtless had a strategic interest in preventing the Obama administration from scoring primary successes, many of them probably truly adhered to Bush’s security narrative, and as has been demonstrated, so did many Democrats (Savage 2009, 2010c, 2010d; Slevin/Finn 2009; Landers 2010; Towell 2010; Forsythe 2011: 191; Rosenberg 2012).

7.6.3 The Apparatus: Government, Military, Secret Services As mentioned earlier, Obama and his administration were widely criticized in 2009 due to the intended review and reassessment of America’s conduct in the fight against terrorism. Part of the media coverage mapped disputes that occurred within Obama’s apparatus. Journalists focused on the “intriguing disagreements within the upper echelons of his national security team about the proper course to pursue” (King 2014: 113). Whereas the Bush administration had presented itself as unified to the outside, Obama’s administration manifested dissension. Besides other issues, it was obvious that views on detention and interrogation policy differed considerably. Fierce debates occurred on how far the policies of the Bush administration could and should be revoked. In fact, dispute was sparked right at the beginning of Obama’s presidency when Obama prohibited the use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ that went beyond those methods permitted in the Army Field Manuel. In this respect,

148 For the citation, see U.S. House of Representatives, House Report 111-675, Section 2210, published on December 21, 2010.

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a main role was played by White House Counsel Gregory Craig. The speculation about his personal and professional fate also says something about the friction within Obama’s administration at the time. Craig, who had been Obama’s national security advisor during the presidential campaign, was a member of the government who sought a profound reversal of Bush’s detention and interrogation policies. The controversy over these issues grew steadily, in particular with White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel. Leaks began to break in summer 2009 about Craig leaving office, although he denied this at the time. However, in fall 2009, Craig resigned, and his reasons for doing so remained opaque (Ambinder 2009; Baker 2009b; Kamen 2009; Perez 2009). This led many observers to believe that Craig had fallen victim to intrigue. Speculations circulated that he had been ousted for following a too idealistic approach to national security. Since Emanuel had been accused of orchestrating “a public whispering campaign”, Craig’s resignation amounted to an “internal drama” at the White House (Ambinder 2009). In this context, it is possible that former Bush officials placed pressure on Obama’s staff to continue certain interrogation techniques. As Newsweek observed: Senior U.S. intelligence officials, including CIA Director Michael Hayden and outgoing Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, told Obama’s advisers [. . .] that they still needed the flexibility to use some interrogation methods not permitted by the military. (Isikoff 2009)

Obama’s review team, chaired by Craig, repudiated this notion. Craig’s departure was then widely noted and particularly lamented by certain interest groups. Anthony Romero, Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), commented on Craig’s resignation with the words, “He was the one voice for a constant application of the rule of law in the White House” (Baker 2010). Craig had also been the driving force that convinced President Obama to release the legal memos demonstrating that the Bush administration had sanctioned torture. This issue had also provoked stiff debate among Obama’s officials. Obviously, one reason for this was that the intention to release the memos had been poorly communicated within the apparatus. Thus, when this intention did become known, it “prompted weeks of debate inside the administration” (Perez 2009). At the same time, the memos also exposed details of the CIA’s aggressive approach to interrogation. The debate on the memos included the questions of whether releasing the documents was responsible, and whether it was actually necessary in order to recapture the moral high ground. Obama’s officials were concerned that the memos contained details that could inflame the hate of radicals and as such have a counterproductive effect. Publishing them could thus generate further political damage, and former Vice President Cheney demonstrated his readiness to exploit this topic. However, as Attorney General Eric Holder sided with Craig, the memos were published, albeit at a price (Perez 2009). Doing so led to another deep discord, this time between Holder and White House Chief of Staff Emanuel. In general, publication of the memos heated tensions within Obama’s national security team particularly

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because CIA Director Leon E. Panetta and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan had also objected to publishing the memos. At the very least, Panetta had called for the memos to be strongly edited in advance of their publication so as to curtail public scrutiny, but he was overruled (Baker et al. 2009; Cheney 2009a). However, what was aimed at providing an opportunity to come to terms with the past probably weakened Obama’s security discourse. As The Washington Post commented: By releasing the Justice Department memos on coercive interrogations, the Obama administration has produced an unintended effect: Revealing the context and care of these decisions has made them more understandable, not less. (Gerson 2009, emphasis in original)

In addition, a further backlash against Obama’s cause occurred when it became public that his National Intelligence Director, Dennis C. Blair, had acknowledged the effectiveness of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ – the very techniques which Obama had classified as torture and were therefore banned. Strikingly, Blair’s memo stemmed from the same day in April 2009 on which the White House published the OLC memos. Blair stated that “high value information came from interrogations in which those methods were used” and that this “provided a deeper understanding” of al Qaeda (Baker 2009a). Although this statement had originally been part of a private memo, it was passed on to the press by a critic of Obama’s policy (Baker 2009a). This incidence buttressed Bush’s security narrative, and it nurtured the impression that Obama’s will to end Bush’s detention and interrogation policies was not shared by all of his administration. The decision by Attorney General Holder in summer 2009 to appoint a prosecutor to review the files on interrogation and to set up an investigation into detainee abuse posed another shock for the CIA. Director Panetta, who feared long-term damage might occur to his agency, tried to prevent the investigations but Holder was adamant and refused to back off. This instance also strained relations between Holder and President Obama as the latter had publicly declared that he would refrain from conducting investigations and ‘look forward instead of backward’. Holder’s stance became even more trying when he announced, as mentioned above, that Guantanamo detainees would be put on trial before U.S. civil courts, and in particular that this would be done with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. However, faced with mounting political and public tension, Holder received far less support from the White House (Baker et al. 2009; Klaidman 2009; Mayer 2010). Although these frictions within Obama’s national security team do not represent a complete list, they show that the planned reversal of Bush’s detention and interrogation policies faced internal resistance. This demonstrates that within the apparatus, i.e., between departments and agencies as well as between single members of the administration, there was dissension about the right course to take. This discord centered on the reasonable limits of America’s moral and legal obligations – with regard to the future as well as to coming to terms with the past. It seems that some members of Obama’s

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team believed that it was impossible to combine values and an approach to security in the way the president had suggested. With regard to Guantanamo, Obama kept emphasizing that it had to be closed since it was “probably the No. 1 recruitment tool” for terrorists (Savage 2010d). In its attempts to corroborate this statement, the White House referred to the military and cited their commanders who had “made clear that closing the detention facility at Guantánamo is a national security imperative” (Savage 2010c). This opinion had even been voiced by U.S. interrogators in former years. According to Human Rights First, an interrogator with Special Operations in Iraq stated that he had learned that “the No. 1 reason foreign fighters flocked there to fight were the abuses carried out at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo. Our policy of torture was directly and swiftly recruiting fighters for al-Qaeda” (Forsythe 2011: 213f). This seemed to confirm Obama’s security narrative. Therefore, even when the administration missed its deadline to close Guantanamo in January 2010, Obama repeated his commitment to close the detention center. As a senior official divulged, failing on this issue would be the worst possible outcome for security “because it would revive Guantánamo as America’s image in the Muslim world” (Savage 2010c). Consequently, it was viewed as better to stick to the announcement that the detention center would be closed, even if this could not actually be done.

7.7 Summary of Policies and the Audiences’ Positions This chapter outlined the action taken by President Obama to reestablish the rule of law and to bring America’s detention and interrogation policies in line with international humanitarian law; and it showed how the audiences reacted to Obama’s framings and actions. During his first hours in office, Obama announced the closure of all detention facilities run by the CIA and ordered Guantanamo to be closed within one year. With regard to interrogations, Obama declared all rulings enacted under the Bush presidency to be inoperative and instead ordered compliance with international treaties. This prohibited the use of torturous measures in interrogations and granted protection to captives under the Geneva Conventions. The status of ‘unlawful enemy combatants’, invented by the Bush administration, was no longer used. In addition, Obama called for the revision of military commissions in Guantanamo, as well as a review of every single case in order to decide on the captives’ release or prosecution. The Obama administration worked actively to resettle those discharged and improved the judicial and humanitarian conditions of those who remained in custody. The aim in the medium term was to transfer these captives to another location in order to clear Guantanamo and close the site. For this reason, a prison in Illinois was chosen to house the remaining detainees after first converting it into a high-security facility. Moreover, Obama intended to have these captives tried in accordance with U.S. civil law. However, as has been outlined, he failed to fully

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implement his plans. As is well known, the detention center at Guantanamo Bay is still in operation, and the captives were not transferred to a prison in the United States. Doing so was prohibited by Congress, as were trials against Guantanamo inmates in U.S. courts. The latter, however, was also the outcome of judicial obstacles due to tainted evidence. In the end, this led to the retention of military commissions in Guantanamo, even if the commissions were reformed and had to grant defendants more rights. This development also meant that dozens of captives who were considered guilty but could not be convicted were still held in indefinite detention. It is obvious that this outcome embodied a shortfall in comparison to the expectations that Obama’s discourse of recapturing the moral high ground had aroused. Clearly, some of the Obama administration’s actions were not consistent with the rule of law. This was also true for Obama’s decision to refrain from prosecuting officials from the Bush administration who had approved and implemented torturous interrogation techniques. In the end, it is possible to conclude that Obama’s rhetoric differed more from Bush’s than Obama’s policies (Baker 2010; Desch 2010). Obama’s call for morality appears to have been first and foremost a means of providing security to the American people. In how far his actions were truly motivated by the will to revive moral bearings remains open. Besides the points that have been set out above, Obama continued renditions and ordered more drone attacks (against al Qaeda in Pakistan) during his first year in office than Bush did during his entire presidency; clearly, this leads to further questions about morality and America’s adherence to the rule of law. Considered in this light, observers believe that “Obama’s approach has been either a dangerous reversal of the Bush years or a consolidation of the Bush years, depending on who is talking” (Baker 2010). However, Obama did at least attempt to eliminate the visible signs of America’s rule-breaking that could be witnessed worldwide and ideologically exploited by terrorist organizations. In terms of the Copenhagen School’s concept, Obama securitized America’s violations of law as could be witnessed in Guantanamo in order to mobilize support for a return to legal proceedings. In order to enable the latter, he repoliticized the treatment of the ‘other’ to a point where regular trials in U.S. civil courts would have been possible. However, he was unable to assemble and unite the American people behind his security discourse. Part of the resistance Obama faced was due to the powerful and lasting security narrative of his predecessor. Bush’s framings were still present and were being reproduced in 2009 and they had shaped the approach to the ‘other’ and the ‘threat’ it was viewed as posing for years. The events at Ford Hood and Detroit probably gave a fresh boost to Bush’s security logic since they revived the fears of the American people and provided a great opportunity for Obama’s critics to attack the president as too weak and indecisive for the ‘War on Terror’. Public opinion and the stance of Congress made it very difficult for Obama to implement his plans. As demonstrated, opposition was strongly voiced by conservatives, but Democrats also sided with Republicans in Congress and rejected Obama’s policies. Moreover, Obama’s plans

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were contested within his apparatus, as the extent to which policy reversion was possible and necessary continued to be debated. Overall, Obama’s framing, which constituted a return to the rule of law as imperative for security, was continually challenged, and it was never able to dominate public discourse. The majority of the American people rejected Obama’s logic that the closure of Guantanamo and the prosecution of terror suspects in civil courts would make them safer. Furthermore, they rejected a return to the rule of law as a primary need for their own security, and as surveys documented, they provided their (albeit silent) approval for the torturous measures the Bush administration had implemented. In sum, large parts of the audiences adhered to Bush’s logic in terms of how the nation could best be secured. In accordance with Bush’s narrative, the evil ‘other’ was an enemy combatant that at best was to be tried by military commissions. Deeply rooted fears and an unwillingness to grant the enemy constitutional rights contributed to this position. It was this background that severely constrained Obama’s ability to implement his policies.

Part IV Conclusion

8 Findings and Implications This final chapter summarizes and reflects on the book’s argument. Section 8.1 provides an abstract of each chapter. It recapitulates the book’s theoretical and methodological approach to the topic, and displays the findings of its empirical part. Section 8.2 considers these findings and draws inferences with regard to the power of language in general, securitization in particular, and a critical awareness towards it. Finally, section 8.3 points to aspects for further research arising from this book. This includes elements that could not be addressed in detail here, and adjacent aspects that are likely to be of interest to future studies.

8.1 Summary of the Book After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the world witnessed an unprecedented violation of the rules by the United States. Under the presidency of George W. Bush, America deviated from established laws and treaties, as the U.S. suspended international humanitarian regulations as part of its detention and interrogation policy during the ‘War on Terror’. This was symbolized by the extra-territorial detention center at Guantanamo Bay, a development that had not been anticipated and thus aroused worldwide indignation, particularly because the United States represented an ideal in terms of human rights – an image that America continues to believe in. This point is also reflected in the highly expected and much hailed announcement by Bush’s successor, President Barack Obama, that he would return to the rule of law. However, it makes it all the more astonishing that Obama was unable to fully implement this change in policy. These are the puzzles this book sought to investigate. How did rule breaking become possible in the first place? How did Obama try to return to due process, and why did he fail to succeed? In seeking answers to these questions, this study examined the security narratives of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. In particular, it traced how the presidents constituted meaning and in how far this meaning was translated into political practice. It scrutinized the presidents’ framings of identity and threat in order to show how this conditioned Guantanamo-related policies by legitimizing or delegitimizing particular practices. This was investigated in line with relevant audiences, mainly the public and the media, Congress, and the apparatus, which included the government and its staff, as well as the military and the secret services. The first part of the book explained and discussed the study’s theoretical and methodological foundation and set out its analytical framework. Chapter 1 provided an introduction and overview of the study. Chapter 2 defined the ontological and epistemological reasoning behind the study and the motivation behind its approach. It continued by highlighting the https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110626056-008

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insights provided by constructivism, and then carved out the strengths of a ‘radical’ constructivist perspective in terms of a consideration that language is central in constructing the social world. According to this understanding, language does not just describe reality, it produces it. Language is viewed as constitutive of meaning and as such the main manner in which we access reality. In this sense, a distinction between the ideational and the material world is impossible as the material world does not speak for itself but has to be interpreted. This notion makes claims to truth impossible. ‘Radical’ constructivists thus argue from a post-positivist stance that attempts to understand the world in its constitution rather than to explain it in terms of causality. This implies the acknowledgement that findings are relative as they cannot be tested against an objective world but just against other interpretations. With regard to the constitutive role of language, Chapter 2 also laid out John Austin’s speech act theory as it inspired the ‘linguistic turn’ in IR. Speech act theory points to the performative quality of speech: speaking is doing; if certain conventions are met, speech creates something and has thus reality-making power. Moreover, it can affect the audience and mobilize for action. In this sense speech can be used strategically. Chapter 3 put the power of speech in a larger perspective and located the ‘radical’ constructivist understanding in the realm of discourse theory. It introduced Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to the study, as it provides the basis for the discourse analysis conducted in this book. In CDA, discourse is understood as language use and social practice, and analyzing discourse means examining the link between the two: This relates discursive structures to larger social structures. With regard to politics, discourses shape our perception of legitimacy and thereby define the scope of accepted action. In this sense, the overall guiding question is: What kind of textual characteristics renders what kind of policies possible? Moreover, Chapter 3 discussed insights derived from postmodern theorizing related to CDA and the Copenhagen School including the exclusive nature of discourses as instruments of power. Taking the latter into account also means understanding who is able to contribute to the discourse under scrutiny and thus shape it. Chapter 4 moved the focus to security discourse and presented the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization, which, in dependence on Austin’s theory, conceptualizes security as a speech act. In securitization, issues or people become security problems when they are labeled as such and when this framing is accepted by the audience(s). When this occurs, it allows for rules to be broken and for a deviation from ‘normal’ proceedings. In general, securitization is a strong means of legitimizing political action, and it opens up new room for political maneuver. However, Chapter 4 also discussed the inconsistencies and shortcomings of the model, including the narrowness of the concept and the awkward role of the audience(s), which remains undertheorized. Nevertheless, the approach of the Copenhagen School is a powerful means of shedding light on how ‘speaking security’ creates political latitude. In this context, it is evident that a central part of

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securitization involves identity formation. Identity defines ‘security’ for the ‘self’ and positions the ‘other’ in relation to it; it thus provides the setting for foreign and security policy. If the ‘other’ is presented as posing a lethal threat, extraordinary means are legitimized in order to guarantee survival. This kind of ‘othering’ often builds on established stereotypes of the enemy. Chapter 5 set out the book’s analytical framework. It linked the book’s theory and methodology to the research question and described the mode of conduct. It demonstrated that Critical Discourse Analysis is a suitable approach for investigating the links between language use and politics. CDA, it noted, conflates well with the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization: both consider discourse as powerful and constitutive, and they also take the agency of willful actors into account. CDA and the CS also correspond in their normative aim to raise critical awareness about language use: language is not innocent, it is effective and it generates consequences. The normative aim of these approaches, in fact, is understood as a central value, and it verifies the relevance of the study at hand. Moreover, Chapter 5 set out the reasons behind the choice of the actors under study in terms of securitizers and audiences, and clarified data selection. It explained why a focus was placed on presidential speeches in investigating governmental security discourse and defined the target groups that make up a main part of what the Copenhagen School calls the ‘relevant’ audience. In addition, it presented the guiding questions for the investigation. Finally, the chapter discussed the matter of validity and pointed to the limits of this study. With Chapter 6, the book turned to empiricism and illuminated President George W. Bush’s security narrative in line with both the detention and interrogation policies he enacted and his audiences’ stance(s). It started out with a detailed examination of Bush’s identity framing and revealed how he constituted the American ‘self’ and the evil ‘other’ in ultimate terms. Whereas the ‘self’ was mitigated, Bush barred the enemy from having even the lowest level of humanity. In his Manichean worldview, Bush framed ‘us’ versus ‘them’ in terms of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’. He reproduced the American myth and constituted an innocent, great and resolute America. In presenting the nation as ‘freedom’s defender’, he nurtured the sense of an exceptional ‘self’ that was just and that had been called to a higher mission. The ‘other’, in comparison, was presented as fanatical in its determination to attack America and the ‘civilized world’. In this light of an imminent and global threat, emergency action was imperative for the sake of survival. One of the keys to security was learning about the terrorists’ plans for future attacks, and in Bush’s narrative the detained terrorist suspects were constituted as indeed having this kind of knowledge. Following this reasoning, Bush was able to break free of the rules and conduct actions that went beyond (inter-)national laws and treaties. Both the alleged inhumanness of the ‘other’ and the constituted imperative to gather information paved the way for the torture and mistreatment of terrorist suspects as this was seen as serving a higher good. Consequently, the Bush government

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permitted ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, and deprived the detainees of their human and legal rights. With regard to the audiences’ reception, Bush’s narrative was sweeping. It was extensively reproduced by the public and the media, whereas alternative framings were hardly voiced; if they were voiced, they were either ignored or silenced. Torture became a popular sight on TV shows and in movies – at least torture that enabled American heroes to save the nation. This was probably both an effect of Bush’s narrative and a substantiation of it. In any case, it nurtured the impression that torture was socially acceptable. Overall, Bush’s conceptualization was hardly challenged and the public accepted his policies in reaction to 9/11, including his policy on the treatment of prisoners. Congress either supported his course outright or at least refrained from controlling and confining the administration’s actions. Even when members of Congress learned about the application of torture, they neither stopped nor investigated it. Within the apparatus, objection was mainly voiced by members of the military, but these concerns were overruled. Finally, the judiciary forced the administration to change course. After years had gone by, the Supreme Court finally declared parts of Bush’s policies unlawful. However, with the help of Congress, the administration managed to continue its policies, at least to some extent. In sum, Chapter 6 argues that Bush’s narrative embodied a case in point of securitization. The evil ‘other’ was constituted as a lethal threat, and this led to a matter of survival. Since the audiences accepted and reproduced this framing, it allowed basic rules to be broken. Rendition, indefinite detention, and ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ were constituted as necessary to keep the American people safe, and because of that, these practices seemed to be legitimate. Chapter 7 examined President Obama’s security narrative. In terms of identityframing, Obama strongly emphasized America’s moral responsibility and legal obligations. Although, in principle, he reproduced the American ‘self’ as exceptional, he also pointed to its current flaws. At this point, Obama’s framing clearly differed from Bush’s who had unrestrictedly inflated American greatness. In contrast, Obama reiterated that by violating the rule of law the American people were corrupting their identity, disuniting the nation, weakening the country’s role as world leader, and in the end, endangering themselves. In this respect, America bore responsibility for the threat it faced. According to Obama’s narrative, Guantanamo had come to epitomize America’s arbitrariness and inflated the enemy’s hate; and it was being used by terrorists around the world as a recruitment tool to arm against the United States. Moreover, it alienated international partners which the U.S. needed in the fight against terrorism. Consequently, closing Guantanamo and ending ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ was imperative for security reasons. It was necessary to denude the enemy of a means for propaganda, to restore America’s image in the world, and to rebuild alliances that had been impaired through America’s conduct in the ‘War on Terror’. Thus, recapturing the moral high ground was a means to be true to the ‘self’ and of lessening the threat America faced through its own bearing.

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As expected, though, the original threat emanated from the ‘other’, and Obama did not question the general need to fight it. In a manner that was similar to Bush’s framing, he presented the threat as imminent and global, with the enemy seeking weapons of mass destruction and lurking to strike on a large scale. Mostly, however, Obama avoided ‘evil talk’ and did not dehumanize the enemy. These differences were meant to enable America to return to established rules by treating terrorist suspects as humans and granting them human rights. As is known, immediately after taking office Obama ordered the closure of Guantanamo within one year, terminated CIA black sites, prohibited ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, declared the validity of the Geneva Conventions, and restored human and legal rights to the captives held in U.S. custody. Yet, Obama was unable to restore these rights in full. His plans to close Guantanamo, transfer captives to the United States and to try them in civil courts were thwarted. In line with the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization, this study suggests that Obama failed to fully implement his policies because he lacked the support of his main audiences. Even his administration and apparatus disputed what had to be done in order to recapture the moral high ground and which steps were feasible and prudent. Obama’s narrative was permanently contested in the public realm and he was charged with weakness. Obama’s logic, according to which the return to due process was imperative for security reasons, never became dominant. Instead, Bush’s logic proved to be strong and was reproduced throughout 2009. In this account, following the rule of law hampered security rather than warranting it. The image of the evil ‘other’ prevailed, and this meant that the enemy did not deserve due process. In line with this, the American people were particularly unwilling to spend any (more) money on detainees’ trials in the United States. Overall, the main position seemed to be that Bush’s approach to fighting terrorism had been appropriate as the majority of the American people rejected the closure of Guantanamo as well as the prosecution of Bush and his officials for their approval of torture. In sum, Chapter 7 argued that Obama’s threat formation differed from Bush’s in that the threat emanated not only from the ‘other’ but also from the ‘self’. Obama securitized America’s rule breaking to mobilize support for a return to the rule of law, yet he never gained acceptance from the majority for this framing. Therefore, Obama was only partly able to implement his policy changes.

8.2 The Bottom Line In comparing the security narratives of President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama, it is striking that although both presidents sought to guarantee the security of the American people, their concepts were antithetic: whereas Bush’s narrative pushed limits and allowed for actions that went beyond the law, Obama’s narrative constrained the scope of actions to legal limits. In Bush’s construction, the operation of Guantanamo including the mistreatment of captives and their

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deprivation of rights appeared to be justified as it was constituted as destroying the power of the enemy and protecting the ‘self’. It thus enhanced America’s security. In Obama’s construction, Guantanamo achieved the opposite: it strengthened the power of the enemy and destroyed the ‘self’. It thus impaired America’s security. According to Obama’s framing, for the sake of security a reversal was imperative which implied abandoning a logic that permitted all means. The respective policies of Bush and Obama corresponded with their identity formation and reveal the link between identity and policy. President Bush and President Obama both constituted the ‘other’ as a highly dangerous enemy that had to be defeated. With regard to ‘who we are’, Bush constituted the ‘self’ as per se in the right; in defending freedom, America’s course was just – no matter what it looked like. Obama, on the contrary, stressed that the justness of America’s course was not given and had to be demonstrated; he emphasized that the nation had gone astray and argued that America had to comply with the rule of law. Despite these differences, the presidents defended their approaches in a similar manner: both used securitization to justify their course. Yet, whereas Bush solely securitized the ‘other’, Obama also securitized the ‘other’s’ mistreatment and thus the conduct of the American ‘self’. He securitized America’s violation of law which, however, was not done to break free of the rules – as the Copenhagen School would suggest – but to gain acceptance for a return to the rules. Obama used his securitization to justify a reversion to legal limits as stipulated in the U.S. constitution and international treaties. He thus securitized away from rule violations, which is a case apt to broaden the Copenhagen School’s concept. Despite the critical stance of the CS towards securitization, Obama’s case demonstrates that it can be used to reach goals that the Copenhagen School would probably endorse. Obama’s framing is also of particular interest as it shows that a concurrence of securitization and politicization is possible on the same issue. Whereas Obama securitized America’s rule breaking, he tried to repoliticize the treatment of the ‘other’ in U.S. custody. Obama sought to retrieve the whole issue of the captives’ handling and prosecution, place it in the realm of ‘normal politics’ and deal with it according to established rules and laws. To this end, he deliberately abandoned certain elements of Bush’s wording and demonstrated that alternative framings were possible; this corroborates the point that framings are not inevitable, they involve political choices. However, as this book argues, Obama partly failed in his attempt to implement a policy change and did so because he lacked moral and formal support. This confirms that it is extremely difficult if not impossible to implement major (security) policies without an appealing, dominant narrative in place that makes these policies seem appropriate, necessary and legitimate to relevant audiences. In this case, the ‘relevant’ audiences did not adopt Obama’s framing that a reversal of policy was imperative for security reasons, and they did not accept the repoliticization of detainee treatment, which would have allowed for a return to the rule of law. Although Obama’s narrative provided the logic for his political course and increased

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the likeliness of public acceptance, this is not an automatism. Instead, Obama experienced that “presidents – no matter how rhetorically skilled they might be – do not possess the power to command the public to attend to their appeals or support their construction of reality” (King 2014: 4; cf. Edwards III 2003, 2009: ch. 3, 2012: ch. 1–3).149 Probably, there are several reasons for Obama’s inability to dominate public discourse with his security narrative. First of all, it was a matter of context. This aspect is only touched on in this book and clearly needs further investigation as suggested below (see section 8.3). Whereas Bush’s narrative had been magnified by the exceptional character of 9/11, Obama’s narrative lacked this kind of aggrandizement. In this sense, the issues at the time were not critical enough for successful securitization (Balzacq 2005: 182). Accordingly, Obama had greater difficulty convincingly framing the threat as a matter of survival, which would have granted particular vigor to his argument. Besides that, his deliberate change of wording reduced the dramatic feature of the topic. As pointed out, Obama omitted the use of Manichean, catchy dichotomies. In contrast, Bush’s dualism of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ put America in a position to claim a divine mission against God’s enemies; in Obama’s framing America was, overall, a more grounded nation with flaws. This hints at two further aspects, namely that Obama’s rhetoric was less emotional than Bush’s and that Obama did not only reassure the American ‘self’ but also criticized it. The former might have limited the immediate impact of his narrative, the latter its acceptance. It is evident – but not at all specifically American – that people are more ready to accept praise and confirmation than criticism and correction. Moreover, as the overview of the audiences’ stance suggests, Bush’s narrative and security logic was kept alive during 2009, and it seems to have been reinforced by the incidents at Ford Hood and Detroit in the fall of that year. However, as the discourse of fear continued it was difficult for Obama to end the politics of fear. His administration was constantly confronted with Bush’s security logic, which was reiterated in Congress and the public sphere. Apparently, the prevalent opinion was that sticking to the rules would further threaten America’s national security. Assuming that extreme enemy images, once established, become stable in that they enduringly structure our perception and cannot easily be overridden (Finlay et al. 1967: 15; Jervis 1976: 187; Nicklas 1985: 103f; Lippert/Wachtler 1988: 79f; Flohr 1991: ch. 3; Lilli 1992: 21; Weller 2001: 20), Bush’s discourse and its effects indeed constrained Obama’s agency. After all, Bush’s narrative had largely closed off alternatives that would look reasonable in the ‘War on Terror’. With the dichotomy of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’, many political options were excluded from the outset. Bush’s classical threat scenario required relentlessness not forbearance; the ‘ticking time bomb’ scenario with consequences as horrific

149 On the relationship between presidential opinion leadership and foreign affairs, see Kernell (2007: ch. 7).

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as the holocaust called for decisive action. Within this framing, the only plausible maxim was ‘security first’ and it had to be warranted by all means possible – not only to save the American people but all ‘freedom-loving people’. A consequence of this framing is that the use of force trumps international (humanitarian) law because in the face of existential threat only the former is believed to be effective. Again, this characterizes security narratives and securitizations in particular as discourses of exclusion (Lock 2008: 75, 78). Moreover, if the ‘other’ is thoroughly demonized and dehumanized, there is “little possibility of anything but annihilation” (Jackson 2005: 91). Against this background, Obama’s intent to provide fair trials and to grant captives constitutional rights appeared inacceptable, as did the prospects of the further costs and the inconveniences that these plans would have caused. In this respect Bush’s discourse continued to largely dominate public thinking and its established views and concepts demonstrate great sustainability. Overall, Obama’s stance was difficult as he held what Forsythe (2011: 5) calls an “absolutist moral-legal position”. For security reasons, Obama sought to change America’s detention and interrogation policies in order to regain the moral high ground. However, acting on an ‘absolutist moral-legal position’ also meant rejecting some of the available means with which to fight terrorism (Forsythe 2011: 5). Whereas the Bush administration had been able to claim that it had done ‘everything’ to protect the nation, the Obama administration had to restrain itself and define limits. With this policy, Obama was easily accused by his critics of not doing everything that was possible to secure the American people, and opponents like Dick Cheney capitalized on this point. In the end, Obama’s course was understood as demonstrating a dangerous level of weakness, because large sections of the American people rejected Obama’s framing that observing the limits was key to keeping them secure. Instead, the public considered this policy as a matter of morality and not of survival. Morality, though, would have been a problematic topic by itself. Obviously, by 2009 there was a lack of understanding among the population that America’s conduct was actually unlawful. By regarding national security as preceding everything else, many things appeared acceptable – and had indeed been practiced for years. The very fact that these extraordinary measures had been applied for a long time, seemed to confirm their legitimacy. This, again, substantiates the constructivist understanding that discourse shapes action and action shapes discourse. Obviously, for many Americans, Bush’s emergency actions had reached a point of normalcy that made changes even more difficult. Eight years after the attacks, Guantanamo and the detention and interrogation practices there had become institutionalized. The aim of this book has been to analyze the link between ‘speaking security’ and political practices and thus, in line with the intent of CDA and CS, to highlight the power of discourse and the importance of critical language awareness. Having scrutinized the discourse after 9/11, it must be acknowledged, though, that it is especially difficult to preserve a critical attitude in times of crisis when people are likely to be looking for reassurance and strong leadership. Under these circumstances, imbued

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with shock and fear, scrutinizing framings is certainly more difficult than during ‘normal’ times, since people are more willing to believe what is declared by the authorities. Besides that, in the realm of foreign and security policy, it is often difficult for audiences to verify what is posed by politicians since relevant information might not be accessible to them at the time. This was also true with regard to Bush’s claim that ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ would provide valuable intelligence and thus keep America safe. However, as the case demonstrates, times of crisis are apt for securitizations and it is therefore of essential importance to remain critical and discerning during crises. Bush’s case confirms that if securitizations are successful, established rules and laws no longer constrain policy, which is exactly what the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization emphasizes. Therefore, politicians bear a particular responsibility for their framings as they construct political demands. With regard to foreign and security policy, it is largely politicians who construct the perception of what is necessary and morally sanctified, or even inevitable, in terms of political action. Taking into account that the military, the CIA and the FBI have since confirmed that the intelligence gathered through ‘enhanced interrogations’ after 9/11 was of little value, this is a case in point. This assessment, which was substantiated by a report by the U.S. Senate in December 2014, debilitated the justification for torture. Similar to the Copenhagen School’s assumption that securitization is not necessarily bound to ‘real’ threats, political action that follows from securitization is not necessarily bound to ‘real’ facts. The power of securitization is particularly displayed by the ability to make things up and thereby render certain extraordinary policies possible.

8.3 Topics of Further Research In light of this critical discourse analysis and the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitization, there are two main aspects that need further investigation: first, more research is needed into the context in which the presidents’ security narratives were embedded; and second, the role of the audiences needs to be further examined. With regard to the former, it has been mentioned that the contexts differed considerably if one regards the aftermath of 9/11, and the year 2009. Although both periods in the United States were dominated by a feeling of crisis, the end of 2001 and the year 2002 were characterized by the shock and fear of the recent terror attacks; in contrast, in 2009, the nation was struggling with a recession. Obama’s narrative thus lacked the temporal proximity to the atrocities of 9/11 and the atmosphere of shock that Bush had been able to capitalize on. Assuming that the success of securitizations strongly relates to the context in which they are embedded and that times of crisis function as catalysts for political resolve (Balzacq 2005: 179), Bush had a clear advantage in terms of contextual features. In 2009, the American people did not come to believe that the danger emanating from Guantanamo in terms of terrorist propaganda and

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alienated partners was a matter of survival; instead, ‘security interests’ were more likely to refer to jobs, payments, and housing. One could suggest, therefore, that one of Obama’s main impediments to discursive dominance was that his security narrative, and, as such, his proposed policy change, was not embedded in a related crisis context. Certainly, the audiences’ “readiness to be convinced” (Balzacq 2005: 192) was considerably lower than in Bush’s case. Yet, the impact of the context on the acceptance and reproduction of Obama’s framings needs further consideration. Future studies could highlight, for instance, how the discourses of economic threat and of terrorist threat were positioned in public awareness and how the media stressed one or the other. In general, a more exhaustive analysis of the media could be useful. In how far did it abet public bias in the security discourse and thus channel the mainstream? In Bush’s case the role of the media has been highly scrutinized; in Obama’s case there is more work to be done.150 Thus, a detailed examination needs to be undertaken of how and by whom Obama’s framings were reproduced, altered or rejected. This would shed further light on both the reach of Obama’s framing and the relation between the participating groups in this discourse (Schwab-Trapp 2010: 179). In general, with regard to the discourses of Bush and Obama, a closer investigation of the inner circle of the apparatus could be promising. As far as issues are dealt with in secret, the inner circle becomes both the securitizer and the most relevant audience for those who are involved in political decision-making. As indicated in Bush’s case, for example, military personnel appeared to be the most critical voices in reacting to Bush’s policies. Examining this in detail would further illuminate how things became possible and to what extent particular groups are vested with discursive power. Overall, this study brings up the question of the kind of psychological effects that wordings and framings can have. As discussed, Bush strongly appealed to listeners’ emotions, whereas Obama was more sober and tended to address the audiences’ intellect. In how far could this have been a reason why Bush’s framings proved to be of particular strength and persistence and were more accepted than Obama’s? In this respect, it might be worth exploring the presidents’ speeches with a particular focus on their emotional and intellectual appeal. In this realm, the psychological effect of fear in politics is certainly of interest, i.e., in how far the endurance of Bush’s security logic was a matter of persistent fear that had been produced and substantiated during the Bush era. Evidently, fear has an impact on people’s reasoning and it is probably very difficult to override with rational arguments. All these aspects might have contributed to Obama’s shortfalls and their analysis would doubtlessly provide a valuable addition to the study at hand. Finally, it must be left to other scholars to examine how the presidents’ discourses impacted on the international standing of human rights and the boundaries

150 For a good start, see King (2014).

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of the acceptable.151 The extent to which Bush’s discourse has impaired these issues and in how far Obama’s discourse was able to ameliorate the damage caused, are certainly research topics worth engaging in. This is also true for the question whether Obama has succeeded in restoring the image of the United States as a role model for human rights. Investigating these issues would require a long-term perspective. Moreover, this study poses the question of America’s stance on human rights in general. Clearly, there is a tension between America’s security needs and its obligations to universal human rights. As has been pointed out, Bush completely abandoned large parts of international law. In his threat scenario, America’s security needs easily trumped the human rights of the ‘other’. This represented the ‘lesser evil’ in comparison to what would otherwise have happened. In Obama’s case, linking national security to compliance with due process certainly lifted America’s morality and its sense for human rights, but it is plausible to suggest that the promotion of human rights law was not Obama’s primary concern. In fact, human rights organizations directly complained about this point (AI 2011). Obama presented moral commitment in terms of self-interest; in his narrative, morality was a matter of security. He rarely argued on behalf of human rights for their own sake. Therefore, the question remains in how far human rights are cherished as such by the United States, or whether they are only of value if constituted as essential for America’s security.

151 See, for example, Dunne (2007).

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